Yohanan PETROVSKY-SHTERN

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ALIEN: JEWS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN THOUGHT*

To love one’s motherland is no crime.

From Zalyvakha’s letter to Svitlychnyi, Chornovil, and Lukho.

 Whoever in hunger eats the grass of the motherland is no criminal.

Andrei Platonov, “The Sand Teacher”

Perhaps one of the most astounding phenomena in modern Ukrainian thought is the radical reassessment of the Jew. Though the revision of Jewish issues began earlier in the 20th century, if not in the late 19th, it became particularly salient as part of the new political narrative after the “velvet revolution” of 1991 that led to the demise of the USSR and the establish-

* I gratefully acknowledge the help of two anonymous reviewers of Ab Imperio whose insightful comments helped me considerably to improve this paper. Ukrainian names in the body text are rendered in their Library of Congress Ukrainian transliteration. In cases where there is an established English (or Russian) form for a name, it is bracketed following the Ukrainian version. The spelling in the footnotes does not follow LC Ukrainian transliteration except in cases where the publishers provide their own spelling.
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ment of an independent Ukraine. The new Ukrainian perception of the Jew boldly challenged the received bias and created a new social and political environment fostering the renaissance of Jewish culture in Ukraine, let alone Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue. There were a number of ways to explain what had happened. For some, the sudden Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement was a by-product of the new western-oriented post-1991 Ukrainian foreign policy. It crystallized out of Ukraine’s alleged tendency to appease western public opinion, being highly sensitive towards the notorious state-sponsored antisemitism in the FSU that on the grass roots level was far more palpable in Kyiv than in Moscow. For others, it probably emerged as the temporary whim of an insignificant group of national-minded intellectuals who apparently had no serious impact on modern Ukrainian political decision-making. However, in order to fully comprehend this phenomenon and assess its proportionate significance in modern Ukrainian politics, one should take into account the previous century-long attempts of Ukrainians and Jews to come to common terms with one another.¹ By and large, scholarship has neglected these efforts.² This paper demonstrates that long before the proc-

¹ These attempts were dubbed in Ukrainian journalism “ukraïns’ko-zhydivs’ke porozuminnia.” The last word is very difficult to translate. It could be conveyed as Ukrainian-Jewish “coming to common terms with one another,” “rapprochement,” “mutual understanding,” and even “self-cognition.” Mention should be made of the linguistic overtones of the word “zhydivs’ke” that appears throughout Ukrainian writings on the Jewish issues, as well as in the footnotes to this paper. Most proponents of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter were of western Ukrainian origin. They used a western Ukrainian dialect in which the word “zhyd” (literally, the Russian word for “yid”) does not have any pejorative connotations. See, for example, how a leading western Ukrainian writer residing in Diaspora explains the offensive connotations of the word “yavrei” and neutral “zhyd” in: Ivan Bahrianyi. Publitsistyka: dopovidi, statti, pamflety, refleksii, esse. Kyiv, 1995. P. 283. For an analysis of these two concepts defining Jews in both the Ukrainian and Russian linguistic mentality, see the somewhat biased yet indispensable publication: Zynovi Knysh. “Yevrei” chy “zhydy” [“Jews” or “Yids”]. Toronto, 1984; for the discussion of the terms “zhyd” and “ievrei” in the context of the identity shift from Ruthenians to Ukrainians, see chapter xxiv of the book: Yevhen Nakonechnyi. Ukradene imia: Chomu rusny staly ukrainistsiamy. 3rd ed. Lviv, 2001, available on the web: http://www.lsl.lviv.ua/e-library/lsl-editions/Nakonechnyj_Ukradene_Imja_2001 (accessed October 22, 2003).

lamination of Ukrainian independence these attempts had become an indispen-
sable element of modern Ukrainian thought that considerably reshaped
the image of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. To elucidate some aspects of the
early history of this dialogue that precedes the post-1991 developments,
this paper traces the transformation of the Jew in Ukrainian political and
social discourse during the second half of the 20th century dating it back to
major figures that shaped Ukrainian thought at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century. It emphasizes the significance of Jewish issues for the rise of
Ukrainian national thought and provides a historical backdrop for the utop-
ian Ukrainian-Jewish encounter depicted elsewhere.

Methodologically, this paper is an essay in the history of ideas with
some questions and concerns articulated by a “cultural” historian. It contin-
ues and develops methodological precepts of analysis of Ukrainian philos-
ophy and politics vis-à-vis the Jews put forward by Ivan Rudnyts’kyi [Rud-

3 This paper demonstrates, among other things, the attempt of Ukrainian political thought
to struggle against its own inherited bias dating back to Istoriia Rusov (end 18th - early
19th century). For the best analysis of the cementing of this bias, see Zenon Kohut. The
Image of Jews in Ukraine’s Intellectual tradition: The Role of Istoriia Rusov // Zvi Gitelman et al. (Eds.).
Cultures and nations of Central and Eastern Europe: essays in honor of Roman Szporluk. Cambridge, Mass.,
2000. Pp. 343-358. It must be taken into consideration that this paper does not attempt to present a full-scale portrayal of
Ukrainian philosemitic thought. Hence the nineteenth century figures briefly analyzed
in Ivan Rudnyts’kyi’s article (see note 5) remain beyond the scope of this research.

4 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern. Jewish Culture in Ukraine // Glenda Abramson (Ed.).
Academic Studies of Judaica in Independent Ukraine // Zvi Gitelman, Musya Glants,
152-172; Idem. Contextualizing the Mystery: Three Approaches to the Protocols of the
nytsky]. It treats a variety of texts created in pre- and post-1991 Ukraine, in the Ukrainian Diaspora, and in the Soviet GULAG – their length, genre, and authorship notwithstanding – as manifestation of major political tendencies characteristic of 20th century Ukrainian politics. It focuses on the meaning of these texts in a broader cultural context and their ramifications in regard to social behavioral patterns. It assesses political journalism in its variety – pamphlets, letters of protest, essays, and speeches – from the perspective of their potential impact on subsequent political decision-making and the creation of an all-embracing national narrative. It brings together a wide range of persons, including leading Ukrainian and Jewish poets and dissidents, communists and nationalists, Diaspora thinkers and literary critics, rational skeptics and religious philosophers, country leaders and rank-and-file GULAG inmates, who in this or that way contributed to the maturity and fruition of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter. Part of a larger project entitled “The Ukrainian-Jewish Utopia”, this paper traces the roots of the modern re-conceptualization of the Jew back to the political ideas of Ukrainian human rights activists and national-minded dissidents.

Two Patterns: Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov

Two paradigmatic attitudes shaped the 20th century Ukrainian policies toward Jews. Be it the Ukrainian Peoples Republic in 1918, the Ukrainian Soviet republic in the 1920s, part of the Soviet empire in the 1970s, or the independent Ukraine after 1991, Ukrainian political thought perceived Jews either through a national-chauvinistic or national-democratic lens. Accordingly, Jews were either excluded from political parlance, among Poles, Rumanians, and other ethnic minorities, or accepted. Colonial or post-colonial realities did not change this dichotomy: in the 1920s, Jews were prominently featured in political thought in the Soviet Ukraine but in the 1970s, they were excluded from it. Likewise, in the 1920s Diaspora Ukrainian

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6 This paper is partially based on the recent publication of a comprehensive nine-volume edition “One Thousand Years of the Ukrainian Social and Political Thought,” in particular on its 7th, 8th, and 9th volumes. See: Taras Hunchak et al (Eds.). Tysiacha rokiv ukrainskoi suspil’no-politychnoi dumky. 9 vols. Kyiv, 2001. Especially vols. VIII (1940s - 1980s) and IX (1989-2001). (Hereafter – TRUSPD). This first and only edition is the most widely circulating edition devoted to Ukrainian political thought. As such, it also has the capacity of informing modern Ukrainian national polity.
thinkers tended to exclude Jews from any positive discourse, whereas in the 1970s, they began extensively to draw on 20th century Jewish historical experience. For Ukraine these two attitudes were much more than merely the inherited patterns common to western political discourse. They were successfully appropriated by two major thinkers who throughout the 20th century dominated the Ukrainian political and philosophical landscape: namely, Lypyns’kyi [Lypynsky], who saw Ukraine as a poly-national monarchy, and Dontsov, who argued for an ethnically homogeneous totalitarian Ukraine. Though V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi (1882-1931) and Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973) have rarely appeared under the same rubric in the annals of Ukrainian political thought, drawing comparison between them might help understand their long-lasting impact on the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter.

Both Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov came from ethnically mixed backgrounds. Dontsov was born to a family deeply integrated into a Russified cultural milieu that resided in the profoundly assimilated Southern Ukraine, whereas Lypyns’kyi, née Władysław [Waclaw] Lipiński, was born to a family of Polish-Ukrainian szlachta. Both thinkers studied and obtained their degrees outside Ukraine, Lypyns’kyi in Krakow and Geneva, Dontsov in St. Petersburg and Vienna. Professionally, both were products of late 19th century positivism: Lypyns’kyi received his diploma in agronomy and sociology, Dontsov, in law. Both were active journalists and Kulturtreggers, who perceived journalism as their most important contribution to the Ukrainian cause: Lypyns’kyi founded and edited a journal-almanac (Przegląd Krajobrazowy, 1912) and a non-periodical edition Khliborobs’ka Ukraina (1920-1925), Dontsov edited Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk (starting in 1922; after 1933 appearing as Vistnyk). Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov became prominent party organizers, and both claimed to have been fathers-founders of the Union of Liberation of Ukraine (1914) and to have actively participated in establishing the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party (khliborobiv-demokrativ, 1918). Both were involved in a Ukrainian state-building experiment: under hetman Skoropads’kyi [Skoropandsky], Lypyns’kyi was Ukrainian ambassador to Austria while Dontsov was the director of the Ukrainian Telegraph Agency. Later Lypyns’kyi and Dontsov became disenchanted with the Ukrainian state-building praxis, left Ukraine, and abandoned their political careers for good.

The fallacious policies of Ukrainian rulers made Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi flatly reject the then most influential Ukrainian political thinkers: Dontsov argued against Drahomanov’s “democracy,” whereas Lypyns’kyi fought against Hrushevskyi’s concept of “peoplehood”. In elaborating their own
political philosophies, both thinkers blatantly criticized the federalists and social-democrats, who envisioned Ukraine not as an independent country but as part of a greater political entity of the Slavic people. Both Dontsov and Lypyns’kyi developed the idea of a strong and independent Ukraine with powerful all-embracing governmental control, drawing heavily on the concept of a ruling élite (providna verstva) that seemed to have been inspired by Ortega y Gasset rather than Nietzsche. Finally, both philosophers almost simultaneously (and not without explicit rivalry) claimed that Ukrainian nation-building is inseparable from Ukrainian national independence.

Affinities notwithstanding, the images of Ukraine projected by both thinkers were (and are) incompatible. Lypyn’skyi, with his consistent legalism, was the late heir of the Age of Enlightenment. On the contrary, Dontsov wholeheartedly hated the French revolution, Enlightenment and rationalità: Rousseau was no less a criminal for him than Lenin, Trotsky, and Skrypnyk. Dontsov worshipped Nietzsche – even more so, all those who claimed to have implemented his political program in the 1930s. Not the spiritual enthusiasm moderated by religious ethics and moral authority (as in Lypyns’kyi), but an immoral will cemented Dontsov’s Ukrainian tradition. Dontsov did not allow any other nationality but Ukrainians to represent Ukraine: he insisted on cleansing Ukrainian politics of any alien influence, and perceived tolerance and democracy as foreign to the Ukrainian cause. Dontsov mistrusted and rejected patriotic feelings of national minorities inhabiting Ukraine – Russian, Polish, or Jewish Ukrainian patriotism signi-

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fied nothing to him. Looking for the best examples of what could become a model for a Ukrainian political system, Dontsov pointed to Germany of the 1930s: a national stronghold ruled by German political élite that successfully wiped out or eliminated any alien participation in state- and nation-building. According to Dontsov, not federalist-democrats like Petliura, and not national-communists like Skrypnyk, but a Ukrainian Hitler would bring Ukraine to what Ortega y Gasset called la rebellion de las masas (the uprising of the masses) and subsequently to a long-awaited national independence. It goes without saying that Dontsov’s stance on Ukrainian politics made him not only the person who “shaped the worldview of an entire generation” but also among the most vociferous anti-Jewish polemicists of the 1930s.

Nothing could have been farther from Lypyns’kyi’s precepts. Lypyns’kyi believed that people’s patriotic feelings were fundamental for any state-building in Ukraine. He argued that whoever supported Ukrainian independence deserved being incorporated into the Ukrainian political decision-making process. Lypyns’kyi dubbed Dontsov’s classic “Nationalism” (1926) “the most brilliant manifestation of mishugism”, implying by “mishuga” not so much the evident Hebrew/Yiddish for “crazy” (perhaps known to Ukrainians) but rather the name of Mishuga, a third-rank nationalist-minded Ukrainian thinker. Neither nationality nor blood, but “territorial consciousness” (territorial’na svidomis’t) of the country’s subjects is a basis for state-building. Unlike nationally-biased Dontsov, Lypyns’kyi acknowledged that several centuries of colonialism did not allow Ukraine to raise a political élite of its own. Therefore, it would be pragmatically plausible to allow non-Ukrainian élites, such as Polish, to run and rule Ukraine, provided their full-fledged patriotism and unconditional commitment to the Ukrainian cause. Unlike Dontsov, who claimed that Ukrainians first need to become a nation and only then proceed to build their own state, Lypyns’kyi argued that a Ukrainian nation would be built through and due to the Ukrainian state, which will precede the birth of the nation. He claimed that only

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a true idealist like a Ukrainian Don Quijote would be able to redeem the Sancho Panza nation from its shallow materialism and provinciality that had so far prevented the implementation of any state-building scenarios.\textsuperscript{13} Lypyns’kyi, whatever self-definitions he preferred, was a democrat to boot who disliked Dontsov’s cheap, attractive, and dangerous populism. Having made almost the same type of analysis as Dontsov, Lypyns’kyi chose for his future Ukraine above-all the US ethno-political model based on the Anglo-Saxon type of national democracy, and not the mono-ethnic French, German, or Austrian.\textsuperscript{14} As if replying to Dontsov’s xenophobic anti-Russian accusations, Lypyns’kyi observed that independent Ukraine would become a possibility through love of its subjects not through hatred of its enemies.\textsuperscript{15}

Comparing Lypyns’kyi’s stance on national minorities to that of Dontsov’s, one cannot over-exaggerate the tolerance of the former versus the xenophobia of the latter. Lypyns’kyi also shared the prejudice of his time and milieu. His references to contemporary Jews, albeit few and random, demonstrate that he, like Dontsov, equated the Jews with Bolsheviks and Bolsheviks with the Jews.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore it would not be accurate to prema-

\textsuperscript{13} See V. Pravoberezhets’ [V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi]. Trahedia ukrains’koho Sancho Pancha (sic!) // Ibid. P. 396-406.


\textsuperscript{16} It should be mentioned that Lypyns’kyi explicitly linked anti-Jewish sentiments with the destructive (if not self-destructive) element in Ukrainian history, see his passage on the “detractors of the Ukrainian State” in: Nasha orientatsia: Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv. Toronto, 1953. P. 43.
turely place Lypyns’kyi among the most prominent Ukrainian Judeophiles, such as Mykhailo Drahomanov [Dragomanov] and Ivan Franko.¹⁷ When discussing minorities, Lypyns’kyi implied the élite of the Polish szlachta or of the Russian Soviet bureaucracy, and not the demos of Rumanians or Jews inhabiting Ukraine. Moreover, his groundbreaking definition of “the Ukrainian” as “everybody that settled on our land (and does not remain nomadic!)” eloquently excludes Jews, apparently the only “nomadic” minority in Ukraine.¹⁸ Yet, his bias and minor remarks notwithstanding, Lypyns’kyi’s overall political theory might have quite positive and constructive implications regarding Jews.¹⁹ His Ukrainian constitutional monarchy, though utopian, would integrate any national minority that supports Ukrainian independence and invests its efforts in Ukrainian state-building. His understanding of the Ukrainian nation as territory gave ample opportunity for all who dwell in Ukraine to become part of a multifaceted nation-state. His attitude toward minorities was consistently that of tolerance and could tentatively be called national-democratic.²⁰ This tolerance and rational approach to historical reality was exactly the portion of Lypyns’kyi’s program that Dontsov hated most of all and that he made the focus of his murderous critique.²¹ Before Lypyns’kyi’s stance became dominant in

¹⁷ On 19th century Ukrainian philosemitism, see note 6.
¹⁹ Following is one of the fundamental statements Lypyns’kyi made about the role of religion in Ukrainian state-building. This statement betrays Lypyns’kyi’s skepticism about Ukrainian national phobias, Judeophobia included. He claimed that Ukrainians need “the church and religion which, instead of the shallow selfish mysticism of weak and passive people lacking God and ideas, would give us the religious mysticism of brave and active people – that is to say, instead of the fear of the devil (which, to justify our own spiritual worthlessness, we define as a Russian, a Pole, a Jew, a nobleman, a bourgeois, a socialist, a Bolshevik or any other ‘reason of our troubles’), will give us the love of God, of truth, of ideas – and, instead of today’s inept convulsions of reason and heart poisoned by hatred and restlessness, will give us a calm strength of spirit founded on deep faith and love for a stable unshakable and consistent implementation of our Ukrainian cause….”
²¹ For the fascinating analysis of Lypyns’kyi’s impact on Dontsov and of the shortcomings of Dontsov’s attitude to Lypyns’kyi’s that, unfortunately to Lypyns’kyi’s posthumous destiny, had a profound impact on a number of generations of Ukrainian émigrés,
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Ukrainian political thought and before, in the late 1980s, it shaped the national minority program of major socio-political organizations such as the Ukrainian Popular Movement (*Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy*), it underwent profound changes that had serious repercussions for Ukrainian Jews.

**The Crisis of Social Democracy and the Era of Dontsov**

The 1917 establishment of the Central Rada after the demise of the Russian Empire legalized a social-democratic pattern of Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement, which was closer to the national-democratic pattern articulated in the 1920s by Lypyns’kyi rather than to the nationalistic pattern of Dontsov. Yet, *sensu strictu*, it was neither. The leading figures of the Ukrainian government such as Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi (1866-1934), Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880-1951) and Symon Petliura (1879-1926), the first representing the socialist-federalist and the second and third, the social democratic parties, flagged their dedication to the ideals of social, not national democracy.22 In the realm of national policy these ideals informed the concept of a national-personal autonomy that the Central Rada introduced for all national minorities, including the 2.5 million Jews inhabiting Ukraine. As Henry Abramson has demonstrated, the decisions of the Central Rada were far-reaching and well grounded, however short-lived. The national-personal autonomy granted to Jews enabled them to revive their traditional self-governing organizations, participate in policy-making activities of the first Ukrainian government, and partake in the revival of urban cultural life.23 The Central Rada introduced the position of a general secretary of

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nationalities (later, a minister) that was occupied by a Jew. It established Yiddish as one of the four national languages of the Ukrainian republic, printed currency with a Yiddish inscription, and allowed Jews to form national units within Ukrainian troops. When anti-Jewish riots and pogroms swept through Ukraine, Petliura demonstrated his will and resolution to put an end to the ignominious attacks upon Jews.24

The documents of this period eloquently demonstrate the Ukrainian government’s sympathetic attitudes toward the problems of Jewish security and wellbeing. The language of the documents betrays the social-democratic agenda of its authors, who speak of Jews as part of the “working masses”, not as a separate people. Even if the Jewish delegates, as well as the representatives of all other national minorities of Ukraine, did not support the January 1918 Fourth Universal that ushered in the political independence of Ukraine, Petliura’s Main Staff remained firmly on philosemitic ground. Petliura outright accused the Bolsheviks of destroying Ukrainians “from within… bribing those criminals who provoke our Cossacks to various riots and to pogroms against the innocent Jewish population, attempting to cast the stamp of a pogromist on the face of the chevaliers who bring liberty to all the peoples of Ukraine.” Petliura continued:

In this way our enemies are trying to separate Ukrainian and Jewish working masses, the routes of which are in fact intertwined and comprise 300 years of oppression under Russian tsarism. Our Peoples Army must bring equality, brotherhood, and liberty to Ukrainian and Jewish citizens since the latter support the Government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. All its parties such as Bund, Fareinike, Po’alei-Tsion, and Folkspartai have firmly established themselves on the grounds of Ukrainian independence and have partaken in the building of the Republic.25


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Taras Hunchak and Volodymyr Serhiichuk have argued that Petliura established a strong philosemitic stance even before 1917, and after 1917 consistently albeit not successfully fought against the manifestations of any anti-Jewish sensibilities among Directory troops. Yet, previous research has ignored that Petliura’s thinking turned much more restrained towards Jews when he learnt about Bolshevik attempts to establish Jewish agricultural colonies in south Ukraine. At that point, new sensibilities replaced his straightforward social democratic convictions.

Paradoxically, it was only after the military and political crisis from which it could never recover that the Ukrainian government adopted a national democratic pattern in relations with the Jews. The shift from federalism to independence and consequently from social to national democracy did not find support or understanding among the new emerging Ukrainian leadership. But for the leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in exile, especially Petliura, the drift towards national democratic principles was significant. “Jews as people” came to replace the concept of “Jewish working class”. Petliura was perhaps the first to attempt to transform the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter into a politically charged issue touching the interests of both people. Already in exile, he wrote to one of the cabinet ministers, Pinkhas Krasny:

I mean the necessity to create the literature that analyzes and deepens the cause of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the people’s mentality. Like some other mottoes that the national revolution in Ukraine put forward, the motto to satisfy the national needs of the Jewish people, their relations with and obligations towards the Ukrainian statehood, neither the Ukrainians nor the Jews have yet acquired appropriately. Therefore we have to do our best to imbue the declaratory statements of this issue with genuine content. Evidently, when we return to

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Ukraine, life itself will expedite the implementation of this matter. Yet I think that even under today’s complicated circumstances some preparatory work can and should be carried out. It would be proper if you engage the authoritative colleagues to compile a publication list of books and brochures analyzing the situation of Jews in Ukraine and their attitude both to the Ukrainian people and to the state. Especially urgent, to my mind, is the analysis of the cooperation of Jews in the creative state-building activity. As far as I know, those themes were raised in the press only. Except for the book by Goldelman and the forthcoming book by Margolin, they were not covered in a scholarly book format. But there is a great and pressing need for this kind of literature as well as the popular one, since only with its ideological assistance would the harbingers of the idea of Ukrainian statehood be able to inoculate the Ukrainian and Jewish masses with their views. Only this literature will enable local cultural elements and personalities to fight and neutralize animal instincts and chauvinistic tendencies as well as mutual prejudice emanating from a complicated historical heritage.\footnote{From the Letter of Petliura to the Minister of Jewish Affairs of the Ukrainian People’s Republic [Jinkhas] Krasny on drawing Jews in the Ukrainian state life. December 5, 1921. For the complete text of this paramount document, see Petliura. Ibid. Pp. 500-502.}

Petliura’s letter demonstrates the high level of awareness among Ukrainian leaders in regard to the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter. Perhaps unknown to later harbingers of the trans-national dialogue, the urgent measures depicted in this letter could not fill the widening gap between Ukrainians and Jews. The failure to engage national minorities in aggressive building of an independent Ukraine to withstand the military advance of the Bolsheviks and Germans, as well as to implement its consistent anti-pogromist policies, signified an abrupt end of both Ukrainian statehood and an ambitious Ukrainian-Jewish experiment of rapprochement. The revival of the national-democratic principles of interaction between Ukrainians and national minorities had to wait until the 1960s when the most courageous among Ukrainian dissidents realized that the Soviet power became a staunch enemy of its own people, Ukrainian in the first place, and that the future of Ukraine could and should not be linked with any socialist foundation. Not before the 1960s, could Petliura’s voice be plugged into the tradition of Ukrainian philosemitism and heard. In the 1920s, it was stifled and, for the leaders of Bolshevik Ukraine, irrelevant.
In the early 1920s, following the failure of the first experiment of Ukrainian political independence, the Ukrainian Socialist Republic offered a new image of Ukrainian Jewry perceived through the lens of national communism. In a certain sense the Socialist government brought to maturity the principles established by the Directory in 1917, while banishing any reference to the Directory that stained itself with a “corrupt bourgeois nationalism”. The government welcomed and encouraged the nationalization of all “workers and peasants” residing in Ukraine. It required the establishment of cultural and educational institutions not only for 30 million Ukrainians in Ukraine and 7 million Ukrainians living in other Soviet republics but also for 2.7 million Ukrainian Jews. National communism of the 1920s offered a wide range of opportunities for the nation-building of any minority, above all Jews.30 Ukrainian leaders consistently argued in favor of this policy, simultaneously opposing the assimilationist scenarios for the Jews proclaimed by orthodox Marxists. For instance, Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933) claimed that the Ukrainian republic had to endorse the development of a Jewish workers’ class and sponsor its national revival, understood in strictly proletarian terms. Skrypnyk argued that Ukraine had accomplished an enormous task by establishing Jewish schools, institutions of higher learning with the centrality of Yiddish, the language of the Jewish proletariat, as well as the Chair (later the Cabinet) of the Jewish culture at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN).31 Praising the activities of Jewish Yiddish writers who proportionately outnumbered Ukrainian literati, Skrypnyk perhaps for the first time coined the word combination “Ukrainian Jewish culture”.32 By “Jewish” Skrypnyk implied the Yiddish culture of the formerly oppressed Jewish workers and peasants, and not the “petty-bourgeois” Hebrew culture of Zionists or clerics that he by no means could accept or tolerate.33

Generally speaking, national communism split Jewish culture in two, declaring its Yiddish-socialist half appropriate, but its religious and traditional half unacceptable. Yiddish language children books published in Ukraine exhibiting Jewish teenagers running away from their decrepit shtetl-looking and traditional-minded parents and joining detachments of cheerful pioneers passing by, manifested only too well the Jewish substance of the nationalization process in Ukraine proclaimed by Soviet power. Yet, even this relatively philosemitic tendency was partially curtailed in the late 1920s and mid-1930s with the closure of some Jewish institutions and dismantling of the fanatically Bolshevik-minded Jewish section of the party. In the late 1940s, in the wake of Stalin’s campaign against “rootless cosmopolitans” and the execution of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Ukrainian Jewish culture was completely eliminated and the language of “Ukrainian-Jewish cultural revival” was forever banished from party discourse. The “national” ingredient of national communism was dropped, and the remaining communist framework did not require the presence of any separate Jewish entity in the political discourse. USSR leaders claimed there were Jews in the USSR but no Jewish question. Only at the end of the 1980s, already in the wake of perestroika, did Ukrainian authorities undertake some clumsy attempts to revive the concept of a Jewish entity “from above,” endorsing the establishment of Shalom Aleychem Societies of Jewish Culture along the lines of the Yiddish-centered and democratically-oriented national communism, but these attempts were transient, subservient, and populist – and the Jewish intelligentsia squarely ignored them.

While national communism was on the rise and the idea of Ukrainian political independence in decline, in the 1920s and 1930s Ukrainian thinkers in the Diaspora were desperately looking for those to blame for the failure of the Ukrainian state-building experiment of 1917-1920. They did not hesitate to accuse the Jews. Thus the latter who previously constituted a minor issue of secondary importance, suddenly became the focus of Ukrainian political journalism. For those Ukrainians from Western Ukrainian borderlands who after World War I found themselves under Poland and were free to critically assess the Soviet experiment, the Jews performed a disproportionately large role in the establishment of Bolshevism in Ukraine. Having meticulously analyzed major Ukrainian periodicals in inter-war Poland, Shimon Redlich demonstrated that the mainstream nationalist Ukrain-
nian press adopted a most vociferous antisemitic stance and embarked on staunchly anti-Jewish accusations, minor differences among periodicals notwithstanding. In keeping with anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda, it perceived the Jews as inborn communists and perpetrators of innumerable anti-Ukrainian crimes: servile boot-lickers of the Polish szlachta and, under Bolsheviks, bloodsuckers that destroyed the Ukrainian peasantry. Zionist-minded Jews were traitors, too, for they shamelessly sought support of the antisemitic Poles, the long-lasting enemies of Ukrainian independence. Events such as the French court’s acquittal of Shalom Schwartzbard, who assassinated Simon Petliura, could not but further ignite anti-Jewish sentiments. Closer to World War II, the liberal democratic voices arguing for some sort of Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement were increasingly stifled and Lypyns’kyi’s stance seemed to have become the issue of the past, whereas nationalist voices identifying with the pro-Nazi stance on Jewish issues became even more pronounced.\(^35\) It came as no surprise that the far right Dmytro Dontsov with his pro-German sympathies, his “integral” Ukrainian nationalism, and his merciless anti-Jewish denunciations moved from the periphery to the center of Ukrainian political discourse.\(^36\)

During the early years of World War II, the support by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) for the New Order of the Nazis and its unabashed antisemitic attacks was overwhelming. The OUN, which heavily drew its inspiration from Dontsov’s ardent journalism wholeheartedly believed that Nazi Germany would help Ukrainians in their struggle against Russian imperialism and Jewish Bolshevism – two evils that represented the immediate danger to the much-sought for independence of Ukraine.\(^37\)


\(^{36}\) Cf., for example, Dontsov’s repeated claim that Russian Bolsheviks and Jews were the worst enemies of the Ukrainian impact on the OUN program adopted at the Great Meeting (\(v\)ely\(k\)yi \(z\)bir) in April, 1941, in Krakow. Despite the attempt to articulate its program along the lines of national liberalism and oppose it to the Moscow-sponsored imperialism, the program’s political directives included some vitriolic antisemitic statements. See: TRUNPD. No. 8. P. 17.

\(^{37}\) On close links and affinities between OUN ideology and Dontsov’s philosophy, see Hryhorii Vas’kovych. Natsional’na ideolohia Donto\(s\)ova // Dvi kontseptsiu ukra\(i\)ns’koj politychnoi dumky: V’\(i\)acheslav Lypyns’\(k\)yi - Dmytro Donto\(s\)ov. N.p.: Rada Oborony i Dopomohy Ukraini Ukra\(i\)ns’koj Konhresovoho Komitetu Ameryk, 1990. Pp. 122-123, 127-128, 140; the complexity of this issue is extensively discussed in: Sosnovs’\(k\)yi. Dmytro Donto\(s\)ov. P. 375-383.
In 1941, the OUN reaffirmed its unrestricted support of the German cause, articulated the principles of Ukrainian-German friendship, and petitioned Hitler personally to foster the development of Ukrainian statehood. The political blinkers apparently did not allow OUN to realize that Germany had no desire whatsoever to replace the “Russian prison of peoples” with a new network of national-liberal states. Yet Ukrainian thought had to make its long way from the enthusiasm over German occupation of Ukraine that, as it were, would promote the establishment of an independent Ukraine, towards the disillusion and frustration with German occupation when hopes for independence turned out to be groundless. But the continuous repressions against Ukrainian nationalists and the encounter with those Ukrainians who before 1941 lived under Bolsheviks and who did not share the xenophobic, above-all anti-Russian slogans, brought about some changes in Ukrainian thought, such as some moderate statements of tolerance toward national minorities. In September 1943, the Third Extraordinary Meeting of OUN named the fascist national-socialist New Order no less an enemy of the Ukrainians than Moscow Bolshevism. Simultaneously, the program acknowledged the rights of national minorities in the future independent Ukraine to develop their own cultures. It was a timid yet significant departure from the narrow nationalist vision of the national minorities’ policy formulated in the 1930s.

After World War II, explicit anti-Jewish sentiments and clichés did not disappear from nationalist thought in exile. Dmytro Dontsov, by far the most popular post-war Ukrainian political thinker (and the only visible authority on the Ukrainian political horizon in the Diaspora) was still very

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38 See, f.e., the OUN Memorandum on the necessity to liquidate the Ukrainian State Government established on June 30, 1941 in Lviv. TRUNPD. No. 8. P. 38. See the letter to Hitler. TRUNPD. No. 8. Pp. 45-47.
40 Significantly, the same Extraordinary Meeting reformulated the attitude of Ukrainian nationalists towards Russians. Rejecting the previous xenophobic policy of OUN, the authors of the new program emphasized that “we offer not a ‘zoological’ nationalism, for which the Bolsheviks have taught the masses to hate us, nor internationalism, which the masses have learned to hate after all the practices of Bolshevism, but the progressive idea of national co-operation, peace and unity based on the principle of freedom, independence and friendship among peoples living as equals with equals.” See D. Shakhai. Our Tactics with Regard to the Russian People // Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtender (Eds.). Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943-1951. Edmonton, 1986. P. 285.
much engaged in his pre-war anti-Jewish rhetoric. Jews were not the only ones Dontsov disliked: his treatment of his Ukrainian colleagues from the nationalist camp was no better. For Dontsov, such personalities as Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895), V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi, Volodymyr Vynnychko (1980-1951), Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934), and Ivan Baryanyi (1907-1963), the most prominent Ukrainian national-minded thinkers, were mere collaborationists and traitors to the national cause. He dubbed them “the servile national hermaphrodites”. Real fighters for the Ukrainian cause had to fit Dontsov’s quasi-Nietzschean myth of the relentless Ukrainian super-hero. It is in this context that one should place Dontsov’s negation of the Jews. Yet even Dontsov could not afford to ignore the rise of new philosemitic post-Holocaust sentiments in the West and the impact of a new geopolitical entity, namely, the State of Israel. To tackle with them, he cast new realities such as Judeo-Christian rapprochement in his far-right mold. First, he disassociated himself from the post-Holocaust and pre-Vatican-II tendency that viewed the Judaic and Christian legacy as fundamental to western civilization. Second, he made clumsy attempts to prove that Christianity historically had nothing to do with Judaism. Christianity was born in the midst of “Hellenized Arians,” not of Jews. Jesus came from Arian Galilee, not from Jewish Judea. Messianic pretensions of the “Lilliputian petty-state of Israel” (liliputnoi derzhavky Izrailia) were baseless. Ben Gurion’s spirit, as well the spirit of his people, was of the Old Testament, which, Dontsov claimed he had proved, was not a Christian text.

Ten years after the establishment of Ukrainian state independence, Dontsov...
ov’s type of anti-Judaism and antisemitism found its way into a number of such post-1991 aggressively anti-Jewish periodicals as Personal, Idealist, as well as the less sophisticated Vechirnii Kyiv, Za vil’nu Ukrainu, and Nesko-rena natsia. Nowadays, too, one could hardly find any difference in the perception of the Jews by such far-right nationalists as Anatolii Shcherbatiuuk or of such a dinosaur of communist-forged antisemitism as Grigorii Shchekin.

However, by the late 1950s, the era of Dontsov was past its prime. The new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals, both in Ukraine and in Diaspora, realized that previous patterns of Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement had to be abandoned and new approaches sought. Steadily but slowly, Lypyns’kyi was re-emerging on the Ukrainian ideological horizon capturing the minds of many, including the staunch nationalists, disciples and followers of Dontsov.

_Ukrainian Diaspora: From Dontsov To Lypyns’ky_

After World War II Jews began acquiring a unique status in the Ukrainian political parlance as the most persecuted nation in the USSR, second only to the Ukrainians. Paradoxically, Ukrainians both in the Diaspora and in the Soviet Ukraine undertook this reassessment. Ardent disciples and sympathizers of Dontsov started to dramatically drift away from his shallow xenophobic mottoes.

Before reconsidering the Jewish issues – or instead of reconsidering them – the post-war Ukrainian thinkers began revising their approach to antisemitism. Apparently not so much the issue of Jews as a nation, but rather Nazi and Soviet anti-Jewish policies moved into the focus of many Western Ukrainian thinkers. As if not yet ready to discuss affinities between the tragic destinies of Ukrainians and Jews, Ukrainian thinkers attempted to discover parallels between imperial Russian (or Soviet) attitudes towards and treatment of each of them. Among other things, Ukrainians realized that the chauvinistic Soviet empire (as they depicted it) shared with Nazi Germany both Ukrainophobia _and_ Judeophobia. That fascism

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44 For the extensive analysis of these periodicals, see R. Myrs’kyi, O. Naiman, Ia. Khonigsman. Iudofobia proty Ukrainy: stari zabobony i moderni vyhadky. L’viv, 1998.
and Bolshevism scorned and oppressed Ukrainians and Jews alike became for Ukrainian thinkers a shocking discovery. Russia remained the object of xenophobia, but Jews were placed in a different cluster. Ivan Bahrianyi [Bagriany], the leader of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party in exile, who actively contributed to Dontsov’s *Vistnyk*, was among the first to transform this discovery into the scathing accusation of his polemical essays in which he tended to at least partially rehabilitate the national-democratic discourse, if not to begin revising Dontsov’s schemes.

Arrested and sentenced for his nationalist convictions in the 1930s, Bahrianyi was lucky to leave the prison in western Ukraine that was invaded by Germany and later escaped to the west. In the post-war period, Bahrianyi, according to Ivan Dziuba, “displayed a great creative energy in a broad intellectual and social diapason – as a poet, novelist, journalist, political thinker and leader, and the organizer of political life”.46 A faithful supporter of the “democratic-populist trend which attempted to incorporate the experience of the Soviet era of the 1920s and 1930s”,47 Bahrianyi professed the ideals close to the Ukrainian renaissance brutally suppressed in the 1930s as a result of Stalin’s shift toward old-fashioned Russian chauvinism intolerant of any national-cultural revivalism. Bahrianyi directed his passionate criticism against the supporters of Russian chauvinism, be they “red” journalists from the Soviet Ukraine or “white” journalists of the Russian emigration. In his essays published regularly in *Ukrains’ki visti*, Bahrianyi traced the amazing degeneration of Russian emigrant thinkers who had fled the blatant chauvinism of the tsarist regime but were trapped in the nets of the chauvinistic Soviet empire.48 Bahrianyi tirelessly emphasized that once liberal-democratic Russian journalists turned to the issues of Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance during and after World War II, they resorted to slogans such as “beat the Yids and save Russia,” expediently substituting “yids” for “Ukrainians.” Bahrianyi noted:

Let us call a spade a spade. Antisemitism in the policy of the “Soviet authority” is the antisemitism of nobody else but of Russian imperialism, antisemitism of the Russian empire. Modern antisemitism in the USSR is the product of Russian messianic chauvinism. It is the

48 Mention should be made of a similar parallel between tsarist and Russian Bolshevik policy towards Ukraine and other national minorities that has been evident for Dontsov, see: D. Dontsov. Tvory. T. 1: Heopolitychni ta ideolohichni pratsi. L’viv, 2001. P. 222.
device of the internal and external policy of the Russian empire. And this antisemitism is not a new Soviet one, but the traditional Russian chauvinistic method of running the empire and securing its integrity. This antisemitism will remain as long as Russia remains the empire – that prison of peoples which the tsars and nowadays the CPSU secretaries keep together by brutal force, terror, oppression of all its subjects, and by mottoes like “beat the yids and save Russia.” 49

For Bahrianyi, Judeophobia and Ukrainophobia became synonymous and mutually complementary elements of Russian imperial policy. 50 Paradoxically, Bahrianyi identified antisemitism as a Russian, not Ukrainian phenomenon. This approach might appear bordering on shallow reductionism and historical inaccuracy. Had it been so, there would have been no serious reason to discuss this or any other of Bahrianyi’s insights. Obviously, Bahrianyi’s innovation was not in exculpating Ukraine and incriminating Russia. By placing antisemitism in the imperial Russian realm, Bahrianyi was at pains to stress that antisemitism was alien to the genuine Ukrainian national worldview. Even if it could sound self-indulgent, this implication demonstrated a new tendency in Ukrainian thought, namely, to disassociate from anti-Jewish sensibilities and thus purify Ukrainian nationalist logic. In a sense, it was an attempt to disassociate genuine Ukrainian nationalism from the ignominious traces of Dontsov’s antisemitism. And the importance of this shift for further Ukrainian-Jewish encounter is difficult to overestimate – especially given the fact that Bahrianyi was not the only one who moved in that direction. Kwitkows’ky represents another good example.

Denys Kwitkows’kyi [Kwitkows’ky] (1909-1979), one of the Diaspora’s most active journalists and the Head of the Movement of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN, stands for Provid Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv), who was born in a village near Sadigora, nowadays a suburb of Chernivtsi, became a professional lawyer in what was Romanian Bukovina, later in Germany, and finally North America. For his pro-Ukrainian nationalist sympathies and enthusiastic journalistic and organization work, he was arrested by Romanian and later by Nazi authorities, spending some five years in prison. Among the many projects he conceived and brought to life were several


leading Diaspora periodicals. Himself a passionate journalist and political thinker of strong legalistic convictions, Kwitkows’kyi was sensitive to national issues, Jewish in particular. Even before the State of Israel was created, he emphasized the emerging centrality of the future Jewish State in the post World War II geopolitical context. In his amazingly sober and mature analytical essay “A Horrible Issue,” published with Ukrains’kyi Biuleten Informatsii (no. 4, 1946), he highlighted the complexity of the state-building problem, especially focusing on an unprecedented challenge of the Jews to the British Empire. Reacting to the emergent Jewish state, Kwitkows’kyi seemed to have been deeply impressed by the courage of Jewish national ambitions. He perceived it as proof of his notion that not so much the strategic interests of the new superpowers, such as the USSR and the USA, but rather the two competing national ideas (Jewish and Arab) would positively inform the political future of the Middle Eastern region and world politics. Amazingly, Kwitkows’kyi did not hesitate to apply the motto put forward by the Israeli Jewish leaders to his understanding of the ways of achieving independence for the people enslaved in the USSR.

As is known, the 1962 Adolph Eichman case demonstrated the strength of the Israeli legal system, the effectiveness of its intelligence service, and the implemented will of the Jewish people to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes committed against Jews. Kwitkows’kyi, a professional lawyer, could not leave this event unnoticed. Using as a point of reference a clumsy comparison between Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi [Chmelnicky] and “Bogey Man” that he found in a Jewish newspaper, Kwitkows’kyi came out with the program article “Jews and Us”. In it, he tended to disassociate Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi from his entirely fictional if not insulting image deeply embedded in Jewish national consciousness. Subsequently,

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53 Published as “Zhydy i my” under the pen-name “D. Kvitka.” See Kwitkows’ky. Borot’ba za Ukrains’ku ideiu. P. 340-347.
54 For the analysis of the Jewish perceptions of the 1648-49 Cossack revolt, see Joel Raba. Between Rememberance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth During the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research. New York, 1995. Pp. 39-50.
Kwitkows’ky disassociated Ukraine from any anti-Jewish perceptions: “So let it be clear: Ukraine has never known any antisemitic movement or premeditated pogroms against the Jewish population. Neither our history nor anyone else’s has recorded any antisemitic philosophy or ideology similar, for instance, to Hitler’s philosophy or ideology.” He underscored the historical context of national revolutions in Ukraine that generated a merciless civil war climate, against which backdrop one must balance any Jewish population losses. He indicated the importance of the colonial factor in Ukrainian history that Jews neglect while assessing alleged Ukrainian antisemitism.

Indeed, Kwitkows’kyi did not want to see such Ukrainian national heroes as Stepan Bandera, Simon Petliura, or Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi prosecuted by the imaginary court of Jewish national memory. Nor did he claim that it would have been legitimate to judge the Jews for their anti-Ukrainian bias on the basis of Lazar Kaganovich’s crimes against the Ukrainian people during the Great Hunger of the 1930s. Though not entirely unbiased in regard to Jewish feelings towards Ukraine and Ukrainians, Kwitkows’kyi suggested a brand new agenda for the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter. It was national but not nationalistic. As in the case of Bahrianyi, it bordered on a somewhat indecisive national-democratic worldview yet not altogether liberated from Dontsovesque rhetoric. Jews, he claimed, should respect a nation of Ukrainians as Ukrainians respect a nation of Jews. Ukrainians have never attacked great Jewish leaders. Therefore, Jews should understand that great Ukrainian leaders emerged to liberate Ukraine, not to beat down Jews. Nobody should blame an entire people for the misdeeds of their representatives, either in the historical past or in modern times. Jews and Ukrainians should extend a hand to one another to fight the common enemy – “communist Moscow” – the only entity that benefits from Ukrainian-Jewish discord. The Ukrainians should purify themselves from the sense of guilt for crimes they have not perpetrated, or at least not initiated. Cooperation and genuine encounter were possible only if Jews and Ukrainians saw themselves as equal partners in dialogue. If Ukrainians were to fight antisemitism, Jews should fight their own Ukrainophobic bias.

In the late 1960s, Kwitkows’ky closely followed the persecution of Ukrainian dissidents in the Soviet Ukraine. That the Ukrainian dissidents

became victims for being too Ukrainian suddenly revealed for him a pivotal common feature between the two people. As Jews were persecuted during the Holocaust for being Jews, Ukrainians were persecuted in the pre- and post-war USSR for being Ukrainians. This affinity made possible the appropriation of concepts elaborated in the realm of Jewish polity and their utilization for the Ukrainian cause. The Zionist apostle-like leaders became examples for the emerging Ukrainian national leadership. In his “To Be Oneself Whatever the Price” presented at the Conference of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, Kwitkows’kyi brought the example of Theodor Herzl as an émigré who, due to his obsession with the idea of national revival, managed to stir the Jewish Diaspora, bring together all strata of Jews, and trigger the establishment of the State which he, like the Biblical Moses before him, did not merit to see. Deliberately or not deliberately, overcoming a bitter feeling of suppressed envy, Kwitkows’kyi resorted to the images and themes in Ukrainian literature (Ivan Franko) that equated Israeli Jews and Ukrainians. But what about the Jews in Ukraine?

**Foundations for a Dialogue**

In the 1960s, liberal-minded Ukrainian scholars considered the legacy of Lypyns’kyi a paramount and indispensable alternative to the shallow xenophobia of Dontsov, whose attitude to national minorities began to be an embarrassment even for his worshippers in the nationalist camp. Though the rise and institutionalization of the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue deserve a separate discussion, it is worthwhile briefly to trace some major events in the 1960s-1970s that for the first time after the 1910s brought together Ukrainians and Jews, fostering a productive exchange of ideas between them. The first round table discussions between Ukrainian and Jewish scholars in Canada and the United States were organized by ardent followers of Lypyns’kyi. One of the most instrumental among them was Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi (Rudnytsky), a prominent Ukrainian Diaspora political historian who published a number of pioneering essays on the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter in philosophy, politics, and literature, calling for “a new Ukrainian-Jewish entente cordiale”, and thus creating a brand-new field in East

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European humanities that fifty years later Marten Feller from Drohobych dubbed ukraino-aida. Another one was Omelian [Omeljan] Pritsak, the founder of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University and subsequently the director of the Oriental Institute at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who came out with a new ethno-genetic concept of Ukraine (to be more precise, of Kievan Rus) that suggested the key role of what was known as the legally Judaic Khazarian state in the establishment of the first settlement on the territory of what later became Kiev. Due to Rudnyts’kyi, the revival of Lypyns’kyi’s theoretical framework shaped the endeavors of such prominent Canadian Ukrainian scholars as Orest Subtelny from York University, Paul Robert Magocsi from the University of Toronto, and Zenon Kohut from University of Alberta, who insightfully contextualized Ukrainian history against the multi-ethnic backdrop of Ukrainian society and culture and embraced East European Jewish issues (along with Russian and Polish) as part of Ukrainian history. Noteworthy, under Rudnyts’kyi’s impact two scholars, a Ukrainian and a Jew, published an unparalleled book on Jewish and Ukrainian historical narratives providing it with a telling subtitle “Two Solitudes”.

In the 1960s-1970s, the Ukrainian Diaspora brought a paramount contribution to the rapprochement between Ukrainians and Jews, enabling them to compare their historical narratives and speak to one another. Initiated by prominent Ukrainian and Jewish scholars, Ukrainian-Jewish conferences and round-table discussions became an indispensable part of modern Ukrainian thought, and the post-1991 events promoted their institutionalization in such society as Ukraine-Israel and such undertakings as Ukrainian-Jewish conventions. Munich-based (now Kyiv-based) Suchasnist, by far the best Ukrainian literary journal in the second half of the 20th century, was established in 1961 as if to revive Lypyns’kyi’s ideals and bring them to

60 For the proceedings of one of the most important conferences, see Howard Aster and Peter Potichnyj. Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective. Edmonton, 1988.
life. Suchasnist consistently published materials on a variety of national minorities that contributed to Ukraine culture. Among those nationalities, judged by the amount of the journal publications, Jews featured prominently. Later in the 1980s, Israeli-based Ukrainian-language Dialohy journal and even more so the Kiev-based Yehupets in the 1990s success-

61 In addition to its “by default” support of Lypyns’kyi, Suchasnist consistently contributed to the research of his legacy publishing a number of important articles by L. Bilas, V. Isaiv, Ie. Piziur, O. Pritsak, V. Shevchuk. See, for example, Suchasnist. 1992. No. 6; 1984. No. 6; 1983. No. 1-2; 1969. No. 9; 1962. No. 2.

fully adapted Lypyns’kyi’s poly-ethnic concept of Ukraine as an operational framework, if not an unwritten program, for Jewish-Ukrainian encounter.

The reassessment of Jewish issues along Lypyns’kyi’s lines by major Ukrainian Diaspora thinkers followed suit. The case of Roman Rakhman-nyi [Rakhmanny] is particularly illuminating. According to Yuri Shcherbak, Rakhmannyi was

a unique phenomenon in Ukrainian politics, literature, and journalism. His works comprise a monumental and tragic encyclopedia of the Ukrainian struggle for independence—a dazzling collection of ideas, hypotheses, predictions, facts, and names. Roman Olynyk-Rakhmanny was a figure of the Ukrainian Renaissance and will remain so in our history. But in contrast to the writers of the executed Renaissance, Roman Rakhmanny refused to become a victim of the Communist regime. He entered the battle against the red “horsemen of the Apocalypse.”

Perhaps Rakhmannyi’s commitment to and participation in OUN in the 1930s cast his nationalistic convictions in Dontsov’s mold. Even in 1973 he dubbed Dontsov “the guardian of Ukrainian dignity” along with Franko, Hrushevs’kyi, Bahrianyi, and Lypyns’kyi. However, Dontsov’s ideas retained for Rakhmannyi symbolic rather than practical significance. When the discussion focused on the present and future of the Ukrainian state, Rakhmannyi explicitly resorted to Lypyns’kyi.

The Jewish theme was not a random choice for Rakhmannyi. In his impassioned articles about Ukrainian dissent, Jewish motifs are sali-

\[\text{From “A Eulogy for Roman Olynyk-Rakhmanny. As Delivered by Dr. Yuri Shcherbak, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine in Canada,” Montreal, 27 June 2002.}\]

\[\text{For Rakhmannyi’s biographical data, see: Fedir Pohrebinyk (Ed). Publitsyst mysli i serdtisa: zbirnyk prats’ na poshanu 80-richchia Romana Oliinyka-Rakhmannoho. Kyiv, 2000. Pp. x-xvi. Unfortunately, this edition dedicated to Rakhmannyi 80th anniversary made no mention of Rakhmannyi’s national-democratic convictions and his consistent struggle against modern antisemitism. Instead, it comprised an extensive paper by the notorious Vitalii Karpenko, full of the most vociferous xenophobia that Rakhmannyi always shunned, see: Ibid. Pp. 77-107.}\]


\[\text{See Rakhmanyi’s rendering of Lypyns’kyi’s definition of the Ukrainian statehood: Rakhmannyi. Ukraina atomnoho viku. Vol. 1. P. 223.}\]
Rakhmannyi closely followed the rise of the new Jewish State and consistently traced a parallel between Zionism and the Ukrainian national revival. On the eve of one of the key Arab-Israeli military conflicts he boldly defended Israel’s case against Moscow-based anti-Zionist and pro-Arabic propaganda. In his essay “Ukraine and Israel: 37 years ago and today” (Natsional’na trybuna, December 11, 1983) he compared the struggle of Menahem Begin’s revisionist Irgun Tsevai Leumi struggling against the British and the Arabs to Ukrainian patriots from the OUN who fought against the Nazis and the Bolsheviks. Rakhmannyi emphasized the primordial importance of the military and political experience of Israel for those who sought Ukrainian national liberation. Surprisingly, Rakhmannyi identified with the uncompromising Zionists of Zhabotinsky’s ilk rather than with the moderate Ben Gurion. It was the desperate courage of the Irgun members on issues of national liberation that Rakhmannyi believed should instruct Ukrainians on how to tackle the Soviet oppression of Ukraine.

In his journalism, Rakhmannyi was looking for and was able to find positive evidence of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter. In his essay entitled “Aliens on the ‘dreadful shadows’ of Ukraine” (Natsional’na trybuna, October 7, 1984), Rakhmannyi presented a surprising portrayal of Osip Mandelshtam, one of the most outstanding Russian poets of Jewish descent, as sympathetic to Ukrainians, pointing out that back in 1933 they fed three Ukrainian children and their father who had abandoned their village devastated by famine and had come to the Crimea in search of food. Tracing parallels between Soviet realities and Mandelshtam’s poetry, Rakhmanny suggested that Mandelshtam’s poetic line about “dreadful shadows of Ukraine and Kuban” was perhaps the reflection of the notorious 1931–1933 hunger that had a devastating effect on the Ukraine. Moreover, according to Rakhmannyi, it was the only reflection of the Ukrainian holodomor in the entire Soviet literature of that time. “Both Mandelshtams

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managed to understand the tragedy of the Ukrainians under Moscow domain and having understood it, they did not remain silent.”

Noteworthy, Rakhmannyi did not write an angry essay reflecting upon the ignominious role that, for example, Lazar Kaganovich purportedly played in artificially arranging the famine in Ukraine (as did Dontsov). Instead, he chose a different topic for his essay. Rakhmannyi managed to identify the reference in Mandelshtam’s poem, compared it to the episode depicted in Nadezhda Mandelshtam’s memoirs, and having realized the source of the reference, wrote an essay about the one courageous word of protest articulated by a doomed Russian-Jewish poet against the Moscow-orchestrated famine in Ukraine. Rachmannyi’s point is obvious: while the rest of the Soviet people praised the collectivization aloud or cursed it tacitly, the Jews were the only ones who reflected upon its dreadful consequences, bemoaning the victims of the famine in Ukraine.

In his profound pamphlet “On the Babylonian Rivers of Ukraine” (America, 1986) Rakhmannyi once again indicated how instructive for Ukrainians was the example of the route the Jews had to take before they managed to convince the western world that they were a nation deserving a state, and not merely another religious sect. Only due to their ability to reshape their self-perception as a distinct political nation, noted Rakhmannyi, did the Jews succeed in reviving their ancestral Biblical land and their Hebrew language. Here lay the lesson that by no means should be lost on Ukrainians.

Not only similarities in the historical past and perhaps imaginary future, but also present day Jews deserved the respect and gratitude of the Ukrainians. In his essay “Their Honest Word Will Never be Forgotten,” Rakhmannyi praised eighteen Israelis, former Soviet “prisoners of Zion,” who publicly addressed Israeli society and called upon it finally to acknowledge the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts’kyi (1865-1944) “a righteous Gentile”. They

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70 “As once the Ukrainians reconquered from the Tartar horsemen their historical steppe up to the Black Sea, the Jews by their own armament and their own blood reconquered from the Arab horsemen, old and new, the territory of their historical kingdoms, Israel and Judea. Ukrainians throughout the world should also reconsider their own self-perception, purify from the alluvium that stuck to them during their desperate sojourn in the rotten sea of Russian occupation and look at themselves as the integral members of a distinct and culturally, spiritually, politically, and socially developed entity, namely, the Ukrainian nation.” Rakhmannyi. Rozdumy pro Ukrainu. Pp. 282-283.
Y. Petrovsky-Shtern, *Reconceptualizing the Alien...*

boldly challenged the dominant opinion of those influential Israeli and western politicians who rejected this privilege to Sheptyts’kyi on the grounds of his alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Rakhmannyi soundly underscored that figures such as Raoul Wallenberg (1912-?) or Oscar Schindler (1908-1974) did not have any choice but to collaborate with the Nazis in order to redeem the Jews. But neither the complexity of the issue nor the threat of harsh criticism of their action from the side of the Israeli establishment intimidated the Jewish defenders of Sheptyts’kyi’s posthumous honor. Rakhmannyi concluded, again emphasizing the ethical example of the Jews: “Eighteen former prisoners, champions of the cause of Zion, honestly defended the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts’kyi. The Ukrainian society will never forget their words. No doubt, we, Ukrainians, have no right to be ungrateful”.71

Amazingly, liberal-minded *literati* and dissidents in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic echoed Rakhmannyi – along with Rudnyts’kyi – almost at the same time and almost with the same words.

*Lypyn’sky’s “Return” To Ukraine*

Israel Kleiner was among the first scholars to draw attention to the preponderance of Jewish themes in the writings of Ukrainian dissidents.72 Among the indisputable merits of his research is that Kleiner identified the main figures engaged in active Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue such as Dziuba, Karavans’kyi, and Sverstiuk and analyzed the Jewish themes in their journalism. He correctly placed the Ukrainian dissident movement in the context of the Petro Shelest “thaw”73 and connected its demise to the early 1970s Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi’s “coup” within the Ukrainian communist party ruling cabinet. Yet, Kleiner’s approach is not without flaws. He seems to have ignored shifts and developments within the realm of Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue, portraying it within one and the same framework that he somewhat simplistically dubs “humanistic and democratic.” He overlooked the fact that the need to seriously discuss Jewish themes pulled

71 Rakhmannyi. Rozdumy pro Ukrainu. P. 149.
73 The UCP First Secretary in 1963-1972, Shelest was removed from his post for his pro-Ukrainian stance and endorsement of the Ukrainian dissidents and national-minded intellectuals.
Ukrainian dissidents out of their common Marxist or national-communist patterns of discourse and opened up for them brand-new socio-political horizons, whereas some Ukrainian scholars noticed this crucial shift. He failed to discuss the intellectual repercussions of the Zionist theme in the writings of Ukrainian intellectuals and he did not try to contextualize the dissident thought in the context of Ukrainian political thinking. In addition, recently published primary sources allow revisiting some major points made by Kleiner.

Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960s left a profound imprint on Ukrainian Diaspora thought, first and foremost due to its autochthonous origin. Kwitkows’kyi wrote: “Neither Chornovil nor Dziuba, neither Zalyvakha nor anybody else from the young generation in Ukraine had any links with Ukrainian émigré organizations and did not draw their thoughts or their cultural and political views from the programs of these organizations…. National revival in Ukraine occurs above all in the spiritual realm of the Ukrainian people, in the sphere of a complete understanding of its national identity and individuality”. That Chornovil, Dziuba, and Karavans’kyi drew parallels between the fate of Jews and of Ukrainians was not lost on the leading Ukrainian thinkers. Some of them extensively quoted passages by Karavans’kyi and Dziuba in regard to the Jews. It was particularly astonishing that quite unexpectedly Ukrainian dissidents assumed the leadership in the debates related to the Ukrainian nation and state-building as well as the national minority policies, despite the fact that sometimes they had no idea which Diaspora thinker (all of whom were outlawed in Ukraine) they followed.

Sviatoslav Iosypovych Karavans’kyi (b. 1920), in the 1930s-1940s a committed Ukrainian nationalist with strong sympathies to OUN, in 1945 was arrested and sentenced to 25 years in the GULAG for his refusal to cooperate with the state security organs. Released long before the end of

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the term due to a mistake in the security organs paperwork, Karavans’kyi published poetry, translations of poems by Byron and Kipling, Shakespeare’s *Sonnets*, Charlotte Bronte’s *Jane Eyre*, and works on linguistics. Having spent a short period outside the GULAG, Karavans’kyi became so productive that he was eventually recognized among Ukrainian intellectuals as “the patriarch of Ukrainian lexicography”. In 1965, after a search in his house, Karavans’kyi filed a formal complaint to the state organs protesting the groundless search of his apartment and “the violation of Lenin’s norms of national policy in Ukraine”. On the initiative of the Prosecutor General, the court cancelled the previous rehabilitation and forced Karavans’kyi to spend the remaining eight years and seven months in a correction colony. In prison, Karavans’kyi unfolded an astounding activity, filing complaints and letters of protest against the violation of Lenin’s norms of national policies in the USSR. Karavans’kyi, who in the late 1930s owned a small bookstore in Odessa, had not heard about Lypyns’kyi and had not read him. Dontsov, though, he did know. But his innate pledge to justice substituted for him the Lypyns’kyi’s legacy and turned out to be more profound than his admiration for Dontsov hence his public defense of the oppressed and insulted. Long before the world learnt about the Katyn tragedy, Karavans’kyi had publicly claimed that the Soviets brutally murdered Polish officers in Katyn. In the Kolyma correction colony, he protected three Russian *zeks* from the excessive aggressiveness of their overwhelmingly Ukrainian inmates. And having observed the grassroots praxis of the Soviet national minority policy, he stood up in defense of the Jews.

On 10 April 1966, Karavans’kyi sent a formal complaint to the Head of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Council. In his com-

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79 Personal communication: from the author’s interview with Sviatoslav Karavans’kyi, October 13, 2003.
80 As it appears from the memoirs of Mikhail Kheifets, a Ukrainian émigré visiting Ukraine was detained at the border with the manuscript of Karavans’kyi *Dictionary of Ukrainian Rhymes*. For the Ukrainian KGB commissioned by Kremlin to plot against Petro Shelest, the then Ukrainian CP secretary general, this dictionary was sufficient evidence of Karavans’kyi’s anti-Soviet activity. The detained visitor was quick to share with the prosecution the names of people he was offered to contact yet never contacted.
plaint, Karavans’kyi denounced the discriminatory admission procedures tacitly approved of in Ukrainian colleges and universities. Though Karavans’kyi fervently defended the rights of such national minorities as Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Ukrainians, Jews occupied a disproportionately large place in his plea.81 The plea demonstrates Karavans’kyi’s liberal democratic utopia, characteristic of many dissidents of the 1960s. In particular, it underscores his belief that Jewish nationalism undermined the universality of the human rights movement in the USSR. If Jews were already despised and destitute victims of the regime and as such deserved sympathy, the awakening Zionist sensibilities from his viewpoint were still a negative phenomenon. But one should seriously consider the fervor with


81 “Above all let me draw your attention to the discrimination of the Jewish population – since in the first place the attitude to the Jewish nationality is the litmus paper for the level of international consciousness of a society. The closure of Jewish cultural institutions, newspapers, schools theatres, publishing houses; the shooting of Jewish cultural figures, the discrimination of Jewish admissions to secondary and higher educational establishments – all these phenomena freely blossomed under Stalin’s cult of personality. It seemed that the denunciation of the cult of personality should have put an end to these forms of discrimination. Unfortunately, that did not happen. N. S. Khrushchev, to calm public opinion abroad (he paid little attention to society in his own country) had to rehabilitate the unjustly murdered and sentenced representatives of Jewish culture. And there he stopped. Yet today, where are Jewish theaters, newspapers, publishing houses, and schools? In Odessa with its 150,000 Jews there are no Jewish schools at all – and what about admissions to higher educational establishments? In the same Odessa where Jews constitute 25 percent of its population there are 3-5 percent Jewish students. This percent represents the numerus clausus tacitly accepted by the admission committees. Jewish youths who apply to higher educational establishments in other towns of the USSR receive the answer: “Odessa has the same institution. You should apply to ‘your university.’” … Are these measures fostering the strengthening of international friendship? On the contrary, they promote the emerging Jewish self-perception as an inferior and unequal nation; they draw Jews to Zionism. And one needs to admit that the Zionist ideas have never been so popular among the Jewish population as they are now. This is a direct result of the discrimination policies against the Jewish minority.” See: TRUSPD. Vol. 8. Pp. 216-217.
which Karavans’kyi defended the right of Ukrainian Jews for cultural renaissance as well as the significant proportion of the Jewish theme in his claim. It came as no surprise that in the list of formal demands to the government, as Kleiner soundly mentions, Karavans’kyi above all placed his requirement to halt anti-Jewish admission policy. Karavans’kyi’s arrest and sentence did not stop his bold attempts to defend the rights of Jews in the USSR. Despite the small impact of Karavans’kyi’s protests, they manifested a brand new development in Ukrainian political thinking and were immediately canonized as standard human rights texts in Ukrainian samizdat, above all in Chornovil’s publications. Assessing the immediate impact of the dissidents’ legal and literary production, Rakhmannyi correctly mentioned that such authors as Karavans’kyi “introduced the Ukrainian case into the wide world of humanism”.

Yet it was Ivan Dziuba who canonized the new Ukrainian stance on Jewish issues. He made it in his acclaimed speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the mass massacres in Baby Yar (September, 1967), which had a major impact on the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter and became

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82 Ibid. P. 217.
83 For instance, in his letter to the Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, Karavans’kyi demanded the immediate arrest of Rudenko, the Soviet Prosecutor General who had transformed the Soviet court system into an organ of genocide against national intelligentsia of the USSR people. Also, according to Karavans’kyi, Rudenko endorsed several pogromist acts against Jewish intellectuals, among them the elder of the Leningrad religious community, G. Piachersky. See: Viacheslav Chornovil. Lykho z rozumu (portrety dvadtsaty “zlochyntsiv”). Paris, 1968. Pp. 155-156.
a blueprint for any further Ukrainian-Jewish discourse. In the 1960s, Ivan Mykhailovych Dziuba (b. 1931) was one of the leading Ukrainian dissidents and the harbinger of the new Ukrainian attitudes towards Jews. For his human rights activities Dziuba was repeatedly detained and interrogated by the Ukrainian KGB, and in 1973 was formally arrested and sentenced for his anti-Soviet activities (the sentence was changed as a result of Dziuba’s public repentance). An outstanding intellectual, philologist, renowned historian of culture, in the 1960s, Dziuba was prohibited to work as a philologist and writer and had to earn his living as a proof editor of biochemistry and aircraft plant periodicals (1966-1969 and 1974-1982, respectfully). The Ukrainian western observers were quick to register the exploding pathos of such intellectual dissidents as Dziuba.

Dziuba considered the treatment of Jews a litmus test of the level of oppression of national minorities in the USSR. In 1966, in his renowned pamphlet “Internationalism or Russification?” Dziuba tended to separate between Marxist principles of national policy and Soviet anti-Marxist practices demonopolizing the official Soviet hermeneutics. In the pamphlet, among other things Dziuba mercilessly mocked the bigotry of the authorities who optimistically reaffirmed that antisemitism had no grounds under

86 Published for the first time in: Slovo. 1967. No. 1349. 8 Oct., it has been reprinted in: Suchasnist. 1967. No. 11 (82). Pp. 32-35, in a number of Dziuba’s works in the west and later in a number of paramount Ukrainian editions such as TRUSPD (see further footnotes).


88 See, for example, Osyp Zinkewych. Svitlychny and Dziuba: Ukrainian Writers under Fire. Baltimore and Toronto, 1966.
Socialism. A very secondary motif of Dziuba’s acclaimed pamphlet, the Jewish theme moved to the central place of his no less celebrated September 1967 oral presentation. The centrality of the Jewish theme made Dziuba (perhaps not deliberately) abandon the intellectually virgin terrain of national communism he explored in “Internationalism or Russification?” and adopt a new approach. In 1967, together with Viktor Nekrasov, Gelii Snehiriov (Snegirev), and Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Dziuba appeared on the site of the infamous ravine Baby Yar in Kyiv where in September, 1941, the Nazis had slaughtered some 30,000 Jews, including the maternal family of the author. As Dziuba recollected later, on that day he saw thousands of people standing on the rims of the ravine in an overwhelming silence. Although Dziuba was not prepared for a formal speech, he met the challenge. A pure improvisation, the text of Dziuba’s speech was later used by the KGB to incriminate him.

It has been reproduced in numerous publications yet it has not received close analysis. Given that some western publications of Dziuba’s “Internationalism or Russification?” appeared with the supplement containing a single essay, namely, his speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Baby Yar massacres, the text of the speech deserves attention.

In Baby Yar Dziuba spoke as a Ukrainian to the Jews, focusing predominantly on national and not so much communist-like international, or to put it better, Soviet-style humanistic issues. Though he made a number of references to “all-human” tasks such as the necessity to fight fascism (“the civilized form of homophobia”), Dziuba’s main point was the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter and his language was that of national-democracy. Dziuba was addressing not Ukrainian or Jewish working masses but two entire peoples. For Dziuba, the Baby Yar massacre was the tragedy of both people, Ukrainians and Jews. And it was incumbent on both to spiritually overcome the tragedy. Ukrainians had to fight their shameful antisemitism whereas Jews had to learn how to respect Ukrainian culture, shedding their anti-Ukrainian bias. And both had to counteract the common threat of assimilation that doomed Jewish and Ukrainian national cultures to annihilation. If the Soviet regime left no chance for Jews and Ukrainians but to begin speak-

89 If that was the case, asked Dziuba, why then did the daily newspaper “Pravda” in its September 5, 1965, editorial, quoting Lenin, call for the “tireless struggle” against antisemitism. See TRUSPD. Vol. 8. P. 215.
ing to one another in the framework of Realpolitik, than at least in the time and space of human creativity both people should seek the opportunity for rapprochement. Literary and intellectual rather than social and political encounter between Jews and Ukrainians was the key portion of his speech:

The great sons of both peoples [Ukrainians and Jews] bequeathed to us mutual understanding and friendship. The life of three great Jewish writers such as Shalom Aleychem, Yitskhak Perets, and Mendele Moykher Sefarim is linked to Ukrainian land. They loved this land and taught others to do good on it. Vladimir Zhabotyns’kyi, an excellent Jewish journalist, supported the Ukrainian people in their struggle against Russian tsarism and called for Jewish intelligentsia to back the Ukrainian national movement and Ukrainian culture. One of Shevchenko’s last civic acts was a well-known protest against the judeophobic policy of the tsar’s government. Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Franko, Borys Hrinchenko, Stepan Vasyl’chenko and other outstanding Ukrainian writers knew well and highly appreciated the greatness of Jewish history and Jewish spirit, and they wrote with sincere sympathy about the sufferings of the Jewish poor.92

Nowadays the philosemitic stance of the personalities cited by Dziuba seems only too well known. Yet in 1960s, they were far from common knowledge, particularly in the Ukrainian milieu.93 That in the mid-1960s Dziuba seemed to be perfectly aware of the philosemitic motifs of these Ukrainian writers and philo-Ukrainian stance of the Jewish literati forty years later should be assessed as an astonishing level of familiarity with the history of the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue. There was hardly at that time a figure among Ukrainian Jews able to make Ukrainian and Jewish classics speak to one another so efficiently as did Dziuba.94 On the other hand,

93 Yitskhak Leybush Perets (1851/52-1915), with his graphic neoromantic hasidic themes, was obliterated from the Soviet Jewish collective memory, whereas it was forbidden merely to mention the name of Vladimir (Ze’ev) Zhabotyns’kyi (Zhabotinsky, 1880-1940). In addition, philosemitic verse by Ivan Franko (1856-1916) and Lesia Ukrainka (1871-1913) were taken out of their complete works.
94 Dziuba was not a consistent thinker. At one point, under permanent pressure and intimidation from the side of state security, party and the writer’s union, he abandoned the struggle he himself triumphantly headed throughout the 1960s. This showed in his address to the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Ukraine, sent December 26, 1969, that resulted in the rescinding of the Union of Writers’ decision to expel Dziuba from its ranks. Dziuba’s withdrawal from the first ranks of intellectual fighters against Russification became an object of criticism among Ukrainian dissidents. See: Valentyn Moroz.
Dziuba’s speech extended his fame as a consistent national-democrat for another half a century, particularly because in it he emerged as a much bolder thinker than in his “legal Marxist” pamphlet against Russification. It is possible that Dziuba used the name of Zhabotinsky not only to remind his Jewish listeners of one of the greatest heroes of Zionism who against all odds supported Ukrainian independence, but also to remind himself of the same national democratic principles of Ukrainian-Jewish interaction that had been articulated by the then hardly known and therefore unnamed Ukrainian thinker.  

Thirty years later, prefacing the Ukrainian edition of Zhabotinsky, Dziuba called him the “Apostle of the Nation” and named that thinker whom he saw as the Ukrainian parallel to the reputed Zionist. It was nobody else but V’iacheslav Lypynsky.

Thus, in the 1970s – early 1980s, both in Diaspora and in Soviet Ukraine, political thought tended to abandon its irrational anti-Jewish bias, shifting to a more sober and indeed more sympathetic perception of the Jewish factor in Ukraine. The events in the GULAG were a major catalyst for this shift.

**National Democracy Behind Bars**

It was at the height of the Ukrainian dissident movement that the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter gained momentum. It manifested predominantly...
in the writings, appeals, and public actions of the Ukrainian dissidents who, unlike their Russian counterparts, focused more on the issue of national cultural revival as part and parcel of socialist democracy rather than on denationalized universal liberalism. The Ukrainian dissident movement seemed to level the differences between Jewish and Ukrainian human rights activists and emphasized similarities that bound them together vis-à-vis the government and state security committee apparatus. For those Ukrainian dissidents who sought ways to revive national spirituality supplanted by the chauvinistic policy of Russification, Jewish issues acquired paramount importance. Unexpectedly, Ukrainian dissidents chose to present the Jewish problem as a key to any further discussion of the national question in general and the Ukrainian question in particular.

After Dziuba, it became an unwritten obligation for a mature Ukrainian thinker to speak up on a variety of forms of Ukrainian-Jewish encounter. On the other hand, the genre of Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue underwent a major transformation: from a relatively free and legal discourse in the liberal circles of Ukrainian-Jewish intelligentsia it moved to the correction colonies of the GULAG. Shcherbyts’kyi era communists did not tolerate national democratic discourse. Their worldview was incompatible with any type of nationalism other than all-encompassing Soviet patriotism. Between 1967 and 1974, mass persecutions and arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents, moderate national-minded thinkers, and simply those who did not fit into the party concept of Ukrainian culture, replenished the camps of Ural and Mordovia with the crème of the crème of Ukrainian intelligen-

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99 See, for instance, the letter of prominent Ukrainian scholars and rank-and-file workers to Leonid Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary General protesting the violation of norms of legality in Ukrainian and Russian courts while considering the cases of human rights activists. In it, the names of Jews (Galanskov and Ginzburg) appear on a par with the names of Ukrainians (Chornovil). TRUSPD. Vol. 8. Pp. 226-229; Mykola Rudenko’s Memorandum of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group that mentions Serhienko, Vudka, and Krasniak together: TRUSPD. Vol. 8. P. 286. Yuri Lytvun’s article “The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine, its sources and perspectives” lists among the fathers-founders of the Helsinki groups in the USSR such activists as Ginzburg, Landa, Shcharansky. TRUSPD. Vol. 8. P. 345; Sviatoslav Karavansky’s letter of protest against the continuous scoffing of female dissidents by the KGB – the letter was signed by Jewish, Ukrainians, Armenians, and Lithuanians, see: Khronika taborovykh budniv. Munich, 1976. P. 110 (among those who signed the collective protest were Zalmanson, Kaminsky, Korenblit, Kheifets, Mykytko, Stus, Chornovil).
Simultaneously, the same correction colonies welcomed hundreds of Jewish liberal-minded dissidents and refusniks. The traditional “kitchen-talk” so common to the dissidents of the 1960s moved into a correction colony environment. The political predilections of most Ukrainian political inmates (who in their majority sympathized with or participated in OUN’s fight on two fronts against Nazis and Bolsheviks) were on Dontsov’s side. But, ironically, the GULAG reality was a twisted version of Lypyns’kyi’s poly-ethnic, not of Dontsov’s ethnically homogeneous realm.

Since the Ukrainian communist party cadre in 1949 supported Khrushchev’s rise to power, Khrushchev “returned the favor” in the 1950s and early 1960s by tacitly endorsing the Ukrainian Communist Party, returning to the Skrypnyk-like pre-World War II policies that favored Ukrainization of the governmental, military, economic, and cultural elite. This return inaugurated a new, albeit much less outstanding phase of the Ukrainian national renaissance, the first wave of which was brutally suppressed in the 1930s. At the same time, the denunciation of Stalinism, the rehabilitation of prominent Ukrainian cultural figures, and the widely announced “return” to Lenin’s principles of socialism generated the ideological endeavors of newly emerging Marxists such as Dziuba, who sought consistency in party politics and also required a return to Lenin’s principles in national policies. For the new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals the concoction of nationalism and communism still seemed an indispensable prerequisite for reform. Therefore, it was no wonder that this concoction informed the Ukrainian political discourse and triggered a radical reassessment of the Jews. However, as it happened with Dziuba, the Jewish theme unexpectedly brought Ukrainian “legal Marxists” far beyond the ideological framework in which for the time being they were allowed to function.

Sentenced for various terms in correction colonies, Ukrainian and Jewish dissidents did not hesitate to elaborate new forms of their dialogue. Ukrainians started the 1974 revolt in the Perm correction colony whereas Jews expediently supported it. In the notorious 35th Perm correction col-

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The spiritual leadership among inmates was assumed by Ivan Svitlychnyi, a leading Ukrainian literary figure and dissident, and Semion Hluzman (Gluzman), the correction colony “scribe,” both of whom headed the camp resistance. In some cases contacts with Ukrainian dissidents brought liberal-minded dissidents to a more pronounced participation in the national movement. For instance, Yosif Zisels, a human rights movement activist, began closely to cooperate with such Ukrainian dissidents as Nadia Svitlychna, the daughter of Ivan Svitlychnyi, the “father” of Ukrainian dissidents, with Opanas Zalyvakha, a painter, Vasyl’ Romaniuk, the future patriarch of Ukraine, and Mykhailo Horyn who, as Zisels observed, “had a serious impact on the rise of my national self-perception.” It was through and due to Horyn that Zisels started to collect materials on the abuses in Ukrainian psychiatric clinics. Viacheslav Chornovil reported with genuine sympathy and pride that a group of Jewish inmates managed to outwit and challenge the cruelty and stupidity of camp authorities by taking advantage of medical herbs growing in the camp. Borys Penson sympathetically registered the celebration of important dates in the Ukrainian dissident movement by his fellow Ukrainian inmates. He also depicted the activities of his fellow-inmates who swamped the authorities with their petitions demanding that the correction colony authorities allow Vasyl Stus, a Ukrainian poet of genius, seriously sick at that time, to obtain medicine from home – a luxury he was completely forbidden by local correction colony medical personnel.102

Both Chornovil and Penson independently recorded important cases of the joint Ukrainian-Jewish “social action.” For example, Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents, inmates from the 17th correction colony (joined by Russians and Lithuanians), sent an appeal to the Presidium of the CPSU Supreme Council, demanding that the politically-minded nationalists be kept separate from war criminals, former Nazi policemen who collaborated with Soviet correction colony authorities. When the repressions against Ukrainian dissidents acquired enormous proportions, a number of Jewish inmates in the correction colonies articulated their full-fledged support of the national movement in Ukraine in their written protest to the Presidium of the

Only the first issue of this Almanach has been published. To some extent, Yehupets became a continuation of this edition, continuing to publish regularly materials on the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter.

Supreme Council of the USSR. Since collective protests were forbidden in the GULAG, every Jewish inmate had to sign the following statement:

December 1, 1974 is the second-year anniversary of the arrests of a number of Ukrainian cultural figures, who were later accused and sentenced for lengthy terms of imprisonment, albeit their only crime was an intent to protect their national and cultural heritage. Since I am a Jew who seeks emigration to his historical motherland in Israel and who is sentenced for this desire alone, the strivings of the national-minded Ukrainians are dear to me, I share their arguments and their hopes, the sufferings of their nearest siblings and relatives. On the anniversary of their arrests, I protest their arrests and demand their release.104

Eventually, these new relations generated the rise of the new Ukrainian perception of the Jews. In December 1977, Yevhen Sverstiuk in his classical essay “The Grains of Ukrainian-Israeli ‘Solidarity’” gave this perception a brand new spin.

**Ukraine and Israel**

A remarkable Ukrainian poet, philologist, psychologist, and teacher of Ukrainian literature, for his political convictions Yevhen Oleksandrovych Sverstiuk (b. 1928) was repeatedly banished from the editorial boards of the Ukrainian journals where he served (1959, 1960, 1961, 1965). Like Dziuba, Sverstiuk also had to earn his living as a low-profile editor with a scholarly journal on botany. In 1972, Sverstiuk was arrested and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment and five years of internal exile for the distribution of Samizdat literature considered in the then USSR an insolent anti-Soviet propaganda activity. Between 1979 and 1988, Sverstiuk worked as a carpenter – first in exile in Buriatia and later in Kyiv.105 Significantly, in 1993, Sverstiuk penned one of the most insightful and profoundly poetic essays on Lypyn’s’kyi in which he contrasted Lypyn’s’kyi and Dontsov only to fully solidarize with the former’s stance on democracy, religion, and Ukrainian idealism.106 Back in 1977, Sverstiuk was but one of the prisoners of the Perm District correction colony. Perhaps his pronounced religious

104 Ibid. P. 121.
105 In 1990s, Sversiuk became a Ph.D. in philosophy, the chief editor of *Nasha Vira* (Our Creed) newspaper and a leading Ukrainian liberal theologian.
worldview brought him close to such religious-minded Zionists as Arye Vudka, Shimon Grilius, Mark Dymshits, and Yosif Mendelevich, – who, as Sverstiuk noted in regard to their spiritual steadfastness, were heads and shoulders above their sentenced brethren.107 A mere coincidence triggered the dialogue between Sverstiuk and Vudka that later grew into a long-lasting relationship in the spiritual journey of both of them.108

In the Perm camp 389/36, Sverstiuk met his fellow inmate Arie Vudka (b. 1947). Ten years after their first meeting, Vudka penned the following highly poetic and densely metaphoric recollection:

One of my brightest impressions from that other part of the world was Yevhen Sverstiuk, who was an angel in that hell. Here he comes, in his correction colony robe, deliberately whitened by bleach, and also in his bleached cap, with his bright clever eyes and a clear smile on his lips. Dirt does not stick to him nor does abomination and grayness, anguish and fear, hatred, anger, and roughness – all those things that permeate everything, even the air of that part of the world. In the dark stone coffin of his cell he composes verses that are as transparent as air and as fresh as spring. And he himself looks like a sunbeam in the deep darkness of the night.109

For Vudka, Sverstiuk was the embodiment of an aristocratic honor unheard of in the correction colony. Sverstiuk’s phenomenal human self-esteem challenged the surrounding slavery, depravity, and corruption. His challenging behavior could not but irritate the correction colony supervisors. The regime was not able to tolerate a Ukrainian speaking offspring of a Ukrainian peasant with a genuine aura of nobility. Yet the regime completely failed to destroy Sverstiuk. In his memoirs Vudka remarked:

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108 The contrast between Ukrainian-Jewish and Russian-Jewish themes in the writings of Jewish political inmates is striking. While Jewish memoirs about their Ukrainian fellow inmates are imbued with a deep sense of common spiritual bond, Jewish letters from prison to relatives that describe the rest of the GULAG inhabitants, mostly Russians, convey the feeling of brazen contempt if not hatred towards the Jews. Can this be explained by the difference of genre (memoirs versus letters) or is there something else to it? Cf.: Dni vozvrascheniia. Pis’ma iz sovetskoi tiur’my i lageria Arie Vudka, Shimon Griliusa, Iosifa Mendelevicha. Jerusalem, 1977.
Thus his very image presents a sharp rebuke and a direct accusation to all the devils and demons of the filthy hell imposed by Moscow. As if he was made not from dust and not taken from the ground like other mortals but rather was made from noble marble that suddenly came to life. Likewise, his books are filled with unworldly spirituality, kindness, and beauty. In his writings he uplifts himself to the heights so dear to him where the national cultural heritage was transformed into a universal treasury. It is a very rare opportunity to see a man whose words and deeds are so coherently integrated into a noble personality.

Sverstiuk and Vudka soon became close. Vudka, according to Sverstiuk, was an easy-going young man. His deep religious conviction brought him to a complete rejection of the Soviet regime and shaped his unbreakable will and persistence. The KGB officials hated him with unprecedented intensity whereas the inmates, particularly the religious ones of all creeds, felt a deep empathy for him.

In turn, Vudka’s consistent self-restraint and tranquility as well as his prodigious memory impressed Sverstiuk deeply. But nothing could impress Sverstiuk more than Vudka’s amazing knowledge of the Ukrainian language, which exceeded that of some Ukrainian inmates. In a country where most Jews (and not only Jews) were assimilated into the dominant Russian culture, the ability of a Jew to express himself in an exuberant Ukrainian displayed a clear-cut political message and flagged Vudka’s unrestricted support for the Ukrainian cause. No wonder that a number of Ukrainian literary figures that shared with Vudka the same correction colony entrusted him with smuggling their writings through the multi-level security system of the Soviet GULAG. Since a very effective search system made it almost impossible to smuggle anything put on paper, Vudka memorized the entire poetic texts of the Ukrainian dissidents, among which were poems by Sverstiuk and perhaps Vasyl Stus, a paradigmatic 20th century Ukrainian poet who never made it out of the GULAG. Later, already abroad, Vudka put on paper the memorized poetry and subsequently helped to publish it in a collection “Poetry from Behind the Barbed Wire: the Word of the Ukrainian Poets Sentenced by Moscow” (Munich, 1978). Before the 1990s, when Sverstiuk’s poetry finally reached his western audience by regular

110 Ibid. P. 155.

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mail, Ukrainian readers in the west – for example, in Canada – became acquainted with it due to Vudka, who recited it from memory and inscribed it on paper once in Israel. Sverstiuk depicted this deed of a Jew who saved priceless pieces of Ukrainian poetry from destruction, emphasizing not only its timeless cultural value but also the significance of its instant impact:

I think the redeemed texts were not merely saved for posterity. They were redeemed for contemporaneity, too. If a text appears at the end of the century it is one thing, but it is quite a different situation if it appears exactly when people are waiting for it. These texts were rescued in this second sense, namely, for contemporaries. The high priority information was redeemed. This information shaped the worldview of certain groups in society. It also conveyed unquestionable cultural values. I think it was a great mission to bring these cultural values through the impenetrable [GULAG] corridor where nothing could survive and where non-existence reigned.

Already in Israel, Vudka continued his dialogues with Ukrainians. In his historiographic essay Moskovshchyna, he devoted a chapter (no. 26) to paradoxes of modern Ukrainian history. It shows that Vudka learned a lot from his Ukrainian inmates whom he praised as “great heroes who did not crash”. Vudka correctly depicted collectivization as a by and large anti-Ukrainian action of the Moscow-based Soviet regime. He poignantly assessed the 1930s famine as “state orchestrated.” He portrayed Russian policy towards Ukraine as that of colonization and Russification based among other things on the practice of resettling Ukrainians outside the territory of Ukraine, simultaneously rescinding their right for Ukrainian education. Vudka strongly protested the policy of Russification of the language of instruction in higher educational establishments of Ukraine. This policy, he claimed, pushed aside the Ukrainian language and culture in favor of the mainstream Russian-based technical revolution. For Russian attitudes towards Ukraine Vudka did not find any other term but “ethnocide”.

113 Ibid. P. 360.
Although it is not clear what particular events prompted Sverstiuk to write his essay “The Grains of the Ukrainian-Israeli ‘Solidarity’”¹¹⁵ that has long become a classic of Ukrainian political thought, yet perhaps it was his fellow Jewish inmates, religious Zionists dreaming about aliyah, who inspired Sverstiuk’s theme, imagery, and metaphors. In his essay, Sverstiuk tended to justify the Ukrainian cause for the Jews, simultaneously persuading his imaginary readers that Ukrainian spirituality was incompatible with antisemitism. “To the best of my memory, Ukrainians of a different age and background have good attitudes towards Israel, despite the everyday [anti-Israeli] injections of radio and press.”¹¹⁶ Not only contemporary Ukrainian Jews of the 1970s, but also all Jews from all periods of the four-millennium-long Jewish history became a metaphor for the national destiny of the Ukrainian people. In his highly charged language, Sverstiuk related that Ukrainians and Jews have many commonalities. Ukrainians, too, were vagabonds and persecuted in their own land. And their land also did not belong to them. Having compared the two nations, Sverstiuk moved to a groundbreaking parallel between Ukraine and Israel. To a romanticized and politicized image of ancient Biblical Israel that Ivan Franko and Lesia Ukrainka transformed into a symbol of the struggle for Ukrainian independence and statehood, Sverstiuk added something new and no less pivotal for Ukrainian political experience: the concept of contemporary Israel with its continuous wars for national survival.¹¹⁷

To introduce this parallel, Sverstiuk suggested that, in fact, there had long existed some sort of bond between the two people. He dubbed it ukrain's'ko-zhydiv's'kyi alians:

Above all, I consider the Ukrainian-Jewish alliance from the ethical perspective as a turn towards positive sensibilities, as the dialogue of equals. These equal interlocutors, Jews and Ukrainians, threw off the false garb of imitating alien concepts, foreign truth, and somebody else’s interests; they stepped out from that slippery bridge that seemed to unite but in fact pitted them against one another, triggering cunning and hypocrisy. We wish Jews good, respect their holy sites, their promised land – they, too, wish us good and would like us to become the owners of our land.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ The first (anonymous) publication was in: Suchasnist. 1979. No. 6 (222). Pp. 107-113.
¹¹⁸ TRUSPD. Vol. 8. P. 298.
Perhaps following Dziuba’s paradigm, Sverstiuk underscored a tolerant and sympathetic attitude towards Jews in the poetry and narrative of such Ukrainian classics as Pavlo Hrabovs’kyi (1864-1902), Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi (1864-1913), and also pointed to Shevchenko’s support of the protest against the antisemitic diatribes of the Russian periodical *Illustratsia*.119

In the 1960-1970s, argued Sverstiuk, the literary “alliance” reflected in the literary works of Ukrainian and Jewish classic writers was fully realized in the Soviet correction colonies. There, however, the sublime literary symbolism gave way to the sober comparison of national existential experience. Like the Jews, Ukrainian fellow inmates of the Sverstiuk milieu were sentenced for their nationalist convictions. As refusniks who fought for free emigration, they sought to stop enforced Russification that suppressed Ukrainian national strivings. Like the Zionists, they cast their hopes in the utopian mold of a culturally and politically independent Ukraine. Ukrainian political inmates in the camps were people of dignity, perseverance, and genuine patriotism. Exactly the same qualities Sverstiuk found among the imprisoned Zionists. They, too, were people of strong will, unshaken conviction, and idealistic love of Israel, their spiritual motherland. The expectations of the Ukrainian dissidents evolved mostly in the realm of Ukrainian culture. Yet they believed that Ukrainian culture with its schools, press, and language was still a possibility within the USSR. Jews, noted Sverstiuk, were more courageous: they had no illusions in regard to the Jewish cultural revival under the USSR. For Sverstiuk, sensitive to religious-minded people, the observant Jewish Zionists were people of amazing spiritual and cultural breadth. Their desire to leave the USSR was a defiance that elevated them in their eyes and in the eyes of the Ukrainian prisoners whose motherland, Ukraine, still remained a colony.

Therefore, the Jewish lesson should never be lost on the Ukrainians. Sverstiuk’s reassessment of the Ukrainian human rights movement through the perspective of the Israeli fight for independence was the climax of his attempt to reconstruct a Ukrainian-Jewish alliance. This important coda transformed his essay from a vague reflection of a distant observer into a sharp political pamphlet charged with enthusiasm and hope. Moreover, it surpassed the framework of human rights parlance and reproduced the Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement in the national democratic context. His

was a dialogue of two conscientious, democratically-oriented, and independent people. Sverstiuk identified the milieu in which the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter was possible, namely, the milieu of Ukrainian and Jewish national-minded dissidents, non-conformist intellectuals, conscientious opponents of Russification and national oblivion, and *Kulturträgers*. The rest were not admitted into Sverstiuk’s elitist club of Ukrainian-Zionist imaginary brotherhood. Was it not but another twist of Lypyns’kyi’s conservative elitism?

**Christianity and Judaism**

Paradoxically, the GULAG did more to bring Jewish and Ukrainians together and make them speak to one another than the scattered groups of loosely connected dissidents outside it. The case of Semen Hluzman (b. 1947) helps to illuminate the point. A 25-year-old doctor of medicine, Hluzman was the only psychiatrist in the USSR who boldly dared to challenge the Soviet penitentiary system. He composed an extra-mural independent expert analysis of General Petro Hryhorenko (Peter Grigorenko, 1907-1987), a paramount Ukrainian dissident and leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, whom the corrupt and KGB-sponsored official Soviet psychiatrists diagnosed with schizophrenia, subsequently sentencing him to forced treatment in a prison-like Moscow clinic. Hluzman’s expertise, based on an in-depth study of the documents smuggled from the KGB and both direct and oblique testimonies made available for him, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hryhorenko was mentally healthy and that the treatment imposed on him was criminal and KGB-orchestrated. The regime could not ignore Hluzman’s challenge. On the basis of some fabricated accusations and false tes-

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120 For a brief survey of the activities of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, see: Liudmyla Alekseeva. Do piatyrichchia Ukrains’koi helsins’koi hrupy // Suchasnist. 1981. Vol. 11 (251). Pp. 56-59; Myroslav Prokop. Chy novyi etap ukrains’koho rukhu oporu? // Suchasnist. 1978. No. 6 (210). Pp. 83-91; Orest Subtel’ny. Ukraine: A History. 3rd ed. Toronto, 2000. Pp. 517-521. I disagree with Subtel’ny’s assumption that the movement failed to attract widespread support because its participants “did not formulate a coherent political program”. Subtel’ny seems to forget about the perception of any “political program” by the KGB and party authorities. First, their program was the 1975 Helsinki Act: members of the group viewed themselves as authorized to supervise the implementation of this Act and therefore did not need a program. On the other hand, had they formulated a coherent program, they would have been sentenced for the alleged attempt to overthrow the regime (as earlier Levko Lukianenko) rather than for less dangerous anti-Soviet propaganda.
timonies, Hluzman was arrested and sentenced to seven years of imprison-
ment and three years of exile for his “anti-Soviet propaganda”, although it
was only too well known that the real reason for his arrest was his “extra-
mural expert analysis” of Hryhorenko.

Brought up in a milieu of Jewish intellectuals so assimilated, as he indi-
cated, into the Russian culture that he spoke Russian to Vasyl Stus, the
greatest of the Ukrainian poets of the second half of the 20th century, with
whom he shared a cell, in prison Hluzman underwent a significant transfor-
mation. The arrest and subsequent circumstances immensely contributed to
the fermentation of Hluzman’s identity as the Ukrainian Jew. It was in the
31st correction colony in Ural that Hluzman met Ukrainians sentenced for
25 years for their participation in Stepan Bandera’s armed resistance. Their
statistical quantity and unique human qualities left Hluzman stunned. As
he penned in his correction colony memoirs, “here I saw the genuine
Ukraine”.121 Behind bars Hluzman became particularly sensitive to the Ukrai-
nian-Jewish encounter. He recollected how Jews in the correction colony
celebrated Israeli Independence Day with a pot of tea (one of the best known
commodities, given the meager correction colony cuisine) and inviting ev-
everybody to join them. Hluzman’s memory captured the image of Vasyl Pri-
us, the former participant of the Bandera military resistance who congratu-
lated the Jews on that occasion. Hluzman wrote: “…and he added some
words – they seemed to me indelibly hopeless yet imbued with astonishing
faith – that Ukraine, God willing, will also celebrate its day of indepen-
dence.”122 Ukrainian inmates considerably shaped Hluzman’s intellectual
and cultural predilections. Vasyl’ Stus (1938-1985) sang to him Ukrainian
songs. Ivan Svitlychny (1929-1992), entitled the father of the Ukrainian
dissident movement, shaped Hluzman’s intellectual horizon introducing him
to works on Medieval and Renaissance studies as well as to the Tartu semi-
otic school. Last but not least, Igor Kalynets (b. 1939), the Ukrainian poet
and dissident from L’viv, introduced Hluzman to the best Ukrainian poetry
of the 1920s.

In the correction colony Hluzman discovered that nobody else but his
Ukrainian fellow inmates sentenced for their strong stance on the Ukraini-
an national issues were his first and foremost brethren. Apparently due to
his new acquaintances, Hluzman started to reformulate his Jewish identity,
imitating the self-perception of politically cognizant and spiritually mature Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s who had been fighting, arms in hand, for their land. In his bitter letter to his parents (who bemoaned his dissident activities) he rejected a victimized self-identity based exclusively on Holocaust memoirs and emphasized his new Zionist-like commitments to his people in Israel able to militarily protect themselves. Simultaneously, Hluzman began composing poetry and narrative in Ukrainian. In the 1990s, Hluzman arrived at a new Jewish Ukrainian identity, reached spiritual maturity and, according to Zinovii Antoniuk, became a paramount figure in human rights reforms in Ukraine. His activities and personal example taught others how to overcome societal and individual fear of the authorities with their entire machinery of terror. That a leading Ukrainian human rights thinker and activist as Antoniuk chose nobody else but a Jew for the paradigmatic example of “the role of an individual in modern Ukraine” was particularly significant and by no means random. Generally, Antoniuk’s sharp essays on Jewish issues appear to be responses to the “Hluzman phenomenon”.

It seems that Hluzman’s presence on the Ukrainian political scene had a noteworthy impact on Antoniuk’s subsequent spiritual itinerary. Perhaps in his essay “Do We Need Today a Jewish-Christian Dialogue?”, surely to become a classic of the genre, Antoniuk applied a profoundly critical approach to ideological myths and received perceptions so characteristic of Hluzman. Also, the main theme of this essay – the psychology of self-perception with all its psychological ramifications – betrays the possible impact of Hluzman’s “psychiatric” approach to intellectual issues. Yet, what seemed to remain within the frame of normalcy for such a rational skeptic as Hluzman, was amazingly courageous and far-fetched for such a Christian as Antoniuk.

123 The letter was considered so important in the Ukrainian Diaspora circles that it was published as: Lyst S. F. Hluzmana dla vidkrytoi publikatsii // Suchasnist. 1975. No. 6 (174). Pp. 103-107.
126 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the subsequent Judeo-Christian encounter in Ukraine followed the intellectual patterns elaborated by Antoniuk, see: Leonid Finberh, Myroslav Marynovych (Eds.). Iudeo-khrystyans’kyi dialoh v Ukraini: stenohrama seminaru (19-20 kvitnia 1999 r., m. L’viv). Kyiv, L’viv, 1999.
In his “Do We Need Today a Jewish-Christian Dialogue?” Antoniuk was not only critical of traditional Christian anti-Jewish bias, he was sarcastic about it. It goes without saying that in the traditional Christian teleology “Old Israel,” the Jews, had fallen from grace with the coming of Jesus, whom they rejected. On the contrary, New Israel, i.e., the Christians, acquired divine grace, spreading it to the world. Starting from Aurelius Augustine, the Bishop of Hippon (354-430), the only reason Christians should tolerate Jews was their unique status of witnesses of His Coming. Yet even Augustine underscored that the Jews sinned by refusing to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, and for that sin should be kept low in society. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274), with all his rational approach to the issue, also confirmed that Jews were guilty, having refused to believe in Jesus. Eastern Orthodox Church fathers such as John Chrysostom (ca. 347-407) went even further than that, claiming that Old Israel, the Jews, had no right to exist and should definitively perish.128

Indeed, the decisions of the 1962-1965 Second Vatican Council dramatically altered those perceptions. Antoniuk attempted to apply some decisions of the new Vatican policies to the Ukrainian case. He argued that Old Israel, the Jews, by remaining faithful to their tradition for centuries, saved their own dignity – and by default the dignity of the Abrahamic legacy in the Christian world. On the contrary, by dooming the Jews, Christians had lost their dignity and caused their own moral downfall that nearly completely destroyed Christianity. The Holocaust embodies this ethical crisis. It led to the physical destruction of the Jews and to the moral collapse of Christianity. Jews did not need the ex post facto and very much condescending post-war attitude of Christians. Rather, Christians themselves needed to dialogue with Jews to overcome their own ethical crisis and to uplift their fallen sense of dignity. Ironically, only dialogue with “semi-beaten, semi-burnt, semi-converted stiff-necked Judaic Israel” could save the face of the “invincible Christian Israel,” claimed Antoniuk.

For Antoniuk, embarking on an intellectual dialogue did not imply an attempt to avoid the ignominious role performed by Ukrainian Christians.

Y. Petrovsky-Shtern, *Reconceptualizing the Alien...*

during the Holocaust. As he argued, given that 20-25 percent of all Jewish victims of the Holocaust perished in the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian contribution to Nazi *Judenfrei* “utopia” seemed enormous. He asks bitterly: where were the Christians of Ukraine? Antoniuk relates how a Jewish family from his native Helm sheltered him, a native Ukrainian, and his Ukrainian family when Nazis kicked them out of their home penniless. Jews supported the Antoniuk’s, too, when their mother was taken to the hospital diagnosed with typhus. But the Antoniuk’s did nothing when Nazis took their redeemers to the ghetto, later brutally slaughtering them near Helm. Therefore, argues Antoniuk, it was not God Almighty who turned his back on the Jews. It was the Christian world that turned its back on them. Jews did not betray the Unified Ethical One; Christians did – by renouncing the Jews. At that point Antoniuk’s essay crossed the limits of the genre and turned into a penitential prayer.

While Western Christianity, first and foremost Catholicism and Protestantism, accomplished a good deal to establish equal dialogue with the Jews, Eastern Christianity, continued Antoniuk, had done next to nothing in this respect. The latter still remained in the mythological realm, such as the laughable fantasy of its uniqueness and exclusiveness. These myths required a dictatorial monologue in relation to the Other, not dialogue. But the genuine tradition was that of a dialogue between Abraham and God, not God’s dictate. Christians, if they want to remain Christians, had no moral right to impose their worldview on the Jews. There was no such thing as standard or exclusive ethics. Christians had to realize that the truth, the final and profound truth, lay in diversity. Yet the Christian Bible, reinterpreting the Hebrew text, looking at it through a Greek lens, had eliminated this diversity establishing the canonic reading, understanding, and interpretation of the Hebrew Bible. Paraphrasing the famous Biblical metaphor, Antoniuk claimed that Christians should finally stop looking at the Hebrew Bible through the dark glass of the Greeks. Christians in general and Ukrainian Christians in particular should acknowledge the spiritual equality of Judaism – not only the civic equality of the Jews. Eastern Christianity should find it incumbent upon itself to get rid of anti-Jewish, pagan-like sensibilities. “It is crucial to understand that the presence of Jews and Judaism in Ukraine is natural and that it forms part of the Ukrainian self-identity.” Ukraine, finally, had to cure itself of its anti-Judaic complexes. Ukrainian Christians had to step forward and pray for the well-being, national integrity, and religious traditions of the Jews – as once three Christian inmates, a Ukrainian, a Russian, and a Belorussian, prayed for their fellow inmates,
Jews among them, during the uprising of political prisoners in the Perm correction colony no. 35.129

**The Impact of the Gulag Encounter**

Western observers closely followed the unprecedented encounter between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents and at a certain point began actively to participate in it. The Munich-based Ukrainian publishers contributed considerably to the Ukrainian-Jewish cause issuing “The Islands of Empathy”, a collection of Jewish inmates’ memoirs on prominent Ukrainian dissidents,130 as well as “The Chronicle of the Correction Colony Routine”, combining under the same cover the brief notes and memoirs of a Ukrainian and a Jew, Viacheslav Chornovil and Borys Penson.131 The former was a well-known journalist sentenced for anti-Soviet activities and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist propaganda. The latter was a painter who joined the famous “aircraft” group of the refusniks (the so-called samoletchiki) who found themselves psychologically and economically in such a desperate situation that they attempted to highjack a Soviet aircraft in order to fly to Israel. The book underscored a lot of similarities in political preferences, attitudes to correction colony authorities, self-perception, and personal dignity between Ukrainian and Jewish inmates portrayed by Chornovil and Penson. If not for the editorial “labels” informing the reader who was represented on the page, it might have been difficult to differentiate between Penson’s and Chornovil’s voices.132

At present, it is hardly possible to encompass all the personal links and intellectual interactions between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents. In fu-

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129 Ibid. P. 358-359.
132 After the publication of the book written in cooperation with Borys Penson, the Jewish-Ukrainian encounter continued to attract Chornovil. Exiled in 1980s, he worked in the Yakutsk archives on the period of imprisonment in the life of Pavlo Hrabovsky, a Ukrainian classic writer and poet. Chornovil’s description of the tsarist prisons reads like a direct comparison between tsarist and Soviet penitential systems – a comparison not in favor of the latter. Amazingly, Chornovil discovered and underscored that Grabovsky was surrounded by, became friendly with, and wrote in his letters about many Jewish inmates imprisoned for their populists or revolutionary activities. See: Pavlo Grabovsky v irkuts’kii viaznytsi (1889-1892) [Lysty politzaslantsiv z arkivy M. O. Ozhigova], [Oberezhno: klasyka!] // Viacheslav Chornovil. Tvory v desiaty tomakh. Kyiv, 2002. No. 1. P. 230-334.
ture, this theme may become the subject of a separate monograph. Sooner or later the former KGB may declassify its archives and a wealth of new information become available. I would not be surprised if what emerges is that in the 1970s and 1980s the KGB officials closely followed (metaphorically and literally) the cooperation between Ukrainian and Jewish dissidents. Perhaps the archives will shed light on the personal relations between the Ukrainian writer and journalist Valerii Marchenko (1947-1984) and Alik Feldman, a Zionist activist from Kyiv.\textsuperscript{133} Intercepted letters of Valentyn Moroz to Arie Vudka may come to light that will add a personal facet to Moroz’s denial of antisemitism and his profound sympathy for the steadfastness of the Jewish people at the outset of his political career.\textsuperscript{134} Personal files would probably illuminate the mutual sympathy of Levko Lukianenko\textsuperscript{135} and Aleksander Podrabinik, the editor of the Moscow-based \textit{Ekspres-Khronika}, as well as Lukianenko’s sarcastic response to the antisemitic bias of some Russian human rights activists.\textsuperscript{136} There is a drastic need to footnote the memoirs of Leonid Pliushch, who underwent an amazing itinerary from his “international antisemitism” to close friendship with Borys Kochubievs’kyi, the Zionist, Semen Hluzman, the human rights activist, and for whom regular visits to Baby Yar became a manifestation of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter.\textsuperscript{137} The reports of prison and correction colonies stool-pigeons would provide more detail on the relations between

\textsuperscript{133} For a brief reflection upon their friendship, see: Valerii Marchenko. Lysty do materiz nevoli. Kyiv, 1994. P. 349.
\textsuperscript{135} Levko Lukianenko (Lev Hryhorovych Lukianenko, b. 1928) was an MGU-trained attorney who after graduating became a staff party agitator in Galicia and later a professional lawyer in L’viv District. He made an attempt to use the opportunities offered by the Soviet Constitution to launch a campaign for the peaceful separation of Ukraine from the USSR. Eventually, he was accused of plotting against the Soviet Power and sentenced to capital punishment, committed to 15 years in prison. For more detail on his case, see: Ukraiins’ky iyuryisty pid sudom KGB [Ukrainian Lawyers Prosecuted by the KGB]. Munich, 1968. P. 24-88.
the renowned Zionist Natan (Anatolii) Shcharansky, who among other things knew Ukrainian, and Bohdan Klymchak, a Ukrainian nationalist, whose sympathetic portrait Shcharansky traced in his memoirs. Archives, if not personal interviews, would reopen the most interesting episodes in the lives of such “legal dissidents” as Miron Petrovs’ky, a literary critic and writer of Jewish descent, and his closest friend Vadym Skuratovs’kyi, a leading Ukrainian intellectual of the last quarter of the 20th century, whose impact manifested in Skuratovs’kyi’s numerous publications on Jewish literature, history, and culture. A future researcher would want to discuss at length the memoirs of Avraam Shifrin, a high-ranking Soviet engineer arrested and sentenced for state treason, who reflected about “tight” and “cordial” Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the correction colony. He left insightful memoirs about Volodymyr Horbovyi, a lawyer committed to the Ukrainian cause; Ivan Dolishnyi, “hard as a diamond,” who fought the Bolsheviks; Yevhen Hrytsak, a person of an “innate generosity” who headed a powerful mass uprising against the colony authorities.

On the eve of Ukrainian political independence, Yosif Zisels, the leader of the Ukrainian Jewish community in the 1990s and former member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, wrote in the Israeli Krug journal (no. 602, February, 1989):

What is the cause of this apparently unexpected attitude toward the Jews in Ukraine? There are many ways to explain its reasons, the most important of which is that the leadership of the Ukrainian national-democratic movement has long included educated and intelligent people. They are Viacheslav Chornovil, Levko Lukianenko, Yevhen Sverstiuk, Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Oles Shevchenko, Serhii Naboka. “Prisoners of Zion,” imprisoned in the correction colonies for political convictions in Mordovia and Ural, would confirm the benevolent attitude towards Jews from the side of these and many other Ukrainian political inmates.

Zisels was among the first to point out to the unique form of the Jewish-Ukrainian encounter behind the bars of the Shcherbyts’kyi era GULAG.

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Subsequent publications of the memoirs and journalism of former dissidents, as we have seen, confirmed his pioneering insight.

**Legalizing New Perceptions**

The August 1991 events brought Jewish issues straight into the midst of those responsible for policy-making decisions in the first months of the independent Ukrainian state. The Appeal of the Supreme council of Ukraine to the citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities issued on August 28, 1991, was one of the first (if not the first) documents featuring Jews adopted in Ukraine immediately after the failure of the anti-Gorbachov coup. It mentioned Jews among other nationalities of Ukraine, second only to Russians. It claimed that the previous regime oppressed the spiritual lives, languages and cultures of the nations of Ukraine and claimed that a new period of inter-ethnic relations had begun. Lypyns’kyi’s legacy became an essential part of the Ukrainian intellectual revival. This was a period when Lypyns’ky’s concepts and ideas – moreover, his suggestions regarding governmental *modus operandi* – began penetrating Ukrainian political decision-making. The Lypynsky East European Institute in Philadelphia and the Archeographic Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv supported by the Ukrainian Legal Foundation launched an ambitious project to publish a 25-volume edition of Lypyns’kyi’s works. As Yevhen Sverstiuk noted, “the Lypyns’kyi’s season has come”.

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The subsequent events proved that governmental intentions went far beyond mere rhetoric. On September 10, 1991, the Ukrainian government declared its intent to commemorate nationally the 50th anniversary of the Baby Yar massacre and acknowledged its share in the guilt of the Holocaust in Ukraine. On September 13, 1991, the then President Leonid Kravchuk had talks with the representatives of leading Israeli business companies.\(^{145}\) On 25 December 1991, Israel recognized Ukrainian independence and on 26 December the two countries established diplomatic relations. Less than a year after the establishment of diplomatic relations, in September, 2002, Israel welcomed the Ukrainian Parliamentary delegation and in the same month Itskhak Shamir met with President Kravchuk.\(^{146}\) The “di-asporization” of the Ukrainian politics transferred to Ukraine more than one undertaking previously taking place in the west. Starting from 1991, Ukrainian-Israeli conferences, featuring the crème of the Ukrainian and Jewish intellectual elite, became part of modern Ukrainian cultural discourse.\(^{147}\) These congresses underscored similarities between two national states, Ukraine and Israel, and indicated the crucial significance of the Israeli experience in state building for Ukraine. In January, 1993, Leonid Kravchuk, appeared in the Israeli Knesset where he reiterated that Ukraine “guaranteed equal rights to different nations and defended their ethnical, cultural, linguistic and religious peculiarities.” Finally, the speech of President Kravchuk at the International Conference on Antisemitism in Brussels, on 7 July 1992, reiterated the Ukrainian government’s strong will to promote the development of Jewish life in Ukraine and combat antisemitism.\(^{148}\)

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Kravchuk’s presentation in Bruxelles was perhaps the pinnacle of the reassessment of the Jews in Ukrainian political thought. The 2001 President Kuchma speech on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Baby Yar massacres proved that Kravchuk’s bold political undertaking created a significant precedent for further development of Ukrainian-Jewish political discourse. Back in 1992, Kravchuk made several points that illuminate the amazing itinerary of the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue from outcast dissidence to the central political theme. Kravchuk emphasized that the previous regime left behind nothing but distorted national and inter-ethnic relations policies. Therefore the new government had to begin from scratch, establishing a legal basis for national relations. In this context, reshaping Ukrainian-Jewish relations acquired particular importance. The co-existence of both people that lasted for two millennia emphasized their common destiny and common sufferings despite their religious, social, and cultural differences. Both people were victims of the same type of persecutions, namely, assimilation and ethnocide. The events of 1991 emphasized once again the commonality between Jews and Ukrainians. The first years of the national Ukrainian renaissance coincided with the rise of Jewish national culture and national educational, scholarly, and communal institutions. The Baby Yar tragedy was of particular significance in this context. Kravchuk reiterated that Ukraine had acknowledged its share of guilt in the massacre and apologized before the Jewish people for the injustices committed towards them in the course of Ukrainian history. Nowadays, he mentioned, Ukraine has banished antisemitism from its state and public discourse. It established firm diplomatic and cultural relations with Israel and disassociated itself from the UNO resolution that identified Zionism with racism.\(^{149}\)

**Conclusions**

*Sensu strictu*, by the 1990s Symon Petliura’s dazzling dream “to create the literature that analyzes and deepens the cause of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in people’s mentality” did not crystallize. However, in a metaphorical sense his dream came true. The generation of Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960s and the harbingers of their ideas in the Diaspora found themselves in

\(^{149}\)TRUSPD. Vol. 9. Pp. 275-280. It is important to mention in this regard that Ukrainian Diaspora journalists were among the first to protest the blatantly antisemitic resolution of UNO identifying Zionism as racism, see: Andrii Zvarun, Bohdan Iasen. Stanovyschche do antysionists’koi rezoliutsii ON // Suchasnist. 1976. Vol. 1 (181). P. 123-124.
a new environment that generated a brand-new dialogic genre focused on Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Abandoning some ineffective schemes of the encounter between Ukrainians and Jews registered and immortalized by Dontsov, Ukrainian journalists, political thinkers, inmates, writers, and poets, whether consciously or not, began formulating the Ukrainian-Jewish relations in full accord with V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi’s vision of Ukraine as a poly-ethnic political and territorial entity with more than one contributing culture. In their oral discourse reflected in prison diaries and memoirs, as well as in written essays, Ukrainian thinkers began re-imagining Jews as a nation with its own fascinating millennia-long history and national dignity, not as ghettoized second-class imperial subjects or subservient agents of the powers colonizing Ukraine. Ukrainians and Jews perceived themselves as people with shared tragic histories and sufferings and bound by shared guilt. Ukrainian dissidents began perceiving Jews as a nation with its own national territory, a developing concept of statehood, and a record of century-long commitment to, and fearless fight for that territory. Israel has emerged as a major metaphor in the dialogue between the two people. The entire Jewish history before the establishment of the State in 1948 came to symbolize the Ukrainian historical itinerary towards forthcoming state independence. That Jewish inmates, unlike a good many Ukrainians expressed their unrestricted sympathy and respect for those Ukrainians who served in the Bandera troops performed a paramount role in cementing the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue behind bars, emphasizing the unconditional right of the Ukrainian people to fight for its own land. The dialogue brought some Ukrainian thinkers to the rediscovery of Judaism not as an inferior proto-Christian heresy but as a harmonious philosophical and religious system, as an inexhaustible source of spirituality and wisdom. Ukrainian thinkers discovered in Jews the Other with whom they could promptly identify. While speaking to one another they realized that philosemitism was a part of the Ukrainian cultural tradition (another favorite word from Lypyns’kyi’s lexicon) of which they were the harbingers and not a provisional view voiced by marginalized writers.

The Ukrainian dissident movement was different from the USSR’s democratically-oriented human rights movement due to the enormous significance of the national issues within it. Emphasizing the physical survival of Israel and the future revival of Ukrainian statehood, Jewish and Ukrainian thinkers disassociated themselves from both liberal-minded “internationalist” dissidents on the one side and chauvinistic-minded dissidents on the
other. Post-1991 political events in Ukrainian-Jewish and Ukraine-Israel relations were nothing else but the implementation and bringing to fruition of the ideas elaborated by the inmates and legal dissidents of the 1960s-1970s. Yet one should not be too optimistic. However multi-level, the second-half-of-the-20th century rapprochement between Ukrainians and Jews became the cause of few, not the cause of many. Its new ideological patterns remained incomprehensible to the vast majority of the population of Ukraine. And the intellectual achievements of the participants of that dialogue, albeit widely published after 1991, were not destined to reach out to rank-and-file Ukrainians for whom the traditional one-sidedness and xenophobia of the century-long communist ideology made it much easier to absorb the ideology of Dontsov rather than that of Lypyns’kyi. The itinerary of some prominent Ukrainian dissident-nationalists such as Valentyn Moroz who, seeking an expansion of his political outreach, switched to an unabashed antisemitism testified that Dontsov’s ideology still prevails in the mass Ukrainian nationalist movement. Also, recent events such as Levko Lukianenko’s ignominious publication defiantly accusing Jews (among whom Stalin was listed) in artificially orchestrating the 1931-1932 Ukrainian famine has demonstrated that the “Lypyns’kyi vector” in modern Ukrainian national minority politics is not necessarily irreversible and that the “Dontsov schism” remains an open and dangerous possibility.

The emphasis on Ukrainian literary philosemitism, on common sufferings and victimization, on the Baby Yar symbolism, and on the new type of Israeli-Ukrainian realities flagged the astounding impact of the reconceptualizing of the Jew started by Ukrainian dissidents in the GULAG and scholars of the Lypyns’kyi school in the west on modern Ukrainian politi-


151 For more detail on Moroz’s shift to the antisemitic and anti-Israeli stance, see the reaction of his former fellow inmate Yakiv Suslens’kyi [Suslensky]. Antysemityzm? Nu i shcho? // Dialogy. 1984. Vol. 4-5. Pp. 3-35.
But has this discourse resonated within Ukrainian modern thinking? Has it struck roots in the new independent soil? Has it remained only within the boundaries of the dissident milieu, or spread among those politicians who silently sympathized with it? From that viewpoint the post-1991 development of the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter deserves a separate conversation. Yet, already at this point, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Back in 1980s the sound metaphor “The Islands of Empathy,” taken as a title for the book of Jewish-Ukrainian GULAG memoirs, captured a new shift in Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Nowadays it would not be an exaggeration to claim that the Ukrainian-Jewish encounter remains the Lypyns’kyi island in the Dontsov sea. Preserving this island and preventing its erosion should become one of the high-priority responsibilities of the Ukrainian political élite.

**SUMMARY**

Образование независимой Украины совпало с радикальным переосмыслением еврейской темы и опыта украинско-еврейских контактов украинской политологии. После 1991 г. еврейские сюжеты стали неотъемлемой частью украинского исторического и политико-философского нарратива. Однако процесс переоценки еврейского исторического опыта украинскими мыслителями начался задолго до развала советской империи. Этот процесс был задан двумя крупными украинскими философами – Вячеславом Липинским и Дмитро Донцовым. Липинскому Украина представлялась полиэтнической монархией, опирающейся на патриотизм проживающих в Украине этносов и национальных групп (т. н. “территориальное самосознание”). Украина Донцова была тоталитарным, этнически гомогенным образованием. Рецепция еврейской темы украинскими мыслителями, политическими деятелями, журналистами, учеными и диссидентами напрямую зависела от выбранной ими “липинской” или “донцовской” мыслительной парадигмы. В 1930-х – 1950-х гг., под прямым воздействием “донцов-

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152 It should be noted that many former dissidents became visible as legal, social, and political leaders: Sverstiuk became the president of the Ukrainian PEN-club; Antoniuk became the co-chairman of the Council of Ukrainian-American Bureau for Human Rights and the director of the prestigious “Sfera” publishing house; Hluzman headed the Association of Psychiatrists of Ukraine; Lukianenko became the leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party; Chornovil headed the Rukh of Ukraine; Dziuba became a minister of culture.