Trouble in the West
Egypt and the Persian Empire
525-332 BCE

Stephen Ruzicka
Trouble in the West
OXFORD STUDIES IN EARLY EMPIRES

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Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525–332 BCE
Stephen Ruzicka
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Stephen Ruzicka
To my wife, Camilla Anne Cornelius
For her enduring love and her loving endurance
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This book had its beginning when as a fledgling ancient historian I was trying to make sense of the “minor” terms of the King’s Peace of 387/6 BCE, the Persian king’s claims to Cyprus and Clazomenae, and concluded that Persia’s Egyptian problems, particularly the failure of the first fourth-century Persian attempt to reconquer Egypt, best explained Persian policies in the west. I found, however, that while many scholars made reference to Persia’s fourth-century Egyptian War and suggested that it influenced Persian policies elsewhere, there was actually no extended treatment of Persian-Egyptian conflict beyond a chapter in Friedrich Karl Kienitz’s *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin, 1953), and nothing at all that employed a Persian perspective.

*Trouble in the West: The Persian Empire and Egypt, 525–332 BCE* attempts to fill this void by reconstructing the story of the Persian-Egyptian conflict from the sixth to the fourth century and by exploring the ways in which this conflict affected Persian dealings with various other peoples in the eastern Mediterranean, Anatolian, and Aegean worlds. Beyond contributing to a fuller understanding of Persian imperial history, reconstruction of the Persian-Egyptian conflict allows us to see Persian imperial history in a broader context as one phase of a much longer history of “trouble in the west”—the problem of Egypt—that successive Near Eastern empires faced and tried to deal with.

It would not have been possible even to attempt such a study without the transformative contributions to Achaemenid history, Late Egyptian history, and eastern Mediterranean history that have appeared in recent years. Over the last several decades scholars have been trying to look at the Persian Empire in its own terms rather than through the lens of Persian-Greek relations, emphasizing where possible Persian and other non-Greek sources such as the Persepolis Tablets and the Fortification Tablets, looking at all the areas embraced by the Persian Empire, and analyzing Persian practices and ideology in a Near Eastern context. Simply put, we
now have a “new Achaemenid history” marked by much fuller understanding of the Persian Empire from the inside.

Similarly, increased scholarly interest in Late Egyptian history and in particular in the so-called Libyan period has served to bring into greater focus the distinctive features of Egyptian political organization (particularly regarding fragmentary or “polycentric” kingship) and ideology of the centuries immediately preceding Persian conquest. We can see that despite the great antiquity of Egypt, there is much that was relatively new in the Egypt that the Persians encountered.

In addition, over the last twenty years or so an enormous number of special studies in the histories of supposedly minor peoples and marginal regions of the eastern Mediterranean have added much to our understanding of the Near Eastern and Egyptian peripheries—the Levant and southern Anatolia. Regions such as Cilicia and eastern Anatolia are beginning to emerge from their previous nearly complete obscurity. The Achaemenid History Workshop publications and those appearing in the new journal *Transeuphratène* are particularly notable. Recent studies on sites in the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian Delta have added further new material.

In moving this study to publication, I am grateful to Stefan Vranka, Classics, Ancient History, and Archaeology editor at Oxford University Press, for his encouragement and to Walter Scheidel of Stanford University, editor of *Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, for very helpful suggestions about placing the fourth-century BCE Persian-Egyptian conflict in a broad historical context. I also thank Christopher Tuplin of Liverpool University for valuable advice on various matters. I owe the title to a suggestion once made to me by Richard Stoneman.

More than my dedication can indicate, I am indebted to my wife, Camilla Anne Cornelius, not only for her stimulating companionship and support but for her continuing love for a too often distracted husband. My daughters Avery Ruzicka and Madhu Cornelius have lived with my preoccupations over many years as well, never asking (at least out loud) about the significance of the Persian-Egyptian war in the larger scheme of things.
In the interest of sustaining correspondence in the text with what we encounter in the sources, the text employs the names for both Persian and Egyptian kings and officials that our Greek sources typically use. The only point where it is helpful to call attention to the difference between Greek and native versions involves Greek use of the same name Nectanebo for two quite different kings of the 30th Dynasty, Nakhtnebef (= Nectanebo I, r. 380–362) and Nakhthorheb (= Nectanebo II, r. 360–343).
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INTRODUCTION: STORIES AND SOURCES

The Persian Empire looms large in sixth–fourth-century BCE Greek history.* In fact, it could be said that Persian-Greek conflicts frame this whole period and were responsible in broad terms for much of what happened in the Greek world between the 540s and 330s. The Persian king Cyrus’ conquest of the Lydians in western Anatolia brought Persian power all the way to the Aegean and subjected Asian Greek cities to Persian rule in the 540s. Then, reacting to Athens and Eretria’s involvement in the revolt of some of those cities in the early 490s, Persian armies pushed to the Greek mainland, initiating a decades-long Greek-Persian War. During this war, the Athenian-centered anti-Persian alliance system, termed the Delian League by modern scholars, took shape. League forces succeeded in expelling the Persians entirely from the Aegean and westernmost Anatolia. But the attendant growth of Athenian power provoked opposition on the Greek mainland and precipitated the prolonged Spartan-led war against Athens known as the Peloponnesian War (431–404). The Persians again assumed a critical role in Greek affairs in the latter stages of that war when in 412 Persian satraps (governors) in western Anatolia began subsidizing Sparta’s ultimately successful maritime efforts against Athens. Persian engagement in Greek affairs persisted after the Peloponnesian War as they warred with the Spartans, who at the end of the fifth century turned against the Persian king and supported Asian Greeks determined to remain free of imperial control. In part by fostering opposition to Sparta on the Greek mainland, the Persians prevailed, and in 387/6 the Persian king asserted his claim to Asian Greek cities and dictated a common peace to the Greek world as a whole. Now favored by the Persian king, the Spartans ended up pursuing their own interests too aggressively on the Greek mainland, inciting renewed hostilities. This led finally to Sparta’s defeat by Thebes and the end of Sparta’s dominant role in Greek affairs, but not to

* Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all dates are BCE.
enduring Greek peace. In the face of continuing Greek instability, some Greeks began to view a Panhellenic war against the Persians as the only way to unify warring Greek city-states. Finally, in the 330s, under the leadership of Philip of Macedon and then his son Alexander, Greeks joined with Macedonian forces to undertake just such a war and to put an end to the Persian Empire.

Because Persia was continuously so central to Greek affairs, Greeks believed that Greece was similarly of paramount importance in Persian affairs. As one scholar recently observed, “the Greek states deluded themselves that they were the Great King’s chief ‘foreign policy priority’” and that “the Great King stayed awake at night, fixated by his desire for Greece.”  In the mid-fifth century, at the very beginning of Greek historiography, Herodotus explained Greek-Persian opposition as the inescapable consequence of a basic, enduring conflict between West and East—Europe and Asia—establishing once and for all West–East antithesis as a “fact” of history. During the fourth century, the Athenian Isocrates repeatedly emphasized this polarity and made allegedly fundamental West–East cultural and political differences the basis for inevitable Greek-Persian antagonism (and Greek superiority in these matters the reason for the certain success of West over East that he predicted).  

Since we depend so much on Greek sources for our knowledge of the Persian Empire and of Persian activities and policies in the west, the sources’ emphasis on Greek-Persian conflict has given us a Greek-centered narrative of sixth–fourth-century history in general and made Greek-Persian relations the primary focus of all reconstructions of eastern Mediterranean and Aegean affairs during this time. However, numbers are sufficient to indicate that Persia’s primary concerns in the west (that is, Persia’s west—the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean worlds) from almost the beginning to the end of the Persian Empire really lay elsewhere. While the Persians mounted two major campaigns against Greek mainland states (492–490 and 480–479) and prepared an ill-fated third enterprise in the early 460s, between 525 and 332 they launched a total of ten campaigns against Egypt and prepared but aborted two others. The largest of all Persian military enterprises in the west was not that aimed at Greece in 480 but that aimed at Egypt in the 340s.

Such evidence of continuous Persian preoccupation with Egypt suggests that in focusing on Persian and Greek interactions in the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries we have been looking at what was really a secondary or derivative story in the broader context of eastern Mediterranean-Aegean history and at developments which we cannot fully understand because we have not adequately taken into account the true nature of Persian interests and aims in the west. 

We may begin to redress this situation by examining Persian-Egyptian conflict from the late sixth–fourth centuries and by reconsidering Persian activities in the west from the perspective of Persia’s Egyptian concerns and strategies. The first task involves reconstructing as far as possible Persian campaigns against Egypt in the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries, the particular situations that produced those campaigns, and the arrangements made after successful Persian campaigns. The
campaigns of the fourth century in particular have been little investigated (primarily because they were part of a Persian-Egyptian War and not a Persian-Greek War), and much basic work is needed to establish reliable chronology, details of preparations, and the course of events for each of the numerous campaigns. The second task involves placing all the familiar developments of the Greek-centered narrative of sixth–fourth-century history in the context of contemporaneous Persian-Egyptian relations and seeing if indeed there is more to learn about the Persian-Greek war (and peace), the later Peloponnesian War, the Spartan-Persian War of the 390s, the King's Peace of 387/6, the activities of Evagoras of Salamis, the story of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the Satraps' Revolt of the late 360s, the Social War of the 350s, and even the rise of Macedon.

Treating the Persian-Egyptian conflict as central to sixth–fourth-century history does not do away with Herodotus’ notion of East–West conflict as a basic and enduring feature of history. Instead, it allows us see that the real story of prolonged East–West hostility is not one that opposes Asia and Europe, but one involving successive Near Eastern imperial states and Egypt. That story is well known in its Babylonian-Egyptian phase from Babylonian annals and biblical sources and in its earlier Assyrian-Egyptian phase from numerous Assyrian texts and, again, biblical sources. We can trace it further back to the middle of the second millennium, long before the post-1000 rise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, and we can follow it in one form or another right up to the time of Arab conquests of the Near East and northern Africa in the seventh century ce. Chronologically, the sixth–fourth-century Persian-Egyptian struggle sits right in the middle of this longue durée. It is also in the middle in the sense that it constituted a critical turning point: Persian and Egyptian strategies during the sixth–fourth centuries served to expand the scope of this enduring East–West struggle much further to the west than had been the case for the previous thousand years. This set the stage for a much broader East–West struggle in which Macedonians and then Romans played leading roles over the next thousand years. The great difficulty in trying to construct a properly Persian-centered account of sixth–fourth-century Persian imperial history in the west (or, to put it another way, a Persian-centered account of eastern Mediterranean and Aegean affairs) is that we have to depend primarily on evidence provided by the same Greek and Greek-derived sources that lie behind the conventional Greek-centered narrative. We have none of the extended victory stelae or royal chronicles that enable us to follow campaigns in earlier Assyrian-Egyptian or Babylonian-Egyptian wars from participants’ perspectives. Egyptian and Persian “textual” evidence bearing (mostly indirectly) on the sixth–fourth-century conflict consists of some scrappy Aramaic letters from Egypt, later Egyptian king lists, two boastful inscriptions from the Persian king Darius, and a couple of autobiographical sketches by Egyptian priests at either end of the conflict. Hebrew scripture, an invaluable source for Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian activities through the early sixth century, has nothing to say about Persian undertakings or Egyptian responses from the late sixth century onward (though we do learn from Hebrew scripture about the Persian king Cyrus’ support
for the repatriation of transplanted Judeans and Artaxerxes I’s backing of Nehemiah and Ezra’s reforms, which some scholars have linked to Persia’s Egyptian concerns in the 530s and 450s.

For literary evidence we have to turn then to our familiar Greek historians—Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus—and supplement these with information from biographers, collectors of stratagems, and the usual mishmash of excerptors and epitomators. None of these is particularly interested in the Persian-Egyptian conflict per se. But in following the activities of various Greek figures or states or in setting up the background to various events, they often inadvertently preserve useful information about that conflict.

For sixth- and fifth-century developments, Herodotus and Thucydides are crucial. Herodotus describes the initial Persian conquest of Egypt (and precedes this with a very lengthy and informative excursus on Egypt that gives us much of what we know of the pre-Persian Saite period in Egypt) because it is an important stage in his story of inexorable western expansion by Persian kings. He also has some evidence regarding initial Persian measures in Egypt and notice of early (480s) revolt. Thucydides, often reproved by scholars for his indifference to Persian matters in his account of the Peloponnesian War, nevertheless has (thanks to Athens’ involvement) important details concerning the lengthy Egyptian revolt of the late 460s and 450s and a couple of chance references which give us a glimpse of Egyptian resistance later in the fifth century.

We do not have Ephorus of Cyme’s now lost Historiae, a pioneering universal history of Greeks and barbarians in thirty books, “from the return of the Heraclidae [eleventh century] to Philip’s siege of Perinthus [340]” (Diod. 16.76.5), but Ephorus’ work seems to lie behind much of what many later authors tell us about aspects of the fourth-century phase of the Persian-Egyptian conflict. The most valuable of these is the first-century historian Diodorus Siculus, who, drawing on Ephorus, furnishes extensive, though episodic, accounts of this phase of the Persian-Egyptian conflict in Books 14, 15, and 16 of his universal history, the Library of History. These constitute the only extant record of some of the most important events in the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian conflict—the Persian war against Evagoras of Salamis in the 380s, the Persian attack on Egypt in the late 370s, the Egyptian counteroffensive of the late 360s, Phoenician and Cypriot revolts in the 340s, and the successful Persian invasion of Egypt in 343.

Ephorus organized his presentation kata genos, or by geography (Diod. 5.1.4). This means that in following Ephorus, Diodorus typically narrates Greek affairs and then turns to non-Greek affairs without any attempt at analytical correlation, suggesting that while Ephorus recounted events in the eastern Mediterranean or in Egypt, he did not try to explain Greek affairs in connection with the Persian-Egyptian conflict. Nevertheless, the degree of detail with which Diodorus narrates various episodes of the Persian-Egyptian War indicates that Ephorus must have presented fairly substantial accounts of these events and thus undoubtedly recognized
the importance of the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian conflict in contemporary affairs.

Diodorus’ dependence on Ephorus means also that he follows Ephorus’ “tendency … to group events around some prominent individual or theme and to allow the resulting narrative to run on until it formed a praxis autotelēs [a completed action]” and presents developments in terms of the activities of a particular individual, often but not always Greek—-the Athenian Conon in the 390s, the Persian Tiribazus in the 380s, the Athenian Iphicrates in the case of the 373 Persian campaign, the Spartan king Agesilaus in the case of the Egyptian counteroffensive in 360, and the Rhodian mercenary commander Mentor in the case of the 343 Persian invasion of Egypt. Ephorus’ individual-centered narratives offered ready-made material for biographers, and we may suspect that his Historiēi was the ultimate source of much of the information about Conon, Chabrias, Iphicrates, Agesilaus, Tiribazus, Orontes, and Datames—figures who played important roles in the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian conflict at one time or another in their careers—which we have in the biographical sketches written by Nepos, Polyænus, and Plutarch.⁷

There are other fourth-century Greek historians who provide valuable information. Perhaps originally the most important of these was Theopompus of Chios, roughly contemporary with Ephorus, who produced (in addition to a Hellenica which treated events from 410 to 394) an extensive account of fourth-century affairs in the fifty-eight books of his Philippica. Though concerned with the rise and activities of Philip of Macedon from 360–336, in digressions and background explanations Theopompus moved far afield chronologically and geographically, treating over perhaps as many as eight books matters touching on the Persian Empire, Asian Greeks, and warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, including Artaxerxes III’s successful attack on Egypt in 343. In these accounts, Theopompus probably incorporated information gleaned from participants—mercenaries and merchants, both of whom were drawn in great numbers into the Persian-Egyptian conflict.⁸ Unfortunately, we have only fragments of these books, the most valuable of which come from Photius’ ninth-century summary of Book 12 of the Philippica and concern Evagoras of Salamis’ activities.

In various works, the Athenian writer Xenophon covers events from the very late 400s through the early 350s. His treatment in the Anabasis of Cyrus the Younger’s attempt to seize the Persian throne at the end of the fifth century furnishes illuminating information about Persian affairs at the time of Egypt’s successful late fifth-century revolt. Xenophon’s Hellenica, while concentrating exclusively on Greek affairs during much of period of the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian war (the Hellenica treats the period 410–362), provides occasional evidence about Persian operations and diplomatic activity. Xenophon’s Agesilaurus, his encomium for the Spartan king Agesilaus, takes us a couple of years further and describes Agesilaus’ activities in Egyptian service from ca. 361–359.
For the 390s, the remnants of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* historian offer some details about Persian naval activities in the Persian–Spartan war not preserved elsewhere. Isocrates, though not a historian, must be treated as an important source. His long life stretched over nearly a century, and he has in several different speeches and letters notices of fourth-century Persian military enterprises in the eastern Mediterranean—he alone, for example, refers to the first fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt in the early 380s. Unfortunately, Isocrates’ effort to persuade Greeks that the Persian Empire was moribund and vulnerable makes his assessments of Persian policies and strategies suspect.9

A number of other fourth-century Greek authors produced *Persicas*. The first of these was Ctesias of Cnidus, well placed as a physician at the Persian court at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century to gain information and make observations (a point Ctesias himself emphasized to contrast his work with that of Herodotus). While he has a few useful details about fifth-century developments—Persian suppression of the 450s Egyptian revolt and Persian succession struggles—his account of Persian matters extended only into the 390s.10 Deinon of Colophon (the father of Cleitarchus, Alexander the Great’s historian) and Heracleides of Cyme produced *Persicas* which treated matters all the way through the 330s.11 The home cities of these figures, like those of Ephorus and Theopompus, were within the realm of the fourth-century Persian Empire, and this may account for their particular interest in Persian matters.

These latter works—perhaps primarily that of Deinon—lie behind much of Plutarch’s late first–early second-century CE account of Persian affairs in his *Life of Artaxerxes* (Artaxerxes II). However, despite the fact that Artaxerxes was engaged in the Persian-Egypt conflict throughout his reign, Plutarch has only a single explicit reference to the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian war (*Artax*. 24.1). He gives us instead a good deal of information about Artaxerxes II’s personal life and intrigues involving various relatives and court officials. This suggests that the fourth-century *Persicas* he used paid scant attention to the ongoing Persian-Egyptian conflict.12

This was true also of nearly contemporary *Egyptiaca*. Hecataeus of Abdera produced one in the late fourth–early third century, and, so far as we can tell, Hecataeus’ interest was mainly in much earlier Egyptian history (and more in philosophy and religion than in history), not the very recent fourth-century history.13 Manetho, an Egyptian priest, wrote in the third century (in Greek) a *History of Egypt* for the new, Macedonian kings of Egypt—the Ptolemaic dynasty—which furnishes our most basic king list and chronology right through the fourth century, but for the period of the Persian-Egyptian conflict Manetho provides us only with names and dynastic affiliations and nothing bearing directly on the Persian-Egyptian conflict beyond the record of the 27th Dynasty—the Persian kings who ruled over Egypt from 525 through 401.14

Altogether, then, we have what amounts to piles of scraps of varying size—bits and pieces of information reflecting what various Greek authors knew and what they were interested in. Nevertheless, these make possible at least a skeletal account
of the sixth–fourth-century Persian-Egyptian conflict. Encouragingly, once we begin to fashion from them a Persian-centered story, more and more of the scraps fall into place, and a narrative begins to take shape almost on its own. As it does, we can better understand and make use of the great amount of archaeological and numismatic evidence now available, much of it recently published. Excavations and surveys from sites in the Egyptian Delta (Naucratis, Sais, Pelusium), the Sinai, the Negev, Idumea (Edom), the regions of Philistine cities and Phoenician cities, and Cilicia have produced copious results relevant to the Persian-Egyptian conflict. Detailed studies of Sidonian and Cilician coinage have added much about Persian relations with local kings and dynasts. This allows us to flesh out our emerging account of the Persian-Egyptian War with non-Greek-centered material and sometimes to fill in gaps where our textual material gives us no scraps at all. Such nonliterary evidence helps us in particular to detect Persian and Egyptian defense or security arrangements and to identify administrative restructuring which took place because of Persian-Egyptian war conditions.

Continuing archaeological and numismatic investigations will certainly furnish new and illuminating insights. But if we look closely at all the evidence we have now, try to understand it consistently in connection with Persia’s Egyptian concerns and activities, augment textual evidence with evidence gleaned from archaeology and coins, and pursue material rather than moral explanations of success and failure, we can indeed recover a good deal of the story of the Persian-Egyptian conflict and, through that, a fuller story of sixth–fourth-century eastern Mediterranean and Aegean affairs in general. This will help us to move toward a more synoptic view of ancient history by demonstrating that the story of the sixth–fourth centuries is really a part of an East–West struggle that stretches over nearly the whole of ancient history.
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Trouble in the West
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CHAPTER 1
Persia and Egypt:
The Historical Context

Over its roughly 200-year history, the Persian Empire was remarkably stable. Organized into large provinces (satrapies) which in many cases had once been territories with their own native kings, the Persian Empire did not regularly experience resistance or revolt by subject peoples, perhaps because Persia’s imperial predecessors had habituated so many peoples to tribute payments and military service demands. The single striking exception was the Egyptians. After conquering Egypt in 525, the Persians faced repeated Egyptian revolts over the next century and a quarter, the first almost immediately after the initial conquest. Persian recovery efforts succeeded until the end of the fifth century, when Egypt finally broke away entirely. After this, native Egyptian kings repulsed Persian attacks decade after decade through the 340s and constantly instigated or supported challenges to Persian authority elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean worlds.

While the sixth–fourth-century Persian-Egyptian conflict stands in sharp contrast to Persia’s relations with other subject peoples, it was in fact the continuation of an enduring conflict between successive Near Eastern imperial states and Egypt. This began a millennium before the establishment of the Persian Empire and in one form or another continued all the way to the end of the ancient world. The conflict was rooted in geography. The region which stretched from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia and beyond to the Iranian highlands had no single center or core where resources were most concentrated and from which power could be extended and maintained most effectively. Instead, there were two cores roughly 800 miles apart, one centered on Egypt, the other on Mesopotamia, both very rich alluvial regions which at an early date developed centralized, bureaucratized governments that managed highly productive agricultural economies. (Despite the large role it plays in the conventional narrative of ancient history, Greece, fragmented politically and poorly endowed with natural resources, was never a true core but rather part of
the far western periphery of the cores region). Between them lay a “middle territory,” the Levant (or Syria-Palestine), separated from Egypt by the Sinai Peninsula and from Mesopotamia by the Syrian Desert. Natural resources in the middle territory, particularly its stands of aromatic cedar and other timber, attracted both Egyptian and Mesopotamian interest and enterprise at an early date and drew the western and eastern cores toward one another (Pritchard 1969, 227, 274–275). The persistent division of Syria-Palestine into numerous small, contentious states meant that there was never a strong local power capable of forestalling intervention in the region by western or eastern cores.

Conflict between the cores began in the middle of the second millennium, when Egyptians, having driven the Hyksos—“the chiefs of foreign peoples,” originally from the middle territory—out of Egypt, strove to keep them as far away as possible through constant campaigns in the Levant. These offensives brought Egyptian forces, with horses, chariots, and sometimes ships, as far north as the Euphrates River (Pritchard 1969, 239–240). Effective Egyptian annexation of the middle territory pushed the boundaries of the western core to those of the eastern core.

Recognizing the parity of their powers by the late fifteenth century, West (Egypt) and East (at this time divided among the imperial states of the Hurrians in the north and the Kassites to the south) abjured further war making and maintained a relatively peaceful equilibrium for several hundred years through the use of international agreements, high-level gift giving, and diplomatic marriages—the earliest example of sustained balance-of-power politics (Pritchard 1969, 247, 257). With the inclusion of the Hittites, this world of “international empires” stretched from Anatolia to the Iranian plateau. Located at the center of this expansive, stable world, the commercial cities of the middle territory prospered, drawing Greek traders from the far west into the eastern Mediterranean-Mesopotamian exchange zone.

Various population movements originating outside this Mediterranean-Mesopotamian imperial state system (coupled perhaps with widespread drought and prolonged poor harvests) put too much pressure on both western and eastern states, leading to the collapse of the Hittite empire, the withdrawal of Egypt from the Levant, and the breakup of the Hurrian and Kassite realms by the twelfth century. Though no longer an imperial state, Egypt remained a sizable kingdom, but elsewhere, after 1100, small-scale political units—regional or city kingdoms and chiefdoms with only local interests—were the rule. In these circumstances, the western–eastern cores conflict abated.

However, in response to local problems, critical developments of lasting significance occurred after 1100 in both Egypt and Mesopotamia, the western and eastern cores. Faced with persistent threats from their west (Libya) and south (Nubia) and with an ever-increasing need for ready troops, Egyptian kings began to install peasant-warriors, primarily Libyans and originally often prisoners of war, in settlements in the Delta. This practice produced a new Egyptian military system based on a permanent, hereditary class of peasant-soldiers, evidently labeled in Egyptian simply “the young soldiers” and “men of the spear” (Greeks termed them machimoi,
“warriors”), which ultimately numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Out of these groups, amplified by continuing immigration, came partially Egyptianized Libyan military commanders who established numerous petty dynasteiai in the Delta—the chiefdoms of the Ma or Meshwesh around Tanis, Mendes, and Bubastis in the eastern Delta and that of the Libu around Sais in the west. Many such warlords came to adopt royal titles, producing a number of “royal” kingdoms—a dozen in the seventh century—centered around fortified towns in the Delta. From some of these, Bubastis, Leontopolis, and Sais, came the kings of the 22nd–24th and 26th Dynasties, who claimed authority over all of Egypt. However, south of the Delta and Memphis, Upper Egypt became a virtually separate realm, with priestly families from Thebes managing affairs from the time of Ramses XI (late 20th/early 21st Dynasties). But if dynasts in the north either joined together or subordinated themselves to one of their number—big ifs—the ever-present machimoi gave Egypt a virtually invincible military force.

In northern Mesopotamia, another distinct form of militarization took shape. Here, from roughly 1100 on, recurrent attacks from the north by Urartians and from the west and east by Aramaean tribal groups compelled Assyrians located on the middle Tigris to mount constant counterattacks, ultimately on an annual basis. This served to make campaigning and preparation for campaigning fundamental to all Assyrian political and economic activity. The entire Assyrian population was liable for military service, but as the scope of Assyrian enterprise expanded, the Assyrians began to incorporate defeated peoples into Assyrian armies (and to develop frightening methods of intimidation to ensure compliance), thus adding the manpower resources of surrounding Near Eastern societies to their own. Many non-Assyrians were resettled within Assyria itself to serve as readily available troops. To facilitate maintenance of and movement by Assyrian military forces, the Assyrians created a network of fortified depots beyond the core territory inhabited by transplanted Assyrians and overseen by appointed governors—more effective methods of asserting state control at great distances than any previously used. Theoretically, the eastern core could now extend and sustain its power far and wide.

After the end of Egyptian hegemony in the middle territory, there were occasional, infrequent Egyptian forays into the region, but no effort to reestablish lasting dominion. The Egyptian king Siamun campaigned through Philistia up to Gezer ca. 970–960, probably seeking tributaries, and made a marriage alliance with the Israelite king Solomon (1 Kings 3:1, 9:16). Sheshonk, first king of the 22nd (Libyan) Dynasty centered at Tanis in the northeastern Delta, moved further north in the 920s all the way to Jerusalem and managed to carry away “the treasures of the house of the Lord and of the royal palace” (1 Kings 14.26; 2 Chron. 12–19).

During this time—the tenth century—Assyrian kings began campaigns which extended Assyrian power in all directions, ultimately producing the Neo-Assyrian Empire. By the early ninth century, Assyrians had advanced west across the Euphrates and into the region the Assyrians termed Abar-Nahar—“Beyond the
River”—which stretched from the Euphrates to the eastern Mediterranean. This set the stage for renewed East–West conflict. Initially, Assyrian texts speak just of predatory campaigns which produced enormous, explicitly listed quantities of tribute taken from many small kingdoms west of the Euphrates. Such campaigns ultimately reached the Mediterranean, “the Great Sea of the Amurru country,” where kings “cleansed [their] weapons in the deep sea” and then cut down cedars, cypresses, and pines before erecting commemorative stelae (see, e.g., Pritchard 1969, 274–276). Aramaean kings of Bit-Adini, Damascus, and Hamath were the great Assyrian opponents, and Assyrian royal inscriptions provide detailed accounts of victories over them. Thanks to sustained campaigning by the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III, by 841 the small middle-territory kingdoms as far south as Israel became client states tributary to Assyria. However, internal problems halted further Assyrian expansion for a century. Then Assyrian enterprise resumed with Tiglath-Pileser III’s campaigns (744–727), and over the next thirty-five years the Assyrians extended their control in Syria-Palestine from the land of Unqi in the north all the way to Gaza in the south, effectively annexing the whole middle territory. Tiglath-Pileser III began “provincializing” this region, transplanting local elites and placing important cities with surrounding territory under the authority of Assyrian governors. 11

By the end of Sargon II’s reign in 705, the entire area from central Anatolia as far as Judah and Philistia formed a nearly continuous bloc of Assyrian provinces (in some, Assyrian governors and local kings were juxtaposed) and, integrated into the Assyrian Empire, the middle territory experienced a period of economic growth and political development. Tyre and Sidon were transformed into major international commercial centers. South of Judah, the Assyrian client kingdom of Edom took shape, with new, fortified settlements linked to north-south Arabian trade routes. Philistine cities became busy commercial or production centers—Gaza and Ashkelon as great market centers, Ashdod specializing in pottery manufacturing, Ekron in olive oil production. 12

Egypt reacted swiftly to the initial Assyrian approach to the middle territory, sending 1,000 troops to join with the Syrian coalition which stalled Shalmaneser III’s advance at Qarqar on the Orontes River in 853. That was all in the way of Egyptian response for a while, but we may take it as marking the beginning of the next phase of the eastern and western cores conflict, with a Near Eastern imperial power, here Assyria, as the aggressor rather than Egypt. Because the Egyptians were preoccupied from this time through most of the eighth century with rivalries among the contemporaneous 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Dynasties and with the advance and conquests of Nubian kings, Piye and his brother Shabako (who first took control of Upper Egypt and then in response to opposition by Delta dynasts attacked and subjugated Lower Egypt as well). 13 Egyptian kings offered no further challenges to Assyrian aggression until 720. In that year, the Assyrian king Sargon II’s move against Gaza, the embarkation point for an advance to Egypt, prompted Osorkon IV, scion of the still viable 22rd Dynasty (whose base at Tanis in the northeastern Delta made him the Egyptian king most exposed to any Assyrian attack on Egypt),
to send a force in (futile) support of the ruler of Gaza. Consequently, the Assyrians were able to campaign repeatedly in the middle territory and “expand the core,” as one scholar has put it, by obliterating many of the persistently troublesome little kingdoms of the region and creating provinces inhabited by “Assyrians.” Still, wary of Egyptian opposition, Tiglath-Pileser III installed an Arab guard force at “the Brook of Musur,” “the border of Egypt” (probably Wadi el-Arish or the Besor River, in either case south of Gaza and actually at least 100 miles from Egypt proper) (Pritchard 1969, 283–284).

Once established in apparently full control of Egypt, 25th Dynasty (Nubian) kings of Egypt began regular intervention in the Levant, offering support to recalcitrant Assyrian vassals. In 701, Shebitku dispatched a force to join a broad anti-Assyrian coalition (including various northern Syrian, Phoenician, Transjordanian, and Philistine kings as well as Hezekiah of Judah). The Assyrian king Sennacherib picked off many of the rebel states as he advanced southward through the Levant and defeated the highly mobile vanguard of Egyptian/Nubian troops at Eltekeh north of Ashdod. Judah suffered most at this time, losing forty-six towns and the major administrative center of Lachish, which Sennacherib looted and depopulated and left under the control of an Assyrian governor and occupation force. However, the arrival of Shebitku’s nephew Taharqa and the full Egyptian/Nubian expeditionary force seems to have led to an Assyrian-Egyptian peace and to Sennacherib’s withdrawal.

Egyptian interventions during Sennacherib’s later years persistently threatened Assyria’s western holdings and prompted Sennacherib’s successors Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal to move beyond the middle territory and attack Egypt itself in the 670s and 660s. Initial campaigns in 679 and 677, involving the capture of “Arza” (el-Arish?) and the dispatch of its king to Nineveh and the destruction of Sidon and the execution of its king, served to suppress belligerent local rulers and secure the approach to Egypt. Finally, in 674, Esarhaddon traversed the Sinai Peninsula and launched a direct attack on Egypt, only to be repelled by a well-prepared Egyptian army. Undeterred, Esarhaddon assaulted Egypt again in 671, fighting three battles in a month and managing to drive the 25th Dynasty king Taharqa out of Memphis and capture the city. Esarhaddon recounted his 671 campaign and his subsequent arrangements in a great victory stela:

From the town of Ishupri as far as Memphis, his royal residence, a distance of 15 days [march], I fought daily without interruption very bloody battles against Tirhakah, king of Egypt and Ethiopia, the one accursed by all the great gods. Five times I hit him with the point of [my] arrows [inflicting] wounds [from which he should] not recover, and then I laid siege to Memphis, his royal residence, and conquered it in half a day by means of mines, breaches and assault ladders; I destroyed [it], tore down [its walls] and burnt it down. His “queen”, the women of his palace, Ushanahuru, his “heir apparent”, his other children, his possessions, horses, large and small cattle beyond counting, I carried away as booty to Assyria. All Ethiopians I deported from Egypt—leaving not even
Still, Esarhaddon’s arrangements failed to thwart continuing Egyptian opposition. Esarhaddon had to return in 669, little more than a year after his conquest of Egypt, but his death en route to Egypt terminated this campaign and gave the previously displaced Nubian king Taharqa the opportunity to retake Memphis. Esarhaddon’s son and successor Ashurbanipal prepared a new Assyrian campaign immediately after his accession, and in 667 the Assyrian force recovered Memphis and pursued Taharqa south to Thebes. But even after this, various supposedly vassal kings in the Delta sought alliance with Taharqa to expel the Assyrians and, Ashurbanipal complains, “they continued to scheme against the Assyrian army…which I had stationed in Egypt for their own support…they broke their oaths, forgot the friendliness with which [Esarhaddon] had treated them, and…they plotted constantly against the Assyrian army massed [in Egypt].” Assyrian response was severe and violent. Assyrian officials arrested all these recalcitrant kings and dispatched them in fetters to Ashurbanipal and severely punished various complicit towns, reportedly executing everyone, hanging their corpses from stakes, and covering the walls of the towns with human skins (Pritchard 1969, 294–295).

At this point (665), the Assyrian solution to securing Egypt was to execute all but one of the rebellious dynasts or “kings” and make a chosen survivor, Necho of Sais, sole king and his son Psammetichus (given an Assyrian name “Nabushezibanni”) lord of Athribis, trusting that such elevation of status and power would ensure continuing loyalty to the Assyrian patron responsible for it. But a campaign from the south (Thebes had not been taken in 667) by Taharqa’s successor Tantamani, aimed at Memphis and Lower Egypt, brought an Assyrian army back to Egypt in 664/663 which advanced all the way to Thebes, chased Tantamani out of Egypt to his Nubian capital of Napata, and thoroughly looted Thebes.

Necho evidently perished at this time, probably as an Assyrian vassal in battle against Tantamani. But his son Psammetichus remained in place—now in Sais rather than Athribis—as an Assyrian client king. By 656, undoubtedly with Assyrian approval, Psammetichus managed to put the whole country under his direct authority, recreating a unified Egyptian kingship, albeit a client kingship, which marked the beginning of the 26th or Saite Dynasty in Manetho’s king list. Wisely, Psammetichus did not challenge his patron—Assyrian backing gave him the advantage in Egypt. Nor, wisely, did Ashurbanipal or his successors challenge Psammetichus as he moved toward effective independence. The Assyrians had come to see that maintaining close supervision over Egypt at such a great distance was impossible, especially with other problems, including troubles with Nabataean and Qedarite Arab tribes (see Pritchard 1969, 297–300).
In the 620s, Babylonian revolt and civil war made maintenance of Assyrian control of the middle territory impossible. To concentrate on problems elsewhere without the distraction of Egyptian campaigns into the middle territory, the Assyrian king Sin-shar-ishkun effectively ceded the middle territory to his Egyptian client king Psammetichus in return for military support. Thus by default Egyptian dominion extended over the middle territory during the last decade of Psammetichus I’s reign. Egypt now took over various fortified sites and manned them with garrisons of mostly foreign troops, including Greeks already in Psammetichus’ service in Egypt. Where they still existed, local kings like Josiah in Judah now became Egyptian vassals. As an Assyrian ally, Psammetichus sent troops to aid Assyrians against Babylonian pressure in 616. Then, when by 612 the Assyrians finally lost control of the eastern core to Babylon, Egypt, as master of the whole region from “the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates River” (2Kings 24:7), found itself the defender of the middle territory against Babylonian expansion.

This new Babylonian-Egyptian phase of the East–West struggle, initiated even before the final Assyrian collapse, went on for more than fifty years. In 610, the last year of Psammetichus I’s reign, Egypt sought to bar Babylonian access to the Levant by securing the Euphrates River crossing at Carchemish, and in the following year the new Egyptian king Necho II, son of Psammetichus I, led an army through the middle territory to assert his claim to the region. But the Babylonians advanced successfully, driving Egyptian troops out of Carchemish and then destroying most of an Egyptian expeditionary force at Hamath in 605.24

Facing Egyptian opposition in the west right from the beginning of their imperial experience (as the Assyrians had not), Babylonian kings treated the middle territory not so much as a region to be defended but rather as an active war zone. The Babylonians did not replicate Assyrian provincial structures in the Levant, but to secure the region they relied instead on constant campaigning and, where necessary, destruction of sites that might serve Egyptian interests.25 Nebuchadrezzar campaigned here (“Hattu-land” in Babylonian terminology) nine times in his first twelve years as king, destroying sites throughout Judah and Philistia, including the previously flourishing cities of Ashkelon (turning “the city into a mound and heaps of ruins”) and Ekron. The loyalty oath imposed on the Judean king Jehoiakim by Nebuchadrezzar—that “he would surely keep the country for him and attempt no uprising nor show friendliness to the Egyptians”—indicates Nebuchadrezzar’s primary strategic concern.26

Having established control over Syria and with vassal kings in office in southern Palestine, Nebuchadrezzar turned to Egypt itself, well aware that previous Egyptian withdrawal from the Levant did not signal an end to Egyptian opposition to Babylonian control of the middle territory.27 Invading Egypt in 601, Nebuchadrezzar progressed only as far as the fortifications in the easternmost Delta, where Egyptian forces inflicted a debilitating defeat on his army. Necho II, predictably, then made a counterthrust, moving through the Sinai to seize Gaza as a base for further northern enterprise (Hdt. 2.159). This and ensuing defections by vassal kings such as
Jehoiakim of Judah brought Nebuchadrezzar back to Hatti-land in 598/7, where he took control of Jerusalem.  

Babylonian policies of annihilation and deportation might deprive Egypt of potential bases in Philistia, but they did not quell Egyptian initiative. Egyptian kings who followed Necho II—Psammetichus II and Apries—utilized aggressive diplomacy (encouraging independence in Judah in the later 590s and adding alliances with Edom, Ammon, and Moab [Jer. 9:25–6], and “those with close-cropped hair living in the desert”—probably Arabs) to stir up opposition to Babylonian rule in the middle territory. Nebuchadrezzar’s response was to obliterate more kingdoms—notably Judah in 586—so that finally, except for the Phoenician city-kings, none of the states in Palestine that had survived the Assyrian provincialization of Syria-Palestine in the seventh century existed any longer.  

By removing recalcitrant middle-territory kings and dismantling the political structures associated with them, the Babylonians aimed at depriving Egyptian kings of further opportunities for intervention. It was, however, to no avail. Apries (589–570) targeted Phoenician sites, mounting a land campaign against Sidon and, with the recently developed Egyptian war fleet, attacking Tyre and Cyprus (perhaps aiming here at gaining a base for further assaults on the middle territory) by sea (Hdt. 2.161; Diod. 1.68.1).  

Backed by Delta dynasts opposed to Apries, Amasis displaced Apries as king in 570 and ultimately chased him from Egypt. Hoping to exploit subsequent Egyptian disunity to resolve the ceaseless Babylonian-Egyptian conflict, Nebuchadrezzar launched a new offensive against Egypt with Apries, now ready to reprise the client-king role played earlier by Necho I and Psammetichus I, in tow (566). Again, however, Nebuchadrezzar failed (and his would-be client Apries apparently perished in the battle between Nebuchadrezzar’s and Amasis’ forces). Under Amasis, Egypt’s anti-Babylonian efforts continued and, if we can trust Diodorus (1.68.6), led finally to Egyptian control of Cyprus.  

During this prolonged period of chronic East–West conflict, the Egyptian core stretched its reach more extensively to the far west, drawing great numbers of Greeks (along with other far western peoples such as Carians) with their very effective heavy infantry equipment and tactics into the Egyptian-Mesopotamian conflict. In Egypt, Psammetichus I employed Greeks not only to face Babylonian invasion but also to balance the native troops under the control of potentially troublesome fellow Delta dynasts unhappy with Saite preeminence and power and unlikely to deliver over to Psammetichus’ command the machimoi they controlled. As settled warriors, Greeks and Carians became in effect the new machimoi, linked exclusively to the Saite king and forming the king’s own royal army. During Psammetichus I’s reign, a Greek trading station and settlement took shape at Naucratis on the eastern bank of the Canopic branch of the Nile about twelve miles from Sais (Hdt. 2.178; Diod. 1.67.8–11). This provided Psammetichus and his successors with a convenient recruiting site close to Sais, and by the early 500s there were reportedly at least 30,000 Greeks and Carians in royal service in Egypt (Hdt. 2.163.1). Rather
than relying on Greeks to learn the native language, Psammetichus created a cadre of professional interpreters by arranging for young Egyptian boys to learn Greek (Hdt. 2.154.2). Subsequently, the Saite army was organized into two parts consisting of Egyptians and “those of foreign speech.” Egyptians commanded both, and quite likely Egyptians who had learned Greek as boys served as interpreters for native commanders.

About the middle of the sixth century, the Egyptian king Amasis, as part of his aggressive naval strategy, established direct relations with maritime Greek states such as Samos and Rhodian Lindos to gain access to additional ships and sailors (Hdt. 2.182, 3.40, 47). Amasis sent presents even to the Spartans on the Greek mainland, and he sought to incorporate Greeks in general into an Egypt-centered world by extending to the Greek world the traditional royal Egyptian role of the king as benefactor of temples by subsidizing rebuilding of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, the primary pan-Greek sanctuary (Hdt. 2.180).

Egyptian measures proved effective. Unlike Assyrians (who initially faced a fragmented Egypt), the Babylonians were never able to conquer or even enter Egypt proper. But at the same time, Egypt was never really able to end Babylonian efforts or to establish lasting Egyptian dominion in the middle territory.

Babylonian failure to move successfully into Egypt and Egyptian failure to do much more than fend off Babylonian attacks during the late seventh and early sixth centuries indicate that the eastern and western cores were evenly matched at this time. The Assyrian-Egyptian and Babylonian-Egyptian conflicts which stretched in seesaw fashion over nearly 300 years reveal something else about Near Eastern and Egyptian resources and strategies. Assyrian militarization had produced effective methods of expansion and control, involving permanently manned depots and garrisons, incorporation of subject peoples into Assyrian campaign forces, and maintenance of authority through brutal punishment of recalcitrant vassals. These practices permitted the Assyrians to push into and establish dominion over the middle territory (and other territories). Babylonian kings adopted these practices, but, while also aiming at permanent control of subject territories, they relied more on constant campaigning to secure their western periphery and did so with special ruthlessness.

Egyptian strategy, however, never really looked beyond the middle territory. The farthest advance of Egyptian arms during the whole struggle with Assyrian and Babylonian kings was to the middle Euphrates region, where in 616 troops dispatched by Psammetichus I joined Assyrian forces at Carchemish in countering Babylonian attacks and where in 609 Necho II attempted a siege of Harran. But these were forays aimed at securing the middle territory, not at acquiring bases for more distant conquests. Egyptian kings might campaign far afield with their machismoi (and, on the evidence of such prophets as Isaiah [30:2–5, 31:1, 36:8] and Ezekiel [17:15], promise or dispatch chariots and horsemen to would-be allies in the middle territory), but they did not systematically use these native troops as garrison troops and relied instead on alliances with and subsidies to local rulers to
sustain Egyptian influence in the middle territory. Recruitment of more and more Greek mercenaries by Saite kings may have been aimed in part at giving them a more rapid response force and one which could also be used to garrison gains outside Egypt, but conflicts with Delta dynasts compelled kings to use Greek machimoi primarily as royal defense forces in Egypt itself.

In terms of military systems and strategies, this meant that an expansionistic eastern core faced a defense-oriented western core. Over time, the result was a standoff. Egyptians managed repeatedly to push back Assyrians and Babylonians from the middle territory, only to see them return following Egyptian withdrawal. But because eastern armies could not decisively conquer and control Egypt, Egyptian kings constantly renewed their intervention in Assyrian- or Babylonian-held middle territory. Détente of the sort agreed to during the previous millennium might seem the necessary and natural outcome.

In fact, this may finally have been, at least de facto, the case in the Babylonian phase of the East–West conflict. After Nebuchadrezzar’s death in 562 and the resolution of the subsequent succession struggle, the Babylonian king Nabonidus undertook western campaigns only at the very beginning of his reign—two through northern Syria into Cilicia and one to Edom. Though this last came relatively close to Egypt, Nabonidus’ subsequent ten-year-long concentration on the conquest of Arab tribes in northern Arabia suggests that his concern with Edom may have had to do with Arab incursions there (a problem already for the Assyrians and for Nebuchadrezzar). This may not have raised Egyptian suspicions sufficiently to instigate any response (though domestic problems might also explain Amasis’ inaction). Nabonidus’ ability to summon labor forces from regions all the way to “the borders of Egypt” during his reign indicates continuing Babylonian control over the middle territory (Pritchard 1969, 562–563), despite the absence of repeated Nebuchadrezzar-like campaigns. Additionally, Nabonidus’ prolonged stay (553–543) at the oasis city of Tayma in northern Arabia and his campaigning against Arabs as far south as Yathrib during that time seem possible only if he had no worries about opportunistic Egyptian enterprise in the middle territory.

If we can trust the claim in Nabonidus’ account (in a late-540s inscription from Harran) of the moon god Sin’s benefactions that “upon the command of Sin, Ishtar, the Lady-of-Battle, without whom neither hostilities nor reconciliation can occur in the country and no battle can be fought, extended her protection over them, and the king of Egypt, the Medes, and the land of the Arabs, all the hostile kings, were sending messages of reconciliation and friendship” (Pritchard 1969, 562–563), we may have evidence of some kind of agreement after 543 involving Egypt and Babylon as well as the Persians (Medes) and Arabs.

The rise of the Persians (a people previously subject to the Medes), marked first by the Persian king Cyrus’ defeat of the Medes in 550 and then by his conquest of the Lydians in western Anatolia in 546, was most likely responsible for bringing Nabonidus back to Babylon from Arabia in 543. With a recently successful Babylonian army under his command, Nabonidus was perhaps able to sponsor a
broad truce agreement involving all Babylon’s recent and potential opponents, including Egypt. Concerned that the emergence of another aggressive Near Eastern power in the form of the Persians might mean a renewed belligerent and expansionistic presence in the middle territory, the Egyptian king Amasis may also have feared that with Persia in control of Anatolia all the way to the Aegean, Egypt’s important Greek and Carian mercenary and ship resources might be cut off. The fact that Herodotus knows of both Persian and Egyptian stories of Amasis’ dispatch of a daughter to Cyrus to become a royal wife (along with an Egyptian eye doctor) suggests that there was some historical basis for such a marriage (Hdt. 3.1–3). The conjectured multilateral agreement brokered by Nabonidus in the 540s and involving, among others, the Egyptian and Persian kings offers the most likely occasion for what was obviously a marriage driven by diplomatic interests.

Some such agreement may account for the sense of security Nabonidus’ concentration on building and cult-related projects in the late 540s implies. But Nabonidus’ complacency meant that he was ill prepared to counter Persian aggression when Cyrus, repudiating any previous agreement, began his campaign against Babylon in 540. After a great victory at Opis north of Babylon, Cyrus was able to advance to Babylon itself and there simply receive the city’s surrender from Nabonidus early in 539.

With this victory, the Persians were now masters of all of Mesopotamia—the eastern core. As heir to the Assyrian and Babylonian imperial realms, which had extended in one form or another to the eastern Mediterranean, Cyrus simply treated the Levant—Syria/Palestine, or the middle territory—as an integral part of the eastern core, appointing a single governor in 535 over “Babylon and Ebir-nārī [‘Beyond the River’],” that is, Babylon and the trans-Euphrates “middle territory.” Thus, with Cyrus’ conquest of Babylon and his annexation of its territory, the western frontier of the Persian empire (south of Anatolia) was the eastern Mediterranean coastal region—the long-contested middle territory. But Cyrus’ strategy to date had been to seek secure frontiers, pushing beyond established boundaries and dealing preemptively with potentially troublesome neighbors: Cyrus followed his takeover of the Median realm, which stretched into eastern Anatolia, with an attack on Croesus, king of Lydia, whose holdings extended eastward to the boundaries of Median territory; Cyrus then turned eastward, campaigning beyond the Iranian plateau into Central Asia. Persian conquest of Babylon and assumption of control of Ebir-nārī thus set the stage for inevitable Persian advance against Egypt, whose opposition had made the Levant the most constantly contested frontier for Persia’s imperial predecessors, the Assyrians and the Babylonians. As it turned out, however, because Cyrus died campaigning beyond the Oxus River in Central Asia (Hdt. 1.201–14)—securing the eastern frontier before turning to the west—it was not Cyrus but his son and successor Cambyses who led the Persian campaign against Egypt.
CHAPTER 2
Persian Success: Conquest and Kingship, 525–518

The whole previous history of conflict between the eastern and western cores demonstrated an inescapable fact: it was not at all an easy matter to invade Egypt, let alone conquer it. As Diodorus observed, Egypt was “fortified on all sides by nature” (1.31.6; cf. 15.42.1), and “in natural strength” it was reputed “to excel in no small degree all other regions that have been formed into kingdoms” (1.30.1). The first problem for any would-be invader from the east was getting to Egypt. Starting at Gaza, the southernmost of Philistine cities, the route through Arabia (as the whole land to the east of the Nile was called) ran through Raffa (Raphia) for about fifty miles of nearly waterless sand dunes across the northern Sinai Peninsula to Rhinocorura (el-Arish), where travelers found palm groves and rain-fed springs. Just west of Rhinocorura, the way split into northern and southern routes. The northern route extended to Lake Serbonis (now Lake Bardawil), as much as three days’ journey through desert without a drop of water, according to Herodotus (3.5.3). There it joined the narrow strip of land between Lake Serbonis and the Mediterranean and continued to the mouth of the easternmost, Pelusiac branch of the Nile (Hdt. 2.141.4). This was treacherous land, full of swamps and quicksand. The longer, southern route, covering some ninety miles from Rhinocorura to the bridges over north-south canals, bypassed lagoons south of the Pelusiac branch and linked with the Wadi Tumilat, a narrow bridge of land north of the “Bitter Lakes.” This furnished an entryway into the northeastern Delta, where Egypt proper began.1

The perils of the journey, real and imagined, are reflected in the Assyrian king Esarhaddon’s boastful account of his successful passage from Raphia across the Sinai to Egypt in 671:

When the oracle-command of Ashur, my lord, came to my mind (during this calamity) my soul [rejoiced] (and) I put [water bottles]… upon the camels which all the kings of
Arabia had brought...A distance of 20 double-hours in a journey of 15 days through...I advanced. A distance of 4 double-hours I marched over a territory covered with alum and musa[-stone]. A distance of 4 double-hours in a journey of 2 days (there were) two-headed serpents [whose attack] (spelled) death—but I trampled (upon them) and marched on. A distance of 4 double-hours in a journey of 2 days (there were) green [animals] whose wings were batting. A distance of 4 double-hours in a journey of 2 days...upper...A distance of 15 double-hours in a journey of 8 days, I advanced [through]...(then) Marduk, the great lord, came to my assistance [he did...and thus] kept my troops alive. For 20 days and 7 [double miles] (a town/region) which is on the frontier of...Magan. [In...] I spent the night. (Pritchard 1969, 292)

The problems of entering Egypt by land from the east might recommend a maritime approach as a necessary alternative. Seven separate branches of the Nile (from west to east, the Canopic, Bolbitine, Sebennytic, Phatnitic or Bucolic, Mendesian, Saitic or Tanaitic, and Pelusiac) emptied into the Mediterranean. Their mouths might seem to provide a number of entry points into Egypt. But conditions were no more inviting to entry along the coast of Egypt than through the eastern desert. Again Diodorus: "The voyage along the coast of [the Egyptian Sea] is exceedingly long [some 200 miles], and any landing is especially difficult; for from Paraetonium in Libya as far as Iope [Jaffa] in Coele-Syria...there is not to be found a safe harbor except Pharos" (1.31.2). Instead of debouching directly into the Mediterranean, the various branches of the Nile formed broad swaths of lagoons, marshes, and mudflats, from ten to thirty-five miles wide. At various points, these stretched out to sea in the form of underwater sandbars and reefs. There was thus no clear evidence at "the coast" of most of the actual mouths. Instead, there was a multitude of "false-mouths" (pseudostomata: Strabo 17.1.19), navigable only by small boats. In the 340s, the rebellious Sidonian king, Tennes, tried to persuade the Persian king Artaxerxes III to spare his life because, he claimed, he knew all the harbors (or entry points) on the Egyptian coast (Diod. 16.43.2)—good evidence that use of the maritime approaches to Egypt required special knowledge and experience. But even when entry was effected, the major Delta cities, Sais, Sebennytus, Mendes, and others, which might serve an invader as bases for further penetration of Egypt, were well inland and reachable from the coast only after passage through extensive marshlands.

Thus, getting to Egypt by land or sea in the first place was not a given. But once there—at the eastern edge of the Delta or on the coast—an invader faced the next big problem, that of traversing the Delta. Strabo aptly likens the Delta to a triangular island with rivers to the west and east (the Canopic and Pelusiac branches) and the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Within this "island," additional branches and large and small canals divided the Delta into numerous smaller islands (Diod. 1.33.4, 34.2, 57.2–3; Strabo 17.1.4). Strabo, for example, could refer to Xoïs above the Sebennytic and Phatnitic mouths as "both an island and a city" (17.1.19). Such "islands" could comprise an entire nome (a separate administrative district), as in
the case of Prosopitis, whose surrounding waters made this a successful refuge for Athenians supporting Inarus’ revolt in the 450s until the Persians drained the canal to the north.  

There were no real roads. Canal embankments, produced by the excavation and constant clearing of canals, formed pathways of a sort, but these were hardly usable by armies. Herodotus comments about the situation, “Though a flat country throughout its whole extent, it is now unfit for either horse or carriage, being cut up into canals, which are extremely numerous and run in all directions” (2.108.2). Typically, the branches, which ran roughly south to north, had no bridges, so moving from east to west across the Delta meant being soon stopped by the need to prepare river crossings. North-to-south movement collided with branches of the main branches of the Nile as well as with the many canals. Really, only ships, assuming they found entry points along the coast, permitted access through the Delta. But since they were limited to whatever branch they entered, unless the ships were of very shallow draft they could have little role in any attempt to secure the whole of the Delta. It is not surprising that the Delta remained a region of separate, quasi-independent dynasteiai through Egypt’s Third Intermediate, Late Kingdom, and Persian periods.

In addition to all these natural and man-made difficulties, there was also the Nile flood, which dramatically altered the country’s landscape for months each year. Beginning in May, the Nile rose steadily, ultimately inundating the entire country to the deserts’ edges before subsiding and returning to normal levels by October. During most of this time, the whole of the country was a world of islands consisting of the villages and towns located on higher ground (Hdt. 2.97.1; Diod. 1.36.7–12).

Still, despite these many difficulties and obstacles, Egypt was not impenetrable from the east. Hence, Egyptian rulers typically maintained frontier fortifications and sought to forestall approach even to these by controlling the whole trans-Sinai route into Egypt, and beyond it as much of the middle territory as possible as well—“to extend the frontiers of Egypt,” as Thutmose III put it (Pritchard 1969, 235). Most recently, Egypt’s defensive strategy had been entirely effective in keeping Babylonian forces out of Egypt.

Fortuitously, the Persians under Cambyses turned to the conquest of Egypt at a time when Egyptian political problems removed obstacles which would normally have made invasion unsuccessful or at best extremely difficult. The Egyptian king Amasis’ need to move his Greek-Carian force to Memphis “to guard him against the native Egyptians” points to his residence in the well-fortified city of Memphis and to his insecurity even there (Hdt. 2.154; Diod. 1.67.1). The troublesome “native Egyptians” responsible for Amasis’ security concerns were undoubtedly the dynasts and the native machimoii they controlled—the only military force in Egypt that could have threatened Amasis. Dynastic antagonism toward Saite monarchs had previously led to the fall of Apries, Amasis’ predecessor, after he had tried to alter the balance between royal (largely Greek and Carian) and dynastic (native) machimoii

[16] Trouble in the West
by sending off a native machimoi force to attack Cyrene, the Greek city on the Libyan coast, where they suffered a tremendous defeat. Surviving machimoi immediately blamed Apries for having deliberately sent them to such a defeat. “They believed,” Herodotus writes (2.161.2), “that he had wished a great number of them to be slain, in order that he might gain more security over the rest of the Egyptians.” After the Cyrene disaster the native machimoi, certainly impelled by their dynastic masters, backed usurpation by one of Apries’ high officials, Amasis (Hdt. 2.162–3, 169; Diod. 1.68.2–6), most probably because as a figure of nondynastic origins he was acceptable to various beleaguered dynastic families in the Delta. But after defeating Apries in battle at Momemphis in the western Delta and seizing the kingship for himself, Amasis took over Apries’ Greek-Carian force and used it in 567 against Babylonian attackers attempting to restore Apries.

As Herodotus’ many stories about Amasis’ kingship indicate, Amasis proved to be a strong, assertive, and generally popular king (2.172–182). However, Delta dynasts, who had hoped for a reversion to the fragmentary kingship of pre-Saite times, likely concluded that in backing Amasis against Apries they had simply exchanged one ambitious monarch for another. As Amasis knew from his own success in battle against Apries, native machimoi gave dynasts a very potent weapon. Transferring his Carian and Greek troops to Memphis, meaning to Memphis’ huge and nearly impregnable citadel known as the White Wall, served to secure Amasis and his royal force. It also meant that Amasis consolidated his troops at the base from which he could most quickly move north via the Nile’s Delta branches to threaten troublesome dynasts. All this may have produced a continuing standoff in which neither king nor opposing dynasts dared move or relax their guard.

Thus, despite the long-established Egyptian strategy of meeting threats by engaging preemptively beyond the border of Egypt, Amasis made no attempt to do so before or after the fall of Babylon and its empire to the Persians in the early 530s. The situation certainly remained the same in Egypt when Amasis died and his son Psammetichus III replaced him in 526. Thus there was no Egyptian move by land or sea to disrupt the preparations for an attack on Egypt that Cambyses mounted in the middle territory some time before 525. Egyptian inaction persuaded Phoenician cities to accept Persian dominion as inevitable, and on the eve of Cambyses’ campaign, they “joined” the Persians. This prompted Cypriot cities to do the same (Hdt. 3.19). With the whole eastern Mediterranean in Persian hands, the “king of the Arabs,” the chief of the North Arabian or Qedarite coalition that controlled territory from southern Judea westward through the Negev and northern Sinai up to Egypt itself, opted to support Cambyses, opening the way to Egypt and facilitating the Sinai crossing by creating water depots along the route (most likely the southern route). This decided, without a fight, the contest over the middle territory. Perhaps anticipating Persian success, Amasis’ and now Psammetichus III’s Greek mercenary commander, Phanes of Halicarnassus, defected before the campaign began and told Cambyses “all the secrets of Amasis,”
giving the Persians invaluable intelligence about the military and political situation in Egypt (Hdt. 3.4).

Because of Amasis’ previous transfer of his Greek-Carian frontier force to Memphis, there was no effective forward defense line along Egypt’s eastern frontier. Limited manpower resources prevented Psammetichus III from splitting his forces and forced him to rely on the outcome of a single battle. Thus, once in Egypt, Cambyses did not have to divide his army to deal with different Egyptian contingents. With the full Persian army, he met what was evidently Psammetichus’ whole available force somewhere in the northeastern Delta in what proved to be the decisive encounter. Herodotus, our source for the Persian conquest of Egypt, provides no details of the battle itself, except to say that it was a terrific conflict that ended after great losses on both sides with the flight of the surviving Egyptians (Hdt. 3.11).  

In the past, continued Egyptian resistance to invaders had been mounted from the Delta (where the machimoi were settled), and in the aftermath of failure in battle against Cambyses, the most promising action for Psammetichus III should have been strategic withdrawal into the western Delta. Psammetichus’ move instead to Memphis after the battle in the northeastern Delta thus strongly suggests that he lacked reliable support in the Delta. Though Psammetichus made a show of resistance at Memphis, killing the envoys Cambyses sent to negotiate and then holding out for a time against Persian siege (possibly in hope of relief by recalcitrant Delta dynasts), ultimately he had no choice but to surrender and submit, ultimately, to execution (Hdt. 3.13–15).

Persian capture of Memphis gave Cambyses control of the rest of Egypt without further fighting. The whole invasion and conquest was evidently completed before the annual flood began. Such swift Persian success was probably due less to Persian military superiority than to decisions by various Delta dynasts to follow the precedent set by their seventh-century predecessors in the face of Assyrian invasion—remain passive or submit quickly and wait for the invading army’s withdrawal to resume independence in the Delta (the behavior that Ashurbanipal complained about so bitterly).

Herodotus, perhaps drawing on later anti-Persian Egyptian slander, depicts Cambyses in Egypt as mentally unbalanced, quick in the aftermath of his conquest of Egypt to order executions of Egyptian officials at Memphis who annoyed him, and responsible himself for the murder of the sacred Apis bull, the embodiment of Ptah, and for the termination of the cult of Apis (3.27–30)—in other words, a completely unsympathetic and arbitrarily violent conqueror. Much evidence of various kinds (including the facts that the Apis bull died before Cambyses ever reached Memphis, that Cambyses himself dedicated the sarcophagus of this bull, and that he is depicted in an attitude of worship, presumably directed toward the Apis bull) points instead to Cambyses as concerned with reconciling Egyptians to Persian dominion by maintaining and participating in Egyptian practices. Cambyses was certainly well aware of the difficulties of controlling Egypt from a Mesopotamian
center—it simply had not been done. Egypt was not only distant but difficult to reach from the Mesopotamian—now Mesopotamian-Iranian—core. Failure to secure Egypt would prompt reversion to the long-lasting state of conflict between West (Egypt) and East (Persia at this time). This would put Persian power everywhere in the west at risk and, if the Persians constantly had to muster and send troops from throughout their realm to the western edge of the empire, also jeopardize Persian authority elsewhere. Consequently, following his conquest of Egypt Cambyses made the solution of his Egyptian problem his primary concern: he stayed in Egypt and worked in person to establish enduring Persian control of Egypt.

Reading between the lines of a self-congratulatory inscription recounting the achievements of Udjahorresnet, once the chief official overseeing foreign trade in Egypt under Amasis and Psammetichus III and subsequently a high official—Companion (“Friend” or “Companion” of the King designated the highest-ranking members of the royal entourage) and Comptroller of the Palace—at the Persian court under Cambyses and Darius, we learn a great deal about Cambyses’ policies in Egypt. Certainly an important advisor on economic matters in Egypt, Udjahorresnet seems to have functioned also as a sort of cultural adviser to Cambyses (and then, leaving Egypt to do so, also to Darius), serving both to apprise Cambyses of local religious conventions and temple lore and to formulate an Egyptian identity for Cambyses. While in his autobiographical inscription Udjahorresnet claims responsibility for transforming Cambyses into an Egyptian king, the decision to adopt such an identity was ultimately Cambyses’ own, and we may treat him as the initiator of the plan to establish enduring Persian control of Egypt by Egyptianizing his kingship in Egypt.

Guided by Udjahorresnet, Cambyses insinuated himself into the Egyptian cosmic system by assuming kingship in Egypt as Mesutire, “Offspring of Re.” In other words, Cambyses became an Egyptian king. Persian government in Egypt, like that of the Saites and innumerable kings preceding them, was centered on Memphis, the enormous (seventeen-mile circumference), age-old capital city whose location at the base of the Delta made it the strategic heart joining Lower and Upper Egypt. Situated on the left bank of the Nile, Memphis with its suburbs stretched out westward to the vast necropolis, marked by the ancient pyramids and their many pyramid temples at the desert’s edge just beyond the Nile valley, that linked Memphis physically to Egypt’s millennia-old royal traditions. With its sizable, nearly impregnable citadel, the White Wall, and its shipbuilding and river harbor facilities, Memphis was Egypt’s military and naval center as well as its political center. It was also in many respects Egypt’s ceremonial center. Here, extending across the southern part of the city, was the great temple of Ptah, the creator god, with a colossal statue of the New Kingdom king Ramesses II at its entrance. Here also was the home of the Apis bull, the living embodiment of Ptah and of the reborn Osiris. Numerous other temples, large and small, to Ptah, Hathor, Khnum, and other deities dotted the sprawling urban area. While in Memphis, Cambyses undoubtedly dwelled in the spectacular palace Apries had built in the city, a 400- by 200-foot structure rising
nearly 50 feet high above a 70-foot platform reached by a sloping approach platform some 300 feet wide. Symbolically and actually, Cambyses thus surmounted the whole of the royal city and from there the whole of Egypt.

While Cambyses installed a Persian, Aryandes, as chief administrative official (satrap), Cambyses’ repeated presentation of himself as king in temple rituals in Memphis and elsewhere during his lengthy stay in Egypt (525–522) served to convey the idea of continuity between the new king and his predecessors. We can see him at Sais, for example, performing the appropriate priestly functions of Pharaoh:

The King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Cambyses, came to Sais. His Majesty went in person to the temple of Neith and he touched the ground in front of her very great Majesty as every king had done. He made a great offering consisting of everything good to Neith the Great, the mother of God [i.e., Re], and to the great gods who are in Sais, as every king had done.

Herodotus’ reference to an oracular response Cambyses received from the oracle of Wadjet at Buto (in the Delta not far from Sais) indicates that Cambyses visited the ancient and great temple of Wadjet (3.64.4), probably just one of many visits he made to the major sanctuaries in Egypt.

We later find Persians as governors (frataraka, “The Foremost”) of the provinces into which Lower and Upper Egypt had long been divided. But the presence under Darius of a native Egyptian (Ptahotep) as head of the state treasury at Memphis, which administered the provincial treasuries with their many officials and scribes, may indicate that Persian practice initially involved leaving leading native officials in place under royal and satrapal supervision. Cambyses’ concern was clearly to display continuity, and retention of existing officials and administrative structures was one of the best indications of an unaltered status quo, announcing as it did that the appearance of a new king—Cambyses as Mesutire—was not going to alter fundamental Egyptian ways. Although Egyptian resources would be immensely valuable in supporting Persian activities elsewhere, following Cambyses’ conquest the Persians seem to have imposed relatively moderate tribute demands. Additional revenues derived from continuation of the collection for “the king’s house” of customs dues on all imports and exports (paid mostly by Greek and Phoenician merchants). At the same time, as indicated by the so-called Decree of Cambyses specifying materials and animals that temples (excepting three in Memphis) had to acquire for themselves, Cambyses followed the policies of recent Egyptian kings in trying to stimulate local economies.

Continuity also marked Cambyses’ military and security measures. Cambyses took over existing fortresses at Marea, Daphnae, Elephantine, and Memphis, and in some cases the Saite garrison forces as well. Royal fortifications under the Saites thus remained royal. The Persians simply maintained the standing Saite river fleet and the naval arsenal at Memphis.
Greeks reportedly flocked to Egypt after the Persian conquest (Hdt. 3.139.1), most probably seeking positions as garrison troops. Persians ultimately appeared in numbers significant enough that a part of Memphis, where they obviously concentrated, came to be called Syropersikon (the “Syrian-Persian” quarter), but this may have been due primarily to the more extensive use of Persians in administrative positions in Egypt from the late 480s onward. Under Cambyses, the continuing presence of the Persian army, the replenishment of garrison forces with newly arrived Greeks (and probably others), and the employment of native Egyptian officials in great numbers obviated the need to install substantial numbers of Persians or to allot great amounts of land to Persians to encourage settlement.  

Having conquered and secured Egypt, Cambyses embarked on further campaigns. Taking an army south from Memphis, he divided it at Thebes, sending part westward through the desert to Siwa and other oases and leading the rest toward Ethiopia (3.26–27). Herodotus’ report of ensuing disasters due to insufficient preparations probably indicates that Cambyses was less interested in the campaign in strategic and logistical terms than in political terms. That is, after becoming King of Egypt, Cambyses rapidly launched these campaigns primarily to display his interest in doing so—to show that he was following in the steps of his Egyptian royal predecessors in leading great undertakings to the west and south aimed at securing the trade routes which brought exotic goods to Egypt. 

Cambyses behaved like an Egyptian king in another respect: he left intact the Delta dynasteiai and the native machimoi connected with them. Strategic concerns gave him little choice. According to Herodotus, “the Libyans who border Egypt” had submitted voluntarily to Cambyses and agreed to pay tribute (Hdt. 3.13), and Libyans, as well as Greek cities in Libya, namely Cyrene and Barca, furnished tribute to Cambyses in 525. But Cambyses failed to establish Persian authority anywhere west of Egypt’s immediate frontier. Not long after Cambyses’ conquest, the satrap of Egypt, Aryandes, tried again, using the whole army and fleet in Egypt in an attempt to secure Libya, but in the wake of Aryandes’ failure no satrapal organization was ever imposed on Libya (Hdt. 4.167.1–5, 200.1–204). Failure to subjugate Libya left the Persian Empire without a secure western frontier in North Africa and exposed Egypt to constant Libyan attacks. The Persian Empire was simply too large—nearly three million square miles—to dedicate permanently to Egypt a sufficiently large force to guard this frontier. Consequently, the Persians had to depend on the Delta machimoi for defense of the western frontier and thus on the Delta dynasts who commanded the machimoi. Both had to stay in place.

Herodotus knew the machimoi as a specially privileged class in Egypt in his day—that is, in the period of fifth-century Persian dominion—and his familiarity with the details of their privileges, ostensibly in Saite times, suggests that these remained intact after Cambyses became king in Egypt. The machimoi contingents were evidently divided geographically into two large groups, Hermotybians and Calasirians, the first dwelling in districts in the western Delta, the second in districts in the eastern Delta (along with Thebes: Hdt. 2.164, 9.32.1). Herodotus terms them
“short-sword carriers”—and describes their equipment as including plaited helmets and concave shields with unusually large rims (2.164; 7.89.3). Plato (Tim. 24) assigns them the lance or spear as their characteristic weapon. Egyptian machimoi appear in Persian service in 480 as marines armed with boarding spears and poleaxes (Hdt. 7.89.3). Their evident use of various arms suggests that machimoi were in fact versatile and, appropriately for professional warriors, not limited to the use of a single weapon.

Machimoi, Herodotus writes, each had twelve arourae of tax-free land. This (about eight acres) was more than twice what was needed to support a single family and may indicate maintenance of more than one generation on a single allotment. A different contingent of one thousand machimoi served the king as guards each year and received very generous rations of bread, meat, and wine (Hdt. 2.164, 168). During the late sixth and the fifth century, “the king” likely meant the satrap at Memphis (where in the 450s we find some loyal Egyptian troops joining with Persian garrison forces to repel attacks by rebellious dynasts and their Athenian allies [Thuc. 1.104.2]). Since neither meat nor wine was typically daily fare in Egypt, the rations were clearly exceptionally generous. This may reflect an attempt by the Persians to provide special rewards for loyal service, and the provision that no warrior could perform this yearlong guard duty more than once may have served to spread Persian largesse as widely as possible among the machimoi. If so, it appears that the Persians, faced with a well-entrenched military class in Egypt and needing its services for their own purposes, sought to establish themselves as patrons of the machimoi, perhaps aiming to counter the long-standing links machimoi had to various local dynasts.

Cambyses evidently hoped to reconcile Delta dynasts to his kingship. After executing Psammetichus III and some high officials, he disinterred and abused Amasis’ corpse (Hdt. 3.16), most likely to signal that as king in Egypt he was not a successor of the Saites, who had sought to limit dynastic power, and least of all of the recently deceased Amasis, whose conflict with Delta dynasts was still fresh. Most of the dynasts had apparently not supported Amasis’ son Psammetichus III, and possibly, if Delta dynasts saw the Persians willing to treat them as quasi-independent (as Saite kings had not), they might tolerate Persian dominion over Egypt as a whole and use their machimoi to strengthen the western frontier. Still, Cambyses’ garrisoning of Marea, Daphnae, and Memphis, all in or near the Delta, meant that there was a permanent Persian military presence in the country to discourage attempts at aggrandizement by Delta dynasts.

To sustain control of the middle territory and the Phoenician, Cypriot, and Arab support which had made Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign possible, Cambyses cultivated the continued allegiance of Cypriots, Phoenicians, and Arabs by using a loose vassal approach to local kings and treating them as autonomous powers. Phoenician kings (heirs to the only kingdoms to survive Assyrian and Babylonian rule in the middle territory), at least those of Sidon and Tyre, were rewarded with control over harbor towns on the Philistine coast. From Acco to Ashkelon, these became...
alternately, possessions of either Tyre or Sidon. In the case of the Arabs, favored treatment meant exemption from tribute payments and responsibility instead for annual “gift-giving” to the Persian king—delivery of a portion of the frankincense-myrrh trade controlled by the Arabs (Hdt. 3.88, 91, 97). Additionally, the Persians left the great city of Gaza, the major terminus of the frankincense-myrrh trade route from southern Arabia, in Arab hands.

Cambyses left Egypt in 522. He died en route, and a period of conflict ensued as Darius, not a member of Cyrus and Cambyses’ immediate family, strove to gain the Persian kingship (Hdt. 3.61.79). Despite the Persian laissez-faire policy regarding political arrangements in the Delta, Delta dynasts wasted no time in challenging Persian authority in Egypt after Cambyses’ death. One of them, Petubastis of Bubastis, may have declared himself king. But Persians retained control of Memphis and various garrison sites. Victorious in the succession struggle following Cambyses’ death, Darius I brought a big army to Egypt in (probably) 518 and sent rebellious dynasts into quick retreat with this show of great force.

Darius had been in Egypt as a royal spear-bearer (a member of Cambyses’ special guard) with Cambyses in the 520s (Hdt. 3.139.2), so he was certainly familiar with Cambyses’ Egyptianizing policies and practices. The report that Darius’ piety, evidenced by his offer of a 100-talent reward for finding the new Apis bull, the sacred bull of Ptah at Memphis (the old one having died at the time of Darius’ arrival in Egypt), so impressed the Egyptians that they no longer turned to the rebels but “gave themselves to Darius” (Polyaen. 7.11.7), indicates that despite revolt by Delta dynasts, Darius did not alter Persian policy in Egypt but, like Cambyses before him, presented himself as king of Egypt, backing up this claim with the threat of force majeure. Darius’ twenty-year project to collect, edit, and translate into Aramaic the details of the perquisites and privileges accorded “the priests, soldiers, and scribes”—critical segments of Egyptian society, whose collaboration would be crucial to the success of Persian dominion in Egypt—likely began at this time and reflects Darius’ effort to appear in every respect the continuer and guarantor of customary Egyptian legal “rights.”

Darius’ long reign in fact gave him more time than Cambyses had to develop and display in Egypt his identity as Egyptian king. Most dramatically, imitating traditional pharaonic practice, Darius embarked on a series of building projects throughout Egypt—at Busiris, at Saqqara (the Serapeum), at El Kab, and probably at Hibis in the el-Kharga oasis (the temple dedicated to Amun-Re). Everywhere in the decorative programs of these temples and shrines, Darius appears in thoroughly Egyptian settings which depict every aspect of royal identity: being fashioned by Khnum and Ptah, being nursed by Neith, symbolically uniting Upper and Lower Egypt, being embraced by the goddess Amaunet, elsewhere by the sky goddess Nut, restoring the magic udjat-eye to Horus. A great statue of Darius erected at Heliopolis, the center of the solar cult devoted to Re (subsequently Amun-Re), bore hieroglyphic inscriptions identifying Darius as
The perfect god, who acts with his own hand, sovereign, Ruler of the Two Crowns, who inspires fear in the hearts of humankind…whose power conquered both of the Two Lands, who acts according to the command of the God. The son of [Re], born of Atum, living image of Re, whom he placed on his own throne to organize that which he had begun on earth…. Lord of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands, Darius—may he live forever!\textsuperscript{46}

Darius’ efforts to present himself as god-king of Egypt are reflected in the tradition about his Egyptian activities preserved by Diodorus (1.95.5):

[Darius] aspired to live a life of virtue and of piety towards the gods. Indeed he associated with the priests of Egypt themselves, and took part with them in the study of theology and of the events recorded in their sacred books; and when he learned from these books about the greatness of soul of the ancient kings and about their goodwill towards their subjects he imitated their manner of life. For this reason he was the object of such great honor that he alone of all the kings was addressed as a god by the Egyptians in his lifetime.

In fact, all Egyptian kings were gods; all had priestly roles as well, and, being responsible for the preservation of \textit{ma’at}—"right order"—all were ideally the protectors and upholders of the welfare of the people. Thus, simply put, Darius was an Egyptian king.

However, like Cambyses before him, Darius did not rely exclusively on an Egyptianizing posture to sustain the Persian hold on Egypt. Darius tried to overcome the great distance between Egypt and Mesopotamia which had helped to perpetuate West–East opposition, and, as part of a larger program of integrating west and east by extensive overland routes (the portion of this system that went from Susa to Sardis was known as the Royal Road), he made the northern Sinai route to Egypt a more convenient connector by establishing many settlements (inhabited ultimately by many “Syrians,” that is, Phoenicians and Philistines) along the desolate northern Sinai route. Spaced roughly twelve to thirteen miles apart—a day’s journey—these functioned as way stations for the empire-wide courier system of dispatch riders and facilitated the movements of Persian officials and troops.\textsuperscript{47} New or much elaborated foundations anchored either end of the route, Pelusium at the western terminus of the route, at the mouth of the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, and (probably) the site at Tell Ruqeqish, about eleven miles south of Gaza, at the eastern end of the route.\textsuperscript{48} All this ultimately came under the supervision of the “Overseer of Roads” responsible for the whole of the Royal Road system.\textsuperscript{49} The Persians dealt with the lack of water along the Sinai coastal route by requiring Egyptians to fill empty wine jugs with water which were then conveyed to the Sinai settlements (Hdt. 3.6–7).

As part of the same program aimed at overcoming the relative isolation of Egypt, Darius completed and reopened Necho II’s canal, begun about a century earlier,
which ran through the Wadi Tumilat and connected the easternmost (Pelusiac) branch of the Nile to the Red Sea (Hdt. 2.154, 158). Linking Egypt and Mesopotamia via the Red Sea–Persian Gulf route, this created a direct maritime connection between the western and eastern cores. A garrison force of Arabs stationed at Patoumos (Tell el Maskhuta), which Herodotus knew as “the Arabian town” (2.158), at the eastern entry to the Wadi Tumilat, guarded the canal and the southern entry to Egypt from the Sinai route.

Cambyses and Darius thus developed a promising solution to the seemingly endless conflict between the eastern and western cores: join the two by holding two kingships, an eastern one and a western one simultaneously. Darius’ employment of Egyptian iconography at the new Persian ceremonial capital Parsa (Persepolis) served to display the incorporation of the western core into an all-encompassing imperial state directed by the Persian king. In Egypt, even while sustaining the persona of an Egyptian king, Darius could not help boasting of this accomplishment. In the cuneiform inscription (but not the accompanying hieroglyphic inscription) on dedicatory stelae commemorating completion of the Nile–Red Sea canal, Darius speaks as a Persian:

A great god is Ahuramazda, who created yonder heaven and who created this earth, who created man, who created prosperity for mankind, who made Darius king, who gave King Darius a large kingdom, with good horses and good people. I am Darius, Great King, King of Kings, King of lands with many people, King of this great (and) wide land, son of Vishtaspa, an Achaemenid. Says Darius the King: I am a Persian; from Persia I conquered Egypt. I ordered the digging of this canal from the River Nile, which flows in Egypt, to the sea, which borders Persia. Thereupon this canal was dug, as I ordered, and ships sailed from Egypt to Persia through this canal, as it had been my wish.

Darius himself travelled to Egypt (probably in 497/6) for the opening of the canal. His pride is palpable and understandable. Darius and the Persians conquered Egypt—the western core—but beyond that they connected it to Persia, now effectively the eastern core. The resulting amalgamation of the western and eastern cores, symbolized by the new canal which joined the Nile to the Persian Gulf, represented the culmination of a struggle going back 1,000 years and was an achievement unprecedented in the whole of that long past.
Following the suppression of the first Delta-centered Egyptian revolt, Darius evidently had confidence that his show of force and his presentation of himself as king of Egypt secured his succession to Cambyses’ kingship in Egypt. If, consequently, Egypt remained submissive, then the Levant would be securely under Persian control. Free from concern about constantly defending the middle territory from Egyptian intervention, Darius could thus extend his ambitions farther to the west—to the “Lands Beyond the Sea”—than had any of his imperial predecessors, Persian, Babylonian, or Assyrian. Great far western conquests would serve to balance the far eastern regions Cyrus had already annexed to the Persian imperial state. By including an attack on Scythian territory north of the Black Sea, such a grand western enterprise would also address Persia’s primary remaining strategic concern following subjugation of Egypt—periodic trans-Caucasian Scythian incursions into the Mesopotamian heartland (see Hdt. 4.119; Diod. 10.19.2).  

Preliminary reconnoitering by Persian scouts provided information about conditions all the way to Italy. But Darius began his Drang nach Westen by extending transportation links—a road—from Asia to Europe in the form of a pontoon bridge across the Bosporus (Hdt. 3.134–38; 4.83–88) and then launching a spectacularly ambitious campaign in (probably) 513 to put the whole Aegean world—Thrace and the Macedonian and Greek mainland—under Persian control. As it turned out, however, Persian enterprise in the far west, made possible by Persian control of Egypt, set in motion a chain of events that jeopardized Persian control of Egypt and ultimately compelled the Persians to adopt new methods of dealing with Egypt.

Facing elusive, highly mobile opponents in his “Scythian campaign,” Darius was unable to gain any decisive victories north of the Danube River (Hdt. 4.120–43). Rather than attempt to sustain large-scale operations in the far west, Darius turned to more limited enterprises from bases in Thrace and western Anatolia, using local levies commanded by Persian officials and venturing toward the Greek mainland by targeting islands in the Cyclades. With this strategy, Darius himself did not risk
defeat, nor did he deploy huge forces at a great distance from the center of the empire. But by 500, the prospect of constant levies and exactions pushed subject Ionian Greeks in western Anatolia to revolt. In light of recent Persian use of only small-scale military enterprises in the far west, Ionian Greeks may have believed that Darius would not mount any great campaign in response to their revolt and that a demonstration of Ionian Greek unity along with evidence of mainland Greek support (Ionian Greeks managed to enlist participation by Athens and Eretria) would suffice to deter local satraps from taking action to recover rebellious cities. However, when all the Cypriot cities except Amathus joined, the Persians faced the loss of this vital island overlooking the middle territory and, because of this, the potential disruption of their authority over the middle territory.

Fortunately for the Persians, the western core and the middle territory—Egypt and the Phoenician cities—did not follow the Ionian and Cypriot lead, probably because Darius’ immediate muster of a great naval force aimed at regaining control of Cyprus indicated Persian determination to deal swiftly and decisively with rebellious cities. Darius was thus able to launch a grand maritime and land campaign, which involved both Phoenician and Egyptian contingents, to restore imperial authority in the west (Hdt. 5.96–6.6).

Persian recovery of defecting cities during 496–494 proceeded successfully—and frightfully, involving practices reminiscent of Assyrian and Babylonian intimidation measures: castration of “the best favored boys,” dispatch of the most beautiful girls as presents to the Persian king, and the burning of cities and temples (Hdt. 6.7–41). Darius then greatly enlarged the campaigning force in the Aegean and renewed the effort to push Persian authority further west, beyond Thrace and into the Greek mainland. But the enterprise stalled, first as a result of the loss of several hundred ships and perhaps 20,000 men in storms off Mt. Athos, the eastern-most of the Chalcidice peninsulas, in 492, and then as a result of Athens’ repulse of a much smaller-scale Persian invasion at Marathon (on the east coast of Attica) in 490 (Hdt. 6.43–45, 94–118).

After the setback at Marathon, Darius decided to secure the far west once and for all by reverting to the large-scale strategy used in 513 and 492. This, as Herodotus reports (7.1.1–3), ultimately incited revolt in Egypt, probably late in 487.

Instantly [after learning of Marathon] he sent off messengers to the various states to make an army much greater than before; and also warships, transports, horses, and grain. . . . All Asia was in an uproar for three years, with the best men being enrolled in the army for the invasion of Greece, and with the preparations. In the fourth year, the Egyptians, who had been conquered by Cambyses, revolted from the Persians. Thereupon Darius hastened even more to lead an army against both of them.

The fact that the Persian satrap and Persian garrison forces in Egypt were unable to quash the revolt indicates that the quasi-independent dynasts with their many machimoi were at the center of it. This crisis compelled the Persians to postpone
the new Aegean campaign and to send to Egypt instead the very large force already raised for the Aegean offensive. Darius initiated this recovery effort, but his successor Xerxes carried it through after Darius’ death in 486.

As in the case of Darius’ invasion of Egypt some thirty years earlier, there is no report of any large battle in Egypt at this time. We may imagine that Delta dynasts who took advantage of widespread opposition to Persian exactions to test Persian resolve in Egypt just melted away again in the face of overwhelming Persian response. The revolt exposed the basic problem for Persian ambitions in the far west. While the joining of the eastern and western cores through Persian control of Egypt permitted imperial expansion to the far west, the cost of such expansion in the face of natural obstacles and effective resistance required exactions which jeopardized Persian control of the western core and, through this, control of the whole west. Clearly, Persian kings’ presentation of themselves as Egyptian kings was not a sufficient foundation for controlling Egypt when the Persians were also making excessive demands on Egyptian resources to support far western operations.

In light of this problem, Xerxes had two alternatives once he recovered Egypt: abandon far western enterprises to ensure continued stability in Egypt, or abandon Cambyses and Darius’ collaborative, Egyptianizing approach to managing Egypt in favor of direct control measures and continue operations in the far west. Xerxes chose the latter alternative, “making,” Herodotus says (7.7), “all Egypt much more enslaved than it had been under Darius.” Herodotus does not specify just what he means, but Xerxes’ new policy evidently involved the use of Egyptians in only the most subordinate administrative positions, a great increase in garrison forces, especially at Memphis, and the end of subsidies to Egyptian temples—the end, in other words, of Cambyses and Darius’ effort to perform the functions of an Egyptian king and thus be an Egyptian king acceptable to Egyptians. Xerxes installed his brother Achaemenes as governor of Egypt (Hdt. 7.1), keeping Egypt in this way closely connected to the Persian king. But henceforth, Persian kings do not try to appear as kings of Egypt, claiming the favor of Re or Neith or building at or otherwise benefiting Egyptian temples.

This was a fateful decision. In the short term, restored and intensified Persian power over Egypt permitted resumption of enterprise in the far west—enterprise, in fact, on an unprecedented scale, with the building of canals, roads, and bridges (including now a suspension bridge across the Hellespont relying in part on cables fashioned from Egyptian papyrus). However, Xerxes’ extended preparations in the late 480s and the vast scale of his invasion of Greece (and the placement of Ahura Mazda’s sacred chariot with its eight milk-white horses ahead of Xerxes in the great procession of the advancing Persian army in 480 [Hdt. 7.40]) did not guarantee swift success. Mainland Greek anticipation of Persian invasion in the late 480s instigated the creation of an Athenian war fleet and the formation of an alliance system joining Athens, Sparta, and a handful of other Greek mainland states. The Persian land force pushed all the way into central Greece in 480, but Athenian and other Greek ships severely mauled Persia’s fleet in 480 and 479 (Hdt. 8.70–99; 9.90–104).
This, together with the death of Xerxes’ commander, his son-in-law Mardonius, in battle in central Greece in 479, compelled Persian withdrawal from Greece (Hdt. 9.64–66). While there was no question of abandoning far western enterprise, given the experience of the 486 Egyptian revolt Xerxes knew he could not immediately make excessive demands on subject peoples to renew operations on the scale of the 480–479 campaign.

Free from fear of any large Persian force returning to the Aegean, and not facing a Persian fleet of any kind there, Aegean and Asian Greek states previously under Persian control allied now with Athens and campaigned to dislodge Persian garrison forces in Thrace and western Anatolia. As freshly liberated Greek cities joined this new alliance system, the Delian League, making contributions in their turn as the original members had, what was in scale and power a kind of imperial state with unprecedented maritime capabilities took shape at the western edge of the Persian Empire. When nearly 200 Greek, Thracian, and Carian members of the Delian League pooled their resources and replenished a common treasury on an annual basis, the great disparity between Greek and Persian resources lessened significantly. Furthermore, the practice of the Delian League allies of mustering and campaigning annually gave this super-state a high level of experience in preparing and executing military operations.

All this now made the risk of failure too great for the Persians to renew Darius’ and Xerxes’ grand enterprises in the far west. In the early 460s, Xerxes turned instead to a strictly maritime enterprise to counter Athens and her league allies, but when allied Greeks under the Athenian general Cimon seized Cypriot and Phoenician ships rendezvousing at the Eurymedon River in Pamphylia in southern Anatolia for an Aegean campaign, the Delian League fleet was in undisputed control of the Aegean and poised to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean (Thuc. 1.100; Plut. Cim. 13).

This altered the whole situation in the west. Now, recalcitrant dynasts in Egypt had potential allies in the far west whose military strength and experience could tilt the West–East balance in favor of the western core. Egyptian dynasts read the post-Eurymedon situation well. When the murder of Xerxes in 464 and the ensuing political confusion as prospective successors fought each other (and the satrap of Egypt, the Achaemenid Achaemenes, departed Egypt to join in the struggle) provided an opportunity for revolt, dynasts—probably in some cases, sons of those responsible for revolt in the 480s—wasted no time or effort. Thucydides gives a concise sketch (1.109):

Meanwhile [he has been recounting events of 462] Inarus, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, the town above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King Artaxerxes, and placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to his assistance.

Diodorus under the year 463/2 amplifies this in numerous ways (11.71.3–4):
When the inhabitants of Egypt learned of the death of Xerxes and of the general attempt upon the throne and the disorder in the Persian kingdom, they decided to strike for their liberty. At once, then, mustering an army, they revolted from the Persians, and after expelling the Persians whose duty it was to collect the tribute from Egypt, they set up as king a man named Inarus. He at first recruited soldiers from the native Egyptians, but afterwards he gathered also mercenaries from other nations and amassed a considerable army.

Finally, Ctesias (FGH 688 F14.36) provides a bit more information, reporting that Inarus “the Libyan” and another, Egyptian, conspirator planned the revolt. Herodotus’ characterization (3.15.3) of Inarus and Amyrtaeus as the figures who caused the Persians the most trouble points to Amyrtaeus as Ctesias’ Egyptian conspirator.

Putting the accounts together allows us to understand the pattern of events. Inarus, the west Delta “Libyan” dynast, was the responsible figure (for Thucydides, he is the “sole author of the revolt”: 1.110.3). In the initial steps reported by Diodorus—mustering an army, revolting from the Persians, and expelling the Persian tax collectors—we can see Inarus starting by using a force of *machimoi* to attack tax collectors in the Delta, symbols of Persian domination and objects of Egyptian hatred, which had probably grown particularly virulent since the 486–484 revolt. Such actions gained Inarus more extensive support, and Diodorus’ reference to the Egyptians setting up Inarus as king indicates recognition of him at least in the Delta. Inarus’ patronymic indicates that he was or claimed to be a scion of the Saite dynasty (the greatest Saite king was Psammetichus I and the last was Psammetichus III, son of Amasis), and it was undoubtedly on this basis that he asserted his kingship.  

The first step in Inarus’ revolt, asserting himself in the Delta and there gaining recognition as king, was evidently accomplished without difficulty. Thanks to the continuing Persian succession struggle, Inarus then had time to amass a much larger army by adding all sorts of foreign mercenaries to his original native force. Inarus also sought Athenian aid in particular, offering, Diodorus says (11.71.4), to share his kingdom (*basileia*) with Athens. This certainly does not reflect a proposal to divide Egypt. By 460, the Athenians had managed to push the Persians entirely out of the Aegean and were venturing into the eastern Mediterranean to attack Persian staging areas (Thuc. 1.104.2). In other words, entirely on their own in the aftermath of the Eurymedon victory, the Athenians had begun to target the middle territory on which Persian control of Egypt depended. The evident willingness of Athenians and the Delian League to extend anti-Persian operations to the edge of the Levant probably led Inarus to a great insight: supported by Egyptian resources, Athens’ fleet along with Athenian and allied hoplite troops would give Egypt the enterprising, offensive capability the still intact Egyptian military system—the *machimoi* with their dynastic commanders—did not alone provide. Respective Athenian and Egyptian strengths would in combination suffice to expel Persian forces from the middle territory.
Most certainly what Inarus proposed was not that Athens share his "kingdom" with him but that he and Athens share archē or dominion over the eastern Mediterranean and Levant after expelling the Persians entirely from this region (11.71.4). Egyptians had never been interested in control of the middle territory for its own sake, at least not since the days of New Kingdom imperialism, and earlier Egyptian kings had been unwilling to dedicate sufficient troops to securing the middle territory militarily on a long-term basis. Now, however, if Egyptians and Athenian shared archē or rule, the Athenians, who had their own strategic reasons for detaching the middle territory from Persian control (here were the home cities of the Phoenician ships without which the Persians could not launch any Aegean campaigns), could assume responsibility for securing the middle territory once and for all. Unsurprisingly, the Athenians accepted the invitation and diverted the allied fleet of 200 ships from intended operations on Cyprus to Egypt (Thuc. 1.104.2).10

An initial Persian campaign, launched in 459/8 before Inarus’ new Delian League allies arrived in Egypt, followed the traditional Persian strategy—send an overwhelming force to Memphis to intimidate rebel dynasts and watch revolt collapse without a battle. However, the arrival itself of such a force failed this time to end the revolt. Having brought to Memphis a campaign force assembled outside Egypt, the Persian satrap Achaemenes (who had been away from Egypt at the time of the outbreak of the revolt) followed the Canopic branch downriver into the district of Papremis in the western Delta (Diod. 11.74.2–4; Hdt. 7.7; 3.12.4). Probably encouraged by the anticipation of Athenian support and bolstered already by recently recruited mercenary troops, Egyptian rebels in the Delta stood their ground and met the Persian invasion force in battle—the first fighting in Egypt for the Persians since Cambyses’ original invasion nearly seventy years earlier.11 The Egyptians prevailed, reportedly killing a quarter of the whole Persian force and Achaemenes himself. This provides a good indication of the effectiveness of the Egyptian machimoi when deployed in large numbers.

Surviving Persian troops withdrew upriver to Memphis, still at this point in Persian hands. The Persian fleet fared no better after this, losing fifty ships in battle when the Athenian fleet arrived from Cyprus. Although the primary aim of the Egyptian-Athenian alliance was establishment of Egyptian-Athenian dominion over the middle territory, the necessary preliminary to this was the complete removal of Persians from Egypt and restoration of native control over the whole country and all its resources. Thus, after Athenian forces reached Egypt and crippled the Persian fleet operating in Egypt, rebel Egyptians together with their Athenian allies advanced from the Delta to Memphis, intent on taking control of the satrapal center and old capital. Persian forces were certainly still substantial, but, having lost their commander Achaemenes and evidently wary of another battle, they allowed Inarus and his allies to occupy Memphis without a fight. However, a Persian garrison force along with some loyal Egyptian troops remained in Memphis’ large citadel, the White Wall or White Fortress, which encompassed a third of the
area of the city (and had walls more than thirty feet thick at their base), and held out against besieging rebel and Athenian forces (Thuc. 1.104.2; Diod. 11.74.1–4). Although Inarus and fellow dynasts and their machimoi defeated Achaemenes’ force without Athenian aid, the Persians recognized that collusion between the far west and Egypt gave unprecedented power to the western core and threatened Persian power everywhere in the west. Artaxerxes turned in 458 first to diplomacy to induce the withdrawal of the Athenian ships and tried to bribe the Spartans to attack Athens. Such a tactic might have succeeded a year or so later, when the Spartans were actually at war with Athens, but at this time the Spartans declined. Artaxerxes then set in motion a new campaign under Artabazus (the commander who had led the Persian army in withdrawal from Greece in 479) and Megabyzus. These two mustered forces in Cilicia and Phoenicia and spent nearly a year—457/6—in preparations and training. This new expeditionary force arrived in Egypt in 456/5 and, meeting no resistance in the eastern Delta (likely because of rebel and Athenian concentration on the siege of Memphis), moved directly to Memphis. Amazingly, the Persian garrison in the White Wall had survived a sustained siege for more than two years. Rebel and Athenian besiegers held the rest of Memphis, but, lacking fortifications of their own, the besiegers were vulnerable to Persian attack once the new Persian expeditionary force reached Memphis. Egyptian rebels and Athenians thus abandoned Memphis and withdrew northward. In retreat the Athenians occupied Prosopitis, a region surrounded by water in the form of the river and canals. Here they held out until the Persians drained one of the canals, destroyed the now grounded Athenian fleet, and attacked the Athenians on land. Surviving Athenians withdrew through the western Delta—Inarus’ home region. Persian forces subsequently destroyed most of a fifty-ship Athenian reinforcement contingent, which arrived unaware of recent Persian success (Thuc. 1.109.2–110.4; Diod. 11.74.5–75.4, 77.1–5).

Destruction of the Athenian force fatally weakened Inarus, and, according to Thucydides, he was betrayed, captured, and crucified. Thus, Thucydides notes, Egypt returned to its subjection to the Persian king, except Amyrtaeus, “the king in the marshes,” whom the Persians were unable to capture because of the extent of the marshes (Thuc. 1.110.2). We may wonder, however, if Amyrtaeus’ survival had something to do with Inarus’ betrayal. Inarus was undoubtedly doomed for his role, but with appropriate displays of submission Amyrtaeus (and other dynasts) might resume their earlier client-like roles and thus retain their dynasteiai. In fact, even Inarus’ own dynasteia remained intact, with his son Thannya subsequently permitted to take his place (Hdt. 3.15.3). The record of Athens’ receipt of grain from Psammetichus, “king of Egypt” or “king of Libya,” in 445/4 (Plut. Per. 37; Philoch. FGH 328 F90), points to dynasts’ continued use of royal titles in the manner of the more or less independent kinglets of the pre-Saite period.

What mattered most to the Persians was breaking the partnership between rebellious Egyptians and aggressive Athenians. With that accomplished by the destruction of Athens’ Egyptian fleet, the Persians overcame the greatest threat to
their power in the west and could leave in place the Delta dynasts and their machi-moi. However, the Athenians were resilient, and surviving Delta dynasts, having achieved near success in the early 450s, were unrepentant. When the Athenians sent a new naval force to Cyprus under their aggressive general Cimon (previously ostracized and thus in exile, but recalled in the aftermath of Persian success in Egypt) in 451, Amyrtaeus solicited Athenian aid for renewed Egyptian revolt. He got sixty ships, but the Athenians brought these back to Athens along with the fleet from Cyprus after Cimon died during Athenian operations on the island (Thuc. 1.112.1–4; Plut. Cim. 18–19.2; Diod. 12.3.1–4).

Despite Persian victory in 454, it was clear that nothing had changed. Dynasts in Egypt were obviously still poised to revolt, and the Athenians were ready to intervene. Thus the threat of a west and far west coalition persisted. The Athenians were in fact better positioned to engage in Egypt or the eastern Mediterranean in 450 than they had been earlier. Thanks to a truce with Sparta in 451, the Athenians were at peace on the mainland (Thuc. 1.112.1). Using a mixture of governors, garrisons, and compulsory oath taking, they had tightened controls over their restive allies after the debacle in Egypt in 454. Thus, so long as peace on the mainland lasted, the Athenians could throw virtually their whole fleet and army into Egypt if they chose. Since there was no question of the Persians mounting a great far western campaign to forestall this—rebellious Egyptian dynasts would certainly exploit Persian preoccupation in the far west and revolt anew—there was no hope for dealing decisively through military means with the continuing prospect of Egyptian-Athenian collusion. The Persians might again manage to push the Athenians out of Egypt, but they could not defeat Athens once and for all and dismantle the Athenian super-state.

In light of this, Artaxerxes made a long overdue decision in 450–449 to abjure extension of imperial power to the far west in favor of securing Persian control of Egypt. He announced a laissez-faire policy in the Aegean, declaring that no Persian officials would come within a three-day march of the coast and no Persian ship would pass the midpoint of southern Anatolia—the so-called Peace of Callias (named after the reported Athenian negotiator). For their part, the Athenians agreed not to send an army into lands which the King ruled (Diod. 12.4.3–6, 26.2; cf. Isoc. 4.120; Dem. 15.29). This marked Persian acceptance of the status quo and abandonment of claims to Asian Greeks—in other words, complete withdrawal from the far western Greek world.

Keeping the far western Athenian archē and Egypt separate from each other would not necessarily preclude further revolt in Egypt, but it would certainly facilitate Persian suppression of any Egyptian revolt and probably remove entirely the possibility of any challenges to Persian control of the middle territory. Herodotus’ report, based on his visit to Egypt in the aftermath of the 450s revolt, that Egyptians had to provide 120,000 measures of grain annually for Persian and auxiliary forces at Memphis (Hdt. 3.91.3) points to something like 10,000 to 12,000 troops in Memphis after Persian recovery and perhaps indicates a significant augmentation of
this all-important garrison, continuous Persian control of which had been the key to recovering Egypt in the 450s. Alternatively, it may reflect a policy of stockpiling on a larger scale than previously in anticipation that the Memphis garrison might need to hold out indefinitely again. In other words, despite excluding the Athenians from Egypt, the Persians were taking no chances. And, clearly, Artaxerxes I, like Xerxes before him, was relying on an entirely military strategy to secure Egypt.

Artaxerxes’ disavowal in 450–449 of far western ambitions marks a fundamental turning point in Persian imperial history: the end of Persia’s century-long expansion efforts and the acceptance of boundaries—the end of the dynamic phase of Persian imperial history and the beginning of its conservative phase. Henceforth, maintenance of the status quo—control of the western core and the middle territory—constitutes Persia’s primary imperial objective in the west. Events over the course of the first half of the fifth century demonstrated that realizing this objective meant preventing collaboration between the western core and the far west. From this point on, that concern dictated Persian policy everywhere in the west.
CHAPTER 4
Losing Egypt, 415–400

As long as Athens remained powerful, Persian-Athenian détente held, and the Persians preserved unchallenged authority over Egypt, the western core of their empire. After Artaxerxes I’s death in 425, Darius II renewed the Persian peace agreement with Athens (Andoc. 3.29), and even though an extended succession struggle followed Artaxerxes I’s death, Delta dynasts remained quiet. The Athenians stayed out of Egypt, indeed out of the eastern Mediterranean entirely, after 449. Abandonment of the idea of a joint Egyptian-Athenian archē gave the Athenians a greater interest in the western Mediterranean (the far west from a Greek perspective), where in the 440s and 430s they entered into a number of alliances and established a colonial base at Thurii in Italy. Suspicions by Greek states not allied with Athens that Athens’ developing western interests were part of a plan to extend Athenian hegemony into the western Mediterranean led to confrontations with Corinth, Megara, and Sparta, and finally to the outbreak of a great far western war, the Peloponnesian War, in 431.¹

Ten years of war with Sparta and her allies resulted in Athenian and Spartan agreement to the Peace of Nicias (421). This left Athenian maritime strength undiminished and her imperial power intact. But, seeing control of Sicily and the western Mediterranean as vital to their long-term security, the Athenians launched a great Sicilian campaign in 415 which targeted Syracuse in particular. Two years later, in 413, they ended up losing nearly all their fleet and most of their expeditionary army in battle with Syracuse (Thuc. 7.22–87). This disaster, apparently marking the demise of Athens as a great imperial power, brought an end to Persian interest in détente. Darius II evidently concluded that with Athenian power moribund there was no need to fear far western interference in Egypt or elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. There was thus no longer any reason for Persian compliance with the terms of the conciliatory Peace of Callias, and, repudiating its concessions, Darius II ordered his satraps in the west again to collect tribute payments (including arrears) from Asian Greek states (Thuc. 8.5, 18). Athens, much weakened by the
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Sicilian disaster and having to face Spartan attacks as the Peloponnesian War started up again, responded by allying with the Persian rebel Amorges (a holdout from the recent succession struggle which claimed the life of his father Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia), who had created an independent base for himself at Iasus on the western Carian coast just south of Athens’ Ionian “allies” (Andoc. 3.28–29; Thuc. 8.5.4–5). Persian-Athenian détente was thus over, and the Persian Empire and Athens were again at war.

The significance of renewed hostilities between Athens and Persia, raising as they did the likelihood of Athenian interest in supporting anti-Persian efforts everywhere, was not lost on Delta dynasts. Though lacking detail, numerous sources with their references to disturbances (including attacks on the satrap Arsames’ personal estates in the Delta), revolts, and troubling alliances (Egyptian grain again being sent to Athens) indicate a flurry of challenges and anti-Persian activities by Delta dynasts, undoubtedly hopeful that fresh hostility between Athens and Persia would restore Athenian interest in engaging in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean.

Diodorus’ report that in 410 Pharnabazus, Persian satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, sent back to Phoenicia the 300-ship fleet that had been prepared for operations in the Aegean after he learned that “the king of the Arabs [undoubtedly the ‘king’ of the Qedarite Arab coalition, whose realm stretched from northwest Arabia into southern Palestine and the Sinai, where Arabs oversaw and controlled entry into Egypt] and the king of the Egyptians had designs on Phoenicia” (13.46.6) suggests that dynasts’ rebellious actions had advanced far enough to engender concern about their possible engagement outside Egypt (or their possible solicitation of Athenian naval enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean). Lacking substantial military resources of their own, Persian satraps in Anatolia subsidized a Spartan maritime force after 412 in an effort to recover Asian Greek cities and collect the tribute payments as recently mandated by Darius II. For six years, Sparta and Athens fought a seesaw war of alternating gains and losses in the Aegean which left Athens no opportunity to engage elsewhere. Hence, rebellious activities by Delta dynasts could not move confidently beyond demonstrations and exploratory diplomacy. Finally, however, in late summer 406, the Athenians won a spectacular and seemingly decisive victory over the Spartan fleet in the battle of Arginusae off the island of Lesbos. Estimation of this as “the greatest sea battle between Greeks and Greeks” attests to the striking impression the battle made on contemporary observers (Diod. 13.98.5, 102.4; Xen. Hell. 1.6.24–35). Since the Athenian-Spartan-Persian war had become an almost entirely maritime conflict, Athens’ great naval victory undoubtedly appeared in 406/5 to point to an imminent end to Athens’ hostilities with Sparta.

Drawing such a conclusion, rebellious Delta dynasts could see that termination of Athens’ war with Sparta would leave the Athenians still at war with Persia and determined to recover recently lost Athenian “allies.” This meant that the Athenian-Persian situation would be again what it had been in the 460s and early 450s. Without their Spartan proxies, the Persians would have to use eastern Mediterranean
resources—ships from Phoenician, Cypriot, and Cilician cities—to oppose Athens. The Athenians would therefore most likely again be interested in engaging in the eastern Mediterranean and in receiving Egyptian support for operations there and elsewhere (even more interested now than in the 460s and 450s, since they had abandoned collection of *phoroi*—tribute payments—from allies in an effort to hold on to recalcitrant allies). Delta dynasts thus had good reasons in late 406 and early 405 for believing that they could conclude an Egyptian-Athenian agreement similar to that arranged by Inarus in ca. 460 and that Athenian forces would soon engage alongside rebellious dynasts in Egypt and then move on to try to push the Persians out of the middle territory.  

Such expectations seem to have sparked a more assertive effort at independence in Egypt. We have no record of dynasts’ actions, just the result: in 405/4, according to Manetho (F72a–c), the 27th or Persian Dynasty came to an end, and the 28th Dynasty began with the kingship of Amyrtaeus of Sais. However, continued use of Artaxerxes II’s regnal years—1, 3, and 4 (= 404, 402, and 401)—in the dating formulas of documents from Elephantine indicates that the far south and probably the whole of Upper Egypt (and Memphis) remained under Persian control until at least 401.  

Like previous revolts in Egypt, that which produced recognition of Amyrtaeus’ kingship by 405/4 was evidently limited initially to the Delta. The name Amyrtaeus echoes that of the midcentury dynast named by Thucydides (1.110.2) as a survivor of the revolt spearheaded by Inarus. Since Herodotus (3.15.3) identifies Pausiris as son and successor of this mid-fifth-century Amyrtaeus, Manetho’s Amyrtaeus may be the grandson of the midcentury rebel dynast and as such a likely figure to lead new revolt and claim a royal title at this time.  

Even though the Persians still held a great part of Egypt after 406/5, with Delta dynasts in full revolt, Amyrtaeus in control of much or all of the Delta, and Athens hostile to Persia and not preoccupied by war with Sparta, the Persians faced the very real prospect of seeing just what Persian policy in the west had sought above all else to prevent for the last half century: renewed Athenian-Egyptian collusion. Although the Athenians had played no direct role in Amyrtaeus’ assertion of power in the Delta, they had not been involved in the initial stage of Inarus’ revolt in the 460s either. Nevertheless, they had aided rebel dynasts in the 450s, defeating a Persian fleet in Egypt and joining in an attack on Memphis.  

However, Athens lost almost all its fleet in an unexpectedly decisive Spartan naval victory at Aegospotami in the Hellespont in mid-405 (Xen. *Hell*. 2.1.25–26; Diod. 13.116.1). This led to Athenian surrender to Sparta and demolition of what was left of Athens’ fleet by mid-404. Athens’ collapse certainly removed much of the urgency connected with Artaxerxes’ Egyptian campaign, but given the independence of the Delta region, the campaign itself was still absolutely necessary; delaying suppression of the revolt could jeopardize remaining Persian authority in Egypt and put other regions in the eastern Mediterranean, especially the Levant, at risk. Darius II’s final, fatal illness at just this time probably prevented the Persians from mounting a response as rapidly as they might have (Xen. *Hell*. 2.1.13; Diod.
13.104.4). But the fact that there was a Persian army in Phoenicia under the command of the Persian general Abrocomas poised to attack Egypt in 401 indicates that Darius II’s successor Artaxerxes II initiated preparations soon—perhaps immediately—after he became king (Xen. An. 1.30.20 with 1.45).

With no prospect of outside assistance following Athens’ defeat, the 406/5 Egyptian revolt must have seemed doomed to join the list of failed or aborted sixth- and fifth-century revolts. Since Memphis remained in Persian hands, a large Persian expeditionary force could advance to the capital and position itself to move from there into the Delta. As in 518 and 486, this would likely prompt grudging submission by Amyrtaeus and other rebel dynasts whose machimoi were too valuable to risk in battle against much more numerous Persian troops.

As it turned out, however, a new twist on far western collusion with Egypt sustained Egyptian revolt in the face of Artaxerxes’ preparations for attacking Egypt. This came in the form of Artaxerxes II’s ambitious young brother Cyrus. Having been demoted after Darius II’s death from the grand military position of karanos (or commander in chief) in Anatolia that he had held since 407 to a lesser role as something like overseer of Ionia, Cyrus was evidently fearful of removal or worse at the hands of Artaxerxes. From his precarious vantage point in Ionia, Cyrus saw in the expected dispatch of a big Persian force to Egypt the opportunity to make an attack of his own on Artaxerxes and wrest the kingship from him. When it occurred, Abrocomas’ departure for Egypt would leave Artaxerxes with few ready troops. If Cyrus covertly made preparations of his own, mainly by recruiting numerous Greek mercenaries, while Abrocomas was mustering his force (Cyrus’ ongoing hostilities with Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia, provided Cyrus a plausible pretense for raising forces of his own) and then timed his move against Artaxerxes to coincide with Abrocomas’ engagement in Egypt, Cyrus might be able to snatch the kingship from his brother. Critical to such a scheme was continued revolt in Egypt, and, concerned that Delta dynasts, no longer hopeful of Athenian involvement, might cave in even before Artaxerxes launched his large-scale invasion, Cyrus apparently took steps to encourage rebellious Delta dynasts to persevere.

The evidence for Cyrus’ dealings with Amyrtaeus comes from remarks by Tamos, an Egyptian from Memphis and Cyrus’ long-standing subordinate as hyparch of Ionia and fleet commander (Diod. 14.19.5), who fled to Egypt after Cyrus’ death in 401. According to Diodorus (14.35.2–5), Tamos believed that he would find refuge because of the “good benefit” (euergesia) he had previously conferred on the Egyptian king (here named Psammetichus by Diodorus, probably an indication that Amyrtaeus had adopted the greatest Saite name as a throne name). Tamos himself certainly had little to offer to Amyrtaeus/Psammetichus or other Delta dynasts in recent years, and the most plausible inference about this euergesia is that Tamos had functioned previously as an agent of Cyrus (as an Egyptian in Cyrus’ entourage, Tamos was a natural intermediary between Cyrus and rebellious dynasts) and on his behalf had provided support of some kind for rebel dynasts. Delta dynasts would certainly have been receptive to Cyrus’ approaches, since they
benefited from a Persian succession struggle no matter what its outcome. If Cyrus were victorious and became king, they would have favorable concessions from him already. If Cyrus failed and Artaxerxes remained king, he would likely be much weakened by Cyrus’ attack and therefore unable quickly to mount a campaign against Egypt.

The whole affair did not turn out well for Cyrus. Suspicions about Cyrus’ activities prompted Artaxerxes’ loyal satrap Tissaphernes to rush eastward from Anatolia to warn Artaxerxes. This compelled Cyrus to move prematurely (using the pretext of dealing with belligerent Pamphylians in southern Anatolia in order to furnish a plausible explanation for his preparations and movements). Rather than hasten to meet Artaxerxes, Cyrus moved cautiously eastward. At any moment, Abrocomas, still in Phoenicia, might turn against him instead of moving to Egypt. Abrocomas indeed halted, but once Cyrus learned his whereabouts and realized he could advance across the Euphrates ahead of Abrocomas, Cyrus rushed his army to do battle with Artaxerxes (Xen. *Anab*. 1.3.20, 4.5, 5.7–9). Cyrus’ and Artaxerxes’ forces met at Cunaxa north of Babylon and just east of the Euphrates, and Cyrus, rushing impulsively to attack Artaxerxes himself, perished in battle (Xen. *An*. 1.8.29; Diod. 14.22).

Although Cyrus died, we may see his challenge to Artaxerxes as responsible for the ultimate success of Amyrtaeus’ revolt and thus for Persian loss of the whole of Egypt. Abrocomas had been poised to attack Egypt when Cyrus began his march up-country in 401. While Abrocomas withdrew from Phoenicia to reinforce Artaxerxes, he arrived only after the battle (Xen. *An*. 1.7.12). His expeditionary force was thus intact and might simply have turned around and resumed the campaign against Egyptian dynasts. Cyrus’ own Spartan mercenary commander Clearchus expected as much and offered his troops to Artaxerxes for use against Egypt (Xen. *An*. 2.5.13). However, Artaxerxes’ concerns about securing his position in light of the extensive support Cyrus had among leading Persians prompted him to postpone resumption of Abrocomas’ Egyptian campaign. Egyptian rebels thus got a reprieve. Soon they got more. Sometime after Cyrus’ death, Cyrus’ admiral and former hyparch Tamos, hoping for refuge, took Cyrus’ fleet of sixty ships to “Psammetichus [most likely meaning Amyrtaeus], the king of the Egyptians,” who was a descendant of “the Psammetichus.” Tamos’ anticipated benefactor quickly put Tamos to death along with the sons who had accompanied him and took Tamos’ fleet and possessions (Diod. 14.35.3–5).

Through 401, documents from Elephantine continue to employ Artaxerxes’ regnal years in their dating formulas before switching to “year 5 of King Amyrtaeus.” If Amyrtaeus “year 1” is 405/4, the date Manetho assigns as the beginning of Amyrtaeus’ kingship, then Elephantine usage indicates that by 401/0 Amyrtaeus had extended his previously limited kingship to all of Egypt. We lack any information about how he accomplished this and must resort to conjecture. Quite likely, Amyrtaeus’ original aim in killing Tamos in the aftermath of Cyrus’ death was to redeem himself in Artaxerxes’ eyes by claiming responsibility for the punishment of
one of Cyrus’ leading collaborators (an act reminiscent of the earlier Amyrtaeus’ suspected exchange of Inarus for his own pardon in the 450s). However, once Artaxerxes’ postponement of the previously prepared Egyptian campaign became apparent, Amyrtaeus probably stopped worrying about self-preservation. Free from concern about having to defend the Delta, Amyrtaeus perhaps moved south to attack Memphis. Using the machimoi previously mustered to meet Abrocomas’ invasion, Amyrtaeus could deal with Persian garrison forces in the capital. With the fleet recently seized from Tamos, he could challenge the Persian river force stationed at Memphis and add further weight to an attack on the “White Wall.”

There is no record of any ensuing battles between rebel and Persian garrison forces in Egypt at this time, but this is not surprising. Facing great pressure (if not everywhere actual attack, then disruption of food supplies and loss of pay) and anticipating no imminent relief, the multiethnic Persian garrison forces in Memphis and elsewhere in Upper Egypt probably capitulated without a fight or, to put it another way, agreed to serve new paymasters. The evidence from Elephantine, where a long-established Jewish garrison force resided, points to a peaceful transfer at least here and to the persistence of the same military units as the garrison moved from Persian to Egyptian control.

While high-ranking Persians in Egypt probably fell victim to execution, there were certainly many native Egyptian administrators and bureaucrats even after Xerxes’ extensive Persianization of government positions following the 480s Egyptian revolt. Thus, just as the Persians themselves took over a comprehensive, functioning administration when they conquered Saite Egypt in the 520s, so with the collapse of Persian authority everywhere in Egypt by 400/399, the new native king may have been able to adopt the whole existing system, less its Persian personnel.

By 400/399, after 125 years of Persian rule, which had finally joined together the long-opposed Mesopotamian and Nile cores, Egypt was again independent under a united kingship, and Egypt’s resources were entirely in Egyptian hands. From the Persian perspective, this was insurrection, but in a broader historical context it was reversion to the normal situation: the western and eastern cores, separate and opposed. The great Persian concern—its imperial preoccupation in the west—now was just what it had been in Cyrus and Cambyses’ time and what it had been for Assyrian and Babylonian kings: gaining control of Egypt to secure empire everywhere in the west. The effort to do so proved far more difficult for Persian kings in the fourth century than it had been for Cambyses or Darius in the sixth century.
CHAPTER 5

Securing the Eastern Mediterranean, 400–395

Having conquered Egypt in 525, thanks primarily to disunity among Delta dynasts, the Persians had held on to it because they always retained control of Memphis or at least its citadel in the face of repeated revolts in the late sixth and fifth centuries. Thus they could send reinforcements to this secure base and from Memphis move north to threaten the Delta. So long as they did not anticipate outside help, rebel dynasts in the Delta usually abandoned resistance at the arrival of such forces. Like his predecessors, Artaxerxes II had quickly readied a large force in response to revolt in the Delta in 405–404. However, Cyrus’ attempted coup compelled Artaxerxes to abort the planned invasion and then to delay its resumption while he dealt with lingering political problems.

Necessary as it may have been politically, this was a fateful decision for Persia’s Egyptian problem. By the time Artaxerxes was finally able to respond to the Egyptian revolt, he faced a much different situation in Egypt than had existed between 405 and 401 or during any previous revolts. After 401, Amyrtaeus extended his kingship over the whole of Egypt—something no rebellious Delta dynast had ever been able to do. There was still conflict among Delta dynasts: Nepherites of Mendes pushed the Saite Amyrtaeus aside, probably in 399, ending the very brief 28th Dynasty, establishing himself as king, and beginning the 29th Dynasty in Manetho’s scheme.\(^1\) There might have been a moment of opportunity here for swift Persian action, but there was no Persian force at the ready. Nepherites’ initiation of widespread building projects stretching from Mendes in the Delta to Karnak in the south indicates that Nepherites effectively asserted his kingship over all of Egypt after displacing Amyrtaeus.\(^2\)

With Egypt fully freed from Persian control and a native king in command of the whole country, Egyptian strategy could now focus on obstructing Persian reconquest. This certainly meant, as in the case of resistance to Assyrian and Babylonian
threats of invasion, contesting for control of the middle territory. Thanks to the seizure of Tamos’ ships and probable rebel acquisition of the Nile river fleet stationed at Memphis, there was a ready fleet in Egypt. Though not enormous, this fleet was certainly large enough to give Egyptians the means to begin maritime initiatives in the eastern Mediterranean of the sort Apries had launched in the early sixth century, striking the middle territory with a naval attack on Tyre coupled with a land attack on Sidon (Hdt. 2.161).³ To the south of Tyre were sites such as Gaza and Ashkelon, vulnerable to seaborne attack which Persian garrison troops in the line of forts along the coastal plain would have difficulty resisting without substantial reinforcements.⁴ (It is entirely possible that many garrison forces in the region had been absorbed into Abrocomas’ expeditionary army and along with it had moved inland on the heels of Cyrus’ army.) In other words, with ships the Egyptians could seize footholds in Philistia to disrupt Persian military preparations and thus obstruct Persian advance into Egypt without having to trek overland across the Sinai Peninsula.

Qedarite Arabs controlled Gaza, the critical departure point for any Persian attack on Egypt. Reported Persian suspicion about “the king of the Arabs” in the late fifth century hints at Arab collusion with rebellious dynasts as early as 411 (Diod. 13.46.6). With Egypt now fully independent and a determined native king in place, Egyptian power was certainly far greater than it had been in 411, and this makes it all the more likely that Arab allegiance was shifting or at least in play.⁵ Qainu, the chief of the Qedarite Arab confederation, sacrificed in about 400 at a shrine at Tell el-Maskhuta in the Wadi Tumilat, the southern approach to Egypt from the Sinai.⁶ Was he just visiting a shrine, or was he stopping at this “Arabian town” at the Egyptian frontier on a visit to Egypt for “talks”? Without a Persian fleet in evidence, Qedarite Arabs might simply open up Gaza’s harbor to Egyptian use, removing the need for any Egyptian attack. Arab cooperation with rebel Egyptians would similarly obviate the need for Egyptians to contest control of the overland Sinai route.⁷ Fully mobilized, the Egyptian machimoi constituted a formidable fighting force. From the Arab point of view, early cooperation with Egypt would ensure against Egyptian attack and Egyptian takeover of Arab-controlled sites in the northern Sinai and southern Philistia.

The situation in Egypt in the early 390s meant that Artaxerxes needed a different kind of force and a different strategy to deal with the Egyptian revolt than had been the case up to 401. With the whole of Egypt freed from Persian control and with an Egyptian king well equipped for fighting on land and at sea (or on the Nile), Artaxerxes would now have to employ ships in great numbers; he would have to plan for gaining Memphis, possibly through siege operations, before undertaking any campaign in the Delta; and he would need to send off to Egypt a sizable enough force so that Memphis, once taken, could be held securely while the rest of the army and fleet proceeded against rebels in Delta (or, less probably, he would have to plan simultaneous Delta and Memphis offensives). This would require protracted, large-scale preparations. This made the security of middle-territory sites where the campaign would be staged critically important.
Artaxerxes evidently dealt quickly with his middle-territory problem. According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.1; cf. Ages. 1.6–7; Plut. Ages. 6.1), in late summer or autumn of 397 a Syracusan merchant named Herodas spotted Phoenician warships (just where, Xenophon does not say; we may guess, given the large numbers reported, that it was Sidon, whose harbor facilities were the most capacious among Phoenician cities), “some of them sailing in from other places, others lying there fully manned, and yet others making ready for sea,” and he heard that there were to be 300 of them. Herodas rushed to warn the Spartans, presently at war with Persian satraps in western Anatolia, that “the King and Tissaphernes” were preparing this fleet. Although Herodas said he did not know where it was bound, his haste in reporting to the Spartans makes it clear that he suspected that the fleet was headed for the Aegean. The Spartans shared his suspicions. This was surely not the case. Whatever the Spartans (and virtually all modern scholars) may have believed, this was exactly the wrong time for a major Persian naval campaign away from the eastern Mediterranean. With the whole of Egypt securely in the hands of a native king by the early 390s, the Egyptians could (and possibly may already have begun to) employ the preemptive strategy of the early Saites, intervening in and trying to control sites outside Egypt. Egypt had supplied 200 warships to the Persian fleet in 480 (Hdt. 7.89.3), and there is no reason to think that shipbuilding facilities in Egypt, mainly in Memphis and thus now under native control, could not turn out new ships to augment those on hand.

The numerous harbor towns along the Philistine coast from Ashkelon up to Acco, all of which belonged to either Tyre or Sidon, certainly required immediate defensive arrangements. In the construction and deployment of the Phoenician fleet operating by late 397 (and in part still under construction), we see just such measures. The fleet had obviously been readied as a precautionary move some time before 397, most plausibly in 398 at the latest, in response to the loss of all of Egypt. Artaxerxes’ greatest concern at the moment was the security of the eastern Mediterranean, and the fleet was undoubtedly serving in 397 to secure the many Phoenician and Philistine harbor towns and cities from possible Egyptian attacks. Herodas’ description of what he saw—ships sailing in and out, others manned but not departing—suggests coming and going. This is precisely what a fleet on watch in the eastern Mediterranean would be doing.

Maritime precautions were paralleled by intensification of garrison coverage in Philistia, the region leading up to Phoenician cities and Persia’s intended staging areas. Recent excavations indicate that about the beginning of the fourth century, the Persians established along roughly the same latitude in southwestern Philistia a chain of fortified sites stretching at six- to nine-mile intervals from Tell Jemmeh south of Gaza all the way to the Dead Sea. Another line of fortresses further south pushed Persian defenses into the Negev, so that all the main routes of entry into Philistia from the Sinai were covered—doubly covered, in fact. Lachish, where a Persian residency and fortifications were built at the same time, now evidently served as a Persian governmental center overseeing what was the
new Persian frontier facing Egypt.\textsuperscript{13} There is no evidence of continuing Persian presence in the early fourth century in “Arabia”—the area of Dedan and Tayma, where Persian officials had earlier taken over Babylonian installations. Possibly, garrisons previously stationed there were shifted west in the 390s to newly constructed fortified sites intended to block Egyptian intervention in Philistia and Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{14}

The possibility of Egyptian enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean was not Persia’s only concern in the west at this time. Matters were further complicated for Artaxerxes by new Spartan hostility toward Persia. Thanks to Athens’ debilitating defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Sparta was after 404 effectively hegemon of the mainland Greek world, with Athens itself now a subordinate Spartan ally. The Spartans were thus able to operate freely outside Greece and, potentially, to summon all mainland Greeks to join them. The Spartan war fleet developed with the help of Persian funds during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War gave Spartan forces great range and mobility. Having broken with Artaxerxes II to support Cyrus, their friend and benefactor in the final years of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans now backed Asian Greeks determined to remain independent of Persian control in the aftermath of Cyrus’ death. To this end, the Spartans sent a force to Anatolia in late 400 and asserted a protectorate over Asian Greeks.\textsuperscript{15} In addition to troops from the Greek mainland, including a 300-man Athenian force (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.1.5), Spartan commanders were able to enlist about 5,000 of Cyrus’ surviving mercenaries (Diod. 14.37.1–2; Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.1.5–6; \textit{An.} 7.6.1, 8.1–8). Over the next two years, they detached Greek cities from the Hellespont to the Maeander River from Persian control and garrisoned many of them, demanding Persian recognition of their autonomy.\textsuperscript{16}

Artaxerxes initially paid scant attention to western Anatolian affairs, leaving his satraps at Sardis and Dascylium, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, to deal with what probably seemed like minor problems left over from Cyrus’ attempted coup: various pro-Cyrean Ionian cities holding out with the help of Sparta, another as yet unreconciled Cyrean ally. Only after Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, traveled to court in 398 did Artaxerxes organize a response of his own to Spartan activities in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{17} Having seen the Spartans overrun Aeolis—the northwestern corner of Anatolia—during 399, Pharnabazus was able to testify to the range of Spartan operations, and he probably argued that the Spartans were engaged in something more than just defending a few Ionian cities against Tissaphernes’ claims. The Spartans had started by establishing a base at Ephesus and advancing up the Maeander River valley to warn off Tissaphernes from the Ionian cities. But they soon moved on to target much of the whole region once embraced by the fifth-century Athenian-led alliance system known as the Delian League, campaigning throughout the Troad and into Thrace as well and insisting everywhere on the freedom of the Greeks (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.2.12, 20, cf. 3.4.5). Spartan commanders had a force of 12,000, including the seasoned mercenary hoplites who had served under Cyrus.
Artaxerxes II must have concluded that the situation was very much like that of the early fifth century, when the Athenians, having started by backing rebellious Ionian cities, moved on to broader objectives in Anatolia and detached and integrated Asian Greeks into a sort of super-state (the Delian League). Athenian activities, however, had stretched over decades, while the Spartans were recapitulating the sequence in a little over two years, liberating Asian Greek cities from Persian control and, through the use of Spartan harmosts (governors), combining them into a Spartan-centered political and military network. Like the Athenians, the Spartans would probably move south and east along the Anatolian coast. They had by 398 established themselves at Rhodes (a new city formed by synoecism only in 407), making that city with its especially large harbor a kind of naval headquar-
ters. Sustaining the Athenian-Spartan comparison, Artaxerxes could anticipate that the Spartans would be seeking recognition of this archē in some form or other and that like the Athenians, who had campaigned in the eastern Mediterranean and exploited the Egyptian revolt of the 450s, the Spartans would be prepared to operate ever more widely to pressure the Persians into concessions. This might mean maritime attacks on the Persian-held middle territory or on nearby Cyprus. These were far from Sparta, far even from the Aegean, but the Spartans, Artaxerxes knew, were no strangers to the eastern Mediterranean. In 401, the Spartan navarch Samius had led a fleet all the way to the Syrian coast to support Cyrus (Diod. 14.19.4–5; Xen. Hell. 3.1.1; An. 1.2.21, 6.1).

During 398, following Pharnabazus’ visit (Xen. Hell. 3.2.13), Artaxerxes II took steps to contain Spartan operations. To deal with the Spartan land force in Anatolia, he appointed Tissaphernes karanos or commander-in-chief in western Anatolia and authorized a levy of troops from Anatolian districts to provide manpower for Tissaphernes. Artaxerxes also initiated the creation of a new fleet, entirely separate from the Phoenician “guard fleet” already being prepared. Cypriot kings (there were ten altogether, but not all held coastal cities), ordered now to construct 100 triremes (Diod. 14.39.1–2), were to provide the ships for this new fleet. This was a substantial number, but in 480 Cypriot kings had furnished 150 ships for Xerxes’ attack on Greece (Hdt. 7.90), so a demand for 100 ships was clearly not excessive. Pharnabazus was to have authority over this fleet, but in naming an operational commander Artaxerxes made an unprecedented move, appointing a Greek—Conon, the Athenian stratēgos who had been residing at Cypriot Salamis in self-imposed exile ever since the great Athenian disaster at Aegospotami in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.1.29; Isoc. 9.52; Diod. 13.106).

Evagoras, the king of Cypriot Salamis, reportedly pushed for Conon’s appoint-
ment, perhaps in an effort to advance his own interests as a Persian vassal king by “loaning” an accomplished Greek commander to Artaxerxes (Ctes. FGH 688 F30; Isoc. 9.54; Diod.14.39.1). Certainly well aware of the strategic significance of Cyprus in the context of a Persian-Egyptian conflict, Evagoras probably wanted to demonstrate his loyalty and make sure that there would be no reason for Artaxerxes to alter his quasi-independent status. It was not an easy matter to promote Conon
as Persian commander. Evagoras himself was in a rather unusual situation. Having recently usurped the kingship of Salamis at the expense of Abdemon of Tyre (who himself had previously driven Evagoras from Salamis), reportedly a special “friend” of Artaxerxes, Evagoras was evidently behind in tribute payments, perhaps under some suspicion in connection with Cyrus’ campaign, and presently at war with another of the Cypriot kings, Anaxagoras (Ctes. *FGH* 688 F30.72). While hardly in Artaxerxes’ favor, Evagoras was proposing that Artaxerxes give over a fleet of ships to a man from Athens, Persia’s nemesis for nearly the past century. In light of these problems, Ctesias and Diodorus’ reports of lengthy and complicated negotiations, including a pre-appointment interview of Conon on Cyprus by Pharnabazus, are entirely credible (Ctes. *FGH* 688 F30; Diod. 14.39.1–3).  

Artaxerxes insisted on Evagoras’ submission, demanding that he pay tribute and cease making war against Anaxagoras—that is, that he behave like a compliant vassal and not a completely independent dynast (Ctes. *FGH* 688 F30). But the Persian king agreed to commission Conon as commander of the ships levied from Cypriot cities. Conon’s subsequent employment of two Athenians, Nicophemus and Hieronymus (both fellow exiles), as his leading subordinates suggests that while Artaxerxes and his Persian officials may have had reservations about handing over a Persian fleet to an Athenian, once they decided to do so they gave Conon a free hand in organizing his command (*Hell. Oxy*. 15.1; Diod. 14.84.4). Athens had a great pool of currently unemployed, experienced oarsmen and sailors, and Conon drew on this to man many of the ships (*Hell. Oxy*. 7.1).  

Persian determination to keep the Spartan fleet busy is evident in Conon’s activities in 397. According to Diodorus (14.39.4), before the entire fleet had been made ready, Conon took forty ships which were “at hand,” sailed across to Cilicia, and “there made preparations for war.” From Cilicia, with just these forty ships he moved along the southern Anatolian coast to Caunus near the westernmost edge of southern Anatolia, not far from Rhodes. Almost immediately, the Spartan naval commander Pharax with a fleet of 120 ships (Isoc. 4.142 says 100 ships)—apparently the whole Spartan fleet—arrived from Rhodes (he had been operating along the Carian coast in 397: Xen. *Hell*. 3.2.12) and instituted a blockade and siege of Caunus (Diod. 14.79.4–5).  

A decade earlier during the Peloponnesian War, Conon himself had been trapped for a long time in Methymna on Lesbos, coincidentally with forty ships, by a Spartan blockade prior to the battle of Arginusae (Xen. *Hell*. 1.6.15–38; Diod. 13.77.1–79.7, 100.5–7; Polyaen. 1.48.4). Conon was also a survivor of the great Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 405, when Spartan ships had swooped down on and destroyed the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont (Xen. *Hell*. 2.1.27–29; Diod. 13.106.6). It is impossible to believe, therefore, that Conon would intentionally move a numerically much inferior fleet into a very vulnerable position, and hard to imagine he would even begin operations so quickly with just the ships “at hand” unless he actually meant to draw Pharax and the Spartan fleet into the waters off Caunus and keep them there. Conon had too few ships at this point to attack the Spartan fleet, but, as
he well knew, the Spartans themselves had used Caunus as a base in 412–411 and from there had taken Rhodes (Thuc. 8.40–44), and Conon could anticipate that the arrival of a hostile fleet at Caunus would raise the specter of an attack on Rhodes, Sparta’s primary naval base in the Aegean, and prompt a swift Spartan response.

There had been much time-consuming preliminary negotiation—transmission of letters between Evagoras and the Persian court, visits to Salamis by royal agents such as Ctesias and Pharnabazus—before naval preparations on Cyprus finally got under way. Thus, Conon most likely acted as soon as possible to forestall any enterprise on the part of a Spartan fleet. There was no question of direct confrontation. Losses, even in a naval victory, would be deleterious to Persian interests. But inviting a siege by Pharax would keep much or all of the Spartan fleet out of action in the Aegean, and, more importantly, it would keep the Spartan fleet out of action also in the eastern Mediterranean and away from Cyprus and Phoenicia, where ship construction was underway. Submitting to a siege at Caunus was actually a fairly safe risk for Conon. From the coast it was possible to follow the navigable Calbis River five miles inland to reach the Caunian Lake. Conon could keep his ships there and block access to the lake. He would not be able to move freely out of Caunus, but at the same time he would not really chance the loss of ships.

Pharax’ blockade and siege of Caunus went on for a couple of months. But late in 397, Pharnabazus moved overland to Caunus with “strong forces” and relieved the siege, probably by preventing Pharax’ forces from foraging or replenishing water supplies or by directly attacking Pharax’ ships if these were stationed in the river. Pharax sailed back to Rhodes. Diodorus’ remark (14.79.5) that “after this Conon gathered 80 triremes and sailed to the Chersonese [the peninsula opposite Rhodes]” points to the fuller story.

Jutting out from the Chersonese and stretching toward the island of Rhodes was the Loryma peninsula. At its tip was Loryma, whose fine, well-protected harbor provided the perfect location from which to watch and interdict Spartan ship movements. Once additional ships—at least another forty—from Cyprus were ready, Conon could move from the safety of Caunus and take up a more exposed position at Loryma. It is likely that Pharnabazus waited to relieve the blockade until the additional ships were on their way, then chased Pharax from Caunus so that reinforcements could rendezvous there with Conon. Thus, probably by spring 396, the Persian guard fleet, totaling eighty ships, was in place, based at the point along the southern Anatolian coast closest to Rhodes and certainly in control of the whole coastline stretching eastward to Lycia.

Spartan reaction was swift: the Spartan fleet abandoned Rhodes. Diodorus makes this the result of a Rhodian uprising, asserting concisely that “the Rhodians, having expelled the Peloponnesian fleet, revolted from the Lacedaemonians and received Conon, together with his entire fleet, into the city” (14.79.6). With the prospect of Persian attack on Rhodes now quite vivid, the Rhodians may not have wanted the Spartans in Rhodes, but just how the Rhodians themselves might have expelled the Peloponnesian fleet of 100–120 ships is not clear, unless, implausibly,
they invited them to leave and the Spartans complied. A more likely conjecture is that the Spartans themselves initiated the withdrawal from Rhodes.²⁸ For all they knew, the ships at Caunus and now at Loryma were part of the very large fleet that Herodas had reported under preparation in Phoenicia. The Spartans might well expect, then, that many more ships were on their way and would soon target the Spartan fleet at Rhodes. At best, Pharax could anticipate a blockade of the sort he had imposed on Conon; at worst, a large-scale assault. There was also the possibility that Conon might bypass Rhodes entirely and move directly into the Aegean and disrupt the large-scale campaign in Anatolia the Spartan king Agesilaus was mounting during 396. In light of these considerations, as soon as Conon took up position at Loryma, Pharax likely made the (wise) decision to abandon Rhodes and take his fleet back into the Aegean to guard the Anatolian coast. Conon made no move to follow and engage the Spartan fleet—a good indication that his intended role was defensive.

Seen in the context of the Persian-Egyptian war, Persian activities in the west in the early 390s were part of a well-planned strategy to secure the staging areas in the Levant—the middle territory—against disruption by outside attack. Organizing and expanding a Phoenician guard fleet provided immediate defense against any rapidly launched Egyptian maritime thrusts. When the possibility of Spartan intrusion in the eastern Mediterranean emerged, the Phoenician fleet served also to secure Cyprus and Cilicia as ship construction took place there. Then a largely Cypriot fleet (Cypriot ships with Greek commanders and crews) moved to bar entry into the eastern Mediterranean from the Aegean by establishing a line of defense centered on bases at Caunus, Loryma, and Rhodes. With these vital defensive arrangements in place by early 396, Artaxerxes must have believed he could now safely initiate and concentrate on preparations for a renewed effort to recover Egypt.
If Artaxerxes II was poised by mid-396 to begin preparations for a new attack on Egypt, evidence of Egyptian entry into the Spartan-Persian conflict—that is, evidence of new far western-Egyptian collusion—in 396 compelled him to postpone the undertaking again. Instead, Artaxerxes ended up deploying Persian forces in an unexpectedly aggressive and wide-ranging campaign in the Aegean.

Following Herodas’ report of Persian maritime preparations in 397, the Spartans had assigned the new Spartan king Agesilaus to undertake expanded operations in western Anatolia with 8,000 fresh troops newly raised from Peloponnesian allies and the helot population (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2; Plut. Ages. 6.2; Lys. 23.1–3). Joined with the force Dercylidas commanded (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4), this brought Sparta’s total campaign army to more than 20,000. Surely, the Spartans must have expected, an army of this size targeting Persian holdings in Anatolia would compel Artaxerxes to recognize the freedom of the Greeks of Asia. As part of the preparations for Agesilaus’ campaign, in late 397 or early 396 the Spartans turned to Egypt for support, sending envoys to seek an alliance and aid or “reinforcements” (Diod. 14.79.4: symmachia and boētheia). The Spartans certainly did not expect to obtain any troops from Egypt, so their request for aid must have been an appeal for supplies or more ships or both. Thanks to Herodas’ report, the Spartans in 397/6 were concerned about Persian naval activities, probably remembering the situation in 412 when the Persians had sought to deal with the Athenian problem in Anatolia by subsidizing a fleet (a Spartan fleet) to confront the Athenians. Challenging Persian control of western Anatolia, the Spartans knew that for the Persians they were now the new Athenians, and the Spartans could only see the reported preparation of Phoenician ships as evidence that Artaxerxes was determined to recover the Asian Greek cities and was expecting the Phoenicians to play the same role the Spartans themselves had played when Darius II sought to regain Asian Greek cities late in the fifth century. Thus anticipating naval opposition in the Aegean and having already mustered from
mainland allies just about all the ships they could deploy, the Spartans probably looked to Egypt for more in 397/6.

Predictably, the Egyptian king Nepherites did not pass up an opportunity to aid Persian opponents. He had ships, but, expecting Persian attack on Egypt in the near future, he held on to them, and instead of any naval reinforcements he sent off ships’ equipment and a half million measures of grain, probably all loaded up at Memphis, Egypt’s main naval arsenal and Egypt’s “great granary,” after the spring harvest in early 396.

As it turned out, once sent, Egyptian aid fell into Persian hands, or more accurately into Conon’s hands, when the Egyptian grain fleet sailed unawares to Rhodes, where Conon captured it and “brought the ships into the harbors and stored the city with grain.” (These were undoubtedly slow merchantmen of the sort used in 410 to bring grain to Athenian forces in Anatolia [Thuc. 8.35.2]). Included in the cargo were fittings for 100 ships (ropes and sails?) (Diod. 14.79.6–7).

Quite possibly, Conon’s occupation of Rhodes occurred about the same time the Egyptian ships destined for Rhodes got under way, leaving too little time for Spartan home authorities to learn of the loss of Rhodes, transmit this information to Egypt, and redirect the convoy. While Conon’s seizure of Egyptian supplies intended for the Spartan fleet may have been entirely accidental, it turned out to be perhaps the most important event of the 390s for the Greek world (though no Greek source makes such a point). Out of this came a change in Persia’s military and political strategy in the far west which led to the end of Sparta’s unchallenged hegemony; the enhancement of other mainland states’ powers, in particular the revival of Athens; and the renewal of Greek interstate conflicts—all, from the Persian point of view, aimed at securing the eastern Mediterranean and removing the possibility of any far western interference in Persian recovery of Egypt.

From the Persian perspective, large-scale Egyptian support for Spartan enterprise signified Egyptian and Spartan collusion, and this meant that the Spartans could potentially draw on virtually unlimited Egyptian resources and sustain operations in Anatolia and the Aegean indefinitely. It meant also that the Spartans might be about to function as Egyptian agents. The Persians had no way of knowing whether or not the Egyptian supplies captured in 396 were just the first sign of a new partnership between Egypt and a far western super-state—the Spartans and their enormous number of “allies.” In any case, Egyptian aid in the form of ships’ equipment would not help the Spartans conquer anything further in Anatolia—they already controlled the whole coast. The supplies might have been intended to strengthen Sparta’s maritime position in anticipation of Persian deployment of Phoenician ships in the Aegean. But the Egyptians would benefit most by attacks on Persian-held sites in the eastern Mediterranean, and it was certainly natural for the Persians to suspect that Nepherites’ provision of supplies for Spartan ships presaged a coming shift in Spartan operations to the eastern Mediterranean. This would likely mean, first of all, an attack on the guard fleet under Conon which barred entry into the eastern Mediterranean.
The first indication of Persia’s new concern about the Aegean theater was the transfer of many Phoenician guard ships and some Cilician ships west to Rhodes, most likely to hold Rhodes and the Caunus-Loryma-Rhodes line against possible Spartan movement eastward. Diodorus notes the arrival of these reinforcements as the last of the naval developments in 397–396 that he recounts in 14.79: Pharax’ siege of Caunus, the end of the siege, the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, and the capture of the grain ships. Then, he writes, “there came also to Conon 90 triremes, 10 of them from Cilicia and 80 from Phoenicia, under the command of the dynast of the Sidonians” (14.79.8). The Oxyrhynchus historian reports the same event: “90 ships of the Phoenicians and Cilicians, came to Caunus, of which ten had sailed from Cilicia, and the remainder [words missing] of them the Sidonian ruler.” His remark (Hell. Oxy. 9.2) that this happened “about the same time” as the Spartan navarch Pollis arrived to replace his predecessor Archelaudas allows us to date the arrival of the Phoenician and Cilician ships to late 396/early 395. This leaves adequate time after Conon’s seizure of the Egyptian supplies intended for the Spartans for a report of Egyptian involvement in the Aegean along with news of Conon’s control of Rhodes to reach Artaxerxes, for Artaxerxes to make a decision about responding, and for Artaxerxes to order Phoenician and Cilician ships to move west to Rhodes (there is no indication that Pharnabazus had any authority over Phoenician ships, so their transfer to the west would have to be authorized by Artaxerxes).

This enlarged Persian fleet, now totaling 170 ships, or nearly half again as many as the Spartans appear to have had, undertook no aggressive enterprise of any kind. Aware of Spartan-Egyptian collusion and suspecting that the Spartan fleet might soon operate on behalf of Egyptian interests, Artaxerxes was evidently shifting part of the Phoenician guard fleet to Rhodes to discourage anticipated Spartan enterprise and, if necessary, to act quickly at the first sign of a Spartan move toward the eastern Mediterranean. Given Persian uncertainty about Spartan and Egyptian plans, prudence dictated Artaxerxes’ action. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia provides glimpses of Conon during this time attending to readiness, drawing up his troops in battle order at the harbor at Rhodes—preparing them, it appears, to repel an attack at Rhodes, not to mount one anywhere (Hell. Oxy. 15.1). Conon also took steps, probably in early 395, to secure the city by promoting the overthrow of the Diagorid tyranny and installing a democracy (that is, a dependably anti-Spartan government). However, when it became clear after some time that the Spartans were not poised to move eastward but were operating along the western Anatolian coast in support of Agesilaus’ operations, the Phoenician ships may have returned to the eastern Mediterranean.

The second indication of enhanced Persian concern about the Aegean theater in the aftermath of Conon’s capture of the supplies that Nepherites sent the Spartans is Artaxerxes’ dispatch of his highest official, the chiliarch Tithraustes, to western Anatolia, where he oversaw the arrest and execution of Tissaphernes. The sources report Tithraustes’ arrival after narrating Agesilaus’ successful surprise attack on
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Sardis in mid-395, making it appear that the Sardis battle prompted the dispatch of Tithraustes and determined the fate of Tissaphernes (Xen. Hell. 3.4.25; Diod. 14.80.6–8; Polyen. 7.16). However, Tithraustes was most likely on his way west at the time of the battle at Sardis, probably already instructed by Artaxerxes to remove Tissaphernes, whose failure even before the battle of Sardis to bring an end to Spartan activities had created the opportunity for Egyptian and Spartan collusion. Tissaphernes reportedly had a big force, 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry (Diod. 14.80.1; cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.11), which Xenophon says he sent for in 396 (Hell. 3.4.6). Much of it, particularly the cavalry, certainly represented local Persian and native levies rather than troops dispatched by Artaxerxes, who would have required a lengthy mustering time. But whatever the size and origin of Tissaphernes’ army, Tissaphernes had done nothing with it.

Tithraustes was Artaxerxes’ man on the spot, but he evidently had no instructions to take over operations in Anatolia and campaign against Agesilaus. Instead, as a sort of special envoy, he seems to have embodied Artaxerxes’ effort to energize the western Anatolian “front,” to investigate the situation firsthand and take whatever measures seemed best to strengthen the Persian position. To gain time, he made a truce with Agesilaus. Then, turning to naval affairs, out of Tissaphernes’ treasury Tithraustes furnished Conon with 220 talents, long overdue funds to pay his near-mutinous troops and keep his maritime force intact (Hell. Oxy 19.3). But rather than prepare to engage Agesilaus directly, Tithraustes sent an envoy, the Rhodian Timocrates, with fifty silver talents to visit potential Spartan opponents on the Greek mainland—Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and Athens—and encourage opposition to Sparta there, which might pull the Spartans out of Anatolia (Xen. Hell. 3.5.1–2; cf. Hell. Oxy. 7.5).

Clearly, such moves on the part of Artaxerxes and Tithraustes reflect new and greater imperial concern about Spartan enterprise. But the Persian response was still essentially defensive. The policies adopted, comprising another truce, investment in anti-Spartan efforts on the Greek mainland, and some funds to preserve the fleet as a ready guard force—300 talents altogether, not a grand sum for the Persian king—were not much of a change. And there were no immediate results. Agesilaus himself moved from Tissaphernes’ satrapy by agreement with Tithraustes, but he then advanced at will through Pharnabazus’ territory during late 395. Agesilaus was operating freely and with far more troops than the Athenians and the Delian League had ever deployed in Anatolia in the fifth century. During 396/5, Agesilaus had added to his already large army Greeks from cities throughout western Anatolia—from Ionia, Aeolis, and the Hellespont—and greatly expanded his cavalry (Diod. 14.79.2–3; Xen. Hell. 3.4.11–19). Given command of both the fleet and the land army by Spartan authorities in 395, Agesilaus initiated a big ship-building program in island and coastal cities aimed at producing 120 additional ships (Xen. Hell. 3.4.26–29, 4.1.1–17; Plut. Ages. 10; Paus. 3.9.6).

Tithraustes’ intervention notwithstanding, the Spartan cause certainly was successful thus far, and on the verge of expanding even further in late 395. With the
increasingly active involvement of coastal and island states, it must have seemed that despite facing some new opposition on the Greek mainland, the Spartans controlled the Aegean and could deploy overwhelming resources. As the sole naval power in the Aegean, the Spartans could easily break up the recently formed anti-Spartan coalition on the mainland, or at least detach Athens from it, by blocking the movement of the essential grain ships which sailed out of the Black Sea in the late summer to supply Athens with wheat. In these circumstances, Persian financial support for mainland opponents of Sparta would hardly be decisive.

Conon, who probably viewed Tithraustes' actions as simply more temporizing on the part of Artaxerxes and Persian officials, seems to have been responsible for persuading Artaxerxes to adopt a different, much more aggressive strategy. Our sources provide rather elaborate accounts of a visit by Conon to Artaxerxes at Babylon in winter/spring 395/4.  Diodorus has the most succinct version:

Conon, the navarch of the Persians, put the Athenians Hieronymus and Nicophemus in charge of the fleet and himself set forth with intent to interview the king. He sailed along the coast of Cilicia, and when he had gone on to Thapsacus in Syria, he then took a boat by the Euphrates River to Babylon. Here he met the king and promised that he would destroy the Lacedaemonians' naval power if the king would furnish him with such money and other supplies as his plan required. Artaxerxes approved Conon, honored him with rich gifts, and appointed a paymaster who should supply funds in abundance as Conon might assign them. He also gave him authority to take as his associate leader for the war any Persian he might choose. Conon selected the satrap Pharnabazus and then returned to the sea, having arranged everything to suit his purpose. (14.81.4–6)

Justin and Nepos have variations of this account. For Justin, Conon's visit to the Persian court is entirely about getting funds from the king and occurred after Conon had “long importuned the king in his dispatches” (6.2.12–15). Like Diodorus, Justin reports that Artaxerxes assigned him a “finance officer” to expedite delivery of necessary funds to Conon. Conon returned to the fleet, went immediately into action, and, “performing many exploits as successful as they were valiant,” so alarmed the Spartans that they recalled Agesilaus from Asia to defend the fatherland (6.2.16–17).

In Nepos' more detailed but rather confused account, Conon travels to the Persian court at Pharnabazus' instigation to inform the king of a supposed rebellion by Tissaphernes. Conon meets first with Artaxerxes' chiliarch Tithraustes, but when Tithraustes explains that court protocol requires that he perform proskynēsis, Conon presents his request to Artaxerxes in written form ( Justin also includes this detail). Nepos continues:

When the king had read the communication, Conon's prestige had so much weight with him that he pronounced Tissaphernes an enemy and commissioned Conon to carry on the war with the Lacedaemonians, authorizing him to choose anyone he
wished as his paymaster. To make that choice, Conon declared, was not his province, but that of the king, who ought to know his own subjects best; but his recommendation was that the position be given to Pharnabazus. Then, after receiving valuable presents, Conon was sent to the seacoast, to levy ships of war on the Cypriots, Phoenicians and other maritime states, and to fit out a fleet with which in the following summer he could make the sea safe; Pharnabazus was appointed to help him, as Conon himself had asked. (Nep. Conon 4.1–2)

Common to all these versions is the view that Conon’s visit to the Persian court marked a critical turning point involving Artaxerxes’ backing of Conon, the king’s creation of a dependable payment system, the association of Pharnabazus with Conon, and the beginning of aggressive operations spearheaded by Conon, who was now not merely the king’s naval commander but also his chief strategist. We might be skeptical of the report of Conon’s request for Pharnabazus as associate, since Conon was already Pharnabazus’ subordinate. But a glance ahead at developments during 394 may clarify the situation. In 394, Pharnabazus appears for the first time joined with Conon in maritime operations and personally commanding “the Phoenician ships” (Xen. Hell. 4.3.11; Diod. 14.83.4). When elements of the Phoenician fleet last appeared (detached temporarily to the west following Conon’s seizure of Egyptian provisions in 396), they were evidently under the command of the king of Sidon (Diod. 14.79.8; Hell. Oxy. 9.2), so it seems that a change of some sort has taken place. We may connect this with Artaxerxes’ adoption of Conon’s “plan” and infer that it involved combining Phoenician ships directly under Pharnabazus’ command with Conon’s Cypriot-Cilician fleet. In terms of this arrangement, Conon and Pharnabazus were joint commanders.

Persian strategy in the Aegean had been essentially a holding strategy both on land and at sea, with the fleet under Conon assigned to guard entry to the eastern Mediterranean. (Isocrates’ charge that the Spartans tied up the Persian fleet for three years [4.141] accurately indicates what the Persian fleet had done—nothing—but Isocrates fails to appreciate that this was precisely the aim of Persia’s naval strategy in the Aegean theater.) There had been otherwise no real naval strategy, and the poor record of payments to the fleet points to royal satisfaction with the status quo. Far from being weakened, the Spartans had grown stronger and more active in Anatolia and the Aegean. Agesilaus was still at large and virtually unimpeded, and by late 395 naval construction throughout the Aegean threatened the Persian fleet’s security and perhaps its existence and raised the specter of a revived Delian League, now under Spartan direction, with member states contributing manpower and ships. Conon had certainly gotten wind of Agesilaus’ shipbuilding program and, knowing that triremes were meant to fight triremes, he could readily conclude that the Spartans planned a big effort aimed at his fleet. If successful, this would open the way to the eastern Mediterranean for a much larger Spartan fleet than the Spartans had when Artaxerxes’ first adopted maritime security measures in 398–397.
To respond to the great increase in Spartan maritime strength, what Conon most likely proposed to Artaxerxes was the adoption for the first time of a truly aggressive maritime strategy involving deployment of much of the Phoenician fleet to augment Artaxerxes’ Cypriot or “Greek” fleet that had faced the Spartans since 397 and (again, to infer from subsequent events) the use of this enlarged fleet in operations in the Aegean targeting the Spartan fleet. If the Spartans could not deploy their fleet at will or access the resources of their overseas allies, then Athens and other states could maintain their opposition to Sparta on the mainland, perhaps indefinitely.

Although previously wedded to a defensive strategy to secure the eastern Mediterranean, Artaxerxes was evidently willing to risk reducing the Phoenician guard fleet. He probably recognized that with a much enlarged Spartan fleet soon to begin operations in the Aegean, his whole defensive maritime strategy was in jeopardy, and there could be no question of proceeding with any enterprise against Egypt. Pharnabazus’ assignment as associate commander with Conon (Diod. 14.81.6) likely stemmed from Artaxerxes’ agreement to join Phoenician ships to Conon’s fleet and Artaxerxes’ interest in then appointing a commander of the Phoenician fleet who could cooperate effectively with Conon (Sidonian kings, typically commanders of Phoenician fleets in Persian maritime enterprises, were evidently not used to subordinating themselves or their fleet to anyone). Previously, Conon (after all, an Athenian commanding ships rowed by many Athenians) had been kept on a short leash, constrained especially by the limited funds provided him. With a more distant enterprise now envisioned, it must have seemed wise to pair Conon with a Persian colleague to preclude any self-serving undertakings by Conon. Some Phoenician ships would certainly remain in the eastern Mediterranean on guard duty, and the Sidonian king would most naturally remain here in command. But Pharnabazus would command the Phoenician ships detached to augment Conon’s Cypriot and Cilician fleet.

The assignment of Pharnabazus to a naval command did not end his overall authority over maritime affairs in the Spartan-Persian war that he had held since 398/7 (Xen. Hell. 4.3.11 terms him “navarch” in 394); it gave him an operational role which he had not previously had. The appointment of a special paymaster or finance official reported by Diodorus and Justin is something new and indicates that Artaxerxes took steps to ensure reliable, regular payments to this fleet and thereby guarantee its sustained ability to function.

Artaxerxes’ decision to adopt Conon’s plan and shift Persian maritime efforts to well-financed aggressive actions in 394 yielded results almost immediately. As it turned out, growing mainland opposition to Sparta compelled the hoped-for recall of Agesilaus in early spring 394. But Agesilaus had every intention of returning, and, to bolster his army with an eye toward quick victory in Greece and a hasty return to Anatolia, Agesilaus took with him many men from Asian Greek cities. “To preserve the cities,” Agesilaus left behind 4,000 troops divided into many small garrisons (Xen. Hell. 4.2.5, 25) and put his brother-in-law Peisander in charge of the
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Spartan fleet, which now included many or all of the 120 new triremes Agesilaus had ordered coastal and island cities to construct (Xen. Hell. 3.4.27–29).11 Knowing nothing of the planned addition to Conon’s naval force, the Spartans likely expected that their much augmented fleet would keep Conon and his force at Rhodes and away from now vulnerable Asian Greek coastal cities. But not long after Agesilaus’ departure in early 394, Peisander evidently heard about Conon’s reinforcement by Phoenician ships—the first step in the execution of the new strategy Conon had persuaded Artaxerxes to adopt. This clearly represented an unanticipated threat to Spartan interests, heralding potential Persian maritime enterprise after three years of virtual inactivity and occurring just when Agesilaus’ departure greatly diminished the Spartan presence in western Anatolia and when Argive, Corinthian, and Athenian opposition to Sparta provided a serious challenge to Spartan hegemony on the mainland. Peisander had no way of knowing Conon’s plans. Conon might head west across the Aegean to reinforce the anti-Spartan coalition, or he might move up the Anatolian coast to undo Spartan gains in Anatolia. Rather than wait and perhaps be out of position to counter whatever strategy Conon adopted, Peisander wisely decided to intercept Conon before he engaged anywhere in the Aegean. Consequently, Peisander sailed south (probably from Ephesus) with most of his enlarged fleet to Cnidus, a philo-Laconian city close to the Rhodes-Loryma-Caunus line and a base from which the Spartans had attacked Rhodes during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 8.43–45). Conon and Pharnabazus were at Rhodes at the moment with more than ninety triremes, and learning of the Spartan fleet’s movements, they prepared to move north from Rhodes toward Peisander’s new base at Cnidus (Diod. 14.83.5). This was perhaps just what Peisander hoped for.

Diodorus, who provides the only detailed description of the ensuing encounter (14.83.5–7), reports that Peisander left Cnidus and put in at “Physcus of the Chersonesus.” This certainly misnames Peisander’s destination, since Physcus is located on eastern side of Loryma peninsula (“the Chersonesus”) and beyond the Rhodes-Loryma-Caunus line, but it probably reflects Peisander’s entry into one of the big harbors or bays on the western side of the peninsula when he brought the fleet “down” (katēnechthē) from Cnidus.12 Bybassus with its large bay is perhaps the best candidate.13 The coastline here offered a mixture of islands, indentations, and blind channels much like the Saronic Gulf, the site of the great Persian-Greek naval battle of Salamis in 480. Peisander, perhaps remembering the strategy Greeks had used successfully against the Persian fleet in that battle, may have been placing many of his ships in hidden positions to ambush the Persian fleet as it headed north.

Peisander was nearly successful. Sailing out of “Physcus,” he attacked Conon, whose Cypriot/Greek contingent was leading the Persian fleet toward Cnidus (this was still “Old Cnidus” in the middle of the Cnidian peninsula before the metoecism that relocated the city to the tip of the peninsula in the 360s). Not having anticipated Peisander’s advance, Conon’s ships were not in battle formation (Xen. Hell. 4.3.11). Thanks to this, Peisander had the upper hand in the battle until Pharnabazus,
trailing Conon’s contingent at some distance, brought up his Phoenician ships in close battle formation. The appearance of the battle-ready Phoenician ships prompted Peisander’s allied ships to flee to land, leaving Peisander with too few ships to sustain a coordinated attack. In true Spartan fashion (perhaps, like the Spartan general Leonidas at Thermopylae in 480, trying to cover the withdrawal of others), Peisander headed his own ship into Pharnabazus’ line, dying in close-in hand-to-hand fighting. Leaderless, the remaining Spartan ships put up little resistance, and Conon, chasing them, captured fifty vessels after their crews jumped overboard near shore. The rest of Peisander’s Spartan ships, probably able to flee as Conon’s ships were busy seizing the abandoned vessels, made it safely back to Cnidus (14.83.7). They were far too few to pose any further danger, and Conon and Pharnabazus evidently did not attack survivors at Cnidus.14

Except for the response to Peisander’s suicidal attack on Pharnabazus’ ships, Conon’s ships did all the fighting in what, misleadingly, came to be called the Battle of Cnidus. In that sense, the naval battle might be called a Greek victory, but without Pharnabazus and the Phoenician ships there clearly would not have been any victory at all.

Now, in late summer 394, a Persian fleet sailed into the Aegean for the first time since 480–479. The Persians had complete supremacy at sea at this point (Diod. 14.84.4), and during the rest of the year Pharnabazus went about systematically restoring Persian authority everywhere in the eastern Aegean and western Anatolia. He led the fleet northward, receiving without struggle the submission of Greek island states: Cos, Nisyros, Teos, Chios, and Mytilene. Disembarking at Ephesus, Agesilaus’ former base, Pharnabazus advanced north by land, leaving Conon to shadow his movements with the fleet the rest of the way to the Hellespont. Asian Greek cities submitted one after another as the garrison forces and city governors left behind by Agesilaus fled to Abydus and Sestus at the mouth of the Hellespont ahead of the Persian advance. When Pharnabazus broke off operations on land late in the year, Conon continued naval operations to gain control of cities all along the Hellespont, ordering them (presumably in Pharnabazus’ name) to prepare ships for operations during the coming year (Xen. Hell. 4.8.1–6; Diod. 14.84.3–4).

Applying Artaxerxes’ policy, which, as Tithraustes had stated to Agesilaus in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.25), involved recognizing the autonomy of Asian Greek cities while still requiring tribute payments, Pharnabazus did not install garrisons in the Greek cities he or Conon visited and presumably did not impose new governments. But Diodorus’ observation that a wave of revolution affected the Aegean and Anatolian cities points to widespread democratic uprisings at this time. According to Diodorus (14.84.4), some cities “expelled the Lacedaemonian garrisons and maintained their freedom, while others attached themselves to Conon.” In other words, some cities, probably mostly island cities, now renewed alliances with Athens through Conon.15 In the following year, Conon proposed to Pharnabazus that he maintain a fleet “from [the contributions of] the islands” (Xen. Hell. 4.8.9), and this suggests that
arrangements were already in place, presumably as part of the agreements made in 394 when cities “attached themselves to Conon.”

Pharnabazus and Conon's post-Cnidus operations during 394 were just the preliminary to more extensive Persian activity in 393, which aimed at preventing any further Spartan-Egyptian collusion and at keeping Spartan forces on the mainland. Given the nearly complete destruction of the Spartan fleet in 394, Pharnabazus and Conon's concern about Asian Greek cities providing ships for operations in 393 seems unnecessary. But it may indicate that many or all of the Phoenician ships, a large part of the fleet Pharnabazus and Conon used during 394, were not going to deploy across the Aegean and instead returned to Phoenician waters and their original guard mission in the eastern Mediterranean. Ships from Asian Greek cities (probably in many cases the same ships that had been prepared previously on Agesilaus' orders and that had survived the battle of Cnidus by abandoning Peisander) would take their place.

At the beginning of the sailing season in spring 393, Pharnabazus together with Conon moved across the Aegean to the island of Melos, marking the first advance this far west by a Persian force in nearly ninety years. This spurred a new wave of democratic revolutions in various island poleis (Isoc. 19.18–21), probably leading to additional renewed alliances with Athens. From Melos, the Persian fleet continued on to the Greek mainland to the Gulf of Messenia, the entryway by sea to Spartan-held Messenia. Landing at Pherae at the head of the gulf, Conon and Pharnabazus' troops devastated the surrounding region as well as other sites on the Messenian coast (Xen. Hell. 4.8.7). Undoubtedly, the aim was to threaten Sparta by demonstrating the vulnerability of Messenia to maritime attack and by promoting rebellion by Sparta's Messenian helots. Conon's hand is certainly to be seen in this. His own first stratēgia at Athens took place in 414/3 during the Peloponnesian War, and Conon surely remembered how in that year while sailing to Sicily his fellow stratēgos Demosthenes had “landed on the coast opposite Cythera…. and, laying waste part of the country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which the helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert and from which plundering expeditions might be made” (Thuc. 7.26.2). Conon himself had Messenian bodyguards or attendants (Hell. Oxy. 19.3), and these must have provided special information about vulnerable targets. However, there were few harbors and few provisioning opportunities, and, anticipating the arrival of Lacedaemonian forces, Pharnabazus and Conon sailed off to the big island of Cythera (Xen. Hell. 4.8.7; Diod. 14.84.4–5).

Located just off the Laconian Gulf, the entryway to Laconia, and overlooking the two promontories which formed the gulf, Cythera was an important, well-established stopping point on the sailing route from Egypt and Libya to Greece. The island belonged to Sparta, and its inhabitants were perioeci overseen by a Spartan official known as the Judge of Cythera (Thuc. 4.54.3). Pharnabazus' seizure and occupation of Cythera positioned Persian forces to interdict shipping between Egypt and the Peloponnese, cutting the natural maritime route between Sparta and Egypt. But Cythera was also well placed to allow an occupying force to directly
threaten Sparta (whose port, Taenarum, was situated at the tip of the western promontory of the gulf). Herodotus has the exiled Spartan Demaratus advise Xerxes in 480 how best to defeat the Spartans by capturing Cythera (7.235).

Detach 300 vessels from the body of your fleet, and send them to attack the shores of Laconia. There is an island called Cythera in those parts, not far from the coast, concerning which Chilon, one of our wisest men, made the remark, that Sparta would gain if it were sunk to the bottom of the sea—so constantly did he expect that it would give occasion to some project like that which I now recommend to you…. Send your ships then to this island, and thence frighten the Spartans. If once they have a war of their own close to their doors, fear not their giving any help to the rest of the Greeks while your land force is engaged in conquering them [i.e., the rest of the Greeks]. In this way may all Greece be conquered; and then Sparta, left to herself, will be powerless.

Despite the fact that a Spartan king himself recommended this strategy, Xerxes did not adopt it, reportedly believing that it was unwise to divide the Persian invasion fleet in 480 by sending off 300 ships on a separate mission (Hdt. 7.236). The Athenians, however, repeatedly targeted Cythera in their conflicts with Sparta, attacking the island in 455 under Tolmides (Paus. 1.27.6) and seizing it in 424 during the Peloponnesian War, thereby, according to Thucydides, virtually paralyzing the Spartans (Thuc. 4.53.1–56.2): “Seeing the Athenians master of Cythera and expecting descents of the kind on their coast, the Lacedaemonians nowhere opposed them in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country…and generally stood very much upon the defensive…. They lived in constant fear of internal revolution…and became more timid than ever in military matters…. They were always afraid of a second disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to take the field” (Thuc. 4.55.1). Given the Athenian Conon’s appreciation of the strategic significance of Cythera, seizure and occupation of the island was certainly at the center of the plan he proposed to Artaxerxes in 395/4.

In 424, when the Athenians took control of Cythera, they had allowed the Cytherians to remain on the island, but Pharnabazus (again most likely advised by Conon) aimed at detaching the island entirely from its Spartan connection. After moving inland from Phoenicus on Cythera’s east coast, he besieged and captured the city of Cythera. Pharnabazus then sent the inhabitants “under truce” to Laconia (perhaps indicating one of the terms of surrender insisted on by Cythera’s defenders) and installed a garrison under the Athenian Nicophemus, Conon’s second in command. Xenophon’s characterization of Nicophemus as a harmost suggests that Nicophemus’ role on Cythera was political as well as military and that he represented a permanent replacement of the Spartan “judge” who supervised the island (Xen. Hell. 4.8.7–8; Diod. 14.84.4–5). In other words, Cythera now became a Persian island with a Persian-appointed governor. Pharnabazus had hired mercenaries in preparation for the 393 trans-Aegean campaign (Xen. Hell. 4.8.7), and these likely made up the garrison force on Cythera. Though the sources say nothing
explicit about naval arrangements on Cythera, Pharnabazus and Conon must have left a portion of the Persian fleet here to disrupt Egyptian-Spartan communication. Nepos’ notice that Conon went to Athens with only part of his fleet may indeed indicate that the rest of Conon’s fleet remained in the waters off Laconia, based at Cythera (Conon 4.5). The sources are silent about Spartan reaction, but we may assume it was similar to that in 424—panic and paralysis, at least in the short term.

Pharnabazus had no intention of engaging in protracted operations on the Greek mainland himself, and, as his garrisoning of Cythera indicates, after initial raids on the Peloponnesian coast he was most interested in making arrangements that would limit Sparta’s war-making capability. To that end, he provided substantial encouragement and support for Spartan foes on the mainland. From Cythera he went to Corinth, and there met with members of the existing anti-Spartan coalition, Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, and Corinthians, currently at war with Sparta. Pharnabazus furnished them a great sum of money (“as much as he had,” Xenophon says) to sustain continued resistance to Spartan attacks, especially by building up a Corinthian fleet to keep Sparta’s ships occupied on the Greek mainland side of the Aegean fighting for control of the Gulf of Corinth (Xen. Hell. 4.8.8–10; Diod. 14.84.5).  

This was not all. On departing, Pharnabazus left Conon and eighty triremes behind (certainly Cypriot and Cilician ships that had been under Conon’s command for several years already21), which Conon proposed to maintain “from the islands.” With Pharnabazus’ agreement, Conon planned to use his crews to help Athenians refortify the Peiraeus, Athens’ harbor, and rebuild the long walls between the city and the Peiraeus (a project begun in 394 at Thrasybulus’ instigation) before continuing operations against island and coastal mainland cities (Xen. Hell. 4.8.9–10, 12; Diod. 14.85.1–4). Pharnabazus contributed additional funds for the Athenian fortification program. Secure in their new walls and empowered by possession of a substantial fleet, the Athenians could confront the Spartans effectively once again and keep them too busy to interfere extensively in Aegean or eastern Mediterranean affairs.23

Reference in the following year to ongoing Persian subsidy of the Athenian fleet (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12) suggests that despite the many benefactions Pharnabazus provided Athens, he drew the line at condoning Athenian exaction of funds from “the islands.” This would be tantamount to authorizing a revival of Athens’ Delian League practices. Artaxerxes had previously appointed a special paymaster for Conon’s operations, and presumably this arrangement remained in place even as Conon and his fleet made Athens rather than Rhodes-Loryma-Caunus their base. If the Persians viewed Conon and his fleet as still a critical part of Persian strategy and foresaw protracted Athenian maritime enterprise, it would be better to keep Athens dependent on Persia by tying their maritime operations to Persian funding. Conon’s achievements to date notwithstanding, the suspicion that attended his original appointment had not disappeared.
From the perspective of Persia’s fundamental and primary Egyptian concerns, the restoration of Athens’ naval strength and installation of a naval guard on Cythera simply moved a Persian guard fleet of Cypriot and Cilician ships (many with Athenian crews) from the southwest corner of Anatolia, where under Conon’s command it had blocked entry into the eastern Mediterranean, to the Greek mainland itself. Facing a threat to both Messenia and Laconia from Cythera, the Spartans would dare not embark on any overseas enterprise. Moreover, lacking a fleet of any size and blocked from overland access to Athens by Athenian and Corinthian control of the Isthmus of Corinth, Sparta had no way to strike militarily at Athens to bring about the removal of the garrison on Cythera. As it turned out, however, they found another way.

Having reported Pharnabazus’ activities in 393, Xenophon has nothing further to say about Pharnabazus until 387, when in describing how ships from Hellespontine Phrygia aided the Spartans he explains the presence of Ariobarzanes as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia by noting that “Pharnabazus, having been recalled, had already [or “before this”] gone up [to court] when he married the king’s daughter” (Hell. 5.1.28). Xenophon does not indicate precisely just when Pharnabazus left his satrapy, but the fact that in 392 responsibility for Persia’s Aegean interests was in the hands of another Persian official, Tiribazus, makes it certain that Pharnabazus was no longer in Anatolia at that time. Most likely, he went east to the Persian court not long after finishing the 393 campaign with Conon. We may then see Pharnabazus’ marriage to Artaxerxes’ daughter as a reward for his great successes in 394–393. Pharnabazus was subsequently one of the commanders of Artaxerxes’ first attack on Egypt in the early 380s (Isoc. 4.140), and the best explanation for his departure from Anatolia is that he moved in 393/2 from his long-standing satrapal position in the west to take up a new role as expeditionary commander when preparations for the new Egyptian campaign got underway. Pharnabazus had been a fixture in Anatolian affairs for such a long time that when Xenophon had occasion to narrate events connected with Hellespontine Phrygia in 387 he had to explain Pharnabazus’ absence even though Pharnabazus had actually departed several years earlier.

Tiribazus had arrived in western Anatolia some time after Tissaphernes’ execution in 395. Artaxerxes II probably appointed him to the now vacant satrapy of Lydia. Tiribazus had previously been hyparch (subordinate governor) in western Armenia, but had become, Xenophon says, a “friend” of the king, the highest honor, perhaps because of his support for Artaxerxes throughout the recent succession struggle and his loyal presence at the Battle of Cunaxa (Xen. An. 4.4.4). Xenophon, who understood Persian titles, knows Tiribazus as “general” (stratēgos: Hell. 4.8.12), so we may infer that Tiribazus was both satrap (as residence at Sardis suggests) and karanos. The fact that Spartan envoys subsequently visited Tiribazus in an effort to get him to stop subsidies to Athens indicates that he was also the paymaster. Possibly he had functioned as such since 395/4, when Artaxerxes created the role of special financial officer charged with issuing funds to Conon. Given the expected area of Conon’s operations, it would be natural to locate this special paymaster in western
Anatolia—hence Tiribazus’ appointment to the satrapy of Lydia. With Tiribazus as satrap of Lydia, payments to Athens (and perhaps Corinth) may have come out of Lydian satrapal funds; that is, subsidies to anti-Spartan Greek states were now built in as part of the regular cost of maintaining security in the Aegean and preventing hostile Greek intrusion in the eastern Mediterranean.

Tiribazus thus held the key to the situation in Greece that Pharnabazus and Conon had created. He provided the subsidies to Athens and possibly Corinth to sustain their military power and guarantee continuing opposition to Sparta on the Greek mainland. And with Pharnabazus’ departure, Tiribazus was effectively in charge of Artaxerxes’ Aegean strategy, empowered by his position as karanos to undertake military operations to support it. Nevertheless, the Spartans sent an envoy, Antalcidas, to Tiribazus at Sardis in 392, probably not long after they learned of Pharnabazus’ transfer, and this suggests that they saw an opening in Tiribazus’ assumption of full responsibility for Persia’s Aegean policy. Tiribazus, they may have hoped, was not as virulently anti-Spartan as Pharnabazus had been. Tiribazus, after all, had not seen his lands in Anatolia repeatedly ravaged by Spartan forces as Pharnabazus had, so he might at least be willing to entertain a Spartan embassy and listen to its proposals.

Recent developments provided the Spartans with what they hoped would be grounds for persuading Tiribazus to abandon Persia’s recently adopted Aegean strategy. At Sardis, Antalcidas raised the specter of a revived Athenian archē resulting from Pharnabazus’ anti-Spartan measures. Antalcidas likely argued that with the great number of renewed alliances between Athens and many former members of the Delian League, an Athenian super-state, the nemesis of Persia in the far west for most of the previous century, was on its way to rebirth. The spread of pro-Athenian democracies during 394–393 and Athenian recovery of Delos (in addition to Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, all Athenian “cleruchic islands”) certainly seemed to corroborate charges of renewed Athenian imperialism. Antalcidas accused Conon of using the Persian-subsidized fleet to win over islands and coastal cities on the mainland in pursuit of aims beyond those connected with Persia’s anti-Spartan strategy, aims which, simply put, involved restoration of Athens’ former archē.

The Spartans proposed terms for a new Persian policy which would end Persian-Spartan hostilities, prevent restoration of an Athenian super-state, and give Artaxerxes undisputed authority over Asian Greek cities. They offered to abandon claims on behalf of Asian Greeks—the Spartan cause since 401 and the ostensible reason for Spartan overseas operations—and proposed that Persia insist on the principle of autonomy for Greek states elsewhere (as the Spartans had claimed to be doing when they went to war with Athens in 431), thus depriving Athens of the ability to reestablish its archē.

Like Sparta, other states saw Tiribazus as the key at this time. Learning of the Spartan initiative, Athens hastily sent an embassy headed by Conon to Sardis. Corinth, Argos, and Thebes also sent envoys—a clear indication of widespread recognition that Greek affairs now depended on Persian policy. All opposed the
principle of autonomy for island and mainland states. Athens feared this would cost it control of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, vital stops near the mouth of the Hellespont on the Black Sea–Athens grain route; Thebes was concerned about its hegemony over Boeotian city-states; and Argos was worried about its recent sympolity with Corinth (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12–14; Philochorus FGH 328 F149).

From Tiribazus’ perspective, the prospect of Athenian imperial aggression, alleged by the Spartans and evidently not disclaimed by the Athenian envoys, was probably most troubling. Revival of something like the Delian League would likely soon lead to renewed Athenian-Persian conflict. Tiribazus could anticipate that, in light of revived Athenian initiative, democracies recently installed in many Anatolian cities would soon ask for aid against oligarchic opponents and that this would provide a pretext for Athenian intervention in western Anatolia. As satrap of Lydia and as general, Tiribazus would be the official responsible for dealing with Athenian aggression. Knowing that Artaxerxes was turning his full attention now to preparing an Egyptian campaign, Tiribazus could anticipate that he would have no great infusion of troops or ships to counter Athenian activities. Tiribazus would be on his own, and Tissaphernes’ fate showed well what the price of failure was.

Thus, despite opposition by Athens, Corinth, and Argos, states that Persia (through Pharnabazus) had been cultivating and financing, Tiribazus accepted the Spartan proposal, undoubtedly believing that its terms offered the best way to resolve his concerns about the consequences of renaissant Athenian power. Abruptly abandoning the anti-Spartan Persian policy of recent years, Tiribazus arrested Conon, the alleged architect of renewed Athenian imperialism, and shifted Persian subsidies to Sparta so the Spartans could build a new fleet to counterbalance and preoccupy Athens. Essentially, this marked a reversion to the philo-Laconian strategy Persian satraps had followed from 412 to 405 to deal with Athens. Having made these arrangements on his own, Tiribazus then traveled to court to bring Artaxerxes news of recent Athenian activities and to gain Artaxerxes’ approval for his decision to accept Sparta’s peace proposal (Xen. Hell. 4.8.15–16).

In terms of stabilizing Aegean affairs, Tiribazus’ was probably the right strategy. Artaxerxes, however, rejected the shift approved by Tiribazus. The most likely explanation is that Artaxerxes simply did not trust the Spartans. With preparations for a renewed Egyptian campaign underway, restoring a Spartan fleet was very dangerous. Despite their proposed concessions, the Spartans could very easily engage again in Anatolia. After all, they had made similar concessions in 412–407 only to renege on them. Moreover, Spartan enterprise might invite renewed Egyptian support, and matters would be right back to where they were in 396.

Thus, instead of ratifying Tiribazus’ strategic shift, Artaxerxes kept him at court and sent a new official, Struthas, to western Anatolia with instructions to keep supporting Athens (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17)—in other words, to function as paymaster. To guarantee closer control of Asian Greek cities, particularly the Ionian cities responsible for fifth-century Athenian and fourth-century Spartan intervention in Anatolia and to give Persian officials the ability to respond swiftly to any new Spartan
overseas enterprise, Artaxerxes also reorganized commands in western Anatolia, separating Ionia from the Lydian satrapy and installing Struthas as satrap of Ionia (GHI 16 = Tod 113), placing him, in other words, on the front lines. Artaxerxes also detached Caria, which the Spartans had targeted in 397, from Lydia and placed it under its own satrap, the Carian dynast Hecatomnus. Lydia, thus attenuated, went to a “new man,” Autophradates. Diodorus’ characterization of Struthas as stratēgos “up to the sea” (14.99.1) and Xenophon’s description of him as “overseer of the coast” (Hell. 4.8.17: epimelētēs tôn kata thalattan) indicate that in addition to his satrapal role and his role as paymaster Struthas had special military authority for dealing with the Spartans; he was thus most probably also karanos or supreme commander in western Anatolia, and as such could direct Autophradates and Hecatomnus as well as Ariobarzanes, the son of Pharnabazus, who took over as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia at his father’s departure for the east.

Once the Athenians learned of Artaxerxes’ affirmation of his pro-Athenian policy, there was no reason to continue the discussions about peace that had been taking place on the mainland. The peace process thus collapsed. Nevertheless, the Spartans made some important gains. Conon, accused by Antalcidas and imprisoned by Tiribazus at Sardis, managed to escape while Tiribazus was consulting Artaxerxes. (Plutarch’s account [Alcib. 27.5–18.1] of the renegade Athenian general Alcibiades’ arrest, imprisonment, and escape in 409 suggests that imprisonment really meant simply being put under guard, not cast in a dungeon of some sort.) Conon made his way once more to Salamis on Cyprus, where his wife and a child had remained, but there fell sick and died. Not only Athens but also Persia lost a very resourceful anti-Spartan figure. To judge by the absence of any further reference to Cythera in the accounts of continuing war on the mainland and by the return of Nicophemus, Cythera’s garrison commander, to Cyprus, it appears that the garrison Pharnabazus and Conon had installed on the island was not maintained. Persian funds had certainly subsidized the garrison. Termination of that support by Tiribazus and expectation that Tiribazus’ Laconizing policy would mean return of the island to Spartan control had likely led to the departure of the mercenary garrison force before Artaxerxes overruled Tiribazus. Thus, although Tiribazus’ Laconizing policy failed to gain Artaxerxes’ support, it lasted long enough to provide important benefits for the Spartans.

It was now 392–391, nearly fifteen years after Amyrtaeus’ initial revolt in the Delta. This represented by far the longest delay in Persian response to problems in Egypt. But Artaxerxes II had initiated campaigns twice already—with Abrocomas’ expedition in 401 and with Phoenician shipbuilding in the early 390s—only to abort or postpone them to deal with Cyrus and then with Spartan and Egyptian overseas activity. From the Persian experience in the 450s, Artaxerxes knew that success in Egypt required a secure Persian hold on the eastern Mediterranean and the exclusion of any Greek support for Egyptian rebels. As he renewed preparations for an Egyptian campaign in the early 390s, Artaxerxes had tried to ensure the security of the eastern Mediterranean by creating two “guard fleets” of Phoenician and
Cypriot/Cilician ships. But after 396, when evidence of Spartan-Egyptian collusion raised the specter of Greek support for the Egyptian rebellion, Artaxerxes (at Conon’s urging) adopted a more aggressive military and political strategy that involved campaigning all the way to the Greek mainland, entering into direct relationships with Greek states, and establishing an official (first Tiribazus and then Struthas) as overseer and manager of Greek affairs and as permanent liaison between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. The situation on the mainland remained fluid and unsettled, especially with the revival of Athenian maritime power, but so long as mainland Greeks were preoccupied with their own conflicts and fought their battles on the mainland, Artaxerxes could comfortably concentrate on his long-delayed Egyptian enterprise.
CHAPTER 7
To Egypt: Preparations and Campaign, 391–387

The only direct report of the first fourth-century Persian campaign against Egypt appears in a passage in the Athenian orator Isocrates’ Panegyricus in which Isocrates attempts to prove that the Persian king lacks real power by considering “the wars which he, unaided [without the participation of one or another Greek state], has fought on his own behalf.”

Take, first, the case of Egypt: since its revolt from the king, what progress has he made against its inhabitants? Did he not dispatch to this war the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighboring peoples as well? After these things, campaigning against Evagoras … the king has not the power to prevail by fighting, but has already wasted six years. (4.140–141)

Most scholars place this three-year campaign after the King’s Peace of 387/6—the comprehensive peace which ended Greek-Persian war and Greek interstate hostilities—on the assumption that the Persians would not embark on an Egyptian campaign before settling Aegean affairs once and for all. But it seems most natural to place it ca. 390/89–388/7. The Cypriot War cited by Isocrates occurred after the King’s Peace, promulgated in 387/6 (Diod. 14.110.3), and this war was still under way at the time of the delivery of the Panegyricus (380), so counting back six years to its start brings us to 386. Persia’s three-year Egyptian campaign, which according to Isocrates preceded the Cypriot War, must therefore fall before 386. Pharnabazus’ participation in the campaign prevents us from pushing it very far back in the 390s, when he was active in the war against the Spartans. At the same time, Artaxerxes’ volte-face in mid-387, when he abruptly abandoned his strong opposition to any
settlement with the Spartans and instead embraced them as allies, seems explicable only on the assumption of impending or actual Persian failure in Egypt by that time. If so, we may put the end of the campaign some time in 388/7. Treating Isocrates’ statement that the campaign lasted for three years as indicating that it stretched over three Athenian archonships before coming to an end, we may view the three years in (part or all of) which the campaign took place as 390/89, 389/8, and 388/7. On the likely assumption that the Persians timed the beginning of the campaign to avoid the Nile flood season, the onset of the campaign would then fall sometime between the end of the “going down” of the Nile in October (390) and the “rising up” of the Nile in late May–June (389).

Persian preparations for large-scale campaigns against the Greek mainland or against Egypt were typically protracted, so if Persia’s Egyptian campaign began in 390/89, we will not be far off dating Artaxerxes’ initiation of concentrated and continuous preparations to ca. 392–391, that is, immediately after Pharnabazus and Conon secured Anatolia and the Aegean in 394–393 and made arrangements to keep the Spartans busy with war on the Greek mainland. We may surmise the arrival of Persian officers, possibly including Pharnabazus, in Phoenician cities and the beginning of stockpiling at this time. Acco (which belonged to Tyre) undoubtedly served as the Persian primary staging area, as it had for Cambyses in the 520s (Strabo 16.758). Major routes from the north, northeast, and east converged at Megiddo, just to the southeast of Acco. The city of Acco was located near a great bay and had a broad plain, so ships and soldiers in large numbers could be accommodated here better than at any other Phoenician or eastern Mediterranean site. Storehouses constructed about this time at numerous sites in southern Philistia—including Tell Jemmeh, just north of the Besor River, the last outpost in Philistia on the way to Egypt—were probably part of the preparation process in the late 390s.

We can perhaps see something of the broad security measures Artaxerxes employed during preparations. As in the early 390s, these involved both inner and outer lines of defense, or, to put it another way, systems of maritime crisis management for both the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. As previously, Persian strategy involved maintaining fleets to guard against Greek or Egyptian intrusions in the eastern Mediterranean.

Thanks to funds provided by Tiribazus in 392, the Spartans built a new fleet which revived the possibility of Spartan naval operations across the Aegean. Nevertheless, Artaxerxes relied on the Athenians and their fleet, composed in large part of the Cypriot ships Pharnabazus had left at Athens in 393. Struthas, the newly appointed satrap of Ionia sent down, according to Xenophon, “to take charge of affairs on the coast” as Tiribazus’ replacement, was the Persian liaison now, and Xenophon’s remark that Struthas in western Anatolia “devoted himself assiduously to the Athenians and their allies” indicates that like Tiribazus before him Struthas was also paymaster responsible for subsidizing the far western—Athenian—fleet (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17).
In the eastern Mediterranean, maritime security had previously depended on Phoenician guard ships based at Sidon. Now these ships would be dedicated to the upcoming Egyptian campaign. Consequently, it appears, Artaxerxes adopted a new maritime security plan in the eastern Mediterranean which involved taking control of Cyprus and using the island as a base for safeguarding the opposite coastal territory. The evidence for this lies in the few references to developments on Cyprus in 391–390. Diodorus (under 391/0) notes that Evagoras initially was king only of Salamis, but having acquired great resources and an army “set out to make the whole island his own”—that is, to become king of Cyprus—subduing some cities by force and winning over others by persuasion (Diod. 14.98.1). (Evagoras actually had previously been expelled from Salamis and after a period of exile had succeeded in 411 in regaining the city from Abdemon of Tyre [Diod. 14.98.1; Isoc. Evag. 26–32], so his concern with strengthening himself as much as possible on Cyprus is understandable.)

While he easily gained control of the other cities, the peoples of Amathus, Soli, and Citium held out against him in the war and sent envoys to Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians, for help. They accused Evagoras of having slain King Agyris, an ally of the Persians, and promised to join the king in acquiring the island for himself. The king, not only because he did not wish Evagoras to grow any stronger, but also because he was mindful that Cyprus was well situated and had great naval strength by which he [Artaxerxes] would be able to make war in defense of Asia, decided to accept the alliance. He dismissed the ambassadors and for himself sent letters to the cities situated on the sea and to their commanding satraps to construct triremes and with all speed to make ready everything the fleet might need and he commanded Hecatomnus, the ruler of Caria, to make war on Evagoras. Hecatomnus traversed the cities of the upper satrapies and crossed over to Cyprus in strong force. (Diod. 14.98.1–3)

In normal times, so long as tribute was paid, the Persians had displayed little interest in Cypriot affairs and left Cypriot kings pretty much on their own. But any plans for extended preparations along the Phoenician coast and for the ensuing campaign in Egypt would have to encompass Cyprus, a target of Egyptian attack in previous centuries. Evagoras had probably initiated attacks on other Cypriot cities in or soon after 394 in the belief that his service in furnishing Conon to Artaxerxes had gained him license to expand his own power on Cyprus. In turning his attention to the eastern Mediterranean after 393, Artaxerxes could see entirely on his own that ongoing conflicts on Cyprus between Evagoras of Salamis and other cities meant instability, and he evidently decided that the best way to secure the island was to establish direct control—to “acquire the island for himself.”

Diodorus probably has identified the various associated events correctly, but he may not have them in the right order. Most likely, Artaxerxes ordered the construction of ships in coastal cities referred to by Diodorus—Cilician, Lycian, and possibly Cypriot cities as well—almost as soon as he initiated renewed
preparations for the Egyptian campaign in 392–391, thus alerting Cypriot cities to Persian plans for creating a new guard fleet. Cypriot cities under attack by Evagoras at this time saw an opportunity for ending the attacks and sent envoys quickly to offer their support for Artaxerxes’ assertion of control over Cyprus—“promising to join him in acquiring the island for himself,” that is, to join in an enterprise Artaxerxes had already set in motion.  

With the additional detail provided by Theopompus (FGH 115 F103) that Artaxerxes appointed as commander the satrap (of Lydia) Autophradates and as navarch Hecatomnus of Caria, we can see that Artaxerxes replicated the very effective Pharnabazus-Conon arrangement of the early 390s, joining a Persian overseer with a non-Persian operational commander, in this case to manage “inner defense” in the eastern Mediterranean.  

Autophradates had probably come west at the time of the subdivision of the Lydian satrapy (when Struthas became satrap of Ionia and Hecatomnus satrap of Caria), and the involvement of these three governors of western Anatolian satrapies in guard duties of one kind or another indicates how Artaxerxes’ Egyptian enterprise made demands on a wide range of officials.  

According to Diodorus (14.98.3–4), in 391/0 Hecatomnus, “advancing through the upper satrapies, crossed to Cyprus with a great force.” In other words, he went eastward, probably to Cilicia, perhaps collecting some native levies on the way, and from there moved to Cyprus with ships Artaxerxes had previously ordered constructed.  

Hecatomnus had no significant harbor or fleet of his own in Caria—his son and successor Mausolus would later develop both of these in connection with his move from Mylasa to Halicarnassus—so Hecatomnus’ role was likely simply commander rather than provider of ships. Given the time needed to prepare ships and given Diodorus’ habit of combining under a single year the events of two or more years, it is most likely that Hecatomnus’ crossing belongs in the latter part of 391/0. Despite Isocrates’ efforts in the Evagoras to make Evagoras appear the greatest of Artaxerxes’ opponents and Isocrates’ reference there to Artaxerxes’ ten-year war against him (9.64), there is no evidence of fighting at this time.  

Isocrates’ report in the Panegyricus in 380 of an ongoing six-year war against Evagoras points to the years after 386 as the only period when real hostilities took place (4.141). Since Isocrates is interested in the Panegyricus in showing the futility of Persian military activities, he surely would have cited a ten-year war rather than a six-year war if fighting had stretched, even episodically, over a ten-year period. Artaxerxes’ “attack,” in other words, was likely nothing more than Hecatomnus’ arrival on Cyprus to assert Artaxerxes’ “ownership” of the island and establish a base for Artaxerxes’ eastern Mediterranean naval guard.  

Nevertheless, since this was the first time since perhaps the 460s that Persian forces of any kind had set foot on Cyprus, it must have seemed to observers like a very belligerent move. Evagoras was guilty enough of aggression on Cyprus in violation of Artaxerxes’ earlier insistence on inactivity, and, evidently fearing the worst when Hecatomnus brought a strong force to Cyprus, he sent for help from Athens (spring 390? 11), where many Cypriot, probably mainly Salaminian, ships were
based. The Athenians voted him ten ships, but the envoys could not, and the Athenian assembly would not, pay for the cost of outfitting and manning them. Nevertheless, using personal and borrowed funds, Aristophanes, son of Niciphemus, who with his father had previously been a guest of Evagoras at Salamis, arranged to send ships, a force of peltasts, and money for arms. Aristophanes’ aid reached Cyprus, but with Hecatomnus’ force on the island and an additional very large Persian army beginning to assemble on the mainland opposite Cyprus, Evagoras likely abandoned attacks on other Cypriot cities and withdrew swiftly to Salamis. Despite Evagoras’ evident fear, Hecatomnus’ mission was not to remove Evagoras but to secure the island and nearby waters against any Egyptian attack, so Evagoras, quiescent, remained in place.

Having “acquired the island” for the king in 390, Hecatomnus and his force remained to guard against Egyptian military activity. Where Hecatomnus was headquartered is not recorded. Plausible places are Amathus and Citium, Artaxerxes’ “allies” on the southern coast of Cyprus directly opposite critical Phoenician cities. But it is possible that Hecatomnus actually moved to Salamis on the eastern coast, the best vantage point for overlooking eastern Mediterranean coastal waters. The report of later collusion between Hecatomnus and Evagoras (Diod. 15.2.3) may reflect friendship initiated at this time (they actually shared similar ambitions for local political aggrandizement and a taste for Greek culture).

The absence of further reference to Hecatomnus on Cyprus suggests that he had nothing to do, an indication that the Egyptians made no move into the eastern Mediterranean and that Persian preparations in Phoenicia were able to proceed without challenge. In the west, however, Artaxerxes’ management strategy was tested almost immediately. Hoping to cause enough trouble to persuade Artaxerxes of his mistake in rejecting Spartan peace proposals, the Spartans, though still embroiled in the Corinthian War, resumed operations in western Anatolia in 391 with a reported 8,000-man force under Thibron, Sparta’s commander in Anatolia in 399–397. Using Ephesus as a base, Thibron set about plundering the king’s territory. Struthas did his job effectively, however, attacking Thibron’s force during an ill-organized Spartan raid and killing Thibron and many others (summer 391) (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17–19; Diod. 14.99.1). Undeterred, the Spartans sent out a replacement (Diphridas) to take over Thibron’s surviving troops and defend the cities that had joined Thibron. Evidence of Sparta’s renewed engagement in trans-Aegean affairs prompted Rhodian oligarchs, who had just overthrown the Rhodian democracy (installed at the time of Conon’s occupation of Rhodes), to appeal to Sparta for support. Sending out a small fleet to Rhodes, the Spartans now extended their operations to the edge of the eastern Mediterranean.

On land during 391/0, Diphridas managed to put Struthas out of action by capturing and then ransoming his wife and son-in-law. The ransom may have represented the funds intended for Athens, and Diphridas may have compelled Struthas to end payments to Athens, thus accomplishing by war what Spartan diplomacy had been unable to do in 392. With these profits, Diphridas hired mercenaries to
augment Thibron’s force, badly mauled by Struthas’ attack some months earlier. Now the Spartans had a sizable force and a solid foothold on land at Ephesus and nearby territory. The Spartan naval force also grew larger. Learning that Rhodian democrats had recovered the city of Rhodes along with a good number of ships, the Spartans sent out additional ships under Teleutias, who garnered more from Samos and captured ten Athenian ships constituting a second contingent heading for Cyprus in response to Evagoras’ appeal in summer 390 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.20–24). These signs of new Spartan strength and enterprise beyond the mainland evidently prompted many pro-Spartan movements. On Lesbos, for example, apparently all cities but Mytilene Laconized (Xen. Hell. 4.8.28), so that the Spartans were becoming again, as Diodorus puts it, little by little master of their allies (14.97.4). They were, in other words, restoring their overseas archē.

In Artaxerxes’ system for managing Aegean affairs, Athens was to furnish a check on Spartan activities. This responsibility, along with the Athenians’ own concerns about the security of their Black Sea grain supply in the face of renewed Spartan maritime activity, impelled the Athenians to engage across the Aegean for the first time since the catastrophe at Aegospotami fifteen years earlier. In 390, they sent out Thrasybulus with forty ships—their largest fleet since 405—and 400 mercenaries to counter the Spartans. Xenophon makes it clear that Thrasybulus’ official mission was to assist beleaguered pro-Athenian democrats on Rhodes and keep the Spartans out of Rhodes, a critical stopping point on the way to the eastern Mediterranean. That is, he was supposed to fulfill Athens’ obligation to defend against the possibility of long-range Spartan enterprise. But instead, Thrasybulus moved north to secure the grain supply route by cultivating friendships along the Hellespontine coast and the Thracian Chersonese and by taking control of Byzantium and Chalcedon at the entry to the Black Sea (Hell. 4.8.25–27). Conon had proposed to Pharnabazus in 393 that Athens’ fleet be maintained by contributions from recently “liberated” Aegean and Asian Greek cities. For Pharnabazus, this was evidently too much like Athens’ fifth-century imperial practices, and, preferring to have more control over Athenian activities, Pharnabazus had insisted on subsidizing the fleet with Persian money (Xen. Hell. 4.8.9,12). Now in 390, however, either because Spartan pressure on Struthas had terminated his payments to Athens or because Thrasybulus wanted Athens to have its own dependable revenues, Thrasybulus set about instituting a financial system designed to support Athens’ naval expenses independently of Persia. At Byzantium, after replacing the oligarchy with a democratic government, he “farmed out the tithe-duty on vessels sailing out of the Pontus” (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25). Moving back down the Anatolian coast and eastward as far as Aspendus on the Pamphylian coast, he imposed or reimposed at some places the 5% harbor tax Athens had collected during the last years of its fifth-century archē. At other stops—Halicarnassus, for example—Thrasybulus simply raided and pillaged. Outraged Aspendians killed Thrasybulus as he advanced along the southern coast of Anatolia and kept up his depredations in summer 389, but the Athenians
assigned another general (Argyrrius) to command the fleet and continue Thrasybulus’ operations (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25–31; Diod. 14.99.5). During 389/8, the Hellespont became the primary theater in a new Spartan-Athenian maritime war when the Athenians sent off another general, Iphicrates, and 1,200 mercenaries to oppose attempts by the Spartan commander Anaxibius to undo recent Athenian successes. Iphicrates did this most effectively, ambushing and killing Anaxibius and a dozen Spartan harmosts (city governors) who had been campaigning with him (Xen. Hell. 4.8.31–39).

This was certainly more than Artaxerxes had bargained for in authorizing the restoration of Athenian naval power in 393 and in ignoring charges in 392 that Athens was intent on reviving its arche. But the fact that Athenian operations were keeping the Spartans busy probably outweighed Artaxerxes’ concerns about the recrudescence of Athenian power. With hostilities concentrating now in the Hellespont, the Spartans were operating far from the eastern Mediterranean. Artaxerxes certainly did not want to postpone the recovery of Egypt any longer, so he did not react immediately to Athens’ independent, imperializing activities in 390–389.

Artaxerxes’ long delay in sending a Persian force to recover Egypt—it was now more than a decade since Abrocomas had been poised in Phoenicia to attack Egypt—gave the Egyptians time for extended preparations. Dynastic rivalry had led to Nepherites’ displacement of Amyrtaeus in 399, but Nepherites continued as king until his death, probably from natural causes, in 393, and his son Acoris followed him, continuing the 29th Dynasty in Manetho’s scheme.20 Acoris presumably concentrated on defensive arrangements as large-scale Persian preparations made it clear that Persian attack was imminent.

About the 390/89–388/7 Persian campaign itself, there is not much to build on. Aiming to demonstrate Persian impotence, Isocrates’ remarks are tendentious, but they contain the only direct evidence we have: there were three Persian commanders, the campaign lasted three years (or at least stretched over three Athenian years), the Persians suffered more ills than they inflicted, and they finally withdrew in disgrace. There is perhaps just enough to reconstruct the outline of a possible story, or at least to provide a basis for reasonable speculation.

First, the multiple commanders, Pharnabazus, Abrocomas, and Tithraustes. Such shared commands were not an uncommon Persian practice (Hdt. 5.116, 121; 7.85; Thuc. 8.58, 37; Ctes. FGH 688 F52). Isocrates does not say anything about the relative status of these figures. Presumably one was commander in chief.21 As Artaxerxes’ chiliarch and thus the highest ranking of the three, Tithraustes seems the most likely candidate. But both Abrocomas and Pharnabazus were distinguished, seasoned, and trusted. Pharnabazus had recently married a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28), probably a reward for his achievements in restoring Persian power in the Aegean in the 390s. Possibly the marriage accompanied his appointment as chief commander. As son-in-law, Pharnabazus would be a latter-day Mardonius, Darius I’s son-in-law and commander of Darius’ and
then Xerxes’ Aegean campaign forces in the 490s and 480–479. Alternatively, Pharnabazus may have commanded the Persian—certainly mostly Phoenician—fleet, marking a continuation of his naval command in 394. Abrocomas, having been in charge of the previous, aborted campaign, possibly reprised that role in the 380s campaign. In the end, we simply have to admit that we do not know just what the command structure was.

Whatever the relative status of the three, their joint involvement represented insurance that should one be killed, it would not be necessary to abandon operations (as had been the case when Mardonius died at Plataea in 479 and Achaemenes in Egypt in 459: Hdt. 3.3.4, 7.7, 9.66.1–3), since a successor as commander in chief was already in place. If so, this explanation reveals Artaxerxes’ determination to keep the Persian force in Egypt until successful.

We may assume Persian strategy was based on previous Persian experiences in Egypt. Most likely, the initial aim was to seize a base in the eastern Delta (probably Pelusium) and, as Cambyses and Megabyzus had done, advance from the north-eastern Egyptian frontier south to Memphis. If the Persian force took Memphis, it could probably gain control of Upper Egypt south of Memphis easily enough. Then, as in the campaign against rebellious dynasts and their Athenian allies in 455–454, the Persians could move north from Memphis to isolate “rebel” forces in the Delta, probably expecting that, as previously, Egyptian defenders would withdraw toward the rather remote northwestern region of the Delta and ultimately accept renewed Persian dominion.

Prior Persian rapprochement with the Arab king whose power evidently extended from Gaza into the northern Sinai may be inferred. He was not displaced; we hear soon after the end of Artaxerxes’ 390/89–388/7 Egyptian campaign that he is one of those of whom Artaxerxes is suspicious (Diod. 15.2.4). By itself the scale of Persian preparations may have sufficed to intimidate the Arab king and open the way through the Sinai into Egypt.

Remembering that under Psammetichus III in 525 the Egyptians had risked everything in a single battle with Cambyses’ force, and in failing had given the Persians control of the whole Delta and opened the way to Memphis (Hdt. 3.10–13), Acoris and the Egyptian commanders probably made no initial attempt, or at least no all-out attempt, to block entry into Egypt by offering battle. Instead, Acoris may have ceded the northeasternmost Delta to the Persians and then tried to keep the Persians from continuing any further. This would mean attacking the Persian base(s), constantly monitoring Persian movements, and trying to block any advance up the Pelusiac branch toward Memphis.

Photius’ notice that Theopompus recounted in Book 12 of his Philippica “how Acoris, the king of the Egyptians, made peace with the Barcaeans”—the inhabitants of the Greek city of Barca, west of Cyrene in Libya—may point to an effort by Acoris to guarantee the security of the western Delta frontier at this time. If Acoris had to concentrate forces in the eastern Delta to deal with the Persians, the western Delta would be left largely unguarded. A very dangerous development from the
Egyptian point of view would involve Persians linking with Barcaeaens/Cyreneans and attacking Egypt from the west. We may guess that as “friends” or allies, the Barcaesans agreed not to exploit this situation and perhaps to counter any Libyan moves to do so, certainly for “considerations”—probably financial. We may see evidence of a larger diplomatic initiative aimed at securing the western frontier in the report that the chief of Siwa, a traditional mustering point for Libyan attacks, acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty for the first time in the reign of Acoris.24

Was there any significant fighting? Isocrates’ remark that during the three-year stay the Persians suffered more ills than they inflicted is so vague as to suggest that all Isocrates knew was that the Persians failed in Egypt and that he had no knowledge of any important encounters or battles. It is entirely possible that this was the case because there actually were none. What we know (or can reasonably surmise) about the political situation in Egypt in 389–388 may explain why.

Evidence for the sequence of 29th Dynasty (Mendesian) kings—Nepherites and his successors—comes from Egyptian sources, Manetho and the Demotic Chronicle (both third-century works), but they are not entirely in agreement. The various versions of Manetho’s king lists all have Nepherites followed by Acoris and then Psammuthis, while the Demotic Chronicle has Nepherites succeeded by his (unnamed) son, who reigned briefly. Then comes mention of a ruler who was deposed and followed by Psammuthis, who “was not permitted to prolong his days as a ruler” and gives way in turn to Acoris.25 Recent scholarship has reconciled these discrepancies and produced a compelling reconstruction which has Acoris, son of Nepherites, succeeding him as king in 394/3 and reigning for five years until a usurper, Psammuthis, gained the kingship, involving, as inscriptions from Thebes and Saqqara dated by his reign attest, control of at least Upper Egypt and Memphis. After a year or so, Acoris recovered the kingship, which he then held, henceforth regularly designating himself “king restored,” for another eight years.26

There is no evidence about just how and in what circumstances this usurpation and restoration took place, but we may make some plausible, though admittedly tentative, inferences. Inscriptional evidence for Psammuthis comes from Thebes and the vicinity of Memphis but is preponderantly Theban. This may indicate that he gained recognition first in Upper Egypt and then in the capital. Possibly, therefore, Psammuthis was of southern origin.27 If so, he was not one of the group of rival dynasts located in the Delta. This means that Psammuthis probably lacked the kind of substantial military resources in the form of machimoi that Delta dynasts, including Acoris, possessed, so we should probably not see Psammuthis’ takeover as the result of superior military strength or battlefield victory over Acoris. Instead, we might guess that Psammuthis owed his extensive success to the absence of strong opposition—that is, that his takeover most likely occurred when Acoris and virtually all the native machimoi were concentrated in the far northeast to face the Persian invasion.28 In these circumstances, Memphis and Upper Egypt were probably left with very few royal troops. Thus, by late 389, Psammuthis was able to assert
authority even up to Memphis, while Acoris was tied to the northeastern Delta to obstruct Persian advance.

Confirmation of the collapse of Acoris’ unified kingship comes from a Greek source—Aristophanes’ *Plutus* (178) and one of its accompanying scholia. In the *Plutus*, which was presented in early 388, one of the characters refers to an evidently recent Athenian-Egyptian alliance which the Athenians made in return for money.29 One scholiast (of several who remark on this passage) explains that this situation occurred when “Psammetichus” was a harsh and very coarse “tyrant” whose subjects voted to condemn him and sent envoys to ask, in exchange for a shipment of wheat, that the Athenians overthrow this intractable master.30 We may easily enough see “Psammetichus” (the most notable Egyptian royal name in recent times) as a version of “Psammuthis,” the usurper of Acoris’ kingship,31 and while the scholiast makes no mention of Acoris here, his use of the term “tyrant” (*tyrannos*) characterizes Psammetichus/Psammuthis as a figure who acquired his position illegitimately—a usurper, in other words. These considerations, along with the fact that the embassy noted by the scholiast probably visited Athens recently enough before performance of the *Plutus* for the event to suit Aristophanes’ topical satire, all point to a usurper in place in Egypt not long before early 388.

It was certainly not, as the scholiast says, Psammuthis’ “subjects” who sought Athenian aid but the displaced king Acoris, the figure with the greatest interest in getting rid of Psammuthis and the only one who could offer Egyptian alliance to Athens. Facing the invading Persian force in the northeast Delta, he himself could not break away to deal with the usurper. However, if he gained an alliance with Athens, then, as in the early 450s, an Athenian naval force might sail to the western Delta and, using the Canopic branch, move upriver to Memphis, chase the probably militarily weak Psammuthis from the city, and take control of it on Acoris’ behalf. Athens’ recent maritime enterprises had announced the renewal of Athenian ambitions abroad, and Acoris could predict that they would be receptive to offers of Egyptian support and willingly enter into a mutually beneficial alliance.

If, as Psammuthis’ ability to seize Upper Egypt and Memphis and present himself as king suggests, Acoris himself was busy in the Delta overseeing the response to Persian invasion, then Psammuthis’ coup created a paralyzing predicament for Acoris. He dared not return to Memphis to deal with Psammuthis for fear of leaving the door open in the Delta to Persian advance. At the same time, Acoris could not attempt a decisive battle against the Persian force for fear of losing, even in victory, many troops and thereby making recovery of Memphis and the kingship very difficult.

We may imagine, then, that Acoris simply waited in the Delta, hoping that his new allies would venture forth and recover Memphis on his behalf. Meanwhile, he likely only engaged in limited military actions aimed at restricting Persian movement.

There is no evidence that Athens did intervene—during late 389 and 388 they had too many problems in the Aegean to permit dispatching any ships to Egypt. Yet
by late 388, it appears, Acoris had recovered the kingship and become, as he subse-
quently styled himself, “the king restored.” Absent Athenian involvement, Acoris
evidently did this on his own. If so, he must have been able to move south sometime
before late 388 without having to worry about a Persian advance, which may point
to Persian withdrawal from Egypt by late 388.

We can only conjecture the circumstances surrounding Persian abandonment
of the campaign at this time. Isocrates’ failure to mention any great Egyptian vic-
tory is a good indication that the Persian force suffered no debilitating battlefield
defeat. If we can infer anything from Isocrates’ assertion that after remaining in
Egypt for three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, Abrocomas,
Pharnabazus, and Tithraustes withdrew in disgrace (4.140), it is that the Persians
had not been able to do much of anything in Egypt during their stay. The Persian
advance in Egypt may have stalled in the vicinity of Pelusium and there faced effec-
tive harassment by Acoris’ forces and then restriction by the months-long flood in
the middle of 389. With the expeditionary force still unable to advance in late 389
and early 388, supplies may have dwindled. Then, as floodwaters rose again in early
summer 388, seeing no immediate prospect of success and only further deteriora-
tion of conditions as they waited out the annual flood, the Persian commanders
may have decided to end the invasion rather than risk real defeat when the flood-
waters subsided.

Placing such a departure sometime after mid-388 would fit with the three-year
stay reported by Isocrates. In his interest in depicting the Persians as militarily
ineffective, Isocrates probably rendered as “three years” what might have been
actually a stay beginning in the latter part of one archon-year (390/89), stretching
through the whole next archon year (389/8), and ending early in the third archon
year (388/7), which started in mid-388. In the ten-month Athenian year, the
“three-year” stay of the Persian force could actually have been a total of just twelve
months, though it was most likely several months longer than this. The “disgrace”
attached to the withdrawal derived from Persian failure for the first time to recover
control of Egypt following native revolt despite Artaxerxes’ deployment of a large,
well-prepared force.

[76] Trouble in the West
Failure in Egypt meant that Artaxerxes could not ignore the situation in the far west any longer. The possibility of Egyptian-Spartan collusion in the mid-390s had prompted Artaxerxes to intervene in Greek affairs, destroying Sparta’s fleet, fostering war on the Greek mainland, and supporting Athens and other anti-Spartan states in order to restrict Spartan enterprise. This strategy had been successful—there had been no Spartan involvement in Egypt or the eastern Mediterranean. But by 388, Artaxerxes had lost control of the situation in the far west. Rebuffed in their attempt to make peace with Artaxerxes in 392, the Spartans were again campaigning across the Aegean with both land and naval forces. And Athens, having been resurrected militarily to function as a watchdog over Spartan activities, was operating independently for its own ends and was on the way to restoring its trans-Aegean maritime empire. To date, this had not impaired Persian efforts against Egypt. But having failed to recover Egypt, Artaxerxes II, like Artaxerxes I in the aftermath of Achaemenes’ defeat in Egypt in 459, would soon be preparing another campaign. There was no question that Acoris, fully aware of Persian determination, would do whatever he could to stall or divert a second Persian invasion. It is unlikely that Artaxerxes knew anything about Acoris’ recently established relationship with Athens, but given Spartan belligerence and Athenian independence in 388, Artaxerxes could anticipate that both Sparta and Athens would be receptive to Egyptian offers of support and that Egyptian intervention in Aegean affairs would permit greatly expanded Greek activity. That prospect made resolution of the situation in the Aegean an absolute necessity before Artaxerxes could turn to preparations for a new campaign against Egypt.

Artaxerxes moved quickly. He knew that the Spartans had been anxious for an end to hostilities and had already proposed to recognize Artaxerxes’ claim to Asian Greek cities in return for his insistence on autonomy for Greek states elsewhere.
(Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14). He knew also that Athens and other states were opposed to such terms. But if, belatedly, Artaxerxes made peace with the Spartans and provided (as in the later phase of the Peloponnesian War) support to strengthen and sustain their operations against Athens and others, he might be able to compel Athens and other Greeks to agree to a general peace and thereby deprive Egypt of opportunities for intervention in Greek affairs. Thus Artaxerxes decided to deal first with the Spartans, then with the Athenians and other Greeks.

In late 388, probably not long after Persian withdrawal from Egypt, Artaxerxes signaled his shift toward reconciliation with Sparta by dispatching the philo-Laconian Tiribazus (whom Artaxerxes had evidently kept at court since rejecting the Spartan peace terms agreed to by Tiribazus in 392) back to western Anatolia to replace Struthas, satrap of Ionia.¹ The Spartans understood immediately what Tiribazus’ return to the west meant and wasted no time in responding, sending out Antalcidas, their envoy to Tiribazus in 392, to take Hierax’ place as naval commander in the belief, Xenophon says, “that by doing this they would most please Tiribazus” (*Hell.* 5.1.6). Antalcidas quickly met with Tiribazus and together they traveled to the Persian court (*Xen.* *Hell.* 5.1.25; *Diod.* 14.110.2). Artaxerxes, who four years earlier had scorned any dealings with the Spartans, now practically fawned over Antalcidas, presenting him with a scented wreath and naming him the king’s “friend,” the highest honor of the Persian court (*Plut.* *Artax.* 22.1–3). This meant, among other things, that there would be no need for Antalcidas to engage in the *proskynēsis* ritual Greeks found so demeaning. Then, according to Diodorus (14.110.3), the king said he would make peace on the terms that “the Greek cities in Asia be subject to the king and all the rest of the Greek cities be autonomous.” In other words, Artaxerxes accepted in full the terms the Spartans had proposed in 392 (*Xen.* *Hell.* 5.1.25).² At the same time, Artaxerxes made clear his determination that all Greek states agree to these terms by asserting that he would make war together with the Spartans against “those who refuse compliance and do not accept these terms.” That the initiative in this was entirely Artaxerxes’ is well indicated by the Spartan king Agesilaus’ reported witticism that the Spartans were not Medizing, the Medes [Persians] were Laconizing (*Plut.* *Ages.* 23.2).

The need to await final approval of the agreement by Spartan authorities may have kept Antalcidas at the Persian court for some months and delayed implementation of Artaxerxes’ plan for Persian-assisted Spartan military operations aimed at ending Athenian overseas activity. Athenian actions during this waiting period ended up creating a major new problem for Artaxerxes: the loss of Cyprus.

Like the Spartans, the Athenians saw in Tiribazus’ return to Anatolia in late 388 a clear sign of Artaxerxes’ shift toward the Spartans. The Athenians could foresee that Artaxerxes’ new Laconizing policy would involve Persian support for Sparta in the ongoing Spartan-Athenian conflict. They could anticipate further that the Spartans and their Persian backers would concentrate on Athens’ greatest vulnerability, its dependence on grain from the Black Sea region (loss of access to that grain with the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 had led to Athens’
surrender and the end of the Peloponnesian War). The Athenians were already fearful about their grain supply in the face of Spartan maritime operations, and, using the Thracian Chersonese as regional headquarters, they had deployed most of their fleet in the Hellespont to deter Spartan attacks on sites along the grain route (Xen. Hell. 5.1.7). So far they had been successful, but if Spartan forces grew with Persian support, the Athenians could not match them and continue to control the Hellespont and the all-important grain route which passed through it.

We hear nothing of Athenian deliberations at this point. We just have Xenophon’s report that “after this [Antalcidas’ departure for Sardis] Chabrias set out on a voyage to Cyprus to aid Evagoras, with eight hundred peltasts and ten triremes, to which force he had also added more ships and a body of hoplites from Athens” (Hell. 5.1.10). Evidently, rather than concentrating their efforts solely on the Hellespont against any anticipated Spartan-Persian pressure, the Athenians sought leverage by initiating an offensive on Cyprus in, most probably, spring 387. And, as Xenophon’s explicit indication that Chabrias’ ships and men came from Athens itself indicates, they aimed to do this without diminishing the resources they had dedicated to the Hellespontine theater.³ The Athenians were well aware of Cyprus’ strategic importance for Artaxerxes. They had repeatedly targeted it during their fifth-century war with Persia, and it had been their campaigning on Cyprus in the late 450s, coupled with the specter of renewed Athenian engagement in Egypt, that had finally persuaded Artaxerxes I to make the concessions embodied in the so-called Peace of Callias.⁴ Perhaps by threatening the Persian hold on Cyprus, Athens could wrest concessions from the Persian king again.

Chabrias (whose military career had begun with Thrasylulus’ campaign in 390) had been commanding the xenikon—the mercenary peltast force—in Corinth in the ongoing Corinthian War (Aristoph. Plut. 173), and the Athenians dispatched him along with his force from this theater to Cyprus, adding heavy infantry and providing enough ships to transport the whole army. This army was certainly not very large, but the Athenians were not interested in great conquests on Cyprus. For diplomatic purposes, they needed only to demonstrate their readiness to engage directly in the eastern Mediterranean and on Cyprus in particular.

As far as we know, Evagoras had not undertaken any military operations on Cyprus since Hecatomnus’ arrival in 390, when Artaxerxes “made Cyprus his own,” but self-preservation dictated aggression on Evagoras’ part at this point. Given his long-term hosting of many Athenians at Salamis (all figures connected to Athens’ fifth-century imperial activities), his backing of Conon, and his provision of ships for Athens’ fleet, Evagoras was inextricably linked to Athens. It might seem, in fact, that he had been complicit all along in the revival of Athenian imperialism. Evagoras undoubtedly anticipated that Artaxerxes’ new philo-Laconian and thus anti-Athenian policy meant that as master of Cyprus Artaxerxes would finally depose him, Athens’ greatest ally. This prospect left him no alternative but resistance, and that required additional military resources. If Evagoras could renew hostilities on Cyprus, take control of much of the island, and thereby prevent Artaxerxes from
using Cyprus as a base for guarding eastern Mediterranean waters, he might be able to survive by trading the rest of the island to Artaxerxes for renewed recognition as autonomous king of Salamis. There is no indication that Hecatomnus and his fleet were still stationed on Cyprus at this time. Once the Persian invasion of Egypt was underway, there was no need for maintaining a watchful guard over Phoenician staging areas, so Hecatomnus’ guard fleet may have dispersed. Alternatively, Hecatomnus may have returned to Caria as Spartan and Athenian operations threatened Persian control of Anatolian coastal regions.

How Athenian collusion with Evagoras in 388/7 was arranged we do not know. We can only guess that, as previously, Evagoras sent envoys to Athens requesting aid and that the Athenians, seeing in aggressive operations on Cyprus the most promising way to gain leverage in the face of Artaxerxes’ Laconizing policy, quickly agreed and dispatched Chabrias with his ready mercenary force along with hoplites from Athens. We know that Acoris and Evagoras cooperated after 386 (Diod. 15.3.4), and it may have been Evagoras who initiated this relationship during 388/7, well aware that Egypt would support any attempt to detach Cyprus from Persian control. Athens itself had already received funds and perhaps entered into an alliance with Acoris (Aristoph. Plutus 178), so if we link Athens and Evagoras and Evagoras and Acoris as well, it is clear that an anti-Persian coalition took shape during 388/7, driven by Artaxerxes’ Laconizing shift.

There is no detailed account of Chabrias and Evagoras’ activities on Cyprus during 387, only Nepos’ notice that Chabrias and Evagoras now conquered “the whole island” (Nep. Chabrias 2.2; cf. Dem. 20.76). Behind this concise report was presumably a series of military operations by Evagoras and the allied Athenian force under Chabrias. Peaceful conditions on Cyprus during the last several years meant that Cypriot cities were not on a war footing, and the sudden arrival and deployment of Chabrias’ force probably left no time for defensive preparations. Evagoras’ reported success is therefore entirely plausible. Thanks then to Evagoras’ desperate initiative and to Athenian participation in it, by early 387 Cyprus, the base for Artaxerxes’ security system in the eastern Mediterranean, was no longer in Persian-friendly hands.

Antalcidas and Tiribazus returned from the Persian court to western Anatolia in (it appears) late summer 387. There had been no interruption of Athenian and Spartan maritime activities in the Hellespont in recent months, and at this time the Athenians had Spartan ships pinned down by blockade at Abydus at the entry to the Hellespont, removing the immediate threat to the grain ships which would soon be moving through the Hellespont into the Aegean. Traveling overland to Abydus, Antalcidas took command of the trapped Spartan ships and not only managed to elude the blockade but also to capture eight Athenian ships into the bargain. The arrival sometime after this of additional ships from Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes (Pharnabazus’ son and replacement as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia) provided confirmation of Athenian fears of what the Spartan-Persian *symmachia* would involve. Reinforcement by even more ships from Syracuse gave the Spartans
insurmountable naval superiority in the Hellespont at just the time merchant ships would begin moving with the year’s grain supply for Athens. This ended Athenian resistance: “The Athenians, therefore, seeing that the enemy’s ships were many, fearing that they might be completely subdued, as they had been before, now that the king had become an ally of the Lacedaemonians, and being beset by the raiding parties from Aegina, for these reasons were exceedingly desirous of peace” (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25—9; Lys. 26.33; Dem. 57.38).7

Tiribazus could now—probably late 387—report to Artaxerxes that the strategy the king had adopted in 388/7 had worked and that Athens was ready to agree to peace. By this time, however, thanks to effective Persian loss of Cyprus as a result of Chabrias and Evagoras’ conquests on Cyprus, Artaxerxes had a new Cypriot problem and, because of that, new concerns regarding Egypt. The peace terms previously agreed to by Artaxerxes and Antalcidas had involved the surrender of Asian Greeks to the Persians and the establishment of autonomy everywhere else as the principle governing Greek interstate relations. But now, in light of the circumstances prevailing in late 387, Artaxerxes needed additional, very precise terms which would clear the way for the recovery of Cyprus, the necessary preliminary to staging any new Persian campaign against Egypt. This meant getting rid of Evagoras, and to do this Artaxerxes would have to prepare a campaign in a secure staging area well away from Cyprus—that is, somewhere in the Aegean rather than in Phoenicia or Cilicia, which were too close to Cyprus. This in turn meant that Artaxerxes had to have unchallenged control of the western Anatolian littoral and access to the ships and manpower of the Asian Greek cities along that littoral.

Artaxerxes crafted a very compact statement of terms which addressed all these strategic concerns, and sent this to be read to Greek envoys whom Tiribazus invited to Sardis (probably) late in 387 as the “King’s Peace.”8

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left autonomous, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong as of old to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace [i.e., “the cities in Asia” or “the other Greek cities”], upon them will I make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31)9

To gain clear control of the Anatolian coast, Artaxerxes claimed the Greek cities “in Asia” unconditionally. Along the coast, the best staging area for a campaign against Cyprus was the capacious and naturally well-protected Gulf of Smyrna (which the Persians had used to mount their trans-Aegean attack on Eretria and Athens in 490). Artaxerxes’ attention to detail in framing the peace terms is well reflected in the specific claim to Clazomenae. Though Clazomenae included mainland territory, its main center was an island in the Gulf of Smyrna,10 and since it might thus be asserted that Clazomenae was not technically among “the cities in Asia,” Artaxerxes
(probably advised by Tiribazus, who was undoubtedly knowledgeable about details of Ionian political geography) made his claim to it in explicit terms.

Artaxerxes also stated explicitly the claim to ownership of Cyprus that he had asserted in practice in 391–390. Greek recognition of that claim would not serve to remove Evagoras, but it would compel Athenian withdrawal. To encourage Athenian agreement to the peace terms and thus terminate ongoing Athenian activities on Cyprus, Artaxerxes used the peace to assure Athens of his respect for the security of the Black Sea–Aegean grain route, excepting from the autonomy principle Athenian possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, islands which “guarded” the mouth of the Hellespont. Concessions were not offered to other anti-Spartan states; Thebes had to abandon its control of Boeotian cities and Argos its dominion over Corinth (Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–34). The whole of this was backed by Artaxerxes’ threat to make war both by land and sea, with ships and money, against whichever mainland or Asian Greek states would not agree to the peace.

It worked, at least in the short term. Athens and ultimately all mainland Greek states agreed to the peace Artaxerxes sent down, known hereafter as “the King’s Peace,” and disbanded their armies and fleets (Xen. Hell. 5.1.35). Now, for the first time since he turned his attention to Egypt after Cyrus’ 401 campaign, Artaxerxes did not have to concern himself with the activities of one Greek state or another. But Artaxerxes’ effort to secure control of affairs in the far west to ensure against Egyptian intervention by adopting a pro-Spartan and anti-Athenian policy had alienated Evagoras, king of Salamis, and Evagoras’ conquests on Cyprus deprived Artaxerxes and the Persians of this strategically crucial island. This situation posed a far greater problem for Artaxerxes’ Egyptian war plans than Spartan or Athenian belligerence had.
An unfortunate consequence of Athenian and Spartan abandonment of overseas involvements following agreement to the King’s Peace is that our sources turn primarily to Greek mainland affairs and provide only sparse information about developments in Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean. As a result, we are very poorly informed about one of the most critical phases in the Persian-Egyptian conflict, the decade between about 387 and 378, when the Persians lost control of the whole eastern Mediterranean to Egypt, then recovered it, only to lose and regain it again. We can reconstruct some parts of the Persian-Egyptian struggle during this period, but it is clear that much of what happened during this decade is lost forever.

Isocrates, speaking in 380, gives us a glimpse of the situation which developed after the collapse of Artaxerxes’ Egyptian campaign in 388/7, at least as seen at a distance by a mainland Greek observer: “Did not [Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus] … finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels [= Egyptians] are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighboring peoples as well?” (4.140). A later passage is more specific about “the neighboring peoples”: “Are not Egypt and Cyprus in revolt against him [Artaxerxes]? Have not Phoenicia and Syria been devastated because of the war? Has not Tyre, on which he set great store, been seized by his foes?” (4.161). Inscriptions and an altar base bearing the Egyptian king Acoris’ name from Tyre, Sidon, and Acco attest Egyptian expansion up to Persian staging areas in Phoenicia at this time, making it probable that Philistine cities, including Gaza, were also taken over as well.1

Once the Persian force withdrew from Egypt, probably soon after mid-388, emboldened by Egyptian success, Acoris evidently moved aggressively to control
the route into Egypt and to deprive Artaxerxes of garrison sites, naval bases, and staging areas in the eastern Mediterranean. This was the strategy employed in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries by Egyptian kings to counter Assyrians and Babylonians in the west, and Acoris’ adoption of it marks a renewal on a full scale of the conflict of western and eastern cores.

Just when Acoris and Evagoras became allies is uncertain. Most likely it was in 387, when Evagoras resumed his aggression on Cyprus with Athenian aid. If Acoris was not involved in this from the beginning, he certainly would have jumped to assist in some way once he learned of Athenian involvement on Cyprus, so reminiscent of anti-Persian Athenian enterprise in the late 460s. Chabrias moved directly from Cyprus to service in Egypt after Athenian agreement to the King’s Peace (Nep. Chabrias 2.3), and this suggests an already existing connection between Evagoras and Acoris. Possibly, some of the strong force Diodorus (15.2.3) reports Acoris providing Evagoras in the 380s arrived at Salamis even before Chabrias’ departure from Cyprus in 386.

Acoris’ various successes were evidently swift, but they were certainly not entirely, probably not even mainly, a matter of military conquest. Tyre, seized, Isocrates says, by Artaxerxes’ “foes” (Acoris and Evagoras), was a fortified island site vulnerable only to lengthy siege. In the seventh century, the Assyrian king Assurbanipal besieged it for three years; in the sixth century, the Babylonian king Nebuchadrezzar II reportedly spent thirteen years trying to take it. Tyre’s “seizure” by Acoris and Evagoras must have involved defection by the Tyrians themselves—a sign of their recognition of Egyptian ascendance and of their desire to avoid a siege at a time when they could not expect swift relief from Artaxerxes. We know the Qedarite Arab king sent troops to Evagoras (Diod. 15.4), so we may infer Arab-Egyptian cooperation. Since Tyrian merchants derived great profits from Arab trade in sheep and goats, spices and aromatics, and precious metals (Ezek. 27: 21–23), this surely compounded Tyre’s concern and probably pushed the city into collaboration. With Tyre’s defection came also the loss of many mainland sites from Achzib to Mt. Carmel belonging to Tyre, chief among them Acco, the Persian staging ground for attacks on Egypt.

Sidon too may have simply declared for the Egyptians. Facing expanding and unchallenged Egyptian enterprise, the Sidonians must have seen their commercial livelihood at risk and opted to shift allegiance to Egypt. A good part of Sidon’s trade, like that of Tyre, was probably linked to dealings with Qedarite Arabs, and Sidonian merchants would not want to jeopardize this by opposing Acoris. Like Tyre, Sidon controlled a number of mainland coastal sites, notably Dor and Joppa, stretching south to the Philistine coast. These undoubtedly came into the Egyptian orbit now, if not even before Sidon itself.

Diodorus has a catalogue of Evagoras’ allies and supporters which, though maddeningly vague in its references to unnamed “such others” and “certain others,” indicates that the Persians lost control of a large part of the eastern Mediterranean in or after 386.
Evagoras made an alliance with Acoris, the king of the Egyptians, who was an enemy of the Persians and received from him a strong force, and from Hecatomnus, the dynast of Caria, who was secretly cooperating with him, he got a large sum of money to support his mercenary troops. Likewise he drew on such others to join in the war with Persia as were at odds with the Persians, either secretly or openly. He was master of practically all the cities of Cyprus, and of Tyre and some others in Phoenicia. He also had 90 triremes, of which 20 were Tyrian and 70 were Cyprian, six thousand soldiers of his own subjects, and many more than this number from his allies. In addition to this he enlisted many mercenaries, since he had funds in abundance. And not a few soldiers were sent to him by the king of the Arabs [emendation from *barbarōn*] and by certain others of whom the king of the Persians was suspicious. (15.3–4)

If we fashion our own list from Isocrates and Diodorus’ references to various places or peoples attacked, lost by the Persians, or engaged in supporting Evagoras, it appears that by the mid-380s a continuous territory stretching from the land of the Arabs east of Egypt through Philistia, Phoenicia, and Syria up to Cilicia had fallen away from Persian control.7 Isocrates’ statement in the *Panegyricus* (4.161) that “of the cities in Cilicia, the greater number are held by those who side with us and the rest are not difficult to acquire” suggests that there were grounds in 380 for viewing at least some Cilician cities as anti-Persian. This may point to their allegiance to the Acoris-Evagoras coalition earlier in the decade and allow us to include various Cilian coastal cities in the coalition. Evagoras had moved to Soloi in Cilicia after being expelled from Salamis by a usurper in 411 and from there had mounted the recovery of his city-kingdom (Isoc. Evag. 27), so he likely had friends and supporters in that city. To the west of Soloi from Holmoi to Anemourion, cities along the coast of “Rough Cilicia” lay directly opposite Cyprus, and the evident rise in Evagoras’ power in 387–386 may have prompted many of them to side with Evagoras, if only to avoid attack.

According to Photius (*FGH* 115 F103), the contemporary Chian historian Theopompus discussed in his *Philippica* “how Acoris the Egyptian made a *symmachia* with the Pisidians,” the perennially troublesome people dwelling inland from the Pamphylian coast, and followed this with a description of their lands and “those of the Aspendians.” We may plausibly date Acoris’ dealings with the Pisidians to the period of Egyptian enterprise ca. 386. This would push the area linked to Evagoras and Egypt at this time well to the west of Cilicia (hostile Pisidians would make Persian use of the southern west–east Royal Road—probably the route taken by Hecatomnus “through the upper satrapies” in 390—hazardous). If Theopompus’ discussion of the territory of Aspendus in connection with that of the Pisidians points to dealings of some sort by Acoris with Aspendus, an important site used as a naval base by the Persians (Thuc. 8.81.3; 87.1,3,6; 88.1; 99), then we can posit Egyptian contacts with sites on the Pamphylian coast. Diodorus’ notice of Hecatomnus’ covert support for Evagoras extends the coalition all the way west to Caria.
Quite clearly, Acoris employed traditional Egyptian practices—alliances, subsidies, and recruit of proxies—to detach the middle territory from control by the eastern core. The idea of Evagoras as the great challenger to Persian rule derives from the absurdly hyperbolic account of the threat posed to Artaxerxes by Evagoras that Isocrates presents in his encomium for Evagoras (Evagoras 57–64). Theopompus’ evidence of Acoris’ diplomatic enterprise points more plausibly to Acoris as the instigator and organizer of widespread revolt during this time.

Egyptian repulse of the great invading Persian force of 390/89–388/7 was a watershed moment. It not only preserved Egyptian independence but also demonstrated newly independent Egypt’s military capabilities. Acoris’ follow-up offensive, even if primarily diplomatic, announced that Egypt as an independent kingdom would once again act aggressively in the eastern Mediterranean. If subject peoples in the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia defected and joined Egypt, they would create an unbeatable coalition. This was probably Acoris’ argument: “be like the Egyptians: rebel, resist, and regain freedom.”

Recent experiences provided good reasons to break with Persia. Persian preparations for mounting the Egyptian campaign had undoubtedly weighed heavily on local populations. Normal requisitions for maintaining garrisons and officials were burdensome enough. The additional exactions connected with Persia’s 390/89–388/7 Egyptian War, which involved the first large-scale preparations for any Persian enterprise in the Mediterranean since the 450s, may have been intolerable for populations unused to extra imperial demands. With Persian failure in Egypt in the early 380s, there would predictably be plans and preparations for a new attack on Egypt. This would mean a renewal of and perhaps an increase in Persian demands in the near future. Thus, as had been the case in the early 480s when Darius was preparing a huge campaign against Athens, cities, dynasts, and whole regions were likely ready in the 380s to break with Persia to escape oppressive exactions for Persia’s Egyptian war.

Evagoras was undeniably a critical participant in all this. But Egyptian strategy and support made him so. Cyprus, which Evagoras controlled by 386, was central to Acoris’ objective of establishing and maintaining a coalition of eastern Mediterranean peoples. Whoever held Cyprus, as Diodorus notes (14.98.2), “would be able to make war in defense of Asia.” Thanks to Acoris’ diplomacy and Egyptian strength, by 386–385 much of “Asia”—at least the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean—was aligned with Egypt. Evagoras had his own long-standing ambitions on Cyprus. Acoris backed these, possibly as early as the time of Chabrias’ operations on Cyprus, but Acoris’ ultimate aim was to gain a commanding base to secure the whole eastern Mediterranean littoral from Pamphylia to Philistia. In Egyptian strategy, Cyprus thus served as a sort of garrison for the Egyptian-held eastern Mediterranean, and with manpower and resources largely organized and supplied by Acoris, Evagoras was really Acoris’ glorified garrison commander.

Perhaps foreseeing difficulties and the problems that perceptions of inactivity might cause, Artaxerxes wasted no time getting started with the recovery of
Cyprus. Isocrates’ remark in 380 that Artaxerxes had already spent six years at war with Evagoras (4.141), coupled with Diodorus’ statement that actual fighting occurred only during two years of the war while most of the period (he dates the beginning to Hecatomnus’ crossing in 390) was taken up with preparations (15.9.2), serves to place the beginning of preparations in 386/5, not long after conclusion of the King’s Peace.

Artaxerxes appointed as commanders Tiribazus, presently satrap of Ionia, and Orontes, satrap of Armenia. Tiribazus was to command the naval force and Orontes the land force (Diod. 15.2.2). Both men had been with Artaxerxes at Cunaxa, and Orontes’ support had been rewarded with marriage to a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. An. 2.4.8). Tiribazus’ familiarity with Ionia and his recent muster of ships from various Ionian cities to support Antalcidas’ anti-Athenian enterprise in the Hellespont probably made him especially valuable during the preparations. Already based in western Anatolia, Tiribazus most likely oversaw the assembly and organization of the expeditionary force. Glos, the son of Cyrus’ ill-fated hyparch and fleet commander Tamos, appears as hegemon of the fleet (Diod. 15.2.3). He had previously married a daughter of Tiribazus. He was likely Tiribazus’ “man” in Ionia, linked through his father’s connections to leading local Greeks who would be trierarchs.

Isocrates says the most effective part of the Persian infantry force—meaning mercenary hoplites—came from the Greek mainland (4.135), so Persian agents must have moved from Anatolia to the mainland on recruiting missions to hire as many Greek mercenaries as possible. If the Persians anticipated having to face Egyptian machimoi in their eastern Mediterranean campaign, they knew they would be facing hoplite-like heavy infantry and will have recruited their own hoplites extensively. Peaceful conditions in Greece at this time and the resulting availability of hoplites for hire probably made this an easy task.

Isocrates’ complaints in the Panegyricus (4.123,137,163) about the Persians razing cities and building fortifications in and occupying the acropolises of Ionian cities refer to Persian activities sometime between the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 386 and 380, the date of the delivery of the Panegyricus. Such fortification building might suggest that the Persians had to secure some Ionian cities to ensure compliance with their demands, but it is hard to imagine any concerted opposition to Persian takeover by Asian Greeks after mainland Greek agreement to the King’s Peace deprived them of any hope of outside support. The more likely explanation is that the Persians fortified and garrisoned various sites against possible Egyptian/Evagorid attack. The Egyptians had access to harbors throughout the eastern Mediterranean and all along the southern coast of Anatolia. From these, they and/or Evagoras might conceivably launch attacks on the western coast of Anatolia to disrupt remaining Persian capabilities. The Persians had previously used guard fleets to secure their staging areas, but they had no ships available other than those being prepared in Ionian cities for the eastern Mediterranean campaign, so they likely had to install garrisons to defend against attacks.
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Tiribazus and Orontes’ preparations, which Diodorus explicitly describes as lengthy (15.9.2), provided ample time for Acoris and Evagoras to marshal adequate forces, and Diodorus notes that Evagoras entered the war with the Persians confidently because he had such great resources (15.2.4). In fact, however, the figures Diodorus provides—a “strong force from Acoris,” 6,000 of Evagoras’ own soldiers and many more from allies, and 3,000 mercenaries (including some of Chabrias’ peltasts?)—do not indicate a really large force. The fact that no numbers were attached to Acoris’ “strong force” suggests that its strength was actually not particularly notable (another indication of an Egyptian king’s unwillingness or inability to deploy *machimoi* outside Egypt on an extended basis). Evagoras’ fleet comprised only ninety ships, none from Egypt. Most likely, Evagoras’ reported confidence came not from the great size of his force but from his and Acoris’ expectation that the Persians, relying primarily on reluctant or hired Greeks, had too few available resources. Evagoras and Acoris both may have believed that recent Egyptian successes in the eastern Mediterranean would prevent Artaxerxes from mounting any large-scale campaign at all and that the relatively small Egyptian and allied force now stationed on Cyprus would suffice to maintain control of already detached eastern Mediterranean sites and to respond to any limited Persian recovery efforts.

Dating from Hecatomnus’ crossing in ca. 390, Diodorus thought of Artaxerxes’ war with Evagoras lasting “approximately ten years.” During this time, Diodorus states (15.9.2), there was fighting only during two years. Since there was no fighting involving Persian forces between the time of Hecatomnus’ arrival on Cyprus and the King’s Peace, and at least two years must be accorded Persian preparations in western Anatolia after the King’s Peace, we may place the beginning of Persian operations and actual fighting sometime after 385, probably as late as 383.13

In Diodorus’ account, which concentrates exclusively on events on Cyprus, Persian forces moved from western Anatolia to Cilicia and then crossed to Cyprus, where, Diodorus reports without further details, they “prosecuted the war energetically” (15.2.2). According to Diodorus, Evagoras initially used light, pirate-like craft to intercept food supplies being brought by ship to the Persian force on Cyprus. This quickly led to food shortages and then to rebellion by the mercenaries, who killed a number of their officers, creating general disorder and tumult in the camp.14 With great difficulty, the Persian commanders, Tiribazus and Orontes along with Glos, restored order, evidently by using the whole fleet to bring a large supply of grain from Cilicia to Cyprus. At this point, Diodorus notes, Evagoras recognized Persian naval superiority and consequently amplified his own fleet, readying sixty more ships of his own and getting fifty ships from Acoris, giving Evagoras a total of 200 ships. Fitting these out “so as to cause terror,” he drilled and practiced the fleet in preparation for a naval battle (15.3.4). During this period of preparations, Diodorus says, Evagoras was much encouraged by a victory he won when he battled a portion of the Persian land force “near the sea.” With seeming confidence, he set an ambush for the Persian fleet, attacking it as it sailed unsuspectingly toward Citium. Evagoras’ preparations and the surprise of
his attack allowed him to sink some triremes and capture others. But Glos and the other commanders resisted valiantly, regrouped, and counterattacked in force, destroying many of Evagoras’ triremes and compelling him to flee. The Persians now concentrated both land and naval forces at Citium on the southern coast of Cyprus and began a land and sea siege of Salamis (15.4.1).

While Diodorus’ account seems rather full, it raises many questions. If, as Diodorus says, the Persians prosecuted the war vigorously once they crossed to Cyprus, what exactly did they do? We find the land force in a camp where it suffers from food shortages and then a portion of the land force encountering Evagoras somewhere “near the sea”—presumably somewhere near Salamis. That is all, until the beginning of the land and sea siege of Salamis mounted from Citium after the naval battle. Diodorus says that Persian forces, presumably both land and sea forces, went to Cilicia and then crossed to Cyprus. But where was the fleet after this? The ability of Evagoras’ pirate-like ships to operate without opposition against grain and merchant ships makes it clear that Persian warships were not present. The arrival of Persian ships solved the problem, underscoring the significance of their prior absence, and it was reportedly only after their intervention that Evagoras recognized the superiority of the Persian fleet and consequently greatly enlarged his own fleet. But did Persian ships continue to operate off Cyprus? Evagoras evidently had ample time and a sufficient sense of security to outfit additional ships, receive reinforcements from Egypt, and then train his large fleet at length. What was the Persian fleet doing during this time? There is certainly no indication that it was contending with elements of Evagoras’ fleet.

It appears that we have in Diodorus’ account of events, despite the great numbers he attributes to the Persian campaign force, a missing fleet and a curiously ineffective land force. If, however, we remember the broader situation the Persians faced in the eastern Mediterranean as they launched this campaign and assume that Persian forces were engaged during this time in an effort to recover Pamphylia (?), Cilicia, and various Phoenician and Philistine cities now in the Egyptian camp, we may be able to appreciate the full scope of the so-called Cypriot War and understand the reasons for the initially limited Persian operations on Cyprus.

Tiribazus and Orontes’ first objective in the campaign was likely to secure Cilicia. Unfortunately, Diodorus’ only reference to Cilicia in his account of the Cypriot War is his terse notice that the Persian force came down to Cilicia before crossing to Cyprus. This probably points to a move from the Cilician coast directly opposite Cyprus. Here were the Cilician cities Anemourion, Nagidos, Kelendris, Aphrodisias, Holmoi, and Soloi. Advancing from the Aegean eastward, Tiribazus and Orontes’ fleet would reach these first. If Acoris and Evagoras had previously detached sites such as Aspendus to the west of Cilicia, Tiribazus and Orontes could safely bypass these cities. But the need for a secure initial base and crossing point to Cyprus made the seizure of Cilician coastal sites sympathetic to Acoris and Evagoras necessary. Undoubtedly, the unopposed arrival of the large Persian force was by itself enough to accomplish the recovery of some or all of these
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Cilician sites and permit Tiribazus and Orontes to establish a base on the Cilician coast for Persian operations elsewhere. Tiribazus and Orontes’ force then crossed to Cyprus, presumably landing on the island’s northern coast. But what happened next? We find a large mercenary force in camp and no sign of the big fleet. The fleet was not off challenging Evagoras directly—he seems to have been unopposed until he himself later engaged the Persian fleet as it was sailing “toward Citium.” Quite likely, the fleet or a very large part of it moved to the Syria-Phoenicia-Philistia coast to regain Tyre, Sidon, and other cities. Isocrates’ reference to the devastation of Phoenicia and Syria “because of the war” (4.161) points to such activities. Archaeological evidence of destruction at Tell Abu Hawam, a city at the mouth of the Kishon River, which has been dated to about 380, may provide some corroboration.

The largely mercenary land force Tiribazus and Orontes deposited on Cyprus probably functioned initially to keep Evagoras tied up so that he could not interfere with Persian operations in coastal regions opposite Cyprus. Evagoras knew well from his friend Conon’s experience as Persian fleet commander in the 390s that angry mercenaries meant problems for commanders, so Evagoras’ attempt to sabotage the food supplies supporting the Persian land force on Cyprus was undoubtedly aimed at rendering that force unmanageable while not risking any of his own troops (Evagoras himself was getting from Acoris all the grain needed to support his force: Diod. 15.3.3). Evagoras’ success at blocking delivery of food to the force on Cyprus compelled the Persian fleet to break off ongoing operations and move to the waters between Cilicia and Cyprus to chase away Evagoras’ pirate-like ships and transport food from Cilicia to Cyprus (Diod. 15.3.2–3).

Diodorus says that Evagoras now saw that he was much inferior in naval strength. Having underestimated Persian capabilities, Evagoras found himself trapped in Salamis, unable to act directly against the Persian land force on Cyprus for fear of leaving Salamis vulnerable to naval assault and unable to challenge the Persian fleet because he was far outnumbered in ships. What he needed was additional ships to be able to confront the large Persian fleet and a strategy which would allow him to do so without leaving Salamis open to attack.

Fortunately, Evagoras himself was not directly threatened at the moment, at least not in Salamis. Thus he had time to fit out a great number of additional ships on his own and also to send to Acoris and get more ships from Egypt. Evagoras then put this fleet of Cypriot, Phoenician (Tyrian), and Egyptian ships, 200 in all now (Diod. 15.3.4), through “continuous trials.” The Persian fleet was the key to Persian operations. If Evagoras could destroy it or render it ineffective, Persian recovery efforts along the eastern Mediterranean coast would collapse and the land force on Cyprus would again be without food supplies and most likely have to withdraw.

When ready, Evagoras chose the occasion for attacking the Persian fleet. Diodorus’ report that Evagoras “fell on the Persian fleet when it sailed past” (presumably past Salamis) toward Citium allows us to reconstruct the situation. Citium is on the southern coast of Cyprus. To sail by the general area of Salamis—presumably
meaning to skirt the great Bay of Famagusta—the Persian fleet would be moving from east to west. Citium seems to have been one of the few Cypriot cities Evagoras did not control—the repulse of attackers in the 390s that Citium's king Milkyaton celebrated in an inscription may indicate that Citium had very effective defenses. Possibly, the Persian fleet had been using this as a base for operations along the eastern Mediterranean coast, sailing back and forth from time to time, thus allowing Evagoras to plan the kind of attack he might make when he had an adequate number of ships.

The battle could have gone either way. In fact, it went both ways during its course. Evagoras attacked an unsuspecting and unorganized Persian fleet (a good indication that Evagoras had so far posed little threat to Persian maritime operations) and was initially successful, sinking and capturing various ships. Glos and other commanders fought on fiercely without at first making any gains. But, according to Diodorus (15.3.5–6), when Glos attacked in strong force (with “weight” \([to\ baros]\), perhaps meaning with the bulk of the force grouped together) and fought “nobly” (understandably—the stakes were high, and there would not be a second chance), those on Evagoras’ side fled, and he lost many triremes.

Evagoras evidently commanded his fleet in person in this battle, so we may see him as responsible for the “flight” that Diodorus reports. If so, it is likely that with mounting Persian successes in battle, Evagoras decided to fall back to Salamis and to preserve as many ships as possible for the defense of his city. How many ships Evagoras lost is unknown, but it was evidently enough to preclude further initiatives on his part. This meant that Persian operations in the eastern Mediterranean could continue unopposed and that Evagoras would soon face a full-scale Persian assault on Cyprus itself.

Eastern Mediterranean affairs now stood at a critical juncture. Would Egypt continue to contest control of the eastern Mediterranean with Persia? Evagoras had been the key to Egypt’s eastern Mediterranean strategy, positioned as he was “to defend Asia in front”—Egyptian-held or pro-Egyptian Asia. But the Persian offensive had tied him down on Cyprus. Then Glos’ crippling victory over his war fleet had left Evagoras unable to campaign beyond Cyprus. Now the Egyptian king would have to make a strategic choice: engage substantial Egyptian forces more directly in defense of Egyptian interests in the eastern Mediterranean or surrender claims and rely on a defensive strategy centered on Egypt itself.

Evagoras recognized the situation, and, according to Diodorus (15.4.2–3), he traveled now to Egypt to urge continued Egyptian involvement. Acoris died some time before mid-380, so Evagoras’ visit must have occurred before this. Since we need to leave enough time toward the end of the approximately ten-year Cypriot War in 380 for quite a few events, it is best to push Evagoras’ visit well back into 381.

Although Diodorus himself may not have understood it, his report that Evagoras appealed to Acoris to consider the war a common enterprise reveals very clearly Evagoras’ problem. The war to this point had been an Egyptian-Persian war for
control of the eastern Mediterranean. Control of Cyprus was part of this, but no more important to Egyptian strategy than control of the Persian staging areas in Phoenicia and the routes to Egypt through Philistia. To date, the common enterprise which Evagoras and Acoris shared was the effort to gain and hold onto the eastern Mediterranean. Acoris had provided manpower, ships, and financial support, while Evagoras had maintained the coalition forces for Acoris on Cyprus, essentially functioning as a kind of garrison commander. This had failed completely in the face of large-scale Persian land and sea operations. Persian forces had recovered eastern Mediterranean territories and now held most of Cyprus and had Evagoras hemmed in at Salamis. The war had thus become a strictly Cypriot war instead of a broader eastern Mediterranean war. Evagoras urgently needed relief from the siege and additional forces to push the Persians out of Cyprus. He had thus to depend on his patron Acoris to make a stand in common with him on Cyprus, and Evagoras must have argued that the now completely Cyprus-centered “Cypriot War” was the key to Egyptian success in the eastern Mediterranean, despite recent Persian achievements. If Acoris substantially augmented Egyptian forces on Cyprus and these defeated the Persian force now concentrated there, the rest of the eastern Mediterranean would come again into Egyptian hands and Persian military power would be discredited once and for all.

Unfortunately for Evagoras, Acoris did not agree. Evidently unwilling to risk the loss of a very large number of troops and perhaps ships in battle outside Egypt, Acoris gave Evagoras some funds—less than he expected, according to Diodorus—but no additional troops or ships (Diod. 15.8.1). For Acoris, Evagoras remained valuable, but from Acoris’ perspective, the best Evagoras could do now was to tie up Persian forces on Cyprus for as long as possible. In the event of Persian success, Persian forces would soon be heading again for Egypt, and Acoris prudently chose to husband Egyptian resources to defend Egypt itself. To date, Egyptian enterprise beyond Egypt had been a matter of using diplomacy, money, proxies, and limited Egyptian manpower, not direct, large-scale military action outside Egypt, so Acoris’ decision at this time not to engage on Cyprus was perhaps predictable. It was simply another instance of Egyptian kings’ characteristic readiness to fall back on a defensive strategy. Returning to Salamis from Egypt with far less than he had hoped for, Evagoras now faced the prospect of a prolonged siege. To make matters worse, in his absence his “allies” had slipped away, probably by agreement with Persian besiegers (Diod. 15.8.2). Their departure is an indication that they recognized that the Cypriot War was over and that the siege of Salamis was strictly Evagoras’ concern.

Tiribazus too made a journey, in his case to Artaxerxes. He undoubtedly traveled to court to report successes in recovering eastern Mediterranean territories and the confinement of Evagoras to Salamis with relatively few troops. Tiribazus likely needed new instructions. Did Artaxerxes wish to accept the status quo at this point and negotiate some settlement with Evagoras to clear the way to renewed operations against Egypt, or did the king want to push ahead against
Evagoras and remove him before turning to any Egyptian enterprise? Artaxerxes wanted to proceed against Evagoras, and he gave Tiribazus 2,000 talents “for the war,” undoubtedly representing pay for mercenaries and seamen. Artaxerxes could not be sure at this point what the Egyptians would do. Recovery of the whole eastern Mediterranean must have seemed within Persian grasp, but control of Cyprus was strategically critical, so full and enduring recovery would depend on the suppression of Evagoras once and for all. The huge sum of money Artaxerxes issued to Tiribazus suggests that Artaxerxes was determined to wage war as long as necessary. Tiribazus thus returned to Cyprus and mounted a “close siege by land and sea now” (Diod. 15.4.2–3, 8.1–3).

Although from a distance Isocrates (4.141) chose to see continuing Persian operations on Cyprus in late 381 and early 380 as evidence of Persian military ineffectiveness, Persian forces on Cyprus were actually on the verge of complete success at this time. Having recovered territories around the eastern Mediterranean over the last two years or so, Tiribazus now pressed the siege of Salamis against a nearly impotent Evagoras. With few troops and no hope of substantial Egyptian support, Evagoras sought to rescue himself by opening negotiations with Tiribazus, who was probably based at Citium. The Persians had evidently made deals with other defecting figures during the recovery campaign, allowing Phoenician kings, for example, to retain their positions. This likely encouraged Evagoras to hope he might gain promise of similar treatment. He still held some other Cypriot cities, which he might offer up in negotiations.

Ultimately, Tiribazus and Evagoras agreed on a settlement by which Evagoras would withdraw from all the cities of Cyprus, be king of Salamis alone, and pay a fixed annual tribute to the Persian king (Diod. 15.8.2). Evagoras, however, insisted that he be subject as king to the king—that is, resume the autonomous kingship he had held before Artaxerxes’ assertion of “ownership” of Cyprus in the late 390s. Artaxerxes, through Tiribazus, may recently have confirmed Phoenician kings’ autonomy, but Evagoras was a far more troublesome figure than any of them had been, and Tiribazus demanded that as king Evagoras obey orders as slave to master—that is, concede his subject status (Diod. 15.8.3). On that disagreement, negotiations stalled.

Although Evagoras failed to reach agreement with Tiribazus, their negotiations set in motion a chain of events which nearly undid recent Persian achievements in the eastern Mediterranean. Orontes, Artaxerxes’ son-in-law and commander of the land force on Cyprus (probably meaning that he was responsible for Cyprus during the larger eastern Mediterranean war), evidently feared that Tiribazus, Orontes’ own former subordinate in his Armenian satrapy, who was now negotiating a settlement on Cyprus with Evagoras, would alone garner all honor and reward if in addition to overseeing the recovery of eastern Mediterranean territories he also finished the Cypriot War (Diodorus seems to know something of this, remarking that Orontes’ envy of Tiribazus’ high position lay behind the charges [15.8.3]). To discredit Tiribazus, Orontes sent a series of slanderous accusations against him to
Artaxerxes, evidently while Tiribazus and Evagoras’ negotiations were underway. According to Diodorus (15.8.4), the accusations were that although he was able to take Salamis, he was not doing so, but was receiving embassies from Evagoras and conferring with him on the question of making common cause; that he was likewise concluding a private alliance with the Lacedaemonians, being their friend; that he had sent to Pytho [the Delphic oracle] to inquire of the god regarding his plans for revolt; and, most important of all, that he was winning for himself the commanders of the troops by acts of kindness, bringing them over by honors and gifts and promises.

There was truth in some form behind all these charges. Tiribazus was indeed conferring with Evagoras; he was philo-Laconian; he had probably been generous with his subordinate commanders, most of them Greek (such generosity was reminiscent of Cyrus the Younger’s treatment of subordinates, and Tiribazus probably knew how well it had served Cyrus); and he may as part of his philhellenic policy have sent a dedication to Delphi at some point in the past. However, by invoking memories of Cyrus’ activities at the end of the fifth century and Tiribazus’ unauthorized peacemaking with Sparta in 392, Orontes managed to present a package of damning charges. From his distance, Artaxerxes II could not judge clearly. But he could not risk Tiribazus somehow undoing recent accomplishments, so Artaxerxes ordered him arrested and sent to court, leaving Orontes as sole commander (Diod. 15.8.5).

Orontes gained a political victory by discrediting Tiribazus, but this soon created big problems. Glos, Tiribazus’ son-in-law and commander of the fleet, feared that he might be suspected of cooperation with Tiribazus in his alleged plan of revolt and thus would also be punished (Glos may have had a mark against him already because of his and his father’s former close association with Cyrus). Glos decided to save himself by making “fresh troubles.” This involved nothing less than “defecting,” evidently taking with him much of the Greek component of the Persian force on Cyprus—the fleet and many soldiers—and much money (probably the funds Tiribazus had brought back from his visit to Artaxerxes) and returning to western Anatolia (Diod. 15.9.3).

Now matters moved quickly and very soon threatened to undo not only recent Persian successes in the eastern Mediterranean but the whole settlement of Aegean affairs that the King’s Peace had produced. Asian Greek cities evidently understood immediately what the defection of so many Greeks from Persia’s eastern Mediterranean campaign force meant: since Greeks had made up the bulk of the campaign force, Artaxerxes now really had no effective military power in the west. Although Diodorus provides no details, his reference to “rebellions in Asia” at this time indicates that a number of Asian Greek cities, most likely primarily Ionian cities, now sought to regain independence (15.18.4).
It had, after all, been only a half-dozen years since mainland Greeks assented to Artaxerxes’ claim to Asian Greek cities. Understandably, there were many in these cities who were not reconciled to this arrangement, coming as it did after nearly a century of virtual independence under Athenian or Spartan protection. Artaxerxes’ dependence on Greek ships and troops for the Cypriot War had exposed Persia’s military deficiencies in the west. If Artaxerxes no longer had control of such resources—and could not, as he had in 387, engage the Spartans—he would be hard put to deal with Asian Greek revolts. In western Anatolia were the satraps, Hecatomnus was in Caria, Autophradates was in Lydia (which may have again included what was briefly the satrapy of Ionia, since the King’s Peace had removed Persian concerns about Spartan military operations in this region), and Ariobarzanes was at Dascylium. But none of these officials had adequate troops at his disposal to deal swiftly with rebellious Asian Greeks (and Hecatomnus had been a covert supporter of Evagoras, and would not likely take the field against Glos and Greek soldiers).

The scant information we have about developments connected with “the rebellions in Asia” suggest that Glos assumed a leadership position (or maintained in defection the command he had held over Asian Greek forces under Tiribazus) and that he sought both Egyptian and Spartan support. He sent off envoys to Acoris (Diod. 15.9.3), undoubtedly to alert the Egyptian king to Asian Greek defections and the resulting degradation of Artaxerxes’ military power in the eastern Mediterranean and to solicit funds.

Glos’ connection with the philo-Laconian Tiribazus and, prior to that, with Cyrus (whom he accompanied on his campaign against Artaxerxes II) meant that Glos probably already had links to Antalcidas (who had worked in tandem with Tiribazus in naval operations against Athens in 387) and other important Spartans. Now, by letter (possibly directed initially to his Spartan friend Antalcidas), he proposed an alliance. According to Diodorus (15.9.4), Glos pledged full cooperation with the Spartans and offered to provide a great sum of money along with other inducements and to cooperate with them in Greece and assist them in restoring their previous supremacy. Glos reportedly had funds of his own, possibly from Tiribazus’ campaign treasury, but it is likely that he invoked the more enticing prospect of Egyptian financing. Diodorus makes no mention of a request that the Spartans campaign on behalf of rebellious Asian Greeks. Glos may have asked only that they not reprise the role as Persian proxy they had performed in 387. In return, Glos, and through him the Egyptian king, would furnish funds for Spartan activities on the Greek mainland. Such an offer would have seemed to promise that if the Spartans broke with Artaxerxes, they would still have a powerful backer for their ambitions on the Greek mainland. Artaxerxes’ evident military problems in the west at the time must have made this an offer worth considering and, indeed, according to Diodorus (15.9.5), they entered gladly into an alliance with Glos.

All this took place while the Cypriot War—in its strictly Cypriot phase—was still going on. But, due to the departure of a substantial portion of the Persian
campaign force, the war did not go on for long. The end came, according to Diodorus, with the collapse of the Persian attack on Salamis and Evagoras and Orontes’ agreement to a hastily arranged settlement. Having renewed the siege effort against Evagoras after the arrest of Tiribazus, Orontes found himself dealing with strong resistance by Evagoras and having to do so with a recalcitrant force angered by the removal of Tiribazus. “Alarmed at the surprising change in the situation,” Diodorus writes, Orontes sent men to Evagoras to offer a settlement on Evagoras’ terms—to be king just of Salamis, pay a fixed tribute annually, and obey orders as king to king (Diod. 15.9.1–2).

Diodorus connects the proposed settlement with Orontes’ problem with soldiers who were listless and insubordinate after Tiribazus’ arrest, and he recounts Glos’ rebellious activities only after noting the conclusion of the Cypriot War. But if, as seems likely, Glos defected immediately after Tiribazus’ arrest, the situation as Orontes tried to finish the siege of Salamis involved more problems than troop discipline. In fact, with the Greek fleet gone, its politically adroit commander Glos at large, and Egypt certainly poised to foster new troubles, the prospect of losing all the gains of recent years loomed very large.

Photius has a detail from Theopompus which hints at the unraveling situation. After noting how Theopompus discussed Evagoras and Orontes’ slanderous accusations against Tiribazus, Photius records that the next matter treated by Theopompus was “how when Nekevebios [Nectanebo I] took over the kingship of Egypt, Evagoras sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians” (FGH 115 F103.10). This precedes Photius’ notice of Theopompus’ discussion of the way in which the Cypriot War came to an end, so we may see Evagoras’ approach to the Spartans occurring during Orontes’ siege, that is, at the time of Glos and the Asian Greeks’ developing rebellion. In (probably) late 381, Evagoras had failed to garner substantial new Egyptian aid for the Cypriot War and had lost the troops provided by other allies. But evidently, the ever-resilient Evagoras saw an opportunity now to survive by linking himself to the emerging Asian Greek-Spartan-Egyptian coalition that Glos was fashioning. With Acoris dead, Evagoras may also have hoped that the new Egyptian king, Nectanebo (a usurper from Sebennytus and perhaps not wedded to his Mendesian predecessor Acoris’ stance), might resume the aggressive strategy in the eastern Mediterranean that Acoris had abandoned. Diodorus’ report that Orontes, besieging Evagoras, saw that Evagoras was boldly resisting the siege may indicate Evagoras’ new expectation that if he held out long enough as Persian affairs deteriorated after Glos’ defection, he might emerge from all this still in possession of Salamis. In other words, despite recent Persian successes, suddenly everything was in flux again.

In this situation—Theopompus’ notice of Nectanebo’s succession puts us after mid-380—the question of Evagoras’ status had little significance for the Persians, hence Orontes’ concession to Evagoras’ terms. Given Persian commanders’ dependence on direction from the king, this agreement most probably reflects Artaxerxes’ own decision. It represented, in fact, a kind of victory for Evagoras,
since Orontes’ agreement with Evagoras involved nothing less than imperial retraction of “ownership” of Cyprus and recognition of Evagoras’ autonomous kingship. From Evagoras’ point of view, that had been the issue ever since Hecatomnus crossed to Cyprus in 391/0 to take control of the island for Artaxerxes, and what might be called Evagoras’ personal Cypriot War dated from that time (unlike the one involving Acris as well as Evagoras and Artaxerxes). This is undoubtedly what Diodorus has in mind when he refers to the Cypriot War lasting “about ten years” (15.90.2).

In addition to ending the siege of Salamis and ratifying Evagoras’ autonomous kingship of Salamis, Artaxerxes seems also to have quickly settled the Tiribazus affair. Following his report of Glos’ activities, Diodorus has a lengthy account of a trial of Tiribazus, involving a panel of three judges, extended and varied testimony, explanations by each of the judges of the reasoning that led to his vote for acquittal (taken together, they cover all possible ways in which different interpretations might lead to the same final vote: accusations debatable while Tiribazus’ benefactions were incontestable; accusations true but outweighed by Tiribazus’ benefactions; accusations not credible, so benefactions were irrelevant), Artaxerxes’ commendation of the judges for their “just decision,” and his bestowal of the highest honors on Tiribazus (15.10.1–11.2). We may dismiss all of this as an attempt to explain by consideration of possible rhetorical strategies the one “fact” in the situation, Tiribazus’ rehabilitation and restoration to favor as “friend” of the king. Most likely, Artaxerxes moved to reconcile Glos by not only acquitting his father-in-law Tiribazus but also very publicly declaring Tiribazus a special friend, thus removing the grounds for Glos’ fears and the reason for his defection. Lacking military resources to deal with Glos, Artaxerxes had to rely instead on political measures.

But he evidently did not rely entirely on political measures. Diodorus’ next notice involving Glos says simply that “he was assassinated by certain persons and so did not achieve his purpose” (15.18.1). Just who murdered Glos and how it was done are unknown. We may conjecture, however, that Glos, perhaps encouraged by Artaxerxes’ reconciliation with Tiribazus, was drawn into discussions about his rehabilitation. According to Diodorus (15.18.1), after Glos’ death his son Tachos took over Glos’ “activities” (praxeis), indicating that the Ionian rebellions continued under Tachos. The fact that suppression of Glos removed him but did not terminate the rebellion he led may indicate that Glos went off somewhere, leaving forces and installations behind under Tachos which enabled him to sustain revolt. We can only conjecture how Glos came to let down his guard, but we might speculate that his father-in-law Tiribazus was somehow involved.

After Glos’ assassination, his son Tachos was understandably wary but evidently undeterred. He put together a force “around him”—probably meaning a special, personal guard force—and constructed a new fortified site (called Leucae) on a promontory at the mouth of the Hermus River between Cyme and Clazomenae. Tachos certainly knew of the rebellious satrap Pissuthnes’ son Amorges’ survival for
years in Iasus in the 410s as a rebel figure after Pisistratus had been seized during Darius II’s succession struggle. The promise of being able to sustain himself at a similarly situated site (surrounded by supportive Asian Greek allies) probably encouraged Tachos to continue Glos’ “rebellion.”  

It must have taken a while to develop a functional base at Leuca, even if Glos had initiated the project before his death. This indicates that Tachos held out and the Asian Greek rebellions persisted for some time after Glos’ death, certainly at least into 379 and probably longer. Again, after noting Glos’ death, Diodorus does not follow developments but moves on to a story of the later contest between Clazomenae and Cyme for control of Leuca, introducing this story simply by saying “a short time after [Tachos’] death a dispute over this city [Leuca] arose.” Nothing is said even about the manner of Tachos’ death. But when Diodorus finishes his Clazomenae-Cyme story, he notes that “After these events the rebellions in Asia came to an end by themselves”—that is, without any Persian military action—and that the Spartans renounced their dealings [praxeis] “in Asia” (15.18.4–19.1). Clearly, Glos and then Tachos had been the critical figures in the rebellion and in the Ionian-Egyptian-Spartan coalition, and with their deaths the whole enterprise collapsed. This took place sometime after Persian reconquest of eastern Mediterranean coastal territories and after the recovery of Cyprus and settlement with Evagoras. But only with the end of the rebellions of the Asian Greek cities could it be said that the Cypriot War was over.

In the Cypriot War, thanks to effective campaigning by mostly Greek forces under Tiribazus, the Persians by 381 had recovered most of the eastern Mediterranean. But Glos’ defection and the ensuing Asian Greek rebellion opened the door to renewed Egyptian enterprise and threatened to undo all these gains. Fortunately for Persia’s eastern Mediterranean affairs, the vicissitudes of Egyptian dynastic politics, the recurrent obstacle to Egyptian success, prevented swift Egyptian deployment of troops away from Egypt to take advantage of Persian weakness. Nectanebo of Sebennytus, the new Egyptian king, pushed aside Acoris’ son and successor (the Mendesian dynasty) to usurp the kingship in Egypt and initiate the 30th Dynasty, the third royal dynasty in twenty years. By the time Nectanebo held the throne securely in Egypt, Glos and Tachos were probably dead and the Greek rebellions at an end. The opportunity for renewed, effective Egyptian action had passed. Despite all the diplomacy and warfare that filled the 380s and the success and failures that both Persia and Egypt experienced during this decade, the situation in the end was much like that in the late 390s, with Egypt anticipating Persian attack and the Persians getting ready to prepare an expeditionary force and worrying about the security of the middle territory.
CHAPTER 10
Preparing the Second Campaign: Engaging Greeks, 380–373

Despite the failure of the Persian invasion of Egypt in the early 380s and the great difficulties the Persians faced in maintaining control of the eastern Mediterranean, there was certainly no expectation in Egypt that Artaxerxes would abandon his effort to recover Egypt. Probably right after the 390/89–388/7 Persian attack, even as he was launching the diplomatic offensive that led to the Cypriot War, Acoris had set in motion a series of building projects, which Nectanebo I continued. These aimed at guaranteeing Egypt’s independence by transforming Egypt into a virtual fortress, organized for defense on a more extensive basis than ever before. The Athenian Chabrias’ name was attached to some of the projects, so we may infer that the whole effort began while he was in Egypt between ca. 386 and 380. But we can be sure that Egyptian kings themselves, consistently committed to defensive strategies, were responsible for the comprehensive defense plan.

From Diodorus and scattered references elsewhere, we can see something of the main features of Acoris and Nectanebo’s plan. Evidently a line of fortified towns, indicated by the use of the name Chabriou charax—“Chabrias’ fortified camp”—for two sites south of Pelusium (Strabo 16.760; Plin. NH 5.68), faced the eastern frontier. The Persian campaign in the early 380s may not have pushed past Pelusium, but Egyptians probably remembered that in the 670s the Assyrian king Esarhaddon had been defeated and driven out of Egypt, only to return several years later using a different, more southerly route.¹ So might the Persians; hence Egyptian interest in securing the region south of Pelusium. Still, Pelusium got special attention. Here, according to Diodorus (15.42.2–3), Nectanebo dug channels connecting with the Pelusiac mouth, “fortified the entrances for ships at the most suitable points, and inundated the approaches by land while blocking the sea by embankments.” Consequently, “it was not easy either for ships to sail in, or for the cavalry to draw near, or for the infantry to approach.” Fortifications guarded the mouths of all the
other Nile branches in the Delta. Thus, while the plan concentrated defenses on an eastern frontier line from Pelusium south, it took into account other possible routes of invasion. A Chabriou kómé—“Chabrian village”—attested near Lake Mareotis (Strabo 17.803, 18.679) may indicate that the plan encompassed measures aimed at possible Libyan intrusions from the west.2

Egyptian planning evidently sought to make the Delta impenetrable by land and sea from all directions. But should the outer lines of defense fail somewhere, newly built enormous brick enclosures (those at Mendes were about forty feet high and more than ten feet thick) transformed all major Egyptian temple precincts into respectable fortresses.3 Such a defense-in-depth strategy meant that if an invading Persian force tried to move further inland, it would still face everywhere strongly fortified sites and ready defenders.

Clearly, even as Egypt’s diplomatic offensive was succeeding in the mid-380s, defense remained Egypt’s primary strategic concern through the 380s. Historically, in the conflict between the eastern and western cores, at least from the ninth century onward, Egyptian successes outside Egypt had inevitably been only temporary. Prudence required preparation for the collapse of extra-Egyptian alliances and the resumption of attacks on Egypt by the Persians.

Starting with Acoris, Egyptian recruitment of Greek mercenaries was significant enough for its high pay and benefits to merit special notice in Greek sources.4 Hiring probably accelerated after the King’s Peace ended hostilities in Greece (for a time) and freed many mainland Greeks to take up mercenary service. Widespread poverty on the Greek mainland traditionally meant that many Greeks were content to serve as mercenaries simply for food and no extra pay,5 so the inducements offered for service in Egypt must have drawn recruits in great numbers. Chabrias himself went from Cyprus to Egypt (Nep. Chabrias 2.3), probably bringing his own mercenary force with him, and Acoris may have given him responsibility for integrating Greeks into Egypt’s military organization. The attachment of Chabrias’ name to new military settlements in both the eastern and western Delta hints at an extensive “Chabrian” project.6 The fact that these were village settlements suggests that Acoris and Nectanebo, like their 26th Dynasty predecessors (Hdt. 2.154), hoped to augment the native force of machimoi by adding to it Greek machimoi, permanently resident in Egypt and thus available at all times for military service. To pay the new Greek force in Egypt, Acoris and Nectanebo produced coinage on the Greek model, using Athenian-type coins (head of Athena and standing owl) struck from Athenian dies or perfect copies of Athenian dies.7

Information about developments in Egypt during the later 380s probably reached Artaxerxes and his advisers only slowly and in stages. Ongoing Egyptian recruitment of Greeks for military service in Egypt was likely evident to the Persians, as they were recruiting troops for the Cypriot War after 386 and drawing from the same manpower pool Acoris did. They could do nothing to counter Egyptian competition except perhaps to raise the pay they offered for Persian service. The Persians did, however, act in 380 to remove Chabrias from Egypt. Envoys from Pharnabazus
demanded in that year that Athens recall Chabrias from Egypt, threatening ominously that his service in Egypt “would deprive the people of Athens of the king’s goodwill.” This presumably meant that Artaxerxes would retaliate against Athens, even though the Athenians were not technically violating any terms of the King’s Peace. At the same time, Pharnabazus requested through his envoys that the Athenians give him the notable Athenian commander Iphicrates as a general (stratēgos) (Diod. 15.29.3–4). Perhaps Pharnabazus’ emissaries presented this request, like that for Athens’ recall of Chabrias from Egypt, as a move necessary to retain the goodwill of the king. The Persians were in any case clearly insisting that Athens adopt a philo-Persian stance and officially prohibit involvement by Athenian citizens in Egypt.

Here we meet the familiar Pharnabazus again, out of sight after the end of the Persian campaign in Egypt in 388/7 but evidently by 380 again in charge of matters connected with Artaxerxes’ Egyptian enterprise. Given his earlier command, he was clearly one of Artaxerxes’ Egyptian experts, so his renewed command is not surprising. But Abrocomas and Tithraustes, joint commanders with Pharnabazus in the 390/89–388/7 campaign, were similarly experienced, and they make no appearance in connection with Artaxerxes’ second campaign (Tithraustes, we know, was still alive [Nep. Datames 3.5]). What appears to have been Pharnabazus’ first move in connection with the new campaign—the hiring of Iphicrates—may point to an explanation for Artaxerxes’ appointment of Pharnabazus alone to command the campaign. So far as we can tell, there had been no substantial contingent of Greek mercenaries in Persian service during the attack on Egypt in 390/89–388/7 (and the virtual absence of any information about that campaign in Greek sources may be an indication that no Greek troops participated in it). However, the hiring of the Athenian mercenary commander Iphicrates in 380 points to Persian plans to make significant use of Greek troops from this point on. Asian Greek sailors and mainland Greek mercenaries had been critical participants in Artaxerxes’ Cypriot War and had demonstrated clearly their military effectiveness during operations in the late 380s (the ultimate defection of many of the Asian Greeks along with Glos notwithstanding). Persian awareness of extensive hiring of Greeks by Egyptian kings and concern that Egyptian kings might deploy largely Greek campaign forces outside Egypt were probably behind the Persian decision to engage for the first time substantial numbers of Greeks for service in the Persian-Egyptian conflict. On the basis of his involvement in the 390/89–388/7 campaign, Pharnabazus was certainly one of Artaxerxes’ Egyptian experts, but he was at the same time also probably Artaxerxes’ greatest Greek expert. Formerly satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Pharnabazus had a history of dealing with Greeks stretching back more than thirty years and marked by an especially successful association with Conon and other Athenians in the 390s. This likely made Pharnabazus the best—perhaps the only—candidate to head a campaign in which for the first time Greek troops and a Greek commander would play a large role.
We may assume that if the Persians had known previously that Chabrias was in Egypt, they would have pressured the Athenians at an earlier date to recall him. It is likely, therefore, that they learned of Chabrias’ involvement in Egypt only shortly before Pharnabazus’ envoys demanded his recall, that is, sometime in 380. It is a plausible conjecture that Evagoras (who may himself have arranged for Chabrias’ employment in Egypt, pursuing advantages for himself by dealing in Greek commanders just as he had in the case of Artaxerxes and Conon in the 390s) was the informant, divulging this valuable information as he tried to reach a final settlement with Artaxerxes. Egyptian recruitment of mercenaries was predictable, but the news of Chabrias’ presence raised the specter of an Egyptian offensive in the eastern Mediterranean involving Greek troops led by Chabrias that could well undo all recent Persian successes (themselves due largely to the Asian Greek sailors and mainland Greek mercenaries in Persian service during the Cypriot War).

Diodorus’ report (15.29.3) that on Pharnabazus’ instructions the envoys who demanded Chabrias’ recall specifically requested Iphicrates as stratēgos indicates that Pharnabazus himself identified Iphicrates as the most valuable Greek to engage as commander. Iphicrates reportedly first distinguished himself “at sea” (meaning before his activities in the Corinthian War and thus before Athens had its own fleet again), and this connects the beginning of his military career with Conon’s Persian service and most likely places him at the Battle of Cnidus, the sole naval encounter in the Persian-Spartan War. Pharnabazus’ acquaintance with Iphicrates thus probably went back to the mid-390s. But it was certainly Iphicrates’ achievements after this as a commander of mercenaries that most recommended him to Pharnabazus. Thanks to Conon’s recommendation, while still in his twenties Iphicrates commanded a standing force of mercenaries in the Corinthiad during the Corinthian War, and with them he won a famous victory against Spartan hoplites in 390 (Xen. Hell. 4.5.11–18; Dem. 1 Philipp. 24). Subsequently, Iphicrates took many mercenaries to the Hellespont, where he defeated and killed the Spartan commander Anaxibius late in 388 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.32–38), and then to Thrace, where he led a large mercenary company (comprising, we are told, 8,000 men) on behalf of the Thracian king Cotys (Polyaen. 3.9.46). Evidently of imposing physical size, Iphicrates had a great reputation not only as a tactician but also as a disciplinarian. In short, Iphicrates had become in the years after the Battle of Cnidus the most distinguished and experienced commander of mercenaries of his day.

Although the Persians had recovered control of Sidon, Tyre, and various Philistine sites to the south, the departure of the Asian Greek fleet in 380 left these sites vulnerable to attack. Persian fear that the Egyptian king, whose recruitment of Greek soldiers gave him a body of mobile heavy infantry, might send a force to try to recover Philistine and Phoenician cities probably best explains Pharnabazus’ hiring of Iphicrates as early as 380, before any other preparations for the second campaign got underway (the actual attack on Egypt in 373) and possibly before Glos and his son Tachos’ “revolt” and the Asian Greek rebellions had come to an end. The Persians needed to install in the middle territory a strong force of their
own which could match Nectanebo’s mercenaries, that is, a force of seasoned Greek or Greek-like troops, to secure the staging areas in this region until Persian preparations for a new campaign brought many additional troops here.

Iphicrates’ first role in Persian service was thus as commander of a Greek security force responsible for deterring any new Egyptian intervention in the middle territory. Iphicrates had gained renown for his victories over the best Greek warriors, the Spartans, in the Corinthiad and the Hellespont, and, having had a mercenary company continuously under his command since the 390s, he could likely bring a sizable ready-made mercenary force with him to Phoenicia. The presence of such a standing force in Phoenicia, wherever exactly it was stationed, would not only serve to deter Egyptian intervention but would certainly also encourage recently recovered cities in the middle territory to remain submissive and, when full preparations for a new Egyptian campaign began, to comply with Persian demands for the campaign. Pharnabazus knew well from Conon’s experience and from recent events on Cyprus that Greek mercenaries, especially when in camp for prolonged periods, were typically insubordinate and potentially mutinous, so Iphicrates’ reputation for controlling troops was certainly another factor in Pharnabazus’ choice.

In addition to the possibility of Egyptian overland intervention in the middle territory, there was also the possibility of some kind of Egyptian naval enterprise. Anaxibos had dispatched ships to Cyprus during the Cypriot War. His successor Nectanebo might well deploy more to challenge Persian control of middle-territory sites in the face of the wholesale defection of Persia’s Asian Greek fleet. The new Egyptian king might perhaps also try to resuscitate Evagoras as an effective proxy. This certainly made maritime security as critically important for the Persians as security on land in the Levant as they set about preparing a new attack on Egypt.

Artaxerxes had previously made use of specially commissioned “guard fleets” from Cypriot and Anatolian coastal cities (mainly Cilician) commanded by non-Persians such as Conon and Hecatomnus under the supervision of Persian officials—Pharnabazus or Autophradates. Literary sources preserve no trace of Persian maritime security measures at this time, but Cilician coins may hint at the development and use of a new guard fleet based in Cilicia. The coins, six groups of Cilician staters with Aramaic legends identifying either Pharnabazus or an apparently local dynast named Tarkumuwa as issuer, attest a close link between Pharnabazus and Tarkumuwa. It is most natural to associate the coins with Pharnabazus’ involvement in the eastern Mediterranean as sole commander of the expedition prepared in the aftermath of the Cypriot War. But the use of Cilician coins (rather than coins on the Persian standard of the sort Tiribazus had issued during the Cypriot War) suggests that the Pharnabazus-Tarkumuwa coins were intended to circulate primarily in Cilicia.

On what basis then did Tarkumuwa’s name adorn such coins? This is a Luvian—that is, not a Persian—name, and presumably identifies a local man rather than a Persian official. Scholars interpreting TRKMW as indicating a figure named Tarkumuwa (rather than representing the Cilician version of the name Datames,
Persian satrap of Cappadocia and, before rebelling, commander for a time of a new expeditionary force assembled in Phoenicia after the 373 campaign) have only suggested that he is “an otherwise unknown local dynast.” But if we see the Pharnabazus-Tarkumuwa coins as intended for payment of Cilicians functioning in Persian service in some way during the time Pharnabazus prepared the expeditionary force for Artaxerxes’ second attack on Egypt, we may infer that Tarkumuwa had a command position of some sort in Cilicia subordinate to Pharnabazus. Given Persian concerns and activities in the eastern Mediterranean in the 370s, we may plausibly conjecture that Artaxerxes, seeking again to establish effective maritime security arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean, bestowed a naval command on a non-Persian—Tarkumuwa in this case—and subordinated him to Pharnabazus (as he had for the same purpose subordinated Conon to Pharnabazus and Hecatomnus to Autophradates at different times in the 390s). Cilician ships, typically commanded by the syennesis or dynast from Tarsus, had traditionally been a critical part of Persian maritime enterprise and had indeed performed guard roles before, moving (along with Phoenician ships) to dislodge Cimon from Cyprus in 450 (Thuc. 1.112.2; Diod. 12.3.1–4; Plut. Cim. 18.6), serving with Cypriot ships under Conon in the 390s and probably under Hecatomnus when he crossed to Cyprus from Cilicia in 390. Ionia was too far away, and Asian Greek contingents were tainted in any case by their involvement in Glos’ revolt. Evagoras, whose city had provided many ships earlier, was certainly deemed too untrustworthy to be assigned a strategically critical role at this time.

That left Cilician ships as the best candidates for employment as guard ships and Cilicia the best base for a guard fleet. From Cilicia, Cilician ships could deal equally well with any maritime enterprise moving eastward from the Aegean or moving north from Egypt. They also could cross to Cyprus to suppress any move by Evagoras. Tarkumuwa may be identified as syennesis at Tarsus, a descendent (son?) perhaps of the reluctant ally of Cyrus we meet in Xenophon’s account of Cyrus’ march up-country.¹⁴ Tarkumuwa and Tarsus, located inland from the Cilician coast, may have remained loyal to the Persians when Acoris put together his anti-Persian coalition in the 380s. Tiribazus, one of Artaxerxes’ commanders during the Cypriot War, used the mint at Tarsus for his coinage during the campaign.¹⁵ He would certainly be well acquainted with Tarkumuwa (if correctly identified as syennesis of Tarsus) and with Cilician cities, and we might conjecture that Tiribazus, again in Artaxerxes’ favor by (probably) late 380, recommended him to Artaxerxes.

Pharnabazus’ hiring of Iphicrates in 380 in the immediate aftermath of the settlement with Evagoras and even while the Glos-Tachos-Ionian Greek rebellion was still ongoing attests to Artaxerxes’ great sense of urgency about the security of the eastern Mediterranean. Clearly, then, Artaxerxes and his advisors deemed it crucial to forestall any renewal of Egyptian military activity well before actual preparations for a new Egyptian campaign got underway. We may thus most plausibly date the development of a new maritime security force to just about the same
time—probably in 380, right after Orontes terminated operations against Salamis in the aftermath of Glos’ rebellion and the defection of Greek naval contingents.

Remains of early fourth-century fortifications at sites in Cilicia from Nagidos to Issus point to an extensive construction program contemporaneous with the production of the Pharnabazus-Tarkumuwa coins.\textsuperscript{16} Remembering Isocrates’ reports about the Persians building fortifications in and occupying the acropolises of Ionian cities at the time of preparations for the Cypriot War (4.123, 137, 163), we may connect this somewhat later construction program in Cilicia with the Persian preparations in the 370s for a new Egyptian campaign and see it as an effort to secure Cilician coastal sites—the bases for the Pharnabazus-Tarkumuwa guard fleet—against attack.

The hiring of Iphicrates and (probably) his mercenary force and the elevation of Tarkumuwa as commander of a Cilician guard fleet appear then to represent twin parts of Artaxerxes’ plan for securing the eastern Mediterranean while preparing and mounting a new campaign against Egypt. Thanks to the cessation of Spartan and Athenian overseas enterprises following agreement to the King’s Peace a half-dozen years earlier, Artaxerxes did not have to concern himself with preventing Greek intrusion into the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, unlike the situation in the 390s, there was no need at this time for any far western counterpart to Persian security measures in the eastern Mediterranean.

Iphicrates probably arrived in Phoenicia soon after his recruitment in 380; sometime in 379 is perfectly plausible. Because of Iphicrates’ likely initial role as commander of a mercenary security force in Phoenicia, we need not mark the beginning of sustained preparations for Artaxerxes’ next Egyptian campaign by Iphicrates’ arrival nor necessarily place Iphicrates immediately at Acco, where the full force ultimately assembled (Diod. 15.41.3). However, preparations were certainly underway by 375, when we catch a glimpse of Persian efforts to enlist additional mercenaries. In this year, according to Diodorus (15.38.1), “intending to make war on the Egyptians and being busily engaged in organizing a considerable (\textit{axiolo-gos}) mercenary army,” Artaxerxes sent envoys to Greece to urge cities to enter into a general peace (that is, to stop fighting and renew their agreement to the principle of autonomy in the King’s Peace of 387/6), so that “the Greeks, once released from their domestic wars, would be more ready to accept mercenary service.”\textsuperscript{17} Persian planners at this time obviously wanted Greek mercenaries in much greater numbers than what they already had in the form of Iphicrates’ mercenaries.

It is clear from what we learn of Persian preparations that the Persians knew a good deal about the nature and scope of Egyptian defensive plans. Chabrias himself was probably the source of such information, just as Phanes of Halicarnassus had been at the time of the initial Persian conquest of Egypt. Chabrias served as \textit{stratēgos} in Athens in winter 379/8 after his recall from Egypt (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.4.14), so he must have returned to Athens before summer 379 (if his \textit{stratēgia} derived from election) or late 379 (if it derived from appointment).\textsuperscript{18} The Persians, who had demanded Chabrias’ recall from Egypt undoubtedly also insisted that the Athenians share any
intelligence gleaned from Chabrias. Possibly Iphicrates himself brought Chabrias’ revelations with him to Phoenicia. (Even if Iphicrates left directly from Thrace, he had his own contacts at Athens.)

On the basis of Chabrias’ information, Pharnabazus could expect to confront lines of defense manned by Greek mercenaries along Egypt’s eastern and western frontiers. He would find Pelusium especially well fortified and defended. That would mean trying to force entry along the Delta coast at one mouth or another, but these too had well-prepared defenses. In this situation, there was no clear single solution. Evidence about Persian armaments and preparations indicates that in their planning the Persians emphasized mobility. Diodorus describes the expeditionary force as comprising 300 triremes, 200 triaconters, a great number of ships for conveying food and supplies, 200,000 “barbarian” troops, and 20,000 Greek mercenaries (15.41.2). The precise numbers are probably not to be trusted, but the different elements involved point to careful tactical planning. Persian triremes could counter Egyptian ships; the slower, thirty-oared triaconters would serve to ferry troops to different points as the situation demanded. In addition to a huge force levied from subject peoples (the “barbarian troops”), Greek mercenaries in unprecedentedly large numbers would match Nectanebo’s numerous mercenaries. There was also cavalry (Diod. 15.42.4). Supply ships could deliver support where needed and triremes could protect these, so Nectanebo could not employ the interdiction tactic used by Evagoras.

While our Greek sources tell us a good deal about Iphicrates’ preparations and nothing specific about the training of “barbarian contingents,” it appears that the strategy Pharnabazus adopted in fact involved special use of Greek mercenary forces (we may remember Pharnabazus’ successful reliance on Conon and Conon’s Greek personnel in the 390s), so the sources’ highlighting of Iphicrates’ role may not be due simply to Greek bias. Nepos’ statement (Iphic. 2.4) that for the Persian attack on Egypt Iphicrates trained his mercenary force so thoroughly that “soldiers of Iphicrates” (Iphicratenses) became a phrase denoting “best soldiers” suggests preparations for unfamiliar circumstances and operations. Both Diodorus and Nepos note many improvements made by Iphicrates in the “tools of war,” especially in “the mode of contending with arms” (Diod. 15.44.1; Nep. Iphic.1.3–4). These included the replacement of hoplites’ spears with spears half again as long and swords with new ones twice as long, use of light shields in place of the hoplon, quickly tied boots (later known as “iphicratids”), and adoption of linen breastplates instead of metal ones (Diod. 15.44.1–4; Nep. Iphic. 1.4). What Iphicrates seems to have done is lighten the hoplites’ armor and shields, giving them greater comfort and mobility, while increasing their reach with longer spears and swords, giving them an edge when closing in battle.

Diodorus’ discussion of these innovations in connection with his narrative of the campaign against Egypt and the fact that this new-style soldier does not appear again suggest the changes were adopted at this time for the special conditions anticipated in Egypt (use of linen breastplates is a clear indication of concern with heat
conditions in Egypt). In fact, while from a Greek perspective the changes Iphicrates introduced were innovations, they were probably really a matter of matching the arms and armor employed by Egyptian heavy infantry—the machimoi. With a large mercenary force assembled in a single place such as Acco, where numerous arms makers were also present, it would be possible to accomplish and pay for such a large-scale shift.

Diodorus’ remark that “the actual use of these arms confirmed the initial test [dokimasia]” provides a glimpse of trial use, certainly in Phoenicia during the extended period of preparations. Evidence of more extensive trials comes from Polyaenus’ account of Iphicrates’ stratagem involving an attack on the Phoenician coast (3.9.63).

When Iphicrates was sailing in with 100 triaconters near Phoenicia, where the coast was full of shoals, and seeing the Phoenicians had drawn themselves up on the shore, he ordered that whenever the signal was given the helmsmen should let down the stern anchors and stop in formation and the troops armed as hoplites should each by his own oar drop down into the sea and stay with his taxis. When he knew that the depth of the sea was suitable, he held up the sign for disembarking. The triaconters anchored in formation, and the troops advanced in order. Amazed by their organization and courage, the enemy [the Phoenicians] fled. Pursuing them, Iphicrates’ men killed some and captured others and took away a great deal of plunder. Putting this into the ships, they made camp on land.

With its mention of prisoners and spoils, this detailed report points to a successful operation, but there is no known time when Iphicrates campaigned in Phoenicia. Another of Polyaenus’ notices may indicate what is actually behind Iphicrates’ reported attack on the Phoenician coast:

Iphicrates used to exercise his troops in all those various maneuvers that might be necessary in action—sham sallies, ambuscades, false surrenders, revolts, surprises, and panics [pseudoboētheias, pseudenedras, pseudoprodosias, pseudautomolias, pseudephodous, pseudopanika]—so that when any of them was really practiced by the enemy, or required from his own troops, they were in either case experienced and ready. (3.9.32)

This provides the key to understanding the episode recounted by Polyaenus in 3.9.63: it was a sham attack, launched to train troops in amphibious landings. This is just what might be anticipated in the Egyptian campaign. The use of a big transport fleet reportedly comprising 200 triaconters points to Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ plan to ferry troops from a base in or near Egypt to some target destination and offload them along the coast. This would mean having to land in the flat and muddy conditions typical of the Delta coast. Polyaenus’ description of Iphicrates’ attack on “the Phoenicians” shows clearly how in his typical fashion Iphicrates identified and then practiced every step in the enterprise, from the approach to the shore to the
coordinated disembarkation, then the attack itself, followed by pursuit and capture of enemy troops, and finally and most tellingly, culminating in the installation of a camp. The landscape in the western part of the Acco plain was marked by swamps, sands, and marshes, just as the Egyptian Delta was, so Iphicrates had close at hand an ideal location for staging maneuvers. The reason the Polyaeus story involves seemingly real Phoenician opponents is undoubtedly that the staging of the sham attack was complete with sham opponents drawn from the local population and simulated casualties. If we can trust Polyaeus’ number of 100 ships (many of which might have been Cilician or Cypriot) taking part, this “attack” would have been a huge exercise, memorable because of its scale alone. Polyaeus’ reference to Greeks pursuing the enemy in this operation likely indicates that the “attacking” force was the Greek mercenaries that Iphicrates commanded. They were practicing along the Phoenician coast the actions that an amphibious assault aimed at gaining a base in the Delta would predictably involve.

Additional stratagems reported by Polyaeus allow us a glimpse of Iphicrates’ management of mercenaries during the protracted Persian preparations in the 370s:

Iphicrates, commanding a great body of land and naval forces, kept back a fourth of their pay each month so they would not leave the camp. Thus he kept many in service and well off, since they had a fourth of their pay in his hands. (3.9.51)

In the story of Iphicrates’ “attack” on the Phoenician coast in Polyaeus 3.9.63, Iphicrates controls the fleet as well as the troops, so the pay practice reported by Polyaeus as taking place when Iphicrates commanded both land and naval forces may be connected with the time Iphicrates served under Pharnabazus in the 370s. What Iphicrates was actually doing was paying only three-quarters of the total due, while supposedly retaining one-quarter in his own keeping. We may suspect that Iphicrates, forced to deal with the typically slow delivery of Persian funds, was actually stretching out limited funds by reducing payments while leading troops to believe he held on to a fourth of their pay for safekeeping.

But if Iphicrates adopted this practice in connection with Persian preparations at this time, it did not prevent problems when wage payments were completely interrupted. We see in another anecdote evidence of shortness of funds and another ploy by Iphicrates to manage the discontent of mercenaries.

Iphicrates, once particularly pressed for money, while the soldiers were making an uproar and demanding a general meeting, clothed in Persian dress some men who were skilled in the Persian language and told them to come forward when the assembly was full and report in Persian “those bringing the funds and very near and we were sent ahead to announce this.” Hearing this, the soldiers disbanded the meeting. (Polyaeus. 3.9.59)

The anecdote must belong to the 370s, since this is only time Iphicrates was in Persian service. It indicates that despite extensive coining by Pharnabazus in
Cilician mints, and despite Iphicrates’ attempt to forestall this kind of situation by withholding part of the soldiers’ pay, over the course of the protracted preparations there were delays and resulting mercenary protests.24

Another stratagem, explicitly located at Acco by Polyaenus, hints at further troubles. While in Acco, learning of a conspiracy formed by two of his generals—meaning subordinate commanders of separate mercenary companies—Iphicrates selected a group of his best and most trusted troops and ordered them immediately to seize the commanders’ arms and those of their troops as soon as he charged the suspected commanders with conspiracy. He executed the mutinous commanders, stripped the common soldiers involved, and turned them “naked” out of camp, meaning without arms, the necessary tools of their trade (Polyen. 3.9.56).25 This may indicate that the problem had to do with mercenaries conspiring to leave Persian service and transfer their skills to Egypt in anticipation of more certain pay and better conditions.

Iphicrates’ maneuvers and drills and his innovations in arms, armor, and tactics certainly helped occupy troops, but obviously not completely. Iphicrates in fact complained to Pharnabazus at one point about the long delay in initiating the actual campaign. Pharnabazus blamed it on Artaxerxes who alone, he said, really commanded, without explaining Artaxerxes’ reasons for delay (Diod. 15.41.2).26 There is likely truth in Pharnabazus’ excuse. The sham attacks and various maneuvers suggest that the whole expeditionary force was already assembled and presumably could have embarked. Because the invasion had to be timed to miss the months of the Nile flood, failure to move at an opportune time meant a delay of another six months or more, and for Iphicrates (who had been in place with many of the mercenaries well before actual expeditionary preparations got underway) that meant having to manage discontented soldiers for that many more months. Pharnabazus, himself present at Acco, certainly appreciated Iphicrates’ problem, and he evidently did not dispute Iphicrates’ implied assumption that the campaign could begin without further delay.

If Artaxerxes was indeed responsible for the delay, his failure to authorize the start of the campaign may indicate that he was waiting for the completion of more than just the preparations at Acco. For this reason, we may suspect Persian involvement in what might seem to have been a fortuitous coincidence, the death of Evagoras I, the troublesome king of Salamis, in 374/3. Theopompus recounted in Book 12 of the Philippica that with the eunuch Thrasydeus of Elis serving as intermediary, Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras had both been sleeping with the daughter of a certain Nicocreon. Nicocreon plotted against them, but having been detected, he fled. Thrasydeus, however, murdered them or achieved their destruction (Theop. FGH 115 F103.2). Diodorus has a garbled, very condensed version of the story, stating that (in 374/3) Nicocles the eunuch assassinated Evagoras and took over the kingship of Salamis (15.47.8). Diodorus says nothing here of Pnytagoras. Aristotle also knew something about this story, describing the assassin as a vengeful eunuch angered because Evagoras had stolen the wife of his son (Pol.
1311b5). Like Diodorus, Aristotle has nothing about the death of Pnytagoras. Probably the only credible elements of the story of Evagoras’ end are the deaths of Evagoras and Pnytagoras and suspicions about the involvement of a eunuch. That is, Evagoras and his eldest son Pnytagoras were killed, and some member of Evagoras’ household was believed responsible.

Asking who benefited from the demise of Evagoras and Pnytagoras, his heir apparent, leads us to suspect Nicocles, another son of Evagoras, who became king after Evagoras’ and Pnytagoras’ deaths. Diodorus’ identification of a eunuch named Nicocles as the figure responsible for the murder of Evagoras may reflect conflation of two different explanations—one blaming the murder on a eunuch (preserved in part in Arist. Pol. 1311b5) and another pointing to Evagoras’ son Nicocles. Further speculation is possible. It seems almost too convenient to be coincidental that Evagoras should perish just as the first Persian attack on Egypt since the failed attempt in the early 380s was about to get under way. Evagoras’ actions had been more damaging to Persian interests in the 380s than anything else, and his removal (along with that of Pnytagoras, whose role as regent when Evagoras left Cyprus for Egypt during the Cypriot War [Diod. 15.4.3] indicates that he was likely heir apparent) would prevent any recurrence of Evagoras’ aggressions while the new Persian campaign was underway. The Athenians had been fashioning a new maritime league during the 370s (commonly termed the Second Athenian League by modern scholars), news of which certainly reached Artaxerxes. It purportedly aimed at challenging the Spartans, and the league’s “charter” or oath of membership explicitly prohibited violating the King’s Peace. Nevertheless, given Athenian involvement on Cyprus in the 460s–450s and the early 380s, it would have been imprudent of Artaxerxes not to take some steps to make any renewal of such activities impossible. Under Artaxerxes, assassination seems to have become part of the repertoire of imperial management tactics—witness the deaths of Glos and Tachos—and we can easily conceive of Persian corruption of member of Evagoras’ court, possibly Evagoras’ son Nicocles, who presumably would not have become king had Pnytagoras lived.

Such machinations, however, would take time, and there was no predicting just when success might occur. Quite possibly, Artaxerxes was holding back the departure from Acco of the long and well-prepared Persian campaign force until news of Evagoras’ demise reached him. In these conspiratorial circumstances, few would be aware of the reasons for the delay. Pharnabazus himself may not have known anything beyond the fact that, as he told Iphicrates, Artaxerxes was responsible.

By the time the campaign was ready, the prospects for success were great. There was no far western ally prepared to engage in support of Nectanebo. Far westerners were present in Egypt in the form of Greek mercenaries, but the Persians had a substantial number of Greek mercenaries of their own, and thanks to Iphicrates’ leadership Persia’s Greeks would likely outfight Egypt’s Greeks. With Evagoras dead, there was no worry that the Egyptians could find a proxy to stir up trouble in the
middle territory which might compel withdrawal of the Persian campaign force after it reached Egypt. Egyptian inactivity outside Egypt in the 370s indicated in any case that Nectanebo was relying entirely on Egypt’s defensive arrangements. The changes Iphicrates had made to the arms and equipment of his Greek mercenary force meant that the Persians now had units well equipped to fight in Egypt and not only counter Nectanebo’s Greeks but also fight like Egyptian machimois. Thanks primarily to Iphicrates, the Persian expeditionary force had trained well in conditions much like those they would encounter in Egypt. The extended preparations had certainly furnished enough time to stockpile sufficient supplies to sustain the Persian campaign in Egypt for as long as the campaign took. Leading the campaign was Pharnabazus, a veteran commander who had been in Egypt fifteen years earlier as one of the commanders in Artaxerxes’ first attempt to retake Egypt. It is hard to think of anything the Persians overlooked in organizing and readying this campaign. Executing it would be a matter mostly of repeating already well-rehearsed actions.

Figure 1
Right side view of the statue of the priestess Utahorresenet holding the naos containing the statue of Osiris. From the Ptolemaic Period, 332–330 BCE. On view at the Museo Gregoriano Egizio, Vatican Museums, Vatican State. Photo Credit: Alinari/Art Resource, NY.
Figure 2
Darius I the Great (550–486 BCE) giving audience in a detail of a relief found in the treasure of the palace at Persepolis, 491–486 BCE. Photo Credit: SET/Art Resource, NY.

Figure 3
The God Horus Protecting King Nectanebo II, from 360–343 BCE. © The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Figure 4
Silver tetradrachm of Artaxerxes III, Achaemenid Persian Empire, Memphis, 343 BCE. Currently in the collection of the British Museum. Photo Credit: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.

Figure 5
Anthropoid sarcophagus with the portrait of a man, Egyptian style. Found near the sarcophagus of Eshmunazar II in the royal necropolis of Sidon, Lebanon. Currently at the Louvre. Photo Credit: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.
CHAPTER 11
Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’
Egyptian Campaign, 373

Thanks to Iphicrates’ involvement, fourth-century writers like Ephorus and Theopompus dealt with the Persian offensive of the late 370s at length.¹ Diodorus thus has a detailed account which allows us to follow events reasonably well. Although we may suspect that Greek interest magnified Iphicrates’ role, close analysis of the campaign suggests that Iphicrates was indeed essential to the initial success of the Persian attack and responsible also for its ultimate failure.

Diodorus starts his narrative with the explicit chronological statement that Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ force finally embarked at “the beginning of summer.” In a two-seasons-per-year reckoning, this would correspond to spring—probably late March/early April 373.² This was two months before the beginning of the rising of the Nile and about six months before the Nile flood’s peak would make movement by an army in Egypt very difficult. Certainly aware of flood timings, Pharnabazus knew that he would have several months for operations. If, despite strong Egyptian defenses, Nectanebo chose to risk everything in a single great battle (as Psammetichus III had in 525), Pharnabazus might hope for a quick decision and a short campaign. If protracted operations were necessary, the Persian force might at least seize one or more bases in the Delta before the full flood and then resume operations after the flood. Ships could protect such bases or, possibly, advance to Memphis even during the Nile flood stage.

The Persian fleet and army moved in tandem along the coast to Egypt.³ From the absence of any report of opposition en route, we may that infer the “king of the Arabs,” whose allegiance Artaxerxes had been concerned about a decade earlier, had realigned with Artaxerxes during the Cypriot War and remained faithful. Polyaeus preserves another illustration of Iphicrates’ foresight and attention to detail in connection with the trek. Facing a two-day march through “sandy country” destitute of water (an indication of the breakdown of the system of water provision
for settlements in the Sinai the Persians had established in the late sixth or early fifth century), Iphicrates had his men fill water casks and march through the night, camping and resting during the heat of the day, then completing the march the following night (Polyaen. 3.9.47).

As the force reached the vicinity of Pelusium, it found the first indications of effective Egyptian defensive measures: “When they came near the Nile, they found that the Egyptians had manifestly completed their preparations for war” (Diod. 15.41.4). Thanks to intelligence from Chabrias, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates probably knew a good deal about the general features of Nectanebo’s preparations, but Chabrias’ information was six years old and concerned construction projects in their early stages before the Egyptians had “completed their preparations for war.” Now a finished system of defense confronted the Persian commanders. Reconnaissance must have quickly revealed that the mouth of the Pelusiac branch was blocked and that moles obstructed the channel itself. In addition, the land approaches to Pelusium had been flooded. The first Egyptian site Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ invading force reached was thus quite secure against attack, at least against any quick attack which might give the Persians a foothold in the northeastern corner of the Delta.

Prepared for the possibility of obstacles on the eastern frontier, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates turned immediately to their transport ships to bypass Pelusium and move contingents to the mouths of other Nile branches. Pharnabazus and Iphicrates boarded some troops—subsequent references to “Iphicrates’ men” indicates this was largely, probably entirely, a mercenary force—and put out to sea out of sight of land. They bypassed the mouth of the Saitic branch (on which Tanis was located) and moved to the mouth of the Mendesian branch, roughly forty miles west of Pelusium. Here broad flats stretched out from the mouth itself and permitted amphibious landings some distance from any entrenched defending force.

Diodorus says nothing about the rest of the Persian army at this point, but it is necessary to assume that the main Persian force meanwhile established a camp somewhere east of Pelusium and that ships and men not involved in the Mendesian landing simply waited. Diodorus follows the actions at the Mendesian mouth. Together with Iphicrates, Pharnabazus took the lead in person. It was probably here that Iphicrates dealt with the absence of harbors along the coastline by having each ship captain suspend forty bags of sand from the sides of his ship to stabilize (counterbalance?) the ships for unloading (Polyaen. 3.9.38), further evidence of Iphicrates’ careful, foresighted preparations. Probably repeating maneuvers they had rehearsed in sham attacks near Acco, 3,000 men disembarked on the flats and advanced to “the walled stronghold” guarding the mouth. Actually, it appears the stronghold straddled the branch, with towers on each riverbank and a wooden bridge spanning the channel from which defenders could assault any ships attempting to move upriver. Egyptian defenders on horseback and on foot moved out of the stronghold and fought with intensity. But the arrival of additional Persian forces—more mercenaries—from the ships offshore decided the battle. Iphicrates’
troops were able to surround the Egyptian defenders who had sallied out of the stronghold and kill or capture many of them. Surviving defenders withdrew frantically into the stronghold, but “Iphicrates’ men” mixed with them and were thus able to seize the fortification from the inside. (This suggests that the Egyptian defense force included Greek mercenaries indistinguishable from Iphicrates’ mercenaries or that because of the changes in arms and clothing that Iphicrates’ men had made they closely resembled Egyptian fighters.) Diodorus states that Iphicrates’ men then utterly destroyed the *phrourion*—the garrison or citadel (Diod. 15.42.4–5). However, Diodorus’ accounts of subsequent fighting make it clear that Pharnabazus and Iphicrates’ landing force now occupied the fortified site here, so what they utterly destroyed was probably the Egyptian (and Greek?) force manning the citadel.

Pharnabazus and Iphicrates thus swiftly achieved the first Persian objective—the seizure of a base for further operations. But at this point, the two fell into bitter disagreement over the next move. Captives (Greek mercenaries?) told Iphicrates that Memphis was undefended—Nectanebo had thrown all his forces into the defense of the Delta. Control of Memphis was the key to recovering control of Egypt. From that base it would be possible for a Persian army to move northward against Egyptian forces in the Delta, much as Megabyzus had done in the 450s. South of Memphis, Upper Egypt lacked defenses of its own and would likely submit spontaneously. As Iphicrates well knew from Athens’ futile effort to take Memphis in the 450s, when the White Wall, Memphis’ great citadel, was properly defended, it was virtually invulnerable. Undefended, however, Memphis could be captured by a relatively small force and probably without a battle. Iphicrates thus proposed taking the mercenaries on hand—meaning those already at the Mendesian base—and sailing immediately upriver to Memphis (this suggests that he also learned that at least the Mendesian branch was not secured further upriver by any Egyptian river fleet, possibly because the Egyptians were relying on defenses at the mouth of the Mendesian branch to block entry) before the Egyptians, knowing now that the Persians had a base in the Delta and that they could move soon to Memphis, threw defenders into Memphis (Diod. 15.43.1).

In reporting at length the disagreement between Iphicrates and Pharnabazus, Diodorus’ sources may have been trying to contrast Greek enterprise and daring with Persian weakness and diffidence. But the disagreement really revolved around two conflicting, equally defensible strategic options. It was certainly also Pharnabazus’ intention to move against Memphis. It was, after all, the strategic key. But Pharnabazus insisted on waiting until the entire Persian force was assembled at the Mendesian mouth before advancing to Memphis, arguing, according to Diodorus (15.43.1), that the campaign against Memphis would then be more secure. Pharnabazus’ position is easy to understand. He knew that there were far more Egyptian troops in the Delta than those which had fought so far at the Mendesian mouth. Iphicrates might have swiftness in his favor, but he certainly did not have numbers. Even if he were able to take Memphis without opposition, he
might not easily hold it for long. Iphicrates himself might end up under siege in the White Wall and thus along with his mercenaries be unavailable for further operations. Moreover, if Iphicrates took a sizable Greek mercenary force upriver, he would deplete the forces securing the Pharnabazus’ Mendesian base. That would put the reinforcement operations and the continuing Persian hold on this critical base at risk and also make the primary Persian camp in the eastern Delta vulnerable to concentrated Egyptian attack. Not surprisingly, Pharnabazus believed it better to secure the Delta base well and then move on with a full force. If this meant encountering a large Egyptian force, so much the better; a big battle could decide the war at once.

Iphicrates persisted, demanding the mercenaries and threatening that failure to seize the moment would mean the failure of the whole campaign. Possibly—although Diodorus does not represent him making this particular argument—Iphicrates also had in mind the need to achieve success before the full flood stage of the Nile severely hampered troop movements and produced another period of forced inactivity and possibly another bout of mercenary discontent. According to Diodorus, Iphicrates’ persistence ultimately made Pharnabazus suspicious that Iphicrates actually aimed at holding Egypt for himself (kat’ idian—privately). Diodorus’ observation a line after this that some [Persian] commanders were jealous of Iphicrates and were fixing unjust slanders on him may well point to the source of such a suspicion (Diod. 15.43.2), but Pharnabazus himself had long experience with “perfidious Greeks” going back to the Spartans after the Peloponnesian War and to Conon in the 390s. The accusation made by Persian commanders may have been that Iphicrates wished to seize Memphis so that he could then ransom it for enormous profit. Knowledge of Nectanebo’s readiness to spend and Persian experience with the willingness of Greek mercenaries and mercenary commanders to serve the highest bidder and change sides in mid-campaign would lend plausibility to such charges. If Iphicrates went to Memphis with Greek mercenaries and Pharnabazus and the rest of the Persian expeditionary army became trapped in camps at edge of Delta, Iphicrates would end up effectively independent. Unable to gain full victory by himself, Iphicrates’ best move would then be to make a deal with Nectanebo. Pharnabazus was evidently as adamant as Iphicrates was, and in the end Iphicrates stayed with Pharnabazus. But this acrimonious disagreement seems to have poisoned their relationship.

Pharnabazus’ caution is understandable, but it meant delaying any action for some time as troops and supplies were ferried over from the camp east of Pelusium. Predictably, Nectanebo used the opportunity to make necessary adjustments, sending a force to Memphis and concentrating the rest of his manpower for an assault on the Persian base at the Mendesian mouth. According to Diodorus, Egyptian troops now attacked the Persian position (the “ruined polismation,” Diodorus calls it), making “incessant close engagements.” Egyptian forces had the advantage because of “the strength of their arms,” and “with ever-increasing strength [in numbers],” they killed many Persians and grew confident against them. Finally, Diodorus continues, as this campaign around Pharnabazus’ Mendesian base persisted and the
Etesian winds came up, the Nile began flooding and made Egypt increasingly more secure. With these circumstances constantly acting against them, the Persian commanders “decided to make a withdrawal from Egypt” (Diod. 15.43.3–4).

Egyptian successes as described by Diodorus seem intelligible only if Pharnabazus did not yet have the full Persian force at this disposal. He wanted to assemble it all at the Mendesian mouth before moving out of the base the Persians had seized there. Possibly the transfer of troops was underway, but not yet completed, as the very large Egyptian force mounted its attack on the Persian base. Diodorus’ description of close fighting “near the polismation” points to intense fighting in the vicinity of the fortified base rather than assaults on the fortification itself (15.43.4). It appears that what Egyptian forces were really doing was attacking Persian troops being landed from transport ships on the flats near the mouth itself (while holding within the fort the complement of troops already there). But this alone was not sufficient to prompt Persian withdrawal. Fighting evidently went on and on. Diodorus’ reference to the Etesian winds may furnish the clue to the biggest Persian problem. These winds blow from the north during the summer months and often reach near gale force during August, exactly the time the flood conditions described by Diodorus prevail. Persian reinforcements as well as supplies had to be carried by ship from the camp somewhere east of Pelusium to the Mendesian mouth and offloaded there. Egyptian attacks made these operations difficult, but the winds may have made them impossible. The situation at the Mendesian mouth thus likely became untenable, probably during August. Rather than face constant Egyptian assault amid deteriorating conditions (a situation likely too reminiscent of circumstances during the 390/89–388/7 campaign), Pharnabazus and his staff decided to withdraw from this now vulnerable base.

Nearly identical conditions compelled the Macedonian general Antigonus Monophthalmus to withdraw from Egypt the invasion force he led against his rival Ptolemy in 306, and the fairly detailed account of this campaign that Diodorus (20.73–76) provides allows us to appreciate the great difficulties posed by powerful north winds. Strong fortifications at Pelusium kept Antigonus from moving his force upriver on the Pelusiac branch, and the width of the river itself kept his troops from crossing it and then advancing westward. So, as Pharnabazus and Iphicrates did in 373, Antigonus landed troops from ships at another of the Delta mouths (in this case, the Phanaitic mouth). But when his son Demetrius with the rest of the fleet tried to land additional troops and supplies, “a strong north wind burst upon them and the billows rose high; and three of his quadriremes and in the same way some of the transports were cast violently upon the land by the waves and came into the possession of Ptolemy.” Though some ships did make land, it proved impossible to supply Antigonus’ force, and he withdrew “to Syria,” intending later to “make a campaign with more complete preparation and at the time at which the Nile was supposed to be at its lowest” (Diod. 20.75.4–76.6). Antigonus’ invasion evidently took place in November, but conditions involving powerful north winds were much the same, if not more severe, in August.
In Diodorus’ account, the Persian force under Pharnabazus now headed back to “Asia.” On the way, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates fell into disagreement again. About what exactly, Diodorus does not say—he probably did not know. But given Iphicrates’ responsibility for so much of the planning and preparations, Iphicrates certainly had a proprietary interest in the campaign, and he perhaps continued to complain about Pharnabazus’ refusal to allow him to proceed immediately to Memphis. Pharnabazus may finally have threatened Iphicrates (did he remind Iphicrates of Conon’s fate?). Taking Pharnabazus at his word, Iphicrates “decided to flee secretly from the camp” (15.43.5), most likely meaning the camp established east of Pelusium, not one at Acco. Securing a ship, he slipped away at night and returned to Athens by November/December 373.

While Diodorus, following his sources’ emphasis on the Iphicrates-Pharnabazus (Greek-Persian) conflict, attributes Iphicrates’ flight to renewed disagreement between the two, we may suspect that having lost Pharnabazus’ support as a result of the argument at the Mendesian mouth, Iphicrates simply left when the opportunity presented itself rather than submit to Pharnabazus’ superior authority. Compare Iphicrates’ reaction in 389/8 when he recommended seizure of the Corinthian acropolis but was prevented by the dēmos—he abruptly resigned his stratēgia (Diod. 14.92.2).

Pharnabazus subsequently sent envoys to Athens to accuse Iphicrates of responsibility for the failure to capture Egypt and, presumably, to demand punishment (15.43.6). Iphicrates’ crime was his flight, not his previously proposed strategy of heading immediately toward Memphis. If his flight could be termed responsible for the failure to take Egypt, then up to the time of Iphicrates’ nocturnal departure Pharnabazus’ plan must have been to continue operations in Egypt. The withdrawal from the Mendesian mouth was, in other words, a strategic withdrawal and not an abandonment of the whole campaign. Given the enormous scale of the Persian enterprise and the length of the preparations preceding the actual invasion, it is difficult to believe that Pharnabazus and his staff would terminate the entire campaign after only several months. It is further difficult to believe that they could have made such a move on their own without the approval of Artaxerxes, who was, in Pharnabazus’ own words, “the master of his actions.” And Artaxerxes, who had left the previous expeditionary force in Egypt for three years (or at least something approaching that), would certainly not have authorized termination after just a single push in 373.

Most probably, Pharnabazus’ original plan at the time of the withdrawal was to hold the full Persian force in the encampment east of Pelusium away from constant attack and beyond the flood zone until the flood and the late summer windstorms subsided and then to renew operations. If the withdrawal took place in late summer—late August or September—it would be possible to resume operations as the waters receded after October (when there was typically a short second rising). Supplies amassed over the long period of preparation were probably sufficient to support the big force for months. Then, with the mobility provided by his ships,
Pharnabazus could attack any one of the mouths of the Nile. Until he did so, Nectanebo would be in the same position he was in at the time of the Persian arrival in early 373—not knowing just where the Persians would attack. He would have to divide his forces again among the various branches of the Nile, and thus confront Pharnabazus with only a portion of the force he had been able to concentrate at the Mendesian mouth after Persian seizure of a base there. Pharnabazus’ prospects of success depended on being able again to utilize his Greek mercenary troops as an advance assault force to seize a base for use by the full Persian force. There had been extensive Persian casualties during the fighting in summer 373, but the huge size of the Persian expeditionary force and the fact that much of it probably never reached the Mendesian mouth meant that Pharnabazus could still deploy overwhelming force if he had a base from which to launch it—if, in other words, the Greek mercenaries did their job of securing a fortified site somewhere west of Pelusium once again.

It is clear, therefore, that Diodorus has severely condensed and distorted what happened in late summer 373 (of course, with Iphicrates’ role diminished and his departure imminent, Diodorus’ sources undoubtedly lost interest in further details of the campaign). When Diodorus reports Iphicrates’ flight from camp, we should understand flight from the camp east of Pelusium, not flight from some temporary stopping point on the way to “Asia.” This explains Iphicrates’ ability to find a ship for his flight—the whole Persian fleet was linked to the land force and probably harbored close by the camp. There were likely many merchants, undoubtedly including Athenians, offering markets to the Persian force (we may compare the Lydian market accompanying Cyrus’ army in 401: Xen. An. 1.3.21), and among these, we may assume, Iphicrates found a willing accomplice. As paymaster for the large mercenary force, Iphicrates undoubtedly had a good deal of money with which to “buy” his escape ship. His night flight suggests he had not far to go to reach his rendezvous—again pointing to camp and fleet being closely linked.

If Pharnabazus subsequently claimed that Iphicrates had been responsible for the failure of the campaign, which must mean, more specifically, that Iphicrates’ flight was responsible for the campaign’s failure, we may speculate that after Iphicrates’ departure, Pharnabazus’ now leaderless Greek mercenary army became unmanageable or unreliable. During the lengthy preparations preceding the invasion, Iphicrates himself had had to work hard to keep the mercenaries busy and compliant. With Iphicrates gone, Pharnabazus had no such effective disciplinarian and leader. Pay problems, always a feature of Persian campaigns, may have alienated the mercenaries Iphicrates left behind. Pharnabazus may finally have concluded he could not trust them to perform—they were, after all, Iphicratenses. Pharnabazus certainly remembered the intractability of Orontes’ Greek force on Cyprus following the arrest of Tiribazus. He might even fear the defection of the Iphicratenses to Nectanebo. In this situation, Pharnabazus could not initiate any new offensive. Ultimately, then, his only alternative was to abandon the campaign and withdraw entirely from Egypt all the way back to Acco. Lacking supplies for
maintaining the huge expeditionary force in Acco, Pharnabazus presumably discharged some of it over the winter of 373/2. By this time, back in Athens and in Athenian service once again, Iphicrates was in Corcyra, involved in an entirely different, Athenian war (Dem. 49.9, 13, 22).

Thus, within a year of its initiation and after six years of preparations—twelve years if Persian response to Acoris’ counteroffensive after 386 is treated as the beginning of preparations for a renewed Persian attack on Egypt—the great campaign against Egypt was over. Persian forces had gotten no further than the very edge of the Delta and had done nothing more than destroy fortifications and a bridge guarding the Mendesian mouth. It might seem surprising that we hear of no punishments by Artaxerxes. He had recently executed high-ranking commanders after a disastrous Cadusian campaign (Plut. Artax. 24.1–25.3). The collapse of the Egyptian campaign was a failure on a much greater scale than that of the Cadusian War. The critical difference between the two disasters, however, was Artaxerxes’ personal involvement in the Cadusian campaign, which meant that he had to deflect blame for its failure to others. In the case of the Egyptian disaster, blame would naturally fall on its commander, Pharnabazus. But Pharnabazus may have been able to argue successfully that neither he nor the campaign strategy had failed. Both had been betrayed by Iphicrates, whose flight, not setbacks suffered by Pharnabazus’ force in Egypt, was responsible for terminating the campaign.

Egyptians certainly knew nothing of the Iphicrates-Pharnabazus rift and the real causes of Persian withdrawal from Egypt and abandonment of the long-planned campaign after just a few months’ effort. Given the lengthy Persian preparations, the enormous scale of the invasion force, and the Persian king’s well-known determination, Egyptians could see the abrupt termination of the Persian attack only as certain evidence of the restoration of Egyptian might. Soon after seizing the kingship, Nectanebo had presented himself the great protector of Egypt, the “mighty monarch guarding Egypt” and “the powerful one with active arm, sword master who attacks a host, fiery-hearted at seeing his foes.” For Egyptians, the seemingly miraculous repulse of the great Persian host undoubtedly confirmed such claims and illustrated the power of Nectanebo as Horus incarnate. Not surprisingly, the statue cult of Nectanebo as the divine falcon (Horus) now gained great popularity throughout Egypt. Observers outside Egypt might not put their reactions in the same terms, but they too must have seen in the Persian withdrawal proof of Egyptian power.
Although Pharnabazus withdrew from Egypt in late 373, it is most likely that he did not disband the expeditionary force entirely, but kept a sizable portion of it under arms (as Persian commanders had done after withdrawing from Greece in 479). Prudence alone dictated such a measure. The Egyptian king Acoris had taken advantage of Persian withdrawal in 388/7 to launch a military and diplomatic counteroffensive which gave Egypt (for a time) control of much of the eastern Mediterranean. With his Egyptian and Greek troops fully mustered for the 373 invasion, Nectanebo I might easily do the same on the heels of Persian withdrawal. Beyond this consideration, it must have seemed to Artaxerxes and his advisers that, with the 373 fleet intact, new preparations, involving only the mustering of additional troops and stockpiling fresh supplies, could be accomplished quickly and the attack on Egypt could be resumed in short order.

Despite their many discipline problems, Iphicrates’ mercenaries had proved indispensable. Such a force, perhaps expanded in size, would be critical in the renewed campaign. The most immediate Persian need, therefore, was recruiting a new Iphicrates. Iphicrates’ replacement turned out to be another (and Pharnabazus’ third) Athenian, Conon’s son Timotheus. According to testimony in a lawsuit brought against Timotheus in 362 by Apollodorus, son of the Athenian banker Pasion, Timotheus left Athens during the month of Thargelion (late May/early June) in the year of the archonship of Asteius (= 373/2; cf. Diod. 15.48.1) “to conduct the war against Egypt for the king” ([Dem.] 49.25, 30). The steps leading to this probably started with the embassy Pharnabazus sent to Athens to complain about Iphicrates late in 373 or early in 372 (Diod. 15.43.6). Pharnabazus hardly dispatched envoys just to register complaints. Nor is it likely that Pharnabazus wanted to persuade the Athenians to send Iphicrates back to him. Certainly the
primary mission of Pharnabazus’ embassy was to recruit a new commander to take over the mercenary force Iphicrates had left with Pharnabazus.

As was the case with Iphicrates, Pharnabazus already knew Tiribazus. Two decades earlier, Timotheus had been with his father Conon at the Battle of Cnidus and probably for the whole period of Conon’s Persian service. In his late thirties or early forties now, Timotheus did not have the extraordinary reputation that Iphicrates had, but as stratēgos (elected general) at Athens each year from 377/6 through 373/2 he was an experienced and successful commander, both on land and at sea (Diod. 15.29.7; Xen. Hell. 5.4.63; Isoc. 15.109). Fortunately for Pharnabazus, at this time Timotheus needed just the kind of employment Pharnabazus’ envoys offered. He had lost his command late in 373 after spending most of the summer seeking funds in the north Aegean when he had been ordered to Corcyra, and he was facing a politically charged review at the end of the Athenian civil year in mid-372. Timotheus thus certainly welcomed a job which would absent him from Athens, and the prospect of great financial reward must have made Persian service even more desirable. We may imagine that Pharnabazus’ agents concluded arrangements with Timotheus very quickly and that Timotheus left Athens for Acco not long after the envoys’ visit. This means that the envoys’ visit to Athens may be dated as late as spring 372. There would thus have been ample time between Pharnabazus’ withdrawal from Egypt in late summer 373 and his dispatch of envoys to Athens for Pharnabazus to visit Artaxerxes, explain the situation, and receive authorization to prepare a new campaign, starting with the hiring of a new Greek commander.

From Nepos’ Life of Datames we learn that Pharnabazus and Tithraustes, Artaxerxes’ Egyptian expert and his vizier (and himself a veteran of the early 380s campaign) respectively, oversaw initial campaign preparations (Dat. 3.5). Presumably this reflects the fact that Artaxerxes confirmed Pharnabazus’ continuing command and that Pharnabazus along with Tithraustes, Artaxerxes’ chief subordinate, began the mustering process. But at some point Artaxerxes appointed a new commander, Datames, the satrap of Cappadocia, and thanks to Nepos’ Life of Datames we have valuable information about Artaxerxes’ new, post-373 Egyptian campaign.

Nepos treats Datames’ whole career in terms of a series of extraordinary exploits, and he presents Datames’ appointment as joint commander with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes as the result of Datames’ capture of the Paphlagonian dynast Thuys (Nep. Dat. 2.2–5). Datames delivered Thuys in person to Artaxerxes, who, according to Nepos, was so impressed by Datames, who had already distinguished himself in Artaxerxes’ Cadusian War a few years earlier, that he appointed him to joint command of the army being prepared for the Egyptian war by Pharnabazus and Tithraustes. Then, Nepos writes, following a period of collaboration between Pharnabazus and Datames (Nepos does not mention Tithraustes again), Artaxerxes recalled Pharnabazus, and Datames took sole command (Dat. 3.3–5)

Using some of this information but not relying on Datames’ exploits as explanation, we may fashion a more plausible account. We know that the expeditionary
force assembled after the 373 campaign included many levies from central and southern Anatolia. As Cappadocian satrap and a figure who had already gained a great military reputation in Artaxerxes’ recent Cadusian War, Datames likely commanded these levies. Nepos’ report that Datames’ became co-commander with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes as a result of his capture of Thuys may simply mean that some time after delivering Thuys to Artaxerxes, Datames joined the expeditionary force with levies from Anatolia. Datames’ subsequent assumption of sole command after a period of collaboration with Pharnabazus was probably just a matter of age giving way to youth. Pharnabazus was at least in his seventies by this time, and after sharing his Egyptian experiences with Datames he may have moved on to a well-deserved retirement; he may well have died soon after this—we do not hear of him again.

Datames’ appointment may have led to the end of Timotheus’ employment. Later we meet a Greek, Mandrocles of Magnesia, as Datames’ most important subordinate (Nep. Dat. 5.6). We know nothing else about Mandrocles, but as Timotheus was “Pharnabazus’ Greek,” so Mandrocles may have been “Datames’ Greek” on his general staff, rendering Timotheus superfluous. Possibly, there was also a preexisting relationship between Datames and Mandrocles, which might mean that Persian (Datames) and Greek (Mandrocles) commanders, already associated with each other, might cooperate better than Pharnabazus and Iphicrates had and better than Datames and Timotheus could be expected to. Timotheus evidently returned to Athens before 370/69, when he performed a syntr hierarchy, and if we see his departure as the result of displacement by Datames’ Greek subordinate Mandrocles, we may date Datames’ assumption of sole command to late 371/0 or early 370/69.

Although Nepos has Datames industriously readying the army (was he practicing Iphicrates’ assault tactics?) and preparing to set out for Egypt (Dat. 4.1), the expeditionary force evidently remained in place for several years. The need to recruit a sufficiently large number of Greek mercenaries may have been an important reason for the delay. The 373 Persian strategy had emphasized mobility—having the capability to seize a base at any vulnerable point and then pour overwhelming manpower into it to secure the site for further operations. It had worked, up to a point. Iphicrates’ mercenaries had been able to make a maritime landing and then assault and occupy a fortified base on the Mendesian branch of the Nile. But once Egyptian troops responded in full strength, the whole Persian operation stalled even as additional Persian troops were reinforcing the initial Persian assault force. Thus, the primary strategic lesson of the 373 effort was that taking and holding a single fortified site invited concentrated attack by well-prepared Egyptian troops. Multiple and simultaneous assaults which would force the Egyptian king to divide his forces to counterattack separate sites would be more likely to succeed. If these could be coupled with a thrust toward Memphis right from the beginning, Egyptian response capabilities would be further limited. Adopting such a revised strategy meant having to enlist even more mercenary forces than previously to permit multiple, simultaneous initial assaults.
Not surprisingly, then, we see Artaxerxes making repeated efforts to gather additional mercenaries. In 372/1, just as preparations for the renewed attack on Egypt were beginning, Artaxerxes dispatched envoys to Greece to call upon “the Greeks to settle their internecine wars and establish a common peace in accordance with the covenants they had formerly made” (Diod. 15.50.44). Greek cities were not disrupting Persian affairs anywhere, and Artaxerxes certainly had no interest in Greek politics for their own sake, so we may most plausibly see his promotion of a common peace in Greece in 372/1 as an indication of his need for mercenaries, as it had been when he last intervened in Greek affairs in 375 (Diod. 15.38.1).¹¹

Theban refusal to agree to the proposed common peace led to a Spartan advance into central Greece and to a decisive Theban victory over the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra in 371, which opened the door to Theban campaigns in the Peloponnesus. With Persian preparations for the Egyptian campaign now well advanced, Artaxerxes tried again in 369/8 to move the mainland Greeks toward peace. Through Ariobarzanes, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, he dispatched two Asian Greeks, Philiscus of Abydus and Diomedon of Cyzicus, as envoys. Using bribes and promises, they managed to get the Thebans and their allies to a peace conference at Delphi. But when the Thebans, who by this time had liberated Messenia (where Sparta’s economically vital helot population dwelled) from Spartan control, refused to recognize Spartan dominion over Messenia, the conference broke up (Xen. Hell. 7.1.27). Philiscus paid for a 2,000-man mercenary force for the Spartans, evidently hoping that this would tip the scales in Sparta’s favor and permit the Spartans to settle affairs on a lasting basis. Fighting continued in the Peloponnes, and in spring/early summer 367 the Spartans annihilated a large Arcadian force (the “Teary Battle”). But no peace ensued, and casualties—reportedly 10,000 on the Arcadian side, according to Diodorus—meant the potential mercenary pool from the Peloponnes was much diminished (Xen. Hell. 7.1.31–32; Diod. 15.72.3–4).¹² Ultimately, in 367/6, Artaxerxes shifted his backing to the Thebans, but they too proved unable to impose peace on the Greek mainland city-states.¹³

While such problems delayed the completion of preparations for a renewed attack on Egypt, the expeditionary force still certainly played an important security role which justified keeping it at the ready indefinitely. Simply by being in place in Phoenicia, Datames’ army guarded against any Egyptian enterprise of the sort Acoris had undertaken in the 380s. Thanks to the delay, Datames was able to keep up with satrapal responsibilities even while functioning as expeditionary commander. He returned, for example, to Anatolia at Artaxerxes’ command to attack Aspis, the ruler of Cataonia (the region between Cilicia and Cappadocia), who had been ravaging widely and attacking tribute caravans.¹⁴

At some point, however, Datames abandoned the expeditionary force in Phoenicia, hastened back to eastern Anatolia, and set about securing himself against attack and displacement. Nepos has a rather full account of these developments. Datames’ achievement in swiftly capturing Aspis and sending him under arrest to
Artaxerxes, Nepos writes, gained him great favor with Artaxerxes, but great jealousy on the part of “the courtiers,” who were resentful “because they saw that he had become greater than all of them.” Consequently, they all conspired to crush him. A court official—Pandantes, “the keeper of the royal treasure”—advised Datames that he would be in great danger if any adverse things happened while he commanded in Egypt. Datames, now back in Acco, decided to revolt from the king.

Yet, Nepos observes, Datames did “nothing unworthy of his own faithfulness.” He put Mandrocles of Magnesia in charge of the army at Acco and “with his own men” went off to Cappadocia—that is, he returned to his satrapy (Dat. 5.2–6). Additional notices from Nepos, Polyaeus, Aeneas Tacticus, and the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica illustrate Datames’ subsequent wide-ranging activities: strengthening his position in central Anatolia, overrunning Paphlagonia, garrisoning various strongholds, and attacking Greek cities on the Black Sea coast.

Nepos connects Datames’ defection to the situation at court, specifically to a conspiracy mounted by jealous court officials, and Datames’ anticipation of punishment by Artaxerxes. However, in his Life of Artaxerxes, Plutarch presents an account of court politics during Artaxerxes II’s last years that allows us to see that Datames’ actions took place in the context of an ongoing succession struggle in which, as Plutarch puts it, Artaxerxes’ sons were contending for the kingship by means of “friends”—the term for the most favored of royal officials—and powerful families (Artax. 26.1).

Four sons figure in Plutarch’s account as notable candidates for the succession: Darius, the eldest; Ariaspes, a “legitimate” son very popular with “the Persians”; Arsames, an “illegitimate” son (meaning one whose mother was a woman other than the queen) who was a special favorite of Artaxerxes; and Ochus, the youngest of the four. Artaxerxes responded finally to the growing factionalization at court by elevating his eldest son Darius (in his fifties by this time) to a co-kingship in an effort to resolve the matter. But as Artaxerxes showed no signs of imminent demise, Darius’ backers became impatient. Plutarch names Tiribazus in particular (certainly the same Tiribazus who had commanded in the Cypriot War in the 380s before being accused by Orontes and recalled by Artaxerxes—he had evidently remained at court after his acquittal on Orontes’ charges) as a close associate of Darius who worked on Darius’ insecurities. Ultimately, Darius, Tiribazus, and “many others” conspired to murder Artaxerxes II to clear the way for Darius’ succession. However, apprised of the plot by a eunuch, Artaxerxes escaped (supposedly identifying each conspirator by sight before fleeing his bedchamber—a good way of explaining the ensuing wholesale roundup and executions). Tiribazus perished in the attempt. Darius fell to execution shortly afterwards. All Darius’ sons but one were executed, as were the wives and children of all the conspirators (Plut. Artax. 26.1–29.7; Just. 10.1.1–26).

Ariaspes, as “the only legitimate son of the king remaining,” seems now to have been next in line, with Arsames, reportedly Artaxerxes’ special favorite, likely next after him should anything happen to Ariaspes. Plutarch’s account follows Ochus’ efforts to displace both these figures. In the case of Ariaspes, this was a gradual pro-
cess, as Ochus arranged to have eunuchs and “friends of the king”—the men most favored by the king—communicate repeatedly to Ariaspes “sundry threatening and terrifying utterances implying that his father had determined to put him to a cruel and shameful death,” sometimes telling Ariaspes that Artaxerxes was on the verge of acting, sometimes that he was delaying. Ultimately, the fear and uncertainty that this engendered drove Ariaspes to suicide. Artaxerxes reportedly suspected intrigue here but could not “search out and convict the guilty one”—that is, while the king suspected Ochus, he lacked sufficient proof. Ochus now had to deal with Arsames, whom Plutarch terms Artaxerxes’ chief support and confidant at this point. Those around Ochus, Plutarch says, did not delay the act, but bringing over to their side Arpates, the son of Tiribazus, they slew Arsames through him. The news of this was too much for Artaxerxes, at this time already hovering between life and death. Aged ninety-four (according to Plutarch), he expired “straightway of grief and despair” (Artax. 30.15).16

Although Plutarch recounts these events in rapid sequential fashion, it is clear that the whole struggle extended over many years, with the successive conspiracies taking some time to develop before reaching their respective culminations. In one form or another, the succession struggle likely stretched over at least the whole decade preceding Artaxerxes’ death in 359/8. There is no difficulty, then, in seeing the earliest phase involving Darius’ plans to seize power taking shape during the time Datames headed Artaxerxes’ Egyptian expeditionary army at Acco in the early 360s. Viewed in the context of the nascent succession struggle, Nepos’ report of a conspiracy at court to remove Datames is entirely plausible. Datames had under him a huge army, the only large Persian force under arms at the moment and one which included a sizable number of Greek mercenaries. Well aware that Artaxerxes had repeatedly shown special favor to Datames and believing that Datames was loyal to Artaxerxes, Darius, Tiribazus, and Darius’ court faction likely feared Datames’ reaction should they do away with Artaxerxes and began to plot to remove Datames from the army at Acco. Getting wind of this, Pandantes warned Datames that he was being targeted, and Datames left Acco abruptly and took steps to secure himself in Anatolia.17

When Datames left the expeditionary army at Acco, he took with him what Nepos calls “his own men.” In Diodorus’ account of Datames’ subsequent actions, Datames appears with a very large mercenary force (15.91.2; cf. Nep. Dat. 8.2). Anecdotes in Polyaeus and the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica depicting Datames as much concerned about paying mercenaries and employing various stratagems to delay payment or get funds confirm his dependence on mercenaries (Polyen. 7.21.1; [Arist.] Oec. 2.2.24a). Most likely, the force of “his own men” that Datames took when he left the expeditionary army was a company of Greek mercenaries. If we date Datames’ assumption of sole command to 371–370, we may give him perhaps two to three years as sole commander supervising preparations (and at the same time heading the security force that the expeditionary army at Acco constituted) and date his defection to 369–367.18
As a Persian official, Datames was satrap of Cappadocia. But his mother was Paphlagonian, and through her, Datames was related to the “royal” family in Paphlagonia which traced its descent back to the Homeric Pylaemenes (Nep. Dat. 2.2; cf. Iliad 2.851–7). The Paphlagonian dynast Thuys whom Datames had earlier arrested and delivered to Artaxerxes was in fact Datames’ own cousin, the son of his mother’s brother. According to Nepos (Dat. 2.2–3), Datames suppressed Thuys on behalf of Artaxerxes in an effort to assert Persian authority over Paphlagonia, but the removal of Thuys may have made Datames himself effectively dynast of Paphlagonia, or at least have given him the basis for making such a claim. We can thus see in Nepos’ report that after leaving Acco, Datames went off to Cappadocia and took possession of the neighboring district of Paphlagonia, evidence of Datames’ intention to remove himself to this largely mountainous and rather isolated region traditionally outside of or only loosely subject to Persian control. Perhaps for the first time, Datames now asserted his own direct control over the region, installing his “friends” in fortified sites (and communicating with Ariobarzanes, whose own satrapy bordered Paphlagonia and who might worry about Datames’ intentions). Paphlagonia’s remote location offered secure sanctuary for Datames, but it provided little to support his mercenary force. However, on Paphlagonia’s Black Sea coast were wealthy Greek cities like Sinope and Amisus, and Datames extended his activities there, besieging Sinope and announcing his plan to advance to Amisus (Polyaen. 7.21.1–2; 5; Aen. Tact. 40.4–5).

On the evidence of Datames’ activities immediately after leaving the expeditionary army, Nepos’ remark that initially Datames did nothing unworthy of his fides seems accurate. Strictly speaking, Datames was not in revolt. He sought to secure himself and provide for his troops, but he engaged in no overt hostilities against imperial interests. An anecdote in Polyaenus’ Stratagems suggests that Datames in fact attempted conscientiously to maintain the appearance of loyalty:

While besieging Sinope, Datames received a letter from the king, who did not authorize him to continue the siege. When he had read the letter, he made obeisance (proskynēsis) before it and acknowledged the good news by sacrifice on the grounds that he had received great gifts from the king, and at night he boarded a ship and sailed away. (Polyaen. 7.21.5)

On the basis of Datames’ reaction, we may suspect that Artaxerxes’ letter contained professions of continuing friendship. Still, Datames did not return to his command, and his continued unauthorized absence from the army in Phoenicia must have raised Artaxerxes’ suspicions, especially amid the political uncertainties connected with the developing succession struggle. Thus, when Datames’ eldest son Sysinas, who perhaps hoped to replace his father as satrap, reported to the king that Datames had in fact “defected,” Artaxerxes was evidently persuaded that Datames was a great danger (Nep. Dat. 7.1). Having taken control of cities and fortified sites stretching from the Black Sea to Cilicia, Datames held territory which straddled the Royal

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Road linking Sardis and Susa (Hdt. 5.52). If Datames was indeed hostile, he could block overland communication between the center of the empire and Anatolia.22

There are reports of three ostensibly different Persian military operations against Datames: one in Polytenus (7.21.3) involving Artaxerxes himself leading “a big force” and pursuing Datames when Datames at some unspecified time “crossed the Euphrates and made war on the Great King”; a second commanded by Artabazus (the young son of Pharnabazus and grandson of Artaxerxes II) in Diodorus (15.91.2–7, under the year 362/1); and a third commanded by Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia, in Nepos’ Life of Datames (7.1–8.6), apparently placed by Nepos in the second year of Datames’ “revolt.” Despite the differently named commanders, Diodorus’ and Nepos’ accounts seem actually to involve the same enterprise. Both are reported invasions of Cappadocia with a large force; in Nepos’ account, Autophradates loses many thousands, and “more than ten thousand” perish in Diodorus’ Artabazus-Datames battle. Both commend Datames’ for his surpassing skill in stratagems or sagacity in the art of war. Most significantly, both observe at the end of their narratives that after failing militarily, Artaxerxes had to turn to subterfuge instead of direct military attack, clearly indicating that neither Diodorus nor Nepos knew of any further military enterprise against Datames after the one each just described. We may conclude that Nepos’ war involving Autophradates and Datames and Diodorus’ war involving Artabazus and Datames were one and the same—that is, that both men participated in the same campaign. Possibly, as Nepos has it, Autophradates was the commander.23 Autophradates was older, experienced, particularly in Anatolia, and had campaigned previously in Cappadocia (Nep. Dat. 2.1), while Artabazus, though of royal blood as the offspring of Pharnabazus and Artaxerxes’ daughter, was probably in his early twenties and apparently without command experience. Nevertheless, despite Artabazus’ youth, his status as Artaxerxes II’s grandson may have gained him joint command with Autophradates. This would explain how one source might term Autophradates commander and another designate Artabazus as commander in what was actually the same enterprise.

The stratagem described by Polytenus in which Datames eludes a “big force” led by Artaxerxes may indicate that before Autophradates/Artabazus mounted the campaign against Datames recounted by Diodorus and Nepos, Artaxerxes himself took the field in an effort to deal with Datames. The stratagem involves Datames’ resourcefulness in withdrawing across the Euphrates by putting boards on the wheels of wagons (thus turning them into sleds), roping the wagons to horses on the far side of the river, and then pulling the wagons across without having them stick in the muddy river bottom. This took place, Polyaenus says, when Datames crossed the Euphrates and made war on the Great King, who himself had a sizable force but due to limited provisions was advancing only slowly. Thanks to his stratagem, Datames was able to cross the river ten days before the king reached it (Polyen. 7.21.3). As usual, Polytenus provides no background or explicit chronology. But some inferences are possible. Datames seems the initial aggressor in
this situation, having crossed the Euphrates from Cilicia-Cappadocia to make war on Artaxerxes. The insufficient provisioning that slowed Artaxerxes’ force (probably meaning it had to forage) may indicate that hasty deployment by Artaxerxes prevented the usual stockpiling. Given Artaxerxes’ advancing age during the 360s, the fact (if it is that) that Artaxerxes commanded in person suggests a date earlier in the 360s rather than later.

Building on these inferences, we may conjecture that Datames mounted a rather sudden campaign across the Euphrates not long after his “outing” by his son and that Artaxerxes himself (perhaps to ensure against any appointed commander ending up colluding with Datames, but perhaps more probably because there were few dependable commanders available after Artaxerxes’ purge following the recent Cadusian War fiasco) led a hastily assembled force to chase him off, moving in the process well north of the normal crossing points. With Artaxerxes in the field leading a large but slow-moving force, Datames made a quick return back across the Euphrates. Artaxerxes reached the river but did not pursue Datames. All this is reminiscent of the use of a sizable mercenary force and the hasty advance eastward that marked Cyrus the Younger’s attack on Artaxerxes II in 401. Quite possibly, Datames intentionally mimicked Cyrus in an effort to intimidate Artaxerxes and gain a settlement securing his position.24 We might conjecture that when Artaxerxes took the field, effectively announcing his readiness to stand against Datames, Datames withdrew rather than engage. Avoiding the usual crossing points in his haste, Datames then had to improvise a crossing in the fashion described by Polyaenus.

If this hypothesized account of events is accurate, we see Artaxerxes using newly levied troops to respond to Datames rather than troops from the expeditionary force in Phoenicia. He may still have hoped to launch the long-delayed Egyptian campaign despite the apparent defection of its commander Datames. But at the same time, Artaxerxes would have been concerned about possible Egyptian activity if he sent most or all of the big expeditionary force into Cappadocia or Paphlagonia. If Datames’ movement indeed reminded him of Cyrus, Artaxerxes may also have remembered how Abrocomas, diverted along with his expeditionary force in 401, had not been able to engage Cyrus in a timely fashion. It is possible also that Artaxerxes suspected that after years under Datames’ command, some units in the expeditionary force might favor Datames. Probably for a combination of these reasons, Artaxerxes initially left the expeditionary force in place in Phoenicia.

However, although Datames’ initiative across the Euphrates accomplished nothing, it probably demonstrated to Artaxerxes the potential threat Datames represented. Artaxerxes could not simply ignore Datames, and there could certainly be no new campaign into Egypt so long as Datames was at large. Thus, probably not long after his own hasty response to Datames, Artaxerxes ordered the full-scale offensive by Autophradates and Artabazus that Nepos and Diodorus report. Nepos notes under Autophradates’ command 20,000 cavalry, 100,000 special infantry troops (the *kardakes*, or Persian heavy infantry25), and additional thousands of
troops from Cappadocia, Armenia, Paphlagonia, Lydia, Aspendus, Pisidia, Cilicia, and the Captiani (of unknown origin), as well as 3,000 Greek mercenaries, the greatest part of whom were light-armed troops (Dat. 8.2). Even allowing for exaggeration, these figures point to an enormous force, and it is unlikely that Autophradates himself could have assembled them after receiving orders to proceed against Datames, especially since Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and Pisidia were in Datames’ hands at this time. Autophradates’ deployment of such troops and of such a large force is explicable only on the assumption that most or all of the force he led against Datames came from the expeditionary army already assembled for the post-373 Egyptian campaign.26

Possibly, Autophradates himself was already in Acco, commanding levies from Anatolia and preparing to advance with them to Egypt (under Datames’ command). If not, he must have traveled to Acco to take over the contingents he led against Datames.27 In any case, while Autophradates probably left some troops in Phoenicia as security against Egyptian enterprise, he evidently took the bulk of the force with him on campaign now. Autophradates, we know, was back in western Anatolia by 366/5 after his campaign against Datames, so we may plausibly place Autophradates and Artabazus’ war with Datames in 367/6.28

Artaxerxes and Autophradates’ (and Artabazus’) strategy evidently rested on the use of overwhelming force—hence the very large number of troops. Nepos gives Autophradates nearly 170,000 troops to Datames’ 20,000, and while we need not accept the figures themselves, they likely reflect the great numerical superiority of Autophradates’ army. Moving up from Acco through Syria and into Cilicia, Autophrates passed into Cappodocia before Datames mustered enough forces to block the Cilician Gates.29 But after this, Datames managed repeatedly to choose battle sites where Autophradates could not deploy his full force to his advantage.30 Autophradates ended up losing “many thousands,” while Datames’ lost altogether “not more than one thousand.” Finally, Nepos writes, “Autophradates, seeing that to prolong the war was more disastrous to the king than to his adversaries, urged peace and friendship and reconciliation with the king” (Dat. 8.5.). Datames, though suspicious, agreed to send envoys to Artaxerxes. Nepos’ ensuing statement that “thus the war which the king had made upon Datames came to an end” points to a truce and at least a de facto détente between Artaxerxes and Datames. (7.1–8.6)

Large as it was, Autophradates’ force was evidently sufficiently banged up to deter Autophradates from engaging Datames any further. We may suspect, however, that battle casualties were only part of the story. Many troops, back in or near their home regions for the first time in years, may have slipped away or threatened to, thus further diminishing Autophradates’ capabilities. As Datames’ agreement to a truce indicates, Datames had little interest in continuing to fight. A truce gave him what he wanted in the circumstances—immunity from attack and the freedom to entrench himself in the interior. Presumably, so long as the truce lasted, Datames would allow imperial use of the Royal Road in his territory. Between his demonstrated willingness to campaign across the Euphrates and his ability to confront a
large army, Datames in fact won a kind of independence, and he seems to have kept
his side of the truce in following years, not campaigning anywhere and, it appears,
not joining other satraps and officials in subsequent revolts.\textsuperscript{31}

Nepos says only that Autophradates withdrew into Phrygia (\textit{Dat. 8.6}). We need
to turn to other sources to follow his activities and those of the expeditionary force
diverted from Acco. By 366/5—not too long after breaking off operations in
Cappadocia—Autophradates, along with Mausolus (son of Hecatomnus and native
satrap of Caria since 377/6), was engaged in an attack on Ariobarzanes, satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia, besieging Atarneus, Assos, and Adramyttium, sites in the
Troad fortified by Ariobarzanes (\textit{Arist. Pol. 2.1267a10}; \textit{Xen. Ages.} 2.26; \textit{Dem. 15.9};
23.141–143). Anecdotes involving battles between Orontes and Autophradates
probably belong to this time and indicate that Autophradates campaigned also in
Ionia well south of the Troad (\textit{Polyaen. 7.14.2–4}).\textsuperscript{32}

Court politics of one kind or another were probably to blame for the troubles
with Persian officials in western Anatolia. Artabazus, son of Pharnabazus and
grandson of Artaxerxes, may have come to Anatolia for the first time to join with
Autophradates in attacking Datames. Possibly Ariobarzanes, Pharnabazus’ much
older son, who had held the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia ever since
Pharnabazus left in the late 390s for Artaxerxes’ first Egyptian campaign, saw
Artabazus’ presence as a sign that Artaxerxes intended to install his own
grandson Artabazus in the “family” satrapy. Rather than await and accept
replacement, Ariobarzanes may have set about strengthening himself even as
Artabazus and Autophradates were campaigning against Datames, perhaps
believing that if he held on to his satrapy until Artaxerxes died (certainly not too
far in the future), Artaxerxes’ successor, lacking Artaxerxes’ special connection to
Artabazus, would have no interest in installing Artabazus in Ariobarzanes’ place in
Hellespontine Phrygia. Like Datames, Ariobarzanes secured a number of fortified
sites, including Assos, Atarneus, and Adramyttium, actions which could be inter-
preted, like Datames’, as an indication of rebellion.\textsuperscript{33}

Orontes’ apparent defection was a separate affair, probably closely linked to fac-
tional developments at court. Orontes was Artaxerxes’ son-in-law, previously satrap
of Armenia, and with Tiribazus co-commander of Persian forces in the Cypriot
War, but, having been demoted as a result of his false accusations against Tiribazus
near the end of that war, he was now governor of Mysia—probably just a regional
official (a “subsatrap” or hyparch) subordinate to Autophradates at Sardis.\textsuperscript{34} Orontes’
connection with Artaxerxes had perhaps protected him against retaliation by
Tiribazus, but when Orontes learned of Tiribazus’ mounting influence with Darius,
Artaxerxes’ designated heir, he may have grown fearful of delayed vengeance by
Tiribazus.\textsuperscript{35}

In operations in western Anatolia, Autophradates presumably still employed
troops which had constituted much of the expeditionary force mustered at Acco
before being detached to Anatolia to campaign against Datames. But here too
Autophradates proved unable to achieve any victory, breaking off his sieges and
departing from the Troad in late 366 (Xen. Ages. 2.26; Nep. Timoth. 1.3). Attacks on Autophradates’ satrapy by Orontes may have been responsible for Autophradates’ abrupt move (Polyaen 7.14.2), but in his encounters with Orontes at Cyme and another, unspecified location Autophradates similarly achieved nothing, despite reportedly bringing great numbers (myrioi) of horsemen to Cyme (Polyaen. 7.14.3–4).

Autophradates may simply have been a poor general, but political circumspection rather than incompetence may have been responsible for his lack of military success. His apparent readiness in his efforts against all the “rebels,” Datames, Ariobarzanes, and Orontes, to break off campaigns abruptly despite having quite a large force at his disposal arouses suspicion. Was he really trying to win? Or, was he perhaps making a barely sufficient show of effort while conceding de facto independence to other officials? We may see in Autophradates’ behavior here another kind of survival strategy in the midst of ongoing political confusion: maintaining the appearance of dutiful compliance while at the same time conciliating challengers—in other words, preparing for any outcome. Autophradates was probably not the only official ready to adopt such a survival strategy. Mausolus, the native satrap of Caria and Autophradates’ ostensibly dutiful colleague against Ariobarzanes, who similarly abruptly broke off naval blockades (Xen. Ages. 2.26), may have been another.

What finally happened to the force Autophradates commanded? After Autophradates’ futile operations, it disappears entirely from sight. Autophradates’ army had comprised largely Anatolian levies, most of them probably originally collected and brought to Acco by Datames. Autophradates could hardly support these indefinitely, and he may have discharged most of them, while perhaps keeping his mercenary force for his own protection. That would in effect deliver a great deal of potential military manpower to Datames in the form of Cappadocian and Paphlagonian levies. Nevertheless, with the truce with Datames in effect, Autophradates, unable (or unwilling) to accomplish anything militarily and perhaps unable to feed or pay his troops, may simply have released them out of necessity and in the hope that a political solution to Datames’ and others’ “revolts” might soon occur.

The Persian force mustered after 373 for a new campaign against Egypt thus never moved to Egypt. When the force finally did take the field, it engaged in operations against Datames and then against defecting satraps in western Anatolia—figures with far fewer resources than the Egyptian king. The failure of these operations probably offered fresh illustration of Persian military weakness just as much as another failure in Egypt would have.
By 365/4, Persian succession politics were probably still in the initial phase noted by Plutarch in his *Life of Artaxerxes*, with Darius as heir apparent but with the highest officials and most powerful families forming factions behind one or another of Artaxerxes’ sons and possible heirs. The stakes were very high. For many, the right or wrong choice might ultimately mean life or death. Great and persistent uncertainty undoubtedly beset satraps and satrapal families as well as officials at court. Succession struggles were not unprecedented; they were in fact predictable. What was different in this situation was the protracted character of the struggle as Artaxerxes lived on and on, through all of the 360s.

This produced a state of near paralysis, at least in the western part of the empire. Due to the need to deal with “rebellious” officials in Anatolia, Artaxerxes had diverted forces mustered for the Egyptian campaign and then aborted the campaign entirely. The size of the army that Autophradates took from Phoenician staging areas and led against Datames suggests that after 366 only a skeleton force remained in the Levant for security purposes. With Datames, Ariobarzanes, and Orontes in revolt, much of Anatolia was outside imperial control now. By intention or through incompetence, ostensibly still loyal officials proved unable to accomplish anything.

To make matters in the far west worse, in the mid-360s Sparta and Athens began anti-Persian operations in the Aegean for the first time in more than twenty years in response to Artaxerxes’ adoption of a pro-Theban stance in 367/6 and his backing of Theban demands for the liberation of Messenia from Spartan control and for the beaching of Athenian ships (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–40; Plut. *Pelop.* 30; Isoc. 6.27). Both Sparta and Athens sought diplomatic leverage through renewed trans-Aegean enterprises aimed at reminding Artaxerxes how much trouble they could cause. Sparta sent Agesilaus to aid Ariobarzanes against Autophradates and Mausolus’ attacks in 366/5 (Xen. *Ages.* 2.26). Then, after Autophradates and Mausolus broke
off their campaigns, Agesilaus traveled elsewhere in western Anatolia, trying everywhere to stir up revolt (Nep. Ages. 7.2; Xen. Ages. 8.5). Also in 366/5, the Athenians dispatched Timotheus, first to Ariobarzanes and then to Samos, which he besieged and in early 365 captured, restoring to Athens the base it had used in the Peloponnesian War for operations up and down the Anatolian coast (Nep. Timoth. 1.3; Dem. 15. 9, 23.142; Isoc. 15.111). To hold Samos, the Athenians quickly sent out cleruchs—Athenian citizen-settlers—and evidently also established a naval guard on the island (Heraclid. Pont. FHG 2.216; Diod. 18.8.9; Strabo 14.1.18).

Persian imperial problems opened the door to renewed Egyptian initiative in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, this time on a far larger and more ambitious scale than anything fourth-century Egyptian kings had previously attempted. Diodorus presents the Egyptian threat as one of a set of simultaneous crises Artaxerxes II faced in 362/1:

During [362/1], the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast revolted from Persia, and some of the satraps and generals rising in insurrection began a war on Artaxerxes. In like manner with them Tachos the Egyptian king, deciding to fight the Persians, prepared ships and gathered infantry forces. Having procured many mercenaries from the Greek cities, he persuaded the Lacedaemonians likewise to fight with him, for the Spartans were estranged from Artaxerxes because the Messenians had been included on the same terms as the other Greeks in the common peace.

When the general uprising [the combination] against the Persians reached such large proportions, the king also began making preparations for the war. For at one and the same time he had to fight the Egyptian king, the Greek cities of Asia, the Lacedaemonians and the allies of these—satraps and generals who ruled the coastal districts and had agreed on making common cause. Of these the most distinguished were Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, who at the death of Mithridates had taken possession of his kingdom [sic], and Mausolus, dynast of Caria, who was master of many strongholds and important cities . . . and, in addition to the two already mentioned, Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia. Apart from the Ionians were Lycians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, and Cilicians, likewise Syrians, Phoenicians, and practically all coastal peoples. With the revolt so extensive, half the revenues of the king were cut off and what remained were insufficient for the expenses of the war. (15.90.1–4)

There were evidently three separate developments: Asian Greek revolt (more specifically, Ionian Greek revolt, as the next-to-last sentence in the passage makes clear), satrapal belligerence toward Artaxerxes, and Egyptian war preparations. These came together by or in 362/1 in what appears to be a grand alliance involving “the Egyptian king, the Greek cities of Asia, the Lacedaemonians and the allies of these—satraps and generals who ruled the coastal districts and had agreed on making common cause.” Many scholars see this as constituting a “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” treating Diodorus’ notice in 15.91.1 that “those who revolted from the king chose Orontes as chief” as evidence of satrapal coalition and organization, which aimed at making war on Artaxerxes.
However, if there is a central figure in Diodorus’ very condensed sketch, it is Tachos, the Egyptian king. He is linked with the Asian Greek rebels and with the Spartans, whom he persuades to make a *symmachia* with him. Tachos, Asian Greeks, and Spartans constitute a group of their own with which, it appears, rebel Anatolian satraps and generals subsequently ally. Diodorus does not try to explain how all this came about (he is really interested in the various betrayals which occurred at this time—so much so, that in the case of Datames, whose father-in-law’s attempted betrayal he narrates at length [15.91.2–7], he does not bother to provide any background at all about Datames’ defection), but scattered pieces of evidence permit reconstruction of developments leading up to the situation Diodorus describes.

A good starting point is the formation of the apparent combination of the Egyptian king (Tachos), the Greek cities of Asia, and the Lacedaemonians, which seems to have taken shape before “the satraps and generals” of the coastal districts joined as allies. We know from an Athenian inscription (*IG* II² 119) that Tachos, who had been elevated by his father Nectanebo I to a coregency in 365/4, sent an embassy to Athens in 364/3. 6 We may connect this with Xenophon’s report (*Ages. 2.27*) that Tachos together with Mausolus, the dynast/satrap of Caria, provided an escort for Agesilaus on his homeward voyage from Anatolia in the 360s. “Tachos” certainly points to Tachos’ envoys of 364/3, and their association with Agesilaus’ return home from Anatolia indicates that the Egyptian envoys visited western Anatolia in 364/3 before coming to the Greek mainland and Athens.7

What Tachos knew even before sending Egyptian envoys on an extended diplomatic tour was that for the first time in more than twenty years there was no substantial Persian force in the Levant poised to respond to Egyptian attack or preparing to move against Egypt. Additionally, Persian Anatolia was in a state of enormous confusion, with satraps warring against each other and Greek mainland states evidently preparing to intervene across the Aegean. Tachos likely saw great opportunity at this time for Egyptian initiative, possibly truly decisive initiative. But it would be critical to investigate the situation closely. In the mid-380s, Egypt had made a successful foray into the middle territory and, at least through alliances, had taken effective control of the whole eastern Mediterranean. However, Artaxerxes had been able to put together a force composed primarily of Asian Greek ships and mainland Greek mercenaries, and this force had been quite effective in recovering the eastern Mediterranean for Artaxerxes. While Tachos knew in 364/3 that the situation in the eastern Mediterranean was inviting, he needed to gauge conditions in the Aegean—in Asian Greek cities, which might again provide ships, and on the Greek mainland, from which mercenaries again might be hired for Persian service. Egyptian envoys could provide firsthand, up-to-date information. They could also, where possible, offer money and promises of support to disaffected Greeks to distance them further from Artaxerxes.

What Tachos’ envoys encountered in western Anatolia was indeed great disarray, with Ariobarzanes and Orontes in rebellion and ostensibly loyal satraps like
Autophradates and Mausolus ineffective. They obviously also met Agesilaus, who himself had been trying to stir up revolt. Asian Greek cities, at least Ionian Greek cities, may have been receptive to Agesilaus’ provocations. Many if not all of them had joined in revolt with Glos and Tachos near the end of the Cypriot War, and they ended their revolts only because of the deaths of Glos and Tachos. Conditions were certainly more promising now in 364/3, with local satraps in revolt or inactive, with both Athens and Sparta engaged again in overseas enterprises, and with Athens, having taken possession of Samos and having installed new cleruchs there, positioned to act along the whole western Anatolian coast. Promises of Egyptian support tendered by Tachos’ envoys may have been all that was needed to persuade Ionian Greeks to decide on revolt—to cease paying tribute and begin to make arrangements for securing themselves against Autophradates’ potential response. If Tachos managed to detach the middle territory from Persian control as Acoris had done, he would not have to worry about Asian Greeks providing ships and manpower for any Persian recovery effort as they had in the late 380s.

Since Tachos’ envoys who visited Athens in 364/3 escorted Agesilaus back to Greece in 364/3 as they traveled to the Greek mainland, we can be certain that they visited Sparta as well as Athens at this time. It is most natural, then, to connect the formation of the Spartan-Egyptian symmachia noted by Diodorus with the envoys’ visit and date it to 364/3. Having experienced repeated military setbacks since 371 and having suffered the loss of Messenia and of most of their Peloponnesian allies, the Spartans were desperate for assistance from any quarter. Xenophon’s reference to Agesilaus’ gratitude for Tachos’ euergesia likely preserves evidence of Tachos’ provision of funds for Sparta at the time of or just following the visit by Tachos’ envoys.  

In his encomium for Agesilaus, Xenophon also briefly reports that Tachos had promised Agesilaus the chief command (hēgemonia) of an Egyptian campaign and that consequently Agesilaus believed that “at one stroke he would repay the Egyptian for his good offices to Sparta, would again set free the Greeks in Asia, and would chastise the Persian king for his former hostility and for demanding now, when he professed to be an ally of Sparta, that her claim to Messene should be given up” (Ages. 2.28–29). Plutarch says similarly that Agesilaus expected to command all of Tachos’ forces in a major campaign (Ages. 37.1). Although Xenophon in the Agesilaus mentions Tachos’ provision of an escort for Agesilaus in 364/3, neither Xenophon nor Plutarch discusses Egyptian-Spartan contacts in the late 360s. They describe instead Tachos’ preparation and launching of a major campaign that he commanded in person in 361–360. Scholars have thus associated Tachos’ reported promise to Agesilaus of the chief command with the ultimate campaign Tachos himself led, in which Agesilaus served only as commander of Tachos’ mercenary force, and have interpreted Xenophon’s claim that Agesilaus traveled to Egypt in anticipation of holding chief command as an attempt by Xenophon to hide the great Spartan king’s actual, less honorable mercenary service in Egypt by presenting him as the victim of deception by Tachos.
However, if we take into account the necessarily tentative nature of Egyptian planning in 365–363 and the characteristically cautious nature of previous Egyptian military activity outside Egypt, the report that Agesilaus was promised or expected the chief command in a major Egyptian campaign may provide us with insight into Tachos’ emerging strategy before his plans reached their final and rather different form in about 362/1. At the time Tachos became coregent in 365/4, it was already evident that conditions invited some kind of Egyptian intervention in the middle territory. Restive Persian subjects—particularly Phoenician and Cypriot cities—would surely break again from Persian rule with proper encouragement. But Tachos likely recognized that effective demonstration of Egyptian initiative was necessary to counter the lesson of the late 380s (only the most recent instance of a recurrent pattern)—that Egypt would not deploy Egyptian troops in sufficient numbers to back allies in the middle territory and the eastern Mediterranean. This had indeed been the policy of Tachos’ father Nectanebo I. Nectanebo was still alive and presumably in charge during the coregency, and it was unlikely that he would make a dramatic shift to large-scale aggression involving the native machimois. There was, however, a possible alternative: build up as large a Greek force as possible, utilizing the great numbers of Greeks already in Egypt and adding to these as many as possible from the far west, and then deploy this as a great expeditionary force into the middle territory and perhaps elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. As the Persians had sought out Iphicrates to command a special force of Greek mercenaries, so Tachos may now have seen Agesilaus as the ideal figure to lead a largely Greek mercenary army against whatever (if anything) remained of the Persian campaign force in the middle territory.

Tachos’ envoys in 364/3 evidently made a special effort at cultivating Agesilaus, and it may well have been at this time that they solicited his potential involvement as hegemon for a campaign, still in a very early planning stage, which envisioned at this point the use of a largely Greek expeditionary force. Agesilaus would clearly have been very receptive to such a proposal. He too knew the deteriorating imperial situation in Anatolia—he himself had been working to aggravate it further. He had laid much of the groundwork for the Ionian Greek defections that Tachos’ envoys had perhaps just effected. Thus, from Agesilaus’ point of view, this was a critical moment, offering indeed the best opportunity “to set free the Greeks in Asia” once and for all. We do not need to imagine that Agesilaus anticipated an Egyptian-financed, Spartan-led offensive in Anatolia on the model of Agesilaus’ enterprise in the 390s. But he may have believed that an Egyptian-financed, Spartan-led campaign into the middle territory, raising the prospect of enduring far western cooperation with Egypt, would compel Artaxerxes II to make the same kind of concessions Artaxerxes I had made in the face of sustained Athenian-Egyptian cooperation in the mid-fifth century, especially given Artaxerxes II’s loss of control of most of Anatolia already.

At this moment, Sparta was beleaguered by Theban successes, revolts of allies, and the loss of Messenia. Quite likely, Tachos’ reported euergesia for the Spartans
involved providing funds for Spartan operations on the mainland in the hope of restoring Spartan power and freeing up Agesilaus to embark on the campaign envisioned by Tachos. Since such an enterprise was in 364/3 only in the very early planning stage, there was no immediate need for Agesilaus in Egypt. He could await the summons and, in the meantime, see to the resolution of Spartan problems on the mainland.

We may thus date the creation of the Egyptian-Ionian-Spartan coalition (which actually involved the addition of Sparta to a recently established Egyptian-Ionian alliance) to 364/3. Diodorus has coastal satraps and generals agreeing on making common cause with each other and then allying with this coalition by or in 362/1. Here too, however, he seems to have condensed into a single notice a rather more complex and extended set of events. In one of Polyaenus’ stratagems involving Orontes, Orontes, in Cyme at the time, deploys a great number (myrioi) of Greek hoplites in battle against Autophradates (Polyaen. 7.14.3), indicating that Orontes was linked to at least one Ionian Greek city—Cyme—before there was any satrapal koinopragia. We may speculate that once promises of Egyptian support drew independent-minded Ionian Greeks into alliance with Tachos (via his envoys), the already rebellious Orontes saw great potential benefits, ranging from military strength to political leverage, in linking himself with the Ionian cause and in or soon after 364/3 entered into a symmachia with rebellious Ionian Greeks. In fact, Diodorus’ report of “those who had revolted from the king” choosing Orontes as their “general in charge of everything” probably attests exactly this development (and not, as it has been invariably interpreted, the organization of a coalition of rebel satraps). That is, as part of the formation of an Orontes–Ionian Greek symmachia, Ionian Greeks—“those who had revolted from the king”—chose Orontes (a figure long familiar to them) as coordinator and general.

We may perhaps glimpse a few further developments. Orontes’ holdings and connections in Mysia (including Pergamum) and Ionia gave him an archē of sorts covering much of the western coastal region of Anatolia, from roughly the vicinity of Adramyttium and Cisthene southward to (perhaps) nearly the Maeander River. In this archē, Leucae, the well-fortified city at the mouth of the Hermus River south of Cyme, which Tachos had built up as a citadel during the rebellion of Asian cities fomented by Tachos’ father Glos (Diod. 15.18.1), seems to have become Orontes’ base. Evidence for this comes from Diodorus’ stories about Orontes’ and his subordinate or collaborator Rheomithres’ ultimate betrayals of the revolts, probably in 362/1. In the first version (15.91.1), Diodorus says simply that after being chosen as general in charge of everything, Orontes betrayed those who trusted him, arresting “those who brought the money” and dispatching them to Artaxerxes. In the second version (15.92.1), another Persian official, Rheomithres, is responsible for the betrayal. Having been sent by the rebels to Egypt and having received 500 talents and fifty warships from Tachos, Rheomithres sailed to “the city called Leucae.” There he summoned many leaders of the rebels and arrested them and sent them to Artaxerxes, thereby gaining rehabilitation himself. Orontes’ and Rheomithres’
betrayals can hardly have been separate episodes. Either one would have warned off participants and made it impossible for the other episode to have taken place. We may confidently combine them into a single episode in which Rheomithres as Orontes’ agent returned from Egypt with Tachos’ funds, after which Orontes together with Rheomithres accomplished the arrest of leading Greek participants they had summoned to Leucae, Orontes’ headquarters.\textsuperscript{14}

By the mid-360s, anticipating the succession of Darius and with it the ascent of his nemesis Tiribazus to great power, Orontes had likely seen that his only hope for any continued power of his own at this time, perhaps for survival itself, lay in the creation of a viable, well-defended \emph{archē}—precisely the same response as Datames’ and Ariobarzanes’. Collusion with rebellious Ionian Greeks provided Orontes with this, and provided him further the prospect of Egyptian support. The stratagems of Orontes recounted by Polyaeus indicate that Orontes engaged in conflict with Autophradates, satrap at Sardis, for some time (7.14.2–4): Orontes occupies Mt. Tmolus and attacks and pillages Sardis; Autophradates attacks Orontes at Cyme; in an encounter at some unnamed site, having lost many of his “allies” to an ambush by Autophradates, Orontes tricks Autophradates into believing reinforcements of Greek mercenaries had arrived. Since coins indicate that Adramyttium, reportedly under Ariobarzanes’ control in 366/5, came under Orontes’ control, we may suspect aggression by Orontes also at Ariobarzanes’ expense.\textsuperscript{15}

Diodorus’ notice under 362/1 of coastal satraps and generals having agreed to make common cause may indicate that at some point before 362/1 other Anatolian satraps abandoned opposition to Orontes and his Greek force as the best means of preserving their own realms. In the case of still-loyal satraps such as Autophradates and Mausolus, this amounted to defection. Hence it could be said, as Diodorus does, that they entered into \emph{koinopragia}. As a sign of his cooperation, Autophradates seems to have “arrested” Artabazus, the son of Pharnabazus and grandson of Artaxerxes, with whom he had campaigned against Datames and possibly Ariobarzanes as well (Dem. 23.154). Insofar as Autophradates and Mausolus now “joined” with Orontes, they also became allies of his allies—the Ionian Greeks, the Spartans, and Tachos. There is no reason to look for plans for any combined military operations on the part of this satrapal “coalition.”\textsuperscript{16} At most, the now colluding satraps likely hoped that by connecting themselves to what was essentially a revival of Glos’ rebellion, they would gain leverage that in the long term would ensure concessions by Artaxerxes or his successor and in the short term keep their own territories in Anatolia safe from (each other’s) attacks.\textsuperscript{17}

These developments in Anatolia, together with Datames’ continuing alienation, amounted to the complete breakdown of imperial authority in Anatolia, and this meant the complete loss of revenues and manpower resources from Anatolia. This new situation may have prompted Tachos to think of greater possibilities than he had a year or so earlier. Other peoples were certainly aware of Persian weakness at this point and aware of the opportunity this provided for breaking with Persia. Behind Diodorus’ reference to Lycians, Pisidians,
Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phoenicians, and “practically all coastal peoples” being in revolt from Persian by 362/1 (15.90.4) we may see a great Egyptian diplomatic effort succeeding, probably without much difficulty and without any fighting, in detaching virtually all the coastal populations of the eastern Mediterranean from Persian imperial authority. 18

These defections, coupled with those of the Ionian Greeks and all the Anatolian satraps and thus their subject populations, meant that Artaxerxes II no longer oversaw a western empire. Persian satraps remained where they had been, but the Persian king himself controlled almost nothing west of the Euphrates. For Egypt, this was an opportunity for aggrandizement comparable only to that Psammetichus I and Necho II had at the time of Assyrian collapse in the late seventh century. By 362/1, Tachos likely saw the possibility of asserting Egyptian dominion permanently throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Instead of a Persian-dominated world-empire, a system of international imperial states, one centered on the western core and the other on the eastern core, might be established. (Tachos probably did not know this, but such an arrangement would revive that which had existed during the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries.)

Thus the continuing collapse of Persian imperial authority in the west permitted Tachos’ ambitions to grow enormously. Tachos’ father Nectanebo I, who had relied exclusively on a defensive strategy to deal with Persian pressure, died in 363/2. 19 This likely freed Tachos to embark on a far grander strategy than his (putative) earlier one involving a primarily Greek campaign force led by a Greek commander. Tachos himself, on the model of New Kingdom conquerors, would lead the campaign. Greek mercenaries would still be an important part, but given the virtual impossibility of any Persian counterattack against Egypt at this time, Tachos could deploy much or all of the huge native force outside Egypt—something his immediate predecessors had shrank from doing.

Diodorus puts his narrative of Tachos’ campaign itself under 362/1, and this date—at least early 361—seems credible for the initiation of the campaign. Campaigning cannot have occurred before this, since Agesilaus, who participated in Tachos’ offensive, was still in Greece through mid-362, when the Battle of Mantinea took place. 20 To place the campaign later than 362/1 leaves too little space for the many events that need to be fitted in between the campaign’s onset and the death of Artaxerxes II in 359/8. The most likely time for the beginning of the campaign is perhaps the first half of 361 before the annual rising of the Nile. 21 If so, Tachos’ systematic preparations for the campaign as finally conceived probably went on for a year or so before this, possibly through much of 362. This was not very long by comparison with Persian campaign preparations, but with native machimoi and many mercenaries already in Egypt, Tachos, unlike Artaxerxes II, did not have to summon campaign forces from distant points and then dispatch them to a distant staging area. Matériel was similarly close at hand. Tachos also probably sought to launch a campaign as soon as possible, before there was any great change in Persian imperial conditions.
Tachos brought the Athenian Chabrias to Egypt again, evidently to oversee much of the preparation process. Tachos’ envoys probably sounded out Chabrias about renewed Egyptian service in 364/3 even before Tachos developed his ultimate strategy. Chabrias was one of the stratēgoi for that year, and in that capacity would certainly have met with such visitors. Since the Athenians were careful to separate themselves officially from Chabrias’ Egyptian service in the 360s, insisting that Chabrias serve Tachos as a private citizen (Plut. Ages. 37.5; Nep. Chab. 2.3), we may guess that Chabrias completed his stratēgia at Athens and then journeyed to Egypt sometime after mid-363.

In Egypt, Chabrias organized Tachos’ fleet, oversaw ship construction, and supervised the training of native Egyptians as seamen (Polyaen. 3.11.7). He also served as a leading advisor for Tachos in financial matters, recommending numerous ingenious schemes for raising the funds to pay for this enormous force. These included ordering the closing of temples and discharge of priests and then relenting on payment of bribes, ordering temples thus exempted to make “loans” to the king of 90% of their revenues (on top of bribes already paid), levying house and poll taxes and a sales tax (paid by both buyer and seller) on wheat, transferring from the temple of Neith at Sais to Tachos himself revenues from tithes on manufacturing and on imports, raising twice as many ship crews as needed and releasing half only if they agreed to furnish two months’ worth of supplies for the remaining crews, and commanding surrender of all privately held gold and silver ([Arist.] Oec. 2.22.5; Polyaen. 3.11.5).22 Much of the gold and silver he squeezed out of Egyptians went into copies of Athenian tetradrachms (with papyrus substituting for the Athenian olive branch on the reverse of gold coins).23 These extortionate financial ploys reflect the great haste with which Tachos organized his grand campaign; there was simply no other way to get the necessary funds quickly than by extortion and confiscation.

Altogether, Tachos reportedly put together a force of 10,000 Greek mercenaries and 80,000 Egyptian infantry—the machimoi. The Spartans sent Agesilaus “according to the alliance” with 1,000 hoplites (hired with funds sent by Tachos) and thirty advisers (Plut. Ages. 36.3). Agesilaus and other leading Spartans took part in the Battle of Mantinea in the Peloponnesus in mid-362, so they most probably arrived in Egypt in late 362 at the earliest—a year or more after Chabrias. Perhaps, as Xenophon indicates, Agesilaus went to Egypt still expecting the chief command, and only upon arrival learned that Tachos had adopted a much different plan that that discussed in 364/3 and that Agesilaus’ intended role was that of mercenary commander, meaning that he would command all Tachos’ Greek troops (Xen. Ages. 2.29–30; Plut. Ages. 37.1–2).24 However, if in fact Tachos had originally envisioned a campaign waged by a largely Greek force under Agesilaus, there was from Tachos’ point of view no real change—Agesilaus would command the same force. What was different was that in Tachos’ vastly expanded enterprise there were also great numbers of machimoi in addition to the Greek mercenary army and a supreme field commander in the person of Tachos.
Diodorus says Tachos also had 200 triremes “expensively adorned.” However, the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica (2.37) reports that Chabrias fitted out 120 ships but only needed sixty, and this is entirely plausible. With the defection of the Phoenicians, Cilicians, and Pamphylians, Artaxerxes had no naval resources in the eastern Mediterranean at this time, so Tachos and Chabrias may have been able safely to scale back the size of the naval force for the campaign and easily spare out of the original 120 (using the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica’s number) the fifty ships Tachos furnished the coalition of Ionian Greeks and rebel satraps (Diod. 15.92.1).

Artaxerxes and other Persians were certainly aware of the gravity of the situation—there was a real possibility of permanently losing the entire west. But Artaxerxes’ response to all this was slow to develop. Diodorus tries to explain imperial inaction by observing that the revenues lost because of defections in the west left Artaxerxes with insufficient funds for the expenses of the war (15.90.4). But in Diodorus’ story of Orontes and Rheomithres’ betrayal of their Ionian collaborators, the report of Orontes’ expectation of reward and promotion by Artaxerxes allows us to infer that before Tachos began his campaign Artaxerxes managed at least one political victory—reconciling with Orontes and through this regaining control of at least the Ionian portion of western Anatolia. Details of this are hidden from our view, but we may suspect that the fall of the Darius-Tiribazus faction cleared the way for Orontes’ rapprochement with Artaxerxes and that negotiations between the king and Orontes got underway in 362/1, the year in which Diodorus places Orontes’ betrayal of the coalition. Diodorus’ report (15.91.1) that Orontes hoped to gain great rewards and to receive the satrapy of the whole coastal region suggests that what Orontes asked for was recognition as satrap of the archē he held as rebel. Evidence of Orontes’ later authority indicates that Artaxerxes agreed. At this point the need to restore imperial authority in Anatolia was more important than the issue of Orontes’ status.

According to Diodorus (15.92.1), Orontes and Rheomithres’ betrayal of the revolt in western Anatolia involved the arrest and dispatch in chains to Artaxerxes of many leaders (hegemons) of “those who had rebelled”—that is, leaders from rebellious Ionian Greek cities. Artaxerxes dispatched hegemons of his own to take over the cities and the soldiers previously under Orontes’ command. This marks the beginning of the restoration of imperial authority in western Anatolia. For evidence of Autophradates’ return to loyalty, we have only the report that he released Artabazus from arrest (Dem. 23.155). Anecdotes reporting ruses used by Mausolus to gather funds from leading Carians “when the king sent to him to render tribute” and when he feared the king would take away his ancestral archē most plausibly reflect Artaxerxes’ demand for tribute arrears at this time as the price of rehabilitation—probably for Autophradates as well as Mausolus ([Arist.] Oec. 2.1348a11–17; Polyaen. 7.23.1). There was no amnesty for Ariobarzanes or Datames, and, evidently desperate to save himself, Ariobarzanes’ son Mithridates betrayed his father and, through an elaborate subterfuge (posing himself as a rebel to gain to gain Datames’
trust), accomplished the assassination of Datames some time before Artaxerxes’ death in 359/8 (Xen. *Cyrop. 8.8.;* Arist. *Pol. 5.1312a;* Harpoc. s.v. Ἀριοβαρζάνης; Nep. *Dat. 10–11;* Polyaen. 7.29.1; Diod. 15.91.1).

Rheomithres’ collection of funds and ships from Egypt in (probably) 362/1 reflects ongoing communication between Tachos and Orontes right up to the time of Orontes’ “betrayal,” but there is no indication that there was ever any plan of actual military cooperation with Orontes or of any other alienated Persian official playing a role in Tachos’ enterprise itself.27 (The rebel satraps’ interest in military preparations was probably entirely political: the greater their military resources, the greater their leverage.) Tachos reportedly demanded family members as hostages in return for the funds and ships he provided Orontes and Rheomithres (Xen. *Cyrop. 8.8.4*), so he clearly anticipated the likelihood of betrayal—he well knew that Persian officials had no interest in his success. Thus the collapse of Tachos’ Ionian Greek and Anatolian satrapal connections had no real impact on Tachos’ campaign strategy, except insofar as the evidence of Artaxerxes’ political resurgence gave additional urgency to Tachos’ undertaking.
Thanks to accounts of Tachos’ great offensive in Xenophon’s Agesilaus and Plutarch’s Life of Agesilaus, both of which naturally concentrate on Agesilaus’ activities, and Diodorus’ more inclusive narrative, we can follow the campaign in some detail. Tachos, the first Egyptian king to move in person into the middle territory since Necho II in the late sixth century, led the campaign. His nephew Nectanebo (properly Nakhthorheb) commanded the native Egyptian force, which was divided into various contingents with their own officers. Chabrias headed Tachos’ fleet, while Agesilaus commanded the Greek mercenary force. Plutarch says that Agesilaus sailed to Phoenicia (Ages. 37.2). Certainly, the entire Egyptian land force did not go by ship, probably not even the 10,000-man mercenary force. Most likely, Tachos and the octogenarian Agesilaus avoided the overland trek and, not concerned about meeting any hostile naval force, proceeded by sea along with Chabrias’ fleet to rendezvous with the land force in Phoenicia. If any Persian garrison troops remained in place anywhere in the middle territory by the time the campaign began, they probably abandoned their posts once the huge Egyptian army approached. Diodorus reports that the army advanced without incident and made camp “near Phoenicia” (15.92.3). This points most probably to encampment at Acco, which belonged to Tyre but was technically outside Phoenician territory. Its great plain and adjoining bay, regularly used for staging Persian campaigns, offered adequate space for the Egyptian army and fleet. From his base “near Phoenicia,” Tachos sent his nephew Nectanebo and the native machimoi to besiege cities in Syria. “Syria” could mean territory all the way to the Euphrates River, and given Tachos’ previously successful diplomatic efforts (Diod. 15.92.4), Nectanebo was probably able to bypass coastal sites and target inland cities in Syria as he moved north. There is no indication that Agesilaus and the mercenary force advanced with Nectanebo. Presumably, they remained with Tachos for
separate operations. The fleet under Chabrias may have used Acco’s great bay as a base while some ships advanced northward in tandem with Nectanebo (if Persian imperial control had been restored over the ships and bases in Cilicia as part of Artaxerxes’ recent recovery effort, there would be need for Egyptian maritime security).

There may be just enough evidence here to indicate Tachos’ grand strategy. Division of the full Egyptian force into two groups suggests that Tachos had both northern and southern objectives at the beginning of his campaign. Nectanebo, leading the northern force into Syria, presumably moved through Phoenicia along the coast up to the Eleutherus River south of Aradus and then followed the river valley inland to reach the Orontes River and the cities that guarded the river crossing, Kadesh, Hom, and Qatna. Securing those, Nectanebo could move more deeply into Syria, heading north toward Carchemish and the river crossings at the Euphrates. He would be recapitulating operations undertaken by Egyptian kings going back more than 1,000 years to Thutmose III (in the 1470s) and including, most recently, Necho II, who in the late seventh century had sought to gain control of the Levant by capturing key sites on the northerly route from the east to the coast.4

Tachos’ occupation of a base “near Phoenicia,” probably Acco, points to his responsibility for a southern theater. Thanks to previous diplomacy, there was likely no need to campaign in this region (as Nectanebo’s evident ability to move directly through the Phoenician coast to Syria indicates). But there was a danger that Artaxerxes, who, according to Diodorus (15.90.2), was preparing for war, presumably by mustering an army, would move west. If Tachos himself led the whole Egyptian army north, he would risk having a Persian force take the southerly route to the coast, moving from Damascus to Hazor and through the Jezreel Valley, and at the very least position itself to block the Egyptian army from moving back southward. At the worst, leaving the southerly route unguarded could allow a Persian force to move right into Egypt, now stripped of troops for Tachos’ war. At Acco, however, Tachos was very close to Megiddo, which controlled the pass (the Aruna Pass) through which the southerly route crossed the Carmel range on its way to the coast. Here, even without the full Egyptian force, Tachos would have a great likelihood of halting any Persian advance. We may conclude, therefore, that in encamping “near Phoenicia” Tachos was guarding the southerly route to the coast (and on to Egypt), which ran past Megiddo.5

If gaining the river crossings in the north and controlling the routes to the coast in the north and south were Tachos’ immediate objectives, what was his ultimate strategic aim? Egyptian troops had defeated the Persians in Egypt twice already, so it is probable that by deploying the entire Egyptian army, a huge Greek mercenary force, and a fleet to take control of Phoenicia and Syria, Tachos was announcing that he was “extending the borders of Egypt” and trying to do just that. Perhaps the experience of recent defeats would deter Artaxerxes from challenging him and risking everything in the case of another Persian defeat. But Tachos could hardly have
been confident that the Persians would remain inactive, so he must have been prepared at the same time to fight—as his farsighted securing of the Aruna Pass suggests. In fact, he might well have welcomed a great battle. Egyptian machimoi were the best warriors among Persia’s past and present subject peoples. Tachos had added to his enormous native force a mercenary army comparable to that which Cyrus had led against Artaxerxes forty years earlier, and he had the best Greek general of the last forty years, Agesilaus, as mercenary commander. Artaxerxes by contrast, had little access to Greeks. Any Persian response to Tachos’ offensive would have to rely almost entirely on native levies.

Whatever Tachos’ precise military objectives may have been, the deployment and advance through Philistia, Phoenicia, and Syria of such an enormous Egyptian force accompanied by a great mercenary army and a new Egyptian fleet announced in unmistakable fashion to Egyptian allies and clients that, however limited deployment of Egyptian troops had been under Nepherites, Acoris, and Nectanebo I, Tachos was prepared to commit all Egypt’s military resources and manpower to an effort to exclude the Persians from the eastern Mediterranean. Such a demonstration would function far better than mere promises of support to ensure the continued allegiance of peoples and cities across the region in the face of Persian countermeasures. Tachos’ campaign would thus serve to mark the beginning of a new era in eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern affairs—the era of Egyptian dominance. Thanks to this campaign, Tachos must have believed, his name would be forever linked to the revival of great Egyptian power. And that, Tachos probably anticipated, would secure once and for all his and the Sebennytus dynasty’s hold on the constantly contested kingship in Egypt.

However, before Tachos’ campaign advanced very far, renewed dynastic rivalry in Egypt brought about its collapse and the end of Tachos’ kingship as well. According to Diodorus, while Tachos’ campaign was underway “the general left in charge of Egypt revolted from the king, and sending over to his son Nectanebo and persuading him to lay claim to the kingship in Egypt, kindled a great war” (15.92.3). Modern scholarship has identified “the general left in charge of Egypt” as Tjahapimau (Tamos), Tachos’ own brother, so Tjahapimau and Nectanebo’s revolt might at first appear to be an instance of intradynastic conflict, not interdynastic conflict. It is hard to believe, however, that Tjahapimau had such ambition that he would try to push aside his brother, knowing that this would ruin the campaign already underway and undo all the diplomatic and military gains that promised to end the prospect of Persian reconquest of Egypt. Diodorus thus may not have the whole story. From Plutarch’s Life of Agesilaus we learn of another claimant whom Plutarch does not designate by name but calls “the Mendesian”—the figure from Mendes (Plut. Ages. 37.2–38.2). Mendes was the home region of Nepherites and Acoris, kings of the 29th Dynasty, which Tachos’ father Nectanebo I had displaced to inaugurate Manetho’s 30th or Sebennytus Dynasty. Here, then, we most likely do have evidence of renewed dynastic conflict—interdynastic conflict—with a member of the displaced Mendesian “royal” family laying claim to
royal authority, and doing so at a very vulnerable moment when virtually all Tachos’ military resources were engaged outside Egypt.

Perhaps we can reconstruct something of the circumstances surrounding the Mendesian’s “revolt.” According to Plutarch (Ages. 38.1), the Mendesian’s force was a mixed rabble of workmen (banausoi) totaling 100,000 men. That is, they were clearly not machimoi, almost all of whom were campaigning with Tachos under Nectanebo’s command. This suggests that the Mendesian claimant headed or exploited a popular cause of some sort. We may suspect such a cause centered on opposition to Tachos’ recent excessive exactions. These had fallen particularly heavily on temples and priesthoods, and we may see in the Mendesian’s “workers” many workers from temples and temple estates dispatched by aggrieved temple authorities. It is a plausible conjecture that this Mendesian, a legitimate candidate because of his lineage (a son, perhaps, of Acoris), emerged as the leader of an anti-Tachos movement sparked by Tachos’ recent and probably ongoing exactions. This was possibly also an anti-Greek movement, insofar as Tachos’ Athenian adviser Chabrias had been responsible for many of Tachos’ financial schemes and Greek mercenaries were primary beneficiaries of the high pay made possible by the success of these schemes.

Most likely, then, the otherwise unexplained revolt of Tjahapimau, Tachos’ brother and regent and the father of Nectanebo, was a preemptive move. With mounting opposition to Tachos centered in the Delta, Tjahapimau, safe for the moment in Memphis, would be an immediate target. If, however, Tjahapimau distanced himself from Tachos and his policies—if he in fact repudiated Tachos entirely and engineered his downfall and the elevation of his own son Nectanebo and got control of the Egyptian expeditionary army—Tjahapimau, and through him the Sebennytus Dynasty, just might survive. The cost of this was the collapse of the Egyptian offensive campaign, certainly the best hope for freedom from Persian attack. But if the alternative was the loss of the Sebennytus kingship in Egypt, then Tjahapimau probably saw the sacrifice of his brother Tachos as unavoidable.

Tjahapimau and Nectanebo’s revolt ended Tachos’ campaign, since different parts of the expeditionary army were now in the hands of rivals, Tachos and his usurping nephew Nectanebo. But the great war which this usurpation “kindled,” according to Diodorus (15.92.3), moved toward actual fighting only slowly, and when it did the fighting (at least initially) involved Nectanebo and the Mendesian claimant, not Nectanebo and Tachos.

After Tjahapimau persuaded him to revolt, Nectanebo had to win over his own force. He did this, probably fairly quickly, through bribes and (unspecified) promises. We may guess these included assurance of a swift return to Egypt, where many machimoi may have feared their holdings were at risk. Nectanebo’s effort to gain the backing of Chabrias and Agesilaus, commanders respectively of Tachos’ fleet and his mercenary force, took longer. Their allegiance, or at least their inaction, was crucial. If Chabrias and Agesilaus remained loyal to Tachos, Nectanebo would have to fight his way through them to return to Egypt. He had superior numbers, but
substantial losses incurred in any battle with Greek troops would jeopardize his chances of success in Egypt. At the same time, supply needs meant that Nectanebo could not wait for long in the north.

In the hope of resolving these problems, Nectanebo appealed to both Chabrias and Agesilaus for support. Chabrias refused. He probably had no choice, recognizing that his most important role if he joined Nectanebo might ultimately be that of sacrificial victim for his part in Tachos’ fiscal schemes. Agesilaus, however, saw this as a matter bearing on Sparta’s alliance obligations to Tachos, and he referred the question to Spartan authorities. Tachos was evidently aware of these negotiations, thanks probably to Chabrias, and he as well as Nectanebo sent envoys to Sparta to present their cases for Spartan support. As it turned out, Spartan authorities referred the decision back to Agesilaus, probably recognizing that from his vantage point Agesilaus could better read actual conditions than they could from theirs and decide how best to salvage some reward out of the whole affair (Plut. Ages. 37.2–6).

Thus authorized, Agesilaus chose to join Nectanebo. Most likely he saw Tachos’ position as fatally weak compared with Nectanebo’s. Sticking with Tachos would mean battling Nectanebo’s numerically superior force in Phoenicia, and, if Tachos was somehow victorious (certainly a very distant possibility), then returning to Egypt to face another opponent. By joining with Nectanebo, who, of course, must have offered great financial rewards for Agesilaus’ support, Agesilaus with his mercenary force would face battle in Egypt only with the Mendesian’s “workers” and not with native machimoi, and would do so as part of the very large force commanded by Nectanebo.

During the period of uncertainty, Tachos evidently withdrew from his base “near Phoenicia” to Sidon, perhaps trusting his ally the Sidonian king Strato more than members of his own entourage (Xen. Ages. 2.30). Deprived now of Greek as well as Egyptian support once Agesilaus made his decision, Tachos made a surprising move: he fled “through Arabia [the north Arabian desert\(^{12}\)] to the King” and, Diodorus reports, threw himself on Artaxerxes’ mercy (Diod. 15.92.5; Plut. Ages. 38.1). Tachos was desperate, but perhaps not entirely without hope. There were precedents for Tachos’ shift from aggression to submission and for his expectation of clemency. Tachos certainly knew of the original Saite experience in the seventh century, though it involved Assyrians rather than Persians, and of Apries’ later flight to the Babylonian king Nebuchadrezzar “who resolved to restore him by force” and sent Apries back to Egypt with a Babylonian army in 567.\(^{13}\) Recent rehabilitation of rebellious Persian officials such as Orontes may have given Tachos hope of similar treatment (Diod.15.92.1). And indeed, when Tachos begged forgiveness for his wrongs, Artaxerxes, we are told, acquitted him, and then appointed him stratēgos for the war against Egypt (Diod. 15.92.5).

Tachos’ flight certainly meant the end of Chabrias’ involvement. Unlike Agesilaus, Chabrias had stuck with Tachos when Nectanebo solicited his services, but now there was no place for him, and he presumably went back to Athens (where
he may have begun to calumniate Agesilaus as “traitor,” giving rise to the criticisms reproduced in the later tradition about Agesilaus’ Egyptian service). We may assume that Agesilaus, along with Tachos’ great mercenary army that Agesilaus commanded, joined Nectanebo when he reached Acco. Presumably, the Egyptian fleet, lacking any strategic role and, after Chabrias’ departure, probably commanded by Egyptian officials who were anxious to distance themselves from association with Tachos, returned to Egypt.

Tachos fell as a result of dynastic opposition. But Tachos’ army seems not to have engaged in any fighting in its ill-fated campaign, so Egyptian military manpower and, thanks to Agesilaus’ shift to Nectanebo, also Egypt’s Greek mercenary force remained undiminished. The question was: who ultimately would command them? Would the ruling dynasty again be Mendesian, or would it remain in the hands of the family from Sebennytus represented now by Nectanebo?
Where was Artaxerxes II at this point? At Susa, at Babylon, or with a Persian campaign force? Diodorus refers to him under the year 362/1 as being compelled to make preparations for the war as he faced the koinopragia of the Egyptian king, the Greek cities of Asia, the Lacedaemonians, and the rebel satraps. Before Tachos began his offensive in 361, the satraps’ “revolt” had collapsed—probably following negotiations between rebel satraps (at least initially Orontes) and Artaxerxes. Orontes reportedly handed over the satraps’ mercenaries to commanders sent by Artaxerxes (Diod. 15.91.1). These troops may then have ended up in Artaxerxes’ service and formed part of the army being prepared to confront Tachos. We cannot be sure, however, that the Persian force was on the move or even fully ready by the time Tachos began his offensive. The absence of any sign of a Persian threat to Nectanebo or Tachos in Syria or Phoenicia while they were negotiating through envoys with Sparta about Agesilaus suggests that while Artaxerxes may have been mustering an army, no Persian force was pushing toward the eastern Mediterranean during 361 or perhaps early 360.

Wherever the Persian force was, Tachos’ arrival at court and the news of political disarray in Egypt must have altered Persian strategy. The Egyptian offensive was over, and Egypt was in a state of great political confusion and thus great vulnerability. Nectanebo was on his way back to Egypt, but he was facing a challenge from “the Mendesian,” most likely a recalcitrant member of the family which had ruled as the 29th Dynasty before Nectanebo I pushed it aside. Here, suddenly and unexpectedly, was a great opportunity for the Persians, and it appears that Artaxerxes II made a swift decision to send a force into Egypt. From the report of the ninth-century Byzantine chronographer George Syncellus, we learn that Ochus, Artaxerxes II’s son and successor (Ochus subsequently took the throne-name Artaxerxes [III]), undertook an expedition to Egypt while his father was still alive.¹ Since Ochus was not among the commanders or chief participants in the
Persian attacks on Egypt in the 380s or 370s, and since there were no other recorded Persian campaigns against Egypt during Artaxerxes II’s reign, we are left with this moment, shortly before the death of Artaxerxes II, as the only possible time for Ochus to have led an attack on Egypt. Diodorus’ confused account of events following Tachos’ flight has Tachos returning to the army of Agesilaus (presumably from the Persian court) and then confronting Nectanebo in Egypt and recovering the Egyptian kingship (15.93.2–6). This is not at all what happened, but it has some elements of truth in it. Tachos’ return to Egypt is likely historical if we see him accompanying a Persian force led by Ochus, just as two centuries earlier Apries, displaced from his kingship and having fled Egypt, returned as part of the Babylonian king Nebuchadrezzar’s invading force. Nectanebo was indeed the target of Ochus’ campaign at this point, so in accompanying Ochus, Tachos moved toward a confrontation with Nectanebo, as Diodorus has it.

There was nothing blocking a Persian advance into Egypt in (probably) late 360 to early 359, and we may imagine Ochus leading the army, readied earlier to face Egyptian forces in the eastern Mediterranean, as rapidly as possible through Phoenicia and Philistia, dislodging on the way any garrisons Nectanebo may have left in place. Then, hoping opportunistically to take advantage of the political disarray in Egypt (and probably aware that the Persians had missed similar opportunities earlier), Ochus perhaps moved through the Sinai and on to Egypt. Strato of Sidon’s continuing coinage after 360 indicates that Strato survived his Egyptianizing defection. Ochus’ apparent clemency may reflect his concern with hastening on to Egypt rather than pausing to mete out punishment and reorganize affairs. The large Egyptian fleet was still intact and most probably back in Egypt, so Artaxerxes would need some naval support immediately, and this pressing need may have prompted his acquittal of Strato and probably other Egyptianizing Phoenician kings, and possibly Tachos’ Cypriot collaborators as well. We may imagine that Ochus paused only long enough to commandeer Sidonian and other Phoenician ships for his enterprise, leaving now submissive local rulers in place.

If on the basis of Syncellus’ statement we may infer that Ochus did undertake an Egyptian campaign at this time, what happened to it is unknown—except that it did not succeed. There are several possible explanations. We know that in Egypt Nectanebo with Agesilaus’ aid defeated the Mendesian claimant who had laid siege to the unnamed city (fortified site?) that Nectanebo and Agesilaus had occupied—probably Pelusium, which Nectanebo and Agesilaus would reach first when returning to Egypt (see Diod. 15.93.1–6 consistently confusing Tachos for Nectanebo; Plut. Ages. 38.1–39.5). The Mendesian disappears from the sources at this point. Nectanebo’s subsequently uncontested kingship likely means that dynastic opposition came to an end with his victory over the Mendesian claimant. Perhaps Ochus learned of Nectanebo’s success and believed that opportunity for a quick victory was now gone; perhaps, given the absence of extended preparations for this campaign, Ochus encountered crippling supply problems; possibly, the Nile flood
coincided with his arrival in Egypt; perhaps most plausibly, news of Artaxerxes’ final decline or death may have compelled Ochus to hasten back to Susa.

Ochus had probably already engineered the demise or removal of his leading opponents for the succession, but in the event of Artaxerxes’ death, Ochus’ absence might encourage others to strike—Ochus reportedly had many other “brothers.” Even if Ochus was confident about the succession, certain ritual performances were required to validate succession, including the successor’s burial of his predecessor, and these would require Ochus’ presence as successor. The tradition (preserved in Polyaen. 7.17) that Ochus kept Artaxerxes’ death a secret for ten months may derive from the interval between Artaxerxes II’s death and Ochus’ ritually legitimized succession (that is, Ochus was able to announce his succession officially only ten months after Artaxerxes II’s death), an interval perhaps due in part to Ochus’ involvement in Egypt at the time of Artaxerxes’ death. It would have taken some time for news of Artaxerxes’ death (or imminent demise) to reach Ochus and then more time for him to extract the army from Egypt and return to court.

There is much chronological uncertainty here. But if we use 361 as the date for the initiation of Tachos’ offensive and have Tachos in Phoenicia and Nectanebo in Syria by mid- to late 361, we may extend the period of Tjahapimau and Nectanebo’s “revolt” and the attempts to gain Agesilaus’ support, involving the journeys of embassies to and from Sparta, well through 361 and probably into the first half of 360. Then with Agesilaus’ abandonment of Tachos, Nectanebo was able with his forces to move to Egypt, perhaps returning after mid-360. Conflict of uncertain duration between Nectanebo and the Mendesian ensued. Agesilaus reportedly departed Egypt in the winter following Nectanebo’s victory (Plut. Ages. 40.2). On this reckoning, Agesilaus’ departure would have occurred in winter 360/359. Ochus reached Egypt sometime after this and sometime before mid-359, only to withdraw soon thereafter, returning to court to claim and announce his succession in early 358.

There was thus no Persian conquest of Egypt in the 360s, but Persian recovery of the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia by 360 constituted a substantial achievement. However, this had not been the result of any Persian military victory. Once again, Egyptian dynastic political conflicts had debilitated Egyptian military enterprise, setting up Persian success, in this case meaning Persian recovery of Syria, Phoenicia, and the whole eastern Mediterranean, without a battle. Ochus evidently pushed all the way to Egypt to capitalize on political and military divisions. He might well have succeeded but for the fact that Artaxerxes, having survived far longer than expected, expired at just this time, compelling Ochus to break off operations in order to claim the succession. Tachos’ war thus produced a Persian victory of sorts. But Egypt remained independent, and the fact that Persian success against Tachos had nothing to do with any Persian military action meant that contemporaries had no reason to change their assessments of Persian military capabilities.
CHAPTER 16
Artaxerxes III: King and Commander,
358–350

With satrapal revolts ended and defecting subject states recovered, the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia were securely under imperial Persian control by the time Ochus became king (as Artaxerxes III) in 359/8.\(^1\) At the same time the mainland Greek world was relatively peaceful. This boded well for the resumption of the Persian effort to reconquer Egypt. However, even with Ochus’ ascent to the throne, the long Persian succession struggle was not yet entirely over, and Artaxerxes III’s preoccupation with lingering succession issues delayed resumption of Persia’s Egyptian enterprise for more than a half-dozen years.

Ochus had made his way to the throne through the claims of three other sons of Artaxerxes II, but thanks to an alleged total of 360 “wives,” Artaxerxes II reportedly had altogether 115 sons (Just. 10.1.1). Having a mother other than the queen was no bar to the succession, as the kingship of Artaxerxes II’s own father, Darius II, had shown, and as Artaxerxes II’s designation of Arsames, even before the final elevation of Ochus, indicated. This meant that Artaxerxes III, though king, still faced a number of potential rival claimants. These included not only various sons of Artaxerxes II but, given Artaxerxes’ longevity, probably also some of his grandsons. If we can trust Polyaenus’ report (7.17) that Ochus delayed announcing the death of Artaxerxes II for ten months while he circulated letters in Artaxerxes II’s name commanding that Ochus be proclaimed king, it appears that although other leading candidates for the succession had perished, Ochus had not been officially designated Artaxerxes II’s successor before Artaxerxes’ death. Artaxerxes may have needed ten months to secure the succession, particularly if absence from court because of the Egyptian campaign made it impossible for him to act swiftly at the time of Artaxerxes II’s death. Curtius’ notice that Ochus killed off all his relatives, including eighty brothers in one day (Curt. 10.5.23; Just. 10.3.1; Val. Max. 4.2.7; cf. Plut. Artax. 30.5), points to the need for decisive action on Ochus’ part. If there was anything
like that number of potential rivals at the time of Artaxerxes II’s death, Ochus evidently did not have a really broad power base on which he could rely.²

Initially, Artaxerxes III’s strength may have rested primarily on his command of the recently levied army. We may be sure that he did not disband this whole force upon returning from Egypt. According to Justin (10.3.2–4; Diod. 17.6.1), Artaxerxes III waged a Cadusian campaign soon after his accession. While the Cadusians, the object of repeated campaigns during the fourth century, were undeniably a perennially troublesome population, the new king’s primary interest in waging such a war at this time was probably that it provided a pretext for retaining command of a very large force.³

Artaxerxes III’s greatest concern must have been that no possible rival should have or acquire any military strength. Such a determination was undoubtedly behind his command in 358 that the “the satraps of the coast”—the satraps in western Anatolia—disband their mercenary forces on the grounds that they used up too much money (Schol. Dem. 4.19). By this time, the so-called Satraps’ Revolt was long over, and the still unreconciled officials Ariobarzanes and Datames had fallen to capture or assassination before Artaxerxes II’s death, so imperial authority seems to have been restored everywhere in Anatolia. But Artaxerxes III knew that Datames had maintained virtual independence for years with an almost entirely mercenary force and that before this, Cyrus the Younger’s mercenary force had enabled him to strike from western Anatolia and nearly seize the kingship. Probably unable to gauge with certainty the attitudes of officials in Anatolia to his kingship, Artaxerxes most likely wanted to make sure that no official had even the nucleus of a force which would allow him to act independently. With the political situation still fraught with uncertainty at the time of Artaxerxes III’s accession, the royal blood of Artabazus, the grandson of Artaxerxes II who had finally assumed the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia some time before the old king’s death, may have made Artaxerxes III wary of him in particular.

According to the scholiast on Dem. 4.19, all the satraps complied. That Artabazus was among these is attested by the availability of his mercenaries for employment by the Athenian commander Chares in 356 when Athens was campaigning in the Aegean against recalcitrant Athenian allies, Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium (Schol. Dem. 4.19).⁴ Artabazus undoubtedly intended to signal his loyalty by obeying Artaxerxes III’s order and discharging his mercenary troops. But that was evidently not enough. We find Artabazus in “revolt” just a short time later in 356 (Diod. 16.22.1).⁵ The most plausible explanation for this situation is that Artaxerxes III tried to remove Artabazus once he gave up his mercenary army and that this drove Artabazus into rebellion. Polyaenus’ reference (7.33.2) to Artabazus’ brothers, Oxythres and Dibictus, participating with him suggests that Artaxerxes was targeting the whole family, the offspring of Pharnabazus and a daughter of Artaxerxes II. Like Datames before him, Artabazus proved a resourceful and determined rebel. Diodorus’ notice that satraps having 70,000 troops opposed Artabazus probably involves greatly exaggerated figures, but likely indicates that Artaxerxes III
dispatched the rest of the satraps in western Anatolia against Artabazus and probably supplied some of the troops they deployed (16.22.1; cf. Schol. Dem. 4.19). Only Tithraustes, satrap of Great Phrygia (and not Artaxerxes’ chiliarch, active from the 390s through the 370s), who commanded 20,000 mostly cavalry troops (probably local levies), is mentioned by name (Schol. Dem. 4.19). But given Diodorus’ use of the plural “satraps” we may plausibly add Autophradates and Mausolus. As survivors of the recent satraps’ “revolt,” both had every reason to respond dutifully to royal directives at this time.

Having complied with Artaxerxes’ “mercenaries decree,” Artabazus initially had few forces at his disposal (Diod. 16.22.1). He did have close Greek connections, having married a Rhodian woman whose brothers Memnon and Mentor (both destined for many subsequent exploits in Persian service) were now in his entourage (Diod. 16.52.3). Perhaps one or another of these Rhodian relatives had commanded Artabazus’ mercenaries—their activities in the 340s and 330s show them to be highly skilled military figures—but once Artabazus discharged his mercenaries in response to Artaxerxes’ “mercenaries decree,” Memnon and Mentor’s military skills would have no significance. Nevertheless, Artabazus was lucky. Athens had recently hired most of Artabazus’ discharged mercenaries for its so-called Social War against Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes, important states that had seceded from the alliance system known as the Second Athenian League. By the end of 356, this mercenary force was under the command of Chares, the sole Athenian commander in the Aegean after his fellow commander Chabrias (the veteran of much Egyptian service) had died in battle in 357 and other Athenian generals had returned to Athens to face charges of incompetence based on Chares’ complaints (Diod. 16.7.3–4; Nep. Chabr. 4; Dem. 20.82). Lack of funds, however, immobilized Chares, and when Artabazus made an offer to Chares’ mercenary force, mostly if not entirely Artabazus’ own former mercenaries, Chares himself took the mercenaries into Artabazus’ service, abandoning operations in the Aegean and crossing to the Anatolian mainland to join Artabazus (Schol. Dem. 4.19; Dem. 4.24; Isoc. 8.44; Diod. 16.22.1).

Artabazus thus got back his previously discharged mercenary force and, acquired, in addition, a skilled Greek commander in Chares. Thanks to Chares, Artabazus defeated the satraps opposing him and during 355 was able to advance inland, ravaging territory in Great Phrygia. When news of this reached Artaxerxes III, he must have seen the elements of a familiar situation taking shape: a rebel official (driven into revolt like so many others by court politics), supported by a leading Greek state—Athens in this case—which had a big fleet and aims of its own. Both Artabazus and Athens, it could be assumed, would welcome additional manpower and funds. Artaxerxes must have anticipated that, given the opportunity, the Egyptian king Nectanebo would gladly assist them in hopes of delaying any new Persian attack on Egypt.

For Artaxerxes, there was no question of solving the problem by reconciling with Artabazus, but Artaxerxes could limit the opportunities for Egyptian mischief
by ending Athenian involvement and thereby weakening Artabazus, Chares’ employer. This Artaxerxes did quickly, demanding in 355 that Athens recall Chares. Rumor spread, probably by design, that Artaxerxes was prepared to send 300 ships—that is, the typical campaign fleet from the eastern Mediterranean—into the Aegean to support Athens’ opponents. Presumably, it was Persian envoys who delivered Artaxerxes’ demand to the Athenians, and it may have been they who made references to the fleet being readied in the eastern Mediterranean (Diod. 16.22.2; P. Erzherzog-Rainer FGH 105 F4; Dem. 14.25).

The Athenians had received a similar demand in 380–379—bring Chabrias back from Egypt or else—and had complied. Now in 355, already weakened by losses in a battle off Chios with their former allies and Mausolus in early 356, and facing aggressions by Philip of Macedon (who had taken Amphipolis in 357/6 and then Pydna and Potidæa from Athens) and the possibility of similar aggressions against towns in the Thracian Chersonese by the Thracian king Cersobleptes (Diod. 16.8.1–7), the Athenians could not risk further losses should Artaxerxes send ships to operate in the Aegean. They thus acceded to Artaxerxes’ demand and recalled Chares, probably in late 355 (Diod. 16.22.2), and soon ended the Social War, abjuring further operations across the Aegean. 10

Artabazus lost Chares as commander, but he likely still had the force that had kept loyal satraps at bay. Chares’ last service to Artabazus was to arrange a truce with Tithraustes. Whether or not Tithraustes knew of Chares’ imminent departure, he undoubtedly wanted to avoid further depredation by Artabazus’ troops. For Artabazus, the truce meant at least a temporary respite from attack, and he quickly made up for the loss of Chares by enlisting the Theban general Pammenes, who brought along 5,000 additional troops from Boeotia in 354 (Diod. 16.34.1–2). 11 Fighting resumed, and thanks now to Pammenes, who defeated “the satraps” in two great battles, Artabazus was again successful. 12

The situation was more and more resembling what had happened in the revolts of Datames and Ariobarzanes—military enterprises by loyal imperial officials failing repeatedly. Both previous revolts had come to an end through treachery rather than military victories. What we know about the end of Artabazus’ revolt suggests that here too betrayal or anticipated betrayal was critical. According to Polyainus (7.33.2), Artabazus grew suspicious of Pammenes’ loyalties and arrested him before deciding to abandon his rebellion and seek refuge in Macedonia. Given Pammenes’ great importance to Artabazus, there must have been good grounds for Artabazus’ suspicion. Most plausibly, Artabazus learned of attempts by Artaxerxes III (through intermediaries) to bribe away Pammenes—we may imagine Artaxerxes promising direct subsidies to Thebes (see Diod. 16.40.1–2)—and, recognizing that Pammenes and the Thebans wanted funds more than anything and probably cared little where they got them, Artabazus concluded that he could not trust Pammenes and put him under guard (and away from his troops).

Without Pammenes and without any ready substitute, Artabazus’ prospects dimmed considerably, leaving Artabazus little alternative but flight. Philip of
Macedon offered hospitality, and in 354/3 Artabazus abandoned his satrapy for Macedonia, bringing with him Memnon, one of his two Rhodian brothers-in-law (Diod. 16.52.3). We next encounter the other brother-in-law, Mentor, in the early 340s in Egyptian service (Diod. 16.42.2). Since Mentor had been in Egypt long enough by that time to be trusted with taking 4,000 troops to Sidon on Nectanebo’s behalf, we may suspect that Mentor went to Egypt soon after Artabazus fled to Macedon.

By 353, with Artabazus finally removed (albeit by flight to Macedonia rather than death), Artaxerxes III could proceed with his first Egyptian campaign as king. After the 390/89–388/7 campaign and Ochus’ putative 359 incursion, this is the most poorly documented Persian attack on Egypt in the fourth century. The fact that in 355–354 the Athenians believed the report that Artaxerxes was ready to send 300 Phoenician and Cilician ships into the Aegean against Athens’ fleet suggests that there was indeed a large Persian naval force available at this time, and this most likely indicates that Persian preparations were underway already in 355. Many of the ships may have actually been “on duty” for some time. It is likely that Tachos’ fleet had returned to Egypt after Tachos’ flight and Chabrias’ departure in 360, and there is no evidence that this fleet engaged in the struggle between Nectanebo and the Mendesian claimant. This means that Nectanebo had a sizable, intact fleet, and while continuing domestic political concerns might prevent him from dispatching any Egyptian troops outside Egypt, Nectanebo might not be so cautious about deploying the Egyptian fleet. Prudence certainly demanded that Artaxerxes make such an assumption. Thus, as had been the case in the 390s, Persian security concerns along the eastern Mediterranean coast may have prompted the assembly and maintenance of a Phoenician/Cilician security force in the early 350s, well before Artaxerxes turned to preparations for a new Egyptian campaign.

In connection with new preparations, Artaxerxes III seems to have made an innovative arrangement, installing a permanent Persian overseer to secure the staging area in and near Phoenicia against Egyptian intervention and to discourage any collusion between local rulers and the Egyptian king. Artaxerxes’ appointee was Mazaeus, who had previously assumed a satrapal or quasi-satrapal position in Cilicia as part of the restoration of imperial authority in Anatolia following collapse of the “satraps’ revolt” and termination of the Egyptian offensive. Mazaeus appears in literary sources only in 345, when Diodorus terms him “archon of Cilicia” (16.42.1), but his numbered Cilician coinage extends over at least twenty-seven years and ends with Alexander’s arrival, so if we count back from the time of Alexander’s arrival in 333, we can place the beginning of his role in Cilicia in 361–360. In Cilicia, Mazaeus had probably assumed the maritime security responsibilities connected with Cilicia and the native dynast Tarkumuwa since the 370s (we do not know what happened to Tarkumuwa, not even whether he was still alive when Mazaeus became “archon” of Cilicia). Now, while retaining his Cilician position, Mazaeus also took on additional responsibilities, involving supervision of Phoenician affairs. Certainly, on the occasion of previous Persian preparations for
Egyptian campaigns, Persian officials of various kinds had appeared at Sidon, Acco, and other nearby sites, and specially installed overseers, Hecatomnus and Iphicrates, based on Cyprus or at Acco, had looked after the security of the region while preparations were underway. But these had been temporary, and in their absence, Egyptian diplomacy, money, and sometimes military activity had disrupted Persian control of staging areas and, twice already, the whole eastern Mediterranean. The record of the last fifty years had been one of Persian failures and Egyptian successes, and, anticipating the same results even as Artaxerxes III began his own first campaign as king, rulers in the eastern Mediterranean might well be receptive to renewed Egyptian blandishments.

The evidence for Artaxerxes’ new arrangement in the Levant comes from coins on the Sidonian standard with conventional Sidonian iconography issued in the name of the Persian Mazaeus. This series began, it seems, in 353 (coins are numbered successively from years 1 to 21 of Mazaeus, 21 being 333, the time of Alexander’s arrival in the eastern Mediterranean and year 1 being the first year of his office). Mazaeus had started out in Cilicia following Datames’ revolt, and there had minted at Tarsus. Year 1 of his Sidonian coins likely reflects Mazaeus’ assumption of a new role in 353, which placed him at Sidon or at least gave him good reason to use Sidon’s minting facilities.15 There is no evidence of revolt or even unrest in the trans-Euphrates region in the mid-350s, so Mazaeus’ position and his coinage are best explained on the assumption that Artaxerxes III installed him to oversee and serve as paymaster for large-scale Persian preparations for a new campaign against Egypt which were getting underway in 353.16 The fact that Mazaeus continued to issue Sidonian coinage (with some interruptions) through the 330s indicates that the position he held was a permanent one. Although local kings like Strato remained in place, the autonomy they had enjoyed was certainly curtailed by the supervisory role assigned to Mazaeus. Just as Artaxerxes II had moved to “make Cyprus his own” in the late 390s by stationing Hecatomnus on the island, now Artaxerxes III moved to make the heretofore autonomous Phoenician cities “his own” by giving Mazaeus authority in Sidon, the main naval base among the Phoenician cities. What this amounted to militarily was an expansion of the maritime responsibilities Mazaeus was already discharging in Cilicia, or, we might say, a combination of two maritime roles, one centered in Cilicia, the other in Sidon. In addition to minting Sidonian coinage, Mazaeus continued to issue his Cilician coinage.

Artaxerxes himself intended to command the expedition against Egypt (Isoc. S.101; Trogus, Prol. 10). His foray into Egypt in 360/359 gave him some experience with such an undertaking. Perhaps he planned to finish in person what he seems to have suspended abruptly at that time. His readiness to lead an army into Egypt in the late 350s suggests a sense of political security on his part. He had evidently secured full control of the court, had dealt in some way with the Cadusian problem, and with Artabazus’ flight to Macedonia had seen the last of the potential challengers to his kingship disappear. But Artaxerxes was still risking much politically by taking personal command of and thus direct responsibility for an
Egyptian campaign. We can certainly trust the reports that he “fitted out the largest possible force” and assembled “vast multitudes of soldiers” (Isoc. 5.101–2; Diod. 16.40.3); he presumably did everything possible to ensure success. Although we have no direct evidence, we may assume enlistment of Greek mercenaries. Perhaps there is some indirect evidence for this in the great numbers of Greek mercenaries seemingly between jobs in Syria and Cilicia in the early 340s (when they flocked to Cyprus to fight on Persian behalf against rebel Cypriot cities: Diod. 16.42.8).27

If there were Greek mercenaries, there were certainly Greek mercenary commanders, but there is no indication of Artaxerxes’ use of any Greek in a leading command position of the sort that Iphicrates and then, for a time, Timotheus had filled under Pharnabazus. Since Artaxerxes III, the Great King himself, was going to lead the campaign in person, he may not have wanted to associate with himself any other figure who, when victory came, might be perceived as responsible for Persian success. Artaxerxes may already have seen his achievement in his Cadusian War diminished by the renown Codomannus (the later Darius III) garnered for his single-combat victory in that war (Diod. 17.6.1–2).

References to the fate of Strato of Sidon may hint at other measures connected with Persian preparations at this time. Strato’s coinage indicates that his kingship continued down to 352, that is, beyond the time of Mazaeus’ assumption of supervisory and security functions.28 Contemporary and near contemporary reports (Theopompus of Chios and Anaximenes of Lampsaicus29) note Strato’s death by violence but provide no details. A third-century CE source, Maximus of Tyre, refers to Strato ending his life in misery. An even later source (Jerome) reports Strato’s fear of approaching Persians and his decision to commit suicide rather than become a “plaything” (when Strato was unable actually to stab himself, according to Jerome, his wife seized the sword from him and dispatched him).20 We might conjecture that Artaxerxes tried to guard against any possibility of defection or collusion, and decided it was time finally to put away the former political apostate Strato.21 Perhaps Strato had chafed against the heavy Persian exactions, or perhaps there was friction with Mazaeus (possibly the basis of the tradition that Strato ended his life in misery). Tennes followed Strato as king. Continuity of coin types might suggest that he was part of the same dynasty, possibly a son of Strato, but an unrelated successor may have chosen to continue familiar types.22

The Persians may also have removed Nicocles, Evagorid king of Salamis since 374/3, at about the same time. Without preserving any details about the circumstances, Photius reports that Theopompus discussed how both Strato and Nicocles met their deaths through violence (FGH 115 F114). We cannot be sure that Strato’s and Nicocles’ deaths were closely connected chronologically—the two kings may have shared similar deaths which occurred at different points in time—but it is perhaps noteworthy that Nicocles’ successor, Evagoras II, was a very dutiful subject king who refused to join in the subsequent Cypriot revolt against Artaxerxes. He may have owed his position to Persian suppression of Nicocles at about the same time the Persians took care of their potential Sidonian problem by doing away with
Though the Persians themselves may have been responsible for Nicocles’ elevation following the death of Evagoras, in the intervening years, marked by satrapal and dynastic defections and by Egyptian aggression, it is possible that Nicocles had proved himself an unreliable client-king.

If we put aside Ochus’ putative opportunistic advance to Egypt in 359 while Artaxerxes II still lived, the last full-scale Persian attack on Egypt had been in 373—two decades previously. But thanks to preparations going back well before this, Nectanebo II had a permanent defense system, with fortifications guarding every point of access and native and Greek forces at the ready. Nectanebo had devoted himself over the last decade to gaining native and priestly support through temple-building activities and temple endowments on a scale almost unprecedented in Egyptian history, and this may have helped him pay for a substantial mercenary force without worrying about the political consequences. Building activities and benefactions represented an extraordinarily great expense, but temples paid taxes and duties, so to invest in temple-endowment was to build up the tax base of the crown and thus the resources for military expenditures. Nectanebo may thus have figured out how to cultivate powerful priesthoods while still sustaining a big military budget.

Diodorus (16.48.2) identifies two Greeks, Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan, as critical to Nectanebo’s success against Persian invasion in 351/0. Lamius is otherwise unknown, but Diophantus may be identified with the syntrierarch on the trireme *Dēmokratia Hagnodēmou* in 349/8 and also with the Diophantus whose absence “in Asia” Isocrates notes in *Letter 8 (To the Rulers of the Mytileneans).* Consequently, we may conclude that Diophantus was a figure normally at Athens and not a mercenary commander on long-term service in Egypt. Presumably, he took employment in the late 350s as Persian preparations signaled an imminent attack on Egypt. This suggests that, despite the presence of very large Greek as well as native forces in Egypt, Nectanebo still recruited Greeks and bestowed high commands on some of them. Quite likely, it was under these circumstances that Mentor, the Rhodian brother-in-law of Artabazus, made his way to Egypt after the collapse of Artabazus’ “revolt.” Possibly, following the practice Tachos had employed with Agesilaus, Nectanebo not only engaged figures such as Diophantus and Mentor (and possibly Lamius) but provided them with funds to hire mercenaries and bring them to Egypt. The rewards Egyptian kings had given such Greek commanders as Chabrias and Agesilaus were probably well known, and expectation of gaining a great fortune will have provided sufficient incentive to potential commanders to enter Egyptian employment on an individual basis in the 350s. Their presence in Egypt need not point to involvement on the part of their home cities.

The 351/0 campaign itself is attested by the merest handful of general references. Isocrates, writing (ostensibly) to Philip of Macedon in 346 and attempting to depict Artaxerxes III as a weak opponent, asserts that “after [Artaxerxes] had brought together and fitted out the largest force he could possibly raise and marched against [the Egyptians], he retired from Egypt not only defeated but laughed at and
scorned as unfit either to be a king or to command an army” (Isoc. 5.101–2). Allowing for exaggeration, we may still take from this that Artaxerxes brought a very large force to Egypt—perhaps the largest yet mustered during the fourth century—and that he failed. Diodorus gives us a date but little more, noting under 351/0 that “[Artaxerxes] made an expedition into Egypt with vast multitudes of soldiers and was unsuccessful” [16.40.3]. Demosthenes, speaking in 351/0, corroborates the date in his reference to the report, unconfirmed at the time of his speech, of Artaxerxes’ failure in Egypt (15.11–12). 27

In an effort to glean some more information about Artaxerxes’ enterprise, we may turn to additional remarks by Diodorus. Diodorus mentions the 351/0 campaign only briefly before moving on, still under 351/0, to discuss at great length the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts that followed this campaign and then Artaxerxes’ subsequent second large-scale Egyptian campaign, which actually took place in 343/2. In his narrative of this second campaign, Diodorus notes that Artaxerxes suffered a great disaster: “As he came to the great marsh where are the Barathra [‘the Pits,’ where windblown sand obscured the waters of Lake Serbonis and created a kind of invisible quagmire; see Diod. 1.30.4–9], as they are called, he lost a part of his force through his lack of experience of the places” (Diod. 16.46.4–6). If Artaxerxes had advanced along the desert route all the way to the Delta in 351/0, even if he had not taken the route to the north of Lake Serbonis, he must certainly have learned of it and its dangers, so it seems impossible that he lacked knowledge of this situation in 343/2. Possibly, then, this episode really belongs to Artaxerxes’ 351/0 campaign (here we must assume that Artaxerxes’ invasion of Egypt in 359 had not penetrated as far as Lake Serbonis or that he had taken the southerly route from Rhinocorura to the Delta, perhaps hoping to reach Memphis while Nectanebo’s and the Mendesian’s Egyptian forces were fighting each other to the north [at Pelusium?]). If so, the losses may have been significant enough to hinder his army’s fighting abilities.

Diodorus remarks that it was because of Nectanebo’s Greek generals, Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan, that Nectanebo was victorious in everything in his 351/0 campaign (16.48.1–2). Unfortunately, Diodorus never says exactly what Diophantus and Lamius did. We can only speculate. The most general sort of explanation would simply be that they commanded the forces which repelled Artaxerxes. Diodorus’ reference to victory “in everything” might indicate different kinds of encounters—on land as well as at sea. Victory on land might possibly be linked with the disaster at Lake Serbonis. Perhaps defenses overseen by the Greek commanders to the south of this (typically the area entrusted to Greek mercenary forces) compelled Artaxerxes to take the northerly route along the treacherous edge of Lake Serbonis. Perhaps Nectanebo’s Greek commanders were then able to assault Artaxerxes’ apparently much diminished force and prevent it from seizing Pelusium. We may conjecturally place here Polyenius’ report of a stratagem employed in Egypt during “the Persian war” by Gastron the Lacedaemonian, when he was commanding—another story of dressing up non-Greeks as Greeks and
driving off the Persians. If Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan were Nectanebo’s primary Greek commanders in 351/0, possibly Polyaenus’ Gastron was a subordinate commander at this time who augmented his forces with Egyptian troops armed and arrayed in Greek fashion. The Spartans had a long history of training non-Spartans (albeit Greeks) such as Lacedaemonian perioeci and helots to bolster their own forces, so such a maneuver by a Spartan commander in Egypt would not be a great innovation.

In his next attack on Egypt, in the 340s, Artaxerxes presumably made corrections, doing what he had not done in 351/0 or not doing again what had failed in 351 (such as approaching Egypt via “the Pits”). Perhaps, then, we can make inferences from Artaxerxes’ distinctive tactics in 343. At that time, he created three strike forces, each comprising a Greek and a Persian contingent, and deployed the forces in separate though coordinated operations (Diod. 16.47.1–4). If this represented an alteration of failed tactics that Artaxerxes had previously employed, we might guess that Artaxerxes had kept his army intact as a single unit in 351/0 (which would have been a deviation from Pharnabazus’ deployment of Iphicrates’ mercenaries separately from his non-Greek troops), and that a single battlefield failure (following the disaster at Lake Serbonis?) forced a withdrawal.

Even accounting for rhetorical exaggeration, the ignominy that Isocrates attaches to Artaxerxes’ effort in 351/0 suggests that the contrast between the enormous size of the expedition and its very limited duration and achievements was so great as to be laughable. Artaxerxes was clearly not an incompetent, ill-prepared, or fearful commander. Something else must explain his defeat and evidently hasty retreat. Our sources do not seem to know just what it was. But a combination of very effective, well-manned frontier defenses (given Egyptian abandonment of any offensive strategy after Tachos’ ill-fated campaign, Nectanebo II undoubtedly concentrated on frontier and other defenses—the system put in place by Acoris, Chabrias, and Nectanebo I—and had had almost a decade to perfect them), the loss of a portion of his army in the disaster along Lake Serbonis, and an overwhelming attack by forces under Diophantus and Lamius may have been responsible. Nevertheless, with so few real clues, all is speculation.

The outcome alone is clear. Within a matter of months after its initiation, the third great fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt collapsed. Whatever the details of Artaxerxes’ failure in Egypt in 351/0, Artaxerxes’ sole leadership of the campaign meant that blame and derision would be directed at him alone rather than at an unfortunate subordinate. There was no scapegoat. Artaxerxes’ only course now was to renew the campaign as quickly as possible and make sure that it finally succeeded.
With a swiftness reminiscent of Artaxerxes II’s following Pharnabazus’ failed 373 campaign, Artaxerxes III began preparations for a new full-scale Egyptian campaign immediately after the 351/0 catastrophe. But there were new setbacks. Coming so soon after the preparations for the 351/0 campaign, Persian demands soon drove Phoenician and Cypriot cities into revolt, opening the door to Egyptian intervention, and crippling Persia’s Egyptian strategy once again. As in the 380s, recovery of the eastern Mediterranean would have to precede renewed attack on Egypt.

Thanks to Diodorus’ exceptionally detailed narrative of events at this time,¹ we do not have to resort constantly to conjecture to flesh out the story.

Now since the king’s satraps and generals dwelt in the city of the Sidonians and behaved in an outrageous and high-handed fashion toward the Sidonians in ordering things to be done, the victims of this treatment, aggrieved by their insolence, decided to revolt from the Persians. Having persuaded the rest of the Phoenicians to make a bid for their independence, they sent ambassadors to the Egyptian king Nectanebos, who was an enemy of the Persians, and after persuading him to accept them as allies they began to make preparations for the war. Inasmuch as Sidon was distinguished for its wealth and its private citizens had amassed great riches from its shipping, many triremes were quickly outfitted and a multitude of mercenaries gathered, and, besides, arms, missiles, food, and all other materials useful in war were provided with dispatch. The first hostile act was the cutting down and destroying of the royal park in which the Persian kings were wont to take their recreation; and the second was the burning of the fodder for horses which had been stored up for the war; last of all they arrested such Persians as had committed the acts of insolence and wreaked vengeance upon them…. Artaxerxes, being apprised of the rash acts of the insurgents, issued threatening warnings to all the Phoenicians and in particular to the people of Sidon. (16.41.2–6)
At this point, according to Diodorus (16.42.1, 43.1), Artaxerxes gathered an army, took personal command, and advanced against the Phoenicians. But before he arrived, Belesys, satrap of Syria, and Mazaeus, governor [archōn] of Cilicia, joined forces and made war on the Phoenicians. Tennes, the king of Sidon, had “from the Egyptians” 4,000 Greek mercenaries commanded by the Rhodian Mentor (the brother-in-law of Artabazus). With these and with citizen-soldiers, Tennes defeated Belesys and Mazaeus and drove their army out of Phoenicia. While these things were going on, Diodorus continues, the kings of the nine cities of Cyprus, in common agreement and in imitation of the Phoenicians, revolted and, having made preparations for war, declared themselves independent (16.42.1–5, 43.1).

Diodorus places these events, as well as all subsequent events through the ensuing Persian campaign in Egypt, under the years 351/0 and 350/49 as part of the section which he begins by noting Artaxerxes III’s failed first campaign against Egypt as king. If Artaxerxes’ first such campaign properly belongs in 351/0, as Demosthenes (15.3) confirms, then Diodorus has severely compressed the chronology of events after that campaign. Sidonian coins—not Tennes’, which have a five-year run (351–347), but Mazaeus’—may point to the true chronology. Mazaeus’ Sidonian coins are numbered starting with 353, the year he began minting in Sidon, as year 1. The coins include numbers 1 through 6 (= 353–348) but skip 7 and 8 (= 347, 346) before resuming with 9. Given the report of Sidonian revolt, destruction of the signs of Persian presence, and repulse of Mazaeus with Belesys about this time, it is natural to infer that the break in Mazaeus’ Sidonian coinage was due to revolt at Sidon. We might therefore date the revolt at the earliest to some time in Mazaeus’ year 6 (assuming coinage numbered 6 was issued early in that year, revolt could have followed at any time during the rest of the year), continuing into 347 and 346, and possibly even into 345, with Mazaeus’ resuming his coinage with number 9 sometime in 345, not necessarily at the beginning of the year.

Diodorus may not have the chronology right, but his narrative makes the sequence of events quite clear. In the aftermath of the failed 351/0 campaign, Artaxerxes began preparations again, probably as early as 350/49. Officials left behind in Sidon and other places as a precaution against any Egyptian move into this region may have spearheaded renewed preparations almost immediately. These continued for a while, but, probably prodded by a very impatient Artaxerxes, Persian officials were insufferably demanding. “The victims of this treatment” were undoubtedly those called upon to furnish provisions and outfit ships—the well-to-do merchants of Sidon—on the heels of the large-scale preparations leading up to the 351/0 campaign and perhaps ongoing guard operations after 359. The 100 “most distinguished” Sidonians subsequently executed by Artaxerxes may have constituted a council of 100, and we may see them rather than Tennes as the sovereign body at Sidon and as the original rebels. Tennes, on the reconstruction proposed here, was a Persian appointee, installed before the 351/0 campaign to insure against any renewed Egyptianizing activities by Strato, a former ally of Tachos. The
distinguished Sidonians executed by Artaxerxes were certainly the leading mer-
chants and shipowners of Sidon and thus those most affected by Persian demands
after the failed attack on Egypt in 351. Aware of mounting disaffection among “the
most distinguished” Sidonians, Tennes may finally have decided to stand with
them, perhaps seeing that otherwise he, like Persian officials, would be an early
target when the rebels acted.8

The concentration of Persian officials at Sidon meant that native resentment was
greatest there. But Persian demands and insolence certainly affected other
Phoenician cities, so “the most distinguished” men of Tyre, Aradus, and Byblos
probably had the same grievances as Sidonians and thus readily supported Sido-
nian proposals for revolt. Diodorus prefaces his discussion of Phoenician affairs at
this time with a reference to Tripolis as the combination of Aradus, Sidon, and Tyre
and the site of a common council, probably an indication that his source had tried
to explain the mechanisms of decision making and cooperation connected with the
Phoenician revolts.9 If Sidon took the lead, the “state” of Tripolis may have provided
the framework for common action, before as well as during the revolt.

There was certainly no doubt that Nectanebo II would provide support. Nothing
would serve Egyptian interests more than Persian loss of staging areas in Phoeni-
cian territory.10 What lies behind Diodorus’ statement that the Phoenicians per-
suaded Nectanebo to accept them as allies and then began making preparations for
the war is probably discussion with Nectanebo about just what kind of support he
would provide. Phoenician revolt would inevitably invite Persian response. Without
substantial Egyptian backing—not money but soldiers—Phoenician cities could
not stand up to a full Persian attack. The Egyptians, however, were clearly a match
for the Persians. They had outfought them three times already in Egypt, and twice
moved out of Egypt into Phoenician cities. But since Nectanebo had taken the
kingship from Tachos in 360, Egyptian strategy had been entirely defensive. The
Phoenicians likely argued that this was the moment for real Egyptian initiative.
Artaxerxes’ new preparations following the 351/0 disaster made it clear that no
matter how many failures the Persians suffered in Egypt, Artaxerxes III, like
Artaxerxes II before him, was committed to recovering Egypt. Subject peoples in
the eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere thus faced the prospect of unending and
constantly increasing Persian demands. More than ever before, they were probably
ready to throw off the Persian yoke. If subject peoples saw evidence of Egyptian
enterprise, a revolt by Phoenician cities might inspire widespread uprisings, marked
by the expulsion of local Persian garrison forces and, as in Sidon, attacks on Persian
officials. Nectanebo could achieve what Tachos had sought—control of the whole
eastern Mediterranean coastal region, perhaps all the way up to the Euphrates—
without having to mount a campaign as massive and expensive and ultimately as
politically destructive as Tachos’ campaign had been.

Nectanebo joined, evidently promising enough aid to prompt the conspirators
to continue. Diodorus reports that Sidonian preparations for the revolt included
outfitting triremes, collecting many mercenaries, and stockpiling arms, missiles,
food, and other materials useful for war. But this is certainly what was already under way in and around Sidon in preparation for the Egyptian campaign. Potentially rebellious Sidonians could hardly have gone about preparations like this for their own purposes under the eyes of Persian officials. Revolt itself seems to have involved a well-coordinated series of actions at Sidon, probably occurring more or less simultaneously on a single day: the arrest and execution of the Persian officials overseeing preparations, the burning of fodder meant to feed horses during the upcoming campaign, and the destruction of the most spectacular symbol of Persian presence, the forested park or paradeisos near Sidon belonging to the Persian king. These were very dramatic gestures, clearly meant to signal outrage at the continuing exactions for Egyptian campaigns and repudiation of Persian dominion.

Whether he was at Babylon, Susa, or Ecbatana, Artaxerxes was a good distance from the coast and could only slowly mount a military response of his own. But Mazaues had been supervising Sidonian, and more generally Phoenician as well as Cilician affairs for several years, and he was nearby, possibly in Tarsus. Thus, Phoenician revolt was in the first instance his concern and suppression of it his responsibility. He may have had with him Greek mercenaries left from the 351 campaign. Belesys, satrap of “Beyond the River”—the trans-Euphrates satrapy which included the Phoenician cities—was in Syria, probably at Damascus. He may have had some troops available as a result of his own ongoing levies for the new Egyptian campaign. Likely aware of widespread discontent, these two officials evidently acted swiftly after news of the Phoenician revolt reached them, not waiting for Artaxerxes or additional troops.

The rebellious Phoenicians had undoubtedly anticipated this, and their dealings with Nectanebo must have aimed in the short term at getting Egyptian support in advance of their rebellion and Mazaues’ predictable response. Timing would be important here. Obviously Egyptian aid could not arrive before the outbreak of the Sidonian revolt, but it had to arrive soon after this. Nectanebo certainly sent the prearranged aid—a 4,000-man mercenary (and thus presumably mostly Greek) force under the Rhodian Mentor—by ship, avoiding the detection that passage overland would produce. This force probably reached Sidon very soon, perhaps immediately, after the Sidonians’ spectacular anti-Persian measures announced revolt against the Persians. Thus when Mazaues and Belesys moved to Sidon, the Sidonians and other Phoenicians were ready. With Mentor’s 4,000 mercenaries augmenting a Phoenician citizen-soldier force (hoi politikoi stratiōtai), Tennes defeated the Persian force and drove it out of Phoenicia, possibly killing Belesys in the process.

Phoenician victory and the evidence of Egyptian support were all that Cypriot kings needed to join in rebellion. Diodorus’ concise statement that “all these kings in common agreement and in imitation of the Phoenicians revolted, and having made preparations for the war, declared their own kingdoms independent” hints at earlier, unrecorded activities—discussions about common action, preparations (stockpiling, hiring troops, and quite likely participation in
negotiations with Nectanebo). Cypriot kings and merchants had undoubtedly been importuned by Persian officials readying renewed attack on Egypt much as the Phoenicians had been. With Tennes’ defeat of the initial Persian response force under Mazaeus and Belesys, there were perhaps now only Cilician ships available for any attack on Cyprus, and these could likely be countered by Phoenician ships in rebel hands. It was certainly well known that Nectanebo had a huge native and Greek military force in Egypt, which had recently chased Artaxerxes III out of Egypt. With the dispatch of a mercenary force to Sidon, Nectanebo had signaled his commitment to the “liberation” of the eastern Mediterranean, and, given recent Persian failure in Egypt, this must have seemed another moment when power in the eastern Mediterranean was about to shift toward Egypt.

There may not have been unanimity among Cypriot kings. Evagoras II, the brother or son of Nicocles, seems to have been expelled from Cyprus about this time, to be replaced by Pnytagoras, probably a grandson of Evagoras I by Evagoras’ eldest son Pnytagoras (who had been assassinated along with Evagoras in the 370s), so perhaps Pnytagoras the Younger was reclaiming his rightful hereditary position from Evagoras II, the son (?) of Nicocles who had taken Pnytagoras the Elder’s place. We may suspect that this usurpation occurred because of Evagoras II’s unpopular refusal to go along with growing anti-Persian plans on Cyprus. Like Tennes, he owed his position to Persian support, and he may have doubted Egypt’s readiness for long-term and large-scale support—he knew what had happened to Evagoras I.

In sending the 4,000-man mercenary force, Nectanebo thus played a decisive role in preserving the Phoenician revolt and in instigating the Cypriot revolts. In the short term, the presence of this mercenary force in Phoenicia—evidently based at Sidon—secured the eastern Mediterranean for Nectanebo. But anticipating determined Persian response in the near future, the Sidonians set about making the city impregnable by digging triple ditches around it and constructing high fortification walls (we may perhaps compare these to those constructed by Tyre against Alexander, which were reportedly 150 feet high).

The evidence of transplantations from Judah in 343 and possibly also the siege of Jericho mentioned by a very late source (Syncellus) seem to point to the spread of rebellion at least to nearby Judah. Like the Cypriot kings, Judean officials may have waited until after the Phoenician victory over Belesys and Mazaeus before breaking with the Persians. If so, unlike the Cypriot kings, they probably had local garrisons to deal with and may have expelled or suborned these as their acts of rebellion. But with Phoenician cities to the north in rebellion and a sizable Egyptian force—Mentor’s mercenaries—present in Sidon and additional Egyptian forces able to move north at will from the Sinai Peninsula, Judah was caught in the middle, and there may have been no alternative than “rebellion,” once Belesys and Mazaeus’ defeated force withdrew and Mentor’s mercenaries and Phoenician troops were free to act elsewhere. There was no Persian force available to challenge them at this time.
If we could trust Isocrates’ assertion in his Letter to Philip in 346 that Artaxerxes had no fleet because he had lost Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cilicia (5.102) we might add at least some Cilician coastal cities to the list of rebels at this time. However, Diodorus’ notice (16.42.9) of the presence in Syria and Cilicia of Greek mercenaries in Persian service in the 340s raises doubts about Isocrates’ report of Cilician defections. Possibly, in the face of Phoenician and Cypriot revolt, Egyptian involvement, and Mazaeus and Belesys’ defeat, Persians were suspicious of Cilician loyalty and dared not depend on Cilician ships.

After Belesys and Mazaeus’ failed effort, there was no swift Persian move. Diodorus places the Phoenician revolts, Belesys and Mazaeus’ attack, Artaxerxes’ muster of an army, and his arrival at Sidon all in the same year, 351/0. Coins, however, appear to indicate that Sidon was free from Persian control during 347 and 346, possibly from late 348 until early 345. If we date the Phoenician revolts to 348–347 and place Belesys and Mazaeus’ attack not long after the revolts, rebellious Phoenician cities may not have faced further Persian attack until late 346/early 345. In addition to the evidence of coins, there is a Babylonian tablet reporting the arrival of prisoners from Sidon in (it appears) year 14 of Artaxerxes, which would be 345. This furnishes a terminus ad quem. Assuming these prisoners were connected with the suppression of the Sidonian revolt, Artaxerxes’ victory has to have occurred no later than 345.

Understandably, Artaxerxes moved slowly. He had to assume that the mercenary troops under Mentor were just the vanguard of a much fuller army that Nectanebo might deploy outside Egypt to keep the middle territory out of Persian hands. Having failed already in Egypt, Artaxerxes certainly could not tolerate another great defeat, especially if it came in Phoenicia or Syria rather than Egypt. To avoid this, in case he had to battle a very large Egyptian force, Artaxerxes needed to assemble and deploy an even larger force of his own. Mazaeus had held on to a number of Greek mercenaries after his failed advance on Sidon, but otherwise Greek mercenaries were probably in very short supply, especially given Artaxerxes’ distant inland base. This meant that Artaxerxes had to rely almost exclusively on very extensive native levies, and the process for mustering such levies typically stretched over a year or more.

The loss of Cyprus compounded Artaxerxes’ difficulties. With all Cypriot cities in revolt, the Egyptians had the whole island at their disposal to use as a base for supporting rebellious Phoenician and Philistine cities—supplying them with matériel or transferring troops from Egypt to coastal locations. Facing a similar situation in 386, Artaxerxes II had commissioned satraps in western Anatolia to prepare a force to recover the eastern Mediterranean. They had relied on Asian Greek ships and Greek mercenaries and deployed forces simultaneously on Cyprus (Orontes) and in Phoenicia (Tiribazus). Artaxerxes III adopted a generally similar two-pronged strategy. Unlike Artaxerxes II in the 380s, Artaxerxes III had a ready fleet and military force in western Anatolia in the form of ships and troops maintained permanently in Caria by the Hecatomnids since the time of Hecatomnus’ son.
Mausolus (dynast and satrap from 377/6 to 353/2), who during the 370s and 360s had built capacious harbor facilities at Halicarnassus. Artaxerxes thus turned to the Hecatomnid Idrieus, brother of Mausolus and now satrap of Caria, “to collect an infantry force and a navy to carry on a war with the kings of Cyprus” (Diod. 16.42.6).

In his Letter to Philip in 346, Isocrates claimed that Idrieus was poised to defect because of the burden of Persian monetary demands and that Idrieus needed only evidence of Philip of Macedon’s engagement in Anatolia to do so. \(^{21}\) Philip did nothing, so we cannot test Isocrates’ prediction, but Idrieus showed no hesitation in responding to Artaxerxes’ command. For him, the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts evidently were not sufficient demonstration of Persian weakness. He may have remembered the risk his father Hecatomnus had taken in the 380s, supporting Evagoras I when it seemed the eastern Mediterranean and perhaps more would be lost to Persia as a result of Egyptian enterprise, only to see Egypt pull abruptly out of the situation, leaving Evagoras to fight on alone. Probably wary of Egyptian commitment to any sustained effort, Idrieus evidently opted to remain dutiful. (It is also entirely possible that Idrieus was simply rather old at this time and uninterested in political adventures.)

Idrieus for his part hired the experienced Athenian general Phocion to command actual operations on Cyprus (Diod. 16.42.7). Before Idrieus launched the campaign, Evagoras II, possibly exploiting ties of friendship between the Evagorids and Hecatomnids going back to Evagoras I and Hecatomnus in the 390s, seems to have ended up in Caria. Coins in his name were minted there, presumably for payment for troops engaged in the recovery of Cyprus. \(^{22}\) Possibly, Evagoras II, drawing on another long-standing Evagorid friendship—that with Athens—served as intermediary for Idrieus in the hiring of Phocion. Idrieus may have had to recruit additional mercenaries, but thanks to the availability of the Hecatomnid fleet, he did not need to engage in any time-consuming shipbuilding.

Phocion and Evagoras II’s attack on Cyprus initiated the recovery effort. As Diodorus observes in an earlier context, Cyprus was well situated to defend Asia, and most likely Artaxerxes acted to prevent its use as an Egyptian base while he launched his own campaign against coastal regions opposite Cyprus. Under Phocion and Evagoras, Idrieus’ force—forty triremes and 8,000 troops—moved to the island, targeting Salamis first (summer 346?). Diodorus, perhaps trying to explain the strategy, calls Salamis the largest of Cypriot cities. That was certainly true, but it is likely that Salamis had taken the lead in fomenting the rebellion of Cypriot cities, and Artaxerxes may have believed that by capturing it Phocion and Evagoras might bring about the submission of other cities. \(^{23}\) This was not at all an easy matter. The Salaminians did not offer battle, but were evidently well prepared to face a siege. Phocion and Evagoras moved systematically, building a fortified encampment and taking control of the countryside. Then, Diodorus states, “they began to besiege the Salaminians by land and by sea” (16.42.8). Phocion and Evagoras’ troops plundered the countryside, but there is no evidence that Phocion
and Evagoras made much headway at Salamis. From Artaxerxes’ point of view, this was probably satisfactory, since by its presence alone Phocion and Evagoras’ force took Cyprus’ cities and resources effectively out of play.

According to Diodorus (16.42.9), the prospect of booty from the island drew so many mercenaries from Syria and Cilicia that Phocion and Evagoras’ force doubled in size. These mercenaries were undoubtedly from the forces Mazaeus and Belesys maintained, and they had probably been marking time after Belesys and Mazaeus’ failed attack on Sidon. Diodorus explicitly terms their crossing “voluntary,” but we may wonder if this was not actually part of the Persian plan for dealing with Cyprus at this time. Artaxerxes’ own enormous force, probably now on its way to Phoenicia, would likely be sufficient to confront both rebellious Phoenician cities and anticipated Egyptian reinforcements. If Phocion and Evagoras were concentrating their efforts on Salamis, they could employ additional mercenary forces to engage other Cypriot cities, making sure that there would be no cooperation with Salamis or with Phoenician cities. If necessary, mercenaries could be quickly shifted from Cyprus to Phoenicia.

Diodorus says that with the great increase in the size of invading forces, the kings throughout Cyprus fell into a “state of great anxiety and terror” (16.42.9), probably reflecting their expectation that not just Salamis but other Cypriot cities would now be targeted. But there is no mention of surrender at this point. Diodorus’ report of the ultimate submission of Cypriot cities comes in the Athenian archon year following his report of the siege and the rush of mercenaries to Cyprus. There is no good reason to doubt this chronology and not extend the siege into a second year.

Suppression of the Phoenician revolts, though begun later than Evagoras and Phocion’s attack on Cyprus, actually proceeded more quickly. Diodorus puts his whole account of Artaxerxes’ dealings with Sidon in a single year—the year preceding the time of the submission of Cypriot cities. Crossing the Euphrates, Artaxerxes evidently advanced through Syria to a position north of Tripolis,²⁴ that is, just outside Phoenician territory. Diodorus reports that before the arrival of the king, the Sidonians burned all their ships so that no one from the city could sail off by himself to gain safety. That is a plausible explanation, but probably Diodorus’ own idea. Asking who might benefit most from this situation leads us to Mentor and Nectanebo. We may speculate that as Nectanebo’s agent Mentor had something to do with the destruction of the Sidonian ships. With Phoenician and Cypriot cities in revolt, Artaxerxes had very little in the way of a fleet at this point. However quickly he might deal with the rebellious cities here, he would not advance to Egypt without a sizable fleet. Destruction of the Sidonian ships (conceivably under the pretext of preventing flight) thus deprived Artaxerxes of a great number of ships and prevented any immediate move from Phoenicia to Egypt should Artaxerxes prevail against Phoenician rebels. If Nectanebo was responsible (through Mentor) for such a preemptive move, he was clearly not depending entirely on Phoenician success, but preparing for the possibility of the revolt’s collapse and an attempt by Artaxerxes to move on to Egypt.

LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE MIDDLE TERRITORY, 350–345
According to Diodorus (16.43.1–2), when the Sidonian king Tennes learned of the great size of Artaxerxes’ force, he gave up any hope of successful resistance and tried to save himself by offering to betray Sidon to Artaxerxes and to assist in the attack on Egypt. He knew, he claimed, the places in Egypt and all the landing places along the Nile, meaning, presumably, along the mouths of the Nile branches. What we may observe at this point is that after sending Mentor and the mercenary force Nectanebo II had made no further move to assist rebel cities—no aid for Cypriot cities, no fleet to Phoenician cities, and no reinforcements for Mentor. Tennes and other rebellious figures certainly made the same observation and likely drew the conclusion that, despite earlier promises Nectanebo had made, the Egyptian king was not going to make a large-scale effort in Phoenicia. Mentor’s 4,000 mercenaries were evidently the extent of Nectanebo’s direct support, and these would have little chance against Artaxerxes’ enormous army.

Artaxerxes’ response to the Phoenician revolts cannot have been unanticipated, and Phoenician envoys must have had Nectanebo’s previous promise of full support before Sidon and other cities actually revolted, so we must infer that Nectanebo reneged on his promise. Perhaps, in the face of Artaxerxes’ methodical preparation of a huge expeditionary force, Nectanebo recognized that if he deployed a comparably large army outside Egypt and failed, Egypt would be completely vulnerable. Thus, despite his probable earlier assurances to Phoenician envoys, Nectanebo decided to keep his army in Egypt and to rely on the already repeatedly proven defensive strategy.

An envoy (Diodorus even knows his name, Thettalion—a good indication of the detailed nature of Diodorus’ sources) conveyed Tennes’ offer to Artaxerxes. Tennes’ expectation of clemency should not surprise us. In recent decades Persian kings commonly rehabilitated rebels when they could be of service—witness Glos (after his participation in Cyrus’ attack on Artaxerxes II), Orontes, and Tachos, in addition to Phoenician kings themselves in the late 380s and (for a time) Strato of Sidon—all cases which Tennes certainly knew. Tennes may have cast blame on the instigators and presented himself as having had to go along with the leading Sidonians who had determined to revolt, quite possibly representing what actually had happened two years or so earlier.

Artaxerxes agreed, and after initial hesitation agreed further to a handshake to seal the bargain when Thettalion told him that only with such a pledge of trust would Tennes proceed with his plan of betrayal (Diod. 16.43.3–4). If this incident is true, we may suspect that Artaxerxes had no intention of granting clemency to Tennes and did not wish to be bound by an agreement he knew he would break. But the prospect of taking Sidon and thus perhaps other cities without any fighting through agreement with Tennes’ proposal probably outweighed all other considerations.

The whole affair went smoothly for Artaxerxes. Tennes confided his intentions to Mentor, who himself undoubtedly saw no hope for success against Artaxerxes’ immense force, and Mentor cooperated with Tennes. At the approach of the Persian
army, or possibly after it had made an encampment, the Phoenician cities evidently planned to hold another common meeting—presumably, as before, at Tripolis. Tennes accordingly left Sidon with 500 stratiōtai—probably members of Mentor’s force—and 100 of “the most distinguished” Sidonians as advisers, pretending that he was going to the general meeting at Tripolis (meaning he was traveling north from Sidon25). These men quite likely had been among the original instigators of revolt, and the negotiations between Artaxerxes and Tennes (through his envoy) probably included Artaxerxes’ demand for the arrest of the leading rebels. When, Diodorus says, they “came near Artaxerxes,” Tennes (presumably meaning Mentor’s troops who accompanied Tennes) seized the 100 men and delivered them to Artaxerxes. Artaxerxes’ bowmen then shot the 100 down as “being to blame for the revolt.” Sometime after this—once Tennes’ betrayal and the execution of the 100 leading men became known—500 “of the first men” approached Artaxerxes as suppliants carrying olive branches in a desperate attempt to save themselves and the city. According to Diodorus, while Artaxerxes wanted control of Sidon, he did not want it with any terms attached, and when Tennes assured him that he could hand the city over to Artaxerxes, the king had all 500 shot down where they stood (Diod. 16.45.1–3).

With Mentor’s mercenaries and Tennes in the lead and Sidonians in the city unaware of their collaboration with the Persian king, Artaxerxes and Persian forces were able to enter Sidon. The city’s recently constructed triple ditches and heightened fortification walls thus never played any role in securing Sidon. Diodorus recounts the unlikely story that with the city swarming with soldiers, the townspeople shut themselves and their families and servants up in their houses and burned them up, so that casualties totaled “more than forty thousand.” Artaxerxes subsequently sold “the funeral pyre”—the burned material of the city—to men who would salvage the great amount of gold and silver melted in the holocaust (Diod. 16.45.5). To trust this account of the burning of Sidon, we would need to accept as credible the coordinated and nearly simultaneous self-immolation of perhaps thousands of families in individual houses. It is much more likely that Artaxerxes ordered the burning of a large part of the city26 This might be seen as fitting retaliation for the Sidonians’ earlier destruction of the royal paradēisos at Sidon, but it probably had a greater strategic purpose. Sidon had taken the lead in fomenting rebellion, and Artaxerxes’ action would announce in dramatic fashion the consequences of such apostasy. Artaxerxes had executed Sidonian leaders of the revolt. After entering Sidon he had Tennes executed. Then, with an eye toward still rebellious cities and their populations, he punished Sidon as a whole. The dividends came almost immediately: “The rest of the [Phoenician] cities,” Diodorus writes, “panic-stricken, went over to the Persians” (Diod. 16. 45.3, 6).27

The record of the arrival in Babylon and Susa of captives from Sidon in October 345 (dating the Babylonian tablet recording this to year 14 of Artaxerxes) enables us to place the end of the Phoenician revolt not long before this—probably late summer 345.28 But the evidence of the dispatch of prisoners allows us further to see
that execution of the king (Tennes) and leading conspirators and burning of much of the city was not the full extent of Artaxerxes' punishment of Sidon and Sidonians. He also had surviving Sidonians, possibly surviving local elites as well as women, boys, and certain craftsmen, rounded up (probably before burning the city) and transplanted.

Artaxerxes' calculated cruelty probably also brought about the surrender of rebellious Cypriot cities. Diodorus reports as the first event in the next Athenian archon year (his 350/49, but properly 344/3) “while the people of Salamis were being besieged by Evagoras and Phocion, the rest of the cities all became subject to the Persians, and Pnytagoras alone continued to endure the siege” (16.46.1). Since the arrival of Evagoras and Phocion, Persian recovery efforts on Cyprus had evidently concentrated on capturing Salamis. But with the destruction of Sidon and the submission of the rest of the Phoenician cities, there was now nothing to keep Artaxerxes from dispatching some or all of his huge force to Cyprus to deal with the rest of the Cypriot cities—and to inflict on the Cypriot kings and cities that resisted the same punishments he had meted out at Sidon. In light of this, Cypriot kings had no choice but to surrender.

Pnytagoras, king of Salamis, alone among Cypriot kings, held out. He had evidently acquired the kingship by expelling Evagoras II, who was now, Diodorus notes (16.46.2), “trying to recover his ancestral rule over the Salaminians and through the help of the king of the Persians to be restored to his kingship.” When submitting, other Cypriot kings evidently retained their positions, but Pnytagoras’ submission would mean his deposition and possibly, as Tennes’ fate indicated, worse. Understandably, then, Pnytagoras could not simply offer his renewed subservience. It appears, however, that Artaxerxes had less interest in punishing the one remaining rebel king than in moving on to the next stage of his offensive, the attack on Egypt.

The quick sketch of the fates of Pnytagoras and Evagoras with which Diodorus completes his story of the Cypriot revolts offers some clues to what happened next.

Later, when [Evagoras] had been falsely accused to Artaxerxes and the king was backing Pnytagoras, Evagoras, after having given up hope of his restoration and made his defense on the accusations brought against him, was accorded another and higher command in Asia. But then when he had misgoverned his province he fled again to Cyprus and, arrested there, paid the penalty. Pnytagoras, who had made willing submission to the Persians, continued thenceforth to rule unmolested as king in Salamis. (16.46.2–3)

Diodorus’ report of Pnytagoras’ false accusations temporarily discrediting Evagoras II is suspiciously reminiscent of the Evagoras-Orontes-Tiribazus affair in the late 380s, which resulted in Evagoras I’s retention of kingship at Salamis. We may surmise that Diodorus here resorts to the same kind of explanation to account for what he did know—that Pnytagoras, despite his sustained resistance, remained as king in
Salamis after submitting. (Diodorus may have known also that Evagoras II later tried on his own to regain control of Salamis and “paid the penalty”—died, in other words, but whether in the attempt at the hands of Pnytagoras and other opponents or as a result of Artaxerxes’ directive is unknown.)

Perhaps if we start at the end, with Diodorus’ assertion that Pnytagoras had made “willing submission” to the Persians, we may produce a plausible reconstruction of the course of events. By the time of his submission, Pnytagoras was Artaxerxes’ only remaining military problem in the eastern Mediterranean. So far in his campaign, Artaxerxes had been concerned at every turn to preserve his force and achieve his ends through intrigue and intimidation rather than battle. He was clearly intent on harboring his force for the Egyptian campaign. On Cyprus were great numbers of mercenaries—those sent by Idrieus and those who had crossed from Syria and Cilicia—as well as ships which Artaxerxes needed for the Egyptian campaign. Rather than suffer casualties and face further delay in an assault on Salamis (whose fortifications had held up well against Persian siege in the 380s and now again in the 340s), Artaxerxes likely offered amnesty to Pnytagoras in return for submission and subsequently rewarded Evagoras, who had remained loyal throughout this time, with a command elsewhere, possibly at Sidon.  

Reports of Judean prisoner transfers may belong to this period and indicate further Persian measures following recovery of territory to the south of Phoenicia, probably, as elsewhere, the result of spontaneous submission. There is evidence of destruction at many sites in Judah which might be connected with Persian suppression of “Tennes’ rebellion” in the 340s. We may catch a glimpse of Persian pacification and reorganization activities here in Josephus’ story of the dealings of the Persian general Bagoas (“Bagoses” in Josephus) with Jerusalem and the Judeans (Antiq. 11.297–301 = 11.7.1). Bagoas reportedly polluted the Temple in Jerusalem and imposed a tax on every lamb offered for the daily sacrifices. This happened, Josephus reports, in response to the murder of Yeshua, “a friend of Bagoas,” by his own brother Yohanan, who was high priest (at this time the highest native Judean official). The murder, which took place in the Temple, occurred when Yeshua, having been promised the high priesthood by Bagoas, quarreled with Yohanan, the current high priest, and so angered him that Yohanan killed him. Learning of this, Bagoas came to the Judeans “immediately” and addressed them angrily for having the impudence to perpetrate a murder in the temple. He himself entered the Temple, profaning it, and then punished the Judeans for seven years (evidently the period of during which he taxed sacrifices in the Temple) for the murder of Yeshua.

Bagoas, we know, held a high command position during Artaxerxes’ invasion of Egypt in 344/3 (Diod. 16.47.3–52.3), so we may assume that he was among Artaxerxes’ chief officials at the time of the suppression of Phoenician revolts and that his dealings with the Judeans were part of the post-revolt settlement process. What we see, then, is Bagoas attempting to install a pro-Persian figure—his “friend” Yeshua—in place of the existing and rebellious high priest Yohanan. Bagoas’ anger at the whole population after Yohanan’s murder of Yeshua points to popular
opposition to Persian intervention. Although Bagoas reportedly imposed special
taxes as punishment, he seems actually to have left Yohanan in place—Josephus at
least says that when Yohanan died, his son Yaddua succeeded him in the high priest-
hood. Yohanan, we may infer, submitted to Persian authority, but resisted
replacement by his brother, and Bagoas in the end left local authority in Yohanan’s
hands (perhaps after demonstrating by his readiness to profane the Temple that he
could quickly move on to destroying the Temple if necessary). But, as Bagoas’ tax
on sacrifices and the record of Judean prisoners arriving in Babylon shows, Persian
punishment still fell on the population as a whole in the form of punitive taxation
and transplantations.

While Artaxerxes, dealing with the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts, gained an
easy “military” victory—the only fighting by Persian forces was on Cyprus—and
thus had a undiminished military force, the evidence for Persian activities after the
seizure of Sidon and the submission of other Phoenician cities indicates that
Artaxerxes did not rush to begin his attack on Egypt. Instead, he sought to secure
all centers of recent opposition, certainly to insure that there would be no oppor-
tunity for Egyptian intervention to the rear of the Persian invasion force once he
did enter Egypt. Given Nectanebo’s failure to engage outside Egypt (beyond the
original dispatch of 4,000 troops under Mentor) while revolts were still underway,
Artaxerxes could be confident that Nectanebo would not launch attacks now that
the revolts had collapsed. Thus Artaxerxes could take his time with both the mopp-
ing-up activities following the end of the revolt and the final preparations for
moving on to Egypt.

The whole affair recapitulated the pattern of events which marked the recent
Assyrian and Babylonian phases of the conflict between eastern and western cores:
Egyptian gains in the middle territory giving way to Near Eastern recovery because
of the refusal of Egyptian kings to commit adequate forces to oppose Near Eastern
operations in the middle territory. Nectanebo had evidently made promises to
would-be Phoenician defectors and had dispatched a force of Greek mercenaries
(but, notably, not any native machimoi) to support them. However, when that effort
faltered, Nectanebo II refused to increase his support and reverted again to reliance
on defensive measures, determined to secure Egypt at the cost of yielding all foot-
holds in the middle territory.
Persian strategy in the 340s involved dealing with the Phoenician revolt while being prepared to meet a full Egyptian counterattack. Artaxerxes III therefore moved to recover Phoenician cities and other rebellious states only after he had assembled an extraordinarily large force which could confront an Egyptian army wherever it might be, in the middle territory or in Egypt. As it turned out, Artaxerxes secured Phoenicia without encountering Egyptian opposition and without having to fight at all. His large army was thus completely intact. Artaxerxes, however, did not hasten immediately to Egypt. Instead, he remained for many months in Phoenician territory, systematically and unhurriedly completing preparations for the campaign in Egypt.¹

To supplement the enormous force he had already under arms, Artaxerxes now sought as many Greeks as possible. With the 4,000-man mercenary contingent under Mentor that had defected from Egyptian service added to the long-employed mercenary force that had rushed to Cyprus from Syria, Artaxerxes already had a significant number of Greek mercenaries. We may certainly postulate further mercenary recruiting—every mercenary hired was one less available for Egyptian service. But what distinguished the preparations of 345–344 was Artaxerxes’ effort to engage mainland Greek cities as allies in his Egyptian enterprise. He sent envoys, probably in 344, to “the greatest cities of Greece” to request that they join him in the campaign against the Egyptians (Diod. 16.44.1). We may imagine Persian envoys undertaking a sort of diplomatic tour of the Greek mainland aimed at adding the far west to Persian/eastern-core forces on a state rather than individual basis. This certainly required many months. Argos and Thebes contributed (Diod. 16.46.4). Athens declined—a good indication that despite having an army at the ready, Artaxerxes was soliciting rather than demanding participation.² Artaxerxes also summoned levies from subject Greek cities in western Anatolia (Diod. 16.44.4), evidently the first call on Asian Greeks for military service since the so-called Cypriot War forty years earlier.
Diodorus’ elaborate narrative of the actual campaign includes references to ships (16.47.3–4), but Diodorus says nothing about their origins. The greater part were probably Phoenician, with newly built ships replacing the ships burned at Sidon in 346–345. After the submission of Cypriot cities, Artaxerxes perhaps took over the forty-ship fleet that Idrieus, the satrap of Caria, had sent to Cyprus with Phocion and Evagoras II. He may also have levied ships from the recently rebellious cities of Cyprus. Others probably came from Cilicia.

Artaxerxes’ preparation for sustained operations in Egypt is indicated by his employment of siege equipment, mentioned as part of the Persian arsenal for the first time in connection with his Egyptian campaign of the 340s (Diod. 16.49.1). This may refer to siege towers and perhaps to ramming devices. Some of these may have been brought to Sidon in anticipation of dealing with the city’s high walls; some may have been constructed following Sidon’s fall, perhaps by Sidonian ship carpenters.

The unprecedented scale of Artaxerxes’ preparations did not go unnoticed. A fragment from Theopompus’ *Philippica* suggests that Theopompus crafted a description of them intended to convey a sense of epic enterprise comparable to Xerxes’ grand invasion of Greece in 480, as narrated by Herodotus (7.1–120):

What city or what people in Asia did not send envoys to the king? What creation of earth or what perfection of art, fine and precious was not conveyed to him as a gift? Were there not many extravagant carpets and cloaks—some purple, some intricate, some white—and many golden pavilions prepared with all manner of useful things, and many robes and extravagant divans? And further, both silver plates and vessels worked in gold, and cups and bowls, some of which you are to understand were studded with gems, and others wrought with extravagant precision. And in addition countless tens of thousands of weapons, some Greek, some barbarian, and pack animals transcendent in their multitude, and sacrificial animals fattened for slaughter, and many ephahs of condiments, and many grain sacks and burlap bags, and blank books of papyrus and all other useful things; and so much preserved flesh of sacrificial animals as to make heaps so large that those approaching them from afar took them to be mounds and hills thrusting in front of them. (*FGH* 115 F263)

The author (“Longinus”) of the first-century CE work *On the Sublime* quotes (and thus preserves) this passage and faults it for descending from the sublime to the lowly: “by mixing into his wonderful account of the whole preparation things like grain-sacks and condiments and burlap bags, he has made it into a kind of image of a butcher’s shop” (43.2–3). Measured by such critical literary standards, Theopompus’ depiction of Persian preparations may be flawed, but historically it conveys very well the extraordinary situation. For many months there was a huge army, assembled, immobile, and growing larger with the accumulation of increasing amounts of armaments and foodstuffs. In its midst was the king and thus the Persian court with all its pomp and luxury.

This grand army was, everyone knew, ultimately
headed for Egypt, but in the meantime it (or portions of it) might be sent elsewhere. Hence many of the embassies from the cities and peoples “in Asia” who brought gifts probably did so to assure Artaxerxes of their fidelity in the aftermath of the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts. At the same time, embassies that visited the Persian court at Babylon, Susa, or Persepolis for one reason or another under normal circumstances had now, with king and court in Phoenicia, to journey instead to the army in Phoenicia.

Despite the immensity of the Persian force readied by 343 for the attack on Egypt, perhaps the greatest advantage Artaxerxes III had at this time came from intelligence provided by Nectanebo’s renegade Greek mercenary commander Mentor of Rhodes, who had been dispatched by Nectanebo in about 348 to aid Phoenician rebels but along with his troops had switched to the Persian side when Artaxerxes threatened Sidon. Fleeing Hellespontine Phrygia at the time of Artabazus’ departure for Macedon, Mentor may have gone to Egypt as early as 352 and may thus have been there during Artaxerxes III’s failed campaign in 351/0. The latest in a line of Greek military experts in Egyptian service, Mentor was undoubtedly thoroughly familiar with Nectanebo’s installations and defense plans. In this he resembled the Greek mercenary commander Phanes of Halicarnassus, who had defected from Psammetichus III in the early 520s and advised and guided Cambyses in the first Persian invasion of Egypt, and the Athenian Chabrias, who likely furnished Iphicrates and Pharnabazus with vital intelligence about Egyptian defenses before the 373 invasion. Now in Persian service, Mentor certainly shared his knowledge with Artaxerxes and Persian commanders. The long delay between the end of the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts and the beginning of the Persian advance into Egypt furnished ample time for Artaxerxes to develop a detailed plan of attack and to train troops to deal with the anticipated situations based on Mentor’s information. The whole of Artaxerxes’ campaign as Diodorus reports it has a tactical sure-footedness about it that strongly suggests expert inside knowledge, and this points to Mentor.

The fourth-century historians Theopompus and Ephorus were most likely Diodorus’ sources for his account of Artaxerxes’ 343 campaign, and Diodorus’ detailed reports of both Persian and Egyptian arrangements suggests that Theopompus and Ephorus had some informants who had been in Persian service and others who had been in Egyptian service. The Rhodian Mentor who served both Nectanebo II and Artaxerxes III has a prominent place in Diodorus’ narrative, and he may have been an important source of information about the 343 campaign, but since both Nectanebo II and Artaxerxes III employed many thousands of Greeks in the campaign, contemporary writers like Theopompus and Ephorus certainly had opportunities to gather information from a great number of participants.

Diodorus gives us Egyptian troop strengths and dispositions at the time of Artaxerxes’ attack. Nectanebo, he says, had 20,000 Greek mercenaries, “about the same number of Libyans,” and 60,000 Egyptians of the machimo class, the native
peasant-warriors dwelling on allotments in the Delta (16.47.6). We may suspect that these numbers come from Theopompus and Ephorus’ informants, and there does not seem any reason to dispute the numbers as reasonable approximations. Compared with the figures given for Tachos’ enterprise in the 360s, we see more Greek mercenaries under Nectanebo II and one third fewer machimoi, perhaps reflecting a greater reliance on Greek mercenaries by Nectanebo II (or perhaps their greater availability now than twenty years earlier). The Libyan troops are new, or at least mentioned for the first time. Most of the machimoi themselves were centuries earlier of Libyan origin, but here “the Libyans” seem grouped with the Greek mercenaries as foreign troops. Possibly Libyan contingents had joined Egyptians during earlier campaigns, but if not, their involvement may have been the result of recent diplomatic efforts by Nectanebo. However, if we add their numbers to the 60,000 machimoi, we come up with the same total of 80,000 “Egyptian” troops that Tachos deployed in 360 (Diod. 15.92.2), so we may suspect “the Libyans” were regularly a part of the full Egyptian levy.

Diodorus’ sources explained the disposition of Nectanebo’s forces well. Diodorus himself does not always appreciate the situation, but fortunately he reproduces enough information to allow us to understand Nectanebo’s defensive strategy. Nectanebo weighted his defensive arrangement toward the east—the region of anticipated initial Persian contact: “The bank of the river facing Arabia [everything beyond the Pelusiac branch of the Nile was commonly termed ‘Arabia’] had been strongly fortified by [Nectanebo], being a region crowded with towns and canals, and besides all intersected by walls and canals” (16.47.7). Pelusium, at the north-eastern corner of the Delta, was the centerpiece of this defensive strategy. In this well-fortified site Nectanebo placed a 5,000-man garrison under Philophron the Spartan. Diodorus makes no reference to native defenders at Pelusium, but since he states that “all the cities were garrisoned by two peoples, Greeks and Egyptians” [16.49.7]), we may assume that native machimoi as well as Greek mercenaries guarded Pelusium. Whether they were included in the 5,000-man force Diodorus places under Philophron or were part of a separate force not mentioned by Diodorus (which would mean that Pelusium’s garrison totaled far more than 5,000 defenders) is uncertain.

Surrounding Pelusium was an extensive area of marshy swamps, and close to Pelusium itself was a deep canal which impeded any hostile approach to the city (Diod. 16.49.8). Diodorus’ remark that Nectanebo had strongly fortified the “bank of the river facing Arabia” probably indicates that all the sites upriver from Pelusium along the Pelusiac branch were well fortified and garrisoned, constituting a veritable Maginot line. If this succeeded in preventing Artaxerxes’ large land force from moving either west into the Delta or south toward Memphis, the Persian threat would come to an end without Egypt proper suffering any damage at all (as had evidently been the case in the early 380s). Diodorus’ note that Nectanebo possessed also “an incredible number of riverboats suited for battles and engagements on the Nile” (16.47.6) indicates preparations for meeting maritime as well as land
assaults. These riverboats were probably not all stationed on the Pelusiac branch—it was necessary to anticipate Persian attempts at entry at other branches as in 373—but many likely many were, and in addition to engaging in actual fighting, these boats could be used to move defenders up- and downriver to reinforce troops at sites under attack.

Diodorus’ further remarks help us to see the bigger picture. After digressing to criticize Nectanebo for refusing to share his command with anyone and for failing to execute any moves “useful in war” (16.48.3), Diodorus goes on (disproving his own or his Greek sources’ low estimation of Nectanebo’s competence) to detail the rest of Nectanebo’s defensive arrangements. We can see in these remarks the full scope of Nectanebo’s plan.

Now by providing the towns [polismata] with noteworthy garrisons, he kept close guard, while he himself with 30,000 Egyptians, 5,000 Greeks, and half the Libyans [= 10,000] kept watch over the most well situated of the mouths. (16.48.3)

This follows by many lines Diodorus’ discussion of the eastern or Pelusiac defenses and refers to the broader arrangements in the Delta. Clearly, even with Nectanebo II’s concentration on the forward, Pelusiac line, his overall strategy involved a comprehensive plan of defense in depth, relying on substantial garrisons in the Delta cities and towns that Acoris and Nectanebo I had provided with massive mud-brick fortification walls. By Diodorus’ (probably exaggerated) figures, Nectanebo had 55,000 men distributed among various fortified sites, with Greeks providing proportionately the greatest number—three-quarters of the total Greek mercenaries. Nectanebo himself retained a sizable and still mixed force in reserve, waiting to see if, as in 373, Persian forces moved west along the Mediterranean coast to penetrate one or another of the Nile mouths. Pharnabazus and Iphocrates had exploited the Mendesian mouth in 373, but there was no way for Nectanebo to be sure that Persian forces would choose the same point of entry in 343. Quite wisely, Nectanebo positioned himself somewhere to the rear of the Nile mouths—possibly in the center of the Delta (in Sebennytus, the dynastic home?)—in order to be able to move northeast, north, or northwest as circumstances demanded.6

So far it is hard to fault Nectanebo. He maintained solid defenses at the Delta’s eastern frontier. Strong fortifications guarded Egypt’s whole Mediterranean coast. Garrisons manned fortified cities inland in the Delta. The main Egyptian army directly under Nectanebo, now totaling, according to Diodorus, 5,000 Greeks, 10,000 Libyans, and 30,000 machimoi, was ready to move wherever the Persian assault occurred. Altogether, it appears, Nectanebo was very well prepared with an ample, carefully distributed force capable of flexible and forceful responses. Behind him was a record of nearly fifty years of Egyptian success in repelling large-scale Persian attacks, and he had had more than a half-dozen years since Artaxerxes III’s last invasion to improve further upon previously effective responses to Persian attacks. What happened?
Diodorus does not give the stereotypical figure of 300,000 men or any other specific number for the total size of the Persian force at the time of its advance to Egypt. But even before Artaxerxes added contingents from the far west—Asian Greeks, Greek allies, and Greek mercenaries—the great size of Artaxerxes’ army had frightened the Sidonian king Tennes into submission (Diod. 16.42.1). Since Artaxerxes was certainly determined to do whatever was necessary to avoid another humiliation, we may be sure that he assembled in the 340s a far larger force than he had in 351/0.

Diodorus does provide some numbers for particular Greek contingents: 1,000 hoplites from Thebes under Lacrates, 3,000 Argives under Nicostratus (according to Diod. 16.44.3, a self-styled second Heracles whom the king had explicitly requested—an indication that Artaxerxes sought to enlist not only large numbers of Greeks but also specific notable Greek commanders), and 6,000 men from Asian Greek cities. That makes 10,000 altogether who served, Diodorus says, as “allies.” It seems incorrect to speak of Asian Greeks as “allies,” since they were probably levied for military service as Persian subjects. “Allies” may thus designate Greeks who were not mercenaries. With the end of the Cypriot revolts, the Greek mercenaries who had flocked to Cyprus from Cilicia and Syria (troops probably assembled by Belesys and Mazaeus as part of the post-351 preparations and then deployed to deal with the Phoenician revolts) were likely attached to Artaxerxes’ expeditionary force. So also may have been some or all of the 8,000 troops Idrieus had sent to Cyprus, probably from his own mercenary force, under Phocion and Evagoras II. Mentor’s 4,000-man mercenary force provided more Greeks. Altogether, then, there were likely far more than the 10,000 Greeks Diodorus reports explicitly.

While Diodorus distinguishes Greeks from “barbarians” in Artaxerxes’ army, he does not specify the origins of Artaxerxes’ various barbarian contingents, as Herodotus does so thoroughly when describing the great expeditionary army Xerxes led to Greece in 480. But the huge size of Artaxerxes’ barbarian army (the one that so intimidated Tennes) guarantees a great variety of contingents, possibly representing a full levy drawing on all subject peoples.

Artaxerxes III’s enormous force most likely departed for Egypt late in 343, once the Nile flood was completely over. It evidently made its way through the desert from Gaza to the vicinity of Pelusium without incident. Because of Mentor’s presence in Artaxerxes’ army at this time, we may dismiss as wrongly attached to the 340s campaign Diodorus’ story of Artaxerxes’ disastrous loss of a portion of his army in the swamps of Lake Serbonis while en route to Egypt “due to his lack of knowledge of the region” (16.46.5). Mentor would certainly have been aware of such features and apprised Artaxerxes of them.

Persian and Greek forces seem to have operated separately on the march, with the Persian force halting and making camp forty stades (less than one half-mile) from Pelusium (possibly at the site of an earlier Persian encampment) while the Greek force advanced closer to Pelusium itself. Potential Greek and barbarian friction may have been the reason for the separate encampments. But, most likely,
the Greeks with their heavy infantry were to serve as a first line of defense against any Egyptian attack from Pelusium.

As it turned out, the strategy adopted by Artaxerxes was not a repetition of the Pharnabazus-Iphicrates strategy of 373, which involved bypassing Pelusium and attacking along other mouths of the Nile. Instead, utilizing three separate “strike forces,” each composed of both Greek and barbarian units, Artaxerxes prepared a multipronged assault at different points along the Pelusium defense line. Diodorus has very specific details about these strike forces. The first comprised the Boeotian (i.e., Theban) troops under Lacrates together with a large force of cavalry and “no small body” of infantry under Rhosaces, one of “the Seven” (meaning a member of one of the exalted Persian families descended from the men who had supported Darius I’s seizure of the throne in the 520s) and satrap of Lydia. The second group contained the Argive contingent under Nicostratus and a barbarian force of 5,000 elite (*epilektoi*) troops under the Persian Aristazanes, an “usher” of the king and one of his closest advisers, as well as eighty triremes. The third group included Mentor along with the mercenary force he had previously brought from Egypt to Sidon, evidently still completely intact. Associated with him was Bagoas, the most trusted of Artaxerxes’ advisers, who commanded “the king’s Greeks” (presumably Asian Greeks), a “sufficient number” of barbarians, and “not a few” ships (Diod. 16.47.1–4).

If we work with the numbers Diodorus provides (where he provides them), we may get an idea of the approximate size of the various groups. The best we can do with Lacrates and Rhosaces’ first group, where our only evidence is Diodorus’ reference to 1,000 Thebans joining Artaxerxes, is to estimate many thousands, probably mostly barbarians (16.44.2, 47.2). For the second group, the Argive force of 3,000 under Nicostratus added to the 5,000 elite troops under Aristazanes gives us 8,000 men (Diod. 16.44.2, 47.3). Being formed from hoplites and specially chosen barbarian troops, the second group must have been put together to provide a very effective compact fighting force. The inclusion of triremes points to a desire for tactical mobility. Mentor and Bagoas’ force seems the largest of the three groups. Mentor’s 4,000 mercenaries plus Bagoas’ 6,000-man force of “the king’s Greeks”—presumably Asian Greek levies (hence the figure 6,000 which Diodorus [16.44.4] gives as the total of Greeks levied from “the coast of Asia”)—makes a total of 10,000 Greeks. Bagoas also had a “sufficient” (*hikanos*) contingent of “barbarians.” If this indicates a number close to that of the Greek contingent, the total would approach 20,000—a respectable army by itself. Bagoas also had many triremes (Diod. 16.47.4).

The Persian commanders of these three groups were clearly among the most exalted of Artaxerxes’ subordinates. But the fact that Diodorus terms Lacrates *stratégos* and his Persian counterpart Rhosaces *hégemôn*, names Nicostratus and Aristazanes *synarchontes*, and says Bagoas *synestrateto* with Mentor seems to indicate that Artaxerxes did not subordinate the Greek commanders to their Persian counterparts but made them, at least ostensibly, joint commanders. Much like Nectanebo, Artaxerxes himself with the rest of the army kept watch over all “the circumstances” (16.47.5).
Diodorus nowhere explicitly describes Artaxerxes’ plan, and Diodorus’ episodic and chronologically confused narrative (some things he describes first can only have taken place after events he describes later) does not produce an immediately evident picture of Persian strategy. Further obstructing our understanding of Persian strategy is the fact that, despite his detailed description of the mixed composition of the three strike forces, Diodorus persistently omits mention of the Persian/barbarian contingents of each group when he recounts the activities of successive strike groups (except when he reports conflict between Greeks and Persians in the same group).

However, if we arrange in strategically logical sequence what Diodorus tells us about the actions of each of the three Persian-Greek units, with “strike force one” (Lacrates and Rhosaces’) initiating engagement at Pelusium, “strike force two” (Nicostratus and Aristazanes’) proceeding to a separate target while “strike force one” remains engaged at Pelusium, and “strike force three” (Mentor and Bagoas’) in its turn doing battle at a third site, we can see that Artaxerxes’ plan involved separate but coordinated activities in which each group served to prepare the way for the actions of the next group. By looking very closely at Diodorus’ narrative, we can also see, or at least glimpse, the role that the non-Greek contingents played in the operations of the various strike forces.

Here first is Diodorus’ somewhat jumbled account. Diodorus has Artaxerxes III’s attack begin with just Greeks impulsively launching an assault on Pelusium: “The Thebans, being eager to show themselves the best of the Greeks that were taking part in the expedition, were the first to venture, unsupported and recklessly, to make a crossing through a narrow and deep canal.” Crossing this canal (perhaps using prefabricated bridges), they rushed at the walls of Pelusium and succeeded in drawing much of the garrison force out of Pelusium to battle them directly. According to Diodorus, because of the intense rivalry on both sides (certainly indicating that he understood the defenders themselves to be Greeks in Egyptian service) the engagement proved severe, lasting the whole day and ending only as night fell (16.46.8–9).

Nicostratus, Greek commander of the second group, whose exploits Diodorus next recounts, sailed with his ships into “a hidden district” (guided by Egyptian hostages) and there encountered and defeated a large force of Nectanebo’s Greek mercenaries under Cleinius the Coan. News of the loss of these Greek troops reportedly left Nectanebo terror-stricken, and, fearful that the whole Persian force would now advance to Memphis, he withdrew from the Delta to Memphis (16.48.3–6).

Diodorus then returns to Lacrates and the first strike force, reporting how Lacrates began the siege of Pelusium by diverting one of the canals and filling in the empty trench with dirt to permit siege engines to be brought up to Pelusium’s walls (a tactic reminiscent of that used against Athenian forces at Prosopitis in 454). Destruction and hasty rebuilding of walls went on for days until, Diodorus says, defenders learned of Nectanebo’s withdrawal from the Delta and, being now
terror-stricken themselves, negotiated a surrender with Lacrates. Artaxerxes then dispatched Bagoas to take over the city, where his force ended up fighting with Lacrates over the treatment of Pelusium’s Greek defenders (16.49.1–6).

Finally, Diodorus turns to Mentor and the third contingent, noting how Mentor (no mention here of Bagoas’ role) succeeded in taking Bubastis and many other cities with a single stratagem—announcing that Artaxerxes offered clemency for those who surrendered their cities but promised to punish in the same way he had punished the Sidonians those who resisted—undoubtedly meaning incineration. Initially in Bubastis and then in other cities, all of which, Diodorus says, were garrisoned both by Greeks and natives, the announcement prompted wholesale surrender as first Egyptian *machimoi*, then Greek mercenaries hastened to submit. Diodorus dwells at length in this section on discord between Mentor and Bagoas and Bagoas’ capture by Greek defenders of Bubastis and Mentor’s responsibility for Bagoas’ release (16.49.7–50.7).

We can accept Diodorus’ report that hostilities began with a “reckless” attack by Lacrates’ Greek troops on Pelusium. But rather than being driven by the Homeric imperative “always be best in battle and preeminent above the rest” that Diodorus implicitly uses to explain the seemingly rash assault, Lacrates and his Theban contingent were undoubtedly acting as Artaxerxes’ advance force to draw out and pre-occupy defenders so that other troops could begin the canal drainage operations that Diodorus connects (in another passage) with the beginning of Lacrates’ siege (16.49.1). With that accomplished and the resulting ditch filled in, Persian commanders could bring up the siege equipment—ramming devices and probably towers—and begin to besiege Pelusium in systematic and sustained fashion.

Quite likely, as Diodorus reports, Pelusium’s defenders put up stout resistance over many days, erecting towers of their own and rebuilding collapsed walls. The fact that Diodorus starts with an account of the attack on Pelusium, then moves to narrate the actions of Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ second group, and then returns to follow the siege at Pelusium is a good indication that the second group began its enterprise and achieved its goal while the first group’s attack on Pelusium continued. This was surely according to plan: sustained Persian siege operations kept defenders at Pelusium occupied securing the city and unable to respond to Persian movements elsewhere in the vicinity of Pelusium.

Diodorus sets up his account of Nicostratus’ battle with Cleinius and his mercenaries by reporting that

Nicostratus, the general of the Argives, having as guides Egyptians whose children and wives were held as hostages by the Persians, sailed by with his fleet through a canal into a hidden district and, disembarking his men and fortifying a site for a camp, encamped there. (16.48.3)

While Diodorus never mentions Nicostratus’ Persian counterpart Aristazanes here or in connection with the ensuing battle, Diodorus’ note that the hostages were
held by “the Persians” indicates that both parts of the strike force were engaged in this operation. It is in fact Aristazanes to whom Diodorus, in his initial description of the three strike forces, assigns command of eighty triremes. Most likely, then, the fuller story is that Aristazanes with these ships transported the second strike force’s Greek and Persian contingents to the “hidden place.” Presumably, these ships managed to enter the Pelusiac branch somewhere near Pelusium. By utilizing canals (relying on intimidated local Egyptians as guides) rather than the main branch itself, Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ force was evidently able to move south undetected and to establish a base at a “hidden place” (kekrummenon)—probably meaning something like “out of the way” or “unexposed,” referring to its distance from fortified and garrisoned Egyptian positions. Egyptian defenders, however, were near this camp, and, according to Diodorus (16.48.4), once they learned of the arrival of “the enemy,” they immediately made an attack (exeboēthoun—indicating that they moved out from their fortified site to make the attack).

Although Diodorus localizes the operations of the other strike forces specifically at Pelusium and Bubastis, he does not identify the fortified site connected with the second strike force’s operation, perhaps because the site itself did not figure in the Persian-Egyptian military encounter. Given the sizable number of defenders—7,000 under Cleinius the Coan (significantly more than the number of Greek defenders reportedly in Pelusium) and (assuming, as Diodorus says [16.49.7], that all the cities were garrisoned by both Greeks and Egyptians) also a substantial number of native machimoi—the fortified site from which Cleinius and the Coans issued to attack Artaxerxes’ second strike force was clearly a critical defensive installation. Quite possibly, it was Daphnae, the site which had formed an important part of the 26th (Saite) Dynasty’s eastern defense line (Hdt. 2.154). Situated here, roughly halfway between Pelusium and Bubastis (the terminal points respectively of the northern and southern Sinai approaches to Egypt), defenders could not only hinder any river crossing by an invading force in the vicinity of Daphnae but also move north or south to aid garrisons at Pelusium or Bubastis if Persian attacks concentrated on one or another of these. Assuming the Persians knew ahead of time about the distribution of Nectanebo’s garrison forces, the mobile reinforcement capabilities of the Daphnae (?) garrison explain Persian interest in advancing a strike force to this destination as soon as the siege of Pelusium got underway.

The strategic significance of such a site for both sides also helps to explain why the unexpected arrival of the Persian strike force led immediately, in Diodorus’ words (16.48.5), to “a desperate battle” (kartera machē). Defenders, sallying forth from Daphnae (?) and forming up into battle lines, evidently fought with unrelenting determination. In the end, however, Artaxerxes’ strike force prevailed, killing Cleinius and more than 5,000 defenders (out of a reported approximately 7,000 involved). Diodorus presents the battle as a strictly Greek-against-Greek (Nicostratus versus Cleinius) encounter. But if Nicostratus commanded something like 3,000 Argives and Cleinius and 5,000 of his mercenaries lost their lives in the battle, it is most likely that Aristazanes’ 5,000 “specially chosen” troops fought
alongside Nicostratus’ Greeks and that the battle really involved a Greek-Persian engagement with Cleinius’ mercenary force. It was, in other words, an even bigger battle in terms of numbers than Diodorus’ Hellenocentric account indicates. We might suspect that Diodorus or his sources similarly neglected non-Greeks—the machimoi—on the Egyptian side in this battle and that Greeks and Persians on one side fought Greeks and Egyptians on the other.

If we trust the casualty figures on the Egyptian side provided by Diodorus, Nicostratus and Aristazanes evidently nearly exterminated Nectanebo’s garrison force. This meant that now a Persian and not an Egyptian force held this strategically located site. While much of Diodorus’ account is chronologically confused, it nevertheless seems plausible to follow Diodorus in placing Nectanebo’s abandonment of the Delta and his withdrawal to Memphis after Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ tremendous battlefield victory. Diodorus explains Nectanebo’s move by stating that

on hearing of the loss of his men [in the battle with Nicostratus], Nectanebo was terrified, thinking that the rest of the Persian army also would easily cross the river. Assuming that the enemy with their entire army would come to the very gates of Memphis, he decided first and foremost to take precautionary measures to protect the city. Accordingly, he returned to Memphis with the army he had retained and began to prepare for the siege. (16.48.6–7)

Nectanebo evidently recognized at this point that his defensive strategy would not work. He was located somewhere in the Delta, possibly in the region of Sebennytus, poised to reinforce defenders at one or another of the Delta mouths. Once Nicostratus and Aristazanes seized a base (Daphnae or a nearby site) which would allow the whole Persian army to enter the Delta, the Persians had a jumping-off point for advance further south and finally to Memphis itself, the key to control of Egypt. If Nectanebo did not act quickly, he might end up to the north of the whole Persian army and cut off from Memphis and Upper Egypt. With Persian strategy now evident (and so far successful), there was no good strategic reason for Nectanebo to remain where he was and every reason to withdraw quickly to Memphis to prevent it falling into Persian hands.9

Diodorus makes no effort to present the activities of Artaxerxes’ three strike forces as in any way coordinated. But we can see that Lacrates and Rhosaces’ siege of Pelusium not only preceded Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ move south but in fact made it possible by tying up defenders who might otherwise block entry into the mouth of the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Similarly, Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ capture of the critical, well-manned fortified site (possibly Daphnae) south of Pelusium preceded and cleared the way for the third strike force to target Bubastis. Diodorus does not explain how Mentor and Bagoas’ strike force reached Bubastis, but since in describing the makeup of the three strike forces Diodorus notes that Bagoas had “not a few ships,” we may be sure that Mentor and Bagoas used these ships to move upriver from Pelusium, trailing Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ force.
Nectanebo’s river fleet makes no appearance. Possibly there were river battles not mentioned by Greek sources; possibly Nectanebo’s ships moved upriver in the face of superior ship numbers on the Persian side; possibly most of Nectanebo’s river fleet was actually guarding other branches of the Nile. Or, as had been the case in Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ penetration of the Delta, perhaps intimidated natives guided the third strike force through canals, allowing it to escape contact with Nectanebo’s river ships.

Targeting Bubastis was a brilliant move on the part of the Persians. Not only was it strategically located, Bubastis also had a unique religious and political significance that would make its capture a stunning blow to Nectanebo and other Egyptians. Lying about fifty miles north of Memphis on the right bank of the Nile, Bubastis might well be called the gateway to Memphis. It was at the western end of the Wadi Tumilat and thus at the point where the southern overland route through the Sinai ended after the trans-Sinai route split at Rhinocorura and where Necho II and Darius’ canal started on its way eastward. Bubastis was the city of origin of the kings of the 22nd Dynasty. It was also one of the most important sacred cities of Egypt, home to the cat-headed goddess Bastet and the site of one of the most popular festivals, which annually drew, according to Herodotus (2.59–60), 700,000 celebrants from all over Egypt. Great monuments erected by Egyptian kings marked its terrain (along with extensive mummified cat cemeteries). Nectanebo II himself had provided a new, large sanctuary for the temple of Bastet and a monumental naos (whose decorative panels were being completed at the time of Artaxerxes III’s invasion).¹⁰ Bubastis may in fact have been one of Nectanebo II’s coronation sites.¹¹ Bubastis was also in what might be called Egypt’s mythic defense zone. Presiding over this zone was Soped, god of the eastern desert, victor over Asiatics, and defender against chaos arising from the east—meaning at this time the Persians. Soped’s residence was at Per-Sopd (“House of Soped”), less than seven miles east of Bubastis. Nectanebo I had paid great attention to Per-Sopd, dedicating there a grey granite naos whose exterior and interior surfaces bore elaborate decorative inscriptions. In these, Nectanebo I presented himself as defender of Egypt, one who protects and appeases the image of Soped and thereby gains control over foreign lands.

The good god, the lord of strength, strong of arm, who defeats the foreign lands, one of useful advice, who provides for Egypt, protector of the nomes, one who drives back the Asiatic countries, who destroys the place of their rm-fighting, imposing of heart, who seizes the moment without turning back, who pulls his elbow for a bow of precision, one who gives the temples the greatness of his power, what is said is instantly created, like (that) which comes from the mouth of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Kheperkara, son of Ra, Nekhtenebef [may he live for eternity] [=Nectanebo I].

You are powerful and mighty, through your strength, your arms are strong so as to attack those who strike Egypt, the gods…son of Ra, Nekhtenebef. The gods who are resting on the shrine of Soped who strikes the Asiatics on its right and left side, those set
up in their place in the temple of Soped, Their divine forms are shown likewise, under
the Majesty of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Kheperkara, son of Ra, Nektanebe, 
may he live for eternity, beloved of Soped, lord of the east, may he live, endure, have all 
dominion, all health, and all joy, and arise on the throne of Horus, like Ra for eternity.\textsuperscript{12}

Persian capture of Bubastis would thus constitute both a strategic and psychological 
victory. Not only would it mean Artaxerxes’ forces had been able to penetrate 
depth into the southern Delta but it would also indicate that the power of Soped, 
who stood guard against “the Asiatics” just to the east of Bubastis, had failed. Before 
switching sides during the Phoenician revolt, Mentor had been in Nectanebo’s 
employ in Egypt for several years, and we may suspect that he was aware of Bubastis’ 
special sanctity and the symbolic significance of this site and the nearby land of 
Soped and recommended it to Artaxerxes as a valuable target.

Arriving at Bubastis, Mentor and Bagoas were able to surround the city and post 
guards at the city’s various gates. Memphis, to the south of Bubastis, was certainly 
the ultimate Persian objective, and the great size of Mentor and Bagoas’ army—the 
largest by far of the strike forces—suggests that this force was meant to proceed to 
an assault on Memphis. Concern with preserving their resources for a battle for 
Memphis and determination to advance to Memphis as soon as possible may there-
fore have prompted Mentor and Bagoas to try to take Bubastis quickly by stratagem 
rather than by prolonged siege. They (despite Diodorus’ depiction of Mentor as 
solely responsible for this stratagem, the subsequent effort by Bubastis’ native 
defenders to negotiate with Bagoas indicates that they viewed him as the respon-
sible official) announced that

\begin{quote}
King Artaxerxes had decided to treat magnanimously those who voluntarily surren-
dered their cities, but to mete out the same penalty to those who were overcome by force 
as he had imposed on the people of Sidon. And [they] instructed those who guarded the 
gates to give free passage to any who wished to desert from the other side. (16.49.7)
\end{quote}

The well-known fate of Sidon just two years or less earlier—wholesale incineration 
accompanied by destruction of the city’s temples and subsequent sale of their gold 
and silver contents (Diod. 16.45.5)—meant that this was not an idle threat. 
Bubastis’ native defenders evidently responded quickly and unilaterally, sending an 
envoy to Bagoas without the knowledge of Bubastis’ Greek defenders and through 
this envoy negotiating surrender of the city to Bagoas. These native defenders were 
likely mostly or entirely members of the group of \textit{machimoi} normally stationed in 
the Bubastis nome as part of the Calisiri division of \textit{machimoi} (Hdt 2.166). 
Individual groups of \textit{machimoi} were organized in each district or nome on a hered-
itary basis, with land allotments going from fathers to sons. Bubastis’ native garrison 
units were thus defending their ancestral home territory and its most important 
city, Bubastis. They presumably had a particularly strong and personal sense of 
responsibility for the sacred city of Bubastis. Seeing little hope of success against the
large Persian force which arrived so suddenly (and perhaps discouraged by the apparent impotence of Soped, heretofore “strong of arm”), Bubastis’ native defenders evidently quickly decided that surrender provided the best way to preserve this all-important city.

Nectanebo’s Greek mercenaries installed in Bubastis also certainly knew what had happened to Sidon, but because they had no religious or personal attachment to Bubastis, the prospect of the Sidon-like destruction of Bubastis did not spur them to such swift submission as it did the Egyptian defenders. Nevertheless, learning of Egyptian dealings with Bagoas, Bubastis’ Greek defenders believed that they were being betrayed and reacted violently, attacking the *machimoi* in the city, killing some, wounding others and corralling the rest into one section of the city. They then somehow contacted Mentor outside the walls of Bubastis. He saw in this situation an opportunity for gaining advantage over Bagoas (we may suspect earlier friction of some sort between Bagoas and Mentor) and advised the Greek mercenaries defending Bubastis to attack Bagoas and his Persian/barbarian contingent when they entered the city to receive its surrender. Diodorus, always most interested in quarrels and tricks and Greek successes over barbarians, now describes in some detail how the Greeks in Bubastis did just what Mentor reportedly advised, closing the gates once Bagoas and part of his men were inside, then killing all his men and seizing Bagoas. At this point, Bagoas, “seeing that his hopes of safety depended on Mentor,” promised to do nothing without Mentor’s advice in the future. Mentor then persuaded the Greeks to let Bagoas go and to have the surrender [of Bubastis] happen through him. Consequently, Mentor, Diodorus says, got the credit for victory. But then, according to Diodorus (16.50.1–7), Mentor and Bagoas agreed to act in common (*koinopragia*) and, exchanging oaths, they henceforth kept the agreement.

Diodorus makes the Persian takeover of Bubastis the turning point in the whole Persian campaign, claiming that as word spread “to all the cities in Egypt” that Egyptians who had fallen into Persian hands were leaving the encampment at Bubastis freely, both natives and mercenaries in other cities (*ta phourria*, indicating the fortified cities), fearful of the threat of what had happened at Sidon and trusting now to Persian clemency, hastened to surrender (16.49.8). Chronologically, submission of other cities certainly followed that of Bubastis, but Diodorus, probably looking for an explanation that would allow him to magnify Mentor’s significance (he previously made Mentor solely responsible for the stratagem used at Bubastis13), may have wrongly assumed that subsequent submissions were due to the particular settlement made by Mentor (and Bagoas) at Bubastis rather than to another, more troubling (and strictly “barbarian”) development—Nectanebo’s abandonment of the Delta.

While submissions at Bubastis were taking place, Nectanebo and his mobile army were in the process of withdrawing from the Delta to Memphis. Word of Nectanebo’s move must have spread quickly throughout the Delta once it got underway—probably well before word of what transpired at Bubastis. Since
Nectanebo’s strategy had been to install strong garrisons at fortified sites in the Delta and then wait with his own force to relieve whichever fortified site came under Persian attack, Nectanebo’s withdrawal meant that garrisons throughout the Delta could no longer expect reinforcement and relief when attacked. In fact, Diodorus himself cites Nectanebo’s retreat as the cause of surrender by the Pelusium garrison. Defenders here (exclusively Greek in Diodorus’ account) had been fighting a successful holding operation “for some days” against Artaxerxes’ first strike force. However, according to Diodorus (16.49.2), when news of Nectanebo’s withdrawal with the main Egyptian army reached Pelusium’s (Greek) defenders, they were struck with panic and quickly sought a settlement with Lacrates, commander of the besieging force. Diodorus makes no mention of Pelusium’s garrison hearing any threat of incineration, and we may conclude that the Persian stratagem used at Bubastis was not employed here and most probably nowhere else in the Delta.

Diodorus’ extended, though somewhat confused, account of the surrender process at Pelusium may shed light on the submission of other Delta garrisons. Diodorus’ narrative of the siege of Pelusium presents only Greek attackers besieging Greek defenders. Consequently, his account of surrender at Pelusium involves Greek defenders alone making a deal with Lacrates. The agreement reportedly was that Greeks in Pelusium would surrender the city in exchange for being allowed to return home with whatever they could carry. Then, according to Diodorus, Artaxerxes sent Bagoas with some Persian troops to take control of Pelusium. These arrived just as the Greek mercenaries were departing, and Bagoas’ Persians seized much of what the Greeks were carrying. Lacrates was incensed when he heard of this, and his own troops chased the Persians away and killed a number of them. Bagoas subsequently accused Lacrates to Artaxerxes, but the king found fault with Bagoas’ contingent and executed those responsible for the robbery (Diod. 16.49.6).

Obviously, we have here another good Diodoran story of Greek-Persian conflict, with the Persians getting the worst of it and the Persian king himself ratifying the Greek position. Nevertheless, we need not on these grounds discount the whole story. Given the fact that Bagoas was associated with Mentor and that their strike force was operating far to the south of Pelusium and after taking Bubastis was certainly poised to move on from there to Memphis, we may suspect that Diodorus has confused Bagoas and Rhosaces, the commander of the Persian contingent joined with Lacrates’ Theban unit. Possibly, in narrating developments at Pelusium, Diodorus’ source just mentioned “the Persian commander” or something similar without using a name, and Diodorus, working at the same time with the information about Greek and Persian dispute at Bubastis, simply transposed Bagoas’ name from the Bubastis episode to the Pelusium episode.

If it was Rhosaces and his troops rather than Bagoas and Bagoas’ troops who were involved in this incident at Pelusium, we may (following Diodorus, but substituting Rhosaces for Bagoas) conjecture that Pelusium’s Greek defenders...
indeed negotiated with Lacrates and reached an understanding with him without Rhosaces’ knowledge (another instance of the difficulties of supposedly joint command arrangements) and that Rhosaces, the Persian commander, refused to recognize this separate agreement and had his men act, confiscating the belongings of the defenders, probably meaning their arms, whose retention they had been promised, as if there had been no agreement. This led to a clash between Lacrates’ Greek and Rhosaces’ barbarian troops, which led in turn to an appeal by Rhosaces to Artaxerxes. Artaxerxes, however, seeing that he had much to lose by alienating Greeks in his service such as Lacrates and his men, had the troops of Rhosaces responsible for the confiscations and the ensuing clash executed.

Like the Greek mercenaries in Pelusium, Greek defenders in garrisons elsewhere in the Delta would likely be little inclined to hold out once they learned of Nectanebo’s withdrawal from the Delta. They could no longer anticipate either reinforcement or pay.

Diodorus probably knew from his sources of conflicts over surrender between Greek and native defenders in Egyptian cities at this time, and he describes these in general terms by noting that “mercenaries everywhere were at variance with the natives [= native defenders] and the cities were filled with strife; for each side was privately endeavoring to surrender its posts and nursing private hopes of gain in exchange for this favor.” Implausibly, however, Diodorus links these conflicts to Mentor’s use everywhere of the same stratagem (threat of incineration) which had brought about surrender at Bubastis. The more likely explanation for Greek mercenaries and native defenders falling into conflict “everywhere” is that Greek mercenaries in garrisons throughout the Delta prepared to negotiate surrender after Nectanebo’s retreat. Native troops, fearing that they would suffer in the event of Persian takeover of the sites they garrisoned—now inevitable if Greeks guarding the same sites submitted—probably opposed their Greek counterparts in one Delta site after another, producing the conflicts Diodorus describes. In some cases, the conflicts may have been bitter and violent, as they were at Bubastis, but ultimately, as at Bubastis, both mercenaries and machimoi ended up surrendering. Conceivably, native troops in Delta cities did finally learn of the amnesty tendered to defenders at Bubastis and, having no real alternatives, decided to take their chances with Persian clemency. To that degree, what happened at Bubastis may have affected cities elsewhere. But unlike the sequence of surrenders at Bubastis, in which native machimoi moved first, Greek defenders elsewhere most likely took the lead in submitting.

Diodorus, we may conjecture, avoided having to depict Greeks as in any way submissive to Persians by characterizing surrender everywhere as a repetition of what had happened at Bubastis—native defenders submitting first with Greek defenders staunchly opposing them and surrendering ultimately only to Greek attackers. He provides specific details only about the surrender at Pelusium, perhaps because submission here involved Greeks surrendering to Greeks. These details belie Diodorus’ general explanation for the collapse of Nectanebo’s Delta
defenses and allow us to suspect that not only at Pelusium but throughout the Delta (except at Bubastis) Nectanebo’s Greek mercenaries initiated surrender of Nectanebo’s garrisons.

Just as Nectanebo’s withdrawal to Memphis had set the stage for submissions in the Delta, Persian takeover of the Delta fortifications probably set the stage for further withdrawal by Nectanebo. Nectanebo himself had fought no battles, so the force Diodorus attributes to him as his reserve force at the beginning of the Persian invasion—30,000 machimoi, 5,000 Greeks, and 10,000 Libyans—must have been largely intact when he moved to Memphis. And since, according to Diodorus, Nectanebo withdrew from the Delta in order to strengthen Memphis, it is likely that he brought much of this force with him to Memphis. Memphis, at least the “White Wall” or citadel, had in the past withstood sieges even for periods of years—witness the prolonged and futile Athenian assault in the 450s. But while Nectanebo might conceivably hold out in Memphis for a long period, once he learned of the fall of Bubastis and then of similar submissions throughout the Delta, he must have seen that there was little to stop largely unfortified Upper Egypt—everything south of Memphis—from also falling into Persian hands. Nectanebo might nevertheless hold out for some time in Memphis, but he would likely be surrounded and without any sources of supplies or support. And, despite the great strength of its citadel, Memphis was not absolutely impregnable. Sustained assault by the combined fleet and army of the Nubian king Piye had effected its capture in the 730s (AEL 3.75–6). So had determined and large-scale Assyrian assault in the 660s. Nectanebo could anticipate that submissions everywhere in the Delta would enable Artaxerxes to dedicate his entire naval and land force to an attack on Memphis and to keep it there as long as it took to capture the whole city.

Nectanebo II thus had two choices: make a stand in battle against Persian forces (as Psammetichus III had done in 525) or withdraw further south (as the 25th Dynasty Nubian king Taharqa had done in the 670s). He took the latter choice. Bringing with him, Diodorus states, the greater part of his possessions, Nectanebo abandoned Egypt entirely and “fled into Ethiopia” (16.51.1).

What this points to is withdrawal into Nubia. Like similar moves made by 25th Dynasty figures of the late eighth and seventh centuries in the face of Assyrian aggression, Nectanebo’s withdrawal was certainly meant to set the stage for subsequent reconquest of Upper Egypt, then Memphis, and then perhaps the Delta. That is, for Nectanebo this was strategic withdrawal, not flight. Naturally, he transported with him “the greater part of his possessions.” He was still king and still required all the accoutrements of his kingship. He also presumably took with him a large part of his native force of machimoi, and he would need “the greater part of his possessions” to maintain this force.

At this moment Egypt was without defenders, and complete Persian takeover proceeded without further fighting of any kind. Amazingly, Persian (re)conquest in 343/2 involved only one great battle, the engagement between Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ force on the Persian side and Cleinius’ force (and probably associated machimoi) on
the Egyptian side. The only additional fighting was at Pelusium. But here the fighting itself, beginning with the very first attack on the city, was inconclusive, and Persian besiegers prevailed only when news of Nectanebo’s withdrawal prompted Pelusium’s defenders to submit. The two opposing kings, Artaxerxes and Nectanebo, never personally engaged in any battle. Artaxerxes himself probably never moved beyond the vicinity of Pelusium until Persian conquest was essentially complete. The key, as Nectanebo had seen, was the breaching of the Pelusiac or eastern defense line by Nicostratus and Aristazanes. Guidance by intimidated natives made this possible. But Nicostratus and Aristazanes’ enterprise was part of a coordinated strategy which rested in the first place on tying down defenders at Pelusium, then bringing ships with troops into the Pelusiac branch, advancing southward to take control of the major defensive installation (probably Daphnae) on the Pelusiac branch leading to Bubastis. Having seized Bubastis, invading troops could next move in force to Memphis.

Though Diodorus says nothing about it, we may assume that Mentor and Bagoas’ strike force advanced from Bubastis to Memphis. Diodorus’ silence is a good indication that this took place without any fighting (and thus without anything Diodorus deemed worthy of recording). With Nectanebo and his companion army on their way south, the Persian strike force probably met no opposition from Memphis’ population and was able to secure the city very quickly. Once word got to Artaxerxes of Nectanebo’s cession of his capital, there was no need for Artaxerxes himself to hasten to Memphis with his own troops. But, although Diodorus again says nothing, we may be sure that Artaxerxes III himself finally advanced to Memphis to assert Persian dominion over Egypt through occupation of its capital.

That control of the Delta and Memphis is what really counted in establishing effective Persian dominion is indicated by apparent Persian indifference toward Nectanebo after his flight from Memphis. Diodorus’ account of the 343/2 campaign from Artaxerxes’ entry into Egypt to his departure is continuous and leaves no space for any unreported distant enterprises by Artaxerxes (it was a twelve- to thirteen-day overland journey from Memphis to Thebes, and of course much longer than that to the far south bordering Nubia14). There is no evidence of any effort even by a small Persian contingent to pursue Nectanebo far to the south. Conceivably, the onset of the flood season or perhaps memory of Cambyses’ ill-fated Nubian campaign in the 520s were factors in Artaxerxes’ decision not to advance into Upper Egypt, but with Memphis and the Delta secured, probably by early 342,15 and Nectanebo roughly 1,000 miles away, Persian conquest must have seemed complete and further operations unnecessary.

Like Cambyses nearly two centuries earlier, Artaxerxes III was really a conqueror of Egypt, not a suppresser of rebellion as Darius I and Xerxes had been. This new, second Persian conquest of Egypt, which stretched over nearly sixty years from the muster of the first expeditionary force under Artaxerxes II’s commander Abrocomes to the ultimate victory under Artaxerxes III, thus brought the Persian-Egyptian War a full circle—back to the late sixth century and to a new beginning for establishing the relationship between the eastern and western cores. Artaxerxes had
no intention of reviving the arrangements for managing Egypt that Cambyses had made and Darius had followed in the sixth century. Instead, he looked back to Assyrian and Babylonian imperial control practices (which, it might be said, he had already mimicked in dealing with Sidon). These may be summed up in a few words: desecrate, pillage, and deport. This meant that whereas Cambyses and Darius had insinuated themselves into Egypt’s millennia-old king-centered cosmic system, Artaxerxes sought to dismantle this system entirely and destroy the sacral foundation of the Egyptian state—in effect, to destroy Egypt as a political and cultural system.

Probably from Memphis, Artaxerxes dispatched troops to plunder temples throughout Egypt. “Stripping the temples bare, he amassed a great quantity of silver and gold,” Diodorus says (16.51.2). Some he destroyed entirely. For example, the walls of the temple of the cobra-goddess Wadjet (Edjo) at Buto, the great oracular deity of the Saite period and probably also of the 29 and 30th Dynasties, whose sanctuary was the site of one of the chief festivals celebrated by all Egyptians (Hdt. 2.59), were deliberately smashed into small pieces. We may suspect that other similarly important sites were specifically targeted and that destruction in the wake of Persian conquest was not simply random or spontaneous.

Artaxerxes gathered even more wealth by carrying off “the inscribed records of the ancient temples” and then ransoming these off for a great deal of money (Diod.16.51.2). The last decades of native monarchy in Egypt, especially the years of Nectanebo II, had been prosperous and marked by extensive dedications and endowments for temples throughout Egypt. A good deal of “royal” wealth had been deposited in temples as compensation for the exactions of Tachos, and Artaxerxes’ ransoming tactic was an effective way to get at this wealth. In other words, where the victorious Persian king did not destroy temples, he removed their contents and deprived them also of the texts which certified their power.

Diodorus’ report (16.51.2) that Artaxerxes had the fortifications of “the most important cities” demolished may allow us to see that he targeted dynastic centers in particular, perhaps finally dismantling the dynasteiai that had been the source of virtually all the problems the Persians had faced in Egypt. Cities such as Sebennytus, Mendes, and Sais were certainly the most important cities of Egypt during the whole of this period, and these would have been primary targets of Persian vengeance. The tomb of Nepherites at Mendes suffered destruction at this time, and this may attest a particular attempt to obliterate monuments of the 28th, 29th, and 30th Dynasty kings, all insurrectional from the Persian point of view.

There is no indication of great casualties among Egyptian machimoii during Artaxerxes III’s conquest, but with Nectanebo far to the south and with dynastic centers in ruins and leading dynasts gone—most likely in flight, some perhaps with Nectanebo, some separately, possibly west into Libyan territory—surviving machimoii (other than those who had accompanied Nectanebo) had no commanders. Without these, they ceased to pose a military threat to Persian control of Egypt, and Artaxerxes presumably left them in place in their Delta landholdings.
To announce the new, post-conquest situation, Artaxerxes issued, undoubtedly from the mint at Memphis, silver tetrads of Athenian type (head of Athena, owl on reverse) with the demotic legend “Artaxerxes Pharaoh.” Minted by Egyptian kings for decades, Athenian owl coins represented the most common coinage in Egypt. Because the bullion used to produce Artaxerxes’ Egyptian coins came from royal or temple treasures, display of Artaxerxes’ name on these coins asserted his ownership of Egyptian wealth. Given the long association of Athenian-type coins with Greek mercenaries in Egypt, the appearance of Artaxerxes’ name on the coins announced also that he was now the military paymaster. Artaxerxes had no interest in presenting himself in any way in Egyptian terms—no throne name, no association with any Egyptian deity. Egypt, the coins asserted, was in the hands of the Persian king, whose position rested on military strength alone. Diodorus’ report that Artaxerxes dispatched Bagoas (i.e., Rhosaces) to take over Pelusium points to a policy of replacing Egyptian (Greek and native machimoi) garrison forces with Persian troops. Artaxerxes’ coinage was likely intended mainly to pay his garrison troops in Egypt, but the coins moved into general circulation and thus broadcast their ownership message again and again.

With the destruction of fortified cities and the plundering of temples accomplished, Artaxerxes dismissed the Greeks who had joined in the campaign, rewarding them, according to Diodorus, with substantial gifts corresponding in value to their particular contributions (16.51.3). Nicostratus and Lacrates’ rewards must have been particularly notable. But Diodorus makes special mention of Mentor’s compensation:

Seeing that Mentor had performed great services for him in the war against the Egyptians, [Artaxerxes] advanced him over and above his other friends. Esteeming him worthy of honor for his gallant actions, he gave him a hundred talents of silver [nearly three tons, certainly from Egyptian treasures] and also the best of other expensive things, and he appointed him satrap of the Asiatic coast. (Diod.16.52.1-2)

Actually, it appears that Mentor had not really performed any “gallant actions” in the campaign itself, at least none in battle. Most likely, the “great services” he provided Artaxerxes in the war had to do with furnishing the king with critically important information and recommendations. So great, in fact, was Artaxerxes’ gratitude (and his political security in the aftermath of the reconquest of Egypt) that he granted Mentor’s request that he acquit Artabazus, Mentor’s brother-in-law and the former rebel satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who had been residing together with Mentor’s brother Memnon at Philip of Macedon’s court for the last decade, and permit his and Memnon’s return (Diod. 16.52.3).

Finally, Artaxerxes installed a Persian, Pherendates, as satrap resident at Memphis, completing the restoration of Persian imperial authority in Egypt. Various other Persians must have remained or soon arrived in Egypt to assist Pherendates. But, as in the sixth century and later, there were Egyptians willing to participate in Persian imperial administration in Egypt. The autobiographical stela
which Somtutefnakht, “son of the Master of Grain” and himself an important official of some sort under Nectanebo II, erected in the temple of the god Harsaphes at Henen-nesut (Heracleopolis Magna) south of Memphis shows that Artaxerxes was ready to reward collaboration. After noting his high standing with Nectanebo (“the Good God”), Somtutefnakht goes on to thank Harsaphes because

You distinguished me before millions  
when you turned your back on Egypt.  
You put love of me in the heart of Asia’s ruler,  
His courtiers praised god for me.  
He gave me the office of chief priest of Sakhmet  
In place of my mother’s brother,  
The chief priest of Sakhmet of Upper and Lower Egypt,  
Nekhthenb. (AEL 3.42)

We may conjecture that Somtutefnakht, a high-ranking official from a distinguished family, performed great services on behalf of Artaxerxes III and that Artaxerxes confirmed him in such an important priesthood (Sakhmet was the lion-headed consort of Ptah, the god of Memphis) that he retained the great status he had enjoyed under Nectanebo II. Somtutefnakht’s inscription indicates further that, despite evidence of damage at a number of temples in the aftermath of Persian recovery of Egypt in 343/2, Artaxerxes did not abolish ancient cults and important priesthoods, but assumed control over important appointments, and did so as a Persian king, not as a self-proclaimed Egyptian king on the model of Cambyses or Darius.

Artaxerxes himself departed, probably before the beginning of flood season in mid-342, taking his army (less the Greek allies and presumably various garrison troops) back to Babylon. In addition to his huge haul of spoils from Egypt, Artaxerxes also took captured Egyptians, including a son of Nectanebo and possibly other royal family members, a move reminiscent of Assyrian and Babylonian practices.

Diodorus’ final remark regarding Artaxerxes III’s achievement is restrained and succinct: “he acquired great glory for what he had accomplished” (16.51.3). Diodorus could (and should) have elaborated on this to note how swift and seemingly complete Artaxerxes’ victory was. While four (or five, if we count Ochus’ putative 359 invasion) previous Persian campaigns, including his own, had bogged down in delays, disasters, and defeat, once Artaxerxes III’s 343 invasion force reached Egypt, it succeeded in a surprisingly short time. But, perhaps because Artaxerxes himself never engaged in battle in 343/2, Diodorus evidently saw no reason to praise him for Persian success. Instead, he attributes Persian victory (when not with patently false assertions crediting Mentor) to Nectanebo II’s incompetence, and cites a number of alleged shortcomings: “his own want of judgment” (aboulia), lack of experience as a general, overconfidence (because he had previously defeated the Persians), failure to share command with Greeks, and inability to execute appropriate military actions (16.47.7-4.2). Clearly, Diodorus really has no
idea why the Persians succeeded, so he can only explain Persian success as the result of Egyptian failure. Despite having at his disposal a good deal of information about Persian operations in Egypt in 343/2, Diodorus was unable to grasp the significance of the tactical organization or the tactics that Artaxerxes employed and was thus unable to see that Persian success in 343/2 was really the result of a well-conceived and perfectly executed Persian plan and not the consequence of any supposedly fatal shortcomings on the part of Nectanebo II.

Like Pharnabazus in 373, Artaxerxes III in 343 used a strike force approach, but unlike Pharnabazus, he employed three separate strike forces operating simultaneously in a coordinated fashion. Thus Artaxerxes was able strike at critical targets without depending first on complete control of a single base—the fatal problem in 390/89–388/7 and 373. Nectanebo II, who in anticipation of a reprise of previous Persian strategies held back a reserve army to reinforce defenders at whatever site came under Persian attack (pace Diodorus, a prudent move based on experience, not want of judgment or inexperience), could not respond by throwing this whole reserve force into action to repel Persian attack on one site (as in the past) for fear that Persian attacks would prevail at other sites. At the same time, Nectanebo's reserve army was not so large that he could divide it into separate units and simultaneously effectively reinforce numerous threatened sites. That left Nectanebo with only one defensive option: fall back on Memphis and use the whole reserve army to defend this single, but most critical, site. Artaxerxes could thus proceed unopposed to what was always the ultimate objective of Persian campaigns in Egypt, the capture of Memphis.

During the fourth century up to this point, Persian kings and commanders had apparently lagged behind Egyptian kings in utilizing large numbers of Greek troops. In his 343 campaign, however, Artaxerxes III probably finally matched and perhaps surpassed Nectanebo II in the number of Greeks he engaged. Artaxerxes thus had enough Greek troops to divide them into separate strike forces and not rely on just a single one as Pharnabazus had. Most importantly, Artaxerxes guarded effectively against independent activities and betrayal by Greeks (fear of which had prompted Pharnabazus to keep his Greek mercenary force and its commander close to him) by coupling the Greek contingent in each strike force with a comparable Persian contingent headed by a trusted Persian of the highest rank. The Persian contingents provided each strike force with both additional strength and an important measure of security that enabled Artaxerxes confidently to deploy his strike forces at great distances from his own command.

There was obviously friction between Greek and Persian commanders and enough real Greek-Persian conflict to allow Diodorus to cast his account of Artaxerxes III’s 343 offensive largely in terms of Greek-barbarian discord. Artaxerxes’ insistence on parity and collaboration between Greeks and barbarians was, after all, new, and certainly difficult for both sides. But by concentrating on an old theme, Diodorus missed what, in being new, was most important about Artaxerxes III’s whole campaign and what furnished the key, finally, to Persian success in Egypt.
CHAPTER 19
From Artaxerxes III to Alexander III, 342–332

After Diodorus reports Artaxerxes’ departure from Egypt for Babylon in 343/2 (16.51.3), Greek sources are completely silent about Egyptian affairs and Persian dealings with Egypt until Alexander of Macedon’s campaign a decade later. For information about developments between Artaxerxes’ great victory and Alexander’s arrival in Egypt in 332 we thus depend entirely on very sparse Egyptian sources.

The Egyptian evidence is indeed sparse. It consists of a demotic loan contract dated to the 18th year, 2nd month of Nectanebo II and an inscription of Ptolemy X (110–88) which mentions retrospectively a gift of land to the Horus temple at Edfu in far southern Egypt in the 18th year of Nectanebo II—342/1, or well after Artaxerxes left Egypt.¹ Additional dating formulas used in a marriage contract of a priest from Thebes and on an Apis bull sarcophagus from Memphis employ the regnal years—1st year, 3rd month and 2nd year, 3rd month respectively—of King Chababash, a figure never mentioned by Manetho.² The appearance of the name of the notary of the marriage contract in another document from the 320s suggests that the Chababash of the marriage contract reigned not too long before the 320s.³ The name “Chababash” appears also on various objects—scarab, vase, leather sling bulla, and amulet—with Lower Egyptian provenance.⁴ Since the sequence of native monarchs from Amyrtaeus to Nectanebo II is known and without gaps, the only place for a fourth-century Chababash is after Nectanebo II (and, of course, before Alexander and Ptolemy). This means, therefore, that there was a break with Persian rule sometime after 343/2.⁵

Further evidence for a kingship of Chababash is provided by the so-called Satrap Stela.⁶ This text dates from 311, when Ptolemy, still satrap under the titular authority of Alexander the Great’s son Alexander IV and not yet “king” of Egypt, was warring with Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius and anticipating invasion by them in response to his campaign into Syria in 312. The stela records Ptolemy’s
renewal of a grant of territory—the “sea-land” in the Delta—to the temple of Horus at Buto originally made, it is claimed, by Chababash. According to the inscription, Ptolemy, having returned from a victorious military campaign, “was seeking the best thing to do for the gods of Upper and Lower Egypt.” He was told by “one who was at his side and the elders of Lower Egypt” about an earlier royal act.

The sea-land, the land of Patanut is its name, was granted by the king, the son of the Sun, Chababash, living for ever, to the gods of Pe and Tep [two districts of Buto] after his Holiness had gone to Pe and Tep, to examine all the sea-land in their territory, to go into the interior of the marshes to examine every arm of the Nile which goes into the Great Sea, to keep off the fleet of Asia from Egypt. Then spoke his Holiness [Chababash] to him who was at his side: “This sea-land, let me get to know it.” They spoke before his Holiness: “This sea-land (it is called the land of Patanut) has been the property of the gods of Pe and Tep from immemorial time. The enemy Xerxes [most plausibly Artaxerxes] reversed it, nor did he leave anything of the gods of Pe and Tep.” His Holiness spoke that there should be brought before him the priest and magistrates of Pe and Tep. They brought them to him in haste. Then spoke his Holiness: “Let me be informed concerning the quality of the gods of Pe and Tep, what they did to the miscreant on account of the wicked action which he had done, seeing that the miscreant Xerxes had done evil to Pe and Tep, and had taken away their property.” They spoke before his Holiness: “The king our Lord Horus, son of Isis, son of Osiris, the ruler of rulers, the king of kings of Upper Egypt, the king of kings of Lower Egypt, the avenger of his father, the lord of Pe, the beginning and the end of the gods, after whom there is no king, cast out [from his palace] the miscreant Xerxes with his eldest son, making himself manifest in the town of Neith, even in Sais, on that day beside the holy Mother.” There spoke his Holiness; that I swear. Then spoke the priests and the magistrates of Pe and Tep: “Then may your Holiness command that there be granted the sea-land (the land of Patanut it is called) to the gods of Pe and Tep, with bread, drink, oxen, birds, all good things. May the renewal of the donation be registered in your name on account of your bounty to the gods of Pe and Tep, as requital for the excellence of your actions.”

The inscription goes on to report how Ptolemy restored to Horus the territory of Patanut, with all its villages, towns, inhabitants, fields, waters, oxen, birds, herds, and all things produced in it as it was previously together with what has been added since, by the gift, made by the king, the lord of both lands, Chababash the ever-living. In other words, Ptolemy ratified a grant originally made at some earlier time by the pharaoh Chababash. The inscription then records in explicit terms the official boundaries of the land grant confirmation. It finishes up with a final reference to Chababash as the original grantor of the land grant now confirmed by Ptolemy as satrap: “The land in its full extent which had been given by the king, the lord of both lands, the image of Tanen, chosen by Ptah, the son of the Sun, Chababash living forever, the donation therefore has been renewed by this great viceroy of Egypt, Ptolemy, to the gods of Pe and Tep forever.”
There is much here that is confusing, but the inscription clearly attests the kingship of a figure named Chababash, and the evidence from the marriage contract from Thebes indicates that this must belong to the period between Nectanebo II’s defeat and the arrival of Alexander. However, by the time of Alexander’s campaign a Persian satrap—Sabaces (not Pherendates, whom Artaxerxes installed in 343/2)—was in charge in Egypt and departed from there with many troops to join Darius III when he faced Alexander at Issus in late 333 (Arr. Anab. 2.11.8). Sabaces’ subordinate or replacement Mazaces was in place when Alexander arrived in Egypt in late 332 (Arr. 3.1.2). In other words, Chababash reestablished a native kingship in Egypt some time after Artaxerxes III’s conquest in 343/2, but the Persians subsequently recovered Egypt by 333.

Scrappy as this information is, it allows us to embark on a tentative reconstruction of events following Artaxerxes’ conquest in 343/2. If dating at Edfu by Nectanebo’s 18th year (342/1) indicates continued recognition of Nectanebo in southernmost Egypt after 343/2, we may ask how thorough Artaxerxes’ conquest and pacification really were at the time he left Egypt. Diodorus reports that after the surrender of Bubastis, “the remaining cities” surrendered by agreement and that after Nectanebo II’s putative flight from Memphis to Nubia, Artaxerxes took possession of all Egypt and demolished the walls of the most important cities (Diod. 16.51.1–2). However, Diodorus, who up to this point has been full of details about the movements and actions of Persian forces, gives no indication that Persian forces ever moved south of Memphis in any substantial way. The Persian king’s “possession of all Egypt” may have been achieved simply by virtue of Nectanebo’s abandonment of “all Egypt” when he moved out of Egypt into Nubia. There may have been little strategic need for Persian forces to advance south of Memphis in any substantial way. The Persian king’s “possession of all Egypt” may have been achieved simply by virtue of Nectanebo’s abandonment of “all Egypt” when he moved out of Egypt into Nubia. There may have been little strategic need for Persian forces to advance south of Memphis in any substantial way. The Persian king’s “possession of all Egypt” may have been achieved simply by virtue of Nectanebo’s abandonment of “all Egypt” when he moved out of Egypt into Nubia. There may have been little strategic need for Persian forces to advance south of Memphis in any substantial way.

Problems elsewhere may have prompted Artaxerxes to leave Egypt as quickly as possible. He seems to have created two large commands after his return to Babylon, appointing Mentor as “commander [hégemôn] of the coastal districts in Asia” and assigning Bagoas command of “the upper satrapies” (Diod. 16.50.7–8), and this may indicate a need to address simultaneously unrest in various regions of the empire. Artaxerxes’ years-long preoccupation with Egyptian matters, including the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts, and his extended concentration of Persian military resources in the eastern Mediterranean may have emboldened troublemakers elsewhere.

To explain the use of Nectanebo II’s 18th regnal year in a dating formula at Edfu—a year or more after Artaxerxes supposedly took possession of all Egypt—we may imagine that in the absence of any actual Persian penetration or presence in
Upper Egypt and with Nectanebo still alive further south, priests at Edfu, some seventy miles upriver from Thebes, could continue to treat him as the actual king, bereft for the time being of Memphis and Lower Egypt.\textsuperscript{10} Alternatively, we might see in the use of Nectanebo’s 18th regnal year evidence of an attempt on his part to recover Egypt and evidence that he did so at least up to Edfu.\textsuperscript{11} In any case, after this there is no mention of Nectanebo. Perhaps he died; perhaps he simply remained inactive.

We find Chababash, however, attested as king at Thebes, Memphis, and in the Delta. In other words, he evidently held Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, and the traditional capital for some time—at least two years and some months, perhaps more. If we can trust the statement of the Satrap Stela that Chababash was in the Delta to examine the mouths of the Nile branches to keep off “the fleet from Asia,” he was clearly concerned about Persian invasion during his kingship. We may assume then that Persian forces had been expelled previously from Egypt (evidence of recognition at Memphis indicates loss of the capital by Persians) and a new attempt at recovery of Egypt by the Persians was anticipated. There may be a reference to this situation in the autobiographical inscription by Petosiris (Pa-di-Usir), the High Priest of Thoth at Hermopolis in the period just before and after Alexander’s conquest.\textsuperscript{12} Petosiris reports at one point that he spent

\begin{quote}
Seven years as controller for this god,
Administering his endowment without fault being found,
While the Ruler-of-foreign-lands was Protector in Egypt,
And nothing was in its former place,
Since fighting had started inside Egypt,
The South being in turmoil, the North in revolt;
The people walked with head turned back
All temples were without their servants,
The priests fled, not knowing what was happening.
\end{quote}

\textit{(AEL 3.46)}

When did this happen? We may be able to infer a rough chronology from statements in the Satrap Stela. The clues are the confiscation of the temple’s property, which, despite the inscription’s use of “Xerxes,” fits best with the post-conquest measures of Artaxerxes III. This points to him as the “miscreant” whom Horus punished by effecting his death and the death of his main son—the murders that Bagoas carried out in 338 (Diod. 17.5.3–4; cf. 16.50.8). The priests stated that the god did this “when there was no king,” meaning no king in Egypt, thus before Chababash’s ascent. If this was the case, then Chababash’s ascent should be placed after Artaxerxes’ death in 338.\textsuperscript{13} Not only Artaxerxes III’s eldest son but virtually the whole of his family perished at this time. Bagoas placed Artaxerxes’ youngest son Arses, apparently the sole survivor among Artaxerxes’ immediate family, on the throne. Then, executing Arses, Bagoas chose Darius (Codomannus), whom
Diodorus calls “a member of the court circle” before identifying him as the grandson of Artaxerxes II’s brother Ostanes, and when Bagoas subsequently tried to put Darius (III) away, Darius forced him to drink the fatal cup of poison Bagoas had prepared for the king (Diod. 17.5.5–6).

The story of Bagoas’ responsibility for Artaxerxes’ and Arses’ deaths is quite similar to other accounts which attribute responsibility for removing kings to court officials or intimate insiders with reasons of their own, who are then killed in just retribution by a royal family member who succeeds. We may suspect that this typically conceals the role played by rivals for the succession, with blame shifted to some court figure. Here we may perhaps detect Codomannus’ (= Darius III’s) responsibility. As grandson of Ostanes, a brother of Artaxerxes II and Cyrus the Younger, he was descended from Darius II and had thereby a solid royal lineage.\(^{14}\)

Ambition or fear might explain his decision to try to seize power. In the reported extermination of most of the royal family we may see the fatal consequences of rivalry between different Achaemenid family groups.

Succession crises had invariably paralyzed Persian government, sometimes for years, as they played themselves out. This crisis may have been especially politically disruptive, as it involved the near extermination of the royal family—the Darius II–Artaxerxes II–Artaxerxes III line—and certainly put at risk all the families most closely associated with Artaxerxes III. Rather than passively await the outcome of the succession crisis, Pherendates, Artaxerxes’ satrap in Egypt, may have left Egypt, possibly with some forces stationed in Egypt, to engage in the anticipated struggle, much as Arsames had done in 425.

Just who Chababash was remains unknown. Scholarly conjecture ranges far and wide: Nubian, Libyan, Arab, Anatolian, “foreign.”\(^{15}\) The name is strange and non-Egyptian. The -\textit{sh} ending might suggest Libyan derivation (cf. Meshwesh),\(^{16}\) but hardly conclusively. The Satrap Stela seems to indicate that the priests of Buto treated Chababash as a perfectly legitimate native king and that he responded in appropriate fashion, restoring land to them in gratitude for the god’s service.\(^{17}\) We must assume that he led a military force of some size, which must have comprised Egyptian warriors—the machimoi. That suggests Libyan links, that is, links to the “Libyan” Delta families connected with the machimoi.

There is a good deal of speculation here, but the scenario that emerges may be persuasive simply because of its familiarity. With Persian affairs in confusion as a result of the succession crisis following Artaxerxes III’s death, a Delta dynast of Libyan descent seizes the opportunity to foment rebellion. (Perhaps again we have a figure who took refuge in “the marshes” and thereby eluded a Persian roundup in 344/3; perhaps we have a collaborator who first joined and aided the Persians and then turned against them; perhaps we have a Delta figure who had accompanied Nectanebo to Nubia in 343/2 and later moved north from there with some of the troops Nectanebo had taken to Nubia.). Petosiris’ description of conditions “while the Ruler-of-foreign-lands [presumably the Persian king] was Protector in Egypt, and nothing was in its former place” has the North in revolt and the South in
turmoil, which perhaps indicates active rebellion in Lower Egypt (the Delta) while Upper Egypt, reacting as always to developments initiated in the Delta, was in a state of confusion, with some supporting Chababash and some not. But we have no idea how Chababash and his supporters managed to deal with Persian garrison forces under Pherendates’ command or what happened to Pherendates.

If we date Chababash’s ascent to winter 338/7 and on the basis of the dating formula of the Apis bull sarcophagus give him a reign of at least two years and three months, we come down to early 335 as the earliest time for Persian recovery of Egypt. By late 336, Darius III had gained the Persian throne, doing away with Bagoas in the process, and he evidently did not face any rival claimants. He was thus able to concentrate on other, imperial problems. Two would have confronted him in 336: the revolt of Egypt and the onset of Philip of Macedon’s Asian campaign, marked by the dispatch of a 10,000-man advance force to western Anatolia in the spring of 336 (Diod. 16.91.2; Just. 9.5.8–9). Given Philip’s record of relentless aggression and expansion, the Macedonian danger might have been more threatening to Darius than the Egyptian situation (though, of course, there was the prospect of the intersection of the two). But Philip’ murder in mid-336 probably seemed to end the imminent danger of Macedonian aggression. This may have allowed Darius to leave response to the Macedonian advance force still in western Anatolia to local officials and to concentrate on the recovery of Egypt, preparing (as the Satrap Stela indicates) a fleet and undoubtedly also a land force.

We can only speculate about the subsequent course of events. Persian control, we know, was restored in Egypt, and a new Persian satrap, Sabaces, was in place by early 334 (when a demotic document so dated witnesses an exchange of property in Sabaces’ name). Most likely, restoration of Persian control occurred during 335. There is no hint of battles, only the Satrap Stela’s indication of Chababash’s anticipation of maritime assault by the “Byblos ships” coming from Asia. Perhaps Chababash’s concern about Delta defenses points to what happened. The extensive and well-entrenched Delta defense system, which had been built up over thirty years between the time of Acoris and Nectanebo I and Nectanebo II, was in ruins, thanks to the dismantling that occurred after Artaxerxes’ victory in 343/2. By the time a new Persian invasion loomed, Chababash had evidently been king for (perhaps) two years. He may from the beginning have anticipated Persian attack, but it is unlikely that he had either the time or the resources to prepare fortifications which in any way resembled those in place in previous decades. He might hope, as the Satrap Stela suggests, for the intervention of Horus, but beyond this he had no effective defenses.

Ultimately, perhaps, Chababash simply faded away—into the Delta marshes, or farther west into Libya, or to the south, like his predecessor, into Nubia. The latter alternative may be attested by a Meroitic inscription of Nastasen, the 26th king of Kush (Nubia), which reports his campaign against an attacker coming from the north, whose name, “Kembesweden,” may be a version of “Chababash.” Nastasen’s regnal dates seem to be ca. 328–308, which puts him fairly close to the time of the
presumed end of Chababash’s brief reign as Egyptian king, and the inscription may provide an indication of Chababash’s activities after Persian recovery of Egypt in ca. 335: he moved (or returned) south and sought to establish himself at the expense of the Kushite king. Nastasen was apparently victorious, but the inscription does not reveal Chababash’s final fate (if indeed “Kembesweden” is Chababash).23

A Persian expeditionary force may therefore have been able to enter and recover Egypt without significant opposition. It is not necessary to assume that Darius III himself commanded it. We may perhaps see in Sabaces’ satrapal status the extension of military authority bestowed on him as commander of the expeditionary force. What is known about Sabaces’ activities in Egypt is limited to his extensive coinage involving copies of Athenian tetradrachms.24 This may well indicate his payment of mercenary troops engaged in the expedition, and perhaps his maintenance of them as an occupying force to secure the country in a thorough fashion. Here they may have stayed until 333, when Sabaces embarked to join Darius and confront Alexander and the new Macedonian invasion force at Issus—and to die (Arr. Anab. 2.11.8; Curt. 3.11.10, 4.1.28; Diod. 17.34.5).

Egypt remained in Persian hands, with Mazaces replacing the departed Sabaces as satrap. But with most of its Persian military force gone, the satrapy was now quite vulnerable. This would seem to have furnished a fine opportunity for renewed Egyptian revolt. That this did not happen may reflect the absence of any dynastic leadership in the Delta. Instead, challenge came from a bold attempt by the Macedonian renegade Amyntas (who had fought on the Persian side at Issus) to seize control of Egypt. With 4,000 Greek mercenaries formerly in Persian service, Amyntas sailed to Egypt from Cyprus in ships taken from the Persian fleet after the battle of Issus. After easily taking control of Pelusium, Amyntas announced that Darius III had sent him to replace Sabaces after Sabaces died in battle at Issus, and he was evidently able to sail upriver from Pelusium to Memphis unopposed. Sabaces’ stand-in and successor Mazaces had too few forces to confront Amyntas and his sizable mercenary company, and Mazaces remained in Memphis. But when Egyptians, hearing of Amyntas’ approach and hoping to seize the opportunity to destroy the Persian garrison at Memphis, rushed to the city, Mazaces had little hope of holding on to Memphis unless he decimated Amyntas’ force. Mazaces thus sent his own troops out of Memphis to battle Amyntas’ mercenaries. Amyntas quickly repulsed the Persian defenders and drove them back into the city. However, when Amyntas allowed his men to plunder at will in the vicinity of Memphis in a disorderly, careless fashion, Mazaces’ surviving troops sallied forth again and this time managed to kill all Amyntas’ Greeks and Amyntas himself (Arr. Anab. 2.13.2–3; Curt. 4.1.27–33; Diod. 17.48.2–5). Thus, Persian control of Egypt, though shaken and still facing native hostility, continued through most of 332.25

Once Alexander moved south instead of east after the Battle of Issus and during 332 advanced through Syria into Phoenician territory, there could be little doubt that he was headed for Egypt. The Persians in Egypt—Mazaces and his troops—were now in the situation successive Egyptian kings had found themselves in during

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the fourth century: certain of imminent attack by forces assembled in the middle territory, certain of the route the invading force would take, and uncertain only of the precise timing of invasion. But, lacking the fortifications, manpower, and resources previous fourth-century (Egyptian) defenders of Egypt had possessed, Mazaces had no hope of repelling Macedonian attack.

Having spent ten months taking Tyre and then Gaza by siege, Alexander finally set forth for Egypt late in 332 (probably late November). He recapitulated in most respects the advance of Artaxerxes III in 343, combining naval and land forces. Starting from Gaza, his army covered the north Sinai route to Pelusium in seven days. Alexander’s fleet, having gone ahead, was already anchored at Pelusium when Alexander arrived (Arr. Anab. 3.1.1; Curt. 4.7.1–2). Barely able to hold on to Memphis, Mazaces made no effort to block Alexander’s entry to Egypt at Pelusium. Thus, Alexander encountered at Pelusium only a great throng of Egyptians gathered to welcome him (Curt. 7.4.2).

Once in Egypt, Alexander proceeded as Persian forces had in 343, moving southward from Pelusium. The fleet sailed on ahead to Memphis. Alexander with his land army headed to Heliopolis at the base of the Delta, staying in the desert to the east of the Pelusiac branch to avoid the many canals west of the river. All along the way, town after town submitted to him (including, we may assume, Bubastis).

Mazaces had won a very lucky victory against Amyntas and his 4,000 mercenaries some months earlier, but he had far too few troops to make a stand against Alexander. He might have secured himself for a time in Memphis’ nearly impregnable “White Wall” citadel, but, knowing already of Darius’ flight from Issus and Alexander’s determined sieges of Tyre and Gaza, he could expect a similarly sustained siege of Memphis by Alexander and no relief from Darius, and, of course, no support from Egyptians. Mazaces thus had no choice but to surrender the whole country to Alexander. Well before Alexander reached Memphis, Mazaces moved out of the city and citadel, “crossing the river” and “welcoming Alexander to the cities and the countryside” (Curt. 4.7.4; Arr. Anab. 3.1.2).

Mazaces’ crossing of the river probably took place in the vicinity of Heliopolis, the point where the Pelusiac branch (and others) split off from the Nile. Traditionally, Heliopolis, the ancient city of the great sun god Re, was one of the places where Egyptian coronation ceremonies had been held. Curtius reports that Mazaces gave over to Alexander not only a huge treasure of 800 talents but also what Curtius’ calls “royal furniture” (regiam supellectilem), presumably symbols of royal status (including a throne?). This may well indicate that Mazaces provided the first acclamation of Alexander as king of Egypt, hailing him as such and investing him with royal paraphernalia in the same place many native kings had been installed (Arr. Anab. 3.1.1–2; Curt. 4.7.3–4). Thus, it might be said, Persian power in Egypt came to an end, finally and peacefully, when the Persian satrap Mazaces bestowed on the Macedonian king Alexander the symbols of Egyptian kingship that had once been the possessions of Cambyses and Darius I and perhaps more recently of Artaxerxes III and Darius III, thereby ceding control of the western core to a far western power.
Alexander moved from Heliopolis, crossing the Nile to make his way to Memphis along the west bank of the river (Arr. Anab. 3.1.3–4). At Memphis, he celebrated his victory with sacrifices (especially, performing the role of an Egyptian king, to the Apis bull) and athletic and literary contests, thus mixing both Egyptian and Greek practices in a way that anticipates Egypt’s Ptolemaic future (Arr. Anab. 3.1.3–4).

The titulature developed for and employed by Alexander emphasized his role as liberator from Persian domination: “Protector of Egypt” and “He who drives out the foreigner.” Coming to Egypt as conqueror of the Persians on the heels of the Persian conquest a decade earlier and more recent Persian reconquest after the native kingship of Chababash, Alexander was naturally seen by Egyptians as an agent of Egyptian interests. Artaxerxes III’s policy of ignoring Egyptian sensibilities and treating the whole land as enemy territory to be pillaged provided Alexander with a good lesson of what to avoid and a good foil for his Egyptianizing activities. Following Alexander’s apparent acclamation by Mazaces at Heliopolis, there is no evidence that Alexander underwent any further and more elaborate coronation process in Egypt. Nevertheless, he functioned as king of Egypt in the manner of Cambyses and Darius, being accorded a throne name for purposes of “cosmic continuity.”

Now as king, probably at the beginning of 331, Alexander took a substantial force on shipboard downriver on the westernmost, Canopic branch of the Nile. Arrian does not specify his purpose. He notes Alexander’s identification of a site for the construction of a new city, but makes this seem an accidental event rather than the outcome of an intentional search (Arr. Anab. 3.1.4–5). Alexander’s primary concern may have been strategic—to secure the whole of the Delta and in particular to intrude into the marshlands in the extreme northwest, where there may have remained “Libyan” dynasts who had so far eluded suppression and might, as in the past, cause problems for any ruler in Egypt. Perhaps Chababash himself was still at large in the western Delta or in Libya, something that Mazaces would have known and reported to Alexander.

Alexander’s route—from Memphis to Lake Mareotis along the Canopic branch to Paraetonium and then to Siwa, with a possible return from Siwa to Memphis—encompassed the whole of eastern Libya. At the very least, through this journey Alexander asserted his claim as king of Egypt to whole of an expanded Egypt, a claim to which the priests of Zeus Ammon at Siwa, itself not traditionally part of Egypt, assented by greeting Alexander as king. The delegation from Cyrene which reportedly visited Alexander at this time may have conveyed Cyrenian acceptance of his control of Libya (Curt. 7.1; Diod. 17.49.2).

Alexander himself did not make an advance southward into Upper Egypt. His assertion of direct control over Lower Egypt and Memphis was likely enough to establish his kingship. But he seems to have garrisoned Elephantine in the far south—the bulwark against any aggression from below the first cataract. Arrian reports that when one of Alexander’s Aegean commanders, Hegelochus, arrived
with prisoners taken during suppression of a revolt at Chios, Alexander sent the Chians “to the city of Elephantine in Egypt with a strict guard” (Anab. 3.2.7). This was clearly a place of exile, and if prisoners were being kept there, troops must have been stationed there as well. But the traditional strategic role of the Elephantine garrison had been to forestall incursions from the south, and this was likely still the primary role assigned to troops stationed there following Macedonian takeover of Egypt. If we put together Alexander’s securing of Elephantine with his Libyan “campaign,” we may see him replicating Cambyses’ strategy and seeking to secure Egyptian frontiers in all directions.

Arrian has an especially detailed treatment of Alexander’s provisions for the administration and garrisoning of Egypt preceding his departure. It is clear that Alexander made comprehensive arrangements to ensure his continued control of Egypt.

He appointed two Egyptian governors of provinces, Doloaspis and Petisis, dividing the whole country of Egypt between them; Petisis, however, declined the office, and Doloaspis took it all over. As garrison commandants, at Memphis he appointed Pantaleon of Pydna of the Companion troops, and in Pelusium Polemon, son of Megacles, of Pella; to command the mercenaries, Lycidas, an Aetolian, and as clerk in charge of the mercenaries Eugnostos, son of Xenophantes, one of the companions; and as their overseers, Aeschylus and Ephippus of Chalcis. As governor of the neighboring country of Libya, he appointed Apollonius, son of Charinus, and of Arabia about Heroopolis, Cleomenes from Naucratis. He instructed him to permit the district governors to govern their own districts as had been their way all along, but he was to exact from them the tributes, while they were ordered to pay these to him. As generals of the army which he was leaving behind in Egypt he appointed Peucestas, son of Macartatus, and Balacrus, son of Amyntas…. It is stated that he divided the government of Egypt between many officers from his surprise at both the nature of the country and its strength, since it did not appear to him safe to entrust the command of all Egypt to one man. (Arr. Anab. 3.5.2–7; cf. Curt. 4.8.4)

While he may have presented himself as an anti-Persian king, Alexander faced many of the same problems in Egypt that Persian kings had. Certainly well apprised of recent Persian-Egyptian history, Alexander likely saw that despite the great welcome he received as liberator of Egypt from Persian control, Macedonian domination might soon seem to Egyptians little different from that of the Persians. The farther east Alexander advanced, the more distant Egypt would be from the moving center of his empire, and the more likely that native opposition of some sort would arise.33 From the Persian experience in the fourth century, Alexander knew that to lose control of Egypt was to jeopardize everything, at least in the west. Alexander’s settlement of affairs in Egypt seems to indicate that beyond his presentation of himself as king of Egypt and defender of the west, Alexander took every possible step to make sure Egypt remained submissive. He left not only garrison troops in Egypt
but a whole army under Peucetas and Balacras. With separate governors of Libya and “Arabia about Heroopolis” (i.e., Pithom/Patoumos, the site now called Tell el Maskhuta, at the eastern entry to the Wadi Tumilat), he took special care to ensure that Egypt’s western and eastern frontier regions were secure.

It worked. Egypt remained securely a part of Alexander’s ultimately vast empire right up to the time of his death in 323, when Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, claimed it in the division of territories among leading Macedonian generals which followed Alexander’s death. Here Ptolemy ruled, initially as satrap and then as king, and under a long line of Ptolemy’s descendants Macedonian dominion of Egypt continued for nearly 300 years.

Still, native dynastic families in Egypt had a remarkable longevity of their own. Nectanebo’s son returned to Egypt after Darius III’s defeat. Ptolemy initially married a daughter of Nectanebo II (until 320). We find a grandson of Nectanebo I’s sister named Nectnef in Ptolemaic administration, calling himself on his sarcophagus “nomarch of the districts of Sebennytus”—the dynastic center of the 30th Dynasty—and Sile in Lower Egypt. The cult of Nectanebo II still existed two centuries later. Despite everything that had transpired from the seventh to the late fourth century, it seems that the situation ended up to some degree traversing a full circle—back to the 660s, when dynastic families in the Delta functioned as subordinates to foreign (Assyrian) kings. However, the difference in the Ptolemaic, post-Alexander age was that the new foreign kings, the Macedonian Ptolemies, unlike any of their non-Egyptian predecessors, lived in Egypt and kept an army of their own stationed permanently in Egypt in allotments throughout the country. In this way, they became more effectively kings of Egypt than Cambyses or Darius had been.
CHAPTER 20
East, West, and Far West after the Persians: The Long View

Seen as a whole, the nearly 200-year-long Persian-Egyptian episode in the enduring East-West conflict was, much like those that preceded it, a standoff. Apparent Persian success in conquering Egypt in the first place in the 520s—the seeming culmination of the long eastern struggle to secure the western core—was made possible not by any eastern-core or Persian superiority but by a peculiar set of circumstances which made normal Egyptian responses to threatened invasions impossible. After their initial conquest, the Persians held on to Egypt for more than a century, but only with great difficulty, improvising control measures in the face of repeated dynastic revolts.

The greatest consequence of Persia’s initial success in securing Egypt was that it enabled the Persians to initiate operations to the far west and to try to push imperial boundaries far beyond those of any earlier Near Eastern imperial state. But by inciting sustained and organized response on the part of many Greek states, Persia’s far western enterprise ended up engendering a Greek super-state, the Athenian-dominated Delian League, determined to oppose Persian power in the west. This made the far west for the first time an integral part of the conflict between the eastern and western cores.

Dynasts in the Delta, who had long memories of failed efforts at conquest and control of Egypt by Near Eastern powers, tested the Persian hold from the beginning and broke it for a time in the mid-fifth century with the support of the Athenian super-state. Encouraged by their near success, Delta dynasts challenged Persian dominion again whenever there was a prospect of Athenian support. Ironically, however, it was after Athenian collapse in the Peloponnesian War, when a great succession struggle preoccupied the Persians, that Egypt finally broke away. With this, the struggle between cores resumed, and a succession of native kings repelled repeated Persian attacks in the 380s, 370s, and 350s. There was no longer an Athenian super-state, but by recruiting great numbers of Greek mercenaries to
augment native *machimo*, Egyptian kings continued to engage the far west in this struggle.

Although after the break with Persia at the end of the fifth century Egyptian kings rebuffed Persian invasions, they failed to achieve any lasting success in securing the middle territory. Unwilling or unable to deploy sufficient numbers of native troops on a long term basis outside Egypt, they had to depend on diplomacy and the limited additional manpower that Greek mercenaries represented. Egyptian initiative during the fourth-century phase of the East–West struggle thus typically took the form of instigating and subsidizing opposition to Persia rather than launching large-scale military enterprises. Tachos’ campaign in the late 360s was the unique exception, but it may have failed in large part just for that reason. While Egypt managed to seduce many disaffected leaders and peoples at various times in the fourth century (and the enormous extent of the Persian Empire in the west provided many places and opportunities for Egyptian intervention), Egyptian failure to commit great numbers of troops outside Egypt meant that Egyptian allies typically submitted quickly in the face of Persian military measures. This was precisely the pattern that had marked the Near Eastern–Egyptian conflict when Egyptian kings opposed the Assyrians and Babylonians: Egyptian initiative, largely diplomatic but at times military as well, gave way to successful eastern-core reactions. While the Persians typically restored their hold on the middle territory, their lack of a standing military force and their slow mustering and training practices (a function in large part of the enormous size of their empire) meant that recovery was often an extended process.

Ultimately, the Persians reconquered Egypt by adopting the Egyptian military practice of employing Greeks in great numbers. That is, the Persians themselves ended up depending on far western resources to tip the balance in the conflict. The first effort, involving employment of the Athenian condottiere Iphicrates and a big Greek mercenary force under his command operating separately from Persian troops, broke down amid understandable mistrust and mounting suspicion (373). However, when about thirty years later Artaxerxes III combined Persians and Greeks into a number of smaller units, he created a true Persian-Greek force which proved flexible and effective. Still, this offered no new method for holding on to Egypt on a long-term basis and thus no final resolution; the Egyptians revolted again in a few years. Only Macedonian conquest brought an end to the Persian-Egyptian conflict.

It was in fact the Persian-Egyptian struggle that opened the way for Macedonian enterprise across the Aegean and in doing so sealed the fate of the Persian Empire. Persistent Persian failures during the continuous fourth-century Persian-Egyptian struggle repeatedly revealed Persian military limitations. Recovery of Egypt in 343, since it appeared to be due mainly to Greek troops in Persian service (Philip of Macedon probably had a Greek-centered version of events from the Rhodian Mentor, whose brother Memnon was Philip’s guest through 342), did little to rehabilitate the reputation of Persian arms. Demonstration of the essential importance
of the far west to the survival of the Persian Empire in the west certainly contributed to Philip of Macedon’s, and then his son Alexander’s, readiness to pit Macedon against Persia, despite the seemingly ridiculous disparity in manpower and resources between Macedon and the Persian Empire.

Fittingly, the first of the new identities Alexander adopted in his career of conquest was that of king of Egypt, marking the amalgamation of the far west with the western core. With his conquest of Persia, Alexander became also the Persian king, and in his person Alexander thus joined together again the western and eastern cores. However, this proved to be a fleeting resolution of the enduring West–East, Egyptian–Near Eastern conflict. In the posthumous division of Alexander’s empire, Egypt and Mesopotamia (Babylon) ended up in the hands of rival Macedonian kings, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids respectively. Neither could tolerate the other’s control of the middle territory, and the western and eastern cores were again in conflict.¹

Like New Kingdom Egyptian imperialists, the Ptolemies extended Egypt’s frontier far into the middle territory, taking Cœle Syria (the lands up to the Eleutherus River) and Phoenicia (Acco now became Ptolemais) as well as Cyprus after the Battle of Ipsus in 301 and organizing the region into hyparchies—an extra-Egyptian version of Egypt’s nomes.² The Seleucids held Syria to the north and planted a number of new cities there, most notably Antioch, the Syrian counterpart to their Mesopotamian capital of Seleucia on the Tigris. (They also established Dura-Europos as a fortress city guarding the Euphrates River crossing on the route between Antioch and Seleucia). There was no détente as the two powers contested the middle territory throughout the third and early second centuries in a series of “Syrian Wars.” The Seleucids, whose resources were comparable to those of the Persian Empire, should have prevailed, but the nearly insurmountable difficulties of invading Egypt frustrated successive Seleucid kings. The Ptolemies, for their part, managed to hold the middle territory (as their Saite and fourth-century predecessors such as Necho II, Acoris, and Tachos had not been able to do) by establishing new cities in Cœle Syria and installing Greek military settlers in great numbers in them—an extension, it might be said, of their Egyptian predecessors’ policy of establishing Greek military settlements in Egypt in the seventh, sixth, and fourth centuries.³

This new phase of the conflict between eastern and western cores drove international relations in the Hellenistic Age. The Ptolemies used bases throughout the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean as platforms for political agitation to divert the Seleucids (and Antigonids) from Egypt⁴—the old anti-Persian Egyptian strategy. The Ptolemies were often effective, because the Seleucids, like the Persians before them, oversaw an enormous imperial state and had correspondingly extensive concerns and vulnerabilities in the west. Both the Ptolemies and Seleucids sought preemptive alliances with other kings and tried to disrupt each other’s alliances. The Seleucid Antiochus III finally overran the middle territory at the end of the third century, but thanks to appeals by the king of Pergamum, who was concerned about
Seleucid enterprise in western Anatolia and the Aegean, this served to draw Rome, with its virtually limitless far western resources, into the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean–Near Eastern world.

Rome soon established a protectorate over mainland Greek states, which gave the Romans a stake in Aegean and eastern Mediterranean politics. Confrontation with Antiochus III followed, and, despite their victory over Antiochus in the so-called Syrian War in the late 190s (fought in fact in Greece and western Anatolia), the Romans remained wary of Seleucid activity. This extended the reach of the East–West conflict to the western Mediterranean on a permanent basis. When Antiochus III’s grandson Antiochus IV, continuing the Seleucid struggle with Egypt and reacting to an Egyptian attack on Syria, brought an army into Egypt in 168, the Romans, fearful of the consequences of the amalgamation of the western and eastern cores, intervened, compelling Antiochus to withdraw (Polyb. 29.27.5). Thus the Romans effectively assumed responsibility for the western core in opposition to the eastern (Seleucid) core.

Not long after this, an Iranian people, the Parthians, began their advance westward, overrunning Seleucid Mesopotamia by 140. The Romans pushed aside the impotent Seleucid dynasty in 63 and annexed Syria—all that remained of the once vast Seleucid realm—as a Roman province. The Romans were now masters of the middle territory, and with the annexation of Egypt in 30 they became masters also of the western core. As such, they directly confronted the Parthians, masters now of the eastern core. Thus began a nearly 700-year-long phase of the conflict between the cores, involving Roman and Parthian opposition through the early third century CE and then, following the Sasanian Persian conquest of the Parthian Empire, Roman-Persian hostilities from the third through the seventh centuries.

Although the political centers of the western and eastern imperial states were located well to the west of Egypt and to the east of Mesopotamia respectively, Egypt and Mesopotamia, the densely settled and still highly productive extremities of the Fertile Crescent, were economically at the hearts of the Roman and Parthian-Persian empires. For this reason, the long Roman-Iranian conflict was essentially the latest version of the enduring conflict between the cores. Over the long term, it was again a standoff. Rome, with an empire extending to the Atlantic and North Sea, had great resources and succeeded in holding on to the middle territory almost continuously. But the location of Parthian and Persian homelands to the east of Mesopotamia meant that even when the Romans advanced to the Tigris—to the heart of the eastern core—the Parthians, and later the Sasanian Persians, could fall back and wait beyond the reach of Roman forces for an opportunity to counterattack.

It was axiomatic, and had been for more than a thousand years, that control of the middle territory by a western or eastern power represented a grave threat to the other power. Roman enterprise corroborated this. In 53—within a decade of assuming control of Syria and, indirectly, Palestine—the Romans launched a campaign under Marcus Licinius Crassus which aimed at capturing Seleucia on the
Tigris and the Mesopotamian core. Crassus died, and nearly the whole Roman force was killed or captured. The Parthians responded by invading Syria and Palestine in 40 and 38. This prompted new Roman campaigns under Marcus Antonius in the mid-30s and Tiberius in the 20s before Roman-Parthian agreement in 1 CE established the Euphrates at the boundary between Roman West and Parthian East. Acceptance of parity lasted little more than a century. Second-century offensives under the emperors Trajan, Lucius Verus, and Septimius Severus pushed the Roman frontier all the way to the Tigris. Antioch, where Roman emperors resided for lengthy periods during this time, became effectively a second imperial capital in the east long before Constantine's foundation of Constantinople in the early fourth century. Still, the end result, following Parthian counterattack and a great three-day battle in 217 CE near Carrhae (Harran), the site of Crassus' disastrous defeat in 53, was a military stalemate and resulted in a truce (Hdn. 4.14.1–15.90)—further evidence of enduring West–East parity.

The balance of power persisted even as the aggressive Sasanian Persians displaced the Parthians as masters of an imperial Iranian state controlling the eastern core. Persian offensives into Syria in the 230s and 250s accomplished not only the sack of Antioch but the spectacular defeat of a Roman army and the capture of its commanding emperor Valerian in 258/9. Nevertheless, though long distracted by military crises elsewhere, the Romans eventually pushed back, restoring control of territory up to northern Mesopotamia at the end of the third century and under the emperor Galerius even annexing territory east of the Tigris River in the early fourth century. The Romans held the initiative through the early 360s, when the emperor Julian led an enormous Roman army (pausing, symbolically, at Carrhae for a grand pre-invasion review, a good indication of the Roman sense of continuity about the West–East conflict) into Babylonia up to Ctesiphon, only to die in battle. Julian's successor Jovian's cession of Roman-held territory east of the Tigris along with Nisibis and Armenia was an admission of the futility of continued Roman attempts to push beyond the Euphrates, and peace prevailed with only minor interruptions after this for nearly a century and a half.

The Roman Emperor Justinian and the Sasanian King Chosroes I's conclusion of a Treaty of Eternal Peace in 532, following fresh confrontations, suggested the possibility of long-term stability. But Justinian's preoccupation with restoring imperial control over territories in the far west offered too great an opportunity for Chosroes to resist. He moved into the middle territory in 540, taking Antioch and advancing right up to the Mediterranean. Predictably, the Romans responded, and Justinian transferred his best general, Belisarius, from the western theater to campaign in Syria. Belisarius restored Roman control over Syria (Procop. Pers. 2.14.8–21.4), but this only initiated back-and-forth campaigns for the rest of the century, which set the stage for the culmination of the East–West struggle in a twenty-five-year war in the early seventh century.

This phase of the struggle, pitting Romans under the emperors Phocas and Heraclius against Persians under Chosroes II, recapitulated much of the whole pre-
ceding conflict. Like those of a sixth-century BCE Persian king (writing “Chosroes” in its more familiar form as “Cyrus” helps us see continuities across a millennium), Chosroes’ forces campaigned far to the west, into Anatolia and ultimately all the way to the Bosporus. Chosroes also turned to the middle territory, taking Antioch and then Jerusalem (614), where, adopting pro-Jewish policies like his sixth-century BCE predecessor Cyrus, he permitted the massacre of Christians and the pillage of Christian sites in the city, before moving on to Egypt. Here in 619 he took Alexandria and established Persian control of Egypt for the first time since the fourth century BCE. However, the conquests were short-lived as the Emperor Heraclius mounted in response the first of the Christian crusades against the East. Advancing eastward from Constantinople in 624, Heraclius’ Roman forces fought their way (even as a Persian army threatened Constantinople itself through 626) to northern Mesopotamia. Here in late 627 Heraclius won a decisive victory at Nineveh and moved on to Ctesiphon, the Persians’ Mesopotamian capital. Ensuing negotiations produced an agreement to end hostilities and reestablish boundaries which placed the Roman-Persian frontier again at the Euphrates. Antioch, Jerusalem, and Egypt—the middle territory and the western core—were again Roman, and recovery was marked by the restoration of the True Cross to Jerusalem by Heraclius.

The Roman-Persian agreement might have been expected to determine relations for a time before inevitably giving way to new conflict—the 2,000-year-old pattern. But this time, despite its apparent resolution, the struggle ended up being fatal to both sides. Economic exhaustion (Heraclius had been compelled to turn all church treasures in Constantinople and many of the city’s monuments into bullion to pay for the war) and, especially for the Persians, political disarray following the Roman victories rendered both West and East incapable of resisting the onrush of Arab campaigns which began soon after the death of Muhammad in 632. During the 630s, the middle territory, recently regained by the Romans, fell to Arab attackers. In the 640s, Egypt followed, and in the 650s the Sasanian Persian Empire became an Arab empire.

Western and eastern cores and, indeed, much of the entire West and East were now joined together under Arab rule. In the end, neither West nor East prevailed in the millennia-long conflict waged by the eastern and western cores. Arab conquerors, themselves neither eastern nor western in origin, had moved north from Arabia and had first taken the middle territory and then moved west and east from there. Thus, it could be said, it was the middle territory that emerged as the ultimate victor. In a sense, the establishment of Damascus (the old seat of the Achaemenid Persian satrapy “Beyond the River”) as the residence of the Umayyad caliphs, the successors of Muhammad, and the capital of the vast Arab empire in 661—in the immediate aftermath of the great Arab conquests—announced the establishment of a new political geography marked by the hegemony of the middle territory and the amalgamation rather than the opposition of western and eastern cores. Thus ended the world of East–West conflict that ancient peoples had known in one form or another for more than 2,000 years.
But was it really over? Since, despite Arab successes, Constantinople and the eastern Roman Empire survived in attenuated form, some could view Arab conquests as just the latest episode in the continuous East–West conflict and Arab expansion, involving control of both western and eastern cores, as only a temporary achievement. This was the view of the influential apocalypticist known as Pseudo-Methodius, who wrote about the middle of the seventh century (in Syriac, that is, the latter-day version of the Aramaic koine of the middle territory in the Persian-Egyptian period). For him, the whole of history had been an East–West struggle in one form or another, and he was able to prove that it would certainly continue. By combining the New Testament prediction that the end of history will come when Christ delivers up the kingdom to God the Father after deposing every sovereignty, authority, and power (1Cor. 15:24) with the Old Testament statement in Psalm 68:31 that “Nubia will reach out her hands to God,” he concluded that the last of the kingdoms was Nubia. But he managed to have “Nubia” really mean Rome and thus to prove that only ultimate Roman victory would mean the end of the East–West struggle. According to Pseudo-Methodius’ wonderfully inventive political genealogy, Cusheth, daughter of King Pil of Cush (i.e., Nubia) had been the wife of Philip of Macedon and the mother of Alexander. After Alexander’s death, Cusheth returned to her father’s realm but subsequently married Byzas, supposedly the eponymous founder of Byzantium. This marriage produced a daughter, Byzantia, who ultimately married Armalaos, the king of Rome, who gave Byzantia Rome as a wedding gift. Thus, in the West, the great post-Egyptian empires—that of Alexander and that of Rome (in its full Mediterranean and now in its eastern Mediterranean form)—all sprang from Nubia or, to put it another way, were Nubian by descent. The scriptural assurance that “Nubia” will be the last of the kingdoms, when God has deposed “every sovereignty, authority, and power,” thus means that no matter what victories “the Ishmaelites” [Arabs] have achieved, ultimately “a king of the Greeks [that is, an eastern Roman emperor] will go forth against them in great wrath.... And the sons [allies?] of the king of Greece will seize the places of the desert and will destroy with the sword the remnant that is left of them in the land of promise.” By itself, such a certain belief in the necessary continuation of East–West struggle and the expectation of inevitable ultimate victory meant that it would indeed go on.

For about a century, Umayyad Arab rulers, having established Damascus as the imperial capital for the Caliphate—in other words, having established their political center in the middle territory—succeeded in holding together both western and eastern core regions. But after the Abbasids replaced the Umayyads as caliphs in the mid-eighth century, they moved the capital to the newly founded city of Baghdad in the eastern core heartland, close to the sites of Ctesiphon and other earlier eastern-core capitals. With that shift eastward, they became, like the Achaemenid Persians, an imperial power attempting to manage from an eastern core base an empire extending far to the west. It was not long before this proved impossible. Within a half-century or so after shifting the imperial center eastward to Baghdad, the
Abbasids lost real authority over most of the west beyond Egypt. After another half-century, they began to struggle for continued control of Egypt before finally surrendering it, and then the whole middle territory, to the Fatimid dynasty, which had originated in Tunisia. Earlier history repeated itself as peoples from the east of the Mesopotamian core—first the Iranian Buyids, then Turks from Central Asia—took control of Baghdad and pushed into the middle territory to Jerusalem and beyond into Anatolia.  

Finally, as Pseudo-Methodius had predicted, a king of the Greeks went forth in great wrath. This was Alexius Comnenus (r. 1081–1118), emperor of the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire. But he did not go forth in person. He turned in 1095 to his far west, to Urban II, the pope at Rome, and through him to kings and warriors in far western Europe. In fulfillment of Pseudo-Methodius’ prophecy, these joined “the king of the Greeks” Alexius Comnenus and launched a great crusade—the First Crusade—which succeeded in taking control of Jerusalem and Antioch and virtually the whole middle territory at the end of the eleventh century. However, despite Pseudo-Methodius’ prediction, this did not produce a final “Roman” victory. It marked instead the beginning of the modern, still enduring phase of the East–West conflict.
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APPENDIX A

Kings of Egypt and Persia

KINGS OF EGYPT (ALL DATES BCE)

26th Dynasty (Saite)
- Psammetichus I: 664–610
- Necho II: 610–595
- Psammetichus II: 595–589
- Apries: 589–570
- Amasis: 570–526
- Psammetichus III: 526–525

27th Dynasty (Persian)
- Cambyses: 525–522
- Darius I: 521–486
- Xerxes I: 486–464
- Artaxerxes I: 464–424
- Darius II: 423–404

28th Dynasty (Saite)
- Amyrtaeus: 404–399

29th Dynasty (Mendesian)
- Nepherites I: 399–393
- Acoris: 393–389
- Psammuthis: 389–388
- Acoris (restored): 388–380
- Nepherites II: 380
### 30th Dynasty (Sebennytus)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nectanebo I</td>
<td>380–362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachos</td>
<td>362–360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nectanebo II</td>
<td>360–342</td>
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### 31st Dynasty (Persian)

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<td>342–338</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artaxerxes IV (Arses)</td>
<td>338–336</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darius III</td>
<td>335–332</td>
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### [32nd Dynasty]

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<tr>
<td>Chababash</td>
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### KINGS OF PERSIA, 559–330 BCE

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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambyses II</td>
<td>530–522</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darius I</td>
<td>521–486</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xerxes</td>
<td>486–465</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artaxerxes I</td>
<td>465–425</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xerxes II</td>
<td>425–424</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sogdianus</td>
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<td>Darius II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artaxerxes II</td>
<td>405–359</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artaxerxes III</td>
<td>359–338</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artaxerxes IV (Arses)</td>
<td>338–336</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darius III</td>
<td>336–331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Timeline/Chronological Chart
(all dates are BCE)

525        Persian conquest of Egypt
C. 522     Cambyses’ death
            Egyptian revolt
C. 518     Darius to Egypt
513        Darius’ Scythian campaign
499–494    Ionian revolt
492        Mardonius’ aborted invasion of Greece
490        Battle of Marathon
487/486    Egyptian revolt
486        Darius’ death
485        Xerxes suppresses Egyptian revolt
480–479    Persian invasion of Greece
477        Formation of Delian League
466(?)     Delian League destruction of Persian fleet at Eurymedon River
464        Xerxes dies; Artaxerxes I succeeds
462–454    Egyptian (Inarus’) Revolt
459–454    Athenian forces supporting Inarus in Egypt
451        Renewed unrest in Egypt
449        Peace of Callias (?)
431–404    Peloponnesian War
425        Artaxerxes I dies; Darius II succeeds
412        Persian satraps subsidize Spartan maritime enterprise against Athens
410        Renewed unrest in Egypt
406        Athenian naval victory at Battle of Arginusae
405        Egyptian revolt
405/4      Darius II dies; Artaxerxes II succeeds
403–401    Persian preparations for Egyptian campaign
401        Cyrus moves east to challenge Artaxerxes II
            Artaxerxes II’s Egyptian campaign aborted
401–399 All Egypt detached from Persian control; Amyrtaeus first king of independent Egypt
398 Persians initiate security arrangements for Egyptian campaign preparations
400–394 Spartans campaign in Anatolia to secure freedom of Anatolian Greeks
395 Persians support Corinthian War
395–394 Pharnabazus and Conon initiate aggressive strategy
394 Move west, establish guard force at Cythera, rearm Athens
392 Artaxerxes II rebuffs Spartan peace initiative
392–390 Persian preparations for Egyptian campaign
390–388 First Persian attack on Egypt
387/6 King’s Peace
385–3 Egyptian diplomatic and military counterthrust; support for Evagoras I of Salamis
382–380 Persian campaign to recover eastern Mediterranean (“Cypriot War”)
380–378 Glos’ revolt
379–374 Preparations for renewed attack on Egypt
373 Second Persian attack on Egypt
372 Preparations for renewed attack
370 Datames’ “revolt”
366 Ariobarzanes’ revolt
365 Orontes’ revolt
363 Tachos’ kingship; Egyptian-Greek-Anatolian satraps alliances
362/1 “Great Satraps’” revolt
361/0 Tachos’ great offensive
359 Ochus’ brief invasion of Egypt
359 Artaxerxes II dies; Ochus becomes king as Artaxerxes III
358 Artabazus’ revolt
351 Artaxerxes III leads third Persian invasion of Egypt
350–345 Phoenician, Cypriot revolts
345–344 Artaxerxes suppresses revolts
343 Artaxerxes leads fourth Persian invasion of Egypt, succeeds
338 Artaxerxes dies; Arses succeeds as Artaxerxes IV
337 Revolt in Egypt; kingship of Chababash
336 Darius III becomes king
335 Darius regains control of Egypt
334 Alexander III begins campaign
332 Alexander reaches Egypt; ends Persian rule

*AchHist 1*  

*AchHist 2*  

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*AchHist 6*  

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*AchHist 11*  

*AchHist 13*  

*AEL*  

*AJP*  
*American Journal of Philology*
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BASOR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
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<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
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<td>GRBS</td>
<td>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</td>
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<td>Hell. Oxy.</td>
<td><em>Hellenica Oxyrhynchia</em></td>
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<td>IEJ</td>
<td>Israel Exploration Journal</td>
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<td>JEA</td>
<td><em>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Hellenic Studies</em></td>
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<td>JNES</td>
<td><em>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</em></td>
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<td>JOAS</td>
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<td>OGIS</td>
<td>W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (Leipzig, 1903–1905).</td>
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INTRODUCTION: STORIES AND SOURCES

3. Amélie Kuhrt has well observed that “Much of Greek history in the fifth and fourth centuries remains incomprehensible if Greek interaction with Persia is not taken into account” (“Introduction,” in AchHist 11, 1). Going a step further, the present work contends that much of Persian interaction with Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries is incomprehensible if Persian dealings with Egypt are not taken into account.
7. Ephorus probably also lies behind the composite “biography” of Chaereas, the fictional hero of Chariton of Aphrodisias’ late-first-century CE novel Chaereas and Callirhoe. Chariton sets many of Chaereas’ adventures in the context of the fourth-century Persian-Egyptian War. Combining traits and activities of Conon, Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Agesilaus—all important participants in the Persian-Egyptian war—Chariton’s Chaereas serves the Persian king, then switches to Egyptian service, functioning as fleet commander and as mercenary commander. On Chariton’s treatment of Chaereas in connection with the Egyptian revolt, see Steven D. Smith, Greek Identity and the Athenian Past in Chariton: The Romance of Empire (Groningen, 2007), 87–98.
8. Gordon S. Shrimpton, Theopompos the Historian (Montreal and Kingston, 1991), 72–78; I. A. F. Bruce, “Theopompos and Classical Greek Historiography,” History and Theory 9 (1970): 86–109 at 96–97; Moshe Dothan, “Akko: Interim Excavation Report First Season, 1973/4,” BASOR 224 (1976): 1–48 at 2, believes the planned voyage to Acco by two Athenian merchants that Demosthenes (52.20) mentions indicates the presence of “an Athenian trading colony in the city in the 4th century B.C.” Since Persian preparations for fourth-century campaigns against Egypt regularly took place at Acco, there would be much information for such merchants to transmit, but Xenophon’s report (Hell. 3.4.1) of
the Syracusean merchant Herodas communicating sightings of Phoenician warships in 397 indicates well the presence in the Levant of Greeks from all over the Greek world. There were thus many different possible informants.

15. Pace Starr, “Greeks and Persians,” 61, who asserts that “any effort to write a meaningful political history of the Persian empire, solely in its western provinces and only as seen by the Greeks, must end when Herodotus lays down his pen,” it is possible once we begin to see things from the perspective of Persia’s ongoing Egyptian concerns to trace a more or less continuous political history of the Persian Empire in its western provinces. Starr does an excellent job of refuting the conventional notion of the Persian Empire being in a state of decline or decadence in the fourth century, but, still emphasizing Greek affairs, he finds no real coherence in Persian policies or activities in the west, observing that “Persian activities in the west from 410 to 340 must appear a tangled web of dim, faceless personalities and ill-connected events” (69). Starr offers as a general explanation of Persian policy in the west in the fourth century the conclusion that “Persian kings of the fourth century were content to be naval masters of the Aegean and to be arbiters of Greek affairs” (75), and never connects this to any fundamental Persian strategic concerns in the west.

CHAPTER 1. PERSIA AND EGYPT: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

[228] Notes to Pages xxiv–4


6. These are possible interpretations of the Egyptian names for the two groups of warriors, which Herodotus (2.164) reproduces as Kalasiries and Hermotybies. See Wilhelm Spiegelberg, “Ägyptologische Randglossen zu Herodot,” Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 43 (1906): 84–97 at 87–90; Lloyd, Herodotus, 3.186–196.


8. Fifteen Delta chieftains are named in the Nubian king Piye’s Victory Stela as important figures; see Anthony Spalinger, “The Military Background of the Campaign of Piye (Piankhy),” Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur 7 (1979): 278–301 at 279. Modern scholarship has moved away from the traditional view which regards this period as that of “the Libyan anarchy.” Instead, fragmentation is viewed as “a functional alternative to the traditional centralized monarchical model”; see Andrea M. Gnirs, “Ancient Egypt,” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, 71–104 (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 92; Jan Assmann, The Mind of Egypt: History and Meaning in the Time of the Pharaohs (New York, 2002), 287–293, 321: “Egypt changed from a territorial state to an agglomeration of small states.”


17. Yurco, “Sennacherib’s Third Campaign,” 233–239. Yurco shows that while Herodotus’ story of an Assyrian army advancing as far as Pelusium under Sennacherib only to withdraw after mice consumed all the troops’ quivers and bowstrings (2.141) is not itself
historical, its explanation of sudden Assyrian abandonment of an Egyptian campaign may link it to Sennacherib's rather abrupt termination of hostilities with Egypt in 701.


27. Wiseman, *Nebuchadrezzar and Babylon*, 30, sees Nebuchadrezzar’s attack as an effort to "to take Egyptian pressure off Babylonian garrisons in Syria-Palestine during a period of consolidation of control.”


37. See below, chapter 2.


42. On such concerns on Amasis’ part, see Herman T. Wallinga, “Polycrates and Egypt: The Testimony of the Samainai,” AchHist 11, 179–183.

43. Vittmann, Ägypten und die Fremden,” 120–122, sorts through these stories and, while not identifying the particular circumstances under which a Persia-Egypt marriage link might have been established, finds such a marriage entirely credible.


3. Herodotus’ five branches reflect the natural (ancient) situation. Below Memphis at Cercasorus (Hdt. 2.97), the Nile split into three branches (from west to east, the Canopic, Sebennytic, and Pelusiac), and further downriver the Saitic and Mendesian branches split off from the Sebennytic. That makes five. But further downriver, two other, apparently artificial, branches, the Bolbitine and Bucolic, split off from the Sebennytic branch, to make a total of seven. See John Bell, *Egypt in the Classical Geographers* (Cairo, 1942), 14; Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt*, 250–251.


6. Evidence for perception of the Delta as comprising many islands comes from the Victory Stela of Piye, the eighth-century Nubian conqueror of Egypt, which refers to Piye’s opponents in the Delta as “the rulers of domains in the west, in the east, and in the isles of the midst”: *AEL* 3.70, 77, 80.

7. Bell, *Contributions to the Geography of Egypt*, 163; Kees, *Ancient Egypt*, 183; Hans Bietak, “Historical Geography in the Eastern Nile Delta,” *Bulletin de l’Institut d’Egypte* 60/61 (1978/80): 71–94 at 80, suggests that there may have been a land road across the Delta along a Tanis-Mendes-Sebennytus-Sais line linking all seven Nile branches, later to be replaced by the first-century CE “Batic River,” but only a later Roman source, the *Itinerarium Antonini*, mentions this; see Kees, *Ancient Egypt*, 183–184; Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt*, 253, believes that key Delta sites were linked only by canals.

8. See provisions for Greek merchant ships to reach Naucratis if they entered Egypt by other than the Canopic mouth: Hdt. 2.179.


11. Lloyd in Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella, *Commentary on Herodotus*, 223, opines that Amasis withdrew the Greek mercenaries from the eastern frontier in order “to replace them with contingents from the Machimoii, who were evidently offended at the slight to their honour of stationing Greek troops at the most dangerous frontier of the country.” Leahy, “The Earliest Dated Monument of Amasis,” 193 n. 39, calls Herodotus’ assertion that Amasis moved troops to protect himself from his own people “patently unsatisfactory” and
suggests that Amasis likely transferred them to Memphis to prevent them from supporting Apries, their former master and a member of the family which had patronized Greek and Carian mercenaries for nearly a century. But if this were true, Amasis would surely have moved them back to the frontier after Apries’ death, when Babylonian invasion was still expected. On the likelihood that the fortress known as Migdol housed a settlement of Greek mercenaries under the Saites, see Oren, “Migdol: A New Fortress on the Edge of the Eastern Nile Delta,” 7–44; Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier, ‘Archaic Greeks in the Orient: Textual and Archaeological Evidence,” BASOR 322 (2001) 11–32 at 21–22; cf. J-Y. Carrez-Maratray, “Le ‘monopole de Naucratis’ et la ‘bataille de Péluse’: Ruptures ou continuités de la présence grecque en Égypte des Saïtes aux Perses,” Transseuphratène 19 (2000): 157–170 at 163, proposing a site between Daphne and Bubastis as the location for the Greek stratopedae.

12. Evidence of construction of fortifications at Tanis and Memphis in year 42 of Amasis (Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 24–26) attests defensive preparations in Egypt itself in the early 520s. Diplomatic agreement in the 540s, cemented by a marriage alliance (as perhaps attested by Hdt. 3.1–3), may have been the best response to the impending Persian threat that Amasis could muster.

13. H. Wallinga suggests that Amasis’ conquest of Cyprus represented an attempt to counter Persian seizure of the Levant (“The Ancient Persian Navy and its Predecessors,” AchHist 1, 47–78; cf. Kuhrt, Ancient Near East, 2.662). Chronology seems not to support this, but in any case Amasis’ reliance on a strictly naval strategy may be a further indication of his problems with dynasts, which left him unable to access great numbers of machimoi who otherwise would have comprised an Egyptian land force.

Henry Jay Watkin, “The Cypriote Surrender to Persia,” JHS 107 (1987): 154–163, dates submission as late as 526 and thinks the Persian-Arab agreement was a precipitating factor (159–160). However, the Cyrus Cylinder’s reference to “kings from the Upper Sea [Mediterranean] . . . dwelling in royal palaces” who “voluntarily offered their submission and tribute to Cyrus in Babylon” might serve to push submission back to before 529; see Gene E. Markoe, Phoenicians (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000), 49. The Cyropaideia’s reference to the Cilician “king” submitting may attest additional spontaneous “alliances” in Cyrus’ time (Xen. Cyrop. 8.6.8); thus Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 33. Dandamaev, Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 59–61, concludes that by 535 all the lands west of the Euphrates to the sea recognized the authority of the Persian king.


15. The location was the vicinity of the site known as Tell Kedua: Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 26–30. We may discount Polyaeus’ preposterous account (7.9) of a siege of Pelusium by Cambyses which succeeded when Cambyses’ placement of dogs, sheep, cats, and ibises, all animals held sacred by Egyptians, in the front of his force compelled Pelusium’s defenders to cease using their arrow-, stone-, and fire-throwing catapults. Aside from the impossibility of Cambyses’ use of such a stratagem, Pelusium was evidently not a Saite fortification (see below, n. 48) and would not have invited Persian attack in 525 (contra, Briant, HPE, 54, who finds evidence of actual Persian difficulties in Polyaean. 7.9). The story may derive from a confused conflation of separate events during Artaxerxes III’s 343 attack on Egypt, when defenders abruptly abandoned the defense of Pelusium and defenders at Bubastis submitted when the city, sacred to the cat-goddess Bastet and home to countless mummified cat tombs, was threatened with destruction by Persian attackers; see below, chapter 18. Ctesias, FGH 688 F13.9–10 has 50,000 Egyptians and 7,000 Persians perish in the battle, but his very confused account may actually be based on later battles, and he may have simply invented numbers; see Drews, Greek Accounts of Eastern History, 113–114.
16. Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 30–34. We might wonder if Herodotus has simplified the conquest story in the interest of depicting the ease with which the Persians expanded their power before confronting Greeks. Cyrus’ great victories—over the Medes, Lydians, and Babylonians—had involved just a single, successful military encounter. Since, however, Herodotus goes on to recount Persian failures in Egypt in campaigns to the south and west, it was not the case that the Greeks were the only opponents to halt Persian expansion. Quite likely, Persian takeover of Egypt involved just the single battle fought against Psammetichus III in the Delta.

17. On Cambyses and the Apis bull, see Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella, Commentary on Herodotus, 427–429; Briant, HPE, 55–57. Jack Martin Balcer, The Persian Conquest of the Greeks 545–450 B.C. (Constance, 1995), 107–109, thinks the tradition originated in the usurper Darius I’s attempt to blacken Cambyses’ reputation. Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 43–45, suggests that Herodotus, determined to depict Cambyses as mad, borrowed the story of a king murdering the Apis bull from an Egyptian legend connected with king “Bocchoris” (see Aelian, On Animals, 11.11) and attached it to Cambyses. Leo Depuydt, “Murder in Memphis: The Story of Cambyses’s Mortal Wounding of the Apis Bull (ca. 523 B.C.E.),” JNES 54 (1995): 119–126, builds a case for continuing to suspect Cambyses’ guilt; cf. also Vittmann, Ägypten und die Fremden, 125–126. Note that despite all evidence to the contrary, by Diodorus’ time Cambyses was viewed as responsible for burning temples in Egypt (Diod. 1.46.4).


19. Cambyses became “king of Babylon” in 539 and even after succeeding Cyrus may have retained that title, giving him a sort of double kingship that may have provided him with a precedent for holding the kingship of Egypt; see H. Petschow, “Das Unterkönigtum Cambyses, König von Babylon,” Revue d’Assyriologie et d’archéologie orientale 82 (1988): 781–782; Balcer, Persian Conquest of the Greeks, 71–72 with n. 129; Lisbeth S. Fried, The Priest and the Great King: Temple-Palace Relations in the Persian Empire (Winona Lake, 2004), 30–31; see Amélie Kuhrt, “Babylonia from Cyrus to Xerxes,” CAH 4, 125–126, for the uncertainties connected with Cambyses’ kingship of Babylon.


22. Hdt. 2.99.4, 153; Strabo 17.1.31–32; Diod. 1.97.6; Thompson, Memphis under the Ptolemies, 9–31.


29. For this interpretation, see D. Agut-Labordère, “Le sens de decret de Cambyses,” *Transeuphratène* 29 (2005): 9–16. Knowledge of the decree comes from an apparent quotation of it in the third-century Demotic Chronicle (W. Spiegelberg, *Die sogenannte demotisch Chronik des Pap. 215 der Bibliothéque Nationale de Paris* [Leipzig, 1914], 32–33). It has been conventional to view the insistence on local provisioning in place of royal subventions as at the least an economy measure (see, e.g., Ray, “Egypt 525–404 B.C.,” 260) and further as an indication of Cambyses’ efforts to suppress traditional temple activities in Egypt (see e.g., Fried, *The Priest and the Great King*, 73–74).


32. Aramaic letters from late in the fifth century indicate that at least at that time the Persian satrap and other high-ranking Persians held estates in Egypt (G. Driver, *Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C.* [Oxford, 1957]). We may guess that such estates went back to the beginning of Persian administration in Egypt and served as a means to enrich and reward Persian officials stationed for long periods in Egypt.

33. Hdt. 3.17–26; Bresciani, “The Persian Occupation of Egypt,” 502, suggests Cambyses’ goals included appearing like an Egyptian king. On varying scholarly characterizations of these campaigns, see Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 34–35.
Cruz-Uribe (35–37) argues that the great oasis of Kharga was the primary objective as part of an effort “to expand and control the trade routes going through the western desert of Egypt” (37); cf. Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella, *Commentary on Herodotus*, 425–426.

34. On the campaign, see B. M. Mitchell, “Cyrene and Persia,” *JHS* 86 (1966): 99–113 at 107; idem, “Notes on the Chronology of the reign of Arkesilas III,” *JHS* 94 (1974): 174–177 at 176, indicating that the 525 submission was not comprehensive or lasting. The commanders of Aryandes’ land and naval forces were Persian, but Aryandes’ deployment of “all the forces which were in Egypt” must mean that native *machimoi* were included.


37. Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 37–40, doubts the historicity of Cambyses’ act, suggesting that at best it was a story developing out of the accidental damage to statues of Amasis by Persian soldiers building shelters in the temple.


41. On the possibility of instigation by Pedubastis (of Bubastite descent?), which would point to dynastic aggrandizement, see J. Yoyotte, “Petoumbastis III,” *Revue d’égyptologie* 24 (1972): 216–223. The question is whether to separate the putative revolt of Pedubastis from the revolt of Polyaen. 7.11.7 (thus Briant, *HPE*, 410) or correlate it (thus Ray, “Egypt 525–404 B.C.,” 262, 266). If we correlate it, then Pedubastis’ apparent hold on Memphis for some time (Yoyotte, “Petoumbastis III,” 123) must be noted. Conceivably, this was another instance of the White Wall, the fortified garrison section of Memphis, in the hands of one force, with the rest of city in the hands of another, as at the time of Athens’ participation in Inarus’ revolt in the 450s: Thuc. 1.104.2).

that Darius entered Egypt between the end of August and early November 518) that Darius took the southern route past the Wadi Tumilat to avoid the Delta during the Nile flood, but then concludes with Parker (above, n. 26) that it is more likely Darius entered Egypt in early 518. At that time, the Nile was not in flood, and thus Darius’ decision to use a route through the Arabian desert to reach Memphis may be plausibly connected with the loss of the Delta to rebellion. Marc Rott Peter, “Initiatoren und Träger der ‘Aufstände’ im persischen Ägypten,” in Ägypten unter fremden Herrschen zwischen persischer Satrapie und römischer Provinz, ed. Stefan Pfeiffer, 9–33 (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), provides concise discussions of this and subsequent revolts; see also Briant, “Ethno-classe dominante et populations soumises,” 138–151.


44. Ray, “Egypt 525–404 B.C.,” 264, characterizes construction at the temple of Amun-Re at Hibis at the el-Kharga oasis as a “cherished project” of Darius. Alan B. Lloyd, “Darius in Egypt: Suez and Hibis,” in Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Information with (in) the Achaemenid Empire, ed. Christopher Tuplin, 99–116 (Swansea, 2007), 111–112, however, questions Darius’ direct responsibility for building here, explaining the texts that appear to document his involvement as instances of traditional temple epigraphy identifying kings as responsible even when projects were initiated and executed locally. On Darius’ religious policies in Egypt, see Vittmann, Ägypten und die Fremden, 132–140.


48. Persian responsibility for the foundation or development of Pelusium is nowhere explicitly recorded, but the fact that the earliest remains date only from the Persian period indicates that the site was not employed or inhabited prior to the Persian conquest; see J. Y. Carrez-Maratray and C. Defernez, “Premières données sur l’occupation ancienne du site de Péluze (la stratigraphie de Farama Ouest),” Cahiers de recherché d’Institut de Papyrologie at d’égyptologie de Lille 18 (1996): 33–49; Oren, “Le Nord-Sinaï à l’époque perse,” 78. Cruz-Uribe, “The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses,” 27. On Tell Ruqeish, probably


52. Briant, HPE, 480.


54. See Dandamaev, Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 144–145; Root, King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art, 61–68.


CHAPTER 3. MANAGING EGYPT, 518–415

1. See Hdt. 1.104–106; E. D. Phillips, “The Scythian Domination in Western Asia: Its Record in History, Scripture, and Archaeology,” World Archaeology 4 (1972): 129–138; Balcer, The Persian Conquest of the Greeks, 147, emphasizing also Darius’ need “to exceed Cyrus and Cambyses’ military plans and expand the Achaemenid Empire” (essentially repeating Diod. 10.19.2). Further on Persian campaigns in the far west as part of a grand imperial enterprise and on the strategic and logistical problems which impaired them, see Jack Martin Balcer, “The Persian Wars against Greece: A Reassessment,” Historia 38 (1989): 127–143. At some point, according to Herodotus (4.166), Darius put to death his first satrap of Egypt, Aryandes, allegedly for an attempt to rival Darius by issuing silver coinage of a purity similar to that of Darius’ gold coinage. The whole affair has defied explanation, but does not seem to indicate any Persian problem with Egypt itself. It may be connected instead with the succession struggle following Cambyses’ death. See Briant, HPE, 409–410; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella, Commentary on Herodotus, 692–693 (with bibliography).


Notes to Pages 24–26 [239]
3. On various possible motivating factors behind the Ionian Revolt, see Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "Darius and the Persian Empire," CANE, 1046–1047; Pericles Georges, "Persian Ionia under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered," Historia 49 (2000): 1–39 at 21–23. While economic grievances have often been cited, with Persian enterprise directed toward the far west after ca. 515, Persian officials undoubtedly made almost continuous use of the manpower and ships of Ionian Greeks, conveniently (for the Persians) located right at the western frontier of the empire.

4. E. Cruz-Uribe, "On the Existence of Psammetichus IV," Sarapis 5 (1980): 35–39, argues for Psammetichus (IV) (father of Inarus, the rebel of the 450s) asserting an insurrectional kingship in 486–484 over Lower and Upper Egypt. Herodotus uses katastrepasamenos to indicate Xerxes' action, and this—"make subject to oneself"—may point to the lapse in Persian authority.

5. Egyptian tradition makes the Persians great violators of Egyptian temples and regularly demonizes Persian kings as enemies of Egyptian gods and priesthoods. This was manifestly not true of Cambyses or Darius, both of whom presented themselves in the guise of traditional Egyptian monarchs as benefactors of temples. Suspicion thus falls on Xerxes and his punitive measures as responsible for this anti-Persian attitude connected with temple policies. We may thus see at least part of his punitive measures having to do with exploitation of temple revenues—reduction of privileges and immunities, etc.—probably connected with preparations for the Aegean Greek campaign. Cf. Briant, HPE, 545–547, however, who cautions against drawing too stark a contrast between Xerxes' and his predecessors' policies toward Egyptian temples and more generally toward Egypt primarily on the basis of the absence of documents attesting Xerxes' benefactions. A quadrilingual inscription published by G. Posener, La première domination perse en Égypte (Publication de l’Institut française d’Archéologie Orientale, Bibliothèque d’Etude, Vol. 11) (Cairo, 1936), no. 36 (pp. 131–136) contains, according to Posener's reading (p. 135), the phrase "chief superintendent of the great barracks of Xerxes," presumably meaning the garrison at Memphis, which may have become "the great barracks of Xerxes" after expansion by Xerxes.

6. It may have been about this time that the two parts of the great satrapy of Babylon and Ebir-nāri ("Beyond the River")—once the territory of the Babylonian Empire—became two separate satrapies, with a governor of "Beyond the River" residing at Damascus (Eph' al, "Syria-Palestine under Achaemenid rule," 153–156; but cf. Kuhrt, "Babylonia from Cyrus to Xerxes," 130–131, and Briant, HPE, 543–544, for the difficulties in determining just when such a division occurred). While this may have been in the first instance a response to Persia's Babylonian problems, particularly a great revolt in 482 (e.g., Olmstead, Persian Empire, 236–237), we may wonder if it was also linked to the situation in Egypt. An official in the middle territory with sufficiently high authority to undertake military operations on his own might support Achaemenes in Egypt if any of the recently rebellious Delta dynasts challenged Persian authority while Xerxes led the long-delayed prepared massive campaign against Greeks in the far west. Note the role played by Megabyzus, likely satrap of "Syria" (= "Beyond the River") in suppressing Egyptian revolt in the 450s (Briant, HPE, 577–578).

7. Athenian Tribute Lists indicate roughly 170 member states by the late 450s; see Malcolm F. McGregor, The Athenians and Their Empire (Vancouver, 1987), 194–198.

8. Cruz-UrIBE, "On the Existence of Psammetichus IV," 35–39. Redford, "Notes on the History of Ancient Buto," 90 n. 171, says "Thucydides' localization of Inarus' place of origin, viz. 'Marea, the town above Pharos,' is the vagueness of a foreigner. Inarus must have come from the vicinity of Buto". Most likely "King of the Libyans" = Great Chief of the Libu: Kenneth G. Hoglund, Achaemenid Imperial Administration in Syria-Palestine and
the Missions of Ezra and Nehemiah (Atlanta, 1992), 140. M. Chauveau, “Inaros, prince des rebelles,” in Res severa verum gaudium: Festschrift für Karl-Theodor Zauzich zum 65. Geburtstag am 8. Juni 2004. Studia Demotica, ed. F. Hoffmann and F. Thissen, 39–46 (Oakville, CT, 2005), publishes a contract from the oasis of Douch in Upper Egypt with a dating formula citing “Inaros, prince of rebels,” which suggests 1) that Inaros’ rebellion may have extended to places well to the south of Memphis and 2) that Inaros may not have used a royal title, perhaps waiting to gain Memphis before he did so. On the possibility that Inaros was the son of Psammetichus IV, see Werner Huss, Ägypten im hellenistischen Zeit, 332–30 v. Chr. (Munich, 2001), 36.

9. Hoglund, Achaemenid Imperial Administration, 115–116, 202–247, dates the beginning of Athens’ involvement in the eastern Mediterranean to 460 and interprets new fortifications and supposedly tighter administrative controls (as, e.g., in Jerusalem)—in the Levant in connection with this. Oded Lipschits, “Achaemenid Imperial Policy, Settlement Processes in Palestine, and the Status of Jerusalem in the Middle of the Fifth Century B.C.E.,” Judah and the Judeans, 35–38, however, is skeptical about measures affecting Jerusalem having anything to do with Persia’s strategic concerns in the west.

10. The reports of the number of Athenian ships differ, with Thucydides giving 200 (similarly, Isoc. 8.86), Diodorus (11.71.5; cf. 13.25.2) 300 (but Diodorus has 200 at 11.74.3), and Ctesias (FGH 688 F14.36) only 40. Given the strategic significance of the enterprise, a larger number of ships is likely, and Diodorus’ use of the stereotypical figure of 300 is probably intended to indicate involvement of a very large fleet, perhaps on the order of the 200 ships Thucydides reports and Diodorus himself has in 11.74.3. On Athenian interest in Cyprus through 460, see Eustathios Raptou, Athènes et Chypre à l’époque perse (VIe–IVe s. av. J.-C.) (Lyon, 1999), 245–246.


12. Samian inscription reporting involvement: Meiggs and Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions, no. 34; Bresciani, “Persian Occupation of Egypt,” 510. Persian authority intact in Upper Egypt: A. E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford, 1923), nos. 8–10; Bezalel Porten, Archives from Elephantine (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968) 27; Hoglund, Achaemenid Imperial Administration, 148–149; but cf. Chauveau, “Inaros, prince des rebelles,” 44–46, for evidence of at least pockets of support for Inaros in Upper Egypt. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri, 32, references a transaction at Elephantine calculated according the “weight of Ptah” as opposed to “royal (Persian) weight” (Aramaic Papyri, no. 11), which he uses to date the document (whose dating formula is missing) to the time of Inaros’ revolt, despite the absence of any evidence for interruption of Persian control of Elephantine and the use of Artaxerxes’ regnal years in documents (nos. 8–10) from 460 and 454.

13. On chronology, see Lloyd, Herodotus, 1.40–41. Thuc. 1.109.1 says that in the interval between the beginning of Memphis siege and end, war took many forms. Lloyd, Herodotus, 1.46, suggests this refers to “raids and counter-raids.” Hoglund, Achaemenid Imperial Administration, 149–150, with A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1945), 320, suggests Thucydides’ reference includes Athenian activities aimed at securing more of Egypt, most likely the eastern Delta, but possibly also activities upriver from Memphis or even outside Egypt. Contra, e.g., Jan M. Libourel, “The Athenian Disaster in Egypt” AJP 92 (1971): 605–615, Eric Robinson, “Thucydidean Sieges, Prosopitis, and the Hellenic Disaster in Egypt,” Classical Antiquity 18 (1999): 132–152, argues persuasively that something like forty ships rather than the original 200 Athenian ships remained in Egypt through the whole Memphis siege and Prosopitis episode, which


15. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte*, 73, thinks that the Persians may not have garrisoned Marea after 450; if the revolt began here, presumably as a result of Amyrtaeus’ seizure of the fortification, then it and surrounding territory was effectively ceded to local dynastic control.

16. Diodorus (11.86) mistakenly places this truce in 454/3.


19. For the estimated total number of troops in Memphis, see Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri*, 32; J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983), 110–111, calculates as many as 16,000. Hoglund, *Achaemenid Imperial Administration*, 165–205, finds extensive evidence of Persian-period fortifications in the Negev and the Judean highlands, which he dates to the period immediately after the Egyptian revolt and interprets as an intensification of imperial garrisons aimed at securing the Levant because, he argues, “the Achaemenid empire viewed the Egyptian Revolt as a challenge to its control over the Levant” (205). If there had been any challenge to the Levant during the Egyptian Revolt, it came in the form of Athenian maritime activity, and it is hard to see how fortifications in the Negev or the Judean highlands could serve to do anything about this kind of challenge. Such fortifications are better dated to the time of successful Egyptian revolt and aggression in the fourth century.

CHAPTER 4. LOSING EGYPT, 415–400

1. This is an extreme condensation of Thucydides’ account (1.24–88) of the genesis of the Peloponnesian War.


3. Jerome (*Interpretatio Chronicae Eusebii Pamphili*, [*Patrologia Latina* 27] col. 457–458) provides an uncorroborated reference to fresh disturbances in Egypt in 414/3 (= Ol. 91.3), but furnishes no details; see Salmon, “Les relations,” 155–156; Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte*, 81. Thucydides’ report that in 412/11 the Spartans ordered six ships to take up position off Triopium at the tip of the Cnidian peninsula “to seize all the merchantmen arriving from Egypt” (8.35.2) may furnish a glimpse of developments in Egypt.
We may assume the targeted merchantmen were Greek (specifically Athenian) ships rather than Egyptian ones, but their cargo was likely Egyptian grain, probably destined for the Athenian fleet at Samos. Remembering Psammetichus’ provision of grain for Athens in 445/5, we may identify one or more west Delta dynasts as the source. There was probably something more than commerce involved here. Unlike the situation in 445/4, Athens and Persia were in a state of war in 412/11, so furnishing grain to Athens was an anti-Persian measure. A surviving cache of letters to and from the satrap Arsames during his absence from Egypt between ca. 411 and 408 has references to attacks and depredations and uses such phrases as “when Egypt rebelled” and “when the Egyptians rebelled” as well as words like “disturbance.” There are no explanatory details—Arsames’ correspondents in Egypt undoubtedly knew all the facts. But it appears that Arsames’ own estates in the western Delta were right in the middle of things: rebels attack his lands; a nearby rent-paying farmer and a group of women perish in the “disturbances”; substantial numbers of dependent craftsmen and workers evidently desert Arsames’ lands. How widespread such attacks were we have no idea, but the evident targeting of Arsames’ holdings in the Delta may be compared to the attacks on Persian tax collectors in the 460s which initiated Inarus’ rebellion as an assault on symbols of Persian dominion meant to encourage support for dynasts as liberators. See G. R. Driver, Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford, 1954), letters 5, 11, 12. For Arsames’ absence: Cowley, Aramaic Papyri, 30, 31 = Pierre Grelot, Documents araméens d’Égypte (Paris, 1972), nos. 102–103; the western Delta location is established by mention of “wine of Paphremis”: see Lloyd, Herodotus, 2.270–71; Bresciani, “Egypt, Persian Satrapy,” 366, with other citations.


5. Pharmabarzus here is likely a mistake for Tissaphernes, see Donald Lateiner, “Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet (Thucydides 8.87),” TAPA 106 (1976): 267–290 at 279 n. 33; Thucydides’ very specific total of 147 ships for the Phoenician fleet in 412/11 (8.87) may be the right number rather than Diodorus’ 300, the stereotypical number for a big expeditionary fleet. Coins minted at Dor bearing Tissaphernes’ image may point to his connection with the muster of a Phoenician fleet at this time; see Shraga Qedar, “Tissaphernes at Dor?” Israel Numismatic Journal 14 (2000–2002): 9–14. On this episode, see D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, Cincinnati Classical Studies 1 (Leiden, 1977), 56; Ray, “Egypt 525–404 B.C.,” 284; Lateiner, “Tissaphernes,” 279–280, argues against Egyptian revolt as responsible, without, however, denying the historicity of revolt.

6. We do not know if dynasts learned in late 406 or early 405 of Athens’ execution of many of the generals who participated in the Arginusae battle (but then because of a sudden storm failed to rescue Athenian survivors from the sea), or, if they did, whether they were able to gauge the significance of this for Athens’ military capability.


9. If Diodorus’ report that Cyrus told his army that he was leading them against a certain satrap of Syria (14.20.5) is connected with Xenophon’s report that Cyrus told his army that he was marching against Abrocomas, an enemy of his (An. 1.3.20), then we might infer that Abrocomas was satrap of Syria. But cf. Matthew W. Stolper, “Bēlšunu the Satrap,” in Language, Literature and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner, ed. F. Rochberg-Halton, 389–402 (New Haven, 1987), making Bēlšunu satrap of “Beyond the River” (which would include Syria) from at least 407 through 401, thus leaving little room for a satrapy of Abrocomas. Most likely, Abrocomas was a specially appointed commander (thus Cook, Persian Empire, 84), and Bēlšunu’s apparent absence from his satrapy at the time Cyrus passed through Syria is best explained on the assumption that he was a backer of Artaxerxes II and had gone off to support him (Bēlšunu was still alive in 400: Stolper, “Bēlšunu the Satrap,” 392). The appearance of a Bēlšunu (= Belesys) as satrap of Syria in the 340s (Diod. 16.42.1) suggests that the satrapy remained hereditary in Bēlšunu’s family.


12. Diod. 14.22.1 mistakenly has Pharnabazus as informant.

13. See Xen. An. 1.9.29; Plut. Artax. 6.2; Briant, HPE, 631. The extended wooing of Ariaeus described by Xenophon illustrates the effort involved in Artaxerxes’ restoration (Xen. An. 2.4.1, 3.2.5).


15. There was a significant interval between the battle at Cunaxa and Tamnos’ arrival in Egypt, since Tamos did not go directly from Cunaxa to Egypt. Having been sent with his ships back to Ionia before Cyrus had embarked on the final stage of his anabasis (Diod. 14.21.5), Tamos fled to Egypt only after Tissaphernes returned to western Anatolia some time after Cunaxa (Diod. 14.35.2–3). News of Cyrus’ failure and Artaxerxes’ success thus certainly reached Egypt well before Tamos did.


CHAPTER 5. SECURING THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 400–395


5. David F. Graf, “Arabia during Achaemenid Times,” AchHist 4, 142: “As a result of the successful Egyptian revolt against Persia in 404 B.C., the relations between Qedar and the Achaemenid empire appear to have disintegrated.” Contra Ephraim Stern, “The Persian Empire and the Political and Social History of Palestine in the Persian Period,” CHJ 1, 75, there is no evidence that the Egyptians destroyed the Arab colony at Tell el Maskhuta during the revolt.


7. Evidence is slight and disputed, but this may have happened by this time or soon after. Inscriptions from Gezer with Nepherites’ name (on a seal and a lid) suggest Egyptian penetration here in early 390s (R. A. S. Macalister, The Excavation of Gezer, vol. II [London, 1912], p. 313, fig. 452; Stern, “The Persian Empire,” 75). Gezer was a strategically important site, guarding the junction of the coastal route and the trunk road leading to Jerusalem and beyond and as such a natural Egyptian target (see Avraham Negev and Shimon Gibson, Archaeological Encyclopedia of the Holy Land [New York and London, 2001], s.v. “Gezer”). Possibly, the Egyptians acquired access through Gaza, thanks to Arab complicity, and then began to move north to sites along and near coastal route. Scholars remain divided on the significance of these finds. In favor of seeing them as evidence of Egyptian intervention: Stern, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible, 358, 362; Rainey, “The Satrapy ‘Beyond the River,’” 67; against: H. J. Katzenstein, “Gaza in the Persian Period,” Transseuphratène 1 (1989): 67–86 at 81.


9. On the date, see Luigi Pareti, Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli spartani e sulla cronologia dei navarchi (= Studi minori di storia antica II. Storia greca) (Rome, 1961), 89 with n. 1; C. D. Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War (Ithaca, 1979), 129 n. 96; cf. D. M. Lewis, “Sparta as Victor,” CAH 6, 44; cf. Simon Hornblower, “Persia,” CAH 6, 67, stating 396. H. D. Westlake, “The Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes,” Historia 30 (1981): 257–279 at 263 n. 23, explains the attribution of responsibility to Tissaphernes here as a reflection of the fact that he was known to hold the office of karana and thus was in charge of all matters related to the Spartan war.

10. E.g., Hornblower, “Persia,” 67; Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 129; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 212, 356, 358; H. D. Westlake, “Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400–397 B.C.,” Historia 35 (1986): 405–426 at 422: “It was becoming increasingly clear that the King would spare no effort or expense to thwart the Spartan intervention in support of the Asiatic Greeks.”

11. Above, n. 6.


15. Xen. Hell. 3.1.3–5 (cf. Diod. 14.35.6–7), stating specifically that the appeal came from Ionian Greeks.

16. Xen. Hell. 3.1.4–5, 2.20, 4.5; Diod. 14.36.1–2; Karl Julius Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, vol. 3, part 1 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922), 35, noting that with Dercylidas’ campaign (through 397), the freeing of the Asian Greeks was essentially complete. The issue was not conquest but rather recognition of the situation by the King.

17. Following conclusion of a truce with the Spartan commander Dercylidas, which probably belongs before summer 398. Xen. Hell. 3.2.10 has Dercylidas beginning wall building in the Thracian Chersonese in the spring, after making the truce with Pharnabazus. Pharnabazus may have departed for court any time after this, but it seems likely he would wait to see if Dercylidas observed the truce or resumed operations in his satrapy; conceivably, to be safe, he may have waited until Dercylidas crossed back to Asia and moved south to Ephesus for the winter: Xen. Hell. 3.2.11; Diod. 14.39.1; Xen. Hell. 3.2.9; “some time in 398”: Eugene A. Costa, Jr., “Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411–391 B.C.,” Historia 23 (1974): 40–56 at 48; winter 398/7.

18. See Ctes. FGH 688 F30; H. D. Westlake, “Conon and Rhodes: The Troubled Aftermath of Synoecism,” GRBS 24 (1983): 333–344 at 334 with n. 7; Hornblower, “Persia,” 66, sees Rhodes as the key to Caria and Caria as the key to Ionia—i.e., supporting a western Anatolian land-centered strategy. This is possible, but what matters here is what the Persians thought the Spartans were doing.

19. Xen. Hell. 3.2.13; Diod. 14.39.4; Westlake, “The Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes,” 262, prefers to date Tissaphernes’ appointment as karas to 400, mainly on the grounds that “his prestige was at its zenith” at that time, but in 400 it was not at all clear that there was a significant military problem in western Anatolia requiring such a command. Sustained and wide-ranging operations made the danger clear by 398; cf. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 141.

20. Ctes. FGH 688 F30. Isoc. 9.54–56 actually depicts Evagoras along with Conon as responsible for persuading the king to adopt a maritime response to the Spartans. Elsewhere (Diod. 14.38; Ctes. FGH 688 F30; Just. 6.1.7), Pharnabazus appears the instigator or, to put it another way, it is a strictly Persian strategy.


22. Athenian and other Greeks were evidently employed so extensively by Conon that Xenophon could refer to the ships under Conon as “the Greek fleet” (Hell. 3.4.11).

23. On the date, see Barbieri, Conone, 93, against Diod. 14.39, which actually covers events from 399–397; cf. Xen. Hell. 3.2.12 for Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus’ joint 397 campaign, which Diod. 14.39.3–4 has under 399. Hamilton, Sparta’s Bitter Victories, 187: late 397/6 or late winter 397/6.


26. On Loryma and its harbor, see Bean, Turkey Beyond the Maeander, 160–166 (the harbor was “exceptionally well protected in all weathers” (Bean, 161)); P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, The Rhodian Peraea and Islands (Oxford, 1934), 65–68.

27. For Loryma as Conon’s base and Pharax’s subsequent use of Ephesus as base, see Diod. 14.83.4; Westlake, “Conon and Rhodes,” 334–335.


CHAPTER 6. INTO THE AEGEAN, 394–392

1. The Egyptian grain sent to the Spartans at Rhodes in 396 probably came from that year’s spring harvest, so the request probably preceded the harvest, making winter 397/6 the most likely time for it.

2. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 79–80; Just. 6.2.1–2 has the Egyptian king “Hercynio” furnish 100 triremes and 600,000 measures of wheat. There is no trace of these ships, and it is better to rely on Diodorus’/Ephorus’ account of Nepherites’ provision only of fittings for ships, not actual ships; Mallet, Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte, 89, suggests this is not simply a mistake but an indication of activity by another dynast in a still fluid dynastic situation in Egypt. Ray, “Egypt: Dependence and Independence,” 81 n. 3, however, suggests that Justin’s “Hercynio” actually derives from Hr-kn “Horus the Brave,” an epithet of Nepherites.

3. McKechnie and Kern, Hellenic Oxyrhynchia, 170; I. A. F. Bruce, An Historical Commentary on the “Hellenica Oxyrhynchia” (Cambridge, 1967), 68–69. The Sidonian ruler at this time was Ba’alšillem II; see J. Elayi, ‘Abd’aštart I/Straton de Sidon: Un roi phénicien entre orient et occident (Paris, 2005), 50–51. There is no discrepancy between Diodorus’ report, which seems to have the Phoenician and Cilician ships join Conon at Rhodes, and the Oxyrhynchus historian’s statement that they came to Caunus. Caunus was still Conon’s primary base even after the seizure of Rhodes, and from Caunus these additional ships could easily move to Rhodes or elsewhere as needed to interdict any movements involving Egyptian ships.

4. Hell. Oxy. 15.1–3; Diod. 14.79.6. M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, vol. 2, Commentaries on the Decrees Granting Citizenship (Brussels, 1982), 43, makes the plausible suggestion that among Conon’s reasons for absenting himself from Rhodes at the time of the democratic revolution (Hell Oxy. 15.1) was his desire to avoid being seen by his Persian masters as involved in a democratic coup, which might provide evidence of his own Athenocentric agenda.

5. Elayi, ‘Abd’aštart I/Straton de Sidon, 50–52, noting that the eighty Phoenician ships were a small part of the full Phoenician fleet, suggests that Artaxexes left most of the fleet in Phoenicia to keep watch on Egypt and that the contingent sent to Rhodes remained there at least through 394.


9. Given the reported location, we may wonder about Ctesias’ assertion that Artaxerxes swore he would not visit Babylon so long as Parysatis was there: Plut. *Artax*. 19 (= Ctesias *FGH* 688 F29).

10. While the Sidonian king is specifically named as commander of the contingent of ships which reinforced Conon in 396 (*Hell. Oxy* 9.2), there is no reference to his commanding Phoenician ships in 394, when the Battle of Cnidus took place. At that time, Pharnabazus seems to lead them (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.11; cf. Diod. 14.83.6). However, Elayi, *‘Abd ‘a št a r t Ier / Straton de Sidon*, 52, believing that the Phoenician/Cilician contingent of 396 remained with Conon, has the Sidonian king present at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 “aux côtes de l’amiral athénien Conon.”


12. J. M. Cook, “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” *JHS* 81 (1961): 56–72 at 57. Buckler, *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century bc*, 73, solves the problem by having Peisander sail past Loryma, then “double the Chersonese” to land at Physcus to the northeast of Loryma. This is quite far from Cnidus, and it is difficult to see how survivors could successfully have fled to Cnidus after the battle or why the naval battle was immediately known as the “Battle of Cnidus.”

13. Diod. 5.62.4 knows a “Bybustus of the Chersonese.” Bybassian Bay (now known as Rena Bay) is cited in Pomponius Mela 1.84. The fact that Bybassus is near enough to (Old) Cnidus to permit flight to Cnidus after battle is a further recommendation. See Bean, *Turkey Beyond the Maeander*, 62–64.

14. Cook, “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” 67–68, argues that after the battle Cnidus continued to serve as a major Spartan fortress, with troops stationed at a camp called “Knidinion” 3–4 kilometers from the city itself.

15. This might suggest that Conon had ulterior motives in recommending against garrisons (Hamilton, *Sparta’s Bitter Victories*, 289–290).


19. Note evidence of Persian sling bullets at Cythera: Hornblower, “Persia,” 74. Pharnabazus and Conon’s need to repair the walls at Cythera (Xen. *Hell*. 4.8.8) suggests that the walls had suffered from siege, and this may point to more opposition than seems indicated by Diodorus’ report (14.85.4) that Pharnabazus and Conon mastered it at once on the first assault. Such determination on the part of Cythera’s inhabitants certainly helps explain Pharnabazus and Conon’s reported expulsion of the whole population.
20. Isoc. 4.119 seems to present a sequential overview of 394–393 operations: “the barbarians won a naval victory, became rulers of the sea, occupied most of the islands, made a landing in Laconia, took Cythera by storm, and sailed around the whole Peloponnesus, inflicting damage at they went.” This Peloponnesian tour seems to involve more than a visit to Corinth, and if we trust Isocrates (on which point, see Michel Nouhaud, L’utilisation de l’histoire par les orateurs attiques [Paris, 1982], 335–338), we may imagine that Pharnabazus and Conon launched more attacks on Spartan and allied territory before Pharnabazus departed.

21. Isocrates (9.56) may point to this in his remark that Evagoras provided the greater part of the armaments which enabled Athens to regain some measure of its old-time glory and become hegemon of the symmachoi.


23. Conon as “restorer”: Dem. 20.68–70; honors for Conon and Evagoras, including statues in the Agora (Conon was the first Athenian so honored while still alive): GHI 11 =IG II² 20; Tod 109; Isoc. 9.57; Paus. 1.3.2; Nep. Tim. 2.3; Schol. Dem. 21.62. Conon’s dedications (using Persian funds?)—gold crown for Athena and a temple for Aphrodite Euploia in the Peiraeus: Dem. 22.72, 24.180; IG II² 1424a, 1425.

24. Xen. Hell. 4.8.12; Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 145 n. 61, suggests recent occupation of Cythera was behind the Spartan decision to seek agreement; on other circumstances, see James G. Devoto, “Agesilaus, Antalcidas, and the Failed Peace of 392/91 b.c.,” CP 81 (1986): 191–202, at 192; Ralf Urban, Der Königsfrieden von 387/86, Historia Einzelschriften 68 (Stuttgart, 1991), 59. Citing the impact of the Cythera occupation, Devoto (194) would date Antalcidas’ mission very soon after this—winter 393/2—and have Tiribazus travel to Susa in spring 392. This seems too compressed to allow enough time for Conon’s alleged imperialistic activities before Antalcidas complained about them to Tiribazus at Sardis.


27. See Olmstead, Persian Empire, 390; Costa, “Evagoras I,” 52 n. 82; Lys. 19.36; Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 508; see Lys. 19.39–41; Diod. 14.85.4, 15.43.5; Nep. Conon 5.3–4; Barbieri, Conone, 186–187.

28. On Nicophemus, see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.1.141 n. 3.

CHAPTER 7. TO EGYPT: PREPARATIONS AND CAMPAIGN, 391–387

1. Diodorus’ remark (14.110.3) that Artaxerxes only turned to deal with Evagoras after the King’s Peace in 387/6 because he had been “distracted by the war against the Greeks” seems to have persuaded many scholars that Artaxerxes could not have mounted a campaign against Egypt before the King’s Peace for the same reason. See, e.g., Dandamaev, A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 297, suggesting simultaneous Egyptian and Cypriot campaigns “around 385–3”; similarly, G. S. Shrimpton, “Persian Strategy against Egypt and the Date for the Battle of Citium,” Phoenix 45 (1991): 1–20 at 2–7, placing initiation of both Egyptian and Cypriot campaigns in 387/6 following the King’s Peace; Lloyd, “Egypt, 404–332 B.C.,” 347–348, says “the attack appears initiated in 385,” but harboring doubts, calls the 374/3 campaign the “first known major Persian attack on Egypt itself”; cf. Vittmann, Ägypten und die Fremden, 141; similarly, Mallet, Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte, 91–92, accepting 389–387, but calling this an “alleged war” which really
involved only preparations and a series of skirmishes against the coast of the Delta, which he believes too well guarded at this time to permit landings. Also persuading some of the impossibility of Isocrates’ three-year war starting as early as 390/89 is the belief that Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28—which notes under 387 Ariobarzanes’ assumption of satrapal office in Hellepontine Phrygia, with the further observation that “[Pharnabazus] being summoned had already gone up [to court or to the king]”—means that Pharnabazus had departed only recently and thus could not have participated in an invasion of Egypt beginning in 390/89; see, e.g., Robin Seager, “The Corinthian War,” 116; cf. Salmon, *Perse et l’Égypte*, 160–161.


4. Stern, *Archaeology of the Land of the Bible*, 420–421; cf. Persian practices in the late 480s, setting up stores of provisions in many places: Hdt. 7.25. Though we might associate these with any of Persia’s fourth-century campaigns against Egypt, provisioning needs were the same for all of them, so the storehouses may be plausibly connected with this first fourth-century campaign.

5. *GHI* 16 (= *SIG* 134; Tod 113), lines 42–43, calls him *exaitrapēs Iōniēs*, reflecting the subdivision of Lydia into several smaller satrapies. See Stylianou, *Commentary*, 533–534; Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford, 1982), 37, nn. 11–12. Diodorus’ report (14.98.2) that Struthas subsequently fielded a force of barbarian cavalry, 5,000 hoplites, and more than 20,000 light-armed troops is most likely an exaggerated reflection of a locally levied force, involving Greek troops from Asian Greek cities and mercenaries, probably Greeks and Thracians (the light-armed troops par excellence). If “allies” refers to those linked with Athens in the Corinthian War, then Struthas may also have supported Corinthian activities.

6. Thierry Petit, “Présence et influence perses à Chypre,” *AchHist* 6, 163–166. Christopher Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies* (Stuttgart, 1996), 48, notes the absence on Cyprus of archaeological or onomastic evidence for any Iranian settlement of the sort which characterized Anatolia. Cf. Claire Balandier, “The Defensive Organisation of Cyprus at the Time of the City-Kingdoms,” *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus*, 169–183 (Nicosia, 2000), 173–183. Persian garrisons are reported on Cyprus in 478 (Diod. 11.44.5) and in Salamis in 450 (Diod. 12.4.1), but installation of these was likely due to Persian security concerns following Greek repulse of the Persian attack of 489–479 and then concerns about Athenian attacks in the period of Inarus’ revolt ca. 460–450; that is, they were not permanent installations.

8. Stylianou, Commentary, 534, establishes Autophradates’ satrapal status against M. Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 366–360 b.c.: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West, Historia Einzelschriften 6 (Stuttgart, 1989), 38–39, who views him as a subordinate officer at this time and only later satrap of Lydia. As Pharmacabuzus was Conon’s superior from 397 on, so Autophradates functioned as overseer of Hecatomnus. Contra Elayi, ‘Abd ‘aštar ‘I/Straton de Sidon, 57, there is no reason to see Hecatomnus and Autophradates holding separate commands, with Autophradates responsible for a land force.

9. MSS of Diod. 14.98.4 have αὑτός . . διαβαίνει είς τὴν Κύπρον. Since the previous sentence has Artaxerxes as subject, αὑτός points to a crossing by Artaxerxes. To avoid this, Dindorf emended αὑτός to οὐτός to point to Hecatomnus, and this has been universally accepted. Diodorus’ reference to “the upper satrapies” whose cities Hecatomnus traversed may be seen simply as an indication of an eastward journey from Caria to Cilicia; cf. Diod. 14.19.3, where anagein is used in connection with movement from the Anatolia coast inland to Cilicia.

10. Isoc. 9.64 is likely the ultimate source of Diodorus’ reference (15.9.2) to a ten-year war against Evagoras.


12. Lys. 19.21–23, 43; Stylianou, “How Many Naval Squadrons,” 464–467. Contra Costa, “Evagoras I” 54–55, these were not the ten ships captured by the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 4.8.24) but the first of three contingents sent from Athens between 390 and 387; the second contingent was the one the Spartans captured (in summer 389: Xen. Hell. 4.8.24; Stylianou, “How Many Naval Squadrons,” 468–469).

13. Because of the absence of notices of any fighting after Hecatomnus’ reported crossing to Cyprus, Stylianou and many other scholars are reluctant to see any actual invasion; e.g., Stylianou, Commentary, 534: “the efforts of Hecatomnus and Autophradates probably did not get off the ground”; similarly, K. Spyridakis, Evagoras I von Salamis (Stuttgart, 1966), 57; G. F. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1940), 132. If we see that the mission was not really to make war against Evagoras unless absolutely necessary, we can understand the absence of any references to fighting.


19. Clazomenae: GHI 18 (= Tod 114), lines 7–8; Halicarnassus: Lys. 28.12, 17.


21. Robert A. Moysey, “The Silver Stater Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames from the Mint of Tarsus in Cilicia,” *American Numismatic Society Museum Notes* 31 (1986): 7–61 at 10, 15, sees in the so-called lady/Ares coins (nymph on obverse, Ares or helmeted warrior on reverse), issued from Tarsus but unlike many of this type lacking Pharnabazos’ name, evidence that they derive from a period of “joint command,” that is, the time of the first Persian expedition under Tithraustes, Abrocomas, and Pharnabazus.

22. Diod. 15.42.1–3 seems to imply that the Egyptian fortifications encountered by Persian forces in 373 had not existed at the time of the first Persian invasion in 390/89–388/7 (not surprising in light of dynastic instability over the previous decade), which would help explain how the Persian army gained a foothold in 390/89.

23. Cf. Amasis’ alliance with Battus of Cyrene in the face of the Persian threat in the 530s; Hdt. 2.181; Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 3.233–5. Hdt. 4.160 indicates well how Cyrenaean, Barcaean, and Libyan affairs were often linked, admittedly in the sixth century, but probably also in the fourth, and Acoris’ awareness of this may have made him uncertain about the security of his western frontier region as he faced a Persian force in the east. Hill, *History of Cyprus*, 1.133 n. 3, calls the Barcaeans Egyptian allies, perhaps overstating the relationship.


27. Ray, “Psammuthis and Hakoris,” 150–151, reviews the evidence for Psammuthis’ origin, but remains agnostic.
28. We may note a similar situation later on in the 360s when a claimant from Mendes (probably connected with the 29th Dynasty figures) used a mixed rabble of workmen (banau-soi) in an attempt to seize the kingship at a time when the king (Tachos) had taken virtually the whole force of machimoi in campaign in Syria-Palestine; see Plut. Ages. 38.1.


CHAPTER 8. THE EGYPTIAN WAR AND THE KING’S PEACE, 387–386

1. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 534: Tiribazus thus became satrap of Ionia at this point, not satrap of Lydia again. Xenophon (*Hell. S.1.6–32*) and Diodorus (14.110.2–4, using Xenophon’s near contemporary Ephorus), our sources for the genesis of the Persian-Greek agreement known as the King’s Peace, offer no explanation for the King’s volte-face at this particular time. Because the sources deal with the Peace only in the context of Persian-Greek relations, modern scholarship has never investigated the possibility that concerns elsewhere might be connected with Artaxerxes’ seemingly abrupt adoption of a pro-Spartan stance, preferring to see it entirely as a reaction to revived Athenian imperialism; see, e.g., Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323 bc*, 3rd ed. (London, 2002), 224–225.

2. It is important to differentiate the two different sets of terms involved in Artaxerxes’ peace-making process. Xen. *Hell. S.1.25* preserves the terms agreed upon when Antalcidas and Artaxerxes met in late 388/early 387. Xen. *Hell. S.1.31* reports an expanded set of terms marking the peace—the King’s Peace—which Artaxerxes finally dictated late in 387. Diodorus (14.110.3) reports Antalcidas’ visit to Artaxerxes and the peace terms agreed to at that time, but he has the final peace including only the terms of this initial Persian-Spartan agreement. Developments between the initial agreement and the peace finally imposed on Greeks, it is argued here, made the additional terms necessary.


4. Or as a result of the “unwritten understanding” dating from about 449, which ended Persian activity in the far west for several decades; thus Mattingly, “The Peace of Kallias,” 116.

5. There was evidently no interruption, for example, in the reign of Milkyaton at Citium, which began in 391, but Lipiński, *Itineraria Phoenicia*, 94, suggests that the absence of any inscription dated in the fifth year of Milkyaton “may be regarded as an indication of a difficult year 387 b.C.” It was Evagoras and Chabrias’ aggressive operations which made this a difficult year.


8. On the date, see Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 3.3.226. Although technically Tiribazus was satrap of “Ionia,” he was likely also karanos or supreme military commander in western Anatolia, at least after his return with Antalcidas in late summer 387, and this probably explains the use of Sardis, with its long-standing satrapal court, as the place he met Greek envoys in 386.

9. Diodorus in 14.110.3 gives the terms of Artaxerxes’ agreement with the Spartans which preceded the King’s Peace. He nowhere provides the terms of the final peace. Plut. *Artax*. 22.5 states that the peace ceded also all the islands which adjoin Asia. This is patently incorrect, but perhaps derives from the cession of Clazomenae and Cyprus.


**CHAPTER 9. EGYPT STRIKES BACK: THE CYPRIOT WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 386–379**

1. B. Porter and R. L. Moss, *Topographical Bibliography of Ancient Egyptian Hieroglyphic Text, Reliefs and Paintings VII: Nubia, The Desert and Outside Egypt* (Oxford, 1952), 382–384; I. Eph'al, “Syria-Palestine under Achaemenid Rule,” 145; Traunecker, “Essais sur l’histoire de la XXIXe dynastie,” 435; Stern, *Material Culture of the Land of the Bible*, 205; Aharoni, *The Land of the Bible*, 359; cf. Lloyd, “Egypt, 404–332 B.C.,” 347 n. 50. Lipiński, *Itineraria Phoenicia*, 306, thinks that the altars bearing Acoris’ name found at Acco and Sidon do not “indicate that the Persians had then lost control over Egypt” or “that Egypt extended its power to the coastal area of Palestine” but that these were “pharaoh’s gifts” witnessing good relations with the king of Sidon. At this time, however, “good relations” between Acoris and the king of Sidon would constitute an anti-Persian stance and attest at the very least the extension of Egyptian influence up to Sidon.

2. Was it a strong force of native machimoi or mercenaries or a combination of the two? Diodorus does not say and may not have known.

3. Ezek. 29:18–19; Markoe, *Phoenicians*, 46–48; H. J. Katzenstein, “Tyre in the Early Persian Period (539–486 B.C.E.),” *Biblical Archaeologist* 42 (1979): 23–34 at 24. These attacks occurred before Alexander filled in the space between the shore and the island, but even after this, Tyre held out against a siege by Antigonus for a year in 314: Diod. 19.56.2. See also Oded, “Phoenician Cities and the Assyrian Empire in the Time of Tiglath-Pileser III,” 47, on the likelihood that Tiglath-Pileser could have besieged Tyre but that the city submitted voluntarily.


7. On Arabs, see Lemaire, “Populations et territoires de la Palestine,” 51; E. A. Knauf, “The Persian Administration in Arabia,” Transeuphratène 2 (1990): 201–217 at 214, who says of the “upheaval that Arabia experienced around 400 B.C.” that “it is tempting to link these wars with the breakdown of Persian rule in Arabia.” We may link the breakdown of Persian rule in Arabia to Egyptian encroachment.

8. According to Isocrates (9.44–57), Artaxerxes supposedly feared that Evagoras would overthrow him, so great was Evagoras’ “unsurpassed” nature and good fortune. As proof that Evagoras represented the greatest threat that Artaxerxes faced, Isocrates notes that while Artaxerxes, though apprised of Cyrus’ intentions, did nothing until Cyrus was practically at the doors of his palace, while he struck against Evagoras even before Evagoras made any hostile move (an interesting interpretation of Hecatomnus’ mission to Cyprus); Tuplin, Achaemenid Studies, 15.


10. See Stylianou, Commentary, 184, on variant manuscript traditions which raise the possibility that ἄρτη in this passage is a corruption.

11. On Tiribazus as satrap of Ionia, replacing Struthas, rather than satrap of Lydia, see Stylianou, Commentary, 533–535; Stylianou, Commentary, 155–156, thinks there was no chief commander and that these were joint commanders, an arrangement with precedents. Stylianou, Commentary, 157–158, argues for separate preparations in western Anatolia (Tiribazus) and eastern Anatolia (Orontes), with a rendezvous in Cilicia, but Diod. 15.2.2 has the two commanders taking over the forces in Phocaea and Cyme.

12. The Tiribazus-Glos situation is a good illustration of the kin-group approach typical of Persian administrative and military practices: Briant, “Pouvoir central et polycentrisme culturel dans l’empire achéménide,” 25–28. Whether Glos held some official position in Ionia is unknown.

13. The extensive bibliography on the chronology of the so-called Cypriot War is discussed by Stylianou, Commentary, 143–154. Add R. J. van der Spek, “The Chronology of the Wars of Artaxerxes II in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries,” AchHist 11, 238–251, dating the siege of Salamis to 382/1 with the crucial naval battle (see below) in 386. On the improbability of such an early date for the naval battle, see Tuplin, Achaemenid Studies, 10.

14. Stevenson, Persica, 120, plausibly suggests connecting Isoc. 4.153, a reference to the king’s army being worse off than prisoners of war, with the food shortage Persian forces experienced here.


16. Stylianou, Commentary, 159, compares Demetrius’ 306 campaign, when his force crossed from Cilicia to the coast of the Carpas peninsula on Cyprus: Diod. 20.47.1–2.

17. Thus Stylianou, Commentary, 161–162.

18. A fragmentary entry from the Babylonian astronomical diaries dated the 12th month of year 23 of Artaxerxes II (= 27 March to 26 April 381) records something done by "the
king of the land Salamis, a famous city of the land of Cyprus,” possibly a reference to the
great naval battle Evagoras initiated. On this chronology, Evagoras’ visit to Acoris would
have to take place after late April 381 and summer 380. For the diary entry, see van der
Spek, “The Chronology of the Wars of Artaxerxes II in the Babylonian Astronomical
Diaries,” 240–241. Van der Spek argues (241–251) that the entry refers to the submission
of Evagoras, with the naval battle occurring much earlier.

22. Cynthia Harrison, “Numismatic Problems in the Achaemenid West: The Undue Modern
Influence of ‘Tissaphernes,’” in Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military
Power in the Ancient World Offered in Honor of A. J. Graham, ed. Vanessa B. Gorman and
Eric W. Robinson, 301–315 (Leiden, 2002), 306, envisions “caravans of pack animals
laden with silver wending their way from the royal treasury down to Cilicia.”

(V–IV s. av. J.-C.), Transeuphratène Suppl. 11. Vol. 1 (Paris, 2004), 650–666, for the
continuous coinage of Ba’alšillem II, king of Sidon, from 402–366.

24. On satrapal competition in general and in the case of Orontes and Tiribazus, see Weiskopf,
The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 14, 19. Photius’ summary of Theopompus’ Philippica
has the heading “how Evagoras plotted against [Tiribazus] and how Evagoras together
with Orontes slandered him to the king” (FGH 115 F103.9), indicating that Theopompus
discussed the fall of Tiribazus and depicted Evagoras as conspiring with Orontes to accom-
plish this. Does this mean that Evagoras was the source of information leading to the
charge that Tiribazus was conferring with Evagoras about making “common cause”? It is
difficult to believe that Evagoras had any direct role in this or anything particular to gain,
unless it might be inferred that he had identified Orontes as the weaker and less capable of
the two Persian commanders and sought somehow to put him in full command. It is pos-
sible, however, that Evagoras merely claimed a role after Tiribazus’ arrest. Since things did
unravel after this for the Persians, Evagoras could thus claim to have been instrumental in
the collapse of the Persian enterprise and at least rescue something for himself out of the
Cypriot War.


26. Cf. T. T. B. Ryder, “Spartan Relations with Persia after the King’ Peace: A Strange Story in
Diodorus 15.9,” CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 105–109, who finds plausible Diodorus’ explanation
that the Spartans were interested because they were concerned with improving their rep-
utation among Greeks. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 58, n. 59, thinks the Glos-Sparta alliance
was just a rumor. It is, however, possible that Photius’ report that Theopompus discussed
in the 12th book of the Philippica about the Spartans breaking their agreement with the
king refers to their receptiveness to solicitation by Glos as well as by Evagoras in the period
after the King’s Peace (Theop. FGH 115 F103.7, 10). See Tuplin, Achaemenid Studies, 14.

27. “Nectanebo” (380–362) is properly Nakht-nef-ef, “Strong in his Lord.” Because Greeks
also called Nakht-hor-heb, “Strong in his Lord Horus, Beloved of Hathor” (360–343)
Nectanebo, it is conventional to label the first as Nectanebo I and the second as Nectanebo
II, and that practice is followed here.

Chronicle as a Statement of a ‘Theory of Kingship,” 66; Tuplin, “Lysias XIX, the Cypriot
War and Thrasybulus’ Naval Expedition,” 185–186.

29. R. B. Stevenson, “Lies and Inventions in Deinon’s Persica,” AchHist 2, 31–32, thinks it all
most likely a fabrication by Deinon.

30. For fortifications built at that time to surround a military encampment (most likely
Amorges’), see Bean, Turkey Beyond the Maeander, 75–78. If the development of Leucae
was among the activities of Glos which Diodorus says Tachos continued (15.8.1), then
fortification of this site began before Glos’ death.
31. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 143–154, argues for a very different chronology, placing the beginning of hostilities in 385, the siege of Salamis in 383, and the arrest of Tiribazus and Glos’ revolt in the same year. His arguments rest primarily on the chronology of mainland events which Diodorus reports in between different parts of his Cypriot War narrative and which Stylianou takes as chronological markers for the events of the Cypriot War. In placing the Persian attack on Cyprus in 385, however, this chronology ignores Diodorus’ statement that when Artaxerxes turned to deal with Evagoras after the conclusion of the King’s Peace, he busied himself for a long time in preparations—an assertion that the great size of the campaign force corroborates. The war seems still to be under way at the time of the delivery of Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* in 380, and if Glos’ revolt took place at the very end of the war, the best time for it is 380.

32. See Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte*, 88–89.

CHAPTER 10. PREPARING THE SECOND CAMPAIGN: ENGAGING GREEKS, 380–373

1. See Redford, *Egypt, Canaan, Israel*, 360 with 199.
2. Diod. 15.42.2; Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte*, 96–100; Salmon, “Les relations,” 161; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 60 n. 5. We also have a notice of a Νικιού κόμη (Aristogoras, *FHG* 98 F3) at an unknown location, which may indicate another site connected with the defense plan and named after another commander, Nicias.
4. Diod. 15.29.1, noting high pay and for many provision of benefits; cf. Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, 112. T. V. Buttrey, “Pharaonic Imitations of Athenian Tetradrachms,” in *Proceedings of the 9th International Congress of Numismatics, Berne, September 1979*, vol. 1, ed. T. Hackens and R. Weiller, 137–140 (Louvain-la-Neuve and Luxembourg, 1982), discusses the enormous quantities of Egyptian-minted tetradrachms dating from the fourth century and constituting virtually a “national coinage” (139), evidently produced both in the Delta and at Memphis. Greek mercenaries were undoubtedly the intended recipients of this coinage, but mercenaries spent in Egypt, and this put such coins into circulation there, a situation indicated by increasingly frequent reference to staters in demotic contracts (Ray, “Egypt: Dependence and Independence,” 86). On the evidence from Aramaic documents of the increased use of Greek coins in Egypt already in the late fifth century, see Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri*, 40.
6. It has been conjectured that the Chabrias-Nectanebo link was very close. Nectanebo evidently had a Greek wife, Ptolemais. Her background is unattested, but A. J. Kuhlmann (“Ptolemais, Queen of Nectanebo I: Notes on the Inscription of an Unknown Princess,” *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo* 37 [1981]: 267–279 at 266–267), seeing this as evidence of “Heiratspolitik,” speculates that she may have been a daughter, sister, or other relative of Chabrias, whom Nectanebo married to bolster his standing with Greek forces in Egypt while he was still a military commander under Acoris.
(perhaps even subordinate to Chabrias) as part of his preliminary preparations for seeking the kingship.


8. Diodorus recounts the Persian embassy and the demand for the recall of Chabrias under the year 377/6, but Chabrias’ stratēgia in 379/8 dates his return to 380/79 or, at the latest, early 379/8; see Xen. Hell. 5.4.14; Mark H. Munn, The Defense of Attica: The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378–375 B.C. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), 210–211; Stylianou, Commentary, 100–101, 259–260. Thus the embassy should be dated to 380, and both the demand for the recall of Chabrias and the recruitment of Iphicrates by the same envoys (Diod. 15.29.3) should be placed in that year.


10. Just. 6.5.2 calls him 20 in 393, but Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 51, argues that this really means “not yet thirty.” On Conon and Iphicrates’ political friendship, see Sealey, “Callistratus of Aphidna,” 184. On Iphicrates’ early career, including his Thracian service in the 380s, see J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), 121–129; Sealey, “Callistratus of Aphidna,” 184; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.2.87–8; Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 55–56.

11. Nep. Iphic. 2.1–2: “At Corinth…no troops in Greece were better drilled or more obedient to their leader”; cf. Polyaeon. 3.9.35. Note also Diodorus’ citation of Iphicrates’ excellence at commanding (15.41.1), an assessment which would seem to point to a combination of leadership and strategic skills.


13. The further assumption is that Pharnabazus first issued the coins, while at some subsequent date (conceivably in 373, when Pharnabazus led the expeditionary army from Acco to Egypt) Tarkumuwa began to issue them in his own name; F. Callataÿ, “Les monnayages ciliciens du premier quart du IVe siècle av. J.-C.,” in Mécanismes et innovations monétaires dans l’Anatolie achéménide: Numismatique et histoire, Actes de la Table ronde d’Istanbul (mai 1997), ed. O. Casabonne (=Varia Anatolica 12), 93–127 (Istanbul, 2000), 102, 116.


16. Casabonne, La Cilicie, 179. Casabonne places the elevation of Tarkumuwa and Cilician construction projects in a much broader context, namely as part of a (conjectured) Persian reorganization of the “Mediterranean front” beginning as far back as the loss of western territories to the Delian League and culminating in the alleged assignment of satrapal responsibilities to local dynasts in the aftermath of the King’s Peace; see “Local Powers and Persian Model in Achaemenid Cilicia,” 62; “De Tarsus à Mazaka,” 254–255; La Cilicie à l’époque achéménide, 180–181. Such reorganization is entirely conjectural, and the elevation of the native Hecatomnid dynasty of Caria to satrapal status, which Casabonne cites as evidence of post–King’s Peace reorganization, most likely took place before the King’s Peace; see Hornblower, Mausolus, 37–38.

17. Cf. Philoch. FGH 328 F151 for corroboration; on the date of the peace, see V. J. Gray, “The Years 375 to 371 B.C.: A Case Study in the Reliability of Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon,” CQ 30 (1980): 316–326 at 314–315; Munn, The Defense of Attica, 173, downplays Artaxerxes’ role in effecting the peace, but Diodorus says only that he urged peace, not that he brought it about. In any case, there is no reason to challenge the motivation—freeing up potential mercenaries—that Diodorus attributes to him; see Martin Jehne, Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Hermes Einzelschriften 63 (Stuttgart, 1994), 58–60.

18. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.2.229–30; Munn, The Defense of Attica, 210–212; cf. the appointment (not election) of Iphicrates as stratēgos epi tōn nautikōn on his return from Egypt in 373: Diod. 15.43.6; Xen. Hell. 6.2.13. Nepos, Chabrias 3.1–2, has Chabrias staying in Athens after his return from Egypt “no longer than necessary” before absenting himself, since he was living elegantly and indulging himself too generously and therefore did not want to be under the eyes his fellow citizens. He evidently came back from Egypt well rewarded.


20. Stylianou, Commentary, 343–346; Trundle, Greek Mercenaries, 49–51. Cf. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, 129–131, who believes that Iphicrates made various changes as a result of his experience in Egypt and during his stay in Egypt. Given Iphicrates’ reputation for foresight and meticulous planning (and the short time he was actually in Egypt), it is more likely that he made the changes as part of the preparations for the Egyptian campaign. Duncan Head, The Achaemenid Persian Army (London, 1992), 58, notes the report of changes but thinks them unconfirmed; J. G. P. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare, Studies of the Dutch Archaeological and Historical Society, vol. 1 (Groningen, 1969), 102–105, rejects the whole idea of “reform.” But the absence of evidence for adoption of these innovations on a continuing basis is itself significant: they were developed for conditions anticipated during a particular campaign and not intended as permanent alterations in equipment or tactics.
21. Contra Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l'Égypte*, 104, who thinks that the whole Persian force moved to Egypt by sea and that this attack occurred along the way.


23. The date might be questioned because Iphicrates also commanded naval and land forces in the form of eight ships and 1,200 peltasts in the Hellespont in 389 (Xen. *Hell*. 4.8.34), but Polyaeus' notice seems to refer to a situation in which pay was provided over an extended period of time, which would have been the case during preparations for the Egyptian campaign.

24. See Moysey, "The Silver Stater Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames from the Mint of Tarsus in Cilicia," 11. Moysey (p. 11 n. 13) calculates that at a pay rate of ninety obols per month, the coin requirements for 20,000 mercenaries (Diodorus' figure: 15.41.3) for five months' training and the duration of the Egyptian expedition would be at least 625,000 silver staters. Even if Diodorus' numbers for mercenaries are high, given the reportedly protracted time of the preparations, many more coins than Moysey estimates were certainly necessary. Delivery delays and insufficient payouts over the period of preparations are probable.

25. On this, see Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, 129–130, connecting it to the issue of who owned or provided mercenaries' arms (on which, see Paul McKechnie, "Greek Mercenary Troops and Their Equipment," *Historia* 43 [1994]: 297–305), but also noting the possibility of fear that discharged mercenaries might take service elsewhere, which at this time could only mean Egypt; additionally, Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l'Égypte*, 103.

26. Specifically, Iphicrates is reported to have asked how someone [Pharnabazus] so quick in speech could be so slow in acting (Diod. 15.41.2).

27. Thus Gordon Shrimpton, "Theopompus on the Death of Evagoras I," *Ancient History Bulletin* 1.5 (1987): 105–111, who argues that everything else—the responsibility of Nicocles, Evagoras' and Pythagoras' intercourse with the same woman, the name of the eunuch (Thrasydeus of Elis—Diodorus names him Nicocles, which is Evagoras' son and successor' name) in Theopompus—is embellishment of or inference from known facts.

28. *IG II²* 43, lines 12–19; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), 28–32. There is a question about the date when allies began paying *eisphora*—373 is the consensus date, but it may have been earlier; see Munn, *Defense of Attica*, 175–176 with n. 74.

**CHAPTER 11. PHARNABAZUS AND IPHICRATES' EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN, 373**

1. Note Polybius' citation of "the expedition of Iphicrates to Egypt" as the interesting kind of story that "ancient writers" told (38.6.2).


5. This led to the heartland of the previous dynasty, displaced by Nectanebo’s usurpation of
the kingship seven years earlier, which raises the possibility that Pharnabazus may have
hoped somehow to capitalize on dynastic conflicts in the Delta.

6. This accepts MSS hoplōn rather than Dindorf’s emendation to topōn, which Kienitz, Die poli-
tische Geschichte, 91, accepts. There is no reference to involvement of any Greek mercenaries
on the Egyptian side, as Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 106, notes. But they may have been
manning various fortified sites near Pelusium and near Lake Mareotis (Strabo 16.76; 17.80;
Pliny, NH 5.68). If the bulk of the Persian force had still been in camp east of Pelusium and
capable of moving or being transported in any direction, it is unlikely that Nectanebo would
have withdrawn Greek troops from their positions, and they may not have participated in the
attacks at the Mendesian mouth after fortifications here fell to the Persians.

7. Arist. Meteor. 2.5.361b; also Strabo 16.2.26 [758]; Ellen Churchill Semple, Geography of
the Mediterranean Region: Its Relation to Ancient History (New York, 1931), 180–181; Lloyd, Herodotus, 2.98.

8. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 91, thinks flooding put the Persians “literally under-
water,” but most likely the captured fort had been built on elevated ground—one of the
“turtlebacks” characteristic of Delta topography.

9. Iphicrates was back in Athens by November–December 373, when together with
Callistatus he prosecuted Timotheus for malfeasance in his stratēgia: Dem. 49.9,22; cf.
Gray, “The Years 375 to 371,” 316, dating Iphicrates’ appointment as stratēgos to July/
August 373, which would put his return to Athens some time before that, but Gray’s
argument based of use of the present tense in the reported complaint about Timotheus
not sailing is not conclusive.

10. W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), 63, char-
acterizes Iphicrates as “haughty and domineering”—good traits, perhaps, for a commander,
but not necessarily so for a subordinate officer, no matter how important.

11. Plut. Artax. 24.1. Although they are not assigned to any particular occasion, certain
remarks by Iphicrates that Polyaelen prescribes fit this situation so well that we may sus-
pect Ephorus or Theopompus included them in accounts of Iphicrates’ Egyptian service.
According to Polyaelen. 3.9,22, Iphicrates said an army is like the human body: the hoplite
phalanx is the trunk, the light-armed are the hands, the horsemen are the feet, and the
leader is the head. If one of the parts is destroyed, the army is crippled, but if it lacks the
leader, it lacks everything. This is certainly an apt characterization of the situation after his
departure, with the army being the mercenary force, now leaderless and thus useless.

12. From the stele of King Nectanebo I from the temple of Neith at Naucratis, dated to Year 1,
fourth month of summer, day 13 of Nectanebo’s reign; AEL 3.86–89.

13. See Arnold, Temples of the Last Pharaohs, 124; H. de Meulenaere, “Les monuments du
culte des rois Nectanebo,” Chronique d’Égypte 35 (1960): 92–107; Kienitz, Die politische
Geschichte, 202.

CHAPTER 12. COURT POLITICS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD
CAMPAIGN, 372–365

21–27.

2. Samos and Cnidus erected statues in both Conon’s and Timotheus’ honor in the after-
math of the battle of Cnidus: Paus. 6.3.16; Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 508.


4. Tithraustes had been one of the commanders of the 390/89–388/7 campaign, and that
has raised the possibility of confusion on Nepos’ part, leading to a number of reconstruc-
tions and alternate chronologies. E.g., Nicholas Victor Sekunda, “Some Notes on the Life of Datames,” _Iran_ 26 (1988): 35–53 at 40–41, associates Datames with the first fourth-century campaign against Egypt and has him serve with “the Expeditionary Force” right through the 373 campaign and then take over the command from Pharnabazus after the failure of this campaign.

5. On Datames as satrap of Cappadocia (as Diod. 15.91.2 has it), rather than Cilicia (as Nep. Dat. 1.1 has it), see Debord, _L’Asie Mineure_, 357–359; Casabonne, _La Cilicie_, 176–177; contra J. Daniel Bing, “Datames and Mazaesus: The Iconography of Revolt and Restoration in Cilicia,” _Historia_ 47 (1998): 41–76 at 42–53.

6. Anatolian levies: see below.

7. Nepos’ report that Datames began his career as a palace guard (Dat. 1.1) establishes his Persian identity, despite Nepos’ assertion that Datames’ father was Carian and his mother Scythian; note reference to him in [Arist.] _Oec._ 2.2.24a as “the Persian Datames”; see Sekunda, “Some Notes,” 35–37; Bing, “Datames and Mazaesus,” 44. Thus, he was certainly an official eligible for such a command. Bing, “Datames and Mazaesus,” 47–48, sees Datames as a “mobilizer of resources,” especially from regions inland from Cilicia, but Bing has him functioning as such in preparation for the 373 campaign (which Bing dates to 374) rather than the post-373 campaign.

8. Nep. Dat. 3.5 has Datames first assuming a command position with authority equal to that of Pharnabazus and Tithraustes and then assuming sole command from Pharnabazus. Tithraustes has evidently dropped out. Perhaps his role was limited to initial preparations.


10. If we follow Casabonne and others in seeing the TRMKW coins from Tarsus as coins issued by the Tarsian _synechis_ Tarkumuwa, these cannot be connected, as often in the past, with Datames: Casabonne, “De Tarse à Mazaka,” 243–263; _La Cilicie_, 174–181; contra, e.g., Moysey, “The Silver Stater Issues,” 12, 15, 23. They therefore provide no help in dating Datames’ command.

11. Dion. Hal. _De Lysia Iudicum_ 12; Xen. _Hell._ 6.3.18: “the Lacedaemonians voted to receive the peace,” suggesting Spartan response to something like a decree—thus Stylianou, _Commentary_, 384; against those denying the king a role in this peace process, see Stylianou, _Commentary_, 321–326, 382–384. Antalcidas’ appearance at the Persian court in 371 (Xen. _Hell._ 6.3.12), followed by Diodorus’ notice of Artaxerxes’ involvement in Greek affairs, seems enough to indicate the historicity of Artaxerxes’ involvement at this time. See also, Jehne, _Koine Eirene_, 66–67.

12. This was certainly also the context of Diomedon’s visit to Thebes and his attempt to bribe Epaminondas; Stylianou, _Commentary_, 451, says autumn/winter 368. On Philiscus’ activities as including preparations for Ariobarzanes’ revolt see John Buckler, “Plutarch and the Fate of Antalcidas,” _GRBS_ 18 (1977): 139–145.


14. Sekunda, “Some Notes,” 42–43, argues that Aspis actually was Persian, in fact, the Persian governor of Cataonia, and that his “revolt” was “just one more in the series of minor satra-
pal revolts which plagued the Persian Empire in the 360s” (43), perhaps caused by Artaxerxes’ “purge” following his disastrous Cadusian campaign. But even if we see “Aspis” as an Iranian name, this is not in itself proof of Persian identity. It is more plausible to view Aspis’ enterprise as a continuation of earlier self-aggrandizing activities by local dynasts, with Aspis taking advantage of the deployment of many local Anatolian troops to the Persian expedition aimed at Egypt.

15. Artaxerxes died in 359/8. Plutarch (Artax. 30.5) makes Artaxerxes ninety-four at his death, while Lucian has him die at eighty-six, though he notes that Deinon gives his age as ninety-four (Macrobius 15). Whatever the case, Artaxerxes was at least in his late seventies in the early 360s. On Darius’ age at this time, see Dandamaev, Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 306.

16. See also Just. 10.1–2; Dandamaev, Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 306–307. While Briant, HPE, 681, refers to “the frantic romanticism of Plutarch’s tale,” he finds no reason to dispute its basic features. Cf. Carsten Binder, Plutarchs Vita des Artaxerxes: Ein historischer Kommentar (Berlin and New York, 2008), 332–360, contending that Plutarch probably drew from both Deinon of Colophon and Heracleides of Cy.me. According to Stevenson, Persica, 9–13, Deinon, writing in the 330s, had good Persian informants.

17. Nep. Conon 5.4; Sekunda, “Some Notes,” 35; Bing, “Datames and Mazaesus,” 42; Moysey, “The Silver Stater Issues,” 12 n. 14. Most likely, Nepos’ source here was Deinon of Colophon’s Persica, and we may see in the supposed details of Pandantes’ letter to Datames evidence of another of the inventions Deinon often employed to provide an explanation for some known event. Deinon, we might surmise, heard about a court conspiracy, but then fashioned the details of the message himself, perhaps adapting what he knew about Artaxerxes’ execution of Persian commanders after the Cadusian War fiasco (Plut. Artax. 24.1–25.3); see Stevenson, “Lies and Inventions in Deinon’s Persica,” 24–35. It is difficult to see how Pandantes’ reported warning of Artaxerxes’ prospective punishment served to alienate Datames. On this reading, Pandantes told him nothing he did not know already—that there was jealousy among other officials and that Artaxerxes dealt harshly with failure. It is better to assume a different kind of warning. In the highly complex political situation of the day, it is not impossible that Pandantes’ own ulterior motive was to separate Datames from the army—that is, that he was actually conspiring with the Darius-Tiribazus faction.


19. Nep. Dat. 2.3 (though her name was Scythissa, “the Scythian”: Nep. Dat. 1.1); Sekunda, “Some Notes,” 37.

20. Nepos (Dat. 5.6) says that after taking possession of Paphlagonia, Datames “secretly made a friendship with Ariobarzanes.” Nepos intends to imply a conspiratorial friendship, since he is chronicling Datames’ rebellious activities undertaken while ostensibly loyal. Datames’ activities in Paphlagonia certainly made a friendship with Ariobarzanes desirable. Otherwise, he might have found himself at war with Ariobarzanes, but it is not necessary to see the two engaged in plotting revolt together (even though Ariobarzanes is indeed ultimately in revolt). There is another wrinkle here. Two branches of the same family descended from Pharaces, an uncle of Darius I residing in Anatolia. One branch, including Pharaces, grandson of the eponymous uncle of Darius, and his son Pharnabazus, held the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia or Dascylium, which was now in Ariobarzanes’ hands. The other branch (descended from a son of Darius’ uncle Pharaces, who had married a daughter of Gobreas, one of Darius I’s co-consirators in this seizure of the throne) had hereditary holdings in Marandynia, the Pontic region immediately to the west of Paphlagonia. Here too an Ariobarzanes was prominent, becoming dynast on the death of his father Mithridates in 363/2 (Diod. 16.90.2). Diodorus himself confuses the satrap Ariobarzanes and the dynast Ariobarzanes in his list of participants in the so-called satraps’ revolt of the 360s (15.90.3). See on this, A. B. Bosworth and P. V. Wheatley, “The Origins of the Pontic House,” JHS 118 (1998): 155–164; Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 99–104. Nepos does not explicitly identify the Ariobarzanes with whom Datames established a friendship, and was most probably not aware of a second Ariobarzanes, but it is possible that it was the homonymous dynast of Marandynia rather than the somewhat more distant satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia that Datames sought to placate when he campaigned widely in Paphlagonia.


23. Scholars unanimously accept the historicity of a second campaign against Datames led by Artabazus. If, as argued here, there was only one campaign, and both men were involved in the same campaign, we might speculate that Artabazus, already in the west, brought some troops from western Anatolia to join Autophradates, bringing troops from the expeditionary army in Phoenicia, making the enterprise against Datames from the point of view of some western (i.e., Greek) observers ’Artabazus’ campaign.”

24. Cf. Moysey’s conjecture that in crossing the Euphrates Datames “probably intended to march on Babylon in much the way Cyrus the Younger . . . did” (“The Silver Stater Issues,” 19). More likely is that he intended to appear to be marching on Babylon in much the way Cyrus did. Weiskopf, “The So-called ‘Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 58–59, places Datames’ exploit in 370–368, north of Mesopotamia in Cappadocian territory (cf. Strabo 12.534), but believes it occurred when Datames was “defending the eastern portion of his satrapy against royal forces (under subordinate commanders, not the Great King).”

26. Polyena. 7.27.3 recounts a stratagem by Autophradates aimed at getting mercenaries to follow him and not having to pay those who did not appear at a muster. Over Autophradates’ long career there may have been a number of occasions where this might fit, but his best known association with mercenaries is the campaign against Datames. The situation described seems to imply that the mercenaries had been idle for a long time. This, along with apparent worry about pay arrears, would fit well with a long stay by mercenaries at Acco, where they probably experienced the typical Persian slowness in paying mercenary wages. Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 365 n. 484, suggests that Autophradates moved from his satrapy along a southerly route, collecting troops from Pisidia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia before rendezvousing with all or part of the troops from Acco.


30. Nepos (Dat. 6.1–8) and Diodorus (91.2–6) report virtually identical stratagems involving Datames overcoming the desertion of his father-in-law and cavalry commander Mithrobarzanes by tricking the enemy into thinking it a false desertion. In Nepos’ account the enemy is the Pisidians, who previously killed Datames’ son Arsidaeus in battle, while in Diodorus’ account the enemy is Artabazus, who reportedly had invaded Cappadocia with a large army. Nepos places this early on in Datames’ rebellion—before he recounts Sysinas’ betrayal of Datames to Artaxerxes—while Diodorus put the story under 362/1. The chronological confusion may be due to their use of an account of stratagems which did not situate Datames’ exploit in any particular context, so Nepos and Diodorus simply put it in at a convenient point in their respective narratives. Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 364, thinks it incomprehensible that Mithrobarzanes would desert as described if the enemy were the Pisidians, and he thus accepts Diodorus’ version, which has Mithrobarzanes essentially deserting to the king, or more specifically to his agent Artabazus (cf. Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 212–214). If, however, we see Artabazus’ reported campaign as actually a doublet of Autophradates’ campaign and attribute the confusion to the fact that Artabazus participated in Autophradates’ campaign as subordinate or colleague, we may be able to preserve both Nepos’ and Diodorus’ versions by viewing Artabazus as the commander of the Pisidian contingent which formed part of Autophradates’ campaign force. Nepos indicates that there were many proelia connected with Autophradates’ attack on Datames in addition to the battle between Datames and Autophradates that he describes. Connecting Nep. Dat. 6.1–8 with Autophradates’ campaign allows us a glimpse of two of these—a battle between Arsidaeus and the Pisidians and another between Datames and the Pisidians.

32. Polyaeon. 7.14.3 and 7.14.4 name Autophradates as Orontes’ opponent. Polyaeon. 7.14.2 recounts an exploit on the way to Sardis “when Orontes, having revolted, made war on the king’s generals,” one of whom, we may infer from the mention of Sardis, was Autophradates. Quite possibly, it had been Artaxerxes’ dispatch of the expeditionary force to Anatolia which prompted Ariobarzanes and Orontes to take self-protective measures in the expectation that they might well be targets after Autophradates dealt with Datames.


34. On this, see Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 70–75, refuting the view of M. J. Osborne, “The Satrapy of Mysia,” Grazer Beiträge 3 (1975): 291–309, that Mysia was a separate satrapy headed at this time by Orontes; see also Stylianou, Commentary, 530–533.


CHAPTER 13. EGYPTIAN STRATEGY SHIFTS: THE GENESIS OF TACHOS’ GREAT OFFENSIVE, 364–361

1. Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 151–157, cites claims to Amphipolis as matter of contention; Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 36 n. 66, is not sure.

2. Isocrates’ remark in the Archidamus (6.63), written in the mid-360s, about potential allies for Sparta (and, by implication, also Athens), including “the dynasts in Asia” as well as the king of the Egyptians, may reflect knowledge of the political uncertainty affecting satraps in Anatolia.


4. On Diodorus’ confusion of Ariobarzanes, son of Pharnabazus, and Ariobarzanes, son of Mithridates, see above, chap. 12 n. 20.


7. “Tachos” is actually an emendation for tacheōs; against attempts to restore tacheōs, see Stylianou, Commentary, 525–527. Stylianou, Commentary, 525–526, thinks that Xenophon’s statement that Tachos (along with Mausolus) provided an escort for Agesilaus indicates that Tachos himself was present in the northeast Aegean and thus sees this as a
different, later occasion than that when envoys from Tachos visited Athens. It is impossible, however, to imagine the Egyptian king himself sailing around the Aegean at any time. Mausolus, whom Xenophon also cites as escorting Agesilaus, certainly did not himself sail to the Greek mainland. It is, however, likely that in 364/3 Mausolus sent envoys to Athens to discuss matters connected with Athens’ recent occupation of Samos (see R. P. Austin, “Athens and the Satraps’ Revolt,” JHS 64 [1944]: 98–100 at 100). These and Tachos’ envoys presumably accompanied a ship carrying Agesilaus at this time.

8. Xen. Ages. 2.25.
9. Thus, e.g., Cartledge, Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta, 328.
10. Elsewhere Polyænæus uses the term mistophoroi when he means mercenaries (7.14.4), so his reference to Greek hoplites points to non-mercenary Greek troops, probably from Cyme and possibly other Ionian cities.
11. In his account of Orontes’ betrayal of “those who trusted” him (15.91.1), Diodorus’ remark that Orontes was going to hand over the rebels “to the Persians” seems to contrast rebels and Persians in ethnic terms, which would be odd if it were rebel Persians Orontes planned to hand over “to the Persians.” The reports that after the betrayal Orontes delivered poleis—that is, Greek cities—to Persian commanders and that he expected he would become satrap of the whole coast, a position probably like that of Struthas, who was “satrap of Ionia” in the late 390s, points to Orontes’ involvement with Ionian Greeks. This makes it most likely that these, not Orontes’ fellow Persian officials, were “those who had revolted from the king” who chose Orontes as general in charge of everything.
12. OGIS 264, lines 4–6, reporting Orontes’ transfer of Pergamum to the king.
14. Stylianou, Commentary, 541, thinks Orontes and Rheomithres must have acted simultaneously or nearly so, and suggests (538) that Orontes’ betrayal took place while Rheomithres was away (in Egypt).
15. Thus Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 80–81. It is possible, however, that the coins postdate the period of Orontes’ revolt.
16. Diodorus’ statement that some of the satraps and generals began a war on Artaxerxes need mean only that they joined in rebellion. This is not to deny that they posed as hostile to Artaxerxes to strengthen their leverage. Trog. Prol. 10 lists defecting officials with whom Artaxerxes dealt successfully, and after referring to Datames, “prefect of Paphlagonia,” and Ariobarzanes, “prefect of Hellespontine Phrygia,” says “then in Syria the prefect of Armenia, Orontes.” Despite Diodorus’ notice of the termination of Orontes’ revolt with Orontes himself in Anatolia, this has led some scholars to postulate a satrapal offensive against Artaxerxes which at least reached Syria. What Trogus may actually have discussed is not known, but the highly condensed prologue is so confused as to be worthless; see Stylianou, Commentary, 530–533.
17. Like Glos, who had tried to draw Sparta into his “rebellion,” the satraps in 362/1 solicited participation by mainland Greeks, probably to further alarm Artaxerxes. See GHI 42 (= Tod 145), a now lost inscription recording the negative response “to the man who has come from the satraps” by Greeks who “share in the common peace”—the peace made after the Battle of Mantinea in summer 362.
18. Cyprus, particularly Salamis, had likely ceased to serve as a major source of ships for Persian maritime undertakings in the aftermath of the Cypriot War. Cilicia, it appears, had become the base for Artaxerxes’ eastern Mediterranean maritime security force, originally at least nominally under Pharnabazus’ command but with the Tarsian dynast/syennesis
Tarkumuwa in charge locally. Tarkumuwa’s issuance of coins in his own name suggests that by the late 370s he assumed full responsibility for this force, perhaps when Pharnabazus departed for the 373 attack on Egypt. When Tarkumuwa began to issue coinage, minting by Cilician cities other than Tarsus and by Pamphylian cities such as Aspendus, Side, and Selge either stopped or continued under the direction of Tarkumuwa, and from this we may infer that Tarkumuwa acquired authority of some kind over the whole of Cilicia and at least part of Pamphylia (Casabonne, “Local Powers and Persian Model in Achaemenid Cilicia,”61; idem, “De Tarse à Mazaka,”254–255.) It has been calculated that Tarkumuwa’s coinage extends over more than twelve years (Callataÿ, “Les monnayages ciliciens,”102, 116, 124), and if we mark its beginning in the late 370s (Callataÿ, “Les monnayages ciliciens,”102), we can conclude that Tarkumuwa was active through the late 360s. Diodorus’ report of Cilician and Pamphylian revolt by 362/1 thus points to Tarkumuwa’s defection and with it Artaxerxes’ loss of control of the maritime security force based in Cilicia. Surrounded everywhere by 362/1 by defecting satraps and subject peoples, Tarkumuwa may ultimately have had no choice but defection.

20. Xen. Hell. 7.5.9–10; Plut. Ages. 34.3–5.
21. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 96, 98,178, has Tachos’ campaign beginning in spring 360 (Stylianou, Commentary, 545–546: spring or early summer 360), and the whole set of events involving campaigning up to Syria, revolt in Egypt, embassies to Sparta, flight of Tachos, return to Egypt by Nectanebo and Agesilaus, and protracted conflict between Nectanebo and rival claimant occurring during 360, with Agesilaus departing Egypt in winter 360/59. This seems too little time to allow for all the reported developments. There is no obstacle to dating the start some time in 361 while leaving Agesilaus’ departure in winter 360/59. This fits well with the evidence of the Demotic Chronicle, which gives Tachos one (full) year of independent rule after the death of Nectanebo I. With Nectanebo dying in 363/2, Tachos’ single full year would be 362/1, with his deposition coming while on campaign in early 361/0, some time into his second (but only partial) year of independent rule; see Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as an Historical Source,”15–16.
22. Will, “Chabrias et les finances des Tachos,” 254–275. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 118–120, thinks most of these measures were already in place thanks to Tachos himself, but, noting the scarcity of gold and silver in Egypt at this time, Kienitz argues that Chabrias was responsible for introducing only confiscation of gold and silver and extortions from temples.
24. Scholars have typically viewed Xenophon’s claim that Agesilaus hoped to gain the freedom of the Asian Greeks as part of an attempt by Xenophon to provide commendable motives for what was just mercenary service on Agesilaus’ part; see Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, 328; Steven S. Hirsch, The Friendship of the Barbarians (Hanover, NH, 1985), 53; Hamilton, Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony, 253.
25. Plutarch’s account of the succession struggle offers no clear clues to dating various episodes. If we connect Orontes’ rapprochement with Artaxerxes to the prior demise of Tiribazus following Darius’ attempted coup, we might date the deaths of Darius and Tiribazus and Orontes’ rehabilitation in 362/1. Since Diodorus’ primary interest in this whole section is betrayals as they affected defecting officials, Orontes’ betrayal (and rehabilitation) may have furnished Diodorus’ chronological anchor. This leaves enough time
before the death of Artaxerxes for the developments connected with the succession which followed the fall of Darius and led ultimately to the success of Ochus (Plut. Artax. 27.4–30.5). Moysey, “Diodorus, the Satraps, and the Decline of the Persian Empire,” 118, puts Orontes’ reconciliation with Artaxerxes after the collapse of Tachos’ offensive. This is at odds with the plausible order of events in Diodorus; additionally, the collapse of Tachos’ threat would remove the primary reason for generosity on Artaxerxes’ part.

26. IG II² 207, an Athenian inscription, records the grant of a gold crown to Orontes, evidently in gratitude for the sale of grain to Athens. Reference to the responsibility of the stra tēgoi Chares, Charidemus, and Phocion for collecting the grain makes 349/8, when all three men are known to have been stra tēgoi, the most likely date for the inscription; see Robert A. Moysey, “IG II² 207 and the Great Satraps’ Revolt,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 69 (1987): 93–100; contra, Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 76–79, dating the inscription to 361/0 and treating it as insurrectional.

27. Briant, HPE, 674; Weiskopf, The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 84.

CHAPTER 14. TACHOS: CAMPAIGN AND COLLAPSE, 360–359

1. Behind “Nectanebo” in this case is Nakhthorheb. Greeks did not distinguish between this and Nakhtnebef and made both “Nectanebo.”

2. Note that when Greek mercenaries returning westward after Cunaxa reached the Black Sea coast, those over forty sailed with the sick, women, and children rather than trek overland (Xen. An. 5.3.1).

3. We have an Aramaic ostracon from Idumea dated to year 45 of Artaxerxes (= 360/59), which might be taken to indicate continuity of Persian authority in this region (or possibly resumption after the collapse of Tachos’ offensive), but the location may have been too far inland to have interested Tachos during preliminary arrangements or the initial stage of his actual campaign; see Israel Eph’al and Joseph Naveh, Aramaic Ostraca of the Fourth Century bc from Idumaea (Jerusalem, 1996), 16–18, 22.

4. Thutmose: Markoe, Phoenicians, 14; Ramesses II: Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, 51; cf. also Necho II’s campaign strategy in 610–606—move up to and beyond the Euphrates and try to control river crossings as a means of securing Syria-Palestine; Lloyd, Herodotus, 3.158–61; Redford, Egypt, Canaan, Israel, 447–455. On the Persian road system in Syria, see Graf, “The Persian Royal Road System in Syria-Palestine,” 152–154.


6. Mary Francis Gyles, Pharaonic Policies and Administration, 663 to 323 B.C. (Chapel Hill, 1959), 90, criticizes Tachos’ ambitious enterprise on the grounds that “Egypt was not strong enough to hold Palestine and Syria in opposition either to Nebuchadrezzar [who had quickly retaken Carchemish and other Syrian sites following their capture by Necho] or the Persians” and that he would have been wiser to “strengthen the native states and rulers of the region without placing so enormous a financial burden on his country.” It is likely, however, that Tachos believed that without such a display of Egyptian strength and initiative, many states and rulers would not sustain their pro-Egyptian stances.

8. Redford, *City of the Ram-Man*, 183, who treats Nectanebo I as a descendant of Nephrites and a cousin of Acoris who “seized the throne and ensconced himself in the neighboring city of Sebennytos” (179), sees “the Mendesian” as “perhaps a disaffected son or nephew of Nectanebo I or Tachos.”

9. See Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte*, 121; Drioton-Vandier, *L’Égypte*, 610–611. Note the reputation for greed and impiety attached to Tachos in the priestly tradition reflected in the Demotic Chronicle: Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as a Statement of a Theory of Kingship,” 64 with n. 24. This army of *banauosi* is reminiscent of the force fielded by “Sethos” (= Sabakos) when *maχimoi* refused to fight for him in the eighth century: Hdt. 2.141 (though Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2.100, suggests that this story may reflect “an undue reliance placed by the Nubians on their own troops at the expense of the [Egyptians]).”

10. Lloyd, “The Late Period,” 342, identifies the connection between fiscal policies and opposition to Tachos, but like most other scholars he assumes that it was Nectanebo and his father who exploited widespread resentment against Tachos to claim the kingship; cf. Olmstead, *Persian Empire*, 420; Will, “Chabrias,” 273; Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as an Historical Source,” 13. Lloyd, “Egypt, 404–332 b.c.,” 341–342, characterizes the Mendesian’s large army as “presumably Machimoi” or professional soldiers, despite the explicit indications of the peculiarly nonprofessional nature of the Mendesian’s troops.

11. Possibly, Nectanebo was able to exploit resentment against Tachos’ Hellenizing military policies; cf. the Apries-Amasis situation in the sixth century.


13. Lloyd, “Saite Navy,” 87, with other citations. Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte*, 119, dates the fall of Tachos to the second half of 361/0, meaning early 360, which agrees with the chronology used here.

**CHAPTER 15. PERSIAN COUNTERATTACK, 359?**

1. Syncellus, *Ecloga Chronographica*, 487: “Ochus campaigned into Egypt while his father Artaxerxes still lived”; Trogus, *Prol.* 10: “[Ochus] Aegypto ter bellum intulit” (the other two wars are those of 351 and 343). See Stylianou, *Commentary*, 546–547; Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte*, 99. Oddly, Diodorus, still placing everything under 362/1, interjects a notice of Artaxerxes II’s death (which properly belongs in 359/8) in the middle of his account of Tachos’ flight to Artaxerxes and his return to Egypt. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 547, suggests that the explanation may be that “Ephorus, having mentioned Tachos’ flight to, and good reception by, Artaxerxes, went on to add that the Great King died shortly afterwards,” and Diodorus simply entered that as if it had indeed occurred at nearly the same time as Tachos’ flight.


3. We may compare Nebuchadrezzar’s push to the Egyptian frontier in the aftermath of the Babylonian defeat of Egyptian forces at the battle of Carchemish in 605 and his ensuing recovery of fortified sites in Syria; see D. J. Wiseman, *Chronicles of Chaldaean Kings (626–556 bc) in the British Museum* (London, 1956), 26.

4. Strato’s coinage continues without interruption all the way down to 352, attesting his survival to that date; Elayi, *Abd’aštart Ier /Straton de Sidon*, 141.

5. Agesilaus’ experience was valuable here. The Mendesian’s force was building a deep trench around the city. Agesilaus waited until the excavation was nearly complete, with the ends of the circumscribing trench almost meeting each other, leaving only a narrow bit of unexcavated land between them (Plut. *Ages*. 49.1–3). Agesilaus had seen this situation before—in the 378 Spartan campaign in Boeotia, when Spartan opponents

6. Cf. the situation at the death of Artaxerxes I in 425; Wiesehöfer, Ancient Persia, 31–32. On the necessary rites, see Kuhrt, Ancient Near East c. 3000–330 B.C., 2.684–686. Briant, HPE, 681, thinks that Ochus’ command of the army formed to oppose Tachos indicates that Artaxerxes II had before this designated him as heir, but he notes that this does not mean that Ochus’ succession was welcomed by everyone.

7. The recent dating of the official beginning of Ochus/Artaxerxes III’s reign to February–April 358 by H. Lozachmeur and A. Lemaire, "Nouveaux ostraca araméens d’Idumée (Collection Sh. Moussaïeff),” Semitica 45 (1996): 123–142 at 128, would fit well with this reconstruction of Ochus’ departure from Egypt. Breaking off this campaign and returning to court not long after mid-359 would leave the interval of many months cited by Polyaneus before Ochus’ officially announced accession.


9. As the dating by Lozachmeur and Lemaire, above n. 7, indicates.

CHAPTER 16. ARTAXERXES III: KING AND COMMANDER, 358–350

1. On the date, see Lozachmeur and Lemaire, “Nouveaux ostraca araméens d’Idumée,” 128.

2. Contra Briant, HPE, 700, 794–796.

3. Just. 10.3.2–4; Diod. 17.6.1. Justin (or his source Pompeius Trogus) puts the Cadusian campaign right after the story of Ochus eliminating all his brothers, which suggests that it fell early in his reign. The Cadusian problem may have been the one outstanding unresolved military and political situation at the time of Ochus’ accession (other than Egypt), so an early campaign is quite plausible. The campaign was a success, reportedly because of Codomannus’ victory over a Cadusian hero in single combat (Just. 10.3.3–4; Diod. 17.6.1; Dandamaev, Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, 307), but if the incident is historical (see Pierre Briant, Darius dans l’ombre d’Alexandre [Paris, 2003], 209–210, for reservations), the campaign will not have gained Artaxerxes renown as a great commander, so his political gains may have been minimal.

4. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 122–123.

5. According to Schol. Dem. 4.19, Artabazus requested that Chares, who was engaged against Chios with a force including Artabazus’ previously discharged mercenaries, bring his army into Artabazus’ service. This allows us to date Artabazus’ need, most probably, to 356, and we can use that to mark the beginning of his “revolt” (more accurately, his attempt to survive).


7. The date should be 357/6, not 358/7 as Diodorus has it; see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.2.258–260; G. L. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Social War," Classica et Mediaevalia 23 (1962): 34–49 at 34–40.


9. Memory of Tachos’ recent involvement with disaffected satraps in Anatolia was certainly still fresh.

10. Diod. 16.22.2; Cargill, The Second Athenian League, 182.

12. Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 124, places at the time of Pammenes’ service with Artabazus a stratagem recounted in Poly/en. 5. 16. 2, in which Pammenes, though outnumbered by an unnamed enemy’s heavy-armed troops, managed to separate them from the main body of the enemy army and demolish them through combined use of cavalry and light infantry. Most interesting here is the reference to Pammenes’ special strength in cavalry, which, if the stratagem is dated correctly, probably reveals how Artabazus could succeed in battle against other satraps. Cf. Agesilas’ difficulties in the 390s because of Persian superiority in cavalry in Anatolia. But we might well imagine that the stratagem comes from Pammenes’ activities in 362/1, when he assisted Megalopolis with 3,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry; see Diod. 15.94.2–3.

13. Diod. 16.52.3.


16. Contra Elayi, ‘Abd’āštart I/Straton de Sidon, 127–138, who is driven to posit revolt by Strato by her belief that Mazaueus’ connection with Sidon, evidenced by his coinage, must derive from his assumption of responsibility there at the expense of Strato and as a result of revolt. Elayi and Elayi, Le monnayage de Sidon, 663, wish to make Mazaueus satrap of “Across the River” (meaning from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean coast) at this time and Belesys, whom Diodorus terms satrap of Syria (16.42.1) in the early 340s, a hyparch under Mazaueus. Although Elayi and Elayi term Belesys “otherwise unknown,” his name suggests that he is related to, probably as son or grandson, the Belesys (Bēlšunu) who governed the satrapy “Across the River” at the end of the fifth century (Stolper, “Bēlšunu the Satrap” 389–402). If so, it is likely that the Belesys Diodorus terms satrap of Syria was indeed just that.

17. See above, chap. 10.


19. Theopompus FGH 115 F114; Anaximenes FGH 72 F18; Athen. 12. 531; Ael. VH 7.2.


21. Elayi, ‘Abd’āštart I/Straton de Sidon, 142–143, noting that details about the circumstances of Strato’s death appear only in very late sources, concludes that it is impossible to determine whether Strato died by accident or whether he had been suppressed “discreetly” by his own entourage or by the Persians.

22. Elayi, ‘Abd’āštart I/Straton de Sidon, 144–145. Mazaueus also employed the same types, so we cannot infer with certainty the dynastic link between Strato and Tennes merely on the basis of coinage.

23. Nicocles’ death is typically associated with that of Strato, and, because scholars have commonly linked Strato’s death to his involvement in the Egyptian offensive in ca. 361, Nicocles’ death has often been placed in ca. 360; see e.g., Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 328; Hill, History of Cyprus, 1.143 n. 3. Elayi, ‘Abd’āštart I/Straton de Sidon, 141, has
shown on the evidence of coins that Strato survived until 352, but she treats Nicocles’ death as occurring in 361, despite the fact that this dating rests on the assumed synchronicity of Nicocles and Strato’s deaths (when Strato’s death is dated to 361), and thus claims the deaths were nonsimultaneous.

tions aux temples dans l’Égypte du 1er millénaire avant J.-C.,” in *State and Temple Economy in the Ancient Near East*, vol. 2, ed. E. Lipiński, 605–687 (Leuven, 1979), 654–655. Ray, *Reflections on Osiris*, 119–120, notes that Nectanebo II was second only to Rameses II in temple building, and this in a reign of eighteen years as compared with Rameses II’s sixty-
seven years.


26. See Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*, no. 4424; Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, 155. Davies does not connect this Diophantus with the one mentioned by Isocrates (Epist. 8.8).

27. Dem. 15.11–12: “I think that if the king’s designs in Egypt were meeting with any success, Artemisia [satrap/dynast of Caria] would make a great eff ort to secure Rhodes for him . . . But if the reports are true and he has failed in all his attempts, she must argue that this island would be of no use to him at the present.”

28. Polyena. 2.16; cf. Frontin. 2.3.13; Mallet, *Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte*, 155–156, dating the stratagem to 351.

CHAPTER 17. LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE MIDDLE TERRITORY, 350–345


2. For the possible original version of the name—Tinney—see Josette Elayi, *Sidon, cité autonne de l’Empire perse*, 130 n. 90. Others see Tabnit (II) behind Tennes: e.g., Lipiński, *Itineraria Phoenicia*, 294.

3. Lipiński, *Itineraria Phoenicia*, 102, thinks that the mention of nine kings instead of the expected twelve or thirteen (reached by having to add Citium, Lapethus, and possibly Keryneia to the traditional number of ten kingdoms cited by Esarhaddon; see Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 327) “may indicate that Citium and some other cities did not join the coalition.”


5. Elayi and Elayi, *Le monnayage de Sidon*, 660–661, argue that the blank years in the sequence of issues need not signify an interruption of Mazaes’ government at this time, but only that there was no need to strike money in these years. It is true that the apparent absence of coins for years 7 and 8 in the series need not signify an interruption of Mazaes’ governorship. But it most plausibly reflects his inability to mint at Sidon during years 7 and 8, and this is best explained by the Sidonian revolt.

6. Elayi, *Sidon*, 143, 146, thinks that with Sidon an autonomous though tributary city, Persian officials were not normally resident there; Diodorus’ use of *diatribein* (16.41.2) in reporting the presence of Persian officials seems to point to temporary residence, at least for many of these who were probably specially charged with overseeing preparations.

7. See Elayi, *Recherches*, 40, 51, here comparing these to the 100 of Tyre; idem, *Abd’aštart F’/ Straton de Sidon*, 80; on the role of councils in Phoenician cities generally, see P. R. S. Moorey, *Biblical Lands* (Oxford, 1975), 70. The fact that the 100 leading Sidonians accompanied Tennes to what they believed was a meeting at Tripolis (when he actually delivered
them to Artaxerxes) may indicate that councils of individual cities met in common at Tripolis to discuss common enterprises.

8. Elayi, ’Abd’āštart I/Straton de Sidon, 76–77, 146–147, assigning primary responsibility to “the Sidonians” with Tennes’ (reluctantly discharged) role involving the traditional royal function of military leadership. Artaxerxes’ execution of 100 leading Sidonians as bearing the blame for the revolt likely reflects Persian understanding of the genesis of Sidonian rebellion. Contra, Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 323. Thus it would be better not to call this “Tennes’ rebellion,” as, e.g., Barag, “The Effects of Tennes’ Rebellion on Palestine,” 8–12, does.


10. Cf. the situation in the 380s and 360s, as well as Shabaka’s support in ca. 705 for the revolts of Sidon and other Phoenician cities from the Assyrians: Lloyd, Herodotus, 3.100.

11. If mercenaries were present already in substantial numbers, we may imagine that Sidonian and Egyptian wealth served to detach them from Persian service.


13. Strabo 16.2.20; Curt. 4.1.4; Elayi, Recherches, 6–7 with n. 38; idem, “Studies in Phoenician Geography,” 94; Briant, HP, 487; Graf, “The Persian Royal Road System in Syria-Palestine,” 155.

14. Katzenstein, “Gaza in the Persian Period,” 83. Possibly, the 4,000 were Mentor’s own company of mercenaries who accompanied him from Hellespontine Phrygia after Artabazus fled Anatolia—that is, some of those who had initially served under Artabazus, then under Chares, and then again under Artabazus.

15. Diod. 16.42.1–2. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 102, puts this attack “probably” in 346. Kings typically commanded the military operations of Phoenician city-states: Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 323. Elayi, Sidon, 130 n. 96, estimates Sidon’s army at about 23,000, which is plausible if this represents contingents from other Phoenician states as well as Sidon. Isoc. 5.102 refers in 346 to Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cilicia having now revolted from the king or being so involved in war that none of them are any use to the king. We may understand this as meaning that Cilicia was involved with war rather than in revolt, and its satrap Mazaesus so preoccupied with the Phoenician situation that he could not engage Philip if Philip invaded Anatolia. Katzenstein, “Gaza in the Persian Period,” 83 with n. 132, sees in the fact that Mazaesus alone subsequently issued coins with himself as satrap of “Beyond the River” [= Syria with Phoenicia-Phliistia] and Cilicia as possible evidence that Belesys died in this attack; on these coins, see Mildenberg, “Notes on the Coin Issues of Mazday,” 10–12; Briant, “The Empire of Darius III in Perspective,” 162.

16. Hill, History of Cyprus, 1.143 n. 3, has Evagoras II succeed Nicocles at the end of the satraps’ revolt, when, Hill suggests, Nicocles was executed; the ensuing ten-plus years’ rule would allow for his extensive coinage (on which, see Hill, History of Cyprus, 1.147n. 3); Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.2.100, thinks Evagoras II was probably a younger son of Evagoras I and thus a brother of Nicocles. On the evidence of a late fifth-century Athenian inscription (Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, D3), Evagoras I had at least one more son, Pythangelos, but there is no indication that he lived long enough to play any role in the succession saga or to produce any sons who did.

17. Arr. Anab. 2.21.4. Presumably, the Sidonians prepared defensive machines like those later used at Tyre: Diod. 17.41.3–4, 43.1; Elayi, Recherches, 35. In 302, Sidonian fortifications, probably not much different than those in place in the 340s and possibly actually dating
from that period, were effective against a siege by Ptolemy (Diod. 20.113.1–2). They might well have worked in the 340s.


19. If the recently identified Persian-era administrative center at Kedesh at the edge of the Tyrian mainland territory to the north of Judea and Samaria was part of the Tyrian control system for their mainland holdings, as excavators suggest (as a possibility), we may imagine that a Tyrian revolt meant the revolt also of such sites, including those along the Philistine coast that Tyre controlled (and by extension, that Sidon’s revolt meant the same for its various holdings). This means that Judea would have been hemmed in to the north, west, and south by defecting cities. See Sharon C. Herbert and Andrea M. Berlin, “A New Administrative Center for Persian and Hellenistic Galilee: Preliminary Report of the University of Michigan/University of Minnesota Excavations at Kedesh,” BASOR 329 (2003): 13–59 at 46–48.

20. A. K. Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Locust Valley, NY, 1975), 114 (no. 9); S. Smith, Babylonian Historical Texts Relating to the Capture and Downfall of Babylon (London, 1924), 148 (no. 22); Elayi, Sidon, 181; Katzenstein, “Gaza,” 83, n. 131, all reading year 14 of Artaxerxes and thus dating to 345. Stevenson, Persica, 134 n. 17, suggests, however, that otherwise unrecorded preliminary skirmishes and not the complete defeat of Sidon may have produced these captives.

21. Isoc. 5.99 claims that Artaxerxes was unable to exercise control over the Asian Greek cities. There do not appear to be any grounds for such an assertion, and we may suspect that in this letter to Philip of Macedon, Isocrates stretched the truth about the extent of disaffection at this time in an effort to encourage aggressive action by Philip against Persia.

22. Head, Historia Numorum, 796; Hill, History of Cyprus, 147 n. 3.


24. Upon leaving Sidon to negotiate surreptitiously with Artaxerxes, Tennes said he was on his way to Tripolis (Diod. 16.44.4). This would not have been a credible destination if the Persian army were located somewhere between Tripolis and Sidon.


27. Diod. 16.45.1; Elayi, Sidon, 79. These voluntary submissions may have been rewarded in some cases by grants of former Sidonian possessions. Sarepta, a rich agricultural district about halfway between Sidon and Tyre in Sidonian possession since the seventh century, seems at this time to have been transferred to Tyre’s control; see Elayi, Sidon, 91–92; idem, ’Abd’âštâr I/Straton de Sidon, 66. Stern, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible, 387–389, 400 (cf. Lemaire, “Populations et territoires,” 58–59), states that after the revolt, Artaxerxes seems to have given some of Sidon’s mainland territory, specifically, Dor and Joppa, to Tyre. Sidon does seem to have only a limited territory at the time of Alexander’s campaign (see Curt. 4.1.26). If Tyre was indeed so rewarded, it must have been for its spontaneous submission.

28. Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles, 114 (no. 9).
29. Thus Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 330; Elayi, Sidon, 147–148 with n. 96; Elayi and Elayi, Le monnayage, 442–443; coins struck in Caria for Evagoras but never appearing on Cyprus may reflect Evagoras’ failure ever to regain the kingship at Salamis; Head, Historia Numorum, 796; Hill, History of Cyprus, 1.147 n. 3. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 103, dates Pnytagoras’ submission to the beginning of 343, which seems too late; the beginning of 344, perhaps six months or so after the fall of Sidon, seems better. Evagoras was not satisfied—Artaxerxes’ pragmatic solution served Artaxerxes’ Egyptian-centered interests well, but left Evagoras without his proper kingship. The stories of Evagoras’ later efforts to regain Salamis on his own are thus entirely understandable.


33. The attempt by Dan Barag, “Bagoas and the Coinage of Judea,” in Proceedings of the XI International Numismatic Congress (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1993), 261–265, to identify Bagoas as the issuer of the unique so-called Ares-type silver drachm, which has the image of a bearded deity on the reverse with the Aramaic legend yhd (Yehud), is vitiated by his incorrect assumption that Bagoas was Artaxerxes III’s commander in chief for the 340s Egyptian campaign and that he would have issued coinage in that capacity as had, e.g., Pharnabazus before him. Artaxerxes himself was commander in chief. There is in fact no reason why the coin could not be attributed to Pharnabazus and connected with an earlier Egyptian campaign.

34. The so-called “Samaria hoard,” a cache of Samarian, Phoenician (from Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus), and imitation Athenian coins, was evidently buried in or soon after 346/5, and may reflect fear in Samaria of Persian confiscations following suppression of the Phoenician revolt. See Ya’akov Meshorer and Shraga Qedar, The Coinage of Samaria in the Fourth Century BCE (Jerusalem, 1991), 65–80.

CHAPTER 18. PERSIAN SUCCESS, 344–342

1. The date of the transfer of Sidonian prisoners to Babylon and Susa indicates that the Sidonian revolt, and probably all Phoenician and perhaps Cypriot revolts, were over by late summer 345; Kienitz’ date (Die politische Geschichte, 181–184) of 343/2 [summer 343] for the conquest of Sidon is too late, on the evidence of prisoner transfers from Sidon dated 345. It also leaves too little time for reported further preparations for Egyptian campaign.

2. It is difficult to establish dates for Artaxerxes’ solicitation of mainland Greek support because Diodorus has everything that occurred from 351 through 342 under 351/0 and in any case puts his notice of Persian embassies to mainland Greeks in the middle of his narrative of the Phoenician campaign. We do know that Persian envoys visited Athens in the archonship of Lyciscus, or between July 344 and July 343: Didymus, On Demosthenes, 8–23; Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 171; E. Bickermann, “Notes sur la chronologie de la XXXe Dynastie,” Mélanges Maspero I: Orient ancien, 1st fasc. (Mémoires de l’Institut d’Archéologie orientale du Caire, Vol. 66) (Cairo, 1934), 81. Whether this came at the beginning or end of the Persian envoys’ tour of mainland Greek cities cannot be determined.
3. Translation from Longinus: On the Sublime, trans. James A. Arieti and John M. Crockett (New York and Toronto, 1985). Shrimpton, Theopompus the Historian, 22–23, treats the passage as an example of Theopompus’ “sarcastic irony,” arguing that the description is meant to ridicule the pomp of the king of Persia and not merely to describe his invasion of Egypt. But it is part of a historical narrative, and whatever Theopompus’ attitude toward Artaxerxes may have been, it is likely that he sticks closely to what happened; he was, after all, writing for a contemporary audience, some of whom certainly knew about these matters independently of Theopompus.

4. Cf. Plut. Al. 20.10–13 on Darius’ tent and accoutrements captured after the battle of Issus. We may assume similar if not identical features for Artaxerxes III’s enterprise.

5. In his novel Chaereas and Callirhoe, Chariton of Aphrodisias seems to have used Mentor’s career (which began as commander under his brother-in-law Artabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia) as the basis for the activities of his hero Chaereas, who moved from Persian to Egyptian service and back again. Quite likely, Diodorus was Chariton’s source.


9. It may have been Nectanebo’s seemingly premature withdrawal to Memphis that prompted Greek criticism of his generalship. The Persians had earlier seized fortified sites (for example, in 373 at the mouth of the Mendesian branch) before sustained Egyptian assaults compelled them to withdraw.


13. Diod. 16.49.7, possibly reflecting the Greek bias he found in his sources.


17. Was Bubastis among them? The fragmentary state of the great monolithic shrine dedicated by Nectanebo II may attest subsequent desecration by the Persians. Spencer, A Naos of Nekhthorheb from Bubastis, 17, suggests (as a possibility) that the Persians in 343 may have been responsible for breaking up the naos of Nectanebo into the fragments seen today. However, an earthquake known to have occurred in the vicinity in “the early Christian era” might also be blamed. It probably destroyed the sanctuary constructed by Nectanebo II: Rosenow, “Le sanctuaire de Nectanebo II,” 38; ibid., “The Naos of ‘Bastet, Lady of the Shrine,’” 263 n. 56. See Gregory Mumford, “A Preliminary Reconstruction of the Temple and Settlement at Tell Tebilla (East Delta),” in Egypt, Israel, and the Ancient

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Mediterranean World: Studies in Honor of Donald B. Redford, ed. Gary N. Knoppers and Antoine Hirsch, 266–286 (Leiden, 2004), 282, for recently discovered evidence of wholesale destruction at this time at Tebilla, about eight miles north of Mendes in the eastern Delta.

18. More than a century later, in the aftermath of the Third Syrian War (238), Ptolemy III as king of Egypt glorified himself and garnered great praise for “having sought out all the sacred objects that were removed from Egypt by the Persians and having brought them back to Egypt” (Michel Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation² [Cambridge, 2006], no. 268). The Canopus decree (issued by a priestly synod) honoring Ptolemy III refers to the same achievement (Austin, no. 271). Just where such sacred objects were is not recorded, but it seems unlikely that Ptolemy could simply have passed off loot taken during the campaign as the sacred objects removed by the Persians, so we may credit Ptolemy’s claim. See P. Briant, “Quand les rois écrivent l’histoire : La domination achéménide vue à travers les inscriptions officielles lagides,” in Événement, récit, histoire officielle: L’écriture de la histoire dans les monarchies antiques, ed. N. Grimal and M. Baud (=Études d’égypptologie 3), 173–186 (Paris, 2003); Jan Krzysztof Winnicki, “Carrying Off and Bringing Home the Statues of the Gods: On an Aspect of the Religious Policy of the Ptolemies towards the Egyptians,” Journal of Juridical Papyrology 24 (1994): 149–190.


21. See Lloyd, “The Inscription of Udjahorresnet,” 178–179, remarking that in his autobiographical inscription, the Egyptian priest Smatawytefnakht [Somtutefnakht], despite collaborating in some way with the Persians after the 343/2 conquest, never refers to Artaxerxes III as “Ruler of Egypt” but only as “Ruler of Asia.” Because, Lloyd notes, “Artaxerxes III and his successors, unlike Cambyses and Darius, showed a total disregard for Egyptian susceptibilities, it was impossible to transmute them convincingly from enemies into Pharaohs.” Similarly, Chimko, “Foreign Pharaohs,” 31–33. For the Somtutefnakht inscription, below n. 21.

22. See Thompson, Memphis under the Ptolemies, 17 n. 37, for Persian remains suggesting a fourth-century Persian citadel at Memphis.


26. It is possible that the campaign prepared in the immediate aftermath of Pharnabazus’ 373 campaign envisioned the use of more than one strike force to attack multiple targets.
Because of Datames' "revolt," that campaign never got under way, and the details of its tactics may have been largely forgotten when two decades later Artaxerxes III began planning his first Egyptian campaign as king.

CHAPTER 19. FROM ARTAXERXES III TO ALEXANDER III, 342–332


11. Lloyd, "Egypt, 404–332 b.c.," 349: Nectanebo driven south into Nubia never to return. Drioton-Vandier, *L'Égypte*, 612, think it is probable there was a second Persian campaign in 341 which completed the conquest. But there is no hint at all of this, and we would have to conjecture that it was undertaken by garrison troops.


17. Chababash perhaps went to Buto in the first place for political rather than military reasons—seeking recognition and thus legitimization at one of the earliest Egyptian capitals. Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as a Statement of a Theory of Kingship,” 68, noting that Pe was an ancient capital of Egypt (cf. Redford, “Notes on the History of Ancient Buto,” 67–101) and that the Demotic Chronicle treats royal rule as legitimized because recognized in Dep as well as Pe. Peter Kaplony, “Bemerkungen zum ägyptischen Königstum, vor allem in der Spätzeit,” *Chronique d’Égypte* 46 (1971): 250–274 at 257–258, explains the absence of Chababash from Manetho’s king list by arguing that the dynastic hopes and ambitions of the Sebennytic royal family were kept alive by descendants of 30th Dynasty families. Manetho, himself from Sebennytos, was their foremost spokesman, and he refused to allow Chababash a place in his system so that the Sebennytic family would be the last native dynasty. Cf. Lloyd, “Manetho and the Thirty-first Dynasty,” 157–158, who believes that Manetho ended with the 30th Dynasty and that continuators added the 31st.

18. Just possibly, an anti-Persian movement extended beyond Egypt. If Evagoras II, quondam king of Cypriot Salamis, had been installed in Sidon when Pnytagoras was allowed to remain king of Salamis in 345–344, then his flight to Cyprus “when he had misgoverned his province” (Diod. 17.46.3) will have been from Sidon. Though Diodorus attributes his flight to misgovernment, possibly Evagoras II was the victim of revived anti-Persian efforts at Sidon or in Phoenicia at the time of disarray at court. See Elayi, *Sidon*, 184.


21. Briant, *HPE*, 718: we can only assume an otherwise unrecorded Persian campaign. But cf. Briant, *Darius dans l’ombre d’Alexandre*, 69–70, for the conclusion that we cannot decide definitively among Artaxerxes III, Artaxerxes IV (Arses), or Darius III as the king responsible for the suppression of Chababash’s revolt. However, Badian, “Darius III,” 253–254, argues that the revolt must have ended before Darius came to the throne, since there is no mention of it in the Alexander sources, and if Darius had been responsible for its suppression, “the Alexander sources would have seized this opportunity of enhancing the stature of Darius for the greater glory of Alexander.”

22. Olmstead, *Persian Empire*, 493 n. 28, has references. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte*, 187, says January–February 335 is the date of a document dated to the 3rd month, 2nd year of


24. Bevan, The House of Ptolemy, 1; Briant, HPE, 861; Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte, 112.


27. Myśliwiec, The Twilight of Ancient Egypt, 159–162. On the date, see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3.2.3–5. Roger S. Bagnall and Dominic W. Rathbone, Egypt from Alexander to the Early Christians (Los Angeles, 2004), 87, state that Alexander despoiled the temple of Re at Heliopolis, but there is no evidence for this completely uncharacteristic act.

28. Kitchen, Pharaoh Triumphant, 2–3, has an evocative description of this route, known earlier as the “Waters of Re,” going in a south-to-north direction.


31. Cf. Cambyses’ campaign against “the Ammonians,” which, despite the reported loss of the army in a sandstorm, seems to have resulted in subjugation—if we see in reported Libyan tribute obligations evidence of submission: Hdt. 3.17, 26, 91. On Macedonian determination to suppress local opposition, we may cite the response in 331 to the murder of Alexander’s Samaria governor in early 331 (Curt. 4.8.9–11). Conspirators were tracked to a refuge cave, where the pursuers built fires at the cave’s mouth, killing 300. See Paul Lapp, The Tale of the Tell (Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, no. 5) (Pittsburgh, 1975), 66–67, 70; F. M. Cross, “The Historical Importance of the Samaria Papyri,” Biblical Archaeology Review 4 (1978): 25–27.

32. Thus Ptolemy, according to Arr. Anab. 3.4.5, but Arrian notes that Aristobulus says Alexander retraced his steps; A. B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great, Part I: The Events of the Reign,” CAH 6, 811, agrees, thinking Alexander returned to Rhacotis to lay out Alexandria’s foundations; cf. A. B. Bosworth, “Alexander and Ammon,” in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, ed. K. H. Kinzl (Berlin and New York, 1976), 51–75; Patricia Langer, “Alexander the Great at Siwah,” Ancient World 4 (1981): 109–127 at 123–124; Bevan, House of Ptolemy, 14, prefers Ptolemy; similarly Mallet, Les rapports des grecs avec l’Égypte, 179. J. G. Milne, reviewing V. Ehrenberg’s Alexander und Ägypten (JHS 46 [1926]: 282–283), argued briefly that the Siwa journey had military aims; that the Siwa oasis, like others, had been a staging area in the past for Libyan attacks on Egypt; and that Alexander’s visit aimed at securing this site along with others. Bevan, House of Ptolemy, 385, rejects this theory in favor of the traditional (and ancient) explanation that Alexander visited the oasis to consult the god and seek religious legitimation. But strategic and “religious” interests need not be mutually exclusive.
Appointment of a governor of Libya (Arr. Anab. 3.5.4) points to subjugation and an interest in direct control.

33. We may perhaps see an indication of Alexander's effort to avoid alienating Egyptians in the posted notice in the name of Peucestas (one of the two chief military commanders Alexander assigned to Egypt) found in the remains of a temple complex at Saqqara. Written in Greek and surely intended to communicate to Greek and Macedonian troops in Egypt, the notice identifies the site as sacred and prohibits entry. It appears that every attempt was made to prevent recurrence of the looting or defiling of native sanctuaries that had occurred during the recent Persian conquest. See E. G. Turner, "A Commander-in-Chief's Order from Saqqâra," JEA 60 (1974): 239–242.


35. Cf. Johnson, "Is the Demotic Chronicle an Anti-Greek Tract?," 123. Native revolts persisted under the Ptolemies, but with the Ptolemies at Alexandria in the Delta, resistance—literary or actual—now centered in southern Egypt. These were different than the revolts of the Persian area—not the result of dynastic activities, but mainly priestly; see Alan K. Bowman, Egypt after the Pharaohs: 332 b.c.–A.D. 642 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), 30–31; Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as an Historical Source,” 5. On Ptolemaic military personnel and practices, see Bevan, House of Ptolemy, 165–174.

CHAPTER 20. EAST, WEST, AND FAR WEST AFTER THE PERSIANS: THE LONG VIEW

1. Lemche, "The History of Ancient Syria and Palestine,” 1215, notes that the division of Syria and Palestine between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires was “in fact, a renewal of the old competition between Mesopotamia and Egypt, both now under Greek rulers.”


5. Peter Green, Alexander to Actium (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), 286–313, 414–432, provides a good account of these developments.

6. A. D. H. Bivar, “The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids,” in CHI 3, 32–46; Richard N. Frye, The History of Ancient Iran (Munich, 1984), 209–216. The initial Roman-Parthian encounter took the form of a meeting, evidently initiated by the Parthians, between a Parthian envoy Orobazus and Lucius Cornelius Sulla in Cappadocia in 96. Sulla was dismissive; see Plut. Sulla 5.4–6.


11. Roman concerns: Cass. Dio 53.4.1, 80.3.1–4; Herodian 6.2.2–5.


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