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1800 to the Present
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THE CAMBRIDGE
WORLD HISTORY OF
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VOLUME IV
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Contents

List of Figures and Maps  page xi
List of Contributors to Volume IV  xii

Introduction to Volume IV  1
LOUISE EDWARDS (UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SYDNEY),
NIGEL PENN (UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN) AND JAY WINTER
(YALE UNIVERSITY)

PART I
RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALISM  19

1 · Empires and Indigenous Worlds: Violence and the Pacific Ocean,
1760 to 1930s  21
PATRICIA O’BRIEN (ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES)

2 · Heresy and Banditry: Religious Violence in China since 1850  41
THOMAS DAVID DUBOIS (FUDAN UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE)

3 · Violence, Non-Violence, the State and the Nation: India, 1858–1958  68
KAMA MACLEAN (UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES) AND
BENJAMIN ZACHARIAH (UNIVERSITY OF TRIER)

4 · Racial Violence in the United States since the Civil War  88
JASON MORGAN WARD (EMORY UNIVERSITY)

5 · Religion and Violence in Modern South Asia  110
MARK JUERGENSMeyer (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA)

6 · Coercion and Violence in the Middle East  125
HAMIT BOZARSLAN (ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES)
PART II
INTIMATE AND GENDERED VIOLENCE 145

7 · A Global History of Sexual Violence 147
JOANNA BOURKE (BIRKBECK COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON)

8 · Sexual Violence against Children: A Global Perspective 168
LISA FEATHERSTONE (UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND)

9 · Homicide in a Global Perspective: Between Marginalisation
and Resurgence 187
PIETER SPIERENBURG (ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM)

10 · Violence and Sport, 1800–2000 207
EMMA GRIFFIN (UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA)

PART III
WARFARE, COLONIALISM AND EMPIRE
IN THE MODERN WORLD 225

11 · Frontier Violence in the Nineteenth-Century British Empire 227
AMANDA NETTELBECK (UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, AUSTRALIA)
AND LYNDALL RYAN (UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA)

12 · Genealogies of Modern Violence: Arendt and Imperialism
in Africa, 1830–1914 246
BENJAMIN CLAUDE BROWER (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN)

13 · Religious Dynamics and the Politics of Violence in the Late
Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Levant 263
HANS-LUKAS KIESER (UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA,
AND UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH)

14 · Violence and the First World War 286
BRUNO CABELANES (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

15 · Witnessing and Fighting Nazi Violence during World War II 304
JOCHEN HELLBECK (RUTGERS UNIVERSITY)

16 · Violence and the Japanese Empire 326
TAKASHI YOSHIDA (WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY)
PART IV
THE STATE, REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 345

17 · Change and Continuity in Collective Violence in France, 1780–1880 347
Peter McPhee (University of Melbourne) and Jeremy Teow (Princeton University)

18 · Geographies of Genocide: The European Rimlands, 1912–1948 367
Mark Levene (University of Southampton)

19 · Concentration Camps 386
Dan Stone (Royal Holloway, University of London)

20 · Violence in Revolutionary China, 1949–1963 408
Zhou Xun (University of Essex)

21 · Anti-Communist Violence in Indonesia, 1965–1966 427
Gerry van Klinken (University of Amsterdam)

22 · The Violence of the Cold War 449
Heonik Kwon (Trinity College, University of Cambridge)

23 · Quotidian Violence in the French Empire, 1890–1940 468
James P. Daughton (Stanford University)

24 · Violence, the State and Revolution in Latin America 490
Robert H. Holden (Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia)

25 · Structural Violence during the Cambodian Genocide, 1975–1979 510
James A. Tyner (Kent State University)

26 · The Origins of Modern Terrorism 532
Randall D. Law (Birmingham-Southern College, Birmingham, Alabama)
PART V
REPRESENTATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF VIOLENCE 559

27 · Criminal Violence and Culture in Europe 561
CLIVE EMSLEY (OPEN UNIVERSITY)

28 · Extreme Violence in Western Cinema 580
JAMES KENDRICK (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

29 · Representing Violence through Media 598
JOLYON MITCHELL (UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH)

30 · ‘Never Forget that This Has Happened’: Remembering and Forgetting Violence 616
JOY DAMOUSI (UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE), JORDANA SILVERSTEIN (UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE) AND MARY TOMSIC (UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE)

Index 637
Figures and Maps

Figures

2.1 Qing troops storming the Taiping capital of Nanjing. Universal Images Group / Getty Images. page 48
2.2 ‘Starving people looting grain’. Universal Images Group / Getty Images. 54
2.3 Boxers in Beijing, 1900. Universal Images Group / Getty Images. 55
2.4 Looting of the Catholic church in Shenyang, 1900. Universal History Archive / Getty Images. 57
2.5 Execution of a Boxer in Beijing. Universal Images Group / Getty Images. 58
2.6 Propaganda serial depicting the crimes of the Way of Penetrating Unity. Xinsheng Wanbao, April 1951, reproduced in DuBois, Sacred Village, p. 136. Author’s collection. 61
2.7 A 2011 protest by members of Falungong in Copenhagen. Francis Dean / Getty Images. 64

Map

2.1 Late Qing China, showing the approximate location of major religious rebellions. Drawn by the author. page 44
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Introduction to Volume IV

LOUISE EDWARDS, NIGEL PENN AND JAY WINTER

Technology and Violence

The two centuries from 1800 to the present day are marked by the increasing efficiency of the means by which humans inflict violence. The myriad causes of violence differ little, if at all, from the other periods analysed in the first three volumes of this collection – greed, envy, lust, anger, vanity and shame produce interpersonal violence while differences in race, language, religion, class or creed are common prompts justifying mass-scale violence. The novel aspect of the years explored in this volume largely revolves around the impact on violence of technological advances. The energy unleashed in the Industrial Revolution spurred the rapid growth in technologies supporting the execution, organisation, annotation and representation of violence from 1800. The digital revolution of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries accelerated many of these trends with the advent of the capacity to move information instantaneously around the globe. This volume examines the impacts of this technology-enhanced efficiency with its large-scale acts of violence – mass deaths in minutes – hitherto unseen in human history. It also tracks the ways that increased access to stories of and information about violence has changed public perceptions of the parameters of legitimate violence at both the mass and the interpersonal level. The decreasing public appetite for violence exists simultaneously with expanding, new forms of leisure which have rendered representations of violence banal.

Technological advances in transportation and weaponry gave European powers with expansionist aspirations the capacity to consolidate their hold on vast swathes of other people’s lands in the nineteenth century. The great empires that had typified new forms of global organisation in the centuries 1500–1800 (discussed in Volume III) appeared set to continue in the nineteenth century with these new tools of travel and force. Technological change
facilitated a rapid expansion in the geographies of empire. The entire South Asian subcontinent came firmly under Britain’s control through the 1800s, while the French extended their control over territory in North, West and Central Africa, in countries as diverse as present-day Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and Madagascar during this same century. The advance of military technology was so dramatic that, where in 1800 conflicts were fought with hand-held swords or bayonets and manually primed cannon, by the 2000s heat-seeking missiles and armed robots called drones are commonplace in inter-state conflicts. Scientific advances produced efficiencies in warfare such that 240,000 people could be destroyed by just two nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki only three decades after aeroplanes first featured in conflict. At the start of the 1800s, belligerents faced each other before attack, while our current conflicts are conducted from computers on desktops thousands of miles away from the target zone. As controllers of robots perpetrate long-distance violence, light-weight, rapid fire, semi-automatic guns designed for military conflict are brought into American schools to settle petty, personal scores in fits of youthful rage – warzone equipment has become a violent ‘personal accessory’.

The techniques and technologies developed through the 1800s and 1900s in the consolidation of empires would later be used by resistance and national liberation movements to expel the colonisers or overthrow oppressive regimes in the twentieth century. Russian Marxists disrupted centuries of monarchical rule in 1917, inspired by liberationist ideals that underpinned their willingness to use violence to achieve political goals. Colonised peoples, undergirded with modern weaponry and mass communication tools, produced independent nation-states with new geographic borders – polities that were created, built and defended with varying degrees of violence. As empires disintegrated, the authority to wield violence increasingly accrued to the nation state. Nationalism emerged as a powerful new form of patriotism that would spur both the formation of new nation states and attacks on rivals for the land, resources and peoples therein.

New methods of recording and organising societies, coupled with the advances in communication technologies, allowed all forms of governments – monarchies, democracies, dictatorships and socialists – to extend their violence to larger and larger sections of their populations. Populations, counted and categorised, could be forcibly relocated, corralled in monitored zones, moved into workcamps, or simply executed with a speed hitherto unseen in human history. In Germany and Poland during World War II, somewhere in the region of 8 million Jews and Romas were identified, documented and
killed in newly designed facilities that pumped poisonous gas into locked chambers. The work of modern scientists, architects and bureaucrats combined to decimate specific populations in carefully planned strategies that took years to develop but once operationalised were brutal in their efficiency.

Technologies were essential to the deployment of the power of the modern state as that institution held claim to the legitimate use of violence. In the twentieth century, states became killing machines with a reach they had never had before. This required not only machines but dedicated cadres to use them. In the extreme cases – Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany and Pol Pot’s Cambodia – violence against enemies within and without created the conditions for the stability of the regime itself. Without sequential paroxysms of violence, these regimes would have collapsed. Thus, the modern state came to devour itself.

The records and artefacts of eugenicist policies would later be used as evidence to punish perpetrators for violence in war crimes courts and reconciliation tribunals – starting in earnest after World War II. International law, backed up by the victors’ military might, emerged as an important new technology in the International Military Tribunal’s Nuremberg Trials from 1945 and for the Far East in 1946. These international military courts determined both the scope of new violence – the execution of convicted war criminals – as well as the parameters around future violence by formulating the acceptable limits of warfare on both troops, prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians. The brutality uncovered in these post-World War II tribunals stood as evidence of the failure of the earlier Hague and Geneva Conventions, that had been written and rewritten over the decades from 1899 with the goal of protecting civilians and POWs and limiting the use of biochemical weapons. New technologies for killing, it had been hoped, could be mitigated by new technologies of multilateral legal agreements.

The newly available records of mass violence in the twentieth century prompted the formulation of new rules designed to constrain violence and set parameters around its legitimate use – led by a new global organisation, the United Nations (UN). Global legal frameworks that outline appropriate behaviours between warring countries, for securing justice after outbreaks of violence and for individuals within systems empowered to inflict violence, are now the norm. The operations of the UN’s peacekeeping forces along with

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international weapons monitoring agencies, from the second half of the twentieth century, are emblematic of the global organisation’s attempts to monitor and constrain violence. Outbreaks of mass violence are now framed as ‘failures’ of the UN and presented as evidence of the limits of its efficacy. The limits of UN power were evident in the most ghastly of ways during the massacres of Tutsi by the Hutu-led government in Rwanda in 1994 and of Bosnian Muslim men in former Yugoslavia in 1995, in which between 500,000 and 1 million Rwandans and 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed, respectively. The massacre in Srebrenica of these men and boys represented just a small fraction of the death toll of Bosnians during this war. Both massacres occurred despite a UN presence. Nonetheless, the UN as a forum has negotiated the reduction of numerous inter-state tensions around the globe through diplomatic pressure in the seventy years of its existence and it remains the dominant voice for the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The establishment of these new global norms through the UN and the technology of international law not only delineated boundaries for behaviours between nation states but also provided protection for human beings as individuals. The new discourses of human rights as universal reminded nation states, but also organisations within those states, of their obligations to all people and their fundamental equality. Human rights became a shield for citizens against their own states as well as against the depredations of others. Laws echoing these principles diffused into national documentation and institutions, and served as constraints on hitherto legitimate interpersonal violence inflicted by elders on their children, husbands on their wives or employers on their workers. In the early twenty-first century, in many societies around the world, violence of any sort is regarded as a path of last resort and the least desirable option. The abolition of the death penalty, which gained momentum in nation states from the mid twentieth century as ideas of reform rather than revenge infused the justice systems, is indicative of this trend.

Advances in printing press technologies during the 1800s gave us the capacity to mass-produce daily newspapers with photographs and propaganda posters of greater colour and design complexity. The emergence of the camera would provide first image and then sound so that people could see and hear real or imaginary violence. Later, the emergence of digital technologies using the internet made text, image, sound and data instantly available all around the globe on a wider array of smaller and smaller devices. At the start of the 1800s ordinary people were not offered this daily diet of diverse horrors occurring elsewhere or in other periods to other people –
violence was known directly only through personal experience or eyewitness accounts.

The advances in technology led to the emergence of a professional cohort of journalists who would provide content for the pages – including sensational stories of violence. Once the long-distance telegraph became widespread in the 1850s, journalists working in one part of the globe were able to post stories to another instantly. This capacity to transmit information, and to print and then disseminate stories, would proceed apace through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, bringing more and more people into contact with knowledge about actual or confected violent acts committed by individuals, groups or military forces. Violence was no longer limited to one’s personal experience, and awareness of the horrors of war and the miseries of soldiers as described by journalists in situ, rather than novelists in armchairs, changed popular views about when, where and to what extent violence was ‘appropriate’.

But these new communication technologies would also produce a concomitant increase in misinformation designed to sway popular opinion to support violent acts. By the mid 1800s, propaganda spread through newspapers and magazines was actively used to justify the violence of which readers were increasingly becoming aware thanks to the same medium. For example, British colonialism in South Asia gained widespread popular support after false newspaper reports of English women and girls being raped at the hands of Indians resisting the takeover of their land in the 1857 Indian Rebellion. Through the twentieth century, propaganda would reach new heights in the world wars with governments establishing special units charged with information management in all conflicts – such as the USA’s Office of War Information, the UK’s Ministry of Information, and Japan’s Information and Propaganda Department. The Third Reich in Germany established a Ministry of Propaganda, with the infamous Joseph Goebbels at its head, charged with creating in the public mind a cohort of domestic enemies and later foreign ones to advance support for the war. Legitimating international violence now required a strong narrative in order to gain public support, since new technologies gave many groups access to the public sphere.

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, people all over the world had access to a 24-hour media cycle that presented a smorgasbord of violence in graphic, multimedia formats through small hand-held devices. The wide array of means available for people to view, hear and participate in violence – real and representational – is unparalleled in human history. Social media websites, streamed video clips and podcasts flow through the internet to even remote parts of the world. This wave builds from earlier leaps in technology
dissemination which similarly carried stories of violence directly to individuals – the mid-twentieth-century technologies of broadcast television, radio, and documentary and feature films continued a tradition set in the nineteenth-century boom in print media of newspapers, posters, brochures and magazines. This plethora of media technologies provided popular access to vast numbers of stories and images of violence – sometimes unspeakable and horrific and at other times mundane. Human access to increasing volumes of representations of historic and current violence is a key feature of the years from 1800 onwards.

The capacity of communication technologies to promote the use of violence has not diminished in the twenty-first century, but both the increasing public awareness of the consequences of violence and the very real capacity of major military powers, like the USA and Russia, to destroy the world multiple times over with weapons of mass destruction in their nuclear arsenals has reduced the popular appetite for violent solutions and reinvigorated the disarmament activism that started in the 1960s and 1970s.² The expanding middle classes sought to distance themselves from personal experience of violence as rapidly as they were vicariously experiencing it in the media. They were also instrumental in struggling to rid their worlds of violence through pressing for cultural and legal changes that would make actual violence punishable.

The Rise of the Individual and Tensions with Institutional Structures

The years from 1800 are also marked by the rising power of the individual vis-à-vis a host of institutional structures – religious authorities, governments of all forms, workplaces and families. As the decades progressed the individual attained greater autonomy and wider rights of personhood. The individual human increasingly secured rights from interference by others and rights to be free from violence inflicted by others. This trend would reach a climax in the twentieth century as legal systems around the world recognised each person’s right to bodily integrity. Each change in the cultures underpinning the perpetration of violence produced a concomitant change in the power structures of the institutions affected.

² John Borrie, ‘Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban’, International Affairs 90.3 (2014), 625–46. In 2017 the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Legislation to criminalise domestic violence empowered wives relative to their husbands, daughters-in-law relative to parents-in-law, and children relative to elders. Parallel legislation provided sanctions against those using violence against animals. The banning of caning and strapping in schools gave students increased dignity relative to their teachers and seniors. Bans on beatings of workers changed factories and farms as bosses came to recognise that their employees were not their property. Each of these shifts would occur at different times in different legal jurisdictions but the trend over the course of the centuries was inexorable – interpersonal violence inflicted by the powerful over the less powerful was no longer acceptable. In its place emerged the notion that the powerful had a duty of care and a responsibility not to use violence, even when it was within their means, if they sought respect for their status. Violence became the mark of the ‘out of control’ individual, the person without dignity, as the decades from the mid twentieth century progressed.

Just as class struggles sought to equalise power between the working classes and the elites, and nationalist struggles sought power from colonial rulers, the global women’s movement fought against patriarchal social and familial systems that had rendered women effectively the property of men. In so doing, they broke many of the taboos around sex and brought the problems of sexual violence to public attention. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries sexual violence against women would emerge as a crime against the woman, rather than a shame for her and her male family member. In nations like Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Jordan, the struggle to recognise women’s integrity over their own sexuality continues as honour killings – where women are killed by family members for the shame their rape or adultery brings to the family – still occur.

Debate continues to rage around the issue of prostitution and pornography and whether these phenomena are violence against women or simply acts of choice. The slippage between wartime prostitution and sexual slavery is made evident in Caroline Norma’s study of the Japanese military’s ‘comfort women’ throughout the Asia-Pacific theatre in World War II. The mass rape of women by invading forces that has been documented as occurring in almost all the conflicts of the past 200 years is exposed and challenged as illegitimate. Since 2008, rape within war has been regarded as a war crime

within the UN’s Resolution 1820 on wartime sexual violence; signatory states are required to take actions to educate troops and punish perpetrators. Women’s reproductive capacities are recognised in this legislation, with mass rape being identified as genocidal where it meets the UN’s definition of ‘intent to destroy’. Preventing violence against women remains a key global goal for the twenty-first century as NGOs, governments and community groups mobilise, but a key stumbling block is the role that women play as symbols of family or national honour – a role that has often stripped them of individual rights to bodily integrity. It has also made sexual violence against women a theme ripe for exploitation in wartime propaganda.

While women fought to gain independence from fathers and husbands, children too were gaining their rights as individual human beings to be free from violence both inside and outside the family. The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been rocked by scandals and court cases involving clergy from a range of religious orders who have perpetrated systemic child sex abuse. Orphanages, children’s homes, juvenile justice institutions and hospitals have all faced the shame of media and judicial attention as well as the financial consequences of their sometimes sustained abuse – beatings, starvation, rape and torture – inflicted on children in their care in the absence of parents. Children are no longer regarded as legitimate objects of an adult’s violent tendencies.

Changes in the perceptions of the causes of interpersonal violence in the decades from 1800 produced new ideas about punishment and prevention. Prisons are conceived of as places of reform and rehabilitation. Perpetrators are framed as products of society-wide failings. Where in previous centuries violent criminal behaviour might be explained by possession by evil spirits like the devil, by the mid twentieth century such anti-social acts by individuals would be understood as emerging from poverty, abuse and inequality. The roots of violence are no longer spiritual failings but sociological ones. Accordingly, governments have set about providing programmes of education, food, health and public facilities as mechanisms for preventing violence and in order to bring more people into middle-class lifestyles.

Changing Justifications for Violence

The hundred years from 1800 saw an unprecedented expansion in violence as an arm of European colonialism. The building of competing European empires justified this violence to sometimes dubious home populations on the grounds of uplifting, improving, saving and civilising humans deemed to be living in ‘inferior’ or ‘misguided’ cultures. The punishment and death of ‘a few’ was understood to be vital to the uplift of ‘the many’. Rapacious plantation owners, traders and merchants found surprising common bonds with Christian missionaries and military forces in the endeavour of Empire. Sometimes uncomfortable alliances, in which each strategically ignored the brutality the other inflicted on colonised peoples, resulted in catastrophes of epic proportions. Men of the Christian cloth had supped regularly with slave owners – the former pacifying with promises of eternal salvation while the latter wielded large sticks.6

An exemplar of this confluence was the so-called Congo Free State (1885–1908), operating as a corporate state run solely by King Leopold of Belgium. Leopold’s state was ‘free’ of tax on international trade while local people endured various forms of slavery, forced labour and land grabs, and were tithed in the form of rubber. As with many other European colonies, the Congo Free State was ostensibly a Christian charitable venture, but ultimately became infamous for the violence Leopold’s agents inflicted on the people.7 The so-called ‘Congo Horrors’ came to light from the late 1890s. In 1904, Roger Casement (1864–1916) issued an eponymous Report detailing in forty pages the atrocities for the UK parliament. Congolese who failed to deliver their rubber quotas faced execution or mutilation. The chopping off of hands was a common punishment and Leopold’s soldiers took severed hands as proof of their enforcement. Sometimes amputated hands were taken in lieu of rubber. In the Congo Free State, the ‘righteousness’ of royalty, plantation farming, free trade, Christianity and military might combined to inflict now-infamous miseries on the people of Congo. In a mere two decades, somewhere between 5 and 10 million people lost their lives directly from violence or indirectly through disease and privation produced alongside the Free State’s policies.

Ideals of the liberty and equality of all people had been building from the European Enlightenment and the anti-slavery movement of the late 1700s and were consolidated in the 1800s. The major beneficiaries of this forced labour system acquiesced in the abolitionist cause over the course of the first half of the nineteenth century. The United States joined this global trend in 1865 after its own bitter Civil War (1861–5) in which around 700,000 people died in the violence spurred by the questions of slavery and race equality. In dismantling slavery, some of the foundations justifying European colonialism were weakened as well. The supremacy of the white races over all others was challenged – the right to exert power required more subtle justifications. Saving souls, making ‘productive’ use of wasted land and opening the world to free trade became common justifications for inflicting violence on less powerful groups. The prestige newly accruing to science and technology gave rise to Social Darwinism, such that, even with the abolition of slavery, the belief in a race hierarchy (with whites at the top) continued through the first half of the twentieth century. This ‘scientific’ position led to abominations such as the removal of mixed-race children from their parents in Australia between 1910 and 1970 – now known as ‘The Stolen Generations’.\(^8\) Under the control of the state, these children became effectively slaves in households and farms around Australia – their wages held in accounts that they struggled to access – experiencing beatings, abuse and rapes common to African slaves a century earlier in the South of the USA. The process of uplifting and civilising ‘revolved around essentially violent policies and practices’.\(^9\)

From the mid 1900s, patience with European dominance was wearing thin even in localities where colonialism had not been quite as egregiously brutal as in the Congo Free State. The twentieth-century independence movements led to the formation of new nation states in which the violence of European colonisation was echoed in the independence struggles that pushed the Europeans out. Nationalist independence leaders sought legitimacy for their violence through narratives of ‘overthrowing oppressors’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘self-determination’. Older rivalries between tribal or language groups were submerged, sometimes temporarily, in the fight to expel the Europeans. In South Asia, Britain negotiated the independence of India and East and West Pakistan along a major religious divide between Hindus and

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Muslims. The violent partition of Pakistan from India in 1947 resulted in the deaths of around a million people and the rape of around 75,000 women. At other times, the ‘political anxiety’ of the weak state resulted in a leap to a violent rather than a negotiated solution. Post-independence Nigeria almost immediately faced a civil war (1967–70) as the region of Biafra dominated by the Igbo people sought to secede from the new multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation. But, in Ukoha Ukiwo’s words, it was state violence rather than cultural divisions that triggered the secession attempt, and it is state violence that has brewed ethnic nationalism ever since. In the conflict and accompanying siege, around 100,000 military deaths and an estimated 2 million civilian deaths through starvation occurred.

Eventually, as these newly independent nations consolidated their social and political systems, national ‘traditions’ were invented to give meaning and unity to the oftentimes disparate groups that attained citizenship. The nation-state adorned itself in flags, anthems, pledges and constitutions communicated through national education and broadcasting systems. The defence of each of these symbols of national unity and sovereign power became the spur for violence directed externally and internally.

**Nation States Claiming a Monopoly on ‘Legitimate’ Violence**

Over the course of the twentieth century, the nation state became the premier site for the ‘legitimate’ exercise of violence – primarily through the armies, police, judicial systems and security apparatus that consolidated within each bordered realm. The nation state abrogated for itself the right to control the systems of violence within its borders and to defend itself through violent means from external threat or internal dissent. In many cases the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate became so porous as to make any violence used by the state appear legitimate.

Secessionist movements are commonly violently suppressed as the nation defends its territory. The suppression of separatist groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines or the United Liberation Movement for West Papua in the western extension of Indonesia, are two ongoing instances where state apparatus and

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secessionists are involved in varying degrees of violence. The expulsion of European colonial powers did not, to the Moro peoples or West Papuans, mark the end of colonialism in toto. A different group simply assumed the role of oppressor and invoked the integrity of the Nation instead of the Empire. In some cases, ethnic groups with claims to rights to nationhood struggle against multiple nation states. The Kurds’ armed struggle for an independent Kurdistan requires assault on Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. In the struggle in Ireland to gain liberation from Britain, Roger Casement, aforementioned feted author of the landmark report on the atrocities in the Congo Free State, was executed in 1916 for high treason when he supported the Irish Republican movement in Ireland’s struggle to break away from Britain. Once knighted for his service to the British Foreign Office, and internationally famous for his work on colonial atrocities in Congo and the Amazon Basin, Casement tragically himself became a victim of Britain’s defence of its colonial territories.

In newly founded states of former colonies, national development programmes gained totemic status. The expulsion of the colonisers or the suppression of foreign and domestic foes gave new national leaders responsibility for the improved livelihoods promised in the process of mobilising people to join their cause. Managing expectations of newly liberated populations sometimes required the exercise of force. New political ideologies produced bureaucracies and institutional structures that would perpetrate violence in the name of progress, development and national advancement. A new ideology of ‘development and economic advance’ emerged and was used to justify numerous acts of physical, bureaucratic and institutional violence. Sometimes ‘development’ projects simply saw a transfer of wealth from colonial elites to ‘independence elites’. The revolutionary socialism of China’s Great Leap Forward aimed to produce prosperity for millions of Chinese but instead emboldened a newly empowered phalanx of cadre to beat, starve and humiliate millions of Chinese farmers, ultimately producing a famine that would kill millions – all justified by the national goal of surpassing the West and ‘achieving socialism in one generation’. Earlier, Stalin’s socialist-inspired collectivisation programme had similarly devastated the Soviet Union. The Cambodian Killing Fields resulted in 2 million deaths and emerged from a calculated bureaucratic structural violence carefully planned and documented – four years in which new agricultural and social policies reduced the one-time rice bowl of the Mekong to a site of unimaginable terror.

The rise of the nation state altered the power of religious leaders. Religious authorities had in previous centuries pronounced the legitimacy of their right
to use violence, but their one-time power would be subsumed under the control of the nation state – which often presented itself as either multi-religious or secular. Sometimes the nation state would make use of religious difference to achieve political ends – such as in the case of the Burmese Buddhist majority in Myanmar seeking to expel the Muslim Rohingya in the 2010s; or in the case of the Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka seeking to crush ethnic Tamil separatists whose campaign for a separate state between 1983 and 2009 threatened the integrity of the Sri Lankan state. During the Pacific War in the mid twentieth century, Japanese military authorities used Shinto and its devotion to the Emperor as a spur for their invasion of China and Southeast Asia.

Religious authorities seeking to exercise their power through violence need some form of state sponsorship. In rare cases, they capture the apparatus of the state and use its bureaucratic structures to exert violence of an ancient kind, the Taliban’s establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001) being the most extreme example of this phenomenon. Their Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice enforced a rigid version of Islamic law upon the population, who were subjected to floggings, mutilations, amputations and public executions.

Internal enemies also became the focus of the nation-state security apparatus. National governments inspired by both Marxism and fascism applied threats of violence and actual violence on citizens of their lands. Death squads, purges, torture and terror became integral to preserving the stability on which the nation state’s prosperity putatively depended. The hundreds of thousands of people who ‘disappeared’ or were jailed in Central and South America from the 1970s are still mourned by mothers and grandmothers in mass protests. Famous among these are the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and the Ladies in White in Cuba whose persistent, peaceful protests contrast with the obduracy of the state apparatuses’ violence.

Early in the twenty-first century the nation state’s control over religious contestants for power faces a transnational challenge in the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS). ISIL sought to establish a religious caliphate that stretched across Iraq and Syria through militarised warfare and invited Muslims the world over to participate through military action in the Levant, but also in singular acts of terrorism wherever they may be in the world. The threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century has allowed state security apparatuses around the world to extend their powers of surveillance over populations in their jurisdiction. The nation state’s fear of transnational activism is not new to the twenty-first century. In the early twentieth
century, Europe was pricked by fears of ‘the bomb throwers’ – anarchists – whose political agenda specifically identified the nation state as a target for ad hoc violence. But in the twenty-first century the extension of security and surveillance technology gives the state unprecedented reach into the lives of ordinary people, whose acquiescence with their reducing freedoms emerges from their overarching desire to be free from random violence. The nation state promises to be the vehicle for their personal safety. The spectacular horror of hijacked passenger jets smashing into skyscrapers in New York in September 2001 marked a new phase in the popular perception of violence and expectations of the state’s duty to protect.

The power of ideologies to globalise, as manifest in twenty-first-century terrorism, was evident half a century earlier in the major rift between ‘communism and capitalism’ – otherwise known as the Cold War of 1945–89. The power struggle between the USSR and the USA was played out in myriad proxy international and civil wars resulting in millions of deaths. On the surface these wars appeared to be generated variously by local tribal differences or regional religious grievances, but without the support of the USSR or the USA many of the wars that have plunged post-1945 Asia, Africa and the Middle East into chaos would have been much briefer affairs. This battle of ideological giants was also apparent in the CIA’s Operation Condor between 1968 and 1989 in which right-wing governments throughout South America gained CIA technical, military and financial support to suppress left-wing or left-leaning groups. Dictators like Chile’s Augusto Pinochet assumed power after a US-backed military coup, overthrowing a democratically elected socialist government led by Salvador Allende. General Pinochet’s regime lasted from 1973 to 1990 and was a classic example of the two branches of the state, the military and the political, combining to brutal effect.

Vicarious Violence – Killing as Leisure and Engendering Empathy

Between 1800 and the present, more and more people have come to know of violence through various forms of media. Those same media also came to form a record of the diverse ways that humans could inflict violence – an archive was emerging that in its expanding form became a tool for combating

violence and punishing perpetrators. A wide range of types of large-scale and interpersonal violence is now presented in both news and leisure media as well as commemorative sites. Individual stories of suffering and survival personalise large-scale violence – people with hopes and dreams emerge from the carnage of piles of dead in the garnering of viewers’ empathy and emotional connection. An individual’s experience of the pain of torture or suffering of loss is narrated sometimes for commercial gain, at other times for educational and moral goals and at yet others for solemn commemoration.

As the technology capable of representing violence gained greater reach into people’s lives – through cinema, television and video games from the twentieth century – representations of violence were often thought to be a cause of violence. Popular concern about the link between acts of violence and the consumption of murder and gore in cinema or First-Person Shooter video games emerged alongside the spread of these technologies. In response governments and national censorship boards introduced ratings that were designed to alert consumers to the various gradients of violent or sexual content in the films, television programmes or games they were about to watch or purchase. Children, it was felt, were particularly vulnerable to harm from viewing explicit violence because their capacity to distinguish fact from fiction was less sophisticated than that of teenage or adult consumers. But it remains unclear whether the steady diet of media violence and gamified killing inures adults to violence as well. Different national censorship boards establish different limits based on their perceptions of how much violence is too much, how much gore is too much for the average person. But representations of violence have been a feature of popular culture for centuries, as has the public appetite for vicariously experiencing ghastly details of crimes and punishment. The technological shifts of the twentieth century, however, meant that people were increasingly able to view or participate in increasingly realistic representations. In the twenty-first century, the arrival of Virtual Reality positions participants in three-dimensional worlds complete with audio accompaniment as they kill, and risk being killed, in simulated combat scenarios. Regulation and law are brought in to control what might well be a limitless capacity for humans to watch extreme violence being inflicted on other people and other animals in pursuit of leisure.

Commemoration of conflict through state-sponsored construction of memorials, museums, obelisks and cemeteries has continued apace around the world but was particularly widespread in the aftermath of the world wars of the twentieth century. These sites are major military tourist attractions in the expanding leisure travel industry that has accompanied the rise, and increasing accessibility, of mass transport technologies of jetliners and high-speed trains.
The political functions of these sites of commemoration are generally to reassert the validity and legitimacy of the particular nation state that funded the construction: the national war memorials around the world pay respect to the people who lost their lives in the formation of the defence of that state. For example, the Monument to the National People’s Heroes in the heart of Beijing’s Tiananmen Square was built in 1958 and is decorated with crucial stages in the struggle to achieve the formation of the People’s Republic of China. Monuments are built to serve very modern political purposes, for example in the case of the opening in 1985 of the Nanjing Massacre Museum to commemorate the 300,000 victims of Japan’s invasion and occupation of that city in 1937. Earlier PRC governments, inspired by Maoist revolutionary zeal and dedicated to building good relationships with Japan for strategic and financial reasons, had not formally commemorated the massacre with a museum. Since Mao’s death, nationalism and patriotism based around commemorating the War of Resistance against Japan have been a central legitimising rhetoric for the PRC government, buttressing Marxism that had been tarnished by the chaos and hardship generated by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But monuments, by their very solidity, often outlast the nation state that built them. Mussolini’s fascist Italy constructed the Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana in 1942 and engraved it with his words announcing Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. The building, along with a range of other fascist architectural pieces, is regarded as another of the remarkable relics Italy houses on its soil from the ancient Romans onwards, rather than as a symbol of fascism per se.

Monuments constructed by losers in conflicts and the inclusion of enemy forces in parades have been contentious around the world. Japanese ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine honouring wartime dead, including Class A war criminals, elicits formal diplomatic protest from Chinese and Korean governments. The Australian veterans’ association, the Returned Service League, agreed in 2006 to allow descendants of First World War Turks to join the veterans’ parade on ANZAC Day, but did not extend the endorsement to Germans, Japanese, Italian or North Vietnamese. The latter were a dreaded

15 See Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory and Japan’s Unending Postwar (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015).
enemy that was despised by the Australian veterans’, where the Turks ‘were a very honourable enemy’.16

Only rarely do nation states commemorate the victims of the violence that occurred in the building of their states. The settler colonial nations of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States fund memorials to their soldiers who fought wars in foreign lands, and have museums of settler society life, but have few if any memorials to resistance wars by Indigenous peoples whose land was being ‘settled’. The politics of commemoration is evident in a comparison of the South Dakota twin sites of Mount Rushmore National Memorial and the Wounded Knee Memorial. The former is an icon of the nation state, the United States, with massive carved profiles of four past presidents standing majestically in the Black Hills. Unveiled in 1936, the site was built to ‘communicate the founding, expansion, preservation and unification of the United States’; it is now a major commercial and tourist hub.17 The neighbouring Wounded Knee Massacre Memorial commemorates the massacre of over 300 unarmed men, women and children from the Lakota tribe in 1890. Twenty of the soldiers that participated in the massacre were awarded Medals of Honour by the US Army. The monument is a local initiative by Lakota people and only a few hundred people visit it each year.18 The enormous size of Mount Rushmore stands in dramatic contrast to the humble structures at Wounded Knee; where the former celebrates the nation state, the latter stands as criticism of the hypocrisy of the peaceful change implied in the term ‘settlement’.

The vast majority of war memorials built around the world are products of civil society and not the state. States do not remember or mourn; groups of people do so in public, frequently through their own initiatives. The collective memory of violence is the memory of collectives, and not primarily of the state. There are substantial differences between commemorations of violence by states which have dominated civil society, like the Soviet Union, and states which are less active than civil society, like Britain. Between the two extremes, most monuments to violence arise from and are paid for by people in small groups who do the work of remembrance. Equally, the cultural sector is active in the production of poems, paintings, sculptures, novels, blogs and films that narrate histories of violence, both

wartime and peacetime. These are frequently powerful critiques of the official commemorative projects managed by states.¹⁹

From the 1970s, commemoration of the victims of the Holocaust became iconic, in that the forms of remembrance of those who disappeared in Nazi-dominated Europe from 1939 to 1945 were adapted to represent those who disappeared in later conflicts, including those that states like Argentina and Chile waged against their own people during Operation Condor. What is now termed multi-dimensional memory today links the victims of violence and genocide in different parts of the world.

There is a scholarly consensus on many of the themes explored in this volume. Industrialisation radically increased the capacity of the state to impose its will, through violence if necessary, on subject populations. Genocide was the direct outcome of the civilianisation of war. Dictators waged war on their own populations because of the supposed disloyalty of targeted groups or because of their identification with subversive movements. Prisons worldwide still hold such ‘enemies’ of the state, and despite international accords against the use of torture, interrogation specialists operate today, as they did a century ago, effectively outside the law. Wartime violence affected patterns of violence in peacetime. Repressing the horrors of war made it easier to draw a veil over violence in families, schools, churches and orphanages. Slowly, the silence surrounding the sexual abuse of women and children is breaking. Since the 1970s, popular transnational human rights movements have emerged to protect individuals from violence, even when the writ of the state lies behind it. Yet, as many chapters herein show, who controls the state controls the instruments of violence. Has economic growth and the spread of technology made the world more peaceable? On balance, the answer must be no. The violence done to the poor through economic inequality is no less now than it was a century ago. The social relations of violence are framed today just as much by power and wealth as they were in 1920. And, while we make no assessment of any rise or fall in violence in the absolute numbers impacted, we are not convinced, contra the controversial book by Pinker, that violence has cast less of a pall over human affairs than it did in previous centuries. There is little reason to believe that the world our grandchildren will inherit will be any different from our own.²⁰

¹⁹ See, for example, Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

PART I

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RACE, RELIGION
AND NATIONALISM
Empires and Indigenous Worlds: Violence and the Pacific Ocean, 1760 to 1930s

PATRICIA O’BRIEN

In April 1864, two men again witnessed the terrible price of war. Watching the battle at the redoubt of Te Morere on the western coast of New Zealand just to the north of the fledgling British settlement of New Plymouth were Te Whiti O Rongomai and Tohu Kākahi. They watched as Māori fighters, defending their lands against a settler invasion, clashed with British troops. The dramatic backdrop to this battle was the mighty mountain, Taranaki, that had endowed this corner of the British Empire with stunningly rich volcanic soils, made fertile with soaking rains. Over the four years preceding the battle at Te Morere, Māori communities had been attacked and looted, and people had been forced to move inland, their country seized by settlers intent on making these prized Māori lands their own. This became known as the First Taranaki War: it devastated Māori. The battle at Te Morere was one theatre of the war that wracked Taranaki. In turn, it was one part of the New Zealand Wars that convulsed that country over seven decades from the 1840s through to the final killings in 1916 when the last Māori community holding out against government control was raided in the east of New Zealand’s North Island.¹ Faced with an ongoing assault by British forces, Te Whiti and Tohu took a course few had taken to that point, a course that would reshape the history of violence in this quadrant of the Pacific Ocean and beyond.²

The violent convulsions in nineteenth-century New Zealand were part of a long, storied history of colonial violence in the Pacific that stretched back nearly four centuries. Over this long period, in this very diffuse and diverse region, violence took many localised forms. Yet there were clear patterns that sparked and sustained it in the colonial history made between the multitude

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of Indigenous peoples that populated the vast region and the colonial peoples that entered the region beginning in the early sixteenth century. This chapter offers a reading of how violence was prominent and ever present in this history. It covers the historical expanse from the earliest Pacific imperial phases to the 1930s, just prior to the greatest cataclysm of violence in the region: World War II. Over this long period, technologies, ideologies and conditions altered the history of violence, as happened in other colonial theatres that were deeply integrated with the Pacific from the outset. Yet it took five centuries to integrate the entire region into global systems. As a consequence, first encounters between Indigenous and colonial peoples, where violence often set a course for future relations, played out repeatedly across the region and across time, beginning in the early sixteenth century and ending, arguably, in the 1930s in the New Guinea Highlands. Violence in the colonial Pacific was also profoundly shaped by immense asymmetries of power and population sizes, vast distances and the great diversity of human and natural geographies that evolved and altered across this historical expanse.

European imperial history in the Pacific commenced seventeen years after the Treaty of Tordesillas was brokered in 1494. The first consequence of this papal licence for Spanish and Portuguese domination of the New World was felt in the Pacific region in 1511 when Portuguese forces conquered Muslim rulers in the trading hub of Malacca. At Malacca, the Portuguese set a gruesome precedent displaying the imperial methods they would deploy to establish future imperial nodes in the region. After they crushed resistant potentates the Portuguese would conduct ‘a general massacre of innocent dependents of . . . vanquished’ rulers. Their methods were bloody, brutal and steeled with the righteous imperatives of the Crusades against ‘infidels’; Christian conversion as well as commanding resources – especially Indigenous labour – were their aims. The Portuguese proved adept at blending religious motives with imperial ones to conquer and covet lands, resources and souls in the string of colonies they established through South-East and North-East Asia.³

Ferdinand Magellan, who was at the conquest of Malacca in 1511 when he was serving Portugal, later switched allegiance to Spain and commanded the Spanish imperial fleet that set out from Europe in 1519. The Magellan voyage took place within months of Hernán Cortés’s forces launching their devastating campaign against the Aztec Empire in Mexico. European imperialism was

still relatively new when Magellan entered the Pacific after navigating around the treacherous southern tip of South America. Magellan and the crews under his command were unaware of the great vulnerabilities they would then face. The rigours of travelling immense distances across open ocean presented further challenges as Magellan and his crews found out. The extreme conditions Magellan’s voyage encountered included near starvation and suffering from the ravages of scurvy following their arduous voyage that was stalled in the Doldrums. When the voyage finally made landfall in present-day Micronesia, the confrontation with the island’s Indigenous people, the Chamorros of Guam, soon descended into violence when they ‘stole’ from the Spanish ships. This led to conflict in which a number of islanders were killed. After the carnage, some of Magellan’s crew feasted on the bodies of Ladrones Islanders, the ‘Island of Thieves’ as the Spanish named them, in the false hope they would be cured of scurvy. When the voyagers landed on the island of Mactan in today’s Philippines, the commander hastily offered his military services in a fight between two local rivals. Magellan would become the first of a number of lionised Europeans, blinded by hubris and superiority, who did not return from the Pacific. He was quickly killed in the skirmish.

Despite Magellan’s demise, the ‘Islands of the West’, as the islands of Micronesia became known, were rapidly enveloped in the immense trade conducted by treasure ships carrying American silver west and Chinese goods east that plied the ocean between Manila and Acapulco. What took place there echoed the fate of Indigenous peoples in the Americas. Bartolomé de Las Casas’s account of the ‘cruel massacres and slaughters’ of ‘innocent people’ in the Caribbean Islands and the American mainland, in his 1656 work The Tears of the Indians, also rang true for Indigenes of these Pacific islands. Las Casas condemned so-called Christians for the staggering death toll, enslavement of survivors of all ages and gender, and the ravishment of women in the Americas. These practices were replicated in Spain’s Micronesian islands despite staunch resistance movements in the early years. Though Magellan and many successors perished in the course of

Europe’s colonial enterprises in the Pacific, the cost of violence from the sixteenth century onwards was borne disproportionately – on a vast scale – by the Pacific’s Indigenous peoples.

Back in Te Whiti and Tohu’s homeland, the first imperial contact came in the form of Dutch explorers who would give the islands the name New Zealand. Dutch forays into the wider Pacific closely followed their supplanting of the Portuguese in Malacca in 1641, a victory that strengthened their colonial position greatly throughout the region. Forty years prior to their conquest at Malacca, the Dutch East India Company was increasingly dominating the spice trade and the Spice Islands from the hub of Batavia (Jakarta). Further north, the Dutch secured exclusive commercial access to Japan when all other foreigners, especially Christians, were violently driven out or underground during the Tokugawa Shogunate that commenced in 1604 and isolated Japan for almost 250 years.8

One year after the Dutch capture of Malacca, explorer Abel Tasman became the first European to ‘discover’ New Zealand. The first meeting between the Dutch and Māori in December 1642 resulted in the deaths of four Dutchmen and the retaliatory shooting of a Māori man. Tasman named the place where this bloody first contact took place ‘Murderers Bay’, marking it always with memories of this first collision of worlds.9 Subsequent sporadic contact between Dutch explorers in the Pacific and Indigenous people repeated this pattern of violence, making bloodshed the norm in Pacific first encounters.

The Dutch differed markedly from their Iberian predecessors, with substantially more emphasis on trade than religious conversion. Commerce mattered above all else, giving the Dutch significant advantages as local peoples supported their campaigns to the detriment of the Portuguese in South and East Asia.10 Though they were more restrained than their Iberian forebears, violence was by no means absent from Dutch colonialism. Slavery networks and other forms of impoverishment and exploitation of local peoples were also a component of Dutch imperial activity. So was the use of brute force. Throughout their colonial rule of the East Indies, the Dutch fought a war of conquest against the Achenese in northern Sumatra who

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sought to maintain their historic autonomy. Both sides waged violent attacks, with the Dutch eventually gaining the upper hand in the late nineteenth century after they launched a determined military effort against the Achenese Sultanate. In an attempt finally to crush a routed opponent, the Dutch launched a ‘pacification’ expedition to put an end to Achenese resistance once and for all, the Dutch hoped. Dutch forces killed over 3,000 mainly women and children in the 1900–3 Gayo Expedition. The Achenese Sultanate surrendered in 1903 but Achenese resistance continued throughout the Dutch colonial era (that essentially was ended by the Japanese wartime occupation), with the Dutch deploying rough justice in return.\textsuperscript{11}

From the first European encounter with the Dutch in 1642 to the midst of the British settler invasion in the 1860s, New Zealand and its wider, interconnected region witnessed much violence. For Te Whiti and Tohu, the weight of this long history of entangled beliefs, tactics and ambitions inspired a vastly different response. Las Casas cited the ‘eye for an eye’ philosophy espoused in Deuteronomy 29.15 as the guiding principle of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Iberian colonisers against New World Indigenes.\textsuperscript{12} In diametric opposition, Te Whiti and Tohu fashioned a non-violent response to the pressures of colonialism they called a ‘fighting peace’.\textsuperscript{13} In this approach, the multiple ravages of colonialism would be met not with the sword (or the main weapon of the 1860s, the gun) but by disruption of settler society’s order – ploughing up fields, cutting fences and challenging a violent foe with acts of largesse that undermined European claims of superiority and amplified the monstrosities of colonial violence. Moral victories mattered as much as military ones in this equation. Due to Te Whiti and Tohu, the Māori community of Parihaka in Taranaki took a different course by fashioning the non-violent message of Christ into an anti-colonial tactic by Indigenous peoples. Te Whiti and Tohu’s response stood diametrically opposed to the version of Christianity carried forth particularly by the Portuguese and the Spanish that had licensed violence to wrest power, land and other resources from Indigenes. This contest was cast as a struggle of ‘civilisation’ against ‘savagery’. The colonial arsenal of ideas and stereotypes embedded in the notions of ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ served many purposes.

\textsuperscript{12} See title page of Las Casas, Tears of the Indians.
The coming of Europeans into the Pacific did not, of course, commence the history of violence in the region. Warrior cultures pre-existed and postdated the European era. Local histories attest to this past, as does a vast array of weaponry and other artefacts, like armour fashioned from coconut fibre used in the Kiribati Islands. In the Sāmoan islands, for instance, rival groups regularly battled when deaths of revered chiefs sparked struggles for succession. It is a fair claim that violence was part of a pre-European Pacific, but one enduring colonial legacy has been reconstructions of pre-European Pacific history that have regularly placed violence at the epicentre of pre-European historical forces in the region. In the absence of evidence, Western explorers and recent scholars have postulated violent episodes that predated sustained European contact in the Pacific Ocean. The island of Rapa Nui (Easter Island) has been a particularly favoured location for theories about violence, Indigenous communities and their history. These Rapa Nui theories posit that in the construction and movement of the immense stone statues (moai) that are emblematic of the island’s cultural heritage were quests for power that precipitated environmental destruction to the point of societal collapse, culminating in an apocalyptic episode of violence. These theories, based on certain readings of explorers’ accounts and some archaeological evidence, are also laced with stereotypes of Indigenous masculinities where violence is depicted as the dominating, uncontrollable racial instinct.\footnote{Steven T. Fischer, Island at the End of the World: The Turbulent History of Easter Island (London: Reaktion Books, 2005); Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin, 2005), chapter 2.}

Though Rapa Nui is one microcosmic component of the Pacific, ideas about innate cultural tendencies of the Pacific’s Indigenes towards violence – the essence of constructions of male ‘savagery’ – have fed into remarkably consistent and simplistic colonial narratives across the centuries. Violence, particularly in the form of cannibalism and the brutalisation of women, took on alarming and disproportionate dimensions in Western imaginings of the region as a whole.

Explorer accounts of the late eighteenth century were largely responsible for proliferating tales of the Pacific that were hair-raising and deeply intriguing in the same instance. British naval captain James Cook, arguably the most important of many Enlightenment voyagers who traversed the Pacific from the 1760s, did more than any other explorer to add to the geographic and conceptual maps of the Pacific. From the first voyage accounts, Europeans spun tales heavy with stereotypes that emphasised the seemingly ready access of European travellers to exotic women that many voyagers,
especially French ones, felt embodied figures from classical mythology. These same accounts emphasised the mercurial natures of Indigenous men who often resorted to random acts of violence against European crews spurred by jealousy and a sense of ownership over women. This supposed racial trait was at the heart of stories emanating from the community found on Pitcairn Island in 1808. The hybrid community, comprised of Tahitian women and one remaining British man, were the remnants of the group founded by the infamous HMS Bounty mutineers, Tahitian men and Tahitian women. In the years after the mutineers disappeared into the Pacific in 1789 and before their discovery twenty years later, every man on the island was killed violently: a sequence of bloodletting sparked by the Tahitian men’s jealousy over women, according to the one surviving white man’s account.

The acts of Europeans in violent encounters have had less cultural resonance until the relatively recent project of postcolonial historical rewriting where the standpoint shifted to take account of Indigenous experiences and perspectives. In this historical reading, European violence has been given more attention and attributed with being the reason for the legendary sexual accommodations Europeans experienced. For instance, when the British Wallis voyage bombarded the island of Tahiti for several days in 1767 with their ship’s guns (a reaction to Tahitian men having pelted the crew with rocks), a legendary sexual encounter commenced. Subsequent European crews benefited from this initial assertion of Europe’s asymmetrical power in Tahiti, an assertion repeated in myriad locales throughout the region as the Spanish had done centuries before in Micronesia.

Captain Cook arrived at Tahiti two years after the Wallis voyage’s naval bombardment. The sexual welcome and the tropical environs of Pacific islands stood in diametric opposition to the harsh realities of life aboard European ships where physical discipline and deprivation were the order of the day. As Cook became increasingly familiar with the Pacific and frustrated by acts such as theft of equipment by islanders (like Magellan long before him), he began meting out severe punishments to people beyond his crews. For infractions against crew and his ships’ property Cook had ears sliced off, leaders held captive and people shot. In 1779, after he again tried to take a chief hostage in order to secure the return of a stolen long boat at Kealakekua Bay in Hawai‘i, Cook was killed, stabbed in the back, during a chaotic early morning melee. Cook’s body was taken and possibly

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16 Ibid., pp. 122–9.
consumed, though a few parts were eventually returned to the British. In revenge, Cook’s crew resorted to punishments of torching boats and villages, killing people, decapitating the corpses and displaying severed heads on spikes.\textsuperscript{17} Like Magellan, Cook was lionised, or more accurately deified, for his imperial deeds while Hawai’ian chiefs were cast as malevolent violent murderers. Cook’s violent deeds were erased from European memory until recent times, but not those of the Pacific’s Indigenous peoples.

One of Cook’s most contested legacies of European contact with the Pacific was the transmission of disease. The great captain himself despaired that his crews had commercialised women’s sexuality and spread sexually transmitted disease throughout the islands. Cook knew this consequence of his voyages was devastating: a form of colonial violence that caused untold harm for generations to come.\textsuperscript{18} After Cook, Indigenous populations were scoured by other imported diseases, like smallpox, that wreaked havoc in this newest New World, as it had in older ones.

After Cook, European encounters in the Pacific surged. This surge brought new forms and increased levels of contact, as well as new forms of violence. The Pacific became dotted with refreshment ports for crews, almost always men, plying the ocean for resources. Sandalwood harvesting required considerable negotiation with local peoples. Many a European man found himself in a dangerous predicament, isolated in a remote location and beholden to local laws and rulers who valued such men when they had utility, particularly when they possessed military knowledge and prowess. In the eastern Pacific, where the first sandalwood rushes took place, a European presence had the effect of elevating certain groups over others. This sparked new waves of fighting among rival Indigenous groups.\textsuperscript{19} The end result in the Tahitian islands was the rise of one dominant ruling family, the Pomare family. In Hawai’i, the Kamehameha family, beneficiaries of new economies in those islands created by sandalwood, rose up and also vanquished their rivals. The Kamehamehas then united the Hawai’ian Islands under their monarchial rule that dominated the political landscape of Hawai’i for nearly a century before the US annexation of the group in 1898.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., vol. 11, pp. 174–5.
For the resource rushes where the bodies of whales, seals and otters were the quarry, violence was an ever-present tool and consequence of the activities of thousands of male crew members scattered throughout the region on sea and land. Not only was there the inherent violence of the hunt, but whaling produced many marauding crews that drastically altered life in port towns like Kororareka in northern New Zealand, Lahiana and Honolulu in Hawai‘i, Papeete in Tahiti and Apia in Sāmoa. All these port towns vied for the dubious honour of being the ‘hell hole’ of the Pacific. In these towns, Indigenous law and custom were greatly strained by thriving markets for sex, guns and alcohol, as well as less salacious forms of refreshment like food and water. Yet the groups who controlled lands around these ports, as in the case of the Pomares and Kamehamehas, were the ones who were rapidly empowered against traditional foes.\(^{20}\)

In New Zealand, the Nga Puhi, who controlled the whaling hub of Kororareka, shifted the practice of capturing vanquished enemies according to the new conditions. From the early nineteenth century, young women enslaved by internecine warfare appeared among the ranks of women participating in the sex trade.\(^{21}\) In exchange for sex, the Nga Puhi acquired guns that wreaked havoc on rival groups. The infusion of guns into traditional warfare in northern New Zealand was hastened by the international travels of Hongi Hika that were organised by Britain to curry favour with this Māori leader. Hongi Hika was showered with gifts in Britain that he then traded en route home for a cache of weapons in the fledgling British colony of Sydney in 1820. After his return to New Zealand, warfare erupted throughout northern New Zealand, resulting in the bloodiest fighting the country has seen to this day. The so-called Musket Wars (1820–40) may have claimed as many as 20,000 lives and redrew the demographic and political map of the Māori with far-reaching consequences.

The other actors in New Zealand’s bloody and dramatic surge in violence in the early nineteenth century were British Protestant missionaries. As with clergy in the Spanish and Portuguese Pacific colonies, missionaries from Britain and the USA, and later French Catholic priests, were beginning to impact the course of history from 1797. In this year, British missionary activity began when a vessel loaded with men intent on bringing the light of Christian teaching sailed to the Pacific to proselytise to the many peoples depicted, often alarmingly to those with Christian sensibilities, in earlier voyager


accounts. Many of these Protestant missionary pioneers were caught up in the warfare sparked by the early sandalwood rushes and fled to the Sydney colony.

In Hawai‘i, New England missionaries gained favour with the Kamehameha family, particularly through the figure of Ka‘ahumanu, the favoured wife of King Kamehameha II. In 1825 she imposed a new legal and moral code shaped by Protestant teachings. The most contentious aspect of this new code was the restriction on the trade in sex between local women and whaling crews. Not long after the imposition of this new moral code, an American whaling ship opened fire on the missionary’s residence in Lahiana. The crew was incensed at missionary meddling in the privileges crews had come to expect.\(^{22}\)

Not all whaling crews resorted to such open violence against missionaries, but throughout the Pacific in the nineteenth century there were countless brash challenges to traditional and new laws that impinged on the activities of European crews. The question of law, jurisdiction and how to capture, try and punish perpetrators of violence became an ever-present polemic. The lawless conduct of European crews pricked the consciences of many. In 1792, British captain George Vancouver had the task of returning two young Hawai‘ian women to their homeland after he discovered them aboard a vessel he encountered on the north-west American coast. The two women had been kidnapped and became caught up in the trade in otter furs for the China market. Vancouver felt it was his duty to return the women to their homeland as an act of gallantry. He could do nothing to punish the perpetrators. Vancouver was witness to a phenomenon that was going to cause havoc in the coming years as the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples surged with the increased colonial traffic in the Pacific.\(^{23}\)

Many Indigenous peoples took matters into their own hands and meted out punishments on perpetrators or on those unfortunate enough to be the next to encounter aggrieved groups after an incident of mistreatment. In the infamous case of the 1809 attack on the passengers of the Boyd, again in New Zealand, little attention was given to the cause of local Māori anger that resulted in most of the people on board the vessel being killed and then eaten. The incident, sparked by the flogging of a young local chief who was travelling on the vessel, sent shock waves through the British Empire. Whalers brutally avenged the killings, sparking ongoing fighting between Māori and Europeans. As well as the price of many lives lost, the

\(^{23}\) Ibid., pp. 120–1.
alarming events around the Boyd deeply impacted ideas about the Māori and other Pacific peoples at the time when contact in the region was growing exponentially. Being well armed and on high alert for Indigenous ‘treachery’ and ‘barbarity’ became the order of the day, sparking further cycles of violent revenge.  

This situation concerned British authorities in Sydney. This was the colony established in 1788 as a penal settlement, a new society embedded with numerous forms of state-sanctioned brutality as a means to impose order in this far-flung British outpost. This martial society also deployed violence as a tool of colonialism to vanquish local Indigenous peoples. The uses of violence and the application of British law within Australia spurred constant tension. Colonial authorities also faced the ongoing dilemma of how to project British law to shipping and crews in the islands in the hope of tempering the alarming rates of mistreatment of local peoples at the hands of European crews. Operating a court system with witness testimony over such a diffuse area proved impossible. Successive governors issued declarations from Sydney that proved equally ineffective in altering the incidence of violence. In the 1830s, Evangelicals in Britain gathered together a litany of atrocities committed throughout the Pacific by European men deemed by the missionaries ‘the dregs of humanity’ that became evidence in a parliamentary inquiry in London. The resolution to the long-running inquiry was to institute a more proactive system of protection where missionaries, with their supposed moral rectitude, would temper the sordid working-class male culture lubricated by alcohol, licentiousness and aggression considered a scourge on peoples throughout the region.  

The concern of British Evangelicals in the 1830s was significantly not extended to Chinese people. At the very same time that missionaries were wringing their hands about the suffering caused by British colonialism upon Indigenous populations in the Pacific, multitudes of Chinese were suffering the deleterious effects of the British opium traffic and other aggressive British

manoeuvres. Reinforced by its vastly superior naval power, Britain aimed to destabilise China and gain immense commercial and imperial benefits in the Opium Wars that culminated in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, in which Britain was awarded territory and immense reparations that had an untold impact on the course of Chinese history to follow.

Britain’s belligerent tactics against the Chinese government were replicated elsewhere around the region at this time. The French, after being excluded from their most desired site for a Pacific colony in southern New Zealand (after Māori signed the Treaty of Waitangi with the British crown in 1840), turned their attention to the eastern islands of Polynesia. In 1842, using classic gunboat diplomacy, the French forced the annexation of Tahiti and surrounding islands and then the Marquesas Islands later in the same year. Tahiti, ruled by Queen Pomare IV, acquiesced to French demands under threats of violence. Following their conquest of a large swath of eastern Polynesian islands, the French turned their attention to the western Pacific islands of New Caledonia. Here they established a penal settlement where various rebels from Paris were sent to labour in the new French colony. The French also commenced a settler assault against the Indigenous Kanak peoples, seizing their lands violently so that agricultural enterprises could take root there. In the 1870s, the economic focus shifted to mining, and with it came another layer of violent history surrounding the recruitment and labour of workers from French possessions in Indochina and other surrounding Pacific islands.28

Following the lead of Britain and France, the US naval captain Matthew Perry targeted the isolated regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan that stood accused of violently mistreating shipwrecked American whalers in the 1850s. With China’s recent crushing defeat by Britain providing a bitter object lesson about the perils of confronting a modern imperial state, Japan acquiesced to US demands but set about modernising and militarising at a stunning pace. In a matter of decades, Japan defeated imperial China and imperial Russia, two events inconceivable a few short years before. Japan continued to mimic Western imperial nations, coveting overseas territories and foreign resources, and increasingly expanding their control over foreign populations. As with European imperial powers before them, Japan deployed numerous forms of violence to suppress peoples absorbed into their newly

acquired territories. As their power increased, Japan’s use of violence did too, reaching notoriously brutal levels against Koreans (Korea was annexed in 1905) and Chinese once the Second Sino-Japanese War erupted in 1937. Sexual violence against women and its institutionalisation in military brothels, an idea directly borrowed from British and French imperial armies, were the most shocking dimensions of Japanese violence. Enslaving populations for their labour was also widespread, but this had a long, storied history in the Pacific before Japan embarked on its imperial era. Sexual violence against women also had a long, highly charged history.

Harnessing the labour of colonised peoples was a preoccupation of all colonial powers across the tropical Pacific in the second half of the nineteenth century, as plantations spread out from South-East Asia where they had already been established by the Dutch. As with plantation economies in older colonial regions, the perennial problem of finding labourers to work tropical plantations bedevilled the Pacific region. Exploitation, mistreatment and violence shadowed plantations wherever they were established at a varied pace across the region. The dominant pattern of acquiring labourers was to bring in foreigners who would work estates carved from lands acquired from Indigenous owners. These land transactions had their own fraught histories of deception and exploitation that often resulted in an exacerbation of tensions between Indigenous groups and colonial land buyers that regularly erupted into violent confrontation. Plantations also allowed a power base for new groups to take root that invariably challenged extant political norms, often leading to violent outcomes.

The most dramatic example of how plantation economics disrupted Indigenous worlds was Hawai‘i. The Great Māhele of 1848 monetised land, facilitating its rapid transfer from Indigenous possession to that of planters, the majority of whom hailed from the United States.\(^\text{29}\) Within four decades, two thirds of all land had passed into haole (white) hands, driving the creation of an elite planter class. Many in this new Hawaiian planter class were descendants of the New England missionaries who established Christianity in the islands from 1820.\(^\text{30}\) Hawai‘i rapidly became a factory of sugar production powered by its volcanic soils and the labour of people from China, Portugal and then, at the end of the nineteenth century, Korea, the Caribbean

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island of Puerto Rico and, most problematic as far as the USA was concerned, Japan. The rapid economic ascent of haole planters came at the expense of Indigenous Hawai‘ians. Every aspect of their culture and lives was adversely impacted by this profound shift from possession to dispossession in a few decades. Change was forced by haole using the threat of military power. A new constitution that stripped the Hawai‘ian monarchy of power was dubbed the Bayonet Constitution because of the overt use of these tactics to compel King Kalakaua to sign it into law, as he did under duress in 1887. The ending of Indigenous governance was achieved when planters seized power from Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893, imprisoning her and threatening force. Despite a determined uprising of the queen’s supporters around Honolulu in 1895, the island group was annexed by the USA in 1898.

The Hawaiian islands were a great prize for the USA. Their strategic importance was unquestioned, allowing the USA to augment its naval power in the Pacific Ocean exponentially. The acquisition of the islands was not an unmitigated advantage, however. Leading figures, like Theodore Roosevelt, questioned the impact of the large population of Japanese in the islands upon the American nation. These fears about a numerous and culturally distinct minority were framed within the rising power of Japan; Roosevelt and others worried where the loyalties of Hawaiian Japanese would lie if the two new Pacific powers clashed. These fears grew through the first three decades of the twentieth century, with Hawai‘i being described as the ‘Restless Rampart’ on the eve of the World War II.\(^\text{31}\)

The threat of war secured the Hawaiian islands for the United States. Other significant territorial gains in the Pacific for the USA were won by war, namely the Philippines and Guam. Defeating Spain in 1898, the USA ended the long Spanish imperial era in these countries commenced by Magellan in the early sixteenth century. In order to oust the Spanish, the USA supported Filipino independence fighters who were promised self-rule. The USA reneged on this arrangement and began fighting Filipinos, crushing hopes that the USA was indeed a liberator and not another colonial power deploying the same methods of enforcing domination through overwhelming displays of force and brutality.\(^\text{32}\)

Elsewhere in the Pacific, plantations also caused great disruption. Indentured labourers recruited from the western Pacific islands manned


sugar plantations in Northern Queensland. Though some of these workers came voluntarily, many were ‘blackbirded’ or kidnapped by unscrupulous operators who plied the islands for young men, and, to a far lesser extent, women. As with violent whaling crews, who triggered cycles of violence between islanders and foreigners, it was well recognised after about a decade of this trade (1870s) that blackbirders were having a similar impact on inciting deadly violence. Humanitarians in the 1870s became concerned that blackbirding and the deplorable conditions labourers faced in Queensland equated to slavery, a practice supposedly outlawed in the British Empire in the 1830s. On top of concerns about the mode in which workers were recruited, humanitarians focused on the treatment of workers and their extraordinarily high mortality rates. The use of the whip to drive workers or punish those who resisted authority was also a source of concern, still being debated as late as the 1930s by Australian colonial administrators.33

The shift to a plantation economy in Sāmoa involved all of these elements. The rapid acquisition of land by foreigners intent on establishing copra plantations was staggering. One land speculator – Frank Cornwall who was a former printer with the London Missionary Society – alone bought some 300,000 acres in a few years (over 40 per cent of all Sāmoan land). He was also involved in labour recruiting, plying the Gilbert Islands (present-day Kiribati) for labourers. Like Pacific island labourers on the sugar plantations in Queensland (who were mostly recruited from the western Pacific island groups of the Solomons and Vanuatu), these labourers’ mortality rates were alarmingly high.34 There were many unsavoury characters involved in labour recruiting, such as the so-called last pirate of the Pacific, Bully Hayes, who like Cornwall plied the Gilbert Islands for labourers for Sāmoan plantations. American-born Hayes became notorious for defrauding, swindling and terrorising the Indigenous communities he raided. His brutal ways finally caught up with him when one of his crew killed him during a dispute and dumped his body into the Pacific: a killing, like so many before and after it in the course of Pacific colonial history, not pursued by courts.

Back in Sāmoa, where Hayes was survived by a wife and children (he reputedly had many of both dotted around the islands), the transfer of such vast amounts of land out of Sāmoan hands in such short spaces of time ignited more warfare between rival groups. The introduction of guns meant that warfare was ferocious and of unprecedented lethality. Sāmoa was wracked by

34 Lal et al. (eds.), *Plantation Workers*, p. 111.
civil war throughout the 1870s to the turn of the century, with brief periods of uneasy peace. Into this toxic mix entered three imperial powers – the USA, Britain and Germany. German nationals spearheaded the plantation economy but all three powers laid claim to the Sāmoan islands, picking sides in the civil war to advance their imperial ambitions and, in the late 1880s, investing heavily in asserting their perceived rights.35 The apex of all these forces came in 1889 when each power stationed naval assets in Apia Harbour in a show of imperial resolve. Nature conjured up a hurricane of legendary proportions; numerous vessels were destroyed in the tempest, and many seamen drowned, adding to the death toll incurred in gaining power in Sāmoa. A peace was brokered with the three powers in Berlin, but it only held for a decade, before civil war again erupted. To resolve the intractable Sāmoan problem, the islands were finally partitioned in 1899. Germany secured the western islands and the USA the eastern ones.

Though initially Pacific islanders made up the ranks of plantation workers in Sāmoa, Chinese indentured servants would dominate during most of Sāmoa’s plantation history up to World War II. The experience of Chinese here replicated that of plantation workers elsewhere in the Pacific. They were driven hard, had few rights, were highly vulnerable to physical abuses and suffered higher levels of disease. As with Chinese in other Pacific polities, these labourers were heavily associated in the minds of their many vocal detractors with depravity, opium traffic and violent interpersonal crime. Also, their presence in Sāmoa was seen as problematic, as it was in other Pacific societies. Fears about miscegenation were paramount. This vision of Chinese in Sāmoa was exacerbated after the First World War erupted in September 1914, as this was largely seen as imperilling the numerically vulnerable white race.36

The First World War began relatively bloodlessly in the Pacific. The first order of business for nations allied to Britain was to secure Germany’s Pacific territories. New Zealand occupied German Sāmoa without a shot being fired. Australia had a brief battle before German forces surrendered in German New Guinea, and Australia gained additional territory on the island of New Guinea, adding to the Territory of Papua controlled by Australia from 1906.

Japan took the expansive islands of German Micronesia, gaining another immense addition to its rapidly expanding territory.

Australia’s military occupation of New Guinea, even for a nation largely inured by a long history of settler violence that was still manifest in northern Australia at this time, attracted significant attention for its brutality. The war’s end and the shift to a mandates system overseen by the League of Nations in 1921 did little to ameliorate the situation. In fact levels of violence worsened. In New Guinea, a gold rush in 1926 saw the influx of large numbers of white men, many of whom were armed and trained veterans of the First World War, into remote regions where contact with the outside world had been minimal, or in some instances non-existent. Like first encounters in the Pacific since the sixteenth century, these meetings were often violent, with white men armed with the latest military hardware combating local peoples, who were more numerous and knowledgeable about the terrain but armed only with spears. The cycles of violence and retribution that had marked the Pacific’s colonial history from the start were replicated. In one instance on the island of New Britain, violence was sparked by the ‘mistreatment’ (that is, rape) of local women, a common cause of outrage avenged through violence against colonial men. In this case, aggrieved local men killed Australian gold prospectors, and Australian colonial authorities retaliated with a punitive expedition that was armed with the weapons of industrial warfare: a machine gun and grenades. For Australia, the undeniable levels of violence in their mandate came with uncomfortable international scrutiny. Despite the incidence and acceptance of violence in both national and international governing bodies like the League of Nations, the rhetoric of enlightened imperialism was given lip service. This paternalistic philosophy espoused restraint in the use of force, but the entrenched methods of colonial rule proved impossible to dislodge.

These tensions about violence and enlightened colonialism after the First World War also gripped New Zealand. Like Australia, veterans from the war flooded the colonial ranks of New Zealand’s mandate in Sāmoa. These veterans faced a hostile populace incensed at New Zealand’s maladministration during the influenza epidemic in 1918. Incompetent officials permitted

the disease into the islands with devastating results: over one quarter of the population perished. Coupled with this recent history, New Zealand continued to blunder in its relations with local leaders, sparking a resistance movement named the Mau. It is another great irony of this long history of colonial violence in the Pacific that when Sāmoans rose up and confronted a colonial regime stoked by the hyper-violence of the First World War they chose to pursue non-violent resistance. Sāmoans adopted the philosophy of non-violence directly from Te Whiti and Tohu who had likewise confronted colonial New Zealand in Taranaki four decades earlier. New Zealand authorities and their supporters in Britain and the League of Nations struggled with ways to challenge peaceful Sāmoans who enmired the colonial administration and caused international embarrassment and, worst of all to many authorities, severely damaged ‘European prestige’. Some leaders were troubled by the spectacle of using traditional forms of salutary punishment against unruly colonial charges; others were not. Eventually the latter won out and in late 1929 New Zealand forces fired into a peaceful protest march on the streets of Apia. Though New Zealand suffered few repercussions at the time, for such was the stomach for violent acts that reinforced colonial order, this massacre still resonates to this day.40

For all the violence that had shaped Pacific history since the sixteenth century, nothing compared to what was unleashed in the course of World War II. Commencing with Japanese aggression in Korea and China, the war would ravage the whole region, from the remotest islands to its densest population centres. New technologies expanded the scope of violence – aerial attacks, new artillery and, at the war’s end, atomic bombs – unleashing new horrors on an unprecedented scale. The war was transformative but not a complete break with the past. In many ways, forms of violence that had been used to commandeer lands and resources, including human bodies for sex and labour, continued. So too did the asymmetries of military power and population sizes that had been such a central feature of histories of violence in the Pacific since the sixteenth century.

Bibliographical Essay

Historians of violence in the colonial Pacific have had ready access to a colossal body of published works. Any studies on this topic should commence by consulting the immense work by Rodrigue Lévesque (ed.), History of Micronesia: A Collection of Documentary Sources

Empires and Indigenous Worlds

(Gatineau: Lévesque Publications, 1992–2002). Lévesque’s twenty-volume work mines the documentary history of the earliest colonial era of the Spanish in Micronesia that bears on the interconnected history of the Spanish Philippines. Violence, in many of its forms, is an ever-present feature in this literature though some works have more relevance or popularity than others, such as the accounts by English buccaneer and circumnavigator William Dampier, who authored the classic work *A New Voyage Round the World* in 1697. Within the extensive historiography of Pacific exploration and encounter, works inspired by the Cook voyages alone are numerous.

The bedrock of the many scholarly treatments of the Cook voyages since the 1950s is the landmark work of J. C. Beaglehole who compiled and annotated the voyage journals of James Cook and other principals and lower-ranking chroniclers of Cook’s three epic voyages in five volumes: *The Journals of Captain James Cook* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955). Subsequent historians have worked over these sources, with some having problematised the inherent violence within these accounts more than others. In O. H. K. Spate’s sweeping three-volume masterwork, *The Pacific since Magellan* (Canberra: Australian National University Press): vol. 1, *The Spanish Lake* (1979), vol. 11 *Monopolists and Freebooters* (1983) and vol. 111 *Paradise Found and Lost* (1988), violence is a consistent feature in the Pacific colonial histories he recounted. Spate’s focus on the era after colonial contact entails details of colonial conquest, piracy, encounters and explorations. Other historians, such as Deryk Scarr in his *The History of the Pacific Islands: Kingdoms of the Reefs* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1990) and *A History of the Pacific Islands: Passages through Tropical Time* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), likewise feature violence as a driver of Pacific history, especially in the era after colonial contact commences in the form of resource-harvesting industries like whaling, sealing and tortoise-shell collecting, and colonial settlements. Scarr paid more attention to Indigenous histories than Spate and so tracked how colonial forces reshaped power dynamics within Indigenous worlds.

Since the 1990s histories have attempted to tell a story about violence from Indigenous perspectives. For instance, Anne Salmond’s *Two Worlds: First Meetings between Maori and Europeans, 1642–1772* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992) attempted to do this from the viewpoint of New Zealand’s Māori. The scholarly tsunami created by the intense debates sparked by Gananath Obeyesekere’s *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Marshall Sahlins’s *How Natives Think: About Captain Cook, for Example* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) plumbed not only the circumstances surrounding the killing of Captain Cook in Hawai‘i but also the politics of scholarly position and the limitations of Western scholarly enterprise. For scholars interested in violence in its colonial context, these debates and their ramifications were considerable. For Hawaiian scholar and activist Haunani-Kay Trask in her provocative work *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), colonial violence was redefined, expanded and given renewed contemporary relevance in current debates about Indigenous rights. Trask also homed in on the politics of gender and how central violence towards women was in the forging of Pacific empires. This theme was highlighted in works by Teresia Teaiwa, notably ‘*Bikinis and Other S/pacific N/oceans*’, *Contemporary Pacific* 6.1 (1994), 87–109, and Patricia O’Brien’s *The Pacific Muse: Exotic Femininity and the Colonial Pacific* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), as well as in the works of Margaret Jolly, including her co-edited work with
At its peak in the mid eighteenth century, the Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was arguably the world’s strongest, wealthiest and most flourishing polity. Within half a century it was showing signs of demographic and social strain, and by the 1850s its very existence was challenged by the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping tianguo), a religious rebellion that occupied much of the southern half of the country, bringing destruction on a scale that eclipsed by a factor of twenty the entire mortality of the American Civil War. Even after that rebellion had been suppressed, similar movements, arising out of poverty and dislocation, and often expressing variations on the same religious themes, would continue to break out across China for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The spectre of militarised religion would haunt governments of the subsequent Republic of China (1912–49, continued on Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (founded 1949), so much so that they would continue to react violently against religious movements as recently as the 1999 campaign against Falungong.

Religious Violence and its Suppression

Qing law outlined a wide-ranging list of religious offences, demanding strangulation or exile for any who ‘pretend to summon noxious spirits, compose charms, chant incantations over water, perform spirit writing and pray to sages . . . [those] who deceptively appear to be engaged in good works; and arouse and mislead the common people’.\(^1\) The breadth of this statute, copied almost word for word from the code of the preceding Ming dynasty (1368–1644), itself suggests the interests of the imperial state in

controlling religion, and, conversely, the wide diversity of phenomena that might be characterised as religious violence.

Defining religion in expansive terms, we may consider these expressions of religious violence broadly in three categories. The first is the violent suppression by the imperial state of threats to its moral and spiritual hegemony. As evinced in the calendar of rituals for the emperor and his ministers to thank Heaven (Tian) for the blessings of agriculture, the imperial state took literally its injunction to act both as the Son of Heaven and as the one and only linchpin in the moral universe. It could brook no pretenders to this claim. The emergence anywhere in the realm of parallel magic, unauthorised ritual or strange portents was no mere annoyance, but rather an existential threat to the legitimacy of the dynasty, and one that would justly be dealt with in the harshest terms.

The second was violence that was mobilised or aided by religion. Ordinary acts of banditry and criminal violence drew upon a pervasive tradition of protective magic, such as the use of charms, ashes and blessed water, as well as various dietary, ritual and martial arts techniques that promised to render the user invulnerable to harm. Religious ritual also provided the bond that held together legal structured organisations such as lineages, as well as illegal ones, such as sworn brotherhoods. From a law-and-order perspective, such organisations could cut two ways. Intergenerational lineages provided stability and structure to rural society, but could also resort to violence in protecting or expanding their economic interests. Sworn brotherhoods, often characterised as ‘secret societies’, in fact included a wide spectrum that ranged from criminal organisations to self-protection societies, the latter being especially important to vulnerable populations such as masons, soldiers, silver or coal miners, barge pullers or porters. Like lineages, these populations developed an internal hierarchy and identity around rituals and deities, often unique ones, and, like them, used the structure created by ritual to enable these groups to mobilise to defend themselves and their interests.

The third and most direct expression is violence that was directly instigated by what Qing law would have regarded as ‘perverse’ (xie) religious

ideas, notably the tradition of millenarianism that circulated freely within popular religious thought. Millenarian themes, such as the notion of sacred time, ran deep within the established orthodox traditions of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. Over time, these three traditions merged into a popular eschatology based around a deity called the Eternal Venerable Mother (Wusheng laomu, a name that connotes escape from the cycle of birth and death), who sought the salvation of mankind before the end of the world at the close of the current epoch. This sort of eschatology combined familiar elements – demon quelling, the quest for post-mortem salvation, the fruition of sacred time and the moral justness of the universe – and variations on this same theme were ubiquitous in everyday ritual life across China. Ideas about the violent destruction of the current world intertwined with other religious beliefs, remaining submerged under ordinary circumstances, but ready to emerge in times of stress.

Qing rulers were acutely aware of the growing danger of religious militarisation. Occasional mass panics about sorcery and uncontrolled dark magic had already arisen nationwide as threats to both sacred and public order. (See Map 2.1.) One such outbreak in 1768 became sufficiently widespread as to warrant the personal attention of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735–96), who was frustrated at the apparent unwillingness of local officials to take the threat seriously. He was right to be concerned. That outbreak was followed in 1774 by a small rebellion in Shandong province that, although easily suppressed, nevertheless revealed a more widespread use of the same worrying themes: the use of charms, incantations and rituals intended to protect rebel troops. From 1796 to 1804, the so-called White Lotus Rebellions raged across numerous provinces of central China, fed both by economic difficulties and by prophecies of a new age. Soon thereafter, the Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 broke out in the suburbs of Beijing. This rebellion not only managed briefly to reach the Forbidden City itself, but, perhaps more menacingly, its leaders included figures who claimed to be the Maitreya Buddha and the true heir of the long-deposed Ming throne, the two themes of apocalyptic fervour and political sedition.4

The rapid escalation of religious violence was without question prompted by the equally precipitous decline of internal conditions. The 1799 death of the long-reigning Qianlong emperor initiated a century of weak imperial

governance, compounding pressing challenges in trade and foreign relations.⁵ The greatest problem was demographic: after a century of steady population growth, China had by 1800 largely exhausted its ability to colonise new agrarian frontiers. Continued population growth (from roughly 295 million in 1800 to 430 million in 1850) was thus accomplished by increasing pressure on existing land resources. The brunt of these trends was borne disproportionately by those at the bottom, who responded by emigrating, or by living more precariously (for example by colonising lands such as floodplains). In the worst cases, demographic stress pushed peasants to life and death decisions. As ritual propriety required families to produce at least one male heir, many at the edge of subsistence were forced to sell female children, or simply

⁵ The Qianlong emperor had formally abdicated three years earlier, but in fact retained much of his former power.
leave newborn girls to die. Over time, millions of these individual decisions added up to produce a massive gender imbalance (with some counties in northern China reporting as many as 1.56 males for every female). With no hope of marriage or of producing an heir, these millions of extra men, referred to colloquially as ‘bare branches’ (guang gun) on the family tree, would become a massive destabilising force in late Qing society. It would not take much to push them to violence. Religion would provide the catalyst.

Taiping Rebellion

The smaller rebellions of the mid-Qing were a foreshadowing of the massive explosion of religious violence that broke out in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first and greatest of these events occurred in the mountainous southern province of Guangxi. It began with the career of Hong Xiuquan (1814–64), who, like so many thousands of other aspirants, had spent much of his life training and studying to take the imperial Confucian examinations, the gateway to a lucrative and prestigious position in the imperial bureaucracy. Competition for these positions was extremely intense, and after four attempts Hong had still not passed the shengyuan licentiate, the bar for entry into the ranks of the literati. It was at this point that he decided to act on a fever dream that he had had some time earlier. In this dream, Hong had met an old man who gave him a sword and commanded him to cast out demons (two motifs from Daoist exorcistic practice) and a younger man, who referred to Hong as his younger brother. Drawing on a missionary tract that he had received some years earlier, Hong interpreted these two figures to be the Christian God and Jesus, respectively, and took the dream as a sign to start a religious movement that became known as the ‘Teaching of the God Worshippers’ (bai shangdi jiao). During the late 1840s, he and about 10,000 of his followers left their homes and moved to remote Zijing Mountain. Alarmed by the group’s growth and its secrecy, the local Qing garrison (the Green Standard Army) launched an ill-fated assault on the community in 1850. The heavily militarised and well-organised community easily repulsed the Qing troops, and beheaded the commander. Now in open rebellion, the society abandoned any pretence of Qing loyalty, growing their hair long in contravention to the requirement that all men shave the top of the head in Manchu style, and earning the movement the nickname of the ‘hairy rebels’ (fa fei). Early in 1851, Hong completed the act of rebellion by proclaiming the foundation of a new kingdom, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping tianguo). Over the next two years, the
armies of the Taipings (as Anglophone contemporaries came to term the movement) campaigned across a swath of southern China, easily defeating demoralised Qing troops, and growing in number with each victory. In 1853, they captured the city of Nanjing, which they renamed as Tianjing, literally the ‘Heavenly Capital’ of the new kingdom.

The unique beliefs and meteoric rise of the Taipings raise the questions of how deeply religion shaped the movement and how violent was their religion. The initial attraction of the movement was clearly shaped by the difficult conditions of life in mountainous Guangxi, a rough area of illegal mines, timber forests and ethnic division (Hong himself was a minority Hakka), where state influence and protection were only occasionally in evidence. Religious brotherhoods thrived in areas like this, and the appeal to the downtrodden remained a prominent attraction as the movement advanced. Peasant grievances were immediately reflected in the utopian promises that the Taipings made: redistribution of land, food to all who labour, the expulsion of the foreign Qing dynasty and restoration of the just and natural order. Such promises were stock features of peasant rebellions as early the second century CE, when an identically named millennial kingdom was established in the south-west.6 At the same time, Hong’s unique religious ideas pervaded the movement’s numerous public statements. While still on Zijing Mountain, the movement banned a series of vices including opium, concubinage and prostitution, as well as women’s footbinding, a Han Chinese custom that was not shared by the Hakka. More important, the place of Hong as the Heavenly Sovereign and of the movement as the legitimate government of China was always portrayed in terms of dispelling evil, punishing demons and serving the will of the Heavenly Father. Taiping propaganda portrayed the foundation of the eternal realm as a divine command, and thus a responsibility from which none could shrink. An 1852 proclamation to the people of Hunan was typical of the rhetoric of the movement, casting the struggle in Manichean terms of absolute good and evil, in which the Manchu Qing were literal demons:

Our Chinese empire has now received the great favor of the Great God who has ordered our Sovereign, the Heavenly King, to rule; how can the occupation and prolonged misrule of the Manchu barbarians be permitted to

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continue? You gentlemen have for generations resided in China; who among you is not a Child of God? If you can uphold Heaven in destroying the demons... you shall be a hero without compare in the mortal world, and in the heaven you shall receive glory without bounds. If instead you cling to your delusions, protect the false and reject the true, in life you will be a barbarian and in death a barbarian demon. Between obedience and disobedience there is a great principle.7

The Taiping advance was not just a military assault, it was also a chastisement of the institutions of the Qing. Once in power, the Taiping state maintained its face of uncompromising puritanism, but also became rent by internal division and a constant need for resources. As a result, the ‘Great Peace’ was anything but peaceful. The Taiping capital was beset by struggles between the subordinate commanders known as the ‘Five Kings’, and devolved into an ‘arena of carnage, greed and paranoia’. Suspicious of a plot by the ‘Eastern King’ Yang Xiuqing, Hong ordered an attack on Yang and his entourage, initiating two weeks of slaughter in which 20,000 were killed. Foreign observers were initially intrigued by reports of a Christian rebellion, but such interest was short-lived. Beyond the problem of Hong’s own beliefs, it became clear that the Taiping state was bad for business. Unwilling to accept the Taiping ban on the opium trade, British and French representatives in Shanghai quickly turned against the movement, even going as far as to provide the support of mercenary troops. But even with such help, suppression of the Taipings was far beyond the capabilities of regular Qing forces, and eventually led to the formation of new types of locally led and financed units, most notably the ‘Ever Victorious’ Hunan Army of Zeng Guofan.8 Military action began in 1860 and ended with the capture and sacking of the capital in 1864 (Figure 2.1). Hong Xiuquan himself had died of food poisoning before the final collapse of his movement. Victorious Qing troops disinterred his corpse, which they cremated and then shot out of a cannon, thereby denying a resting place to his spirit.

The death total of the rebellion is extremely difficult to calculate. The conservative estimate of 20 million people killed would make it by far the deadliest event of the nineteenth century, vastly more so than either the Napoleonic Wars or the American Civil War. But the real number may

Figure 2.1 Qing troops storming the Taiping capital of Nanjing. The lower left-hand corner shows the tactic of driving cattle set on fire to burst the city gates.
have been much higher. The siege and capture of fortified cities was often followed by an orgy of recriminatory slaughter of the civilian population, and some important cities such as Anqing changed hands multiple times. Beyond the violence of the rebellion and its suppression, the destruction of supply routes, market towns and rice fields decimated an already precarious countryside, sending waves of refugees (and with them an outbreak of cholera) into safe havens such as Shanghai. The combined effect of these disasters completely depopulated vast swaths of one of China’s most productive agricultural regions. In 1855, Guangde County in southern Anhui had a population of nearly 310,000. Ten years later, just over 5,000 remained, and within a generation newly arrived migrants would come to make up five out of six of the county’s residents. Even with repopulation policies in place, the region was slow to recover. The 1953 population of four central provinces (Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu and Jiangxi) was still nearly 20 million lower than it had been a century earlier.\(^9\)

Taiping Contemporaries

The suppression of the Taiping Rebellion placed a strain on the Qing finances and military from which it was never able to recover. This burden left the dynasty not only less able to respond militarily to the breakdown of social order, but also less able to exercise routine governance of the sort that would stabilise society. As the dynasty entered into a period of steep decline, it increasingly neglected tasks such as dredging flood-prone rivers or delivering relief supplies, further exacerbating the stress of continued population rise. Official neglect allowed crises such as the North China Famine (1876–9) to become far more deadly than they would have under better circumstances.\(^10\)

As a result, the spiral of social dislocation and organised violence continued to accelerate throughout the remainder of the century. At roughly the same time the Taiping were emerging from Guangxi, armed bands known as Nian (the name most likely refers to skeins of twisted paper, although the precise provenance remains a matter of dispute) were organising in Huabei, another impoverished region that spanned a tangle of provincial borders. While


earlier interpretations emphasised the connection of the Nian Rebellion (1851–68) to an internally coherent White Lotus tradition, scholars since the 1980s have moved away from the idea that an existing religious tradition drove the formation of the Nian, and have instead come to see the movement as an opportunistic extension of the banditry that was endemic to the area. The distraction of Qing forces by the Taiping suppression gave these bandit gangs (and the communities that supported them) an opportunity to develop into a proper military force, which aimed less to expand their power territorially than to keep the Qing from returning. However, while the Nian may not have been driven by religion in the same way as the millenarian Taipings, religion should not be discounted entirely. As were other violent brotherhoods such as the Triads or the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui), the Nian military was structured around a tradition of narrative, lore, rituals and blood oaths. Long after the Nian themselves were suppressed, this region would remain known for organised violence.

A far less compromising dynamic was at work in the 1866 conflagration of the Yellow Cliff Teaching (Huangya jiao) in nearby Shandong Province. Originally a school of syncretic Confucianism called the Great Ancient (Taigu), the movement formed into a community of disciples who (in part as a measure of protection against Nian incursions) sold their property and relocated to a stronghold at the foot of the Yellow Cliff Mountain. There the community of a few hundred families developed the belief that previous teachers lived among them as immortals, and practised a strict regimen of prayer and ritual. Provincial authorities watched these developments with alarm. Governor Yan Jingming characterised the group as the ‘intersection of heresy and banditry’ (xiejiao tong fei), and, beyond the usual charges of holding lewd nocturnal rituals and practising illicit magic, claimed that the community was storing up weapons. Convinced that danger from the group was too great to ignore, Yan sent in a contingent of troops to force them to disperse, attacking the community and burning it to the ground. Leaders and their families were killed in the ensuing battle and fire, as were hundreds of followers who tried to defend the community. Rather than surrender, many of the remaining followers committed suicide, bringing the total death toll to

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thousands. Decades later, many of Yan’s fellow literati continued to defend the teaching and criticise his mishandling of the situation.

**Muslim Rebellions**

The distraction of the Qing military provided an opportunity for two additional uprisings, one in the south-west and one in the north-west. These ethnically diverse regions sat on the frontier of the empire, with many areas under the mediated administration of native chieftains. Among the area’s distinct groups were Chinese Muslims (often known as Hui), most of whom dated their arrival to or after the influx of Central Asian Muslims during the Mongol rule of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and were scattered unevenly throughout the region. Muslims were an important minority in Yunnan, the mountainous south-west province bordering Burma, where they engaged in trade, and came as migrants to work the rich copper and silver mines. Further north, the newly conquered territory of Xinjiang bordered areas of concentrated Muslim settlement in Gansu and Shanxi.

Violence in these areas grew out of a confluence of factors that included poverty, dislocation, and grudges against neighbours and local officials, that were energised, organised and ignited by religion and religious identity. The so-called Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan followed a rise in ethnic conflicts, and was sparked by a dispute between Han and Hui Muslims, growing into a desire to annihilate the region’s Hui population. A spiral of mutual recriminations escalated into a massacre of 8,000 Muslims in 1856 by Han militias and garrison troops, and from there into an anti-Qing movement that captured the city of Kunming before being suppressed by arriving forces under the command of defecting fellow Muslim Ma Rulong (1832–91). The first of the north-west rebellions (known to contemporaries as the Dungan, a corruption of the Chinese dong Gan, meaning Eastern Gansu) developed in the 1860s when local militias that formed in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, along with Hui contingents in the Qing military, began turning on each other in waves of reprisals. Out of this, Yaqub beg (1820–77) declared a Kingdom of Kashgaria, which fell into disarray and was ultimately crushed by the Qing forces under the general Zuo Zongtang (1812–85). Thirty years later, the same region would again erupt into violence.

Like the Taiping Rebellion, the Muslim rebellions of the nineteenth century are striking for their sheer brutality. The rise and suppression of the smaller Panthay Rebellion resulted in a million killed, while ten years of
warfare in the north-west may have been as deadly as the Taiping Rebellion itself. Equally striking was the scale of violence against civilians, including the recriminatory slaughter of entire villages and towns. The violence itself did not always follow simple ethnic lines. Both the rebel and the suppressing armies were ethnically mixed, and the Hui themselves were internally very diverse, representing different customs, sects of Islam and lineages. Islam itself played a greater role in the north, where Muslims constituted a larger proportion of the population, and kept closer ties to currents and allies in Central Asia, but that role changed over time. The northern rebellion did come to view itself as a ‘holy war’, but in addition to violence between Han and Hui, much blood was shed by Muslims who were divided by tribal or ethnic loyalties, or by such ‘ritual minutiae’ as beard length or pronunciation of the vocalisation of Sufi devotions. Nevertheless, the largest-scale violence did eventually take the form of what would now be called ethnic cleansing. The slaughter of Muslims that followed the capture of the Panthay capital of Dali left the roads ‘ankle deep in blood’. From the dead, soldiers cut more than 10,000 pairs of ears – enough to fill twenty-four large baskets. The rebellions of the north-west were started by rumours of Qing plans to massacre Muslims. The shifting waves of violence took as their goal first the eradication of Han Chinese, followed by a suppression that sought through exile or murder to remove the Hui from entire regions.14

**Christian Mission and the Boxer Uprising**

Christianity was not new to nineteenth-century China. Nestorian Christianity first reached China via the Silk Road during the Tang dynasty (618–907), and Iberian Catholicism arrived by sea in the sixteenth century. Following a conflict over Catholic refusal to adhere to Confucian ritual proscriptions, Christian mission was banned in 1732, but was again allowed as a provision of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. Once so opened, China quickly received a large and diverse influx of Christian missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant. As had been the case during the earlier period of Iberian Catholicism, mission was frequently bound to national interest, producing

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a network of rivalries among competing missions and with local elites and religious figures such as Buddhist monks. Unlike the earlier period, this new reintroduction of mission came at a time of Qing dynastic decline, and the increasingly aggressive search by foreign powers for special concessions and spheres of interest within China. Some missions were bystanders to these events; others were willing antagonists. Many missionaries and diplomats felt that their aggressive defence of the Christians was a fair response to official xenophobia; others were unapologetic in their ambition to seed conflict that would result in diplomatic gain. As China’s position continued to deteriorate during the last decade of the nineteenth century, local officials were cautioned to avoid such conflict at all costs.

It is difficult to characterise simply the reasons behind Christian conversion, or the hostility that was felt against the religion. While most Catholic and Protestant missions set standards of knowledge and behaviour for new converts, it was not uncommon for one to accuse the other of accepting converts with more enthusiasm than care. More serious charges came from suspicious Chinese, who accused the missionaries of sorcery. Missionaries used their diplomatic leverage to protect their charges in civil and criminal disputes, creating deep grudges against the Chinese Christians. The Christians themselves frequently exacerbated these divisions by refusing to participate in village rituals. Often entire families would convert to Christianity, thus bringing religious difference into lineage feuds and conflicts that went back decades or longer.

These forces could come together with deadly results. In 1870, a mob gathered at the French church in Tianjin, enraged by rumours that Catholic nuns were kidnapping Chinese children and using their eyes and organs to make potions (the nuns did in fact offer a cash payment to people who brought dying children to the church for baptism). Sent to calm the situation, the bellicose French consul instead shot the magistrate’s assistant (possibly by accident), prompting the crowd to attack the church, killing the diplomats, priests and nuns, as well as a number of Russian bystanders and about forty Chinese Christians.

The brewing tensions reached a peak in the Boxer Uprising of 1900. For a number of years, the North China Plain had been afflicted by drought (Figure 2.2), a condition that many interpreted as Heaven’s displeasure at the spread of the foreign religion. This sentiment spread through the countryside through religious and martial arts networks, including one style of boxing called Plum Flower Fist (Meihua quan). Along with fighting techniques, these networks spread the techniques of direct possession, by which young men of a pure heart could be directly
Figure 2.2 ‘Starving people looting grain’. This woodcut image from around 1900 hints at the severity of the drought in northern China, and suggests the role of poverty and natural disasters in driving events like the Boxer Uprising.
possessed by martial deities such as Guan Gong, or by apotheosised literary figures like the Monkey King, Sun Wukong, from the classic *Journey to the West*. So possessed, these young men would be invulnerable to bullets (*daoqiang buru*) and ready to enter battle against the foreigners. Still without a leader, the movement consisted of bands of men like the ones shown in Figure 2.3 who began converging on the foreign enclaves in Tianjin and Beijing. The movement called itself the Society of Righteousness and Harmony (*Yihe tuan*). Seeing their penchant for martial arts display, the foreigners dubbed them Boxers. A smaller force consisting solely of women, particularly pre-pubescent girls, was called the Red Lanterns Shining (*Hongdeng zhao*), and was credited with a variety of magical powers, including the ability to fly, and to destroy armies and buildings with a wave of their fans.

The rise of the Boxer movement coincided with and exacerbated chaos in the Qing court. In 1900, the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), who had revealed herself to be the true power in Beijing, reversed her earlier policy of suppressing the Boxers, and instead supported them, issuing a demand for all foreigners to leave China. Doubting her assurances of protection, the
foreigners chose instead to defend the legations while waiting for relief from the 20,000-strong Eight Nation Expeditionary Force that reached Beijing on 14 August. Many local Christians did the same, barricading themselves into stoutly constructed and easily defensible churches. Provincial officials acted on their own volition: the Shanxi governor Yuxian (1842–1901) assured his infamy by offering protection to fifty-four local missionaries and then having them slaughtered inside the government compound. Others, such as Shandong governor Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), ignored the order to support the Boxers, and others (particularly Muslim units in the army) were from the outset hostile to the movement.

Although the Boxers are remembered as anti-foreign, the violence of the movement and its suppression were directed mainly at Chinese. While the missionary press justly lamented the deaths of their own, the number of Chinese Christians killed was far higher, perhaps as many as 30,000 (Figure 2.4). As was so often the case, the unrest presented an opportunity to settle old grudges violently. The missionary doctor Arthur Peill recounted how Boxers in southern Zhili (modern Hebei) turned against a cluster of Muslim villages: ‘Hundreds of Boxers surrounded these unsuspecting villages, and slaughtered their inhabitants to the number of almost a thousand people, massacring men, women and children without distinction. Babies were thrown up into the air and caught on the points of spears and so on.’

The suppression was equally brutal (Figure 2.5). Both foreign troops and Qing units were unsparing in their recriminations against Boxer areas. Villagers and townsfolk who had been unable to challenge the Boxers during the movement’s rise took the opportunity to exact revenge. Foreign troops added to the chaos by engaging in large-scale looting of cultural treasures. Although no admirers of the Boxers, first-hand witnesses such as Peill were nevertheless appalled at the indiscriminate violence visited by wave after wave of attacks inflicted on villages that in many cases were only tangentially connected with the movement.

As was the case with the Taipings, the violence both of and against the Boxers was intertwined with religion on many levels. Boxer practices echoed prevalent beliefs in magical invulnerability, incarnated the gods of the popular pantheon, and anticipated a world renewal that was at least inspired by the eschatology of the Eternal Venerable Mother. But in many cases, such as

Figure 2.4 Looting of the Catholic church in Shenyang, 1900. Somewhat unusually for foreign images, this drawing highlights the murder of Chinese Christians, rather than missionaries.
attacks on neighbours or employers, the breakdown of order simply provided an excuse to settle long-held scores.

Religious Violence in the Early Twentieth Century

The early twentieth century was a period of significant turmoil, but relatively little organised violence by or against religion. Although there were small-scale uprisings by religious groups, such as the Vast Yang (Hong yang) and Yellow Yang (Huang yang) teachings, most of the violence was a reaction to the continued decline in public security.\(^\text{17}\) The doddering Qing regime finally fell in 1911, and China was formally declared a Republic early the next year. For a time, the Republic existed in name only; China was in fact divided among competing militarists until the first incomplete military unification under the Nanjing government in 1927. In response to the pressures of insecurity and the often exploitative nature of various powerholders (including the Nanjing regime itself), local society organised and militarised under a number of different networks. Armed groups that had once fed into the Boxers, such as the Red Spears (Hongqiang hui), the Golden Armour (Jinzhong

\(^{17}\) Shengjing shibao, 30 March 1913, 15 January 1919.

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Figure 2.5 Execution of a Boxer in Beijing. Public executions and the display of mutilated corpses aimed to dispel any remaining rumours of Boxer magic.
zhao) and the Big Sword Society (Dadao hui), remained a force in local society, occasionally coming to blows with the forces of the central government, regional warlords or each other. Much of the violence was concentrated in places like Huaibei, Shandong and the north-east, all of which were known for popular militarisation. Like the Nian, these groups relied on rituals, protective magic and blood oaths, but were not religious in motivation. These networks grew as the Chinese security situation deteriorated, particularly during the chaos of the Japanese occupation (which gradually expanded between 1931 and 1945).

Is there value in treating the growing communist insurgency during this period as a religious rebellion, or at least subjecting it to the same analytical criteria? The religious violence of the nineteenth century had encompassed an extremely diverse array of phenomena: it included influences and variations on the existing eschatology of the Eternal Venerable Mother, but also from Christianity and Islam; it sometimes sought to protect a private group, and at others to transform the world by hastening some culmination of sacred time. The one constant would seem to be social stress, to which religion provides intellectual coherence and organisational form. Such would have been the view of the Chinese communists themselves, which took seriously Marx’s view of religion not simply as a sedation of social discontent (that is, the ‘opiate of the masses’), but also as the seed of proto-revolution, a flawed but expedient method of organising and expressing class interests. The Chinese communists saw two dangers in religious violence: the first was that violence against religion might galvanise the forces of reaction, as had been the case in the early Soviet Union. The Chinese Communist Party, which in the 1920s shifted its organisational emphasis from the cities to the countryside, was thus emphatic that cadres should speak out against religion but not be seen to oppose it violently. The greater danger was that religious rebellion would serve as an imperfect substitute for, and thus sap the strength of, genuine revolution. While the communists saw a kinship with the grievances championed by groups such as the Taipings, they were also very keen to distance themselves from that legacy, not only of apocalyptic and superstitious belief, but also of rebellion in the absence of a revolutionary programme.

Religious Violence in the People’s Republic

The communists would continue their fraught relationship with religion after 1949, the year they declared victory in their war with the Nanjing regime and founded the People’s Republic of China. This new era
would initiate new challenges both for and by religion. While technically the new regime proclaimed its commitment to uphold the freedom of religious belief, the complicated history of foreign mission and religious militarisation ensured that this promise would come with numerous and moving caveats. The first hint of a crisis came late in 1949, when local governments began preparing to move against groups they considered politically suspect, most notably a teaching called the Way of Penetrating Unity (Yiguandao). By June of the following year, directives for a national campaign against the group were being coordinated at a national level, and by the beginning of 1951 a coordinated propaganda drive was unleashed. The suppression of the Way of Penetrating Unity coincided with a series of other events, including a drive to demonise and expel the Catholic missionaries (Protestants were generally spared charges of criminality, but were nevertheless repatriated a few years later), and a national campaign to ‘Suppress the Reactionaries’ (zhénya fàngémíng) that reflected the radicalisation of the Korean War.  

The violence of this suppression was both actual and symbolic. The campaign set the tone for the place of religion in the People’s Republic: it ridiculed the religious beliefs of the Way of Penetrating Unity, but accompanying film and newspaper propaganda (Figure 2.6) also levied against it stock charges of theft, rape and treason for supposedly having collaborated with the Japanese occupation. This campaign probably resulted in 2–3 million killed. Many of the campaigns victims were prominent religious figures, but recalling the cost of attempts by the early Soviet Union to suppress the Russian Orthodox Church, the Chinese Communist Party did not publicise the violence. Only a small number of devotees were tried as ‘class enemies’, and formally sentenced to death – 263 out of nearly 42,000 members in one county near Tianjin – although in reality many more would die as a result of overwork and privation while in the ‘custody of the masses’. The Party was especially keen to ensure that the campaign would not be perceived as a general purge against religion. Buddhist and Protestant leaders were recruited or misquoted to add their criticism to the campaign, specifically that groups such as the Way of Penetrating Unity were traitors both to the nation and, more tellingly, to the

19 According to the formulaic class analysis used by these campaigns, only about 5 per cent of society are ‘enemies of the people’, and thus beyond rehabilitation. Generally, it was only this small group that was officially sentenced to execution, representing a small fraction of actual deaths. See ibid., pp. 204–6.
real purpose of religion. A theme seen as early as the Ming anti-sorcery statute, charges were levied primarily against leaders, who counted among their crimes the wilful deceit of their gullible followers. The suppression of the Way of Penetrating Unity not only expelled the group (as well as a number of smaller groups), but also was an important expression of stylised violence. Similar campaigns would be repeated both against the remainder of the group itself (long after the movement had been broken, old members continued to be brought out and publicly ‘struggled’ as an act of political theatre), and against other class enemies, both real and imagined.

Along China’s ethnic frontiers, religion represented a stratum of entrenched interests to be tamed or pulverised. In places like Inner Mongolia and Tibet, lamaseries were often the largest landholders, and had for centuries been vital centres of wealth and economic activity. The greatest problem with the lamas, or the Muslim leaders in places like Xinjiang, was not their religion as such, but rather their considerable political authority, one that appealed specifically to non-Chinese populations in regions where the new government was
conspicuously weak. Even having granted nominal self-rule to ethnic ‘autonomous regions’ within the sovereign state of the People’s Republic, it was very unlikely that the new government would leave these competing structures intact. From the early 1950s, cadres began identifying and removing troublesome leaders, often on pretence of criminal or lewd behaviour, although, as with the campaign against the Way of Penetrating Unity, care was taken to avoid the appearance of a general purge. The fears of the state were made reality in 1959, when a wave of ethnic uprisings near Tibet escalated into protests and eventually a full revolt in Lhasa. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army quickly and brutally suppressed the poorly armed rebels, many of whom were in fact monks, burning and looting numerous monasteries and prompting the flight across the Himalayas of the Dalai Lama and roughly 80,000 monks and ethnic Tibetans.

Conversely, it is not implausible to consider that communism itself, and in particular the personality cult that developed around Mao Zedong in the 1960s, became the de facto national religion. It is easy to discern phenomenological similarities between Maoism and the external characteristics of religion: central reliance on a sacred text (the *Quotations of Mao Zedong*, popularly known as the ‘Little Red Book’), rituals of worship, ecstatic devotion and an intense drive to proselytise. We might then ask in what ways the history of religious utopianism shaped expectations of the communist ‘high tide’, and in particular whether it provoked or predestined the violent extremism of events like the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (the actual movement lasted only from 1966 to 1969, but is often taken to include the years until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976). One point of similarity is with prevailing patterns of utopianism. Like the various incarnations of religious millenarianism, Maoism clearly represented a culmination of sacred time, and, like the Yellow Cliff Teaching or the Boxer movement, placed paramount importance on ideological purity. Viewed in this way, the extremism of the Cultural Revolution period, with its routine victimisation and outright murder of those labelled as enemies of the revolution, as well as internecine struggles between groups of ideologically charged youths, was perhaps the most destructive episode of religious violence of China’s twentieth century.20

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The years following Mao’s death were marked by an emphasis on economic growth, political stability, and strong determination to avoid the ideological extremism of previous decades. This policy shift included the gradual rehabilitation of religion, a process that began in 1982, with the promulgation of the document ‘Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period’ (also known as Document 19). This document departed from an earlier orthodoxy by stating that religion could in fact be a socially progressive force, particularly in the cultures of national minorities such as the Muslim Hui and Buddhist Tibetans and Mongolians. By the 1990s, religion was making what appeared to be an overt return to public life. Conspicuous state support for accepted religion (which is allowed within the confines of politically controlled ‘patriotic associations’ of five religions: Buddhism, Islam, Daoism, and Protestant and Catholic Christianity) was again on the rise. More tellingly, formerly banned popular festivals were again being organised, often on a very large scale.21

This apparent resurgence was halted with the onset of the campaign against Falungong (Dharma Wheel Practice) in 1999. Falungong had formed during the early 1990s as a school of qigong (meditation and concentration exercises), and spread during the national qigong craze, ending the decade with a nationwide following and a desire for formal recognition. In April 1999, approximately 10,000 practitioners staged a peaceful protest outside the government compound at Zhongnanhai in Beijing, so alarming President Jiang Zemin that he took a personal interest in the eradication of the movement. Beginning that summer (which, perhaps not coincidentally, marked the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre), the Chinese government initiated a coordinated series of arrests and detention of Falungong leaders, along with a massive propaganda campaign that (reminiscent of the 1951 campaign against the Way of Penetrating Unity) labelled the group as both criminal and superstitious, a danger both to China and to socialism. The veracity of the Chinese government’s claims aside, the group has proven extremely difficult to dislodge. Not only has Falungong retained a core following inside China, it has also spread overseas, out of the grasp of the Chinese government. The repression of the group inside China has been characterised by violence, both the brutal treatment of followers subjected to government rehabilitation, and the reported self-immolation by Falungong

protestors that state sources say demonstrates the inhumanity of the group’s brainwashing. (Falungong itself says that such events were staged.) The overseas following of Falungong has lobbied relentlessly for censure of the Chinese government based specifically on the brutality of this persecution (Figure 2.7). Materials displayed and distributed at the group’s protests and public petition drives highlight charges of forced labour, organ harvesting, torture and mass murder, often accompanied by graphic displays of beaten, injured and mutilated bodies. These items sometimes feature more prominently than does the teaching of the group itself, suggesting the degree to which persecution has become central to the group’s identity.

It is not implausible that official hostility towards Falungong was driven by the same fears and attitudes that motivated the earlier imperial regimes to ban the propagation of ‘perverse’ religion. Beyond Falungong specifically, well-placed scholars in China have put forward the opinion that even seemingly benign New Religious Movements are dangerously incompatible with modern society.22 Such attitudes were seemingly justified with the rise of a small but virulent strain of teachings such as the True Jesus (Zhen Yesu)

Church. Also known as the Eastern Lightning (Dongshan), this group is an extreme offshoot of Pentecostal Christianity, and teaches that Jesus has been reincarnated in China as one of the group’s female leaders. Despite being banned, the group is extremely aggressive in its proselytisation, and exerts tight control over its members, as evinced by the 2014 bludgeoning to death of an unwilling convert in a McDonalds restaurant in the coastal city of Yantai. In response, the Chinese security apparatus made approximately 1,000 arrests, and sentenced to execution at least five of the perpetrators.

Conclusion and Future Prospects

Late in 2016, the Chinese government made public the planned revisions to its ten-year-old Religious Services Law. This law governs the acceptable practice and parameters of religion, and the proposed revisions revealed a growing concern with issues such as fraud and online recruiting, but far less so with religious violence. Apart from the standard injunction that ‘no organisation or individual shall use religion to harm national security, disrupt social order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the national educational system, or otherwise harm national interests, public interests and the legitimate rights and interests of citizens’, there is little to suggest that the Chinese government currently sees any existential threat in religion or religious violence, at least no threat that is unique to religion. This stance is not surprising. Although imperial era Chinese regimes may have understood the danger of religion in intrinsic terms (the fear, for example, that rebel invincibility magic might actually work), the predominant political concern since at least the time of the Boxer debacle has been the ability of religion to organise and energise people who are already marginalised, violent or disaffected. Certainly this would be the view of China’s current government, which is externally confident that religious violence, and religion itself, will fall away as Chinese society grows ever more wealthy and stable.

But even now, such confidence is not absolute. China does remain highly concerned about ethnic violence carried out through or in the name of religion, particularly Islam, and keeps exceedingly close guard over any manner of religious education, or communication with potentially restive Muslim regions such as Xinjiang. It also keeps the threat of religious violence available as a potential policy card of its own. Whatever threats it may or may

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not continue to see in groups like Falungong, the Chinese government certainly recognises the ancillary benefits of its own past campaigns against evil cults, and would undoubtedly be able to produce a similar threat, if the need again arose.

Bibliographical Essay


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The volume *Popular Religion and Shamanism* edited by Ma Xisha and Meng Huiying (Brill Religious Studies in Contemporary China Collection 1, Leiden: Brill, 2011) presents the translated work of a number of important Chinese scholars, including classic articles by Han Bingfang on the Yellow Cliff Teaching, Lu Yao on the origins of the Society of Righteousness and Harmony, and Zhou Yumin on the early relationship between the Society of Righteousness and Harmony and the Way of Penetrating Unity.


This chapter provides an overview of the role of violence in the operations of the colonial state in India, with reflections on how its various explicit and implicit modalities defined imperialism, shaped anti-colonialism, constructed concepts of the nation, hardened communal identities, and informed the constitution and practices of the early independent Indian state, which sought to inherit the ‘legitimate monopoly of violence’ from its predecessor. Accepting the narratives encoded into colonial accounts of the Raj, which tell of the triumphant establishment of pax Britannica in a turbulent subcontinent, will not do; nor will a narrow conceptualisation of violence as pure physical force explain the longevity of Her (and, after the death of Queen Victoria, His) Majesty’s Government in India. A list of different modalities of violence evident in India would include, but not be limited to: the manifest violence in warfare; military or police action; the establishment of the rule of law, which legitimised and sanitised state violence and delegitimised Indian resistance; the prevalence of interpersonal ‘white’ violence (in the form of everyday cuffs and aggressions meted out by Britons to Indian subjects); the displays of force that were encoded into pageantry and ceremonial exhibitions of power that formed the very culture of the Raj; and the structural violence that resulted from the reorientation of the Indian economy for British profit. These modalities were pervasive, overlapping and mutually reinforcing.

We interpret violence broadly but not expansively, reading its presence or effects in a number of explicit and implicit state projects. Our aim is to highlight the dialectic between colonial coercion in its various guises and the formation of Indian nationalism and its other, ‘communalism’, a term used extensively in South Asian studies to describe the mobilisation of ethnic and especially religious identities, frequently ending in conflict. Such a framework helps to explain how it was that an avowedly non-violent
nationalist movement managed to deliver an independence that was marred by the extraordinary violence of partition.

There are good reasons to be sceptical of British pretensions to use physical violence as only a last resort and in exceptional circumstances, but it is equally important to interrogate presumptions that the Indian anti-colonial movement was both singular, and singularly non-violent. There were many different strains and ideologies that informed Indian nationalism, and much questioning of the viability of non-violence as a political strategy. Incidents of political violence by Indian revolutionary groups targeted at British interests in the subcontinent threw Gandhian non-violence into stark relief, rendering Gandhi a viable political leader in the eyes of the British.1 Moments of political violence by revolutionary organisations – construed as ‘terrorists’ by the British – were often directly inspired by acts of state violence in its different modalities.

Until recently, there has been surprisingly little emphasis on the violent nature of colonialism in British India,2 or, for that matter, on the strains of violence in Indian anti-colonialism. This is perhaps a product of the early dominance of British historiography in South Asian Studies, which tended to focus on liberal strains within the colonial state. It may also be the case that an over-reliance by historians on the administrative records generated by the Government of India in the colonial archive – embedded in discourses that justified or elided incidents of state violence as exceptional – has frustrated scholarly interrogation of violence in British India. Recent methodological interventions and the broadening of the field of South Asian Studies have opened up fresh concerns and concepts of what constitutes an archive, throwing up new evidence that provides a very different narrative of imperialism in the subcontinent. In 1947, the independent state inherited many of the mechanisms of violence of the colonial state that preceded it: an irony, given the nature of nationalist critique that questioned the legitimacy of a state that relied extensively upon the use of force.

Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence

Although British legal codes intoned that the Government of India ‘was established by law’, the colonial state in India was established amid

extraordinary violence in 1858. The assumption of power in British territories in India by the crown followed what historians agree was the most significant revolt against the excesses of the East India Company – the rebellion of 1857 – following the mutiny of Indian troops in the Company’s army in north India, which catalysed a wide spectrum of opposition to the British presence. The British victory over rebels and insurgents in warfare that was marked by an unrestrained ferocity cemented its monopoly on violence, identified by Weber as the hallmark of the state. 3 Significantly, this established an equation of violence as unidirectional, meted out by Britons and their agents on Indian subjects. If and when Indians resorted to violence in response and attacked Britons, this was construed as an illegitimate ‘outrage’ or ‘revolt’ (depending on the scale) and an unjustifiable inversion of the nature of things. 4 Whenever the dominance of the state was violently challenged by Indians, this was construed as illegal, which in turn justified the full disciplinary apparatus of the state, including detention and execution. By 1860, inciting disaffection with the state even by word would become illegal, according to Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, inviting a lengthy and punitive prison sentence – although colonial officials found this remarkably hard to enforce, given the vagueness of the law.

At the same time, eruptions of ‘native’ violence were crucial to justify state repression, including the costs of maintaining an extensive army, which early nationalists deplored. Military charges were the largest single budget item in British India, accounting for between 40 and 50 per cent of government expenditure in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. 5 Moreover, incidents of native rebellion were frequently used to bolster arguments that Indians were politically immature and incapable of self-governance. Just as the Black Hole of Calcutta had been deployed as a justificatory narrative to support the aggressive expansionism of the East India Company, the rebellion in 1857 provided fresh and equally selective lessons to provide the basis for further subjugation, not only in India, but in the British Empire at large. During the Mutiny, anything short of brutal and summary execution of

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Indian suspects was construed as a weakness that was not becoming of an empire.\(^6\) The string of atrocity stories arising from the 1857 rebellion came lavishly illustrated, forming the matrix of late nineteenth-century colonial culture in the form of novels, newspapers, memoirs and (later) film. These perpetuated an instructive undercurrent of fear, of what might happen if power were not assertively maintained, and a consequent rationale for repressive activities against Indian subjects, thereby simultaneously justifying state violence and applauding the state’s restraint.

The sanitised language that would later be used to describe the ‘pacification’ of post-rebellion north India was revealing of an awareness that while violence was indispensable in times of crisis, it could not be relied upon to maintain stability. This was especially so given the skewed ratio of Briton to Indian in the subcontinent, and the evident fragility of loyalties in the army. While the ratio of Briton to Indian in the British Indian Army was increased after 1857, the reliance on Indians to serve in repressive institutions such as the army, the police and prisons would remain. In the army in particular, this was tempered by a regimental ‘divide-and-rule’ policy in which ethnically or religiously selected regiments could be called upon to fire upon fellow Indians of other ethnic or religious denominations.\(^7\) This reliance on collaborative repression became increasingly problematic, especially as anti-colonial organisations began to expand in the twentieth century. Until the challenge of mass nationalism in the twentieth century, the military would only be deployed in a limited fashion, in localised, small-scale peasant conflicts, or in overseas wars or imperial conflicts, where Indian revenues financed additional imperial manpower, most notably in the two world wars. The colonial state would work over the next fifty years to establish a more elaborate framework of coercion, enabling apologists to maintain that Britain had not established a military state in India.\(^8\)

Despite the insinuation that 1857 constituted the greatest single challenge to British rule, there were regular rebellions against British authority. These rebellions were dismissed as the rabble-rousing of uninformed peasants, from the Deccan riots of the 1890s to the Moplah Rebellion of the 1920s. Yet these, and earlier violent movements like the Santal Rebellion of the 1850s, left

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a paper trail of memorials and petitions to the colonial government outlining the oppression of excessive taxation, rent-hungry landlords protected by the colonial administration, and arbitrary miscarriages of justice. Thus, the disempowered and the illiterate (at least in English, the language of the colonial state) were not as voiceless as often assumed by historians. They were able to find spokesmen who would put their grievances into words, before peaceful options were exhausted and violence broke out, with the certainty of failure and death, in some cases mediated by the millenarian hope of invulnerability provided against firearms by divine intervention against moral and social injustice. 9

The Power/Knowledge Nexus

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, forms of power/knowledge and bureaucratic strategies informed by such knowledge began to legitimate colonial domination, largely precluding the need for force. Anthropological theories were applied to Indian castes and tribes in an attempt to predict loyalty and perfidy based on a range of racial and/or physical characteristics. These theories were deeply problematic, framed within Orientalist assumptions and presuming as they did that Indian subjects could be reduced to a series of group identities according to caste, religion or region. And yet they informed a range of government projects, from the restructuring of the army by recruiting only ‘martial races’ to ensure fealty, to the pre-emptive punishment that was enshrined in the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871. Ethnographic assessments were intimately tied to the census, which sought to enumerate, control and presage the behaviours of India’s castes, tribes and races. The subsequent persecution of and use of violence (seen as ‘reasonable force’) against newly defined ‘savage’ elements in British India demonstrated that knowledge was more than merely discursive. Technologies of the state such as the census, which by 1891 had become decennial, broke up the population into relatively manageable units, aggregated along the lines of region, caste, religion and gender; and regulations that demarcated sections of the population as ‘criminal tribes’, believed to be inherently prone to violence, thieving and plunder, justified a variety of punitive measures. Prisons were sites of

intense violence against the person of the prisoner, ranging from murder of inmantes to torture to various forms of sensory deprivation.  

One of the most protracted debates about British imperialism in the subcontinent revolves around the degree to which the Indian economy was reorganised to ensure British profit. Economic mismanagement formed the basis of Indian accusations about ‘unBritish rule’ in the late nineteenth century. While this critique was initially mounted in rather abstract terms, it can be related to a process that has recently been identified by scholars as structural violence, in which the manipulation of social and economic structures by governments results in the deprivation of the conditions necessary to sustain longevity of life. Mike Davis’s devastating critique of imperial famines in India as ‘late Victorian holocausts’ provides a sobering account of mundane government protocols, provocative for its comparison of the Raj to the Nazi state, in its perpetration of mass death by economic policy. This challenges prevalent Victorian imagery of British India as an Oriental melange of Kipling, tiger hunts and princes, but in fact these icons too can be seen as reflecting state violence. Much of Kipling’s work, for example, is set against the backdrop of some sort of military aggression. ‘Gunga Din’, Kipling’s classic ode to a water-carrier who was ‘belted and flayed’ by the soldiers he served, for example describes the exploits of a British regiment advancing into hostile territory.

Implicit and Symbolic Violence

The righteousness of state violence remained a key element in the system of control over British India, even when it was reserved. Implicit or latent violence was strategically displayed across the Indian urban landscape in the form of commemoration and pageantry. The visual display of violence passed or violence tamed was an effective form of intimidation. Among these, we might count the prominent display of the cannon, Zam-zammah,

11 See, for example, Latika Chaudhari et al. (eds.), A New Economic History of Colonial India (London: Routledge, 2016).
described by Kipling in *Kim* as the ‘fire-breathing dragon’ that served as the emblem of power for rulers of the Punjab, decommissioned by the British after its capture; or the erection of statues of British mutiny ‘heroes’, including men responsible for ordering sadistic, summary executions; or the construction of memorials in Indian urban spaces to Britons murdered during the rebellion. All of these served as perpetual reminders of the power vested in the colonial state, and of what it had done before and might do if provoked.

Such prominent reminders were intended to breed compliance in subjects, although by the early twentieth century these symbols merely served to provoke. A prominent statue of General Neill in Madras became the focus of a Gandhian protest in 1927. Its removal was one of the first acts of the provincial Congress government in 1937, leading to animated indignation in the conservative British media and the House of Commons as an act that was ‘offensive to all Europeans in India’. Memorials to the Black Hole of Calcutta have been twice relocated, in 1940 from the prominent Dalhousie Square to the relative ignominy of a nearby churchyard. Many Indians wrote feelingly of the quotidian humiliation involved in walking past a statue of John Lawrence outside the High Court in Lahore, the script on whose plinth rhetorically demanded of passers-by: ‘Will you be governed by the pen or the sword?’ The relationship between the two, of course, was intimate: as Walter Benjamin noted, ‘law-making is power-making, and to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence.’

The co-option of elites, most spectacularly evidenced by the containment of the heads of Princely States showcased at various durbars and ceremonies in Delhi and in London, became a staple of imperial spectacle. The implicit violence in a durbar ceremony, replete with its structured parades of regiments, cavalry and cannon, is most starkly evident in Pathé footage of the 1911 Delhi Durbar. The grammar of such displays would be later reproduced in the Independence and Republic Day parades of the independent Indian

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14 ‘Removal of General Neill’s Statue’, IOR/L/PJ/7/1380, citing discussions in the House of Commons, 29 November 1937.
state, indicating that the existence of potential force was in the nature of a display of stateness. The other cliché of imperial culture in India – tiger hunting – was extensively fetishised, representing the symbolic domination of the empire over an exotic and ferocious apex predator that typified the many dangers lurking in the Indian landscape. Tiger hunting not only had the advantage of a historical connection with Mughal nobility, and therefore traditions of kingship in the subcontinent, but also afforded young men the ‘training to allow them to deal better with crises such as the Mutiny’, when restraint was the order of the day.¹⁹

**Law and Violence**

The colonial state, with its claims to introduce peace, reform, good governance and rule of law to the subcontinent, could not plausibly justify driving such a project at the barrel of a gun. The rule of law provided an ostensibly colour-blind framework that served to justify and elide the ‘white violence’ that pervaded social and labour relations between Indians and Britons. Up until the early 1900s, errant servants might be thrashed, and in the event of the servant’s death judicial findings would routinely blame the fatality on the weakness of the Indian body, and the tendency of the native spleen to rupture at the slightest provocation.²⁰ The prevalence of interpersonal and interracial violence in British India provides an important subtext to the controversy sparked by the Ilbert Bill, a proposed amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code allowing Indian judges and juries to trial European criminals in 1883. Mass protests by the British expatriate community in India, accustomed to the liberal use of interpersonal violence in the name of protecting British women, led to its withdrawal.²¹ The episode has long been held to be a defining moment in Indian nationalism, leading to the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the organisation that by the early twentieth century would form the backbone of the independence movement.

The tendency in contemporary Britain to view the empire with nostalgia has meant that attempts to highlight the everyday violence of the Raj have been resisted vehemently by both conservative academics and members of

the public, many of them descendants of families who were invested in the Raj and who remain alert to the deconstruction of colonial mythologies. Bart Moore-Gilbert’s candid family memoir, dealing with shocking revelations of the culture of police violence perpetuated by his father as an officer in India, is a useful corrective.22

Excessive Force and the Crisis of Colonialism

The use of explicit and extreme force was an indication that the hegemonic power of the state was not functioning. It was moments of breakdown in the state’s overt restraint on the use of violence that indicated its instability and weakness, and provided the most powerful incentives to anti-colonial sentiments and mobilisation. One specific instance was the passing of the Rowlatt Act (1919) at the end of the First World War, which aimed to extend special wartime powers that restricted civil liberties into peacetime, as a means of quelling postwar unrest. Containing the resulting protests in the Punjab, a province hit hard by the effects of World War I, led to the invocation of martial law. With restraints removed, General Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on a peaceful crowd of thousands assembled to celebrate a festival in an enclosed park in Amritsar on 13 April 1919. The Jallianwalla Bagh massacre, as it came to be known, was a defining moment in the history of the colonial state in India, when the implicit threat of violence contained in the various mechanisms of colonial control became all too explicit. The need to resort to such excessive violence demonstrated the fragility of the state’s hegemony, opening the floodgates of criticism, undermining moderate nationalist hopes for a negotiation of a better position for India in the imperial order as a consequence of her loyalty during the First World War, and leading to the first of Gandhi’s mass mobilisations, the Non-Cooperation Movement.

This moment of crisis for the Raj was therefore one brought about by its own violence. In a subsequent commission of inquiry, Dyer’s actions were construed as an aberration by a government unwilling to concede or imagine alternatives to the use of physical force. However, Dyer’s actions are better seen as a ‘pathology of a system, rather than of an individual’.23 The Congress mounted an inquiry of its own, in the process rhetorically constituting itself

as an alternative government; its report indicted the government and its report on a number of counts, detailing endemic violence and daily humiliations suffered by the people of the Punjab. Dyer was part of an emerging pattern towards arbitrary and collective punishment as a form of coercion in British India, as the state began to weaken after the First World War.  

The Interwar Moment: Violence versus Non-Violence

The after-effects of the First World War led to a substantial escalation in nationalist activity in India. The Rowlatt Satyagraha was called by Gandhi in protest at the extension of wartime powers to peace, and it was these protests that led to the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in 1919. The Non-Cooperation Movement in 1921–2 foregrounded the state’s extreme violence as a show of weakness: state violence actually worked to strengthen the moment of Gandhian ‘non-violence’. Their mutual dependence is clear from the circle of events: and the Non-Cooperation Movement cited ‘the Khilafat wrongs’ (the post-First World War treatment of Turkey by the Allies) and ‘the Punjab wrongs’ (the collective abuses following the declaration of martial law in the province in 1919) as the basis of the movement. Yet Gandhi abruptly withdrew from the movement just as it was building momentum, following an incident in a small town in the United Provinces in 1922, when protesters retaliated against police violence in Chauri Chaura, killing twenty-three Indian police officers. Gandhi was promptly arrested, and upon his release spent much of the next six years in his ashram, to concentrate on what he saw as his constructive programme to reform a community of Indians who would be worthy of independence. Crucially, the power of non-violence relied upon state violence, as was clear from Gandhi’s emphasis on martyrdom (through the deaths of activists following state imprisonment or confrontation); otherwise the staging of a moral confrontation did not work.

Gandhi re-emerged onto the political scene in late 1928, at a time when anti-colonial violence had begun to dominate both nationalist and state attention. A revolutionary movement came to the fore of national politics in late 1928 in north India, following the assassination of a British policeman who had taken part in an attack on a non-violent protest against the Simon Commission in

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Lahore, which led to the death of a prominent Congress leader. Acts of colonial police brutality, the assassins declared, would not go unavenged; non-violence could not be taken for granted. A sharp rise in political violence directed at Britons followed, as lone individuals followed the example of revolutionary organisations who aimed to use violence to galvanise nationalist opinion in their favour. This violence was seen by its protagonists, a rather articulate group of young men who wrote and published in defence of their actions, not as individual acts of heroism, which they ultimately considered futile, but as the basis for a wider mass organisation that was unwilling to compromise with British rule. A number of these revolutionaries were reading the literature of a spectrum of leftist thought, relating their own life-worlds and politics to these ideologies. This included a nascent communist movement, which the government sought to define and isolate as foreign-funded and alien to India, in the process ironically drawing more attention to Marxist thought. Moreover, many revolutionaries, and some ostensibly on the side of non-violence, understood that for non-violent agitation to be effective, its alternative, violence, had to be existent. The public celebration of those accused of political violence prompted the British to craft a special ordinance under emergency provisions to allow for ‘terrorists’ to be tried in absentia and away from the scrutiny of the media, denying them the publicity they had enjoyed, and enabling them to be sentenced to death or awarded life imprisonment.

The Civil Disobedience Movement (1930–4), often thought of as Gandhi’s second non-violent mass campaign, can therefore be seen as his strategy for reorienting political energies away from anti-colonial violence. The presence of violence on the political spectrum in the interwar years served to highlight Gandhi’s desirability as a political opponent and interlocutor. In 1931, he emerged as a viable political leader (as opposed to the leader of a seditious movement), eligible to meet and to ‘parley on equal terms’ (as Winston Churchill indignantly scoffed) with the Viceroy, and later with the King himself. This is starkly highlighted by poems and cartoons published at the time of Gandhi’s visit to London for the second Round Table Conference, in which he was depicted toothless and shirtless; a stark contrast to his European radical or fascist contemporaries, arrayed in shirts marked black, brown, red and green (Figure 3.1). The British endorsement of Gandhi

26 Franziska Roy and Benjamin Zachariah, ‘Meerut and a Hanging: “Young India”, Popular Socialism and the Dynamics of Imperialism’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33.3 (2013), 360–77.
27 Kama Maclean, ‘Revolution and Revelation: or, When Is History Too Soon?’, *South Asia* 39.3 (2016), 678–94.
as a mediating figure, and of non-violence as a legitimate form of anti-colonial action, rendered political violence all the more illegitimate. In this respect, during the interwar years, the government of India and Gandhi seem indistinguishable in their insistence on non-violence.

The importance of appearances and visibility is crucial in understanding the operation and the limits of state violence in British India. The success of non-violence as a political strategy in the interwar years can in some measure be explained by the performativity of satyagraha, crucial to which was the concept of a global audience for the media. A peaceful protest of Sikhs at Guru Ka Bagh in Amritsar in 1922 was met with police brutality, captured on film by an American cinematographer, A. L. Varges – a testament to photography’s capacity to ‘poison’ the state by producing devastating images of evidence.\(^{28}\) The Salt March, which concluded with the clubbing of Indian volunteers by police in Dharasana, was covered by an American journalist, Webb Miller; his coverage is generally credited for winning American sympathy for Gandhi’s politics.\(^{29}\)


The Indian National Congress – formerly a loose organisation that accommodated a range of political opinion – substantially tightened in the interwar years, as Gandhi sought to dominate the movement while increasingly organising along essentially religious lines. Gandhi, compelled to include in his movement persons of lower-caste origins, referred to in a patronising manner as ‘harijans’ or ‘children of god’, was unable to include Muslims within a Hindu-inflected rhetoric of belonging. Many of his movements made conditions of everyday life, even survival, difficult or impossible – akin to upper-caste denial of water and food to lower castes – making the claims of non-violence difficult to justify.  

Communalism: Ethnic Violence in South Asia

Often read in opposition to nationalism, communalism is probably more usefully seen as setting the boundaries of the nation in a way that challenges the hegemonic view of the nation. In the context of colonial India, it almost invariably refers to separate visions of nationhood as defined by Hindu and Muslim political actors, and the extent to which these are fuelled or furthered by violence between the two communities. Explorations into the psychology of the colonised, who are forced to come to terms with the humiliations of colonialism, are to some extent helpful in understanding the compulsions of internecine violence. Frantz Fanon writes compellingly that violence ‘frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect’. He also argues that the apparent invincibility of the colonial power promotes a redirection of violence inwards within the colonised society, leading the colonised to turn on one another. Fanon sees this as a direct substitution for confrontation against the colonial state; however, the separation between colonial oppressor and internal other/oppressor isn’t always clear in India. With anti-colonial violence effectively delegitimised by both Gandhi and government, the competition for dominance and redress for the humiliations of colonialism was redirected towards internal others. However, in Gandhian and

30 Gandhi himself admitted that social boycott could be a form of unwarranted coercion, and in 1922 had referred to its ‘summary use’ as ‘unpardonable violence’, and tried to prescribe humane limits to its use. Gandhi: Selected Writings, ed. Ronald Duncan (New York: Dover, 2005), pp. 80–2.
32 Ibid., pp. 17–18; Penderel Moon, Strangers in India (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945), chapter 5.
Congress mobilisational tactics, exploitation or oppression of Indians by Indians was consistently underplayed or glossed over, and class, caste or religious conflicts were not simply the result of some sort of false consciousness, but were as genuine as any grievances against colonial rule, and in many cases more immediate.

The rise in communal violence from the 1920s is therefore not simply the outcome of an over-reliance by the Congress on religious tropes in its mobilisation,\(^{33}\) of the self-interested machinations of religious leaders\(^ {34}\) or of British divide and rule policies.\(^ {35}\) It was also a corollary of the braking of the nationalist movement by Gandhi’s insistence on non-violence in the interwar years. In more direct terms, as various groups positioned themselves in an anti-colonial struggle, it was also apparent that what was at stake was the ability to control a future state, to win a future conflict in a fundamentally conflicted society and to decide on who would primarily belong to that state. To that end, mobilisation in the interwar years, in common with much of the rest of the world, took the form of organising, training, and as far as possible arming, paramilitary groups ostensibly charged with ‘social service’ work as ‘volunteers’, but in effect creating sectarian private armies to create communal quasi-states or states-in-waiting, challenging the state’s monopoly of violence.\(^ {36}\) Gandhi himself spoke of the ‘military discipline’ demanded of Congress volunteers, and allowed those who ran the Congress’s volunteer corps to train on military lines. Gandhi had made recruitment speeches for the British Indian Army during the First World War, and he maintained that non-violence could only be practised by those who were capable of violence, rather than those who abstained from violence simply because they were weak.\(^ {37}\)

While the dialectic of violence established between white ruler and brown subject seems relatively straightforward, the uncomfortable fact remains that, by the early twentieth century, a substantial measure of state violence inflicted upon the Indian body by coercive forces such as the police was inflicted by Indians serving in those forces. Revolutionary groups explicitly

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targeted Indians working for the state, appealing to them to leave the colonial services. On 23 April 1930, a Garhwali regiment ordered to fire on a protesting crowd in Peshawar refused to do so, and was court martialled, constituting a worrying new trend for the Government of India.\textsuperscript{38} Gandhi, who might have been expected to endorse this decision, responded by denouncing the Garhwali regiment: imagine, he argued, if when India had a national government they similarly refused to do their duty to the state.\textsuperscript{39}

In the face of the pressures of mass nationalist organisation and escalating ethnic tensions, the response of the state became less predictable, leading to ‘tacitly permitted transgressions’ of conventions about the use of force, such as whipping, \textit{lathi} (baton) charges and so on.\textsuperscript{40} A political compromise of sorts seemed to have been reached in the Government of India Act of 1935, which devolved provincial authority to Indians (barring a clause that would reappropriate authority to a British-controlled centre in case of emergency), thereby also devolving a part of state violence to ‘nationalists’ of various descriptions, as the policing of provincial disorder fell to these governments. The majority of governments established in the provinces of British India following the elections in 1937 had Congress-led ministries: seven out of eleven, with another two in coalition, leaving only Bengal and the Punjab with non-Congress governments. The left flank of the Congress was often then the only opposition to the Congress governments in power which, dominated by Indian business interests, were invested in order and did the job of the colonial state by controlling ‘subversives’ and ‘seditionists’ (often their own Congress colleagues) by imprisoning them.\textsuperscript{41} When the Congress governments resigned in protest at being drawn into the war without consultation in 1939, Gandhi wrote that it was a rescue of sorts for the Congress, bringing Congress factions together again and covering ‘the fact that we were falling to pieces’.\textsuperscript{42}

From the Second World War to the Post-Partition State(s)

The stalemate of 1939 continued till 1942, with sections of the British government in London and Delhi and the Congress left manoeuvring to find

\textsuperscript{38} Letter from Viceroy to King, 30 April 1930. British Library, Mss Eur C 152/2.
\textsuperscript{39} ‘Speech at Chharwada’, 26 April 1930, \textit{Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi}.
\textsuperscript{40} Sherman, \textit{State Violence}, p. 10.
a formula that would make the Congress’s cooperation in the war effort possible, given that this was seen as a war against a rising fascist coalition, which would be far more dangerous to India than a weakened British imperialism. With negotiations failing, in August 1942 the Congress launched the Quit India Movement, the leadership were imprisoned and therefore unable to control any emerging movement. The ensuing movement was relatively spontaneous, led, if at all, by a secondary level of local underground leaders. The movement was therefore neither Gandhian nor non-violent. Under conditions of wartime media censorship and governmental emergency powers, it was repressed with immense state violence, including aerial bombardment and machine gunning of civilian populations, with no impact on world opinion. However, once again the use of excess force by the colonial government was widely seen by the Indian populace as evidence, especially after the fall of Singapore and Burma and the return to India of the migrant working population from South-East Asia, that the British Raj was on the verge of collapse.\textsuperscript{43} Significantly, after the suppression of the Quit India Movement, military authorities treated India not as an ally but as an occupied territory for the rest of the war, and the new Viceroy who arrived in 1943, Lord Wavell, called for a viable withdrawal plan after the war.\textsuperscript{44}

As the war came to an end, demobilised troops mixed with disenchanted workers as the wartime expansion of employment contracted. The aftermath of the Quit India Movement and the disruptions of the war years had left a legacy of violence. The call for a separate state of Pakistan had been raised in 1940 with British encouragement, as a bargain made with Muslim parties, now represented by the Muslim League, in return for loyalty during the war. Now, as the politics of British withdrawal began to play out, general insecurity fanned violence of all kinds, and demobilised soldiers in recruitment areas were armed and ready to join the existing militia. The perceived persecution of members of the Indian National Army (INA), composed of deserters from the British Indian Army and of recruits among civilians in Japanese-occupied areas of Asia, led to further unrest.

In November 1945 and February 1946 there were serious anti-European and anti-Eurasian riots in Calcutta. In February 1946, the Royal Indian Navy mutinied, protesting, among other things, against differential pay rates for its white and Indian members. This mutiny made it clear that the armed forces

could no longer be relied upon to underpin British rule. By August 1946, violence had taken a different turn, the anti-colonial solidarities of February giving way to communal violence. Following an ambiguous Muslim League call to ‘Direct Action’ and Bengal premier H. S. Suhrwardy’s provocative remarks in his speech on 16 August in Calcutta, sporadic violence began with Muslims looting shops, only to discover that neighbourhoods had organised local ‘defence groups’ and militia in anticipation of violence. Because violence had been anticipated from Muslims, these defence groups were largely Hindu, although they were organised according to localities rather than in a massive collective communal organisation. Insecurity bred violence, defence turned easily into offence, and many more Muslims than Hindus died in the three days of violence that followed in Calcutta. In October, violence spread to Noakhali, where the slogan ‘We Want Revenge for Calcutta’ was heard, but violence was largely muted in comparison to Calcutta and to subsequent events, restricted to what amounted to a local act of revenge against a Hindu zamindar; the rioters were mostly content to humiliate Hindus ritually. Then the violence spread to the north and west of India, and any question of restraint was quickly lost. These forces were exacerbated by the structural violence of the 1942 Bengal famine, whose after-effects enhanced ethnic tensions in Calcutta in 1946, which in turn lent legitimacy to the forces demanding partition.45 Thus, one modality of violence bled into and enhanced others, leaving a destabilised civil and political order in an India that the British urgently wished to withdraw from.

Recent historiography of partition violence draws on oral testimonies that speak of collective madness, and the suddenness and incomprehensibility of violence; but in this case, memories lie.46 What was essentially a communal war of succession for the control of the state took place against the backdrop of an anticipated partition and the creation of Pakistan, whose impending boundaries were kept secret until 15 August 1947. This level of uncertainty was greatly destabilising, and in anticipation of partition many areas tried to cleanse themselves of their minorities. The western parts of the country were the worst affected – the Punjab was a region with ready access to arms due to its high levels of army recruitment – and organised massacres of Hindus and

Sikhs by Muslims and of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs, accompanied by gratuitous mutilations of bodies, by rapes, abductions, and communities killing their own women to protect their ‘honour’ rather than have them ‘deified’ by the enemy, continued well past the date of actual transfer of power. A scramble for property, and for the displacement of persons from territories to render them Hindu- or Sikh-majority areas, was often organised by paramilitary groups like the Akalis and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; similar dynamics can be discerned in western Punjab, with the support of the Muslim National Guards.\textsuperscript{47} Meanwhile, the emerging independent state, with Jawaharlal Nehru as prime minister of an interim government from September 1946, accepted the use of colonial-style collective fines and firing upon crowds from the air as ways of restoring peace.\textsuperscript{48} Casualties from the period of partition and post-partition violence have been estimated at between 200,000 and 800,000.\textsuperscript{49}


The post-independence state can be seen to be taking shape before the colonial state completed its withdrawal, but in the process it is important to see violence as the driving force behind the compromise between a retreating and increasingly vulnerable colonial state and those elites competing for succession. The ‘war of succession’ that was Partition meant that the new states of India and Pakistan were forged not from non-violence, but from the extremes of popular violence that led to the new states maintaining much of the repressive machinery of the predecessor state. From this matrix, a number of insurgencies were born, some of which continue to threaten the nation-state. Faced with irregular forces supported by the new state of Pakistan at his borders, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed an ‘instrument of accession’ to India. In the case of the state of Hyderabad, its princely ruler wanted to join Pakistan, but with geopolitics decidedly against him, the matter was similarly decided by the Indian army. The army conducted a ‘police action’, suppressing a communist-led movement at the same time. A Naga Insurgency continued throughout the 1950s. The long-standing legacy of colonial-style legislation is


\textsuperscript{48} Zachariah, Nehru, chapter 5.

the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, still in operation in many states in the north-east, and since 1990 extended to Kashmir. The Act grants immunity from prosecution to armed forces personnel, and effectively places areas under a perpetual state of emergency, suspending basic civil liberties in the manner of the Rowlatt Act before it.

The post-independence state thus relied on violence being administered in particular regions and for particular times as states of exception emerged. In the writing of Giorgio Agamben via Carl Schmitt, the state is implicitly, through being able to administer and decide upon the state of exception, a concentration camp. Historians would insist on a distinction between a philosophical argument about a sovereign rule of exception that turns states into the equivalent of concentration camps, and actually existing states whose use of exceptional powers has not achieved camp-like dimensions. In the newly independent India, the army was deployed to control unruly and recalcitrant populations of the new nation state’s peripheries, first in the north-eastern region of Assam, forcibly incorporating a number of ‘tribal’ minorities, some of which resisted incorporation into the new state, and over time in Kashmir, similar to Pakistan on the North-West Frontier.

The postcolonial state was faced with the same central questions as its predecessor colonial state: does the monopoly of violence remain legitimate if the frequent use of violence becomes necessary? And does an excessive use of violence, in turn, lead to the loss of that monopoly? The question remains open as to whether the frequent resort to exceptional forms of state violence is indicative of a loss of legitimacy, or if it is merely an indicator of the hegemony of the state. But part of our argument is that state violence is not always explicit. A state built on the premise of a civilising mission or good governance is undermined if it must resort to extreme repression in order to maintain its hegemony. By reading the existence of state violence across a range of modalities – epistemological, implicit, symbolic or structural – we highlight ways in which dominance was maintained in British India. It is important to be sensitive to invisible forms of violence, for their effective operation frequently precludes more overt manifestations, which by the mid twentieth century precipitated a crisis of legitimacy.

Bibliographical Essay

The historiography of violence in India remains separated into thematic specialisations, with an overview of different forms of state and non-state violence not yet available, and the themes not able to speak to one another. A few exceptions are to be found in as yet unpublished essays or PhD theses, and/or in larger works.


The rise of communal violence from the late nineteenth to the twentieth century tended to be viewed as the product of colonial policies – symptomatically, see Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) – or as a result of more primordial identities, see Sudhir Kakar, The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Regional studies show instigation of violence by the police against Hindus, and/or the move from an overlap of class and community in the structure of a rioting crowd to organised forms of violence: see for instance Suranjana Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1905–1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Sulagna Roy, ‘Communal Conflict in Bengal, 1930–1947’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999. The contrast between spontaneity and organisation in riots or pogroms has been a continuing theme in the historiography of independent India.

In 2018, a national memorial to victims of lynching opened in Montgomery, Alabama. The culmination of years of research, advocacy and planning by the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), the memorial consists of 800 columns — one for each county where EJI researchers have documented at least one killing — and individual inscriptions for each of the more than 4,000 lynching victims recorded in the EJI’s heralded 2015 report, *Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror*. Situated on a bluff, the National Memorial for Peace and Justice will overlook the EJI’s planned museum, ‘From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration’, which will house the nation’s largest collection of lynching data as well as exhibits that trace the broader consequences and legacies of racial violence.

This current moment of memorialisation calls for a broader reckoning with racial violence in modern America. The pioneering work of EJI and other advocacy groups demonstrates an increasingly ambitious and sophisticated approach to documenting this bloody history. The EJI memorial and museum, located in the original capital of the Confederacy and built within a few hundred yards of a former slave market, emphasise a legacy of brutality and oppression that reaches back centuries. Furthermore, the EJI lynching report acknowledges the national reach of mob violence and highlights campaigns of racial terror, such as the lynching of hundreds of Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans in the south-western borderlands, that have received less public attention. Yet while the bloodshed has transcended regional boundaries and targeted a variety of vulnerable populations, the current campaign for memorialisation reveals the difficulties inherent in telling a national narrative of racial violence in modern America. The challenges are considerable, but the need has never been more urgent.
Racial violence is at once the most prominent form of political violence in American history and the most difficult to synthesise. Scholars and activists have compared the patterns of violence committed against racial and ethnic groups in various regions of the country and drawn parallels between the racial motivations of American violence at home and abroad, yet such analysis runs the risk of oversimplification. Racial violence is widespread, yet it is also diffuse and protean in nature. In the late nineteenth century, terror campaigns targeted emancipated African Americans in the South, Chinese merchants and labourers in the Pacific and Intermountain West, and Mexicans in the south-western borderlands. As the United States government emerged from the Civil War eager to consolidate its grip on the western frontier and extend its global reach, racialised violence against Indigenous peoples at home and abroad defied generalisation. Racial violence transcended borders, yet it did not originate in a particular time or place, nor did it ‘spread’ from one region to another. Indeed, if any key theme links the histories of racial violence in America, it is the ongoing process of encounter and adaption. White supremacy has proven remarkably durable and dynamic even as its brutal logic has maintained a deadly consistency.

The Reconstruction of White Supremacy in Post-Civil War America

Racial violence undergirds and enables other forms of discrimination and oppression, forcing scholars and activists alike to expand the very definition of what is violent. The question of what makes racial violence modern is a bit less thorny. The American Civil War was a watershed moment for racial violence in the United States, and for good reason. Historian Richard Hofstadter, in a prescient essay on American violence, argued that the resolutions of the nation’s major wars have influenced the scope and character of the domestic violence that followed in their respective wakes. He contrasts the American Revolution, which settled the question of independence and ushered in several decades of ‘relative social peace’, with a far bloodier Civil War that ‘left an extraordinary inheritance of bitterness and lethal passion that has not yet ended’. Any serious student of racial violence could poke holes in Hofstadter’s characterisation of the early nineteenth century as ‘one of the least violent periods in our domestic history’. Nevertheless, his characterisation

of the Civil War as a cataclysmic clash driven by questions of freedom and
equality largely left unresolved helps to explain why a war to end slavery
unleashed a century and a half of persistent racial violence.\textsuperscript{2}

To be sure, the imperative to maintain white domination, fuelled by the
pervasive fear of black insurgency, predated the Civil War.\textsuperscript{3} However,
expressions of violence that had plagued America in the antebellum era,
such as urban rioting and vigilantism, took on an increasingly racial character
in the post-Civil War era. Forerunners of post-Civil War lynch mobs had
tarred and feathered loyalists in the Revolutionary era, and nativist rioters
had torched Catholic churches and schools in northern cities, but ‘modern’
mob violence focused increasingly on perceived threats to the racial status
quo. While this violence transcended any particular region and targeted
a variety of racial groups, the white supremacist counter-revolution that
swept the South after the Civil War captured national attention and trans-
formed the political landscape of modern America. White supremacists in
the post-Civil War South inherited the fears of black insurrection from
predecessors who responded to the threat of slave revolts with draconian
measures. Having lived through a war that precipitated the emancipation of
enslaved blacks, and faced with the proposition of a postwar Reconstruction,
white supremacists lamented a society turned on its head and utilised
counter-revolutionary methods to take power back. That these men, and
millions more across the nation, had lived through a civil war that spurred
a domestic arms race and familiarised a generation with military tactics only
heightened the destructive potential of modern racial violence.

Reconstruction historians have increasingly emphasised the fundamental
role of violence in quashing interracial democracy in the South. Early studies
of the era, many written under the tutelage of Columbia University historian
William Archibald Dunning, characterised white supremacist violence as an
unfortunate yet inexorable response to venal and inept interracial regimes.
Depictions of a ‘tragic era’ of Yankee carpetbaggers, traitorous scallywags and
‘Negro domination’ reached popular audiences via films, novels and text-
books that celebrated the overthrow of Reconstruction as a noble crusade.
Later ‘revisionist’ histories, which emphasised the accomplishments of
Republican governments across the South, largely placed the blame for this

\textsuperscript{2} Richard Hofstadter, ‘Reflections on Violence in the United States’, in
Richard Hofstadter and Mike Wallace (eds.), \textit{American Violence: A Documentary History}

\textsuperscript{3} Richard Maxwell Brown, \textit{Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and
‘unfinished revolution’ – to quote from the title of Eric Foner’s peerless history of Reconstruction – at the feet of an increasingly ambivalent northern public and its representatives in Washington. Yet unrelenting white supremacist violence not only sapped northern political will but also eviscerated shaky Republican coalitions through an increasingly organised reign of terror. This counter-revolution gained steam as white supremacist Democrats, working in close coordination with their paramilitary auxiliaries, ‘redeemed’ state governments from Republican control. The campaign peaked in Mississippi in 1875, when a coordinated campaign by the White Line and other pro-Democrat groups attacked black political rallies, assassinated Republican officials and terrorised polling places. The brutal campaign, vividly documented in a two-volume, 2,000-page congressional report, fatally crippled the Republican coalition in the state with the largest black majority in the South. The following year, ‘Red Shirt’ militias in South Carolina followed the ‘Mississippi Plan’ and toppled one of the last pro-Reconstruction regimes in the region.4

By neutralising the threat of black politics, the Redeemers claimed to have settled the question of white supremacy – their sine qua non for racial peace. Yet just as the end of the Civil War failed to pacify the South, the fall of Reconstruction failed to quell racial violence or stamp out the volatile anxieties that fuelled it. Sexual violence against black women, and fear of black attacks on white women, undergirded the politics of white supremacy from Reconstruction onward. As Hannah Rosen has argued, ‘a discourse of rape and criminality’ justified attacks on black men even as white supremacists continued patterns of abuse and exploitation that reached back to slavery. In the post-Reconstruction era, white supremacist regimes sanctioned ‘gendered racial terror’, as historian Sarah Haley argues, as a tool of punishment and domination. Many white women rallied behind white supremacists precisely because of the protection from the mythical ‘black rapist’ they offered. Yet the hypocrisy of this gendered culture of violence, which simultaneously idealised and degraded womanhood along racial lines, also propelled resistance from anti-lynching crusader Ida B. Wells to civil rights icon Rosa Parks.5

The overthrow of Reconstruction and the institutionalisation of disfranchisement and segregation in the South proceeded apace with a broader campaign for white supremacy that spanned the continent. While the racial brutality that pervaded American life in the late nineteenth century is often compartmentalised into tidy regional, racial and ethnic categories, perceptive scholars have focused on when and where these narratives of violence intersect. Particularly compelling is the convergence of the white supremacist counter-revolution in the post-Civil War South with the brutal subjugation of Indigenous peoples in the American West. As the nation neared its hundredth birthday in 1876, and Reconstruction teetered on the brink of collapse, news reached the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia that several thousand Plains Indians had routed cavalrymen under the command of George Armstrong Custer at Little Big Horn. While the nation reeled from this bloody yet temporary setback to continental consolidation, white supremacists in Hamburg, South Carolina, massacred black militiamen and townspeople who had gathered for a Fourth of July parade. Fifteen years later, and just a few weeks after Mississippi delegates gathered for a constitutional convention that effectively disfranchised black citizens by erecting the gauntlet of voting restrictions, the massacre of scores of men, women and children at Wounded Knee – perpetrated by the same cavalry regiment routed at Little Big Horn – punctuated a decades-long campaign to stamp out Indian resistance. Throughout the latter stages of the Indian Wars, many of the Union veterans who had fought to crush the Confederacy and worked to protect the rights of freed people during Reconstruction sensed no contradiction between their prior missions and their crusade to subdue the American West.

Rather than view the retreat from the promise of Reconstruction and the conquest of the Plains Indians as contradictory, historian Daniel Sharfstein outlines a broader trajectory – a ‘pivot from emancipation to Jim Crow and empire’ – for racialised violence in modern America. The rapid industrialisation of post-Civil War America, spurred by the bloody consolidation of the frontier and fuelled by immigrant labour, unleashed a wave of violence aimed at those deemed unassimilable in a whitening West. From the Pacific Coast to the Rocky Mountains, anti-Chinese violence ranged from arson and murder to armed expulsions. As in the Reconstruction-era South, officials out West euphemistically characterised the larger-scale outbreaks as riots. Yet when white miners in Rock Springs, Wyoming, destroyed

a neighbouring Chinese mining camp in a rampage that left at least twenty-eight dead, and when mobs in Seattle and Tacoma expelled hundreds of Chinese residents – all within a span of twelve months in 1885–6 – the violence more closely resembled an ethnic cleansing. This bloody campaign of harassment and intimidation, which extended to other Asian immigrant groups in subsequent decades, reflected the interplay between racial violence and racist policy. Occurring just a few years after the United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the mob violence in Wyoming and Washington dramatised how legislation grounded in racial hostility sanctioned ongoing persecution. Moreover, the anti-Chinese campaign provides yet another example of the national reach and brutal logic of white supremacist politics. The bipartisan support for the Chinese Exclusion Act, the first significant restriction on immigration in American history, reflected a growing national consensus regarding race, civilisation and civic fitness.  

Enforcing the Colour Line at Home and Abroad

By the turn of the century, this rejection of Reconstruction’s egalitarian promise portended consequences for America’s foreign rivals and colonial subjects. The United States’ emergence as a global power, a narrative too often disconnected from domestic struggles over race and citizenship, had profound implications for patterns of racial violence at home and abroad. Prescient observers like W. E. B. Du Bois, the pre-eminent black intellectual of his generation, recognised this critical continuity. Three years before his 1903 pronouncement that ‘the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the colour line’, Du Bois declared in his presidential address to the American Negro Academy that ‘the colour line belts the world’. Thanks to its recent triumph over Spain, the United States controlled a swath of territorial spoils that stretched halfway around the globe. Prior patterns of racial violence informed American attempts to subdue their far-flung acquisitions. Imperialists and anti-imperialists alike drew parallels between the violent subjugation of Native Americans and the attempts to subdue Filipinos, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In the Philippines, the campaign to quash

a nationalist rebellion against American occupation reflected the global reach of American racial violence. Yet while Americans drew the colour line in blood, the ‘race war’ in the Philippines was not simply an ‘export’ of white supremacy campaigns, Indian Wars and anti-Chinese purges back home. ‘While race helped organize and justify U.S. colonial violence’, historian Paul Kramer contends, ‘imperial processes also remade U.S. racial formations.’ As Americans racialised Filipinos, they rationalised race war. Interpreting Filipino guerrilla tactics as proof of ‘savagery’, and drawing on the lessons of ‘Injun warfare’, the American military tortured prisoners, launched scorched-earth campaigns, and implemented ‘reconcentration’ policies that led to tens of thousands of civilian deaths. American troops, many of whom initially disparaged Filipino insurgents as ‘niggers’, soon embraced a novel epithet for a new racial adversary – the gu-gu.8

As the United States extended the colour line to its new territorial possessions, white supremacists in the South codified segregation and disfranchisement one state at a time. Racial violence fuelled this campaign, and followed in its wake. Following the lead of the delegates to Mississippi’s 1890 constitutional convention, who adopted poll taxes, literacy tests and the ‘understanding clause’ as barriers to black voting, state legislatures across the South adopted a dizzying array of disfranchisement laws. A resurgent wave of race riots and mob killings facilitated this process. In North Carolina, a ‘Fusion’ movement of black Republicans and white Populists stood in the way of white supremacist Democrats’ Jim Crow agenda. In order to wrest power back from this interracial coalition, the Democrats launched a campaign of racial propaganda and organised terror that peaked with an 1898 massacre in the port city of Wilmington. Over the next two years, North Carolina legislators followed Mississippi’s lead in adopting disfranchisement schemes that they hoped, as one architect of the white supremacy campaign put it, ‘had settled the Negro question for all times’. In 1906, white mobs rampaged through the black neighbourhoods of Atlanta. As in North Carolina, a racially charged political climate and press reports of black attacks on white women portended a final barrage of white supremacist legislation.

With its 1908 adoption of the literacy test, Georgia capped off a two-decade campaign to force black southerners out of civic life.9

As in the earlier campaign to overthrow Reconstruction and the push for Chinese exclusion, the architects of the turn-of-the-century white supremacy campaigns utilised violence for political ends and argued that their political solutions would mitigate future bloodshed. Yet, just as the most notorious attacks on Chinese communities occurred after the passage of the Exclusion Act, southern mob violence persisted in the wake of the late nineteenth-century white supremacy campaigns. With the rise of Jim Crow, lynching became the most persistent and virulent weapon for white supremacists intent on quashing any perceived threat to the racial status quo. While this peculiarly American tradition of mob violence traced its roots to the Revolutionary era and vigilante notions of ‘frontier justice’, lynching had become an increasingly regional and racial phenomenon by the end of the nineteenth century. After 1885, the last year where white victims outnumbered black in the Tuskegee Institute’s pioneering lynching database, the overwhelming majority of killings occurred at the hands of white mobs in the American South. In 1892 alone, Tuskegee recorded over 160 lynchings of black Americans. In 1895, the Mississippi-born journalist Ida B. Wells documented in graphic detail the surge in anti-black killings over the previous three years. In addition to coupling the rise of Jim Crow to the surge in lynchings, Wells documented and challenged the sexually charged fears stoked by the white supremacy campaigns that lived on in the mobs that tortured, castrated, burned and executed victims with impunity.10

Southern lynchings frequently took the form of public spectacle, with hundreds and even thousands gathering to watch the killings. As many as 10,000 onlookers converged on Paris, Texas, 1893 to watch relatives of a murdered white girl torture her alleged killer with hot irons. Mob leaders then soaked the execution platform – emblazoned with the word ‘Justice’ – with oil and set it ablaze. Onlookers later sifted through the ashes for body parts and scraps of wood to sell as souvenirs. As with dozens of similar spectacle lynchings that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, photographs of the lynching circulated as mementos. The highly

ritualistic nature of Jim Crow era lynchings captured the imagination of contemporary observers, who argued that the South’s distinct mix of fundamentalist Christianity and a ‘Lost Cause’ ideology rooted in the bloody soil of Reconstruction had birthed a distinctively American form of racial violence. ‘After the trauma of Appomattox’, sociologist Orlando Patterson argues, ‘the Southern community had to be restored in the most extreme compact of blood, and its God propitiated in the most extreme form of sacrifice known to man.’ The recurring themes of sacrifice, crucifixion and redemption – a word that bore a specific and evocative meaning for white southerners who lived through Reconstruction – persisted in the pronouncements of lynching’s staunchest advocates and most ardent foes.11

**Violence, Migration and Protest Politics in Jim Crow America**

As lynching concentrated in the South in the early Jim Crow era, mob violence outside the region demonstrated a broader willingness to counter perceived threats to white power and privilege. When black southerners migrated north, due in no small part to surging racial terrorism, they encountered whites who traded in rumour-mongering and sexual anxieties that frequently proved as volatile as those of their southern counterparts. In the first decade of the twentieth century, accusations of murder and rape sparked anti-black riots in industrial centres across Ohio and Indiana. Then, in 1908, as Springfield, Illinois – final resting place of Abraham Lincoln – prepared to celebrate the Great Emancipator’s hundredth birthday, white mobs tore through the city’s black neighbourhoods after demanding that police turn over two black prisoners. Flush with black migrants from the South, Illinois’s capital city reeled from a ‘riot’ that portended a national racial crisis. In response, white and black reformers convened in New York to organise the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Citing ‘the spread of lawless attacks upon the Negro, North, South, and West’, the organisers drafted a call for a national conference to address anti-black persecution. ‘No other nation, civilized or savage, burns its criminals’, Ida B. Wells-Barnett declared in an address to attendees. ‘Only under the Stars and Stripes is the human holocaust possible.’12


The NAACP’s moderate organisers shied away from Wells-Barnett’s condemnation of the United States’ ‘National Crime’, but the organisation reflected reformers’ conviction that black migration had nationalised mob violence. While northern mobs lynched black victims suspected of crimes or social transgressions, the spread of large-scale ‘race riots’ evoked earlier patterns of racial violence. From white supremacist political violence in the South to anti-Chinese purges in the West, the term riot belied the organised and intentional nature of northern racial violence. As contemporary observers dissected the anatomy of these disturbances, clear patterns emerged. In Springfield and elsewhere, whites initiated violence in response to perceived threats from blacks. Frequently, rumours of black criminality and sexual predation played a crucial role in aggravating tensions and intensifying violence. While the term riot suggests randomness and spontaneity, such disturbances occurred most often during periods of economic and social turmoil. A riot involves mutual culpability and belligerence, but urban racial violence almost always occurred within black neighbourhoods. Finally, while the ‘race riot’ emerged as the northern counterpart to southern mob violence, outbreaks of racial violence in the urban North provided cover for targeted killings that fit the profile of a Jim Crow lynching.

As the Great Migration blurred patterns of anti-black violence, the lynching of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the south-western borderlands challenged the notion that black mobility had nationalised racial strife. Indeed, the fluidity and volatility of life along the southern border spurred a renewed wave of mob violence in the second decade of the twentieth century. After the discovery of the ‘Plan de San Diego’, a manifesto drafted by imprisoned revolutionaries in northern Mexico and circulated on both sides of the Rio Grande, Texas Rangers and vigilantes killed hundreds and displaced thousands more in their search for suspected insurgents. The massacre in South Texas marked the bloodiest episode in a decades-long reign of terror that historians William Carrigan and Clive Webb deem ‘comparable, at least on a per capita basis, to the mob violence suffered by African Americans’. The relative inattention to anti-Mexican violence reflects the binary approach of early anti-lynching activists, who classified documented victims simply as black or white. Yet mob violence against Mexicans in the United States also underscores the international and diplomatic dimensions of American racial violence. Black activist groups appealed to state and federal government institutions for action, while foreign nationals could also seek recourse through diplomatic officials. In the case of Chinese victims of riots and purges in the West, diplomatic protest resulted in damage suits. By World War I, when questions of international
reputation carried unprecedented weight in Washington, consular inquiries into anti-Mexican mob violence yielded results.\textsuperscript{13}

Global conflict had broader consequences for racial violence. War mobilisation accelerated black migration to industrial centres, where whites responded with a wave of urban unrest that dwarfed earlier race riots. Two months after the United States entered the war, in July 1917, white mobs in East St. Louis massacred as many as 200 black citizens. Just weeks before, striking aluminium plant workers had blamed black migrants for threatening their jobs and declared their city ‘a white man’s town’. The following year, as white southerners fretted about an exodus of black workers and the imminent return of emboldened black veterans, the annual lynching count nearly doubled from the previous year. By Armistice Day, November 1918, the Tuskegee Institute had tallied over one hundred wartime lynchings in less than twenty months. As the nation transitioned from war to peace, a potent mix of racism and anti-radicalism fuelled a wave of violence remembered as the ‘Red Summer’ of 1919. Deadly outbreaks in Chicago, Washington, DC, and a dozen additional northern cities followed earlier patterns of urban unrest, but surging mob violence across the South blurred the lines between ‘race riots’ and lynchings. In the Arkansas Delta, shots exchanged between snooping white officials and attendees at a black sharecroppers’ union meeting sparked a massacre that left over 200 black Arkansans dead. Dubbed a ‘race riot’ and blamed on an imminent black insurrection by white newspapers, the mass lynching echoed the fears of subversion and indiscriminate carnage still raging in South Texas.\textsuperscript{14}

The Great War also accelerated movements against racial violence, although these campaigns encountered considerable ambivalence. A few weeks after the East St. Louis riot, the NAACP organised a Silent Protest Parade of 10,000 men, women and children in New York City. The year before, the organisation had formed an anti-lynching committee after a brutal spectacle lynching in Waco, Texas. Confronted with a wartime surge in racial violence, the NAACP multiplied its membership and lobbied the first southern-born president since Reconstruction to speak out against lynching. By contrasting Woodrow Wilson’s crusade to ‘make the world safe for


democracy’ with white supremacist violence at home, civil rights activists hoped to compel federal intervention on behalf of vulnerable minorities. Publicity, in the form of daring investigations and searing exposés, fuelled this anti-lynching campaign. Rooted in a tradition of bearing witness to the racial violence that attended emancipation and Reconstruction, as well as the muckraking ethos of Progressive reformers, the anti-lynching crusade gained considerable momentum during World War I. Walter F. White, the blonde-haired and blue-eyed son of light-skinned black Atlantans, passed as a white man to investigate lynchings in Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi during his first year as an NAACP staffer in 1918. His reports on these atrocities, which included the torture and mutilation of at least three pregnant women, pierced the veil of deflection and apologia that clouded the ‘official’ white accounts of Jim Crow lynchings. White completed his undercover investigations just in time to insert his findings into the NAACP’s landmark report, *Thirty Years of Lynching, 1889–1918*, which documented 3,229 lynchings in just over one hundred pages of print.\(^{15}\)

The wartime anti-lynching push also demonstrated the growing traction of the first nationally viable civil rights campaign of the twentieth century. With southern black migrants pouring into industrial centres across the North, urban politicians felt at least some pressure to acknowledge their concerns. In 1918, Missouri congressman Leonidas Dyer, a Republican who represented St. Louis’s largest black enclaves, introduced the first federal anti-lynching bill in American history. Over the next two decades, every congressional sponsor of federal anti-lynching legislation represented a northern or western state with a growing black constituency. The following year, the NAACP followed the publication of *Thirty Years of Lynching* with a National Conference on Lynching. The May 1919 gathering featured former Republican presidential candidate and United States Supreme Court justice Charles Evans Hughes, as well as a carefully recruited contingent of southern white lynching critics – including ex-governors from Georgia and Alabama. The conference, which packed New York City’s Carnegie Hall, reflected the national resonance of an anti-lynching movement just weeks before a surge of postwar violence revealed the national reach of a white supremacist backlash.

Red Summer and the postwar ‘return to normalcy’ underscored the mixed legacy of World War I for racial violence. While the rate of documented lynchings declined steadily during the 1920s, massacres in Tulsa, Oklahoma (1921) and Rosewood, Florida (1923) razed entire communities and claimed dozens of black lives. The rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan, inspired by the glorification of Reconstruction era racial terrorism in D. W. Griffith’s 1915 blockbuster Birth of a Nation, harnessed the reactionary politics of the 1920s and mainstreamed the Invisible Empire’s violent agenda. With a national membership that peaked at 3–5 million, the Klan reflected the broader appeal and brutal logic of nativist politics. New immigration restrictions favoured northern Europeans over the predominantly Catholic and Jewish arrivals from southern and eastern Europe and severely restricted or banned outright immigration from Asia and Africa. As in the late nineteenth century, violence presaged the nativist backlash and normalised persecution in its wake. In California, attacks on Filipino, Japanese and South Asian residents spiked in the years before and after the inaction of stricter immigration policies. Yet just as the wartime spike in lynchings proceeded apace with the surging NAACP membership, the postwar nativist backlash inspired organisation and advocacy. From the reorganisation and expansion of the Chinese American Citizens Alliance in the 1910s and 1920s to the founding of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) – both in 1929 – persecuted communities invoked citizenship as an antidote to racial violence.

The interwar years demonstrated the fractious and complex nature of campaigns against racial violence. LULAC, for example, distanced itself from black activists in a calculated appeal to Mexican Americans’ white racial identity. As Carrigan and Webb argue, this strategic move ‘exposes the limitations and lost opportunities of anti-lynching protest’. The NAACP’s efforts to cultivate interracial alliances below the Mason–Dixon line bore fruit with the founding in 1930 of the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL), a coalition of white reformers who rejected the myth that mob violence was necessary to protect them from black rapists. Yet while anti-lynching groups shared strategies of publicity and political persuasion, they failed to coalesce around a common agenda or even a uniform definition of lynching. While the ASWPL’s white, middle-class leadership appealed to local and state officials, founder Jessie Daniel Ames shied away from the NAACP’s

16 Carrigan and Webb, Forgotten Dead, p. 125.
push for federal anti-lynching legislation. The NAACP also clashed with more radical black activists who challenged the organisation’s anti-lynching strategy and offered a broader, more systemic definition of mob violence. When Alabama authorities condemned nine black youths to death for allegedly raping two white women in 1931, the communist-backed International Labor Defense (ILD) mounted a national fundraising and publicity campaign on behalf of the Scottsboro Boys. As the ILD pamphlet *Lynching Negro Children in Southern Courts* suggests, radical activists framed mob violence as a weapon of economic exploitation that blurred the lines of extra-legal and state-sanctioned punishment.\(^{17}\)

The New Deal era dramatised the success and shortcomings of anti-lynching activism. After two decades of failed attempts, and just days after a brutal blowtorch lynching of two black Mississippians grabbed national headlines, the United States House of Representatives passed a federal anti-lynching bill in 1937 by a three-to-one margin. Yet when the Senate convened in January of the following year, southern Democrats launched a seven-week filibuster – the longest in five decades – to kill the legislation. Invoking white supremacy and ‘local control’, southern senators warned that federal intervention in lynchings would provide, as Mississippi’s Theodore Bilbo put it, ‘the entering wedge to the bill of civil rights and social equality by the Negroes’. Fearful of alienating his southern base, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt avoided any public discussion of lynching. Despite congressional inaction and executive ambivalence, some activists pointed to a dramatic decline in documented lynchings as proof that protests and publicity had forced southern officials to rein in racial violence. The apparent demise of lynching posed a strategic dilemma for activists who struggled to maintain political momentum and convince the public that racial violence posed an ongoing threat. As the NAACP warned in its 1940 pamphlet *Lynching Goes Underground*, white vigilantes continued to kill under cover of darkness, in smaller numbers, and frequently in concert with law enforcement officials. Despite her strategic differences with the NAACP, ASWPL founder Jessie Daniel Ames echoed the warning that the ‘changing character of lynching’ posed a significant threat to a nation engaged in a global struggle against

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fascism. ‘The aftermath of the First World War,’ she warned, ‘gives evidence of what the backwash from war can bring.’

Racial Violence, American Diplomacy and the Rise of the Civil Rights Movement

The United States’ entry into World War II bore out Ames’s fears of another racial backlash, but the diplomatic implications of that violence proved more compelling than during the First World War. Even before Pearl Harbor, civil rights activists warned federal officials that the Axis powers would exploit American racial violence to embarrass the United States and undermine the Allied war effort. At a 1940 hearing on a new anti-lynching bill, the NAACP’s Walter White quoted a Nazi newspaper that characterised American treatment of blacks as less humane than German treatment of Jews. The diplomatic stakes of racial violence probably weighed on the Roosevelt administration’s halting prewar actions, from prewar establishment of a civil rights unit within the Justice Department to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiry into the 1940 killing of a Tennessee NAACP official. When a Missouri mob lynched and burned black murder suspect Cleo Wright in early 1942, just weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the head of the Justice Department’s new Civil Rights Section echoed the NAACP’s earlier warning that wartime lynchings were ‘a matter of international importance and a subject of Axis propaganda’. While Wright’s brutal murder, which harkened back to the spectacle lynchings of earlier decades, and subsequent wartime lynchings prompted federal investigations, none resulted in a successful prosecution.

A little more than two decades removed from Red Summer, wartime mobilisation and migration demonstrated how rapid economic and demographic change could aggravate racial conflict. Across the South, anxious whites spread fantastic rumours of black rebellion, many of which revolved around emboldened black soldiers accosting white women and arguing with white men. As in World War I, uniformed black servicemen proved especially susceptible to racial attacks. In Mobile, Alabama, a shipbuilding centre bursting

with wartime migrants, the 1942 killing of a black soldier by a white bus driver nearly sparked an NAACP-sponsored bus boycott. The following year, a wave of racial clashes swept through the nation’s industrial hubs. A three-day riot in Detroit left thirty-four dead and more than 400 injured. The same month, white locals and off-duty servicemen in Los Angeles attacked dozens of Mexican, Filipino and black youths clad in baggy zoot suits. Like the anti-black violence that marked most wartime riots, the Zoot Suit Riots dramatised the potent mix of racial resentments and mass migration that fuelled broader attacks on racial and ethnic minorities. The forced relocation and internment of Japanese Americans underscored how state-sanctioned discrimination legitimised a broader campaign of harassment and exploitation that predated and outlasted the war emergency.

Ultimately, the postwar stand-off with the Soviet Union motivated federal officials more than the struggle against the Axis. A postwar wave of racist brutality, which included a police attack that blinded black veteran Isaac Woodard in South Carolina, an execution-style quadruple lynching in Georgia, and a string of attacks on black voters during primaries in Georgia and Mississippi, prompted the formation of the National Emergency Committee against Mob Violence. Compelled by reports of gruesome racial attacks, Harry S. Truman appointed a presidential committee in late 1946 to study domestic racial problems and offer recommendations. The following summer, he became the first US president to address the annual conference of the NAACP. The report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, released in late 1947, emphasised postwar racial violence and warned that the Soviet Union would ‘shamelessly’ exploit domestic racial strife in the global struggle for hearts and minds. Based on the recommendations of his civil rights committee, Truman unveiled a ten-point civil rights programme that included federal penalties for lynching and compensation for Japanese Americans interned during World War II. While Truman’s proposals extended beyond the most brutal excesses of white supremacy, anti-lynching historian Robert Zangrando rightly concludes that ‘the recurrent phenomenon of racist violence’ prompted his unprecedented actions.20

The diplomatic exigencies of the Cold War, as well as demographic and political trends decades in the making, help to explain why the 1955 lynching

of Emmett Till became the most famous incident of racial violence in modern American history. The brutal Mississippi killing, allegedly in retaliation for Till’s advances on a young white cashier, reflected the long shadow of the black rapist myth and the white southerner’s fierce resistance to racial change. Till’s abduction and brutalisation by the white relatives of his accuser also confirmed anti-lynching advocates’ predictions that racial killings would persist in more secretive forms. Occurring just months after local whites organised the segregationist Citizens’ Councils in response to the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, the seemingly apolitical murder foreshadowed assassinations of local black activists across Mississippi. Till’s open-casket funeral in his home city of Chicago, a political, cultural and media hub of black America, dramatised a longstanding tradition of bearing witness and harnessing publicity to call the nation to action. Mamie Till-Bradley ‘wanted the world to see’ her son’s bloated and brutalised corpse, and no other image did as much to underscore the moral and geopolitical stakes of the American civil rights struggle.21

Racial Violence and Government Response in the Civil Rights Era and Beyond

Racial violence alone did not launch the civil rights movement, but the fundamental brutality of white supremacy shaped its philosophy and tactics. Non-violent direct action, from the student-led Freedom Rides and sit-ins to mass demonstrations led by Martin Luther King, Jr., anticipated and amplified white supremacist violence for an international audience. By exposing the brutal and frequently state-sanctioned resistance to racial equality, movement strategists aimed to compel federal intervention and force congressional action. Violence informed the movement’s targets as well as tactics, as demonstrated by a series of confrontations in Alabama and Mississippi that precipitated the passage of landmark civil rights legislation. Movement leaders chose Birmingham for a 1963 protest campaign due in large part to the city’s violent reputation. Dubbed ‘Bombingham’ due to some fifty dynamite attacks on black homes and churches since the end of World War II, the city also underscored the interplay between racial terrorism and the official violence sanctioned by its police chief, Eugene ‘Bull’ Connor. The year after Connor turned firehoses and dogs on black youths, hundreds of northern volunteers poured into Mississippi knowing that they might not survive the ’64 Freedom

Project. On a lonely dirt road in Neshoba County, three civil rights volunteers – two northern whites and one black Mississippian – died at the hands of Klansmen and local police. By summer’s end Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act and, after the Alabama Highway Patrol’s assault on marchers at Selma’s Edmund Pettis Bridge in early 1965, the Voting Rights Act.22

Anti-civil rights violence exposed the tensions and contradictions inherent in a white supremacist movement steeped in generations of blood. Robert Patterson, leader of the segregationist Citizens’ Council, claimed he would ‘gladly lay down [his] life to prevent mongrelization’ yet distanced his organisation from the Ku Klux Klan’s brutal reputation and murderous tactics. The bombing campaigns that spread from Birmingham to cities and towns across the South – particularly attacks on houses of worship – compelled many segregationists to disavow racial terrorism. Even the resurgent Klan’s various factions diverged in tactics and strategy, with the United Klans of America (UKA) prioritising public rallies and membership drives while the secretive Mississippi White Knights – the organisation implicated in the 1964 Neshoba killings – earned notoriety for their exceptional brutality. Ultimately, white ambivalence towards racial terrorism forced pragmatic political officials to soften their defiant stand against civil rights, yet the distinction between violent and non-violent resistance remained blurry as hostility towards racial change continued to shape policy and political culture.23

Ironically, political and academic interest in the nation’s violent past surged not in response to white terrorism but rather in the wake of urban riots, campus unrest and the civil rights movement’s perceived turn towards violence in the late 1960s. Cries of ‘Black Power’ and images of armed Black Panthers fuelled popular fears of a rebellion aimed at whites. The organisation of the Brown Berets by Chicano youth in southern California, subsequent armed demonstrations by the American Indian Movement, and the embrace of ‘power’ politics by a diverse array of marginalised groups prompted concerns that historical perpetrators had become contemporary


targets of ‘racial violence’. Those fears found official sanction in a campaign of police repression, from local raids on militant groups to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s covert Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), but also in federally commissioned research. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, established by Lyndon Baines Johnson after the Kerner Commission’s 1968 report on urban riots, included a task force to study the history of American violence. Directed by historians Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, the academic committee’s far-ranging report showcased eminent scholars grappling with the nature and definition of racial violence. Recent urban ‘uprisings’ compelled the prominent sociologist Morris Janowitz to assess whether black rioting portended ‘collective racial violence’ against whites. However, civil rights scholars August Meier and Elliott Rudwick traced a deep history of black self-defence and acknowledged scattered calls for retaliatory violence and armed revolution among black revolutionary groups. Nevertheless, they concluded, ‘The advocacy and use of violence as a deliberate program for solving the problems of racial discrimination remains thus far, at least, in the realm of fantasy; and there it is likely to remain.’ Despite fears of an anti-white uprising, the scholarly understanding of racial violence as a historical force driven by the political, economic and social imperatives of white supremacy survived the popular and political backlash to the ‘power’ movements.

Racial violence in recent decades has echoed the white supremacist tactics of previous generations and adapted to undermine changes wrought by the civil rights revolution. Great Society immigration reforms that abolished quotas and bans based on national origin, as well as an aggressive Cold War foreign policy that created a wave of refugees from South-East Asia, broadened white supremacists’ range of targets. In the 1970s, Klansmen firebombed school buses in Michigan to undermine school desegregation, conducted armed border patrols in the south-west, and set fire to the shrimp boats operated by resettled Vietnamese refugees along the Gulf Coast. In November 1979, emboldened Klansmen and neo-Nazis gunned down white and black protesters in Greensboro, North Carolina, in broad daylight and with news cameras rolling. This new wave of racial violence echoed a tradition of white supremacist violence that melded apocalyptic racism and revolutionary tactics. The 1981 lynching of

Michael Donald by Alabama Klansmen, the 1988 murder of Ethiopian student Mulugeta Seraw by Portland skinheads, the 1998 dragging death of black Texan James Byrd, and the 2015 Charleston church shootings all reflected the racial terrorists’ belief that their vanguard tactics could spark a race war that might again redeem the nation.\(^{25}\)

Rather than the last gasps of white supremacy, these recent attacks underscore the urgency of examining the ways racial violence has shaped American history and infused ongoing conflicts over pluralism and democracy in the twenty-first century. ‘Unlike almost any other object of historical study’, Karl Jacoby contends, ‘violence simultaneously destroys and creates history.’ As the most pervasive form of political violence in the American past, racial violence leaves behind a bloody trail for historians to follow. Yet the urge to forget, as evidenced in ongoing debates over who and what Americans see fit to carve in granite and cast in bronze, remains strong. Historians continue to expand our understanding of racial violence and the attendant ills – from sexual and gendered violence to poverty and mass incarceration – that white supremacy continues to reinforce. And the inherent violence of our racial present, from politics to policing, underscores the urgent need to confront the lessons of the past.\(^{26}\)

### Bibliographical Essay


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Though the rise of religious violence has been a global phenomenon in the modern period, perhaps nowhere is the arena of competition among contesting religious and secular politics greater than in South Asia. Recent decades have seen violence related to the rise of Hindu nationalism movements in India, the Muslim Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the militant Khalistan movement of Sikhs in India’s Punjab, and Buddhism nationalism in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the region. These movements have competed in the context of a secular political order that was the legacy of British colonial rule, once embraced by founding leaders such as Pakistan’s Muhammad Ali Jinnah and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, who advocated the nationalism of ‘secularism and socialism’. Though each of these political ideologies has its own history and internal dynamics, each is also related to the others. They have arisen as mutual responses to one another and to the global influences of colonialism, transnational religion and globalisation that have buffeted South Asian politics in recent years.

The Sikh Attempt to Create a Religious State

In the 1980s, a sizable section of the young Sikh population in the rural areas of the north-west Indian state of Punjab became embroiled in a violent confrontation with the Indian government led by the Sikh activist Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.\(^1\) Bhindranwale was a rural preacher who spoke with the conviction of someone who knew the details of his religious heritage. He said that the great battles of Sikh history were being repeated in the present day. Like then, the present confrontation was ‘a struggle . . . for our faith, for the Sikh nation, for

Rather than politicising religion, Bhindranwale was religio-nising politics. The confrontation between his group of angry Sikhs and the Indian government was not just a clash of political views, it was war. And more than war, it was cosmic confrontation, the battle of good versus evil, right against wrong, religion against anti-religion. Bhindranwale would recount the great battles of Sikh tradition, the heroic sacrifice and martyrdom of early Sikh leaders when confronted with the military force of the Moghul Empire, and by implication suggest that those legendary times were alive once more. He and his followers saw their own struggle in grand historical terms; it was a transhistorical conflict of order versus chaos. They saw themselves engaged in not just a political conflict but also a defence of the whole of Sikh culture and civilisation. For these reasons they were willing to kill to defend their position. And they were willing to die for it.

The Sikh uprising in the 1980s, though violent and dramatic, was not the only time that Sikhs had been politically active in the Punjab. In the 1960s, for instance, another Sikh leader, Sant Fateh Singh, threatened to immolate himself in a vat of boiling oil on the roof of the Akal Takht, one of the main buildings in the precincts of the Harmandir Sahib, also known as the Golden Temple, which is the Sikhs’ central shrine, located in the city of Amritsar. Sant Fateh Singh never carried out his threat, but the demands of the moment were met. The Indian state of Punjab was carved into three states, so that in the smaller state of Punjab that remained, Sikhs were in the majority. It was a concession by the central government that was intended to solve the Sikh problem once and for all.

This turned out not to be the case. The Sikh militancy in the 1980s was in some ways a repeat of the early movement, but it was also significantly different, in at least two ways. It was more strident, more violent; and its vehemence was aimed against the secular state. The aim was not just to secure more political power for the Sikh community but to reject the secular authority of the Indian government. Hinduism as a religion was not the target, even though some Hindu leaders were seen as cooperative with the state’s position, and therefore worthy of attack in the eyes of the Sikh militants. The explicit goal was to reject the legitimacy of the secular state. Though there was controversy within the movement as to what should replace it, many Sikhs who supported the movement thought that its success

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would lead to the creation of a new religious nation. The proposed new Sikh state was dubbed Khalistan – the land of the Sikh community, the Khalsa. Bhindranwale, the most prominent spokesperson for the movement, said that he was neither for nor against the idea of Khalistan. But clearly he and his followers wanted a new political order, one that would be based on religion rather than secularism.

It may seem preposterous that a religious community could claim the status of nationhood. Where could the Sikhs have got such a remarkable idea? The European Enlightenment model of the nation state presumes a stance of secular detachment from religion. And yet, for the Sikhs, examples of religious nationalism were close at hand. They needed to look no further away than the country that formed the western borders of the Punjab: Pakistan.

The Invention of Religious Politics in South Asia

Perhaps the most momentous political event in South Asia in the twentieth century was not independence and the withdrawal of British rule, but the political partition of the subcontinent into two rival states: India and Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands were killed in the violent upheavals created during the partition, and more were killed in the battles between the two wings of Pakistan – East and West – in the emergence of a separate East Pakistan, renamed Bangladesh. Perhaps inadvertently, the retreating colonial rule of Great Britain consciously participated in the creation of new national entities based on religion. This event has done more to spur the notion of religious politics and the ugly reality of religious violence that have accompanied separatist movements of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Buddhists in the subcontinent than anything else in recent history.

The year following independence and the partition of the subcontinent was a time of massacre after massacre. Trains arriving in India from Pakistan carried loads of corpses of passengers slaughtered on the journey that they hoped would bring them to safety. Similar numbers of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were killed as they attempted to disengage from their homelands and join the throngs of refugees that gathered in Karachi and Dacca on the Pakistan sides and in Delhi and Calcutta on the Indian side. Though the numbers are disputed, the figures often quoted about this tragic shift of population is 14 million people uprooted, 10 million sent into refugee camps, and over a million killed.
One of the interesting features of this tragic episode is that it is not clear that partition had to happen. There had not previously been a strong groundswell of support for a Muslim-dominated state. There were some lone voices calling for an independent Muslim state earlier in the twentieth century, notably that of the poet Muhammad Iqbal, which he expressed in the 1930 meeting of the Muslim League; but most leaders in the League desired a semi-autonomous region in a united India, and according to one historian, Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah raised the issue of an independent Pakistan largely as a threat, a kind of bargaining chip to gain what he really wanted, a semi-autonomous state. Jinnah’s rival Muslim organisation, the Unionist Party in the Punjab, was adamantly opposed to secession. Interestingly, the most articulate voices from the religious right were also opposed to the idea of a separate Muslim state. Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the best-known Muslim political thinker in the region, adopted a position much like that of Said Qutb in Egypt. Maududi regarded the Western concept of the nation-state as non-Islamic, and feared that a secular state, even one comprised largely of Muslims, would be antithetical to the religious community of devout Muslims. Eventually Maududi joined Pakistan after it was created, and helped to form a new Muslim political party, the Jamaat-e Islami, which continues today to be a voice for Muslim interests in Pakistan.

So if there was no huge demand for a separate Muslim Pakistan in the subcontinent, where did the idea come from? One might argue that it came from the Muslim political tradition over the centuries, but that is not quite true either. Although Muslim history is full of strong political leaders, caliphs who led armies and empires, there is not really a precedent for the modern idea of a religious nation state. In fact, the idea of the nation state – the notion that there is such a thing as a natural national community in a geographical region that supports a state apparatus which is responsible to it – is a foreign idea. Specifically it is a European idea, and the introduction of the concept of national community – and the role of religious affiliation within it – was exported by the British to South Asia and, for that matter, to much of the rest of the world.

In an interesting book, Enlightenment in the Colony, a UCLA scholar of comparative literature, Aamir Mufti, argues that the British helped to invent the idea of religious minorities in India. Mufti’s point is that, although Muslims

in South Asia were in the numerical minority over the centuries, ever since Moghul rule brought Islam to the subcontinent, they did not think of themselves as minorities. Nor were they treated as minorities within a society that was unselfconsciously pluralistic. Traditional Indian society has encompassed a variety of religious communities, and the tradition that we know as ‘Hinduism’ has been a congeries of different sects and lineages of teachers and teachings that vary widely from one another. Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Jains and other religious communities fit easily into this pattern of religious diversity.

According to Mufti, the process of secular nation-building in Europe has gone hand in hand with the conceptualisation of a national culture that marginalises some religious and ethnic communities in the process of creating the idea of a unified national culture. In doing so, the byproduct of this nationalist paradigm is the invention of the notion of ‘minorities’ as a problem. The paradigmatic case in Europe is the ‘Jewish question’, in which Jews do not fit into the idea of cultural consensus in emerging modern national communities. Adolf Hitler’s infamous ‘final solution’ to the Jewish problem was an attempt at cultural and physical extermination. Alternatively, the British solution at the end of World War II was to help create the modern state of Israel as one that would provide a national homeland for the Jews.

Mufti argues that this idea is transported to South Asia where both British and Indian nationalist leaders identify the national culture with Hinduism, as they imagine that, as in European nations, the national culture of India should be part of one homogeneous religious entity. This way of thinking makes Muslims a minority, and like the Jews in Europe they create a problem for the building of a modern national community. In Mufti’s examination of the literature in Britain as well as the literature produced by Indian writers in English, Hindi and Urdu languages, he finds that this notion of Muslim minority identity as a problem creeps into writing about nation-building in the subcontinent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. No surprise, then, that Jinnah – the urbane, London-trained leader of the Muslims – as well as the cosmopolitan Nehru would think of modern nation-building as one of homogeneous cultural unity in a way that would naturally exclude minorities such as Muslims. Nehru’s 1946 book, Discovery of India, chronicles his own self-discovery of the unity of India’s past, implicitly a cultural as well as a political unity. No wonder that Jinnah thought that his Muslims would be uncomfortable in such a nation, and no wonder, also, that the British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, would instinctively understand the logic of
having a separate nation for a nation-sized minority. The formation of Pakistan became for South Asian Muslims what the creation of Israel had been for European Jews.

The idea of the modern nation state is a part of the world’s inheritance from the European Enlightenment, in which religion plays a somewhat paradoxical role. While Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke regarded political institutions as secular – free from the taint of religious influence – they thought of the culture of a national community as unified, a unity that often involved common religious beliefs. According to the Berkeley sociologist John Lie, in an arresting book, Modern Peoplehood, the concept of a national community, or ‘peoplehood’, is one of the major constructs of the Enlightenment’s understanding of modernity.\(^5\) The modern nation is inconceivable, Lie argues, without it. The very notion of a national community needs the glue of culture, including religion, to hold it together.

Both Pakistan’s Jinnah and India’s Nehru bought into the European idea that national communities were formed with a homogeneous culture. They also accepted the Enlightenment notion that national governments should be secular – free from the influence of sectarian bias or religious authority. To Jinnah, this meant that South Asian Muslims constituted a distinct nation within the subcontinent, and this warranted their being granted a semi-autonomous region, or, failing that, their own separate nation state of Pakistan. But the dapper Jinnah, ever dressed in a European-style business suit, was insistent that the government of the new Pakistan would be similar to European states – that is, secular.

Nehru also accepted the European notion of a culturally homogeneous nation with a secular government, but he interpreted both of those concepts somewhat differently than from Jinnah. Nehru’s description of India’s cultural unity in Discovery of India seemed to many Muslims to be very Hindu, but Nehru thought of it as Indic – not narrowly Hindu but a part of a united cultural tradition. He did not think that it privileged Hindu or any other set of religious beliefs. In his mind, Indian culture embraced Islam as well as Hinduism. His notion of secularism, therefore, was a matter not just of keeping religious influences out of government but also of treating all religious communities equally and in a fair-minded way. It was precisely for this reason that Nehru thought that the Muslims should be a part of India and not separate from it.

In fact, neither Jinnah nor Nehru’s European notions of national culture and secular government had much connection to traditional ways of thinking about religion and politics in India’s history. The concept of a national community is non-existent in India’s early history, as it was in most societies, including European ones, before the eighteenth century. There were caliphs and kings, princes and emperors, who ruled on the basis of power, not the consent of the governed. Even so, however, they were expected to uphold certain moral standards in their conduct of governing. In traditional India, there is the notion that kings are expected to come from military castes that have their own ethical codes of conduct. Moreover, the king of a realm is expected to rule on behalf of dharma, the moral order that undergirds all of society. The image that is presented in ancient scriptures is that of a king upholding the ‘white umbrella’ of moral righteousness over the people. But these rulers are not in any narrow sense religious.

The same can be said of the Mughal rulers, a lineage of Muslim emperors who reigned over much of the subcontinent from roughly the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries. Though a quarter of the Indian population converted to Islam during this period, and Muslim holy sites were often privileged over Hindu ones, the imperial rule was hardly a theocratic state. One of the greatest of the Mughal rulers, Akbar, in the latter half of the sixteenth century created his own court religion that was dismissive of orthodox Islam and meant to be compatible with all faiths. Famously, Akbar is said to have welcomed theologians and thinkers from all religious persuasions to enter into philosophic discussions in his chambers.

British colonial rule was secular, of course, but the colonial government maintained an ambivalent relationship to the hordes of Christian missionaries who had the run of India during its rule. Many of the British officers regarded them as a nuisance. But others regarded them as an extension of the civilising influence of the British rule. Christian hospitals and educational institutions were especially welcomed as efforts to serve Indian society and bring the benefits of Western civilisation to South Asian shores. The inheritors of British rule in South Asia – Nehru and Jinnah – carried on this tradition of secular government with a benign, but wary, attitude towards religious authorities and organisations. Each regarded religious extremists and true believers as potentially dangerous. But each also regarded religion, as an ingredient of the cultural homogeneity that made India and Pakistan distinctive national communities, to be absolutely essential. And that laid the groundwork for the religious violence of recent centuries.
The trajectory of religious politics in India and Pakistan after independence in 1947 is different from what either Nehru or Jinnah expected. In both cases, religion burst out of the confines in which they thought it had been contained, as elements of a homogeneous national culture, into direct and often violent participation in politics.

Muslim Violence in Pakistan

In Pakistan, successive political leaders increasingly found religion to be a useful rallying point for national unity. It also provided a built-in network of support from Muslim religious authorities and activists. Perhaps no political leader in Pakistan did more to pander to conservative Muslim support than Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who led the country from 1977 to 1988 after instituting a coup against his mentor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Zia established sharia law, outlawed marginal and heretical religious movements, and subsidised the Mujahadeen movement against a Soviet-backed government in neighbouring Afghanistan. Though the numbers of votes gained by Muslim religious parties in Pakistan have consistently been very small, since the time of Zia the parties’ influence in the government has been disproportionately large.

One legacy of the Zia regime has been the covert Pakistani support for extremist Muslim political movements in Afghanistan. First the Mujahadeen and then the Taliban movements have been secretly supported by elements of the Pakistan military and intelligence services. The ideas of the Taliban are related to the Deoband Muslim reform movement in South Asia that attempted to purify and standardise the teachings and practices of Islam. Groups such as the Taliban interpreted this reform movement in a rigid and uncompromising way. The movement was not only an agent of religious standardisation, however; it became the political wing of the Pashtun tribal community, large numbers of which were within Pakistan’s own western borders. Mollifying the Taliban, then, was a way of currying favour with the critical Pashtun community.

In the twenty-first century, religious violence has persisted in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and in some regions of Pakistan the extremism of Muslim political groups led to violent confrontations and acts of terrorism. Following the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, many of the leading forces of the Afghan Taliban came across the border to Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan along the Afghan border, especially in Baluchistan. A new Pakistan-based Taliban emerged, responsible for...
a series of attacks on Pakistan political leaders, including presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The Taliban rebounded from its defeat in the invasion of the United States coalition forces in 2001, and asserted a major role in Afghan politics through violent encounters and terrorist attacks that confounded the attempts of the United States to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan almost two decades later. The Taliban and its affiliates, such as the extremist Haqqani network, controlled much of the Pashtun and other tribal regions of western Pakistan as well as most of eastern Afghanistan.

Hindu Nationalist Violence in India

At the same time that Pakistan was developing a more strident Muslim political posture, religious nationalism was also surfacing within India, as we have seen with the rise of a Sikh separatist movement in the 1980s. But violence has accompanied the religious nationalism of Hindus as well. In some ways, the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the re-emergence of a religious strand of Indian nationalism that extended back to the early part of the twentieth century. One of the early voices for Indian independence came from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who founded the Hindu Mahasabha, and advocated a concept of Hindu culture which he called *Hindutva* as being the basis of Indian national identity. He once entered into a debate with Mohandas Gandhi over the efficacy of using violence in the struggle for India’s freedom.6 Despite Savarkar’s efforts, Hindu nationalism was not a major element in India’s nationalist movement. After independence, several political parties took up the banner of support for Hindu causes, notably the Jan Sangh, but it was not until the 1990s that a new movement of religious consciousness led to spectacular political successes for the BJP.

The BJP was officially launched in 1980 out of the remnants of previous Hindu-oriented political parties.7 It did not gain strength, however, until the 1990s with the events that led up to the violent attack on a Muslim mosque said to be located on the site of the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram in the town of Ayodhya. Religious activists associated with the sectarian Hindu organisations, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, championed the destruction of the mosque in order to liberate the grounds from Muslim associations. Though archaeologists questioned the

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authenticity of the assertion, and many questioned whether a spiritual entity such as a god actually had a birthplace, the site became a matter of religious contention, fuelled by political rhetoric. It was the secular Congress Party, after all, that allowed the mosque to continue to exist on that spot. Though the Indian government said that it was protecting the site in the name of secularism – which in India meant the equal protection of all religious communities – the BJP political response was that the Congress’s position was ‘pseudo-secularism’ that in fact masked the privileging of minority communities such as Muslims over the interests of Hindus. (Even after the creation of Pakistan, the numbers of Muslims remaining in India were 15 per cent of the population, enough to constitute a significant electoral base of votes, and a reason for politicians to curry the Muslims’ favour.)

In 1992 a mob of over 100,000 angry Hindus convened in Ayodhya, attacked the mosque with improvised tools, and rendered it to dust. The BJP capitalised on this sentiment of Hindu nationalism, and employing Savarkar’s concept of Hindutva as the bedrock of Hindu nationalist culture, launched a series of political campaigns. The elections brought the BJP into positions of power in the legislatures of several states, and from 1998 to 2004 it was the dominant party in a national coalition that ruled India, and the BJP leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, became India’s prime minister. In 2014 and again in 2019 national elections returned the BJP to power under the leadership of Narendra Modi, and the BJP was able to rule without the need for a coalition with other parties. If one considers the BJP to be a movement of religious nationalism, it quite likely has had the largest following of any such movement in world history, and was one of the most politically successful. Violent protests, however, have followed in the wake of its electoral successes.

A violent past also clouds the leadership role of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. When he was chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002, Modi is said to have encouraged Hindu mobs to kill over a thousand innocent Muslims in neighborhoods at the edge of the city of Ahmedabad. Thousands more were injured, and tens of thousands fled the city in fear. Though official investigations and judicial proceedings cleared Modi of any direct involvement in the massacre, accounts of Modi’s encouragement that were included in reports by Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organisations were sufficient for the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to ban Modi from entering their countries until he became elected prime minister in 2014, when he was greeted as a head of state.

One of his political allies, however, did not get off so easily. Seven years after the 2002 massacre, Maya Kodnani was convicted for what the judge in
the specially designated court described as her role as being the ‘kingpin’ and ‘one of the principal conspirators’ of the assault; he then sentenced her to twenty-eight years in prison. Like Modi, she had been raised in a household dominated by the ideology of the Hindu nationalist movement, the Rashtrriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the ‘national volunteer organisation’), and at the time of the 2002 massacre she was a legislator in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly and a member of Modi’s political party, the BJP. Though rumours of her role in the massacre persisted after 2002, five years later Modi named her to his cabinet as minister for women and child development, a role appropriate to her profession as a gynaecologist. She stepped down from the position at the time of her trial and conviction, which Modi’s government did not contest.

Whether the 2002 Gujarat massacre was an act of terrorism, and whether government officials – including possibly Modi himself – can be described as terrorists, are contested issues. There is no doubt about the basic facts of the case, however: perhaps as many as 2,500 innocent Muslim men, women and children were hacked to death, stabbed, raped and burned alive by angry Hindu mobs. It has often been referred to as a ‘riot’, but this implies an equal amount of violence from both religious communities, and in this case the Muslims were almost entirely the victims of angry Hindus. Some scholars have called it a ‘pogrom’, implying that Hindu political leaders deliberately planned and conducted the act. Still others have described it as ‘religious violence’, or a ‘massacre’. Martha Nussbaum has called it ‘ethnic cleansing’, adding that it was ‘premeditated’ and ‘carried out with the complicity of the state government and officers of the law’. Whatever it was called, however, it was one of the most horrifying events in India’s recent political history.

Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bhutan and Tibet

Though one does not often think of Buddhism as a religious culture that supports political activism and violence, strong movements of religious politics have surfaced in several of South Asia’s Buddhist nations that have
had a violent edge. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks supported movements resisting the government’s concessions to Tamil Hindus and Christians in the northern portion of the country, claiming that Sri Lanka should be a Sinhalese Buddhist state. A Buddhist monk assassinated Prime Minister Bandaranaike in 1959. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, a new movement emerged with a programme of violent aggression against the Muslim minority community in Sri Lanka. Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) movement, led by a firebrand monk, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, raised the spectre of global Muslim terrorism in order to promote fear against the small and peaceful Muslim community in Sri Lanka. Following the 2019 Easter attacks on Christian churches by a handful of Muslim extremists associated with the Islamic State, Buddhist-fomented attacks increased on Muslim communities throughout the country.

In another Theravada Buddhist country of South Asia, Buddhism has also been an instrument of protest and revolt. In the country of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, Buddhist monks were at the forefront of protests against the autocratic military rule. In 2012, a new movement developed that was strikingly similar to the anti-Muslim rhetoric of Sri Lanka’s BBS movement. In the Myanmar case, it was linked to long-standing tensions between Burmese and the Muslim minority community of Rohingya in Rakhine state. Some Burmese activists claimed that the increase in the Muslim population would soon make them the majority, and riots ensued, with killings on both sides. This tension spread throughout the country in a spiral of anti-Muslim activism, fanned by the rhetoric of activist monks like Ashin Wirathu from Mandalay. The government responded to the anti-Muslim sentiment with a series of enactments that greatly restricted the rights of Rohingya within Myanmar, essentially making them citizens without a country. In 2015, some 25,000 Rohingya set sail on crowded boats seeking asylum in surrounding countries. It is estimated that hundreds died attempting to reach shore in Thailand, Indonesia or Malaysia.

In the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, the longing for a Buddhist state was realised. An almost theocratic alliance among the monarchial, monastic and elected branches of power in Bhutan led to an enormous amount of government support for Buddhist institutions and sites, and established a rigid code of behaviour that mandated that all citizens wear traditional clothing and maintain their homes in traditional styles. Non-Buddhist Nepalese Hindus were forcibly removed from Bhutan, an act of ethnic cleansing that expelled 15 per cent of Bhutan’s population. Many of these exiled ethnic Nepalese were driven into refugee camps in India and Nepal.
In Tibet, monks protesting the loss of cultural autonomy and the steady increase of Han Chinese presence in the region clashed with the Chinese military. Often, despite the Dalai Lama’s admonition to adopt only non-violent tactics, Tibetan Buddhist monks were aggressors in the conflict. From the Chinese perspective, the Tibetans challenged the notion of China’s sovereignty. From the Tibetan perspective, China was attempting to undercut the national cultural integrity of Tibet. The old issue of the role of religion in defining a national community was once more the central issue.

South Asian Violence in Global Perspective

These movements of religious politics and their accompanying incidents of violence have persisted in what has come to be called the global era of the twenty-first century. It is a period in world history in which transnational forces challenge national institutions and communities, and in which the very notion of the nation state as the prime unit of world political order is being reassessed. A critical aspect of contemporary globalisation is the de-nationalisation of demographic communities. Today everyone can live everywhere, and they often do. It is a phenomenon that affects the established societies of Europe as well as emerging nations of South Asia.

Religion is often part of these far-flung globalised political discussions. And it can also be a factor in the immigrant communities’ responses to their situations. In some cases the sense of alienation that immigrants experience is overcome by identifying with a struggle for a religious or ethnic nationalism back home. Paradoxically, the support for such movements can be even stronger in the diaspora than in the homeland. This was often the case with the Sikh Khalistan movement, which was monetarily supported by Sikh communities in the USA and the UK, where the symbols of the movement were created. The first currency printed in the name of Khalistan, for instance, was minted in England. The BJP also received widespread support from Hindus living abroad. Sri Lankans living abroad supported both sides of the struggle in Sri Lanka, especially in the UK, where Sinhalese Buddhists supported one side and Sri Lankan Tamils supported the other.

The global diaspora of ethnic and religious communities has also created something of a global backlash. Often the voices of support for such right-wing protests are strident; occasionally their political strength is substantial; and on some tragic occasions the rhetoric moves some desperate extremists to violent actions, even terrorism. An attack in the United States in 2012 was aimed at a gurdwara (a Sikh temple) in the suburbs of Milwaukee, where
a member of a racist Christian subculture killed seven, including himself. The killer, Wade Michael Page, thought he was preserving a pure American culture in the face of multicultural globalism. Ironically it was Sikhs – who in the 1980s were attacking the secular state of India to create their own religiously pure homeland – who were the targets of this Christian terrorist in America who saw them as a problem in his own notion of national purity.

Thus the South Asian experience with religious politics – interesting in its own right – also is instructive about the rise of religious violence globally in the decades at the end of the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first centuries. Secularism as an ideology has not been seen as a neutral actor, it seems, either in South Asia or in other parts of the world where religious politics have often emerged as a response to what are perceived to be attempts to remove traditional aspects of religious culture from the public sphere. Hence the rise of religious politics in South Asia tells us much about this particular moment of late modernity, where it may well be not so much a passing fancy as a bellwether of new postmodern and postsecular identities and new forms of imagined transnational publics in a shifting global order that tragically is often violent.

Bibliographical Essay


Studies of violence in Sikhism are mostly related to the Khalistan movement in the 1980s, including the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. The most revealing study, based on insider interviews, is Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997). See also


Coercion and violence have played a decisive role in the shaping of the Middle East and affected all aspects of social life throughout the post-Second World War decades. Although they have always been related to political, social or economic issues, class, generation, gender or ethnic and sectarian relations, or regional and ‘international relations’ and wars, they have also created new and widely autonomous dynamics. If each historical period had its peculiar forms of violence, the continuity of violence as a phenomenon has nevertheless given birth to a cumulative process of brutalisation of the societies.

The classical approaches in historical and political sociology, which use either the theory of resource mobilisation or that of relative deprivation, may be useful in order to understand the pre-1979/80 forms of violence in the region, but not the ones observed since this turning point, and particularly the self-sacrificial violence which has become quite commonplace since the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000–4) and 9/11. This is also true as far as comparative perspectives are considered: if they allow us to understand the formation of ‘terror in the mind of God’ in many parts of the world during recent decades,¹ they cannot explain the scale of post-9/11 violence and its aestheticised cruelties. Scholars thus reach the limits of what one could call phenomenological approaches, a fact that may explain the very small number of academic works on the issue of violence in the Middle East compared to those devoted to other parts of the world such as Latin America.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere, there is a strong relation between violence and criminalisation of political, ethnic and sectarian conflicts. In most parts of the region, the power-holders not only preserved the Islamic political doctrine which, since its elaboration between the seventh and tenth

centuries, prohibited internal dissent and promoted absolute obedience to
the state, but also adhered, implicitly if not explicitly, to Social Darwinism. They have aimed at the formation of organically integrated, conflict-less ‘national’ bodies. If they legitimised themselves by unifying, nationalist, ‘socialist’ or Islamist da’was (‘call’, ‘cause’), they have also often confiscated power on behalf of some ethnic, sectarian, tribal or regionalist group with a strong asabiyya (‘group-solidarity’) and excluded wide sections of society. Even in the strongly integrated countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, where one can hardly mention any autonomous asabiyya, power has always been monopolised by tiny elites excluding large sectors of society.

Off-Limits Issues

Given the limits of this chapter, I will not be able to deal here with the issue of violence in the supra-territorial Palestinian and trans-border Kurdish spaces in the Middle East. It is, however, important to mention that the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the ‘Six-Day War’ in 1967 have changed the face of the region and transformed the Palestinian issue into a most salient one. The Palestinian non-state actors, who won a quasi-state form in the refugee camps, played an important role in Jordan before the kingdom’s massive repression during the famous Black September clampdown in 1970, and in Lebanon before the Israeli invasion of 1982 which constrained the PLO to take refuge in Tunisia. The Palestinian camps also hosted non-Palestinian militants, among them members of the German Red Army Faction and the Japanese Red Army.\(^2\) ‘Palestine within’ also played a political role during the First Intifada (1987–93), which included riots by Palestinian youth and women activists, and the Second Intifada (2000–4), which has made suicide bombings as the main tool of violence commonplace. Together with South Yemen, where a ‘socialist Republic’ survived between 1967 and 1990, the Palestinian supra-national space had been dominated by left-wing movements until the mid 1980s, before hosting Islamist actors such as Hamas.

As far as Kurdistan is concerned, it became the theatre of uprisings in Turkey, Iran and Iraq in the 1920s–1940s and has been almost constantly in a state of violence since the 1961 Barzani rebellion in Iraq. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdish conflict claimed more than 200,000 lives. Left-wing movements have been dominant in Kurdistan and, although challenged by Islamist actors, still enjoy a hegemonic position in the political landscape.

\(^2\) J. Croitoru, Der Märtyrer als Waffe: Dis historischen Wurzeln des Selbstmordattentats (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2003), pp. 73–5.
This chapter will also leave aside the issue of political violence in some parts of the Middle East, to start with in pre-1979/80 Turkey and Iran. In the former, violence started in the wake of the 1968 contest between left- and right-wing groups, but also had a communitarian, Sunni-Alevi aspect. In Iran, the left-wing guerrilla movement, which amplified itself throughout the 1970s, was one of the factors preparing the ground for the 1979 revolution, which will be mentioned later on. In both countries, as well as in Morocco, which hosted a left-wing guerrilla movement, violence remained confined, mainly, within the ‘national’ boundaries. That was not the case in the long-lasting guerrilla warfare in Dhofar (1963–76) as well as in the intra-Yemeni war which involved Great Britain, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Historical Cycles of the Twentieth Century and the Issue of Violence

In this chapter I will suggest that the issue of violence in the Middle East has been determined by specific features of different historical cycles the region went through. Each cycle started as a consequence of violent ruptures that exerted a destructive and restructuring impact well beyond one single country. Each was also dominated by a specific ideological and political ‘micro-climate’ and bore the fingerprints of a given generation. The first cycle, which began with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the partition of its Arab provinces, lasted until the foundation of the state of Israel. The second cycle covered the thirty-year period from 1948 to 1979. The third cycle, which I have analysed elsewhere, started in 1979 with the Camp David Agreements and recognition of Israel by Egypt, the Iranian revolution, the Islamist uprising in Mecca and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Red Army. The most recent cycle opened with the Arab revolutionary contests of 2011 and their disruptive effects in some countries since then.

During the first cycle, violence took the form of anti-mandate/anti-colonial or anti-settlements riots in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Palestine. Except in Egypt, where political movements and trade unions had a notable presence, the other uprisings were launched by tribal categories or large coalitions, including the Shia clergy, some pro-Kurdish or pro-Druze forces, or

urban elites. In Palestine, many urban dynasties, *hamulas* (‘enlarged families’) and the religious establishment became sources of the revolts of the 1930s.

One should however bear in mind that, although they were difficult to deal with, the majority of the old social classes and tribal sheikhdoms ultimately accepted cooperation with the rules of the Mandatory system. In contrast, the Arab intelligentsia maintained a high level of mobilisation even after the revolts. Before the First World War, this intelligentsia did not necessarily adhere to a nationalist ideology, but it was radicalised after the execution of some Arab dignitaries by Cemal Pasha, the Ottoman proconsul for Syria, in 1916. After the war and the formation of the new states, nationalism became the dominant political current within this generationally renewed category. With some few exceptions, the intelligentsia did not switch to violence; but it was highly influenced by European radical right-wing ideas and forms of mobilisation. Movements such as the Umayyad Brigades in Syria, al-Futuwwah (‘The Youth’) in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt took the shape of paramilitary organisations. In Iraq, the only country that established a ‘national army’ in the wake of its independence, the ideas of this intelligentsia also influenced the military. In particular Bakr Sidqi, who in 1936 organised the first coup d’état in the history of the Arab countries – the 1941 coup of al-Gaylani – also bore the hallmark of right-wing ideas.

The second historical cycle, which lasted from 1948 to 1979, was marked by a revolutionary crisis in many parts of what would come to be known as the Third World. But in the Middle East, the creation of Israel was seen as a new amputation of Arab lands and unleashed a long process of radicalisation. In a context in which the Arab world was divided along Cold War lines, the defeat of the Arab armies could but give birth to violent internal reactions which adopted left-wing mottoes and themes, but were also influenced by Social Darwinism.

The trauma following the Arab defeat by Israel put an end to the very ideal of democracy in the Arab Middle East. It is true that elections took place in Iraq and Syria in the 1950s, but as Nasser put it bluntly, the ‘bourgeois’ democracy was henceforth perceived as a Trojan horse aiming at the division of the Middle East and as a rule of ‘feudal’ strata over society. While authoritarianism was accepted as the only way of uniting the state and the

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6 Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (eds.), *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives / Les Mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

nation and resolving the social and national questions through the concentra- 
tion of power, violence became synonymous with ‘national resistance’. As the 
killing of the Jordanian King Abdallah, the Syrian president Husni al-Zaim and 
the Egyptian prime minister al-Nuqrashi Pasha attested, violence was before 
everything else internal, targeting mainly the ‘betrayers’; but the revolutionary 
crisis in Egypt and in Syria and the intifada in pre-1958 Iraq demonstrated that it 
could also be applied to wider popular contests. The post-1948 crisis led to 
a series of military coups and to the establishment of new and in some cases 
extremely brutal ‘revolutionary’ regimes in Egypt (1952), Syria (1948, 1963, 1966, 
1970) and Iraq (1958, 1963, 1966, 1968), and later on in Libya (1969) which, 
together with independent Algeria (1961), formed the so-called Arab progress- 
ive bloc. Under these new powers, political language itself was brutalised. For 
instance, Iraqi TV after 1968 left no doubt about the future coercive praxis of 
the new regime: ‘the great and immortal squares of Iraq shall be filled up with 
corpses of traitors and spies! Just wait!’8 

There is no doubt that Middle Eastern violent conflicts were, at least 
partly, linked to the Cold War alignments of some countries such as Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria with the Soviet Union, and of the others, namely Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Turkey, with the Western bloc. The contests which took place then 
could partly be explained by the diffusion of left-wing ideas which exerted an 
almost hegemonic impact across the ‘Tri-Continental region’. This was not 
only the name of an organisation which was founded in Havana in 1967, but 
as importantly a world-wide regime of subjectivity, a political grammar 
which spread itself throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia. One can in 
fact easily compare the aesthetics and vocabulary of the Middle Eastern 
vioence of the 1950s–1960s with those of other parts of the world during 
the same period, replete with a fetishism of armed struggle and revolutionary 
organisation on behalf of an imagined ‘united people’.

Sociologically speaking, one could consider the military and civilian intel- 
ligentsia as the main actors of contest and violence in the Middle East of these 
decades. These strata, which included many students, young lawyers, engi- 
eeers, officers and what one could call the literati, constituted the ‘inter- 
mediary elite’ of these societies; they had an operational knowledge of the 
world and were also able to extrapolate from science to social issues. But they 
were not the sole actors of contestation on the Arab scene: the plebian strata 
also emerged as political actors between the 1950s and 1970s to replace the

8 Quoted in Thabit A. J. Abdullah, Iraq since 1989: Dictatorship, Imperialism and Chaos 
intelligentsia almost entirely in the following decades as the core of contestation. Their ascent went hand-in-hand with the reinforcement of some formerly marginal parties such as the Communist Party and the Ba’ath, and a generational renewal in many parts of the Middle East. Nasser, son of a modest postman, was only 34 when he took power in 1952, and Arafat, another symbolic figure, only 30 when he became a world-renowned figure of Palestinian struggle. The revolutionary fidai (‘the one who sacrifices him/herself’), who had much to share with guerrilleros across the world, imagined him/herself as in charge of a ‘historical mission’. That mission was not only to mark a decisive break with the past Ottoman and mandate/colonial legacy and the corruption of the present, but also to offer a new horizon to Arab societies, regenerated by resistance and by an act of ‘re-foundation’.

Although socially marginal, the Islamist movement also went through a process of radicalisation during these decades. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose leader Hassan al-Banna had been killed in 1949, participated in the insurrectional violence of the turn of the 1950s. Towards the end of this decade, Sayyid Qotb, the organisation’s most prominent intellectual (executed in 1966 at the age of 60), abandoned the legacy of the seventh- to tenth-century legists as well as al-Banna’s policy of ‘re-Islamisation through reform’ and justified the use of violence within the dar al-islam.

1979: The Turning Point of the Middle East

Towards the end of the 1970s, the left-wing movements were dominant, but also in deep crisis. In Syria and in Iraq, power was seized by a tiny clique, which constantly fragmented in a brutal process of ‘purification’. Instead of the former utopias of social and national emancipation, these societies had henceforth to face cruel dictatorships and warmongers. The Egypt of Anwar al-Sadat (assassinated in 1981) was ruled by what one could define as a kleptomaniac. The Gaddafi regime in Libya, which gradually switched from pan-Arabism to pan-Africanism, had been transformed into a grotesque but highly repressive dictatorship. As far as the non-state-sponsored, i.e. ‘communist’, left was concerned, it was simply incapable of broadening its social base. The Palestinian movement not only failed to ‘liberate’ Palestine, but also went through a process of internal fragmentation, and has been either repressed or manipulated by the major Arab states. Hafez al-Assad, who abandoned the Palestinian actors during the Black September crackdown in Jordan in 1970, when he was commanding the Syrian armed forces, intervened actively in the Lebanese civil war, not in
order to support the Palestinian fighters but to repress them, namely in the Tel al-Zaatar camp in 1976.

However, the crisis of the left took place while the Middle East was still in a revolutionary moment, a fact that differentiated it from many other parts of the world. In spite of the Sandinista revolution of 1979 and the following civil wars in Latin America, the 1980s represented the years of world-wide de-radicalisation. In Europe, for instance, the left-wing movements which advocated violence lost all credibility after the murder of the former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978. In the Middle East, in contrast, the revolutionary and ‘anti-imperialist’ passions were still alive, but could not be satisfied any longer by left-wing discourse and mobilisation. Islamism, whose motto was Islam al hal (‘Islam is the solution’), could thus impose itself as the new revolutionary alternative. Many Arab intellectuals were indeed keen to ‘revolutionize Islam as a prolongation of a nationalist project’;\(^9\) contributing thus to transforming Islamism into the ‘hegemonic syntax’\(^10\) of the new historical cycle of the Middle East.

The major events which took place in 1979 were in no way related to each other. Recognition of Israel by Egypt was the outcome of a long process of rapprochement between Cairo and Washington. This act of ‘betrayal’ to the ‘resistance front’ was a deadly blow to ‘Arab socialism’. The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army, which had more to do with internal conflicts within the pro-Soviet regime of Hafizullah Amin than with world-wide geopolitical competition, created the feeling that Moscow was taking the path of the Western capitals as a new imperialist force. In contrast, the occupation of the Ka’ba in Mecca by a small Islamist group led by a Mahdist figure called Juhayman al-Otaybi (executed in 1980) seemed to suggest that Sunni Islam, which was represented until then as a regional pawn of Washington, could in reality have strong revolutionary and anti-Western potential. As far as the most dramatic event of the year, the Iranian revolution, was concerned, it was the outcome of a year-long contest, tremendously reinforced by the participation of the Shia clergy and the bazaris. The involvement of these strata transformed the revolution into an extremely radical and yet ultra-conservative one.

These events were totally disconnected from each other, but in a context in which the left was losing ground, they could easily interact and project Islamism onto the new revolutionary horizon. The assassination of President al-Sadat in Egypt in 1981 and the Islamist uprising of Hama in Syria the

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following year were at once consequences and new manifestations of a region-wide radical Islamism. More importantly, through its prolongation via the Iran–Iraq War, the Afghan jihad and the Lebanese civil war, reconfigured by Iranian involvement in the Lebanese Shia community, the year 1979 produced some long-lasting effects. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, which destroyed militarily the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) of Arafat, but at the same time reinforced the newly founded Shia Hezbollah, has further contributed to the dying out of left-wing movements. Already by the mid 1980s, radical Islamist movements which found their inspirations in the person of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian religious figure who acted as the ideologue of the Afghan jihad (killed in 1989), began to exert a decisive role in the Palestinian camps in this country.

These three wars, and state coercion in countries such Iraq and Syria, which reached an unprecedented level, claimed more than a million lives and provoked the internal and external displacement of many other millions. The Palestinian camps in the Middle East, which were an exception in the world of the 1950s–1970s, became a model for other refugee communities. As importantly, in contrast to the 1967 and 1973 Yom Kippur wars, during these new wars the violence of regular armies and security forces and the violence of non-state actors widely interacted throughout the region. The first consequence of this evolution was the organisation of a military transhumance from many parts of the Arab countries to Peshawar and/or the Afghan front. In fact, the Afghan War gave birth to a dark romanticism, attracting some 35,000 young men from different geographical, sociological and economic backgrounds. Some of these militants (Bin Laden, the very wealthy Zawahiri and the very poor al-Zarkawi, al-Suri, al-Libyi, etc.) remained active until around 2010. The second consequence was that the frontiers, which according to the 1648 Westphalian model constituted ‘bordered power containers’, were transformed into zones producing violence. The Islamist actors were not the only ones to take part in this evolution: Palestinian organisations, Kurdish fighters from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Iranian opposition groups or Iraqi Shia movements were also involved, both in the armed transhumance.

of this period and in the production of border-area violence. As a combined consequence of these factors, new figures such as chehid (martyr), mudjahids or urban militiaman replaced the Palestinian fidai model in the Middle Eastern imaginary and praxis of violence and constituted the symbols of wide-scale violence for the decades to come.

One of the most important outcomes of the post-1979 evolution in the region was that Peshawar and Teheran imposed themselves as Sunni and Shia ‘model-producers’ for almost the entire Arab world – and well beyond – at the expense of other models, be they Western, Soviet or Arab ones. The previous left-wing references vanished almost totally in the region, the former ‘Tri-Continental region’ making way for a narrowed but still highly hypothetical Islamic universalism. The generation of Arafat and Leyla Khaled, the well-known Palestinian hijacker, and Nasser, al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, marked the emergence of young militants who had a military-virile body language redolent of ‘oldness’ and the past. In contrast, the new generations of militants found their leaders in the old figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini, who was 80 when the Iranian revolution took place, and later on the Palestinian Sheikh Yassin (1937–2004). Living proofs of authenticity and loyalty to the sacred causes, these new leaders called on the generation of their grandchildren to accomplish sacrificial and self-sacrificial forms of violence to keep the ‘cause’ alive.

The Conflicts of the 1990s

The three wars of the 1980s ended towards the end of the decade, when the Cold War was also coming to its close. After the fall of the military regimes in Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s and that of the Soviet bloc in 1989, many observers thought the Middle East would also experience a process of democratisation. Similarly, the failure of the Iranian model and the instability of postwar Afghanistan seemed to indicate a weakening of Islamism as a radical strategy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, followed by a new ‘Gulf War’ (2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991), and violence and wars in the peripheries of the Muslim world such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Tajikistan, however, created the conditions for a new wave of violence, which lasted throughout the 1990s. Although Islamism constituted only one of the components of these local conflicts, they were seen as parts of one single jihadist chain. The collapse of the state in Somalia and the military coups of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan (1989 and 1993) also offered to jihadi fighters new spaces of protection, where they could gain military experience, and interact with each other.
The main fields of struggle of the 1990s, however, were located in the Arab world itself: in Egypt and Algeria. In Egypt, where public opinion was radicalised in response to the Mubarak regime’s unconditional cooperation with the USA in the 1991 war, the repression of the pacific Muslim Brotherhood made space for the radical Gama’a Islamiya (‘Islamic Association/Community’). Guerrilla warfare lasted until the massacres of tourists in Luxor in 1997 and claimed several thousand lives. In Algeria, the collapse of ‘Algerian socialism’ and the brutal repression of the non-Islamist social riots of October 1988 paved the way for the ascent of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), which was almost certain to win the elections of 1992. The election process, which included two rounds of voting, was interrupted after the first round by what the Algerian political language describes as le Pouvoir (‘The Powers that be’). The repression which followed could only reinforce those militants who, in contrast to the leadership of the party, never believed in an electoral strategy. The young militants of the FIS created a new organisation called the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), whose multiple factions played a decisive role in a range of brutal attacks. The Algerian army and security forces also responded to the uprising with extreme cruelty. In less than one decade, violence claimed some 200,000 lives, and the civil war became a ‘fratricide’ – one with many communities and families divided, and with violence taking an increasingly ‘intimate’ form.

Violence in Egypt and in Algeria was both a continuation of the Afghan war and a breaking-point with it. Many figures such as Tayyib al-Afghani and Jaffar al-Afghani of the Islamist guerrilla leaders in Algeria had been previously involved in the Afghan jihad. Switching from the remote jihad against a foreign enemy to the jihad within dar al-islam against a Muslim ruler, they considered that the conquest of Cairo and Algiers was a prerequisite for the ‘liberation’ of Jerusalem. It is however obvious that, whatever their feelings about their regimes may have been, these societies did not support military jihadism, and followed the medieval legist al-Mawardi’s (Alboacen) teaching: ‘a thousand years of tyranny is better than one minute of discord’.

Islamist violence of this decade should also be analysed in relation to post-infitah economic policies. Islamism was the language that gave to dislocated youth a sense that the social, political, cultural and economic world had been

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'corrupted' and proposed an alternative to it. It is obvious that during this decade the informal mechanisms of social control and traditional solidarity networks ceased to be effective,\(^{17}\) and could no longer contain the radicalism of their client groups. The *hijra* ‘paradigm’,\(^{18}\) which allowed the exportation of Arab radicalisms to a remote jihad-front such as Afghanistan as in the 1980s, was no longer an alternative after the Soviet withdrawal, the civil war of the 'war lords’ and the ascent of the Taliban.

**The Self-Sacrificial Violence of 9/11**

Towards the end of the 1990s, the failure of jihadist strategies obliged the mainstream Islamist organisations to distance themselves from violence, to accept the legitimacy of existing boundaries, to abandon the project of founding a new Islamic society and to adopt neoliberal economic policies. The ageing Islamist leaders, who were integrated into the professional and economic fabric of their respective countries, were henceforth keen to promote social conservatism and religious orthodox praxis, a policy which, in fact, was also accepted by their states.

This evolution convinced many observers that two decades after its heyday and one decade after the end of the Cold War the flame of jihadism was, *finally*, about to extinguish itself. Amid this real de-radicalisation, however, a new form of violence was taking place at the margins of Islamism and the Arab societies. Promoted by former Arab-Afghans such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, or by much younger militants such as Muhammad Atta who had no militant experience, the new radicalism emerged in spaces with no public visibility: isolated military camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, prisons in the Arab world and student communities in Europe. These milieux which would join the al-Qaeda organisation founded in 1988 by Bin Laden had a double outlook. On the one hand, they were able to think strategically, and promoted a non-territorial war against the West, to start with against the United States. On the other hand, they believed that the individual’s body was the main field of battle between good and evil; after having been purified, the body could and should be sacrificed to the Cause. As a consequence of this new orientation, jihad ceased to be articulated within a social and political movement. It became much more


violent and self-sacrificial than before, but it also lost its socially and politically revolutionary content, developed earlier by the Muslim Brotherhood from al-Banna to Qotb.

Al-Qaida was not the first organisation to use suicide attacks; the first case of such violence in the region’s recent history was that of Sana’a Mehaidli, a Christian young woman who was a member of the Lebanese Communist Party. In 1985, she blew herself up near an Israeli convoy.\(^{19}\) Other organisations, both Islamists like Hamas and non-Islamists like the Kurdish PKK, have also organised suicidal violence. In spite of many studies on the issue, this form of violence remains difficult to explain: whatever its strategic utility might be in an armed conflict, by destroying the present, a suicidal attack also destroys the past and the future, and leaves no room for any social-political language. If it is true that al-Qaida emphasised and still emphasises the conflict between \textit{dar al-Islam} and \textit{dar al-harb}, and legitimates violence against civilians, including Muslims,\(^{20}\) its suicidal violence aims at an eschatological delivery. Through the new aesthetic forms it developed, this violence brought back death to the city from which it had been expelled as the condition of ‘civilisation-building’.\(^{21}\) Sacrificial violence was, therefore, distinct from the dialectic of state coercion and social and political conflict, which can become violent as a result of a process of radicalisation.

The highly aestheticised attacks of 9/11 in 2001 represented the most striking form of such violence. The destruction of the Twin Towers, which was followed by the new Afghanistan War (2001), the occupation of Iraq (2003), deadly attacks in Europe (Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels) and in the Middle East (Riyadh, Amman, Rabat, Istanbul and no fewer than one thousand suicide bombings in Iraq between 2003 and 2011), constituted a heavy mortgage on the entire region and determined American foreign policy during the first two decades of the twenty-first century.

The USA, as well as major European states, gave priority to the consolidation of authoritarian states as the only alternative against violence, while in fact, the coercive nature of these ‘fragmented tyrannies’\(^{22}\) and their kleptomania were among the structural reasons behind the violence.


The Post-2011 Era

The Arab revolutionary configurations of 2011–12 started a new cycle in the history of the Middle East. There is no need to insist here on the structural and conjectural factors behind these contests whose main aim was to end authoritarian rule. We must acknowledge a decades-long social fatigue and a level of ‘ordinary’ violence that Arab societies produced at their margins but that touched them at their very heart.23 The uprisings constituted a unique moment during which the ideal of democracy and the praxis of revolution could be combined in the Arab world. But the region’s internal dynamics were far too radicalised and fragmented to permit the kind of social and political liberalisation that occurred in Latin America and in east European countries throughout the 1980s.

The uprisings started in Tunisia and Egypt. In these two countries, which for centuries have had centralised states, the capital city has always occupied a decisive place in the making of the political map. Tribal and intra-Muslim sectarian divides played either a limited role or no role at all in national political life. In Tunisia, after a period of tension, elections led to a recomposition of the political system: Ennahda, the Islamist party, has been integrated as a subordinated actor (for the time being) into the new political system in which some figures of the ‘ancien régime’, such as Beji Caid Essebsi (born in 1926!), the country’s president, occupied key positions. The country, however, became an ‘importer’ and an ‘exporter’ of violence from and to other zones of conflict in North Africa or in the Maghreb. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012, but with a very weak level of popular participation in the elections. After one year in power, however, the Islamist president Muhammad Morsi was overthrown by a bloody military coup on 3 July 2013, which officially claimed more than a thousand lives, organised by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Military rule has provoked widespread violence in the country, namely in the Sinai Peninsula where the central government’s authority has always been very weak and where tribal structures remained strong in contrast to the rest of the country. The strength of anti-Cairo feelings, solidarity with the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, and the fragmentation of the tribal world were among the factors explaining the triumph of the jihadist movements in the peninsula, and their capacity to spread their violence to other provinces.

The revolutionary wave originating in Tunisia and Egypt spread to other places with radically different social, anthropological and political features, among them Libya, Yemen, Bahrein and Syria. The case of Syria cannot be separated from those of neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon, both with highly fragmented social structures. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, these countries were created in the twentieth century and could be considered as republics with weak capital cities, but strong trans-border affiliations, and tribal, regional and sectarian divides. The nature of the ‘state cartel’ there was also very different from the one in Tunisia and Egypt: while the Tunisian and Egyptian armies refused to participate in direct repression and abandoned the rais, al-Khalifa’s, al-Assad’s, Gaddafi’s and Saleh’s regimes were able to mobilise massive resources of coercion against the demonstrators.

As Adel Bari Atwan wrote, by 2012 the overall fate of the Arab world (and the enlarged Middle East) was determined not by revolutionary contests, but by the development of jihadist milieux, which increased in number and were able to create links between different conflicts in the region.24 In contrast to the military transhumance of the 1980s which followed a double-track pattern, from (mainly) the Arab world to Peshawar and Afghanistan, and back again, and to that of al-Qaeda at the turn of the 2000s, which was much more complex but has never been able to mobilise more than a couple of thousand men, the new armed transhumance concerned probably some 200,000 men (and a few thousand women) from different geographical origins towards many destinations, including Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa. The break-up of Iraq in 2013–14 and the extremely rapid evolution of the Syrian conflict into a full sectarian civil war were decisive. In this field of force, we can observe the active involvement of the regional powers: Turkey, Saudi Arabia which supported jihadist groups, and Iran and its allies such as the Lebanese Hezbollah; and later on Russia which supported the Bashar al-Assad regime. Here is the environment in which a dissident offspring of al-Qaeda emerged: the IS (‘Islamic State’). The territorial control that this organisation exerted in Syria and Iraq, the division of Yemen with a new war including Saudi Arabia, and the de facto partition of Libya, aggravated the region-wide ‘state of violence’.25

In reality, many elements of this ‘state of violence’ were already present in the 1980s. There are, however, some major differences between the two periods: not only is the scale of violence much higher in the 2010s, but

25 See for this notion, Frédéric Gros, États de violence: essai sur la fin de la guerre (Paris: Gallimard, 2006).
Different Middle Eastern conflicts interact much more strongly with each other and form both an intra-Arab civil war and a region-wide sectarian war. Moreover, with the exception of the Anfal operations in Iraqi Kurdistan (1988) in which chemical weapons were used, the state of violence of the 1980s did not lead to the destruction of societies, while thirty years later the new wave of violence directly damaged the social structure. Nearly 2% of the Syrian population has been killed and half of it forced into exile or to internal displacement in less than five years. Although less dramatic, similar developments have been observed in Iraq, Yemen and Libya. This evolution goes hand in hand with a fragmentation of time and space and creates a power vacuum in the epicentre of violence. One cannot understand the facility with which IS conquered vast regions in Syria if one forgets that the Bashar al-Assad regime has transformed itself into a brutal militia force, sharing power with some 1,200 other militia forces in 2013. The fragmentation of Libya also gave birth to some 300 militia organisations.

Moreover, the conflicts of the 2010s constantly mutated, leading to a progressively higher level of escalation and violence. To give the most dramatic example of the Syrian war, it has been reconfigured during each summer since 2011: some branches of the opposition decided to militarise the conflict in the summer of 2011; the deadly attack of 18 July 2012, which decimated the regime’s high command in Damascus and killed the president’s brother-in-law, opened a new phase marked by the systematic use of aerial force and the withdrawal of the regime from Kurdish areas; the summer of 2013 was marked by the reconquest of the city of al-Qusayr on the Lebanese border by the Lebanese Hezbollah and the formation of a compact among elements supporting the regime in ‘secured’ territory including Damascus, Homs (which has been largely emptied of its Sunni population) and Latakia; the summer of 2014 was marked by the intensification of Iraqi and Syrian conflicts and the proclamation of al-Baghdadi’s caliphate, and that of 2015 by Russian intervention and the full internationalisation of the Syrian conflict. The logic of this vertiginous chronology has to be found in the fact that the dynamics present in a given moment become irrelevant within ten to twelve months, obliging the actors to move towards a much higher level of violence.

Another significant element is that the conflicts in the 2010s gave birth to a new enlargement of the Middle East. The end of the Gaddafi regime in Libya redefined the Sahara region, leading to the creation of a short-lived jihadist state in the north of Mali. The Islamist contest of Boko Haram in the north of Nigeria, which has its own history distinguishing it from other
Islamist movements, has become part of a wider violence and affirms itself as part of IS. One can even say that through unprecedented refugee waves and deadly attacks in Paris in 2015, the Middle East has moved into western Europe. But this ‘internationalisation’ is also related to the rather long history of armed jihadism and to generational changes: Bin Laden, a product of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, was 43 years old during the 9/11 attacks; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (named Caliph Ibrahim) was the same age when he proclaimed his Islamic state in 2014 and was a product of the Iraqi jihad of the years after 2000. In the 2010s, as in the years after 2000, the intermediary cadres of jihadism were in their twenties or thirties, and the rank-and-file militants even younger. The only difference was that these later militants came from much more plebeian categories then before.

Pacified Societies, the Behemoth and Brutal Margins

The new state of violence in the Middle East attests the weakness not only of the states created in the twentieth century, often through arbitrary international decisions, but also of ideological-social projects such as Arab nationalism, socialism and Islamism. The overwhelming force that sectarian and tribal dynamics exhibited after 2011 means that, in a context where societies collapse, the ‘primary frameworks’ become the only ones to bring an ad minima protection to their members. The tribes, for instance, can either protect their members from violence or become a unit of a large-scale state of violence, as is the case of the Hasheds in Yemen and the Ghaddafas in Libya. Sectarian affiliations, which formed internal boundaries through marriage and family ties, at times were not militarised. The context of violence forced these groups to protect themselves militarily through new leadership, to impose a unique identity and to formulate unique allegiances to their members, and to sacralise and radicalise their political language. Now they included ancient references such as to Qamus al-Uthman and Karbala, references to the shirt that the third Caliph of Islam wore when he was killed in 656, and the murder of Hussein, son of the fourth caliph and grandson of the Prophet in 680.

Similarly, this new situation created a ‘Tillyian’ scenario,26 in which power depends primarily on the capacity of some armed actors to wage war and

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‘protect’ their ‘subjects’, while in order to finance these ‘prerogatives’ they impose a brutal policy of taxation on them. The fall of cities such as Kidal and Timbuktu in 2012, and Fallouja and Mosul (a city which had huge military resources) in 2014, had in fact a strong link not only with the issue of violence, but also with the pacification and/or fragmentation of societies that had lost their capacity of resistance. The success of a couple of hundred jihadist fighters in conquering vast spaces is of course not unique in Middle Eastern history; at the beginning of the 1990s, the Taliban of Mullah Omar (d. 2013), who had perhaps thirty fighters, could impose themselves on a largely fragmented country. Other actors, such as Ahmad Shah Massoud (killed by al-Qaeda on 9 September 2001), who called themselves commanders, certainly had massive military resources and a vast client group, but their fragmentation, and the absence of a ‘universal cause’ that could unite them, allowed the Taliban to radicalise their da’wa and create an asabiyya of their own. The Afghan case, like the IS case of the years after 2010, confirms the fourteenth-century historian and thinker Ibn Khaldun’s analysis according to which the force of conquerors resided not only in their capacity of using coercion, but even more in the incapacity of the urban populations which had lost their habitus of resistance, their capacity to defend themselves.²⁷

Conclusion

This survey of the phenomenon of violence during recent decades in the Middle East also shows the limits of the phenomenological approaches that scholars usually adopt in their analysis. Before the third historical cycle which started in 1979, the process of mobilisation, modes of action and discourses of legitimisation of violence in this region could easily be compared with what one could observe elsewhere in the world, including in Latin America or even in Europe, where ‘revolutionary violence’ had some purchase in certain intellectual circles. But how could we explain the post-1979 evolution? The partition of the Arab Middle East, the creation of Israel and the Palestinian issue, and the series of wars which did not end with the end of the Cold War certainly helped to create the conditions behind a generalised regional instability. The failure of the past nationalist, ‘socialist’, Islamist unanimist projects, which went hand-in-hand with some forms of integrative

welfare society, has also contributed to the spread of general despair. One could also recognise that the enormous resources of the sacralisation and radicalisation of Islam, whose naked reality contradicts its ideal of the ‘just society’, have also played a role in the formation of new and violent elements within Islam. But this violence can’t be explained by its origins or by any simple causality.

One should bear in mind that if Middle Eastern violence constitutes an exception in the world after 2010, it is certainly not an exception in world history. The European Wars of religion in the sixteenth century, or Nazi violence with its perversity and yet perfect rationality and its nihilism which destroyed its own rationality and astonished intellectuals such as Arendt, Benjamin, Bloc, Freud, Haffner and Kraus, making them aware of the possibility of the victory of Thanatos, are comparable with what one can observe in the Middle East today. In all such cases, a destructive and self-destructive violence was the ultimate means of imposing cruelty as the only condition that societies could or can envision as their destiny.

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One should also mention the importance of International Crisis Group’s reports on Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen (www.crisisgroup.org/).
PART II

* INTIMATE AND GENDERED VIOLENCE
Violence is an essentially contested concept. Despite the fact that cooperation and communion with other sentient beings is at the heart of what it means to be human, in every period of history and in every culture, the fleshly vulnerability of other sentient beings can provoke aggression. Frequently, it includes a sexual component.

This chapter interrogates the two components necessary for any historical understanding of sexual violence: that is, what is meant by ‘sexual’ and ‘violence’? How have those concepts changed? What ideological, political and economic forces have produced ‘the sexual’ and ‘the violent’ at any period of time and for any particular group?

Both the ‘sexual’ and the ‘violent’ parts of ‘sexual violence’ are constituted through formative, discursive configurations. Practices become sexually violent through classification and regulation generated by a vast array of agents. Crucially, these agents include victims as well as perpetrators, witnesses and bystanders, and national as well as international authorities. Just as there is nothing natural or permanent about the body and its sexualisation, conceptions of aggression are also fluid. Sometimes violence is seen as requiring brute force; other times, subtle intimidation will suffice. In all instances, agency is important. The sexed body is active and resistant in processes of subjection and subjugation.¹

What Is ‘Sexual Violence’?

There have been important shifts in the weighting given to the two components of ‘sexual violence’. For many people and for much of history, emphasis has been placed on the ‘sexual’ nature of sexual violence: it was a heinous

¹ I defend and expand on this definition in Joanna Bourke, Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present (London: Virago, 2007). In the USA, it is published as Rape: Sex, Violence, History (New York: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2007).
crime because it attacked the purity, decency and honour of girls and women. By extension, it violated their families and communities as well. From the late 1960s onwards, however, many feminists (especially in the West) attempted to disrupt this weighting, stressing instead the ‘violent’ part of sexual violence. Susan Brownmiller’s *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (1975), Kate Millett’s *Sexual Politics* (1969) and Susan Griffin’s essay ‘Rape, the All-American Crime’ (1971) contested assumptions that rape has a libidinal component for perpetrators or that it dishonours or despoils victims. While wholly in agreement with the latter argument, other feminists (including Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin) contended that distinguishing male sexuality from aggression was itself flawed because violence is an integral part of masculine desire. As MacKinnon put it, ‘Rape is not less sexual for being violent. To the extent that coercion has become integral to male sexuality, rape may even be sexual to the degree that, and because, it is violent.’ As she trenchantly asked, ‘if it’s violence not sex why didn’t he just hit her?’

There have also been concerns about those problematic categories of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’? I will be referring to targets of violence as ‘victims’ despite the fact that in recent decades a certain strand of feminist thought prefers to call them ‘survivors’. I do this because many ‘victims’ did not survive, and many ‘survivors’ insist that they are ‘victims’, however much they repudiate the passivity that is often attached to that term. My use of the word ‘victim’ draws attention to the hurt of abuse; it is neither a moral judgement nor an identity. It also acknowledges that aggressive ‘perpetrators’ may also be victims. Both these terms are shorthand attempts to problematise and historicise every component of the complex interactions between sexed bodies.

In exploring these issues on a global scale the first question to ask is: who is entitled to label something as ‘sexually violent’? For centuries, male-biased legal and penal systems have taken the task of deciding whether a sexual assault or rape has taken place or not. The patois of perpetrators has echoed loudly through time, insisting upon their rights to define and delimitate what is legitimate and illegitimate aggression. The claims of abused children, women and men have been routinely questioned, if not disparaged, silenced and suppressed. Paying attention to all these voices is important if we are to

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understand not only the struggles of people in the past, but equally the
meaning of violence itself.

Admittedly, attempting to compose a global history of sexual violence
presents formidable challenges. Global analyses of any phenomenon are
necessarily reductive. When the timeframe extends over two centuries
(in this chapter, the nineteenth century to the present), there is also a risk
of emphasising similarities over differences. This must be resisted. The
abducted peasant women of Ireland or central Europe have little in common
with date-raped sophomores in America; the girls and women violated by
Red Army soldiers in 1945 cannot reliably be compared to women who
acquiesce to sexual intercourse with their husbands as the ‘easier option’. It
matters if you are a boy or man. It makes a difference if the attacker wields
a machete or waves an employment contract. Terror is always local; uni-
versalist assumptions insult the specificities of individual histories. Sexual
violence is deeply rooted in specific political, economic, social and cultural
contexts. This is why it is not inevitable.

The fluidity of definitions of sexual violence is particularly evident in legal
spheres. Depending on the time period and territorial jurisdictions, legal
characterisations of sexual violence may be based on either evidence of
extreme physical coercion or lack of explicit consent to sexual intercourse.
Both violence and consent have histories. In some countries, and during
certain periods of history, only girls and women can be raped and there has to
be proof of penile penetration of a vagina as well as evidence of emission of
semen. Elsewhere, the gender of both victims and perpetrators is irrelevant
and a wide range of acts are accepted as sexually abusive. In jurisdictions
prioritising consent, age is important. Sexual activity with ‘a minor’ (that is,
a person who has not reached a designated stage of maturity) is by definition
‘violent’. This, too, can change with startling rapidity. In England and Wales,
for instance, the age of consent was raised from 12 to 13 in 1875, then, scarcely
ten years later, to 16 years. Having sexual intercourse with girls below those
ages was outlawed. Similarly, in the USA, the age of consent in most states in
the 1880s was 10 years. In 1889, Congress revised the statutory age in the
District of Columbia to 16 years. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
difference between the ages in which a girl’s ‘yes’ was legally deemed to be
meaningful could be as young as 10 in Mississippi and Alabama and as old as
18 in Kansas and Wyoming. Throughout the globe, such variations were
linked to ideas about the onset of puberty, different expectations of child-
hood, shifting views about the innocence or culpability of infants and youth,
and the strength of feminist and other activist movements.
If the fluidity of definitions is one problem, the dearth of evidence is another. The difficulties in assessing the extent of sexual violence are legion. We don’t know how many people perpetrated acts of sexual violence; we don’t know how many were victims.

Rapists know that what they are doing is wrong. They routinely beg victims not to tell anyone. They feel embarrassed, ashamed and guilty. Many seek solace in alcohol, drugs and other numbing substances. Such reactions suggest that sexual violence is not an esteemed masculine trait, but its opposite.

Victims as well as whistle-blowers often find that they are not believed. This is usually due to denial and mistrust of the victims, but it is also because rape accusations have often been used to serve ulterior political functions. The propaganda value of rape accusations is extremely high in times of war. During the First World War, for example, the Allies deliberately spread rumours about the ‘rapes committed by the Hun’ in an attempt to persuade the US government to commit troops to the war effort. This also happened during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia where every side made use of rape propaganda: the Serbian press vilified Croat and Muslim men as orientalised rapists while the Croatian and Bosnian media did the same to the Serbs. In the words of gender scholar Dubravka Zarkov, ‘raped women became flags waved by the warring parties’.


Silence and Speaking

Throughout the world in the past two centuries, victims and witnesses have been reluctant to come forward. Victims know that reporting sexual assault will be an ordeal. They fear publicity and the likelihood of retaliation. They dread having to undergo humiliating police questioning and uncomfortable genital examinations. In some contexts, they faced hostile jurors or, even worse, judges who guffawed during their testimony. Many were promised anonymity, only to discover that their names were publicised. Certain types of victims were routinely discriminated against. Thus, prostitutes, peddlers, domestic workers and immigrant groups are generally correct when they believe that their complaints will be ignored. Victims fall silent, ashamed of their own violation.
Protesting against sexual violence is also difficult for members of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. Male victims sometimes become aroused, further complicating issues of compliance. Ejaculation is used as evidence of pleasure, even when levels of brutality have been extreme. Male victims often fear that being attacked in a sexual way is emasculating. Victims with a heterosexual orientation worry that they might be labelled homosexual or lesbian: perhaps they ‘unconsciously wanted it’. In other words, homophobia is a powerful disincentive to reporting both male-on-male and female-on-female abuse. Reporting sexual assault – ‘washing our dirty linen in public’ – also provokes alarm within LGBT communities, anxious that they will be further stigmatised. It is not an unrealistic fear: as late as 1973, the American Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as a disorder, as did the World Health Organization until 1992. Today, more than seventy countries criminalise sexual activity by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex people.

In fact, silence might be the preferred option for those victims keen not to humiliate their own communities. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Jewish women who had been sexually abused by fellow prisoners (such as Kapos or Funktionshäftling) in labour and extermination camps were often speechless. Admitting to having been raped in the camps was akin to testifying to gendered suffering. Their abuse was not a shared experience that could be employed to reconstitute communities, but a sexed violation in which Prisoners were not pitted against Nazis but Women against Men. The failure of one’s community of men to protect ‘their’ women was humiliating for all concerned.

In times of armed conflict, the relative silence of rape victims might also be due to the fact that it was simply one of many vicious assaults on their bodies and minds – and perhaps not the worst. A stark example of this can be seen in Rwanda. Between the second week of April and the third week of May 1994, mass rape was routine, but it occurred in a context where between 5 and 10 per cent of the country’s population was slaughtered. Survival took place against great odds.

Victims routinely struggle to find words for their suffering. In many cultures (such as Mexico in the nineteenth century), they faced assumptions that only shameless women would talk publicly about sexual matters. Frequently, the language of sexual violence was itself deeply problematic. In Kinyarwanda, for example, the word used to refer to sexual violence was kubohoza, meaning ‘to help liberate’. The term had initially referred to the act of coercing Rwandans to change political parties, but was applied during the
1994 genocide to the rape of girls and women. In Rwandan courts, the Kinyarwanda phrase ‘gufata ku ngufu’, meaning ‘to take by force, to rape’, was obscure to most witnesses, who consequently preferred using indirect languages and metaphors, including ‘we got married’.

In wartime, in particular, accounts of rape projected powerful messages about national identity and ideology. As a result, censorship was rife. In the Soviet Union, East Germany and Hungary following the Second World War, it was only after the collapse of communism that many people felt able to talk about what they had done or experienced. Tight controls over the press and mass media had ensured that their stories had to be buried. In many communist states, governments had promoted an idealised version of history in which the Red Army liberated (rather than victimised) populations. When rape was discussed – as in Hungary – it was often as a political attack on communism. For many Hungarian Jews and others, the image of a rapacious Red Army was dismissed as a myth propagated by conservative, nationalist commentators who sought to ‘marginalize the importance of Fascism and the Holocaust for Hungary’.

Throughout the globe, justice systems were found to be incompetent, corrupt or even sympathetic to perpetrators. The perpetrators might be the government or other state agents.

A further problem lies in proving ‘lack of consent’. It is generally assumed that the victim has to prove that she did not consent, rather than the accused proving that she did. Whether it is the Nguyên Penal Code in Vietnam, which required corroboration by witnesses and physical injury, or the famous instruction given to jurors in Britain and the USA that ‘a charge of rape is easily to be made and hard to be proved and even harder to be defended’, accusers generally have to provide irrefutable physical evidence of having vigorously resisted in order to be believed.

Finally, if the court case is not proven beyond doubt, rape accusations can rebound dramatically on the woman herself. Unsuccessful complainants in Darfur can be charged with zena or adultery, which is punishable with imprisonment or a public whipping. The Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan include rape under zina (adultery/fornication) offences. If a prosecution for zina-bil-jabr (rape) fails, the accuser can be treated as having confessed to

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6 Jonneke Koomen, ‘“Without These Women, the Tribunal Cannot Do Anything”’, Signs 38.2 (2013), 265–6.
adultery, and punished by public lashings or even stoning to death. Is it any wonder that many victims preferred to 'bury their dishonour', as rape victims during the war in the former Yugoslavia put it, rather than seek redress?\(^9\)

**Politics of Wounding**

Despite the formidable challenges in quantifying the extent of sexual violence, there is no doubt that it has blighted the lives of billions of women in the past and today. In some jurisdictions such as South Africa (where 'jackrolling' or gang rape is considered a game), the extent of rape has been called an 'unacknowledged civil war'.\(^1\) It has been a political stratagem (for instance, against followers of Aristide in Haiti or supporters of Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party in Pakistan), a weapon wielded by one ethnic group against another (the Chinese in Indonesia, the Ogoni in Nigeria and the Tutsis in Rwanda), a way of collecting information during interrogation (its function for Peru’s counterinsurgency forces) and a way of wreaking religious vengeance (against Muslims and Croats in the former Yugoslavia, as well as against Muslims in India and Myanmar). Sexual violence has been routinely used to humiliate individual women as well as their families and communities.

The personal harm of rape is undeniable. It is important to note that the destructive effect of sexual violence actually *precedes* any attack. The *fear of* rape constrains women’s movements and may encourage parents to marry their daughters at very young ages in the (mistaken) belief that husbands will provide some kind of protection. In other circumstances, victims of sexual violence are *not even present* at the moment of violation. Children born of rape can be stamped with a formidable stigma, often for life.

For the immediate victims – the sexually violated girls, women, boys and men – sexual violence was a scourge that caused suffering for years or decades after the attack. The physical and psychological harms were

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atrocious. Survivors of wartime sexual abuse routinely found themselves discarded by their own communities, as with the 160,000 women forced to become *ianfu* (‘comfort woman’) from 1937.

**Violence and ‘Consent’**

All of these difficulties in ‘hearing the voices’ of victims of sexual violence are entangled in definitions of what is ‘sexual’ and what constitutes ‘violence’. The ‘sexual’ components of ‘sexual violence’ were often disparaged; the ‘violent’ components diminished. In order to understand such confusions of tongues, we need to interrogate centuries of cognitive distortions about gender, sexuality and violence.

Women have often been viewed as culpable for attacks made upon them. Even the mass rapes carried out by the Red Army as they made their way through eastern Europe near the end of the Second World War were presented in this way. In Budapest, around 50,000 women were raped; during the Red Army’s march into Germany, an estimated 1.9 million women were sexually violated. In Berlin, approximately one in every three women was raped and over 10,000 died as a result of sexual assault. Thousands committed suicide.

Boris Slutsky was a poet who served as a *politruk* of a Red Army infantry platoon between 1941 and 1945. In his memoir, he dismissed any suggestion of suffering, claiming that

> In Europe the women surrendered themselves and were unfaithful sooner than anyone else... The Hungarian women loved the Russians in their turn, and... along with the dark fear that parted the knees of matrons and mothers of families, there was also the affectionate nature of young women and the desperate tenderness of the women soldiers, who gave themselves to the men who had killed their husbands.

Aggressors routinely stated that their victims were seductive, and therefore at fault for the cruelty inflicted upon them.

Another version of this myth claims that husbands, boyfriends and close acquaintances might get ‘carried away’, but women wanted ‘it’ anyway. In early and mid-twentieth-century texts, American and European psychiatrists

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routinely christened rape a ‘victim-precipitated’ crime. In the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Behavior* in 1940, for instance, criminal psychologist Hans von Hentig concluded that ‘if there are criminals, it is evident that there are [also] born victims, self-harming and self-destroying.’ In an attempt to normalise abuse, sexually violent men might even carry out a ‘parody of domestic interaction’ in its aftermath, as did German rapists in France during the First World War. In the conflict in Guatemala, soldiers carrying out mass rapes would often insist that their victims cook them a meal and dance to marimba music. Civilian rapists politely thanked their victims, offered to escort them home, and requested a cup of tea.

The notion that ‘honour is greater than death’ has been disastrous for victims of sexual assault. In many jurisdictions (including Puerto Rico), there is some evidence that, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been increased emphasis placed on the need for victims to provide evidence proving vigorous resistance to the attack, rather than sexual coercion by itself. In nineteenth-century European and American jurisprudence textbooks, women were expected to fight off attackers – even to the point of being severely wounded or killed. The claim that it is ‘impossible to sheath a sword into a vibrating scabbard’ (a phrase used in nineteenth-century jurisprudential textbooks in the UK and USA) is used to suggest that ‘true’ resistance is always effective. The penis is coded as a weapon; the vagina is its passive receptacle, which merely by ‘vibrating’ could ward off attack. There is another way of saying this: any women who failed to fight off an attack on her virtue could be assumed to have acquiesced or even consented. Concessions were made when the victim was a delicate, middle- or upper-class woman. Sturdy, working-class women and ‘primitive’ women had no excuses: they were effectively unrapable.

The damage done by arguments that rape could not occur if a woman resisted or if she subsequently became pregnant are augmented by more general problems with arguments based on ‘consent’. In certain contexts, ‘consent’ is seen as redundant. Extreme examples include slave–master encounters. What was the meaning of ‘consent’ for slaves? As a female

slave explained, ‘we do anything to get our poor flesh some rest from de whip’.\textsuperscript{18}

War and times of atrocity also undercut the salience of ‘consent’. Indeed, ‘volunteering’ for sex work could be a survival strategy. In the words of a woman speaking of her experiences during the Holocaust,

Well, I refused to be consumed and vanish like a cloud. I wanted to return to my house. I’m eighteen years old – I don’t want to die . . . Everyone in the lager goes around picking up leftovers from the garbage. They suck bones other people spit out – and I’m supposed to refuse life because it’s offered on a dirty plate?\textsuperscript{19}

In other words, when food, shelter and life itself depend upon sexual relations, the liberal emphasis on free and informed consent in deciding issues of rape is a charade.

\textbf{Gender}

If the first cognitive distortion about sexual violence focuses on notions of consent, the second one concerns the gendered identities of victims and perpetrators. In the USA, four out of five victims of sexual abuse by Catholic clergy were male.\textsuperscript{20} Estimates of the percentage of prisoners who are raped in US prisons vary from between \(1\) and \(20\) per cent.\textsuperscript{21}

Although I have used the male pronoun to refer to sexual predators, the claim that the rapist is inescapably male is actually unsupportable. Women, too, can be guilty of sexual violence, especially during armed conflicts. Female violence was particularly vicious during the conflicts in Rwanda, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the DRC, \(41\) per cent of female rape victims and \(10\) per cent of male victims claimed to have been assaulted by a woman.\textsuperscript{22} In Rwanda, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko (ironically, the...

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\textsuperscript{18} Cited in Peter W. Bardaglio, ‘Rape and the Law in the Old South: “Calculated to Excite Indignation in Every Heart”’, \textit{Journal of Southern History} 60.4 (1994), 749–72, at 758.
\end{flushleft}
national minister of family and women’s affairs) ordered militia to round up people in her hometown for slaughter, encouraging them to rape the women first. In most instances, female perpetrators abused their victims in conjunction with, rather than independently from, their male comrades.

We should not be surprised by the presence of sexually violent women in armed conflicts. Nationalist and ethnic ideologies exerted a formidable power over these women, trumping female solidarity. Many female perpetrators had been subject to extreme violence, even rape, themselves. In insurgent forces, sexual violence has been used as a mechanism for forging effective fighting units. Some female soldiers also hoped that their cooperation in abusing other women would mean that their male comrades would spare them similar insults.

Minimisation of Harm

The concept of ‘violence’ is further complicated by the fact that certain kinds of aggressive behaviours are not thought to be serious. Certain groups of women, for instance, have not been regarded as fully human – they are said to be less sensitive to pain or are ‘naturally promiscuous’ anyway – making it easy to minimise the injury done to them. In the USA, accusations made by African American women have frequently been discounted for this reason. Forensic commentators repeatedly discuss rape as simply another ‘sexual perversion’ rather than a violent crime. For example, in *Lezioni de medicina legale*, criminologist Cesare Lombroso included rape in his discussion of sterility, impotence and hermaphroditic conditions.

Such cognitive distortions have major repercussions, especially in terms of legal retribution. As a general rule, the greater the social distance between aggressors and victims, the lesser the penalty. In the USA, for example, a white man found guilty of rape of a white woman might be imprisoned; a black man in the same circumstances, executed. Immediate justice for African American abusers spared ‘delicate’ white women the agony of testifying in public.

In other instances, some kinds of forced sex are not ‘wrong’ at all. The most egregious example is rape within marriage. The marital rape exemption was only abolished in Scotland in 1989 and in the rest of the UK in 1992. In Europe and the USA, the ‘marital rape exemption’ is attributable to a 1736 ruling by the jurist Sir Matthew Hale. In his words, ‘The husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract." Some proponents of the marital rape exemption alluded to the property implications of dowries: where men pay large dowries to the families of their brides, there was the assumption that they had ‘bought’ their wives and therefore had a right to complete authority. Others (such as members of the Partido Acción Nacional in Mexico) contended that marital rape was an oxymoron. In Ghana (where there is still no provision for wives to prosecute their husbands for rape), politicians argued that the proposed law would infringe the ‘sanctity of marriage’ and would be ‘anti-Ghanaian’.

‘Perpetrators as Victims’

A related problem is the dichotomy between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, when some people are both. There is clear evidence that many men and women who act in extremely aggressive ways have experienced sexual violation themselves. Child soldiers are a good example.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that ‘cycle of abuse’ arguments have limited explanatory power. They don’t help us understand why so many children who grow up in loving homes end up as aggressors, nor why so many people who were abused as children respond by joining the caring professions. Since girls are much more likely to be sexually victimised than boys, the argument also does not explain why sex offenders are predominantly male.

‘Perpetrators as victims’ appear most frequently in the brutalising context of combat. An example of this process can be seen in analyses of the mass rapes carried out by Red Army soldiers as they moved through Germany at the end of the Second World War. In the 1990s, these rapes were co-opted by revisionist historians who were attempting to reposition the German people as victims of that war, as opposed to its major instigator.

This is not the only function performed by the rhetoric of ‘perpetrators are victims’: it helped alleviate the guilty consciences of individual aggressors. For example, Japanese soldier Kondô Hajime insisted on his victim status when he came forward to testify alongside women who had been forced into sexual slavery for the Japanese Imperial Army after 1937. His motivations were partly compassionate, but they were also an attempt to explain that the soldiers only acted as they did because of extreme cruelty practised against them. Ruthless military training, a starvation diet and heartless senior officers

who sent them into combat unprepared were the real villains. Hajime reminded his listeners that ‘our hearts have [also] been tormented ... The victims have gone through a lot, but perpetrators have also suffered tremendously.’

It was a refrain often heard during the Winter Soldiers’ Investigation in early 1971 when 109 American veterans testified about war crimes that they had committed during the conflict in Vietnam. These GIs provided a formidable list of the reasons why they acted in atrocious ways, including racism, peer pressure, fear of being punished by their comrades or senior officers, environmental confusion, retaliation and revenge, lack of training, failures in military leadership and so on. The problems with these excuses for rape were, first, they cannot explain the high levels of violence directed at their own side (after all, 30 per cent of American women who served in Vietnam were raped by their own comrades, as have between 30 and 40 per cent of women in the US military today) and, second, the list of ‘stressors’ is so long that sexual atrocities quickly became over-determined. The veterans at the Winter Soldiers’ Investigation repeatedly made claims such as ‘I think it’s an atrocity on the part of the United States Army’ and ‘don’t ever let your government do this to you’. The true victims (the raped, tortured and killed) were effectively effaced; the ‘real victims’ were the grunts – victims of US government policy.

War

Implicit in my chapter so far is the symbiotic relationship between sexual violence during armed conflicts and in more peaceable times. It is important not to position ‘war’ as existing outside of broader societal practices, ideologies and power struggles.

However, it is equally crucial not to conflate the two contexts. Mass rape in wartime requires significant planning: combatants have to be trained; propaganda disseminated; military hardware marshalled; racial and other intercommunal prejudices drummed up. Armed conflict not only radically lowers the threshold at which interpersonal violence can take place, but also dramatically alters the nature of that violence. Compared to peacetime, wartime rape becomes an intensely public display of brutality; it could even be valorised as a patriotic act and one that facilitated emotional bonding

between perpetrators. The international research group SVAC (Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts) has been instrumental in analysing these particularly egregious components of wartime rape.\textsuperscript{25}

The ‘violent’ component of ‘sexual violence’ is especially problematic when entire armies set about attempting to destroy each other. In armed conflicts, rules against violent behaviour can become extraordinarily relaxed. During the First World War, the most thoroughly documented instances of mass rape took place in Belgium and Russia. From the late 1930s, rape and enforced prostitution were a feature of the Japanese invasion of China. In Nanjing, for example, over 20,000 women were raped in 1937 alone. Indeed, every invading army during the Second World War proved to be rapacious. Sociologist J. Robert Lilly calculated that between 14,000 and 17,000 women were raped by American military personnel between 1942 and 1945.\textsuperscript{26} Notorious mass rapes took place in Germany, Russia, Korea, China, Japan, Italy and the Philippines.

Despite horrific levels of sexual violence during the Second World War, international law was sluggish in responding. The war crimes trials in Nuremberg ignored rape and other gender-based crimes. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape, but as ‘inhumane treatment’ and ‘failure to respect family honour and rights’, rather than as a major war crime.

The catalogue of sexual violence in armed conflicts goes on and on. In 1947, the partition of Punjab between India and Pakistan led to mass rapes. During nine months in 1971–2, Pakistani soldiers raped around 200,000 Bengali women, 80 per cent of whom were Muslim. Some scholars believe that twice that number of women were sexually assaulted. In the 1990s, there was widespread rape as well as torture and killings in Timor, Sierra Leone and Guatemala. After the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it was concluded that between half and 90 per cent of surviving Tutsi girls and women had been sexually attacked. An unknown number of Hutu girls and women had also been sexually assaulted, generally because they associated with Tutsi women or were in the ‘wrong place at the wrong time’.

In the twenty-first century, mass rape in Darfur was an attempt to drive populations out of valuable land and into the desert. As a genocidal strategy, it has been relatively effective. Another place where sexual violence was driven by economic incentives, internal political ambition, the weakness of

\textsuperscript{25} See their website: www.warandgender.net/.
\textsuperscript{26} J. Robert Lilly, \textit{Taken By Force} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
state authorities and ethnic rivalries is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That conflict has been called ‘Africa’s world war’, since it is the deadliest war in the world since 1945. A thousand girls and women are raped every day; today, there are over 200,000 surviving rape victims in the DRC. One third of victims are children under the age of 18. Other conflicts that have seen sexual violence reach such extreme levels that it amounts to femicide include Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zaire and Zimbabwe.

Even more than in peacetime, wartime rape communicates a powerful message between men: it has a symbolic value as an insult to the masculinity of the enemy. In the words of anthropologist Veena Das, ‘The woman’s body ... became a sign through which men communicated with each other.’ It was an indictment of these women’s male associates: that they had patently failed to fulfil the unwritten ‘gender contract’, under which men fight to protect women, who, in turn, provide them with nurture. Because women have been positioned as ‘biological reproducers of the collectivity’ and ‘transmitters of its culture’, their rape was a potent declaration of dominance.

The trigger-point for international attention being paid to wartime sexual violence was the 1991–9 conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in the heart of Europe. Mass rapes took place on all sides, but systematic and widespread violations were perpetrated by Serbian forces against Muslim women, Catholics and Croats. According to some estimates, nearly 20,000 women were raped. Women and girls were routinely violated in their homes; they were incarcerated in detention camps established explicitly for the purpose of rape; they were forced into prostitution; and at rape camps like the one at Foca they were deliberately impregnated, then forced to bring the foetus to term and give birth.

Feminists found themselves disagreeing vehemently on how to respond. The debate became: was national or female solidarity to be prioritised? On the nationalist side was American activist Catharine MacKinnon. She argued that the rapes were genocidal. In her words, Serbian-perpetrated sexual violence ‘are to everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday anti-Semitism. Without everyday anti-Semitism a Holocaust is impossible,

but anyone who has lived through a pogrom knows the difference.\textsuperscript{29} In contrast, the feminist group ‘Women in Black’ warned against ‘the politics of instrumentalization of victims’. They refused to become tangled up in arguments about ‘who is the real victim, or who has the greatest right to call themselves victims’. They pointed out that ‘A victim is a victim, and to her the number of other victims does not decrease her own suffering and pain.’\textsuperscript{30} Still other feminists worried that there was a risk of casting \textit{all} women as victims, thus excusing them from their role in the carnage.

The high levels of sexual violence during the break-up of Yugoslavia have been designated ‘rape as a weapon of war’ (also called ‘rape warfare’ and ‘strategic rape’) taken to extremes. Should the violence be considered as ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Serban forces? There is general agreement that the mass rapes were part of an attempt to clear territory of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, with the intention of destroying their cultures. In the words of Kelly Dawn Askin, legal consultant and adviser to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the methods of achieving ethnic cleansing were not limited to physical elimination. For instance, a person may be sexually assaulted in order to be humiliated or emotionally destroyed or to be proven submissive or subordinate; a person may be raped in order to cause chaos or terror and/or to make people flee the area, effectively destroying the group; a woman may be raped in order to forcibly impregnate her with a different ethnic gene. Different tactics but with the same objective – destroying or removing the unwanted group.\textsuperscript{31}

But was ‘ethnic cleansing’ a form of genocide? Should widespread, systematic rapes conducted by Serban forces be regarded as genocidal or were they a dramatic extension of ‘everyday rape’? Was there a risk of ignoring the rapes carried out by non-Serbs? Notably, the first time that the ICTY judged rape to constitute a grave breach of international humanitarian law (rather than a breach of the Geneva Convention) concerned a Croat defendant (Furundzija) while the second prosecution involved a Bosnian Muslim

defendant who raped Serbian women at Čelebići (Foča). Did some victims’ suffering count for more than others?

An important plank in the argument that the Serbian rape campaigns were genocidal lay in the deliberate impregnation of women who were then forced to give birth to what the rapists claimed would be ‘little Chetniks’. In other words, they assumed that infants born of rape would be Serbian. This is deeply problematical, and not solely for the obvious physiological reasons. This version of the genocidal argument accepts the ideology of the rapist that ethnicity is biological and paternal: that is, infants born of rape belong to the father. As legal expert Karen Engle put it, the belief that ‘if a Muslim egg were inseminated with a Serbian sperm, a Serbian child would ensure’ too often went unchallenged.32 This socially constructed notion of biology, favouring the male, was particularly stark in the context of Bosnia, where there is little to differentiate Bosnian Muslims and Serbs genetically and where, prior to the war, around one-third of marriages in the region were inter-group.

In the international furore over the genocidal violence in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, important legal precedents were established. In 2001, both the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognised rape as a crime against humanity, as opposed to a violation of men’s property rights or an inhumane act. In the words of philosopher Debra Bergoffen, by

identifying rape, like torture, as a crime against humanity, the ruling affirms the principle of embodied subjectivity. It goes beyond past rulings on torture, however, in attending to the sexual realities of embodiment and in insisting that violating a woman’s sexual integrity is a crime against humanity.33

International scholars were jubilant; sexually violent perpetrators barely noticed.

It is important to reiterate, however, that ‘rape as a weapon of war’ should not be allowed to dominate the history of sexual violence. As Miranda Alison reminds us, such a focus ‘misses so much’. It ‘means that sexual violence that occurs during conflicts but does not stem from a directed military strategy is either obscured from view or is, troublingly, assumed to be part of a military strategy instead of the deeper structures of

power in any given society’. We should be just as wary of a ‘politics of exception’ (wartime rape is worse than endemic abuse) as the ‘politics of accountancy’ (only once this threshold of victims is reached can it be labelled an atrocity).

Eradicating Sexual Violence

Throughout the last two centuries, victims, feminists, politicians, lawmakers, police and community activists – and none of these categories are mutually exclusive, of course – have debated how sexual violence can be diminished, if not eradicated. It is impossible to do justice in a couple of pages to the range of resistances all over the globe.

Briefly, however, from the nineteenth century to the present, many attempts to reduce sexual violence have been unconstructive. Demands that the law enforcement agencies must ‘simply lock ‘em up and throw away the key’ do not work. Victim blaming – an attitude that is embedded in suggestions that women police their own behaviour, upgrade their security and comport themselves modestly – is common. Too many anti-rape initiatives warn women to avoid ‘dark alleys’ and ‘short skirts’. Advising girls and women to ‘stay at home’ is equally unhelpful: household survival often depends upon female labour in the fields, forests and marketplaces, so insisting on purdah is impossible. And domestic spheres are crowded with abusers anyway.

Other proposals make emotional sense, but have minimal effect outside the immediate context. This includes attempts by individual women to seek out ways to humiliate their attackers publicly. In nineteenth-century England, for instance, known sexual abusers might be paraded around the village to local jeers; the windows of their homes broken; their credit rejected in the market square. In the contemporary period, vigilantism against sexually violent men has also flourished, most notably in India where the Pink Sari Gang (or the Gulabi Gang) are the world’s largest female vigilante group, boasting over 20,000 members. Local justice may be gratifyingly retributive, but will never change a culture of sexualised violence.

Still other solutions are palliative. Prison reform – including greater surveillance of institutional blind spots (such as shower rooms and dorm facilities) – might have some effect, but at the cost of greater intrusiveness.

34 Miranda Alison, personal communication, 2014.
into the lives of everyone, and not just sexually aggressive people. More practically, other rape reformers (particularly in the USA) provide prisoners with information on how to litigate against prison officials who fail to prevent sexual abuse. In non-prison contexts, voluntary and philanthropist organisations also help victims navigate the legal system.

Most solutions to sexual violence focus on specific elements of the problem. Lawyers believe in better laws; international relations experts place their faith in inter-state agreements. Feminists debate whether the solution is less pornography or better pornography. Do we need a return to family values or a celebration of (sensual-oriented) sexual liberation? Should men march in the streets with placards sporting the problematic slogan ‘Hands Off Our Women’ or should women do it for themselves, as did Haitian women when they established Solidarité Fanm Ayisyèn/SOFA (Haitian Women’s Solidarity Group) and Kay Fanm (Women’s House)? In the late twentieth century, support for rape crisis centres grew, although they have been chronically under-funded.

Tackling wartime sexual violence will probably require broader strategies. One of the most debilitating myths for those of us seeking to forge more peaceful worlds is the assertion that sexual violence is inevitable. However, rape is not ‘about’ male biology or an evolutionary inheritance; it varies greatly over geographical space and historical time, as I argue in Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present (2007). Even in armed conflicts, there are wide variations in the nature and degree of sexual violence – with some conflicts experiencing very little. Although rape is high during what international scholar Mary Kaldor has called ‘new wars’ – that is, those that are counterinsurgent or guerrilla in nature and where the lines between armed forces and organised crime are blurred – it is low in armed groups that possess a strong degree of internal discipline and ideological values. Cultures with sexual equality, high levels of female economic power and low levels of armed conflict tend to have relatively low levels of rape. Sexual abusers learn how to act as sexual abusers within specific historical communities.

Conclusion

Rape is an ‘essentially contested category’,38 infused through and through with political meaning and norms about gender performances. This is why any diminution of sexual violence will require the political, ideological and discursive labour of every global citizen. Sexual violence and the fear of violation are embedded in women’s lives. This is not because of any innate tendency in men; it is not only because of socialisation. Rape thrives in situations of structural inequality. In the modern period, compulsory heterosexuality, marriage vows and the gendered division of labour have been particularly effective ways of controlling women. Obviously, there is an urgent need to reform the legal system so that more rapists are identified, convicted and punished for their crimes but, in the final analysis, political attempts to reduce and finally eliminate sexual aggression must start with the main perpetrators. Rape is a crisis of manliness; its eradication is a matter for men – for a radically different conception of agency and masculinity.

Bibliographical Essay

When Susan Brownmiller published Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Harmondsworth: Penguin) in 1977, there were very few historical analyses of sexual violence. Today, there is a sophisticated historical literature on rape and other forms of sexualised violence. It is impossible in a short bibliographical essay to convey the depth and breadth of this literature. Many of the best works are published in journals rather than as monographs. For a historical analysis of perpetrators of sexual violence in Britain and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Joanna Bourke’s Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present (London: Virago, 2007). In the USA, it is published as Rape: Sex, Violence, History (New York: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2007). In the context of France, the best overview is Georges Vigarello’s A History of Rape: Sexual Violence in France from the 16th to the 20th Century, trans. Jean Birrell (Malden, PA: Polity Press, 2001). The literature on rape in wartime is particularly rich. The best way to access this is through the website of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts (SVAC: www.warandgender.net/), which has a comprehensive bibliography of the literature as well as extremely robust critiques of it. For insightful series of edited essays, see Raphaëlle Branche and Fabrice Virgili’s Rape in Wartime (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Dagmar Herzog’s Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For supreme examples of the way wartime rape is memorialised during and after conflicts, see James Mark’s ‘Remembering Rape: Divided Social Memory and the Red Army in Hungary, 1944–1945’, Past & Present 188 (August 2005), 133–61, and Gina Marie Weaver’s Ideologies of Forgetting: Rape in the Vietnam War (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010). There is a vast historical, philosophical, legal and political literature focusing on the

UNICEF has called child sexual assault ‘a fundamental violation of children’s rights’,¹ while the World Health Organization (WHO) has named it a ‘serious infringement on a child’s right to health and protection’.² Yet child sexual assault has been a common experience of many children, now and in the past. This chapter will explore child sexual abuse (CSA) across the modern age, while acknowledging at the outset that attitudes towards sexual assaults on children vary significantly across time and place. An act that might be a heinous crime in one time period or one region may be legally and socially acceptable in another.

Knowledge about sexual violence in the past is limited by inadequate access to primary-source information. When the data are available, they come from policing documents, court records, medical sources, government statistics and studies, autobiographical stories and oral histories. There are inconsistent and patchy records on child sexual assault in the nineteenth century (and before) in some jurisdictions in Europe, the United States and Australia. But there has been almost no historical research on CSA in many regions of the world, due to the difficulty or impossibility of accessing sources; social and political tensions around child sex; and the prioritising of other urgent problems including war, poverty, displacement and disease. In many cases, data have been destroyed, lost or never adequately collected or archived. It is therefore impossible to offer a comprehensive and detailed analysis of rates of child sexual assault in the global past. We can, however, examine changing attitudes towards CSA, including moments of change in awareness around sexual assaults on minors; altering definitions of criminality; the prosecution of

offences; and differences in media debates over sexual violence against children. Even so, some periods and regions remain better covered than others.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, there has been an escalation in studies of CSA, including a new focus on qualitative and quantitative data; the development of treatment regimens for victims and perpetrators; and a growing public awareness, fed by media attention. Yet, as this chapter shows, child sexual assault was not ‘discovered’ in the 1970s. It changed shape, and interest was perhaps professionalised, but the two centuries before had also shown knowledge of, and fear around, sexual violence against children in many nations, evidenced by legislation, policing, prosecution and media reports. Children have long been seen as vulnerable to sexual abuse in numerous forms, assaults which were, in theory, viewed as both criminal offences and morally corrupt. Yet, almost paradoxically, state and community practices failed to and continue to fail to protect children, as recent large-scale studies have proven. The problem of violence against children is an enduring one that crosses the globe.

Defining Sexual Violence against Children

One primary challenge to thinking about sexual violence across time and place is that there was and is no simple or unchanging definition of what we mean by child sexual abuse. A widely used contemporary definition of CSA comes from WHO:

Child sexual abuse is the involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or she does not fully comprehend, is unable to give informed consent to, or for which the child is not developmentally prepared and cannot give consent, or that violate the laws or social taboos of society.

This may include sexual activity, or the exploitation of a child through prostitution or pornography.

Thinking historically, there is an immediate problem with this definition, for the meaning of the term ‘child’ is historically contingent. How do we derive the social and legal parameters of childhood? Over the past 200 years, the majority of nations have sought to establish the boundaries of childhood through ‘age of consent’ legislation. Age of consent laws outline when a child might be considered legally fit to have sexual relations, regardless of the issue of consent. The age of consent was generally conceptualised around girls, though many jurisdictions introduced age of consent laws for male

homosexual activity. In some states, the age of consent was set at a higher age 
for boys or for the act of sodomy, with the implicit suggestion that homo-
sexual sex was especially troubling.  

Currently the age of consent varies across jurisdictions, with the majority 
settling on an age of consent of 16 or 18, though there are some as high as 21, 
and others in the early teens. A small number of jurisdictions have no age of 
consent, but control child sexual assault through other legal mechanisms 
such as gross indecency and rape legislation. In addition to age of consent 
laws, some nations have legislated specific child sexual assault charges, 
including laws around abuse perpetrated by fathers, teachers and other 
authority figures. In these instances, the age of consent might be higher, 
and the penalties stronger. Clearly, there was and remains much variation in 
the ways offences against children were legislated for. 

Criminal law was not, however, the only way that CSA was governed in 
a society. The age of consent might exist, but not be applied. Or, the age of 
consent might be over-ridden by marriage: in some jurisdictions, if the age of 
consent was 18, but a girl was married at 15, intercourse would be legal with 
her husband. Further, in some countries or regions, the age of consent was 
not a meaningful social or legal construct. Under sharia law, for instance, all 
sexual activity within marriage is legal, and all sexual activity outside of 
marriage illegal. Age of marriage could be, but was not always, legislated 
for. Thus, the idea of a single age of consent is not universal, but is culturally 
specific. What might be common or normalised in one culture would be 
unusual, troubling or even criminal in another. 

Other difficulties with assessing CSA over time and place are common to 
all studies of sexual violence. Sexual assaults on children are generally private 
crimes, and criminologists and historians of sexual violence know that under-
reporting of all forms of sexual assault is common. Few cases are reported to 
police, and even fewer enter the criminal justice system. Thus researchers 
capture only a small proportion of sexual assault cases, and this is complicated 
even further in historical cases, where record keeping was inadequate. For 
cases that have been reported, there are substantial problems with gaining 
access to records involving children, with the state maintaining a range of 
protective measures around CSA cases. While in some areas we can access 
broad information – arrests, prosecutions, charges – researchers cannot 
necessarily access the specificities of either the assault or the trial. 

4 See Matthew Waites, The Age of Consent: Young People, Sexuality and Citizenship (London: 
Children and Sexuality in the Victorian Period

In Britain and other Western nations, the Victorian period saw an escalating interest in the sexual abuse of girls, and consequently some of our most comprehensive historical records are from that period. In part, this was due to the emergence of specific cultural views of childhood, which imagined girls as innocent, pure and requiring protection. The nineteenth century saw a raft of protective measures aiming to impose safeguards for children in the home, the workplace, the school and the street. These targeted the children of the poor, and aimed to instil middle-class values among the working classes. A key aspect was the imposition of sexual morality: it was clear to contemporaries that young girls were suffering various forms of sexual violence. Youthful prostitutes were a visible problem on the city streets. Girls with venereal disease were presenting to public hospitals. As social workers, child welfare experts, parliamentary committees, journalists and writers began to investigate, it was claimed that incest, early pregnancy and other forms of vice and immorality were common in working-class homes and suburbs.

The ‘discovery’ of the vulnerable child – and the need to impose moral order – led to a flurry of public discussions about age and sexuality. This stimulated debate over the age of consent, and it is worth considering the British situation at length, as it informs all debates that follow. Britain was unusual amongst European nations in its early establishment of laws around child sexual behaviour: the age of consent for girls had been set at 12 in the thirteenth century. It had largely remained 12 until 1875 when the Offences against the Person Act raised the age of consent to 13, and also increased the maximum sentence for an offender having sex with an underage girl to life imprisonment. There was, however, no social consensus over the age of consent and the ending of childhood: many reformers suggested girls should be protected until the age of 21. There was no corresponding ‘age of consent’ for boys, and indeed boys as victims were largely absent from these debates.

In the 1880s, there was a great deal of formal and informal opposition to raising the age of consent for girls. Elite men in the House of Commons

6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 Waites, Age of Consent, p. 63. The age of consent was raised to 13 in England, Ireland and Wales, but remained 12 in Scotland.
claimed that raising the age of consent might take young prostitutes off the streets, but immorality would only be driven underground. Given the perceived needs of young men for a sexual outlet, the working-class girl was to be made available, to keep the middle- and upper-class homes virtuous. In the face of a parliament reluctant to raise the age of consent, the journalist W. T. Stead published a sensational series of articles. The ‘Maiden Tribute’ articles exposed an underworld of child prostitution, forced sex and the ‘white slave trade’. In the most scandalous of the articles, Stead wrote of his purchase of a girl’s virginity for five pounds, and whether true or not, it stimulated a vast, unprecedented outcry over sexual danger and the ruin of young girls working in London’s brothels.9

‘The Maiden Tribute’ pressed the Conservative government into action, and the Bill to raise the age of consent was reintroduced into parliament. Many of the old oppositions still stood – for members of the House of Lords, it was their sons, not young girls, who needed protection.10 Under significant public pressure, however, the Bill was passed, raising the age of consent to 16 (though carnal knowledge with a girl aged under 13 was a felony, while sex with a girl aged 13 to 16 was a misdemeanour).11 It is questionable whether the law had a significant impact on child sexual assault, and some men effectively used the defence that they believed the child was older than 16, even in cases where it was clear she was quite young.12

Similar debates took place in other Western nations.13 Most American states had an age of consent for girls of 10 years old. By 1895, twenty-two states had increased the age to 16 or 18 years. Many southern states did not raise the age of consent, however, and at the turn of the century five states still set the age of consent at 10 years. Infamously, Delaware had an age of consent of 7 years.14 Debates in the USA were similar to those we have

11 Jackson, Child Sexual Abuse, p. 13.
13 In Australia see Andy Kaladelfos, “Call All Male Offenders by their Right Name”: Masculinity and the Age of Consent, Melbourne Historical Journal Special Issue 1 (2009), 1–20; Jill Bavini-Mizzzi, Ravished: Sexual Violence in Victoria Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995).
Sexual Violence against Children

encountered in Britain: on the one hand, there were fears over the social and economic ruin of young girls; on the other hand, there was a reluctance to punish men for sex with girls, especially those who were considered delinquent or otherwise sexually experienced.

This was further complicated in the US states by troubled race relations that permeated ideas of crime and violence. Age of consent laws had not applied to slaves, and black women were seen as routinely sexually available. Child sexual assaults perpetrated on black children by white men were not a policing priority, especially in southern states. Instead, there was a racialisation of sexual assault, where black men were readily imagined as brutish or barbaric rapists. In many states, sexual assault of a white child by a black man would lead to harsher penalties than if the perpetrator had been white.

Child sexual assault might be handled by the judiciary, but it was also managed through extralegal means, including mob violence. Lynching involved the ritual or actual death of the alleged perpetrator, and, at worst, his torture and mutilation. Historians of lynching argue that this form of mob violence was utilised to maintain racial hierarchies in the post-slavery society. In the period from 1880 to 1920, when 90 per cent of lynchings were of African Americans, around one quarter of all lynchings had their basis in sexual violence, either real or imagined. Race would also have important implications for official reactions to sexual violence, with black Americans making up the vast majority of offenders executed for sexual offences. Not all lynchings were mob law for assaults against children, of course, but young girl victims featured in many of the most violent lynchings, whether white or black men were accused. By the early twentieth century, the black presses were regularly reporting sexual assaults on black girls by white men, and black writers also drew attention to the fact that few of these crimes were recorded in the mainstream media. Nonetheless, in America and elsewhere, black men were more readily imagined as bestial, as uncontrolled, and most specifically as rapists of women and children (see Bourke, this volume for further detail on race and rape).

16 Ibid., p. 128.

173
Beyond the Metropole

Racial politics were also central to understanding attitudes towards sexual violence in the colonies. Western debates over the age of consent of girls rippled outwards to the Empire, taking on specific forms in regions where child marriages were relatively common. Debates over the age of consent were particularly marked in colonial India, and showed – on the surface at least – a divide between British and local ideas on the control of female sexuality. In India in 1891, a bill was introduced to the Legislative Council to raise the age of consent for girls from 10 to 12 years (there was no serious discussion of raising the age of consent to 16, as it was in England). The Bill was designed to protect unmarried girls forced into prostitution and girls married at a young age, but it was the latter that was controversial. Though the Bill was not especially far reaching, and attempted not to ban child marriage but rather to prevent consummation, it generated extraordinary controversy. Despite the fact that in most regions a girl was not sent to the home of her husband before puberty (at around the age of 12), the Bill sparked outrage. Opposition to the Bill focused on its removal of the authority of Indian men. Though the legislation was probably inspired by the death of a 10-year-old bride after forced sex, and there were some media discussions on the sexual assault of the child and the physical damage caused by intercourse and childbirth, in the main the debates focused on male rights. Opposition was most fierce in Bengal, where it was argued that the Bill would interfere with a husband’s fundamental patriarchal rights of access to his wife. The Age of Consent Bill is often seen as a defining moment of Indian and especially Hindu nationalism, where the colonised opposed imperial rule. The Bill, then, was not only about the age of consent. Though the outcome was ostensibly a victory for the imperialists, and in March 1891 the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure

23 Ibid., 110
26 Ibid., p. 138.
were amended to raise the age of consent to 12, historians have suggested the law was of limited practical use.27

Family and Institutions

The relative invisibility of child brides in India under colonial rule is just one example of the broader invisibility of sexual violence against children. Due to the private nature of the abuse, child sexual assault was often unreported. This was further complicated by the way the offender was imagined as a ‘stranger’ and the subsequent focus on ‘stranger danger’. Offenders who were policed and charged fitted the profile of a stranger rather than an intimate.28 Yet, sexual assaults on children are most commonly perpetrated by offenders already close to the victim. Familial sexual violence is amongst the most hidden of all crimes, and we do not have good information for all regions, even in contemporary times.29

Though some jurisdictions introduced specific laws against ‘incest’ in the late 1800s and early 1900s, historical studies have suggested these were not always utilised, and that familial sexual assault was treated no more seriously than other forms of sexual violence against children.30 This was because it was difficult to imagine a child would be hurt by a family member. The family was and is supposed to be an orderly ‘safe’ space.31 There were significant complications with uncovering, policing and prosecuting familial sexual violence. In the nineteenth century, sexual violence in families was generally displaced upon the poor, hiding abuse in other households. Across all time periods, children could be accused of making up assaults, or victims were accused of immorality or seduction. Domestic violence complicated some cases, making them difficult or impossible to report. As Yorick Smaal has noted, intrafamilial crimes were not always reported to police: ‘love, fear, dependency, or malice could all motivate spousal (in)action’.32 Further, work

32 Smaal, ‘Keeping It in the Family’, 325.
on familial sexual violence in the 1950s shows there was a reluctance to report crimes against children when the perpetrator was the breadwinner for the family. A mother might plead in court to protect her husband: without the safety net of the welfare state, a family without a working male was vulnerable to extreme poverty.  

The main reason for the secrecy surrounding sexual assault was, however, probably a complex culture of silence around family violence. Linda Gordon has suggested that there is a general reluctance to even acknowledge that incest exists: this reluctance crosses police, jurors, mothers, teachers and probably even perpetrators. The widespread taboo of incest makes the resistance to acknowledge intrafamilial sexual assault a transnational phenomenon. As Frederick reports in his study of South Asia, this continues to the present: ‘the child’s security and rights at times may be secondary to family honour, for public disgrace can have immense negative impacts on all family members’.

While familial sexual violence has been and continues to remain largely hidden, there have been an increasing number of studies into the sexual abuse of children within institutions, including schools, homes and orphanages, religious organisations and programmes such as the scouting movement. Recent national inquiries have revealed that violence against children, including sexual violence, was relatively common in the institutional context for much of the twentieth century, and that these abuses were regularly if not routinely handled ‘in-house’, rather than being referred to the criminal justice system. As such, perpetrators were rarely prosecuted, and victims were silenced.

Karen Terry’s team from John Jay College undertook a comprehensive report into historical institutional child sexual abuse amongst the Catholic clergy in the USA from 1950 to 2010, commissioned by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Findings suggest that priests cannot be simply understood as ‘paedophiles’: only 5 percent had a specific sexual interest in children. Instead, children were assaulted as they were available as objects of sexual attention. Priests followed similar patterns to other sexual offenders. They may have felt some emotional tie to the victim, combined with a lack of meaningful relationships with adults. The offender may have

been able to make ‘excuses or justifications’ to overcome their inhibitions.37 The reports also tabled the problematic responses from the Church: when allegations of child sexual assault were made, there was generally internal action. But ‘the response typically focused on the priest-abusers rather than on the victims’.38 The emphasis was on the rehabilitation of the priest, rather than on helping child victims.

In Ireland, the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (established 2000) investigated all forms of child abuse including sexual assault, also with an emphasis on institutional abuse. The Commission concluded that in Ireland ‘Sexual abuse was endemic in boys’ institutions’ in particular. As with the Catholic Clergy in the USA, once abuse was uncovered, action was taken to protect the offender, and the ‘damage to the children affected and the [potential] danger to others were disregarded’.39

The emphasis was on the rehabilitation of the priest, rather than on helping child victims.

The studies into child sexual assaults within institutions highlight that some children are more at risk of CSA than others. As Frederick has suggested in his study in Asia, those most vulnerable include:

- children with physical and mental disabilities,
- children from ethnic minorities and marginalized populations,
- children living and working on the street,
- children in conflict with the law,
- child refugees,
- children separated from their families,
- children in places of conflict and natural disasters,
- sexual minorities,
- children living in slums and the children of sex workers.

Children who belong to several of these groups are even more vulnerable.40

Here, we see the complex intertwining of various forms of vulnerability to sexual violence, complicated by race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, poverty and other forms of fundamental disadvantage.

Indigenous children were and are at greater risk. In Australia, the Bringing Them Home Report (1997) detailed harrowing physical, emotional and sexual abuse of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, who had been removed from families and communities in an ugly attempt to assimilate them into white Australia. As the National Inquiry noted, ‘Children in every placement were vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation’: they were sexually assaulted in domestic homes where they were sent as foster children.

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38 Terry et al., *Causes and Context*, p. 4.
40 Frederick, ‘Sexual Abuse and Exploitation’, 5.
or servants; in work places and in institutions.\textsuperscript{41} Indigenous children in Australia continue to be at risk of sexual violence at higher rates than non-Indigenous children.\textsuperscript{42}

In Canada, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal People (1996) made similar findings. Though the focus was not sexual violence, the Report indicated that children removed from Indigenous families suffered physical abuse, emotional neglect and sexual assault in foster care and institutions.\textsuperscript{43} Further, Indigenous communities suffered various traumas including high rates of domestic violence and sexual assault.\textsuperscript{44} Continuing problems of violence against Indigenous children are currently being recorded in a National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.\textsuperscript{45} While not all nations have developed similar Commissions, it is likely that further inquiries in postcolonial nations will reveal similar problems for Indigenous children under colonial rule, and in racist regimes during and after the decolonisation process. Suffering from the traumas of land loss and removal from families and extended kin networks, alongside pseudo-scientific ideas of racial decline, Indigenous children were amongst the most susceptible to sexual assault, and despite legislation around CSA, the state failed to protect them, and in some cases facilitated their abuse.

‘Strangers’

It is clear that children were vulnerable at home, and perhaps most vulnerable in institutions, the very places supposed to guarantee their protection.


\textsuperscript{45} National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, \url{www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1448633299414/144863350146}.
However, instead of focusing on these dual sites of danger for child sexual abuse, by the mid twentieth century in North America attention had diverted to the stranger, and particularly to the so-called ‘sexual psychopath’. Though there was no recorded increase in the known cases of sexual violence or murder of children in this period, sensationalised reports from media outlets fed on domestic anxieties about child safety.\textsuperscript{46} Between the late 1930s and the 1950s, North American jurisdictions developed substantial legislation for dealing with sexual assaults on children. As Chenier has suggested, these laws were framed not only within the justice system but also within the health system. It was increasingly suggested that the sexual deviant had a mental health problem that could be treated through psychiatry, rather than merely contained through incarceration.\textsuperscript{47} The laws generally allowed a prisoner convicted of sexual crimes against children (and other crimes considered to be particularly deviant including sodomy) to be held for an indefinite period, supposedly to prevent reoffending, and for the treatment of the offender.\textsuperscript{48}

The new North American interest in the perpetrators of child sexual assault has been seen as a side effect of the Cold War, with its corresponding emphasis on normativity, family, heterosexuality and the wider linking of domestic and national stability.\textsuperscript{49} Scientific and medical knowledge was prioritised, with the increased presence of psychiatry in the courtrooms and prisons of North America. As Chenier suggests, however, the legislation was more concerned with managing a problem population – and managing the social fears around sexual offenders – than about treating men who had sex with children, or other troubling types of offenders.\textsuperscript{50} Further, by linking them together as ‘deviant’, the legislation only consolidated the perceived links between homosexuality and paedophilia, a slippage that operated in both law and the popular imagination.

Though not all Western nations legislated specifically against the ‘sexual psychopath’, the focus on ‘sexual deviants’ as certain kinds of men – eugenically

\textsuperscript{48} Jenkins, \textit{Moral Panic}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{50} Chenier, ‘Natural Order’.
unsound, socially deviant – only served to hide the fact that most children were (and are) sexually abused by those close to them: fathers, step-fathers, teachers, neighbours, family friends. Through much of the twentieth century, the twin myths of ‘stranger danger’ and the ‘sexual psychopaths’ erased the fact that a site of real danger was in fact the domestic spaces of the family home.\footnote{Ibid., 174.}
The 1970s and 1980s, however, saw a raft of substantial and enduring changes to the ways we imagined sexual assault, in the West but also increasingly in the developing world.

The So-called ‘Discovery’ of Child Sexual Assault

Some historians have argued that this period saw the development of the ‘paedophile’ as a concept, an object of discourse and an identity.\footnote{Steven Angelides, ‘The Emergence of the Paedophile in the Late Twentieth Century’, \textit{Australian Historical Studies} 36.126 (2005), 272–95.} As we have seen, there is a much longer history of concern about child sexual assault. Yet it is true that there were changes to the ways the paedophile was imagined and prioritised in this period. The renewed interest in child sexual assault stemmed initially from two quarters. First, feminists in many Western nations focused on the impact of male violence on women. This was extended to thinking about the ways the patriarchal family led to sexual abuse within the home and the broader culture.\footnote{See for example, Susan Brownmiller, \textit{Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape} (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1975), which has a chapter on child sexual assault. On the history of rape more broadly, see Freedman, \textit{Redefining Rape}; Joanna Bourke, \textit{Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present} (London: Virago, 2007); and Chapter 7 in this volume.} Second, the mid to late 1970s also saw an increased interest in broader concepts of child abuse and neglect, of which sexual abuse was one significant factor.

By the 1970s, a raft of individuals and groups were increasingly concerned with CSA, including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, sociologists, activists and those working in both policing and criminal justice. Research by sociologists and psychologists had a strong impact on emerging ideas on child sexual abuse. David Finkelhor’s work \textit{Sexually Victimized Children} drew attention to the problem of child sexual abuse, offering theories on how and why offenders might abuse, and a large-scale survey of victims, to understand more fully how abuse occurred, and the impacts CSA had on survivors.\footnote{David Finkelhor, \textit{Sexually Victimized Children} (New York: Free Press, 1979).} During the 1980s, feminists highlighted the multiple physical and
emotional traumas children might suffer, and the ways these were intensified by the power relations between victim and offender. Feminism powerfully advocated that victims could suffer ongoing trauma after sexual violence. Rethinking concepts of harm acted to reorient broader understandings of CSA, placing the victim’s experience at the centre of understandings of abuse.

Working alongside feminists, therapists and reformers were groups at the other end of the political spectrum: conservatives and those espousing ‘family values’. Child pornography in particular raised issues of exploitation, and feminists, social workers and moralists were drawn together in opposition to its manufacture and distribution.\(^55\) It was deeply ironic that radical and conservative groups held oppositional views on gender and sexuality, yet were united in their vision of child sexual assault as a major social problem, and one which should be regulated by the state.

Yet not everyone believed CSA was necessarily harmful. In 1978, Henry Kempe, an expert on child physical assault and ‘baby battering’, suggested that a single, ‘non-violent’ assault would cause little harm to a child living in a safe family home.\(^56\) Others were more radical in attempting to rework ideas of liberation and sexual freedom. In the 1970s, a small number of psychologists and therapists claimed that child sexual activity and even incest might have a positive impact on a child. They were suggesting that childhood sexual activity was merely acting on a natural search for pleasure, and that, performed with joy and comfort, it might help develop healthy future sexual relationships.\(^57\) Most radically, controversial paedophile and pederast advocate groups in Europe and the USA claimed that intergenerational sex was not harmful or exploitative of children or teenagers. Most notable was the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), founded in 1978 (it still remains an online presence). NAMBLA argued that there were positive benefits to a boy having a sexual relationship with an adult, including the development of a healthy sexual identity.\(^58\) Similar self-justifying views have been revealed in interviews with paedophiles.\(^59\) While this was hotly contested in the media and in law enforcement, it is indicative of the wide-ranging responses that child sexual activity could generate.

\(^55\) Jenkins, Moral Panic, p. 121. \(^56\) Ibid., p. 104.
Despite these alternative voices, by the mid 1980s CSA was widely recognised in most Western nations as a serious social problem. In Britain, there was a broad moral panic, largely driven by the media, around various forms of CSA, including child pornography, paedophile rings and sex murders. There was also an increasing awareness of the rates of intrafamilial sexual assault. During the 1980s, reports of all forms of CSA in the United States swelled, in part due to widening definitions. It had become commonplace within the media to refer to the 22 per cent of Americans who had allegedly been victims of child sexual assault, while in Britain it was claimed one in ten children had been sexually assaulted.\(^6\) Though the reportage of CSA in the media had become increasingly hysterical in many countries, this should not distract us from the realities of sexual violence, and this period also saw an increase in policing, social work and written resources for children, families and caseworkers. Similar concerns were raised in many nations across the world, and in 1989 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was ratified. Article 19 required all participating states to provide ‘legislative, administrative, social and educational measures’ to protect children against multiple forms of abuse. Article 34 dealt more specifically with sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, including sexual activity, prostitution and pornography.\(^6\)

**Continuity and Change**

Concern over CSA has escalated in the global South over recent decades, with major aid agencies, governments and NGOs investigating the problem across a number of regions. The recent focus on CSA in African nations, for example, has been stimulated by high rates of HIV/AIDS amongst the young.\(^6\)

Yet advocacy has had to take fundamentally different forms from the West. In some regions, sexual intercourse with minors was and is accepted practice, and can be institutionalised in the law and culture. Child marriages remain common. Almost one in ten children in some countries in East Asia are married by the age of 15.\(^6\) In Bangladesh, over a quarter of girls are


married before the age of 15. Older teenagers, too, are regularly married: in Laos, for instance, 37 per cent of children are married before they turn 18, while in the Solomon Islands the figure is 28 per cent. In some areas in Africa, the rate is even higher: in rural areas of northern Nigeria, it is estimated that 90 per cent of girls are married before they are 12 years old. The low age of female marriage in countries such as Nigeria has been shown to be a primary indicator of both female poverty and reproductive ill-health. Despite the risks, sex with a minor is not necessarily read as a criminal act, but rather marriage renders sexual activity both legal and socially condoned.

Further, there remains an often hidden underbelly of criminalised behaviour against children, including sex trafficking, sex tourism, child pornography and related cyber crimes that cross the boundaries of the globe. UNICEF has estimated that over a million children have been trafficked annually to the West from countries in South and South-East Asia, South and Central America, and eastern Europe, generally to work in the sex industry. Other more conservative reports put the figure at around 600,000–800,000 children trafficked each year across international borders. In addition, children may be forced into sex work in their own country: it is estimated that around 2 million children and youths work in the commercial sex trade in Asia alone. There is evidence too of growing rings of child prostitution in Africa, including in Senegal, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is a particular problem in conflict zones: in Sierra Leone, for example, it is estimated 37 per cent of sex workers are aged under 15 years, and displaced children are particularly at risk. Some regions have legislated in an attempt specifically to combat sex tourism. In Thailand, for instance, the age of consent was initially raised from 13 to 15 in 1987, but it was raised to 18 for girls working in prostitution.

64 Ibid., p. 28.
65 Annie Bunting, “‘Authentic Sharia’ as Cause and Cure for Women’s Human Rights Violations in Northern Nigeria’, Hawwa (Leiden), 1–2 (2009), 157. Note that the age of consent was recently raised to 18 in Nigeria under the Sexual Offences Bill (2015), but it is too soon to know how this will be policed in remote regions.
68 Ibid., p. 108. 69 M’Jid, Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, p. 16. 70 Ibid., p. 20.
71 Waites, Age of Consent, p. 49.
Though sexual exploitation for commercial purposes and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) have garnered a lion’s share of attention in studies of abuse in developing nations, continued emphasis needs to be placed on detecting, policing and studying CSA in the domestic home and community. In many regions in Africa, for instance, it remains impossible to quantify CSA.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly, some nations in the Asia-Pacific have no statistics on violence against children.\textsuperscript{73} It is significant that, in some areas, repercussions for CSA are handled within the community through local or traditional law, and no formal records are kept.\textsuperscript{74} Further, there are broader issues, including lack of qualified staff and low budgets for policing and prosecuting. In regions suffering political, economic and/or social turmoil, investigation of CSA is likely to be overlooked.\textsuperscript{75} And when it is investigated, once again, the tendency to externalise abuse – onto the stranger and in this case the trafficker – has acted to hide the dangers of CSA within families and neighbourhood communities.

Conclusions

Child sexual assault is a continuing global problem in both the developed and the developing world. It crosses nation, region, race, class and religion. Historically, we are still uncovering information about CSA in the past, through research in court transcripts, media reports and medical records. Data are limited, and most studies focus on only a limited number of jurisdictions, generally in the West, making it difficult to uncover beliefs, practices and incident rates across much of the world. In more recent times, there have been more systematic attempts to track CSA in many nations, and we now have a useful statistical analysis or estimates for many countries. The data, however, contain only reported cases. The many unreported cases, and also instances that did not leave a trial record or a medical report, remain all but impossible to track.

We can however trace broader attitudes towards child sexual assault, and several themes emerge. In most regions of the world, sex with a child is regarded as a heinous crime, with a serious impact on the young survivor. There is a greater, and deeper, acknowledgement that CSA may lead to substantive and long-lasting trauma for the victim. All in all, there is

\textsuperscript{72} Lalor, ‘Child Sexual Abuse’, 440.  \textsuperscript{73} UNICEF, Violence against Children, p. xi.
\textsuperscript{74} M’Jid, Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, p. 5.
a widespread discursive rejection of the sexual abuse of children. Yet debates remain on what actually constitutes sexual assault, and what is socially sanctioned in one area might be condemned or criminalised in another. Further, we know there is a chasm between the discursive condemnation and the reality. Girls and boys across the world continue to suffer various forms of sexual abuse at home, in the neighbourhood, at school and at work. Some children are more vulnerable than others, and may slip through the cracks or elude any frameworks already in place. In the modern world, two centuries of legislative and social change has not yet solved the problem of sexual violence against minors.

Bibliographical Essay

Primary sources on historical child sexual assault (CSA) are generally hidden in the archives, largely in court records, but also in medical records and archives from social workers, institutions and charities. Basic policing records are generally readily available in annual government reports, but these give only an overview. Detailed analysis requires archival research, in records that are generally not yet digitised.


Postwar Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). New work on Australia in the 1950s shows, however, that the prioritising of psychiatric understandings of offenders was not universal: see Lisa Featherstone and Andy Kaladelfos, Sex Crimes in the Fifties (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016).

By the 1970s and 1980s, feminist research on CSA proliferated. Some, including Linda Gordon’s Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 1880–1960 (London: Virago, 1989) considered earlier historical periods, but were heavily infiltrated with second-wave feminist ideas about violence and patriarchy. Further work on CSA was more present centred, with sociologists and various therapists producing qualitative and quantitative research, all being useful sources for the historian of the recent past. Other important historical studies engaged with the 1970s and 1980s as a transformative period, including Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child Molester in Modern America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

More recently, there are multiple studies of CSA across all regions. UNICEF and WHO have produced compelling studies that examine CSA in both micro and macro perspectives, all of which are readily available online. Both WHO and UNICEF have prioritised studies in regions that have not always been covered by scholarship, including Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Importantly, governmental studies (including Australia’s national inquiry the Bringing Them Home Report and Canada’s Royal Commission into Aboriginal People) interrogate abuse of Indigenous children, showing sexual violence was common in state-run institutions. Other interrogations into institutions, including most notably the John Jay College study of the Catholic Church, highlight the vulnerability of children, and the lack of care for individual victims, that have now become a hallmark of a number of cultural institutions in the twentieth century. See Karen J. Terry et al., The Causes and Context of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests in the United States, 1950–2010 (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2011); K. Daly, Redressing Institutional Abuse of Children (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Overall, there has been some exceptional scholarship detailing a hidden past of CSA in some nations. However, far more research is needed, in both developed and developing nations, to uncover more about the extent of CSA; its policing and judicial approaches; and outcomes for both offenders and victims.
This chapter focuses on homicide and serious interpersonal violence in modern Europe, placing its character and incidence within a global context. The word interpersonal serves to distinguish my subject from other types of violence such as warfare or ethnic conflict, which are dealt with in different sections of this volume. For a large part, this chapter continues the focus on male-on-male violence present in my contribution to volume III. However, since the section as a whole deals with women, mainly with reference to sexual violence and infanticide, I will occasionally step outside the bounds of masculinity to pay attention to female perpetrators and victims, as in the crime passionnel for example. More is known about the global context as we approach the present. Yet, much research remains to be done for the non-Western world and, to the extent that it has been done, overlap with the chapters on colonial violence should be avoided. Thus, I will primarily discuss quantitative and qualitative changes in European homicide, touching on non-Western regions whenever this is appropriate from a comparative perspective.

The conceptual pair of marginalisation and resurgence forms a guideline for my discussion. These contrasting themes can be understood in a double sense. In European history they constituted two phases following upon each other. After 1800, as homicide had ceased to be a day-to-day affair in urban and rural communities, the remaining acts of murder assumed the character of sinister or sensational exceptions. However, from about 1970 on, homicide was on the rise again, for reasons over which criminologists disagree. On the other hand, this recent rise was relatively modest. As a consequence, the conceptual pair of marginalisation and resurgence also makes sense synchronically. Viewed that way, it refers to the contrast between Europe, where lethal violence still is largely confined to a few unpacified sectors of society, and the non-Western or postcolonial world, in many parts of which lethal interpersonal violence is endemic.
Interpersonal Violence up to the First World War

Let me start with the quantitative dimension. The reader is referred to my contribution to volume III for an extended discussion of the concept of homicide rates and the long-term decline of murder in Europe. All homicide rates mentioned here are per year and per 100,000 inhabitants of a given geographic area. The declining trend continued in most of Europe into the 1950s or 1960s, but the bulk of the long-term decrease had already occurred by 1800. In nineteenth-century Europe the most conspicuous quantitative feature of interpersonal violence consisted of a division between an inner and an outer zone. In the outer zone homicide rates remained relatively high, not approaching those of the core area until the First World War. Scholars long believed that the countries and regions with relatively high homicide rates comprised a kind of ring around the core area, from Ireland to the Mediterranean and from there to the Balkans and Russia into Finland. New research, however, casts doubt on the violent character of Irish society even in the early nineteenth century. Reliable figures for all homicides reported in the country in the 1840s yield a rate of 1.97, while the rate comes at 2.83 in the slightly less reliable police statistics for the 1830s. The mean of 2.4 lies within the range characteristic for the core countries of Europe at the time. Pre-Famine Ireland’s undeserved reputation as an extremely violent society resulted from the preoccupation of travellers and political writers with a few episodes of agrarian and sectarian unrest.¹

Southern Europe, in particular the Mediterranean fringe, certainly belonged to the outer zone. On two islands off the western coast of Greece the homicide rate stood at 12.4 in the first half of the nineteenth century. Within Italy the incidence of violence increased per region from north to south during all of the nineteenth century. Roman homicide rates were between 10 and 12 from the 1850s to 1880s, around 8 until 1910 and just under 5 on the eve of the Great War. Corsica, where feuding remained rampant long after 1800, probably was the champion in murder. The island’s homicide rate fluctuated between 26 and 64, measured by five-year averages, between 1800 and 1850, then declined, went up again after 1875 and still stood at 14 in the 1890s.²

Estimates for the core countries of Europe, 1800–1914, fall within a range from about 1 to about 4. The continuation of the long-term trend of decline is visible mainly when we contrast this period, continent-wide, with the years 1920–70. For the rest, the national homicide rates in the inner zone in the long nineteenth century fluctuated without a clear or common pattern, except for a slight rise in several countries on the eve of the First World War. The collection of national statistics of crime, which per country started off at various points in time during the first half of the nineteenth century, actually means a disadvantage for the quantitative study of murder. These statistics are based on prosecution records and hence represent an undercount. In many countries it was not until the end of the nineteenth or even the beginning of the twentieth century that statistics of the causes of death – a source equally reliable as early modern body inspection reports – began to be collected. For the intervening period, available homicide rates are usually based on criminal statistics.

There are practically no data for the non-Western world to compare the pre-1914 European homicide rates with. The only reliable figures I have found so far are based on the governor’s reports of the Mexican states of Hidalgo (1869–72), Oaxaca (ten years between 1869 and 1898) and Estado de México (1877–9, 1889–93). Homicide rates in these three regions averaged 58.6, 27.6 and 30.2 annually. These figures suggest that late nineteenth-century Mexico had a rather high incidence of serious interpersonal violence, even when compared to the European outer zone. The available homicide rates for Brazil (fluctuating between 2.8 and 5.9, 1830s–1880s) and Japan (between 2.8 and 3.6, 1890s–1910s) are probably from statistics of prosecuted cases.

Despite the relatively low homicide rates prevailing in the European core area, the qualitative dimension of interpersonal violence featured one notorious continuity with the early modern period: the formal duel. It was alive and well once more in the hundred years from the defeat of Napoleon until the First World War. This is true, moreover, for core-area countries such as France or Germany as well as representatives of the outer zone such as Italy or Russia. In England the duel flourished only in the first half of the nineteenth century, while the Dutch continued a tradition of rejecting it. As in the early modern period, the duel rested on the principle that an affront to male honour required a challenge to a fight. Hence, the continued fashion for

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duelling in nineteenth-century Europe implied a temporary setback to two long-term historical developments: the pacification of the elites and the spiritualisation of honour (whereby male honour came to be based on inner virtue instead of physical bravado).

As before 1800, the formal duel was socially exclusive. Only members of an elite could challenge each other and you were morally obliged to accept the challenge only from your peer. For the first time, however, this elite included a substantial number of bourgeois men, such as politicians or university professors, next to nobles and military officers who were the traditional practitioners. As the century progressed, the elite ‘entitled to satisfaction’ was gradually broadened to include journalists, for example. Another difference with the preceding centuries is even more crucial. These latter-day duels involved decidedly less violence than their predecessors. If pistols were the weapons agreed upon, the adversaries often strove to miss each other or shoot at an opponent’s feet. After a few bullets had been exchanged, the seconds declared the honour of both parties saved. Duels with rapiers were regularly fought ‘at first blood’. A satirical cartoon depicted a physician examining a duelist during a time-out, finding no blood and offering the man to secretly cut him with the scalpel, so that the confrontation would be finished. Thus, the duels of this last period were rarely lethal, which explains why they could coincide with relatively low homicide rates. The duel died in the trenches of the First World War.

Outside Europe the duel was practised primarily by men with European roots. It was frequent among the planter class in the southern United States in the antebellum period. The elites of several Latin-American countries, notably Mexico and Argentina, took up duelling around 1870 in imitation of their European counterparts. Duels there were often related to political competition and usually led to no more than minor injuries. This fashion lasted until about 1930. Finally, duelling was practised by men from the colonial elites in the age of imperialism. Dutchmen in Indonesia, for example, were decidedly more keen on it than their peers in the homeland. It appears that the colonial setting, which brought violence of all kinds with it, also made European men more eager to challenge each other to a duel.

Although a conspicuous feature, the formal duel everywhere and always represented just a small part of all interpersonal violence. Can we identify

types and patterns within the majority of cases in nineteenth-century Europe? From the perspective of intercontinental comparison, perhaps the most important characteristic was a negative one. There were no slaves; everybody was free, except the serfs on the continent’s Russian fringe until 1861. There were no racial minorities either; with few exceptions, everyone was white. No colonial elite faced a native majority; even if we accept the theory of internal colonialism, this concept implies two populations that are separated geographically. More generally, the effect of ethnic divisions on serious violence was limited. Within Europe’s nation states the extension of schooling promoted the homogenisation of language and culture, while international geographic mobility was limited still. The process of ethnic cleansing in east and south-east Europe, beginning around 1870, has been amply documented, but we know much less about the character of interpersonal violence in the region’s multi-ethnic cities before that date, except for the presupposition that everyone lived happily together. In Europe’s inner zone, ethnic violence was not entirely absent. Conflicts between natives and the Irish in England, exacerbated by religious difference, abounded, especially in Liverpool. In the South of France Italian immigrants were targeted. Incidents often took the form of collective rather than interpersonal violence. This was certainly so with anti-Semitic violence, increasing towards the close of the nineteenth century, although a few isolated murders against the background of Jewish–Christian tensions have been reported as well.

As a positive characteristic, the great majority of fights among European men took place within a working-class setting, whether urban or rural. This sealed a development which had already begun before 1800 with the social differentiation of male fighting. For the inner zone alone, the disappearance of the knife constituted another new development. Knife fighting had been extremely common in early modern Europe. In England, as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, lower-class men most often fought with their fists only. The formality of such fights increased as well. The opponents shook hands before they started off and the spectators formed a ring. Often there was talk of seconds and distinct rounds. The duel – as it may well be called – ended when one combatant gave up or was unable to continue. The participants in such fights appear to have shared a growing conviction that it was un-English to use anything other than your bare hands. In fact, it was uncore-European. Throughout the inner zone, knife fighting either was already a rarity by 1800 or had largely disappeared after mid century, although the formality of English fist fights remained unreported elsewhere. Among men prepared to use violence, many shared an understanding that a confrontation
should not turn too dangerous, refraining from handling knives in particular. Spatial segregation enhanced the social exclusiveness of fighting. Whereas in the early eighteenth century respectable men had often been obliged to defend themselves, after 1800 they were less likely to meet their social inferiors. Physical confrontations were confined even more strictly to working-class neighbourhoods and rural villages.

Remarkably, gun violence in the inner zone also remained limited. Several countries witnessed a gap of three to four decades between the widespread availability of handguns and the introduction of legislation restricting ownership of them. That was the case in England, which introduced prohibitive legislation in 1920. Mauser and the Belgian firm of Browning increased their production for the German market from the mid 1890s, while the number of ads for handguns increased likewise. By 1911 the national government was concerned enough to ask the country’s states to report incidents and announce their opinion about regulation, but the war interrupted the legislative process. Regulation had to wait until 1928. Significantly, the incidents reported in 1911 consisted mostly of accidents, when adolescents had taken a gun with them to school to impress their fellows, for example. A direct link between the modest increase in homicide rates in several countries on the eve of the First World War and the availability of handguns has not been demonstrated so far. It is quite possible that firearms were too expensive for the majority of working-class men who did most of the fighting.

Within Europe’s outer zone, whatever the availability of guns, the knife continued to be a popular weapon in male-on-male confrontations in most places throughout the nineteenth century. Popular duels, akin to those of the early modern period, have been studied in depth for several places from the Mediterranean to Finland. All these places had high homicide rates; in Finland a neat correlation existed between a province’s homicide rate and the prevalence of knife fighting. Thus, it is highly likely that the entire level of murder throughout the outer zone owed much to the continuation of the use of knives as weapons there. Conversely, the lower level of murder in the inner zone owed much to the renunciation of knives. Men fought with their fists only, which was rarely lethal. When an incident amounted to murder, this was often done with any kind of instrument at hand. Homicide ceased to be a day-to-day event. Consequently, the image of murder came to be

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dominated by a few remarkable types. One of these consisted of the exploits of serial killers, which I will discuss later. Another was the *crime passionnel*.

There is no official definition for the *crime passionnel*; a murder or attack falls into this category by virtue of its designation as such by contemporaries. This happened most often in France; hence the French name. The act always had to do with love, often extramarital. Murders or attacks were labelled as passionate in particular when the target was either a lover who had broken off the affair or a rival in love. The label referred not to the intense mutual affection that had once prevailed but to the moment of blind rage in which the perpetrator supposedly had acted. Juries (and the public they represented), psychiatrists and criminologists were the parties that helped shape the *crime passionnel*. The first and third parties had a sympathetic understanding for the offenders in question, considering the risk of repeat, moreover, negligible. The second group, increasingly called upon as forensic experts as the century progressed, pleaded temporary insanity. As a consequence passionate killers got off with relatively light sentences. In the public imagination *crime passionnel* was a typically female crime, but in fact from three-fourths to four-fifths of the perpetrators were men. This still means an over-representation of women when compared to overall violent crime. It was only women, moreover, who used the method of throwing vitriol (sulphuric acid) at former lovers and often at their new sweethearts when caught with them. This custom was largely restricted to France, but *crime passionnel* overall had a truly international dimension. This is exemplified by the case of Maria Tarnovskaia, a Russian noblewoman who had a series of affairs with men from Kiev to Venice between 1903 and 1910. She got each of them so jealous that all but the last one killed their rivals. The age of *crime passionnel* began in the 1870s, when all three parties that produced the label were in place. It ended around 1930, when popular and scientific sympathies waned.

When examining interpersonal violence world-wide up to 1914 from a qualitative perspective, we can begin by turning Europe’s negative characteristic around. Racial tensions, colonial dominance, ethnic conflict or, until its abolition, slavery – one or more of these factors – deeply affected the pattern of homicide and assault. Even China had to accept the introduction of extraterritorial zones in its port cities, where Europeans acted as masters. Studies that directly address interpersonal violence in the non-

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Western world up to 1914, however, mostly cover limited regions within countries and sometimes for brief periods. Consequently, it is difficult to deduce larger patterns, valid for broader world regions, from these studies. We know little about the class character of homicide and assault, for example, although one study maintains that all violence – thus not just interpersonal – in Brazil throughout the nineteenth century and beyond served to maintain elite dominance.9 This raises the question of the distinction between interpersonal and other types of violence, also in colonial settings. French ruthlessness in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, for example, has been amply described; among other actions, natives hiding in caves were smoked to death.10 There is nothing wrong with calling this murder, but it was also part of establishing colonial rule and as such probably belongs to another section of this volume.

Let me briefly touch on two world regions, independent Latin America and colonial India and Indonesia. A study of several local courts in Bahia, 1780–1840, bridges the gap between the colonial period and Brazilian independence. These courts dealt mainly with cases of violence. No fewer than two-thirds of all accused murderers were free men of colour, whereas whites accounted for a mere 6 per cent; the others were slaves. Race mattered indeed! Honour played a role in nearly all cases and some involved group murder out of revenge.11 In the backlands of Fortaleza, in the subsequent four decades, traditional male honour equally played a role in violence, whether it concerned conflicts over access to land or with rivals in love. Whereas rich men derived a large part of their honour from status and wealth, poor sertanejos could maintain a reputation with physical strength only. Alternatively, men channelled their energies into poetic contests.12 Murders were frequent around this time even among the convicts on the island of Fernando de Noronha, 350 km off the Brazilian coast.13 Frontier areas of Latin America witnessed both interpersonal and collective violence. One study narrates the hostilities between the Mexican presidio of Janos and a nearby Chiricahua community, which started well before 1800.

and continued after an international border officially separated them. Mutual violence effectively ended with Geronimo’s final surrender to the United States in 1886.\textsuperscript{14} Banditry, finally, was rampant in many rural parts of Latin America in the post-independence period.

Interpersonal violence in a colonial setting has been studied for British India in particular. Here, too, the racial difference deeply affected relations between colonisers and colonised. British people of all social classes routinely called Indians blacks or niggers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, numerous incidents were reported of Europeans who had shot natives and claimed in court that, while hunting, they had accidentally mistaken them for monkeys, birds or buffalos. Courts usually credited such claims with an acquittal. A considerable part of coloniser-on-native violence took place within the context of labour relations, such as on Assam’s tea plantations. Employers and managers treated Indian labourers as if they were slaves, disciplinarily beating them with sometimes lethal result. In such cases, too, the killers got off lightly in court, which was the reverse of when a native had attacked a European.\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Elisabeth Kolsky suggests that racist violence and judicial condonement of it in India were as high in 1914 as they had been in 1800, Martin Wiener sees a change of attitude beginning at the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{16}

Male honour loomed large in assault and murder not only in Latin America but also in many colonial societies. To whites in British India, honour mattered more than to their countrymen in the metropolis, and it was equally important for natives. The penal code that the English introduced in India was modelled after their own, except for acknowledging a large spectrum of insulting words and gestures as signs of provocation that reduced a charge from murder to culpable homicide.\textsuperscript{17} This legal situation also benefited Indians who had killed fellow natives. Traditional honour was likewise important for many native men on the islands of Dutch Indonesia. The colonial government often leaned on violent entrepreneurs for support, but such tough men also turned against Europeans with robbery raids or setting sugar cane fields on fire.\textsuperscript{18} Compared to repression and anti-

\textsuperscript{14} Lance R. Blyth, Chiricahua and Janos: Communities of Violence in the Southwestern Borderlands, 1680–1880 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012).
\textsuperscript{15} Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 18, 142–84, 191.
\textsuperscript{16} Wiener’s review of Kolsky in English Historical Review 126.521 (2011), 987–9.
colonial resistance, native-on-native violence gets less attention in the historical literature. In cases of *inter se* killing among Australian Aboriginals, the culprit usually enjoyed mercy, escaping capital punishment, for reasons of ‘tribal custom’.19

The Trough of Violence in Europe

For European violence, the five decades from the 1920s to the 1960s constitute a unity because overall homicide rates declined from the nineteenth-century level, reaching their lowest point towards the end of this period. Once more, there is no reason to assume a similar chronological unity for the non-Western world, although decolonisation had been achieved in many parts by 1970. Within Europe, the decline meant first of all that the difference between the inner and outer zones lessened; in particular, Mediterranean areas joined the core. By the 1950s and 1960s homicide rates converged in the countries west of the Iron Curtain, being well under 1 per 100,000 in most. Surprisingly perhaps, the two world wars had little lasting effect on interpersonal violence. In the last year of the first and for one or two years afterwards several countries witnessed a rise. In Belgium, for example, the temporary breakdown of the state’s monopoly of force led to a resurgence of traditional banditry. From 1920 on, homicide rates everywhere returned to the prewar level or below, despite contemporary fears that life in the trenches had degraded the men who came back. Similar things happened during and just after World War II. A rise in 1943–5 was due primarily to the activities of resistance movements. The aftermath peak was more modest than in 1919, except in Italy where some 10,000 fascists were eliminated extra-legally. Soon, however, all of Europe west of the Iron Curtain witnessed the trough of violence. Although medical expertise certainly improved between 1920 and 1970, the effect of this improvement on the decline of homicide probably was modest.

As we advance through the period 1920–70, non-European homicide rates are increasingly available. We know them for the ‘Western Offshoots’ since the beginning of the twentieth century; they are similar to European rates in Canada and Australia but much higher in the United States. With Africa still a blank spot on the chart, Latin America begins to emerge as the leading continent in violence. In Mexican causes-of-death statistics the homicide rate

19 Mark Finnane, ‘Settler Justice and Aboriginal Homicide in Late Colonial Australia’, *Australian Historical Studies* 42.2 (2011), 244–59.
fluctuates annually between 40 and 67 from 1927 until 1952; from 1953 (nearly 38) it decreases until a low of just under 10 in 1969: still higher than in the United States at the time. The Argentinian homicide rate averaged 6 in the 1960s. A surprisingly low rate of 1.1, on the other hand, is reported for Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s. It is not always clear, however, whether such rates are based on causes of death or prosecutions only. Indian national homicide rates, fluctuating between 2.5 and 3 in the 1950s and 1960s, were collected by its federal police from reported cases and arrests.20

Turning to qualitative aspects of European violence, we must once more begin with a negative characteristic. Homicide rates declined further because fewer fights ended lethally. The relative peacefulness of working-class males, in particular the renunciation of settling conflicts with knives, intensified and became geographically more widespread. This development was due in part to conscious campaigns to change the behaviour of the rough sections of the working classes, through housing projects for example. In the 1950s and 1960s knives more often were the weapon of choice for men who killed their female partners than for those attacking other men. This coincided with the culmination of a centuries-long trend by which murders in intimate relationships accounted for an ever larger proportion of total homicide. By the mid twentieth century they made up between a third and nearly half in several European countries. With the fascination for crime passionnel gone, moreover, murders of intimates or rivals in love received equal public condemnation as other types of homicide. Murder had become a marginal phenomenon.

The marginalisation of murder was symbolised most tellingly in the rise of and subsequent fascination with serial killers. They were not new in the period examined in this section. Serial killing appeared on the European scene from the mid nineteenth century onward, first in France – that is, if we define the perpetrators as murderers who select specific types of victims for sadistic pleasure, often with a sexual element, and exclude serial poisoners with a financial motive who have been attested since the seventeenth century. Whereas poisoning could remain undetected for some time, the ‘modern’ type of murder sequence simply was impossible to carry out in a preindustrial world where all neighbours intensely supervised each other. During the interwar period this phenomenon underwent a geographic

spread, most notably to Weimar Germany. Its most notorious serial killer was Fritz Haarmann, who, in Hanover between 1918 and 1924, at the point of his orgasm bit through the throats of the male adolescents he had seduced. The opportunity for seduction offered itself because the police had recruited him as an informer and unofficial detective. For the phenomenon of serial killing, our 1970 dividing line has less meaning than for overall homicide.

The second marginal phenomenon, which inculcated both fascination and fear, was the underworld, as it came to be called. The underworld appeared in Europe’s largest cities around 1900, with a concentration of prostitution, gambling and the homes of habitual criminals in a few neighbourhoods. It became firmly established during the interwar period in cities such as London, Berlin and Marseilles, although these did not match the reputation of Chicago. Indeed, in Europe after particularly notorious incidents, the media and the public alarmingly spoke of an American situation. This happened in Berlin in 1928, when a participant in a massive fight between two rival gangs had died and a host of club members escorted the victim to his funeral in cars. The media concluded that the underworld was motorised, which enabled them to perform quick raids into wealthy neighbourhoods. Despite driving cars, most criminal gangs of the interwar years were based locally and this largely remained so in the 1950s and 1960s.

As I have posited earlier, the hippie movement of the second half of the 1960s was the cultural corollary to the trough in violence. Its encompassing youth culture was at home in Europe no less than in the United States. Whereas young men for ages had been the main perpetrators of physical violence, hippies, male and female, renounced it and proclaimed love. Although like-minded youth groups preceded them, these had consisted overwhelmingly of young men and women with a middle-class background. The hippie movement was the first to attract a significant part of working-class youths. As it turned out, this ideal of peacefulness was short-lived, but we must turn to the pre-1970 non-Western world first. While some hippies proclaimed a cultural revolution, non-violent of course, this term soon became associated with a wave of massive violence in China. This semantic switch symbolises the diverging experiences of the West and the rest.

Unfortunately, the semantic switch is also a symbol for the state of research (in languages accessible to this author). Qualitative evidence for violence in the non-Western world, 1920–70, abounds, but it refers overwhelmingly to instances of mass violence or to colonial repression. Thus, one study with violence as first word in the title, covering European colonies world-wide during the interwar period, deals in fact with the policing of
labor unrest. The author argues that economic interests rather than political concerns determined when and where police forces were called upon. One exception, in which the focus is on interpersonal violence, concerns the African cases in which Indigenous beliefs played a facilitating role. Especially notorious were the medicine murders in Lesotho, tried between 1895 and 1969, whose perpetrators believed that their victims’ organs gave them extra strength. The murders masked as leopard attacks in Nigeria and Ghana, 1945–8, were probably cases of revenge but the killers took advantage of beliefs about were-animals.

Martin Wiener’s study of murder in various British colonies, extending to 1935, focuses on the legal treatment of Westerners who had killed non-whites. In British Honduras, now Belize, the colonial elite mingled with immigrants from the southern United States. One of them, an Alabama-born lumber mill owner, searched the home of his black employee for stolen goods in 1934, finding none but yet shooting the tenant to death. The owner claimed that his gun fired accidentally but several black witnesses testified that he had threatened the victim. This resulted in a life sentence, of which the condemned eventually served two and a half years. For Argentina, finally, a process of refinement has been observed which involved the retreat of the rough gaucho as a cultural hero. The ‘new guard’ of tango lyric writers, active in the 1920s and 1930s, wrote about independent women and romantic men, whereas the ‘old guard’, active 1880–1920, had glorified honorific men who subjugated women and often were skilled knife fighters.

The Globalization of Violence

For the period from about 1970 to the present we can finally speak of a world history of interpersonal violence. This is due primarily to the growing geographic integration which we refer to as globalisation. Among other things, this has brought with it an increased interlocking of international criminal networks. But let me start again with the European quantitative figures. Although I have occasionally referred to Russia, I will disregard eastern Europe for now. It underwent its own peculiar development due to

22 Wiener, Empire on Trial, pp. 222–9.
the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it should be noted that in 1989, just before this collapse, the Russian homicide rate stood at a high 10.6 already.²⁴

Two statistical studies of European homicide share this focus on the area west of the (former) Iron Curtain. Each examines fifteen countries, with fourteen the same in both.²⁵ Since they situate the beginning of the rise in homicide in 1960 and 1965 respectively, which would contradict my 1970 turning point, this matter should be cleared first. In fact, in Eisner’s table per decade, 1840–2004, the 1960s have the lowest mean homicide rate (0.77) as to 0.79 in the 1950s. Only the non-country of Scotland shows a significant reverse process of 0.6 in the 1950s to 1.2 in the 1960s.²⁶ Aebi and Linde’s table begins in 1960, breaking the figures down to five-year periods and the authors distinguish a geometric mean from a mean. The first is 0.69 for 1960–4 and 0.68 for 1965–9; the second is 0.86 for 1960–4 and 0.79 for 1965–9. This suggests that no upward rise occurred during the 1960s. The two means of Aebi and Linde, moreover, are highest in 1990–4 (1.27 and 1.36), after which they decrease to 0.87 and 0.93 in 2005–10. Together these figures suggest a rise in homicide rates in western Europe that began around 1970 and broke off by the mid 1990s. The decline following on it did not yet take the level back to that of the 1950s and 1960s.

Two methodological problems, however, complicate the issue again. First, the figures cited are based primarily on causes-of-death statistics, a good source. Since the 1990s, however, police counts of bodies found murdered are performed systematically and are available for many European countries. In most of them – though not in all – the police register more homicides than captured in the medical statistics. In 2001–3 the resulting rates diverged markedly for the United Kingdom (2.2 vs. 0.4); for the Netherlands this was 1.4 vs. 1.2.²⁷ In the latter case we know the reason why. Police counts exclude

²⁶ Eisner bases the chronology of 1960–92 for the rise on a calculation of turning points per country (table 4, p. 305).
and medical statistics include Dutch residents victimised abroad; conversely, police counts include and medical statistics exclude non-residents victimised within the Netherlands. If this is the same in all other European countries where police counts are higher than medical counts, the Dutch murder surplus is in fact a western European surplus: fewer western Europeans are killed outside the EU than non-EU residents within it.

The second methodological problem is the old one of changes in the ability and opportunity of doctors to save the lives of injured persons. Most homicide scholars acknowledge it but few appear to have made an attempt to estimate its effect on the rates. The capacity to save lives certainly increased between 1970 and the present, for example through the spread of hospitals and, more recently, the introduction of fully equipped ambulances. Obviously, this means that the real rise in potentially lethal aggression was steeper than the figures indicate at first sight. Next to the growth of medical knowledge and infrastructure, a third factor, the speed with which assistance can be mobilised, is often overlooked. I have pointed earlier to the temporal coincidence of the decrease in homicide rates since the mid 1990s and the spread of mobile phones in Europe. These enable friends of an assault victim to call upon assistance at the spot instead of going to a phone, or even lone victims to reach for their pocket instead of just dying. Could it be that the spread of phones explains part or even all of the decline in homicide between 1995 and 2010? As I am writing, no one has yet attempted to investigate this.

If we trust the available figures for the moment, the question of what caused the rise and subsequent decline – partial, because not back to the level of the 1960s – becomes pertinent. Eisner as well as Aebi and Linde relegate to the dustbin the explanations offered by a number of other scholars. Several authors, for example, focused on their own country and tried to explain the incidence of homicide by national peculiarities, whereas the trends were Europe-wide. All standard economic predictors of homicide, moreover, correlate only weakly or not at all with the trends. Instead, both articles seek an explanation in terms of changes in lifestyle or way of life. In contrast to my thesis, they suggest that the lifestyle which initiated the rise in homicide was that of the hippies. Their renunciation of traditional bonds and the bourgeois family supposedly made them more aggressive, despite their proclamation of love. This argument at least makes it understandable that the authors in question want the rising trend to begin before 1970. In my view, however, the crucial change in lifestyle was away from that of the hippies to one based on hiphop music and a flirtation with American gangs, which broke through around 1990.
On one point the explanations by Eisner and by Aebi and Linde diverge. The first sees above all a temporary resurgence of male-on-male violence based on a corresponding return of a macho culture of fighting males, aged 20–40. This conclusion, however, is based almost exclusively on English statistics, which also reveal (since 1969, when they start to include the offender–victim relationship) a massive surge in the killing of strangers. Eisner hypothesises the following types of confrontations: fights between youth gangs, armed robberies, conflicts between drug addicts ending in a knife being pulled, or simple pub brawls going wrong.28 For all fifteen countries, on the other hand, Aebi and Linde observe that male and female victimisation follows the same trend between 1960 and 2010. Additionally, they stick to the WHO’s categorisation of ages, noting that victimisation, for both men and women, is highest in the 30–44 group, then in the 45–59 group and only then for those aged 15–29. Finally, Aebi and Linde propose another new lifestyle that corresponds to the decline in homicide beginning during the 1990s. This was the decade when the internet became available; people were less inclined to go out, they claim, watching their computer screens at home alone. One wonders whether early internet addicts belonged to the social stratum most prone to violence. In any case, this hypothesis implies a prediction: from about 2010 everyone is surfing the internet on their smart phones, while bars and restaurants routinely offer free wifi.

The problem with studies of aggregate national statistics like the ones cited is that they largely ignore the evidence from qualitative studies of potentially violent groups and in-depth analyses of judicial records or police dossiers. Based on these two types of evidence, I have attempted to assess the contribution to the rise in homicide since 1970 of two new phenomena: the rise of an urban multi-ethnic street and school culture and the proliferation of organised crime related to the spread of drug use.29 Perhaps a third, the increasing instability of families, can be added now. This factor may have brought a slight rise in the killing of intimates, which in its turn may explain why the victimisation of women increased as well. However, this factor hardly explains why female victimisation has declined again since the mid 1990s. So let’s consider the other two phenomena. Hard drugs such as heroin appeared on European markets precisely at the beginning of the 1970s, from which time on wholesale trade was vigorously pursued. The new youth culture thrived on the increasing diversity in most European cities, with

28 Eisner, ‘Modernity Strikes Back?’, 308.
(the sons of) immigrants importing back traditional honour but also influencing lower-class males from the native population. This produced a common urban street culture, often with its own slang, that became clearly visible around 1990.

The answer is unequivocal. The new youth culture has contributed to the rise in homicide, but only a little. Pupils bring knives with them to school, for example, but mostly to show off. Some, on the other hand, use these to commit street robberies. Yet, overwhelmingly the part of youthful violence remains non-lethal. This is also suggested by the timing of the breakthrough of the new youth culture: when most of the increase in homicide had already occurred. It is likely, then, that the other new phenomenon’s contribution to the rising homicide rates – followed by a mere stabilisation if my mobile phone hypothesis holds – was more considerable. The expanding market for illegal drugs has fostered organised crime, which in its turn came to focus also on human trafficking and the smuggling of weapons. Modern organised crime in Europe is unlike the interwar underworld that thrived on local prostitution and gambling. Infused by globalisation, today’s underworld has an international dimension, with cooperation as well as competition extending over long distances. Thus, since about 1970 violence concentrates in specific social environments, whereas sensitivity to violence has increased, especially since the 1990s, among the majority of Europe’s population. Paradoxically, this sensitivity explains the rise in prosecuted rates of non-lethal violence since 1970, as judicial conceptions of assault and robbery are subject to inflation.30

The international dimension of organised crime constitutes an occasion for a brief look at non-Western homicide since 1970. The international drug trade obviously contributes to the level of lethal violence in countries such as Colombia and Mexico. Nevertheless, countries with high homicide rates like post-Apartheid South Africa also witness a lot of personal conflict in the context of a macho culture. The existence of rival gangs often exacerbates this violence, as in Central America, where the export of gangs from the United States constitutes another example of globalisation. No common global trend in homicide levels since 1970 is visible. In the first decade of the twenty-first century Latin America, the larger part of Africa and the former Soviet Union were the most violent world regions. Note that the level of health care there is lower than in the Western world, which results in

a greater lethality of attacks. Homicide rates stood at levels similar to western Europe in Canada, Australia and a set of stable Asian states. Interesting is the case of Cambodia. Most people associate this country with the ‘killing fields’ of 1975–9 (see Chapter 25 in this volume), but it recently caught up with the level of stable Asian societies. Instability continued into the 1990s and in 1993 the national homicide rate, including political and extrajudicial killings, peaked at 23.5. A consistent decline set in after 1998, from about 12 in that year to 2.4 in 2012. Broadhurst and colleagues attribute this decline partly to the growing effectiveness of state repression which diminished the tendency to seek private justice. Intriguingly, modern Cambodia resembles fin-de-siècle France to the extent that women frequently commit crimes passionnels by throwing acid at rivals and cheating husbands.31

Conclusion

Murder turned into a marginal phenomenon in Europe between 1800 and 1970. Since then it has resurfaced to some extent. However, personal violence in contemporary western Europe remains at a marginal level when compared to much of the rest of the world. At the same time, globalisation ensures that the recent history of homicide has an ever more intertwined character.

Bibliographical Essay

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Homicide in a Global Perspective


Humans and Violence in Sport

Through most of human history, displays of violence, between either humans or animals, have been an integral component of sport. Just as physical aggression was present in most people’s daily and working life, so inevitably was it an uncontroversial element of their recreational life as well. Violent sports have not only been global in reach, they have also extended across every social rank, though they have been largely a male domain, with many societies placing restrictions on the extent to which women might participate in sports of any kind whether as participants or spectators, and particularly those involving displays of aggression.

Yet the past two centuries have witnessed an unmistakable redrawing of the place of violence in sport. Starting in Britain and progressing from there to western Europe, the United States and Australia, governments have actively sought to eliminate sports which involved staged acts of aggression between animals. At the same time, sporting organisations have imposed ever greater regulation around the violence that human combatants might perpetrate against each other – opening, in the process, a space for female involvement, firstly as spectators, and in the second half of the twentieth century as participants. Outside the West, however, opposition to violence in sport has been more muted. Whilst most non-Western societies have been involved in the move to restrict the extent of violence that humans might commit in the name of sport, they have been far less interested in imposing restrictions on sports that involve animals. Here, the force of ‘tradition’ has invariably trumped the self-styled ‘humanitarianism’ of the Western abolitionists.

It is helpful to begin by thinking about the range of violent sports enjoyed in the past, many of which have now disappeared from the industrialised world. These fall broadly into two categories – sports encouraging violence amongst
animals and those involving violence between human combatants. Sports involving animals – often labelled ‘blood sports’ by their critics – can be helpfully divided into two distinct categories: staged fights or contests between animals or between animals and humans; and hunting. Staged combats generally take place in an enclosed or semi-enclosed area and usually between domesticated, rather than wild, animals. Cockfighting and dogfighting are the most ubiquitous forms of blood sport, having been recorded in some form in most corners of the globe. The underlying principle of such fights is to match the animals as equally as possible – their appeal lies in placing bets on a contest with an unpredictable outcome.¹ Most countries have had many additional local blood sports, determined by the native animal population and by tradition – badger-baiting, bull-baiting, bear-baiting, ratting, bull-running and bull-fighting to name a few from western Europe.² These sports are much more varied in nature, and are not necessarily enjoyed as opportunities for gambling. The bull-running, or jallikattu, in Tamil Nadu, for instance involves tying a bag of coins between the horns of a bull and setting him loose in the streets. Participants chase the bull down and attempt to untie, and claim for themselves, the bag of coins. Like countless other bullfighting and bull-running traditions that have been recorded around the globe, jallikattu is essentially a festive, community event – an occasion for community cohesion and displays of masculine bravery.

Hunting differs in principle from animal combats in that the animals are wild rather than domesticated and are hunted in their natural habitat – some animals hunted by men armed with guns, others by men working in tandem with other animals, usually dogs or birds.³ In reality, though, this ‘pure’ form of hunting has been hard to maintain in the past 200 years – an era of unprecedented population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation throughout the world. In many parts of the globe, pressure on the land has forced hunters to pursue animals that were semi-tame, or even tame, and much of their hunting takes place in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces rather than in the wild.⁴ Nonetheless, it is helpful to maintain a distinction between

¹ George Ryley Scott, The History of Cockfighting (London: C. Skilton, [1957]).
² The most studied of these has been the Spanish bullfight. See Timothy J. Mitchell, Blood Sport: A Social History of Spanish Bullfighting (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).
staged animal combats and hunting, less because of an innate difference between these sports and more because humanitarian reformers have always insisted in differentiating between the violence that occurred in animal combats and that which occurred on the hunting field.

Sitting alongside those sports involving animals and violence was a wide range of sports involving interpersonal violence. Various forms of human combat have existed across the globe since the beginning of time, though the precise form they have taken has varied widely. In East and South Asia, martial arts have dominated. In the West, bare-knuckle fighting has always been more popular. Generalising about the nature of these sports is an impossible task owing to the enormous global variation, but at heart they involve displays of fighting strength and skill between two (invariably male) opponents. In addition, many team sports which are today considered to be ‘non-contact’, such as football, involved high levels of physical violence in 1800. More generally, these sports always took a non-standard format. This is not to suggest that they were not governed by rules. Parameters such as the rules of combat, the size of teams and pitches, or the length of play were all subject to rules, but these rules tended to vary from one village or region to the next. As a result, team sports in 1800 looked very different from those of the present day. They were characterised by very high levels of interpersonal violence and, though rule bound, they were played according to local custom rather than by national, standardised sets of rules.

Animals, Violence and the Move towards Prohibition

Opposition towards the use of violence in sports began in Britain, with an organised campaign against cockfighting and bull-baiting. It is significant that the country’s first anti-violence movement of any significance was targeted towards animals, rather than any of the human constituencies at risk of violence – children, wives, apprentices or servants. As such, it is worth looking in detail at the campaigners’ objections towards blood sports and asking why they found such a fertile reception in early nineteenth-century Britain?

5 Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth, Martial Arts of the World: An Encyclopedia of History and Innovation (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), vol. 11, pp. 175–82.
Many religions have expressed concern about the use of animals, which are after all part of God’s creation, for sport and recreation, and Christianity is no exception. Since the sixteenth century, Puritan reformers had been objecting to sports such as cockfighting and bear-baiting – both on the grounds of the time-wasting and gambling implicit in such activities, and owing to the cruelty to animals they involved. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, a new, secular strain of criticism began to emerge, objecting to the mistreatment of animals not simply as an abuse of God’s creation, but upon humanitarian grounds as well. Although these reformers ranged widely over human treatment of animals, as their ideas began to filter into popular consciousness these concerns crystallised around a small number of blood sports. In the process, criticisms of hunting were entirely filtered out, and working-class blood sports such as cockfighting and bull-baiting were targeted as the only serious form of animal cruelty that needed to be addressed. From the 1790s, public outrage over the persistence of these two ancient sports continued to mount, and as it did so, parliament soon turned its attention to these sports as well. Criticism that had originated in newspapers and drawing rooms rapidly transmuted into a divisive political and class wrangle that was to last nearly forty years.

The first bill to attack blood sport was Sir William Pulteney’s ‘Bill for Preventing the Practice of Bull-Baiting’, introduced in 1800. It had the narrow goal of outlawing (in Pulteney’s words) ‘the savage custom of bull-baiting’, but despite gathering considerable support in the House, it faced eloquent and lengthy opposition from Sir William Windham, the Tory MP for Norwich. Windham derided the bill as evidence of ‘a busy and anxious disposition to legislate on matters in which the laws are already sufficient’, and his impassioned defence played a large role in the ultimate defeat of the bill – it was lost by just two votes. Windham had successfully tapped into a widely held concern that, by interfering in men’s private pleasures, parliament was stepping into new and dangerous waters. ‘It should be written in letters of gold’, declared The Times, ‘that a Government cannot interfere too little with the people ... whatever meddles with the private personal

12 Ibid., col. 203.
disposition of a man’s time or property is tyranny direct.” It was a powerful critique, and one that protected working-class blood sports for a number of years.

Further attempts to introduce legislation to prohibit bull-baiting were made over the next two decades, but reform was delayed until the 1820s, when Richard Martin – dubbed by his friends ‘Humanity Dick’ – a large Irish landowner and keen practitioner of all field sports, mounted another, this time successful attack on blood sports. His ‘Bill to prevent cruelty to cattle and horses’ received royal assent in 1822. This Act outlawed acts of cruelty to farm and draft animals, but did not in fact outlaw bull-baiting in the way Martin and his supporters had hoped: bulls had been expressly omitted from the final act by a government sensitive to the criticism that it was meddling in spheres it had no right to touch.

This omission kept the reformers busy for the next decade, but the precedent set by the landmark 1822 Act made their task rather easier. In 1835 they secured the passage of the Protection of Animals Act, which extended protection from livestock to domestic animals and made it illegal to keep any place for the fighting or baiting of any animal, wild or domestic. Overnight, enjoying a bull-bait, bear-bait or dogfight became a criminal offence, and fines and prisons served to convince anyone who might think otherwise. This Act, consolidated and extended to include cockfighting in 1849, was the first major piece of legislation passed to prohibit blood sports in the Western world.14

The outcome of these new laws was initially mixed. Bull-baiting, being near impossible to hide from the authorities, was relatively easy to suppress. Despite some very public displays of opposition in the immediate aftermath of the Act, local authorities speedily and effectively used their new powers to round up those involved and consign the sport to history.15 A cockfight or badger-bait, however, was much more easily shielded from prying eyes, and so its disappearance was far more protracted. In an attempt to enforce the law more rigorously, a self-proclaimed body of ‘divers benevolent persons’ formed itself into the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) in 1824, and started collecting funds to assist individuals in prosecutions. In 1835, the Society received the first of many royal patrons (the Duchess of Kent) and in

13 The Times, 25 April 1800.
Queen Victoria, a patron since 1835, granted it permission to prefix ‘Royal’ to its name.\textsuperscript{16} As the new society grew in size and importance it took to hiring constables to walk the streets and apprehend offenders. Its officer corps grew steadily, totalling 120 by the end of the century.\textsuperscript{17} The RSPCA played an important role in translating the new legislation into effective action against working-class blood sports. It was a pattern that would be widely repeated in the Western world. Passing legislation often proved more straightforward than enforcing it, and these private enforcement societies played an important role in rendering the reformers’ ambitions a reality.

Though the elimination of working-class blood sports proved to be protracted, the general trend was clear: by the end of the nineteenth century, bull-baiting had disappeared, and cockfighting and dogfighting had been firmly pushed underground. Sports that people of all social ranks had enjoyed for hundreds of years had been cast out of the realm owing to the changing values of a small, but powerful, minority who no longer took part. It marks a turning point in the history of blood sports, and one is inevitably led to ask: why did the Victorians impose such an intrusive piece of legislation?

One argument that we have to reject is that this was the spontaneous flowering of a new compassion for animals. It is certainly true that this period did see the awakening of some sensitivities surrounding animal suffering, but most of these views were expressed in poetry, literature and art, rather than in mainstream society. Throughout this period, cruelty to animals was ubiquitous. Animals were used in every aspect of life, and were inevitably much abused in the process. For most people, animals were there to fill stomachs, work machinery and move things about. Animals could be seen everywhere: horses, donkeys, dogs, cats, cattle, sheep and poultry filled streets, markets, gardens and fields. The sight, sound and smell of animals were an inescapable part of everyday life. People’s lives and homes were shared with animals, and there was little room for sensitivity and compassion in this world, and ample scope for cruelty and ill-use.

Even if we were to grant that the reformers were genuinely concerned about animal cruelty, there is something suspicious in the targeting of blood sports. Of all the forms of cruelty that animals might face, cockfighting and


\textsuperscript{17} Brian Harrison, ‘Animals and the State’, \textit{English Historical Review} 83 (1973), 786–820, esp. 789, 794.
bull-baiting were surely the least of their worries. A cockfight was a combat between two evenly matched animals fighting freely. The concept of a fair fight was also intrinsic to the sport of bull-baiting, and by the late eighteenth century, the sport was in any case already very much on the decline. Cockfighting and bull-baiting both bore more than a passing resemblance to all forms of hunting and coursing, as animal combats lay at the heart of these sports too, yet neither attracted criticism of any real note. Furthermore, the systematic abuse and overwork of the millions of horses that powered the English economy was surely a greater evil than any of the uses to which animals were put in the name of sport. Blood sports were marginal forms of cruelty in a society in which the use and abuse of animals was extremely widespread. If the Victorians really cared so much about animals, why did they not focus on more pressing cases of cruelty?

The answer of course may be found by switching our gaze away from the animals and back to ourselves. Early campaigns against blood sports were not about animals, but about the human spectators. Animals naturally fight, but what Britain’s early reformers found objectionable about these fights was the fact they were orchestrated by humans for their own pleasure, excitement and financial gain. In arguing that bull-baiting and cockfighting should no longer be tolerated, the literate classes were promoting their own vision of a progressive and compassionate society.

Inevitably, it was the poor that needed to be saved, and the oft-used accusation of class bias is not too far from the mark. With the exception of a small but dedicated core of wealthy gentlemen who continued to support cockfighting, the poor were the primary supporters of most forms of animal fighting and baiting by the early nineteenth century. According to one writer, bull-baiting was popular with the ‘the most unfeeling, and least humane, part of the very lowest, and most abandoned orders of the people . . . brutes; the very scum and refuse of society’.  


progress and civilisation; this was a way for the middle classes to reaffirm their own status as humane and enlightened individuals.

Western Europe followed the British example with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The United States, with its shared Puritan heritage and longstanding concerns about vice and immorality, was the nation most receptive to the British example. Proposing a bill to strengthen the laws governing cockfighting in 1830, the representative of Westmoreland County, Samuel Bushfield, described cockfighting as a ‘kind of vice’ and a crime ‘of great magnitude’. He continued,

All kinds of vicious people attended them; some to bet money, some to satisfy criminal curiosity, and many to spend money which ought to be applied to the support of many of their families. Apprentices and the children of honest parents have their morals ruined by attending such gaming places; indeed they are often tempted to steal money to spend it in this way.

Yet despite Bushfield’s eloquence, the resulting legislation was a compromise: cockfighting itself remained legal, only the betting on matches was prohibited.20 This was a pattern often replicated in the USA during the twentieth century, as legislators struggled with the concept of interfering in what private individuals did in their leisure time.

Just as in Britain, so in the States, the cause of blood sports was subsequently taken up by the animal protection societies. And once again, although the remit of these societies was animal cruelty in general terms, they proved to be particularly exercised by the use of animals in sport. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1866 and the American Humane Association was established a decade later. Both played an important part in pressuring state legislatures to abolish not simply betting on cockfights, but the organising and watching of such events. But American animal protectionists always faced a greater battle than their British counterparts, for although there was considerable sympathy for the anti-vice message of their campaign, there was also much stronger sentiment in favour of personal liberties. Abolition of cockfighting proceeded on a state-by-state basis and it was a protracted process, with parts of the South not outlawing cockfighting until the twenty-first century (Louisiana was the last state to outlaw cockfighting; it did so in 2008).21

In continental Europe the process of eliminating violence towards animals in sport was also highly uneven and encountered resistance of a different nature. Whereas American abolitionists faced objections from those who believed in personal freedom, in parts of Europe animal protectionists were stymied by the power of tradition. In France, for example, cockfighting was prohibited by law in 1951. This was already more than a hundred years after the British example and it included an important exemption: those regions with an uninterrupted local tradition of such fights were permitted to continue the sport. Nord-Pas-de-Calais claimed this exemption and remains to this day home to dozens of cockpits, or gallo-dromes, and to a lively, and entirely legal, cockfighting scene. Efforts to outlaw bullfighting in Spain met similar resistance. Whilst cockfighting was abolished in most parts of Spain in the twentieth century, opponents of bullfighting have as yet signally failed to overturn arguments promoting the sport as a unique and ancient national tradition. Here, as in France, successive governments have been persuaded that protecting native tradition is more important than attempting to ban sports which contained elements of violence. The experiences of both countries are an important reminder that the forces of modernisation and industrialisation do not automatically quell violence against animals in the name of sport.

The partial and piecemeal nature of reform is also evident in the large areas of sporting life that have generally been exempted from reform. Despite the unmistakable hardening of attitudes towards working-class blood sports in most of Europe and North America, attitudes towards hunting have changed far less. Even in the case of hunting with hounds, which generally involves staging a fairly contrived combat between a supposedly wild animal and trained hunting dogs, Western opinion has shifted far more slowly, and indeed in many quarters has shifted hardly at all. Since the nineteenth century, animal protectionists have maintained a strict distinction between ‘blood sports’ and hunting, and the ideological insistence that these form separate categories of sport has played an important role in protecting all forms of hunting with hounds.

Once again Britain has been at the forefront of the prohibition movement. The Hunting Act of 2004 banned the hunting of wild mammals with dogs in England and Wales, and still stands out as a rare piece of legislation that restricted hunting through animal welfare, as opposed to conservation.

23 Mitchell, Blood Sport.
motives. Just as with cockfighting, however, hostility towards hunting in reality encompassed a wide range of concerns, not all of them centred upon violence or cruelty towards animals. The Hunting Act owed as much to the new social and political sensibilities ushered in with Labour’s landslide victory of 1997 as it did to concerns about animal cruelty. Nor have these concerns about hunting translated effectively beyond Britain’s shores. In continental Europe and the United States, hunting continues to enjoy a largely unchallenged place in society. In these countries, not only is hunting protected by law, there is very little in the way of public disquiet about the hunters’ activities.

Beyond the West, hostility towards the use of animals in sport has been much more muted and animal protection arguments have done little to undermine the popularity of traditional animal combat sports such as cockfighting and dogfighting. Cockfighting bans have been introduced in parts of South America (Brazil in 1934; Argentina, Chile and Paraguay in the later twentieth century) but through most of Asia the sport remains legal. Across large parts of the globe, concerns about animal cruelty have failed to dent what are widely regarded as ancient and legitimate traditions involving animal combat.

In order to understand the enduring popularity and legality of cockfighting across large parts of the globe, it is necessary to appreciate its ancient roots. In China, for example, evidence of cockfighting has been uncovered from the Zhou period (sixth century BCE). In the following 2,500 years, cockfighting has featured in Chinese literature, philosophy and poetry. It has been linked to important spring festivals and been enjoyed by all from the emperor to the masses. Furthermore, cockfighting in China has been situated within the yin-yang principles of Daoist belief. In this belief framework, cocks are given the same yang symbolism as the sun and this provides a space for cockfighting to fill in the renewal spring festival of Hanshi. Hanshi was marked by extinguishing of all fires and the eating of cold food for three days, followed by the relighting of fires. Whilst Chinese reformers have long raised concerns about the animal cruelty, crowds and betting they believe to be associated with cockfighting, they have been unable to overturn the sport’s very broad social and cultural basis of support.

In fact, cockfighting has been slotted into a wide variety of very different religious and belief systems across the globe. In Bali, for example,

24 Griffin, Blood Sport.
cockfighting is linked with Balinese Hinduism. Here it plays a role in religious purification rituals designed to expel evil spirits, with the blood of the losing chicken offered as a sacrifice to the spirits. Likewise in India, cockfighting has a very long history. It is mentioned in literature from the Sangam period (from 3 BCE) and has since then been enjoyed in both secular and religious contexts. In many nations, then, cockfighting is regarded not simply as a recreational pursuit, but as a practice with deep historical, religious and cultural roots. And inevitably, these cultural traditions have not been quickly and easily erased in the march towards modernisation.

The experience of India illustrates the obstacles faced by the animal protectionists. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960 legislated against the unnecessary pain or suffering of animals and included inciting animals to fight within its provisions. The Act provided a clear statement of India’s claims to modernity, but the combined forces of culture and tradition have proved more powerful than the rhetoric of modernity and reform. The conservatism of Indian society has stood in the way of effective elimination of the sport and most attempts at repression have focused on the betting that accompanies cockfighting rather than the sport itself. Not only have the police been notoriously reluctant to interfere in cockfights, there have also been disagreements amongst the courts concerning whether or not cockfights are covered by the provisions of the Act, particularly those held within temples or associated with Hindu festivals. The passage of the Act has done little to eliminate back-street cockfighting; indeed economic growth has in some instances provided an impetus to the growth of cockfighting. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, the annual festival of Makar Sankranti has become the occasion of large, spectator cockfights with high-level betting in excess of Rs 1,000. With local politicians, MPs, prominent businessmen and even film celebrities visiting coastal Andhra during Sankranti to participate, cockfighting became big business in the decades following the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. Inevitably small fines of no more Rs 25–100 and a local police force which is at best indifferent, at worst complicit, have failed to provide any form of deterrent to those who want to participate.26

It is clear that the elimination of violence from sport is not a linear and universal process. In the West, violence towards animals in sports became increasingly controversial around 1800, though abolition attempts were

26 Times of India, 8 January 2012.
almost always directed towards animal combat sports rather than hunting and rarely extended to more general concerns about the mistreatment of animals in agriculture and transport. Britain led the way and whilst the pace and motivation of the animal protectionists have varied across Europe and the United States, the general trend is unmistakable. Cockfighting and dogfighting are no longer mainstream activities in the West; indeed in most Western nations organising or watching animal combats is a criminal offence. At the same time, however, many non-Western nations have been far more hesitant to interfere with sports that are regarded as belonging to ancient or religious traditions. Although a number of nations in Asia and in South and Latin America have passed laws outlawing animal cruelty, some have been unclear about whether traditional sports fall within the remit of the new laws and lax enforcement efforts have often rendered the legislation a dead letter. Other countries have not attempted to legislate against popular blood sports. As a consequence, cockfighting and a host of other animal combat sports remain legitimate and popular pastimes across significant parts of the globe.

Interpersonal Violence in Sport

The history of interpersonal violence in sport has followed a rather different trajectory from that of violence between animals. Whereas the West has diverged sharply from other parts of the globe since 1800 with an ever more successful animal protection movement, no such divergence is evident with respect to human combat sports. The trend here has been towards ever-greater regulation rather than prohibition, and the move towards tighter regulation has been shared in Western and non-Western nations alike.

Men have made sport out of fighting with each other since the beginning of time, and this tradition remained firmly in place in 1800. Indeed, most governments have traditionally looked favourably towards their indigenous fighting sports and customs, regarding them as a means of encouraging strength, courage and manly vigour, as the foundation of a strong, fighting nation. Enthusiasm for human combat sports has hardly waned over the past two centuries. Admittedly, some abolitionist pressure emerged in parts of the West in the twentieth century, yet this never gained the strength and


218
momentum of the animal protection arguments. When it comes to violence in sport, reformers have sought to control and contain that violence, rather than to eliminate it.

In the West, much of the impetus for limiting the degree of violence permissible in hand-to-hand combat emanated, once again, from Britain. Whilst it is difficult to reconstruct exactly how bare-knuckle fighting was conducted in Europe at this time, it is clear that high levels of violence were tolerated. A manual from early eighteenth-century Britain provided instruction for techniques such as head-butting, punching, eye-gouging and choking.\textsuperscript{28} It is certainly the case that organised prize-fights had an unfortunate tendency to end in death, resulting in unwelcome manslaughter charges for the victorious fighter. It was undoubtedly this which provided the spur for reform of the sport’s rules. The first set of boxing rules were introduced by the champion fighter Jack Broughton in 1743, and known as Broughton’s rules. Broughton also encouraged the use of ‘mufflers’, a form of padded glove, though their use remained optional well into the nineteenth century. Broughton’s rules were revised and consolidated as the London Prize Ring Rules in 1838, which were in turn superseded by the Queensbury Rules in 1867. These mandated the use of gloves and form the basis of the sport of boxing as it is played today. In the USA, one advocate of new boxing rules argued that they encouraged fighting which was ‘fairer and more harmless’, and they certainly did lead to a decline in the frequency with which prize-fights ended in death.\textsuperscript{29} What we find in the case of hand-to-hand combat, then, is not an attempt to eliminate violence from sport, but a move towards greater regulation around the circumstances in which men fight.

Once this transition had occurred, boxing was able to take its place in Western society. It was introduced to the Olympics in 1904 and has been contested at every set of games since, with the exception of the 1912 Olympics in Sweden (the Swedish government banned the sport at that time).\textsuperscript{30} These developments have also opened a space for women to take part in the sport. Women participated in the sport informally throughout the twentieth century but only began to assume a formal presence when national amateur

\textsuperscript{28} See Sir Thomas Parkyns, of Bunny Baronet, \textit{The Inn-Play or Cornish-Hugg Wrestler. Digested in a Method with Teacheth to break all Holds, and throw most Falls mathematically} (London, 1727).


boxing associations began to admit women.\footnote{Malissa Smith, \textit{A History of Women’s Boxing} (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).} Indeed it was Sweden which kicked off this trend, with the Swedish Amateur Boxing Association sanctioning events for women in 1988. Through the 1990s, the USA and most European nations followed suit and women’s boxing was included in the Olympics just outside the timeframe of this volume – in 2012.

Elsewhere in the world, human combat sports inevitably took a highly diverse form, with not only each nation nurturing its own local customs, but considerable variety between one region and the next. Yet for all this diversity, the same trend towards standardisation is evident. Take the example of Japan. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Japan was the home of numerous distinct fighting traditions – martial arts such as ju-jitsu, karate and aikido; sword-fighting traditions such as kendo and naginata; and wrestling. Most of these sports claimed heritage back to at least the fifteenth century, and many considerably earlier than that. All the Japanese martial arts and wrestling traditions contained high levels of violence and had held a central place in the culture of the ancient samurai, or warrior class. Although they had ceased to play an important role in military preparedness by the end of the eighteenth century, they were nonetheless still highly esteemed for the encouragement they gave to a man’s self-control and fighting spirit.

Despite their long histories, most modern Japanese martial arts are in reality only loosely related to their earlier forms. Sumo wrestling, for example, is all that remains of a once far wider set of wrestling customs. Medieval sources reveal wrestling contests that were performed as part of religious rites, or as a spectator event for aristocratic patrons, or for financial gain. Bouts were fought according to locally determined custom, and although they did not ordinarily end with the death of one or other opponent, fights to the death were practised in some contexts. The same variety was evident in all the Japanese martial arts, with each practised in numerous different formats and contexts, according to local custom rather than standardised rules.\footnote{P. L. Cuyler, \textit{Sumo from Rite to Sport} (New York: Weatherhill, 1979); Harold Bolitho, ‘Sumo and Popular Culture: The Tokugawa Period’, in Gavan McCormack and Yoshio Sugimoto (eds.), \textit{Modernisation and Beyond: The Japanese Trajectory} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 17–32.}

Wrestling was the first Japanese combat sport to undergo standardisation, a process which began unusually early in this instance. The tradition of \textit{tsuji-zumo}, or ‘street-corner’ wrestling, had started to attract the attention of the
ruling class in the mid seventeenth century. Street corner wrestling, as its name implies, took place out of doors, often accompanied by hawkers, jugglers, and theatrical and freak shows. It encouraged crowds to gather and gamble on the outcome, and, in the eyes of the authorities, posed a threat to the social order. The Tokugawa government passed edicts banning it around the middle of the century, but as these proved only partially successful government officials began instructing wrestling organisers to regulate their fights instead. One of the most significant outcomes of these negotiations was the agreement to hold fights within a defined space, giving rise to the dohyo – an arena with a clearly defined, circular border of rice-straw bales – which is still employed today. In addition, certain rules for sumo wrestling were formalised – the disallowing of hair-pulling, eye-gouging and blows with closed fists. Referees were introduced to ensure they were followed. Further regulation followed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Together, these reforms sharply reduced the risk of sumo wrestlers experiencing serious physical harm or dying in the ring. And although this had certainly been far from the reformers’ intentions, the introduction of a formal set of rules also gave rise to a nationwide tournament circuit as wrestlers from across Japan became familiar with a standard set of procedures. As a result, sumo wrestling emerged from its medieval origins into a modern spectator sport, fit for Japan’s growing urban centres.

A similar process of standardisation transformed the complex patchwork of martial arts and sword fighting that had existed in Japan in the early nineteenth century. Swords, for example, had had a significant presence on the medieval battlefield, but with no major wars during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), sword-fighting had evolved from a form of military training into a spectator sport. Fights were highly choreographed so that fighters might strike their opponent without fear of injuring or killing them. In the eighteenth century, the traditional metal swords were replaced with bamboo so as to allow for a more authentic, full-contact combat, yet despite this sword-fighting techniques, along with other traditional martial arts, fell into decline at the start of the Meiji period in the 1860s. The creation of a new government in 1868 – the Meiji, or ‘Enlightened Rule’ – marked the beginning of a new era in Japanese history. Successive leaders actively sought to accelerate industrialisation, to modernise, to catch up with the West. In such an environment, the nation’s ancient martial arts increasingly appeared to be outdated relics of the past.

All of Japan’s ancient combat sports, however, were unexpected beneficiaries of the rise of nationalist fervour that swept the nation in the final
quarter of the nineteenth century. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 and the nationalism it helped to foster prompted a reappraisal of traditional martial culture. The 1890s saw a sharp increase in the number of students joining martial arts associations and the emergence of a number of martial arts organisations active in both codifying the sports and lobbying for them. Kendo was codified into its modern form in the 1890s; in the same decade naginata was revived as a suitable physical recreation for girls; it was codified with the creation of a national centre in 1934. Meanwhile, older ju-jitsu techniques were reconfigured as Kodokan Judo by Kano Jiguro in the 1880s. Kano created a training school and a governing body for his new martial art, introduced a system of belts to rank competitors, and established a point system and time-limits for matches. In each of these sports, codification helped to restrict the expression of violence in sport. It did not remove violence altogether, but did sharply limit the degree of harm that combatants could cause their opponents.

Chinese martial arts evade simple categorisation. There are dozens of unique fighting styles and training methods, inspired by different philosophies and religions, each with its origins in distinct periods of Chinese history and regions of the country. Yet despite the great variety of martial arts in China, these too have all undergone a recognisable process of standardisation. The process here was delayed until the twentieth century and was powerfully shaped by China’s own unique social and political context. In the early twentieth century, one martial art school after another established its own national association, produced its training manual, and set about organising its own system of national examinations and competitions. The trend towards standardisation was further accelerated in the 1950s with the creation of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC, whilst enthusiastic about the physical recreation element of martial arts, was suspicious of the ancient traditions and aristocratic lineage claimed by some practitioners. The Chinese State Commission for Physical Culture and Sports sought to resolve this tension by establishing one, national form of kung fu – wushu – backed by the All-China Wushu Association, created in 1958. This attempt to iron out the variety of Chinese martial arts was inevitably only partially successful. Nonetheless, the martial arts scene in China at the end of the twentieth century looked remarkably different from that at the century’s beginning. Despite a large number of different schools, within each of these schools standardisation was complete. Here, as elsewhere, interpersonal violence in sport now took place within a much more rigorous and restrictive framework.
Clearly, then, the place of violence in world sport is highly complex. Nonetheless two distinct trends are observable. In the first instance, the West has seen a determined, and largely successful, attempt to eliminate sports which manipulate or showcase aggression between animals for entertainment. Although countries in many other parts of the world have attempted to pass some legislation prohibiting animal cruelty, these have tended to be less explicitly focused on animal sports and far less rigorously enforced. Elsewhere, the weight of tradition has protected animal combat sports from any serious threat of repression. In the second instance, there has been a concerted effort to rein in the degree of interpersonal violence tolerated in martial arts, boxing and wrestling in all parts of the world. While hand-to-hand combat sports remain popular across the globe, regulation has sharply reduced the risk of death or serious injury during competitive events. Violence in sport is still permitted, but the circumstances in which it is allowed to occur are now more tightly circumscribed.

Bibliographical Essay

In contrast to many of the other topics covered in this volume on the history of violence, scholars have not previously identified violence in sport as a discrete area of inquiry. There are, however, a number of different points of entry into the field. A good starting point is the field of sports history. Good recent introductions to the global history of sports can be found in J. A. Mangan (ed.), Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies (London: Taylor & Francis, 2001), David G. McComb, Sports in World History (London: Routledge, 2004) and Jeffrey Hill, Sport in History: An Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).


The history of hunting has generally attracted more scholarly attention than blood sports, but this is not usually worked around the concept of violence. For an introduction see Emma Griffin, Blood Sport: Hunting in Britain since 1066 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) and Richard Hummel, Hunting and Fishing for Sport: Commerce, Controversy, Popular Culture (Bowing Green, KY: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1994).

The literature on the history of human combat sports is more extensive, though not all of it is academic in nature. Some good introductions to the history of boxing in the
PART III

WARFARE, COLONIALISM AND EMPIRE IN THE MODERN WORLD
II
Frontier Violence in the Nineteenth-Century British Empire
AMANDA NETTELBEC AND LYNDALL RYAN

Typologies of Colonial Violence

In The Trouble with Empire, Antoinette Burton explores how violence accompanied the imperial project wherever it went. Arising from a perennial struggle between imperial expansionism and counter-resistance, she argues, violence emerged as an inherent feature of Britain’s colonial frontiers. Although it sometimes took the form of large-scale warfare, colonial violence predominantly manifested itself as innumerable, small-scale insurrections that perpetually called forth Britain’s military interventions.¹ The level of repressive violence that was required to shore up Britain’s fragile rule over its extensive territories belied its own understanding of itself as a harbinger of civilisation. Rather than representing a benign civilising force, the British Empire was a ‘great military machine’, as Richard Gott puts it, one that over an extended period pursued the widespread exploitation of peoples, lands and resources.² This is not to say that ideas of civilisation exist in a state of inevitable contradiction with violence. As the precedent of the Roman Empire had demonstrated, the violence of colonisation and a belief in its civilising potential had long gone hand in hand, and this was also true of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. Framed by the beginning of the Second British Empire (with American independence in 1783) and the end of the so-called imperial century (with the onset of World War I in 1914), the ‘long’ nineteenth century of the British Empire witnessed a period of unparalleled territorial growth accompanied by various forms of coercion.

In this respect, the consequences of colonisation for the peoples whose territories became part of the British Empire’s global map after 1783 took

more subtle forms besides conquest through military power. Justified on the 
grounds of taking British civilisation to the world, different kinds of cultural 
and institutional violence were imposed on colonised peoples through 
administrative measures that included the introduction of British law, the 
spread of British jurisdiction through offices of government, the systematic 
dismantling of Indigenous sovereignty, and the incarceration and cultural re-
education of Indigenous peoples. In myriad ways, therefore, the impacts of 
colonial violence could be witnessed not just in military campaigns and their 
resultant cycles of conflict and revolt, but also in the everyday working 
conditions of colonised labourers, in the assumed sexual availability of 
colonised women, in the prohibitions that were exercised over colonised 
people’s cultural practices, and in the forms of introduced legislation that 
dermined their political autonomy and social coherency.

However, while all these forms of physical and cultural violence were 
apparent in different degrees across the British Empire, frontier violence 
stands out as a particular feature of the British settler colonial world, where 
incoming settlers sought to displace Indigenous peoples from their home-
lands and turn those lands to new economic use. The economic forces that 
drove colonisation in Britain’s slave and plantation colonies, or that under-
pinned the model of company rule in British India, were shaped by access to 
natural resources such as mineral wealth or human labour. In distinction to 
these forms of ‘exploitative’ colonisation, the principal motivator of settler 
colonialism in the nineteenth century was the permanent acquisition and 
cultivation of land. Patrick Wolfe describes this core distinction between 
settler colonialism and colonialism per se as being grounded, quite literally, in 
the inherent value of the land itself. Because settler colonies such as the Cape 
Colony, Australia, New Zealand and British Canada were principally estab-
lished not to accrue economic benefit from labour or other extractable 
resources but to take possession of profitable territories from which 
Indigenous occupants would need to be dispelled, they were predicated on 
the elimination of native societies.

The ‘logic of elimination’ that defines settler colonialism, Wolfe stresses, 
not only encompassed physical violence – most characteristically in the form 
of frontier wars and homicide as strategies of conquest – but also entailed an 
array of institutional strategies through which colonial governments sought 
over time to render Indigenous peoples and societies ‘superfluous’. These 
strategies included an array of programmes of ‘resocialisation’ and assimila-
tion: ‘breeding out’ to eliminate Indigenous bloodlines; education schemes 
implemented by missionary and government schools that aimed to
permanently remove Indigenous children from the influence of their families and cultures; legal prohibitions to prevent Indigenous peoples from speaking their own languages or practising their own customs. Whereas other kinds of exploitative colonisation might come to an end once the value of colonised resources or labour had been extracted, settler colonialism’s enduring objective of dissolving and replacing Indigenous societies ensures that it functions as an ongoing ‘structure’ rather than a past ‘event’.

Lorenzo Veracini has elaborated on this structural distinctiveness of settler colonialism in terms of ‘sovereign entitlement’. While some models of economic colonialism enabled the metropolitan imperial power to remain significantly politically distinct from its colonies, settler colonialism was implemented ‘from within the bounds’ of settler colonial governments that carried an agenda of British sovereignty to the colonial peripheries and sought to recreate a model of British civilisation in the New World.

From the 1820s onwards the scope and scale of settler colonial migration around the British Empire increased exponentially with what James Belich has described as the ‘settler revolution’: a period of dramatic expansion in settler migration and entrepreneurialism through the early to mid nineteenth century that was made possible by new technologies in communication and travel, flourishing cross-colonial networks of trade, and burgeoning opportunities for economic investment in the colonies. The sheer pace and intensity of this settler explosion, Belich argues, had an overwhelmingly negative impact on Indigenous societies. While imperial expansion in an earlier era had remained sufficiently contained to allow Indigenous peoples to respond to colonial newcomers with strategies of resilience and adaptation, the explosive degree of settler migration that occurred from the 1820s onwards was unprecedented and devastating.

The Settler Colonial Frontier: Vacillations of Conciliation and Warfare

The dramatic increase in settler migration from the 1820s set the terms for the kind of frontier conflict that would continue across the British Empire for the

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remainder of the nineteenth century. As settler entrepreneurs sought to capitalise on expanding economic opportunities in the colonies, new frontiers spread out into territories where the presence of government remained fragile, or in some cases was yet to be established. With each new wave of settlement boom, flashpoints of violence erupted with Indigenous peoples who sought to protect their resources, communities and laws. The constant threat of Indigenous resistance to British rule prompted a range of responses from the imperial government and its colonial representatives that ranged from diplomacy and conciliation through to military and paramilitary force. As an important strategy of conciliation, the British government sought to negotiate treaties with Indigenous peoples in circumstances where their existing demographic strength and military power made diplomatic transaction the most prudent option. Whether or not the British government embarked upon treaty negotiations also tended to depend upon whether it recognised Indigenous models of law and political organisation as being sufficiently equivalent to British ones to warrant diplomatic discussions.

Ultimately, however, the existence of treaties offered no guarantee against the flaring of violence on the Empire’s settler frontiers; nor did treaties guard against unpredictable shifts in the fragile political landscape that led agreements of allegiance to change into conditions for warfare. In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840 between the Crown and more than 500 Māori chiefs formed the terms on which the British government secured the exclusive right to purchase Māori lands in order to advance sovereignty claims over the territories of New Zealand. However, the Treaty had not long been in existence before competing understandings of its terms took root as a set of conflicts over land, control and sovereignty. As James Belich has analysed, this conflict came to fruition in a series of costly frontier wars that took place between the mid 1840s and the early 1870s, in which 18,000 British troops were mobilised against 60,000 Māori who fought to defend an unbroken belief in Māori sovereignty.

Complex vacillations between peace negotiations and frontier warfare were also the experience on the northern and eastern frontiers of South Africa. South Africa represented the most diverse of Britain’s settler frontiers, each of which raised distinct questions about the methods and consequences of colonial violence. The northern frontier of the Cape Colony, which Britain

inherited from the Dutch in 1795, was already marked by violent warfare between the Khoisan, the San and Dutch settlers. According to Nigel Penn, this inheritance influenced British policy in the establishment of mission stations which would become a feature of all the Cape frontiers. It also led the Dutch to vacate the Northern Cape in 1833 in the Great Trek for the southern African interior, which in turn would create a new set of problems for the British. On the eastern frontier, strategies of conciliation and violence underwent complex turns over the nineteenth century, as Britain’s involvement in eastward expansion entailed the intervention of its troops in Boer/Xhosa wars. For the greater part of the nineteenth century, British settlement of the Eastern Cape unfolded not as a territorial sweep through Indigenous lands but as a series of cyclical shifts between treaties and frontier wars. The resistance of the Xhosa and their highly successful strategies as guerrilla fighters created persistent problems for the British in achieving governmental control. In its intensity of sustained conflict over a century, Noel Mostert has shown, the Eastern Cape frontier constitutes the most protractedly violent frontier zone in South Africa’s history.

At the same time, it must be recognised that the history of colonial violence is far more complex than can be encompassed by a settler colonial account of the frontier as a site of Indigenous dispersal and settler replacement. In the nineteenth century alone, colonial South Africa was shaped by shifting relationships between the Boers, the British and multiple African peoples. Far from being forced from their lands, many Indigenous peoples stayed in place in significant numbers, remaining in close proximity to British settlers who sought out their labour. In the south-east, Natal Africans were actively encouraged under the ‘Shepstone system’ to hold land as a farming peasantry, in the expectation that an ordered model of colonial governance would produce more enduring loyalty to British rule than violent conquest.

The complexity of colonialism in South Africa reminds us that the British Empire was shaped not by any one kind of frontier, but rather by a series of frontiers that worked in distinctive ways. Some colonial frontiers took the form of borders between competing polities, which jostled for power by negotiating through treaty or by competing through warfare. Other frontiers were much more permeable spaces through which colonial settlers and Indigenous groups moved in fluid capacities, and where violence arose in the intimate context of proximity, labour and economic exchange.¹³

The idea of an advance frontier that would introduce colonial order and thereby avoid the causes of open conflict between Indigenous people and settlers was tested in British Canada during the 1870s, when the dominion government sought to gain control over the vast prairie lands that stretched west from Manitoba to the Rocky Mountains. Unlike New Zealand and South Africa where frontier wars followed in the wake of short-term or thwarted treaties, the westward push of the Canadian frontier was relatively stable, planned as a process of laying down the framework of law and government before the arrival of settlers.¹⁴ The relative peace of western Canadian settlement compared to other British settler frontiers might also be attributed to the terms that coalesced on both sides to favour a state of allegiance rather than conflict. For Indigenous nations of the western prairies, the treaties negotiated with the dominion government through the 1870s were preceded by a long history of diplomatic and military exchange with the British Crown, and so represented an extension of an existing relationship. More pressingly, by the 1870s the increasing scarcity of the bison on the prairies had come to threaten a staple aspect of Indigenous people’s subsistence and economic life, and no doubt made the Crown’s promise of its protection and resources appear advantageous. From the dominion government’s point of view, acquiring access to Indigenous lands through diplomatic rather than forcible means was an urgent priority. Aside from the existing diplomatic links between Indigenous peoples and the British Crown in Canada, the Indigenous nations of the prairies together constituted a huge population and their combined military capacity was formidable; the possibility of conflict was both impolitic and imprudent.

However, the absence of frontier wars does not mean that Canadian settlement proceeded without coercion, threat of force, or enlistment of cultural violence against Indigenous people. Following the signing of treaties through the 1870s, Indigenous peoples were managed onto circumscribed reserve lands, which became whittled down as increasing numbers of settlers migrated west to take up land for farming and cattle ranching. Those bands who refused to accept treaties were coerced into submission, and Indigenous people’s promised rights as British subjects became increasingly limited under the statutory powers of control embodied in the federal Indian Act (1876) and its later amendments. As Gerald Friesen has put it, by the last decade of the nineteenth century Indigenous people were confined to a restrictive regime on reserves where they were managed as ‘wards of the state’, setting them upon ‘a very different course’ from Anglo-Canadian settler society’. While resistance did not often take the form of physical violence, Indigenous people have always actively protested the Canadian government’s interpretation of the treaties and its failures to protect Indigenous rights, arguing that the spirit of the treaties was to share the land’s resources, not to cede Indigenous sovereignty.

As a diplomatic strategy of imperialism, then, negotiating treaties with Indigenous peoples was not necessarily a measure that either secured the sovereignty of the British Crown or granted effective authority to its representatives in colonial government. As Richard Price observes, it was in the very nature of the settler colonial frontier to be fragile and unpredictable, because, by definition, the frontier was a space ‘where hegemony was constantly being negotiated and defended’. This was evident in New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, where treaties were forged only to become contested or negated in future years. However, in these settler colonial sites the imperial government had at least recognised the importance of Indigenous polities to the extent that it undertook to negotiate formally for Indigenous lands.

In the Australian colonies, by contrast, no formal transactions for Indigenous lands were ever pursued by the Crown, a decision justified on the perceived grounds that Australia’s Indigenous people’s political, legal and agricultural practices were not sufficiently developed to warrant such negotiations, and that they therefore already came within the Crown’s protection. This absence of a treaty-making tradition helped to determine how Australia’s colonial frontiers became defined by repeated, episodic conflict.

15 Friesen, Canadian Prairies, p. 128. 16 Price, Making Empire, p. 7.
that was fought opportunistically between Indigenous and settler groups or otherwise waged by colonial governments in periodic campaigns against resistant Indigenous populations. The imperial government’s failure to recognise Indigenous polities on their own terms also shaped the ways in which Australia’s patterns of frontier violence were treated by colonial authorities. In New Zealand and South Africa, the failure of treaties to secure lasting peace led ultimately to military campaigns that were openly acknowledged as warfare. In Australia, however, the concept that Indigenous peoples could already be deemed subjects of the Crown meant that frontier violence was handled, at least officially, not as warfare but as a form of civil insurgency.

A much-debated response to the dilemmas of violence with and against Indigenous peoples was the concept of protection, a policy initiative of the imperial government that evolved during the 1830s in the wake of the successful campaign to abolish slavery around the British Empire. The objectives of protective policy were outlined in the 1837 Report of a House of Commons Select Committee that had been established in 1835 to consider the status of the Empire’s Indigenous peoples and the question of how their rights and well-being could be reconciled with a British agenda of continuing colonisation. Much of the evidence that came before the Select Committee focused on the recent problems of frontier violence in the Cape Colony, but the devastating consequences of recent conflict with Indigenous people in Van Diemen’s Land also raised the prospect that ‘the whole of the native population’ could be eradicated by violence.17 The Select Committee Report argued that the best means to repress further conflict would be to proffer Indigenous people the benefits of British civilisation, including through the refuge of British law. Nowhere was this seen as being more urgent than in the Australian colonies, where in the face of settler violence and ‘the contamination of the dregs of our countrymen’, Indigenous people were perceived as being at risk of vanishing ‘from the face of the earth’.18

Through the 1840s, Aboriginal protectorates operated in New Zealand and several Australian colonies as a measure that authorities hoped would encourage Indigenous people’s conciliation to colonial culture, help to secure the Crown’s jurisdiction on fragile frontiers, and ultimately allow the causes


18 Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines, pp. 10–11.
of violent conflict to give way to new regimes of assimilation and order. By the mid 1850s, however, all of the protectorates established in the Australasian colonies had been wound down. In this critical period of the mid nineteenth century, a political shift towards granting settler colonies powers of self-government saw the metropole gradually loosen its oversight over Indigenous matters, leaving colonial governments with increasingly independent scope to deal locally with the ongoing problems of frontier violence.\(^{19}\)

**Indigenous Resistance and State Responses**

Wherever the British established white settler colonies, such as Australia, New Zealand, Rhodesia and Kenya, or expanded the territories of those acquired from other European powers, such as from the French in Canada and the Dutch in the Cape Colony, the Indigenous owners invariably made clear their resistance to British claims of sovereignty over their homelands. Acts of resistance could take non-violent forms, as was case when Indigenous peoples appealed to the Crown for recognition of their land rights.\(^ {20}\) Acts of violent resistance ranged from the raised spears of the Cadigal warriors shouting ‘warra, warra, warra’, ‘go away, go away, go away’, to the ships of the First Fleet as they prepared to enter Sydney Harbour in New South Wales in 1788, to the Xhosa chief who informed the British Governor of the Cape Colony in 1850 that unless his lands were returned he would mount an army against the British.\(^ {21}\)

While British settlers considered Indigenous land as a commodity that could be conquered, bought and sold, for the Indigenous owners it was the spiritual core of their being that defined who they were as a people. Whether or not Indigenous peoples were induced to make treaties with colonisers, as was the case in New Zealand, the Cape Colony and Canada, their connection to country remained paramount; indeed, the acceptance of treaties did not necessarily imply the ceding of lands to Indigenous peoples but the sharing of

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their resources. In the Australian colonies, where the British declined to conclude a treaty, the Indigenous people continued to point out that kinship, totem and country defined who they were as people. Across the settler colonial empire, Indigenous reaction to the invasion of their homelands was largely driven by their determination to force the settlers to observe protocols and treaties in relation to their country. Despite the efforts of missionaries and protectors, it was the settlers who usually broke the protocols and treaties, rather than the Indigenous landowners.22

Resistance largely took the form of guerrilla warfare that was common to Indigenous societies: that is, it ranged between small-scale guerrilla warfare, which typically involved payback for failure to observe protocols, and larger-scale traditional militarism that the British recognised as being parallel to its own military strategies. In the Australian colonies, Aboriginal resistance ranged from payback killings for unauthorised abduction of Aboriginal women and small-scale seasonal guerrilla-style attacks on settler farmhouses. These included raids for British rations of flour, tea and potatoes, maiming sheep and cattle and taking maize crops, all in retribution for the loss of food resources from the settler occupation of their hunting grounds.23 In the Cape Colony, the well-armed Khoisan warriors carried out large-scale cattle raids and attacks on settler villages as well as conducted up-front battles with British soldiers. In New Zealand, Māori warriors led raids on settler villages and farmhouses, and, when under attack from a large force of British soldiers, they retreated to their pa, or forts, from which they repelled British assaults with singular success.24 Before the 1850s, Indigenous peoples’ superior knowledge of the terrain often placed British forces at a disadvantage, with their limited access to horses and reliance on single-loading firearms.25 After the 1850s, however, as the British gained access to long-range repeating rifles, employed larger mounted forces and became more familiar with the terrain, they developed military strategies that were specifically designed to overcome Indigenous resistance. These included a ‘scorched earth’ policy used

against the Xhosa in the Cape Colony, ‘Flying Columns’ of mobile infantry deployed in New Zealand to surround Māori pa, burning down Xhosa and Māori villages in both colonial sites, and, on Australasian frontiers that remained beyond the reach of the law, a strategy of massacre. These frontier wars, however, were often conducted within a framework of legal exceptionalism in which the concept of legal procedure was modified to respond to Indigenous resistance. Principal among these strategies of legal exceptionalism were martial law and paramilitary policing, including use of Indigenous forces.

Martial Law

The use of martial law against subject peoples in the British Empire intensified in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, when military governors were appointed to the settler colonies. Their capacity to declare martial law empowered them effectively to suspend the ordinary rule of law. As the Colonial Office under-secretary James Stephen noted, martial law ‘is but another name for the suspension of all law; It is a measure which necessity justifies, but for which the Act of Indemnity is necessary for even when necessary it is illegal’. In 1867, legal commentator W. R. Finlason defined martial law as ‘the final power colonial governors could impose upon dissidents under their jurisdiction who were perceived to be in an act of rebellion’. He argued that martial law not only enabled colonial governors to use military force against all kinds of insurgent subjects across the empire and to render ‘immune from prosecution’ those government agents who disposed of insurgents, but also denied insurgents ordinary legal rights. Indeed, he considered that martial law was a necessary measure to control the empire, and that without it the empire would collapse.

Possibly the most notorious uses of martial law in the history of the British Empire until the end of the nineteenth century relate to Jamaica and India where it was used to put down large-scale uprisings with brutal efficiency. In the settler colonies, however, martial law was also used against resisting Indigenous peoples on the frontier as insurgent subjects of the colonial state. In denying Indigenous people sovereign status, the British used martial law in

26 James Stephen, Minute to Correspondence from George Grey Lt Governor of New Zealand to Gladstone, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Despatch No.109, 23 October 1846, National Archives, London, CO 325/53.
the settler colonies to secure fragile frontiers. As such it proved an extra-
ordinarily flexible mechanism that British governors could use in situations of
crisis to extend and consolidate the settler frontier. It could be used, for
example, to subdue Indigenous resistance in frontier regions, such as
Zuurveld District of the Cape Colony where it was proclaimed in 1811 to
drive the Xhosa out of the district and across the Great Fish River, or the
Bathurst Plains in New South Wales, where it was proclaimed for a period of
four months in 1824 so that a military campaign could ‘clear out’ the
Wiradjuri people who were resisting the settler invasion. It was also useful
in securing larger territories, such as the Settled Districts in Van Diemen’s
Land (Tasmania) where it was promulgated in 1828 to contain the violent
resistance of several Tasmanian Aboriginal nations. Two years later it was
extended across the entire island, and when it was revoked sixteen months
later in 1832, most of the Tasmanian Aborigines had been killed. Just as
flexibly, it could be used in response to a perception by settlers that a treaty
with Indigenous people had been abrogated. In New Zealand for instance,
between 1844 and 1845 and again in 1846, martial law was invoked in specific
regions of the North Island where settlers considered that Māori chiefs were
abrogating the Treaty of Waitangi. British troops were despatched to bring
them to justice, but in this case the chiefs outsmarted the British, who were
forced to sue for peace. Martial law would again be invoked between 1868
and 1872 in the second phase of the frontier wars before the two sides reached
a stalemate. Martial law could also be invoked in a very specific place for
a few days, to carry out summary punishment on specific Indigenous groups.
For example, in 1840 martial law was declared at a specific stretch of coastline
in the colony of South Australia so that a police party could arrest two
Milmenrura warriors, try them in an open court on the spot, and then
hang them on the site where twenty-four passengers from the ship Maria,
wrecked at the mouth of the Murray River a few weeks earlier, had been killed.
This was the largest single killing of settlers by Indigenous people in
the history of colonial Australia. In this case, martial law was used as an
instrument of terror in the hope that it would deter Indigenous attacks on
vulnerable settlers in the future.28

28 On the enlistment of martial law in these settings see Rande Kostal, A Jurisprudence of
Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);
Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Gott, Britain’s Empire, p. 178; Lyndall Ryan,
Belich, The New Zealand Wars, pp. 64–71; Julie Evans, ‘Colonialism and the Rule of Law:
The Case of South Australia’, in Barry S. Godfrey and Graeme Dunstall (eds.), Crime
The settler frontiers where martial law was invoked most often in the nineteenth century were the Cape Colony’s eastern frontiers between 1811 and 1860 and the North Island of New Zealand from 1844 to 1872. In each place, several thousand British troops were deployed over many decades to assert British sovereignty. On the eastern Cape frontier of the Xhosa homelands, the colonial government invoked martial law on at least ten occasions, sometimes for years at a time, and deployed British troops to suit the shifting requirements of colonial security: it was variously used to force the Xhosa to move from one part of their homelands to another, to ‘dispose’ of them for allegedly breaking treaties, to coerce them into particular areas, and to force them into British re-education camps. In New Zealand it appears to have been invoked on at least five occasions during the course of the frontier wars on the North Island. The powers of martial law were not necessarily limited to the colonial state’s capacity for military manpower. During the 1820s, for instance, the military powers available to the colonial government in Van Diemen’s Land were considerably extended by adding a call to arms of the civilian population to assist in wresting the land from the Indigenous owners. Martial law also conferred on other colonial officials, such as police and magistrates, the summary powers either to ‘dispose’ of ‘insurgents’ without arresting them, let alone bringing them to trial in a court of law, or to place them in detention in places such as Robben Island. As a key instrument for putting down Indigenous resistance with force, the principal purposes of martial law on the settler frontier were to secure the settler polity and to assert colonial claims to sovereignty over Indigenous lands.

Paramilitary Policing

By the mid 1830s, the astonishingly violent outcomes of martial law were causing deep concern in Britain amongst humanitarian politicians who

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Martial law was declared in the frontier wars in New Zealand in February 1846, March 1860, March 1862, May 1864 and January 1869. However, in The New Zealand Wars, Belich does not directly acknowledge the declaration of martial law, April 1845.


considered that the role of the British Empire was to Christianise and civilise the Indigenous peoples rather than exterminate them. A key principle of the 1837 Select Committee Report was that only by bringing Indigenous people within the pale of British law could the empire both achieve peace on its colonial borders and provide justice to Indigenous people. However, this was more easily imagined than achieved on settler frontiers where Indigenous people resisted colonial authority. After the early deployment of military forces to assert Crown sovereignty, local colonial police forces were seen as the principal legal instrument for bringing law and order to Britain’s settler frontiers. But whereas civil policing based on the English model of the London Metropolitan Police remained the ideal in settled towns, this was clearly ineffective on frontiers where British jurisdiction remained insecure, giving rise to a typology of paramilitary policing around the British Empire for ‘intermediate’ or frontier zones where Indigenous people and settlers competed for territory. From the late 1830s until the end of the nineteenth century, armed and mounted paramilitary police operated across the settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Cape Colony to extend and protect the authority of the colonial state.

In all these colonial sites, paramilitary policing became increasingly reliant upon the employment of Indigenous men, although Canada was exceptional in that it never employed dedicated Indigenous forces. Notably, an original intention of establishing ‘native police’ forces in the Australian colonies was not to secure colonial authority through force but to extend a ‘civilising’ influence by training young Indigenous warriors in the discipline of British civilisation. The authorities on the settler frontier in the Cape Colony were more pragmatic. They considered that a native police force formed from defeated Indigenous peoples would be a cheap and effective way of maintaining and extending the settler frontier. Over time, the latter view prevailed. By the mid nineteenth century, native police forces had become familiar across the empire as a special legal instrument that served as a cheap and effective way of suppressing Indigenous resistance.

35 For a humanitarian concept of a native police force, see Alexander Maconochie to the Editor, Murray’s Review, 16 January 1838.
The first native police forces established in the settler colonies included those formed in Queen Adelaide Province in the Cape Colony in 1836, in the Port Phillip District of New South Wales in 1837 and in New Zealand in 1841. Initially recruited from particular Indigenous groups in collaboration with ‘friendly chiefs’ and under the supervision of British officers, the recruits were issued with Western-style uniforms and rations at government expense. While the native police in Queen Adelaide Province were initially unarmed, their counterparts in the Port Phillip District and New Zealand not only carried firearms but were also mounted on horseback. Despite these differences, however, they each operated with the same purpose: to apprehend supposed culprits, to protect the white population on the extreme limits of the settler frontier, and to use their specialist knowledge to reconcile their people to settler rule. In the Port Phillip District, those considered ‘culprits’ included runaway convicts from New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), but in Queen Adelaide Province and in New Zealand they were exclusively Indigenous people who engaged in livestock theft or broke other laws of the settler hegemony. The native police quickly became an integral strand in the British web of control over settler frontiers, tracking down livestock theft, operating as informers and acting as messengers between the colonial authorities and Indigenous leaders. In this role they were a second line of defence against Indigenous resistance.

By the mid 1840s, all three groups were operating on the settler frontier as paramilitary forces in suppressing Indigenous resistance. By 1850, they were vastly expanded and deployed in coercing their people to accept British sovereignty. By then, however, the settler frontier had moved on and the forces in Queen Adelaide Province and the Port Phillip District were disbanded. Most members of the force in Queen Adelaide Province promptly deserted to the leading Xhosa chief who opposed the British, allowing several thousand rounds of ammunition to fall into his hands. Some of the Port Phillip native police sought employment in subsequent iterations of the native police force and others became important leaders in their community in promoting their rights as Indigenous people. In the new colony of British Kaffraria and in New Zealand, the duties of native police included regulating the flow of Xhosa and Māori looking for work, trying to control the illicit

arms trade, and forcing out Xhosa and Māori squatters from so-called undesirable locations and burning down their homes. The force in New Zealand was disbanded in the mid-1880s.\footnote{On the operation and disbanding of police forces in these different jurisdictions, see Watson, ‘African Sepoys?’, 72–7; Fels, \textit{Good Men and True}, pp. 237–57; Hill, ‘Maori Police’, 178–80.}

While these first native police forces had a temporary role in supporting the imposition of British authority, on the newly expanding frontiers of northern New South Wales and later Queensland the native police had a striking longevity as the first line of defence from their establishment in 1848 until the end of the nineteenth century. They were so successful in suppressing Aboriginal resistance that they became the prototype for the use of paramilitary violence in securing the settler frontier. The Queensland force became particularly notorious for the way that it ‘dispersed’ Aboriginal insurgents, over the course of half a century, without the requirement to declare martial law. From the 1870s, the force was largely deployed in ‘clearing’ new frontier regions of Aboriginal resistance before the settlers arrived, and was particularly effective in attacking Aboriginal encampments at night and killing the occupants. The troopers would then force the survivors onto reserves or pastoral runs and if they offered further resistance they could be sent to prison.\footnote{Jonathan Richards, \textit{The Secret War: A True History of Queensland’s Native Police} (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2008), pp. 1–4, 132–4.} Colonial authorities were reliant on the skills of Indigenous people to secure the settler frontier, while Indigenous people themselves undoubtedly had other motivations relating to their own social and political world for becoming involved in colonial policing. In this sense, the impact of ‘native policing’ may have been not only coercive but also a form of Indigenous adaptation to the structural changes wrought by settler colonialism.

**Conclusion**

The expansion of the British Empire through the nineteenth-century age of ‘explosive colonisation’ could not proceed without disregarding or directly subjugating the sovereign claims of existing peoples. Despite the imperial government’s objectives from the 1830s to govern the empire on the humanitarian principle that Indigenous people held shared rights as British subjects, continued colonial growth could not be achieved without ongoing physical, institutional and cultural violence. In the settler colonies in
particular, where increasing numbers of settlers jostled with Indigenous peoples over rights to land, the colonial project to domesticate new lands and replicate a model of British civilisation was made constantly problematic because the practical difficulties of conciliating and governing Indigenous peoples repeatedly challenged the assumption of British sovereignty.

As Wolfe has succinctly observed, in order for the settler colonial endeavour to be interrupted, ‘all the native has to do is stay at home’.40 Under conditions where Indigenous people and settlers were compelled to compete for access to the land and its resources, frontier violence became an endemic and cyclical feature of Britain’s settler colonies. While it is impossible to identify frontier death tolls with accuracy, the calculations put forward by historians for different sites are suggestive of the scale and impact of frontier violence around the empire. The human cost of violence on Australia’s colonial frontiers has been a contested question, but conservative estimates by historians Henry Reynolds and Richard Broome suggest that fatalities were in the range of 20,000 Indigenous people and 2,000 Europeans, or a rough ratio of 10:1. More recently, Raymond Evans has suggested that upwards of 24,000 Indigenous people died at the hands of the Queensland Native Police alone during the years of its operation. In New Zealand, historian James Cowan calculated that more than 2,000 Māori and more than 700 British lost their lives in the frontier wars that took place between 1845 and 1872. Historians have estimated that the longest and the most bitter of the serial wars on the eastern Cape frontier, the 1850–53 war, resulted in 16,000 Xhosa and 1,400 European casualties.41

Certainly, the expressions and intensity of frontier violence varied according to local differences, including the pace and concentration of settlement, the topography of terrain, and the question of how much settlers were dependent upon colonised labour. Yet behind these localised variations, Britain’s settler frontiers all confronted the experience of Indigenous

40 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, p. 1.
resistance, and colonial authorities across the empire responded with strategies of extraordinary legal force. These patterns shaped how frontier violence unfolded across the British Empire from the 1820s, and how it continued for more than a century thereafter.

**Bibliographical Essay**

Frontier violence has only recently become a recognised structuring theme of histories of British imperialism. Philippa Levine’s excellent overview of the rise and fall of British imperialism, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (London: Routledge, 2013), deals with frontier violence and Indigenous dispossession as an inevitable consequence of colonial conquest. Other recent works that give more targeted attention to the nature of the British Empire as a site of contested power struggle and Indigenous resistance are Antoinette Burton’s *The Trouble with Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and Richard Gott’s *Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt* (London: Verso, 2011). However, although frontier violence is relatively new as a trans-imperial subject of study, it has flourished as one of the most important themes structuring regionally specific histories of the British Empire.


Frontier violence has been valuably theorised through a number of particular frames. One of the most controversial of these is the question of whether the violence of colonial conquest in Britain’s settler colonies constituted genocide. Key works exploring this question are Mohamed Adhikari’s anthology *Genocide on Settler Frontiers* (New York: Berghahn, 2014) and Patrick Woolf’s *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016), both of which focus on the concept and comparison of genocide.
The History of Violence, Large and Small

In this chapter I re-examine the European conquest of Africa in a critical dialogue with German philosopher Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). This book first proposed understanding the violence of Europe’s twentieth century through imperialism and the conquest of Africa, placing what had been understood as separate and unrelated episodes within a single analytical frame. Arendt thus offers a valuable perspective from which the African conquest and its particular histories of warfare can be thought of within a general history of violence. This task presents challenges. Violence reveals itself best in its local and contingent dimensions. Every assassination, riot, lynching, battle, mass killing, strike or famine carries within itself an overdetermined set of causes. The same holds true for occasions of violence occurring outside of the event, the violence of pollution, poverty, hunger and illness. The historian pulling a fine-toothed comb through the sources best grasps each instance’s specific logic as well as how it is embedded in otherwise invisible economic systems and social structures. But how can historians think about relations between these phenomena across time and space in ways that do not rely on abstractions, closed systems and pre-determined patterns?

Arendt’s merit reveals itself precisely in the fact that *Origins* does not present a master narrative or overarching theory of totalitarian violence, identifying precursors and tracing developments as conventional historiography might attempt. Indeed the ‘origins’ of the book’s title misleads many readers. Arendt does not concern herself with identifying an original point from which totalitarianism developed. Moreover, by ‘origins’ she did not mean ‘causes’. Causality implies a sequence of events, where one event can be explained by a preceding event. Arendt argues instead that the ‘event
illuminates its own past, but it can never be deduced from it. (Many scholars directly inspired by Arendt fail to grasp this nuance, as I will discuss below.) Her argument depends upon identifying violence’s ‘elements’, or the constitutive ideas and practices that ‘crystallised’ in the first half of the twentieth century. Among the many who have been inspired by Origins to reread modern violence it is perhaps only the scholar Enzo Traverso who has fully grasped this specific point when he writes in his Origins of Nazi Violence that his goal ‘is to seize upon the elements of civilizational context in which that regime existed, elements that throw light upon it and, retroactively, can be seen to constitute its “origins”’. We see here something of Walter Benjamin’s better-known understanding of an event as a constellation of historical forces rather than their culmination. The massive violence of the mid twentieth century then appears as something of a perfect storm, neither an aberration nor a continuation but ‘one permutation among an infinite number of possible configurations, conjunctions and correspondences’. This neatly departs from standard historical arguments with cause–effect questions concerning the continuity and discontinuity of violence, its long and short durée. Properly understood, Arendt’s ‘origins’ helps historians separate the causes of violence from its effects, while highlighting what Michel Foucault separately called genealogy, namely history’s ‘wavering course’, its ruptures, lack of stable forms and, ultimately, its heterogeneity, even to itself. This is especially important for the study of violence, with its traumas and related epistemological crises that seed the archive with aporia, fissures and gaps.

There are, however, perils to this project. Arendt’s readers have commented upon the difficult, improbable structure of the book. (Origins consists of three volumes: along with the second volume on imperialism is a first tome on anti-Semitism and the third volume on totalitarianism.) Moreover, Arendt’s method strikes some as intuitive, even improvised. Even if one dispenses with reading Origins as a whole and focuses only on its volume for imperialism and Africa, as I propose here, the material can be problematic. First and foremost, there is the fact that Arendt knew very little about Africans or Africa despite the centrality of this place to her analysis. Indeed she may have harboured antipathy towards the continent, especially in the period when she finished writing Origins and the decades after when Africans threw off European rule. Decolonisation occurred with the violence that she abhorred and a sharp critique of European norms that she held dear, as she made clear in her 1970 essay, On Violence. This may account for the fact that, although she condemns racism as one of the most dangerous legacies of imperialism, she has no qualms approaching colonised Africans from the same prejudicial perspective as her sources, even placing people of colour ‘outside language . . . outside politics, outside reason’, as her most trenchant critic has put it. Moreover, apart from the most famous figures, like Cecil Rhodes, Carl Peters and Lord Cromer, she knew precious little about imperialism’s agents. That many of these agents were not Europeans never seems to have entered Arendt’s mind.

Finding a ‘Black Arendt’ in Africa

It is therefore useful to begin this chapter by situating Arendt’s Origins with respect to African historiography, a task that is especially urgent because few have undertaken it. Africanist historians understand imperialism and colonialism very differently from Arendt. The German philosopher saw Europeans imposing themselves on closed and unchanging African societies; history proper begins in her mind only when Europeans arrive. By contrast, African studies first constituted itself as a field (at about the same time that Arendt was writing Origins) precisely in response to these sorts of views ‘which saw

Africans as the passive backdrop to the deeds of white proconsuls and missionaries. It did not take long for Africanists to dispense with these stereotypes, even writing histories of the imperial and colonial era where Europeans are largely absent. In the early 1980s eminent first-generation Africanist Roland Oliver could write confidently that ‘African history throughout this period pursued paths still largely separate from those of the European colonisers . . . Even by the end of the period, only a small minority of Africans had seen a white face or had any idea that their countries were subject to foreign rule.’ Rather than the celebrated European ‘scramble for Africa’ of the textbooks, Africanists found a more important internal African scramble led by expanding African states which defined the continent’s nineteenth-century history. ‘Thus, some African leaders viewed Europeans as allies and partners in essentially local struggles of some antiquity: Europeans, essentially, were co-opted into African wars, using African troops.’

Thus, Africanists’ priorities have diverged substantially from Arendt’s interests. They have explored the interdependence of Europeans and Africans and even the dependence of the colonisers on the colonised. This included various systems of indirect rule deployed by Europeans wherein colonised people ruled themselves, with the colonisers using local networks reworked to their interests. Africans also played the essential role of intermediaries and proxies of imperialism, as tax collectors, translators, school-teachers, clerks, interpreters, even as ‘violent intermediaries’ as was the case for the askari forces in German East Africa studied by historian Michelle Moyd. In the early case of Algeria, where France had made major commitments of treasure and blood by the 1840s and where many found genocide an attractive solution to the so-called ‘Indigenous question’, generals and ministers recognised that they needed Algerian labour if European settlers were to have a chance in the rough-hewn, former Ottoman province. Thus nearly everywhere across colonial era Africa, the infamous command

‘exterminate all the brutes’ from Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* had to reconcile itself to the fact that European successes depended as much upon mobilising Africa’s human resources as it did on exploiting raw materials, farmlands and ports.¹⁵

Ultimately, Africanists have shown that colonialism and imperialism mutually transformed Africans and Europeans. In the case of European missionaries, for example, ‘a protracted dialogue based in part on misrecognition, in part on shared interests, in part on alliances across the very lines that divided them’, constituted social relations with Africans.¹⁶ This went beyond social and political relations to transform understandings of something as fundamental as race. Historian Bruce Hall writes that African and European notions of race emerged in a dialogic process: ‘Africans brought rich vocabularies and developed concepts about the social world in which they lived into their relationships with Europeans, just as colonial officials carried a late-nineteenth century conceptual vocabulary of race, nation, and tribe . . . it would be a big mistake not to recognize that this was a two-way process.’¹⁷

It might be, however, that these historiographical insights produce their own forms of blindness. Notably the violence of the European conquests can fade or even disappear from the historian’s attention. Today, there are few Africanist or Middle Easternist historians in the Anglo-American world who focus on the colonial era’s episodes of mass violence. Fears of neo-orientalism influence in part this reticence to focus on violence. For example, historian of Algeria James McDougall has pointed to the dangers of violence studies in an influential 2005 article that warns how this research risks reproducing colonial stereotypes. He writes, ‘However many savage wars Algeria may have suffered, Algerians have not thereby been collectively brutalized into thinking with savage minds.’¹⁸ It is hard to disagree with a statement like this, but it leads to my concern that important parts of history might be foreclosed to research if this sort of historiographical gatekeeping becomes predominant. Exceptions to this trend are Africanist scholars trained at continental European universities such as Jan-Bart Gewald, and African scholars who

¹⁵ A notable exception for the period of high imperialism is the German General von Trotha’s ‘Extermination Order’ (1904) for the Herero. (See Bibliographical Essay for relevant sources.)


maintain a sharpened postcolonial consciousness, like Toyin Falola, Mahmood Mamdani and Achille Mbembe.¹⁹ For scholars of Africa working in African universities, Algeria for example, colonial violence is a mainstay of the field in spite of the censure their work faces in Europe and the United States.

What then to make of Arendt? Even as she brings Africa into the origins of European totalitarianism, and she places the question of violence at the centre of colonial-era African history, she fails to recognise the role of Africans. Ultimately the problem hinges on the fact that Arendt sees imperialism and its violence as a problem for Europeans, not for Africans. Karuna Mantena puts this in strong terms: ‘Arendt’s interest in imperialism is limited to how imperialism impinges upon, and indeed radically disrupts, the moral and political coordinates of Europe, and has very little to say in terms of its specific and catastrophic legacy for the ex-colonial world.’²⁰ While Mantena does not fully contextualise *Origins*, which was written when the world was hardly yet ‘ex-colonial’, she does nicely point out Arendt’s inability to see non-Europeans as significant historical actors. Africans do appear in *Origins* but hardly in ways that advance our understanding of colonial violence. They play a central role in the book’s sections concerning full-blown modern racism, which she argues had only punctuated European thought in the nineteenth century until imperialism made it a principle of politics and a permanent feature of social thought. Africans triggered what Arendt called the ‘shattering experiences’ felt by Europeans who encountered Africans, somehow shocking in their physical appearance, and race served these Europeans as an ‘emergency explanation’ for all of this. Arendt’s understanding of ‘shattering’ has little to do with the actual force of African resistance, for example the victories won by the Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir (d. 1883) in northern Africa or Samori Touré (d. 1900) in western Africa, who are not mentioned in *Origins*. Quite the opposite: the racial shock experienced by Europeans is associated with

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her view that to Europeans, Africans ‘were as incomprehensible as the inmates of a madhouse’. 21 Thus Arendt fails to understand that whatever shattering occurred was a result of the Europeans’ own pre-existing racism towards people of colour. The sort of ‘Africans’ who Arendt has in mind come from the slanted sources available to her and her entirely unnuanced, uncritical reading of them. Working from accounts penned by journalists like Selwyn James’s South of the Congo (1943), Arendt conveys a vision of the ‘Dark Continent’ as a primeval land inhabited by ‘savages’ (both terms used by Arendt without irony). 22 Thus she writes:

Whether these [Africans] represent ‘prehistoric man’, the accidentally surviving specimens of the first forms of human life on earth, or whether they are the ‘posthistoric’ survivors of some unknown disaster which ended a civilization we do not know. They certainly appeared rather like the survivors of one great catastrophe which might have been followed by smaller disasters until catastrophic monotony seemed to be a natural condition of human life. 23

The reader will recognise echoes between Arendt’s post-apocalyptic representation of Africans and Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. The novel is a key source for her, so influential that she occasionally mixes her own voice with Conrad’s words, producing the sort of ventriloquism apparent in this passage above. 24 Conrad knew a good deal about Africa, but Heart of Darkness is a novel, not a history. Although Arendt was a sophisticated analyst of texts, she subjected Conrad’s complex novel to a straight reading, using it as a source of empirical information. 25 She can then be accused of being a ‘bloody racist’, an accusation that writer and critic Chinua Achebe levelled in 1977 against Conrad, having himself, it would seem, also read Conrad straight. 26

What then to do with Arendt in Africa? Certainly, one can say that Arendt’s dated Origins fits with enormous difficulty into African studies. Thus, recent

22 Selwyn James, South of the Congo (New York: Random House, 1943).
23 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 192.
scholars who contend that Arendt merits consideration as a postcolonial thinker need to seriously account for her Eurocentrism, prejudices towards people of colour and antipathy towards decolonisation.27 My point is not to find a place for her in African historiography but to highlight points from which a fruitful framing of questions relating to violence and Africa might occur. In this respect, if Martin Bernal was correct to look for a Black Athena to counter the racism of European ‘Hellenomaniacs’, and if Susan Buck-Morss showed similar vision in seeking a better understanding of Hegel in Haiti (where the deeply prejudiced philosopher found inspiration for his master–slave dialectic in the real struggles of black slaves), then I too suggest that Arendt can be critically appropriated in ways useful to students of the conquest of Africa.28 As flawed and dated as they are, Arendt’s writings provide a useful point for making sense of modern violence, revealing in particular the importance of areas outside of Europe as fertile grounds for research.

The ‘Boomerang Thesis’

Most readings of Origins concerned with imperialism centre on what is known as the ‘boomerang thesis’ or what Arendt herself calls the ‘boomerang effect’. Arendt’s usage of this term shifts in the book, making it difficult to pinpoint her ideas accurately. And in spite of its importance to Arendt’s later readers, the term ‘boomerang effect’ only appears four times in the 600-page book, putting the boomerang thesis on thin foundations.29 In the most general terms, one might think of this question within Arendt’s overall argument that Europe’s civilising process derailed itself in imperialism’s racism, rapacious expansion and lawless rule. Imperialism ‘led to an almost complete break in the continuous flow of Western history as we had known it for more than two thousand years’, Arendt writes, and this served as ‘a preparatory stage for coming catastrophes’.30 Practices and thoughts that developed in Africa returned to Europe in totalitarianism. Thus, scholars evoking the boomerang thesis will generally write about imperialism’s

‘creating the conditions of possibility’ for totalitarianism, or that ‘imperialism had set the stage for totalitarianism’.31 This interpretation informs the work of two researchers who have undertaken studies emblematic of how the boomerang thesis has been used to link imperialism and the Holocaust, and it points to their shortcomings. The first is French scholar Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison and his 2005 book Coloniser, exterminer: sur la guerre et l’État colonial (Colonise, Exterminate: On War and the Colonial State). The second is German historian Jürgen Zimmerer, who has published a series of studies since the early 2000s. Le Cour Grandmaison’s book concentrates on the links between the Holocaust and France’s conquest of Algeria (1830–71). This conquest is regularly upheld by historians as one of the most violent of Europe’s modern global expansion. It ravaged Algerian society, which lost roughly half of its precolonial population of 3–4 million people to the direct violence of military encounters, as well as the famines, epidemics and emigration triggered by the conquest.32 As such, it serves Le Cour Grandmaison as a case from which he will deduce the ‘origins’ of the Holocaust. Coloniser, exterminer takes as its primary sources the accounts published contemporaneous to the conquest. Hardly hidden from the public view, the violence was well known at the time. Along with those condemning it were those who celebrated it in dangerous groundbreaking theories of genocide. These included plans to ‘make disappear, by means of a war of annihilation, all life deemed useless, a nuisance, or dangerous’33 Thus he argues that French colonialism has to be understood primarily as a project of extermination, a point announced clearly in the book’s title.

Le Cour Grandmaison takes up the boomerang thesis and seems to share Arendt’s understanding that colonialism diverted the trajectory of European history. Thus the ‘constraints and self-restraint effective in Europe fell apart over there’.34 Military practices forged in Algeria travelled to France in incidents such as the army’s crushing of the 1848 workers’ movement (known as the ‘Bedouin of the metropole’), along with the laws of exception first imposed on Muslims in Algeria, and then on non-citizens and Jews in France, as well as, finally, in more diffuse ways, an early ‘brutalisation’ of

33 Le Cour Grandmaison, Coloniser, exterminer, p. 128. 34 Ibid., p. 196.
European society, one that occurred well before 1914–18 when George Mosse first observed its importance. Ultimately, ‘what was perpetrated in Algeria constitutes a disturbing precedent . . . and a major rupture’, with new forms of violence specific to colonial contexts appearing on the European continent. These transformed thinking about the nature of human life, and these in turn shifted political relations by enlarging the boundaries of state violence. In sum, Le Cour Grandmaison sees these as so many ‘new “red threads”’ beginning in Algeria and leading to the totalitarian disasters’.36

Finding the same red threads preoccupies German historian Jürgen Zimmerer, who seeks the links between imperial Germany’s genocide of the Herero (1904–8) in Namibia and the Nazi’s brutal occupation of eastern Europe and the Holocaust. Zimmerer argues that Nazi policies in the Holocaust must be studied alongside German imperialism in Africa. Building upon a famous 1941 quote of Hitler – ‘Russian territory is our India’ – Zimmerer argues the Nazis looked to the short-lived projects of German imperialism (the Allies stripped Germany of its empire after 1918) as well as to the successful empires of the British and French to conceive their later plans for Europe. ‘Nazi policies for the occupied areas of Poland and the Soviet Union must also be viewed as part of the global historical tradition of colonial rule’, he writes.37 The way in which a boomerang returns to Europe from Africa is considered in a number of guises, what Zimmerer calls ‘transmission channels’, such as the personnel who worked first in the German colonial administration and then for the Nazis. Zimmerer’s most important contribution comes in response to his question, ‘Where did the idea that an entire people could simply be “exterminated” come from, on what discursive conditions did it rest?’38 He finds answers in an ‘archaeology of genocide’, or the common discursive formations and the archive of experiences on which the Nazis drew. This brings Michel Foucault into Zimmerer’s conceptual and theoretical scaffolding, adopting the French philosopher’s early ‘archaeological’ project of understanding the historical conditions that make certain forms of thought possible in a given moment. Archaeology thereby gives Zimmerer a way to constitute an ‘origin’ for Nazi violence in a conventional sense. ‘European colonialism is an important historical starting point for the Nazis’, Zimmerer writes, ‘as it rests on

fundamentally similar concepts of space and race to those at the heart of the Nazi policy of expansion and murder. Thus Africa gave ‘precursors’ and ‘precursors’ for Nazi ideology and policy.

Both Le Cour Grandmaison and Zimmerer have taken a great deal of fire. Reviewers in France attacked *Coloniser, exterminer* in shrill terms that faulted the book with a litany of errors, including, it would seem, its having reanimated controversial arguments previously used by lawyer Jacques Vergès to draw analogies between French colonialism and Nazism in his defence of Klaus Barbie at the highly divisive 1987 trial. And Zimmerer’s historiographically more influential body of work was subjected to negative reviews in the English-speaking academic world, as well as scepticism from many scholars. Besides sending something of a chilling effect into the field of colonialism and violence studies (especially for Algerian studies in France), such reviews failed to identify what I take to be the principal problem with both authors’ arguments and the boomerang thesis overall: first, it puts forth a very conventional and un-Arendtian understanding of ‘origins’, and, secondly, it relies on a problematic diffusionist model for its perspectives on Africa. As stated above, Arendt clearly refused the notion that totalitarianism had an originary place, a starting point on a timeline, but argued instead that it emerged from a complex process composed of many different elements. (These included ‘tribal nationalism’, social imperialism, secret governance, arbitrary rule by decree and the crisis of the nation state.) Arendt’s rich understanding of temporality and causation disappears in the boomerang thesis’s standard search for starting points. In sum, I suggest that the boomerang thesis fails to account for violence’s historicity. It can be said in this respect that, like words, practices change meanings over time, ideas lose their original logic, policies disguise themselves (even to themselves), displacement


transforms thought and affect, and goals must be improvised, often on the
spot. Thus every act of violence, especially extreme violence like genocide, is
in some way particular to itself.

Nevertheless, the boomerang might serve as an appropriate metaphor
for analysis if it is precisely understood as a thrown object, rather than
used generically to denote a circular relationship. This idea can be framed
by a quotation slip from the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘Boomeranging is
dangerous for on-lookers, till the thrower is a perfect master of his
weapon.’ The danger referred to here is the fact that a boomerang
does not just ‘come back’ from another direction or place. The path
traced by this weapon is in fact counterintuitive because it can hit its
target from a different direction, even in reverse to the position of the
thrower. As a metaphor then, the boomerang places specific require-
ments upon those seeking comparative or trans-historical understanding
of violence and genocide. Although it is studied ‘from Sparta to Darfur’,
genocide is the outcome of complex processes bound to the specific force
of change and constellation of elements produced in a given time, as
Arendt argues.42 This means that the outcome of this process will be
different at different moments, making precise historicisation critical and
fixed trans-historical concepts problematic. Here we can look to the
lessons of Foucault with regard to genealogy, and his point that nothing
is immutable.43 This observation leads to my second point: in the boom-
erang thesis Africa figures simply as a precursor to later developments in
Europe plotted along a linear course, or, more bluntly stated, Africa
serves simply as a place where Europeans start doing bad things. While
Arendt’s prejudicial accounts of Africans are gone in the recent scholar-
ship, so too are Africans for the most part, who figure only in abstract
form as victims. The insights of African historiography regarding the
dialogic nature of colonial relations do not enter into analysis. This
deployment of the boomerang, focusing on beginnings and points of
origin, can be contrasted with Isabel Hull’s conclusions on the institu-
tional culture of the German military during their devastating African
campaigns against the Herero. While she pays little attention to Africans
and African historiography, Hull provides important insights by remain-
ing close to her European sources. She finds that German officers
‘learned nothing from colonial warfare that did not confirm their

42 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to
43 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’.

257
prejudices about the correct way to fight wars’. In other words, colonial Africa served only as a testing ground for practices originating elsewhere. On the same note, one might add for the French in Algeria that their own strategies and tactics, centred on punitive raids called ‘razzias’, probably originated not in northern Africa, despite the misleading name, but during the revolution’s campaigns.

Power and Violence

Arendt did not, of course, scapegoat African events for Europe’s violence, and she cannot be faulted with teleology. Origins consists precisely of arguments that correspond to the perplexing course of a true boomerang-like violence with its strange turns and multiple pathways, along with its contingencies and its ruptures. In this final section, I briefly highlight one of these, what might be called a hyperbolic notion of power that Arendt identifies in imperial ideologies. This does not respond to all concerns that emerge from Arendt’s work on imperialism – notably it does not solve the problems posed by African historiography – but it highlights the ways of rethinking violence that I previously pointed to, including the need to properly historicise and theorise the violence of Africa’s conquest. The section of Origins that interests me opens with a comment made by Cecil Rhodes that Arendt cites as an epigraph: ‘I would annex the planets if I could.’ Rhodes’s hubristic astro-imperialism nicely frames Arendt’s study of a truly imperial conception of power, as something inherently limitless and unbounded, and she presents the strange path by which it intersects physical violence. Normally separate politico-discursive fields and the ways that they interact with each other in a larger field of power are important to parsing this argument. Rather than locating violence in semi-autonomous, inward-looking fields, like Hull’s study of the development of extremism within the German military’s planning, Arendt focused her attention on how fields overflow their particular spheres, even ‘colonising’ neighbouring fields with their values, assumptions, protocols and concepts. It is precisely such a transposition from one field to another, Arendt argues,

46 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 121.
that informs Rhodes’s bizarre comment, namely how economic logic became political principle, resulting in the lawless and violent process of global expansion that was imperialism.

Like several generations of scholars, Arendt follows J. A. Hobson’s *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) towards the links uniting imperialism and capitalism.47 Unlike Hobson’s Marxist readers, however, she does not see the state as the simple instrument of capitalists, even if she accepts the view that the state did capitalism’s bidding. The originality of her argument in comparison to Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg and their own readings of imperialism comes from the fact that Arendt maintains clear distinctions ‘between capitalism as an economic system, the bourgeoisie as a social class, and the nation state as a political formation’, as philosopher Seyla Benhabib writes.48 Moreover, Arendt historicises these distinctions, pointing to a sort of division of labour that existed prior to the imperial era, when, for example, the bourgeoisie and capitalism recognised a separate sphere for the state.49 This changed in the imperial era when the boundaries that separated these institutions and their distinct norms collapsed. In this sense, whereas Lenin saw imperialism as the last stage of capitalism, Arendt saw it as the first stage in the political triumph of the bourgeoisie.

This triumph was marked by economic concepts and ideals making their way into the sphere of political philosophy and transforming the norms of the liberal (or liberalising) state. The never-ending economic accumulation sought by capitalism transformed itself into a never-ending accumulation of power.

Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism. Since it implies neither temporary looting nor the more lasting assimilation of conquest, it is an entirely new concept in the long history of political thought and action. The reason for this surprising originality – surprising because entirely new concepts are very rare in politics – is simply that this concept is not really political at all, but has its origin in the realm of business speculation, where expansion meant the permanent broadening of industrial production and economic transactions characteristic of the nineteenth century.50

So rather than a break in the civilising process caused by soiling one’s hands in overseas conquest, Arendt points to this transposition which changed the political field, and with it the foundations of the state. The ‘unlimited accumulation of capital’ transforms itself into the ‘aimless accumulation of power’ at the level of the state.\(^{51}\) This resulted in bounded nation states becoming rogue imperial juggernauts, with politics, like the capitalist economy, conceived not nationally but globally.\(^{52}\) The broad spectrum of norms and political values that animated liberalism – human rights (or ‘the rights to have rights’), rule of law and consent of the governed are cited by Arendt – narrowed to the pursuit of profit and power.\(^{53}\)

**Conclusion**

It is in this circuitous way that European imperialism can, even from the weak position it occupied in Africa, produce no small amount of violence. Arendt puts her emphasis on the undermining of liberal values, a point that she’ll develop further in her problematic effort to distinguish violence, power and the law in *On Violence* (notions that do not easily separate themselves). But *Origins* provides rich suggestions for understanding how the *transposition* of distinct norms and values contributed to *transgression* and a generalised climate of normlessness. If many of Arendt’s conclusions and assumptions prove not satisfying, the questions she poses to her sources and framing of the project are worth consideration. In this sense I see Arendt less in need of a ‘historical turn’, as some have proposed, than I see the importance of the history of violence making a self-reflexive theoretical turn.\(^{54}\) In this case, Arendt helps historians see that general rules and ‘origins’ of violence are not reliably deduced from individual events, any more than individual events can be understood separately from larger processes. How they come together in fateful, contingent episodes provides historians with some of their most meaningful understandings of violence, large and small.

**Bibliographical Essay**

Hannah Arendt (1906–75) wrote *The Origins of Totalitarianism* in English, and the original title was *The Burden of Our Time* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1951). She later rewrote the book in her native German (Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, [Elements and Origins of Total Rule] (Munich: Piper, 2013 [1955])). Her other major works

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 137.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. xviii, 143.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 269.  
\(^{54}\) King and Stone, ’Introduction’, p. 6.


Among those whom Arendt inspired to read Nazism through imperialism, Enzo Traverso’s *Origins of Nazi Violence*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 2003) nicely negotiates away from a diffusionist ‘boomerang thesis’. The cultural links between Nazism and imperialism are explored in Jared Poley, *Decolonization in Germany: Weimar Narratives of Colonial Loss and Foreign Occupation* (Berne: Lang, 2005). Nearly all of the other major works in this field are noted in chapter 5 of Dan Stone’s *Histories of the Holocaust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), with the exception of Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison. The field of comparative genocide studies refers to Arendt, even if the nuances of her ‘crystallisation’ method are often ignored. A useful introduction to

Religious Dynamics and the Politics of Violence in the Late Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Levant

HANS-LUKAS KIESER

When religion offers an incentive to perform violent acts, killing and death appear as ultimately meaningful. Violence, in these circumstances, becomes an affirmation of identity, that is, a confession of faith and belonging. When there exists, at the same time, a lack of faith in a viable political project, violence can become the ultimate act of self-affirmation through killings and, possibly, self-immolation. The ‘Islamic State’ (IS; or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) of the twenty-first century is a particularly blatant example of an organisation with such a connection between religion, violence and death, labelled jihad. Its credo can be condensed as ‘I am, because I kill (neco, ergo sum), and even the more so if I die.’ The IS drew explicitly on certain Islamic as well as modern Islamist tenets, but it also emerged as a reaction to the neo-conservative US invasion of Iraq. Whether experienced, feared or pretended, Western power had served since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt as an argument used to perpetrate intra-societal violence against non-Muslims, who were considered as agents of hostile global powers. ‘Levant’ designates here the core lands of the late Ottoman Empire: today’s Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel.

The war in Syria in the 2010s, has been an extremely violent phenomenon. A civil war with various changing domestic fronts, it has become, since its beginning in 2011, the scene of an international struggle involving the main regional and global powers. Together with neighbouring Iraq, Syria at war has displayed a new and deep Sunni–Shiite divide and given room to an extremist eschatological experience of a self-declared Islamic state. Turkey, the Western powers’ NATO partner, has turned to domestic authoritarianism under the dominant AKP party (the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party, is led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), and to a political

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Sunni Islam tinged by neo-Ottomanism. Since 2016, it teaches the virtues of jihad in its schools. Such neo-imperial confessionalism has determined AKP Turkey’s active partisanship at the side of Islamist forces during the war.

Thus, the Levant and the world have become considerably different since and because of these recent violent events. Fundamental historical rethinkings have to take these core lands into account and to concede that religion has a real place and power in history, and that this was the case during the whole modern era. The modern Levant’s most violent period was the last Ottoman decade (1912–22), which included the Balkan Wars, the First World War, genocide, internationalised civil wars and massive refugee issues, many of them consequences of deliberate ethno-religious cleansing. Analogous violent patterns continued to haunt the region in various guises after former violence was implicitly endorsed by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the diplomatic foundation of a precarious post-Ottoman order in the Middle East and the supposed solution of the Eastern Question.

This chapter concentrates on two related aspects: domestic jihad in late Ottoman and post-Ottoman times; and the more general connection between public violence, religion and eschatology. Since the late eighteenth century, public violence in the midst of society, committed along religious lines, has been a remarkable feature in the modern Levant. In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was still a giant, stretching from Anatolia and the Balkans to the South Caucasus, Iraq, greater Syria, the Arabic peninsula and North Africa. In contrast to contemporary states in or originating in Europe, or to Russia (its most feared and most hated adversary), the Ottoman Empire lost territory, and could not expand continentally or through colonies or frontiers. In religious, ethnic and linguistic terms, it was more diverse in its core lands than any other contemporary empire. Factors such as the concentration of ethno-religious diversity, a unique depth of thousands of years of written history, monotheist eschatology on the revelation of final futures in a biblical, Koranic, Sunni and Shiite Hadithic geography, and ideologies like Islamism and Zionism have made the late and post-Ottoman world a modern global hot spot of unresolved conflicts and produced a theatre of violence with global ramifications.

This chapter argues that modern coexistence among different groups is not viable without social contracts. However, stark communitarian and eschatological traditions have particularly prevailed in the modern Levant, aborting any sustained efforts at establishing such contracts being based on egalitarian relations. Even those states and movements that sidelined political Islam, like Kemalism (the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey under Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk), could do so only for restricted periods of time, without achieving societal peace. Divisive Muslim, Christian and Jewish eschatologies provide religious visions of an ultimate future, thus adding to the sense of incommensurate existence – although the pragmatics of life call for a decent, contracted coexistence. Yet successful pragmatics depends upon viable tenets of faith in political philosophy, theology and eschatology.

The chapter starts with a general introduction, followed by sections on public violence and eschatology; the Eastern Question as interrelated with violence against Ottoman Christians; and a close focus on the Levant’s most violent decade – the 1910s – followed by the Kemalist era. Kemalism performed an incomplete, temporary secular handling of politico-religious dynamics. These have again, but in a stronger sectarian and eschatological shape, come to the fore in the Levant, including in Turkey and Israel, in the early twenty-first century.

Social Contract, Prophetic Monotheism and Public Violence

Strong incentives are needed to overcome barriers of human decency, shame and inhibition in order to welcome public acts of violence and to consider them as justified patterns of human behaviour. The perception of danger, entrenched social conditions and religion can combine to offer such incentives. Publicly committed and justified violence has been a frequent occurrence in the modern Levant from the late eighteenth century to the present. Remaining largely unpunished, like the notorious lynch violence endemic in parts of the USA, it repeated itself in various shapes. Lynching cost the life of thousands of African Americans in the United States from the late eighteenth century; domestic jihad in the Levant was even more deadly, costing the life of many hundreds of thousands of non-Muslim civilians.

In question, therefore, is a public violence that is visible and involves active participation by leaders who use politico-religious arguments to justify that violence. It is generally tolerated by state authorities, and at times organised by them. Relying on a consensus regarding a threat to the state’s main community, that is, the Islamic ummah – the seminal community of faith standing at the centre of any legitimately ruled polity, according to Koranic tradition – there is a type of pact among the public, the perpetrators and the state that incites and tacitly encourages or tolerates violence. Thus we are confronted with patterns of intra-societal or domestic (in contrast to military) violence along politico-religious lines. What are and what do these lines
mean? Why has the Levant been less domesticated by modern social contracts than other regions on earth, while premodern, hierarchical arrangements have been comparatively effective in maintaining internal social peace? Historical answers can only rudimentarily be elaborated here, but my tentative general answers are simple: the Levant is the cradle of monotheism and the focus of powerful eschatological projections. These have overruled or mitigated modern constitutional precepts that, in turn, had previously delegitimised premodern agreements.

Starting with the Ottoman Tanzimat (‘rearrangement’ or reform) state in 1839–76, modern states in the Levant tried, but failed, to establish a constitutional patriotism and civil religion, as related to a functioning modern social contract. They failed because the challenge was higher than elsewhere. The Ottoman Empire’s premodern hierarchical fabric knew a high degree of non-territorial religious and cultural autonomy for non-Muslim religious communities, yet the establishment of modern egalitarian plurality was not facilitated by regional differentiation. In other historically diverse and regionalised polities, for example in Switzerland, geography reflected and protected recognised ethno-religious differentiation. Also, the Koran’s socio-religious hierarchies and, deduced from them, the Ottoman millet system (autonomy of subordinated Christian and Jewish Ottoman communities, so-called ‘millet’) were obstacles to recognising equality in conditions of social plurality. Moreover, the centralist state tradition of the late Ottoman capital, emulated by most post-Ottoman rulers, did not allow for true regionalisation.

‘Ottomanism’, the term for egalitarian relations among the diverse populations of the empire under a constitution, enjoyed currency only among small parts of late Ottoman state elites and among non-Sunni groups who, as minoritarians, had a high interest in equality and legal security. Weak constitutionalism went hand-in-hand with the ongoing political relevance of religious boundaries and prejudices. Peace beyond conflictual religious claims and identities did not have a real chance in these circumstances. Eschatological expectations in their divisive premodern language remained resilient, and this was even more entrenched as the Levant represents the central theatre of biblical and Koranic eschatology.

Such resilience in eschatological expectations also applies to Turkey and Israel, two post-Ottoman countries that seemingly held strong secular ideologies: Kemalism and Zionism. Their predominance did not, however, last much longer than the second third of the twentieth century. Also, they were based on national salvation narratives originating in religious sources: the
modern father of Israel’, David Ben-Gurion with his Zionist reading of the Hebrew Bible on the one hand, and on the other Ziya Gökalp’s messianist interpretation of Islam and Turkish ethno-history, largely adopted by Atatürk. Gökalp, the prophet of Muslim-Turkish greatness during the First World War, is the pre-eminent spiritual father of Turkish nationalism.

Ethno-religious social unrest stood at the centre of the modern West’s Eastern Question. This major issue of diplomacy comprised the challenging crisis of the Ottoman sultan-caliph’s realm and revealed the limit of modern Western methods to build up modern polities in the Levant. From the late eighteenth century, leading Western statesmen and observers questioned the future of a premodern, slowly reforming Islamic realm. Contradicting wishful diplomatic thinking after the Lausanne Treaty and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Eastern Question was not resolved with the end of the Ottoman Empire. Concretely, it had started with struggles for independence in the Balkans (moving from Serbia and Greece to Bulgaria and finally Macedonia) and culminated in the Armenian Question and the genocide of the 1910s. It had little to do with Western conspiracy or a violence supposedly essential to an Islamic Orient but was essentially about open questions on valid rules for human society in general and the Levant in particular. Although Western technical know-how was in high demand from the eighteenth century, the example of an often brutally expanding West did not inspire faith but rather influenced many Ottomans to revert to their own premodern tenets and structures.

Repeatedly failed social peace is tantamount to a matrix of violence. The general apocalyptical mood, as framed by Islamic scholars in the late Ottoman period from the eighteenth century, went alongside the conjuring of a better imperial era and a Sunni-Orthodox social order (supposedly) to be restored from earlier centuries. Mainstream Sunni Muslims, which is the community most tied to the imperial Ottoman state, and not only extremists, believed that the perceived domestic enemies of the endangered imperial order had to be eliminated for the salvation of a state considered as symbiotic with religion (din ü devlet). If the authorities did not or could not act in an acute crisis, religion demanded pre-emptive and punitive public violence to be exerted intra muros by locally organised male mosque-goers. The ‘infidel’s’ (gavur, kafir’s) blood was declared halal, and mass murder deemed an act of heroism and salvation. Most instances of such recurrent intra-social attacks were associated with vociferous tekbîr/takbîr, the invocation of God (‘God is greatest’), and at times also with references to the sultan-caliph. Islamic
vocabulary, the rejection of European modernity, and the social envy of
Christian neighbours concurred in frequent social upheavals that took the
form of pogroms.

A significant example of these upheavals are the large-scale public
massacres of Armenians under Sultan Abdulhamid II, particularly in 1895
(c. 100,000 killed from October to December 1895). Abdulhamid had reacted
in the late 1870s against military defeat and Europe-backed reforms that, in his
eyes, weakened the state. He promoted a politics of Islamic unity, a kind of
Muslim nationalism or late Ottoman Islamism, rightly called pan-Islamism by
contemporaries, because Abdulhamid himself emphasised its global dimen-
sion. He regarded Muslim unity as the only viable and coherent force against
increasing Western influence and centrifugal tendencies within the empire. It
is true, if we leave aside the devastating impact of reactionary violence, that
non-Muslims benefited disproportionately from Western commercial, diplo-
matic, missionary, educative and philanthropic penetration of the late
Ottoman world. Yet this boom was not a political conspiracy as
Abdulhamid’s propaganda claimed but rather resulted from the zimmi’s1
readiness and will to escape subalternity and participate in nineteenth-
century globalisation.

Abdulhamid called, formed and empowered modern Islamist enthusiasms,
but could not fully check them. Urban mob violence, organised in mosques,
together with some regional violence of gangs and tribes against villages,
played the main role in the 1895 massacres. Such perpetrators of unofficial
domestic jihad claimed they were fighting foreign evil and were not fully
controlled by the central authorities. Yet they were influenced by an empire-
wide parallel structure of religious figures affiliated to the palace regime that
Abdulhamid had established alongside the official administration. They all
conjured up the spectre of Western and Armenian rule over eastern Asia
Minor, resulting from reforms wanted by Europe and non-Sunnis of the
region. Jihad was declared by local religious leaders who claimed to do so in
the name of the sultan-caliph. At times, local instigators defied the sultan,
accusing him of being too pliable vis-à-vis foreign intrusion and not able to
assert his forefathers’ exercise of power in times of Ottoman glory. This
direct connection to the Islamic empire distinguishes the late Ottoman
pogroms from the 1965 massacres in Indonesia where local Muslim

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1 According to the sharia, zimmi (dhimmi) refers to (provisionally) protected or tolerated
but politically and legally subordinated Christian and Jewish communities living within
the Islamic state. However, the term ‘unbeliever’ (gavur, kafir) is largely, but theologi-
cally wrongly, applied also to zimmis among Muslims of the modern era.
perpetrators acted as instruments of the army (about a million supposed communists, many of them ethnic Chinese, were killed; the Cold War-affected USA condoned the bloodshed).

Unrest against non-Muslim minorities remained a powerful weapon and a trademark of militant Islam in the Levant. A tradition of explicit Islamist throat-cutting of civilians, declared disloyal unbelievers, runs from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. In a few weeks in autumn 1895, tens of thousands of mostly Armenian men and youngsters were killed, on occasion by their own neighbours. A large Sunni male population organised in the local mosques of towns in central and eastern Asia Minor perpetrated these mass murders, spoliations and rapes, and was supported or vociferously backed by women. Tribes sometimes joined in the violence or spread it to rural areas. Violence was declared sacred and salutary, whence killing and robbing became a festival, even a competition. In contrast to the genocide of 1915, conversion to Islam saved many Christians from death, whereas in the First World War it saved Armenians only in particular circumstances.

Eschatology and Violence

Eschatology rooted in Ottoman history implies an imperial, state-centred (neo-)Ottoman restoration and the wish for a strong leader (reis) able to establish absolute power. This reis is seen in the image of a mythical world conqueror (sahib-kirân), in the likeness of Muhammad and the conquering sultan-caliphs. In contrast, other Muslim eschatologies, particularly since the second half of the twentieth century and influenced by the seminal Egyptian author Sayyid Qutb, anticipate and strive for the breakdown of existing states and societies in line with other violent eschatological traditions. Claiming holy scriptures and theologies or ideologies of salvation, this type of Muslim, Christian, Jewish or secular apocalypse attempts violently to enforce the eschatological reign of God, creating a divinely ordained or perfect society on Earth. Spectacular violence and ruthlessness against perceived enemies serve to confirm the group’s own supposedly rightful authority and a precipitation into the exalted future. There is no stronger example of this than the IS in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, an utterly eschatological enterprise, whose killings were choreographed as a service of worship before locals and a global internet public. Though reduced to a local public, analogous patterns were present during the massacres in 1895.

In contrast, since the eighteenth century, various actors in and from the modernising West projected eschatology into the Levant. In particular,
Protestant American missionaries believed in peace-centred (post-millennialist) and at times violent (pre-millennialist) visions that nurtured their lasting engagement on late Ottoman territory. They linked their visions to Jesus’ kingdom on Earth, and initially also to the quest for ‘Israel’s restoration’, that is, the restoration of the Jews to Palestine and to Jesus. Often acting independently of home country governments, and emphatically non-violent in their actions, they were nevertheless perceived as agents of a threatening, malevolent Western Christianity. Their unanimous support for constitutionalism reinforced reactionary forces that were convinced of a general conspiracy against Islamic rule and sovereignty. There were conflicts, most acutely in the 1830s and 1840s, between missionaries and oriental (Armenian, Greek, Arab, Assyrian) Christians, especially representatives of the millet hierarchy who feared radical changes. But these conflicts never escalated into general violence.

Missionaries and other foreigners were not generally in danger under Ottoman rule even if they were perceived as subversive forces. They had protective home countries behind them that could pressure the Ottoman government. However, it was a different situation for Ottoman non-Muslims. This is especially true for those like the Armenians, Assyrians or Yezidis, who were in friendly contact with foreigners, but not backed by another home country. Structurally perceived as devalued ‘others’ outside the ummah and as agents of foreign powers, and often socially envied, they became preferred targets of public violence throughout and beyond the late Ottoman era. This violence climaxed in the cataclysmic last Ottoman decade (1912–22). One of the main frontlines during the Ottoman First World War was interior: state-led but condoned by major parts of the society and by many perpetrators understood as a jihad, domestic violence removed and exterminated the majority of Ottoman Christians. Influenced by a political messianism called Turanism (a mix of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism), the ruling Young Turks party, known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), thus brought the process of othering in the late Ottoman era to the apex of genocide.

The main instances and patterns of late Ottoman politics of Turkish-Muslim violence paid off, relatively speaking, by making the perpetrators rich in goods and power, even if they were politically insecure. This is particularly true for the massacres in 1895 and the genocide in 1915 when, besides confiscations by the state, many local Muslims enriched themselves with spoils from their Armenian neighbours. Many patterns of violence appeared, therefore, to be functional and invited analogous acts in the future.
As a rule, not only central or local authorities profited from them, but also the collaborators and bystanders behind the proactive perpetrators on the ground. Many contemporaries considered the removal and murder of the Armenians in 1915–16 an unprecedented, country-wide state crime. Yet, after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and because of the international prestige and attraction of Turkey’s modernist national revolution, these violent policies not only remained unsanctioned by national or international prosecution but became appealing beyond the post-Ottoman world. Right-wing revisionists, especially in interwar Germany (Ottoman Turkey’s ally in 1914–18), admired Turkey’s diplomatic success, its radical politics, and its unashamed, transformative use of domestic violence. The victors of the First World War condoned this stance when they abandoned elementary demands of justice and, as far as minority protection was concerned, ceded to most of Turkey’s claims through the Lausanne Treaty. Afterwards, Ankara easily thwarted the minority clauses.

Turkey’s claims in Lausanne comprised unitary Turkish power over Asia Minor; a complete silence on the Armenian Genocide with no prosecutions and reparations; and a compulsory so-called population exchange to which a disproportionately high number of non-Muslims were submitted. Lausanne established peace for a high price that mortgaged the future. The victors of the First World War were led to believe their diplomacy to be realpolitik, yet this had the effect of corroding international politics and laying the ground for violence to come, instead of opening a new and better postwar era. Neither did the ‘divide and rule’ practices of the Mandatory regimes in the interwar period in former parts of the Ottoman Empire contribute to social contracts beyond religious and partisan bounds. Equality, supra-religious political thought and inclusive institutions have remained a utopian challenge as a result of the course set in Lausanne in 1923. Age-long religious distinctions and related imperial or eschatological myths continued to pervade a highly fractured human geography in which promises of apocalyptical fulfilment and of paradise for ‘martyrs’ live on. The ideological influence of the Cold War was limited in the Levant.

Dying while waging war during jihad is, historically speaking, the most commonly accepted form of martyrdom, that is of publicly becoming a shahid/šehit (‘martyr’) in Sunni and Shiite Islam. The condensed credo ‘I am (a believer), because I kill (in faith), and this even the more so if I die’ is reminiscent of propagandistic European First World War theologies that helped transform millions of humans into killers because superiors demanded so in the name of God and the nation. The management of violence and
death is a powerful weapon that helps produce authority and operates hegemonic relations of race, class, party, religion and empire. Life thrives, in contrast, in societies where killing is not accepted as a political option, because a social contract enables common prosperity, and the law is in force to diminish personal and party power that is ultimately in need of coercion and violence. If being killed while killing is believed to be endorsed by faith, this opens the door for abuse of faithful people by strategists of power. Also, the common consumption and/or perpetration of violence creates a compelling communion in crime that founds or re-founds the identity of the group in question, in our case a militant ummah in the 1890s or during the First World War.

This aspect, the affirmation of an active Sunni identity, is present in all anti-Alevi urban pogroms in Turkey in the second half of the twentieth century. (The large minority of Anatolian Alevis, today about a fifth of the population, accept only partly or not at all the pillars of Sunni Islam and have organised themselves outside the state-controlled mosques; Alevis have been traditionally considered infidels or heretics by conservative Sunnis since the sixteenth century.) Proud affirmation of Sunni and radical right-wing Turkish identity characterises perpetrators of recurrent anti-Alevi violence in Turkey. Such violence is particularly serious in the case of Kurdish Alevis (for the 1937–8 massacre in Dersim see below). Although historically different from the Alevis and less brutally persecuted, the heterodox group of Arab Alawis in Syria experienced a similar history of discrimination, before they were positively discriminated under the French Mandate and the Baath regime. These divisions have fundamentally marked the civil war in Syria in the 2010s.

Western Aggression and Domestic Jihad

The public use and consumption of violence became utterly manifest in former Arab core lands of the Ottoman Empire occupied by IS. New in this case was the global dimension of a spectacle, not only before crowds of local spectators but on the internet, framed by discourses of eschatological Wahhabism. (Wahhabism is a radical Sunni movement that emerged in the eighteenth century, aimed at restoring ‘original Islam’; it became Saudi Arabia’s state ideology and has largely determined the IS’s Islamic tenets.) Although patterns of public violence were present in much larger dimensions during the First World War, they were never globally visible. Moreover, eschatology was less articulate, and holy scripture was not as present at the
public surface of political acts as in the case of contemporary jihadists, as well as other groups fighting (also) in the name of religion for their future in the Levant.

The domestic jihad against Ottoman non-Muslims and the expansion of modern Europe’s imperial nation states were related. This situation began to emerge in the late eighteenth century as a profound and acute crisis of the Ottoman Empire, called the Eastern Question. From the mid nineteenth century, a central issue turned around postulates of supra-religious constitutional rule. Despite new departures and comparatively ground-breaking constitutional texts during the Tanzimat, for example the Reform Edict of 1856 and the first Ottoman constitution of 1876 (revised in and after 1908), egalitarian plurality remained utopian. Sultan Abdulhamid II’s Islamist authoritarianism marked the opposite direction, and the CUP went even further during the last Ottoman decade.

The accession of the Ottoman Empire since the mid nineteenth century to a ‘European concert’ of monarchical powers could not positively influence the new Ottoman partner, because the European powers were only to a limited degree inspiring modern democratic states, honestly interested in spreading rule of law. Diversity, together with legal and real equality, posed a particularly difficult challenge, because the Ottoman realm could not be divided into democratic homelands versus imperial dominions, as in the case of modern Europe’s national empires. Their homelands were ethnically and religiously relatively homogeneous, while in the mixed colonies the standards of the homelands did not count. Thus, the Levant displayed more directly the challenges and dysfunctions of human societies on the threshold of global modernity than did contemporary European states, or states originating in Europe like the USA, Canada and Australia, because these acted on a global scale. In their periphery, they could more easily disguise violent anti-egalitarian patterns that violated human rights.

Often, modern Europe obeyed premodern premises like royal rights of conquest and land grab, so that the rule of law in Europe stood in contrast to lawless frontiers, military government overseas and discrimination against Indigenous people. Lynchings in US-American culture as well as slavery and discriminatory post-slavery societies were a fundamental feature of a racial society. A combination of proletarian misery, convicts and children being transported to Australia, and a pervasive, deep-seated race and class mentality, contradicted the letter and spirit of modern human rights. Many of these phenomena can be subsumed under imperialism as well as colonial and
settler violence in the context of ‘democracies’ that excluded whole domestic groups from equality.

Still, there was the important experience of (relatively) democratic rule of law and freedom at home, far from colonial frontiers. This was an important distinction between the late Ottoman Empire and western Europe where a considerable number of Ottoman political refugees found asylum. In Europe after the world wars, this positive experience served as an important historical connection for innovative reconstruction after destruction, because well-known principles could be reclaimed. In short: democratic rule of law, even if limited, kept taking seriously basic human rights in core institutions, parliamentary debates and domestic public space. The late Ottoman Empire missed this even in its capital and the parliament. The same is, in general, true for post-Ottoman states. In the image of the CUP, they have largely functioned as partisan regimes in which favouritism instead of meritocracy, systemic corruption and (auto-)censure reign.

The modern, post-American and post-French Revolution era coincided with an acute and permanent Ottoman crisis in which local and geostrategic dimensions entangled as never before. International stakes entered Cairo, causing new scenes of violence during the French invasion of Egypt and of parts of greater Syria at the end of the 1790s. French aggression and repression of resistance were associated with the organisation of urban mob violence, locally claimed as jihad, against Ottoman Christians identified with a foreign power. Even without foreign intervention, but conjuring real or imaginary foreign threats, ringleaders organised such domestic jihad in other late Ottoman towns, such as Aleppo and Diyarbekir where Ziya Gökalp grew up, or in metropoles like Istanbul, Izmir and Beirut. Violence against Ottoman Christians was henceforth more than just a case of ‘collateral damage’ or a facet of ‘normal violence’, as it might appear in the case of Cairo in 1798–1800: it became built into the fabric of late Ottoman society. The Ottoman general Nasif Pasha called on Muslims in March 1800 to make jihad against Christians, as a result of which the Ottoman Copts and Syriacs of Cairo became the target of killings. They were considered members of a global body of a hostile Christianity.

Late Ottoman public violence was largely intimate, because it often targeted neighbours and even friends who were regarded as having broken a contract of submission and loyalty. When in 1850, after an anti-Christian pogrom in Aleppo, a contemporary Arab writer reported that no Muslim of the neighbourhoods ‘was there who did not commit these atrocities; not even ten per cent out of one hundred’, he may have slightly exaggerated, or
not. In many late Ottoman crises, religious polarisation proved so strong as to blur the lines between a diversity of Ottoman and European Christians. At times, this category included groups considered local friends of Christians, such as the Alevis or the Yezidis. Stigmatised as heretic, these groups were also targeted, and more brutally excluded than Christians from interacting with the ummah.

The new dimension of late Ottoman violence went against traditional codes, transcended traditional factions, and included public violations of women. This inaugurated misogynist patterns far beyond the premodern discrimination against women, including the tradition of devalued non-Muslim female slaves (cariye). Similar incidents to those occurring in Cairo in 1800 described above also happened in areas far from Europe, when no part of Ottoman territory was attacked. Ottoman Christians, and on a lesser scale the much smaller group of Ottoman Jews, would be at risk of being openly targeted by violence as soon as egalitarian reforms were broached, and well-organised groups, foremost the Ottoman Armenians, fought and lobbied for them. An additional factor was social envy, related to the economic and educational successes of the zimmi. Important were feelings of revenge, instigated by leaders after diplomatic pressure or military defeats against ‘Christian’ (European) powers. Such resentment served as an argument in many pogroms. Both the anti-Armenian massacres that occurred in 1909 and 1895 and the genocide of 1915 took place after important instances of diplomatic support from Europe for egalitarian reforms.

An increasing number of nationals of Western countries had begun to live in late Ottoman towns close to non-Muslims, and established new networks of business, diplomacy, health and education. As a result, Levantine Christians and Jews were not only able to advance their own personal careers but also able to develop the life of their communities (millet) in terms of education, health and self-organisation. The liberal reforms of the Tanzimat, starting in 1839, and in particular the 1856 Reform Edict, made these developments possible, and with them a high degree of organised diversity. The millets, above all the Armenian Protestant and the Armenian apostolic communities, became, in a nutshell, non-territorial parliamentarian systems within the empire. Against such developments, late Ottoman public violence was generally in defence of a premodern empire, including its pre-reform

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hierarchical social order. A jihad against its perceived domestic enemies and looting were allowed by a widespread vulgar understanding of sharia, in which hate speech was combined with the discourse of a sultanate-caliphate in urgent need of militant defence against traitors and unbelievers among neighbours within the empire.

Late Ottoman, predominantly Sunni public violence thus appears in global perspective as a reaction of those who had lost power but who still possessed considerable regional means of force against potential domestic opponents. Mob violence was an advantage in which terror compensated for weakness on other levels. Yet these forces made regional and central rulers susceptible to blackmail by local factions, because local factions used violence at times single-handedly and threatened minorities or even foreign representatives, thus creating diplomatic conflicts. The authorities were responsible for law, order and security, particularly to protect foreigners. In critical times, as in 1895 and during the comparable (though more limited) massacres of Armenians in Adana in 1909, they concentrated upon both protecting foreigners and offering local perpetrators the freedom to kill, loot and rape local Christians during limited time slots.

Forced conversions, including painful and risky ad hoc circumcisions of men, are another poignant chapter of a modern Middle Eastern history of violence. They were acts of humiliation and public displays of the supposed superiority of Islam. Not only mostly provincial Christians but also Alevi and Yezidis were targeted by coerced conversion in critical times. The Yezidis were also subject to a related military campaign in the 1890s. The genocide of Yezidis in 2014–17 conducted by ISIS, including forced conversions, is in line with Ottoman campaigns and, above all, age-old stigmatising discourse. Islamist discourse, social envy and impunity for murder and robbery conditioned the people to accept late Ottoman massacres as well as the genocide of 1915, including large-scale spoliation. The state tolerated, promoted or organised such violence while it empowered Muslims and granted them preferential treatment. Many Ottoman Muslim refugees (muhacir) from the Balkans and the Caucasus were settled on the land and in houses of Ottoman Christians. Public discourse justified such preferential treatment as a compensation for imperial losses and for a supposed supreme Muslim suffering in the modern age. These policies and the sense of Muslim victimhood derived from a sweeping interpretation of the modern age: evil, anti-Muslim European designs had started in the eighteenth century and had peaked during the First Balkan War, while the Western press and scholarship
suppressed positive contributions to human civilisation by Muslims and Turks.

The Most Violent Decade (1912–1922) and Kemalism

A decisive new factor for the politics of domestic violence under the CUP in the 1910s was the interplay of domestic jihad with a new, radical Turkism that the dictatorial CUP leadership adopted on the eve of and during the First World War. It complemented Abdulhamid’s Islamism (Hamidism), making a radical Turkish Islamism or Muslim Turkism that based modern national identity on Islam and Turkishness. The CUP regarded Hamidism as too reactionary and therefore unfit for the modern exercise of imperial power. Turkism on the other hand aimed at Turkish salvation by embracing Turkish roots and expansion into a huge Central Asian motherland called Turan. It claimed to make Asia Minor a sovereign Turkish homeland led and possessed by Muslim-Turks alone, not to be shared with other groups rooted in the same soil. Whereas Islamism warranted support in the provinces, Turkism provided the CUP with the backing of large parts of Istanbul’s intelligentsia and students, as well as power on the streets of the capital.

Gökalp was the main prophet of an Islamist Turkism, while his friend Mehmed Talaat (Pasha) was Istanbul’s main political leader in the 1910s. In contrast to their ideology and politics of war and violence after 1913, the horizon of democratic equality, multicultural peace and pragmatic collaboration had emerged as a more hopeful goal during the Ottoman spring after the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908. However, just a few years later, this vision turned to bloody dystopia. Political infighting and Talaat’s disillusion with parliamentarism, continued territorial losses and Europe’s unfriendly diplomacy, all played a role in the CUP’s turn to war and violence. (The European Powers did not actively maintain Ottoman integrity despite the promises of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 that had determined the parameters of the late Ottoman Empire.) Talaat and his friends then hastily abandoned the constitutional ideals of 1908 that had valorised hitherto discriminated groups and made the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the main Armenian party) their political ally.

The dynamics of the Ottoman descent into violence started with the Balkan Wars that coincided with the re-emergence of the conflict about the reforms for eastern Asia Minor in 1912–14, based on the Berlin Treaty. The political atmosphere made it easy for detractors of internationally monitored
reforms to denounce egalitarian reforms as an anti-Ottoman and anti-Sunni plot. Ottoman war dynamics became a factor for larger Europe’s cataclysm in July 1914. It culminated in the genocide of 1915–16 and ended provisionally when the war for Asia Minor was decided in 1922. Seen from Istanbul, Italy’s invasion of Ottoman Libya in the autumn of 1911 had already polarised the political situation in accordance with the old lines of Europe versus the Orient, and Christians against Muslims. The First Balkan War in autumn 1912 entrenched these lines even more. Heavy losses in this war made the CUP leadership resentful against Christians in general, both domestically and internationally. Yet, importantly, Talaat’s acceptance of war and domestic polarisation had been his choice on the eve of the First Balkan War in September and early October 1912. The weak performance of the liberal-conservative cabinet in power during the war played into the hands of the future putschists.

In 1913, the CUP installed the first single-party regime in the twentieth century. Domestically at a nadir after an anti-CUP coup had temporarily succeeded in July 1912, they embraced the hazardous politics of war and a putsch. They managed to establish their regime after a coup in January 1913. In 1914, they started to combine the politics of imperial restoration and expansion with comprehensive demographic engineering and a right-wing-revolutionary transformation of society. Establishing a Muslim war ummah, the CUP secured a safe support base for its radical regime. Unprecedented in Levantine history, public domestic violence, organised or instigated by authorities, killed over a million Armenians and Assyrians in 1915–16. The events included serial torture, and mass executions in or outside towns (the mass killings took place mostly outside of towns, in contrast to 1895), the serial rape of tens of thousands of Christian women and children, the mass starvation of hundreds of thousands of deported Armenians, and slave markets of children and women in many towns in Mesopotamia.

In 1922, the results of an extremely violent decade favoured radical Turkish nationalism. This brand of Turkish nationalism is called Kemalism after the former CUP general, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who became the decisive leader after 1918. Gökalpian Turkism then turned from Talaat to the new leader and the Ankara-based Republic, and rapidly dominated after 1923. It repudiated political Islam, and instead emphasised Gökalp’s ethno-nationalist tenets. However, Kemal’s decisive War of (Turkish-Muslim) Independence in 1919–22 was fought together with Sunni Kurds in the name of Islam. The early Kemalist movement cooperated with late Ottoman political Islam to win this war for Asia Minor, before rejecting it in favour of a radical and
exclusive Turkism. The brusque rejection of political Islam won Turkey the sympathy of the West, and to a lesser degree also of Soviet Russia, which had already been a crucial ally during the war for Asia Minor. Yet the break suppressed any serious soul-searching regarding previous jihad and genocide. Decades later, this unclarified history facilitated the return of Islamism. Attempts at making a break with the experience of massive domestic violence, including trials against perpetrators and a few attempts at public ostracism, failed within two years after 1918.

Those responsible for the anti-Christian violence in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire remained therefore largely in power at all levels of the administration in post-Ottoman Turkey, except at the head of the state itself. The perpetrators, their successors and their spokesmen in the new capital Ankara continued over decades to rationalise the use of violence by the CUP as mainly self-defence, in line with CUP propaganda. Late Ottoman patterns of violence and their public arguments remained formative in the Republic of Turkey, even though the context had changed. There were aspects of the Armenian genocide in the military campaign of 1937–8 that killed more than 10,000 civilians in the Alevi Kurdish region of Dersim and transferred surviving children from one group to the other. Similar events like the 1895–6 anti-Armenian pogroms, though not of the same scale, occurred in the second half of the twentieth century against Alevi, who were depicted as heretics and communists.

Talaat and most CUP Central Committee members understood the First World War as a jihad for the sake of Turkey’s power. For them, the violence perpetrated between 1911 and 1922 was in defence of the Islamic empire and the state and for a last sovereign resort for Turkish-speaking Muslims in Asia Minor. It was also expansionist, combining a seemingly constitutional parliamentary rule with an aggressive party dictatorship inspired by Gökalp’s pan-Turkism. Gökalp’s pan-Turkism had been built on Islam’s supposed supremacy. Islam-sceptical Kemalism attempted to found its authority on a pseudo-scientific ‘Turkish History Thesis’ that pretended that ethno-historical Turkdom was the cradle of human language and civilisation and had been present in Anatolia since prehistoric times. The socio-political conclusion was similar: Turkdom was supreme, and non-Turks, a fortiori non-Muslims, had no claim on and no equal rights in Anatolia.

Despite defeat in the First World War, the main players saw the violent removal of Christians as a crucial achievement and the Treaty of Lausanne as a diplomatic triumph, at least in respect to the genocide. Against the backdrop of such successful violence, the CUP lastingly prefigured the domestic patterns and behaviour of various post-Ottoman power players, namely the Kemalist single-party regime and the Arab Baath parties. Also, the reverse conversion of AKP luminaries in Ankara from fresh reform-oriented democrats in the 2000s to war-prone, national-Islamist authoritarians under Erdoğan in the 2010s displays a political behaviour that is familiar from the early 1910s.

This perpetuation of patterns is true, although Kemalism abstained from imperial ambitions and repressed political Islam until the end of the 1990s. It did this, however, only insofar as it feared Islamic competition in the politico-cultural arena, not when it conformed to common concepts of the enemy. Islamism developed in the second half of the twentieth century into the hegemonic ideology in the Levant (and the Islamic world in general), when the superficially secular post-Ottoman regimes began to show major shortcomings. Kemalist actors reared up forcefully a last time in the military putsch of September 1980, when violence and mass imprisonments targeted above all left-wing and Kurdish militants. This intervention did not stop the return of political Islam in Turkey. On the contrary, a semi-official Turkish-Islamic synthesis resulted, and compulsory Islamic instruction was introduced in public schools after the coup.

As a comparatively strong and messianic ideology based both on Gökalp’s Turkism and a cult of Atatürk, Kemalism had inspired a state whose structure was, however, no less at risk than that of other post-Ottoman states, because it too lacked a true social contract. Turkey was caught up by Islamism comparatively late, after its role as a Middle Eastern cornerstone of NATO in the Cold War had expired and a promising road to real democracy had been usurped by authoritarianism. The ‘religious turn’, or the emergence of religion on the political surface, was a global phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century. Besides Islam in the Middle East, we also saw the rise of the religious right in the United States, a religious shift in post-1967 Israel, and an explicit eschatological reading of Zionism by Jews and Christians. In Europe, and partly also in Turkey, this religious turn remained long hidden in the shadow of ideological Cold War conflicts.

It is true that Turkey’s re-intensified interaction with the European Union, which had condemned the 1980 putsch and recognised the Armenian genocide, opened new windows of opportunity and access to new instruments of
conflict resolution from 2000 on. This led to a more consensual, violence-preventing policy-building, including steps towards a new constitution based on universal standards; an opening towards the Kurds and negotiations with Kurdish leaders; and, importantly, some steps towards a coming to terms with mass violence in modern Turkish-Muslim history that has long been denied by the Turkish state. But these constructive developments were interrupted and destroyed in the context of an anti-Kurdish war policy that started domestically in the south-east of Turkey in July 2015 and has continued since August 2016 in northern Syria.

Conclusion

From a population of over 15 million, Asia Minor lost more than 6 million inhabitants in 1914–23, two-thirds of them Christians, and half of them killed. The organisers of the latter’s removal gave actors of domestic jihad ample opportunity to kill, rob and rape. Of about 4 million deaths in the Ottoman First World War, less than 800,000 were soldiers. Domestic death and killing caused far more fatalities than military violence at the fronts. Rebellions or domestic war in the inter-war period continued to kill tens of thousands in the former Ottoman world, the majority of them Kurdish civilians.

The 1878 Berlin Treaty was replaced in 1923 by the even more fundamental Lausanne Treaty, which is still valid today in its main points, but, in real terms, the post-Ottoman world has never come to rest. After the Second World War, Israel’s wars took centre stage. Since the late 1970s, interstate and domestic wars such as the Iran-Iraq war, the anti-Kurdish Anfal campaign, the Lebanese civil war, the Kurdish guerrilla wars in Turkey, the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the US-invasion and its long aftermath in Iraq, the civil war in Syria and the war in Yemen have killed millions of people and forcibly removed many more. In contrast to the Cold War-related mass violence in South-East Asia, unrest has increased in the Levant since the late twentieth century. In both areas, it has been openly marked by ethno-religious references. Jihad played a major role.

Since 1945, there has been an incomparably higher death toll through war and violence in the post-Ottoman world than in continental Europe, including in war-torn former Yugoslavia (Europe’s own post-Ottoman region). Unsettled issues and a lack of social contracts have kept this vast expanse of human geography in a state of violent unrest since the cataclysm of the 1910s. Jihad – domestically even more than towards the exterior – is a crucial aspect
of this violence. Kemalism failed in overcoming Islamism, as it pretended, but acted like an ersatz Islam, perpetuating former patterns of imperially biased, leader-centred politics that favoured (in this case, urban) Turkish-speaking Sunnis.

Recent research on violence, inspired by the social sciences, has emphasised social, political, economic and spatial factors in explanations of violence and helped deconstruct monolithic ideas on polarisation. Yet it has long failed to address certain significant elements. The genocide of 1915, a topic dismissed by Western academia until the end of the twentieth century, is the most striking among them, and its long-term consequences still wait to be explored. Religion is another. Twentieth-century scholarship in general missed analysing and measuring the resilience and power of prophetic religion. Historical developments in the Levant went against the grain of disciplines rooted in Western Enlightenment. Sectarian resurgence and violence since the 1960s, in particular the civil war in Lebanon and the Islamic revolution in Iran, have taken Cold War-focused Western intellectuals and strategists by surprise.

Because ethno-religious differences accompany categorical eschatological claims, social contracts resulting from a pragmatic negotiation, based on equality, are almost impossible in the Levant. This is manifest in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Israel-Palestine and the whole former Ottoman world. Myths of power, identity and hierarchies hold sway in politico-religious discourses and practices. Research must expose them and their resilience. Among the strongest imperial myths are those such as Islamist, (pan-)Turkist and neo-Ottomanist that refer to the Ottoman sultanate-caliphate, which is the most durable Islamic empire in history. Among the strongest religious myths is apocalyptic Wahhabism, whose birth goes back to the eighteenth century, when it reacted against an Ottoman capital seen as weak, corrupt, and under European influence. Referring to the Koranic society of the seventh century and holy scriptures, it has developed a violent global apocalypticism over recent decades. Due to the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, Shiism also strongly displays eschatology on the surface of its political discourse. The historico-religious lines dividing Shiism from Wahhabite or neo-Ottomanist Islamisms, however, are deep and have determined alliances on the battlefields in Syria in the 2010s.

Current Sunni and Shiite apocalypticisms cannot be understood without considering interaction with the West. Not only do they react against American intervention and presence in the Middle East, but they are also influenced by products such as the films, books, pamphlets and games of
a late twentieth-century industry of apocalypticism in the USA. This industry sold and sells pre-millennialist representations of violence along religious lines. Militant Islam in the spirit of ISIS claims to hasten by war Mahdi-Messiah Jesus’ second coming and his establishment of a global Muslim rule, and this is a pattern of Sunni eschatology of which many Christians are not aware. Although the ‘millennium’ or Kingdom of Jesus cannot be forced by violence or conquest in most Christian traditions, sales-oriented pre-millennialist fantasy made its arrival a spectacle of unavoidable mass killing. Shiite eschatology displays faith in its own militancy and in Jesus’ coming at the side of the Mahdi, the revealed hidden Imam. Though more flexible in general, Shiite Mahdism in the militant form of Iran’s Islamic Revolution mirrors Sunni eschatology in its emphasis on global Muslim conquest and superiority, and marginalises Sufi or liberal interpretations.

Taking seriously the political weight of legacies, but refusing essentialism, this chapter has explored patterns of violence, particularly domestic jihad, rooted in ethno-religious inequality and conflicting eschatology. Often controlled by or going in tandem with state power, such patterns exist to this day in the post-Ottoman Levant. They encompass demographic engineering, genocide, annihilating urban warfare, serial suicide attacks, pogroms, mediated atrocities, and war in the name of religion and eschatology. This chapter has understood the persistence of violence and brutalisation of societies as a lack of effective social contracts. It has dealt with the failure of attempts to achieve them in the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman Levant. It has argued that negotiating them is nowhere more demanding than in a geography where the historical claims of all revealed monotheisms meet, and religious mobilisation is rewarded. Given the force of diverging eschatologies claiming supremacy for their groups and projecting the future in absolute terms, it is hard to see an end to polarisation in the present Levant.

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Although a century has passed since its outbreak, the First World War retains much of its mystery. Historians have long debated its origins. But now it is the very violence of the conflict that focuses many of their discussions: its intensity; its specificity, if we compare the First World War to the wars that preceded it; or even the way in which combatants and civilians succeeded in holding on for so long, in almost unbearable living conditions. A mystery, then, that the historian François Furet has summarised as follows: "Today's teenagers cannot even conceive of the national passions that led the peoples of Europe to kill each other for four full years."¹

Violence on the battlefields, violence against civilians, the violence of weapons and of words: the first global conflict marks a major rupture in the history of modern warfare, precisely because it abolished any distinction between combatants and non-combatants. To understand the intensity of total war, military historians first had to move away from a 'history from above', from the perspective of statesmen, strategists and generals, and instead study how the violence of war impacted bodies and minds. This first historiographical revolution occurred in the 1970s, when John Keegan published his groundbreaking book *The Face of Battle.*² More recently, military historians have explored the impact of the war on civilian populations (the Armenian genocide; the bombing of cities; blockades and famine; the displacement of refugees; sexual violence . . .) and reflected on the way in which stirring discourse allowed societies at war to endure the conflict. Indeed, the violence of the First World War was enacted not only by nation states, armies, police forces and administrations, but also by individuals, or groups

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of individuals, acting spontaneously or under constraint in support of their homeland. It consisted not only of violent acts, but also of violent images and words. Studying the links between the discourse and practice of violence is one of the important aspects of the history of war cultures, which has been developed by historians since the late 1990s.³

Last but not least, thinking about the violence of the First World War means interrogating its place in the history of modern warfare: the emergence of industrial warfare in the second half of the nineteenth century; the thresholds of violence breached one by one in 1914–18; and finally, how the violence of war was transformed (far more than it was dissipated) in the transition from war towards peace. In other words, it requires redefining what we commonly call ‘wartime’: the individual and collective initiation into violence; thresholds of violence and the way they are perceived; how forms of violence mutate; the rhythms and modalities of demobilisation; and finally, the future of war violence after the official cessation of hostilities.

Towards Total War

From its very beginnings, the First World War was perceived as different from previous conflicts. In the spring of 1915, French soldiers used the expression ‘Grande Guerre’ for the first time in their correspondence; it reveals how the conflict pushed violence to its paroxysm and human endurance to its limits. In the summer of 1914, it only took a few days – a few weeks at most – for Europe to discover the extreme violence of the conflict that had just broken out.

The war of movement that lasted four months on the Western Front (August to November 1914) and almost a year on the Eastern Front was particularly deadly: 300,000 French soldiers were killed in 1914, which is to say an average of 60,000 dead each month and more than 2,000 each day. On the single day of 22 August 1914, the French army lost 27,000 combatants – as many soldiers as were killed during the Algerian war from 1954 to 1962.⁴ As for the German army, September 1914 was one of the three deadliest months of the war: 71,481 were killed or declared missing, only a few less than in July and September 1916. On the Western Front, the Battle of the Frontiers, at the

end of August 1914, marked a turning point which was underestimated by military historians for a long time.

The rather imprecise monthly tallies of casualties do not allow us to appreciate fully the descent into violence as it was experienced by combatants. In their war journals, soldiers narrate a series of initiations, which progressively led them to discover the reality of war violence: destroyed houses; cannonades heard for the first time; the first wounded; the first dead bodies (of men or of horses); the first experience of combat. Though Europe quickly descended into modern warfare, the initiation of individuals to violence happened step by step – with the decisive threshold of the ‘baptism of fire’. For Ivan Cassagnau, an artilleryman from south-western France, the tipping point was on 19 August 1914, a day when two officers, eight NCOs and 117 of his comrades were killed or declared missing in the Belfort sector. ‘How far away it is already, that fatal date of August 2! And yet how close it still is!’, he wrote in his journal only three weeks after being mobilised. ‘On August 2, my life was ripped apart. Until then, I was leading a happy life. I didn’t know it, but I realize it now. Since that day, I have known more worries, anguish, pain, and mourning than in all of my twenty-four years.’

From the start, civilians were also targeted, in Belgium, in northern France, on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans. There were massacres, deportations and sexual violence; houses, hospitals and historical monuments were destroyed and cemeteries were desecrated. Only four days after the invasion of Belgium, 850 Belgian men, women and children had already been executed: Germans carried out a ruthless suppression of purported ‘francs-tireurs’ (civilian guerrilla fighters) and of their accomplices. More than 6,000 civilians were killed in Belgium and northern France in August and September 1914, in massacres that foreshadowed those of the Second World War. Women and children were sometimes separated from men, as in the Tschoffen Wall Massacre in Dinant; at others they were lined up together, without any age distinctions, as at Faubourg des Rivages on 23 August 1914.

Degradations, pillaging and destruction usually accompanied these massacres. In Château-Thierry or Coulommiers, for example, the ‘Germans took everything they wanted, even loading quantities of provisions and bedding onto wagons … Inside the houses, they smashed whatever they did not

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The conquerors left an indelible imprint as they lashed out at people’s homes; anthropologists characterise such actions as crimes of desecration. It was the very private life of residents that the soldiers targeted, as they soiled their bed sheets or covered the interior of their homes with faeces. Desecrating the domestic space, the space of conviviality and of hospitality, also complicated any future return home. ‘The “atrocities” one hears of are true’, stated the novelist Edith Wharton in a letter to a friend. ‘It should be known that it is to America’s interest to help stem this hideous flood of savagery by opinion if it may not be by action. No civilized race can remain neutral in feeling now.’

After the massacres of the summer and fall of 1914, 1915 saw the escalation of violence on the battlefields as the armies settled into a war of positions, at least on the Western Front. The General Staff sought at all costs to maintain an offensive posture and to keep the hope of a decisive breakthrough alive, even at the expense of heavy casualties – for example, in the attacks described as grignotage (literally, ‘nibbling’) launched by the French commander-in-chief Joffre. A new kind of combatant came into being, sprawled beneath enemy fire, making himself as invisible as possible in his dirty, muddy uniform. In order to survive, the soldier needed to become one with the earth. In 1915, the French army experienced more casualties than in 1916, the year of the great offensive battles of Verdun and of the Somme. In the inferno of Gallipoli, the Australian and Turkish nations were born. For ANZAC troops, the battle was a sanitary disaster almost unequalled during the rest of the war (the exception being the French offensive at the Chemin des Dames in April 1917): with 20,000 wounded and 64,000 suffering from epidemics, the Australian Army Medical Corps was completely overwhelmed.

Civilians were far from spared in 1915, a pivotal year which saw Europe descend into total war. On the Western Front, the atrocities of the invasion period opened onto new kinds of violence against civilians, as Germany began its occupation of Belgium and northern France: forced labour; pillaging of natural resources; famine; deportations to German labour camps. Occupying regimes on both the Western and Eastern fronts served as laboratories of a kind for the military occupations of the 1940s.

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7 Ibid., pp. 220–1.
Balkans, the violence of invasion continued for all of 1915, with the invasion of Serbia by the German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies.

On the Eastern Front, the war of movement created almost 4 million refugees who fled the advance of German troops.\(^ {12} \) Starting in May 1915, the Russian authorities’ scorched-earth policy also forced the displacement of some 134,000 German and Austro-Hungarian nationals, as well as of a million Jews who lived in the Russian Empire and were suspected of being internal enemies. These massive population shifts, which accompanied the ‘great retreat’ of the Russian army in the spring of 1915, entailed heavy casualties from exhaustion, hunger and epidemics. The deportation policy was then relaxed beginning in the autumn of 1915.

Conversely, for Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the violence against civilians became more brutal and more systematic in January (in response to Russian victories in the Caucasus), in April (when the Allies landed on the Gallipoli peninsula), and finally in June. It was not only the intensity but the very nature of the violence of war that changed in 1915. By the end of the year, the majority of the Armenians in the empire would have been killed, in the first genocide of the twentieth century. The willingness to destroy an ethnic group or a people by physically annihilating it, to draw on the lawyer Raphael Lemkin’s definition, as well as that of the 1948 UN Convention, was not new. But never before in Western history had a genocidal policy been carried out so systematically, leading to the death of 650,000 to 850,000 civilians – which is to say about 8 per cent of the victims of the Great War.\(^ {13} \)

The year 1915 also saw the introduction of new weapons which transformed combat practices and dramatically increased violence on the battlefields. Mine warfare, for example, quickly spread across the Western Front, with increasingly high explosive charges. Flamethrowers, first introduced in autumn 1914, became widespread by the spring of 1915, and were used by the attacking waves of the German army. But it was chiefly chemical weapons that made a spectacular breakthrough: after a first deployment on the Eastern Front at the end of January 1915, which failed because of the wind and the cold, asphyxiating gases were used on the Western Front, in the Ypres sector, on 22 April 1915. Poison gas immediately became a symbol of the atrocity of industrial warfare. In reality, there were few victims of gas attacks: armies quickly developed protective masks that limited casualties. But it was the


manner in which gas killed that inspired the combatants’ horror: it was an invisible death by suffocation, and, for survivors, pulmonary complications that could last long after the end of the war. For the first time in the history of warfare, weapons killed without visible wounds or bloodshed.  

The increased sophistication of weapons of war is one of the markers of the development of industrial warfare – a ‘war of iron and gas’, as the novelist Pierre Drieu de la Rochelle put it. We see this development represented in paintings of the conflict: in 1915, C. R. W. Nevinson painted his famous work Machine Gun, in which he showed how, in the industrial age, combatants became fused with their weapons. Ten years later, Marcel Gromaire would take up this theme again in his painting La Guerre (1925): five soldiers wait, impassibly, in their trench. The French painter represented them as robot-like, bundled up in their horizon-blue uniforms, to remind viewers that the Great War was foremost a mechanical, industrial and dehumanising war.

Indeed, the dominant image of 1915 was that of a war of machines that destroyed individuals. Combatants were killed by gas; civilians became victims of the submarine war with the sinking of the Lusitania, which was torpedoed on 7 May 1915. Science and scientists were put to the service of destruction. Each belligerent nation placed the blame for the corruption of scientific progress on the other camp. From the point of view of the Allies – even if they, too, would use poison gas – chemical weapons proved the barbarity of ‘German science’ and of Germany’s chemists, including the most famous among them, Fritz Haber. ‘All social and scientific intercourse with Germany will be practically stopped for this generation’, wrote the physicist Rutherford.

Industrial warfare reached its apogee in the following year, 1916, with the titanic confrontations of Verdun and of the Somme. The combatants’ experience of war was utterly transformed. For the first time in the history of warfare, firepower did not merely mean inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy; it meant that combatants who were hit by a shell could simply vanish. Without bodily remains, no burial was possible. The desperate quest for the missing would mark the rest of the war and the postwar period. New rituals would have to be invented to pay tribute to the combatants of whom no trace remained: lists of names engraved on monuments to the

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dead, such as at Thiepval in the Somme, and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier – the Great War’s quintessential commemoratory innovation.\(^\text{16}\)

Paul Dubrulle, a Jesuit serving at Verdun in 1916 as an NCO in the 8th Infantry Regiment, described the distinctive fear triggered by artillery bombardment:

> When one heard the whistle in the distance, one’s whole body contracted to resist the too excessively potent vibrations of the explosion, and at each repetition it was a new attack, a new fatigue, a new suffering. Under this regime, the most solid nerves cannot resist for long ... Perhaps the best comparison is that of seasickness ... [sic] finally one abandons one’s self to it, one has no longer even the strength to cover oneself with one’s pack as protection against splinters, and one scarcely still has left the strength to pray to God ... [sic] To die from a bullet seems to be nothing; parts of our being remain intact; but to be dismembered, torn to pieces, reduced to pulp, this is a fear that flesh cannot support and which is fundamentally the great suffering of the bombardment.\(^\text{17}\)

In the midst of battle, physical violence (sensory saturation, deafening, exhaustion) fused with moral suffering (the individual’s powerlessness in the face of the chaos of war, terror, dehumanisation). Combatants were trapped in a world without clear boundaries, whose spatial and temporal landmarks had been removed. After the clashes of the beginning of the war, such as the Battle of the Marne and the Battle of Tannenberg, there would be no more battles lasting only a few days. The Battle of Gallipoli took more than eight months, and that of Verdun, ten months. The Battle of the Somme took more than four months, as did the third Battle of Ypres in 1917. The very definition of a battle had changed: it now meant a siege in the open countryside. Considerably enlarged and fragmented, the battlefield now spread over dozens of square kilometres. A new kind of battle was born, whose violence stemmed not only from the kinds of weapons being used, but also from the feeling of powerlessness experienced by soldiers.

In the trenches of the Western Front, mud was everywhere, swallowing up corpses and threatening to drown the living. The violence of war, as it was perceived by combatants, was inseparable from this constant attack on their individuality: there was no more space or time to oneself. In this context, time ‘stolen away’ from the war – in correspondence with one’s loved ones or the


crafting of trench art – became vital. There was also a violence in waiting and boredom, which took up most of wartime. And when combat finally broke out, soldiers felt like simple victims sacrificed to chance.

This anonymous, depersonalised violence had a double effect on combatants. First, it gave them the feeling that their survival was due only to luck. The syndrome of ‘survivor’s guilt’ would be studied in the years that followed by the psychiatrist William Niederland. ‘Still now, almost sixty years later, I hold on to this conviction: I’m here by chance’, confided the historian Georges Dumézil in an interview given just before his death in 1986. ‘I came out different, on borrowed time.’

Industrial warfare also removed the interpersonal dimension from the act of killing. With the exception of a few snipers, soldiers on the battlefield in 1914–18 rarely aimed at precise targets. Face-to-face killing was uncommon: only when an enemy trench fell into the hands of a group of assailants did hand-to-hand fighting take place. These moments did not demonstrate the technological sophistication that characterised the rest of the war. Combatants used all kinds of primitive weapons: shovel handles, knives and clubs, sometimes crafted by the soldiers themselves. The grenade remained the weapon used most often during these encounters. That said, such moments of interpersonal violence were uncommon. Data on the origins of deadly wounds confirms that artillery dominated the war of 1914–18. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1, 70 per cent of French soldiers and 90 per cent of German soldiers had been killed by bullets. Forty years later, only 20–30 per cent of overall deaths were caused by bullet wounds; 70 per cent of the dead were killed by artillery shells.

In 1914–18, soldiers rarely made eye contact with those they killed. Death no longer had a face; rather, it took on the sinister and grotesque appearance of the bodies abandoned in no man’s land. Skills long taught in military training, such as bayonet attacks, were of no use in the context of the war’s new violence. At the same time, industrial warfare gave rise to a new kind of narrative about violence, one specific to the era of total war and of genocide. Its central theme can be summed up as each individual’s struggle to maintain his or her identity in an increasingly dehumanising conflict. Soldiers felt entirely overwhelmed by the violence of war, as if they counted for nothing.

**Cultures of Violence in Countries at War**

War violence did not only take place on battlefields or in abuses against civilians. The First World War was also waged in images and words: it was
a cultural war. At the time of mobilisation, each of the belligerent nations already had at its disposal a repertoire of collective representations that could kindle xenophobia and nationalism. The enemy of the summer of 1914 was often already the enemy of yesteryear. For the French, for example, the German – soon to be called the Boche – was the Prussian, the erstwhile enemy of the war of 1870–1. He was the pillager, the vandal, the occupier from the last war, remembered by the older generation, which had kept his memory alive and passed it on.\textsuperscript{18} As for the Germans, many were animated by an irrational fear of Russians, a fear which was mixed with disdain and which was also rooted in an imaginary inherited from the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{19}

Throughout Europe, it was believed that only ‘growing nations’, in a Social Darwinist perspective, could survive the competition between the major powers. This state of mind fed a real obsession with decadence, which could take various forms depending on the country: fear that global power would shift to the Far East after Japan’s naval victory over Russia in Tsushima in May 1905; fear of the French demographic decline; fear of aerial bombardment of cities, for the British; for the Germans, fear of encirclement (Einkreisung) by Czarist Russia on one side and by France and Great Britain on the other. Popular literature titles reveal the muffled violence permeating Europe on the eve of the war: The Coming Terror (Sydney, 1894); How the Germans Took London: Forewarned, Forearmed (London, 1900); The Infernal War (Paris, 1908).

In the first weeks of the war, the belligerent nations threw themselves into the conflict with the conviction that their survival was at stake. The hunt for internal enemies began as soon as the mobilisation was announced. State violence was rapidly brought to bear against individuals originating from enemy nations. In 1911, Australia had 33,000 residents born in Germany or in Austria-Hungary. As early as 10 August 1914, they were required to register at the nearest police station and to make a written commitment not to engage in hostile actions. Almost 7,000 of them, including women and children, were interned during the war. German clubs were closed and the teaching of the German language in schools was forbidden.\textsuperscript{20} In Paris, in London, in Berlin, rumours labelled recent immigrants, foreign nationals, and ethnic and

\textsuperscript{18} Michael Jeismann, Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich (1792–1918) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992).


religious minorities as ‘enemy agents’, liable to undermine national defence. In Germany, rumours spread that French and Russian secret agents – Jews – were crisscrossing the countryside in cars filled with gold. In Paris, the Maggi company was accused of distributing poisoned milk ‘to children . . . so that there would be no French people left after the war’.21 Most of its 800 stores were looted in the first hours of the mobilisation. Even more surprisingly, this wave of violence against internal enemies also affected countries that were not yet officially engaged in the war, countries far from the front: in several cities in the American Midwest, numerous German immigrants were arrested on suspicion of spying.

Fear was also one of the fundamental mechanisms in the abuses committed against civilians by combatants in the summer of 1914. There is nothing surprising about this: for any army, invading enemy territory entails a period of vulnerability. Soldiers advanced into unknown and unsecured territory without reliable access to provisions. Even before entering Belgium and northern France in early August 1914, German infantrymen, remembering the war of 1870–1, were convinced that they would encounter strong resistance from ‘francs-tireurs’ perched on bell towers, ready to shoot them as they went by. ‘They put out the eyes of the wounded and cut off their limbs one by one’, confided a Bavarian soldier to a resident of Nomény (Meurthe-et-Moselle). ‘If it wasn’t true, our leaders wouldn’t have told us so.’ A pervasive feeling of insecurity; the exhaustion caused by forced marches; insufficient food and water: everything conspired to increase the Germans’ nervous tension. They found an outlet for their anxieties in the massacre of civilians and in rampant destruction. The same pattern occurred on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans. According to Germany, its troops’ violation of the laws of war decreed in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 signalled the supremacy of military necessity over any humanitarian principle.22

The German armies’ strain was mirrored by the fear of the invaded populations, which was based both on real experiences of violence and imaginary crimes. For example, the stories of ‘German atrocities’ spread by the 200,000 Belgian and 150,000 French refugees often included terrifying descriptions of children whose arms or hands the Germans had purportedly deliberately cut off. This new version of the myth of the ogre, devourer of children, provoked a real panic in the north of France. Even the Bryce Report

21 Bruno Cabanes, August 1914: France, the Great War and a Month that Changed the World Forever (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), chapter 7.

on German atrocities (May 1915) sought an explanation for this paroxysmal form of war violence. Rings being stolen? Saber thrusts by uhlans? The myth of children with severed hands would quickly spread across France and the United Kingdom, through caricatures, postcards, editorial cartoons and mobilising posters.

The theme of ‘German atrocities’ and its counterpart, the imaginary abuses committed against German troops by ‘francs-tireurs’, fed the demonisation of the enemy for most of the war. When the United States officially entered the war against the Central Powers in the spring of 1917, for example, mobilisation posters still referred to the ‘violation’ of Belgium —in the sense both of the violation of its neutrality and of sexual violence during the invasion. ‘Remember Belgium’, warned an American poster in September 1918; it depicted a German soldier with his spiked helmet dragging a little girl by the hand. In other posters, the enemy was portrayed as a gorilla assaulting a woman.23

Obviously, this hatred varied in intensity across different countries and social classes, and among different individuals. Similarly, the cultural war against the enemy did not always have the same intensity. The initial mobilisation of the belligerent societies weakened, especially with the crisis of 1917; a period of remobilisation followed in France and Great Britain in the spring of 1918. Despite these nuances, the enemy was often considered a ‘race’ apart, characterised by his barbarism, his lack of moral conscience and his taste for wanton destruction. Soon the enemy was said to have a foul smell, a bloodthirsty temperament, and animalistic behaviour — to be an animal.24 In a classic process studied notably by the philosopher René Girard, the animalisation of the enemy allows him to be stigmatised as totally Other — and therefore to be fought without restraint.25 ‘They [the Germans] don’t deserve to be treated like human beings’, declared a French soldier from the Fourth Army in a letter to his parents on the eve of the Armistice. Another soldier complained about President Woodrow Wilson, who ‘spoke to the Boches as if they were people. What do you want? He hasn’t seen anything, that American’, he concluded.26

What is striking, in these letters from French soldiers in autumn 1918, is the persistence of representations first generated in the summer of 1914 — despite the

grind of four years of war and the 1917 crisis of morale. If this discursive violence lasted more than four years, it is precisely because it was not only the product of a discourse artificially constructed by the state – what has often been called propaganda. The violence against the enemy came from the bottom: it was the outcome of a kind of self-mobilisation by civilians and combatants, as well as of the continuous flow of news between the Front and the interior. We should not imagine that combatants were unaware of the suffering endured by their families, of blockades and hunger in the case of the Central Powers, of the urban bombardment undergone by civilians living in Paris or London, and, for all, of mass bereavement and of material deprivations in daily life.

In much the same way, civilians were perfectly aware of the violence of everyday life at the Front. As early as the summer of 1914, rumours spread by refugees and by the first wounded soldiers disseminated, and often amplified, the news of abuses committed against civilians and of the considerable losses of the first weeks of war. By the end of 1914, Kodak’s portable camera allowed thousands of soldiers to take photos of the battlefields. These were then sent to family members and friends far from the Front, evading official censure. At the same time, illustrated magazines sought to purchase war photos from readers: on 14 March 1915, the French weekly Le Miroir launched a contest to find the ‘most striking war photograph’, with a prize of 30,000 francs. After the forests of mutilated trees and the bodies of horses photographed in the early weeks of the war, it was now human bodies – friends or enemy – whose images were published in newspapers.

The question is therefore not whether or not civilians knew about this new war violence, but what they wanted to know. From this point of view, the turning point in all likelihood was in 1916. That year, the Prix Goncourt – a prestigious prize in French literature – went to Henri Barbusse’s Le Feu [Under Fire]. In Great Britain, the documentary The Battle of the Somme had tremendous public success, attracting almost 20 million spectators. After the slaughter of Verdun and the Somme, the representation of war violence changed forever. ‘Combat hammered and forged us to make us what we are’, Ernst Junger would state six years later in ‘Battle as Inner Experience’ (1922). ‘This war will always be the axis around which the carousel of our existence turns, as long as we are alive.’

The Future of Violence

What exactly do we identify as the end of the war? If we mean the end of combat, the Armistice of 11 November 1918 suspended hostilities on
the Western Front until the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed. But the question is naturally more complex than this military definition of war and peace allows. The *sortie de guerre*, as French historians now call the period of transition from wartime to peacetime, was a long, chaotic and complex process. Periods of demobilisation and remobilisation succeeded each other, as did gestures of peace and manifestations of the impossibility or refusal to demobilise. Sometimes, as in Germany or Russia, the Great War persisted in the form of a civil war or of new international conflicts. We must then raise the more fundamental question of how war violence mutated in the aftermath of the First World War.

This evolution took various forms across different countries. There were battles between regular armies. For example, the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22) ended, for the first time in Western history, with the mandatory transfer of 1.5 million individuals on the basis of ethnic homogeneity: Turkish citizens living in Turkish territory who were of Greek Orthodox faith were systematically exchanged for Greek citizens living in Greek territory who were of Muslim faith (Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of 30 January 1923, later integrated into the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923). There was also ethnic and religious violence, such as in Poland or in Ireland (during the war of independence of 1919–21), as well as class struggles against an ‘internal enemy’, as in Bolshevik Russia. Violence contesting the colonial presence also broke out in India and Egypt, Algeria and Indochina.

Some of the violence emerged directly from the outcome of war in the autumn and winter of 1918. Thousands of families of German descent were expelled from Alsace, as per the decisions of ‘Commissions de Triage’ (sorting commissions) created in December 1918. There were skirmishes between Allied occupation troops and German civilians in the Rhineland. In Germany, the months that followed the Armistice of November 1918 were marked first by the Spartacist uprising, by the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg and of Karl Liebknecht, and then by the repression of revolutionary movements by paramilitary groups of the far right. ‘We were told that the war was over. That made us laugh. We are the war’, a member of the *Freikorps* (German paramilitary volunteer units) declared.

The historian George Mosse used the concept of brutalisation to encapsulate the transformation of war violence into political violence, from violence against an external enemy to violence against an internal one. Since the late 1990s, this idea has been met with so much enthusiasm from historians – and
not only First World War specialists – that the meaning Mosse gave it in his groundbreaking book has often been forgotten. He pointed to veterans’ heightened indifference to violence as a result of the traumatic experience of the Front and of the pursuit, in peace, of the aggressive attitudes of war.\(^\text{27}\) The term ‘brutalisation’ is certainly too vague to be fully convincing. Is brutalisation a collective phenomenon which we can observe at the scale of postwar societies (and, in this case, did veterans from victorious nations react differently from those from vanquished ones?), or is it a behavioural trait manifested only by certain veterans? Even if Mosse’s stated goal has always been to carry out a ‘comparative cultural history’ of Europe in 1914–18 and after the war, his examples are largely drawn from German political history.

According to the historian Antoine Prost, the idea of brutalisation is more difficult to apply to France, where a strong republican tradition and pacifist movement mitigated veterans’ violence.\(^\text{28}\) In Great Britain, brutalisation was much more a ‘collective fear’ than a reality in the 1920s.\(^\text{29}\) For Dirk Schumann, the relative stability of France and of the United Kingdom is due to their displacement of postwar violence towards their colonies, whereas Germany, having lost its colonial empire, was forced to shift lingering war violence onto the political field – against its own citizens.

These interpretations start with the assumption that the experience of war in itself inevitably kindles a response of individual and collective violence, which certain countries might succeed in suppressing with parliamentary democracy and veterans’ associations, or in redirecting towards the colonial empire. But might it not be instead the ‘culture of defeat’,\(^\text{30}\) with its emotional mixture of humiliation, frustration and anger, that explains how some countries descended into various forms of political violence while others were able to organise the return of veterans while limiting social disorder? Defeat is neither only the result of the power balance between two nations, nor simply a fact sanctioned by diplomats, but very much a state of mind. In Germany, for example, the feeling of defeat encompassed various realities: the occupation of the Rhineland, the political instability of the Weimar Republic, the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles, the loss of border


\(^{29}\) Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain’, *Journal of Modern History* 75.3 (2003), 557–89.

regions in central Europe – from which, not coincidentally, most of the members of the Freikorps emerged in the aftermath of the war.

In Russia, the weakening of state power opened up space for warlords, who carried out frequent pogroms with their private armies. In this unique period of ‘war communism’ (1918–21), many forms of violence combined to create a quasi-permanent climate of violence: the struggle against counter-revolutionaries (real or imagined), against foreign intervention forces (which reached 20,000 men in 1919), and against ‘class enemies’ such as kulaks; the Polish-Soviet war (1919–21), in which some 250,000 people died; ethnic struggles. The Russian philosopher Pyotr Struve, who went from Bolshevism to the counter-revolutionary movement, concluded that ‘everything we are living through is only the continuation and mutation of the world war’.

At the same time, the disintegration of European empires led to a resurgence of nationalism in the Caucasus, in the new Baltic states, in Poland, and also outside Europe. In Africa and Asia, there was unrest in proportion to the considerable expectations that colonised people had placed in the person of President Wilson and in Wilsonianism. Many saw the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as a test of the Western powers’ commitment to implement the right to self-determination. The Chinese delegation, made up of young westernised diplomats, argued that former German concessions should be transferred to China. Anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out across China when negotiations collapsed, especially in Beijing on 4 May 1919. In mid April 1919, at the Amritsar massacre, also called Jallianwala Bagh massacre, British troops under the command of Brigadier General Reginald Dyer killed at least 379 protesters; it was a bloody repression of the Indian nationalist movement. The violence that erupted in the colonial world was a direct result of the Great War and of the hope for a new world that it had engendered.

Conclusion

The First World War scarred the twentieth century as a whole with its extreme violence. A century later, who could say that this violence has totally dissipated? Without the Great War, there is no Auschwitz, there are no gulags and there is probably no ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Balkans in the 1990s; without the war writers of 1914–18, no Primo Levi; without the eruption of nationalism, no ulterior development of totalitarianism.

To stress the continuity between the First and Second World Wars is not to defend the idea that Italian and German fascism were the inevitable result of the frustrations and resentment provoked by the peace treaties; the 1930s’
spiral into totalitarianism has many roots. On the other hand, the lack of distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the fear of the internal enemy, the industrialisation of death on the battlefield, the degrading and murderous treatment of prisoners of war, the extermination and deportation of an entire people on the basis of ethnicity are collective practices of violence that were inherited from the Great War and that reached their climax in later conflicts.

In the aftermath of the Great War, veterans did not share the same ideologies, but they were all convinced of the fragility of peace and the possible resurgence of violence. Some of them bitterly observed that the conflict continued in other forms. During the First World War, Michal Römer, born near Vilnius in 1880, had joined the Polish Legions of Józef Pilsudski with the secret hope that one day Lithuania would be independent. On 1 April 1919, he stated what many of his contemporaries had also perceived:

The war, finished in autumn, has not died away. Peace and a return to stability appear to be as remote, if not more distant, as in autumn when the war was formally approaching its end. Evicted from the trenches, frontlines and from the official and regular struggle of militarised powers, it reached into human societies and transformed itself into a state of permanent chaos, a bellum omnium contra omnes. Formally, the regular war has stopped, but the catastrophe, of which the war was only the first act, goes on and is far from over. Who knows if it is only in its initial stage?31

Bibliographical Essay

It is somewhat surprising that the study of war violence is relatively new in research on the First World War. It was not until the 1970s and the publication of John Keegan’s groundbreaking volume The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin, 1976) that military historians began to describe the battlefield from the point of view of combatants and the effects of the new weapons of war – artillery, machine guns, flamethrowers, etc. – on soldiers’ bodies. According to Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, in 14–18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2003), this delay can be explained by historians’ reluctance to work on extreme violence and their inability to understand the concrete reality of combat. In a recent book – Combattre: une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne (Paris: Seuil, 2008) – Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau also observes how difficult

it was for social scientists (historians, sociologists) who had participated in the First World
War to reflect on their own experience.

For a long time, it was the immense body of war literature, produced both during and
after the war, that bore witness to the extreme violence of the First World War. Photographs, documentary films, artifacts and the material culture of the conflict also
led historians – more accustomed to work on written sources than on images – to change
their approach; see Stéphane Audoin Rouzeau, Les armes et la chair: trois objets de mort en
1914–1918 (Paris: Armand Colin, 2009). With these newly rediscovered sources, the violence
of war is now at the centre of historical research. Historians of the First World War have
used several approaches to study the violence of war. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau et al.
(eds.), La violence de guerre, 1914–1945 (Paris: Editions Complexe, 2002) and
George Kassimeris (ed.), The Barbarization of Warfare (New York: New York University
Press, 2006) compare the violence of war in the First and Second World Wars. Other
books examine specific years in the Great War, identifying them as turning points in the
escalation of war violence. See, for example, John Horne (ed.), Vers la guerre totale: le
tournant de 1914–1915 (Paris: Tallandier, 2010). Other historians have chosen to study specific
battles, staying as close as possible to the experience of combatants. See Jean-Michel Steg,
Le jour le plus meurtrier de l’histoire de France, 22 août 1914 (Paris: Fayard, 2014) and
Damien Baldin and Emmanuel Saint-Fuscien, Charleroi, 21–23 août 1914 (Paris: Tallandier,
2012) for the Battle of the Frontiers; also see Keegan, The Face of Battle, for the Battle of

On combat as a bodily experience, the groundbreaking book is Joanna Bourke, An
Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare (London: Granta,
1999). On the medical history of the Great War, the literature has been deeply revitalised
since the 2000s: see, for example, Sophie Delaporte, Gueules cassées: les blessés de la face
pendant la Grande Guerre (Paris: Noésis, 2001), and Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British
violence of war and shell-shock, see the Journal of Contemporary History 35.1 (2000), special
issue: ‘Shell-Shock’.

The history of war violence includes the histories of the representation of the enemy,
the mobilisation of societies at war, and the motivations of combatants. The concept of
‘war culture’, introduced by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker in ‘Violence
et consentement: la “culture de guerre” du premier conflit mondial’, in Jean-Pierre Rioux
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of this cultural approach. Also see Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14–18: Understanding the
Great War, and Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First

Recent research has led to a re-evaluation of the impact of war violence on civilians
during the First World War. These studies may focus on the violence of the invasion
period in the summer of 1914 (John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A
History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001)), on sexual violence
(Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, L’enfant de l’ennemi (Paris: Aubier, 1995)), on violence in
occupied countries (Annette Becker, Oubliés de la Grande Guerre (Paris: Hachette, 2003)),
on the Allied blockade of Germany, on violence committed against prisoners of war
(Heather Jones, Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011)), or on the question of refugees.

Witnessing and Fighting Nazi Violence during World War II

JOCHEN HELLBECK

As Soviet troops closed in on Germany in January 1945, Ilya Ehrenburg, Soviet Russia’s foremost wartime writer, published an article in the Red Army’s newspaper, reminding his readers about the larger meaning of the war they were fighting:

Advancing toward Berlin are not only our divisions and armies, but also legions of petrified mothers, inconsolable widows, and children whose hair has turned gray . . . Advancing toward Berlin are the boots, shoes and slippers of those who have been gassed, among them the tiny shoes of a two-year-old. . . . Buried alive by the Germans, the children have crawled out of the pits and antitank trenches; they are already at the border, eager to get to Berlin . . . These children are not going to go away. They are our conscience. They are guiding our tanks and soldiers.1

In histories of the Second World War, Ehrenburg often figures as a fierce propagandist whose fiery calls on Red Army men to kill Germans contributed to the exceptional violence that defined the German-Soviet war.2 But in important other respects his writings have been overlooked: as carriers of detailed information about Nazi atrocities in the East, and as catalysts of a moral position from which Ehrenburg’s readers, whether they were soldiers at the front or civilian workers in the war economy, were to encounter and defeat the German invaders. The children killed in ravines and death camps were not going away: Ehrenburg’s editorials ensured that they lived on in the conscience of Soviet survivors. The violence practised by the German occupants, Ehrenburg felt, should incite moral outrage and lead the Red Army

1 Krasnaia zvezda, 10 January 1945. For the ‘cabbage of Majdanek’, see below pp. 319–20.
soldiers on towards victory and retribution. Ehrenburg had been writing in this
vein since the first days of the German invasion – his January 1945 piece marked
a culmination of a multi-year campaign to inform, agitate and educate.

World War II differed from preceding wars on three counts: its staggering
overall death toll of some 60 million people; the fact that most of the
casualties were on the Allied side; and the much higher death rate, again
on the Allied side, of civilians over soldiers. The mass killing of civilians was
a strategic objective of the war. ‘Millions of people’, Richard Bessel writes,
‘lost their lives not as a consequence of military campaigns with military
objectives, but as a result of actions the fundamental aim of which was just to
kill civilians.’ The war’s epicentres of violence were territories of China and
the Soviet Union occupied by Axis forces for years. This chapter focuses on
the Soviet case, the arena of greatest civilian suffering anywhere in the world.

Germany’s war in the East rested on a transgression of the moral norms of
humanism, which Nazi leaders purposely disavowed to justify the promotion
of a particularist racial ethic and the mass annihilation of ‘unworthy’ life. Both
the moral provocation that defined the Nazi project and its cruel effects for
people who were defined as antithetical to the ‘Aryan race’ registered
profoundly with Soviet observers. Millions of people witnessed German
atrocities on Soviet soil first-hand or learned about them through
Ehrenburg’s writings, political seminars held inside the Red Army, or letters
received from family members who had experienced German rule. Soviet
commentators seized on the nature of German violence to build a moral case
about their war effort, expressed in the imperative need for ‘Soviet humanity’
to fight ‘fascist barbarism’. This narrative, replete with detailed information
about German atrocities, was paramount in mobilising Soviet people to
fight Nazi Germany. In the eyes of many, it also redeemed the Soviet regime,
absolving it of its own ample record of political violence.

Increasingly during the war, the Soviet moral language of anti-fascism
shaped Western attitudes towards Nazi Germany. Documentations of Soviet
suffering presented in newspaper reports or films circulated through many
parts of the world where they produced a groundswell of popular sympathy
with the Soviet Union. In the process, decidedly communist norms of fighting
the German fascist threat to humanity, and fighting it passionately, passed over
to the West. While historians have recently begun to point to the deep sense of
moral superiority over Nazi Germany as a key binding agent that held the anti-

3 Richard Bessel, ‘Death and Survival in the Second World War’, in Michael Geyer and
Adam Tooze (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Second World War, vol. III (Cambridge:
Hitler coalition together and ultimately accounted for Allied victory in 1945, their preconceived notion that morality resided in the West and was defined by it reduces this important insight. Challenging this view, the present chapter traces how Soviet writers, journalists, filmmakers and many other eyewitnesses of German violence formulated an activist and universal response to German fascism that would become a benchmark of moral value for Western observers as well. While Stalin disavowed universal ideals after the war, this did not diminish their wartime vitality and reach, or the part the Soviet Union played – materially as well as conceptually – in defeating Nazi Germany.

Shared hatred of Hitler held the Allies together until the end of the war, but the alliance fractured soon after the German regime of violence had been overcome. At the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Stalin’s brazen insistence on indicting the Germans for a mass murder of Polish officers at Katyn that in fact Soviet forces had committed backfired spectacularly. Many international observers began to distrust the entire Soviet documentary record on German war crimes. With these sources in discredit, some of the worst German atrocities in the East were eclipsed from the historical record. In the postwar West, anti-fascism yielded to anti-totalitarianism, as Stalin began to appear as another Hitler. Western anti-communism and liberal notions of Soviet society as totalitarian have conspired to produce an exceedingly politicised understanding of the Soviet war effort as masterminded by a cynical regime. This interpretation is insensitive to a Soviet documentary record of Nazi violence awash with powerful human emotions: shock, grief and hatred. It represses from view the existential perspectives of violated people roaming ravaged homes. Even though serious scholars today believe most Soviet records of Nazi atrocities to be truthful, the Katyn dossier forming the sole exception, this acknowledgement has barely translated into an injunction to explore these records beyond their instrumental aims.

One reason for this omission is a Western-centric understanding of the Holocaust, which liberal scholars have posited as the defining human challenge of the Second World War. Such an understanding elides millions of non-Jewish Soviet victims of the Nazi campaign against ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’ – POWs, communists, partisans and slave workers. In their defence, Holocaust scholars often claim that the Soviets disregarded or sought to repress knowledge about ‘the Holocaust’, conceived as both the particular suffering of Jews and the overall record of the Nazi war of annihilation in the East. Yet as this

chapter contends, a wide range of people in the Soviet Union were informed about Nazi violence against Soviet POWs and civilians, Jewish as well as non-Jewish. It brings into view multiple local initiatives to record German atrocities and shows how they fed into the work of high-level propagandists like Ehrenburg. It establishes how documentations of violence catalysed support for the Red Army and hatred towards the German invaders, throughout the Soviet Union and beyond its borders. Everywhere in Nazi-occupied Europe, whether we consider Emmanuel Ringelblum’s clandestine archive in the Warsaw ghetto or French wartime reports on the Nazi massacre in Oradour-sur-Glane, the documentary impulse served similar mobilising needs. What set the Soviet case apart were a much more pervasive practice of German violence and, in response to it, much broader efforts on the Soviet side to record enemy atrocities. The documents produced in the process brimmed with a singular emotional charge: they urged their readers to fight and kill.

The Record of German Violence

In the European theatre, World War II began with a double attack on Poland, with Germany invading from the West on 1 September, and the Soviet Union following suit, from the East, days later. Stalin’s and Hitler’s regimes stood out among other European states as two ruthless dictatorships that openly advocated massive political violence for the sake of enacting their social or racial utopias. Both began occupation with campaigns to crush national elites on enemy soil, killing thousands of captured officers, aristocrats, intellectuals, political activists and priests. Both carried out deportations on a vast scale. Yet these similarities obscure important differences. Germany’s occupation policy was more lethal as it served a more ambitious purpose to incorporate into the Aryan Reich portions of Poland which were predominantly inhabited by ethnic Poles and Jews.5 Entrusted with a scheme of comprehensive racial reordering, SS chief Heinrich Himmler prepared the resettlement of ethnic Germans from other parts of Europe into western Poland. To clear the ground, Himmler dispatched his Einsatzgruppen killing squads into Poland where they executed scores of Polish nationalists and forced Jews into ghettos, randomly killing many in the process.6

The ‘higher’ law of Germany’s racial survival and enhancement necessitated the enormous violence in Poland in the eyes of many. Condescension towards the neighbour in the East as a less civilised type also played a role. As the occupation progressed, Joseph Goebbels recorded Hitler’s ‘devastating’ verdict on the Poles: ‘More like animals than human beings.’

Intensely deadly, the Polish campaign emerged in retrospect as but a prelude to Operation Barbarossa, the code name for Germany’s war against the Soviet Union, which radically extended and reforged Nazi violence in World War II. During the invasion of Poland, at least some German army leaders saw themselves bound by the conventions of international law and objected to the SS terror on these grounds. Operation Barbarossa was planned in such a way as to ensure that every single German soldier became a conscious agent of the Nazi war of annihilation. This campaign would be unlike any other, Hitler believed, because it would be fought against Nazism’s mortal enemy, Judeo-Bolshevism. Military orders issued in spring 1941 commanded an army of several million conscripted men to adapt their conscience to the laws of Nazi racial ideology. To prevail against the ‘criminal’, ‘cruel’ and ‘barbaric’ Soviet enemy, German soldiers were directed to set aside principles of humanity and international law. Only a year before, Himmler had drawn a principled line between the Nazis as ‘civilized Europeans’ and the ‘Bolsheviks’. As he presented Hitler with a plan to improve the racial stock in Germany’s east by separating racially valuable Polish children from their parents, he described the project as ‘cruel and tragic’ for the concerned individuals, but ‘mild and ... better, when compared to the Bolshevik method of physical extermination of a people, a method that we reject in principle as non-Germanic and impossible’.

Now, about to come face to face with millions of ‘Bolsheviks’ who were supposedly more beastly than human, German soldiers were to resort to the very cruelty and ruthlessness that was ascribed to the enemy. As Hitler directed his generals in a 30 March 1941 address: ‘The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked.’

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8 Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, pp. 15–21.
10 Browning, Origins of the Final Solution, pp. 69–70.
Beyond the specific instruction to isolate and execute Soviet commissars, Nazi notions about the nature of the Jewish Bolshevik enemy were vague, however. German commandos proceeded to apply them broadly and lethally. As they entered Soviet homes the first question soldiers would pose to frightened residents was: ‘Jude, Kommunist?’ Individuals that fitted either category would be taken away and executed. Einsatzgruppen internal reports revealed some conceptual flux as they alternated between ‘communists’, ‘Jewish communists’ or ‘Jews and other communist elements’ in their classification of the same people they had shot. By August 1941, the widespread sentiment that Jews and Bolsheviks were interchangeable, or that at the very least Jews firmly backed the Bolshevik system, so much so that ‘every Jew, in principle’ had to be regarded as a partisan (as Heinrich Himmler instructed his commandos in Bialystok) prompted the SS to annihilate entire Jewish settlements, complete with women, children and the elderly. The mass killing of Soviet Jews thus unfolded as part of Nazism’s ideological struggle against the carriers of ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’, an enemy whom the Nazis portrayed as terroristic and savage.

These killings refashioned Germany’s way of war. The murderous campaign against the Soviet agents of ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’, who could be killed with greatest ease as they were imagined as most radically removed from European norms of civilisation, became the template into which the treatment of Jews from Germany and other parts of Europe was fitted. The image of the Judeo-Bolshevik enemy, and the forms of mass violence that it generated, travelled west in autumn 1941, inaugurating what is often identified as the Holocaust. The fact that the decision to annihilate all the Jews of Europe came after, and was an effect of, Operation Barbarossa underscores how centrally the war against the Soviet Union defined the Nazi regime of violence.

With almost the same exterminatory zeal that they showed toward Jews, Germans proceeded to killed Soviet POWs. Their systematic destruction was an integral component of Nazi policy towards the Soviet Union. The lethal motive extended beyond starving to death millions of ‘superfluous eaters’. Soviet POWs (even absent the commissars who had already been shot) were widely identified as ‘Bolsheviks’, with all the consequences that this appellation entailed. German military guards were under explicit orders to train their weapons on captured Red Army men with ‘particular

When the SS began to introduce gas vans in Sachsenhausen and gas chambers in Auschwitz, it performed the first deadly experiments on Soviet POWs. By the end of January 1942, almost 60 per cent of the 3.35 million Soviet prisoners of war who had been captured by then had died. This number dwarfed even the number of Jews who had been killed by the Germans up to that point.  

To turn German soldiers into agents of the Nazi war of annihilation required ongoing indoctrination beyond the Barbarossa decrees of spring 1941. This work was performed by army field orders, including the directive that Field Marshal von Reichenau issued to the Ukraine-based soldiers of the Sixth Army on 10 October 1941. Reichenau reminded the German soldiers stationed ‘in the East’ of their political mission ‘to free the German people once and for all from the Asiatic-Jewish danger’. His order specifically called for the annihilation of resisting enemy male soldiers, female soldiers (‘degenerate women’) and suspected partisans as perpetrators of ‘subhuman insidious cruelty’.

Three months after Reichenau issued this order, Pravda presented it to its readers as an order ‘so monstrous and cynical that all Soviet people and the entire civilised world must know about it’. In May 1942, Pravda published excerpts from Göring’s ‘Green Folder’, a policy directive that ordered the total economic exploitation of the conquered Soviet Union for the exclusive needs of Nazi Germany. Already in a November 1941 address to Moscow officials, Stalin had quoted from German military orders found on the battlefield to describe the nature of ‘Hitlerism’ and ‘fascism’ (he used these terms interchangeably). Stalin also quoted from Herrmann Rauschning’s recently published ‘Conversations with Hitler’: ‘Hitler says: I liberate man from the degrading chimera called conscience. The conscience, as well as education, cripple man. I have the advantage of not being constrained by any theoretical or moral concerns whatsoever.’

Soviet leaders publicised available German documents, the Barbarossa decrees in particular, to flag the Soviet war effort as

15 Several of these army orders are reprinted in ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, pp. 339–45.  
17 *Pravda*, 4 and 7 May 1942; reprinted in *Zverstva, grabezhi*, pp. 115–30.  
18 I. V. Stalin, *Sochinenia. Tom 15* (Moscow: Izdatel stvo ‘Pisatel’, 1997). Stalin’s citation is a recognisable though not verbatim quotation from Rauschning’s book, which he did not reference. While the scholarly consensus today is that Rauschning invented at least
a moral campaign against a depraved invader. Ilya Ehrenburg practised this method from the very outbreak of the war. He was also one of the earliest Soviet observers to call attention to the Nazi annihilation of Jews in western parts of the Soviet Union. On 25 August 1941, Pravda carried his accusation: ‘They kill children, forcing their mothers to watch. They force terrified old men to act the buffoon. They rape girls. They stab, torture, and burn. Because of them, Belostok, Minsk, Berdichev, and Vinnitsa have turned into terrible names.’ ‘Mankind as a whole’, Ehrenburg concluded, ‘is now waging war against Germany – not for territorial gains, but for the right to breathe.’

During the first months of the invasion, Soviet knowledge of German atrocities against civilians was episodic. In November 1941, the media reported the shooting murder of an estimated 52,000 Jews from Kiev, men, women and children, at Babi Yar. This grisly picture filled up with more detail after the Red Army drove the Germans back from near Moscow and in southern Russia. In January 1942, authorities dug up the remains of thousands of executed civilians in Kerch and Rostov, for the most part Jews. Images showing landscapes of bodies strewn along antitank ditches, or close-ups of the dead were publicised in Soviet newspapers and magazines. A commission of Moscow historians began to interview survivors and witnesses of German occupation, starting in the liberated areas near Moscow. Planning also began for the creation of an Extraordinary State Commission (ChGK) that would catalogue the crimes committed by the Germans, in anticipation of postwar trials and reparations. That commission took up its work in November 1942. Yet it was only with the sustained


20 Mordechai Altshuler, ‘The Holocaust in the Soviet Mass Media during the War and in the First Postwar Years Re-examined’, Yad Vashem Studies 39.2 (2011), 121–68. Einsatzgruppen reports record that 31,771 Jews were killed at Babi Yar on 29–30 September 1941.
liberation campaign that followed on the heels of Soviet victory at Stalingrad that these various bodies started to amass a comprehensive record of German atrocities on Soviet soil.

Since early 1942 the Political Administration of the Red Army had been publishing brochures detailing atrocities committed by the ‘German fascist invaders’. In spring 1943, a new phrase entered these brochures: the ‘mass annihilation of the Soviet civilian population’. As the authors stressed, the Germans conducted their ‘physical extermination’ in a ‘planned manner and on a mass scale’.\(^{24}\) The discovery of crimes unprecedented in size and nature jolted Soviet observers. At the Krasnodar trial of eleven Soviet citizens who had collaborated in Nazi atrocities against Soviet civilians and POWs, held in July 1943, new evidence about the killing methods used by the Germans came to the fore, in particular their use of gas vans adapted to asphyxiate passengers by exhaust fumes. Filmmaker Mark Troianovskii, who directed an official camera team at the trial, wrote to his mother from Krasnodar:

You of course know about the trial from the newspapers. But I must tell you that I was all choked up when I heard Dr. Kazel’skii’s story about how the Germans killed his sick patients, the testimony of the teacher Inozemtseva who talked about the killing of the children, and others. Witness Ivan Ivanovich Kotov we couldn’t record with audio. His throat is paralysed after he was poisoned with carbon oxide. It’s as if he has arisen from the dead. He’s the only one who has miraculously survived the gas van.\(^{25}\)

War crime trials, at Krasnodar and elsewhere, were but a few of numerous sites at which Soviet citizens were instructed and educated about the nature of the ‘German-fascist atrocities’. In liberated towns and villages, Red Army political officers gathered rank and file soldiers around the exposed corpses of victims or near former Gestapo prisons. Local survivors who had personally witnessed Nazi atrocities spoke; agitators lectured about the horrors committed by the Germans. These ‘meetings of vengeance’ culminated with ritualistic vows by the assembled soldiers to fight the enemy with redoubled force. The sight of German massacres of civilians held enormous mobilising power for the present soldiers; it stirred into action even recruits who had initially disliked Stalin or were unwilling to fight. In the face of such atrocities, the war acquired an even higher moral purpose: ‘as every day of occupation meant more women raped, towns destroyed, and fellow citizens humiliated

and murdered’, soldiers felt a mandate to move westward quickly, in order to save lives.26

Red Army soldiers who observed the effects of Nazi occupation corresponded with Ehrenburg, feeding him with evidence that they knew he needed for his editorials. Twelve days after the liberation of Liady, formerly a Jewish town on the border of Russia and Belorussia, soldier V. Izvekov wrote to Ehrenburg sharing stark impressions: ‘How many corpses of children with faces distorted by pain? Among the murdered there is even a six-month-old child with a pacifier in its mouth, apparently buried alive, as there are no traces of murder.’ Izvekov’s letter ended like a ritualised ‘meeting of vengeance’, with a description of his unit marching ‘forward to the West, past the martyrs’ grave’, his fellow soldiers’ eyes filled with ‘tears of rage, such rage that no one has previously experienced’.27 Izvekov’s letter was a single sheet in a huge dossier of personal documentation about the nature and effects of German rule that was produced in the immediate aftermath of Soviet liberation. Everywhere in the liberated areas, a wartime correspondent noted, ‘people were seized with the spontaneous need to write, to testify. Stacks upon stacks of testimonies piled up in the political sections of regiments and divisions. They were written on scraps of Gestapo forms, on the backs of idiotic Goebbels posters, and more frequently in school notebooks. There is no statute of limitations for what was written in them.’28 Visiting Kharkov in February 1943, days after the Red Army had retaken the city, British correspondent Alexander Werth was struck by the urge of residents to tell their stories. Invariably, these testimonies would centre on hangings: ‘public hangings. It was that which seemed to have left the deepest impression of all.’29 This is confirmed in hundreds of testimonies that the Moscow historical commission collected from witnesses of German occupation throughout the liberated areas of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia.

Violence figures at the centre of these testimonies, not only and not primarily because the historians asked the witnesses specifically to talk about enemy atrocities, but because the German style of violence had etched itself in witnesses’ minds as the most harrowing thing they had ever experienced. Etta Maizles, a Jewish survivor of the Minsk ghetto, used drastic words

when she talked about the series of mass killings in the ghetto that also claimed the lives of two of her own children: ‘He [the German] is a beast, worse than a tiger, worse than anything in the world. You cannot imagine what kind of beasts they are, bloodthirsty to no end, unless you come into their way.’ One of the many German ‘actions’ in the ghetto disturbed Maizles in particular – the systematic killing in March 1942 of 300 children who lived in an orphanage in the Minsk ghetto after their parents had died:

What happened to the children was unbearably sad. They were innocent victims of these monsters. By then I’d seen so many horrors, but when I saw them massacre those children, I just couldn’t take it. I was beside myself. If you’d seen that pile of children, those bodies with broken legs. They’d pick them up by the legs and smash them on the corners and walls of the buildings. You can understand how such horror could make you lose your mind. I couldn’t live, couldn’t work. For days on end I didn’t say a word. Everything inside me went numb.30

Witnesses referred to the inhuman and debasing style of German violence as the defining characteristic of the occupation regime. A Belorussian partisan who was interviewed as early as December 1942 (he and others had been flown to Moscow to update communist officials about the state of partisan warfare in the swamps and forests of Belorussia) remarked on the gallows that the Germans had set up ‘on squares, in parks and in front of theatres. Lately gallows were put up in every village district. They string them up with hooks in their jaws, like fish.’31 The defiling of culturally sacred places (theatres and city parks) and the inhuman methods of killing are crucial markers in this testimony. Partisans noted that the Germans deliberately placed the gallows in public places, ‘for everyone to see’.32 Nazi violence, along with the German denigration of Soviet culture and the fact that the Germans only barked orders at Soviet civilians but did not address them as citizens, challenged survivors’ self-understanding as Soviet people.

At least some Soviet citizens who had previously called out the communist regime for its repressive policies came to espouse a novel understanding of Soviet power in the light of Nazi violence. Lev Nikolaev, a professor of medicine in Kharkov, had kept a secret diary since 1936, in which he

31 Nauchnyi Arkhiv Instituta Rossiiiskoi istorii Rossiiiskoi Akademii nauk (NA IRI RAN), f. 2, razd. II, op. 4, d. 34, l. 6: Interview with Nikifor S. Pankratov, 29 December 1942.
32 NA IRI RAN, f. 2, razd. II, op. 4, d. 6: Interview with Aleksei N. Mal’chevskii, 10 September 1942.
compared Stalinism and Nazi Germany as two similarly blood-drenched dictatorships. Nikolaev kept his diary through the war. His first-hand experience of the Germans’ ‘cunning cruelty’ clarified his moral horizons, making him long, like many other Soviet citizens, for ‘liberation’ by ‘our’ Red Army soldiers.33

After liberation, one of the first things Soviet officials did in liberated cities and towns was to assemble the entire local population for political meetings. Their purpose was to reinforce the antithesis of fascist inhumanity and Soviet humanity, a central trope in the ongoing Soviet ideological battle against fascism. Similar to the Meetings of Vengeance practised in the Red Army, these gatherings were typically held in front of gallows – sometimes with corpses of Soviet partisans still hanging from them. A Melitopol official who was interviewed by the Moscow historians described the overwhelming effect of a meeting that he convened six days after the city’s liberation. He was the first to speak, followed by priests and a few Red Army officers. The last speakers were four partisans – ‘two comrades [i.e. party members] and two girls, all of them from Melitopol’. They joined the partisans after the Germans had shot their families and parents. ‘What we witnessed was not a regular meeting – it was a single roaring and howling. The stories were so horrible, we all stood there, unable to move.’34

Such meetings were held everywhere on liberated soil, including in the Baltic republics and the western regions of Ukraine and Belorussia, which the Soviet Union had annexed in the wake of the Hitler–Stalin Pact. In these areas, where memories of Soviet occupation and violence in the early phases of the Second World War were fresh, stories of individual survival of Nazi terror were particularly important to buttress Soviet claims of ‘liberation’. Significantly, the Germans never contemplated a comparable interview project during the period of their rule over Soviet lands, as its civic potential contravened their colonial ambitions. Soviet civilians, Reichenau’s order declared, were to be motivated by fear of German reprisals, not to be addressed as citizens.

Soviet photographers and film crews played a crucial role in weaving evidence of atrocities into the moral tale of Soviet humanism battling fascist inhumanity, and disseminating this story to broad audiences. Camera teams recording the westward advance of the Red Army were under specific instructions to ‘Record the atrocities and trail of destruction caused by the

33 NA IRI RAN, f. 2, razd. VI, op. 6, d. 7a and 7v.
34 NA IRI RAN, f. 2, razd. VI, op. 11, d. 2, l. 3.
Germans, record the most horrific and painful scenes, without any regard to aesthetic concerns. Cameramen shooting this material should be directed by no other concern than the obligation to fixate the Germans’ plunder and infamy on our soil, for which they will have pay one day.\(^\text{35}\) A well-known documentary made from this footage was Aleksandr Dovzhenko’s *Battle for Our Soviet Ukraine*, which the director had initially titled *Ukraine in Flames*. The film’s principal subject is Ukraine’s and Ukrainians’ unspeakable suffering at the hands of the Germans. The camera pans over an opened mass grave in Kharkov containing the remains of 14,000 victims of Nazi terror, to the voice of a speaker: ‘You who are alive, look at us! Don’t turn away from our terrible trenches. We cannot be forgotten or ignored. There are many of us. We are a great multitude in Ukraine. Do not forget us! Take revenge on Germany for our suffering!’ The film also showed footage of public meetings in the wake of liberation, and it featured surviving witnesses, including Lev Nikolaev who showed effects of famine and torture on his body to the camera, standing in front of Kharkhov’s ransacked medical institute, his former workplace that, he explained, had been torched by the Germans.

‘You who are alive, look at us!’

These words in Dovzhenko’s film reached audiences the world over. From early on, Soviet leaders sought to bring information about the extent and nature of Nazi crimes beyond Soviet borders, to shore up hatred against Germany and to solidify the anti-Hitler alliance. In the process, they transmitted to Western Allied nations their moral understanding of the war against ‘fascist inhumanity’. Among the earliest to do so were Ehrenburg and other Soviet Jewish writers who gathered in Moscow on 24 August 1941 for an international radio appeal. At the meeting, Solomon Mikhoels described fascist violence as ‘elaborate methods of unheard of, unprecedented, brutal, bloodthirsty cruelties’ that aimed at ‘humiliation and [man’s] degradation to a level lower than that of an animal’. Mikhoels called on Jews around the world to fight Nazi leaders passionately. This was the ‘duty . . . of all humanity’.\(^\text{36}\) Many of the Moscow Jewish writers subsequently became a Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC). When committee members


toured US cities in summer 1943 to raise funds for the Soviet war effort they
drew huge crowds. The efforts of the JAC to collect documents on the
annihilation of the Soviet Jews contributed to the publication in the United
States of a ‘Black Book’. The publication featured an epigraph by JAC leader
Itzik Fefer: “The globe is too small to hold both mankind and fascism.”37

Shown in Allied countries during the war, Soviet documentary films
detailing Nazi violence made a powerful impression. Moscow Strikes Back,
a film devoted to the first liberation campaign in December 1941 and
January 1942, came out in US movie theatres in August 1942 and won an
Oscar in 1943. A critic for the New York Times described the film as at heart
‘a picture of the brutal desolation wrought by war, of the monstrous desecra-
tion of humanity that the Nazis unleashed throughout the world. And any
one who sees it cannot help but be deeply, implacably aroused.’ To call
Moscow Strikes Back the most exciting of all contemporary war films was an
understatement; another reviewer noted: ‘The film makes you want to jump
out of your seat in the movie theater and join those fighting on the screen in
order to purge once and for all Nazism’s degeneracy and senseless cruelty
from the face of this earth.’ ‘While the film was shown, the theater hall,
crowded with people, was completely silent’, a third reviewer noted. ‘The
people sat there holding their breath. But as the last images flickered over the
screen, everybody erupted in applause and cheers.’38 In Great Britain, popular
identification with the Soviet war against Germany proved even greater than
in the United States, where at least until D-Day the Pacific War relegated the
European theatre to a secondary front. At an August 1942 exhibition of war
photographs in London, it was the ‘Russian atrocity section’ that made by far
the greatest impression.39 Soviet anti-fascist posters trickled into the United
States where they prompted strong reactions from curators who lauded the
ability of Soviet graphic art to communicate forcefully, incite action and
foment hatred of the enemy. ‘They kill Germans’, a critic summarised the
visual power of these posters. Compared to this Soviet standard, British and
American posters looked ‘pretty dull’.40

37 The Black Book: The Nazi Crime against the Jewish People (New York: Duell, Sloan &
Pearce, 1946), p. iii.
38 New York Times, 30 August 1942; New York Post Meridian, 2 December 1942; Motion
Picture Herald, December 1942, cited in Tsena kadra, 1009–10 (reverse translations from
Russian).
39 Janina Struk, Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence (London:
40 Peter Kort Zegers and Douglas Druick (eds.), Windows on the War: Soviet TASS Posters at
The British and US governments contributed to the outpouring of popular sympathy with the Soviet ally by toning down or even actively countering references to the violent nature of the Stalinist state. The British Ministry of Information issued a manual, ‘Arguments to Counter the Ideological Fear of Bolshevism’, instructing journalists to think of notions such as the ‘Red Terror’ as figments of the Nazi imagination.\(^{41}\) The Roosevelt administration enlisted director Frank Capra to produce propagandistic films that portrayed the Soviet Union solely in a favourable light. The 1943 film *Mission to Moscow*, made in a faux-documentary style, went so far as to proclaim that prominent Soviet communists executed during Stalin’s Great Purges were in fact German and Japanese agents. But while engaging in overt propaganda, Western governments remained highly sensitive about the workings of propaganda, especially when it came to atrocities. Americans recalled the denunciations of the German ‘Huns and Apes’ during World War I which had had the effect of pulling their country into a campaign that they later regretted having joined. British censors removed pictures of killed Soviet civilians from the stock of *Moscow Strikes Back*, ostensibly on the grounds that the disturbing images could produce a popular neurosis. British wartime films regularly showed pictures of dead women and children killed by the Blitz; Soviet observers suspected that the British operated from a position of disbelief towards the Soviet documentary record.\(^{42}\) Such disbelief affected Soviet communists in particular, as a Russian director who represented the Soviet film industry in Hollywood during the war experienced first-hand. (‘Here, every word coming from a Soviet person is treated as propaganda, with the word “propaganda” essentially denoting a disease that robs Americans of their entire property and leaves them hungry’, he wrote to his Moscow superiors in 1943.) But US officials extended their scepticism also to atrocity reports spread by Polish and Jewish activists as early as 1940. They feared being ‘propaganded into the war’.\(^{43}\)

These attitudes were put to the test in April 1943 when the German government started a campaign to inform the world about the ‘real face of barbarous Bolshevism’. In a Russian forest near the village of Katyn, the Germans had discovered the remains of over 4,000 Polish officers, who, they established, had been murdered by Soviet security forces in 1940. Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels embraced the discovery as an ‘excellent

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\(^{42}\) Kino na voine, pp. 647–8; see also p. 638.

\(^{43}\) Mikhail Kalatozov to I. G. Bolshakov, 1 November 1943: *Kino na voine*, p. 597; Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust*, p. 29
opportunity ... to refute most drastically the attempts undertaken in England and the United States to whitewash Bolshevism'. Against Goebbels’s hopes, Katyn did not split the wartime alliance. It wasn’t necessarily that Western leaders believed the Soviet counter-claims, forged documents ‘proving’ that the Germans had murdered the Polish officers in 1941. Churchill, for one, believed the ‘Bolsheviks’ to be ‘capable of the worst atrocities’, as he confided to the head of the Polish government in exile. But if he and Roosevelt chose not to engage the German claims, they did so for two reasons: one was a deep-seated distrust towards any form of atrocity propaganda. The other was their knowledge of the barbaric nature of the Nazi system. Ironically, Soviet wartime propaganda had provided much of this knowledge in the first place. By 1943, the Western Allies had become firmly imbued with the moral position of their Soviet ally: the Nazi regime posed a singular threat to humanity and had to be defeated with the power of passionate hatred.

If, after Stalingrad, the discovery of mass grave after mass grave in liberated areas of Russia and Ukraine had dwarfed prior Soviet notions of Nazi crimes that had formed in 1941 and 1942, the Red Army’s move into Poland in 1944 disclosed German atrocities in yet another previously unthinkable register. Upon seeing the Majdanek death camp, director Roman Karmen wrote that the gas vans that the Germans had operated in Russia were but an ‘artisanal form of murder’, compared to the brutally efficient ‘conveyor belt method of human annihilation’ practised in Majdanek. Karmen pointed out a ‘shocking detail’: the Germans had used the bones and ashes of the victims to fertilise cabbage that they grew on nearby fields. A defining feature of Majdanek for him was its ‘pan-European significance’: trainloads of people from Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia and France were ‘brought here, only to be annihilated’. Karmen’s documentary footage fully expressed his script notes. Successive shots of gas chambers, ovens, crematoria and warehouses filled with prisoners’ clothes, shoes, glasses, toys and hair emphasised the cold and unsparing human annihilation practised in

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44 Scholars today believe that the Soviets killed a total of 14,500 Polish officers and policemen at various execution sites, of whom 4,421 were murdered at Katyn. Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva and Wojciech Materski (eds.), Katyn: A Crime without Punishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 1, 332.

Majdanek. The camera dwelled on rows of thick cabbage growing on a field in the shadow of the camp towers, and it zoomed in on the passports of camp inmates – French, Italian, Dutch, Greek and Polish – to reveal its Europe-wide significance. While the film certainly portrayed Europe as a victim of Nazi violence in order to underscore the Red Army’s stature as Europe’s liberator (and counter German claims to the contrary), Karmen’s notes also brimmed with an ethical concern: ‘The entire world, all future generations, must know about what happened behind the barbed wire of the German death machine . . . in which Hitler’s henchmen killed more than a million free people.’

The response that the Soviet discoveries and appeals met throughout the world was mixed, however. When correspondent Alexander Werth sent the BBC a detailed report on the discovery of the Majdanek camp in August 1944, his editors in London turned it down, thinking it was a Soviet propaganda stunt. In the United States, popular empathy with tales of Soviet suffering appeared to be fading. When Ukraine in Flames came out in American theatres in spring 1944, a reviewer described it as ‘yet another documentary film on the war in the Russia . . . all about dead bodies, burning cities, weeping women’. ‘Perhaps it is the duty of every American to see with their own eyes the horrors of the fascist invasion’, another reviewer noted, ‘but it is an unpleasant duty.’ These reactions strikingly differed from how Moscow Strikes Back had been met two years earlier. All the more noteworthy was a New York Times article of October 1944 that presented as a major news item the fact that W. Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador to Moscow, ‘supported . . . the many reports that have come out of Russia concerning widespread German atrocities’. According to the paper, Harriman specifically singled out the ‘character of the German atrocities on the eastern front’: their ‘utterly unbelievable’ ruthlessness and efficiency.

The atrocities in the east, he explained, were entirely different from those committed by the Germans in western Europe. While the shooting of hostages in the west was shocking, he pointed out, these incidents were relatively less than the killing of large masses of people, especially Jews, in the east. He mentioned in this connection the reports from Lublin, Poland, where Soviet and Polish authorities have estimated that as many as

47 It was not, Werth remarks in his memoirs, until the ‘discovery in the West of Buchenwald, Dachau and Belsen that Western media became convinced that Majdanek and Auschwitz were also genuine’. Werth, Russia at War, p. 890.
1,500,000 persons were killed in a ‘slaughter house’ operated by the Germans at Majdanek.\textsuperscript{49}

Beyond backing the factual truth of Soviet atrocity reports, Harriman’s account echoed the moral understanding of German violence that characterised Soviet responses to Nazi crimes in the East.

In Berlin, military intelligence specialists at the Fremde Heere Ost office (FHO) avidly studied Soviet media publications, filing many articles in folders entitled ‘Soviet hatred and atrocity propaganda’. The Germans were as incredulous as the officials at the BBC. An internal October 1944 memorandum reported on Soviet coverage of the ‘so-called “Majdanek annihilation camp near Lublin”’. ‘Aside from Jews’, the report read, ‘representatives of all European nations are said to have been liquidated using ostensibly the most refined methods.’\textsuperscript{50} The FHO specialists understood the Soviet reporting as an ‘exaggerated propaganda action’ aimed at countering the earlier German revelations about Katyn. The other purpose they noted was the incitement of hatred. Captured Soviet soldiers confirmed to their German interrogators that ‘the constant atrocity propaganda filling the Soviet press is stirring up civilians as well as soldiers to a boiling point. All they seek is revenge.’

In February 1945 the FHO specialists faced a new flood of Soviet reporting – this time on the Auschwitz death camp, which the Red Army had liberated a few weeks earlier. Replete as they were with detailed information about the history and anatomy of the camp as relayed by individually named survivors, the reports appeared to challenge the disbelief of their German readers: the intelligence officers no longer provided distancing commentaries of their own, allowing the Soviet documents to speak for themselves. The translated materials included an editorial from a Soviet army newspaper which stated that the Germans had burned about 6,000,000 people in Auschwitz (‘Killing, burning, poisoning – those are the German professions’) and appealed to its readers: ‘Comrade! You have seen a lot on your glorious advance since Stalingrad. Everywhere one finds bloody traces of German crimes. You have seen and experienced a lot, but Auschwitz surpasses this all as the most cruel testimonial of German atrocities.’\textsuperscript{51}

As they read enemy reports, the FHO officers paid particular attention to the works of Ehrenburg. Their dossier for 1944/45 contains several full

\textsuperscript{49} ‘Harriman Confirms German Atrocities’, \textit{New York Times}, 27 October 1944.
\textsuperscript{50} National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, T\textit{78/483}, 254–71.
\textsuperscript{51} NARA, T\textit{78/483}, 82–7.
translations of his pieces, without commentary. One of them, penned in mid August 1944, discussed the retrenchment of German troops into East Prussia ahead of an anticipated Soviet storm. Ehrenburg began by quoting an order by the commander of a tank army instructing subordinate commanders to enforce a fundamental break with all hitherto existing rules and habits. Russia’s expanse gave the German Wehrmacht a freedom that is no longer appropriate in Germany... Everything necessary could be taken where it was found... Everywhere the German soldier was the master. In German cities and villages, the situation is the opposite. The people with whom we are dealing here are our fellow people. To respect and help them is our duty.

Ehrenburg commented:

Shamelessly, the Commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General Reinhardt, admits that his soldiers wreaked havoc and plundered in Russia like barbarians... The bandit general speaks to his chaps: ‘Remember, Germany is not Russia!’ Very well! We will firmly remember the German general’s words. We will repeat them in Königsberg and Berlin. We were liberators until we reached the German border. Now we are judges.

Ehrenburg reminded his readers of the flurry of orders issued by German commanders during the occupation of Soviet lands, orders that had been fully implemented if judged by the sight of razed towns and ravines overflowing with corpses that the Red Army had encountered on its path of liberation:

After three bitter years, we are advancing on Germany past Ukraine, past Belorussia, past the ashes of our cities and the blood of our children. Woe is the land of the murderers! Not only our troops have reached the German border. Advancing with us are also the shadows of the dead. Who is knocking on the doors of Prussia? The dead and murdered, killed by gas or fire, the old people from Trostianets, the children from Babi Yar, the martyrs from Slawute, the dust and ashes from the ovens in which millions of helpless people were burned... Where are these shadows moving toward? Toward Königsberg, toward Berlin. Right behind them follow we, the living. Nothing will stop us now. We can’t sleep because of our sorrow and anger. Woe is the land of the wrongdoers. Woe is Germany!

NARA, T78/483, 236–9; published as ‘Gore im!’, Krasnaia zvezda, 20 July 1944.

Trostianets (mispelled): (Maly) Trostenets, a Nazi extermination camp on the outskirts of Minsk. Slawute (mispelled): Slavuta, a city in western Ukraine whose sizable Jewish community the Germans wiped out during World War II. Ehrenburg carefully picked murder sites from different union republics to emphasise the universality of Soviet suffering, a consistent Soviet mandate.
The FHO officers singled out Ehrenburg as a signal author of atrocity propaganda on the enemy side. Had they read more widely they would have noticed a veritable outpouring of soldierly declarations of grief, outrage and revenge steeped in detailed evidence of horrors personally witnessed or experienced, which filled Soviet army papers in the last phase of the war. Letter writers included seasoned soldiers who had seen evidence of atrocities pile up on their westward march: ‘The Hitlerites mocked the Jewish population with particular cruelty. In Artemovsk they forced virtually all the local Jews together, stripped them naked and drove them into underground shafts. They sealed the entrances to leave the people to die slowly and painfully from asphyxiation.’ Some of them had escaped German captivity and talked about life in Nazi camps:

The fascists taunted the POWs in various ways. They forced the sick, wounded and exhausted soldiers to sing the song ‘Katyusha’, and shot those who didn’t sing along. They made Jews jump onto barbed wire. Every day they gathered the entire camp population in line formation and shot between 50 and 60 people. Then we would be dismissed. They threw morsels of foul horsemeat into the crowd of hungry POWs and opened fire onto those who tried to grab a piece. How many humiliations I endured over twenty days! But I know who abused me. I’ll enter the fascist den and will get even with the abusers.

Others were survivors of German occupation who had recently enlisted into the Red Army: ‘Dear editors! We, Communist youth from the occupied regions, have borne on our shoulders all the burdens of German occupation, we have seen hundreds of fascist crimes. Herewith we are sending you accounts about German atrocities by Communist youth members from the unit of Senior Sergeant Voloshchuk and Senior Sergeant Chabanov.’54 What all the letters bore in common were trappings of Ehrenburg’s documentary style and accusatory stance, with which their authors were undoubtedly familiar. The letters also confirmed Ehrenburg’s central point: the memory of those who had suffocated in gas vans, or were tortured, burned or hanged, was alive. It lived on in the Soviet soldiers who advanced towards Berlin, thirsting for a reckoning.

Bibliographical Essay

While the Eastern Front now commonly figures as the epicentre of violence during World War II, scholars disagree on the nature and cause of this violence. In Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), Timothy Snyder casts the German


Earlier histories of the Holocaust insisted on a rigid distinction between war and genocide and imagined the Holocaust apart from other horrors perpetrated during World War II. By contrast, recent studies are sensitive to the intricate dynamic between ethnic prejudice and war, and they embed the mass murder of Jews into the history of the Second World War; see, for instance, Omer Bartov’s locally grounded study, Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018). Several recent studies have called attention to the Soviet victims of the Holocaust; see Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); and Yad Vashem’s online platform, ‘The Untold Stories: The Murder Sites of the Jews in the Occupied Territories of the Former USSR’, www.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/homepage.html.

wartime morality. Many studies favour liberal projection over historical understanding: Richard Overy, author of *Why the Allies Won* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), writes that the Anti-Hitler Alliance functioned as a moral coalition ‘only to the extent that the West was able to suppress or at least lighten their [Soviet] ally’s dark image’ (p. 296). In line with this view, scholars understand Soviet wartime documentations of Nazi violence predominantly as politically motivated atrocity propaganda; see Marina I. Sorokina, ‘People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR’, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6.4 (2005), 797–831, and Karel Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). However, when placed into the wider context of wartime documentation across Nazi-occupied Europe, Soviet documentary efforts no longer appear unique. Everywhere in Europe, Nazi violence prompted initiatives among occupied populations to record acts of violence in order to solicit support in the struggle against Nazism. Everywhere records of German violence were created for the purposes of mobilising readers into action. See Laura Jockusch, *Collect and Record! Jewish Holocaust Documentation in Early Postwar Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Sarah Bennett Farmer, *Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

By May 1943, 80 per cent of the Red Army’s personnel had reportedly participated in at least one of more than a thousand ritualised Meetings of Vengeance, held on sites where Germans had tortured and killed Soviet civilians (Brandon Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers: A History of the Red Army in World War II through Objects* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), p. 112). Mark Edele makes a strong case for the revenge thesis, by pointing out that all Allied soldiers were more likely to rape German women than those of other nationalities, and that the Red Army was particularly fierce among the occupiers of Germany. Mark Edele, ‘Soviet Liberations and Occupations, 1939–1949’, in Richard J. B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War*, vol. 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 487–508, at 492–4. Even those historians who support the revenge thesis do so mostly on political grounds; they portray the soldiers as stirred up by a propaganda of hatred and skirt the issue of personal experience. Oleg Budnitskii tries to discount the revenge thesis by arguing that some Jewish Soviet officers whose families had been killed by Nazis practised restraint, while many soldiers who did not suffer personal losses raped German women; see Oleg Budnitskii, ‘The Intelligentsia Meets the Enemy: Educated Soviet Officers in Defeated Germany, 1945’, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 10.3 (2009), 629–82. And yet his study reads as a sustained demonstration of the workings of a Soviet morality shaped by the experience of Nazi violence and summed up in the dictum, ‘We’re not Germans.’
On 6 April 1868, the Meiji emperor proclaimed the Imperial Oath and ‘restored’ the imperial rule, beginning the Meiji period (1868–1912). At the time, the emperor was a mere 15 years old, so the royalists from southern domains, often of humble origin inside the samurai class, overthrew the Tokugawa government in his name. The Oath was written, not by the emperor, but by these royalists, and one of their objectives was abolishing ‘harmful’ (rōshū) feudal customs of the previous periods. The Tokugawa government had provided the people with a no-war environment for more than two centuries. While nearly 3,000 peasant uprisings and other social upheavals occurred during the Tokugawa period (1600–1867), the government experienced neither domestic nor international warfare. Nonetheless, the Tokugawa era was not necessarily less violent than the Meiji era. The Tokugawa government used various kinds of punishment, including torture, in order to maintain domestic peace and order. After all, it was the Meiji government that introduced Western-style penal reforms, abolished some harsh older punishments and built new Western-style prisons and a Supreme Court. In addition to judicial reforms, the new government accomplished various economic, political and social reforms in order to demonstrate that the new empire was as civilised as the Western powers.

To examine whether the Tokugawa or the Meiji government was more violent, one needs to define ‘violence’. If it is defined as physical violence such as war, torture and murder, the Meiji government may have been more
violent than the Tokugawa, because, similar to other colonial governments in the West, it committed atrocities and acts of aggression both within and outside the empire, including the Civil War (1868–9), the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5). Nonetheless, if the term includes structural violence, as defined by Johan Galtung, a sociology professor who founded the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, the evaluation may be more difficult, because structural violence includes poverty, hunger, and inequalities based on ethnicity, gender, nationality and religion. If one counts these latter forms of violence, one may conclude that Tokugawa Japan was as violent as its successor.

A comparison among the Meiji (1868–1912), Taishō (1912–25) and Shōwa (1925–89) periods in Japan yields troubling results. Like Meiji Japan, Taishō Japan continued to be energetically involved in international military conflicts such as World War I from 1914 to 1918 and the Siberian intervention from 1918 to 1920. As the scale of the military conflicts widened, the degree of violence abroad also intensified. Nonetheless, many more citizens of the empire, including ethnic minorities from its colonies, probably enjoyed liberal domestic politics, including labour, civil rights and feminist movements. Compared with Meiji and Taishō, the early Shōwa period brought the most severe destruction to Asia and the Pacific from the early 1930s to 1945, during which millions of people perished. From 1945 to the end of the Shōwa, however, Japan embraced the so-called Peace Constitution and Japanese have enjoyed a much less violent period than the wartime and prewar years.

While it is difficult to decide which period of the Japanese empire was more violent, violence in the empire was without doubt too abundant to list entirely. Nonetheless, it can be grouped as violence related to imperialism/militarism, racism and sexism. This chapter details some of the specific examples in each category in order to demonstrate institutionalised violence committed by the state from the birth of the empire in 1868 to the end of its existence in 1945. The term ‘violence’ in this chapter includes not only physical but also structural violence.

Imperialism/Militarism

The imperial era military conscription system, first announced by the emperor in 1872 and promulgated a year later, was a piece of institutionalised
violence that symbolised Japanese imperialism and militarism. The Meiji government carefully studied conscription law in Europe and the United States and modelled their system after the one in Prussia. Proponents of conscription such as Ōmura Masujirō, a scholar of Dutch studies, had been familiar with Prussia’s military studies through Dutch publications since the Tokugawa period. The law mandated that all non-exempted 20-year-old Japanese citizens serve in the military for three years and enlist in the reserve forces for four years.⁵

The size of the conscripted military was small at first. In 1874, 5.3 per cent of all 20-year-olds (14,461) were called to serve. In 1875 and 1876, the numbers were 2.4 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively. In the early Meiji years, the government was not able to afford a large military, and it selected a small number of capable young men from a large pool of candidates. The system at first provided a series of exemptions from mandatory conscription through legal means. For example, bureaucrats, medical school students, public university students, students studying abroad, heads of households, adopted sons, siblings of a drafted brother, criminals imprisoned a year or more, and those who paid 270 yen were all exempted from the service.⁶

By 1889 the empire needed a large military, and these legal exemptions, except for those pertaining to men with criminal records, disappeared. The empire drafted more than 10 per cent of the eligible 20-year-olds in 1896, nearly 20 per cent in 1919, and approximately 60 per cent in 1943. In 1944, the government revised the law and inducted not only the 20-year-olds, but also 19-year-olds. This enabled the government to draft more than a million men. In 1945, approximately 90 per cent of the nineteen- to twenty-year-olds who passed the medical examination served in the military. By the end of World War II, the imperial army and navy had enlisted more than 7 million servicemen.⁷

Those enlisted servicemen included ethnic minorities such as Koreans and Taiwanese. Taiwan became Japan’s colony in 1895, after the Sino-Japanese War, and Korea became a part of the Japanese empire in 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War. By 1943, both the army and the navy adopted Taiwanese volunteers. While the total number of Taiwanese volunteers in the navy is unknown, nearly 5,000 Taiwanese served in the army by the end of the war.

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⁶ Ibid., pp. 20, 46–7.
The government was planning to pass a conscription law that would make military service mandatory for Taiwanese, but the war ended before it was executed. As to the Koreans, by 1943 the military enlisted more than 16,000 and military service became mandatory for the Korean minorities in 1944. In 1944, the army drafted 45,000, while the navy inducted 10,000. Both military institutions drafted the same number of servicemen in the following year. While the empire made military service compulsory in Korea, it did not extend suffrage to those minorities in its colonies.8

According to Fujiwara Akira, a veteran who later became a renowned scholar of modern Japanese history, the imperial military can be summarised as a violent organisation that stripped individuality from servicemen with strict discipline and punishment. In the military, absolute obedience was mandatory, and senior officers constantly used physical abuse and violence against their juniors. While the military officially prohibited corporal punishment, certain officers believed that physical punishment would cultivate strong minds and patience among the servicemen, transforming them into tough and courageous soldiers. Newly recruited soldiers learned that they were no longer in the civilian world through public humiliation and physical abuse from their seniors. Slaps on the face, beatings on the buttocks and blows of fists were all common in both the army and the navy. As violence was so systemic, many Japanese soldiers were accustomed to it, and did not hesitate to exercise violence on their own troops when they became senior in the military.9

Indeed, imperial Japan had a highly disciplined military. In the final years of the Asia-Pacific War (1941–5), the imperial military demanded that its servicemen fight to the death. Nonetheless, the battles themselves did not inflict the most critical damages on them. One estimate suggests that starvation and malnutrition-related disease caused more than half of the deaths of 2.3 million servicemen. Another study finds that 70 per cent of the dead succumbed to hunger and related illnesses. In the postwar years, some of the veterans who survived the war in the Philippines and New Guinea even confessed to having committed cannibalism during the war. Although the exact figure of the deaths from starvation is unknown, the loss of air and naval supremacy

to the Allies in China and in the southern Pacific in the end of the war brought substantial deaths from starvation among Japanese servicemen.10

Similarly, drowning was another significant cause of deaths among Japanese servicemen. One study concludes that approximately 182,200 navy servicemen and 176,000 army servicemen died by drowning during the Asia-Pacific War. In short, 15.6 per cent of the 2.3 million Japanese servicemen who died (including ethnic minorities) were killed in the sea. The Allied strikes were the direct causes of these deaths, but the military exacerbated the problem by packing too many servicemen into each ship. In addition, due to the shortage, the military used not military transport boats but commercial cargo ships that were more vulnerable to the Allied assaults. Servicemen’s deaths from drowning during the Asia-Pacific War were four times those of the Russo-Japanese War.11

While the number is much less striking compared with the deaths by starvation or drowning, deaths from suicide attack were also significant among Japanese servicemen. Both the imperial army and the navy decided to utilise suicide tactics to alter the tide of war in early 1944. It was in February that the navy first commissioned a prototype of a human torpedo. The Army Chief of Staff urged the Commander in charge of the defence of the Philippines to employ suicide tactics in order to destroy enemy morale. The first kamikaze suicide attack occurred at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. More than 4,000 servicemen (including those from Taiwan and Korea) died in suicide attacks by aircraft, and 43 percent of the navy’s and 23.5 per cent of the army’s suicide forces were teenagers, the youngest of whom were 16 years old. In addition, 68 per cent of the navy’s and 55 per cent of the army’s servicemen deployed for suicide missions were rank-and-file military men. As to the officers, the military preferred reserve officers for these missions, meaning that those who graduated from ordinary colleges and universities, instead of the Imperial Army Academy or the Navy Academy, were more likely to be selected for those missions.12


11 Ibid., pp. 76–7.

Various kinds of weapons were used for suicide missions besides aircraft, casualties of which were not included in the figure in the previous paragraph. *Kaiten*, a weapon developed by the navy, was a small submarine with explosives on its front. Approximately eighty Kaiten crews lost their lives during missions. The Navy also built *Ōka*, a rocket propelled glider with explosives, and *Shinyō*, a motorboat with explosives. The Navy used the battleship *Yamato*, with approximately 3,300 men on board, for a suicide mission at the Battle of Okinawa in April 1945. The mission failed, and the battleship sank to the bottom of the ocean, killing all but 276 of the crew. Similarly, the army built *Marure*, a suicide motorboat, and often utilised ‘human bullets’, soldiers with explosives, who were ordered to destroy tanks and other armed vehicles.13

During the last years of the empire’s existence, civilians too suffered extreme violence in many different forms. The empire demanded that its people on the Japanese islands and colonies sacrifice their lives for the empire, if necessary. Okinawa, for example, became a battlefield in March 1945, and approximately a half of the 244,000 Japanese losses were civilians.14 This is partly because the government mobilised the residents in Okinawa to defend not only the Okinawan islands, but also the Japanese mainland. Historians such as Hayashi Hirofumi consider the Battle of Okinawa itself a suicide mission meant to protect the emperor system and the Japanese mainland.15 All able-bodied people, including children, ethnic minorities and women, were mobilised to prepare for the battle, building air bases, barracks and bunkers and transporting necessary equipment and materials. The army drafted some 22,000 men aged 17 to 45 to reinforce its undermanned units and mobilised male and female students and youth aged 14 and above into the youth, the medical and the transportation units. One third of the Japanese defence forces consisted of the Okinawan draftees and students. While many of the Okinawans perished in the American assaults, many others died from starvation, took their own lives, or died at the hands of the Japanese military.16

15 Hayashi Hirofumi, “‘Shūdan jiketsu’ mondai o kangaeru shiten” (‘Examining the “Mass Suicide” Dispute’), *Kikan sensō sekinin kenkyū* (Quarterly Journal of the Study of Japan’s War Responsibility) 60 (2008), 3.
As more than 2 million shells fell on the islands, the civilians and the defending forces retreated to southern Okinawa, taking shelter in natural underground caves. Two-thirds of the civilian deaths occurred after the retreat. The Army often drove out civilians who had been hiding in the caves without much food, and these wanderers consequently lost their lives in the bombardments. When the caves were shared between the army and the civilians, the army often prohibited the civilians from surrendering to the American troops and forced them to die with the servicemen. Compulsory mass suicides by the ‘volunteers’ frequently occurred during the battle, and the army provided grenades for them to kill themselves. In addition, the army often executed suspected Okinawan spies, including those who refused to give up their food or shelter, who attempted to surrender, who received food from the American troops, or who provided ‘suspicious’ responses to the army interrogators.17

Wartime education, aimed at creating imperial subjects (kōminka), justified the government’s war efforts and provoked patriotism among the youth, such that many young Okinawans, like their counterparts in other regions, saw sacrificing themselves for the empire as ethical and just.18 In addition, the wartime mass media demonised the American and British people.19 It is not surprising that the young Japanese patriots chose to fight to the death rather than surrender as they often believed that the American enemy would torture Japanese men and boys to death and would rape and kill Japanese women and girls.20 The trend of the times hardly allowed the youth to question patriotism imposed by the empire. The empire utilised various tools, including its judicial system, to control dissent. Treason was a serious crime, and unpatriotic Japanese had no place in the empire.21

This mobilisation of youth was not limited to Okinawa. It happened across the empire, and children were forced to work at unsafe places such as the poison gas factory on Ōkuno Island (built in 1929) in Hiroshima. Yoshimi

17 Hayashi Hirofumi, “Shūdan jiketsu”, p. 3.
18 See, for example, the excerpt about the Pacific War in the 1943 history textbook in Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking’: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 3–4.
20 Hayashi Hirofumi, “Shūdan jiketsu”, p. 4.
21 In 1937, for example, the Japanese government arrested some 529 alleged leftists, among whom 210 were indicted for violations of the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which made illegal any attempt to challenge the empire’s national polity and allowed the state to employ capital punishment for those who violated the law. See Yoshida, Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking’, p. 21.
Yoshiaki, professor of history at Chūō University, estimated that the imperial military produced a total of 73.8 million tons of toxic gas between 1931 and 1945, of which 66.2 million tons were made on the island.22 Due to its strategic importance, the island was erased from the map during the war. At its peak, approximately 5,000 workers produced lethal gas at the factory.23 From June 1943 to August 1945, more than 1,000 students aged between 13 and 16 were mobilised to work on the islands. Their duties included moulding ignition powder for the smoke canisters and rolling drums filled with lethal materials from the storehouse to the pier. These drums were often covered in remnants of the toxic liquids, but the children had little protection. Nearly 64 per cent of the former student and adult workers on the island experienced respiratory and digestive problems in the postwar period.24

In order to cope with the labour shortages and to propel war industries, the empire also mobilised residents of Japan’s colonies and occupied territories. For example, one estimate concludes that, between 1939 and 1945, the Japanese government mobilised more than 6 million Koreans to propel Japan’s war machine. Approximately 1.5 million of these Koreans were transported to Japan in order to work at mines, military factories, construction sites, and other places that required hard manual labour.25 As for Chinese mobilised labourers, nearly 40,000 people in northern China were transported to Japan and forced to work in the 135 mines and other construction sites across Japan.26 Their working conditions were generally harsh, and approximately 18 per cent of them died. In addition, the Japanese government transported thousands of Chinese ‘special labourers’ (tokushu kōjin), including suspected communist sympathisers and prisoners of war, to the mines in Manchuria as the region needed more than 1.1 million workers.27

Exploiting prisoners of war for work was not uncommon in the Japanese empire. In 1942, the army announced that it had captured more than 260,000 Allied servicemen after they surrendered to the empire. Between November 1942 and October 1943, the empire mobilised approximately 60,000 Allied prisoners of war in addition to tens of thousands of Asian labourers (rōmusha) in order to build the 260-mile Burma–Thailand Railway.28 As the army did not allow its servicemen to be captured, its policy towards the Allied prisoners was hostile and often cruel. The Army forced these labourers to work more than ten hours a day in order to build the railway as fast as possible. It was no surprise that approximately 43,000 are estimated to have died during the construction because of exhaustion, malnutrition, disease and physical abuse.29

Many of the guards of the Allied prisoners were ethnic minorities. In 1942, the Army sent more than 3,000 Koreans and Taiwanese to the Allied prisoner of war camps in South-East Asia. The army tried to use these Allied prison camps as facilities to convince the imperial subjects that the empire was superior to the American and European powers. This is one example of how prevalent racist thoughts were during the war. A statement on 5 November 1941, by Hara Yoshimichi, president of the Privy Council, revealed his concern that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor would unite ‘the entire Aryan race’ against Japan.30 He, like many others of the period, understood international affairs from a perspective of race relations.

Racism

While Japanese servicemen suffered violence from the empire, they also perpetrated violence. Killing enemy servicemen in combat was considered honourable. Although killing civilians was not considered admirable even during the war, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants became blurred as the war with China and the Allies progressed. After the

30 Utsumi et al., Taimen tetsudō to Nihon no sensō sekinin, pp. 123–6, 146; Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays (New York: Bedford/St Martins, 1999), p. 37.
war with China broke out near Beijing, the Japanese mass media often stressed the brutality of the Chinese forces and their killings of Japanese civilians. Many ordinary Japanese welcomed attacks on Chinese forces, as seen in news reports about the ‘100-man killing contest’ between two second lieutenants who were trying to outdo each other in killing one hundred Chinese enemies while they advanced to Nanjing. When the Japanese forces captured Nanjing, the newspapers widely reported the annihilation of the enemy.\textsuperscript{31} The nation celebrated the fall of Nanjing, instead of mourning the loss of the lives of the enemy nationals.

The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946–8) estimated that more than 200,000 Chinese people were killed in and around Nanjing during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation. The Tribunal, describing the atrocities in Nanjing, said:

The Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city and committed various atrocities. According to one of the eyewitnesses they were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said by eyewitnesses that the city appeared to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey, that it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and that the members of the victorious Japanese Army had set upon the prize to commit unlimited violence. Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering, raping, looting, and burning. There was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese men, women, and children without apparent provocation or excuse until in places the streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their victims. According to another witness, Chinese were hunted like rabbits, everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese men, women and children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings.\textsuperscript{32}

Tall and thick walls with blockaded exits protected the city of Nanjing, but many of the Chinese defending forces were trapped inside these same walls. The troops threw away their uniforms and attempted to hide in the refugee zone. The thorough mopping up operations by the Japanese military contributed to the number of victims.

In terms of scale and duration, the Japanese Army’s strategy known as the Three-All campaigns (kill all, burn all and loot all) was greater than the atrocities in Nanjing. The campaigns were intended to annihilate Chinese

\textsuperscript{31} Yoshida, Making of the 'Rape of Nanking', pp. 16, 82.
communists and their sympathisers in northern China for three years from 1941. The Japanese North China Area Army (Kita-Shina hōmen gun) occupied more than 10 million hectares in northern China (including Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Chahar, Suiyuan and part of Henan) with a population of approximately 100 million people. In order to carry out the campaigns, the army mobilised at least 2 million labourers to dig 6 by 35 m trenches running 200 km from north to south or build walls if it was impossible to dig trenches. These trenches and walls were used to surround and isolate the enemy bases. After completely destroying the villages, the army sprayed mustard gas so that the enemy would not be able to reuse them as bases. While the exact number of the deaths from the campaigns is unknown, one Chinese estimate concludes that nearly 2.5 million people were killed during these campaigns.33

As many of the Japanese perpetrators explained in the postwar period, they did not feel remorse when they killed Chinese enemies. Whether they were civilians or combatants, whether old or young, whether male or female, whether adults or children, these differentiations were not important to many of these perpetrators as they felt utter contempt for the Chinese people. For example, Tominaga Shōzō, a squadron leader who beheaded Chinese prisoners, ordered his squadron to machine gun a group of prisoners, and participated in burning a village of one hundred houses during the war, needed a lengthy and complex process to overcome his wartime hatred and disdain for the Chinese people. Yuasa Ken, an army surgeon who conducted human vivisections during the war, believed that ‘the Koreans were despicable and that the Chinese were an inferior race’. These views helped him justify his atrocities during the war.34

After the war both Tominaga and Yuasa were captured and imprisoned by the Chinese communists. Tominaga spent six years in prison, while Yuasa spent five years. Contrary to their expectations, they received no retribution. The Chinese communists neither tortured nor executed them. Instead, they were treated humanely and received ample time to re-examine their wartime thoughts and deeds. They discussed their atrocities with their fellow inmates, confronted the Chinese survivors of the Japanese atrocities, and began to feel inexpiable guilt and responsibility for their war crimes. They recognised their victims not as faceless enemies but as other human beings and took

33 Fujiwara, Tennō no guntai to Nit-Chū sensō, pp. 109–16, 124.
responsibility for their crimes instead of accusing the state, their superiors in the Army, or their education. Tominaga and Yuasa were not alone, and they established the Liaison Society for Returnees from China (Chūgoku kikansha renrakukai) after their repatriations. When they returned to Japan, they began to educate the public about the atrocities that they had committed through publications and oral presentations. They believed that their honest confessions would convey to young Japanese the reality of war, and their mission of atonement continued until their deaths.35

Racist ideology probably also inspired Japan’s chemical and biological warfare. During the eight years of the war with China, according to the Chinese government’s study, the Japanese military used both lethal and non-lethal chemical weapons approximately 2,000 times in more than nineteen provinces. These weapons killed and wounded more than 90,000 Chinese combatants and civilians. The Chinese government estimates that the Japanese military abandoned nearly 2 million gas canisters and shells in China. In addition to chemical warfare, the army also conducted biological warfare in China. The Army units such as Unit 731 and Unit 100 conducted vivisections, germ warfare and lethal experiments on people in China. Although it is unknown how many people were killed by Japan’s biological warfare, Unit 731 alone took 3,000 human lives through its medical experiments.36

Opium and other drugs were systematically used to control the people in China, Korea, Mongolia and Singapore. In Mongolia, the Japanese government controlled the puppet regime and sold 714 tons of opium between 1939 and 1942, 55 per cent of which was exported to Shanghai and 24 per cent to northern China. The amount of opium was able to provide annual supplies for 500,000–800,000 people. In Manchuria, between 1933 and 1945 at least 3,410 tons were produced, while in Korea 293 tons were harvested between 1935 and 1944. In addition, the Japanese government imported Iranian opium to central China and Manchuria. After Imperial Japan conquered South-East Asia, the Japanese government initiated opium operations in Singapore.

35 Takashi Yoshida, From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace: War and Peace Museums in Japan, China, and South Korea (Portland, ME: Merwin Asia, 2014), pp. 35–40.
According to Eguchi Keiichi, Professor of Modern Japanese History, Japan’s opium operations in China had two goals: to profit from selling the drugs and to poison China into submission, because addiction would deprive the Chinese people of their will to fight. While the Japanese government functioned as the drug cartel, dealers were often colonial residents from China, Korea and Taiwan, many of whom struggled to survive at the bottom of the empire’s social hierarchy.\textsuperscript{37}

Although racism may not be the sole reason for such violence as the Nanjing Massacre, Three-All campaigns, chemical and biological warfare, and opium production and smuggling, the belief that the Japanese people were racially superior to colonial residents amplified violence by the state and the individuals in the empire. Similarly, the state and its residents frequently committed violence against women.

Sexism

From the beginning of the Meiji Period to Japan’s defeat, according to Okuda Akiko, a scholar of women’s history, men dominated all areas in politics, the economy and society, and led the nation to the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War and the Asia-Pacific War. In the eyes of Okuda, while women continued to challenge men’s dominance, it was a period of restraint and subordination. While modern ideas were introduced to society in the Meiji period, the same feudal patriarchy continued to exist. The newly introduced civil code in 1898 legally empowered men, and legally incapacitated women and children. The law strictly limited women to the household, and wives had no right to inherit their husband’s wealth. The law allowed men to sue their wives (and mistresses) for adultery, but wives (and mistresses) had no such right.\textsuperscript{38}

During the empire’s reign, the government tolerated prostitution and human trafficking.\textsuperscript{39} From the early Meiji period, male traffickers purchased women, including girls as young as 13, from the heads of households and sold


\textsuperscript{38} Okuda Akiko, ‘\textit{Jo’} (‘Introduction’), in Okuda Akiko et al. (eds.), \textit{Onna to otoko no jiku} (\textit{The Time and Space of Gender: Redefining Japanese Women’s History}), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 1995), pp. 16, 17–21, 23.

\textsuperscript{39} Fujiwara, \textit{Tennô no guntai to Nit-Chû sensô}, p. 6.
them to the brothels in Japan, Asia, Europe and Americas for the purpose of sexual slavery.\footnote{Morisaki Kazue, ‘Sekushuaritī no rekishi’ (‘The History of Sexuality’), in Okuda Akiko et al. (ed.), Onna to otoko no jiku, vol. v, pp. 155–8.} The Meiji government licensed and taxed brothels, and the recruited women were controlled through debt bondage. The prostitution law was in effect in the Japanese colonies, but different standards applied to different regions: female prostitution with a minimum age of 18 was legal in Japanese homelands; the minimum age was 17 in Korea and 16 in Taiwan. While human rights activists attempted to criminalise prostitution, their efforts did not succeed. The empire supported the narrative that the prostitution law would benefit society and was essential for public hygiene and for the military.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 155–8, 165, 171.} Many of these women attempted to escape, died because of sexual diseases or committed suicide, but the government completely ignored their wishes.\footnote{For example, in Fukuoka (known as the ‘prostitution kingdom’), between January and July 1927, among the some 2,000 women forced into prostitution, 16 women died and 171 attempted to escape. See ibid., pp. 155–8, 165, 171, 174.}

As the government embraced the idea that setting up brothels would serve the greater public good, it was inevitable that the military founded and sponsored the so-called comfort stations in Asia and the Pacific, including China, Hong Kong, French Indochina, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Thailand, New Guinea, the Japanese Okinawan archipelago, the Bonin Islands, Hokkaidō, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a professor of history who specialises in the study of the ‘military’s comfort women’, concludes that the comfort stations existed along with the military stations where the Japanese troops were dispatched and that between 50,000 and 200,000 women were forced into sexual servitude during the Asia-Pacific War.\footnote{Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 91, 93.} The military believed that these ‘comfort stations’ would prevent its servicemen from raping local women or contracting sexual diseases, maintain morale by providing sexual ‘comfort’ to the troops, and protect secret information by limiting its servicemen’s contacts with outside people. Contrary to the military’s expectation, the establishment of these stations failed to prevent assaults on local women by the military and the spread of sexual diseases among the servicemen. Nonetheless, the number of these stations continued to increase and spread across Asia.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 72, 74–5, 91, 93.}

41 Ibid., pp. 155–8, 165, 171.
42 For example, in Fukuoka (known as the ‘prostitution kingdom’), between January and July 1927, among the some 2,000 women forced into prostitution, 16 women died and 171 attempted to escape. See ibid., pp. 155–8, 165, 171, 174.
44 Ibid., pp. 72, 74–5, 91, 93.
The victims of such sexual slavery included women of various nationalities and ethnicities, including Australians, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, Filipinas, Koreans, Indonesians, Japanese, Singaporeans, Taiwanese and Vietnamese. Procurement of these women varied. Some of them were deceived or lured with the promise of a well-paid job, some were abducted, and others volunteered without knowing the realities of the services that they had to provide. In the case of Pak Yong-sim, born in 1921 in South Pyongan, when she was 17 a Japanese policeman promised her a well-paid job, but she was taken to a ‘comfort station’ in Nanjing and was coerced into providing sex to the Japanese soldiers. Three years later, she was transferred to Burma and then sent to the war front. The Japanese troops were annihilated except a few soldiers, but she and two other women escaped the battlefield and were rescued by the Chinese troops. She was pregnant and experienced heavy bleeding. A Chinese doctor gave her a Caesarean section, but discovered that her child was dead. She lost not only her child, but also her uterus. In the 1950s, she was married, and adopted a child. For nearly fifty years she kept her wartime experience secret from her son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren. In 1993, inspired by other women who had similar experiences, she decided to share her haunting experience with the public. Understandably, she could not forgive the empire or forget what it had done to her.45

After Japan’s defeat, the empire’s attitude towards women remained unchanged until the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1947, which guaranteed women’s civil rights. During the Allied Occupation, the Japanese government established the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) and opened the same kind of ‘comfort stations’ for the Allied troops. The government believed that these stations would save women and girls from being raped by the Allied troops, and disregarded the fact that the RAA employees had to sacrifice their bodies for the state. The Association originally planned to mobilise 5,000 women. The government intended to enlist primarily geisha, licensed and unlicensed prostitutes, waitresses, barmaids and habitual offenders under the prostitution law.46 In reality, however, non-professional women, including high school students who lost their families

due to the bombings, were recruited. The Association put up a large poster in front of its office in Tokyo to recruit the women:

Announcement to New Japanese Women! We require the utmost cooperation of new Japanese women who participate in a great project to comfort the occupation forces, which is part of the national emergency establishment of the postwar management. Female workers, between 18 and 25 years old, are wanted. Accommodation, clothes and meals, all free.47

To lure as many patriotic women as possible, the advertisement stressed that the job was urgent and important to the nation.

RAA succeeded in enlisting 1,360 women. An estimate suggests that those women had to provide sex to between fifteen and sixty Allied servicemen a day. Whether these stations did prevent the Allied servicemen from raping women is unknown, but Allied soldiers frequently perpetrated violence against women even after the establishment of these stations. For example, seven drunken former Australian POWs confined three women to a room and gang raped them, apparently for retaliation. Some members of the American military police took advantage of their rank and raped Japanese women. In addition, contrary to expectation, sexual diseases among the Allied servicemen increased. Soon after the Occupation, venereal diseases became the most urgent health issue for the Allied troops. Nearly half of the US Navy and Marine troops in Yokosuka were suffering from such diseases in 1946. By then, the Occupation forces had prohibited their servicemen from visiting public or private brothels, and RAA closed its facilities.48

The RAA facilities were short-lived. Nonetheless, the Japanese government declared that women had the right to become prostitutes and continued to disregard the women who were exploited by the Allied servicemen allegedly to protect a greater number of girls and women from sexual violence. Prostitution play, in which a boy imitated an Allied serviceman while a girl pretended to be a prostitute, became a popular activity among the children in occupied Japan. ‘You like to meet my sister’ became as popular as ‘give me chocolate’ to many orphans who collected some money by introducing their women to the servicemen. These prostitutes included girls as young as 14 years old.49 Although the empire collapsed, its attitude towards

47 Quoted in Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, p. 146.
49 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 112.
less privileged citizens remained no different. Even after the war ended, the government consistently justified abuses in the name of national emergency.

Conclusion

As discussed above, much of the violence that the Japanese empire inflicted was associated with imperialism, militarism, racism and sexism. These ideologies, fuelled by the social and political contexts of the time, led the empire to become the perpetrator of atrocities and war crimes. Victims of such violence were not limited to non-Japanese, but included a wide variety of nationalities and ethnicities as well as both sexes. In many cases, however, this fact is dismissed as if the empire’s mass violence had been aimed exclusively at its colonial subjects and foreign nationals. From the birth of the empire in 1868 until the birth of the new Constitution in 1947, imperialism and militarism were unleashed. They tended to be galvanised by racism and sexism, and mobilised in the name of national interests.

The same society that waged aggressive wars and brought destruction in Asia and the Pacific has embraced pacifism since the end of the empire. Defeat and despair obliterated the cultures of war, and a new Japan outlawed any aggressive war under Article Nine of the Constitution. Nationalism certainly survived in the new nation, but society has been able to contain it successfully. Japan’s case demonstrates that any society can perpetrate mass violence and that imperialism, militarism, racism and sexism provoke this violence.

Bibliographical Essay

Studies of violence and the Japanese empire are rich in Japan. Particularly since the early 1980s too many monographs to be listed have tackled this topic, inspired by the dispute over the textbook description of Japan’s wartime aggression. These studies examine such topics as the Nanjing Massacre, Japan’s chemical and biological warfare, slave labour of Chinese and Koreans in Japan, Japanese colonial exploitations in East and South Asia, mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war, violence against women, and indiscriminate bombing of cities. Takashi Yoshida’s ‘Historiography of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan’, Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, published in June 2008 (www.massviolence.org/Historiography-of-the-Asia-Pacific-War-in-Japan) summarises the study of Japan’s war crimes in Japan. For those who are able to read Japanese, Kikan sensô sekinin kenkyû [Study on Japan’s War Responsibility], currently published twice a year, gives up-to-date scholarly articles on violence and the Japanese empire. Scholars in Japan continue to discover new materials that enable us to expand our knowledge on the topic.


Compared with scholarly accounts, non-scholarly accounts and websites on violence and the Japanese empire are already abundant and widely available. These non-scholarly accounts, whether written in Chinese, English, Japanese or Korean, tend to provide simple dichotomous narratives between good and evil. While the scholarly books listed above certainly have strengths and weaknesses, many of these books try to go beyond this nation-state oriented analysis.
PART IV

* THE STATE, REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Change and Continuity in Collective Violence in France, 1780–1880

PETER MCPHEE AND JEREMY TEOW

When the Bastille fell on 14 July 1789, first its governor and then, shortly after, the mayor of Paris (prévôt de marchands) were seized and gruesomely decapitated by the crowd, before their heads were paraded on pikes around the capital’s streets. For some historians, from Thomas Carlyle to more recent ‘chroniclers’ like Simon Schama, these scenes of collective violence prefigured an inherently bloody course for the French Revolution. Others, in riposte, have argued that the outbreak of revolutionary violence ought to be situated within a longer span of time, drawn back to the various riots before the Revolution, if not to an even wider economy of violence under the ancien régime.¹

But whereas the origins of popular violence have long sparked a heated debate, much less has been said about its transition into the years following the Revolution and into France’s ‘revolutionary century’. For, from 1780 to 1880, a series of popular insurrections either succeeded in overthrowing the nation’s established regime – in 1789, 1792, 1830, 1848 and 1870 – or failed to prevent what was resented as an elite retreat from revolutionary change – as in 1795, 1832, 1851 and 1871. Not until the late 1870s was a durable democratic polity consolidated in the mass electoral politics of the Third Republic. The French Revolution of 1789–99 may have been the period most visibly marked by acts of collective violence, but these acts did not decline across the nineteenth century. Rather, their forms, expressions and targets shifted within a transforming political culture.

What, then, was different by 1880 in occurrences of popular violence, in what ways, and what remained the same? By closely examining several case studies of collective violence throughout the revolutionary century, this

chapter explores the possibilities for reckoning with these questions of change and continuity, melding older interpretations with new modes of analysis.

Political Protest and Collective Violence: Models of Transition

Developments in insurrectionary violence were gradual and regionally varied as the mass of France’s population underwent a ‘politicisation’, understanding particular grievances within wider national structures and contexts. As with the broader issue of violence, historians disagree about when this particular change occurred, searching for a seemingly illusory moment of transition. Michel Vovelle has seen the French Revolution as the moment of unprecedented popular participation in national politics, while Maurice Agulhon and many others have identified a mass political ‘apprenticeship’ during the Second Republic. For Eugen Weber, this was a process that only began after 1880 in regions south of the Loire. Sudhir Hazareesingh, in contrast, has emphasised the importance of the Second Empire, usually dismissed as an authoritarian hiatus in the democratic, republican narrative.2

Yet, in each revolutionary crisis, forms of collective violence reflected the changing society of which they were a product. Building on the insights of Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé, Charles Tilly in particular saw in the history of rebellion in nineteenth-century France the paradigmatic example of the interrelationship of changes in the nature of the state, society and protest.3

Tilly’s vast quantitative surveys demonstrated two key theses. First, violent protest was endemic rather than confined to the months of spectacular revolutionary upheaval (there were more such protests in 1832 than in 1830, for instance) and was to be understood as an expression of conflict between

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‘contenders’ for power, including the centralising state. Second, the changing forms of protest were a reflection of wider changes in economic and political structures. As mechanisation of manufacturing became more widespread, for example, so machine-breaking became a common reaction, jostling with older forms of protest such as collective price-fixing (taxation populaire) during grain shortages.4

By the 1850s, both subsistence rioting and machine-smashing – which had also underpinned key elements of popular ideology in the first half of the century – had effectively disappeared. Tilly has argued that the years of the Second Republic (1848–51) were the time of critical transition in the forms in which political power was contested, the changing ‘repertoires’ of protest. The great wave of subsistence protests in 1846–7 and the explosion of forest invasions, occupation and destruction of private property, and anti-tax rebellions in 1848 were to be the last great outbreak – at least on a large scale – of forms of protest described by Tilly as ‘reactive’ or ‘defensive’ responses to state centralisation and capitalist economic structures. From 1848 they were juxtaposed with a remarkable proliferation of demonstrations, mass electoral rallies, ‘associational’ political activity and coordinated insurrectional activity epitomised in secret societies and resistance to Louis-Napoléon’s coup d’état in 1851: collective action he described as ‘proactive’ or ‘national’.5

Fundamental to these changes in the nature and orientation of protest were transformations in urban and rural society. In Tilly’s words, the decades before and after 1845:

spanned the country’s first great surge of industrial expansion and urban growth. They included the knitting together of the nation by railroad and telegraph. They contained the advent of universal manhood suffrage, the emergence of political parties, and the formation of trade unions . . . It was a time of profound political transformations. The nature of collective violence changed in step with those transformations.6

Tilly’s model, which became more nuanced over time, is compelling and profoundly influential. One weakness, however, is in his comparatively brief treatment of the decade of the Revolution of 1789. Rather than being an

intense period of ‘reactive’ violence, as Tilly suggested, the Revolution actually initiated an extraordinary range of ‘proactive’ conflict. The evidence is overwhelming in the light of the new state structures, political associations and revolutionary political culture. To be sure, there were thousands of episodes of food rioting, forest invasions and land seizures, but these were mixed with nationwide ‘associational’ activity in political societies, especially Jacobin clubs, national elections, petition campaigns and even strikes. Nationally, there were perhaps 6,000 Jacobin clubs and popular societies created in 1793–4, short-lived though many of them were. At times, the distinction between ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ protest seems arbitrary at best: the most sweeping collective action of the decade – the ‘Grande Peur’ of July–August 1789 – was both a defensive reaction by rural communities in preparation against anticipated attacks by vengeful nobles and then a revolutionary attack on the seigneurial system when those attacks failed to eventuate.

Strikes, usually understood as the paradigmatic form of protest in industrial societies, were far more common in the eighteenth century than historians have assumed. For example, while the Le Chapelier law of June 1791 was chiefly directed at ‘coalitions’ of Parisian wage-earners, it was also aimed at the waves of strikes by large bands of harvesters working on the commercial wheat-farms in the Paris basin. These often violent strikes, or ‘bacchanals’, occurred at times when harvests were plentiful and labour was in strong demand, as in the summer of 1791, during which the administrators of Aisne had to outlaw strikes of up to 700 harvesters on farms around Château-Thierry. At the height of the ‘Terror’ of 1793–4, the district authorities of Montpellier complained that ‘the workers involved in agricultural labour form themselves into groups [se coalisent], threaten, aggress and force the landowner to pay a day’s labour at a rate far above that fixed by the law’. In Heudicourt and other communes of the department of Somme, labourers confronted farmers, some holding placards reading: ‘Unity is strength – to the harvester of good will – to harvest at that price – republicans have had enough. All citizens will come at two o’clock for a festival . . . to dance around the tree of fraternity.’ For these reasons, it could be argued that the

great turning point in the forms of collective protest was 1789, not 1848, or that the decades 1789–1860 as a whole were the period of transition.10

The Challenge of Cultural Anthropology

A second shortcoming lay in Tilly’s quantitative focus on the causes and types of violent collective behaviour, which led him away from a sufficiently qualitative analysis of the cultural practice of violence. Sporadic though they may have been, the striking instances of deliberate cruelty by rioting crowds in particular have since attracted closer study. In investigating the genealogy of mass democratic political culture in France, scholars have, in recent decades, highlighted the importance of close-knit communities of place, faith and family, and examined the specificities of violent acts.

Cultural anthropology has especially informed this recent work. Seeking to nuance interpretations of food protests beyond subsistence motivations, such analyses have stressed the internal logic of crowd action by pointing to the symbolic rites of popular violence.11 Violence may have lingered daily in the streets of eighteenth-century Paris, for example, but this world of frequent ‘disorder’ also held, in Arlette Farge’s words, a ‘great desire for justice and order’. Urban crowds were governed by a sense of communal solidarity and mobilised within a local system of ‘customary rights and obligations’. These moral boundaries were dynamically ‘enforced’ in quotidian acts; they limited crowd violence through a strong tradition of self-regulation.12

Understanding social tensions as more than simply direct expressions of material interests therefore reveals much about the communitarian nature of collective violence, with some of its most startling expressions across the revolutionary decades directed towards individuals who were known to their killers. In October 1790, for example, the villagers of Varaize in the department of Charente-Inférieure stabbed their mayor Latierce to death in the streets of Saint-Jean-d’Angély, a nearby town. Latierce was the manager of the Countess d’Amelot’s local estates, and was caught between his interests

in preserving her seigneurial rights and the insistence of his village that the feudal regime had been destroyed in 1789. It was later claimed that Latierre was held upright so that his neighbors could all have the opportunity to join in this violent act, as if to figuratively expel him from the community – not unlike the ‘symbolic extrusion beyond death’ that Colin Lucas has argued for the post-mortem inflictions on corpses during the ‘White Terror’ in 1795.13

If common ties between perpetrators of violence and their victims help to account for the intensity of some cruel acts, however, personal familiarity was not always essential. An estranged awareness of prominent individuals, in fact, in many ways favoured the selective targeting of victims by popular anger. On 22 July 1789, a week after the fall of the Bastille, the royal officials Foulon de Doué and Berthier de Sauvigny were lynched and decapitated in Paris, just a few hours apart from each other. They were later exhibited on pikes: with hay stuffed in his gaping mouth, Foulon’s floating head was brandished before Berthier. The brutality of these deaths reflected in part simmering undercurrents of rumour, conspiracy and fear, all common to popular revolt – whether in stirring Parisian panic over the ‘vanishing children’ of the 1750s, sparking the rural disturbances during the Great Fear of summer 1789, or stimulating fears of a Prussian invasion that underlay the September Massacres in 1792.14

As rumour’s underlying structure remained, then, its forms altered along with anxieties over conspiracy. The fervent level of hostility towards Foulon and Berthier, while underpinned by fears of armed forces outside Paris, derived particularly from the ‘famine plot persuasion’ of eighteenth-century France. A recurrent popular reaction to subsistence crises in the ancien régime, this popular belief in conspiracy extended blame beyond market boundaries to moral ‘crime’ – where dearth was ‘artificial’, generated by rumour-sustained ‘plots’ among notables – that were only remediable through price alterations.15 Foulon was a wealthy former army official who had controversially replaced the popular finance minister Jacques Necker, whose dismissal

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only a few days earlier had sparked fierce protests until he was recalled on 19 July.\textsuperscript{16} As the \textit{intendant} of Paris, meanwhile, his son-in-law Berthier was responsible for provisioning. His filial ties with Foulon were only compounded by the devastating harvest of 1788, which raised bread prices in July 1789 to a peak unseen since 1715.

Moreover, Foulon had been particularly subject to vicious if apocryphal rumours of ‘boasting . . . of making the people eat [hay]’.\textsuperscript{17} Similar contemptuous metaphors of ingestion had circulated previously. In 1725, for example, the Parisian lieutenant general of police, Ravot d’Ombreval, was suspected not only of hoarding grain, but also of having dismissively remarked, ‘Let them eat cabbage runts.’ During the ‘Flour War’ of 1775, a farmer in Signy-Signets likewise incensed other villagers by commenting that ‘the poor could no longer complain, because the grass was growing and they could eat that’.\textsuperscript{18} That the motif of hay would dog Foulon from procession to posthumous torture could then hardly have been surprising – both men, accused of entanglement with ‘conspiracy of the court against Paris’, made for obvious victims.\textsuperscript{19}

E. P. Thompson’s work on the ‘moral economy’ of early modern English crowds and Natalie Zemon Davis’s pioneering argument about the denominational divergences in ritualised violence during the French Wars of Religion have similarly helped to reshape new, cultural characterisations of later forms of violence.\textsuperscript{20} The ‘War of the demoiselles’ makes for a pertinent example. Between 1829 and 1832 in Ariège, bands of men ‘armed and disguised as women’ sought to re-appropriate local forests in resistance against the Forest Code of 1827, perceived to have encroached upon the community’s rights to the shared resources of the woodlands. But if reliance on forest land for pasturing livestock lay at the heart of the peasants’ discontent, and if their disturbances reveal strong communal attitudes – both towards their environment and in their ability to mobilise collectively in retaliation against the state – these acts also bore the cultural imprint of past rites. Investigating their

\textsuperscript{18} Quoted respectively in Kaplan, ‘Famine Plot Persuasion’, 17–18, and Cynthia Bouton, \textit{The Flour War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Régime French Society} (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1993), pp. 90–1; see also 203–4.
\textsuperscript{20} Davis, ‘Rites of Violence’. 
‘symbolic dimension’, Peter Sahlins has suggested, points to these guerilla-like incidents as constituting a subversive, ‘festive rebellion’. The demoiselles, rather than killing their enemies, performed instead something of a charivari writ large; coloured by carnivalesque rites, their female garb arguably evoked the fertility of the lands they sought to recover. Thus folkloric tradition mingled with the violence of the men, not only as they pillaged local chateaux and intimidated the forest guards, but also in their sartorial inversion; in the way they sacralised the forest and respected its supernatural beliefs; and in the way local social and sexual hierarchies were preserved through dress and gesture.\footnote{Peter Sahlins, *Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); several similar, earlier cases have been noted, most recently in Kieko Matteson, *Forests in Revolutionary France: Conservation, Community, and Conflict, 1669–1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).}

As during the French Revolution, there were sporadic cases of communalitarian violence towards well-known and hated individuals in later revolutionary crises, when an explosive coincidence of economic misery, expectation of radical change, government instability and the liberation of political life generated an escalation of division and conflict. On 12 November 1830, near Narbonne, long-standing friction over access to wooded hill-sides culminated in the collective killing of a noble and his son.\footnote{The account that follows draws on Peter McPhee, *Revolution and Environment in Southern France: Peasant, Lords, and Murder in the Corbières, 1780–1830* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), chapter 8.} Early that day a brigade of gendarmes went to the estate of Gabriel Latreille at Gléon, on Gabriel’s insistence, to make arrests of locals from Villesèque, a village 4 kilometres away, who were illegally grazing their livestock and cutting wood on his estate. There was an angry stand-off between, on the one side, Gabriel and his son Gonzague, six of their private forest-guards and the gendarmes, and, on the other, perhaps one hundred Villeséquois armed with spades, meat-spits and rifles. The question of who fired first was to be hotly debated, but the wounding of one in the crowd provoked them into rushing the gendarmes, overwhelming them, and seizing their ammunition. As Gabriel and Gonzague attempted to flee through the trees, they were pursued by the villagers and shot dead.

The murders of the Latreilles were the climax of a half-century of open resentment and conflict between the inhabitants of Villesèque and the proprietors of the two large estates on the borders of the commune’s land. The murders make more sense because here the rural people involved knew...
their victims, and only too well: the murders were the manifestation of extreme and longstanding hatreds, at least a half-century in the making. Here, to follow Tilly, news of the Revolution of 1830 in Paris had shifted the balance between contenders for power even at the village level, and permitted Villeséquois to confront the Latreilles openly. Whether the violence was premeditated or spontaneous was never to be clear.

Forty years later, in August 1870, several hundred peasants from around the tiny village of Hautefaye, near Nontron in south-western France, systematically battered a young nobleman for two hours, then, as he was about to expire, burned him to death. In his comprehensive microhistory of the murder, Alain Corbin teased out the reasons why, for the noble, Hautefaye was the fateful place to be. Part of his explanation was a web of historical factors. In this area north of the Dordogne, popular ideology was distinguished by a longstanding hatred of nobles (evident in the Grande Peur of 1789), mistrust of priests (manifest in a wave of rioting after rumours of a plot to reimpose the tithe in 1868) and resentment of urban republicans (news of the workers’ insurrection in Paris in June 1848 had caused a panic in the area).

This distinctive ideology, combined with unprecedented prosperity under the Second Empire, had generated a fervent Bonapartism. The news of the imperial army’s reverses during the Franco-Prussian War in August 1870 reached the drought-affected countryside at the same time as the anxious villagers from around Hautefaye were attending a fair and celebrating Napoleon III’s national holiday (15 August). The young noble, Alain de Monéys, unknown to most of his assailants, was accused of shouting ‘Long live the Republic!’, dubbed a ‘Prussian’, and became a doomed symbol of accumulated hatreds and fears. Up to 800 locals participated in or looked on as the young nobleman was tortured for hours, then incinerated.

The incident at Hautefaye in 1870 shocked and deeply embarrassed the liberal republicans who came to power a few weeks later. For the murder occurred eighty years after the French Revolution and the presumed triumph of a new political culture based on citizenship, equality before the law, tolerance and popular sovereignty, running against their assumptions that the rural masses had shared in a linear progress of enlightenment. Corbin in turn used the incident at Hautefaye not only to probe the meanings of collective violence, but also to pose the relationship between the rise of liberal democracy and continuing examples of collective violence.

Politics, Emotions and the Rites of Violence

It is important to emphasise that these social and cultural approaches do not rid revolutionary violence of its political agenda. Instead they reveal the complex ways in which political action could be articulated. Recent work has especially highlighted the primacy of sovereignty in popular insurrection, where exercises of revolutionary violence staged transfers of legitimate violence from its monarchical monopoly to that of the people. The deaths of Foulon and Berthier, for instance, can no longer be viewed simply as the outcome of a subsistence riot or even an expression of communal anger, but assume a political drive central to the national events of July 1789. Paolo Viola has stressed the need to go beyond the ‘classical’ view of popular violence vue d’en bas – as in Georges Lefebvre’s model of ‘defensive reaction and punitive will’ – which fails to comprehend violence as both ‘sovereign’ and ‘a form of political representation’. Like Colin Lucas and Regina Janes, Viola has argued that by appropriating the state’s power over punishment through the pike, the revolutionary crowd visually encoded its actions with statements of sovereign power. Since these rites of violence mirrored those of the ancien régime’s execution process (supplice), they were imbued with the ‘virtual representation’ of spectacular punishment – that is, ‘invested with an extraordinary symbolic power’ by the crowd’s own legitimising dynamics of spectatorship.24

Revolutionary crowds likewise often established makeshift courts to judge their victims – even if they were almost always already guilty in the eyes of their captors, such as those who ‘tried’ Foulon in the hôtel-de-ville in 1789 or the refractory priests in Paris’s prisons in September 1792. So too did the perpetrators of collective violence when on trial – from the cook Desnot, who decapitated the governor of the Bastille on 14 July 1789, to those at Hauteufaye – often refuse to recognise that they had committed a wrong, at times even framing their crimes as patriotic acts. Rhetorical bluster aside, the indignant demand of the participants in the September 1792 massacres at Meaux for compensation for their roles, like others elsewhere before and after them, points to the conscious integration and articulations of popular

justice that were only bolstered under the collective sentiments of revolutionary action.25

Military situations could create an environment particularly conducive to such attitudes, stirred by fears of defeat or counter-revolution. Hautefaye was one example, as Corbin has charted, with the rise of regional ‘anxiety and rumour’.26 A representative to Soissons’s electoral assembly, Nicolas-Joseph Grain, recorded another in his memoirs upon a particularly brutal death there in September 1792. As volunteers arrived at a military camp stationed near Soissons, a group of soldiers seized one accused of treason; crying ‘Death to the traitor [Meure le traître]!’, they jabbed him with their bayonets as they ‘dragged him from the city to the camp’. Surrounded by a circle of soldiers, he was forced on to his knees and made to ‘beg pardon of the Nation’ before being ordered to lower his head. Once executed, his remains were cut into pieces and paraded around at the tip of a bayonet – in perhaps the military equivalent of the Parisian crowds’ pikes – to celebratory cries of ‘Vive la Nation!’27

Yet popular violence cannot be elided with sovereign punishment alone. In the search for the logic of political crowds, the more experiential interplay between brutal acts and their actors can often be overlooked. In this sense, the emotional currents of violence have remained relatively under-appreciated. In July 1789 cultural and political dimensions were also welded with an emotional agenda: Berthier was forced to kiss the ‘pale and bleeding head’ of his father-in-law as it was flaunted in front of him. William Beik, among others, has advanced us in this direction by outlining how crowds in the ancien régime played more broadly into a ‘culture of retribution’. Building on Thompson’s earlier model, this form of ‘moral outrage’ extended past the moral economy’s restorative motives in demanding a ‘focused ... vindictive aspect’ to ‘harm the responsible parties’.28

If there is a limitation to this more recent focus on the affective dimension of punitive anger, it is that this remains largely one-dimensional in addressing only perpetrator emotions. Understandably, modern scholarship has sought both to escape the emphasis of traditional histories on elites and to repudiate

26 Corbin, Village of Cannibals, pp. 7–8 and chapter 1.
the reductive ‘crowd psychology’ of nineteenth-century theorists.29 Yet a closer look reveals that the revolutionary crowds drew on encoded rituals to wield emotional power that also inherently involved their victims. The deaths of Foulon and Berthier were notably punctuated by inflections of humiliation, which, as a ‘self-conscious’ emotion, requires a corresponding response from its targets.30 The actors central to emotional transactions in violent acts – that is, the victims themselves – should not be overlooked. From the perspective of Foulon and Berthier, the crowd’s violence was clearly not sovereign, but politically and judicially illegitimate, and above all emotionally transgressive. Humiliation had a dual function here, each integral to the broader social and political meanings of its violence. On the one hand, it was a violent supplement to the retributive nature of popular punishment; on the other, it formed a critical component of an enacted judicial and hence sovereign rite.

To this end, these punishments were explicitly structured along a mimetic logic that drew upon the spectacular configuration of ancien régime public executions, including a shaming procession that culminated in the punitive site of the Place de Grève.31 As both men were captured outside Paris and escorted that morning back into the city, onlookers made clear to stress the emotional spectacle of their journey. As the editor Nicolas Ruault noted, describing the scene in terms of visible justice, Foulon was humiliatedly tied to the end of a cart with ‘a string of hay around his body’, which presaged the mouthful his severed head would later receive. Berthier’s carriage was expressly ‘cut in half so that everyone could see him’.32 Even in death, the humiliation of the supplice could be posthumously inflicted again through the emotional weaponry of various physical interactions: the hay stuffed in Foulon’s mouth; his decapitated head paraded in front of his son-in-law; the crowd’s taunts for a kiss between them.

Just as these acts had relied on the crowd’s knowledge of their familial ties, the Princess de Lamballe’s own head was similarly paraded outside the Temple in September 1792 before the eyes of her confidante Marie-

Antoinette. This use of close relationships to intensify psychological torture, one might argue, suggests much about the need for different kinds of spectatorship – not just the legitimising eyes of the crowd, as Lucas and Viola have rightly signalled, but also a more intimate and vengeful exhibitionism, grounded on an acute social awareness of the relationships between victims. To recognise these emotional associations in acts of intimidation and aggression is not to reduce the symbolic force of other cultural codes, but merely to add further dimensions to understand violence within each political space.

**Violated Bodies and the Search for Meaning**

But are all unhappy cases of mutilation or decapitation alike? In Gémenos and Rocquevaire in 1795, for example, victims had their eyes, ears, noses and throats cut out. In March 1793 in La Rochelle, conversely, both the heads and genitals of refractory priests were set atop pikes (as well as forks, sabres and batons) in a triumphant parade, their corpses dragged along closely behind.33 Nor were the shootings of Gabriel and Gonzague Latreille in 1830 and the attack on the gendarmes to force them to release their prisoners the final act of violence that morning. After the wounded gendarmes had left the scene, the band of Villeséquois then turned on the bodies of Gabriel and Gonzague and cut off their heads with axe-blows. Raymond Huard has argued of popular politics in nineteenth-century Languedoc that, ‘in its roughest form, the revolutionary tradition as a political expression generated a particular conception of political victory which allows only the complete annihilation of the enemy . . . symbolised by the guillotine’.34 It is possible that, by the time of the Villesèque murders, these acts of decapitation could have been seen as the symbolic form of a people’s guillotine.

On the other hand, even as there is something cross-cultural about the public display of beheadings, meaning inevitably alters with context, as Regina Janes has noted: ‘While severed heads always speak, they say different things in different cultures.’35 Hence Claudy Valin, in seeking to understand the decapitations of the La Rochelle massacre in 1793, points away from the

35 Janes, ‘Beheadings’, 24, 47.
influence of the guillotine’s introduction. Instead, he cites a deposition of 1791 from the nearby town of Dompierre-sur-Mer that made reference to the earlier bouts of violence in Paris as a model – saying, of the local constitutional priest, that one had to ‘cut his head off and put it at the end of a baton like one had done in Paris’. 36

Even so, explanations of decapitation in terms of political symbolism do not necessarily conflict with other possibilities. One alternative reading is that such mutilation represented a chance to express loathing in a communitarian fashion. Whatever misgivings one might have about Elias Canetti’s discussion of the group dynamic of violent crowds, there are undeniable similarities between the participatory nature of these posthumous acts and his insights on the ‘unsurpassed intensity’ of ‘baiting crowds’:

Everyone wants to participate; everyone strikes a blow and, in order to do this, pushes as near as he can to the victim . . . His permitted murder stands for all the murders people have to deny themselves for fear of the penalties for their perpetration . . . No-one has been appointed executioner; the community as a whole does the killing. 37

Although the murders at Villesèque occurred in November, there may also have been a symbolic identification of the lifeless nobles with the carnival dummy dispatched on Ash Wednesday to represent the climax and the end of ‘the world turned upside down’: the enactment of symbolic popular justice was common in carnival celebrations in the Midi. 38 However, in this region the carnival dummy was normally burnt on Ash Wednesday, sometimes after being ‘hanged’ or ‘shot’ first. 39 Alternatively, just as Corbin stressed the parallels between the way the nobleman was burnt at Hautefaye and the roasting of pigs in its region, 40 so the regular butchering of sheep and goats in Villesèque may have rendered the severing of the nobles’ heads less shocking to those involved.

To be sure, change could and did occur. Comparing the Hautefaye murder to those of the September Massacres, Corbin has argued for the clear handprint of ‘modernity’: the perpetrators of violence in 1870 displayed certain ‘humanitarian sentiments’ by refusing to ‘indulge in the “ceremonious mutilations”’ of the earlier case. Yet it is also easy to exaggerate this. Even when assessing the killings of September 1792, to confront their violence head-on is not to cede to naivety over either contemporary sources or posterior accounts. The Princess de Lamballe’s infamous torture at the hands of the septembriseurs has gone down in the canons of French history as exemplifying the sheer brutality of the September Massacres. Soon mythicised as the bloodthirsty apex of popular violence, even immediately published narratives painted macabre scenes of how, after striking her dead on a pile of corpses, her assailants stripped her naked, gruesomely disembowelled her, then dragged her headless and unclad body through the gutters, while fixing her body parts on pikes. In fact, according to Antoine de Baecque, she was ‘neither stripped nor mutilated’. 41

But that revolutionary and subsequent accounts centred on the sexual and feminine dimensions of de Lamballe’s vulnerability prompts questions about the reverse: male violence. Thirty-four men from Villesèque stood trial; in Hautefaye, twenty-one men were accused. The gendered assumptions of judicial authorities aside, which inevitably fed into these legal outcomes, what might this say about violence and masculinity? Working within the tradition of the Annales school, the analyses of Nicole and Yves Castan of violence in eighteenth-century Languedoc illuminated the mentalité of this rural world, one in part characterised by a highly developed male sensitivity to perceived insults, to ‘l’honneur viril’ and by a ready escalation of physical resolution to such menaces to manliness. In Nicole Castan’s words, ‘in a society based on esteem and dignity, the desire to protect physical and moral respectability mattered above everything’. 42

Still, although much violence in nineteenth-century France can be traced to such intersections of honour and masculinity, which were accentuated in rural areas, demographic trends of especially young men cannot alone

explain everything. Subsistence riots often present another exception as a domain traditionally dominated by women. Olwen Hufton’s reading of the ‘bread riot [as a] maternal terrain’ has been extended by David Garrioch to argue for the gendered particularity of the October Days. Female violence too could therefore be revolutionary: as Garrioch has reminded, we must detach ourselves from a common ‘condescending dichotomy’ between a putatively ‘traditional’, localised collective action that is female and its ‘modern’ and national ‘male’ counterpart.

Conclusion: Violence and Democracy

Finally, there is an important caveat to be stressed about the relationship between collective violence, protest and the history of democracy. Throughout the nineteenth century, according to Corbin, popular politics was predicated on an explosive mixture of new assumptions about popular sovereignty and a long tradition of collective cruelty – even cannibalism – dating back to the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre and beyond, and which had resurfaced during the September Massacres of 1792 and the decapitation of the deputy Féraud in 1795. The mutilation of the bodies of Gabriel and Gonzague Latreille might accordingly be read as the resurfacing of archaic, pre-democratic cultural forms – if only evidence could be found of such behaviour in the region, rather than in Paris. Rivalries between villages and neighbourhoods were regularly expressed in violent ways, but it is remarkable how few violent deaths were occasioned in rural France after 1816 in this manner or through political conflict. At Villesèque, the violence was all the more shocking because wider evidence suggests that murder, if not physical assault, was comparatively rare through the wider region, the lowlands of Languedoc.

44 Corbin, Village of Cannibals, p. 72.
48 Castan, Criminel, pp. 159–66; Castan, Honnêteté, p. 545 and annexes.
Instead, as Tilly and Rudé stressed, insurgent crowds tended towards verbal and symbolic violence – the use of threatening language, occasional destruction of property, and ritualistic action (‘repertoires’) that channelled violence within cultural limits. This is precisely why the murder at Villesèque, like that at Hautefaye, was so deplorable to contemporaries. In 1870, Hautefaye stood out because, as Corbin points out, it was a rare vestige of spectacular brutality.\textsuperscript{49} To focus exclusively on the horror at such violence expressed by the nineteenth-century \textit{âme sensible} is thus to underplay the relative isolation of these cases. Corbin and others have used the insights of cultural anthropology to insist – rightly – on the distances of time, space and perception between ourselves and those who lived in nineteenth-century France. Carried to an extreme, however, such an approach falsely implies an unbridgeable rift between the ‘modern present’ and a sharply distinct ‘archaic past’ by magnifying exceptional examples of splanetic action into the fixed expressions of a fundamentally violent society.

In Paris, too, far more common in actuality than the potent images of violent mobs were peaceful demonstrations, petitions, banquets and mass meetings. Micah Alpaugh has found that only 12 per cent of an estimated 750 protests by \textit{sans-culottes} in 1789–95 resulted in physical violence.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, apart from the September 1792 killings, the greatest losses of life in Paris over this ‘revolutionary century’ – the Réveillon riots of 1789, the rue Transnonain in 1834, the coup d’état of December 1851, and the repression of the Paris Commune in May 1871 – were the work of armed forces.

In this sense, Georges Lefebvre’s elementary distinction between the revolutionary crowd as spontaneous gathering (\textit{agrégat}) and premeditated assembly (\textit{rassemblement}) still provides us with a useful starting point to analyse popular violence.\textsuperscript{51} The relative infrequency of collective acts of extreme cruelty suggests that they tended to arise from the former rather than the latter, as with both the September Massacres and the Hautefaye murder, for instance. But for the crowds that set out from Paris to retrieve Foulon and Berthier, or for the market-women on the road to Versailles in October 1789, the outcome of murder – as opposed to justice – was hardly set

\textsuperscript{51} Georges Lefebvre, ‘Foules révolutionnaires’, \textit{Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française} 61 (1934), 1–26.
in stone; or, at least, any retrospective speculation of their motives remains merely that.

Instead, they possessed different motives and intentions as heterogeneous groups, just as protesters do today. To focus unwaveringly on the violence of insurrectionary crowds during the revolutionary century, without paying attention to their wider aims and diverse tactics, is to erect a false dichotomy between such behaviour and democratic politics. Particularly when what is at stake seems to be the very survival of the social order, nowhere is the practice of popular sovereignty free of collective pressures – or, indeed, of violence itself.

**Bibliographical Essay**


The mountain masses and mountain chains of the peninsula do not constitute a regular, well-defined system . . . This irregularity . . . has its analogue in the distribution of the various races which inhabit the peninsula. Hungary has a homogeneous population, if we compare it with that of Turkey; for in the latter country there are districts where eight or ten nationalities live side by side within a radius of a few miles.¹

Macedonia lies confounded within three vilayets (i.e. provinces), which correspond to no natural division either racial or geographical . . . the result is that no race attains a predominance, and no province acquires a national character. The natural arrangement would have been to place Greeks, Serbians, and Albanians in compartments of their own, leaving the Bulgarians to occupy the centre and the East.²

One might think that the primary role of geography is to describe the Earth’s landscapes, environments, peoples and places. As such, the way it acts as a bridge between the social sciences and humanities on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other ought to be benign. Nobody would normally associate the study of geography with the perpetration of genocide. Here we argue to the contrary, not because the making of accurate maps, the topographic descriptions of a region or the compiling of comprehensive statistics about its inhabitants is in itself toxic, but because in the way they have been deployed as tools of modern, post-Enlightenment orderings of the world as their practitioners imagine it ought to be, they intrinsically are. Of course, the fin-de-siècle observations – and irritations – as quoted above, of a renowned French geographer, Elisée Reclus, and an influential British journalist, H. N. Brailsford, as to the failure of both physical and human Balkan geography to fit into neatly contained boundaries would not count for too

² Quoted in ibid., p. 109.
much if these were purely idiosyncratic. But they were not. They influenced, fed into or otherwise were part and parcel of wider Western scientific and cultural assumptions that there was something wrong and ill-formed, if not about the physical then certainly about the ethnographic landscape of the Balkans; that something radical by way of demographic engineering was pivotal to its reform but at the same time this could not be achieved under Ottoman imperial rule. At which point supposed empirically led analysis bled into a whole slew of racial or gendered stereotypes as to the ‘uncivilised, crude, cruel and without exception, dishevelled’ nature not just of Turks but of all Balkan peoples. More surprisingly, perhaps, it was exactly such ‘thinking’, as imbibed by indigenous Balkan elites, which helped catalyse and drive their own transformational nation-state building agendas.

It is in the transmission belt from an Enlightenment project to observe, describe and categorise the world to the political one of ‘seeing like a state’ that we posit the seeds of genocide in the Balkans. Or to put it another way, it was through the insistent, hegemonic proposition that the only way healthy, modern societies might cohere, develop and take their legitimate place within an international system of such states was through the separation of previously jumbled up ‘national’ elements into their correct, bounded ‘national’ territories that drives for cultural homogenisation had their corollary in the urge towards ethnic cleansing. This was not some straight, unilinear or inevitable trajectory. For one thing it assumed the supersession of a great, age-old, dynastic Ottoman world empire by contending and actually aggressively competing if paradoxically weak national states. Indeed, before 1900, these were all protean, peripheral to the empire, necessarily geographically circumscribed or, quite possibly, existing only in the minds of their national dreamers. It was the concatenation of their respective aggrandising ambitions with the historically contingent that produced an imperial shatter zone in which a genocidal reordering of political and hence human geography took place.

Yet the fin-de-siècle perception of the Ottoman Balkans (and Ottomania more generally) as a power vacuum in the making was hardly limited to small, putative, neighbouring – themselves ex-Ottoman – states but rather was equally driven by the competing geopolitical interests of the great powers. If Britain and France, the truly avant-garde nation states among these, were also the first (competing) purveyors of a modern, liberal, geographically informed, economically interconnected, international nation-state

system, they were also at the same time imperial powers in their own right, competing with other European imperial powers, in this instance to determine the fate of, or, if one prefers, the spatial arrangements of a post-Ottomania. It was this wider geopolitical power struggle, as it catastrophically launched or more plausibly slid into the 1914 Great War, that spread an already emergent Ottoman shatter zone from the onset of the Balkan wars two years earlier, to embrace – on their 1917–18 collapse – the Russian, Austrian and German empires too. Or again, more precisely, those parts of these empires which were not reconstituted or failed to fully cohere within their successor radically anti-liberal, Soviet and eventual Hitlerian states but were either fragmented, indeed Balkanised, as a series of smaller and what at the time looked like provisional polities – the post-1919 ‘New Europe’ – or remained ‘problem’ regions within the USSR or post-Ottoman Middle East.

Here we have our exact historical conjuncture between a Western presumption to recast the world in its own metropolitan image and the realities of the political breakdown of previously normative world empires: in Wallersteinian terms, what we might call a semi-periphery to a Western core. But it was at the geographical intersection between these two systems, at the exposed European or near-European rim of the semi-periphery that the full brunt and genocidal consequences of being turned into a shatter zone were fully borne. It was in these rimlands between 1912 and 1953 that there was a concentrated yet repeated incidence of genocide, the completion of which coincided (in most cases) with the triumphant compartmentalisation of alleged national groups within fixed, impervious boundaries over forms of historic multicultural co-existence within fluid zones of cross-frontier human engagement.

In this chapter we will focus on Macedonia and Thrace – regions which often have been overlooked or ignored in the history of genocide – to illustrate and develop this trajectory in microcosm. But first, we need to return to the wider geography of early to mid twentieth-century genocide: to the landscape of the rimlands.

The Rimlands: A Geography of Genocide

Studies of genocide have a habit of isolating discrete examples from any bigger picture. This tends to be in line with a general treatment of the phenomenon as

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a product of a particular country’s problematic development, the emergence of radical and uncompromising ideological tendencies, and, very often, the role of megalomaniac, power-crazed leaders who have driven this or that polity towards extreme outcomes. Moreover, despite scholarly efforts geared towards comparing one genocide with another across time and space, these efforts usually seek to reinforce the peculiarity of the act against a normative, non-genocidal mainstream. On one level, this would dovetail with what Raphael Lemkin, the founder of the neologism genocide, assumed to be true. Lemkin saw the phenomenon as a regressive condition which could only be defeated through a strong international community outlawing such barbarism. Yet at the same time he recognised that tendencies towards the combined physical, biological and cultural destruction of peoples were widely applicable to many modern instances.6 Consideration of major optimal cases from the first part of the twentieth century such as the Holocaust, the Holodomor in early 1930s Ukraine and the Medz Yeghern, the Armenian genocide of 1915–16 might thus make greater sense if they could be charted as part of a wider sequence of genocidal events, the vast majority of which took place or at least emanated in this period from our rimlands’ range.

Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands has been suggestive of this historical-geographical intermeshing at least in relation to the Holocaust and Holodomor.7 The very title of his study underscores the idea of an extended region in which many peoples – Jews, Poles, Ukrainians and Germans amongst others – suffered mass violence leading to the death of millions. Yet despite being replete with detailed maps, for Snyder the geography is largely incidental to the causative issue, which is presented as a giant totalitarian struggle between Hitler and Stalin for ultimate control of the lands between Germany and Russia. Thus, heavily focused on the period 1933 to 1945 Snyder foreshortens the time scale within which we might read the broader relationships between history, geography and the making of genocide. But he also reduces the geographical framework itself, excluding the Balkan region where the mass murder of Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Jews and Roma – amongst others – took place in synchronous time, not to say an Anatolia-Caucasus range where the extermination of the Armenians and many other genocidal events occurred prior to the rise of Stalin or Hitler.

7 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (London: Bodley Head, 2010).
The key question here is can (indeed should) we emplot (to borrow a term of Paul Ricoeur) all these examples within a single narrative and at the same time legitimately embrace them within one map? Snyder’s analysis did not require him to do that, not least because his main interest was in the Hitler–Stalin contest not genocide per se. Even so, Snyder implicitly reinforces the standard liberal view that the phenomenon is aberrant, each genocide thus a separate deviation from the normal course of historical development. An alternative view, however, might argue that modern genocide is an aspect of a systemic dysfunction and so a good indicator of humanity’s direction of travel towards a globalised political economy founded on the creation of an international system of nation states. As such the spatial emplotment of genocide could be as a series of similar or even linked events.

For instance, a major clustering of genocides occurred towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as very diverse but premodern societies in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Antipodes sought to resist Western imperial encroachment, penetration and ultimate colonial–settler subjugation. The geographic range is global yet explicable as part of the final metropolitan surge towards an integrated world system at the expense of a Wallersteinian periphery. By the same token, a more staccato spate of genocides committed by Russian, Chinese and Ottoman empires from the mid to late nineteenth century might equally be identifiable as semi-periphery responses to Western penetration, and not least as the primary victim ‘minority’ groups – Circassians, Uighurs, Armenians – were perceived by their respective imperial nemeses as Trojan horse tools of external destabilisation. The fact, moreover, that taken together these events – to use a more geological metaphor – took place on increasingly fragile yet interlocking political fault lines along a single Eurasian tectonic plate may explain how one small seismic shift on one fault might spark off a series of after-shocks further down the plate. This causative pattern in fact can be discerned as the harbinger of the much more concentrated shatter zone effect from 1912. This in turn would be succeeded by a much more intensive if disparate ‘Third World’ range of postcolonial genocides from c. 1948, before the end of the Cold War would produce a yet further sequence of genocidal events, including some on the latent stress points of the Eurasian tectonic plate. In short, a repeat potential for genocide would necessarily indicate a history of disturbed, unresolved if latent local state-communal hostilities,

yet in its actualisation would also most likely be symptomatic of more paradigmatic and hence systemic geopolitical shifts.

This returns us to the European rimlands as the primary 1912–53 locus of genocide. Let us attempt a clearer geographical delineation. Though he uses the more politically neutral term ‘borderlands’, Terry Martin’s description of these regions, as an L-shaped swathe of territory ‘extending southwards from Leningrad through the Balkans, and then eastward across southern Ukraine and Turkey into the Caucasus region’, serves well. However, the delineation could be made stronger through the identification of three sub-zones. A first would encompass most of the Balkans (with the exception of pre-1912 Greece) but also leap-frog both the Aegean and the Dardanelles to include western Anatolia and its adjacent islands. A second would consist of a Caucasus–Black Sea–eastern Anatolia zone. A third sub-zone, sometimes referred to as ‘The Lands Between’, more or less equivalent to Snyder’s Bloodlands, would embrace a giant sliver of territory running from the Baltic to include Belarussia and right-bank Ukraine in the east, modern-day Poland as far as Silesia in the west, and through the Carpathians and sub-Carpathian ranges towards an intersection with the Danube at its deltaic point of entry into the Black Sea. The intersection at various points such as this, or the Crimea, of two or more zones might be noted.

Does this confer a coherent geography of genocide in the rimlands? Not exactly. There were, to use a more volcanic metaphor, parts which we might visualise as a central, ‘hot’ core, with, by degrees, cooler, outer layers which at critical moments seemed to be drawn by the core’s heat. There could be spill-over too, into adjacent regions, extreme violence, like any seismic shift, being no respecter of pre-existing boundaries. If there is fuzziness here, that is because – still utilising the geological language of fault lines, stress points and volcanic eruptions – the way in which the genocidal reshaping of the political, social and, above all, ethnographic landscape of the rimlands took place did not come all at once through one single catastrophic event, but rather might open up at one point, close down again for a while, and then re-emerge further down the fault, coalescing with other feedbacks, to produce a sequence of blasts, spasms and after-shocks. Only when the zone had ‘cooled’ into new political building blocks was the genocidal sequence brought to a close, though even then – particularly by reference to what happened in post-1990 Bosnia and the

Caucasus – some regions were plunged once more into genocide, suggestive again of the resilience of fault lines.

Yet despite all this, there was nothing intrinsic in the human geography of these regions to suggest the inevitability of genocide. On the contrary, the fundamental paradox of the rimlands is that, while their diverse peoples may have been living on pre-existent political fissures, their consistent record was one of co-existing with each other for centuries without recourse to mass, inter-group violence. This does not mean there was no violence. However, Arnold Toynbee’s 1923 verdict on the specifically Ottoman scale of it was that the previous dozen years had been ‘worse than during the rest of the previous century, worse again during that century than between the years 1461 and 1821’. In other words, what was at stake was not a continuity of ancient inter-ethnic hatreds – the repeated Western presumption as to Balkan and Middle Eastern mindsets – but rather a case of radical rupture. The key questions are how we explain the rupture and, if it wasn’t from within the traditional fabric of traditional rimlands’ society, from whence it came.

Toynbee’s answer was simple: it came from the outside, as a Western import, in the form of nationalism. But once more we have a paradox. The notion that nations were or, to follow Brailsford’s dictum, should by rights have been existing on this or that piece of territory cut across a premodern ethnographic reality in which an extraordinary mosaic of different ethnoreligious and linguistic communities, whether peasant or mountaineer, nomad or transhumant, socially, economically and culturally interacted in the same plural environmental space. Worse, from the nationalist perspective, they did so with no reference whatsoever to national difference. Here is a classic observation from the British author, Arthur Ransome, on his trip to Russian-occupied eastern Galicia early on in the Great War:

The peasants working on the land were very unwilling to identify themselves as belonging to any of the warring nations. Again and again, on asking a peasant to what nationality he belonged: Russian, Little-Russian, or Polish, I heard the reply ‘Orthodox’, and when the men were pressed to say what actual race he belonged I heard him answer safely: ‘We are local.’

It was not then that rimlands’ inhabitants did not recognise distinctions between themselves. But those distinctions were fundamentally based on

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religion, supported by an understanding of self embedded in clan, family and habitus, and thus completely at odds with the nationalist ‘imagined community’ of language, primordial identity and terrestrial goal-driven purposefulness across time and space.\(^{12}\) Such notions began as the preserve of schooled, literate, usually urban people, more often than not of people aware – through the cognitive map of the world they imbibed through newsprint – of the rapid pace of change in the wider world, including as it impinged on their own patch, and hence of all manner of existential dangers which lurked just over the horizon.

If the emergence of nationalism in the rimlands thus began as a minority creed, it usually also carried feelings of both acute anxiety and grievance. However, their common corollary was a powerful proactive urge towards rapidly cohering and mobilising the ‘nation’ – even where the majority of that constituency were not yet aware of their alleged commonality. It was the accruing of national assets – firstly the very numbers of people whom one could call one’s own (the assumed marker of which was usually ‘language’) followed by a designation of the territory upon which they had supposedly lived since time immemorial – that, by means of modern maps and censuses, as well as lexicons, novels and historical accounts, became the legitimating tools through which the nation’s entitlement was presented or demanded of a wider international (usually meaning metropolitan) community. Herein also implicitly lay the pre-1912 limiting factors on the making of national destiny. There were already putative nation states – including Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia – in the rimlands’ zones. But these had emerged at the margins of still existing empires and could not expand further without either militarily confronting them singly or in combination, or having the support of other, great powers. Equally crucially, none was a true nation-state in the sense that each included ethno-religious communities who were perceived by the political elites of these countries as extraneous, alien or downright subversive to the national cause. Given the weakness of these states, the possibility that ‘minorities’, as they now increasingly became called, might act as some fifth column for the dominant imperial or some other state interest became nationalists’ recurring nightmare.

Therein lay the origins of genocide in the rimlands even before the violent removing or killing of ‘minorities’ had begun in earnest. One could of course seek to absorb such problematic peoples (forcibly or otherwise) into the

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tissue of the nation in what Zygmunt Bauman would call an *anthropophagic* approach. Or one might opt for an alternative *anthropoemic* route, vomiting out the unwanted elements from society and polity.\(^\text{13}\) Either route could be seen as Social Darwinian and zero-sum, which is why Lemkin tended to view both of them as potentially genocidal. However, before 1912, while there had already been a whole series of massacres and mass flights as Muslim *muhajirs* (refugees) in particular had fled regions where Ottoman power in the Balkans and Transcaucasia had been reduced, no up-and-coming national state had been strong or foolhardy enough to undertake a systematic ethnic cleansing. Paradoxically, the best prior model for how to achieve that came through one of the empires: Russia’s early 1860s deportation of the Circassian peoples from the north-west Caucasus onto Ottoman shores offered an indubitably genocidal precedent.\(^\text{14}\)

Another such imperial precedent came through the Ottomans themselves, plans for wholesale mass relocations of non-Turkish national groups at the far corners of the residual empire emerging in the wake of the Committee of Union and Progress’s 1908 usurpation of power. Significantly, though in principle upholders of empire, the CUP were increasingly focused on achieving this goal through a nationalist ‘Turkey for the Turks’ path. Further radicalised through the depredations of the Balkan wars in 1912–13, it was above all the CUP’s decision to enter the Great War that unlocked the potential for mass deportations of people being turned into wholesale operational practice. The first great casualties were the Armenians, the most concentrated element of whom inhabited eastern Anatolia.\(^\text{15}\) But if what was broadcast by the CUP as deportation in summer 1915 was actually full-scale genocide it was also the first of many such ‘national’ assaults on the non-Turkish elements of the residually multi-ethnic empire.\(^\text{16}\)

Writ large, the 1914–18 war opened up the prospect for a mass ethnic reordering of the resulting rimlands’ shatter zones by whichever national or postimperial forces had the wherewithal with which to stamp their territorial writ on them. The most drastic of such reorderings would be conducted by the Soviets and the Nazis, Stalin’s great advantage over his Hitlerian

antithesis, in the central Asian, far eastern and northern expanses of the Russian empire to which the Soviets had succeeded, providing a vast spatial dumping ground for any and all of his unwanted ethnic and social enemies.\footnote{Pavel Polian, \textit{Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR} (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).} Genocide, if one prefers, at one remove. Denied these possibilities through the failure of his 1941 military campaign against the USSR, Hitler’s only recourse was directly to exterminate the Jews and vastly reduce Slavic peoples, as envisaged in Generalplan Ost within what amounted to the much more limited geographical scope of the rimlands.\footnote{Mechtild Rössler et al. (eds.), \textit{Der ‘Generalplan Ost’: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik} (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993).}

However, focus on the vast scale of Hitlerian and Stalinist killings should not deflect us from who were the ultimate beneficiaries of totalistic efforts to recast rimlands’ geography. When the dust settled and their territorial integrity was confirmed, albeit with boundaries truncated or redesignated thanks to a triumphant Stalin, it was the ‘New Europe’, even paradoxically for the next forty or more years a communist ‘New Europe’, that was the heir to the genocidally cemented process of people-homogenisation begun between 1912 and 1923. Nor was it only Hitler and Stalin who were protagonists in this extirpation of rimlands’ plurality. The Western Allies, despite their 1919 treaties’ commitment to safeguard the minorities of the shatter zones, had also given their imprimatur to the ‘unmixing of peoples’ between Turkey and Greece at the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, effectively a mandate for ethnic cleansing.\footnote{Renée Hirschon (ed.), \textit{Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey} (New York: Berghahn, 2003).} Twenty-two years later at Yalta they repeated the formula when, in association with Stalin, they endorsed the even larger compulsory removals of millions of ethnic Germans plus many Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians and other peoples.\footnote{Pertti Ahonen et al., \textit{People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath} (Oxford: Berg, 2008).}

The protection of minorities was thereafter a dead letter. In short, the genocidally supported destruction of a historic human geography involved diverse geopolitical protagonists from conflicting ideological systems. That said, as we will see by way of the final ‘cleansings’ from Macedonia-Thrace at the onset of the Cold War, the liberal reaffirmation of the culturally homogeneous nation state was also closely aligned to the emergence of a Western led, ultimately hegemonic world system of such states.
Passages in a Genocidal Reordering: Macedonia-Thrace

Before 1912 geographical designations such as Macedonia or Thrace had no administrative meaning. The terms derived from the classical world. However, through an Ottoman lens they were no less than oxymoronic, the organisation of vilayets in Rumeli – the name the Porte gave the European part of the empire – cutting across a zone whose modern geographical nomenclatures would only become commonplace through the eruption of violent conflict largely derived from external forces and factors. It was the mid-nineteenth-century collapse of most of Ottoman power in Europe and the post-1878 great power ‘propping up’ of what remained that focused attention on the empire’s residual territories west of the Bosphorus. And it was great power assumptions, both cultural and political, that it was only a matter of time before the entire Ottoman carpet was rolled up once and for all, that acted as the primary goad to the mapping of ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Thrace’ by any number of parties who claimed them as their own by dint of some natural birthright, geopolitical necessity, or both. Where Western pontificators like Brailsford led in assuming that Balkan reform could only come through ethnographic reordering, regional Greek, Bulgarian, Serb and latterly Albanian actors followed in seeking to demonstrate their national preponderance in all or parts of these regions. The rising incidence of pre-genocidal, inter-group political violence in Macedonia and Thrace thus can be closely correlated to these ambitions. A flurry of competing late nineteenth-century, usually German-published maps – thus reinforcing their supposed empirical credentials – were grist to this mill, as was an Orthodox kulturkampf between Bulgarian Exarchists and Greek Patriarchists which through competing statistics on the number of their congregations and school rolls – as regularly presented to foreign consulates – proved equally toxic in dividing, paralysing or polarising communities.21

This is where a modern sense of seeing the human landscape through clearly demarcated nationalities so destabilised what in practice was ‘a cultures area, inhabited by a plethora of ethnic groups tied together in a complex web of interactions’.22 Christians, Muslims, Jews, all living side by side in a plural multifaceted ‘mazemata’, was not simply an affront to nationalist consciousness while proof of these regions’ backwardness but all the more reason why

21 Yosmaoglu, Blood Ties, chapters 3 and 4.
they needed urgent homogenisation. Over and beyond the mobilisation of religious differences, even within a formerly single and unified Orthodox faith, the nationalist route was to intrude respective national bands – andartes, komitadjis or çeta – into Macedonia to dragoon hesitant communities on side or clear out those who stood in the way. As this largely outsider-inspired violence began to spiral from the turn of twentieth century, the Ottoman military also became increasingly involved, retaliating often indiscriminately against suspect villages. Moreover, it was precisely the experience of this ‘dirty’ counterinsurgency war that helped crystallise from within the ranks of Ottoman Third Army junior commanders such as Enver Pasha, a Turkish nationalism which in key respects was a mirror-image of all other Balkan ethno-national creeds. It was Enver and his CUP comrades – when faced in 1908 with what seemed an imminent great power pretext of intervening directly to end the Macedonian violence – who reacted by marching out from the Third Army Salonika headquarters to overthrow the Sultan in Constantinople. If this act was intended to firmly forestall either a great power or Balkan nationalist partition of the region, it proved rather to be the starting gun for the creation of Europe’s first rimlands’ shatter zone and thus for a sequence of genocidal reordering lasting almost forty years.

Up to this point we can see the trajectory of communal violence largely shaped by guerrilla bands or their local Ottoman army adversaries. What followed from 1912 was not just a scaling up of the violence, as state armies directly intervened, but the implementation of policies designed to suffocate or destroy those local populations now designated as alien and hence enemies of the national interest. The first key evidence of this acceleration was when Greek, Serb, Montenegrin and Bulgarian polities, in defiance of great power agendas, allied together to take matters into their own hands and unilaterally expel the Ottomans from Europe. Direct exterminatory violence against Albanian Muslims, most especially committed by both Serb bands and military, was one obvious consequence of this first Balkan war, many hundreds of thousands of Muslims further south in the region not waiting to suffer a similar fate but fleeing en masse towards the port of Salonika. But the contours of ethnic cleansing became all the more evident when the Balkan League allies fell out over the territorial division of the Macedonian

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and Thracian spoils and began terrorising ethno-religious communities loosely associated with their erstwhile partners, either to forcibly assimilate them or to get them to flee to the ‘other’ side.

The ferocity of this second Balkan 1913 war was made plain through the ‘remarkably well-documented and impartial’ report by the Carnegie international commission sent to investigate charges of atrocity.26 Over and above extensive atrocities committed by soldiers upon soldiers, it found that each and every party to the conflict had also repeatedly committed multitudinous atrocities against supposed ‘enemy’ non-combatants. The murder of un-uniformed battle-age men in the course of war has a long and vicious history.27 But these massacres went beyond vengeful blood lust. Rather Carnegie’s findings suggested something more akin to a standard operating procedure which, alongside the systematic burning of villages and towns, was aimed at getting the greater mass of surviving terror-filled inhabitants to clear out at speed.

Certainly, there were variations on this theme. In the contested Greco-Bulgarian zone in western Thrace, around Sérres and Kukuch, for instance, leading members of Exarchist Slavophone congregations were intimidated by Greek soldiery with the words ‘If you want to be free; be Greeks.’ Meanwhile, in the Rhodope mountains, thousands of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims – Pomaks – found themselves inducted into the Bulgarian Exarchist church in mass ceremonies. The compulsory rite of passage was the biting of a pork sausage: hence a conscious slap at an Islamic dietary prohibition. Similar antics occurred in much of the area around Pec, in Kosovo, which came under Montenegrin occupation. Here, too, thousands of both Albanian Catholics and Muslims were rapidly turned into Orthodox congregants.28 If not all the violence thus was directly exterminatory, it was nevertheless genocidal in the Lemkinian sense that it was geared towards the physical, biological and cultural emasculation of ethnic or religiously different groups with a view to their ultimate disintegration.

But equally the destruction could be immediate and total, as took place in the south-east Thracian districts of Malgara, Rodosto and Airobol, close to the Sea of Marmara, where Carnegie reported the ‘men, women and children’ of more than forty-five villages, mostly Bulgarian, some Pomak, ‘were separated,
and all killed without exception’. But these genocidal massacres, which also included systematic mass rape, were mostly committed by Ottoman-organised bashi-bazouk irregulars, or by the embryonic Teskilât-i Mahsusa, or Special Organisation. This covert formation, as founded by the CUP leadership, appears to have played an instrumental role in the Armenian genocide two years later. The covert involvement of ‘violence specialists’ aside, another reason why Malgara is significant is that it offers a reminder on the one hand of the provisionality of the new political map of Macedonia and Thrace as a result of the Balkan wars – the episode being part of a late CUP bid to take advantage of the intra-League struggle and recapture a smidgen of its European territories – and, on the other hand, of the ongoing vulnerability of communities who might fall prey to genocide as a consequence.

The immediate focus of these ongoing tensions was the Bulgarian grievance that it had been denied parts of Macedonia and Thrace which it believed were its by right of national composition and conquest. Sofia’s attempt to recover what it perceived as its unredeemed territories thus set a pattern of conflict in which Greece and Serbia sought to consolidate their hold on their respective gains, Bulgaria to overturn them. The latter’s alignment with the Central Powers in 1915, and its military ‘recovery’ at Greek or Serbian expense of much of Macedonia and Thrace, carried further efforts to forcibly assimilate Slavophones or clear out Greeks. The scale and atrocity of these efforts, now fully supported by the total coercive machinery of military and state, left the earlier Patriarchist–Exarchist conflict in the shade, and precisely spoke to the ‘barbarism’ and ‘vandalism’ of Lemkin’s early efforts to describe ‘genocide’. Yet when the Bulgarians were defeated in 1918 the whole thrust of this demographic reordering simply went into reverse, the ‘voluntary’ exchange of Greek and Bulgarian populations in western Thrace, as given Allied imprimatur by the 1919 treaty of Neuilly, being in practice a green light for Greece to ‘get rid of her Bulgarian population at any cost’. The statistics speak for themselves. The Greek share of this previously predominantly Turkish- and Bulgarian-speaking region jumped within a few years from a mere 21 per cent to almost 70 per cent. And while Turkish and Pomak Muslims were in principle safeguarded here by dint of a protective clause in the Lausanne treaty, throughout the rest of Greece

hundreds of thousands of ‘Muslims’ were compulsorily exchanged for up to 1.3 million ‘Orthodox’ Greeks, most of whom had already been ethnically cleansed from Turkey.  

One might argue, of course, that however severe such deportations, notwithstanding the uncompensated loss of homes, land and businesses, this did not of itself constitute genocide. It is also true that the relatively orderly post-Lausanne Muslim removals from places such as Salonika to Turkey were hardly equivalent to the genocidal CUP, and then Kemalist deportations mostly from Anatolia of Armenians, then Greeks, over preceding years. Yet the overall pattern was unmistakably the same. In our Macedonian-Thracian theatre for instance, state drives towards socially engineered homogenisation of recently acquired territories continued to veer towards extreme instrumentalisation so long as the noisily irredentist claims of neighbouring states exposed one or more minorities as their supposed stalking horses. In other words, so long as the political geography of the New Europe in this particular arena remained contested, elimination of ‘enemy’ populations – by fair means or foul – remained a long-term state policy objective.

The role of renewed general war thus represents the key contingent factor in the violent consolidation of land and people in our region. From 1923 to 1938 southern Balkan states were impeded from implementing mass removals by an Anglo-French-led international order which, ambivalent about population transfers, nevertheless was adamantly against unilateral border changes. After Munich that writ was clearly defunct, opening up the possibilities of a territorial repartition of the rimlands, Macedonia-Thrace included. Paradoxically, that initially suggested, yet again, that the process of creeping nation-state consolidation in the interests of one dominant society could simply be overturned in favour of another. Bulgaria’s partisanship to the Axis-led sweep into the Balkans in April 1941 reaped its reward thus, in Berlin’s sanctioning of its annexation of much of previously Greek Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. In its wake came Sofia’s massive effort to disgorge recent Greek settlers in what it now called Belomorie and replace them with Bulgarians, the majority of the latter previously displaced in the 1910s and 1920s by the Greeks. Some distance to the north, ultra-nationalist Serb Chetniks attempted to counter the emergent Croat Ustasha state by scoping a post-Yugoslav Greater Serbia whose forcible absorption of Croats and complete erasure of Muslims would take place after the war when other countries would be too

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busy with their own problems to care about whether an unwanted population was being annihilated somewhere else. Meanwhile, during the war, just as Zagreb was doing exactly such things to Serbs and Jews, Sofia was doing the same to Greeks and Jews. The Bulgarian aspect of wider Axis occupation (Katochi) of 1941–4, as remembered by its Greek inhabitants, is one of extreme barbarity and atrocity. Yet it was based on a Bulgarian foreign ministry blueprint whose transparent aim was to intimidate, suffocate or starve its Greek and other non-Slavophone elements to a point where those elements would fall apart or flee. On the latter score, refugee deaths from the area were disproportionately high among the hundreds of thousands of fatalities in the war-induced Greek famine of winter 1941/2.

Yet while the Bulgarian occupation is treated in contemporary Greece as genocidal, its most optimal feature was the assault not on the region’s Greeks but on its Jews. This finally brings us back to the Bloodlands element in the Macedonia-Thrace, geography–genocide equation. The rounding up and deportation to Auschwitz of nearly all of Salonika’s 50,000 Jews, the most significant concentration of Sephardim in Jewry’s global diaspora, is the single most egregious act both in the Nazi ‘final solution’ in Greece and of the Katochi. The Nazi descent on the Balkans may be seen as a complete bolt from the blue, or alternatively as consistent with competing European great power efforts to fill or control a weak political vacuum created by the Ottoman retreat from before 1912. Yet either way, it cannot be entirely divorced from the nation-state building of Nazi Germany’s regional clients, or victims. The Bulgarian willingness to round up the entirety of some 11,400 ‘Belomorie’ Jews just before the Salonika transports began to roll in March 1943 was not just compliance with Sofia’s own ethno-national homogenising goals. Local Greek complicity with the destruction of Salonika Jewry was the same: the sequestration or outright theft of its private and communal assets not simply a case of rampant venality but identical nationalising objectives.

What is equally striking is the way bigger postwar geopolitical contests continued to intermesh with and feed such lethal nationalising trajectories. Where the Germans and Italians retreated, the British and then Americans entered the fray, ostensibly to forestall a Soviet communist drive into the Aegean. That meant in Greece either disarming or liquidating the Greek Communist Party (KKE)-led national liberation movement, ELAS, which in 1944 effectively controlled most of the country outside of Athens. This task could only be accomplished by supporting, arming and directing ultranationalist forces many of whom had previously fought as fascist proxies. This emerging confrontation is recognised as representing the first shots in the superpower Cold War. The tragedy for Macedonia, however, is that it became a cover and pretext through which the ultra-nationalists could turn a merciless civil war into a wholesale, genocidal assault on what remained of the country’s non-Greek, primarily Slavophone communities.

During the war, Bulgarians had cynically mobilised many of these communities under their jurisdiction as armed proxies, just as the Italians had attempted to do with the Albanian-speaking Chams of Epirus. The fact that other Chams had sided with ELAS only compounded the grounds for the Greek rightist, Colonel Zervas, to carry (British-aided) fire and sword into the district aimed at forcing the entire 15,000–20,000 surviving Chams across the Albanian border. But the remaining Slavophone communities, mostly concentrated in eastern Macedonia where the Bulgarian writ had not run, numbered many hundreds of thousands. Here their logical alignment was to the KKE, as the only Greek political party which – albeit shifting its emphasis many times between equal rights and actual independence – had recognised their ‘national’ existence. Given that at World War II’s end the Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Soviet communist parties were all vying to create a ‘Slavic’ Balkan federation with Macedonia as one of its constituent parts, that was enough to brand all Slavophones, regardless of political allegiance, as ‘Slavo-communist’ enemies of Greece. Indeed, as the nationalist noose tightened around the residual KKE strongholds in this now Macedonian-centred struggle, it is telling the degree to which it regurgitated toxic historic alignments, elements of the longstanding Bulgarian-backed Internal Macedonian

Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), among the violence specialists on the ‘communist’ side, many formerly Anatolian Greek refugees, a significant element among the grass-roots, right-wing bands loosely coordinated by ‘government’ forces. The result was counterinsurgency, terror, starvation, forcible mass displacement and finally ethnic cleansing leading to a mass Slavophone excision from Aegean – Greek – Macedonia-Thrace.\textsuperscript{42} In this sense the government victory was not so much against communism but for a genocidally implemented national homogenisation. But what is significant is that it could not have been achieved ultimately without great power intervention. Just as the Bulgarian script for cultural homogenisation of the region piggybacked on the Nazis, so the alternative Greek one – as founded on a cartographically inspired vision of expansion to and ethnic consolidation of its Aegean frontiers – was dependent for its full realisation on the British and Americans.

This was not the complete end of the story. The previous signature of the great powers to the treaty of Lausanne meant that a return to the pre-1941 territorial status quo ante did not carry with it an imprimatur for a further cleansing of the Muslim (including Pomak) communities of western Thrace. They continued to survive in a sort of no man’s land between Greek acceptance and Turkish exit.\textsuperscript{43} Residual Slavophone communities, as with other minorities, the surviving Jews included, necessarily kept their heads down, the very concept of cultural difference more or less expunged from Greek consciousness.\textsuperscript{44} Only when another cross-border issue – the declaration of an independent Macedonia following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 – presented Athens with a neighbouring state whose very constitution harked back to the struggles for the autonomy of ‘the whole of the Macedonian people’ was there reason to believe that sacro egoismo was about to resurface in violent conflict.\textsuperscript{45} In fact, despite inflamed denunciations of ‘the other’ on both sides of the border, that conflict, dampened by international intermediaries, has never come to pass. Instead, with the 1949 culmination of the Greek civil war on the napalm-soaked slopes of Mount Gramos, Macedonia-Thrace, as a microcosm of the broader geography of the genocidal rimlands, arrived through the extirpation of its plurality at its dysfunctional, contemporary ‘normality’.

\textsuperscript{43} Featherstone, Last Ottomans, chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{44} Richard Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society (London: Hurst, 2002).
\textsuperscript{45} Danforth, Macedonian Conflict, p. 52.
Bibliographical Essay

Works such as Jeremy Black’s *Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) clearly show how cartography has helped shape modernity. But while Black’s study considers war, nationalism and geo-politics, the connection between geography and genocide is absent. There are some studies which make explicit links between aspects of the Holocaust and geography. Notable is Robert Jan van Pelt and Deborah Dwork’s *Auschwitz: 1270 to the Present* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), a highly innovative exploration of the location of the Nazi death camp par excellence at a historic European crossroads, replete with maps illustrating how changing borders over time were a factor in determining the fate of millions. Excellent maps are also assets in other Holocaust or Holocaust-related studies, including Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower’s *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) and Timothy Snyder’s *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (London: Bodley Head, 2010), but minus considerations of how the disciplinary development of geography per se informed an increasingly toxic Ratzelian geopolitics.

However, there has been keen interest in recent studies of the impact of imperial collapse on Europe’s borderlands and its people. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) exemplifies the contemporary scholarship in the field, including a growing awareness of how and where genocide became a key vector of postimperial nation-building. That this also included Soviet ‘nation-building’ is acutely developed in Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, *Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998), 813–61. Martin’s study is also exemplary in its situating of Soviet ethnic cleansing within a borderlands landscape which needs to be read as a whole, as well as disaggregated into discrete zones of violence.

While the broad, systemic picture of genocide in its relationships to historical time and geographical space is yet to be fully explored, there have been suggestive regional studies including of the Macedonia-Thrace arena. Henry R. Wilkinson, *Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951) was a notable forerunner in assessing how competing, mythic and increasingly belligerent nationalist claims on territory were dependent on the creation of allegedly accurate, supporting ethnographic maps. More recently the subject has been brilliantly reconsidered in İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1906* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), not least in demonstrating the connecting threads between cartography and censuses and an ensuing mass violence.

What Is a Concentration Camp?

Zygmunt Bauman has offered one of the more memorable assessments of concentration camps, with his pithy claim that just as the eighteenth century was the age of reason and the nineteenth the age of progress, so the twentieth century will be remembered as the ‘century of camps’. Following Hannah Arendt, he writes:

The camps were distillations of an essence diluted elsewhere, condensations of totalitarian domination and its corollary, the superfluity of man, in a pure form difficult or impossible to achieve elsewhere. The camps were patterns and blueprints for the totalitarian society, that modern dream of total order, domination, and mastery run wild, cleansed of the last vestiges of that wayward and unpredictable human freedom, spontaneity and unpredictability that held it back. The camps were testing grounds for societies run as concentration camps.’

There is a striking mismatch between this sort of philosophical attempt to account for the meaning of concentration camps and historical studies which examine the development, running, staffing and victims’ experience of camps as they appeared in particular settings. This chapter will consider the historiography of concentration camps, showing how histories of individual camp systems – and individual camps – mean we now have a detailed understanding of how camps arose, developed and, in many cases, closed, although the scholarship is much better developed in some cases than others. This body of literature now allows historians to ask whether concentration camps should be considered from a transnational perspective, the ‘global portability of the concentration camp’

as Klaus Mühlhahn puts it.² Did regimes learn from one another’s practices? Were ideas about incarceration passed on by particular ‘experts’ or by the press and concerned commentators? Were the specific practices engaged at concentration camps, such as the use of barbed wire, torture, ritual humiliation or forced labour, shared ideas or did they emerge spontaneously across the globe? The answers shed light on camps as one of the twentieth century’s most notable inventions. I will suggest that this history should make us wary of accepting some of the most influential philosophical accounts of the meaning of concentration camps, such as Bauman’s, insofar as these argue on the basis of an archetypal and ahistorical ‘camp’. Philosophers and sociologists have asked whether concentration camps are ‘laboratories of violence’ (Sofsky) or places for the ‘eradication of man’ (Arendt). They have claimed that the camps’ victims are reduced to ‘bare life’, that is, non-people whom the guards can kill with impunity, and that this biopolitical control combined with the normalising of the ‘state of exception’ reveals that camps are ‘the nomos of the modern’ (Agamben). Still, despite talking past one another, in many ways these apparently discrete worlds of scholarship share common ground and together they can help us understand why and how concentration camps emerged when they did, and why studying them, however unpleasant, remains crucial for understanding twentieth-century world history.

The question ‘what is a concentration camp?’ is not as easy to answer as it might at first appear. On the one hand, it may seem straightforward to say that a concentration camp is an enclosed site used to hold against their will and without due legal process a group of civilians deemed ‘unwanted’ by a regime. On the other hand, and thanks mainly to the association of concentration camps with the Third Reich, we tend to think of concentration camps as places where the law has been abandoned, ‘spaces of exception’ where the inmates are set against each other and where they are at the mercy of the guards’ whims. The imagery of barbed wire, guard towers, machine gun emplacements and ironic slogans over the entrance gates completes the picture. That is all well and good, until we consider some questions which complicate the story. What if we take seriously the notion that camps in South Africa were set up by the British primarily with the aim of preventing a rural population, whose land had been destroyed by the British Army’s scorched-earth policy, from supporting Boer guerrillas and not as ‘punishment’ camps? What if we consider the cases of people interned against their

will because of racial and political paranoia, such as citizens of many European countries during World War I, Japanese Americans or German-Jewish ‘enemy aliens’ during World War II, Jewish Displaced Persons at the end of World War II, either in Germany and Austria or, even more problematically, in the camps set up by the British in Cyprus where Jews who had made the ‘illegal’ crossing to Palestine were held until the establishment of Israel? What happens to our understanding of camps when we discover that in the Soviet Gulag there were prisoners who were granted the right to live ‘outside the zone’ (so-called zazonniki) who could move about unguarded? How should we deal with ‘liberal’ countries’ use of camps – in which brutal torture and mistreatment were rife – in the context of decolonisation in Malaya, Kenya or Algeria? None of the people in these camps want to be there, but can we say that they are in each case a ‘surplus’ population abandoned to their fate, deprived of the law? The case of Guantánamo Bay is especially disconcerting here. Few would dispute that it is a shocking abuse of power and that it is wrong to hold people for years solely on the basis of suspicion, but is it, as some commentators hold, a concentration camp? Are favelas, slums, sweatshops or enclosed territories such as the Gaza Strip huge open-air concentration camps? There are those who believe so.\(^3\) If all of these sites are concentration camps then we rapidly come to the conclusion that there is no archetypal camp, that a camp need not look like Dachau in order to qualify as a concentration camp, and that the concept of the concentration camp needs to be historicised, for what it designates changes over time.

**Histories**

Concentration camps did not appear out of nowhere. There is a long history of incarceration that includes workshops, POW camps, asylums, quarantine islands, slavery plantations and prisons. The idea of isolating unwanted population groups precedes the modern age. The most important precedent is to be found in the European overseas colonies, ‘spaces of exception from European law’, places in which, as Hannah Arendt argued, anything was possible.\(^4\) The consistent forced relocation of American Indians, the forcing off the land of Aborigines in Australia, the wiping out of whole populations such as San Bushmen or Caribs, all were justified on the grounds that the ‘natives’ were not able to follow the laws of civilised

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4 Mühlhahn, ‘Concentration Camp’, 547.
warfare. Specific cases such as Flinders Island off the coast of Tasmania or Shark Island off the Namibian coast are very close approximations of concentration camps, except that they were ‘ready-made’ rather than constructed. Indeed, the first wave of camps to be known as ‘concentration camps’ were located in the European colonies: Cuba, South Africa, the Philippines, German South West Africa. In the first three of these places, concentration camps were established primarily as a military solution to guerrilla warfare. By removing the displaced rural population, guerrilla fighters would lose their source of food, shelter and morale, and the civilian authorities could engage in social engineering. German South West Africa is somewhat different; here the camps were established after the war, more as a means of pacifying and humiliating a defeated enemy and forcing them into slave labour than a counter-guerrilla strategy. Revealingly, though, given that the term Konzentrationslager had been used in German, up to that point, to refer to the British camps in South Africa, it is clear that the British experience in their guerrilla war was regarded as some kind of guide by the Germans.5

Klaus Mühlhahn writes that the global history of concentration camps shows that they ‘first emerged in the non-Western world within the historical context of colonial rule – which reinforced the assumptions of white superiority, justified the use of violence against colonized populations, and proliferated ideas of ethnic and/or political cleansing’. That is probably not contentious. His following statement is more interesting, however: ‘Global connections and transfers moved the military and policing doctrines from the European colonial domains to the European continent itself where the implementation of those practices facilitated the shift to total war and also helped shape a new brutality displayed by European armies toward non-combatants during and after World War I.’6 This claim makes assumptions about the transnational nature of concentration camps that need to be tested. Perhaps, following anthropological models, we might in fact discover that similar ideas arose less through ‘diffusion’ – the transnational sharing of ideas – than through ‘evolutionism’ or ‘parallel development’. In other words, the repertoire of violence represented by concentration camps was

6 Mühlhahn, ‘Concentration Camp’, 555.
an expression of structural similarities and family resemblances in modern
global history that emerged largely spontaneously in different locations.

The most compelling reason for the redeployment in Europe of these
colonial practices was the First World War. During this conflict, not only
were POWs taken in numbers previously unseen but so were civilians
interned – and subjected to all manner of suffering – in enormous numbers.
Some 8–9 million POWs were held during the war, 2.2 million in Russia
alone. Nor was this only a European problem, with German POWs being
held in Japan, albeit in small numbers. POW camps cannot by definition be
considered concentration camps, but the sheer scale of them during the First
World War, not to mention the high death rates in them, tells us something
about the modern state’s ability and willingness to intern huge numbers of
people. In the era of total war, this willingness to intern then impacted most
forcefully on civilians. As historian of the POW camps Heather Jones notes,
in the First World War the ‘prisoner of war camp began the conflict as
a means of ensuring that the captured enemy combatant was kept away from
rejoining the battlefield fight; in other words, with a purely military function;
it ended the war as a sophisticated system of state control and as a laboratory
for new ways of managing mass confinement, forced labour and new forms
of state–military collaboration.’

Even more significant for later developments was the internment of
civilians during World War I, and not only in Europe. In 1915, in a move
that had enormous ramifications for the rest of the twentieth century and
beyond, France revoked the status of naturalised citizens from people of
‘enemy origin’. Belgium, Italy, Austria and Germany soon followed suit, with
the result that one could be stripped of one’s nationality and reduced to
statelessness and thus deprived of the benefit of law – this being long before
the UN Refugee Convention, of course. British civilians in Germany, for
example, were held in the Engländlerlager Ruhleben near Berlin. In total, by
the end of the war, some 111,879 ‘enemy civilians’ were in German intern-
ment. At the same point, October 1918, 24,255 German, Austrian and
Hungarian civilians were still interned in Britain. The Austro-Hungarians
used French and Belgian citizens for forced labour, and deported Italian
citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for being ‘out of place’: they were
either interned or deported to Italy. From 20 May 1915 they were held in what

7 Heather Jones, ‘Discipline and Punish? Forms of Violent Punishment in Prisoner of War
Camps in the First World War: A Comparative Analysis’, in Christoph Jahr and
Jens Thiel (eds.), Lager vor Auschwitz: Gewalt und Integration im 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin:
Metropol, 2013), pp. 91–116, at 100.
were called ‘concentration camps’, one of which, at Steinklamm, the Italians referred to as the ‘Campo della morte’ (camp of death). The internees were treated very harshly, were forced to work for little pay, and received inadequate food supplies. The Italian royal commission of investigation noted, in fact, that the ‘really tragic characteristic of these concentration camps was the hunger’ and, in the face of large numbers of deaths, especially of children, claimed that the Austrians intended to ‘destroy or reduce to a small number the Italian race on its territories’. The Austrians also rounded up some 7,000 so-called ‘Russophiles’ in eastern Galicia and Bukovina and deported them to the Thalerhof camp near Graz, where nearly 1,500 died. In the colonies, German priests and civilians in Togo and Cameroon were rounded up and interned first in Dahomey and later in Algeria and Morocco, and in British East Africa German civilians were deported to camps in India.

The war also witnessed refugee movements on a huge scale. The Russian Revolution of 1917 created about 1.5 million refugees, and even before that, as a result of the war, in Russia’s larger cities refugees made up more than 10 per cent of the population by mid 1916; in Kharkov it was 25 per cent and in Samara 30 per cent. There were philanthropic efforts to help them, but these were insufficient to counter the power of a nationalist language of ‘floods’, ‘swarms’, ‘deluges’ and other biblical disasters, which quickly became associated with refugees across Europe. The Times, for example, described Belgian refugees in Britain as ‘a peaceful invasion’, whilst Russian commentators used even more colourful terms such as ‘lava’ or ‘avalanche’. These population movements saw emergency accommodation being created in schools, factories, barracks, monasteries and so on, and the creation of refugee camps for the first time on European soil. The refugees were not always grateful, however. Belgians in Britain, for example, were constrained by the Aliens Restriction Act (4 August 1914), confining them to specific parts of the country; they complained that this amounted to being held in a ‘concentration camp’. Whether undertaken out of fear of ‘fifth columnists’, as reprisal actions or in order to obtain forced labourers, the scale of

civilians internment during the war was far greater than anything that had been witnessed before.

Perhaps more important than the sheer numbers of civilians held in camps is the reason for their being so held. This is the point at which the emerging nation states as well as more established ones, became gripped by fears of ‘fifth columnists’, by paranoid fantasies of enemies within, and by a fascination with racial and national homogeneity which rendered civilians with foreign descent suspect in the eyes of patriots and nationalists. The logical extension of this fear was the declaration of a state of emergency, a state which France, for example, remained in from 1914 until 1919. Civilian camps were thus the expression of the break with the liberal rule of law and rule by decree under a state of emergency in which those rendered suspect by irrational political fears were placed in a position of enemy number one, with the result that when rendered stateless or denied citizenship rights they suddenly became very vulnerable indeed. Mühlhahn claims that: ‘The temporary internment of displaced and dislocated groups and POWs in the wake of the war together with the politization of citizenship and nationality and the temporary suspension of regular legal procedures provided the conditio sine qua non that facilitated the emergence of concentration camps on the European continent.’ In other words, in the global history of concentration camps, the POW and civilian camps of the First World War provide closer connections to the later Nazi and Soviet camps than do the colonial concentration camps of southern Africa.

Nowhere is this claim clearer than in the context of the Armenian genocide, during which Anatolian Armenians were deported to the deserts of Syria, with many eye-witnesses describing their destination as concentration camps or even, as in the case of Katma (Ghatma), death camps. Take, for example, Naomie Ouzounian’s description, written in 1982:

The ‘camp’ where hundreds of thousands had already been thrown together was a narrow strip of the desert, surrounded by bare hills. The hot, humid air was filled with the stench of human refuse and decaying unburied bodies. I couldn’t breathe, oh, if only I could take a deep breath! The name of this hell was Ghatma. ‘Dear Lord, I hope there is no Ghatma in the hereafter, and if there is one, forgive my sins and do not condemn me to it’, I prayed.

12 Mühlhahn, ‘Concentration Camp’, 549.
Historians of the Armenian genocide agree with this terminology. Hilmar Kaiser goes on to talk of the ‘world of the death camps’ as the genocide became more coordinated and ferocious in 1916.\textsuperscript{14} Other historians concur, Ronald Suny claiming that the ‘concentration camps’ at Tel-Abiad, Ras al Ayn, Mamureh, Katma and Aleppo ‘were way stations toward extermination. They were death camps.’ Taner Akçam too says of the ‘concentration camps’ of Aleppo that ‘the appalling sanitary and humanitarian conditions turned these into death camps’.\textsuperscript{15} These were camps designed not to isolate civilians but to get rid of them altogether.

What is different about twentieth-century camps from colonial and European sites of incarceration that preceded them is thus the context. First of all, we are talking about civilians, people who have not formally been convicted of any crime. As Arendt noted, ‘Criminals do not properly belong in the concentration camps, if only because it is harder to kill the juridical person in a man who is guilty of some crime than in a totally innocent person.’\textsuperscript{16} They are held against their will because of who they are or what the authorities suspect them of believing or what they might do. That ‘liberal’ regimes have incarcerated – and continue to incarcerate – people on this basis is an important reminder that concentration camps are not solely the tool of ‘mad’ dictators and evil regimes, though we should be clear that the most complete instantiation of camps as ‘laboratories of human behaviour’ occurred in the fascist and communist regimes of the twentieth century. Second, it is less the physical appearance of camps that is significant than what they represent, that is to say, the power and the nature of the twentieth-century state, although it is true that with the exception of the Soviet ‘special settlements’ – from which there was little chance of escape across hundreds of miles of tundra – they tend to assume a similar pattern, based on conventional prisons, though less accessible to outsiders. Third, the large-scale incarceration of civilians not because they were diseased physically but because they were presumed to be ‘diseased’ mentally or racially conforms to what we know of the development of modern states.

Concentration camps appeared in the age of the modern nation state when the drive to establish homogeneous populations – ethnically, nationally or

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 66.
‘racially’ – was common and when the inability to achieve that goal was put down to the existence of ‘alien’ population groups. As multinational empires gave way in Europe to homogenising nation states or as new empires such as the Soviet Union attempted to mould society in a new image, the threat of ‘enemies’ and ‘wreckers’ was in-built as something that had to be combated. Concentration camps were novel forms of incarceration because they were the expression of the modern state when it felt itself to be under threat.

This analysis is most easily confirmed when one turns to the literature on the Nazi and Soviet camps, which we will examine briefly. Here the continuities with the earlier manifestations of concentration camps are clear – but perhaps not as clear as the breaks. Hannah Arendt remarked that the colonial camps provided only ‘apparent historical precedents’, although the fact that they provide precedents at all, even in Arendt’s formulation, should not be dismissed. There is a huge literature on the Nazi camps, exemplified now by Nikolaus Wachsmann’s KL (2015), which follows Saul Friedländer’s paradigm of an ‘integrated history’. This combines top-down institutional history with a deep regard for the ways in which the camps’ inmates lived through the experience, and shows how the camp system changed over time, from the ‘wild camps’ of 1933 to the early camps designed to rid Nazi Germany of political enemies and ‘asocials’, and through to the massive expansion of the camps after 1938, peaking at the end of the war with the huge growth in slave labour sub-camps attached to the numerous main camps, and showing how the SS’s camps system became embroiled in the history of the Holocaust, the murder of Europe’s Jews. There are histories of all the main camps and a growing historiography on the sub-camps, dealing with issues such as gender, survival rates, SS economic policy, human experiments, the camps as ‘schools’ for Nazi ideology, and many other topics.

Yet the Third Reich was a world of camps in another respect too. Just as the regime’s de facto ‘enemies’ were eliminated through the use of concentration camps, so the Volksgemeinschaft, or ‘people’s community’, was to be brought into existence and trained in martial values through the use of a variety of labour camps for different constituencies: Hitler Youth, BDM and teachers, for example. Indeed, according to a law of November 1934, the term Arbeitslager (labour camp) was reserved for organisations which catered for Volksgenossen (racial comrades) and which were devoted to the honour of the German Volk. Camps therefore became a necessary fixture of German life, whether for those excluded from the racial community or for those who were to be drilled into it. The Labour Service camps in particular became must-see sites for foreign dignitaries and tourists alike and were regarded by
Nazi commentators as ‘the best means of making this National Socialist call for a Volksgemeinschaft a reality’, as Reich labour leader Konstantin Hierl put it.\footnote{Kiran Klaus Patel, 
\textit{Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933–1945} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1.} The Janus-faced nature of the Nazi camps meant that few alterations were required to make a concentration camp for the eradication of enemies into a site for the education of the racially valuable members of the Volk – and vice-versa.\footnote{Kiran Klaus Patel, ‘Volksgenossen und Gemeinschaftsfremde: Über den Doppelcharakter der nationalsozialistischen Lager’, in Jahr and Thiel (eds.), \textit{Lager vor Auschwitz}, pp. 311–34, at 327–8.} Inclusion and exclusion went hand in hand; the former required the latter.

With respect to the Gulag, the rather under-developed and partisan historiography of the Cold War has given way to a far more sophisticated and nuanced set of works, which see the camps less as the realisation of Stalin’s dream of totalitarian control and more as a changing set of institutions. In particular, the many different faces of the Gulag – which was by no means a monolithic institution – have been revealed. With lines of continuity from Tsarist and early post-revolutionary carceral practices, the Gulag has been traced by historians from its early days on the Solovetski Islands to the proliferation of prison camps, labour camps and ‘special settlements’ across the Soviet Union. Historians have shown how there was no single experience of the Gulag. From the brutal camps of the Far East and Arctic north to the camps of Kazakhstan, the Gulag encompassed a wide variety of institutions: prisons, punishment colonies, corrective labour camps, agricultural colonies, ‘special settlements’ and, after the Stalinist period, psychiatric clinics.

The brutal nature of the Gulag’s infamous sites of Magadan and Vorkuta is not in doubt. Recent historiography, though, shows that these places changed over time. Perhaps the most notorious of the ‘camps’ was Magadan in the Soviet Far East, ‘the capital of the Gulag’. The city of Magadan was the administrative centre of a region of nearly 3 million square kilometres which reached from the Lena River to the Bering Strait, an area larger than western Europe. Magadan’s camps existed because of the area’s gold reserves. Dal’stroi, Magadan’s penal branch, was the largest entity in the labour camp system. Its name, an acronym for the Far Northern Construction Trust, was ‘a calculated euphemism for a ruthless organisation whose wide array of functions made it the omnipotent overlord in the Soviet north-east’.\footnote{David J. Nordlander, ‘Origins of a Gulag Capital: Magadan and Stalinist Control in the Early 1930s’, \textit{Slavic Review} 57.4 (1998), 791–812, at 793.} The growth in prisoner
numbers in Magadan mirrored the spectacular growth of the Gulag as a whole: from 9,928 in 1932 to 190,503 in September 1940.

A similar process occurred elsewhere. Vorkuta, in the Arctic north-east of Russia, became the site of one the largest camp complexes, holding about 75,000 prisoners in 1950. Coal mining began in Vorkuta in 1931 when a group of thirty-nine prisoners was sent to the uninhabited region for that purpose; it soon grew into a massive camp complex, particularly in 1937–8 as victims of the Great Terror arrived in large numbers and thus as ‘political enemies’ replaced ‘colonists’. Although prisoners were sent there to be ‘reformed’, their deaths in appalling conditions meant that the reality was far grimmer than the authorities had anticipated. Ukhtpechlag camp was, according to the inspectors’ own reports, ‘exceptionally appalling’. By the end of 1937, Ukhtpechlag held nearly 60,000 prisoners in an area of over 700,000 square kilometres. It was split into four separate camps in May 1938. But the term ‘camp’ should not conjure up an image of a small, enclosed institution. One of the four camps, Vorkutlag, occupied a vast space in which the small population was not properly divided (‘zonified’) between prisoners and non-prisoners and in which the civilian administration was more or less indistinguishable from the camp administration. Even during the war, when control over the prisoners was tightened, not all sections of Vorkutlag had been enclosed behind barbed wire.

Far more than the Nazi case – despite the efforts of the WVHA, the SS’s economic wing – the Soviet camps were tied to the country’s economy, proving vital for mining and other basic industries. And historians have shown that inmates were handled with a great degree of variance, ranging from those imprisoned behind barbed wire to the so-called zazonniki (‘un-zoned’), who were able to live and work within a certain territory but were not shackled or permanently guarded. According to one historian, ‘in some parts of the Gulag, such as Vorkuta, it was quite common for prisoners to live outside of the [camp] zone, and the borders between camp and city frequently shifted’. Although recent popular histories of the Gulag tend to follow the Cold War script, describing it as an ‘archipelago’ of isolated sites of atrocity, this is to overlook the findings of post-Cold War scholarly research. Certainly there were very isolated camps and being sentenced to a ‘corrective

21 Ibid., p. 35.
labour camp’ was tantamount to a death sentence. But elsewhere, especially in the ‘special settlements’ – which were half way between freedom and the concentration camp – the situation was different. Most important, historians now agree that the Gulag provides a microcosmic mirror on Soviet society as a whole, with the camp system’s waxing and waning following the pattern of development of the Soviet system in general.

The totalitarian regimes’ use of concentration camps marked their high water mark, although this does not necessarily justify Arendt’s assertion that ‘these camps are the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power’, since camps have occurred in numerous settings across the world. In the cases of Francoist Spain, fascist Italy, communist China, Cambodia or North Korea, or in the right-wing dictatorships of Argentina and Chile, the spread of camps combined the diffusion of camp ‘technologies’ with specific local conditions and national traditions. Even the Nazi and Soviet camps were not particularly bound to one another. Contrary to Ernst Nolte’s claim that Hitler’s camps were inspired by a Soviet model, the Germans had already looked to the British for the terminology and to South West Africa for the practice, and had also officially named as Konzentrationslager two former POW camps reopened in 1921 to hold ‘unwanted foreigners’, that is Ostjuden. Russian military officials, too, first used the term konzentrationnyi lager during the Anglo-Boer War and the Bolsheviks quickly revived the term after the 1917 revolution. Perhaps it is in Nationalist China that the evidence for transnational learning is strongest: the Guomindang was advised not only by American officers but by General Alexander von Falkenhausen, a friend of Lothar von Trotha, the man responsible for the concentration camps in German South West Africa.

In Europe, camps became the standard fare of authoritarian regimes. More than half a million Spaniards and other Europeans passed through the more than 180 camps which made up the Francoist concentration camp system. The largest, Miranda de Ebro, opened in November 1936 and remained in existence until 1947. As of June 1937, they were administered by the Prisoner Concentration Camps Inspectorate (Inspección de Campos de Concentración), a name which ‘is eerily reminiscent of Eicke’s Nazi Inspectorate of 1934’. Himmler inspected

Franco’s camps and prisons in 1940; in the same year Spanish officials visited Sachsenhausen. In Italy a ‘fascist archipelago’ comprised islands such as Ventotene and San Nicola and held political prisoners. Later, some fifty-two ‘fascist concentration camps’, holding about 10,000 civilians, were set up all over Italy between 1940 and 1943, ‘directly influenced by Mussolini’s race laws that he introduced in 1938’ – that is, primarily for Jews and Gypsies, but also for foreign citizens.

There are even indications of an attempt to create in 1932 an ‘extermination camp’ for Italian political prisoners in the Libyan Sahara, in Gasr Bu Hadi, 478 kilometres south-east of Tripoli. Financial constraints meant it was not built but the idea shows the logic of fascism’s radical exclusion taken to its extreme.

In fascist states, concentration camps were central to the functioning of the regime as such. The use of concentration camps in the context of colonial wars and decolonisation, such as in Kenya, Malaya or Algeria, recapitulated the logic of earlier colonial wars, in separating guerrillas and civilian supporters, and sanctioning exceptional measures that would have been considered unacceptable at home. Several authors refer to the ‘Gulag’ in the context of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. More people were detained in Kenya than anywhere else in the British Empire, with a maximum of 71,346 detained in December 1954, the vast majority of them (98 per cent) from Kenya’s Kikuyu-speaking central highlands. David Anderson calculates that ‘at least one in four Kikuyu adult males were imprisoned or detained by the British colonial administration at some time between 1952 and 1958’. Kenya already had a higher number of prisoners than neighbouring British colonies of Uganda and Tanganyika, but when the ‘Emergency’ began in 1952 numbers increased rapidly. As part of Operation Anvil in 1954, further camps were built, and the use of forced labour – contrary to international law – was sanctioned by Oliver Lyttleton, secretary of state for the colonies in Churchill’s Tory government. Operation Anvil itself was ‘Gestapolike’, as loudspeakers were set up in Nairobi and a 25,000-strong security force cordoned off the city to

search it sector by sector in order to ‘purge’ it, a technique that the British had previously deployed in Tel Aviv.30 One historian writes that the Kenyan camps ‘were not wholly different from those in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia’ and suggests, more provocatively, that in these camps ‘Britain finally revealed the true nature of its civilizing mission.’ The slogan placed at the entrance to Aguthi Camp: ‘He Who Helps Himself Will Also Be Helped.’31 Clearly, a transnational model has some purchase here, although we lack explanations which prove that the process was a conscious one and which connect the Kenyan camps to the earlier South African ones. Doing so would mean taking into account the British role in liberating the Nazi camps and how that affected British colonial and military self-perception in the context of decolonisation.

Recent revelations of the torture and brutal rule that characterised the British camps in Kenya has shocked the public. But the scale of the camp system was dwarfed by that established by the French in the context of the Algerian War (1954–62). Algeria was considered a part of metropolitan France, not a colony, and the fight to retain it united almost all shades of French political opinion. During the years of the war, some 2.3 million people were driven out of their villages and ‘resettled’ in some 2,000 ‘camps de regroupement’ – in other words, a third of the rural population. The inmates depended on the army for their basic necessities, the hygiene conditions were appalling, and one historian notes that they were no more than ‘fenced-in tent camps’.32 After 1958, with de Gaulle’s return to power, plans to improve conditions and turn the camps into ‘new villages’ were announced, but by 1962 only very few had been built. Unsurprisingly, the camps which were supposed to stem support for guerrillas – in Kenya and Algeria, and many other examples from Rhodesia to Vietnam – had the opposite effect. And where resettlement succeeded, as in ‘villagisation’ in Malaya, ‘it usually did so not because of any economic benefits it generated for a majority, but through sheer force’.33

By contrast with the lack of interest in British colonial camps, the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War has generated a sizable historiography. Indeed, this case is in many ways the most disturbing since, like

31 Ibid., pp. 153, 188 (Aguthi).
the internment of ‘His Majesty’s Most Loyal Enemy Aliens’ – German and Austrian Jews in wartime Britain – here we are dealing with a state interning its own citizens or residents. Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans came under suspicion. In the anti-Japanese clamour, this statement from leading anti-Japanese campaigner Lieutenant-Colonel John L. De Witt was typical: ‘I have little confidence that the enemy aliens are law-abiding or loyal in any sense of the word. Some of them yes; many, no, particularly the Japanese. I have no confidence in their loyalty whatsoever. I am speaking now of the native born Japanese – 117,000 – and 42,000 in California alone.’

Ultimately it was President Roosevelt’s decision to intern the Japanese, one he took on the basis of his own personal antipathy and because anti-Japanese feeling was generally strong. Daniels puts it down to ‘the general racist character of American society’. Indeed, the decision to intern the Japanese Americans was made before Pearl Harbor.

The presence of a post office, laundry buildings, a library and schools, and the fact that internees could receive guests, clearly indicate that camps like Tanforan, Minidoka or Manzanar were not Dachau. Nevertheless, some historians are in no doubt as to what to call them:

The most accurate overall descriptive term is concentration camp – that is, a barbed-wire enclosure where people are interned or incarcerated under armed guard. Some readers might object to the use of this term, believing that it more properly applies to the Nazi camps of World War II. Those European camps were more than just places of confinement, however; many were established to provide slave labor for the Nazi regime or to conduct mass executions. I contend that such camps are more properly called Nazi slave camps or Nazi death camps.

Whatever we call them, the experience of internment was not pleasant and the decision to intern Japanese Americans was hardly a credit to a democratic state. All that really happened was that ‘The myth of military necessity was used as a fig leaf for a particular variant of American racism.’ Indeed, the practice set a precedent for postwar America: at the height of the Cold War the Emergency Detention Act (1950) gave the president the right to set up

35 Ibid., p. 72.
camps for ‘The detention of persons who there is reasonable grounds to believe will commit or conspire to commit espionage or sabotage’ (Sec.101 [14]). Daniels observed in 1971 that ‘Any foreseeable use of these concentration camps will be for ideological rather than racial enemies of the republic.’ Although the act was partially repealed by the 1971 Non-Detention Act, Daniels here presciently foresaw Guantánamo Bay.

The liberal countries’ use of camps is dwarfed by the Chinese camp system, however. Internment in the UK or USA represented ‘an authoritarian trend . . . in our home life’, as the author of a contemporary study of the policy wrote, suggesting that the spread of illiberal ideas concerning foreigners, citizenship and national belonging was very hard for the democracies to resist when the fascist countries seemed to be in the ascendant. But in the communist countries, concentration camps were tools of the wholesale reshaping of society and were inseparable from the regimes’ economic plans. China’s massive laogai system remains understudied. Enough is known, however, for us to agree with the authors of one study that ‘China endured more than its share of concentration camps during the twentieth century. Moreover’, they go on, ‘China is the only major world power to have entered the twenty-first century with a thriving concentration camp system, which has been commonly known as “the laogai system” [laodong gaizao zhidu] since May 1951.’ Of course, in China one cannot refer to ‘concentration camps’, only to ‘remoulding through labour facilities’ or ‘re-education through labour facilities’. The term is freely used by emigrants who have published their memoirs abroad, as one might expect; but scholars have also found the term applicable. ‘While considerable variability among the camps is naturally present in a country as large and diverse as China’, two scholars write, ‘the living and working conditions in their camps have often evoked the harshness associated with concentration camps, particularly during spikes in the death rate such as the record-breaking famine of 1959–62.’

Like in the Soviet Union, the laogai system has also been characterised by the forced settlement of those formally ‘freed’ from the camps. When Harry Wu returned to China in 1991 to make a film about the camps for CBS, he met a former prisoner named Zhou. Having served eight years from 1956 to 1964 for ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’, Zhou then remained in Xining, the capital

38 Daniels, Concentration Camps USA, pp. 142–3.
39 François Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1940), p. 27.
of Qinghai province, for a further twenty-seven years. He told Wu that one third of the province’s population were resettlement prisoners and their families. ‘Their labour’, writes Wu, ‘had been used, he told me, to reclaim wasteland, construct roads, open up mines, and build dams, not just prior to 1979 but throughout the 1980s’. In other words, far more so than in the Soviet Union, the labour of laogai prisoners was economically beneficial to the CCP; the goods manufactured by the prisoners ‘are sold in domestic as well as foreign markets and have become an indispensable component of the national economy’. This is hardly surprising when one considers the numbers involved. In 1992, Harry Wu estimated that at least 50 million people had been sentenced to labour reform camps over the previous forty years and that 16–20 million were still confined in them. Thought reform through labour turned out to be a convenient way of acquiring ‘a dependable source of wealth’, as Luo Ruiqing, the public security minister, put it at the Communist General Assembly of 1954. Unlike in North Korea, the laogai system was formally abolished in 2013 but the structure of the system remains: prison factories, psychiatric prisons, community correction centres and other forms of extrajudicial incarceration still exist, according to campaigners. As all of the above examples show (and there are many others that could have been examined), concentration camps not only have a global history; they are one of the best indicators and symptoms of the nature of the world ‘system’, if we can use that term.

Conclusion

In 1949, American critic Isaac Rosenfeld published an article in Partisan Review, entitled ‘The Meaning of Terror’. In this cry of despair, Rosenfeld set out his opinion that the world had been forever sullied:

Terror is today the main reality, because it is the model reality. The concentration camp is the model educational system and the model form of government. War is the model enterprise and the model form of communality. These are abstract propositions, but even so they are obvious; when we fill them in with experience they are overwhelming.

43 Ibid., p. 15.
44 Ibid., p. 34.
What does it mean to say that the concentration camp is the ‘model form of government’? Surely this is no more than a case of postwar shock? And yet the recurrence of concentration camps, with states’ ready recourse to them in all parts of the world in different political, geographical and cultural settings, suggests that Rosenfeld may have been on to something.

What Rosenfeld captured was the way in which the concentration camp became an expression of modern states, especially fascist states, at a certain historical moment. The German philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote that: ‘This reality of concentration camps, this circular movement of torturers and tortures, this loss of humanity threatens human survival in the future. Confronted with the reality of the concentration camps, we are unable to speak. This is a greater danger than the atom bomb, since it represents a threat to the human soul.’\(^\text{46}\) That may be true but it is also ahistorical. Concentration camps emerged in the early twentieth century as modern states emerged out of older empires, sustained by ideas of nationalism and biological metaphors defining the healthy and valuable on the one hand and the polluting and degenerate on the other.

It is in fact possible to historicise the emergence of the concentration camp and to explain why, for all the continuities with social and colonial practices of preceding centuries, the term and the phenomenon arose when they did. The concept of the concentration camp, Javier Rodrigo reminds us, ‘refers not so much to a place with a set of uniform features over space and time as to the status that has been conferred on such a place’. As he notes, concentration camps emerged in many places around the same time, but with distinct local variations, meaning that there is a ‘cumulative history’ of concentration camps, ‘with lessons learned, discontinuities and adaptations to the contexts in which they developed’. Rodrigo provides a clear statement of the historical context in which concentration camps emerged in the wake of colonial wars and the First World War:

The concentration camps symbolized the transformation and radicalization of the politics of occupation, which extended from the treatment of political prisoners and prisoners of war to the deportation of civilians, from forced labour in extreme conditions to the hunger and misery occupied peoples were also subjected to. Concentration camps also came to serve as a space for social cleansing and internal politics.\(^\text{47}\)


Concentration camps were ways of keeping the unwanted elements at bay and, furthermore, putting them to use: not only through their labour (which was rarely very productive) but as a warning to wider society too. ‘The camp’, Richard Overy writes, ‘reflected political and social insecurities, and a public discourse of fear, part real, part sustained by regimes built on warring ideologies.’ The concentration camp was an expression of the centralisation of terror, one of the key characteristics of the modern state in the age of nationalism and technology.

For many historians today, the extraordinary vileness of the Nazi camps means that it is invalid to use the term ‘concentration camps’ to encompass both the Nazi sites and those established by regimes in other times and places. Yet many of the first people to see the Nazi camps in 1945 made the connection explicitly, as a way of warning the world of the risk of seeing the Third Reich as a sui generis case. Percy Knauth, for example, one of the first American journalists to see Buchenwald after liberation, not only admonished his fellow Americans for failing to do anything about the Nazi camps whilst they were in existence, but went further and urged his readers to think through what the Nazi camps meant for humanity:

And even in this year of peace and victory, we have let the concentration camp live on. We have let it live in Argentina, right in our own hemisphere. We have let it live in Egypt, where Greek soldiers who a year and a half ago revolted against a government-in-exile which had oppressed them while it held the power were clapped in prison by our British allies. We are letting it live in country after country – in Greece and in Palestine, in India and in Spain, among nations liberated and unliberated from the oppressions against which, after four long years, we were finally forced to fight. We wrote ‘Four Freedoms’ on our banners – freedoms for which men were dying in places we had never heard of; but now the freedoms and the places and the Buchenwalds have all receded into the unpleasant past . . . Our measure of responsibility for Buchenwald is not so great or immediate as is Germany’s, but it is equal with Germany’s responsibility for concentration camps as a creation of mankind. If we deny that responsibility today, as Germany did when Hitler came to power, we may find Buchenwald in our own land tomorrow.

This kind of universalising moralising is not to everyone’s taste. Some may find Knauth’s argument that all people are to some extent responsible for things done by a certain regime unpalatable, regarding it as playing down the

specific responsibility of those who created and ran the camps. Yet there are different ways we can read Knauth. He could be warning us not to regard the Nazi camps as the only manifestation of concentration camps in history. He may be reminding us that even if they are not as destructive or as synonymous with a ruling ideology as the Nazi camps, concentration camps can still exist elsewhere. And he might be telling us that bracketing off the Nazi experience – even if done for valid and justifiable reasons – might have the opposite effect to the one intended and might allow evil to flourish. Indeed, it is quite clear that the camps discussed in this chapter are all quite different. I have stressed the camps of World War I not because they were physically more like the Nazi camps than were others but because they help us to understand the ways in which camps became indispensable tools of the twentieth-century state. That it is nevertheless possible to speak of them using the same designation – concentration camps – does not mean that they are the same either empirically or morally. The question is how we historicise the camps.

Bibliographical Essay


Concentration Camps


In 1848, commenting on the quashing of the Viennese popular uprising against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Karl Marx predicted the only way the ‘bloody birth throes of the new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, [would be through] revolutionary terror’. Marx’s pessimistic words evoking the ‘Terror of 1793–4, with its mass executions across France, took on new meaning in twentieth-century China. After a long civil war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalist army and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in autumn 1949. During the early years of the PRC, the CCP employed total terror in Marx’s sense: first, as a means to bring about revolutionary change; then to create a new social reality; finally to guard the ‘fruits of revolution’ against reactionary forces. In this process, the use of violence was justified over and over again and became common coin of social experience in the early PRC. For Mao Zedong and many top CCP leaders, ‘power grows out of the barrel of gun’ and the revolution had to be maintained with those weapons. The use of violence was seen as necessary.

After the CCP seized power in 1949, remnants of the Nationalist army as well as hostile local forces staged fierce resistance across the country. For the new and fragile CCP regime, repression and terror were essential instruments to guard their newly gained power while at the same time, to destroy the ‘old’ and to make a ‘new’ society free of the ‘evil remnants’ of the past. Together with the counter-revolutionary as well as the ‘bad’ elements, landlords and rich peasants were classified as enemies of the people. They were to be eliminated at any cost. ‘Be ruthless and be tough’; ‘To strive one must kill’; for Mao there was no middle ground. Common people were encouraged to take up violence against their fellow countrymen.

Between 1950 and 1953, the CCP launched the Land Reform in the Chinese countryside and the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries throughout China. The top leadership urged local cadres to ‘not fear executing people’ and to punish those who were too lenient and practised peaceful Land Reform. Killing quotas were handed down. In 1951, at a February CCP Central Committee meeting, it was agreed that one out of every thousand should be killed. A month later, when speaking about the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries campaign in big cities, Mao used the metaphor of ‘blast rain’: ‘killing counter-revolutionaries should be fast and thorough like blast rain. We must kill a huge numbers of them’, he said. Within one year, millions of people were charged as counter-revolutionaries. They were either executed, imprisoned or controlled. According to official estimates, 712,000 ‘counter-revolutionaries’ were executed, 1,290,000 were imprisoned and 1,200,000 were subject to control at various times. But both Yang Kuaisong and Frank Dikötter argue that the actual number of executions was much larger than the reported 712,000. Recent archival research also shows that in far southwestern regions such as Guizhou and Sichuan where the population consisted of a mixture of social and ethnic groups, who were treated as subalterns or officially classified as minorities, the number killed far exceeded the quota handed down by the CCP Central Committee. In the heat of the killing, countless ordinary civilians were stirred up to violence. Revolutionary upheaval led to turmoil and lawlessness. Some used suppression of counter-revolutionaries as a way to settle personal scores. For others, killing became a job to do or, indeed, a habit. In some parts of the country, killing was undertaken at such speed that there was not enough time to determine who was counter-revolutionary or not. After thousands were killed, their crimes, as well as often their names, were invented to pass the inspection from the party. Physical torture such as burning, limb amputation, hanging and beating were also widely used prior to the actual killing. In Guizhou’s Huishui County, a man named Xie Caoxiang was arrested simply because he had visited a landlord in the same village. Being charged with the

2 ‘Chairman Mao’s Instruction to Comrade Huang Jing on Supplement Plan for Tianjin’, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, file CX1-78, p. 12.
crime of liaising with counter-revolutionaries, he was repeatedly hanged and beaten. Eventually he died while his body was hanging on a pole. The violent atmosphere incited fear as well as rage. In western Sichuan, at a public trial of a counter-revolutionary, the angry crowds jumped on the accused. After repeatedly beating him with wooden clubs and stones, in the chaos that followed the poor man had his eyes gouged out.

In rural China, Land Reform provided villagers with the context to overthrow the landlords and take over their properties. The sins of the landlords, as well as of the rich peasants, were not merely being counter-revolutionary but also being rich. Once the Confucian moral framework was removed (a common moral and cultural heritage shared by the majority of the population living in China), rural Chinese villages quickly turned into what Hannah Arendt called ‘the atmosphere of disintegration’. All of a sudden, the old rule of the world had ceased to apply. Gone with it was the moral balance between right and wrong and between good and evil. Some interpreted revolution in their own light. In many areas, the Land Reform turned out to be an exercise in looting others. Hatred began to play a central role in everyday human interaction as well as in public affairs. Everyone was pitted against everybody else, most of all against their next-door neighbours, their fellow villagers. Many villagers took up violence in almost medieval fashion. In central and south China, for example, under the disguise of revolution or the Land Reform, the bloody feudal style of clan fighting was rife. Hundreds, indeed thousands, were brutally murdered as a result. Protected by the local command of the Public Security Police or village militia, known as the Peasant Association (nonghui), villagers of one clan openly robbed fellow villagers from another. In addition to landlords and rich peasants, many middle-level peasants were also targeted. In China’s south-west, in Yunnan province’s Zhanyi County, seventy villagers were tortured to death within twenty days during the Land Reform in 1951. One landlord was beaten to death simply because a fellow villager wanted

6 Western Sichuan Public Security Bureau’s report on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries campaign, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-843, p. 98.
8 The Central Committee of the CCP and the Southwestern Bureau’s Instruction on How to Carry Out Land Reform and Tax Collection Work, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-882, p. 16.
his trousers. In Guizhou province’s Wuchuan County, a region with a predominantly Miao and Gelao ethnic population, a 70-year-old local peasant Zhang Baoshan was butchered in the Land Reform in 1951 after he had been falsely classified as a landlord. His two sons sought revenge for their father’s death. One son was caught and hacked to death with an axe by two fellow villagers; the other son Zhang Ren’an was besieged by a group of revolutionary activists in the village and then hanged. After Zhang Ren’an’s death, they chopped off his tongue and sexual organ and burned his body. The rest of the family were also arrested and brutally tortured by local cadres and villagers. In some cases, the party had to intervene to save landlords from sheer butchery, though killing and looting were allowed as long as they were done in what, according to the authority, was labelled a civilised manner. In southern Sichuan’s Zizhong County, for example, during the Land Reform more than 400 people were beaten to death within ten days. Most of those being killed were not landlords or counter-revolutionaries. They were beaten to death simply because someone else in the village hated or envied them. When the local authority was alarmed at the seriousness of the situation, instead of mediating, they instructed villagers: ‘Don’t kill anyone in broad daylight.’ In other words, killing was allowed as long as it was done secretly or in the dark. In parts of Guangdong, which were historically the base for revolutionary guerrilla fighters, after Mao issued instruction to speed up the pace of Land Reform, killing had become so uncontrollable that eventually its extent alarmed even the CCP Committee.

For some local officials, the use of violence also became a habit, an obligation or a pathway to promotion. A student from the elite Tsinghua University in Beijing sent to the south to assist Land Reform and tax collection was so shocked by the sheer scale of violence in the countryside that he wrote a letter to the Beijing Municipal Government raising serious concerns. According to him some village officials in rural Zhejiang tortured people routinely in order to secure their position: they arrested or tortured villagers when they could not collect enough grain to meet the government’s tax quota. When being challenged, they replied: ‘Our job is to meet the target.'

9 Ibid., pp. 16, 21, 156–8, 284–5. 10 Ibid., pp. 127–8.
11 The Central Committee of the CCP and the Southwestern Bureau’s Instruction on How to Carry Out Land Reform and Tax Collection Work, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-884, pp. 32, 38–9.
12 The Central Committee of the CCP Instruction Regarding the Problems during the Land Reform, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-886, p. 6.
We will have remorse later.’ As a result, the majority of villagers lived in fear and horror. ‘What kind of revolution is that?’ this student asked.13

As landlords were being killed or arrested, their properties were to be ‘distributed’. Villagers, encouraged by local officials, rushed to chop down trees as they now belonged to the public. The logs were sold for profit to boost local funds. The authority tried to stop the unrestricted logging, leading to violent clashes with villagers. In addition, villagers from different villages fought each other to secure more logs, thus more profits. This often led to further bloodshed.14

Such violence was ubiquitous in regions of mixed populations such as in Gansu and Ningxia, where since the Manchu conquest in the eighteenth century the ethnic Hui and the Han lived next door to each other under imperial rule. On the eve of Communist Liberation, their fragile or (perhaps) artificial sense of solidarity – ‘All under the Heaven’ as it was labelled in imperial China – evaporated. As happened with Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, ethnic hatred and violence soon followed. This quickly escalated into spontaneous pogroms. In Gansu province’s Linxia region in the north-west, the local authority fell into the hands of Han officials who were seconded here from other parts of China. The local Public Security office too was dominated by the Han. In the name of ridding the area of bandits, they openly arrested and tortured a huge number of the local Hui population. One night at the regional Revolutionary Political Department office, eight local Huis froze to death during detention. After they died, their bodies were openly abandoned on nearby wasteland. The incident caused a huge public outcry and a riot broke out. Local bandits stirred up public anger, and recruited an army of 8,000 Hui ‘rebels’ to wage a war against the communist officials and armies as well as the local Han population. More than 400,000 of the local population were implicated in this ethnic massacre. In the chaos, thousands of both Han and Hui were brutally murdered. To escape the massacre, some 40,000–50,000 Hui fled to what is now called Inner Mongolia in the PRC.15

13 The Central Committee of the CCP and the Southwestern Bureau’s Instruction on How to Carry Out Land Reform and Tax Collection Work, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-882, p. 21.
14 The Central Committee of the CCP Instruction Regarding the Problems during the Land Reform, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-86, pp. 110–12.
15 The Central Committee of the CCP, the PLO and the Public Security’s Instruction on Eliminating Bandits and Spies, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive File CX1-877, pp. 19–20; the Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCP United Front’s Instruction on Works in the Ethnic Regions, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, CX1-879, pp. 3–7.
In Gansu province’s Guiyuan, now under the administration of Ningxia Hui autonomous region, ethnic conflicts dated back to the warlord era (1916–28). After the communist Liberation, to reduce financial and administration burdens, the region was forced to become integrated with another nearby region. The majority of the local population, both the Han and the Hui, refused the amalgamation. A major revolt broke out. The populace tried to disarm the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. In the chaos that followed, some PLA soldiers killed one of the civilians. This stirred up further violence. The civilians turned on the regional CCP head. After repeatedly kicking and beating him, they tied him up and used him as a bargaining chip to deal with the authorities. When the authorities refused to listen to their appeal, they turned on each other: the Huis took up violence against the Hans, and the Hans seized weapons to kill the Huis.¹⁶

In China’s far south-west, prior to the communist Liberation, Xikang province, now part of Sichuan, had been the territory controlled by the warlord Liu Wenhui. Historically on the periphery between the Chinese empire and the Himalayan kingdom of Tibet, the region was of strategic importance both militarily and commercially. In the eighteenth century the Manchu had conquered and pacified these regions. After the end of imperial rule, it fell into the iron grip of the warlord. During the Manchu rule, as under the warlord, the Han Chinese and the Tibetans as well as some nomadic tribes were integrated. They traded with each other as well as married each other. Prior to any substantial settlement, the nomadic Lolo tribes had been moving back and forth in these regions, and occupied different hills. Trade in merchant goods as well as opium allowed settlements to flourish. The Lolo tribes soon learnt that they could make a living from the Han and Tibetan merchants, as the caravans had to pass through their hills. From the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of Han villagers moved there to cultivate the cash-rich opium crops, as the Manchu government imposed a ban on opium in the Chinese heartland. These Han villagers rented hills from the Lolo tribes on which to grow opium, and in return they paid the Lolos in silver, food and sometimes weapons. This was not without conflict, but there was a general understanding and agreement between all groups that as long as the Han and the Tibetans kept the Lolo supplied with silver, food and weapons, the Tibetans and the Han were allowed to trade and the latter to grow their opium. This continued to be the case after the warlord

¹⁶ The Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCP United Front’s Instruction on Works in the Ethnic Regions, from Western Sichuan Party Committee Archive, File CX1-879, pp. 15–16.
Liu Wenhui took over the region. Liu was one of the ‘opium lords’, who profited greatly from the illicit drug trade. Under him opium became the major lifeblood for the region.

The communist Liberation, however, broke down the existing harmony resulting from the economic system in the region. The new freedom became an open invitation to violence. As soon as the former ruler – the warlord – was obliterated, so too were the old rules. Now the warlord was gone, lawlessness prevailed. Bandits – many of them opium lords – as well as remnants of the Nationalist army took advantage of the situation, threatening the CCP authority as well as the civilian population. To rid the region of bandits was also interpreted as a call to rid the area of opium, suppressing the opium trade. As the opium fields were wiped out, the new communist authority also hunted down all opium farmers and traders. The Lolo, who were the previous possessors of the hills and had weapons, were classified either as landlords or as counter-revolutionary bandits. To start with, the Lolo understood this as meaning that the Han had broken the rules governing their relationship. In response, they blocked trading routes, looted caravans carrying essential supplies and massacred the Han villagers. Fearing for their lives, and in panic, the remaining Han population began to flee. Zhaojue, the capital of Xikang, turned to total chaos. Instead of mediating between these different groups, the CCP officials, most of them Han from elsewhere in China, began treating all of the Lolo tribal chiefs as bandits. As these tribal chiefs were arrested or beheaded, the different Lolo tribes were reorganised into one single group with the new ethnic label ‘Yi’. As Yi, these different tribes came under the new leadership of the CCP, with Mao as their supreme head. Ethnic hatred, previously unknown in the region, became a living reality. The chaos soon spread across Xikang. It continued into the late 1950s. Although Xikang was merged to become part of Sichuan province after 1955, it took nearly ten years for the CCP finally to consolidate its rule in the region. In the process, the CCP authority gradually isolated the Yi population into the hills around Zhaojue. The Lolos, the former possessors of a range of different hills, had since been turned into a permanent underclass with their new ethnic label Yi.

The ever-growing chaos in Xikang, as well as its geographic position at the periphery of China, provided the authorities with a further context for introducing a hard-line approach. In 1954, in two villages in the suburb of Xichang city – the site of the CCP’s regional authority

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17 Xikang Provincial Party Committee’s Instruction Regarding the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign, from Xikang Regional Party Committee Archive, File JK.1-418, pp. 19–22.
headquarters – hundreds of innocent villagers were arrested. They were interrogated and tortured until they were forced to admit they were counter-revolutionary bandits.  

While the chaos in Xikang, coupled with violence, persisted into the late 1950s, for most of the rest of China both the Land Reform and the Campaign to Suppress the Counter-revolutionary had almost come to an end towards the last quarter of 1953. Violence, however, did not cease. On the contrary, as the CCP regime began to introduce the national ‘grain procurement policy’ (centralised grain collection system), demanding set quotas of grain collection from across rural China from 1953, violence found a new context. Many local officials, who had become used to the practice of violence during the earlier revolutionary campaigns, took up violence as an instrument to force villagers to hand over ever more grain. On the other side, villagers took to violence as a necessary weapon for self-defence. For example, in China’s agricultural heartland, Anhui province, between 1953 and 1955 more than 32.5 per cent of the total number of crimes were ‘crimes of sabotaging’ the government’s grain procurement policy. 

Those saboteurs who were caught were charged not according to their supposed crimes but as counter-revolutionaries. The use of violence against them was thus further justified. Looting, physical torture and public humiliation were some of the most common methods used. As with the Land Reform, many officials once again used grain procurement as a weapon to attack their rivals or to settle personal scores left over from previous eras. In Xikang province’s Huili County, more than half of the homes were looted, and many villagers suffered physical abuse. The methods of torture varied from hanging to beating, suffocation by smoke, and poisoning by forcing villagers to swallow a large dose of hemp. Sometimes, torture sessions would last as long as three days and three nights. 

Direct personal violence and structural violence went hand in hand. As James Gilligan observed, this led to behavioural violence such as suicide. When the pressure to hand over grain and the fear of physical

18 Investigative report by Xichang city and other backward regions party committee, from Xikang Regional Party Committee Archive, File JK1-1978, no page number.
19 Anhui Difangzhi Editorial Department, Anhui Local History – Legal Section (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 1997), p. 409.
torture became too great, when they had been denied human dignity, when they had no one to turn to for their grievances, many villagers turned their anger and sense of helplessness into self-loathing and self-hatred. Some believed it was better to be a criminal than free, as life in prison seemed a better and safer outcome than being constantly abused or being starved to death. An even greater number were driven to commit suicide. In north-west Anhui’s Fuyang region, for example, within less than one month between December 1953 and January 1954, thirty-two villagers committed suicide because they could not endure the public humiliation or physical torture inflicted on them by local officials during the grain procurement campaign. Suicide was not limited to one or two areas, or to the grain procurement campaign. It had become a widespread phenomenon in the early years of the People’s Republic. Between 1954 and 1955, 512 cases of suicides or suicide attempts were reported to the central authority of the CCP. The frequency of suicide among the wider public had alerted the CCP’s political centre. Although Lu Dingyi, the man in charge of national political cultural work, who became the PRC’s first minister of propaganda, admitted that the CCP did not like the fact that so many people had committed suicide, in his address to the meeting of the eighteen provincial leaders that year he insisted that ‘we should not let this hold us back. We must have confidence. We must try to think positively . . . being petrified, lack of control, as well as lack of confidence are the reasons behind high suicide rates. We must encourage the masses to participate in our national political culture. We must take total control . . . If we don’t win them over, they will join the enemies.’ He urged the provincial leaders that ‘to win them over is to educate them over and over again’. For the next thirty years, ‘thought reform’ dominated the everyday political culture of the PRC. As Wang Lishi, a survivor of the Great Leap Famine told me during an interview, ‘there were just endless meetings in those days. We used to say that under Chiang Kai-shek there were endless taxes to pay, and under Chairman Mao there were endless meetings to attend . . . Every

22 Ya’an region’s special report on grain procurement work (1954–5), from Xikang Regional Party Committee Archive, File JK1-2174, pp. 55–6.
23 Fuyang regional party committee documents on grain procurement work, from Fuyang Regional Party Committee Archive, File J3-2–57, pp. 40–2.
24 Lu Dingyi’s speech to the conference of eighteen provincial leaders, from Xikang Regional Party Committee Archive, File JK1-3123, pp. 10–13.
night they called us out to meetings. Only one or two nights when there was no campaign meeting could we get some rest. But the peace never lasted long. Soon, another campaign would begin.\textsuperscript{25}

In the meantime the national grain procurement policy persisted. In 1955, the CCP went ahead and launched the agricultural collectivisation in the Chinese countryside. As with the grain procurement policy, collectivisation was regularly met with contention. Violence was used as a form of ‘power propaganda’ to realise the ideological claim in building the new socialist countryside or the future socialist utopia. While not all local officials accepted the CCP’s ideological claims, many were intimidated into competing with each other. To outdo others, many local officials used violence to whip unwilling individuals into joining agricultural collectives. By 1956, to Mao’s surprise, virtually all agricultural households in China had been organised into farming collectives. The use of violence was thus retrospectively ‘justified’.

\section*{Violence during the Great Leap Famine}

Once the CCP regime had completed or achieved its initial goals of Land Reform, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and the initial stage of collectivisation through terror, the system quickly turned not only against its stated enemies, but against much wider sections of the population. From the end of 1957, as Mao and the top leadership pushed for the Great Leap Forward, the CCP inaugurated radical collectivisation in the Chinese countryside. Terror and violence were the foundation of the Great Leap Forward. In the People’s Commune, the new and the highest form of administrative, economic and political organisation in rural China created to lead rural China into a ‘communist paradise’, terror, repression and violence were used directly against the Chinese peasantry, who had been among the CCP’s most loyal supporters before its claim to power. Organised violence was practised as a means of total control. The aim was to ‘kill one in order to deter one hundred’, or, as a Chinese proverb says, ‘Kill the chicken to scare the monkey.’

From its outset, Mao conceived of the People’s Commune as an environment without legal safeguards, which operated strictly as a military organisation, meaning that violence could be practised with impunity. At the CCP ‘Enlarged Politburo Conference’ in August 1958, Mao urged his colleagues

that ‘we must re-establish our military tradition. It is Marxist tradition. Being boorish is a good thing. It shows we are sincere. Bourgeois politeness is deceitful . . . an orderly society is built on discipline . . . We don’t rely on civil or criminal law to ensure public order . . . The Soviet Union used force to collect grain. We have twenty-two years of military tradition.26

Echoing the chairman, Tan Zhenlin, the minister of agriculture, reminded provincial leaders that ‘last year we achieved high yield by giving forceful orders . . . This year, we need to pay more attention. We must fight with peasants. Cadres should continue giving forceful orders. The practice of giving forceful orders will continue for the next ten thousand years . . . this is not the best method, but it’s necessary.’27

Violence quickly turned into normal practice in the People’s Commune. As it permeated every aspect of daily life in the People’s Commune, for some the practice of violence became habituated, or indeed for some an ‘addiction’. Once made into a habit, the act of violence no longer needed any intellectual rationale. In Guangdong province’s Huaiji County, for example, within four days one commune party secretary physically assaulted eleven people. Villagers called him the ‘tiger’. In their eyes, he no longer acted as a human but had turned into a beast.28 Endless ‘struggle’ meetings provided opportunities for venting personal revenge. Local cadres used their positions of power to extract as much benefit for themselves as possible, while punishing anyone they disliked or with whom they disagreed. Villagers were also encouraged to ‘struggle’ against each other, and in some cases even family members fought one another. In Guangdong province in southern China, the practice of violence had reached an unprecedented level. As mentioned earlier, Guangdong has a long revolutionary tradition. The CCP was extremely active there from its earliest days, and in 1927 China’s first rural Soviet base was established in Haifeng and Lufeng counties in eastern Guangdong. One legacy of Guangdong’s revolutionary culture was a propensity for political violence. With the People’s Communes, the region’s military tradition was restored by Mao’s order; oppressive control was revived. Violence became a routine practice. Local cadres as well as villagers were coordinated to take up violence against fellow villagers. Most communes set up their own

26 Chairman Mao’s speeches at the August Enlarged Politburo Conference (17–30 August 1958), from Hunan Provincial Party Committee Archive, File 141-1-1036, pp. 27–30.
28 A report on several recent cases [of commune cadres] violating the law (June 1959), from Kaiping County Party Committee Archive, File 3-Ao.09-80, p. 5.
prisons or labour camps. These were called ‘little prisons’. Commune or brigade officials, as well as villagers, could arrest anyone they disliked by labelling them potential ‘saboteurs’ and put them in these little prisons. They needed no warrants. They only had to frame it as if they were supporting the party ‘general line’ or the People’s Commune. In Taishan County, one woman in her sixties suffered poor health. When she asked for permission to be absent from a commune’s celebration meeting, the local cadre forcefully brought her to the meeting, where she came close to death spitting blood. In one commune, more than seventy villagers were locked up in the commune labour camp. Their crimes were that they were ‘disobedient’ and ‘wilful’. When the number of arrests had become so extensive that there was no longer any room to accommodate them, they were crowded into village toilets. Those under arrest were routinely tortured, beaten and hanged. Common methods of torture included whipping with sticks; administering electric shocks; pouring boiling water over their heads; using red-hot metal to burn faces or bodies; forcing prisoners to kneel for long hours; mutilation such as scalping or chopping off ears; medieval style humiliations such as tattooing. In one commune in Luoding County, nearly a hundred villagers were clubbed to death.29

As the People’s Commune, the CCP’s so called ‘bridge to communist paradise’, descended into the ‘people’s hell’, grain production plummeted. As of spring 1959 a severe famine took hold across rural China. The procurement system for the acquisition of grain and other agricultural products broke down across large sections of the country. But crop failure and famine conflicted with the state’s utopian vision of abundance. Mao and many top CCP leaders determined to win ‘the war’. On 22 February 1959, in a letter to provincial leaders, Mao suggested that the food shortage was a conspiracy: the peasants were hiding grain and this was due to corruption at the local level. To ‘take back the countryside’ and to ‘educate the peasants’, he gave orders for the launch of the ‘Anti-Hiding Campaign’. A month later, at a top CCP leaders’ meeting in Shanghai (25 March to 1 April), Mao again urged the leadership to ‘be relentless’ towards the peasants and to procure ‘a third’ of the total crop produced.30

The nationwide Anti-Hiding Campaign soon turned into another crusade against peasants. Under pressure from their superiors, provincial leaders

29 A report on several recent cases [of commune cadres] violating the law (June 1959), from Kaiping County Party Committee Archive, File 3- Ao.09-80, pp. 5–6, 42.
30 Chairman Mao’s words at the Shanghai Conference (25 March 1959), from Gansu Provincial Party Committee Archive, File 91-18-494, pp. 44–8.
turned on those at the level immediately below them. As the popular Chinese saying goes, ‘The big fish eats the small fish, the small fish eats the little shrimp, and the little shrimp eats nothing but sand.’ At the local level, cadres made up false production figures showing praiseworthy success. This led to the ever-increasing procurement quotas based on the false figures. When they failed to procure the projected amounts, local cadres forced starving peasants to hand over their very last kernels of grain and to work day and night in scorching summer and freezing winter. Anyone who did not follow orders was severely punished. Many were tortured or starved to death. In some counties in Shandong province, villagers caught hiding grain were treated as saboteurs or ‘American devils’. In Dan County, more than one third of the families were looted. Local villagers commented that the CCP policy was worse than the wartime Japanese army’s Three All Policy (burn all, kill all and loot all). In Juye County, when one female villager asked for leave to take care of her sick child, the brigade head refused by saying: ‘If he dies we could save 180 kg of grain, and his corpse could be used as fertiliser.’

31 In the aftermath of the CCP’s Lushan Plenum in late July and early August 1959, Mao silenced the critical voices of the Great Leap Forward within the CCP leadership, and pushed the campaign even harder. Violence intensified across the countryside. At the local level, public meetings became the platform for the promotion of terror and the site for decisions about its execution. A mass campaign, engineered by the Party under the Three Red Banners (Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune), turned into a ‘beating frenzy’. It spread across the country at terrifying speed. Sichuan province, the proverbial land of abundance, was led by the provincial Party boss Li Jingquan, whom Mao once called more ruthless than even the earlier regional warlords. Having reached his position by being brutal, Li was keen to take up the public practice of mass violence for his own career interests. Early in the spring in 1959, serious food shortages afflicted the Sichuan countryside. But Li was only interested in receiving continuous praise from top CCP leaders in Beijing for Sichuan’s steadfast and generous provision of grain to the rest of country. He launched a ‘Balance the Books Campaign’ in March to achieve unrealistically high procurement quotas. This was part of the nationwide Anti-Hiding Campaign, accompanied by the ‘Rectification Campaign’. Rectification, however, did not clean up

corruption among the cadres. It enabled open looting of peasants’ homes and the theft of the very last reserves of food they possessed. When no grain was found, peasants were physically tortured or were punished by total food deprivation. In eastern Sichuan’s Shizhu County, a county not far from prosperous Chongqing, more than 70 per cent of the local population in the Xianfeng Big Brigade of the county’s model Huaban commune were battered during the ‘Balance the Books Campaign’. Here local cadres took pride in beating villagers up. Indeed special ‘people-beating squads’ were set up. Local cadres even encouraged children to attack other children. Between mid 1959 and mid 1961, Shizhu County had an average death rate as high as 60 per cent. While the majority of those who died did so as the result of starvation, many were also beaten to death. In nearby Fuling County the situation was no better. Take the Baozi Commune, for example. This was once considered Fuling’s granary. With its lush green terraced fields, the area had produced such an abundance of food that over 2.5 million kg of grain were sent to the state granary in 1958. But in 1959 and the first half of 1960, the death rate there was as high as 29 per cent. By January 1961 the population had dropped by 46 per cent compared to 1957. The majority were either beaten to death or died of food deprivation during the Anti-Hiding Campaign. In Qinglong Big Brigade, in December 1959, the Anti-Hiding activists meeting lasted for six days and nights. During this protracted public ordeal villagers were repeatedly beaten. Some were clubbed to death in the meeting and many more were severely injured as a result. One former village cadre, an opponent of the acting brigade head, was so brutally tortured that he was driven completely insane. In Youyang County, an official estimate found that 359 people had been beaten to death in less than a year during the Anti-Hiding Campaign. In Youyang’s Longtan district, the local party secretary knocked out the teeth of more than eighty villagers, and beat one four-year-old child to death for having eaten a small amount of sweet potato. A government investigative report shows that he had beaten every child in the district during the campaign.

Humiliation inflicted as much pain as torture. In traditional China, public humiliation was used as a form of punishment. Under the Maoist regime it was an essential tool for carrying out political violence and it was widely practised in the People’s Commune. In the name of Anti-Hiding, women in Shandong’s Juye County were regularly raped or publicly humiliated by being forced to stand naked if they were suspected of hiding grain or could not work in the fields due to menstruation.  

In time of scarcity, food was a more powerful weapon than torture. Food deprivation was a common method used by local cadres to force villagers to work harder or to extract more food. While the total number of people who died of food deprivation during the Great Leap Famine is a statistic hard to obtain due to the continuing restricted access to archival material, from those examples gathered from local archives we learn this was a widespread problem. Take eastern Sichuan, for example, between 1959 and 1961: in one commune in Hechuan County 496 people died an abnormal death. Of these, forty-two were hanged or buried alive or frightened to death and sixty-two were beaten to death, while 392 died of food deprivation.  

What makes the Great Leap Famine in Mao’s China different from famines in late imperial China and the brief period of the Chinese Republic is the extraordinary level of violence that was meted out during this period. In the pursuit of the CCP’s utopian vision to transform the Chinese countryside into a communist paradise, it is estimated that 2–3 million people were tortured to death or deliberately killed between 1958 and 1961. Some of these were buried alive; others were beaten to death; even more were starved to death by deliberate food deprivation. As with the earlier campaigns, the majority of those victims had done nothing wrong: some happened to have been born into the ‘wrong class’, and others simply fell victim to a lawless environment where privilege and cronyism were the only ways to survive. For most of the local cadres who committed violent crimes, there was often no ideological conviction or specifically evil motive. As Hannah Arendt famously argued, ‘the sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil’. When the practice of violence became a habit in the

34 Report from Tian Qilang and Wang Ying Regarding the Food Crisis and the Widespread Problem of Oedema, Jining region (April 1959), from Shandong Provincial Party Committee Archive, File A001-01-465, p. 28.  
36 For further discussion on the figure see Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 298.
People’s Commune, it needed no intellectual or moral justification. Like all habits, it could be learnt over time.

Once they had been deprived of their dignity as well as their rights to live a human life, some began to live as criminals or indeed even as savages. The Chinese countryside turned into an even more violent world. Robbery, theft, murder and cannibalism were regularly reported between 1959 and 1961. According to an incomplete estimate by the Ministry of Public Security, from September 1960 to 25 January 1961, there were 30,000 incidents of gang robbery from state granaries in twenty-three different provinces and regions throughout China. Railways across the country had become the main battlefield. Train robbery became a ‘weapon of the weak’, a survival strategy in time of famine. Starving villagers carrying knives routinely robbed passing trains carrying grain and goods. In Gansu alone, the Public Security reported more than 500 incidents of train robbery. In Shandong province, famous for the Boxer sectarian violence at the turn of the twentieth century, sectarian groups were active again. They put out slogans such as: ‘To have enough to eat, we must unite together to kill cadres and rob granaries.’ Southern and south-western China also saw a revival of sectarian activities. There were regular reports of sectarian followers storming the local Public Security and furnishing themselves with weapons. Many villagers saw the famine as a sign that the CCP had lost the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, the right to rule. They killed local CCP officials and declared they would take over Beijing and overthrow the CCP rule. To suppress these ‘counter-revolutionary sabotages’ led to many violent clashes between the PLA soldiers and followers of sectarian groups. In parts of the country, cannibalism became widespread. In Linxia autonomous region in Gansu province, for instance, where there had been violent clashes between Chinese officials and the Hui ethnic group during which thousands were massacred (as mentioned earlier), more than fifty instances of cannibalism were uncovered in one municipality between late 1959 and the following summer. While the majority consumed the flesh of villagers who had died as a result of starvation, five villagers murdered victims before consuming their flesh. One even killed his own younger

brother and ate his flesh. Far away from Gansu, in Sichuan’s Fuling region as well as in parts of Guizhou in south-west China, cannibalism was regularly reported. Here again, it was often children who became victims of human scavengers. On one occasion, a desperate mother strangled her own son to death and consumed his flesh.\(^{39}\) In Henan’s Xinyang region, China’s agricultural heartland and the birthplace of the People’s Commune, villagers in Guanshan County told me that every village had cases of cannibalism.\(^{40}\)

The systematic violence that haunted the PRC during the Mao era was not merely the result of a series of unplanned and disconnected events. Violence was a state weapon used to implement radical political changes aiming towards a perfect, utopian state that would be free of mass violence. Once such practices were built into the system, violence became habituated, and therefore beyond any justification. Before modern times, Chinese society had been constrained by Confucian ideals, which also limited the ability of the state to inflict random violence against individuals. This broke down over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with the decline of imperial and then Republican rule (and the emergence of local warlords). This meant that it became easier and easier to instrumentalise violence for a wide range of purposes, both public and private, under Mao’s leadership. Thus, violence in the PRC took a wide range of forms and was not necessarily ‘top-down’. From torture and beatings to public humiliation and starvation, violence became the common coin of human interaction in the PRC. It became a vocabulary through which state policy was seen as validated and thus also became simultaneously a means by which individual interests and desires could be fulfilled. The PRC under Mao’s leadership became defined by violence at every level, well exceeding Marx’s pessimistic view of the nature of revolution in 1848.

**Bibliographical Essay**

Until the 1990s, because of restricted access to the Party archives and other essential primary sources, there had been no in-depth analysis that had scrutinised violence in revolutionary China. Scholars studying the history of the PRC, who relied on the published works, could do little more than provide a broad view that, to a large extent, echoed the CCP’s official historiography. This coincided with the decade leading up to as well as after Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, when a group of Westerners, including some China specialists, took an increasingly sympathetic view of the PRC. They often credited


\(^{40}\) Zhou Xun, *Forgotten Voices of Mao’s Great Famine*, pp. 258–60.
the CCP with establishing a stable government after decades of war and political turmoil. This began as a counter-trend that quickly gained momentum in the wake of the Vietnam War. This positive image of the Chinese communist revolution and the achievements in the PRC was a useful weapon in their criticism aimed against America’s military aggression in South-East Asia. After the death of Mao, however, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the stories of persecution of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution years (1966–76) began to challenge this earlier positive image. The background for this was the 1981 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s (CPCC) ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party’ that divided the history of the PRC into pre- and post-1957. In this modified version of Chinese historiography, the years before 1957 were depicted as the ‘Golden Years’ of the PRC, during which the CCP and the PRC government had successfully accomplished peaceful Land Reform and embarked on the First Five-Year Plan that foreshowed the rapid and non-violent agricultural collectivisation from 1955 to 1956. Western as well as Chinese scholarship quickly adopted the CPCC’s 1957 division. This was further supported by an increasing number of autobiographical and fictional texts on the Cultural Revolution that were published in and outside of China. They reinforced the official view that the Cultural Revolution was the disastrous period of the PRC history and that the years before it were ‘Golden Years’.

This position began to change in 1989 when the news of armed violence against unarmed students on Tiananmen Square shocked the world. Gradually, in the 1990s, a bleaker picture of the pre-1957 PRC history began to appear. An increasing number of Chinese as well as Western scholars began to challenge the image of the pre-1957 ‘Golden Years’. In the 1990s, in part triggered by similar developments in the former Soviet Union and its east European ex-satellites, changes took place in the PRC archives. The 1990 new archival regulation (revised in May 1999) theoretically made documents more than thirty years old available for public access. In practice, however, a great number of documents were and still are classified as ‘unsuitable’ for public access and remain as ‘closed’ files. After autumn 2012, greater restrictions were introduced by the State Archives Administration of China (SAAC), which made it difficult for researchers to read documents from the period of 1949 to 1979. The short window of openness between the 1990s and 2012, however, allowed Chinese as well as Western scholars in the humanities and social sciences access to a great mass of declassified original Party and other sources on the PRC’s first three decades. This newly unearthed information, often in conjunction with newly available documentary materials in other countries, transformed the ability to study, understand and explain the social, economic and political history of the PRC under Mao. This resulted in a far more critical view of the Chinese communist revolution and the early PRC history. In this reappraisal, we learn that coercion and violence existed throughout the Mao era from the early PRC to the end of the Cultural Revolution. Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden’s Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), for example, showed that during and after the Great Leap Famine (1958–62), intra- and inter-village clashes erupted and spilled over into violence. This continued into the Cultural Revolution, when violence peaked throughout the countryside. At the same time, Yang Kuising’s ‘Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries’, China Quarterly 193 (2008), 104–20, allowed readers in English to see how violence was an essential tool used by the CCP regime to maintain its fragile power in the early 1950s after the communist Liberation.
Frank Dikötter’s major history of the Great Leap Famine, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), argued that violence was the very foundation of the Great Leap Forward. There was widespread violence on the local level throughout the famine period. The argument presented by Dikötter was further reinforced by Zhou Xun’s companion volumes. Using first-hand oral interviews with survivors as well as previously unseen Party archival documents, Zhou Xun’s Forgotten Voices of Mao’s Great Famine: An Oral History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013) and The Great Famine of China, 1958–62: A Documentary History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) allowed readers to see for themselves that the sheer extremity of violence that took place during the Great Leap Forward famine was beyond doubt.
On 23 May 1965, the immensely popular President Sukarno addressed 120,000 enthusiastic communists cramming the national stadium. The 45th anniversary celebrations for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) looked like a national holiday. Five months later, all those people were being hunted down in a nationwide campaign to exterminate the PKI. By mid 1966, about half a million people were dead, many more had been imprisoned without trial, and still more had lost civil rights. The biggest communist party outside the communist bloc disappeared almost overnight, as did its affiliated peasant, labour, women’s and intellectuals’ organisations. It was the worst political violence to take place in this country since its war of national liberation in the late 1940s. How could this happen? Where anti-communist pogroms in, for example, Spain, El Salvador or Guatemala had followed significant communist violence, this had hardly been the case in Indonesia. Yet where military violence against leftists in, for example, Argentina or Thailand took place with little popular support, many Indonesians seemed to endorse it.

Within Indonesia, the ‘crushing’ of the PKI has since then always been a matter of public celebration. But that this involved murdering so many unarmed civilians remains a taboo. A militarised New Order regime made the crushing a central part of its legitimacy. Contrary to the expectations of human rights activists, however, democracy since 1998 has not brought about a change of narrative. The tenacity of denial suggests that statist explanations do not do justice to reality. As one experienced student of the episode has put it, the central dilemma facing scholars remains what it has been for many years: determining ‘the relative importance of army initiative and local tension’.

On the one hand, growing evidence indicates that nearly all the killings were coordinated by the military. Earlier accounts that attributed a large proportion of deaths to uncontrolled violence by outraged religious militias and other independent civil groups are increasingly discredited. In reality most victims were taken to their deaths out of military detention centres. Rather than the work of frenzied mobs, these were mass disappearances.² Where soldiers did not kill the victims themselves, they signed them out for murder to their stooges, who put them to death at military-controlled sites. The militias carried out their gruesome work with evident enthusiasm, but they still acted under military orders. These discoveries take the story out of the realm of popular outrage – where New Order propaganda always placed it – into that of military planning.

Within the technical constraints of a Third World state, the soldiers did an effective job of (a) disposing of large numbers of communist sympathisers in a short time; (b) ensuring they (the soldiers) would not be blamed for it afterwards; and (c) fixing an impression of unspecified terror permanently in the public mind. Radio broadcasts immediately created a warlike atmosphere that justified extreme violence; local officers forced political party representatives to sign off on death lists. Afterwards, military teams toured rural areas to survey political affiliation and run indoctrination sessions. In the longer term, military censors checked that news media and school textbooks reinforced the effect of terror created by the half-secret killing campaign. Even today, military-backed militias remain available to intimidate human rights groups intent on honouring or exhuming victims. The garrison system that made this possible – heavy on intelligence capabilities – remains in place, though the system of seconding (retired) military officers to key senior government positions is mostly gone.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that social involvement in the killings was substantial. Civilians enthusiastically took part in killing people for local reasons – prestige, envy, payback, even fun. This adds complexity and even ‘multi-causality’ to the story.³ Civilians provided the death lists, and the labour to do much of the dirty work with them in hand. Afterwards they created the stigma that still attaches to survivors today. They helped to stifle incipient signs of a backlash to the violence, and to block questioning of the military account (or rather denial) of it. Two decades after the end of the New

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Order, Indonesia is rightly praised for its successful democratic transition. Yet no post-1998 government has shown more than a passing interest in changing the 1965 narrative. Like the Armenian genocide in Turkey, denial remains part of the Indonesian national orthodoxy. Maintaining a belief of this nature requires civilian complicity.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first reviews three theoretical approaches that have inspired explanations for the 1965 killings, evaluating them in terms of their success at dealing with the state and society question. The next two sections apply the best of them, a contentious politics approach, to the problem at hand. One of these, the second, sketches the context before a marked turning point in 1963; the third reconstructs an arc of escalating tension, climax and de-escalation over the subsequent three to four crucial years. A fourth section ends the chapter with observations on the nature of state–society relations that produced mass violence in Indonesia in this period.

Three Approaches

Behaviourism was popular in social science work on violence at the time that the Indonesian events occurred. Its instinct that violence arises from the irrationality of the crowd found vindication in the nightmarish quality of the atrocities being committed there. The accounts written under its influence speak of ‘extraordinary popular savagery . . . mainly along the primordial lines’, and of ‘a nation running amok . . . the mob on the one hand, and the army on the other’.4 Exotic Asian emotions were part of the picture. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist John Hughes wrote of ‘the sudden boiling over of resentment against the Communists’.5

Samuel Huntington soon after this drew a recommendation from the spectre of a society breaking down into anomic violence: ‘the soldier as institution-builder’.6 Hobbes’s epigram – ‘when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps’ – summed up the 1960s and 1970s argument for prioritising strong state institutions over social mobilisation. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, this argument came under pressure from a human rights

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perspective. As New Order militarism went on to unleash one wave of human rights abuse after another – against East Timorese, Acehnese, Papuans, left-wing students, fundamentalist Muslims, and even common criminals – the view that ‘1965’ was the nation’s originary case of state violence became increasingly commonplace. This is the perspective that has carried the subject into the genocide studies community, with its emphasis on state responsibility. Recent studies of 1965 have only tightened the net around the military.

As the human rights perspective overtook the ‘amok’ studies, however, the question of ‘the relative importance of army initiative and local tension’ came little closer to a solution. One recent attempt to bridge the gap came from a comparative scholar new to Indonesian studies. Societies are not inherently violent, Gerlach wrote in his chapter on Indonesia in 1965, but they can become extremely violent at certain moments. Mass participation in violence, driven by multiple motivations, produces tempestuous violence at such moments that spreads to other groups besides the announced target group. ‘Neither state violence controlled and manipulated by the military, nor popular rage, nor the organization imparted by political party machineries and religious groups alone can explain the power of the 1965–66 killings; what was crucial was the combination of all three.’

Once the interests of the various parties to the violent coalition began to diverge – from January 1966 onwards – violence declined. Gerlach was inspired by Michael Mann’s idea that twentieth-century ethnic violence was intimately linked to the rise of political participation in state processes. In Indonesia, the PKI had been at the forefront of a massive mobilisational surge over the two decades preceding 1965. It brought millions into politics for the first time. Recognising the modernity of the moment was a great step forward. Nevertheless, merely seeing a ‘link’ between social mobilisation and violence is not the same as understanding the social mechanisms that laid it. Like many other historians of 1965, Gerlach begins his narrative on 1 October 1965. On that day, a small group of left-wing conspirators abducted and eventually killed six right-wing generals in Jakarta. Seizing on the pretext that the Communist Party had betrayed the nation, General Suharto seized the army command and, helped by civilian allies, launched a military operation to suppress the PKI, with the results described above. The most shocking atrocities began to occur almost immediately after this date. But beginning

7 Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, p. 87.
a story at its climax is not usually the best way to tell it. To unravel the social
processes that led to this moment, we need to go back in time to the point at
which the contention began to escalate. At that moment, about two years
earlier as we shall see, key elite actors perceived fresh opportunities and
threats, launched new strategies to respond to them, and in doing so devel-
oped the sharply polarised identities that came to underlie the violence.

Murder on such a scale cannot easily be analysed with conventional
institutional political science tools. It crosses the boundary separating nor-
mal, contained political action and grossly transgressive modes of action.
A third approach known today as contentious politics focuses on both kinds
of action, by all the key collective actors involved. They can range from
a well-established military hierarchy or a political party, to an ad hoc,
temporary local militia or an occasional pact among religious leaders. All
are engaged in strategic action; none can be sure of success. Political conten-
tion has been likened to an argumentative conversation, which likewise
cannot be easily reduced to the intentions of any of the participants.\(^9\) The
analyst will want to identify who is making claims, and why; who they say
they are, and why; and what forms their claim-making actions take, and why.

Contentious politics looks for explanatory mechanisms that lie at the
middle level, in between the grand narrative of a single explanation and the
irreducible multiplicity of the newspaper account. It breaks a series of events
(known as an episode) into a limited number of analytical elements called
social mechanisms or social processes. Such elements are robust enough to
serve an explanatory function because they are found in many different types
of contention. An example of a social mechanism is brokerage, which brings
previously unconnected collective actors into a relationship. This can cause
contentious coalitions to expand.

Some of the best work on ‘1965’ was done with such a contentious politics
approach before it acquired the name. Geoffrey Robinson’s study on the mass
violence in Bali dispensed with ahistorical and apolitical anthropological
accounts that focused on long-standing cultural beliefs.\(^10\) Instead, it attributed
violence to contemporary contestation within the state. State institutions had
been riven with factional conflict since independence. Local government
leaders had to build alliances with local capitalists and with national political
groups, for patronage and for protection. PKI sympathisers also took part in

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9 Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*

10 Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca, NY:
this struggle for the state. They exacerbated internal bureaucratic conflicts by using state resources to stimulate class consciousness. Dynamics such as these could be found all over Indonesia at the time, as the following account will demonstrate.

Context

In order to avoid having to recreate an infinite regression of causal processes going back to the remote past, contentious politics analysts identify a key turning point in the story that they find the most puzzling. The rest they consign to ‘context’. The following paragraphs sketch the context for a turning point in 1963.

Indonesia at this time was the economic basket case of South-East Asia; 90 per cent of its 100 million inhabitants remained rural and poor. Its economy had been shattered by the Pacific War (1942–5) and by the revolutionary war of national liberation it had fought against the colonial Netherlands (1945–9). The young national institutions remained fragile and deeply embedded in the numerous local societies that made up this diverse nation. To correct the economic injustices of the colonial era, the government promised ‘socialism à la Indonesia’. To the indigenous middle class, small but largely urban and vocal, this meant jobs for them. But the government lacked the wherewithal to disturb the inherited capitalist economy. As it desperately attempted to control inflation and thus the money supply on the one hand, while not offending the state-dependent political class on the other hand, the government from 1958 onwards lurched from crisis to crisis. The only solution was to slash government expenditure, yet precisely that was politically inexpedient.

The result was an economy of primitive accumulation in which too much money – acquired in highly political ways by the well-connected – was chasing too few goods. Indonesia’s developing economy was ‘marginality-ridden’: awash in financial and labour surpluses, while the poor remained cut off from the modern formal economy.11 Financial surplus was the basis for a politics of patronage through the highly politicised bureaucracy. Labour surplus disempowered labour. The corruptly acquired wealth of military generals, well-connected rural landholders, and those within the upper reaches of the bureaucracy and the political parties created growing

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dissatisfaction among the rural and urban poor. The Communist Party found it easy to recruit new members by portraying elite behaviour as a betrayal of the promise of 1945.

Three phenomena of relevance to the ensuing violence followed from this political economy context. One concerns the prevalence of patron–client relations; the second, populist politics that the government deployed to compensate for organisational ineffectiveness; and the third, the slow growth of institutional effectiveness particularly in the armed forces.

Patron–client relations began to attract researchers’ attention in the 1960s, when American social scientists rediscovered Weber and reformulated his notion of patrimonialism as ‘neo-patrimonialism’.

They quickly found many instances of it in Indonesia. From the rural dependency relation between landlord and peasant to the personalised politics at the highest levels of the Indonesian military, Indonesian society was shot through with patron–client relations. Everyone, including Indonesians themselves, thought these relations signified a modernisation lag. Even government officials initially praised the communist-affiliated Indonesian Farmers Union (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) for attempting to wean peasants off their dependency on patrons. It encouraged them to take ‘small but successful’ steps towards modern, autonomous citizenship.

One reason that the party ultimately failed is that patron–client relations proved to be far more resilient than was then thought. Such unequal relations typically thrive under conditions of poverty and insecurity.

Populist mobilisation was one of the hallmarks of the period. As in other developing countries at the time, elites in Indonesia oscillated between wanting to mobilise and to repress popular agitation. In the absence both of autonomous citizens and of a smoothly functioning state apparatus to deliver effective services to them, President Sukarno chose to hold the diverse nation together by means of enthusiasm (semangat). Nationalist solidarity had proven a powerful weapon in the face of the colonial enemy in 1945–9, and he believed it would continue to carry the nation through its teething troubles in early independence. As the economy began to falter from the late 1950s onwards, he responded to the inevitable growth of internal

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fractiousness by launching aggressive campaigns against ‘neo-colonial’ Western powers.

The Communist Party was far better at spreading calls to arms than any one else. All the others were patronage parties with limited mass appeal. The PKI practised modern politics, based on an active membership and on practical material issues. Starting with just 8,000 members when the new leadership took over in 1951, it gained 16 per cent of the national vote in the 1955 general election, and even more in regional elections held in some areas in 1957. By 1964 it claimed to have branches in every large island, 93 per cent of districts and cities, 83 per cent of sub-districts and small towns, and 62 per cent of villages.¹⁵

The party had, moreover, a strong interest in building a mutually beneficial relationship with the president. It had barely survived elimination during the national revolution in 1948, when it had supported a rebellion at Madiun (East Java) against the national leadership. Fighting between local Muslims and communists broke out that claimed tens of thousands of lives. Memories of the PKI betraying the republic at its most critical hour were to resurface vigorously after 1963. But in the early 1950s, under new leadership, the party managed to rebuild its nationalist credentials. Socialism was de rigueur. Indonesia was officially neutral in the accelerating Cold War, but nearly everyone, whatever their religion, accepted the idea that Western capital was the cause of misery in former colonies. The party followed the Soviet united front strategy of supporting the nationalist bourgeoisie. Of all the nation’s parties, it was the most loyal to the president.

Social mobilisation of all kinds in the 1950s and early 1960s created an enormous range of popular organisations at the provincial level. These often represented cross-class collaborations that saw themselves optimistically as bringing modernity to their region. At the same time, limited state centralisation meant that these organisations also expressed and deepened locally specific social divisions. Underneath their (often religious) differences lay latent class conflict. This was particularly so where agrarian capitalism had penetrated deeply, such as in East Java and North Sumatra.

Institutional effectiveness, the third contextual phenomenon to consider here, was low. Elites weakened it by constantly politicising the bureaucracy. They struggled for advantage, and for control of rents. The military, too, was affected. Rather than a professional force guarding borders against foreign

enemies, it had looked inwards towards internal security since its birth in the national revolution. But as an armed hierarchy it was less open to public intervention than other institutions. It could afford to contemplate organisation as an effective political resource even without popularity. Initially, however, it did not even have a presence outside the major towns. Especially in the thinly populated islands beyond Java, the state bureaucracy in general was virtually absent, while political party mobilisation was widespread. The army’s success in suppressing the regional rebellions of 1956–7 provided a major motivation to expand. Between 1958 and 1963 it extended its network of garrisons to the provincial level, and in some critical areas of Java down to the district and even village level. In March 1961 it set up a mobile force called Kostrad that could be deployed anywhere at short notice. A year later a new army office was created to insert active army officers into every field of government activity. Senior military officers kept in close touch with the US Embassy, which worried about Indonesia falling into the communist camp.

Internally, the military leadership increasingly saw the organisational reforms as a counter-balance to PKI influence. They saw the PKI expanding in areas where the army, for lack of funds, still had no presence. PKI general secretary D. N. Aidit realised top army officers were overwhelmingly anti-democratic and anti-communist – the reason he sought the president’s protection – but he believed rank-and-file ‘peasant soldiers’ could be appealed to.

Despite many incidents of riots, rebellions and bannings out in the provinces, political contention at the centre did not become particularly antagonistic before late 1963. President Sukarno would not permit open confrontation in his polity. He acknowledged ideological distinctions among nationalists, the religious and communists, but he ruled that all should work together. In 1960 he announced that factional struggles within the government should be resolved through a principle of proportional representation he called Nasakom (NASionalisme, Agama, KOMunisme). This prevented open discord, but at the cost of intensifying byzantine intrabureaucratic politics. Every government departmental head, governor, attorney or police chief owed their appointment to factional alliances. The communists, under-represented in the bureaucracy, stood to gain most from Nasakom.

Sukarno’s always-belligerent campaigns against foreign oppressors provided more opportunity for manoeuvring. Each new venture led to yet another joint military–civilian organisation primed for mobilisation. The
campaign from December 1961 to recover West Irian (West Papua) from the Dutch was the first of these; the move from September 1963 to combat the new state of Malaysia another. Each helped to militarise society, yet in each the military had to share authority with civilians.

Whenever the military attempted openly to buck the enforced unity and assert their own agenda, they failed. A coup d’état attempt on 17 October 1952 backfired. In 1956–7, revolts by various regional commands against perceived communist dominance in Jakarta failed, despite military backing from the United States. Later in 1957 the army piggybacked on Sukarno’s economic nationalism and seized the remaining Dutch plantations and other companies, and in the same year they became martial law administrators in many regions. Neither initiative brought them much popularity: the first set them in opposition to the labour unions, and the second to civil society organisations.

Only Sukarno could get away with assertive action. After returning from a visit to communist China late in 1956, he spoke about ‘burying the parties’, which, he said, divided the nation. Extra-constitutional acts followed rapidly after this. In 1957 he dismissed the cabinet and appointed a non-party ‘working’ cabinet. Two years later he took over the leadership of cabinet himself, dismissed the elected assembly debating a new constitution, and reinstated the authoritarian 1945 constitution. In 1960 he got rid of the elected parliament and appointed his own, arguing that politicians did not understand the people as well as he did. The military supported these anti-democratic moves. Then he banned the small but powerful liberal intellectual technocrats’ party PSI. More importantly, in August 1960 he banned the Islamic party Masyumi. Both were enemies of the PKI. Many newspapers were banned as well. All this alienated some upper-middle-class intellectuals in Jakarta, and many religious petit bourgeois traders in the outer islands. But the political heartlands remained loyal, and nowhere did these actions trigger national-level contention that threatened to get out of hand.

An Arc of Contention

So, what further destabilised the situation in 1963 and created the conditions for the confrontation that followed? Most observers agree Aidit of the PKI made the first move. One historian of the PKI wrote: ‘By late 1963, the party leaders felt more secure and capable of taking political initiatives.’\(^{16}\)

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September he visited the People’s Republic of China. The China–Soviet split had become open by 1960, and China was eager to demonstrate its leadership of the Third World, particularly among Southeast Asian communist parties. Where Aidit had long favoured Italian- and Soviet-style gradualism, he now echoed Chinese criticism of Khrushchev, who had caved in over Cuba and whose massive aid to Indonesia seemed to have done the country little good. In this Aidit was following Sukarno, who, like Mao, had for years been building his iconic Third World leader status on constantly rising militancy.

Aidit felt politics had put the army on the back foot. In May, martial law had been lifted, reducing the army’s day-to-day powers. No longer was armed forces commander A. H. Nasution the most powerful man in the country after Sukarno, but the civilians Johannes Leimena and Subandrio. This was a victory for Sukarno. He won another in July with the successful resolution of the Irian Jaya crisis. Aidit began to speak in thinly veiled terms of a struggle within the state between a ‘pro-people aspect’ and an ‘anti-people aspect’. The PKI – never opposed to democracy – put elections back on the agenda in 1963, thus openly countering hitherto successful army efforts to postpone them. It felt confident of winning them.

Another motivation for Aidit’s risky move came from below. His party had drawn millions into politics for the first time, but until now they had seen none of the social justice it had promised them. In 1960 the PKI had been the biggest supporter of a new basic land reform law (UUPA). Bureaucratic wheels were set in motion to implement it. PKI cadres in the provinces laboured to make farmers aware of their rights. Three years later, Aidit’s Chinese tilt seemed to be a signal that he had heard them. Having dropped class struggle as a campaign theme since 1959, he now revived it in September 1963. Just as loud nationalistic demonstrations against Malaysia filled the capital’s streets, he spoke of ‘radical land reform’. In December he urged peasants to seize land without compensation. This went beyond the land reform law.

Early in 1964, farmer groups belonging to the PKI-affiliated Farmers Union (BTI) began scattered unilateral actions (aksi sefitah) to occupy and till plots of land they considered theirs by right. This was a shocking new repertoire in the rural and small town areas where they took place. Until this point, the PKI’s agitation had not diverged much from the general tone set by the president. Its members had confronted foreign plantation owners over land and labour rights, but even the army had agreed foreign capital should be tackled hard. Now farmers began confronting indigenous landowners. As aksi spread from Central to East Java, landowners began to coordinate
a response through their Islamic party Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a long-standing rival to the PKI. The timing of the aksi increased the sense of threat. Instead of serving as vote-getters at election times, land seizures were now intruding into everyday life.

NU sent flying squads of its youth militias (Ansor) to support landowners against challengers. Rival groups adopted strident identities, and assigned their opponents to distinct categories as well. Where organised communists had until then been seen as little different from other nationalist groups, now a mutual process of name-calling kicked in that saw them take on distinct shapes. Groups led by religious landowners and village bureaucrats presented themselves as defenders of the faith against atheist communists. Their repertoire of tactics grew increasingly violent. These new repertoires gave them strident new identities that served both to distinguish and intimidate rivals, and to embolden followers. In short, the contestation was transformed. Sukarno’s united front was beginning to fall apart into competing fractions. This is how one observer described the change:

Revolutionary conflict, as a new phenomenon, resulted in a new social reality constructed by both the PKI and its opponents. The two parties had to redefine the political arena from a competitive political market (prior to 1963) to a battlefield where political and human survival became the new stakes. Social interaction also changed, and new violent actions, such as beatings, kidnapping and killings, replaced prior actions, such as ‘horse trading’.17

A legitimation conflict lay behind the demonstrative shows of force by rival provincial groups. Farmers Union members squatting on rice fields felt inspired by their president’s sympathy for their plight. They knew that justice had been at the heart of the independence war twenty years earlier. At the very same time, NU drum marchers in a town nearby felt they were defending the faith of their community, indeed the entire social order, from godless attack, just as their fathers had done in Madiun in 1948. Similar legitimation conflicts were emerging in other parts of Indonesia. In Bali, one observer wrote, ‘The anger of PNI administrators, landlords and traditional rulers had been roused by the boldness of the PKI’s agitation in the 1960s.’18 A Catholic

priest who had mobilised church youths against communists in Central Flores wrote afterwards of the heightened tension surrounding the prospect of new national elections: ‘A new authority must be established within society.’ He had in mind one that was obedient to the church.¹⁹

As both sides perceived and acted on threats and opportunities, they engaged in a spiral of increasingly confrontational actions. To its own surprise, however, the PKI by September 1964 found itself in a defensive position in the most religious parts of East Java. One reason was that the resources that each side had brought to this local class conflict were unbalanced. The Farmers Union only had the promise of land to hold out to its supporters. These were the poor who had not long been involved in politics, and had no access to rents from the state. Their opponents in the aksi sefishak struggles, meanwhile, had the material incentives that flowed from rents that its leaders – NU Muslim leaders and PNI nationalists – were extracting from the state. Aidit dropped his ebullient mood by December 1964, but his opponents had sensed success and violent incidents kept occurring in Java in February and March 1965.

The PKI had overestimated its own strength in the villages. Recruitment to the peasants’ cause was not bringing in as many new supporters as they had hoped. Unlike China, Java had no real tradition of rural revolt. Even with inflation running at several hundred per cent, the economic crisis was not bad enough to be creating an impoverished rural proletariat. Moreover, they had too little success leveraging cross-class linkages on the issue of economic injustice. Middle-class civil servants, army officers and white-collar workers were still doing reasonably well. This caused one foreign observer to write prophetically already in 1962 that the nation was unlikely to turn to the PKI ‘by acclamation’.²⁰

The increasingly strident tone of the rural confrontations soon attracted attention higher up the social and administrative chain. As it did so, contestation expanded to the provincial and even the national level and fed into the elite struggle between army and president. Each side framed the situation in sharply contrasting ways, aiming to strengthen internal ranks and attract allies. Military commanders in some regions (West Java, Aceh, North Sumatra, Sulawesi) identified the problem as one of communists creating unmanageable disturbances to public order. They cracked down

on communist organisations in their regions. The president weighed in on the other side in June 1964. He expressed sympathy for the farmers’ actions and asked his deputy prime minister Leimena to resolve the dispute through mediation. In his National Day speech on 17 August, he said he was ‘not satisfied’ with the pace of land reform and identified ‘sabotage’ as the problem, particularly in the communist heartlands in Java, Madura and Bali.

Meanwhile, on the ground an expanding circle of contestants was being drawn into the ring. Groups directly opposed to the aksi sefihak had revived the Madiun theme of the PKI as a danger to the nation. This broader theme appealed to elite urban groups for whom peasant landlessness held no interest. By means of brokerage, the new discursive repertoire was spreading and helping to expand a still rather loose anti-PKI coalition. Students belonging to religious and nationalist organisations, already at odds because their future careers depended on factional patronage, now took up the PKI question as the lens on their differences. On one side was the Islamic HMI, backed by the army, and on the other the left-wing CGMI, backed by the PKI. They began loudly to confront each other in May 1964, and in October HMI was expelled from the national student union PPMI. Polemics continued to escalate throughout 1965. These were the nation’s elites, many from well-connected families. The polarising language they each used was widely reported and helped set the tone for journalists and other opinion-makers throughout the nation.

‘Show of force’ rallies and marches where these slogans were aired began to be widely deployed throughout 1965. On 23 May 1965 the PKI invited President Sukarno to a massive 45th anniversary rally held in the nation’s largest sports stadium. Aidit announced the party had 20 million sympathisers throughout the nation. Sukarno told the rally Aidit was the ‘bulwark of Indonesia’. Similar PKI rallies were held in towns all over the country. Non-communist parties, who increasingly saw themselves as anti-communist, tried to follow suit with rallies of their own. Posters lampooning rival elites appeared on town walls. Muslim religious youths in August and September 1965 were holding militant drum marches in the East Javanese towns most affected by the aksi sefihak.

In this polarised atmosphere, marked by agitating popular collectivities that increasingly saw themselves and rivals in antagonistic terms, national elites began to fear the other side would strike first. The military feared the PKI. Army commander Yani had been secretly consulting an informal ‘brains trust’ of top generals since January 1965 about contingency plans
in the deteriorating political situation. In that month Aidit, hoping to increase the party’s influence within the armed forces, called for the establishment of an armed civilian militia. He knew the army leadership was busy in Borneo with Sukarno’s anti-Malaysian Confrontation (which had also started in September 1963). The first volunteers began training in June 1965. More threatening, the generals felt, was the possibility that Sukarno, president-for-life with unlimited powers, might anoint Aidit as the next president. He was a somewhat fragile 64 years of age, and lacked an obvious successor since his vice-president Hatta had resigned in 1956 without being replaced. His remarks praising Aidit at the May PKI rally worried them.

Simultaneously, the PKI feared the military. The Politburo read news leaks about Yani’s ‘brains trust’ as a coup-in-preparation. In August 1965, it blinked. It authorised Aidit to give ‘political support’ to pre-emptive military action by progressive army officers, leaving the details to him. Inspired by the progressive coup by Algerian army officers the previous June (he had met the conspirators in Paris), Aidit secretly formed a little group that would kidnap a number of right-wing generals. He intended that they should be presented to Sukarno, who would condemn them and replace them with leftists. Street politics in support of the PKI was supposed to do the rest. The plan was adventurous, but not a coup.

However, the kidnapping on 1 October 1965 went wrong. All six abducted generals were killed by their ill-trained captors after some resisted. Not among those taken was another general, named Suharto. He too was right-wing but had kept a low profile. Suharto took over the levers of military power in Jakarta vacated by those killed and neutralised the kidnappers’ group within 24 hours. He then judiciously ignored various executive orders from President Sukarno designed to limit the impact of the incident. Instead, he set about using it to justify a nationwide crackdown on all communist organisations. His coherent, purposeful action suggests he was working to contingency plans prepared in preceding weeks, even if implementation was chaotic. Army censors told newspaper editors early in October they were starting a campaign against the PKI and anyone printing information critical of that campaign would be considered an ally of the PKI.21 The following months were taken up with organising and mobilising to seize state power on

the back of the destruction of the Communist Party and the isolation of President Sukarno.

The high command realised the military were unpopular, so rolling in the tanks alone would not work. However, it believed it could build a legitimating coalition out of friendly factions in the nation’s peak and provincial elites, and of course from its own military ranks. The preceding polarisation had spooked the nation’s factionalised elites enough to make them listen to a call for united action. Without this, Suharto would not have been able to solve his collective action problem. Images of the six dead generals, luridly exploited in military broadcasts, finally convinced them that communists were a serious threat to their established authority. The wonderfully unifying effect of popular action on elites similarly created many other autocracies in the Southeast Asian region during the Cold War, as Slater has shown.22 Leaders of the devout Islamic community, Christian minorities, and members of the indigenous entrepreneurial, professional and bureaucratic middle class, and a Westernised intelligentsia, united quickly behind Suharto. Western governments, meanwhile, had already quietly indicated their support for anti-communist action. The US government had long envisaged a military-led developmentalist regime as its preferred option for Indonesia. It committed itself after 1960 to ‘provoking a clash between the army and the PKI, on the presumption that the army would emerge victorious . . . Washington [in 1965] did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of the alleged PKI members.23

Within the armed forces, Suharto had to persuade or else remove officers unhappy about the brutal and unconstitutional course upon which he was set. Governors, some but not all active military men, also had to be persuaded to permit aggressive action in their region. All this required skill and time. Ultimately, the organisational resources available within the armed forces were decisive to the outcome.

Out in the provinces, Suharto had to mobilise the civilian groups that had joined the loose anti-communist coalition over the previous eighteen months. In addition, he had access to a large array of non-ideological civilian clients who were more or less directly attached to military garrisons. Every local commander could call on hundreds of young men who

had registered as village guards or other auxiliaries. Various campaigns over the years had led to people’s militias being set up to recruit volunteers for possible service in faraway places such as Papua or Malaysia, or for village defence against insurgents such as Darul Islam militants. All were encouraged to vent their feelings about PKI treason to the nation. A barrage of radio, television and newspaper propaganda about the PKI ‘stockpiling Chinese weapons, digging mass graves for opponents, compiling lists of individuals to murder, or collecting special instruments for gouging out eyes’, while entirely fictitious, helped build a ‘kill or be killed’ atmosphere.24

At some point, the young men were given a licence to kill those in detention. Who issued this licence, and why, remains a matter for research. Mass murder from then on became for the allied provincials the ultimate ‘show of force’. Aware that the military needed their eyes and ears for local intelligence, and their hands for plausible deniability, they exercised a reign of terror in which every neighbourhood feud could be dressed up as anti-communist righteousness. It was these feuds that, in some areas, gave the killing sprees an anarchic energy that early observers saw as amok. Yet rarely, so far as we now can see (and contra Gerlach), was it a case of ‘uncontrolled violence’.

Organisational exigencies meant that the exact timetable and course of events varied from one region to another. Wholesale savagery occurred in rural parts of Java and Bali, and in the plantation zone near Medan. In East Nusa Tenggara the military mostly did the killing themselves, for lack of a strong anti-communist civilian movement. We still know little about other regions of Indonesia.

Some mass executions took place in public, with crowds forced to watch and even clap for joy. But even when they took place secretly at night – as was more often the case – a performative element remained central. Heads were left on spikes, severed penises nailed to trees, bodies thrown into rivers. The great majority of victims were indigenous leftists (the stubborn myth that most were ethnic Chinese obscures the class nature of the violence). The carnage stopped before all the millions who had supported the PKI were dead. Apparently, the political objective of establishing a new ‘counter-revolutionary’ authority had been achieved. Allowing unruly proxies to go on killing risked unleashing civil war. After initially encouraging it, the military in some cases intervened to rein in further violence.

Detainees suffered a full array of torture techniques – rape, forced ‘marriage’ with officers, electric shock, displacement, forced labour, hunger. ‘Scientific’ psychological tests designed in the West were used to purge hundreds of thousands of teachers and other civil servants from the state apparatus. The military first shut down and subsequently controlled closely all political party activity. This left them as the sole party in charge of allocating rents obtained from the state. The religious militias failed to gain significant prominence afterwards: they had been pawns. On the contrary, the New Order became a military-led, secular developmentalist regime. It demanded religious observance as a form of obedience but prosecuted any who preached theocracy.

Elite and middle-class members of the anti-communist coalition looked to their military patrons for rewards. The rapidly expanding bureaucracy after 1965, paid for by Western aid and a fortuitous oil boom, could accommodate plenty of them. Depoliticised economic planning turned the economy around, creating performance legitimacy for the new arrangement.

Censorship of print and electronic media remained tight throughout the three decades of the New Order. Yet middle-class support for the destruction of the PKI was largely genuine, despite some discomfort over the extreme violence it took. A new legitimation discourse dropped the theme of justice for those dispossessed by neo-colonialism, and took up bourgeois concerns for law and order, and religion. In this discourse, the killings in fact never ended. They continued in the form of more or less subtle threats of further arbitrary violence made on every public occasion. At the community level, meanwhile, ‘Violence continues to reverberate through social networks, marking everyday life and molding aspirations for the future.’

Indonesian political, social, economic and cultural life continues to pay a high price for this single violent episode. The principles of non-violent political consultation were replaced by those of violent authoritarianism. The political party’s function of forum for popular representation disappeared and with it progressive programmes of land reform and labour rights. Emancipative aspirations born out of the anti-colonial movement went underground. Whole genres of fictional, political and historical writing as

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well as visual and dramatic arts were banned. Even after democratisation in 1998, law courts still have not recovered from the blow to their authority delivered by the extrajudicial impunity with which the killings were carried out.

**Conclusion**

By retracing the social relations that produced it, the 1965 violence is seen to arise within a long arc of contention. Far from being the product of a momentary encounter between social groups, violence on this scale becomes comprehensible only if we recover a view of Indonesia as a coherent society, albeit one shot through with struggles for the ultimate rule-making power. So what do the sociological dynamics that have emerged tell us in answer to the question about ‘the relative importance of army initiative and local tension’?

All the evidence points towards a notion of the state that cannot easily be divorced from society. What Robert Holden writes in Chapter 24 in this volume he could have written about Indonesia: ‘[I]t is the combined problem of violence and the state – whose principal function is to administer justice – that will dictate the course of this analysis, with the unavoidable addition of the concept of revolution in its distinctly Latin American expression as the ever-frustrated search for a just order.’ Whether at the national or the local level, the boundary between state and society is porous. The discovery that state institutions are embedded in various social formations, captured by the term ‘state-in-society’, continues to be fruitful in analysing Indonesian society today.26

The contentious politics approach reveals that the 1965 drama involved both elite and non-elite collective actors. The popular contention that culminated in mass murder began with elite initiatives, and this is usually the case. But popular movements can in turn also influence elite behaviour. Aidit would probably not have escalated the tension in late 1963 without pressure from his large constituency of impatient peasants and workers. The military would not have been spooked by Sukarno’s praise of Aidit as the nation’s ‘bulwark’ if peasants had not engaged in unruly actions in East Java, where they triggered religious outrage among provincial elites. This contingent sequence of events culminated by 1965 in a legitimacy crisis

26 Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Consti
affecting both elites (including ‘the army’) and non-elites (provincials involved in ‘local tensions’). Such a crisis can lead to genocidal violence.\(^{27}\) Those groups that could muster the greatest resources at every level of the polity won the struggle over the ultimate legitimate authority. This struggle, moreover, took place within a state that was rooted in a highly unequal political economy of primitive accumulation. Organisational and financial resources available through the bureaucracy favoured the state-dependent urban middle class. This lent a strong class dimension to the outcome, and justifies the term ‘counter-revolution’ for the 1965 violence in Indonesia.\(^{28}\)

**Bibliographical Essay**


Behaviourist thinking had considerable influence on early thinking about the massacres; see overview in Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Some well-known scholars of Indonesia like Clifford Geertz and Anthony Reid used behaviourist language in the 1960s and 1970s when alluding to the Indonesian killings, and as late as 2003 one historian still described them as a ‘vast popular irruption’; Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 99). However, book-length work in this vein has tended to come from journalists, notably the Pulitzer Prize-winning John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*. It has also been prominent in Indonesian accounts that remain close to the army’s narrative of the period; Nugroho Notohusantono and

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\(^{27}\) As one useful though somewhat tortuous definition puts it, genocide is ‘a strategy that ruling elites use to resolve real solidarity and legitimacy conflicts or challenges to their interests against victims decreed outside their universe of obligation in situations in which a crisis or opportunity is caused by or blamed upon the victim (or the victim impedes taking advantage of an opportunity) and the perpetrators believe that they can get away with it’. Helen Fein, ‘Revolutionary and Anti-Revolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia 1965 to 1966’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35.4 (1993), 796–823, at 813.

\(^{28}\) Kammen and McGregor (eds.), *Contours of Mass Violence*, p. 11.


The political intrigues in Jakarta on the night of 1 October 1965 have been of central interest. What links did the ‘30 September Movement’ have with the PKI, the military, Sukarno, or even Suharto? On this topic, refer to military historian Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, rev. edn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).


One of the reasons (beyond the behaviourist instinct) that early work on the massacres emphasised societal dynamics was that they showed so much regional variation in timing and extent. The particular savagery in the countryside of East Java, for example, was seen to indicate Javanese cultural motives. A growing number of regional studies have focused precisely on questions of the state–society interface that provides the backdrop for the killings. Among the best of these is still Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). Others have discussed the impact of the violence on women (Saskia E. Wieringa, *Sexual Politics in Indonesia* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)); on literature (Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and

The Violence of the Cold War

Heonik Kwon

The Cold War occupies a rather unusual place in the history of organised mass violence. The second half of the twentieth century is sometimes depicted as an exceptionally peaceful era in modern history, in contrast to the century’s first half, which witnessed two wars of great magnitude. In this pacific view of the Cold War, which is not uncommon in the scholarship of modern European and transatlantic history, the Cold War was an unconventional conflict: it was fought mainly according to political, economic, ideological and polemical means; the powerful nations that waged this war kept building arsenals of weapons of mass destruction in the hope that they would never have to use them, and the threats of mutually assured destruction came to assure one of the longest times of international peace among industrialised nations. These strange features of the Cold War as being neither real war nor genuine peace, which Mary Kaldor succinctly explains with the idiom of an ‘imaginary war’, makes it difficult to come to terms with its history according to the conventional antinomy of war and peace.¹ George Orwell sums up this oddity of the Cold War in his novel Nineteen Eight-Four with the emphatic statement, ‘War is Peace.’

Turning our attention to the historical horizons outside Europe and the transatlantic, however, the pacific view of Cold War history runs into obstacles. The term ‘cold war’ refers to the prevailing condition of the world in the second half of the twentieth century, divided into two separate paths of political modernity and economic development. In a narrower sense, it means the contest of power and will between the two dominant states, the United States and the Soviet Union, which, according to Orwell, set out to rule the world between them under an undeclared state of war, being unable to conquer one another.² In a broader definition, however, the Cold War also

entails the unequal relations of power among the political communities that pursued or were driven to pursue a specific path of progress within the binary structure of the global order. The ‘contest-of-power’ dimension of the Cold War has been an explicit and central element in Cold War historiography; in contrast, the ‘relation-of-domination’ aspect has been a relatively marginal and implicit element. Highlighting these two contrary aspects of the global conflict, Walter LaFeber states that the questions of which Cold War and whose Cold War are central to any effort to understand Cold War history in a global perspective.3 In a similar light, Geir Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad emphasise the importance of political and revolutionary struggles for decolonisation in the making of the Cold War global order.4 Their view is that the experience of the Third World is pivotal to Cold War global politics and, therefore, the history of decolonisation is integral to the history of the bipolarisation of world politics.

It is important to note that the Cold War took violent forms especially in the regions that underwent the advent of political bipolarity as part of the political process of decolonisation. In this light, this chapter deals with three interrelated issues concerning the place of the Cold War in the history of violence. First, it discusses the fact that the Cold War becomes a legitimate subject of the history of violence once we broaden our interest to include postcolonial historical milieux. Second, it considers the related issue that the violence of the Cold War can be conceptualised broadly in terms of two forms: on the one hand, an imaginary violence – most notably, the threat and the fear of thermonuclear destruction – and, on the other, a non-imaginary, real violence that tore apart the physical and moral integrity of numerous human communities. It explores the duplex character of the Cold War’s violence, adopting what may be called a historical anthropological approach that is attentive to questions of plurality and unity in human historical experience. The destruction of the Cold War first became apparent in North-East and South-East Asia. Drawing upon the violent postcolonial Cold War experience in Korea and Vietnam, finally, the chapter will explore how the duplex character of Cold War violence, imaginary and non-imaginary, can be discussed as an issue of the Cold War in Asia, not merely along the

comparative historical horizon between postcolonial Asia and post-World War II Europe.

Cold War Divisions

In December 1955, the US Gallup Poll conducted a survey on the meaning of the Cold War. Their question to Americans was: ‘Will you tell me what the term “COLD WAR” means to you?’ The responses to this survey question were diverse and revealing. The pollsters classified the following as correct answers: war through talking, not down and out fighting; not a hot war; a subtle war, without arms – a diplomatic war, state of enmity between countries but will not become a total, all-out war; war without actual fighting; political war, battle of words among powers to gain prestige among their nations; like a bloodless war. The correct answers included: doing what you want to do and disregarding the other country’s opinion; war of nerves; peaceful enemies; propaganda to agitate the reds against democracy; nations can’t agree among themselves – bickering back and forth; uncertainty between foreign countries and this country; battle of wits. The Gallop pollsters classified other responses as incorrect: little children being parents and going without; too many people feathering their own nest. The so-called wrong answers included: cold war just like a hot war – as in Korea just as many boys being killed – that was supposed to be a cold war; fighting slow – no one knows what they are doing; war where no war is declared; fighting for nothing; real war all over the world; where everybody was at war; like a civil war.

The distance between ‘a bloodless diplomatic war’ and ‘real war all over the world like a [global] civil war’ is huge, and we can infer from the above episode that these radically different understandings of the Cold War coexisted at the initial stage of the global confrontation. It is interesting to discover that these contrary, nearly mutually incompatible conceptions of the Cold War were expressed in the context of the post-Korean War American society. The Korean War, for Americans, was part of their nation’s police action in the world at the time of the Cold War. About 30,000 American lives were lost in this conflict, not to mention 2 million Korean lives. Their nation fought in both European and Asian spaces during World War II. It continued to be involved militarily in Asia after that war was over, whereas in Europe the country’s postwar involvement took different means that were primarily political, diplomatic and economic. These bifurcating understandings of the early Cold War, between America’s relation to postwar Europe, on the one
hand, and its actions in the postwar Asia-Pacific on the other, is squarely present in the result of the 1955 polls. What is interesting about the episode is also the fact that one stream of interpretation out of the two was assigned to a categorical mistake. The pollsters classified as correct answers seeing the Cold War as a bloodless or political war, relegating the opposite view of the Cold War world as a global civil war to an uninformed, mistaken understanding of the concept.

These two radically different images, and related unresolved issues relating to the place of violence in Cold War history, persist even now, many years after the end of the Cold War. In March 2015, I had the pleasure of attending the preparatory meeting of the Center for Cold War Studies in Berlin and, shortly before, in February of the same year, the inaugural meeting for the Association for Cold War Studies in Seoul. These two events presented rather different atmospheres. The Berlin meeting was decisively one of historical reflection, consisting primarily of historians of modern Germany and those specialising in the international history of the Cold War. It clearly represented the change in Cold War studies since the 1990s, from the field of social science to that of historical research. In the Seoul meeting, however, it was not clear to me whether the conference was approaching the Cold War as a subject of historical research or as a set of questions concerning contemporary history. My impression was that this meeting had two outlooks. In relation to global horizons, it discussed the Cold War as a historical question; however, when the conversation covered conditions in the Korean peninsula and in broader North-East Asia, issues of the Cold War appeared to be much more ethnographical than historical as these concerned phenomena and developments here and now rather than from a bygone era. There was another notable difference between the two events and between the ideas of the Cold War invoked in these events. Unlike in the Berlin meeting, in the Korean one the very idea of the Cold War seemed somewhat controversial and even contradictory, having to include in it the human experience of an extremely violent and precarious social crisis that is at odds with what the term ‘cold war’ usually stands for.

The crisis took myriad forms and continues to affect local lives. In the south-eastern region of the Korean peninsula, for instance, there is a village once known in the environs as a moskoba (Moscow) – the wartime reference for a communist stronghold. Each year, people originally from this village return to their homeland in order to join the ceremony held on behalf of their family and village ancestors, mainly to visit their graves scattered on the hills around the village. On these occasions, the relatives
from distant places are pleased to meet each other and exchange news – but not always so. When a man cautiously suggested to his lineage elders recently that the family might consider repairing a neglected ancestral tomb, the harmony of the family meal held after the tomb visit was disrupted. One elder left the room in a fury, and others remained silent throughout the ceremonial meal. The man who proposed the idea was the adopted son of the person buried in the neglected tomb, having been selected for this role by the family elders for a ritual purpose. The elder whom he offended happened to be a close relative of the deceased. The ancestor had been a prominent anti-colonial communist youth activist before he died at a young age in a colonial prison without a descendant. The elder’s siblings were among the several dozen village youths who left the village together with the retreating communist army during the chaos of the Korean War (1950–3). Such phenomena were widespread in the early months of the war when local communities were exposed to the preemptive and retributive violence against the so-called collaborators committed liberally by both sides of the war as the frontier of war moved (see below). The elder believes that this catastrophe in village history and family continuity could have been avoided if the ancestor buried in the neglected tomb had not brought the seeds of ‘red ideology’ to the village in the first place. Beautifying the ancestral tomb was unacceptable to this elder, who believed that some of his close kinsmen had lost, because of the ancestor, the social basis on which they could be properly remembered as family ancestors.

The morality of ancestral remembrance is as strong in the Vietnamese cultural tradition as it is in the Korean. These two countries also share the common historical experience of being important sites and symbols in Asia for the American leadership in the global struggle against international communism. In recent years, since the Vietnamese political leadership initiated a general economic reform and regulated political liberalisation in the country in the late 1980s, there has been a strong revival of ancestral rituals across Vietnamese villages. Such rituals were previously discouraged by the state hierarchy who regarded them as being incompatible with the modern secular, revolutionary society. In the communities of the southern and central regions (what was South Vietnam during the Vietnam War), a notable aspect of this social development has been the introduction to the ancestral ritual realm of the identities previously excluded from public memory. The memorabilia of the hitherto socially stigmatised historical
identities, such as those of former South Vietnamese soldiers, have become increasingly visible in the domestic and communal ritual space.\textsuperscript{5}

In the home of a stonemason south of Danang, a commercial and administrative centre of Vietnam’s central region, the family’s ancestral altar displayed two framed pictures of young men. One man wore a military uniform, and his name was inscribed on the state-issued death certificate hanging above the family’s ancestral altar. The other, dressed in his high school uniform, had also fought and died in the war. His death certificate, issued by the former South Vietnamese authority, had been carefully hidden in the closet. Recently, the matron of this family decided to put the two soldiers together. She took down the Hero Death Certificate from the wall and placed it on the newly refurbished ancestral altar. She laid this on the right-hand side of the altar usually reserved for seniors. She had enlarged a small picture of her younger son that she had long kept in her bedroom. She invited some friends, her surviving children and their children for a meal. Before the meal, she held a modest ceremony during which she said she had dreamed many times about moving the schoolboy from her room and next to his elder brother.

Another family living in the same environs has a similar, yet deeper and broader history of displacement and reconciliation. The family’s grandfather was a former labourer soldier of the French colonial army. In 1937–8, the French colonial authority in Indochina conscripted a large number of labourers from the central region of Vietnam and shipped them to the great Mediterranean city of Marseilles. There, in the city’s\textit{ poudrerie}, 2,000 Vietnamese conscripts manufactured gunpowder for the French army and, under the Vichy regime, for the German army under French management. Some of these Vietnamese labourer soldiers objected to their situation and joined the French resistance, whereas others continued to endure the appalling working conditions in the factory. After sharing the humiliating experience of German occupation with the French citizens, these foreign conscripts found themselves in a highly precarious situation following their return home in 1948: the leaders in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement distrusted them, indeed looked upon them as collaborators with the colonial regime; and the French took no interest in their past service to their national economy or their contribution to the resistance movement against the

\textsuperscript{5} Heonik Kwon,\textit{ After the Massacre: Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 161–4.
German occupiers. Many of these returnees perished in the ensuing chaos of war – the First Indochina War (or what the Vietnamese call the War against France) – and many of their children joined the revolutionary resistance movement in the following era during the Second Indochina War (which the Vietnamese call the War against America).

The family’s grandfather is one of the few returnees who survived the carnage and has an extraordinary story of survival to tell: how he rescued his family in 1953 from the imminent threat of summary execution by pleading to French soldiers in their language. He accomplished this again in 1967 thanks to the presence of an American officer in a pacification team who understood a few words of French as a result of having fought in Europe during World War II. The man’s youngest brother died unmarried and without a descendant, so the man’s eldest son now performs periodic death-remembrance rites on behalf of the fallen. His brother was killed in action during the Vietnam War as a soldier of the South Vietnamese army, and his eldest son is a decorated former partisan fighter belonging to the National Liberation Front. The eldest son, together with his father, also performs a periodic rite of commemoration for his great-grandmother who died in a tragic incident in 1948 shortly before her only surviving grandchild returned from France.

At that time, the woman was living alone in her bamboo hut. She had lost her husband in 1936 and her children shortly after, and her orphaned grandchildren had left the village for an urban ghetto or further away. She survived on a small plot of land where she grew vegetables. The neighbours regularly helped the lonely woman with rice and fish sauce. On the fifth day of the eleventh lunar month of 1948, she spotted a group of French soldiers conducting a house-to-house search. Ill at the time, she waved to the soldiers for help. The soldiers came, pushed her back into the house, closed the shutters and set fire to the bamboo house. In the following era, the locals reported seeing apparitions of this woman. The villagers eventually erected a small shrine in her memory on the site of her destroyed home and then started calling her Ba Ba Linh, meaning powerful grandmother. Throughout the chaos of the Vietnam War, her humble shrine attracted regular visits by local women who came to pray to the old woman for their family’s safety. During the day, some Saigon soldiers saw the village women kowtowing to the shrine, heard the story and prayed for their own wishes at the site. At night, the peasant militiamen who came to survey the area heard the same story. The village women saw that some of these partisan fighters were praying to the shrine before they hurriedly joined their group to move to the next hamlet. When people returned to the village after an evacuation during the
critical period of the Vietnam War in 1967–9, they recalled that there was nothing standing in the hamlet except the humble wooden shrine dedicated to the powerful grandmother.

The precarious condition of life that confronted this family and many other people in this region for many years is often referred to as *xoi dau* by the locals. *Xoi dau* refers to a ceremonial Vietnamese delicacy made of white rice flour and black beans. Used also as a metaphor, the term conveys how people of these regions experienced the Vietnam War. As such, *xoi dau* refers to the turbulent conditions of communal life during the war, when the rural inhabitants were confronted with successive occupations by conflicting political and military forces. At night, the village was under the control of the revolutionary forces; during the daytime, the opposing forces took control. Life in these villages oscillated between two different political worlds governed by two mutually hostile military forces. The people had to cope with their separate, yet equally absolute, demands for loyalty and with the world changing politically so frequently that sometimes this anomaly almost appeared normal. *Xoi dau* conveys the simple truth that, when you eat this food, you must swallow both the white and the black parts. This is how *xoi dau* is supposed to be eaten, and this is what it was like living a tumultuous life seized by the brutally dynamic reality of Vietnam’s civil and international war.

Survival in such a reality often meant accepting both sides of the dual world. One common episode that resulted from coping with such a thundering bipolarity involved family disunity: some siblings joined ‘this side’ (*ben ta*, the revolutionary side) whereas others, especially the younger ones, were dragged to ‘that side’ (*ben kia*, the American side). The situation was tragic and the result often painful: many of them failed to return home alive, and even years later the younger ones cannot return home even in memory. Yet the situation also had a creative side: for instance, the family hoped to have at least one of them survive the war by having them on different sides of the battlefield; or if the family had the extraordinary luck of seeing all of them return home alive, the siblings on the winner’s side would be able to help those on the loser’s side to rebuild their lives.

The meaning of *xoi dau*, of course, is not the same as the meaning of the Cold War as we usually understand it; yet the extreme conditions of human life that this Vietnamese idiom refers to are very much part of Cold War history as the latter was experienced by people in central Vietnam and many other communities in the decolonising world. Moreover, the experience of *xoi dau* is hardly a thing of the past and is very much part of contemporary history, involving vigorous communal efforts to come to terms with the
ruins of the past destruction existing in communal life. This is the case with the stonemason’s family, and the same is true with the village in South Korea, both mentioned earlier.

The moskoba village’s tragedy related to the changing waves of war and occupation. The Korean War was not a single war but rather a combination of several different kinds of war. Above all, it was a civil war waged between two mutually negating postcolonial political forces, each of which, through the negation, aspired to realise the ideal of self-determination by building a common, singular and united modern nation state. It was part of a global war waged between two bifurcating international political, moral and economic forces having different visions of modernity, which we commonly call the Cold War. The Korean War was also an international conflict fought, among others, between two of the most powerful states of the contemporary world, the United States and China. Hidden beneath the relatively well-known characteristics of the Korean War as a civil, international and global conflict, recent studies show that another kind of war was being waged in postcolonial Korea. Steven Lee characterises the last layer of the Korean War as a war against the civilian population.⁶

In the very early days of the war, in face of the enemy forces rapidly advancing southward to its territory, the South Korean state committed pre-emptive violence against society on a massive scale. Directed against people whom it considered sympathisers or hypothetical collaborators with the enemy, this state action set in motion a vicious cycle of violence against civilians in the ensuing chaos of war: it radicalised the punitive actions perpetrated under North Korean occupation against the individuals and families who were classified as supporters of the southern regime, which in turn escalated the intensity of retaliatory violence directed against the so-called collaborators with the communist occupiers when the tide of war changed. When the North Korean forces left their briefly occupied territory in the South, they acted in the same way as the South had done before, committing numerous atrocities of pre-emptive violence against people whom they considered to be potential collaborators with the southern regime. The mobile frontier resulted not only in extreme abuse of the civilian population by the coercive powers of the warring states but also in the rise of the phenomenon that Kalyvas calls the privatisation of violence.⁷ Village communities were turned inside out, becoming a crucible of destruction in

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the image of the wider theatre of war but at the hands of people who were kin and had been neighbours for generations. This chaotic, reciprocal violence against society generated a mass exodus of the terrified population from their places of origin, both southward and northward, and thus was greatly responsible for one of the most critical questions of the human condition in the post-Korean War Korean peninsula, which remains unresolved till today – the plight of families divided between North and South. The generalised human displacement and family separation had other far-reaching implications. The presence in families of missing persons – those who were suspected to have moved to the enemy territory or those who were killed during the war while being accused of being anti-state elements – became a critical liability for the surviving families after the war was over.

In places that experienced the early Cold War in such a chaotic civil war, therefore, kinship rarely constitutes a politically homogeneous entity. Their genealogical unity is crowded with the remains of wartime political bifurcation. In the customary practices of ancestral commemoration, people must deal not only with the memory of meritorious ancestors who contributed to the nation’s revolutionary or anti-communist march to independence but also with the stigmatising genealogical background of working against the defined forward march. As in Sophocles’ epic tragedy Antigone, which inspired Hegel in his philosophy of the modern state, many individuals and families in these regions were torn between the familial obligation to tend to the memory of the war dead related in kinship and the political obligation not to do so for those who fought against the anti-communist or revolutionary state. It is common in these places for a family to have a few heroic fallen soldiers from the war to commemorate. Siblings and others close to those killed in action on the opposite side of the war’s frontier are also somehow accounted for. The memories of the dead in these communities are simultaneously united in kinship memory and bipolarised in political history. The initiatives taken by people such as the stonemason’s family or the man in the Korean village arise out of this long, turbulent political history, and they continue to evolve and expand today.

Decolonisation and the Cold War

The violence of the Cold War, such as that which inflicted enduring wounds and crises on these families, was typically intertwined with the process of decolonisation. In this sense, we may start thinking about the Cold War’s globally encompassing yet regionally and locally variant histories, in terms of
two broad realities: the imaginary war in Europe and North America on the one hand and, on the other, the postcolonial experience of bipolar politics in which the very concept of the Cold War becomes problematic and contradictory. Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis calls the second half of the twentieth century a ‘long peace’, an exceptional period of international peace in contrast to what came before, the first half of the century characterised by two gigantic wars among nations and empires. A late historian of modern Europe, Tony Judt, objected to Gaddis’s characterisation of the Cold War as a long peace, however. He writes, ‘This way of narrating cold war history reflects the same provincialism. John Lewis Gaddis has written a history of America’s cold war. As a result, this is a book whose silences are especially suggestive. The “third world” in particular comes up short.’

Indeed, as LaFeber notes, the era of the Cold War was far from a peaceful time when seen in a broad perspective; it witnessed over 40 million human casualties across territories. The experience of bipolar politics certainly varied in intensity and in temporality across regions. The most violent manifestation of the global Cold War took its earliest tolls in South-East and North-East Asia, represented by the outbreak of the First Indochina War (1945–54) and the Korean War. In the following decades, while a new total war was being waged in Vietnam and its neighbouring countries, the Cold War’s political violence became much more transnational and generalised, engulfing many nations and communities in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America during what Fred Halliday, historian of the Middle East, calls the Second Cold War. It is against this historical background that the celebrated Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez once said that nations in Central and South America did not have a moment’s rest from the threat and reality of mass violence during the so-called ‘cold’ war. The reality of mass violence endured in Latin America may have been different in intensity and in character from that suffered by the Koreans in the 1950s and by the Vietnamese in the 1960s, which incorporated a totalising war as well as systematic state political violence. Moreover, not all postcolonial states and communities experienced the Cold War in terms of armed conflicts or in

other exceptional forms of political violence. South Asia is a notable example. Despite these exceptions, however, it is reasonable to conclude that, for a great majority of decolonising nations, the Cold War was hardly a period of long peace.

The claim that the Cold War was a global conflict should not mean, therefore, that the conflict was experienced in the same terms all over the world. Cold War politics permeated developed and underdeveloped societies, Western and non-Western states and colonial powers and colonised nations alike; in this sense, it was a truly global reality. However, the historical experience and the collective memory of the Cold War contain aspects of radical divergence between the West and the postcolonial world. This has indeed been one of the key questions in recent developments in Cold War studies. For the past decade, enquiries into the plurality of the Cold War human historical experience have been mostly focused primarily on the comparison between the postcolonial world, on the one hand, and Western Europe and the larger transatlantic world, on the other.\footnote{Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 73–109.}

Grounded in the observation that Asia’s postcolonial experience of political bipolarisation was far from an ‘imaginary war’ – a warlike condition that is nevertheless contrary to an actual condition of war – a reasoned consideration of this question has been pivotal to the advent of new Cold War historical scholarship in recent years and has provoked a number of innovative studies of the zone of historical field that is often referred to as decolonisation and the Cold War.\footnote{Among many examples are Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War in the Third World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Hajimu Masuda, The Cold War Crucible: The Korean War and the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).}

The emerging interest in the postcolonial Cold War shows that we can no longer think of the history of the Cold War, and the broader political history of right and left that in the mid twentieth century became entrenched in the form of what some observers call the confrontation between the empire of liberty and the empire of equality, without thinking of the history of mass violence and mass death. Both right and left were part of anti-colonial nationalism, signifying different routes towards the ideal of national liberation and self-determination. In the ensuing bipolar era, the ideas of right and left transformed into the ideology of civil strife and war, in which achieving national unity became equivalent to annihilating one or the other side from
the body politic. In this context, the political history of right and left is not to be considered separately from the history of human lives and social institutions torn by the distinction, nor is the social development beyond the Cold War to be separated from the memory of the dead ruins of this history.

The recognition that a Cold War with mass human casualties and a Cold War without them are different entities, however, should not be taken to mean that these two histories are not comparable or commensurable. Dissecting the whole of the global Cold War into different constituent parts is for the purpose of creating a new image of the whole rather than dismantling the image of the whole. Even within the history of mass death, there are elements of diversity. The US experience of the Cold War does not collapse to the paradigm of the imaginary war or the long peace as easily as does the dominant European experience. The United States has a memory of mass sacrifice of American lives from the era, not least in relation to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. This collective memory of mass sacrifice, however, is not the same as the memory of mass death kept in Vietnam or in Korea. Consisting principally of the heroic death of armed soldiers, the American memory distinguishes the United States from the rest of the West, whose dominant memory of the Cold War encompasses a painful but largely deathless confrontation between political groupings, but it is also distinct from the collective memories of death in the wider world during the Cold War, chiefly the tragic mass death of ordinary civilians. In the sphere of the history of violence and the related realm of death commemoration, therefore, we cannot easily say that Europe and America constitute a single community of shared collective memory called the West. But nor can we easily reconcile America’s memory of heroic death and sacrifice in the struggle against communism with the memories of mass tragic death associated with the same struggle in the rest of the world.

Although the recent development in Cold War studies has made a notable contribution to diversifying Cold War narratives, an equally important question remains critically unexplored. The plurality of the Cold War experience is not merely an issue of comparative history between Asia and Europe; instead, it may be discussed as part of a specific regional history.

Witnessed in the relatively narrow sphere of East Asia, the early Cold War was manifested differently among the societies that constitute this regional entity. For instance, Japan experienced the early Cold War in a manner that is closely akin to how nations in western Europe underwent the era: with the imperative post-World War II socio-economic reconstruction, a growing economic prosperity and an unprecedented era of international peace. In
the late 1960s, Japanese society underwent forceful social protests and generational upheaval, which Immanuel Wallerstein dubbed a ‘revolution in the world-system’. Provoked by the tragedy of the Vietnam War and the West’s role and complicity in it, the multi-sited, simultaneous civil protest in 1967–9 transformed the social fabric of Japan as well as that of the United States and several western European nations. However, the so-called world revolution hardly had any ramifications elsewhere in Asia or in Japan’s neighbouring societies.

We can apply the same idea of Cold War historical plurality to other political societies in Asia. The fate of Korea in the 1950s, which involved a destructive civil war, is not that remote from the experience of political societies in the Middle East and in Africa in the 1970s and the 1980s, during which many of them were swept into a civil war or a similar crisis. The behaviour of some of the East Asian states (such as China and North Korea) in the 1970s comes close to that of some of the Western states during the general crisis of the early Cold War in the 1950s: maintaining the peace of an imaginary war at home while playing a role in the escalation of a total war crisis elsewhere in the postcolonial world. It is a known historical fact (although one that is not yet satisfactorily researched) that North Korea and China were deeply implicated in the crisis of the Second Cold War across the African continent, from Sudan and Uganda to Angola and Zimbabwe. By then, these state entities were both in and out of the Cold War, having assimilated an ideology of non-alignment in thought, yet in practice engaging vigorously in the international postcolonial sphere with a self-conscious and sometimes self-centred revolutionary zeal. Meanwhile, South Korea, together with Taiwan and some other political entities in South-East Asia, joined, with considerable success, what some Cold War historians call ‘the right kind of revolution’ – economic development as a Cold War power struggle – while maintaining within its domestic political sphere a military-led authoritarian political order and radical politics of containment with regard to civil society, which is fairly akin to how societies in Latin America underwent the Cold War era.16

Conclusion

If we approach the plurality of Cold War experiences in this way, we may say that Cold War history has a fractal formation. A fractal theory of social structure and political system is very much a part of the development of modern social anthropology. It posits that the whole and each of the parts that together constitute the whole have an identical structural form – as in the study of the segmentary kinship and political systems of traditional Africa.\(^{17}\) Concerning the subject matter at hand, this idea conveys that a new way of conceptualising Asia’s place in modern global history may be possible. Asia’s Cold War experience is in many ways distinct from and even contrary to how Europe underwent the era of political bipolarity. The Cold War in Asia was far from an imaginary war, and we are not sure whether it is over and done with today. Parallel to these differences in form and in temporality, however, Asia’s Cold War has elements within it, an attention to which can render the region’s experience of bipolar modernity in a similar image of the global Cold War. Considered this way, Asia’s Cold War was other than an imaginary war and, at once and in part, very much an imaginary war. We can see in it not only the long peace of Europe but also the turbulent fates of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. In the end, it appears that Asia’s Cold War is not an Asian history but rather a global history in the guise of an Asian history.

If the Cold War was both an imaginary war and at the same time a generalised experience of political terror and mass death, we need to tell its history accordingly, inclusive of the seismic death events experienced by communities, rather than considering the latter as only perfunctory marginal episodes in an otherwise peaceful, balanced contest for power. In regard to the Cold War’s duplicity in terms of the presence and absence of mass violence, Mary Kaldor argues that the Cold War ‘kept alive the idea of war, while avoiding its reality. [No conventional warfare] broke out on European soil. At the same time, many wars took place all over the world, including Europe, in which more people died than in the Second World War. But because these wars did not fit our conception of war, they were discounted.’\(^{18}\) Kaldor believes that these ‘irregular, informal wars of the second half of the twentieth century’ took place ‘as a peripheral part of the central conflict’, and


she argues that these ‘informal wars’ are becoming the source of new post-Cold War bellicosity. If we follow Kaldor, it appears that Cold War history has a concentric conceptual organisation consisting of a ‘formal’ history of relative peace in the centre and ‘informal’ violence on the periphery. The Cold War was both an idea of war in the exemplary centre and a reality of revolutionary war and chaotic violence in the peripheral terrains. At the centre, the end of the Cold War was a largely peaceful event and opened a constructive development of transnational integration, whereas in the periphery the same ‘end’ gave birth to a new age of aggression. In this view of the Cold War and what comes after it, the Cold War was not only an ambiguous phenomenon, being neither real war nor genuine peace, but also a highly contradictory phenomenon, experienced as an idea of war for some and as a reality of prolific organised violence for others.

The above comment from an eminent observer of modern Europe demonstrates that our understanding of the Cold War is still grounded in a concentric spatial hierarchy. In the history of the Cold War as an imaginary war, the history of man-made mass death existed mainly in the form of disturbing memory and a disturbing possibility, being haunted by the morbid events in Auschwitz and Hiroshima and overshadowed by the threat of thermonuclear destruction. As the philosopher Edith Wyschogrod argued, the ‘life-world’ in the second half of the twentieth century was suspended between the death events of the immediate past and the fear of an apocalyptic end of the life-world in the uncertain future. Beyond the horizon of the imaginary war, however, death events were not a possibility but an actual ‘unbridled reality’ and an aspect of everyday lives.

This chapter proposes that confronting the centre/periphery hierarchy in the conception of the Cold War is critical to a grounded understanding of the political history of the bipolar era. The effort involves an attention to the violence of the Cold War and its variant forms, real or imaginary. It also involves the recognition that the violence of the Cold War was experienced varyingly within a region as well as between different regional entities. Communities in Asia did not experience the Cold War in an identical way, just as bipolar politics was manifested differently between post-World War II Europe and postcolonial Asia. Orwell’s ‘War is Peace’ continues to be meaningful for understanding the nature of the Cold War, yet for reasons that

20 The expression ‘unbridled reality’ is Gabriel García Márquez’s and is quoted in Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*, p. 170. See also Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*. 
depart from what he had in mind when he coined the expression. How to reconcile the radically different historical experiences and related divergent historical memories of the global conflict goes beyond an issue of academic research in significance. Rather, it constitutes a vital, unresolved issue of public policy in the international sphere, relevant to efforts to build up transnational solidarity in the face of common contemporary threats to human security, as manifested in the debates about territorial disputes in East Asia.

The real distinctiveness of Asia’s Cold War experience is perhaps to be found in a much more minute scale and intimate sphere of human life than in a wide comparative historical sphere. It may be found, rather than in the violent ways in which communities in the region experienced the Cold War, in the ways in which the violent historical legacies are kept alive and its meanings are transformed in the intimate sphere of human life. The humble shrine for the powerful grandmother south of Danang is one example I am familiar with. The grandmother lost her life amidst the crisis of the First Indochina War. She transformed into a powerful spirit at the start of the Second Indochina War, and she listened and responded to many hopes against hope enunciated by numerous people whose lives were turned upside down by the continuing war. Today, her spirit continues to be responsive to a multitude of other human hopes. The history of this grandmother manifests the power of the human spirit to overcome the destructive power of modern history. However, it does so on the basis of a specific religious and cultural tradition, which has long celebrated the vitality of the regenerative human spirit that refuses to give in to the annihilation of violent death.

Bibliographical Essay

The Cold War holds a unique place in the history of violence. Notably, a large body of Cold War literature concentrates on imaginary violence (the threat and fear of violence), especially regarding thermonuclear destruction. Among the prominent exemplars are Mary Kaldor’s *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East–West Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990) and John Lewis Gaddis’s *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For Gaddis, the era’s imaginary violence is equal in meaning to the extraordinary stretch of peace that Western and other industrialised nations enjoyed during the Cold War.

Different renderings of the place of violence in Cold War history also exist. These typically result from broad comparative or global historical views of the Cold War that consider the different ways in which violence was manifested across territories, especially between post-1945 Europe and the postcolonial world. Walter LaFeber’s *An End to
Which Cold War?, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 13–20, clarifies that Cold War conflicts resulted in over 40 million human casualties across places. The era’s large-scale violence erupted especially in places that experienced Cold War confrontation as part of decolonisation. Accordingly, the theme of Cold War violence is discussed widely in studies on the global conflict that was waged in the decolonising world. Notable in this regard is Odd Arne Westad’s *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which brings to the centre of Cold War historical narratives the history of Third World revolutions, which typically involved civil war crises.

The view of the Cold War in terms of a history of violence is present in several area studies. In Latin American studies, Greg Grandin’s *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) is useful for discerning the particular character of political violence that the region experienced – both as a continuation of colonial violence and as a new form of political terror that was harbouring novel ideological dispositions. Kyle Burke’s *Revolutionaries for the Right: Anti-Communist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2018) provides a history of counterinsurgency warfare during the Cold War in a global context. In addition, the growing scholarship on Asia’s Cold War experience has consistently foregrounded the violent aspects of global confrontations in the region. Heonik Kwon’s *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) and Hajimu Masuda’s *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Post-War World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015) are some recent examples.

New and innovative studies are now exploring other forms of Cold War violence, which have been hitherto understudied. Monica Kim analyses highly intimate violence, both physical and psychological, in relation to the idea of ‘brainwashing’, which was manifested in the interrogative acts against the communist prisoners of war during the Korea conflict, in *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019). Polymeris Voglis explores similar issues in the context of the Greek Civil War in his *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002). Edwin A. Martini’s *Agent Orange: History, Science, and the Politics of Uncertainty* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012) explores the Vietnam War’s violence against the environment, focusing on the widespread use of highly toxic herbicides as part of counterinsurgency warfare. This form of violence left enduring human disabilities on combatants, civilians and even those born after the war. These aspects of the Cold War’s ‘war against nature’ are investigated in *The Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, edited by J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Another notable example in this research genre is anthropologist Krisna Uk’s informative study of how the Jorai people in the border region between Vietnam and Cambodia relate to the deadly remains of the Vietnam War, including unexploded bombs and mines that abound in their highland forest environment, in *Salvage: Cultural Resilience among the Jorai of Northeast Cambodia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
Quotidian Violence in the French Empire, 1890–1940

When Léon Leconte beat, blinded and threatened to kill Chief Tieou he had little reason to fear recrimination. In 1908, at the time of the attack, Leconte’s father was one of the richest and most powerful Frenchmen in the Pacific colony of New Caledonia. Both father and 29-year-old son had, as the governor of the possession put it, ‘reputations for brutality’ as well as records of beating and injuring local residents stretching back nearly twenty years. Neither had ever been punished for his actions.¹ This most recent incident would likely have gone completely unnoticed, not to mention unpunished, except for the facts that Leconte attacked a chief and did so in front of witnesses.

As Chief Tieou told the story, at about one o’clock in the afternoon, he was walking into the village of Koné, in the north of the island, on his way to pay his tribe’s taxes when Leconte assailed him without saying a word. Leconte knocked him to the ground and kicked him, cutting his head and right eye, covering the chief’s face in blood. Tieou fled his assailant, escaping to a nearby river to wash his wounds. But Leconte found him and attacked again, this time chasing him into the river, yelling, ‘Give me a knife and I’ll kill him.’ Tieou would not be caught; he swam across the river to the opposite bank, and ran to a nearby village. A Kanak witness named Levi saw the altercation but did not get involved for fear of being beaten himself. ‘Leconte’, Levi later explained, ‘is the terror of the country.’²

When interrogated by the local gendarme, Leconte felt no obligation to say anything at all about the affair. A few days later, Leconte tried to convince

Tieou to retract his complaint, but the chief, who would be left incapacitated for a month and permanently blinded in one eye, refused. Leconte soon appeared in court in the capital, Nouméa, with his attorney who happened also to be a high-ranking administrator in the district. The attorney had a number of private conversations with the jurors before the procedure began and in no time secured an acquittal for his client. The judge, however, was less easily persuaded of Leconte’s innocence and awarded Chief Tieou 3,000 francs in damages. In reflecting on the verdict, the governor of the colony wrote to his superiors in Paris that it was unfortunate that Leconte’s punishment was only pecuniary. But he assured the minister of colonies, with perhaps disingenuous optimism, that the judgment had had ‘the best effect in giving the indigenous the assurance that they can count . . . on the protection that they are due’. Of officials in Paris expressed concern that the jury had not shown the ‘desirable impartiality’ that one might expect. But the case was closed and, it seems, soon forgotten, at least by French officials.

Leconte’s attack on Chief Tieou was not an uncommon event in the modern French empire. Many French civilians – be they settlers, merchants or travellers – believed beating, kicking and verbally abusing non-Europeans to be an expected, and even necessary, part of daily colonial life. Africans, Asians and Pacific Islanders in the empire lived at the bottom of a social hierarchy defined by race, class and social status. As in the Jim Crow American South, many colonial subjects were systematically kept in positions of political and economic weakness by laws that excluded them from government decisions, tax schemes that pushed many from subsistence to misery, and labour expectations that made it impossible for them to produce enough food for their own consumption. In everyday social interactions, their subservience to white settlers and officials was punctuated by acts that could run the broad gamut from verbal abuse to murder. Colonial populations were left wondering why, as one African subject put it in 1922, when ‘blacks and whites are the children of the French republic’, they were exposed to the most degrading humiliations.

That colonialism is synonymous with violence has become a truism, so much so that it is tempting to see the colonial world, to quote Frantz Fanon,
'cut in two'. The question for historians is thus not whether colonialism was violent, but where to locate the incision that so brutally divided colonial societies. Most historians of the French Empire have located the dividing line in what Fanon called ‘agents of government’, particularly soldiers, policemen, judges and administrators, who acted as the ‘spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression’. The result has been a rich collection of historical works on myriad forms of colonial violence, from military conquest to abusive tax systems, that has highlighted the complex structural underpinnings of the iniquities of French rule. In so doing, historians have made plain the claim of the Antillean poet and critic Aimé Césaire, who said ‘between colonization and civilization there is an infinite distance’.

Acts of violence carried out by non-state actors – that is, by European settlers, merchants and travellers like Léon Leconte in New Caledonia – remain far less explored in the historiography of French colonialism. In important ways, brutality perpetrated by non-state actors helped perpetuate the Manichean dynamics of colonialism so powerfully described by Fanon and others. Such violence helped harden the racial, political and social hierarchy of coloniser and colonised. The prevalence of violence suggests that quotidian brutality was central to settlers’ sense of power and identity in regions where they felt under constant threat from larger non-European populations.

But the ways in which civilians mistreated colonial subjects often differed starkly from the state’s efforts to legitimate its own use of violence in military, administrative and judicial capacities. As the Leconte case makes clear, in possessions where subjects greatly outnumbered white colonists, daily acts of violence were potentially threatening to the colonial administration. They undermined administrative control of French citizens and destabilised what were often delicate balances of power between officials and subject populations. Equally important, uncontrolled violence jeopardised the central rhetorical claim that colonisation brought rationalism and civilisation to allegedly less-developed societies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Such issues were brought increasingly to the fore in the interwar years when internationalist organisations increasingly scrutinised the treatment of colonial subjects in all European empires.

9 Daughton, 'Behind the Imperial Curtain', pp. 503–28.
Violence and Everyday Colonial Life

The men, women and children who lived under French rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were reminded daily of their inferiority to Europeans. The very language of the ‘civilising mission’, with its promises of transforming backward, unclean ‘savages’ into educated, moral human beings, made inequality the basis of all colonial relations and the chief justification of European rule. Racial difference was inscribed in a variety of cultural artefacts, from novels and advertisements to political tracts and pseudo-scientific theories. Beyond the rhetorical, non-Europeans’ interactions with white people were regularly laden with humiliation as well as physical and emotional pain that reinforced the colonial hierarchy and made all too apparent the relative helplessness of many subjects.

While it is possible to find many descriptions of quotidian violence in published and archival sources, there is good reason to believe that the number of specific cases of abuse reported represent only a fraction of the incidents of violence that occurred. The mainstream press rarely picked up stories of whites harming Indigenous men, women and children, even when incidents were publicised in the radical press or by organisations like the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, France’s premier defender of civil rights. A perusal of major colonial newspapers leaves the reader assuming that the empire was the exclusive domain of progress and civilisation. Memoirs written by those who defended colonial expansion, such as merchants, officials and soldiers, rarely reflected on Indigenous suffering. For mistreated Indigenous men and women, as well as white men and women who found the abuse unacceptable, little good resulted from reporting incidents. Africans, Asians and Pacific Islanders who reported cruelty at best found the administration unresponsive, and at worst could be imprisoned or further abused. Even whites – be they officials or colonists – who spoke out against inhumane behaviour had to overcome intense social pressures not to stray across the racial divide. Even well-established writers, including André Gide, Albert Londres and Félicien Challaye, faced heated recriminations and even accusations of treason for highlighting the mistreatment of Indigenous people at the hands of European colonisers.

While the pressure to ignore abuses against non-Europeans was intense, there is also evidence that whites in the empire grew immune to even disturbing scenes of violence. Across the empire in the early twentieth century, for example, postcard producers not only capitalised on the exotism of the ‘Orient’ and the grandeur of colonial facades; they also sought
profit by producing ‘real photo’ images of killed rebels and bombed-out pirate dens. In Indochina, following the 1908 campaign against the legendary anti-colonial fighter De Tham in Indochina, Pierre Dieulefils, one of the colony’s most prolific postcard makers, produced a series of images, ranging from half-starved conspirators captured to the executed bodies of the condemned. Dieulefils’s cheap, mass-produced postcards mirrored those gaining popularity in the USA that depicted the lynching of African Americans. Both types of photos emphasised the total vulnerability of non-whites to white violence and social and political power. A final indignity could be levelled with a trifling salutation scribbled by the sender. On the back of one particularly graphic image of the severed head of a ‘pirate’, a Frenchman wrote to a loved-one at home with a succinct, if startling, nonchalance: ‘I haven’t forgotten you. A thousand kisses.’

If cultural artefacts offer only suggestive evidence of French attitudes towards colonial violence, official reports, newspaper articles and travellers’ accounts provided more detailed descriptions. In the more remote and understaffed colonies, where white settlers and businessmen were furthest from the administration’s view, evidence of the mistreatment of Indigenous people was often vague but suggestive. Writing about the New Hebrides in 1911, for example, the governor of New Caledonia admitted, ‘the actions that have given Europeans a detestable reputation, very often merited, in the eyes of the natives, are unfortunately too frequent’. Stories of ‘revolting facts’ circulated, though were hard to prove. Islanders were exposed to white plantation owners with reputations for brutality, for whom life in the tropics seemed ‘destructive to the moral senses’. These settlers, he continued, ignored the law, living like the ‘old buccaneers’ of the Caribbean. When labourers were needed, whites hunted them down and captured them as slavers would. The governor was optimistic that rational rule over whites could be established in the New Hebrides, for there were some people who ‘remained French in all the noble meanings of the word’. But considering the logistical and administrative challenges of ruling such a remote collection of islands, the governor’s optimism was not entirely convincing.

11 Postcard of a Vietnamese ‘pirate’, Stanford University, Manuscript Collection: Misc 1433.
12 ATNC: 44 W 585: Letter from Governor Richard to the colonial minister. Nouméa, 8 November 1911.
Even in a colony like Indochina, which many Frenchmen considered to possess an ancient and refined culture, colonial subjects were exposed to the pettiest mistreatment. White Frenchmen demanded to be treated with formality, regardless of their rank. Vietnamese of all ages and grades were expected by many Frenchmen to bow and tip their hats in their presence. Regardless of their accomplishments, the Vietnamese were addressed as ‘tu’ by even the lowliest French fonctionnaire and regularly excluded from white people’s homes. When shopping, whites believed they had the right to be served before Vietnamese customers. Even wealthy Vietnamese elites could be made to feel unwelcome in more exclusive stores, restaurants and hotels.

Félicien Challaye, an outspoken critic of colonial rule, was struck by the variety of mistreatment he witnessed in Indochina. In 1901, Challaye encountered a well-dressed and cultivated Vietnamese administrator arriving home from a trip to France. Unable to wait a moment longer, the man’s father, wife and children all boarded the ship looking for him on the second-class deck. The French ‘garçons’ working on board chased the family from the deck, swiping at them with their towels, while white on-lookers laughed. Such indignities reminded even successful and assimilated colonial subjects of their inferiority to their French counterparts. Other encounters were more violent. ‘I constantly saw Frenchmen offend, injure, brutalize the indigène’, Challaye wrote. White Frenchmen used whatever was at hand – their fist, a cane, a riding crop – to hit Vietnamese people who displeased them. Challaye saw one colonist slap and pull an old Vietnamese man through a village by the ear, and another beat and kick young women who had come to his hotel to have tea. He saw Frenchmen hit pousse-pousse drivers while haggling over a fare. And he saw them hit for no reason at all, except ‘for the pleasure, or well, as they say, to maintain the prestige of the white man’.

The most regularly mistreated non-Europeans were probably domestic servants. Regardless of the employee’s age, the French used the English term ‘boy’ to describe their menservants. For Challaye, ‘boys’ appeared to be the white man’s punching bag of choice. ‘I constantly see the Frenchman – stricken by the heat, absinth, opium – beating the indigenous domestic who poorly executed an order poorly given in a language poorly


understood.\textsuperscript{15} The activist Camille Drevet noted with horror that her hotel in Phnom Penh found it necessary to hang a sign warning clients that it was prohibited to beat the servants.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, the governor general of Indochina ultimately felt it necessary to publish a circular outlawing the beating of the Indigenous population, though there is no evidence it was ever enforced.\textsuperscript{17}

The poet and travel writer Luc Durtain witnessed similar behaviour. Over a meal with a Frenchman, Durtain watched with shock as his host interspersed his cultivated conversation about Montaigne and Valéry with tirades against the hired help. ‘Damned peasant [\textit{nha-qué}]! Idiot!’, the man screamed, throwing punches at his servant for forgetting the champagne and a spoon for the mustard.\textsuperscript{18}

Such mistreatment of servants was not only to be found in Indochina. A Frenchman in Equatorial Africa reported that the lieutenant governor of that colony had beaten his ‘boy’ to the point of unconsciousness, the servant’s body covered in blood. Though rumours swirled, the real reason for the attack was unknown; the ‘boy’ had served many other civil servants and had always received high marks.\textsuperscript{19} This fragmentary piece of news is hauntingly reminiscent of the Cameroonian writer Ferdinand Oyono’s \textit{Une vie de boy} (1956). In the novel, Toundi, the main character, is beaten to death essentially for knowing too much about the infidelity of his employer’s wife – a fact he could not help but learn working in her house.

Whether discussing assaults on elites or servants, reports of such daily humiliation did not come simply from appalled Frenchmen. Indigenous people across the empire expressed their own resentment of the treatment they received. In 1916, for example, a group of eight educated men from Gabon protested their treatment in a letter to the president of the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme in Paris. ‘The \textit{nègre} before the white man’, they complained, ‘is considered a bestial being.’ Some Europeans, including colonial officials, acted terrified of blacks, refusing to receive them in their offices or homes for fear, it seemed, of getting fleas or disease. One administrator, the men wrote, denied Africans the most basic courtesies: he refused to hold any afternoon meetings because, he said, at that hour ‘it was too hot to speak to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Léon Werth, \textit{Cochinchine} (Paris: Viviane Hamy, 2005), p. 47.
\item \textsuperscript{18} ‘Nha-qué’ is a derogatory Vietnamese term for ‘peasant’; Luc Durtain, \textit{Dieux blancs, hommes jaunes} (Paris: Flammarion, 1930), p. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{19} ALDH: F delta rés 798/90: Letter from E. Mathias to secretary general, LDH. Dijon, 26 February 1933.
\end{itemize}
blacks’. Such offensive behaviour came on top of beatings, injuries and other insults. The men, showing the extent to which racial hierarchies in the colonies could be internalised by Indigenous people, simply wanted appropriate treatment: ‘Our desire is not to be equal to the European, but we desire certain improvements of our lot.’

The lieutenant governor of Gabon responded to the eight men’s complaints in typical fashion: he brushed over the specifics of the claims with civilising rhetoric and patriotic flourishes. In a response to the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, he swore that in his long career he had always taken care to safeguard Indigenous people. Certainly, there were some officers who misunderstood their role, the governor continued; but the majority embraced a ‘spirit of self-denial’ and were driven to put into practice ‘the principles constituting the cornerstone of the republican colonial mission [œuvre]’. The lieutenant governor felt no need to investigate the complaints of humiliation. The rhetoric of republican imperialism, it seems, had told him all he needed to know.

The Human Cost of Mise-en-Valeur

In the wake of the First World War, issues of quotidian humiliation, beatings and murder became increasingly imbricated in questions of colonial mise-en-valeur, or economic development. Of particular importance in many overseas possessions – especially Indochina, West and Equatorial Africa, and various islands in the Pacific – was colonial labour. French investors regularly complained that local administrations obstructed, more than facilitated, their access to labour. As a result, many colonial officials turned a blind eye to European employers’ mistreatment of Indigenous employees. Denunciations of abuses and calls for reform often met with vindictive responses from the white colonial community. As a result, the colonial administration often dealt with problems between critics and colonial business interests, but rarely stepped in to sanction violence against non-Europeans.

In 1920, for example, the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme published in its journal, Cahiers, a damning article entitled, ‘The Reestablishment of Slavery in New Caledonia’. The report, written by Ligue members from Nouméa, provided an overview of both labour legislation and the actual treatment of Kanaks recruited for plantation work. Most pressing, plantation owners

willingly ignored the law and efforts to protect free labour were regularly ignored. Employees who were ‘mistreated or wrongly paid’ had, by law, the right to leave their employers. But in practice they were not allowed to go freely. Colonists wanted to have slaves and, in the report’s assessment, through a series of weak laws and blatant abuses, ‘they succeeded’. The most common form of recruitment in New Caledonia was through an official who dealt with Indigenous affairs, a chef de service, who worked with tribal chiefs. It was this system, the Ligue’s report argued, that was so open to abuse. ‘The administration writes to the chef [de service] and says it “needs” 50, 60, 80 people. – Certainly, no one says to use violence, but the chef understands’, the authors reported. ‘Thus opens a veritable hunt for men and children. The chef sends his police agents whose cudgels work marvels.’ In addition to blunt force, threats of sending the labourers to the New Hebrides, a place Kanaks believed to be notoriously inhospitable, scared them into agreeing to work locally. The Kanak ‘is terrorised by the chef, by this distant and formidable machine that is the administration’, the report asserted; ‘when one says before him this dreaded name, he is inclined to consent’.21

Once recruited, Kanak men, women and children had little idea what to expect. Some employers, ‘with humanity’, provided their labourers with what regulations required: salary, lodging, clothes, food, medical care and, if necessary, hospitalisations. But many employers failed to do so, and recruits remained ‘badly fed, badly paid, badly cared for, [and] overwhelmed by work and punishments’. Such conditions were nothing new; sixteen years earlier, in 1904, a medical doctor complained that the administration of Indigenous affairs was woefully understaffed, leading to grave mistreatment at the hands of ‘inhuman’ employers. The workers, the doctor reported, were left in ‘deplorable health’, stricken by fatigue and tuberculosis.22

Under colonial law, labourers could complain of poor living or working conditions, but employers were given a grace period to make improvements. The Ligue insisted this was unacceptable, as workers ‘had time to die before having obtained justice’. And that assumed workers had the opportunity to lodge a complaint. ‘Most often’, when labourers denounced a powerful colonist they were simply put in prison, charged with ‘insubordination’. Workers could be sentenced to hard labour – usually breaking rocks from 5 in the morning to 8 at night – for eight to sixty days. Further insubordination

22 Dr Blandeau, quoted in the procès-verbaux of the Conseil Général deliberations, 1904, p. 311 (‘Le rétablissement de l’esclavage’, p. 5).
meant solitary confinement in a concrete room without air, light or blankets. If they fell sick from this confinement, the time spent in hospital did not count towards their sentence. Some workers opted to run, but in such cases employers resorted to imprisoning family members as a kind of ransom until the recruit returned. Despite the draconian treatment of recruits, many employers thought the treatment too lenient.

The members of the Ligue in Nouméa closed their report with an impassioned plea to end this form of slavery. It acknowledged that colonists in New Caledonia lacked adequate labour, but rejected the all-too-often made claim that it was necessary and ‘civilising’ to force Kanaks to work. There was no moralising influence in this form of recruitment. Instead, recruiters introduced workers to alcohol and trafficked Kanak women as prostitutes. The Nouméa section of the Ligue demanded that the French government no longer tolerate such abuses and that all labourers have the chance to address their complaints to competent tribunals.23

When pushed by the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme in Paris to investigate, the colonial ministry did contact the governor for information. But the outcome of the governor’s review was a standard non-denial. ‘The native question in New Caledonia’, the colonial minister wrote, ‘is intimately linked to the problem of labour and my Department as well as the local administration accords all its attention to the examination of this question that interests the future of our colonisation of the Pacific. The appropriate instructions have moreover already been sent to the colony.’24 The colonial minister did not feel obliged, however, to tell the president of the Ligue whether his instructions included ending the alleged regime of slavery in New Caledonia.

While the ministry brushed over the accusations with typical aplomb, the Ligue report caused an intense backlash in the colony. Within three months of publication in the *Cahiers* of the ‘Re-establishment of Slavery’ report, members of the Ligue in Nouméa felt their livelihoods and jobs threatened by powerful political and economic interests. A representative of the Nouméa section wrote to Paris to ask for help: ‘Their devotion to the cause of law and justice must not be for them the loss of their jobs, their ruin and that of their children.’25 And this plea was sent before two incendiary articles denouncing the Ligue appeared in the colonial press.

24 ALDH: F Delta rés 798/94: Letter from the colonial minister to the president of the LDH. Paris, 7 April 1921.
The responses to the Ligue’s report showed how many colonists in the French Empire justified severe treatment of non-Europeans by pointing to their own alleged sacrifices in trying to develop colonial economies. In December 1920, an article appeared in the influential Caledonian newspaper, *Le Messager*, called ‘The League of Rights of the Canaque’ and written by the paper’s editor-in-chief, Alin Laubreaux, a white native of New Caledonia who became a successful right-wing journalist in France. In his response, Laubreaux admitted that there was one truth in what the author of the Ligue’s report had said: ‘It is, this truth, that slavery has been effectively re-established in New Caledonia . . . Yes, certainly. There are slaves in New Caledonia and these slaves, IT’S US.’ The white man’s master, according to this white Caledonian, was none other than ‘His Majesty the Canaque’. 26

Laubreaux expressed violent sentiments about Kanaks that were not uncommon among landowners in New Caledonia. The Indigenous, it was widely claimed, were overly protected, even pampered, by an administration that refused to force them to work for French settlers in dire need of labourers. According to Laubreaux, Kanaks were free of taxes, free of work obligations, and free to leave their land uncultivated, all at the expense of the white population. Progress, he argued, had made this kind of ’communism’ unacceptable: ‘You know full well, that the first of [our] duties is to produce at least as much as we consume, and that the lazy, the useless don’t even have a right to exist.’ Laubreaux argued that the Kanak’s ‘ignorance, filth and laziness’ was only augmented by the protection offered from the administration.

Laubreaux concluded his article by reminding the ’League of the Rights of the Canaque’ of a colonist named Grassin, who went to the bush, armed with the ideals of the Rights of Man, ready to defend the islanders. And what happened to him? ‘One day they came, savagely tattooed, armed for war, lit his house on fire, pillaged his stores.’ Grassin, he reported, was decapitated and disembowelled; his wife killed, then raped. ‘Voilà. Is that enough?’ The reader was left with the question hanging: enough for what? Laubreaux added no further comment. But it is hard to read the article, which deemed Kanaks to be ungrateful murderers and rapists, as anything but a call to arms.

Certainly not all Europeans were so overtly violent. An article in *La France Australe*, also written in response to the Ligue’s report, was less combative towards the government but argued that the Kanak had to be dealt with sternly or else he would ‘lose all consideration for the white man’. ‘The

native must be disciplined: he must, like a child who knows to obey his father, know to obey the administration. We must be very just with him, very good when he submits to orders, very severe when he tries to evade them.27 While La France Australe left undefined what ‘severe’ meant, other settlers were more to the point. A dozen years later, with an international depression underway, debates still raged about Kanak labour. Letters to the editor flowed into the offices of La France Australe. One reader, appalled by the insensitivity of his fellow colonists, summed up their opinions thus:

The humanitarian point of view has nothing to see here. We need labour before everything else. – Thus the canaques before daring to plant their own crops must work for the European . . . uniquely for him! At the same time, we claim the whole place . . . Let’s make colonization 100% white . . . That day, there will be no more canaques but that doesn’t matter . . . Labour! And soon . . . let’s kill them, if we have to! 28

In his letter to the editor, this reader condemned such ‘blind hatred’ and violent – even genocidal – proposals as being ‘anti-French’. That may have been true; but they were not entirely uncommon in the French Empire. White men and women living in the empire regularly complained that metropolitan Frenchmen had no idea of what their lives were like and had no business criticising their treatment of the Indigenous population. In the opinion of many colonists, metropolitan misunderstanding of colonial ways of seeing stemmed from their inherent naivety that misled Frenchmen in France into believing that all Indigenous people were, as one writer put it, ‘the victims of European colonisers’.29

In a particularly frank 1928 article on the subject, an ‘Old Colonist’ from Madagascar wrote of his compatriots in France who ‘speak of our Colony and of our natives like a blind man [speaks of] colours and proclaim that it is us who are wrong when we do not share their opinions’. The ‘Old Colonist’ considered the apparent transformation that took place when the idealist metropolitan moved to the colonies. ‘How to understand this immediate volte-face of the intractable diehard humanitarian, for whom all the Malagasy must be beloved brothers’, he mused, ‘who suddenly becomes the level-headed,


28 P.L., ‘La haine aveugle . . .’, La France Australe, 27 August 1932; this and other clippings from August and September can be found in ALDH: F Delta rés 798/94.

calm, just, but mistrustful and distant man, characteristic of the true colon?’ For this writer, the difference was easily explained by experience. Whatever ‘humanitarian convictions’ the new arrival came with dissipated when he found himself ‘facing a reality completely different from that expected’.

What ‘hard and sometimes cruel experience’ revealed to the new arrival in Madagascar was little different from what Alin Laubreux saw in New Caledonia. According to the ‘Old Colonist’, the new arrival slowly finds that the administration works primarily for the Indigenous population, and that the ‘character’ of the native is ‘deceitful, lying, lazy, and above all infinitely ungrateful’. Malagasies – like Kanaks, it seems – only understood tough treatment: they were weak and obsequious when they feared the white man; arrogant and insolent when they felt themselves safe from punishment.30

Colonial administrators had at least two reasons for not cracking down on colonists who condoned the rough treatment of Indigenous labourers. First, inherent in the backlash against the Ligue’s article decrying slavery in New Caledonia was a volatile contempt for the administration, both in the colony and in Paris. Already reviled by many colonists for allegedly being on the side of the Indigenous population, local administrators shied away from further angering their compatriots by disciplining them for mistreating their workforce. Locally powerful and with strong support from the colonial lobby in Paris, planters had the political sway to oust officials who tried to undermine their business plans. Second, many officials agreed that Indigenous labourers needed to be forced, even with violence, to work. As the colonial ministry pointed out, labour shortages were a problem faced in many parts of the empire, from New Caledonia to Cochinchina to Madagascar to Equatorial Africa. If the colonies were to be profitable, labour was needed at any cost – a belief adopted by even some outspoken administrative critics of labour violations.31 Suffering was part of the political economy of empire. And for many Frenchmen – settlers, businessmen, officials – the price of humane treatment was too high.

Colonial ‘Justice’

If the economic development of the empire helped justify violence, ironically so too did notions of justice. Brutality was the clearest indication that many

settlers, merchants and even travellers believed that they had every right to perform the role of judge, jury and, in some instances, executioner. The absence of a reliable colonial police and judicial system no doubt encouraged vigilantism among French civilians. But acts of violence also helped draw the lines of identity: brutality solidified racial distinctions and political and social hierarchies within the empire. French men and women often mistreated colonial subjects—even to the point of torture and murder—with an assumed impunity based entirely on their race, claim to French culture and civilisation, and relation to political power.

In 1922, the Ouest-Africain Français, a ‘republican-socialist’ newspaper, under the ironic headline ‘Civilisation’, reported two cases of murder in Equatorial Africa that the local administration had chosen to ignore. In the first case, a Gabonese ‘notable’ named Awalo, who worked on a launch, drowned when a French mechanic on his boat threw him overboard. The second victim, who was unidentified, was shot and killed by an English agent of a local business in Gabon. The agent then doused the body in gasoline and burned it. According to the paper, he probably would have succeeded in hiding his deed but for one of his workers who stumbled upon him. The Englishman tried to shoot that worker as well, but missed. No motives were established in either case. In demanding that the administration order investigations of the murders, the Ouest-Africain Français noted that they were two in a ‘long series of crimes, until now kept in the shadows’ of the colony.\(^{32}\) The Ouest-Africain Français warned that the population had been left ‘scandalised’ since the criminals had been ignored simply because they were not black. The Gabonese, the article continued, protested energetically ‘against the violation of his right to life [droit de vie], of this intangible right that the most backwards man recognises in his own kind’. The only explanation for denying justice to the people of Gabon was ‘negrophobia’.

The administration, however, was unmoved and showed no interest in investigating the murders. It is perhaps not surprising that the Ouest-Africain Français—a minor publication if ever there was one—did not persuade the administration to open an investigation. More revealing of official recalcitrance, though, is that the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme in Paris did not fare any better. Three letters on the subject from the organisation’s president to the colonial minister went unanswered. And when the minister finally replied—well more than a year after the president of the Ligue first wrote—he offered a polite brush-off. ‘I can assure you’, he wrote, ‘that all

\(^{32}\) L’Ouest-Africain Français, 29 January 1921, clipping in ALDH: F Delta rés 798/90.
measures are being taken to avoid in the future all new causes of trouble, of agitation, or of discontentment’ in the region.\textsuperscript{33} On the brutal crimes of old, the minister had nary a word to say.

Similar incidents – and official responses – could be found across the empire in South-East Asia. In 1925, a man named Charles Yonne, who worked for a coalmine in Vietnam, shot a 23-year-old coolie named Ngô Việt Ly who was ‘satisfying his needs’ near the fence around Yonne’s property. Yelling, ‘go soil somewhere else’, Yonne fired at the crouching man, hitting him in the side. Ngô tried to flee but soon could run no further. An ambulance took him to the hospital where he underwent surgery. The bullet had torn internal organs; he died the next day. Yonne later claimed only to have been shooting towards the victim in order to scare him away. Before dying, however, Ngô said he had not heard Yonne until the bullet hit him, calling into question the Frenchman’s desire to chase him away. For killing the 23-year-old worker, Yonne was given a two-year suspended sentence and was not required to pay an indemnity to Ngô’s family. He walked out of court a free man.

Such verdicts caused anger and dismay within the wider Vietnamese community. Yonne’s killing of Ngô came just one month after a Japanese employee of a French concession killed a Vietnamese worker suspected of stealing coffee plants. Uyéno Nisaku hanged the suspect, Lê Van Da, by his thumbs, punched him, kicked him, and beat him with a bamboo rod. He left Lê suspended for some time, hoping to elicit a confession. But when Nisaku returned he found only a cadaver. Nisaku had been accused of inflicting this punishment – which the president of the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme termed ‘torture’ – just the previous day by another employee.\textsuperscript{34} Like Yonne, Nisaku was given a two-year suspended sentence, meaning that he, too, walked out of court without even paying a fine.

The decisions the court handed down on Nisaku and Yonne caused disbelief in Vietnam. The injustice was compounded by the fact that, the same year, Phan Bôi Châu, a prominent anti-colonial nationalist who had been captured in China and returned to Hanoi, was condemned to forced labour in perpetuity. One French commentator reported that the Vietnamese were struck by the severity of Phan Bôi Châu’s punishment considering the fact that he had ‘neither killed nor tortured’ anyone. ‘The life of

\textsuperscript{33} ALDH: F Delta rés 798/90: Letters from the president to the colonial minister, Paris, 12 May and 2 November 1922 and 1 August 1923; and letter from colonial minister to president, Paris, 20 September 1923.

\textsuperscript{34} ALDH: F delta rés 798/85: Letter from president of LDH, Hanoi Section, to secretary general, LDH, Hanoi, 7 November 1925.
a Vietnamese’, the commentator noted, ‘is estimated at a very low price in Indochina.’ A number of Frenchmen reflecting on the cases insisted that the acquittals did damage to the Indigenous population’s respect for the French and the justice they purported to bring. But in the 1920s, the administration was interested in supporting, rather than punishing, industries like mining and plantations. Labour was a particular point of tension between businessmen and officials. For the time being, the administration chose not to pursue harsher punishment.

By the 1930s, with criticism of colonial brutality mounting, both from anti-colonial voices and from bodies like the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization, such acts of vigilante justice had become increasingly troubling for the administration. But subject populations were not much closer to finding justice. In 1931, for example, *La Revue d’Outre Mer* recounted the horrific story of a Gabonese man named Massima who was accused by his employers of stealing a *chicotte* from the forestry concession where he worked. Ironically, the chicotte – a hide whip – was the emblem of white violence in the empire as it was regularly used to punish workers. Massima was accused randomly, but his employers decided to torture him until he confessed to the crime. They began by stripping him, tying him to the back of a tractor, and dragging him until he lost consciousness. Failing to elicit an admission of guilt, they bound him in a ‘croix de Saint-André’ and proceeded to burn his extremities; a white woman among the group insisted they burn Massima’s sexual organs as well. Finding him still alive – and still refusing to confess – the Frenchmen hanged their victim from a post by the ankles, his head dunked in a barrel of water until he passed out. Unconscious, the man was untied from the post; he died shortly thereafter. According to a number of reports, the Frenchmen sipped champagne as Massima expired.

The sheer horror of the crime, distinguished by what one commentator called the ‘incredible refinement of cruelty’ shown by the torturers, brought Massima’s murder into the mainstream press in France. Making it even more shocking, the Frenchmen involved in the crime confessed to certain instances of abuse, but denied the most troubling details, including the dragging and burning of Massima’s body. At trial, all four of the accused were acquitted, as the court remained unconvinced that the drowning of Massima actually caused his death. The court also condemned four African

witnesses who were found guilty of giving false testimony, sentencing three of them to five years in prison.\(^{38}\) Condemnation of the decision was widespread. The decision was criticised in the French National Assembly. The procurer general who reviewed the case deemed it ‘shocking’. For Pierre Contet, a French writer who had spent years in the Congo, it was nothing but ‘white man’s justice’: in Equatorial Africa, he noted, it was customary to condemn ‘the weak in order to cover up the thefts, corruption, and crimes of the powerful’.\(^{39}\)

The fallout from the Libreville verdict revealed the difficult position that the colonial administration found itself in when it came to issues of justice. Severe shortages of officials in Equatorial Africa meant that the presiding judge had minimal knowledge of law. Strapped for cash and short on experts, the administration had no alternative but to assign functionaries from other departments to hear cases. In the Massima case, the judge’s primary job was working for the postal service; the assessors were merchants and bureaucrats equally ignorant of criminal procedure. French residents were unlikely to find their compatriots guilty of mistreating Indigenous people. Such was the colour of justice in many parts of the French Empire.

But the colonial ministry in France, itself closer to much of the outrage about miscarriages of justice, did take action. It drafted and then released a circular to all administrations in the empire condemning the ‘disproportionate’ sanctions given to Europeans and Indigenous people for the same crime. Such ‘verdicts of race’ risked undermining the principle that ‘justice is equal for all’. Tellingly, the circular admitted to being motivated by the fact that miscarriages of justice empowered ‘denigrators of our colonisation’. It also acknowledged the delicacy of racial hierarchies in the empire: the ministry’s intention was not to ‘diminish the prestige of the European’, but rather to emphasise that the settler’s authority should be defined by his ‘magnanimity and his moral superiority’, not by ‘his power’.\(^{40}\)

The ministry’s call for all colonies to be more scrupulous in questions of justice where violence was involved, however, did not result in sweeping changes of practice. Three years after the circular was sent out, more calls for reform followed the death of a Vietnamese hotel employee suspected of robbery. The accused killer, a Frenchman named Furcy, insisted he was simply trying to get a suspect to confess to stealing cash from a septuagenarian French

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\(^{38}\) ANOM: Aff Pol 664: ‘Note pour le ministre’, 16 February 1933; and letter from the procurer general J. Sanner to the governor general of AEF, Brazzaville, 20 October 1932.

\(^{39}\) Pierre Contet in *Le Populaire* 17 année, no. 4208 (11 August 1934), 2.

couple, the Bernards. A low-ranking Vietnamese administrator was called to the scene, but failed to intervene as Furcy and M. Bernard interrogated the suspect. The two men beat the Vietnamese victim, identified as Ly Van Binh, to the point of unconsciousness and left him without medical assistance. Ly later died from his wounds. There was evidence that Furcy had tortured the man, holding a burning candle under his nose and ears, but officials would only admit that Furcy did not ‘hesitate to employ criminal means’. Known to possess ‘a violent character’ and having been previously condemned for beating, Furcy nonetheless only received a suspended sentence. Bernard, too, was freed with what one journalist called ‘complete absolution’.

The administration again became the focus of criticism from the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme and a couple of radical newspapers. The president of the Ligue complained to the colonial minister that the Vietnamese people were ‘violently moved by the insufficiency of the condemnations’ and the ‘administrative negligence’ shown in the case. The Revue Franco-Annamite asserted that the verdict exposed a double standard in the justice system. ‘Suppose the victim had been a Frenchmen’, the paper noted, ‘and the two murderers [had been] two Indigenous men, would they have been given suspended sentences?’ Rebutting the ‘judges without courage’ and a dysfunctional administration, the Revue concluded, ‘there is a lot to redress here’. But the Ligue and the Revue were minority opinions. Another paper, the Tribune Républicaine, reported that the mainstream press had insisted that ‘sound justice’ had been rendered in the case. ‘Relations between French and Vietnamese’, the Tribune dissented, ‘have nothing to gain from verdicts of this kind.’

The colonial ministry did, on paper, argue that colonial courts should crack down on the ‘tendency of some French citizens’ to assume certain ‘feudal’ rights. Failing to do so could be ‘prejudicial to French prestige in Indochina’. But little was done to rectify the system. The colonial minister ultimately defended the verdict in the Furcy case, saying that ‘attenuating circumstances’ had led the criminal court to suspend the sentence. ‘No violation or false interpretation of the law’ had occurred. The only one at the scene of the crime deemed negligent was the low-ranking Vietnamese

42 Raymond Delmas, Tribune Républicaine, 1 July 1938.
43 ALDH: F Delta rés 798/431: Letter from the president to the colonial minister, Paris, no date (c. April 1938); ‘Verdict trop doux’, La Revue Franco-Annamite 213 (1 May 1938); and Delmas, Tribune Républicaine, 1 July 1937.
administrator, who was said to have shown indifference and passivity in the face of the violent Frenchmen. He was relieved of his duties and a demerit (blâme) was put on his record.\footnote{ALDH: F Delta rés 798/431: Letter from colonial minister to president of the LDH, Paris, 16 May 1938.} No one apparently saw the irony that the administration was holding a Vietnamese subaltern to a higher moral standard than the two native-born Frenchmen.

Calculating Brutality

The question remains why officials in Paris, who so often waxed lyrical about the liberating power of their civilising mission, did not do more to curb quotidian violence. For experts interested in the theory of colonial rule, the suffering of Indigenous populations at the hands of colon\textls{8}ons had long been a core concern. As early as the 1870s, the French government had studied the causes of revolts and other forms of political unrest in the empire. In 1878, in a moment of uncommon introspection, the naval ministry, which at the time oversaw New Caledonia, ordered an investigation into the causes of a major insurrection in which hundreds of Kanak warriors tried to destabilise French rule. Kanaks had killed as many as 200 European settlers and soldiers; but the army brutally defeated the revolt, killing around a thousand islanders, or 5 per cent of the Indigenous population. The root causes identified by the final report would have seemed strikingly familiar to anyone who read the Ligue’s 1920 report on the re-establishment of slavery in the colony. The 1879 report explained the rebellion by pointing to dispossession of Kanak lands, mistreatment by immoral white colon\textls{8}ons, an unfair and abusive labour system, and inadequate administrative protection of islanders from unscrupulous settlers, who, among other misdeeds, often refused to pay their labourers. The commission also found fault with authorities who remained ‘quite blind’ to the situation around them.\footnote{ANOM: FM /SG/NC: V Carton 43: ‘Rapport sur les causes de l’insurrection canaque en 1878’, 4 February 1879.}

Half a century later, administrators had apparently not learned the lessons of their own reports. In 1929, Georges Hardy, one of the leading colonial experts of his generation, again identified both colonists and administrators as potential problems for achieving long-term stability across the empire. Of particular concern to Hardy was the colonist’s moral judgement, especially when placed in tropical climes that proved so trying to what he deemed ‘the European’s nerves’. At all costs, Hardy argued, white civilians should avoid...
‘bad habits, like slovenliness, crude language, an excess of anger, [and] brutalities’ when around the Indigenous population.  

While all indications – from the 1879 commission’s findings on the Kanak insurrection to Georges Hardy’s 1929 study – suggested that the French government should shun acts of violence against Indigenous populations for the sake of stability, if not humanity, the administration lacked both the will and the means to do so. Violence was a subject that many regional officials refused to report and preferred not to discuss. To report the occurrence of abuses in an administrator’s region was tantamount to an admission of professional negligence. Officials in Paris associated disorder, including settlers acting unlawfully, with weak leadership. The few bold officials who did report abuses perpetrated by Frenchmen not only potentially tarnished their own reputations, but also regularly faced vicious recrimination from the colonial community.

Where the central administration was most negligent, however, was in not diligently investigating complaints. The colonial ministry was entirely willing to believe in the power of its own regulations. If certain violent behaviours, such as the mistreatment of labour, were unlawful, then most officials in Paris insisted that they did not occur. The ministry was also far too trusting of its own officials, even when they were implicated in cases of alleged corruption and cruelty. With independent inspectors scarce in the empire until the 1930s, the colonial ministry regularly ordered investigations to be carried out by colleagues of the very officials accused of abuse. The Ligue des Droits de l’Homme pointed this out to the ministry: investigations that were carried out ‘with the collaboration of local officials, associated with the local quarrels’ were done so ‘in vain’.

Not only did such investigations prove futile; they often made matters worse. As a Frenchman in Guadeloupe put it in 1930, failing to hold whites accountable for their violent behaviour only encouraged them to carry on with a sense of ‘impunity’. Considering the importance of the presence of a punitive authority in curbing violent behaviour, the ministry’s insistence that abuses did not take place made colonies more prone to abuse, rather than less. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that critics in the interwar years would decry the lack of justice across France’s African

48 ALDH: F Delta rés 798/89: Letter to the minister of colonies from the president of LDH, Paris, 1 February 1933.
49 ALDH: F Delta rés 798/91: Letter from Joseph Sarat to the secretary general of LDH, Pointe-à-Pitre, 11 March 1931.
possessions, where there was no hint of a truly republican administration, but only a ‘sovereign master’ that oversaw a ‘regime of terror’.50

Bibliographical Essay


50 ALDH: F Delta rés 798/179: Two reports, ‘De la justice criminelle en Afrique Occidentale Française’ and ‘Justice indigène en Afrique Occidentale Française’, no date, but with a cover letter dated 26 July 1922.


Violence, the State and Revolution in Latin America

ROBERT H. HOLDEN

Latin America, defined here as the nineteen American republics that once constituted almost all of the overseas territories of the monarchies of Spain and Portugal, now accounts for 8 per cent of the world’s population and 13 per cent of its land area. This chapter analyses the violence associated with the social field of power surrounding the state, or what we will call ‘public violence’. The volume’s focus on the period after about 1800 conveniently captures the first years of the great divide in the chronology of Latin American public violence: the rupture, extending from about 1808 to about 1824, that ended a three-century, post-conquest period of relative order and stability under the rule of the Iberian monarchies. That break inaugurated two centuries of self-government distinguished by consistently high levels of public violence. In breadth and intensity, public violence associated with the making and remaking of state institutions may have peaked in the late twentieth century. Since the 1980s, organised violence of a more criminal and less overtly political kind has flourished in many places without losing its place within the field of state power, because so much of it has depended directly on the collaboration, indifference or incompetence of agents of the state.

No investigation of violence, in any society, can pass over the role of the permanent institutions of rule (i.e., the state), particularly those responsible for the administration of law and justice. As a result, it is the combined problem of violence and the state – whose principal function is to administer justice – that will dictate the course of this analysis, with the unavoidable addition of the concept of revolution in its distinctly Latin American expression as the ever-frustrated search for a just order. Public violence remains closely linked, as both condition and consequence, to long-standing traditions of Latin American politics that cannot be overlooked but which can only receive cursory notice here. First among them is a towering indifference to the rule of law, and its sequelae of impunity and official venality. Another is
patrimonialism and its offspring, personalism and presidentialism, for where public office is widely seen as a kind of endowment to be utilised by its occupant for the benefit of family and friends, the personal qualities of the caudillo or leader, including his capacity to attract and reward followers while punishing enemies, overshadow law and ideology, thwarting common notions of just order. These mutually reinforcing dispositions entail a continuous summons to violence as the means of enlargement or resistance, enforcement or abatement, validating and even invigorating the dispositions and thus the tendency to use violence.

The following analysis interprets public violence not as some amorphous, unchanging ‘structure’ of Latin American life but as a collective activity subject at once to the circumstances of particular times and places and to the larger tendencies that cross the national boundaries of the Hispanic world. In its numerous guises, public violence may signal a crisis of order, but only rarely, if ever, a state of utter disorder or chaos. Public violence should thus be understood as a mode of action dictated by a particular strategy for keeping or seizing power, or for influencing those in power. Its agents justify it in the same way that they justify the exercise of the power that the violence is intended to serve – i.e., according to the principles of some legitimacy-bestowing authority. For power always invokes, and at least formally remains accountable to, some powerless, supreme authority: a political ideology, a person gifted by an extraordinary grace (charisma) of leadership, or some higher-order world view appealing to deeply held beliefs. Hence, violence in the service of state-making.

Any state-centred analysis of violence across two centuries must rest on a periodisation of what Oakeshott called the ‘interminable enterprise’ of the state formation process itself. As the processes and outcomes of state-making shifted over time, so did the kinds of violence associated with them, yielding the four-phase chronology of state formation that frames the following analysis. A formative period associated with intense violence among rival power-seekers loyal to a diversity of legitimacy-bestowing

1 I owe this perspective in part to Eduardo González Calleja, ‘La razón de la fuerza: una perspectiva de la violencia política en la España de la Restauración’, Ayer 13 (1994), 85–103, at 86.
authorities ended in the 1870s. In the second phase, lasting to about 1940, violence diminished as state institutions were consolidated along more or less liberal but markedly non-democratic lines. The phase of state-making that coincided with World War II and the ensuing Cold War was probably the most destructive in the region’s history, as the result of large-scale mobilisations of people seeking more inclusive levels of both economic and political development, and the repressive response by states and their allies outside of Latin America. In an era of Marxist-tinged social revolution, expanding state responsibility for economic development and social welfare accompanied an often disproportionate enlargement of the capacity and internal reach of the armed forces. Finally, an era of democratisation and demilitarisation, from about the 1980s until the present, has been unmatched in two, paradoxical, ways. The level of elections-driven political stability has never been higher or appeared more durable. But so has lawless violence, official corruption and state failure.

The Great Rupture and its Consequences: Rival Authorities and Fragile Institutions, c. 1810 to c. 1870

The first phase (roughly the 1810s to the 1870s) was a formative period of institution building, characterised by the persistence of a wide range of competing authorities to which rival power holders and power seekers appealed as the sources of their right to rule. Because such authorities conveyed competing criteria by which the legitimacy of states, governments and office holders were to be judged, the result was a crisis of legitimacy. During this first phase of state formation, most power seekers found inspiration in the continuous arrival of European-derived mutations of liberalism and conservatism, spawning a range of ideological authorities whose followers issued anathemas invoking mutual declarations of extermination. Almost everywhere, in this phase, the fragility of governing institutions – a characteristic that has never faded entirely in Latin America – was at its maximum level. State-making tended to be dominated by power-seeking personalities, caudillos and their clients, many of whom organised under the banner of one or another justice-seeking ideological or moral authority. The rivalry over control of the nascent state apparatus, which itself frequently consisted of little more than the means to coerce rivals and to occupy the customs-house, has rarely been more intense. Power deployed in the pursuit of state-making was likely to be transient and dispersed, focused above all on defending itself against rivals.
Another distinguishing feature of the first phase of state formation, and the violence associated with it, was its matrix: the great rupture of 1808–24, which separated the Americans from a governing entity in which the power of monarchy and the authority of religion, though overlapping rather than strictly separated, had together managed to generate and sustain order for more than three centuries. Independence normalised what was relatively exceptional during the period of Spanish rule: the use of force. Under Spain, there was not even a standing army until the late eighteenth century; composed almost entirely of Spanish Americans, its main function was to defend the realms against Spain’s European adversaries. The military occupation of Spain and the removal of its legitimate monarch, Ferdinand VII, by imperial France in 1808 unleashed the discord over authority that would shortly begin to lacerate the Hispanic world. A restoration of the old order, founded on the power of kingship and the authority of religion, natural law, corporate rights and the church, would prove to be beyond reach. While the process of separation itself need not occupy us here, its outcome is crucial for understanding the patterns of public violence that would follow. The simultaneous collapse of substantive traditions of rule and the invasion of emancipatory ideologies generated a crisis of order in all the new republics of Spanish America. It was a fate largely avoided by the Empire of Brazil, whose independence from Portugal was proclaimed in 1822 by none other than a resident prince of the ruling Braganza dynasty of Portugal itself. Brazil’s transition to independence, marked by continuity, favoured the persistence of familiar institutions suitably recalibrated by the legitimate monarch. In the Spanish dominions, only Puerto Rico and Cuba eschewed independence, adhering to the monarchy until 1898 when an independence war in Cuba and a US invasion of Puerto Rico finally terminated Spain’s presence in America.

Independence was not so much sought by Ibero-Americans as thrust upon them by events in Europe. A rupture that was unplanned, and for which no one was prepared, generated experiences whose effects would resound across the rest of the century and beyond, in two main ways: first, in the pressing need to adopt institutions of self-rule subject to some socially recognised authority to replace those of the monarchy, a need that persisted well beyond the actual acquisition of full independence in 1821–4; and second, in the myriad, and often destructive, means devised to advance the fortunes of one or another party, programme, regime or leader in the search for political order. Rather than a clearcut encounter between a Spanish army and American armies seeking national independence, the
violence of the independence era (1808–24) was overwhelmingly internal, pitting groups of Americans against each other – an ominous portent. Grievances and identities tied to ethnicity (Indian, European, African and their composites), class (typically smallholders, landless peasants and estate owners) and locality (in defence of claims to political autonomy) blended with new and old ideological and religious commitments, spurring mobilisations and conspiracies, civil wars, and cross-border interventions. Politics became militarised, military forces became politicised, and state-making became an improvisational art subject less to constitutional mandates than to the transient exigencies of office holders, office seekers and their respective political programmes.

Emerging immediately as a characteristic practice of the age was the pronunciamiento, the vehicle of so much state-centred violence and the primary expression of the region’s search for a socially recognised, legitimacy-bestowing authority. A pronunciamiento might range from an act of force against an incumbent power holder – a straightforward coup d’état – to some declaration of principles issued by a disaffected group, aimed at intimidating those in power as a prelude to negotiating a new governing arrangement. Their paradoxical character, typical of the age, has been remarked by Fowler, their most assiduous analyst: ‘unlawful yet legitimate, revolutionary and at the same time tiresomely bureaucratic, openly aggressive yet not always violent’, defying the government even while ‘hoping to negotiate with it’. By 1876, Mexicans had launched more than 1,500 pronunciamientos, making them, rather than elections, the primary means of effecting political change.4

Across Spain’s former dominions, a crisis of order comparable to Mexico’s sowed devastation, though the fighting forces elsewhere tended to be more fragmentary and disparate than those of Mexico, whose army managed to preserve, at least until the 1850s, a semblance of the unity it inherited as the direct successor of the royal army. Uprisings and civil wars contested power not only on the national level but also at the infra-national; so far, a systematic numerical analysis of their frequency, range, intensity and cost in lives and property has eluded researchers. Suggestive indicators abound, however, beginning with the high rates of turnover among heads of state and the frequency with which constitutions were replaced or

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4 Will Fowler, ‘Introduction’ (pp. xv–xxxiv) and ‘’I Pronounce Thus I Exist”: Redefining the Pronunciamiento in Independent Mexico, 1821–1876’ (pp. 246–66), in Will Fowler (ed.), Forceful Negotiations: The Origins of the Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); for the quotation, see p. 246.
reformed. In Colombia, over the course of the nineteenth century, a year of peace was exceptional. The country saw between nine and fourteen national-level civil wars (historians disagree on how to count them), perhaps two wars that qualified as ‘international’, three coups d’État by the army and numerous local wars. In the ‘semi-absence’ of a state, in the estimation of Sánchez, war fused with politics. Political and military leadership became inseparable. The men who followed the caudillos into battle rarely did so willingly but as the clients of their patrón, making the wars more patrician than popular. Invariably ending with a pact between the leaders (because clear winners or losers rarely emerged), these wars and the devastation they wrought became the means by which principled differences would be affirmed in Colombia until the present day.

Here and elsewhere in Latin America, state-making was in effect privatised among an ever-shifting array of rivals who alternately fought and pacted with one another. As a result, the actual strength of ‘the state’ at any given moment was less important than the certain knowledge that those who occupied its offices rarely counted as the ultimate source of power. To a partial extent this was true even for Brazil, where a monarch presided over a weak but stable national system of administration that tolerated the regular use of violence among rival patron–client networks for control of local and regional posts, particularly at election time. Chile, almost alone in the Hispanic world, succeeded in overcoming an initial decade of violent disorder by establishing in 1830–3 a competent, centralised state with a national army that exercised, in the interest of public order, a near monopoly on violence, under one of Latin America’s most enduring constitutions (1830–1925). Of the many explanations for the ‘Chilean exception’ of comparative tranquillity, the foremost is the cohesion of the elite and the consequently high level of social recognition accorded to the legitimating principles upon which the state was founded. And yet even so, that consensus was fragile enough to fail in three civil wars (1851, 1859, 1892). Much like Chile, Costa Rica in the 1830s also established an effective, socially recognised state

apparatus that managed to draw under its control, in the form of a national army, disparate sources of public violence. The army tended to dominate the civilian leadership, making Costa Rica’s regime stability, like Chile’s, markedly authoritarian. Compared to their northern neighbours in Central America, Costa Ricans experienced far less of the sort of violence that arose among rival caudillos for control of a quasi-state structure forever subject to improvisation. But like Chileans, they were not entirely exempt from public violence, for at least seven coups d’état from within the national army decided who would rule between 1846 and 1870.

Neither in this nor in subsequent phases of state formation was international war, of the sort driven by geopolitical tensions and aiming at territorial conquest, a common occurrence in Latin America. That may have been a gift of the state’s improvisational and therefore less capable character. Typically counted among the few such wars was the most ruinous of the nineteenth century, that of the Triple Alliance, in which Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay ganged up against Paraguay from 1864 to 1870. Costing at least 350,000 deaths in combat alone, the war propelled all four countries towards the construction of more militarised, national states. Not to be overlooked in the same category was the US–Mexican war of 1845–8, which resulted in the US capture of half of Mexico’s territory, and the War of the Pacific (1879–84), in which Chile annexed huge and strategically rich parts of Bolivia and Peru. A more frequent type of cross-border warfare, categorised by Loveman as ‘transnational wars of political consolidation’, including wars of secession, significantly altered boundary lines at least nine times between 1823 and 1851.7

Within nine years of declaring its independence, Gran Colombia disintegrated into three republics in 1830: Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia. In 1823, the provinces of the former Kingdom of Guatemala – which had seen almost no violence during the independence era – seceded from the short-lived Empire (soon-to-be republic) of Mexico, to which they had been forcibly annexed in 1821–2. They established themselves as the Federal Republic of Central America, a union that fell apart in the late 1830s under the pressure of continuous war among the provincial capitals for control of the federal republic. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica separately declared their independence. But in neither the former Gran Colombia nor the former Republic of Central America did secession deliver domestic peace; caudillo-led civil war and rebellion persisted at levels no less

intense within the new countries, and in the case of Central America civil war often entailed mutual invasions of each other’s territories.

Perfecting Coercion in an Era of State Consolidation, c. 1870 to c. 1940

In the first phase of state formation, public violence was largely driven by internal conflicts among power-seekers loyal to a plurality of rival criteria of legitimacy. During the second phase (c. 1870 to c. 1940), state structures in most places were gradually consolidated around specifically liberalist ideas from which the egalitarian and political-freedom branches were pruned away in favour of a more practical but cold-blooded economic liberalism. Heavily salted with the premises of Comtean positivism and Social Darwinism, this oligarchical or dictatorial liberalism was thus less tolerant of popular expressions of non-conformity with the officially defined goals of order, progress and civilisation. At the same time, export-driven economic growth and copious injections of US and European investment capital ensured that state-makers knowledgeable enough to exploit the opportunities aroused by industrialisation in the North Atlantic world would not lack the revenue required to finance the further expansion of state power, particularly in the direction of military and police spending.

Dictatorial methods of rule found institutional expression in the gradual emergence of national armies whose troops were increasingly conscripted, and who served under the command of men trained by European military missions in national service academies. Where they could, these armies absorbed or neutralised, through cooptive techniques, the more formidable caudillo-led bands. Where such measures failed, extermination was their usual fate, as was that of the semi-autonomous or rebellious Indian groups that inhabited the national peripheries, particularly of Argentina, Chile and northern Mexico. Having worked out a modus vivendi with the Spanish monarchy in the latter years of the Bourbon dynasty – sometimes siding with Spain in the turmoil of 1808–24 – these so-called ‘independent Indians’ found that their success in evading the reach of the phase-one quasi-states would be temporary.

Military professionalisation had the paradoxical effect of politicising the officer corps, which increasingly saw itself as the patriotic and technically competent counterweight to a corrupt caste of greedy, power-hungry politicians. A concomitant tendency towards institutional autonomy and social detachment, enhanced by constitutional provisions sanctioning unilateral
military intervention in times of political crisis, engendered a new kind of militarism. In the 1920s and 30s, a wave of unconstitutional government successions in thirteen countries counted on the participation of the military, a tendency that hardened into the outright seizure of power by military dictators in the 1930s in fifteen countries, some of whom continued to rule into the 1940s and 50s. Although guided by a diversity of ideological authorities, extending from right to left and including at times a mélange of both, the dictators in uniform typically shared a strongly statist, developmentalist and authoritarian approach to government, and thus a readiness to punish dissenters, rebels and agitators who occasionally resorted to violence themselves in the course of objecting to the terms and conditions of industrial employment or, in the case of rural cultivators, to the loss of customary rights to land.\(^8\) The threats posed by such protests to the social order, and to the stability of economies heavily dependent on one or two commodities for export and on the confidence of foreign capitalists, frequently generated a violent response from the state. Within weeks of ousting an elected left-wing civilian government in December 1931, El Salvador’s army – the best in Central America – repressed a rural rebellion by massacring 8,000–10,000 people during the first few months of 1932. In similar circumstances, civilian governments were often no less ready to unleash the military. In 1907, Chilean soldiers machine-gunned to death striking nitrate workers and their families in a school yard in Iquique; the estimates of lives lost range from hundreds to a thousand or more.

Similar tactics applied the same year by the Mexican liberal-dictatorial regime of General Porfirio Díaz have been widely cited as precursors of the most profoundly destructive civil war (1910–20) in the history of Latin America. In 1906 and 1907, after thirty-one years in power, Díaz’s government still seemed to be unshakeably in command when its armed forces confronted striking copper miners at a US-owned mine, and factory hands at a French-owned textile mill. To the dozen or so deaths at the mine were added fifty to seventy at the textile mill. Widely publicised and exploited by the rising political opposition, these events eroded the legitimacy of the regime. But weightier still were grievances among rural cultivators over declining access to land and deteriorating working conditions stemming from the export-led development policies of the Díaz dictatorship. The campesinos converted a liberalist political revolt in 1910–11 into a social revolution that would take the lives of at least a million Mexicans in the course of

\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 75, 102.
establishing a state that would go on to implement the most thoroughgoing and extensive land reform in Latin America, while guaranteeing urban workers the right to organise and strike. The revolutionary regime’s fiercely anti-Catholic policies would, however, ignite a counter-revolution (the Cristero War) in 1926–9 that would harvest the lives of still another 100,000 combatants by the time the two sides – devout Catholics versus the Mexican state – negotiated a settlement that essentially ratified the revolutionary state’s power to continue controlling (albeit somewhat less oppressively) traditional religious expression, until constitutional and statutory revisions were adopted in 1992.

In this phase, only Mexico’s civil war qualifies as one fought largely to revolutionise society, making it a harbinger of the revolutionary movements that swept Latin America after the 1950s. On the other hand, except for the land redistribution and pro-labour legislation of the 1930s, the state-affiliated and financed Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI in its Spanish acronym) governed Mexico until the 1990s according to principles that deviated little from those of the dictatorship that it replaced. In comparative terms, however, Mexico’s epochal revolution, whose populistic attributes the ruling party managed to elevate to a patriotic myth, delivered a state that produced what no other Latin American country could in the twentieth century: eight continuous decades of stable, civilian government, without a single instance of military intervention or interruption of the constitutional succession of presidents. Far from eradicating violence from public life, the Mexican ‘revolutionary’ state managed to regulate it in favour of institutional continuity and at a level that most Mexicans found tolerable. From the 1960s, the system’s legitimacy would nevertheless be put to the question in emblematic acts of public violence that will be analysed in the next section. Elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico’s long-term, populist-authoritarian solution to factional violence in the field of state formation remained a uniquely Mexican innovation. Perhaps the key explanatory variable was the unusual readiness of the victorious faction (the ‘Constitutionalists’) to accommodate, with the reforms mentioned above, the many followers of its defeated revolutionary rivals in framing the Constitution of 1917. And that readiness may have been inspired by the uniquely violent and destructive character of the war that the Constitutionalists had just won, and perhaps wished to avoid re-igniting.

In Colombia, factions of liberals and conservatives, unable to produce their own counterpart of the widely admired General Díaz of Mexico, continued to rise up in arms against one another in the 1880s and 90s, until the cataclysmic War of the Thousand Days (1899–1901), which took uncounted
tens of thousands of lives. The relative tranquillity of the four decades after 1901 climaxed in 1930 with the country’s first peaceful change of the party in power, though the worst carnage in Colombia’s history awaited it in the second half of the century. In Venezuela, for most of the period from the 1870s to the 1950s, self-styled generals rose up, mobilised their clients, and ruled in the colourful, personalistic fashion of the traditional caudillo. In both republics, military professionalisation lagged as the armed forces only very gradually shed their clientelistic character, despite the establishment of military academies and the presence of foreign military training missions.

In the Southern Cone countries, whose economies had achieved considerably higher levels of growth and diversification, military professionalisation and institutional stability advanced considerably beyond almost anywhere else in Latin America. In some respects, the armed forces in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay could even take credit for the comparative depth in the formation and reach of their countries’ non-military state institutions. Civil war nearly disappeared, and overt military intervention in the political process, in the form of coups d’état, was now a rarity except in Argentina, where the armed forces established themselves as final arbiter, and as the habitual counterweight to populist excess. Brazil’s military exercised a similar supremacy over the political process, although its multiple interventions never ended in outright seizures of power except in 1889, when it removed the monarchy and made the republic, and in 1964. Brazil’s nineteenth-century pattern of chronic, localised violence centred on the distribution of patronage at election time may actually have intensified after the removal of the monarchy, owing to the absence of its conciliatory influence, according to Graham. On the other hand, by delivering benefits to clients, Brazilian patrimonialism dampened political animosities and thus may have prevented outbreaks of violence on a national scale.  

In the countries of the Caribbean basin, including those of the isthmus of Central America, public violence in this phase was not so easily distinguished from that of the first. The state’s markedly patrimonial and therefore improvisational character, and the persistence of a clientelistic rather than professional relationship between the typically despotic executive and his armed forces, nourished violence and instability. The situation increasingly drew the attention of the United States, particularly from the 1890s onward, the decade that marked its emergence as a world power and the beginning of its role as

a significant participant in the public violence of the Caribbean basin countries. Driven as much, if not more, by legitimate security interests as by imperialistic ambitions, US military interventions were typically followed by long-term military occupations and US administrative oversight. The aim was to install and maintain regimes sufficiently businesslike in their conduct to avoid the rise of pretexts (such as bank loan defaults or asset-threatening chronic violence) that had earlier been seized by Washington’s European rivals to justify their own interventions. The uninvited entrance of the United States into Cuba’s war for independence in 1898 fixed the pattern for the next three decades. In 1903, the United States joined with separatist forces in the Colombian province of Panama to make way for the possession of an inter-oceanic canal on better terms than those on offer from the Colombian government. Subsequent interventions through the 1930s resulted in the occupations, and control of governments, in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. In each instance, the US exit strategy called for the creation of a supposedly non-partisan national constabulary that would in theory maintain constitutional order after the withdrawal of US forces. In every such case, however, despots seized control of the constabularies almost immediately after the US departure, utilising them to tyrannise the country for decades, often with the continued financial and military collaboration of Washington.

Insurgency and Military Rule in the Cold War, c. 1945 to c. 1990

The markedly oligarchical nature of second-phase state formation gave way, from about the 1940s, to an evolving but rarely pacific struggle over the limits of political and economic inclusiveness. A diverse repertoire of techniques of popular mobilisation, violent protest and insurgent warfare incited proportionately, and sometimes disproportionately, violent responses by state institutions increasingly fortified by centralised, coordinated and modernised military and police agencies. As such, this third phase of state formation – the 1940s to the 1980s – produced the bloodiest wave of public violence in Latin America’s history. Aggravating and enlarging the scope and intensity of the violence was the Cold War rivalry of the great powers of the period, which drew the United States directly into the fray as the stalwart enemy of radical social change.

Until the 1960s, populist caudillos took the first steps towards a kind of paternalistic incorporation of the masses. Nationalistic and class-based appeals for votes would be paid for with a dose of national esteem, curbs
on the plutocratic enemies of the working class and the fatherland, and promises of higher living standards through state-directed economic development via import-substitution industrialisation. As these largely unsatisfied aspirations increasingly resolved into unruly protests, radical political movements, guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism, the armed forces reacted by seizing power from elected civilian governments, abrogating civil and political rights, actively repressing dissenters, and ruthlessly pursuing insurgent bands and urban terrorist cells in almost every country of the region. A major source of inspiration for these movements was Cuba’s popular, putatively liberal-democratic revolution of 1959 to overthrow the dictatorship of General Fulgencio Batista, anti-communist ally of the United States. Reconfigured by 1961 as a communist dictatorship under Fidel Castro, the new regime executed some 2,000 enemies within two years of seizing power, jailing or driving into exile many thousands more, and seizing virtually all private property by 1970.

The ‘Cuban model’ of development – a thoroughgoing political and social revolution under the guidance of Marxist ideology – rapidly drew adherents throughout Latin America, provoking a massive increase in US support for both counterinsurgency operations and economic development initiatives by the militarised governments of the region. At first, the United States sought to remove the threat at its source by launching a Cuban invasion force of anti-Castro exiles in 1961. In turning back the invasion promptly, decisively and with the evident support of the populace, the regime fortified itself politically and enhanced its prestige abroad; Washington, on the other hand, suffered the disgrace not only of failure but of the unveiling of its hitherto covert role in financing and organising the invasion.

But this was not Washington’s first covert effort to change a Latin American government it disapproved of, nor would it be the last. A similar strategy had succeeded in removing an elected, left-wing government from power in Guatemala in 1954, but the role of the United States remained secret until the 1970s. It was tried again in 1980, when the United States sought to undermine the Marxist-oriented government that had seized power in Nicaragua in 1979 under the banner of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation, which had fought a guerrilla war to oust a US-backed dictator. Nicaragua seemed poised to replicate Washington’s Cuban nightmare. This time, US participation from 1980 in the organisation and training of a guerrilla force of Nicaraguan exiles based in neighbouring Honduras was promptly revealed, and pridefully acknowledged, by Washington. The US-backed insurgents succeeded in substantially weakening the Nicaraguan
government’s hold on power, forcing it to hold a competitive election in 1990 won by a pro-US slate of candidates. As a result, the programme of radical reforms that Washington considered to be a continuation of Cuban-style, communist penetration of the hemisphere was abruptly halted and reversed. Elsewhere in Central America, Washington helped the governments of El Salvador (in the 1980s) and Guatemala (from the 1960s to the 1980s) stand off guerrilla armies seeking to carry out revolutionary reforms along Marxist lines. The antagonists in these three civil wars, driven by sharply opposed, Cold War era beliefs over the criteria of legitimate rule, could count heavily on the supply of external resources associated with one or the other of the era’s two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, prolonged and intensified, these wars savaged Central America more profoundly than did all of the previous civil wars of the region, where political violence had been practically endemic since independence from Spain. The human cost alone exceeded 325,000 lives: more than 200,000 in Guatemala alone from 1962 to the peace settlement in 1996, some 75,000 in El Salvador from 1989 to the 1992 settlement, and about 50,000 in Nicaragua, including the period of insurgent mobilisation from 1972 and the civil war that followed in the 1980s. Not all public violence was Cold War related; what Colombians call ‘La Violencia’, a civil war pitting political-party militias and the army against one another, swept away more than 200,000 lives between 1946 and 1966.

Where military rule was firmly established, the generals and their civilian technocrats, guided by a miscellany of liberal-developmentalist ideologies, sought to expand the reach and influence of the state. Import-substitution industrialisation and the statist policies that accompanied it would be carried forward under the care of the generals to their disastrous conclusion in the 1980s, the ‘lost decade’ of the region’s post-World War II economic history. But the most enduring legacy of this period of military rule would be the unusually cruel and barbarous character of the repression of groups and individuals considered to be subversive by the authorities, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala. The contours of the repression would not be fully revealed until the epochal institutional changes that broke forth, in almost dialectical fashion, in the next phase of state formation.

Lawless Violence and Impunity in the Age of Electoral Democracy, c. 1990 to the Present

The drive in favour of democratic inclusiveness, interrupted by nearly three decades of military rule, resumed spectacularly in the 1990s, the decade that
marks the onset of the fourth phase of state formation. Civilian governments everywhere but in Cuba were being chosen in free elections. The armed forces appeared to have stepped away permanently from direct intervention in state affairs. The state formation process was generating institutions capable of responding successfully to some of the core tenets of liberal democracy, above all requirements for reliable mechanisms of popular consent in the form of fair elections open to all, and the subordination of the armed forces to elected civilian governments. The popular revulsion against military rule, in countries where many people had often welcomed coups to remove incompetent civilian governments, found expression in the creation of commissions of inquiry (‘truth commissions’) in thirteen countries between 1979 and 2007 to ascertain as precisely as possible the methods of repression and to identify and quantify both the perpetrators and the victims. Torture, often bestially sadistic, had been a routine instrument of military rule, as was the intentional killing of unarmed civilians considered to be subversives. Tens of thousands of people were ‘disappeared’ – their bodies secretly burned, buried, or dropped in the ocean. Others died in collective massacres carried out by army patrols in the countryside, often against civilians suspected of aiding insurgent combatants. Even in civilian-governed (but authoritarian) Mexico from the 1960s until the early 1980s, under the rule of the official Institutional Revolutionary Party at least 645 persons were ‘disappeared’ by government agents, at least another ninety-nine were summarily executed and more than 2,000 tortured, according to a five-year investigation sponsored by the first non-PRI government to win the presidency in eight decades and released in 2006. Not included in that accounting was the public massacre by Mexican security forces of roughly 300 unarmed, pro-democracy protesters in the capital on 2 October 1968; revulsion over the ‘Tlatelolco massacre’ marked the beginning of Mexico’s slow transition away from one-party rule.10

By the middle of the new century’s second decade, some twenty-five years after the transition to democracy had begun, Latin America’s commitment to electoral democracy and civilian rule was still holding firm, with the exceptions of Cuba (where the first had never existed) and Venezuela (where a left-wing government allied with Cuba’s sought to abolish competitive elections). Organised political violence, whether that of a repressive military

10 The most compact synthesis of truth commission findings is in Robert H. Holden and Rina Villars, Contemporary Latin America: 1970 to the Present (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 82–95, including Table 4.1, ‘Truth Commission mandates and findings’, which summarises the work of each century’s commission.
force, a guerrilla army, a gang of urban terrorists or a party militia, had almost entirely faded from Latin America. However, institutions long inimical to liberal-democratic practice and social peace continued to flourish, and in some respects, as we shall see, the state’s capacity in many countries to carry out basic policing functions and to administer justice appeared to have diminished significantly during the democratisation phase. In almost every country, the fourth phase of state formation coincided with a fundamental shift towards a consensus, one more widely held than any since late colonial times, in favour of liberal democratic principles as the core criteria of legitimacy. Curiously, however, the twenty-first-century consensus also happened to share with its late-colonial analogue what Taylor authoritatively styled the latter’s ‘nearly always conditional and incomplete’ character. Murderous violence, often wreathed by and intertwined with the very state institutions designed to prevent it; an unremitting record of spectacular and seldom-punished acts of malfeasance among public officials; and a pervasive, society-wide indifference to the rule of law all persisted well into the twenty-first century. That was enough to provide, for many, a plausible justification for reversing democratisation and restoring the military’s prerogative to intervene in the political process and suspend elections.

The Latin American state’s tentative and improvisational character, while particularly obvious in the first phase, has therefore survived in the form of violence-inducing patterns of ‘competitive state-making’, ‘state capture’ or ‘the criminalisation of the state’, in the varied terminology of a growing academic literature on the subject. In parts of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and elsewhere, criminal organisations competed – often successfully – with the state for the loyalty of a region’s populace. They did so by erecting and sustaining transnational systems of production and exchange – illegal economies typically centred on narcotics, but often extending into complementary services such as extortion, kidnapping, murder for hire, and contraband in firearms, human labour or environmental resources. The criminals (who occasionally presented themselves as social revolutionaries) earned a kind of local legitimacy protected by their capacity to generate revenue in sufficient quantity to buy off agents of the

state and to develop the military power necessary to ward off competitors and the state’s own law enforcement agents. The latter sometimes played a double role as business competitors in the illegal economies. Cities were no less subject to competitive state building; in November 2010, it took Brazilian military and police forces a week to recover control of the Complexo de Alemão district of Rio de Janeiro from the drug gangs that had governed it for years, at the cost of thirty-seven lives.

The shift away from traditional authoritarian forms of rule to competitively elected civilian government had added a measure of accountability and transparency—exposing flaws, but achieving little in overall effectiveness, and highlighting as never before the linkage between public violence and state-sanctioned impunity for, and collaboration with, wrongdoers. It was now ‘public knowledge’, two prominent Mexican jurists wrote in 2008, that the criminal justice system of Mexico was ‘completely bankrupt’ and therefore ‘useless for trapping the most dangerous criminals’. No Mexican would be surprised, they asserted, by the statistical record: 85 per cent of victims never file a complaint, 99 per cent of offenders avoid conviction, 92 per cent of criminal hearings occur without the presence of a judge, 60 per cent of arrest warrants are never executed, 40 per cent of prison inmates have never been convicted, and 80 per cent of detainees have not spoken to the judge who convicted them. Across Latin America, civil disputes that might have been settled through negotiations or within the judicial system were routinely terminated by assassination; only in high-profile cases did arrests occur. In Honduras, Berta Cáceres, a prominent Indigenous leader of a movement to stop the construction of a hydroelectric dam, ignored numerous death threats. She was shot to death on 3 March 2016 as she slept in her home. In 2018, seven men were convicted in her murder, a rare step in a country where 123 environmental activists were said to have been murdered between 2009 and 2016. By 2012, Latin America had become ‘the most dangerous place on earth’, with 33 per cent of the world’s homicides (and 8 per cent of its population); its rate of 20 homicides per 100,000 persons was three times the world average and the highest of any world region.

The failure to administer justice in much of Latin America was not a fourth-phase innovation; nor was there anything novel about its sources—a combination of the venality, impotence and incapacity that had largely characterised the region’s state structures for two centuries. What defied expectations was its continuity even after the unparalleled, and apparently lasting, transition to representative institutions and electoral democracy. As Latin America commemorated two centuries of independent self-government, only distant echoes remained of the pronunciamento, the populist caudillo, social revolution and the military junta. What endured almost everywhere was the violence-laced crisis of order that had followed immediately on independence. Its source was no less familiar: a fragile, shallow and easily disrupted level of social recognition for the legitimating principles (now, liberal-democratic) of the state, almost everywhere.

**Bibliographical Essay**

Luxuriantly documented episodes of lawlessness and violence have never been scarce in the historiography of Latin America. But only since the 1990s has violence achieved its current status as a distinctive category of systematic research, a move that coincided with the rise in the study of Latin American state formation. Both themes have inspired a sizable corpus of works that frequently overlap.


A landmark collection of essays amid the rising tide of work on the failure of the rule of law is Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Paulo Sérgio de M. S. Pinheiro (eds.), *The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999); particularly insightful is O’Donnell’s concluding essay.


Racketeering and banditry are old themes but their recent, newfound prominence, and their capacity to suborn or even substitute for state institutions, have attracted systematic attention in Enrique Desmond Arias, ‘The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro’, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38 (2006), 293–325; Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington,
Structural Violence during the Cambodian Genocide, 1975–1979

James A. Tyner

On 14 November 1976 a young woman named Kim Ham-Bin was arrested and detained at a secretive prison designated ‘S-21’. Located in Phnom Penh, the security-centre was established as one of approximately 200 detention sites located throughout Democratic Kampuchea – as Cambodia was renamed. During its brief existence, roughly between October 1975 and January 1979, upwards of 12,000 men, women and children were warehoused under inhumane conditions. Many were tortured and forced to confess to various crimes; all but a handful were eventually executed, either within the broader S-21 compound or at the nearby ‘killing fields’ known as Cheoung Ek.

Little is known of Kim Ham-Bin. Archives from S-21 indicate that she was 25 years old. Her ‘position’ is recorded simply as ‘wife of Chhim Sak’. No documents have survived that might indicate why she was arrested – other than the fact that she was the wife of Chhim Sak. As to Chhim Sak, he was arrested on 16 January 1976 and executed on 22 July 1976 – three months prior to his wife’s arrest.

On the day of Kim Ham-Bin’s detainment, forty-five other people were arrested. Of these, at least forty were women, all of whom were classified as ‘wife’, ‘mother’ or ‘sister’ of other detainees. And with few exceptions, all of these women, including Kim Ham-Bin, were executed within twenty-four hours.

Since the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea, the security-centre known as S-21 has assumed a prominent role in the ongoing historiography of the Cambodian genocide. As an institution, S-21 calls attention to the administered violence that was manifest in Cambodia. Undue focus on S-21, however, deflects attention from other, more systemic forms of violence that enabled the security-centre to function.

From its inception as a disorganised socio-political movement, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK; aka the ‘Khmer Rouge’) emerged
as one of the most violent and brutal apparatus of state terror and murder since the Nazi party held power in Germany. Between April 1975 and January 1979 approximately 2 million people died from starvation, disease, exposure, torture, murder and execution. Historians and other scholars have attempted to understand how this mass violence could have taken place, with particular emphasis focused on the allegedly ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ variant of Marxist-Leninist doctrine forwarded by the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, something of a caricature of the Khmer Rouge has emerged, as the CPK has variously been compared to Peru’s ‘Shining Path’ and, most recently, to al-Qaeda and ISIS – the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

The dominant interpretation of Cambodian history during this period, described by Michael Vickery as the ‘Standard Total View’ (STV), presents the CPK as a totalitarian, communist and autarkic regime seeking to reorganise Cambodian society around a primitive, agrarian political economy. Under the STV, the victims of the regime perished as a consequence of the structural violence of misguided and irrational economic policies, a draconian security apparatus implemented to instil terror, and the central leadership’s fanatical belief in the creation of a utopian communist society. Notable here is the blame laid upon Pol Pot, the highly secretive and paranoid leader of the CPK. Under the Khmer Rouge, following the STV, cities were emptied; hospitals and schools destroyed; and religion, currency and private property were abolished. To this end, Stewart Clegg and co-authors write, ‘the Khmer Rouge embarked on creating an agrarian, egalitarian, anti-professional, anti-technology and self-sufficient society – a primate communist utopia’.²

For Vickery, the STV limits our understanding of CPK ideology, policies and practice to such an extent that its presumptions of CPK autarky and despotism have become conventional wisdom. These latter presumptions have permeated not only scholarly accounts, but also popular understandings and journalistic commentaries. Consequently, the STV has become the interpretative framework for understanding the Cambodian genocide: a taken-for-granted historiography into which new evidence is either accommodated or ignored. Thus, Greg Procknow is able to write that CPK policies ‘converted the bourgeoning capitalist economy into a communistic, rural-

centric, independent, self-sustainable nation, with an emphasis on self-mastery. Money was abolished, foreign trade collapsed.\(^3\)

It is not so much that the STV is inaccurate as that it is incomplete and theoretically vapid. In fact, documentary evidence indicates that the CPK sold rice surpluses on the global market to satisfy the state’s need for fertiliser, tractors, industrial inputs and provisions.\(^4\) Ben Kiernan finds also that agricultural exports were traded for artillery, coastal patrol boats and other weaponry.\(^5\) Rhetoric aside, the regime’s consolidation of control was not based on an irrational foundation of self-reliance and self-mastery. Instead, as I document in this chapter, CPK policy was predicated upon surplus agricultural production and a selective engagement with the global economy as informed by its allegiance to the Non-Aligned Movement. Accordingly, I challenge standard historiography of the Cambodian genocide by providing an analytical overview of the structures of violence set in place by the Khmer Rouge. First, however, it is necessary to provide a broader geopolitical framework from which to understand the emergence of the CPK as a political organisation that would come to orchestrate genocidal violence upon its own people.

**Conflict Comes to Cambodia**

The push for a communist revolution in Cambodia was largely connected and facilitated by the broader geopolitics of the Cold War. As with many former colonial states, Cambodia functioned as a proxy for the ideological struggle between, on the one hand, the United States of America (USA) and its ‘western’ allies and, on the other hand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and their ‘eastern’ allies. Across the Indochina peninsula, various revolutionary movements – including both ‘Marxist’ and non-Marxist factions – had long sought to liberate their

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homelands from French colonial rule. These efforts intensified in the years immediately following World War II, leading to the First Indochina War (1946–54). For those individuals informed especially by Soviet ideology, including members of the Vietnamese Communist Party, successful liberation could only be achieved if all of Indochina was liberated. This meant in practice that victory in Vietnam was dependent upon victory in both Cambodia and Laos. Consequently, in 1951 the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) was founded. The precursor to the CPK, this organisation was heavily influenced directly by the Vietnamese communists, and indirectly by the USSR and PRC.

In general, there was never a singular communist movement in Cambodia, but instead various factions that over the years ebbed and flowed as a result of external influences and internal dissent. Moreover, other social movements not aligned with communism came and went. Broadly speaking, Cambodian revolutionaries were motivated to a greater or lesser extent by three factors. First and most pressing, most if not all revolutionaries sought an independent, sovereign state, free from French colonial rule. A second motivating factor was a sense of widespread exploitation and oppression resultant in large part from perceived inequalities in land ownership. This was an argument made most vehemently by those revolutionaries influenced by Marxism. A final and very much minority cause was anti-monarchical, that is, an argument to overthrow the long-standing prince, Norodom Sihanouk.

In 1953 Cambodia – unlike Vietnam – was granted independence by the French. Thus, whereas Vietnamese revolutionaries continued to wage their anti-colonial war, this objective in Cambodia became moot. As David Chandler explains, most Cambodians ‘were reluctant to become involved in rebellious politics after Cambodia’s independence had been won’. Stalwart communists, however, redirected their efforts, in part as a revolution against the monarchy of the reigning prince and, increasingly, as an anti-imperial revolution against the USA. This latter cause increased in importance as the USA gradually replaced France as the dominant foreign power in Indochina.

America’s overt military involvement in Vietnam was gradual and haphazard, reflecting an ignorance and uncertainty over objective, policy and strategy. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV; i.e., North Vietnam) posed no military threat to the United States. However, convinced that the fall of Vietnam to communism would lead to the loss of all of South-East Asia, a succession of American presidents – from Dwight Eisenhower to

6 Also known as the Franco-Viet Minh War.
Richard Nixon – came to believe that the establishment of a sovereign and non-communist state in southern Vietnam\(^7\) was imperative. Indeed, Vietnam, itself standing for all of South-East Asia, became a ‘surrogate space’, as both the country and the war became symbols of American geopolitical policy.\(^8\)

Sustained aerial bombing campaigns against North Vietnam began in mid February 1965. Repeated sorties, however, failed to deliver the expected results and, consequently, American tacticians gradually expanded both the list of ‘acceptable’ targets and the frequency of air-strikes. Consequently, sorties against the North increased from 25,000 in 1965, to 79,000 in 1966, and to 108,000 in 1967; bomb tonnage increased from 63,000 to 136,000 to 226,000 over the same period. However, the DRV remained steadfast in the face of America’s bombing campaign. This led to the gradual expansion of American ground forces, as the war continued to intensify in scale and scope. Not surprisingly, casualty rates in the growing conflict also rapidly spiked upward. Vietnamese civilian and military casualties nearly doubled from 13,000 in 1965 to approximately 24,000 in 1966.\(^9\)

Throughout the 1960s the conflict between the United States and North Vietnam expanded geographically. As early as 1959 the National Liberation Front (NLF; also known as Viet Cong) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) began to use networks of trails in Laos and Cambodia as transit routes and sanctuaries from US bombing. These networks – what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail along the border with Laos and Cambodia, and the Sihanouk Trail within Cambodia – had been used by the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War to maintain north–south communication over hilly and densely forested terrain. Seeking to deprive its enemies of this strategic advantage, as early as 1965 US military leadership authorised bomber pilots to strike targets within Cambodia, an ostensibly neutral party to the conflict between the USA and the DRV. Between March 1969 and May 1970, the US Strategic Air Command conducted Operation Menu, a covert bombing campaign in eastern Cambodia intended to deprive Viet Cong forces of sanctuary and disrupt the flow of material and communication. Operation Menu was followed by Operation Freedom Deal, which ran until

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\(^7\) South Vietnam, alternatively known as the State of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam, was established following the Geneva Convention of 1954.


August 1973. By the time all air campaigns were halted in late 1973, American B-52s had dropped over 260,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia – a figure that does not include the tonnage dropped by other American fighter planes.¹⁰

A defining moment in the growth of the Communist Party in Cambodia occurred in March 1970. While travelling to France, Sihanouk had entrusted his government to army general and prime minister Lon Nol and his pro-Western deputy prime minister, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. In Sihanouk’s absence, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak launched attacks on the Vietnamese communist positions, organised anti-Vietnamese demonstrations, and re-established ties with various non-communist groups. Sihanouk, upon learning of these actions, condemned both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. In response, Sirik Matak pressured Lon Nol to depose Sihanouk and, on 18 March 1970, the National Assembly voted 89–3 to remove Sihanouk from power.¹¹

Following the coup, Sihanouk was persuaded by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to form a military alliance with the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists and to lead a government-in-exile.¹² Consequently, Sihanouk issued an appeal to the Cambodian people whereupon Royalist supporters would join the Khmer Rouge in a unified effort to defeat the Lon Nol government. The Khmer Rouge, for their part, continued to hold Sihanouk responsible for the war in Cambodia, but well understood his popularity. Accordingly, the coup was widely used for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

The alliance of Sihanouk with the CPK, coupled with the sustained and indiscriminate air campaign waged by the United States, contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Whereas in 1970 Khmer Rouge forces were described as ‘marginal’, with perhaps only 4,000 members, by 1972 these forces were estimated to have grown to more than 20,000. Indeed, some US officials presented figures between 35,000 and 50,000, with some CIA

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¹² Initially, China attempted to align itself with the Lon Nol government, if three conditions were met: permission for the Chinese to continue to supply the Vietnamese communists through Cambodian territory; authorisation of Vietnamese communists to maintain their bases inside Cambodia; and Khmer support of the Vietnamese communists in government statements. In effect, the Chinese were willing to postpone the Cambodian revolution in order to help the Vietnamese revolution and to maintain a Chinese-Vietnamese front against the United States. The Lon Nol government, given its anti-Vietnamese and anti-communist hardline stance, predictably refused the Chinese overture. It is also likely that Lon Nol assumed that the United States would not abandon a loyal ally in its proxy war against the communists.
estimates placing Khmer Rouge forces at over 150,000. As one villager who joined the communist forces in 1970 recalls:

I saw them [the bombs] being dropped at Andaung Pring [village] . . . The bombs came tumbling down in a big clump . . . right onto Andaung Pring, and that time villagers were killed in amazing numbers . . . The bombs fell in the village, setting fire to people’s houses and killing them . . . sometimes they didn’t even have the time to get down out of their houses . . . The bombing was massive and devastating, and they just kept bombing more and more massively, so massively you couldn’t believe it, so that it engulfed the forests, engulfed the forests with bombs, with devastation.

From 1973 onward the CPK and its military wing, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, progressively ‘liberated’ Cambodia from Lon Nol’s Republican forces. When victory was achieved on 17 April 1975, however, it was not because of the military or strategic superiority of the Khmer Rouge. Ben Kiernan is blunt in his assessment: ‘Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won power without [the] US economic and military destabilization of Cambodia.’ To this we must add the geopolitical machinations of the DRV, the PRC and the USSR, among many others.

Democratic Kampuchea as a Non-Aligned State

When the Khmer Rouge stood victorious on the streets of Phnom Penh in April 1975 they constituted neither a centralised, efficient political party nor a military force. Their victory was the haphazard by-product of the culmination of a series of concurrent revolutions, armed conflicts and geopolitical machinations. The CPK inherited also a country devastated by years of conflict. By war’s end, approximately one-third of Cambodia’s bridges were destroyed, two-fifths of the road network was unusable, and the railroad was inoperable. Much of the country’s productive infrastructure, including its lone oil refinery near Kompong Som, had stopped working. Only 300 of 1,400 rice mills and 60 of 240 saw mills were functioning; and both timber and rubber production – Cambodia’s major prewar commercial products other than rice – had declined to only one-fifth of prewar production levels.

15 Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, p. 16.
16 Internal factions among the CPK leadership would result in widespread purges.
Moreover, upwards of half of Cambodia’s livestock had been killed, either through fighting or bombing, or as a food source for the starving people.\textsuperscript{17}

Once in power the Khmer Rouge never achieved or received widespread support. They did however enjoy, initially, a certain level of backing, if only because the populace hoped for an end to conflict and a return to normalcy – something the Khmer Rouge in fact promised. What they ultimately delivered was anything but salvation. On paper Democratic Kampuchea was a ‘People’s State’, meaning that all men and women over the age of 18 were to participate freely in democratic governance. In practice, power was monopolised by a few key individuals who formed the Standing Committee of the CPK – dominated by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary.\textsuperscript{18} Over the next three years, eight months and twenty days the CPK subjected the people of Cambodia to forced labour, starvation wages, horrendous living conditions and widespread terror. These conditions, moreover, were in direct contradiction to those forwarded in public pronouncements, both within and beyond Democratic Kampuchea, as Cambodia was renamed by the Khmer Rouge.

On 14 December 1975 a constitution was drafted for Democratic Kampuchea; to the world, this event signalled the arrival of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on the world stage. Administratively, the constitution declared that Democratic Kampuchea was ‘an independent, united, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign and democratic state with territorial integrity’.\textsuperscript{19} From the outset, therefore, it was clear that, at least rhetorically, the CPK adhered to the position advocated by other international members of the Non-Alignment Movement.

In the early years of the Cold War representatives of former colonial powers sought to forge an independent path, free from the dictates of either American capitalism or Soviet socialism.\textsuperscript{20} Known as the Non-Aligned


\textsuperscript{18} As of April 1975 the Standing Committee consisted of Pol Pot (secretary general), Nuon Chea (deputy secretary general and vice-chair of the Military Commission), Ieng Sary (deputy prime minister of foreign affairs), So Phim (secretary, East Zone), Vorn Vet (deputy prime minister for the economy), Ros Nhim (secretary, Northwest Zone), Ta Mok (secretary, Southwest Zone), Son Sen (deputy prime minister for defence) and Khieu Samphan (president of the State Presidium). The Standing Committee was a subset of a larger Central Committee; this committee consisted of approximately thirty individuals at any given time.

\textsuperscript{19} Document No. D55874, archived at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

Movement, this became a powerful political force that proclaimed a commitment to nationalism, the preservation of national dignity and the realization of national power. More precisely, the Non-Aligned Movement connoted an alliance with the forces of regionalism, national independence, the struggle for a new economic order, social and economic progress, and self-reliance.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the aims of the Non-Aligned Movement broadened considerably. Participants at the 1974 Conference held in Algeria for example called for efforts to create a new economic world order. This attempt was predicated on a crucial distinction that was made between ‘anti-colonialism’ and ‘anti-imperialism’. As Singham explains,

> Until the end of World War II, the political form of imperialist exploitation was colonialism in that it sought outright control over the subject peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas ... World War II, however, resulted in the great awakening of colonial powers who proceeded to demand and obtain political independence for their countries ... The end of colonial rule did not negate imperialism. While one saw the decline of the colonial powers in Europe one also saw the emergence of a newly reconstructed capitalism led by the United States.

Thus, for many members of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was necessary to identify a path towards development that did not result in a form of neo-colonialism. This meant that states were to avoid becoming entangled in asymmetric foreign and trade relations.

In August 1976 the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka. In attendance were representatives of Democratic Kampuchea. The context of the Fifth Summit is important in understanding subsequent CPK policy. Throughout the early to mid 1970s many liberal economic strategists and financial institutions advocated the view that developing countries could and should pay for essential imports by borrowing extensively from private banks; in turn, numerous developing countries borrowed sizable amounts to engage in the importation of industrial goods. High levels of indiscriminate borrowing contributed to a worldwide debt crisis – a problem that was compounded by the decision of OPEC

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22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 7.
to raise the price of oil.\textsuperscript{25} It is no surprise, therefore, that participants at the Colombo Conference, including representatives of the CPK, debated at length alternative paths to economic growth.

The attitudes and positions of the CPK in response to the Fifth Summit are revealed in a text later published by the Embassy of Democratic Kampuchea in Berlin, East Germany.\textsuperscript{26} According to this document, the Summit had ‘achieved brilliant victories’, including the adoption of a number of policies:

\begin{quote}
which reinforce the principles of non-alignment, enhance the role of this Movement and confirm the resolute solidarity of the non-aligned countries in the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and against the interferences, interventions, aggressions and against the expansionism of the rich great powers, for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of each people to determine the destiny of its nation by itself in full independence and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

The text continues that:

\begin{quote}
The people of Kampuchea warmly hails the victories of the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries which consolidate the non-aligned principles, enhance the non-aligned movement and strengthen the solidarity within its ranks . . . In contributing to the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the world, to the liberation struggle of the brotherly countries of the Third World and to the strengthening of the cause of the great non-aligned family, the people of Kampuchea is determined to carry out the revolution successfully in its own country, to build up its economy and edify its country according to the principles of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

Two months later Ieng Sary, deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, spoke before the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Following an opening welcome statement, Ieng Sary explained that:

\begin{quote}
The 31st Regular Session of our General Assembly takes place at a time when all the peoples of the world and especially the peoples of the non-aligned countries and of the Third World are waging a victorious struggle everywhere against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism and all forms of foreign interference, aggression, expansionism and exploitation, for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, for the right to determine
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 6–7.
\textsuperscript{26} Document No. D55874, archived at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
their own destiny and for the establishment of a new international economic order on the basis of justice and equality.\textsuperscript{29}

He continued that:

Dozens of new independent states are arising from the ruins of colonialism, determined to engage in the struggle to defend and consolidate their political and economic independence, their sovereignty and territorial integrity against all acts of domination, exploitation, interference and aggression on the part of the rich great powers . . . They call forcefully for the establishment of new relations between the peoples and nations, in accordance with the significant changes which have taken place in the world, and based on the principles of mutual respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality, mutual advantage, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the right of every people to manage its own affairs.\textsuperscript{30}

Democratic Kampuchea, Ieng Sary explained, stood by these principles. Moreover, the people of Kampuchea had participated actively in the struggle against colonialism and foreign aggression. ‘Together with all the other peoples’, he declared, Democratic Kampuchea ‘has actively taken part in the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in order to liberate itself from all forms of domination, oppression and exploitation’.

Ieng Sary presented Democratic Kampuchea as not so much an isolated, autarkic society, but rather an independent, sovereign state that would interact on the global stage on its own terms. Viewed from this vantage point, the repeated phrases of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-mastery’ that appear throughout CPK documents take on a new interpretation. As Ieng Sary explained:

Democratic Kampuchea will always continue to follow a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment . . . As a non-aligned country, Democratic Kampuchea respects and conscientiously practises the principles of non-alignment . . . Democratic Kampuchea neither participates in any alliance nor in any regional association. She resists the establishment of any foreign military bases on her territory and all forms of intervention and interference with her internal affairs. Our people resolutely defends its independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and its inalienable right to determine its own destiny, for which it has fought so hard and sacrificed so much. At the same time, Democratic Kampuchea continues her efforts to establish and maintain close relations with her neighbours and with

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.  \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
all the other countries of the world, based on the strict mutual respect for
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, of the principle of equality
and mutual advantages.\textsuperscript{31}

Democratic Kampuchea’s allegiance to self-reliance and self-mastery would
extend to its participation in the global economy. Ieng Sary clarified that

Problems of economic development remain the major preoccupation of our
world . . . [The] present international economic order [is] based on relations
of domination, exploitation and dependence [and has] enabled the developed
countries to enrich themselves very rapidly and to live in superfluity and
wastage, whereas the developing countries get poorer from day to day, and
having acquired their political independence, still remain confronted with
the dramatic problems of misery, malnutrition, hunger, sickness and
illiteracy.\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover,

The terms of trade continue to deteriorate for these developing countries,
because the basic products and raw materials they possess are constantly
devaluated. Their indebtedness with all the resulting financial implications is
growing in a tragic manner . . . [and] these unequal and unjust relations have
led to the importation of the economic and financial crisis of the capitalist
world with all its consequences, especially inflation, rising prices, devalua-
tion of currency and a sinking standard of living for the population.\textsuperscript{33}

Agricultural Policies as Structures of Violence

The CPK premised that economic success – and, by extension, political
success – depended on its agricultural sector. As explained in its ‘Four-Year
Plan’, developed between 21 July and 2 August 1976, the CPK identified two
economic objectives. The first was ‘to serve the people’s livelihood, and to
raise the people’s standard of living quickly, both in terms of supplies and in
terms of other material goods’.\textsuperscript{34} This was to be accomplished through the
satisfaction of a second objective, namely to ‘seek, gather, save, and increase
capital from agriculture, aiming to rapidly expand our agriculture, our
industry, and our defence’.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, to achieve \textit{industrial} self-sufficiency

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{31} Ibid., \bibitem{32} Ibid. \bibitem{33} Ibid.
\bibitem{34} Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK], ‘The Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism
\bibitem{35} Ibid., p. 51.
\end{thebibliography}
– including both light and heavy industry – the CPK decreed that they would ‘only have to earn [foreign] capital from agriculture’. CPK policy, in other words, conforms readily to those strategies identified by members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

During the 1950s and 1960s many former colonies, but especially those adhering to the Non-Aligned Movement, embarked on a particular economic strategy known as import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). Proponents of ISI argued that less-developed countries should initially substitute domestic production of previously imported, simple consumer goods and then substitute through domestic production for a wider range of more sophisticated manufactured items. In other words, advocates of ISI promoted an economic strategy predicated on self-sufficiency. Variously understood within broader theories of dependency or underdevelopment, the argument was this: For decades if not centuries the economies of colonies were held in check by unfair trade arrangements and production processes that consigned the colonies to positions of subservience within the global economy. Colonies and former colonies historically were forced to import most of their manufactured goods in return for the export of primary products, such as sugar, bananas, coffee, tea and cotton. Under ISI, these unequal relations were to be inverted. Governments of former colonies would protect their domestic industries and by extension encourage the production of domestic consumer goods. Revenue saved from not having to import these goods could then be used to purchase other manufactured commodities that could not be produced given the country’s overall level of industrialisation.

In practice, ISI constitutes a form of self-imposed isolation and it is this economic strategy I maintain the CPK initiated from 1975 onwards. An internal document dated 8 May 1976 states clearly that ‘We will decrease importing items next year, including cotton and jute, because we are working hard to produce ours. We will import only some important items such as chemical fertiliser, plastic, acid, iron factory, and other raw materials.’ According to this document, such a strategy was deemed most appropriate; indeed, to solve the currency problem, it was determined that solutions were

36 Ibid., p. 96.
39 Document No. Do0698, ‘Cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce’, archived at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.
not to be found ‘by taking loans from the West or eastern Europe’, for in so
doing the CPK would lose their ‘self-reliant stance’. ⁴⁰

Having adopted a policy of import-substitution, the CPK next directed its
attention to those items that could be effectively produced, both for domestic
consumption and for foreign trade. On the home front, plans called for the
promotion of items necessary to facilitate the people’s livelihood: plates, pots,
spoons, mosquito-nets, shovels, hoes and so on. In practice, most of these
industries never materialised, although textile factories and some machine
shops were in operation. Internationally, documents indicate that the CPK
was receptive to any number of imported goods but that economic efficiencies
would be the determining factor in deciding the conditions of foreign trade.

Within a system of production for exchange, it matters little if linen or
clothes are produced; whichever offers the best opportunity for capital accumu-
lation will, in principle, be produced. Marx refers to this tendency as
‘indifference to use-value’ and the CPK was in many respects indifferent to
use-value. In a document entitled ‘Report of Activities of the Party Center
According to the General Political Tasks of 1976’, it is noted that

We can export and sell many products such as kapok, shrimp, squid,
elephant fish, and turtles. All of these products can earn foreign exchange.
There are great possibilities for exporting peanuts, wheat, corn, sesame, and
beans. The objective would be to save up these products for export. Almost
anything can be exported, so long as we don’t consume it ourselves, but set it
aside. ⁴¹

The report further details that ‘We have the potential to achieve full quotas in
rubber, cement, railroads and salt. We have progressed nicely, almost with
empty hands. We have achieved good results. But the possibilities are even
greater. We must expand the Plan. Our line is to stress industry and the
working class as the basis.’ ⁴²

For the CPK, agriculture – but especially rice – was determined to be the
country’s comparative advantage. During a speech delivered in June 1976 at
an assembly of cadres of the Western Zone, the speaker (most likely Pol Pot)
discussed the importance of rapid agricultural development. The speaker
explains: ‘National construction proceeds along the lines laid down by the

⁴⁰ Ibid.
⁴¹ Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK], ‘Report of Activities of the Party Center
177–212, at 200.
⁴² Ibid., p. 200.
Party. The important point of this is building up our agriculture, which is backward, into modern agriculture within ten to fifteen years. This point is developed at greater length in the Four-Year Plan, whereby it is noted that Democratic Kampuchea is replete with ‘such things as land, livestock, natural resources, water sources such as lakes, rivers and ponds’ and that these ‘natural characteristics have given us great advantages compared with China, Vietnam, or Africa. Compared to Korea, we also have positive qualities.’ Paramount among these, of course, was agriculture. According to the Four-Year Plan, ‘We stand on agriculture as the basis, so as to collect agricultural capital with which to strengthen and expand industry.’ This was no desire to construct an agrarian utopia but instead a pragmatic course of action based on capitalist principles. Indeed, it was simply a continuation of policies advocated by the former French colonial government and that of Sihanouk. From a competitive standpoint, rice was the clear choice. And while other agricultural products were identified, including rubber, corn, beans, fish and forest products, these were largely gratis. The CPK argument was profit-based: ‘For 100,000 tons of milled rice, we would get [US] $20 million; if we had 500,000 tons we’d get $100 million . . . We must increase rice production in order to obtain capital. Other products, which are only complimentary [,] will be increased in the future.’

Returning to the twin objectives established by the CPK it becomes clear that policy decisions were based on calculations of expected economic productivity. Foremost was the proposed increase in rice production – an objective that was pivotal to the CPK’s overall strategy of state building. This is vividly illustrated in a series of remarks prepared and delivered by Pol Pot to a special meeting of the CPK ‘centre’ during 21–23 August 1976. Here, Pol Pot considers ‘the production of rice as it is related to rice fields’. He explains:

We have greater resources than other countries in terms of rice fields. Furthermore, the strength of our rice fields is that we have more of them than others do. The strength of our agriculture is greater than that of other countries in this respect . . . It is the Party’s wish to transform agriculture from a backward type to a modern type in 10–15 years. A long-term strategy must be worked out. We are working [here] on a Four-Year Plan in order to set off in the direction of achieving this 10–15 year target.

The CPK determined that Democratic Kampuchea would need to triple rice productivity, to a national average yield of 3 tons per hectare per year. Only by attaining such a surplus could the CPK raise sufficient revenues to obtain necessary goods and commodities from abroad; notable among these was ammunition. The strategy for increased rice production was predicated on the introduction of more ‘rational’ and ‘efficient’ agricultural techniques. Thus, the CPK classified rice fields into two categories: those harvested once a year and those harvested twice. Calculations provided by the CPK indicate that in 1977 there would be an anticipated 2.4 million hectares of land suitable for rice production; of these, 1.4 million hectares could sustain a single harvest per year; the remainder would be conducive to two harvests. Over the next four years, according to Pol Pot, the land devoted to single harvests would remain constant, while the amount of double-cropped lands would progressively increase from 200,000 hectares in 1977 to 500,000 in 1980. However, it was determined that all new agricultural lands would generate two harvests per year.47

For the CPK, an overriding difficulty associated with increased rice production – and, by extension, the economic development and defence of Democratic Kampuchea – was the ‘problem of water’. According to the Four-Year Plan, it was necessary to ‘increase the degree of mastery over the water problem from one year to another until it reaches 100 per cent by 1980 for first-class rice land and reaches 40–50 per cent for ordinary rice land’.48 Following a table of calculations indicating the annual percentage increase projected between 1977 and 1980, the text continues: ‘In order to gain mastery over water there must be a network of dykes and canals as the basis. There must also be canals, reservoirs and irrigation pumps stationed in accordance with our strategy.’49 The rapid and massive development of irrigation was thus paramount, necessitating the completion of thousands of dykes, dams, canals and reservoirs throughout the country. This necessitated a constant moving of men and women to satisfy ever-changing labour needs. In turn, through the forced displacement of the population, the CPK dramatically altered the human environment both for urban and for rural inhabitants. The collective movement of people from diverse parts of the country into agricultural communes exposed people to infectious diseases, while the close confines, insanitary living conditions and rudimentary medical care present in the communes accelerated the spread of diseases. In addition, the forced labour employed to complete these projects endured brutal working

47 Ibid., p. 132. 48 Ibid., p. 89. 49 Ibid., p. 89.
conditions, with many people succumbing to exhaustion, injury and eventually death.

The rapid expansion of agriculture and irrigation systems was to be achieved through the standardisation of labour and a matching implementation of food rations. Consequently, under the CPK, various social classifications were established. And for many men, women and children, the consequences of these administrative practices were grave indeed. Most prominent throughout Democratic Kampuchea was the separation between ‘base’ people and ‘new’ people. ‘Base’ people, also known as ‘old’ people, were those who either participated in the revolution and/or lived in geographic zones liberated and controlled by the Khmer Rouge during the war. ‘New’ people (also identified as ‘17 April’ people) consisted of those men and women who were evacuated from the cities and towns following the Khmer Rouge victory. Rhetoric of equality notwithstanding, these designations could literally mean the difference between life and death. ‘Base’ people, for example, were eligible for ‘full rights’, meaning that they were allowed to vote and run for local elections. They could become chiefs of cooperatives and generally had access to better food rations and medical care. ‘New’ people, conversely, received less food, were treated more harshly, had fewer rights, and were directly killed more readily than ‘old’ people.50

Labourers were further classified as either kemlang ping (full strength) or kemlang ksaoy (weak strength), with the former consisting mostly of adults and the latter consisting of small children and the elderly. Those designated as full-strength were further classified into two subgroups: kemlang 1, which consisted of young, able-bodied, single men and women who comprised mobile work brigades (kong chhlat); and kemlang 2, composed of married, able-bodied men and women who were divided by sex but generally worked closer to the village. The heaviest tasks were generally reserved for kemlang 1 persons. These work-teams were segregated by sex; males belonged to kong boroh and females to kong neary. These brigades were set to work primarily on land-clearance, the digging of canals and reservoirs, and the construction of dams and dykes. As the name implies, people assigned to mobile work brigades often lived outside of villages, in temporary work-camps also segregated by sex. Kemlang 2 workers generally worked closer to their villages, performing such tasks as local wood-cutting (for building materials or fuel), preparation and cultivation of agricultural fields, and maintenance of

irrigation schemes. These tasks were also, but not always, segregated by sex; women, for example, reaped the rice while threshing was performed by the men.\textsuperscript{51} Lastly, the ‘weak strength’ labourers (kemlang 3) were given lighter tasks. Elderly workers were grouped into work-teams known generically as senah chun; male groups were termed senah chun boroh and female groups senah chun neary. Duties for members of senah chun groups included sewing, gardening, collecting small pieces of wood and caring for children. Depending on the conditions and the attitudes of the cooperative chief, some elderly workers might be required to labour in the rice fields or engage in other, more strenuous work. Children under 14 years of age were assigned to work groups known as kong komar, with boys and girls separated into kong komara and kong khomarei, respectively. Children were responsible for watching over cows and water buffalo, light digging in gardens and fields, collecting firewood, and gathering cow dung for fertiliser.\textsuperscript{52}

The Khmer Rouge division of labour was matched with a corresponding system of food rations, namely, a fourfold system was devised to distribute food rations based on type of workforce. Those workers classified in the No. 1 system would be allocated three cans of rice per day; those in the No. 2 system, two and a half cans; No. 3, two cans; and No. 4, one and a half cans.\textsuperscript{53} This numeric system refers to the type of labour involved; those people performing the heaviest manual labour, in principle, were to receive the highest rations. The lightest tasks, performed by the elderly or the sick, received the smallest rations. Pregnant women, or women who had just given birth, were at times given higher rations. Ostensibly, two side dishes (either soup or dried food) were to be provided to all workers; desserts were to be offered once every three days. Moreover, detailed work-schedules were devised – although not necessarily implemented – that determined how many days of work were required, and for how long a period, for society as a whole. In this way, the CPK determined the average amount of surplus that could be produced for the country as a whole. Consequently, the CPK was able to calculate work-quotas, such as the amount of soil to be excavated,


\textsuperscript{53} The ‘cans’ used for measurement were most often Nestle’s condensed milk cans; each can could contain approximately 200 grams of rice.
the amount of forest to be cleared, or the hectarage of fields to be planted and harvested. Often, these quotas were calculated collectively, based on the work-group in question. A work-team of fifteen ‘full-strength’ women, for example, may be assigned to reap one hectare of rice per day.

Apart from the imposition of food rations, the Khmer Rouge prohibited by deadly means all other means of subsistence. With few exceptions, notably for ‘base’ people or more trusted cadres, people were prevented from cultivating personal gardens or from foraging for food. In effect, through the establishment of supervised cooperatives everyone in time became dependent upon the Party to satisfy even their most basic of provisions. That adequate food, medicine and other materials were in short supply contributed to the prevalence of illness, injury and death. Moreover, horrific conditions played a role in the ever-expanding terror as the Khmer Rouge sought to tighten its grip on a disintegrating society.

The Contradictions of Mass Violence

The Khmer Rouge wanted to create a state funded by rice exports, a policy that justified the pursuit of an ever-expanding agricultural surplus for export. To increase overall production, they sought to increase the area under cultivation, increase the overall productivity of agriculture, and limit domestic rice consumption. To increase the cultivated area, labour was required to build paddy and irrigation works, and cultivate new fields. This work was supplied in the form of forced labour. The plan to increase productivity involved the domestic production or importation of agricultural tools, fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides. To produce these agricultural inputs domestically entailed additional forced labour, while importation depended once again on the rice surplus (and, by extension, forced labour). Finally, to reduce domestic rice consumption, the Khmer Rouge imposed a regulating system on the workforce. In these ways, the new political economy of Democratic Kampuchea placed the majority of the population between the teeth of two powerful forces: a demand for surplus rice and agricultural inputs that justified severe labour policies, and an austere rationing system that subjected men, women and children to starvation wages.

These economic structures of violence contributed most especially to the direct violence that permeated Democratic Kampuchea. The fragility of CPK rule upon victory contributed on the one hand to the development of a massive security apparatus designed to seek out and ‘smash’ perceived external and internal enemies. First, former soldiers and officials of the
previous governmental regime were to be identified, arrested and, often, killed. Likewise, Vietnamese soldiers and ‘spies’ were to be eliminated. Second, many high-ranking officials of the CPK cautioned against the presence of ‘internal’ enemies, such as traitors and saboteurs. ‘New’ people by definition were immediately suspect; more pernicious, however, were perceived traitors among the ranks of the Khmer Rouge: disloyal soldiers, traitorous officials, and those cadres harbouring ‘revisionist’ or ‘bourgeois’ tendencies.54

On the other hand, it was the hurried implementation and resulting inefficiency of economic policies that led to widespread paranoia among the highest echelons of the CPK. Surviving CPK documents describe people being arrested for ‘stealing’ food or merely complaining about insufficient rations. Such punishment was not confined to the masses: CPK leaders also purged local officials who admitted that starvation was occurring in their areas. As the food crisis increased, the CPK accused traitorous and inept low-level cadres of undermining the food production system.55 Thus, beginning in 1976, and intensifying throughout 1977, Pol Pot and his close associates initiated a series of purges against suspected traitors and reactionary elements within the Party. High-ranking cadres were arrested, detained and executed. Prior to their death, they were tortured and forced to confess their knowledge of and involvement in traitorous activities and to divulge names of other men and women. These ‘strings of traitors’ would subsequently lead to more and more purges. In time, entire divisions and work groups would be arrested and executed en masse.56

In short, the deaths from exposure, starvation and disease during the Cambodian genocide were not unintended side effects of poor research,
poor planning or poor implementation, but rather the necessary and dialectic consequence of the CPK’s distinct imperative to increase surplus. Without the threat of direct violence, the policies of rationing and surplus could not have been enforced. Without the policies of rationing and surplus, neither the material nor the discursive basis for direct violence could have been realised. Consequently, structures of violence worked dialectically with direct forms of violence to account for the massive death toll associated with the Cambodian genocide.

Bibliographical Essay


There are a number of accounts written from the perspective of journalists who covered the events, including Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: Cambodia and


Although wars, classic insurrections and genocides have claimed far more lives, terrorism has become the very face of modern conflict and turbulence, particularly since the attacks of September 11, 2001. But terrorism has a much longer history: in fact, recognisably ‘modern’ terrorism has existed for more than two centuries. This chapter surveys terrorism from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries and analyses its emergence as a peculiarly modern form of violence in the context of the clash between the growth of state power and the emphasis on individual rights and entitlements.

The word ‘terrorist’ was first used in English by Edmund Burke in 1795 in a passing comment denouncing the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror. The terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ were rarely invoked in the following decades but entered wide if idiosyncratic circulation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Those who used or advocated insurrectionary or symbolic political violence frequently embraced the word ‘terrorism’ to describe their own behaviour, even as it began to enter broader usage as a convenient epithet to use against those whose motives or means of waging a struggle were deemed illegitimate by political elites or dominant populations. When scholars, legal authorities and international agencies began to turn their attention to ‘terrorism’ in earnest in the middle of the twentieth century, the phenomenon was understood to overlap broadly with insurgency, that is, asymmetric warfare waged against a state by a group or a population not legally recognised as a sovereign entity. Only in the wake of the ascendance of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the emergence of ‘international terrorism’ in the late 1960s did observers analytically distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence. Policy-oriented academics – usually from the social sciences – began to emphasise several core features: first, that it was

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violence against civilians outside of the normal bounds of war; second, that its intent was to achieve political change by intimidating state authorities or the broader population; and third, that it was, by definition, carried out against states by sub-state groups.

In the 1980s, a minority within academia began to focus on the symbolic nature of terrorism and to characterise it as a communicative act, which untethered the study of terrorism from the increasingly lengthy list of criteria that was used to define it. Such an approach made clear that terrorism could be used by both states and non-states, against soldier and civilian alike, and within and beyond the confines of war. Those who advocated this approach identified terrorism as a strategy that sought to change the behaviour of the many by violently targeting the few and argued that those who use terrorism pick symbolically charged targets and take advantage of the subsequent media attention to communicate their grievances, recruit new followers, terrorise and provoke their enemies, and – they hope – achieve political change.

But just as the study of terrorism has evolved, so has terrorism itself. Terrorism can be treated as a dynamic, evolving strategy in many different ways. Sometimes this is done via the broader effort to link the emergence of ‘modern’ terrorism to one or more ‘modern’ phenomena – such as mass media or certain weapon technologies – or the development of ‘modern’ self-consciousness or subjectivity.2

This chapter locates the emergence of modern terrorism in the parallel growth of the rhetoric and the reality of, on the one hand, state power and nationalism and, on the other, of individualism, individual entitlements and individual rights. To put it more polemically, modern terrorism is democratic violence for a democratic era. This has multiple meanings. First, much terroristic violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was carried out in pursuit of liberating ‘the people’ from coercive state authority and asserting their rights, both individual and collective. Second, modern terrorism is individualised and small scale, not only in terms of the perpetrator and the victim, but also in the narratives that are created in which members of society are encouraged to see themselves as the personal victim of the violence. Third, modern terrorists assert the power of the individual who strikes back heroically against an all-powerful state but often on behalf of causes that have a deeply social, even ‘mass’ element.

Democracy, Revolution and Terrorism

The roots of modern terrorism are deep and can be found in the slow emergence of state power, the ideology of democracy and the conception of the individual. Early European writers, such as St Augustine (d. 430), widely referenced the ‘common good’ and the duty of the powerful to safeguard certain traditional rights of the people. Later scholars, such as John of Salisbury (d. 1180) and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), countenanced violence to protect those traditional rights of society or to punish those who ruled as tyrants. But such violence differed from modern terrorism in many ways: it was only to be used by society’s elite against those individuals who were directly responsible for tyranny in order to restore society’s natural harmony. But the Protestant Reformation, the English Civil War (1642–51), John Locke (d. 1704) and America’s Founding Fathers democratised and secularised violence and introduced the possibility of revolutionary, not just conservative political violence.

The French Revolution (1789–94) was the real watershed moment in the intertwined histories of terrorism, state terror, democracy, nationalism and individualism. Revolutionaries introduced a new language of both individual and collective rights, as well as justifications for state power based on them. Meanwhile, attacks on symbols of royal and aristocratic power grew in number and intensity and resonated powerfully among revolutionaries and the broader population. As the Revolution grew more radical, its proponents carried out even more displays of symbolic violence, such as attacks on Church property and aristocratic reactionaries. The coming of war in 1792 between France and its conservative neighbours drew a European-wide battle line between popular and monarchical sovereignty. When the moderate Charlotte Corday assassinated the radical journalist Jean-Paul Marat in the summer of 1793, revolutionaries interpreted it as a violent act meant to intimidate supporters of the new French republic. With the Revolution under assault at home and abroad, radicals ruled France as a dictatorship and deployed terror on a massive scale to cement and extend state power and, at least rhetorically, to establish liberty. The targets of this violence were the anti-democratic pillars of the old order as well as revolutionaries who either insufficiently supported the use of terror or supported popular rather than state power. Approximately 17,000 people were executed by the authorities during the Reign of Terror, but unofficial numbers are easily double that.3 The moderate revolutionary Jean-Lambert Tallien, who helped organise the arrest

of Maximilien Robespierre and end the Reign of Terror, identified the essence of the radical regime: ‘if the government of terror pursues a few citizens for their presumed intentions, it will frighten all citizens’.4 What differentiated ‘terror’ from the state’s other violent actions, such as the prosecution and even execution of criminals, was that ‘terror’ was used against potential criminals and was thus essentially symbolic.

When the Bourbon dynasty and European conservative elites were restored after Napoleon’s defeat, sub-state, conspiratorial groups became the principal users of what today we would recognise as terrorism. One example was the Carbonari, who plotted terrorist actions that they hoped would spark popular revolutions against the monarchies of France and Italy. Carbonari plans included prison breaks, assassinations, and coordinated efforts to sow chaos. In the end, Carbonari cells, which were active in the 1810s and early 1820s, did little beyond recruiting members, hatching plots, and engaging in Mason-inspired oaths and rituals that were awash in symbolism and revolved around bloodthirsty denunciations of the Catholic Church and monarchical tyranny.

The more important point is that groups such as the Carbonari represent the transition from terrorism as a state to a sub-state phenomenon. In theory, the goals (civil liberties, popular sovereignty, representative assemblies) and the enemies (religious and secular tyrants) remained the same. But with the political and military defeat of Napoleon, the revolution and the violent means that would be necessary to achieve and secure it went underground. The French revolutionaries had been state actors, developing as terrorists after they had seized the reins of state authority. Only after 1815 did ‘revolutionary’ acquire the meaning that today seems commonsensical, that of the underground conspirator dedicated to seizing power and the use of violence to overturn the current order and establish a new one.

The conservative powers of Restoration Europe – the most significant of which were France, Prussia, and the Russian and Habsburg empires – identified themselves as opponents of revolution and protectors of the traditional pillars of society: monarchy, nobility and the church. These governments used the military as well as traditional legal, economic and social privileges to preserve their holds on power, but they also increasingly turned to new, even ‘liberal’ forces to preserve their position. Chief among these forces was industrialisation. Conservative states co-opted or aligned themselves with emerging capitalists through contracts, favourable tax policies, the provision

of critical infrastructure (roads, canals, ports and eventually railroads), and the use of law and force to quell labour disturbances.

The Industrial Revolution encouraged and was accompanied by other ‘revolutions’ that led to the growth of the size, reach and effectiveness of bureaucracies, militaries and security forces – in short, the growth of state power. This bureaucratic expansion took many forms, including the growth of the means to surveil, tax and conscript citizens, as well as to shape lives and dominate spaces through the development of infrastructure, public works and public health. Another manifestation of urbanisation and bureaucratisation was the establishment in the second quarter of the nineteenth century of permanent, uniformed police forces which could be used, on the one hand, to combat crime and ensure a minimal level of safety and, on the other, to suppress labour gatherings and disturbances as well as public protests for more rights and freedoms.

Meanwhile, during the mid nineteenth century the intellectual framework for terrorism developed despite the lack of terrorist acts per se. The crucial figure was Karl Heinz, a Prussian radical democrat who participated in the upheavals of 1848–9 in his homeland. Shortly thereafter he published a series of articles entitled ‘Murder’, in which he stated that although killing is always immoral, in practice the state praises its soldiers for killing during war, its patriots for acts of tyrannicide during ‘proper’ revolutions, and its hangmen for executing criminals. Meanwhile, the state denounces those who fight for democracy, liberty and the people’s rights. Heinz argued that states are themselves simply the expression of the interests of the wealthy and that the concepts of morality and justice are relative. Therefore, governments should not be able to reference those standards when violently oppressing their opponents. Moreover, true freedom fighters should not shrink from using violence. ‘Let us, then, be practical’, he wrote. ‘Let us call ourselves murderers as our enemies do, let us take the moral horror out of this great historical tool.’ The dilemma that freedom fighters faced was that states possessed more than just the faux moral and legal standing to suppress democratic movements; modern states also had the economic, logistic and demographic ability to overwhelm those who would take up arms against them. The answer, Heinz said, was for revolutionaries and democrats to fight against well-armed states by using terror, conspiratorial organisation and destructive new technologies – in a word, terrorism (although he did not

use it). In the end, he drew the Machiavellian conclusion: ‘the path to Humanity’ could pass successfully ‘through the zenith of Barbarity’. In doing so, Heinzen appropriated the moral arguments of the Enlightenment concerning civil rights, democracy, liberty and emancipation, but used them to justify terror, violence, even mass murder. These rhetorical devices were later used by many movements and individuals – which, of course, were unlikely ever to have heard of his name – that have used terrorism.

Russian Revolutionary Terrorism

The theory and practice of terrorism became a major fixture of the modern world in the last third of the nineteenth century in many places, but it achieved the most prominence in three distinct forms: Russian revolutionary terrorism, international anarcho-terrorism, and American white supremacist terrorism. Those behind each of these forms theorised and carried out terrorism on behalf of society against what they described as the overarching, tyrannical power of the state, and yet proponents of each movement individualised the violence to a greater or lesser extent.

Tsarist Russia was a land with little experience of representative institutions, civil liberties or the rule of law. The leaders of the revolutionary movement that developed there in the third quarter of the nineteenth century were devoted to the emancipation of the serfs, an emphasis on local governance and a massive reapportionment of the land – in toto, a generic form of agrarian socialism known in Russia as ‘populism’. They vacillated between working towards the development of a popular revolutionary movement through education and agitation and, when tsarist police infiltration and repression blocked that possibility, the use of targeted assassination. The earliest attempt on the life of the tsar by a revolutionary was carried out by Dmitri Karakozov against Tsar Alexander II in 1866. The return of revolutionary terrorism was marked in 1878 by attacks on St Petersburg’s governor general Fyodor Trepov by Vera Zasulich (unsuccessful) and on Nikolai Mezentsov, the head of the tsar’s secret police, by Sergei Kravchinsky (successful). Both assassins were ideologically populists. While Zasulich’s attempt was primarily an act of revenge meant to punish Trepov for his beating of a jailed revolutionary, Kravchinsky’s attack had a much broader motive, about which he later wrote at great length. He imagined that

individual acts of targeted violence against the state’s leaders could actually change the regime’s behaviour – this because and not in spite of the vast gulf between the power of the state and its subjects. On the one hand, he believed that it would be virtually impossible for the authorities to find all the individual assassins who could hide within the broader population. Meanwhile, assassinations of prominent figures would create popular heroes who could keep alive the revolutionary movement and inspire the emergence of new activists. On the other hand, Kravchinsky theorised that these violent acts would encourage a bunker mentality on the part of the tsar and his ministers which would diminish the government’s effectiveness and encourage its repressive tendencies, leading, in turn, to the creation of a true mass movement that could eventually topple the tsar and his system.  

In the late 1870s, Russians formed the first-ever large-scale conspiratorial organisation devoted to the use of revolutionary terrorism. The People’s Will, as it was known, probably did not have more than a few score hardcore members, but its several thousand supporters across Russia were organised into cells, whose members were unaware of each other’s names and locations. These cells engaged in agitation, raised money, recruited members and supplied safe houses. Within the central organisation, members specialised in distinct fields, such as surveillance, counterespionage, forgery, smuggling and explosives. The group’s leaders debated among themselves about how best to deploy their violence: Nikolai Morozov argued for a massive campaign of terrorism that would destabilise Russia and lead to peasant rebellions, while others proposed using targeted assassinations as a prelude to a coup. The organisation’s nominal chief, Lev Tikhomirov, eventually prevailed: like Kravchinsky, he believed that the principal purpose of terrorism was symbolic in that it could keep the movement alive, undermine the legitimacy of the tsar and his regime, and eventually pave the way for some sort of revolution. More to the point, he later confessed that the commitment to violence came before the rather tortured efforts to validate its purpose. Although Morozov left when his dream of a widespread campaign was discarded, he captured the group’s mood when he claimed that terrorism ‘should make the struggle popular, historical, and grandiose’.  

attempts on the life of the tsar, the People’s Will finally succeeded in assassinating Alexander II on 1 March 1881, by blowing up his sled with hand-tossed explosives. No popular revolution erupted, and the tsar’s son, Alexander III, rolled back reforms and launched a major crackdown on even mild subversion after he came to the throne.

Anarchist Terrorism in Europe and Russia

The second form of political violence during this period was anarcho-terrorism, which was shaped not only by horror at the consequences of rapid industrialisation and growing state power in Europe and the United States but also by complicated political and ideological developments across the political spectrum. As middle-class support for liberal democracy grew, most embittered workers turned to socialism. That movement inspired few terrorists during this era, however, because socialists found that they could make more progress in terms of improving workers’ lives through large-scale organising. And many conservative leaders, such as Germany’s Otto von Bismarck, found that they could blunt the revolutionary impulse by implementing limited reforms and even turn some workers towards the state by harnessing nationalism. Gradualism – from both the Left and the Right – threatened to undermine more radical movements, such as revolutionary Marxism, which preached that workers could only truly be emancipated when the system was completely overthrown. Even those Marxists committed to the use of violence rarely turned to terrorism, however. As the Russian revolutionary Lev Trotsky put it in 1911, ‘if we rise against terrorist acts, it is only because individual revenge does not satisfy us’.10 Terrorism was ahistorical, Trotsky argued, since it was the work of small groups rather than of entire social classes.

The radicals most threatened by the partial amelioration of working-class demands and the growing might of centralised states were anarchists. Like socialists, anarchists lamented what they understood to be working-class repression at the hands of capitalists and the states that they controlled. But anarchists decried the solutions proposed by socialists, which were seen as the substitution of one kind of repression for another. Anarchists denounced the state itself – regardless of who controlled it – as repressive, since it always represented the power of one segment of society over another.

Most anarchists were peaceful, even pacifistic, but a small fringe of the movement turned to violence in the hopes of bringing about a liberating revolution. But if they were few in number – as were the number of casualties – their impact was significant. Anarchist terrorists struck targets in Europe, Russia, South America and the United States, and their violence stretched from the 1880s to its last gasp in the early 1920s. While some anarchist attacks were carried out by small cells and loosely affiliated networks, individuals were responsible for most of the mayhem.

Anarcho-terrorists acted on a range of motives, but three stand out. The first was articulated by Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian who was one of the key anarchist theorists of the nineteenth century. He theorised that individual attacks, motivated by anything from thievish greed to altruistic idealism, could foment chaos and wear down the state, eventually creating opportunities for revolutionaries to overthrow the state and establish self-governing communes. ‘Everything in this fight is equally sanctified by the revolution’, Bakunin declared. ‘[Never mind that those destined to perish] will call it terrorism!’\(^\text{11}\) While his vision of an anarchist heaven-on-earth never materialised, his strategy of using essentially random violence to create a revolutionary moment has become second nature to modern radicals willing to use terrorism, particularly against civilians.

The second motive behind anarcho-terrorism was best articulated by the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin who popularised the phrase ‘propaganda of the deed’. For him, this meant acts of violence or even simple insubordination that, through visceral, immediately experienced examples, pushed commoners past their passivity, their sense of inferiority, and their ingrained reluctance to act against their oppressors. In other words, violence was empowering. For Kropotkin, the significance of terrorism – a word he rarely used but a concept that he clearly evoked – lay almost entirely in its impact on the perpetrator and not the victim.

The European most associated with the direct promotion of terroristic ‘propaganda of the deed’ was the German Johann Most, who published the anarchist newspaper *Die Freiheit* (*Freedom*), first in Germany and then in New York after he emigrated in 1882. Most essentially brought the Bakuninist and Kropotkinite justifications for terrorism together. He claimed that terrorism could ‘stoke the fire of revolution and incite people to revolt in any way we can’.\(^\text{12}\) Most did not just encourage propaganda of the deed; the

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11 Laqueur, *Voices*, p. 70.
pages of *Die Freiheit* contained detailed descriptions of how to make and deploy poisons, dynamite and letter bombs. And after he moved to the United States, he spoke to rapturous audiences at anarchist clubs across the country – a speech in Chicago reportedly drew 6,000 – and directly contributed to the spread of the doctrine of the propaganda of the deed in the New World.

Terrorist actions in Europe during this period were often prompted by the desire to avenge fellow anarchist revolutionaries. This was the case in France in the first half of the 1890s, when a string of intertwined bombings killed only a handful of victims but horrified and entranced the nation. The attacks were carried out, in two separate threads, first as responses to the suppression of a parade and a strike and then proceeded as reactions to the arrests of the others. Also notable was the nature of the targets, which included the home of a judge and a prosecutor, the headquarters of a mining company, cafés, the French Chamber of Deputies itself, and finally, in 1894, the French president, Sadi Carnot, who was stabbed to death by an Italian anarchist. The terrorists used their trials to rail against the evils of capitalism and state power and to plead for other anarchists to take up the fight. Although these anarchists did not personally know each other, their actions created the impression – fanned by the government and the newly ascendant mass-circulation newspapers – that France was beset by a widespread anarchist conspiracy. The irony was that the combination of the state’s lopsided monopoly on the use of legitimate violence and the development of a labour movement that alternated between compliance and mass organisation meant – again contrary to the perception of most – that terrorism primarily existed as an individual *cri de cœur* against the power of the state.

The same could be said for Russia, where, after a nearly two-decade lull, terrorism reached dizzying heights of destructiveness during and shortly after the 1905 Revolution. In that year, terrorism was only one of many kinds of violence and disruption alongside organised political opposition, peasant revolts, massive labour strikes, and mutinies by soldiers and sailors. Only Tsar Nicholas II’s last-minute concessions of a limited constitution, a legislature and limited civil rights prevented the collapse of the state. Even then, terrorist violence was only finally brought down to manageable levels by 1911.

The most frequently told story of these years is the return of targeted assassination by the Combat Organisation, a small, secret group that carried out terrorist operations on behalf of the populist Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs). The SRs, who aspired to build a mass movement, valued terror for its
ability to attract recruits, keep pressure on the state, and potentially create a revolutionary situation. The Combat Organisation assassinated two ministers of the interior (essentially national police chiefs) and a host of other officials, including the tsar’s own uncle, the Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich.

While these attacks garnered headlines at home and abroad, they did not and could not seriously undermine the state itself. Far greater damage was done to both the state and society by a tidal wave of uncoordinated terrorist violence that swamped Russia during and for some time after 1905. Anna Geifman has estimated that nearly 17,000 people were killed or wounded in these terrorist attacks from 1905 to 1910. While local Socialist Revolutionary cells were responsible for some of these attacks, the vast majority were carried out by anarchists. While some were undoubtedly political, many were crimes sheathed in ideology, such as was the case with so-called ‘revolutionary expropriations’. These were robberies and murders carried out to raise funds for revolutionary purposes or, as was often the case, for personal gain but with the Bakuninist claim that such crimes struck at the capitalist system.

Anarchist Terrorism in the United States

The United States has a long and bloody history of labour-related violence, which formed the backdrop for sporadic outbursts of terrorism. The first such eruption occurred in the eastern Pennsylvania coal fields in the 1860s and 1870s. When a few dozen company managers and bosses were killed, the authorities blamed their deaths on the Molly Maguires, supposedly an underground group with roots in the Irish Whiteboys and other secret societies. Twenty miners were eventually executed after sensationalistic trials based on flimsy evidence. Today, historians doubt that the Mollies even existed as an organised group. But the spectre of conspiratorial violence carried out by immigrants with ties to Old World movements set the tone for much of what was to follow. Middle America, the country’s political leaders and the mainstream media came to understand American terrorism as essentially the work of outsiders or hyphenated Americans. For the next fifty years, the dominant image of the American terrorist was of a heavily whiskered foreigner with an unpronounceable name and a bomb hidden under an overcoat.

It is important to note, however, that the bulk of labour-related violence was carried out not by terrorists but by state militias or armed strike breakers, such as during the Homestead strike (1892), the Pullman strike (1894), the Ludlow massacre (1914) and the Battle of Blair Mountain (1921). A second key point is that the majority of the workers who went on strike or organised were relatively non-ideological, and those who did profess an ideology could be classified as socialists. Socialists and labour activists did occasionally use terrorism, though, such as the October 1910 bombing of the headquarters of the Los Angeles Times, which was locked in a debilitating dispute with its union. The blast killed twenty-one non-union employees. This sort of violence tended to be closely connected to specific labour grievances and economic issues.

Most sub-state labour-related terrorism in the USA was carried out by anarchists who always formed a radical fringe of the labour movement; one estimate puts the number of anarchists in the USA at the time of the movement’s peak in 1885 at 7,000. Even then, violent anarchists lay at the fringe of the fringe. Not surprisingly, they attracted the lion’s share of national attention, in part because of their violent rhetoric. One anarchist paper, for instance, exhorted its readers: ‘Dynamite! . . . It brings terror and fear to the robbers . . . A pound of this good stuff beats a bushel of ballots hollow – and don’t you forget it!’ Anarchist rhetoric also differed from that of the mainstream labour movement by focusing significant energy on the state and its war against individual liberty. Quite tellingly, most anarchist violence in the USA was carried out by individuals or extremely small cells, even as it was characterised by authorities and the mainstream press as the leading edge of a massive and violent revolutionary movement.

The story of anarchist violence in the United States begins with the Chicago Haymarket Riot of 1886. After hundreds of thousands of workers marched and went on strike across the United States on 1 May demanding the eight-hour work day, demonstrations continued in Chicago, in part to protest police violence at a local strike. On 4 May, as a demonstration led by anarchists wound down, someone threw a bomb, killing eight policemen. What followed was America’s first red scare, a nationwide panic during which the authorities went on a witch hunt for violent revolutionaries and newspapers fanned the fears of middle America. Chicago police rounded up anarchists and used the hysteria to suppress socialists and union activists.

Despite a paucity of evidence, eight defendants were found guilty and five were sentenced to death. Those on the left loudly denounced the verdict as a miscarriage of justice. By 1893, the governor of Illinois agreed and issued pardons. But there had been a bomb, and trial evidence revealed that a small group of anarchists had made bombs and plotted to use them at some time. In a country rife with labour-related tension and conflict, terrorism had become the fault line, crystallising for the bulk of the population the danger of labour, immigrants and even rampant individualism, while clarifying for those on the left the horrifying demagogic power of the state.

The first red scare of 1886 stigmatised the American labour movement and the campaign for the eight-hour work day, but labour organisation soon picked up again. In fact, from 1897 to 1920, total union membership increased tenfold. Just as importantly, evidence suggests that wages grew and the average work week shrank during this period for unionised workers more than for non-union workers. Ironically, the creeping success of American labour organisers alarmed not just industrialists and their government backers but also anarchists, who – as in Europe – feared that the slow amelioration of working-class disaffection threatened their claims that only a revolution could fundamentally right society’s wrongs. Afraid that they would lose their audience, anarchists doubled down on terrorism. But they also shifted even more clearly towards a rhetorical emphasis on the evils of statism and the importance of individual liberty.

Thus it is significant that the most high-profile incidences of American anarcho-terrorism around the turn of the century were individual acts of propaganda of the deed. In 1892, the Russian-American anarchist Alexander Berkman attempted to kill Henry Clay Frick, chairman of the board of Carnegie Corporation, in retaliation for Carnegie’s violent clampdown on striking steel workers in Homestead, Pennsylvania. And in September 1901, Leon Czolgosz shot and killed US President William McKinley at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. Just before his execution, Czolgosz, an anarchist and former steelworker born in the United States to Polish immigrants, stated, ‘I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good people – the good working people. I am not sorry for my crime.’

Record-setting foreign immigration, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and American involvement in World War I stoked fear in the United States of Bolshevies, workers, anarchists, terrorists and unassimilated foreigners. The Immigration Act of 1917 legalised the deportation of resident aliens who promoted assassination, and the Sedition Act of 1918 prohibited antigovernment speech. In 1919, these laws were used to take into custody Luigi Galleani, an Italian immigrant who had taken Johann Most’s place as America’s loudest and most notorious proponent of anarchism and propaganda of the deed. That June, eight bombs set off outside the homes of officials associated with the legislation produced three fatalities: a guard, a bystander and one of the bombers. Pamphlets signed by ‘The Anarchist Fighters’ that were found at the scene stated, ‘there will have to be murder: we will kill, because it is necessary; there will have to be destruction; we will destroy to rid the world of your tyrannical institutions’. The dead bomber was a colleague of Galleani; no other terrorists were arrested.18

A new moral panic ensued. US attorney general A. Mitchell Palmer declared that America was under assault from ‘alien anarchists’, and a beefed-up Bureau of Investigation rounded up 10,000 suspects over seven months. The government eventually deported about 500 of those seized. The climax of American anarchist terror came soon after. On 16 September 1920, a bomb exploded on New York City’s Wall Street, killing thirty-eight and wounding over 200 – the most destructive American terrorist attack until the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The authorities never found the culprit, but suspicion fell on the few Galleanists who remained, in large part because of the discovery of a nearby note from a group claiming to be the American Anarchist Fighters. The note seemed to reference recent arrests: ‘Free the political prisoners or it will be sure death for all of you.’19

White Supremacist Terrorism in the United States

The tragic irony surrounding the American caricature of the foreign terrorist was that in the Ku Klux Klan the United States produced a wholly domestic terrorist movement during Reconstruction that gleaned more support and shed more blood than any in Europe or Russia. Most importantly, Klan

19 Quoted in Joseph T. McCann, Terrorism on American Soil (Boulder, CO: Sentient, 2006), p. 64.
terrorism actually proved to be successful, unlike most other sub-state terror campaigns described in this chapter.

The American Civil War left over 600,000 men dead and devastated the infrastructure of the American South. Moreover, it fundamentally transformed the region’s culture, society and economy as well as destroying its moral and ideological centre by ending slavery. Aided by the newly established Freedmen’s Bureau, African Americans set up businesses, bought property, worked their own land, attended schools and learned to read, held public assemblies, and, in short, sought to live as free citizens for the first time on a large scale in the American South. But Southern states essentially tried to re-enslave African Americans through Black Codes, which used vagrancy laws, employment contracts and penal labour to restrict their movement and liberty. After ‘Radical’ Republicans surged into Congress in 1866, they passed legislation that stripped former soldiers and administrators of the Confederacy of the right to vote and sent troops to reoccupy the South in order to safeguard African Americans’ newly won franchise. Although they remained a majority in most areas of the South, former Confederates – nearly all of them Democrats – quickly found themselves ruled by Republican coalitions of freed blacks, black and white Northerners ‘carpetbaggers’ who had come south, and white Southern ‘scalawags’ who cooperated with the new authorities.

Having lost the rebellion and unable to wage another open war of resistance to protect their lost world, militant southern white Democrats responded by launching a campaign of terrorism. The Ku Klux Klan became the centrepiece of this resistance. Formed by early 1866, the Klan briefly existed as a centrally organised movement but soon flourished as a patchwork of independent chapters. Other extravagantly named local terrorist groups, such as the Knights of the White Camelia, also emerged. Disparate in dress, ritual and rhetoric, what united these cells was their devotion to white supremacy, an unwillingness to buckle to renewed northern ‘aggression’, and a willingness to use symbolic violence on a vast scale. The Klan and related groups killed thousands of blacks who sought to live free and public lives, as well as thousands of blacks and whites who supported the Republican Party – the party of Abraham Lincoln, the North and emancipation.

Because of poor record-keeping and broad popular support in the South we do not know the true extent of the casualties. What we do have are the occasional local body counts. For example, twenty-five murders and 115 assaults on ‘innocents’ were reported between June and October 1867 in Tennessee. Two hundred racially based murders occurred in Arkansas
between July and October 1868. And perhaps one hundred people were killed in a single Florida county from 1865 to 1871. An avalanche of anecdotes from memoirs, official reports and congressional testimonies make clear that violence such as this was epidemic across most of the former Confederacy.

Across the South, masked riders delivered beatings and whippings, raped women, burned down houses and schools, and shot, burned or lynched their victims. Blacks were targeted when they registered or voted, acquired parcels of land, taught or attended school, armed themselves or formed local militias out of self-defence. According to a Mississippi Klansman, ‘when a leading negro would make himself particularly obnoxious . . . and was considered dangerous, he was selected as an example’. White Republicans who acted in concert with blacks or supported them as teachers, business partners, tax collectors, election officials, sheriffs or politicians were also attacked.

The US Congress passed laws to mobilise resources against the KKK, and President Ulysses S. Grant sent federal troops on several occasions to take on the Klan. But this was expensive, extended the divisiveness of the Civil War, and created increasing resentment in the North. Federal support for Reconstruction dried up, troops were slowly withdrawn, and courts were starved of money to prosecute and punish Klan members and other white supremacists. Violence against Republicans, black and white, grew, and white supremacist cells evolved from nighttime arson, beatings and murder to open organisation in militias. So too did the purpose of white supremacist violence evolve: from instrumental terror meant to influence to functional violence designed to occupy spaces and physically keep African Americans and white Republicans away from polls. In 1876–7, the last Reconstruction era governments elected by blacks and whites were driven from office, and Union troops fully withdrew. Soon thereafter, Klan violence largely evaporated – not because the Klan had been suppressed, but because the Klan had won.

White supremacist violence was, of course, specifically intended to restore the racial hierarchy upset by the Civil War. But it was often couched in the rhetoric of protecting the people and their rights from an intrusive, aggressive government. After all, the first white supremacist blow against Reconstruction was struck when the actor John Wilkes Booth uttered the immortal words ‘Sic
semper tyrannis’ (‘Thus always to tyrants’) while assassinating Abraham Lincoln in April 1865. As for the southern campaign of violence itself, a South Carolinian Klan manifesto described it thus: ‘Defeated on the battlefield, defrauded at the ballot box, we have but one remedy – the dagger that was made illustrious in the hands of Brutus.’ Anti-federal vitriol only increased in the immediate aftermath of Reconstruction, as can be seen in the words of I. W. Avery, a historian and newspaper editor, from 1881: ‘Georgia was ruled under a scorching travesty of law, alternating with bayonet despotism governed by mob caprice; [an] era of whimsical yet savage tyranny.’ As whites, southerners rebelled against black equality, ‘negroism’ and ‘negro rule’; as Americans, they rebelled against tyranny, statism and outside intrusion. While those unsympathetic to the clearly racist argument by which ‘negro rule’ and ‘savage [i.e., federal] tyranny’ were conflated might wish to deny it, such an argument attracted many in the South during and after Reconstruction and was instrumental in mobilising support for what we today recognise as terrorism.

It is important to observe that white supremacist terrorism did not cease with the end of Reconstruction. In the 1890s, the states of the former Confederacy adopted new constitutions and new laws that fully implemented racial segregation. This is what we know as Jim Crow, but it was to all intents and purposes American apartheid. It was enshrined in the law and maintained by the authorities to be sure, but what really preserved it was lynching. According to the Equal Justice Initiative, over 4,000 African Americans were lynched from 1877 to 1950. Lynchings were mob violence ostensibly carried out to achieve justice, but the accusations used to trigger these murders were often fabricated. Victims were sometimes chosen arbitrarily or under the flimsiest of circumstances. In other words, individuals were primarily lynched to send a message to the rest of the targeted population to remain subservient. The author Richard Wright said in his autobiography, ‘The things that influenced my conduct as a Negro did not have to happen to me directly; I needed but to hear of them to feel their full effects in the deepest layers of my consciousness.’ One would be hard-pressed to

come up with a clearer description of how terrorism – or, for that matter, state terror – operates. Jim Crow established the legal basis for segregation. But lynchings – that is, terrorism – were the occasional outbursts of violence that helped preserve segregation.

Epilogue

Conspiratorial sub-state terrorism petered out in the 1920s and virtually disappeared by the 1930s. One observer wrote in the 1933 *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* that terrorism had become something ‘irrelevant and unnecessary’.26 Indeed, after the 1920 Wall Street bombing, anarchist violence precipitously declined. But terrorism did not go away; it simply reappeared in different guises. As noted above, white supremacist violence moved from nighttime violence to daylight lynchings, which enjoyed broad public support and quasi-state involvement – this was closer to state terror than sub-state terrorism. And while sub-state Russian revolutionary terrorism evaporated, it was replaced by Soviet state terror on a scale never before seen (and probably not even dreamed of by Maximilien Robespierre and Karl Heinzen). The 1930s and 1940s were, in fact, the age of state terror, when totalitarian regimes in the USSR, Germany and Italy used mass, organised violence to rid themselves physically of opponents but also – as the terrorists of the nineteenth century – to intimidate enemies, motivate supporters and shape societies.

But sub-state terrorism itself had not gone away; it had merely gone dormant. It re-emerged in its classic guises in the decades after World War II, at first principally as part of larger insurrectionary strategies by ethno-nationalist groups seeking independence from European imperial powers. In Palestine, two Zionist organisations – Irgun and LEHI – successfully spearheaded the expulsion of the United Kingdom via a two-pronged effort that highlighted the vulnerabilities of modern democracies. First, Irgun and LEHI attacks undermined support among a war-weary British public to the point that by 1947 newspapers back home began to call for British withdrawal from the region. Second, these groups rallied support among the international community, in part by demanding that Western powers live up to their principles of promoting democracy and national self-determination as proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the United Nations Charter of 1945.

Algeria’s struggle to free itself from France provides more insight into how terrorism spread in the twentieth century at the paradoxical juncture of state power and individual entitlement, particularly within the context of postwar democracy. In 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) began its war of independence against France, but its efforts to force Paris to the negotiating table via a semi-conventional military campaign in the Algerian hinterland made little headway. In a desperate but calculated bid to force Algerians inside Algeria to choose sides and to garner attention beyond the territory’s borders, the FLN launched a terror campaign in the colonial capital of Algiers, attacking civilians, police and symbolic targets. This succeeded in provoking the French military and settlers into disproportionate, reactive violence, which turned the moral strength of liberal democratic France against itself, since constitutionalism appeared hypocritical in the light of the violence committed by French counterterrorist forces when rooting out enemies who hid amidst the local population. While FLN violence – against both French and Algerians – was gruesome and widespread, the list of French human rights abuses was even more appalling: massive cordon and arrest operations, the wholesale suspension of habeas corpus, the extensive use of torture, and perhaps 3,000 extrajudicial executions. By 1960, the FLN was leading a mass movement that could support a semi-conventional army in the countryside and enormous popular demonstrations in the cities. In response, settlers demanded a hard line in Algeria, which precipitated a constitutional crisis in metropolitan France and to French departure from Algeria in 1962.

The Algerian conflict also produced an influential argument in favour of terrorist violence. The psychiatrist-turned-anti-imperialist Frantz Fanon argued that European colonialism had turned the colonised of Africa, Asia and Latin America into self-loathing peoples who – in a twentieth-century twist on Kropotkin – had become enablers of their own enslavement. ‘Violence’, Fanon wrote, ‘is a cleansing force . . . [It] frees the native from his inferiority complex and . . . restores his self-respect.’ And while Fanon did not specifically prescribe terrorism as his preferred means of violence, its use made perfect sense to colonised organisations and peoples that had little, when compared to the great European imperial nation states in the way of arms, funds, logistical support and trained troops. What independence-minded groups knew, though, was that potentially they had overwhelming numerical superiority, if only the native populace could be roused to action.

28 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2005), p. 94.
Ethno-national separatists and liberation groups embraced terrorism as the great equaliser, one that they believed could bridge the gulf between vastly powerful modern states and oppressed, marginalised peoples.

In fact, the FLN’s strategy became a model for others. In Northern Ireland, Palestine and the Basque region of Spain, independence movements sought to use terrorism as the springboards from which to mount broader campaigns with mass participation. While, respectively, the Provisional Irish Republic Army, the various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Basque Homeland and Liberty (known as ETA from its name in Basque) occasionally gained significant support, none succeeded in mounting widespread insurgencies. Not surprisingly, none of these movements achieved full independence, although several gained partial autonomy and increased rights for their peoples. In the case of Malaya in the 1950s, the Malayan Communist Party fought against the local authorities and the British Empire to achieve national independence under the guise of Marxism. But the communist insurgency – which made liberal use of terrorism – failed at least in part because it remained rooted in ethno-nationalist grievances that appealed only to a small ethnically Chinese base.

During the second half of the Cold War, Marxist radicals in Europe, the United States and Latin America used terrorism in an attempt to spur class-based revolutions. But the ethno-nationalist movements of the mid century cast a long shadow, since the most prominent groups – including the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Red Army Faction (originally known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and Weatherman/Weather Underground in the United States – also invoked Fanon’s anti-colonial rhetoric of violence-as-empowerment. Moreover, they explicitly linked ethno-racial issues to economic concerns by identifying the USA and its allies as imperial powers that oppressed Third World peoples abroad (such as via the Vietnam War) and racial minorities and the poor at home. Similar to the violent anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the leftist revolutionaries of the 1960s and 1970s operated as individuals or in very small cells that used symbolic violence to publicise their cause, to produce a crackdown from the fascist state and a revolutionary crisis (as articulated by the Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella), and subsequently a mass uprising. While US and European radicals attracted a great deal of attention from media and the state and even a certain measure of sympathy, primarily from middle-class students, in the end they did little more than generate support for the authorities and discredit more moderate movements. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros’ terrorism backfired even more
spectacularly when mounting violence triggered a right-wing crackdown on the radicals that was at first largely welcomed by the population but led to more than a decade of police-state rule.

Since the 1980s, terrorism has been most associated with the rise of jihadism and radical Islamism. Their origins stretch back to the formation in Egypt in 1928 of the Muslim Brotherhood, which sought to create a parallel, insulated society in which devout Muslims could seek spiritual, social and cultural rejuvenation. Although the movement was mostly peaceful, occasional government crackdowns provoked violent responses and halting efforts to create a secret organisation capable of exacting revenge. By the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood, which by this time had spread throughout most of the Sunni Muslim Middle East, had failed to achieve much success against the region’s authoritarian regimes which promoted varying combinations of pan-Arab nationalism, Soviet-oriented socialism or Western-oriented crony capitalism. As a result, the most radical Islamists began to gravitate towards more widespread sub-state conspiratorial activity and a willingness to use terrorism to facilitate a coup or build a larger movement. But Sunni Islamist uprisings and terrorist campaigns in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1979–81 failed to produce larger revolutionary movements and instead led to violent state repression.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan opened up a new front and new possibilities. Radical Islamists who had not found success at home travelled to Afghanistan to fight in defence of Islam. The most famous of these Islamists, Osama bin Laden, created the precursor to al-Qaeda in 1986 to recruit and train Muslims from across North Africa, the Middle East and Asia to fight against Soviet troops and the Soviet-backed Afghan government. The Soviet Union withdrew its troops in 1988–9, and the Soviet-backed Afghan government was defeated several years later. With no more reason to exist, al-Qaeda nearly broke up in the mid 1990s, but bin Laden reimagined the group, transforming al-Qaeda from an organisation devoted to local radical Islamist insurgency to global jihadist terrorism.

The concept of Lesser Jihad – the defence of an Islamic community so as to insure its ability to live under sharia – underpins radical Islamism. Groups that embrace it essentially substitute Islam for other ideological organising principles. But in jihadism, jihad became, in the words of Reza Aslan, the basis of a ‘cosmic war’. 29 Jihadism is characterised by a transnational effort to recreate the Caliphate and a global understanding of the moral and cultural

fault line between Islam and the other, between good and evil. Another key feature of jihadism is particularly relevant in the context of this chapter: jihadists emphasise the ability of martyrdom essentially to erase personal sin, even – or particularly – for secular Muslims who have only recently embraced faith. This has meant that jihadist terrorist violence has become in recent decades the ultimate expression of individual empowerment vis-à-vis statist authority.

Bin Laden committed al-Qaeda to fighting against the United States, the ‘far enemy’ that some radical Islamists had long identified as the great power that propped up the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes as well as the Jewish state of Israel. Al-Qaeda’s escalating campaign of terrorist violence culminated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, that killed nearly 3,000 civilians in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. The USA and its allies invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, which changed jihadist violence again. Al-Qaeda evolved from a centralised conspiratorial organisation that planned and carried out terrorist operations to an isolated band of leaders that sought to influence global jihad by promoting a brand and backing what have been called ‘franchises’ by many observers. In this manner, al-Qaeda eventually endorsed local insurgent and/or terrorist operations in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Northern Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – a rival that emerged from the chaos of the Syrian Civil War and the United States’ decision to withdraw from Iraq in 2011 – used slickly produced pamphlets, extensive social media and gruesome videos to appeal directly to disaffected, marginalised Muslims in Europe and the United States. Some travelled to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria or Iraq to take part in insurgencies against local authoritarian regimes or Western interveners, but others – variously referred to as ‘self-radicalised’ or ‘lone wolves’ – remained at home where they carried out jihadist attacks against soft targets. Examples of attacks that were inspired but not directed by al-Qaeda or ISIS include the Fort Hood, Texas, mass shooting (November 2009), the Boston Marathon bombing (April 2013), an attack on several Parisian sites including the satirical paper Charlie Hebdo (January 2015), the San Bernadino massacre (December 2015), the Nice, France, truck attack (July 2016) and the London Bridge attacks (June 2017). While the motivation in each of these terrorist attacks was ostensibly jihadism, the pattern has been strikingly similar to the anarchist attacks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: terrorist attacks carried out by individuals or small cells that are personally unaware of each other but that are drawn together into a widely dispersed movement via propaganda.
These recent developments have brought us full circle. What we see in the decades since the 1950s are refinements of tactics and strategies pioneered from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. As it developed across the nineteenth century, terrorism emerged as a strategy of symbolic violence used against the few in order to influence the many. This was true when used from above, as it was by French revolutionaries and later Bolsheviks, Nazis and Italian Fascists, and from below, as by Russian populists, European and American anarchists, and, in the USA, white supremacists.

As described in this chapter, modern terrorism took on its particular forms in large part because of a peculiarly modern paradox: the side-by-side development of powerful states and entitled individuals. This paradox remains at the core of both democracy and terrorism, linking two facets of the modern world in ways that continue to surprise and befuddle. Within this context, the truism that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter takes on new and startling meaning.

Bibliographical Essay


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The Origins of Modern Terrorism


PART V

* REPRESEmtATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF VIOLENCE
In 1970 a senior civil servant in the British Home Office could publish a book called *The Conquest of Violence* which chronicled what he considered to be a social triumph within the United Kingdom. The book was an expression of the way that many felt in the liberal democracies of Europe a generation after the Second World War. It built on perceptions that seemed to be growing during the nineteenth century that violence, especially criminal violence and harsh responses by those in authority, was alien to what were essentially progressive and humanitarian developments within European culture and society. More recently the cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker has taken the decline in violence in the West as a given and sought to explain it with a description of how ‘the better angels’ of human nature alongside the spread of good government and cosmopolitanism, together with an empathy with fellow human beings, have encouraged a rejection of different forms of violent behaviours and responses. This chapter has two principal aims: first, to probe past beliefs about criminal violence and the responses to it; and second, to explore some of the ways in which European cultural forms portrayed such violence and to compare these with might be termed the reality, such as it may be constructed.

The Vicarious Thrill of Violence and Crime

Most of the individuals brought before the various criminal courts of different European countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were charged with some kind of property crime; such crime rarely involved violence. Nevertheless, it was violence that often characterised crime and criminals in the popular mind, and it was violent crime that most worried people.

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Moreover, such crime provided particularly exciting stories and gave vicarious thrills to the readers of novels, newspapers and ‘penny dreadfuls’, and, subsequently, to the audiences of films and television. Violent offences that were particularly horrendous and hence newsworthy prompted moral panics, notably when the victims were well-to-do or wealthy, or when they were vulnerable children, women or elderly people. The British press whipped up concerns over ‘garrotters’ in the 1850s and 1860s, and over ‘muggers’ a century later. Essentially these offenders were committing the same crime – street robbery – but the name suggested something alien and novel. The London garrotting panic of 1862 gained a singular boost from the fact that the first victim – or at least the first individual identified as such – was a member of parliament returning from a late-night parliamentary debate. Some of the garrottings mentioned in the press over the following months were not violent robberies at all, but this did not prevent them being portrayed as such.\(^3\) The French press fostered similar alarm over the Parisian equivalent of garrotting – *le coup du père François* – during the 1830s and 1840s, and also over the youth gangs, or *apaches*, at the close of the nineteenth century. The murder of a 9-year-old girl in Berlin in the summer of 1904 sparked another big-city panic but helped also to shape an understanding of the city through breathless press reporting of the different areas of danger, delight, poverty and social intermixing in the city. A few years later a series of knife attacks on young women in Berlin prompted a press panic about a ‘ripper’, but it also encouraged the police to establish a policy of working together with the press. The hope among the police hierarchy was that feeding newspapers with detail to pass on to the public would encourage both the collection of useful information and public confidence in the police management of criminal offending.\(^4\) Other police institutions, most significantly the Metropolitan Police of London, took much longer to seek press assistance; rather they appear to have wished to remain aloof and, by so doing, to emphasise that they were experts with skills that should be acknowledged and respected.


Newspaper editors and owners had their own agendas. In the opening years of the twentieth century, for example, the Petit Parisien used the panic over apaches and the brutal sexual murder of 11-year-old Marthe Erbelding by Albert Soleilland to launch a referendum on the death penalty. In this instance, and in most others, the impression offered, and sometimes directly stated by media outlets, was that violent criminality was getting worse. Academics might insist that violence and violent crime have decreased and, indeed, statistics have been deployed to demonstrate a decline in murder rates across Europe since the early modern period; but within the media thrilling stories of criminal violence rarely came with any suggestion that they were exceptional and running against a trend of decreasing violence. Moreover, virtually no one, other than an academic of some kind, posed the question about what constituted criminal violence in any given society and how it might best be measured. At the end of the nineteenth century the criminologist Enrico Ferri compared the homicide figures of seventeen European countries to demonstrate that areas of southern Europe had far more people convicted of killing than northern Europe. According to the figures deployed by Ferri there were 9.69 killings per 100,000 inhabitants in Italy, fewer than 2 per 100,000 in France and Germany, and even fewer in England and Scotland. Yet even here the question was not posed as to whether the incidence of homicide ought to be taken as the measure of criminal violence. It is conceivable that societies with fewer homicides had more violent assaults than the more murderous societies. And if this was indeed the case, should that lead to them being considered more violent or less? Moreover, some forms of violent assault were condoned or tolerated by large numbers of people in the less murderous societies; the courts in England, for example, began to move more positively against wife beaters and against organised but unregulated pugilism during the nineteenth century. In such instances, however, juries could take a more sympathetic and supportive attitude towards the accused than judges and magistrates. And just as popular attitudes might be rather different

6 See, for example, Manuel Eisner, 'Modernization, Self-Control and Lethal Violence: The Long-Term Dynamics of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective', British Journal of Criminology 41 (2001), 618–38.
7 Enrico Ferri, Atlante atropologico-statistico dell'omicidio, originally published as an appendix to his L'omicidio nell'antropologia criminale (Omicida nato e omicida pazzo) (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1895).
towards some acts of violence as compared with those managing the state and their officials, so rough and sometimes violent popular justice might be exacted on anyone who broke traditional mores, which may or may not have been defined as ‘crime’ in legislation or penal codes. While, probably, they were decreasing in number, incidents of charivari in France, Katzenmusik in Germany, rough music in England, scampenate in Italy and their other European counterparts continued long after the early modern period. In Russia, village communities often took the law into their own hands in acts of samosud, literally judging for oneself; and samosud could be especially violent towards those stealing things of particular value, such as horses. Rural areas were increasingly the most common settings for such justice but similar demonstrations, sometimes resulting in physical violence, might also be found in urban districts, especially amongst recent migrants from rural areas. Newspapers in England made jibes about Irish migrants behaving in such fashion in their cities. The problem with assessing popular justice in rural areas is that little written evidence remains. Moreover complaints from the local population were rare since, while the state’s law would have considered it as criminal violence, whatever the cause or provocation, the perpetrators did not. Popular justice was an element of the view of the world shared by many.9

Heroes and Gangs

Even if there were a stable definition of what constituted criminal violence in general, whether or not it was increasing or decreasing is a statistical question which the statistics are incapable of answering. The principal problems here are that the reporting and the perception of what constituted criminal violence have not remained consistent over time and, in addition, many incidents of criminal violence have never made their way into official statistics, since some victims prefer to hush matters up, or seek an opportunity to revenge themselves personally rather than make a formal report to the police. Surviving Occurrence Books and Refused Charge Books for British police forces contain incidents of individuals refusing to press charges against family members for violent behaviour, even when the evidence of physical injury has been plain for the investigating officers to see. Hospital records have been little used in this respect, but they appear to contain similar evidence of violence which was not taken any further because of family

links, fear, possible embarrassment, or possibly the intention of seeking private revenge later.  

In parts of southern Europe particularly, throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries the feud and the vendetta remained facts of life; this, in turn, most probably led to the greater incidence of homicide in comparison with northern Europe. A vendetta killing was committed as a matter of personal or family honour. Among the groups involved it was a matter of ‘justice’, and those involved could often employ the language of state power to justify their actions; the local leaders had ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘office’, they were responsible for ‘administration’, they collected ‘taxes’, and they demanded ‘loyalty’ and the silence of their subordinates. Yet there were also instances where the official courts were used as a means of continuing a feud, as the British found in the courts that they administered in the Ionian Islands during the early nineteenth century. Here the court became a theatre where a ritual knife fight could be refought with defendants, plaintiffs and witnesses justifying the incident, apportioning blame, celebrating the victor or excusing the loser. Yet elsewhere, where the state was weak or imposed by outsiders, as in southern Italy and Sicily, the alternative society might also seep into the new state’s political framework. Sicily provides a particularly good example, with politicians – both local and national – as well as bankers, lawyers, police officers and others working with or directing the activities of gangsters. There was a serious attempt to break the mafia in Sicily during the fascist period but, while this hurt some of the clans, the honoured society lived on; and so too did its counterparts in Naples (the Camorra) and Calabria (the ‘Ndrangheta). In the aftermath of the Second World War these so-called ‘honoured societies’ expanded their activities to link with similar groups elsewhere in the world in the supply of illicit goods, particularly drugs; indeed new such societies were formed, such as the Puglian Sacra Corona Unita, or emerged in the wake of political upheaval such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. Violent enforcement and punishment remained central to their criminality; they maintained links with local politicians and in some instances with national ones. Even as violent villains, however, a degree of romance has sometimes surrounded the portrayal of these

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gangsters, as well as other bandits and armed robbers in different forms of media representation.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ballads were sung and sold, together with rapidly produced dying-speeches, around the scaffolds where offenders were executed. As often as not the printer of a broadside for sale at the scaffold would cannibalise an old wood-cut or print for the upper portion of the sheet. Some violent offenders who caught the popular imagination through their deeds were celebrated and glamourised in these broadsides, such as the French smuggler Louis Mandrin who was broken on the wheel in 1755. Johannes Bückler, popularly known as Schinderhannes, enjoyed a criminal career in the Hunsrück region of Germany both before and after it was occupied by French troops. He was captured and guillotined but his deeds against the French and other groups disliked or feared by the local population ensured that he lived on in ballads as a Robin Hood character.

I wandered through the land, and in the wood lay low
And plundered all the rich, and also many a Jew
In pitiless fashion! To set my conscience free
I’d give some to the poor, perhaps one time in three.13

Schinderhannes robbed in rural districts, but it was not just in rural areas or weak states that violent gangs emerged. A century after Schinderhannes large German cities were home to the Ringvereine, literally ring clubs or associations which some suggested took their name from the German word for wrestling, Ringen. These clubs were officially chartered groups collecting fees and imposing fines on members for infringements of their rules. They were initially established to provide mutual aid for their members, who were mainly convicted offenders. Women were barred, but might receive financial assistance if their husband or other male breadwinner was in prison or had died. The clubs, however, appear also to have engaged in criminal activity themselves, notably prostitution, drug trafficking and extortion. And if they generally avoided violence, the threat of such and its occasional use were ways of ensuring that authority was maintained and orders were obeyed. The Ringvereine had unofficial links with the police, usually related to assistance in dealing with sex offences and murders. They were also reported as running Ganovengerichte (hoodlum courts) to try and if necessary punish those that offended their rules. The Ringvereine were largely destroyed by the Nazi

Law on Preventive Custody and extra-legal methods. Generally speaking they were no threat to most ordinary citizens, and to this extent they were like the British gangs of the same period whose main concern was profit-eering from the bookmakers at racecourses. The racecourse gangs were the milieu for Graham Greene’s violent young thug Pinky in his novel *Brighton Rock* (1938). Ordinary citizens, once again, were not much threatened by the gangsters of interwar Britain, nor by those of the postwar period when the violent Kray brothers attracted a degree of personal celebrity not least by attracting rather silly actors, politicians and other attention seekers to bask in the celebrity of their nightclub. Towards the end of the twentieth century the collapse of the Soviet empire fostered the emergence of mafias that profited from the turmoil and opportunities of the changing market conditions.

Violent gangs, however, did not necessarily organise for the purpose of financial gain. In the industrial cities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Britain gangs of young men fought over territory, over insults, over girls; weapons from knuckle dusters to knives, razors and even pistols were used. As with the Ringvereine, outsiders were rarely at risk, unless they got in the way; although on occasions gang members specifically targeted people for robbery, and the members did not take kindly to police officers seeking to suppress their behaviour. The press gave the gangs group labels – hooligans, peaky blinders and scuttlers respectively in London, Birmingham and Manchester at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Half a century later came Teddy Boys, then Mods and Rockers in the 1960s, and the Skinheads in the 1970s. Some of these titles suited the gangs, though they often took names from their local streets and neighbourhoods, something that appealed to their group pride, such as the Protestant sectarianism of the Glaswegian ‘Billy Boys’. On other occasions a gang might use a place name for personal identification, like the scullter gang whose members called themselves the ‘Bengal Tigers’ after their home-base in Bengal Street in Ancoats, Manchester. A couple of miles north-west of Ancoats a gang based in the colliery district of Whit Lane, Salford, chose the more exotic title of ‘Buffalo Bill’s Gang’ after the veteran American scout who had become an international showman. The gangs in Paris in the decade or so before the First World War became known collectively as apaches; the term was chosen deliberately to link them to the allegedly

cruel and violent Native American tribe. The gangs themselves assumed similar titles to those in Manchester; there were names alluding to a district (Bande d’Auteuil, Courbeaux de l’Île Saint-Louis, Loups de Montmartre) and to dress (Casquettes Vertes, Habits Noirs). In the late 1950s, following a term devised by the daily newspaper France Soir, Parisian gangs acquired the collective name of blousons noirs. This linked them with the youth cult emerging in the United States which, with its rock and roll music and cultural icons such as Marlon Brando in The Wild One (1953) and James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause (1956), was so distasteful to many of their parents’ generation. Cocking a snook at the older generation appealed to the gang members in France and elsewhere, and their violence, commonly directed towards establishing superiority over another gang, appears like the violence of earlier gangs, principally as a means of expressing their masculinity.  

Gang violence made good stories for the press and later for television news. So too did other forms of violent assault and murder, although up until the middle of the twentieth century stories of sexual violence and rape tended to be restrained and wrapped in euphemism. It has often been suggested that the statistics of murder and manslaughter are the closest criminal statistics to actual levels of criminal offending since there is usually solid evidence of the crime in the form of a corpse. There remain problems, however, in equating the statistics from different countries as well as different regions to assess whether or not everywhere experienced the same kinds of patterns and fluctuations. At the end of the First World War, for example, an eminent criminologist suggested that across Europe there was an increase in murder; yet the scale of the increase varied from country to country and was scarcely perceptible in England and Wales. Moreover, the different legal definitions to be found in different countries mean that comparisons have to be made with caveats and qualifications. Hermann Mannheim, who fled Nazi Germany for Britain in 1933, pointed out that the English concept of ‘murder’ was much wider than the German Mord. The media, however, has always tended to shy away from complexity; it also has shown a short memory and has focused on the stories of individual murderers, or other exceptional crimes, to make the points that it wishes to stress about the ills of society.

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Relics and Remains

In addition to the crime story itself, especially during the nineteenth century, the most notorious incidents commonly witnessed an aftermath during which relics of the event might be exhibited in museums such as Madame Tussauds. By the same token, artefacts were constructed for viewing or even for sale in remembrance of the incident. Media representations or imaginings were (and are) often deliberately constructed to thrill audiences, and they invariably build on stereotypes and existing plot structures. Such was the case, for example, with the melodramas written around William Corder’s murder of Maria Marten in the Red Barn at Polstead in Suffolk in 1827. Similarly Fritz Lang’s film M (1931) loosely echoed the killings of Peter Kürten in Weimar Germany, although scripted before his arrest; and that appears to have been how many in the audience understood the story. Tangentially it is interesting to note that the film also portrayed the Ringvereine, demonstrating its members’ revulsion at child murder; and allegedly the Ringvereine threatened to sabotage the production if some of its members were not employed as extras.19 The persistence of what might be called the Jack the Ripper genre provides, perhaps, the best example of this constant returning to plot, structures and images. Robert Louis Stevenson’s novella Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886) preceded the Whitechapel murders by two years; a stage play preceded them by a few weeks and had to be closed because of the panic. While initial representations of ‘the Ripper’ represented him as a man from the working class, he became increasingly perceived as a top-hatted gentleman, like Stephenson’s Mr Hyde. The term ‘the ripper’ has been applied to subsequent assailants and serial killers of women such as Joseph Vacher, the French Jack l’Éventreur du Sud-Est (active 1894–7), the mysterious knife-wielding attacker of early twentieth-century Berlin mentioned earlier, Gordon Cummins ‘the Blackout Ripper’ (1942) and Peter Sutcliffe ‘the Yorkshire Ripper’ (1975–80). And, in addition to dozens of films on the original ripper or updating him in some supernatural fashion, the notion of a man brutally killing women, often with some kind of sexual deviance as a cause, has become grotesquely popular and commonplace in novels, films and television dramas.

Possibly Jack the Ripper did send letters and body-parts to the police and others to boost his (or less likely her) celebrity, but equally these might have been sent by hoaxers. Some offenders, however, did seek self-publicity,

even some form of immortality, in writing memoirs which publishers were happy to print and members of the public were delighted to read for vicarious pleasure. Pierre-François Lacenaire, guillotined in Paris for a double murder in 1836, was among the first and most striking of such individuals, but he was followed by a string of others, especially in the twentieth century. Sometimes the authors (though their books were invariably the work of ghost writers) sought to cash in on a popular image, such as George Smithson who called his autobiography *Raffles in Real Life*, seeking to echo E. J. Hornung’s short stories of A. J. Raffles, celebrated cricketer and gentleman thief, or Billy Hill, a razor-wielding thug who claimed, in his book title, to be *Boss of Britain’s Underworld*. Jacques Mesrine was equally boastful but possessed perhaps of a little more literary skill in writing his *L’instinct de mort* inside La Santé Prison and having it smuggled out shortly before he escaped. Mesrine died in a shoot-out with the gendarmerie in Paris in 1979; like Lacenaire, he has featured in cinematic versions of his life. The problem with being a killer who boasts some form of Robin Hood, anti-establishment persona is that such individuals have rarely lived to see themselves on celluloid. The Sicilian bandit Salvatore Giuliano did not pen any romantic autobiography and was shot dead in 1950 after a career which some have described as Robin Hood-like, while others have seen him as the instrument of unscrupulous politicians and mafia leaders. Yet personally Giuliano was very conscious of how his image was projected and, since his death, he has been the subject of two films, directed respectively by Francesco Rosi in 1961 and Michael Cimino in 1987, a novel, *The Sicilian*, by Mario Puzo (1984) on which Cimino’s film was based, and an opera by Lorenzo Ferrero (1985).

**Theories of the Violent Criminal**

Theories were constructed about criminals as different from ordinary people; they were trapped in an earlier stage of evolution or were possessed of something different, more primitive, in their make-up. The best-known theorist behind this perception was the Italian doctor Cesare Lombroso, whose *Criminal Man* was first published in 1876 and went through five editions, ever expanding and developing his ideas before his death in 1909. Above all, it was his notion of the criminal as an atavistic being – a notion that he greatly refined and qualified over time – that struck chords with so many who wanted the criminal to be different and some sort of exception among ‘ordinary’ European people. The brain of the criminal was smaller,
suggesting ‘not the sublimity of the primate, but the lower level of the rodent or lemur, or the brain of a human fetus of three or four months’. Moreover, while he considered that novelists overemphasised the appearance of criminals, in his first edition Lombroso explained that, after studying offenders in various prisons,

one has to conclude that while offenders may not look fierce, there is nearly always something strange about their appearance …

In general, thieves are notable for their expressive faces and manual dexterity, small wandering eyes that are often oblique in form … Like rapists, they often have jug ears. Rapists, however, nearly always have sparkling eyes, delicate features, and swollen lips and eyelids …

Habitual murderers have a cold, glassy stare and eyes that are sometimes bloodshot and filmy; the nose is often hawklike and always large; the jaw is strong, the cheekbones broad …

Such descriptions were ideal for novelists, but it is also true that novelists such as Harrison Ainsworth and Eugène Sue had been portraying criminal offenders in this way long before Lombroso’s earliest theorising provided what appeared to be a scientific underpinning. Ainsworth’s eponymous Jack Sheppard, for example, had a physiognomy that betrayed his cunning and knavery: his mouth was ‘coarse and large’, his nose ‘was broad and flat’ and ‘the expression pervading [his] countenance … was vulgarity’.  

Gender played a major role in the idea of the criminal, especially the violent criminal. The violent offender was perceived as male; generally the female equivalent of such men was the prostitute. Again Lombroso outlined this in his criminological theorising; in 1893, between the fourth and fifth editions of his Criminal Man, he published The Delinquent Woman, the Prostitute and the Normal Woman. Generally women appeared in European courts charged with criminal offences in far fewer numbers than men. Among them there were some women accused of violent acts, and these were often doubly stigmatised: first, they had committed violence but second, and more importantly, their action appeared a denial of what was seen as natural to their sex. Abortion was an obvious example, though for the offender it may simply have been an attempt to preserve an element of respectability and avoid the stigma of illegitimacy. Poison was popularly

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21 Ibid., p. 51.
seen as a means by which women, in another perversion of their domestic role, killed family members. Yet the evidence does not suggest that women used poison to any greater degree than men in acts of homicide. In the context of fin-de-siècle France it has been forcefully argued that female criminality, which at the time hit the headlines with a series of vitriol attacks on unfaithful husbands and lovers, became linked with debates about women’s role in the public sphere. Notable in highlighting the problem was Alexandre Dumas fils who, in 1880, published an essay Les femmes qui tuent et les femmes qui votent [Women Who Kill and Women Who Vote].

In the same way that violent female offenders were considered to be part of a movement challenging the natural social order, so it was a relatively easy step to describe an especially violent individual who supposedly had the visual appearance of a ‘criminal’ as a ‘monster’ – someone or something not entirely human. The perpetrator of a series of knife attacks on young women in London at the end of the eighteenth century was labelled as a ‘monster’. A cheap print with an engraving and a doggerel verse beneath explained his modus operandi:

It is of a Monster I mean for to write,
Who in stabbing of Ladies took great delight;
If he caught them alone in the street after dark,
In their Hips, or their Thighs, he’d be sure cut a mark.

One hundred years later the front pages of Le Petit Journal and Le Petit Parisien regularly carried vivid and violent representations of murderous monstres and ogresses setting about their victims – especially tragic when they were poor little enfants martyrs. Albert Soleillard, for example, was described as both a ‘monster’ and a ‘satyr’. London’s mid-century garrotters seem to have been given their label to imply a foreign or alien nature – garrotting, for example, was a Spanish method of public execution; they were also labelled ‘thugs’, which linked them with the Indian bandits who had strangled travellers using a Ruma{l} (a scarf, usually coloured some sort of yellow, which might be worn as a turban or a cummerbund). The horrors of Thugee had recently been exposed and supposedly suppressed by the East India Company; the events had been described and popularised in the accounts of Captain W. H.

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Sleeman, who was personally involved in the suppression, and Colonel Philip Meadows Taylor.  

**The Alien and the Soldier**

Aliens and migrants were commonly feared, perhaps in a few instances with some justification. Irish migrants into British cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were uniformly perceived as violent. Corsicans were believed to have brought a distinct brand of violence to the criminality of Marseilles and Paris, especially in the interwar years. Jews were also ‘aliens’ and the suspicion of Jews led to them being seen as behind what popular culture occasionally, and generally quite wrongly, perceived as ritual murders. Jack the Ripper was variously labelled as a Thug, a Bavarian and also, most notably by W. T. Stead in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, a Frenchman. In Stead’s view Jack had to be a French practitioner of black magic and necromancy, since the poor French working class despised prostitutes as much as they despised Jews, and murdering prostitutes was ‘peculiarly a French crime’. For others, however, Jack was obviously a Jew himself, and throughout the century, particularly it seems in central and eastern Europe, there were accusations against Jews that they ritually murdered Christian children. There were at least seventy-nine such accusations during the 1890s, of which roughly half were made in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In English literature the most celebrated nineteenth-century Jewish criminal is Charles Dickens’s Fagin, not a murderer but a fence who trained boys to steal for him. Across Europe there were popular assumptions that criminals started with small offences, often as children, and progressed to becoming murderous burglars. The two ends of this spectrum were portrayed, along with Fagin, in Dickens’s *Oliver Twist*; Jack Dawkins, ‘the Artful Dodger’, was at the youthful end and Bill Sikes was the fully developed adult criminal. Male members of this ‘criminal class’ were considered to use violence to settle disputes among themselves and to abuse female partners and children. There were social groups that regularly used violence to settle disputes, ranging from the ‘hard men’ of the poorer districts of cities or

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industrial villages to the landowners and peasant entrepreneurs, such as the Sicilian mafiosi, who could be found in other, similar societies. The people most at risk from such ‘hard men’, however, were not members of the general public but rivals or individuals who challenged their position. It is particularly frustrating here that the raw statistics which reveal a higher rate of homicide in southern Europe than in the north rarely provide the detail and nuances necessary to explain precisely who were victims and why – something that would enable the historian to get beyond the conclusions that might be drawn from other sources.

Another group often stigmatised as dangerous to the public were soldiers. War was considered to have a brutalising effect on the men that fought it. The brigand bands that affected eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe were commonly seen to have deserters or former soldiers present in their ranks; similarly the brigands in southern Italy immediately after unification had a backbone of men from the old, beaten Bourbon army. Several English highwaymen enjoyed adopting military trappings; they rode to commit their crimes armed with sword and pistols and delighted in military rank, notably ‘captain’. Some brigands liked to pose as heroic Robin Hoods, though there was little romantic about either their threats or the occasions on which they opened fire; the poor rarely if ever profited from highwaymen robbing the rich. Yet a highwayman brought to the gallows in Britain, or broken on the wheel in France or elsewhere, might make a good, courageous death in the eyes of the crowd that assembled to witness his end – the kind of death associated with a good and courageous soldier. One of the first attempts to explore the impact of a military campaign on violence committed by young men was undertaken in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War by Wilhelm Starke, a senior figure in the Prussian Ministry of Justice. Looking at the criminal statistics for both France and Prussia over several years before and after the conflict, Starke concluded that, among some significant shifts in criminal offending, there was an increase in violent crime immediately following the war.28

Unlike other European powers, the British had an army composed of volunteers until the introduction of conscription in 1916, and though before the end of the Victorian period old soldiers were increasingly regarded sympathetically – not surprisingly given the common move of British veterans from the barracks to the workhouse – those still serving were often feared as ‘criminal types’ and drunkards. In the British Army the punishment of

flogging continued until 1881; its replacement, Field Punishment Number 1, known as ‘crucifixion’ by soldiers, could be ferocious and was known occasionally to result in death. A press campaign towards the end of the First World War led to its abolition. The Royal Navy, however, remained a law unto itself and flogging continued to be listed as a punishment in King’s Regulations up until the beginning of the Second World War; as a deterrent all ships carried a cat, with which the punishment was administered. As had been noted by Starke for France and Germany at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, there was a slight increase in assaults in Britain at the end of both world wars. At least some of this can be put down to violence meted out by returning soldiers on wives and girlfriends who had been or were said to have been unfaithful during the war. In a number of such incidents juries were inclined to give a wronged soldier the benefit of the doubt when charged with assaulting an unfaithful wife, and magistrates and judges were similarly inclined to pass a very lenient sentence.  

29 Such incidents do not appear to have been confined to Britain. At the same time, communities were inclined to exact popular justice without recourse to any formal court on women guilty of what was euphemistically termed la collaboration horizontale. Usually such women were dragged from their homes, sometimes had their clothes torn away, had their heads shaved in front of jeering crowds and were then paraded before their communities. Some such assaults took place before the war’s end, but most commonly they became a part of the celebration of liberation. 30 In many respects they need to be considered as another and an especially violent and degrading manifestation of the traditional practice of charivari.

Violent Punishment: Civilising Violence

Until well into the nineteenth century the European patriarch had the duty of disciplining the family; this might involve physical punishment. In Victorian Britain, however, while schoolboys particularly could be severely chastised with canes and leather straps, wife beating was increasingly considered to be a working-class fault in need of correction. Men from the middle and upper


30 See, for example, Fabrice Virgili, La France virile: des femmes tondues à la Libération (Paris: Payot, 2000).
classes rarely appeared on such charges, though these social groups seem to have included a number of very violent husbands and fathers.

In the same way that, particularly in Britain, the respectable classes generally considered that a beating was a reasonable way to correct and ‘civilise’ schoolboys, they tolerated or simply closed their eyes to violent behaviour by the new, bureaucratic police bodies that emerged during the nineteenth century. As long as their focus remained on what a police official in France described as the ‘dangerous classes’, the police were perceived to be disciplining the uncivilised. The Italian police and particularly the gendarmerie-style Carabinieri were deployed partly to persuade the peasants that they were now part of the newly united state; to enforce their position they employed brutality and violence, and even an unsuspecting British tourist who got in their way could find himself suffering the pain inflicted by a pollici (thumbscrew).\(^{31}\) In late nineteenth-century Paris leaders of the police and their non-critical media advocates boasted that they were so well acquainted with criminals that, once a crime was committed, they could rapidly identify the offender from the modus operandi. Yet this did not prevent le rafle by which usual suspects were rounded up; nor did it prevent la cuisine de la sûreté or le passage au tabac as tough interrogations or beatings were popularly termed. In interwar Britain there were concerns that Hollywood films and stories of American crime might foster some sort of ‘third degree’ among the ‘best police in the world’, though it does not seem that British policemen needed too much encouragement to bully suspects or to get their retaliation in first.

Popular culture often made fun of police officers, and there were figures such as Mr Punch or the Lyons silk weaver Guignol who could raise laughs at puppet plays for beating up policemen – in Guignol’s case the victim was a gendarme. The incidence of assaults on gendarmes in rural France appears to have declined over the nineteenth century, but across Europe violent assaults on policemen still occurred, notably during strikes or political demonstrations.\(^{32}\) The police responded with violence of their own. A strike in a Durham colliery in 1891, during which fifty county police charged and

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batoned a crowd of miners with their wives and children prompted a parody of Tennyson’s patriotic Charge of the Light Brigade:

Flash’d all their batons bare,
Flash’d as they turned in air,
Thumping at back-skulls there,
Mauling away because
Someone had blunder’d
Pounding at ev’ry head,
Quiet folks’ blood was shed;
Women and children
Reeled from the blows that sped,
Moaning and sunder’d
Then they marched back again
Gallant half hundred!33

Criminal assaults by police could be investigated, and yet, while in Britain a violent policeman could be tried, found guilty, sentenced and as a consequence lose his job, in Germany at least he was quite likely to return to his old post after he had served his sentence. The Blutmai in Berlin in 1929 began with some assaults on traffic policemen by youths, and ended with thirty-three people killed and another 198 wounded after the police responded with ferocious violence.34 The police of Weimar Berlin appear to have shared the thinking of many respectable householders across Europe that the ‘dangerous classes’, a concept so easily extended to the bulk of the working class, had now morphed into communists. Problems arose when police violence was meted out to the respectable, but this was rare and, in England particularly, when any such complaints were made against the police, or about scandalous police behaviour in general, these were investigated by the authorities usually with more care than elsewhere.35

There was a fascination with criminal violence that continued in Europe across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This went together with a possible decrease in such violence, and a belief among the educated and well-

to-do that European society was increasingly shifting away from the idea of using violence to settle disputes. This developing view of interpersonal violence survived the ferocity of the two world wars and the bureaucratic and industrialised mass murder of the 1930s and 1940s. The Holocaust was seen to be exceptional. The sharp rise in the criminal statistics from the 1950s, which continued until the mid 1990s, together with a growing politicisation of these statistics prompted increasing nervousness. Non-violent property offences continued to dominate the number of crimes reported and brought before the courts but the cultural forms of news media, popular literature and films very rarely picked up on this. The supposed ‘conquest of violence’ did not easily fit with the narrative chosen by sections of the media, or with political debate, though it did not prevent the steady and continuing abolition of violent punishments for offenders. Yet, at the same time, any rough behaviour employed by the state and its functionaries to repress or discourage aggressive behaviour by those perceived as ‘criminal’ continued often to be excused or ignored.

Bibliographical Essay

Like so much cultural and social history, the history of criminal violence tends to be written from national perspectives. Moreover, while the subject is increasingly popular, much of the work remains in the language of the country dealt with. Some sections of Clive Emsley’s Crime, Police and Penal Policy: European Experiences 1750–1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) address criminal violence. Richard Bessel, Violence: A Modern Obsession (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015) focuses mainly on the twentieth century and addresses the violence of wars as well as the shifting sensibilities to, for example, forms of sexual abuse. Bessel concludes that in the West there is generally less tolerance towards all forms of violence. The shifting attitudes in Europe towards the most violent of crimes, murder, is to be found in Pieter Spierenburg’s wide-ranging A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

Extreme Violence in Western Cinema

JAMES KENDRICK

Violence in the cinema has been and will continue to be fraught with controversy because there is still no fully agreed upon consensus as to what constitutes the very subject itself. The types of violent representation – physical, emotional, psychological, symbolic, systemic, and so forth – present in Western cinema since its inception are as broad and varied as any other element of the cinematic experience, yet there remains a stubborn tendency to subsume this vast and diverse arena into a singular entity called ‘violence’. Film violence is not some monolithic and therefore easily understandable ‘thing’, but rather a complex mode of stylised representation that needs to be thoroughly grounded in historical, cultural, aesthetic and industrial contexts.

This chapter will look specifically at various forms of ‘extreme violence’ in Western cinema, which is generally understood as violence that pushes past current cinematic norms in its intensity and graphic qualities. Extreme violence is emotionally upsetting, causes discomfort, shocks, and may even physically assault the spectator’s body by causing uncontrollable physiological responses. While various films produced in the United States and Europe have achieved such levels of violence, not all of them (or even most) are still defined as such, having been surpassed by even more extreme depictions. How those definitions have changed and continue to change can tell us much about the interrelationships of social and political sensibilities, changing ethics, and the ever-evolving aesthetics of filmmaking.

Violence in Early Western Cinema

The cinema, which was born almost simultaneously in the United States and Europe, has always been violent.¹ The prevalence of violence in the earliest

movies is not surprising given that the medium emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when violence of varying sorts was already a constituent part of many entertainments. In the United States and Europe, violence was integral to both high culture (Shakespeare, operas)\textsuperscript{2} and low culture (dime novels, Punch and Judy shows, murder ballads). The French had the notorious Théâtre du Grand Guignol, England had penny dreadfuls, Germany had gruesome fairy tales, and Spain had bullfights (see Chapter 10 in this volume). The penny press, which flourished across Europe and the USA in the mid 1800s, focused intently on violent crime, drawing people together in mutual fascination with the ghastliest of details.\textsuperscript{3} In the late 1800s and early 1900s, many state-sanctioned executions were still performed in public and drew enormous crowds.

While the earliest films were documentaries that captured innocuous, everyday moments, it was not long before filmmakers started turning their cameras towards more violent subjects, both real and recreated. \textit{The Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots} (1894), a Kinetoscope film produced by the Edison Company, depicts the beheading of the Scottish monarch in 1567. While it appears to consist of a single take observing Mary as she kneels down in front of the executioner’s block and has her head hacked off with a single axe stroke, it is actually a trick film in which an edit disguises the replacement of the actor with a dummy body that is then beheaded (a technique that came to be known as ‘stop-motion substitution’). As one commentator notes, ‘It’s difficult to know how viewers in 1895 would have responded to this. It’s hard to imagine that they could have been technically savvy enough to understand the way in which the effect was achieved, even if they believed (or wanted to believe) that a real human head wasn’t actually being severed.’\textsuperscript{4} The film’s illusion that the beheading was caught in a single take enhances its sense of realism, providing strong evidence that the desire for graphic film violence is as old as the medium itself.

Other late nineteenth-century Edison films such as \textit{Indian Scalping Scene} and \textit{Lynching Scene} (both 1895) ‘indicate a curious penchant for the gore of murders and executions’.\textsuperscript{5} The British distribution company Maguire & Baucus’s 1897

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3}Karen Halttunen, \textit{Murder Most Foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 69–70.
\end{itemize}
film catalogue reveals numerous films centred on violent subject matter: *Cock Fight, Duel With Pistols*, a series of bullfight films, numerous French and English military 'views', *Mexican Knife Duel, Joan of Arc* (which depicts the French martyr being burned at the stake), as well as the aforementioned *Lynching Scene*, two different films depicting Indiana scalplings, and *The Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots.*\(^6\) The French film company Pathé Frères also produced its share of violent films, including *History of a Crime* (*Histoire d’un crime*, 1901), in which a thief stabs a man to death, is arrested, imprisoned, and then executed via guillotine (again depicted using stop-motion substitution). Writing in *The Photo-Era* in 1908, journalist Carl H. Claudy described one film in which he saw 'a knife plunged deep into the breast of a woman by a jealous lover . . . and, by the art of the picture-maker, the knife really seems to enter the flesh and the blood to spurt forth, after which the victim writhes, rolls her eyes and finally dies in agony! Ugh!'\(^7\) Importantly, not all the violence in this era was recreated; some early films recorded actual executions, including *The Hanging of William Carr* (1897)\(^8\) and *An Execution by Hanging* (1898), which is described in the American Mutoscope & Biograph Company’s 1902 catalog as 'A very ghastly, but very interesting subject'.\(^9\)

From a social standpoint, concerns about depictions of sexuality were typically more pressing than concerns about violence, which is why, when the major Hollywood studios agreed to the Production Code, an industry-wide document that was adopted in 1930 to govern content in their films, the initial version offered far less regulation of violence than of sex. The original text stipulated that 'Brutal killings are not to be presented in detail', that rape 'should never be more than suggested', and that 'repellant subjects', which included 'actual hangings or electrocutions', 'third degree methods', 'brutality and possible gruesomeness', 'branding of people or animals', 'apparent cruelty to children or animals' and 'surgical operations', were to be 'treated within the careful limits of good taste'.\(^10\) *Hollywood’s Movie Commandments*,

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\(^6\) ‘Maguire & Baucus, Ltd. Fall Catalogue 1897’ (Maguire & Baucus, Ltd., 1897), Rutgers University Community Repository: Motion Picture Catalogs, https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/23938/PDF/1/.


\(^9\) ‘Picture Catalogue’ ['Picture Catalog'], 1902, 240, Rutgers University Community Repository: Motion Picture Catalogs, http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3M9090H.

a guide for screenwriters to help them avoid running afoul of the Production Code, noted that, without the Code, ‘movie audiences would be exposed to such visual details in the films as disfigured, dismembered, bloodstained and mutilated bodies, close-up views of dying men, and hair-raising details of inhuman treatment’.11 While the Production Code Administration (PCA) actively enforced the Code from 1934 to the mid 1960s (also dictating the content of foreign films distributed in the USA), such extreme imagery was largely absent from mainstream Western cinema. There were always exceptions – the gangster film cycle, Universal’s gothic horror films, combat films during World War II, and various low-budget exploitation films that were produced outside the studio system – but, for the most part, Hollywood film violence was relatively sanitised and unrealistic.

However, starting in the 1960s, depictions of violence throughout Western cinema began to change. What had been left off-screen or depicted with minimal detail was now on-screen and graphically depicted with new special effects and make-up. As Philip French noted, there was no increase in violent content – ‘It [was] the form and intensity of violence that . . . changed, rather than its quantity.’12 While there have been instances of what we would now call extreme violence throughout film history, its presence became decidedly more pronounced in the latter half of the twentieth century, to the point that it is now a common and constituent part of the cinema.

Conceptualizing Extreme Violence

In 2004, film programmer and critic James Quandt was among the first to identify a new trend in European, specifically French, cinema, which he labelled ‘the New French Extremity’.13 According to Quandt, these films, which include Gaspar Noé’s I Stand Alone (Seul contre tous, 1998), Virginie Despentes and Coralie Trinh Thi’s Baise-moi (2000), Claire Denis’s Trouble Every Day (2001), Marina de Van’s In My Skin (Dans ma peau, 2002), and Bruno Dumont’s Twentynine Palms (2003), marked a new kind of cinema that was ‘suddenly determined to break every taboo, to wade in rivers of viscera and spumes of sperm, to fill each frame with flesh, nubile or gnarled, and subject...

it to all manner of penetration, mutilation, and defilement’. The emergence of these films coincided with a number of similarly extreme cinematic trends in other Western countries around the turn of the twenty-first century. Given the increasingly transnational nature of global film production, spurred by DVD and Blu-ray distribution, streaming services like Netflix, Amazon Prime, The Criterion Channel and Hulu, and the vast amount of information available on millions of web sites, it should come as little surprise that films characterised by extreme violence would emerge all over the globe within a relatively short period of time.

Around this same time the United States saw the emergence of ‘torture porn’, a term coined by film critic David Edelstein to describe a cycle of horror films ‘defined by its extensive and graphic depiction of torture’. This cycle was exemplified by the Saw series (2004–10) and Eli Roth’s Hostel (2005) and Hostel: Part II (2007); a spate of horror remakes of low-budget films from the 1970s and 80s such as The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974; remade in 2003) and Halloween (1978, remade in 2007); and what Paul Gormley has termed ‘the new brutality film’, a trend in 1990s commercial Hollywood cinema that ‘attempt[ed] to renegotiate and reanimate the immediacy and affective qualities of the cinematic experience’ and included Quentin Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs (1992) and Pulp Fiction (1994), Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days (1995) and David Fincher’s Seven (1995). Extreme cinema also emerged in other parts of Europe as well, including Austria (Michael Haneke’s Funny Games, 1997), Denmark (Lars von Trier’s Antichrist, 2009), the Netherlands (Tom Six’s The Human Centipede, 2009) and England (Ben Wheatley’s Kill List, 2010). Similar developments were happening throughout Asia, including Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong and South Korea. ‘Asia Extreme’ became a familiar term among cult film enthusiasts after the UK-based video distribution company Tartan Films adopted it in 2001 as a brand for a wide range of films made in various Asian countries – including Hideo Nakata’s Ringu (1998), Takashi Miike’s Audition (Ôdishon, 1999), Chan-wook Park’s Oldboy (Oldeuboi, 2003) and Kim Jee-woon’s A Tale of Two Sisters (Janghwa, Hongryeon, 2003) – which for Western viewers collapsed regional and generic distinctions into a singular category that invoked ‘the Western audience’s perception of

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14 Ibid., 127–8.
the East as weird and wonderful, sublime and grotesque’. The circulation of extreme Asian films on video, Hollywood’s remakes of several titles in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and Oldboy’s winning the Grand Prix at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival raised awareness of these films and enhanced their influence on other film industries.

For an early twentieth-century viewer, today’s film violence would be extreme in a way that he or she probably could not have conceptualised at the time. Technological advances in the motion picture medium itself (higher resolution and larger format celluloid and now digital, the ability to reproduce a wide spectrum of colour, multichannel surround sound, stereoscopic images) as well as advances in the artistry used to create the illusions of violence (make-up special effects and prosthetics, explosive squibs, and now computer-generated imagery and ‘bullet time’) have greatly enhanced the perception of violence on screen. At this point, filmmakers can represent any form of physical violence they can imagine, leaving absolutely nothing to the imagination except what they choose. This is not to say, however, that extreme violence was absent from early twentieth-century cinema screens. In fact, as we have already seen, there was a great deal of extreme film violence in that era, although the parameters by which such violence was considered extreme were vastly different from the ones we use today. Thus, what was visually shocking, appalling and dreadful in 1900 will likely strike today’s viewers as antiquated, even as they recognise the fundamental brutality of what they’re witnessing. This is in part because our fundamental understanding of violence is constantly shifting according to all manner of cinematic, cultural and historical criteria. This is why Martin Barker argued that ‘[T]here simply isn’t a “thing” called “violence in the media”’. Such an absolutist claim seems counterintuitive because we all know violence when we see it, but the varying definitions and heated contests over the years about the nature of film violence and its various impacts both personal and cultural speak to its eternally contested nature. As J. David Slocum put it, ‘violence both marks prevailing coherencies and punctuates changes’.

The subjective nature of film violence does not mean, however, that we cannot conceptualize it in its various forms, including extreme violence,

according to its fundamental components. Violence in the cinema is the stylised depiction of action that harms or is intended to harm and its subsequent effects. Building on that definition, then, we can say that extreme violence is a depiction of violence that is experienced by the viewer as particularly explicit in comparison to contemporary cinematic norms. Such a definition involves numerous interlocking components, which are worth examining individually in some detail.

**Behaviour and Style in Film Violence**

In defining film violence as the stylised depiction of an action and its subsequent effects, we must first take into account the fact that we are simultaneously talking about two interrelated concepts that both tend to be labelled *violence* without any additional terminological distinction. First is the behavioural act itself – a stabbing, a shooting, someone hitting someone else, a building exploding, a car crashing, and so forth. There are myriad violent behaviours – physical, interpersonal, sexual, social – that can be and have been shown on screen, which means that filmmakers are essentially drawing from an enormous well of possibilities. For the most part, we tend to agree on what actions count as *violence*, although there are always discrepancies (a parent striking a disobedient child, for example, is seen by some as justifiable punishment and by others as child abuse; the first group would not describe the action as violent, the second group would). However, film violence is not just the action itself, but also the manner in which the action is depicted via the tools of cinematic representation. This brings us into the realm of poetics – ‘how filmic devices are used to depict violence with the purpose of producing certain effects in the spectator’. 20

Stephen Prince has conceptualised the interrelationship of the behavioural and stylistic components via a two-dimensional coordinate system on which film violence can be visually charted. 21 On the x-axis, Prince places what he calls ‘the referential component’ (the action itself), and on the y-axis he places what he calls ‘the stylistic amplitude’ (how the action is depicted). He notes that stylistic amplitude is the function of two elements: (1) graphicness – the amount of explicit visual detail used to depict the violence, as well as the portrayal of suffering and pain; and (2) duration – how long the violence is held on screen. When we describe film violence as extreme, it usually

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involves an intensification of both graphicness and duration in the depiction of a violent act that is understood to be particularly aberrant.

For example, midway through *Hostel: Part II*, one of the exemplars of torture porn, there is a six-and-a-half minute sequence in which Lorna (Heather Matarazzo), one of several college-age backpackers who are lured to a Slovakian hostel that serves as a front for an underground business in human slaughter, has been captured, stripped naked and hung upside down in chains in a cavernous warehouse. Director Eli Roth generates maximum discomfort by taking several minutes to reveal her fate, during which time she hangs helplessly with a gag in her mouth, moaning and whimpering while large, frightening-looking men wrench her along a pulley system until she is hanging over a recessed bathtub in the floor. Eventually a tall, dark-haired woman (Monika Maláková) in a robe emerges from behind Lorna, undresses, and lies down in the tub beneath her, from which she draws a long-handled scythe.

At this point it becomes frighteningly clear what will happen – that Lorna is to be the victim in an Elizabeth Bathory-inspired killing – but Roth continues to draw out the tension by having the woman slide the scythe’s lengthy blade across Lorna’s back and buttocks and face before cutting away the gag so we can fully hear her screams and cries for mercy. It is only then that the woman begins cutting Lorna’s back with the scythe and bathing in the blood that rains down on her. The wanton cruelty and sadism of the act is intensified by the manner in which Roth depicts it. The first three times the woman slices Lorna’s back, we do not see the cuts, but instead hear the heightened sound of cutting on the soundtrack and see the blood beginning to run down Lorna’s neck and face and drop onto the woman lying beneath her. However, Roth then shows us the next three slices (albeit in quick cuts lasting no more than a second or two), as copious amounts of blood begin to pour down and the woman rubs it all over her body. She finally kills Lorna by slicing her throat, which we see in full detail, as Roth cuts into a closer shot as her throat opens and begins spraying arterial blood.

While the graphic violence of the scene lasts just over a minute, it feels interminable, partially because of the deliberately slow build-up in which we learn along with Lorna what her horrific fate is to be; partially because of the shrieking, agitating orchestral strings on the soundtrack; and partially because Roth focuses so intently on Lorna’s abject and inescapable suffering. Lorna, who has been depicted earlier in the film as an awkward outsider looking for acceptance and therefore already somewhat pitiable, is completely and utterly helpless, with no means of protecting herself or even trying to
escape. Matarazzo’s performance effectively conveys Lorna’s absolute terror, and the apparent physical discomfort in which she was placed as an actress, hanging naked upside down with the veins in her neck bulging from physical stress and the pull of gravity while a real blade was pushed and drawn against her skin with genuine pressure, gives the scene a graphic, unrelenting sense of realism.

_Changing Cinematic Norms of Violence_

Because judging film violence as extreme is reliant upon changing cinematic norms, our understanding of what constitutes such violence is never fully stable. Further complicating matters is the fact that different cultures and nations have different criteria for defining extreme violence and different standards regarding its acceptability as entertainment. And, within those different cultures, the criteria employed are likewise shifting and changing. However, despite the lack of stability in the standards by which film violence is judged extreme, there are broad patterns that can be traced across the history of Western cinema, with specific challenges to those norms marking new developments in how film violence is depicted by filmmakers and understood by audiences.

Take gun violence, for example. For many years the normative mode of depicting someone being shot by a gun was the _clutch-and-fall_, where the victim, upon being shot, does not react with great pain or distress, but rather gracefully sinks out of frame, often grabbing at a particular part of his or her body (usually the chest) to indicate where the bullet hit. Audiences usually did not see a bullet hole or blood or any visible violation of the body, thus ensuring a kind of visually sanitised death. This was acceptable to audiences during Hollywood’s classical era, although such a representation today would likely provoke laughter due to its immediately recognisable unreality. As Stephen Prince points out, ‘Once new thresholds of permissibility [are] established’, filmmakers cannot return to ‘prior norms’. There are some examples of films rejecting the clutch-and-fall during the classical era, including George Stevens’s _Shane_ (1953), which depicts a character being forcibly blown backward by a shotgun blast to the chest. However, it was in the 1960s that the stylistic amplitude of gun violence started escalating quite rapidly with films like Arthur Penn’s _Bonnie and Clyde_ (1967) and Sam Peckinpah’s _The Wild Bunch_ (1969), leading us to watch gun violence under a new set of expected norms, which generally involve seeing a bullet hole and a strong,

22 Ibid., pp. 153–5. 23 Ibid., p. 165.
involuntary physical reaction from the victim that reflects the violable nature of the human body.

The visual evolution of the stylistic amplitude of gun violence can be examined in some detail by comparing the aesthetic differences between similar scenes in Billy Wilder’s *Some Like It Hot* (1959) and Roger Corman’s *The St Valentine’s Day Massacre* (1967). Both films include a scene in which a group of men are lined up against a brick wall and shot at close range in the back with tommy guns by three or more men. *Some Like It Hot* avoids showing any graphic instances of wounding by focusing instead on reaction shots of the two main characters (Jack Lennon and Tony Curtis) grimacing as they witness the event from their hiding place behind a car. The film does show a small amount of blood on one of the victims who is not killed in the first round of gunfire, but it is confined to two patches of dark liquid on his coat (without any corresponding damage to the material) and another dab at the corner of his mouth after he is shot again off-camera. Corman’s film, however, shows the violence of the machine gunning in comparatively graphic detail, with squibs used to depict the bullet hits accentuated by a rapid editing style that cuts aggressively among shots of the three men firing machine guns, reverse close-ups of the shocked and agonised victims’ faces, some of whom spit blood from their mouths, and medium shots of the men’s bodies being pummelled with bullets and falling to the ground.

Genre certainly has some hand in dictating the tone of the violence in each film. *Some Like It Hot* is a comedy that uses gangland violence as a plot mechanism to explain why its protagonists must dress up like women and hide with a travelling all-girls band, while *The St Valentine’s Day Massacre* is a dramatic film about the real-life organised crime boss Al Capone. However, one cannot discount the fact that the seven years between the two films saw significant evolution and experimentation in on-screen violence. The fact that *The St Valentine’s Day Massacre* is in colour, while *Some Like It Hot* is in black and white, amplifies the former’s violence, as the red of the blood on the men’s bodies and faces draws even more visual attention. The duration of the violence is also quite different, with the initial volley of gunfire in *Some Like It Hot* lasting barely 5 seconds, whereas in *The St Valentine’s Day Massacre* it goes on five times as long, a little more than 26 seconds. Thus, the stylistic amplitude of the violence in Corman’s film is decidedly more extreme in comparison to Wilder’s film in terms of both the graphicness of the violence (the use of squibs and visible blood, as well as focus on the victims’ suffering and pain) and duration (taking up five times as much screen time).
The instances of violence in films like The St Valentine’s Day Massacre, Bonnie and Clyde and The Wild Bunch were viewed by audiences and critics at the time as extremely graphic because they deviated from the norm. Andrzej Wajda’s A Generation (Pokolenie, 1955) is generally considered the first film to employ a squib to create a bloody eruption on the body to simulate a bullet strike. As Wajda put it, ‘nobody had as yet been able to convincingly create the effect of a bullet hitting the human body’, so he tasked his assistant director Kazimierz Kutz with developing the effect. Katz assembled a contraption whose ‘main component was a detonator, the kind used in coalmines to set off dynamite. Kutz fixed it with a bandage onto a lead sheet to protect the actor’s body. On top of the affixed detonator he attached a condom filled with blood-coloured liquid. Once the detonator’s cables were drawn out under the actor’s trousers . . . and connected to a battery, we could have our explosion.’

However, such graphic visualisations were not at all common prior to the late 1960s, particularly in Hollywood, whose production practices regarding the depiction of graphic violence were circumscribed by the Production Code, whose stipulation that ‘brutality and possible gruesomeness’ were to be treated within the careful limits of good taste generally meant not showing it (as in Some Like It Hot, which was produced while the Code was still being enforced, although even The St Valentine’s Day Massacre leaves some violence to the imagination, as Corman chooses not to show the results of the final use of a shotgun at close range on the dead or dying men).

Today, the use of blood squibs is the norm in depicting bullet wounds and, while still recognised as a form of graphic violence, is not considered particularly extreme. Instead, extreme forms of gun violence have evolved into heads being eviscerated by shotgun blasts (e.g., Drive, 2011), appendages being blown off (e.g., RoboCop, 1987), and entire bodies being reduced to bloody shreds by close machine gun fire (e.g., Rambo, 2008). The spurtling and sprays of blood that were previously accomplished with physical effects are now augmented or replaced entirely by computer-generated imagery in films such as David Fincher’s Zodiac (2007), Zack Snyder’s Watchmen (2009), Sylvester Stallone’s The Expendables (2010), Matthew Vaughn’s Kick-Ass (2010) and Nicholas Winding Refn’s Only God Forgives (2013).

These shifts in what is considered extreme can also be charted by how films are handled by various ratings and censorship boards. In the United States, films distributed by the member studios of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) are assigned an age-appropriate rating by

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the Classification and Ratings Administration (CARA), which was instituted in November 1968 by the MPAA as a replacement for the increasingly outdated Production Code. Kevin S. Sandler has argued that the key to the functionality of the MPAA ratings system is its stability of meaning over time, with each rating category being ‘historically stable, but always transitory’; in other words, the overall meaning of each category must remain relatively the same over time even if the specifics of what content warrants each rating changes. CARA has long been accused of being more lenient towards violence than sex when applying its two age-restrictive ratings – R (no one under 17 admitted without a parent or guardian) and X (no one under 17 admitted), which was replaced in 1990 by NC-17 – which is why people took notice in 1974 when the board, under the leadership of the newly installed chairman Richard Heffner, gave the Japanese martial arts film *The Street Fighter* (*Gekitotsu! Satsujin ken*, 1974) an X rating for its violence, something that had never happened before. Heffner openly proclaimed that he intended to be stricter than his predecessor in rating violent films, especially violent horror films, which is why so many of them had to return repeatedly to the editing room in order to secure a market-friendly R-rating during his tenure from 1974 to 1994. A number of independent producers and directors refused to accept an X rating and instead released their films unrated; these included George A. Romero’s *Dawn of the Dead* (1978), William Lustig’s *Maniac* (1980), Sam Raimi’s *The Evil Dead* (1982) and *Evil Dead II* (1987), and Stuart Gordon’s *Re-Animator* (1985). Yet, viewing these films today, graphically violent as they are, it is difficult to conclude that they are any more so than recently released R-rated films like Rob Zombie’s *The Devil’s Rejects* (2005), Neil Marshall’s *The Descent* (2005), Alexandre Aja’s *Piranha* remake (2010), Fede Alvarez’s *The Evil Dead* remake (2013), and Eli Roth’s *The Green Inferno* (2015), or any given episode of the AMC cable television series *The Walking Dead* (2011–).  

25 The current MPAA age-based ratings system includes five ratings: G (general audiences), PG (parental guidance suggested), PG-13 (may not be appropriate for children under 13), R (no under 17 without an adult), and NC-17 (no one under 17). The PG-13 rating was added in 1984 and the NC-17 replaced the X rating in 1990.


In England, films are classified by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC), which was founded in 1912 as the British Board of Film Censors. While the board began classifying films in just two categories – U (Universal, suitable for children) and A (Adult, children must be accompanied by an adult) – it has grown and evolved over the years, particularly in the 1980s in response to the growing home video industry and the attendant ‘video nasty’ scare, when the country was thrown into a social panic over the easy availability of graphically violent horror films. The BBFC now has seven rating categories, ranging from U (Universal, suitable for all) to R18 (Restricted 18, restricted to those aged 18 and older at licensed premises only). However, unlike the MPAA rating system, the BBFC can also ban certain films outright from distribution in the UK, a power it has exercised throughout its history, particularly with regard to extremely violent films. The BBFC also employs different standards for certifying films on home video versus cinemas, resulting in films that were approved to play theatrically, but had to be edited for home video distribution or were banned outright.

But, just as attitudes and expectations have shifted over the years in the USA, the same has happened in England, and numerous films that were previously banned or edited for their violent content have since been approved for distribution in their original, uncut forms. For example, Wes Craven’s *The Last House on the Left* (1972), which was initially released on home video in the early 1980s when the market was unregulated, was banned by the BBFC for decades once the government required films on home video to be classified under the Video Recordings Act of 1984. The uncut version of the film was eventually approved for home video distribution in 2003 with an 18 certificate. Similarly, *The Texas Chain Saw Massacre*, despite having played in London theatres in the early 1970s, was banned from home video distribution until 1999, when it was approved with an 18 certificate. Sergio Corbucci’s spaghetti western *Django* (1966) was initially rejected in 1967 by the BBFC due to its ‘excessive and nauseating violence’; another distributor pulled it from consideration in 1974 after the board informed them the film

32 ‘The Last House on the Left | British Board of Film Classification’, www.bbfc.co.uk/releases/last-house-left-1972.
could not be classified without heavy cutting. Yet, it was eventually released uncut on video in 1993 with an 18 certificate, which was then downgraded to a 15 certificate when it was resubmitted in 2004.\footnote{‘Django (1967) | British Board of Film Classification’, www.bbfc.co.uk/case-studies/django-1967.} Thus, a film that was deemed so violent in the late 1967 that it couldn’t be shown is now considered acceptable viewing for teenagers not yet old enough to legally drive.

**Viewer Reaction**

Regardless of the rating assigned to a film according to its violence, we are ultimately at the whim of our autonomic nervous systems while watching it. When we see an act of film violence that seems particularly explicit or extreme in comparison to the norms to which we have become accustomed, there will invariably be a strong, visceral reaction – diverting our eyes away from the gruesome imagery, clutching at a person seated nearby, shrinking in our chair, and even feeling physical sensations of nausea, light-headedness and muscle constriction. In fact, one could argue that extreme film violence is the kind that most thoroughly erases the distance between the spectator and the act he or she is witnessing, forcing the physical body to react involuntarily, which typically marks such violence as an aspect of disreputable ‘low’ culture. Linda Williams, writing about the genres of horror, pornography and melodrama, noted that they are considered to be low culture due to the ‘perception that the body of the spectator is caught up in an almost involuntary mimicry of the emotion or sensation of the body on the screen’.\footnote{Linda Williams, ‘Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess’, Film Quarterly 44.4 (1991), 2–13, at 4.} Paul Gormley defines ‘new-brutality films’ in similar physical terms: ‘All these films attempt to assault the body of the viewer and make the body act involuntarily . . . these films all make the viewer’s body act in such a way that it imitates and mimics the actions of the cinematic body, or the bodies that the viewer experiences on the screen.’\footnote{Gormley, New-Brutality Film, p. 8.}

Interestingly, the idea of a motion picture forcing involuntary reactions from spectators’ bodies dates back to the earliest projected images, starting with the accounts of audiences screaming, leaning back in their chairs and even running panicked from the theatre while watching the Lumières’ short documentary *The Arrival of a Train* (*L’arrivée d’un train à La Ciotat, 1896*), which depicts a passenger train moving towards and past the camera before stopping at the station. Although the story of extreme audience panic in
response to this film is entirely apocryphal, 37 it remains a potent origin point for the connection between movies and visceral physical reactions.

Given our innate responses to violence, it is not surprising, then, that such physical reactions became frequently associated with films featuring extreme forms of violence. Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (1960) is an instructive example, as it induced in its initial theatrical audiences an intense physical response that Linda Williams describes from personal experience: ‘I vividly remember a Saturday matinee in 1960 when two girlfriends and I spent much of the screening with our eyes shut listening to the music and to the audience’s screams.’ 38 The idea that spectators could be literally harmed by the violence in a film was exploited for marketing purposes by low-budget filmmakers like William Castle, who took out insurance policies with Lloyd’s of London against death by fright while watching *Macabre* (1958), and director Herschell Gordon Lewis and producer David Friedman, who passed out white vomit bags for their gory drive-in shocker *Blood Feast* (1964), 39 a gambit that was used decades later by the distributors of the horror film *Bite* (2015) when it had its world premiere at the Fantasia International Film Festival in Montreal. 40

In some instances, extreme film violence can and has generated literal revulsion and physical sickness. When unsuspecting audiences were given a sneak preview of *The Wild Bunch* in Kansas City and Fresno in the summer of 1969, the reaction cards submitted after the screenings provided copious evidence of how strongly affected many of the spectators were, with reports of watching the film with one eye closed from behind one’s arms, perspiring and feeling physically nauseous (these ranged from viewers who said ‘It made me want to vomit’ and ‘The picture made me want to PUKE’, to at least one who wrote ‘I vomited’). 41 Even today’s supposedly jaded, hardened audiences find themselves reacting uncontrollably to the violence in certain films. In the introduction of their book *The New Extremism in Cinema: From France to Europe*, Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall note that the reception of the new wave of extreme art-house films coming out of Europe in the early 2000s, ‘whose brutal and visceral images appear

designed deliberately to shock or provoke the spectator’, were characterised by ‘Reports of fainting, vomiting and mass walkouts’.42 After the 2002 Cannes Film Festival screening of Gaspar Noé’s *Irreversible*, which features a graphic 10-minute rape scene, fire wardens administered oxygen to twenty people who fainted;43 the premiere of *Bite* resulted in two people fainting and one person vomiting, which led to an ambulance being called to the theatre;44 and there were reports of multiple viewers passing out at a screening of *Raw* at the 2016 Toronto Film Festival.45 Such responses are not always confined to horror films and art-house provocations either; there were numerous reports of viewers fainting or vomiting at screenings of Danny Boyle’s *127 Hours* (2010) when the protagonist is forced to cut his own hand off with a pocket knife,46 and the premiere screening of Alejandro G. Inarritu’s multiple-Oscar-winning *The Revenant* (2015) was marked by a number of people walking out because they were unable or unwilling to handle the film’s starkly realistic violence.47 Thus, the connection between movies and visceral physical responses, symbolically originating with spectators fleeing in fear of the image of a train coming towards them, remains powerfully in effect.

Conclusion

Violent films have been, and continue to be, a staple of Western culture. They are omnipresent – in the theatres, on television, on DVD and Blu-ray, and streaming online. The presentation of graphic violence has become ‘an
intrinsic part of contemporary cinema’, and it attracts large audiences all over the world. Viewers in the USA, Europe and around the world spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year at the cinema watching people being shot, beaten, burned and dismembered. Yet we continue to have a strange relationship with cinematic violence – at once drawn to and repelled by it. As film critic Stephen Hunter noted: ‘We abhor the authentic stuff, and turn in national revulsion from it. Then we go pay seven bucks to watch it in Technicolor in the mall.’ Questions persist about the place of extreme violence in our entertainment, the purposes it might serve, and how it might affect and be affected by societal and cultural norms and limits. The continual presence of such violence throughout the history of Western cinema – from single-shot primitive documentaries of executions and boxing matches, to today’s epic spectacles costing hundreds of millions of dollars – speaks to its fundamental appeal and endless source of fascination. In his book The Fascination of Film Violence, Henry Bacon asks, ‘Is it even possible to depict horrific violence in a way that would not be potentially fascinating?’ The past 120 years of cinema seem to suggest that the answer is no.

Bibliographical Essay

Prior to the 1960s, the vast majority of writing about film violence was confined to empirical effects research, whose goal was to find causal connections between viewing of violent content and subsequent behaviour. Even after its mid-twentieth-century institutionalisation as an academic discipline, film scholarship has often treated violence as a secondary concern, which for a long time left a gap in the research literature that seems all the more obvious when one considers how other humanities disciplines, such as literary studies and anthropology, often privilege violence as a primary mode of signification.


There are a number of fine anthologies, histories and overviews. For general, concise overviews of the subject, see J. Kendrick, Film Violence: History, Ideology, Genre (London: Wallflower, 2009) and S. Prince, ‘Graphic Violence in the Cinema: Origins, Aesthetic Design, and Social Effects’, in Prince (ed.), Screening Violence (New Brunswick: Rutgers

50 Bacon, Fascination of Film Violence, p. 101.
Extreme Violence in Western Cinema


Representing Violence through Media

Jolyon Mitchell

Representations of violence have become visual commonplaces, bringing distant conflicts and faraway wounds close.¹ Over the last century different media from all over the world have offered audiences image after image of violence. They have come in many different forms: from grainy black and white film footage of the Battle of the Somme (1916), via the jerky colour Zapruder film of John F. Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas (1963) to countless pictures of a plane crashing into a skyscraper in New York (2001), or mobile phone footage of ‘democracy’ protestors being confronted by masked gangs or armed police in Hong Kong (2019). These and other now familiar representations of violence have tended to dominate the collective memory in Europe and North America. There are many other images from around the world that also now circulate the globe: the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945), a summary execution in a Vietnamese street (1968), a photograph of a young man carrying the body of 12-year-old Hector Pieterson in Soweto, South Africa (1976), a rare film of two women in the distance being hacked to death in the middle of a street during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and more recently films of hostages in Iraq being beheaded (c. 2014–16). Such representations have become ubiquitous, shaping how events are remembered and interpreted, so becoming part of a symbolic reservoir. Moments captured on film are often drawn upon metonymically to illustrate wider historical movements and fault lines. Technological advances have amplified the power of individual representations. Images both of actual violence and of its effects are invariably now digitised and easily available online. A few clicks on a smartphone or laptop, and these images, along with millions of others, are almost instantaneously available. A global history of past and present violence is there for the watching. With the development of the internet and the

¹ This chapter draws upon, adapts and updates material from Jolyon Mitchell, Media Violence and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially chapters 1–3.
World Wide Web these traces of bloodshed are easily accessed, preserved and circulated.

In the pages that follow I analyse how audiences, journalists and producers interact with media representations of violence. More precisely I examine the practices of revealing, representing, redacting, remembering and responding to images of violence, using a wide range of examples from different media. While recognising the power of vivid journalistic written and verbal descriptions of violence, this chapter primarily considers visual representations over the last two centuries, starting from the 1810s, in the decade before the first photograph (c. 1826), to the present day. As the previous chapter has considered cinematic violence, this one will concentrate upon non-cinematic examples, such as photographic portrayals of non-fictional violence. Other practices such as hiding, selecting, overlooking, forgetting and recollecting will be juxtaposed with these core practices of revealing, representing, redacting, remembering and responding. My argument is that these related practices contribute to the way violence manifests itself around the circuit of communication, which begins with acts of creation and production of images of violence, and which is then followed by their dissemination, reception and recycling. Reflecting further on this circuit of communication and these related practices will help answer questions such as: Why do certain images of violence receive more attention than others? Why are some media representations of violence remembered and others easily forgotten? Before turning to these and related questions it is useful to reflect upon the recurring tension between reticence and exposure, discernible in the evolution of representations of violence.

Revealing: Reticence and Exposure

At first sight it is tempting to see representations of violence as evolving in a straight line over the last two centuries from reticence to exposure. Early photography, like Ancient Greek drama, typically shows the after-effects of violence, rather than the actual moment of conflict and killing. Roger Fenton’s The Valley of the Shadow of Death (1855) shows nothing but a rough road with over fifty cannonballs littering the ground. Many believe that Fenton personally ‘oversaw the scattering of cannonballs on the road itself’, to portray the supposed location where over a hundred British soldiers met their deaths in the Crimean War (1853–6), ‘even though the infamous charge of the Light Brigade had not taken place there’. This ‘landscape of aftermath’

creates a ‘terrible beauty’. Often described as the first British war photographer, Fenton took over 300 pictures in Crimea. Most of his pictures are peaceful portraits of soldiers, beside their horses or tents, as well as of encampments in rough landscapes and ships docked in small ports. The ‘enemy’ are almost entirely invisible. It is possible, however, that some of Fenton’s seeming reticence was born of technical necessity, as much as of cultural sensitivity: cumbersome materials, combined with a photographic process unable yet to capture movement, limited Fenton’s options for representing violence.

Photographers of the American Civil War (1861–5) demonstrate far less reticence. In July 1863 Alexander Gardner and Timothy O’Sullivan took photographs of soldiers’ corpses, sometimes moving them to picturesque sites and into more dramatic poses. Gardner, in his *Photographic Sketch Book of the War* (1865–6), may have gone so far as to use the same corpses in photographs representing both Union and Confederate dead. For Gardner these photographs underline ‘the blank horror and reality of war, in opposition to its pageantry. Here are the dreadful details! Let them aid in preventing such another calamity falling upon the nation.’ Many viewers were shocked by what they saw: several of Gardner’s 1862 photographs of the dead at Antietam, Maryland, were displayed in a New York gallery, and, said the *New York Times*, did ‘something to bring home to us the terrible reality and earnestness of war. If he has not brought the bodies and laid them in our dooryards and along the streets, they [the photographs] had done something very like it.’ By photographing corpses, Gardner overcame the technical difficulties of representing extreme violence in photography, to produce images that pulled new punches.

Other media than photography, however, have been used to portray violence realistically. *The Disasters of War (Los desastres de la guerra)*, 1810–20, a series of eighty-two monochrome prints by the Spanish painter Francisco Goya, is a good example. They reveal the consequences of war between the French and the Spanish for both civilians and soldiers. Some are disturbing and hard to look at, revealing acts of brutality, cruelty and violence: a man is about to bring down his axe and decapitate a soldier on the ground (plate 3), soldiers attempt to rape women (plates 9 and 10), dismembered and mutilated corpses

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are depicted impaled or hanging from trees (plates 37 and 39). Plate 60 shows a weeping woman, with three women’s bodies at her feet. It is entitled: ‘There is no one to help them’ (No hay quien los socorra). This cry of pain illustrates the potential of visual representation to expose the realities of violence on individuals. ‘The uniqueness and power of much of Goya’s imagery of war lie in the fact that he isolates individual vignettes, giving the paradigmatic “inhumanity of war” an all too human face. Often that face is transformed by the violence it imposes or suffers.’ Goya puts it well with the ironic title of one of his prints: ‘One cannot look at [this]’ (No se puede mirar, plate 26).

Of course, one can be both drawn and repulsed by what is portrayed in these forms of realistic art and subsequent news photography. ‘Whereas earlier artists (and many of Goya’s successors as well) were concerned with their ability to transform realities into a pleasing or instructive picture, Goya and the modern news photographer convey observations with uncompromising immediacy.’ Several scholars have pointed to the parallels between these communicative practices. For Fred Licht, ‘Goya and news photographers do not allow us time to enter their pictorial space gradually but aggressively arrest our attention with the incontrovertibility of a blow.’

By contrast, even today creators of news will show reticence: there are many images that news editors will not publish or broadcast. Most stopped broadcasting live film of people jumping from the Twin Towers in Manhattan on 9/11 once they realised what was happening. The extent of restraint varies from region to region: in Carnage and the Media Jean Seaton observes how a ‘chairman of an international television conference after the attacks of 11 September’ remarked that ‘there had been a real “difference between the kind of pictures that were shown on the northern-European TV and the much greater detail of carnage that was shown in the south … I think you have to conclude that religion made a difference. The Catholic south was more comfortable with death on screen.”’

While it is possible to describe the evolution of representing violence as a move from reticence to exposure, this would be too simple. Even in the earliest days of photographic reporting some sought to reveal through their work the human costs of violence. Modern photographers who reflect the effects of violence are part of a long tradition. Some images have an iconic quality, such

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as the shot of a 9-year-old girl running naked, screaming, away from a Napalm attack in Vietnam (1972). Nick Ut, who took this picture, said ‘The photo was as authentic as the Vietnam War itself.’ This act of exposure became a persuasive witness to the impact on fragile bodies of dropping Napalm, and, beyond that, symbolic of how civilians and children can all too easily be caught up in conflict. But as the example of Goya shows, this was not new.

Representing: Spectacular Violence

Why do certain kinds of violence attract more coverage than others? The most obvious example of an instance of violence that attracted a great deal of coverage is that of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Within a few minutes of American Airlines Flight 11 hitting the North Tower numerous cameras were trained on the scene and were able to film the second plane crashing into the South Tower, and the subsequent collapse of both towers. These images were repeated again and again over the next hours and days, often in slow motion, allowing audiences around the world to watch the images again and again. Repeated viewing led some young children to believe similar attacks were still occurring. This was unarguably an event of great significance and, above all, a terrible personal tragedy for those killed, injured or otherwise caught up in it. In the words of an experienced BBC reporter, James Robbins, speaking on a BBC 1 news report, following these attacks: ‘an entire society feels violated by terror’. The ripples spread throughout North America and became the catalyst for the global ‘war on terror’.

Nevertheless, a question can be asked about the scale of the media representation. Many commentators claimed this was ‘the biggest story’ of their lifetimes or the ‘biggest since the end of the Second World War’, many networks devoting their entire schedules to the story for several days. For Dan Rather, ‘September 11 was unlike anything we’d seen before’; Tom Brokaw said he ‘never thought there would be a story of this magnitude or a story this horrifying’. A BBC executive passed a note to the experienced broadcaster Robin Lustig while on air: ‘This is the biggest global story for 50

One of Fox News’s vice-presidents said ‘I think at first our audience and all the television news were like moths to the flame … We were addicted to the video of the horrific event.’ It is worth asking why editors were so addicted.

New York is the news-media capital of the USA. The news personnel, production facilities and infrastructure were situated near to the attacks. Both Rather and Brokaw recall being able to see the event for themselves the moment after they heard of it through the media. Several journalists were nearby covering other stories and retrained their cameras onto the ‘smoke pouring out of the World Trade Center’. Breaking news broke, as it seldom does, in the domestic spaces of a generation of reporters.

The 2003 Iraq War provides an interesting contrary case. The 700 or so embedded journalists were able to provide close-up pictures of fighting, but by their own admission were often unable to describe the ‘big picture’. The journalists at the media centres in Qatar found themselves in an even more frustrating situation than those trapped in the media pools at Dahran in the 1991 Gulf War: many returned home early. Their access to news stories and pictures was severely limited by the military press minders. Only a few unilateral journalists working independently of army units were able to capture the kind of distinctive footage and interviews available to all journalists during 9/11, and this at the cost of being exposed to considerable physical danger.

In short, where the journalist is, where the output is produced and where the events take place make a difference to what is reported on. Whether or not you can see the event, and perhaps are caught up in it, influences perception of what is newsworthy. Imagine how news values would alter if most major news networks had their executive offices and editing suites in north-eastern Congo. Location matters.

Moreover, some locations are more symbolic than others. Nancy Gibbs wrote in Time: ‘If you want to humble an empire it makes sense to maim its cathedrals. They are symbols of its faith, and when they crumble and burn, it tells us we are not so powerful and we can’t be safe.’ And of course the symbolism of the Twin Towers was by no means the most important layer of tragic meaning. These buildings were populated. The victims came not just

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11 Lustig thought of one story more significant: ‘I can just remember the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, and to me, that was even bigger, because it carried with it the threat of nuclear war between the two main super-powers. But it was close.’ British Journalism Review 12.4 (2001), 14–26.

12 Zelizer and Allan (eds.), Journalism after September 11, p. 4.

from the USA, but from some eighty-three other nations from around the world. All of this helped to personalise the story, for viewers and editors alike.

The economics of production also shapes news. Stories originating in Africa tend to be less profitable than those in wealthier nations with a larger media presence, partly because of what richer news consumers want to view, and partly because of the cost of providing the images. Many Western news organisations closed foreign bureaux to save costs in the 1980s and 1990s, which had questionable effects on framing of news stories in the West, effects that have not been reversed by the keener interest in foreign news after 9/11. News organisations still rely on ‘fire-fighter’ journalists ‘parachuted’ into conflict zones equipped with highly portable cameras but often lacking the linguistic, cultural or historical knowledge to make sense of what they film.

Given such practices, it is not surprising that many journalists are drawn towards covering the spectacular. Guy Debord, the French theorist and author of The Society of the Spectacle, argued that spectacle depoliticises and pacifies the public, whilst affirming the power of the ‘ruling order’. Reliance by news organisations on daily spectacles of relatable violence can contribute to an incomplete understanding of the nature and causes of conflict. As Eddie Adams reflectively said of his own work: ‘Still photographs are the most powerful weapons in the world. People believe them; but photographs do lie, even without manipulation. They are only half-truths.’

Redacting: Hidden Violence

The other side of this coin is that much violence is overlooked or hidden in the news media. The recurring, daily violence against women around the world, the hidden, ongoing war between the Turkish government and Kurds, and the regular strafing by helicopters of villagers in central or southern Sudan to clear the way for oil exploration rarely make it into the frames of Western news channels. There are exceptions. Some commentators write about the ‘Hidden truth of violence against women’, or the ‘Hidden violence blighting women’s lives’. Nevertheless, celebrity stories take priority. For instance, in June 2005, CNN, Fox News, NBC, ABC and CBS ‘collectively ran 55 times as many stories about Michael Jackson as they ran about the

Representing Violence through the Media

genocide in Darfur’, leading one writer for the *New York Times* to muse: ‘If only Michael Jackson’s trial had been held in Darfur.’ Likewise, the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, described by Fergal Keane as ‘Africa’s Forgotten and Hidden War’, supposedly claimed over 6 million lives in two decades, but received limited coverage in Western media. Even a small fraction of this number of casualties in North America or Europe would have received far more global media attention. Consider, for example, the extensive coverage of the lorry attack in Nice on Bastille Day, 2016, as opposed to the near silence regarding the ongoing conflicts and violence in parts of North and sub-Saharan Africa and Yemen. If such violence is covered in the West it is often towards the end of news bulletins in abbreviated reports, or hidden away inside broadsheet newspapers or specialist sections on news internet sites.

Journalists repeatedly use the phrase ‘Africa’s Forgotten War’ to describe these and similar conflicts. Even coverage of violence in Syria and Iraq commonly eclipses most stories from Africa. At times during 2016 the bombing of east Aleppo or the struggle for Mosul dominated many Western news reports. Aid workers often describe the country where they work as suffering from a ‘forgotten war’ as a way to wrench the West’s attention onto potential humanitarian disasters. For example, in 2016 Amnesty International described the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Huthi in Yemen as ‘the Forgotten War’. Over ten years earlier the British development charity Action Aid’s chief executive Salil Shetty claimed that ‘Liberia is Africa’s forgotten war.’ Or more recently *Radio Free Europe* described the ‘simmering conflict’ in Donbas as ‘Ukraine’s Forgotten War’ (26 July 2016). Such descriptions and predictions are then used by journalists or NGOs to frame particular conflicts, as they attempt to awaken Western public opinion.

Religious leaders have sometimes made use of the ‘forgotten war’ motif as a way of pleading for aid, dialogue and peace-making. Under the headline ‘John Paul II Recalls “Forgotten Wars”’, the Vatican’s international news agency Zenit described how the then pope, during one of his general audiences in Rome, reminded his audience of around 25,000 that, while the

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media may have forgotten them, there are conflicts ‘lacerating Africa’ which are sowing death, hatred and poverty:

From Angola to the Great Lakes, from Congo-Brazzaville to Sierra Leone, from Guinea Bissau to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from the Horn of Africa to Sudan, there is a long and bitter series of internal conflicts, as well as inter-Nation conflicts which, above all, strike innocent peoples and affect the lives of the Catholic communities.20

Earlier studies show that ‘Third World’ coverage in the Western press has a long-term tendency to focus on violence, conflict and disorder. On rare occasions where African conflicts are covered, reports tend to highlight brutality and the predicament of victims. African countries are often caricatured as isolated places of little hope whose troubles are home-grown, ignoring how inextricably connected the continent is with the rest of the global and political economy. In a brief news report it is hard to investigate whether violence has roots in the colonial divisions of the nineteenth century, the Cold War hostilities of the twentieth century, or the economic power exerted by multinational companies in the twenty-first century. Exceptions can be found in documentaries, weekend newspaper supplements or alternative news websites: but news which focuses on the spectacular or proximate contributes to forgetfulness of other places.

The redaction of violent events ‘elsewhere’ is the other side of the focus on spectacular violence closer to home. In a well-known piece of research, ‘The Structure of Foreign News’, 21 Galtung and Ruge suggest that if a news story is culturally proximate, concerned with elite nations or elite people, and is negative and unexpected, it is more likely to be selected for coverage by journalistic gatekeepers than a story that is not. While Galtung and Ruge’s work has been both criticised and developed, with political, cultural, economic and geographic factors being included in explaining why news tends in the West to ignore African wars, their work is still widely cited; 9/11 fulfilled all their criteria, whilst the civil war in the Congo and other chronic violent stories fulfilled few, if any. Journalists rarely reflect formally upon news criteria, relying on ‘gut instinct’ and ‘local debate’, which has been described as their habitus, doxa or lifeworld: but that does not mean that implicit

criteria are not applied. African wars are seen as ‘business as usual’ among elite audiences, so senior journalists and editors perceive audience interest as lacking, and such stories fall out of the dominant Western news frames. Even with the apparent democratisation of news, through many internet sites and citizen journalists, Western news organisations remain dominant in many parts of the world because of the economic power they hold, allowing them to dictate what makes it into the news.

Remembering: Amnesia and Recollection

Since the 1980s, memory researchers have explored how recollections move from temporary short-term memory to longer-term storage. Why do some painful or traumatic memories persist? Why do some violent news reports or violent films stick so firmly in the memory? Research suggests that emotional resonance is implicated.\(^22\) If an event is associated with or coincides with a heightened emotional state, then the memory will be retained firmly. Viewers of news may sometimes remember even more clearly than participants or eyewitnesses: many viewers of 9/11 have clear memories of the attacks, while many actually involved were so traumatised that their memories are far more blurred.

To explore how this works in detail I draw on some of my empirical research, which included asking over 400 respondents in mixed groups from all over the UK and beyond which images of violence from the news they could remember. Most of this questioning took place before the 7 July 2005 London bombings, but over three years soon after 9/11. It now provides a historical insight into some of the most remembered stories during that period. The most commonly recalled violent images included many from Iraq: vehicles ablaze after car bomb explosions in Baghdad; a marine shooting an injured man in a mosque in Fallujah. Many recollected pictures of children running out of School No.1 in Beslan, South Russia; a shattered train after a terrorist attack in Madrid; and, most consistently, a number of images related to the events in Manhattan on 11 September 2001. Many were able to describe exactly where they were when they saw this news. Such remembering, where individuals recall precise details, is often described as ‘flashbulb memory’.\(^23\) Fifteen years later many can still recall where they were and


what they saw of the 9/11 attacks. Images from Sarajevo, Rwanda and Darfur were less commonly recalled. Two factors implicated in the patterns of remembering are proximity and repetition. Despite the access of residents of what Marshal McLuhan famously described as our ‘global village’ to images of the violence experienced by their ‘electronic’ neighbours, the violence that was most remembered tended to be that physically, or sometimes psychologically, close to where viewers lived. And repeated viewing, typified by the experience of so many people who watched the 9/11 footage, also appears to embed these memories firmly in viewers’ minds.

Of course, not all viewers live in the USA and Western Europe: all violence takes place where someone lives. Viewers who live close to conflict or who experience violence first-hand, find this colours their memories. A Serbian academic from Belgrade recalls pictures of the state television station damaged by NATO bombing in April 1999, and she admits that her memory of the media coverage is reinforced by having seen the devastation with her own eyes. Others found that the recycling of graphic news images led to more immediate recall. A middle-aged Korean man vividly recalled images from the 1980 Kwangju massacre, in part he said, because twenty years later images from the massacre, such as a student being beaten by a soldier, were commonly reused by local Korean television stations and newspapers. These media images reinforced his own actual memories.

Alongside proximity and repetition/recycling there is another reason for viewers remembering news images: identification. In Northern Ireland, out of thirty Protestants aged between 39 and 69 years old not one recalled images from ‘Bloody Sunday’ (30 January 1972), where thirteen Catholics had been killed, whereas they did recall images of IRA violence. Memories which make a significant emotional impact tend to be retained in what is often described by cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists as the episodic or autobiographical memory. And emotional impact is connected with identification: the more closely you identify with the people involved in the violent situation, the more emotional impact the image will have, and the deeper will be the memory. Thus many Muslims found the depiction of violence against fellow Muslims in both Iraq and Afghanistan distressing or enraged, which contributed to their recalling the related images.

Identification can substitute for proximity. Take as an example the massive response to the shooting of fifteen 5- and 6-year-olds and their teacher in Dunblane, Scotland, on 13 March, 1996, by people from all over the world. News about the shootings at a Port Arthur tourist site in Tasmania (1996) and at Columbine high school in Colorado, USA (1999) were remembered by
many respondents in Scotland even though they were many thousands of miles away from the event. Resonating with the Dunblane story, these distant tragedies were brought close by immediate news images and reports. Many respondents also did not distinguish between seeing spectacular acts of terrorism and seeing images from recent wars. It was easier to remember the spectacular event rather than the context in which it was set. Domestic violence, which, as suggested earlier, is normally left outside the news frame, was never recalled, despite its being ubiquitous and terrible.

It is also important to note that, alongside television, the internet, newspapers and other channels play an important role. One respondent said: ‘The most powerful images I had from July 7 were from narratives in newspapers.’ He contrasts the constant flow of images on television, which he believes ‘reduces or replaces analytical content’, with the narratives in newspapers and analysis on the radio, which he often finds far more memorable. Since the mid 1950s the majority of viewers have identified television as their main source of world news, ahead of the press, with 69 per cent of respondents in a large 1994 survey in Britain putting television as their primary source for world news. But television news is not produced and received in a communicative vacuum. Younger viewers, and now also older ones, are increasingly turning to web-based news. Dramatic news images are regularly reused and discussed in different media. Circulation and discussion contribute to certain images being remembered more than others.

Having said all this, there is truth in Montaigne’s widely quoted aphorism: ‘Memory tells us not what we choose, but what it pleases.’ There is an untameable quality to memories that makes it hard to control or to predict which ones will persist or recur. Nevertheless, repetition, proximity and identification will continue to be important in determining which media images of violence are remembered.

Responding: Passively and Actively

We do not simply view media: it has an effect on what we do next. This is not to resurrect early models of audience responses which claimed a simple,

24 More recently the Scottish playwright David Greig wrote The Events (2013), which explored the effects of a mass shooting in a small seaside community. Performed to critical acclaim in both Scotland and Norway it resonates with the attacks not only in Dunblane (1996), but also on Utøya Island (2011), where Anders Behring Breivik killed sixty-nine people with an average age of 20.
direct impact on behaviour, and which are now rightly out of fashion.\textsuperscript{26} As active moral agents, audiences can respond to and interact creatively with the news media and memories of what has been seen. News about violence arguably influences viewers, shapes memories and in some circumstances even sets agendas. ‘Acknowledging that audiences are “active” does not mean that the media are ineffectual. Recognising the role of “interpretation” does not invalidate the concept of “influence”.’\textsuperscript{27} Violent news events in the media shape the symbolic environment in which we act, dream and believe. One response is to switch off or switch over. In \textit{States of Denial} Stanley Cohen suggests there are many ways to block out what is seen.\textsuperscript{28} Susan Moeller shows how the viewer ‘resorts to compassion fatigue as defence mechanism against the knowledge of horror’.\textsuperscript{29} The never-ending repetition of images of suffering and violence can lead to a sense of powerlessness. On the other hand it may also provoke anger and even violent reactions, for example the attacks on Asians, assumed to be Muslims, in Britain and the USA following recent terrorist attacks. It is no surprise that photographs of Muslims being held in orange jump suits in Guantánamo Bay, being paraded naked or hooded in Abu Ghraib Prison or being massacred in Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995), are often cited negatively online and appear also to have contributed to the radicalisation of some young Muslims. Resentment can grow into the desire to meet violence with violence. And repeated viewing of these images feeds that resentment. In this way passive viewing can lead to active responses.

The Norwegian scholar credited with laying many of the foundations for modern Peace Studies, Johann Galtung, argued that news can contribute to violent situations, with journalists tending too often to misframe or even misremember violence, and to focus on apparently irrational acts rather than structural causes. Elements of John Birt and Peter Jay’s well-known argument in the seventies, that news reports had a ‘bias against understanding’, remain valid today.\textsuperscript{30} Galtung notes how many reports tend to reduce the number of

\textsuperscript{29} Susan D. Moeller, \textit{Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death} (London: Routledge, 1999).
parties in a conflict to two, and ignore the goals of outside interventionists, leading to what he describes as Manichaeism, with a good side and an ‘evil’ side. He sees a related weakness in the failure to explore the causes of escalation, and indeed the impact of media coverage itself. Violence is presented as inevitable; alternatives are ignored. This viewpoint finds some support in Media and the Path to Peace in which Gadi Wolfsfeld concludes that ‘the news media generally play a negative role in attempts to bring peace’. Galtung goes further, claiming that ‘when news about attempts to resolve conflicts are absent, fatalism is reinforced. That can engender even more violence.’ Images of peaceful outcomes are often left outside the news frame, and hence are easily forgotten. Robert Entman claimed that news frames offered prior to the Gulf War marginalised those proposing a negotiated settlement.

The result of ignoring structural elements in this episodic news process, according to Shanto Iyengar, ‘is the trivialization of public discourse’ and the lack of evidence to help audiences make informed moral choices in response to violence. Even in the supposedly more interactive internet, news providers work under constraints, including the necessity of framing stories to fit their site. So a popular blog such as Baghdad Burning interacted with television news.

Yesterday they were showing Sunni and Shia clerics praying together in a mosque and while it looked encouraging, I couldn’t help but feel angry. Why don’t they simply tell their militias to step down – to stop attacking mosques and … to stop terrorizing people? It’s so deceptive and empty on television – like a peaceful vision from another land.

This passage may be critical of television news, but it illustrates how news coverage, broadcast visual memories, provoke a strong response.

Such frustration with the limitations of the tools of their trade is shared by many journalists, as well as by their audiences. Fergal Keane writes of his work in Rwanda:

To this day I am at a loss to describe what it was really like. That smell. On your clothes, on your skin … This was not something I could convey with words or photographs or film … Our trade may be full of imperfections and ambiguities but if we ignore evil we become authors of a guilty silence.  

As Jean Seaton says, ‘Journalists … are … travellers between moral worlds. They go from where you must not kill people, to where you have to.’ The journalist in these situations acts as a witness of tragic suffering and tangible evil. They aim to ensure it is not forgotten. Their efforts are not always wasted. Pablo Picasso famously created Guernica in response to news reports of aerial bombing, an artistic expression of grief, protest and rage, not only bearing witness to the horrors of the Spanish Civil War (July 1936 to April 1939) but also anticipating the impact of conflict upon civilian populations in the World War soon to follow.

Conclusion

Images of violence and images related to violence now permeate across global communicative environments. The ways they are circulated and disseminated have evolved. Even as recently as the 1960s pictures had to be flown back from Vietnam. Politicians had more time to digest the implications of a news story. Journalists had more time to interpret a set of pictures. From the 1970s, film crews and reporters began to visit exotic or dangerous locations to be the audience’s eyewitnesses of ‘foreign violence’, and the audience watched news as it happened. Today some journalists claim the ‘feast of digital pictures generated by anyone and everyone’ renders the official ‘reporter’s presence on the spot well-nigh obsolete’. This is significant because it means local specialist correspondents with time to learn about the distinctive contours of their patch are replaced by reporters parachuted in for a few days or by journalists interpreting footage or social media at a

37 Seaton, Carnage and the Media, p.200.
38 See Russell Martin, Picasso’s War: The Destruction of Guernica, and the Masterpiece that Changed the World (New York: Dutton, 2002). It is possible that Picasso was also influenced by seeing earlier news reports of bombings on other civilian targets. Picasso was commissioned to create a mural for the Spanish Display at the 1937 Paris International Exposition.
distance. This leads to a preference for the spectacular at the expense of reporting hidden forms of violence.

Representations of spectacular violence can contribute to a sense that while the current status quo is unfortunate it is almost unavoidable. The noise created by media spectacles drowns out the cries of those who suffer daily and die from treatable diseases, and related forms of structural violence. The dominance of spectacle puts non-dramatic pictures outside the news frame, and so beyond attention and memory. Chronic, hidden or structural violence can all too easily be overlooked.

It is commonly believed that the more dramatic the pictures, the more likely a story will find its way to the top of the news schedule. While there is some truth in this, spectacular pictures are not always the defining criterion for a news story’s precedence. Some stories are more spectacular than others, with or without pictures of the actual violence. The sinking of the Titanic, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the suicide of Hitler are a few examples of major news stories, lacking pictures of the event. If this is so, then what makes something spectacular is partly in the imaginative eye of the beholder. Seeing the world differently can lead not only to different kinds of definitions of the spectacular, but also to different kinds of questions. How far is there a moral obligation for spectators to dissent from the accounts of reality dominated by violent spectacle? How far is there a moral responsibility for viewers and journalists to look beyond the screens in search of unspectacular stories? What is the role of both audience and broadcaster in settings where ‘post-truth’ politics and the echo-chambers created by Facebook and other social media can trump more established forms of news reporting? And in what ways will peaceful practices responding to media visions of violence lead towards peace?

Bibliographical Essay

Media violence remains one of the most hotly debated topics in media, communication and cultural studies. For example, the extent, if any, to which media violence affects or influences viewers has provoked numerous qualitative and quantitative studies. Some argue there are no or very few discernible causal effects, while others posit significant and specific impacts. While questions about the impact of media violence regularly recur, other topics have also been investigated. For a helpful collection of essays on the relationship between media and violence see C. Kay Weaver and Cynthia Carter (eds.), *Critical Readings: Violence and the Media* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2006). This includes a range of voices, exploring theories, productions, representations and audiences.
There is related and extensive literature regarding portrayals and receptions of violence in film (see Kendrick’s bibliographical essay to Chapter 28 in this volume).


There is also growing scholarly literature relating to media, conflict and war. See, for example, the journal Media, War and Conflict (Sage, from 2008). Some focus on a single conflict or geographical area, while others on various wars. These include: Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1989); Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, rev. edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis (London: Sage, 2004); Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Broader themes are considered in Colleen Roach (ed.), Communication and Culture in War and Peace (London: Sage, 1993).


Several authors have reflected upon how violence entertains and how news media are commonly drawn towards spectacularly dramatic forms of violence. Sissela Bok, Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998). Scholars have reflected upon violence as a form of communication for several decades. See Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1982). Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, more studies were produced reflecting upon the relationship between terrorism and media. These include Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism
A recurring concern is about the impact of media violence upon youngsters. See, for example, Edward L. Palmer and Aimee Dorr (eds.), *Children and the Faces of Television: Teaching, Violence, Selling* (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Some become more polemical or advocate changes in policy or practice, such as Dave Grossman and Gloria DeGaetano, *Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill: A Call to Action against TV, Movie and Video Game Violence* (New York: Crown, 1999). Some argue that representing violence is necessarily morally problematic or dangerous. From this perspective, viewers need to be inoculated or protected. David Buckingham critically describes this view in *Media Education: Literacy, Learning and Contemporary Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

In ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, *Journal of Peace Research* 6.3 (1963), 167–91, Johan Galtung argues the need for an ‘extended concept of violence’. Distinctions are now made between the role of different media in making violence visible and invisible, such as domestic violence, that often takes place behind closed doors against women and children. Structural violence, as considered by Paul Farmer in *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), is also often overlooked.


Finally, some scholars do not confine themselves to contemporary examples from the so-called modern or Western media, as many of the issues raised by the phenomenon of violence in the media are by no means new. Consider for example Jody Enders, *The Medieval Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory and Violence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) and Richard Raskin, *A Child at Gunpoint: A Case Study in the Life of a Photo* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2004); and for a study drawing on a range of international examples from different periods see Jolyon Mitchell, *Promoting Peace, Inciting Violence: The Role of Religion and Media* (New York: Routledge, 2012). Many studies described above illustrate the value of developing a more nuanced approach, demonstrating that violence in the media is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which merits creative, critical and thoughtful engagement.
‘Never Forget that This Has Happened’: Remembering and Forgetting Violence

JOY DAMOUSI, JORDANA SILVERSTEIN AND MARY TOMSIC

Never forget that this has happened.
Remember these words.
Engrave them in your hearts
When at home or in the street,
When lying down, when getting up.
Repeat them to your children.
Or may your houses be destroyed,
May illness strike you down,
May your offspring turn their faces from you.

Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz (1947)

In the seventy-three years since Primo Levi extolled us to ‘never forget’ the genocide of Auschwitz, remembering the violence of the Holocaust has assumed many and varied forms. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries there has not been one universal way this indelible event is remembered or represented. Indeed, all acts of atrocity committed throughout the twentieth century are now recalled through a multiplicity of media and with many varied messages. Scholars have examined a range of cultural sites that have served the purpose of remembering as well as forgetting acts of violence. These include analyses of memorials, the use of oral history, family histories, personal memories, pilgrimages, artworks and sculpture, museum exhibitions, violence on the physical landscape, material artefacts of violence and state-sanctioned commemorations. Cultural media such as film and photography have been examined as forms of commemoration. In the digital age, social media offer a new vehicle for commemorative practices recalling experiences of violence and enduring aftermaths.¹

¹ With the memory boom, different forms of remembering and forgetting violence have become a major theme in historiography from the late twentieth century onwards. Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.),
In this chapter, we attempt to capture some of the sites of memory – in Jay Winter’s enduring phrase – that have emerged and are continuing to emerge in response to violent events during the twentieth century. These commemorative practices, and the sites upon which these are manifest, are not static rituals frozen in time, but are changing, contested and fluid, constantly evolving to reflect contemporary perspectives. Here we chart the shifting nature of remembrance and the forms it has taken and continues to take across a range of historical events. These include world wars, civil wars, the Holocaust, colonisation, truth and reconciliation, gender and violence, and child sexual abuse. Together, we identify the range and complexity of remembrance that has been transformed by new technologies, shifting ideologies and reinvented cultural practices.

Blood, Bodies and Bones

In the early twenty-first century, remembering violence has increasingly focused on three sites: blood, bodies and bones. In the first part of this chapter, these three sites form the basis of considering the remembrance and forgetting of past violent events that took place during the First World War, the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Spanish Civil War of 1936. The remembrance of these cataclysmic events more broadly brings into focus forms of commemoration that have recently concentrated exclusively on the body. These involve new technologies such as DNA testing and the retrieval and exhumation of bones of the victims of violence.

The aim is to explore this new wave of commemorative practice and argue that in the twenty-first century new technologies have ushered in distinctive forms of such practices surrounding the dead body. This is evident in many circles – especially for the families of the dead – as a highly respectful and appropriate way of remembering victims of violence. In his work on the dead, Thomas Lacquer argues there emerged a new respect for the dead from
the eighteenth century that began a significant shift for the ‘visibility and accountability of the dead’.²

The focus adopted in recent scholarship on the victims of violence has been to consider how human remains have become a distinctive part of commemorative practice. In 2015, Sévane Garibian wrote in a special issue of Human Remains and Violence of the need for scholars in genocide and memory studies to consider the importance of human remains in commemorations. He wrote that the ‘function of human remains in commemorative practices is multiple, be it memorial, cognitive, probative or cathartic’.³

Does this focus on human remains reflect a new attempt to access the ‘true’ experience of war? Is the appeal of this exercise that it somehow gives a more ‘accurate’ representation of the infliction of violent acts and how these should be remembered – that is, through the forensic analysis of the dead? The issue of ‘true’ commemoration of violent acts was raised during the debate that took place over the centenary of memorialisation of the First World War in London, to which we will now turn.

Blood: Symbolism of Violence

Blood Swept Land and Seas of Red was the exhibition constructed at the Tower of London in 2014 to commemorate the century of the beginning of the First World War. Comprised of 888,246 red ceramic poppies each to represent a British fatality in the war, it was designed by artists Tom Piper and Paul Cummins. Over 5 million people visited this exceedingly popular memorial.⁴ Guardian journalist Jonathan Jones was not so impressed. He attacked it, noting that it was based on a nationalistic paradigm that was romantic and narrow. It was a celebration of blood and patriotism, he argued, in the quintessential nineteenth-century tradition. It narrowly focused on mourning only British not German, French or Russian victims. More than that, it was ‘a deeply aestheticised, prettified and toothless war memorial’, which elevated war to a noble

form. War was everything but noble and should be represented as such. ‘A meaningful mass memorial to this horror would not be dignified or pretty’, Jones insisted. ‘It would be gory, vile and terrible to see. The moat of the Tower should be filled with barbed wire and bones. That would mean something.’ The designer, Piper, defended his artwork, insisting it was about ‘loss and commemoration’ and a ‘communal tribute to a great loss of human life’. Piper argued that the representation of violent loss of life did not need to be overtly violent. He wished to make it accessible and not ‘state the obvious’, as we had been ‘all inured to scenes of violence on TV and film’. Each of the ceramic poppies was sold for £25 and funds were given to charities. Critics believed ‘blood’ in this instance was a purely aesthetic representation. It did not ‘truthfully’ represent the impact of violence or the authentic experience of death. The violence of war was not fully captured. For some, the answer to doing so was to retrieve the bodily remnants of the victims themselves.

Exhuming Bodies and Bones

Sculptured bodies are erected on most memorials that commemorate violence. In the traditional form, whether on war memorials, or memorials of uprisings, or social movements, the clear articulation of a typically male face or body is central. In more recent times, the forensic identification of bodies through DNA testing as a form of remembrance of violence has emerged. Bodies are exhumed for identification and to ascertain what happened to them, which can also redefine how the genocide is not only remembered but more fully understood by closer explorations of the wounds inflicted.

This practice has now taken place with the commemoration of two events in the early twentieth century: the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. In 2009, a systematic effort was made to exhume the bodies of dead soldiers of the First World War. Between May and August, 250 remains of Australian and British soldiers were removed and DNA samples were taken from bones and teeth found in the clay. The attention to detail of removing these remains ensured that this was undertaken with ‘great care’.

This process allowed for the discovery of details of height, facial features and prewar conditions that assisted in further identification. The serious and severe traumatic injuries of the battle were clearly apparent. In the process of this excavation 6,200 artefacts were discovered. The items found constituted a form of remembrance and included buttons and buckles, as well as more personal items such as a fountain pen, a bible, a French phrase book, a leather pouch with coins inside, a rail ticket. Objects were conserved to see how they could illuminate an individual’s identity.

Once the exhumation process had been completed, the individual process of identification began. This was important for families for their own remembrance and commemoration of members lost. While the Australian Army formally initiated and sanctioned this process, families of deceased soldiers have embraced this as a vital part of their own commemorative endeavours and practices.

Reburial: Fromelles Military Cemetery

In similar exercises, by the end of February 2010, 249 of 250 bodies recovered from Pheasant Wood in the Fromelles – where in July 1916 the first major battle was fought by Australian troops on the Western Front – had been reburied in the new cemetery. Again, DNA matching with descendants identified soldiers, and their names were inscribed on headstones. A formal commemorative ceremony involving Australian and British dignitaries took place with full military honours together with traditional rituals of hymn singing and prayers. In 2014, the families of soldiers buried in unmarked graves began a campaign in Australia to exhume mass graves of fallen Gallipoli soldiers. According to John Basarin, chairman of the Friends of Gallipoli committee, the arguments put forward were that ‘people have paid their ultimate sacrifice and deserve to be treated – if they’re found – in the normal manner they should be accustomed to, with a headstone at a proper burial place where the descendants can go and pay their respects on location’. There has been controversy and debate about the uses of this technology and the state’s

use of it. Families and descendants have been active in supporting this form of commemorative practice to honour the dead by identifying them and providing a full reburial and ceremony. The centenary of World War I has especially drawn attention to these practices. But they have also now been applied to commemorative practices of other violent events such as civil wars.

Reburial

Almost two decades after the end of the First World War, the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) erupted and set the prelude to the Second World War. It was a brutal civil war with high casualties and shocking atrocities. In remembering this conflict and its cruelty and violent crimes, families, communities and governments have undertaken exhumations of bodily remains. In the location of many of the battles of the civil war, DNA testing has been undertaken. These are especially connected to family burials and commemorative practices, and are crucial to how families are now drawing on this process to remember and commemorate the violence inflicted on their relatives. As Zahira Araguete-Toribio argues, ‘DNA technology has reconvened families with their disappeared relatives and become a political agent in the mediation of complex identification demands in the aftermath of mass atrocity.’ In Spain, this commemorative practice was initiated not by the state, but by individuals and families. There have been acts of reburial and these have informed particular commemorative practices. For families of communists, this has become an act of justice. But it has connected families, scientists and the state. It is a ‘grass roots’ movement, one in which a family is mobilised to define a distinctive commemorative practice in the twenty-first century.

Resisting forgetting has been a central aspect of this process and attempts to keep remembering – through the medium of photography – is a perennial theme, which we will now consider.

The Erasure of Bodies

There is a voluminous literature on the way photography serves as a form of remembrance of violence and how throughout the twentieth century it has served this purpose. Scholars draw a direct connection between this visual form and its vital role in constructing narratives about the urgent need to remember atrocities.13

But how do we examine cases when there is no visual representation of atrocity? Anouche Kunth explores the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the attempt to erase any visual evidence through censorship. The extermination of the Armenians was quickly erased from memory and disappeared from the political agenda as the abandoned corpses in the desert were destroyed. The photographs of Armin Wegner, a nurse, powerfully represent how visual material was vital in the representation of genocide. However, any attempts to seek justice for victims became impossible as efforts failed ‘to move the lines of international law to encapsulate the specificity of crimes against humanity’, with the result that the genocide would soon potentially be erased.14

But the visual material would soon provide the material evidence that genocide had taken place. Two significant commemorations drew on these photographs to put the case that genocide had been committed against the Armenian population.

On the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide in 1965, the families of the survivors demonstrated around the world to demand justice, after decades of indifference. With the advent of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the United Nations in 1948, this offered a new opportunity to present a case for genocide. In 1975, on the sixtieth anniversary, a pioneering work was published: Jean-Marie Carzou’s An Exemplary Genocide, Armenia 1915, which was accompanied by a booklet of photographs, which were crucial to the remembrance of the event.15 The photographic representation of bodily remains was a powerful form of remembrance when such remains could not be retrieved. The compulsion to never forget through bodily remains continued after the Second World War. Collecting the ashes of the dead became more common,

15 Ibid.
but this was not a new practice. In the context of the genocide against European Jewry this practice was especially poignant.

Holocaust Ashes

Between 1945 and 1960, Holocaust ashes were part of the personal commemoration and remembrance of the victims of violence. In the immediate postwar period this became a common form of remembrance, involving bringing home ashes of the atrocity. As in earlier periods, pilgrimages occurred to concentration camp sites. In the postwar period, the transfer of ashes acted as a form of substitution for the body. The ashes symbolised the whole, standing for all the dead. Through these there was a form of commemoration and remembrance, in a context where bodies could not be returned for formal burial or religious rites.16

In the immediate aftermath of war, respect for the dead was paramount in communities. As new technologies have emerged, family members – as a way of extending this respect – have embraced further knowledge of the violence inflicted on them. Where the violence enacted in the first half of the twentieth century is remembered today through the vectors of blood, bodies and bones, as outlined above, the violent events explored in these next sections – namely, the Holocaust, decolonisation and settler colonialism, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions of the 1990s and 2000s – have had their memory enacted through pilgrimages, places and gatherings. In the next section, we will take each of these in turn.

Pilgrimages: Remembering the Holocaust through Travel

The Holocaust stands within European, and Western, memory as a landmark event in the twentieth century, and has played a significant role in the development and shaping of traditions of memorialising violence. Its profound status is such that, as Saul Friedlander has written, ‘for many these events are so extreme and so unusual that they are considered events at the limits, posing unique problems of interpretation and representation’. Memories of the Holocaust – or, more precisely, modes of remembering the Holocaust – are today largely shaped by questions of universality,

particularity and responsibility, and when questions of what it means to participate in the remembering of this moment of radical violence are raised, it is often reflected that Holocaust memory makes a ‘demand’. In the words of Deberati Sanyal, which are reflective of a much larger discussion within both scholarly writing and the broader memorial world, the demand centres around ‘our duty to remember and our collective responsibility for the past and present, but also our vigilance toward new Holocaust dormant in everyday practices’.

While such questions have provided a framing, journeys to the sites of the Holocaust have become a central form of representing and embodying memory in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Such journeys, pilgrimages or tourist ventures stand at the intersection of many of the questions surrounding embodiment, space, and memory, which shape memory studies and violence studies today. All of these aspects come together in pilgrimages to former sites of violence, as journeyers both remember what occurred and reflect on the ways in which memories and histories continue. The journey itself plays a key role in remembering violence, asking travellers to change their perspective – to become something new and gain new knowledge – through the process of embodied movement. These sites and journeys compel those visiting to participate in remembering and creating memories into the future. There are ‘spectral traces’ present which implore those visiting these sites of haunting to ponder the ‘behavioural norms’ appropriate to this embodied and emplaced remembering. Moreover, as Brigitte Sion has noted, ‘death tourism . . . raises complex questions about ethics, politics, religion, education and aesthetics’. These questions include a meditation on what it means to make a pilgrimage to a site, and how one should act when there. At Auschwitz one can have an ice-cream while waiting for the bus to Birkenau, but is that what should be done? Laurie Beth Clark argues that for those attending such spaces ‘the most widespread [behavioural] mimicry is of cemeteries, but trauma sites also frequently look like places of worship or museums, all of which imply solemnity and reverence’. Yet this is not always the case, as any visit to such a site can demonstrate.

Travels, by those acting as tourists and memory-keepers, to sites of death, disaster and trauma are not unique to the Holocaust, with sites as diverse as the Killing Fields in Cambodia, Ground Zero in New York, and the Hôtel des Mille Collines in Kigali drawing tourists interested in affective travel in order to remember and bear witness. Yet the notion of a pilgrimage of remembrance to a historical place of violence attaches most closely, perhaps, to those seeing themselves as descendants of the victim group, with large numbers of individuals, families, and school and community groups travelling to the former homes of their compatriots. But like any form of memory or memorial, such journeys necessarily condition the memories created, passed on and retained. Amongst the remembering there is as much forgetting. Auschwitz is both, as Tim Cole noted, ‘A site of mass tourism and a site of pilgrimage’; those who journey there can be considered ‘tourists of guilt and righteousness: guilt at an almost pornographic sense of expectancy of the voyeurism ahead. And yet guilt tempered by a sense of righteousness at choosing to come to this place.’ Holocaust pilgrimages cannot be characterised as any one thing, occurring as they do both as part of the everyday and as an exceptional moment in a journeyer’s life. Their memorial-meaning is potentially ever changing, pointing us to the complexity of remembering violence.

But it is evident that, for many, visiting such sites, or ‘traumascapes’, in Maria Tumarkin’s terminology, engages those making the journey within notions of trauma. To be present at a site, to sit with its hauntings, is potentially to be present with memories of trauma. A site then can act as a form of testimony, testifying to a space and place of violence, and to the ways in which its past traces continue into the present. In these trauma-laden spaces, past and present collide while also remaining determinably apart. The traumatic memory and history they contain is, for

20 For example collected essays in Sion, Death Tourism.
22 On forgetting amidst remembering the Holocaust, for example, Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s Eye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
those in the following generations, a postmemory: as Marianne Hirsch explains, these memories raise the question of how ‘we [are] implicated in the aftermath of crimes we did not ourselves witness?’ This postmemory is structured by both a belatedness and a sense of being entangled; it is both linear and disruptive. Like Michael Rothberg’s conception of ‘multi-directional memory’, which places memories of different events together in a manner which ‘borrows’ and is ‘productive’, postmemory is one of the new structures through which memories of Holocaust violence are given meaning for new generations.24 Building collective Holocaust memories – through pilgrimage and narration – is never an isolated project. Remembering such mass violence is embroiled in ongoing questions of politics and ethics, drawing in questions, for instance, of what an embodied memory involves, how feminist narrations come into play, and what a multilinear memory looks like.

Places: Histories of Colonisation

While slavery in the British Caribbean, Mauritius and the Cape was abolished by British parliament in 1833, the ongoing legacies of enslavement continue into the present day. Slavery, one aspect of global histories of colonialism, served to structure both British and slave societies, and in the 2010s a project was established by University College London, led by historian Catherine Hall, to track the ‘compensation money’, a ‘grant of £20 million in compensation, [which was] paid by the British taxpayers to slave owners’. The first part of the project paid careful attention to where this money was spent, ‘tracking, in so far as it is possible, what they did with the money’. In this way, new memories about places were created: new histories of Bloomsbury and Fitzrovia, for instance, were produced, as maps were made of the Fitzrovia and Portman areas of London showing where this compensation money went.25 In this way, this project acts as a situated


memorial which seeks to overturn a history of forgetting slave ownership in
Britain generally, and in London in particular. This historical and memorial
project remembers the way that the benefits of violence were reaped not
only in close proximity to the physical violence but across the globe; the
ways that colonisation was – and is – a global project, and so requires
a global memory of the violence. Such memorials present an idea that the
violence perpetrated was not only physical but can exist in the forgetting, or
disremembering, that has occurred, as well as in the making of profit from
physical violence and the dispossession of land.

Alongside such projects sit others which remember violent histories of
settler colonialism. One such recent memorial established in Melbourne
in September 2016 commemorates the hanging of Tasmanian Aboriginal
men Maulboyheenner and Tunnerminnerwait in 1842. Sitting at the
site where they were executed, the memorial, named ‘Standing by
Tunnerminnerwait and Maulboyheenner’, narrates the story of how
‘The two men and three Tasmanian Aboriginal women – Truganini,
Pyterruner and Planobeena – had waged a guerrilla campaign, robbing
and clashing with settlers from Dandenong to South Gippsland.’ At the
dedication of the memorial it was narrated that ‘the memorial “will
forever stand as an unambiguous reminder of the brutal impacts of
displacement, dispossession and despair that was inflicted upon our
people and their homelands and of those who bore the brunt of that
invasion and paid the ultimate price”’. This memorial was important,
Carolyn Briggs, a Boon Wurrung elder, explained, as it represents ‘a first
step towards acknowledging our stories of the past.’

Indeed, settler colonial violence is predicated on a certain forgetting of that
violence, both its initial moments of contact and the continuing violence of
dispossession. The very land, or place, on which colonisation (and decolo-
nisation) occurred remains an important facet of memory making. Site-
specific memorials to colonial violence, then, serve as one way in which
colonial forgetting can be undone, or colonial memory can be made more
vivid. Memorials to this historic, and continuing, violence, serve to intervene
in the colonial situation.

Rob Anders and Netty Shaw in ibid.
Gatherings: Coming Together in Truth and Reconciliation

Just as Holocaust memorialisation provides an opportunity to reflect on responsibility and complicity, as individuals and as societies, and as memorials to colonialism stand on site in order to attempt to create new stories, so too do Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC). TRCs – to utilise a broad term emanating from post-apartheid South Africa to encompass a wide variety of commissions, hearings and movements – have now occurred across the world and have served to air a series of accounts of violence: testimonies both of the perpetrators and the victims, those who have enacted violence and those who have been subjected to it. TRCs have become a staple of national and international governing, understood widely as a foundationally important moment for a nation to gather together, both physically and symbolically.

The hearings associated with the South African TRC served as an opportunity to produce memories, as well as forgettings, about violence pursued under apartheid rule. One documentary about the TRC, Long Night’s Journey into Day (2000), asserted that the commission raised ‘some of the most profound moral and ethical questions facing the world today – questions about justice, truth, forgiveness, redemption, and the ability of brutalized and brutalizing individuals to subsequently coexist in harmony’. The TRC sits within a paradigm of ‘reconciliation’, a political formation which ‘has emerged as a potent and alluring form of utopian politics’ across ‘contemporary settler societies’. Such reconciliation movements and moments – such as the bridge-walks which occurred across Australia in 2000 – can act as a moment of gathering, a performative expression of a vast set of emotions. In Australia, people were urged by Mick Dodson ‘to see today, this day, as the beginning of the reconciliation process. This day, this day is the dawning of that brand new day.’

In other countries, such gatherings to speak and hear have led to formal government reports and apologies. What though are the implications when there is ‘structural injury’ at stake: when what is being testified to, recounted, remembered and gathered together is not a passing phase of violence but a violence which is structural to the state which initiates the

28 Sanyal, Memory and Complicity, p. 13.
gathering? Some scholars, such as Jennifer Matsunaga, caution against seeing truth commissions as one thing, writing that while they are incompatible with projects of decolonisation, some survivors find validation in sharing their stories. Matsunaga argues that truth commissions, operating as part of transitional justice work, serve as vehicles for memory but ‘generally remain silent on land-centred decolonization and Indigenous resurgence knowledge’. These gatherings then contain the same inherent contradictions as any memory source. For some they serve as a chance to restore one’s place in society, or to confess past wrongs; for others they act as a screen, preventing difficult and violent memories from being fully reckoned with.

We turn now to examine the contemporary practice of public apologies, looking in particular at the memories created through apologies surrounding the violence of colonisation, violence of family separation, violence against children in institutional care and sexual violence against women. Public apologies are modes through which states and institutions frame, remember and forget violent pasts. We first focus on the meaning of apologies and then consider specific examples.

**Saying Sorry – States’ (Non)Recognition of Violence**

Our age has been deemed one of Apology by Roy L. Brooks, given the number of apologies offered by contemporary world leaders to various groups. In an academic context, Melissa Nobles has identified seventy-two public apologies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (until 2007) from around the world. Nobles’s list covers heads of state, governments and religious institutions as well as formal groups and organisations. These are all public statements responding to histories of violence linked to war, religious persecution, internment, genocide, slavery, colonisation, apartheid and forced sterilisations.  

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Public apologies are a historically specific response to past and present violence and injustice. Elazar Barkan has identified morality and justice as exerting a strong presence in national politics and international diplomacy since the conclusion of World War II, and increasing since the end of the Cold War. What has followed is a ‘demand that nations act morally and acknowledge their own gross historical injustices’. Truth commissions, inquiries and investigations have a common focus on ‘stressing personal suffering and feeling’. In this political context, apologies have been offered, and Rhoda Howard-Hassmann and Mark Gibney suggest that, through them, states and social institutions showed ‘empathy to those they had harmed’. From the end of the twentieth century, Judith Brett classifies government apologies as being made ‘directly to the victims of state actions’ rather than used as instruments of international diplomacy and peacekeeping. The possibility of a state apologising and assuming a moral persona is identified by Mark Finnane as a novel function of national governments since the 1960s.33

In addition to apologies offered, demands made for formal apologies also require attention. In this way victims and those affected by historical violence are calling for formal recognition, for states and institutions to speak directly to them. In terms of numbers, demands for apologies far exceed those given, and these demands, according to Alice MacLauchlan, should be understood as a call ‘for a change in the authoritative historical record’.34

Theorising apologies is a recent topic of scholarly attention. Melissa Nobles sees public apologies as future-focused symbolic gestures about the past, with implications for shaping politics. Jason Edwards has examined collective apologies as a rhetorical genre. Judith Brett identifies apologies as a government technique ‘to restore civic harmony at those moments when the wrongs of the past erupt into the present’.35 Public apologies, and


demands for them, reanimate the past at specific points, and while formal public apologies are a global trend (at times for global audiences) the meaning and impact of them are strongly tied to local and national contexts.\(^{36}\) Examining specific apologies is vital to interrogate the meanings made of violent pasts through the apologies offered and the basis for them being offered at particular times.

There is currently widespread public remembering of historical abuse of children. One significant case is the over 170,000 children committed to the Irish industrial schools system between 1936 and 1970 due to poverty. Lindsey Earner-Byrne argues that the 1999 apology by then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern to the children abused in these schools placed attention on responsibility and national narratives, rather than nuanced historical interrogation. Earner-Byrne argues the apology and debate functioned to compartmentalise blame, first with the Roman Catholic Church and then the state, and failed to open space for examining publicly and holistically the Irish society that facilitated the large-scale abuse of children within these institutions.\(^{37}\) While there had been pressure to examine institutions like the industrial schools since the 1940s, alongside formal inquiries, it was not until the 1990s when widespread sexual abuse within the Catholic Church was being revealed and believed, accompanied by popular television documentaries revealing the abuse, that public interest created the political context for the state to respond with an apology. Feminist activism of the 1970s and 1980s had provided an intellectual framework to consider the political structures and power dynamics that supported and enabled abuse within institutions like schools and the Catholic Church. Feminist analysis provided survivors with language and concepts to use to make sense of their experiences. Linked to this, the early 1990s marked the beginning of a period that saw a shift in Western cultures, with increasing familiarity with personal stories of survival, trauma narratives and survivors’ accounts of traumatic pasts in the public sphere.\(^{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Katie Holmes and Stuart Ward, ‘Introduction: “Poison and Remedy”: The Pressure of the Past in Ireland and Australia’, in Holmes and Ward, Exhuming Passions, pp. 1–18, at 9, discuss the global and national in a broader context of memory studies.


Personal experiences of childhood abuse have not always found a receptive public space to be heard. Peter Tyrrell wrote a survivor memoir of his time in industrial schools in the early 1960s but was unable to secure publication. His campaigns to have his experiences recognised were ignored, disbelieved or thought of as blackmail. Tyrrell’s death in 1967 was deemed a suicide and the memoir was published in 2006 after it was found amongst someone else’s personal papers. His experiences and reporting of physical and sexual abuse were also included as evidence in the Child Abuse Commission in 2009. As Earner-Byrne notes, Tyrrell’s ability to write about this experience meant that he posthumously became a central witness to the realities of the system that has so damaged him. In this case we see the contingent nature of when victims of violence are listened to, and correspondingly spaces that emerge for violence to be heard and remembered rather than forgotten.

Johanna Sköld and Shurlee Swain suggest that an increased emphasis on children’s rights had played an important role in shaping apology politics. The 1990s was when Western political attention began to focus on historical abuse of children in out-of-home care. This interest saw formal avenues employed to document, collect testimony and make future focused recommendations about historical violence based on adult memories. In the Australian federal context, the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families began to be investigated by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission beginning in 1995, and in Canada the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also looked at the forced removals and abuse of Aboriginal Children in residential schools. The histories that these inquiries document are ones of settler colonial violence and control. The demands and silences involved in the various apologies and non-apologies in Australian and Canadian cases cannot be examined here, but we draw attention to two moments to highlight how past violence has been understood.

The limits of public apologies reveal how violence at the heart of settler colonial projects is (and is not) acknowledged. In Canada in 1998, ten years before the formal apology to former students of Indian Residential Schools was offered by the prime minister, a ‘Statement of Reconciliation’ was made in Ottawa, in response to the abuses of Indigenous children in residential

schools. Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder note the ‘nondescript and guarded language’ in this statement that described residential schools’ legacy. The only explicit apology offered was ‘to those individuals who experienced the tragedy of sexual and physical abuse at residential schools’. No apology was given for impacts of a cultural, political, economic or psychological nature.

The language used to describe historical violence in apologies reveals the significance placed upon that violence. On 26 May 1997, the day the ‘National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families’ was tabled in the Australian Federal Parliament, Prime Minister John Howard spoke at the opening of the Australian Reconciliation Convention in Melbourne. He expressed his personal deep sorrow for those of my fellow Australians who suffered injustices under the practices of past generations towards indigenous people and for the ‘hurt and trauma many people . . . may continue to feel as a consequence of those practices’. In saying this, he refused to apologise on behalf of the nation. On this occasion and others, Howard spoke of ‘blemishes in Australia’s history’. This elided the violent structure of colonisation and the ongoing impacts of it; we see here the power of the state carrying out reconciliation on its own terms. In the personal apology given we also see historical remembering of violence framed in personal terms and largely confined to the past. The response from the audience at the Convention, however, was clear, with people standing and turning their backs while others booed. The prime minister concluded his address in ‘a state of mild hysteria’.

Official apologies produce a public discursive space within which meaning is made. Ruth Rubio-Marian, examining responses to sexual and reproductive violence committed against women, argues this interpretative context is vital to provide victims with ‘due recognition and some form of repair’. One


example of historical sexual violence in which continued demands for apology have been made is the case of survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery during World War II. While evidence of the system of military prostitution had been available since the late 1940s, Vera Mackie notes a new discursive context was required for public debate. This came from the intellectual framework developed by feminist analysis of violence against women. From this, forces of gender, class and ethnicity were understood within the internationalised industry of prostitution, which included the military. This, Mackie argues, transformed activism around women’s rights as human rights and developed a discursive space for past experiences of sexual violence to be recognised.44 From the early 1990s survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery from Korea (and later from China, the Netherlands, the Philippines and Indonesia) actively demanded an apology and compensation. In December 2015 South Korea and Japan reached a ‘final and irreversible resolution’ of the issue, with Japan apologising and financial payment promised to provide care for the survivors. Survivors, however, were not involved in the negotiations and continue to make demands as to how their experiences are recognised: survivor Lee Young-soo was reported as saying: ‘The agreement does not reflect the views of former comfort women’ and ‘I will ignore it completely.’45 Here Young-soo demands her personal history be remembered on her terms. You-me Park argues for the importance of examining the culturally specific gendered assumptions embedded in the language used in describing this history and case. Park suggests that ‘a genuine apology . . . can only come in the form of recognizing the impossibility of making a suitable apology or making amends’.46 In this case, we see the limits of language and apology, and the demands that survivors continue to make.

Conclusion

The resurrection and erasure of blood, bodies and bones have become central to current forms of commemoration of violence. With enhanced technologies, the world wars and civil wars of the twentieth century are increasingly being remembered through these new forms. Whether these are perceived to bring more immediacy to the memory of the dead or a connectedness to and respect for the dead, retrieving bones and bodies through DNA testing has become a new, public form of remembrance. The phenomenon of pilgrimages, the formation of places and the instituting of gatherings have over time taken up important roles in the cultural expression of remembering atrocities and genocide across many contexts. The concept of the apology has been manifest in a range of cultural and political settings – from sexual crimes of war to child abuse, particularly the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families.

How we remember violence, what we choose to forget and why, and what form this takes, is a dynamic and constantly shifting cultural, political and social phenomenon. What remains constant is the enduring presence of the traces of acts of violence, however defined, at the individual, community and state level, whether they are officially sanctioned or not. These are permanent reminders of the impact of violent acts, whether these are privately engraved on people’s hearts, as Levi so eloquently describes it, or recalled in public forums. The haunting shadows that have been cast by atrocities indelibly remain with us.

Bibliographical Essay

Recent scholarship on the intersection between memory and violence has highlighted the centrality of religion and its role in how violent events are remembered. This is a key theme in J. Shawn Landres and Oren Baruch (eds.), Religion, Violence, Memory and Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). Religious understandings of space and place are central to these discussions as they argue that memory and violence are often fused with religious frameworks. Scholars have also explored the role of religion and violence in relation to reconciliation and human rights, for example R. Scott Appleby, Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

While the literature on religion and remembering violence is significant but not voluminous, there is a vast body of literature on physical memorials to the Holocaust, with James E. Young providing perhaps the definitive overview in The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), alongside texts such as Edward Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (Princeton: Columbia University Press, 2001). Projects such as the Stolpersteine

A central aspect of memory and violence needing further exploration is gender. Scholars have made compelling cases for focusing on gender in visual representation of violence. This is significant, given a dominant mode of remembering violence is through the visual, particularly in film and photographs. Ulrike Weckel’s analysis of depictions of women in films documenting the liberation of concentration camps in 1945 and 1946 is notable: *Gender & History* 17.3 (2005), 538–66. Griselda Pollock argues for the power of dominant cultural scripts of feminine suffering, which circulate at the expense of historical and political analysis through the continued use of a particular photograph taken during the Holocaust; and Nancy Miller examines how two photographs of Kim Phuc (known as the ‘Napalm Girl’), taken in 1972 and 1995, publicly function as gendered narratives of American national history in the context of the Vietnam War; see two chapters in Jay Prosser (ed.), *Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis* (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), pp. 65–78 and 147–54.
Index

Abdulhamid II, Ottoman Sultan 268, 273, 277
abolitionism 10
abortion 571
abuse
‘cycle of’ 158
see also child sexual abuse; sexual violence
Aceh, northern Sumatra
Dutch war of conquest with 24
Gayo Expedition (1900–1903) 25
Achebe, Chinua 252
Action Aid 605
Adana, 1909 massacre of Armenians 276
adultery, charges against rape victims 152
aerial bombing
Cambodia 514
of cities 286
Vietnam 514
aeroplanes, in warfare 2
al-Afghani, Jaffar 134
al-Afghani, Tayyib 134
Afghanistan 141
jihad 132, 552
Mujahadeen movement 117
Soviet Union invasion 131, 552
Taliban in 13, 110, 117
US invasion (2001) 117, 553
war in (from 2001) 134, 136
and recruitment of fighters 132
Africa
anti-colonial nationalism 300
child marriage 183
child prostitution 183
European need for labour 249
expansion of African states 249
First World War internment camps 391
‘forgotten wars’ in 605
French empire 2, 474
HIV/AIDS in children 182
influence on Europeans 251
interpersonal violence and indigenous beliefs 199
media reporting 604
and Second Cold War 462
see also British Empire; Congo, DRC;
Kenya; Nigeria; Rwanda; South Africa; Sudan
African Americans (former slaves) 89, 546–547
Freedmen’s Bureau 546
lynchings 173, 265, 548
see also racial violence, United States
African historiography 248–253
and interdependence of Europeans and Africans 249, 257
treatment of violence 250
view of Europeans 249
age of consent 149, 169–170
Britain 149, 171–172
India 174
overridden by marriage 170
prostitutes in Japan 339
Agulhon, Maurice 348
Ahern, Bertie, Irish Taoiseach 631
Ahmedabad, Gujarat, massacre (2002) 119
Aidit, D. N., PKI general secretary 435, 440
and kidnapping of generals 441
and land reform 437
move towards militancy 437
visit to China 436
Ainsworth, Harrison 571
Akbar, Mughal ruler of India 116
Akçam, Taner 393
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), Turkey 263
and national-Islamist authoritarianism 280
Al-Qaida organisation 135, 552
in Middle East 553
and self-sacrifice (suicide bombing) 135
and September 2001 attacks in USA 553
Alabama, Scottsboro Boys 101
Alawis (Alawites), in Syria 272
Albania, and First Balkan War (1912) 378
Aleppo, 1850 anti-Christian pogrom 274
Alevi (Shia Muslims), in Anatolia 272
jihad against 276
military campaign in Dersim (1937–38) 272, 279
Alexander II, Tsar 537, 539
Alexander III, Tsar 539
Algeria 129, 250
civil war 134
France and 194, 249, 254, 258
links with Holocaust 254
rise of FIS 134
Algerian War (1954–62) 399
and terrorism 550
Alien Restriction Act (1914) 391
Alison, Miranda 14
Allende, Salvador, President of Chile 14
Alpaugh, Micah 363
Amritsar 272
American Anarchist Fighters group 545
American Civil War (1861–65) 10, 89, 90–91, 546
American Psychiatric Association 151
American Revolutionary War 89, 534
American Mutoscope & Biograph Company 582
American Humane Association (1876) 214
American M是一款电影
Arsenal 538
Argentina 497
massacre (1919) 76–77, 300
armed forces
Latin America 497
political power of 494, 495, 497
see also French army; Germany army; Indian army; Japanese Imperial Army; Red Army; US army
Armenia
1895 massacre 268, 269, 276, 279
1909 Adana massacre 276
lack of international sanctions 270
and state confiscations 270
Armenian genocide (1915) 267, 278, 282, 286, 290, 370
commemoration with photographs 622–623
deportations to Syrian camps 375, 392
Armenian Question 267
Armenian Revolutionary Federation 277
Armenians, in Ottoman Empire 270
INDEX
638
arson 90
Artemovsk, murder of Jews in underground shafts 323
artillery, and deaths in First World War 293
asabiyat (group solidarity) 126
Ashin Wirathu, Buddhist monk 121
Asia
anti-colonial nationalism 300
Cold War in 454, 456–458, 465
extreme cinema 584
see also Cambodia; China; Japan; Korea; Pacific Ocean; Vietnam
Asia–Pacific War (1941–45) 13, 38, 329–331
Askin, Kelly Dawn, ICTY 162
Aslan, Reza 552
al-Assad, Bashir, Syria 138, 139
al-Assad, Hafez, Syria 130, 133
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL) (1930) 100
Assyrians, in Ottoman Empire 270
genocide (1915–16) 278
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 264, 278
see also Kemalism
Atlantic Charter (1941) 549
atrocities
Balkan War 379
Boxer Uprising 56
Evangelical inquiry into Pacific 31
German First World War 288, 291, 295, 311
Indian Mutiny 71
Japanese at Nanjing 160, 335
see also atrocities, Nazi; massacres
atrocities, Nazi 288, 295, 304–323
discovery of mass graves 319
murder of Jews at Babi Yar 311
photographic evidence 315
Soviet reports of 304, 306, 311, 316–323
Soviet witnesses to 305, 312–315
see also Auschwitz; Holocaust
Atta, Muhammad 135
Atwan, Adel Bari 138
Augustine, St 534
Auschwitz 382, 616
gas chambers 310
Soviet reports of 321
tourism at 624, 625
Australia
arrival of First Fleet (1788) 235
Bringing Them Home report (1997) 177
frontier violence 234, 243
and Gallipoli campaign 289
homicide rates 196
indigenous connection to land 236
internment of Germans 294
legal system 31
memorial to executed Tasmanians 627
native police forces 240, 241, 242, 243
native-on-native killing 195
and New Guinea 36
Northern Queensland indentured labourers 34
payback killings 236
penal settlement at Sydney 29, 31
reconciliation movements 628
relations with indigenous people 233
removal of mixed race children
(‘The Stolen Generations’) 10, 177, 632
retribution for wreck of ship Maria 238
Returned Service League parades 16
seizure of Aborigine lands 388
settler violence 234
use of martial law in New South Wales 238
Australian Army
exhumation and identification of soldiers 619
reburial of soldiers 620–621
Australian Reconciliation Convention (1997) 633
Austria, extreme cinema 584
Austria-Hungary
internment and deportation of enemy aliens 390
Jews 388, 573
Viennese uprising (1848) 408
authoritarianism
Costa Rica 495
Indonesia 444
Ottoman Empire 273
populist, Mexico 499
Turkey 263, 280
Avery, I.W. 548
Ayodhya, India, Hindu attack on mosque (1992) 118, 119
Azzam, Abdullah, and Afghan jihad 132
Ba’ath party 130, 280
Babi Yar, massacre of Jews 311
Bacon, Henry, The Fascination of Film Violence 596
badger-baiting 208, 211
Baghdad Burning, blog 611
al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, IS 139, 140
Baise-moi (2000 film) 583
Bakunin, Mikhail, on anarchism 540
Bali, cockfighting 216
Index

Balkan League 378
Balkan Wars 277
  First (1912) 276, 278, 378
  Second (1913) 379
Balkans 367
  diversity in 373, 377
  and expulsion of Muslims 378
in First World War 289
independence movements 267
and nation-state building 368
Second World War 381
  and Turkish nationalism 378
Western cultural assumptions about 368
  see also Bosnia; Bulgaria; Greece; Macedonia; Serbia; Thrace; Yugoslavia
Baltic states, rise of nationalism 300
banditry
  bands of brigands 574
Belgium 196
  in China 42, 49, 412, 414
Latin America 195
Bangladesh
  child marriage 182
  independence 112
al-Banna, Hassan, Muslim Brotherhood 130
Baqr Sidqi, Iraq 128
Barbie, Klaus 256
Barbusse, Henri, Le Feu (1916) 297
bare-knuckle fighting 209, 219
Barkan, Elazar 630
Barker, Martin 585
Basarin, John 620
al-Bashir, Omar, Sudan 133
Batista, Gen. Fulgencio, Cuba 502
Battle of Blair Mountain, USA (1921) 543
Bauman, Zygmunt 374, 386
bear-baiting 208, 211
behaviourism 429
beheadings
  of corpses 28
  Iraq, hostages 598
  and parade of heads 347, 352, 359, 443
  symbolism of public 359
Beijing, Monument to the National People’s Heroes 16
Beik, William 357
Belgium
  banditry 196
  First World War casualties 288
  German occupation 289
  refugees from 391
  Belich, James 229, 230
  Belize (British Honduras), treatment of
    murder 199
  Ben-Gurion, David 267
  Bengal, famine (1942) 84
  Benhabib, Seyla 259
  Benjamin, Walter 247
  Berghoffen, Debra 163
  Berkman, Alexander 544
  Berlin
    Center for Cold War Studies 452
    police force 577
    Red Army mass rapes 154
    street violence 562
  Berlin, Treaty of (1878) 277, 281
  Bernal, Martin 253
  Berthier de Sauvigny, Louis, murder of (1789) 352, 353, 356, 357–358
  Bessel, Richard 305
  Bhindranwale, Sant Jarnail Singh, Sikh activist 110, 112
  Bhutan, Buddhist nationalist state 121
  Bhutto, Benazir 153
    assassination 118
  Bhutto, Benazir Ali 117
  Biafra, war of secession (1967–70) 11
  Bigelow, Kathryn, Strange Days 584
  Bilbo, Theodore, US senator 101
  Bin Laden, Osama 132, 135, 140, 552
    and USA 553
  Birmingham, Alabama, civil rights protest
    campaign (1963) 104
  Birt, John 610
  Bismarck, Otto von 539
  bison, on Canadian prairies 232
  Bite (2015 film) 594, 595
  BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), India 118
    diaspora support for 122
    as government 119
  Black Hole of Calcutta 70, 74
  Black Panthers (US) 105
  blockades, and famine 286
  blood, and symbolism of violence 618–619
  Blood Feast (1964 film) 594
  blood sports, working classes and 212
  Blood Swept Land and Seas of Red exhibition 618
  bodies
    commemoration for unrecoverable 291
    exhumation and identification of soldiers 619–620
    reburial of soldiers 620–621
    and respect for the dead 617
Index

Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) movement, Sri Lanka 121
Boer/Xhosa wars 231
Boko Haram Islamist movement, Nigeria 139
bombardment
artillery 292
of cities 286
Bonnie and Clyde (1967 film) 588
‘boomerang thesis’
Arendt and 253–258
definition 257
Booth, John Wilkes 547
Borglum, Gutzon 17
Bosnia
propaganda value of rape 150
Srebrenica massacre (1995) 4
Boston Marathon bomb attack 553
Bounty, HMS, mutineers on Pitcairn Island 27
Boxer Uprising (1900)
China 53–58
Eight Nations Expeditionary Force and 55
murder of Chinese Christians 56, 57
Red Lanterns Shining girls movement 55
violence of suppression 56
boxing, rules for 219
Boyle, Danny, 127 Hours 595
boys
school beatings 575
as victims of sexual abuse 171
Brailsford, H. N. 367, 377
Brazil 495
criminal control of cities 506
homicide 189, 194
independence from Portugal (1822) 493
interpersonal violence 194
power of armed forces 500
and Triple Alliance 496
Brett, Judith 630
Briggs, Carolyn 627
British Army, crime and punishment in 574
British Board of Film Classification 592
British Empire 2, 228
acquisition of land for settlement 228, 235–236
civilising mission of 227, 239
and concept of protection of indigenous people 234
death tolls in frontier violence 243
expansion 242
frontier violence 227–244
imposition of law and administration 228
legal treatment of murderers 199
‘logic of elimination’ of indigenous peoples 228
military response to indigenous resistance 236
paramilitary policing 239–242
settler colonisation 239, 242
treaties and warfare 229–235
use of martial law 237–239
Brokaw, Tom 602
Brooks, Roy L. 629
Broome, Richard 243
brothels
Japanese ‘comfort stations’ 339–341
Japanese Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) 340–341
Japanese recruitment for 339, 340
used by occupying Allied forces in Japan 341–342
see also prostitution
Broughton, Jack, rules of boxing 219
Brown Berets, Chicano youth in California 105
Brownmiller, Susan, Against Our Will 148
brutalisation
concept of 298
of Europe 254
Buchenwald concentration camp 404
Buck-Morss, Susan 253
Buddhism
and nationalism 110
as political majority 13
and political violence 120–122
Bulgaria 367, 374
claims to territory 380
displacement of Greek population 380, 381
First World War 380
and Jews in Macedonia-Thrace (‘Belomorie’) 382
Second World War 381
war with Greeks in Thrace 379–381
Bulgarian Exarchists 377
bull-baiting 208
campaign to prohibit 210–211
bull-fighting 208
Spain 215, 581
bull-running 208
Tamil Nadu 208
Burke, Edmund 532
Burton, Antoinette, The Trouble with Empire 247
Bushfield, Samuel, and cockfighting 214
Byrd, James, murder in US (1998) 107

641
Cáceres, Berta, murder 506
Cairo 274
Calabria, ‘ndrangheta 565
Calcutta
Muslim–Hindu violence 84
riots (1945–46) 83
California, racial violence against Asians 100
Cambodia 510–530
1975 Constitution 517
agricultural exports 512
agricultural policy 521–528
communist factions in 513
and CPK increase in rice production 524–525
engagement in global economy 512, 521
food controls and rationing 527–528
homicide rates 204
independence (1953) 513
infrastructure 516
Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) 513
Killing Fields 12, 510
labour for irrigation schemes 525
and Non-Aligned Movement 512, 516–521
S-21 security centre 510
social classifications 526–527
‘Standard Total View’ (STV) 511
terror campaign 528–530
US covert bombing campaigns 514
work schedules and quotas 527
see also Khmer Rouge
cameras see photography; video
Camorra, Naples 565
Canada
homicide rates 196
Indian Act (1876) 233
indigenous reserves 233
National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 178
Royal Commission into Aboriginal People (1996) 178, 652
settlement and negotiation with indigenous people 232–233
Canetti, Elias 360
Cannes Film Festival 585, 595
cannibalism
during Chinese Great Leap Famine 423–424
by Japanese servicemen 329
by Magellan’s crew 23
by Māori 30
Pacific islands 26, 27
Cape Colony, South Africa
frontiers 230
Khoisan cattle raids 236
native police force 240, 241
use of martial law 238, 239
capitalism
and imperialism 259
and power 259
Capra, Frank, Mission to Moscow (1943) 318
Carbonari terrorist group 535
Carlyle, Thomas 347
Carnegie Corporation 544
Carnegie International commission, on Balkan War atrocities 379
Carnot, Sadi, President of France 541
Carrigan, William and Clive Webb 97, 100
Carzou, Jean-Marie, An Exemplary Genocide 622
Case ment, Roger
‘Congo Horrors’ report (1904) 9
execution (1916) 12
Cassagnau, Ivan 288
Castan, Nicole and Yves 361
Castle, William 594
Castro, Fidel, Cuba 502
casualties see death tolls
Catholic Church, and child abuse by clergy 176–177, 631
Catholic missionaries, in China 52, 60
Caucasus, rise of nationalism 300
cause and effect (Arendt) 246
cell phones see mobile phones
Cemal Pasha, Ottoman proconsul in Syria 128
censorship 318
of accounts of rape 152
Indonesia 428, 444
of violence in films and games 15, 590–593
ceremonial, as exhibition of power 68
Cé saire, Aimé 470
Challaye, Félicien 471, 473
Chandler, David 513
charivari 563
Charleston, S. Carolina, 2015 church shootings 107
Chauri Chaura, India, killing of Indian police officers (1922) 77
chemical weapons 3, 291
First World War 290
Japan 337
used in Iraq 139
see also poison gas
Chemin des Dames offensive (1917) 289
Cheoung Ek, Cambodian killing field 510
Chicago
Haymarket Riot (1886) 543–544
mob violence 98
child marriage 174, 182
Indiac 174–175
child pornography 181, 183
child sexual abuse 8, 168–185
and age of consent 169–170, 171–172
boys as victims 171
continuing global concern 169, 182–184
definitions 169–170
detection and prosecution of 184
effect on child 181
focus on (1970s and 1980s) 180–182
and focus on ‘sexual psychopath’ 178–180
in institutions 176–178
lack of records 168
legal controls on 170
mob violence against 173
and moral panic (1980s) 182
public apologies for 631–633
research on 180
sex tourism 183
sex trafficking 183
and trauma 180, 184
unreported 170, 175
Victorian moral perspective 171–173
within the family 175–176, 185
child-soldiers 158
children
abuse of indigenous boys 177–178
beating of schoolboys 575
and boundaries of childhood 169, 171
cannibalism of 424
and collective violence in China 421
exposure to mediated violence 15
female genital mutilation 184
HIV/AIDS in Africa 182
killed by Nazi soldiers 304, 313, 314
massacres of (First World War) 288
prostitution of 171, 172, 183
rights of 8
Chile 495
CIA operation in 14
massacre of strikers (1907) 498
memorials 18
and War of the Pacific (1879–84) 496
China, imperial 44(map)
anit-Japanese demonstrations (1919) 300
banditry 42, 49
Boxer Uprising (1900) 53–58
cockfighting 216
demons 46
Eight Trigrams Uprising (1813) 43
Europeans in port cities 193
and hippie movement 198
and Japan 16, 33
labourers in Japanese mines 333
laogai camp system 401–402
lineage feuds 53
lineage organisations 42
martial arts 53, 222
kung fu 222
millenarianism 43
Muslim rebellions 51–52
nationalism 16
natural disasters 53, 54
Nian armed bands 49–50
North China Famine (1876–79) 49
Opium Wars 31
population
depopulation (Taiping rebellion) 49
gender imbalance 44
growth 44
and religion
Christianity in 52–53
eschatology of Eternal Venerable
Mother 43, 59
martial arts networks 53
religious militarisation 43
religious violence 41–66
secret societies 42
sworn brotherhoods 42, 50
Taiping Rebellion 41, 45–49
White Lotus Rebellions (1796–1804) 43
see also China, People’s Republic of; China,
Republic of; Nanjing; Qing dynasty
China, People’s Republic of (from 1949) 41,
408–424
agricultural collectivisation 417
Anti-Hiding Campaign (grain and
food) 419
fall in grain production 419
banditry 412, 414
criminality 423
Cultural Revolution (1966–69) 62
ethnic autonomous regions 62, 65
Falungong movement, campaign against
63–65
Great Leap Famine 417–424
Great Leap Forward 12, 417
hatred in 410
illegal logging 412
and Korean War 457
Lolo tribes in Xikang province 413
Index

China, People’s Republic (cont.)
Mao Zedong personality cult 62
Monument to the National People’s Heroes, Beijing 16
Nanjing Massacre Museum 16
Nationalist army resistance 408
Peasant Association (village militia) 410
People’s Commune 417, 418–419
Public Security Police 410
Rectification Campaign 420
rehabilitation of Japanese prisoners 336
and religion
expulsion of Catholic missionaries 60
and New Religious Movements 64
religious rehabilitation 63
suppression of religious groups 59–62
removal of moral constraints 410, 424
resurgence of ethnic violence 65, 412–415
sectarian violence 423
and standardisation of martial arts 222
and Tibetan revolt (1959) 61–62
train robberies 423
see also Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

China, Republic of (1912–49) 41, 58
armed groups 58
Communist insurgency 59
and Paris Peace Conference (1919) 300
see also Taiwan

Chinese, in America
Chinese American Citizens Alliance 100
racial violence against 89, 92, 95
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries 409, 415
and cases of suicide 416
‘grain procumbent policy’ 415–416, 417
killing quotas 409
Land Reform (1950–53) 409, 410, 415
public meetings to promote terror 420
‘struggle meetings’ 418
‘thought reform’ 416
and uncontrolled violence 411, 418–419
use of total terror 408, 417
use of violence by local officials 411, 415, 418
view of religion 59
Christian missionaries
in Africa 250
and colonial violence 9
India 116
see also Catholic missionaries; Protestant missionaries

Christianity
in China 52–53
conversion to 22
eschatology of 269
and Sunni eschatology 283
see also Catholic Church; Orthodox Church
Christians, Sunni Ottoman violence against 274, 276, 280
Churchill, Winston 78, 319
CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency), Operation Condor (in South America) 14, 18
Cimino, Michael 570
cinema 15, 580–596
behavioural act of violence 586
British wartime 318
changing norms of violence 588–593
computer-generated imagery (CGI) 590
definition of extreme violence in film 583–586
depiction of gun violence 588–590
depictions of sexuality 582
early films 580–583
and evidence of Nazi atrocities 315
films of executions 582
graphicness and duration of violence 586–588
physiological reactions to 580, 593–595
portrayal of murderers 569
ratings and censorship 590–593
recreations of violent events 581
regulation 582
and special effects 583
stories of violent crime 562
technological advances 585
The Battle of the Somme documentary 297

Circassian peoples, deported from Russian
Caucasus 375
cities
bombing of 286
criminal control of (Latin America) 506
Civil Disobedience Movement, India 78
civil rights movement, United States 104–107
and black power violence 105–106
early campaign 99
Freedom Rides 104
and Nazi propaganda 102
tactics and targets 104
Truman’s Presidential Committee on 103
violence against 105
civil wars
Algeria 134
Colombia 495, 503
Index

Iraq 138, 139
Japan 327
Latin America 494
Lebanon 130, 132, 281
Mexico 498, 499
Nigeria 11
Samoa 35
Spain 621
Syria 138, 139, 263, 281, 282, 605

Civilians
and Armenian genocide 290
and Chinese Muslim rebellions 52
deaths in battle of Okinawa 331
First World War 286, 288, 289
Islamist legitimisation of violence against 136
Islamist throat-cutting of 269
Korean War 457
mass killings as strategic objective 305
propaganda and images of war 297, 311
treatment in war 3, 295, 390
see also internment camps; massacres

Civilisation
imperial role in 227, 239, 471
to justify violence 9, 10
Cixi, Empress of China 55
Clark, Laurie Beth 624

Class
Cambodia 526–527
and sport 207, 213–214
and wife beating 575
see also elites; middle classes; working classes

Classification and Ratings Administration (USA films) 591
Claudy, Carl H. 582
Clegg, Stewart 511

Cockfighting 208
in Asia 216–217
bans on 216
hidden 211, 212
prohibition (1849) 211

Cohen, Stanley, *States of Denial* 610
Cold War (1945–89) 14, 449–465
and American racial violence 103
American understanding of 451–452
Cambodia and 512–513
as contest of power 449
and decolonisation 450, 458–462
global politics of 460
historiography 452
as imaginary war 449
Japan and 461

Latin America 501–503
and Middle East 128, 129
plurality of 461–462, 463
political violence 459
proxy wars 14
regional (peripheral) violence 450, 461, 464
Second (Africa) 462
Cole, Tim 625

Collective violence
China
people-beating squads 421
uncontrolled 411
within villages 410
domestic jihad
justification of 265
Levant 265–266, 283
see also jihad; Ottoman Empire
France 347–364
appropriation of state power of punishment 356
cultural anthropology of 351–355
decapitations and parade of heads 347, 352, 359
and deliberate cruelty 351
emotional agenda 357–358
and humiliation 358
improvised courts 356
and mutilations 359–362
reactive and proactive 349
and social tensions 351
and targeted victims 352, 354, 358
Latin America 490, 497
and power 490–491
see also mass violence; mob violence
Colombia 496
civil wars 495
‘La Violencia’ 503
homicide rates 203
and Panama 501
War of the ‘Thousand Days’ 499

Colonialism 470
‘civilising mission’ of 227, 239, 471
and economic development 475
French theory of 486
and independence movements 2, 10
and interpersonal violence 193
memorials to violence of 626–627
and propaganda 5
and psychology of colonised 80
settler 228
and violence against colonised peoples 9
see also imperialism; indigenous people

645
colonies
concentration camps in 388, 398
see also Africa; British Empire; French Empire; India
concentration camps in 388, 398
of colonial violence 626–627
of conflict 15
First World War memorials 291, 618
of holocaust 18, 616
as implicit violence 73–75
and inclusion of enemies 16
media and 616
memorial to victims of lynching 88
modern forms of 635
with photographs 622–623
pilgrimages 623–626, 635
for unrecoverable bodies 291
of victims of state-building 17
war memorials 17, 292
see also memorials
commerce
Dutch 24
effect on Pacific islands 28
communalism, and Indian nationalism 80–82
communication
cell phones 201, 598
digital 1, 4, 598, 612
and promotion of violence 6
social media 5
and state control 2
see also information; internet; media;
newspapers; records
Communist parties
Middle East 130
see also Chinese Communist Party; Khmer Rouge
Communist Party of Indonesia see PKI
concentration camps 386–405
colonies 388, 398
definitions 387
economic function 389, 396, 402
guerrilla warfare and 389, 399
Hannah Arendt on 386, 393, 394
imagery of 387
as ‘laboratories of human behaviour’ 393
as ‘model form of government’ 402
nation-states and 393
Nazi 394–395, 404
pilgrimages to 623–626
and politics of occupation 403
Soviet Gulag 395–397
terminology 397
transnational nature of 386, 389, 397
and unwanted elements 404
use by totalitarian regimes 397
see also Auschwitz; Holocaust; internment camps; POW camps; refugee camps
Confucianism, moral framework removed by CCP 410, 424
Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC)
female violence 156
forgotten war in 605
sexual violence 160
Congo Free State 9
Congress Party, India 119
Connor, Eugene ‘Bull’, police chief 104
Conquest of Violence (Critchley, 1972) 561
Conrad, Joseph, Heart of Darkness 250, 252
consent
age of 149, 169–170
proof of 152
and sexual violence 149, 154, 156
constitutionalism, Western support for in Levant 270
contentious politics, and mass violence 431–432, 445
Contet, Pierre
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population (1923) 298
Cook, Captain James 26, 27
murder of 27
Corbin, Alain 355, 360
Corbucci, Sergio, Django 592
Corday, Charlotte 534
Corder, William 569
Corman, Roger, The St Valentine’s Day Massacre 589, 590
Corntassel, Jeff 633
Cornwall, Frank, Sāmoa 35
Corsica, homicide rates 188
Cortés, Hernán 22
Costa Rica 495, 496
coups d’état
Iraq 128, 129
Middle East 129, 137
Cowan, James 243
CPK (Communist Party of Kampuchea) see Khmer Rouge
crime passionnel 193
punishment of 193
Crimean War, charge of the Light Brigade 599
criminal behaviour, social causes of violence 8
criminal gangs 198, 202, 566–568
international 199, 203
Latin America 505
Index

names of 567
and youth cult 568
criminal violence 561–578
definitions 564
and homicide 563, 568
relics of 569
statistics on 564, 578
street robbery 562
vicarious thrill of 561–564
see also homicide

Criminals
aliens and immigrants as 573–574
appearance (physiognomy) 571
as monsters 572
romanticised 565–566
self-publicity and memoirs 569–570
solders as 574–575
theories about 570–573
Croatia, and Serbian Chetniks 381
Cromer, Lord 248
Cuba 493, 504
Ladies in White 13
liberal-democratic revolution (1959) 502
US intervention (1898) 501
culture see cinema; media; paintings; popular culture; popular literature
Cummins, Gordon 569
Cummins, Paul 618
CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) (Young Turks) 270, 273, 277
and atrocities in Thrace 380
putsch (1913) 278
and relocation of non-Turkish national groups 375
and Turkish nationalism 375, 378
Custer, George Armstrong 92
Czolgosz, Leon 544

Dalai Lama, exiled 61–62
Daniels, Roger 400, 401
Darfur, mass rape 152, 160
Das, Veena 316
Davis, Natalie Zemon 353
De Witt, Lt. Col. John L. 400
death penalty
move towards abolition of 4
see also executions and death penalties
death squads, state 13
death tolls
Armenian genocide 290
Cambodia 511
China 336
Anti-Hiding Campaign 421
campaign against counter-revolutionaries 409
famine 422
Cold War 459
Latin America 503
Cuban revolution 502
First World War
French 287, 289
German army 287
Japanese servicemen (Asia–Pacific war) 329–331
Mexican civil wars 499
Ottoman public violence (1914–23) 281
Partition (1947) 85, 112
Reign of Terror (French Revolution) 534
Russian terrorist attacks (1905–10) 542
Second World War 305
Taipeing Rebellion 47
Triple Alliance war (1864–70) 496
Vietnam War 514
white supremacist victims 546
‘death tourism’ 624
Debord, Guy, The Society of Spectacle 604
decapitation see beheadings
decolonisation
Arendt’s view 248
and Cold War 450, 458–462
defeat, culture of, after First World War 299
Delaware, USA, age of consent 172
Delhi Durbar (1911) 74
democracy
Indonesia 428, 445
Latin America 492, 503–507
middle classes and 539
in Middle East 128, 133, 137
and terrorism 534–537
and violence (France) 362–364
Democrat Party, US
and Jim Crow era 94
and white supremacist violence 91
Denis, Claire, Trouble Every Day 583
Denmark, extreme cinema 584
Dersim, massacre of Kurdish Alevi (1937) 272, 279
desecration, crimes of 288, 314
Despentes, Virginie and Coralie Trinh Thi, Baise-moi 583
destruction
of buildings and monuments, First World War 288
Chinese villages 336
Detroit, race riot (1943) 103
Dhofar, guerrilla war in 127
diasporas
support for religious nationalist movements 122–123
and terrorism 122
Dickens, Charles, Oliver Twist 573
Die Freiheit (Freedom) anarchist newspaper 540
Dieulefils, Pierre 472
digital technology 1
and dissemination of news 598, 612
and instant communication 4
Dikötter, Frank 409
Dinant, Tschoffen Wall Massacre 288
diplomacy
and Eastern Question 267
as realpolitik 271
Turkey and Lausanne Treaty (1923) 271
'third parties', of opposition citizens 13, 504
disease
sexually transmitted 28
smallpox 28
transmission to Pacific islanders 28
Django (1966 film) 592
DNA testing 617, 619
documentation
of genocides 3
and state control 2
Dodson, Mick 628
dog-fighting 208
ban on 211
hidden 212
domestic jihad see collective violence;
Ottoman Empire
domestic violence
and child sexual abuse 175–176, 185
criminalisation 7
punishment 575
Dominican Republic 501
Dompierre-sur-Mer, France 360
Donald, Michael, lynching of (1981) 106
Dovzhenko, Aleksandr, 'Battle for Our Soviet Ukraine' 316, 320
Drevet, Camille 474
Drieu de la Rochelle, Pierre 291
drones (armed robots) 2
drowning, death by, Japanese servicemen 330
drug addiction
and homicide 202
and organised crime 203
drug trade
international 203
Latin America 505
drugs, Japanese use in China 337
Du Bois, W. E. B. 93
Dubrulle, Paul 292
duelling 189–190
pistols 190
rapiers 190
Dumas, Alexandre (fils), Les femmes qui tuent... 572
Dumézil, George 293
Dumont, Bruno, Twentynine Palms 583
Dungan rebellion, northwest China 51
Dunning, William Archibald 90
Durham, colliery strike (1891) 576
Durtain, Luc 474
Dutch East India Company, and Jakarta 24
duty of care, principle of 7
Dworkin, Andrea 148
Dyer, General Reginald 76, 77, 300
Dyer, Leonidas, anti-lynching legislation 99
Earner-Byrne, Lindsey 631
East India Company 70, 572
East Indies, Dutch rule 24
East St Louis, massacre (1917) 98
Easter Island see Rapa Nui
Eastern Front, First World War 287
Eastern Question 264, 273
ethno-religious social unrest 267
economy
'Cuban model' of development 502
development debt 518
export-driven growth (Latin America) 497
illegal (Latin America) 505
import-substitution
Cambodia 522–523
Latin America 501, 503
see also commerce
Ecuador 496
Edelstein, David 584
Edison Company, films 581
Edwards, Jason 630
Eguchi Keiichi 338
Egypt 127, 130
2011 uprising 137
Gama'a Islamiya 134
homicide rates 197
Muslim brotherhood 128, 130, 137
recognition of Israel 131
Sinai Peninsula 137
Ehrenburg, Ilya, Soviet writer 304, 321–323
German interest in 321, 323
on Nazi atrocities 304, 311
radio appeal (1941) 316
Red Army evidence of atrocities 313, 323

648
Index

El Salvador
independence 496
rural rebellion (1932) 498
US intervention 503
elites
co-option of Indian 74
rejection of violence 190
Emergency Detention Act (1950, USA) 400
enemies
commemoration of 16
‘enemy aliens’ in wartime 387, 390
representations (demonisation) of 294–295
within the state 2, 3, 11, 13, 498, 503
Engle, Karen 163
English Civil War 534
Enlightenment
and idea of nation-state 115
and rhetoric of imperialism 37–38
Entman, Robert 611
Enver Pasha, Ismail 378
Epirus, Albanian-speaking Chams 383
Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), Lynching in America (2015 report) 88
Equatorial Africa, French treatment of servants 474
Erbeling, Marthe, murder of 563
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 263, 280
eschatology
China 43, 59
of IS/ISIS (Islamic State) 269, 283
modern Wahhabism 272
projections in Ottoman Empire 266
and violence 269–272
Essebsi, Beji Caid 137
ethnic cleansing
Bhutan 121
Gujarat 120
Macedonia and Thrace 377–384
of native populations 388
rape and 162
Soviet Union 375
in suppression of Chinese Muslim rebellions 52
see also genocide
ethnic nationalism 11
and political use of rape 153
ethnic violence
China 65, 412–415
Europe 191
Poland 298
see also racial violence
Europe
‘brutalisation’ of 254
criminal violence 561–578
hunting 216
interpersonal violence 190–192
Islamist attacks in 136
left-wing movements 131
modernisation 273
and rule of law 273
see also Eastern Question; European periphery; France; Germany; Italy;
Netherlands; Spain; United Kingdom
European periphery (rimlands)
delineation 372
diversity of 373
as fault lines 372
genocides 367–384
Western forms of nationalism 373
see also Balkans; Bulgaria; Greece;
Macedonia; Ukraine
European Union, and Turkey 280
Evangelicals, British, and inquiry into atrocities in Pacific 31
Evans, Raymond 243
An Execution by Hanging (1898 film) 582
executions and death penalties
filmed 582
mass public (Indonesia) 443
public 581
strangulation, China 41
see also beheadings; punishments
Falola, Toyin 251
Falungong (Dharma Wheel Practice), campaign against 63–65
families see children; domestic violence; women
famines
Bengal 84
and blockades 286
China 49, 417–424
India 73
Fanon, Frantz 80, 469, 550
Fantasia International Film Festival 594
Farge, Arlette 351
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) (US), Counter Intelligence Program 106
fear
American fear of terrorism 542, 545
culture of 295
of ‘fifth columnists’ 391
and myth of ogre 295
see also moral panic
Fefer, Itzik 317
female genital mutilation (FGM) 184
Index

feminism and focus on child sexual violence 180, 631 and view of rape 148
Fenton, Roger, *The Valley of the Shadow of Death* (1855) 599
Ferdinand VII, King of Spain 493
Ferrero, Lorenzo 570
Ferri, Enrico 563
feuding and homicide rates 188
‘fifth columnists’, fear of 391
fighting bare-knuckle 209, 219 with fists 191 with knives 191, 192, 197, 565 lethal outcomes 197 sports 218 working-classes 191 see also sports film see cinema Fincher, David
*Seven* 584
Zodiac 590
Finkelhor, David, *Sexually Victimized Children* 180
Finlason, W. R. 237
Finnane, Mark 630
First World War 286–301
Index

remobilisation (1917) 296
rural strikes 350
Second Empire 355
Second Republic 348, 349
September Massacres (1792) 352, 356, 361, 362
sub-state conspiratorial groups 335
and Taiping rebellion 47
Third Republic and democracy 347
tradition of animal sports 215
urban growth 349
view of Germany as enemy 294
War of the demoiselles (1829–32) 353
see also French Empire; French Revolution
La France Australe, article on Kanaks 478
Franco-Prussian War (1870) 355
Frederick, John 177
French army
and collective violence 357
First World War casualties 287, 289
French cinema, trend to extreme violence 583
French Empire 468–488
in Africa 2, 474
central government investigations into abuses 486–488
colonial administration 254, 480, 484
colonial judicial system 480–486
international criticism of brutality 483
need for labour 472, 475–480
postcards of killed rebels 471
reports of abuses 471
and state use of violence 470
treatment of indigenous people 469, 472, 473, 478–480
vigilantism 481
violence by settlers 470
see also Cambodia; Indochina; New Caledonia
French, Philip 583
French Revolution 348
collective violence 347
Reign of Terror 534
and use of terror 534
Frick, Henry Clay 544
Friedländer, Saul 394, 623
Friedman, David, Blood Feast 594
Fromelles Military Cemetery 620
frontiers
British Empire 227–244
lawlessness 273
Middle East 132
see also European periphery
Frontiers, Battle of the (1914) 287

Fujiwara Akira 329
Furet, François 286

Gabon
Awalo murder case 481–482
protests at French mistreatment 474
torture and murder of Massima 483–484
Gaddis, John Lewis 459
Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, Buddhist monk 121
Galleani, Luigi, anarchist 545
Gallipoli campaign 289, 292
exhumation of mass graves 620
Gallup Poll, US (1955) 451–452
Galtung, Johan 610
Galtung, Johan and Mari Holmboe Ruge, 'The Structure of Foreign News’ 606
gambling, and sports 208, 214
Gandhi, Mohandas (Mahatma)
and Civil Disobedience Movement 78
and Congress 80
and Hindu nationalism 118
and Muslims 80
and negotiations with Britain 78, 79
Non-Cooperation Movement 76, 77
Gardner, Alexander, Photographic Sketch Book of the War (1865–66) 600
Garibian, Sevane, in Human Remains and Violence 618
‘garotters’, London (1862) 562
Garrioch, David 362
Gaspar Noé, I Stand Alone 583
al-Gaylani, coup d’état Iraq 128
Geifman, Anna 542
Gémenos, France, murders 359
gender, and rape 149, 156–157
A Generation (Pokolenie) (1955 film) 590
Geneva Conventions, failures of 3
genocides 162, 257
documentation of 3
European periphery (rimlands) 367–384
First World War 290
geographic range 371
and ‘indigenous question’ 249
origins of 369
rape as strategy 160, 161
as systemic 371
theories of 254
‘third world’ post-colonial 371
UN Convention on 290, 622
Yezidis 276
see also Armenian genocide; Bulgaria;
Cambodia; ethnic cleansing; Herero people; Holocaust; Rwanda
Index

genre, and film violence 589
gender, role of 367–368
Georgia, US, segregation laws 94
Gerlach, Christian 430
germ warfare, Japanese use of 337
German army
demonisation of 295
Einsatzgruppen commandos 307, 309
First World War atrocities 288, 291, 295, 311
indoctrination 310
invasion of Belgium 288, 295
and Nazi ideology 308, 309
German East Africa 249
German Southwest Africa
concentration camps 389
see also Namibia
Germany
duelling 189
fairy tales 581
First World War
casualties 287
effects of 298
fear of Russians 294
French view of as enemy 294
humiliation of defeat 299
internment of enemy civilians 390
rumours of enemy aliens 295
Spartacist uprising (1919) 298
and Turkey 271
Weimar Republic 299
handguns 192
homicide rates 563
military culture 257
Red Army Faction 551
Ringvereine criminal gangs 566, 569
and Sámoa 35
serial killers 198
see also Berlin
Germany, Third Reich
campaign against Judeo-Bolshevism 306, 307–310, 318
efficiency of operation 2
Freikorps 298, 300
Fremde Heere Ost office (FHO) 321–322
General Plan Ost 376
Ministry of Propaganda 5
Nazi policies 255
occupation policy 307
and Second World War 304–323
and Soviet evidence of atrocities 321–322
transgression of moral norms 305
Volksgemeinschaft camps 394
see also Holocaust
Gewald, Jan-Bart 250
Ghana
leopard attack murders 199
marital rape 158
Gibbs, Nancy 603
Gibney, Mark 630
Gide, André 471
Gilligan, James 415
Girard, René 296
Giuliano, Salvatore 570
globalisation
Cold War politics 460
of ideology 14
and imperialism 1
of interpersonal violence of 199–204
Goebbels, Joseph 308, 318
Gökalp, Ziya, pan-Turkism 267, 277, 279
Gordon, Linda 176
Göring, Hermann, ‘Green Folder’ policy
directive 310
Gormley, Paul 584, 593
Government of India Act (1935) 82
Goya, Francisco, The Disasters of War 600
gradualism 539
Graham, Hugh Davis 106
Grain, Nicolas-Joseph 357
Grant, Ulysses S., US President 547
Greco-Turkish War (1919–22) 298
Greece 374
Allied support for ultra-nationalists 383
ELAS liberation movement 383
homicide rates 188
population exchange with Turkey 298, 376, 380
population in Thrace 380
ritual knife fights 565
and Salonika Jews 382
Second World War 383
and Slavophone communities in
Macedonia 383–384
war with Bulgarians in Thrace 379–381
Greek Patriarchists 377
Greene, Graham, Brighton Rock 567
Greensboro, N. Carolina, Ku Klux Klan gun
attack (1979) 106
grenades 293
Griffin, Susan, ‘Rape, the All-American
Crime’ 148
Griffith, D. W., Birth of A Nation 100
Gromaire, Marcel 291
Guam 23, 34
Guantánamo Bay internment camp 388, 401
Guatemala 155, 160
Index

and Mexico 496
US interventions 502, 503
guerrilla warfare
concentration camps and 389, 399
indigenous people 236
by Kurds in Turkey 281
Gultung, Johan, Peace Research Institute Oslo 327
gun violence
film depictions of 588–590
mass shootings 106, 553
guns
accidents with 192
in American schools 2
for interpersonal violence 192
machine
regulation of ownership 192
Gurr, Ted Robert 106
Guru Ka Bagh, Amritsar, Sikh protest at (1922) 79

Haarmann, Fritz, serial killer 198
Haber, Fritz 291
Hague Convention, failures of 3
Haiti 283, 501
Haitian Women’s Solidarity Group 165
political use of rape 153
Hajime, Kondo 158
Hale, Sir Matthew 157
Haley, Sarah 91
Hall, Bruce 350
Hall, Catherine 626
Halliday, Fred 459
Halloween (1978/2007 film) 584
Hama, Syria, Islamist uprising (1982) 131
Hamas organisation 126, 136
Hamburg, S. Carolina, massacre of black militiamen 92
Hamidism (Turkish Muslim nationalism) 268, 277
hanings, public, by Nazis 313, 314
Hara Yoshimichi 334
Hardy, Georges 486
Harriman, W. Averell 320
Hauffeaye, France, torture and murder of nobleman 355, 357, 361, 363
Hawai’i
annexation by USA 34
Cook at 27
Great Mahele (1848) 33
imported labour 33
Kamehameha ruling family 28, 30
monarchy 34
New England missionaries 30, 33
sugar plantations 33–34
Hayashi Hirofumi 331
Hayes, Bully, labour recruitment in Pacific 35
Hazareesingh, Sudhir 348
Heffner, Richard 591
Hegel, G. W. F. 458
Heizen, Karl, and theory of terrorism 536
Hentig, Hans von 155
Herero people, German genocide (1904–08) 255, 257
Hezbollah, Shia movement 132
and Syrian civil war 138, 139
Hideo Nakata, Ringu 584
Hierl, Konstantin 395
highwaymen 574
Hill, Billy, Boss of Britain’s Underworld 570
Himmler, Heinrich, SS 307, 308, 309, 397
Hindu nationalism, India 110, 118–120
and Gujarat massacre (2002) 120
Hinduism
and diversity 114
and Indian national culture 114
hippie movement, and interpersonal violence 198, 201
Hirsch, Marianne 626
Hitchcock, Alfred, Psycho 594
Hitler, Adolf 114, 255
and extermination of Jews 376
war against Judeo-Bolshevism 308
see also Holocaust
Ho Chi Minh trail 514
Hobsbawm, Eric 348
Hobson, J. A., Imperialism: A Study (1902) 259
Hofstadter, Richard 89
Holden, Robert 445
Holder, Cindy 633
Hollywood
Production Code 582, 590, 591
see also cinema
Hollywood’s Movie Commandments 582
Holocaust 370, 376, 382
links with conquest of Algeria 254
Nazi concentration camps 394–395, 404
and non-Jewish victims 306
pilgrimages to sites of 623–626
remembrance of 18, 616
return of ashes 623
see also Auschwitz
Holodomor (Ukraine) 370
Homestead strike, USA (1892) 543
homicide 187–204
crime passionnel 193
homicide (cont.)
criminal gangs 198
and drug addiction 202
in intimate relationships 197
Latin America 506
legal definitions 568
lives saved by medical intervention 201, 203
by poisoning 197
serial killers 197–198
of strangers 202
women as victims 202
and youth gangs 202
see also interpersonal violence
homicide rates
calculation 188
collection of statistics on 189
and lifestyle 201
methodologies 200–201
non-European 196–197, 203–204
trends in Europe 187, 196, 563
inner and outer European zones 188
homosexuality
age of consent 169
classified as disorder 151
as criminal offence 151
linked with paedophilia 179
and rape 151
Honduras 496
homicide 506
Hong Xiuquan, Taiping Rebellion 45–47
Hongi Hika, Māori leader 29
honour
in colonial interpersonal violence 195
concept of women’s 155
and duelling 190
and masculinity 361
honour killings 7
Horeck, Tanya, and Tina Kendall, The New Extremism in Cinema 594
Hornung, E.J., Raffles 570
horror films, graphic depictions 584
Hostel films, Eli Roth 584, 587–588
Howard, John, Australian Prime Minister 633
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda 630
Huard, Raymond 359
Hufton, Olwen 362
Hughes, Charles Evans, and National Conference on Lynching (1919) 99
Hughes, John, on mass violence 429
Hui, Chinese Muslims 51, 52
Hull, Isabel 257, 258
human rights 260, 429
development of discourse 4, 6
national laws on 4
Human Rights Watch, and Gujarat massacre (2002) 119
human trafficking
of children 183
in Japan 338
humiliation see public humiliation
Hungary 367
Red Army mass rapes 152, 154
Hunter, Stephen 596
hunting 208
criticism of 210
with dogs 208, 215–216
tigers, India 75
Huntington, Samuel 429
I Stand Alone (1998 film) 583
ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) 163
ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 162, 163
identity
lack of, in European periphery 373
national cultural, India 114
ideology
globalisation of 14
and Indian nationalism 78
Latin America 492
secular 266
see also political ideologies
Ieng Sary, Khmer Rouge 517
and Non-Aligned Movement 519–521
Ilbert Bill (amendment to Indian Criminal Procedure Code) 75
immigrants, as criminals 573–574
immigration, United States 100, 106, 545
imperialism
Arendt’s view of 253, 258
and capitalism 259
and globalisation 1
rhetoric of enlightenment 37–38
see also colonialism
implicit violence 86, 490
in memorials 73–75
In My Skin (2002 film) 583
Inarritu, Alejandro G., The Revenant 595
incest, laws against 175
indentured labour
‘blackbirding’ (kidnapping) 35
Northern Queensland 34
independence movements
Balkans 267
Index
colonial 2, 10
Ireland 12, 551
and terrorism 550
see also national liberation movements
India 68–86
Amritsar massacre (1919) 76–77
Calcutta riots (1945–46) 83
child marriage 174–175
Christian missionaries 116
cockfighting 217
colonial use of excessive force 69, 76–77
coloniser-on-native violence 195
communalist violence 80–82, 84
Criminal Tribes Act (1871) 72
Deccan riots (1890s) 71
durbars 74
economy 73
famines 73
Government of India Act (1935) 82
Hindu nationalism 110, 118–120
homicide rates 197
and Ilbert Bill (1883) 75
independence 10, 85
inter-war anti-colonial violence 77
interpersonal violence 195–196
legitimacy of colonial state violence 69–72, 79
Moplah Rebellion (1920s) 71
native-on-native killing 195
paramilitary groups 81, 85
Partition (1947) 11, 84–85, 112, 160
penal code 195
Pink Sari Gang vigilante group 164
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (1960) 217
rebellions (as illegitimate violence) 69–72, 82
Rowlatt Act (1919) and imposition of martial law 76, 77
rule of law 68, 69, 75
Salt March 79
Santal Rebellion (1850s) 71
secular colonial rule 110, 116
Sikh separatism 110–112
statues to British ‘heroes’ 74
tiger-hunting 75
traditional view of religion 113, 116
use of martial law 237
see also BJP; India, independent; Indian National Congress
India, independent
Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) 86
and Hyderabad 85
and Kashmir 85
and legitimate monopoly of violence 68, 85–86
mechanisms of violence 69
treatment of regional insurgencies 85–86
Indian Army (British) 70, 71
deployment 71
and Peshawar protesters 82
Indian National Army (INA) 83
Indian National Congress
formation (1885) 75
government ministries 82
and Quit India Movement 82
religious divisions in 80
and Second World War 82
Indian nationalism 68
and ideology 78
and political violence 78
see also Hindu nationalism; Sikh nationalism
Indian Penal Code, amendment (1891) 174
Indian Penal Code (1860) 70
Indian police, state violence in
Indian Army (British) 191
and interpersonal violence, Africa 199
and disease 28
fighting sports 218
first encounters 21, 23, 24, 235
French colonial treatment of 469, 472, 474–475
guerrilla warfare 236
imposition of British jurisdiction 228
and interpersonal violence, Africa 199
Latin America 497
‘logic of elimination’ of 228, 479
and memorials 17
Natal landholding (‘Shepstone system’) 231
racialised violence against 89, 92
resistance by 230, 235–237, 241, 243, 486
revenge violence by 30, 37
seizure of land from 33, 235
stereotypes of ‘savagery’ 26
treaties and warfare with 229–235
violent control of 31
see also Māori
Index

individual(s)
and empathy with victims 15
rising power of 6–8
risk of violence to 18
stories of experience of violence 15

Indochina 32
campaign against De Tham (1908) 472
colonial Vietnamese murder cases
482–483, 484
First Indochina War (against France) 455, 459, 513
French colonial treatment of Vietnamese
454, 473
treatment of domestic servants 473–474
see also Cambodia; Vietnam

Indonesia 268, 427–446
aksi occupation of land by farmer groups
437–439
anti-communist violence 427–446
context 432–436
denial of killings 429
interpretations of 429–432
mass executions 443–444
middle classes and 444
military coordination of 428, 441–443
popular support for 427, 428
torture 444
anti-democratic actions of Sukarno 436
arc of political contention 436–445
authoritarianism 444
ban on Masyumi Islamic party 436
democratic transition 428, 445
economy 432–433, 444
institutions 434
Irjan Jaya campaign 435
Kostrad (mobile military force) 435
and land reform 437
Madiun rebellion, East Java (1948) 434
and Malaysia 436, 441
and patron–client relations 432
PKI call for elections 437
politiced bureaucracy 432, 434
populist politics 433
power of military 434–436
social mobilisation 434
socialism 432, 434
and United Liberation Movement for West Papua 11
see also PKI; Sukarno
Indonesian Farmers Union (BTI) 433, 437, 438
Industrial Revolution 1
and machine-breaking 349
and state power 536

industrial warfare
First World War and 287, 291
removal of interpersonal violence 293
information
power/knowledge nexus, India 72–73
rapid transmission of 5
see also communication; records
institutions, state
and individuals 6
Indonesia 434
Latin America 492, 497–501, 504
secular nature of 115
International Labor Defence (ILD), Lynching
*Negro Children in Southern Courts* 101
International Labour Organization (ILO), and
French empire 483
international law
global frameworks on conflicts 3
and prosecution of war crimes 3
and rape 160, 161
rape as breach of humanitarian law 162
rape as crime against humanity 163
International Military Tribunal, for Far East
(1946) 3, 160, 335
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg
trials (1945) 3, 160, 306
internet
film streaming 584
and interpersonal violence 202
news images 609
internment camps 393
for ‘enemy aliens’ 387, 390
First World War 294, 390
United States 399–401
see also concentration camps
interpersonal violence 578
duelling 180–190
in Europe 190–192
globalisation of 199–204
in India 75, 195–196
and industrial warfare 293
and internet 202
legal constraints on 4, 7, 563
and macho culture 202
in war 159
see also fighting; homicide; sport
Intifada see Palestine
Iqbal, Muhammad 113
Iran
1979 revolution 127, 131
and Syrian civil war 138
violence in 127
Iran–Iraq war (1980–88) 132, 281
Index

Iraq 138
  Anfal campaign in Kurdistan 139, 281
  Barzani rebellion (1961) 126
  civil war 138, 139
  coups d’État 128, 129
  hostage beheadings 598
  IS in 13

Ireland
  Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2000) 177, 632
  historical child abuse 631
  homicide rates 188
  Republican independence movement 12, 551
  war of independence (1919–21) 298

Irgun, Zionist terrorist group 549
Irian Jaya, Indonesian campaign 435, 437
Irish Republican Army, Provisional 551
Irreversible (2002 film) 595
IS/ISIS (Islamic State)
  emergence of 13, 138, 272
  eschatology of 269, 283
  genocide of Yezidis 276
  religious violence (jihad) 263
  use of media 553
Islam
  in China 52
  Deoband reform movement 117
  eschatological traditions 266, 269–272, 283
  forced conversions to 269, 276
  and justification of mass violence 267
  and martyrdom 271, 553
  in Pakistan 117
  political doctrine 125
  radicalisation of 142, 283
  socio-religious hierarchies 266
  Sunni–Shiite divide 263, 282
  see also Islamism
Islamic terrorism 13–14, 552–553
  influence of 553
  see also jihad, jihadis
Islamism
  as alternative to left-wing discourse 131
  appeal of 134
  hegemonic development in Levant 280
  religious orthodoxy and social conservatism 135
  rise of radical 131, 135, 552–553
  see also jihad, jihadis
Israel
  creation of state of (1948) 114, 126, 128, 270
  Egyptian recognition of 131
  religious shift (after 1967) 280
  wars 281
  Yom Kippur war (1973) 132
  Zionism 266

Italy
  duelling 189
  Fascist concentration camps 398
  homicide rates 188, 196, 563
  internment camps 390
  invasion of Libya (1911) 278
  Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana 16
  police use of violence 576
  Red Brigades 551
Iyengar, Shanto 611
Izvekov, V., Red Army soldier 313

Jack the Ripper 573
  persistence of genre 569
Jacoby, Karl 107
Jakarta 24
Jalal, Ayesha 113
Jallianwalla Bagh (Amritsar) massacre (1919) 76–77
Jamaat-e Islami, Pakistani Muslim party 113
Jamaica, use of martial law 237
James, Selwyn, South of the Congo (1943) 252
Janes, Regina 356, 359
Janowitz, Morris 166
Japan 326–342
  Allied occupation 341–342
  child labour 332
  and China 16
  civil war (1868–9) 327
  and Cold War 461
  Constitution (1947) 340
  Dutch commercial access to 24
  and German Micronesia 37
  homicide rates 189
  imperial ambitions 32
  legal incapacity of women 338
  martial arts 220–222
    ju-jitsu (Kodokan Judo) 222
    kendo 222
    naginata (for girls) 222
    sumo-wrestling 220–221
    sword-fighting 221
    wrestling 220
  Meiji period 326, 328, 338
  patriotism 332
  penal reforms 326
  post-war pacifism 342
  rise of nationalism 221
  Satsuma Rebellion (1877) 327

657
Japan (cont.)

Second World War
atomic bombing of 598
and Burma-Thailand railway 334
ethnic minorities as guards for prisoners of war 334
Information and Propaganda
Department 5
and Pacific War 13, 38
Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) 340–341
violence of imperialism/militarism 327–334
violence of racism 334–338
violence of sexism 338–342
see also Japanese Imperial Army
Shōwa period 327
Taishō period 327
Tokugawa Shogunate 24, 32, 221, 326
use of colonial labour 333
use of violence 33, 326
war with China (1894–1902) 327
war with China (1937–45) 33, 335–337
war with Russia 294
Yasukuni Shrine 16

Japanese American Citizens League (1929) 100
Japanese Americans, internment 103
Japanese Imperial Army
conscription 327–329
death toll (Asia-Pacific war) 329–331
discipline and punishment in 329
ethnic minorities in 328
killing of Chinese 334, 336
military sexual slavery (‘Comfort Women’) 7, 158, 339–341, 633
size 328
suicide attacks 330–331
Three-All campaigns 335–337
use of chemical and biological weapons 337
Japanese Imperial Navy 328
suicide attacks 330–331
Jaspers, Karl 403
Jay, Peter 610
Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC), Moscow 316
Jews
anti-Semitic violence 191
Austria-Hungary 388, 573
Balkans 382
and concept of national culture 114
forced into ghettos 307
perceived as criminals 573
rape of women in extermination camps 151
in Russia 290, 309
see also concentration camps; Holocaust
jihad, jihadis (Islamic militants) 263, 552–553
in Afghanistan 132, 552
against Yezidis 275, 276
coercive nature of power of 140
domestic jihad 265–266, 283
and generational changes 133, 140
internationalism of 552
Lesser Jihad 552
and martyrdom 271, 553
military camps 135
and modern Levant wars 281, 283
and regional conflicts 138
rise of 132, 135
and Sharia law 276
see also Al-Qaida; IS/ISIS (Islamic State); Islamic terrorism
Jim Crow era, United States 94–102
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 110
call for semi-autonomous state 113
and national cultural identity 114
and secularity 115
Joffre, Joseph, Marshal 289
John Paul II, Pope 605
John of Salisbury 534
Jones, Heather 390
Jones, Jonathan 618
Jordan, Black September repression (1970) 126, 130
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Behavior (1940) 155
journalism and journalists 5, 610–612
and interpretation 612
and spectacular violence 602–604
written 599, 609
see also media; photography
judicial systems
and definition of rape 148, 149
failure of (Latin America) 506–507
French colonial 480–486
and legal constraints on interpersonal violence 4, 7, 563
Jutt, Tony 459
Junger, Ernst, ‘Battle as Inner Experience’ (1922) 297
Kaddaфи, Muammar, Libya 130
Kaiser, Hilmar 393
Kalakaua, King of Hawai‘i 34
Index

Kaldor, Mary 165, 449, 463
Kalyvas, Stathis 457
Kano Jiguro 222
Karakozov, Dmitri 537
Karmen, Roman 319
Kashmir 85
Katma (Ghatma) camp, Syria 392
Katyn, murder of Polish officers at 306, 318
Katzenmusik 563
Keane, Fergal
on DRC 605
on Rwanda 611
Keegan, John, The Face of Battle (1976) 286
Kemalism (Turkish nationalism) 264, 267, 278
and lack of social contract 280
and pan-Turkism 279
rejection of political Islam 279, 282
as secular ideology 266
and ‘Turkish History Thesis’ 279
Kempe, Henry 181
Kennedy, John F., film of assassination 598
Kenya, Mau Mau uprising 398
Kerch, German execution of civilians 311
Kerner Commission, report on US urban riots (1968) 106
Khaled, Leyla 133
Khakhov, Dmitri 537
Khoisan peoples, Cape Colony 231
Khomeini, Ayatollah 133
Kick-Ass (2010 film) 590
Kiernan, Ben 119
Kim Ham-Bin, Cambodian victim 510
Kim Jee-woon, A Tale of Two Sisters 584
King, Martin Luther 104
Kipling, Rudyard
‘Gunga Din’ 73
Kim 74
Kiribati Islands 26, 35
Knauth, Percy 404
knife fighting 191, 192, 197
Knights of the White Camelia 546
Kodnani, Maya, and Gujarat massacre (2002) 119
Kolsky, Elisabeth 195
Korea
and ancestral commemoration of war 452
 annexed by Japan (1905) 33, 329
economic development of South Korea 462
sexual slavery in Japan 634
 civilians and 457
family displacement and divisions 458
pre-emptive and retaliatory violence 457
Koreans, in Japanese mines 333
Kosovo 379
Kotov, Ivan Ivanovich 312
Kramer, Paul 94
Krasnodar, trial of Soviet collaborators 312
Kravchinsky, Sergei 537
Kray brothers 567
Kropotkin, Peter, propaganda of the deed 540
Ku Klux Klan 100, 105, 546
1970s attacks 106
as domestic terrorism 545
murder of civil rights volunteers 105
Kurdistan 126
Kurds
and demand for independent
Kurdistan 12
guerrilla wars in Turkey 281, 604
and Turkish War of Independence 278
Kürten, Peter 569
Kutz, Kazimierz 590
La Rochelle, murders 359
labour camps
Chinese People’s Communes 402, 418
Nazi 394
see also concentration camps
Lacenaire, Pierre-François 570
Lacquer, Thomas 617
Ladrones Islanders 23
LaFeber, Walter 450, 459
Lamballe, Princess de, torture and murder 358, 361
Lang, Fritz, ‘M’ (film) 569
Laos
child marriage 183
and Viet Cong trails 514
Las Casas, Bartholomé de 25
The Tears of the Indians 23
Latierge, M., murder of 351
Latin America 490–507
ban on cockfighting 216
banditry 195
changing boundaries 496
chronology 490
Cold War insurgencies 501–503
commissions of inquiry ('truth commissions') 504
criminalisation of state 505
defined 490
democratisation 492, 503–507
development of state institutions 492, 497–501, 504
failure of criminal justice systems 506–507
homicide rates 196, 203
independence era (great rupture) (1808–24) 493
indifference to rule of law 490, 505
international wars 496
mass violence 459
military dictators 497–498, 502
mobilisation for development 492, 501, 504
patrimonialism 490, 495
state formation period 491, 492–497
uprisings and civil wars 494
US support for counterinsurgencies 502–503
see also Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Guatemala; Mexico; Nicaragua; Uruguay
Latreille, Gabriel, and son Gonzague 354, 359, 362
Laubreaux, Alin, article in Le Messager (New Caledonia 1920) 478
Lausanne, Treaty of (1923) 264, 267, 271, 280, 281, 298
and expulsion of Muslims from Thrace 384
and population exchanges 376, 380
Lawrence, John, statue 74
Le Cour Grandmaison, Olivier 254
Coloniser, exterminer 254
reviews of 256
Lé Van Da, murder of 482
League of Nations 37
and French empire 483
and mandate system 37
League of United Latin American Citizens (1929) 100
Lebanon 126, 138
civil war 130, 132, 281
Israeli invasion (1982) 132
Leconte, Léon, beating of Chief Tieou 468–469
Lee, Steven 457
Lee Young-soo 634
Lefebvre, Georges 363
left-wing political movements
crisis of (1980s) 131
in Middle East 126, 128, 129, 130
terrorism 551
LEHI, Zionist terrorist group 549
Leimen, Johannes, Indonesia 437
Lemkin, Raphael 290, 290, 375
Leopold, King of Belgium 9
Lesotho, medicine murders 199
Levant 263–283
defined 263
lack of social contract in 264, 266, 282
modern wars 281
public violence (domestic jihad) 265–266, 281, 283
see also Iraq; Lebanon; Ottoman Empire; Syria; Turkey
Levi, Primo 300, 616
Lewis, Herschell Gordon, Blood Feast 594
Leyte Gulf, Battle of (1944) 330
Li Jingquan, Sichuan province 420
Liady, Russia, liberation of 313
Liaison Society for Returnees from China 337
liberalism 260
in Latin American states 497
Libya 129, 139
de facto partition 138, 139
Italian invasion (1911) 278
proposed Italian 'extermination camp' 398
under Kaddafi 130
Licht, Fred 601
Lie, John 115
Liebknecht, Karl 298
lifestyle
and fall in homicide rates 201
urban street culture 202
Ligue des Droits de l'Homme 474
on colonial abuses 471, 487
criticism of colonial murder trials 485
protest at Gabon murder case 481
report on slavery in New Caledonia 475, 477, 486
response to report 478–480
and treatment of Kanak workers 476
Lili'uokalani, Queen of Hawai‘i 34
Lilly, J. Robert 160
Lincoln, Abraham, US President 547
Little Big Horn, Battle of (1876) 92
Liu Wenhui, Xikang province warlord 413
Locke, John 115, 534
Index

Lombroso, Cesare
Criminal Man (1876) 570
Lezione de medicina legale 157
The Delinquent Woman 571
Lon Nol, General, Cambodia 515
London
areas built with slavery compensation money 626
crime and policing 562
London Bridge attacks (2017) 553
Round Table Conference (1931) 78, 79
Tower of 619
London Prize Ring Rules on boxing 219
Londres, Albert 471
Long Night’s Journey into Day (documentary) 628
Los Angeles, Zoot Suit Riots 103
Los Angeles Times, bombing (1910) 543
Lu Dingyi, Minister of Propaganda 416
Lucas, Colin 352, 356, 359
Ludlow massacre, USA (1914) 543
Lumière brothers, The Arrival of a Train 593
Lundestad, Geir 450
Luo Ruiqing 402
Lusitania, sinking of 291
Lustig, Robin 602
Luxemburg, Rosa 298
Luxor, Egypt, attack on tourists (1997) 134
Lynching Scene (1895 film) 581
lynchings 95, 265, 548
of child abusers 173
Cleo Wright 102
decline (late 1930s) 101
during First World War 98
Emmett Till (1955) 103
federal anti-lynching law (1937) 101
and first anti-lynching legislation 99
of Mexicans 88, 97–98
Michael Donald (1981) 106
national memorial to victims (US) 88
as public spectacle 95
ritualistic 95
see also mob violence; racial violence
Lyttleton, Oliver 398
Ma Rulong, Muslim leader 51
Macabre (1958 film) 594
McDougall, James 250
Macedonia 367
genocidal ethnic reordering 377–384
independence (1991) 384
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) 383
Jews 382
rising political violence 377
Slavophone communities in 383–384
see also Thrace
Mackie, Vera 634
McKinley, William, US President 544
MacKinnon, Catharine 148, 161
MacLauchlan, Alice 630
Madagascar, French ‘Old Colonist’s view of 479
Madame Tussauds museum 569
Madras, India, statue of General Neill 74
mafia
post-Soviet Russia 565
Sicily 565, 573
Magadan Gulag camp 395
Magellan, Ferdinand, voyage to Pacific 22
magic and sorcery, in China 42, 43, 53, 56, 59
Maguire & Baucus, film distributors 581
Maizles, Etta 313
Majdanek death camp, Poland 319
Malacca
Dutch conquest (1641) 24
Portuguese conquest (1511) 22
Malaya
communist insurgency 551
‘villagisation’ 399
Malgara, Thrace, genocidal massacres 379
Mali, jihadist state 399
Mamdani, Mahmood 251
Mandrin, Louis, smuggler 566
Manila to Acapulco trade, Spanish treasure ships 23
Mann, Michael 430
Mannheim, Hermann 568
Mantena, Karuna 251
Mao Zedong
Anti-Hiding Campaign (grain and food) 419
and People’s Commune 417
personality cult 62
and use of violence 408
Maoism, religious characteristics of 62
Māori
attack on Boyd whaling ship 30
and British colonisation 21
and Dutch 24
response to colonialism 25
and Treaty of Waitangi 32, 230
maps, mapping
Balkans 377
and states 367
Marat, Jean-Paul 534
Māria, shipwreck, Australia 238
Index

Marighella, Carlos 531
marital rape 157
Marne, Battle of the 292
Marquesas Islands, French annexation (1842) 32
Marquez, Gabriel Garcia 459
marriage, overriding age of consent 170
Marten, Maria, murder of 569
martial arts 209
China 53, 222
Japan 220–222
martial law
India 76, 77, 237
as instrument of terror 238
and summary powers of detention 239
use in British settler colonies 237–239
Martin, Richard, Act to prevent cruelty to cattle and horses (1822) 211
Martin, Terry 372
martyrdom, in Islam 271, 553
Marx, Karl, on revolutionary terror 408
Marxism 539
and ethno-nationalist terrorism 551
and imperialism 259
masculinity
and honour 361
and violence 361
mass rape 7, 159
of Christians in Ottoman Empire 278
Darfur 160
First World War 160
former Yugoslavia 161
Red Army 152, 154
Rwanda 151, 160
Second World War 160
by Turkish bashi-bazouks 380
mass violence 1
behaviourist explanation 429
contentious politics approach 431–432, 445
Fort Hood shootings (2013) 553
human rights perspective 429
Islamic justification of 267
Latin America 459
and political participation 430
see also collective violence; Indonesia; mob violence
massacres
Amritsar (1919) 76–77, 300
Armenia 268, 269, 276, 279
on Australian frontiers 237
Chile (1907) 498
of civilians in wartime 295
East St Louis (1917) 98
El Salvador (1932) 498
of ethnic Hui in China 412
First World War 288
France, September (1792) 352, 356, 361, 362
Gujarat (2002) 119, 120
Hamburg, S. Carolina 92
Kurds (1937) 272, 279
Latin America 504
Ludlow, USA (1914) 543
of Mexicans in south Texas 97
Nanjing 47, 48
Oradour-sur-Glane 307
Partition 112
Rosewood, Florida (1923) 100
San Bernardino, USA 553
Srebrenica (1995) 4
Thrace 379
Tlatelolco, Mexico (1968) 504
Tschoffen Wall, Dinant 288
Tulsa, Oklahoma (1921) 100
Wilmington (1898) 94
Wounded Knee (1876) 92
Massoud, Ahmad Shah, Afghanistan 141
Matsunaga, Jennifer 629
Maudadi, Maulana Abul Ala 113
Mbeki, Achille 251
Meaux, France, September Massacres (1792) 352, 356
Mecca, occupation of Ka’ba by Islamist group (1979) 131
media 598–613
archives of violence 14, 598
celebrity stories 604
depictions of violence 5, 71
and economics of production 604
and forms of commemoration 616
illustrated magazines 297
reporting of violent crime 578
responses to 609–612
reticence of news editors 601
social 5
spectacular violence 602–604, 613
see also cinema; internet; journalism;
newspapers; photography; propaganda;
television; video
medicine, and deaths from homicide 201, 203
Meier, August 106
Meiji emperor, Japan 326
Melbourne, Australia, memorial to executed Tasmanians 627
memorials see commemoration
memory
identification 608
proximity and repetition 608
and response to violent images 607–609
of trauma 625
men
as rape victims 151, 156
sexuality and aggression 148
single (‘bare branches’) in China 45
and sport 207, 218
see also masculinity
Mesrine, Jacques, L’Instinct de Mort 570
Metropolitan Police force, London 562
Mexicans and Mexican Americans, lynching of 88, 97–98
Mexico
1917 Constitution 499
1968 Tlatelolco massacre 504
civil war (1910–20) 498
collective and interpersonal violence 194
counter-revolution (Cristero War) (1926–29) 499
criminal justice system 506
‘disappearances’ 504
duelling 190
and Guatemala 496
homicide rates 189, 196, 203
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 499
marital rape in 158
‘Plan de San Diego’ manifesto 97
sexual violence 151
use of pronunciamiento 494
war with United States (1845–48) 496
Mezentsov, Nikolai 537
Mhadli, Sana Youssef 136
Micronesia 23
middle classes
and anti-communism 444
and liberal democracy 539
and personal experience of violence 6
Middle East
anti-colonial riots 127
and Cold War 128, 129
conflicts of 1990s 133–135
coups d’état 129, 137
and democracy 128, 133, 137
effect of violence on social structure 140–141
enlargement of 139
fragmentation 139
frontiers as ‘bordered power containers’ 132
historical cycles 127–130
influence of intelligentsia 128, 129
left-wing political movements 126, 128, 129, 130
Muslim Brotherhood and 552
nature of violence in 125–142
regional instability 141
revolutions (2011–12) (‘Arab Spring’) 137–140
scale of sectarian war (2010s) 138
sectarian affiliations 140
trans-border affiliations 138
as ‘Tri-Continental Region’ 129, 133
tribal loyalties 127, 140
violent ‘national resistance’ 129
weak states 140
see also Iran; Iraq; Islam; Islamism; Israel; Levant; Ottoman Empire; Palestine; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Turkey
Mikhoels, Solomon 316
military dictators, Latin America 497–498, 502
military transhumance
expansion of 138
to Pakistan and Afghanistan 132
millenarianism, China 43
Miller, Web, journalist 79
Millett, Kate, Sexual Politics 148
mines, in warfare 290
Minsk ghetto, mass killings 313
Le Miroir, French weekly 297
missionaries see Catholic missionaries; Christian missionaries; Protestant missionaries
Mississippi
black disenfranchisement 94
Citizens’ Councils 104, 105
lynching of Emmett Till (1955) 103
White Line terror campaign (1875) 91
Mississippi White Knights 105
Missouri, lynching of Cleo Wright 102
mob violence
against Armenians (1895) 268
against child abusers 173
against Chinese 89, 92
dynamite attacks (Birmingham, Alabama) 104, 105
and National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence (US) 103
Ottoman domestic jihad 276
tarring and feathering (US) 90
torture 95
United States 88, 95
and vigilantes 97
see also arson; collective violence; lynching;
mass violence; racial violence
mobile phones
and call for assistance (in homicides) 201

Index
Index

mobile phones (cont.)
photographs and videos on 598
Modi, Narendra, Indian Prime Minister 119
and Gujarat massacre 119
Moeller, Susan 610
Molly Maguires, US underground group 542
Monéys, Alain de, murder 355
Mongolia, Japanese sale of opium in 337
monotheism, origins in Levant 266
Montgomery, Alabama, memorial to victims of lynching 88
Moore-Gilbert, Bart 76
moral panics 545, 562
about child sexual abuse 182
Moro, Aldo, Italian Prime Minister 131
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Philippines 11
Morocco 127
Morozov, Nikolai 538
Morsi, Muhammad, Egypt 137
Mussolini, Benito 16
Mutilations
cutting off ears 27, 52
female genital 184
post-mortem 352, 443
symbolism of 359–362
mutually assured destruction, Cold War 449, 450
Myanmar (Burma)
Buddhist violence 121
and Muslim Rohingya 13
NAAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)
anti-lynching committee 98
formation (1908) 96
interracial alliances 100
Lynching Goes Underground (1940) 101
National Conference on Lynching (1919) 99
Silent Protest Parade (1917) 98
Thirty Years of Lynching, 1889–1918 report 99
Truman address to 103
Naga insurgency, India 85
Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Islamic party, Indonesia 437
Namibia 255
see also German Southwest Africa
Nanjing (Nanking)
Japanese atrocities (1937) 160, 335
storming of (1864) 47, 48
as Taiping capital 46
Nanking, Treaty of (1842) 32
Naples, Camorra 565
Nasif Pasha, Ottoman general 274
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 128, 130, 133
Nasution, General A. H. 437
nation-states
and cultural homogenisation 368, 377, 381, 393
Enlightenment view of as secular 115
as European concept 113
former colonies 12
and marginalisation of religion 114
and minorities 374
and monopoly of ‘legitimate’ violence 11–14, 68, 85–86
political function of commemoration sites 16
and transnational terrorism 13–14
trappings of 11
see also state formation; state violence
national development programmes, former colonies 12
National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence (US) 103
national liberation movements 2
Algeria 550
Greece 383
see also independence movements; PLO
nationalism
anti-colonial 300, 460
Arab 140
and Buddhism 110
development of 374
rise of 2, 221, 300
see also ethnic nationalism; Hamidism; Indian nationalism; Kemalism
Native Americans
American Indian Movement 105
forced relocation 388
rational violence against 89, 92
NATO, and Turkey 280
‘ndrangheta, Calabria 565
Necker, Jacques 352
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister 85, 110
Discovery of India (1946) 114, 115
and national cultural identity 114
and secularity 115
Neshoba County, Mississippi, murders 105
Nestorian Christianity, in China 52
Netherlands
and Cape Colony 231
and duelling 189, 190
emphasis on commerce 24
extreme cinema 584
homicide rates 200
and Indonesia 432, 436
and Japan 24
and Pacific exploration 24
plantations in East Indies 33
Neuilly, Treaty of (1919) 380
New Caledonia 472
French penal settlement 32
Kanak insurrection (1878) 486
Leconte case 468–469
Ligue des Droits de l’Homme in 477
recruitment of Kanaks as plantation labour 475, 478
New Guinea 21
Australian occupation 36
gold rush 37
New Hebrides 472, 476
New York, Wall Street bomb (1920) 545, 549
New York Times 317, 320, 600
New Zealand
colonial violence 25
deaths in frontier violence 243
discovery 24
effect of colonialism on indigenous warfare 29
‘Flying Column’ attacks on Māori 237
Māori raids 236
Musket Wars (1820–40) 29
native police force 241
occupation of Sāmoa 36, 37
Treaty of Waitangi (1840) 32, 230
use of martial law in North Island 238, 239
see also Māori
New Zealand Wars (1840–1916) 21
First Taranaki War (1860–64) 21
Newinson, C. R. W. 291
newspapers
and criticism of French colonial administration 481–482, 485
mass daily 4
names for youth gangs 567
power of written reports 609
reporting of crime 562, 563
Nga Puhi, New Zealand tribe 29
Ngô Viêt Ly, murder of 482
Nian Rebellion, China (1851–68) 49–50
Nicaragua
independence 496
Sandinista Front 502
US interventions 501, 502
Nice, France, attack (2016) 553, 605
Nicholas II, Tsar 541
Nigeria
Boko Haram Islamist movement 139
child marriage 183
civil war (1967–70) 11
independence 11
leopard attack murders 199
Nikolaev, Lev 314, 316
Nobles, Melissa 629, 630
Noé, Gaspar, Irreversible 595
Nolte, Ernst 397
Non-Aligned Movement 517–518
5th Summit Conference, Sri Lanka 518
Cambodia and 512, 516–521
Non-Cooperation Movement, India 76, 77
Non-Detention Act (1971, USA) 401
non-violence
American civil rights movement 104
Gandhi and 76, 77, 80
and political violence 78, 79
resistance in Sāmoa 38
North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) 181
North Carolina, black disenfranchisement 94
Northern Ireland 551
nuclear disarmament 6
nuclear weapons 2, 449
Nuon Chea, Khmer Rouge 517
Nuremberg trials (1945) 3
and rape 160
Nussbaum, Martha 120
Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline, Rwanda 156
Offences Against the Person Act (1875) (UK) 171
Okinawa, Battle of (1945) 331–332
Okuda Akiko 338

665
Oliver, Roland 249
Olympic Games boxing 219
women’s boxing 220
Omar, Mullah, Taliban 141
Ōmura Masujirô 328
127 Hours (2010 film) 595
Only God Forgives (2013 film) 590
Onoyo, Ferdinand, Une vie de boy 474
Operation Anvil, Kenya 398
Operation Barbarossa (German war against Soviet Union) 308, 309
opium, Japanese use in China 337
Oradour-sur-Glane, Nazi massacre at 307
Orthodox Church
Bulgarian-Greek divisions 377
forced conversion of Muslims to 379
Orwell, George 464
Nineteen Eighty-Four 449
O’Sullivan, Timothy 600
al-Otaybi, Juhayman 131
Ottoman Empire 263–283
and Berlin Treaty (1908) 277
Constitution (1876) 273
CUP regime (from 1913) 278, 279
decline of 368, 377
diversity 264, 266, 273
domestic jihad against Christians 274, 276, 280
envy of non-Muslims (zimmi) 275
eschatological traditions 266, 269–272
European influence and 273
and First World War 270, 278
and France 274
jihad against non-Muslims 268, 270, 272, 274, 276
lack of democratic rule of law 274
last decade (1912–22) 264, 270, 277–281
and Macedonia 378
millet system 266, 275
and Muslim nationalism (Hamidism) 268, 277
power of imperial myth 282
power of 264, 273
Protestant missionaries in 270
public domestic violence (1915–16) 278
reaction to Western modernity 267, 268
refugees from Balkans and Caucasus in 276, 375
refugees from in Europe 274
state toleration of jihad 276
Sunni Islam view of state 267
Tanzimat reform state (1839–76) 266, 273, 275
Reform Edict (1856) 273
Turanism 270, 277
Young Turk Revolution (1908) 277
see also Turkey
Ouest-africain français newspaper 481–482
Ouzounian, Naomie 392
Overy, Richard 404
Pacific Ocean 21–38
application of British law to shipping and crews 31
economic exploitation 28, 29, 30
European exploration 21, 22, 24
First World War 36–37
French colonies 32
indigenous warrior culture 26
plantation economies 33–35
port towns 28, 29
Second World War 38, 329
see also Australia; China; Hawai‘i; Japan; Kiribati; New Guinea; New Zealand; Philippines; Sāmoa; Tahiti
paedophilia
justification of 181
linked with homosexuality 179
Page, Wade Michael, attack in Milwaukee 122
paintings, of war 600, 612
First World War 291
Pak Yong-sim, Korean ‘comfort woman’ 340
Pakistan
call for independence 83
Hudood Ordinances on rape 152
Muslim violence in 117–118
opposition to independence 113
Partition (1947) 11, 84–85, 112, 160
political use of rape 153
Taliban in Baluchistan 117
Palestine 126, 128, 549, 551
First Intifada (1987–93) 126
Gaza Strip 137
Second Intifada (2000–04) 125, 126
Palestinian movement
fragmentation 130
see also PLO
Palestinian refugee camps 132
militants in 126
Tel al-Zaatar 130
Palmer, A. Mitchell 545
pan-Islamism 268
Panama, US and 501
Index

Panthay Rebellion, Yunnan province, China 51
Paraguay, war with Triple Alliance 496
Paris
  apaches (youth gangs) 562, 567
  Bataclan theatre attack (2015) 140, 598
  Charlie Hebdo attacks (2015) 140, 553
Commune (1871) 363
mob violence 363
Paris Peace Conference (1919) 300
Paris, Texas, mob violence 95
Park, Chan-wook, Oldboy 584
Park You-me 634
Parks, Rosa, civil rights campaigner 91
Partition (1947) (India and Pakistan) 11, 84–85, 112
sexual violence 160
Pashtun tribal community, Afghanistan, Taliban and 117
Pathé Frères, History of a Crime film 582
patriarchy, women’s fight against 7
patrimonialism, Central America 490, 500
Patterson, Orlando 96
Patterson, Robert, Citizens’ Council 105
Peckinpah, Sam, The Wild Bunch 588
Peill, Arthur, missionary, Boxer Uprising 96
Penn, Arthur, Bonnie and Clyde 588
Penn, Nigel 231
Perry, Matthew, US naval captain 32
Persian Gulf war (1991) 281
Peters, Carl 248
Le Petit Journal 572
Le Petit Parisien newspaper 563, 572
Philippines
  Mactan island 23
  Moro Islamic Liberation Front 11
  US conquest of 34
  US racialism 93
The Photo-Era journal 582
photography
  American Civil War 600
  commemoration 622–623
  early 599
  evidence of Nazi atrocities 315
  and French postcards of killed rebels 471
  images and sounds of violence 4
  mobile phones 598
  and record of brutality 79
  war 297
Picasso, Pablo, Guernica 612
pilgrimages, of commemoration 623–626, 635
Pinker, Steven 18, 561
Pinochet, Augusto, Chilean dictator 14
Piper, Tom 618
pistols, duelling 190
Pitcairn Island 27
PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia)
  45th anniversary celebrations 427, 440
  call for elections 437
  kidnapping and killing of six generals 430, 441
  relations with military 440–441
  relations with Sukarno 434
  and rural confrontation 439–440
  support for 433, 434
PKK, Kurdish 136
‘Plan de San Diego’ (Mexican manifesto) 97
plantation economies
  Hawai‘i 33–34
  imported labour for 33
  New Caledonia 475, 478
  Pacific 33–35
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) 126, 532, 551
military defeat (1982) 132
poison gas 291
  factory on Ōkuno Island, Hiroshima 332
  First World War 290
  gas chambers 310, 319
  gas vans 310, 312
  used by Japanese in China 336, 337
  poisoning 197
as women’s means of killing 571
Pol Pot 511, 517
  purges 529
  on rice production 524
  see also Cambodia
Poland
  ethnic violence (1919) 298
  German invasion (1939) 307
  Red Army move into (1944) 319
  rise of nationalism 300
police forces
  American 103, 104
  colonial 240
  armed and mounted 240, 241
  native 241, 243
  criminal assault against 576
  Indian 77, 81
  recording of criminal violence 564
  relations with press 562
  urbanisation and 536
  use of violence 576–577
Polish-Soviet war (1919–21) 300
political ideologies
  Cold War and 14, 460
political ideologies (cont.)
and national development movements 12
and state violence 13
and terrorism 534–537
political violence
France 356–359
and Indian nationalism 69, 78
Latin America 504
politics
militarisation of 494, 495
morality and justice in, since Second World
War 630
Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) 379
popular culture
representations of violence in 15, 581
ridicule of police 576
see also cinema; media; popular literature
popular justice, against local
transgressions 563
popular literature
melodramas 569
pre-First World War 294
romanticised villains 566
stories of violent crime 561, 581
war photos in 297
population exchange, Greece and Turkey
(1923) 298, 376, 380
population growth, and risk of violence to
individual 18
populist-authoritarianism, Mexico 499
Porfirio Díaz, Gen. Luis de la Cruz,
Mexico 498
pornography
child 181, 183
and sexual violence 165
Portugal
and conquest of Malacca (1511) 22
and conversion to Christianity 22
and independence of Brazil (1822) 493
power
and capitalism 259
and ceremonial 68
and ideology in Latin America 492
of media 609
and public violence 490–491
and violence 258–260, 271
Pravda
on Nazi atrocities 311
publication of German policy directives 310
Price, Richard 233
Prince, Stephen 586, 588
prisoners of war
and Burma-Thailand railway 334
First World War 390
Nazi treatment of Soviet 309, 323
POW camps 390
rules on treatment 3
prisons 8
Chinese People’s Communes 418
rape in American 156, 165
reforms 164
see also concentration camps; internment
 camps; labour camps
Prix Goncourt 297
Procknow, Greg 511
Production Code Administration,
Hollywood 583
pronunciamiento, as means of political change,
in Latin America 494
propaganda 5, 296
demonisation of enemy 295
Nazi 5, 102, 306, 311
printed 4
rape as 150
Western suspicion of 318
propaganda of the deed 540, 544
property crime 561
Prost, Antoine 299
prostitution 7
child 171, 172, 183
criminal women as 571–572
Japan 338
Japanese ‘comfort women’ 7, 158, 339–341
New Zealand 29
see also brothels
Protection of Animals Act (1835) 211
Protestant missionaries
in China 52
Hawai‘i 30, 33
in Levant (American) 269
in New Zealand 29
psychiatry, and measures against child sexual
abusers 179
Psycho (1960 film) 594
public humiliation
in China 422
and collective violence 358
of non-Muslims 276
sexual violence 164
public opinion, on consequences of violence 6
public violence see collective violence
Puerto Rico 493
Pullman strike, USA (1894) 543
Pulp Fiction (1994 film) 584
Pulteney, Sir William, Bill against bull-baiting
210
punishments
abolition of violent 4, 578
British Army 574
changing view of 8
chopping of hands (Congo) 9
corporal 7
for crime passionnel 193
exile 41
food deprivation (China) 422
tarring and feathering (US) 90
within family 575
see also mutilations; torture
Punjab state, India
division (1960s) 111
Unionist Party 113
Puritans, and animal sports 210
Puzo, Mario, The Sicilian 570

al-Qadir, Amir 'Abd 251
Qianlong, Emperor of China 43
Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 41
decline of 49
fall of 58
and religious offences 41
Taiping opposition to 46
Qotb, Sayyid, Muslim Brotherhood 130
Quandt, James 583
Queensbury Rules on boxing 219
Quit India Movement, repression of 82

race
European notions of 250
and white supremacy 10

racial violence
1970s and 1980s 106
interracial violence in India 75
Japan 334–338
see also ethnic cleansing; racial violence, United States
rational violence, United States 88–107, 173
against Chinese 89, 92, 95
against emancipated African Americans 89, 546–547
against Mexicans 88, 97–98
against Native Americans 89, 92
and civil rights movement 104–107
memoralisation 88
nature and definitions of 106
by police 104
race riots 97
and Second World War 102
and sexual violence 91, 172, 173
see also lynchings; mob violence
Ransome, Arthur 373
Rapa Nui (Easter Island) 26
rape 166
in American prisons 156, 165
and charge of adultery 152
children born of 153, 163
and credibility of victims 150
as crime against humanity 163
discrimination against victims 150, 154
‘domestic interaction’ after 155
and evidence 150
and evidence of resistance 155
and gender 149, 156–157
as genocidal strategy 160, 161
homosexual 151
and lack of consent 149
marital 157
and masculinity 161
perpetrators as victims 158–159
personal harm of 153
physical coercion 149, 152
as political weapon 153
proof of lack of consent 152
racialisation (US) 173
shame and guilt of perpetrator 150, 158
as ‘victim-precipitated’ crime 154–155
victim’s fear of reporting 150
violence of 154–156
as weapon of war 150, 151, 162
of women in Chinese Anti-Hiding
Campaign 422
see also mass rape
rape crisis centres 165
rapiers, duelling 190
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh movement 118, 120
Rather, Dan 602
ratting 208
Rauschning, Hermann, ‘Conversations with Hitler’ 310
Ravot d’Ombreval, Nicolas, Paris police 353
Raw (2016 film) 595
rebellion
as illegitimate violence 69–72
response of military dictator states 498
Reclus, Elisée 367
Reconstruction, post-Civil War (US) 90–91
depictions of 90
records
of child sexual abuse 168
Indian census 72
of Indian rebellions 71
Index

records (cont.)
media archive of violence 14, 79, 598
police 564
Red Army
advance into Germany (1945) 304
evidence of atrocities 313, 323
as liberators 320
mass rape by (Second World War) 152, 154
Meetings of Vengeance 315
publication of Nazi atrocities 312
Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof), Germany 551
Red Barn murder (1827) 569
Red Brigades, Italy 551
‘Red Shirt’ militias, South Carolina 91
‘Red Summer’ of violence, 1919 (US) 98, 100
Refn, Nicholas Winding, Only God Forgives 590
Reformation 534
refugee camps, First World War 391
refugees
deaths in Macedonia-Thrace 382
First World War 286, 290
from Middle East wars 132, 140
from Southeast Asia 106
Reichenau, Field Marshal von 310, 315
religion
and identity in European periphery 373
monotheism 266
political power of 282
and use of animals in sport 210
see also Buddhism; Catholic Church;
Christianity; eschatology; Hinduism;
ideology; Islam
religious leaderships
political influence of 12–13
and political power 13
religious movements
appeal of 46
diaspora support for 122–123
and political use of rape 153
utopianism 46
religious orders, abuse of children 8
religious violence
China 41–66
definitions (China) 42–43
India 110, 118–120
Pakistan 117–118
and secularism 123
and self-affirmation 263
South Asia 110
see also Islamic terrorism; Islamism
Reservoir Dogs (1992 film) 584
revenge violence
collective 357
by indigenous people in Pacific 30, 37
by ships’ crews 28
Revue Franco-Annamite 485
Reynolds, Henry 243
Rhodes, Cecil 248, 258
right-wing political movements, Middle East 128
rights
of children 8
individual 534
traditional 534
see also civil rights movement; human rights
Ringelblum, Emmanuel 307
Riots: revenge violence
Robben Island, South Africa 239
Robbins, James 602
Robespierre, Maximilien 534
Robinson, Geoffrey 431
Rocquevaire, France, murders 566, 569
Rodrigu résultats (France) 349, 362
United States 96, 97, 106
Robben Island, South Africa 239
Robbins, James 602
Robespierre, Maximilien 534
Robinson, Geoffrey 431
Rocquevaire, France, murders 359
Rodriguez, Javier 403
Rohingya Muslim minority, Myanmar 121
Romania 374
Rome, homicide rates 188
Römer, Michal 301
Roosevelt, Franklin D., US President 400
Roosevelt, Theodore, US President 34
and lynching 101, 102
Rosen, Hannah 91, 111
Rosenfeld, Isaac, ‘The Meaning of Terror’ (1949) 402
Rosewood, Florida, massacre (1923) 100
Rosi, Francesco 570
Rostov, Nazi atrocities 311
Roth, Eli, Hostel films 584, 587–588
Rothberg, Michael 626
rough music 563
Rowlatt Act (1919), India 76
and Gandhi’s Satyagraha 77
Royal Indian Navy, mutiny (1946) 83
Royal Navy, flogging 574
RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) (1824, 1835) 211
Rubio-Marian, Ruth 633
Rudé, George 348, 365
Rudwick, Elliott 106
Index

rule of law
  Europe 273
  India 68, 69, 75
  and lack of democracy in Ottoman Empire 274
  Latin American indifference to 490
Russia
  Combat Organization 541
  deportation of Circassian peoples 375
  duelling 189
  homicide rates 199
  samosud 564
  scorched earth policy in First World War 290
  Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) 541
  The People’s Will conspiratorial terrorist organisation 538
  ‘war communism’ (1918–21) 300
see also Soviet Union
Russia, post-Soviet
  mafia in 565
  and Syrian civil war 138, 139
Russian Revolution (1917) 2, 298
  refugees from 391
  terrorism of 537–539
Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 327
Rwanda
  female violence 156
  genocide (1994) 4, 598
  mass rape 151, 160
  Sachsenhausen 310, 397
  sacred time
    concept of 43, 59
    Maoism as culmination of 62
  al-Sadat, Anwar 130
  assassination 131
  Saddam Hussein 133
  Sahlin, Peter 354
Salonika, Macedonia, deportation of Jews to Auschwitz 382
Sámoa 35–36
  Chinese indentured labourers 36
  civil war (from 1870s) 35
  Mau resistance movement 38
  New Zealand occupation of 36, 37
  non-violent resistance 38
  plantations 35
  samosud, Russia 564
San Bernardino, USA, massacre 553
San people, Cape Colony 231
sandalwood, Pacific islands 28
Sandler, Kevin S. 591
Sant Fateh Singh, Sikh leader 111
Sanyai, Deberati 624
Saudi Arabia
  and Syrian civil war 138
  Wahhabism 272
  and Yemen 138
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, Hindu Mahasabha 118
Saw series of films 584
scapenenate 563
Schama, Simon 347
Schinderhannes (Johannes Bückler), robber 566
schools
  corporal punishment 7, 575
  guns in American 2
Schumann, Dirk 299
Seaton, Jean 612
  Carnage and the Media 601
secessionist movements
  suppression of 11
see also civil wars; independence movements; national liberation movements; nationalism
Second World War 304–323
  Balkans 381
  behaviour of Red Army 152, 154
  government information management 5
  India and 82–83
  and internment 399–401
  mass rape 160
  Pacific Ocean 38, 329
  rape of Jewish women in camps 151
  United States 102
see also Germany, Third Reich; Holocaust; Japan
secularism
  of British rule in India 110, 116
  Enlightenment and 115
  and religious violence 123
security forces, state 11
  and internal enemies 13
see also armed forces; police forces
self-control, violence as loss of 7
self-sacrifice see martyrdom; suicide bombing
Seoul, Association for Cold War Studies meeting 452
Serbia 374
  and Croat Ustasha state 381
  German invasion (1915) 290
  mass rape by Serbian forces 161, 163
  and propaganda value of rape 150

671
Index

Sergei Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke 542
serial killers 197–198
servants, beating of
India 75
Indochina 473–474
Seven (1995 film) 584
sexual equality, and sexual violence 165
sexual violence 7, 147–166
against children 168–185
and consent 149
definitions 147–150
former Yugoslavia 161
Japanese, in China 33, 160
language of 151
laws against 164, 165
military brothels 7, 33, 158, 633
perpetrators 148, 150, 179
as victims 158–159
physical coercion 149
public humiliation 164
racialisation of, southern US 91, 172, 173
range of 149
silence and reporting of 150–153
society and 166
solutions to 164–165
victim-blaming 164
victims 148, 150
and war 159–164, 286
by women 156
see also mass rape; pornography; prostitution; rape
Shane (1953 film) 588
Sharfstein, Daniel 92
sharia law
and domestic jihad 276
and sexual activity 170
Shark Island, Namibia 389
Shetty, Salil 605
Shiism
eschatology 282
Mahdism 283
Shinto, Japan 13
Sicily, mafia 565, 573
Sierra Leone 160
child prostitution 183
Sihanouk, Norodom, Prince of Cambodia, and alliance with CPK 515
Sihanouk Trail, Cambodia 514
Sikh nationalism 110–112
and 1960s demands 111
1980s conflict with government 110, 111
diaspora support for 122
religion and 111
Sino-Japanese War, First (1894–5) 222, 327
Sino-Japanese War, Second (1937–45) 33, 335–337
Sion, Brigitte 624
Sirik Matak, Prince Sisowath, Cambodia 515
al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, Egypt 137
Sköld, Johanna 632
slave markets, Mesopotamia 278
slavery
abolition of 10, 626
compensation money 626
and ‘consent’ to rape 155
Dutch colonialism and 24
in French colonies 475, 477, 486
sexual, Japanese Imperial Army 7, 158, 339–341, 633
see also forced labour; indentured labour
Sleeman, Captain W. H. 572
Slocum, J. David 585
Slutsky, Boris, on Red Army mass rape 154
Smaal, Yorick 175
Smithson, George 570
Snyder, Timothy 370–371
Snyder, Zack, Watchmen 590
social contract
essential to modern coexistence 264
failure in Levant 264, 266, 282
lacking in Kemalism 280
Social Darwinism 10
applied to nations 294
in Middle East 128
social media 5
socialism
Indonesia 432, 434
revolutionary (China) 12
working-class and 539
Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), Russia 541
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (USA) (1866) 214
soldiers
as criminals 574–575
fear of resistance in invasions 295
and nature of First World War combat 289, 291–293
post-war indifference to violence 299
Red Army letters to Ehrenburg 323
US Army 102, 159
war journals and letters 288, 296
Soleilland, Albert 563, 572
Solomon Islands, child marriage 183
Solovetski Islands, Gulag 395
Somalia 133
Some Like It Hot (1959 film) 589, 590

672
Index

Somme, Battle of the (1916) 291, 292
film footage 598
South Africa
colonial frontiers 230–232
concentration camps 387
gang rape 153
homicide rates 203
Robben Island 239
Soweto 598
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 628
see also Cape Colony
South America see Latin America
South Dakota, USA
Mount Rushmore National Memorial 17
Wounded Knee Memorial 17
South Korea, economic development 462
Soviet Union (USSR)
and Afghanistan 131, 552
censorship of accounts of rape 152
and Cold War 14, 449
dissemination of evidence of Nazi atrocities to West 305, 316–323
ethnic deportations 375
Extraordinary State Commission (ChGK) on Nazi crimes 311
German invasion (1939) 307
Gulag camps 395–397
and Kemalist Turkey 279
moral outrage at Nazi atrocities 304, 310
occupation policy 307
political meetings after liberation 315
and propaganda on Nazi atrocities 306, 311
and Second World War 304–323
‘special settlements’ 395, 397
see also Red Army; Russia
Soweto, South Africa 598
Spain
Basque separatists (ETA) 551
bull-fighting 215, 581
end of empire (1898) 34, 493
Francoist concentration camps 397
and Pacific 23
Spanish Civil War, exhumation and identification of victims 621
spectacular violence
representation of 602–604
see also cinema; media
sports 207–223
animal combats 208, 210, 215
move towards prohibition 209–218, 223
bare-knuckle fighting 209, 219
boxing 219
and gambling 208, 214
human combat 209, 218–223
humanitarian reformers and 209, 212
hunting 208
martial arts 209, 220–222
regulation of 207, 209, 218, 223
team (non-contact) 209
and tradition 215, 216–217
wrestling 220
see also hunting
Springfield, Illinois, riot (1908) 96, 97
Srebrenica massacre (1995) 4
Sri Lanka
Buddhist violence 121
diaspora support 122
and Tamil separatists 13, 122
Stalin, Joseph
and ethnic deportations 375
and German military orders 310
post-war Western view of 306
response to German fascism 306
Stalinism, compared with Nazi Germany 314
Stallone, Sylvester, The Expendables 590
Starke, Wilhelm 574
starvation of Chinese peasants in Anti-Hiding Campaign 420
deaths of Japanese servicemen from 329
of deported Armenians 278
see also famine; food
state of emergency
use of 86, 392
see also martial law
state formation
Latin America 491, 492–497
see also Israel; nation-states
state violence
and civil wars 11
implicit 73–75, 86, 490
as legitimate 11–14, 69–72, 85–86
as means of total control (China) 417, 424
see also Chinese Communist Party
states
and concentration camps 393
control of populations 2
criminalisation of (Latin America) 505
management of information (propaganda) 5, 296
measures against revolution 535–536
and public apologies for violence 629–634
violence against enemies within 2, 3, 11, 294–295, 498, 503
see also institutions; nation-states; terror,
state use of
Index

Stead, W. T. 573
‘Maiden tribute’ articles 172
Stephen, James, Colonial Under-Secretary 237
Stevens, George, Shane 588
Stevenson, Robert Louis, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 569
Strange Days (1995 film) 584
strikes
Chile 498
Durham (1891) 576
France 350
USA 543
Struve, Pyotr 300
Subandrio, Indonesia 437
submarine warfare, sinking of Lusitania 291
subsistence crises 352
and riots 349, 362
Sudan 133, 604
Sue, Eugène 571
Suharto, General, and operation against PKI 430, 441–443
Suhrawardy, H. S., Bengal Premier 84
suicide
to avoid violence in revolutionary China (1953–54) 415–416
kamikaze attacks by Japanese servicemen (1944–45) 330–331
self-immolation 63
suicide bombings 126, 135
Sukarno, President of Indonesia 433
ban on political parties 436
leadership of 435–436
and PKI anniversary celebration 427, 440
Suny, Ronald 393
Sutcliffe, Peter 569
SVAC (Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts) 160
Swain, Shurlee 632
Sweden, boxing 219
Sydney, Australia, British penal settlement 29, 31
symbolic violence 533, 534, 554
Syria 130, 272, 392
2012 uprising 138
civil war 138, 139, 263, 281, 282
escalation 139
news coverage 605
Kurdish areas 139
and Lebanon 139
Tahiti
French annexation (1842) 32
Pomare ruling family 28
Wallis expedition to (1767) 27
Tahitians, on Pitcairn Island 27
Taiping Rebellion (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) (1850–64) 41, 45–49
appeal of 46
ban on vices 46
death toll 47
effect of suppression 49
Taiwan, as Japanese colony 328
Takashi Miike, Audition 584
Talaat, Mehmed (Pasha) 277, 279
Taliban 141
in Afghanistan 110, 117
and Haqqani network 118
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 13
Ministry for the Promotion of Afghanistan and Prevention of Vice 13
Tallien, Jean Lambert 534
Tamil Nadu, bull-running 208
Tamil separatists, Sri Lanka 13
Tan Zhenlin 418
Tannenberg, Battle of 292
Tarantino, Quentin
Pulp Fiction 584
Reservoir Dogs 584
Tarnovskaya, Maria 193
Tartan Films 584
Tasman, Abel, and New Zealand 24
Tasmania 234, 238, 239
Taylor, Col Philip Meadows 572
Te Morere, Battle of (1864) 21
Te Whiti O Rongomai, Māori 21
technology
DNA testing 617, 619
military 2
transport 1
and violence 1–6
see also communication; digital technology; weaponry
television
power of image 609
violent crime on 562
see also cinema
terror, state use of 13, 533
Cambodia 528–530
China 408, 417, 420
French Revolution 534
Soviet Union 549
totalitarian regimes 549
terrorism 408, 532–554
and Algerian War (1954–62) 550
and cell organisation 538
definitions 532
Index

and diasporas 122
ethno-nationalist insurrections 549, 551
evolution of 533
and ideology of democracy 534–537
and independence movements 550
international 532
Islamic 13–14, 552–553
origin of term 532–533
Russian revolutionary 537–539, 542
as strategy 533
sub-state actors 533, 535
sub-state conspiratorial groups 535, 538, 549
symbolic nature of 533, 534, 554
target assassination 537
see also anarcho-terrorism; jihad

Terry, Karen 176
Texas, Fort Hood mass shooting (2013) 553
Thailand, child prostitution 183
Thalerhof camp, Graz 391
The Arrival of a Train (1896 film) 593
The Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots (1894 film) 581
The Expendables (2010 film) 590
The Hanging of William Carr (1897 film) 582
The Revenant (2015 film) 595
The St Valentine’s Day Massacre (1967 film) 589, 590
The Street Fighter (1974 film) 591
The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974/2003 film) 584, 592
The Wild Bunch (1969 film) 588, 594
Théâtre du Grand Guignol, France 581
Thiepval, war memorial 292
Third World and Cold War 450
Western news coverage 606
Thompson, E. P. 353
Thrace
exchange of Greek and Bulgarian populations 380
genocidal ethnic reordering 377–384
Greco-Bulgarian conflict 379–381
rising political violence 377
see also Macedonia
‘thugs’, and ‘Thuggee’ 572
Tianzhibai (Heaven and Earth Society), China 50
Tianjin, China, attack on French church 53
Tianjin, Treaty of (1858) 52
Tibet, suppression of Lhasa revolt (1959) 61–62
Tieou, Chief, New Caledonia 468–469
Tikhomirov, Lev, People’s Will 538
Till, Emmett, lynching of (1955) 103
Till-Bradley, Mamie 104
Tilly, Charles 348, 363
The Times, on Belgian refugees 391
Timor 160
Tohu Kâkahi, Mâorí 21
Tominaga Shôzô 336
Tordesillas, Treaty of (1494) 22
Toronto Film Festival 595
torture
Indonesia 444
Latin America 504
mass (Ottoman Empire) 278
mob violence 95
state use of 13
see also torture, China
torture, China
Anti-Hiding Campaign 420
campaign against counter-revolutionaries 409
of fellow villagers 410
methods of 415, 419
People’s Communes 419
use by local officials 411
‘torture porn’ films 584
Touré, Samori 251
Toynbee, Arnold 373
trauma
of child sexual abuse 180, 184
memories of 625
Traverso, Enzo, Origins of Nazi Violence 247
Trepow, Fyodor 537
Triad brotherhood, China 50
Tribune Républicaine 485
Triple Alliance, war against Paraguay 496
Troianovskii, Mark, filmmaker 312
Trotsky, Lev (Leon) 539
Trouble Every Day (2001 film) 583
Truman, Harry S., US President, presidential Committee on Civil Rights 103
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 623, 628–629, 630
Tshushima, Battle of (1905) 294
Tulsa, Oklahoma, massacre (1921) 100
Tumarkin, Maria 625
Tunisia, 2011 uprising 137
Tupamaros group, Uruguay 551
Turanism, political messianism 270
Turkey
anti-Kurdish war policy 281, 604
and Armenian genocide 271
and European Union 280
foundation of Republic (1923) 267
and Gallipoli campaign 289
Turkey (cont.)
Kemalist putsch (1980) 280
and NATO 280
persistence of Ottoman political-religious
tradition 271, 279
population exchange with Greece 298, 376, 380
return of political Islam 280
and Syrian civil war 138
turn to authoritarianism 263, 280
violence in 127
war with Greece (1919–22) 298
War of (Turkish-Muslim) Independence
(1919–22) 278
see also Kemalism; Ottoman Empire
Turkism 277
Tuskegee Institute, US, lynching database 95, 98
Twenty nine Palms (2003 film) 583
Tyrrell, Peter 632
Ukhtpechlag Gulag camp 396
Ukraine 605
Ukraine in Flames (film 1944) 316, 320
underworld see criminal gangs
UNICEF, on child sexual assault 168, 183
United Kingdom
and age of consent 149, 171–172
Belgian refugees 391
and colonial independence 10
criminal gangs 567
duelling 189
extreme cinema 584
ferocity of warfare by 70
fist-fighting 191
homicide rates 563
House of Commons Select Committee on
indigenous people (1837) 234, 240
and hunting with dogs 215–216
and internment camps 387
Irish migrants 573
and Kenyan concentration camps 398
Ministry of Information 5, 318
moral panic about child sexual abuse
(1980s) 182
and Opium Wars with China 31
‘penny dreadfuls’ 581
police force Occurrence Books 564
and religious minorities in India 113
remobilisation (1917) 295
and Sāmoa 35
Sikhs 122
and South African concentration camps 387
and Soviet evidence of Nazi atrocities
317, 318
and sport with animals 207, 209, 218
and Taiping rebellion 47
see also British Empire; India
United Nations (UN) 3
Charter (1945) 549
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948) 290, 622
Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989) 182
limits of power of 4
peacekeeping forces 3
Resolution 1820 (on rape as war crime) 7
United States of America
abolition of slavery 10
age of consent 149, 172
anarcho-terrorism 542–545
anti-federalism 548
arrest of Germans as spies 295
attack on Sikh gurdwara 122
black migration to North 96
cold war 96
criminal gangs 567
child sexual abuse
moral panic about (1980s) 182
Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 93
Civil Rights Act (1964) 105
Civil War (1861–65) 10, 89, 90–91, 546, 600
Reconstruction 90–91, 546, 547
duelling 190
fear of foreign terrorists 542, 545
First World War 97, 296
foreign relations
annexation of Hawai’i (1898) 34
and Cold War 449, 461
colonial acquisitions 93–94
covered bombing of Cambodia 514
and Cuba 502
geopolitical policy 136, 513
and Indonesia 436, 442
international reputation 97, 102
and Japanese 32
and Korean War 451, 457
military interventions in Central America 500–501
and proxy wars 14
and Sāmoa 35
and South America 14
support for Latin American counterinsurgencies 502–503
Index

and Vietnam War 513–515
  war with Mexico (1845–48) 496
homicide rates 196
hunting 216
Immigration Act (1917) 545
immigration restrictions 100, 106
Indian Wars 92
industrialisation 92
and international communism 318, 453
interment of Japanese-Americans 399–401
and Islamic terrorism 553
and Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC) 316
labour movement 544
labour-related violence 542–543
New Deal 101
Office of War Information 5
and race
  enforcement of colour line 93–96
  Jim Crow era 94–102, 548
  race riots 97
  racial police violence 104
  racial violence 88–107, 173
  segregation and disenfranchisement in South 92, 94
rise of religious right 280
Second World War 102
Sedition Act (1918) 545
and Soviet evidence of Nazi atrocities 317, 318, 320
Voting Rights Act (1965) 105
Weatherman/Weather Underground 551
white supremacist terrorism 545–549
attacks on Republicans 546, 547
youth cult 568
see also US Army
Uruguay 551
and Triune Alliance 496
US Army
  black servicemen 102
  Winter Soldiers’ Investigation (1971) 159
women servicemen 159
US Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 104
USSR see Soviet Union
Ut, Nick, Vietnam image 601, 604
Uyéno Nisaku, murder of Vietnamese worker 482
Vacher, Joseph 569
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, Indian Prime Minister 119
Valin, Claudy 359
Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) 234
Van, Marina de, In My Skin 583
Vancouver, George 30
Varaize, Charente-Inférieure 351
Varges, A. L. 79
Vast Yang religious uprising, China 58
Vaughn, Matthew, Kick-Ass 590
vendetta, southern Europe 565
Venezuela 496
  abolition of elections 504
  military dictators 500
Veracini, Lorenzo 229
Verdun, Battle of (1916) 291, 292
Vergès, Jacques 256
Versailles, Treaty of 298, 299
Vickery, Michael, on Cambodia 511
Victoria, Queen, patron of RSPCA 212
video, home industry 592
video games 15
Video Recordings Act (1984) 592
Vietnam 453–457
  ancestral remembrance 453
  Communist Party 513
  family displacement and reconciliation 454
  First Indochina War (against France) 455, 459, 513
  influence on Cambodia 513
  Nguyễn Penal Code 152
  xôi dau experience 456–457
Vietnam War (Second Indochina War) 159, 455, 456, 513
  image of Napalm 601
  US aerial bombing 514
  use of trails in Laos and Cambodia by Viet Cong 514
vigilantes
  France 481
  lynchings by 101
  and mob violence 97
  and sexual abusers 164
Villesèque, Narbonne, murder of the Latreilles 354, 359, 360, 362
Viola, Paolo 356, 359
violence
  causes of 1, 15
  changing justification for 9–11
  definitions of 326
  and democracy 362–364
  and eschatology 269–272
  increase and decline in 18, 561, 563
  and masculinity 361
  personal experience of 5
  and power 258–260, 271

677
Index

violence (cont.)
  social rejection of 4, 6
  structural 327
  vicarious 14–18
  see also collective violence; interpersonal violence; mass violence; mob violence; racial violence; religious violence; sexual violence; state violence
Virtual Reality 15
Vishwa Hindu Parishad organisation 118
vitriol (sulphuric acid), use in crime passionnel 193
vivisection, by Japanese in China 337
Vorkuta Gulag camp 396
Vovelle, Michel 348
Wachsmann, Nikolaus, KL 394
Wahhabism (radical Sunni movement) 272, 282
Waitangi, Treaty of (1840) 32, 230
Māori infringements 238
Wajda, Andrzej, A Generation 590
Wallerstein, Immanuel 462
Wang Lishi 416
war
  and battlefield violence 289
  bayonet attacks 293
  definition of battle 292
  distinction between combatants and noncombatants 286
  international limits on 3
  length of battles 292
  media reports of 598
  and perpetrators as victims 158
  and post-war crime 574, 575
  propaganda value of rape 150
  and sexual violence 157, 159–164, 165
  silence of rape victims 151
  and thresholds of violence 287
  see also American Civil War; civil wars;
    First World War; guerrilla warfare;
    industrial warfare; internment camps;
    Korean War; Second World War;
    Vietnam War; weaponry
war crimes, courts and tribunals 3, 312
war memorials
  as product of civil society 17
  Thiepval 292
  see also commemoration
War of the Pacific (1879–84) 496
Warsaw ghetto 307
Watchmen (2009 film) 590
Wavell, Lord, Viceroy of India 83
Way of Penetrating Unity (Yiguandao) movement, China 60, 61
weaponry
  artillery 293
  biochemical 3, 337
  British forces in settler colonies 236
  drones 2
  for duels 190
  First World War 290–291
  grenades 293
  hand-to-hand combat in war 293
  indigenous Pacific islands 26
  machine guns 291
  missiles 2
  nuclear 2, 449
  used for Japanese kamikaze attacks 331
  see also chemical weapons; guns; poison gas
Weatherman/Weather Underground, USA 551
Weber, Eugen 348
Wehner, Armin 622
Wells-Barnett, Ida B., anti-lynching crusader 91, 95, 96
Werth, Alexander, journalist 313, 320
West Papua, Indonesia, secessionist movement 11
West, the
  and homogenisation of European periphery 376, 377
  influence of Soviet anti-fascism on 305
  post-war anti-totalitarianism 306
  and Soviet evidence of Nazi atrocities 316–323
Westad, Odd Arne 450
Western Front, First World War 287
whaling
  American 32
  and missionaries in Hawai‘i 30
  in Pacific 29, 30
Wharton, Edith 289
whip, used against plantation workers 35
White Line pro-Democrat group, US 91
White Lotus Rebellions, China 43
white supremacy 10
  anti-civil rights violence 105
  in post-Civil War America 89–93
  terrorism 545–549
  women and 91
  see also mob violence
White, Walter F., NAACP report 99, 102
Wiener, Martin 195, 199
wife beating 575
Wilder, Billy, *Some Like It Hot* 589
Williams, Linda 593, 594
Wilmington, N. Carolina, massacre (1898) 94
Wilson, Woodrow, US President 98, 296, 300
Windham, Sir William, and Bill against bull-baiting 210
Winter, Jay 617
Wolfe, Patrick 228, 243
Wolfsfeld, Gadi, *Media and the Path* 611
women 7–8
and American white supremacists 91
brutalisation of, in Pacific region 26
and *crime passionnel* 193
and criminal gangs 566
as criminals 571–572
female genital mutilation 184
global movement for independence 7
hidden violence against 604
and honour killings 7
Japanese violence against 338–342
massacres of (First World War) 288
in Ottoman Empire 275
as prostitutes in New Zealand 29
Red Lanterns Shining movement, Boxer Uprising 55
return of kidnapped women to Hawai‘i by Vancouver 30
sale of female children in China 44
serial killers of 569
in sport 207, 219
status as victims of sexual violence 157
support for Armenian massacre (1895) 269
as symbols of family and national honour 8
treatment of wartime collaborators 575
as victims of murder 202
see also domestic violence; feminism; prostitution; rape; sexual violence
Women in Black feminist group 162
Woodward, Isaac, police attack on 103
workers, ban on violence against 7
working classes
and anarchists 539
and blood sports 212
fighting 191
reduction in violence 197
and socialism 539
state reforms and 539
World Health Organization (WHO) 151
on child sexual assault 168, 169
World Trade Center attacks (September 11, 2001) 14, 136, 532, 553
pictures of 598, 601
Wounded Knee, massacre (1876) 92
Wright, Cleo, lynching of 102
Wright, Richard 548
Wu, Harry 401
Wyschogrod, Edith 464
Xhosa peoples 235, 237
and use of martial law 238, 239
wars with 231
Yalta conference (1945) 376
*Yamato*, Japanese battleship 331
Yan Jingning, governor of Shandong province 50
Yang Kuaisong 409
Yang Xiuqing, Taiping leader 47
Yani, Indonesian army commander 440
Yaqub Beg, Chinese Muslim rebel 51
Yassins, Sheikh 133
Yellow Cliff Teaching (*Huangya jiao*) movement, China 50
Yellow Yang religious uprising, China 58
Yemen 126
war 127, 138, 281, 605
Yezidis
ISIS genocide of (2014–17) 276
jihad against 275, 276
in Ottoman Empire 270
Yonne, Charles, murder of Vietnamese coolie 482–483
Yoshimi Yoshiaki 332
Young Turk Revolution (1908) 277
Young Turks party see CUP
Ypres, third Battle of (1917) 202
Yuan Shikai, governor of Shandong 56
Yuasa Ken 336
Yugoslavia, former, war (1991–99) 150, 161
Yunnan province, China, Panthay Rebellion 51
Yuxian, governor of Shanxi 56
Zangrando, Robert 103
Zarkov, Dubravka 150
al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 135
Zasulich, Vera 537
al-Zawahiri, Ayman 135
Zeng Guofan, Hunan Army 47
Index

Zervas, Colonel 383
Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier, and Sihanouk 515
Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, Pakistan and conservative Islam 117
Hudood Ordinances on rape 152
Zimmerer, Jürgen 254, 255
Zionism and Irgun terrorism 549 as secular ideology 266
Zodiac (2007 film) 590
Zuo Zongtang, Qing general 51