Historical Dictionary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

James E. Hoare
The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays of the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, providing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.
HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF ASIA, OCEANIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

Lebanon, by As’ad AbuKhalil. 1998.
Azerbaijan, by Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian C. Collins. 1999.
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Iraq, by Edmund A. Ghareeb with the assistance of Beth K. Dougherty. 2004.
Burma (Myanmar), by Donald M. Seekins. 2006.
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Malaysia, by Ooi Keat Gin. 2009.
Tibet, by John Powers and David Templeman. 2012.
Historical Dictionary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

James E. Hoare

The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Lanham • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
2012
For

Georgia, Joseph, and James
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Of all the countries in the world, none comes close to being as poorly known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or more simply North Korea. Most of the time, it is ignored. When it is not, the response is usually annoyance, anger, or alarm, depending on the action it has taken. Yet, even then, it is clear that the outside world does not know just whom it is dealing with or exactly what is going on there. We do admittedly know something about the political system, but not even that much about the leaders and hardly anything about those in lower echelons. We have some facts (but rather few figures) on the economy and some idea of the society, but not much is known about the realities of life in such a place since few foreigners visit and even fewer Koreans go abroad. Whatever descriptions we do get are vague, consist more of rumor and sometimes propaganda than realities, and sadly enough, reflect North Korean propaganda by referring only to one person as if there were scarcely anyone else. Yet, North Korea is a big country with a relatively large population and, while its positive contribution to the international community is hardly worth mentioning, its negative potential cannot be overlooked.

It is therefore useful to learn considerably more about the DPRK than can be gleaned from the press or, more rarely, television. First, it is useful to know about more of the people who either still exercise or once exercised important functions; then about a few places, cities, provinces, rivers, and mountains to make North Korea seem more real; then about its political system, economy, and society, to say nothing of its ideology (juche), which covers every aspect of life; and finally, about the history since it was created more than half a century ago, and its trajectory since then contains more twists and turns than one would expect and may just give us a clue as to where it will head next. This information, and more, is provided in the new Historical Dictionary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and can be found, first, in an extensive chronology, then in the broad introduction, and finally in the hundreds of entries in the Dictionary section. Those who want to learn more would be well advised to refer to some of the titles in the bibliography.

It was not easy to find an author for this volume, since “experts” on North Korea are exceedingly rare, so it is fortunate that James Hoare took on the
formidable task of collecting and verifying as much information as could be found. Hoare has long studied North Korea from outside, among other things while serving at the British embassies in Seoul and Beijing, but then more intensively from within, as he was the first British representative to Pyongyang from May 2001 to October 2002. Since his retirement from the British diplomatic service, he has been active writing about the DPRK in books, including *North Korea in the 21st Century*, coauthored with his wife, Susan Pares, and has also written extensively on South Korea, including its historical dictionary. Hoare also teaches a course at the School of Oriental and African Studies, at the University of London, and serves as commentator on radio and television. His inside/outside view of one of the world’s least known countries is particularly acute, and it would be hard to find a better guide.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor
Preface

This is a completely new Historical Dictionary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), not a new edition of Professor Ilpyong J. Kim’s Historical Dictionary of North Korea, published by the Scarecrow Press in 2003. Inevitably, some of the subject matter overlaps, and I have from time to time drawn on Professor Kim’s work for background. But even if the books cover similar ground, none of the entries in the present volume repeat those in the earlier book. That said, the purpose of both books is the same: to provide clear and unbiased information about the DPRK.

It is usual to introduce books about the DPRK by pointing to the lack of knowledge about a country that few people have visited and that rarely makes the headlines except when there are problems. But there has always been a lot of information available about the country even if it was not always readily available in Western languages. In Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea), much has been published, especially in recent years. There is also growing information about the DPRK available since the United Nations’ Development Programme, the World Food Programme, and other UN organizations began working on the ground in the country in the mid-1990s. A number of foreigners who have lived there have written accounts of their experiences, while a great deal of archive work on the Korean War and on the postwar period has appeared in books in recent years. Films and music are available, and there is a growing international trade in DPRK art. Art exhibitions, which are sometimes dismissed as mere propaganda, have been staged in many countries. So it is now possible to know the DPRK better than before. Admittedly, much still remains unknown, especially when looking at the leadership and how it operates, although there is much speculation and plentiful rumors.

The DPRK is a country that attracts strong feelings. I have tried to be as dispassionate as possible, since there is more than enough polemic without adding to it, but it is only fair that I make my position clear to the reader. There are two states on the Korean Peninsula and have been since 1948. That makes them quite venerable, given the number of new states in the world since 1945. It would have been better if Korea had not been divided in 1945, though I suspect there would still have been major problems arising from
ideological differences and the different experiences of those who spent the colonial years in the United States and those who spent them in China or Manzhouguo, and it is not inconceivable that some form of civil war would have taken place. But just because an area was once united, for however long, does not mean that it must be united again. It may, and many may hope for this, but it is a goal to aim for, not something that should happen by right.

In the case of the two Koreas, neither has ever fully admitted the other’s right to exist. This may have given them both a certain moral satisfaction but it has done nothing to help them coexist or to achieve the unification that they both claim to want—even if it is hard to discern any policies pursued by either Korea that would bring this about. Perhaps the nearest that either Korea has come to accepting the other was at the time of the 2000 Summit and the years that followed, when the ROK for the first time actively encouraged its friends and supporters to establish relations with the DPRK.

As far as I am concerned, the two Koreas exist, are each now as legitimate as any other state—both were admitted to the United Nations in 1991—and should be treated accordingly. For that reason, I have strictly used the official titles of both countries, rather than using North or South Korea, or worse, North Korea and Korea, as though somehow the ROK really embodied the whole of Korea. I also avoid terms such as “failed state” or “rogue state,” which are aimed more at demonizing than clarifying. The DPRK has major problems but, despite the polemic, it is neither the poorest state in the world nor the most dangerous, though I concede that it ranks high among the world’s awkward squads.

I should add a note about coverage. This is already a large book and yet it could have been much larger. Many subjects have only been touched upon. In an ideal world, for example, each of the nongovernmental organizations that have operated in the DPRK could have had an entry. There should be much more on the organizations that operate under the auspices of the Korean Workers’ Party, and more ministries would have necessitated separate entries. This has not proved possible, although the bibliography will lead to more information if desired.

Many people have contributed to this book. I began working on matters relating to the Korean Peninsula in the 1970s and made my first visit to the ROK in 1976. From the start, I found the Koreans very different from their Chinese and Japanese neighbors. A posting to Seoul between 1981 and 1985 led to many friendships, some of which survive to this day, which have been renewed on many subsequent visits. In Seoul, even in the 1980s under what was still essentially a military government, it was possible to argue and discuss all sorts of issues, including the relationship with the DPRK. Since then, it has become even more likely that a mention that one has lived in the DPRK
will provoke a lively and informative discussion. Ten years ago, I would have been prepared to mention individuals, but times have changed, and it is probably better not to single out anybody.

The same applies to DPRK contacts. I first visited the DPRK as part of a European Union humanitarian delegation in 1998. By the time I went back in 2001, I was Great Britain’s designated first representative, a surprising development but one that I welcomed. Because it was unexpected, my wife, Susan Pares, and I probably had a more positive attitude toward the DPRK than many others, but that did not mean we suspended critical judgment. Yet, we did enjoy our time there, and in discussions with many people, both Korean and foreign, advanced our knowledge and understanding. For obvious reasons, I cannot again name the individuals who added to my understanding—here again, the two Koreas are not so far apart as some might assume—but I am grateful to all those who were willing to answer questions and who understood my wish to know more. We have also gained from two return visits, in 2004 and 2011, although these provided a very different experience from living there.

Over the years, many people outside the two Koreas have added to my understanding of things Korean. They include journalists, academics, and officials. The following list is by no means exclusive, but records some of my more obvious debts for discussions, arguments, and advice: Jeff Baron, Keith Bennett, Stephen Brown, Sabine Burghart, Bob Carlin, James Cotton, Mike Cowin, John Everard, Mark Fitzpatrick, Aidan Foster-Carter, Ruediger Frank, John Gittings, Keith Howard, Peter Hughes, Beth McKillop, John Merrill, Warwick Morris, David Morton, Rajiv Narayan, Jane Portal, Keith Pratt, Ken Quinones, Richard Rutt, the late Gerry Segal, the late Bill Skillend, Hazel Smith, John Swenson-Wright, Robin Tudge, Peter Whitehead, my students at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and my former diplomatic and other colleagues in Pyongyang. I suspect that several of them would not agree with me! My greatest debt, as always, is to Susan, who has encouraged and accompanied me during the past 40 years.

A book such as this inevitably draws on the work of others. I have made much use of material published by the DPRK’s Korean Central News Agency and the ROK’s Yonhap Agency, as well as newspapers and journals published in both Koreas. Publications such as the Annual Register (now published by ProQuest) and the Korea Yearbook (published by Brill), to both of which I contribute, and the older Korea Briefing series (published by M. E. Sharpe) have provided useful narratives and chronologies. Frank Shulman’s massive compilation of university theses, A Centenary of Doctoral dissertations on Korea 1903–2004: An annotated Bibliography of Studies in Western Languages, which is due for publication in 2012 and which I have been able
to consult in draft, has provided much new information, as has Frank Hoffman’s CD-based *Harvard Korean Studies Bibliography*.

Romanization is a problem, and this is examined more fully in the “Reader’s Note.” For many years, the standard Western academic romanization was the McCune-Reischauer (M-R) system, devised by two American scholars and published in the *Transactions of the Korea Branch Royal Asiatic Society* in 1939. There were always those who opposed this system on the grounds that it did not exactly reproduce Korean sounds or, less acceptably, that it was wrong that two Americans, one later associated with Japan, should have produced the standard romanization system. After experimenting with various other systems, in the 1980s, the ROK announced that it would henceforward use M-R. The DPRK, without making any announcement, was in effect using the same system, although it did not use the diacritics that are such a marked feature of the M-R system. About the same time, the two Koreas began to work on a joint romanization system under the auspices of the International Standards Organization. No agreement was reached, but there was a clear tendency toward accepting a modified M-R system, perhaps without diacritics. In 2000, however, the ROK government decided to go for a different system. Although this is supposed to make it easier for foreigners to pronounce Korean correctly, most English-speaking non-Koreans do not find this so. In this book, I have continued to use the romanization system used in the DPRK.

I owe a major debt to the series editor, Jon Woronoff, and the staff of the Scarecrow Press. The former has been an excellent editor who has shrugged and accepted yet another delay, while providing helpful commentary as the work progressed. The latter, like all the United States’ publishers with whom I have had dealings, have displayed a professionalism and interest that has put me firmly in their debt.

Finally, a word of caution about the uncertainties of life. This preface was originally dated November 2011, and in that month, the manuscript, maps, and pictures were all sent off to the publishers, who immediately began work on them. Then at 4:15 A.M. on 19 December, I was woken up by the newsroom at Sky News telling me that the DPRK media had just announced that Kim Jong Il had died two days previously. There followed two weeks of frantic radio and television interviews, and the realization that the manuscript would need revision in the light of this new development. I have tried to do this in the introduction and in the main entries, and I have also brought the chronology up to the end of 2011—it had previously ended in August. The judgments in these new additions are necessarily very tentative. It will be some time before we know whether the arrangements that Kim Jong Il made rather late in the day for his succession will hold or whether a whole new political structure will emerge and Kim Jong Un, his third son and heir,
will be swept aside. Personally, I think it unlikely, but there is no means of knowing at this early stage. All I can hope is that this Dictionary will provide some guidance.

J. E. Hoare
London, January 2012
Until the mid-15th century, Koreans used Chinese characters to write their language, even though the Chinese ideographs were not well suited to writing Korean. A variety of means were used to indicate pronunciation. Koreans date their own written language from 1446 when King Sejong the Great (r. 1418–50) created an indigenous alphabet for the Korean language. Sejong commissioned members of the academy of scholars, called the Hall of Wise Scholars (Chiphyonjon), to create a phonetic system that would be more in keeping with Korean grammar. These scholars drew on a variety of sources, including Sanskrit, to create the new script that Sejong adopted. In 1446, he proclaimed it as Hunmin Chongum, or the “correct sounds to instruct the people.” The new script immediately came under attack from orthodox Confucian scholars, who dismissed it as onmun (common, or vulgar, letters) and refused to use it. However, it survived and was widely used by women and writers of popular stories and songs. Only at the end of the 19th century did the use of Hunmin Chongum begin to spread among the educated classes. In the Japanese colonial period (1910–45), its use became patriotic. It was then that the term hangul, originally “Great Script” but also a pun on “Korean letters,” began to be used. Hangul is still the term used in the Republic of Korea (ROK), although it is now generally romanized as hanguel. In the ROK, the Korean alphabet is used with Chinese characters. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the older term, Chosun muncha (Korean letters), is still used and has entirely replaced Chinese characters. The modern written language has 10 vowels, 14 consonants, and a number of diphthongs and compound consonants. There have been many debates and disputes since the 19th century on the correct spelling of Korean words and whether the script should be written from top to bottom or across the page.

The other great issue has been romanization. French missionaries devised the first widely used system for rendering Korean words into Western languages in the 19th century. It used French sound values and fixed equivalents for each letter, ignoring the fact that some letters changed in speaking. The system did not come into general use. Koreans too devised a number of
systems of romanization, generally working on the principle that each letter should have fixed value and that it is letters that are transliterated, not sounds. Koreans know what the sounds are, but for many English-speaking foreigners, this approach produces unpleasing mispronunciations, such as *dogrib* for *independence*, *Bag* for the surname Pak (Park), and *Gim* for Kim. The ROK Ministry of Education approved the use of a form of this system in 1959, abandoned it for a modified version of the McCune-Reischauer system (see below) in 1984, and then reverted to a new version of it in 2000.

Among Western academics, the system widely used in the United States and Europe since the late 1930s has been the McCune-Reischauer system, devised by two American scholars with considerable input from Korean colleagues and published by the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1939. Their system was not a transliteration of *hangul* but a phonetic transcription of modern Korean. It was not intended for linguistic study, and other systems have been devised and are in use for that purpose. It worked on the assumption that vowels should be pronounced as in Italian and consonants as in English, a principle that had already become accepted in the romanization of Chinese and Japanese.

Although it is never so described, a modified version of the McCune-Reischauer system, omitting diacritics, is used for romanization in the DPRK. This is what has been used in this Dictionary. Over many years, I have found that it works well, producing an approximation to Korean sounds that is easy for non-Koreans to use and produces aesthetically pleasing words on the page. Thus the DPRK capital is written as Pyongyang, and not as Pyeongyang as it is currently written in the ROK. The islands that were subject to DPRK shelling in late 2010 appear as the Yonpyong Islands and not as the Yeonpyeong Islands. However, the romanization preferred by individuals and organizations has been kept, even though this may not conform to the McCune-Reischauer or sometimes any other system. The other major exception is the ROK capital, Seoul. This would be Soul in the modified McCune-Reischauer system, but Seoul, which derives from the French missionary usage, has become established and is used in both Koreas.

**NAMES**

In all East Asian countries, the traditional practice has been for the surname to come first, followed by given or individual names. This system is followed here, even for people who have become well known in the West. Thus it is *Kim* Il Sung, *Ito* Hirobumi, and *Mao* Zedong. Whatever the official orthodoxy about writing *hangul*, individuals tend to write their names in their own
way, and I have followed this. Thus the first president of the ROK, Yi Sung-
man, always romanized his name as Rhee Syngman, and he so appears here.

CROSS-REFERENCES

In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient location of information and to make the book as useful a reference tool as possible, extensive cross-refer-
ences have been provided. Within individual Dictionary entries, terms that have their own entries are in boldface type the first time that they appear. Further cross-referencing is shown through See and See also.

MEASUREMENTS

Both Korea use the metric system for all measurements, so metric measure-
ments are used throughout this book, with equivalents in bracket.

PRICES

Prices and costs are given in U.S. dollars.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AMG</td>
<td>(United States) Army Military Government</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>APTN</td>
<td>Associate Press Television News</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>chemical and biological warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>chief executive officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chongryon</td>
<td>General Association for Korean Residents in Japan</td>
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<td>Chosen Soren</td>
<td>General Association for Korean Residents in Japan</td>
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<td>CNC</td>
<td>computer numerical control</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
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<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>Communist International</td>
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<td>CPV</td>
<td>Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers</td>
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<td>DCB</td>
<td>Daesong Credit Bank</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<td>EBA</td>
<td>European Business Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>exclusive economic zone</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
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<td>FDRC</td>
<td>Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee</td>
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<td>FLPH</td>
<td>Foreign Languages Publishing House</td>
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<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of Seventy-Seven</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GMT</td>
<td>Guomintang</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hanminjon</td>
<td>National Democratic Front of Korea</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>IPU</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Taekwondo Federation</td>
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<td>JRO</td>
<td>joint recovery operations</td>
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<td>JSA</td>
<td>Joint Security Area</td>
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<td>Korean Communist Party</td>
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<td>KWP</td>
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<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>PVCO</td>
<td>private voluntary organization consortium</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Command for the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Supreme People’s Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Now ITAR-TASS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>tuberculosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCURK</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Chronology

1876  2 February: Japan–Korea Treaty of Kanghwa.
1894  10 January: Tonghak rebellion begins. 1 August: Sino–Japanese War begins.
1895  17 April: Treaty of Shimonoseki ends Sino–Japanese War. 20 August: Murder of Queen Min.
1897  11 August: Proclamation of the Great Han Empire.
1907  June: Korean delegates refused permission to take part in the Hague Second Peace Conference.
1910  22 August: Japan annexes Korea.
1912  15 April: Kim Il Sung (original name Kim Song Ju) born near Pyongyang.
1919  22 January: Death of former Korean Emperor Kojong. 1 March: Proclamation of Korean independence leads to nationwide protests and heavy Japanese repression during March and April. 9 April: Korean Provisional Government established in Shanghai.
1926  10 June: Funeral of Emperor Sunjong. 17 October: Kim Il Sung allegedly founds the Anti-Imperialism League (claim first made in the 1970s).

1931  September: Manchurian incident leads to establishment of Japanese puppet state of Manzhouguo in 1932.

1937  June: Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing leads to full-scale Sino–Japanese War.

1940  September: Kim Il Sung and his Kapsin guerrilla group retreat to the Soviet Union and eventually join the Red Army.

1941  7 December: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor marks beginning of the Pacific War.

1942  16 February: Kim Jong Il born on Mount Paektu, according to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accounts.

1943  November–December: The United States, Great Britain, and China declare at the Cairo Conference that Korea should be independent “in due course.”

1945  8 February: Soviet leader Josef Stalin and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt agree at the Yalta Conference that Korea should be placed under a joint trusteeship. July: Potsdam Conference agrees to carry out terms of Cairo Declaration. 8 August: USSR declares war on Japan and invades Korea. 11 August: U.S.–USSR agreement on the division of Korea along the 38th parallel in order to effect the Japanese surrender. Soviet forces move into Korea. 15 August: End of the Pacific War and of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. 2 September: Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the Pacific announces division of Korea into U.S. and Soviet operational zones. 6 September: People’s Republic of Korea proclaimed. 7 September: U.S. troops arrive in Korea. General Douglas MacArthur issues General Order No. 1 establishing the 38th parallel as the dividing line between USSR and U.S. troops. 9 September: Japanese governor-general signs the surrender document. 19 September: Kim Il Sung and partisan colleagues arrive at Wonsan. 8 October: Establishment of the Five Provinces Administrative Bureau, an embryonic North Korean government. 14 October: First public appearance of Kim Il Sung in North Korea. 7 November: Student uprising in Shimuiju against Soviet forces. 18 November: Women’s Democratic League inaugurated. 30 November: North Korean General Federation of Trade Unions formed. 18 December: Kim Il Sung becomes chair of the newly established North Korean Communist Party. 26 December: (North) Korean Buddhist Federation founded. 28 December: Moscow Agreement on Korea endorses trusteeship. Anti-trusteeship protests throughout the peninsula.
1946  3 January: Korean Communist Party announces support for trusteeship. 4 January: Cho Man Shik publicly opposes trusteeship and is arrested. 17 January: North Korean General Federation of Trade Unions formed. 31 January: North Korean Peasant Union formed. 8 February: Provisional People’s Committee under Kim Il Sung established. 11 February: (North) Korean Chondoist Association formed. 5 March: Provisional People’s Committee announces land reform. 20 March: Joint U.S.–Soviet Commission stalls over issue of trusteeship. 20 March: Kim Il Sung announces his Twenty Point Program that establishes the main political and economic structure for North Korea. 8 May: Joint U.S.–Soviet Commission fails to reach agreement and adjourns sine die. 10 June: Nationalization of all Japanese industry. 24 June: Labor Law proclaimed. 30 July: Law on sexual equality. 9 August: Introduction of “Citizen’s Certificate” (identity card) to be carried by all over 18—lowered to 17 in December 1972. 10 August: Nationalization of major industries. 28 August: First Party Congress of the North Korean Communist Party. 10 October: Kim Il Sung University established. 25 November: Kulloja (Workers), the party theoretical journal founded. 28 November: (North) Korean Christian Federation founded. 5 December: Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) established.

1947  20 February: People’s Committee, with Kim Il Sung as chairman, replaces the Provisional People’s Committee. 23 August: U.S. places the Korean Question before the United Nations (UN). 14 November: UN General Assembly adopts U.S. Resolution to set up UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK); USSR and its allies oppose. 1 December: Monetary reforms replace all existing currencies.

1948  8 February: Korean People’s Army (KPA) founded (date later changed to 25 April). 27–30 March: Second Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Congress leads to purge of northern domestic communists. 3 April: Jeju uprising in South Korea. 14 May: North Korea cuts off supply of electricity to the South. 24 July: New national flag designated. 15 August: Republic of Korea (ROK) proclaimed. 25 August: First meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). 3 September: SPA ratifies constitution. 9 September: Foundation of the DPRK, with Kim Il Sung as prime minister. 12 October: DPRK–USSR diplomatic relations. 20 October: Yosu rebellion in ROK. 12 December: UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) recognizes ROK as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. Dissolution of UNTCOK, which is replaced by a Commission on Korea. 31 December: USSR announces that all Soviet forces have left the DPRK.

1949  January–February: Two Koreas apply for UN membership, with each opposing the other’s application. 3 March–7 April: Kim Il Sung makes
first visit to Moscow. **25 June:** Establishment of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland. **29 June:** U.S. forces withdraw from the ROK. **30 June:** Formal establishment of the KWP. **1 October:** Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). **6 October:** DPRK–PRC diplomatic relations.

**1950**  **12 January:** U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a policy speech excludes Asian mainland from the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. **25 June:** DPRK attack across the 38th parallel at 0400 hours marks the beginning of the Korean War. **27 June:** DPRK forces capture Seoul. U.S. President Harry S. Truman orders Seventh Fleet to prevent all military action in the Taiwan Straits. **30 June:** U.S. forces arrive in Korea. **5 July:** First U.S.–DPRK military clash at Osan. **7 July:** UN Unified Command (UNC) created under General MacArthur. **19–22 July:** Battle for Taejon; Major General William F. Dean becomes highest ranking U.S. officer captured by DPRK forces. **15 September:** UN forces land at Inchon. **28 September:** UN forces capture Seoul. **30 September:** PRC issues public warning to the UNC not to cross the 38th parallel. **1 October:** UN forces cross the 38th parallel. **7 October:** UN resolution calls for a unified, independent, and democratic government to be established in Korea and establishes the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). **19 October:** UN forces capture Pyongyang. **26 October:** First clash between Chinese and UN forces. **3 November:** UN General Assembly adopts a Uniting for Peace Resolution. **21 November:** U.S. forces reach the Yalu River. **24 November:** UNC launches Home by Christmas offensive. **28 November:** Chinese forces operating as Chinese People’s Volunteers launch full-scale attack on UN forces, which begin rapid retreat. **3 December:** Chinese capture Pyongyang. **16 December:** President Truman declares a national emergency with respect to DPRK. **17 December:** U.S. Treasury implements restrictive regulations under the Trading with the Enemy Act. **21–23 December:** Third plenum of the second KWP Congress purges Mu Chong and other leaders from the Yan’an group.

**1951**  **4 January:** Chinese and DPRK forces recapture Seoul. **1 February:** UN resolution declares China an “aggressor” in Korea. **14 March:** UN–ROK forces recapture Seoul. **11 April:** President Truman dismisses General MacArthur. **18 May:** UN General Assembly resolution applies a strategic embargo against DPRK and the PRC. **1 June:** U.S. Secretary of State Acheson announces that the United States is prepared to accept a truce around the 38th parallel. **10 July:** Armistice talks begin at Kaesong, attended by DPRK, PRC, and the UNC. **23 August:** Armistice talks broken off. **12 November:** UNC Commander General Matthew Ridgway ends UNC offensive strategy, which is replaced by an “active defense” strategy. **27 November:** Armistice talks
resume at Panmunjom. Substantive agreement on armistice line but prisoner of war (POW) issue causes problems.

1952  2 January: UNC proposes voluntary repatriation of all POWs. 18 February: Major clash between communist POWs and UNC guards at Koje Island POW camp in the ROK. 7 May: Armistice negotiations stall over repatriation issue. U.S. Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, commander of Koje Island POW camp, held hostage by POWs. 11 May: Dodd released. 23 June: UNC attacks dams on the Yalu River to hasten conclusion of the armistice talks. 29 August: 1,403 UNC aircraft attack Pyongyang, virtually destroying the city. 8 October: DPRK–Chinese side reject POW settlement. 1 December: DPRK Academy of Sciences established.


1954  1 January: Launch of three-year economic plan. 26 April–20 July: Geneva Conference fails to reach agreement on a political settlement in Korea. 28 September–5 October: Kim Il Sung visits China for fifth anniversary of establishment of the PRC.

1955  15 February: DPRK proposes establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan. 25 May: Establishment of the General Association for Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon/Chosen Soren). 15 December: Former Vice Premier Pak Hon Yong sentenced to death for alleged espionage for the United States and the ROK.

1956  February: General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev denounces Stalin at a secret session of the 20th Party Congress. 27 February: DPRK–Japan Red Cross agreement on the repatriation of Koreans from Japan. 23–29 April: Third KWP conference. 1 June–19 July: Kim Il Sung visits USSR, Eastern European countries, and Mongolia. 1 August: Compulsory universal primary education. 30 August: Kim Il Sung under attack over his personality cult at KWP Politburo emergency plenary session but defeats and arrests his opponents. 31 October:
Agreement on a civil air service between Pyongyang and Moscow. 11–13 December: KWP Central Committee starts Chollima movement.

1957  1 January: Five-year economic development plan with stress on heavy industry. 27 August: Second SPA election. 4–21 November: Kim Il Sung visits USSR for celebration of 40th anniversary of the October Revolution.


1959  14 January: Worker–Peasant Red Guards founded. February: Kim Il Sung in Moscow for talks with Soviet leader Khrushchev. 1 April: Civil air services open between Pyongyang and Beijing. 3 August: DPRK and Japanese Red Cross societies sign agreement on transfer of Koreans from Japan to DPRK. 16 December: 975 Koreans from Japan arrive in DPRK.

1960  2 March: General Federation of Literature and Arts established. 19 April: Rhee Syngman government falls in ROK. 21 May: New China News Agency (NCNA) and KCNA cooperation agreement. 14 August: DPRK proposes establishment of a “confederated republic” to solve the problem of reunification. 16 September: Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and KCNA cooperation agreement.


May: *Rodong Shinmun* denounces President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia as a “revisionist.”

1964 24 February: Kim Il Sung’s “Socialist Rural Thesis” published. 15 September: DPRK returns 219 ROK detained fishermen. 1–4 November: Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno visits DPRK.


1966 July: DPRK soccer team reaches the quarter final of the Soccer World Cup in Great Britain. 26 August: DPRK–Japan Red Cross talks on further repatriation of Koreans from Japan. 5–12 October: KWP representatives’ second conference; Kim Il Sung becomes KWP Secretary. 22 November: Law on nine-year compulsory technical education.


1968 21 January: 31 DPRK special forces troops attempt attack on the Blue House, the ROK presidential palace; 30 killed and one captured. 23 January: U.S. surveillance vessel *Pueblo* captured; one crew member killed and 82 held captive. October–November: DPRK 120-strong guerrilla force lands on ROK east coast. 23 December: *Pueblo* crew released.

1969 15 April: DPRK fighter airplane shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance airplane some 144 kilometers (90 miles) off the DPRK east coast, killing all crew members. 7 June: 68th Assembly of the IOC meeting in Poland uses “DPRK,” the first time that a UN body made a formal reference to the country’s official title. 9 October: DPRK–Finland trade agreement. 1 December: Kim Il Sung announces the successful completion of the first seven-year plan—three years late. 11 December: Korean Airlines YS-11 turbo prop aircraft with 47 passengers and four crew hijacked to the DPRK.

1970 29 January: DPRK–PRC shipping service agreement. 14 February: 39 people from the 1969 hijacking repatriated. 5–9 April: PRC Premier Zhou Enlai visits DPRK. 5 June: ROK ship captured by DPRK and taken north; crew never returned. 22 June: DPRK agents plant bombs in the National Cemetery in Seoul in an attempt to kill ROK President Park Chung-hee. 15 August: President Park Chung-hee calls for peaceful competition in development, construction, and creativity between North and South. 2–13 November: KWP Fifth Congress, which makes *juche* the DPRK ideology; Kim Il Sung reelected KWP General Secretary.

1971 1 January: Six-year (1971–76) economic plan launched. 6 August: Kim Il Sung proposes a North–South summit meeting. 20 September: First North–South Red Cross preliminary meeting at Panmunjom.

1973  13 February: Three Revolutions Teams established. 14–16 March: Second NSCC meeting in Pyongyang. 9–10 May: Sixth round of Red Cross talks in Seoul. 17 May: DPRK admitted to the World Health Organization (WHO). 23 June: ROK President Park proposes that two Koreas should simultaneously enter the United Nations; DPRK responds that both Koreas should join as one “Confederated Republic of Koryo.” 11 July: Seventh round of Red Cross talks in Pyongyang. 28 August: Following kidnapping of ROK opposition politician Kim Dae-jung, DPRK suspends all talks. 5 September: Pyongyang subway opens.

1974  15 February: DPRK patrol boat fires on ROK fishing boats off the Paengnyong Islands in the West Sea; one boat sunk and one with 30 crew members taken to the DPRK. Kim Il Sung’s younger brother, Kim Yong Ju, becomes deputy premier. 25 March: DPRK sends a letter to the U.S. Congress proposing a DPRK–U.S. peace treaty. April: References to the “Party Center” (later identified as Kim Jong Il) begin to appear. 1 April: All taxes formally abolished. 15 April: Kim Il Sung’s birthday proclaimed a national holiday. 15 August: Korean–Japanese Mun Se-kwang attempts to assassinate ROK President Park during National Liberation Day speech at the National Theater in Seoul but kills Madame Park instead. 16 September: DPRK joins the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 17 October: DPRK joins UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 15 November: Discovery of a DPRK invasion tunnel under the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

1976  14 May: DPRK joins the Group of 77. 18 August: Two U.S. army officers killed in clash at Panmunjom. 20 August: DPRK ambassador to Denmark Kim Hung Chol and three other diplomats expelled for illegally selling drugs, cigarettes, and liquor.

1977  1 January: Kim Il Sung calls for a peace treaty with the United States in his New Year’s address. 14 July: U.S. Chinook CH-47 helicopter shot down after crossing DMZ; three crew killed and one briefly detained. 1 August: KPA Supreme Command establishes military sea boundaries in East and West Seas. 16 August: DPRK joins the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 5 September: Kim Il Sung publishes “Theses on Socialist Education.” 14 November: DPRK joins UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).


1979  19 January: ROK President Park proposes North–South officials’ meeting. 25 April–6 May: DPRK hosts 35th World Table Tennis Championship. 21 July: ROK navy sinks DPRK infiltration vessel; six bodies equipped with diving gear recovered. 26 October: ROK President Park assassinated. 6 December: U.S. military patrol crosses DMZ; one killed and four injured.

1980  7–9 May: Kim Il Sung attends Marshal Tito’s funeral in Yugoslavia and then visits Romania. 18 July: Congressman Stephen Solarz is the first U.S. public official to visit the DPRK since the end of the Korean War; meets Kim Il Sung. 10–14 October: Sixth KWP Party Congress sees first official appearance of Kim Jong Il as his father’s successor. 14 October: Kim Il Sung proposes reunification of the peninsula as the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.

1981  12 January: ROK President Chun Doo-hwan proposes exchange of visits between presidents of ROK and DPRK. 19 January: DPRK rejects Chun proposal. 14 February: French Socialist Party leader François Mitterrand visits DPRK. 5 June: ROK President Chun again proposes direct meeting of two presidents. 1 July: Kim Il Sung rejects the proposal. 4 October: Fourth session of the sixth SPA endorses various land reclamation projects, including the West Sea Barrage. 22 December: PRC delegation led by Premier Zhao Ziyang in DPRK.
1982  10 February: DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland proposes a joint meeting of 100 politicians from the two Koreas. 28 February: Seventh SPA election. 31 March: Publication of Kim Jong Il’s On the Juche Idea, to mark Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday. 15 August: ROK President Chun repeats summit proposal. 15–26 September: Kim Il Sung visits the PRC and holds talks with Deng Xiaoping.

1983  2 April: DPRK signs international agreement against skyjacking. 9 May: DPRK signs international agreement on preventing and controlling crimes against civil aircraft. 2–12 June: Kim Jong Il visits PRC at the invitation of CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang. 8 October: PRC passes message to the United States that the DPRK is willing to join tripartite U.S.–ROK–DPRK talks. 9 October: DPRK commando bomb attack in Yangon (Rangoon), capital of Myanmar (Burma), misses President Chun but kills 21 others. 11 November: Myanmar withdraws diplomatic recognition from the DPRK.

1984  10 January: DPRK proposes a nonaggression pact with the ROK and a peace treaty with the United States. 16 May–1 July: Kim Il Sung makes first visit to the USSR for 23 years; he also visits several East European countries. 8 September: Joint Venture Law promulgated. 29 September: Following floods in the ROK, DPRK relief goods arrive at Panmunjom. 4 October: Second delivery of DPRK relief goods. 6 October: DPRK suggests tripartite DPRK, ROK, and U.S. talks to discuss U.S. troop withdrawal and a nonaggression pact. 15 November: North–South economic talks at Panmunjom. 20 November: Red Cross preliminary meeting.

1985  9 January: DPRK postpones planned eighth round of Red Cross talks because of the Team Spirit exercise. 9 April: Fourth session of the seventh SPA calls for a North–South parliamentary conference to discuss a joint statement on nonaggression. 4–6 May: CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang in DPRK. 17 May: Second round of North–South economic talks. 28–29 May: Eighth round of Red Cross talks in Seoul reaches agreement on exchange of family members and art troupes for Liberation Day on 15 August. 20 June: Third round of North–South economic talks. 23 July: Preliminary round of talks at Panmunjom on parliamentary exchanges breaks up with no agreement. 27 July: Inauguration of the National Democratic Front of Korea (Hanminjon), nominally based in the ROK. 27–28 August: Ninth round of Red Cross talks; ROK proposes exchanges of Red Cross missions, but walks out of talks over DPRK “political” gymnastic performance. 4–6 September: DPRK Politburo member Ho Tam visits Seoul secretly in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a summit. 20 September: Separated family members meet in Pyongyang and Seoul; exchange of folk performance groups.
September: Second round of parliamentary talks, again with no agreement.

12 December: DPRK signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1986 10–11 June: Inter-Korean athletic talks are held in Switzerland. 5 September: KPA announces that 150,000 military personnel will work at construction sites. 4 October: Chinese Premier Li Xiannien holds talks with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang. 27–30 October: Kim Il Sung visits the USSR and holds talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev. 2 November: Eighth SPA election. 30 December: At the first session of the eighth SPA, Kim Il Sung proposes North–South politico-military talks.

1987 1 January: Third seven-year economic plan (1987–93). 5 February: DPRK issues revised criminal law. 20–23 May: Kim Il Sung visits the PRC and holds talks with CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. 29 November: Korean Air Boeing 747 Flight 858 is blown up over the Andaman Sea by DPRK agents, killing all 115 on board; one agent kills himself but the other, Kim Hyon Hui, is caught. 14 December: KPA says that the armed forces have been reduced to 100,000.

1988 1 January: Kim Il Sung proposes joint meeting of presidents and officials. 12 January: DPRK Olympic Committee announces that DPRK will not participate in the Seoul Summer Olympics. 15 January: Kim Hyon Hui, arrested after the Andaman Sea bombing, confesses she is a DPRK agent. 25 February: ROK President Roh Tae-woo expresses hope for a summit. 30 June: DPRK Catholic Federation established. 25 June–1 July: Kim Il Sung visits Mongolia. 4–5 July: Kim Il Sung visits Khabarovsk. 7 July: ROK President Roh proposes a six-point plan for reunification. 11 July: DPRK rejects Roh proposal. August: Series of meetings on parliamentary exchanges fails to reach agreement. 7 September: PRC President Yang Shangkun visits DPRK. 8 September: Kim says wishes to meet Roh. 17 September: Seoul Olympic Games. 31 October: U.S.–DPRK official talks in Beijing. 21 November: ROK allows private trade between ROK and DPRK.

1989 1 January: Kim Il Sung proposes an Inter-Korean Consultation Conference for National Unification in his New Year’s address. 16 January: DPRK Premier Yon Hyong Muk accepts ROK proposal to hold meeting of officials. 1 February: ROK–Hungary diplomatic relations; DPRK protests and downgrades representation in Hungary. 25 February: First ever DPRK student defectors, who had been studying in Prague, arrive in Seoul. 9 March: DPRK–ROK talks begin on a joint team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games—a total of five rounds are held by December. 3 April: USSR opens trade mission in the ROK. 24–29 April: CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang visits DPRK. 1 May: Kim Chong Min, head of the Taeyang Trading
Company, defects to the ROK. May Day stadium opened. 4 May: First U.S. public statement expressing concern over DPRK nuclear developments. 6 May: Two DPRK student defectors from Poland arrive in Seoul. 30 May: Establishment of the DPRK Religionists’ Council. 1–8 July: 13th Youth and Students World Festival held in Pyongyang. 5–7 November: Kim Il Sung visits PRC.

1990  1 January: Kim Il Sung proposes a joint North–South meeting of government officials and political leaders. 10 January: ROK President Roh calls for summit to discuss inter-Korean communications, trade, and travel. 3 March: Fourth tunnel under the DMZ discovered. 14 March: CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visits DPRK. 22 April: Ninth SPA election. 24 May: Kim Il Sung proposes a joint UN seat for the two Koreas. Kim Jong Il becomes first vice chair of the Central Military Commission. 31 May: Party and government meeting in Pyongyang proposes North–South mutual arms inspections and the creation of an inter-Korean military committee to discuss disarmament. 4 June: USSR President Gorbachev and ROK President Roh agree to establish diplomatic relations at a meeting in San Francisco. 26 July: North–South agreement on inter-Korean prime ministerial talks. 4 September: First round of inter-Korean prime minister talks in Seoul. 28 September: DPRK–Japan joint communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations. 30 September: ROK–USSR diplomatic relations. 9 October: DPRK–ROK soccer match in Beijing. 11 October: First ever DPRK–ROK soccer match in Pyongyang. 17 October: Second round of prime minister talks in Pyongyang. 23 October: First ever DPRK–ROK soccer match in Seoul. 2 November: DPRK–USSR agreement ending barter trade and introducing hard currency settlement of all two-way trade. 12 December: Third session of prime minister talks in Seoul. 15 December: DPRK–Japan talks in Beijing on diplomatic relations. 18 December: ROK President Roh says ROK free of all nuclear weapons and calls on the DPRK to shut down all nuclear facilities and allow international inspections.

Korean People’s Army. 30 December: Rajin-Sonbong free economic and trade zone announced.

1992


1993

January: IAEA team visits DPRK to discuss discrepancies in DPRK declaration. Sixth IAEA ad hoc inspection. 30 January: Law on the Free Economic and Trade Zone. 9 February: IAEA requests special inspection of two suspect sites. 20 February: DPRK rejects special inspection. 25 February: ROK President Kim Young-sam expresses hope to meet Kim Il Sung. IAEA board of governors passes resolution calling on DPRK to accept special inspections within one month. 12 March: DPRK announces that it will withdraw from the NPT. 18 March: Second IAEA governors’ resolution calling for special inspection by 31 March. 19 March: Ri In Mo, long-term prisoner in the ROK, returns to the DPRK. 1 April: IAEA board finds DPRK in breach of its safeguards’ agreement and reports to the UN Security Council. 3 April: DPRK expels Czech delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). 9 April: Kim Jong Il becomes chairman of the
National Defense Commission (NDC). 3 May: DPRK calls a meeting at Panmunjom at which it demands that the Swiss and Swedish delegations to the NNSC cease to use buildings on the northern side of the military demarcation line (MDL) and announces that the delegations may no longer cross the line without DPRK permission. 11 May: UN Security Council Resolution 825 calling on DPRK to comply with safeguards agreement. 17–21 May: DPRK–U.S. diplomats meet in New York to arrange high-level talks. 2–11 June: DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci issue a joint statement in which DPRK agrees to suspend withdrawal from the NPT. 4–19 July: Second round DPRK–U.S. high level talks in Geneva agree DPRK and IAEA will hold talks on inspections. 3 December: After talks between Ho Jong, DPRK UN deputy head of mission, and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Tom Hubbard, DPRK offers to open some nuclear sites for inspection. 3 December: DPRK–U.S. agreement on resumption of IAEA routine and ad hoc inspections. 8 December: Third three-year economic plan announced and admission that the seven-year plan ended in failure. 24 December: UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali crosses the DMZ for talks in the DPRK.

1994  7 January: DPRK–IAEA talks in Vienna. 21 January: DPRK rejects IAEA request for inspection of seven nuclear sites. 22 January: DPRK announces that it is opening its airspace to all airlines. 27 January–1 February: U.S. evangelist Billy Graham visits DPRK. He preaches in the Pongsu Church and meets Kim Il Sung, who sends a message to U.S. President William Clinton. 25 February: ROK President Kim says he will push for summit despite DPRK nuclear issue. Ho Jong, deputy chief of DPRK UN mission, says in New York that DPRK will agree to international inspections from 1 March. 1–15 March: IAEA inspection team in DPRK. 31 March: UN Security Council adopts unanimous presidential statement calling on DPRK to allow full nuclear inspections. 3 April: U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry says DPRK has produced two nuclear weapons. 28 April: DPRK announces its withdrawal from the MAC and proposes to the United States that the 1953 armistice agreement be replaced by a peace treaty. 14 May: DPRK announces that it has begun replacing spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon five-megawatt reactor. 24 May: DPRK establishes the People’s Army Mission to the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. 13 June: DPRK announces that it will withdraw from the NPT. 15–17 June: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung sends message proposing a North–South summit and also agrees to a nuclear freeze. ROK President Kim accepts the summit proposal. 28 June: ROK and DPRK officials agree to hold summit 25–27 July in Pyongyang. 8 July: Kim Il Sung dies of a heart attack. 11 July: DPRK announces indefinite postponement of the proposed summit. 19 July: Kim
Il Sung’s funeral. 5 August: DPRK–U.S. talks on nuclear issues postponed because of Kim Il Sung’s death, resume in Geneva. 13 September: 14 sets of remains of U.S. soldiers missing in action (MIA) from the Korean War returned via the UN Command at Panmunjom. 11 October: Dedication of the “reconstructed” tomb of the legendary founder of Korea, Tangun. 21 October: DPRK–U.S. Agreed Framework on resolving the nuclear issue signed in Geneva. 1 November: DPRK announces that it has halted construction of its two graphite-moderated reactors. 7 November: ROK government lifts the ban on business cooperation with the DPRK and offers economic cooperation. 10 November: DPRK rejects the proposed economic cooperation. 6 December: DPRK–U.S. working level talks in Washington on the mutual establishment of liaison offices. 15 December: Withdrawal of Chinese forces from the MAC at Panmunjom. 17 December: DPRK announces it has shot down a two-seater U.S. OH-58 helicopter that intruded across the MDL. 17–22 December: U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson in DPRK. 22 December: Body of U.S. Chief Warrant Officer David Hilemon returned. 28 December: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hubbard visits Pyongyang to secure the release of the surviving helicopter pilot. 30 December: U.S. Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hal released.

1995 1 January: The army, party, and youth league newspapers carry a joint editorial in place of the head of state address to the nation. 11 January: Nine-member delegation of the ROK’s Samsung group begins five-day visit to DPRK. 24 January: DPRK calls for a Grand National Congress of North and South political groups to be held on 15 August. 7 February: Central People’s Committee designates Kim Jong Il’s birthday, 16 February, as the “most festive national holiday.” 27 February: Joint venture agreement between Hong Kong–based Peregrine Bank and the Daesong Bank signed. 28 February: Polish delegation to the NNSC, denied support by the DPRK, abandons its camp near Panmunjom. 9 March: Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) launched in New York. 30 May: DPRK detains ROK fishing boat Woosung No. 86 and its crew. 4–10 June: First DPRK trade mission to the U.S. 13 June: U.S. and DPRK agree in Kuala Lumpur that DPRK will accept “South Korean-model” light water reactors (LWRs). 3 July: DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam writes to the UN secretary general demanding the end of UN insignia use by U.S. forces in the ROK. 8 July: Kim Il Sung’s embalmed body is placed in the Kumsusan Memorial Palace. 9 July: ROK pastor Ahn Sung-yun, operating in Yanbian in the PRC, kidnapped by DPRK agents. 26 July: ROK freighter Sea Apex enters DPRK port of Chongjin with 2,000 tons of rice and is forced to raise DPRK flag. 18 August: DPRK media carry reports of severe flooding hitting many parts of the country and appeals for international assistance. 15 August: First KEDO
group visits DPRK. 7 September: Russia announces that it will not renew its 1961 treaty with the DPRK but will negotiate a new agreement. 27 September: U.S. State Department announces that Sweden will provide consular services for U.S. citizens visiting the DPRK. 10 October: 50th anniversary of the founding of the KWP marked by military parade in Pyongyang. 24 October: Second KEDO team to DPRK. 5 November: Brussels-based international mailing company DHL opens an office in Pyongyang. 11 November: Rajin–Pusan direct sea route opens. 5 December: DPRK and KEDO sign reactor contract in New York. 22 December: DPRK announces that it will return five crew members and the remains of three others from the Woosung No. 86 fishing boat, captured in May, via Panmunjom.

1996 10 January: DPRK team begins visit to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. 29 January: DPRK protests at the proposed Wassenaar Arrangement on the export of arms and dual-purpose goods and technology. 6 February Peregrine–Daesong Bank joint venture opens in Pyongyang. 15 February: DPRK citizen tries to seek asylum at the Russian embassy in Pyongyang but is refused. 22 February: DPRK Foreign Ministry calls for a "tentative agreement" with the United States until a peace agreement can be signed. 5–7 April: DPRK troops with heavy weapons and a mortar enter Panmunjom on three successive days in violation of the truce agreement. 16 April: U.S. President Clinton and ROK President Kim propose Four Party Talks to include the United States, ROK, DPRK, and the PRC. 4–9 May: DPRK–U.S. talks in New York on U.S. missing in action (MIA) from the Korean War. 23 May: Five DPRK warships cross Northern Limit Line (NLL) in West Sea. 24 May: DPRK media announce that the country has received 200,000 tons of foreign aid grain. 14 June: Three DPRK warships cross the NLL. DPRK and KEDO sign a transportation and communications protocol. July: DPRK participates in Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia. 18 September: DPRK submarine runs aground in Kangwon Province. 23 September: DPRK Armed Forces Ministry admits that a submarine has entered ROK waters but says this was the result of engine failure and demands the return of the vessel and its crew. 6 October: DPRK announces arrest of U.S. citizen Evan Carl Hunziker, allegedly for spying for the ROK. 11 October: Colonel Choi Ju Hwal is highest ranking DPRK military officer to defect to the ROK. 15 October: UN Security Council adopts a presidential statement condemning the DPRK submarine infiltration. 20 November: DPRK closes its North–South liaison office at Panmunjom. 27 November: Hunziker released after visit by U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson and payment of a $5,000 hotel bill. 28 November: DPRK–Russia sign economic agreement. 26 December: DPRK returns five crew members and cremated remains of three others from an ROK fishing vessel held for almost seven months.
1997  12 February: Hwang Jang Yop, highest ranking DPRK official to defect, seeks asylum at the ROK consulate in Beijing. 10 March: Two DPRK soldiers cross the MDL at Panmunjom but return to the DPRK. 15–18 March: Catherine Bertini, head of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), visits the DPRK and signs agreement on food aid. 28–29 March: U.S. delegation led by Ted Stevens, head of the Senate Appropriations Committee, visits DPRK. 20 April: Hwang Jang Yop arrives in Seoul. 11 May: DPRK announces that it wishes to join the Asian Development Bank. 12 May: 14 members of two DPRK families defect by boat to the ROK. 26 May: North and South Red Cross officials sign an agreement on the supply of food aid to the DPRK. 5 June: Naval clash in the Yellow Sea when DPRK fishery protection vessel crossed the NLL. 30 June: DPRK agrees to attend Four Party Talks. 24 June: ROK Chosun Ilbo newspaper carries editorial blaming the DPRK leadership for the famine conditions in the country. 24–28 June: Yasushi Akashi, UN undersecretary for humanitarian aid, in DPRK. 29 June: DPRK Democratic Front for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland threatens to bomb the Chosun Ilbo offices. 8 July: Establishment of the juche calendar, with the year of Kim Il Sung’s birth, 1912, as Juche Year One. 16 July: DPRK forces cross the center line in the DMZ, resulting in a firefight between DPRK and ROK forces. 4 August: DPRK hands over four sets of U.S. MIA remains. 6 August: UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) opens office in DPRK. 9–11 August: Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Intelligence Committee Porter Gross visits DPRK to discuss MIA issue and the opening of liaison offices. 19 August: KEDO groundbreaking ceremony for two LWRs at Kumho on the east coast. 27 August: DPRK ambassador to Egypt Kang Sung Gil, plus his wife and elder brother, granted asylum in the United States five days after disappearing from Cairo. 8 October: Kim Jong Il becomes secretary general of the KWP. 19 November: Following a DPRK–ROK agreement in October on sharing flight information, a direct telephone line for air traffic control opens between the North and South. 9–10 December: Four Party Talks convene in Geneva. 18 December: Kim Dae-jung elected ROK president and begins to articulate a new policy of engagement (the “sunshine policy”) toward the DPRK.

1998  1 March: Cathy Pacific cargo aircraft becomes first noncommunist commercial airplane to pass through DPRK airspace since the end of the Korean War. 16–21 March: Second round of Four Party Talks. 11–17 April: First talks on inter-Korean relations since July 1994 held in Beijing but break up without agreement. 25 April: Kim Il Sung’s widow, Kim Song Ae, is replaced as head of the Women’s Democratic League. 9 June: Agreement on first general officer talks at Panmunjom since 1991, providing a U.S. general leads for the UN side. 16 June: Hyundai Chairman Chung Ju-yung leads 501
head of cattle across the DMZ. 22 June: DPRK submarine is caught in ROK fishing nets near Sokcho in Gangwon Province. 5–9 August: During Four Party talks in Geneva, DPRK demands withdrawal of U.S. forces and that the United States signs a peace treaty with the DPRK. 31 August: DPRK fires a multistage Taepodong-1 missile over Japan, claiming it was a satellite launch. 5 September: 10th SPA amends DPRK Constitution to make the head of the NDC, a post held by Kim Jong II, the highest constitutional position. 9 September: 50th anniversary of the DPRK marked by military parade and mass rally. 2 October: ICAO adopts resolution condemning the DPRK missile test. 21 October: Third round of Four Party Talks. 30 October: Kim Jong II holds talks in Pyongyang with Hyundai head Chung Ju-yung. 16–18 November: Charles Kartman, U.S. special envoy to the Korean peace process, meets Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan in Pyongyang. 18 November: ROK Hyundai Corporation launches first tourist cruise to Mount Kumgang in the DPRK.

1999 14 January: PRC delivers 80,000 tons of crude oil to the DPRK. 18–22 January: Fourth round of Four Party Talks. 3 March: Ministry of City Management and Land Environment Protection divided into two independent ministries. 9 March: IAEA delegation in DPRK. 29–30 March: U.S. State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn visits DPRK. 18 April: North–South meeting in Beijing fails to reach agreement on meetings about divided families. 24–27 April: Fifth round of Four Party Talks. 14–15 May: Charles Kartman again in DPRK and meets Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. 20–24 May: Joel Wit, deputy chief of the U.S. State Department’s Korea desk, leads inspection team to the Kumchang-ri suspected nuclear site. 3–7 June: SPA Standing Committee chair Kim Young Nam leads delegation to the PRC. 15 June: Major DPRK–ROK naval clash in the West Sea, with the sinking of one DPRK torpedo boat and damage to several others. 22–26 June: DPRK–ROK vice-ministerial talks in Beijing. 5–9 August: Sixth round of Four Party Talks. 2 September: DPRK announces that it does not regard the NLL as valid and establishes a “maritime military demarcation line” in its place. 7–12 September: U.S. and DPRK diplomats reach an understanding in Berlin on a DPRK moratorium on its missile program and further tests. The United States lifts a number of trade sanctions. 13 September: DPRK announces moratorium on long-range missile tests, while the DPRK–U.S. talks continue. 15 September: U.S. policy coordinator on DPRK affairs William Perry recommends that the United States eases economic sanctions on the DPRK in return for suspension of missile tests. 5 October: PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visits DPRK. 21 October: First DPRK Internet site, Korea Infobank, launched. 9–15 November: Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visits DPRK. 1–3 Decem-
ber: Former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomichi and delegation in DPRK and reach agreement to resume negotiations on diplomatic relations.

19–21 December: DPRK–Japan Red Cross talks in Beijing on humanitarian cooperation.


29 May–3 June: Kim Jong II makes an unannounced visit to the PRC. 13–15 June: ROK President Kim visits Pyongyang. 15 June: Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il sign the North–South Joint Declaration. 19–20 July: Russian President Vladimir Putin visits DPRK and signs a joint declaration with Kim Jong Il. 27 July: DPRK becomes 23rd member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. 29–31 July: First postsummit North–South ministerial meeting. 15 August: First North–South family reunions since 1985. Border liaison offices reopen at Panmunjom. 11–14 September: Kim Yong Sun, chair of the Asia–Pacific Committee, leads delegation to Seoul to plan for Kim Jong Il’s proposed visit to the ROK. 15 September: DPRK and ROK teams march together at the start of the Sydney Summer Olympics, but compete separately. 25–26 September: DPRK and ROK defense ministers hold first meeting on Jeju Island. 27–30 September: Third round of inter-Korean ministerial talks held on Jeju Island. Agreement reached on setting up a joint economic consultation body. 9–12 October: Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok visits the United States as Kim Jong Il’s special envoy and presents a letter from Kim Jong Il to President Clinton. Joint communiqué issued. 22–26 October: PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian visits DPRK and meets Kim Jong Il. 23–25 October: U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits the DPRK. 25 October: DPRK Foreign Ministry suggests the United States signs a nonaggression treaty and gives a security guarantee. 13–16 December: Fourth inter-Korean ministerial meeting held in Pyongyang and agreements signed on economic cooperation framework.

on Russian arms’ sales. 2–4 May: European Union (EU) delegation led by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson in DPRK. Kim Jong Il pledges to continue the existing moratorium on missile tests. 14 May: DPRK–EU diplomatic relations. 9 June: President George W. Bush announces completion of Korean policy review and his willingness to resume talks with the DPRK. 14 July–8 August: Kim Jong II visits Russia by train; meets President Putin in Moscow. 2 September: DPRK proposes resumption of North–South high-level dialogue after six-month gap. 3–5 September: PRC President Jiang Zemin visits DPRK. 13 September: DPRK issues statement condemning terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Groundbreaking ceremony for LWRs at Kumho. 15–18 September: Fifth round of North–South ministerial talks in Seoul and economic cooperation plan adopted. 19 September: Agreement to resume family reunions. 19–20 September: ROK forces fire on DPRK forces that cross the MDL at Panmunjom. 9–12 November: Sixth round of North–South ministerial talks at Mount Kumgang. 31 December: U.S. Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review lists DPRK as head of the list of U.S. nuclear targets.

2002 29 January: U.S. President George W. Bush describes the DPRK as part of an “Axis of Evil” with Iran and Iraq in his State of the Union address. 29 June: DPRK–ROK naval clash in the West Sea, with some 30 DPRK and four ROK sailors killed. 17 September: Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visits DPRK. Kim Jong II confirms that DPRK special forces kidnapped a number of Japanese and that the DPRK had used spy ships against Japan. 3–5 October: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in DPRK where he charges the DPRK with pursuing a highly enriched uranium program in breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework. 16 October: U.S. announces that DPRK admitted pursuing a secret nuclear arms program. 18 October: Five Japanese citizens abducted by DPRK 25 years before they are allowed a brief visit home on condition that they return, but the Japanese government refuses to allow them to go back. 26 October: DPRK publicly denies that it has a highly enriched uranium program. 14 November: President Bush declares November oil shipments to the DPRK will be the last if it does not agree to put a halt to its weapons program. 11 December: DPRK-made Scud missiles are found aboard a ship bound for Yemen. The United States detains the ship, but is later forced to allow it to leave, conceding that neither country has broken any law. 12 December: DPRK blames the United States for wrecking the 1994 Agreed Framework and threatens to reactivated nuclear facilities for energy generation, saying the U.S. decision to halt oil shipments leaves it with no choice. 13 December: DPRK asks the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon power plant. 22 December: DPRK begins removing monitoring devices from the Yongbyon plant. 24
December: Repairs begin at Yongbyon plant. North–South Korea talks over reopening road and rail border links stall. 27 December: DPRK expels IAEA inspectors and says it will reopen a reprocessing plant.

2003  6 January: IAEA resolution demands that DPRK readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons program or face action by the UN Security Council. 10 January: DPRK announces it will withdraw from the NPT. 28 January: In his State of the Union address, President Bush says DPRK is “an oppressive regime [whose] people live in fear and starvation.”

29 January: DPRK says Bush’s speech is an “undisguised declaration of aggression to topple the DPRK system” and that he is “a shameless charlatan.”

5 February: DPRK claims that it has reactivated its nuclear facilities and their operations are now going ahead “on a normal footing.” 12 February: IAEA finds DPRK in breach of nuclear safeguards agreement and refers the matter to the UN Security Council. 24 February: DPRK fires a missile into the East Sea/Sea of Japan. 25 February: Roh Moo-hyun sworn in as ROK president.

2 March: Four DPRK fighter aircraft intercept a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadow it for 22 minutes. 10 March: DPRK fires a second missile into the East Sea/Sea of Japan. 9 April: UN Security Council expresses concern about DPRK’s nuclear program, but does not condemn it for pulling out of the NPT. 18 April: DPRK announces that it has started reprocessing its spent fuel rods. The statement is later amended to read that it has been “successfully going forward to reprocess” the rods. 23 April: China hosts talks in Beijing between the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and DPRK MFA American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Director General Li Gun. 24 April: U.S. officials say DPRK has claimed that it has nuclear weapons. 2 May: Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer expresses concern after a DPRK Korean Workers’ Party official is found on board a state-owned ship accused of bringing A$80 million (US$50 million) worth of heroin into Australia. 12 May: DPRK announces it is ending the 1992 North–South agreement on keeping the Korean Peninsula free from nuclear weapons. 9 June: DPRK says that it will build a nuclear deterrent, “unless the US gives up its hostile policy.” 30 June: Hyundai Asan begins construction of a special economic zone, the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), at the DPRK town of Kaesong, close to the DMZ. 1 August: DPRK agrees to participate in Six Party Talks with the ROK, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia on its nuclear program. 27–29 August: Six Party Talks begin in Beijing but break up without agreement, although the delegates agree to meet again. 2 October: DPRK announces it has reprocessed the spent fuel rods. 30 October: DPRK agrees to resume talks on the nuclear crisis, after saying it is prepared to consider the U.S. offer of a security guarantee in return for ending its nuclear program. 21 November: KEDO, the international consortium
formed to build the DPRK’s light water reactor nuclear power plants, decides to suspend the project. 9 December: DPRK offers to freeze its nuclear program in return for U.S. concessions, but if the United States does not agree, it will not take part in further talks. President George W. Bush rejects the offer, saying that the DPRK must dismantle the program altogether.

2004  10 January: An unofficial U.S. team visits Yongbyon. 22 January: U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker tells Congress that the delegates visiting Yongbyon were shown what appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but that he did not see any evidence of a nuclear bomb. 23 June: Third round of Six Party Talks held in Beijing, at which the United States offers fuel aid to the DPRK if it freezes and then dismantles its nuclear programs. 2 July: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell meets the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun. 23 August: After President George W. Bush calls Kim Jong Il a “tyrant,” DPRK describes Bush as an “imbecile” and a “tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade.” 11–14 September: Great Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Bill Rammell makes first ever British ministerial visit to the DPRK. 28 September: DPRK claims that it has turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons. Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon says at the UN General Assembly that the weapons were needed for self-defense against the U.S. nuclear threat.

2005  14 January: KCNA says that the DPRK is willing to restart stalled talks on its nuclear program. 19 January: Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s nominee as secretary of state, identifies the DPRK as one of six “outposts of tyranny” where the United States must help bring freedom. 10 February: DPRK suspends its participation in the Six Party Talks for an indefinite period, blaming the Bush administration’s intention to “antagonize, isolate and stifle it at any cost” and repeats the claim that its nuclear weapons are for self-defense. 23 March: National Democratic Front of Korea changes its name to Anti-Imperialist National Democratic Front. 18 April: ROK says DPRK has shut down the Yongbyon reactor, a move that could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear weapons. 11 May: DPRK says it has completed extraction of spent fuel rods at Yongbyon as part of plans to “increase its nuclear arsenal.” 16 May: First North–South Korea talks in 10 months, with the DPRK seeking fertilizer. 25 May: The United States suspends MIA program in the DPRK, citing unspecified security threats to U.S. personnel. 22 June: DPRK requests more food aid during the North–South first ministerial talks for a year in Seoul. 9 July: DPRK agrees to rejoin nuclear talks. 12 July: ROK offers the DPRK electricity as an incentive to end its nuclear weapons program. 25 July–7 August: Fourth round of Six Party Talks in Beijing end in deadlock and a recess is called. 13 September: Talks resume,
but a new DPRK request to build a light water reactor prompts warnings of a “standoff” between the parties. 15 September: U.S. Treasury announces sanctions directed at alleged DPRK money laundering through the Banco Delta Asia in Macau. 19 September: DPRK agrees to give up all its nuclear activities and rejoin the NPT, while the United States says it had no intention of attacking the DPRK. 20 September: DPRK says it will not scrap its nuclear program until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor. 24 September–1 October: Great Britain–DPRK All-Party Parliamentary Group delegation led by General Lord Guthrie in DPRK. 11 November: Fifth round of Six Party Talks ends without progress. 20 December: DPRK says it intends to resume building nuclear reactors.

2006 8 January: KEDO staff withdraw from the Kumho LWR site. 10–18 January: Kim Jong Il makes “unofficial” visit to China. 4–8 February: 13th session of DPRK–Japan normalization talks in Beijing end inconclusively. 10 February: ROK and DPRK athletes compete as one team in the Turin (Italy) Winter Olympics. 3 July: The United States dismisses a DPRK threat to launch a nuclear strike against the United States in the event of an American attack. 4 July: DPRK test fires at least six missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2, despite repeated international warnings. The Taepodong-2 launch is not successful. 5 July: Seventh missile launched despite international condemnation of the earlier launches. 7 July: ROK suspends food aid in protest at the missile tests. 15 July: UN Security Council unanimously votes to impose sanctions on DPRK over the missile tests. The resolution demands UN members bar exports and imports of missile-related materials to the DPRK and that it halt its ballistic missile program. 13 August: The first Orthodox Christian Church since 1945 opens in Pyongyang. 11 September: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill warns DPRK against a nuclear test, saying that it would be a provocative act. 27 September: DPRK blames U.S. financial sanctions for the deadlock in multilateral talks on its nuclear program. Choe Su Hon tells the UN General Assembly that the DPRK was willing to hold talks, but the U.S. stance had created an impasse. 3 October: DPRK Foreign Ministry statement says that the DPRK will carry out a nuclear test “in the future . . . where safety is firmly guaranteed” to “bolster” its self-defense in the face of U.S. military hostility. 9 October: DPRK says it has carried out its first ever nuclear weapon test. 14 October: UN Security Council unanimously agrees to Resolution 1718 to impose weapons and financial sanctions on the DPRK over its claimed nuclear test and demands that it eliminates all its nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. 31 October: PRC announces that Six Party Talks will resume, following a meeting between U.S., DPRK, and PRC envoys. 18 November: DPRK deputy representative at the United Nation says peace treaty should
### Chronology

18–22 December: Six Party Talks resume in Beijing, but make no progress. 29 December: ROK officially describes DPRK as a “serious threat,” in the wake of the October nuclear test.

**2007**  
16–18 January: U.S. and DPRK representatives meet in Berlin. 3–31 January: Second session of U.S.–DPRK talks on U.S. financial sanctions. 8–13 February: Six Party Talks in Beijing reach deal under which the DPRK agrees to close down nuclear reactor in return for economic assistance. Working groups would be established to handle a variety of issues. 27 February–2 March: 20th inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang. 1 March: United Nations Development Program (UNDP) suspends its DPRK operations. 7–8 March: DPRK–Japan normalization talks in Hanoi end with no progress. DPRK–U.S. normalization talks in New York. 13–14 March: IAEA director Mohamed El Baradei visits Pyongyang and says DPRK is “fully committed” to giving up its nuclear program. 17 March: Second U.S.–DPRK normalization meeting. 19–22 March: First session of sixth round of Six Party Talks in Beijing. DPRK leaves early in protest at delayed transfer of funds from Banco Delta Asia. 24 March: DPRK–U.S. talks in Beijing on DPRK funds held in Banco Delta Asia. 8–11 April: New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and party in DPRK to discuss search for U.S. MIAs. 14 April: DPRK misses deadline to close nuclear facilities, arguing that the disagreement over blocked funds remains unresolved. 16 April: Remains of six U.S. MIA handed over at Panmunjom, the first return of remains since U.S. cancellation of the MIA program in 2005. 25 April: DPRK–Myanmar diplomatic relations, suspended after the 1983 Yangon bombing, are restored. 16–23 May: First group of Korean–Americans make home visit. 17 May: First test train crosses DMZ. 20 May: First DPRK cargo ship visits ROK port of Busan since before the Korean War. 25 May: DPRK launches several short-range missiles over East Sea. 7 June: DPRK launches two short-range missiles over West Sea. 16 June: Macau officials confirm that the blocked DPRK funds in the Banco Delta Asia have been released and passed to a Russian bank. 19 June: DPRK launches short range missile over East Sea. 21 June: First power link between North and South since 1948. 21–22 June: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in Pyongyang. 23–25 June: European Parliament delegation in DPRK. 25 June: DPRK declares banking dispute with the United States is over. 13 July: The United States rejects DPRK proposal for military talks with a UN presence. 14 July: DPRK suspends nuclear operations at Yongbyon, and visiting IAEA team conducts inspections. 28 July–7 August: Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun attends ASEAN Regional Forum in Philippines and meets ROK Foreign Minister Song Min-soon. 5–18 August: Severe flooding leaves several hundred dead or missing and 84,000 houses damaged. DPRK appeal for international aid. 2 September:
The United States announces after bilateral talks in Geneva that DPRK will dismantle nuclear facilities by the end of the year. **5–6 September:** Second round of DPRK–Japan normalization talks in Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia. **15 September:** DPRK issues denials of nuclear cooperation with Syria. **18–21 September:** Typhoon Wipha causes additional flood damage. **2–4 October:** ROK President Roh Myo-hyun visits DPRK. **29–30 October:** DPRK cargo ship rescued from pirate attack off Mogadishu by U.S. destroyer. **14 November:** ROK and DPRK prime ministers meet for first time in 15 years. **4 December:** U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in Pyongyang. **6 December:** President Bush sends a letter to Kim Jong Il urging him to keep the DPRK pledge to reveal full details of its nuclear program. **12 December:** ROK Prime Minister Han Duck-soo visits KIZ. **19 December:** Lee Myung-bak elected ROK president.

**2008**  
**1 January:** Dandong City (China) announces plan to build a new bridge across the Yalu. **15 January:** ROK president-elect Lee Myung-bak says he is willing to meet DPRK leader Kim Jong Il at any time to improve relations. **21 January:** DPRK suspends planned working level meeting on railway cooperation projects. **30 January:** Egyptian Orsacom Telecom company announces that it has been granted first commercial license to provide mobile telephone services in the DPRK. **8–10 May:** Head of U.S. State Department Korea desk Sung Kim visits DPRK to receive a declaration of its nuclear stockpile. **11–12 June:** Japan–DPRK talks on normalization in Beijing. **17–19 June:** PRC Vice President Xi Jinping visits DPRK. **23 June:** DPRK team wins Women’s Asian Football Cup in Bangkok. **26 June:** DPRK hands over details of nuclear program to China. President George W. Bush lifts remaining trading with the enemy-related sanctions and informs Congress that he proposes to remove the DPRK from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. **11 July:** ROK President Lee Myung-bak proposes resumption of North–South dialogue. ROK woman tourist is shot dead after entering a restricted military area near the Kumgang Mountains tourist resort. **23 July:** DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meet and shake hands at an ASEAN summit in Singapore. **26 August:** DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that the DPRK stopped the denuclearization process on 14 August because the United States had not removed it from the terrorism list. **3 September:** ROK government says DPRK has begun to reconstruct nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. **1–3 October:** U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in DPRK. **2 October:** First inter-Korean military talks in eight months—also the first official bilateral North–South dialogue of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency—held at Panmunjom, but they are brief and make little headway. Forty lawmakers from the ROK main opposition Democratic Party visit the KIZ. **7 October:** DPRK test fires two short-range
missiles in the Yellow Sea. **10 October**: Japan extends sanctions on the DPRK for a further six months. **11 October**: President Bush announces that DPRK has been removed from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. **21 October**: DPRK newspaper *Minju Chosun* calls for Japan’s expulsion from the Six Party Talks because it impedes the denuclearization program. **27 October**: DPRK–ROK military talks at Panmunjom. **28 October**: KPA soldier defects across the DMZ. **29 October–1 November**: 250-strong ROK delegation visits Pyongyang for the opening of the Pyongyang Hemp Textiles Joint Venture. **4 November**: KCNA criticizes Japan for sponsoring an anti-DPRK resolution at the UN Human Rights Committee meeting. **6 November**: General Kim Yong Chol, chief DPRK delegate to inter-Korean military talks and policy chief of the National Defense Commission, leads an unprecedented and unannounced KPA inspection of the KIZ. **12 November**: General Kim Yong Chol announces major controls on the KIZ. **15–19 November**: Delegation from the ROK Democratic Labor Party visits DPRK and reports strong hostility to Lee Myung-bak government. **1 December**: DPRK Red Cross announces closure of its Panmunjom office. **8–11 December**: Six Party Talks in Beijing fail to reach agreement on verification.

**2009**  
**9–11 January**: PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue in DPRK. **13 January**: DPRK releases a Japanese citizen, Sawada Yoshiaki, held as a suspected drugs dealer since 2003, on humanitarian grounds. **15 January**: ROK nuclear delegation in DPRK to explore possibility of buying spent nuclear fuel rods. **23 January**: Kim Jong Il meets Wang Jiarui, head of the CCP’s international department, and says that the DPRK wishes to see the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. **26–29 January**: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin and delegation in DPRK. **14 February**: UN Population Fund says DPRK population has reached 24.05 million, according to 2008 census data. Pyongyang’s population is said to be 3.2 million. **20 February**: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announces in Seoul that Stephen Bosworth is to be the U.S. special envoy for the DPRK. **2 March**: First general officer talks in six years held at Panmunjom. **8 March**: Yu Seong-jin, an employee of Hyundai Asan at the KIZ, detained for allegedly slandering the DPRK leadership and attempting to persuade a DPRK worker to defect. **17 March**: Two U.S. journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, detained on the Sino–DPRK border. DPRK says it wants no more U.S. food aid and calls for the immediate departure of U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from the country. **5 April**: DPRK launches three-stage rocket that it says is to put a satellite into orbit. **9 April**: SPA elections; Kim Jong Il reelection chair of the NDC and his brother-in-law Jang Song Taek elected to the commission. **13 April**: UN Security Council unanimously issues a non-binding presidential statement condemning DPRK rocket launches. **14 April**: 
DPRK announces that it is quitting the Six Party Talks, will not abide by agreements reached at the talks, and is resuming its nuclear program. **16 April:** IAEA inspectors leave Yonbyon. **18 April:** ROK says it will postpone announcing a decision on joining the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) until after inter-Korean talks. KCNA carries a statement by the KPA general staff warning the DPRK would regard ROK full participation in the PSI as a declaration of war. **19 April:** ROK “regrets” DPRK threats, and insists that PSI is not specifically targeting DPRK. **21 April:** DPRK–ROK first official civilian meeting in over a year lasts just 22 minutes, after procedural disputes delay the start for over 12 hours. **22 April:** U.S. forces’ in Korea Commander General Walter Sharp says that the United States will continue to offer the ROK protection under its nuclear umbrella after the 2012 transfer of wartime operational control. **29 April:** DPRK Foreign Ministry says that unless the United Nations apologized for its actions, the DPRK would take self-defense measures, including nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. **8 May:** DPRK rejects bilateral talks with the United States. **17 May:** DPRK newspaper *Minju Choson* says that DPRK will not return to negotiations unless the United States and the ROK give up hostile attitude. **23 May:** Former ROK President Roh Moo-hyun commits suicide. **25 May:** DPRK conducts second nuclear test and launches two short-range missiles. **26 May:** ROK announces that it will play a full part in the PSI. **27 May:** DPRK threatens retaliation if ROK attempts to search its ships. DPRK announces that it will not abide by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. **5 June:** DPRK proposes talks on the KIZ. The ROK accepts, and they agree to meet on 11 June at Kaesong. **8 June:** DPRK announces that two detained U.S. journalists had committed a grave crime and would be sentenced to 12 years “reform through labour.” **10 June:** U.S. special envoy to the DPRK, Stephen Bosworth, says the United States will do what is needed to protect allies but has no intention of invading DPRK or overthrowing its government. **11 June:** DPRK demands wages at KIZ be quadrupled and rent increased 30-fold. **12 June:** UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 1874, which calls on UN members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying military materials in or out of DPRK. DPRK Foreign Ministry denounces UNSC Resolution 1874 and says that DPRK will “weaponise” its existing plutonium stockpiles, begin a program to enrich uranium, and take “firm military action if the United States and its allies try to isolate us.” **15 June:** U.S.–ROK summit in Washington at which U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates tells ROK President Lee that the United States will use all means necessary, including nuclear arms, to defend the ROK against military threats from the DPRK. **18 June:** U.S. officials say the U.S. military is tracking a DPRK ship believed to be carrying illicit weapons in the Pacific Ocean. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates orders the U.S.
military to take defensive measures should the DPRK attempt to fire a ballistic missile toward Hawaii. Japan imposes a ban on all trade with the DPRK until April 2010. **19 June:** DPRK offers to lift all restrictions on access to the KIZ. **22 June:** UNDP says that DPRK aid projects will continue as planned, regardless of the sanctions resolution. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also says it plans to continue its medical aid projects for the DPRK. **24 June:** U.S. President Barak Obama extends sanctions on commerce with the DPRK for a year under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act. **26 June:** Obama administration appoints Philip Goldberg to lead a task force coordinating U.S. military and financial measures against the DPRK. **2 July:** DPRK fires four short-range missiles over the East Sea/Sea of Japan. DPRK–ROK officials meet but fail to reach agreement on the future of the KIZ. **4 July:** DPRK fires seven ballistic missiles into the East Sea/Sea of Japan. **7–9 July:** ROK official websites, including the Blue House, and a number of U.S. government websites, come under cyber attack. Press reports blame the DPRK, but there appears to be no clear evidence that this was the case. **22 July:** Ministry of Foodstuffs and Daily Necessities created. **4–5 August:** Former U.S. President Bill Clinton visits DPRK, meets Kim Jong Il, and secures release of the two detained U.S. journalists. **10–17 August:** Hyundai Group chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun in the DPRK. **11 August:** Arirang mass games open in Pyongyang. **13 August:** Hyundai Asan employee Yu Seong-jin released. **17–27 August:** 10,000 U.S. and 56,000 ROK troops take part in the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise. **18 August:** Death of former ROK President Kim Dae-jung. **20 August:** DPRK announces that it will restore road and rail cross-border traffic at Kaesong to the level before it imposed restrictions in December 2008 and will reopen the joint office on economic cooperation. **22 August:** Director Kim Yang Gon of the KWP, leader of the delegation for Kim Dae-jung’s funeral, and ROK Unification Minister Hyun In-taek hold the first high-level inter-Korean talks in nearly two years in Seoul. Hyun also hosts a dinner for the delegation. **23 August:** DPRK delegation meets ROK President Lee Myung-bak. **25 August:** North–South Red Cross telephone link, closed since November 2008, reopens. **26 August:** Family reunion talks resume after almost a two-year gap. **29 August:** After a month’s detention in the DPRK, ROK squid boat 800 Yonanho and its crew are released. **1 September:** ROK lifts land border restrictions. **4 September:** DPRK announces that it has entered the final phase of uranium enrichment. **7 September:** DPRK opens dams on the Imjin River, releasing a wave of water that kills six ROK citizens camping on the riverside. **16 September:** Ceremony in Pyongyang to mark the opening of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Agreement reached on a 5 percent wage hike for DPRK workers at
the KIZ, after the DPRK withdraws demand for a 400 percent rise, raising minimum wage to about $58 from $55 per month. 19 September: State Science and Technology Commission established. 21 September: ROK President Lee Myung-bak, speaking at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, offers the DPRK a “Grand Bargain,” under which it would give up nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees and aid. DPRK rejects the proposal. 22 September: Western sector DMZ hotline restored after 12 months. 26–28 September: First family reunions for two years held at Mount Kumgang, with 97 ROK citizens meeting 233 of their DPRK relatives. 4–6 October: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits DPRK. 8 October: Minju Choson denounces nomination of a new U.S. representative for human rights in the DPRK. 14 October: DPRK–ROK working level meeting at Kaesong to discuss flood control on the Imjin River. 23 October: The United States freezes assets of the DPRK Amonggang Bank. 26 October: ROK Red Cross offers food and medical assistance. 1 November: DPRK Foreign Ministry calls for direct talks with the United States. 9–12 November: Jack Lang, special envoy of French President Nicholas Sarkozy to the DPRK, reports that the DPRK is willing to have a human rights dialogue with France. 10 November: West Sea naval clash. 16 November: Singapore-registered M.V. Theresa VIII, with 28 DPRK crew members, hijacked off Somali coast. 8–10 December: U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth in the DPRK to discuss nuclear issue. DPRK later confirms that he carried a letter from President Obama addressed to Kim Jong Il. 13 December: Georgian-registered aircraft allegedly carrying DPRK-produced weapons detained at Bangkok airport. 14–17 December: U.S. business delegation in the DPRK. 25 December: Korean–American human rights activist Robert Park crosses into DPRK from China with a letter demanding the opening of the frontier to deliver medicines and calling for the release of all political prisoners and is detained. 18 December: ROK sends H1N1 influenza vaccine for 500,000 people to the DPRK, the first high-level assistance for nearly two years. 30 December: Refurbished North–South military hotline reopens.

2010 4 January: Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) designated a special city. 13 January: Beijing-based Koryo Tours says that DPRK will allow U.S. tourists to visit. 15 January: DPRK NDC condemns ROK contingency plan for dealing with a DPRK collapse. DPRK sends message that it will accept ROK offer of 10,000 tons of corn offered in October. 27 January: DPRK fires artillery shells into the West Sea. 8 March: Joint U.S.–DPRK Foal Eagle/Key Resolve military exercise begins. 26 March: ROK corvette Chonan sunk in the West Sea. 7 April: DPRK court sentences U.S. citizen Aijalon Mahli Gomes to a $700,000 fine and eight years in a labor camp for illegally entering the DPRK. 25 April: First Chinese tourist train with 400 passengers,
including a group of Finnish students, visits DPRK. 23 April: DPRK takes over various ROK-constructed facilities at the Mount Kumgang tourist site. 29 April: DPRK freezes remaining ROK assets at the Mount Kumgang tourist complex. 3–7 May: Kim Jong Il makes private visit to China, meets CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao. 12 May: DPRK claims that it successfully carried out nuclear fusion on 15 April, Kim Il Sung’s birthday. 20 May: ROK international panel report concludes that the Chonan was sunk by DPRK torpedo. 26–29 May: WHO Director Margaret Chin visits DPRK and attends ceremony marking the introduction of an online medical service. 27–28 September: KWP party congress, the first since 1980, sees the first public indication that Kim Jong Un, third son of Kim Jong Il, is being groomed to succeed his father. 10 October: DPRK defector Hwang Jang Yop dies of natural causes in Seoul. 12–14 October: DPRK First Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan visits PRC. 29 October: DPRK–ROK exchange of fire in the DMZ. 1 October–5 November: 18th family reunion at Mount Kumgang. 12 November: Visiting U.S. delegation shown uranium enrichment facilities at Yongbyon. 23 November: DPRK shore batteries shell ROK’s Yonpyong Island in the West Sea, killing two ROK marines and two civilians, in response to ROK naval exercises in the area. 28 November: Joint ROK–U.S. naval exercise in the West Sea. PRC proposes emergency Six Party Talks on the Yonpyong shelling. 9 December: Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo visits DPRK and meets Kim Jong Il. ROK President Lee Myung-bak says that Korean reunification is not far off. 11 December: DPRK Foreign Minister Park Ui Chun visits Russia. 18–21 December: New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson visits DPRK. 26 December: DPRK state television broadcasts the British feature film Bend It Like Beckham to mark 10 years of diplomatic relations.

2011 3–7 January: U.S. special envoy for the DPRK Stephen Bosworth visits Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo to discuss next steps on DPRK policy. 8 January: Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland proposes unconditional North–South talks. 10 January: ROK rejects the proposed talks. 12 January: DPRK Red Cross reopens hot line and Panmunjom Liaison Office. Head of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen says that DPRK missile and nuclear technology poses a serious threat to the United States. 13 January: ROK blocks all access to Internet sites with the DPRK’s .kp extension as they are suspected of supplying illegal information. 15 January: DPRK cabinet announces a 10-year Strategic Plan for Economic Development. 25 January: Establishment of the DPRK Elderly Care Fund, an NGO to take care of the aged. 8–9 February: Colonel-level talks at Panmunjom end with no agreement on agenda for future talks. 10 February: KCNA reports that foot and mouth disease is present in the DPRK. 13 Feb-
ruary: PRC Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu visits DPRK. 15 February: U.S. State Department says that it has no immediate plans to supply food aid to the DPRK. 21 February–11 March: UN interagency fact finding visit to the DPRK to assess food situation. 28 February: ROK says that it has no plans to seek the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula, citing the 1991 North–South denuclearization agreement. U.S. National Security Council says that it has no plans to reintroduce nuclear weapons. 28 February–30 April: Annual Foal Eagle/Key Resolve ROK–U.S. military exercise. 12 March: The United States affirms that it will not supply food aid to the DPRK without close consultations with the ROK. 14 March: DPRK Red Cross sends message of condolence to the Japanese Red Cross following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. 19 March: DPRK economic officials began 16-day tour of U.S. industry. 22 March: DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesman denounces the United States and “other Western countries” for attacking Libya. 27–31 March: SPA President Choe Tae Bok visits Great Britain. 29 March: DPRK and ROK geologists meet at the ROK border city of Munsan to discuss volcanic activity in the Mount Paektu region. 18 April: President Obama reinforces U.S. trade sanctions against the DPRK. 24–29 April: Delegation of The Elders, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former Finnish Prime Minister Martii Ahtisaari, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland, and former Irish President Mary Robinson, visits DPRK, PRC, and ROK. 4 April: ROK government approves civic groups donation of humanitarian aid for DPRK children. 29 April: WFP and UNICEF launch appeal for $200 million for emergency aid for the DPRK. SPA formally annuls Hyundai Asan rights at the Mount Kumgang tourist resort. 26 May: U.S. navy prevents DPRK vessel from reaching Myanmar. 20–26 May: Kim Jong Il makes an “unofficial visit” to the PRC. 24–28 May: U.S. special envoy for North Korea Robert King and his delegation in the DPRK to discuss human rights and food aid. 1 June: KCNA reveals secret North–South contacts to discuss a possible summit meeting. 9–16 June: DPRK taekwondo team visits the United States. 6–17 June: EU officials in the DPRK to assess food needs. 13 June: ROK government refuses to allow a 100-strong delegation to visit DPRK to mark the anniversary of the June 2000 North–South summit. 27 June: Universities closed until April 2012 to allow students to undertake construction work. 7 July: Pakistan government dismisses statements by the disgraced atomic scientist A. Q. Khan that the DPRK paid “millions of dollars” to Pakistani generals for nuclear technology. Voice of America reports that a DPRK refugee has been granted refugee status in the United States for the first time. 13 July: ROK government and business delegation visits Mount Kumgang to discuss ROK-owned assets but no agreement is reached. 22 July: DPRK and ROK nuclear negotiators Ri Yong Ho and Wi Sung-lac
meet at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali and agree on a resumption of the Six Party Talks. **25–29 July:** DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ky Gwan visits the United States. **29 July:** Seoul central district prosecutor’s office announces the arrest of five people who are alleged to be members of a pro-DPRK underground group Wangjaesan. **1 August:** DPRK announces loss of life and damage as a result of Typhoon Meani. **3 August:** ROK Red Cross offers $5.6 million food aid after DPRK floods. DPRK responds with request for food, cement, and heavy construction equipment, which is refused. **4 August:** DPRK assumes the rotating chair of the UN Conference on Disarmament. **4–8 August:** PRC naval visit to Wonsan. **8 August:** U.S. Department of Defense Prisoner of War/ Missing Personnel Office announces that the United States has written to the DPRK proposing talks on MIAs but has not had a reply. Russia announces 50,000 tons of food aid for the DPRK. ROK claims that the DPRK fired three artillery rounds near the NLL and the ROK navy responded. DPRK says it was blasting on land. Hyundai Asan team visits Mount Kumgang tourist resort to discuss their assets. **20–25 August:** Kim Jong II visits Russia. **23–26 August:** Associated Press delegation led by Vice President John Daniszewski in the DPRK. **24 August:** Kim Jong II holds summit with Russian President Dimitry Medvedev in Ulan Ude. **29 August:** Academic seminar on Japanese occupation of Tokdo in Pyongyang. **31 August:** KCNA says that DPRK and Russia are discussing a gas pipeline. **13 September:** DPRK oil industry delegation visits Russia. **21 September:** Seven religious organizations from the ROK visit Pyongyang. **26 September:** DPRK–Cuba agreement on friendship and solidarity. **26–30 September:** DPRK Premier Choe Yong Rim in China. **4 October:** ROK cancels 3 August aid offer. **20 October:** EU delegation led by Baroness Valerie Amos in DPRK. **24–25 October:** DPRK–U.S. talks in Geneva on resuming the Six Party Talks. **21 November:** UN Third Committee adopts resolution on DPRK human rights. **24 November:** ROK naval exercise near Yonpyong Island on first anniversary of the shelling; DPRK Supreme Military Command threatens to turn the ROK presidential palace into a “sea of fire.” **24 November:** Protocols signed with Cuba on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and on commodity exchange. **1 December:** Meeting of people with disabilities at the Taedong River Cultural Center in Pyongyang to mark the International Day of Persons with Disabilities. **15 December:** Kim Jong II visits Kwangbok area supermarket in Pyongyang—his last known visit. **17 December:** Kim Jong Il dies of a heart attack—announced on 19 December. **19 December:** DPRK test fires a short-range missile. SPA awards Kim Jong Il title of Hero of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. **24 December:** Rodong Sinmun describes Kim Jong Un as supreme commander of the People’s Army. **26 December:** Lee Hee-ho, widow of former ROK President
Kim Dae Jung, and Hyun Jong-eun, head of the Hyundai Group, allowed to visit Pyongyang to pay respects to Kim Jong Il. **28–29 December:** Kim Jong Il’s funeral and memorial in Pyongyang. **30 December:** KCNA announces that Kim Jong Un has assumed supreme command of the Korean People’s Army at the behest of leader Kim Jong Il in his will of 8 October 2011.
Both Koreas use “East Sea” instead of “Sea of Japan” and “West Sea” instead of “Yellow Sea”
The Korean Peninsula lies at the strategic heart of east Asia, between China, Russia, and Japan, and has been influenced in different ways and at different times by all three of them. With such powerful neighbors, Koreans have had to struggle to maintain their identity. The result has been to create a fiercely independent people, proud of their separate culture and language, with over 1,000 years of political statehood. Even though the country’s political independence came to an end in 1910, when it became a Japanese colony, it remained a culturally distinct entity despite colonial efforts to change it.

That unity was shattered in 1945, when some 30 years of harsh Japanese rule ended following Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War. Koreans had expected that the end of colonialism would bring the restoration of independence. Instead, because the Allies judged that Korea was not ready for independence, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel, with Soviet forces taking the Japanese surrender in the north and United States forces doing the same in the south. This temporary division quickly hardened as the wartime alliance gave way to the Cold War. In 1948, two separate states emerged on the peninsula, and the division was consolidated by a savage war between 1950 and 1953. Although the two states retained many of the features of a more traditional Korea, they also took on some of the characteristics of their respective protecting powers. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) modeled itself on Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union, while the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea) looked to the United States. The DPRK was at first more successful, with a greater degree of industrialization and higher gross national product (GNP) than the ROK. Those days have long since passed, and it is now the ROK that is the more successful of the two. The signs indicate that if the peninsula is eventually reunified, a unified Korea will follow the ROK model rather than that of the DPRK. For the present, however, the two states continue to exist.

Of the two, the DPRK is generally the less well known internationally, although this has begun to change since the 1990s. For much of its history, the DPRK was relatively isolated and tended to hold even its supporters at arms’ length. In the years after the 1950–53 Korean War, Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European diplomats found themselves treated more like potential enemies.
than friends, and the few visitors from elsewhere were tightly controlled and carefully chaperoned. Contact with ordinary people was frowned upon. DPRK citizens who traveled abroad did not go alone and tended to avoid too much contact with foreigners. The end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe were developments that had major adverse consequences for the DPRK. As it reeled from the loss of markets and an economic system with which it had felt at ease, the DPRK was hit by other disasters. Its only leader since 1945, Kim Il Sung, died in 1994, leaving his legacy to his son, Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il was better trained than his father, having attended university and spent many years learning the ways of the party and government. But he lacked his father’s political skills and charisma. He also chose, following Confucian tradition, to withdraw into three years of mourning for his father just as a series of natural disasters struck a country already immersed in major economic difficulties. North Koreans were no strangers to hard times, but the 1990s were particularly hard, with famine conditions prevailing even in the capital city of Pyongyang. After some hesitation, the country appealed for international assistance. This brought in foreigners in large numbers and increased the outside world’s interest in and, slowly, knowledge of, the DPRK.

The 1990s also saw growing international concern about the DPRK’s nuclear program. It claimed this was for peaceful energy production, which was certainly needed, but there was widespread conviction that it was attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability. This also increased interest in why the DPRK behaves as it does. Knowledge about the DPRK may still be limited in some areas, but it is growing all the time.

LAND AND PEOPLE

The Korean Peninsula extends due south from northeast China (traditionally known in the West as Manchuria) on the Asian mainland. The peninsula and its associated islands lie between longitudes 124° and 131° east and between latitudes 33° and 43° north. The total area of the peninsula is some 221,000 square kilometers (82,242 square miles), about the same as Kansas or mainland Great Britain. The peninsula is roughly 1,100 kilometers (688 miles) long and 216 kilometers (134 miles) wide at its narrowest point. The average width is about 250 kilometers (170 miles). The Yalu (Amnok in Korean) and Tumen rivers separate it from China, and it is surrounded by the East Sea, or Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea (West Sea), and the Korea Strait. The peninsula shares a 1,025-kilometer (640-mile) border with China, and a short 12-kilometer (9-mile) border with Russia.
Today, the peninsula is divided into two Korean states along the 240-kilometer (150-mile) military demarcation line (MDL) laid down in the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which forms the southern border of the DPRK and the northern border of the ROK. The DPRK is slightly the larger of the two, at 122,827 square kilometers (46,768 square miles); the ROK is 99,173 square kilometers (38,131 square miles). The demilitarized zone (DMZ) that lies 2 kilometers either side of the MDL covers an area of some 1,253 square kilometers (477 square miles). Despite its official demilitarized status, the area is heavily mined and both sides maintain large numbers of troops close to the division line. Although the DMZ follows rivers and mountains to some extent, it makes no more sense as a frontier than did the original 1945 division along the 38th parallel. Its origins lie in the actual line of military control at the armistice, not in any logical division of the peninsula.

The Western name “Korea” is derived from the Koryo dynasty that ruled a unified Korea from 936 to 1392 A.D. The other name of Korea, Chosun, comes from the kingdom that the Yi dynasty established in 1392 and ruled over until 1910. Chosun can be translated as “the land of morning freshness,” implying the land in the east (relative to China), where the day begins. The popular Western name, “the Land of the Morning Calm,” which dates from the 1880s, appears to be a misunderstanding of the original Chinese characters. During the colonial period, the Japanese called the peninsula “Choson,” as they still do today, reflecting the Japanese reading of the Chinese characters. (It also appeared as Tyosen, reflecting a different romanization system.)

The whole peninsula is mountainous, but the northern part particularly so. The west coast along the Yellow Sea has low hills with some plains, but these are fewer and smaller in the north than in the south. In the north, the Changbaek (Changbai in Chinese) mountain range and its branches cover an extensive area. The highest mountain in the Changbaek Range that runs along both banks of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, and the highest mountain on the whole peninsula, is Mount Paektu (2,744 meters or 9,000 feet). In the Nangnin Range, the Kaema and the Pujon plateaus constitute the “roof” of northern Korea. The Taebaek mountain chain, the backbone of the peninsula, runs almost its entire length and parallels the east coast from the eastern fringe of the Kaema plateau. This range includes the most famous mountains in the peninsula including the Kumgang (Diamond) Mountain region (1,631 meters; 5,350 feet), which lies wholly in the DPRK.

The DPRK’s east coast generally has a smooth shoreline, but the west coast is irregular with numerous bays and inlets and many islands. As in the ROK, land reclamation in the DPRK, which began during the Japanese colonial period, is steadily reducing the number of islands. Most major rivers flow westward into the Yellow Sea (known to the Koreans as the West Sea). The main
rivers in the DPRK are the Yalu, the Chongchon, and the Taedong. The Imjin and the Han rivers both rise in the north but are mainly in the south. The Han River estuary marks the western end of the DMZ. The Tumen River, which forms the border with China and Russia, flows into the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The DPRK has two major plain areas in the northwest and in the west-central region and one in the southwestern region of the peninsula. About 16 to 17 percent of the land is cultivatable, mainly in the west. The rest of the country is made up of relatively high mountains and steep narrow valleys.

The DPRK climate is more continental than oceanic, with four distinct seasons. Spring generally begins in late March to early April in the north. It is often accompanied by warm breezes from the south and lasts until late May or early June. During this period, light rain falls at regular intervals. Late June and the month of July are generally the rainy season. They are also hot, with July temperatures reaching 25°C (77°F) with high humidity due to southern monsoon winds. Annual precipitation varies from about 61 centimeters (24 inches) in the northeast to more than 140 centimeters (55 inches) in the more southern regions of the DPRK. The autumn is pleasant, starting generally from late September and ending in mid-November with the first frosts. Autumn is a period of dry and sunny weather; the Koreans, like the Chinese, refer to it as the time “when skies are high and horses are fat.” Winter in the DPRK begins around mid-November and lasts until March. It can be extremely cold in the north, where January temperatures can fall to −17°C (8°F) in Pyongyang or even lower in exceptional years. Winter temperatures on Mount Paektu are regularly around −20°C (−36°F). Except in some northern mountain regions, snow is not heavy but can fall anytime from early November until March. The ground is very cold, and snow and ice tend to linger.

The Koreans are a homogeneous people, speaking the same language, and culturally distinct from their neighbors. Generally, Koreans are lighter skinned than Chinese or Japanese; some see this as evidence of a Western origin. The ancestors of present-day Koreans appear to be chiefly the Tungusic peoples, who originated in the Altai Mountain region and brought their culture, religion, and language to Korea in about 3,000 B.C.

At the time of liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the total population was about 25 million. The U.S. zone had about 16.5 million and the Soviet zone a little over 9.5 million people. The population of the ROK is now about 47 million and that of the DPRK, according to the 2008 census, about 24 million. The annual population growth is low, at less than 2 percent.

When the DPRK was established in 1948, Seoul, the historic capital of a united Korea from 1392, was still described as the capital, with Pyongyang as the “temporary” capital. Only in the 1972 DPRK Constitution was Pyongyang designated as the national capital of the DPRK. Pyongyang, with between 2
and 4 million inhabitants, is the largest city in the country; other important cities include Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo, Kaesong, and Haeju.

In theory there are Buddhist, Chondogyo (an indigenous syncretic religion), Christian (Protestant), Catholic, and Orthodox congregations, all of which have places of worship in Pyongyang, but in reality, religious practices went into a steep decline for most of the population after the establishment of the DPRK in 1948 and disappeared altogether after the Korean War until the 1970s. Buddhist temples are scattered throughout the country but are treated mainly as historical or cultural relics rather than religious centers.

HISTORY

Accounts of the DPRK often begin in the 1920s or even in 1945, with the implication that the earlier history of the peninsula properly belongs to the ROK and that the DPRK is an aberration, with no history behind it. The reality is that while both Koreas may sometimes disagree on how to interpret the course of Korean history and certainly place different emphases on what they think important, they both share a common past upon which they draw to justify their legitimacy.

Korean history can be divided in a number of ways, all of them to some extent arbitrary. The two Koreas agree that a distinctive Korean people have occupied the peninsula since the period of the Three Kingdoms, although they do not always agree on dating. Archaeology shows that the peninsula was occupied long before then.

Before the Three Kingdoms

War and postwar reconstruction have revealed many prehistoric sites on the Korean Peninsula, and the picture of its distant past is constantly changing. Paleolithic people inhabited the peninsula from about 30,000 B.C. Neolithic people, originally from Central Asia, began to migrate into the peninsula from about 3000 B.C., bringing the Ural-Altaic language and shamanism.

Traditional legendary history begins in 2333 B.C., although it was not written down until the 12th century A.D. This date is the origin of the Korean claim to “5,000 years of history.” According to one of Korea’s many foundation myths, the supreme deity allowed his son to come to earth, where he turned a female bear into a woman and married her. Their son was Tangun (also known as Wanggong), who created the first state on the peninsula, Old Chosun. Old Chosun is said to have included southern Manchuria and northwestern Korea along the Taedong River, with its capital at Asadal. Asadal
is identified by some with present-day Pyongyang, whose former name was Wanggomsong ("Wanggom’s fortress"). Much is made of this version of Korea’s early history in the DPRK, since it enhances the role of Pyongyang and the north of the peninsula in the nation. In the mid-1990s, the DPRK announced that archaeologists, using new techniques, had found Tangun’s tomb just outside Pyongyang. Not only did the tomb contain Tangun and his wife, but their sons were also buried there. On President Kim Il Sung’s instructions, a large new tomb, in somewhat eclectic style, was erected on the site. From about 1120 B.C., a fugitive from China, Kija, was said to have been made king of Old Chosun by King Wu of China. Later, the throne was taken over by Wiman, also from China, in 194 B.C., ushering in the Wiman Chosun period. Although in the past there were shrines to their memory in Pyongyang, neither Kija nor Wiman, with their supposed Chinese background, figure in DPRK historiography.

Legend has it that Wiman Chosun was eventually overthrown by the Chinese Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, who established three military colonies on the peninsula and one in southern Manchuria. Such colonies, or commanderies, were designed to exercise Chinese control. One of these, Lelang (Korean name Nangnang or Rangang), was near modern Pyongyang and lasted until about 313 A.D. This too causes problems for DPRK historians. Although the name of a district on the edge of modern Pyongyang still reflects the existence of the commandery, current DPRK accounts deny that it ever existed, claiming that there was a Korean entity of the same name. Archaeological remains that indicated Lelang’s Chinese origins excavated in Japanese colonial days are no longer displayed.

**The Three Kingdoms**

Chinese texts date the Three Kingdoms from 57 B.C. for Silla, 37 B.C. for Koguryo, and 18 B.C. for Paekche. DPRK accounts concentrate on the emergence of the Koguryo kingdom, which they claim existed from about 227 B.C., well before the other two. The legendary founder of Koguryo, King Tongmyong (Chumong in some accounts), was, according to another foundation legend, the descendant of the son of the creator, while his mother was the daughter of the dragon king. Tongmyong himself was claimed to be born of an egg. Despite these unusual antecedents, his “tomb” was discovered near Pyongyang in the 1970s, and as with Tangun, a massive new edifice was constructed on Kim Il Sung’s instructions. While it bears rather more resemblance to traditional tomb architecture than that provided for Tangun, Tongmyong’s tomb is equally nonhistoric.
According to DPRK histories, Koguryo under Tongmyong’s leadership conquered the State of Puyo in northwestern Manchuria and then extended its territory into the Korean Peninsula, establishing its capital in the middle region of the Yalu River during the first century B.C. In reality, Koguryo became a recognizable political entity in the third century A.D. and its major achievements began in the fourth century. It drew heavily on Chinese cultural and political traditions. Indeed, some Chinese historians argue that it was as much a Chinese state as a Korean one, an interpretation that has led to some bitter exchanges between both Koreas and the Chinese since the early 2000s. This Chinese influence did not stop Koguryo from overthrowing Lelang in 313 A.D. It also gradually extended its control over southern Manchuria and northern Korea, moving its capital to Pyongyang in 427.

Political changes were also taking place in the south during this period, with the emergence of the Paekche and Silla kingdoms. Around the middle of the fourth century, the Three Kingdoms, all in varying degrees drawing on but also adapting Chinese norms, are clearly discernible. China was then in disarray, which may explain the emergence and survival of these new political entities. For Koguryo, especially, much energy had to be devoted to fighting off attempts by northern neighbors to reassert their presence on the peninsula, but all three kingdoms suffered from attacks from China and from Japan. The Korean kingdoms also fought each other. Ruins of defensive walls and fortified towns still testify to the constant jockeying for control that marked these centuries. Eventually Silla, allied with Tang China, defeated the other two kingdoms to create the first unified government on the Korean Peninsula in 668. The Tang then made an unsuccessful attempt to impose Chinese control over the peninsula. Ties would continue and China remained the model for Korean institutions, but Silla’s rulers were determined that China would be kept at a distance. Unified Silla could not establish control over all the lands of the Three Kingdoms. Its northern border lay along the Taedong River. Most of what had been Koguryo territory therefore was no longer under Korean control. Some was absorbed into China, but from 698 to 926, a state called Parhae in Korean and Bohai in Chinese existed in eastern Manchuria and on the Korean Peninsula north of the Taedong River. It too has been the subject of modern debate about whether it was a Korean or a Chinese state. Under Silla, the center of power lay in the southeast of the peninsula, far from the northern border area. Thus began a division within Korea that has ebbed and flowed ever since. Silla’s hegemony lasted some 200 years, but by the end of the ninth century, its rulers faced challenges from within. For a short period, Korea was again divided by states claiming to be the successors to the original Three Kingdoms.
The Koryo Period

These “Later Three Kingdoms” were unstable and prone to internal and external conflict. Eventually, in 918, General Wang Kon of the later Koguryo rebelled against the existing king and established himself in the role. His capital was at Kaesong, then called Songdo, which lies in the center of the peninsula. In a gesture toward the past, he renamed the kingdom Koryo, apparently derived from Koguryo, whose military exploits he hoped to emulate. From Kaesong, he set out to subdue the other kingdoms, using bribery and cajoling as much as military force, a task that was completed with the surrender of Later Paekche in 936. Wang was also successful in his attempts to regain the former Koguryo territory north of the Taedong River, pushing the Korean frontier in the west up to the Yalu. In political terms, the Chinese influence continued, with the adoption of the Tang bureaucracy and legal systems and the growing influence of Confucianism. Buddhism, already well established on the peninsula, became the state religion, although older traditions did not disappear. Land distribution kept officials and generals onside, but this helped to make the society more rigid. Although there was a Chinese-style examination system for the recruitment of officials, it was not open to all. Instead, it helped to perpetuate elite rule, a practice that would become well entrenched.

Koryo Korea saw the development of woodblock printing and the first Korean accounts of its history, based on Chinese texts. Its porcelain is still highly prized. It was an important trading state. But from its earliest years, it was subject to regular attacks and invasions from Asia as new emerging groups along the frontiers tried to establish themselves in the old Parhae kingdom. Divisions within the ruling class led to the deposition of one king and some 60 years of military rule. By that stage, Koryo also faced severe threats from the China’s new Mongol dynasty. The Mongols turned the Koryo monarchy into a vassal state but in the process irretrievably damaged its credibility. This mixed history causes some problems in the DPRK. In some ways, Koryo is seen positively. The shift of the capital to Kaesong, which is now in the DPRK, is presented as a progressive move. Wang Kon’s tomb, close to Kaesong, has been tidied up, although not with the same cavalier approach displayed at the Tangun and Tongmyong tombs. Developments in arts and sciences under the Koryo kingdom are presented as the work of peasants and workers and are proudly displayed in Pyongyang and in Kaesong’s own museum. More problematical is the relationship with China and the eventual subservience to the Mongols.

The Yi Dynasty

Similar problems arise for DPRK historians with the Yi dynasty that replaced the decrepit Koryo in 1392. It was the replacement of the Mongols
by a native Chinese dynasty, the Ming, that led to Koryo’s downfall. Koryo sided with the Mongols until one general, Yi Song-gye, decided that Korean interests would be better served by abandoning them. Instead of following orders, Yi turned back from the Yalu River and seized power in Kaesong in 1388. Four years later, he displaced the last Koryo king and established himself on the throne. His descendants were still there in 1910.

Yi Sung-gye began a process that tied Korea more and more into the Sinic world. As they had done under the Koryo system, Korean kings looked to China for endorsement. Chinese practices, albeit with some Korean characteristics, became the norm. Neo-Confucian ideas about hierarchy and obedience governed the bureaucracy, the court, and, increasingly, the lives of ordinary people. Buddhism was banished to the mountains. A new capital was created at Hanyang (now Seoul), from which operated a heavily centralized government machine. But the Korean commitment to a ruling aristocracy remained strong. Korea’s ruling class, the yangban, were educated in the Confucian classics, but made sure that these were not open to all as they were in theory in China.

At first, the dynasty was highly successful. The lands in the northeast, lost since Koguryo days, now came again under Korean control, and the northern border was firmly established along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Good relations were maintained with the Ming, whose borders lay farther south and who were content with the deference shown to the Chinese emperor by the Korean kings. Pirate attacks were curtailed. Scientific research found royal patronage, which led among other developments to the creation of the Korean alphabet under King Sejong in the middle of the 15th century. Confucian scholars disliked this attempt to move away from Chinese writing, and it would not be until the end of the 19th century that the new system would really take off. But it was an important achievement, acknowledged as such in both Koreas.

The late 16th century saw problems emerge. Political factionalism among the ruling class led to purges and executions. It also affected the military, which had dire consequences in the 1590s as the country faced a major challenge. A newly reunified Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea as a prelude to attacking China. Although combined Ming and Korean forces were eventually able to defeat the Japanese invaders, the Imjin Wars of 1592–93 and 1597–98 took a terrible toll. In the first conflict, marauding forces moved up and down the peninsula, leaving a trail of death and destruction. Palaces and temples were destroyed. In many cases they remained in ruins until the 20th century. The second conflict was mainly in the south. It inflicted less damage and came to an end with the death of Hideyoshi in 1598. Some 126,000 Koreans were killed, while 60,000 to 70,000 skilled workers
were taken to Japan, never to return. Bitterness against the Japanese became widespread. Ming China was also seriously weakened at a time when it faced threats from a new tribal grouping, the Manchu, across its northern borders. Manchu territory abutted Korea, and the Koreans were drawn into the death throes of the Ming, with Manchu invasions in 1627 and 1636. When the Manchu finally conquered China and established their new Qing dynasty in the 1640s, the Koreans accepted them as their new overlords, but the abrupt and brutal change left many doubtful over the issue of relations with China.

There were no further invasions of Korea until the 1890s, but the damage done to the Yi state was serious. Factional disputes absorbed energy that might have otherwise developed new solutions to the country’s problems. Instead, suspicions of new ideas and the outside world intensified. Many yangban ceased to seek office and concentrated on their estates or on scholarship. New ideas, known as sirhak (“practical learning”), came from China but were often dismissed by more conservative scholars. One new strand of learning was Roman Catholicism. First encountered by Korean emissaries visiting Beijing, this new belief led to the establishment of a clandestine church. Korean leaders were aware of the spread of Christianity in Asia and of its links with Western countries. Japan and the Philippines showed how religion, trade, and politics were entwined. Catholicism, with its ban on traditional Confucian practices such as honoring the ancestors, was seen as a threat to the established social order. This would lead to harsh persecution and foreign intervention.

It was not only Catholicism that was causing problems. By 1800, peasant rebellion was common. The increasing Western presence in Asia was slow to affect Korea but, like China and Japan, it found itself the focus of unwanted attention as survey and trading ships began to reach Korean waters. As these pressures increased, especially after Japan was forced to open its ports in the late 1850s, Korea, under a king who was a minor and a regent who was conservative, tried to hold back the wave of new ideas. This proved to be unsuccessful. The persecution of Catholics led to a short war with France. The attempt by the armed merchant ship, the General Sherman, to force its way up the Taedong River in Pyongyang in 1866 for trade, which led to the destruction of the ship and the deaths of all on board, brought war with the United States. The Koreans claimed victory in both, but it availed them little. Five years after the American war, the Japanese forced Korea to sign the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, a document that mirrored the “unequal treaties” that had been forced on the Japanese themselves some 20 years previously.

The treaty ushered in a period of disruption. The Japanese were soon followed by others as Korea signed treaties with the major countries of the West. This seemed to mark the end of the country’s close relationship with China,
but the Chinese and the Koreans behaved as though it continued. Other countries were also ambiguous in their attitudes, and Korea’s international status remained unclear. Twenty years of jockeying by China and Japan for influence in Korea ended in the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95, from which Japan emerged triumphant. Korea’s independence was enshrined in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the Korean king declared himself an emperor, of equal status with the emperors of China and Japan. He also renamed the country the Han Empire, abandoning Chosun.

Concerned about growing Japanese influence, the new emperor looked to Russia to provide a balance. It proved an ill-judged move. The 1900 Boxer Uprising in China brought large numbers of Russian troops into East Asia, which did not withdraw when the crisis ended. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway also showed a long-term Russian interest in the region. Japanese alarm at this threat led them to war with Russia in 1904. Japan’s unexpected defeat of Russia the following year brought more problems for Korea. With the tacit agreement of Great Britain and the United States, Japan declared a protectorate over Korea in 1905, arguing that the Yi dynasty had failed to reform itself and its instability threatened Japanese interests. Many Koreans resisted, forming “Righteous Armies” in the tradition of those that had fought the Japanese in the Imjin wars. Such resistance was fiercely repressed. Then in 1909, a Korean assassinated the Japanese elder statesman and former resident-general of Korea, Ito Hirobumi, at Harbin. The following year, Japan annexed Korea, ending the rule of the Yi dynasty. Korean independence was at an end. In the DPRK, whatever earlier successes the Yi dynasty might have had counted for little in this shameful loss of independence.

The Japanese Colonial Period

From 1910, Korea was ruled by a central government named the Government-General of Korea (Chosen Sotokufu). This was effectively a military bureaucracy normally headed by a Japanese army general on active duty, with little control from Tokyo and none within Korea. The senior ranks of the police were all Japanese, and even in the lower ranks, the Japanese came to predominate. While the Japanese paid lip service to the “brotherhood” of Japanese and Koreans, the reality was different. Koreans were now second-class citizens in their own country. It is true that the colonial period saw economic development, but this was for the benefit of Japan rather than for the Koreans. Land reform turned Koreans into tenants of the Japanese and Korean rice went to feed the Japanese. Educational reforms also benefited the Japanese rather than Koreans. Rich Koreans sent their children for education in Japan or to Europe or the United States. The Imperial University, established at
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Keijo (Seoul), was for Japanese rather than Korean students. The Japanese were willing to exploit Korean culture for propaganda purposes, as they did at the 1910 London World Exhibition, but in Korea they made strenuous efforts to deny Koreans access to their history or to independent views. Newspapers and magazines were closed, as were private schools.

On 1 March 1919, the Koreans rose up in protest against their colonial masters. Inspired by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s support for self-determination, Korean students in Japan began a campaign for an independent Korea. Following this example, a number of prominent Koreans, mostly from religious backgrounds, made a Proclamation of Independence in Seoul’s Pagoda Park. Demonstrations spread throughout the country. The Japanese response was savage enough to arouse international concern, even among countries that had hitherto paid little attention to Japan’s heavy-handed colonialism. This led to some modification in the colonial government. Koreans were allowed to publish newspapers again, and the gendarmerie was disbanded. Life became somewhat easier for Koreans, but protests against Japanese rule continued.

Outside the country, Koreans were also organizing. In April 1919, a group of Koreans in Shanghai in China established a Provisional Government of Korea. This had Rhee Syngman, once a political prisoner under the Yi dynasty, then the first Korean to obtain a Ph.D., as premier (later president), although he was at the time in the United States. Another stream of opposition to the Japanese came from left-wing groups, some of whom came together in 1925 to form the first Korean Communist Party. In the north of the peninsula and in Manchuria, a tradition of military opposition to the Japanese lingered on and reemerged in the 1920s and 1930s. These developments brought Korean and Chinese groups together to fight the common enemy—and sometimes each other. As Japan tightened its grip on Manchuria, where it established the puppet state of Manzhouguo in 1932, conflict intensified. It was here that Kim Il Sung acquired his political and guerrilla skills.

From 1937, there was full-scale war between China and Japan. This led to tighter control in Korea. The Japanese launched a movement designed to make Koreans “imperial subjects.” Koreans had to use Japanese family and given names, memorize and recite the “Pledge of the Imperial Subjects,” and speak only Japanese in public. In an attempt to wipe out Korea’s ethnic identity and nationalist consciousness, the teaching of the Korean language was discouraged and abolished altogether in 1938. After Pearl Harbor in 1941, Koreans were recruited for the Japanese war effort. Some joined the military on a voluntary basis. Many others, including women forced into prostitution as “comfort women” in Japanese military brothels and men taken to work coalmines in various parts of the empire, had no choice.
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Liberation, Partition, and the Allied Occupation

At the November 1943 Cairo conference on the progress of World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed on the future of Korea without consulting any Koreans. A communiqué released on 1 December 1943 stated that “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea,” the three Allies resolved that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” The Soviet Union later acceded to this declaration. After a further meeting at Yalta in February 1945 with the United States and Great Britain, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945. Soviet troops quickly occupied the northern half of Korea. Despite DPRK myths, although there were some Soviet Koreans with the invasion forces, the small guerrilla groups that the Japanese had forced into the Soviet Union in 1940–41 seem to have played no part in this operation. At this point, the U.S. government proposed the partition of Korea into two military operational zones along the 38th parallel line. The ostensible purpose of this proposal was to effect the Japanese surrender, but there was also U.S. concern that the Soviet Union planned the occupation of the entire Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union accepted the arrangement, even though it put Seoul under U.S. control.

Within Korea, the Japanese authorities, realizing in early August that the end of the war might be approaching, tried to make arrangements for an orderly transfer of power to protect Japanese citizens and to prevent the spread of communism. A left-wing leader, Yo Un-hyong, took on this task just as the war came to an end and set about organizing a nationwide administration under the auspices of a Committee for the Preparation of National Reconstruction. The committee called for elections to a National Assembly, which set up a Korean People’s Republic on 6 September 1945. The term “People’s Republic” did not then have the resonance it acquired later, but there was certainly a left-wing tinge to these developments. At the same time, Rhee Syngman, still in the United States, was named as president of the “Republic.” This was an attempt to provide continuity with the Korean government in exile, but Rhee turned down the offer. In the northern half of the peninsula, Soviet forces were willing to work with local representatives of the Republic. When General John Hodge arrived in the south with U.S. forces on 8 September, he refused to deal with the Republic, establishing an American Military Government instead.

Autumn and winter 1945 saw much political activity as exiles returned and the newly liberated Koreans formed parties covering the whole political spectrum. When the Allied foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in December 1945 put forward arrangements for trusteeship, there were bitter protests throughout the peninsula. Before long, however, the major left-wing groups changed their stand and came out in favor of trusteeship, which added to the
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political turmoil. The U.S.–USSR Joint Commission that was supposed to carry out the Moscow Agreement met in Seoul in March–May 1946, but the Soviet delegation refused to have any dealings with groups opposing trusteeship. The impasse continued at the second session of the commission in Pyongyang in May 1947. The commission went into indefinite suspension the following month. Effectively, the 1945 division, combined with the increasingly hostile atmosphere as the Cold War developed, was tending toward the creation of separate states on the peninsula despite Korean opposition to such a development. Global antagonism, rather than any real consideration of what was best for Korea, was now driving policy on Korea.

Confidant of being able to dominate the UN General Assembly, where there was no veto, the United States referred the Korean issue to that body in September 1947, discarding the Moscow Agreement. In November, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that established a UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). This was authorized to take account of Korean wishes on their political future and to organize free and fair elections. The Soviet Union and its supporters did not vote against the resolution but made it clear that the commission would not be allowed to operate north of the 38th parallel. Elections duly took place in the south in May 1948, with seats reserved for the missing northerners. A National Assembly met and adopted a Constitution and a new name for the country, which would now be Daehan Minguk or Republic of Korea (ROK), reviving the name used by Korea’s last independent government. It adopted a presidential system of government, with the 65-year-old Rhee Syngman as the first president. When it became formally independent on 15 August, the new republic claimed jurisdiction over the whole peninsula.

The northern administration protested at these developments and began to cut off the few remaining North–South links. It too moved toward the establishment of a separate regime. Elections were held for a Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), which were said to have taken place in the south as well as the north, and another new state, Chosun Minjuuiui Inmin Konghwaguk, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), came into existence, keeping the Yi dynasty and Japanese colonial name for the peninsula. It was in theory a parliamentary democracy, with the 36-year-old former guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung as its premier. It too claimed jurisdiction over the whole peninsula. Efforts at reconciling the two states did not cease, but they became increasingly unlikely to succeed.

**The DPRK 1948–50: Kim Il Sung**

From its foundation in 1948, the DPRK was led by Kim Il Sung, and it still bears many marks of his influence. Kim Il Sung is not an easy person
to pin down. Over the years, a steady accumulation of myths has surrounded his persona, designed to emphasize his unique leadership qualities. Separating fact from fiction is often a hard task. He was born Kim Song Ju in April 1912, not apparently at Mangyongdae, the village near Pyongyang now treated as his birthplace, but according to his own account, at his mother’s home in the village of Chilgol, also near Pyongyang. According to the myth, he was born of a revolutionary family; his great grandfather supposedly led the attack on the General Sherman in 1866, and his father was an active opponent of the Japanese. There is no independent evidence for either claim. His father was a herbalist and may have taught at the primary school level for a time, before moving to Manchuria in about 1916. Kim Il Sung received his education partly in Manchuria and partly in Korea, but never went beyond middle school. The family was back in Korea by 1919, and the myth claims that the senior Kim played a major role in 1 March 1919 independence demonstrations in Pyongyang, accompanied by Kim Il Sung, then just under seven.

At 14, young Kim supposedly returned to Manchuria to organize the fight against the Japanese. What is certain is that by the late 1920s or early 1930s, Kim was operating on the fringe of some of the Korean and Chinese communist groups fighting the Japanese in Manchuria and along the Manchurian–Korea border. Kim apparently joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and became sufficiently well known as a guerrilla fighter to have a price put on his head. Although later accounts record battles and full-scale campaigns, the reality was of a conflict of small skirmishes that tended to provoke ferocious Japanese reprisals. It was a world of much danger as groups fell out with each other and captured members betrayed their former companions.

As Japan moved on to a war footing after 1937, the pressure on the guerrillas increased. By 1941, most of them had been driven out of Manchuria. Kim was among those who went to the Soviet Union, where he and his comrades were incorporated into the Red Army. Kim became an officer, and it was in the Soviet Union that his eldest son and successor, Kim Jong Il, was born in 1941; the myth has it that he was born in 1942, when his father was 30, on Mount Paektu on the Sino–Korean border. Kim returned to Korea in 1945; in the myth, he triumphantly fought his way back, but in reality he arrived as a Soviet army officer on a Soviet ship, some weeks after the first Soviet forces arrived. There is no evidence that he was widely known in the Soviet Union outside the Far Eastern Military Region or that he was specially selected as the leader. But he may have been seen as a useful front man. Until the Korean War, he was perhaps primus inter pares, but he had already established a powerful position, which would be consolidated between 1950 and 1953.
The Coming of War

Nobody wanted the division in 1945, and the leaders of both Koreas wanted reunification. Each stressed their own legitimacy and argued that unification should come about under their auspices. The departure of the Soviet and the U.S. forces appeared to leave the Koreans free to pursue this aim without any outside entanglements. The DPRK had the better trained and more experienced armed forces, including many who had fought with the Chinese communists, and it had received weaponry from the departing Soviet forces. The ROK’s military was a much smaller affair, but its population was twice that of the DPRK. Although there was little publicity, military clashes between troops of the two Koreas, some quite serious, regularly took place along the 38th parallel, and each side engaged in cross-border raids. There were blustering statements from both Koreas, but the DPRK was not just blustering. Kim Il Sung was convinced of his ability to reunite the country if given the chance. To this end, he approached the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, in 1949 without success. The following year, with the communists victorious in the Chinese civil war, Stalin was more forthcoming and agreed that, if the Chinese raised no objection, Kim could carry out his proposed reunification by force. But there would be no direct Soviet involvement; if things went wrong, Stalin did not want a direct clash with the United States.

The Korean War began with a surprise DPRK attack launched at 0400 hours on Sunday 25 June 1950 along the 38th parallel. This was no usual border skirmish. Some 80,000 well-trained DPRK troops, supported by tanks, crossed the parallel and invaded the ROK. Many ROK army units were on leave for the weekend, and were totally unprepared for the attack. The DPRK maintains that it was a thrust north by the ROK army on U.S. instructions in the Ongjin peninsula that started the conflict. Three days after the fighting began, the DPRK People’s Army (KPA) captured Seoul and pushed southward. Neither the ROK army, in which there was widespread panic, nor small units of U.S. troops hastily sent to Korea from Japan, were able to check the advance. The KPA soon occupied most of the ROK, leaving only the southeastern corner of the country along the Naktong River near the city of Pusan unoccupied. By the beginning of September 1950, it looked as though the DPRK would reunify the peninsula.

What saved the ROK was the U.S. decision that “communist aggression” could not be ignored. Responding to a U.S. appeal, the UN Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union, condemned the DPRK as an aggressor, and organized a UN force, consisting of troops contributed by 16 member nations, to assist the ROK. After the arrival of UN troops and the formation of a UN Unified Command (UNC) under General Douglas MacArthur, UN forces launched a counterattack, beginning with a seaborne landing at Inchon,
the port for Seoul, in September 1950. At the same time, a breakout was organized from the southern enclave. Seoul was recovered on 28 September, and the invaders were pushed back beyond the 38th parallel. UN troops then advanced into the DPRK in early October, capturing Pyongyang on 19 October. On 21 November, UN advance units forces reached the Yalu River.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), established in October 1949, had a strong suspicion of the U.S. motives because of U.S. support for the Chinese Nationalists in the civil war. Tensions between Beijing and Washington increased at the outbreak of the Korean War when the United States announced that the Seventh Fleet would patrol the Taiwan Straits to prevent any attempt by either the PRC or the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan to invade the other. After the Inchon landing, the Chinese indicated through third parties that if UN forces approached the Yalu River, China would intervene. MacArthur discounted the signals, and in October–November 1950, China sent troops to the Korean Peninsula to save the DPRK and to protect its own border. By late November 1950, some 250,000 troops of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had clandestinely crossed the Yalu into the north of Korea. Officially described in the Chinese media as the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), in the hope of avoiding a formal war with the United States, they now struck hard at UN forces.

MacArthur panicked and the UN troops began to retreat. By December 1950, ROK and UN troops had withdrawn from the DPRK. Seoul fell to the communist forces for the second time in January. Over a million Chinese troops participated in the Korean War, while Chinese and Soviet pilots, in Chinese or DPRK uniforms, joined in limited air battles against the UN forces. The UN forces, under the local command of General Matthew Ridgway, regrouped and mounted a counterattack, retaking Seoul on 12 March 1951. Thereafter, although many fierce battles would be fought, the war settled down in April–May 1951 in a stalemate roughly along the 38th parallel, where it had begun.

At this point, the Soviet government called for truce negotiations. Talks began behind the communist lines at Kaesong in July 1951 but failed to end the fighting. They were later transferred to Panmunjom, on the 38th parallel. Hostilities continued and the armistice talks were frequently broken off. When Stalin died in March 1953, however, his successors were anxious to end the conflict. Talks resumed, with exchanges of sick and wounded prisoners and civilian detainees. An Armistice Agreement was finally signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 between the UNC on one side and the DPRK and the CPV on the other. The ROK government refused to sign the armistice, which President Rhee regarded as a betrayal, but did agree to abide by its terms. The 1953 cease-fire line became the military demarcation line, a new
boundary between the two Koreas, with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two countries. The war caused millions of casualties on both sides as well as enormous property damage.

**Postwar and the Rise of Kim Jong Il**

The war did not solve the problem of division, which now was even more firmly in place. The Armistice Agreement had called for a political conference to be held to tackle the question of reunification. This was duly held in Geneva in spring 1954, with both Koreas in attendance. Both put forward irreconcilable proposals for reunification. The conference was preoccupied with developments in Indochina, and Korea received relatively little attention. It was clear, however, that apart from the Korean leaders, nobody else wanted to see further conflict on the peninsula. To that end, Chinese and UN forces stayed on the peninsula. The Chinese withdrew in 1957, having played a major role in the DPRK’s postwar reconstruction. The UNC, which after 1957 consisted largely of U.S. forces, remained. It still exists, with a headquarters in Seoul, but it is a shadow of its former self.

Foiled in attempts at reunification, the two Koreas concentrated on building up their separate political bases. The rhetoric of unification was never abandoned, but in reality from 1953 onward, neither Korea made any serious efforts to solve the problem of division. Proposals were made, but they had more to do with claiming the moral high ground than with any realistic hope of success. All cross-border links were cut and remained so until the 1970s, when the first tentative attempts at contact were made at the government level. The divided families and the refugees on both sides of the DMZ would have to wait until the 1980s before either side allowed even the most formal contact, and the process would only became regularized after the June 2000 North–South summit in Pyongyang.

Although there can be little doubt that the war was Kim Il Sung’s brainchild, he emerged unscathed from it and from the defeats of the autumn of 1950. Instead, he blamed others for the military failures that had deprived the DPRK of victory. This allowed him to purge or neutralize those who might have posed a challenge to his increasingly one-man rule. These included many senior military and political figures. Pak Hon Yong, deputy premier and foreign minister and the former leader of the southern communists, was executed in 1955 on charges that included spying for the United States. Thereafter, Kim seems to have faced only one substantive challenge to his growing power. In August 1956, following the secret de-Stalinization speech by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev earlier in the year, Kim was criticized for his growing cult of personality. He rode out the challenge and conducted
another purge. Henceforth, he would rely on former Kapsan faction guerrilla companions, so named from the mountain area where they had supposedly been based fighting the Japanese.

Postwar reconstruction got under way as soon as the armistice was signed. The DPRK had received much assistance during the war from the Eastern European countries, and this continued. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany), perhaps partly because it too had recently gone through a devastating war, was especially generous, and after 1953 undertook the rehabilitation of the city of Hamhung. Poland, which, like East Germany, had provided refuge for many children during the war, also provided much postwar assistance. The greatest help, however, came from the Chinese. The PRC not only wrote off the DPRK’s war debts, unlike the Soviet Union, but also provided new assistance, while the CPV undertook much construction work. While ostensibly following Soviet models of development, most notably in heavy industry, the DPRK clearly showed signs of leaning toward the Chinese way of constructing socialism. This, inter alia, involved the speeding up of collectivization on the farms and a steady move toward the communization of goods and living conditions. China might have had its Great Leap Forward, but the DPRK had the not too dissimilar Chollima movement.

Under a series of plans, the DPRK made rapid progress. By the early 1960s, it had become the second Asian industrialized country after Japan. Then the rapid advance began to falter. The DPRK seemed less than grateful for the assistance it received, which was often coming from countries that were still themselves coping with the aftermath of war. As DPRK demands grew, donor fatigue began and assistance dropped away. The departure of the Chinese troops in 1957 ended a major source of assistance. In addition, while the workforce undoubtedly worked hard, the overconcentration on heavy industry left little space for consumer goods and other incentives. As the DPRK moved more and more toward communism, people tended to respond less and less to exhortations to do more. In the countryside, collectivization also reduced the effect of the earlier land distribution. One sign that things were not going well was the gradual disappearance from about 1961 of real statistics. From then on, percentage increases in production would become the norm; concrete figures were rarely quoted. The plans also had problems, with additional years sometimes tacked on so that goals could be met.

De-Stalinization had been a problem for Kim Il Sung, but by the late 1950s, it was raising wider concerns among communist states. The Chinese leadership had not been happy with the post-Stalin leadership of the USSR, which in turn was not happy with the increasingly radical policies being pursued by Mao Zedong and his colleagues. Although conducted by inference and hint rather than openly, it was obvious by 1960 that there was a major
dispute between the two largest communist countries, and that other parties and governments would be expected to take sides. The DPRK tried to avoid doing so for a long time; it benefited from its links with both the Soviet Union and the PRC, but eventually opted for the PRC. Kim had, after all, been a member of the CCP, and his ideas were more attuned to its approach than to the more cautious positions of the Soviet party. One side effect of the dispute was the emergence of the *juche* ideology. Whatever it later became, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was little more than a means for Kim Il Sung to claim the status of an independent ideologue, worthy to be considered with Mao and Stalin and perhaps even with Marx and Lenin as a communist theorist.

The 1960s also saw the strengthening of Kim’s own cult of personality, signified by the 1972 Constitution. Hitherto, like Stalin, Kim had been prime minister and party general secretary, with another colleague taking the ceremonial position of state president. The 1972 Constitution transferred executive power to the president, and Kim took on the role, while remaining party secretary. He also began to pay more attention to the succession. At first it seemed that one of his brothers would take over, but during the 1960s, Kim began grooming his eldest son, Kim Jong Il, for the role. When the younger Kim graduated from Kim Il Sung University around 1963, he began a series of attachments designed to make him familiar with the ways of party and government. This was done without publicity, although it was obvious by the late 1960s that the process was under way. In the ROK, a series of incidents, including a raid on the ROK presidential palace and the capture of the USS *Pueblo*, both in 1968, were attributed to Kim Jong Il, whom, it was said, was attempting to prove to his father that he would be a worthy successor. The other field that interested Kim Jong Il was the arts and, in particular, films and filmmaking.

Meanwhile, there was no letup in the political and economic problems. Leaning to the Chinese side in the Sino–Soviet dispute became more difficult as China descended into radicalism in the mid-1960s. The Chinese Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 saw Red Guard criticism of “fat Kim Il Sung,” and there were rumors of clashes along the border. The DPRK was also reported to be concerned that the dispute had hampered efforts to aid the war in Vietnam; possibly the real concern was that this showed that a small country could not expect to depend on its supposed supporters. Indeed, one other consequence of the war in Vietnam that worried both Koreas, for different reasons, was the growing rapprochement between the United States, on the one hand, and the USSR and the PRC, on the other hand. Nikita Khrushchev’s behavior during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and pursuit of “peaceful coexistence” had already prompted DPRK concerns about the Soviet willingness to provide protection, but now U.S.–China contacts leading to President
Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972 added to such worries. These developments led the two Koreas to begin the first tentative dialogue since the early 1950s, which would culminate in the 4 July 1972 Joint Communiqué.

The late 1960s also saw growing economic problems. To some extent, the DPRK was able to exploit the Sino–Soviet dispute to its economic advantage, although how much it actually gained is not easy to establish. The heady growth of the postwar years was past, and the workforce was increasingly unresponsive to exhortations for more toil. It was not only the workforce that was exhausted. Equipment gifted in the 1950s was beginning to wear out. But the leadership remained nothing if not ambitious and, with a thriving export trade in coal, gold, and other commodities, thought that it could afford to purchase state-of-the-art vehicles and other equipment from Western countries. When it came to paying, however, the 1973 oil crisis meant that the bottom had dropped out of the commodities markets. Eventually, the DPRK became the first communist country to default on its debts, a move that would have a knock-on effect on its ability to trade into the 21st century. As the country increased its military spending to compensate for the less than certain commitments from the Soviet Union and China, it began to lose ground to the rapidly industrializing ROK. Exactly when the ROK overtook the DPRK in economic terms is not clear, but by the early 1980s, it was obvious that it had done so. It was also pulling ahead in the competition for international status, with the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting held in Seoul in 1983, and even more significantly, with the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games going to the ROK.

Kim Jong Il emerged from the shadows at the 1980 party congress, and his role as his father’s successor steadily consolidated during the 1980s. In the ROK, the younger Kim continued to be seen as the force behind increasingly hostile DPRK activities, especially the 1983 Yangon bomb attack on ROK President Chun Doo-hwan. The bomb missed Chun but killed several of his senior ministers and advisors. Yet the signals were at best mixed, for a year later, the DPRK responded to heavy floods in the Seoul area with an offer of aid, which the ROK accepted. This led briefly to talks on more extensive economic cooperation, but they soon lost momentum.

The PRC decision to attend the 1986 Asian Games was a blow for the DPRK. A campaign to have part of the Seoul Olympics staged in the DPRK came to nothing, and in an attempt to dissuade attendance, DPRK agents blew up a Korean Air passenger airplane over the Andaman Sea, killing all on board. The capture of one of the agents would eventually reveal much about the DPRK’s illegal acts, such as the kidnapping of Japanese and other foreigners. The bombing failed to deflect attendance at the Olympics, with both the Soviet Union and China and most other socialist countries represented.
Concern about safety for the Olympics did lead to one gain for the DPRK. After years of refusing to talk directly to DPRK representatives, the United States changed its policy. President George H. Bush authorized diplomats in Beijing to begin a dialogue with their DPRK counterparts. Before long, a more intensive DPRK–U.S. dialogue would be under way, as concerns grew about a possible DPRK nuclear weapons program.

The Hard Years after 1991

The late 1980s saw major changes on the international scene. For some time, Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, and China had been trading with the ROK. Such trade had not been flaunted, and cargo had been theoretically shipped through third party ports such as Hong Kong or Singapore. By 1988, such fictions were often ignored, and cargo and paperwork went directly. ROK businessmen and officials were increasingly seen openly operating in China and elsewhere. The DPRK had, perforce, to turn a blind eye publicly to these developments, whatever protests it might have made in private. But in 1989, the pretence ended, when Hungary first established a trade office in Seoul and then moved to full diplomatic relations. The DPRK reacted with fury, downgrading relations, but soon found that most of its former supporters were going the same way. By 1992, all the Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union (just before it collapsed), and China had established diplomatic relations with the ROK. Both the Soviet Union and China also indicated that they would no longer veto any ROK bid to enter the United Nations. Protesting that such a move would hinder reunification, although it had made attempts to join in the past, the DPRK also applied for membership, and the two Koreas were finally admitted to the world organization.

By that stage, there were again signs of rapprochement between the two Koreas. Roh Tae-woo, who succeeded Chun Doo-hwan in 1987 as ROK president, was another former general, but one with more imagination. He had set out on what he called a policy of “Nordpolitik,” analogous to the “Ostpolitik” pursued by West Germany toward East Germany. Roh’s policies were more successful vis-à-vis communist countries than they were toward the DPRK, but in 1990, inter-Korean talks began at the ministerial level and eventually produced a series of agreements. If they had been implemented, they might well have moved relations onto a new level with wide-ranging contacts and economic cooperation, but in reality nothing happened.

The DPRK may have felt that it did not want the ROK too involved in its economy for fear of what might be revealed. The economic decline that had set in by the 1970s was not reversed, even though Kim Jong Il and some of the economic ministers seemed interested in change. The younger Kim
visited China in the mid-1980s and was apparently impressed by the special economic zones then being established. A DPRK Joint Venture Law was introduced in 1987 and the DPRK’s first special economic zone, at Rajin-Sonbong (now Rason) in the far northeast of the country, began in 1991. But mindful of the DPRK’s past record, foreign investors showed little interest. Rajin-Sonbong attracted some Chinese companies and became for a time a gambling center, but it did not take off as the Chinese zones were doing. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) system brought further problems for the DPRK economy. Markets for its goods disappeared, and it could no longer get the oil and other products on which it had come to rely. Russia ended “friendship prices” and demanded the repayment of vast sums of accumulated debt. To make matters worse, the PRC also indicated that “friendship prices” were over, and in the future the DPRK would have to pay the going rate for what it wanted. The Chinese would eventually relent and return to barter trade (and to direct aid), but these moves hit the DPRK hard. Lack of oil not only had a debilitating effect on transport, heating, and lighting but also meant less fertilizer. Less fertilizer meant less food production, which in turn meant hunger. A downward spiral was under way.

In the mid-1990s, things got worse. Kim Il Sung, the only leader the DPRK had known, died in July 1994. Kim Jong Il, groomed for the succession since the 1970s at least, did not assume his father’s roles, but instead went into a very Confucian three-year mourning period. The economy and state affairs were left to others, who had to operate without the central guidance to which they had become accustomed. If everything had been well, this form of autopilot might have worked. But the country was hit by a series of natural disasters that made a bad situation worse. Floods and drought hit the country from 1994 onward. Farmland was destroyed, people were killed, and there was major economic disruption. Some of this was due to cultivation methods. High terracing destroyed the natural barriers against heavy rainfall, while reclaimed land behind sea walls was vulnerable to heavy rains and high tides. An exhausted population had few reserves to cope with disasters. Mines flooded, and a lack of electricity meant that the pumps necessary to clear them were unworkable. Lack of oil affected electricity supplies and transport facilities. Even where food was available, there were problems of distribution. The showpiece capital, Pyongyang, did not escape; reduced electricity meant darkened streets and tower blocks that had neither working lifts nor water supplies. Primitive privies appeared at the base of buildings in the very center of the capital, and vegetable plots appeared on balconies and around workplaces. Outside the capital, things were more desperate, especially in the poor lands in the mountain areas. Death and disease were widespread.
The health and educational services, deprived of funds, ceased to function in many areas. Hungry students and teachers were often barely able to stay awake, let alone study, and hospitals without drugs or heating could do little for their patients.

Coping mechanisms came into play. Those with relatives in the countryside either went there, or, more often, sought help from them for food. Cross-border movement into China became more frequent and would eventually lead to a permanent outflow of refugees. The state, unable to meet requirements, stopped supplying or heavily reduced rations for urban dwellers. Local controls on travel were relaxed somewhat, and officials who had hitherto looked to the state to provide supplies began to take on the responsibility themselves. The social contract of earlier years unraveled. The state did not just stand aside, however. From 1995, it appealed for international assistance, a rare gesture from a communist country.

The assistance came, but it brought its own problems. The DPRK was not a stranger to international aid. It had received aid in the Korean War and after and later had itself given aid. As late as 1991, there were foreign students in the DPRK, and there were DPRK aid projects especially in Africa. It had also been engaged with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for some years, and UNDP training programs had been provided for the DPRK. But it was rather different having aid organizations on the ground in the country itself. Expectations on both sides were very different. The DPRK clearly hoped for foreign funds that it could distribute to priority groups, such as industrial workers along the east coast, as it wished. The aid organizations’ priorities were the vulnerable, especially pregnant women, children, and the elderly. They were also used to operating in areas where effective government had broken down or disappeared. Although the DPRK might no longer be able to feed its people, it was unwilling to abandon control over them. There were issues over monitoring and access. The DPRK would not allow Korean-speaking aid workers for many years. It was not long before there were clashes and some organizations withdrew. Others remained and were still there in 2012, despite occasional DPRK claims that it no longer needed assistance. Indeed, in 2010, the DPRK made fresh appeals for food aid and continued to repeat them into 2011.

All this took place against the backdrop of another problem, the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear program. The DPRK had shown an interest in nuclear development since the 1950s and in the 1960s received some assistance from the Soviet Union for a civilian research project. At Soviet insistence, the facilities were registered with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), and the DPRK was also persuaded to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 1991, there was growing international concern that the
civilian projects masked nuclear weapon development. Satellite photographs showed that there were more facilities at the main nuclear site at Yongbyon than the declared Soviet reactor. This was confirmed by a DPRK list supplied to the IAEA. What was described as a radiochemical laboratory appeared to be a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant that would enable the DPRK to extract the plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons. The IAEA attempts to inspect these facilities led the DPRK to announce in March 1993 that it would withdraw from the NPT. In theory such a move was allowed, but no other country had done so, and it threatened to put the whole international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy.

Great pressure was put on the DPRK not to withdraw. U.S. President Bill Clinton considered military action but decided against it. Instead, a combination of threats and promises led the DPRK to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. Following a visit by former President Jimmy Carter in June 1994, negotiations began between the DPRK and the United States and continued with only a slight pause following Kim II Sung’s death. These led to the signing of an Agreed Framework at Geneva in October 1994. The DPRK agreed to freeze all its activities at Yongbyon, while a consortium, known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), would supply two light-water reactors (LWRs) to meet DPRK energy needs. In addition, the DPRK would receive heavy fuel oil until the LWRs were operational. The United States undertook to lift sanctions and to move toward diplomatic relations. Only when the new LWRs were about to become operational would the IAEA fully investigate the DPRK’s past nuclear history. In 1997, a groundbreaking ceremony for the LWRs took place.

Progress was slow. Some speculated that the U.S. government, in the wake of the end of the Soviet Union, Kim II Sung’s death, and the disasters of the 1990s, thought that the DPRK was on the point of collapse and saw little need to rush the LWR program. But despite many prophecies about imminent collapse, the DPRK struggled on. The main U.S. interest was the preservation of the NPT regime and the cap on a DPRK nuclear weapons program; there was no disposition to rush forward on the LWRs or on other aspects of the Agreed Framework. The DPRK, for its part, was anxious to exploit the agreement for what it was worth, which led to disputes over personnel and payments. But whatever the problems, there was an overall improvement in U.S.–DPRK relations. As well as cooperation over the Agreed Framework, these years saw a Missing in Action program in the DPRK, with joint military teams tracking down U.S. military missing remains from the Korean War. The pinnacle of the relationship came in autumn 2000. The second highest ranking member of the DPRK elite, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited Washington and then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to the DPRK. The Albright
visit was seen as a precursor for one by the president himself, but this did not materialize.

A Brief Burst of Sunshine

The year 2000 marked a high point in other ways as well. There was still hunger, but the worst of the famine appeared to be over. (The long-term effects, in widespread malnutrition, stunting of children, and general debilitation, made known though UN-conducted surveys, would persist, as would the damage done to the infrastructure.) The election of the long-term ROK opposition politician Kim Dae-jung as president in 1997 brought with it a new approach to inter-Korean relations, dubbed the “Sunshine Policy.” Kim offered help with rebuilding the DPRK economy, while at the same time postponing the issue of reunification to the future. There would be no ROK attempt to destabilize the DPRK. After being dismissive at first, Kim Jong Il eventually reacted positively, and the first ever inter-Korean summit took place in Pyongyang in June 2000. There was much euphoria and discussion of schemes for cooperation. Later, it became clear that the summit had only been possible through the payment of large sums to the DPRK, and that such sums were still being dispersed. But for a time, it brought hope. An immediate consequence was that Western countries that had refused to establish relations with the DPRK now began to do so, although only a small number opened embassies in Pyongyang. The DPRK joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, a further sign of a more outward approach to the world. Talks with Japan on diplomatic relations and compensation for the past, stalled since the early 1990s, also resumed.

Improved North–South relations continued to develop under Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Myoo-hyun between 2000 and 2008. These included the opening of the Kumgang (Diamond) Mountains and later the city of Kaesong for tourism, regular meetings and a permanent meeting place for divided families, and the creation of a special economic zone at Kaesong, where DPRK workers staffed ROK-owned factories. The ROK also supplied food and fertilizer. Although at the 2000 summit Kim Jong Il had promised to make a return visit to the ROK, this did not happen. However, a second Pyongyang summit took place in October 2007 between Kim Jong Il and Roh Myoo-hyun.

But by then, the “Sunshine Policy,” long since renamed the “Engagement Policy,” faced an uncertain future. Conservatives in the ROK had always expressed skepticism about the DPRK’s real intentions, and there was growing concern about the cost. The ROK also found its main ally’s position changed. The 2000 U.S. presidential election brought in a Republican administration
whose leading members dismissed the Agreed Framework as “appeasement.” President George W. Bush, who thought Kim Dae-jung naïve and was openly critical of Kim Jong Il, announced a review of U.S. policy. While this was under way, there would be no U.S. engagement with the DPRK. The Agreed Framework continued, but the program was falling way behind schedule. The DPRK complained that the United States would not explain the delay. When the two sides finally met, in October 2002, the U.S. envoy, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, did not want to discuss delays in the Agreed Framework. Instead, he challenged the DPRK with operating a clandestine second nuclear program designed to produce highly enriched uranium. Leaks after the visit indicated that the DPRK negotiators first denied the claim but later admitted it. The DPRK, for its part, claimed that the U.S team had misunderstood what was said, and that whether it had such a program or not, it had the right to do so since it was still a U.S. nuclear target. Claim and counterclaim flew back and forth, but the result was that by the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework, and with it the cap on the DPRK’s nuclear program, was effectively dead. The heavy fuel oil deliveries, always somewhat erratic, stopped. The DPRK expelled the IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon, restarted its nuclear program, and formally withdrew from the NPT, the first state ever to do so.

Once again, there was much international activity, leading eventually to talks involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States in August 2003. These Six Party Talks continued until 2008, coming tantalizingly close to agreement from time to time, but failing to stop the DPRK nuclear program. The DPRK carried out nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, and by 2010 had also made progress on an enriched uranium program. There was international reluctance to accept its claim to be a nuclear weapons state, but the reality appeared to be that it was. Sanctions proved ineffective. Russia and China, while both condemning the DPRK’s nuclear policies, were cautious about isolating it and were unenthusiastic about enforcing sanctions.

The nuclear issue also affected inter-Korean relations. The ROK did not want to disengage, but it also did not want a nuclear DPRK. Some aid stopped because of the nuclear tests, but other contacts continued, as did the Kaesong zone. The lack of U.S. support for the ROK during the Bush administration was sometimes very obvious; it was clear that the United States had moved a long way from the attitude that Korean matters were for Koreans to solve. The DPRK, for its part, continued to argue that it needed a formal settlement with the United States, as the signatory of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and would not engage with the ROK on the matter.

The December 2007 ROK presidential election brought the conservative Lee Myung-bak to power. The DPRK had avoided criticizing him during the
campaign and waited for some time after he took office. But as Lee made it clear that he would not follow the policies of the previous two administrations, the DPRK became hostile. Lee rejected the proposals agreed to at the October 2007 summit, even though several of them would have been directly beneficial to the ROK. The shooting of a tourist at the Kumgang resort effectively ended that venture. The DPRK protested, to no avail. Kaesong continued despite some rather heavy-handed DPRK pressure and marked deterioration in relations in 2010 following the sinking of an ROK naval ship and the shelling of ROK-held islands close to DPRK territory. A change of administration in the United States in 2008 did not help the DPRK, since the Democrats under Barack Obama proved just as tough as the Republicans had been on the nuclear issue and showed little disposition to engage. Overall, by 2011, North–South relations were in a poor condition.

“A Strong and Prosperous Nation”?

It is against such a background that the DPRK designated 2012, the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, as the year when it will become a “strong and prosperous nation.” The signs were inauspicious. There was little indication that Kim Jong Il and those around him realized the extent of the country’s problems or knew what to do about them. Since the late 1990s, there has been an even heavier emphasis than in the past on the importance of the military, and the country has officially pursued a “military first policy” (Songun). Although this does not necessarily mean that all those in the military are well looked after, it does reflect the disproportionate amount of resources that go to the military and the consequent distortion of the economy. Nuclear and missile programs do not come cheap, even in a low labor-cost country such as the DPRK.

The old Soviet-style heavy industry is dead, but it has not been easy to find replacements for it. Glossy pictures in magazines present vibrant modern factories producing high-quality goods, but the reality is different. DPRK factories are small scale and often inefficient. They find it hard to compete in the world economy. It is not only the old-style industry that has gone. The socialist system, with its centrally controlled and targeted distribution arrangements, has broken down. There are periodic attempts to reintroduce it, and the government does not like to admit that it has failed. But increasingly, most urban dwellers shop in markets and pay something like market prices. Attempts to control change have been less than successful. In 2002, a reform of prices and wages gave a temporary boost, but people soon realized that while their wages had gone up, so too had the prices and the latter soon outstripped the former. At the same time, the old planning arrangements came
to an end. By 2005, attempts were being made to return to the old system, but they were only partially successful. Even more unsettling was a botched currency reform in 2009, which apparently led to public protests and the reported execution of the official responsible for its introduction.

And increasingly the question of Kim Jong Il’s health and the succession loomed large. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il apparently gave little thought to what would happen when he died. He was known to have three sons at least, by two different mothers, but these were kept out of the public eye. All three apparently received some of their education in Switzerland, a fact known only to a few in the DPRK. The eldest, Kim Jong Nam, who according to some reports was his father’s favorite, may have ruled himself out when he attracted international publicity in 2001 by attempting to enter Japan on a false passport. He thereafter mostly lived outside the country. The two younger sons were in their 20s.

In 2008, Kim Jong Il disappeared from view for some time, amid rumors that he had suffered a stroke. Photographs appeared showing him going about giving guidance as usual, but some of these appeared doctored, and it was some months before he began to appear regularly. When he did, he had clearly lost weight and showed some classic stroke symptoms. This led to much international speculation about the succession. By early 2010, it was widely believed that Kim had selected his third son, Kim Jong Un, thought to be in his late 20s to take over. No formal announcement was made, but the young man, showing an uncanny likeness to his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, appeared at the party congress held in September 2010, the first since 1980. Both he and his aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, became generals, although neither is known to have any military experience. Kim Kyong Hui’s husband, Jang Song Taek, a senior party official, was also advanced at the same time. For the following 15 months, Kim Jong Un appeared regularly with his father on ceremonial occasions and visits. He was never identified as Kim’s son, but DPRK officials did not deny who he was. Many of the visits, as often with Kim Jong Il, were to military units. It seemed clear that the process of establishing the succession was under way. There was much international speculation about such a young man taking over, especially when he was seen surrounded by elderly generals. Surely the military would look askance at such a young and inexperienced leader?

In any event, the time for preparation proved short. On 19 December 2011, DPRK state media announced that Kim Jong Il had died on 17 December of a heart attack while on an inspection visit. No explanation for the delay in the announcement was provided, and there were soon voices in the ROK casting doubt on the official story. According to these sources, Kim Jong Il’s train had not left Pyongyang, so he could not have died on an inspection trip as
claimed. But as the DPRK moved into formal mourning, with Kim Jong Un and other leaders paying their respects to Kim Jong Il lying in state in the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, where the body of Kim Il Sung also lies, there could be no doubt of his death. His funeral obsequies, carried on international television, showed people in apparent paroxysms of grief, emphasized the role of Kim Jong Un but also showed party, state, and military leaders lined up with him. The message was clear; the leadership was together, rallied around Kim Jong Il’s chosen successor. By the end of December, Kim Jong Un had been given a range of titles that indicated he headed the party, government, and the military. He had also begun to make visits and undertake other activities that indicated there would not be a prolonged period of mourning as there had been when Kim Il Sung died.

What the reality is can only be guessed. It is not clear now and it is unlikely to be for some time whether Kim Jong Un is really in charge or whether some form of consortium will run the country. In either case, there is unlikely to be any major change in policy in the short term, whatever debates are under way in the background. The leadership knows that the DPRK does not operate in a vacuum, and that in the ROK and elsewhere there are those who want to see the regime disappear. They will also know that any change in the status quo would be a threat to those who currently run the system. Most North Koreans do not know of what has happened to the leaders of Egypt or Libya, but the leadership does and has no wish for any similar developments in the DPRK. It is still claimed that the DPRK will be a “strong and prosperous” country by April 2012, and the celebrations to mark Kim Il Sung’s centenary will go ahead. The signs are not positive. The country appears to be still unable to feed its people; the appeals for food aid made since 2010 are widely believed to be in order to enable the population to celebrate the centenary. While the capital and a number of other cities are being spruced up for the occasion, it is at some cost. DPRK officials have confirmed that many university students have been taken off their courses in order to work on construction projects. Sanctions over nuclear issues may not bite very hard, but there are signs that efforts to stop DPRK exports of military-related equipment are having an effect. And the nuclear issue effectively blocks off international development aid, which the DPRK needs.

From the beginning in the 1940s, there have been rumors that the DPRK was on the point of collapse, and no doubt one day they will prove to be true. That day may still be some way off, however. The DPRK began under Soviet auspices, but unlike Eastern Europe, it was not Soviet guns that kept it in existence. Drawing on selective Korean traditions and applying lessons learned in guerrilla warfare in the 1930s, Kim Il Sung and his colleagues created something that was their own. The Korean War reinforced the earlier experi-
ences but also left a bitter legacy on the peninsula. The DPRK leadership, faced with an alternative system in the ROK and aware of the continued hostility that still exists, will not just accept an ROK takeover. To do so would be far too dangerous for the elite. Eventually, perhaps when memories of the bitterness of the Korean War have passed from active memory, geography, history, and culture will probably lead to a reunified Korean Peninsula, but for the immediate future, the existing separate states will continue. For the present, Kim Jong Un’s resemblance to his grandfather is a visible reminder of the continuities in the DPRK.
ABDUCTIONS. In September 2002, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il told the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro that DPRK agents had abducted a number of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. This was the first time that the DPRK admitted such allegations. It had long been at the center of accusations that it abducted nationals of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and several other countries, especially Japan. The history of the ROK abductees began during the Korean War, when large numbers of what were called “intelligentsia” were taken north. After the war, ROK fishermen regularly disappeared from 1955 onward and reappeared in the DPRK. In 1969, 47 passengers and four crew of a Korean Airlines’ aircraft were hijacked to Wonsan in the DPRK. The following year, 39 were returned. A small number of ROK citizens disappeared elsewhere in the world from the late 1960s until the early 1980s, including the actress Choe Eun-hui and her film-director husband, Shin Sang-ok, who vanished from Hong Kong in 1978, and later resurfaced in the DPRK. Since about 2000, there have been a number of alleged abductions along the DPRK border with China among people working with refugees; these included an ROK missionary, Kim Tong-shin, who disappeared from the area in 2000. The DPRK always denied that it abducted ROK citizens, claiming that any who were in the DPRK were there voluntarily and had no wish to return. The ROK government rarely raised the issue before 2002 and then did so in a low-key way. However, in 2005, it was agreed at inter-Korean ministerial talks that the regular North–South Red Cross talks might look at the question of those missing since the Korean War as part of the separated families issue. The DPRK eventually produced a list of around 400 people, with names and jobs, and indicated that some of these might take part in family reunions. One of those reported as abducted, Kim Young-nam, who disappeared in 1978, did take part in a reunion meeting in 2006. When asked, he denied that he had been abducted. Since then, there has been no further progress on the issue.

The Japanese authorities state that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that 17 Japanese citizens (nine female and eight male) were abducted by DPRK agents in the 1970s and 1980s. Private organizations in Japan claim
that as many as 70 or 80 were taken. The youngest was Yokata Megumi, who disappeared from Niigata Prefecture in November 1977, aged 13. Until the late 1980s, the claims about such kidnapping tended to be discounted for lack of evidence. However, following the Andaman Sea bombing in 1987, the DPRK agent who was captured, Kim Hyun Hee, said that she had been trained by a Japanese national who had been brought to the DPRK for that purpose. This led the Japanese government to raise the issue with the DPRK in the context of talks on the normalization of relations, but without success. However, Koizumi’s visit in 2002 provided a breakthrough. During a meeting with Kim Jong Il, the latter said that “overzealous” agents had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens. Kim said eight were dead, including Yokata, who was said to have committed suicide in 1994. The agents had been punished. In October 2002, the DPRK allowed the five living abductees to return to Japan for a visit. However, once they were there, the Japanese government, now under intense pressure from the families and their supporters, decided not to let them return to the DPRK, despite the fact that they had left spouses and children behind. (One of the returnees was Soga Hitomi, the wife of Charles Jenkins, a deserter from the United States army.) The DPRK protested at this breach of the agreement reached during the Koizumi visit, but the issue was already further complicated by the renewed nuclear issue, and the Japanese government refused to change its position.

Koizumi paid a second visit to the DPRK in May 2004 and secured agreement for the children of those who had left in 2002 to join them. These included the Soga-Jenkins’s children, while Jenkins was also able to leave the DPRK. As for those whom it was claimed were dead, the DPRK provided detailed information about them in November 2004, most of which the Japanese government found unsatisfactory, as well as what it claimed were samples from the remains of two of the deceased, Yokata Megumi and Matsaki Karu. After DNA testing, the Japanese government claimed that the remains did not match the DNA of either, although some doubt was subsequently raised about the standards and abilities of the laboratory that carried out the tests.

The demand within Japan for more information remained strong, and the issue tended to dominate the Japanese approach to the Six Party Talks. The Japanese regularly raised the issue at the meetings and, when agreement was reached in 2007 on supplying funds to the DPRK in return for dismantling of its nuclear facilities, the Japanese declined to meet their share until the abduction issue had been settled. The DPRK attitude was that they had provided all the information that was available, while Kim Young-nam, who took part in the 2006 family reunion program, not only said that he was Yokata Megami’s husband but confirmed that she had committed suicide. He also demanded to be left alone. There was international support for the Japanese position, with
U.S. President George W. Bush meeting families of the abductees, although there was also some annoyance at the Japanese single-minded pursuit of the issue. A number of ROK politicians noted that during the Japanese colonial period, large numbers of Koreans were forced to go to work in various parts of the empire.

As agreement appeared to be in sight on the nuclear issue in 2008, it was announced in August that the DPRK and Japan had agreed to a plan for further investigations, but nothing appears to have happened. In October 2009, the Japanese government established a new task force, chaired by then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, to look into the issue of abductions. This task force replaced the Headquarters for the Abduction Issue set up in 2006 under then Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The issue was also raised when U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth visited the DPRK in December 2009. Bosworth reported that the DPRK “showed a positive stand towards holding talks between Japan and North Korea, including on the abduction issue.”

On 12 December 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama said at a press conference that he was ready to go to the DPRK to discuss the issue; however, nothing furthered happened. In early 2011, the Japanese media carried unconfirmed reports that two of the supposedly dead Japanese abductees had been seen alive in recent years.

There has been much debate over why the DPRK undertook the abductions. In the case of ROK citizens abducted during the Korean War, the main reason seems to have been to bring able-bodied people to the North to aid its development. The detention of prisoners of war probably arose because of the complicated negotiations on the issue leading up to the 1953 Armistice Agreement and then from an unwillingness to admit that people had remained in the DPRK against their will. The capture of fishermen may have been part of an attempt to claim that people in the ROK were longing to go to the DPRK, while some of the later abductions, especially those of Choe and Shin in 1978, appear to have been at the personal whim of Kim Jong Il. Others may have been in the wrong place at the wrong time and were taken to the DPRK to prevent them from reporting the activities of infiltration groups.

In the case of Japan, there appears to be a similar mixture of motives. Some may have been taken so their identities could be assumed by DPRK agents. Such people may well have been killed, hence the reluctance of the DPRK to examine their cases. Others may have been taken to provide training for agents, although it is hard to see why the DPRK could not use members of the large pro-DPRK community in Japan for such purposes. Others, such as Yokata Megumi, who was clearly too young to be of much use in a training role, may have been witnesses to infiltration attempts and were taken to keep them quiet.
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. The Academy of Sciences is the principal center of scientific and technical research in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The academy controls a variety of agencies and organizations, including a number of publishing houses. Some social science institutes are also attached to it, as well as a number of special committees working on subjects that include the compilation of classics, language issues, and so forth. The academy dates from 1952 and reports directly to the president’s cabinet. From 1994 to 1998, it was called the National Academy of Sciences, but it then reverted to its original title. Its headquarters are in the Moranbong district of Pyongyang, where it has some facilities, but much of its work is concentrated in the city of Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, a short distance from the capital. There is also a branch at Hamhung. The DPRK’s first contacts in the field of nuclear science were made under the auspices of the academy in the 1950s, and it is widely believed to be the main center of the DPRK nuclear program. Like all such organizations in the DPRK, the academy has suffered from lack of funds since the late 1980s. In addition to the Academy of Sciences, the DPRK has an Academy of Agricultural Sciences, an Academy of Social Sciences, and an Academy of Medical Sciences.

ACHESON’S STATEMENT ON KOREA. On 12 January 1950, Dean Acheson, then secretary of state of the United States, spoke on Asian policy at the Press Club in Washington, D.C. Speaking from notes, he said that the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific ran along the Aleutians to Japan, to the Ryukyu Islands, and to the Philippines Islands, which must and would be held by the United States. In his statement, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan were conspicuously absent from the line of the U.S. defense perimeter. Some have seen this as the signal to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that it would not have to deal with the United States in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, thus clearing the way for the attack in June 1950. See also KOREAN WAR.

AGREED FRAMEWORK. A document signed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States at Geneva on 21 October 1994, which aimed to cap the DPRK’s nuclear program. Under the terms of the agreement, the DPRK agreed to freeze its plutonium enrichment program and to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to monitor both the freeze and other nuclear-related activity at Yongbyon. The DPRK and the United States would also cooperate to store the spent fuel from the existing 5-megawatt reactor and to dispose of it safely.

It was further agreed that the two sides would cooperate to replace the DPRK’s existing graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light water reac-
tors (LWRs), to be provided by an international consortium; that until the LWRs were functional, the United States would supply heavy fuel oil to the DPRK; that the two sides would begin negotiations for the establishment of full diplomatic relations and economic cooperation; and that both sides would work for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as well as to strengthen international nonproliferation.

The Agreed Framework was not a treaty and was therefore not submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval. Rather it was a process that allowed the United States and the DPRK to get around their lack of diplomatic relations and to raise issues of concern. There was criticism both at the time and later that the agreement was an example of appeasement and that it lacked any monitoring system, while the DPRK soon began to realize that the project would take a long time to come to fruition. For its part, the United States seemed to be inclined to let the project drag on without any sense of urgency, once the immediate problem of stopping the DPRK nuclear program had been settled. Some commentators later said that this was because few in President Bill Clinton’s administration believed that the DPRK would survive for long after the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, who had been its only leader since the mid-1940s. But the United States also faced difficulties in providing heavy fuel oil, especially after the Democrats lost control of the Congress. For a time, money for this was found from funds outside congressional control but eventually international funding met the shortfalls. From 1996, congressional funding was forthcoming, but it was often late and insufficient.

The agreement appeared to start well. The DPRK began winding down its nuclear program and to cooperate with U.S. and IAEA verification efforts. In January 1995, the United States eased economic sanctions dating back to the Korean War. In order both to finance and carry out the Agreed Framework, the United States created the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). A number of countries joined the KEDO board, although for most, this was a question of providing funds rather than having any significant effect on the organization. Although detailed work on the LWR project was now the responsibility of KEDO, the Agreed Framework continued to function in parallel. It was under the aegis of the Agreed Framework that the United States raised the issue of the underground facility that the DPRK was detected constructing at Kumchang-ri, for example.

When George W. Bush succeeded Bill Clinton as U.S. president in 2001, the Republican hostility to the Agreed Framework quickly resurfaced. The arrangement was not formally denounced until after Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s visit to the DPRK in October 2002. Under the Clinton administration, Kelly’s charge that the DPRK was known to have a program to produce highly enriched uranium would probably have been handled under the
Agreed Framework, but the DPRK’s apparent admission of the claim was now used to bring the Agreed Framework to an end. The heavy fuel oil deliveries stopped in November 2002, which led the DPRK to announce that it would end the 1994 nuclear freeze, expel the IAEA inspectors, and that they would restart its nuclear program. By the beginning of 2003, the Agreed Framework was dead for all practical purposes. See also SIX PARTY TALKS.

**AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NON-AGGRESSION AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH.** Following a series of talks between the premiers of the two Koreas between September 1990 and December 1991, an agreement was signed at the fifth round of talks in Seoul, the Republic of Korea (ROK) capital, on 13 December 1991. Echoing the terms of the 4 July 1972 North–South Communiqué, the two sides agreed to noninterference in each other’s affairs and to respect each other’s political systems. Until a permanent peace agreement could be reached, each would abide by the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. They also agreed to stop international competition with each other. The agreement provided for a wide range of social and economic exchanges and for the reconnection of road and rail links severed since the Korean War.

The agreement was approved by ROK President Roh Tae-woo on 17 January 1992 and by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) President Kim Il Sung the following day. The approved document was exchanged at the sixth round of the premiers talks, held in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, from 18–21 February 1992, which brought the agreement into force. In practice, it remained a dead letter until some of its precepts were reaffirmed at the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit and again at the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit. As a result, there has been some progress on issues such as family reunions and links. Appendix B provides the text of the agreement.

**AGRICULTURE.** The agricultural sector in what is now the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) underwent a major reorganization even before the establishment of the state in 1948. As early as March 1946, a Land Reform Law, later incorporated into the 1948 Constitution, provided for the confiscation of land and agricultural equipment that had belonged to Japanese landlords or to Koreans who had left the northern part of the peninsula. In this way, just over 50 percent of the land available for agriculture in all forms was taken by the state, while the remainder was distributed to those who had always worked the land. There was no doubt that some measure of land reform was necessary in the wake of the liberation; even in the non-communist southern part of the peninsula, two campaigns to redistribute land
were launched in the Republic of Korea (ROK) between 1948 and 1952, a process also made easier by the Japanese departure. In both parts of Korea, wartime disruption of agriculture and life in the countryside made dramatic changes in land holdings possible. The difference between the DPRK and the ROK was that eventually in the DPRK the initial land distribution to the peasants was replaced by a collectivized system that has remained in place ever since. The state set production norms, while the cooperative farms served as both the organizational basis of agriculture and the means of providing the rural population with facilities for health, education, and cultural activities.

Collectivization was completed by 1958, by which time the average cooperative farm had 275 to 300 farming households and around 400 to 500 hectares (988–1,235 acres) of land. The existing ri (villages) formed the basic units of the new collective farms. The workforce was divided into work teams and again into subwork teams. Through this collective system the foodstuffs essential to the functioning of society are drawn off, after the producers have taken their requirements. This surplus would then be distributed to the rest of society through the Public Distribution System. In return, other sections of society would help those engaged in agriculture to meet the needs that they could not satisfy from their own resources. Extra voluntary labor has always been drafted in as required from the military or civilian population. At plant-
ing, transplanting, and harvest times, school and university students will join soldiers in the fields, often for extended periods.

The present (2011) number of cooperative farms is about 3,000, each with an average area of 300 hectares (740 acres). Their main task is to produce the staple cereal crops. Some undertake more specialized work, including livestock rearing and breeding, fruit farming, fish rearing, and seed supply. Military farms, established in remote and difficult areas, attempt to open poor lands to cultivation as well as supplying the armed forces with their own food needs; the military also receives (or in recent years, apparently takes) food from the civilian farms. The third element in land holding is the private family plot. These vary greatly in size, from 10 to 100 square meters (107–1,076 square feet). Since the famine of the 1990s, these plots have sometimes been supplemented by access to marginal land, especially on the hillsides. This development, while helping with short-term needs, has created serious problems in the rural environment.

Agriculture and agricultural workers have had to bear heavy loads. The amount of arable land available is just over 2 million hectares (7,722 square miles) for all types of crops, which amounts to only about 20 percent of the country’s total land area. On this basis, the agricultural section has been required to feed a population that has more than doubled since 1945. At the same time, agriculture lost a large number of workers early on, as they were drafted into the manufacturing sector to push forward the DPRK’s industrial development. The harsh climate has added to the difficulties, with frost-free days at most about 190 per annum, and often as low as 130, depending on the location. Good cultivable soil, dependent on alluvial deposits and loam, is distributed unevenly, with most of it on the west side of the country and in a small strip along the east coast. Some 10 percent of arable land has been reclaimed from the sea. Other lands have been brought into use by the clearing of small hills and the creation of large fields. (Some in the ROK profess to believe that the real reason for this measure is not the creation of more efficient agricultural units but the elimination of traditional boundary lines and landmarks, to make impossible any future attempt at the restoration of lands to their former owners.) Erosion, particularly through heavy summer rainfall and floods, is a recurring problem and is increased by high terracing and the clearing of trees from the new large fields.

In order to produce the good yields necessary to meet demand, farmers must extract a high rate of utility from the land. Close planting, described as juche nongbop, or the practice of juche in farming, is a characteristic of DPRK rice cultivation. Since the land was given little time to recover between plantings, DPRK farms became, and remain, heavy users of artificial fertilizers. The provision of fertilizer has been a problem because of the over-
all economic decline. Most fertilizers were a side product of oil refining, but
the amount of oil available has declined. It is estimated that the DPRK pro-
duces less than 500,000 tons of artificial fertilizer, which is only about a third
of what is required. For some years, the ROK helped to meet the shortfall,
but since the election of ROK President Lee Myung-bak and the continued
nuclear crisis, this supply has ceased.

During the industrialization of the country from the 1950s through to the
1970s, programs were put in hand to mechanize and modernize agriculture,
to bring electric power to the countryside and thus to improve irrigation
through pumping stations, and to boost the production of chemical ferti-
lider. Agricultural output rose, and the export value of some items in the
sector was recognized. Self-sufficiency in food production was taken as a
marker of the country’s independence and progress, and it was claimed at
various times that it had been achieved. Some flexibility, however, always
existed in practice; rice might be exported to earn foreign exchange, while
cheaper grains were imported for domestic consumption. Now the support
that agriculture received in earlier decades from the industrial sector has
fallen away, machinery is wearing out, and electricity is failing, the neces-
sary inputs of fertilizer often are provided from outside the country, if at all,
and the soil is losing its fertility. Farms that once had 10 or 12 tractors are
now lucky to have one or two working; the rest are cannibalized for spare
parts. In many parts of the country, oxcarts have replaced tractors both for
plowing and hauling.

As the worst of the famine ended in the late 1990s, the importance of the
agricultural sector was increasingly recognized by the input of new funding.
Agricultural rehabilitation and innovation were priorities for the government,
for the international aid agencies, and for foreign nongovernmental organi-
izations that had begun to establish a presence from the mid-1990s. But the
agricultural sector still struggles to provide the 6 million metric tons of cere-
als the state says is required each year, not just to feed the human population
but also to meet seed, animal, and industrial requirements as well as to cover
the losses that occur even in the best years. It is also known that the DPRK
maintains a stockpile of cereals, which it claims is to meet emergency needs;
it may also be maintained in case of war. The United Nations World Food
Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization estimate that
there is a shortfall of about 1 million metric tons per annum. Some of this is
met by the government’s commercial purchases, which are known to have
increased since the economic improvements began in the late 1990s. The
international organizations attempt to meet the remaining gap but have found
it increasingly difficult to get countries to contribute year after year. In late
2010, the WFP thought that, even after government imports, there would be
a shortfall of about 500,000 metric tons, and it appealed for donors, but there was little response.

Other means of increasing food supplies include encouraging some diversification of crops. Koreans may prefer to eat rice, but in the DPRK, they have been encouraged to grow maize, wheat, barley, and potatoes. The last of these was traditionally only grown in the very north of the country and was used to make side dishes. But while Kim Il Sung was unwilling to see the potato crop expanded, his son, Kim Jong Il, who took over in 1994, took a more positive approach and encouraged the use of potatoes as a staple, now cultivated throughout the country. There have been problems with blight, however, and there are experimental farms attempting to find a means of combating this. Double cropping, which was used in earlier years but then abandoned, has been reintroduced, with considerable success. Farmers are encouraged to raise goats, chickens, dogs, and rabbits. These are not necessarily eaten by the producers, who may find it more profitable to sell or barter them in the market so that they can obtain cereal. The rearing of small animals such as rabbits and goats is also encouraged in urban areas, and people may grow vegetables on tiny plots or even in window boxes. Cattle are mainly used as draught animals. Apart from the elite, few people eat beef, except on special occasions.

The collective organization of agriculture has been much criticized since the 1990s as contributing to the famine and to general shortages of food. Yet the system, as well as representing the working out of Kim Il Sung’s policies, had roots both in the history of the peninsula during the Japanese colonial period, whereby land was apportioned among large landowners, often but not entirely Japanese settlers, and many small tenant farmers, and in the wider East Asian tradition of cooperation in the cultivation of rice. See also FLOOD DAMAGE REHABILITATION COMMITTEE; HUMANITARIAN AID.

AIR KORYO. Air Koryo is the only airline in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was founded in 1954 as the Civil Aviation Authority of Korea (Choson Minhang; – CAAK), replacing an earlier joint DPRK–Soviet Union airline, and made its first flight the following year. It is said to have 2,500 staff and a fleet of 40 Soviet-made aircraft; many now rather old. However, it acquired new TU-204M aircraft from Russia in 2008, and it is believed more are on order. Its headquarters are at Sunan airport near the capital, Pyongyang. Personnel of Air Koryo are said to be members of the armed forces. Air Koryo has scheduled flights to Beijing and Shenyang in China, to Bangkok in Thailand, and to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok in Russia. There are also occasional charter flights to other destinations. Hotels in Pyongyang (and older guidebooks) often still show lists of scheduled flights to Europe, but these have long ceased to operate. The European Union
(EU) banned Air Koryo from European airspace because of pollution and safety issues in 2003. Subsequently, a number of EU countries advised their nationals not to use the airline if there is an alternative. However, the ban was partially lifted in 2010 after the acquisition of new aircraft. In general, the airline has a good international safety record, despite the aging of most of its fleet, with only one known fatal crash on an international flight in 1983. Domestic routes include Pyongyang–Hamhung, Pyongyang–Chongjin, and Pyongyang–Samjiyon (for Mount Paekdu); it is not clear whether these are scheduled or charter flights. Air Koryo joined the International Air Transport Authority (IATA) in 1997; its IATA code is JS. Between 2002 and 2008, Air Koryo flew occasional charter flights to the Republic of Korea (ROK); these have stopped since Lee Myung-bak became ROK president in 2008. Since 2009, a body called the Korea Friendship Association has maintained an unofficial website relating to Air Koryo (www.korea-dpr.com/airkoryo.htm). See also TRANSPORT.

AN CHAE HONG (1891–1965). A progressive nationalist, who went to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the Korean War. An graduated from Waseda University in Japan in 1914. After returning to Korea, he was active in the Korean Young Men’s Christian Association and in 1919 was jailed for three years for his part in the Samil movement (1 March 1919). In 1923, he was a founder of the Shidae Ilbo and served on its editorial board. Later, he became president and editor-in-chief of the Choson Ilbo, a position he held for 10 years. He was imprisoned again in 1925, 1936, and 1942 for his nationalist views. During these years, An had contacts with the Korean Communist Party. In 1945, An, as a member of the Korean Nationalist Party, was a founder of the Committee for the Preparation of National Reconstruction. When the United States Army Military Government in Korea established the South Korean interim government in 1947, An became its head as civil administrator. However, he opposed the United Nations’ plan to hold separate elections in South Korea. During the Korean War, he was one of a number of Republic of Korea politicians who were forced or in some cases chose to go voluntarily to the DPRK. He reappeared in 1956 as one of the members of the newly created Council in North Korea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. Along with most other members of this organization, he was probably purged in 1958–59. See also COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND.

AN JUNG GUN (1879–1910). Korean patriot, usually known as An Chung-gun in the Republic of Korea, where there is a museum in his honor, and as An Jung Gun in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He
was born at Haeju, now in the DPRK, and was baptized as a Roman Catholic in 1895. For a time he was a coal merchant, but after the establishment of the Japanese protectorate in 1905, he moved to Vladivostok in Russia, from where he organized a righteous army to fight against the Japanese. On 26 October 1909, he assassinated Prince Ito Hirobumi, the first Japanese governor general of Korea, at Harbin station. An was detained by Russian police and handed over to the Japanese. He was tried and executed in 1910. He is much admired in the DPRK and featured in a two-part film, *An Jung Gun Shoots Ito Hirobumi*, produced in 1979, which was supposedly based on a revolutionary drama of the same name staged in the early days of the Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary activities. Kim Jong Il is said to have provided guidance to the film’s director, Om Gil Song.

**ANDAMAN SEA BOMBING.** On 29 November 1987, a Boeing 747 passenger airliner belonging to the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Korean Air on a flight from the Middle East to Seoul exploded in midair over the Andaman Sea near Myanmar (Burma). All 115 passengers and crew were killed. Suspicion fell on a Korean man and woman who had left the flight during a stopover in the gulf. The man committed suicide before he could be caught, but the woman, later identified as Kim Hyun Hee, failed to kill herself and was handed over to the ROK authorities. At first, she claimed to be a Japanese citizen and denied any involvement with the attack, but later admitted that she was a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea agent and a member of a special task force formed to carry out the attack in the hope of dissuading people from attending the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, to be held in Seoul. She was sentenced to death but eventually was reprieved and granted amnesty. She has been a prime source of information about abductions.

**ANTARCTIC EXPLORATION.** A news item carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in December 2010 noted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1987 and had sent two expeditions to the Antarctic in 1990–91. The first expedition, in May 1990, engaged in survey work and chose the site for a scientific research base at 67° 55’ south and 44° 32’ north, where it set up a signpost saying “First Antarctic Expedition Team of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The second expedition took place from 16 October 1990 to 4 October 1991, and established a base at the same spot in December 1990. There appears to have been no further activity since 1991.

**ANTI-IMPERIALIST NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT.** Established on 23 March 2005, this is nominally an organization that brings
together Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) supporters in the Republic of Korea (ROK). It claims to be based in Seoul, capital of the ROK, but is actually based in the DPRK and is run by the Korean Workers’ Party. It fully supports DPRK policies on all matters. It is the successor to the equally bogus Revolutionary Party for Reunification, which was supposedly established in August 1969 and which changed its name to the National Democratic Front of Korea in July 1985. The front is also supposed to operate a radio station, the Voice of National Salvation, also based in the DPRK. It has representative offices in Tokyo and in the DPRK capital, Pyongyang.

APRIL SPRING FRIENDSHIP ARTS FESTIVAL. This event, which lasts several days and to which foreign artists are invited, began in 1982 to mark Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s President Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday. Its organization was always closely associated with Kim Jong II, his son and successor. The festival continued even after the elder Kim’s death in 1994. The Republic of Korea’s newspaper Daily North Korea, reported in 2008 that the festival would in the future alternate with the domestic National Arts Festival, but it was held as usual in the following years. Much effort is being expended to attract performers for the 2012 festival, which will mark the centenary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.

“ARDUOUS MARCH” (kananui haenggun). Term applied to the period of economic and social difficulties that struck the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the mid-1990s. By 2003, the DPRK media claimed that the “Arduous March” was at an end, even though many problems persisted. The phrase is linked with the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the late 1930s, and also Kim Il Sung’s alleged journey from Pyongyang to China in 1926.

ARIRANG. “Arirang” is probably the most famous Korean folk song, and it regularly appears in anthologies of international folk songs. It is one of the few traditional songs that are found in both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea, although with different words, and both use it as a symbol of longing for unity. Since April 2002, Arirang has been used as the title for the annual Mass Games, the DPRK’s showpiece gymnastic performance, which also has the theme of unification. Until 2011, this event was one of the few occasions when United States’ citizens could get visas for the DPRK.

ARMED FORCES. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) maintains one of the largest armed forces in the world. Although the
country’s population is only about 23 million, the total number of people in
the military is estimated at over 1 million. This number includes personnel
engaged in farming and civilian construction works, but even allowing for
this, the DPRK has a formidable number of military personnel. The armed
forces are under the control of the Korean Workers’ Party Military Affairs
Committee and under the command of the National Defense Committee
(NDC). Kim Jong Il chaired this until his death in December 2011. His son,
Kim Jong Un, assumed the leadership role immediately and has been hailed
as the supreme military commander, and became first chairman of the NDC
in April 2012. Since the late 1990s, the “Military First policy” has seen the
Korean People’s Army (KPA; inmin gun) designated as the leading force in
society, from which other groups should learn. Despite this, the KPA has not
been able to escape the consequences of the economic difficulties that the
DPRK has suffered since at least the early 1990s. There have been reports of
soldiers seizing food from civilians and even evidence of malnutrition among
front line troops.

The KPA now traces its origins to the Anti-Japanese People’s Army that
Kim Il Sung is supposed to have established in Manchuria in April 1932. While there is no doubt that Kim was active in the guerrilla warfare against
Japan fought by the Chinese and Koreans, there is no evidence that he es-
ablished an independent guerrilla organization in the 1930s. Indeed, until

![Army Day Parade, April 2002, Pyongyang.](Image)
1978, the KPA was said to date from 8 February 1948, and between 1948 and
1978, 8 February was marked as Army Day in the DPRK. While the guerrilla
tradition has long been stressed, the KPA is in many ways a conventional
force, originally established, trained, and equipped by Soviet advisors, and it
still owes much to the Soviet military tradition. This is particularly marked
in uniforms and equipment. From 1949, the KPA’s numbers were boosted by
the discharge of large numbers of experienced soldiers who had fought with
the Chinese communist forces both against the Japanese until 1945 and then
in the Chinese civil war.

The KPA’s severest test was in the Korean War. After initially sweeping
all before it, it was stopped at the Naktong River near Pusan in the far south
of the peninsula in August 1950. Thereafter, extended supply lines and the
vastly superior power of the United Nations Command (UNC) saw it lose
the initiative. It was pushed back across the 38th parallel and was unable to
halt the UNC advance. The KPA retreated north, abandoning Pyongyang, the
DPRK capital, in October 1950. Only the intervention of the Chinese later
that month saved the KPA and the DPRK from total defeat. Much effort went
into the rehabilitation of the KPA under Chinese auspices. It did fight again
but it played a relatively subordinate role during the remaining years of the
war. Since the Korean armistice in July 1953, the KPA has seen active service
in Vietnam and in some African countries.

The DPRK occasionally denies that its forces are out of proportion to its
size and disputes the numbers put forward by outside commentators, but
most assessments conclude that the KPA has currently about 950,000 ground
forces, together with some 85,000 personnel in the air force and 46,000 in
the navy.

The ground forces are arranged as follows:

- Four mechanized corps
- 12 infantry corps
- Two artillery corps
- One capital defense corps

There are 27 infantry divisions, together with 15 armored and 14 mecha-
nized brigades. The DPRK also has some 120,000 special forces, designed
to infiltrate behind enemy lines. Much of the KPA equipment is obsolete, of
World War II vintage or design, or was domestically produced. However, it
has a well-developed range of missiles for short and medium use, although
many of these are also old. It is also widely suspected of having a chemical and biological warfare capability and has conducted two nuclear tests.
Many of its artillery and rocket sites are concealed in underground facilities; the DPRK has a tradition of using underground tunnels for concealment and protection going back to the Korean War. This makes the detection of its military facilities difficult even with the development of satellite imagery. From 1980 onward, KPA ground forces are believed to be heavily deployed between Pyongyang and the demilitarized zone, which has separated the two Koreas since the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

The navy dates from 1946, when it began as a Maritime Security Force. It played a minor role at the beginning of the Korean War. It has about 46,000 personnel. Its fleet is split into two, with five or six squadrons in the West Sea (Yellow Sea), with headquarters at Nampo, and about 10 squadrons in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), with headquarters at Toejo-dong. There are widely varying figures for the total number of vessels, from between 500 to over 1,000. Most are small craft, however, and not capable of traveling long distances. As with other DPRK forces, the majority are forward deployed in the south of the country. There is a heavy reliance on mines and torpedoes. The two fleets are not able to support each other and do not appear ever to have conducted a joint exercise. The navy, like the other military bodies, suffers from a lack of modern equipment and a lack of training due to oil shortages. However, it does possess midget submarines, motor torpedo boats, and hovercraft. In recent years, the navy has had several clashes with the Republic of Korea’s navy, some of which have involved fatalities on both sides.

The air force was established in 1948. It played a role at the beginning of the Korean War but was soon overwhelmed by the superior machines and firepower of the UNC. It is now believed to have between 85,000 and 100,000 personnel, with about 1,000 combat aircraft. This includes 80 bombers, 541 fighters, 316 transports, 588 transport helicopters (supported by 24 armed helicopters), 228 training aircraft, and a large inventory of air-to-air missiles and surface-to-air missiles. There are four air divisions, covering the north, south, and east of the country, with one training division. These are organized into 33 regiments, with 11 airbases. Many of the aircraft are very old, although there are some relatively up-to-date Russian fighters. It is assumed that the large number of helicopters would be used for infiltration purposes in an inter-Korean conflict. Air force pilots appear to undergo very limited training exercises, probably as a result of lack of fuel and lubricants. Air Koryo, the DPRK’s civil airline, is also run by the air force.

In theory, military service is compulsory for all young people, male and female, from the age of 17. Recruits normally serve 10 years. In practice, children of the elite are able to avoid long service and may instead do a short service with the Young Red Guards. Kim Jong Il, for example, did this during his student days at Kim Il Sung University in the early 1960s. Although
his third son, Kim Jong Un, was made a four-star general in 2010, as was his aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, there is no evidence that either of them had actually served in the military.

The KPA is supported by the Workers and Peasants’ Red Guard, a militia force with some 3.5 million members, and the Young Red Guards, a student militia. Both are nominally civilian organizations but would come under military control in a time of conflict. Taken together, these organizations have an important role in ideological training. In addition to its purely military functions, the KPA runs what amounts to a separate economy. The military have their own farms and factories and trade in their own right. They may also help out on civilian farms and are particularly noted for carrying out construction work. This economic activity is organized and administered separately from normal state activities.

The DPRK has government military advisers in 12 African countries, but otherwise seems not to provide military training. It has one security treaty, with the People’s Republic of China, which dates from 1961. A similar treaty with the former Soviet Union, also dating from 1961, was replaced in 2000 by a new treaty that no longer carried a security commitment. See also ACAD-EMY OF SCIENCES; JO MYONG ROK; KIM IL SUNG MILITARY UNIVERSITY; O JIN U; SONGUN; RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH; UGANDA, RELATIONS WITH; UNITED STATES MISSING IN ACTION RECOVERY PROGRAM; ZIMBABWE, RELATIONS WITH.

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. Signed on 27 July 1953 between the United Nations Command and representatives from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Chinese People’s Volunteers, it halted the Korean War. It established the then existing line of military control as a cease-fire (military demarcation) line and designated a 2.4-kilometer (1.5-mile) area on each side of the line as a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The cease-fire line is some 240 kilometers (150 miles) long, zigzagging from sea to sea. This became the de facto frontier between the two Koreas, replacing the original dividing line along the 38th parallel. A Military Armistice Commission, made up of representatives from the two sides, would oversee the implementation of the armistice, while a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, drawn from countries nominated by the two sides that had not participated in the war, would investigate violations of the cease fire. The Republic of Korea (ROK) refused to sign the agreement, arguing that it perpetuated the division of the peninsula, but President Syngman Rhee agreed not to oppose it.

This remains the only agreement governing the cession of hostilities on the peninsula. In February 2003, however, the DPRK threatened to denounce the
agreement, as tension rose over its nuclear program, and in 2009, it declared that it would no longer recognize the agreement. In practice, however, it continued to abide by the armistice.

**ARMY FIRST POLICY.** See *SONGUN.*

**ARTS AND ARTISTS.** Given the general lack of knowledge about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the West, it is not surprising that very little is known of the arts in that country. The relatively few visitors to the DPRK may notice the architecture and the dramatic posters that mark the capital, and in recent years, visitors have been invited to *Arirang* or the Mass Games, which are a cross between a mass rally and a gymnastic display, with strong artistic overtones. Not many visitors will see the art galleries or museums that can be found in the capital, Pyongyang, unless they make a special request. Few appear to do so, and even long-term foreign residents rarely bother to go. Outside the DPRK, it was hard to find examples of the country’s painting, ceramics, or other art forms until very recently. Now posters and some paintings are marketed on the Internet or available from other specialist outlets. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), art from the DPRK was banned as propaganda until the 1990s, and it is rarely on show even today. There have been some exhibitions of DPRK art, such as one held in Vienna in 2010, but these have often aroused controversy. In the past, some DPRK art was on display in other socialist countries, but such displays have long since disappeared. The only permanent display of DPRK art in the West appears to be that at the British Museum in London, where it forms a minor addition to the Korean Gallery; it too has aroused controversy, with some sections of the ROK media condemning it as propaganda.

DPRK art can be placed in two contexts: the totalitarian tradition of grandiose monuments and buildings and the intensely political nature of all activities in the country. It is impossible to assess art in the DPRK without an understanding of the historical background from which the leadership derives its legitimacy and the effort that goes into glorifying that leadership. Any monument has a link to *Kim Il Sung*, who led the country from the 1940s until his death in 1994, or to his son, *Kim Jong Il*, who succeeded to his father’s role, if not his titles. Visitors will be told that one building has so many blocks, representing Kim Il Sung’s life, or that another’s height tells the same story. The reconstruction of historical monuments is not something connected with scholarly accuracy, but rather to support the system. Painting, sculpture, and music echo the same themes. All this is presented as if it were original and based on Korean traditions. This is not entirely false. In the ROK, too, monuments are refurbished to bolster current political legitimacy,
and if not quite so ubiquitous as in the DPRK, pictures of the leader are found in all government buildings.

However, even the most casual observer becomes aware that what passes for Korean tradition in the DPRK is a rather eclectic collection of styles drawn from all over the world. Architecture draws on Chinese, Russian (especially the Soviet period), and European buildings and monuments. And despite the hostility between the DPRK and the United States, there is more than an accidental echo of some of the latter’s monuments in Pyongyang and elsewhere. In painting, too, although traditional Korean styles can be found, much of the public art on display resembles the Socialist Realism school once popular in the Soviet Union and China. Even the music, or at least that provided at public performances, which is presented as more authentically Korean than that found in the ROK, seems heavily derived from the Russian tradition in both classical and popular music. In the theater, the revolutionary operas, while superbly staged and performed, owe more to China’s Peking opera and Japanese kabuki than they do to any indigenous theatrical tradition. In the cinema, while only Korean themes are handled, it is very much in the Hollywood style; Kim Jong Il was reputed to have a vast collection of American films and always took a great interest in the cinema. Perhaps only in ceramics are Korean traditions clearly predominant, although as in other fields, the individual’s work is subsumed in the collective, and political themes are frequent.

Those who show talent in any of the arts, like those who are good at sports, are selected from an early age and trained in special institutions. They follow tightly prescribed courses. Once trained, they become state employees, working in studios such as the Mansudae Art Studio, concert halls, or at a university. In recent years, some painters in particular have begun to be identified individually in both the DPRK and abroad, but the vast majority of artists are little known in a country where celebrity status is normally confined to the leadership. See also Nation and Destiny, The; Numbers; Three Revolutions’ Exhibition; Yun I-Sang.

ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE. An organization set up in the early 1990s to handle Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations with noncommunist countries with which the country does not have diplomatic relations. Although nominally independent, it works closely with the Korean Workers’ Party United Front Department and also with organizations engaged in contact with the Republic of Korea (ROK). It has been particularly prominent with academic and other nongovernmental contacts from the United States and Japan, but also deals with other countries. During the 1990s, it acted as the principal DPRK contact point for aid from
Japanese and ROK nongovernmental organizations. In 2007, it played a role in organizing the visit of the then ROK president, Roh Moo-hyun. Three members of the Committee attended the funeral of former ROK President Kim Dae-jung in Seoul in August 2009, including its chairman, Kim Yang Kon, who is also director of the United Front Department, Won Dong Yon, the director and a major figure in high-level inter-Korean contacts for the past 20 years, and Maeng Kyong Il. See also CHOE SUNG CHOL; COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND; FLOOD DAMAGE REHABILITATION COMMITTEE; HUMANITARIAN AID; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL.

AUGUST 1956 INCIDENT. This was a rare challenge to Kim Il Sung’s leadership. It arose out of the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Josef Stalin in February 1956. While Kim Il Sung was visiting Moscow in the summer of 1956, the Soviet and Yanan factions within the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee criticized him for behavior similar to that of Stalin. In particular, Kim was accused of fostering a personality cult and not following the Leninist policy of collective leadership. Pro-Kim elements within the party fought back, however, and all those who opposed Kim’s leadership were either purged or fled to the People’s Republic of China. This proved to be the last time that Kim Il Sung’s leadership was challenged. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

AUSTRALIA, RELATIONS WITH. The Australian involvement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) goes back to 1947 and the establishment of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), with an Australian official, S. H. Jackson, as one of its members. Australia continued to be represented on UNTCOK’s successor, the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established in December 1948. Australia also sent forces to support the United Nations Command during the Korean War. Thereafter, Australia took little interest in the Korea Peninsula until the early 1960s. Only in 1962, for example, did Australia establish an embassy in the Republic of Korea (ROK). There was even less interest in the DPRK until the election of a Labor government in 1972. This government established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and with North Vietnam in 1973, and then began negotiating with the DPRK. On 1 August 1973, Australia formally recognized the DPRK, and diplomatic relations were agreed to on 31 July 1974. A DPRK embassy opened in Canberra on 31 December 1974, and an Australian embassy opened in Pyongyang on 30 April 1975. This proved a short-lived interlude. The DPRK
was disappointed that Australia continued to support the ROK’s position internationally and withdrew its embassy from Canberra on 30 October 1975, while expelling the Australian embassy from Pyongyang a few days later.

Formally, the two countries still recognized each other, but contacts were not renewed until the 1990s, and it was not until May 2000 that formal diplomatic relations resumed, although there were political and economic exchanges before that. Australia joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 and contributed to its financial needs. Both countries accredited nonresident ambassadors in July 2002, and a DPRK embassy reopened in Canberra in May 2002. It closed in January 2008 for financial reasons. Australia apparently contemplated reopening an embassy in the DPRK, but decided not to, partly on financial grounds but also, after October 2002, over concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

Australia contributed humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, and there were regular exchanges of visits. In August 2008, the then Australian ambassador in Seoul, Peter Rowe, was also accredited as ambassador to Pyongyang; before that, the Australian ambassador to Beijing had been accredited. The nuclear issue continues to affect relations between the two countries, with Australia refusing to issue visas for a DPRK cultural group in December 2009 because of DPRK behavior.

**AX MURDERS AT PANMUNJOM (1976).** In the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), the term “ax murders” is commonly used to describe the outcome of an incident in the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom on 18 August 1976, which resulted in the deaths of two U.S. officers at the hands of a Korean People’s Army (KPA) unit of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The incident arose between members of a United Nations Command (UNC) Support Group, whose task was to trim a poplar tree that blocked the view between two UNC observation posts when in full leaf, and KPA members who protested the action. Tree trimming by both sides was usual in the JSA, by agreement of both sides. An earlier attempt to trim this tree had stopped after a DPRK protest but had not led to the security officers’ meeting usually held when problems arose. Instead the UN team, made up of two U.S. army officers, one ROK officer, and eight others, had instructions to seek a security officers’ meeting if there was trouble.

As the UN team began to trim the tree, a KPA officer, identified as Senior Lieutenant Pak Chul, asked them to stop so that the status of the tree could be discussed at a security officers’ meeting. The senior U.S. officer, Captain Arthur Bonifas, refused and work began. Lieutenant Pak, who was known for his confrontational approach, sent for reinforcements, and some 30 KPA soldiers arrived on the scene. Pak again demanded that the work stop until there
had been a security officers’ meeting, but the demand was again rejected. The UN side claimed that Pak then shouted “Kill the Americans.” Bonifas was knocked to the ground and beaten to death. The other U.S. officer, Lieutenant Mark Barrett, was also killed. The UN axes were used during the attack against the Americans. The fight lasted four minutes, ending when one of the UN side drove his truck to protect the body of Captain Bonifas from further attack, and the two sides dispersed.

Although both sides went on high alert and the DPRK apparently moved people away from the demilitarized zone and from the capital, Pyongyang, the tension was quickly defused. On 21 August, the UNC sent a large number of armed troops into the JSA while a duty detachment cut down the poplar tree, in what was known as Operation Paul Bunyan. On the same day, the UNC received a message from DPRK President Kim Il Sung, which, while not apologizing for the incident, expressed regret that it had taken place and suggested that measures should be taken to prevent a repetition. A full meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) on 6 September agreed on the removal of four KPA observation posts from the south side of the military demarcation line (MDL), and that in the future the line would be more clearly marked within the JSA. It was also agreed that there would be no more free movement in the entire area. From then on, only MAC personnel and members of the Neutral Nations’ Supervisory Commission would be authorized to cross the MDL. KPA guards were also stopped from entering the JSA from a common point, thereafter only doing so from the northern side of the line. A shrine to the memory of the two officers killed is maintained in the UNC quarters at Panmunjom, and the UNC base camp was renamed Camp Bonifas. See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

“AXIS OF EVIL.” In his 29 January 2002 State of the Union address, United States President George W. Bush used this phrase to describe Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). According to the president, “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. . . . In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.” However, despite the rhetoric, there was little basis of fact for the comment, which appeared to have been inserted into the speech without much consultation within the U.S. government. There was no evidence of any coordination of policy between the three countries and no joint treaties. Iran and Iraq had fought an eight-year war, during which the DPRK had supplied weapons to Iran, to the annoyance of the Iraqi government. The DPRK had apparently been added to the list so that it would not refer only to Islamic countries. The
DPRK Foreign Ministry condemned the phrase, saying that it seemed to indicate a U.S. intention to wage war on the country. The phrase had become an embarrassment by the time of the second Bush administration, which sought to improve relations with the DPRK, and it gradually disappeared from use in U.S. official statements, although it continued to be used by journalists.
BADGES. Since the early 1970s, all citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) above the age of 12 have had to wear a badge showing Kim Il Sung, or less frequently, his son, Kim Jong Il, whenever they are outside their homes. Failure to wear a badge is regarded a serious offense and can lead to severe criticism. The badges cannot be bought. The practice began possibly in imitation of the badges worn by Chinese during the Cultural Revolution to show their loyalty to Chairman Mao Zedong, but it became far more important in the DPRK. The wearing of badges in China was voluntary, but since Kim Il Sung’s 60th birthday in 1972, the badges have been compulsory, although DPRK officials will sometimes claim that people wear them out of simple loyalty. There are claims that a particular badge indicates the wearer’s status, but this may not always be the case since one person may acquire a number of different badges as he or she moves from one position to another. Foreigners who want to buy badges are normally rebuffed, but copies for sale can be found in China, as can a few genuine badges. A few foreigners have been “awarded” Kim Il Sung badges in gratitude for their support for the country. See also NUMBERS.

BANKING AND FINANCE. Like other socialist economies, banking in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been organized around one Central Bank, which in theory allows the state to control all resources in all sectors of the economy. In the Japanese colonial period, Korea appeared to have a thriving banking system, with a Central Bank (Chosen Ginko; Bank of Chosen), an industrial bank, and the Oriental Development Corporation (the last was not strictly speaking a bank but did carry out some banking operations) at the top, and a number of other banks and cooperatives also involved in financial transactions. Although there were some Korean-owned entities, the bulk of Korea’s financial institutions were Japanese run and governed, with the Japanese government playing a major role, and there was a steady reduction in the total number of financial institutions over the years. At the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese withdrew. From both a practical and an ideological standpoint, it made sense to the Soviet Union’s administration in the northern part of the peninsula to nationalize the banks.
When this took place in 1946, only two of the then existing banks were re-
tained, the Central Bank, which appears to have become Soviet-dominated,
and the Farmers’ (sometimes Peasant) Bank; effectively, they operated as
one. The first major task faced was the need for currency reform. From the
beginning of the Soviet occupation of the north of Korea in August 1945,
the currency available consisted of Bank of Chosen notes issued before 15
August 1945 and Soviet military scrip. There was a particularly large amount
of the latter in circulation, which contributed to high inflation. In December
1948, therefore, the old currency was replaced by the (North) Korean won.
The amount that could be exchanged was limited. This was a pattern that
would be repeated in later currency reforms.

In 1959, the Central Bank and the Farmers’ Bank merged to form the pres-
ent Central Bank. The role of the Central Bank has remained unchanged since
then. Its main purpose is the total control of all resources. It issues banknotes
and coins, sets interest rates, controls credit lines, supplies operating funds to
government agencies and businesses, takes receipts and payments of govern-
ment taxes, supervises other banks in the DPRK, and is the bank of last re-
sort. It approves the establishment of new banks. It also handles the DPRK’s
remaining state-to-state trade settlements. The Central Bank is reported to
have 227 branches. All factories, shops, and other entities have to keep ac-
counts at designated branches, the most important of which are the “general
branches,” established in North Pyongan, South Hamyong, North Hwanghae,
and Kangwon provinces. Individuals are encouraged to maintain accounts
and to deposit and withdraw individual savings. Most monetary transactions
between individuals involve cash. Checking accounts appear to be rare, al-
though some foreign establishments use them to a limited extent. There are
indications that many of those who have made money in the relatively more
relaxed atmosphere since the famine years of the 1990s are reluctant to put it
into bank accounts, especially since the 2009 currency reforms.

Credit cards are not available in the DPRK, and foreign credit cards cannot
be used. Since March 2011, prepaid debit cards have appeared. The first card
was called Narae, and this was quickly followed by the Koryo card. They
can be used at a number of outlets in Pyongyang. Customers are charged
the equivalent of $3 for the card, onto which they can load money. DPRK
citizens can do so in DPRK won, while foreigners must pay in dollars or
euros. Apart from the convenience for foreigners of not having to carry large
amounts of cash, the main purpose of such cards may be to limit domestic
access to foreign currencies.

At the same time as the establishment of the current Central Bank in
1959, the Foreign Trade Bank was set up to handle international business.
Although there are now other banking organizations involved with foreign
trade, the bank is still important. It is responsible for extending settlement arrangements for international transactions and credits and also for transacting payment guarantees. It handles foreign exchange business and also contacts with overseas banks. As the DPRK tried to develop its international trading links in the 1970s, two new banking organizations were established. One was the Kumgang Bank, established in September 1978, which was designed to meet the need for an international trade facility for import and export trade outside the socialist system. The other was the Daesong Bank, which was also involved in trade with nonsocialist countries and, since its foundation in the late 1970s, has become the DPRK’s leading commercial bank. It is supervised by the Daesong Trading Company, the largest trading company in the DPRK, whose transactions it processes. This company in turn is believed to be controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party and is reported to have had connections with Kim Jong Il. From 1982 to 2004, Daesong Bank operated a subsidiary, the Golden State Bank, in Vienna. It was the sole DPRK bank operating overseas. It November 2010, United States Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey said that “Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation are key components of Office 39’s financial network supporting North Korea’s illicit and dangerous activities.” Office 39 is believed to be the unit that handles the leadership’s overseas financial arrangements. Since then a number of other banks have been created, each linked to one or another government or party organization. They are assumed to facilitate trade and other transactions by such bodies, but there is very little information available about them.

Possibly in relation to the renaming of Rajin-Sonbong as Rason and the upgrading of the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone, it was announced in January 2010 that the National Defense Commission planned to launch a State Development Bank. This would fund development projects, providing investment for major projects. It was officially launched on 10 March 2010, with headquarters in Pyongyang, with funding from the Korea Taepung International Investment Group, which has links to China. With reported capitalization of $10 billion and 25 subsidiaries, the bank would carry out “transactions with international monetary organizations and commercial banks.”

No foreign banks operate in the DPRK. However, in 1995, a joint venture, the Peregrine Daesong Development Bank, was established in Pyongyang. The main partner was the Hong Kong–based Peregrine Group, with Korea Daesong Bank as a 30 percent shareholder. The Peregrine Group went bankrupt in 1998, a victim of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and there was a run on the Daesong Development Bank. It survived, however, having been able to meet all claims against it and continued to function. In 2000, it became the Daedong Credit Bank (DCB). Although the Daesong Bank seems to have
retained a share in the renamed bank, it was a wholly foreign-managed enterprise. DCB offered “high street” style banking facilities to foreign companies, joint ventures, international relief agencies, and foreign individuals doing business in the DPRK. It was badly affected by the U.S. Treasury sanctions imposed in 2005 on the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia for alleged money laundering. The Banco Delta Asia was the main bank handling DPRK-based accounts, and these were all frozen for two years. The Daedong Bank always maintained that it took vigorous action against potential money-laundering exercises and the passing of counterfeit notes. In August 2011, the then board of foreign directors announced their resignation and the takeover of the bank by the Nice Group from the People’s Republic of China. Other short-lived joint venture banks included one involving the Dutch ING Group and the DPRK Ministry of Finance. The Hong Kong–based Global Group opened a joint venture bank in 2005, but it no longer features in the group’s publicity. The Egyptian-based Orascom Company, which is involved in operating a cell phone network and in construction work in the DPRK, established the Ora Bank, a joint venture with the Foreign Trade Bank, in 2008. It has not subsequently attracted any reporting.

The only known DPRK attempt to raise funds outside the banking system since the Korean War was in 2003, when it was announced that People’s Life Bonds would be issued from 1 May 2003, to be redeemed on 30 April 2013. They were valued at 500, 1,000, and 5,000 won and accrued no interest. However, there would be a lottery every six months and the winners would receive interest when the bonds matured. It was widely assumed outside the DPRK that this was another way of extracting funds from the workers, especially as committees appeared in workplaces to drum up support for the bonds. As far as international finance is concerned, sanctions in force since the Korean War, which have intensified since 2006 because of missile and nuclear activities, together with its record of defaulting on debts have prevented the DPRK from accessing financial support from the international financial institutes, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The DPRK has occasionally expressed interest in beginning contacts with these institutes, but these approaches have come to nothing.

The State Insurance Bureau and the Korea Foreign Insurance Company provide insurance against fire and natural disaster and livestock, marine, and passenger insurance on a compulsory basis as required. Individuals may take out various types of property, life, and travel insurance, all provided by the government. Much DPRK insurance is covered through the London insurance market. See also JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.
BLUE HOUSE ATTACK (1968). One of the most spectacular attacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Republic of Korea (ROK) occurred on 21 January 1968 when a 31-man team of DPRK commandos infiltrated the northern part of Seoul in order to gain access to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee. The attackers were intercepted, and in the ensuing pursuit, all but one of the commandos were killed by the police. However, some claim there were 68 ROK deaths and almost the same number of injured during the pursuit. The sole survivor, Kim Shin-jo, now lives in Seoul. The attack may have been linked with the Tet offensive in Vietnam.

BOSWORTH, STEPHEN WARREN (1939– ). In February 2009, Stephen Bosworth was appointed as the United States Special Representative for North Korea, while continuing as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts. Before taking up this appointment, Bosworth had a long career both as a diplomat and an academic, with close connections to Korean issues. He served as U.S. ambassador to Tunisia (1979–81), the Philippines (1984–87), and to the Republic of Korea (1997–2001). He was president of the U.S.–Japan Foundation between 1987 and 1995, and then became the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), charged with the building of two light water reactors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which was set up following the 1994 U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework. Bosworth’s appointment as DPRK special representative was widely seen as sending a positive signal to the DPRK about the intentions of the incoming Barack Obama democratic administration. However, the DPRK apparently felt that the new administration was not serious about engagement, despite the appointment. It continued to conduct missile tests and to test a second nuclear device in April 2009. There was also U.S. domestic criticism about the part-time nature of Bosworth’s appointment. Bosworth made his first visit to the DPRK as special representative in December 2009, when he found DPRK officials positive about engagement. Nothing came of this, and it was not until October 2011 that Bosworth again had substantive talks with DPRK officials in Geneva. During these talks, it was announced that Glyn Davies, the U.S. envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, would replace Bosworth as special representative for North Korea. See also HILL, CHRISTOPHER; KARTMAN, CHARLES.

BUDDHISM. See KOREAN BUDDHIST LEAGUE.

BURMA. See MYANMAR, RELATIONS WITH.
BUSH, GEORGE H. W. (1924–). George H. W. Bush was the 41st president of the United States from 1989 to 1993. He is the son of Prescott Bush, a prominent Connecticut investment banker and senator. After attending Phillips Academy in Andover Massachusetts, he joined the U.S. navy as an aviator in 1942. At the end of World War II, he went to Yale University and then became an oil man in West Texas. He later became a member of the House of Representatives, ambassador to the United Nations, first U.S. envoy to the People’s Republic of China, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He served two terms as vice president to President Ronald Reagan and became president himself in 1989. Direct contacts between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States had begun under Reagan in the context of the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1988, and Bush continued this policy. He also reduced the regular military exercises conducted by U.S. and ROK forces as a means of encouraging the DPRK–ROK rapprochement that eventually led to the 1991 North–South Agreement on Reconciliation and the entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations in 1992. However, by the time he left office in 1993, there was growing concern about the DPRK nuclear program. Bush lost his attempt at a second term to Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential elections. See also BUSH, GEORGE W.; TEAM SPIRIT.

BUSH, GEORGE W. (1946–). Eldest son of George H. W. Bush and 43rd president of the United States (2001–2009), he was only the second president to be the son of a previous president. Born in New Haven, Connecticut, he graduated from Yale University in 1968 and from the Harvard Business School in 1975. Like his father, he entered the oil business but was not very successful. He was also for a time the co-owner of the Texas Rangers Baseball Team. In 1995, he become the 48th governor of Texas and remained governor until his election as president in 2000. During his first term as president, he had to cope with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, which led him to declare a War on Terror, invade Afghanistan, and eventually to go to war against Iraq.

Bush, his vice president Dick Cheney, and his secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld all made no secret of their dislike of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and of what they saw as the “appeasement” of its rulers by the previous Bill Clinton administration. They were particularly opposed to the 1994 Agreed Framework, which had been negotiated as a means of curtailing the DPRK’s nuclear program. On coming to office, Bush announced a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK, which concluded that the United States had little option but to continue some form of engagement. While formally accepting this conclusion, Bush and his
colleagues continued to make clear their dislike of the regime, and in his 2002 State of the Union message, Bush included the DPRK in his list of countries that he said formed part of an “Axis of Evil” that needed to be restrained. Bush also made clear that he did not like the Engagement Policy being pursued by the U.S. ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK), which sought to change the DPRK’s behavior through economic assistance and engagement.

In October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited the DPRK. Instead of the wide-ranging dialogue that the DPRK hoped for, Kelly’s purpose was to state that the United States had evidence that the DPRK was pursuing a highly enriched uranium program, which was in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1991 North–South agreements, and the Agreed Framework. The DPRK negotiators at first denied that there was such a program, but later, according to Kelly and his colleagues, admitted that they did have one. The DPRK subsequently maintained that the U.S. side had misunderstood what had been said, but in 2010 showed a visiting U.S. nuclear scientist that they did have an enriched uranium program. Using this apparent admission by the DPRK, the Bush administration persuaded the agency carrying out the terms of the Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to stop deliveries of fuel oil to the DPRK. The DPRK responded by announcing that it would withdraw from the NPT and expel the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. By the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework was effectively dead.

Although the Bush administration broke off direct talks with the DPRK, concerns over the DPRK nuclear program and the need to get the United States and the DPRK together led to the Six Party Talks in 2003. The aim was to provide a forum in which the DPRK and the United States could meet, without formally engaging in bilateral negotiations. The talks did not go smoothly, and the United States continued to denounce the DPRK as a “rogue state,” but involvements elsewhere made it increasingly clear that direct U.S. action to halt the DPRK’s nuclear activities was unlikely. Eventually, in September 2005, after Bush had won a second term in office, the DPRK returned to the negotiating table and agreement appeared to have been reached on its denuclearization. Euphoria was short lived, however. While the nuclear issue was the major U.S. concern about the DPRK, it was by no means the only issue; others included alleged counterfeiting of U.S. currency and money laundering. Within days of the signing of the nuclear agreement, the U.S. Treasury placed sanctions on DPRK funds held in a Macau bank, which was said to facilitate both of these operations. It was widely believed that it was not a coincidence that the Treasury action came on the heels of an agreement that was unwelcome to some of the more hard-line members of the Bush administration.
The stalemate continued for another 20 months. During that period, the DPRK tested missiles and, in October 2006, carried out a nuclear test. There was widespread condemnation, including a United Nations resolution, but eventually talks resumed and a further agreement was reached February 2007. In return for the DPRK freezing its nuclear program, allowing IAEA inspections, and closing down Yongbyon, the United States agreed to lift the Macau-related sanctions quickly, to move toward the lifting of other sanctions and the listing of the DPRK as a state sponsoring terrorism, and to begin the normalization of relations. These moves were to take place in parallel. Before long, however, the United States and the DPRK were each accusing the other of not sticking to its side of the bargain. At the same time, the Bush administration seemed to have changed places with the ROK government, which, following the election of President Lee Myung-bak in 2007, had become tougher in its approach to the DPRK. For a time, U.S.–DPRK relations appeared to be getting better, while ROK–DPRK relations sharply deteriorated. President Bush himself seemed keen to settle the nuclear issue before he left office.

In the end, this proved impossible. Despite the efforts of Bush’s team, especially Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, no final agreement was reached by the time Bush stepped down in January 2009. Indeed, far from the nuclear issue being solved, the DPRK conducted a second nuclear test in May 2009. The Bush administration’s hopes of solving the problem of the DPRK’s nuclear program ended with the DPRK further advanced along the nuclear road than where it had been at the start of the presidency.
CAIRO AGREEMENT. In November 1943, a summit conference of the United States, Great Britain, and China was held in Cairo, Egypt, to adopt an allied plan to deal with Japan during and after World War II. In the communiqué issued on 1 December 1943 it was stated that “the . . . great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” This followed the decision that Japan be stripped of all territories that had been taken by violence and greed. There was no consultation with any Koreans over the wording, which caused much outrage when it became known that Korea would not receive its independence immediately after the war had ended. It was in order to implement the terms of the Cairo Agreement that the United States and the Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to establish a trusteeship in Korea in 1945. See also POTSDAM CONFERENCE.

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK. In July 1959, then United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed the third week in July as Captive Nations Week. Every successive president has followed suit. The motive behind this move was to give support to “oppressed peoples.” Lev Dobriansky, professor of economics at Georgetown University, who was of Ukrainian origin, wrote the original Captive Nations Week Resolution. He was an active member of the National Captive Nations Committee, an anticommunism advocacy group, created in 1959 by Public Law 86-90 with the responsibility to maintain a Captive Nations List (CNL) of nations governed by communist and other dictatorial, nondemocratic regimes. This committee sponsors the Captive Nations Award and the annual Captive Nations Week. Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, attention has focused on countries such as the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The resolution has no practical results.

CARTER, JAMES (JIMMY) EARL, JR. (1924– ). The 39th president of the United States, he held office from 1977 to 1981. Jimmy Carter was born in Plains, Georgia. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and served in the navy from 1946 to 1953. He then entered politics and was governor of
Georgia from 1971 to 1975. In the early years of his single-term presidency, he took a critical approach to the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-hee and expressed the intention of withdrawing U.S. troops. However, during a visit to the ROK in June 1979, he agreed to continue a military presence in the country. Nevertheless, his more critical approach to the ROK won him praise in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), whose leader, Kim II Sung, described Carter as “a man of justice.” In his last months in office, Carter worked to persuade ROK President Chun Du-hwan not to execute the dissident ROK politician Kim Dae-jung.

Carter continued to take an interest in Korean affairs after leaving the presidency, as part of the work of the Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program. During the 1994 crisis over the DPRK nuclear program, he became the first ever former U.S. president to visit the DPRK. There he secured Kim Il Sung’s agreement to halt the program and to resume negotiations with the U.S. government. Although there were clearly other factors at work, Carter’s personal involvement and his apparent rapport with Kim II Sung undoubtedly created the right atmosphere for the negotiations, which led to the October 1994 Agreed Framework. Carter’s visit was also a precedent for former President Bill Clinton’s 2009 visit to the DPRK to secure the release of two detained United States’ journalists. In 2010, Carter made a second visit to the DPRK to secure the release of a U.S citizen, Aijolon Mahli Gomes. Gomes, who had illegally entered the country and had received a heavy prison sentence. The Barack Obama administration made clear that this was a strictly private visit and that Carter did not carry a message from the U.S. government. Carter did not meet the then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il but was able to secure Gomes’s release.

In April 2011, Carter led a delegation from the group known as The Elders, established by former South African President Nelson Mandela, to the DPRK. The aim was to contribute to an easing of tensions between the two Koreas, to try to make progress on the nuclear issue, and to address the reported renewed food crisis in the DPRK. The visit aroused international criticism, with the group accused of avoiding difficult issues such as human rights, and being generally naïve about the DPRK. They also failed to meet Kim Jong Il, which some saw as indicating that the DPRK no longer viewed Carter as a player of significance in Korean matters. See also BUSH, GEORGE H. W.; BUSH, GEORGE W.

CELL PHONES (HANDPHONES, MOBILE PHONES; KR. SON CHONHW). Until 2002, cell phones were banned in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Visitors arriving at one of the three entry points permitted (Pyongyang, Shinuiju, and Tumen) had to surrender such
phones, which were labeled and stored until departure. Retrieval could be complicated if a passenger would be leaving from a different departure point from his or her arrival. DPRK attempts to set up a cell phone network were hampered because much of the equipment needed came under the United States and other embargoes. However, in 2002, a joint venture between two Thai companies, Loxley and Charung Thai, and Teletech of Finland established a cell phone network in the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone. From this base, the network gradually extended to other cities, including Pyongyang. Visitors were then allowed to keep their own phones on arrival, although they did not work on the DPRK system. Estimates of the number of users varied widely from as few as 3,000 to over 200,000. Since their use was confined to senior officials, the lower figure seems more likely. In April 2004, following the Ryongchon explosion, which it was rumored had been directed at a train bringing then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il back from Russia, the cell phone network was closed down and the ban on the importing phones was reinstated. Some people in the DPRK still had access to cell phones smuggled in from China, which could make use of networks along

Since 2009, cell phones have spread rapidly in the DPRK. Privileged young people in Pyongyang, such as this young woman at the Golden Lanes Bowling Alley, use their phones just like their counterparts throughout Asia.
the northern border, although the authorities periodically clamped down on their use and penalties for such illegal use could be high.

During 2008, cell phone transmitters began to appear in various parts of the country, following an agreement between the DPRK Posts and Telephones Corporation and an Egyptian conglomerate, Orascom. This company had employed DPRK workers in the Middle East and by 2009 had a number of joint ventures in the DPRK. The license would be for 25 years, with a four-year exclusive contract. Orascom had a 75 percent share and the DPRK partner had a 25 percent share. According to Orascom, the new system would eventually cover the whole country and would include text messaging and video capabilities. The Republic of Korea (ROK)-based Open Radio for North Korea reported in February 2009 that Orascom had offered 100,000 free phones as a marketing strategy, but that the DPRK authorities were charging officials $200 for a phone, while “ordinary citizens” were first charged $470, later reduced to $235. This may be a registration fee, but it is still very expensive as are calls, which are charged at a dollar a minute. A variety of international and ROK press reports in mid-2009 claimed that the network had almost 20,000 subscribers. Handsets, which could be bought at an Orascom shop in Pyongyang, were then reported to cost between $300 and $500, and the cheapest subscription cost 850 won, equivalent to $6 a month at the official exchange rate, but only 24 cents at the black market rate. The reports said that the main subscribers were foreigners, wealthy people, and trade officials. In October 2009, the Voice of America, quoting various Egyptian sources, said that the number of users had reached 48,000 in June 2009 and had risen to 100,000 by the end of September. It was predicted that there would be 123,000 users by the end of 2009 and that they would reach 310,000 by December 2010. In April 2010, a pro-DPRK newspaper published in Japan said that the number of users would reach 600,000 by the end of the year. The same report said that the DPRK would shortly begin manufacturing its own cell phones, at first using some imported materials but eventually becoming fully self-sufficient. However, a report from the ROK’s Yonhap News Agency in June 2011 said that Orascom claimed to have 535,000 users at the end of March 2011.

It remains unclear how widely the system is available. In terms of physical coverage, it is in use in cities such as Kaesong, Hamhung, and Wonsan and along the way. Tour guides say that it is less reliable in mountain areas, although relay masts can be seen. The ROK newspaper Choson Ilbo claimed in a 30 July 2009 report that members of the Korean Workers’ Party and government officials were banned from owning cell phones, but their widespread use in Pyongyang seems to belie this. Among young people in the capital, the use of cell phones is as common in some areas as would be the case in most world capitals. The ban on the importation of cell phones remains in place.
CEMETERIES. There are a number of “revolutionary cemeteries” in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The chief of these is the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Mount Taesong in the capital, Pyongyang, where the majority of those buried or commemorated are former members of Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla forces. Revolutionary martyrs were buried here from early days, but the cemetery was laid out in its present form in the mid-1970s, apparently on Kim Il Sung’s personal instructions. About one-third of those commemorated there died after 1945. They include Kim Jong Suk, Kim Il Sung’s second wife and the mother of Kim Jong Il, as well as guerrilla comrades such as Kim Chaek and O Jin U. Another cemetery in Pyongyang is at Sinmi-ri and is for those who contributed to the foundation of the socialist regime after liberation in 1945. There is also a cemetery for “patriotic” martyrs” at Pyongsong in south Pyongan Province, again not far from Pyongyang, and near the headquarters of the Academy of Sciences.

In July 2009, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that a new national cemetery had opened in the east coast city of Hamhung. According to KCNA, this brought the total of “national cemeteries” to four. The new cemetery housed the “remains of the martyrs, officials and working people who dedicated themselves to the struggle for the freedom and liberation of the people and national reunification and prosperity.” There is also a cemetery dating from the Soviet postliberation period in Pyongyang for Soviet citizens who died between 1945 and 1948, and a cemetery for members of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Those buried there include Mao Anying, the eldest son of Mao Zedong. During a state visit to the DPRK in 2009, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid his respects at Mao Anying’s grave. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

CENTRAL BANK. See BANKING AND FINANCE.

CHANG SONG TAEK. See JANG SONG TAEK.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBW). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is frequently accused of developing both chemical and biological warfare capabilities. It has denied this, claiming that since it suffered chemical and biological attack during the Korean War, it is totally opposed to the development and use of such weapons.

The development of heavy industry in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula during the Japanese colonial period included chemical and fertilizer factories, some of which the Japanese used for the development of their own wartime CBW capabilities. The DPRK inherited these factories after World War II, and although they suffered much destruction during the
Korean War, they were generally reconstructed and several continue to function to the present. Many of these have dual-use capabilities. The science used in making fertilizer or brewing beer can be relatively easily switched to producing weapons. The DPRK began to develop CBW defense units within the armed forces immediately after the Korean War and continues to maintain such a defense capability.

According to Republic of Korea (ROK) sources, the then leader Kim Il Sung issued a directive in the early 1960s that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) should develop an offensive CBW capability. Since then, ROK and United States officials have asserted that there is such a program, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, similar claims have come from Russian sources. Then U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton made several statements during his time in office under the George W. Bush administration, in which he asserted that there was “no doubt” that the DPRK possessed a CBW capability. Several DPRK defectors have claimed that they worked in institutions engaged in CBW production, and others, including Hwang Jang Yop, claimed to have been told of such a program. Some former prisoners have described experiments on fellow inmates. None of these claims have been independently verified. A number of companies in Japan have been prosecuted for providing dual-use equipment to the DPRK, which it is said was for use in the CBW program. Both the ROK armed forces and the U.S. forces in the ROK work on the assumption that the KPA has such a capability. It is assumed that CBW would be used in warfare to sow terror among the civilian population and to render areas such as ports and airfields unusable.

In 2004, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies published a report on “North Korea’s Weapons’ Programmes,” which examined the available evidence and concluded that there were 17 civilian chemical products factories that were probably being used to produce CBW. These included the chemical-fertilizer complexes at Hamhung and the vinalon factories. It also noted that there were widespread civilian biotech facilities that could be used to produce biological weapons. An updated report from the same institution in 2011 speculated that while the DPRK certainly still has chemical warfare capability, its holdings of chemical warfare material might have declined because of the economic problems the country has faced since the early 1990s.

The DPRK signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Warfare Convention in March 1987, but has not signed the Chemical Warfare Convention. Both are relatively weak instruments, with no verification procedures. In 1993, the DPRK formally denied that it had a CBW program. See also RUSSIA/SOVET UNION, RELATIONS WITH; WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT.

CHEONAN INCIDENT. See CHONAN INCIDENT.
CHILDREN'S UNION (Sonyondan). A mass organization, founded in June 1946, and compulsory for all children since the mid-1950s. It is closely modeled on the Soviet Union’s Young Pioneers, which in turn drew many of its ideas from the Boy Scouts movement. Members wear a red necktie and, like the Boy Scouts, the motto is “Be Prepared.” As with other organizations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it operates on a cellular system. The highest unit is a school, with each class being a detachment, subdivided into groups of between 5 and 10 members. Much use is made of oaths, rituals, and parades to instill a sense of corporate belonging. Favored pupils, that is, those with a good class background, are promoted early, but eventually all children in a particular school become members. The admission ceremony is treated as a solemn and special occasion, with the children taking the union oath, administered by a Korean Workers’ Party official, and being presented with the red necktie by parents or teachers. Members of the union have to carry out public duties, such as street cleaning, but it also arranges outings and holidays, as well as military-style exercises.

CHINA, RELATIONS WITH. Until the end of the 19th century, the links between the Chinese empire and the Kingdom of Korea were strong. Of all China’s neighboring states, Korea was deemed the most loyal, especially under the Ming (1368–1644) and, eventually, the Qing empires (1644–1911), but the relationship went back much further than that. Confucian principles and the Buddhist religion came to Korea via China. Chinese cultural and political concepts took hold in Korea. Under the long-reigning Yi or Choson dynasty (1392–1910), Korea became a model Confucian state, looking up in suitable fashion to its elder brother, China. The relationship was not always easy. Problems in China often spilled over into Korea, and vice versa. Later, the Koreans were not above reminding the Qing court that Korea’s links with China long predated the arrival of the Manchu upstarts in Beijing, and that they were better placed than the Qing to perform the correct Confucian rites. But a proper relationship with the rulers of China was always important.

In fact, the relationship was always a complex one, as it is today. The Koreans had to struggle to escape total Chinese dominance. The peoples who became the Koreans at one time were to be found established well inside what are now China’s northeastern provinces; they were pushed south by the expanding Chinese, who according to legend, destroyed the original Korean state, Wimen Choson, with its capital near modern Pyongyang, replacing it with four military commanderies established in Manchuria and the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. By about 500 A.D., however, the modern division between the two areas had become established more or less along the
Amur and Tumen rivers, although it was not finally settled until the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418–50).

The boundary between China and the Korean Peninsula runs some 1,416 kilometers (880 miles) from the mouth of the Yalu River in the west to that of the Tumen in the east, where the boundary runs out to the sea in a set of marshlands. Apart from one 30 kilometer (20 mile) section, it is shown on both Chinese and Korean maps as following the rivers, both of which meander considerably.

Although rivers often form boundaries, they are not generally very good at providing a sharp distinction, bringing people together as much as separating them. In the Korean case, this was particularly true. Both the Tumen and Amur rivers are shallow and regularly freeze over in winter, thus allowing easy movement across them. From the Korean point of view, they often brought the Chinese side too close for comfort. Early attempts at keeping out their neighbors by means of palisades and walls failed. After the early 17th-century Manchu invasions, therefore, the rulers of Korea sought the agreement of the new emperors in Beijing for the creation of an informal “no man’s land” between the two countries. A strip of land on the Chinese side of the Yalu was cleared of all inhabitants and in theory remained so until the late 19th century. Later, another strip of land was cleared along the Tumen River. Although the Chinese operated controls only on the northern side of these two areas, with the official crossing point limited to the “Korean gate” (Gaolimen), the territory itself remained Chinese. Gradually, however, Korean farmers drifted across the two rivers and settled in the empty area, especially in the disturbed years of the late 19th century. (There was a similar movement of Koreans into Russian territory.) In the area beyond the Tumen River, the descendants of these settlers eventually became the inhabitants of the Chinese–Korean minority area of Yanbian.

The present boundary lines along the two rivers, as well as being seen as the customary division between the Chinese and Korean states, were also so described in the only known treaties referring to this frontier, which date from 1895 to 1909. The treaties signed then only touched on frontiers indirectly, and, while defining the rivers as the frontier, did not make clear exactly where the line of division in the rivers should be. In theory, this means that the status of the islands in the rivers has not been settled. In practice, following the thalweg principle (i.e., that the central navigational channel forms the boundary in the absence of any other agreement), most seem to have been administered by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 1948, and there appears to have been little difficulty over joint usage of the rivers.

However, the treaties appear to have left a disputed section, which lies between the headwaters of the two rivers. This area is small but is important
to both countries. In Chinese, it is the area of the Changbai Mountains. In it lies Mount Paektu (Korean) or Mount Baitou (Chinese), and the volcanic Lake of Heaven (Korean Ch’onji; Chinese Tian-si) at the top. To all Koreans, the mountain is now regarded as a sacred place (although there is not much evidence that it was before the 20th century), with the mysterious “heavenly lake” often shown as a symbol of the Korean people. In the DPRK, it is officially additionally sacred as the claimed birthplace of Kim Jong Il, son of the DPRK’s first leader, Kim Il Sung. To the Chinese, it is the sacred home of the Manchu, the last imperial dynasty.

Until recently, this was a very remote area, hard to access especially in winter. Although the area lies roughly on the same latitude as Rome, the climate is much more northerly and continental in character. Recent years, however, have seen the development of tourism on the Chinese side, and the area now features in guidebooks to China. Foreign access to the area is generally from the Chinese side, and the Chinese appear to control the lake. Neither the DPRK nor China admits publicly that there is any dispute over the border. From time to time, each country has published pictures or articles about the region, which studiously ignore the other side’s claim. Both the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continue to feature the lake as Korean territory. Although maps show a different alignment, there is generally little disposition on the part of either China or the DPRK to draw attention to the problem, while for the ROK, the issue will only become a practical one if the peninsula is united. In the DPRK case, the reason for this apparent restraint probably lies in the fact that it is now more dependent on China than at any time since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

However much the Koreans might have preferred to keep their big neighbor at bay, China has on numerous occasions over the past 150 years found itself involved in Korean affairs. During the late 19th century, as the West and Japan pressed in on the Korean Peninsula, the Koreans turned to the Chinese for advice, as they had in the past. The Chinese, hard-pressed themselves, counseled the Koreans to establish relations with the Western powers, in the hope of reducing the influence of Japan. But on at least two occasions, the Chinese found that they could not avoid direct involvement in Korea. The first was in the early 1880s and seemed to leave China in the strong position that it had previously, but the second, in 1894, led to a humiliating defeat for China at the hands of the Japanese. From the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 until the defeat of Japan in World War II in 1945, China had little part to play in the affairs of the Korean Peninsula. The area along the border, and with it the Korean minority, effectively passed under Japanese control with the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo (now romanized as Manzhouguo in the People’s Republic of China [PRC]) in 1932.
of Korean exiles operated on Chinese territory during the Japanese colonial period, but until the defeat of Japan in 1945, China had minimal interest in Korea. Even in 1945, China had other preoccupations than Korea. The nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek took some interest in the future of the peninsula, but domestic considerations were of far more concern. Control over most of the northeast, and therefore over the areas adjacent to the Korean border, passed directly to the Chinese Communist Party, and many Koreans fought with the Chinese Red Army in the Chinese civil war. Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new state found itself involved in Korea, just as its predecessors had done.

In recent years, evidence from former Soviet archives and from Chinese sources shows that China and Russia were involved in DPRK planning for an attack on the ROK to a much greater extent than was previously thought. But going along with Kim Il Sung’s planning for reunification by force was grounded in the belief that he would win. Instead of the easy victory Kim Il Sung had forecast, the United States and other countries did not sit by and allow the ROK to fall. United Nations (UN) forces, dominated by the U.S. troops, drove the DPRK forces back across the 38th parallel in September 1950 and then comprehensively defeated them. The Chinese faced a dilemma. They could let the DPRK fall, thus allowing the United States, or a U.S. ally, to become established on their border. Or they could intervene, and risk a clash with the United States. Some Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, perhaps expected that eventually they might have to face a showdown with the United States and that Korea would do as well here as anywhere.

When warnings failed, the Chinese intervened. Formally, the Chinese forces in Korea were not soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, but rather Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). Nobody was fooled. It is true that many of the CPV were ethnic Koreans from the area along the border, but they fought in what were Chinese armies, whatever their official title. By December 1950, these Chinese forces had driven the United Nations out of the DPRK and continued their advance south. For a time they held Seoul, but long supply lines and the huge military might of the United States defeated them, and they were pushed back to the area of the 38th parallel, where the war had begun. There followed two years of stalemate, while negotiations continued for an armistice agreement, finally concluded in July 1953. While the victory had by no means been clear-cut, few could dispute that the Chinese had saved the DPRK and fought the United States to a standstill. Chinese forces remained in the DPRK until 1958, playing a major role in postwar reconstruction. They also guaranteed both that the DPRK would not be attacked and that it would not launch another attempt at reunification by force. The DPRK was as unhappy with the Chinese wish to be accommodating at
the 1954 **Geneva Conference** as the ROK was with the United States, but big power wishes prevailed.

After 1958, relations fluctuated. Officially, they were always good; this was the period when the phrase about Sino–DPRK relations being as “lips and teeth” became a regular feature in communiqués and speeches. The DPRK did not want to take sides in the Sino–Soviet dispute and achieved a precarious balancing act, symbolized by signing mutual defense treaties with both the PRC and the Soviet Union in 1961. During China’s Cultural Revolution (1965–76), there were reports that Chinese Red Guards had criticized “fat Kim Il Sung” as a revisionist, and there were periodic unconfirmed reports of border closures.

As the Cultural Revolution faded, relations between the two returned to normal. There is no evidence that the Chinese informed the DPRK before they began to talk to the United States in 1971, a move that led to ultimately fruitless talks between the two Koreas in 1972. The fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to communist forces in 1975 prompted Kim Il Sung to go to Beijing to sound out the Chinese on whether he should make another sally south. The Chinese advice appears to have been “no,” and Kim listened. As long as Sino–Soviet relations continued strained, the DPRK was able to play a reasonably successful balancing act, getting assistance from one, then from the other. By the late 1980s, however, this was an increasingly difficult line to follow. The Eastern European countries began to look at the ROK’s economic development and see advantages for themselves in moving away from the Soviet support for the DPRK. Hungary was the first, but it was soon followed by others, including the Soviet Union itself. Trade was followed by diplomatic recognition. The DPRK fumed but had little leverage.

At the same time, there were clear signs that the Chinese, too, were reconsidering their approach to the Korean Peninsula. The 1980s saw a series of tentative moves toward a relationship with the ROK. At first, like other Chinese overtures, it was in areas such as sports. ROK university sports teams found that they could visit China to play tennis or volleyball. Then contact was allowed with the Yanbian Korean autonomous area. By the late 1980s, ROK companies were allowed to advertise in China, and ROK-made goods began to appear in Chinese shops. Despite DPRK protests, China teams attended both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 **Olympic Games** in Seoul.

DPRK public reactions were muted. Even when China established diplomatic relations with the ROK in 1992, and as trade between the two countries expanded at a great rate, it remained quiet. It may have had little choice. The changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ended traditional DPRK economic links. Now the DPRK faced the demand that it pay market rates for goods, and, potentially even more devastating, that it pay back the large
sums owed from the past. The PRC made similar demands and announced that there would be no more friendship prices for the DPRK. In practice, however, the Chinese were less fierce toward the DPRK than some of their public statements would indicate. They continued to supply the North with food and fuel oil, in sufficient quantities to avoid a total collapse, if nothing more.

As the DPRK faced famine because of poor harvests, economic mismanagement, and natural disasters from 1995, the PRC provided assistance on a large scale. Exact details are not known. The Chinese work on a bilateral basis, rather than through international organizations, and do not publish the figures, but it seems clear that China has become the major food supplier to a beleaguered DPRK. In addition, the DPRK has become an important center for Chinese investment since the 1990s. Chinese companies, especially small and medium-size companies from the three north eastern provinces, which have been undergoing economic problems, have found new outlets in the DPRK, and the PRC does not want to see these threatened. The DPRK’s natural resources have assumed increasing importance as the PRC’s economy has expanded. The Chinese companies involved are not necessarily state-owned enterprises, and there is no evidence that this economic involvement is the prelude to a Chinese political takeover of the DPRK, despite some of the more lurid claims made by ROK and other commentators. Chinese companies, many of which are owned by Korean–Chinese, seem to have just as many difficulties as other countries in their dealings with the DPRK.

The PRC has also become more directly involved in political and strategic developments affecting the DPRK, especially over nuclear and missile issues. The PRC supplies weapons to the DPRK, and there are also regular exchanges between the armed forces of the two countries. The 1961 treaty between them, while modified, has not been completely replaced, and still provides for PRC assistance should the DPRK suffer an unprovoked attack. But the PRC has shown itself to be concerned over the DPRK nuclear program and has given support to international efforts to end this. The PRC apparently declined a DPRK request in the 1960s for assistance with the development of a nuclear program and has long made it clear that it would prefer a nuclear-free peninsula. It expressed concern during the standoff between the DPRK and the United States in the early 1990s and welcomed the 1994 Agreed Framework, which defused that crisis. It took part in the unproductive Four Party Talks of the later 1990s. The PRC’s major role on the nuclear issue, however, came after the breakdown of the Agreed Framework following the visit by James Kelly to the DPRK in October 2002. The PRC brokered the Six Party Talks, apparently providing the DPRK with economic assistance to get it to the negotiating table. More economic assistance, perhaps as much as $2 billion, was supplied in 2005. When the talks broke down that autumn,
the PRC continued to press the DPRK to resume negotiations. Although the DPRK nuclear test in October 2006 led to a PRC condemnation, as did the second test in 2009, and the PRC formally signed the resulting UN sanctions, it did not fully implement these measures. It has continued to resist isolating the DPRK, despite strong U.S. pressure, arguing that it is dangerous to push it too far. This attitude continued into 2010. Despite the sinking of the ROK corvette, the Chonan, for which the DPRK has been blamed, as well as the shelling of Yonpyong Island, about which there could be no doubt about DPRK responsibility, the Chinese continue to urge restraint and effectively block measures designed to penalize the DPRK, to the fury of the ROK and U.S. governments.

Although there may be a degree of altruism in this, there are also hard practical reasons. China has no wish to see chaos on its borders with Korea. Should the dire predictions about a “collapse of the North” come true, the PRC faces the prospect of an influx of refugees, which could well have a destabilizing effect on its own Korean community. The problems already caused by the growing number of DPRK refugees in China, and the related international concern about their treatment, have given the PRC a foretaste of what would happen if the numbers were to increase substantially. The PRC is also concerned that a breakdown in the DPRK would have serious economic consequences in a part of China already suffering difficulties. Finally, there is the specter of a unified Korea that would allow the United States, with troops still on the ground in the ROK, to expand its influence to the Yalu River. See also DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; FOREIGN POLICY; FOREIGN TRADE.

**CHO MAN SIK (1882?–1950?).** Cho was a Christian nationalist leader who played an important part during the Japanese colonial period in the self-strengthening and anti-Japanese movements. In the early 1920s, he organized the Korean Products Promotion Society, which encouraged the use of native products. In 1945, he was nominated to the cabinet of the short-lived Korean People’s Republic, based in Seoul. He was later head of its organization in the north, the People’s Committee for North Korea, based in Pyongyang. Once the Soviet forces had established control in the north of the peninsula, Cho became head of the Five Provinces Administrative Bureau, which did not last long. In November 1945, Cho founded the Korean Democratic Party. While he at first worked with the Soviet forces, his opposition to trusteeship and his religious background made him increasingly unpopular with them. As a result, he was purged in early 1946. His dismissal was the decisive step in ending the independence of the smaller parties in the North. There is no record of when he died, but it is widely assumed that he was killed at the
CHOCHONGNYON. See GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN.

CHOE EUN-HUI/SHIN SANG-OK KIDNAPPING. In 1978, Choe Eun-hui (1926– ), who had been a major film star in the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the 1950s and 1960s and who had recently divorced her husband, the director Shin Sang-ok (1926–2006), disappeared while on a visit to Hong Kong. Shin flew to Hong Kong to find out what had happened, and he too disappeared. Both later surfaced in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where Shin made a number of films for Kim Jong II, the son and designated heir of Kim Il Sung, the DPRK leader. According to their later account, Kim Jong II persuaded them to remarry. Choe starred in some of the films and won the best actress award at the 1986 Moscow Film Festival for one part. That same year, the younger Kim allowed them to attend a film festival in Vienna. They slipped away from their colleagues and sought asylum at the United States’ embassy, which accepted them in. They claimed that they had both been kidnapped on Kim Jong II’s orders, so that Shin could make films for him, that they had been forced to undergo reeducation, and that Shin had been imprisoned for a time for attempting to escape. They also produced tapes of conversations with Kim Jong II in which he admitted the kidnapping and talked about his love of films.

Questions have been raised over their account. There were those, including some officials of the Hong Kong government, who discounted the kidnapping story. They believed that the couple might have gone willingly to the DPRK, but had later became disillusioned by what they found and their treatment by the regime. Both their careers were in the doldrums in 1978, with Choe unable to get roles and Shin’s studios closed by the ROK government. Shin’s family was from the northern city of Chongjin, and for many years after 1986, he would not visit the ROK on the grounds that he could not be sure that his version of what happened would be believed. Choe lives in retirement in the ROK. Shin died of complications following an operation for liver cancer. See also ABDUCTIONS.

CHOE DUK SIN (1914–1989). Choe Duk Sin (Ch’oe Tok-sin) was head of Chondogyo, an indigenous religion, in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) when he died. He was the highest ranking defector from the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the one who achieved the highest rank in the DPRK. Before his defection, he had already had an interesting and
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varied career. Born in Uiju, on the Yalu River, in 1936 he graduated from the Republic of China’s Whampoa Military Academy and became an officer in the Chinese Nationalist Army. In 1945, he returned to Korea with the rank of colonel. He then entered the (South) Korean Military Academy as a second lieutenant. He later attended the United States Military Academy. During the Korean War (1950–53), he commanded the 11th Division, which was blamed for the massacre of civilians in South Kyongsang Province in February 1951, and took part in the Armistice Agreement negotiations at Panmunjom. He retired from the ROK army in 1956 as a corps commander. Following Park Chung-hee’s coup in 1961, he became foreign minister from 1961 to 1963, and then ROK ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; West Germany) from 1963. On leaving the FRG, Choe became the seventh “bishop” of Chondogyo.

Choe had been a staunch anticommunist and a supporter of Park, but he turned against his former patron in the 1970s over corruption and became critical of the government. The government in turn accused him of corruption involving Chondogyo funds, and in 1976, he and his wife, Ryu Mi Yong (1921–), left for the United States, from where they conducted an anti-ROK campaign. He visited the DPRK for the first time in 1984, and two years later, moved there permanently. Before long, he was a vice chair of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, chair of the Central Committee of the Chondoist Chungu Party, chair of the Central Ch’ondogyo Guidance Committee, and, from May 1989, chair of the umbrella Association of Korean Religionists. He was also a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). When Choe died in November 1989, his wife took over his role as head of the of the Ch’ondogyo Guidance Committee. She is also a member of the SPA, and led the delegation for family reunions from the DPRK to the ROK that followed the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. Choe is buried in the National Cemetery for Revolutionary Martyrs in Pyongyang. See also RYO WON GU; RYO YON GU.

CHOE KWANG (1918–1997). Born in North Hamgyong Province, Choe joined a Chinese-run anti-Japanese guerrilla unit in Manchuria in the 1930s, and fled to the Soviet Union in about 1940. He then became an officer in the Soviet Red Army, returning to Korea with the Soviet forces as a reconnaissance officer in 1945. He was instrumental in creating the Korean People’s Army, the main component of the armed forces, and became commander of the First Division in 1948. During the Korean War, he was commander of the 13th Division. After the war, he held a variety of posts, including president of Kim Il Sung Military University and commander of the air force, before becoming chief of the general staff in 1963. He was then
promoted to full general. During this period, he also advanced in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) hierarchy, as well as serving as a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).

While he was chief of the general staff, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a number of guerrilla attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), and ROK commentators regularly linked these directly to Choe. However, in February 1969, Choe was dismissed, together with then Defense Minister Kim Chang Bong and Ho Bong Hak, who was directly responsible for the guerrilla raids, as Kim Il Sung moved to get rid of the former partisan leaders. According to ROK reports, Choe was sent to work in the Ongjin iron ore mine in South Hwanghae Province. Then in May 1977, he reappeared at a mass rally in Haeju as chairman of the South Hwanghae Province People’s Committee. The following year he was reinstated in the KWP, ranking 21st among the 145 members of the Central Committee. In October 1980, he was elected as a candidate member of the party Politburo. In 1981, he became a deputy premier, and the following year concurrently chair of the Fisheries Commission, as well as returning to the SPA. Most remarkable of all was his reappearance as chief of the general staff in February 1988, 20 years after he had previously held that position. His rehabilitation did not stop there, for he became a vice chair of the National Defense Commission and a full member of the Politburo in 1990. In 1992, he was appointed vice marshal and was promoted to full marshal on becoming armed forces minister in October 1995. He died of a heart attack on 21 February 1997.

**CHOE SUNG CHOL (1956– ).** Choe Sung Chol came to prominence when, as the vice chair of the Asia–Pacific Peace Committee, he organized the visit of President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit. During 2008, however, he was replaced by Yu Yong Sung, formerly leader of the Korean Buddhist Federation. There were rumors that he had been purged and eventually executed because he had failed to keep the DPRK leadership informed of the likely ROK switch to more conservative policies when Roh was succeeded by Lee Myung-bak. However, it was also reported that he had been sent to work on a chicken farm in Hwanghae Province. See also COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL.

**CHOE TAE BOK (1930– ).** In July 1998, Choe Tae Bok became president (equivalent to speaker in other parliamentary assemblies) of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) at the 10th SPA meeting. The post is essentially a ceremonial one and should not be confused with the more important chairman of the presidium of the SPA, who acts as head of state for ceremonial purposes. Choe is also secretary for international relations of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party.

Choe was born in North Hamgyong Province on 6 December 1930. He studied engineering at Kim Il Sung University, Leipzig College of Engineering (in what was then the German Democratic Republic [East Germany]), and spent some time at Moscow University. In 1961, he was appointed professor at the Chemical Engineering College at Hamhung, becoming director of the Research Institute of the Hamhung branch of the Academy of Sciences in 1965. Five years later, he moved to Pyongyang as a dean of the faculty at the Kim Chaek University of Technology, becoming the university president there in 1973. These appointments, and his own training, may indicate an involvement in the early stages of nuclear development in the DPRK. In 1980, he became chair of the Education Committee of the State Administrative Council and thus began to move away from university teaching and administration into the broader field of government. He has been a delegate to the SPA since 1982. He also began to take on roles in the KWP, also related to education and science, becoming secretary of education to the Central Committee in 1986 and director of the party’s Science Education Department in 1990. He became an alternate member of the KWP Politburo in 1990. He was a member of the funeral committee for President Kim Il Sung in 1994.

In his role as SPA president, Choe meets visiting parliamentarians and undertakes parliamentary and party-related visits abroad. He visited Great Britain in 2004 and again in 2011. While pleasant enough to talk to, he never deviates from the official line and does not seem to be in the DPRK’s political mainstream. He claims to be a great admirer of Byron’s poetry. See also KIM YONG NAM.

CHOE YONG GUN (1903–1976). Guerrilla leader, military commander, party and state deputy, Choe was one of the most loyal supporters of Kim Il Sung throughout his career. Choe was born in North P’yongyan Province in 1900 or 1903. He went to China and attended the Yunnan Military Academy. As a member of the Chinese Communist Party, he fought together with Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s. Like Kim, he moved to the Soviet Union under Japanese pressure 1940 or 1941. He returned to Korea in 1945. He was head of the security bureau in the Provisional People’s Committee and then became head of the Korean Social Democratic Party, replacing Cho Man Sik in 1946. He was later a vice chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). In February 1948, Choe became the first commander of the Korean
People’s Army, and, following the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948, defense minister. He played an important role in the Korean War and was named as the first vice marshal when the rank was introduced in February 1953. In February 1956, Choe led the KWP delegation to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party at which then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Josef Stalin’s personality cult. The following year, Choe became president of the Standing Committee of the second Supreme People’s Assembly. He retained his position as a KWP vice chairman and held both posts until his death. See also KIM CHAEK; MU CHONG; NAM IL.

CHOE YONG RIM (1930– ). Premier of the State Council since June 2010. Choe was born in North Hamgyong Province. He served in the armed forces during the Korean War (1950–53). He then attended the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, Kim Il Sung University, and also studied at Moscow University. According to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), he later qualified as an economic engineer. The same source says that he worked as instructor, section chief, vice department director, first vice department director, department director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), and chief secretary of the Secretaries’ Office of the Kumsusan Assembly Hall. This last post indicates that he was head of the secretariat for the late President Kim Il Sung; the Kumsusan Assembly Hall was where Kim worked when he was alive, and it is now the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, his mausoleum.

At some point, Choe became a vice premier of the Administration Council, director of the Central Public Prosecutors Office, and secretary general of the Presidium of the DPRK parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, from 2005 to 2009. For a brief period, he became chief secretary of the Pyongyang committee of the KWP, before becoming premier in June 2010, replacing Kim Yong Il.

CHOI HONG HI (1918–2002). Choi Hong Hi was born in what is now the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the Japanese colonial period. He spent some time in Japan, where he became acquainted with the martial art of karate. In 1942, he was drafted into the Japanese army, but in 1945, he was imprisoned for attempted desertion. After Japan’s defeat, he went to South Korea and was later commissioned in the newly formed Republic of Korea (ROK) army. He fought in the Korean War (1950–53), and during that time, he developed and named the martial art of taekwondo, which combined elements of both Japanese and Korean hand-fighting tradi-
tions. As a major general, he supported the 1961 ROK military coup, but was forced to resign when Park Chung-hee became president, since he had been one of the panel that had condemned Park to death in 1948 for his alleged part in the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion.

After leaving the military, Choi became ROK ambassador to Malaysia from 1962 to 1965, and then concentrated on the development of taekwondo, founding the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) in 1965. Choi saw taekwondo as something for all Koreans and tried unsuccessfully to visit the DPRK in 1966 to promote the sport there. In 1972, he left the ROK and settled in Canada, taking the ITF with him. The ROK government then established the rival World Taekwondo Federation. In 1980, Choi visited the DPRK and introduced taekwondo. He saw his attempts to work with the DPRK as furthering reconciliation, but the ROK government saw them as treasonous. Choi died in Pyongyang on 15 June 2002.

CHOLLIMA MOVEMENT. Chollima is a legendary Korean horse that can travel a thousand ri (Korean miles; or about 400 kilometers (248 miles) in a day. The name was applied to a massive campaign that began in December

![Giant statue of Chollima, the Korean fabled winged horse, erected in 1961 in Pyongyang.](image)
1956, following a resolution of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee plenum. This, the first major exhortation campaign in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is generally regarded as running until superseded by the Three Revolutions Team Movement in 1975. It is often compared to the Great Leap Forward in the People’s Republic of China, although it began before it; it is also seen as linked to the 1930s Stakhannovite movement in the Soviet Union. Its aim was to increase production at a fast pace, using exhortation, slogans, and mass mobilization. It began in the manufacturing sector but eventually spread to all areas. In agriculture, it led to collectivization but not to the establishment of “people’s communes” as in China. The movement was closely associated with the first long-term plan, the Five-Year Plan of 1957, and is regarded as one of the main reasons why that plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule. A prominent statue of the winged horse still stands in Pyongyang. The Chollima approach to production never entirely disappeared from DPRK thinking, and many scholars have described the 150-Day Battle launched early in 2009 as a “second Chollima.” See also ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INDUSTRY.

CHONAN INCIDENT. On 26 March 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK) corvette Cheonan (romanized as Chonan in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK]) sank near the Paengnyong Islands in the West Sea. The ship split in two, with the loss of 46 sailors from its 104 crew. The islands are ROK territory but are close to the Ongjin peninsula in the DPRK. The ship sank just south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed sea boundary between the two Koreas, and an area that has seen several maritime clashes in recent years. It also came soon after the end of the annual United States–ROK Foal Eagle military exercise. The ROK government reacted cautiously, saying at first that there was no evidence of DPRK involvement, and that it would draw no conclusions until there had been an investigation. To many, however, the incident had all the hallmarks of a DPRK action.

The ROK established a Joint Civilian–Military Investigation Group, which included representatives from Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Canadian experts joined the team shortly before the group reported on 20 May. The conclusion was that the DPRK had carried out the attack, probably using a midget submarine, citing evidence that a torpedo of a type known to be used by the DPRK had hit the ship. Later, Russia also conducted its own inquiry but did not release the results. Press reports said that these did not agree with the Investigation Group report and had cast doubts on whether the DPRK was capable of such an attack. China also expressed doubts, and while condemning the attack, did not assign blame.
ROK President Lee Myung-bak demanded an apology and imposed sanctions. The ROK took the issue to the United Nations, seeking a Security Council resolution condemning the DPRK. The DPRK denied any involvement and demanded to examine the evidence; the ROK refused. On 27 May, the DPRK General Staff issued a “crucial notice,” effectively ending all contact designed to prevent clashes between the two sides and prohibiting most movement between them. Although most Western countries and Japan supported the ROK position on UN sanctions, China and Russia urged caution and refused to back the resolution. The best that the ROK could get was a UN Security Council Presidential Statement condemning the sinking without assigning blame.

Speculation about what had really happened continued long after the official report, both in the ROK and in other countries. Some cast doubt on the scientific evidence that had concluded that the DPRK was responsible, and it was never clear what role the international experts had taken in the investigation. There were also questions about how the ROK military had handled the issue. One consequence was that the ROK decided to take a full part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It had not done so previously to avoid clashing with the DPRK. It took part in one PSI exercise later in the year. ROK–U.S. joint naval exercises, designed to send a warning message to the DPRK, annoyed the Chinese since they took place close to Chinese waters. ROK domestic hostility toward the DPRK as a result of the incident continued throughout 2010, being reinforced at the end of the year by the shelling of the Yonpyong Islands in November. See also ARMED FORCES.

CHONDOGYO (TEACHING OF THE HEAVENLY WAY). Founded as Tonghak (Eastern Learning) by Choe Che-u in 1860, this movement quickly became a religion of the oppressed. It drew on various traditional beliefs in a better future, the unity of god and man, and human equality, and became antiestablishment, antiforeign, and particularly anti-Christian. Its followers took part in the Tonghak Uprising in 1893–94, which led both China and Japan to intervene in Korea and ultimately to the Japanese takeover of the peninsula in 1910. In 1906, it changed its name to Chondogyo. Members of Chondogyo played an important part in the 1919 Samil movement (1 March movement) and in other Korean independence activities. They opposed the division of the peninsula in 1945. This left the majority of its followers in the north, where they were assiduously courted by the communists; their anti-Christian stand was particularly valued. This led to the establishment of the Chondoist Chongu Party in 1948, which still formally exists as a minority political party. As with other religions, little was heard of Chondogyo after the Korean War (1950–53) until the late 1970s. Then, as the government
realized that religion might play a useful role in improving the international image of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it formally reappeared. Sometime in the 1980s, a Chondoist church was constructed in eastern Pyongyang, where it shares a building with the Chondoist Chongu Party. It is not clear how many members it has. Chondogyo is also a minor religion in the Republic of Korea.

CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY (CHONDOGYO CHONGU-DANG; HEAVENLY WAY YOUNG FRIENDS PARTY). One of the two minor political parties that exist in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) alongside the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP); the other is the Korean Social Democratic Party. The party has its origins in the 19th-century Tonghak (Eastern Learning) rebellion, which drew on various traditions in Korea to oppose Christianity and Western influence. The rebellion had the ironic result, however, of leading to the 1894–95 Sino–Japanese war and ultimately to Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. After the failure of the rebellion, its leader changed the name of the movement to Chondogyo (Teaching of the Heavenly Way). Many of its leaders were active in the 1919 Samil movement against Japanese colonialism in Korea, and in 1925, organized the Korea Farmers Association, which was active in the north of Korea and which worked with various left-wing groups. The division of the peninsula in 1945 left many Chondogyo supporters in the northern half of the peninsula, and this led to the formation of the Chondoist party in February 1948, but its independence was being undermined by communist infiltration from the beginning. Nevertheless, its continued existence was important in presentational terms especially toward the Republic of Korea (ROK), since it appeared to show that independent parties continued to exist in the DPRK, an important consideration after the emergence of separate states in 1948. During the Korean War, party members were accused of supporting the ROK, and there were major purges. But the value of the party in presenting a united front ensured that it did not disappear, even if it remained firmly under KWP control. It still formally exists and its supposed leaders occupy state positions. Although land reform and collectivization have long since effectively eliminated any independent peasant class, the party is now said to represent the interests of the descendants of those who were once peasants. In practice, like the Korean Social Democratic Party, its role is to support the KWP. See also AGRICULTURE.

CHONGRYUN. See GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN.
CHOSÓN ILBO (KOREA DAILY). A prominent Korean newspaper founded in March 1920 by Sin Sogu (1894–1953) during the Japanese colonial period, following the introduction of more liberal policies after the suppression of the Samil Undong protests of 1919. At first it supported the Government General of Korea, but soon it became an advocate of Korean independence and the preservation of Korean culture. After it closed down, along with other Korean newspapers, in 1940, it reappeared in 1945. It is now said to be the most popular newspaper in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The newspaper has always had a reputation for conservatism, with a strong anti-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) stance. After 1998, it took a very skeptical line on the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy” toward the DPRK. The latter has responded with heavy criticism and threats to close the paper down, without, so far, any attempt to implement them.

CHRISTIAN FRIENDS OF KOREA. See EUGENE BELL FOUNDATION.

CHUN DU-HWAN (1931– ). Republic of Korea (ROK) general and president from 1980 to 1987. Chun was born in South Kyongsang Province and educated at the ROK Military Academy. Following Park Chung-hee’s coup in 1961, he served on the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction until 1963 and then held a succession of security-related posts. In 1970–71, he served with the ROK forces in Vietnam. In March 1979, he was made head of the Defense Security Command, the chief military intelligence organization, which was particularly concerned with the loyalty of the ROK armed forces. Following Park’s assassination in October 1979, Chun and his colleagues staged a coup in December 1979. The following year, he became acting president, and in 1981, under a new Constitution, president.

Although strongly anticommunist, Chun did make overtures to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but these were rejected. DPRK propaganda consistently attacked Chun as a usurper and blamed him for incidents such as the 1980 Kwangju massacre. He was the presumed target of the 1983 Yangon bombing, carried out by DPRK agents. Despite this attack, Chun accepted a 1984 offer of materials for flood relief from the DPRK. This rare imaginative gesture came to nothing. Chun stepped down in 1987 and was succeeded by his former military classmate, Roh Tae-woo. Allegations of corruption surrounded Chun and his family, and after admitting the truth
of some of the claims on television in 1991, he and his wife retreated to a Buddhist monastery.

After Roh’s term of office ended in 1993, demands surfaced for the investigation of the affairs of the two former presidents. President Kim Young-sam resisted these for a time, but eventually both were arrested in 1995 on bribery and corruption charges. Later charges of treason and mutiny were added to the indictment. In 1996 both were convicted. Chun was fined and sentenced to death, though this was later commuted to life imprisonment. Both were released in 1997 after the election of Kim Dae-jung. The fines were never paid. Chun occasionally made public appearances thereafter but commanded little respect.

CHUNG JU-YUNG (1915–2001). A leading businessman in the Republic of Korea (ROK), Chung Ju-yung was originally from the northern half of the peninsula. In 1946 he started a company called Hyundai Auto Services that eventually became the basis of the ROK’s biggest conglomerate until the early 2000s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Hyundai group worked closely with the government of Park Chung-hee in bringing about the economic transformation of the ROK. After Park’s death in 1979, Chung and Hyundai were less in favor with the government, which eventually led Chung to an unsuccessful attempt to enter politics.

When that failed, Chung tried to establish links with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Concerned about the famine in the mid-1990s, in 1998, Chung took 501 head of cattle with him to the DPRK (he had taken the family cow with him when he left home and was now returning with it). He repeated this gesture later in the year. This approach fit in with President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” and from it would eventually emerge Hyundai Asan (Asan was Chung’s home village), a company that developed tourist links with the DPRK in the Kumgang Mountain tourist resort in the DPRK. Hyundai Asan also transmitted funds that helped to pave the way for the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. Chung was also interested in the development of the border city of Kaesong as a tourist resort and in the nearby Kaesong Industrial Zone.

Chung died in March 2001. His death prompted the breakup of the Hyundai conglomerate. Revelations about payments and undercover transactions seems to have led his son Chong Mong-hun, then head of Hyundai Asan, to commit suicide in August 2003. Relations between the two Koreas deteriorated in the wake of the election of the conservative Lee Myung-bak as ROK president in 2007, and the tourist visits to the Kumgang Mountains ceased in 2008 after a woman visitor was shot dead. The DPRK threatened to take over Hyundai Asan’s assets at the resort unless the tours resumed, and began to implement this policy in 2011.
CLINTON, WILLIAM (BILL) JEFFERSON III (1946– ). Bill Clinton became the 42nd president of the United States in 1993. He served two terms, leaving the White House in January 2001. He was born William Jefferson Blythe III, in Hope, Arkansas, on 19 August 1948, but later took his stepfather’s name of Clinton. He studied at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., the University of Oxford, and took a juris doctor (JD) degree from Yale University Law School. It was at Yale that he met his future wife, Hillary Rodham, who also took a JD degree. In 1978, Clinton became governor of Arkansas. After losing the 1980 election, he again became governor in 1982, a position he held until 1992 when he successful stood as the Democratic candidate for the presidency.

By the time Clinton became president, there was already international concern over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear program. This came to a head in 1993, with the DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty over what it claimed were intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Authority. Although the Clinton administration appears to have considered an attack to take out the DPRK’s known nuclear facilities, this was deemed too dangerous for the Republic of Korea (ROK), and talks began instead. These failed to solve the issue, and another crisis developed in summer 1994. However, the DPRK leader, Kim Il Sung, hinted to various visitors that a crisis might be averted, and when former President Jimmy Carter, acting in a private capacity, visited the DPRK, he secured Kim’s agreement to halt the program and to begin negotiations with the U.S. government. There are reports that the Clinton administration was not happy with this example of private diplomacy, but it was the starting point that led to the Agreed Framework, which effectively put a cap on the DPRK’s nuclear development for some years.

Relations between the United States and the DPRK pursued a somewhat roller-coaster trajectory for the remainder of the Clinton presidency, and until 2000, there is not much evidence that the president concerned himself with what was happening. However, these were the years of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization program, which also saw some relaxation in the U.S. sanctions that had been in place since the Korean War. In October 2000, Clinton received Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the highest level DPRK official ever to visit the United States. In return, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited the DPRK some weeks later, and there was much speculation that Clinton himself would go.

Other matters intruded and Clinton did not visit as president, but these years marked the high point of U.S.–DPRK relations. The incoming George W. Bush administration contained many, including the president, who had criticized the Agreed Framework as “appeasement” and, following the October 2002 visit by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the agreement fell
In retirement, Clinton did not seem to take much interest in the affairs of the Korean Peninsula until August 2009, when he visited the DPRK, over the issue of two detained United States` journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee. Clinton had talks and dinner with then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il and secured the release of the two journalists. Both the Barack Obama administration and Clinton, whose wife had become secretary of state in the Obama administration, were adamant that the visit was purely private, but it was hard to believe that no political discussions took place over dinner.

Hillary Rodham Clinton, as secretary of state, has been a strong critic of the DPRK and its policies. At one point in 2009, she accused the DPRK leadership of acting like “spoiled children”; the DPRK media response was that she was a “funny lady.”

COCOM. See WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT.

COMFORT WOMEN. Name given to Korean and other non-Japanese women who were used as military prostitutes by Japan`s military forces from about 1932 onward in Manchuria, China, and in other parts of the Japanese empire. After decades of silence, a number of women came forward in the early 1990s in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and other areas of Japanese occupation, arguing for a formal Japanese apology and for compensation. There were claims that between 100,000 to 200,000 Korean women had been forced into military prostitution by the Japanese, some 80 percent of the total. Many had died or had been killed during World War II and most had been prevented by shame from coming forward. When the first comfort women had emerged in the early 1990s, the Japanese government argued that the program had been an entirely private one. Later, as evidence emerged that in fact there had been official involvement, the Japanese position shifted to argue that all ROK claims had been settled by the 1965 Normalization Treaty. Subsequent Japanese proposals for privately funded compensation have met with a hostile response in the ROK, and few claimed the offered sums. A number of former comfort women came forward in the Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the government also demanded that Japan acknowledge their claims. The failure to make progress on the normalization of relations between Japan and the DPRK has prevented any further movement on the issue. The DPRK media occasionally covers ROK protests on the issue.

COMMITTEE FOR ASSISTING THE RETURN OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS. This committee was set up under paragraph 59 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement to deal with two groups. One was people who had been resident on one side of the military demarcation line before 24 June
1950 and who found themselves on the other side at the end of the Korean War (1950–53). The other was foreign civilians who were north or south of the line at the end of the war. Two military officers from each side made up the committee. Only 37 in the first category from the southern side went to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK put forward no Koreans, but released 19 foreign nationals (one family of 11 Turks and nine stateless Russians) who had been captured in 1950. After these exchanges, the committee was disbanded on 1 March 1954. Subsequent movements of population were clandestine. See also ABDUCTIONS; FAMILY REUNIONS.

COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND. This committee was established on 13 May 1961 in order to develop links with organizations in the Republic of Korea (ROK) after the overthrow of President Rhee Syngman in April 1960. It has ever since been at the forefront of attempts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to influence opinion in the ROK in favor of eventual reunification of the peninsula on the DPRK’s terms. It issues statements relating to unification issues from time to time. Although in theory it is a nongovernmental body, it is closely associated with the Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department. See also ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL.

COMMITTEE FOR REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR. Set up under the terms of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, this committee consisted of three officers from each side (on one side were Chinese and North Koreans and on the other UN forces) whose task was to supervise the handing over by both sides of prisoners of war. Large numbers were involved, with 66,900 from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and China, and 12,700 from the Republic of Korea and United Nations’ forces. The committee was tasked to complete repatriation of prisoners of war within 60 days of the signing of the armistice. It then disbanded. See also ABDUCTIONS; FAMILY REUNIONS.

COMMUNICATIONS. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a postal system covering the whole country and a nationwide network of post offices. Mailboxes for collection are clearly visible in the cities, but it is less clear how mail is collected in rural areas. Postage stamps are available at post offices, hotels, and some other outlets. Most mail is stamped with a small number of definitive issues, as in most countries, although the
DPRK annually issues many sets of stamps. The Kingdom of Korea joined the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1900. This membership lapsed during the Japanese colonial period, and was revived by the Republic of Korea (ROK) in December 1949. The DPRK joined the UPU on 6 June 1974.

There were 1.18 million telephones in 2008, for a population of about 24 million. This ranks as 71st in the world. A few senior officials have telephones at home, but the majority of instruments are found in factories, offices, and similar places. Public telephones are available in the towns and cities and are much in use. During the late 1980s, fiber optics replaced traditional cabling, and this is now the standard down to the county level. For international telecommunications, the DPRK uses one Intelsat and one Russian satellite or connections via Beijing or Moscow. Fax communications are widely used. No telephone directories appear to exist. A cell phone system was allowed in the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone in 2002. Then a network gradually extended to other areas, including in Pyongyang, the capital, but closed down two years later. A new system began in 2008–9 in Pyongyang and later Nampo, which has proved popular, despite the expense. Along the border with China, many people use cell phones linked to Chinese servers. This is illegal and those caught are liable to punishment.

Use of information technology is severely restricted. There is a nationwide intranet that links academic and other organizations, but access to the Internet is very tightly controlled. Individuals do not have e-mail addresses, and the number of institutions that do is small. That said, computer training is provided in schools and universities and, despite theoretical restrictions on access to up-to-date technology because of international sanctions, the DPRK seems to have an increasingly well-developed computer industry; visitors have reported seeing state-of-the-art equipment, which it is assumed to have come from China. Since about 2009, there have been regular claims from the ROK and from the United States that the DPRK is behind cyber attacks on government and other systems. The DPRK has denied this. DPRK embassies and offices overseas appear to have few problems in using either cell phones or computers. Since 2002, embassies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in the DPRK have been allowed to use secure satellite communications and to install communications equipment in vehicles. They also have access to international radio and television broadcasts. Their DPRK staff may also have such access.

All media are state controlled. No foreign newspapers or magazines are offered for sale. A limited number of officials appear to have permitted access to foreign broadcasts. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) provides a daily summary in Korean and English of foreign news to ministries, state organizations, and resident foreigners; this includes material from ROK.
COMPUTER NUMERICAL CONTROL (CNC). This term refers to the use of computer-controlled machine tools in industry. It began with the development of computers from the 1940s onward, but began to take off in industrialized countries in the 1970s and is now very widespread. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), there were claims that computers were in use in industry during the 1990s, but the first mention of CNC did not appear in the media until 2002. References to CNC still remained rare until 2009, after which they suddenly took off. Many factories were said to use the method and then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il began to make regular references to it. Stamps, posters, and songs all featured CNC, as did the 2010 Mass Games. The 2011 New Year joint editorial of the three major newspapers, which normally sets the agenda for the coming year’s activities, called for an expansion of CNC. Because the intensified campaign to use CNC coincided with the apparent rise of Kim Jong Il’s third son Kim Jong Un, some commentators have linked the two developments, arguing that in addition to its role in encouraging economic development, the term CNC may also be a coded way of promoting the younger Kim. Equipment designed to illustrate CNC on display at the Three Revolutions’ Exhibition in October 2011 had a distinctly 1970s look. See also CELL PHONES; INDUSTRY; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

CONFUCIANISM. A Chinese secular philosophy, which was introduced to the Korea Peninsula in the second century A.D. It gained strength during the Three Kingdoms period, exerting a wide influence on political, cultural, and social development. The Koryo dynasty (935–1392) maintained the Confucian influence by promoting an educational system in the Confucian tradition. The Yi dynasty (1392–1910) adopted the Chu Xi school of Neo-Confucianism as a state creed, building a Confucian temple and establishing Confucian academies and other colleges collectively known as Sahak. Along with the Confucian bureaucracy that the Yi dynasty inherited and strengthened, certain social institutions such as ancestor worship (chesa, more correctly, honor to the ancestors) were transplanted to Korea and became firmly entrenched there. Although much discredited by the beginning of the 20th century because of its apparent failure to handle the new challenges that faced Korea and other East Asian countries, Confucianism survived into the Japanese colonial period as a social and moral code, with a strong authoritarian strand.

Officially, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea rejects Confucianism, but in reality its ideas continue to remain firmly embedded in society.
at many levels. These include respect for the leadership, the high value placed on educational attainments, the role of women, and the very hierarchical nature of relationships. There are also signs that Confucian traditions relating to honoring the ancestors survive at various levels, from Kim Jong Il’s observance of a three-year mourning period after his father, Kim Il Sung, died in 1994, to individuals paying respect to photographs of deceased family members at the autumn harvest festival, Chusok. See also RELIGION.

CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has had a number of constitutions since its establishment in 1948. The first was adopted in September 1948. It had 10 chapters and 104 articles. It defined the legislative body, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), as the highest state organization. It would be elected on a full adult franchise, with one delegate representing 30,000 constituents, and would have a four-year term. It was to meet twice a year, and when the SPA was not in session, a presidium of leading members of the assembly would carry out its full functions. The cabinet was defined as the “highest executive organ” of the state and was in theory subordinate to the SPA. The cabinet would consist of a premier (sometimes translated as chairman), vice premiers, ministers, and chairs of commissions. The premier was commander of the armed forces and also chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). Paralleling this structure was a system of local assemblies, which would, under the overall control of the SPA, carry out local functions. From the beginning, the DPRK media reported 100 percent turnouts for SPA elections and this has continued. The arrangements bore a strong resemblance to practices in the former Soviet Union.

The first session of the fifth SPA adopted a new constitution in December 1972, with 11 chapters and 49 articles. This constitution redefined the office of president, who now became the chief executive rather than a ceremonial figure. He would be above the SPA and would be commander of the armed forces. In other ways, the structure remained similar, although clearly with the creation of the office of president, the role of the premier was downgraded, especially as Kim Il Sung, formerly premier, was now president. The 1972 Constitution was described as the “socialist constitution.” A constitutional amendment in April 1992 re-created the National Defense Commission as an independent state organ, second only to the SPA. In April 1993, Kim Jong Il, eldest son and designated successor to President Kim Il Sung, who had hitherto been an NDC vice chair, became chair and commander in chief of the DPRK armed forces.

Four years after the death of Kim Il Sung, the first session of the 10th SPA meeting in September 1998 introduced what was called the Kim Il
Sung Constitution. This had seven chapters and 166 articles. The preamble to the Constitution defined Kim Il Sung as the great leader of the country and pledged to complete the *juche* revolution, based on his ideas. The position of executive president was abolished. Instead Kim Il Sung was declared “perpetual president,” while the NDC was to be “the highest organ of state.” The Constitution therefore effectively endorsed Kim Jong Il as the leader. This was made more explicit in April 2009 when the 12th SPA made changes to the 1998 Constitution, modifying some sections and adding six new articles, making a total of 172. The chairman of the NDC was declared supreme leader of the DPRK, who would oversee the “entire national business.” He would appoint military officers, ratify or abrogate treaties, appoint special envoys, and could declare a state of emergency or war. Some commentators saw these changes as part of the preparation for Kim Jong Il’s successor.

**CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS.** See WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT.

**COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON).** Founded in 1949, COMECON (the term used in the West for this council) was the economic equivalent of the Warsaw Pact and it linked the Soviet Union and the European People’s Republics together in a mutual trading community. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) did not join the association, unlike the Mongolian People’s Republic, but its economy was closely tied in with the system. Following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, COMECON was dissolved in June 1991, with considerable negative effects on the economies of both the DPRK and Mongolia.

**COUNCIL IN NORTH KOREA FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND (Chaebuk Pyonghwa Tongil Chokjin Hyopuihoe).** An organization created in July 1956 to support Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) proposals for the reunification of the peninsula. Its theoretical founders were former Republic of Korea (ROK) politicians who had been captured or voluntarily gone to the DPRK during the Korean War (1950–53). It was essentially a propaganda body that made periodic appeals to people in the ROK. However, many of its leading officials were purged in 1958–59, apparently because of unsanctioned links with the ROK, and the council’s role was subsumed into the newly formed Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland in 1961. See also ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL.
CROSS-RECOGNITION. In 1971, a United States diplomat, Morton Abramowitz, on secondment to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote a pamphlet in which he suggested that the way forward on the question of reunification was for the allies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to each recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the other state. Thus the United States and Japan would establish relations with the DPRK, while the Soviet Union and China would do so with the ROK. The idea caught the imagination of then U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger and seemed to fit in with the ROK President Park Chung-hee’s announcement in June 1973 that the ROK would abandon its previous position of breaking off diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the DPRK. A few Western countries established relations with the DPRK in the 1970s, but there was no move by the major countries Abramowitz had identified.

The idea did not entirely disappear during the next two decades, and in the late 1990s, there seemed to be renewed prospects of it coming to fruition. Although the Eastern European countries began to establish relations with the ROK beginning with Hungary in 1989, and eventually followed by the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992, there was no corresponding move on the part of Western countries for links with the DPRK until Italy established relations with the DPRK in early 2000. There followed a major shift among Western countries toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK. By 2004, only France and the Vatican among European countries had not established relations. However, neither the United States nor Japan had done so. The United States was reluctant to move forward because of nuclear and other issues, while negotiations with Japan had become complicated because of both the nuclear issue and the question of abductions. In 2011, the idea of cross-recognition remained only half fulfilled, with little prospect of change in the short term. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

CURRENCY AND CURRENCY REFORMS. For two years after the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, the Soviet authorities continued to use the Japanese colonial period Korean currency; Soviet military scrip also circulated. With the establishment of the Central Bank in 1946, however, a new currency, the won was introduced. This became the currency of the new state following the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948 and was pegged at par to the Soviet rouble, a linkage that remained until 1978. Inflation led to a revaluation and the issue of new notes in 1959; 100 old won now equaled one new won. There were special notes for visitors from socialist countries and a third set of notes came into
use for those from nonsocialist countries. In 1978, the link with the rouble was broken, and from then until 2002, the won was nominally linked to the United States dollar, at a rate of won 2.16 to one U.S. dollar. No official explanation for this rate was ever issued, but it was presumably no coincidence that 2.16 can also refer to 16 February, the official birthday of Kim Jong Il, eldest son of Kim Il Sung, who was being groomed as his father’s successor. The black market and the official rate soon diverged.

Although separate notes for foreigners continued to be issued, by the late 1990s, they were becoming increasingly less used, with shops, hotels, and other outlets dealing with foreigners insisting on hard currency to meet payments. While the U.S. dollar was, ironically, the most preferred currency, many other currencies were being accepted; only Republic of Korea (ROK) won, which have a different value from the DPRK currency of the same name, were rejected, at least publicly; it was not unusual, however, to see them among currencies laid before the deities in Buddhist temples. The economic reforms of 2002 saw the DPRK won allowed to float, reaching levels more akin to those on the black market, at around won 140 to the U.S. dollar, although the black market rate has tended to soar upward from the official rate. As tensions arose over the nuclear issue in 2002–3, the Central Bank announced that the euro would be the preferred foreign currency for transactions involving foreigners, a move that was only partially successful since there were rarely enough euros available. By 2009, the U.S. dollar was once again the most preferred foreign currency, although euros, Japanese yen, and Chinese renminbi were also in use.

In late 2009, the DPRK carried out its first major revaluation of the currency in 50 years. Although embassies were told of the changes, there was no public announcement; information trickled out via pro-DPRK publications in third countries and through travelers. The official explanation for this move, offered much later, was that it was necessary to curb price inflation and to increase workers’ spending power. But it was widely seen as an attempt to reassert central control over the economy and, most of all, to curtail the activities of those operating as private traders, hitting at the markets that had increasingly come to replace the socialist system of public distribution. The government may also have hoped to increase its foreign exchange holdings. Existing notes were to be replaced at a rate of 100:1, up to a maximum of won 100,000. At the official rate, this amounted to some $715, but only about $40 at the prevailing black market rate. To complicate matters further, the old notes ceased to be legal tender on 30 November and the new notes were not issued until 7 December. Shops, restaurants, and transport shut down since there was no currency that could be used. Even outlets catering to those with foreign currency found themselves in difficulties, and many of these also closed.
Protests began almost immediately, with reports that some with large holdings of the old notes were either burning them or throwing them into rivers. Since some notes had Kim Il Sung’s portrait on them, this was a serious offense. In response to the protests, the limit on cash that might be exchanged was raised to won 150,000, while savings of up to won 300,000 might also be exchanged; these limits were later raised again, but this did little to improve the situation and protests continued well into 2010 as inflation increased dramatically. In March 2010, ROK news media carried reports that blame for the decision to reform the currency had been fixed on Pak Nam Gi, who had been director of the Planning and Finance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee, and that he had been executed. There was no independent confirmation of these reports.
DANDONG. Dandong is a city in Liaoning Province in the People’s Republic of China, which has played an important role in Sino–Korean relations. It is situated some 40 kilometers (30 miles) from the mouth of the Yalu River, opposite the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) city of Shinuiju. Originally called Andong, meaning “pacifying the East,” a reference to the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea, it was given its present name, which means “Red East,” in 1965. The city was opened to foreign trade in 1907 during the Japanese colonial period. Under the Japanese puppet state of Manzhouguo (1932–45), it was a provincial capital. During the Chinese civil war that began in 1946, Andong played a major role. The Soviet Union’s occupying forces and the North Korean authorities supported the Chinese communist forces by allowing large numbers of noncombatants to cross the Yalu into North Korea when the area came under heavy Guomindang attack. Communist forces were also able to cross and to regroup in North Korean territory.

In the early stages of the Korean War (1950–53), the Chinese 40th Army from Guangzhou took up positions in the city, in preparation for a possible Chinese intervention. In September 1950, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, protested at an alleged bombing raid on the city by United Nations Command (UNC) aircraft. After the Chinese People’s Volunteers moved into Korea in October, Andong became a major military center and staging post for Chinese forces. The city now has a monument and a museum of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Support Korea, the Chinese term for the Korean War.

After the Armistice Agreement in 1953, Andong resumed its role as the major trade link between the DPRK and China, which it still maintains. Not only does the main railway line between Pyongyang and Beijing pass through the city, but it is also the main road link between the two countries. Some 40 percent of the DPRK’s total international trade is reported to pass through the city. The majority of the population of some 2 million in the wider urban area are Han Chinese, but there is also a sizable Korean population of between 20,000 to 30,000 living permanently in the city. In January 2009, it was reported that the DPRK had opened a consular office in the city.
DEAN, WILLIAM F. (1899–1981). In August 1950, United States army Major General William F. Dean became the highest ranking prisoner of war captured by either side during the Korean War (1950–53). Dean was born in Carlyle, Illinois, attended the University of California at Berkeley, and became a regular army officer in 1923. He served in Europe in World War II, where he won the Distinguished Service Cross for bravery. In December 1947, he became the U.S. military governor in South Korea. The following year, Dean took command of the Seventh Infantry Division, which moved from Korea to Japan. He was briefly chief of staff of the Eighth Army and then commander of the 24th Infantry Division. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the U.S. decision to support the Republic of Korea, this division was the first to be sent to Korea. Dean arrived on 3 July and established his headquarters at Taejon, a major communications center.

His instructions were to attempt to hold up the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) army, then rapidly advance down the peninsula, until 20 July, to allow time for other units to arrive. By 19 July, Dean’s forces had fallen back on Taejon itself and had suffered heavy casualties; Dean personally engaged in frontline combat as a means of encouraging morale, but was later blamed for not having stayed in the rear to direct the fighting. When the retreat finally got under way, Dean became separated from his party. Badly injured when he fell down a hill, he spent 36 days trying to reach safety but was eventually captured by DPRK forces on 25 August.

His capture was not made known until he was interviewed by the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett in December 1951. Until then, he was listed as “missing in action” and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery during the defense and evacuation of Taejon. During his captivity, Dean claimed that he was threatened with torture and death, and that at one point he had contemplated committing suicide for fear that he might reveal secrets under torture. He remained in captivity until 4 September 1953, six weeks after the Armistice Agreement ended the war in July 1953. On his release, he expressed surprise that he was regarded as a hero, saying that he had only been doing his duty. After his return to the United States, Dean became deputy commanding general at the Presidio of San Francisco. On retirement in October 1955, he was awarded the Combat Infantry Badge for his service in World War II and the Korean War. In 1963, he published an account, with William L. Worden, of his experiences in Korea, General Dean’s Story. He died in August 1981.

DEFECTORS/REFUGEES. Since the end of the Korean War, there has been a steady trickle of defectors/refugees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the Republic of Korea (ROK), matched by a
much smaller number who have gone the other way. The volume of defectors to the ROK has been rising since the 1990s. In October 1998, the ROK Unification Ministry said that from July 1953 to October 1998, 923 defectors had come from the DPRK. The years of hardship and famine from the mid-1990s saw a steady increase of defectors. In 1999, the number was 148, and in 2000, it rose to 312. In 2001, the number reached 583, while in the following year, it almost doubled to 1,140. It remained about 1,500 per annum until 2007, when the Yonhap News Agency gave a figure of 2,570. In 2008, the ROK conservative newspaper, the Choson Ilbo estimated that 2,800 had reached the ROK since 1953. Since the late 1980s, an increasing number of defectors have come via China. Estimates vary for the numbers hiding out in China, from about 10,000 suggested by the Chinese government to over 300,000 according to various ROK nongovernmental organizations that seek to help them. Many of those in China work and have married, but they remain vulnerable at all times to denunciation or police activity. Children born to these groups have no legal status and no entitlement to education. In 2002–3, at least 200 of these made persistent attempts to seek asylum in embassies and consulates in China, to the embarrassment of the Chinese authorities. Most of these were eventually allowed to make their way to the ROK via third countries.

Personal problems or, increasingly, economic and social reasons appear to be the main reasons for leaving. A 1994 ROK survey found that only about a quarter of those questioned said they had left for ideological reasons. Some, such as DPRK agents discovered in the ROK or fishermen who drifted into ROK waters, may have originally been involuntary defectors; a number of these have been returned. Both China and the DPRK claim that the majority of defectors are economic migrants, not refugees, and that the international conventions on refugees do not apply. When discovered in China, therefore, such people are returned to the DPRK, where they are treated as illegal border crossers and usually punished. Penalties range from detention in “labor training centers” to long periods of imprisonment, although there have been signs of a somewhat more lenient approach since 2007. Despite the penalties, some people make multiple attempts to escape, while others go back to bring out family members. Reports of the bribery of DPRK and Chinese border guards and police are common.

Prominent DPRK defectors have included the deputy head of the Korean Central News Agency, Yi Su Gun, who fled to the ROK while covering a Military Armistice Commission meeting at Panmunjom in 1967. He was later accused of being a spy and executed. The most senior was Hwang Jang Yop, supposed architect of the juche philosophy and onetime tutor to Kim Jong Il in 1997. Most defectors have not found adjustment easy, and a few have gone back to the DPRK to meet an uncertain fate. When numbers were
small, the ROK government used to give defectors a relatively large sum of money and help them to resettle, although, as Yi Su Gun’s case made clear, they were often watched very carefully for fear they might be Fifth Columnists. The amount of money given has fallen sharply as the numbers have increased, although training for resettlement in the ROK is still carried out. A relatively small number of DPRK refugees have settled in Western countries.

The number of genuine defectors from the ROK to the DPRK since the end of the Korean War is believed to be very small, but it includes some prominent figures, such as Choi Hong Hi, a former military officer and later sportsman. From time to time, there are reports of South Koreans being kidnapped and taken to the DPRK. ROK fishermen and farmers from the demilitarized zone have also appeared in the DPRK from time to time and are invariably described as having left of their own free will. See also ABDUCTIONS; DRESNOK, JAMES JOSEPH; JENKINS, CHARLES; FAMILY REUNIONS.

DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ). This strip of land, 4 kilometers (1.4 miles) wide, cuts across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula, separating the two Koreas. The zone follows the line of actual control at the end of the Korean War in 1953, not the 38th parallel, which was the dividing line at liberation in 1945. It stretches 240 kilometers (149 miles) on land, with an additional 60 kilometers (37.5 miles) extending into the Han River estuary on the west side of the peninsula. Starting from this estuary, the DMZ pursues a line running northeast–east–northeast to end at the East Sea coast. The zone was established under the first article of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The agreement stipulates strict control of the movement of soldiers, police, and civilians into the zone and of the introduction of weapons and the construction of military installations, conditions that have not always been observed. The DMZ is fortified on each side by mine fields, barbed wire entanglements, and antitank walls constructed within the zone and by civilian control lines north and south of the zone. Between 1974–90, the government of the ROK announced the discovery of four tunnels, which it claimed, had been dug beneath the DMZ from the northern side for purposes of infiltration. The DPRK government rebutted such claims.

Since 1991, responsibility for the security of the DMZ has been in the hands of forces of the DPRK and the ROK. The zone is constantly patrolled. The reduction of violent episodes and armed intrusions in recent years led to a series of agreements between the ROK and the DPRK. For a time, a rail link and two roads provided access across the DMZ to the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) and the Kumgang Mountain tourist project. The broadcasting of propaganda messages across the zone also stopped. The first test railway
crossing of the DMZ took place in May 2007, and regular services began in December 2007. Following the deterioration in relations between the two Koreas after the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as ROK president in February 2008, the DPRK closed the rail link on 1 December 2008; the Kumgang project had been suspended the previous July and was eventually closed completely in 2011. Road access to the KIZ continues.

Farming continues in both the southern and northern sections of the zone, but one consequence of the relative general lack of human activity and the prohibition on hunting in the area is that the DMZ forms a kind of wildlife reserve. Visitors from either side may make escorted trips to their respective section of the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom within the DMZ. See also NORTHERN LIMIT LINE.

DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF KORYO. On 10 October 1980, the then leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), President Kim Il Sung, proposed that to solve the problem of Korean unification, the two Korean states should establish a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo. “Koryo,” from which the West derived the name Korea, was chosen because this was the name of the first Korean dynasty to fully unite the Korean Peninsula between 935 and 1392. The proposal, which was a reworking of one first put forward on 14 August 1960, has remained the basis of DPRK policy on the unification issue ever since. The proposal as now presented has 10 points but essentially comes down to the continued existence of two Korean states for an undefined length of time, each preserving its social and political systems. They should both be free of outside influences, and they should have a common defense and foreign policy. Leaders in the Republic of Korea, while not rejecting the proposal entirely, especially under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun between 1997 and 2007, have generally been skeptical, given the marked social, political, and economic differences between the two countries. No substantive discussion of the issue has ever taken place on the subject.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE FA
THERLAND (Choguk Tongil Minjujuui Chonson). This is an umbrella body for the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Established on 25 June 1949, it brought together members of the Democratic United Front set up in the north in 1946 with representatives of parties and organizations from the southern half of the peninsula who had fled north. As the name implies, its purpose was and remains to bring about the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on DPRK terms. From the start, the front was firmly under the control of the KWP.
However, many members defected during the Korean War and it had to be reconstructed. The front suffered further losses in the political purges of the 1950s, when most of those from the south were dismissed. This did not stop the front from continuing to claim to represent the “real” views of people in the south, and it remains the major united front body in the DPRK, issuing regular calls for reunification on DPRK terms. It also plays an important role in the selection of candidates for election to the Supreme People’s Assembly. See also POLITICAL PARTIES.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK). Formally established on 9 September 1948, the DPRK, informally known as North Korea, occupies the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. While it is officially a “people’s democracy,” effective rule has been from the beginning in the hands of Kim Il Sung, from 1948 until his death in 1994, first as premier and later as president, and then his son, Kim Jong Il, who took over his father’s powers but not his title of president in 1994. In September 2010, Kim Jong Il’s third known son, Kim Jong Un, was given various appointments that indicated he was likely to be his father’s successor, although no formal announcement about the succession was made at that time. However, when

Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square, political and cultural center of the DPRK.
Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, Kim Jong Un was immediately hailed as his successor. The DPRK has been a member of various United Nations organizations since the 1970s, and, together with the Republic of Korea, entered the United Nations in 1991.

DETAINED UNITED STATES’ JOURNALISTS. In March 2009, two United States journalists, Laura Ling (1976–) and Euna Lee (1972–), were detained on the China–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) border. They both worked for Current TV, founded by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Eventually charged with illegal entry, they were each sentenced to 12 years’ detention in a labor camp in June 2009. International protests followed both the original detention and the severity of the sentence. However, the DPRK did not move them to a labor camp but held them in a guest house in the capital, Pyongyang, which indicated that the authorities were prepared to negotiate their release. This was achieved in August 2009, when former U.S. President Bill Clinton paid a “private” visit to Pyongyang and met with then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il.

The episode aroused much controversy. There were claims that they might have been set up by their guide in order to provide the DPRK with a bargaining chip. The two journalists denied that they had violated DPRK sovereignty but admitted that they had crossed the China–DPRK border. However, they said that they were apprehended after crossing back to the Chinese side of the border. There were claims in the Republic of Korea that their actions had compromised the escape routes operated by some human rights groups for refugees leaving the DPRK, and had led to the arrest of people involved in running these escape routes. In 2010, both published books about the incident. Laura Ling and her sister Lisa wrote Somewhere Inside: One Sister’s Captivity and the Other’s Fight to Bring Her Home, while Euna Lee published The World Is Bigger Now. See also ABDUCTIONS.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. Since its establishment in September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has had several distinct phases in its diplomatic relations. In the first, from 1948 to the 1958, only communist countries extended recognition to the new state, which reflected the circumstances of its creation. Following the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK), under United Nations (UN) auspices, also in September 1948, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in December that declared that the ROK was the “only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula,” and a majority of the UN member states therefore refused to recognize the DPRK. The DPRK, for its part, made little effort to seek recognition from noncommunist states, even before the Korean War (1950–53),
while the war also tended to polarize international attitudes around the status quo. The existence of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) from 1950, which assumed the eventual reunification of the peninsula, was also deemed by many countries to prevent diplomatic recognition of the DPRK.

The position began to change in the late 1950s, as former colonial territories gained independence. Many were anti-Western and anti-imperialist and viewed the DPRK as a progressive and developing country. This led to a willingness to establish relations with the DPRK rather than with the ROK, which they tended to see as pro-United States and pro-imperialism. The DPRK also became more interested in widening its contacts, and in 1956, its leader, Kim Il Sung, perhaps in an attempt to lessen dependence on the Soviet Union and China, declared that it was ready to establish relations with countries of different social systems. From 1958, when Algeria established relations, until 1969, 19 countries, mostly in Africa and the Middle East, but also including Cuba (1960), Indonesia, and Cambodia (both 1964), opened relations. During these years, the ROK for its part operated a practice similar to that followed by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from the mid-1950s to about 1970 (the Hallstein Doctrine) toward the German Democratic Republic. This meant not recognizing or maintaining relations with any country that recognized the DPRK. The DPRK does not seem to have maintained a similar doctrine.

The expansion of the DPRK’s diplomatic presence increased in the 1970s, when some 48 countries established relations as the two Koreas competed for international support. The DPRK continued to make gains in Africa, partly on the back of decolonization, but also because of its aid program. This may have been relatively small by world standards and heavily concentrated on military assistance, but it was accepted since the aid often went to countries that otherwise would not have received help from other sources and it came with “no-questions-asked” accountability.

Other factors were also at work in the 1970s. The two Koreas had begun talking in 1971 for the first time since the end of the Korean War, and this led the ROK to formally abandon its Hallstein Doctrine about the same time the FRG did, although in practice, ROK diplomatic missions were still expected to do all they could to prevent recognition of the DPRK. The winding up of UNCURK in 1973 removed an obstacle for many countries, which the DPRK was now quick to exploit. Several European countries established relations, including the Scandinavians, Switzerland, and Portugal. Further afield, there was Australia, while the DPRK continued to cultivate African and Asian countries. The linkage with Australia, which recognized the DPRK in 1973 and established an embassy in Pyongyang in April 1975, broke down in
October–November 1975, when the DPRK took offense at the Australian failure to support it internationally.

Despite this setback, for a time it seemed possible that the trend toward wider recognition would continue, with countries like Great Britain considering formally recognizing the DPRK. There was a suggestion from a senior U.S. diplomat that the United States and Japan should consider “cross-recognition,” whereby they would establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK while China and the Soviet Union would do so with the ROK. Although the idea apparently even attracted U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for a time, nothing came of it. The later 1970s were notable for a string of accusations that DPRK embassies were engaged in illegal actions such as smuggling and the sale of duty-free goods.

The 1980s saw a slowing down in the number of countries establishing relations with the DPRK and a return to cultivating the third world; only 13 countries established relations during this period. The Yangon bombing in 1983 led Myanmar to break off diplomatic relations and withdraw recognition. One slight advance came in 1984 when France, then under the socialist President François Mitterrand, agreed to the establishment of a DPRK quasi-diplomatic General Representative Office in Paris. This dealt primarily with Paris-based international organizations but carried out other tasks as well. The 1990s were marked by the fallout from the collapse of the Soviet Union. All the newly independent republics established separate relations with the DPRK, although none actually opened embassies. Sweden, which set up an embassy in 1974, closed it in 1994, but reopened it the following year, mainly to look after U.S. interests.

From 2000 onward, the improved relations between the two Koreas as a result of the “Sunshine Policy” led the ROK government to positively encourage countries to establish relations with the DPRK. The DPRK, for its part, faced with economic problems and famine, was eager to reach out to developed countries. Beginning with Italy in January 2001, the process sped up after the apparent success of the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. Great Britain (December 2000) and Germany (March 2001) opened embassies in Pyongyang. Most other European countries also established relations, the last being Ireland in December 2003, which left France and the Vatican as the only European states without diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Australia also restored diplomatic relations in May 2000. In May 2010, Canada suspended diplomatic relations with the DPRK, following the Chonan incident.

Currently (spring 2012), the DPRK has diplomatic relations, according to its own calculations, with some 157 countries, the majority in Africa. The main countries that do not have relations are the United States, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Vatican. The DPRK used to maintain embassies
in a large number of countries, but from 1993 onward it began to close such missions, mainly for economic reasons. Even where it still is represented, it has tended to reduce the number of staff. There are now 42 DPRK embassies. The number of embassies in Pyongyang has hovered around 25 in recent years. Most are small, with an expatriate staff of less than 10. The Russian and Chinese are the largest, and these two countries also have consulates-general in Chongjin. Switzerland does not have an embassy but maintained a cooperation office, as Italy did for a time. The Swiss office closed at the end of 2011. A number of UN organizations have offices in Pyongyang, including the United Nations Development Programme (the longest established), the World Food Programme, and the World Health Organization.

DOMESTIC FACTION. See KOREAN COMMUNIST PARTY; KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY; PAK HON YONG.

DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM LEAGUE. This organization was supposedly founded by Kim Il Sung in northeast China in 1926, when he was 14, and is now regarded in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the basis on which the Korean Workers’ Party was eventually established. There is no contemporary mention of such an organization, and it only began to feature in official biographies of Kim long after he had come to power. There is some evidence that he was involved with young people on the fringes of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement as early as the late 1920s, but nothing that corresponds to this league.

DRESNOK, JAMES JOSEPH (1941–). Along with Charles Jenkins, James Joseph Dresnok is one of the more prominent defectors from the United States army to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Dresnok was born in Richmond, Virginia, and joined the army in 1958. While serving in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the early 1960s, his wife divorced him and he faced a court martial for infringements of military discipline. On 15 August 1962, therefore, he defected to the DPRK and has lived there ever since. Although, like all the defectors, he experienced harsh treatment at first, his circumstances improved and he participated in films and undertook translations from Korean. He also married twice more. In 2007, he was the subject of the film Crossing the Line, in which he made it clear that he intended to stay in the DPRK. Three other U.S. military defectors, Larry Abshier (1943–83) from Illinois, Jerry Wayne Parrish (1944–66) from Kentucky, and Joseph White (1961–85) from St. Louis, were reported to have died in the DPRK. Private First Class Ryan (or Roy) Sup Chung, who defected in 1979, may also be dead.
EAST BERLIN CASE. On 8 July 1967, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA, now the National Intelligence Service) announced that 107 Koreans had been arrested in connection with an alleged pro-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) espionage team based in East Berlin, then the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR—East Germany). The internationally renowned composer Yun I-Sang and his wife, I Soo-ja, were among 17 members of the alleged spy ring who were abducted to Seoul via the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG—West Germany). They, along with those who were arrested in the ROK, were tried under the National Security Law. Of the 34 who were indicted, two were given the death sentence, later commuted to life imprisonment, one a life term, and the rest received various prison terms. There were widespread international protests at the methods used. The ROK government countered by claiming that other people did not understand the threat the country faced from the DPRK, and also argued that the adverse comment was an interference in the country’s domestic affairs since criticism of the trials implied that the ROK judiciary was not independent.

However, the protests continued, with the FRG threatening to end economic assistance to the ROK. Five of those who were abducted from West Berlin, including Yun I-Sang, were allowed to return to West Germany in March 1969, and all the others were released in December 1970. Although the KCIA insisted that the case was genuine and that Yun I-Sang had at least visited the DPRK, there were strong suspicions that the real reason for the trial was to build support for President Park Chung-hee. A committee set up to examine the issue under President Roh Moo-hyun concluded that the issue had been exaggerated. See also KIM DAE-JUNG.

EAST SEA/SEA OF JAPAN CONTROVERSY. The terms East Sea and Sea of Japan are names for the stretch of water that lies between the east coast of the Korean Peninsula and Japan. During the Japanese colonial period in Korea (1910–45), Japan registered the name Sea of Japan with the International Hydrographic Organization in 1929. Koreans argue that the name East Sea or even Sea of Korea has a pedigree dating back to the beginning of the
Three Kingdoms period in 37 B.C., and that the name Sea of Japan only came into general use from the end of the 18th century. Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, successive ROK governments have sought at least to have both names accepted, although preferring East Sea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also claims that East Sea is the correct name, using much the same material as the ROK to support this position. Many cartographic publishers now include both names.

EC 121 DOWNING. On 15 April (14 April on the east coast of the United States) 1969, a U.S. naval reconnaissance EC 121 aircraft took off on a routine mission from Atsugi airbase in Japan to monitor troop movements in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The aircraft was an unarmed four-engine propeller-driven Constellation, with 31 crew on board, which was equipped to monitor both ELINT (electromagnetic intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence). According to a briefing given to the U.S. Congress on 25 April 1969, such aircraft were instructed to fly on a series of elliptical orbits along the coast of the DPRK but not to approach nearer than 76 kilometers (approximately 40 nautical miles), which would keep them well clear of DPRK territorial waters. The United States claimed that on this occasion, the aircraft was instructed to fly even farther out. However, at one point, the aircraft deviated from its route slightly, although it was still outside DPRK waters, and was warned by U.S. radar that it ran the risk of attack. It then moved farther away from the DPRK, but some 165 kilometers (95 miles) south of the DPRK port of Chongjin, it disappeared from radar screens. DPRK radio announced soon afterward that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that had intruded into DPRK airspace had been shot down. U.S. aircraft later spotted wreckage in the sea, and two U.S. and two Soviet destroyers searched the area. Some wreckage and two bodies were recovered.

Although the newly elected President Richard Nixon wanted to take action, the U.S. response was confused. The Defense Department stopped all reconnaissance flights over China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Mediterranean; they were not resumed until 8 May 1969. They were then provided with armed escorts. Suggestions that a DPRK ship be seized proved impossible to implement since no DPRK ships had put to sea since the capture of the USS Pueblo in January 1968, while other actions, such as an attack on a DPRK airfield, were ruled out since that might lead to a wider conflict. In the end, a mild protest was made at the Military Armistice Commission and two aircraft carriers were sent to the East Sea/Sea of Japan, but there was no demand for compensation and the carriers were soon redeployed elsewhere. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.
ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. From very early on, the leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) claimed that they wished to build a kangsong taeguk, a “strong and prosperous country.” Yet as the country approaches the 100th anniversary of the birth of its first leader, the former guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung, in April 2012, the slogan is still being repeated, while the reality seems as far off as ever. So many economic problems beset the DPRK that at best, 2012 will present another economic sleight of hand with the overall position of the country and its people little improved. Kim Il Sung wrote that the aim was for the people of the DPRK to live in tiled houses, eat meat soup, and dress in silks, but the goal remains distant.

Some argue that the problems began with the division of the peninsula in 1945, others see Japanese colonial rule as the source. Under the Japanese, the southern half of the peninsula was the agricultural center of the country, as well as the main source of light industry and consumer goods. The north had abundant natural resources, which provided raw materials for the development of heavy industry. The Allied decision to divide Korea for administrative purposes after the defeat of Japan in 1945 left 65 percent of the peninsula’s heavy industry, 37 percent of agricultural production, and 31 percent of light industry in the area controlled by the Soviet Union. In the south, controlled by the United States, lay the bulk of agricultural production, light industry, and commercial activity. The south also had the greater population, more than double that of the north: approximately 22 million compared to 9 million (the proportions have remained broadly the same, with the ROK in 2011 at approximately 48 million and the DPRK at 24 million). Although the division would not become total until the emergence of separate states in 1948, in broad terms, it cut off the agricultural south from the industrial north. Both countries have struggled ever since to remedy the situation. The DPRK was more successful until perhaps the late 1970s. Since then, it has been the ROK that has triumphed economically.

Even before the DPRK was proclaimed in September 1948, it had set out to build a planned economy. Kim Il Sung and his followers professed to be Marxist-Leninists who looked to the Soviet Union as a model. Since the Soviet Union was a planned economy with the main focus on heavy industry, that was what Kim would do. As well as absorbing some Soviet thinking during his time in the Soviet Union during World War II, he may also have been influenced by the only other example of development with which he was in any way familiar, the Japanese puppet state developed after 1932 in Manchuria, which also emphasized heavy industry. Whatever the origin, the Soviet advisors who operated in North Korea from 1945 to 1948 encouraged the development of an economy based on planning and industrial
development. A series of plans began in 1946 and continued until the whole economy was thrown off course by the fall of the Soviet Union, famine, and other economic difficulties that struck in the 1990s. All plans were described as successful, but the reality was that some had to be extended, others were abandoned, and, except in the early years, they failed to deliver as promised. Later, they would be increasingly distorted by military spending.

Between 1945 and 1950, however, the prospects seemed good. The departure of the Japanese and of many landowners, already worried about their prospects in a socialist state, made the task of nationalizing the economy relatively easy. Banks and factories were taken over for the state, and the workers were pleased to think that they were now in charge. Agricultural reforms were made easier by the departure of the landlords, and land reform (also carried out in the southern part of the peninsula) seemed to bring the peasants onto its side. Mass campaigns for education and the eradication of illiteracy were designed to compensate for the failings of the Japanese educational provisions and to produce a better qualified workforce. (Some Japanese had to be kept on in the north after 1945 to run factories in the absence of a trained Korean workforce, although there was no public acknowledgment of this.) There were One-Year Plans in 1947 and 1948, which showed spectacular returns, with industrial output growing by 54 percent in the first year and 64 percent in the second—of course from a low starting base. The produc-
tion of consumer goods and grain was also up. Even more spectacular results were achieved in 1948–50. Then in June 1950, Kim Il Sung, anxious to bring about the reunification of the peninsula that the Soviet Union and the United States had failed to achieve, launched the Korean War. Although the DPRK claimed a victory when the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953 and has done so ever since, the reality was that the war caused immense destruction in both parts of Korea, but the DPRK suffered the heaviest losses. Its cities were bombed, its economic gains disappeared, and many of its skilled workers were either killed, maimed in the fighting, or fled south. In both Koreas, most of the economic gains made before 1950 were wiped out.

The DPRK’s postwar economic reconstruction began with a Three-Year Plan that ran from 1954 to 1956. Much aid flowed into the war-torn country from its communist supporters. In the Chinese case, this was not only financial assistance but also physical labor as the Chinese People’s Volunteers stayed on and helped rebuild the country. Priorities that would dominate economic planning in the future now became evident: restoration of the industrial base received a greater share of resources than other sectors, with only about a quarter of all expenditure going toward the re-creation of educational and cultural establishments and domestic housing. The DPRK claimed that the plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule, showing that the DPRK’s system was more effective than that of the ROK. During this period, the peasants found that the reform that had given them land of their own was to be replaced by a system of farming cooperatives. As in the late 1940s, the disruption caused by the war, with many leaving the land and not returning, allowed this innovation. It also marked a move toward following Chinese rather than Soviet models.

In succeeding years, agricultural collectivization would gather speed, aided by increasing mechanization in the countryside, and reaching 100 percent in 1958. The state also increased its control of production activities in other areas. Officially, all appeared successful, but from the early 1960s, the DPRK ceased to publish statistics; advances, and they were always advances, now appeared as percentages of percentages. Observers increasingly had to rely on guesswork to try to establish the real figures. As the DPRK’s foreign policy shifted with the intensification of the Sino–Soviet dispute, there was a growing emphasis on juche, or independence, in economic as in other matters. Rather than depend on quarrelling neighbors, the DPRK would go it alone. Another factor was that sanctions, in place since the Korean War, some of which remain in force in 2012, limited potential access to international funding. Going it alone meant heavy industry, which tended to take a steadily increasing share of production during the 1960s and 1970s. Growth certainly continued, although the absence of statistics concealed the details and
allowed exaggerated claims. According to DPRK sources, the economy grew by an average of nearly 16 percent annually during the 1970s, a time when most outside observers think it actually began to contract. The extractive industries were important, including coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, and gold; the latter was traded on the London gold market until the late 1980s, when fears of legal proceedings to seize its assets to meet foreign debts led to a change of policy. Partly to improve production in these areas, but also to compensate for the wearing out of machinery and equipment supplied in the immediate post–Korean War years and to avoid overdependence on communist countries whose technology was falling behind that of the West, the DPRK turned in the late 1960s to new sources of supply. Safe in the assurance that communist countries did not default, countries such as Japan and Sweden entered into contracts to supply the DPRK with the up-to-date machinery that it craved. The machinery was supplied, although it often proved too sophisticated for DPRK use, but most of the contracts were not honored. Eventually, the DPRK would default on its debts, a move that would affect its economic development well into the 21st century.

As well as claiming steady industrial growth, the DPRK also said that agriculture, carried out according to juche principles, expanded hugely during the 1970s. Claimed grain production rose from 7 million metric tons in the early 1970s to over 10 million by the mid-1980s. There was undoubtedly some progress in agricultural output. New land was brought under cultivation, and heavy inputs of fertilizer helped push up production in the short term. But the land was being overexploited, with no fallow periods between crops, and eventually it became less fertile. There may also have been some sleight of hand, with purchased grain being passed off as domestic production. New plans continued to be issued, but they were increasingly not achieving the expected results. The second Seven-Year Plan from 1978 to 1984 failed to reach its targets and was extended by a year. Industrial production was falling, and agriculture was taking a bigger share of the economy, but it too was beginning to decline. At the same time, the 1980s saw heavy increases in military spending and more and more resources diverted to the military economy. From the 1970s onward, expenditure increased on large monuments to commemorate the achievements of Kim Il Sung, under the guidance of his son, Kim Jong Il. Although some of the work on these projects was undertaken as “social work” or voluntary labor performed by workers in their spare time, it still diverted resources away from the productive sectors.

By the late 1980s, the DPRK economy was in difficulties and was increasingly unable to meet people’s needs. For urban dwellers, the “social contract” was that they would receive their needs in the form of state-distributed rations provided though the Public Distribution System according to need. Housing,
education, and health care would all be provided. On farms, there were no rations, but the members of the collective received their grain supplies before the surplus was handed over to the state. Wages and salaries were little more than pocket money for most people. As one official told a visiting European Union delegation in 1998: “I do not even know the price of rice. My salary is for buying ice cream or the occasional luxury.” There were officially no personal taxes, although the claim that all taxation was abolished in the 1970s is not strictly accurate since taxes continued to be levied on certain types of transactions.

But the system was no longer capable of delivering, and rations were often less than the expected amount. The situation deteriorated the farther away one was from Pyongyang, the capital, but even in Pyongyang, it was possible to see empty supply points and poor quality housing. The system kept going but very little was going into preserving and developing the infrastructure. People were being called to work harder and harder to less and less effect.

Then came the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, there had been a revival of DPRK–USSR economic ties, but some of the promised new factories failed to materialize. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, they remained empty shells. A promised light water reactor (LWR) for electrical power also failed to materialize. In addition, the DPRK’s foreign trade had been closely linked to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Soviet-dominated common market of communist countries. That too vanished and with it guaranteed markets for DPRK goods. Concessionary prices also ended, which had an immediate negative effect on the economy as fuel and fertilizers ceased to be available. To add to the country’s woes, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced in 1992 that it too would no longer supply the DPRK at “friendship prices.” Although these were contributory factors rather than the cause of the economic problems, such developments had a widespread economic effect. Lack of fuel not only affected transport but also reduced the electricity available for industry, including the extractive industries, heating, lighting, and farm work. Tractors disappeared from the fields, and as the 1990s progressed, agricultural methods clearly regressed and yields dropped. Lack of industrial production and inability to keep mines free of water meant there were fewer products to sell, which in turn meant there was less money available to meet grain shortfalls. At the same time, spending on the military continued to account for a larger and larger share of the economy. Exhortation continued, with the call: “Let us eat two meals a day” being used to try to make food supplies go further.

Further blows came in the mid-1990s. The death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994 left power in the hands of Kim Jong Il. Rather than tackling the manifest economic problems the country faced, the younger Kim went into three years
of mourning. Government did not stop, but it was hardly functioning at its best. More serious in economic terms was a series of natural disasters that included flooding and drought. Eroded hillsides, the result of overextended terracing and the stripping of trees and undergrowth for heating, produced destructive landslip and severe environmental damage. Food production dropped even further and famine conditions set in. By 1995, the situation was desperate, and the DPRK called for international assistance. There was a massive response, though many humanitarian aid agencies did not find it easy working with the DPRK authorities. The food aid supplied by various countries, including the United States and the ROK, channeled through agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), met the shortfall in grain. The Red Cross and other bodies provided assistance in health and other areas, such as the provision of clean water, which the state was now unable or unwilling to do. Nongovernmental organizations worked in other areas as well, growing vegetables, for example, or introducing new agricultural techniques. By 1998 or 1999, the worst of the famine was over. No official figures have ever been published relating to those who died as a result of the famine. Estimates vary from 200,000 to 3 million; the higher figure tending to come from opponents of the DPRK. But even dispassionate observers give figures of between 800,000 and 1.5 million. The effects of the famine were not equally distributed; some areas were affected worse than others. In rural areas, it was often possible to search out alternative foods. Urban workers, tied to the Public Distribution System, had more difficulty coping, although factories or work units often worked to create garden plots. Even though Pyongyang was relatively protected, people there suffered, too. Private or semiprivate traders emerged, meeting needs the state could not. They were usually tolerated, but the authorities would engage in periodic crackdowns and would not allow foreigners to visit the markets where they operated. Even the armed forces suffered deprivations. Only the very top ranks of the party, government, and military leadership and their families escaped the shortages of those years.

That these years took a massive toll on the economy cannot be denied. The International Monetary Fund estimated that the DPRK gross national product (GNP) shrank from about $21 billion in 1992 to $10.6 billion in 1996. It then slowly began to recover, reaching some $22 billion in 2002 and $28 billion in 2010. DPRK estimates of per capita GDP gave figures of $990 in 1992, $722 in 1994, and $482 in 1996. By 2008, the American Central Intelligence Agency gave a figure of $1,244, ranking the DPRK about 160th in the world. Comparable data for the ROK gave a figure of about $28,000 to $30,000, ranking the ROK 50th in the world. The 1990s had left most of the DPRK’s traditional industrial economy in ruins. Glossy publications and government statements might still describe a vibrant economy, but for anyone traveling in
the country, the decline was obvious. Along the great industrial belt from the east coast north from Wonsan, there were stretches of derelict factories, with trees growing through the roofs and what was left of their machinery piled on wagons ready to ship to China as scrap. A similar sight was visible on the river road from Pyongyang to Nampo. Coal mines near the capital were idle since there was no electricity to work the pumps. Transport was badly affected. Scheduled rail services had effectively ceased to operate. Trains ran, but except for a small number of international routes, no attempt was made to keep to timetables. The rolling stock and the permanent way were visibly crumbling. Urban transport ceased to run except in the capital. Even Pyongyang suffered much degradation, although it was still the country’s showcase. High-rise buildings had privies at their base since there was not enough power to pump water to the water closets. The buildings were dark and unheated even in the depths of winter. The capital’s hotels normally provided no heating except in the bedrooms. Trams and trolley buses were stationary for long periods because of a lack of power.

After 2000, there was improvement. International assistance continued, and there were growing links with the ROK. Pragmatists seemed to be in command, and a series of changes in pricing and wages, introduced in 2002 and described by one official as being as “important as the 1946 land reform,” seemed to mark a new departure. However, people soon found that their increased wages did not match the increased prices. Markets flourished and for the first time were officially admitted to exist. Foreigners were even allowed to visit the newly created Tongil Market in Pyongyang, where there were plentiful displays of foodstuffs and white goods from China. Elsewhere in the country, private enterprise was taking off, but with it came corruption and gangsterism. Such developments may have alarmed the more orthodox Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) members, including Kim Jong Il, and after 2005, regular attempts were made to return to the old ways of planning and a centralized economy. Markets were restricted and exhortations to the people to work harder returned. The international situation also became more negative for the DPRK. Hopes of tapping into Japanese funds foundered on the abduction issue, while the pursuit of nuclear weapons, which led to tests in 2006 and 2009, resulted in new economic sanctions. A change of government in the ROK in 2008 brought those favoring a tougher line toward the DPRK into power and had a negative effect on North–South economic relations.

At the end of 2009, a major currency reform was undertaken. This was not the first such reform, but it hit hard. Amounts of old currency that could be exchanged were severely limited, thus wiping out savings. The use of foreign currency was also made illegal. The purpose seems to have been directed at those who were making money through the markets and through
smuggling. In effect, it paralyzed economic activity for some weeks, with not even hotels or restaurants catering for the small foreign community knowing what to charge. The government backtracked, and there were reports that some of those involved had been executed. As 2012 and the anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth approached, the DPRK economy might have gotten over the worst of the previous two decades, but it was still in a precarious position. Perhaps in order to make sure there would be sufficient food to mark the celebrations, in 2010 the DPRK began to solicit food aid from a variety of countries, including the United States, a campaign that continued in 2011. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

EDUCATION. Koreans have traditionally had a high respect for education. The “educated man”—women were not usually educated—was the ideal product of Confucianism. This high respect of education continues in both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and among Korean communities overseas. Major efforts have been made to create a full range of educational opportunities, originally to compensate for the relative meager provisions made under the Japanese colonial period. Both Kim Il Sung, who led the DPRK from 1948 until his death in 1994 and who completed no more than a few years of middle school, and his son, Kim Jong Il, leader from 1994 until his death in 2011 who graduated from Kim Il Sung University, wrote about education.

The modern system of education in the DPRK began in 1949, when the Supreme People’s Assembly, the DPRK parliament, passed a law introducing compulsory primary education starting in 1950. Even before then, efforts were being made to provide schooling, and campaigns were under way to reduce adult illiteracy. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 badly disrupted education, and it was not in fact until three years after the war ended in 1953 that compulsory primary education was fully introduced. In 1967, nine years of education became compulsory, and in 1975, a full 11-year system was put in place. In theory, children attend one year of preschool, from age four. Elementary/primary education follows at age six, for four years. From age 10 onward, children do six years of middle and high school education. Schools work on a two-semester year, with the first running from 1 April to 31 July, and the second from 1 September to 31 March, with a three-week break between semesters. As well as traditional subjects, school children are expected to take part in physical labor on farms, and they may also engage in industrial work. Much of a child’s leisure time is likely to be spent with school classmates rather than with family, and on holidays and weekends, children are expected to engage in tasks such as weeding or helping to keep the streets clean. In higher educational institutions, especially in the capital,
Pyongyang, students may be taken away from their studies to participate in performances such as Arirang or in parades or other functions, as well as helping with rice transplantation in the spring and harvesting in the autumn. In summer 2011, there were reports that university students in the capital were being taken out of classes to take part in construction work to prepare for the celebrations to mark the centenary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in 2012. Officials later confirmed the reports.

Beyond high school, there is a wide range of colleges and universities, with Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang at the pinnacle. Entry to higher education is determined by class and political status, although there are also entrance examinations. All education fees and living expenses are met by the government. In addition to the ordinary educational system, there are a number of schools for orphaned and handicapped children. The most prestigious is the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School. Originally for the education of children whose parents had been killed in the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, it is now a school for the children of the elite. Since his emergence as leader, Kim Jong Un has made a number of highly publicized visits to this school. There is also a small International School situated in the main diplomatic area of Munsu-dong in Pyongyang, which caters to the children of resident diplomats and other foreigners. In Pyongyang at least, and possibly in other big cities, some adult education, especially in foreign languages, is also available outside the formal academic structure.

There is no doubt that the educational system has produced results. Illiteracy has long been eliminated. Foreign language teaching has expanded. Before 1994, children learned Russian as their first foreign language; now it is English. Children are encouraged to learn musical instruments and to participate in sports; some of this takes place in Children’s Palaces, which are a combination of library, sports, and recreational centers. There are at least two in Pyongyang, and there are others in major cities. If the children are skilled and if their family’s political background is satisfactory, they are likely to be selected for special training. The school curriculum has a heavy political content. Education in the DPRK is not just aimed at providing young people with skills for work and living but is also a tool of party and government control. There is a strong emphasis on nationalism, with much propaganda against the Japanese, the ROK, and the United States. One problem with the International School has been the use of textbooks reflecting these themes. Children who are deemed to be from the wrong political background are not able to compete for the prestigious Pyongyang institutions and may not be allowed to follow any form of higher education.

The effects of the 1990s’ famine and the wider economic problems have also been seen in education. Children and teachers suffering from severe
lack of food are in no position to learn or to teach. Conditions were probably worse the farther away from the capital, but even in Pyongyang, foreign teachers noted during the early 2000s that students would fall asleep in unheated classrooms and even when awake were not able to concentrate for long. Lack of funds for education meant that in some schools, few printed textbooks were available, and occasionally, parents would copy them by hand so their children could study.

Before the collapse of communism, the DPRK sent students to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as to China, for training at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. Such students might be recalled suddenly if there were political problems, such as in Hungary in 1956 or China in 1989, but normally the exchanges would resume. Students have also been sent to countries such as Australia, Great Britain, France, Sweden, and Southeast Asia in recent years, and the DPRK authorities say they are willing to send more. However, the government is reluctant to provide funds, looking to the host governments to meet both tuition and living expenses. Other problems associated with students who might be sent overseas is their unfamiliarity with Western-style examinations and their lack of ability in English. See also ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; KIM IL SUNG MILITARY UNIVERSITY; KIM IL SUNG SOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

EGYPT, RELATIONS WITH. Egypt and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established diplomatic relations on 24 August 1963. Linked by a common dislike of “imperialism,” relations developed in the early 1970s, when the DPRK provided training for Egyptian air force pilots. Egypt also provided the DPRK with Russian missiles, which the DPRK then back engineered to produce its own Nodong missiles. The DPRK sold these back to Egypt and to other Middle Eastern countries in the 1980s and also supplied other military equipment. In those years, the DPRK embassy in Cairo became an important center for such military sales. These sales continue, but the DPRK–Egyptian relationship has taken on a new aspect in recent years, with the increasing involvement with the DPRK of the Egyptian construction and communications company, Orascom. Links appear to have first developed through Middle East construction work but have expanded. Now, Orascom is the main partner in the DPRK’s revived cell phone system and has also undertaken the completion of the Ryugyong Hotel.

ENGAGEMENT POLICY. See “SUNSHINE POLICY.”
ENVIRONMENT. All Koreans, North and South, express great devotion to the physical beauty of the Korean Peninsula, with its dramatic mountains, fast-flowing streams, and diverse wildlife. War, industrialization, and natural disasters have taken their toll, however, as has the decline in people’s living standards. Environmental degradation began during the Japanese colonial period but did not stop in 1945. The Korean War (1950–53) caused much damage, especially in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which was particularly vulnerable to bombing. With virtually total control of the skies, the United Nations’ Command air forces destroyed most DPRK cities and, lacking other targets, much agricultural and forest land as well. At the end of the war, the DPRK, like other countries that were determined on the development of heavy industry, paid little attention to the environmental consequences of coal-burning power stations and intensive farming methods needed to feed the workers. Attempts at reforestation were thwarted by the needs of rural people for wood for heating and cooking.

As the world began to realize the consequences of industrialization in the 1970s, DPRK leader Kim Il Sung also became aware of the environmental costs to the country due to rapid industrialization. From 1977 onward, he made pronouncements about the need for environmental protection. Laws were introduced for this purpose and efforts were made to educate the population about the need to take action. But little was done to tackle the fundamental causes. Factories continued to depend on coal-fired power stations and to adopt a cavalier attitude toward the use of water. One positive factor in limiting its pollution, which still operates, was the lack of motor transport.

The 1990s saw other problems diminish as natural disasters hit all aspects of the DPRK’s economy. Nonfunctioning factories were no longer polluting. Light pollution, never very high, disappeared. Even in major cities, the night sky was clearly visible. But in the countryside, deforestation persisted, made worse as people pushed terracing even higher to produce more food. High terracing in turn made the land particularly vulnerable to flash flooding, which would sweep away high-level fields and create battering ram-like conditions as walls of water swept down hillsides. More intensive farming also led to more water use.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN bodies began studying environmental issues in the DPRK from the mid-1990s, following the DPRK’s appeal for international assistance for famine relief. In 2003, the DPRK Ministry of Land and Environment, together with UNDP and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) prepared a joint report on the state of the DPRK environment. This, with earlier sectoral reports, provides the most comprehensive account of environmental issues
available. Figures derived from these documents show the DPRK’s total area as 120,540 square kilometers, of which 120,410 square kilometers is land and 130 square kilometers is water (respectively, 46,540.75 square miles, 46,490.56 square miles, and 50.19 square miles). Land was 14 percent arable and 60 percent forest. Industrial use and urban areas counted for 23 percent, and a small amount of permanent pasture accounted for the remainder. Water usage was 73 percent for agriculture and 16 percent for industry; the remainder included drinking water.

The reports identified the country’s main environmental problems as deforestation and water pollution. Each year, cooking and heating with wood consumed 7 million cubic meters (9.156 million cubic yards) of wood. Despite strict rules and severe penalties, people still uproot newly planted trees as well as deplete older stands of timber. This forest degradation adds to soil erosion. Forest fires are another hazard. As for water usage, the economic problems of the 1990s might have reduced industrial use of water, but increases in agricultural output meant continued high demands and added to water pollution. Pollution of drinking supplies was common throughout the country, although the causes varied. In the countryside, contamination from agricultural usage was high, and aid agencies devoted much effort to improvement. In the cities, poor quality pipes, often installed immediately after the Korean War, led to contamination of drinking water.

Other problems included waste disposal, carbon monoxide emissions, and pollution from neighboring countries, especially acid rain from China. Animals and birds at risk included the Siberian tiger, the Amur leopard, the Oriental white stork, the crested ibis, and Tristram’s woodpecker. Although not spelled out in these reports, it is widely assumed that the famine years of the 1990s had taken their toll, especially on the small bird population. Very few birds were seen or heard in the capital, Pyongyang, in the early 2000s. One sign of better times was that birds were once again in evidence in 2011.

The DPRK government was not unaware of the problems, but it often lacked the expertise and resources to solve them. As mentioned, Kim Il Sung had encouraged action on environmental issues in the 1970s, but some efforts began before the Korean War. From liberation in 1945, strenuous efforts went into reforestation. A Tree Planting Day began in the 1940s, and a small park not far from the Pyongyang diplomatic quarter marks the occasion in 1948 when Kim Il Sung and his family, including the young Kim Jong II, took part in such an event. Decrees, ordinances, and laws have all sought to encourage the preservation of the environment. The Environment Protection Law was amended in 1999 and again in 2011. According to the Korean Central News Agency, the latest revision is designed “to beautify our homeland, protect the health and wellbeing of our people, and provide a culturally hygienic environment with favorable working conditions.”
Spectacular pollution from the Hamhung fertilizer factory, a major industrial complex that dates originally from the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945).
The DPRK has registered a number of its hydroelectric plants under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Once the processes are completed, this will allow it to receive carbon credits that can be sold for hard **currency**. The DPRK has taken advantage of international opportunities for environmental training under UN auspices. In May–June 2011, for example, 10 officials from the Ministry of Land and Environmental Protection and National Science and Technology Commission attended a training course on integrated watershed management at the Asian Institute of Technology in Thailand in a program organized by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific as part of a project on Promoting Regional and Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The DPRK is party to a number of environmentally related international conventions. These include the **Antarctic** Treaty, the Antarctic Environmental Protocol, the Climate Change Convention, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Law of the Sea. It has signed but not ratified the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by the 1978 Protocol.

**EUGENE BELL FOUNDATION.** The Eugene Bell Foundation, established in 1995, is one of the principal United States-based nongovernmental organizations operating in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It was established by members of the Linton family, who have been missionaries in Korea since 1895. The name commemorates the Reverend Eugene Bell (1868–1925), a Southern Presbyterian, who arrived in Korea, with his wife, Charlotte, also a missionary, in 1895. The Bells’ daughter, also named Charlotte, married the Reverend William Linton. The most prominent member of the family currently still active is Dr. Stephen Linton, a fourth-generation member of the family. Soon after its establishment, the organization split, with one group, also including several Linton family members, forming the Christian Friends of Korea (CFK). Initially, both the Eugene Bell Foundation and the CFK were engaged in the supply of food during the famine of the 1990s, but they have subsequently moved into the **health** sector at the request of the DPRK Ministry of Public Health. Both concentrate on programs to eradicate tuberculosis (TB) but have also engaged in hospital and clinic rehabilitation programs.

The Eugene Bell Foundation is actually two organizations that work closely together. Eugene Bell USA is a nonprofit charitable body registered in the United States, while Eugene Bell Korea is similar, but registered in the Republic of Korea (ROK). There are offices in Maryland, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and in Seoul, the ROK capital. These offices channel donations from a wide range of religious and business donors, with most fund-
ing coming from ROK religious groups. Donations have also been received from the ROK government. The Eugene Bell Foundation had seven full-time staff and three part-time staff in 2008. It was then reported to be supplying TB medical and diagnostic equipment to about one-third of the DPRK population and supporting some 40 TB-related establishments. About the same time, CFK ran three TB hospitals and 15 rest houses for TB patients. Stephen Linton has regularly testified before U.S. congressional and senate committees on matters relating to the DPRK. A fluent Korean speaker, he acted as interpreter for the U.S. evangelist Billy Graham when the latter visited the DPRK in 1992 and 1994. See also HUMANITARIAN AID.

EUROPEAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATION (EBA). Set up in April 2005, the EBA is the first such organization to be established in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). An associated body, EBA-Berlin was established in 2008. The aim of the EBA is to assist foreigners in doing business in the DPRK. Resident members are drawn from those companies that have permanent resident status in the DPRK, and there is also a category of nonresident members. These either have offices in the DPRK staffed by Koreans or make regular visits for business purposes. The EBA organizes stands at the regular trade fairs held in Pyongyang. See also EUROPEAN UNION, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU), RELATIONS WITH. The EU established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 14 May 2001. The agreement was signed during a visit to the DPRK by then president of the EU Council Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, who was accompanied by EU Commissioners H. R. Solana and Chris Patten. In addition, all the EU member states, with the exception of France, have established bilateral diplomatic relations with the DPRK. In 2001, the EU sought to build on the apparent improvement in relations on the Korean Peninsula following the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. The DPRK for its part perhaps hoped that the EU would counterbalance the United States’ role on the peninsula. In fact, as far as political and security matters are concerned, the EU has remained a firm supporter of the U.S. position, calling for an end to the DPRK nuclear program and for a resumption of the Six Party Talks. It also maintains that sanctions, imposed by the United Nations in the wake of DPRK missile and nuclear tests, should be firmly implemented.

EU involvement with the DPRK began in 1995 when the EU started to supply humanitarian aid in response to the DPRK’s appeal for international assistance. The EU also contributed to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and was eventually on its board. By 2010, total
EU humanitarian aid amounted to some euros 366 million ($480 million). Much of this was distributed through the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to a number of European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the DPRK in the fields of food security, health care, and water sanitation. These were the only NGOs allowed to have staff permanently based in the country. In 2005, they were threatened with expulsion by the DPRK authorities, who said that they had no more need of such assistance. However, ECHO negotiated an agreement whereby the NGOs were allowed to continue working in the DPRK, but as EU support units rather than under their individual organization names. They still functioned as such in 2011. The EU responded to the DPRK appeal for further food assistance in 2011 with a donation of euros 10 million ($14.14 million). The EU has also sponsored some modest capacity building and training for DPRK officials. In 2002, the EU produced a “Country Strategy Paper” for the DPRK, which envisaged a more extensive training program, but this was never implemented because of the nuclear issue.

The EU had a human rights dialogue with the DPRK for a short period after 2001. However, from 2003 onward, the EU became a regular cosponsor of UN resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK, and this led to a DPRK refusal to continue the dialogue. There are regular exchanges of visits, but the original expectations of both sides have failed to be met. See also FAMINE.
FAMILY REUNIONS. The Japanese colonial period (1910–45), division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, the creation of separate states in 1948, and most of all, the Korean War (1950–53), led to major family divisions. Koreans worked or were forced to work all over the Japanese empire, and developments after 1945 often made it difficult for them to return to their place of origin. The emergence of the communist north and the capitalist south after 1945 led people to flee to more congenial areas. Many landowners and religious believers moved from the north to the south, while left-wingers tended to go north, as did many writers and artists. The Korean War was even more disruptive. Again many fled for ideological reasons but most probably moved to escape the fighting and the bombing. There are no clear figures but it is sometimes claimed that as many as 10 million people in the Republic of Korea (ROK) either came from the north or are descended from those who did so. Many of these still have relatives in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is not known how many people in the DPRK have relatives in the ROK, but DPRK officials have talked in terms of millions.

From the end of the Korean War in July 1953 until 1971 or 1972, neither the DPRK nor the ROK did anything to facilitate contact between the separated families. Indeed, in both Koreas, having relatives on the other side was likely to arouse suspicions about loyalty, and there was much discrimination against such people. The issue was raised during the Red Cross talks held between the two sides in 1971–72, but no progress was made before these broke down in 1973. In 1985, there was a one-off set of exchanges that brought together 50 people from each side. It also demonstrated the gap that had developed between the two Koreas, with those from the ROK complaining that their relatives talked in propaganda terms. There was no follow-up to the 1985 meeting, but as a result of June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, a more regular program of exchanges began. Eventually, the DPRK built a facility for the meetings at the Kumgang Mountain tourist resort. In addition to face-to-face meetings, people were able to contact their relatives via video links. Since 2000, some 20,000 ROK citizens have met family members from the DPRK, out of 120,000 who applied to do so. A similar number of DPRK
citizens have also been involved. By 2010, 40,000 of the original ROK applicants had died, and the vast majority of those remaining were over age 70; no comparable figures have been released for the DPRK.

The schedule of meetings has regularly been disrupted because of tensions between the two Koreas, especially when relations between the two sides deteriorated following the election of Lee Myung-bak as ROK president in 2007 and the shooting of an ROK tourist at Mount Kumgang in 2008. Reunions stopped for a year between 2008 and 2009. Although they resumed in October 2009, they were again suspended and did not resume until October–November 2010. On that occasion 430 ROK citizens from 97 families met their DPRK relatives. See also ABDUCTIONS.

FAMINE. Between the early 1990s and 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) experienced a famine that led directly or indirectly to a large number of deaths among the population. The DPRK admitted that there was a severe shortage of food and appealed for international assistance in 1995, but it has never published official figures for the numbers who died due to the famine. Extrapolating from one set of figures given in 2000 by an official of the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC), the body set up to handle international assistance, the death toll was about 200,000. However, outside observers have estimated that famine-related deaths were between 600,000 and 2 million. Even though the worst was over by 1998, the food situation in the DPRK has remained precarious. Malnourishment and the stunting of children are widespread.

DPRK officials and media blame the food crisis on a series of floods and droughts that hit the country in the mid-1990s. These destroyed harvests, damaged agricultural land, and affected food distribution. There certainly were devastating floods, probably the worst of the 20th century. Dykes protecting reclaimed land were broken and sea water swept far inland in some areas. Elsewhere, flash floods acted like battering rams, destroying agricultural terracing, houses, crops, roads, and railways. Mines flooded and became unusable, affecting power supplies for transportation and harvesting.

Some outside commentators have seen other reasons for the food shortages. Many believe that collectivized agriculture is inefficient and unable to produce the required amounts of food. They also question whether the DPRK was ever really self-reliant in food production as it claimed, believing that shortfalls in production were made up by purchasing food abroad. This was not admitted, and might not have been known to the top leadership, since it clashed with the self-reliant juche doctrine. With the DPRK’s economic collapse in the wake of the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were reduced funds for purchasing grain abroad. Restrictions on the supply of oil meant a
steep decline in fertilizer, which is essential in the intensive farming practice there. In addition, massive military expenditure, plus the need to ensure enough food for the armed forces, had a distorting effect on the food supply.

The international appeal in 1995 produced a strong response. The World Food Programme (WFP) established an office in the DPRK. Other United Nations famine-related bodies followed, as did the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross. China, the United States, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) all responded with supplies of grain. International relief agencies such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and many smaller nongovernmental organizations offered assistance. The DPRK response was mixed. While it welcomed the aid offered, it made it clear that it would prefer to be provided with funds or material and allowed to use this any way it wished. Officials expressed resentment about demands for monitoring, arguing that when the DPRK had given international aid in the past, it had done so without strings attached. As it became clear that this was not an option as far as most organizations were concerned, the DPRK reluctantly agreed to allow them to establish a physical presence in the country, although they were all subject to tight control, and on some occasions, aid was turned away either because the donors had not gone through the proper formalities or because they were unwilling to abide by DPRK restrictions. Even those organizations that did open offices found that the difficulties did not abate, and that dealing with the DPRK bureaucracy was not like operating in a failed state. This led to withdrawals and much mutual recrimination. Those who remained faced continued difficulties over monitoring, with the DPRK officials demanding long lead-ins before inspections could be made. There were frequent claims that food aid was diverted to the armed forces or to other groups favored by the leadership, particularly as the WFP tended to use the public distribution system (PDS) on the grounds that it was efficient and that it got food where it was needed. In time, conditions for relief workers eased somewhat. At first they had been confined to their hotels, as they continued to be in the provinces, but by the late 1990s, they had greater freedom to move around the capital Pyongyang. Other restrictions remained, however, with no access to secure communications, despite several pleas from senior UN figures. Only in 2002, when the DPRK agreed to a request from Great Britain for secure embassy communications, did this change. Thereafter, other embassies and UN bodies were able to install such communications.

By that stage, the WFP concluded that the famine conditions of the 1990s had ended, and that the combination of international assistance and improved harvests meant that there was no longer a danger of widespread starvation. However, there remained concerns about the security of the food supply and the effects of what was still a very restricted diet on both the current population
and future generations. Periodic claims continued that food aid was diverted to the military. While some food aid was diverted, it was not certain that this was the doing of the Korean People’s Army, but rather local enterprise, which contributed to the growing marketization of the economy. Attempts to continue to supply the DPRK food needs were hampered by international concerns from 2002 onward about the country’s nuclear program, and in the case of Japan, the issue of the abductions. These issues led to reductions in food aid, as did the general sense of donor fatigue as the years passed.

In 2005, the DPRK demanded that the WFP cease to operate in the country, and also asked NGOs to leave, arguing that the continued supply of humanitarian aid, rather than development aid, was creating a “dependency culture.” The WFP program ended in December 2005. At that stage, it was supplying food to some 6 million people. Eventually, it was allowed to continue with a reduced operation and with some emphasis on economic development as well as the supply of food. The small number of remaining NGOs, all from the European Union, were no longer officially allowed to operate as independent bodies but were designated as belonging to the European Community Humanitarian Office, which had always provided much of their funding. By 2010, when then head of the WFP Josette Sheeran visited the DPRK, she reported that the WFP was receiving only 20 percent of the funding for which it had appealed, and that it was supplying only 2.5 million people; at the height of its operation, the WFP had been supplying over 8 million people. Sheeran confirmed that stunting was still a problem among children. There were press reports in 2010 that DPRK embassies around the world had been instructed to seek food aid from their host governments. Similar appeals were made in 2011. There were also reports that bad weather had hit the 2010 cabbage crop, vital for the manufacture of kimchi, a dish of pickled cabbage that provides vitamin C during the winter months.

Some commentators have concluded that while the famine had very negative effects on large sections of the DPRK population, it did have a positive side. Unable to feed people, the authorities were forced to relax some of the very tight controls over movement that had previously existed. The need for food contributed to the spread of markets, which also tended to undermine the rigid structures in existence before 1994. Although the authorities made periodic attempts to snatch back the concessions forced out during the famine years, this proved difficult and was never wholly successful. But there was no fundamental attempt at either agricultural or wider economic reform, and there is no doubt that the famine severely tried the DPRK population and that the scares will persist for many years.

FIFTEEN APRIL LITERARY WORKS GROUP. Established in either 1967 or 1968, reportedly under the direct orders of Kim Jong Il, this group
is subordinate to the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the **Korean Workers’ Party** (KWP) of the **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** (DPRK). Its purpose has been to produce “Great Leader image making literature,” extolling the lives of the late President **Kim Il Sung** and his successor **Kim Jong Il**. It draws its name from the date of Kim Il Sung’s birthday. It has always been headed by prominent writers and has produced a steady stream of novels, short stories, and children’s stories, as well as poetry and film scripts, about the lives and ancestry of the two Kims. It will probably assume the same role for Kim Jong Il’s successor, his son **Kim Jong Un**.

**FLAG.** The national flag of the **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** (DPRK), the *ingongki*, or Flag of the People’s Republic, dates from July 1948, just before the formal establishment of the DPRK. Before then, the flag used in the north after the defeat of Japan was the *taeguki*, which had been the national flag of Korea before the Japanese takeover and is still the national flag of the **Republic of Korea**. In July 1948, the veteran communist **Kim Tu Bong** denounced the *taeguki* because it included symbols for *yin* and *yang* that derived from a foreign country (**China**). The flag was thus symbolic of *sadaejwui*, or “looking up to the great,” a term used for earlier relations with China.

The flag adopted in 1948 has a central red panel, bordered above and below by a narrow white stripe and a broad blue stripe. The central red panel has a five-pointed red star on a white circle placed off center toward the hoist. According to DPRK-published handbooks, the central red panel symbolizes “the blood shed by the anti-Japanese revolutionary forerunners and other people of Korea in the revolutionary struggle for the freedom and independence of the country.” The red star, which once symbolized socialism, now apparently indicates the revolutionary tradition of the DPRK, according to one official account, or the dignity of the Korean people and their bright future, according to another. The white stripes represent the homogenous Korean nation, while the blue strip symbolizes the desire to fight for the victory of the ideals of independence, peace, and friendship in unity with the progressive peoples of the world. See also **CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**; **NATIONAL ANTHEM**; **NATIONAL EMBLEM**.

**FLOOD DAMAGE REHABILITATION COMMITTEE (FDRC).** An ad hoc committee established in 1995 in the **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea** (DPRK) to handle international relief organizations that came in response to an appeal for assistance following the heavy flooding that hit the country in that year. It was based in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and many of its staff came from that ministry. These included the “temporary head,” Jong In Chan, whose title indicated that as far as the DPRK was concerned,
the problems were transitory and there would be no need for the long-term establishment of aid agencies in the country. The FDRC dealt mainly with the United Nations agencies and with European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Aid from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and to some extent, the United States was handled by the Asia–Pacific Peace Committee.

From the beginning, there were tensions in the relationship between the FDRC and its clients. The committee was responsible for supplying staff to assist UN organizations and NGOs. Staff provided were often of high cali-

ber, but the committee selected them for their ability to speak English rather than for any technical knowledge of the issues involved. The staff were also employees of the FDRC, not of the organizations that paid their salaries. The committee appeared to see its main role as controlling aid workers. The aid organizations were forbidden to bring in foreign Korean speakers. Until about 1998, foreign aid workers were confined to hotels even in Pyongyang, the capital, and were not allowed to drive themselves. This began to change as the general atmosphere improved after the June 2000 Inter-Korean Sum-

mit, but restrictions remained in place outside the capital. The committee also laid down the terms on which aid could be monitored, insisting on a week’s notice, but sometimes canceling visits at the last minute. FDRC personnel from both the local and the national level insisted on accompanying all monitoring visits and carefully controlled access to local people.

Such restrictions led some NGOs, including high-profile ones, such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières to pull out. Others stayed. The FDRC claimed that it, too, had problems, with pressures from the Ministry of Health and particularly from the armed forces and security ministries and organiza-

tions; the latter were said to see all foreign aid workers as potential spies. In 2005, the DPRK government announced that the crisis was over and called upon all NGOs to leave. Consequently, the FDRC was formally dissolved in May 2006. However, following the European Union–DPRK negotiations, some EU-based NGOs were allowed to remain, and a new body, the Korean–European Co-operation and Co-ordination Agency, was created to handle relations with them. See also HUMANITARIAN AID.

FOREIGN DEBT. Over several years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has acquired two forms of foreign debt. Either through borrowing or through not paying its bills, it built up negative balances with the Soviet Union, China, and a number of Eastern European countries from 1948 onward. Although communism still prevailed, there was little mention of this indebtedness, but after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the Soviet Union and China apparently began to seek repayment of what by then was estimated to be a total debt to communist countries of some $2 billion.
No settlement has ever been reached and the debt continues to grow. In an attempt to meet one claim in 2010, from the Czech Republic, the DPRK was reported to have offered to pay it in ginseng, but the Czechs refused.

The DPRK also has debts to noncommunist countries, mostly dating back to the attempt to update its industrial base in the late 1960s. Aware that it was beginning to fall behind the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the latter embarked on a major program of industrialization, and faced with equipment that was wearing out, the DPRK went in search of state-of-the-art industrial plant and vehicles, planning to meet the costs through sales of raw materials. However, the 1973 international oil crisis had a negative effect on the markets for such goods and the DPRK was unable to repay its creditors, which included Sweden and Japan. After stalling for some years, it defaulted on its debts to free market countries, the first communist country to do so. In 1979, it was able to renegotiate much of the debt, but the following year, it defaulted on all loans except those from Japan. In 1986, the Japanese declared the DPRK to be in default, and the total debt to noncommunist countries was estimated at over $4 billion. A small amount of this was repaid in 1988, but the DPRK then drew back again, and by 2005, the total DPRK debt was estimated at $12.5 billion, or just under $600 per capita. Although this is a relatively low figure by international standards, it is high given the limited nature of the DPRK’s foreign trade. It may be too low an estimate, since Leonid Petrov of the Australian National University has stated that the debt to Russia alone is approximately $8 billion. Whatever the real amount, it also continues to grow, in the absence of any attempt at renegotiation. It has also increased as a result of debts owed to the ROK. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

FOREIGN POLICY. The foreign policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) owes much to the circumstances of its founding. Foreign policy and foreign affairs are as much Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) matters as they are state responsibilities, and in the case of communist countries, the party has always played the major role. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is staffed by able officials, it does not have a prime role in deciding foreign policy issues, and while the foreign minister is often distinguished, he is essentially a figurehead.

Although it was never the intention that the division of Korea in 1945 should become permanent, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on how to bring about reunification as their relations were increasingly colored by the Cold War, and the U.S. decision to refer the issue to the United Nations led in 1948 to the emergence of two separate states. In the U.S. occupied zone, a nominally capitalist and democratic government
was established with the veteran independence fighter, **Rhee Syngman**, as president of the **Republic of Korea** (ROK). In the northern half, the Soviet Union encouraged the formation of a Marxist-orientated government under the former guerrilla leader **Kim Il Sung**, who became premier of the DPRK. The United Nations declared that the ROK was the “only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula” and withheld recognition from the DPRK. As a result, only the Soviet Union and its allies established **diplomatic relations** with the DPRK after September 1948, and many of these countries did not open embassies in **Pyongyang**. After the foundation of the People’s Republic of **China** (PRC) in October 1949, it too established relations with the DPRK. The DPRK, for its part, followed the Soviet Union in its criticism of noncommunist countries and made no attempt to cultivate them. Some contact was made with communist parties in the West.

The **Korean War** (1950–53) further intensified the DPRK’s relations with communist countries and its isolation from the noncommunist world. Although it claimed that it was the ROK that had started the conflict, outside the communist countries the DPRK was seen as the aggressor. It was condemned by the U.S.-dominated United Nations, which set up the **UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea** (UNCURK). Most noncommunist countries accepted that the establishment of this commission precluded any form of recognition of the DPRK since the United Nations had only recognized one government on the peninsula, and it was assumed that this government would be the beneficiary of any UN-sponsored reunification.

The failure to make progress on reunification at the **Geneva Political Conference** (1954) left both Koreas free to consolidate their respective positions. The DPRK had regular exchanges with the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, but showed little interest in trying to establish links with noncommunist countries during the early 1950s, although Nam Il, then foreign minister, proposed diplomatic relations with **Japan** in 1955, a proposal that fell on very stony ground. The DPRK did begin to join various international bodies in the 1950s, beginning with the International Radio and TV Organization in November 1954. Toward the end of the 1950s, however, as many former colonial territories became independent states, the DPRK moved to establish relations beginning with Algeria in September 1958. During the next 15 years, the DPRK’s formal links with ex-colonial states in Africa and the Middle East steadily expanded. It proved difficult to go beyond this group however, although Indonesia, another ex-colonial territory with a strongly left-wing government, established relations with the DPRK in 1964. The following year, Kim Il Sung visited Indonesia, his first visit to a noncommunist country; it later transpired that he was accompanied by his son, the young **Kim Jong Il**. During these years, the DPRK became an aid-giving country,
with various projects in Africa, some involving military training or the supply of military personnel from the armed forces as bodyguards. Training of foreign students was also undertaken in the DPRK; this continued until the famine in the 1990s brought the program to an end.

Although the late 1950s and early 1960s saw the DPRK expanding its overseas contacts, it established few new embassies, and not many countries opened embassies in Pyongyang. These years also brought a new problem, the growing Sino–Soviet split that began following Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Josef Stalin and his cult of personality in 1956. It would be some years before the DPRK felt the need to take sides publicly on the issue, but from the very beginning it was a difficult one to handle. There were domestic issues as well, as shown by the August 1956 incident when Kim’s own cult of personality was challenged, but it was in foreign relations that the split made the biggest impact. Kim had no desire to antagonize either of the major communist powers. Stalin and the system he had created were major influences on Kim and his approach to government. At the same time, his ties to the PRC were very strong, dating back to the 1930s, and it was the PRC that had saved the DPRK and Kim in the Korean War.

The DPRK avoided taking sides, but in June 1960, the DPRK delegate at a convention in the Romanian capital, Bucharest, took the Chinese position. The following year, there appeared to be a move back toward the Soviet Union. The DPRK signed Mutual Defense Treaties with both countries, and Kim visited the USSR in October–November. This was a short-lived change of position. Following the Soviet decision to back down during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the DPRK adopted a critical position, and it also supported China against Soviet-supported India as those two countries moved toward war over their disputed borders. By the following year, the DPRK seemed to be firmly in the Chinese camp, with the media coming out against the Soviet Union’s position in the dispute. In 1965, however, Alexei Kosygin, then Soviet premier, visited the DPRK, which may have influenced the latter’s move to a more neutral position. The media began to stress the DPRK’s independence of both the USSR and the PRC.

This position shifted somewhat as the PRC began its Cultural Revolution in 1966. During the intense early years, when student Red Guards, encouraged by Mao Zedong, roamed China attacking old ways and old attitudes, criticisms were levied at the DPRK and its leadership, which did not go over well. As early as September 1966, when the Red Guard movement was only a few months old, the DPRK media criticized the Cultural Revolution as “left-wing opportunism,” and relations between the two countries and leaderships grew distinctly cooler. Another cause of tension was the failure of the Soviet
Union and the PRC to unite to assist North Vietnam in its struggle against the United States and South Vietnam. The DPRK sent assistance, including troops, to the Vietnamese, no doubt seeing parallels with its own war against the United States 20 years earlier. Relations with the PRC were not fully restored until the most intensive phase of the Cultural Revolution came to an end in 1971–72.

In other ways, too, the 1970s marked several changes in the DPRK’s foreign policy. As first the Soviet Union and then the PRC moved to improve relations with the United States, the DPRK began to have doubts about their continued support. Not only did this lead to a greater stress on the DPRK’s independence, but it may also have been a factor in the decision to begin a nuclear weapons program. Kim Il Sung began to play an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which was established in Belgrade in 1961. Since one of the leaders was Josef Tito of Yugoslavia, who had been somewhat of a thorn in the flesh of international communism because of his refusal to toe the Soviet line after 1948, communist countries had been inclined to ignore the movement, but now Kim began to use it as a means of asserting the DPRK’s independence. The DPRK formally joined the movement at its conference in Lima in August 1975. The following year, the DPRK joined the Group of 77 (G-77), the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries.

The 1970s also saw advances in diplomatic relations. The DPRK made its first official links with a noncommunist European country in 1971 when it established relations with Malta. Thereafter, the combination of the 1971–72 North–South dialogue, the official end of the ROK’s Hallstein Doctrine, whereby it had broken off diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the DPRK, and the abolition of UNCURK in November 1973, led to a flood of diplomatic activity. The two Koreas now fiercely competed for recognition. The DPRK, being further behind, made up most ground. During 1973, all the Scandinavian countries had established relations. Australia followed in July 1974 and Austria and Switzerland by the end of that year. The following year, Portugal and Thailand were among the countries establishing diplomatic relations. The DPRK also began to join UN organizations: the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in April 1973, followed by the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in 1974. A Permanent Mission to the International Organizations opened in Geneva in 1973, and another to the UN offices in New York in 1975.

In the early 1970s, it even seemed possible that there might be movement on links with the United States. A relatively senior State Department official Morton Abramovitz, on secondment to the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies, wrote in 1971 of “moving the glacier” of DPRK–U.S. relations and of “cross-recognition,” with the United States and Japan establishing
relations with the DPRK and the Soviet Union and China doing so with the ROK. In 1972, Harrison Salisbury and John M. Lee of the New York Times became the first U.S. journalists invited to visit the country since the Korean War.

The year 1975 was particularly active. The North Vietnamese victory in April saw Kim Il Sung and a large delegation visiting China; it was widely assumed that his purpose was to sound out the Chinese on another attempt to reunify Korea by force. If that was the aim, the Chinese were unsupportive. Kim traveled again in May–June, visiting Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Both Koreas conducted campaigns for admission to the United Nations, which culminated in 1975 with the passing of contradictory resolutions. Similar resolutions were introduced in 1976, but developments during that year, including the **ax murders at Panmunjom** in August, led to their withdrawal.

Not surprisingly, in these circumstances, little came of cross-recognition, and the DPRK found that its diplomatic successes often did not lead to much change. As before, few of the countries that established relations actually opened embassies in Pyongyang. Some that did found it a difficult place to work. Western diplomats were rather isolated. Not only were they treated with suspicion by the DPRK authorities, but they were not welcomed by either the communist or third world countries that had hitherto made up the DPRK’s diplomatic community. Sweden had hoped to solve the problem of **foreign debt** but had no success. The Australian embassy remained open only a few months. When Australia did not support the DPRK position at the United Nations, relations soured and eventually the Australians withdrew after being accused of “hooliganism” (some members of the embassy had been seen eating ice cream on the street). The DPRK also withdrew its embassy from Australia, and relations were not normalized until 2001.

There were other problems. The DPRK was short of the hard **currency** necessary to finance its new embassies. Some staff apparently sought to obtain the necessary funds through illegal activities, such as selling duty-free goods or dealing in narcotics. In October 1976, Sweden and Finland expelled DPRK diplomats for engaging in such activities, and there were reports of similar actions elsewhere. DPRK diplomats continue to be caught engaged in such illegal practices, although it has never been clear how far they are officially sanctioned.

The wider international scene at the end of the 1970s was also worrying. In China, the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 removed two leaders who had supported the DPRK. Relations with Beijing were clearly still important, and there were regular exchanges of visits. But as Deng Xiaoping returned to the scene and began a series of reforms and opening up
to the outside world, China looked to be a less reliable ally. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December the same year were matters of concern; if big powers could intervene in one country because they did not like what was happening, that had implications for the DPRK. Further uncertainty was added by the assassination of ROK President Park Chung-hee in October 1979.

There were also domestic changes that may have had a bearing on foreign policy. At the KWP conference in 1980, Kim Jong Il was publicly presented for the first time as his father’s heir, and it was indicated that he would be taking over some of his father’s responsibilities, mostly these related to domestic matters. But there was also speculation in the ROK media and government that what was discerned as a more aggressive approach to North–South issues was because these decisions too were now being handled by the younger Kim, who was eager to prove his worth. While the broad lines of foreign policy continued as before, this new approach to the ROK also had its effect on foreign affairs.

Relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC remained the mainstay of the DPRK’s approach to the outside world. Although in some ways the relationships appeared to be in balance, with the usual regular visits and exchanges at the government and party levels, the reality was that the DPRK leaned somewhat more toward the Soviet Union. Only it could supply the military hardware that the armed forces increasingly demanded. The Soviet Union, at least in the early 1980s, saw the DPRK as a bulwark against U.S. influence in East Asia and was prepared to supply equipment without worrying too much about payment; under the circumstances, this was just as well, since the DPRK remained less than zealous in meeting its debts.

The DPRK had other concerns about both its allies. Since the late 1970s, it had become difficult to avoid the fact that whatever had been the case earlier, now the PRC and the Soviet Union, as well as the Eastern European countries, were increasingly taking an interest in the ROK and its successful development. Contact began in a small way, with invitations to students and other nonofficial groups, but before long, there were also trade contacts. At first these took place though third world countries, or in the case of Sino–ROK links, via Hong Kong, but as the 1980s progressed, trade channels became increasingly more open. The PRC, for example, may have had no official links with the ROK until 1992, but by 1988, the flight information monitors at Beijing International Airport were made by the ROK’s Samsung Company, advertisements for Hyundai were on the baggage trolleys, and Korean Air, which then did not fly to China, had huge billboards outside the airport. Other signs indicated that the relationship was changing. The PRC sent a team to the 1986 Asian Games in the ROK capital, Seoul, despite DPRK protests.
Even more dramatic was the attendance at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Despite DPRK protests, Seoul had been awarded the 1988 Olympics in 1981. Although the DPRK later demanded it should share events, it proved impossible to reach agreement, and, despite the Andaman Sea bombing in 1987, the games went ahead. Only Cuba and Albania among communist countries supported the DPRK call for a boycott of the games.

Both Koreas continued the pursuit of diplomatic relations, but as the DPRK economy faltered and the ROK pulled further ahead, the latter was able to devote more resources to the exercise. The DPRK began to exploit new channels of contact, however, with some success. Having ignored religion and religious groups for years, it began to see them as possible allies internationally. From the late 1970s onward, religious organizations started to appear, and by the end of the 1980s, there were both Protestant and Roman Catholic churches functioning in Pyongyang (but not elsewhere in the country), as well as Buddhist temples, which were more widely distributed. Foreign visitors were taken to these for services, including distinguished figures such as the U.S. evangelist Billy Graham, whose wife had been educated in Pyongyang before 1941. DPRK religious figures began to appear at international meetings. The DPRK also hosted some international events, including the 1989 Pyongyang World Youth Festival, for which sports’ facilities prepared for Olympic events were used, and in 1991 the 85th meeting of the IPU took place in Pyongyang.

But major changes were under way. In February 1989, Hungary became the first communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the ROK. The DPRK, which had sent Kim Il Sung’s son Kim Pyong Il, half brother to Kim Jong Il, as ambassador, reacted with fury to what it described as “a betrayal.” Kim Pyong Il was withdrawn from Budapest and the Hungarian ambassador was expelled from Pyongyang. Relations continued but at a low level. Before long, other Eastern European countries had followed Hungary’s lead and established relations with the ROK, DPRK protests notwithstanding. Worse, from the DPRK’s viewpoint, was the Soviet Union’s decision to go down the same road in 1990. The PRC was also moving in a similar direction. The DPRK supported the PRC hard line during the student demonstrations of 1989 and may have hoped that the crackdown indicated that the period of reform and opening was coming to an end, and that a reversal to more orthodox Marxist–Leninism would lead to continued support for the DPRK. Similarly, in August 1991, when some Soviet hardliners attempted a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, the DPRK came out in support. But it had misjudged in both cases and found itself wrong-footed. The PRC established relations with the ROK in 1992. Before that, both Russia, as the Soviet Union had become again, and China had indicated that they would not oppose the
admission of the ROK on its own to the United Nations. Faced with this prospect, the DPRK also applied and both Korea entered the United Nations on 17 September 1991.

The DPRK’s world was now in turmoil. The end of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR were not only psychological blows but had harsh economic consequences. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the DPRK’s main trading partner, was no more. Russia not only ended “friendship prices” for the DPRK but also demanded the repayment of the large debts that had built up over the years. The PRC too announced that friendship prices were over. Russia also indicated in 1992 that the 1961 mutual defense treaty, which had been renewed automatically in 1991, might be subject to modification so that Russian would not automatically be involved if the DPRK were to start a conflict.

The DPRK had made some attempts to reach out to the capitalist world in the 1980s, with the introduction of a joint venture law. Now it became urgent that its officials acquire new skills to meet the changes that were under way. It turned to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for training and began to sound out countries such as Great Britain and Germany on improving relations. It also sought to normalize relations with Japan and began the first steps toward experimenting with Chinese-style reforms, through the establishment of the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone. All this took place against a backdrop of apparently improving North–South relations.

Also hopeful from the DPRK’s point of view was that it was at last talking directly to the United State. Following the Andaman Sea bombing in 1987, an attempt to dissuade attendance at the 1988 Olympic Games, President Ronald Reagan authorized contact between U.S. diplomats and their DPRK counterparts in the Chinese capital, Beijing. Although the meetings themselves were not very productive, the DPRK was dissuaded from any further terrorist attacks relating to the Olympics. But now a new issue arose that would see U.S.–DPRK contacts increase out of all recognition. From the late 1980s, satellite imagery had begun to raise doubts about what exactly the DPRK was doing at its declared nuclear site at Yongbyon. Growing concern over the DPRK’s nuclear program led the United States to abandon any pretense that it would not talk directly to the DPRK, and from 1991 to 2001, contact between the two countries steadily increased. Although for a time, U.S. concerns seemed likely to lead to conflict, in the end the contacts, which included a visit by former President Jimmy Carter, led to the 1994 Agreed Framework and to the U.S. Missing in Action Recovery Program, as well as opening the door to a wide range of unofficial contacts. U.S. academics, journalists, and even tourists went to the DPRK. U.S. officials, perhaps to their surprise, found that they could do business with North Koreans. The
traffic in the other direction was more limited, but a number of DPRK officials did visit the United States; the most senior of these was Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the number two in the DPRK hierarchy, whose visit in October 2000 was followed by a return visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the DPRK later the same month. When the DPRK appealed for humanitarian aid in the mid-1990s, U.S. official and unofficial assistance flooded into the country. Although the establishment of official representation in each country under the terms of the Agreed Framework failed to materialize, the United States did lift some sanctions that dated back to the Korean War. Under President Bill Clinton, the United States was also supportive of the ROK “Sunshine Policy” toward the DPRK, which began in 1998.

It was not just relations with the United States that improved during this period. The DPRK also began to reach out to other Western countries, seeking both diplomatic recognition and trade and investment. These initiatives at first produced little success; DPRK representatives were, if received at all, treated to harangues about nuclear matters and human rights issues. The appeal for assistance from the mid-1990s affected a change, and a number of European aid groups began to operate on the ground in the DPRK. Since many of these relied on government funding, governments began to be involved as well. Again, increased contact became the norm. Under ROK President Kim Dae-jung, governments friendly to the ROK found themselves encouraged to develop links with the DPRK. This encouragement, and the apparent success of the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il, opened the last remaining barriers to diplomatic relations. The DPRK was also reaching out, with the foreign minister writing to his counterparts in a number of countries suggesting the establishment of relations. By 2004, most countries had done so, with only France, Saudi Arabia, and the Vatican holding out, although the Vatican has maintained some contact with the DPRK since the late 1980s. In 2011, France announced that it would open a cooperation office, headed by a former diplomat, in Pyongyang.

Few countries opened embassies in the DPRK. In a new development, a number of them side-accredited their ambassador in Seoul to Pyongyang, a symbolism that the DPRK did not like but accepted. The DPRK opened some additional embassies, but its economic problems precluded any major expansion. It was also soon obvious that the high hopes the DPRK had about these new links were unlikely to be fulfilled. Although there was still a willingness to provide humanitarian assistance, a certain amount of “donor fatigue” set in as the appeals went on year after year, and it became increasingly more difficult to fund the international appeals. Some countries provided training, but the DPRK expectations were high and the number of qualified people relatively low. There were also problems over priorities. With people going
hungry, for example, not many countries were willing to fund training in architecture, which at first DPRK officials maintained was a priority. Some training programs were set in place in Italy, Australia (which restored relations in 2000), Switzerland, Sweden, and Great Britain, among others. Much of the training was in modern economics and commerce, and many of those sent to partake in the courses proved apt pupils. Great Britain concentrated on language training. There was even some human rights’ training and the beginning of a human rights’ dialogue with the European Union.

But any hopes of major changes quickly foundered on the nuclear issue. Although this was an issue that concerned many countries, it was primarily the United States that took the lead. The change of administrations in 2001 brought to power in the United States a number of people, from President George W. Bush downward, who were profoundly skeptical of the Clinton approach to the DPRK and were hostile to the ROK’s engagement policy and to the Agreed Framework. Rather than continue the existing policy, they set in motion a major review and declined to engage with the DPRK while it was in progress. When the review was completed, it concluded that some form of engagement was the only option. President Bush then indicated he was ready to talk. The DPRK, for its part, noted the offer of talks but declined to engage. It complained of a continued hostile U.S. policy and also demanded to know when the light water reactors, to be built under the Agreed Framework, now some years behind schedule, would be completed. DPRK concerns were heightened by the increasingly U.S. belligerent tone toward Iraq and by the inclusion in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address of the DPRK as one of the members of the “Axis of Evil.” Although the DPRK had promptly condemned the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon and had continued to cooperate on the Missing in Action Recovery Program, it was becoming increasingly concerned at U.S. hostility. Eventually, in the summer of 2002, it looked as though the two sides would begin talking. However, following a naval clash between the two Koreas, the United States postponed the planned meeting.

It was not until October 2002 that it was rescheduled and Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly led a delegation to Pyongyang. This proved not to be the far-reaching dialogue for which the DPRK was hoping. Kelly, who was under very tight instructions, charged the DPRK with engaging in a clandestine highly enriched uranium program as an alternative route to nuclear weapons. He said that this was in breach of the Agreed Framework. The DPRK negotiators at first denied there was such a program, but, according to Kelly and his team, later admitted it. The talks promptly broke up. News of these developments were leaked in the United States soon afterward, and before long, both sides accused each other of having broken the Agreed Frame-
work. By January 2003, the DPRK had left the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, while some work continued for a short time on the light water reactors, the project was effectively dead.

In order to try to solve the issue, in 2003, the PRC brokered the Six Party Talks, bringing together the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia to discuss the nuclear issue. These would continue until 2008, sometimes making progress and sometimes not, but they failed to halt the DPRK’s nuclear weapons’ development, and it carried out tests in 2006 and 2009. The nuclear issue also affected the DPRK’s relations with the rest of the world. Some humanitarian assistance continued, but most other forms of aid dwindled almost to nothing. In the wake of sanctions imposed after its nuclear tests, and with its debts from the 1960s onward still unpaid, the DPRK found it difficult to develop much international trade. Japan, both because of the nuclear issue and abductions, increasingly placed limits on contact between Koreans in Japan and the DPRK, once an important source of revenue. As time went by, the DPRK became more and more dependent on the China for international support and as a source of food and oil. PRC companies also began to dominate trade with the DPRK. There was even rather far-fetched speculation that the PRC might absorb the DPRK as a Chinese province. This seems unlikely, but there is no doubt that the PRC has become the main supporter of the DPRK.

FOREIGN TRADE. Foreign trade has played a relatively small part in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) economic development. This is partly ideological, stemming from the desire to maintain the country’s independence, but it may also have been a consequence of the lack of competent traders and a lack of understanding of how international trade worked. Such trade as there was has been marked by a consistent negative trade balance, relatively few partners, and above all, by a comparatively low volume. An accurate picture is difficult to obtain, since the DPRK does not release trade figures, but from third-party statistics, it appears that for most of its history, the DPRK’s trade has accounted for a steadily declining percentage of the country’s gross national product (GNP). Other characteristics include a heavy dependence on metals and other commodities for export, while importing large quantities of machinery and other equipment, chemicals, and foodstuffs, and a relatively small number of trading partners.

From 1945 until the late 1950s, most of the DPRK’s trade was with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Eastern Europe. The DPRK imported coal, petroleum, and equipment of various sorts and exported ferrous and nonferrous metals, rice, fish, and chemicals. Much of this was barter trade, which, even today, the DPRK still seems to favor. Given the
country’s generally limited hard currency resources, the preference for barter trade was understandable. The late 1950s saw some diversification, with Japan becoming a supplier of modern engineering and electrical equipment, taking DPRK metals and foodstuffs, especially seafood, in return. Although the DPRK’s trading links remained limited compared to other developing countries, they did begin to expand somewhat in the 1960s. The USSR and China continued to dominate, with Japan still the main noncommunist trade partner, but the DPRK bought chemicals, vehicles, and equipment from a number of countries, including Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG—West Germany), in an apparent effort to update its industrial and infrastructural base. As part of its efforts to improve living conditions, it also began to purchase grain from a number of Western countries, including France, Greece, Australia, and Argentina, and rice from Southeast Asia. As a result, it began to build up heavy trade deficits. Eui-Gwak Han notes that the annual trade deficit rose from minus –$40.1 million in 1968 to –$635.9 million in 1974.

It was widely assumed that communist countries did not default on their debts, but in 1976, the DPRK did just that, with all noncommunist countries except Japan. In 1979, it reached an agreement on rescheduling its debt, but again defaulted shortly afterward; this time Japan was also included. In some cases, governments made good the losses, and in most cases, the debt has been traded on so that few of the original claimants are still pursuing claims. But these actions, and the continued refusal of the DPRK government to address the issue seriously, have hampered its attempts to get credit since the 1970s. Trade continues, but companies demand a substantial portion of payment upfront before they will supply goods or services to the DPRK.

From time to time, the DPRK has claimed that it would make an expansion of foreign trade a priority. Such claims were made in 1982, in 1991 with the establishment of the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone, and again in 1993. They were repeated as the DPRK expanded its diplomatic relations in the wake of the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. The reality has been somewhat different. DPRK trade peaked in the late 1980s, at about $5 billion per year. At the beginning of the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of communism in Eastern Europe, and the PRC announcement that it would abandon “friendship prices,” trade plummeted. It was $4.7 billion in 1990, $2.7 billion in 1991, and only $1.5 billion in 1999. In 1990, the main DPRK trade partners had been the USSR, China, and Japan, in that order, but by 2000, the order was China, the ROK (trade was formally allowed first in 1988 but did not really take off until the end of the 1990s), and Japan. In subsequent years, as DPRK–Japanese relations steadily deteriorated over abductions and the nuclear issue, Japan began to drop out of the picture.
There has also been some reduction in trade with the ROK since 2008, when the new administration of President Lee Myung-bak introduced a tougher policy toward the DPRK. Trade still reached $1.68 billion in 2009. However, a total ban on inter-Korea trade, apart from that generated by the Kaesong Industrial Zone, was introduced in May 2010, following the sinking of the ROK frigate Chonan, and North–South trade declined heavily. China remains the DPRK’s main trade partner. In 2010, trade between the two went up by 22 percent, with the balance heavily in China’s favor. Chinese exports to the DPRK reached $2.6 billion, while imports amounted to $1.5 billion. According to the ROK’s Trade–Investment Promotion Agency, some 80 percent of the DPRK’s trade in 2010 was with the PRC. DPRK coal was the largest export item, while imports included fuel (mainly oil and oil products), machinery, and electrical goods. No other trading partner comes anywhere near the volume with the PRC.

Officially, foreign trade in the DPRK is largely conducted through trading companies, which are themselves affiliated to the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), government ministries, or the armed forces. This remains the formal position, although there have been modifications, some planned and some not, since the famine years of the 1990s, and it is now more difficult to argue that all trade is still state controlled. Details of the armed forces trade are unavailable, but it certainly includes weapons and missiles, and there are claims that it includes nuclear materials. The DPRK has also been accused of conducting clandestine trade in forged U.S. currency, cigarettes, and drugs. In particular, the U.S. agencies have periodically claimed that the DPRK produces counterfeit US$100 “super notes,” of which some $45 million are thought to be in circulation, and trades them illegally. Such charges led the U.S. Treasury to take a number of measures in 2005 against the DPRK and foreign organizations that it claimed were assisting in this illegal trade, which had an adverse effect on the Six Party Talks. The measures were lifted in 2007, but the allegations continue to surface, even though a number of commentators and other governments have expressed doubts about the DPRK’s ability to produce counterfeits of the quality detected. In February 2009, the head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime said that there had been no evidence of DPRK engaging in illegal drug transactions since 2002, but that the smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes did continue. See also ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE; BANKING AND FINANCE; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE.

FOUR PARTY TALKS. At a summit meeting on Jeju Island in the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 16 April 1996, United States President Bill Clinton and ROK President Kim Young-sam proposed that there should be
FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH. France is one of a small number of countries that has not formally recognized or established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In common with most Western countries, France recognized only the Republic of Korea when the two Korean states were established in 1948. Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, France sent the frigate La Grandière to Korean waters in support of the United Nations, and on 24 August 1950 agreed to send an infantry battalion of French volunteers. French troops arrived in November 1950 and remained until October 1953, when they left for Indochina. After the end of the Korean War, France’s contact with the DPRK was as limited as those of other Western European countries. However, the DPRK was permitted to establish a trade mission in France in 1968. This was allowed to become a “Délégation générale” in 1984, with quasi-diplomatic status. It is situated at Neuilly-sur-Seine, near Paris. The French Foreign Ministry maintains contact with the Délégation, and French diplomats and other officials occasionally visit the DPRK, mostly in connection with humanitarian aid or training. These contacts were described as “working-level relations” in the French National Assembly in May 2005. French politicians have also visited, and in November 2009, Jack Lang, a former minister, went to the DPRK as President Nicholas Sarkozy’s special envoy. DPRK official visits occasionally take place. Two French nongovernmental organizations have worked in the DPRK since the flooding of the 1990s: Triangle Génération Humanitaire from 1998 and Première Urgence from 2002. France also
provides some language training as well as allowing DPRK architectural students to study in the country. There is some modest trade.

France and the DPRK have had discussions on the establishment of diplomatic relations on at least two occasions since 2000, without coming to an agreement. The French government cites the nuclear program and missile issues, and the DPRK’s poor human rights record as reasons for not taking the issue further. In 2011, France announced that it was establishing a cooperation office in the DPRK, to be headed by a former diplomat, from September 2011, but there was no mention of diplomatic relations. See also EUROPEAN UNION, RELATIONS WITH; FOREIGN TRADE.

FRIDAY LABOR. Since the 1970s, all party and government workers in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are expected to spend Fridays working at construction sites or on collective farms, depending on the season. This means, for example, that officials in the Foreign Ministry and other government departments will not normally see resident diplomats or staff of international organizations on that day. The work can be demanding, and all ranks, including ministers and vice ministers, are expected to participate. Monuments constructed by such labor include the Unification Arch, which marks the road south from Pyongyang to Panmunjom, erected by Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in 2000–2.

FUJIMOTO KENJI. Fujimoto Kenji is the pen name of a Japanese who has published three books in which he claims that he worked in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1998 until 2001 as the personal sushi chef to then DPRK leader Kim Jong II. Since the first book appeared in 2003, Fujimoto has become widely quoted as the expert on Kim Jong II’s apparent dissolute life, fondness for good food and drink, and style of work. He wrote that he first visited the DPRK in 1982 and was then recruited on a salary of around $70,000 in 1988. He claimed to have spent much time with Kim Jong II and to have known his family, especially his three sons. Many of the stories about these three, Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Chul, and Kim Jong Un, are based on his accounts. He was thus much sought after in the frenzy of speculation about a possible successor that began after Kim Jong II’s apparent illness in autumn 2008. Following Kim Jong II’s death in December 2011, Fujimoto seems to have been less in demand, although he gave an interview to one Republic of Korea television station, in which he said that Kim Jong Un, the chosen successor, would probably introduce economic reforms similar to those in China.

Kim Jong II was also reported to have recruited two Italian pizza chefs for a brief period in 1997. Although they were asked to train Kim’s own chefs, they appear not to have met him personally.
GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN (in Japanese, Zainichi chosenjin sorenggokai, abbreviated to Chosen soren; in Korean, Chae ilbon chosonin ch’ongyonhaphoe, abbreviated to Chongnyon).

This pro-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) organization in Japan is generally known outside the Korean Peninsula by the Japanese reading of the abbreviated version of its title, Chosen soren. It dates from 1955; earlier pro-DPRK groups had been closed down either by the United States occupation forces or by the Japanese government after 1952. It is thought to have between 150,000 and 200,000 members. Chosen soren plays a dual role. Because the DPRK has no diplomatic relations or official presence in Japan, Chosen soren has tried to act as an unofficial channel between the governments of the two countries. It is also a pressure group for Korean interests in Japan and runs schools and a private university, which follow the DPRK educational curriculum. It publishes the Japanese-language Chosen Shinpo and the English-language People’s Korea. During the 1950s, it encouraged Koreans to resettle in the DPRK; many found themselves discriminated against and they were forced to break off contacts with family members still in Japan.

Chosen soren has been a major economic supporter of the DPRK over the years. It runs joint venture companies in the DPRK, for example, but probably its most important role has been in supplying funds to the DPRK, derived from its various business interests, including the running of pachinko (a form of pinball machine) rooms, found all over Japan. Estimates vary of the amount of remittances sent annually, from $400 million to $2 billion, but remittances have fallen off since the 1960s and 1970s, as members dropped out of the association. Some were disillusioned by the reports that filtered back about the hardships experienced by Koreans who had returned to the DPRK at the end of the 1950s, while others found the attractions of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its economic successes more appealing. Although the ROK has welcomed the declining influence of Chosen soren, it has been concerned that some of those coming to the country are in fact spying for the DPRK. In recent years, the Japanese government has curbed some Chosen soren activities because of concern over issues such as the nuclear program and the abduction issue; its regular ferry service between Niigata
and Wonsan has been stopped, for example. Chosen soren also faces a problem as younger Koreans desert it either because its education is thought to be of little use in modern Japan or because they no longer see themselves linked with the DPRK. See also FOREIGN TRADE.

GENERAL SHERMAN AFFAIR. In the summer of 1866, the SS General Sherman, a United States armed merchant vessel leased to a British company, sailed from the China coast to Korea in an attempt to open trade. Among those on board was a Welsh missionary, the Rev. Robert Thomas. The ship attempted to reach Pyongyang but ran aground on a sandbank in the Taedong River. The local authorities demanded that the ship leave as soon as possible, saying they could not negotiate with foreigners, but Thomas and others went ashore. Thomas distributed Bibles and religious tracts, while his companions appear to have taken food and water without payment and to have captured women to take to the ship. These actions led local people to attack the ship, which was set on fire and all on board were killed. A U.S. punitive expedition in 1871 inflicted heavy casualties on Korean troops on Kanghwa Island at the mouth of the Taedong but was unable to reach Pyongyang.

This event has become an important feature in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea historiography, where it is depicted as a deliberate move by “American imperialists” to subdue Korea. (This view of the incident is not unknown in the Republic of Korea as well.) A monument in modern Pyongyang now marks the spot where the attack is supposed to have occurred; in 1999, the Pueblo, a U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel captured in 1968, was moved from Wonsan on the east coast to Pyongyang, and moored near the General Sherman monument. In addition, in Kim Il Sung’s later years, his biographers claimed that his great grandfather, who lived on the outskirts of Pyongyang, had led the 1866 attack on the General Sherman. No evidence exists for this claim.

GENEVA POLITICAL CONFERENCE (1954). Article 4 of the July 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the Korean War (1950–53), called for a conference of governments to settle the political issues that had not been addressed by the armistice negotiators. These included the withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula and “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.” A conference of 19 nations was held from 26 April–20 June 1954 at Geneva to deal not only with these issues arising from the conflicts in Korea, but also with issues arising from the Indochina war, which had then reached a critical phase. In the event, Indochina tended to overshadow matters relating to Korea. In addition to the 16 nations that had fought on the United Nations side in the Korean War and the Republic of Korea (ROK),
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), China, and the Soviet Union participated in the Korean part of the conference. The conference reached agreement on the Vietnam problem by dividing Vietnam into two, but failed to reach agreement on the Korean issue. The DPRK and the ROK tabled mutually incompatible proposals to bring about a peaceful unification of Korea, and their respective supporters proved unwilling to press the issue to a conclusion. Following the conference, those countries that had fought in the Korean War issued the Sixteen Nations Declaration on Korea. This stated that the United Nations was fully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, to extend its good offices, and to seek a peaceful settlement in Korea. The declaration also said that genuinely free elections should be held in Korea under UN supervision to unify the country. The declaration has never been invoked. An ROK attempt to do so at the time of the Pueblo incident in 1968 met with no response.

GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR—East Germany) established diplomatic relations in 1949. During the Korean War (1950–53) and the postwar period, the GDR provided assistance to the DPRK in a number of ways, including a major involvement in the reconstruction of the city of Hamhung. Later, the DPRK embassy in East Berlin, on the site of the historic Kaiserhof Hotel, which was bombed in World War II, was important to the DPRK as a monitoring post for European developments. The government of the rival Republic of Korea (ROK) claimed that it was also a base for espionage and subversive activities. There were no relations between the DPRK and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG—West Germany).

After German reunification in 1990, most DPRK embassy staff withdrew from Berlin, although a small number remained as a DPRK “interests section.” In the DPRK capital, Pyongyang, the former GDR embassy compound housed a small group of German diplomats who were officially the “German Interests Section” of the Swedish embassy until the establishment of DPRK–Germany diplomatic relations in March 2001. The compound then again became the German embassy. In 2011 it housed offices for the embassies of Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, and residential accommodation for the first two, and the French cooperation office.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Germany has provided economic assistance and training to the DPRK. In 2004, the German cultural body, the Goethe Institute, announced that it had reached agreement with the DPRK authorities on the establishment of a reading room in Pyongyang. Ordinary North Koreans were in theory to have access to the resources of the reading room, which was to include Internet facilities and several thousand
books. Goethe Institute staff also thought that they would be allowed access to the DPRK’s intranet as a means of spreading information about Germany and German culture in the DPRK. In 2009, however, the head of the Goethe Institute in Seoul said that the Pyongyang reading room had never been able to function properly. Its main entrance was often locked, and access to the rear entrance was obstructed by a permanent building site. Internet and intranet access had never been permitted. The reading room therefore closed in 2010 and it is no longer listed on the Goethe Institute’s website. See also EAST BERLIN CASE; YUN I-SANG.

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA (Chosen Sotofuku). Following Japan’s annexation of Korea in August 1910, a Government-General was established in Seoul to run the new colony. All but one of the governors-general between 1910 and 1945 were Japanese army generals; the exception was an admiral appointed after the Samil Undong (1 March 1919) uprising. The Japanese emperor appointed the governors-generals and they were directly responsible to him and to the Japanese prime minister. The governor-general exercised military power and could mobilize Japanese armed forces in Korea. He appointed provincial governors and police superintendents. Japanese held all senior posts in the Government-General. An advisory council included Koreans, but this had neither power nor influence. The Government-General was abolished after Japan’s defeat in 1945, but elements of its structure and methods survived in both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. See also MANCHURIA.

GRAHAM, WILLIAM FRANKLIN (BILLY), JR. (1918– ). Billy Graham is probably the most prominent Christian evangelical leader in the world. Born in North Carolina in the United States, Graham studied theology and anthropology, graduating in 1943. That same year he married Ruth Bell (1920–2007), the daughter of U.S. missionaries working in China and the granddaughter of Eugene Bell; like many other such children, she had been educated at the missionary-run Foreign School in Pyongyang, now the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Graham began what became his characteristic mass rallies or “crusades” with a series of tented meetings in 1949 and acquired an international reputation during the 1950s and 1960s as he used the same techniques at meetings around the world. He first visited the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the Korean War (1950–53), when he preached to soldiers and had visited hospitals and medical units. He returned in 1973, and preached to over a million people in the capital, Seoul.

In 1992, Graham visited the DPRK and met with President Kim Il Sung. He made a second visit in 1994 and again met Kim, who died that same
year. Graham, who had a reputation as a firm anticommunist, said after his visits that Kim Il Sung was a “different kind of communist,” and that he had conducted a patriotic war against the Japanese. During his 1992 visit, Graham was the first American to preach at the Protestant Bongsu Church in Pyongyang, which he did again in 1994. On both occasions he also addressed students and faculty members at Kim Il Sung University. Ruth Graham visited Pyongyang separately in 1997, the first occasion she had returned to the city since her school days.

Billy Graham has not returned to the DPRK since the 1994 visit, but his son and designated successor, Franklin Graham, went in 2000, 2008, and 2009. In addition to his work with Graham’s foundation, Franklin Graham is the president of the charitable organization Samaritan’s Purse, which describes itself as “a non-denominational evangelical Christian organization providing spiritual and physical aid to hurting people around the world,” and which has been providing humanitarian aid to the DPRK since the famine of the mid-1990s. Samaritan’s Purse has moved from food aid into medical and dental assistance and has also been involved with the rehabilitation of hospital facilities. Like his father, Franklin has preached in the Bongsu Church. On his most recent visits, Franklin Graham has been accompanied by Dr. John Linton, brother of Dr. Stephen Linton, head of the Eugene Bell Foundation, and a distant cousin. Neither of the Grahams appears to have expressed any public views about the status of religion in the DPRK.

GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH. Great Britain took an interest in Korea in the 19th century mainly because of the peninsula’s strategic importance, but Korea was never a primary concern. Britain’s main focus was on China and Japan, and the 1902 Anglo–Japanese Alliance effectively allowed Japan a free hand in Korea. Britain maintained a consulate-general in Seoul, and a handful of Britons lived in Korea as traders and missionaries until the late 1930s, but generally British interest in Korea remained minimal. Britain played a minor role in the World War II discussions of Korea’s future and was a party to the 1943 Cairo Agreement and subsequent declarations, but took no part in the postwar occupation of Korea. Following the 1948 elections in South Korea, Britain recognized the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK), establishing diplomatic relations in 1949.

After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Britain responded to the United Nations call for assistance for the ROK, despite heavy imperial commitments elsewhere, including the anticommunist emergency in Malaya. The Royal Navy was quickly in operation off the coast of Korea, and the first ground troops arrived at the end of August 1950. The Royal Air Force played a small part. In 1951, British ground forces became part of the First Com-
monwealth Division. British troops remained in the ROK until 1957, and a British general, representing the Commonwealth Forces, sat on the Military Armistice Commission. Britain played a role in ROK postwar reconstruction and was a firm supporter internationally, especially at the United Nations.

There were few British contacts with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the war. Some trade developed, and a DPRK team took part in the 1966 Soccer World Cup in Britain. Britain refused, however, to establish any form of official relations with the DPRK or to recognize its existence. (This had as much to do with the question of recognition of the German Democratic Republic as it did with the DPRK.) Legal obstacles to British recognition of the DPRK were removed with the abolition of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea in 1973, and at one point, Britain was close to recognizing the DPRK. However, the moment passed and Britain did not formally recognize the existence of the DPRK until the two Koreas entered the United Nations in 1991. That same year saw the first official British visit to the DPRK, when two officials accompanied a parliamentary delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Pyongyang. During the 1990s, there were occasional meetings between DPRK and British officials but little substantive change in relations.

This changed when Kim Dae-jung became ROK president in 1998. Unlike his predecessors, he encouraged countries supporting the ROK to develop links with the DPRK. Britain was at first reluctant to do so, although the political dialogue continued and a few officials visited the DPRK. One such visit in the spring of 2000 led to a British government-funded English-language training program in the DPRK, initially with two British teachers attached to Kim Il Sung University and to the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. Their main task was to provide training for teachers of English, but they also had some involvement with teaching students. Later, the numbers increased to four teachers at three universities and was combined with a regular program of short-term English-language training in Britain for DPRK officials.

On 12 December 2000, Britain and the DPRK reached agreement in London on the establishment of diplomatic relations with immediate effect. James Hoare (1943– ) became the first chargé d’affaires in January 2001, responsible for establishing an embassy in Pyongyang. The original intention was that he would be a member of the British Embassy in Seoul, but following a visit to Pyongyang in March 2001 by the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Sir John Kerr (now Baron Kerr of Kinlochard), it was decided that Britain’s representative would be resident in Pyongyang from May 2001. The British embassy formally opened in Pyongyang in July 2001. Initially, it had two diplomatic staff members, later
raised to four. Hoare left Pyongyang in October 2002 and, after a short hiatus as a result of the October 2002 James Kelly visit, was succeeded by David Slinn (1959– ), who arrived as ambassador in December 2002. Since then, there have been three further ambassadors. In May 2011, British Foreign Secretary William Hague announced that an additional British officer would be appointed to the embassy in due course. There are plans to increase the language-training program.

A DPRK embassy opened in London in 2003, with Ri Yong Ho (2), now (2012) vice minister for foreign affairs, as the first ambassador. He was replaced by Ja Song Nam in October 2007, who in turn was replaced by Hyon Hak Bong in December 2011. DPRK ambassadors to Great Britain have also been accredited to the European Union and to Republic of Ireland since the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 2004. In October 2004, a British–North Korea All-Party Parliamentary Group was established, with Lord Alton of Liverpool as chair and Baroness Cox of Queensbury as vice chair. Both have made regular visits to the DPRK. There is also a DPRK–Great Britain Parliamentary Group, headed by Ambassador Ri Jong Hyok. The only ministerial visit from Great Britain to the DPRK since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2000 was that by the then Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, Bill Rammell, in September 2004. The highest ranking DPRK visitor to Great Britain has been the president of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Choe Tae Bok.

GREATER Tumen Initiative. A plan to develop and exploit the resources of northeast Asia, which began life as the Tumen River Development Project in 1991. The present name was adopted in 2005. The project emerged from a conference held under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and was named after the Tumen River, which forms the northeastern border between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the DPRK, and Russia. In addition to these three countries, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan also attended. Japan, which was expected to provide the main financial underpinning of the project, soon lost interest and has taken no further part in the proceedings. The other countries continued to meet. In the first phase of the project from 1991 to 1996, work began on developing special economic zones in the area where the PRC, DPRK, and Russian borders come together. The area was widely regarded as one of great opportunities, with an abundance of oil, gas, and minerals, in addition to timber and other natural products.

The DPRK’s contribution was to establish the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone in 1991. The PRC also began to develop a special economic
zone in 1992 around Hunchun, just across the Tumen River from the DPRK. In December 1995, the participating countries signed various formal agreements on the project. However, by then there were signs that the project was in trouble. The abundant natural resources were not matched by suitable transport or other infrastructure. The onset of economic difficulties in the DPRK, publicly admitted with an appeal for international assistance, and the failure of Rajin–Sonbong to attract the expected levels of investment made progress difficult.

Although formally the period from 1997 to 2000 was described as one of building up the project, little happened. The next phase, which began in 2001, was supposed to see the development of the region’s infrastructure, but again little happened. In the DPRK’s case, Rajin–Sonbong seemed to go backward, and for a time seemed likely to be eclipsed by the Shinuiju Special Administrative Region. Even when that collapsed, following the arrest of its first chief executive, Rajin–Sonbong continued to fail to live up to expectations. In 2005, the countries involved met at Changchun in the PRC and adopted the Changchun Agreements. These included the change of name from the Tumen River Development Project to the Greater Tumen Initiative. More important was a decision that the countries involved would take over the project from UNDP. The latter would, however, continue to play a supporting role. The Changchun meeting also adopted a strategic action plan, under which the member states would concentrate on the development of transport, energy, tourism, and investment, with environmental issues as an overarching theme. Since then there have been several meetings of the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission. The DPRK’s involvement appears to have become somewhat spasmodic in recent years, and it was not present at the 10th meeting of the Consultative Commission held in the Mongolian capital, Ulaanbaatar, in March 2009. At this meeting, the other members stressed the importance of DPRK participation. There seems to have been no DPRK response.

While the project remains formally in existence, with a secretariat in Beijing, its prospects do not look good. The remoteness of the area, the lack of any substantial outside investment, and border and political tensions among the participants all speak against it.
HAEJU. Haeju city, on the Ongjin peninsula, is the administrative center of South Hwanghae Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is the only port on the west coast of the DPRK that remains ice free throughout the year. The city’s population was estimated at 236,000 in 2000. Although always somewhat out of the mainstream of modern Korean development in the Japanese colonial period, being to one side of the main North–South road and rail axis, since the end of the Korean War it has played an important role in DPRK trade with China. As well as being a commercial port, Haeju is important as the nearest DPRK naval base to the demilitarized zone. It has extensive naval repair facilities and chemical and cement industries. There is a teacher training institute, the Haeju University of Education, and the area has a number of scenic and historic sites. Claims and counterclaims about the origins of the Korean War have often centered on an alleged Republic of Korea (ROK) attack on Haeju on 25 June 1950, to which DPRK forces responded. At the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit, then ROK President Roh Moo-hyun and then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il agreed that Haeju should be developed as a special economic zone with ROK assistance, along the lines of the Kaesong Industrial Zone. Nothing had been done to implement this proposal by the time Roh left office early in 2008, and his successor, Lee Myung-bak, has shown no interest in the project. See also FOREIGN TRADE; TRANSPORT.

HAMHUNG. Capital of South Hamgyong Province, Hamhung is located on the east coast about 113 kilometers (70 miles) north of Wonsan and 185 kilometers (115 miles) northeast of Pyongyang. Hamhung competes with Nampo for the title of second-largest city in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Its origin dates from the 12th century. It has been a major industrial center since the Japanese colonial period and has a population of about 750,000. The founder of the Chosun dynasty, which ruled Korea from 1392 to 1910, Yi Taejo (Yi Songgye) was born here in 1335. It was the scene of heavy fighting during the Korean War (1950–53), when it was twice occupied by United Nations and Republic of Korea (ROK) troops. The city suffered much destruction, and it was largely rebuilt.
with assistance from the German Democratic Republic, a fact now rarely acknowledged in the DPRK.

The city’s chemical industry utilizes the abundant limestone, anthracite, and other minerals in the area. It is the site of the 8 February Complex, which produces a chemical fiber, vinalon, developed in the early years of the DPRK, when clothing material was in short supply. The Hungnam Fertilizer Complex is the country’s biggest fertilizer producer. It is also believed to be the DPRK’s main producer of chemical weapons. Machinery and textiles are also important. Hamhung has a branch of the DPRK Academy of Sciences, with a number of laboratories, pilot plants, and factories producing experimental appliances. It is the site of the country’s main orthopedic hospital. The city suffered badly as a result of the economic difficulties in the 1990s. The nearby beach resort at Majon is popular, and new facilities were opened in 2009. The following year Hamhung was formally opened to foreign tourism. A further sign of its importance was the announcement in 2009 that the Hamhung Martyrs’ Cemetery had been built in the city to bury the bodies of “local people of merit.”

HAN DUK SU (1907–2001). Head of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (generally known by the Japanese reading of the short-
ened form of its title as Chosen soren) from its foundation in 1955 until his
death in Tokyo in February 2001. Han was born in North Kyongsang Prov-
ince in February 1907 and moved to Japan in 1927. He was active among
Korean workers in Japan and was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned. After
the end of World War II in 1945, he was one of the organizers of the Gen-
eral Federation of Koreans in Japan, which became Chosen soren in 1955,
and then became its director. Under him, the organization became closely
linked with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and with
its leader Kim Il Sung. Han was a member of the Democratic Front for
the Reunification of the Fatherland from 1949 and was a delegate to the
Supreme People’s Assembly from 1967 onward. He was also rector of the
DPRK-funded Korean University in Tokyo. He was often received by both
Kim Il Sung and his son and successor Kim Jong Il, and he received many
DPRK medals and awards.

HAN SO RYA (1900–1976). Han So Rya (usually romanized as Han Solya
in the Republic of Korea) was a novelist and the first official biographer
of Kim Il Sung, leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK). Han came from a rich peasant background and was active in anti-
Japanese groups as a teenager. He took part in the 1919 Samil Undong dem-
onstrations and served a short period in prison for his activities. In the 1920s,
he was a member of the Korean Proletarian Artists’ Federation (KPAF),
where he mixed with other young radicals; Han, like the other writers in the
group, wrote of poverty, exploitation, and revenge and the lives of ordinary
people. The KPAF waxed and waned under Japanese pressure. Han was ar-
rested with other members in 1934 and spent two years in jail. He published
several novels on his release and continued to be active in the underground
movements. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, he emerged as the president
of the central committee of the North Korean Association for Literature and
the Arts, a communist front organization. He was close to Kim Il Sung, who
apparently called him “teacher,” and he figured prominently in both Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP) and state hierarchies, becoming minister of education
after the establishment of the DPRK in September 1948. During this
period, he wrote several eulogistic accounts of Kim Il Sung’s career. He was
one of the few artists to survive the political purges after the Korean War,
and he continued to flourish during the 1950s.

Just as he seemed to be at the height of his career, with the publication of
an English translation of his major biography of Kim Il Sung, Hero General
Kim Il Sung in 1962, he came under attack from within the KWP. He was
accused of coming from a pro-Japanese family, of having engaged in immor-
ality, and various other offenses. He lost all his posts and had his properties
confiscated. Since that time, he was listed as ranking 29th in the party’s Central Committee, an attack that must have been sanctioned personally by Kim Il Sung. Han and his writings disappeared from view. He reappeared in 1969, though in a much lower position in the hierarchy, but then disappeared again, possibly because of illness. He is buried in the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang, which indicates that he remained in favor until his death.

Han’s writing often strikes outsiders as rather turgid, with stock characters, especially villainous missionaries. Some of his shorter works are available in translation. They include the 1951 novel Jackals, which is a bitter attack on American missionaries in Korea. It has also been made into a film in the DPRK.

**HEALTH.** According to official Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accounts, the first moves toward a system of universal health care were made in 1947, with the introduction of a health insurance scheme for office and factory workers. It is claimed that even during the Korean War (1950–53), the system was extended to the whole country in 1952. Health care was to be free, provided by a system of hospitals and clinics that would reach down to the smallest village. Specialist provision would be available in the provincial capitals, in the capital, Pyongyang, and one or two other centers. The national orthopedic hospital was in Hamhung, for example. In each county, there would be a general hospital, and below that a series of polyclinics. A small clinic would be the lowest level, possibly staffed by a part-time paramedic or first aider. These arrangements were similar to those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and medical staff from these areas played an important role in getting the system established. DPRK medical staff were sent to these counties for both initial and postgraduate training. DPRK officials told one visiting journalist in 2000 that there were 616 general hospitals, 13 tuberculosis (TB) institutions, and 60 sanatoria, with 10,000 beds for a population of about 22 million. Below that, there were clinics in 212 counties and in 4,700 ri (villages). Although there was always an element of discrimination in the system, with those living in Pyongyang being especially favored, the general consensus is that medical provision in the DPRK was good compared to many other countries. Medical staff maintained high standards and were aware of developments in medicine and health care elsewhere in the world until the 1970s. A strong emphasis was placed on preventative medicine, with extensive vaccination campaigns, and there was much progress in controlling and even eliminating some diseases.

As economic problems mounted in the 1970s, the medical provisions became less effective. From the mid-1970s, the state ceased to supply funds
for foreign medical journals, and DPRK medical staff rarely went overseas for training. DPRK doctors became increasingly out of touch with contemporary medical developments. The system continued to cope, and some new facilities appeared; the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital dates from 1980, for example. But the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies hit the health services badly, and the deterioration continued for the rest of the decade. Factories ceased to produce medicines, and the government did not allocate funds for purchases on the international market. As the economy deteriorated, the situation got worse. Lack of drugs saw the reemergence of TB, measles, and malaria. The famine and food shortages led to malnutrition and intestinal illnesses. Hospitals lacked elementary provisions such as bandages, surgical instruments, and anesthetics. In the absence of drugs, many hospitals turned to traditional or Koryo medicine, but staff admitted that it was not very effective in acute cases. Doctors may have continued to offer free diagnoses but demanded payment for such few medicines as were available.

Shortages of power meant no electricity or water for long periods; water was also increasingly contaminated, which added to intestinal illnesses. During the winter months, sometimes only one hospital in an area would function, in order to economize on heating and lighting. Unless absolutely necessary, the sick avoided hospitals. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which provided assistance from the late 1990s, estimated that only 15 to 20 percent of hospital beds were in use in the winter; DPRK officials claimed it was 50 percent but agreed that people tried to avoid hospitals. There were widespread reports of payment being demanded even when provision was supposed to be free. Humanitarian aid went some way to alleviate the situation. But aid agencies were often frustrated. Médecins Sans Frontières, the first medical charity to come to the DPRK’s assistance, quickly pulled out. Others, such as the Eugene Bell Foundation and the IFRC, stayed despite the difficulties.

From about 2002, the situation began to improve. That year, the government allocated increased funds for health care, and a year or two later, domestically produced drugs began to reappear. This investment in the health service continues, and improvements in the areas such as the supply of electricity have had an effect. There are still distortions, with a high proportion of funds going to Pyongyang, while other areas suffer shortages. Medical practices remain behind advanced countries but are probably still better than many third world countries. There are also curious priorities; thus much attention is still focused on the care of triplets who are always taken into state care.
“HERMIT KINGDOM.” A term much used by journalists, politicians, and some academics to describe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) because of its alleged isolation and supposed lack of understanding of the modern world. Although the term is often used as though it derived from Korean usage, it in fact comes from a book by the United States missionary and educator W. G. Griffiths (1843–1928), who in 1882 published Corea: The Hermit Nation. The book enjoyed considerable popularity in the 19th century when there were relatively few books available about Korea. Griffiths, who lived and worked in Japan, rarely visited Korea and did not speak Korean, yet the book was seen as giving an accurate account of Korea and its people. The reality was that Korea was never entirely cut off from the outside world, and neither is the DPRK, although it may be highly selective in the contacts it chooses to make. See also FOREIGN POLICY.

HILL, CHRISTOPHER (1952– ). From 2005 until 2009, Christopher Hill, a career United States diplomat, was head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party Talks, aimed at settling the second nuclear crisis with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Hill, the son of a diplomat, served in the U.S. Peace Corps in Cameroon and joined the Foreign Service in 1977. His first experience of Korean affairs was in the U.S. embassy to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the 1980s. He later worked in the Balkans and was U.S. ambassador to Macedonia from 1996 to 1999 and to Poland from 2000 to 2004. In 2004, he was appointed ambassador to Seoul, but the following year, became assistant secretary of state for East Asia, responsible, inter alia, for the Six Party Talks. With the support of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the apparent acquiescence of President George W. Bush, Hill was tireless in his efforts to make the talks work and was widely credited with having brokered the September 2005 agreement, which seemed to mark a breakthrough. Although that agreement immediately ran into difficulties, leading to the first DPRK nuclear test in October 2006, Hill continued apparently undaunted, achieving a second breakthrough in 2007, after making the first senior level U.S. visit to the DPRK in five years. But new difficulties arose at regular intervals, and Hill was denied the success for which he worked hard. After the change of U.S administrations in 2009, Hill became ambassador to Iraq. In 2011, after his retirement, Hill said that he thought the DPRK could not be trusted and that it had probably not been sincere in negotiations. See also BOSWORTH, STEPHEN WARREN; KARTMAN, CHARLES.

HO KAI I (1908–1953). One of the leading Soviet Koreans, who played a major role in the establishment of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). Vari-
ous dates are given for his date and place of birth, but the Russian scholar Andrei Lankov has established that he was born Aleksi Ivanovich Hegai in Khabarovsk in 1908. Nothing is known of how his family came to be in the Soviet Far East, although it is known that his father was a teacher in a Korean school. Both his parents died in 1911, and he was brought up by an uncle. He joined the Soviet Communist Youth League in 1924 and soon became an official of the league. In 1934, he attended an agricultural university in Moscow for a brief period but had to leave in order to support his wife and children. By the late 1930s, Ho was one of the leading party cadres in the Soviet Far East. However, he lost his position during the purges and moved to Soviet Central Asia. Although rehabilitated, he did not regain his former status.

Following the defeat of Japan in August 1945, he was conscripted to serve in Korea, where he moved in November 1945. Although most of his fellow conscripts worked as interpreters or translators, Ho was engaged in building up the Korean Communist Party, because of his administrative background, and later played a role in the emergence of the KWP. By September 1948, he was the first deputy secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party, ranking behind Kim Tu Bong and Kim Il Sung. When the KWP was formed the following year, he was the first secretary of the central committee, second only to Kim Il Sung, and mainly engaged in party building. His first wife died in 1947, and in 1949 he married Nina Tsoi, a daughter of Piotr Ivanovich Tsoi, a Soviet army officer of Korean origin who had survived the Stalinist purges and who in 1948 was posted as a military advisor to the newly established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Along with a general decline in Soviet influence during the Korean War (1950–53), Ho’s position weakened. In late 1950, he was tasked with carrying out an inquiry into KWP members who had remained in the DPRK during the brief United Nations’ occupation. He ran this strictly, following Soviet precedents, and many people lost their party membership. At a party plenum in November 1951, Kim Il Sung accused Ho of being too doctrinaire in his approach and sacked him. The real reason for the confrontation seems to have been the clash between Kim’s belief in a mass party and Ho’s in an elitist, industrial worker–based party. He lost his party positions, although he remained a deputy premier. As the Korean War drew to an end in 1953, Ho was again investigated, and it was reported that he had committed suicide on 2 July 1953. His fall marked the effective end of Soviet Korean influence in the DPRK. See also NAM IL; PAK HON YONG.

HO TAM (1929–1991). Ho Tam (also Ho Dam) was for many years the diplomatic face of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He was also related by marriage to DPRK leader Kim Il Sung. Ho was
educated at Moscow University from 1949 to 1954 and joined the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) on his return to the DPRK. He later served as a section chief of the KWP’s International Department. In 1962, he became deputy foreign minister and in 1970 foreign minister. In 1977, he added the post of deputy prime minister to that of foreign minister and held these two posts until December 1983. During this period, he became the first DPRK minister to visit the United States, when President Jimmy Carter’s administration granted him a visa to attend the Non-Aligned Movement conference in New York in 1977. Ho also progressed in the KWP, becoming an alternate member of the Politburo in 1977 and a full member in 1983. On leaving the Foreign Ministry, Ho became head of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, a KWP united front body that handled relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK). In this capacity, he met ROK visitors such as Chung Ju-yung, the head of Hyundai, and the dissident Rev. Moon I-kwan. Ho’s other posts included secretary of the KWP International Committee and chair of the Supreme People’s Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee; he was first elected to the assembly in 1972. He died in May 1991. See also FOREIGN POLICY.

HOLIDAYS. Holidays in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be divided into three main groups. In order of importance they are political holidays, especially those associated with Kim Il Sung and his family, traditional Korean holidays, and professional holidays such as Teachers’ Day. An additional holiday, combining features of the first and second groups, is the Western New Year, celebrated on 1–2 January.

Until the end of 2011, the political holiday year began with Kim Jong Il’s birthday on 16 February. Following Kim’s death in December 2011 and the succession of his son Kim Jong Un, there was widespread speculation that his birthday on 8 January would become equally important, but in January 2012, it was a low-key affair, understandable so soon after his father’s death, which provided no clues as to how it will be marked in future. Up until 2012, people had two days off to mark 16 February. Given that it falls in the middle of winter, there were no outdoor displays for this occasion, but there were concert and other performances in Kim’s honor. The next event, Kim Il Sung’s birthday on 15 April, is presented as the major holiday of the year and is again spread over two days. The weather is better in April and many events take place outdoors. Since the 1980s, Kim Il Sung’s birthday is also marked by an International Music and Dance Festival, during which a variety of foreign groups perform in the capital, Pyongyang. Chinese performers and those from the former Soviet Union are usually well represented, but they are by no means the only ones to take part. The DPRK media regularly report that
celebrations in honor of this occasion have taken place in many countries; the real extent of such celebrations is probably limited. Army Day on 25 April has become more important since the introduction of the songun (“Army First” policy) in 1996. It is marked by military parades and declarations of solidarity between the people and the armed forces. Victory Day on 27 July, the anniversary of the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, marks the “victory” in the Korean War (1950–53). Liberation Day on 15 August marks the end of World War II and the end of the Japanese colonial period; it is the only formal holiday that both Koreas celebrate. State Foundation Day falls on 9 September, followed by Party Foundation Day on 10 October. Women’s Day on 8 March and May Day are more low key than the other political festivals.

The traditional Korean festivals rank very much below the political holidays, at least in official thinking. Since many of them derived originally from religious origins or were associated with China, they were banned in the 1950s. In the 1970s, low-key celebrations were permitted, and in 1989, four traditional holidays were made public holidays. (Traditional holidays were treated in a not dissimilar manner in both China and the Republic of Korea [ROK] and again were only formally reinstated in the 1980s.) The holidays begin with Lunar New Year (often called Chinese New Year in the West), which takes place on the first day of the first lunar month. The Lunar New Year was featured in an article in the glossy magazine Korea Pictorial in January 2009. This gave descriptions of traditional ceremonies, food, and games associated with the holiday. Others are Chusok on the 15th day of the eighth lunar month; Hansik (the day of cold food) on the 105th day after the winter solstice; and Tano, which marks the beginning of summer, on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month. Probably the most popular is Chusok, sometimes called the Korean Thanksgiving Day in the ROK, but not in the DPRK because of its American associations. At Chosuk, family members try to return home to take part in grave cleaning and ceremonies to honor the ancestors. Even in Pyongyang, family groups will gather for picnics and will often display a photograph of the most recently deceased member of the family. Sometimes the urn containing the ashes of the deceased will also be displayed. Although people have a day off from work on these occasions, they are required to make up lost working time on the following Sunday.

Celebrations of the Lunar New Year have not displaced 1 January in importance, and this is usually a two-day holiday. It has, however, been taken over as an additional political holiday in many ways. People are expected to visit the nearest statue of Kim II Sung to bow and to renew oaths of loyalty. The Pyongyang Diplomatic Corps is expected to make one of its periodic visits to the statue of Kim II Sung on Mansudae Hill and then to visit the Kumsusan Memorial Palace.
HONG SOK JUNG (1941– ). Hong, a novelist and short story writer in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was born in Seoul, now the capital of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The family moved from Seoul to what is now the DPRK after 1945, and his grandfather, Hong Myong-hui (1888–1968), also a novelist, became a respected writer who was eventually buried in the Revolutionary Martyrs’ cemetery in Pyongyang. Han Sok Jung served in the DPRK navy and then studied at Kim Il Sung University. His first published work, a short story titled “Red Flower,” appeared in 1970. His most successful work was the novel Northeaster, which appeared on 1993. In 2002, he published a historical novel set in the 17th century, Hwanagjini, which became the first novel published in the DPRK to win an ROK literary prize in 2005.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Since the mid-1990s, when foreign aid agencies and organizations began to visit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in relatively large numbers following the appeal for famine relief, the issue of human rights has come prominently to the fore. Worldwide concern about human rights issues generally was one factor, but so was greater knowledge of conditions within the country. Condemnation of the DPRK for human rights violations was not entirely new, but it had previously been limited and spasmodic. It was also often seen as politically motivated, especially when it originated from the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) whose own record was not very good before the late 1980s. The issue remains highly politicized, used by a number of governments to condemn the DPRK, but also taken up by nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch Asia, and many others. The growing number of DPRK defectors/refugees, especially in the ROK, and the wider Korean diaspora have become increasingly active on the issue.

There is no doubt that the DPRK is a totalitarian regime, which treats duties, as defined by the state, as more important than rights. In recent years, and in response to criticism, the DPRK has begun to refer to “human rights of our kind,” but essentially its approach to this issue is the same as other communist countries, namely that the collective is more important than the individual and that it is the duty of citizens to obey. In the DPRK, this is a system grafted on to a long tradition of authoritarian rule, sometimes called Confucianist, first under the Korean kingdom and later during the Japanese colonial period. These strands, rather than the Western liberal tradition, are reflected in the DPRK constitution and in the way the state is administered. Officials, especially those involved in the security apparatus, have great power normally not tempered by any effective controls. But they too are vulnerable if they attempt to modify or criticize the system or if they fall foul of
a person in higher authority. This goes right to the senior levels of the system, with people among the leadership inner circle regularly falling from power and suffering humiliation or physical punishment. In another strand that was once common in East Asia, it is not only an individual who has fallen who suffers but the whole family.

Although in theory there is an operating legal system, with courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel, the reality appears to be that arbitrary imprisonment is the norm. As well as ordinary prisons, the DPRK maintains a number of prison camps, sometimes described by commentators as “concentration camps,” with some 200,000 to 250,000 inmates. Accounts of these camps are of horrific conditions. There are also reports of the brutal treatment of defectors who are caught either trying to leave the country, which is illegal without permission, or on return.

The state divides people into categories based on their perceived loyalty to the regime. At the top are those who fought with Kim Il Sung as guerrillas in Manchuria in the 1930s and those who fought in the Korean War and their descendants. From these groups come the senior leadership. They and their families live in the capital, Pyongyang. Those who serve in the armed forces are also favored. Next are those who are deemed loyal but who have performed no particular service. At the bottom are those descended from landlords, collaborators with the Japanese, and those captured during the Korean War. These live far away from the capital and are often engaged in hard jobs like mining. For them, educational and social advancement is limited, even if they or their children have obvious talents.

What are regarded as individual rights are lacking. There is no freedom of movement, although this was modified somewhat during the famine years. Residence and work are assigned. Rights of women and children, although formally protected, are often ignored in practice. Domestic violence against women appears to be common. Women have also suffered considerably from the economic difficulties of the past 20 years, and along the border with China, there is much trafficking of women into prostitution and forced marriages. The media are totally state controlled, and knowledge of the outside world limited to a few privileged people. Education is used for indoctrination purposes. Health services and social support arrangements have been badly affected by the economic problems. Religion is in theory permitted, but in reality religious practices are viewed with suspicion. The only known churches are in Pyongyang. Buddhist temples appear to be treated as historical or cultural remains rather than places of worship. Many defectors have claimed that the worst treatment in the camps is for those who profess Christianity.

The DPRK response to critical comment and to adverse reports is to refuse to admit there is a problem. During the 1980s, there was occasional contact
with groups such as AI, but this stopped when critical reports were produced. Since joining the United Nations in 1991, the DPRK has signed up to some of the human rights conventions and has made a number of reports. These are usually late and rather thin. For a time in 2001–2, it engaged in a dialogue on human rights with the European Union (EU), but with growing criticism of its nuclear program, and the EU’s decision to cosponsor a critical motion at the UN Human Rights’ Commission, this came to an end. See also ABDUCTIONS; CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK; JANG SONG TAEK; NORTH KOREA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT; PAK HON YONG; VOICE OF KOREA.

HUMANITARIAN AID. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) first received humanitarian aid during and immediately after the Korean War (1950–53). The aid came almost entirely from the Soviet Union, China, and other communist countries and tapered off toward the end of the 1950s. From then until the end of the 1980s, the DPRK was itself an aid donor, mainly in Africa, and it also provided assistance to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Much of its other assistance was in the form of military training and support, but it also included civilian technical training in areas such as agriculture and medicine. Growing economic difficulties had largely ended such programs by 1991. From about 1979, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) operated a small office in the DPRK, which provided some technical assistance, mainly in the form of economic training.

In 1995–96, the DPRK appealed to the United Nations and to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the first time for international assistance. The government claimed that a series of natural disasters, which included both floods and drought, had led to severe food shortages, amounting to famine. The DPRK had faced major food shortages before but hitherto had made no attempt to tap outside sources of help. The response was positive despite international concerns’ issues such as DPRK military spending and its nuclear program, the lack of information about the extent of the claimed disaster, and an absence of the dramatic publicity that tended normally to develop around appeals for assistance in such conditions. According to World Food Programme (WFP) figures, as set out in a United States’ Congressional Research Report, from 1995 to 2009, some 12 million metric tons (13,228,000 tons) of food aid reached the DPRK. This came from a variety of sources. China accounted for 26.9 percent, the Republic of Korea (ROK) for 26.5 percent, the United States for 17.5 percent, Japan for 10.7 percent, and other countries and organizations for 18.4 percent.

Much of this aid was handled by the WFP, which opened an office in Pyongyang in 1996. This quickly began to fill a duel role. It was the main provider of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, where its operations be-
came the largest in the world for a time. Its other role was as the chief negotiator between the DPRK authorities and international humanitarian organizations. The importance of the WFP operation was confirmed in 1998 when the head of the Pyongyang office became the first UN humanitarian coordinator. This role became more important as other international agencies established a presence in the DPRK. They included the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and the World Health Organization (WHO). These addressed the growing health problems in the DPRK, which, while they had many causes, were directly linked to the food shortages. In addition to the international agencies, many NGOs responded to the DPRK call for assistance. Over the following years, NGOs from the United States, the ROK, the European Union (EU), Japan, Canada, China, and Australia operated in the DPRK. Among them were many religious groups. Most were nonresident, but until 2005, about 10 at any one time had staff living and working in the DPRK.

On the DPRK side, a new body, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC), became the main contact point between the humanitarian agencies and the various DPRK ministries and organizations. However, the FDRC was mainly staffed from the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which meant

![The author terrifies innocent children during a WHO/UNICEF vaccination campaign, near Haeju, autumn 2001.](image)
that other ministries were not always very cooperative. Another difficulty
was that in general, staff from the FDRC, with the exception of those from the
Health Ministry, were generalist English-speaking officers with no technical
knowledge of the matters they were handling. The FDRC was perhaps never
meant to be more than a short-term body. Its head was always the “acting di-
rector.” There was more fundamental problems, however. It is not clear what
the DPRK expected when it appealed for international assistance, but it soon
made it clear that it was not the inspections and checks that were the interna-
tional norm when receiving such assistance. From the beginning, problems
arose over issues such as in-country residence, monitoring and inspections,
and access to those deemed to be in need. The DPRK attitude seemed to be
that the country needed assistance but did not need aid workers from either
international agencies or NGOs. Officials argued that since the DPRK had
never imposed conditions on the aid that it gave to others, why should condi-
tions now be imposed when it needed help?

It was clear that this would be no ordinary relief effort. Rather than a wel-
come, aid workers found themselves treated with suspicion. Obtaining visas
was difficult as was getting clearance for flights with aid supplies. The DPRK
would not normally allow Korean speakers. Tight controls were placed on
the movements of both resident and visiting aid staff. Even in Pyongyang,
they were at first confined to their hotels, only able to leave with a Korean
escort. There was no free access to the aid recipients. The FDRC demanded
at least a week’s notice of any monitoring visit and sometimes canceled visits
at the last moment. Even when an inspection went ahead, foreigners were not
allowed random access. What they saw and whom they saw were arranged
by the FDRC. Many counties, perhaps a quarter of the total, were closed off
altogether, even though no aid was supplied where there was no access. The
government maintained that it was meeting local needs in such areas, but
when previously closed counties were occasionally opened, the agencies gen-
erally found that conditions were bad, with urgent need for food, medicine,
and medical equipment. This raised concerns about what conditions were like
in areas that were not open. The DPRK was wary of photography so that the
normal methods of publicizing a humanitarian crisis through dramatic im-
ages were not available. The problem was that while the DPRK might have
asked for assistance, it was still a functioning state, whereas many of those
who came to provide that assistance were used to operating in circumstances
where there was no effective government. The DPRK might not be able to
feed its people, but it was still determined to control them.

The WFP tried to smooth out problems, but within two years, a number
of NGOs withdrew, claiming that they could not work in the DPRK. They
included Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World), Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF—Doctors without Borders), which had been the first to establish a residential presence in the country, Action Contre la Faim (Action against Hunger), and Oxfam. U.S. NGOs had been grouped together as the Private Voluntary Organization Consortium (PVCO). PVCO had experienced much DPRK suspicion and eventually collapsed. Some former members of the PCVO, such as the Eugene Bell Foundation, continued to operate in the DPRK. Interestingly, this organization was headed by Dr. Stephen Linton, a fluent Korean speaker. Most of those who withdrew kept official silence about their reasons for doing so, but MSF publicly denounced the DPRK for obstructing humanitarian relief and suggested that others should follow its lead. This did not happen, and there was some criticism of its stand, not least from other organizations that had to take on its projects at short notice. One EU NGO, Children’s Aid Direct, withdrew in 2001 because of financial difficulties. Another, Cap Anamur from Germany, left in 2002, but most chose to remain. Cap Anamur had acquired some notoriety because a former member, Dr. Norbet Vollertsen, claimed to have been granted special privileges in the DPRK that had allowed him to witness at first hand the misuse of aid and the appalling conditions in hospitals. He said that his attempts to publicize these had led to his expulsion in December 1999, after which he became a fervent protestor against the country. Former colleagues who worked in the DPRK at the same time expressed doubts about his account, pointing out that he had not in fact been expelled but had not had his visa renewed, and that there was no independent evidence that he had done what he claimed. He has nevertheless been widely accepted as an accurate critic, who for a time attracted much attention.

By 2000, most resident NGOs had moved from immediate relief work to a more diffuse range of tasks, which included elementary development programs. Typical was the group Welthungerhilfe (German Agro Action), which arrived in 1997. At first it provided food, coal, and children’s clothes, but then switched to agricultural projects in South Hwanghae and North Pyongan provinces. It sought to improve seeds, diversify and intensify agricultural production, and maintain agricultural equipment more efficiently. Its staff built a large maize seed processing factory and helped build 600 greenhouses, 15 starch and noodle processing units, and 200 rural water systems. They rehabilitated local bakeries and improved a number of machinery workshops.

After the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, ROK NGOs began to operate in the DPRK. The DPRK would not allow them to establish resident offices, but they had the advantage of native Korean-speaking staff, who would regularly visit. From then until the advent of the Lee Myung-bak government in 2008, ROK NGOs played an increasingly important role. Improvements in conditions for all aid workers were already under way. Staff in Pyongyang
were able to move out of hotels into accommodation in the diplomatic area in the east of the city. Once there, they were treated in a similar fashion to resident diplomats in that they could move freely about Pyongyang and the adjacent port city of Nampo. They could also drive in these two cities. As more countries established diplomatic relations in 2000–2002, further changes took place. The most important of these was the decision in May 2002 to allow Great Britain to have secure satellite-based communications for its newly established embassy. Not only was this privilege extended to other diplomatic missions, but it was also applied to the UN agencies. Embassies, UN agencies, and NGOs were also allowed to set up vehicle communications’ networks for the first time.

Other problems did not go away. Access was still limited, and there were persistent claims that food and other aid was being diverted. These were increasingly fueled by DPRK refugees who claimed they had either never heard of foreign aid or never received it. The aid agencies and the NGOs responded to such claims by pointing out that they only delivered aid to areas to which they had access, however restricted. Of necessity, therefore, aid was not distributed in closed counties, and therefore those coming from such areas were unlikely to have seen any. The WFP in particular stressed that it targeted vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, children, and the elderly. Other groups, however much they might be suffering, did not receive assistance. The aid agencies also argued that most of what they supplied was corn or other coarse grains, while the armed forces, like most Koreans, preferred rice. The army and the elite received supplies of rice as a priority and were usually not much interested in the less palatable grains supplied as aid. They may also have had access to aid from China, supplied without any demand for accountability. In the case of nonfood supplies, some NGOs provided materials that were only of use to the target groups; baby diapers was one example. Despite all the precautions, some food aid probably was diverted to the military or ended up in the markets, but the professionals of the aid agencies did not think that the amount so diverted was significant.

The aid agencies and the DPRK government said that they wished to move on from relief aid to developmental aid. This proved difficult. As it was, the agencies and the NGOs found it increasingly hard to raise humanitarian funds for the DPRK. The initial enthusiasm tended to fade as the appeals went on year after year and as other international appeals drove the DPRK from the headlines. News of difficulties operating in the DPRK created adverse publicity, and the increasing tensions over nuclear matters did not help the appeals and also led to the governments withholding aid. Appeals for developmental assistance fell on particularly deaf ears and very little was forthcoming. Training in farming methods or modern economics did contribute to develop-
ment in the broadest sense, but these too were small scale. In 2005, DPRK frustration over the lack of development aid and the attempts by some in the leadership to turn back the economic clock to the days of unbridled socialism came together in a confrontation with the aid community. During the course of the year, the DPRK claimed that good harvests meant that there was now sufficient food in the country to meet demands. It therefore said that the provision of humanitarian aid, which was creating a culture of dependency, should be replaced by development aid. Although the WFP warned that these measures would leave the most vulnerable at risk, the DPRK remained adamant, also instructing all Western NGOs, resident or not, to leave by the end of the year. No attempt was made to end support from China or the ROK, both of which supplied food aid without monitoring. As an indication of the ideological reasons behind this move, it was announced that the sale of cereals at markets would be banned and that the quasi-moribund Public Distribution System for food would be revived.

This attempt to turn the clock back did not last long. Floods in 2006 hit the harvest and led to a new agreement with the WFP; its humanitarian operations would now be smaller in scale, but they would resume. Even the resident NGOs were allowed to continue, although now they functioned formally as part of the EU humanitarian program. International food aid on a large scale resumed for a period, but there were again problems over monitoring and access. Under the terms of the 2005 and 2007 agreements negotiated in the Six Party Talks, fuel oil was also supplied to meet the DPRK’s continued energy shortage. The May 2009 DPRK nuclear test put a stop to such supplies, and additional UN sanctions made it difficult for any form of significant development aid to continue. Political changes also had their effect. Japan had long since ceased to supply aid because of frustration over the abduction issue. Both the Lee Myung-bak administration in the ROK and the Barack Obama administration in the United States adopted a tougher attitude toward the DPRK than had their predecessors. Not all aid dried up, but the amounts available were smaller than in the past. It also tended to be channeled through NGOs, as governments distanced themselves from direct involvement with the DPRK authorities.

The sinking of the Chonan in March 2010 and the shelling of the Yongpyong Islands in November led to further restrictions on humanitarian assistance, although it never ceased entirely. These developments took place as the international agencies, including the WFP, reported that the DPRK was moving toward another food crisis because of significant shortfalls in the harvest. The DPRK itself began a campaign for more food, which continued into 2011. In spring 2011, the United Nations sent an investigation team to survey the food situation. It concluded that there was a real danger of major
shortages. Others, including some of the NGOs with long experience in the DPRK, have been skeptical, linking the DPRK appeal to the 2012 centenary of the birth of Kim Il Sung and the wish to have adequate food supplies for the occasion, rather than any real need for humanitarian aid. However, by autumn 2011, both the United States and the ROK, the main donors, seemed on the point of resuming food aid.

Other forms of humanitarian aid also continue. Work still is under way on the supply of drinking water and better medical facilities. The people of the DPRK may not be starving, but there is no doubt that years of inadequate food have taken their toll and left many vulnerable to disease and illnesses. Apart from the very top of the ruling group, even supposedly favored groups, such as the armed forces, show signs of deprivation. The need for humanitarian support and assistance seems likely to continue for many more years.

HWANG JANG YOP (1923–2010). In February 1997, Hwang Jang Yop, secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) since 1985, became the highest-ranking defector from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the Korean War. Hwang was born in Pyongyang and graduated from Moscow State University in 1949. In 1954, he became chief professor at Kim Il Sung University and became head of the university in 1965. During this period, he was credited with being the main theorist of the KWP’s juche (self-reliance) philosophy. Among his students was Kim Jong Il, Kim II Sung’s son and heir. Hwang pursued a parallel political career as a deputy chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the KWP from 1954 and as chairman (that is, speaker) of the national parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, in 1972 and again in 1982. He was sufficiently important to appear as 25th on Kim Il Sung’s funeral committee in 1994.

The defection, which took place in Beijing following a visit to Japan and which appears to have been arranged by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Agency for National Security Planning (now the National Intelligence Service), was at first seen as an indication of major problems within the DPRK regime. However, although the defection was denounced by the DPRK, this proved not to be the case, and while Hwang revealed some details about the DPRK political structure, it was soon clear that he had long been away from the center of political power and that personal as well as political reasons had played a part in his defection. Hwang was also unfortunate in his timing in that the change of government in the ROK that brought Kim Dae-jung to power in early 1998 led to a new approach to relations with the DPRK. Hwang complained that his views were not listened to and that he was prevented from traveling abroad. The return to a more conservative ROK
government in 2008 made his views more acceptable, but by then his direct knowledge of the DPRK was well out of date. This did not restrain him, however, and he made regular pronouncements on the situation in the DPRK, usually in his capacity as president of the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea. He died in Seoul on 10 October 2010 of natural causes.

HYON CHOL HAE (1934–). General Hyon Chol Hae was identified in the Republic of Korea (ROK) media during autumn 2008 as the military figure who had accompanied Kim Jong Il on most occasions (32 in all) during the year. He was also reported to have occupied a similar position in 2007. This led to speculation that he was in charge of day-to-day affairs after Kim apparently suffered a stroke in August 2008, and that he could be prominent in the post–Kim Jong Il leadership, but he seems to have fallen from prominence since then. He was listed as number 59th on Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee in December 2011.

Hyon attended the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School (1947–50) and studied in Romania in 1950. He was one of Kim Il Sung’s bodyguards during the Korean War. He was identified as deputy director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 1968, an important role in the armed forces, when he was a major general. In 1973, he was the principal of the Rear Military Officer Academy with the same rank. By 1986, he was a lieutenant general and was director general of the General Logistics Bureau of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. He became an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party in December 1991 and a full member in December 1993; he had meanwhile been promoted to colonel general in April 1992. He was a member of the funeral committee for Kim Il Sung in 1994. He became a full general in October 1995, when he was again identified as deputy director of the General Political Department of the KPA. He was a delegate to the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly in July 1998 and a member of its delegate Qualification Screening Committee in September the same year. In 2001, he accompanied Kim Jong Il on the latter’s visit to China.
IM SU-GYONG. See LIM SOO-KYUNG.

INDUSTRY. In the early decades of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), heavy industry was regarded as the key element in state planning and the measure of its success. Kim Il Sung looked for inspiration to the only real model of a socialist state, the Soviet Union, where the development of heavy industry had the main feature of the economy since the 1920s. He may also have drawn, wittingly or unwittingly, on the Japanese development of Manchuria after the establishment of the puppet state of Manzhouguo in 1932. He was probably encouraged to launch the construction of the DPRK’s economy on the back of heavy industry by the existence of an industrial base, including hydroelectric schemes, in the north of the peninsula, together with a workforce already accustomed to factory work and a relative abundance of mineral resources. Agricultural development was essential to ensuring national self-sufficiency, but both the agricultural sector and light industry received inferior levels of investment compared to heavy industry. Kim Il Sung’s insistence on heavy industry was not accepted by all of his colleagues; among the charges against two colleagues purged in 1956 was their alleged criticism of such policies.

There were further ideological and demographic twists. Among the categories into which the population was reclassified after 1945—workers, peasants, intellectuals, and small traders—it was the industrial workers, following the general Marxist–Leninist line, who constituted the “leading class,” with the agricultural population as its “powerful ally.” As heavy industries expanded their bases in the big urban centers, many of them on the northeast coast, the numbers of industrial workers grew and the balance between the agricultural and urban populations shifted toward the latter. By the 1970s, the balance was 60 to 40, and it has remained so ever since, even though much of the original heavy industry has long since ceased to function.

The years from 1945 to 1950 were devoted to establishing a new style of economy through nationalization and land reform, to securing the people’s living conditions, and to rehabilitating and expanding war-damaged installations. Starting from a low base, output was bound to rise. The Korean War
(1950–53) destroyed much of this work. The war of movement and then heavy bombing smashed the cities, the factories, and much of the agricultural base. The three-year postwar reconstruction plan (1954–56), with much input of raw materials, machinery, equipment, and even labor from the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, was again productive; growth levels of over 40 percent per annum were claimed for the years 1953–55. The plan restored the industrial base, albeit once more from a very low level. Under the three plans that ran from 1954 to 1970, industrial development included the extractive and power sector, the machine-building industry, chemical and fertilizer industries, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical plants, and the cement industry. Such a program demanded huge amounts of capital, and large sums were indeed invested in industrial construction, more than in any other sector. The necessary funds, aside from what foreign aid might provide, were to come from domestic reserves, raised through increased productivity, economies, and extended operation of equipment. As a formula, it was inadequate. Although the government continued to claim very high annual growth rates, the small domestic market within which the economy functioned could not provide the necessary base for continued high growth rates. The labor force was too small for the tasks imposed on it, the armed forces were taking an increasing share of what was available, and foreign funds declined. “Donor fatigue” set in as the DPRK authorities demanded more and more assistance, often in somewhat peremptory tones, from countries that had their own development to consider.

Problems started to emerge from the mid-1960s, the decade of the first Seven-Year Plan. Slowdowns were identified in the extractive and energy sectors, which hampered production in other industries. An indication that targets were not being met was the increasing rarity of published statistics after the early 1960s. Recognizing the need for technical modernization and perhaps dissatisfied with the quality of East European and Soviet equipment, during the Six-Year Plan (1971–76), the DPRK ordered up-to-date equipment and more luxurious goods such as automobiles from Japan and Western Europe. Not all of this was well used; the DPRK may have become an industrialized country but, even by 1970, it was well behind technologically. Worse was that the DPRK found itself unable to pay for what it had ordered. It eventually defaulted on its foreign debt, which remains unpaid to the present, and retreated back into policies of self-reliance. The economic lead that it once had over its southern rival, the Republic of Korea (ROK), faltered. From being the second industrialized country in East Asia, after Japan, the DPRK began to fall behind the newly industrializing countries of the region.

Production seems to have stagnated during the 1980s, though the period was marked by small measures to loosen up formerly rigid systems in the
management of the economy and by renewed overtures to the outside. Deficiencies in the production of electric power, steel, and chemical fibers were a particular disappointment in the implementation of the third Seven-Year Plan (1987–93). In a swing away from heavy industry, agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade were identified as areas to be promoted during the subsequent three-year period of adjustment (1994–96). Manufacturing and mining still contributed to the DPRK economy throughout the 1980s, but industry largely lost its role as a powerhouse and other ways had to be found to keep the economy going. The industrial (manufacturing and mining) share of the economy declined from over 60 percent in the 1980s to about 25 percent in the early 2000s. Agricultural, about 20 percent in the 1980s, accounted for over 30 percent in the 2000s, while the service sector accounted for much of the remaining economic activity.

The 1990s saw the DPRK industrial base hit by two major blows. The fall of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECOM) meant that the DPRK’s trading partners vanished. Its goods were no longer guaranteed outlets, and its supplies of energy and manufactured goods dried up. The situation was made worse by the Chinese decision to cease trading with the DPRK on the basis of “friendship prices” but to charge standard international prices for goods supplied. On top of these blows came a series of natural disasters, including floods and drought, which added to the difficulties. Mines flooded and could not be rehabilitated because of lack of electricity to power the pumps. This in turn led to the loss of coal to fire the power stations, and so the downward spiral intensified. The disasters also hit agriculture, damaging crops. The transport infrastructure suffered badly, which affected the means of distribution. Lack of production meant that shortfalls could not be met by outside purchases. The state found it increasingly difficult to provide the workers with food and other necessities and had to permit them to travel about in order to track down what might be available. Social order was coming under pressure. Faced with famine, the DPRK appealed for international aid.

The decline of the heavy industry section could not be concealed. Along the east coast, major cities such as Hamhung were filled with factories that, if working at all, were doing so at a fraction of their former capacity. By the early 2000s, often the only sign of activity was the collection of scrap metal from derelict factories for sale to China. Even in the capital city of Pyongyang, it was impossible to hide the lack of power and the absence of activity. The old road from Pyongyang to the port of Nampo reflected the east coast in miniature. Workers were still expected to attend, but there was less and less for them to do; in some cases, industrial workers, in theory the aristocracy of the DPRK, were employed on subsistence rations on unskilled
construction work. A few coal and gold mines did operate, albeit at a reduced capacity, and there were efforts to substitute light industrial production for the departed heavy industry. The DPRK media continued to produce stories that implied the country was still a major heavy industrial producer, but the reality was that while such production did not cease, newer, light industrial products, such as textiles and electronic goods, were taking an increasingly important role. Domestic media also tended to ignore the country’s increasing dependence on outside assistance.

A major distorting factor in industrial development is the role of the armed forces. It is clear that, while they do contribute substantially to the ordinary economy, they also run a parallel one. This is openly acknowledged in the existence of army-run farms, but it is also true of the industrial sector. Unsurprisingly, it is not an area that receives much publicity. But the military runs factories that produce goods that form an important part of the DPRK’s export efforts, as well as probably being the main means by which the armed forces are financed. Sales of weapons, including sales of missiles, are clearly an important factor in the country’s economy, and there is international concern that the DPRK’s nuclear development might also be intended for overseas sales.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. Interest in computers and all aspects of information technology is high in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and appears to date from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. At that time, a small integrated circuit plant was built in Pyongyang, with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme. This led to the first domestically produced personal computer, the Bonghwa 4-1, in the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s, there were some 20,000 computers in the country, but development of the industry was hampered by international restrictions on the transfer of technology. Without such access, the DPRK was forced to develop its own software and programs, and, while visitors sometimes saw computers in factories and offices, it was not often that they were in use. Increasing shortages of electricity also affected the development and use of computers.

Nevertheless, the evidence is strong for the growing use of information technology. When the United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited the DPRK in October 2000, then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il asked for her e-mail address, although he did not offer his. At that time, embassies in Pyongyang could use e-mail via servers in China, albeit at exorbitant cost. A cyber café opened in Pyongyang in 2002, also served via China and again with high prices. Its use was apparently limited to foreigners. There were frequent reports of the development of a DPRK intranet, used, inter alia, for
passing meteorological information to shipping and for links between scientific institutions. There were also rumors that certain high-level officials, in addition to Kim Jong Il, had access to the Internet. Kim Jong Chul, second son of Kim Jong Il, was reported to be a computer programmer.

Since 2000, the DPRK computer industry has steadily developed. In 2002, an operating system able to undertake speech and character recognition became operational. DPRK media reported that the country’s first Internet connection had been established, and in 2004 the first DPRK portal, Naenara (“My Country”), was launched. Access to it was banned immediately in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In 2006, an operating system based on the freely available Linux system and with many resemblances to the Microsoft Windows system was available. DPRK computer programmers have developed a successful animation industry, which has strong international links. Despite the formal interdictions on the DPRK acquisition of advanced computer technology, visitors in 2010 reported seeing the latest Windows computers in operation in offices and institutions. DPRK institutions that now have a web presence include the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun. See also CELL PHONES; WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT.

INSPECTOR O. Fictional Pyongyang detective, who features in a series of novels by “James Church,” the pseudonym of a former United States intelligence analyst who has visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) many times. O is of a good class background, which helps him in some difficult moments, but he also has to operate the system while faced with many more powerful people with very different agendas. His first appearance was in A Corpse in the Koryo, published in 2007. Although the novels are exciting thrillers in their own right, they also provide an excellent introduction to life in the DPRK since the mid-1990s. The incidental details appear wholly accurate. The fourth in the series, The Man with the Baltic Stare, appeared in 2010. It is understood that two more books are planned. Inspector O and James Church can also be found regularly on the website 38th North (http://38north.org/), a program of the U.S.–Korea Institute at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

INTERNATIONAL KIM IL SUNG PRIZE. Established in Delhi in 1993 as part of the celebrations for the 81st birthday of Kim Il Sung, then president of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The prize is awarded by a committee, whose membership is not made public. The winner receives a medal and a sum of money. Recipients are said to be those who have devoted themselves to the study and promulgation of the juche philosophy. The first was the Japanese Inoue Shuhachi, then director general of the
Tokyo-based International Institute of Juche Ideology; others have included Vishwanath, described as secretary general of the International Kim Il Sung Prize Council, later as Inoue’s successor and Kim Il Sung’s eldest son and successor, Kim Jong Il. In October 2007, the DPRK Korean Central News Agency announced that a British businessman, Dr. Johnny Hon of the Global Group, would be the head of the newly established International Kim Il Sung Foundation. The purpose of the foundation would be, according to Hon, to ensure the successful awarding of the International Kim Il Sung Prize and to “contribute to the study and dissemination of the Juche idea worldwide, global peace and the cause of independence.” However, no award seems to have been made public since 2007. Dr. Hon’s webpage still lists him as chairman of the foundation.

ITALY, RELATIONS WITH. Italy and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established diplomatic relations on 4 January 2000, an event that marked the beginning of a breakthrough in the DPRK’s links with major Western European countries. The DPRK established an embassy in Rome in July 2000, where it already had an office accredited to the Food and Agricultural Office of the United Nations. There is no Italian embassy in the DPRK, although Italy had a Development Cooperation Office in Pyongyang in the early 2000s. Italy has provided some technical training assistance to the DPRK.
JANG SONG GIL (1939–2006). A career armed forces officer, whose last known rank was lieutenant general. Unlike his brothers Jang Song U and Jang Song Taek, he does not seem to have held any party or state positions outside the military. However, he appears to have gone into eclipse when Jang Song Taek was in political difficulties, which suggests that the two were closely linked.

JANG SONG TAEK (1946– ). Brother-in-law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il, married to the latter’s only sister, Kim Kyung Hui, and thus the uncle of the current DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Jang’s main official position is director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee, but he is widely believed to exercise much power behind the scenes. His name is generally spelled Chang Song-taek in Republic of Korea (ROK) accounts. He is the brother of the late Marshal Jang Song U and Lt. Gen. Jang Song Gil. Jang Song Taek was educated at the Kim Il Sung Military University and the Kim Il Sung Higher Party School. He also studied at the Moscow State University. He married Kim Kyung Hui in 1972, and then occupied various party positions. He appeared to suffer a demotion in the late 1970s, when he became manager of a steel works in Nampo. Reports said that he was becoming too powerful or, according to other accounts, he had an overostentatious lifestyle. However, he reemerged as deputy director of the Youth Work Department of the KWP Central Committee in 1982, becoming the director in 1985. He was first elected as a delegate to the eighth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in 1986, and also served in the 9th, 10th, and 11th assemblies. In April 1989, he was named as a People’s Hero, and in June the same year was elected as an alternate member of the KWP Central Committee. He was awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung in April 1992. Later that year he became a full member of the KWP Central Committee. He served on the Kim Il Sung funeral committee in 1994, and took up the post of first vice director of the Organization and Guidance Department in November 1995.

His rise came to an apparent halt in 2004, and he disappeared from view. Various rumors surrounded his nonappearance. It was said that he had been
intriguing over the possible succession to Kim Jong Il or that he had again
been leading an extravagant lifestyle. It was also reported that he clashed
with then prime minister Pak Pong Ju over development of the economy.
Whatever the cause of his disappearance, it proved only a temporary blip in
his career and he reemerged in 2006 as first vice director of the Organization
and Guidance Department. In March that year, he led a delegation to China
to examine economic developments. In the wake of Kim Jong Il’s illness in
autumn 2008, there was much international speculation about Jang’s role,
with some accounts claiming not only that he was effectively running the
country in Kim’s absence, but also that he might be a possible successor. He
was elected to the powerful National Defense Commission in 2009, a further
indication of his importance. Following Kim Jong Il’s death in December
2011, Jang was listed 19th on the funeral committee. However, during the fol-
lowing week, he appeared in a uniform of a four-star general, although there
had been no previous announcement of a role in the military. On the day of
the funeral, he was one of those who walked beside the hearse, immediately
behind Kim Jong Un.

It is believed that he and his wife are separated. They had two children,
one of whom, Jang Kim Song, whose exact date of birth is not known, is cur-
rently working in the Organization and Guidance Department. It is rumored
in the ROK that he is an adopted illegitimate son of Kim II Sung. A daughter,
Jang Kum Song, born 1977, apparently committed suicide in Paris in 2006,
allegedly over her parents’ objection to her choice of husband. She had also
worked in a department under the Central Committee. Reports from the ROK
say that Jang is deeply unpopular among ordinary people because of his wish
to reimpose a more rigid socialist system and his opposition to markets. Other
reports say that he is interested in economic reforms along Chinese lines.

JANG SONG U (1935–2009). Armed Forces’ vice marshal and elder
brother of Jang Song Taek, the brother-in-law of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong II. Educated at the Kim Il
Sung Military University, he first appeared as a vice departmental director
in the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’
Party Central Committee in 1971, but otherwise held mainly military
positions. He was also a delegate to the seventh and subsequent Supreme
People’s Assemblies and was a member of Kim II Sung’s funeral committee
in 1994. Republic of Korea sources have linked him with the 1983 Yangon
bombing incident, but there is no conclusive evidence.

JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH. Relations between Japan and the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), like those between Japan and
the Republic of Korea (ROK), are complicated by the historical legacy. Pirate attacks and years of devastating war in the 16th century had left a bitter legacy, which was added to by the events of the Japanese colonial period (1910–45). While the DPRK usually portrays the United States as its main enemy, DPRK officials will say that while the United States has been an enemy for 100 years, Japan has been the enemy for 1,000 years. Although appearing to despise Japan as a U.S. puppet state, the DPRK also anxiously watches for signs of a revival of Japanese militarism, an attitude it shares with the ROK. Indicative of the difficulty of relations between the two Koreas and Japan is that it took from 1948 to 1965 for the ROK to normalize relations with Japan, and the DPRK has still been unable to do so.

The end of the World War II in 1945 left large numbers of Koreans in Japan. Some had lived in Japan for many years, and others had been conscripted for war-time work. By 1945, their numbers totaled about 2 million. Many eventually returned to the peninsula, but others were either unable or unwilling to do so. The number of Koreans in Japan in 2011 was approximately 600,000, with around another 250,000 who have become Japanese citizens. Although the majority of such Koreans came from the southern half of the peninsula, in political terms, the Korean community in Japan was more evenly divided and has remained so until the present. Even before the emergence of two states on the peninsula in 1948, separate organizations representing groups with allegiance to either the South or the North had emerged. The pro–South Korean group, or Mindan, was formed in 1946. Pro–North Korean groups had a variety of names before eventually coalescing in 1955 into the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (usually known outside Korea by the abbreviated Japanese version of the title Chosen soren). This organization has played a somewhat ambiguous role, both as a representative body for many Koreans in Japan and as an unofficial representative organization for the DPRK. It has also established a network of schools and colleges that provide a DPRK-style education for Korean students in Japan. For many years, it provided funds to the DPRK and contributed to the country’s economy in other ways as well, including the building of joint venture factories.

Over a period of eight years from 1959, some 100,000 Koreans returned from Japan to the DPRK, under arrangements brokered by the Red Cross Associations of both countries. Those remaining in Japan were classified as “aliens” if they continued to display allegiance to the DPRK, while after the normalization of ROK–Japan relations in 1965, those who gave their allegiance to the ROK were formally granted permanent residence status. It was not until 1992 that all Koreans in Japan, whichever Korea they looked to, were granted permanent residence status.
There have always been some officials and politicians in Japan who felt that the relationship with the DPRK was unsatisfactory, and there was occasional contact to try to improve relations. One breakthrough did come in August 1977 when the two sides agreed that some 1,800 Japanese women who had accompanied their repatriated Korean husbands to the DPRK would be allowed to visit Japan to renew family contacts. Some visits did take place, but the program eventually ground to a halt as a result of other DPRK–Japan issues. A more concerted effort led in 1990 to talks between the two sides to establish **diplomatic relations**. However, working-level talks in Beijing in 1990–92 and again in 1997–98 made little progress. DPRK demands for apologies and compensation were not rejected by the Japanese but were often couched in such offensive terms as to be unacceptable. Growing concerns over the DPRK **nuclear program** were another stumbling block to progress, as was the test flight of a DPRK long-range **missile** over Japan in 1998.

Increasingly, the issue of Japanese **abductions** also limited the options available to Japanese negotiators. From the 1970s onward, suspicions grew that the DPRK was behind the mysterious disappearances of a number of Japanese, but no definite linkage was established until the testimony of a captured DPRK agent, **Kim Hyun Hee**, after the 1987 **Andaman Sea bombing**. Her claims that she had been schooled by a Japanese abductee and knew of others led to increased pressure on the Japanese government to take action. No progress was made, however, until in September 2002, when then Japanese Prime Minister **Koizumi Junichiro** made a surprise one-day visit to the DPRK. There was no advance publicity, and the visit was handled in a low-key manner. However, in a meeting with then DPRK leader **Kim Jong Il**, Koizumi apologized for previous conflicts with Korea and for the Japanese colonial period. In return, Kim admitted that “certain elements” had kidnapped Japanese citizens and that other acts had been committed that infringed on Japanese sovereignty and pledged that such acts would not happen again. Kim promised to continue the moratorium on missile testing that was then in place and to work toward denuclearization. The two sides recorded their views in the **Pyongyang Declaration**, which looked forward to the normalization of relations between them and to Japanese assistance with the DPRK’s economic development when such normalization had taken place.

Any euphoria resulting from Koizumi’s visit quickly evaporated. According to Kim, only five abductees were still alive. In October 2002, these five were allowed to visit Japan, without their spouses or children, on condition that they would return to the DPRK at the end of the visit. Public opinion did not allow this, with the immediate consequence that normalization talks held at the end of October in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, broke up as soon as they had begun, with the DPRK accusing the Japanese of bad faith. A
further hindrance to progress was the revelation following the October 2002 James Kelly visit that the DPRK was apparently pursuing a highly enriched uranium program.

Japan joined the Six Party Talks on the nuclear issue in 2003, but the abductees issue remained firmly at the top of the Japanese agenda. Whatever Japanese politicians might have wished, public opinion, fanned by right-wing and anti-DPRK organizations, made sure that the issue did not go away. Another swift visit by Koizumi in May 2004 secured the release of the spouses and children of the group that had stayed in Japan in 2002, but Japanese demands for further information about those who had supposedly died were rejected, as was criticism of the condition of the remains that had been repatriated. The Japanese had apparently promised food aid to the DPRK in the 2004 negotiations, but this was not supplied. The Japanese approach to the DPRK now became increasingly hostile. In 2005, Japan, together with the European Union, cosponsored a resolution before the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission condemning the DPRK record on human rights. Missile and a nuclear test in 2006 saw Japan impose increasingly tough sanctions against the DPRK, including suspending the regular shipping service that was an important link between Chosen soren and the DPRK. Japan also played a major role in organizing international condemnation of the DPRK. The same pattern repeated itself following the second DPRK nuclear test in 2009. Increasingly, the Japanese were at the same time bringing pressure to bear on the pro-DPRK community in Japan, with investigations and raids on its premises. By 2011, DPRK–Japan were at as low an ebb as they had ever been and seemed unlikely to improve. See also JENKINS, CHARLES.

JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD. Between 1910 and 1945, the Korean Peninsula was a part of the Japanese empire, under the Government-General of Korea. As Japan entered the Meiji period after 1868, many Japanese politicians became obsessed with what they claimed was the threat posed by the Korean kingdom to the safety of Japan. Because Yi dynasty Korea refused to open to Western pressure, it attracted much international attention. Japanese leaders expressed concern that Korean intransigence might lead to a Western takeover of Korea. In 1876, therefore, to preempt such an action, the Japanese forced Korea to sign a Western-style treaty similar to those that Japan had been compelled to accept from 1854 onward. This increased Japanese interest in Korea led to conflict with China, which had long seen Korea as within its traditional orbit. In 1894, the two countries went to war over Korea, a conflict that China lost. At Japanese insistence, Korea declared itself independent, with the Korean king taking the title of emperor, but before long, the Japanese faced competition from Russia for influence over Korea.
This in turn led to another war in 1904, from which Japan emerged victorious in 1905. The Japanese at first proclaimed a protectorate over Korea, but in 1910, it annexed the peninsula as part of the Japanese empire.

There followed 35 years of harsh colonial rule. The Japanese claimed to be modeling their Korean administration on that of British India, but by 1919, when the Koreans rose up in the Samil Undong (1 March) movement against the Japanese, even the British were appalled at the overbearing methods used by the Japanese. The uprising was brutally suppressed, but there followed a period of relatively relaxed Japanese rule until the late 1930s. Resources were put into education, and the Japanese began a program of economic modernization. While this benefited Koreans, that was incidental; the main thrust of Japan’s economic development was to meet Japan’s needs, a policy that became even more marked as Japan moved onto a war footing from 1937 onward. At the same time, the Japanese began a more concerted attack on Korean culture, which would eventually include a ban on the use of the Korean language in public and an insistence that Koreans use Japanese-style names. Koreans were also conscripted for the war effort; this included a large number of women taken to act as “comfort women” (military prostitutes) for the Japanese armies.

In the early days of the protectorate and the colony, Koreans had taken up arms against the Japanese, often using the term “righteous armies,” an echo of the monks who had fought against the Japanese invasion in the 16th century. Most of these were wiped out by 1913, but the tradition of opposition lingered on and was revived in the 1920s. Anti-Japanese groups of Koreans and Chinese operated in Manchuria, increasingly under communist auspices. It was as a member of these groups that the future leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim Il Sung, learned his political and military skills in the 1930s.

The colonial period came to an abrupt end in August 1945, following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Neither the Japanese nor the Allies had made any real provision for such a development, which caught planners by surprise. Both the Soviet Union and the United States held the view that the Koreans were not ready for immediate independence, and that they should be subject to a period of trusteeship. Increasing tension between the two led to the U.S. proposal to divide the peninsula for the purpose of taking the Japanese surrender, and this in turn led to the decision to make the division along the 38th parallel. All unknowing, a decision was made that would lead to a division that led to the Korean War and continues to the present. See also STALIN, JOSEF; UNITED NATIONS.

JAPANESE RED ARMY HIJACK (1970). The Japanese Red Army (Rengo sekigun) was a terrorist organization. It emerged in the late 1960s
from among various extreme left groups in Japan that had been active in
the student and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. On 31 March 1970, nine
members of one faction within this loose body, calling itself the Red Army
Group, hijacked a Japan Airlines aircraft and took it first to the Republic
of Korea, where they released the passengers, and then to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK returned the crew and the
aircraft but granted the hijackers political asylum. Of the original nine, four
remain in the DPRK. Three others died there, and one, who returned to Ja-
pan, received a 12-year sentence in 2004. In November 2004, Japan formally
demanded that the DPRK return the remaining hijackers for trial, a demand
the DPRK rejected, while encouraging the hijackers to return to Japan volun-
tarily. The refusal to hand over the hijackers was one reason why the United
States listed the DPRK as a supporter of terrorism until 2008.

JENKINS, CHARLES (1940–). Charles Jenkins was born in North Caro-
lina in 1940 and, although underage, joined the United States National Guard
in 1955 and the regular army, as a private in the First Cavalry Division, in
1958. He served in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1960 to 1961, then
in Europe, and returned to the ROK in 1964. In January 1965, Jenkins, then
a sergeant, disappeared while on duty at the demilitarized zone between
the two Koreas. Later, he surfaced in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), where, along with a small group of other former U.S. mili-
tary defectors, he remained in obscurity until 2002. The group took part in
DPRK films, and Jenkins for a time taught English at Pyongyang University
of Foreign Studies until he was dismissed because of his strong accent. In
2002, it became known that he had married Soga Hitomi, one of the abduct-
ees from Japan. The marriage took place in 1980, when she was 20 and
he was 40. They had two children. Soga returned to Japan in autumn 2002,
after Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visit, but Jenkins, who
faced a possible court martial, and the children stayed in the DPRK. Follow-
ing Koizumi’s second visit in May 2004, the Jenkins family was reunited in
Indonesia, and they eventually went to Japan.

The U.S. authorities insisted that Jenkins be handed over under the terms
of the Japan–U.S. Status of Forces’ Agreement, and he was detained on
charges of desertion. When tried, he pleaded guilty, saying that he had been
frightened of having to go to Vietnam. He received a sentence of 30 days’
detention and a dishonorable discharge from the army. On release, he ex-
pressed the hope that he might be able to revisit the United States. He and
his family have now moved to Sado, the island in northern Japan that was his
wife’s home. He published an account of his time in the DPRK in Japanese,
Kokuhaku (“To tell the truth”), which has been translated into Korean; an
English-language version, The Reluctant Communist: My Desertion, Court-Martial and Forty-Year Imprisonment in North Korea, appeared in 2008. In these works, he describes his life in the DPRK as one of “privileged misery.” One other U.S. serviceman, Private First Class James Joseph Dresnok, who went to the DPRK in 1962, still lives there. The others are said to have died of natural causes.

JO MYONG ROK (1928–2010). Jo was a vice marshal in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) armed forces from 1995 and the first vice chairman of the National Defense Commission from 1978. He was born on 12 July 1928 (although dates given for his birth have varied between 1928 and 1936) in Yonsa county, North Hamyong Province (other accounts say that he was born in what is now the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region in the People’s Republic of China). He studied at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School and later at the Soviet Air Force Academy. In December 1950, he began flying with the DPRK air force. In 1974, he became a member of the central committee of the Korean Workers’ Party and an air force commander in 1978. He became a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly in 1986.

Jo was always regarded as a close supporter of Kim Jong Il. In October 2000, he visited the United States as a special envoy from Kim Jong Il, the highest ranking DPRK officer ever to do so. On that occasion, he was able to present personally a letter from Kim Jong Il to President Bill Clinton. Jo’s visit led to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to the DPRK later in October. Although Jo suffered from illness and had treatment abroad, he was still active until his death November 2010. He received the Order of Kim Il Sung in April 1982.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE NON-NUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. An agreement initialed between representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 31 December 1991. It provided for the total end of nuclear weapons’ development and deployment on the Korea Peninsula and for full mutual inspection. ROK President Roh Tae-woo approved it on 17 January 1992 and DPRK President Kim Il Sung on 18 January 1992. The document was exchanged at the sixth round of talks between the premiers of the two Koreas held in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, in February 1992. However, the declaration has remained a dead letter.

JOINT SECURITY AREA (JSA). The JSA is a roughly circular area at the truce village of Panmunjom on the division line between the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as laid down in the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Under the terms of the armistice, each side was allowed 35 military police in the area. Until 1976, both sides circulated freely in the JSA. However, following the ax murders at Panmunjom that year, it was agreed that neither side would in future cross the demarcation line. The only exception to this is in the hut that used to host the Military Armistice Commission meetings and where lower level meetings sometimes still take place. Here both sides cross the demarcation line, but only when the other side is not in the hut. The JSA was at the center of a very successful ROK film made in 2000 called Joint Security Area.

JOY, CHARLES TURNER (1895–1956). Admiral Charles Turner Joy was commander of the United States Naval Forces, Far East, at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and was head of the United Nations delegation to the armistice talks in 1951–52. Joy was born in St. Louis, Missouri, and joined the Naval Academy in 1916. He assumed command of his first ship in 1933 and participated in 11 naval combat missions in the Pacific during World War II. In 1949, he was appointed commander of Naval Forces, Far East. When the Korean War began, Joy felt that his resources were not sufficient, but the U.S. and other UN navies proved adequate to the task, as was shown by the successful naval landing at Inchon in September 1950; Joy apparently had strong reservations about the operation. In July 1951, he became head of the UN delegation to the armistice talks, a post that he held until he asked to be reassigned in May 1952. Caught as he was between the stalling tactics of the enemy side and what he saw as vacillation on his own, it was an experience he did not much enjoy. He wrote an account of his experiences, How Communists Negotiate, published in 1954, and his more revealing diary, Negotiating while Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference, appeared in 1978. After leaving Korea, Joy became commander of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis from 1952 to 1954. He died of leukemia in June 1956.

JUCHE. Term denoting the policies of self-reliance and independence that have guided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 1955, when the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung introduced it into the country’s political vocabulary, although it was not until later that it was presented as a fully developed philosophy. The word is composed of two parts: ju, signifying “master” or “the main element,” and che, meaning “the whole” or “essence,” with the connotation of self-sufficiency and independence in working out solutions to problems. At first, Kim used the concept to underline the desirability of avoiding being drawn into the ideological dispute between the
DPRK’s allies—the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union—as well as to underline his own role as a developer of Marxism–Leninism. The meaning was soon extended into other areas of activity such as the economy. From this, there developed the “juche doctrine,” which has remained the basis of the DPRK’s official philosophy and is enshrined in the constitution as the country’s “guiding principle.”

Juche revolves around two concepts: the people are the masters of their destiny, and they should remain independent of all outside influences. External contact and the acceptance of assistance are permitted, but the nation should avoid spiritual and psychological dependence and any sense of deference to stronger powers. While juche stresses the central role of human beings, people can play out this role only through subordination to a leader. The doctrine, which was developed further by Hwang Jang Yop, who later defected to the Republic of Korea, thus supported the rule of Kim Il Sung and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Il, who had studied directly under Hwang. Juche has survived as the basis of the DPRK’s philosophy and policies, despite the country’s visible dependence on outside assistance since the mid-1990s. So intimately is the concept associated with Kim Il Sung that in 1997, on the occasion of the third anniversary of his death, both the term juche and Kim’s year of birth—1912—were incorporated into the DPRK’s official chronology. Thus, 2011 was Juche 100 (the initial year being counted in), and the second Juche century begins with Juche 101 in 2012. To many outsiders, juche seems more like a religious movement than a political philosophy, and it has been examined in this sense in a number of academic studies.

JUNE 2000 NORTH–SOUTH SUMMIT. In June 2000, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Kim Jong Il, then the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), held the first ever North–South summit in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital. The two leaders held a series of wide-ranging talks and reached agreements that held out much hope for a reduction of tension on the peninsula. The meeting was essentially designed to make the ROK’s “sunshine policy” (engagement policy) more effective. Before 2000, some ROK aid went to the DPRK, and trade, allowed since the late 1980s, had begun to develop, but until 2000, no spectacular breakthrough seemed likely. In March 2000, however, Kim Dae-jung made a speech in Berlin that offered assistance to the DPRK. He also gave a pledge that his policy was not aimed at the overthrow of the DPRK regime but was designed to end the confrontational approach that had hitherto dominated relations. There was no immediate DPRK public response, but in April 2000, it emerged that the two sides had almost immediately begun talking and had agreed that the two leaders would meet in Pyongyang in June. There had
been many proposals in the past for such a summit meeting. As recently as 1994, one had been planned between then DPRK president Kim Il Sung and his ROK counterpart President Kim Young-sam. But Kim Il Sung’s sudden death in July 1994 halted the preparations for the meeting, and when Kim Young-sam declined to send condolences on the death to the DPRK, the two sides lapsed into their customary hostile mode.

Planning for the 2000 visit was more successful. On 13 June, Kim Dae-jung and his wife went to Pyongyang in the first direct civil flight between the divided peninsula since 1948, the first ROK president to visit the DPRK. It was Kim Jong Il who dominated the summit, however. He appeared at the airport to greet his guest, thus publicly according the older man the deference Koreans would expect. Over the next few days, he became the unlikely star of the media coverage of the visit. The formal talks were conducted on the DPRK side by Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, but Kim Jong Il appeared at several informal sessions. After two days of talks, the two sides pledged in a joint declaration to work for national unification, accepted that there were common elements in each side’s proposals about some form of federated state, agreed to work together for a balanced national economy, promised to promote exchanges and cooperation, and agreed to work toward further humanitarian exchanges by 15 August, the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945, one of the few events celebrated by both Koreas. Kim Jong Il also agreed to make a return visit to the ROK. Implementation of the summit agreements began almost immediately. Red Cross meetings led to two rounds of family reunions. These were stilted affairs, with the DPRK participants carefully chosen from among the most loyal groups. Attempts to agree on more regular exchanges, with a permanent meeting place, led to much wrangling between the two sides.

Many in the ROK felt that the DPRK gained the most from the summit, especially as details emerged of how much had been paid by the ROK to get DPRK agreement. The ROK also agreed to provide aid and economic assistance and to repatriate a number of long-term unconverted prisoners. The DPRK did not reciprocate, denying that it held any similar long-term prisoners. Kim Jong Il never made his promised return visit to the ROK. The DPRK procrastinated on the resumption of North–South railroad links. Talks between armed forces of both sides were held, but again the ROK felt that these lacked substance, and in particular, failed to begin the implementation of confidence-building measures that would reduce the military standoff on the peninsula. Despite these problems, the “sunshine policy,” which was increasingly referred to as the “engagement policy,” continued under Kim Dae-jung until his retirement in February 2003. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun,
continued a similar policy toward the DPRK and went to Pyongyang for the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit. But when the conservative Lee Myung-bak succeeded Roh as president in 2008, engagement effectively came to an end. Lee showed no interest in carrying forward the agreements reached in 2000 and 2007. Both sides still occasionally refer to a possible further summit meeting, and there has clearly been some contact. The DPRK revealed some of these in 2011, to the embarrassment of the Lee Myung-bak government. Until there is a change of government in the ROK, further summit meetings look unlikely.
KAESONG. Now in North Hwanghae Province in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kaesong (as Songdo) was the capital of a united Korea under the Koryo dynasty (918–1392). After the fall of the Koryo dynasty and the move of the capital to Seoul in 1394, Kaesong became something of a political backwater, although it remained an important commercial center with a thriving merchant class. With the division of Korea in 1945 along the 38th parallel, Kaesong was in the south, but it was very close to the parallel and quickly captured at the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950. It then changed hands as the armies moved up and down the peninsula. As the war settled into stalemate in the spring of 1951, Kaesong became the only Republic of Korea (ROK) city still held by DPRK forces and has remained in DPRK control ever since. It was the site of the first truce talks in June 1951 but was eventually replaced by Panmunjom. Although it did not entirely escape attack, its position as the headquarters of the DPRK and Chinese teams negotiating the Armistice Agreement afforded it a certain amount of protection, and it was one of the few DPRK cities that survived the war with some ancient buildings remaining intact. It lies 198 kilometers (134 miles) south of Pyongyang, the capital city, to which it is connected by rail and road.

From 1955 to 2003, it was a special city governed directly from the center. In 2003, the setting up of the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), which adjoins the city, led to the remainder of the area joining North Hwanghae Province. It has a population of some 308,000 according to the 2008 census. It produces porcelain, and its ginseng is said to be the best in the whole peninsula. Since the demilitarized zone and Panmunjom are only a short distance away, it is a major center for the DPRK armed forces. Tourism is important for Kaesong. The city and the surrounding area have a large number of cultural relics, including Koryo royal tombs, various temples, and a Koryo museum, housed in the former Confucian academy. One of its hotels, particularly popular with Western visitors, was constructed from old-style housing. Not surprisingly, language and food are similar to those in the Seoul region, which has an appeal for DPRK visitors. For a brief period in 2007–8, tourist groups from the ROK could visit Kaesong by bus. The tours were tightly controlled and there
was very limited contact between the visitors and DPRK citizens. As relations between the two Koreas deteriorated following the election of President Lee Myung-bak, the tours stopped in November 2008 and have not resumed.

The area is an important archaeological site. Since the late 1990s and the beginning of work on the KIZ, teams of archaeologists from the two Koreas and from the West have been engaged in examining and preserving as much as possible.

KAESONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE (KIZ). In 2003, a groundbreaking ceremony took place just outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) most southerly city, Kaesong, for the KIZ. The KIZ has had its problems, but it is so far the most successful of the DPRK’s attempts at following the Chinese concept of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) as a means of boosting economic development. The concept was the brainchild of the founder of the Hyundai conglomerate Chung Ju-yung, who was for many years the foremost business leader in the Republic of Korea and who was originally from what is now the DPRK. One of his companies, Hyundai Asan, played a leading role in the setting up and organization of the KIZ. In many ways, the KIZ was the most potent symbol of ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” of engagement with the DPRK as an alternative to confrontation.

Royal Koryo tomb figures at Kaesong. Long before the “Army First” policy, civilian officials take precedence over the military.
The KIZ is situated between the town of Kaesong and the demilitarized zone (DMZ), some 10 kilometers (6 miles) to the south, which has marked the boundary between the two Koreas since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The original plan envisaged that the project would be completed by 2012, the centenary year of the birth of the DPRK’s first leader Kim Il Sung. It would then have 700,000 employees on a site of 65 square kilometers (25 square miles). Work on the first phase finished at the end of 2004. Fifteen ROK companies applied for places, although only three began manufacturing on the site in March 2005. This was less spectacular than expected, but it was progress. Buses regularly crossed the DMZ, and the first goods manufactured in the zone, kitchen pans, went on sale in the ROK. The ROK began supplying telephone service and electricity. In 2007, 22 companies employed 12,000 DPRK staff, who were producing shoes, textiles, and light industrial goods. Foreign companies were also invited to set up factories, and there was some interest for a time, but the growing international tensions over the DPRK nuclear program may have put off potential investors. By mid-2010, the KIZ was employing some 42,000 DPRK staff in 121—some reports said 110—companies and there were 800 ROK managers. The complex was responsible for $941 million of inter-Korean trade in 2009 and $1.44 billion in 2010.

The KIZ was not exempt from the tensions between the two Koreas over nuclear and other issues. But until the advent of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, the effect was minimal. Lee did not conceal his dislike of the engagement policy of his predecessors, however, and the DPRK reacted accordingly. Following the suspension of the Kumgang Mountain tourist project after the shooting of an ROK tourist in July 2008, there was concern that the KIZ would also suffer. The DPRK at first took no action, but at the end of the year it imposed restrictions on access and the number of ROK staff that could work there. There were also hints that it might close the KIZ entirely. After a short time, however, all restrictions were lifted and business continued as before. Then in the middle of 2009, the DPRK announced that it was scrapping all existing rent and salary agreements in the KIZ and demanded that wages be raised from $75 per month to $300. (Wages when the zone first opened were $57 per month.) Following a visit by the chair of Hyundai Asan, the DPRK withdrew the threat and accepted a 5 percent increase in wages.

The sinking of the Chonan and the Yonpyong Islands clash in 2010 brought relations between the two Koreas to a very low ebb, with the cutting off of most contacts. However, the KIZ remained in operation, although the construction of new facilities largely came to a halt and the large number of construction workers of the early years disappeared from the site. Some
construction resumed in 2011. The zone’s continued existence is clearly important to the DPRK since it brings in a relatively large sum of money each year. The ROK companies that have invested in the project have regularly petitioned to keep it going since they would suffer heavy losses if it came to an end. If the KIZ closed, these companies might well seek compensation from the government.

The communiqué signed at the end of the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit envisaged the KIZ becoming the model for other similar zones along the DMZ, for the mutual benefit of the two Koreas, and as a contribution to the easing of tension. Like most other provisions of the communiqué, this one has remained a dead letter. See also FOREIGN TRADE; KIM YONG CHOL; RAJIN-SONBONG SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE; SHINUIJU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.

KANEMARU SHIN (1914–1996). A prominent Japanese politician with links to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He was educated at Tokyo Agricultural University, and entered the Diet in 1958 on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ticket. From the early 1970s, he held a variety of party and government posts, but his real influence began when Takeshita Noburu took over the former Tanaka Kakuei faction within the party. Kanemaru’s son was married to Takeshita’s daughter, and before long, Kanemaru effectively ran the Takeshita faction, amassing large funds in the process. This led to his downfall as he became involved in a scandal with the Sagawa Kyobin company. He had also shown himself politically inept during a visit to the DPRK where he exceeded his brief in promising compensation for Japan’s alleged damage to the DPRK since the end of World War II. A police raid on his house in 1992 revealed vast sums collected for political purposes, and Kanemaru resigned from parliament. He died before he was due to be tried on corruption and other charges. His death ended any support for the DPRK in conservative Japanese political circles.

KANG SOK JU (1939– ). In September 2010, Kang Sok Jun became a vice premier and, apparently, vice president of the Supreme Court. Previously, he had been first vice minister of foreign affairs since September 1998, and a leading negotiator on nuclear issues. Kang is a member of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee and a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly. He was born in Pyongwon, South Pyongan Province, and educated at the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, majoring in English. He is also reported to speak Chinese. His brother, Kang Sok Sung (1928–2001) was a prominent government official and director of the KWP Party History Institute. The younger Kang worked in the KWP external affairs department in the 1970s, and in 1981 was reported as a third secretary
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) delegation to the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in France. During the mid-1980s, he was back in the KWP external affairs department, moving to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as first deputy minister in 1987. He was awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung in 1992 and served on the funeral committees for Kim Il Sung in 1994 and O Jin U in 1995. He led the delegation to the first round of DPRK talks with the United States in 1993 and continued to play a prominent role in subsequent negotiations on nuclear matters. It is thought that he was close to Kim Il Sung and to Kim Jong Il; one report says that they were cousins, but he was not a member of the Kim Jong Il funeral committee in 2011. As a negotiator, he was known for playing a tough role, with an earthy line in comment, in contrast to his deputy, Kim Kye Gwan. There are also unconfirmed reports that he was sent for reeducation at one time because he had acted without party authority in the nuclear negotiations.

KANG SONG SAN (1931– ). Kang is a technocrat and has been premier twice. He was born in North Hamyong Province in 1931 and educated at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School and in Prague, now in the Czech Republic, where he studied engineering. He first emerged as a Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) official in Nampo, the port city for the capital Pyongyang, in August 1969, but by November of that year, he was chief secretary of the Pyongyang Municipal Committee of the KWP. He was a delegate and a member of the presidium of the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in 1972. In October 1973, he became an alternate member of the KWP Politburo. After a brief period as chair of the Transport and Postal Committee, he became a deputy prime minister and minister of railways in September 1979. From January 1984 to December 1986, he was premier. After his replacement, for which no reason was given, he reemerged two years later as head of the local government in North Hamyong Province. In 1992, he returned to Pyongyang as premier once again, which some saw as a sign of a more technocratic approach to the economy. However, he ceased to appear in public at the beginning of 1997 and was replaced by Hong Sung Nam, first as acting premier and then substantively from September 1998. Kang was also not elected as a delegate to the 10th SPA in February 1997. There were some reports that illness was the reason for his dismissal, but there were also rumors of political difficulties after a defector claimed in 1994 that he was Kang’s son-in-law. The gap between this incident and his loss of position makes this unlikely.

KANGSONG TAEGUK. This phrase, meaning a “strong and prosperous country,” began to used in 1998, when it first appeared in a Rodong Sinmun
editorial in August. This was shortly before the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) announced in September that the National Defense Commission would be the “highest government organ” in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and that Kim Jong Il would be its chair. The phrase has echoes of the 19th-century Japanese phrase fukoku kyohie, meaning “rich country and strong army.” It indicated the importance of military power to achieve strength in all fields, especially heavy industry, and as the songun (“Army First”) policy became increasingly prominent from 2001 onward, the two concepts were often linked. In 2008, Kim Jong Il linked the achievement of a “strong and prosperous country” with the 100th anniversary of the birth of his father, Kim Il Sung, which would be celebrated in 2012.

KAPSAN FACTION. Name given to the group of former guerrilla leaders upon whom Kim Il Sung placed the most reliance as he gained political control over the party and state after the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. The name comes from the Kapsan area South Hamyong Province (now Yanggang Province) where the group is supposed to have operated against the Japanese during the 1930s.
and 1940s. They remained the dominant political force within the DPRK until well into the 1970s.

KARTMAN, CHARLES (1948–
). United States diplomat and administrator who was executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from May 2001 to August 2005. Kartman joined the State Department in 1975 after graduate study at George Washington University. Much of his earlier career was spent working in Japan. He also served as political counselor and later deputy head of mission in the U.S. embassy to the Republic of Korea. From June 1996, he was the principal deputy assistant to the secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was acting assistant secretary for much of 1997. In July 1998, he became the special envoy for the Korean Peace Talks, until he succeeded Stephen Bosworth as head of KEDO in 2001, at which point he retired from the State Department. Although he could be highly critical of the DPRK, he believed that a policy of engagement made more sense than one of confrontation. He therefore found himself out of sympathy with the policy pursued during the first George W. Bush presidency. See also HILL, CHRISTOPHER; KELLY, JAMES A.; NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

KELLY, JAMES A. (1937–

President George W. Bush nominated him as assistant secretary of state in what would prove to be a difficult point in U.S.–Asia-Pacific relations. The new administration did not like President Bill Clinton’s approach to dealing with the DPRK and had little time for the “Sunshine Policy” pursued by Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-jung. Kelly’s room for maneuver vis-à-vis the DPRK was therefore very limited. When he was eventually allowed to lead a delegation to the DPRK in October 2002, it was not for the wide-ranging discussion of issues that the DPRK claimed it wanted, but to raise the allegation that the DPRK was in breach of the Agreed Framework. Kelly and
his team, which included a number of Korean speakers, said that Kang Sok Ju, the chief DPRK negotiator, admitted to such a program after at first denying it. The DPRK later claimed that its negotiators had been misunderstood, but the Agreed Framework quickly began to unravel. By the end of the year, the DPRK had taken measures to reactivate its nuclear facilities and to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kelly continued in office during the remainder of the first George W. Bush administration and led U.S. delegations to the Six Party Talks, which began under Chinese auspices in 2003, but his ability to negotiate remained limited, compared with the leeway allowed during the second Bush administration to his successor Christopher Hill. Kelly returned to the CSIS Pacific Forum in 2005, which created a James A. Kelly Korean Studies Fellowship Program in his honor in 2009.

KIM BOK SHIN (1925– ). Kim Bok Shin, born in North Pyongyan Province, is one of the few women to have reached political prominence in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). She was educated at the Central Party School and at Kim Il Sung University, where she studied economics. Her first post was as manager of a pulp factory. By September 1958, she was a vice minister of light industries and a vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Light Industries Department. She was elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in 1957. After a series of posts connected with the textile and paper industries in the capital, Pyongyang, she became minister for textiles and paper in 1971. Kim continued to hold senior party and government posts and in 1982 became a vice premier. Elected an alternative member of the Politburo the following year, she held the position until 1992. During the 1980s and 1990s, she was closely associated with the drive to attract foreign investment, as chair of the State External Economic Affairs Commission and Korea International General Joint Venture Commission. When she stepped down as vice premier in September 1998, she was appointed an honorary councilor to the cabinet. She was awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung in 1982 and was for a time the chair of the DPRK–Iraq Friendship Committee.

KIM CHAEK (1903–1951). Born in North Hamyong Province, Kim Chaek went to Manchuria and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. He became an important associate of Kim Il Sung in the guerrilla fighting against the Japanese in North Korea and Manchuria in the 1930s, but, like Kim, was forced into the Soviet Maritime Provinces during the Japanese offensive against the guerrilla forces in 1940. Again like Kim, Kim Chaek stayed in the Soviet Union until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. He returned to Korea with Soviet forces in August 1945. After Kim Il Sung’s return in au-
tumn 1945, Kim Chaek was one of his strongest supporters. In October 1945, he became the first head of the Military Academy. He also held important party posts. With the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948, he was a vice premier and also minister of industry. At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, he was one of the members of the Korean Workers’ Party military committee, which was responsible for the conduct of the war. In September 1950, he became a frontline commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and was responsible for organizing guerrilla units to operate behind enemy lines as the KPA retreated following the Inchon landing. He was killed in a bombing raid in January 1951. Kim Chaek City and its ironworks and Kim Chaek University of Technology were named in his memory.

KIM CHAEK UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY. One of the small number of institutions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that commemorates somebody other than a member of Kim Il Sung’s family. Named after Kim Chaek, a guerrilla fighter and close associate of Kim Il Sung, the university was founded in 1948 and given its present name after the Korean War. It is a major center for weapons-related and information technology research, with a student body of around 10,000 to 12,000 and staff of 2,000 in 2011. It has also been involved in nuclear research since the mid-1950s. Since 2001, it has had a research collaboration with Syracuse University in New York. See also ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

KIM CHEOL-WOONG (1972– ). Former chief pianist with the Pyongyang Philharmonic Orchestra who left the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2001 and who now lives in Seoul, in the Republic of Korea (ROK). He was educated at the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance and at the Tchaikovsky Conservatoire in Moscow. He became chief pianist with the Pyongyang Philharmonic Orchestra in 1999, but claims that he was criticized and forced to write a confession for playing music by Richard Claderman. This led him to flee to the People’s Republic of China in 2001; he told the New York Sun in May 2008 that he had left “not because he was hungry for food but because he was hungry for music.” He claims that he was twice captured and sent back to the DPRK, but was successful at his third attempt and reached the ROK in 2003. His mother later joined him. He frequently appears at events organized in support of DPRK defectors/refugees and in support of campaigns for human rights improvements in the DPRK. See also YUN I-SANG.
KIM DAE-JUNG (1924–2009). A longtime opposition politician in the Republic of Korea (ROK), Kim became president in 1997 at his fourth attempt. First elected to the National Assembly in 1960, he was from the start closely associated with the main opposition party. He narrowly lost the 1971 presidential election to the incumbent Park Chung-hee, and thereafter was Park’s determined opponent. In 1973, he disappeared in Tokyo and turned up in the ROK capital, Seoul. He maintained that he had been kidnapped on Park’s orders and saved by United States’ intervention. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) used this event as a reason for breaking off the talks between the two Koreas that had been ongoing since 1971.

Kim continued to oppose Park and suffered frequent arrests. Following Chun Du-hwan’s coup in 1979, he was again imprisoned and eventually sentenced to death. Once more U.S. intervention saved him, and he was allowed to leave for “medical treatment” in the United States. On his return to the ROK in 1985, he again became active in opposition politics. He failed to win the presidential elections in 1987 and 1992, after which he briefly retired from politics. With the 1997 elections in mind, he aligned himself with Park Chung-hee’s former right-hand supporter (and relative) Kim Jong-pil.

Although Kim was a Roman Catholic, there were claims, sometimes spread by government officials, that he was a crypto-communist. As “proof” of such claims, it was noted that the DPRK frequently included him in lists of those in the ROK with whom it was willing to have dealings. Such listings were probably linked to his role in opposition and to his long advocacy of a less negative approach to the DPRK than what prevailed under the successive military governments. Once elected president, Kim began to develop these ideas, but at first his energy was mainly focused on the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. Only as the ROK began to recover from that was he able to expound what became known as the “Sunshine Policy.” The long-term aim of this was the reunification of the two Koreas at some distant date, but in the shorter term, Kim offered an assurance that there would be no attempt at forced absorption and that the ROK was willing to provide assistance in overcoming the DPRK’s economic problems. At the same time, he made it clear that the ROK would not tolerate attacks or interference in its affairs. To further these aims, he encouraged companies and organizations to engage with the DPRK.

The DPRK was at first wary of the proposals but gradually showed interest, while companies such as Hyundai began to turn Kim’s ideas into practical projects. The big breakthrough came in early 2000 when negotiations led to the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. Although there were some in the ROK who were critical of Kim’s decision to go to Pyongyang, the apparent deference of then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il toward him and the agreements that followed the visit led to huge domestic and international successes for
the ROK president. That year Kim received the Nobel Prize for Peace. North–South contacts expanded and the ROK also encouraged countries to establish **diplomatic relations** with the DPRK. The euphoria did not last. It was soon clear that the summit had only taken place because a lot of money had passed to the DPRK. While U.S. President Bill Clinton had broadly been in support of the “Sunshine Policy,” after 2001 the George W. Bush administration moved toward a more critical and confrontational approach. Kim also had to cope with damaging claims of corruption in his family, although there was no evidence of any wrong-doing on his part.

After he left office in 2003, he continued to support his successor Roh Moo-hyun over engagement, despite the continued domestic criticism and the problems over the DPRK nuclear program. He was highly critical of Roh’s successor Lee Myung-bak, who adopted a far more skeptical approach to the DPRK from 2008 and who largely ended engagement. By then Kim’s views counted for little. Roh Moo-hyun’s suicide in May 2009 caused him distress, and his own death followed in August that year. The DPRK sent representatives to his funeral. He remains a highly controversial figure in ROK politics, though he is still seen positively in the DPRK.

**KIM HYUN HEE.** Kim Hyun Hee and Kim Sung II were arrested in November 1987 at Bahrain airport, following the Andaman Sea bombing that destroyed Korean Air flight 858. Both were Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) citizens and unrelated, although they were traveling on Japanese passports as father and daughter. Kim Sung II committed suicide, but Kim Hyun Hee was taken alive. She first claimed to be a Japanese named Hachiya Mayumi, but later confessed that she was from the DPRK. She also admitted that she and her companion had been on a mission to destroy the flight in order to disrupt the 1988 Olympic Games, due to be held in Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (ROK). She also claimed that Kim Jong II, son of the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung, was behind the attack. The Bahraini authorities handed her over to the ROK, where she was tried and sentenced to death. While awaiting execution, however, she became a Christian, expressing repentance for her actions. The ROK government later pardoned her. She wrote an autobiography, *The Tears of My Soul*, published in 1993. In 1997, she married an officer from the ROK National Intelligence Service. In her book, she said she was born in Kaesong in 1962, lived abroad while her father was on a diplomatic posting, and had been recruited as an agent after university. She also claimed that a Japanese woman had coached her in the DPRK, thus providing the first substantive evidence of Japanese abductees.

In 2004, relatives of some of those killed in 1987 disputed Kim’s story and launched an unsuccessful demand for a government inquiry. They claimed
that the destruction of the aircraft had been part of a plot by then President Chun Du-hwan to win support for Roh Tae-woo in the 1987 presidential election campaign.

KIM IL SUNG (1912–1994). Leader and ruler of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from its foundation in 1948 until his death in July 1994. From the post of premier, which he took in 1948 with the formation of the new state and its first administration, he was elevated in 1972 to the position of president and head of state. He was also elected general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), the top party post, in 1966, after moving upward through successive party positions from 1946. In his later years he was referred to as the “Great Leader.”

Kim Il Sung was born into a peasant family that lived in the village of Mangyongdae in the outskirts of Pyongyang, now described as his native place and a national shrine. In his memoirs, he says that he was actually born in his mother’s family house at Chilgot, another village on the outskirts of Pyongyang, and also now a shrine. His original name was Kim Song Ju. His mother, Kang Bang Suk, was a Christian, and Kim himself admitted that he had attended services as a child, but found them boring. His father, Kim Hyong Sik, who died in 1926, was a teacher and an occasional practitioner of Koryo medicine. From 1919 to 1929, Kim’s education appears to have been divided between schools in Manchuria and Korea as his family moved back and forth between the two countries. According to official DPRK accounts, Kim traveled alone and on foot from Manchuria to Pyongyang in 1923, returning again, on foot, in 1925. He appears to have been expelled from school in 1929 for unlawful student activities, was imprisoned for a short time, and on release, joined one of the many Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla bands operating from northeast China. There was some liaison between these bands and Chinese communist groups, and Kim also joined the Chinese Communist Party. Around this period he changed his name to Kim Il Sung. In the DPRK, much has been made of his achievements in political organization and guerrilla activity against the Japanese, which are sometimes dismissed as propaganda. But while Kim was by no means the only guerrilla leader among the Koreans, he did rise to some prominence and was the subject of special attention by the Japanese gendarmerie. Under Japanese pressure in 1940–41, many guerrilla groups, including Kim’s, retreated into the Soviet Union.

There is no clear record of his activities during World War II, although he appears to have served with the Soviet Red Army in garrison duties in the Soviet Far East. In 1945, following the division of Korea, he returned in Soviet army uniform with many of his former guerrilla colleagues and a number of Soviet Koreans. Kim played no part in the defeat of the Japanese,
but he was part of the group that helped to establish the administration in the Soviet-run northern part of the peninsula. Kim does not appear to have been chosen especially for this role; rather, as an able organizer and administrator, he appealed to the Soviet forces. His abilities carried him forward to the reconstruction and reorientation of his country. He appears to have been genuinely welcomed by Koreans as someone with a popular touch and the vigor to get things done. No detail of people’s lives was deemed too insignificant for his comment. The reverse of this was a readiness to dominate and control. Whatever the reasons, he had certainly become the dominant political figure in North Korea by the time that separate states were established on the peninsula in 1948. He was not yet the all-powerful figure he would later become, but he was well on his way to such a position.

Like most Koreans, Kim was dismayed at the allies’ division of Korea, but his attempt to reunify the country through the Korean War ended in failure and continued division. After the war ended in 1953, he concentrated at first on building up his position and that of his family through shrewd and ruthless elimination of political rivals and those judged unreliable, and then on turning the DPRK into an independent socialist entity. The philosophical underpinning of the new state was provided by the doctrine of *juche*, which

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*Arch of Triumph, Pyongyang, erected in 1982 to mark Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday and to commemorate his fight against the Japanese.*
emphasized self-sufficiency and self-reliance and the value of the people as the master of their destiny; however, the people needed the appropriate leader to guide them. The economic course he proposed for the DPRK, of agricultural collectivization and rapid industrialization, met with considerable domestic support and initial success. But it proved impossible to sustain its momentum, and from the 1970s, the DPRK began an economic decline, which was reflected in slogans such as “Let’s eat two meals a day!” The need for domestic reconstruction, his international supporters’ discouragement of renewed military action, and the United States troops in the southern half of the peninsula pushed thoughts of reunification into the background. Instead, a sporadic campaign of terrorism was pursued, aimed at destabilizing the Republic of Korea (ROK). In 1960 and again in 1980, Kim proposed a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, as a solution to the issue of reunification. In this proposal, which remains the official DPRK position, both Korean political systems would coexist in one state.

From 1971 to 1973, the two Koreas engaged in a dialogue, first through “unofficial” Red Cross talks and then in ministerial-level meetings to discuss ways of moving toward reunification, but the contact fizzled out. In international affairs, Kim steered between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and the DPRK avoided taking sides in the Sino–Soviet dispute. Kim’s ability to see the advantages to the DPRK in various contemporary international trends, such as anticolonialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, coupled with his talent for personal rapport, allowed him to strike up friendships with a number of world leaders, especially in the third world. However, his willingness to pursue a program apparently designed to give the DPRK its own nuclear weapons, despite his repeated statements that there should be no nuclear weapons on the peninsula, attracted the hostility of the United States and nearly brought another war to Korea. He died before the disasters of the mid-1990s that reduced the DPRK to appealing for international humanitarian aid.

Kim is known to have married twice. His first wife, Kim Jong Suk, also had a guerrilla background. She was known to the Japanese police before 1940 as a member of Kim Il Sung’s unit, although not as his wife. They probably married in the Soviet Union in 1940 or 1941; she was apparently known as Vera among the leaders of the Soviet occupation forces after 1945, for whom she would sometimes cook large meals. They had three children, the eldest of which was Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Suk was the first lady of the DPRK for one year, from September 1948 until she died while giving birth to a stillborn child in September 1949. She then effectively disappeared from view until Kim Jong Il began to emerge as his father’s successor in the 1970s. A monument to her guerrilla activities and a museum were built in her hometown, and her
exploits, hitherto ignored, now featured in the media. She continued to receive much attention after Kim Jong Il succeeded his father in 1984.

Kim’s second wife was Kim Song Ae, of whose background little is really known. There is speculation that she had some secretarial role in his entourage. Some accounts say that she was originally a nurse to Kim Il Sung’s orphaned children and that they married in 1953. Others give the date of marriage as 1963. Since she began to make public appearances only from about 1965, the later date seems most likely. She regularly accompanied Kim on overseas visits and at state functions. She also appeared, in her own right, as president of the Korean Democratic Women’s League, replacing Choe Kwang’s wife in 1971, after Choe was purged. She and Kim Il Sung had four children, and there are rumors that she tried to push one of these forward as successor but was unable to stop the rise of Kim Jong Il. Although she appeared on the funeral committees for both Kim Il Sung and O Jin U in 1994 and 1995, respectively, she made no other known appearances. She was replaced by Chon Yon Ok as president of the Women’s League in 1998 and is said to live under a form of house arrest near Pyongyang, together with other members of her family.

The question of a successor concerned Kim Il Sung greatly. After some years apparently favoring his younger brother Kim Yong Ju for this role, he switched his preference to his eldest son Kim Jong Il. This was probably in the early 1960s, although the younger Kim remained in the background until he appeared as the designated successor in 1980. When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, there was no doubt that he had largely fashioned the DPRK, and it remains very much his creation. However, he left a country facing multiple and severe problems, most of which were the result of policies he had insisted on following over the years.

Kim Il Sung continues to dominate the DPRK even after his death. His pictures and statues are everywhere. Since 1998, he is formally called the “Eternal President” and is still referred to as the “Great Leader” (widaehan suryong—a title originally reserved for the Soviet leader Josef Stalin). Children, to whom he is “Grandfather Kim Il Sung,” are taught that he is the source of all benefits. His mausoleum at his former place of work, the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, is effectively the national shrine of the DPRK. In 1997, the DPRK formally adopted his year of birth, 1912, as the base date for a new Juche calendar. Elaborate preparations were put in hand to celebrate the centenary of his birth in 2012. Despite the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, the events to mark the centenary are to go ahead. Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il’s third son and designated successor, bears a remarkable similarity to his grandfather. See also BADGES; CARTER, JAMES (JIMMY) EARL, JR.; HOLIDAYS; KAPSAN FACTION; KIM CHAEK; “ON THE SPOT GUIDANCE.”
KIM IL SUNG MILITARY UNIVERSITY. Established in 1948, this institution provides graduate-level training for officers of the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), although some of its graduates also become civilian officials. It is situated in the Mangyongdae area. It has absorbed a number of earlier institutions. Republic of Korea press reports say that Kim Jong Un, the third son and successor of Kim Jong Il, attended the university.

KIM IL SUNG SOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE. Originally founded in 1946 as the Party Youth League, it became the Socialist Workers’ Party Youth League in 1964 and took its present title in 1996. It is the main Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) organization for young people aged between 16 and 30; specially favored young people can join at 14, but the majority have to wait until they are 16. After 30, members of the Youth League would expect to join the KWP. Like other KWP-related organizations, it was originally based on a Soviet Union model, in this case, the Komsomol. It plays an important role in indoctrination.

KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY. Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang is the most prestigious educational institute in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was founded in 1946 as the North Korean People’s University, but changed its name after the establishment of the DPRK in September 1948. It is the only full university in the country. Currently, there are 15 departments and some 12,000 undergraduate and postgraduate students. The student body includes a number of foreigners, and there are also some foreign teachers, mainly concerned with language teaching. The library is said to have some 2 million books. The campus is on an attractive site not far from the Kumsusan Memorial Palace. Student selection is on the basis of background and qualifying tests, but there are rumors that children of the top leadership are guaranteed places whatever their educational standards. Its graduates occupy senior positions in party and government. They include both Kim Jong Il, who succeeded Kim Il Sung as leader of the DPRK in 1994, and the current leader, Kim Jong Un, who took over when his father died in December 2011. A memorial room at the university commemorates Kim Jong Il’s time there, and there are several monuments to visits established by him and his father over the years. The university featured on the first ever commemorative postage stamps issued by the DPRK in September 1949. During 2011, a number of new buildings were added to the campus, as part of the preparations for Kim Il Sung’s 100th birthday in 2012. See also ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
KIM JONG CHUL (1981– ). Kim Jong Chul is the second son of the late Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il by Ko Yong Hui, and thus the brother of Kim Jong Un and the half-brother of Kim Jong Nam. He was educated at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School and in Switzerland. According to the Japanese chef Fujimoto Kenji, who worked for Kim Jong Il in the 1990s, the latter had little time for Kim Jong Chul, whom he described as “like a little girl.” In 2007, he was appointed as deputy chief of the leadership division of the Korean Workers’ Party, which led to speculation that he was being groomed to succeed his father. This proved unfounded. He is thought to be a fan of the rock singer Eric Clapton. He was reportedly filmed at one of Clapton’s concerts in Germany in 2006 and identified by some of his former schoolmates. There were also reports that he attended another Clapton concert in Singapore in February 2011. In 2008, the DPRK embassy in London stated publicly that Eric Clapton would perform in Pyongyang, but no concert materialized. Kim Jong Chul is also reported to be interested in computers. He was not listed as a member of Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee in December 2011, and there has been no mention of him since his father’s death and the succession of his brother Kim Jong Un.

KIM JONG IL (1942–2011). Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from July 1994, when he succeeded his father, Kim Il Sung, until his death, reportedly from a heart attack on 17 December 2011. He in turn was succeeded by his third known son, Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Il’s formal titles were general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), a post to which he was elected in October 1997, commander-in-chief of the armed forces (from 1991), and chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC), a position he held from 1992 and to which he was reelected at each new Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). Although long expected to succeed his father, he took only one of the latter’s formal titles, that of party general secretary. In September 1998, after a change to the constitution, the position of chairman of the NDC was redefined as the nation’s highest post. Kim Jong Il did not become president, that office being preempted by the decision in 1998 to designate Kim Il Sung “president in perpetuity.” Since Kim Il Sung’s death, state ceremonial functions have passed to the chairman of the SPA Presidium, currently (in 2012) Kim Yong Nam.

According to official DPRK accounts after he emerged as his father’s successor, Kim Jong Il, the eldest son of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Suk, was born in 1942 in a guerrilla camp on Mount Paektu on the border with China, in an area that Koreans have traditionally regarded as sacred. His birth was supposedly marked by unusual natural phenomena. (Similar events, such as unseasonal rainbows and unusual behavior by birds and animals are also said
to have marked his death.) The reality seems to be that he was born in 1941 near Khabarovsk in the Soviet Union, where his father had lived from 1941 to 1945. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the family returned to Korea. During the Korean War (1950–53), he and his sister, Kim Kyong Hui, were sent first to the far north of the peninsula and then to northeast China for safety. The two siblings remained close ever afterward. Kim was educated at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, graduating in 1963. Some accounts claim that he also studied in the Soviet Union, in the German Democratic Republic, and in Malta. After graduation, the younger Kim worked in the KWP secretariat, eventually becoming his father’s secretary and assisting him in the purges of cadres accused of insufficient loyalty and enthusiasm in 1967. In 1973, Kim Jong Il became party secretary in charge of the Organization and Guidance Department. His treatise On the Art of the Cinema, which appeared that year, confirmed his close interest in the use of cinema as a didactic tool in propagating the appropriate ideological message. During the early 1970s, he is said to have been involved in film and stage productions. As well as writing on the cinema, he has also produced works on other aspects of the arts and on the juche idea. Throughout the following years, his father worked to have him accepted as his successor, sometimes against domestic resistance and foreign doubts. Before his formal designation as the successor in 1980, he

*Climax of a theatrical performance to mark Kim Jong Il’s 60th birthday, February 2002.*
Kim Jong Il was not named but was referred to as “the party centre.” By the early 1990s, he was said to be in charge of the day-to-day running of the country.

Kim Jong Il faced a series of problems after his father’s death. The DPRK was still suffering economic problems following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) trading system. From the mid-1990s, a series of natural disasters caused widespread damage and disruption and led to a decision to appeal for humanitarian aid. The resulting influx of foreign aid workers was unwelcome to the DPRK authorities and, it appears, to Kim Jong Il personally. Kim likewise made clear his opposition to the introduction of economic changes that might take the country away from the socialist model. Nonetheless, in 2002 he agreed to price and wage restructuring and to the improvement of managerial skills in production and marketing. This reforming trend continued until about 2005. Since then, however, there have been periodic efforts to pull back from the changes.

In foreign policy, Kim Jong Il moved away from his father’s former alliances and toward grappling with the issues of the country’s relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK), with regional neighbors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Japan, and with the United States. After considerable groundwork, including payments of large but unacknowledged sums, Kim Jong Il and then president of the ROK Kim Dae-jung met in Pyongyang for the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. A promised return visit by Kim Jong Il to the ROK failed to materialize. Contacts between the two Koreas continued at various levels and in a number of fields, however, including the Kaesong Industrial Zone. Despite increased tensions after 2002 over the DPRK’s nuclear intentions and periodic fluctuations in the relationship, Kim Dae-jung’s successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, and Kim Jong Il held the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit, also in Pyongyang. When the more conservative Lee Myung-bak succeeded Roh as president of the ROK in 2008, many of the contacts came to an end and there was a steady deterioration in relations.

After emerging from formal mourning for his father for three years, Kim exchanged several visits with Chinese and Russian leaders. In 2000, he received U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for discussions on a deal over missiles and regional security. Following President George W. Bush’s assumption of office in 2001, U.S. policies toward the DPRK hardened. In response, the DPRK withdrew from international nuclear agreements and resumed missile tests. Whatever the nature of the decision-making process in the DPRK, it must be assumed that Kim Jong Il had the final say on important questions and that he therefore backed the current stand on the United States and other issues. His decision to meet then Japanese premier Koizumi...
Junichiro in 2002 to discuss issues dividing the two nations was a bold move, even if the talks became largely concerned with the fate of Japanese abductees. The DPRK’s admission of responsibility for the abductions indicated a desire to unfreeze DPRK–Japan relations and thereby press its claim for compensation from Japan. However, despite a second visit by Koizumi in 2004, relations with Japan deteriorated as the DPRK could not or would not meet Japanese demands over the abductees. Matters were made worse by nuclear and missile issues. As a result, Japan began to play an obstructive role in the Six Party Talks and imposed heavy sanctions on the DPRK.

Not a great deal is known about Kim Jong Il’s abilities, though he largely managed to shake off the former unflattering image of him as a playboy. In meetings with visiting foreigners, he came across as confidant and knowledgeable and not unwilling to ask for information from his aides if he was unfamiliar with a subject. He was said to have a large collection of films and to be very interested in the Internet; he suggested to Madeleine Albright that they keep in touch by e-mail, although he failed to provide her with an e-mail address. After his father’s death, many of his public appearances were with the military, leading to speculation that he was dependent on them for support—or that he felt more at ease in a military atmosphere.

His private life was complicated, with children by several mothers. This is another subject about which there is very little reliable information. No details of his marital status have ever been published in the DPRK media. He has never appeared in public with a spouse. Accounts of his wives and mistresses appear regularly in the ROK but are generally unverifiable. In the early 2000s, people in the DPRK professed not to know if he was married. One report on his domestic life says that he thought a wife should be a person who takes care of children and does household work.

According to her sister, who published a book in 2000, his first mistress was an actress, Song Hye Rim (1936–2002), whom he met during his school-days. She later married one of his friends, but this did not stop her from becoming his mistress around 1970. She later divorced her husband. Their son, Kim Jong Nam, was born in 1971. Some accounts say that he never met his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, because of the circumstances under which he was born. In 1973, Kim Jong Il apparently took up with Kim Yong Suk, by whom he had one daughter. Later in the decade, he began a relationship with Ko Yong Hui, by whom he had two sons, Kim Jong Chul and Kim Jong Un, and a daughter Kim Yo Jong. After Ko’s death from cancer in 2004, he is thought to have taken one of his secretaries, Kim Ok, as his mistress. The more salacious reports say that this was at Ko Yong Hui’s suggestion.

In August 2008, Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke and did not appear for several months. This led to many rumors about who was actually running the
country, especially when some apparently doctored pictures were published to show that he was still active. There was also speculation about a possible successor. When Kim reappeared in January 2009, he had visibly lost weight and appeared to have limited movement in one arm but seemed to be in full possession of his faculties. However, the naming of his third son, Kim Jong Un, who bears a remarkable resemblance to his grandfather Kim Il Sung, to a number of positions in September 2010 indicated that he was finally giving some thought to the succession issue. Kim Jong Un was not formally identified as his father’s son, but his apparent ease in his presence and his regular appearances alongside Kim Jong Il, together with his remarkable similarity to his grandfather hinted toward the relationship.

Kim Jong Il’s death was announced by the DPRK media on 19 December 2011, two days after it was said to have taken place on his train while he was on an inspection trip. ROK sources immediately cast doubt on the report saying that the train had not left Pyongyang. Wherever he died, there was no disputing the fact of his death, as DPRK television showed him lying in state at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, where Kim Il Sung’s embalmed body also lies, while mourners, including Kim Jong Un but not his brothers, passed by. The funeral on 28 December was also broadcast internationally, although not live, showing scenes of mass grief in the midst of heavy snow. No foreign delegations were invited, but the Chinese ambassador apparently attended. It was later announced that the body would be embalmed and take its place in the Kumsusan Memorial Palace with Kim Il Sung. His birthday, 16 February, would henceforth be celebrated as the Day of the Shining Star.

Within the DPRK, the official statement was “We suffered the greatest loss in the history of our nation as a result of the sudden, unexpected and tragic loss of the great leader Kim Jong-il,” as stated by Yang Hyong Sop, vice president of the Presidium of the SPA in an interview with the newly opened Associated Press office in Pyongyang in January 2012. Kim was said to have made the DPRK strong and independent through the development of nuclear weapons. Postage stamps depicting Kim Jong Il and books about his life quickly appeared. Echoing many themes from recent years and linking the legacy of the two deceased Kims, the party newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, began carrying a moving banner on its Internet page that called on people to go “All out for a general offensive to achieve the prosperity of the great Kim Il Sung’s nation, Kim Jong Il’s Korea.”

International assessments of Kim Jong Il’s legacy were generally negative, blaming him for the continued economic decline of the country, for abuses of human rights, and for pursuing nuclear and missile programs in defiance of world opinion. DPRK defectors/refugees were particularly negative. There were widespread claims that Kim Jong Il was far less popular than Kim Il
Sung and that apparent outpourings of grief were all staged with serious consequences for those who did not fully participate. Commentators in China and Russia were somewhat more nuanced, noting the continued existence of the DPRK 17 years after Kim Jong II took power despite the widespread predictions in 1994 that neither he nor the regime would last. See also BADGES; HOLIDAYS; JANG SONG TAEK; KIM SONG AE; “ON THE SPOT GUIDANCE.”

KIM JONG NAM (1971– ). Eldest son of Kim Jong II, leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1994 until his death in December 2011 and reportedly his father’s favorite when young. Kim Jong Nam was born in Pyongyang. His mother was Song Hye Rim, a movie star, who reportedly divorced her first husband to marry Kim Jong II. It is believed that Kim Il Sung did not approve of Song’s background and although Kim Jong Nam was at one time seen as the logical successor to his father, this seemed increasingly unlikely as the years passed. It is widely believed that he damaged his chances of doing so when he was stopped at Tokyo airport in May 2001, accompanied by two women and a small boy, while traveling on a forged Dominican Republic passport. When challenged, he said that he wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland. Although he visited the DPRK after this incident, Kim Jong II was reportedly annoyed by it. Kim Jong Nam lives in Macau and makes regular visits to China and occasional trips to Europe. He is reported to have had three partners, by whom he has had two sons and two daughters. There are unsubstantiated reports that he was placed in charge of the Korean Computer Center at 17, was made a general in the Korean People’s Army, and was in charge of the State Security Department’s foreign intelligence work, all as part of his grooming to be his father’s successor. The Republic of Korea press claims that there is a rift between Kim Jong Nam and Kim Jong Un, who became the favored successor at least from 2010. The same sources say that Kim Jong Un has sought to have his older half-brother killed. However, China has supposedly warned that it would take a dim view of any such happening.

Kim Jong Nam may have briefly returned to the DPRK after his father’s death, but if this is true, the visit was given no publicity in the country. In January 2012, a Japanese journalist on the Tokyo Shimbun published a book that he said was based on e-mails he had exchanged with Kim Jong Nam. The latter claimed to be in touch with South Koreans and Japanese from his school days. He also indicated that he was not overimpressed by his younger half-brother and said that unless Kim Jong Un began a reform process, the DPRK was doomed to fail. He also has apparently said that he has never met his younger half-brothers.
In October 2011, reports emerged that a 16-year-old boy, Kim Han Sol, who was described as the son of Kim Jong Nam, had applied for a place at the United World Colleges’ school in Hong Kong. When his application for a visa was refused, he applied for a place at the same organization’s school in Mostar, Bosnia. His alleged Facebook page was also publicized, as was that of Kim Jong Nam.

KIM JONG SUK (1917–1949). Wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong Il, Kim Mun Il, and Kim Kyong Hui. She was born to a poor peasant family in North Hamyong province. Her family moved to China in 1922, and she became active in the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in the 1930s. According to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reports, she was working with Kim Il Sung by about 1937 and acted as his bodyguard, among other roles. She seems to have been known to the Japanese police. By 1941, she was in the Soviet Union with Kim, and it was there that Kim Jong Il was born, probably in 1941. According to the DPRK account, however, she established a guerrilla base on Mount Paektu, where she gave birth to Kim Jong Il in 1942. After 1945, she lived with Kim Il Sung in what is now the Party Foundation Museum in Pyongyang. It was there that her second son, Kim Mun Il, drowned in 1947. She was apparently known as Vera by the Soviet occupation forces and renowned for the quality of her cooking. She died in September 1949, while giving birth to a stillborn girl.

Kim Il Sung took a second wife, Kim Song Ae, who may already have been his mistress before Kim Jong Suk’s death, although he appears not to have married her until the 1960s. She presumably did not want to hear about her predecessor and there were few references to Kim Song Juk until the 1970s. However, as Kim Jong Il emerged as his father’s likely successor, there were occasional references to his mother, who was named a “Hero of the DPRK” in 1972. After the elder Kim’s death in 1994, Kim Song Ae soon disappeared from public life and the focus switched to Kim Jong Suk. She was described as one of the “Three Generals of Mount Paektu” and the “Mother of the Nation.” Pictures and statues showing her in military uniform or riding with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mount Paektu now began to appear. Biographies were published and a number of institutions were named after her, including various schools and the Naval Academy at Hamhung. It is also widely believed that the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital, to which Kim Jong Il is said to have paid much attention, was partly a tribute to his mother. The DPRK media reported in February 2009 that the Geographical Institute of the Academy of Sciences had published An Atlas on the Anti-Japanese Heroine Comrade Kim Jong Suk’s Revolutionary Activities.
KIM JONG UN (1983?– ). Third son of Kim Jong Il. His mother was Ko Yong Hui. Like his siblings, Kim Jong Nam and Kim Jong Chul, Kim Jong Un appears to have attended school in Switzerland and later to have studied at both Kim Il Sung University and at the Kim Il Sung Military University. No picture of him appeared in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) media until 2010. However, following Kim Jong Il’s reported stroke in the summer of 2008, there was much speculation that Kim Jong Un was his designated successor. This was reinforced when he was appointed to a junior position on the National Defense Council, which his father headed. In May 2009, the Republic of Korea (ROK) newspaper Korea Herald claimed that he accompanied his father on all major visits and that he had organized the 150-Day Campaign to encourage production. There were also reports in the ROK around the same time that he had been given the title “Brilliant Comrade” (yongmyung dongj), and that schools and institutions had been instructed to sing a song in his praise: “Footsteps” or “Sounds of Footsteps.” It was also claimed that the increasing use of the initials CNC (Computer Numerical Control) was in fact a code for the young Kim. There was no independent confirmation for these claims, and foreign residents in the DPRK said that they had not heard the song. The rumors steadily increased until the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) meeting in September 2010, when Kim Jong Un was named as a vice chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission and appointed a four-star general, though he appears to have no direct military experience, and began to appear with Kim Jong Il at functions. His title now appeared to be the “Young General.” These moves indicated that he was indeed being groomed to succeed his father, although there was nothing to indicate that he had taken over any of the latter’s functions. The most remarkable feature about him was his strong physical resemblance to his grandfather, Kim Il Sung.

During 2011, Kim Jong Un was pictured with his father on many visits and officials seemed prepared to admit that he was Kim Jong Il’s son, although there was never any public announcement that this was the case. This reticence disappeared immediately after the announcement of Kim Jong Il’s death on 19 December 2011. Kim Jong Un was now clearly identified as Kim Jong Il’s son and was conspicuous as the chief mourner while his father lay in state and at the funeral ceremonies held on 28–29 December. He also acquired new titles. On 31 December 2011, the KWP Politburo announced that, in accordance with Kim Jong Il’s will dated 8 October 2011, Kim Jong Un would become supreme commander of the armed forces. He was also referred to as the supreme leader of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the state and army of the DPRK, “Great Successor,” “Supreme Leader,” and “Great Leader,” and there were also references to the “Dear respected leader Kim Jong Un.” Un-
like Kim Jong Il, who retreated into a three-year mourning period after his father’s death and was rarely seen during this period, the new leader began to make public appearances soon after the funeral. The propaganda machine also came into action, with films and photographs showing the new leader in a series of action shots, including horse riding, driving a tank, and engaging in other military activities, as well as being greeted enthusiastically whenever he appeared. Foreign commentators found it rather crude, but they were not the target audience. Few ordinary North Koreans, at whom the material was aimed, would likely notice the jerkiness and omissions that marked much of the material. Kim Jong Un was shown as a heroic figure, but little additional information was given about him as a person or about his views. A young woman seen in some of the mourning scenes was tentatively identified as his wife, but there was no confirmation of this.

Outsiders have continued to speculate about who really holds power in the DPRK following the departure of Kim Jong Il. Officially there is no issue to be debated, since the younger Kim was clearly his father’s designated successor and, according to Yang Hyong Sop of the SPA, he had been trained by his father for the role. The reality is that there is probably some form of collective leadership designed to guide the new leader as he learns his way around. This will include his uncle, Jang Song Taek, who was prominent at the funeral, walking beside the hearse immediately behind Kim Jong Un. Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho (1), widely believed to be close to Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, who also walked beside the hearse, will be another. Kim Jong Il’s sister and Jang Song Taek’s wife, Kim Kyong Hui, who became a four-star general in 2010, may also play a role. Kim Jong Un will probably not be as powerful as his father, but he may be a useful frontman and is thus unlikely to disappear from the scene.

KIM JUNG RIN (1923–2010). At the time of his death in April 2010, Kim Jung Rin had been active in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) since 1954. He was born to a peasant family in Jagang Province in 1923. He became a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly in 1962, and remained so until his death. By 1972, he was the KWP secretary in charge of relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK), and in that capacity he held meetings with the head of the ROK Central Intelligence Agency (now the National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea) to discuss relations between the two Koreas. Little is known of his subsequent activities, although he was noted as receiving the Order of Kim Il Sung and other awards.

KIM KI NAM (1926– ). Kim Ki Nam has been secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee since July 2000. He is also a
vice-chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, in which capacity he has made a number of visits to the Republic of Korea (ROK). He was born in Wonsan and graduated from Kim Il Sung University. He also studied at Moscow University. In the later 1950s, he taught at Kim Il Sung University. During the 1960s and 1970s, he worked as an editorial writer on the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) newspaper Rodong Sinmun, then as deputy chief editor and later chief editor on the KWP theoretical journal Kulluja. In April 1976, he became chief editor of Rodong Sinmun and also chair of the central committee of the Korean Journalists’ Union. He was elected to the seventh Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in November the following year and has been a delegate to the SPA ever since. He has also been a member of the SPA Presidium. In October 1985, he became director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the KWP Central Committee, a post he held until July 2000, when he became secretary of the KWP Central Committee. In 1982, he was made a member of the Order of Kim Il Sung, and he was a member of Kim Il Sung’s funeral committee in 1994. During a visit to the ROK in August 2005 as leader of a delegation to a Unification Festival marking Liberation Day, Kim made an unannounced visit to the National Cemetery in Seoul, where the ROK dead from the Korean War are honored.

KIM KYE GWAN (1943– ). Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) first senior vice minister of foreign affairs from September 2010. He was previously deputy foreign minister and one of the leading DPRK negotiators on the nuclear issue. He studied French at the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies and then undertook further language training at the DPRK embassy in Algeria. He became a director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1975, and then appeared as a “researcher” attached to the MFA’s International Organizations Division. Kim was a roving ambassador, or ambassador at large, from September 1989, becoming councilor at the MFA in March 1991. He became a deputy minister in 1995 and a vice minister in 1998. He was also awarded the title of “Labor Hero” in 1998. He was James Kelly’s main interlocutor during the latter’s 2002 visit to the DPRK and played a prominent role in the Six Party Talks. He greeted former U.S. President Bill Clinton on his visit to the DPRK in 2009 and former President Jimmy Carter in 2009. According to U.S. negotiators, he often played a “friendly” role, while his colleague Kim Suk Ju would play a tough one. In private conversations, he was always polite and amiable. He became an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party in September 2010. He was a member of the funeral committee for Kim Jong Il in December 2011.
KIM KYONG HUI (1946– ). Kim Kyong Hui was born in Pyongyang on 30 June 1946, the only daughter of Kim Il Sung and his first wife, Kim Jong Suk. She was therefore sister to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il, who died in December 2011. She was close to her brother, dating from their time together in China during the Korean War. She is married to Jang Song Taek, although there are reports that they are separated. Jang was also reputed to be close to Kim Jong Il. She has held posts in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) for several years. In 2010, she was appointed to the KWP Politburo, a move apparently designed to provide support for her nephew Kim Jong Un as Kim Jong Il’s probable successor. She was also made a four-star general, although she does not appear to have held any previous involvement with the armed forces. She was listed as 14th on her brother’s funeral committee in December 2011; Jang was 19th.

KIM KYONG JIN (1953– ). Kim Kyong Jin is the daughter of Kim Il Sung and his second wife, Kim Song Ae, and was therefore a half-sister to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il. Like her half-brother Kim Pyong Il, she has apparently deemed it prudent to be away from the DPRK since her father died, and she has accompanied her husband, Kim Kwang Sup, currently (in 2012) ambassador to Austria, on various overseas posts.

KIM MUN IL (1944–1947). Second son of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Suk and the younger brother of Kim Jong Il. Often referred to by his Russian name, Shura, he drowned in the pond of what was then the family home in Pyongyang and is now the Party Foundation Museum. He is rarely mentioned in the DPRK.

KIM OK (1964– ). According to reports from the Republic of Korea (ROK), Kim Ok was for some years in charge of the personal secretariat of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leader Kim Jong Il, who died in 2011. She is also rumored to have been his mistress or wife; one report says that they married in 2007. She is the daughter of Kim Hyo, an official in the Finance and Accounting Department of the Korean Workers’ Party, and her brother is Kim Kyun, a vice dean of Kim Il Sung University. She studied piano at the Pyongyang School of Music and then joined Kim Jong Il’s secretariat. She came to prominence in 2000, when she accompanied Marshal Jo Myong Rok on his visit to the United States. She also accompanied Kim Jong Il on his January 2000 visit to the People’s Republic of China. In September 2008, when Kim Jong Il apparently fell ill, there was much speculation about her role, with some claiming that she controlled all access to the
leader. The ROK newspaper, *JoonAng Daily* reported in November 2009 that she was no longer in Kim’s secretariat and had married a military officer. The same report claimed that Kim’s sister, *Kim Kyong Hui*, had replaced Kim Ok as the person with control over access to the leader. Kim Ok was not a member of Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee in 2011, but she was shown on state television among the mourners at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, where his body lay in state. She was also seen bowing to his youngest son and successor, *Kim Jong Un*.

**KIM PYONG IL (1954—  ).** Kim Pyong Il is a half-brother to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader *Kim Jong Il*. He was born on 10 August 1954, the eldest of two sons and the second child from Kim Il Sung’s relationship with his secretary *Kim Song Ae*. His younger brother, *Kim Yong Il*, died in 2000. Kim Pyong Il graduated from Kim Il Sung University, where he majored in economics, and then attended the Kim Il Sung Military University. On graduation, he served with the DPRK armed forces, becoming a battalion commander. There are reports that during the 1970s, his mother attempted to have him nominated as his father’s successor, but such attempts were forestalled by the rise of Kim Jong Il. On the eve of the public announcement of Kim Jong Il as successor, both Kim Pyong Il and Kim Yong Il took up diplomatic appointments, which gave them status but kept them out of the country. Kim Pyong Il went first to Yugoslavia, and then became ambassador to Hungary in 1988. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Republic of Korea (ROK) the following year, Kim Pyong Il moved to Finland. In 1998, he became ambassador to Poland, where he has remained ever since; his children have been educated there. Neither Kim Pyong Il nor his brother and sister were named as members of the funeral committee for their father on the latter’s death in 1994. The ROK newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* reported that he had returned to the DPRK in July 2011 to visit his sick mother and had been arrested, but other reports indicated that he was still ambassador to Poland. He did not attend the funeral of Kim Jong Il in December 2011.

**KIM SHIN-JO (1941—  ).** Kim Shin-jo is the only surviving member of a 31-member Democratic People’s Republic of Korea commando team that in January 1968 staged the Blue House attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) presidential mansion in an apparent attempt to kill President Park Chung-hee. Most of his companions were killed, but Kim, a special forces’ lieutenant, was captured. After a year’s interrogation, he was released and allowed to adopt a new life in the ROK. For a time he was a small shopkeeper, but was eventually persuaded by his wife to become a Christian. He became
a pastor in the 1990s and preaches about the evils of communism in the ROK and abroad.

**KIM SONG AE (1924– )**. Secretary and second wife of **Kim Il Sung** and mother of **Kim Kyong Jin** (1953), **Kim Pyong Il** (1955), and **Kim Yong Il** (1957). She attended Pyongyang Women’s University and **Kim Il Sung University**, where she graduated in English. She began working as a secretary to Kim Il Sung in the late 1940s. It is not clear if she and Kim Il Sung were formally married, but they seem to have been living as husband and wife from 1953, and there are reports that she was his mistress before the death of his first wife, **Kim Jong Suk**, in 1949. In the 1960s, she became vice chair of the Central Committee of the **Korean Democratic Women’s League** and was its chair from the mid-1970s. She reportedly pressed for one of her sons to succeed Kim Il Sung, without success. She appeared as a member of Kim Il Sung’s funeral committee in 1994, but otherwise has disappeared from view since her resignation from the chair of the Korean Women’s League in 1998. According to **Hwang Jang Yop**, the most senior defector from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, she and her children were referred to as an “offshoot clique” and were ostracized by **Kim Jong Il** and the rest of the leadership. She is reported to live in seclusion in a villa in South Pyongan Province. Radio Free Asia reported that she was killed in an automobile accident in Beijing in 2001, but more recent reports have said that she is still alive and that her son, Kim Pyong Il, had returned to Pyongyang to visit her because she was ill.

**KIM TU BONG (1886?–1957?)**. Veteran communist and leader of the **Yanan faction** of Korean communists who fought with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Yanan in **China** during the 1930s. His year of birth has also been stated as 1889. He was born in South Kyongsang Province and became a noted linguist, publishing a grammar of the Korean **language** in 1916 and being an active member of a group that sought reform of the Korean alphabet, **hangul**. Kim was also a political activist and took part in the **Samil Undong** movement against the **Japanese** in 1919. He fled to China, where he continued his scholarly activities, publishing a second revised and expanded edition of his Korean grammar in Shanghai in 1923. At the same time, he played an important role in the Korean revolutionary movement in Shanghai and Chongqing until the early 1940s.

He then joined **Mao Zedong**’s forces in Yanan, organizing the Korean Revolutionary League that fought with the CCP until 1945. After his return to Korea, sometime after August 1945, the league became the New Democratic Party. When this merged with the **Korean Communist Party** to form the
North Korean Workers’ Party in 1946, Kim was the first chairman. However, when the Korean Workers’ Party was created, Kim ceded the top position to Kim Il Sung. On the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948, Kim Tu Bong became the first chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, which meant that he was the DPRK head of state for ceremonial purposes. In addition, he was for a time head of Kim Il Sung University and of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. Although he opposed the attempt in the August 1956 Incident to challenge Kim Il Sung, he was ousted from his public positions, accused of being a spy for the United States, and disappeared from view. His scholarly role was also condemned. It is assumed that he was executed either in 1956 or 1957. The attack on Kim had more to do with Kim Il Sung’s determination to get rid of any possible opposition than to any real opposition to the regime.

Kim had trained as a philologist and published on the subject. He was awarded a doctorate in linguistics in 1948. He was involved in the language reform movements of the 1950s, which saw the abandonment of Chinese characters and the promotion of hangul. See also HO KAI I; MU CHONG.

KIM WON GYUN (1917–2002). Prominent composer, who in 1947 composed the national anthem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as songs such as the “Song of General Kim Il Sung” and the music for revolutionary operas. He was born in Wonsan in 1917 and studied at a music school in Japan. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Korean Musicians Union in 1954 and later became its vice president and president. In 1960, he became dean of the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance, and in 1985, president of the Pibada Opera Troupe. In September 1990, he was chairman of the North Side Korean Reunification Music Festival. Kim was also a delegate to the ninth (1986) and 10th (1998) Supreme People’s Assemblies. He received many honors and awards, including Labor Hero, Merited Artist, and People’s Artist, the highest cultural award, and was a Kim Il Sung Prize winner. In 2006, the rebuilt Pyongyang Conservatory, a monumental edifice on the banks of the Taedong River, was named the Kim Won Gyun Conservatory, apparently at the suggestion of Kim Jong Il.

KIM YONG CHOL (?–?). Lieutenant general in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) armed forces and head of the Policy Bureau of the National Defense Commission. Kim is also commander in chief of the Kaesong Military District and a regular participant in North–South Military Talks. In 2008, he made two visits to the Kaesong Industrial Zone to inform
Republic of Korea companies of proposed restrictions on movement and to establish how quickly they could close up if the DPRK decided to shut down the zone. In any event, the implied threat did not materialize. In March 2009, Kim became a first-time delegate to the DPRK parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly.

KIM YONG CHUN (1936– ). Appointed minister of the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2009, Kim Yong Chun was born in Kangwon Province. He was educated at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School and at Kim Il Sung Military University and also studied at the Frunze Military Academy (now in Kyrgyzstan) in the former Soviet Union. After apparently holding provincial positions in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and becoming an alternate member of the KWP Central Committee in 1980, he was noted as a lieutenant general in the armed forces in 1982. By 1986, he was director general of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Strategy Department and a full member of the KWP Central Committee. The following year, he received the Order of Kim Il Sung. He was elected to the ninth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) for a Kangwon district in 1990. Promoted to full general in 1992, he became director general of the KPA Munitions Mobilization Bureau in 1993.

In 1994, he was commander of the Sixth Army Corps stationed in the far northeast of the country and a member of the funeral committee for Kim Il Sung. Although the Sixth Army Corps apparently mutinied against Kim Il Sung’s successor Kim Jong Il in 1995 and was forcibly disbanded, Kim Yong Chun not only escaped censure but continued his advance. He served on the funeral committee for O Jin U in February that year and was appointed a vice marshal and KPA chief of staff in October 1995. He was a delegate to the 10th SPA in 1998, and in 2007 became vice chairman of the National Defense Commission at the ninth session of the 11th SPA. He was appointed minister of the People’s Armed Forces in February 2009. However, he ceased to appear in public from November 2009.

Because his time as chief of staff saw incidents such as a submarine incursion in 1998, various naval clashes, the development of long range missiles and nuclear testing, he has become associated in the Republic of Korea with a more aggressive policy. It is not clear, however, whether such policies can be attributed to him personally. He is also reputed to be have been close to Kim Jong Il and to engage in drinking parties with him. Again, such stories are impossible to verify.

KIM YONG IL (1944– ). Kim Yong Il was premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from April 2007 until June 2010. He
KIM YONG JU (1920– ). Younger brother of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Il Sung and for many years seen as the likely successor. Like Kim Il Sung, he spent much of his early years in Manchuria but does not seem to have been involved in the struggle against the Japanese. He studied at Moscow University. In 1954, he joined the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee, becoming its director in 1960. The following year, he became a member of the Central Committee and was elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the DPRK parliament, in 1962. During the 1960s, he continued to progress through various party and government positions and was generally seen as the probable successor to his brother. But, after becoming deputy premier in 1974, he vanished from view in 1975 and did not reappear until 1993. His disappearance was linked to the rise of Kim Jong Il, who was publicly identified as his father’s successor in 1980. Kim Yong Ju was perhaps easily pushed aside since he lacked any real power base, apart from his brother, and was also apparently not in good health. When he reappeared, he was listed as a member of the KWP Central Committee Politburo. In 1994, he was a member of the Kim Il Sung funeral committee. He became an honorary vice president of the SPA Presidium in 1998 and was also elected a deputy. It is not clear if he is still alive. If he is, his advanced age means that he is clearly no threat and has now no political significance.

KIM YONG NAM (1928– ). Kim Yong Nam is the ceremonial head of state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as chairman of the
presidium of the **Supreme People’s Assembly** (SPA). He was born in what is now the DPRK capital, **Pyongyang**. He studied at **Kim Il Sung University** and at Moscow University, where he majored in diplomacy. By 1956, he was employed in the international affairs department of the **Korean Workers’ Party** (KWP). While he continued to advance in the KWP’s international affairs’ hierarchy, he was also involved in state diplomatic affairs, first in the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and then in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He became a vice minister for foreign affairs in 1962. During the 1960s, he added the SPA to his portfolio, becoming a delegate in November 1977, and a member of the presidium almost immediately afterward. The following year, he became a member of the KWP Politburo.

From 1983 to 1998, Kim was a vice premier and concurrently minister of foreign affairs, and he then took up his present post. This theoretically became of great importance after the death of DPRK President **Kim Il Sung** in 1994. Kim was declared the “Eternal President” and his son, **Kim Jong II**, decline his father’s presidential role. The DPRK still needed a living person for ceremonial purposes, so, reviving the practice before the 1972 revision of the constitution, Kim Yong Nam assumed this role. In this capacity, he signs and receives ambassadorial credentials and meets visiting dignitaries, such as former **United States** President **Jimmy Carter**. Real power lay with Kim Jong II and the **National Defense Commission**. Kim Yong Nam was awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung in 1982 and became a Labor Hero in 1998. He was a member of the funeral committees for Kim Il Sung and **O Jin U**. In December 2011, he was listed second after **Kim Jong Nam** on the funeral committee for Kim Jong Il and he played a prominent role in the obsequies for the latter. This probably reflects his ceremonial importance rather than real power or influence.

**KIM YOUNG-SAM** (1927– ). President of the **Republic of Korea** (ROK) from 1993 to 1998. Kim Young-sam was born in Pusan and, after graduating from university in 1951, spent most of his career as an opposition politician. He was first elected to the ROK National Assembly in 1954. When General **Chun Du-hwan** seized power in 1979, Kim was one of those placed under a political ban. He resumed active politics in 1984. For a time, he was allied with **Kim Dae-jung**, another prominent opposition politician, in the Council for the Promotion of Democracy and later in the New Korean Democratic Party. In 1987, Kim Young-sam established a separate party, the Reunification Democratic Party, and stood as its candidate in that year’s presidential elections. He was unsuccessful, but relations between him and Kim Dae-jung remained distant. In 1990, his party merged with the Democratic Justice Party of President **Roh Tae-woo**, Chun’s successor, and a smaller party to form the
Democratic Liberal Party, for whom he became a presidential candidate in 1992. He was the first civilian to be elected president since 1960.

In 1989, Kim visited the Soviet Union, a move that helped Roh Tae-woo’s policy of *Nordpolitik*, or building links with socialist countries, a process that was largely complete by the time of Kim’s election. It had been expected that the election of a nonmilitary president would improve relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but the continued crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program cast a long shadow over the presidency. Kim was concerned at the willingness of the United States to negotiate directly with the DPRK on the nuclear issue, often with little or no consultation with the ROK. His own policy toward the DPRK seemed sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but he eventually agreed in 1994 to hold a summit meeting in the DPRK capital city of Pyongyang with DPRK President Kim Il Sung. When the latter died just before the meeting, Kim declined to send any message of condolence, unlike U.S. President Bill Clinton. The resulting DPRK hostile reaction to what it considered an insult persisted while Kim remained in office.

In his last year in office, Kim spent much effort in a failed effort to prevent Kim Dae-jung from succeeding him. In retirement, he was critical of the “Sunshine Policy.”

KIMCHAEK CITY. A major industrial city port situated on the east coast of North Hamyong Province. It was originally called Songjin but was given its current name to commemorate Kim Chaek, a close associate of Kim Il Sung in his guerrilla days, and later a vice premier and military commander. He was killed in the early stages of the Korean War (1950–53). The city has an important iron and steelworks but has suffered badly from the economic decline since the early 1990s. Its population was estimated at 197,000 in 2009.

KIMILSUNGIA AND KIMJONGILIA. Two flowers, named respectively for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the first two leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Kimilsungia is a species of orchid that originally came from Indonesia. When Kim Il Sung visited that country in 1975, he admired an orchid in a botanical garden. Since it was around the time of his birthday, it was suggested that the flower be named after him. He is said to have demurred at the idea, but was persuaded by Indonesian President Suharto to accept the honor. The Kimjongilia, a species of begonia, was, according to DPRK reports, named after Kim Jong Il by a Japanese botanist, Motoderu Kamo, in 1988. Both flowers are widely cultivated in the DPRK despite the adverse climatic conditions. Institutions maintain special
greenhouses for them and exhibit them at a dedicated exhibition hall build in Pyongyang in the early 2000s. Foreign organizations, including embassies and international bodies, are also encouraged to take part in these occasions. Despite the attention paid to them, neither flower is the national flower, which is the magnolia.

KO YONG HUI (1953–2004). Third known partner (wife or possibly mistress) of the former Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il, frequently described as his favorite. She was born in the Korean community in Japan and was a dancer by training. She came to the DPRK in the early 1960s and became a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe, where she attracted Kim Jong Il’s attention. She had three children by Kim Jong Il: two boys, Kim Jong Chul (1981) and Kim Jong Un (1983), and a daughter, Kim Yo Jong (date of birth not known). Ko did not appear in public. She died, apparently of cancer, in 2004 (2003 in some accounts), in Paris, where she had gone for treatment. According to Republic of Korea press reports, it was she who selected Kim Ok to be Kim Jong Il’s secretary.

KOGURYO. Koguryo was the northernmost and largest of the Korean Three Kingdoms that existed from around the first century B.C. until the unification of the peninsula by the Silla kingdom in 668 A.D. It was centered on the Yalu and Tumen rivers, extending into what is now China’s northeastern provinces. Koguryo occupied much of the territory that now makes up the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), had its capital at what is now the DPRK capital, Pyongyang, and opposed attempts from China to dominate the peninsula. It has therefore received particular attention from DPRK historians, who give more detailed coverage in historical writings to Koguryo than to the other two kingdoms, Silla and Paekche. It is said to be the first of the kingdoms to be founded, and its martial spirit is much praised. During the 1990s, the supposed tomb near Pyongyang of Tongmyong, its first king, was refurbished and made grander, apparently under the direction of Kim Jong Il. In DPRK historiography, Koguryo was only partially conquered by Silla, since most of the northern part of the state became Parhae (Bohai in Chinese), situated in what is now China, under Koguryo leaders.

In 2004, a dispute involving China, the DPRK, and the Republic of Korea began over the status of Koguryo, sparked by attempts to have Koguryo tombs in the DPRK and in China registered as World Heritage Sites under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). China, which had previously appeared to accept that Koguryo had been an independent state, now claimed that it had been a Chinese vassal state and that its culture was really Chinese. All mention of its history
was removed from Chinese official websites. After protests, mainly from the Republic of Korea, although the DPRK also indicated concern, the Chinese removed all references to Korean history before 1945. The issue faded in time but the arguments continue. However, at its meeting in Suzhou, China, in June–July 2004, UNESCO World Heritage Committee accepted the DPRK application for enrollment of the tombs, the first DPRK application to be accepted. At the same time, UNESCO encouraged the governments of the DPRK and China to consider “the possibility of a future joint, transboundary nomination of the Koguryan culture.” New remains of the Koguryo kingdom continue to emerge, but the idea of a joint China–DPRK registration does not seem to have been pursued.

KOIZUMI JUNICHIRO (1942– ). Prime minister of Japan from 2001 to 2006, Koizumi was the most flamboyant holder of that office since 1945, and he enjoyed periods of great domestic popularity and electoral success. Born in Kanagawa Province, he took a degree in economics at Keio University in 1967. He entered the Japanese Diet in 1972 as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). His first official position came in 1979, as parliamentary vice minister of finance, and he rose rapidly in the LDP ranks during the 1980s. Faced with the prospect of losing power, the LDP turned to the relatively charismatic Koizumi in the hope of avoiding defeat in the 2001 elections. He became LDP president and prime minister and won the election. Although he promised radical reforms, he found it not easy to deliver. However, one success was his journey to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2002, when he made some progress on the issue of abductees and signed the Pyongyang Declaration with DPRK leader Kim Jong Il. This, inter alia, acknowledged the harm done by Japan to Korea in the past and envisaged an improvement in relations, eventually leading to normalization. It remains the most positive and forward looking document ever in Japan–DPRK relations. Although the DPRK admission that it had carried out abductions and its refusal or inability to account for a number of those concerned led to an outcry in Japan, Koizumi still gained credit for his efforts. A return journey in 2004, which led to the release of family members of those abducted, also proved popular.

Koizumi did not return to the question of relations with the DPRK in any substantive form after 2004, and the issue of the abductees, together with the DPRK’s nuclear and missile program, continued to cloud relations. As far as the DPRK was concerned, Koizumi’s failure to follow through on the promised improvement in relations—and possible compensation—was galling, while his insistence on visiting Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine and for a more active role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces internationally led to harsh condemnation by both the DPRK and the Republic of Korea.
KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY

KOREAN BUDDHIST LEAGUE. Originally established in December 1945 as the North Korean Buddhist League, this organization, which is supposed to represent Buddhist interests in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), disappeared from view in the mid-1960s, but was the first religious body to reappear in 1972. It was then used mainly to forge international links with other Buddhist groups. It organized the first known celebration of Buddha’s birthday in the DPRK in 1988 at Pohyun Temple on Mount Myohang, which remains an important center for DPRK Buddhism. Unlike the Christian churches, which are limited to three buildings in the capital Pyongyang, a number of Buddhist temples are open throughout the country. While in theory these hold services on the occasion of Buddha’s birthday, Buddha’s enlightenment, and Buddha’s passage to nirvana, there is little evidence that such ceremonies actually take place. Although people at the temples claim to be monks, they do not appear to undertake any religious practices.

KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA). KCNA is the only news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Founded in December 1946, it is a state-run organization that speaks for the Korean Workers’ Party and for the DPRK government. Its central headquarters are in Pyongyang, and it has branches in a number of provincial cities and abroad.

KCNA delivers news to the DPRK media. It also produces summaries of international and inter-Korean news for distribution to officials and to Pyongyang-based embassies and international organizations. A daily bulletin is produced in English, Russian, and Spanish. For many years, this was available on the Internet through a server based in Japan, but, since 2009 KCNA has its own DPRK-based site (www.kcna.kp), one of the earliest examples of the use of the DPRK’s own Internet designator. The agency has long had international links, particularly with Xinhua (New China News Agency) and the Russian ITAR-TASS agency, both of which have offices and resident correspondents in Pyongyang. In 2011, both the Associated Press (AP) and Reuters reached agreement on closer links with the KCNA. In the AP case, this included the opening a news bureau in Pyongyang. This was scheduled for December 2011 but was postponed following the death of Kim Jong Il. It eventually took place in January 2012. The video arm of AP, Associated Press Television News (APTN), opened a permanent office in Pyongyang in 2006. It had previously had a correspondent there in 2001–2. KCNA is also a member of the Bangkok-based Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies. A number of staff from the KCNA have gone abroad for training with other agencies and news organizations, including Reuters and the British Broadcasting Corporation.
KOREAN COMMUNIST PARTY. Korean communism began outside the peninsula in the years after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. One group of Koreans led by Nam Man-chon established a Korean section of the Russian Communist Party at Irkutsk in Siberia in 1918, while another, under Yi Tong-hwi, established the Korean Socialist Party in Khabarovsk in the Russian Maritime Province the same year. In 1919, Yi and his supporters went to Shanghai, China, where they joined the Korean Provisional Government. While in Shanghai, Yi reorganized his party and took the title Korean Communist Party (KCP). Yi’s party continued to maintain a presence in Russia, and the two competing groups from Irkutsk and Shanghai clashed periodically as they competed for the small pool of potential members and for recognition and funding from the Communist International (COMINTERN), the international wing of the Bolshevik party organization.

From the early 1920s, attempts were made, mostly among students who had returned from Japan where they had been introduced to Marxism–Leninism, to set up a communist party within Korea itself. The first official party was established in Seoul in 1925 but soon disintegrated under Japanese pressure. Attempts to revive it failed. Communist groups within Korea, following COMINTERN directives, worked in a united front with Korean nationalists until such collaboration ceased when the line changed in 1931. After that, there was no unified communist organization in Korea, although youth groups and peasants and workers’ groups continued to pursue vaguely Marxist–Leninist policies. In the northeast of the peninsula, many militant groups operated, some of which had Marxist tendencies. Eventually, branches of the KCP developed in Manchuria, China, and Japan.

With the end of the war against Japan in August 1945, communist groups reappeared in the Korean Peninsula. After some squabbling, a unified party emerged in September 1945, with Pak Hon Yong as chair and with headquarters in Seoul. The division of the peninsula meant, however, that the northern bureau of the KCP, established in October 1945, began to issue its own membership cards. Given the general hostility toward communism in the United States–run south, it was unsurprising that the strength of the KCP was greater in the Soviet-run north. KCP support for the trusteeship proposals put forward at the end of 1945 further weakened its support in the south. The U.S. Army Military Government increased pressure on the KCP, and when a warrant was issued for Pak Hon Yong’s arrest in September 1946, he fled north. In November 1946, the remnants of the party in the south merged with the New People’s Party to form the South Korean Workers’ Party. In 1948, all communist activity was banned after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, and the South Korean Workers’ Party merged with the North Korean Workers’ Party to form the Korean Workers’ Party.
KOREAN DEMOCRATIC WOMEN’S LEAGUE. The North Korean Democratic Women’s League (sometimes Union) was established on 18 November 1945, as part of the North Korean Communist Party’s attempt to enroll as many people as possible in united front organizations. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accounts say that it took its present name following a joint meeting of women from the DPRK and the Republic of Korea held in January 1951 during the Korean War. In another version, put out by the league’s then head, Kim Song Ae, the second wife of Kim Il Sung, in a speech in 1985, the origins of the league were pushed back to December 1926. It was claimed that Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Ban Sok, set up the Korean Women’s Anti-Japanese Society at that time. There is no independent evidence for either of these accounts, both of which appear unlikely.

The league is supposed to protect and to give a voice to women who do not belong to any other organization, but like other similar bodies it mainly serves as a channel to pass down decisions from the central leadership. There are claims that Kim Song Ae used her position in the league to try to advance her sons, rather than the children of Kim’s first marriage. After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, the league lost some of its influence as Kim Jong Il sought to reduce the role of his stepmother, who was dismissed in 1998. It still formally exists, but there is no sign that it does much to protect the interests of women. See also RYO WON GU; RYO YON GU.

KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO). KEDO was established in 1995 to carry forward the terms of the Agreed Framework that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States signed in Geneva in October 1994. Under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK would eventually be supplied with light water reactors (LWRs) to replace the nuclear plant that it had been developing at Yongbyon, and in the meantime, it would receive heavy fuel oil as compensation for the loss of energy that, it claimed, would result from the Yongbyon closure.

The original members of KEDO were the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). These joined in March 1995 and formed the executive board. Later members included the European Union, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Indonesia, all joining in 1995, and Chile and Argentina joining in 1996, Poland joining in 1997, the Czech Republic joining in 1999, and Uzbekistan joining in 2000. In addition, 19 other countries contributed funds to the organization. KEDO signed a supply agreement with the DPRK in December 1995, and many other agreements and protocols were negotiated during its existence. Under the terms of the supply agreement, two LWRs that met the safety requirements of the United States, Japan, and the
ROK were to be built and functioning by 2003. A ground-breaking ceremony was held at the chosen site at Kumho on the DPRK east coast in April 1997, but the project did not go out to tender until the following year, when the ROK’s Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) won the main contract. The DPRK was not happy at the close involvement of the ROK in the project and periodically raised objections, although eventually accepting that there was little choice in the matter. The DPRK was also concerned at the long drawn-out process; in May 1998, it even threatened to restart the Yongbyon reactor if there was no progress. The tension eased, but real work on the project did not get under way until 2000; in the meantime, much effort had gone into construction of suitable accommodation for the workers at the site, the provision of roads and jetties, and other forms of infrastructure.

The actual project fell further behind, while delays in the supply of heavy fuel oil were an increasing annoyance to the DPRK. By the time U.S. President George W. Bush took office in 2001, it was estimated that the provision of the LWRs was at least five and possibly eight years behind schedule. The new U.S. administration made clear that it disliked the Agreed Framework and KEDO and began to hint that unless the DPRK began to account for its past nuclear activities, the project was in danger. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, such accounting was not due until such time as the LWRs were ready to go active. KEDO continued to carry out its work at the LWR site, concluding various agreements on access and conditions of work, including direct shipping and air links to the ROK and training for DPRK technical staff in the ROK. On 7 August 2002, a concrete pouring ceremony took place at Kumho, in the presence of a large delegation of journalists, including U.S. journalists, staff connected with the project, and representatives of some of the KEDO board, DPRK officials, and members of the Pyongyang diplomatic corps from contributing states. In his speech on the occasion, the chief U.S. representative, Jack Pritchard, raised the issue of the eventual DPRK declaration on its past nuclear activities and warned that a failure to do this could put the project in jeopardy.

In October 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with the claim that the United States had evidence that the DPRK was engaged in a secret highly enriched uranium program. The MFA officials at first denied that there was such a program but later, according to Kelly and his party, admitted that it did exist; the DPRK maintained that the U.S. team had misunderstood what was said. Soon after the news of this exchange was leaked in Washington D.C., KEDO suspended deliveries of heavy fuel oil. The DPRK responded by announcing that the Agreed Framework was at an end, and that it would reopen the Yongbyon plant and expel the International Atomic Energy Authority inspectors from the site. By the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework was in disarray,
with each side blaming the other. KEDO effectively ceased to function except in the most perfunctory manner.

It remained in existence, however, until 31 May 2006, issuing annual reports up to 2005. Then the executive board announced the termination of the LWR project, assigning all blame to the DPRK’s failure “to perform the steps that were required in the KEDO–DPRK Supply Agreement for the provision of the LWR project.” Even then, KEDO enjoyed a somewhat ghostly existence as it attempted to sort out the financial and other issues arising from the decision to terminate the project. See also SIX PARTY TALKS.

**KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY.** See ARMED FORCES.

**KOREAN PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY.** Name given to a meeting of delegates from both north and south Korea organized by the nationalist leader Kim Ku in Seoul in March 1947 to seek approval for a Provisional Republic of Korea. When this failed, Kim resigned as the chair of the Korean Provisional Government. Kim went to Pyongyang in 1948 for talks about reunification, but without success. He was assassinated in Seoul in 1949.

**KOREAN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC.** Nationwide organization created in September 1945 to fill the political vacuum created by the Japanese surrender and withdrawal from government in Korea at the end of World War II. The main organizer was the nationalist leader Yo Unhyong, who had previously set up a Preparatory Committee for Building the Country. He aimed at a united front bringing together left and right, and the Republic elected Rhee Syngman and other right-wing nationalists as its leaders. Several of those elected were not in the country and even those present were not consulted. Most declined the nominations, not wishing to support a platform that established “People’s Committees,” and which included land reform and nationalization among its main planks. Yo resigned in November 1945, and the organization fell under the control of communist leaders such as Pak Hon Yong. In December 1945, the United States Army Military Government proscribed it in the south, preferring to work with right-wing nationalist groups such as the Korea Democratic Party. It was more favored in the north, where the Soviet administration was happy to work with the People’s Committees. The supporters of the Republic, however, were among those who opposed trusteeship, which led to the end of Soviet tolerance.

**KOREAN PROLETARIAN ARTISTS’ FEDERATION (KPAF).** An organization formed in 1925, which is usually known by its initials, of those who used literature and other arts as a weapon in the class struggle. There
were similar movements in China and in Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. It claimed at times to have over 200 members. In 1927, it issued a manifesto that aligned it firmly with the Soviet-dominated Communist International. Under pressure from the Japanese authorities, most of the membership moved to Tokyo where the KPAF operated as an underground movement until it was suppressed in 1935. Among its members was the novelist Han So Rya, who later became a leading figure in art circles in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. When Han fell from power in the early 1960s, the movement also came under criticism. Its reputation has been somewhat restored in recent years, and a version of its history has featured in the multipart film series The Nation and Destiny.

KOREAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (CHOSUN SAHAEMIN-JUDANG). One of the minor political parties in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which supposedly represents the interests of those who, because of family and class background, are not eligible to join the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). It was founded as the Chosun Minjudang (Korean Democratic Party; there was also a Korean Democratic Party in the Republic of Korea, but it called itself Hankuk Minjudang) in November 1945, after the Soviet Union occupied the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in August 1945. Its leader was the Christian nationalist Cho Man Sik, and among its early members were many Christians. Cho opposed the Soviet–United States policy on trusteeship for Korea, which led to his arrest in 1946. The party was then effectively taken over by the communists and has never subsequently had an independent existence. Its supporters, like those of the Chondoist Chongu Party were accused of supporting the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the Korean War, but the party’s propaganda value meant that it continued to exist. Today, its representatives say that, while it is a wholly independent party, its role is to provide support for the KWP. There are no pictures of its own leaders on display, only those of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, successive secretaries general of the KWP.

KOREAN WAR. The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when, just before dawn on a Sunday morning, the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a well-prepared attack against the Republic of Korea (ROK) across the 38th parallel, the line of division between the two halves of Korea since the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

The war came as a surprise to the ROK and its armed forces were not on alert that weekend. But, after the division of the peninsula by Soviet and United States forces in order to take the Japanese surrender, and even more since the emergence of separate states in 1948, there was a widespread expec-
tation that there would be a war in Korea. The leaders of both the DPRK and the ROK talked about reunification of the peninsula. Such talk was accompanied by jostling by the armed forces of both sides along the parallel, with frequent border raids and attacks by both sides. Even before the establishment of the DPRK, the Soviet military had set about creating a North Korean army, while the communist victory in China’s civil war in 1949 released large numbers of battle-hardened Koreans to join the Korean People’s Army (KPA). The KPA was equipped with Soviet tanks and other weapons. The United States, however, had not created a comparable army in the ROK, and the ROK forces were far less well equipped. They had no tanks and only light artillery. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had military advisors on the peninsula, but there were no foreign combat forces there in June 1950.

In early 1949, Kim Il Sung, the DPRK premier and chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party, proposed to Soviet leader Josef Stalin that the DPRK should launch an attack on the ROK to bring about the unification of the peninsula. Stalin did not sanction this proposal, fearing that it would lead to a wider conflict with the United States. Kim again raised the issue in February 1950. This time Stalin was more receptive. Not only did the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appear to alter the balance in favor of a communist victory, but Kim was confident that there would be an uprising in the ROK once the invasion began. Stalin’s agreement was conditional on Chinese support for an attack. Once this was forthcoming, Kim Il Sung began to prepare for war. Stalin was willing to provide military aid and advisors but was determined to take no overt part in the war.

Some 80,000 DPRK troops, supported by tanks, crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June. They captured Seoul, the ROK capital, three days later. The ROK forces crumbled before the DPRK’s superior fire power, and the government fled first to Taejon and then to Taegu and finally to Pusan, a port city in the far south of the peninsula. The ROK appealed for international assistance immediately after the initial attack. The U.S. government responded immediately, ordering troops on garrison duty in Japan to Korea to support ROK forces. However, the U.S. forces that arrived in July were lightly equipped and ill-prepared and could not stop the DPRK’s southward push. ROK and U.S. troops took up defensive positions in the southeastern corner of the peninsula in an area along the Naktong River that became known as the Pusan perimeter. In the areas under DPRK control, attempts were made to set up local communist-run administrations. There were also purges of those deemed to be right-wing or anticommunist; religious organizations suffered badly. Both sides carried out reprisals, and many civilians were killed or injured in the fighting. From the beginning, the U.S. air force established control of the skies over the peninsula and was able to mount massive aerial attacks on the DPRK and its forces. Many civilians were killed in such attacks.
The United States also brought the issue to the United Nations. The Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union, which was protesting at the refusal to transfer the UN seat from the defeated Chinese Nationalist government to the newly victorious PRC, condemned the DPRK as an aggressor, demanded the restoration of the status quo, and mounted a collective defense action in support of the ROK. A United Nations Command (UNC) was established under General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of the Allied forces in Japan since 1945, who also now became supreme commander of the UN forces in Korea. Sixteen UN member states, including Great Britain, Canada, France, Australia, New Zealand, Greece, and Turkey, in addition to the United States, provided military forces. ROK President Rhee Syngman also placed ROK forces under MacArthur’s command. Once the UNC was established, the United Nations played little further role in the conduct of the war, and the United States remained the dominant country in the UNC.

In September 1950, MacArthur ordered a breakout from the Pusan perimeter, at the same time launching a seaborne attack at Inchon, the port for Seoul. By then the DPRK forces were experiencing difficulties because of the speed of their initial attack and the long supply lines needed to sustain it. The KPA fell back before the UN forces, and Seoul was recaptured on 26 September. These successes brought the war back to the 38th parallel, where it had begun. The original objective of the UN intervention, to restore the status quo, was thus achieved. Now, however, this was ignored, and in early October, the UN forces moved across the parallel in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, capturing Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, on 20 October. At the same time, UN troops reached the Yalu River, the border between Korea and China.

The Chinese had sent messages via the Indian ambassador in Beijing that they would not stand by if non-Korean forces approached their borders, and as the UN advance continued, intelligence reports indicated a buildup of Chinese forces. MacArthur discounted these reports, even though by late October, UN scouting parties were capturing occasional Chinese soldiers. By mid-October, some 250,000 troops of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, described by the Chinese as the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), were in Korea, filtered across the border rivers at night. They joined the KPA in combat, launching a massive counterattack against the advancing UN forces. Although some UN forces fought a rearguard action, many fled south in what became known as the Big Bug-out, abandoning or destroying equipment and supplies as they went as well as burning towns and villages. The UN bombing campaign against the DPRK continued, as it did throughout the war. The CPV–KPA crossed the 38th parallel, and Seoul fell for the second time on 4 January 1951. The UN forces set up their defense line just south of Wonju.
City, some 160 kilometers (100 miles) south of Seoul. UN counterattacks launched in February pushed the enemy northward, and on 15 March 1951, Seoul was recovered. In early April, UN forces again crossed the 38th parallel, but neither side now dominated and a stalemate developed. That same month, U.S. President Harry S. Truman dismissed MacArthur, who had criticized what he claimed were restrictions on his conduct of the war. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced MacArthur as supreme commander of the UN forces. Ridgway had no wish to relaunch a war of movement on the peninsula.

In April 1951, the Chinese launched a ferocious attack to end the war, but after some initial success, it fizzled out. The fighting now entered a long period of stalemate. With the two sides back more or less where they had started, there was a growing wish among some of the participants to end the conflict. Both Kim Il Sung and Rhee Syngman might have wish to see reunification of the peninsula, but neither the Chinese nor the United States was prepared to attempt this. Thus when Yakov Malik, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, called for a ceasefire on 23 June 1951, and when the Chinese also voiced their desire for a ceasefire two days later, the U.S. government welcomed the opportunity to initiate truce talks. Ridgway was instructed to arrange meetings to achieve this.

Soviet forces also took part in the Korean War, although not as openly as the United States or China. Stalin remained anxious not to enter into a direct confrontation with the United States. Soviet military advisors operated with the DPRK forces, and Soviet units manned antiaircraft guns. Some 70,000 Russian airmen were involved in the war from November 1950, flying MiG-15 and other Soviet aircraft, wearing Chinese uniforms, with their air bases in Manchuria. The Soviet Union supplied ammunition and equipment to both the KPA and the CPV and charged for it. The extent of the Soviet involvement has become much clearer since once-classified reports became available after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Negotiations for an armistice began on 10 July 1951, at Kaesong, the capital of Korea in the Koryo period (935–1392), a South Korean city that had been captured by the DPRK in the early stages of the war. This proved an unsatisfactory site, with both sides violating its neutrality, leading to the suspension of the talks on 23 August. They resumed at a new site nearby, along the line of actual control, at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951. Progress was slow and the full-scale talks were again suspended between 8 October 1952 and 26 April 1953, although working-level contacts continued. These led to the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war (POWs), as well as a number of Western civilians who had been held by the DPRK since June 1950. As the two sides argued over issues relating to POWs and the location
of a truce line, the fighting continued; it now more resembled the trench warfare of World War I than the swiftly moving campaigns of the first year of fighting. Bombing of the DPRK continued throughout the negotiations to wear down resistance. President Rhee opposed a ceasefire, advocating a complete victory against the communists and the reunification of the peninsula. So vehement was he on the subject that the U.S. government even had a plan for his removal by a military coup, but it was never implemented.

The full-scale talks resumed in April 1953. There was a new U.S. president, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was anxious to end the fighting. The death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 may have also contributed to the decision to renew the negotiations. The main areas of contention were the demarcation of a ceasefire line and the creation of a demilitarized zone, the role and composition of supervisory bodies for the ceasefire and control of the movement of weapons into the peninsula, the release and exchange of POWs, and political recommendations to governments. Of these, the POW issue was the most difficult. In a move away from what had hitherto been standard international practice, the UNC pressed for voluntary repatriation on the grounds that both the KPA and the CPV contained large numbers of men who were from the ROK and Chinese Nationalist forces, respectively, who had been involuntarily forced into service, and who should now be allowed to chose where they wanted to go. The KPA/CPV side insisted that the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which said that POWs should be quickly and compulsorily returned to their country of origin, should apply.

Rhee’s opposition to an armistice led him to attempt to sabotage the negotiations by ordering ROK guards at POW camps to release some 27,000 POWs, who were resisting repatriation, on 18 June 1953. The communist side was furious, but under U.S. pressure, Rhee agreed not to engage in any further disruption. On 27 July 1953, General William K. Harrison, representing the UNC and General Nam Il, representing the DPRK, signed the agreement at Panmunjom, while Kim Il Sung, General Peng Dehui, (representing the CPV), and U.S. General Mark Clark signed at their respective headquarters. Rhee refused to sign. The fighting stopped.

With the signing of the Armistice Agreement, a military demarcation line was established across the peninsula, based on the respective lines of actual control at the time of the armistice, with a demilitarized zone on either side. At the same time, Panmunjom, where the truce was signed, was designated as a neutral zone. It was there that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), created under the armistice agreement, established their respective headquarters. The NNSC, drawn from UN member nations that had not taken part in the Korean War, was to supervise observance of the terms of the armistice,
while the MAC, composed of the representatives of the DPRK, China, and of the UN Command, was to deal with any problems rising between the former belligerents.

Following signing of the truce agreement, the 16 UN member states that fought in the Korean War issued a **Sixteen Nations Declaration on Korea**, in which they stated that they would fight again if the communists renewed their aggression. Although the ROK attempted to invoke this declaration at the time of the 1968 **Blue House attack**, none of the 16 nations responded, and it must be assumed that it has become a dead letter.

Exchanges of POWs were carried out under the supervision of a United Nations Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (UNNRC) in an exercise called Operation Big Switch, which began on 5 August 1953. It saw the handing over of 75,823 communist POWs, including 5,640 Chinese, who wished to be repatriated. The communist side turned over 12,773 UN POWs (3,597 American, 7,862 ROK, and 1,112 other UN troops). The remaining 22,606 POWs were held under the custody of the UNNRC pending their decision on repatriation. Of these, some 22,118 from the communist side, mostly Chinese, elected to settle either in the ROK or Taiwan. The CPV withdrew from the DPRK at the end of 1958. Since 1957, when the last units of the British Commonwealth Division left, only the United States has retained any large number of troops in the ROK. The UNC remains nominally in existence. The 1954 **Geneva Political Conference** was convened to meet the armistice agreement’s call for a political conference but failed to solve any of the issues.

The war was a tragedy for the Korean Peninsula and its people. It achieved nothing other than destruction, loss of life, and great human suffering. It fostered deep hatred. Rather than bringing about unification, it made it more difficult as the two sides concentrated postwar on the building up of separate states with no contact between them. The war caused heavy property damage and a large number of casualties on both sides. In the ROK, some 373,500 civilians were killed, more than 225,600 wounded, and over 387,740 were listed as missing; there were 1 million orphans and 600,000 war widows. During the occupation of Seoul, the communists massacred 128,936 civilians and 84,523 were taken captive to the DPRK. When the communists retreated from Seoul, a large number of artists and writers went or were taken with them. The DPRK casualties were some 294,151 soldiers killed, 229,849 wounded, and 91,206 missing. Some 406,000 civilians were reported killed, 1,594,000 were wounded, and 680,000 were missing. Over 1.5 million fled south during the war. Of some 1.3 million U.S. troops who served in the Korean War, 33,625 were killed, 105,785 were wounded, and several hundred were reported missing. The ROK army lost 225,784 and
717,170 were wounded. Some 2,186 other UN troops were killed and 10,117 were wounded. No figures for Chinese losses were ever issued, but it has been estimated that some 900,000 were either killed or wounded. See also AX MURDERS AT PANMUNJOM; CHOE KWANG; COMMITTEE FOR ASSISTING THE RETURN OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS; DANDONG; DEAN, WILLIAM F.; FAMILY REUNIONS; FOREIGN POLICY; HO KAI I; KIM CHAEK; LINJIANG; MU CHONG; NORTHERN LIMIT LINE; RI IN MO; SHINUIJU; UNITED STATES MISSING IN ACTION RECOVERY PROGRAM; WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION AND SUPPORT KOREA; ZHOU ENLAI.

KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY (KWP; CHOSUN RODONG DANG).

The KWP developed from a merger of the northern bureau of the revived Korean Communist Party (KCP), which was established in Pyongyang in October 1945, and the New People’s Party, made up of Koreans who had been active against the Japanese in China. This became the North Korean Workers’ Party in August 1946. A similar movement in the southern half of the peninsula saw the emergence of the South Korean Workers’ Party. After the establishment of separate states on the peninsula in 1948, the government in the Republic of Korea (ROK) eventually banned the South Korean Workers’ Party as part of its drive against left-wing parties. As a result, the two Korean Workers’ Parties merged in June 1949, with Kim Il Sung as the general secretary and the southern leader, Pak Hon Yong, as his deputy. Kim was already the dominant figure in the leadership and would remain so until his death in 1994. With the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948, the KWP became the sole ruling force and has since maintained control of all political activity within the state, operating through party cells and local committees, but with real power always firmly held at the center in the Central Committee’s Politburo and its Standing Committee. Under Kim Il Sung’s leadership, which became unchallenged after a series of purges in the 1950s, the party adhered to the concept of juche (variously defined as involving political independence, economic self-reliance, and national self-defense) as its ideological foundation.

In its early years, the KWP acknowledged the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin as the “vanguard of the world communist movement.” At the same time, the party had close relations with the People’s Republic of China, established in October 1949, and with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In particular, it acknowledged the major role the PRC played in saving the DPRK during the Korean War (1950–53). During the late 1950s, the KWP leaned more toward the Chinese position. Kim Il Sung had been a member of the CCP during the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement
in the 1930s and admired movements designed to speed up the development of socialism in China such as the Great Leap Forward. He was suspicious of the de-Stalinization process in the Soviet Union that began in the mid-1950s. The Sino–Soviet split that developed from that process proved difficult for the KWP, which in 1961 again recognized the Soviet Union’s vanguard role. However, from 1963, the KWP moved to a pro-Chinese line. As time went by, Kim took a more independent stance on the ideological competition between the two great communist powers. The rapid post-1989 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 did not shake the KWP’s certainty about its right to rule. In this new world, where its former friends had begun to establish relations with the ROK and to demand payment for goods supplied, the KWP had little choice but to move closer to China, although it did not follow the Chinese policies of reform and opening.

The death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994 generated much external expectation that the forces of political reform would be unleashed in the DPRK. In any event, little formally changed in the system of KWP rule. However, although long groomed for the succession to his father, Kim Jong Il appeared at first reluctant to take over the formal trappings of power, and it was not until October 1997 that he was at last named as KWP general secretary. A year later, he became effective head of state as chairman of the National Defense Commission. However, the KWP suffered something of an eclipse under Kim Jong Il. Until September 2010, there had been no party congress since October 1980. Old leaders were dismissed or died and were not replaced. Kim Jong Il turned to the armed forces for support, favoring a policy of songun (“Army First”), in which the military become the leading class, displacing the proletariat. Although portraits of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels remained on display in Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square, Marxist–Leninism was dismissed as no longer appropriate for the DPRK. From about 2005, however, some the KWP began something of a comeback, perhaps as a vehicle for securing Kim Jong Il’s successor. When Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, it was the party that announced that Kim Jong Un would be the successor, and party leaders were also prominent in the subsequent obsequies. See also CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY; JANG SONG TAEK; KOREAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; KULLUJA; ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT; POLITICAL PARTIES; RODONG SINMUN.

KORYO MEDICINE. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), traditional medicine is called Koryo medicine, which reflects the fact that the systematic study of the use of plants, animal, and mineral sources for medical purposes began under the Koryo dynasty (918–1392). Although acknowledging that Koryo medicine shares many characteristics with
traditional Chinese medicine, DPRK scholars claim that it developed separately and that it is quite different from other forms of traditional medicine found elsewhere in Asia. In the early years of the DPRK, traditional medicine was looked down on as something approaching superstition, and a comprehensive Western-style health system developed in the DPRK after the Korean War (1950–53). However, traditional methods were revived in the mid-1950s. The Academy of Koryo Medicine dates from 1962 and falls under the Academy of Sciences. Kim Il Sung, whose father had for a time practiced as a herbalist, endorsed the use of traditional medicine in 1979 when he published an essay titled “On Developing Traditional Korean Medicine.” As well as departments of traditional medicine attached to general hospitals, where doctors are trained in the proportion of 70 percent Western medicine, 30 percent Koryo medicine, there is a 500-bed General Hospital of Koryo Medicine based in Pyongyang. This became a World Health Organization collaborative center for traditional medicine in 1989; it opened in its present form in 2002. The economic problems of the 1990s have had a strongly negative effect on the Westernized health services, with few drugs available. In these circumstances, much more use is made of traditional medicines. Many hospitals now grow their own medicinal herbs or prepare other forms of traditional medicine.

**KULLUJA (THE WORKER).** Kulluja is the monthly theoretical journal of the Korean Workers’ Party, founded in November 1946. The first editor was Tae Sung Su, a supporter of Kim Il Sung. During the early years of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the journal carried articles that reflected the struggle between Kim Il Sung and his supporters and other groups. Later, it faithfully reflected official views. In the 1970s, it was one of the chief sources of references to the Party Center as a term for Kim Jong Il before he was formally mentioned by name. It remains an important and authoritative source for information about KWP thinking, although it has not been generally available outside the DPRK since the 1990s. Occasional joint editorials with other publications do appear, but they do not necessarily reflect the discussions in Kulloja itself.

**KUMCHANG-RI.** Kumchang-ri is a village in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Yongbyon, the site of the DPRK nuclear program. In 1998, there were claims in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States that work was under way on a clandestine nuclear site at the village. The United States challenged the DPRK on this issue, which appeared to violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. In May 1999, a team from the U.S. Department of State, including
technical experts, visited the site. While clearly a large underground area had been excavated, the team found no evidence of nuclear-related development. It is believed that the United States provided a large amount of aid by way of apology for the mistaken claim.

KUMGANG MOUNTAIN TOURIST PROJECT. Like the Kaesong Industrial Zone, the Kumgang Mountain tourist project was the brainchild of Chung Ju-yung, the head of the Hyundai conglomerate of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Kumgang (Diamond) Mountains have long been famous as among the most spectacular natural scenery in Korea, with three distinct areas: Inner, Outer, and Sea Kumgang. Even in traditional Korea, the mountains were a center of tourism and remained so during the Japanese colonial period.

Chung was born in Tongchon, a town close to Kumgang, in what is now the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which was probably another reason for his interest. He was active from the late 1980s in attempts to effect a better relationship between the two Koreas. One way that this seemed possible was through tourism. When then ROK President Roh Tae-woo introduced his Nordpolitik of engagement with the DPRK and socialist countries in 1988, Chung saw his chance. The following year, he visited the DPRK to discuss a tourist project with President Kim Il Sung and got an agreement in principle. But the high hopes of an improved relationship between the two Koreas foundered after 1991 and the idea was not developed.

The election of Kim Dae-jung as ROK president in 1997 and the development of the “Sunshine Policy” revived Chung’s hopes. In 1998, he received government approval for a $96 million plan to put the tourism project into action. In October 1998, he signed an agreement with the Asia–Pacific Peace Committee under which tourists would go by ship from the ROK to the Kumgang Mountains on the east coast of the peninsula, close to the demilitarized zone, the de facto border between the two Koreas. The agreement assumed that there would be widespread interest in the ROK at this opportunity to go to the DPRK. Hyundai agreed to pay $12 million a month until February 2005, a total of some $950 million, together with over $400 million for development rights and construction costs. This would require some 350,000 tourists a month.

In November, a month after the agreement was signed, the first cruise took place. By the end of 1998, 15,500 ROK citizens had made the trip. The first full year saw 148,000, and there were 213,000 in 2000. The visitors only spent one night in the area. They were not allowed to stay ashore, but spent the night on the ship. DPRK security was tight and, apart from tour guides, no contact was allowed with the local people. One visitor who tried to do so
was briefly detained, which led to a suspension of tours for two months and raised questions about protection in case of a serious incident. The tours were expensive, at $500 per person for one night away. The result was that fewer wanted to visit than Hyundai had expected. Numbers fell to only 58,000 in 2001 and Hyundai heavily lost money.

This led to a renegotiation with the DPRK. From June 2001, payment was made on a per capita basis rather than a monthly lump sum. The hope was that the new arrangement might make the DPRK more willing to adjust to tourist expectations. Conditions did improve somewhat with the opening of a Hyundai-constructed hotel in 2004. In June 2005, the company reported that the millionth person had visited. Hyundai was still losing money, however, and the ROK government began to subsidize the visits, with reduced rates offered to categories such as students and the elderly. New rules and regulations seemed to provide protection for visitors and procedures should there be incidents. Travel also became easier, as buses replaced the sea route.

On 11 July 2008, the whole arrangement began to unravel. On that day, a woman tourist, who had apparently wandered into a restricted area in order to see the sunrise, failed to respond to a challenge from a guard and was shot dead. The ROK demanded that it be allowed to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances. The DPRK, while expressing regret at the death, refused to allow an inquiry. The ROK then suspended the tours, which have not resumed. The Hyundai chair, Hyun Jeong-eun, reached an agreement with then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il on resumption in August 2009, but the ROK government would not agree. The DPRK waited but, when nothing happened, it announced in March 2010 that it would take “extraordinary measures” unless the tours resumed. The following month, it seized five ROK properties at the resort and expelled some ROK staff. It also began to allow tours to the area by Chinese and Western tour groups, which had been stopped in 1998. In September 2011, the last Hyundai employees were expelled and the DPRK took over all the facilities. The ROK protested and urged other countries not to allow their nationals to visit the area.

Whether the project could ever have made money is doubtful, but its closure has not come cheaply. Not only has Hyundai lost heavily but so has the ROK more generally. The ROK government had heavily subsidized the project until the suspension in 2008. Since then, border areas in the ROK have seen heavy revenue reductions because of the drop in tourist trade. Ultimately, if the DPRK does confiscate the properties, the ROK government is likely to face compensation claims since it was government action that led to this situation. Critics in the ROK have argued that it was providing funds to a hostile government and have pointed to the relatively low take up.
KUMSUSAN MEMORIAL PALACE. This building, set among trees on the edge of Pyongyang, has a huge facade, a vast plaza, and its own dedicated tramline. Given that it was built when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was in a period of severe economic decline, it perhaps indicates more than anything else where the regime’s priorities lie. The original building was where Kim Il Sung lived and worked in his later years. Here he received visitors such as the U.S. evangelist Billy Graham and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. After Kim’s death in 1994, his son and successor Kim Jong Il directed that the palace should be refigured as his mausoleum, and Kim’s remains now lie there. The mausoleum formally opened for visitors on 8 July 1995, the first anniversary of Kim’s death. On important days such as 1 January and 15 August, the diplomatic corps and Korean dignitaries are expected to pay their respects. It is possible for other foreigners to visit on Fridays and Sundays, but all visits must be arranged in advance. Visitors have to dress respectably and be properly behaved within the building. They are conveyed to the actual memorial hall via moving walkways and escalators and have to pass through special areas where the dust is blown off their clothes and shoes. The complex contains a selection of gifts presented to Kim Il Sung over his lifetime, and his honorary degrees and other awards are also on display.

It was here that Kim Jong Il’s body lay in state after his death in December 2011. It was subsequently announced that his body would also be embalmed and placed in the Kumsusan Memorial Palace.
LANGUAGE. Like all other matters in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the question of language has always been highly political. This was partly inherited from the Japanese colonial period (1910–45), during which there were attempts to suppress the Korean language and the use of the Korean script, hangul, replacing them with Japanese and Japanese scripts. Restoring the language to its rightful place was therefore important in both parts of Korea after liberation in 1945. One of the earliest mass campaigns in the north was a determined effort to eradicate illiteracy; it was estimated that one-quarter of the population was illiterate in 1945. This campaign, which ran from 1945 until 1954, having been interrupted by the Korean War (1950–53), led to important decisions about the language. Until the beginning of the 20th century, educated Koreans used Chinese characters rather than the Korean alphabet. Even when hangul became more popular, Chinese characters continued to be used for names, newspaper headlines, and in many other areas. However, to learn Chinese characters takes much time and effort, and it was thought that this would be a hindrance to the elimination of illiteracy. There was also a belief that the use of Chinese was an indication of a subservient attitude. Therefore, the use of Chinese was discouraged and, after 1949, abolished for most purposes. When such characters were used in publications, they were supposed to appear in brackets after the Korean version. From 1968 onward, Chinese was taught only as a foreign language.

The Korean alphabet also became a political issue. The veteran linguist and communist leader Kim Tu Bong, who was head of Kim Il Sung University, advocated reforms in the writing of hangul, a subject that had interested him since the 1910s. The proposed reforms included horizontal writing, which had been debated during the colonial period, the introduction of new letters, and changes to the order of the letters. These proposals had made little progress before the outbreak of the Korean War, which effectively set the issue aside. When the language question was revisited after the war, Kim Tu Bong’s proposals disappeared. As he became the subject of political criticism, eventually leading to his purge and execution, even former supporters denounced his proposals.
Language issues continued to be debated, and changes introduced. From 1956, horizontal writing—but not the way that Kim Tu Bong had wanted it—replaced vertical in all publications. The term and the concept of “standard language,” which had been developed in 1936 by the Korean Language Society, with which Kim Tu Bong had maintained contact while living in China and was based on the language of the Seoul middle class, was to be replaced by the term “cultured language.” This was defined as the language most commonly used among Korean people. After 1964, this would be defined as the speech of the DPRK capital, Pyongyang. In 1964 and 1966, Kim Il Sung published two Conversations with Linguists. Although he noted that hangul letters were not ideal, he argued against changing them until after reunification, since it would be wrong for the two Koreas to diverge on such an important matter. However, he also argued against the continued use of Sino–Korean words and against the introduction of foreign words, while accepting that these could not be completely eradicated.

Since then, the language debate has continued. In principle, the effort to prevent the influx of foreign words is maintained. The media carries periodic attacks on the ROK for allegedly allowing such words to replace native Korean words and on the United States for pursuing a policy similar to that of the Japanese to eradicate the Korean language. However, since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the greater exposure to the outside world as a result of the famine, more foreign words are creeping into the language.

For most of its history, the main foreign language taught in the DPRK was Russian. Chinese was second. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, English has replaced Russian in schools and universities. Chinese is widespread and Japanese, despite the political issues between the two countries, is also popular. Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies is the principal center for foreign language teaching, but other universities also have language faculties. Graduates have traditionally been employed in areas such as foreign policy and foreign trade. See also EDUCATION.

LEE HU-RAK (1924–2009). Born in Pusan, Lee served as a noncommissioned officer in the army during the Japanese colonial period. He attended the Republic of Korea (ROK) Military Academy after liberation, and from 1963 to 1970 he served as private secretary to President Park Chung-hee. After a brief period as ambassador to Japan in 1970, he became director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA; now the National Intelligence Service of the ROK) the same year. In May 1972, he visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as Park’s special envoy. Later that same month, he hosted a return DPRK visit, led by Vice Premier Pak Sung Chol, which led to the 4 July 1972 North–South Joint Communi-
Lee lost his job in 1973 over the KCIA’s kidnapping of opposition leader Kim Dae-jung. In 1979, Lee was elected to the ROK National Assembly but was purged for corruption and banned from politics in 1980. The ban was lifted in 1985 but Lee never returned to public life.

LEE MYUNG-BAK (1941–). Lee Myung-bak was elected president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2007. He was born in Osaka, Japan, where his family had moved during the Japanese colonial period. The family returned to Pohang, now in the ROK, at the end of World War II. After school and university, Lee joined the Hyundai Construction Company in 1965, becoming chief executive officer (CEO) in 1988; he was then the youngest CEO in the ROK. During his time at Hyundai, he acquired the nickname “Bulldozer,” supposedly because he once stripped down and repaired a broken bulldozer but perhaps also because of his no-nonsense management approach. His political career began in 1992, when he was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the Democratic Liberal Party. From the beginning, there were questions over his election expenses and he resigned his seat in 1998 to avoid legal action. In 2002, he became mayor of Seoul, where he added to his reputation for getting things done. By then, Lee was a member of the opposition Grand National Party. In 2007, he announced that he would stand as a candidate for the presidential elections against Park Geun-hye, the daughter of former President Park Chung-hee, who had been the favorite up to then. Lee won both the nomination and the presidency in December 2007.

Lee had expressed skepticism over a number of his predecessor’s policies, in particular the issue of engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He quickly made it clear on taking office in 2008 that he would not continue the aid that had flowed north over the previous 10 years unless there was movement on the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Existing projects would be examined to see if they should continue, and in the future the ROK would concern itself more with the issue of human rights in the DPRK. In return, he offered what he called Vision 3000, an offer to raise DPRK income levels to $3,000 per capita. The DPRK, which had not criticized Lee directly during the presidential campaign, broke its silence on 1 April 2008 with a blistering attack on him and a rejection of his proposals. Thereafter, relations between the two Koreas steadily deteriorated. There was a certain amount of irony in that, while the ROK was becoming tougher on the DPRK, the U.S. President George W. Bush’s second administration was pursuing a more conciliatory policy in the hope that this would curtail the nuclear program. Only after the end of the Bush administration and the election of Barack Obama did the ROK and U.S. policies reconverge.
In July 2008, Lee drew back somewhat from his earlier tough stand. On 11 July, he made a speech in which he said he would follow a policy of “mutual benefit and common prosperity” and pledged that agreements reached at the 2000 and 2007 Inter-Korean Summits would be honored. By an unfortunate coincidence, that morning an ROK tourist was shot dead at the DPRK’s Kumgang Mountain tourist resort, after allegedly refusing to answer a sentry’s challenge. As the DPRK rejected Lee’s offer, the ROK demanded that it should be allowed to investigate the incident. The DPRK expressed regret but refused to allow an ROK investigation to take place. The ROK then suspended the tours, which have not resumed. Tours to Kaesong continued, as did the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), but the end of year saw the DPRK suspending the Kaesong tours and putting pressure on the KIZ. Lee did not change his policy.

The standoff seemed to worsen in 2009, with a DPRK missile launch in April and a nuclear test in May. When sanctions followed, the DPRK reacted by saying that all agreements and arrangements between the two Koreas were null and void. It later said, not for the first time, that it would no longer recognize the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Lee did not overreact, and in practice, nothing much happened. By August, there were more hopeful signs, especially when Lee met the high-ranking DPRK delegation that came for former President Kim Dae-jung’s 22 August funeral. Soon afterward, Lee made another offer of a “grand bargain” of aid and security linked to DPRK denuclearization, similar to his earlier proposal. The DPRK rejected it but in less hostile terms than before. There were even talks about a possible summit. Hopes of improved relations continued in early 2010, but the sinking of the ROK corvette, the Chonan, in March, and the shelling of the Yonpyong Islands in November, left Lee with little choice but to condemn the DPRK and to seek further sanctions. At the end of what had been a difficult year, Lee began to talk as though reunification of the peninsula was not far off and of the need for a “reunification tax.” Although there was much outrage at the two attacks, neither of Lee’s proposals seemed to strike a note with his fellow citizens. Despite the tensions, DPRK revelations early in 2011 showed that the ROK was apparently still willing to discuss the possibility of a further summit. In reality, it seems unlikely that the DPRK would wish to engage with Lee, whose term of office ends in 2012.

LEGAL SYSTEM. In formal terms, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a legal system that is similar to that found in many other communist or former communist countries, which in turn derives from German and Soviet legal practices. The system is not designed to provide a fair trial or to see that justice is done, but to ensure that people stay loyal to the leadership. Matters such as defacing a picture of a leader, even accidently,
which would not be crimes elsewhere, are treated as among the more heinous crimes in the DPRK. Foreign and Republic of Korea visitors have sometimes found themselves in trouble for inadvertently spoiling or failing to treat with respect pictures of Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il that have appeared in newspapers or magazines. In theory, trials should not be held in secret but, in reality, this rule is more observed in the breach than the observance.

There are two strands under the Central People's Committee: the court system and the procurator's office. Below the Central Court is a Special Court, and then provincial/centrally administered city courts and people's courts. The procurator's office has similar divisions. There are also courts that deal with military and railroad matters. Formal legal provisions are rather simple and much is left to administrative guidance, which comes from the Supreme People's Assembly or from the Korean Workers' Party. A trial is normally conducted by a judge with two "people's assessors," whose role is supposedly similar to that of a Western jury. Details are not known of how they are selected. Defendants are in theory entitled to defense lawyers, but these appear to make no attempt to support their clients; their role seems to be to defend state and public interests. Although changes were introduced in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Law in 2004–5 to improve trial procedures, defectors report that in reality nothing has changed and trials are still conducted in an arbitrary fashion.

In addition to the formal system, there are "people's trials" in which there is little pretence of following legal norms and where the sentence is often death by public execution. The DPRK authorities have admitted that public executions do take place. The exact number of such executions is not known but appears to wax and wane depending on the political climate. Punishment is also not confined to the perpetrator of an offense, particularly in the case of alleged political crimes. In such cases, once convicted, not only is the accused punished but in many cases so are his or her family, often for several generations. Since 2004, the Administrative Penalties Law allows various agencies other than the courts to apply penalties such as unpaid labor, demolition, sacking, and reprimand.

Conditions in all detention centers, whether prisons or camps, appear to be very bad. Defectors testify to long hours of work, routine beatings, torture, forced abortions, and lack of food and medical care. Arbitrary killings are common. The total number of prisoners is not known, but international human rights' organizations estimate them at about 200,000. Some defectors' organizations claim that the numbers are much higher.

In recent years, the DPRK has made some attempts to provide a better legal system for foreigners wishing to do business in the country, with a number of joint venture laws from 1987 onward. In 2007, the state-owned Korean Central News Agency reported the establishment of the Pyongyang Law
Office, whose role would be “to provide solutions for legal matters arising in various areas” and to introduce the relevant DPRK laws in matters relating to the Kaesong Industrial Zone, the Kumgang Mountains tourist project, and foreign trade. See also OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA.

LIM SOO-KYUNG (1968– ). In 1989, when Lim Soo-kyung (also written as Rim Su Gyong and Im Su-kyung) was a student at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (ROK), she went without permission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Her purpose was to attend the Pyongyang World Youth Festival that had been organized after the failure of the DPRK to share the Seoul 1988 Summer Olympic Games. Lim made her way clandestinely to the DPRK, traveling via Japan and Germany, and accompanied by a Roman Catholic priest, Father Moon Kyun-hyun. She described herself as a representative of the National Council of Student Representatives, an ROK student dissident group. The two were widely feted in Pyongyang, where they made a series of statements denouncing the division of the peninsula and demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops. Both also joined a march for Peace and Reunification, from Mount Paektu on the DPRK’s northern border to Panmunjom on the military demarcation line. There they tried to cross back into the ROK, but were refused entry. They then went on a hunger strike and were eventually allowed to cross on 15 August, which both Koreas celebrate as National Liberation Day.

They were promptly arrested and charged under the ROK’s National Security Laws. Lim received a 10-year sentence, later reduced to five, while Moon received eight years, also later reduced to five. On release, both adopted a low profile. However, Lim came to some domestic prominence in 2005, when her son, who was studying English in the Philippines, drowned in a hotel pool. This led to very hostile comments on a website to the effect that she deserved it as a traitor. A number of people, including at least one university professor, were prosecuted and convicted. She remains a hero in the DPRK, which has published a postage stamp in her honor, and which still cites her as an example. An account of her visit, “My Participation in the Pyongyang Festival and My Stay in the North for One Month and a Half,” appears in For a United Homeland (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Press, 1992).

LINJIANG. Chinese city in Jilin Province on the Sino–DPRK border, near to the Changbai Korean Autonomous County. This was the area in which Kim Il Sung’s family lived for a time from 1916 and where Kim first went to school. Linjiang was an important staging post for Chinese People’s Volunteers entering the DPRK during the Korean War. In more recent years, it has become a major transit point for DPRK trade with China and also a center for smuggling. See also FOREIGN TRADE.
MACARTHUR, DOUGLAS (1880–1964). Supreme commander of the United Nations forces during the Korean War; commander-in-chief of the United States forces in the Pacific theater from 1941; general of the army from 1944. The son of a Civil War hero and career army office, General Arthur MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur was born at Fort Dodge, Arkansas, in 1880. Much of his youth was spent on army posts. He attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1903, and saw service in France during World War I, where he reached the rank of brigadier general. He became army chief of staff in 1930. At the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, he was in the Philippines, from where he went to Australia, promising to return. This he did and in September 1945, he formally presided over the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. He then became supreme commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan; Korea was included in his area of responsibility, but he paid little attention to it until 1950, visiting the peninsula only in August 1948 for the inauguration of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, U.S. President Harry S. Truman appointed MacArthur additionally as commander of the United Nations Command (UNC). On 14 July 1950, ROK President Rhee Syngman placed ROK armed forces under his command. MacArthur made his second visit to the Korean Peninsula in late June 1950, where he found chaos as ROK forces retreated before the rapidly advancing armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). He determined to fight back, and in September 1950, planned and executed Operation CHROMITE, which led to the capture of the port city of Inchon. This, and the linked breakout from the “Pusan perimeter” in the far south of the peninsula, opened the way to the ROK capital, Seoul, and for the crossing of the 38th parallel into the DPRK. The UNC met little opposition from the remaining DPRK forces. MacArthur discounted reports of possible People's Republic of China (PRC) intervention if the UN forces approached the Yalu River. When PRC forces attacked in November 1950, MacArthur panicked and demanded that the war be extended to PRC territory; he also wanted to use nuclear weapons. Truman refused, and after initial PRC successes faltered, the line of battle stabilized around the 38th parallel in mid-1951. Following a
public letter in April 1951 in which MacArthur called for the use of Republic of China forces from Taiwan against the Chinese mainland, MacArthur was relieved of his command on 11 April 1951, and General Matthew Ridgway took over both as SCAP in Japan and UN commander in Korea.

At one time, it looked as though MacArthur might stand as the Republican Party candidate in the 1952 U.S. presidential election, but the moment had passed. General Dwight D. Eisenhower won the republican nomination, and MacArthur quickly faded from the political scene. In retirement, he continued to blame those he believed had prevented him from winning the war in Korea. In Japan, he is remembered for the relatively beneficial role of the occupation authorities. The ROK remembers him as the savior of the country, while the DPRK still condemns him as an invader.

MACAU. The former Portuguese colony of Macau, which became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1999, has long had links with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Beginning from 1974, after Portugal established diplomatic relations with the DPRK, Macau became an important point of contact for DPRK trade, with several companies established there. The best known of these was the Jokwang (also spelled Zokwang or Chokwang) General Trading Company, which is widely believed to be connected to the top DPRK leadership. There are also unconfirmed press reports that the company helped trade DPRK weapons internationally, and staff of the company were reported to be traveling on DPRK diplomatic passports.

Funds from Jokwang and other DPRK companies were handled by a small Macau bank, the Banca Delta Asia (BDA). This attracted attention in 1994 when it voluntarily alerted the Macau financial authorities to deposits made by Jokwang staff of fake United States dollars. The Jokwang staff involved were detained but were then deported without any charges being made. In September 2005, the BDA again attracted attention when U.S. Treasury officials claimed that it was a main DPRK center for money laundering. This led to a run on the bank, followed by a decision by the Macau authorities to freeze all accounts held within it. No detailed evidence for the U.S. claims was published, but the announcement and the Macau actions led to a DPRK refusal to take any further part in the Six Party Talks on nuclear matters. The claims about the BDA came just after an apparent breakthrough in the nuclear talks, and there were some suspicion that the announcement was deliberately leaked from within the U.S. administration to prevent an agreement being reached. In 2006, the Jokwang Company apparently left Macau for Zhuhai in the PRC, and it no longer appears in the published lists of DPRK companies.
After lengthy negotiations, the freeze on the BDA accounts was lifted in 2007. Newspaper reports said the accounting firm of Ernst & Young and the government of Macau had both found no evidence of illegal actions by the bank. After the freeze was lifted, the DPRK was eventually able to access its funds and the Six Party Talks resumed.

There are other connections between Macau and the DPRK. In her 1993 book, *Tears of My Soul*, Kim Hyun Hee claimed that she and her accomplice, Kim Sung Il, who had carried out the Andaman Sea bomb attack on a Korean Air flight in 1987, had received training in Cantonese in Macau arranged by the Jokwang Company. Stanley Ho (He Hongshen), a Macau-based entrepreneur and casino owner, established links with the DPRK, and one of his organizations runs both the Cantonese restaurant and the casino in the Yanggakdo Hotel in the DPRK capital, Pyongyang. Since the early 2000s, journalists have identified a man in Macau as Kim Jong Nam, the eldest son of the DPRK leader, Kim Jong Il. He occasionally gives interviews. See also FOREIGN TRADE.

MANCHURIA. The Western name for the area that the Chinese call “the northeast,” made up now of the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. It was the original home of the Manchu, who established the Qing dynasty in China in 1644. The name Manchuria is associated with the Japanese puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo in the older Wade–Giles romanization) and the term is not used in China. There have been sizable Korean communities in parts of the area since the late 19th century, and it was a major center of Korean guerrilla activity against the Japanese in the 1930s. Kim Il Sung’s family lived there from time to time from about 1919 to the early 1930s. It was also an important staging area for Chinese forces moving into Korea during the Korean War (1950–53). Today, much of the foreign trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) comes through Manchuria, and companies from the area, both Chinese and Korean–Chinese, play an important role in the DPRK’s economy. See also DANDONG; KOGURYO; LIJIANG; YALU RIVER; YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS REGION.

MANGYONGDAE. A small “village” situated downriver from Pyongyang on the Taedong River, described as the birthplace of Kim Il Sung, although according to his memoirs, he was born at his mother’s village of Chilgot, also close to Pyongyang. Mangyongdae was his father’s home village, where the family lived and where Kim was raised. The original buildings have long since disappeared and have been replaced by a stylized set of typical small houses and outhouses. The area is carefully landscaped, and Kim Il Sung’s
parents and grandparents are buried nearby. Mangyongdae is a major center of the personality cult that surrounds Kim and his family, to which specially selected groups are brought. All about are spots supposedly associated with Kim’s childhood. There is also the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Museum, founded in 1970, which commemorates Kim and his family’s alleged revolutionary activities. Nearby is the Mangyongdae Fun Fair, which can supposedly handle 100,000 visitors a day. The village is also the site of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, an elite establishment for the children of the top leadership.

MANGYONGDAE REVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL. This school, founded in 1947, began as the School for Bereaved Children of Revolutionaries and was renamed in 1962. At first, the pupils were the sons and daughters of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters and those killed in the Korean War (1950–53). In recent years, the students have come from senior party and government backgrounds and are trained to carry forward the revolutionary tradition either as government cadres or as military officers. Past pupils have included Kim Jong II and Kim Jong Un. The school appears to be under the control of the armed forces. Those attending wear military-style uniforms.

MANSUDAE ART STUDIO. This is the largest and most important center of the plastic arts in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is also known as the Mansudae Creation Company. It was said to be under the direct guidance of the DPRK leader Kim Jong Il. Founded in 1959, it has some 4,000 employees, of whom 1,000 are said to be artistic “creators.” The site, which can be visited, occupies 120,000 square meters (1,291,669 square feet), of which 76,000 square meters (818,057 square feet) is indoors. It has at least 10 departments: ink painting, oils, painting, sculpture, prints and posters, wall paintings, pottery, crafts, handicrafts, design, and gemstone painting (said to be a uniquely Korean technique). Themes and styles, apart from those drawn from traditional Korean art, tend to be in the “socialist realism” mode. Staff from the studio constructed many of the monumental works that can be seen in Pyongyang and elsewhere in the country. It will produce works to order, and its products have been sold abroad, especially in China and Japan. What was described as its first official exhibition in Europe was held in Genoa, Italy, in 2007. Two further exhibitions took place in Italy in 2009. An Internet site described as the “Official Western Web-Site of the Mansudae Art Studio” also appeared in 2009. Works from the studio have regularly been praised by the late Kim Il Sung and by Kim Jong Il. See also SON U YONG.

MAO ZEDONG (1896–1976). Mao Zedong was born into a rich peasant family in Hunan Province in central China and for a time was a librarian at
Beijing University. He led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the 1930s until his death. Mao took part in the founding conference of the CCP in Shanghai in 1921 and did much political work among the peasants. In 1935, he led a large group of followers on the Long March to escape the Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang or GMD). From then on, he was the dominant figure in the communist leadership, though he was not without challengers. He fought the GMD and then combined with them to fight the Japanese. After the defeat of the latter in 1945, civil war soon resumed in China, leading to the communist victory and establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949.

All the signs are that the PRC would have preferred a period for peaceful consolidation to establish the new state after 1949, rather than further conflict. However, Mao apparently agreed with the proposal from the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim Il Sung, that the time was ripe in the summer of 1950 to bring about reunification of the Korean Peninsula by invading the Republic of Korea (ROK), the other state established on the peninsula in 1948. Although the ROK had support from the United States, which the Chinese communists accused of interfering in the civil war, the peninsula seemed of little interest to the United States and there were no U.S. troops in the ROK. Kim was also optimistic that his forces would be welcome.

By late autumn 1950, any optimism had evaporated. The United States had orchestrated a United Nations intervention. Although at first the aim of this was the restoration of the status quo along the 38th parallel, the dividing line between the two Koreas since 1945, when UN forces found that the DPRK armed forces fled in disarray, they pushed up toward the Sino-Korean border. Chinese warnings were ignored, and Mao, apparently against much opposition from his colleagues, decided to send Chinese forces to help the DPRK. Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, promised assistance, while declining to commit Soviet forces to the conflict. Mao may also have thought the U.S. opposition to the PRC taking the China seat at the United Nations and the decision at the start of the Korean fighting to place the U.S. Seventh Fleet between the Chinese mainland and the GMD forces on Taiwan showed deep U.S. hostility toward the PRC. This meant that there could be a conflict between them at any time. Korea would be as good a place to fight as any.

In late October 1950, therefore, Chinese forces under the command of General Peng Tehuai began to move into the DPRK. They would be described as the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) rather than as regular Chinese troops, and they lacked sophisticated equipment. Many of them were ethnic Koreans, others were former GMD soldiers forcibly conscripted into the People’s Liberation Army. They hit the UN forces hard, driving them back down across the 38th parallel by the end of 1950. For a few more months,
the fighting moved back and forth across the parallel, but by April–May 1951, it settled down to something more like trench warfare. Chinese initial successes had come at a great cost, with heavy casualties, including Mao’s favorite son, Mao Anying, killed in an air raid. The Chinese spent much effort in rebuilding the DPRK forces, so that by 1952, they were again an effective fighting force.

After the signing of the **Armistice Agreement** in July 1953, Mao waived all DPRK debts to the PRC. Stalin charged the the Koreans and the Chinese for what the Soviet Union had supplied. The CPV stayed on to help with postwar reconstruction until 1958. They may also have been there to make sure that the DPRK did not make another attempt at reunification by force. China took part in the 1954 **Geneva Political Conference**. While its delegation, led by Mao’s right-hand man Premier **Zhou Enlai**, supported the DPRK position, it did not press hard for it, and most of the delegation’s efforts were focused on Indochina.

Kim Il Sung seems to have admired many of Mao’s policies and introduced elements of them into the DPRK, especially in **agriculture**. Kim’s cult of personality owed as much to Mao as it did to Stalin, and some features, such as the wearing of **badges**, may have been inspired by Chinese practices. DPRK gratitude for Chinese support was demonstrated by the erection of a number of memorials. Gradually, however, as with the Soviet liberation of the country in 1945, the Korean role rather than any foreign involvement was what was stressed on a day-to-day basis. Thanks for assistance became a rather ritualized annual event. It is also not uncommon to hear the view that while the PRC helped the DPRK, it did so for its own purposes rather than the latter’s. Relations with the PRC were complicated by the Sino–Soviet dispute and later by criticisms of Kim Il Sung during the more extreme early stages of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–76). But Kim Il Sung visited China later, and relations were restored. The DPRK has not endorsed criticism of Mao since his death, despite the reassessments the CCP has made.

**MASS GAMES.** A form of gymnastics display, once common in communist countries but now only survives in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Massed gymnastics displays developed in Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th century. Such displays became heavily politicized for propaganda purposes in both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and often involved thousands of participants. The DPRK began putting on performances from its earliest days, claiming to draw on traditions that had developed while fighting against the Japanese in the 1930s. Such performances used schoolchildren in large numbers both as performers and as card turners. The latter are placed opposite the audience, and they turn colored cards to
provide what are often stunning backdrops to the gymnastic performances in the foreground. The technique is widely used for all sorts of performances, including children’s concerts, but has become particularly associated with the spectacle *Arirang*, performed most years since 2002. The late DPRK leader, Kim Jong Il, was reputed to take a great interest in *Arirang*.

Since tens of thousands of school and university students have to rehearse for many months to achieve the high standards, the games clearly have a disruptive effect on education and reportedly there have been clashes between the culture and education ministries about the amount of time devoted to the games. The former has so far won out. There has also been criticism, especially in the Republic of Korea, of the games as an abuse of human rights.

MEDIA. All the media in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are officially controlled, and there are no private broadcasting stations or publications. This has been the case since the division of the peninsula in 1945. The purpose of the media is to promulgate the views of the leadership and to promote and defend the work of the party and state. “News” as understood in most of the rest of the world is not carried. Overall supervision of all media outlets lies with the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), founded in 1946, is the only national collector and distributor of domestic and foreign news in the DPRK. It broadcasts in Korean, English, Spanish, and Russian. It also produces a daily collection of material taken directly from foreign media, including material from the Republic of Korea, which is distributed to government and party officials and to foreign embassies. It maintains a number of foreign correspondents. Its headquarters are in the diplomatic area in eastern Pyongyang.

The main national newspapers are headed by Rodong Sinmun (“Workers’ Daily”), the official KWP newspaper, published every day of the year. Minju Choson (“People’s Daily”) is the government newspaper, and Choson Inmungun (“Korean Army”) is the armed forces’ newspaper. There is also Chongnyonjonowi, the newspaper of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League. In addition there are a number of local newspapers. There is little variation between the main news items, but it is possible to detect nuances in editorials, and some claim that Minju Choson is more lively than its rivals. Since 1995, the main newspapers have carried a “Joint Editorial” on the Western New Year, 1 January. This replaced the annual New Year message from President Kim Il Sung, which appeared until his death. The New Year editorials, like his messages, indicate the broad outline of government policy for the coming year. There are also a number of technical journals and magazines on scientific and cultural matters. The weekly Pyongyang Times, which
is also published in French, carries a selection of translated material, mostly from KCNA.

Broadcasting began in Korea during the Japanese colonial period. Radio and television are in the hands of the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, which in its present form dates from 1948. Its remit is similar to that of print media. In addition to Korean, it broadcasts in Chinese, Russian, English, French, Japanese, Spanish, and Arabic. The former Radio Pyongyang, now the Voice of Korea, also broadcasts internationally, and there is virtually no difference in content. Radio FM Pyongyang, started in 1989, is aimed at younger people in the Republic of Korea (ROK), while the clandestine Voice of National Salvation, which began as the Voice of the Unification Revolutionary Party in 1967, purports to be based in the ROK. However, the majority of people in the DPRK receive information via a cable system that has been in operation since 1979. According to the ROK’s Yonhap News Agency, its original purpose was to instill loyalty to Kim Jong Il as he was groomed to be his father’s successor.

Television in the DPRK dates from 1963. In 1970, the original Pyongyang Television Station became the Choson Central Television Station (CCTS) in 1970, and it began color broadcasts in 1974. CCTS broadcasts from 17:00 hours to 23:00 on weekdays, and from 10:00 to 13:00 and 15:00 to 23:30 on weekends. On weekends and holidays, an additional channel, the Mansudae TV station, broadcasts four hours on Saturdays and 10 hours on Sundays. It has lighter programs than CCTS. A third channel, the Choson Educational and Culture Station, began broadcasting in 1997. As the name implies, it carries educational classes. All these television outlets use the PAL transmission system that cannot be received on ROK sets. However, a station in Kaesong, close to the demilitarized zone, uses the NTSC format, which is used in the ROK. Its programs are the same as those on the CCTS channel. It is not known what sort of audience it attracts.

All radios and televisions in the DPRK are supposed to be fixed so that they can only receive local channels. It is known that some senior officials have access to foreign radio broadcasts if needed for their work, but the majority of the population are forbidden to listen or watch material from abroad. That said, there is increasing evidence from defectors and others that the theoretically fixed dial radios can be modified to receive foreign broadcasts. ROK human rights’ organizations have also made efforts to smuggle radios into the DPRK and report that there is evidence of their use. Since about 2004, some foreign television programs have been available in hotels catering for foreign visitors. The availability varies, but it has included the BBC World Television, Japanese, and Chinese channels. See also CELL PHONES; COMMUNICATIONS; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; KULLUJA; OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA; RADIO FREE ASIA.
MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION (MAC). The MAC was established under the terms of the Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 that ended the Korean War (1950–53). The MAC would consist of five officers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)/Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) and five from the United Nations Command (UNC), of which three on each side should be of general rank. Its purpose was to ensure adherence to the ceasefire as laid down in the Armistice Agreement, and to deal with issues related to violations of the neutrality of the demilitarized zone or territorial rights of North and South Korea by another party.

A conference building for the MAC was erected at Panmunjom, where the armistice was signed, and it was designated a free zone. The conference building straddles the military demarcation line. It is now the one area on the peninsula where each side can freely cross to the other. The MAC was a joint organization with no chair supported by a secretariat and 10 joint observer teams. It was also noted for the lack of normal courtesies by each side. Those arriving for meetings did not greet each other and did not exchange pleasantries or shake hands.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) in China, the CPV withdrew, but they returned in the early 1970s. From 1953 until March 1991, the UN side was headed by a United States’ general or admiral, but the UNC announced that a Republic of Korea (ROK) officer, Major General Hwang Won-tak, would be the next head of the UN side of the UNC. The DPRK refused to recognize the change, which they had been informed was likely, charging that the ROK had no right to represent the UNC because it had not signed the agreement. As a result, the 460th meeting, scheduled for 29 May 1992, failed to take place and there have been no further meetings at the senior level. Lower-level secretariat meetings have continued, however.

In April 1994, the DPRK announced that it was withdrawing from the MAC and called for a new mechanism to replace it. In August 1994, they announced the establishment of the Korean People’s Army Panmunjom Mission, which effectively operated as before. They also persuaded the CPV to make a similar announcement in December 1994. Although the Chinese did so, the Chinese also made it clear that until a new mechanism was in place, the armistice arrangements continued in force, a position that they have maintained even after the CPV withdrew their mission from Panmunjom. In June 1998, the DPRK proposed a resumption of general officer-level meetings at Panmunjom, with the provision that a U.S. officer would head the UNC side. Nothing came of this proposal and it was not until 2009 that a general officers’ meeting was held under the MAC’s auspices. The meeting produced no results. See also JOINT SECURITY AREA; NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISING COMMISSION.
MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE (MDL). The MDL is the boundary between the opposing forces drawn up along the line of actual control when the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953, ending the Korean War. The 240-kilometer (150-mile) line runs from sea to sea. A 2.4-kilometer (1.5-mile) wide demilitarized zone was established on each side of the line. The site of the small hamlet named Panmunjom was on the MDL, where the armistice negotiations had taken place after being moved from Kaesong, and was designated a “truce village.”

The MDL only runs on land, and the Armistice Agreement made no mention of a boundary at sea. On the east coast, the line is simply projected out into the East Sea/Sea of Japan, which has caused few problems. On the west coast, however, soon after the armistice, the United Nations Command introduced unilaterally a maritime division line, which became known as the Northern Limit Line. This runs north of the logical extension of the MDL in order to secure important fishing grounds for Republic of Korea (ROK) fishermen and to allow access to ROK-controlled islands.

MISSILES AND MISSILE TESTING. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is probably the leading third-world producer of missiles. It is also a leading proliferator of missiles and missile technology. It began to develop its missile technology in the 1960s, with assistance from the Soviet Union. Soviet technology in turn was derived from German World War II developments. When the Soviet Union became cautious about supplying the DPRK in the 1970s, the latter turned to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The DPRK developed its own versions of various types of missiles, either by back engineering or by exchanges of information and testing facilities with countries such as Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria. Thus the DPRK produced its own version of the Scud missile, the Hwasong, in 1984. The Scud was based on the German V2 rocket, but the DPRK version could carry a heavier payload and fly farther than the original. The Iranians used Hwasong rockets during the Iran–Iraq War, and although the quality was not very good, the rockets were inexpensive and relatively effective when used in large numbers. By the late 1980s, there were estimates that the DPRK possessed several hundred relatively short-range rockets and that these had been deployed to military units. These could attack targets in most of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

From the Hwasong, the DPRK developed the Nodong, which in theory has a range of 1,300 kilometers (780 miles) and is able to carry a heavier payload. Production of the Nodong was also helped by Pakistan and Iran. However, when first test fired in 1993, it only flew some 500 kilometers (310 miles). The DPRK also began work on a three-stage intercontinental ballistic mis-
A missile (ICBM) known as the *Taepodong* outside the DPRK; the official name is *Paektusan I*. This was a three-stage missile, in theory capable of traveling 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers (930–1,550 miles). In August 1998, the DPRK tested the *Taepodong II* (*Paektusan II*) in what it claimed was a satellite launch. The missile went up some 1,100 kilometers (680 miles), but the third stage failed to fire and the missile broke up over the Pacific. However, the fact that it had flown over Japan aroused considerable international concern and a determination to try to constrict the DPRK’s missile development. The DPRK, for its part, maintained that a satellite had been launched and that it possessed the sovereign right to develop missiles both for self-defense and for the peaceful exploration and exploitation of space.

Despite this stand, the DPRK indicated that it was prepared to discuss some form of missile moratorium. Talks began on such a moratorium between the United States as early as 1995, soon after the Agreed Framework restricting the DPRK’s nuclear program. The two sides failed to reach an agreement, with the DPRK demanding large sums to stop missile production and proliferation. In 1998, after the August *Taepodong* launch, the DPRK’s Korean Central News Agency said that the country would conduct no further tests and would restrict missile exports while talks on the issue continued with the United States. Kim Jong Il, DPRK leader from 1994 to 2011, gave similar undertakings on a number of other occasions, sometimes linking them with a suggestion that such a moratorium could become permanent if a DPRK satellite was launched by a third country. During a visit by a European Union delegation in May 2001, Kim told its leader, the Swedish then–prime minister Göran Persson, that the missile moratorium would be extended to 2003.

The advent of the George W. Bush administration, with a more hostile policy toward the DPRK than that of the Bill Clinton administration, eventually led to the breakdown of the DPRK–U.S. missile talks, and the DPRK resumed missile tests. In July 2006, it carried out a second test of the *Taepodong II*, along with a number of other tests. The missile failed within 42 seconds of takeoff, but the launch led to international condemnation and United Nations sanctions. A further test, also unsuccessful, took place in April 2009. The DPRK again claimed that it was a satellite launch, and for the first time it gave notification to the International Maritime and International Civil Aviation authorities that the test area should be avoided. The launch and the subsequent nuclear test were widely condemned and led to further sanctions. The DPRK rejected the condemnation and the sanctions, which it described as an act of war, and has continued to insist on its right both to develop and to test missiles.

Although there have been lurid claims about the ability of DPRK missiles to hit targets as far away as the mainland United States, this seems a long
way off. The main international concern is that the DPRK remains willing to proliferate both missiles and their technology.

**MOSCOW CONFERENCE.** In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain met in Moscow to take forward the issues relating to Korea that had not been properly addressed at the Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945. The ministers agreed that there should be a five-year period of trusteeship in Korea under U.S., Soviet, British, and Chinese control, during which a U.S.–Soviet joint commission would work with an elected Korean provisional government toward the goal of an independent Korea. The first meeting of the joint commission was held in Seoul in January 1946 amid widespread opposition to the whole concept of trusteeship. That and the growing estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union as the Cold War developed, together with the return of civil war in China, effectively rendered the idea of trusteeship inoperable. Instead, as 1946 progressed, there was a steady move toward the emergence of two separate states on the peninsula. See also RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

**MU CHONG (1905–c. 1951).** Active in the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in the 1930s, Mu Chong was purged during the Korean War (1950–53). He was born in North Hamyong Province, but moved to China. He studied at the Henan Military Academy, becoming an expert in artillery warfare. He fought with the Chinese Nationalist forces for a time, but later joined the Chinese Communist Party and may have taken part in the 1934–35 Long March. By 1939, he had organized a Korean military unit to fight with the Chinese against the Japanese. In 1942, he played a leading role in the formation of the North China Korean Independence League and commanded the Korean Volunteer Army. The Chinese communist leadership regarded him as the key figure among Korean revolutionaries who became known as the Yanan faction. He returned to Korea in 1945 but lost his independent power base when Soviet forces disarmed the Korean Volunteer Army as it crossed the border from China. He held office in the northern branch of the Korean Communist Party and later in the North Korean Workers’ Party. When the Korean armed forces were being organized under Soviet auspices in 1946, he became head of the artillery corps. On the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, he was in charge of the Second Army Corps, defending Pyongyang. However, he retreated to China when the United Nations Command swept north in October 1950 in order to regroup his forces. In December 1950, he was charged with incompetence and insubordination for having failed to defend Pyongyang and was stripped of his rank and position.
For a time he was apparently in charge of the construction of the Moranbong Underground Theater, but died soon afterward. Mu’s links with the Chinese make it likely that Kim Il Sung was anxious to have him and his Yanan faction out of the way as the future of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was increasingly dependent on the Chinese. See also CHOE YONG GUN; KIM CHAEK; NAM IL.

MUSEUMS AND ART GALLERIES. The majority of the museums and art galleries in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are in the capital city of Pyongyang. They include the Korean Central History Museum, which traces the history of Korea from prehistoric times to the mid-20th century. Originally founded in 1945 on Moran Hill just after liberation, it moved to its present site in 1977. The museum is vast and rather dark and gloomy. Nearby is the Korean Art Gallery, which opened in 1954. It features Korean art from early tomb paintings to contemporary works in the “socialist realism” style once popular in the Soviet Union and in the People’s Republic of China, both of which have clearly influenced DPRK artistic development. There are also paintings and drawings in traditional style. The gallery has annual exhibitions. The third major museum in the capital is the Victorious Liberation War Museum, which deals, from the DPRK point of view, with the Korean War (1950–53). It too is vast, and few if any visitors ever see it all. According to official accounts, it opened in August 1953, less than a month after the end of the war; the current building came much later. The captured United States surveillance vessel, the Pueblo, which is moored on the Taedong River, is part of the War Museum. There is also a Revolutionary Museum, which chronicles the rise of Kim Il Sung and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). Smaller museums in Pyongyang include the Party Founding Museum, which opened in 1970 and is housed in a Japanese colonial period building, near the center of the city. According to DPRK accounts, Kim Il Sung founded the KWP in this building in October 1945 and it later housed his residence before the Korean War. It was in its grounds that Kim Mun Il, Kim Il Sung’s second son and younger brother of the Kim Jong Il, drowned in a pond in 1947. Various rooms are arranged as they were when the family lived there. Not far from the Taedong River is the Folk Museum, a three-story building that depicts life and work up to the 20th century. It is by far the most visitor friendly and lively of the museums in the capital. The Kumsusan Memorial Palace, now Kim Il Sung’s mausoleum, has exhibition halls that display some of the gifts he was sent by other leaders such as Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong, as well as honorary degrees and other awards given to him. One feature of the museums and galleries is that the visitor is not normally allowed to wander about at will. With the exception of the Folk
Museum, which attracts a lot of children, visitors are strictly controlled and accompanied by a guide who ensures that they look at what they are supposed to look at and are provided with the correct interpretation.

Outside Pyongyang, as far as the DPRK is concerned, the main museum is the International Friendship Exhibition on Mount Myohang, a famous mountain area north of Pyongyang, which comprises two large halls displaying traditional-style house gifts that had been given to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il from all over the world. They range from the grandiose to the trivial, all presented in awed tones by the guides. Not the least unusual aspect is that gifts are still arriving for Kim Il Sung, although he died in 1994. A more traditional museum can be found in the former capital of the Koryo dynasty (935–1392), Kaesong. Housed in the former Songgungwon, or Confucian study center, the Koryo Museum has well-displayed artifacts from the Koryo period (although many of the best pieces are no longer there) within the buildings and in the grounds. Kaesong, which escaped relatively unscathed from the Korean War, has something of the feel of an open air museum, with many buildings dating back over 100 years. Some of these have been incorporated into a tourist hotel, but others continued to be used as individual dwellings. Nearby at Pannunjom, there is a small museum, sometimes described as a peace museum, which commemorates the signing of the Armistice Agreement in July 1953 and what are claimed to be subsequent DPRK victories over United States imperialism. Another Korean War–related museum is nearby at Sinchon, which is the site of a supposed massacre by U.S. forces in the Korean War. The museum contains various remains of those who were killed.

Throughout the country, there are historical sites, some of which will have a small museum attached. Not all are easily accessible or publicized. Many relate to the lives or “revolutionary exploits” of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong II, and new sites are regularly “discovered.” There is much about Kim Il Sung at his family home of Mangyongdae, for example, and there are small museums relating to Kim Jong II at Kim Il Sung University, where he studied, and at the Pyongyang Film Studies, where his great interest in filmmaking is demonstrated. Others include the sites of houses of former Korean leaders, temples, and pavilions. See also ART AND ARTISTS; MANSUDAEB ART STUDIO.

MYANMAR, RELATIONS WITH. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar (Burma) established diplomatic relations in 1975. However, following the Yangon (Rangoon) bombing in October 1983, Myanmar not only severed diplomatic relations with the DPRK but also formally withdrew its recognition of the state, citing DPRK involvement in the
incident. Myanmar’s increasing international isolation led to the resumption of relations in 2007, and since then there have been increased contacts between the two states. There were reports that even before the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, Myanmar was trading rice and other foodstuffs for DPRK-produced weapons. From 2009 onward, there were persistent rumors that the DPRK was assisting Myanmar in acquiring various weapons systems, building underground defense-related structures, and developing a nuclear capability. At least two DPRK ships, apparently en route for Myanmar, have been followed and forced to turn back by United States naval vessels since 2009.
NAEWOE NEWS AGENCY. This Republic of Korea news agency specializing in information and comment about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea dates from the 1970s. Although not formally acknowledged, it was known to have close links to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, now the National Intelligence Service. Since January 1999, it has been part of the Yonhap News Agency, although the Naewoe imprint continues in use. Among its products is the monthly Vantage Point: Developments in North Korea. Until the late 1990s, it was somewhat partisan in its selection and interpretation of news but, from 1998 to 2008, it became more neutral. Under the Lee Myung-bak government since 2008, something of the old approach has returned. Since 1996, Vantage Point has also been available on the Internet.

NAM II. (1913–1976). A soldier and negotiator, Nam II was one of the few Soviet Koreans to survive the various purges by which Kim Il Sung consolidated his hold on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Nam’s family members were Korean emigrants who settled in Russia following the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, and Nam was born there. He spoke Russian and Chinese as well as Korean. He trained at Smolensk Military Academy and was commissioned in the Soviet Red Army. Some sources say that he fought at Stalingrad and in the relief of Warsaw during World War II. He first went to Korea in 1945 with the Soviet occupation forces and seems to have quickly attached himself to Kim Il Sung, to whom he remained loyal for the rest of his life. He was chief of staff during the first year of the Korean War and became head of the joint Korean/Chinese delegation during the negotiations from July 1951 until the signing of the Armistice Agreement in July 1953. He then became minister of foreign affairs. In this role, he led the DPRK delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference. He remained foreign minister until 1959 and was concurrently a vice premier from 1957. He was a vice premier until his death in 1976, but he also held a variety of other posts, including chairman of the State Construction Commission and chairman of the Light Industry Commission. See also HO KAI I.
NAMPO. Nampo is the west coast gateway to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) capital, Pyongyang. 55 kilometers (34 miles) to the east. A modern multilane highway connects the two. Originally known as Chinnampo, it opened to foreign trade in 1897. In December 1950, it was the scene of a major evacuation of United Nations forces retreating before the Chinese forces, during which the city suffered heavy damage. Nampo had a population of around 366,000 at the 2008 census, which makes it about the same size as Sinuiju and Wonsan. It is situated on the estuary of the Taedong River and is a major port and center of shipbuilding and repair. There was a regular, although unadvertised, weekly container service from Nampo to Inchon in the Republic of Korea from 2001 to 2008 but it is not clear if it is still functioning. Fishing and the production of salt from salt flats are also important, as is coal mining. The West Sea Barrage controls the huge west coast tides, providing safe berth for 50,000-deadweight ton ships, supplying electricity and allowing the reclamation of 340,000 hectares of arable land. The city is also an important heavy industrial base, including the Chollima Steel Complex, the Taean Heavy Machinery complex, the Kum Song General Tractor Plant, and the Taean Friendship Glass Factory (a gift from the Chinese government). Kim Il Sung gave “on the spot guidance,” which became known as the Taean work system, on streamlining industrial management at this complex in 1961. In the nearby Kangso district is the Chongsanri Cooperative Farm, where Kim gave similar instructions on agricultural management known as the “Chongsanri method.” Near Nampo are a number of tombs from the Koguryo period.

NATION AND DESTINY, THE. A major series of films produced in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 1992. They depict the recent history of the Korean peninsula since the late 19th century, as interpreted by the DPRK. Some 56 films had been produced by 2000, which was supposed to complete the series, but there have been indications that more are planned. The series, which mixes real and fictional episodes, aims to show how the destiny of individuals and of the nation are closely intertwined, with the former only achieving satisfaction when operating in harmony with the state. The series was highly praised by Kim Jong Il, who was closely involved in its production in the early years. A National Organizing Committee for the Production of The Nation and Destiny was established on his instructions to oversee the project, and many well-known writers, directors, and actors were recruited. Real-life figures are featured in the series, including Choe Duk Sin, Ri In Mo, and Yun I-Sang. Music otherwise banned because of its origin in the Republic of Korea also features in the series.
NATIONAL ANTHEM. The national anthem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as described in the constitution, is “the Patriotic Song,” or “Aegukka,” although it is also known as “Achimun pinnara,” or “Let Morning Shine,” derived from its opening words. According to the official account, the song was composed in 1946, two years before the establishment of the DPRK, on the express instructions of Kim Il Sung. It was approved at a meeting of the People’s Committee for North Korea the following year. The words were written by Pak Se Yong (1902–89), who fled from the South to the North in 1946, and the music is by Kim Won Gyun (1917–2002), a prominent musician who also composed the “Song of General Kim Il Sung.” The music is similar to that of the Republic of Korea’s national anthem, also known as the “Aegukka,” which was in use in both parts of the peninsula immediately after liberation in 1945. See also FLAG; NATIONAL EMBLEM.

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION (NDC). The NDC of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) dates originally from 1972, when it was one of a number of commissions subordinate to the Central People’s Committee that were established under the 1972 Constitution to oversee various state functions. The president of the commission was the president of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, who was described as “the supreme commander of all the armed forces of the DPRK and the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and [who] command[ed] all the armed forces of the State.”

In its present form, it dates from 1992. In 1993, Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung’s son and designated successor, became chairman and thus head of the armed forces of the DPRK. Its role is defined in the 1998 Constitution as being the “highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ on military matters.” In fact, the NDC is responsible for more than military matters. When the ceremonial head of state, Kim Yong Nam, who chairs the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), renominated Kim Jong Il for the post in 1998, he stated that the office of NDC chair was the “highest office of state.” In April 2009, after a further constitutional revision, the NDC’s role was formalized as part of the government structure, with Article 106 stating that the “National Defense Commission is the supreme national defense guidance organ of state sovereignty.” This was made even more explicit in September 2010. Other provisions would allow the NDC to function even in the absence of the chair, presumably to cover the situation when the latter might not be able to function. Currently, the chair of the NDC is defined as the supreme leader of the DPRK, who can provide overall
guidance, appoint and dismiss senior military officials, ratify and abrogate treaties, grant special pardons, and declare war, emergencies, or mobilization. The NDC supervises the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of People’s Security, thus effectively controlling all aspects of state security. Following Kim Jong II’s death in December 2011, the SPA announced in April 2012 that he would be the Eternal Chairman of the NDC, while his successor, Kim Jong Un, would hold a new role as First Chairman.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF KOREA. See ANTI-IMPERIALIST NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE. On 22 June 2005, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the parliament of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), announced the establishment of this committee, which is charged with handling economic relations between the two Koreas. It replaced an earlier National Economic Co-operation Association established by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1998. One of the committee’s main functions has been to form the DPRK side of the North–South Economic Co-operation Office that oversees the Kaesong Industrial Zone. See also ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE; COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND; FOREIGN TRADE; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL.

NATIONAL EMBLEM. The national emblem, or state seal, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was adopted before the formal establishment of the state in September 1948. The national emblem shows Mount Paektu, the sacred mountain of revolution, and a hydroelectric power station under the light of a five-pointed star, with ears of rice forming an oval frame, bound with a red ribbon bearing the inscription “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Mount Paektu and the five-pointed star symbolize the revolutionary struggle and the bright future of the Korean people, while the hydroelectric power station and ears of rice depict the “might” of the DPRK’s industry and agriculture. See also CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, FLAG; NATIONAL ANTHEM.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. Originally established in 1961 as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the Republic of Korea (ROK) National Intelligence Service (NIS) became the Agency for National Security Planning after its director shot dead President Park Chung-hee in October 1979. It took its present name in 1999.
While its staff claim to be the equivalent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency or Great Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, the NIS has always had as its prime purpose the countering of the influence and activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) both at home and abroad. It has paid particular attention to student groups. Overseas, most of its agents operate under diplomatic cover. It is not known if it runs agents within the DPRK, but it has been active among DPRK defectors in the ROK and among the Chinese–Koreans of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COUNCIL. An organization that supposedly dates from 1998. Its purpose has been to handle visits to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from the Republic of Korea (ROK). Such visits were rare—and in many cases illegal under ROK National Security Law—until the introduction of the “Sunshine Policy” after the election of President Kim Dae-jung in 1997. The council’s first known task was to organize the meeting to commemorate the first anniversary of the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, which was held at Mount Kumgang in June 2001. It handles most political, cultural, and religious visits, including ROK attendance at the Arirang mass games. See also ASIA–PACIFIC PEACE COMMITTEE; COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND; NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE.

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. This Republic of Korea (ROK) legislation was originally promulgated on 3 July 1961 by the ROK Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, although it drew on earlier laws. Its purpose was to strengthen the anticommunist posture of the ROK, to block the activities of communist organizations, and to “secure the safety of the nation and freedom of the people.” It consisted of 11 articles barring the affiliation and solicitation of affiliation with antistate organizations; praising, encouraging, or cooperating with antistate organizations or escape to or secret entry from regions under control of antistate organizations (that is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] and other communist countries); or offering assistance to persons who had committed offenses in violation of the National Security Law. Those who violated the law or failed to report to the authorities any criminal offenders under it would be punished. In December 1980, the Anti-Communism Law was consolidated with the National Security Law. The DPRK has all along bitterly opposed the legislation, which it claims is a hostile act directed against the “brother nation.” Although the law has been much criticized, only modest
amendments have been made to it, even under apparently liberal presidents such as Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC). A body created by the Armistice Agreement signed in July 1953 at the end of the Korean War (1950–53). Its main purposes were to supervise the observation of the Armistice Agreement by the signatories and to prevent the import of any new arms by either the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each party to the armistice was allowed to nominate two countries that had not taken part in the fighting. The communist side selected Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the United Nations Command (UNC) selected Switzerland and Sweden. However, from the start ROK President Rhee Syngman objected to the commission, and the Czechoslovak and Polish contingents were soon prevented from working in the ROK. The DPRK followed suit and took an equally hostile line toward the Swiss and Swedish delegations. However, the NNSC remained in existence and was able to carry out some limited liaison functions until the 1990s.

Following the breakup of Czechoslovakia, in 1992 the DPRK refused to accept the Czech Republic as the successor state on the NNSC. Then, in January 1995, the DPRK informed the Polish delegation that all service personnel and guards would be withdrawn from their mission at the end of February 1995. The Poles were also informed that, without guards, the DPRK could no longer guarantee their safety. This effectively made it impossible for the Polish delegation to function since they would have no heating, cooking facilities, or transport. Despite international protests, the DPRK remained adamant, and the Poles withdrew at the end of February 1995. The Swiss and Swedish delegations still remain on the ROK side of the demilitarized zone, and the NNSC still meets from time to time, with the Poles occasionally attending. However, it is now unable to carry out any of its original functions. See also PANMUNJOM.

NOKO JEANS. A Swedish company that began to import jeans made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 2008. They were by no means the first Western company to have goods made in the DPRK, but were unusual in that they insisted that labels of origin showed DPRK rather than China or Republic of Korea. For a short time, the jeans were on sale through a department store in Stockholm, but this outlet refused to continue selling the product because of concerns about human rights abuses in the DPRK. Noko Jeans continues to function, although it is not clear whether there are any commercial outlets apart from their website. See also ECONOMY.
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). This organization of countries that were not aligned with either the pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact or the pro-United States North Atlantic Treaty Organization, grew out of the 1955 Bandung Conference. It was formally established in Belgrade, then the capital of Yugoslavia, in 1961. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Il Sung praised the conference as reflecting the spirit of independence of newly emerging states, but it was not until the more active phase of DPRK diplomacy in the early 1970s that the DPRK formally applied to join the movement in March 1975. It was admitted as a full member on 30 August 1975, despite having close treaty links with both China and the Soviet Union. It was also able to argue successfully that the Republic of Korea should not be considered for membership because of its alliance with the United States.

The DPRK attended its first Non-Aligned Summit in 1976 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The summit adopted a pro-DPRK resolution on the Korean Peninsula, but this came against the backdrop of the ax killings at Panmunjom in August 1976, and 24 member states signed a protest against the support for the DPRK. There were also reports that the host government and the president, Marshal Josip Tito of Yugoslavia, were unhappy with the behavior of the DPRK delegation. By the time of the next summit, in Havana in 1979, the DPRK had learned to be more discreet. Thereafter, the DPRK has played an active role in the movement, which remains generally supportive of the DPRK on Korean issues.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). From the first use of the atomic bomb by the United States in August 1945, there have been attempts to restrict nuclear technology. However, the Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and the People’s Republic of China (1964) all developed their own nuclear weapons, and it seemed likely that other countries would do so also. Israel and South Africa were widely suspected of developing a nuclear weapons capability, and later both India and Pakistan became nuclear weapon states. The NPT was an attempt to stop the spread of such weapons. Eventually agreement was reached in 1968 based on a number of principles. These included the acceptance by nonnuclear weapon states of the safeguard standards of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) or of equivalent standards; an obligation on nuclear weapon states not to transfer weapons’ technology to any country that did not already have it, and on such states not to receive it; and the preservation of the right of nonnuclear weapon states to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on 1 July 1968. Opened for wider signature that same year, the treaty entered into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the treaty,
including the five nuclear-weapon states. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement. The United Nations Department for Disarmament notes that the treaty “represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States,” but there has been international criticism of the alleged failure of those states to make real progress toward that goal.

The Republic of Korea signed the treaty in 1975. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which had registered its experimental reactor at Yongbyon with the IAEA in 1977 at Soviet insistence, signed in 1985, again at Soviet insistence. However, the DPRK delayed submitting a full list of its nuclear holdings and signing a safeguard agreement with the IAEA until 1992. When the IAEA insisted on a thorough inspection of all the country’s nuclear facilities the following year, the DPRK gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty, the first state to do so. The notice was withdrawn, after 89 days, just one day short of it coming into force, and negotiations began that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, when the Agreed Framework broke down at the end of 2002, the DPRK announced that it was reinstating its 1993 notice and would withdraw from the treaty. Although there were many protests at this action, and a number of countries have said that they do not accept that the DPRK has left the treaty, the DPRK view is that it has done so and that it is not bound by its terms. The 19 September 2005 Joint Statement at the end of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks called on the DPRK to “return” to the NPT, which appears to be an acceptance that it had in fact left the treaty. The DPRK has carried out nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. See also BOSWORTH, STEPHEN WARREN; BUSH, GEORGE H. W.; BUSH, GEORGE W.; CARTER, JAMES (JIMMY) EARL, JR.; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; CLINTON, WILLIAM (BILL) JEFFERSON III; JOINT DECLARATION OF THE NON-NUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA; PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

NORTH KOREA. See DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

NORTH KOREA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. Legislation passed by a voice vote in the United States Congress in 2004. The act authorized the expenditure of up to $20 million in each of the years 2005–2008 for assistance to DPRK refugees; $2 million for promoting “freedom and democracy” in the DPRK; and $2 million for promoting “freedom of information” inside the DPRK; in particular, there should be “enhanced support” for radio broadcasting to the DPRK. The act also stated that DPRK citizens could be eligible...
for refugee status in the United States and instructed the State Department to facilitate applications. Other provisions included the appointment of a U.S. special envoy for human rights in the DPRK, a requirement that U.S. humanitarian aid should be conditional on improved monitoring, and the “sense of Congress” that human rights should remain a key element in U.S. negotiations with the DPRK. In addition, the act stated that the People’s Republic of China should be obliged to provide the United Nations High Commission for Refugees with “unimpeded access” to DPRK citizens within China.

Some of the provisions of the 2004 act, such as support for broadcasting, were already in place. A lawyer, Jay Lefkowitz, was appointed the first special envoy in 2004; he was succeeded by Robert King in October 2009. The DPRK denounced the act and the appointment of special envoys. It would not allow them to visit until 2011, when King was allowed to go. In May 2011, a Republic of Korea newspaper reported that the United States had accepted a total of 101 refugees from the DPRK. See also ABDUCTIONS; OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA.

NORTH–SOUTH POLITICAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE. This committee, established after the July 1972 statement on Korean reunification, held its preliminary meeting at Panmunjom in August 1972. Its purpose was to take forward the government-to-government dialogue on political issues that had developed since 1971 and to discuss and settle various procedural steps necessary for the achievement of peaceful reunification of the country in accordance with the 4 July statement. Between October 1972 and July 1973, six meetings were held in Seoul and Pyongyang. However, there was little substantive progress and, in August 1973, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea unilaterally suspended the dialogue after the Republic of Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency kidnapped opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo to Seoul. The committee never met again.

NORTH–SOUTH RED CROSS TALKS. On 12 August 1971, the president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Red Cross Society proposed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Red Cross that the two societies should begin talks to discuss ways to ease the sufferings of dispersed families, suggesting that both Red Cross societies launch a movement to search for separated family members, arrange an exchange of letters between them, and arrange their reunion. The DPRK Red Cross promptly accepted the proposal on 14 August, and talks began in September. There were 18 rounds of talks in 1971 and 54 in 1972, the highest level ever reached. Although the dialogue has continued ever since, with meetings every year except 1978, the
results have been limited. There was an exchange of a 151-member group comprising hometown visitors and folk art troupes in late September 1982, which both sides used for propaganda purposes. Following heavy floods in the ROK in September 1984, the DPRK Red Cross Society offered assistance, which the ROK Red Cross promptly accepted. Working-level meetings of the representatives were held in 1989 to arrange another exchange of hometown visitors and performing art troupes, but they failed to reach an agreement on that occasion. Both sides continue to use the Red Cross as a channel when direct government-to-government contacts are difficult for whatever reason, and each has made sure that its own Red Cross is staffed by high-quality personnel. The two Red Cross organizations have continued to be involved with the issue of family reunions, leading to the introduction of a regular program of such contacts. See also COMMITTEE FOR ASSISTING THE RETURN OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS; COMMITTEE FOR REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL). The NLL is a unilateral seaward extension of the military demarcation line (MDL) and forms the de facto sea boundary between the two Koreas in the West Sea. It does not feature in the Korean Armistice Agreement that established the MDL, but was introduced by the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command (UNC) in August 1953 to reduce the possibility of conflict in the West Sea and to ensure that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would have access to the Paengnyong Island group, which lies close to the coast of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The exact coordinates of the line have always been classified and have never officially been made known to the DPRK. The line’s status is unclear. If the two Koreas were to be regarded as independent countries (rather than as two halves of a temporarily divided country), then the NLL would not be viewed as a legitimate maritime boundary under the “equitable principles” that govern boundaries, because it denies the DPRK access to adjacent sea areas. This contradicts the principle of “nonencroachment” because it appears to give the small islands the same right to generate maritime zones as does the continental land mass of the DPRK, a concept that is regularly rejected when such cases come before international tribunals. Such tribunals have ruled that small islands should have limited capacity to affect a maritime boundary, especially when their effect dramatically changes the result that would exist in their absence.

That said, from 1953 until 1973, DPRK naval vessels did not cross the line. Thereafter, however, they did so on a regular basis, claiming that the waters around the islands came within DPRK territorial waters. The ROK protested and there were occasional naval standoffs. After the signing of the
Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North in December 1991, the ROK argued that the DPRK had agreed to accept the NLL as the de facto maritime boundary. The text is ambiguous, however, and the ROK defense minister said in the National Assembly that crossing the NLL did not constitute a breach of the Armistice Agreement. The ROK media and some academic commentators reacted with fury, but the ROK government, while maintaining that the DPRK should respect the NLL, did not repudiate the statement. In 1999 and 2002, two naval clashes occurred as a result of crab fishing by ROK fishermen in the area. A third clash occurred in November 2009. As relations between the two Koreas deteriorated after the advent of the Lee Myung-bak government in 2008, the DPRK frequently denounced the NLL. In January 2009, it announced that it would no longer recognize it as the de facto sea boundary in the West Sea. The move was condemned by the ROK. The area has continued to be the scene of clashes. See also CHONAN INCIDENT; YONPYONG ISLANDS.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) began a civilian nuclear energy program in the 1950s, with assistance from the Soviet Union. The country had deposits of graphite and uranium, which had begun to be exploited in the Japanese colonial period, and some Korean scientists had received rudimentary training in nuclear technology at Japanese universities. There was also a widespread belief that nuclear energy development made sense for countries with high energy demands and relatively few resources; during the same period the United States was encouraging the use of nuclear energy in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The DPRK had hydroelectric power, which was unreliable in winter, and its coal supplies were inadequate for the ambitious industrial development program that Kim Il Sung favored.

The Soviet Union provided training and an experimental reactor, which was built at Yongbyon in 1965. At Soviet insistence, this reactor was registered with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in 1977 and subject to IAEA inspection. In 1987, the DPRK joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), again at Soviet insistence. However, it did not sign the required safeguards agreement or submit a full list of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA until 1992. In December 1991, in the wake of the decision by President George H. W. Bush to remove United States tactical nuclear weapons worldwide, the ROK declared that there were no longer any nuclear weapons in its territory. As a result, the two Koreas signed a Joint Declaration of the Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Like the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
between the South and the North signed at the same time, this has remained largely a dead letter.

By that stage, international concern was growing that the DPRK interest in nuclear matters might be moving toward developing a nuclear weapons program. Satellite photographs showed that there were more facilities at Yongbyon than the Soviet reactor. This was confirmed by the list supplied to the IAEA. What the DPRK described as a “radiochemical laboratory” appeared to be a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, to extract plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons. IAEA attempts to inspect these facilities led to the March 1993 DPRK declaration of its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

This move challenged the whole international nonproliferation regime. The DPRK came under great pressure, including the threat of United Nations sanctions, not to go forward with its withdrawal, and the United States, under President Bill Clinton, even considered military action against Yongbyon. However, the DPRK was persuaded to withdraw its suspension and, following a visit to the DPRK by former President Jimmy Carter in June 1994, U.S.–DPRK negotiations began that led to the signing of the Agreed Framework at Geneva in October 1994. The DPRK agreed to freeze all its activities at Yongbyon, while a consortium, to be known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), would supply two light water reactors (LWRs) to the DPRK to meet its energy needs. Until such time as
the LWRs would come on stream, KEDO would supply heavy fuel oil. The United States also undertook to lift sanctions and to move toward diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Only when the new LWRs were at the point of becoming operational would the IAEA be allowed to fully investigate the country’s past nuclear history. Although there was widespread satisfaction that the crisis seemed to have passed, the Clinton administration came under heavy criticism from the Republican Party for “appeasement” of the DPRK regime. ROK President Kim Young-sam was also concerned that the U.S.–DPRK negotiations had been purely bilateral, excluding the ROK, while the IAEA was not pleased that it too had been bypassed.

Implementation of the Agreed Framework was very slow, with much mutual suspicion. The site, at Kumho on the east coast, had to be constructed from nothing, and construction was held up over labor and cost disputes. It was not until 1997 that the groundbreaking ceremony for the LWRs took place, and the first concrete pouring for the reactors took place in August 2002. By then, there were new concerns. One was whether the DPRK would fulfill its part of the 1994 agreement and produce a full accounting of its nuclear activities. The other was a suspicion that it had embarked on a separate road to a nuclear weapons program using enriched uranium. This suspicion was apparently confirmed in October 2002 when a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited the DPRK, the first such visit since George W. Bush became president in 2001. The DPRK was eager for such a visit, which it hoped would open discussion on a wide range of issues, including the slow progress on the LWRs. However, Kelly’s only purpose was to accuse the DPRK of cheating on the Agreed Framework by engaging in an undeclared enriched uranium program; no evidence for the charge has been made public, but the United States may have learned of the alleged program from Pakistani sources. Shortly after the visit, it was leaked in Washington that the DPRK had at first denied such a program but later admitted it. The DPRK denied this, but claimed that it had the right to develop such a program, since the United States continued to target it with nuclear weapons. President Bush declared that the Agreed Framework was at an end and stopped the deliveries of fuel oil. The DPRK responded by claiming that it was the United States that had broken the agreement. It expelled the IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon and removed the seals that had been placed on the equipment. It also announced that it would restart its plutonium program and formally withdrew from the NPT, the first state ever to do so. KEDO went into suspended animation, but was eventually wound down in 2006.

Once again, there was much international concern as the way now seemed clear for the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. Matters were complicated by the reluctance of the Bush administration to reengage with the DPRK,
but eventually, in a deal brokered by China, in August 2003, what became known as the Six Party Talks began in Beijing. (The six parties were the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.) The group met periodically in 2003–4, without much progress. The DPRK may have been awaiting the outcome of the 2004 U.S. presidential election, but if they were hoping for a Democratic victory, they were disappointed. In February 2005, the DPRK issued a Foreign Ministry statement in which it claimed to have “manufactured nukes for self defense.” Although it was not clear what this meant, since no DPRK nuclear test had been detected, it added to the concern, especially as the statement also said that the DPRK would no longer take part in the Six Party Talks.

This proved not to be the case, however, and the talks resumed in July 2005. The second Bush administration, preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, proved more willing to engage with the DPRK, and Christopher Hill, who succeeded Kelly as assistant secretary of state, had more flexibility in negotiating. There were still those who believed that the DPRK could not be trusted and opposed any deal with the DPRK that did not stop all nuclear activities, including those for energy needs. But an agreement was reached in September 2005 that seemed to resolve the problem. Under its terms, the DPRK would abandon all its nuclear programs and return to the Six Party Talks. The United States pledged not to attack the DPRK and to move toward normalization of relations. Heavy fuel oil would be supplied to help the DPRK meet its energy needs in the short term, while a subcommittee would look at longer-term energy requirements. Other subcommittees would examine issues such as economic assistance and relations with Japan.

But this euphoria was short lived. The DPRK indicated that it wanted an LWR, while almost at the same time as the signing of the agreement, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on the DPRK for alleged money laundering and other offenses. Since these were not new charges, there was a widespread international assumption that the decision had more to do with hard-line objections to any nuclear deal with the DPRK than with the question of financial wrongdoing. The DPRK was furious, withdrew from the talks, and announced that it was recommencing its nuclear program. All efforts to entice it back to the negotiations proved unsuccessful. From May 2006 onward, the tension increased, with signs that the DPRK was preparing for missile tests. Numerous international warnings, including one from China, met with no response. On 4 July, the DPRK launched a series of missiles, to international outcry. On 7 July, the UN Security Council backed a Japanese-sponsored resolution calling for sanctions, although China and Russia argued for a softer approach and refused to support the resolution. The DPRK condemned the sanctions, broke off cabinet-level talks with the ROK, and ignored a protest brought in person by a Chinese vice foreign minister.
The missile launch showed there was no united international approach to
deal with the DPRK and apparently no pressure that could be brought to bear
to make it change its policies. This became even more apparent as evidence
mounted from mid-August that the DPRK was preparing for a nuclear test.
Despite appeals, the DPRK announced on 3 October that it would conduct
such a test. Appeals once more proved unavailing, and on 9 October, the
DPRK carried out some form of a nuclear test. This was much smaller than
other countries’ first nuclear tests, and there was a strong suspicion that it was
a failure. Nevertheless, it was carried out in defiance of international opinion.
The UN Security Council unanimously condemned it in Security Council
Resolution 1718, which imposed fresh sanctions; this time even China and
the ROK agreed to sanctions. This proved to be a less than total commit-
ment, as both indicated that while opposing the test, they would not become
involved in measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
which involved the searching of DPRK ships. The UN resolution also called
for the DPRK’s return to the NPT, a demand that appeared to accept that it
had legally left the treaty, although this was not a position that all countries
accepted.

A renewed diplomatic effort followed, with a meeting between the chief
U.S. and DPRK negotiators in Berlin in January 2007, which led to another
agreement on 13 February. This basically repeated the September 2005 ar-
rangements. The DPRK agreed to close Yongbyon and to allow the IAEA
inspectors back in to monitor activities at the site. The United States agreed to
release the blocked DPRK funds and to move toward lifting other sanctions.
In addition, five subcommittees were to be created to examine U.S.–DPRK
relations and Japan–DPRK relations, economic aid and energy needs of the
DPRK, and armistice, security issues, and the denuclearization of the penin-
sula. In the meantime, 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil would be supplied
to the DPRK within 60 days to meet immediate energy needs.

At first there was little apparent progress. The United States found it dif-
ficult to release the blocked DPRK funds since most banks refused to handle
them for fear of being penalized by the United States for handling possibly
contaminated funds, and it was not until May 2007 that an arrangement was
finally made, involving a Mongolian bank. The two committees on normal-
ization of relations did meet, but the Japan committee immediately collapsed
over the issue of abductions. The outlook seemed more promising on the nu-
clear front once the blocked funds issue had been settled. In July, the DPRK
closed the Yongbyon facilities and allowed the IAEA inspectors to return. In
May 2008, it handed over 18,000 pages of documentation on its nuclear pro-
gram, and in June not only did it make a declaration on its nuclear activities
to China for passing to the other members, but it blew up the cooling tower at
Yongbyon, producing an iconic picture that flashed around the world.
But having agreed in principle to lift sanctions, the U.S. government, which still contained many who harbored suspicions of the DPRK, dragged its feet about actually doing so and increasingly demanded that the DPRK should provide details of its past nuclear activities. The change of government in the ROK, with Lee Myung-bak replacing the “Sunshine Policy” of his two predecessors with a more robust line toward the DPRK, was another complication, and one that, in DPRK eyes, unbalanced the Six Party Talks. In April 2008, in an apparent attempt within the U.S. government to undermine the 2007 deal, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency briefed Congress on alleged DPRK–Syrian cooperation on building a nuclear reactor that had been bombed by the Israeli air force in 2007. The DPRK, argued that, in closing down the Yongbyon facility, providing documentation, and allowing IAEA inspectors, it had met its side of the agreement, began to demand a U.S. response before it would do anymore. When the United States failed to respond, the DPRK announced in August that it was suspending the decommissioning process, and when that move failed to alter the U.S. demands on verification, it said that it was no longer interested in being removed from the terrorism list. Despite these setbacks, Christopher Hill continued his efforts to reach a settlement of the verification issue, and he eventually appeared to have achieved this aim when the DPRK agreed to a verification process and resumed the disablement of Yongbyon. The United States finally delisted the DPRK as a terrorist state and lifted some sanctions. However, U.S. officials made it clear that other sanctions remained in force, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it proved impossible to reach an agreement on sampling and other verification issues by the end of the year and by what was effectively the end of the Bush administration.

The incoming Barack Obama administration paid little attention to the DPRK, being reoccupied with domestic issues and the Middle East, although the president did put an experienced former head of KEDO, Stephen Warren Bosworth, in charge of policy toward the DPRK. Possibly out of pique at the apparent neglect, but more likely because of domestic considerations, the DPRK announced in February 2009 that it planned a “satellite launch,” in clear violation of the 2005 UN resolution that had demanded a ban on such launches by the DPRK. Insisting that it had the right to pursue peaceful space exploration, on 5 April the DPRK launched a three-stage rocket. The DPRK claimed that this carried and launched a satellite, but the consensus was that the launch was not a success, with the third stage breaking up. The United Nations adopted nonbinding UN Security Council Resolution 1718, condemning the launch. The DPRK announced on 14 April that it would quit the Six Party Talks, would not abide by the agreements reached in the past, and would resume its nuclear program. Later, it said that unless the United...
Nations apologized, the DPRK would take “self-defense measures,” including nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. Despite warnings of tough consequences if it went ahead, the DPRK’s second nuclear test took place on 25 May 2009, as did the launch of two short-range missiles. The test, which was widely condemned, appeared to be more successful than the 2006 launch. When the ROK announced that it would take a full part in the PSI, the DPRK replied that attempts to search its ships would lead to retaliation. It also said—not for the first time—that it would no longer abide by the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Chinese and Russian reluctance delayed agreement on further sanctions, but eventually, UN Security Council Resolution 1874 passed unanimously on 12 June. This banned arms sales to or from the DPRK and called on UN members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying military materials in or out of the country and to take measures to prevent proliferation. The DPRK Foreign Ministry denounced the resolution and said that DPRK would “weaponise” its existing plutonium stockpiles, begin a program to enrich uranium, and would take “firm military action if the United States and its allies try to isolate us.” These threats were ignored and many countries, including the ROK, introduced a sanctions’ regime. China, however, while voting for the resolution on sanctions, appeared to make little effort to enforce measures against the DPRK.

There was no progress on the nuclear issue in 2010. The need for the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks has become a standard international mantra, and the DPRK regularly hinted that it might do so. By the end of the year, however, the ROK and its allies were taking the position that there would be no return to the talks until the DPRK had reformed its ways. This assumed that the DPRK valued the talks for their own sake, but there was not much evidence that this was the case. With the United States, Japan, and the ROK seen as clearly hostile, with Russia moving away from support for the DPRK, and even the Chinese anxious to control the DPRK’s nuclear development, the Six Party Talks may well have become an unnecessary burden for the DPRK. In November 2010, the nuclear issue underwent a further twist when the DPRK revealed the existence of an enriched uranium program at Yongbyon to a group of visiting U.S. experts. The revelations did not have as much impact as might have been expected, being overshadowed by the shelling of the Yonpyong Islands a few days later. Although the visitors were surprised at the advanced state of the equipment they were shown, they concluded that there was still a long way to go before it would be fully operational. Its existence, however, raised questions about how many other facilities the DPRK had developed.

There has been much discussion as to why the DPRK has so persistently pursued a nuclear weapons policy. Undoubtedly, security concerns have
played a part. The threat of a nuclear attack has hung over the DPRK since
the Korean War and has persisted even after the withdrawal of U.S. tactical
weapons from the ROK in the early 1990s. The United States has made no
secret of the fact that it continues to target the DPRK with its long-range
capabilities. There can be little doubt that if there was a conflict, the DPRK’s
small number of nuclear warheads would be no match for the United States,
but the DPRK may hope that the very existence of any DPRK nuclear weap-
ons and their possible ability to strike the ROK and Japan, where there are
U.S. forces and military bases, might act as a check on the U.S. willingness
to use its nuclear power against the DPRK.

Many people see the DPRK nuclear program as essentially a bargaining
chip, to be used to gain economic support. Some have argued that the very
fact that little attempt was made to conceal what was being done at Yongbyon
from the late 1980s onward indicates that the DPRK wanted the world, and
especially the United States, to see what it was doing, in the hope that it could
trade off a not very successful and increasingly aging program for economic
assistance. Certainly since negotiations began, the DPRK has laid emphasis
on what it should get in return for giving up its program. As well as LWRs,
which have regularly featured in the demands, there have also been more
mundane but still essential requests for food and fertilizers. Nuclear weapons
aside, the DPRK does have a continued need for new energy sources, which
may be another reason for pursuing the LWR program. There remain doubts,
however, over the capacity of the DPRK’s power grid to cope with the power
produced by LWRs, but there have been few if any signs of attempts to im-
prove the system.

Another factor is probably prestige. The possession of nuclear weapons,
it is sometimes argued, allows a country to “punch above its weight,” and
for the DPRK, which has clearly lost the economic race with the ROK and
remains a small country surrounded by much larger ones, nuclear weapons
provide the additional advantage that would otherwise be missing. Hence
the DPRK has regularly insisted since 2003 that it should be regarded as a
nuclear weapons state, a demand that the other declared nuclear weapons
states have not been willing to concede so far.

NUMBERS. Numbers have had a symbolic importance in most societies. In
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the 1970s, the
use of numbers associated with Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il, have
become an important part of the cult of personality that has come to surround
both. Dates and years relating to the only two leaders the DPRK has known
are particularly important. Thus the Tower of the Juche Idea (usually known
just as the Juche Tower) on the east bank of the Taedong River in Pyong-
yang, which was erected in 1972 to mark Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday, is supposedly composed of 25,500 granite slabs, one for each day of his life up to that point, while there are 70 stairs inside the monument. At Panmunjom, the Unification Monument with Kim Il Sung’s calligraphy erected in 1995, one year after his death, is supposedly 9.4 meters high (representing the year of his death) and 7.1 meters wide, referring to 1 July, the day on which he wrote the words. The monument to Kim Il Sung erected in 1997 at the start of the street that leads to the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, his mausoleum, marks his age at death. It is 82 meters high and has 82 azalea flowers carved on it. (In 2002, the tower was rebuilt because it had subsided and was therefore no longer 82 meters high.)

Numbers associated with Kim Jong Il tended to focus on his birthday, 16 February (represented as 2.16). Thus for some years before the economic reforms of 2002, the official exchange rate for the DPRK against the U.S. dollar was won 2.16 to one dollar. Air Koryo flights to and from Beijing often arrived and departed from gate 216 at Beijing airport. Sometimes the numbers were not immediately obvious. The height of the peak, renamed Jong Il Peak in 1988, above the log cabin in which Kim Jong Il was supposedly born in 1942, is reported to be 216 meters above the cabin.

Other numbers reflect what are deemed to be important events. Thus the Three Unification Principle Memorial Tower, which was dedicated in 2002, is 61.5 meters high, an apparent reference to the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, held on 15 June 2000 (6th month 15th day). The Party Foundation Monument, erected to mark the supposed 50th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1995 is 50 meters high. Many factories or military units will incorporate a date into their title, which usually records a leadership visit. No doubt similar coded references will emerge for Kim Jong Il’s successor, his third son, Kim Jong Un. See also RELIGION.
O JIN U (1917–1995). A senior military figure in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), close to Kim Il Sung. O was also believed to be a strong supporter of Kim’s son, Kim Jong Il. He was born in South Hamyong Province and received part of a middle school education before moving to Manchuria to join the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. Like Kim Il Sung, he spent the years from about 1940 to 1945 in the Soviet Union, where he received training as an infantry officer. In later years, O was credited with being a good strategist and was the author of books on the anti-Japanese campaigns. He returned to Korea as a Soviet military officer in 1945 and was the commander of the Central Public Security Officers’ Training School, first at Anju and then in Pyongyang. One account says that he was also Kim Il Sung’s chief guard. During the Korean War, he commanded the 776th Unit. After the war, he was the commanding general of the Third Infantry Division.

He remained loyal to Kim Il Sung during the political struggles and purges of the 1950s, and thereafter began to advance rapidly in both party and military circles. He became an alternate member of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee in 1956, a full member in 1970, and a permanent member of the party’s Politburo and Central Military Commission in 1980. O was vice minister of public security in 1963, while still an army general. In 1969, he was chief of staff of the People’s Army and became a vice chair of the National Defense Committee (NDC) in 1972. In 1976, he was appointed minister for the armed forces. He held this position and his role on the NDC until his death. In 1985, he was promoted to vice marshal and became a full marshal in 1992. Among his honors were Hero of the Republic (1968), Order of Kim Il Sung (1982), and Double Hero (1992). He also served on Kim Il Sung’s funeral committee in 1994, shortly before he too died of cancer the following year, despite having been sent to France for treatment. See also JO MYONG ROK; O KUK RYOL.

O KUK RYOL (1931– ). In February 2009, General O Kuk Ryol became a vice chair of the National Defense Committee (NDC) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), one of the most senior positions in the DPRK hierarchy. O was born in Jilin in Manchuria in 1931. According
to an item put out by KBS radio in the Republic of Korea (ROK), he is the son of O Jung Song, who fought in Manchuria with Kim Il Sung. After his father’s death, he was brought up in Kim Il Sung’s family and was therefore close to Kim Jong Il. He was educated at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School and at Kim Il Sung University. He also received military training in the Soviet Union. In 1964, he was promoted to major general in the Korean People’s Army (KPA) air force and appointed dean of the Air Force Academy. In 1967, he became a lieutenant general and commanding officer in the air force. He also became a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) at this time and a member of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee in 1970. In 1977, he was appointed vice chief of staff of the armed forces and became chief of staff two years later. Jo Myong Rok succeeded him as head of the air force. His advance in party and military positions continued during the 1980s. In 1988, however, he successively lost his positions. He was dismissed as chief of staff in February from the KWP Politburo, of which he had become a full member in 1980, in April, and from the Central Military Committee, also in April. It was said that he had clashed with O Jin U, minister for the armed forces, over the question of modernizing the military and was only saved from total disgrace by the intervention of Kim Jong Il.

When he reemerged at the end of 1988, it was as head of defense on the KWP Central Committee. The following year, he became director of the strategy department of the Central Committee, which oversees matters relating to the ROK. Although he served on the funeral committees for Kim Il Sung in 1994 and O Jin U in 1995, his profile thereafter was generally low key until his appointment to the NDC. O is seen as powerful because of his links to Kim Jong Il and his involvement with the ROK, which explains his appointment to the NDC. Some reports say that he is a rival to Jang Song Taek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, others that they work together. There have also been claims that O and other members of his family are involved in the counterfeiting of United States dollars. He speaks Russian, Chinese, and English. An indication that he continues to be an important figure was his presence as 29th on Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee in December 2011.

OBAMA, BARACK (1961– ). In 2008, Barack Obama became the 44th president of the United States. Born in Honolulu, he studied at Columbia University and Harvard Law School. He was elected U.S. senator from Illinois in November 2004 and beat Hillary Rodham Clinton, wife of former President Bill Clinton, as the Democratic Party candidate for the 2008 presidential election. From the beginning of his presidency, Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton, who became his secretary of state, adopted a firm stance
toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially over issues such as missile tests and its nuclear program. His administration worked closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) under President Lee Myung-bak on these issues.

OCTOBER 2007 INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT. From the beginning of 2007, the Republic of Korea (ROK) hinted at the possibility of a second summit with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) if other issues were resolved. Although the DPRK leader Kim Jong Il had not fulfilled his promise made during the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit that he would make a visit to the ROK, advocates of the “Engagement Policy” (earlier the “Sunshine Policy”) thought that a second summit might well take relations forward and might also help smooth over other matters, including the nuclear issue. A meeting was arranged for August 2007 but was postponed at DPRK request because of the heavy floods that hit the country that month. The summit eventually took place in October in the DPRK capital Pyongyang. The date was very close to the ROK’s presidential election, and the opposition Grand National Party demanded postponement; but ROK President Roh Moo-hyun refused and the summit duly went ahead on 2–4 October. Roh took his wife and a large business entourage and, in a symbolic gesture, walked across the military demarcation line between the two countries in the demilitarized zone. Most in the ROK did not oppose the visit, but few expected much from it.

It was seen as successful. Kim Jong Il was not as publicly enthusiastic as he had been in 2000, but Roh did not allow himself to be overwhelmed, as some had feared would happen. The closing eight-point joint declaration, which used the formal name for each side, agreed to work toward improved economic and security arrangements and to reduce military tension. The West Sea was to be turned into a “special peace and co-operation zone.” There would be further economic zones near the DMZ, building on the Kaesong experience. There was an ROK undertaking to help upgrade the DPRK’s transport infrastructure, including introducing a direct air service between Seoul and Mount Paektu on the DPRK’s border with China to boost inter-Korean tourism. The declaration also mentioned the Six Party Talks on denuclearization and touched on the possible replacement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement by a peace treaty. None of this would be cheap: estimates put the bill as high as $11 billion.

Following on from the summit, in November, there was a meeting of prime ministers and the first high-level armed forces meeting in seven years. But even as these took place, the ROK political scene had changed with the election of the conservative Lee Myung-bak as president. Lee made no secret
of his unwillingness to implement his predecessor’s program. Since he took office in 2008, the 2007 declaration has remained a dead letter.

“ON THE SPOT GUIDANCE.” Term (Hyonji chido in Korean) used in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to describe the admonitions and instructions that the country’s leaders, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and since December 2011, Kim Jong Un, give when visiting factories, farms, and other organizations. The practice began in the 1950s, and some places received many such visits. The guidance was often on technical matters and was designed to boost the image of the leader as all knowing and all powerful but also as somebody in touch with the people. However, when asked, DPRK officials have said that both Kims had received detailed briefings in advance of such visits in order to be able to make appropriate comments. Photographs recording the visits invariably show officials, often very high ranking, making careful notes. The visits are also marked by commemorative plaques. From about 1980 onward, Kim Jong Il frequently accompanied his father as part of his preparation for succession. On 12 April 1998, the Korean Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun noted that Kim Il Sung had visited some 8,000 organizations and had traveled over 2,350 days giving such guidance from the founding of the country in 1948 until his death in July 1994. No comparable figures have been released for Kim Jong Il, but the impression is that he did less and preferred visiting military units and places associated with his father above all others. From autumn 2010, he was accompanied by his son and eventual successor, Kim Jong Un.

OLYMPIC GAMES. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established an Olympic Committee in 1953 and was recognized by the International Olympic Committee in 1957. A team took part in the 1964 Innsbruck Winter Games, where Han Pi Hwa took a silver medal in the women’s 3,000-meter speed skating event. The DPRK did not participate in the Summer Olympics until the 1972 Munich Games. Since then, its participation has been spasmodic. It boycotted the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles and the 1988 Games in Seoul. It tried unsuccessfully to persuade the socialist countries not to attend the Seoul Games, while the Andaman Sea bombing incident sought unsuccessfully to dissuade other countries from attending. There have also been gaps in its attendance at the Winter Games.

At the Munich Summer Games, the DPRK team won five medals, including a gold for rifle shooting. It has always won at least two medals, with its best performance at the 1992 Games in Barcelona, where the DPRK team won four gold and five silver or bronze medals. At the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the DPRK won seven medals, including two gold. The total would have
been higher, but one competitor, pistol shooter Kim Jong Su, was disqualified for drug taking after winning two medals. The DPRK’s most successful Olympic athlete is judoka Sun Hui Kye, who won three medals across different weight classes at the 1996, 2000, and 2004 Games.

From the beginning of DPRK membership, there were attempts to establish a joint DPRK–Republic of Korea (ROK) Olympic team, but the nearest the two sides came to these was to march together under one flag at the opening ceremonies of the 2000 Sydney and 2004 Athens Summer Games, although they competed separately. The flag depicted an undivided Korean Peninsula in blue on a white background. The two teams again entered under this flag at the 2006 Turin Winter Games. By the time of the 2008 Beijing Games, however, relations between the two sides had deteriorated in the wake of the DPRK 2006 nuclear test and the 2007 election of Lee Myung-bak as ROK president, and the teams marched separately. One new development in the lead-up to the 2008 Games in Beijing was that the Olympic torch was paraded in both Koreas. It received a mixed reception in the ROK, where there were anti-Chinese protests, but was received with great enthusiasm in the DPRK. Following allegations that some DPRK gymnasts had given false information about their dates of birth, the DPRK gymnastic team was banned from participation in the 2012 London Olympics. See also MASS GAMES; SPORTS AND GAMES.

100-DAY BATTLE. Campaign launched in 1978 to increase productivity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Despite the claimed successes of the 70-Day Battle of 1974 and of the Three Revolutions Team Movement, the DPRK economy was again failing to produce enough goods by 1978, and so another campaign started in the late summer. As usual, great successes were claimed across all sectors of the economy, but the reality seems to have been that, as with other similar campaigns, there were no lasting achievements. See also 150-DAY BATTLE; 200-DAY BATTLE.

150-DAY BATTLE. Campaign announced by the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in April 2009 to increase economic output and to draw on the “spirit of the anti-Japanese guerrillas” to pave the way for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to become a “great, prosperous and powerful nation” by the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in 2012. Like similar earlier “battles” in the 1970s and 1980s, this campaign called upon all sections of society to work longer and harder to increase production. To assist this process, propaganda and guidance teams drawn from organizations such as the Mansudae art troupe, the Pyongyang Circus, and the KWP toured the country encouraging greater efforts. There were soon
reports of production targets being completed well ahead of schedule and people working well in excess of their normal hours. A pro-DPRK newspaper in Japan announced that the campaign, due to end on 17 September 2009, would be extended for an additional 100 days.

All such campaigns, however, have tended not to produce any long-lasting increases in production, and they are probably as much concerned with political purposes as they are with economic needs. In 2009, outsiders saw the campaign as focusing attention away from Kim Jong Il’s reported illness and questions over the succession, although these issues would not have been known to most of the population. See also 70-DAY BATTLE; 100-DAY BATTLE; 200-DAY BATTLE; THREE REVOLUTIONS TEAM MOVEMENT.

OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA. Founded in 2005, Open Radio for North Korea is one of three radio stations established in Seoul in the Republic of Korea (ROK) to broadcast to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The others, established around the same time, are Free Radio North Korea and Radio Free Choson; the last is run by DPRK defectors. All broadcast a mixture of comment and news. They are supported by the United States nongovernmental organizations Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy, which have provided funding since 2006. In November 2009, the ROK news agency, Yonhap, reported that the Paris-based Reporters without Frontiers would give $380,000 to the three stations. It is not known how large an audience there is for the broadcasts in the DPRK, where radios are strictly controlled, but there were reports in 2007 that the DPRK was jamming these stations. Open Radio for North Korea also produces a web-based newspaper, the Daily North Korea. See also COMMUNICATIONS; MEDIA; RADIO FREE ASIA.

OPERATIONAL PLAN 5029. According to a report carried by the Republic of Korea (ROK)–based Yonhap News Agency in November 2009, Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029 is the name given to current joint ROK–United States contingency plans to be set in motion following either regime collapse or other internal emergencies in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Quoting an unidentified source, Yonhap said that the joint plans covered civil war, the outflow of weapons of mass destruction, kidnapping of ROK citizens, a massive outflow of refugees, or natural disasters. According to the source, discussions on such arrangements had gone on for many years, but the concept was only turned into an OPLAN after the conservative Lee Myung-bak government came to power in the ROK in 2008. The source also noted that in the event of an emergency, the ROK military would take
the lead, with U.S. forces concentrating on nuclear issues and missiles. This plan replaced earlier OPLAN arrangements, going back to 1973. Until 1998, the plans apparently aimed at the quick ending of any war on the peninsula. However, the 1998 version, OPLAN 5027, envisaged that if a conflict broke out, the aim would be to destroy the DPRK as a state.

Although there has been no independent confirmation of this report, it seems highly probable that such arrangements do exist. It also seems likely that the United States is in informal discussions about what to do in the event of a crisis in the DPRK with other countries in the region. One DPRK publication was reported as having described the existence of the plan as provocative.

**ORASCOM.** An Egyptian-based company, specializing in cell phones, construction, and hotel development and management, which announced in January 2008 that CHEO Technology, a joint venture between Orascom and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, had been granted a license to provide a cell phone network in the DPRK. Orascom was established in 1998 and is quoted on the Cairo, Alexandria, and London Stock Exchanges. It had previously established such networks in Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Zimbabwe. The formal launch of the network, known as Korylink, took place in December 2008, in the presence of Orascom’s chairman and chief executive officer Naguib Sawiris. The company announced at the same time that it was establishing a bank, Ora Bank, in the DPRK. Ezzeldine Heikel would be the president of both the cell phone joint venture and the bank. In April 2008, Orascom also announced that it would begin work on the unfinished 105 story Ryugyong Hotel. By mid-2011, the outside of the hotel appeared to have been finished, but it was not clear what, if any, changes had been made to the interior.

**ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT.** This is the most powerful department under the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), the ruling party in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Its main role is to ensure loyalty to the leadership and ideological correctness. It carries out regular assessments of party members and its sway extends into all aspects of the party and government, including the armed forces. It also controls party and state elections.

Many members of the senior leadership have served in the department, including the late Kim Jong Il and his brother-in-law Jang Song Taek. During the 1960s, it was headed by Kim Jong Yu, a younger brother of President Kim Il Sung. At the outset of his career, Kim Jong Il was trained
by members of this department, and he joined it in 1964. He later became its head, replacing his uncle, and he used the position to consolidate his position as successor to his father. In 1995, Jang Song Taek became the senior deputy director of the department, responsible for the daily management and personnel of all state security and legal bodies. Jang disappeared from view from 2004 to 2007, and when he reappeared, he resumed the same supervisory role as previously, although now the department was referred to as the Administration Department. In 2008, he became the director of the department. The Organization and Guidance Department may not now have the same power it had under Kim Il Sung, but for senior party members, it and those who run it are still something of which to be wary.
PAEK NAM SUN (1929–2007). Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) foreign minister from 1998 until his death in January 2007. He first came to notice as a delegate to the North–South talks in the 1970s. He was listed as the vice chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1972 and as deputy head of the General Federation of Trade Unions in 1973, but became ambassador to Poland that same year. He left Poland in 1979, reappearing as deputy head of the Journalists’ Union in 1985. From 1990 to 1998, he was secretary of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. While foreign minister, he apparently suffered from kidney problems and was often absent. He had no discernible effect on foreign policy but was a pleasant figurehead.

PAENGNYONG ISLAND GROUP. Also known as the Five West Sea Islands group, these small islands are situated at 37°57′42″ north and 124°39′31″ east. They are Republic of Korea (ROK) territory and are administratively part of Inchon city. However, they lie within Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) territorial waters, close to shore. Their population is estimated (2011) at about 15,000, including several thousand military personnel. The Five West Sea Islands were occupied by the United States forces at the end of World War II. During the Korean War, some of the islands were temporarily held by DPRK forces. These were driven out and, by the end of the war, the islands were firmly under United Nations Command (UNC) control. During the conflict, and for some time afterward, they were reportedly used to launch clandestine operations into the DPRK. In order to provide access to the islands, the UNC designated the Northern Limit Line in August 1953. The DPRK has never accepted the line as a valid border, but until 1973, DPRK naval vessels generally operated above the line. The situation of the islands has led to naval clashes, some severe, since the early 2000s, and they are heavily fortified. In March 2010, the Chonan incident occurred in nearby waters. See also YONPYONG ISLANDS.

PAK HAK SON (?–). Pak Hak Son was identified as the chair of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Physical Culture and Sports
Commission and concurrently chair of the DPRK Olympic Committee in February 2008. The commission replaced the former Ministry of Sports in 1999. Pak, who had been number two in the commission since 2006, replaced Mun Jae Dok, who was appointed to both posts in 2004. Pak was first noted as the manager of the Sports Department of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League in 1985, but according to the Republic of Korea Yonhap News Agency, he had kept a low profile. Since taking up his current post, Pak has appeared praising the decision to send the torch for the 2008 Beijing Olympics to Pyongyang, the first occasion in which the Olympic torch passed through the DPRK capital. He also led a sports delegation to Myanmar in May 2009.

PAK HON YONG (1900–1956). Pak Hon Yong was a communist activist who played a major role in the establishment of the Korean Communist Party (KCP) in 1925 and became the leader of the revived party after 1945. Based in Seoul, he fled north in 1946 and, with other South Korean communists, joined forces with Kim Il Sung. Kim distrusted him, however, and he was purged, tried in 1955, and probably executed in 1956.

Pak was born in South Chungchong Province in southern Korea. He studied in Seoul and Tokyo and in 1921 went to Shanghai. There he became involved with Korean communists from the Soviet Union. In 1922, he was arrested and imprisoned when he tried to enter Korea. He remained active in left-wing circles on his release, and in April 1925 was one of the founders of the KCP and the Korean Communist Youth League. When the KCP collapsed in November 1925, Pak was again arrested and imprisoned by the Japanese. When released in 1928, he went to the Soviet Union. He then returned to Shanghai, where he was again arrested in 1933 and sent back to Korea. He remained in prison until 1939. On release, he disappeared from public view, spending most of the war years as an ordinary worker, to avoid further arrest.

After the defeat of the Japanese, he reemerged and again went to Seoul, where he revived the KCP in September 1945, becoming party chairman. But the United States Military Government was increasingly hostile to the KCP, especially when it opposed the idea of trusteeship, and in September 1946, faced with a warrant for his arrest, Pak and a number of his colleagues fled to North Korea. Pak and his “domestic faction” of South Koreans were accepted by Kim Il Sung, and when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in September 1948, Pak became a vice premier and minister of foreign affairs. The following year, he became a vice chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), and on the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, a member of the KWP’s Military Affairs Committee.
Immediately after the signing of the **Armistice Agreement** in July 1953, Pak was arrested along with most of his associates. There are reports that he had claimed that the southern population would rise up to support a northern invasion, and that he had been blamed when this failed to happen. Those accused with him were tried and executed in August 1953 on charges of treason and spying, but Pak did not go on trial until December 1955. He then faced similar charges to his former companions, with allegations that he had worked closely with the American missionary Horace H. Underwood and that he had been plotting to seize power. He admitted all charges, was sentenced to death in December 1955. He was probably executed in 1956, although this has never been confirmed, *See also* **HO KAI I**; **MU CHONG**.

**PAK NAM GI (1928–)**. Pak Nam Gi has long been seen as a leading figure in the **economic development** of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and has survived the economic ups and downs of recent years. Like many others, he has occupied party, state, and parliamentary positions interchangeably over the years. Born in **Haeju**, he trained as a mechanical engineer in Czechoslovakia. He first came to notice in May 1972, when he was a vice minister of the metal industry, and in 1976 he was appointed vice chairman of the State Planning Commission. In July 1984, he moved into a party role as a member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and as vice director of its Second Economic Affairs Department. In December 1984, he became the Central Committee’s secretary of economic affairs. In September 1985, he was elected a member of the Central Committee’s Economic Policy Inspection Committee. In November 1986, he was a delegate to the Eighth **Supreme People’s Assembly** (SPA) and the following month a member of its Budget Committee. In October 1988, he became chairman of the State Planning Commission (thus in charge of the whole economy) and the Central Committee’s secretary for economic affairs in November. Reelected to the SPA in 1990, he was appointed chairman of its Budget Committee.

In 1993, he was removed from his various party and state positions, but not demoted, since he was appointed chairman of the Administrative and Economic Committee of the **Pyongyang** municipality. His next move, in 1997, when he became chairman of the District Planning Committee of North Hwanghae Province, might have been a demotion or it might have been to broaden his experience. If it was a demotion, it did not last long, and in September 1998, Pak was back as chairman of the State Planning Commission, a post he held until April 2009. He also occupied a number of party posts relating to economic affairs, in particular the director of the Central Committee’s Finance and Planning Department from September 2005. He chaired the
budget committees of the 11th SPA in 2003 and the 12th in 2009. He remains a KWP Central Committee member. He has twice been awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung, in April 1985 and again in April 1992. He served on the Kim Il Sung funeral committee in 1994.

PAK PONG JU (1939– ). Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from September 2003 to April 2007. Pak began his career in 1962 as manager of a food factory. He became an alternative member of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee in October 1980 and chief of the Namhung Youth Chemical Combine Committee in July 1983. In May 1993, he became vice director of the KWP’s Light Industries Department, and in March 1994, he was the vice director of the party’s Economic Policy Supervisory Department. In July of that year, Pak ranked 188th of 273 members on the funeral committee of the late leader Kim Il Sung, indicating that he was on the periphery of the elite hierarchy. However, in September 1998, he was appointed chemical industry minister under Premier Hong Song Nam, whom he replaced five years later. Pak was seen as an economic reformer and led a group of economy-related ministers on a two-week visit to Seoul in 2002. At the time of his replacement, Pak had not been seen in public since May 2006, and there were rumors that he had been removed because of misuse of funds and that he had paid too much attention to Chinese suggestions for economic reforms.

PAK SUNG CHOL (1913–2008). A former guerrilla fighter in Manchuria in the 1930s, Pak was briefly Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) prime minister in the 1970s. He was born in North Hamyong Province but appears to have attended school in Manchuria, where he became active in the guerrilla movement in about 1936. Like others, his group was forced to go to the Soviet Union under Japanese military pressure. He returned to Korea with the Soviet forces after the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 and seems to have always been aligned with Kim Il Sung. In August 1948, he was chief of staff of the Third Division of the Korean People’s Army and commanded the 15th Division during the Korean War. After the end of the war, he was briefly director general of the police bureau of the DPRK Ministry of National Security, but in 1954 was successively minister and then ambassador to Bulgaria. On his return, he took up posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee’s Department of International Affairs. He was a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly from 1957, and he remained a delegate until his death.

Pak was appointed minister for foreign affairs in 1959, and was also a member of the Central Committee of the KWP’s Committee for the Peace-
ful Reunification of the Fatherland. He became an alternate member of the KWP Central Committee in June 1964 and a full member in October 1966, when he was also appointed a vice premier. In the early 1970s, he played an important role in the development of links between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK), acting as cochair to the North–South Political Coordinating Committee. He visited the ROK in December 1972 in this role to hold talks with ROK President Park Chung-hee. In April 1976, he became premier, but only held the post for a short period before becoming a vice president in December 1977, a post he held until he became an honorary vice chair of the SPA in September 1998. Pak became a Hero of the Republic in 1992 and received the Order of Kim Il Sung in 1993.

PAKISTAN, RELATIONS WITH. Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established diplomatic relations on 9 November 1972. Each country maintains an embassy in the other. The main links at first were through foreign trade. From the start of relations, there were rumors that much of the trade involved arms and especially missile technology, including that relating to the Nodong and the Taepodong. Pakistan–DPRK relations were especially close under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto until his deposition and execution in 1977, and under his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, when she became prime minister in 1988. This led to a joint ballistic missile project and also, it is claimed, allowed the DPRK to obtain strategic materials and equipment that it could not otherwise get easily because of international controls. It is widely believed that the cooperation also included nuclear developments. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man who has been called the “father of the Pakistan nuclear bomb,” is believed to have assisted the DPRK with the enriched uranium program that United States’ Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly raised during his visit to the DPRK in October 2002. Khan has indicated that he did have contacts with the DPRK on nuclear matters, at the behest of senior Pakistani military and government officials. This has frequently been denied but the stories continue to surface.

PANMUNJOM. The site of a hamlet, located some 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of Seoul on the 38th parallel, that was totally destroyed in the early stages of the Korean War. The site, which lay just inside the line held by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Chinese forces, became the second meeting place for the armistice talks in September 1951. The Armistice Agreement was signed here in July 1953, and it was through Panmunjom that exchanges of prisoners of war took place in April and August–September 1953. The headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was located there until the 1990s, and the Military Armistice...
Commission held its meetings there until 1991. It is a joint security area under the United Nations Command and DPRK guards, with the military demarcation line running through the middle. It has been the site of occasional North–South meetings and it remained the only recognized land crossing point between the two Koreas until 2002. Both the DPRK and the Republic of Korea organize tourist visits to the site. See also AX MURDERS AT PANMUNJOM; EC 121 DOWNING; PUEBLO, USS.

PARK CHUNG-HEE (1917–1979). President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. Although an authoritarian dictator, he succeeded in building the ROK into a modern, economically powerful state, well able to stand up to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He was born the youngest of seven in a poor farming family. In 1937, he became a primary schoolteacher. In 1942, he enrolled at the Manzhouguo Military Academy, moving to the Japanese Military Academy in 1944. On graduation, he joined the Imperial Japanese Army as a second lieutenant. Returning to South Korea in 1945, Park became a captain in the Korean Constabulary, later transferring to the ROK army. In 1948, he was
implicated in a rebellion and sentenced to death, but was reprieved. During the Korean War (1950–53), he reached the rank of brigadier general, becoming a major general in 1958. In May 1961, Park and a group of fellow officers overthrew the ROK Second Republic. Park headed the military revolutionary committee, then served as chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction from July 1961. He became acting president upon the resignation of President Yun Po-son in March 1962. He retired from the army as lieutenant general in 1963. Elected in October 1963 as the president of the Third Republic, he was reelected in 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1978. He carried out a series of five-year national development plans that contributed to the modernization and industrialization of the ROK.

One of the accusations against Park in 1948 was that he was a communist, but he adopted a firmly anticommunist stand thereafter. He was the target of a number of DPRK assassination attempts, including an attack on the presidential mansion, the Blue House, in 1968. In 1974, an assassination attempt carried out by a Korean from Japan failed but killed his wife. Nevertheless, he began a dialogue with the DPRK in 1971 that led to the historic 1972 Joint Declaration between the two Koreas. Park used this to increase his own power and he grew more authoritarian, especially after the death of his wife. By 1978, there was widespread opposition to his rule. Following disagreement with his advisors on the handling of this opposition, then director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (now the National Intelligence Service) shot him dead at dinner on 26 October 1979.

Park’s political legacy lived on under President Chun Du-hwan until 1987 and to a lesser extent under Chun’s successor Roh Tae-woo. Today, various ROK politicians and groups trace their line back to Park, including his daughter, Park Geun-hye. When she visited the DPRK in 2002, then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il expressed his admiration for her father’s methods and results and asked for a copy of an ROK television series about his life. See also Rhee Syngman.

PARTY CENTER. A term (tangjung ‘ang in Korean) that began to appear in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) media in the early 1970s, but which remained publically undefined until 1980. There were hints, however, that it meant Kim Jong Il, the eldest son of the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung, especially as there were frequent references to the “Great Leader” and the “Party Center,” which indicated a close link between the elder Kim, who was always referred to as the “Great Leader” and the “Party Center.” When Kim Jong Il was formally designated his father’s successor after the 1980 Korean Workers’ Party congress, he began to be referred to by name or as the “Dear Leader” and the term Party Center faded from use.
PAULEY MISSION. Edwin W. Pauley served as the special representative of the United States President Harry S. Truman with the personal rank of ambassador on the Allied Reparations Committee, a body set up at the end of World War II to assess how much Germany and Japan should pay in reparations. As part of this process, and following rumors that the Soviet Union was stripping former Japanese assets from Korea, Pauley sought to visit the Soviet-occupied northern part of the Korean Peninsula from November 1945 onward. Eventually, after much diplomatic maneuvering, he and a small U.S. team were able to visit from 29 May to 3 June 1946. Traveling by train and under tight Soviet control, the delegation toured major industrial sites and could observe conditions in the north. After the visit, Pauley prepared an account, published as the Report on Japanese Assets in Soviet-Occupied Korea to the President of the United States, June 1946, which concluded that contrary to rumor, there was no wide-scale Soviet plundering of assets from the north. Pauley’s report is one of the few Western firsthand accounts of conditions in the Soviet zone, and it also served as a basis for identifying targets for air attack after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. See CHINA.

PERRY REVIEW. After the signing of the United States–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Agreed Framework in 1994, President William Clinton faced much criticism, especially from the Republican Party, for appeasing rather than confronting the DPRK. In an attempt to defuse this criticism and to establish a policy toward the DPRK in light of its August 1998 missile test over Japan, at the end of 1998, Clinton asked former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to carry out a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK and to make recommendations for the future. Perry consulted widely, visited various countries, including both the DPRK and China, and submitted his report in October 1999. He concluded that while a review was required, the Clinton administration was on the right course, and that the DPRK was largely in compliance with the Agreed Framework. He noted that the United States faced two alternatives. It could work for the normalization of relations with the DPRK or it could follow a policy of confrontation. Perry came down firmly on the side of normalization on as many fronts as possible, including the lifting of sanctions. The Clinton administration accepted Perry’s findings and began to implement some aspects of his report. However, the election of President George W. Bush in 2000 led quickly to a move away from Perry’s proposals.

Perry remained an active commentator on the DPRK. Following the second nuclear test in 2009, he called for military intervention but subsequently
appeared to modify his position. He is believed to be close to the Barack Obama administration that took office in 2009.

POCHONBO, BATTLE OF. Name given to an attack carried out on 4 June 1937 by a group of guerrillas under the command of Kim Il Sung, which has acquired iconic status in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as proof that the guerrilla forces really mattered. Pochonbo, which lies on the Yalu River, was then called Pojon. Contemporary Japanese accounts say that the attacking force was about 80, while DPRK accounts claim that there were 150. In the attack, seven Japanese policemen were killed, the police station and a number of other government buildings were destroyed, leaflets were handed out, and Kim made a speech. Whatever the short-term morale boosting effect of the attack, the Pochonbo raid and another clash at the end of June 1937 led to a major Japanese offensive against the guerrilla groups in Manchuria, including Kim and his followers. The consequent retreat from the border area became known as the “Arduous March.”

POLITICAL PARTIES. The constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as amended in 2009, states in Article 67 that the free activities of political parties are guaranteed by the state. Three parties exist in the DPRK and have representatives in the parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). They are the Chondoist Chongu Party (“Heavenly Way Young Friends Party”), which claims to represent the interests of the peasants, the Korean Social Democratic Party, representing the professional and middle class, and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), representing, as the name implies, the working class. The first traces its origin back to the 19th-century Tonghak movement, and the second dates from 1945. Both have offices in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, where officials claim that these are functioning political bodies but are reluctant to provide membership numbers or to define the distinctive role of the parties. There are no pictures of party leaders. Their candidates have to be endorsed by the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, which is an umbrella body under the control of the KWP. Like the officially sanctioned religious organizations, these parties are there to provide an appearance of plurality and have no role beyond supporting the only party that matters, the KWP.

POPULATION. At the end of the Japanese colonial period in 1945, the total population of Korea was about 25 million. The creation of two separate occupation zones left some 16.5 million in the south and 9.5 million in the north. The flow of people to and fro across the 38th parallel altered the ratio somewhat, with more people going to the south than to the north, a trend that
was intensified during the Korean War (1950–53). Some did so for political reasons, but many were just trying to escape the bombing. No exact figure for the number who moved south has ever been established, but it is believed to have been substantial.

As far as is known, no census was conducted in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) until 1993. A publication in 1962 reported that the 1960 population was 10,789,000, which was said to represent a 17 percent increase over that of 1945. Thereafter, the DPRK ceased to publish precise statistics. In material originally prepared for the United States Central Intelligence Agency, it was estimated that there were some 17 million in the early 1980s. Life expectancy was 70 for men and 73 for women, and the death rate was 25 percent less than in 1945, which was attributed to improved health care. Other estimates put the life expectancy figures much lower, at 61 for men and 65 for women. The birth rate was low, a consequence of late marriage (not before 27 for women and 30 for men), readily available contraception and abortion, and poor nourishment. Although the state encouraged large families, with special privileges for those who had three or more children, few couples had more than two.

The DPRK carried out a census in 1993. No details are available of how it was conducted, but figures were released and appeared in pro-DPRK publications. These showed a population of 21,217,000, with 10,884,000 females (51.3 percent) and 10,330,000 males (48.7 percent). Life expectancy was given as 76 years for women and 68.4 years for men. The infant mortality rate was 14 per 1,000, and maternal mortality was 54 per 100,000. From 1994 onward, the DPRK experienced a series of natural disasters and appealed for international relief to help with famine. No official figures have ever been released for the numbers who died during the worst years of food shortages, generally accepted as being 1994–98. The only statistic quoted by a DPRK official was that given to journalists in 1998 by Jong In Chan, the acting head of the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, the official organization that dealt with foreign aid. Jong said that deaths beyond what might normally be expected totaled 220,000 between 1995 and 1998, and that this was 37 percent more than normal. In one report of the meeting, a journalist gave a figure of 2.5 million, which led to a correction in the DPRK media. From this, it can be presumed that the 220,000 figure was the one that the DPRK wanted accepted. Others have placed the figure for deaths much higher. The most senior DPRK official to defect, Hwang Jang Yop, gave figures of 500,000 in 1995, 1 million in 1996, and 2 million in 1997. Others have placed the death toll at anywhere between 1 and 3 million. By the early 2000s, the population was estimated to be around 23 million, although the DPRK leader, Kim Jong Il, is said to have mentioned a figure of 26 or 27 million.
Between 1–15 October 2008, the DPRK conducted a census with assistance from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). At UNFPA’s request, statistics officers from the Republic of Korea (ROK) gave training in China for the DPRK officials who were to conduct the census in China, and the ROK also provided funding for the exercise. Details released by the UNFPA and the DPRK showed that the population was 24,062,000: 12,330,393 females and 11,721,838 males. This amounted to a 0.85 percent growth over 1993. Life expectancy was 72.7 for females and 65.6 for males. Infant mortality was up slightly at 19 per 1,000, and maternal mortality rose from 54 per 100,000 in 1993 to 77.2 per 100,000 in 2008. The population was becoming elderly, with those over 60 accounting for 8.7 percent. By comparison, the rate in Japan and Italy was 20 percent, China 8 percent, and the ROK 9.3 percent. The DPRK ranks as 55th in terms of world population density, at 198.3 persons per square meter (512 per square mile).

Questions still remain about the DPRK census, not least because it is not clear how the armed forces figured in the returns. In most areas, the DPRK has shown itself reluctant to give details about the military, although it has regularly stated that outside estimates of the numbers in the armed forces, which are usually stated as over 1 million, are too high. It is clear that the DPRK remains an urban-based country, with some 60 percent of the population living in cities. The capital, Pyongyang, is also by far the largest city, with some 3 to 4 million. The 2008 census asked questions about disabilities. Those admitting problems were a very small percentage of the total; lack of mobility and failing eyesight, both likely to be marked in an aging population, were the most common conditions reported. The declining life expectancy, which some commentators have argued is underestimated, and the rise in maternal mortality probably reflect the overall downturn in living standards since the early 1990s. See also ECONOMY.

POSTAGE STAMPS. The first Korean postage stamps appeared in 1884. However, because of a failed antigovernment coup of that year, in which the newly established post office was burned down, very few were ever used, and it was not until 1895 that stamps were regularly issued. During the Japanese colonial period (1910–45), Japanese stamps were used. Thereafter, the two occupying powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, both issued stamps in their respective zones until the establishment in 1948 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north of the peninsula and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south. Since then, both Koreas have been assiduous issuers of stamps. The DPRK also issues substantive catalogs listing stamp- and other postal-related items. In the DPRK, where information is often not easy to come by, postage stamps can provide some clues about
developments. Thus the growth of the personality cult around Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il can be traced via stamps. Soon after the latter’s death in December 2011, stamps appeared showing him hale and hearty and with the military, as well as with his third son and heir, Kim Jong Un.

Stamps also provide some clues to foreign policy. The DPRK uses postage stamps and related philatelic material such as letter cards to raise money, and several issues in recent years have been discounted by reputable stamp dealers as not being meant for regular postage use. These include a series issued in 1982 that featured the British Princess of Wales and another in 1984 on European royalty. Although DPRK officials claim that stamps featuring leaders can be used for ordinary postage, this seems unlikely, given that such images are otherwise treated as sacrosanct. Neither the DPRK nor the ROK will accept mail with the other’s stamps. See also COMMUNICATIONS.

POTSDAM CONFERENCE. Meeting held in Berlin between 16 July–2 August 1945 attended by Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain (succeeded by the Labour Party leader Clement Attlee on 28 July), Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union, and United States President Harry S. Truman. The conference did not deal directly with Korea but reasserted the reference to independence “in due course” in the 1943 Cairo Agreement. However, a meeting of military chiefs of staff approved the adoption of the 38th parallel as the dividing line between the two proposed occupation forces from the Soviet Union and the United States. See also RUSSIA/soviet union, relations with.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI). In May 2003, during the second Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear crisis, United States President George W. Bush announced in a speech in Krakow, Poland, the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The purpose of the PSI was to improve cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to interdict weapons’ shipments. States signing this were Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United States. These countries would share intelligence and would try to interdict shipping both in territorial waters and on the high seas. Although Bush did not specify that the DPRK was the main target of the initiative, it was clear that this was the case. The DPRK reacted with hostility to the announcement, saying that it would treat any attempt to interfere with its shipping as an act of war.

In fact, the PSI proved difficult to implement. It appeared to lack any legal basis. Some argued that it breached the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which guaranteed rights of innocent passage, and that it could only acquire
legal status through a specific United Nations resolution. At one point, then U.S. ambassador to the UN John Bolton claimed that the United States could interdict DPRK ships under the right of self-defense, but this view gained little support. The Republic of Korea (ROK) declined to be associated with the initiative when it was first put forward, arguing that in the special circumstances of the Korean Peninsula, it would be difficult for it to take action against DPRK shipping. However, on 23 May 2009, the Lee Myung-bak government announced that the ROK would henceforward play a full role in the PSI. The DPRK promptly denounced this move and said that it would retaliate against any attempt by the ROK to search its ships.

PUEBLO, USS. The USS Pueblo was a lightly armed United States Banner-class navy technical research vessel of World War II vintage. It was commissioned under the command of Commodore Lloyd M. Bucher in May 1967 to gather intelligence and oceanographic information off the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in particular to monitor DPRK electronic and radio signals from outside DPRK territorial waters. While engaged in these activities, it was seized on 23 January 1968 off the east coast of the DPRK by DPRK naval vessels supported by fighter aircraft. The incident took place as the DPRK began a more aggressive policy toward the Republic of Korea (ROK), following the Blue House raid and just as the war in Vietnam entered a new phase with the January 1968 Tet Offensive.

The Pueblo attempted to escape, and in the resulting fight, one crew member was killed. It proved impossible to destroy all the classified material on board and some of this fell into DPRK hands. The 82 survivors, who included two civilian hydrographers, were captured and imprisoned. The U.S. government claimed that the ship had been taken in international waters, while the DPRK, which claimed a 50-mile limit, said that it was within its territorial waters. The U.S. deployed naval and air units to the region in a show of force but made no attempt to recapture the ship. While in captivity, the crew members were subject to some mistreatment and made confessions. Following lengthy negotiations conducted through the Military Armistice Commission and a U.S. apology for the ship’s intrusion into DPRK territorial waters, the surviving crew and the remains of the man killed were handed over at Panmunjom on 23 December 1968. The U.S. government promptly withdrew the apology, maintaining that the ship had been on the high seas. Although there were suggestions that the ship’s officers should be court-martialed, this did not happen.

The DPRK did not release the ship, and for many years it was on display at Wonsan on the east coast. In 1999, it was moved, presumably through international waters, to the DPRK capital, Pyongyang, where it has become a
regular tourist attraction. At least one of the guides aboard the vessel claims to have taken part in the 1968 action. The point where it is moored on the Taedong River is, according to DPRK accounts, close to the spot where the U.S. merchant ship General Sherman was detained and burned in 1866. In October 2002, just before the visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the vessel disappeared and there were rumors among the foreign community that the DPRK planned to return it to the United States. (It remains formally still in commission as a U.S. naval vessel.) The return did not happen, although there have been subsequent reports of DPRK offers to return the vessel.

Several of the crew, including the captain, published accounts of their captivity. Many suffered ill health, allegedly because of the ill-treatment they had received, and in 2008, a group of the survivors were awarded damages in a U.S. federal court because of the treatment they had received. See also EC 121, DOWNING OF.

PYONGHWA MOTORS. The Unification Church established this company in the Republic of Korea (ROK), where it is now spelled “Pyeonghwa,” in 1999. The following year, the company announced that it was entering into a 70-30 joint venture arrangement with the Ryonbong General Corporation to manufacture automobiles in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Until then, the main DPRK automobile manufacturer was Sungri Motors, established in 1958, making mainly trucks. In 2002, Pyonghwa Motors completed the construction of a plant within the Nampo urban district. The joint venture was given the sole right to manufacture, purchase, and sell used cars in the DPRK. By 2004, it was manufacturing two small sedan cars, based on Fiat models, a pickup truck, and what was described as a sports utility vehicle. In 2006, the company was producing a luxury sedan, the Junma, which resembled a Mercedes-Benz, but seems to have been modeled on the ROK SsangYong Motor Company’s Chairman and a utility vehicle based on an old Toyota model, the Hiace. These products, apparently produced from knock-down kits, involved a Chinese automobile company based in Dandong, although the exact details of this arrangement are not clear. Billboards advertising one of the cars appeared in Pyongyang in 2004, the first commercial advertising seen in the DPRK. Although it was reported that the Nampo plant was capable of producing 10,000 vehicles, it appears that in the early years, only about 300 were actually made; this had risen to 652 units in 2008. In July 2009, according to the ROK Yonhap News Agency, the company reported its first profits; $500,000 was remitted to the ROK parent company via a Hong Kong bank, while the Ryonbong Corporation received $200,000. The market for the company’s products remains unclear, but some are probably sold in China. See also ECONOMY; FOREIGN TRADE; INDUSTRY.
PYONGYANG, “Temporary” capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1948 until 1972, and subsequently its capital. Pyongyang was the center of the Chinese commandery, or military colony, of Nangnang (Lelang in Chinese) in northwest Korea and became the capital of the kingdom of Koguryo in 427 A.D. Under the Yi or Choson dynasty, it was a major provincial capital. It suffered much damage during the Sino–Japanese War (1894–95) and the Russo–Japanese War (1904–5). When Soviet forces occupied the northern half of Korea in 1945, they administered it from Pyongyang. In 1948, it became the “temporary capital” of the newly proclaimed DPRK; Seoul, which lay on the south of the dividing line and had been the capital of a united Korea since the 14th century, was still listed as the national capital. The population of the city was some 40,000 in 1890 and 235,000 in 1938. During the Korean War, the population dropped, but as postwar reconstruction got under way from 1953 onward, it began to rise again, reaching about 650,000 in the early 1960s and 1.3 million by 1978. No figures on its exact current population are officially available, but following the 2008 census, it appears to be almost 4 million.

Pyongyang was heavily damaged during the Korean War when it suffered extremely heavy air attacks. For nearly three years, much of life was conducted underground, and when the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the city was in total ruin. It was subsequently rebuilt, with many parks and with wide boulevards. However, pockets of older traditional-style housing dating from the postwar period persist. It is the largest urban area in the

DPRK. Pyongyang is the social, communications, economic, educational, diplomatic, media, military, political, and transport and tourist center of the country, with numerous museums and art galleries and other cultural manifestations. The only religious buildings in the country, apart from Buddhist temples, are in Pyongyang. The Pyongyang Circus is world class. The city is exceptionally well supplied with sports facilities, many of which date from the 1989 Pyongyang World Youth Festival. It has hosted other international gatherings, including the 1991 Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting. The cult of personality that surrounds the leadership of Kim Il Sung, who was the leader of the DPRK from 1948 until his death in 1994, is very much associated with Pyongyang. He was born in an adjoining village, and his family home was in another, at Mangyongdae. Pyongyang is full of monuments to his achievements, many erected under the direction of his son and successor, Kim Jong Il. It is the site of his mausoleum, the Kumsusan Memorial Palace.

Residence is strictly controlled. All those who live in the city are privileged, but they are by no means all equal. To be banished from Pyongyang is a heavy punishment. While it is clearly the showcase for the DPRK, there are real people doing real work there. The city is theoretically twinned with a number of places, including Moscow and Kathmandu, but there appears to be little substance to the links. See also ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; APRIL SPRING FRIENDSHIP ARTS FESTIVAL; ART AND ARTISTS; CEMETERIES; GENERAL SHERMAN AFFAIR; INSPECTOR O; KIM CHAEK UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY; KIM IL SUNG MILITARY UNIVERSITY; KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY; MANGYONGDAE REVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL; MANSUDAE ART STUDIO; NUMBERS; PYONGYANG HEMP TEXTILES; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES; PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; RYUGYONG HOTEL; SUNAN AIRPORT; THREE REVOLUTIONS’ EXHIBITION.

PYONGYANG DECLARATION. Name given to the document signed at the end of the meeting between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il and Koizumi Junichiro, the premier of Japan on 17 September 2002. The two leaders agreed that they would work for the normalization of relations and would make determined efforts to tackle problems. Japan acknowledged that it had caused harm and suffering to the Korean people and undertook to provide assistance for the DPRK’s humanitarian and developmental needs. Each side agreed that it would respect international law, while the DPRK undertook that there would be no repetition of the “regrettable incidents” that had affected “the lives and security of...
Japanese nationals.” Finally, both sides undertook to work for the peace and security of East Asia and to solve the question of nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK for its part undertook to maintain its moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003. This declaration remains the most important document in DPRK–Japan relations, to which both parties refer to from time to time, but it has remained largely a dead letter. See also ABduCATIONS; GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA; JAPANESE COloNIAL PERIOD; JAPANESE RED ARMY HIjACK; KANEMARU SHIN.

PYONGYANG HEMP TEXTILES. A joint venture between Andong Hemp Textiles of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Saebol General Trading Company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), each of which has invested $15 million in it. The project, to produce hemp products, began in 2006, and its backers on the ROK side included the Roman Catholic Church. In October 2008, a 254-strong ROK delegation went by chartered airplane to Pyongyang for the formal opening ceremony. As part of the agreement, a Franciscan, Father Paul Kim Kwon-soon, was allowed to run a workers’ welfare center within the joint venture, the first Roman Catholic priest to be allowed to reside in the DPRK since the 1950s. In June 2011, the ROK Yonhap News Agency reported that the project was suffering heavy losses because of the ROK government’s decision to suspend North–South trade in the wake of the sinking of the Chonan. See also FOREIGN TRADE; INDUSTRY; RELIGION.

PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES. A language-centered university, which separated from Kim Il Sung University in 1961. Although perhaps somewhat less prestigious than Kim Il Sung University, which also has a language department, the Foreign Studies University is highly regarded in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and there is much competition to gain entry. Many of its graduates work as diplomats or in foreign trade organizations. The main languages are English, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese, but it also teaches a variety of other languages. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, English has become the most desirable foreign language. The university has used resident foreigners such as the Americans James Joseph Dresnok and Charles Jenkins as teachers, not always very satisfactorily, given their own limited education and, in Jenkins’s case, strong Southern United States’ accent. Since 2000, Great Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office has provided funds for professionally trained English teachers for this and a number of other universities. There are also teachers from Germany and France. The university has an associated school and many of its students come from this background.
In October 2010, what has been billed as the first ever private university in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) admitted its first group of students on a specially constructed campus near Pyongyang. According to its founder and first principal, Kim Chin Kyung (also known as James Kim), the idea came to him while he was briefly in prison in the DPRK in 1998 on suspicion of spying. Kim is an evangelical Christian based in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region in China and now carries a United States passport, although he claims that he fought in the Republic of Korea (ROK) army during the Korean War. After a spell as a businessman in the United States, he studied theology in Europe and moved to the ROK in 1972. In 1992, he founded the Yanbian University of Science and Technology, which is the model on which PUST is based. During the 1990s famine, Kim brought humanitarian aid to the DPRK, but his frequent visits, his U.S. connections, and his ability to speak Korean seem to have aroused the suspicions of the authorities, which led to his detention. Exactly how he came to be released, and how the DPRK was persuaded to allow him to set up PUST, is not clear. He has denied paying anything and maintains that the project is financed from his own resources and from Christian donations.

The agreement to establish PUST was signed with the DPRK government in May 2001; the ROK government, then following the “Sunshine Policy,” approved it in June that year. A year later, a groundbreaking ceremony was held in Pyongyang, but it was another two years before building work began. The formal opening ceremony was due in 2008 but was postponed and eventually took place in September 2009. By that stage, the ROK government, now under President Lee Myung-bak, was much less enthusiastic about the project. Although an ROK government representative took part in the ceremony, the government blocked certain items of equipment, including computers, because of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Kim persisted, however, and in October 2010, enrolled the first group of 160 postgraduate students. PUST has 16 teachers, none of whom have come from the ROK. Its website lists and carries messages from four co-chairs: Dr. Kim, Dr. Kim Jung-bae, former president of Korea University and now president of the ROK Academy of Korean Studies, Dr. Park Chan-mu, former head of Pohang University of Science and Technology in the ROK, and Dr. Malcolm Gillis, former president of Rice University in the United States.

PYONGYANG WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL. The World Youth Festivals began in 1947, organized by the International Union of Students and the Federation of Democratic Youth, both communist-run organizations. The 13th Festival, held in Pyongyang from 1–8 July 1989, was the first one to
be held in an Asian country. Some 22,000 participants from 177 countries attended to take part in meetings, rallies, and other events under the slogan “For Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship.” Then DPRK leader President Kim Il Sung gave a welcoming speech, calling on young people to be the vanguard of the times. The delegates were able to make use of some of the buildings that had been erected in the hope that Pyongyang would be able to share the 1988 Summer Olympic Games with Seoul. A highlight of the Youth Festival was the attendance of Lim Soo-kyung, a student from the Republic of Korea, who claimed to represent the National Council of Student Representatives, a dissident student body.

As far as the DPRK authorities were concerned, the occasion was not an unqualified success. It took place against a backdrop of confusion in the communist states and the June 1989 crackdown on dissent in China. Some of the groups tried to raise the issue of human rights in both China and the DPRK. Such activities were stopped, but a series of articles in the Korean Workers’ Party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, on the need for attention to the loyalty of young people, indicated concern. See also APRIL SPRING FRIENDSHIP ARTS FESTIVAL.
RADIO FREE ASIA. Radio Free Asia is a private non-profit-making corporation established in March 1996 under legislation passed by the United States Congress in 1994 and is supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a bipartisan federal agency whose members are appointed by the president. Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C., and it has an office in Seoul in the Republic of Korea. Radio Free Asia broadcasts in nine languages and maintains a website. Its purpose is to provide a substitute for the lack of free media in a number of countries, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It broadcasts in Korean for five hours a day, seven days a week. It is impossible to gauge how effective it is in reaching the DPRK population, but some defectors have reported listening to it. See also CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK; COMMUNICATIONS; MEDIA; OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA; VOICE OF KOREA.

RADIO PYONGYANG. See VOICE OF KOREA.

RAJIN–SONBONG SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE. The twin cities of Rajin and Sonbong lie on the far northeastern coast of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), close to the borders with China and Russia. Rajin’s port was originally developed in the Japanese colonial period and provided an important link between Korea and Japan. In 1991, the area was designated the DPRK’s first special economic zone, following the Chinese model. Foreigners would be allowed to establish joint venture companies and special rules and regulations would apply. These included visa-free visits. There were various conferences and seminars to promote the zone, and according to DPRK sources, it attracted a number of pledges of funds from China, Japan, and elsewhere.

However, the zone ran into difficulties from the start, and few of the pledges of funding were made good. It was remote from both the capital, Pyongyang, and from the industrial heartland of the country. It bordered on regions that were also backward. It lacked a proper infrastructure, with poor transport access. Soon after its establishment, the DPRK began to suffer a severe famine, which further reduced its attractiveness for foreign investors.
Most investment that did come was from China, and it was largely confined to the service sector; gambling featured prominently, which did not please the Chinese authorities. The expected manufacturing plants failed to materialize. It was assumed that the Greater Tumen Initiative would provide investment for the project, but it also failed to materialize. The zone has not been abandoned, and in 2010 it became the special city of Rason, but it has consistently failed to meet expectations. See also FOREIGN TRADE; KAESONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE; SHINUIJU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.

RASON. See RAJIN–SONBONG SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE.

RELIGION. Before 1945, there were strong religious traditions in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Ideas that came from China tended to take root first in the north. Traditionally, Koreans practiced Buddhism and observed the tenets of Confucianism, although there is much debate among scholars as to whether Confucianism can be called a religion. Buddhism, in severe decline at the end of the 19th century, experienced something of a revival in the Japanese colonial period, and there were some 400 temples, with 1,600 monks and several thousand believers in Korea in 1945. From the 18th century onward, if not before, Koreans also embraced Christianity, first in its Roman Catholic form, and from the 1880s, as Protestants. (As in many other Asian countries, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK], a distinction is made between Christians, meaning Protestants, and Catholics.) Pyongyang, the present DPRK capital, was a major center of Protestantism by the early 20th century, and it was the seat of a great Christian revival soon after the Japanese annexation of the country in 1910.

To many Koreans, Christianity was seen as Western and modern—not Japanese—although there were Japanese Christians in the country. Even the family of the future DPRK leader Kim Il Sung had Christian connections; his uncle was a Protestant clergyman and his mother taught Sunday school, although Kim himself later wrote that he found it all rather boring. There were also followers of the native syncretic religion, Chondogyo, or the “doctrine of the heavenly way.” The spread of war in East Asia after 1937 saw the withdrawal or imprisonment of most Western missionaries, and in Korea, the Japanese introduced increasingly severe restrictions on the churches. Data published in the DPRK in 1950 gave the following figures for religious practitioners in 1945, when the DPRK population was about 9,160,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians (Protestant)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Catholics 57,000
Chondogyo 1,500,000

In theory, religion was tolerated in the north after liberation in 1945, and a Christian, Cho Man Sik, was at first selected as the northern leader. But both the Soviet occupation forces and the Korean communists whom they advanced professed atheism and were suspicious of religious organizations as being “counter-revolutionary.” Church land and buildings were appropriated during the land reform campaign of 1946, and many Christians in particular fled to the United States zone south of the 38th parallel. Such movement became difficult after the emergence of separate states in 1948, but resumed during the Korean War (1950–53). During the early period of the war, when the DPRK armed forces occupied much of the Republic of Korea (ROK), they tended to view both native and foreign clergy as likely to be spies. Large numbers were killed or brutally treated. The war also saw massive urban destruction both in the first year’s “war of movement” and in the United Nations Command air war; churches and temples were not exempt. What remained of parish and other religious organizations was destroyed or severely disrupted by the conflict.

After the war, the DPRK made no attempt to reconstruct the destroyed churches. Those that had not been destroyed were appropriated for other uses. Some Buddhist monasteries survived, and others at historic spots underwent reconstruction from the 1960s, but they were treated more as cultural monuments than places for religious activities. There were formal religious bodies dating from 1945 to 1946, but they were widely regarded as empty fronts and there was no encouragement of religious activity. The official religious bodies in the DPRK today claim that religious activity survived in “house churches,” but there is little substantial evidence that this was so. Constitutionally, freedom of religion was guaranteed, as was the right to promote atheism, but the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and the government worked to eradicate religious belief. The small trickle of defectors that escaped from the DPRK between 1953 and the 1990s reported that any overt religious practices would lead to detention and worse.

The 1970s saw a change of approach. The antireligious campaigns were modified, perhaps as Kim Il Sung realized that religion could be useful internationally. Organized religious groups, firmly under party and state control, could help to project a more positive image of the DPRK as it competed for diplomatic relations and international status with the ROK. People claiming to be Buddhists and Christians from the DPRK began attending international meetings and making attempts to join international religious organizations. The World Council of Churches (WCC) rejected one such attempt in 1974 because the DPRK would not supply any solid data on religious practices,
but since the late 1990s, there have been contacts between the WCC and the Protestant churches in the DPRK, with visits by the WCC secretary general in 1999 and 2009. The attempts to gain international recognition continued during the 1980s, with supposed religious leaders giving details to foreign journalists and others of religious practices in the DPRK. Thus a Buddhist leader, identified as Pom Tong, said in an interview with the German newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1982 that there were 300 monks in the DPRK, while a Christian leader said there were 5,000 Christians but no churches. A latter report, from 1993, said that there were 300 Buddhist monks, 60 or so temples, and 100,000 followers—the more usual figure given is 10,000.

The late 1980s saw a renewed emphasis on religion in the DPRK. In June 1988, the formation of an Association of Catholics was announced, and in May 1989, an Association of Religionists; the latter included representatives from the Buddhist League, Chondogyo, the Christian League, and the Association of Catholics. The first head of the association was the former ROK general Choe Duk Sin. It continues to function, with each of the associated bodies taking turns providing the leader. In September 1989, the DPRK claimed there were 10,000 Buddhists, 10,000 Christians, and 5,000 Catholics. No figures were given for Chondogyo.

This period also saw the first churches built since the end of the Korean War. In 1988, the Pongsu (or Bongsu) Protestant Church and the Changchung Catholic Cathedral opened in time for the *Pyongyang World Youth Festival*. Korean attendees were few, and some have argued that the churches were meant primarily for foreign visitors, and that services did not take place when no foreigners attended. One of those who preached in the Pongsu Church was the evangelist Billy Graham, who visited the DPRK in 1992 and 1994. His son, Franklin Graham, also an evangelist, has made a number of visits and has preached there as well. Since there are no Catholic priests, Mass is not celebrated at the Catholic Cathedral except by visiting priests. A Chondogyo church opened in 1990; it shares a building with the *Chondoist Chongu Party*. A second Protestant church opened in 1992 at Chilgol, the suburb of Pyongyang where Kim Il Sung’s mother and family lived. The Chilgol church is on or close to the site of the church that they had attended. The churches do not display the pictures of the leaders that are found in other buildings in the DPRK, and worshipers remove their badges that show either Kim Il Sung or his son and successor Kim Jong Il before attending the services. No prayer books or hymnals appear to be produced in the DPRK; those in use tend be from the ROK or the United States. The congregations are generally elderly. The churches appear not to carry out any other functions of a religious nature apart from the Sunday services.

During the period that the churches began to function, theological colleges for training Buddhist and Protestant clergy were established. About the
same time, Kim Il Sung University established a religious studies’ program, although few of its graduates took up a religious calling. Constitutional changes in 1992 allowed authorized religious gatherings and the construction of buildings for religious use, and it deleted a reference to the freedom of antireligious propaganda. However, the constitution also stipulated that religion “should not be used for purposes of dragging in foreign powers or endangering public security.”

The number of churches in Pyongyang rose to four in 2006, when an Orthodox monastery opened in Pyongyang. Work on this began following Kim Jong Il’s visit to Russia in 2002. Kim assured the Russian embassy that there would be believers, but there appears to be no published figure for the number of Orthodox believers in the DPRK. In 2003, students were sent to Russia to attend an Orthodox seminary. There is also an Orthodox Church Committee. Foreigners who have attended report that very few Koreans attend.

No churches appear to exist outside Pyongyang. Some visitors have been told that in addition to the Pyongyang churches, there are a large number of “house” or “family” churches—500 is the usual figure—but there has been no independent verification of this claim, and defectors seem to be unaware of the existence of such places. Figures for current membership of religious groups are usually given in round numbers as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Group</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians (Protestant)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chondogyo</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There appear to be no Confucian temples in the DPRK, and the official attitude seems to be that Confucianism, a relic of the feudal past, has died out. However, Confucian behavior lingers on in attitudes toward leaders and in reverence for deceased family members. The cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung’s family clearly owes something to the Confucian tradition, and it is also possible to see ordinary people paying respect to ancestors either by visiting graves or by honoring the deceased on occasions such as the autumn harvest festival, Chusok, which is now a recognized holiday.

Defectors claim that those genuinely practicing religion are persecuted in the DPRK, and most say that they have no knowledge of the existence of churches in Pyongyang or anywhere else in the country. Some have claimed that Koreans who attend the services in Pyongyang are actors rather than true believers. Many believers are said to be in camps, where it is claimed that they are subjected to savage conditions and regularly executed. Defectors who have returned from China and who have there been in contact with
Christian missionary organizations, it is claimed, have been particularly harshly treated. See also VATICAN.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK). Informally known as South Korea. Following elections held in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula in May 1948, the Republic of Korea, which controlled that part of the Korean Peninsula where the United States had taken the Japanese surrender in 1945, was formally established on 15 August 1948. Its National Assembly claims to represent all Korea. The United Nations recognized the new republic as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula but did not otherwise define the extent of its jurisdiction. Under its first president, the veteran nationalist campaigner Rhee Syngman, it ran on increasingly authoritarian and anticommunist lines. With UN and especially U.S. assistance, it survived the Korean War, but at huge economic and social cost. Rhee’s overthrow in 1960 was followed by a brief democratic interlude and then a military coup that brought Major General Park Chung-hee to power in 1961.

Park continued his predecessor’s hostility toward communism but also began a program of development that would eventually see the ROK far outstrip the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. In 1971, Park authorized talks with the DPRK, but these fizzled in 1973. Following Park’s assassination in 1979, another brief democratic interlude was followed by another military coup that brought General Chun Du-hwan to power. Under Chun, the ROK increased its economic lead over the DPRK and acquired international prestige through hosting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul. After Chun, the ROK took a more democratic turn. The first civilian president since 1961, Kim Young-sam was elected in 1992 through an alliance with Chun’s successor, another former general, Roh Tae-woo, but in 1997, the election of a longtime dissident, Kim Dae-jung, marked a further step toward democracy. Under Kim and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, a determined effort was made to engage the DPRK. Both presidents visited, as part of the “Sunshine Policy,” but the policy of engagement was effectively reversed following the election of Lee Myung-bak as president in 2007. See also AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NON-AGGRESSION AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH; ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; BLUE HOUSE ATTACK; CHONAN INCIDENT; CHOSON ILBO; CHUNG JU-YUNG; CROSS-RECOGNITION; DEFECTORS/REFUGEES; DEMILITARIZED ZONE; FAMILY REUNIONS; FOUR PARTY TALKS; GENEVA POLITICAL CONFERENCE; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANITARIAN AID; JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD; JOINT DECLARATION OF THE NON-NUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA;
RHEE SYNGMAN (1875–1965). A patriotic leader who became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948 and an implacable anti-communist. Rhee (Yi Sung-man) was born in Hwanghae Province, now in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He received a traditional Confucian education but became a student activist at a mission school in Seoul. He was an advocate of nationalism and cultural reform, joined the Independence Club on its foundation in 1896, and was imprisoned in 1898 for an alleged plot to overthrow the monarchy and establish a republic. Released from prison in 1904, Rhee traveled to the United States to study and became the first Korean to acquire a doctoral degree, a Ph.D. in political science, in 1910 from Princeton University. He returned to Korea, then under Japanese colonial rule, but in 1912, the Japanese forced him to leave. Returning to the United States, he formed a Korean nationalist society, Tongjihoe (Comrades Society). When exiled Korean groups established a government-in-exile in Shanghai in 1919, he was named premier. After revision of the administration, Rhee became president, a post he held until 1931. He campaigned unsuccessfully for official recognition of the Provisional Government as the legitimate government of Korea. He was held in such prestige that the left-wing Korean Democratic Republic elected him as its president in 1945, even though he was still outside the country.

Despite opposition from the U.S. Army Military Government (AMG), Rhee returned to Korea in October 1945, becoming the leader of the right-wing National Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. He was chairman of the Representative Democratic Council, which the AMG established in 1946, and was elected to the Constituent Assembly in May 1948. This assembly elected him first president of the ROK in 1948. He was reelected in 1952, 1956, and 1960, becoming more and more autocratic. During the Korean War, Rhee argued against any compromise with the DPRK or China; he also advocated the use of nuclear weapons. He opposed the Korean Armistice Agreement, which he tried to jeopardize, even though he
eventually agreed to abide by its terms. Following a student uprising in April 1960 brought about by heavy-handed rigging of the 1960 presidential election, Rhee was forced to resign from the presidency on 26 April 1960. He went into exile in Hawaii, where he died.

RI CHOL (1935–). A senior diplomat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), who from 1987 to 2010 was the ambassador to the DPRK United Nations mission in Geneva, and concurrently, from 1988 to 2010, the ambassador to Switzerland. Ri was educated at the Mansudae Revolutionary School and at Kim Il Sung University. He was noted as a bureau director in the foreign ministry in the early 1970s, and became director of the protocol department in 1974. In 1980, he became a deputy director in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Organization and Guidance Department and also held a position in the personnel secretariat. That same year, he was appointed as counselor to the DPRK UN mission in Geneva, becoming head of the post in 1987. The following year, he also became ambassador to Switzerland.

Republic of Korea (ROK) and other media regularly identified him as the person handling the former DPRK leader Kim Jong Il’s personal finances in Switzerland, and he was also believed to have overseen the Swiss education of the latter’s three sons, Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Chol, and Kim Jong Un. He was reported to be the broker behind the deal that brought the Egyptian construction and communications company Orascom to the DPRK. No reason was given for his departure from Switzerland, although there was much speculation that a new generation of DPRK leaders would prefer a new lead person in Geneva, or that tightened Swiss laws on bank accounts made it more difficult for him to operate. See also CELL PHONES; RYUGYONG HOTEL.

RI CHUN HUI (1943–). Ri Chun Hui is the face of television news in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As such, she can frequently be seen on YouTube and similar outlets. She was originally an actress at the Korean Film Studios, but was selected to be a news presenter for the newly established Korean Central Television in about 1971. Since then, she has become the most prominent television news reader and is usually chosen to make special announcements such as the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 or the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. On such occasions, her voice vibrates with emotion. She normally appears in traditional Korean dress, and her “rusty” voice is much admired. In addition to her television appearances, she has also provided commentary for documentary films about both Kim Il Sung and his successor Kim Jong Il. It was Ri who made the official announcement
of Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011, and she appeared in a number of subsequent items about the event. She is a member of the propaganda and agitation departments of the Korean Workers’ Party. See also MEDIA.

RI GUN (?– ). Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) diplomat who, as director general of the North American affairs bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, played a role as deputy to Kim Kye Gwan in the Six Party Talks aimed at the denuclearization of the DPRK from 2003 onward. Little is known of his background, although he speaks English and has the personal rank of ambassador. He has visited the United States on a number of occasions. He has a reputation as a tough and unyielding negotiator. See also NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

RI IN MO (1917–2007). Ri In Mo was a war correspondent who accompanied the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) armed forces during the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. He was captured in January 1952. Because he refused to recant his beliefs, he served a total of 34 years in prison. Although released in 1988, his activities continued to be restricted until he was eventually allowed to return to the DPRK in March 1993, where he was reunited with his wife and daughter. He was well treated in the DPRK and made numerous public appearances. In 1996, he was sent to the United States for medical treatment. He published an account of his life and imprisonment, Memoirs: My Life and Faith, in 1997, in which he depicted himself as a fighter against Japanese colonialism and later the U.S. and ROK oppression. When he died, he was given a revolutionary hero’s funeral, and a statue to him was erected in the DPRK capital Pyongyang in 2008.

RI KWANG GUN (1953– ). According to reports in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2010, in 2011 Ri was a deputy director of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee United Front Department, with oversight for inter-Korean economic affairs, and an executive of the Taepung International Investment Group. He was previously minister of foreign trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 2000 to 2004. His father was one of DPRK leader Kim Il Sung’s personal physicians and director of the Ponghwa Clinic, the special hospital for the DPRK elite in Pyongyang. Ri is a graduate of the German department of the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies and of Kim Il Sung University. From 1977 to 1979, he was attached to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and then to the State External Economic Affairs Commission. In 1987, he was a first secretary for trade matters in the DPRK embassy in East Berlin, but by 1991,
was back with the External Economic Affairs Commission. As minister for foreign trade from December 2000, he tried to capitalize on the developing relations with European countries. As well as German, he has a reasonable command of English.

**RI MYONG SU (1937– ).** A general since October 2000, Ri is director of the administrative department of the National Defense Commission and was reportedly close to Kim Jong Il. First noted as president of the Victorious Revolutionary Museum in 1980, he is said to have been instrumental in arranging Kim Jong Il’s emergence as successor to Kim Il Sung in the 1970s. He became a lieutenant general in 1992 and chief of staff of the Third Army Corps the following year. He was promoted to colonel general in 1995. In November 1996, he became vice chief of staff of the Military General Staff and director general of the Bureau for Strategy of the Military General Staff in April 1997. In 1998, he was a delegate to the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly. From 2003, he was Kim Jong Il’s second most frequent companion after Hyon Chol Hae. He was listed as 74th on Kim Jong Il’s funeral list in December 2011.

**RI RYONG NAM (?)– ).** Ri first appeared as a vice minister of foreign trade in April 2005. Nothing is known of his background or education. From October 2004, he also held the post of vice chairman of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Committee for the Promotion of International Trade. In March 2008, he became minister of foreign trade. He is also a member of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee.

**RI SUNG GI (1905–1996).** Ri was an important scientist. He was born in Tamyang, now in the Republic of Korea, and educated at a local school. In 1931, he took a degree in chemistry at Kyoto University in Japan and received a Ph.D. in chemistry in 1939. While at Kyoto, he began to work on the synthetic fiber vinalon. At the end of World War II, he returned to Seoul and taught for a time at Kyongsong University, which became Seoul National University in 1946. Ri was apparently unhappy with this development, and during the early stages of the Korean War in July 1950, he went to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). There he played a prominent role in the development of vinalon. He was a leading figure in the DPRK’s nuclear program and possibly for other weapons-related programs. Ri was appointed head of the DPRK Atomic Energy Institute in June 1965. He headed the Hamhung branch of the Academy of Sciences from the 1960s until 1986. In 1998, he was commemorated on a DPRK postage stamp as the inventor of vinalon.
RI YONG HO (1942– ) (1). A vice marshal in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) armed forces, who played a prominent role in the ceremonies following the death of DPRK leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011. According to an official biography published in 2010, Ri joined the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 1959 and later attended Kim Il Sung Military University. He held various positions, and by 2002, he was a major general. In 2003, he became commander of the command force that looks after the capital, Pyongyang, a position he held until 2009, when he became KPA chief of staff. At the September 2010 party conference, which saw the emergence of Kim Jong Un as the probable successor to Kim Jong Il, Ri became a member of the presidium of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and a vice chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission. Thereafter, he made frequent appearances with Kim Jong Il. He was listed as number four on Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee in December 2011 and played a major role in the ceremonies marking Kim’s death. He is believed to be a supporter of Kim Jong Un and is likely to play an important role among those guiding the younger Kim as he takes over from his father. See also JANG SONG TAEK; KIM KYONG HUI.

RI YONG HO (1956– ) (2). A senior diplomat and the first Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ambassador to Great Britain. He became a vice minister for foreign affairs in September 2010, succeeding Kim Kye Gwan, and in July 2011, he was named as the DPRK representative to the Six Party Talks on nuclear matters. Ri was born in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, where his father was a cameraman with the Korean Documentary Film Unit. In this role, he came to the attention of Kim Jong Il, who moved him to the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) propaganda and agitation department. Later, the elder Ri became head of Kim’s secretariat, and from 1992 to 1994 he was KWP secretary at the DPRK embassy in Paris, where he was sent in order to receive medical treatment.

Ri attended Namsan High School in Pyongyang, where Kim Jong Il also studied, and then graduated from Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1976 and served in Zimbabwe and Sweden. He returned to the DPRK in 1988 and worked in the MFA’s international organizations’ bureau. From then on, he was closely associated with policy toward the United States, a role that continued when he was promoted to councilor in 1995. The councilor’s office prepares all official MFA statements on international affairs as well as those relating to the Republic of Korea. As MFA councilor, Ri became involved with the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework on the nuclear issue, and, with the title of ambassador at large, accompanied Jo Myong Rok, the vice
chair of the National Defense Commission, on his visit to the United States in 2000. In May 2001, Ri led the DPRK delegation to the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum in Vietnam. He also visited Great Britain to attend a conference. Following the establishment of the DPRK embassy in London, Ri became the first ambassador in 2003. When the DPRK and Ireland established diplomatic relations in 2004, Ri was also accredited to Dublin and to the European Union. He remained in London until 2006, when he returned to the DPRK and resumed a senior role in the MFA. Ri speaks Swedish and English and has an easy way with foreigners. His wife and daughter accompanied him to London. In September 2010, he was appointed a vice foreign minister. He is said to be close to the former senior vice foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator Kang Sok Ju, who became a vice premier in 2010. In December 2011, he was listed as number 182 of 233 on Kim Jong Il’s funeral committee.

RICHARDSON, BILL (1947– ). Bill Richardson is a United States politician who served as a congressman from New Mexico before becoming U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1997 and then energy secretary from 1998 to 2001 under President Bill Clinton. Richardson was born in Pasadena, California, the son of a Spanish-born mother and a Nicaraguan-born father. He grew up in Mexico City but attended boarding school in Massachusetts and then Tufts University. After working on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he was elected as a congressman in 1983. In 2002, he became governor of New Mexico. In 2008, he was a contender for the Democratic Party nomination for president, but dropped out. He then endorsed Barack Obama for president, despite his previous closeness to the Clintons. Obama nominated him for secretary of commerce, but he withdrew.

Richardson is one of a relatively small number of U.S. politicians who has developed a good relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He has made a number of visits, most recently in December 2010. He has also maintained contact with DPRK diplomats at the United Nations. During a visit to the DPRK in December 1994, Richardson secured the repatriation of the body of Chief Warrant Officer David Hileman and the release of Chief Warrant Bobby Hall, whose helicopter had been shot down after crossing the military demarcation line. Two years later, in December 1996, he secured the release of a U.S. citizen, Evan Carl Hunziker, who had been arrested and charged with spying in the DPRK. In April 2007, Richardson again visited the DPRK and was able to negotiate the repatriation of missing in action remains, the first time that the DPRK had handed over remains since the bilateral program was canceled by the United States in 2005.
During his December 2010 visit, which was a private one, at the invitation of then senior DPRK nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Gwan, Richardson was told that the DPRK was willing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to resume work in the DPRK. He also said that he was reassured by the “statesmanlike way” the DPRK had reacted to the Republic of Korea’s live firing exercise near Yonpyong Island. See also CARTER, JAYNE (JIMMY) EARL, JR.

RIM CHUN CHU (1912–1988). At the time of his death in April 1988, Rim Chun Chu was a vice president of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and ranked sixth on the list of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) hierarchy. He was born in North Hamgyong Province. Little is known of his early life, but he fought with Kim II Sung in the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Manchuria during the 1930s, and with Kim, moved to the Soviet Union as Japanese pressure increased around 1940. After his return to Korea in 1945, Rim appeared as chair of the People’s Committee (head of the local government) in Kangwon Province in 1946 and became the Kangwon KWP chair in 1950. After the Korean War, he was ambassador to Albania (1957) and Bulgaria (1958). In 1961, he was a member of the auditing committee of the KWP Central Committee, secretary of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in 1962, and served twice as secretary of the Central People’s Committee. In 1983, the Seventh SPA elected him as one of the DPRK’s then three vice presidents. In 1982, he was made a “Hero of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” on his 70th birthday. He was apparently a strong supporter of Kim Jong Il as Kim II Sung’s successor, and the younger Kim made a condolence call on the family before the funeral.

RIM SU GYONG. See LIM SOO-KYUNG.

RODONG SINMUN. Rodong Sinmun (Workers Daily) is the official newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). It began as a weekly publication called Jungro on 1 November 1945 and became a daily publication under its present name on 1 September 1946. Its editor in chief is also the chair of the Korean Journalists Association. As the party newspaper, its main role is to provide ideological information and interpretation rather than news. It regularly publishes joint editorials with Minju Choson, which represents the government. On New Year’s, the joint editorial also appears in Choson Inmingun, the newspaper for the armed forces. This editorial sets out broad guidelines for the coming year. Rodong Sinmun’s domestic circulation is about 1 million. An Internet version is available at www.rodong.rep.kp/InterEn/. See also MEDIA.
ROH MOO-HYUN (1946–2009). Roh Moo-hyun was president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 2003 to 2008, following on from Kim Dae-jung. Roh came from a poor family, and after military service, he became a lawyer. During the 1980s, he specialized in cases involving dissident students. He was briefly jailed in 1987 for supporting an illegal strike. He entered politics as a member of Kim Young-sam’s Democratic Reunification Party in 1988 and was elected to the ROK National Assembly. He broke with Kim when the latter forged an alliance with the ruling party of President Roh Tae-woo (no relation) and lost his seat in 1992. Eventually Roo Moo-hyun supported Kim Dae-jung in the 1997 presidential election campaign and became minister for maritime affairs and agriculture in 2000. In 2003, he succeeded Kim Dae-jung after an election that was marked by the use of electronic links to drum up support for him. Roh’s presidency was marked by controversy over his competence and judgment, and at one point the opposition made an unsuccessful attempt to impeach him. He continued and intensified Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite opposition both within the ROK and from the United States under President George W. Bush and the issues raised by the DPRK nuclear program. His view was that if the DPRK’s security concerns were met, the nuclear issue would be solved. Following the 2006 DPRK nuclear test, however, he ended many official contacts. He and his wife went to Pyongyang for the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit with then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il. This decision attracted much domestic criticism because it came very close to the 2007 ROK presidential election. Although the chemistry seemed less than that at the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, a joint communiqué contained many proposals that would have benefited the ROK as much as the DPRK. This was to no avail. The presidential election brought to power Lee Myung-bak, who refused to implement any of the proposals and began a process of unraveling the engagement policy. After leaving the presidency, Roh and a number of his family members came under investigation for corruption. While these inquiries were under way, Roh apparently committed suicide in May 2009.

ROH TAE-WOO (1932– ). President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1988 to 1993. Roh graduated from the ROK Military Academy in 1955. He later underwent advanced military training in the United States and in the ROK Military War College. As commander of the Capital Security Command in December 1979, he played a key role in the coup that brought his colleague Chun Du-hwan to power. He became commander of the Defense Security Command in 1980 but left the army the following year to hold a series of ministerial posts during Chun’s presidency. After various political ma-
neuverings, Roh succeeded Chun as president of the ROK. He presided over the 1988 Olympic Games, which most socialist countries attended despite opposition from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This helped him develop his concept of Nordpolitik, announced soon after taking office, which was modeled on the earlier Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt of the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1992, the majority of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China, had established diplomatic relations with the ROK. Roh also wanted better relations with the DPRK. Negotiations began that eventually led to the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and other agreements, but these had not been implemented by the time Roh left office in 1993, and they have remained largely a dead letter. In his last two years in office, he had to cope with growing international concern over the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Roh had concluded an alliance with the veteran opposition leader Kim Young-sam, who succeeded him as president in 1993. The latter was unable to prevent attacks on Roh and Chun for the 1979 coup and eventually agreed to their arrest and trial on charges that included bribery and corruption, to which mutiny and treason were later added. Roh received a heavy fine and 22 years’ imprisonment but was released after a short time. The fine has remained unpaid. See also RUSSIA/SOVET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

RUSSIA/SOVET UNION, RELATIONS WITH. Russian involvement with the Korean Peninsula began in the mid-19th century, when the Russian empire acquired what is now the Maritime Province from China. Toward the end of the century, Koreans began to move into Russian territory at times of unrest or food shortages, and some stayed. The Russians generally welcomed them, since they were peaceable and were good farmers. As the Korean kingdom expanded its international relations after 1876, there was considerable Russian interest in the peninsula and in the activities of the other powers around it. Russia and the Korean kingdom signed a treaty in 1884. Great Britain and Japan feared Russian expansionism in both Japan and Manchuria, a factor leading to the Anglo–Japanese Alliance of 1902. Two years later, Japan and Russia went to war. The latter’s defeat led first to the Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1905 and then to the complete takeover of Korea in 1910. Thereafter, Russian and later Soviet interest in Korea declined. A small Russian community continued to live there, however, and there were Korean Russian Orthodox communities in a number of Korean cities, including Pyongyang, which is now the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
After the Japanese takeover, many Koreans fled to China and Russia, augmenting the existing communities. Some of these launched attacks on the Japanese. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, a number of Koreans studied in Moscow and eventually formed the basis of the Korean Communist Party. There were also communist groups among the Koreans in the Maritime Province who contributed to the revolutionary ferment. Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, was highly suspicious of the Koreans, seeing them as a potential fifth column for the Japanese, and in the late 1930s, large numbers of them were moved at short notice and often under appalling conditions into Central Asia. Strenuous efforts were made to break their links with their Korean past, and although there are still communities of Koreans scattered in what are now the Central Asian republics who try to maintain some semblance of Korean culture, most have lost the language and prefer to stay where they are rather than return to the peninsula.

But while one group of Koreans was being moved in the late 1930s, the Korean community in Siberia was being augmented by new arrivals. These were guerrilla units, including that led by the future leader of the DPRK Kim Il Sung. The Japanese, moving on to a total war footing from 1937 onward, drove these groups out of Manchuria and the north of Korea into the Soviet Union in a series of military sweeps. They were allowed to stay, and some,
again including Kim Il Sung, were incorporated into the Red Army. A few saw action in Europe, but many were confined to garrison duties around cities such as Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.

Although the United States, China, and Great Britain agreed in the 1943 Cairo Agreement that “in due course” Korea would become independent, the Soviet Union did not play any part in wartime considerations of the future of the Korean Peninsula until February 1945, when an agreement was reached at the Yalta Conference that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after Germany’s defeat. Although the July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference paid little attention to Korea, it noted that the terms of the Cairo Agreement would be carried out in the form of a trusteeship for Korea. Longer-term considerations of Korea’s future were postponed; they would eventually be examined at the December 1945 Moscow Conference of foreign ministers. As far as military actions were concerned, it was clear that the Soviet Union, with troops just across the frontier, was in a better position to act than U.S. forces, which were in Okinawa and were expecting a long fight to capture the Japanese mainland. In the meantime, the death of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945 had brought a deterioration in U.S.–USSR relations, and the United States decided it would attempt to send troops to Korea to counterbalance the Soviet presence. This became particularly important as expectations grew that the atomic bomb might lead to the end of the war against Japan sooner than originally expected. The United States therefore proposed that there should be a joint movement of Allied troops into Korea, with the 38th parallel as the division line. Although Soviet forces had crossed into Korea immediately after the declaration of war in 8 August and U.S. forces were not expected to arrive before early September, they stopped at the parallel. There was no intention on either side to make the 38th parallel a permanent division; rather Korea was to be united and, eventually, independent. Neither is there any evidence that the Soviet Union intended to take over Korea. If it had wished to do so, there would have been little to stop it between 8 August and 8 September 1945.

The Korean people were not passively awaiting the arrival of outside forces. The whole peninsula was swept up in political ferment. The Soviet forces, commanded by General Ivan Christiakov, had lived and worked with Koreans in Siberia, and were probably better equipped in terms of Korean speakers than their American counterparts. They worked with the locally established People’s Committees and favored the Korean Communist Party’s northern bureau in establishing an administrative structure. While they were at first willing to work with noncommunists, such as the veteran nationalist and Christian Cho Man Sik, he and others were removed when they opposed trusteeship as endorsed at the December 1945 Moscow Conference. From
then on, it was communists led by the former guerrilla leader and Soviet army officer Kim Il Sung who dominated the northern administration. Also, as the U.S. and Soviet negotiators failed to reach agreement on the implementation of the trustee arrangements, the Soviet administration in the north seemed increasingly to be planning for a separate state similar to those then emerging in Eastern Europe. Opposition was heavily suppressed and Soviet-style organizations and practices were introduced. The foundations were also laid for a powerful armed forces, again modeled on Soviet lines. These moves were completed with the proclamation of the DPRK in September 1948 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces in December. Some military advisors remained with the DPRK armed forces. The departing Soviet forces left behind their weapons and equipment, strengthening the DPRK’s military position.

The decision to go to war in June 1950 to reunify the peninsula seems to have come from the leadership of the DPRK and was not a plan hatched by the Soviet Union, as was once widely believed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the West. It now appears that during Kim Il Sung’s first visit to Moscow in 1949, he tried to persuade Stalin to endorse a DPRK attack on the ROK. Stalin was reluctant, fearing direct conflict with the United States, which at that point still had troops in the ROK. Kim raised the issue again early in 1950. By that time, U.S. forces, apart from a small military advisors’ group, had left, while the communist victory and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 not only seemed to strengthen the international communist movement but also released large numbers of battle-hardened Koreans to swell the DPRK forces. In addition, various U.S. statements seemed to imply that the Korean Peninsula was outside the area that was thought vital to U.S. interests in the Pacific, while there seems to have been a widespread belief within the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) that people in the ROK would welcome “liberation” by the DPRK. On this basis, Stalin apparently agreed that Kim could go ahead, providing Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership also agreed. The Chinese attitude was mixed. The Chinese communists had been fighting either the Japanese or the Chinese Nationalists since the early 1930s. They now wanted a period of rest in order to restore the country and its economy. But at the same time, they resented past U.S. involvement in the civil war and support for the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. Even though the latter had been defeated and had retired to Taiwan, there were voices in the United States calling for continued support for him and his followers. Mao’s attitude seems to have been that if there was to be a clash with the United States, it might as well come sooner rather than later, and that Korea would be as good a place as any for it to take place. Mao therefore also agreed to Kim Il Sung’s proposal.
In June and July 1950, DPRK troops swept all before them. Even though Kim’s projections about both U.S. intervention and an uprising in the ROK proved wrong, there appeared little cause for concern. It also seemed not to matter that the Soviet Union’s absence from the United Nations Security Council in protest over the failure to transfer the China seat to the PRC enabled the U.S. to engage the UN in the conflict. U.S. forces sent to Korea proved unable to stop the DPRK advance, and if there was no popular uprising, the ROK’s territory was limited before long to a small enclave around the southern port city of Pusan. The Chinese were not happy at the U.S. decision to send the Seventh Fleet into the Straits of Taiwan, but the war was going well. When the situation changed in September 1950, as UN forces first pushed the DPRK out of the south and then took the war to the north, Kim Il Sung turned to Stalin for assistance. Stalin declined any direct Soviet involvement, instead urging the Chinese to do so. The Chinese were at first not keen, but eventually, as the UN forces began to come within striking distance of the border, agreed to intervene on condition that the Soviet Union supply tanks and equipment for 10 divisions. Stalin at first accepted this but quickly changed the offer to a loan only. When the Chinese decided to go ahead anyway, Stalin increased the loan and also offered air support.

As a result, both the Chinese forces and the reformed Korean People’s Army were able to fight back. The Soviet Union and its allies provided constant support for the communist cause, denouncing the United States as the aggressor. Soviet pilots flew in aircraft with DPRK markings, and Soviet forces manned antiaircraft units. But they did so to defend China and did not normally operate over Korean territory. Stalin also seems to have been behind the first initiatives for an armistice in 1951, but later encouraged the Chinese and the North Koreans to pursue a tough line in negotiations. Only after his death in March 1953 did a more conciliatory line emerge, leading to the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953.

The Soviet Union, together with its East European allies and China, played a major role in the postwar rehabilitation of the DPRK. Following the Soviet example, Kim Il Sung and his colleagues pursued economic policies that favored heavy industry. In other ways too, the DPRK took much from the Soviet Union, including the cult of personality that was increasingly built up around Kim. Meanwhile, the DPRK looked less to the Soviet Union for leadership as time passed; in Kim’s eyes, successors such as Nikita Khrushchev were not Stalin’s equals and could not make the same claims to head the communist movement. Tensions increased after Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech in which he criticized Stalin’s policies and his cult of personality, criticisms that could also be directed at both Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong. Not only did this cause domestic problems for Kim, with a challenge mounted to his
leadership during the August 1956 Incident, but it also led to a growing divergence between the Soviet Union and China and a possible need for the DPRK to take sides in the dispute.

In the late 1950s, some of Kim’s policies were more akin to those of China, but the DPRK tried to maintain a rough equilibrium in its relations with its neighbors. The DPRK’s economy was tied into the Soviet and Eastern European system, and the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons provided a balance against the United States. Yet the long border with China could not be ignored, and the Chinese assistance during the war was not forgotten. Kim Il Sung began to stress DPRK independence, criticizing those whom he claimed were overly reliant on the Soviet Union in areas such as education and culture. This stance would eventually emerge as *juche*, or the doctrine of nondependence. At the same time, in 1961 the DPRK concluded mutual defense treaties with the Soviet Union and China. But treaties or no treaties, the DPRK did not necessarily inform the Soviet or the Chinese leadership of what it intended to do, even when engaging in confrontations with the United States. This did not stop Kim Il Sung from seeking their support when needed.

The 1960s was not an easy time for the DPRK. China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–76) created tension in that relationship. Kim feared possible similar movements in the DPRK and turned more to the Soviet Union. Another factor was that the latter could supply the equipment and spare parts needed for both military and civilian development, and its nuclear shield was more likely to deter the United States than the Chinese could. But there were worrisome signs that the DPRK might not be able to depend on either of its allies. The Soviet backdown over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis cast doubts on whether it would be willing to defend the DPRK in a crisis. The Soviet unwillingness to be overinvolved in the Vietnam War was another disquieting factor. Such disquiet, however, had to be suppressed since the DPRK remained heavily dependent on Soviet weapons. During the 1980s, as the ROK pulled ahead in economic development, the need for Soviet weaponry increased, and the Soviet Union, faced itself with more aggressive U.S. policies under President Ronald Reagan, was happy to supply advanced aircraft and other equipment. A sign of this closer relationship was Kim Il Sung’s first visit to the Soviet Union in 22 years in 1984.

Deliveries of advanced weaponry, including MiG-29 and SU-25 aircraft, then very much state of the art, continued until the end of the 1980s, and the Soviet Union accounted for well over 40 percent of all DPRK foreign trade. But there were increasing signs that the Soviet Union was prepared to take a more realistic view of the realities on the Korean Peninsula. The 1970s had seen the first tentative Soviet contacts with the ROK, through cultural and sporting links, to which economic links were soon added. There were even a
few political contacts. The Soviet shooting down of a Korean Airlines passenger aircraft in September 1983 proved to be only a temporary setback, and under Mikhail Gorbachev from 1984, there was a great expansion of links. Soviet athletes took part in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, ignoring the DPRK call for a boycott. In 1990, the Soviet Union followed the Eastern European countries and established diplomatic relations with the ROK, again ignoring protests from the DPRK.

Even worse, the Soviet Union effectively ended over 40 years of economic support when it announced that all trade with the DPRK would be conducted in hard currencies in the future. There would be no more weapons or other goods at “friendship prices,” which had usually meant at no cost at all, since the DPRK had often not paid anything. With little in the way of hard currency and with its heavy industries in decline, the DPRK faced a bleak future. When Boris Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev, relations deteriorated further. The Soviet Union broke up, which the DPRK regarded as a dangerous portent. In Seoul in 1992, Yeltsin announced that the military clauses of the 1961 treaty, which had been automatically renewed in 1991, no longer applied, and tortuous negotiations began on a replacement. When this eventually came, in 2002, the old references to mutual assistance in the event of conflict had been removed.

The Russians also expressed concern over the DPRK’s nuclear program, the origins of which lay in Soviet-era scientific and technical cooperation. The Russians also sought repayment of large DPRK foreign debt owed for trade and assistance.

Even under Yeltsin, there were Russians who felt that the tilt away from the DPRK toward the ROK had gone too far. ROK trade and investment proved disappointing. To many in the ROK, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to indicate that they had paid too high a price to conciliate a superpower that had now disappeared, and there was less interest than previously in cultivating Russia. Russia was still a neighbor of the DPRK and the ROK was still an ally of the United States. So a swing back began, especially when Vladimir Putin became Russian president in 1999. The improved relations between the two Koreas, especially after the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, seemed to open the prospect of improved land links between Russia and the DPRK. In July 2000, Putin became the first-ever Soviet or Russian president to visit the DPRK. Putin reported that Kim Jong Il had said that he would end the DPRK missile program, providing another country agreed to launch a DPRK satellite; Kim later said that this had been a joke.

Kim was generally believed to be favorably disposed toward Russia where he had been born and raised; he still used his Russian name, Yuri, among Russians. In July–August 2001, he set out by train for an extended tour of Russia, during which he again met Putin. The declaration that the two leaders
signed was the first known document signed by Kim Jong Il as the DPRK’s paramount leader. For a time, DPRK–Russia relations showed an improvement, with Kim visiting the Russian embassy in Pyongyang from time to time, and there was talk of Russian assistance in economic rehabilitation.

Little came of this. There is no direct Russian economic assistance to the DPRK, Russia having apparently concluded that it could not meet the large sums required for railroad repairs or for other projects. Trade, which had plunged dramatically in the 1990s, remained low, although the debt issue was largely solved in 2007, with Russia abandoning most of its claims. The nuclear crisis that erupted again in 2002 led to Russian participation in the Six Party Talks, but the Russians were as frustrated as the other participants by the DPRK’s approach. That said, the Russians, like the Chinese, preferred to keep the DPRK in play on the nuclear issue rather than isolating or condemning it. A similar approach marked the Russian attitude toward the sinking of the ROK warship Chonan in March 2010. Russia went along with the sanctions’ regime imposed by the United Nations, but with little enthusiasm, wishing neither to antagonize the DPRK nor to encourage the United States to become more involved in the region.

Broadly, relations remain good. Each country maintains a large embassy. The Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS has long had resident staff in the DPRK. DPRK workers operate logging concessions in the Russian Far East, although there have been some questions raised over the conditions in which they work. In another development, the Russian Orthodox Church has returned to Pyongyang, after a break of 60 years. During one of his visits to Russia, Kim Jong Il was intrigued with the Orthodox ritual and architecture and as a result decided that an Orthodox church, complete with clergy and a congregation, should be established in the capital. A group of North Koreans went to Moscow and Vladivostok for training, and the Church of the Holy Trinity opened in August 2006. See also COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; FOREIGN POLICY; RELIGION; SOVIET KOREANS; STALINISM.

**RYO WON GU (1928–2009).** Ryo Won Gu (also Yo Won-gu) was the third daughter of the anti-Japanese campaigner and political activist Yo Un-hyung (1885–1947). Yo Un-hyung was a cofounder of the exiled Korean Provisional Government in 1919 and helped to establish the Korean People’s Republic in 1945. He was assassinated in Seoul in 1947. Before then, Ryo and her older sister Ryo Yon Gu, had moved to Pyongyang, where they both remained for the rest of their lives. She studied in Moscow from 1946 to 1954 and then taught at Kim Chaek University of Technology. In 1981, she became a vice minister of education, but her most prominent roles were as
cochair of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, from 1998, and as a vice chair of the Supreme People’s Assembly, also from 1998. In general, she took over positions that her sister had held before she died in 1996. Ryō thereafter regularly participated in North–South activities, and in August 2002, she was a member of the delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Liberation Day (15 August) celebrations in the Republic of Korea. On that occasion, when she laid a wreath on her father’s grave, she spoke of the support she had received over the years from Kim Il Sung, his first wife, Kim Jong Suk, and their son, Kim Jong Il. She was still active in the months leading up to her death in July 2009.

RYO YON GU (1927–1996). The older sister of Ryo Won Gu, Ryo was born in Shanghai, China, where their father, the anti-Japanese campaigner, Yo Un-hyung (1885–1947), was in exile. She attended Ewha Women’s University in Seoul but quickly dropped out and, like her sister, she moved to Pyongyang in 1946. She remained there for the rest of her life. What she did from 1946 to 1981 is not clear, for it was only in the latter year that she began to make public appearances, mainly in organizations connected with united front work, such as the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, of which she was cochair, or various bodies connected with overseas Koreans. Elected to the seventh Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in 1982, she became a vice chair of the presidium in 1983, a position she held until her death. She was also an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party and a permanent member of the Central Committee of the Korean Women’s Democratic League. In 1991, she headed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea delegation to the Second Conference on Asia’s Peace and Women’s Role, held in Seoul in the Republic of Korea. During this visit, she laid a wreath on her parents’ grave, which she said had been given to her by DPRK leader President Kim Il Sung. She was a member of the funeral committee for Kim Il Sung in 1994 and for O Jin U in 1995. She received the Order of Kim Il Sung award in 1987. She died in September 1996.

RYONGCHON EXPLOSION. Ryongchon is a small town in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) not far from the border with China. It is a railway junction. On 22 April 2004, then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il passed through the town by train while returning from a visit to China. Some hours later, the town was hit by a massive explosion, which killed 160 people, injured some 1,300, and caused extensive damage to property. Among the dead were 63 children and two teachers from the Ryongchon Primary School. The DPRK authorities immediately appealed for assistance.
and allowed representatives of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) based in the DPRK to visit the site. Some resident diplomats and members of other resident international agencies were also subsequently allowed to go there. According to reports from these various organizations, the DPRK Red Cross had moved swiftly to implement an emergency plan, and local hospitals and clinics also functioned effectively, despite suffering some damage in the explosion. The DPRK appealed for international aid, and by September 2004, the IFRC regarded the emergency as over. By 2009, the Republic of Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported that satellite images indicated the town had been reconstructed.

Much international speculation about the cause of the explosion followed, but the official DPRK explanation was that trains carrying ammonium nitrate and fuel oil collided, setting off the blast. This seemed to be confirmed by the WHO/IFRC reports, which noted that some of the injured had been affected by ammonia. However, there were also widespread reports that the explosion was an attempt to assassinate Kim Jong Il, which had been thwarted because he had used a different route. The banning of cell phones a few days after the explosion was taken as evidence of security concerns.

RYUGYONG HOTEL. The Ryugyong Hotel is a vast building in Pyongyang’s Potonggang district. The name means “capital of willows,” a traditional name for the city. Construction began in 1987 on the site of a children’s park. The hotel was planned to be a 105-story, 3,000-room building reaching 330 meters (1,083 feet). This would have made it the tallest hotel in the world. Even at that time, Pyongyang was not a major tourist destination, and since there was plenty of hotel capacity, it was assumed that the construction was designed to outshine a Republic of Korea company that had just completed what was then the world’s tallest hotel in Singapore. The building should have been finished by 1989, in time for the Pyongyang World Youth Festival, but there were apparently problems with the structure, and construction came to a halt in 1992. Although the main framework appeared completed by then, the building had no windows, remained unclad, and had a large crane clearly visible on top.

No further work was done on the building for 16 years. Foreigners were denied access to the site and discouraged from photographing it from close quarters. Since it dominated the skyline, they could not be prevented from taking distant views. Occasionally, official photographs appeared showing the building illuminated at night. This was apparently trick photography, since residents in the city never saw it actually lit up. As the years passed, the building began to be removed from some tourist maps, although its existence continued to be obvious to even the most casual observer.
In April 2008, however, the Orascom group of companies began to use the building as part of their cell phone network. Later, they announced that they would undertake work on the building. By April 2009, much of the structure had received a glass cladding. Orascom indicated that while they would make the building more presentable from the outside, they would not necessarily undertake the massive work of completing the interior. DPRK officials have been reported as saying that the building would be completed in time for the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in 2012.
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SAMIL UNDONG (MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT). One of the few events in modern Korean history that is marked in both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea is the anti-Japanese demonstration of 1 March 1919. In spring 1919, as the Versailles Peace Conference got under way, Korean students in China and Japan issued calls for Korean independence. This, plus the death of the former Emperor Kojong on 21 January, led to an outburst of Korean anti-Japanese sentiment that culminated in the reading of a Declaration of Independence in Pagoda Park in Seoul on 1 March 1919. The declaration, drawn up by various religious leaders, spread throughout the country and led to demonstrations that the Japanese put down with brutal determination. However, 1 March remained a potent symbol of Korean nationalism. In the DPRK, it is claimed that Kim Il Sung’s father, Kim Hyong Jik, took an active part in anti-Japanese demonstrations in Pyongyang on or around 1 March 1919, and that the then six-year-old Kim Il Sung accompanied him. There is no independent evidence for either claim.

SANCTIONS. A former head of the World Food Programme’s operation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has described it as the most sanctioned country in the world. The United Nations first called for sanctions on the DPRK (and on China) in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War. The United States, which placed an embargo on trade and financial dealings with the DPRK, based originally on those imposed on the Soviet Union in 1948, has maintained the most comprehensive sanctions regime, but other countries also imposed them, and some have remained in place ever since. The justification for the continued imposition of U.S. sanctions has varied somewhat over the years. Originally aimed at trying to stop the Korean War, they were later continued because of DPRK support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and illegal monetary transactions. The United States added more sanctions in 1979 in order to try to limit arms supplies to the DPRK. There was some easing of U.S. sanctions in the period 1988–2000 in an attempt to solve the nuclear issue. However, the second nuclear crisis that began in 2002 and the DPRK missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 led to renewed sanctions. These were mainly aimed at nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and at the acquisition by the DPRK of up-to-date weapons, computer equipment, and other high-tech products, but also included the prohibition of the export of luxury goods to the DPRK. This was an attempt to bring direct pressure on the leadership who, it was argued, would be personally affected by such measures. In addition, the U.S. Treasury imposed certain monetary sanctions in 2005, directed at alleged DPRK money laundering and counterfeiting of U.S. dollar bills, while Japan also imposed separate sanctions over the abduction issue. The Republic of Korea (ROK) imposed sanctions in 2010, following the sinking of the corvette Chonan.

There is much discussion about the effectiveness of sanctions on the DPRK. The DPRK blames some of its current economic difficulties on their existence, but the evidence is mixed. Until the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the DPRK tended to conduct most of its foreign trade, which was never very extensive, within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) system rather than with the countries that imposed sanctions. The United States agreed in the late 1950s that its allies could trade with both China and the DPRK, so that while the United States maintained a very strong sanctions regime against the DPRK until the 1990s, other countries did not. After the end of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea in 1973, countries such as Sweden engaged in more extensive trade with the DPRK, including items that could be regarded as of strategic use such as motor vehicles, but even then, the bulk of its trade was still with COMECON and China. The DPRK also made use of the Korean community in Japan to acquire technologically advanced goods and seemed to have little difficulty in doing so until after 2000. The U.S. Treasury sanctions imposed in 2005 were withdrawn in 2007 in the hope of getting the DPRK back to the negotiating table on nuclear weapons following the October 2006 nuclear test.

The sanctions then imposed, and the additional ones that came in 2009 after the second test, seemed at first to have a better chance of success since even Russia and China voted for them. In practice, however, the Chinese authorities were not as firm in imposing sanctions as other countries, and the DPRK seemed to have little difficulty getting what it wanted. Visitors in 2009 and 2010 reported, for example, that information technology in use in universities and other factories, which had tended to lag well behind Japan, the ROK, and other East Asian countries, was now very much up to date. The DPRK did not appear to have difficulty obtaining the equipment it needed for the enriched uranium program revealed to visiting Americans in 2010. Neither is there any evidence that the attempts to prohibit luxury goods from entering the country have been successful; again, such goods appear to come in
via China without much difficulty. In any case, there are stronger reasons for
the loyalty of senior figures than the occasional bottle of brandy or a fast car.

One area where sanctions have been effective is in keeping the DPRK out
of the international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. This has meant
that the DPRK is denied funds for development. Although the DPRK has
from time to time complained about its exclusion, it is known that its officials
have had some discussion with World Bank officials over the years, and that
the bank was willing to explore ways of helping it. The DPRK was, however,
reluctant, or unable, to meet the levels of transparency about its economic
development that would be required before any assistance could be offered.
See also CELL PHONES; PAKISTAN.

SEOUL. Now the capital of the Republic of Korea, Seoul had been the
capital city of united Korea from 1392 to 1910 and remained the capital during
the Japanese colonial period. The division of the peninsula between the
United States and the Soviet Union in 1945 left Seoul in the U.S. zone of
occupation, while the Soviet Union established its government in the northern
provincial city of Pyongyang. When the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) emerged in 1948, it continued to refer to Seoul as the national
capital, with Pyongyang as the “temporary capital.” The DPRK occupation
of Seoul during the Korean War was short lived and effectively the admin-
istration remained in Pyongyang. Only with the new Constitution of 1972
was Pyongyang listed as the capital of the nation. Now on DPRK maps and
atlases, it is Seoul that is shown as a provincial city.

70-DAY BATTLE. Faced with economic difficulties arising from the 1973
international oil crisis, in October 1974 the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)
began a campaign in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
to increase the production of goods for export. The campaign was supposedly
the brainchild of Kim Jong Il, son of Kim Il Sung, then working in the KWP
as part of his grooming as the successor to his father. In his selected works,
published much later, he was credited with authoring a paper titled “Let’s
Do 70-Day Battle by Mobilizing the Whole Party.” The speed campaign was
deemed to be successful, and Kim Il Sung praised it indirectly in his 1975
New Year’s Address. However, the former senior DPRK official Hwang
Jang Yop, who defected to the Republic of Korea in 1997, claimed after
his defection that the campaign had been a waste of resources and achieved
very little. See also 100-DAY BATTLE; 150-DAY BATTLE; 200-DAY
BATTLE; THREE REVOLUTIONS TEAM MOVEMENT.
SHINUIJU. Shinuiju (New Ui; also romanized as Sinuiju), the capital of North Pyongan Province, is an important city in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Yalu River. Developed as an industrial center during the Japanese colonial period (1910–45), it lies some 10 kilometers (7 miles) from the original city of Uiju. The 2008 census gave a population figure of about 360,000. It is the main road and rail crossing point between the DPRK and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and is one of the three official entry points for foreign visitors. The city lies opposite the PRC city of Dandong, to which it is connected by the China–Korea Friendship Bridge. In November 1945, it was the scene of student demonstrations against the Soviet forces that had moved into northern Korea to take the Japanese surrender.

Shinuiju was heavily bombed during the Korean War (1950–53) as the area was an important mustering and supply point for the Chinese People’s Volunteers and close to Chinese airfields. Its industries, which included paper making and textile production, were revived after the war but have suffered severely from the economic decline that has hit the country since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, there are important industrial complexes in and around the city, including the Rakwon Machinery Complex and the Shinuiju Chemical Fiber Complex. The latter is said to be linked to the DPRK’s chemical and biological warfare capacity. DPRK leader Kim Jong II, who died in December 2011, is said to have had a villa near the city. He used to visit the city frequently and provided “on the spot guidance” to the local industries on numerous occasions. As well as schools, it is also the site of the Shinuiju Light Industry College, which is a national-level institution, the Shinuiju University of Medicine, and the Shinuiju University of Education. In 2002, the Korean Workers’ Party designated it as the site of the planned Shinuiju Special Administrative Region, but this failed to take off after its designated head, the Sino–Dutch businessman Yang Bin, was detained and charged with tax evasion in China.

SHINUIJU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION. In September 2002, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) announced that a “special administrative region” would be established to encourage economic development at Shinuiju on the Yalu River, opposite the People’s Republic of China (PRC) city of Dandong. The zone would have its own basic law, an administrator who need not be a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) citizen, a 15-member council, foreign judges, and its own flag. It would be a visa-free area, coming directly under the central government. In order to allow it to become established, the central government would draw no tax revenue from it for 50 years. In the weeks that
followed, other details of the proposed zone were leaked. It would incorporate parts of Shinuiju city and surrounding areas. All existing residents in the designated area would be removed and replace by ideologically sound people from other parts of the country.

This was not the DPRK’s first experiment with special economic areas. The Rajin–Sonbong Economic Special Zone was established in the far northeast of the country in December 1991. It was apparently modeled on the PRC’s “special economic zone” at Shenzhen near Guangzhou, but it failed to prosper. The Shinuiju zone was different in that the arrangements proposed were far more like the Chinese “special administrative regions” of Hong Kong and Macau than Shenzhen. However, there seemed to be no appreciation that the arrangements for Hong Kong and Macau arose from historical circumstances and foreign occupation that were wholly absent at Shinuiju. Neither was there any indication that the PRC authorities had been consulted in advance of the announcement. Yet without PRC cooperation over issues such as visa-free entry, it would be difficult for the special region to function.

Shortly after the initial announcement, Yang Bin, a Dutch citizen of Chinese origin, was named as the first administrator for the new zone. Yang had extensive business interests in China and had undergone one inconclusive investigation there for tax evasion. More recently, he had begun to develop tulip fields in the DPRK. Before he could take up his appointment, however, he was arrested while visiting Shenyang in the PRC—he still held Chinese as well as Dutch citizenship—on tax evasion and other charges. In 2003, he was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment and given a large fine. Despite Yang’s arrest, the DPRK authorities maintained that the region would continue under a new administrator. Various names were mentioned, but no appointment made. In 2004, it was announced that responsibility for the region would pass to the Commission for Foreign Economic Co-operation, but again, nothing happened. In 2012, a new scheme was announced, based on islands in the Yalu River. See also KAESONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE.

SHTYKOV, TERENTII FOMICH (1907–1964). Political advisor and first ambassador of the Soviet Union to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Shtykov was born in Vitebsk Province in Russia in 1907. He was active in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) as a member of the communist youth movement and later as a Communist Party official, surviving the purges of the late 1930s. During World War II, he was a political commissar with the Soviet Red Army, based in the Maritime Province adjoining China and Korea, and was one of only three commissars to reach the rank of colonel general. Kim Il Sung, the future DPRK leader, served in his command during the war. In August 1945, after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan,
his unit, the 28th Military Corps, was ordered to move into Korea. After the establishment of the North Korea provisional People’s Committee, Shtykov became political advisor to the new administration, working closely with Kim Il Sung. He also headed the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission on Trusteeship established at the December 1945 Moscow Conference. He proved to be a tough negotiator.

Following the establishment of the DPRK in September 1948, Shtykov became the Soviet ambassador, while continuing to retain control over all Soviet advisors. Documents from the former Soviet archives have revealed how important he was in this role, and he played an important part in the lead-in to the Korean War. During the early part of the war, he continued to advise Kim Il Sung and also acted as the main channel between Kim and Soviet leader Josef Stalin. However, he was apparently criticized for the disastrous turn of events in September–October 1950, following the United Nations’ forces move across the 38th parallel. Recalled to Moscow, he was demoted to lieutenant general and assigned to work in the provinces. He later served as ambassador to Hungary and then as an official in the Russian Soviet Federal Republic. He died on 25 October 1964.

**SIBERIAN LOGGING.** Under an agreement originally concluded in March 1967 between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the former Soviet Union, the DPRK established logging camps in the Chita, Amur, and Chegdomyn regions of Siberia. Lumberjacks from the DPRK lived in these camps and engaged in logging, with profits being shared on a 30- to 70-percent basis between the two countries. Even though the camps were situated away from population centers, they were still well guarded by DPRK officials, and the workers, who were rotated approximately every three years, were effectively under DPRK control. Conditions in the camp were hard but probably no harder than in similar working conditions in the DPRK itself, and the workers enjoyed better wages. There may have been occasional attempts at defection but they were few and far between, especially as those caught were handed back to the DPRK officials running the camps.

The position began to change in the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union. New freedoms led to Russian journalists becoming concerned about the camps and the human rights of the loggers. The economic changes in Russia also brought in private businessmen who demanded greater returns.

Conditions in the camps clearly deteriorated, with shortages of food and more demands being placed on the workers, many of whom found that they were being cheated out of their wages when they came to the end of their time abroad. As a result, defectors became more common and sometimes found sympathetic support among Russians, enabling them to leave the country. Some of these reached the Republic of Korea (ROK)—24 in 1994, for ex-
ample—where they were at first welcomed and their stories were given wider publicity. The Russian government had become concerned about the negative image created by the camps, at a time when it was seeking assistance from the ROK, so when the existing agreement expired at the end of 1993, it negotiated new terms. These came into force in February 1995. In theory, the camps were no longer treated as extraterritorial. They were to be open to Russian inspection, and the workers were to have the same rights as Russian workers.

In reality, little seems to have improved, and local Russian officials work with Russian businessmen and DPRK officials, who make profits from the enterprises, to maintain firm control over the camps. Logging is valuable, and this has attracted criminal groups as well. Defections continue, but the welcome from the ROK is much less enthusiastic than in the past. International media reports occasionally highlight the plight of the workers, without much effect. *See also* ECONOMY; FOREIGN TRADE.

**SIX PARTY TALKS.** A series of talks held in Beijing, China, from 2003–8, to try to solve the issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear program. After the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework at the end of 2002, the United States, under President George W. Bush, refused to take part in bilateral negotiations with the DPRK. Continuing concern over the possibility that the DPRK decision to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that it was engaged in a nuclear weapons program led the Chinese government to propose that the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, Russia, Japan, and China should meet together to discuss the issue. In reality, what mattered was not the plenary sessions, which were somewhat formalistic, but the opportunity the talks gave for the United States and the DPRK to talk directly to each other. The talks began in August 2003. There were periodic interruptions, but an agreement seemed to be reached in September 2005, under which the DPRK would abandon its weapons and other nuclear programs and return to the NPT. However, the agreement stalled when the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on the DPRK for alleged money laundering and other offenses. The talks broke off and did not resume until after the 2006 DPRK nuclear test. A second agreement, in 2007, which reaffirmed the 2005 terms, had not been implemented by December 2008, when the talks broke down over the extent of verification of the DPRK’s program. They have not been renewed. At a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations’ Regional Forum held in Bali, Indonesia, in July 2011, the chief nuclear negotiators from the DPRK and the ROK met and expressed the hope that the talks would restart before too long. *See also* BOSWORTH, STEPHEN WARREN; HILL, CHRISTOPHER; FOUR PARTY TALKS; RI YONG HO (2).
SIXTEEN NATIONS DECLARATION ON KOREA. On 27 July 1953, following the signing of the Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War (1950–53), the 16 nations with forces attached to the United Nations Command issued a Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice, pledging that they would again unite to resist any renewed communist aggression. At the Geneva Conference in July 1954, these 16 nations declared that further consideration and examination of the Korean question should be transferred to the United Nations. Since then, there have been no further declarations by this group. In 1968, the Republic of Korea appealed to the 16 nations to act following the DPRK commando attack on the Blue House, but there was no response.

SON U YONG (1946–2009). Son was born in Pyongyang in 1946. He attended the Pyongyang Fine Arts University and then worked for 40 years as a member of the Mansudae Art Studio, specializing in ink drawings, although he also worked in other genres. His work appeared in exhibitions in several countries, including China, Japan, and Great Britain. Son was also popular in the Republic of Korea, appearing in the 2002 inter-Korean art exhibition in Seoul, and he was one of four artists from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who featured in a Buddhist-organized exhibition in April 2009, shortly before his death in August 2009. He won a prize at the Eighth Beijing International Art Exhibition in 2005 and was a recipient of the Kim Il Sung Prize as well as being named a People’s Artist.

SONGUN (“ARMY FIRST” POLICY). On 25 August 2009, a meeting was held in Pyongyang to mark the 49th anniversary of the introduction of the Songun, or “Army First” policy. According to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) media reports, also carried by the Chinese Xinhua News Agency, the anniversary commemorated a visit that the 18-year-old Kim Jong Il made on 25 August 1960 to an armed forces tank unit. Other DPRK accounts claim that the idea dates from the 1930s and the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement under Kim Il Sung and was further refined by Kim Jong Il before 1960 (when he was 18). In reality, references to the “Army First” policy, now always referred to in the DPRK foreign language media by the Korean term, emerged only after the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and was originally dated to a visit that Kim Jong Il made to an army unit on 1 January 1995.

Under the policy, all problems—social, economic, and political—can be solved by giving priority to military affairs, and it is described as a powerful weapon against aggression. The concept fits well with the strong militaristic tendencies that have marked the DPRK since its foundation. However,
placing the role of the military above that of the Korean Workers’ Party, it further removes DPRK practices and doctrines from those of orthodox Marxist–Leninist parties.

SOUTH KOREA. See REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

SOVIET KOREANS. During the later years of the 19th and the early years of the 20th centuries, large numbers of Koreans moved into Russia and China. Most left for economic reasons, although some fled from Japanese oppression after 1905. They settled in the Russian (later Soviet) Far East. In the 1930s, Josef Stalin, fearing that the Koreans might act as agents for the Japanese, ordered their removal, often at very short notice and with no preparation, to Central Asia, where they were expected to farm. Korean communities still exist today in former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While generally they have lost their language, they have maintained some Korean traditions.

Not all Koreans were moved from the Far East, and in 1945, some of those who had served in the military were recruited to help with the Soviet occupation of the northern part of Korea after the end of the war against Japan, on the assumption that they would understand Korean ways. Among the most prominent were Ho Kai I and Nam Il. In the past, it was believed that these Soviet Koreans had played a major role in the Soviet interim government in the north and in the early years of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. This partly reflected Cold War beliefs about Soviet intentions. However, it is now generally believed that the Soviet Koreans, who were few in number and often unfamiliar with local conditions, played a much less important role than native Koreans such as Kim Il Sung. Kim was suspicious of all except those who had fought with him in Korea and Manchuria, and by 1953, the Soviet Koreans, for the most part, had been excluded from power, although there were a few exceptions. The most prominent of these was Nam Il, who remained an important figure until his death in 1976. See also YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS REGION.

SOVIET UNION. See RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

SPORTS AND GAMES. Officially, sport is available for all in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and it is claimed that there is a sports club in every town and county throughout the country. However, such clubs, even by the official definition, are designed more to train top athletes than to provide popular recreation, and sports facilities are in the main heavily concentrated in the capital, Pyongyang. Toward the end of 2010, the
authorities announced that a number of sports universities would be established throughout the country, but no precise details have emerged. Again, this points to the training of an elite rather than the provision of ordinary sports facilities.

Probably the most popular sport in the DPRK is soccer, which is played by teams drawn from the provinces or institutions. There are numerous stadia used for games throughout the country, but again, the capital has the most. North Koreans take an interest in international soccer competitions, including the World Cup, in which DPRK teams compete from time to time, and some at least are aware of the exploits of teams such as Great Britain’s Manchester United. They are particularly proud that the DPRK reached the World Cup quarter finals in 1966, having defeated Italy, then one of the highest paid teams in the world. The 2002 World Cup, with finals in Seoul in the Republic of Korea (ROK), caused great excitement and received coverage in the media, although the DPRK did not take part. In 2009, the DPRK team qualified for the 2010 World Cup by defeating Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. Women’s soccer is also popular and in some ways more successful internationally; the DPRK team won the 2006 World Cup competition, but lost to the United States in 2008. During the 2011 World Cup in Germany, two members of the DPRK team tested positive for drugs. The players in both men’s and women’s teams are not formally professionals, but defectors report that good players are singled out and are likely to spend all their time playing the game, whatever their theoretical occupation. Many come from the armed forces, who are also prominent in other sports. Violence is not unknown either on the field or among spectators. Outside the professional game, soccer can be seen being played on any piece of open ground.

The martial art, taekwondo, which is also popular in the Republic of Korea (ROK), is particularly associated with the armed forces, and military units receive training in this and other martial arts. There are also student groups. A taekwondo team toured the United States in 2007. Gymnastics, especially in the form of the Mass Games, also enjoys great popularity; again those who show talent receive special training. The most widespread popular game, even rivaling soccer, is table tennis, played on permanent concrete tables by both young and old. DPRK teams also compete internationally, including at the Olympic Games, and have enjoyed some success. Basketball, volleyball, and boxing teams are to be found at some universities and probably schools. Children can be seen swimming in rivers, and some swimming is done at seaside resorts, but outside Pyongyang, which has an unheated Olympic-class pool, there appear to be few dedicated facilities. In the winter, ice skating is popular on frozen rivers and lakes; Pyongyang has an indoor skating rink, where local and international skating and ice hockey teams compete. Young
men in particular like pistol and rifle shooting, hardly surprising in a country where the military features so prominently.

Tennis is hardly known, although some among the elite play; Kim Jong Il, leader from 1994 to 2011, was reputed to enjoy the game in his earlier years. There are golf courses in and near Pyongyang, where there is also a driving range, and at Wonsan on the east coast. These are primarily aimed at foreigners, especially from Japan, although other resident foreigners and diplomats have been known to play. The first one was built in 1987 by Koreans from Japan, to mark President Kim Il Sung’s 75th birthday, and has been the scene of occasional “international tournaments” organized by Roger Barrett, a British businessman based in China, with commercial interests in the DPRK. According to Fujimoto Kenji, Kim Jong Il liked to play on this course. Western reports that the DPRK claims that he scored five holes in one in his first game appear to be an invention. The ability of most people in the DPRK to play games has been affected since the mid-1990s by the widespread food shortages and probably by a general shortage of equipment, except of the simplest kind, outside Pyongyang.

STALIN, JOSEF (1879–1953). Josef Stalin, who led the Soviet Union from the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924 until his own death, was born in Gori in the Caucasus in December 1879. He attended a theological college in Tbilisi, where he began to study Marxism, which led to his expulsion. There followed periods of prison and exile, but at the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he emerged as a leading figure among the Bolsheviks. He worked closely with Lenin, who, however, seems to have had some misgivings about him, and became secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party in 1922, a position he held until his death. In 1941, he also became premier.

By the late 1930s, he had purged most of his rivals. He was also very suspicious of the Korean minority in the Soviet Far East, believing that they might be pro-Japanese. Some were purged and most of the remainder were moved into Central Asia. When Germany attacked in 1941, Stalin, after a shaky start, became a powerful leader, ranked with the United States President Franklin Roosevelt and Great Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Stalin did not attend the 1943 Cairo Conference, which set out the Allied approach to a postwar settlement for Korea, but Roosevelt persuaded him to accept the arrangements proposed at the Tehran Conference, also in 1943. Having accepted a joint U.S.–Soviet occupation of Korea to effect the Japanese surrender, Stalin went along with the U.S. proposal that the 38th parallel should form the dividing line. When the December 1945 Moscow Conference agreed that there should be a trusteeship in Korea, Stalin at first showed a disposition to work with the United States. However, the onset of
the Cold War and growing mutual suspicions between the two great powers effectively ended their cooperation, and each side allowed the development of separate states to take place on the peninsula.

After the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948, Stalin withdrew Soviet military forces. Military assistance continued, however, and Soviet military advisors helped organize and train the DPRK armed forces. Stalin was much honored in the DPRK. A special term for leader, suryong, was reserved for him, and the main square in Pyongyang was named after him. (After Stalin’s death, suryong began to be used for Kim Il Sung and Stalin Square became Kim Il Sung Square.) In the early years, much of the apparatus of the party and state, as well as patterns of economic development, were based on the Soviet model.

Kim Il Sung visited Moscow in late 1949, apparently seeking Stalin’s approval for an invasion of the Republic of Korea, which was established in September 1948. Although a united communist Korea would help to neutralize any threat from Japan, now firmly under U.S. control, Stalin remained cautious, fearing that a conflict in Korea might involve direct Soviet confrontation with the United States. It was not until March–April 1950 that he gave his final approval to the invasion, after Mao Zedong, the leader of the newly established People’s Republic of China, had also accepted the plan.

Officially the Soviet Union played no part in the Korean War, but it is clear from documents published since 1991 that Stalin was closely involved. Soviet advisors worked with the DPRK military, although they were kept back from frontline engagements. Military equipment and ammunition reached both the Korean and the Chinese forces, while Soviet pilots, dressed in DPRK uniforms and enjoined not to speak Russian in the air, flew combat missions against United Nations forces. Much of the Soviet aid was in the form of loans rather than outright assistance. Although Stalin favored the truce talks that began in 1951, he encouraged the DPRK/Chinese side to take a tough line, and it was only after his death, in March 1953, that the Armistice Agreement was concluded. See also SHTYKOV, TERENTII FOMICH; SOVIET KOREANS; STALINISM; ZHOU ENLAI.

**STALINISM.** Term used to describe the policies associated with Josef Stalin (1879–1953), who ruled the Soviet Union from 1924 until his death. The term is associated with the most hard-line, centralist, and undemocratic form of communism. It is now regularly applied by commentators and academics to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), whose leaders are seen as pursuing the same heavy-handed methods as Stalin, with no tolerance of debate or dissent. Many also see echoes of Stalin’s policies in the DPRK’s economic and social policies, especially as pursued under Kim Il Sung.
However, in practice, the term, which is often combined with a reference to the “Hermit Kingdom,” has become somewhat hackneyed, with little real meaning, especially as the DPRK, under Kim’s successor, his son, Kim Jong Il, moved steadily away from orthodox Marxism–Leninism.

STATISTICS. A major problem in assessing economic and social developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a lack of reliable statistics. Statistics were published on a more or less regular basis in the early years, but stopped at the beginning of the 1960s. Thereafter, the DPRK tended only to refer to percentage increases in production year on year, but not to provide hard figures. Until the early 1990s, this was not because there was no effort made to gather statistics, but it apparently reflected the government’s determination to keep as much information as possible about the country away from the eyes of outsiders, whether friendly or not. During the economic difficulties and famine of the 1990s, however, there may have been a breakdown in the supply of statistics to the central government. The situation has probably improved somewhat since about 1998, but the DPRK still does not publish even the most basic statistical information. The picture is not entirely black. Foreign trade figures can be derived from trade partners’ statistics, and the presence of United Nations and nongovernmental organizations since the 1990s has produced some information on population and health figures, as well as details in such areas as agricultural production. Requests for specific amounts of fertilizer, for example, allow observers to estimate the amount of land under cultivation. Nevertheless, many areas remain hidden, especially where the armed forces are concerned. The reluctance to provide open and reliable statistics is one of problems that the DPRK would have to tackle if it ever wanted to join international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.

SUNAN AIRPORT. Sunan International Airport is the main airport for the whole of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It is situated near the capital, Pyongyang. It had a minor role in the Korean War; the city’s main airfield at that time was in the eastern part, across the Taedong River, as it had been in the Japanese colonial period. The airport, which is also the headquarters of Air Koryo, the national airline, continues to have a military role, and military aircraft are frequently parked there. The air force academy is nearby, and the area is well protected by antiaircraft installations. See also ARMED FORCES; TRANSPORTATION.

SUNGRI MOTORS. This is the oldest manufacturer of automobiles and trucks in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), dating from
1950. The plant is situated in Tokchon City in South Pyongan Province. It was originally known as the Tokchon Motor Company, but it took its present name, which means “victory,” in 1975. The company produced its first truck, the Sungri-58, in 1958. The Sungri-58 was based on the Soviet Union’s Gaz-51 truck, and most of the company’s products are either copies of Soviet or Chinese vehicles or assembled from knock-down kits. Its vehicles are generally for civilian use; the DPRK armed forces appear to have their own facilities or use imported vehicles. The DPRK senior leadership also uses imported German or Japanese automobiles. The company claimed to be producing 20,000 vehicles per year in the early 1980s, but the real rate was probably between 6,000 and 7,000, and the rate plunged during the economic difficulties of the 1990s. Production may have improved since then, but the company now faces competition for passenger vehicles from the joint venture Pyonghwa Motors at Nampo. DPRK leader Kim Jong Il visited the Sungri Motor Works in March 2009. See also INDUSTRY; TRANSPORT.

“SUNSHINE POLICY.” Also known as the “Engagement Policy.” When Kim Dae-jung became president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1998, he announced that his government would follow a new approach, dubbed the “Sunshine Policy,” toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The term comes from one of Aesop’s fables, “The North Wind and the Sun,” in which the wind and the sun contend in trying to persuade a traveler to take off his overcoat. The wind blows as hard as possible, without success, but the sun succeeds by shining steadily.

In essence, the policy was one of engagement with, and assistance to, the DPRK, with certain clear rules laid down if it behaved in a hostile fashion toward the ROK. The idea of engagement was not new, dating back to President Park Chung-hee in 1971–72 and advocated by all his successors. However, unlike his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung stuck to it even when there were difficulties. The policy appeared to have worked when Kim and then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il met in Pyongyang at the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. But from the start, critics claimed that the ROK was giving away too much for little return, and that there was no sign of the expected reciprocity. There was particular adverse comment about Kim Jong Il’s refusal to make his promised return journey to the ROK. Such criticism increased toward the end of Kim Dae-jung’s term in office as it began to emerge that the 2000 summit had been brought about by payments to the DPRK. However, Kim Dae-jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to solve the Korean problem, and his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, continued the policy, albeit with a somewhat different title. Roh also visited Pyongyang, for the October 2007 Inter-Korean Summit, despite Kim Jong Il’s continued failure to visit Seoul, and signed a number of agreements.
Roh’s successor, Lee Myung-bak, effectively ended the policy in 2008, although he has always maintained that he wanted better relations with the DPRK. See also CHUN DU-HWAN; KIM YOUNG-SAM; ROH TAE-WOO.

SUPREME PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY (SPA). The Supreme People’s Assembly is the legislative body (parliament) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It first met on 8 September 1948 to adopt the DPRK’s first constitution. It is unicameral. Since the introduction of the 1972 Constitution, the SPA has had 687 members, who are nominally elected by all adults over 17. In reality, the delegates are drawn from a list approved by the Korean Workers’ Party. The last SPA elections were held in March 2009. The full SPA meets for only a few days each year. In between these full sessions, its work is carried out by a Presidium, whose chair also acts as formal head of state. The SPA elects the premier and the cabinet, but its most important role is the election of the National Defense Commission, which is designated as the “highest executive body” of the state. The SPA is a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and it hosted the 85th annual meeting of the IPU in Pyongyang in 1991. Some 830 delegates attended, from 86 countries and 10 international organizations. A 25-member delegation from
the Republic of Korea was among the delegates, the first such visit since the division of the peninsula in 1945.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES. A private university, founded by the Methodist Episcopalian Church in New York State in 1832, Syracuse is now a nonsectarian university with a strong interest in science. Beginning in 2001, it has, uniquely among United States universities, established a link with Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This was brokered between Syracuse, the DPRK mission to the United Nations, and the New York–based Korea Society. The main area of cooperation has been information technology and has included the creation of the DPRK’s first digital library at Kim Chaek University, which opened in October 2007, training seminars, usually held in Beijing, China, encouragement of DPRK student teams’ participation in international scientific competitions, and frequent exchange of delegations. Although the venture remains strictly private, both the DPRK and the U.S. governments have provided encouragement for the exchanges, even when relations were otherwise strained over nuclear and other issues. The initiative was carried further forward in December 2009 when a delegation from the American Association for the Advancement of Science visited the DPRK.
TAEAN FRIENDSHIP GLASS FACTORY. In 2004, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began construction of a modern glass factory at the port city of Nampo. The factory was formally opened on 9 October 2005, in the presence of then Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Il and visiting PRC Vice Premier Wu Yi. Later that month, PRC President Hu Jintao, also accompanied by Kim Jong Il, visited the factory. Production of various types of glass began in 2006. According to a paper published by a Chinese scholar, the initial civilian workforce proved incapable of managing the state-of-the-art machinery and the computer-controlled equipment. The DPRK armed forces then successfully took over operation of the project. Both the PRC and the media make frequent references to the project as an example of the close relations between the two countries. See also ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INDUSTRY.

TAEDONG RIVER BEER FACTORY. This is one of the consumer-related industries that appeared to indicate a new approach to economic matters around 2000 in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). According to DPRK media reports, Kim Jong Il decided that there was a need for more beer to meet consumer demand, although there was already an established brewery producing lager beers and a number of microbreweries operating in the capital city of Pyongyang. The result was the purchase of a disused brewery that had formerly been used by Ushers of Trowbridge, a town in Wiltshire, Great Britain. The purchase was arranged through a German broker, Uwe Oehms. DPRK workers dismantled the brewery, which was then shipped to Pyongyang. A groundbreaking ceremony was held in January 2000. Using modern German technology, the brewery in 2002 began producing four varieties of Taedong River Beer, including a black beer. This led to the first advertisements on DPRK television in July 2009, which instantly became a success on YouTube. In November 2009, it was widely reported that the advertisements had been stopped at Kim Jong Il’s express order. For a time, the beer was exported to the Republic of Korea, but sales dropped off in 2007 when there was a heavy price increase. In 2011, it was
reported that a United States company, the Korea Pyongyang Trading Company, had received permission to import the beer in September 2010 and would put it on sale starting in May 2011. However, media reports in April 2011 said that intensified U.S. sanctions against the DPRK introduced that month might prevent the importation of the beer and the story seems to have gone to ground.

TEAM SPIRIT. Team Spirit is a major United States–Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercise first held in 1976 to provide assurance of a continued U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK in the wake of the end of the war in Vietnam. The main purpose was to test cooperation between the two armed forces. During the 1980s, it involved some 140,000 ROK troops and about 60,000 Americans. Many of the latter came from outside the Korean Peninsula, which involved major air and naval deployments. The exercise was scaled down in 1991 because of the reduction in the U.S. defense budget at the end of the Cold War and because of the Gulf crisis. The following year, in a move linked to a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) agreement on nuclear inspections, the exercise was canceled, but it was resumed in 1993 as the first nuclear crisis developed. In 1994, it was again canceled and has not resumed. However, other exercises such as Ulchi Lens Focus, Foal Eagle, and, since 2008, Key Resolve, which provide much the same experiences but make heavy use of information technology, continue to be held. The DPRK always objected to Team Spirit and maintains its opposition to the current exercises, claiming that they are the prelude to war. During the period of joint exercises, the DPRK goes onto a “semi-war footing,” with frequent air raid practices and other forms of mobilization, which it claims causes serious economic disruption to the country.

TERRITORIAL WATERS. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has claimed 22.23 kilometers (12 nautical miles) of territorial waters since 1955. Although not formally announced, it appears that territorial waters are measured from straight base lines or on the basis of historic claims. Since August 1977, the DPRK has claimed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which also covers fishing, of between 92.6 kilometers (50 nautical miles) in the West Sea, corresponding to the median point between the DPRK and the People’s Republic of China, and 370.4 kilometers (200 nautical miles) in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. Photographs may not be taken and foreign vessels are forbidden to carry out surveys in the zone. At the same time, the Korean People’s Army announced the establishment of a military security zone. This extends beyond territorial waters to 92.6 kilometers (50 nautical miles) in the West Sea and to the limits of the EEZ in the East Sea. Foreign military vessels
and aircraft are not allowed to enter this zone, and merchant vessels can only do so with prior permission. The DPRK signed the Law of the Sea Convention in December 1982 but has not ratified it. Most other countries do not accept the restrictions announced by the DPRK, and the United States has periodically protested and also tested them by overflight. See also ARMED FORCES; EC 121 DOWNING; NORTHERN LIMIT LINE; PUEBLO, USS.

3 AUGUST CONSUMER GOODS CAMPAIGN. Following a visit by Kim Jong Il to a consumer goods fair in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in August 1984, a campaign began on his instructions to make use of scrap material and underused workers in order to produce consumer goods, which were in short supply. Sidework job teams were organized to make use of the marginal labor, but in fact, in many factories, the ordinary workers found themselves compelled to work longer hours in order to produce consumer goods. In 1988, the campaign was deemed a success, although no details were made available of what sort of consumer goods had been produced. In March 1996, the Korean Workers’ Party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, reported that there were 48,000 workshops, housewives’ work teams, and by-product teams with some 600,000 workers engaged in such production. The goods produced are on sale in special “3 August” shops. The campaign continues, but in recent years, it has been used to remove from the books workers for whom there was no work. See also ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INDUSTRY.

38th PARALLEL. The parallel 38 degrees north cuts through the center of the Korean Peninsula, bisecting farms, villages, and administrative units for some 240 kilometers (150 miles). This became the division line between the Soviet and United States armies in 1945 following Japan’s surrender. As Soviet forces moved quickly into Korea following the Soviet declaration of war on Japan on 8 August 1945, concern grew in the United States that they might occupy the whole peninsula and thus threaten U.S. interests in Asia. The United States therefore proposed on 13 August 1945 that Korea be divided into two military zones along the 38th parallel for the purposes of taking the surrender. Although this proposal put the capital, Seoul, into the U.S. zone, the Soviet Union accepted it. It was not planned that the division would be permanent, but as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union steadily deteriorated, the parallel became the de facto frontier between the two halves of the peninsula. It remained relatively open until the emergence of two separate states on the peninsula in 1948, when it became the boundary between the two states. The 38th parallel lost its significance at the end of the Korean War in July 1953, when the Armistice Agreement
accepted the then line of actual military control as the military demarcation line (MDL) between the two Koreas. Since then, the MDL has formed the actual boundary between the two Koreas, although neither recognizes it as a national boundary. See also DEMILITARIZED ZONE; DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA; REPUBLIC OF KOREA; RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

“THREE GENERALS OF MOUNT PAEKTU.” Term used to describe Kim Il Sung, his first wife, Kim Jong Suk, and their son, Kim Jong Il. Mount Paektu (Paektusan in Korean and Changbaishan in Chinese) on the Sino–Korean border is supposedly both the site of some of Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla activities against the Japanese and the birthplace of Kim Jong Il in 1942. The three are often shown in paintings and murals in military uniforms and riding together.

THREE REVOLUTIONS’ EXHIBITION. Derived from the Three Revolutions’ Team Movement launched under Kim Jong II’s leadership in 1973, the Three-Revolution Exhibition site was created on the edge of the Pyongyang built-up area in 1993. The exhibition site has a large monument showing three red granite flags, representing the cultural, technological, and agricultural revolutions, as well as a large statue of Kim Il Sung at the center of the General Introduction Hall. This hall also has exhibits on the cultural aspects of the movement. Most of the exhibition area, however, is devoted to pavilions that display achievements in heavy and light industry, technology, electronics, and agriculture, supposedly showing the highly developed nature of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in such fields. Large numbers visit the site. They display little interest in the ideological side of the exhibitions but are clearly fascinated by the science and technology and the industrial displays. The exhibition site is also regularly used for trade fairs at which foreign and domestic goods are displayed.

THREE REVOLUTIONS TEAM MOVEMENT. This movement (Samdae hyongmyoong sojo undong in Korean), apparently proposed in 1973 at a meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party political committee, was launched in late 1974 under Kim Jong II’s clandestine leadership as a means of giving him a higher political profile and of remotivating the workforce by sustained exhortation. The campaign was further intensified by the Three Revolution Flag Movement, which dates from December 1975. Both had their origins in proclaimed cultural and technological revolutions carried out in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the banner of the Three Revolutions Team Movement, large numbers of young people were sent to the countryside and to facto-
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tries to boost production and introduce new methods and technologies. Two medals were produced to reward those who took part in the campaigns: the Three-Revolution Red Flag and the Three Revolution Honor Badge. As in China during the Cultural Revolution, many farmers and workers resented the implication that untrained urban youth could teach them how to work better, and there was little increase in production as a result of the campaign.

The main purpose of the movement was to bring forward Kim Jong Il as the successor to his father, Kim Il Sung, and the movement coincided with the increasing use of the term Party Center. There are still occasional references to it and the Three Revolutions’ Exhibition attracts domestic and foreign visitors, but the movement has long since lost any real importance, especially since Kim Jong Il was publicly acknowledged as his father’s successor in 1980. See also 150-DAY BATTLE.

TITLES. Titles matter in East Asia and are often used where names might be in the West. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), both Kim Il Sung, the first leader of the country, and his son and successor Kim Jong Il have had a variety of titles over the years, which causes confusion and sometimes amusement to foreigners. For those from the DPRK, however, it can be dangerous to get such things wrong. In the later years of his life, Kim Il Sung’s main title was “Great Leader,” which is widehan suryong in Korean. The title suryong, or leader, was first used in the DPRK for the Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and, increasingly after 1948, for his successor Josef Stalin. Only toward the end of the Korean War was it used for Kim Il Sung, and then, following Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the development of Kim’s cult of personality, it steadily gained ground. By the early 1960s, only Kim was referred to as suryong, although the term was generally used only on special occasions. He had other titles as well, which tended to be in more everyday use, including prime minister and general. Later, when he became president after the change in the constitution in 1972, that title was also used. Titles were often combined, so Kim would be described as “the Great Leader President Kim Il Sung.” He was also frequently described as the “Fatherly Leader” or oboi suryong. Kim has retained the title widehan suryong in death and the term suryong is not used for anyone else.

Before he was publicly acknowledged as his father’s successor in 1980, Kim Jong Il was referred to as the “Party Center.” His personal name was never mentioned even though observers outside the DPRK had identified the Party Center with the younger Kim by the mid-1970s. Once he was in the public eye, he was referred to as the “Dear Leader,” chinaehanun chidoja in Korean, a title that has caused amusement outside the DPRK. After his
father’s death in 1994, the younger Kim did not take on the title of widehan suryong, but instead used widehan chidoja. He was also frequently referred to as the “Beloved General” (kyongaehanun changgun) or simply as “Our General/Great General” (uri changgun/uri dae changgun). While commemorative plaques from earlier periods still refer to Kim Jong Il as chinaehanun chidoja, that term became increasingly rare in the DPRK after he assumed power, although it continued to be widely used by foreign journalists, usually in a somewhat sneering way.

Following Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011, his third son and successor Kim Jong Un was referred to as “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un, supreme leader of the Workers’ Party of Korea, state and army of the DPRK.” He was also variously described as the “Great Successor,” “Supreme Leader,” or “Great Leader,” and there were also references to “Dear respected leader Kim Jong Un.” No doubt as time passes, a simpler formula will emerge. See also BADGES; NUMBERS.

TOURISM. Tourism is relatively little developed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Domestic tourism has been largely confined to visiting “historical” sites associated with Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong II, and other members of the Kim family, together with some scenic spots. As in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, children and workers might spend some time at a seaside resort or sanatorium. All such activities were severely curbed in the 1990s because of the economic collapse and famine that hit the country. They have been revived somewhat since about 1998, but are largely confined to a privileged few. The mass domestic tourism that is found in other East Asian countries is absent in the DPRK. Few DPRK citizens are able to travel abroad and, when they do, it is mostly for business purposes.

International tourism in the DPRK in theory dates from the establishment of a travel company in August 1953, immediately after the end of the Korean War. Since the country was then largely in ruins with few buildings standing, it is hard to believe that many visitors arrived, apart from those on official delegations. This probably remained the case for most of the 1950s as the DPRK concentrated on postwar reconstruction. From the 1960s onward, groups more recognizable as tourists, including children, came from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They tended to stay in health resorts in the mountains or along the east coast. From the 1980s, groups also began to visit the DPRK from the People’s Republic of China. The flow of Soviet and Eastern European visitors dried up after the collapse of communism, but by then the DPRK had joined the World Tourist Organization in 1987, and a trickle of Western tourists had started to arrive. Among the first companies to organize such tours was Regent Holidays of Bristol in Great Britain. Koryo Tours,
also British owned but based in Beijing, started to organize tours to the DPRK in 1993. In Germany, Professor Eckart Dege of Kiel University ran tours from the late 1980s and published one of the first guidebooks to the country (see the Bibliography). For a brief period, the DPRK provided statistics for arrivals to the World Tourist Organization, which showed an increase in the number of overnight visitors recorded from 43,000 in 1988 to 117,000 in 1992. Visitors would have included those attending the 1989 World Youth Festival as well as Koreans from China and Japan. From 1985 onward, new hotels were constructed in Pyongyang and other cities and tourist sites, in the expectation of more visitors. In 1992, the DPRK claimed to have some 4,700 hotel rooms available.

Although small numbers of foreigners visited the DPRK after the onset of the famine in the mid-1990s, including members of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, many of whom were housed in hotels for greater or lesser periods, the news of distress in the country inevitably had an affect on tourist numbers. Nevertheless, the DPRK joined the Pacific Area Travel Association (PATA) in 1997, and as it came out of the worst of economic crisis, tourism picked up somewhat. The opening of the Rajin–Sonbong Special Economic Zone in 1991 attracted many Chinese visitors because gambling was allowed there. (Since the late 1990s, there has also been a casino, open only to foreigners, in the Yanggakdo Hotel in Pyongyang, which also attracts a Chinese clientele.) Chinese visiting Rajin–Sonbong were not required to have visas, which added to the attraction. Chinese government concern at the extent of gambling led to a ban on visa-free travel to Rajin–Sonbong in 2006, but this ban was lifted in 2009.

All other tourists apart from the Chinese require a tourist visa. Although the United States lifted its ban on visits to the DPRK in 1995, tourists with U.S., Republic of Korea (ROK), and Israeli passports were not normally given visas for the DPRK. However, exceptions have often been made for U.S. tourists since 2002 for the annual Arirang Mass Games held in Pyongyang, and in early 2010, Koryo Tours reported that all restrictions on U.S. tourists appeared to have been lifted. ROK citizens could take part in visits to the Kumgang Mountains from 1998. The tours were halted by the ROK government in 2008 after a tourist was killed on one visit. The DPRK from time to time pressed for the tours to resume, but the ROK declined, demanding that it should be allowed to investigate the incident. For a brief period from 2006 to 2008, tourist visits from the ROK were also possible to Kaesong, near the demilitarized zone. In mid-2009, the DPRK hinted that it might allow both these tours to resume, but in April 2010, the DPRK authorities took over most of the ROK facilities constructed at the Kumgang site and froze all ROK assets there. About the same time, there were reports that the DPRK was
considering recruiting a Chinese firm to run tours, presumably for foreigners in the absence of ROK tourists. There were also hints that ROK-constructed tourist-related facilities at Kaesong might be taken over.

Currently, tourism is organized by the State General Bureau of Tourism based in Pyongyang. Foreign tour operators have to work closely with this body. Tourist groups, which can range from a single person to about 20, are tightly controlled and follow a strict itinerary. This will include visits to Kim Il Sung’s family home at Mangyongdae, his mausoleum at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, and other sites in and around Pyongyang. Further afield, visitors are regularly taken to see the two Friendship Museums and Buddhist temples at Mount Myohyang. It is also possible to visit Panmunjom, Kaesong, Mount Paektu, and the east coast. The industrial city of Hamhung became a tourist destination in 2010. What are called “home stays” have become possible in recent years, although visitors do not actually stay in ordinary homes but in specially built accommodation. In April 2010, a special tourist train from Liaoning Province in China visited the DPRK with 400 passengers. These were mostly Chinese but also included a group of Finns studying in China.

A PATA task force that visited the DPRK in 2003 reported that tourism in the country had great potential. However, the authorities remain concerned at what they see as the possible negative influences from tourism, such as the spread of information, and seem reluctant to relax the tight supervision currently in place. This tends to make the DPRK a once-only destination for most tourists, although tour operators report a small number of returnees.

**TRANSPORT.** The main form of transportation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the railroad system. The origin of the system lies in the scramble for railway concessions in East Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the first stretch of line between the capital, Seoul, and the port city of Inchon operating from 1899. By 1908, Korea was connected to Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway. More extensive development took place during the Japanese colonial period (1910–45). Japanese military thinking was highly influential and the routes built had much to do with facilitating the movement of troops. The shifting of goods and people was a secondary consideration and was also geared to Japanese rather than Korean needs. Because of extensive use during the Pacific War, the Korean railway system was in poor shape in 1945 at the time of the Japanese surrender and the division of the Korean Peninsula.

Although the division along the 38th parallel did not entirely cut off north–south rail links (the Pauley Mission in 1946 went by train from Seoul into the Soviet-occupied zone), they were steadily reduced and broken off al-
together with the establishment of separate states in 1948. Thereafter, the two Korean railway systems developed on their own. The link between Pusan and Paris via the Trans-Siberian line was broken and still remains so. By 1950, railways in both the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) had recovered from the war. Then the Korean War led to a new round of damage and destruction. It was heavy on both sides, but the DPRK system suffered the most, since railways and rolling stock were particularly vulnerable to aerial attack. By the end of the war in 1953, the DPRK railway system was in ruins and its rehabilitation was a major factor in postwar reconstruction.

Currently, the DPRK has around 5,000 kilometers (3,125 miles) of railways, compared with the ROK’s 3,000 kilometers (1,875 miles). There are 10 trunk lines and about 90 branch lines. Most of the DPRK track is standard gauge, at 1.435 meters (4 foot, 8.5 inches), which accounts for about 87 percent of the total. There is a small amount of wide gauge, which links to the Russian system, and about 500 kilometers (312.5 miles) of narrow gauge. Only some 150 kilometers (94 miles) of the total track is doubled; the rest is

Oxen still play a major role in rural transport.
single track, which slows up movement. In theory, 80 percent of the system has been electrified, but since the economic problems of the 1990s, it is not unusual to see diesel engines on what are theoretically electric lines. Some steam locomotives are also still in use for freight purposes. The rail system as a whole is heavily used for freight, with some 38.5 million tons being carried on it each year. Passenger numbers are 35 million per annum. The whole network is very run down, with poor track and decrepit rolling stock. Even the prime Pyongyang–Shinuiju–Beijing route suffers frequent delays, which in the summer rainy season can amount to several days as trains cope with washed out permanent way and damaged bridges. This is the main international route and is open to foreigners including tourists. Four trains a week go to and from Pyongyang and Beijing. It is a busy route and often heavily booked. A route via Tumen goes to Russia with a twice monthly Pyongyang–Moscow sleeping car service. It takes nine days and is not open to tourists. In addition, a weekly Pyongyang–Moscow route travels via Shinuiju, Dandong, Shenyang, and Harbin; this route does take tourists.

The country’s only metro system is in the capital, Pyongyang. It began in 1973 and appears to be modeled on the Moscow Metro. The stations are deep, which indicates a dual purpose as air raid shelters. As on the Moscow system, the stations are both palatial and monumental. There are two lines, totaling 22.5 kilometers (14 miles) and 17 stations. Foreigners are sometimes taken to see one or two of the stations and allowed to ride a short distance, but generally cannot freely use the system. Much of the rolling stock comes from the former German Democratic Republic or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Pyongyang also has a motor bus network, together with tramways and a trolley-bus system. In Pyongyang, newer buses, both from domestic producers and from China, including double-deckers, have made their appearance since the early 2000s. Although foreigners have occasionally traveled on the Pyongyang buses, this is not usually permitted. There appears to be no intercity bus service as there is in the ROK. A few long distance buses do run, but for the most part, people hail trucks for such passenger travel as takes place between cities. As well as buses and trolley buses, there is a light railway in Hamhung, which may have stopped running during the difficult years of the 1990s but which was once again functioning in 2002. Like the rest of the system, it was in poor condition, with carriages with broken windows. Other cities have buses and trams, although none compares with the Pyongyang system.

Of the total road length of some 21,200 kilometers (13,250 miles) only about 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles) is paved; much of this is in towns. There are 682 kilometers (426 miles) of multilane highways; these include the east–west highway between Pyongyang and Wonsan on the east coast, the
road south from Pyongyang to Kaesong, and the short Pyongyang–Nampo highway. Heavy vehicles cannot use the last of these. The main road between Pyongyang and Shinuiju on the Chinese border, which carries a lot of freight to and from China, is in particularly poor condition, with many heavy loads being directed onto even poorer and longer routes along the coast. There are reports that it may be upgraded with Chinese assistance. The majority of roads are surfaced with gravel or crushed stone or dirt. All roads are poorly maintained and suffer from the heat and rains of summer and the severe cold of the winters. Bridges are often in poor condition and are often swept away by floods. It is not unusual to be forced to make large detours in the rainy season as a result. Despite these problems, it is estimated that roads handle some 12 percent of goods transported within the country. Although newer Chinese and Japanese models are seen, most trucks are old and often decrepit. Breakdowns are frequent. One unusual feature is the use of steam-powered trucks, mostly by the armed forces. They too suffer from frequent breakdowns.

The use of river and sea transport is very limited. Perhaps 2 percent of all freight is moved by ship. The main sea ports, which are all ice free, are Nampo and Haeju on the west coast, and Rajin, Chongjin, Hungnam, and Wonsan on the east coast. The rivers are little used for navigation, being generally too shallow. International sanctions and the Proliferation Security Initiative may limit the DPRK’s use of shipping, as does an aging fleet and fuel shortages.

Air transport is largely the preserve of the military and the political elite. The late leader, Kim Jong Il, appeared to be adverse to flying. Such international journeys as he undertook since the 1970s were by train. Air Koryo handles both international and domestic flights, using a fleet of Russian-made aircraft, including helicopters. Most of the fleet dates from the Soviet era, although newer aircraft have come into service since 2007. There are international flights to China, Thailand, Germany, and Russia. Little cargo is transported by air, although it is not easy to obtain data on this. The United Nations estimated in 2001 that the DPRK only moved some 5 tons per kilometer flown, compared with the ROK’s 11,503 tons per kilometer flown.

The number of automobiles has visibly increased since about 2000, but the numbers remain small by international standards. Most belong to organizations rather than to individuals, although it is said that the number of private vehicles is increasing. There have been attempts to clamp down on the import of second-hand Japanese cars, although the regular reports of renewed controls and the numbers on the roads indicate that they are still arriving. While Kim Il Sung was alive, bicycles were a rarity in Pyongyang, but they were found elsewhere. Since his death in 1994, bicycles have become more common in the capital. For some years, their use was confined to men, and
women were discouraged from riding bicycles, although they will sometimes be seen using tricycles. Reasons given for this prohibition vary: the female anatomy is not suitable for bicycles, women are not agile enough, bicycles are inelegant. Outside the capital, where there has been a major increase in the use of bicycles since 2002, women appear to have had no problems with either anatomy or agility. Motorbikes, once confined to the police or the military, are beginning to be more widespread. In rural areas, there is some use of ox carts and small tractors for transport purposes. See also PYONGHWA MOTORS; SUNGRI MOTORS; WEST SEA BARRAGE.

TRUSTEESHIP. During the war with Japan, the Allied powers decided at their wartime conferences that since former colonies might not be ready for full independence, they should undergo a period of trusteeship under big power control until they were ready. In the Korean case, this assumption was partly based on an unsuccessful appeal by Rhee Syngman in 1919 that Korea should be taken from Japan and made a mandated territory of the League of Nations. However, as the idea became known during the war, Koreans expressed much opposition. This opposition continued after Japan’s surrender in 1945 and intensified after the Moscow Conference of December 1945, at which the Allied foreign ministers announced that the trusteeship, to be conducted by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China, would last five years and would be managed by a U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission. The leaders of the Korean People’s Republic organized protests against the proposal throughout the whole peninsula. Then, in early in 1946, the Korean communists and other left-wing groups under Soviet pressure switched to support the proposal and the demonstrations soon ended. Meanwhile, the efforts of the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission to prepare Korea for eventual independence were soon entangled in the developing Cold War. By 1947, as it became clear that there would be no progress on the issues before the Joint Commission, the United States turned the Korean question over to the United Nations.

TUMEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. See GREATER TUMEN INITIATIVE.

TUNNELS UNDER THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. Since 1974, Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Nations Command (UNC) forces have discovered four tunnels under the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that has divided the two Koreas since the end of the Korean War. The first was discovered in November 1974. The previous year, observers noted construction work on the northern side of the DMZ and detected several explosions. A defec-
tor from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) confirmed that tunneling was taking place in the Korangpo and Chorwon areas, and on 15 November 1975, a routine ROK patrol noticed steam coming from the ground. Five days later a small tunnel was located some 45 meters (148 feet) below the surface. The tunnel was 3,500 meters (2.17 miles) long, half on the southern side of the military demarcation line (MDL). It was 1.2 meters (4 feet) high, and 1.1 meters (3.5 feet) wide. It contained a small railroad for removing spoil as well as other equipment. It was claimed that it would have allowed DPRK infantry to deploy behind ROK lines.

The discovery of a second tunnel, in the Chorwon area of the DMZ, was announced in March 1975. This one was deeper, between 50 and 150 meters (164–492 feet) below the surface, and longer, at 3,300 meters (almost 2 miles), one-third of which was south of the MDL. It was taller and broader (2 meters wide and 2 meters high; 6.5 by 6.5 feet), which would have allowed vehicles and, it was claimed, up to 8,000 troops an hour to pass through. Generator rooms to enable air to be pumped through were also discovered, as were three booby-trapped obstruction blocks.

Three years later, a third tunnel was found, using an interceptor tunnel just south of Panmunjom. This was 73 meters (240 feet) deep and 1,640 meters (just under 1 mile) long, with about a quarter of its length south of the DMZ. Again the dimensions were approximately 2 by 2 meters (6.5 by 6.5 feet), which would have allowed rapid movement of troops. Finally in December 1989, a fourth tunnel was discovered farther to the northeast. When it was penetrated in March 1990, it was found to be some 140 meters (460 feet) deep and 1,850 meters (just over 1 mile) long, with almost a third of it on the south side of the DML. Height and width were both about 1.8 meters (6 by 6 feet).

Based on evidence from defectors, the ROK maintains that the tunnels were constructed on the express orders of DPRK leader Kim Il Sung, issued in the late 1960s at a time of heightened tension along the DMZ. The DPRK, when challenged about the tunnels, has denied constructing them, claiming that either they were the remains of old coal mines, although the tunnels are reported to be all constructed through granite and they do not have the branch tunnels that are associated with coal mining, or that the ROK constructed them in order to invade the DPRK. The ROK military believe that other tunnels, as yet undiscovered, still exist. Tourists can visit the third tunnel, and many accounts of such visits can be found on the Internet.

200-DAY BATTLE. A production campaign launched in 1988 to mark the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was also to complete facilities for what was hoped to be a share of the 1988 Summer Olympics and for the 1989 13th World Youth
and Student Festival to be held in the capital, Pyongyang. From this period date areas such as the Sports Village on Chongchun Street and the May Day Stadium. During the campaign, which echoed a number of similar campaigns particularly associated with Kim Jong Il, great advances were reported in constructing the Sunchon Vinalon Complex, the Sariwon Fertilizer Factory, a 100-kilowatt hydraulic plant, and an extension to the Kim Chaek Steel Mill. See also 70-DAY BATTLE; 100-DAY BATTLE; 150-DAY BATTLE; THREE REVOLUTIONS TEAM MOVEMENT.
UGANDA, RELATIONS WITH. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) cultivated the African state of Uganda after the overthrow of President Idi Amin in 1979. From 1980 onward, the DPRK armed forces supplied arms to Uganda and also provided training for the military and the police. This training took place in both Uganda and in the DPRK. According to the Republic of Korea publication Vantage Point, in 1984 there were some 1,000 DPRK military instructors in Uganda. When General Tito Okello came to power in July 1985, he expelled them, but following his overthrow in January 1986, they were invited back and continued to operate there until the 1990s, when economic problems in the DPRK forced their recall. Relations between the two countries remain good, with frequent exchanges of delegations, and the DPRK maintains an embassy in Kampala. There is no Ugandan embassy in Pyongyang, however. See also NAEWOE NEWS AGENCY; ZIMBABWE, RELATIONS WITH.

UNIFICATION CHURCH. The Unification Church was founded in 1954 in Pusan in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the Reverend Moon Sun-myung. It was originally called the Holy Spirit Church for the Unification of World Christianity, but was renamed the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity in 1994. Moon was born in what is now the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1920. He claimed to have had a vision at the age of 16 in which Jesus Christ asked him to continue the work of salvation of mankind that he had been unable to finish. Moon visited Pyongyang after liberation in 1945 to preach but was imprisoned by the communist authorities the following year on suspicion of being a United States agent. Although he was freed, he was rearrested and sent to a labor camp from which he was released during the Korean War. He then moved to the ROK. Unification Church membership was never very large in the ROK, although it had a number of high-profile enterprises, but it was favored by successive governments because of Moon’s strong anticommunism. By the 1960s, most of the church’s followers were abroad. Moon moved to the United States in 1971, although he remained an ROK citizen. He was a staunch supporter of President Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal and also encouraged
the lobbying of Congress in support of the ROK government. This led to the 1977 Koreagate scandal and an inquiry into tax evasion; Moon was convicted and imprisoned in 1983, after which he left the United States, although the Unification Church maintained several business enterprises there.

Moon remained fiercely anticommunist and was especially critical of the DPRK. However, in 1991, he visited the DPRK and met its leader, Kim Il Sung. There were reports that Moon presented Kim with a large sum of money. From then on, Unification Church links with the DPRK steadily increased. The church acquired the Potanggang Hotel in Pyongyang. This was much favored by Japanese businessmen and was for many years one of the few hotels where it was possible to watch Western television; it also had an excellent wine cellar. There were reports that the Unification Church intended to build a faith center near the hotel, but as of 2011 this had not yet materialized. Moon sent condolences to Kim Jong Il on the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and was also said to have provided funds to the younger Kim. It was rumored in the mid-1990s that the Unification Church would organize the Kunggang Mountains tourist project, although the concession eventually went to the ROK’s Hyundai group. Following an agreement reached in 2001, a Unification Church–linked company, Pyonghwa Motors (Pyeonghwa Motors in the ROK) began constructing a factory near Nampo to produce automobiles in cooperation with the DPRK’s Ryongbyong Corporation. When the products went on sale in 2004, the first advertising billboards also appeared in Pyongyang. A proposal to establish a pilgrimage site at Chongju, where Moon was born, seems to have been unsuccessful. See also CHUNG JU-YUNG.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR). See RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.

UNITED NATIONS. The United Nations was established by charter in 1945, with headquarters in New York, and has been involved in the affairs of the Korean Peninsula since September 1947, when frustration at the failure to agree on a trusteeship arrangement led the United States to refer the Korean issue to the General Assembly (UNGA). At that time, the United States tended to dominate the UNGA, which did not have a veto system as there was in the Security Council (UNSC). The UNGA adopted a resolution on 14 November 1947 that called for the establishment of a unified government for Korea through nationwide elections and created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to carry out this program. The UNTCOK was unable to operate north of the 38th parallel because of Soviet obstruction and could only supervise elections in the southern part of
the peninsula. In December 1948, the UNGA passed a resolution stating that
the newly established Republic of Korea (ROK) was the “only legitimate
government on the Korean peninsula,” and UNTOCK was replaced by the
United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK). The UNCOK attempted
to visit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in February
1949 without success.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the UN involvement
in Korea expanded. The absence of the Soviet Union, apparently over the
refusal of the United Nations to transfer the China seat in the UNSC from
the defeated Chinese Nationalists to the newly established People’s Republic
of China (PRC), allowed the UNSC to take an active role on Korea. It passed
two resolutions in June 1950 that called on UN member states to provide
forces to support the ROK and not to support the DPRK. This provided the
legal basis for the establishment of the United Nations Command (UNC),
proposed by the UNSC in a resolution of 7 July 1950 that requested the
United States to provide a commander. The resolution also called on the UN
commander to provide periodic reports to the UNSC but otherwise provided
for no further control over his actions. The Supreme Commander for the Al-
lied forces in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, took up the concurrent
position of UN commander.

With the return of the Soviet representative to the UNSC, UN action on
Korea returned to the UNGA. In October 1950, as UN forces swept into the
DPRK, the UNGA established the United Nations Commission for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) in October 1950,
followed by the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency in December
1950. In 1951, resolutions were passed condemning China as an aggressor
and introducing an embargo on some exports to China and the DPRK. At
this stage, the course of the war meant that none of the UN agencies could
operate north of the 38th parallel. Thereafter, while Korean issues came be-
fore the UNGA from time to time, it played no real part in peninsular affairs.
After the end of the Korean War, the UNGA received periodic reports and
regularly reaffirmed the UN commitment to the peaceful reunification of
the peninsula. The continued existence of UNCURK provided the legal basis on
which a number of countries declined to establish diplomatic relations with
the DPRK until the early 1970s. This ended in 1973, when, following ROK
President Park Chung-hee’s declaration that the ROK would no longer op-
pose the establishment of such relations, the United Nations carried a consen-
sus decision to wind up UNCURK.

Early attempts by both Koreas to enter the United Nations were vetoed
either by the United States (DPRK) or the Soviet Union (ROK). However,
as the nature of the United Nations changed in the 1960s and 1970s, with
many former colonial territories achieving independence, the UNGA became a regular battleground between the two Koreas for UN recognition. In 1975, resolutions were passed that favored both positions. However, the apparent contradiction was not put to the test and, after 1975, the issue of UN membership did not come again before the UNGA until 1991. The ROK, while not opposing the DPRK’s membership, continued to seek its own admission, using the analogy of the two German states to plead its cause. The DPRK opposed separate entry on the grounds that it would hinder the cause of reunification. This did not stop it from taking up observer status with a number of UN agencies from 1973 onward, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ran training programs for DPRK officials. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ROK indicated that it would again seek UN admission. When it became clear that neither China nor Russia would veto such a move, the DPRK, still protesting that it would not help reunification, reluctantly also agreed to apply. Both Koreas entered the United Nations on 17 September 1991.

The DPRK has not found membership easy. Since the emergence of the nuclear crisis, which coincided with its entry to the United Nations, the DPRK has on several occasions been condemned for both its nuclear and its missile programs and has been subjected to UN sanctions. Its human rights record has also come under scrutiny. However, it maintains missions in both New York and Geneva. In the absence of relations with the United States, the New York mission has been regularly used as a channel for contact with U.S. government officials.

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC). Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United Nations Security Council condemned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as an aggressor and resolved in July 1950 to established a United Nations force under a unified command to counter that aggression. General Douglas MacArthur, then supreme commander for the Allied forces in Japan, was named UN commander. Under him, troops from 16 nations and the Republic of Korea (ROK) were assigned to the command and took the field against the DPRK armed forces, later joined by Chinese troops operating as the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The UNC, which was a signatory to the 1953 Armistice Agreement, remained in existence after the war and still does, with headquarters in the ROK capital, Seoul. The command is now merely a shell, however, with no forces beyond a small honor guard regularly attached to it, but it still has a function in the absence of a peace treaty on the peninsula in maintaining the Armistice Agreement. It makes periodic reports to the United Nations but otherwise acts independently of that organization.
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON KOREA. The United Nations General Assembly established this organization in December 1948 to take over the duties of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Its role was to supervise the dismantling of all non-Republic of Korea (ROK) organizations on the peninsula, in the wake of the UN recognition of the ROK as the only legitimate government on the peninsula, to facilitate reunification. Facing reality, the commission argued that there could be no progress toward reunification without the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also critical of the ROK’s increasingly authoritarian rule. On 21 October 1949, the commission was reorganized and given the new task of monitoring the possibility of conflict. Under these new terms, the commission went to the ROK in February 1950, but when it attempted to enter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it was fired upon. It then requested that it should have trained military observers attached to it. The presence of these observers and their reports on conditions on 25 June 1950 at the outbreak of the Korean War formed the basis of the subsequent UN resolutions condemning the DPRK as an aggressor. As the course of the war seemed to favor the ROK–United Nations Command forces in the early autumn of 1950, this commission was dissolved and replaced by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on 7 October 1950.

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK). Following the United Nations Command decision to cross the 38th parallel into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September–October 1950 during the Korean War, the United Nations General Assembly established this commission in October 1950 to replace the United Nations Commission on Korea, on the assumption that Korea would be reunified. Two months later, UNCURK’s rehabilitation work was taken over by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which only ever operated in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The UNCURK remained in existence, however, still charged with the task of bringing about Korean reunification. This provided many countries with a legal reason for not recognizing the DPRK since UNCURK’s remit was based on UN resolutions that recognized the ROK government as the one legal government on the peninsula. Following contact between the two Koreas in the early 1970s and a modification in the ROK’s position on diplomatic relations, the United Nations passed a consensus decision to end UNCURK on 21 November 1973. This removed any legal objection to establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK. See also FOREIGN POLICY; UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA.
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME DISPUTE. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established in 1965, has had a program in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 1979 and an office since 1981. This makes it the longest-established UN body in the DPRK. It operated on an annual budget of some $2.6 million, and until the 1990s, mainly conducted training programs in good governance, trading practices, and economics. During the famine years of the mid-1990s, it became the main UN coordination body for international humanitarian aid. This led to a small expansion of both international and local staff. Like all other international organizations and foreign entities operating in the DPRK, UNDP was not able to recruit local staff directly but, as in China and Vietnam until the 1990s, staff were seconded from the DPRK government. Most such staff members were from the foreign ministry, although some connected with health matters came from the health ministry. Also, and again as in other communist countries, UNDP did not pay its staff directly. Instead, payment was made in hard currency to the Diplomatic Service Bureau, which then paid the staff a proportion of the money received as salary in local currency. The rest, in theory, was to cover pension, health care, and other similar costs. Overtime and meal allowances might be paid directly to staff in foreign currencies.

In early 2007, claims surfaced that UNDP had handled counterfeit United States currency, that it had allowed the DPRK authorities to pass sums of money through its bank account, and that it had evaded U.S. restrictions on the export of certain dual use materials to the DPRK. Many of the charges came from allegations made by a former UNDP official, Artjon Shkurtaj, an Albanian who had worked as director of operations and security at the UNDP office in the DPRK capital, Pyongyang, from 2004 to 2006. He claimed that rather than investigating his charges, UNDP had dismissed him. The UNDP response was that it had operated as other foreign organizations did in the DPRK, that the counterfeit notes, with a face value of $3,500, had been in the office safe since 1995, when a member of staff had turned them in, and had been overlooked, and that the equipment that was allegedly dual use was for an agricultural aid project. It also argued that Shkurtaj’s contract had come to an end, and that he had not been dismissed for “whistle blowing.”

Although the London Economist pointed out in July 2007 that the United States had been generally a supporter of the UNDP, this did not stop a campaign in Congress and in other quarters alleging massive mismanagement. Both the conservative Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, which regularly displayed hostility toward both the United Nations and the DPRK, prominently repeated the allegations. The UNDP board of auditors conducted an investigation, which found no evidence of the wilder claims, but it did recommend changes in recruitment, use of local currency, and over-
sight of projects and other procedures to bring practices in the DRPK into line with the organization’s worldwide standards. The DPRK authorities refused to allow any of the proposed changes. The UNDP therefore closed its Pyongyang office and withdrew its personnel. Its role as provider of administrative support for other UN organizations in the DPRK was taken over by the office of the World Health Organization.

In January 2008, a U.S. Senate investigation committee criticized the UNDP for inappropriate staffing decisions and lax financial controls, but concluded that the DPRK authorities had taken advantage of the “altruism that drives UNDP programs.” An independent review under the leadership of former Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Nemeth cleared the UNDP of the most serious allegations but also made recommendations for better oversight of its programs. On this basis, the UNDP went back to the DPRK government and reached agreement on new procedures, which the UNDP executive board agreed to in January 2009. As a result, the UNDP reopened its offices in Pyongyang in autumn 2009 and employed local staff on new terms. A number of projects, suspended since March 2007, were reactivated. They included a sustainable rural energy program, improved seed production, a small wind energy project, an environmental program, and other programs concerned with food security. It has also resumed its role as the overall UN coordinator. In August 2010, the UN Disputes Tribunal decided that there had been procedural violations in the way that Artjon Shkurtaj’s claim for compensation for wrongful dismissal had been handled and ordered that he be paid a total of $165,000.

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA (UNTCOK). Following the adoption of a resolution on Korea on 14 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations created this commission, with representatives from Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Its purpose, based on the resolution, was to establish a unified Korean government through general elections. However, the commission was not allowed to operate in the Soviet-controlled northern half of the peninsula. Elections were held therefore only in the south on 10 May 1948, and the UN General Assembly, following a United States’ proposal, adopted a resolution on 12 December to replace UNTCOK with a new United Nations Commission on Korea. This authorized it to travel, consult, and observe throughout Korea for the purpose of fulfilling the original aims of the UN resolution of 14 November 1947. During the Korean War, it was replaced by other UN agencies. See also UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA.
UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH. To the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States is its main enemy. In DPRK historical accounts, U.S. hostility is traced back to the SS General Sherman affair in 1866 and to the subsequent Korea–U.S. war in 1871. Although in the Republic of Korea (ROK) these incidents are generally shrugged off as a side effect of the isolation of the Korean kingdom, in the DPRK they are portrayed as part of a long-term U.S. imperialist plot to take over Korea, culminating in the 1945 division of the peninsula and U.S. involvement in the Korean War (1950–53). To the United States, the DPRK is a hostile power that committed aggression against the ROK in 1950, treated U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in an appalling manner during the war, and has remained a dangerous threat to the peace of East Asia ever since. Since the late 1980s, concerns about DPRK nuclear and missile developments and proliferation have been added to the earlier concerns. The continued presence of U.S. troops in the ROK is an indication both of the U.S. commitment to the ROK and concern about the DPRK. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations, and although they have been meeting regularly since 1988, they have made little progress in improving relations.

The U.S. and the Kingdom of Korea signed a treaty of friendship in 1882. This led to a modest U.S. presence in Korea, with missionaries forming the largest group. Like other Western powers, the United States did not oppose the Japanese takeover of Korea between 1905–10. During the Japanese colonial period, there was periodic U.S. concern about Japanese behavior, but no attempt was made to modify colonial rule. During these years, a number of Koreans studied or worked in the United States, including the future ROK President Rhee Syngman. With the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1941, groups working for independence hoped that this would be achieved after Japan’s defeat. However, there was little wartime planning in the United States about Korea, although the idea emerged that, since Koreans were not yet ready for self-government, there should be a period during which four powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China—would supervise a trusteeship over the country, leading eventually to full independence. It was this decision and the need to receive the surrender of Japanese forces that led to the division of the peninsula in 1945. That division led, in turn, to the emergence of two separate states on the peninsula in 1948. The DPRK sees the United States as having prime responsibility for the division, although it was also agreed to by the Soviet Union.

There was no contact between the DPRK and the United States from 1948 to 1950. Korea as a whole seemed of little importance to the United States, which was preoccupied with China and its civil war and with Japan. U.S. official statements appeared to put the peninsula outside the orbit of U.S.
interests. This may have been a factor in the DPRK decision to try to end the division of the peninsula by war in June 1950. If this was in fact true, it was a miscalculation, and President Harry S. Truman responded quickly to the DPRK attack by committing U.S. forces, eventually under United Nations auspices, to the conflict. Although 15 other nations contributed forces to the Korean conflict, it was the United States that made up by far the largest proportion of the outside forces. As far as the DPRK is concerned, the war was with the United States. It was a savage conflict on both sides, leaving bitter memories that have been kept alive ever since. This is particularly so in the DPRK, where campaigns to remember the war and alleged U.S. atrocities are an important part of current propaganda. In the United States, other wars have tended to overlay the Korean experience, but among veterans’ groups and those who experienced direct losses, the commemoration of the war is still an important part of their lives.

The negotiations that eventually ended the fighting in 1953 were characterized by deliberate rudeness on both sides and by petty point scoring. This too has left its mark. For both sides, the 1953 Armistice Agreement was deemed unsatisfactory. Each claimed victory, but it was widely felt to be a
hollow victory. The peninsula remained divided, and the prospect of reunification would steadily diminish in the years to come. Vast sacrifices of lives and treasure had left the two Koreas more or less where they had started in territorial terms. For the United States, the war was described as the “first war that we have lost.” And the two sides still faced each other across the demilitarized zone.

DPRK–U.S. hostility did not diminish with the end of the fighting. The United States increased its military power in the ROK with the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons at the end of the 1950s, a move that may have prompted the DPRK to begin to explore a nuclear path of its own. The United States also maintained a wide-ranging system of sanctions against the DPRK. First introduced in the early stages of the Korean War, these sanctions would survive virtually unmodified until the late 1990s. Even then, a number of sanctions continued into the 21st century and were supplemented by new sanctions following DPRK nuclear and missile tests. Clashes occasionally took place at Panmunjom, some of which involved fatalities. There were also incidents at sea (the capture of the USS Pueblo and her crew in 1968, for example) and in the air. A small number of U.S. soldiers became defectors. The U.S. reaction was cautious and careful, not wishing to see another major conflict on the peninsula. The DPRK periodically called on U.S. forces to leave, sometimes coupled with the suggestion of a peace treaty, excluding the ROK on the grounds that the latter had not signed the Armistice Agreement. The U.S. response was that there could be no peace treaty without including the ROK, and that it would be up to the two Koreas to negotiate their future.

As U.S. relations improved with both the Soviet Union and China as the Vietnam War began to wind down, the DPRK made occasional gestures of conciliation. Two American journalists were allowed to visit in 1972, the first to be on DPRK soil since the early days of the Korean War. The Supreme People’s Assembly, the DPRK parliament, sent a letter to Congress in 1974 proposing a peace treaty. In the late 1970s, a group of Korean–American academics were allowed to visit. The U.S. government remained firm in its resolve that it was for the two Koreas to settle the problems of the peninsula. Indeed, relations became more strained when the United States added the DPRK to its list of states sponsoring terrorism in January 1988, after it was implicated in the Andaman Sea bombing incident. Paradoxically, that same incident led to a modification of the U.S. position of avoiding contact with the DPRK except through the Military Armistice Commission. In order to ensure that the 1988 Olympics Games, scheduled to be held in the ROK capital city of Seoul, could be held safely, there were talks in Beijing between officials of the two countries. Not much progress was made, although the Olympics took place without trouble. The contacts continued, and there was also some relaxation of the U.S. rules about nonofficial links and foreign trade.
Growing concern over the DPRK’s nuclear program led to a more radical change in the U.S. position in the early 1990s. In January 1992, the first-ever high-level talks between the two countries began in New York. Against a backdrop of increasing tension between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the DPRK, the talks made so little progress that the ROK and the United States announced that they would resume the Team Spirit military exercise in 1993. Faced with multiple pressures, the DPRK announced that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This move caused consternation. No country had ever withdrawn from the NPT, and to allow the DPRK to do so would be an unfortunate precedent. Thus began two years of intense negotiations to persuade the DPRK to reconsider. There was no further mention of rejecting direct DPRK–U.S. talks, which led to concern in the ROK that it was being sidelined. Although the 1993 talks appeared to make some progress, a new crisis emerged in spring 1994, when the DPRK announced that it was unloading fuel from its 5 megawatt reactor. Within the Bill Clinton administration, there were some who argued for military action against the DPRK, but while the U.S. military were confident of ultimate victory if there were another conflict on the peninsula, it would be at high cost.

Instead, the United States pushed for UN sanctions against the DPRK but also held open the prospect of further talks. These began but had made little progress by the time former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited the DPRK in June 1994. Carter, who had at one point during his presidency been prepared to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from the ROK, had remained popular in the DPRK. During his visit, he met President Kim Il Sung. This meeting not only led to a proposal for a North–South summit but also to a more positive commitment to talks with the United States. A third round of talks began in Geneva on 8 July 1994. Kim Il Sung’s death led to a temporary postponement in the talks, but they resumed in August 1994.

The Geneva talks led in October 1994 to the signing of the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States. The DPRK undertook to freeze its nuclear program, while the United States would supply light water reactors (LWRs) for domestic power needs and would lift some sanctions. The two sides also agreed to work toward the establishment of liaison offices in each other’s capitals, as the first step toward diplomatic relations. Once the DPRK freeze began, the United States moved on sanctions in January 1995, allowing transactions for telecommunications purposes, credit card use, and the opening of journalists’ offices; some limited use of the U.S. banking system; the import of magnesite, and a number of matters necessary for the LWR project. The project got under way, under the auspices of an international consortium established for the purpose, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Until the reactors were completed, heavy
fuel oil would be supplied to make up for the closing down of the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Although relations were not always smooth and suspicions remained on both sides, U.S.–DPRK contacts now entered a brief period when progress toward a less confrontational relationship seemed possible. In addition to the work on the LWR project, many other delegations were exchanged, especially as U.S. humanitarian organizations became active in response to the DPRK’s appeal for international assistance because of famine in the latter part of the 1990s. A United States Missing in Action Recovery Program (MIA program) began to search for the remains of U.S. forces from the Korean War. This brought the armed forces on both sides into contact in a way that had never happened before. Some U.S. tourists were even allowed into the DPRK. The Clinton administration welcomed the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, and the highpoint in the relationship came later that same year. In October 2000, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, generally seen as the number two in the DPRK leadership, made the first ever visit by a DPRK senior military official to the United States. He met President Clinton and extended an invitation for him to visit the DPRK. In preparation for such a visit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a return visit to the DPRK later the same month. She clearly found Kim Jong Il a good host. Kim indicated that as long as the DPRK and the United States were discussing a missile ban, the DPRK would conduct no further tests. The stage seemed set for a Clinton visit. However, other demands prevented this from taking place before Clinton ran out of time and President George W. Bush took over in January 2001.

In the election campaign, the new president and his colleagues made no secret of their dislike of the DPRK regime and of the Agreed Framework. There was no let up in their hostility once in office. Disparaging references to the DPRK leadership were an early indication that there would be little continuity in U.S. policy. Although the LWR project and the MIA program remained in force, all other formal contacts were put on hold as the new administration undertook a review of U.S. policy. The DPRK authorities chafed at this, seeing it as a prelude to abandoning the Agreed Framework and the beginning of a process of regime change in the DPRK. They complained that while it was clear that the LWR project was well behind schedule, the U.S. declined to provide any explanation for the delays. Nevertheless, the DPRK responded quickly with a message of condolence and a condemnation of terrorism following the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the other Al-Qaeda attacks. Soon after, the DPRK said that it would sign up to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. No improvement in relations followed these moves. The U.S. continued to insist that it was ready for talks but the DPRK held back. And while
professing to be willing to talk to the DPRK, there were other signals from the Bush administration that sent a different message, most notably the inclusion of the DPRK in the president’s 2002 State of the Union message as one of the members of the “Axis of Evil,” together with Iran and Iraq.

In fact, the Bush review concluded that, as the previous administration had found, while a military solution to the Korean issue might in theory be possible, the cost would be enormous and that therefore, engagement in some form should continue. On 6 June 2002, President Bush offered to bilateral discussions. The DPRK response was less than forthcoming, demanding that relations should go back to what they had been at the end of the Clinton administration, something that was clearly not going to happen.

As 2002 progressed, the DPRK appeared to become more and more concerned that the U.S. might turn on it after it had settled the Iraq issue. At the August 2002 concrete-pouring ceremony for the LWRs, the chief U.S representative, Jack Prichard, reminded the DPRK that before the reactors could go critical, the DPRK would need to account for all its past nuclear developments. The crisis came in October, when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, visited the DPRK, apparently to renew the dialogue. Instead of the wide-ranging discussion of issues of concern to both sides that the DPRK expected, Kelly confronted his interlocutors with the claim that the U.S. had evidence of a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in breach of the Agreed Framework. The DPRK response, according to Kelly and his colleagues, was at first to deny the claim, and then later to admit that it did have such a program. With this admission, Kelly broke off further discussion and returned to Washington. Soon after his return, the story leaked to the media. The DPRK denied that it had admitted to such a program, saying that it had asserted that it had the right to develop one if it chose to do so, and that it had said that it had even more powerful programs.

The U.S. response, once the story was public knowledge, was to ask KEDO not to deliver any more heavy fuel oil after the November delivery. The DPRK then announced that it would resume processing at the Yongbyon nuclear site. Arguing that the United States had broken the Agreed Framework by the failure to deliver the fuel oil, the DPRK began to remove the seals and cameras at Yongbyon on 12 December. On 27 December, it expelled the IAEA inspectors from the site. By January 2003, with the DPRK apparently beginning reprocessing plutonium at Yongbyon and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, the Agreed Framework was effectively dead, although KEDO continued a somewhat ghostlike existence for a further period.

Increasingly preoccupied with Iraq, the United States seemed to be uninterested in the DPRK, although it did take part in international efforts at the
United Nations and elsewhere on the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear program. In April 2003, it agreed to attend a Chinese-brokered meeting in Beijing, which broke up without progress. In August 2003, China again brokered a more extended meeting, involving not just the United States and the DPRK but also Japan, the ROK, and Russia. Thus began the Six Party Talks, which would function spasmodically until the end of 2008. The talks paused in 2004, possibly while the DPRK assessed the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. The return of President Bush brought little comfort and for a time the DPRK refused to rejoin the talks. However, the second Bush administration adopted a somewhat less hostile policy and talks resumed. But when a broad agreement seemed to have been reached in September 2005, it was promptly scuttled by a combination of DPRK insistence that it should be provided with a LWR and a U.S. Treasury decision to impose financial sanctions on the DPRK over allegations of counterfeiting U.S. dollars and money laundering. The formal closure of KEDO added to the sense of failure. Increasing U.S. attempts to raise the issue of human rights in the DPRK also increased tension.

When the Six Party Talks eventually reconvened at the end of 2006, the U.S. official policy of restricting DPRK missile tests and preventing it from becoming a nuclear power was in shambles. On 4 July 2006, the DPRK had resumed missile tests and on 9 October carried out some form of nuclear test. The latter may have been a partial failure, but it still marked a stage further on the DPRK’s nuclear road. The continued U.S. economic sanctions, imposed in 2005, became a stumbling block. Although agreement was apparently reached in direct U.S.–DPRK talks in Berlin in January 2007, DPRK funds remained frozen. In May, when the United States finally found a solution involving a Mongolian bank, there were swift developments. Yongbyon was shut down again and IAEA inspectors reported positively. But the United States still pushed on other nuclear issues, including HEU, and the Japanese continued to emphasize the abduction issue, so progress was slow. Progress continued to be slow the following year, with matters now complicated by the election of President Lee Myung-bak in the ROK. A more positive note was struck at the beginning of 2008 when the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited the DPRK and played to excited audiences. Progress on the nuclear front followed in May, with the blowing up of the Yongbyon cooling tower and the handing over to China of a vast compilation of nuclear-related documents. But U.S. responses were slow, particularly over a pledge to remove the DPRK from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. This led the DPRK to announce that it would suspend the decommissioning of Yongbyon in August, and then in September that it was no longer interested in being removed from the list. The United States then moved on the issue, although at the same time making it clear that other sanctions were still available. In
2008, George Bush’s presidency ended without an agreement on sampling and other verification issues.

If, as was widely believed, the DPRK had high hopes of the new Democratic administration of Barack Obama that took office in 2009, these hopes were soon dashed. A DPRK suggestion that it might send a delegation to the presidential inauguration was apparently rebuffed. The new administration made it clear that there would be no compromise on the denuclearization issue, and it seemed far more preoccupied with the Middle East and with domestic matters than it was with the DPRK. Instead of improving, relations seemed to become progressively worse. A three-stage rocket test in April was followed by a second nuclear test in May. International condemnation followed both, but the DPRK remained defiant. Relations further deteriorated with the detention and eventual trial of two U.S. journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, who, it was claimed, had entered the DPRK illegally while investigating a story about refugees on the Sino–DPRK border.

Their release was eventually effected by former President Bill Clinton in August. Although Clinton, whose wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, was the secretary of state, and the administration denied that the visit was anything more than purely humanitarian, Clinton met and had dinner with Kim Jong Il. It was widely assumed that they discussed more than the weather. Whatever the reason, the second half of 2009 saw some positive steps in U.S.–DPRK relations, including a letter from the president to Kim Jong Il carried by the U.S. special representative Stephen Bosworth in December. U.S. businessmen also visited and there was talk of liaison offices being opened. In 2010, however, such hopes appeared to evaporate in the wake of the sinking of the ROK corvette Chonan in March and then the shelling of the Yonpyong Islands in November. At the end of the 2010, a visit by the outgoing New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson saw the DPRK making positive sounds about returning to the negotiating table and allowing nuclear inspections to recommence.

The Obama administration remained wary, but during 2011 it began to signal a willingness to improve relations. A debate developed about the possibility of resuming official humanitarian aid. By October, the two sides were holding talks in Bangkok on restarting the MIA program and in Geneva on nuclear issues. Wariness persisted, but there was a glimmer of hope that had been absent since the end of 2008. See also AX MURDERS AT PANMUNJOM; CAIRO AGREEMENT; DETAINED UNITED STATES’ JOURNALISTS; POTSDAM CONFERENCE.

UNITED STATES MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) RECOVERY PROGRAM. The United States attaches particular importance to the repatriation of the remains of service personnel from overseas conflicts and also has
elaborate programs in place to track down those who are MIA. According to a 1994 report commissioned by the U.S. defense department, the Korean War left some 8,140 personnel whose remains were not repatriated at the end of the war. Of these, nearly 6,000 are known to have died, but some 2,195 are still listed as MIA. These numbers arose from the nature of the first year of the war, with rapid movement up and down the peninsula, the burying and reburying of bodies, and hasty retreats. In addition, many prisoners of war (POWs) died while being moved northward during the conflict, and it was often impossible for their companions to identify where they died or where they were buried. The United Nations Command (UNC) regularly presented lists of U.S. and other missing persons at the Military Armistice Commission meetings, but these lists were rejected by the other side.

However, from May 1990, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) began to repatriate what it claimed were U.S. remains to visiting U.S. dignitaries. In May 1992, after a total of 16 sets of remains had been returned in this way, it offered to conclude an agreement on the issue. This offer was not taken up immediately, but from 13 May 1992, the DPRK armed forces began to repatriate remains to the UNC. By the end of May, a total of 46 sets of remains had been handed over. In April 1993, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) submitted a claim for expenses incurred in repatriating these remains. U.S. calculations were that the amount claimed equaled $897,304. A further 17 sets of remains were handed over in July 1993. On 24 August that year, the UNC and the KPA signed an Agreement on Remains-Related Matters, and the UNC paid $897,000 compensation for costs incurred up to that point. Repatriation continued and, by December 1993, 194 sets had been returned. That month, the KPA submitted a claim for $4 million for the additional 131 sets of remains. To take forward the agreement, scientists from the U.S. Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii and from the KPA held two days of discussions at Panmunjom in January 1994. A week later, the first positive identification from the remains returned was approved.

When former President Jimmy Carter visited the DPRK in June 1994, President Kim Il Sung said that the DPRK was ready to begin joint U.S.–DPRK POW/MIA investigations. Although Kim Il Sung died before this could be taken further, the DPRK continued to return remains. However, in September 1994, an offer of $262,000 for expenses incurred for 131 sets of remains returned in November–December 1993 was twice rejected by the KPA as too low. In December 1994, Senators Paul Simon and Frank Murkowski visited the DPRK on the first U.S. military aircraft to visit the DPRK since the Korean War and presented a letter addressed to Kim Jong Il calling for the beginning of joint operations.

Although there was no agreement on reimbursement, a steady trickle of remains continued in 1995–96, and to take the program further forward, the
State Department invited a DPRK delegation to the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii in January 1996, but again failed to reach agreement on reimbursement. A second meeting, in New York in May 1986, did agree on reimbursement and on the start of Joint Recovery Operations (JRO) in the DPRK. Following on from this agreement, the U.S. government paid $2 million for expenses incurred in the recovery of remains in 1993–94. The first JRO took place north of Pyongyang in July 1996. Thereafter, the teams operated regularly. The DPRK, however, began to object to the repatriation of remains via the UNC at Panmunjom and in May 1999 unilaterally modified the procedures there. The KPA officer was not, as previously, the opposite number (typically colonel to colonel) of the UN side’s liaison officer, and the personnel handling the remains did not wear military uniform. During the remainder of 1999, the DPRK side refused to deal with the UNC on the issue, arguing that this was a direct DPRK–U.S. matter. From October 1999, remains were handed over to a U.S. honor guard at Pyongyang’s Sunan airport.

The JRO teams continued to operate in the DPRK until 2005, and remains were regularly repatriated. Excavations often took the U.S. investigators into areas off limits to other foreigners. They were not allowed to have direct contact with the KPA soldiers who carried out the excavations, but they were present on these occasions. They were also allowed some access to archive material in the War Museum. Over the years that the JRO took place, many people on both sides came into contact with “the enemy” for the first time, and nearly 500 sets of remains were sent to Hawaii for identification.

In May 2005, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, citing unspecified threats to U.S. personnel, unilaterally withdrew the U.S. teams from the DPRK. Although the State Department objected on the grounds that it was in charge of policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK announced that cooperation was ending. No more remains were returned until New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson visited the DPRK in March–April 2007. The DPRK then handed over six sets of remains, which Richardson was able to bring out via Panmunjom. In January 2010, the U.S. naval commander in the Pacific, Admiral Robert Willard, said at a press conference in Honolulu that the DPRK had proposed resuming the MIA program. This overture appears to have been rejected on the grounds that the DPRK should first return to the Six Party Talks on denuclearization. In October 2011, however, talks on the issue of MIA resumed in Bangkok.

No other country has pursued the issue of those MIA. However, the DPRK has handed over to Great Britain what it said were a set of British remains and has identified the grave of one British airman.
VATICAN. The Vatican is one of the few European states that does not extend diplomatic recognition to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, the Vatican has not cut off all ties either to the Central Committee of Korean Catholics or to the state authorities. There are occasional visits by Vatican officials, and visiting Roman Catholic priests from the Republic of Korea (ROK) or other countries are not forbidden to say Mass in the one Catholic church that exists in the capital Pyongyang. In 2005, then head of the Central Committee of Korean Catholics Samuel Jang Jae Oh sent condolences to the Vatican on behalf of DPRK Catholics on the death of Pope John Paul II. During the famine years of the 1990s, the Vatican provided some $10 million in humanitarian aid between 1996 and 1999. ROK President Kim Dae-jung said after his visit to the DPRK in July 2000 that then DPRK leader Kim Jong Il had agreed to a suggestion that the pope might visit the DPRK; this followed a statement by the pope hailing the reconciliation between the two Koreas. No such visit has taken place. See also RELIGION.

VIETNAM, RELATIONS WITH. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the then Democratic (later Socialist) Republic of (North) Vietnam established diplomatic relations in January 1950. Relations were cordial if not very deep, reaching a high point in 1958 when the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh visited the DPRK, and the DPRK leader, Kim Il Sung, made a return visit to North Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, the DPRK supported the North Vietnamese, sending fighter pilots and antiaircraft crews to Vietnam, as well as providing material assistance, including 2 million uniforms. At the same time, forces from the Republic of Korea (ROK) were supporting the United States and South Vietnamese forces. The first Vietnamese public admission of this assistance came only in 2000. The following year, the DPRK media for the first time acknowledged that DPRK armed forces had fought in the war.

Relations cooled in the 1970s, but revived again in the 1980s. In 1989, the two sides established an intergovernmental committee, which met on a number of occasions. However, as Vietnam came out of its postwar isolation
and began to pursue a policy of development, its leaders began to look at the rapid progress of the ROK as a possible model. By 1992, Vietnam, like most other communist or former communist countries, had established diplomatic relations with the ROK. This inevitably led to a cooling in relations with the DPRK. High-level visits, never very common, fell away and the intergovernmental committee did not meet between 1992 and 2000. The only high spot in those years was in foreign trade, as DPRK-produced arms, including midget submarines, were bartered for Vietnamese rice in 1996 during the DPRK famine.

By 2000, the shock of Vietnam’s decision to establish relations with the ROK had worn off, and relations warmed somewhat, as witnessed by the Vietnamese acknowledgment of the DPRK’s wartime assistance. Vietnam supported the DPRK bid to join the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum. DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam saw the graves of DPRK soldiers in Hanoi when he visited Vietnam in July 2001. The following year, the Vietnamese president visited the DPRK. The intergovernmental committee resumed meetings between 2000 and 2003, although it is not clear whether these still continue. A new complication arose around 2004, as increasing numbers of DPRK defectors/refugees reached Vietnam as well as other Southeast Asian countries. A group of 468 was allowed to go to the ROK in July 2004. Although both the Vietnamese and the ROK government tried to keep the transaction quiet, the DPRK became aware of it and was apparently not happy that it had taken place. By 2007, when the Vietnamese ruling party secretary general visited the DPRK, and DPRK premier Kim Yong Il made a return visit, relations were once again restored. Some DPRK officials have undergone economic training in Vietnam, and many commentators have argued that the Vietnamese model would be more suitable than the Chinese model for the DPRK, but there is no sign that the DPRK leadership is willing to follow it.

VINALON. Vinalon was the second man-made fiber to be invented, after nylon. It has been extensively used in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the only country known to do so, for clothing, ropes, tarpaulins, and similar products. It is derived from limestone and anthracite, both of which are abundant in the DPRK. It was first developed at the Takatsui Chemical Research Center, part of Kyoto University in Japan in 1939 by a Korean graduate of the university, Dr. Ri Sung Gi. Ri returned to Korea after the Japanese defeat in 1945 and settled in Seoul. However, little attempt was made to develop vinalon further until Ri left the Republic of Korea for the DPRK in July 1950 in the early stages of the Korean War. Under his guidance, the DPRK built the 8 February Vinalon Factory at Hamhung be-
between 1954 and 1961 and began to produce the fiber. Its 50,000-ton annual production alleviated the shortage of other fibers for textile production. The first stage of a second plant, built with assistance from the Soviet Union and also capable of producing 50,000 tons per annum, opened at Sunchon, north of Pyongyang, in 1989, but there have been no reports of its completion. Visitors to the Hamhung factory have been told that it is only operating at a fraction of its total capacity, but in 2010, DPRK leader Kim Jong Il attended a rally celebrating its return to full production. He is supposed to have made a further visit to the factory in October 2011, but there were no signs of activity later in the month. Although vinalon cloth is durable and still widely used for clothing in the DPRK, it is shiny and prone to shrinkage. Some products, such as ropes, are sold internationally, but in general, there has been little use of vinalon outside the DPRK. See also CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.

VOICE OF KOREA. The Voice of Korea (Choson ui suri) is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) international broadcasting service. Originally founded in October 1945 as Radio Pyongyang, it changed its name in 2002. It broadcasts in Korean, Chinese, Spanish, German, French, English, Russian, and Arabic. Most of its services are on shortwave frequencies, but it also has high-frequency broadcasts for neighboring countries and increasingly via satellite. Until 2000, the station broadcast coded messages directed at the Republic of Korea and some other countries. The agent Kim Hyun Hee, who was involved with the Andaman Sea bombing in 1987, said in her book, Tears of My Soul, that she had received coded messages via Radio Pyongyang while staying in China immediately before the bomb attack. Such broadcasts stopped after the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. No audience figures are available. See also INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY; MEDIA; OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA; RADIO FREE ASIA.
WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION AND SUPPORT KOREA. Although Chinese will informally refer to the Korean War (1950–53) as either Hanguk zhanzheng when dealing with the Republic of Korea or Chaoxian zhanzheng with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the official Chinese term for the war used at the time was the “War to resist U.S. aggression and support Korea” (Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng). This is still regularly used in publications, museum displays, and on monuments.

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT. During the Cold War era, Western countries controlled the supply of strategic goods to the Soviet Union, China, and other communist countries, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). This was created in the years immediately after World War II. It mainly comprised members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but also included countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, COCOM was wound up in 1994. However, the countries that had formed COCOM wished to continue restrictions on the supply of conventional arms and dual-use materials. At the United States initiative, members met at Wassenaar in the Netherlands in 1995 and drew up a new agreement, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, shortened to the Wassenaar Arrangement. This became operational from December 1996. The chief targets of the arrangement were the DPRK, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. The NATO countries were prominent in the organization, but it also included Russia and Eastern European countries, as well as many non-European states. The DPRK protested as the Wassenaar Arrangement was taking shape that it was an attempt to suffocate the independence of the countries at which it was aimed. The Wassenaar Arrangement has been used to prevent the export of various modern technologies to the DPRK, including information technology, though there is also much evidence that firms are willing to help it evade the controls. See also MISSILES AND MISSILE TESTING; NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
WEST SEA. Korean name used by both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) for the Yellow Sea, the strip of water that lies between the Korean Peninsula and the China mainland. In the DPRK, the major West Sea port is Nampo. Shinuiju, on the Yalu River, and Haeju are also West Sea ports. The main ROK port is Incheon. The sea is relatively shallow, with high tidal variations, and is a rich fishing area. This has led to clashes between DPRK, ROK, and Chinese fishing vessels and periodic naval clashes. See also NORTHERN LIMIT LINE; TERRITORIAL WATERS; YONPYONG ISLANDS.

WEST SEA BARRAGE. Work began in 1981 on this major project near the port city of Nampo in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and was completed in 1986. The DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and his son and successor Kim Jong Il are both said to have taken a keen interest in the project. Construction was carried out by units of the armed forces, and it is admitted that many lives were lost in the process; the work and the losses are commemorated in monuments at the northern end of the barrage. The cost was said to be 4 million DPRK won (some $1,860,465 at the then official exchange rate). The barrage controls shipping access to the Taedong River and thus to Pyongyang. It reduces flooding on the Taedong River, formerly a major problem but now rare, although floods did hit the city in 2007. The barrage allows for irrigation of a large area of farmland, mostly to the south, and also provides hydroelectric power. There have, however, been reports of problems, including silting, but these have been denied.

WOMEN. In July 1946, the North Korean interim government introduced a sexual equality law, the broad terms of which were later incorporated in the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The new law, taken with other measures, such as the redistribution of land and the abolition of the patrilineal registration system and the drive to end illiteracy, marked a major departure from the past. Particularly since the beginning of the Yi dynasty in 1392, Confucian principles severely restricted the role of women to the domestic sphere. While these principles may not have been as rigidly applied among the lower classes or in the countryside as they were among the aristocracy and in the cities, they did permeate all society. In an ideal Confucian world, women would remain in the background. Western missionaries and the Japanese colonial period government effected some changes in traditional attitudes, especially with regard to the education of women, but these developments had little effect on the mass of the population. The 1948 law and the other changes, which appear to have had the backing of Kim Il Sung, in theory freed women from domestic drudgery and
male domination. If women worked, they were entitled to maternity leave and suitable arrangements when pregnant or nursing. Women were given the vote, despite some opposition, and they were encouraged to take an active role in political affairs.

While Kim seems genuinely to have favored the advancement of women, there was also a practical economic reason for the provision of nurseries and other facilities, since it enabled women to take a greater role in production. This seems to have been achieved. Women only accounted for 5 percent of the industrial workforce in 1947, but the proportion had reached 15 percent by 1949. During the Korean War (1950–53), women played a full role in both frontline and rear activities, and they were prominent in postwar construction. Photographs from this period show women clearing rubble and engaged in building in the cities and in farming in the countryside, as well as selling goods in the markets. The involvement of women in the industrial workforce continued to grow, and by 1967, they made up almost half of the total. Their share has remained more or less constant, at some 45 percent of the industrial workforce and about 60 percent of the agricultural workforce in the 1980s. Given that many young men between 18 and 30 spent much of their time in the military, women in that age group may have accounted for as much as 90 percent of the workforce. Educational opportunities were also better and many women attended college or university. While there was always a small number who studied traditional male subjects, such as engineering, women are particularly well represented in education and in medicine. Formally, women’s interests are protected and advanced by the Korean Democratic Women’s League, but this is wholly under the control of the Korean Workers’ Party and has no independent voice. In 2001, the DPRK acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). As with similar conventions on the rights of the child, the DPRK seems to find it easier to abide by such conventions and, while not discussing other human rights issues, has been willing to submit reports and to engage in dialogue on the position of women.

At the same time, the reality has been that in most areas, women were and are still treated as inferior to men. It was true that they worked on the farms and in the factories, but they rarely held senior positions. In the capital, Pyongyang, women are often in higher-profile roles, including driving buses and trolleybuses, but the abiding image is of glamorous traffic police or airline hostesses on Air Koryo, rather than as captains of industry or other high-ranking roles. Women may have been formally emancipated and some burdens taken from them, but they were still the ones expected to undertake the household chores morning and evening, on top of their normal work and the political study required of all workers. Even when performing similar
tasks to men, they do not receive the same wages and do not reach the higher echelons of management. This pattern is also reflected in the political sphere. Women are included in the party and state hierarchy but never exercise the same amount of power as men. This may be changing. The famine years from the mid-1990s may have altered the balance between the sexes somewhat. As much of the country’s heavy industry ground to a halt, and as men’s wages ceased, women emerged as casual traders in the various formal and informal markets that developed as a coping mechanism.

The DPRK has encouraged women to concentrate on their femininity, especially where they are highly visible, and particularly in Pyongyang. Unlike the more puritan approach of some communist countries, makeup and smart dressing have not been discouraged, although the economic difficulties since the mid-1990s have limited what women can afford. Indeed, in Pyongyang, clear rules appear to apply to what women can wear—no trousers from spring to autumn, for example—and they are discouraged from riding bicycles. Only a certain number of hairstyles are approved, but a similar rule applies to men. Away from the capital, control is far less strict and many country women wear trousers most of the time. The prohibition on bicycle riding also seems not to apply away from the capital. Marriages still tend to be arranged, and commentators have noted that romance does not necessarily play much part in the process. Divorce, except at the very top, is difficult to obtain and not generally approved. Extramarital affairs may happen, again in the higher levels of society, but opportunity in a society where everybody watches everybody else is not easy, and physical tiredness from long work and poor diet may also act as a deterrent. Prostitution is officially forbidden but appears to exist, with women plying for customers near railway stations and other areas of relative anonymity. There have also been reports of liaisons between foreign residents and maids. See also CHILDREN’S UNION; COMFORT WOMEN; KIM BOK SHIN; KIM HYUN HEE; KIM JONG SUK; KIM KYONG HUI; KIM KYONG JIN; KIM OK; KIM SONG AE; KO YONG HUI; LIM SOO-KYUNG; RI CHUN HUI; RYO WON GU; RYO YON GU.

WONSAN. Wonsan is the capital of Kangwon Province, on the East Sea/Sea of Japan and the east end of the Korean Peninsula’s neck. Kangwon is one of the Korean provinces divided by the military demarcation line; the other is Kyonggyi Province. Its population in 2011 was about 360,000. It is linked to the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, by rail and by the 200-kilometer (125-mile) Youth Hero Highway. There is also a military and civilian dual purpose air station. Wonsan opened to foreign trade in the 1880s and was an important settlement even before the Japanese annexation of the country in 1910. During the Japanese colonial period, it
developed as a port and industrial center and was a naval base during World War II. It was the scene of heavy fighting and much destruction during the Korean War and has been completely rebuilt since then. The surveillance ship USS Pueblo was on display in Wonsan harbor for many years after its capture in the East Sea in 1968, until it was moved to Pyongyang. Wonsan has a variety of industrial centers, including an aquatic product processing factory, a shipyard, a chemical enterprise, a railway wagon factory, and a cement factory. There are several institutes of higher education, including an agricultural university. A hydroelectric power station was completed in 2009. Nearby Songdowon is a famous sea-bathing destination, as the water there is exceptionally clear. Pine trees are abundant in the surrounding area. There is an International Children’s Union Camp in the area, which hosts youth exchanges between the DPRK and other countries as well as providing resources for Korean children. The late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il was reported to have had a villa nearby. Some accounts of his son and successor, Kim Jong Un, link him to Wonsan, where his mother, Ko Yong Hui, is said to have arrived from Japan in the 1960s.
YALU RIVER. The Yalu River (the Korean name Amnokgang is much less well known than the Chinese) forms some two-thirds of the border between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Yalu, which rises on Mount Paektu, has always played an important role in relations between China and the peninsula and has been the de facto dividing line between them since the fourth century A.D. During the Korean War, Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States forces reached the Yalu in October 1950 but were then driven back when the Chinese intervened. The Yalu River area was an important center for prisoner-of-war camps, and its bridges and hydroelectric dams were a target for the United Nations air attacks. In recent years, the crossing between the DPRK city of Sinuiju and the Chinese city of Dandong has become a principal point of contact between the two countries, with important road and rail connections. During the 1990s, both the Yalu and Tumen rivers have been important escape routes for DPRK defectors/refugees crossing to the PRC. See also TRANSPORT.

YANAN FACTION. Name given to a group of Korean communists who fought with Mao Zedong and his followers, who had their headquarters at Yanan, in China’s Shaanxi Province. They included Kim Tu Bong and Mu Chong. Like other China-based groups, they returned to Korea after the end of the war in 1945. Many were well trained and experienced. They played an active role in Soviet-occupied Korea, and, after September 1948, in the newly established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, they were viewed with suspicion both by the Soviet Koreans and even more by Kim Il Sung and his Kapsan faction. Using a variety of excuses, Kim had them all purged during or immediately after the Korean War, leaving him in full control in the DPRK.

YANBIAN KOREAN AUTONOMOUS REGION. A district on the Chinese side of the border between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), this region, known as Yongbyong in Korean, has the largest concentration of ethnic Koreans
in China. Although there are Korean claims that this is historically part of Korea, in modern times, Koreans settled the region from the late 19th century onward. The Republic of Korea foreign ministry estimated that the total Korean population of China was about 2.3 million in 2009. Of these, just under 2 million are permanent residents, with a majority living in the Yanbian area. The region has always had strong ties to the DPRK, and there are many cross-border family links. However, since the late 1980s, ties have also developed with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Many ROK businesses have established factories in the area, and there are close links between some ROK educational institutes and those in Yanbian. During the famine years of the 1990s, many Koreans crossed the border into Yanbian in search of food. At first, most returned, but in due course, Yanbian became a staging point for DPRK defectors/refugees trying to escape the country. It also attracted missionary and other groups wishing to help or to profit from these refugees. Authorities on both sides make periodic attempts to clamp down on this cross-border trafficking.

YANG BIN (1961–). Yang Bin was the designated head of the Shinuiju Special Administrative Region that was announced in September 2002. Born in Nanjing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), he was orphaned at the age of five and reared by his grandmother. After service in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army navy, he went to the Netherlands in 1987 and eventually obtained Dutch citizenship. In 1995, he returned to China and established the Euro–Asia Agricultural (Holdings) Company, which was quoted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The company’s main business was orchid production near Shenyang (PRC), where he also proposed to establish a Dutch-style residential complex, Holland Village. According to Forbes magazine, he was the second richest man in the PRC by 2001. By then, he also had contacts in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He began to appear at functions in Pyongyang, and there were rumors that he was close to the country’s leader Kim Jong Il. He was also said to have obtained permission to use land near the Kumsusan Memorial Palace in Pyongyang for tulip fields. It was apparently these contacts that led to his appointment as head of the planned special region at the border city of Shinuiju.

However, the DPRK appears not to have informed the PRC of its plans for Shinuiju, which would have required Chinese assistance in order to operate the zone’s proposed no visa policy, which would also have had implications for Chinese plans to designate Dandong on the opposite bank of the Yalu River as a Border Economic Co-operation Zone. Neither had the DPRK notified the PRC of Yang’s appointment. There was no public PRC comment on the zone or on Yang’s role, but when the latter, who had retained Chinese citi-
YON HYUNG MUK (1931–2005). Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1989 to 1992, Yon was born to a revolutionary family in North Hamgyong Province. He was educated at the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, at Kim Il Sung University, and in Czechoslovakia (some reports say in the former Soviet Union), where he studied engineering. He first came to prominence as an official of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), specializing in matters relating to heavy industry. He became a secretary of the party’s Central Committee in 1968, then an alternate and later a full member of the Politburo. By the end of the 1970s, Yon began to take on government roles in addition to his party functions. In 1985, he became head (minister equivalent) of the metal and machine industry commission and a deputy premier. Later that same year, he became first
deputy premier, and then in 1989, premier. In this role, he played an active part in the DPRK–Republic of Korea contacts during the early 1990s. He was dismissed as premier and also demoted to alternate member of the Politburo in 1992, becoming chief secretary of the Jagang Province party committee. However, he retained his position as a member of the National Defense Commission (NDC), to which he was appointed in 1988, and he became an NDC vice chair in 2003. He was also a member of the Supreme People’s Assembly, first elected in 1967. He received various honors, including Labor Hero and the Order of Kim Il Sung. He served on the funeral committee for Kim Il Sung in 1994, when he was ranked 21st, and 18th for the funeral committee for O Jin U.

YONGBYON. A village situated some 90 kilometers (55 miles) north of Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Yongbyon, which is the Republic of Korea’s pronunciation of the name, has become the normal international usage; in the DPRK the village is called Nongbyon. It has been the center of the DPRK’s nuclear program since the 1960s and has formed the main focus of international concern about that program. Activities at the site were capped between 1994 and 2002 under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. When that broke down during the first George W. Bush presidency, the DPRK resumed activities there. It is assumed that the plutonium used in the DPRK’s first nuclear test in October 2006 came from Yongbyon. Following another agreement in 2007, work again stopped at Yongbyon, and in a symbolic gesture, the cooling tower on the site was demolished in 2008. But the 2007 agreement did not hold and a second nuclear test, again using plutonium from Yongbyon, took place in 2009. In November 2010, the DPRK revealed the existence of a large enriched uranium plant at the site to a group of visiting United States nuclear experts. See also ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

YONPYONG ISLANDS. Group of islands in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) that has been under Republic of Korea (ROK) control since the Korean War. Their name is usually romanized in the ROK since 2000 as Yeonpyeong. The islands lie north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a maritime boundary that was unilaterally designated by the United Nations Command (UNC) after the Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953. Two of the islands are inhabited. They are administered as part of Ongjin county, Inchon, and lie some two hours’ travel time by fast catamaran from that port. They lie very close to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with the nearest point some 8 kilometers (5 miles) away. The DPRK shows the islands as ROK territory on maps but has refused to recognize the NLL. There
have been periodic clashes in or near the islands since the early 2000s, often as a result of contending fishing activities. The most serious of these came in November 2010. The ROK navy announced that it would stage a live firing exercise in the area, as it had done several times in the past, and went ahead despite DPRK protests. On 23 November 2010, DPRK onshore artillery batteries opened fire on the largest of the islands, destroying several buildings and killing two civilians and two ROK marines. The ROK responded by firing at the batteries concerned, but it is not known if there were any DPRK casualties.

The DPRK action attracted much international condemnation, although the DPRK said the incident was the result of ROK provocation and China, which did not condemn the DPRK, ensured that the United Nations was not able to impose further sanctions as a result of the incident. The DPRK threatened retaliation if the ROK carried out such exercises again. However, when the ROK conducted a further live ammunition exercise in late December, the DPRK did not respond, saying that it was not necessary to respond to “every provocation.” See also CHONAN INCIDENT; PAENGNYONG ISLAND GROUP; TERRITORIAL WATERS.

YOUTH LEAGUE. See KIM IL SUNG SOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE.

YUN I-SANG (1917–1995). Yun was the most famous Korean composer of the 20th century, but for most of his life, he was more honored in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) than in the Republic of Korea (ROK). He was born in Tongyong, in South Kyongsang Province. He studied Western music in Seoul and in Japan, where he was also active in Korean revolutionary groups. He was briefly imprisoned for his activities toward the end of the Japanese colonial period. After Japan’s defeat, he returned to Seoul where he taught music until he won a major competition in 1955, which allowed him to study music in the Federal Republic of Germany. There he acquired an international reputation as a serialist composer, while at the same time drawing more and more on his Korean roots. However, in 1967, he and his wife, along with other South Koreans in Germany, were kidnapped by the ROK Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA; now the National Intelligence Service) and brought back to the ROK, where they were accused of spying for the DPRK. Yun was sentenced to life imprisonment, which was later reduced. Following an international outcry, including protests by the German government, he was released after two years and allowed to return to Germany.

Thereafter, Yun’s music became more political and more Korean. He visited the DPRK several times, where the government provided an apartment
for him. He established the Yun I-Sang Music Institute in central Pyongyang, where visiting musicians perform his music. Ironically, however, a DPRK film about his capture and imprisonment, Yun sangmin, which appeared in The Nation and Destiny series in 1992, in which he was shown composing a symphony in prison, did not use his music since it does not fit the prevailing view of music in the DPRK. Yun remained highly critical of the ROK government under Park Chung-hee and his successors, and for a time he became chair of the overseas headquarters of the National Alliance for the Country’s Reunification, a DPRK front organization. After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, Yun, who was ill in Germany at the time, did not immediately return to the DPRK, which led to the closure of his center for a number of years. He never returned to the ROK, where his music was banned.

After his death from pneumonia in November 1995, however, the ROK’s changed political climate led to increased interest in him and his music, which is now regularly performed in the ROK. He has also been reinstated as a popular figure in the DPRK, and the institute named after him functions again. There is an annual series of concerts in his name, and a Yun I-Sang Music Festival was held in Pyongyang in 1998; it has since become a regular event. On such occasions, his music is played, but it is not otherwise performed in the DPRK. In October 2008, musicians from the North and South played his music together in the festival for the first time. His widow and daughter continue to keep an apartment in Pyongyang and are regular visitors to the DPRK. The former made her first visit to Seoul in 40 years in 2007.
ZHOU ENLAI (1898–1976). Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai in the Wade–Giles romanization) was premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 until his death. He came from a reasonably well-off family in Jiangxi Province. He studied in Japan and in the early 1920s went to France on a work-study program. While in France, he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but on his return to China in 1924, he worked with the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) until the latter turned on the CCP in 1927. Thereafter, Zhou was associated with the CCP. From 1934, he worked with Mao Zedong, a partnership that lasted until Zhou’s death. During the 1930s and 1940s, Zhou proved to be a skilled negotiator, and after 1949, an equally skilled administrator. For 10 years until 1959, he combined the roles of premier and foreign minister. He was heavily involved in matters relating to the Korean War and led the PRC delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference. He remained politically active until the end of his life, often acting as a restraining influence on Mao, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Zhou made a number of visits to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and he remains a popular figure there. On the 110th anniversary of his birth in 2008, the party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, stated that the “Korean people pay high tribute to Zhou Enlai,” who had made a “big contribution to Sino-DPRK relations.” A statue of him stands in the DPRK’s main fertilizer factory in the industrial town of Hamhung. After his death, his widow, Deng Yingchao (1904–92), who was chair of the Chinese People’s Consultative Committee from 1983 to 1988, regularly received DPRK delegations and was reputed to favor close relations between the two countries.

ZIMBABWE, RELATIONS WITH. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) links with Zimbabwe go back to the first years after the country gained its independence in 1980. In 1981, the DPRK supplied Zimbabwe with tanks and weapons and sent 106 soldiers to train the Fifth Brigade of the Zambian army. This brigade later became notorious for its ferocity in suppressing an uprising in Matabeleland and was disbanded in 1985. Also during the 1980s, seven DPRK artists from the Mansudae Art Studio worked with a large number of Zimbabweans to create the National Heroes Acre near
Harare, a monument to those who had died in the fight for independence; it shows a strong resemblance to similar monuments in the DPRK. When Kim Yong Nam, the Supreme People’s Assembly chairman, and DPRK symbolic head of state and Ri Ryong Nam, minister of foreign trade visited Zimbabwe in May 2009, the Zimbabwe foreign minister described the monument as “a prominent symbol of friendship.” Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, who met Kim Il Sung on several occasions, is said to be an admirer of the juche philosophy. See also FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Appendix A

Korean Armistice Agreement 27 July 1953


PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.
3. This Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the military demarcation line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil
police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by
the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry
arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice
Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the
complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized
Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint
Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations
Inspection teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, mate-
rials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized
Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of move-
ment shall be permitted through the territory under the military control
of either side over any route necessary to move between points within
the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads
lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a
complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under
their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval,
and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agree-
ment is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of
the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to fa-
cilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by
both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders
of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies,
and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise
provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements,
and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military
Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to ex-
ist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military
forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such
hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by
the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards.
Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized forty-five (54) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term “coastal islands”, as used above, refers to those islands, which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANG-HAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58’N, 124°40’E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50’N, 124°42’E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46’N, 124°46’E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38’N, 125°40’E), and U-DO (37°36’N, 125°58’E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the island on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3).

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope
“Rotation” is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replace which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat
aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this armistice agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (see Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.
j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively co-operate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's
Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.
30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term “neutral nations” as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission
may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications
personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided however that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY
41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
   a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
   b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
   c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs of characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.
   d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.
   e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory un-
der the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraphs, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels used in the performance of this mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry.

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

- INCHON (37°28'N, 126°38'E)
- TAEGU (35°52'N, 128°36'E)
- PUSAN (35°45'N, 129°02'E)
- KANGNUNG (37°45'N, 128°54'E)
- KUNSAN (35°59'N, 126°43'E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers

- SINUIJU (40°06'N, 124°24'E)
- CHONGJIN (41°46'N, 129°49'E)
- HUNGNAM (39°50'N, 127°37'E)
- MANPO (41°46'N, 126°18'E)
- SINANJU (39°36'N, 125°36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).
3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as information only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.
49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, or personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto, “Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.”

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to other side shall, for the purposes of the Armistice Agreement, be called “repatriation” in English, “song hwan” in Korean and “ch’ien fan” in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.
52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56.

a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervision the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when neces-
sary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Committee upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57.

a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representative from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the Joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all of the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.
58.  

a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59.  

a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and who on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon
the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control of contents of the provisions of this subparagraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displace Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and
to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

ARTICLE V

MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
NAM IL                       WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
General, Korean People’s Army    Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate                  Senior Delegate

Subsequently signed by
Kim Il Sung, Marshall, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Supreme
Commander, Korean People’s Army
Peng The-huai, Commander, Chinese People’s Volunteers
Mark W. Clark, General United States Army, Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command

(A variety of texts exist, with slight variations in punctuation and layout)
Appendix B

North–South Joint Declaration 4 July 1972

Lee Hu-Rak, director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, visited Pyongyang in the period from May 2 to 5, 1972, and had talks with Kim Yong Ju, director of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang, and Vice-Premier Park Sung Chul, acting on behalf of Director Kim Yong Ju, visited Seoul in the period from May 29 to June 1, 1972, and held further talks with Director Lee Hu-Rak.

With the common desire of achieving the peaceful unification of the nation as early as possible, the two sides engaged in a frank and openhearted exchange of views during these talks and made great progress towards promoting mutual understanding.

In an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust, and mitigate the heightened tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a consequence of their long period of division and moreover to expedite unification, the two sides reached full agreement in respect of the following issues.

1. The two sides agreed on the following principles as a basis of achieving unification:
   First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.
   Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, without resorting to the use of force against each other;
   Third, a great national unity shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake military provocations, whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.

3. In order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, the two sides have agreed to carry out numerous exchanges in various fields.
4. The two sides have agreed to actively cooperate in seeking the early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are currently in progress with the fervent support of the entire nation.

5. In order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents and to deal directly, promptly, and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.

6. In order to implement the above items, to solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification, the two sides have agreed to establish and operate a South–North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak and Director Kim Yong Ju.

7. Firmly convinced that the above items of agreement correspond with the common aspirations of the entire Korean people, all of whom who are anxious for an early unification, the two sides solemnly pledge before the entire Korean nation to faithfully carry out these agreed items.

Agreed upon July 4th 1972

Lee Hu-Rak, South side delegate,

Kim Yong Ju North side delegate

(NB. There are slight variations of wording, but not of meaning, in the texts issued by the two sides. In addition, in versions issued by the DPRK, North and Pyongyang come first and South and Seoul second.)
Appendix C

Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 21 October 1994

Signed Geneva, 21 October 1994

Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue.

I.

Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1. In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
   a. The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
   b. The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
   c. As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

2. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of
   a. Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
   b. Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3. Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR’s and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.
   a. The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
   b. Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
   c. The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4. As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
   a. At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
   b. At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II.

The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations
1. Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2. Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.

3. As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III.

Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula

1. The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2. The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3. The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV.

Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime

1. The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

2. Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3. When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the
accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci  Kang Sok Ju
Head of Delegation of the Head of the Delegation of the
United States of America, Democratic People’s Republic of
Ambassador at Large of the Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
United States of America of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(Text from http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptagframe.pdf?_=1316553697
&_=1316553697)
Appendix D

June 2000 North–South Joint Declaration

In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.

The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South–North relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.
3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.
4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields.
5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements expeditiously.

President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong Il will visit Seoul at an appropriate time.
Kim Dae-jung
President, Republic of Korea

Kim Jong Il,
Chairman, National Defense Commission
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
June 15, 2000

As the special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission, the First Vice Chairman, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited the United States of America from October 9–12, 2000.

During his visit, Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok delivered a letter from National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il, as well as his views on US–DPRK relations, directly to US President William Clinton. Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok and his party also met with senior officials of the US Administration, including his host Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen, for an extensive exchange of views on issues of common concern. They reviewed in depth the new opportunities that have opened up for improving the full range of relations between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The meetings proceeded in a serious, constructive, and businesslike atmosphere, allowing each side to gain a better understanding of the other's concerns.

Recognizing the changed circumstances on the Korean Peninsula created by the historic inter-Korean summit, the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relations in the interests of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two sides agreed there are a variety of available means, including Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.

Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the US and the DPRK sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.

Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 US–DPRK Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and
maintain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and noted the value of regular diplomatic contacts, bilaterally and in broader fora.

The two sides agreed to work together to develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation and exchanges. To explore the possibilities for trade and commerce that will benefit the peoples of both countries and contribute to an environment conducive to greater economic cooperation throughout Northeast Asia, the two sides discussed an exchange of visits by economic and trade experts at an early date.

The two sides agreed that resolution of the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. To further the efforts to build new relations, the DPRK informed the US that it will not launch long-range missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue.

Pledging to redouble their commitment and their efforts to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed Framework, the US and the DPRK strongly affirmed its importance to achieving peace and security on a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula. To this end, the two sides agreed on the desirability of greater transparency in carrying out their respective obligations under the Agreed Framework. In this regard, they noted the value of the access which removed US concerns about the underground site at Kumchang-ri.

The two sides noted that in recent years they have begun to work cooperatively in areas of common humanitarian concern. The DPRK side expressed appreciation for significant US contributions to its humanitarian needs in areas of food and medical assistance. The US side expressed appreciation for DPRK cooperation in recovering the remains of US servicemen still missing from the Korean War, and both sides agreed to work for rapid progress for the fullest possible accounting. The two sides will continue to meet to discuss these and other humanitarian issues.

As set forth in their Joint Statement of October 6, 2000, the two sides agreed to support and encourage international efforts against terrorism.

Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok explained to the US side developments in the inter-Korean dialogue in recent months, including the results of the historic North-South summit. The US side expressed its firm commitment to assist in all appropriate ways the continued progress and success of ongoing North-South dialogue and initiatives for reconciliation and greater cooperation, including increased security dialogue.
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok expressed his appreciation to President Clinton and the American people for their warm hospitality during the visit. It was agreed that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will visit the DPRK in the near future to convey the views of US President William Clinton directly to Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission and to prepare for a possible visit by the President of the United States.

(Text from Office of International Information Programs, United States Department of State.)
Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese Prime Minister, met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.

The two top leaders shared the view that liquidating the unpleasant past between the DPRK and Japan, settling the pending issues and establishing fruitful political, economic and cultural relations between them are in the basic interests of both sides and greatly conducive to regional peace and stability.

1. Both sides decided to exert all efforts to establish the diplomatic ties at an early date on the basis of the spirit and main principle laid down in the declaration and resume the negotiations on opening them within October, 2002.

   Both sides expressed strong resolution to sincerely address all issues existing between the two countries in the course of normalizing the ties on the basis of relationship based on mutual trust.

2. The Japanese side honestly admitted the historical facts that it had inflicted huge damage and sufferings upon the Korean people during its past colonial rule over Korea and keenly reflected on and sincerely apologized for them.

   Both sides decided to earnestly discuss the specific scope and content of economic cooperation at the talks for normalizing the diplomatic ties on the basis of basic understanding that it is in the spirit of the declaration for the Japanese side to render economic cooperation to the DPRK side including grants in aid, low-interest long-term loans and humanitarian aid through international organizations and provide loans and credit through the International Cooperation Bank of Japan, etc. from the viewpoint of aiding non-governmental economic activities in the period both sides think appropriate after the normalization of diplomatic ties.

   Both sides agreed to consult the normalization of diplomatic relations in detail at the talks for normalizing diplomatic relations on the basic principle of abandoning each other’s claims on national and individual assets that existed before August 15, 1945.
They agreed to sincerely discuss the status of Koreans in Japan and cultural treasures at the talks on normalizing diplomatic relations.

3. Both sides confirmed their will to observe international law and refrain from threatening mutual security. As regards the pending issue concerning the life and security of Japanese nationals the DPRK side declared that it would take a proper measure to prevent the recurrence of such regrettable things, a product of the abnormal relations between the DPRK and Japan.

4. Both sides affirmed their will to cooperate with each other to preserve and consolidate peace and stability in northeast Asia.

   Both sides shared the understanding that it is important to underscore the importance of building a structure of cooperative relations based on confidence among the countries concerned in the region and reinforce the framework to promote the confidence-building in the region in step with the normalization of their relations.

   Both sides affirmed the pledge to observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. They also underscored the need to facilitate the settlement of problems by promoting the dialogue among the countries concerned as regards all security matters including nuclear and missile issues.

   The DPRK side expressed its will to extend its moratorium on missile tests beyond 2003 in the spirit of the declaration.

   Both sides agreed to discuss issues related to ensuring security.

Kim Jong Il                                          Junichiro Koizumi
Chairman of the National Defence Commission,        Prime Minister of Japan
DPRK
September 17, 2002 Pyongyang

(Text from KCNA 17 September 2002. The text at Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html is based on a different translation and reverses the name order of the two leaders, but there appears to be no difference in the meaning.)
The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasaé, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexandr Alekséyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in a spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

   The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

   The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

   The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

Appendix G

Six Party Talks Joint Statement 19 September 2005
The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.

The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005, concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.”

6. The six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six-party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

(United States State Department at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm)
The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action”.

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

Appendix H


The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

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1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase—which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant—economic, energy and
humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

Appendix I

The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7),
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
Stressing its collective support for the NPT and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT in any case,
Deploring the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,
Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,
Expressing its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further generated increased tension in the
region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. **Condemns** in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

2. **Demands** that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;

3. **Decides** that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;

4. **Demands** that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);

5. **Demands** that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;

6. **Demands** further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

7. **Calls upon** all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (“the Committee”) pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);

8. **Decides** that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;
9. **Decides** that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;

10. **Decides** that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and **calls upon** States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms or light weapons, and further **decides** that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;

11. **Calls upon** all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. **Calls upon** all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

13. **Calls upon** all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11;

14. **Decides** to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council
resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

15. Requires any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13, or seizes and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;

16. Requires any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph 12 or 13 to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;

17. Decides that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

18. Calls upon Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial as-
sistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;

20. Calls upon all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities;

21. Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

22. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 of this resolution;

23. Decides that the measures set out at paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a;

24. Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution, including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;

25. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and this resolution, through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant to paragraphs 10, 15, 16, and 22 of this resolution;
26. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts ("Panel of Experts"), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

27. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;

28. Calls upon all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

29. Calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;

30. Supports peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six Party Talks without precondition, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

31. Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;
32. **Affirms** that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant paragraphs of this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK’s compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;

33. **Underlines** that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;

34. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, there were relatively few publications on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) compared to those available on the Republic of Korea (ROK). That is no longer the case. Since the early 1990s, a torrent of DPRK-related books and articles has appeared. However, coverage of the DPRK is still not comprehensive. There is much on the Korean War, although this is diminishing a little as the first wave of archive research has now passed. Earlier books often referred to the war as the “forgotten war,” but such a description is now long out of date. There is still a gap, however, because the DPRK has published relatively little in English on the war. Other well-covered topics include the DPRK nuclear and missile programs, food shortages, and human rights issues. Large areas still remain untouched, either from lack of interest or, more usually, from lack of information.

The DPRK remains a secretive society, which discourages inquirers. Its media do not engage in investigative journalism or seek to criticize the authorities; rather the emphasis is on unremitting support for the army, the party, and the leader. Few foreign scholars have been able to visit the DPRK, and those who have done so have found their access to materials and people restricted. Journalists are even more hampered. After the mid-1990s, information derived from the work of the international aid agencies, from nongovernmental organizations, and from diplomatic missions operating in the DPRK added to our knowledge.

Since the late 1980s, the development of the Internet has changed the way in which scholars work. Much is now published in e-journals that once would have appeared only in print. This is as true for the DPRK as for any other country, although the same caveats apply to the web as to other sources of information. Certain topics attract a
lot of coverage, and equally, those that have received little attention in conventional publications remain equally unpopular on the web. Websites and web journals that provide a regular supply of material on the DPRK are listed below. The usual caution should be applied; DPRK-related websites are as likely as any other to suddenly cease to function and even to disappear altogether. They also attract conspiracy theorists and sycophants. Beyond those listed here, the range is huge, from some that are DPRK owned, through a variety of supporters, to the very hostile. There are numerous sites relating to the Korean War, including some that support the DPRK’s position as to the origin of the war. Wikipedia carries much material about both Koreas, but it too has to be used with caution. The struggle between the two Koreas is often reflected in the way its pages are written or edited.

Much published material, whether in conventional or electronic form, is often frankly polemical; the DPRK is not a country that invites indifference. Publications from the DPRK and those published in other countries by its supporters relating to Kim Il Song and Kim Jong Il are hagiographic. By contrast, works published elsewhere on the two leaders or on the system tend to be highly critical. A judicious and balanced account is rare.

The present bibliography is designed to give the nonspecialist reader a wide range of sources from which to begin developing an understanding of the DPRK. It is largely confined to English-language material. For those who read Russian, Japanese, Chinese, or Korean, there is much available. Some of this scholarship gets translated, especially in journals and on the web, and that is reflected in the bibliography. While the bibliography aims to be as up to date as possible, including works published up to early 2011, it also includes older works that still have value. It also includes a number of works published in the DPRK in order to indicate what is available. These will not be on sale in a local bookshop in the United States or Great Britain, but they may well be in academic libraries, especially where Korean studies are part of the curriculum. Books relating to security and the nuclear question are also likely to be available in most academic libraries, since these subjects have attracted attention well beyond centers of Korean studies.

Some of the more recent books published in the DPRK can often be purchased online; there are a number of outlets selling DPRK books, magazines, compact discs, and video or DVD recordings. It is also possible to purchase stamps, posters, and other artwork. Until the mid-1990s, such items were seen more as a means of publicizing the country than of making money, so they were cheap. Today, even if the DPRK is not a capitalist nation, those who sell such material, either on behalf of the DPRK or their own account, have come to realize that there is money to be made and prices have risen accordingly. If you have the opportunity to visit the DPRK, however, you will find that prices are much more reasonable and that even bargaining has become acceptable. That said, outlets are limited and there is no guarantee that what you are seeking will be readily available. But keep looking, as the most unexpected items may turn up in out-of-the-way places!

The bibliography is perhaps more patchy than many others in the “Historical Dictionary” series, an inevitable result of the still limited information from the DPRK. There is little on architecture, for example, although it is covered to a limited extent in Jane Portal’s book Art under Control in North Korea and in some of the picture
books, and there is very little on food. Many categories overlap; where does history end and politics begin? Is food aid to be covered under international relations, human rights, or some other category? One can only ask that the reader persists. If what is needed is not available here, then there are a number of aids that may help. The best general bibliography is to be found at the regularly updated http://ks207.moore.hawaii.edu/ref/index.php. Frank Hoffman’s CD-ROM, *Harvard Korean Studies Bibliography*, is a vast compilation, useful for older and sometimes more obscure works, but it only lists publications up to 1997.

The DPRK often now features in guidebooks devoted mainly to the Republic of Korea, but Robert Willoughby’s *North Korea: The Bradt Travel Guide*, now in a second edition, is one of the few guidebooks that are devoted exclusively to the DPRK. It is clear and straightforward. Chris Springer’s *Pyongyang* is the only guide to a particular DPRK city and is packed with interesting information about both the capital and the regime. The DPRK’s National Tourism’s *Korea Tour*, published in 1997, is also useful. All maps of the DPRK are likely to be defective in some way, although satellite imagery has improved the situation in recent years. Many industrial and military sites are underground, however, and do not appear on maps.

Among periodical publications, the *North Korea Quarterly*, published for many years by the Institute für Asienkunde in Hamburg, is a much missed source of information. *Vantage Point*, from Seoul, and now also available on the web, is much less polemical than it used to be, and taps into a wide range of sources.

Most general histories of Korea available in English have little coverage of the DPRK; indeed, some cover the whole peninsula only until 1945, preferring to concentrate thereafter on the Republic of Korea. An exception is Bruce Cumings’s *Korea’s Place in the Sun*. Not only is it very readable, but it also gives a nonpolemical account of the DPRK. Ken Quinones and Joseph Tragert’s *Complete Idiot’s Guide to North Korea* has the usual quirksiness of that series, but benefits from Quinones’ insights derived from his time as a U.S. foreign service officer dealing with both Koreas. Suh Dae-sook’s *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948* is a reliable account of the origins of Korean communism and the beginnings of the DPRK. More comprehensive, and taking the story up to the beginning of the 1970s, is Scalapino and Lee’s two volume work, *Communism in Korea*. No comparable work exists covering the period since then, although Suh Dae-sook’s biography, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader*, is good not just on Kim Il Sung but also on how the DPRK developed under his leadership. Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig’s *North Korea through the Looking Glass* is also worth reading.

Literature on the Korean War is vast. As well as numerous combat accounts, the opening of archives in the 1980s led to a flood of books on the politics and international dimensions of the war. That said, since no DPRK archives have been opened, there are few accounts that give the DPRK perspective. One work that tries to is Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings’s *Korea: The Unknown War: An Illustrated History*, derived in part from a major study of the war produced by Great Britain’s Thames Television in the mid-1980s. For the international history of the war, the most up-to-date perspective comes from two books by William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, published in 1997, and *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Both also have the advantage of being extremely readable.
After the war, it becomes more complicated. Interesting books on politics include Adrian Buzo’s *The Guerrilla Dynasty* and Don Oberdorfer’s *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, by a former diplomat and a distinguished journalist, respectively. Lim Jae-cheon’s *Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea* is full of information and avoids the venom of some accounts. Life in the DPRK is covered in Andrei Lankov’s collection of essays, *North of the DMZ*, in Helen-Louise Hunter’s now dated *Kim Il-song’s North Korea*, originally prepared for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and in Oh and Hassig’s *The Hidden People of North Korea*. On the famine, see Andrew Natsios, *The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy*, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform*, and Hazel Smith, *Hungry for Peace*, which looks at wider issues than the famine.

There is little on foreign affairs as such, but much on security and nuclear matters. This includes academic studies and accounts by those who were involved. Mike Chinoy’s *Meltdown* is one of the more comprehensive and readable accounts. Hazel Smith has edited a useful collection of papers on these subjects, in *Reconstituting Korean Security*.

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Dr. James E. Hoare was a member of the British Diplomatic Service from 1969 to 2003. He holds a B.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of London. He served in the British Embassies in Seoul (1981–85) and Beijing (1988–91). Following Britain’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in December 2000, he became the first British representative to Pyongyang, where he served from May 2001 to October 2002. Since his retirement, he has regularly written and broadcast about the DPRK and currently teaches a course on the subject at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He revisited the DPRK in May 2004 and again in October 2011. Among his publications are Japan’s Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements 1859–1899: Uninvited Guests in Meiji Japan and Embassies in the East: The Story of the British and Their Embassies in China, Japan and Korea from 1859 to the Present. Together with his wife, Susan Pares, he has written a number of books on Korea, including, Korea: An Introduction and North Korea in the 21st Century: An Interpretative Guide. He was coeditor of the second edition of Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea.