PIVOT of ASIA

Sinkiang and the Inner Asian
Frontiers of China and Russia

by

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Introduction

Sinkiang is a Chinese province in which the overwhelming majority of the population consists of non-Chinese peoples. It stands at the back door of the old Empire of India, in which the new political, economic, and social forces of the Dominions of India and Pakistan are now at work. It stands at one of the front doors of the Soviet Union — the front door most inaccessible to those forms of power, prestige, and influence which are at the disposal of the foreign policy of the United States. It stands, finally, at an angle of the hinterland frontier which for centuries has been regarded as the back door of China, but which two thousand years ago was China’s front door to the heart of Asia and is now becoming once again the most important front door on the landward side of China.

When Russia was expanding into Central Asia in the nineteenth century, American interest was lively. There was a strong traditional American bias against Britain, and in the rivalry between the British and Russian Empires the sympathy of Americans was rather markedly in favor of the Russians, who were regarded as benevolent and competent empire builders. Eugene Schuyler, a member of the American Diplomatic Service, wrote a classic account of the new Russian conquests which, under the simple but fascinating title of Turkestan, was widely read and influential in its day.¹

American interest in Inner Asia died down after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. America and Britain, though not committed by any formal alliance, had by then become tacitly

associated in support of Japan and in opposition to the Russian desire for a warm-water port on the Pacific. Even the Russian Revolution and the part played by America in intervention in Siberia did not lead to a sustained American interest in that part of the wide frontier zone between China and Russia which is inhabited by many peoples, but few Chinese or Russians.

Interest revived only after the defeat of Japan and Germany. Since 1945, the primary concern of American policy has been to limit and if possible to forestall the expansion of Russian power and the infiltration of Russian influence anywhere in the world. Around the Asiatic frontiers of Russia, this concern has even led to American “preventive infiltration” into such countries as Iran and Afghanistan.

It was in the period of minimum American interest in the frontier zone between China and Russia that my wife and I began, in 1926, to travel in those regions. For more than twenty years our activity in study and in writing has been primarily directed toward those regions, and toward those peoples of the frontier who are neither Chinese nor Russian.

In 1947 the Carnegie Corporation made a grant of $12,000 to the Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University for an Inner Asian Seminar. Under this seminar a group study of Sinkiang Province was carried out. The aim of the group was to assemble the materials necessary for a description of the pivotal region where the frontiers of China, Tibet, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union approach each other, and through the study of these materials to analyze the forces at work in the region.

Not all of these frontiers touch each other, but each of them touches more than one of the others. The Inner Asian region as a whole is closed off on the Middle Eastern side by Iran, and on the Far Eastern side by the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia). Sinkiang is the pivot of this region.

For the region as a whole the term “Inner Asia” is coming into wider usage than the term “Central Asia.” In the nineteenth century, and in its narrowest application, the term “Central Asia” was used for the territories also known as “Russian and Chinese Turkistan.” The term “Inner Asia” may be applied to a group of countries, territories, and provinces which have no outlet to the sea, including Sinkiang, Tibet, Kashmir and several smaller states of the Indian frontier, Afghanistan, the Asiatic Republics of the U.S.S.R., the Mongolian People’s Republic (Outer Mongolia), and the Inner Mongolian territories of China. Other countries and territories, such as Iran and the Manchurian provinces of China, which do have access to the sea, also have strong associations with the Inner Asian region. In this book the term “Inner Asia” is preferred.

This book was made possible by a range of institutional and individual co-operation which it is a pleasure to acknowledge. The point of departure was the grant made by the Carnegie Corporation. Among the “area studies” to which the Carnegie Corporation has given so much support, the work of the Inner Asian Seminar may be called an inter-area study, since the geographical focus of its research lies in an area of contact and overlap between the Chinese area, the Russian area, and the Iranian and Indian areas.

Columbia University and its Russian Institute made it possible for Dr. Karl H. Menges and Mr. Thomas Wiener to take part in the work of the Inner Asian Seminar. The Hoover Institute and Library of War, Revolution, and Peace, at Stanford, made an invaluable loan of newspapers and pamphlets from Sinkiang. Most of these were in Uighur, but there was also material in Chinese, Russian, Mongol, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Manchu. Extensive use was made of material in the Library of Congress, and to facilitate access to this material the Library set aside a study room for members of the seminar.

Dr. A. A. Horvath, of Princeton, New Jersey, as a visiting member of the seminar, was generous with the lending of material from his personal library, and gave invaluable bibliographical advice.
Members of the seminar who made direct contributions to the production of this book were, in alphabetical order of their names:

Mr. Chang Chih-yi, Fellow of the Page School and formerly a Research Associate of the Academia Sinica. Mr. Chang was largely educated in Manchuria, so that his frontier interests and associations go back for many years. In 1944 he carried out independent field work in Sinkiang, especially in the southern oasis region, under the auspices of Academia Sinica. His major contribution to this book was to the chapter on Economic Development (XI).

Dr. Chen Han-seng, a Fellow of the Page School in 1946-1947 and 1947-1948, took a leading part nearly twenty years ago, as a senior member of Academia Sinica, in setting up modern scientific methods and standards in the study of colonization in Manchuria. As organizer and supervisor he was also responsible for field studies in economics and sociology in many other parts of China. During the war he carried out independent field work on the China-Tibet frontier and the China-Burma frontier. One of China’s outstanding authorities on agrarian economic history, he has also an exceptional insight into the working processes of non-Chinese frontier societies which are in the process of being modified by contact with Chinese culture and by the effects of Chinese administration. His principal contributions were to the chapters on Chinese Policies, Social Structures, and the Crossroads of Inner Asia (III, VI, VII).

Dr. John De Francis, of the staff of the Page School, was my indispensable assistant in directing the work of the seminar and in co-ordinating the research of its members. He himself carried out one of the most important sections of the research in analyzing the different schools of nationalism in Sinkiang and their relation to partly distinct but partly overlapping nationalities. Among American social scientists Dr. De Francis is establishing for himself a leading position in the field of nationalism in the Far East, especially as it is expressed in “nationalism of language” and other forms of cultural nationalism. His study of Nationalism and Language Reform in China is the authoritative discussion of this problem in contemporary China. In his work on this and kindred problems Dr. De Francis has had the exceptional advantage of travel in Inner Mongolia and Northwest China, followed by careful linguistic training in America, work on early Chinese history, and long-continued study of both the theoretical literature and the political programs of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and minor Chinese political parties and intellectual movements. His major contribution was to the chapter on the Peoples of Sinkiang (IV).

Mrs. Eleanor Holgate Lattimore, as a volunteer member of the seminar, kept the records of seminar discussions and was also responsible for the greater part of the arduous work of preliminary, intermediate, and final editing without which group research can never achieve the smooth efficiency of teamwork.

Dr. Karl H. Menges, of Columbia, facilitated the work of the whole group by his extraordinary knowledge of Inner Asian languages, the histories of these languages, and the relation of language to other aspects of culture. An expert in the Slavic languages as well as the Turco-Mongol or Altaic languages, Dr. Menges made two journeys in the Soviet Republics of Inner Asia in the period between the two world wars to collect materials, and has edited texts from Sinkiang. His principal contribution to the seminar was in his translations from the Hoover Library materials.

Dr. Daniel Thorner, a Fellow of the Page School in 1947-1948 and now Research Assistant Professor in the Program of South Asia Regional Studies being conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, was with the U.S. Foreign Economic Administration in India during the war. His researches during the past decade on the modern political and economic development of India provided the background for work on the history of Anglo-Russian relations.


3 Volkstumliche Texte aus Ost-Türkistan, aus dem Nachlass von N. Th. Katanov herausgegeben, Berlin, I, 1935; II, 1943. (Dr. Menges’s name is suppressed when these volumes were published in Germany.)
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Oriental Rivalry in Inner Asia. His principal contributions were to the chapters on this Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the Crossroads of Inner Asia (II, VII). In addition, his wife, Mrs. Alice Thorner, contributed a valuable study of the widely scattered international literature on the art and archaeology of Sinkiang (Appendix I).

Mr. Thomas Wiener, of Columbia, and now of Duke University, had undertaken research on nationalism in Russian Central Asia, especially Kazakh nationalism in the nineteenth century, before he joined the Inner Asian Seminar. His principal contributions were to the chapter on Nationalities and the appendix on Literature and Oral Art.

The fullest measure of credit is due to all these members of the seminar. The work of most members was devoted more to some parts of the book than to others. All work, however, was put through the process of seminar discussion, and was subject to revision as the result of this process. All final decisions, however, on what to say and how to say it have been mine. All facts used have been carefully checked. All statements of opinion have been made after deliberation, and worded with care. It is always possible that statements of fact may later prove to be incorrect or incomplete. It is always possible for statements of opinion to be challenged. For any inadequacy of fact or opinion, I am alone responsible.

Owen Lattimore

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CHAPTER I A New Center of Gravity in the World

Sinkiang, Pivot of Asia

A new center of gravity is forming in the world. In terms of power politics it has two outstanding characteristics: accessibility from Russia, for the kinds of power which are at Russia’s disposal, and inaccessibility from America, for the kinds of power that are at America’s disposal. In terms of ideology, it is a whirlpool in which meet political currents flowing from China, Russia, India and the Moslem Middle East.

China’s Inner Asian province of Sinkiang occupies a major part of the focal area within which lies this new center of gravity. Sinkiang is China’s India. Of its people, 90 per cent are not Chinese. They feel themselves to be subjects, rather than citizens, of the Chinese Republic. Like the peoples of India, they are divided among themselves by differences of language and religion, while the increase of nationalism tends in some ways to unite and in other ways to divide them. As in India, Mohammedanism is not only a religion but a political force. And finally, many of these non-Chinese subjects of China have close ties of language and historical association with various peoples in the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan.

A circle with a radius of a thousand miles, centering on Urumchi, capital of Sinkiang, encloses more different kinds of frontier than could be found in any area of equal size anywhere else in the world.
There are linguistic and cultural frontiers between Mongols, Chinese, Tibetans, Indians, Afghans, the peoples who speak one or another of the Inner Asian Turkic languages, and Russians.

There are religious frontiers between Mohammedans, Buddhists, followers of primitive religions, Orthodox Christian Russians intermingled with consciously atheistic Russians, and predominantly unreligious Chinese.

There are political frontiers between independent states, overlord states, satellite or dependent states, and states which have only recently been freed from colonial status, and also between the monarchy of Afghanistan, the principality of Kashmir, and theocratic Tibet.

There are frontiers between the recently industrialized economy of the Soviet Union, the rapidly changing pastoral economy of the Mongolian People's Republic, the traditional nomad economies of the Kazakhs and Mongols of Sinkiang, the ancient agricultural practices of China, partly infiltrated by such new agencies of transformation as the railroad and the factory, the oasis economy of Inner Asia, the Alpine economy of the Kirghiz of the Tien Shan, and the high plateau economy of such peoples as the Sarikolis of the Pamirs.

In all this welter of frontiers, however, there is not one state which provides a strong foothold for free capitalist enterprise organized politically around the kind of democratic institutions familiar in Western Europe or North America. In Sinkiang and also in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and China, the countries around Sinkiang, there is not a single political movement engaged in the defense of an old, established democracy, for in these regions no such democracy has ever existed. Nor is the aspiration toward democracy, anywhere in Asia, aimed at forms or institutions which are willingly recognized in America as democratic. In the midst of these problems of change and transition Sinkiang holds a pivotal position. If these problems are to be understood they must be studied in the full context of their historical development.
tury of our era. In the writings of two celebrated Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang, who had traversed the area in the fifth and seventh centuries respectively, were glowing descriptions of great temples and monasteries which were centers of learning and piety.

Expeditions to uncover the lost Buddhist culture of Central Asia set forth in the 1890's. It soon became clear that the possibilities for scholarship and artistic booty were even greater than had been expected. By the first decade of the present century English, Russian, French, German, and Japanese archaeological missions were engaged in a lively competition for the discovery of new sites and the carrying off of manuscripts, wall paintings, and sculpture.¹

Scientific expeditions have also brought back from Inner Asia even older relics of the very beginning of human society. The prehistory of Inner Asia can now be traced all the way back to the Stone Age migrations and trade over the whole territory between Europe and China.

At the dawn of human history, mankind was distributed so thinly, and organized in social units of so small a size, that it would be misleading to think of geographical areas which dominated other areas. The Black Sea area in Europe and the Yellow River area in China were potentially capable of much denser populations than the Inner Asian area; but the central groups in which men lived were then probably just as large near the sources of water and food in Inner Asia as they were on the shores of the Black Sea and in the valley of the Yellow River.

Between the Black Sea and the Yellow River a very ancient line of travel, trade, and culture diffusion traversed Inner Asia. It may well have been established by the migrations of paleolithic man, but the evidence of it first becomes clear in the Neolithic Age.² In this "land of passage" three ancient forms of society were in contact with each other. On the southern side, in oases where water was available, were settled agricultural peoples. On the northern side, in the vast forests reaching all the way from Russia through Siberia to Manchuria, were forest tribes. In between were the pastoral nomads.

Of these three forms, pastoral nomadism was later than the other two; in fact it evolved out of them. At the edges of the forests, some groups of hunters took to the domestication of animals and moved out into the grasslands to pasture them. Similarly, animals were also domesticated in the farming oases on the south, and at the edges of the oases some groups of people abandoned farming and moved out into the steppes as herdsmen. Thus the nomads of the steppes were in touch both with forest tribes and with farming peoples, and the "land of passage" which they occupied became a valve through which pulsed the movements of trade, migration, and conquest.

Through this valve, China began to exert pressure on Inner Asia in the Han period (206 B.C.-220 A.D.). China had by this time become a vast civilized empire. Within its own territory, this empire was based economically on agriculture, but on its northern fringes it faced, like the contemporary Roman Empire, the problem of dealing with barbarian tribes which resisted both absorption into the Chinese culture and control by the Chinese state.

The first "foreign policy" of China grew out of attempts to deal with this problem. It took the form of trying to exclude the barbarians physically from the area solidly occupied by Chinese agriculture and civilization, and led to the building of the Great Wall as a fortified frontier, just as the Roman Empire, in the same period, in its attempts to stabilize the cleavage between Roman civilization and Teutonic and Slavic barbarism, fortified the Rhine-Danube frontier.

The Chinese then found, however, that the barbarians whom they were trying to shut out into outer darkness were not mere savages. They were capable of social and political evolution, as well as of military evolution, enabling them to deal with the Chinese Great Wall frontier policy. They found that, as petty tribes, they could no longer cope with the massive Chinese Em-

¹ For an account of the results of these expeditions see Appendix I.
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pire and so their tribal warfare among themselves rapidly took
the form of subordinating petty chieftains to a supreme ruler of
all the nomads. Thus there arose the unified Empire of the
Hsiungnu or early Huns, matching the unified Empire of China.

Sinkiang, lying out in Inner Asia beyond the northwestern end
of the Great Wall, and on the southwestern flank of the
Hsiungnu Empire, then became a pivotal strategic area. The small fertile
oases of Inner Asia, widely scattered among deserts, steppes, and
mountains, could support flourishing cities but not strong states.
They were so far from China that transportation in bulk was
expensive, and therefore they could not be incorporated eco­
nomically within the Chinese state.

If left to pay tribute to the Hsiungnu and to trade with them, however, they were a danger­
ous source of strength to the nomads. Of necessit it therefore be­
came the Chinese policy to occupy as many of the oases as pos­
sible, as garrison points; to treat other oases as protected states,
in order to keep them from falling under Hsiungnu control; and
to keep their trade oriented toward China, rather than toward
the Hsiungnu. Thus the expansion of Chinese long-range trade
into Inner Asia was politically motivated. It was fostered by im­
perial policy — to keep the oases bound to China — and was not
the outgrowth of an economic search for markets for the surplus
production of China.

In penetrating into Sinkiang, the Chinese for the first time en­
countered not barbarism but an agricultural and urban civiliza­
tion as sophisticated as their own. A story from the first century
shows that the people of Inner Asia, though recognizing the
power of the Chinese, were not overawed by their culture. The
ruler of the oasis of Kucha spent a year at the Chinese Court, as
a dutiful vassal, and returned with a Chinese wife. He then built
a palace in the Chinese style and introduced ceremonies, cos­
tumes, music, and an administrative system in imitation of the
Chinese; but the people of Kucha ridiculed this imitation as “half
horse and half donkey” — a sterile, “mule” culture.

The high civilization of the oasis cities of Inner Asia had been
stimulated by contact with surrounding areas. On the southern
side, the most important civilized state was the empire founded
in Northwest India by Chandragupta, whom the Greeks called
Sandrocottus, a contemporary of Alexander the Great. His grand­
son, Asoka, who reigned just before the opening of the Han pe­
riod in China, first made Buddhism a great state religion. Bud­
dhist missionaries soon established the religion in the oases of
Inner Asia, and one of the results of Chinese penetration into
Sinkiang was the entrance of Buddhism into China. The Chinese,
in their Inner Asian expansion, were in fact not one-way carriers
of a superior culture; they brought back with them ideas and
practices which were accepted with admiration in China.

More faint than the influences from India, but also important,
were the contacts which the Chinese at this time made with the
centers of high civilization in Iran, west of Inner Asia. It was
from this area that advanced irrigation engineering had pen­
etrated into Inner Asia — making it possible to support dense pop­
ulations, and a high culture, in small oases.

In the Han period each of the world’s great empires had
expanded from its center and had walled its outer frontier to
exclude the barbarians. In the terrain between Iran and what is
now Soviet territory, the geographical contrast between land best
suited to the plow and land which favors the herdsman is not so
clear as it is along the Great Wall frontier of China. Neverthe­
less, frontier walls were built in this region against the incursions
of nomads, as they were also in the Crimea. Since the Roman
Empire also built walled frontiers, it is clear that it was a com­
mon feature of the great civilizations of this period that they all
faced, on the north, barbarian territory, from which they were
periodically menaced, but which they did not wish to enter, con­
quer, and annex: a walled frontier marks a line which a state is
prepared to defend, but beyond which it does not wish to ex­
pand.

All of these great empires were similar in structure and had

similar troubles along their barbarian frontiers principally because, just before this period, there had been several centuries of extremely rapid development. Iron became plentiful enough to displace not only bronze, but the stone weapons and farming implements which had continued to be widely used even in the Age of Bronze. Farming populations then multiplied very rapidly, spreading out and occupying land which had not previously been brought under the plow.

The whole agricultural world, from Britain and Gaul all the way to the Pacific, then became much more solid and tended to exclude from itself a "barbarian fringe" of forest and steppe tribes. In the civilized empires occupations became rapidly more diversified and specialized; the urban-rural relationship became more complicated; social classes became more sharply marked off from each other; and new, more complex and geographically much larger political states developed.

This evolutionary process then gave way to a devolutionary phase, during the period from about A.D. 200 to 600. The great states were exhausted, partly by the tendency of the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer, which produced internal crises, and partly by the economic drain of chronic frontier war. Among the new kingdoms which then formed, the frontier states especially tended to be dominated by barbarian conquerors.

In China, the tendency among such rulers to adopt Buddhism as a mark of civilization was important in keeping up contact with Inner Asia. Thus, in the fifth century, the Chinese pilgrim Fa Hsien, passing through the oasis of Khotan on his way to India, described four great monasteries and many smaller ones. He and his Chinese companions were lodged at a monastery where three thousand monks took their seats for meals in regular order and "perfect silence." He describes a new monastery, near the

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8 Most of the larger towns of Sinkiang have at least three names - the Uighur, Kazakh, or Mongol name; the Chinese name used under the Manchu Dynasty; and the Chinese name used under the Republic. Many have several other names. To avoid confusion, the name used by the local people in the local language will be used in this book. Variant names are listed in Appendix VIII.

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and other Turkish nations in Inner Asia; and the Khazar, Bulgar, and Pecheneg states in the Caspian-Black Sea steppe.

Sinkiang in this period continued to hold a pivotal position between the Chinese, Indian, and Iranian worlds, with distant connections with the South Russian steppe. In its culture the Indian, Iranian, and Near Eastern elements were still stronger than the Chinese influence. Merchants of the Sinkiang oases traveled widely. In the ninth century there were communities of them at Sian (Ch'angan, the T'ang capital), at Loyang in the main Yellow River Valley, at Yangchou on the Yangtze, and even at Canton on the southern coast of China. They carried with them the practices of Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam.

The tradition of pilgrimage from China through Inner Asia to the centers of Buddhist learning continued, and accompanied a general growth of Chinese influence. In the middle of the seventh century, when the pilgrim Hsuan Tsang had departed eastward from the oasis of Komul, there were only three Chinese monks to see him off. About a hundred years later, there were many Chinese in the monastic communities of Kucha, Kashgar, and Khotan; and one of their activities was the making of usurious loans to the local population.

Hsuan Tsang himself writes of Aksu that "the customs and temperament of the people, as well as their script and law, are the same as in Kucha. The dialects are somewhat different. Monasteries number several tens and monks over a thousand in Aksu. The people in general are cunning and greedy, loans are often transacted between father and son. Virtues are not treasured but wealth is worshiped. The life of the very rich appears to be miserly, being shabby in dress and stingy in food. It would seem that half of the population is engaged in trading and the other half in field cultivation." 10

In this period Tibetan invaders penetrated both Sinkiang and Northwest China. After they had been dislodged from Sinkiang, they continued to control the frontier kingdom of Hsi Hsia or Tanggot in Northwest China, with a capital at Ninghsia on the Yellow River, and a mixed population of cultivators whose languages were Chinese and Turkish and pastoral nomads whose languages were Tibetan, Turkish, and Mongol. It was as a result of this expansion that elements of Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity were carried back from Inner Asia to Tibet, where they contributed to the transformation of Northern Buddhism into the new syncretic religion of Lamaistic Buddhism.

Most important of all, however, was the movement of wave after wave of Turkish invaders — Uighurs, Karluks, Kirghiz, and others — from the northern steppe fringe of Inner Asia and the southern edges of the Siberian forests into positions which put them astride of the trade routes and in control of Inner Asia and the southern edges of the Siberian forests into positions which put them astride of the trade routes and in control of the oases. Gradually Islam became the prevailing religion among these Turks, and at the same time their languages displaced the Indo-European and Indo-Iranian languages which until then had been spoken in the oases. By the end of this dual process, which was not completed until after the close of the T'ang period, Turkish was spoken, in different variants, from the borders of Iran to the borders of China, and Islam ruled all the way from Northwest China to the Black Sea.

The forms of migration involved in these changes are important. They did not empty that part of the steppe in which they originated. Nor did they exterminate or drive away the populations of the territories into which they penetrated. The typical forms of movement, to which the terms "migration" and "conquest" tend to be applied without sufficient discrimination, were movements of warrior bands, not of the whole people from whom the warriors were recruited. At first these bands made raids for plunder. Then they settled permanently in territories from which...
they could take an annual revenue. It was not to their interest to destroy the whole of the population which provided the revenue. As for the defeated rulers, often they succeeded in leading bands of their own followers to "migration" or "conquest" in another region. Thus the transfer of tribal names was wider than the migration of whole tribes; and descendants of the original Indo-European or Indo-Iranian peoples of Inner Asia, though Turkized in language and Islamized in religion, continued to form a great part of the population, especially in the oases.

In the tenth century there began a new development, culminating in the Mongol conquests at the beginning of the thirteenth century and continuing until the Mongol empires fell apart in the fourteenth century. In this period conquerors of steppe nomad origin moved from kingdoms on the frontiers of civilization to empires with capitals in the heart of ancient civilized territory. Once more, developments in China had their parallels in India, Iran, and South Russia, which should not be left out of mind.

In North China the Khitans of western Manchuria and eastern Mongolia founded the Liao Empire, astride the Great Wall and reaching into the Yellow River plains. They were succeeded by the Jurchids of the Chin or Kin Empire, whose barbarian territory of origin in Manchuria lay farther from the Great Wall than the Khitan steppes, and whose conquests pushed beyond the Yellow River to overlook the Yangtze.

Then, at the opening of the thirteenth century, the conquests of Jenghis Khan created an empire extending from northern China to southern Russia; but this empire broke up quickly, under the descendants of his sons, into separate empires and kingdoms. The process of parcellation was most rapid and most complete the Jurchids overthrew the Khitans, a warrior band of Khitans broke away to the Northwest, through Mongolia, and set up a Khara-Khitai kingdom in Inner Asia, astride the present frontiers between Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Siberia. Throughout both the Khitan and the Jurchid period, Northwest China continued to be dominated by the Tibetan-ruled Hsi Hsia or Tanggot state; thus throughout this period neither the oasis nor the steppe peoples of Inner Asia were in touch with any Chinese state ruled by Chinese; and contact between Inner Asia and the older Indian and Iranian cultures was also cut off by Moslem conquests.

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fused in Inner Asia. The Golden Horde in South Russia and the Yuan Dynasty in China ruled the two most solid Mongol empires; Inner Asia lay between them, and tended to break away from both of them.

Mongol rule ended in China when the Ming Dynasty was founded in 1368, and began to weaken rapidly in Russia a century later. When they first overthrew Mongol rule, the Chinese pushed their campaigns far into Mongolia; but through most of the Ming period (1368–1644) the Chinese horizon in Inner Asia was extremely limited. Rarely did even indirect Chinese influence extend beyond Komul and Turfan, the nearest large oases of Sinkiang.

There was a similar situation all around Inner Asia. As civilization recovered from the Mongol onslaught, strong states were again formed; but they were not strong enough to make conquests in Inner Asia. In this period, moreover, Arab, Indian, and Chinese navigators developed a considerable ocean commerce, thus weakening the pressure which might otherwise have developed for the reopening of the long-distance overland trade routes. Inner Asia was therefore left more to itself than for many centuries. Innumerable small states were formed. By the sixteenth century, the last traces of Buddhism and Christianity disappeared from the oases, and Islam prevailed unchallenged except among the Mongol-speaking nomads, who still adhered to the Tibetan (or Lamaistic) form of Buddhism.

The cases were ruled from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century by the Moghuls, warriors of Mongol descent who had become Turkish in language and Moslem in religion. Their Khans—who claimed descent from Chagatai, son of Jenghis Khan, a claim which is of doubtful value—had split away from the Chagatai domains of Western Turkistan in the fourteenth century. In the fifteenth century, following a pattern not uncommon

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When the Jurchids overthrew the Khitans, a warrior band of Khitans broke away to the Northwest, through Mongolia, and set up a Khara-Khitai kingdom in Inner Asia, astride the present frontiers between Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Siberia. Throughout both the Khitan and the Jurchid period, Northwest China continued to be dominated by the Tibetan-ruled Hsi Hsia or Tanggot state; thus throughout this period neither the oasis nor the steppe peoples of Inner Asia were in touch with any Chinese state ruled by Chinese; and contact between Inner Asia and the older Indian and Iranian cultures was also cut off by Moslem conquests.
in Moslem lands, a line of hereditary religious potentates, the Khojas, established itself beside the Khans. By the seventeenth century, the Khojas had displaced the last quarreling heirs of the Moghuls and taken over direct rule of the Sinkiang oases.

In the steppe, power was divided among three groups of nomads. In Russian Inner Asia the Kazakhs and other Turkish-speaking nomads prevailed. On the east, after many tribal wars, the dominant Mongol power was that of the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia. In the center, in northern Sinkiang and western Mongolia, were the Oirats or Western Mongols—called "Kalmucks" by the Russians.

By the year 1400—when the Mongols in western and southern Inner Asia had taken to the Turkish language and to Islam—the Oirats, who remained Mongol in speech and hostile to the Moslems, had become a warlike league which repeatedly invaded western Inner Asia and attacked the southern oases and Tibet. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they struck eastward and nearly made themselves masters of the whole of the ancient Mongol homeland. It was to break their power that the Manchus, who had conquered China in the preceding century, invaded Sinkiang in the eighteenth century, conquered the Western Mongol Confederation, and established strong military garrisons. In the same period the Russians began their expansion into Siberia and Inner Asia, and the British their expansion over India up to Afghanistan, the Pamirs, and Tibet. This triple process marks the confluence of modern world history.

In the nineteenth century there were prolonged and bloody Moslem rebellions against the Manchus both in China and in Sinkiang. It was only after the suppression of these rebellions that Sinkiang was placed under a form of administration comparable to that of other Chinese provinces. In 1884 it ceased to be a possession, and became a Chinese province.

Under the Chinese Republic, since 1911, Sinkiang has continued to be nominally a province like any other province; but in actuality the tendency of governors of the province has always been to rule as independent war lords. Sometimes this independence has been carried so far that governors have conducted their own foreign relations with Russia and India and have even treated the National Government of China almost as if it were a foreign power. China's present problem in Sinkiang is how to deal with the relations between the Chinese provincial authorities and the national government, the relations of both the provincial authorities and the national government with Russia and India, especially Russia, and the effort of both provincial and national Chinese authorities to maintain themselves in the face of the nationalist demands of the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang.

Nationalism in Sinkiang is a modern outgrowth of traditional Mohammedan and tribal rebellions against Chinese rule. It began to take newer forms in the 1930's, when Sinkiang fell under the rule of a Chinese military adventurer named Sheng Shih-t'ai. Since Sheng could not call on China for military reinforcements for fear of being supplanted, he followed a new policy of seeking support from each subject nationality separately, while at the same time preventing any coalition of nationalities. He also increased trade with the Soviet Union, obtained Soviet loans, and sent Uighur and other students to the Soviet Union for technical training. In 1943 he broke with the Russians and came to terms with the National Government of China. A policy of "firmness" toward the non-Chinese peoples was then reasserted, but in the meantime political nationalism had taken root.

There are now two major nationalist movements in Sinkiang. One follows a policy of "Sinkiang for the Uighurs." It seeks to win autonomy from the Chinese and at the same time to assert
Uighur domination over the other peoples of Sinkiang. The second movement is the “coalition nationalism,” whose stronghold is at Kulja. It seeks to unite all nationalities in Sinkiang; it is as friendly to the Soviet Union as was the Azerbaijan nationalist movement in Iran, and some of its leaders were born or educated in Soviet territory.

**Forces Converging on the Center of Gravity**

China’s colonial problems in Inner Asia are enclosed in a framework of great power politics. The political interests of America and Britain are sensitive to changes in the area in which the territorial frontiers of China and Russia meet in Inner Asia.

Until the Age of Columbus the movement of man within the land mass between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Polar Sea, was more important than his enterprises on salt water. Coastal voyages were made, and early navigators crossed the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, and perhaps even the Pacific; certainly the Pacific Islands were reached from Asia; but the major interaction of cultures and the building of the great civilizations took place within the Eurasian land mass and in North Africa.

With the great voyages of navigation and circumnavigation at the end of the fifteenth century, a new mode of history began. The peopling of North America, the colonizing of Central and South America, and the conquest of India and Southeast Asia were the work of Western European man, moving across the oceans. Inner Asia, once a crossroads of the world, became a stagnant area of secondary commercial and strategic importance.

Then there came a period of fifty years, from 1580 to 1630, in which the histories of different parts of the world began to flow together as components of a true world history. In 1580 Yermak began the Russian drive into Siberia, sponsored by merchants interested in the expansion of the fur trade. After 1595, when Boris Godunov founded a gun-making industry at Tula, the eastward thrust of the Russians became even more effective against Siberian and Inner Asian tribes still armed with the bow and arrow. In 1600 and shortly after, the British, Dutch, French, and other East India Companies were founded. In 1605 Akbar died; he was the real founder of the Moghul Dynasty, and the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth and of Nurhachih, founder of the Manchu Dynasty. In 1619 Nurhachih took the title of Emperor, though his Manchus did not establish their dynasty in China until 1644, after his death in 1627. In 1620 the Russians reached the Lena. A few years more, and they were reaching the Amur and the Pacific, just as the Manchus were establishing themselves in China. Modern world history had begun.

After the British defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588 and Yermak had presented Siberia to Ivan IV, the British and the Russians created the two most gigantic empires in the world. By the closing decades of the nineteenth century the two had met, at their frontiers of maximum expansion. British and Russians were clambering about the Roof of the World — the Fanns — with knives in their teeth, and eying each other with suspicion across the ridgepole, the Hindu Kush.

Geographical conditions accentuated a primary difference between the British and Russian Empires. Of the two, Britain’s was economically the more efficient. All of Britain’s vast holdings were physically separated from Britain by the oceans of the world. In Dominions like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, there was actual British colonization organized under British institutions. To the conquered, well-populated colonial possessions — of which India was by far the most important — Britain exported garrison troops, small numbers of administrators and police officials, and an economic managerial personnel; she brought back, across the oceans, commodities and raw materials. Later, Britain exported both money capital and machinery and equipment for production and transport, and took out of the colonies not only increased quantities of raw materials but an increasing proportion of semi-processed materials and finished commodities. A part of this
output went into world trade without passing through Britain, and some of it even competed with the processing industries of Britain itself.

The whole process depended on efficient exploitation of the cheapness of water transport. Even the military power of Britain was mobilized primarily in its Navy, which could concentrate at any point on any coast, or stand across the supply lines of any rival. The number of men withdrawn from production to serve in the Royal Navy and the small “expeditionary force” Army was much less than the number economically neutralized in the standing armies of Russia or Germany.

When there is a great diversity in economic development in different parts of the world, cheapness of water transport is a vital factor in taking skill and equipment to backward areas and in bringing raw materials to developed industrial areas. Industrial, steamship-owning Britain was able to hold back the development of a modern textile industry in India for a long time. India grew the cotton; Britain processed it, and sold textiles to India, besides making a profit on the transportation in both directions. In proportion to the development of industries in the areas which produce raw materials, however, the process of exchange tends to shift from a footing of necessity to that of convenience. Politically, this change is reflected in the increasing importance of relationships in which the ability to dictate the terms of exchange has been superseded by the need to negotiate exchange on terms of mutual consent. Thus India’s textile industry, after a long struggle, has now become independent; but as Britain is still a buyer of Indian cotton and other raw materials, Britain still has bargaining power in its commercial relations with India.

In contrast to the ocean-separates holdings which Britain accumulated all over the world, Tsarist Russia incorporated all of its holdings within one vast, continuous expanse of land. Though Russian expansion has been dramatically described by one eminent historian as “The Urge to the Sea,” the Russians, when they did reach the Pacific, did not go on to build a maritime empire.


They acquired Alaska, but having acquired it, sold it willingly. It was in the great land mass between Europe and Asia that the Russians created a nation and made that nation the master of an empire. Centuries of interpenetration with nomadic peoples on the steppe frontier made class warfare and politics as familiar as national warfare to both Russians and non-Russians. When nomad Khans had the upper hand, some of the Russian nobility became their vassals, and continued as a ruling class, though a subordinate ruling class. When the Russians, in turn, conquered the steppe, they took the steppe nobility into their service, and continued some of their privileges.  

Similarity (though not identity) of interest between Russian and non-Russian upper classes was an important consequence of this method of empire building. Many of the non-Russian upper classes were anti-Russian, up to a point, because their privileges had been encroached on by the Russian upper classes; but since the Russian state was the guarantor of such privileges as they retained, a hesitation of self-interest prevented them from becoming effective leaders of nationalist rebellion against the Russians. Consequently, when the Russian Revolution broke out the outcome was determined, among the non-Russian peoples, by a left-wing leadership which believed in revolution against the native privileged classes as well as rebellion against the Russian state. There was thus a community of interest between the left-wing nationalists and the Bolsheviks, who were determined to destroy not only the Tsarist state but the society which had supported it, and been exploited by it. This community of interest was given an institutional framework by the Communist nationality policy, which was formulated by Stalin himself. This policy, “nationalist in form but socialist in content,” made possible a federative state based on a permanent alliance between Russian and non-Russian Communists. It combined nationalist separatism in language and other cultural characteristics — institutionally or-

ganized under Republics, Autonomous Regions, and so forth—with homogeneity of political and economic institutions.

Economically, the incorporative Tsarist Empire also differed from the accumulative British Empire. The Russian extraction of wealth from newly conquered and added lands was far less efficient than was the British, because of the difference between expensive transport by land and cheap transport by water—even when allowance has been made for the system of river transport in the Russian homeland west of the Urals. The cotton textile interests of Russia, to take one example only, wanted to develop the growing of cotton in Russian Central Asia while retaining a monopoly of manufacture in Russia proper; but to grow cotton around Tashkent and Samarkand, to transport it by train to Moscow and other textile centers, and then to send out cotton cloth over the vast land expanses of the empire made possible a much lower rate of profit and capital accumulation than did the British system of cargoes carried by sea between America, Egypt, India, and Manchester.

This differential was overcome by the Communist-planned economic revolution, which was as drastic as the political revolution. Direct industrialization was undertaken in Inner Asia and elsewhere at the sources of the supply of raw materials. Soviet industrialization in Inner Asia and eastern Siberia has now built up the greatest total of horsepower, the widest technological diversification, and the highest level of skilled man power anywhere in Asia. The Soviet centers of industrialization are closer to India, the hinterland of China, Afghanistan, and Iran, than the industries of any Western state, and closer to coastal China than any industrial center except Japan. Success in industrialization has been made possible by developing a higher level of general education and a higher proportion of graduates of advanced institutions than anywhere else in Asia, including Japan.

America is now advancing from the wings onto the stage from which Britain is withdrawing. After the establishment of American power in the Philippines in 1898, the enunciation of the Open Door Doctrine, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the limiting of Russian power in the Pacific and in China became a permanent objective of American foreign policy. In addition, one of the pillars of our policy is now the principle that the weakening of Britain should not be allowed to form a vacuum into which the power of Russia might flow. As the rear guards of Britain withdraw, therefore, we advance our outposts. They are already in Inner Asia. During the war we established a Consulate General in Sinkiang for the first time. We have an active policy in Afghanistan, including a policy of road building. Since the war, we have opened diplomatic relations with Nepal. A Tibetan trade mission has been received in Washington. But we have blocked the admission to the United Nations of the Mongolian People's Republic, which we regard as an outpost of Russia.

This review of history shows how, to see the problems of Sinkiang in the round, the past and the present must be brought into focus with each other. In the past, influences flowed into Inner Asia from China, India, and Iran—long before the day of the Slav, the Anglo-Saxon, or the American. Inner Asia, however, also has its own history. There were always peoples firmly lodged in its oases, as well as peoples in transit through its steppes. Today again Inner Asia is a focus toward which converge influences from the outside. They stem from Russia, from China, from India, and from the Moslem Middle East. Through China and India are also transmitted the influences of America and the West. Today, as in the past, however, Inner Asia also has its own standing. Its peoples are not inert pawns on the vast chessboard of power politics. They are capable of political volition. Once more, as in the time of the Han Chinese and the Hsiungnu nomads two thousand years ago, their importance is of a peculiar kind. Though they cannot by the wildest maneuver accumulate great strength for themselves, they can add a strength disproportionate to their numbers to the side in whose direction they move, and detract more strength than on a coldly mathematical reasoning would seem possible from the side they choose not to join.
CHAPTER II Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang, 1800–1917

Early British and Russian Empire Building

Sinkiang's modern international relations began in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Britain, moving westward and northward through India, became increasingly sensitive to the Russian expansion southward from Siberia. The concern of Britain and Russia with Sinkiang rose steadily during the 1850's and 1860's, and came to a climax in the 1870's, during the exciting days of the adventurer Yakub Beg, who for a time seemed to have succeeded in carving out a new kingdom in the no man's land between the great powers. The forerunners of both British and Russian interest were geographers, explorers, and other daring individualists. Some of these men were primarily in search of scientific information, while others were government officials, traders or intelligence agents.¹

An impetus to obtain improved knowledge of Sinkiang was furnished in the first half of the nineteenth century by talk of the French and later the Russian menace to India. In his march to Moscow in 1812, Napoleon had carried with him dictionaries and maps of India. Perhaps he thought of persuading the Tsar to cooperate with him in a vast expedition to India which would dwarf the fourth century B.C. invasion by Alexander the Great. There had been discussion of such a move on India, in France and Russia, as early as the last decade of the eighteenth century. In both countries romantic proponents of such far-reaching plans were rebuffed by soberer officials who pointed to the well-nigh insurmountable obstacles which would have to be overcome. These plans, nevertheless, stirred fears in Britain which, in varying degrees of strength, have lasted throughout the century and a half since the days of Napoleon.²

For a brief moment early in 1801 the Russians under Tsar Paul had made active preparations for an invasion of India. When Tsar Alexander came to the throne in March 1801 he canceled that move on the first day of his reign. "The memory of the abortive attempt long remained in English minds," writes the British scholar, Cheshire, "and this date may be taken as the starting point of the suspicions which Great Britain subsequently entertained toward Russian action in Central Asia."³ Preliminary reconnaissances were made of the various routes by which Russia might conceivably cross Central Asia and pass over the mountains to India. One British agent, Mir Izzet Ullah, traveled in 1812–1813 from Kashmir to Yarkand and all the way around to Kabul via Bokhara. His journey, H. W. C. Davis tells us tersely, "disclosed the main routes by which Russian traders could communicate with China, Afghanistan, and the Punjab." Izzet Ullah's

¹ The fullest description of the explorations in the third quarter of the nineteenth century is furnished by Herman von Schlagintweit-Sahlinuski (brother of the Adolph Schlagintweit who was murdered at Kashgar in 1857) in his Reisen in Indian und Hochasien, 4 vols., Jena, 1869–1880, Vol. IV, pp. 217–404.

² The interest of France in India during the period of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon is the subject of a large literature—see for example A. L. P. Dennis, Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1901; especially Chapter III, "Napoleon Bonaparte and the Orient: The Egyptian Expedition." Samples of the immense mass of materials dealing with Russia and its interest in Central Asia and India are A. Rouire, La Rivalité Anglo-Russe au XIXe siècle en Asie, Paris, 1908, and Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, New York, 1933. The German historian, Hermann Oncken, sketches the development of British concern over the security of India in an uneven series of lectures on Die Sicherheit Indiens: Ein Jahrhundert englischer Weltpolitik, Berlin, 1937.

journey was followed in the next decade by the celebrated reconnaissances of William Moorcroft, who also aimed to go from Kashmir to Bokhara via Yarkand. "Moorcroft hoped to capture for British manufacturers a considerable share of the trade of Central Asia and the Western provinces of China." In the 1830's a bold surveyor called John Wood "not only ascended the plateau of the Pamirs . . . but also explored the trade-route connecting the Oxus with Chinese Turkestan, and the cross-routes by which an army might reach Afghanistan from the middle Oxus."

In the work of these and other British explorers the close connection between strategic and commercial purposes is manifest. The same is true on the Russian side. The British Minister to the Court of the Tsar reported in the 1840's that the great Russian landed proprietors, the most influential men of the day, almost all had money sunk in mills and factories. These men "had suffered much from the superiority of our [British] goods in the markets of Central Asia and latterly also in China . . ." thereby helping to give rise to a spirit of jealousy of England. In the middle of the nineteenth century both Britons and Russians considered it quite likely that trade with Central Asia might yet be-

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1. In a masterly and exciting article—"The Great Game in Asia (1800-1844)," Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XII, 1926—H. W. C. Davis has described the part played by agents of the Government of India in Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia (quotations from pp. 234, 245 and 236). Davis deals only with the first half of the nineteenth century. Russian activity throughout that century is traced by Cheshire who refers only in passing to the work of Russian explorers and geographers. That side of Russian activity is traced in detail by V. V. Bartold (or W. Barthold) Die geographische und historische Erforschung des Orients, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der russischen Arbeiten, Leipzig, 1915. A French translation of Bartold's work is now available. See also the recent work by B. E. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, London, 1937, Ch. I, Sec. 3, "Central Asia." A useful summary of British exploration in the Pamirs and nearby areas is given by Lord Curzon in The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus, London, 1896, which is a reprint of three articles published by him that same year in the Geographical Journal.


3. Davis, op. cit., p. 255.

India. As Terent'yev, one of the best known of the Tsarist writers on Central Asia, put it in the 1870's, in the Pamirs and Kashmir "Nature has left open for us a broad gate to India. These are the regions the Russian explorers ought to examine and toward which the attention of the Russian Government ought to be directed ... in view of the immense advantages which we should gain from a discovery of England's most vulnerable point."8 Thereby Russian forces would be able, in future periods of tension, to frighten Britain, pin down British troops in India, and distract British attention from the Black Sea, the area of greatest importance to Russia.

In these efforts Sinkiang shared very early. In 1857, the first year after the Crimean War, two explorers, Valikhanov and Semenov, examined the politics and topography of Kashgar and the Tien Shan area respectively. That same year the Tsarist Governor General of Western Siberia, General Gasfort, declared in his annual report: "The transformation of Kashgar into a State independent of China under a Russian protectorate would render a great service to its people, for whom the Sino-Manchurian tyranny has become insupportable. ... We shall make ourselves masters of Central Asia, and we shall be able to hold all the Khans in respect, which will facilitate our march forward."9 In the following decade Russia humbled in rapid succession the Khanates of Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand, Khiva, and Khokand. Russian merchants applauded these conquests, which improved the market for their manufactures and also provided a potential new source of cotton. Russian textile manufacturers did not wish to depend upon the American South for cotton, and during the American Civil War they sought frantically for alternative sources. This need was undoubtedly a factor of importance in the speedy Russian conquest of Turkistan in the 1860's and after.

Tsarist officers simultaneously sought to utilize for their pur-


poses the intense anti-British feeling which had developed at the Imperial Court in Peking as a result of the three Anglo-Chinese wars between 1839 and 1860. The Russian consul in Ili went so far as to suggest in 1860 to the Military Governor of the province that China revenge itself on Britain by attacking India through Yunnan and Tibet. The Military Governor passed on this suggestion to Peking and received in due course a complete rejection. The Imperial Court pointed out that Russia was not a disinterested party. That same year Russia extracted from Peking the right to station a consul in Kashgar (a similar right having been obtained for Kulja in 1851). On the other hand, Russia's success in securing the entire Maritime Province north of the Amur River, including Vladivostok, began to shift the emphasis of Russian policy from the Inner Asian end of the long frontier with China to the maritime end.

British interest in Sinkiang meanwhile had been mounting steadily since the final conquest of the Punjab in 1849, at the close of the Sikh Wars. Kashmir, which had been a part of the Sikh Empire, was made over to a renegade feudatory of the Sikhs, in consideration of his services to the British and upon payment of about 500,000 pounds. The British believed that their new position in northern India would put them "in possession of the key to the whole commerce of Central Asia ..."10 They noted with anxiety the spread of Tsarist power in the Khanates north of the mountains.

As early as 1844 the first of a series of elaborate reports was published on trading with Central Asia. That same year the Maharajah of Kashmir was made to agree to reduce his exactions on trans-frontier trade passing through his territory, while in 1867 a British official was stationed at Leh in Ladakh to aid the development of commerce with the north. In the same years one bold British surveyor, Johnson, visited Khotan briefly, and another, Hayward, went to Yarkand. A third, Robert B. Shaw — who in the familiar Inner Asian pattern was at once a government agent, a tea planter, a would-be trader, and a daring traveler —

became in 1869 the first Englishman to reach Kashgar. Shaw was the uncle of the still more famous Sir Francis Younghusband.

The pace of British activity was too slow for one group of impetuous military men and government officials. They called in the 1860's for an immediate show of Britain's strength, in cooperation with friendly Moslem potentates in Central Asia, to halt the Russian advance north of the mountains. The successful revolt of Yakub Beg in Sinkiang described later, soon led the Punjab Government to recommend a more positive course of action to the Governor General of India. C. U. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, wrote as follows on January 4, 1868:

Par. 10. — The expulsion of the Chinese from the countries of Eastern Turkistan has at the same time removed one of the greatest obstacles to trade with Yarkand, Khotan and Kashgar, while the advance of Russia has caused all the Mohammedan races of the North to look with more favor than heretofore towards England. We have had ambassadors from Khokand, Bokhara, and Khotan, all professing on the part of their chiefs a strong desire to open out friendly relations with the British Government, and in particular to promote the development of commerce between their countries and British India. We have received similar communications (through the Maharajah of Cashmere) from Yakub Koosh Begi, the new and energetic ruler of Yarkand, Kashgar, and Khotan; so that, in fact, all that now remains for us to do is to respond to the advances made to us on almost every side.

Par. 13. — The Lieutenant-Governor [of the Punjab] regards it as virtually certain, that of all Central Asia this (the country under Yakub Koosh Begi's rule) is the portion which is the most inviting to the trader, as being richer, more populous and more eager for traffic and the arts of peace, than the regions which may be called Tartary Proper, etc.; from the tracts published from time to time in the public papers, derived mainly from Russian sources, it seems clear that the Russians are of this opinion.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang

Par. 16. — Every reasonable effort should, in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, be made to establish friendly relations directly with the ruler of Yarkand... The Lieutenant-Governor is strongly of the opinion that it will now be a wise policy on our part to depute a native officer, of intelligence and discretion, in whom we can repose entire confidence, with suitable introductions to Yakub Koosh Begi's court, to assist our traders and watch over their interests, to collect detailed information in regard to the requirements and possible extension of the trade, and to keep the Yarkand ruler assured of the friendly intentions of our Government. 11

To this suggestion the Governor General responded with a flat and total rejection. Writing one year earlier the Economist had argued that Britain already had its hands full in China and India. "While we cannot afford to keep the peasants of Orissa alive [a reference to the famine of 1866 in eastern India, which took more than one million lives], we certainly do not want any responsibility for the shepherds of Kashgar." 12 The view which prevailed until the end of the 1860's was that "watchful waiting" would be the wisest policy.

The British in London were then debating the much larger question of their entire policy toward the Manchu Empire, whose power they had already done so much to enfeeble. The Manchus were struggling with the immense Taiping Rebellion in South and Central China, and with Moslem revolts in Southwest China as well as in the Northwest and Sinkiang. If these succeeded, the
British finally decided, the position of foreign powers and foreign trade would deteriorate. London's policy therefore switched over to support of the Manchus, to whom in the years after 1867 British banks extended a number of advances and loans. These helped finance the pacification force which the Manchus in 1867 began to organize to regain control of China's rebellious North-western Provinces. These were the first foreign loans obtained by China and it is noteworthy that they were made available for military rather than productive purposes.

Yakub Beg, Inner Asian Adventurer

To the British in India, however, apprehensive about Russia and desirous of Central Asian trade, the future of Sinkiang was too important to be allowed to depend solely on the slow and uneven progress of Manchu arms. By the end of the 1860's, the adventurer Yakub Beg had already been in power in Sinkiang for half a decade. High British officials, influenced by a series of optimistic reports from Shaw and other travelers and agents in Sinkiang, came to feel that Yakub Beg was well entrenched in power. They saw in his "strong state" a possible "convenient buffer," not only between China and Russia, but also between British India and expanding Russia.  

In language that has a quaintly modern ring, they referred to Central Asia as an area where "Russian influence immediately fills any space that is left vacant by the English powers. This political process has been aptly compared by a very high authority to the natural rushing of air into a vacuum."  

Informed British writers pointed with alarm to the progress of relations between Yakub Beg and the Russians. This had occurred, they explained, because of the failure of Britain to respond to earlier overtures from the Kashgar ruler, who had been left with no alternative but "to obey the law of ... political gravitation, under which his small kingdom, in common with all small States similarly situated in isolation between two large Powers, existed, viz. to lean upon one or the other."  

At the very time that London policy was supporting the recovery of Manchu authority in China, therefore, the British in India ended the policy of "watchful waiting" and in the 1870's threw aid and support to Yakub Beg.

This celebrated and colorful figure first appeared in Sinkiang in 1864, in connection with an effort to re-establish Khoja power. The Khojas had been hereditary Moslem potentates in Sinkiang from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, when they were driven out, first by the Mongols and then by the Manchus. They found refuge in Khokand (modern Ferghana), from which base they made periodic sorties toward Kashgar and other towns in the Tarim Basin. When the Manchus lost control of Sinkiang during the Moslem uprisings of the 1860's, the Khojas struck again. In 1864 a descendant of the former Khoja ruling house of Kashgar led a small band of men from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he had taken over Kashgar and Yarkand. His chief of staff was Yakub Beg, a Khokandi of humble birth whose youth had been spent as a dancing boy. In his manhood he turned to soldiering, and he played a part in the struggles of Khokand and neighboring Khanates to resist the tide of Tsarist expansion.

After the first wave of successes in the western Tarim Basin, the Khoja prince under whom Yakub Beg was serving devoted himself to dissipation. Yakub Beg soon displaced him and rounded off the Moslem reconquest of Eastern Turkistan by seizing Aksu, Khotan, and Urumchi.

Soon after seizing power, Yakub Beg had tried to buttress himself against the Manchus by securing recognition as an independent sovereign from his two powerful neighbors, Russia and British India. The British response, after an initial period of hesitation, was encouraging. For just as the Russians were arousing British sensitivity about India, the British were bringing pressure on Russia's weakest point, the Black Sea area. To this end the British, and particularly the British Indian Government, desired

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15 Showers, op. cit., p. 7.
“to build up a common front between Great Britain and Islam against Russia...” 16 As part of this program the British encouraged the pretensions of the Sultan of Turkey to the Caliphate— that is, to the primacy of the entire Islamic world, in the hope that the Sultan would direct that world against Russia.

When Yakub Beg, who had taken the title of Atalik Ghazi, sent an envoy to India in late 1869, he was received much more warmly than earlier emissaries from Kashgar. Partly this was because C. U. Aitchison, former Secretary of the Punjab Government, was now Secretary of the Foreign Department directly under the Governor General. More important was the fact that the attitude of the Government of India toward Inner Asian states was now colored by the conception of an Islamic front against Russia, in which Sinkiang might well play an important part. Even in its internal policy the Government of India was at this time in the process of swinging away from the pronounced anti-Moslem phase which characterized the decade after the great rebellion of 1857-1858, the outbreak of which had been attributed by the Government of India chiefly to India’s discontented Moslems.

Yakub Beg’s envoy was “honorably received” in Lahore by the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab and then granted an interview in Calcutta by the Viceroy. The envoy transmitted Yakub Beg's request that a British officer pay “a friendly visit” to the Atalik Ghazi’s court in Yarkand. The Viceroy agreed to send T. Douglas Forsyth to Yarkand, but strictly as an amicable gesture and not for any official business: his “sole purpose” was to be that of “opening up and giving impulse to the trade with that country.” 17 Yakub Beg’s envoy was permitted to buy four hundred muskets in Calcutta to be carried over the mountains to Yarkand. Forsyth


soon left at the head of a small party, but on his arrival at Yarkand he found that Yakub Beg was far away fighting around Urumchi. He thereupon turned around hastily and just managed to cross the mountains back to India in 1870, before snow closed the passes for the winter.

When a later envoy, Yakub Beg’s own nephew Saiyid Yakub Khan Tora, appeared in India in 1873, he was received most warmly and was aided in journeying on to Constantinople. There, the Sultan gave the high title of Amir-ul-Mu’minn (Commander of the Faithful) to Yakub Beg, and advised him to be friendly with Britain and shun dealings with the Tsar. The Sultan also sent Yakub Beg two hundred rifles, three cannon, and three army officers as instructors. As Yakub Beg’s envoy traveled through India on his return journey, he was joined by a well-staffed British mission, again headed by Forsyth. Together they crossed over the Karakoram Pass to Kashgar, where in 1874 Forsyth signed a treaty which threw Sinkiang open to trade with India and accorded Yakub Beg the high privilege—unprecedented for any other Central Asian ruler—of exchanging with India envos carrying the full status of Ambassador. The Forsyth Mission reported that Yakub Beg was securely entrenched in power; British strategists began to look forward to setting up a protectorate over Sinkiang; arms flowed from India to Yakub Beg via a trading company established in 1873 under Government of India inspiration, and in 1876 the Government of India formally ratified the Treaty of 1874.

One year later Yakub Beg was dead, his power shattered, and his realm overrun by Manchu forces.

The Russians, in contrast to the British, had always regarded Yakub Beg coldly. They were extracting many concessions from the Manchus and had no desire to alienate Peking by recognizing the pretensions of Yakub Beg—who, in any event, was an old enemy of theirs and had fought against them before he left Russian Turkistan. They felt that his regime could become a rallying point for the Moslems of all Inner Asia, including Russian Turkistan, against the power of the Tsar. Uneasy Russian officers termed
Kashgaria “a powerful Mussulman State, to which as to a center would be drawn the sympathy of the population, not only of the weak Mussulman States which had preserved their independence, but also of the population of the provinces which we had conquered. The importance of Kashgar in our eyes was, moreover, increased in consequence of the attempts of the English to draw this country to their side so as to incorporate it, (1) in a neutral zone of countries, which was to separate Russia from India, and (2) to acquire in Kashgaria a fresh market for the sale of their manufactured goods.”

Throughout the period of Yakub Beg’s rule Tsarist officers took care to safeguard what they considered to be Russia’s basic strategic and commercial interests in Sinkiang. Strategically, their chief concern was with the Ili River Valley, an ancient inland trade and military highway between Russia and China, which a titled Russian historian has termed as important to Russia as the Khyber Pass was to the British in India. About the time of the first Forsyth visit to Yarkand in 1870, Yakub Beg, who was operating around Urumchi, turned westward and seemed to be making a movement in the direction of Ili. “Under the spur of Yakub Beg’s move, and concerned for the safety of this trade route, Russia in 1871 moved troops into Kulja and occupied the territory of Ili. . . .” To reassure the Manchu Court in Peking, Tsarist officials announced that the occupied area would be returned as soon as Manchu forces were strong enough to maintain effective control there.

Impressed if not intimidated by Russian military action, Yakub Beg agreed in 1872 to Tsarist proposals for opening Eastern Turkistan to Russian commerce. Up to then he had tried to seal off his state against Tsarist merchants, largely from fear that they might pave the way for political penetration. His sweeping commercial treaty with Forsyth in 1874 was doubtless intended in large part to balance the British against the Russians. Worse still, from the Russian point of view, was Yakub Beg’s action, during the winter of 1873–1874, in accepting arms from the Sultan of Turkey and the title of Amir — the latter in such a way as to make Sinkiang something like a vassal state of the Sultan. Turkey was then the bitterest of Russia’s enemies and strongly under British influence. Tsarist officers considered Yakub Beg’s action tantamount to waving a red flag in their faces. The Tsarist Governor General of Turkistan concentrated troops in 1874–1875 in locations where they could best be deployed against Kashgar. Perhaps they actually would have been used against Yakub Beg had not a serious uprising broken out in Khokand, in 1875, draining off all Tsarist troops available in the area. In 1876, however, a Russian mission under Kuropatkin descended upon Yakub Beg and made a peremptory demand for strategic posts in the mountain passes west of Kashgar. Yakub Beg reluctantly but speedily acceded.

Yakub Beg’s position, by 1876, was in fact becoming very difficult. To the west and north stood the menace of unfriendly Russia. To the east, the Manchu pacification force under the indomitable Tso Tsung-fang was moving slowly but relentlessly in Yakub Beg’s direction, having already occupied Barkul, Hami, and Kuchengtze. Tso’s forces, moreover, were by 1876 receiving at Kuchengtze (a little more than one hundred miles east of Urumchi) important grain supplies from the Russians — thanks to an agreement negotiated in 1875 between Tso and the famous Russian explorer, Colonel Sosnovskii. Funds to purchase that grain came in part from loans to the Manchus by British banks in China.

The British, still interested in preserving Yakub Beg’s realm — for, despite their loans, they did not believe that the Manchus would be able to reconquer Eastern Turkistan — tried to medi-
The Age of Stable Empires before the Russian Revolution

The Russians were in no hurry to return Ili. They had expected the Manchus to win, and their grain supplies had played a significant part in the victory. But the Tsar did not intend to go unrecompensed. As early as March 1876 a conference of the half-

A. W. Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 2 vols., Washington, D. C., 1944. Vol. II, p. 766, article on Tso by Tu Lieh-che. There are many conflicting accounts of Yakub Beg’s death. Mohammed Yusuf Effendi, a Turkish officer — one of the three originally lent as “instructors” by the Sultan in 1873 — has left us a valuable eyewitness account. His version is that Yakub Beg became confused and disheartened, and Yakub Beg himself took (or was given) poison and died. In the ensuing disorder Manchu dominion was quickly reasserted over the entire province, except for Russian-held Ili.

Negotiations for the withdrawal of Tsarist forces from Kulja led in 1879 to the initialing of a draft treaty. Russia was to retain the western part of the Ili area, the valley of the Tekes River (an affluent of the Ili River) and certain strategic passes. Also, Russia was to be given sweeping advantages in the overland trade with China and an indemnity to defray the costs of occupying Ili. The provisions of this treaty were violently denounced in Peking, and a sentence of decapitation was passed on the envoy who had agreed to them. For a time it looked as though the Manchus would rather fight than accept them. Repeated British advice made the Manchus realize that if they went to war the only outcome would be the collapse of the dynasty. Reluctantly, a new envoy of the Manchus signed at St. Petersburg in 1881 a treaty almost identical with that of 1879 — the chief change being the return to China of the Tekes River valley and the strategic Muzart Pass. The sentence of decapitation on the earlier envoy was not carried out.

Frechting, op. cit., p. 885. Frechting found in the archives of the British Foreign Office documents describing the meeting in March, 1876, in St. Petersburg. “F.O. 65/937, Loftus to Derby, September 26, 1876, No. 444, secret; and enclosure, Hon. F. A. Wellesley (Military Attaché) to Loftus, September 18, 1876, No. 20, secret. This was one of the highly confidential Russian documents which Wellesley obtained through judicious bribery.”

Frechting criticizes sharply previous writers on China’s international relations who have characterized the treaty of 1881 as a “bloodless diplomatic triumph” for China (cf. Morse, II, p. 338). In Frechting’s view, Russia, by retaining the western part of Ili, ended up with more than the Tsarist officials had expected at their key conference in March 1876. It
In addition to their general disappointment over the outcome of the Yakub Beg affair, the British in India were deeply disturbed by military intelligence received from the second Forsyth Mission. Several of its members took roundabout routes from India to Sinkiang, exploring the passes through the Pamirs between Russian Turkestan and Kashmir. They confirmed earlier suspicions that troops and wheeled artillery could cross the mountains with relative ease. The Viceroy therefore prevailed on the Maharajah of Kashmir in 1876 to agree to take under his wing the several mountain chiefs controlling the southern approaches to the passes. Kashmir also consented to the stationing of a British officer in Gilgit, the pivotal point of the mountain country.

Later and more thorough reconnaissance in the 1880s demonstrated that no significant military force from Central Asia could approach India by way of Kashmir. British apprehension about danger from the direction of Sinkiang diminished, though anxiety about the area never completely disappeared.

might be more appropriate to call the treaty of 1881 not a “bloodless” triumph for China, but a “hollow” one. Implicit in the judgment on the 1881 treaty pronounced by Morse, Cordier, and writers who have followed them is the assumption that Russia really meant to keep all of the occupied Ili area. In this connection it is noteworthy that the most recent detailed British account of the crisis over Ili from 1879 to 1881 notes that “Russian administrators [in Kula], not knowing how long they were to remain, had not undertaken any work of development—a fact which tells against the idea that they had from the first a settled intention of keeping what they had got.” (V. Kiernan, *British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885*, Cambridge, 1989, p. 93.)

East of the Pamirs, suspicions about the possibility of wheeled vehicles crossing the Karakoram through the Chang-Chenmo Pass had been voiced in 1869 by Col. Charles L. Shooters, who wrote that “Messrs. Shaw and Hayward confirm Mr. W. H. Johnson’s account of the easy gradients and general practicability of the Chang-Chenmo route for wheeled carriages throughout.” (See Shooters’s memorandum of August 20, 1869, reprinted in his *Central Asian Question*, London, 1873, p. 10.) For Shaw’s later opinion of the impracticability of the Chang-Chenmo route, see his note added to the English translation of Terent’ev, pp. 108–109.

A tentative Tsarist move in 1878 no doubt helped to keep British nerves on edge. After being forced to give up some of Russia’s recent gains in the Black Sea area the Tsar called for some anti-British diversions in Central Asia. As part of these, “General Kaufman was ordered to move from Samarkand to Balkh, Bamiyan and Kabul, while General Abramov received orders to lead a column from Samarkand to Chitra and Kashmir. Nothing happened except some futile probing in the Pamirs; as one of the generals admitted later, “We did not know either the ground to be traversed or the population we were to meet.” (Cheshire, p. 96.)

Cited in Kiernan, op. cit., p. 207.
tance. They were both preoccupied with more serious rivalries in Europe, the Near East, and the Far East. In the 1890's, therefore, they worked out what amounted to a tacit agreement to let Sinkiang remain a backward, neutral zone, a buffer area between the two great empires. A key step forward in this process of accommodation was the delimitation in 1895 of Russian and British "spheres of influence" in the Pamirs; the follow-up to this was the Pamir Boundary Commission of the same year. Its chief work was to make certain that the Tsarist and British Empires would be separated from each other by a narrow finger of Afghan territory, the Wakhan Valley, which, it was agreed, would be considered to extend across the high mountains until it touched Chinese territory at the western edge of Sinkiang.

By the close of the nineteenth century there were no longer any sharp differences of opinion between Britain and Russia over Sinkiang. Britain's fears about Russia were distinctly lessened after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In the comprehensive settlement in 1907 of Anglo-Russian differences, Sinkiang was not so much as mentioned. Speaking in London in 1909, George Macartney (then British Consul in Kashgar) praised Russia for its restraint in Sinkiang and virtually termed Russian policy there one of "conspicuous moderation." The improvement in Anglo-Russian relations about this time is usually attributed to common fear of Germany. A British writer points out that both powers were also moved by fear of growing unrest among the peoples of Asia, and cites a striking quotation of General Kuropatkin in his report as War Minister in 1900 to Tsar Nicholas II: "India in the 20th century would be a burden for Russia. In Asia there is arising a struggle of the non-Christian regions against the Christian ones. In this struggle we are on the side of England." 30

That alliance made the Japanese watchdogs of the British against Russia; when the treaty was renewed in 1905, at the close of the Russo-Japanese War, a new provision was added whereby the two parties guaranteed each other's "special interests," not only in the Far East, but in the region of India as well.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 gave rise to a fresh set of fears about the future of Sinkiang, but did not upset Anglo-Russian harmony in the area, which persisted right through the outbreak of war in 1914 and down to the Soviet Revolution of 1917.

This chapter may be concluded with two suggestive quotations. The first is from the aggressive Tsarist General Skobelev, who penned in 1891 his famous remark: "Without a serious demonstration towards India, in all probability in the direction of Kandahar, it is impossible to think of a war for the Balkan Peninsula." Skobelev's afterthought, however, is not cited so frequently: "It would be possible to give up the whole of Central Asia for a serious and advantageous alliance with England." 31

The final quotation comes from a recent work by a distinguished British authority who served for thirteen years as Adviser to the Foreign Office on the Far East:

Throughout the nineteenth century the expansion of Russia in Asia was the favourite bogy of British statesmen of all schools of thought. Occasionally a voice would be raised to point out that a sprawling, loose-knit and somewhat slack and inefficient empire such as that of Russia was not really capable of embarking on and carrying through so desperate an enterprise as the invasion and conquest of India, but it was always a voice crying in the wilderness. We continued persistently to overrate the offensive capacity of Russia as much as later on we underrated that of Japan. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why, when our chief fear was the threat to India, we should from the earliest times so persistently have thrown ourselves across Russia's path in the Far East. In other parts of the world we definitely disclaimed the role of the "Knight Errant of the world careering about to redress grievances and help the weak." We interfered only when a threat to British interests gave us a definite locus standi, but it is difficult to see what important British interest was threatened by Russian expansion in northeastern Asia in the middle of the nineteenth century. A realistic foreign

30 That alliance made the Japanese watchdogs of the British against Russia; when the treaty was renewed in 1905, at the close of the Russo-Japanese War, a new provision was added whereby the two parties guaranteed each other's "special interests," not only in the Far East, but in the region of India as well.

31 Cheshire, op. cit., p. 97.
policy, such as that adopted by our rivals on the continent of Europe, might well have encouraged such a development as tending to lessen the risk to India.32


CHAPTER III Chinese Policies in Sinkiang

The Crushing of the Moslem Rebellion

Before Sinkiang became a Chinese province in 1884 this western borderland was known to the Chinese as Hsi Yu ("the Western Region"). The story of China's relations with this area is a long one. As early as 115 B.C. Emperor Wu Ti of the Han Dynasty began to send envoys to Hsi Yu with lavish presents, and by 36 B.C. nearly all the kingdoms of Hsi Yu had recognized the suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor. In the late Han Dynasty about fifty kingdoms were asked to send hostages to China, some of whom were returned, with Chinese wives or Chinese troops, to succeed to the local thrones. One kingdom was set against another in a policy of "divide and rule." Military expeditions were sent — the largest, under General Li Kuang-li, comprising 100,000 troops — and a series of able commanders, aided by cavalry and military colonization, continued to keep order among the oases of the Tarim Basin up to the beginning of the third century A.D., when the Han Dynasty fell.

After several centuries of confusion, a Chinese reconquest of Hsi Yu took place under the Tang Dynasty when the Western Turks were defeated in Jungaria. The Chinese Emperor established two military governorships, one north and one south of the Tien Shan, and from 657 to 751 the oasis kingdoms acknowledged Chinese suzerainty.

Chinese policy during the Tang period was more aggressive and resourceful than it had been under the Han Dynasty. Embassies were sent not primarily to offer bribes but to secure information. Instead of individual hostages, large numbers of Iranians were brought from Hsi Yu to Kansu and Shensi as settlers.
Not only were Iranian soldiers used in military campaigns but Iranian and Uighur generals were appointed in the Imperial Service. Military and civil administrations were expanded and developed on both sides of the Tien Shan. By 742 there was a Chinese frontier army with a total strength of 490,000 men and more than 80,000 horses, and ten marshals had been appointed to supervise the frontier military bases. Then, in a battle near the Talas River in 751, the Prince of Tashkent, aided by Arabs, disastrously defeated the Chinese, and the Inner Asian kingdoms were freed from Chinese rule.

The next Chinese reconquest of Hsi Yü was under the Manchus in the second half of the eighteenth century; and after the Yakub Beg rebellion during the latter part of the nineteenth century Sinkiang became a Chinese province. Manchu policy in Hsi Yü was militarily much weaker than that of the Han Dynasty, and politically inferior to that of the Tang. The crude and cruel nature of the Manchu policy was shown by their unprecedented massacres in Jungaria and in the Uighur revolts in the Tarim Basin which culminated in the Yakub Beg rebellion.

For the suppression of this rebellion, the Chinese (Manchu) Government for the first time in history resorted to foreign loans. In 1876 Tso Tsung-t'ang, a Chinese general from Hunan who had already done much to subdue the Taipings and prove himself loyal to the Manchu Imperial Court, was appointed commander in chief of the Sinkiang expedition. His second in command was Liu Ching-t'ang, who proved himself so able that later he became the first governor of Sinkiang. At Suchow in Kansu he accumulated a stock of grain large enough to last his army for two years. When his army reached Komul, Barkul, and Kuchengtze, it was divided into two groups. The best soldiers remained in the regular army, while the less able-bodied garrisoned the three cities, and, as colonists, raised their own food by farming.

Liu Ching-t'ang, continuing the westward advance, captured Urumchi and Manass. His troops then joined another column south of the Tien Shan, and Kharashahr, Toksun, and Turfan fell in quick succession in 1877. Yakub Beg, then at Kurlia, committed suicide upon receiving this news. In the autumn of 1877, Kucha, Bai, Aksu, and Uch Turfan were taken by the forces under the overall command of Tso Tsung-t'ang. In the beginning of 1878 the four western cities of Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, and Khotan were also taken. The people, who had been too heavily taxed by Yakub Beg to sympathize with his regime, were glad to welcome Tso's army.

Before the Sinkiang campaign was completed, however, there had been a serious debate in China as to its real worth. Li Hung-chang, the Viceroy of Chihli (now Hopei), and Pao Yuan-sheng, the Governor of Shansi, believed that the reconquest of Sinkiang should be abandoned in order to concentrate energy on coastal defense. Tso Tsung-t'ang, on the other hand, strongly advocated the continuation and completion of the land campaign in the Northwest, and even pointed out the great danger of not taking and garrisoning Urumchi.

According to Li and Pao, "Sinkiang is the limb but coastal defense is the heart of China. The capital is near the sea, and is closely linked with coastal defense. In case the capital is lost, there would be no use in holding Sinkiang. The Northwest land expedition therefore is not so urgent nor so important as coastal defense." According to this view it was almost impossible to look after the defense of both the coast and the northwest land frontier, and to keep Sinkiang would in any case be a burden to China.

because Sinkiang was not a revenue-yielding region and would have to be heavily subsidized by the Imperial treasury. Sinkiang would also be a disadvantage in international relations, because China was not strong enough to ward off Russia, Britain, Persia and Turkey, all of which had interests in Jungaria or the Tarim Basin. It would be more practical to give up Sinkiang than to attempt to keep it temporarily. In this connection, the unwarranted fear of Persia and Turkey is an interesting revelation of the limitations of the factual knowledge available to the Manchu Court.

Li Hung-chang therefore advised the Imperial Court to withdraw the Northwest expedition and to settle some of the troops as colonists, not in Sinkiang but in Kansu, in the Anhui and Tunhuang areas, where they would be available as a permanent frontier militia. The local governments of Ili, Urumchi, Kashgar, and other areas should be acknowledged as Chinese protectorates or tributaries, similar to Annam, Korea, or the Miao, Yao, and Tai tribal "principalities" on the borders of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan.

In direct opposition to Li Hung-chang’s policy of abandoning the Sinkiang expedition, Tso Tsung-t’ang vehemently advocated the suppression of the Yakub Beg rebellion and the preservation of Sinkiang. Tso’s reasons may be summarized as follows: Sinkiang was of the utmost strategic importance to North China, in that the defense of Peking had to rely on the military posts at Kalgan, Uliassutai and Kobdo, and the defense of Mongolia depended on the security of Sinkiang. China’s seaboard was not threatened by the foreign powers—which were interested only in obtaining commercial privileges, and not in the occupation of any territory which would involve them in military and civil administrative expenses. In order to have a firm hold on Sinkiang it would be necessary to keep Urumchi, as well as Barkul and Komul to the east and Chuguchak to the northwest. Tso argued that Jungaria was strategically more important than the Tarim Basin, and therefore he would not listen to any idea of retrenchment until these posts in northern Sinkiang were captured and well administered.

Tso was genuinely convinced of the importance of Sinkiang. When the British Minister in Peking suggested to the Manchu court that Yakub Beg’s realm might be treated as China’s protectorate, Tso vigorously opposed the idea. Again when the Chinese Minister in London tolerated the British proposal of recognizing a separate kingdom in Kashgar, Tso countered, as described in Chapter II, by suggesting that if the British had been sincere in their intentions toward Kashgar they should have ceded some Indian territory to it, and that if the British Minister in Peking had wanted to negotiate he might better have gone to Tso’s own headquarters at Suchow. With this resolute attitude and with a firm military policy, Tso Tsung-t’ang moved troops from Jungaria into the Tarim Basin and conquered it.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century China was virtually ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Tso Tsung-t’ang, Li Hung-chang, and Chang Chih-tung, the famous Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan. Chang leaned more toward Tso’s policy than toward Li Hung-chang’s, and advocated the sending of a Chinese mission to St. Petersburg for new negotiations regarding Ili. Perhaps the Manchu Court in Peking ultimately decided in favor of Tso Tsung-t’ang’s policy, out of respect for the military records of the Imperial Ancestors. Since Jungaria and the Tarim Basin had been conquered and consolidated by the Emperor Ch’ien-lung in the middle of the eighteenth century, it would have appeared to be neglect of filial piety if the Imperial Court had not restored Sinkiang, including Ili, to the empire.

Tso Tsung-t’ang’s policy in Sinkiang was marked by his caution in selecting civil and military officials and by his harshness
against the Tungans or Chinese Moslems, in order to obviate future rebellion. He employed many of his own relatives and supporters from Hunan Province in his administration, and this accounts for the fact that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Hunan officials almost completely dominated the Sinkiang administration. While Tso regarded the Uighurs as rebels, he regarded the Tungans as traitors, because they were Chinese in language, and largely Chinese by descent. Partly out of hatred against them as traitors and partly in order to “divide and rule,” Tso massacred the Tungans in great numbers but showed the greatest clemency to the Uighurs, the Kazakhs, and the Mongols.

Even after the conclusion of Tso’s military campaigns in the Tarim Basin there were debates among high officials and in the Imperial Court as to the status of the reconquered region. Finally the view championed by Tso Tsung-fang was adopted by the Manchu Emperor. On November 18, 1884, an Imperial Edict was issued which made Sinkiang a province (Hsin-chiang, “the New Territory,” or, as it is frequently translated, “New Dominion”). Urumchi, under the Chinese name of Ti-hua, was proclaimed the capital and more than twenty district administrations were organized.

The Chinese in this new province may be classified in four categories, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. First are the descendants of criminals and officials who were banished from China during the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. Second are the families of military and civil officers in Sinkiang, mostly from Hunan, Yunnan, Kansu and the Northeastern (Manchurian) Provinces. Third are the merchants, including money-changers from Shansi, traders from the Tientsin area, and brick tea merchants from Hupeh and Hunan. Fourth are the peasants, whose immigration began in 1776, when an Imperial Edict provided for a subsidy for those who would settle in Sinkiang.¹⁰

¹⁰ Tung-hua hsii-lu, 1a-1b, Kuo-ku 66; Ta Ch’ing Ta Tsung Ching Huang-ti Shih-lu, 190, 27a-28a; and Ch’ing Shih Kao, Pen-chi, Vol. 23, 17a.

¹¹ Wang Hsien-chien, Tung-Hua Lu (Collection of State Papers), Imperial Edict of June, 1776.

Merchants from Tientsin have flourished as far north as the city of Kulja in the Ili Valley. Nearly twenty years ago a British observer remarked that “successful merchants at Kulja come from the towns of Tou Liu and Yang Liu Ch’ing near Tientsin; the commerce of Ili has been kept in the families for generations, and considering the numbers of relations and connections every Chinese has, it is not to be wondered at that Tientsin people form a whole community, ranging from barbers to landowners, at Kulja.”¹¹

Ever since Sinkiang became a province a small Chinese minority has ruled it by the indirect methods which many colonial governments have found effective. The traditional Uighur and Kazakh and Mongol feudal structures have been left more or less undisturbed, with the existing Begs and princes used as instruments of Chinese rule. In Sinkiang, just as in Sikang and the southernmost parts of Yunnan, the result of this indirect rule is an administration with a Chinese upper stratum and an indigenous lower stratum. The chief defect of this system is that instead of promoting political and administrative progress, it fortifies and preserves the feudal system, and hinders the evolution of a more modern form of society.

While bribery, corruption and venality are almost endemic in the lower stratum of administration, the quality of the upper administration is naturally subject to the policy of the governor or the chairman of the provincial government. At this top level Chinese policy has passed through three distinct stages. From 1884 to 1933 there was a period of about half a century dominated by an old-fashioned feudal bureaucracy. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin and Governor Chin Shu-jen can best be described as the last of the old imperial bureaucrats, though both served under the Chinese Republic. Then followed a decade of war lord rule from 1933 to 1944, under General Sheng Shih-ts’ai, whose policy was at first liberal and later harshly repressive. Finally, from 1944 until Sinkiang became enveloped by Chinese Communism on the east as well as Russian Communism on the west,
Kuomintang policy in this frontier region can best be described as one of fitful opportunism in the face of chronic emergency.

Feudal Bureaucracy, 1884–1933

Of all the feudal bureaucrats in Sinkiang the most able was Yang Tseng-hsin. He was born in Yunnan, though his family originally moved there from Nanking. After having successfully passed the Imperial Civil Service Examinations, he was appointed district magistrate in Kansu and later promoted to be prefecture head and regional administrative head (Taofai) in that province. His record was so good that it attracted the attention of Wang Shu-t'ang, Commissioner of Civil Affairs in Sinkiang, who recommended his appointment as Taofai of the Aksu region. Still later he became Taofai (Intendant of the Circuit) of Urumchi and Barkul. In 1912, after disturbances accompanying the Chinese Revolution, the Governor of Sinkiang resigned and made Yang Tseng-hsin his successor. Yang negotiated with separatist leaders in Ili, prevented a Moslem revolt in Komul, quickly suppressed a rebellion of the Ko Lao Hui (Elder Brethren) secret society in the Tarim Basin, and unified the whole provincial administration.

Most of the important military and police officers under Yang were from Yunnan. These were young men, enthusiastic about the new Chinese Republic. When in 1916 General Ts'ai Ao in their distant home province of Yunnan raised the banner of revolt against Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to set up a monarchy, they wanted to join the Republican movement. Because Yang Tseng-hsin refused to join, they plotted to kill him, but the plot was discovered by one of his intelligence agents. The steps that Yang then took showed his alertness and cunning.

First he called the Yunnanese officials before him to answer the charge. When they denied it, he executed his own intelligence agent to convince them that he believed they had been falsely accused. He then had their families moved into his own residential quarters. Shortly afterward, when he had to entertain an inspector from the Peking Ministry of Education, he invited all

the important Yunnanese officials to the feast. There he had his bodyguards murder two of them right in the dining hall; the rest were imprisoned or banished.12

Of middle height, with a strong face, Yang looked remarkably dignified; but he was a cunning and suspicious person. He ruled the province as an autocrat, taking very little notice of the Central Government in Peking. Though the central authorities made several attempts to depose or retire him, he kept his position by a mixture of bribery and force. Officials sent from Peking were either held up at his headquarters until he was sure that they did not or could not oppose him, or given presents and politely sent back. In the fifteen years of his rule he built up a family hierarchy, posting his relatives from one end of the province to the other. In 1927 all the district magistrates in southernmost Sinkiang, from Keriya to Kashgar, with two or three exceptions, were related to him either directly or by marriage.

Throughout his rule, Yang was troubled by the fear of revolt, and showed an extreme caution in handling people and affairs. Chinese and foreign newspapers were regularly censored. Any news that might encourage disturbances was excluded from the province as far as possible. No newspapers were permitted in the Uighur or Kazakh languages.13 The telegraph office at Yang's headquarters was attended to by the Governor himself. He locked and unlocked the door every day, and the office staff were not allowed to talk with outsiders. He himself took custody of all important documents, which could not be consulted, even by heads of bureaus, without his permission.

Yang made an important change in the lower or "native" administration at the level of the Begs, or Uighur "headmen." At some time prior to 1910, and probably shortly after Sinkiang became a province, the Chinese administration had given these

12 This story is told by Hsieh Pin, in his Account of Travels in Sinkiang, Shanghai, 1925, p. 135 (in Chinese). The author was the inspector from Peking who was present at the feast.
Begs the Chinese designation of Hsiang Yeh ("District Elders"). Chinese magistrates came and went, but these Hsiang Yeh often held office for twenty or thirty years, or even for life. In this way the Uighur District Elder, solidly entrenched, often had an advantage over his superior, the temporary Chinese magistrate. Not infrequently a wealthy and locally powerful elder, dismissed by a higher Chinese official, was able to obtain reinstatement when there was a change of administration. In 1915 Yang Tseng-hsin found a device which undermined this kind of local strength. He recommended by the Chinese magistrate, and finally appointed by himself. After appointment, the District Elder might be dismissed at any time, but had the privilege of re-election. The significance of this ladder of election, recommendation, and appointment was that it was also a ladder by which talebearers could reach the provincial capital and make accusations against locally powerful men.

As a bureaucrat of the old school Yang was both generous in cultivating good will and severe in punishing offenses, with the result that the tales told about him reflected the popular conviction that even in justice he was despotic. According to one of these tales the old Governor, while walking in the streets of his capital like a Harun al-Rashid, saw a soldier stealing boots from a shop. After watching him successfully remove fourteen pairs, he shot him. At the same time, he was generous to Russian refugees in Sinkiang; for many of them he found employment, to others he gave money allowances. It was also said that he gave money for the education in Peking of the son of Fan Yao-nan, his Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, the man who in the end murdered him.

In his policy toward the non-Chinese nationalities in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin followed tradition in setting one people against another, and also in exploiting quarrels between factions within each nationality. Under Manchu rule, the Torgut Mongols of Sinkiang had been favored against the Kirei Kazakhs. The basic rights to pasture were considered to belong to the Mongols, and Kazakh clans or tribes were treated as "tenants" of Mongol tribes. Disputes over primary and subsidiary rights, and over the use of migration routes, forested lands, and water were frequent. It was traditional also to exploit antagonisms between nomads and settled peoples, and among the settled groups themselves.

When Yang Tseng-hsin came to power there had been a revolution in Outer Mongolia as well as in China. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might make common cause with Outer Mongolia, Yang turned his favor away from them and toward the Kazakhs. The Mongols were forbidden to carry arms, but the Kazakhs were allowed to hire arms from the Chinese provincial forces. An exception was made, however, for the Kharashahr division of the Torgut Mongols, who were most distant from Outer Mongolia and whose territory lay strategically between the Ili Valley and the Tarim Basin. This one group of Mongols was allowed to maintain a good cavalry force, trained by Russian Cossacks.

Yang was not unaware, however, of the modern aspects of nationalism. In a memorial to the National Government at Peking in 1925, when revolutionary influences were stirring all over China, he pointed out that power and privilege had been the basic factors in Pan-Islamism among all the Moslem peoples in both Europe and Asia. His idea of the appropriate policy in Sinkiang can be seen from the following quotation:

"The son of Fan Yao-nan, his Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, the man who in the end murdered him.

Only by a Republican federation can racial antagonisms be gradually dissolved. Most important of all is to realize political and administrative reform. The land of the Moslems should not be regarded as "fish or meat"—an object of exploitation. It must be demonstrated that the indirect rule of the Chinese is superior to the autonomy of the Moslems.

Otherwise it would be difficult to avoid internal conflicts and to ward off aggression from without.  

He was also fully aware of the underlying weakness of Chinese rule in this distant frontier province. In the same memorial he wrote:

It is a pity that what is called five races in one family [Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans] has been only nominal and has not become a reality. Chinese officials, without a sense of moral obligation but full of ideas for selfish gain, are rarely talented in administration. There are too many bad officials and too few good ones. This is why there have been more days of trouble and fewer of tranquility. This is true of all provinces, but it is worse on the frontier. It will be impossible for the Chinese officials to control the Moslems permanently unless administration is greatly improved.

In keeping with the ideas expressed in his own memorial, Yang Tseng-hsin made certain attempts to improve the economic situation in Sinkiang. As early as 1915 he put an end to the monopolization of the trade in silkworm eggs. In Yarkand, Khargalik, Cuma Bazar, Khotan, Lob, and Keriya especially Chinese magistrates had been accustomed to import silkworm eggs from Russia and India. These they sold to the peasants, charging over three taels and sometimes as much as five taels for a case of eggs that cost one tael at most.

In 1916, Yang made an attempt to end the special form of corvée, known by the Manchu term wula, widely prevailing in such frontier provinces as Sikang, Szechuan, Chinghai, and Sinkiang, under which officials and travelers with official authority can requisition food, lodging, and transport. The requisitioning is done through local officials, and is a source of abuse because of the extra requisitioning which the officials exact on their own be-

17 Tseng Wen-wu, op. cit., p. 599.
18 Ibid., p. 103.
19 Ibid., pp. 595-596.
loans and the lending of public money, and then by ordering the complete withholding of government loans.20

More effective, because more easy to carry out, was Yang's policy of regulating trade balances. He required merchants to limit imports to values which would not exceed the value of exports. The object of this policy was both to prevent the draining of wealth from the province and to prevent Uighur merchants from banking their accumulated wealth in Russia (before the Russian Revolution), and also to stop Chinese merchants from holding their wealth in provinces other than Sinkiang. He himself, however, through Chinese merchants acting as his agents, sold Sinkiang exports, principally in Tientsin, and then banked the proceeds not in China but under the American flag in the Philippines.

During Yang Tseng-hsin's rule Sinkiang was forced to change its fiscal basis completely. Before the Revolution, the province had been heavily subsidized by the Imperial treasury. The annual subsidy was at one time as high as 2,920,000 taels; then it fell to 2,600,000 taels, and by the time of the Republic the poverty of the Central Government cut off the subsidy altogether. Yang Tseng-hsin then issued his own provincial paper currency to a face value of about 10,000,000 taels.21 This measure inevitably caused an inflation and considerable hardship.

Eventually, no less than four paper currencies were established in the same province. The Urumchi, Turfan, Ili, and Kashgar regions each had its own currency, and each currency exchanged against the others at different rates. Each paper currency, carrying values not in dollars but in taels, had a subsidiary copper coinage. Only in the Kashgar region, with its two-way trade with both India and Russian Turkistan, was there a certain amount of silver backing, with silver coins in circulation in addition to paper.

20 For these reforms or attempted reforms, see Tseng Wen-wu, op. cit., pp. 595–596.
22 For these reforms or attempted reforms, see Tseng Wen-wu, op. cit., pp. 595–596.
24 The mu, a traditional land measure, varies from place to place. Six mu to the acre is often taken as an average figure.
In Chinese Turkestan, where corruptness permeated all classes, advancement, like other marketable commodities, was bought and sold... The result was that nothing was done which was not specially paid for, and the people were plundered in order that their rulers might grow rich. Such were the ways in which villages and towns were vampired.24

As an official of the old school, Yang's attitude toward foreign civilization was definitely conservative. Though he was too courteous to show his feelings to foreigners directly, it is known that he disliked them. When a Chinese student attached to the Sino-Swedish Expedition under Sven Hedin asked him why he did not employ foreign engineers to introduce modern techniques into his province, he flew into a rage and said: "Yes, that is just like you students, ready to sell your country to the foreigner."25

Yet he was a realist in handling as best he could the international situations with which he was confronted. In 1912, when he was inaugurated as Military Governor, he said in an official statement:

From the Han and T'ang Dynasties on, whenever China was at peace and powerful the frontier people became obedient; but whenever China was weak and in confusion they revolted. Today the situation has greatly changed. We are being threatened by Outer Mongolia and powerful foreign nations. We shall not be able to come back to Sinkiang if we once lose it.26

As soon as he took office as Governor in 1912, Yang Tseng-hsin had to concern himself with problems on the Sinkiang frontier with Outer Mongolia. Then, in 1916, there was a revolt of the Kazakhs in Russian territory, set off by a Tsarist order for labor conscription.27 When it was crushed, many armed Kazakhs crossed into Sinkiang, plundering and murdering as they swarmed in thousands over the frontier passes, especially near the mountain lake of Issik Kul. They then dispersed among the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. Governor Yang did not attempt to prevent their entry, and let them go where they pleased.

As soon as the October Revolution broke out in Russia, refugees began to enter Sinkiang. In 1920 and 1921 two groups of armed "White" (anti-Red) Russians retreated into Sinkiang. They totaled between 30,000 and 40,000 men. Some wished merely to retreat through Sinkiang into China proper; others wished to reach India; others attempted to join up with the counterrevolutionary Russian bands in Outer Mongolia. Yang, who had only about 10,000 troops under his command, dealt with the emergency cautiously but firmly. He disarmed some of the Russian troops and interned them in and near Kuchengtze. He then negotiated with Moscow for amnesty for all those who would return peacefully to Russian territory. At the same time, he asked for help from Moscow to dislodge armed "White" Russians from the Altai region on the Outer Mongolian frontier. He also took advantage of this emergency to revise the administrative structure of the Altai region — which before 1912 had been in some ways subject to the jurisdiction of the Manchu Amban in Kobdo, in Outer Mongolia, as well as to the provincial authorities in Sinkiang — a stronghold of Mongols and Kazakhs, by dividing it into three districts and three subdistricts.

In his dealings with the new Soviet regime across the frontier from him, Yang Tseng-hsin was cautious but not hostile. The National Government at Peking to which he was nominally subordinate was virtually powerless, and for some years had no relations with Moscow. He himself, however, had to deal with a dual

24 Bosshard, op. cit., p. 497.
heritage of Russian interests in Sinkiang and Chinese interests in adjoining Russian territory. In 1920 he closed the frontier toward Russia west of Kashgar—a move which may have been prompted by the fact that the British, who were especially hostile to the new Soviet regime, had strong influence in Kashgar and had, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, used it as a subsidiary base for their activities in Russian Central Asia.  

In the same year, however, he concluded a trade agreement between Sinkiang and the local authorities in Soviet territory. Under this agreement he encouraged the return of Russian refugees, while the authorities at Tashkent agreed to take a friendly attitude on the problem of the private property of Chinese citizens which had been affected by the Soviet program of confiscation.

At the same time, the trade route through the Ili Valley was fostered as an alternative to that through Kashgar. Instead of the previous seven Russian consulates, there were to be only two, both in the Ili Valley. A Chinese consulate was provided for at Semipalatinsk and another—in spite of the fact that this was a local agreement made by a Chinese province, not by the National Government—at Verkhne-Udinsk, on the frontier between Siberia and Outer Mongolia. The reason for a consulate at the main gateway of trade between Russia and Outer Mongolia is not clear; there can have been little trade of concern to Sinkiang passing by this route. Most important of all, extraterritoriality was abolished and traders and travelers were made subject to the law of the locality where they happened to be.

This makeshift arrangement was superseded in May 1924 when diplomatic relations were restored between China and the Soviet Union under a treaty signed at Peking. In December of the same year a Soviet consulate was opened at Chuguchak; in the spring of 1925 one at Sharasume and one (already provided for under the provincial agreement) at Iining; in August, a Soviet consul

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29 M. R. Norius, Gateway to Asia, N. Y., 1944, p. 62.
five-barred flag of the Chinese Republic to the new blue-field, white-sun national flag of the Kuomintang, did Yang Tseng-hsin acknowledge the Nanking Government; but in practice the internal administration of Sinkiang was scarcely affected. In this year, the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition, headed by Sven Hedin and backed by the authority of the Chinese Government, reached Sinkiang after a journey through Inner Mongolia. The movements of its Chinese members as well as its Swedish and German members were carefully circumscribed by the provincial authorities. Only reluctantly was Sven Hedin permitted to leave Urumchi for Komul; and in his own words his "reception by the Chinese officials of Hami was as disagreeable as that by the Sultan [of Hami] was the reverse." 31

In the same year of 1928 Yang Tseng-hsin was assassinated, after he had ruled Sinkiang for seventeen years, dealing successfully with the events that followed the Chinese Revolution, the Outer Mongolian Revolution, and the Russian Revolution. When in 1928 he changed flags and nominally proclaimed allegiance to Nanking, he seems to have anticipated an early end to his career. He had transferred his enormous wealth to British and American banks, and placed his family in Manila, beyond Chinese jurisdiction." 32 To that extent, he was ready for the death that came to him at the hands of his trusted subordinate Fan Yao-nan, in a manner that recalled the way in which he himself, at the outset of his career as Governor, had murdered his Yunnanese colleagues.

Fan Yao-nan, Yang's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, gave a feast on July 7, 1928, on the occasion of the graduation exercises of the Government Law School in Urumchi. As that school used the Russian language in its curriculum, Soviet consular officials and other Russians were invited together with all the leading Chinese officials. Yang Tseng-hsin arrived with an escort of two hundred soldiers in addition to his regular bodyguards. Fan's

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lambkins were collected at only a tenth of the market value. Monopolies of this kind, through collection at the source of supply by the assertion of official authority, were common in China — especially in the frontier provinces. A Russian observer estimated that in Urumchi only 12 per cent of trade capital belonged to local merchants, 37 per cent to agents of foreign firms, and as much as 51 per cent to Chinese officials. 84

While Governor Yang had issued paper currency to a total of 10,000,000 taels, Governor Chin increased the inflation by expanding the issue to 145,000,000 taels. Under Yang, the paper currency had a uniform face value of one tael (subject to an exchange differential between regions, as described previously); under Chin, notes were issued in denominations of one, three, five, eight, ten, thirty, and fifty taels. At one time, a tael of silver (about one and one-third ounces) could be bought for two paper taels; by the end of Chin’s regime, it took 80 taels in paper to buy a tael of silver. 85

Both Yang and Chin could be described favorably as “cautious” or unfavorably as “suspicious” in their dealings with foreigners. According to Sven Hedin: “Chin hated foreigners. He took a cynical pleasure in tripping them up, in hindering or frustrating their endeavors.... Marshal Yang had decided that a house should be placed at the disposal of the expedition so long as it remained in Sinkiang, arguing that our work was of benefit to the development of the province. For this house Chin demanded an unreasonable rent, which he made retroactive. For that matter, the narrow-minded despot treated everyone with the same meanness.” 86 On the other hand, my wife and I, when traveling through Sinkiang in 1927, met with the most cordial treatment from Chin Shu-jen, who was then administrator of Aksu oasis. 87

The completion in 1930 of the Turksib Railway, passing close to the Chinese frontier in the Ili region, naturally encouraged Sinkiang-Soviet trade, which in that year passed the level of 32,000,000 rubles. In the following year, 1931, shortly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Urumchi was threatened by Ma Chiung-ying, the leader of a Moslem invasion from Kansu, who had already captured Barkul and Komul and was taking over the leadership of a Moslem rising within the province. Since Ma was accompanied by Japanese “advisers” and believed to be backed by Japanese militarists, he was not only a menace to the province but a danger to Soviet frontier interests. Chin Shu-jen, in order to obtain arms from the Russians, and because the rising cut off trade with China, signed a trade agreement in October 1931 which gave Soviet interests new privileges.

Under this agreement eight Soviet trade agencies were established, at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan. Customs duties on Soviet goods were reduced, and new Sinkiang-Soviet telegraph and radio communications were opened. Chin signed the agreement without authorization from Nanking and without reporting it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for this he was imprisoned when, later, he fled the province and returned to China.

Chin was forced out of Sinkiang by a combination of insurrection, invasion, and a mutiny of “White” (exile) Russian mercenary troops. The insurrection began in the Komul oasis in 1931 and was joined by Chinese Moslem (Tungan) invaders from Kansu. Urumchi was attacked in the winter of 1932 and again in January 1934. In November 1933 an Eastern Turkistan Republic was proclaimed in Kashgar. In the main, the rebellion was brought under control by June 1934; but as late as the fall of 1935 there were still 20,000 Tungans, who had originally come from Kansu, holding out in Guma Bazar on the southern rim of the Tarim Basin. It is estimated that these dark and bloody years cost about 100,000 lives.

The original revolt in Komul was certainly precipitated by the weak and avaricious Chin. In the winter of 1930 the last Uighur ruler of the ancient principality of Komul died. His son and suc-
cessor, who was opposed by the people, went to Urumchi to offer bribes for assistance. In the meantime the Chinese garrison commander at Komul advised the Governor to discontinue indirect rule of the oasis as a “native state,” and to divide it instead into three administrative districts under appointed magistrates, thus making it possible to collect revenues directly. The advice was accepted, and the “natives” were alarmed by the fact that a new land survey threatened to double or treble their taxes.

The situation that developed illustrates the complexities of a multinational frontier province. Most of the people of the oasis had no strong loyalty to the old ruling house to which they had paid their customary taxes; but they resented the new direct administration which, though established in 1931, declared that back taxes for 1930 would also be collected. There was general hostility to the Chinese garrison commander. At the same time, a minority faction which supported the prince who was claiming the succession feared that he might be arrested in Urumchi.

Into this situation there entered some eighty Chinese non-Moslem refugees from a drought-stricken district in the province of Kansu. The Governor ordered the magistrate of one of the three new administrative districts to provide for them, which he did by expropriating land cultivated by Uighurs. The Uighurs were transferred to new land, not yet brought under cultivation. It is a general tradition in Chinese frontier provinces that settlers of such land should be exempted from taxes for the first few years; but in this case the Uighurs were assessed for the same taxes that they had paid on their old land, while the refugees to whom this land had been given were exempted from taxes for three years. In addition to this injustice, the salt bureau of Komul embarked on a program of forced sales. Everyone was either to buy a quota of salt every day, or pay cash for a “salt certificate.”

Revolts were touched off when an “infidel” (non-Moslem) Chinese tax collector tried to force the parents of a pretty Moslem girl to give her to him in marriage. The people rose and killed not only the tax collector but the Chinese refugees from Kansu. Thousands joined the revolt. Delegates were sent to Kansu to solicit help from Ma Ch’ung-ying, a young chieftain belonging to the most famous, powerful, and warlike Chinese Moslem clan in Kansu, who was then in command of the 36th Division, though nominally troops of the National Government were actually his personal followers. With only 400 Tungan cavalry, Ma Ch’ung-ying successfully attacked Barkul, Ch’ichiaoching (“Seven-cornered Well,” on the main truck route from Kansu to Urumchi), and Komul. After suffering a wound he retired to Kansu, but returned to Sinkiang in May, 1932.

Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Chameleon War Lord

In the winter of 1933 Ma Shih-ming, a subordinate of Ma Ch’ung-ying, marched to the outskirts of Urumchi. Under Chin Shu-jen’s orders, the defense of the city was taken over by Sheng Shih-ts’ai, a professional soldier of Manchurian origin. Sheng took command of over a thousand troops who had reached Urumchi from Manchuria. These troops, after fighting the Japanese, had retreated into Siberia, where they were interned. The device of repatriating them to Chinese territory in Sinkiang had enabled the Soviet authorities to strengthen the Provincial Government of Sinkiang with a reinforcement of trained Chinese soldiers. As non-Moslems, they could be counted on to resist the insurrection; as men from the Manchurian provinces, they were disposed to be more loyal to Sheng Shih-ts’ai than to any other officer. With the aid of this force, Sheng drove Ma Shih-ming back to the south.

Then in April 1933 “White” Russian troops in Urumchi mutinied, joined with local Moslems in an attack on the provincial headquarters, and killed Chin Shu-jen’s younger brother, who was head of the Military Bureau. These Russian troops had been recruited or conscripted among exiled Russians living in the

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province—who, though considered formidable fighters, had been badly treated and irregularly paid. Their mutiny broke Chin Shu-jen's nerve, and he fled to Russian territory, whence he returned to China. The remaining officials in Urumchi then elected the head of the Education Bureau, Lin Wen-hung, as acting provincial Chairman, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai as acting commander of the military forces.

Ever since the regime of China's first modern war lord, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a provincial governor who does not control his own troops has usually been overshadowed by the commander of the provincial military forces. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sheng Shih-ts'ai soon dominated his nominal civil superior. Sheng was born in Liaoning Province, in the south of Manchuria, and educated partly in Shanghai and Nanking. He went to Japan in 1915 and again in 1925 to study political economy and military science. During his second stay in Japan he was already under the patronage of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1926-1927 he served on the staff of Ho Ying-ch'in, Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek on the "Northern Expedition" which resulted in the capture of Nanking and Shanghai and Chiang's rise to power. At this time it was not sure whether or how the Kuomintang would be able to take over the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), and it was advisable to have in reserve a promising young Northeastern officer. Eventually, however, the Northeastern Provinces came over to the Kuomintang under their own war lord, the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsieh-liang, which left no room for Northeasterners who did not belong to his personal following. The hopes of Sheng Shih-ts'ai went into eclipse, and for lack of other prospects he went to Sinkiang in 1929 on the personal staff of a bureaucrat who had been appointed General Secretary of the Provincial Government. By 1930 he had worked up to the position of Chief of the General Staff Office of the Frontier Army.

As soon as he took over the real power in 1933, Sheng announced an "Eight-point Policy" for Sinkiang, which was to become famous: equality between nationalities; religious freedom; immediate rural relief; financial reform; administrative reform; extension of education; encouragement of self-government; judicial reform.40

Before he could do much in the way of reform, however, Sheng had still to cope with the Moslem rebellion led by Ma Chung-ying. While Sheng was taking the first steps toward power in the north, Ma was threatening to secure control in the south, most of which he now held from Komul in the east to Kashgar in the west. By June 1933 Ma's forces had also entered Kuchengtze, in Jungaria, and begun to push toward Urumchi. By this time, however, Ma's ruthlessness and his plundering of the countryside were weakening him by arousing the hatred even of his fellow Moslems. At Komul the shops were closed and the villages nearby had become heaps of rubble. At Ch'ichiaoching, on the main trade route, the streets were littered with the bodies of dead horses. Trade through Turfan had been suspended.

As Sheng Shih-ts'ai at the head of his Manchurian troops went out to meet him, Ma cut south across the mountains and took Turfan, main valve of the trade routes both eastward to China and westward to Kashgar. At the beginning of 1934, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai had to detach some of his forces to face a fresh revolt in Il'i, Ma advanced once more from Turfan against Urumchi—only to meet, this time, his decisive defeat. Sheng had been able to obtain war materials from the Soviet Union, including even planes. He threw back Ma's attack and harassed his retreat by bombing the road between Toksun and Kharashahr. Ma himself barely escaped to Kucha, and fled on to Kashgar. There he remained from April to June, 1934; but when Sheng's troops approached, he fled once more—this time to Soviet territory. He was reported to have been seen in. Moscow at the beginning of 1936.41 For some years, Soviet policy was to hold an exceptionally advantageous position. Sinkiang was now to be governed by a non-Moslem Chinese who depended on Russia not only for arms but for economic co-operation. Yet the chief alternative

claimant to power, the Moslem leader Ma Ch'ung-ying, was living in Soviet territory.

There can be no doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in addition to being dependent on good relations with Russia, was genuinely opposed to Japanese imperialism— which, like many Chinese who had studied in Japan, he thoroughly understood. There is also no doubt that Ma Ch'ung-ying had Japanese agents at his headquarters—agents who can be described as adventurous forerunners rather than acknowledged representatives of Japanese policy. Had Ma won, Japanese policy could have followed up these agents; when Ma lost, Japan had nothing to say in public.

The operations of Japanese agents, however, did not end immediately with the flight of Ma to Russia. As late as 1937, from February to October there was a revolt in Kashgar in which the Japanese were accused of having a hand. In October 1937 Sheng told Tu Chung-yuan, a former fellow student in Japan who was then working with him in Urumchi, that he knew of Japanese intelligence agents in the Moslem strongholds of Ninghsia and Ch'inghai (Kokonor) — Chinese frontier provinces adjoining Inner Mongolia and Tibet — and that Japanese remittances to Sinkiang through the coastal Treaty Port of Tientsin in recent months had amounted to more than three million yen. He believed that another ten million yen or more would be sent into Sinkiang. Tu Chung-yuan describes how four important government officials and some merchants with traitorous connections were then arrested.42

In the meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai had embarked on a period of real reform. His “Eight Points,” announced in 1933, have already been listed. In the following year he declared that Sinkiang was to be considered “the New Sinkiang,” and that his “Eight Points” were to be implemented through “Six Great Policies.” The first of these was anti-imperialism (subsequently to be interpreted in a strongly anti-British as well as anti-Japanese sense); this was followed by rapprochement with the Soviets, racial or national equality, clean government, peace, and reconstruction.

Uighurs and Kazaks were immediately appointed to high posts in their own districts. All non-Chinese nationalities were allowed to promote education in their own languages and schools. The number of students increased from 3000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and in addition 329 non-Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union to study medicine, veterinary science, engineering, and agriculture. Under the provincial Bureau of Education in Urumchi, five branch bureaus were opened: at Sharasume, Chnguchak, Kulja, Aksu, and Kashgar.

The provincial newspaper Hsinchiang Jih Pao set up branch offices at the same five places, and another at Chingho. Editions were published in seven languages. “Cultural associations” began to function for Uighurs, Kazaks, Tungans, Tatars, Russians, and Chinese. Of these the most active was that of the Uighurs, the majority people, with 8 regional and 41 district branches, supporting 1736 primary schools with 124,174 students, and also conducting teacher training and adult education.43

For a time, there was even relatively clean government. Under Yang and Chin it had been possible for a magistrate to pocket 80,000 to 100,000 Chinese dollars a year. At the beginning of Sheng's administration, inspectors and auditors were sent out to prevent such speculation. More than any other reform, however, this one depended on the degree to which the system as a whole really functioned in a democratic way. After 1940, when Sheng was officially appointed Chairman of the Provincial Government, he became more and more autocratic and suspicious, and an old provincial saying began to be heard again: “The provincial Chairman may be less fat than the Bureau head, and the Bureau head may be less fat than the Regional Administrator, who in turn may be not so fat as the District Magistrate” — the District Magistrate, as the closest to the people, being the official with primary access to sources of “squeeze.”44

42 Ibid., pp. 29–30, 62–63, 97.
44 Chiang Ch'in-chang, op. cit., pp. 80–84.
Like many another official insuring himself against a fall from power, Sheng in his last years in Sinkiang put by an immense fortune. In 1945 when, after a series of political deals, he had returned to Chungking, the man who had formerly been the head of his Reconstruction Bureau in Urumchi was quoted as saying that he had contributed 500,000 Chinese ounces of gold to the Kuomintang party treasury; and it was further alleged that it was because of this gift that Chiang Kai-shek did not take action against him for his record in Sinkiang.45

In 1940, when Sheng was at the height of his power, a British official who visited Sinkiang informed me that as far as he personally was able to form an opinion, from his own observation and from documents such as the Governor’s own speeches, the system of government was decidedly autocratic. He compared the authority of the Governor in Sinkiang to that of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China, but he had the impression that the Governor was not much influenced by any of his lieutenants. The Governor inspired fear, and demanded that his authority be consulted even in minor details.

On the other hand, this observer conceded that the policy being carried out was relatively progressive and enlightened. He considered that the policy was clearly under the influence of developments close at hand in Russia. He attributed the existence of the secret police, and such practices as convictions and executions without trial, to the fact that while the Governor was determined to hold onto power, he was a prey to suspicion and fear. In his opinion, the Governor could not be called a follower of either the Kuomintang or the Communists. The facts, as this British observer saw them, were that the geographical situation and mixture of peoples in Sinkiang made a special policy for the province necessary.46

Sheng himself is quoted by the man who was the director of his provincial newspaper as saying that he was not a member of the Kuomintang, so that “It is strange that they should have elected me a member of the Kuomintang Central Control Committee!”47

After coming to power with Soviet military assistance, Sheng negotiated a Soviet loan of five million gold rubles for reconstruction purposes. This loan, which involved no political or economic conditions, carried an interest of 4 per cent.48 Sheng also asked for Soviet technical assistance. In 1937 he instituted a three-year plan of reconstruction, during the course of which he obtained a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans. In 1938 the Provincial Commercial Bank was reorganized as the Sinkiang Commercial Bank, with partly private and partly Provincial Government capital. It issued new notes, and the currency was to a large extent stabilized. By the end of 1939 the old paper currency was declared invalid. During 1939 credits of $17,872,500 (Chinese) were granted to the bank to promote commercial and agricultural capitalization. Funds from the Soviet loans were used to build more motor roads, and trucks in use increased from only 20 in 1933 to 400 in 1938 and eventually to 3000 in 1941. In the same period, 1350 miles of telephone lines were installed. By 1939, there were some 20 factories in the province, and over 400 tons of Soviet machinery had gone into the construction of a refinery at an oil field northwest of Urumchi.

The development of aviation involved the National Govern-
Pivot of Asia

As well as the Provincial Government. Under the Nanking-Moscow Nonaggression Agreement of 1937, a through air route had been stipulated. Under the Soviet-Chinese Trade Agreement of June 16, 1939, a Sino-Soviet Aviation Corporation was organized. By the terms of these agreements, Russia obtained priority over other countries in air traffic, jointly with China, over Sinkiang.

In 1941 Sheng decreed a second three-year plan. The economic activities of the Provincial Government were expanded through “Foreign Trade and Local Resources Companies.” Reconstruction bonds were issued; and the combined effects of inflation in China and a trade boom in Sinkiang raised the exchange value of the Sinkiang dollar from the low point of 4000 to one Chinese national dollar in 1934 to a rate of six to one national dollar in 1942. At the time Sheng left the province in 1944, the rate was five provincial dollars to one national dollar. The boom was largely promoted by an arbitrary linking of the “official” exchange rate between American dollars and Soviet rubles, which enabled Sinkiang to buy from the Soviet-operated Sinkiang Trading Corporation at artificially favorable rates. During this period many Russians entered the province as technicians, but — according to the British observer already quoted, who visited the province in 1940 — there was nothing to suggest that Soviet administrative control was being forced on Sinkiang.

In retrospect, it is clear that Sheng Shih-ts’ai was guided throughout by opportunity rather than by principle. Even while carrying out reforms, which for some years were encouragingly successful, he did not lose his concern for his own interest. This concern led him into a policy of sudden shifts in his relations with Russia, in contrast with the policy of steady neutrality pursued so long and so successfully by Yang Tseng-hsin. From 1938 to 1940 he leaned toward the Soviet Union and away from the National Government of China. From 1941 to 1942 he cut off his relations with the Russians roughly and suddenly, and threw himself on the support of the National Government in a manner suggesting he had little confidence in his own power in his own province. In 1944, however, he tried — this time unsuccessfully — to break away again from the Kuomintang and the National Government, offering to assume a position of satellite dependency on the Soviet Union.

During the first period, Sheng Shih-ts’ai ran Sinkiang very smoothly, on the three wheels of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, democracy, and increased recognition of the identities and interests of the “nationalities” or ethnic groups of the province. In October 1938 he held a provincial congress of all nationalities, which condemned Japanese machinations in Inner Mongolia, pledged money to contribute ten airplanes to the Chinese Air Force, and promised to keep open an overland route through Sinkiang, facilitating the movement of Soviet supplies to China. Sheng himself visited Moscow, ostensibly in search of medical care. Two years later, on December 8, 1940, he joined other Chinese leaders in condemning the Nanking puppet regime under Wang Ching-wei. In 1941, after the New Fourth Army incident (when Kuomintang troops attacked Communist-led troops in the Yangtze Valley), Sheng told a correspondent of Ta Kung Pao, China’s great independent newspaper, that Sinkiang was devoting all its strength to transport work and reconstruction in order to hasten victory, and that all parties and cliques in China should continue in their united resistance to Japan.

When Germany invaded Russia, Sheng was informed that he could no longer receive material aid from hard-pressed Russia. Later, with Nazi forces besieging Leningrad and Stalingrad, he appears to have been convinced that Russia, even if not defeated, would no longer be one of the dominating great powers. He turned about-face and made contact with Chungking, indicating that in his belief a man who holds power in Sinkiang must rely on outside support in addition to concentrating control within the province in his own hands. Adjusting his rule within Sinkiang to his new orientation toward Chungking, he converted his earlier

\[Sa Kung-liao, op. cit.\]
\[Chen Chi-ying, A Bird’s-eye View of Sinkiang, Chungking, 1941.\]
and relatively democratic policy into authoritarian repression of the Uighurs and other non-Chinese national groups, and began to round up not only his Communist advisers but liberal Chinese as well.

The sudden shift of policy was marked by the imprisonment and secret murder of Tu Chung-yuan, a famous nationalist and liberal, once a schoolmate of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who had been invited to come to Sinkiang during the democratic period to head up cultural work, and had brought with him a considerable number of progressive young Chinese. By 1944 about 80,000 people had been imprisoned, including Sheng's own Soviet-trained brother and his wife. Torture was used to obtain confessions. Christopher Rand, correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, reported the case of a man "whom General Sheng's experts began to skin alive. After a square inch of skin had been removed, the victim wisely signed a 'confession.' The terror conflicted badly with General Sheng's 'new deal' program. He imported teachers and experts from China to develop the province; then he would become suspicious of them, throw them into jail and proceed to import more of the same. His schools turned out an increasing number of literate men who might conceivably spread ideas among the people — and a diploma came to be a ticket to jail." Later in the same year, when Chiang Kai-shek was at Lanchow, capital of the province of Kansu, General Chu flew again to Urumchi, taking with him no less distinguished a person than Madame Chiang Kai-shek, together with Wu Chung-hsin, who was destined to become Sheng's successor in Sinkiang two years later.

In the fall of 1943 Sheng himself flew to Chungking to confer with Chiang Kai-shek. The Treasury was then instructed to allocate ten million Chinese dollars a year for reconstruction in Sinkiang. Chungking undertook a program of widely advertising the prospects of colonization in Sinkiang. The province was compared with California before 1849, and its Altai region with Alaska before 1867. Refugees from a severe famine in Honan in 1942-1943 were sent out to Sinkiang. Over 4000 of them arrived at Kuchengzze, and 1500 reached Urumchi, but though each household was supposed to be allotted fifteen acres of land the project was mismanaged and in the end the refugees became tenants and hired farm hands.

In 1943 Chungking began to strengthen its position by sending

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officials and troops into Sinkiang. At the same time the Russians capped the main oil well they had been exploiting west of Urum- 
chi, and carried their refinery equipment back to their own terri- 

For Sheng Shih-ts'ai himself, the comparisons between his pe- 
riod of dependence on the Russians and his new dependence on 
the government of his own country must have been ironic. The 
Russians had supplied him with a great deal of material assis- 
ance and had also looked with favor on his program of demo- 
cratic reform, which had for the time being made him popular 
among the non-Chinese nationalities of the province. Under 
the assertion of Chungking control, he received very little material 
aid, while the officials appointed by Chungking encroached on 
his personal power. At the same time his abandonment of his 
reform program had destroyed his popularity among the non-
Chinese.

By 1944, accordingly, Sheng was ready for another shift. The 
Russians, in the meantime, had held and thrown back the Ger- 
man invasion. It was evident that, at the end of the war, they 
would be much more powerful than Sheng had once thought. 
In February of this year, therefore, Sheng declared himself ill 
and declined to appear at official conferences. In April, he began 
to arrest officials loyal to Chungking. During June, students and 
teachers were also imprisoned, on charges of being involved in 
plotting. In August, more Chungking appointees were impris-


omened without trial, and their property was confiscated. With 
some 200 Chungking men out of the way, General Sheng, accord- 
ging to one report, “asked Generalissimo Stalin to incorporate 
Sinkiang into the Soviet Union. The Russian leader, who evidently had had quite enough by this time, refused. Chungking 
also had had enough, and decided to remove General Sheng by 
a delicate operation.”

General Chu Shao-liang was again sent to Urumchi, and pers- 
suaded Sheng Shih-ts'ai to leave Sinkiang and accept the post of 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in Chungking. (Under the 
Kuomintang, this Ministry had become a sinecure for men out of 
power, because of its inability to do anything challenging the in- 
terests of the landlords who had increasingly gained control over 
the Kuomintang.) On September 2, 1944, the provincial *Hsin-
chiang Jih Pao* published the news that Sheng had been trans- 
ferred to Chungking, and on September 11 he departed from 
Urumchi airfield. His reign was over.

Breakdown of Chinese Frontier Policy

Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai had one 
after another established themselves as the rulers of Sinkiang, and 
and had then been “recognized” by the National Government. After 
the deposition of Sheng, on the other hand, the National Govern- 
ment was able to name four men in succession as its own ap- 
pointees to the post of Chairman of the Provincial Government. 
These men were Wu Chung-hsin, Chang Chih-chung, Masud 
Sabri and Burkhan. The contrast shows that since 1944 Sinkiang 
has once more come within the orbit of Chinese national politics.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945 the C.C. Clique and the 
Political Science Group became the main sources of Chinese na-
tional policy in Sinkiang. The C.C. Clique — the “Tammany” of

Han Hai Ch’ao (*Tides of the Dry Sea, or Desert Tides*), Urumchi, 
January, 1947, p. 13; also Shanghai edition of the same date, p. 21 (in 
Chinese).

Dispatch from Christopher Rand, dated Urumchi September 22, 1947, 
the Kuomintang, controlling more political machinery and more key appointments than any other faction—was known for its impatient policy of direct repression, and its preference for the use of force in extirpating any challenge to its supremacy. Its strength came from the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang Kai-shek and confidential secretaries to the Generalissimo who helped to engineer his original rise to power. The Political Science Group—made up of experienced bureaucrats and administrators, with something of the subtlety and refinement of the old mandarinate—preferred moderation whenever possible.

Both factions, however, required a strong military leader as a pivot around which to revolve, and both always revolved around Chiang Kai-shek. They have been used by him, at his discretion, in alternating phases of policy. They represent different expressions of the Confucian tradition that the function of officials is not to represent the people but to rule over them. Despite the friction of rivalry between them they held basically the same view with regard to minority peoples within the Chinese realm: these peoples are not entitled to equal representation in a Chinese federation, but should be ruled over by the Chinese.

This view differs from that of Sun Yat-sen, who definitely recognized the Moslem Turks (the Uighurs) in Sinkiang as a distinct nationality. According to Article Four of his National Reconstruction Program, and also the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, all such “nationalities” in China are entitled to self-determination. Sun Yat-sen only developed this view fully at the very end of his life, almost certainly under the influence of Russian and Chinese Communist advisers, and probably under the influence of the successful example of the Soviet policy toward national minorities. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, however, this approach was abandoned by the Kuomintang. Even Kuomintang members who recognized the distinct nationality of such peoples as the Uighurs had no policy providing for self-determination in practice. The narrowest view of all is well expressed by Li Tung-fang, a historian patronized by the C.C. Clique, who asserted that the Uighurs are descended from the Huns, that the Huns (Hsiungnou) were in turn descended from the ancient Chinese, and that therefore there is no real difference of “nationality” between Uighurs and Chinese.57

The latest trend of Kuomintang theory was to ignore self-determination, and to discuss instead “equality of treatment” and “promotion of autonomous government.” Both formulas, as will be seen, are subject to very special interpretation. At the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the essence of nationalism was to liberate the Chinese and to treat all nationalities within China on a basis of equality. In November 1944 Sun Fo restated this view.58 The practical limits of this approach were laid down by Li Tung-fang, in stating the opinion that self-government—not self-determination—should not be applied to a unit larger than a district within a province, and should never be extended to a whole province. Chang Chih-chung apparently feared that self-determination might lead automatically to secession and independence. In a speech at Urumchi on May 18, 1947, when he was Governor of Sinkiang, he declared that though “scores of years or several centuries hence” Sinkiang might become independent, it could not be independent now.59 Thus, in the later trend of Kuomintang theory, self-determination has apparently been fully identified with independence.

Under actual conditions in China, however, a demand for self-determination is not necessarily the same thing as a demand for independence. “Self-determination” is often in fact an assertion of the right to stay within the Chinese comity on the basis of a federation of provinces with equal status, and the demand for self-

58 Speech by Sun Fo at the celebration in Chungking of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Soviet State, November 1944.
determination often stems not from separatism but from resistance to the assertion of a central dictatorship over outlying provinces.

Thus the *New York Times* correspondent Tillman Durdin, in a Mukden dispatch of February 9, 1948, noted that "Perhaps the main cause of bitterness against the government among the Manchurians has been the policy of officials appointed by Nanking of treating the Manchurians as a people to be dominated militarily and exploited economically." The "Manchurians" are, of course, Chinese, closely related to the main stock of North China. The situation in Sinkiang, where most of the people are not Chinese, is similar but more marked. Thus even Masud Sabri, an Uighur who was regarded by other Uighurs as subservient to the C.C. Clique, felt constrained to say in 1945 that while the war against Japan was still going on the main characteristics of Chungking policy in Sinkiang were military domination by a large number of troops who were regarded as "human-faced locusts," and promotion of the kind of Chinese colonization that had contributed so much to such uprisings as that in Komul.60

When Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang in September 1944 he left behind six divisions of his own troops. In addition, four divisions of Chungking troops had already entered the province. Two divisions of Chinese Moslem cavalry from Ch'inghai were added a year later, bringing the total up to twelve divisions. Strong fortifications facing west were then built, and though there have been a number of reorganizations, the total military force has remained at about 100,000.61 The economic strain and social friction associated with the maintenance of such a force in a distant and thinly inhabited province have been described by a Chinese


61 This figure was reported by Frank Robertson, who in 1947 spent about eight months in Sinkiang. See his dispatch of January 28, 1948, published in *New York Times*, February 1, 1948. For military establishment at the time Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang, see press interview with Chang Chih-chung published in *Hsinchiang Iih Pao* (Sinkiang Daily), Urumchi, July 4, 1947 (in Chinese).

Heavy taxation and inflation stimulated bitter hatred against the Chinese, accompanied by much resentment even among Chinese against the political regime. As one American reporter observed, "to save Sinkiang, China would have to make spectacular reforms on a scale unknown in the Orient. But even if this were possible and if it were done, China's efforts might break down against the barrier of emotion" — meaning the aroused nationalism of the Uighurs.64

In the rivalry for power in Sinkiang in the last years of Kuomintang rule, the C.C. Clique had the upper hand over the Political Science Group most of the time. It was able to use, in succession, an old-line bureaucrat like Wu Chung-hsin, a general like Chang Chih-chung, and a wealthy Uighur landlord member of the Kuomintang like Masud Sabri.

Wu Chung-hsin, long associated with the C.C. Clique, long active in frontier affairs, and long distrusted by Mongols and Tibetans, was appointed provincial Chairman in October 1944. Though a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy, his most important posts had been in the Civil Service. He was Governor of Anhui, his native province, in 1929, Governor of Kweichow


64 Frank Robertson.
from 1935 to 1937, and Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission from 1938 to 1944. During this period he headed an important and personally profitable mission to Tibet, and supported a land-grabbing colonization policy which did much to turn Inner Mongolian nationalism against China.

His appointment in Sinkiang was backed by General Chu Shao-liang, who has already been mentioned, who was then active on behalf of the C.C. Clique. The most important members of his staff were also members of the Clique, including Tseng Shao-lu, Secretary-General; Teng Chiang-hai, Civil Affairs Commissioner; Yu Tao-yu, Reconstruction Commissioner; and Hsi Li En-chi, Educational Commissioner. Only his Finance Commissioner, Lo Yo-wen, was an adherent of the Political Science Group.

By the end of November 1944 Wu had set free most of the Chungking appointees who had been arrested by Sheng Shih-ts’ai, but many prisoners who had no connections with the C.C. Clique or with Chungking remained in jail, and much confiscated property was not returned. Political refugees who had fled to a number of cities in China, and even to Mecca, India, and Afghanistan, were not allowed to return. The passport fee for a merchant leaving the province was first trebled and then multiplied by ten. Inflation and corruption increased to the point where the saying became current in Sinkiang that “one Sheng Shih-ts’ai went out, but two came in.”

Opposition to the new trend in Chinese rule was not long in crystallizing. A rebellion broke out in the Ili Valley in November 1944. Fighting lasted for more than forty days, until Chinese forces gave up the city of Kulja and withdrew. This rising, referred to in the Chinese political literature as “the Inning Affair,” marked the opening of a new phase of nationalism in Sinkiang.

A regime calling itself the Eastern Turkistan Republic was set up at Kulja, headed by a council of three—an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a “White” or non-Soviet Russian, a resident of the region. The military leaders were Ali Khan Ture, Osman Bator (a Kazakh who later turned against the regime), and Abdugani Bator. Leaders in administration and propaganda were Akhmedjan Kasimi, Rakhimjan Klojaev, and Abulkhair Ture. The Chinese residents of Kulja cautiously declared that they had nothing in common with the oppressive policy of the Provincial Government. The Sibos, holding agricultural land near the city, delivered supplies. Uighurs and Kazakhs joined in the fighting; an important development, in view of the fact that the Ili Valley is the most important region in Sinkiang in which Uighurs do not form the largest part of the population.

An American correspondent who reached the region somewhat later reported that there was “no evidence” to support Chinese charges that the insurgents were armed with “modern Russian equipment.” Most of the Uighur troops were in fact without rifles, and were armed only with hand grenades. The most important mobile troops were Kazakh cavalry. After hard fighting through the months of July, August, and September, the Kulja regime extended its control into the Chuguchak region. The insurgent forces then turned eastward and drove to Manass, the important town near which the trade route from Urumchi divides, with one fork leading to Ili and the other to Chuguchak. The fighting at Manass was so severe that the population was reduced from 40,000 to 17,000, and the physical devastation was proportionately great. By this time the Kulja insurgents were reported to have 40,000 men under arms, and were considered a grave threat to Urumchi itself. Crack troops from the command of Hu Tsung-nan, which throughout the war against Japan had been garrisoned in Northwest China to “contain” the Chinese Communists, were sent to Sinkiang, but failed to throw back the insurgents.

65Yu Han, “Sinkiang Memoir,” in Tu Chih Wen Choi (Reader’s Digest), Shanghai, July 18, 1946, Vol. 1, No. 6 (in Chinese).
66Hsin Hwa Wen Tsa Chih (News Miscellany), No. 8, Chungking, March 15, 1946 (in Chinese). Under Sheng, the passport fee had been $150,000 (Chinese). By 1946 it had increased to $2,000,000.
At this point it was considered necessary to negotiate, and
General Chang Chih-chung was sent from Chungking to Sin-
kiang in September 1945. Although a military man, General
Chang, who has since become of steadily increasing importance
both in Sinkiang and in Chinese national politics, has never been
a war lord basing himself on a territory with troops of his own.
After graduating from the Paoting Military Academy and studying
in Germany, he was given command of a division and later of the
Fifth Army. He took part in the defense of Shanghai
against the Japanese in 1932, and later was made Dean of the
Central Military Academy, since when he has not held active
command of troops. From 1937 to 1939 he was Chairman of the
Hunan Provincial Government; in 1940 he was aide-de-camp to
the Generalissimo, and during the war he was head of the politi-
cal training board of the National Military Council. Concurrently
he was Secretary-General of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, a
stronghold of the C.C. Clique. He has never been fully identified
with either the C.C. Clique or the Political Science Group, but
has been one of the few important men able to co-operate with
either of them in specific enterprises. Although his known pref-
ference for compromise set him aside from the disciplined author-
itarianism of the C.C. Clique, the Clique did not oppose his
assignment to Sinkiang to attempt to settle by negotiation a
situation that could no longer be handled by force.72

In the course of his negotiations with the Kulja insurgents,
Chang Chih-chung had to make three journeys by air between
Urumchi and Chungking, in September and October 1945 and
January 1946. His first meeting with the Kulja delegates was
promising. They were willing to abandon the "independence" of
the "Eastern Turkistan Republic," if Chungking would grant
autonomous self-government to the whole province of Sinkiang.

Chang was willing to let Kulja retain its armed forces as a local
"peace preservation corps" (a common arrangement in China),
but insisted that Chungking retain top military command in the
province and full authority over diplomatic relations.

The second conference took place in Urumchi in November,
1945. The insurgent movement had by then spread into the Tarim
Basin. In the south of the province the government had lost con-
trol of Yarkand and Khargalik, and Khotan was surrounded by
armed rebels. Chungking was unable to detach large forces for
operations in Sinkiang. Although the war against Japan was over,
delicate negotiations with the Chinese Communists were in pro-
gress. In this period, therefore, interesting parallel negotiations
took place. While General Marshall, although America was re-
garded as primarily the friend and supporter of the Chinese Gov-
ernment, acted as mediator between the Kuomintang and the
Communists, the Soviet Consul General in Urumchi, although
Russia was regarded as friendly to the insurgents, acted as medi-
ator between them and the Chinese authorities.

Between October 1945 and June 1946 there were eighteen
official meetings and more than ten unofficial meetings. To en-
hance the prestige of General Chang in carrying on the negotia-
tions, he was made Head of the Generalissimo's Headquarters
for the Northwest.

The negotiations resulted in three agreements. The basic agree-
ment comprised eleven articles. Attached to Article Nine of this
agreement was a supplementary agreement on the reorganization
of the Provincial Government. Both of these agreements were
signed by General Chang and by three Kulja delegates—Akh-
medjan Kasimi, Abulkhair Türe, and Rakhimjan Klojaev. A second
supplementary agreement, attached to Article Ten and dealing
with the reorganization of armed forces, was not signed until June
6, 1946 — on which day there was a grand celebration in Urumchi,
and Wu Chung-hsin, as Chairman of the Provincial Government,
telegraphed to all districts to release political prisoners.72

The main agreement provided for adult suffrage, with district

fifteen members of the Provincial Government to be nominated by provincial delegates. The non-Chinese nationalities were to be taught as a compulsory language in middle schools. The Provincial Government was to be partly appointed by the Chinese National Government, partly nominated by Sinkiang and National Government troops, and with the offices to be held by them.

The first supplementary agreement dealt in detail with the fifteen members of the Provincial Government to be nominated by provincial delegates, and with the offices to be held by them. The second supplementary agreement dealt in detail with the organization, command, and expense of maintenance of Provincial Government and National Government troops, and provided for future agreement as to the places or districts where troops were to be stationed.

If these three agreements had been carried out, the non-Chinese nationalities in Sinkiang would have achieved a large measure of self-determination and autonomous local administration, backed by the preservation of a part of their armed forces. Equality of treatment would have been promoted by this improvement in status. The agreements were, however, never put into full operation. Their implementation was held up principally by the delaying antics of the C.C. Clique, whose devotion to the "leader principle" required a stubborn resistance to representative government.

Under the first application of the agreements, however, Chang Chih-chung replaced Wu Chung-hsin as provincial Chairman in July 1946. One of his Vice-Chairmen was an Uighur, the other a Tatar. Liu Meng-hsun, a close associate of the C.C. Clique, was appointed Secretary General, with a Kazakh and an Uighur as his deputies. Wang Tseng-shan, Civil Affairs Commissioner; Chao Chien-feng, Social Welfare Commissioner, and Ku Chien-chi, Vice-Commissioner of Reconstruction, were all active C.C. Clique members.

With this mixed team, General Chang made a real effort to improve government, at least in Urumchi. A basic law for the province, in ten articles, was immediately adopted. Under this law officials were forbidden to engage in trade, and private banks were encouraged to increase production. Requisitions were limited and tax reduction was provided for, at least as a hope. All district councils and magistrates were to be elected within three months. To implement this law, the government ordered the liquidation of the provincial trading corporation which had been set up by Sheng Shih-ts'ai. (General Chang ordered 25,000 Chinese ounces of opium to be burned in front of his headquarters.) To reduce the danger of riots, intermarriage between Moslems and non-Moslems was forbidden. Taxes in arrears were canceled, and a reduction of taxes was promised for 1947. To cover the budget deficit, General Chang went to Nanking to ask for an annual subsidy of $165,000,000 in Chinese dollars.

More than a hundred Chinese Communists who had been put in prison by Sheng Shih-ts'ai (many of them being men who had worked for him in his reform period), were released by Chang Chih-chung and sent to Yenan in a special convoy of trucks. In taking this step, he was following consistently the line which for some years had marked him as a moderate man who favored compromise. Certainly General Chang was sincere in his efforts to reach a workable compromise in Sinkiang. In a speech at Urumchi on May 13, 1947, for instance, he said, "Whenever I

78 The three documents were first published in full by the official Chinese Government Central News Agency, Nanking, June 29, 1946.

81 Details of sixteen tax reductions were published as an official announcement in Hsinch'iang Jih Pao (Sinkiang Daily), Urumchi, January 12, 1947 (in Chinese).
82 Same publication, April 11, 1947.
found myself not in accord with the minority over a question, I always settled the difference either by negotiation or by concessions. For this reason, a false impression has been created among outside circles that we were too weak and permitted the group led by Vice-Chairman Akhmedjan to control everything.” This reference to unfriendly criticism may well have been intended for the C.C. Clique, with which General Chang had to contend on the one hand while negotiating on the other hand with the non-Chinese nationalists.

Compromise was, in fact, the policy of realism at this time. At the end of 1946 the National Government troops, over which Chang had some degree of authority, though not the authority of actual command, were unable to push beyond the Manass River. Products from west of the Manass, including gold, oil, coal, grain, flour, meat, and hides, were not coming into the Urumchi region.

By January 1943 a provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang and a branch of the Central Political Training Institute, both controlled by the C.C. “machine,” had been established at Urumchi. By the end of 1946 there were more than 2000 graduates of the Political Training Institute; and early in 1947, when the first provincial congress of Kuomintang delegates was held, a Sinkiang membership of 50,000 was claimed. As soon as General Chang became Chairman, branches of the Kuomintang (San Min Chu I) were set up at Urumchi, Aksu, and Kashgar. The C.C. Clique member controlling all of these activities was Ch’i-en Hsi-tseng, who was able to count on co-operation not only within the Provincial Government but on the part of the garrison commander and the police.

Whereas Chang Chih-chung had no strong staff of his own, the C.C. membership penetrated all political ranks. In spite of the unpopularity of the Chinese, it was able to recruit members among all non-Chinese nationalities through its ability to open the way to public office. The Clique has never hesitated to use graft as an auxiliary to party organization, and accordingly in Sinkiang, as elsewhere in China, its party officers and magistrates and military officers affiliated with it have been accused of organized corruption. Organized association with gangs is also widely attributed to the C.C. Clique, especially for the purpose of breaking up elections and popular meetings. Among “incidents” attributed to the C.C. Clique were the murder of a government delegate at Emin, near Chuguchak, in November 1946; a big riot in Urumchi in February 1947, in which five were shot and many wounded; and riots in Turfan, Toksun, and Shanshan during July 1947. The pattern follows that long established by the C.C. Clique in China, down to the detail of having such incidents reported in controlled newspapers in such a way as to imply that the blame for them lay on the Uighurs and other non-Chinese.

With a deteriorating situation in China itself, Chang’s policy of moderation and compromise in Sinkiang was bound to appear more and more like a policy of temporizing, and to seem, to the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, more like a reluctant retreat

from reason and less like a hopeful, though cautious, approach toward reason. First deadlock and then crisis developed in the early months of 1947.

In February of that year Akhmedjan declared that “the expression ‘Eastern Turkistan’ does not mean that we advocate an independent Eastern Turkistan. It means solely that the people have finished with the former policy of oppression and do not want it to continue. . . . The problem of our day is the confirmation of national unity [i.e. the unity of the “nationalities” of Sinkiang] and the putting into action of the democratic policy.” He put forward his program under three headings: unification of all the peoples of the province; executive power to rest with the Uighurs and other non-Chinese nationalities, except for defense; and a Kurultai, or assembly of the nationalities of the province, to be the supreme judiciary body. He declared that in Sinkiang the supremacy of any one nationality was not needed. “The condition for peace and unity is unity of the nationalities and a democratic policy. This is written in the Kulja Declaration.”

Akhmedjan made the accusation, supporting it with considerable detail, that in many oases of the Tarim Basin elections had been interfered with by the police and the Chinese troops. People were beaten, students and teachers imprisoned, meetings forbidden or broken up, and once the military even boasted that they had the atom bomb with which to destroy Sinkiang. While making a stand against Chinese claims to arbitrary authority, however, and by clear implication against the C.C. Clique influence in Sinkiang policy, Akhmedjan held out the possibility of reconciliation between the Chinese people as a whole and the non-Chinese.

Chinese of Sinkiang. “In this province,” he declared, “it is impossible to maintain peace by means of persecution, corruption, trickery, and fraud”; but on the other hand “the enemies of our people are not the Chinese nation, but those individuals who advocate oppressive government, who want imperialist policies, who are against rights for the people.”

In April 1947 Chang Chih-chung made a tour of the most important oases of the Tarim Basin. In May, fortified presumably by the firsthand knowledge he had acquired, he made an important speech at Urumchi in which he put forward a Chinese policy countering the policy of Akhmedjan. There should, he pleaded, be no resort to revolution. Theoretically, Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic system of rule; but autonomy and democracy should be based on a choice between the Sun Yat-sen pattern and the Soviet pattern. The Kulja group, he asserted, because of its opposition to the Chinese Government, must be regarded as opposing the San Min Chu I or Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat-sen, and must therefore be pro-Communist.

General Chang also dealt with a number of the substantive issues standing between the Chinese Government and the Kulja group. Akhmedjan, as the spokesman of the Kulja group, was willing to recognize the right of the Chinese Government to control the national defense of Sinkiang. General Chang, however, contended that reorganization of the six regiments in the three frontier regions of Kulja, Chuguchak, and the Altai district should be preceded by the complete surrender of those regiments to the Chinese forces. His demand in this respect was parallel to that of the Chinese Government in its 1945–1946 negotiations with the Chinese Communists, through the Marshall Mission: the Communists offered to reduce their forces and to place them under a united high command, but demanded that their identity as units be preserved and that the units continue to be stationed in Communist districts; the National Government insisted on its right not only to take over such forces but to disperse or reassign them.

Akhmedjan, in the speech cited above.
In addition to other minor demands, General Chang wanted the assent of the Sinkiang nationalist leaders to the building of a railway into Sinkiang. From the government point of view, this was a reasonable project for the linking of a frontier province to the main body of China. From the point of view of the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, railway communication meant the danger of being submerged by a flood of Chinese colonists.

General Chang's final demand was that Sinkiang give up its separate provincial currency and adopt that of the National Government. From the Chinese point of view, this was a rational demand. From the Sinkiang point of view, it carried with it the danger that the wealth of Sinkiang would be freely pumped into China, without a compensating flow back from China into Sinkiang.

Before the deadlock could be broken General Chang gave up his post as Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government. He retained, however, the post of Commander of the Generalissimo's Northwest Headquarters, which gave him general supervisory powers in Northwest China and Sinkiang. He was succeeded as Chairman in May 1947 by Masud Sabri, the elderly representative of an Uighur family of rich landholders and merchants.

In 1904, at the age of seventeen, Masud Sabri had gone to Turkey to study. After eleven years, spent mostly in Istanbul, he returned to Sinkiang in 1915, strongly influenced by the Turkish nationalism of Kemal Atatiirk. In 1934, after practicing medicine in Ili for several years, he traveled through Kashgar to India and then by sea to China, where he soon became associated politically with the C.C. Clique. Through the support of this clique, and not through any process of nomination by supporters in Sinkiang, he was made a delegate from Sinkiang to the Kuomintang National Conference of 1936 and subsequently a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. During the war against Japan, the C.C. Clique placed him in the National Political Coun-


cill. In 1942 he became a member of the National Government.

Thus in 1947 when Masud Sabri became Chairman of Sinkiang — the first "native" ever to hold that position — he did not come to the fore as the head of a movement originating in Sinkiang but as a "tame" Uighur who had long been the pensioner of the powerful C.C. Clique. The fact that he was not stepping up to the governorship from within Sinkiang but was returning after an expatriation of many years was underlined by his arrival from China in the company of General Sung Hsi-lien, commander of the Chinese "expeditionary forces" that had been sent into Sinkiang, and General T'ao Shih-yueh, provincial garrison commander.

It is not surprising, therefore, that even before Masud Sabri's arrival several members of the provincial assembly signed a letter to General Chang Chih-chung protesting his appointment. On June 4, after his inauguration on May 31, no less than 63 members of the assembly out of 90 present adopted a resolution opposing him, while outside of the assembly the opposition to him was headed by twelve popular organizations. Handbills distributed by these organizations stressed the fact that Masud Sabri had not been in Sinkiang when the nationalist risings began, that he had not shown himself as soon as Sheng Shih-ts'ai fell from power, and that he had no local record in either administration or leadership.

In spite of these protests conservative Uighurs, especially landholders in oases occupied by Chinese forces, gathered around Masud Sabri in numbers sufficient to split the nationalist movement. With the backing of the C.C. Clique and the Chinese military, confirmation was withheld from elected members of the provincial judiciary, command appointments in the provincial peace preservation corps were held up, and district magistrates elected by local councils were forced to continue to take orders from the Chinese military. Out of 421 appointments to the police bureau in Urumchi only 48 were Moslems, with Chinese holding
84 per cent of the posts. Police orders were written only in Chinese, and Moslem members of the force were not allowed to carry arms. Moreover a secret police force continued to operate, although supposedly abolished under the “basic provincial law” of July 1946.²¹

Tension mounted. Only a month after Masud Sabri’s inauguration the secret police and members of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, supported by the regular police, attacked a moving picture theater where more than a thousand people were gathered and beat up members of the provincial assembly and a former Deputy District Magistrate from Turfan, and at the same time people in the street who had been reading a wall poster denouncing Masud Sabri were arrested, beaten, and imprisoned.²² Pressure by Masud Sabri prevented the holding of a protest meeting which had been planned by Kulja members of the provincial assembly.

The split between Masud Sabri and the militant Kulja nationalists then became open. In July 1947 a group of twenty-seven members of the provincial assembly left Urumchi for Kulja; this group included representatives from Kharashahr, Turfan, Khotan, and Aksu as well as from the Kulja region itself. They were joined shortly afterward by twenty-two members from the Kashgar region, and finally in August the rest of the Kulja delegates withdrew to Kulja, headed by Akhmedjan Kasimi.²³

From his supervisory position as a backer of Masud Sabri, General Chang Chih-chung in September addressed an open letter to Akhmedjan, as the leader of the dissidents, asking in effect if there was to be war or peace: “If you have no intention against peace, you will return to Urumchi and reopen negotiations with the government.”²⁴ The Kulja reply, in November, denied that secession from China was intended and offered to return to Urumchi if the government would meet certain demands, including the removal of Masud Sabri. In December Chang Chih-chung answered that the Chinese Government would not consider replacing Masud Sabri without an election; but at the same time he renewed his invitation for further negotiations. The Kulja response merely reiterated the demand for the removal of Masud Sabri.²⁵

In the meantime General Chang Chih-chung had returned to Nanking, where he submitted to the government a “five year plan” for the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, cattle raising, and industry in Sinkiang. In January 1948 the Chinese Government appropriated NC fifty billion dollars in the depreciated currency of the period as compensation for private property confiscated by Sheng Shih-ts’ai. A high official, Peng Hsueh-p’ei, was sent on a six-week “fact-finding” tour of Sinkiang, and on his return urged immediate improvement of health and transportation facilities.

In the main, however, the situation continued at deadlock through the year 1948. The Chinese Government maintained a force of about 100,000 troops in Sinkiang, many of them American-equipped, and these troops were effectively immobilized in the civil war against the Communists. Opposed to them were troops of the Kulja coalition, mainly Uighurs and Kazakhs, whose numbers were variously reported at figures ranging from 20,000 to 60,000. These troops were frequently reported to be receiving aid from Russia.

In military action, however, the most sensational events were not on the frontier between Kuomintang-held Sinkiang and the dissidents of the Kulja coalition, but on the Outer Mongolian frontier, around the knot of mountains known as the Baitik Bogda. These mountains are an outlying spur of the main Altai range, and stand at the edge of the Jungarian Desert of northern Sinkiang. When Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and China were united under the Manchu Empire, this frontier was not of great impor-

²¹ Ibid., June 24 and 29, 1947.
²² Ibid., July 9, 1947.
²⁴ Time, New York, October 6, 1947.
²⁵ Dispatch by John Roderick from Lanchow, Kansu Province (General Chang’s headquarters), dated April 5, 1948, published in China Daily Tribune, Shanghai, April 7, 1948.
tance. The grazing grounds of the western slopes of the Altai were used not by Khalkha tribesmen of the main group of tribes in Outer Mongolia, but by Torguts and Ölïts of the Western Mongol groups of tribes, whose pastures were partly in northwestern Outer Mongolia and partly in Sinkiang.

In the same region there were Kazakhs, whom the Imperial authorities had considered as “tenants” of the Mongols, paying the Mongols for the pastures that they used and having no claim to territory of their own. Some of these Kazakhs made use of summer pasture in the Baitik Bogda. The Baitik Bogda were also partly occupied by Mongols, who practiced a certain amount of agriculture in addition to owning livestock. In the winter it was the custom of the Kazakhs to leave most of their horses in the Baitik Bogda, horses being able to paw down through the snow to get winter feed, but to bring their sheep, cattle, and camels down into the Jungarian Desert, where they were clearly within the jurisdiction of Sinkiang. There was a tendency on the part of the Kazakhs to move clear across the desert and up to the lower slopes of the Bogda Ula near Kuchengtze; but the policy of the Sinkiang authorities was to drive them back toward the Baitik Bogda and to keep them out of the jurisdiction of Sinkiang, because they were regarded as cattle thieves and troublemakers. In practice, therefore, the attitude of the Sinkiang authorities was that the Baitik Bogda lay outside of Sinkiang.

By 1948, however, the attitude of the Sinkiang provincial authorities and of the Chinese military command had changed. The Kazakh leader Osman Bator, who has already been mentioned, had at first joined the Kulja coalition, had later broken with it, and had withdrawn to the foothills of the Bogda Ula. The policy of the Chinese authorities was to encourage him to move northward from this region and to occupy the Baitik Bogda, which were accordingly claimed as Chinese territory.

These attempts on the part of the Chinese-supported Kazakhs were resisted by Outer Mongolian frontier patrols, and the frontier incidents which resulted were sensationnally reported. No widespread fighting broke out, however, and American reporters who went up to Sinkiang after the first reports tended to minimize the significance of the incidents.95

The exact location of the frontier in this region remains unclear. Recent Chinese maps show the entire Baitik Bogda within Sinkiang, and the Outer Mongolian frontier running along the main crest of the Altai.97 Older maps, however, both Russian (Tsarist) and British, show the frontier running either right through the Baitik Bogda or somewhat to the south of the main height of the hills.

In December 1948 the Chinese Government made a new move of major importance by dropping Masud Sabri as Chairman of the Province and replacing him with Burkhan, the former Vice-Chairman, who as a “middle-of-the-roader” was more acceptable to the Kulja dissidents. Burkhan, a Russian Tatar by origin, with large trading interests, had been a man of influence in Sinkiang since Tsarist times. He had managed to maintain himself under the regimes of Yang Tseng-hsin, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, and the Kuomintang.

In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung returned to Sinkiang to attempt to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty, to replace a ten-year agreement signed in 1939 under the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. It was reported at the time that the Russians were attempting to acquire monopoly rights in mining and trade. There was also speculation that on the Chinese side an elaborate maneuver was being carried out to create a conflict of interest between the Russians and the Chinese Communists, by granting to the Russians exclusive rights in this frontier sector of Chinese territory. In the upshot, no new treaty was negotiated, but the Russian monopoly right to an air service between Komul and the

See, for example, dispatch from Henry R. Lieberman, from Urumchi, August 27, 1948, in New York Times, September 8, 1948.

Soviet frontier, secured under the old treaty, was continued for five years.98

Returning from Sinkiang after the first few meetings of these negotiations, Chang Chih-chung later joined a five-man “peace team” of the Kuomintang which went to Peiping to negotiate with the Chinese Communists. There, together with the other members of the delegation, he denounced the Kuomintang and declared his adherence, not to the Chinese Communist Party, but to the movement for a coalition government headed by the Communists.

Finally, in September, 1949, all the threads of the politics of Sinkiang were drawn together and tied in one knot: Seyfuddin, of the Kulja coalition, went to Peiping as a delegate to the People’s Consultative Council—called by the Communists—where another delegate was Chang Chih-chung, once the Kuomintang’s top representative in Sinkiang. Almost simultaneously the oasis of Komul, key to the eastern approaches from China proper to Sinkiang, declared in favor of the new Communist regime, and the Sinkiang provincial government immediately followed with a formal declaration of adherence.99 A chapter in the history of Inner Asia had definitely closed. The first words of the next chapter were yet to be written.


CHAPTER IV The Peoples of Sinkiang

The Population

The number of people living in Sinkiang is a matter of considerable debate. No satisfactory census of the population has ever been made. Widely varying estimates range from 2,000,000 to 8,000,000. The figure of 3,730,000 was reached by a survey made by the office of the provincial police in 1940–1941, and this estimate is likely to stand as the best available until a more precise survey is conducted.1

About two thirds of the total area of Sinkiang is uninhabited. The pastoral areas, which are thinly populated, include about a quarter of the province but only a little more than 10 per cent of the population. The cultivated areas, the most thickly settled in the province, make up less than 5 per cent of the total area but contain almost 90 per cent of the people. The greatest concentration of population is south of the Tien Shan, or, more precisely, in the southwestern corner of the province near the Soviet border. The four administrative districts of Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu, and Yarkand contain over two thirds of the people of the whole prov-

1 The geographic distribution of the population is indicated, though only with approximate accuracy, by the figures obtained by the 1940–1941 survey for the ten administrative districts into which the province is divided. (See map.) These divisions, listed in order of the numerical importance of their population, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khotan</td>
<td>605,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksu</td>
<td>561,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarkand</td>
<td>561,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi</td>
<td>372,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulja</td>
<td>351,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiguochak</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharashahr</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharasume</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komul</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ince. North of the Tien Shan the greatest concentration is also near the Soviet frontier, in the Ili Valley.

The population is divided, economically, between those who live by cultivation and those who depend on animal husbandry. Other occupations, such as trade and handicrafts, are of far less importance. In religion, the people are divided among the Moslem, Confucian-Buddhist-Taoist, Lama-Buddhist, and Greek Orthodox faiths, with an overwhelming predominance of Moslems.

The sedentary oasis Moslems, though less strict in religious observance than many other Islamic peoples, are more strict than the pastoral Moslems, who have retained a great deal of their earlier shamanistic beliefs.

Racial divisions in Sinkiang have rarely been described in scientific terms. What little scientific information is available points to a mixture of two main racial elements. One is the racial type designated as Alpine, relatively tall with wavy hair, gray or brown eyes, thin prominent nose, “white” skin, and thick facial and body hair. The other is the racial type known as Mongoloid, relatively short with straight hair, black eyes with the “Mongolian fold,” nose broad at the base, light brown skin, slight facial and body hair, and other features characteristic of the peoples of continental eastern Asia.

The settled inhabitants of the Tashkurgan area in southwestern Sinkiang, the Tajiks or Sarikolis, are most representative of the Alpine type. They are a small group who speak an Iranian language and are commonly believed to be remnants of the indigenous population of a large part of Inner Asia. Following them in conspicuously Alpine characteristics are the settled people of the Tarim Basin, the Uighurs, who constitute about three quarters of the population of the province. Closest to the pure Mongoloid type are the Chinese and the Mongols, followed by the main

Unpublished figures secured in Sinkiang by Mr. Chang Chih-yi are as follows:

- Moslem: 3,439,000
- Confucian-Buddhist-Taoist: 215,000
- Lama-Buddhist: 68,000
- Greek Orthodox: 13,000

The Peoples of Sinkiang

Pastoral groups in the uplands of the province, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. Thus the scale of racial composition suggests that invading Mongoloid peoples, largely nomadic, have merged in varying degrees with an indigenous Alpine population.

Although the only terminology which has any validity in the scientific classification of races in Sinkiang is along the lines men-

\[\text{ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS IN SINKIANG}\]

If “language” is defined in such a manner as to include mutually intelligible forms of speech, and to exclude mutually unintelligible forms, then it appears that there are ten main languages spoken in Sinkiang. These are distributed among three distinct linguistic families, the Altaic, Indo-Chinese, and Indo-European. The languages in the Altaic group are distributed among three subgroups, the Turkic, Mongolian, and Tungus. The classifica-
The Peoples of Sinkiang

An attempt to analyze or classify the population of Sinkiang accurately on the basis of races or nationalities is complicated by the frequently loose and unscientific use of terms by foreign travelers and, much more important, by political motives on the part of Chinese administrators and Turkic nationalist leaders.

It is paradoxical that the sorting out of the peoples of Sinkiang is made more difficult by the fact that there is a rich Russian and Western literature about Sinkiang. For nearly a century there has been incessant publication of books about Inner Asia by explorers, archaeologists, geographers and casual travelers. Unfortunately, in the greater part of the foreign literature the descriptions of racial type, national grouping and political affiliation are excessively loose. For example, an American writer refers to the “distinctly Aryan” features of a regional group, to a “Kirghiz race,” and to evidence of “Turkish and Mongol blood” in Kashgar. “Aryan” can only be used properly in the description of languages, not of races, and even as a linguistic term it has now largely been abandoned, while peoples who speak the Turkish, Kirghiz, or Mongol languages may be of the most various and mixed origin.

Loose terminology in the foreign literature leads merely to misunderstanding or irritation, but it is politically dangerous when it is used to clothe the theories of administrators who are in a position to act. Contemporary Chinese political theories applied to concepts of race and nationality are of critical importance where Chinese administrative policy is confronted at every turn by growing nationalist movements which compete both with each other and with the projects of Chinese politicians. It is therefore essential to sort out the terms used both by Chinese administrators and by nationalist leaders, before attempting an accurate and rational classification of the many peoples who make up the population of Sinkiang.

In China, attempts to classify the peoples of Sinkiang in ways which reinforce political theories have led to four main trends.

The first trend is called Ta Han Chu-i, the “Greater Chinese Theory,” by the Chinese who do not support it, and by Mongol, Uighur, and other nationalists who fear it. According to this defi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Turkic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Uighur</td>
<td>2,941,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kazakh</td>
<td>319,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kirghiz</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uzbek</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tatar</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,338,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mongolian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mongolian</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Tungusic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Manchu</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL 3,418,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Indo-Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Chinese</td>
<td>294,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL 294,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Indo-European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Iranian</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Russian</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL 22,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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nition, all non-Chinese groups within the political frontiers of China are mere subvarieties of an ancient "greater Chinese" race, and should be absorbed into a standardized Chinese race. This trend was pushed by right-wing groups, during the period of Kuomintang ascendancy, who aimed at building up an uncompromising, militant, and expansionist ideology.

The second trend rejects the idea of forced assimilation and stresses instead a program of cultural diversity. It may therefore be labeled as "cultural autonomy." Its main exponents were Sheng Shih-ts'ai, former Governor of Sinkiang, and Chang Chih-chung, the chief Kuomintang emissary to the province after Sheng's withdrawal.

The third trend, which may be called "Pan-Turkish nationalism," emphasizes the fact that the majority of the population in Sinkiang speaks Turkic languages and belongs to the Moslem faith. It is most actively promoted by an Uighur group which has some Kazakh allies.

The fourth trend incorporates the idea of territorial as well as cultural autonomy and hence may be described as "cultural nationalism." It derives its ideas from Soviet nationality policy and is actively propagated by the Chinese Communists, but has a considerable appeal to non-Communist, non-Chinese national minorities which would like to maintain their national identities but to live in harmony with the Chinese in a common state. It has also an appeal to moderate and liberal groups in and out of the Kuomintang, and would have been more widespread if it had not been for fear of the consequences of consenting to any part of the Communist program.

The foremost exponent of the "Greater Chinese Theory" has been Chiang Kai-shek. In his China's Destiny, as officially translated, all the people in China are mentioned as belonging to a single "Chunghua (Chinese) nation." This "nation" is said to be made up of a number of groups which are described in the authorized translation as "stocks." In Chiang's opinion the differ-


ences among these "stocks" are limited to habits, customs, religious beliefs, and geographical environment, and do not include race or blood. "In short," he says, "the various stocks in China constitute not only one nation but also one race." 7

The generalized statements about race and nation made in China's Destiny have been applied to the nationality problems of Sinkiang by a writer belonging to the Kuomintang C.C. Clique, a tightly organized political machine whose political creed was to give extreme authoritarian interpretations of every opinion or theory uttered by Chiang Kai-shek. Following his terminology, the C.C. theorist divides the peoples of Sinkiang into fourteen "stocks." He then concludes that since they are not separate nationalities but merely "stocks" of a single "nation," therefore they are not entitled to separate political recognition, a thesis which other writers have extended into the cultural field as well. He proposes that "self-government" in Sinkiang should be based on small geographical units, the counties, regardless of differences between the peoples inhabiting these administrative units. In order to make impossible any other interpretation of the term for "self-government," he rejects, in so many words, the identification of "self-government" with "freedom" or "independence." 8

In contrast to the rigidly assimilative approach of the C.C. extremists is the policy adopted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai when he was military dictator of Sinkiang. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 Sheng took into his administration a National Salvationist who appears to have been instrumental in elaborating for him a policy intended to effect a compromise between the Chinese monopoly of the provincial administration and the stirrings of nationalism among the non-Chinese peoples.

The National Salvationists in China at that time represented a point of view rather than a political organization. In face of the emergency created by the Japanese danger they believed in effecting the widest possible political coalitions and in taking the

7 Ibid., p. 18. The Chinese term for "nation" or "nationality" is min-tsu, and for "stock," tsung-tsu, also often translated as "clan."

stress off all political cleavages, from the great cleavage between the Kuomintang and the Communists down to all minor factional quarrels. The National Salvationist point of view was thus well suited to the attempt to create a harmonious wartime morale in Sinkiang.

In line with the National Salvationist influence in his entourage, General Sheng proclaimed a program of “Six Great Policies.” Under one of the policies the peoples of Sinkiang were officially classified as belonging to fourteen “nationalities.” These, listed in the order of the documents of the period, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>202,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongul</td>
<td>63,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem (Dungan)</td>
<td>92,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>2,900,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>318,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>8,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranchi</td>
<td>41,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>4,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>65,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>7,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibo</td>
<td>9,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solon</td>
<td>2,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>13,408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The criteria for this classification are not clear. The admiring translator of the admiring advisor of Sheng Shih-ts’ai comments that the confusion in criteria is such as “would tend to eliminate this as any ‘scientifically worked out ethnic list.’” Nor can it be based on geographic criteria, for the groups are not delimited on a territorial basis. It is not based on economic criteria, for some of the groups consist of pastoral herdsmen and others of sedentary cultivators. It is not based on religious criteria, for only the Chinese-speaking Moslems are listed as “Moslems,” while followers of other religions are not mentioned as such, and other Moslems, such as the Uighurs, are not identified by religion. It is not based on administrative criteria, for Sinkiang is divided into ten administrative areas which cut across the fourteen groups. It is not based, finally, on any observable combination of these criteria.

It is probable that this classification, the vehicle of which appeared to be a policy more liberal than any previous Chinese policy toward minorities, represented an attempt at cautious partial imitation of the Soviet minority policy. The imitation, however, did not go very far. Sheng Shih-ts’ai, as his subsequent history shows, was by no means a slavish follower of the Soviet Union or its ideas. The sole emphasis in his program was on promoting the culture of the minority peoples, a policy which permitted cultural autonomy but carefully stopped short of territorial or political autonomy. Indeed it would appear, especially in view of Sheng’s administrative gerrymandering of the province, that his purpose was to manipulate the national classifications which he recognized in such a way as to strengthen the dominant position of the Chinese minority in the province. General Sheng’s classification was in fact influenced by political criteria which if not precisely scientific are at least as old as the earliest empire.

The program promoted by Sheng Shih-ts’ai was in large measure taken over by Chang Chih-chung when he in turn became head of the province. Like his predecessor, Chang was most active in stressing the cultural differences among the fourteen peoples of Sinkiang. Unlike the extreme authoritarians of the C.C. Clique, he appeared to concede that the different peoples of Sinkiang, rather than such administrative units as the counties, should provide the basis of self-rule. “The administration of Sinkiang,” he says, “should be entrusted to the various racial groups and should function under the guidance of the many national leaders of the province.” This formula, however, glosses over the fact that the administrative divisions of Sinkiang do not coincide with the distribution of “the various racial groups.” Further limitations on the right of self-rule are indicated by the following:

The Central Government is willing to surrender all political power to the people of Sinkiang on condition that the...
territory and sovereignty of the nation suffer no impairment thereby. The Central Government will not tolerate anything possibly detrimental to the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the State— even at the cost of a war.12

In opposition to the foregoing Chinese policies stands the “Pan-Turkic nationalism” of a group of native leaders who deal with the population of Sinkiang within the framework of a policy designed to strengthen their control over all the people living within the boundaries of the province. Foremost among these leaders is the recent Kuomintang governor of the province, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landowner and merchant from the Kulja area. Likewise prominent is Mohammed Emin, an Uighur who studied for several years in Turkey and is counted as one of the intellectual leaders of Sinkiang.13

In the view of Masud and Emin, China does not consist of a single “nation” or “nationality” and Sinkiang does not contain fourteen groups of people, whether designated as nationalities or by any other term. They use nationality, however, as the basis for their own classification of the peoples of the province, and define the term with great precision by listing the criteria which in their opinion determine nationality. These criteria are: (1) uniform language; (2) common territory; (3) similar habits and customs; (4) common will; (5) common religion; (6) common race; (7) common clothing, adornments, and other elements like blood relationship. On the basis of these criteria they conclude that the seven groups designated by Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Taranchi, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks are all of one nationality. In their opinion these groups together comprise the “Turkic nation,” despite the fact that the Tajiks do not speak a Turkic language, but an Iranian one.

As Turkic nationalists, Masud and Emin oppose the use of terms like Uighur and Kazakh to represent different nationalities. Actually, they say, the old subgroupings should be redesignated as “tribes,” for all their members are descended, like the ancient Hsiungnu and Yueh-chih, from a single Turkic nation.

The Turkic nation as defined by Masud and Emin would include about nine tenths of the population of Sinkiang. They divide the remaining one tenth into three nationalities: the Chinese, the Manchus, and the Mongols. In the category of “Chinese” they include the two groups designated by Sheng as “Chinese” and “Moslems”: Moslem in this context being a synonym for the Dungan, who are Moslem by religion and Chinese in language. In the category of “Manchus” they include the three groups designated by Sheng as “Manchu,” “Sibo,” and “Solon.” They also suggest that the last group in Sheng’s list, the Russians, may perhaps form a fifth nationality in Sinkiang, though they are somewhat dubious of this since, they say, the Russians in Sinkiang are citizens of the Soviet Union and not of the Republic of China.

The significance of the thesis of a single Turkic nation is revealed by the anticipated relationship of the “Turkis” toward the Chinese state on the one hand and toward the other nationalities in Sinkiang on the other. This relationship in turn is revealed by the terminology employed by the Turkic nationalists in their demands for elevation to nationhood. In the course of a discussion with Li Tung-fang, Mohammed Emin denies that the “Turks” might want to become “independent.” Indeed, he does not even demand the right to “self-determination” which, as he himself mentions, was conceded to the minorities in China in Sun Yat-sen’s Manifesto to the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924. He and other Turkic nationalists ask for no more than the right to “self-government.”

While demanding self-government for themselves, the exponents of Turkic nationalism do not seem to concede this right to the other nationalities in Sinkiang. The Turiks, they say, live in every part of Sinkiang. The name of the province should be changed to one which would reflect their dominant position. Disregarding the interests of other groups, they demand that all Sinkiang be officially designated as “Turkistan.”

Thus Turkic nationalism displays a dual aspect. It is willing to
accept a position of subservience to the Chinese majority in the Republic of China, but it seeks to attain a position of dominance over the whole population of Sinkiang. In this latter objective, Turkic nationalists are in competition with authoritarian Chinese; but the degree of political opposition between Chinese assimilationists like Li Tung-fang and Turkic nationalists like Masud Sabri and Mohammed Emin should not be exaggerated. That there exists an area of agreement between the two groups is evidenced by the fact that Masud Sabri was himself a member of the C.C. Clique and was sponsored for the governorship of Sinkiang by that extreme right-wing faction in the Kuomintang.

There exists also, opposing the theories of these Chinese and Turkic schools, the federal idea of devising territorial and cultural arrangements so as to minimize antagonisms springing from racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. Although many people in China and among national minorities would like to live without such antagonisms, only the Chinese Communists have attempted to work out a theory and program of federalism, and even their discussion of the subject is marked by important gaps.

In their discussions of theory, the Chinese Communists have borrowed heavily from Soviet ideas. They start with Stalin's definition that: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture." Following out this definition they conclude that the Republic of China is made up of a number of different nationalities. The Chinese are the preponderant nationality; other nationalities are referred to as "national minorities." Among those specifically listed in the Communist literature are the Mongols, Tibetans, Yi, Miao, Yao, and Hui (Moslems). The use of the term "Hui" here covers all Moslems, without making a distinction between Chinese-speaking and Turkish-speaking Moslems.

Although the Communists are quite specific in defining nationality, they have done little in the way of applying their ideas to specific groups of people. There does not seem to exist any complete Communist demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang. Nor does there seem to be, in the Chinese Communist literature, any discussion of the administrative units under which a federative nationality policy could operate. However, a general policy for the multinational Republic of China was proposed by the First All-China Congress of Soviets in 1930 in the following resolution:26

"... In such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kweichow, in which a majority of the population belongs to another, non-Chinese nationality, the toiling masses of these nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic."

The Chinese Communists have since abandoned their Soviet regime in favor of what they call "the New Democracy," but their policy toward national minorities does not appear to have undergone basic modification. Speaking before the 1945 Congress of the Communist Party, Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese "demand better treatment for the national minorities of China, according them the right of self-determination and of forming a union with the Hans [Chinese] on a voluntary basis." Mao's failure to repeat the earlier offer of the right of secession may indicate that he has foremost in mind a union of national states under the formula of a "Union of Democratic Republics."24

27 In this resolution the Chinese Communists declared for the principle of the right of secession. In his speech of August 24, 1945, recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic, Chiang Kai-shek also recognized the right of secession, not only for the Mongols but also for other non-Chinese minorities—a striking modification of his views expressed in China's Destiny and elsewhere. Thus on the right of secession President Chiang and the Chinese Communists were within reach of at least verbal agreement. Other Chinese assimilationists, and the "Pan-Turkic" nationalists, have not conceded the right of secession.

24 Mao Tze-tung, The Fight For a New China, New York, 1945, pp. 35 and 44.
The necessity for some sort of federal arrangement is evidenced by the constant armed rebellions resulting from the suppression of local nationalism. The Kulja movement referred to in Chapter III was a rebellion of this kind. It had special significance in the fact that it split the Uighur nationalist movement into two main sections. One section, led by Governor Masud Sabri, and by Burkhan, Mohammed Emin, and Isa Beg, all well-to-do leaders in the Uighur community, took the Chinese side against the Kulja movement. Another group, in which Akhmedjan played a prominent part, supported the Kulja program against the Chinese and their followers. The split between the two groups occurred in August 1947.

That section of the Uighur leadership which most closely identified itself with the Chinese went farthest in the direction of the Turkic nationalism described earlier in this chapter. The Uighur supporters of the Kulja movement found this Turkic nationalism to be an obstacle to their co-operation with other groups. On one occasion Akhmedjan went to some pains to convince the Kazakh supporters of the Kulja coalition that, far from being slighted by the Uighurs, they were receiving more than a proportional share in the coalition.

Although the leaders of the Kulja movement made plain their opposition to the policies of Uighur nationalists like Masud Sabri they did not present an equally clear picture of their own nationalist ideas and objectives. A particularly important point about which full information is lacking is the extent to which their opposition to earlier Chinese rule in Sinkiang led them to accept the federal proposals advanced by the Chinese Communists. It appears that in the early phase of the Kulja revolt the insurrectionists may have had the objective of full independence, as indicated by their use of the term "East Turkistan Republic." After the signing of the Kulja Agreement the word "Republic" was dropped, and as late as October 16, 1947 the representatives of the Kulja group assured the Chinese that they "have never employed direct or indirect, secret or open methods to raise the question of Sinkiang seceding from the Chinese Republic." In addition to disavowing any intention of secession Akhmedjan stated that:

The problem today is to confirm national unity and to put into effect a democratic policy. We do not put the question of the rule of one nation or group of nations over another nation or group of nations. Therefore the national self-government which we desire is supreme authority in our Province under an executive power which is to be effected not only by the Uighurs or those of Turkic race, but also by the unification of all the peoples in our Province and the implementation of a democratic policy.17

The demand of even the most militant Uighurs seems so far to have gone no further than the preservation of their own entity within the Chinese state. A key issue has been the struggle for elections free of intimidation by the Chinese, who attempted to cow the people with assertions that "We have the atom bomb," and that "80,000 American troops" would come to establish "order" in Sinkiang.18 Another demand has been for national courts adapted to the local needs of the population. The issue of the use of their own language also looms large in the eyes of the Uighurs. Item Three of the abortive Kulja Agreement provided that both Chinese and Uighur were to be used in all official documents, and that petitions from the people were to be in the language of the petitioner. Item Four provided that education in lower and middle schools was to be in the language of the student, that the study of Chinese was to be obligatory in middle schools, and that higher education was to be either in Chinese or in Uighur, according to the convenience of the student.

These items suggest the emphasis which Uighur nationalists, like those of other minority groups in Sinkiang, place on their cul-

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17 Sin Čan Gezeti, February 19, 1947 (in Uighur).
18 Loc. cit. (in Uighur).
ultural heritage, and make plain their desire to defend it against Chinese encroachment by preserving their own language, literature, and traditions.

Religious freedom is likewise demanded by Uighurs of all political factions. The Islamic flag, depicting a crescent and star on a red background, flies over the schools in Kulja and Chuguchak. After the break between Kulja and Urumchi, the Kulja group was requested by Chang Chi-chung to clarify its intentions by flying the "national colors" over the schools and military establishments.

It is apparent that the nationalist movement among the Uighurs has never gone as far as the militant revolutionary stage reached by the Viet Minh and other radical groups in the Far East. The Uighurs seek primarily a modicum of liberties such as will permit them to continue to survive as one people under a government of their own choosing. Important sections of the Uighurs have shown that they are willing to join with other peoples, even including some Chinese, in fighting for these demands.

The past history of Sinkiang, considered together with the latest uprising in the province, suggests that the demands of the various peoples are not likely to be fully satisfied without at least some measure of territorial as well as cultural autonomy. Just how this can be arranged is something that has to be worked out —jointly, if it is to be done harmoniously— by the minority border peoples and the majority Chinese in the country as a whole. Hitherto, however, the range of disagreement is such that it appears to be impossible even to obtain accord on the demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang!

The problem is not much easier for the scholar concerned solely with describing the peoples of the province. Any classification into nationalities is impeded at the outset by the dearth of information on the national sentiments of any more than a mere handful of nationalist thinkers. Nevertheless, such concrete data as lie at hand do provide some means for objective analysis of the population. In this connection it is particularly striking that, with hardly an exception, language appears to be an index to an aggregate of characteristics which set off one people from another. For the most part the speakers of the ten languages noted earlier—the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, Iranians, Chinese, Russians, Manchus, Uzbeks, and Tatars—are homogeneous within themselves.

Thus the Uighurs—that is, the people who speak one of the many mutually intelligible dialects of the Uighur language—are all Moslems, all share the same literary and artistic heritage, live chiefly by agriculture, have a common history, form 95 per cent of the population in the Tarim Basin (where 90 per cent of them are concentrated), and in other respects display a high degree of uniformity. At the other extreme are the Chinese of Sinkiang, one third of whom are Moslem while two thirds live within that vague association of Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist ethical maxims and ceremonial observances which satisfies the need for religion in the lives of most Chinese. They do not form the majority of the population in any area, and are sharply divided by conflicting group loyalties. Whether these factors outweigh the bonds which tend to unite Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese into a common nationality is a subject of some dispute. There is less ambiguity about the rest of the population. Assuming, as seems most likely, that in the case of Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese the unifying force of common language is greater than the divisive force of different religions, then there seems little question that with language as an index of other common characteristics the population as a whole is to be demarcated into ten nationalities.

Of the ten language-grouped nationalities in Sinkiang, the Uighurs comprise 80 per cent of the population of the whole
Distribution of Nationalities within Sinkiang

Majority Population:
- Mongols
- Kazakhs
- Uighurs - Thickly Inhabited
- Uighurs - Sparserly Inhabited
- Sarikalis
- Khirghiz
- Chinese

Pastoral and Agricultural Economy in Sinkiang

- Pastoral Economy
- Agriculture, Mainly Oasis Agriculture
province. The next largest group, the Kazakhs, are the preponderant nationality in northeastern Sinkiang, in the area bordering the Kazakh S.S.R. of the Soviet Union, and are also found along the Mongolian frontier. Kirghiz comprise the major portion of the population of the upland areas bordering on the Kirghiz S.S.R., and are also found in the Pamirs. The Mongols are the major nationality in northeastern Sinkiang, in the area bordering the Mongolian People's Republic, and are also found in the Tien Shan, in the heart of the province. The Iranians, who are sometimes called Tajiks or Sarikolis, though small in number relative to the other peoples of Sinkiang, form the major section of the population of the Tashkurgan Valley, adjacent to the Tajik S.S.R.

Thus Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, and Iranians are each distinguished by the fact, clearly revealed in the accompanying sketch map, that they form the local majority in some clearly defined part of the province, in addition to being in a minority in other parts of the province. In contrast, none of the remaining peoples is the major nationality in any area of significant extent. At best they exist as isolated local majorities in villages or towns, as in the case of the Chinese, who form two thirds of the population of the capital city of Urumchi.

Since the Chinese, Russians, Manchus, Uzbeks, and Tatars are all people lacking a territorial base, the only viable nationalities in Sinkiang in terms of national consciousness combined with a territorial base for existence as a nationality are the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, and Iranians.

Nationalities and Their Characteristics

1. The Uighurs, the Majority People of Sinkiang

The use of the name Uighur has been revived in Sinkiang only in recent years. Historically it first appears in the records of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.) as the name of a tribal confederation of pastoral nomads living along the Selenga River, in what is now the northern part of the Mongolian People's Republic.

From 745 to 840, warriors of this confederation penetrated into Inner Asia north and south of the Tien Shan. In 840 the Uighur power in Mongolia was destroyed by Kirghiz from the Lake Baikal-Yenisei area. Some of the Uighur warrior class succeeded in withdrawing southwest, where they took over the oases north of the Tien Shan, infiltrated in large numbers into the oases south of the mountains, and made themselves the rulers of a settled population. From Chinese transcriptions of the name Uighur, like Hui-hu and Wei-ru-erh, there was eventually formed the name "Hui" or "Hui-hui," the popular Chinese term for all Moslems.

The people or peoples among whom the Uighurs were absorbed but to whom they gave their name had for half a millennium or so enjoyed several flourishing civilizations. From the oases of easternmost Sinkiang have been recovered documents dating from the first century A.D., written in the Sogdian script. The language of these documents has been identified as belonging to the Indo-Iranian group; the main centers of the Sogdians were Samarkand and Bokhara, but their language was widely used in Inner Asia, especially by traders. The Khotan oasis has given up documents in the Tokharian language and also in the Saka language, also belonging to the Indo-Iranian group, which date from 200–400 A.D. and are written in the Kharoshthi script, which came from India. The Saka civilization was related to the Kushan culture in northwestern India, and like it showed marked Hellenistic influences. In the same period there flourished in the Kucha and Turfan oases a civilization which also used the Tokharian language. What is most interesting about this language is that it belongs, like the Indo-Iranian languages just mentioned, to the larger Indo-European family, but unlike them has more affinity with languages of the "Kentum group" spoken in western Europe than with those farther east.

Besides speaking Indo-European languages the pre-Uighur peoples were distinguished by their devotion to Buddhism and Greco-Buddhist art, and to Manichaeism. The most important literary and artistic treasures from the Tarim Basin are connected with these religions.
When the Uighurs penetrated to the Tarim area, they had already felt the influence of Manichaeism through Sogdian traders. After their contact with the settled population, numbers of the Uighurs were converted to Buddhism. In turn they established their own language among the indigenous people. Both groups were also influenced at an early period by Nestorian Christianity.

Subsequently Islam became the dominant religion in the whole area. The Kashgar region was first converted in the tenth century, but Islam spread slowly and did not completely drive out Buddhism until the sixteenth century.

The period of Uighur domination was brought to an end in the first quarter of the twelfth century by the invasion of the Khara Khitai, who at the beginning of the thirteenth century were in turn overthrown by Jenghis Khan. Mongol Khans continued to rule over the area even after the Mongol (Yuan) Dynasty was overthrown in China. The period of Mongol ascendancy was marked by a dual system of administration in which native princes, ecclesiastical leaders, and commune elders retained a considerable degree of authority. With the weakening of the Mongol hold the Moslem prelates, called khojas, were able to take over complete control in 1568 and establish what was virtually a theocratic state. Their influence continued to some extent even after the invasion by the Jungar Mongols in 1650 and the replacement of Jungar rule by the Manchus in 1756.

In the checkered history of Sinkiang the Uighurs appear as only one of many invading peoples. Despite the fact that in the process of amalgamating with the indigenous population the Uighurs were able to impose their own language on the other peoples, the total importance of their influence should not be exaggerated. Physically the present population of the Tarim Basin is more akin to the Alpine than to the Mongoloid type. The culture, way of life, and other aspects of the present population also owe little to the Uighurs who rode out of Mongolia in the ninth century.

The revived use of the name Uighur in Sinkiang, though justified by the fact that the Uighur language is used by the people who now once more call themselves Uighur, is primarily political in motivation. During the Ming Dynasty, when the Chinese had little contact with the area, they maintained in their translation bureau, the Szu I Kuan, one section dealing with “Moslem” people in general and another with the “Kao-Ch’ang” people of Turfan, who were clearly considered by the Ming Chinese to be identical with the Uighurs. During the Manchu period the population of the Tarim Basin was generally referred to in documents as Ch’an Hui, or Turbaned Moslems, and in the Chinese spoken language as Ch’an-thou, or Turbaned Heads. When foreigners first began to penetrate the area in numbers in the nineteenth century, they referred to the population either as “Turks” or as “Sarts” and to the region as Turkistan. The word “Sart,” widely used in Inner Asia, was adopted by the Russians as a general designation for settled people speaking a Turkic language. The word “Turkistan,” a Persian expression meaning “land of the Turks,” was first applied by Arab geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries to the area northeast of the Syr Darya, was later adopted by the Russians to designate most of their holdings in Central Asia, and was also used as an administrative term for part of Afghanistan. The British applied it to Chinese Central Asia, though the term has never had any administrative significance there, and also designated the population as Turki.

At a meeting held in Tashkent in 1921 a small number of emigrants from the Tarim Basin living in Soviet Central Asia demanded that the name Uighur be revived. In 1934 the Provincial Government of Sinkiang accepted a resolution from the Association for the Promotion of Uighur Education for a formal change to this name. A resolution adopting the new name was promulgated in that year under the signature of Sheng Shih-ts’ai and Khoja Niaz, a nationalist leader who had been instrumental in setting up the abortive East Turkistan Republic in the Turfan area in the early thirties. The growing use of the name Uighur is a measure of increasing national consciousness among people...
who for several centuries had referred to themselves only as Kashgarliks, Turfanliks, and so on — that is, as inhabitants of a particular oasis.

Since the most important oases are in the Tarim Basin, the major concentration of the Uighurs is south of the Tien Shan. North of the mountains they are few in number and dispersed among other peoples. One reason for the greater mixture of peoples in the north is that the Jungarian Basin has historically served as a migration route. Its present population consists of relatively new immigrants. In the course of the Manchu conquests in Central Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century 30 per cent of the population of Jungaria was exterminated, 40 per cent died of epidemics and other causes, and 20 per cent fled away. In repopulating the region the imperial policy was to mix Uighurs, Chinese, Mongols, and other groups.

The Uighurs who were brought into the Ili region at that time became known as Taranchi or “cultivators.” In his list of fourteen peoples Sheng Shih-ts’ai separated the Taranchis from other Uighurs; but there is no reason for such separation except to prevent political unity.

In language the Uighurs are uniform except for minor differences of dialect. Uighur is written with the Arabic script, which is no more suited to it than it is to other Turkic languages. So far there has not arisen any significant movement, comparable to that in Turkey under Kemal Atatiirk or to that developed in the Soviet Union in the '20's and '30's, for the adoption of a script based on either the Latin or the Cyrillic alphabet. Suggestions have however been made, against the opposition of those wedded to the script in its present form, for the adoption of minor changes. One proposal calls for removing the single most important drawback to the Arabic script by adapting it to the writing of all vowels. Another suggestion is to write as one speaks, but this has encountered difficulty because agreement has not yet been reached on what dialect of the language is to be chosen as the standard.

The linguistic uniformity of the Uighurs is only one aspect of their general homogeneity. Almost the whole population is dependent upon agriculture and subsidiary occupations. The chief exception is a group known as Dulani who live in large part by animal husbandry along the banks of the Yarkand and Tarim Rivers. It may be that these are a people in the process of assimilation. Although they speak Uighur they are said to derive from the Kipchak tribe of the Middle Horde of the Kazakhs. (The main body of Sinkiang Kazakhs belong to the Eastern Horde.) Uncertainty as to the precise relationship of the Dulani is increased by the fact that their womenfolk wear a distinctive style of headgear which is quite similar to that used by Kirghiz women. A still smaller splinter of nonsedentary Uighur-speaking people are the Lopliks, who live in the area of Lob Nor and make their living largely by fishing.

Apart from these groups the Uighur population as a whole lives either in farmsteads scattered in the fields or in houses ranged along the narrow streets of oasis cities and towns. The houses usually consist of mud-brick apartments grouped around open courtyards. In the summer much of the daily living is carried on in the open bazaars and on streets shaded by poplar trees and mat-covered trellises.

The Uighurs have a reputation for being indolent and pleasure-loving, with a special fondness for music, drama, and good eating. Ever since the time of Marco Polo the inhabitants of the Tarim Basin have been particularly noted for the casual relations between the sexes. Divorce is extraordinarily easy, temporary alliances are common, and the family as an institution is unstable to a degree unsurpassed among peoples of Islamic faith.

Religion has an uneven influence on the population. The most important positions in the Moslem Church are held by religious leaders who have inherited their posts from a long line of ancestors and most of whom are related to the large landowners and officials who dominate Uighur society. Not surprisingly, therefore, the upper strata of Uighur society include the most ardent supporters of Islam. The poorer classes are indifferent.

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Katanov-Menges.
churchgoers and have a low opinion of the clergy. A common saying is, "Do what the mullah says, not what he does."

The intimate ties between the upper lay and ecclesiastical strata enhance the importance of religion. Such literary works as are possessed by the Uighurs are mainly of a religious or didactic character and both historical and contemporary Uighur literature stresses the role played by the church in the struggle of the Uighurs against oppression by the Chinese and earlier rulers.

2. OTHER NATIONALITIES WITH A TERRITORIAL BASE

Kazakhs. The Sinkiang Kazakhs, who officially number 318,716 people, share a common history with the Kazakhs of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in the U.S.S.R.

As a separate nation they appear comparatively late in history. They were originally a part of the Ulus or heritage of Chagatai, one of the sons of Jenghis Khan, and then became part of the Uzbek Khanate, one of the successor states of the Ulus or appanage of Juchi, eldest son of Jenghis, called by the Russians the Golden Horde. The Uzbek Khanate suffered from constant friction among tribal Sultans and Princes. In the middle of the fifteenth century two Sultans of the Barak clan, which was the most powerful opponent of Abul-Khair, the ruling Khan, left the Uzbek confederation and migrated to the neighboring Khanate of Mogulistan, taking their tribal subjects with them. The Mogul Khan — who controlled the territory from east of Tashkent to Jungaria — hoping to find in them allies against his rivals the Uzbeks, ceded to them a stretch of grazing lands from north of the River Chu to west of the River Sary-su. The transformation of this small splinter group into a national and political unit was not accomplished until the end of the fifteenth century, when the Uzbeks conquered the southern oasis regions of Inner Asia and, through close contact with the sedentary oasis population, ceased to be pastoral nomads. At that time, several tribes separated from the Uzbek Khanate and remained in the northern steppes, joining the Kazakhs, whose border was thus moved far westward into what is today called the Kazakh steppe. The diverse tribal origin of the Kazakhs is indicated by the name "Kazakh," which is believed to mean "a fugitive or masterless man who has separated himself from his tribe" (or overlord). The same name, modified by Slavic pronunciation, was adopted by the Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians who became the Russian Cossacks.

In the sixteenth century the newly formed Kazakh Khanate split into three hordes, forming a loose federation which united only rarely, under stress of war. This deterioration of the former unity was a result of the increased wealth of the Kazakhs, obtained by their conquest of some of the southern oasis regions from the Uzbeks in the sixteenth century, which made the individual tribal Sultans less dependent on the economic and political protection of the Khan. Of these three hordes, it was the easternmost, or the "Old Horde," whose grazing lands reached east of the present Soviet-Chinese border into Sinkiang.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russians began to penetrate into the territory of the Kazakhs and by the end of the nineteenth century had succeeded in colonizing the territory of the three hordes, except for the easternmost part of the Old Horde which remained under Chinese domination. Even after the drawing of a border line between the bulk of the Kazakhs in the west and the small splinter group in Chinese territory, however, many aspects of the common historical development continued, since the nomads were no respecters of national boundaries and migrated back and forth across the frontier which cut through their tribal lines.

The main grazing grounds of the Sinkiang Kazakhs are along the borders between Sinkiang and the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and between Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic. From the Tekes and Kunguz Rivers in the Ili region they range northeastward to the Chuuguchak region and then southeastward along the Mongolian Altai. There are even Kazakhs on the other side of this frontier, under the sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Kazakhs are pastoral nomads, herding sheep, goats, horned cattle, horses, and camels. Felt tents are used in the summer, but
most Kazakhs live in mud huts in the winter or, in mountain country, in log cabins. Sheep and goats are the economic staple and serve as the units of exchange value. Poorer people live more on milk and cheese than on mutton; wealthier herd-owners eat more mutton. Sheepskins, tanned with the wool on them, are used for clothing; cotton textiles, used for lighter clothing or as a facing for the skin clothing, are acquired in trade. Felted wool is used to cover the round, conical-roofed tents. The horse, formerly important in war, is honored in Kazakh folklore for its beauty, bravery, and faithfulness. In modern times the wealthy keep herds of mares in order to be able to drink kumis, made by fermenting mare's milk.

Like all pastoral nomads of Inner Asia, the Kazakhs have always had some acquaintance with agriculture. Rich men sometimes hire Uighurs or Chinese to cultivate grain for them on suitable land; on the other hand, poor Kazakhs, whose herds are not large enough to sustain them, turn their herds over during the summer to richer clan relatives and work at cutting and storing hay or at cultivating grain or potatoes.

Like other nomads, also, the Kazakhs do not wander planlessly. Summer pastures belong collectively to a group of families forming a clan, identified by a common ancestor (real or fictitious); these pastures lie within a larger territory in which jurisdiction is claimed by the larger unit, the tribe. Winter quarters more commonly belong to a single family, often the "large family" of several generations living together. The chief migrations are in spring, from winter quarters to summer pastures, and in autumn, from summer pastures back to winter quarters. The most hazardous migration is in spring, when herds are weak after the winter, when lambs are being born, and when spring blizzards may cause heavy losses.

Good winter quarters are much harder to find than good summer pastures; shelter and food must be in close combination. Hence the scarcity of suitable winter quarters rather than the amplitude of summer pastures determines the total population capacity of a nomad territory. In practice the wealthy families acquire the determining political power within clans and tribes and secure the best allocations of pasture. Disputes over winter quarters are the most common cause of quarrels between clans and tribes, and similarly the fact that good winter quarters are often on land suitable for cultivation is the commonest cause of friction between Kazakh or Mongol nomads and colonizing Uighur or Chinese farmers.

The economic development of the Sinkiang and Russian Kazakhs has not been uniform since the Soviet Revolution. The pastoral economy of the Sinkiang Kazakhs has not improved, but conditions have become worse where the Chinese authorities have permitted colonization of some of their territory by Uighurs or Chinese. On the Soviet side of the frontier, the traditional nomadic economy has been strongly modified. "Clan collectivism" has given way to socialist collectivism. Winter quarters and summer pastures are owned by collectives which are not necessarily formed out of kinship clans; the breeds of livestock have been improved; and agriculture has been developed in combination with the pastoral economy. In addition industrialization has been introduced on a very large scale, including coal and copper mining. In coal mining, particularly, a fairly large Kazakh labor force is engaged; and out of industry and the improvements in farming and herding have developed opportunities for higher education and technical training.

The Kazakh language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic family, and is closely related to other Turkic languages in Inner Asia, and to Osman Turkish. The language of Sinkiang and Soviet Kazakhs is identical. There was almost complete illiteracy among both groups until the Soviet Revolution. The small number of literates, mainly within the upper classes and the clergy, used the Arabic alphabet, which is unsuited to the phonology of the Turkic languages. After the Bolshevik Revolution a Latin alphabet was introduced, with the addition of a few special letters; this script was replaced in 1940 by the Cyrillic alphabet, again with the addition of a few special letters. The attack on illiteracy went slowly in the first years under the Soviet system. In 1931, 77 per
The majority of the Kazakhs were not converted to Moham­
medanism until the seventeenth century. Even then they re­
mained lax in observing many of the rules of Islam. They neither
veil nor seclude their women, because the conditions of nomadic
life require active kinds of work which would be hampered by
the veil. Men and women mingle in many kinds of work around
the camp. They are also lax about the details of the Moslem
dietary laws, except for the prohibition against pork; they do not
adhere strictly to the hours of prayer or the seasons of fasting, and
frequently neglect to circumcise their sons.

Kirghiz. There has been considerable confusion in the use of
the term Kirghiz. The Russians, to avoid confusion with the Rus­
sian Cossacks, formerly called both the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs
"Kirghiz," adding the term Kara (black) to the real Kirghiz, and
calling the Kazakhs "Kirghiz Kaisak." These distinctions were
made, however, only when absolutely necessary. In everyday use,
both people were called "Kirghiz." It was only with the establish­
ment of national autonomy for both peoples under Soviet rule
that a clear distinction was made between the Kirghiz and the
Kazakhs.

Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz are divided today by the frontier
between China and the U.S.S.R. Up to the time of the Soviet
Revolution the historical development of the Kirghiz on both
sides of the frontier was essentially the same. It was only with the
establishment of the Kirghiz Soviet Republic, which encompasses
the vast majority of the Kirghiz, that the development of the
Kirghiz people on either side of the frontier began to take on
radically different forms. While the Soviet Kirghiz have been
partly settled, organized into collectives, and enjoy a high degree
of cultural and political autonomy, the Sinkiang Kirghiz are con­
tinuing in the traditional ways.

The original home of the Kirghiz was on the upper Yenisei
River. The oldest Chinese references appear to be under the name
Chienchun, at about the opening of the Christian era. The tribal
or clan name Burut appears to confirm their northern origin, and
an ancient connection with the ancestors of the Buryat Mongols.
In 840, Kirghiz war bands defeated the Uighurs in Mongolia,
causing some of the Uighurs to move south into Sinkiang. In the
tenth century the Kirghiz themselves were defeated by the Khara
Khitai. A part of the Kirghiz then moved back to the Yenisei River,
and a part started on a gradual migration southwest toward the
region which they inhabit today, where they are mentioned by a
Turkish source of the sixteenth century. Like the Kazakhs, the
Kirghiz were conquered by the Russians in the nineteenth cen­
tury, except for those who remained within the Manchu-Chinese
hegemony.

The Sinkiang Kirghiz officially number 65,248. Like those across
the border, they are a mountain people. They are distributed
from the Tekes Valley in the Tien Shan as far east as Aksu, and
along the mountains west of the Sinkiang-Soviet border down to
the Pamirs and the Karakoram Mountains.

Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz are pastoral nomads; but they are
Alpine nomads in contrast to the Kazakhs, who are steppe no­
mads. While some groups of the Kazakhs spend their winters in
the protection of the foothills below the main mountain ranges,
and while their winter quarters are owned by individual families,
the Kirghiz establish their winter quarters on the banks of rivers
and the whole clan occupies common winter quarters. Their sum­
mer pastures, unlike those of the Kazakhs, are high up in the
mountains. Each clan moves freely up and down between winter
quarters and high summer pastures, but is limited in horizontal
movement by the presence of other clans in neighboring valleys.
Basically, their cattle-breeding economy is the same as that of the
Kazakhs, except that they own more horned cattle including yaks,
which are useful pack animals for mountain travel. They are con­
siderably poorer in total number of livestock than the Kazakhs,
but have somewhat more agriculture, some of it irrigated.

Kirghiz is a Turkic language, more closely related to Chaghatai
Turkish and Uighur than to Kazakh. The same language is spoken by the Kirghiz on the Soviet side of the frontier. Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz in Sinkiang are almost completely illiterate, and the only written form for the language is the Arabic alphabet; while in Soviet Kirghizia, illiteracy has decreased sharply with the introduction of the new Kirghiz alphabet, originally based on the Latin script but now using an adapted Cyrillic script.

Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz are nominal Mohammedans but with strong shamanistic holdovers. Radlov, a century ago, maintained that they considered themselves to be exemplary Moslems and were less tolerant of non-Moslems than the Kazakhs. This is evidenced in their folk literature in which the struggle against nonbelievers plays an important role.

Mongols. The Mongols of Sinkiang, numbering some 63,000 people, are badly split up and unevenly distributed in widely separated sections of the province. The largest concentrations are in the Chuguchak and Ili administrative regions, in each of which they number almost 25,000. Another group totaling about 13,000 is found in the highlands of the Kharashahr region. There are a few along the northeastern section of the frontier between Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic, and other scattered fragments in the northern part of the province.

The area most clearly dominated by the Mongols is along the western end of the frontier with the Mongolian People's Republic. Yet the Mongols in this region constitute only a small fraction of the total number in the province, while the areas in which they are most heavily concentrated, such as Chuguchak and Ili, are in turn dominated by Kazakhs.

The geographic fragmentation of the Mongols is explained largely by their historical vicissitudes. They are divided into three major tribal groups: (1) the Western Mongols, who include the Olots, the Torguts, and the Khoshots; (2) the Chahar Mongols, and (3) the Urianghai Mongols; but the political units do not correspond with these tribal divisions. The Mongols are administratively organized into three leagues and two special groups.
out of Lake Baikal into the Yenisei. A number of indications point to the probability that the majority of the Western Mongols are the descendants of tribes which originally were forest tribes and later moved into steppe country, where they became pastoral nomads.

The Western Mongols eventually formed a federation, referred to in the Chinese chronicles as the Oirat Federation, and also known as the Ölöt Federation. (The Mongol written form of Ölöt is Ughel.) In the seventeenth century the Jungar or “left wing” of this federation attempted to conquer the rest of the federation. It is from the Jungars that Jungaria is named. Of those who would not submit to the Jungars a large number, including many Torguts and Khoshots, fought their way westward through territory held by Turkic tribes until they reached the lower Volga, where they became known as “the Kalmuks,” probably from a Turkic word meaning “the remnant.” Eighty years later the Manchus invaded Sinkiang, defeated and almost annihilated the Jungars, and invited those who had resisted the Jungars to return. Some did, including the ancestors of most of the present Torguts of Sinkiang, while others remained in Russia.

In their economic life the Mongols of Sinkiang closely resemble the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. In their social organization, the hereditary Princes of the Mongols enjoy a much stronger and much more institutionalized feudal power than the sultans of the Kazakh tribes. One result of this difference is that poor Mongols are much poorer than poor Kazakhs. In addition, the Lama Buddhist religion of the Mongols is institutionalized to the point of constituting an ecclesiastical feudalism, with the result that the payment of dues and the making of special gifts for the upkeep of lama monasteries is another principal cause of the impoverishment of the Mongols as compared with the Kazakhs.

Until the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Mongol Princes had virtual autonomy in administering their tribal territories. Under the Republic, the Chinese authorities have upheld the power of the Princes over their subjects, but at the same time have steadily increased Chinese control over the Princes themselves. The result of this policy has been to make all progressive Mongols antifeudal as well as anti-Chinese.

Chinese policy has also been to encourage friction between the Mongols and other peoples. Under the long regime of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin from 1912 to 1928 the Kazakhs were provided with arms and were permitted to drive a wedge of expansion into the Altai area in order to separate the Mongols of Sinkiang from their too revolutionary brethren over the border in the Mongolian People’s Republic. On the other hand, the Torguts of Kharashahr, geographically separate from other Mongols and close to a region of Kazakh strength, were allowed to develop a well-equipped cavalry force trained by Russian Cossacks who had left Siberia after the Soviet Revolution.

Only recently, with the increase both of nationalism and of the revolutionary trend of nationalism in Sinkiang, have some Mongols and some Kazakhs begun to make common cause. There are sections of both Mongol and Kazakh support for the Kulja coalition and the Kulja program. More revolutionary elements among the Sinkiang Mongols may be expected to look with even greater interest toward the Mongolian People’s Republic. No outstanding individuals, however, have been reported among the Mongol nationalists of Sinkiang.

Iranians (Sarikolis, Tajiks). In the extreme southwest corner of Sinkiang is a group of people who speak an Iranian tongue. They are concentrated in the Sarikol or Tashkurgan Valley, where they form the majority of the population, and appear in smaller numbers in neighboring areas. All told they number only 8800. They are usually referred to as Sarikolis, but were classified by Governor Sheng Shih-t’ai in his list of the peoples of Sinkiang as Tajiks. Recent Russian writers also called them Tajiks, but it is not clear whether they are following the Chinese classification or whether the Chinese adopted a Russian classification.

The Sarikol Valley lies close to the point where the Chinese,
Soviet and Afghan frontiers meet, but the frontiers are not well defined, have been disputed in the past, and may be disputed again. The Sarikolis are resentful of Chinese rule, especially because of the burdens imposed on them for supplying men and animals, without pay or for insufficient pay, to keep open a high mountain route between Sinkiang and India which is used by official travelers and to a smaller extent by traders. This discontent might take the form of an attempt to break away from Chinese rule, but if so it is not clear what other people they would prefer to join.

There are two Iranian languages spoken in adjoining districts. One is the Pamir group of dialects, spoken in the Wakhan Valley of Afghanistan and in the Mountain Badakshan Autonomous Region enclosed within the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. The other is Tajik. Thus the question whether the Sarikolis speak Tajik or Pamir Iranian is important, but there is as yet no authoritative answer.

The Sarikolis are said by Grenard to be a remnant of the early inhabitants of Khotan who left documents dating from the period 200–400 A.D. in the Saka language, a now extinct Indo-Iranian tongue. Tang Dynasty Chinese records likewise describe the Sarikolis as identical in external appearance and language with the inhabitants of Khotan. At that time they were devout adherents of Buddhism, maintaining no less than ten monasteries in their little kingdom. The Chinese first conquered the region in the Tang Dynasty and established there a military post which marked the extreme point of Chinese military occupation in Central Asia.

Subsequently the people were converted to Islam. They now adhere to the Ismaili sect of the Moslem faith, which acknowledges the Agha Khan in Bombay as its head. Culturally they are extremely backward, and are still without a written language.

The people live for the most part as settled cultivators despite the fact that the Sarikol Valley nowhere drops below 10,000 feet. Irrigation is practiced, and the main crops are oats, barley, and legumes. Despite difficult conditions, the land is apparently capable of supporting a larger population than it does at present. In the Tang Dynasty, the population was of such a size as to support five hundred monks and a military force of no less than a thousand men. In the last century the population has declined, in part because of slave-hunting raids conducted by peoples from northern India before and after the time of Yakub Beg.

At present the settled population lives in close contact with pastoral Kirghiz. The relations between the two groups appear to be friendly. On the other hand the relations of the Tashkurgan population with the Chinese administration have not been good in recent years. There existed in the area an organization known as the Partisans of the Red Tents — made up of Kirghiz or Iranians or both — which opposed the provincial administration and was friendly toward the program of the Kulja group. Whether the name of the organization is due to a more decided political coloring cannot be ascertained as yet.

3. NATIONALITIES WITH NO REGIONAL OR TERRITORIAL BASE OF THEIR OWN

Chinese. It is noteworthy that though Sinkiang is a Chinese province, there is within it no significant territorial enclave in which the population majority is solidly Chinese. Ever since the foreign policy of China first penetrated Sinkiang in the second century B.C., the Chinese have intermittently figured among the important population groups in the area, but not as colonizers who displaced the native population from large blocks of territory. In between the periods of their ascendancy they either remained as an alien minority, returned to their homeland, or disappeared in the savage massacres which they often invited by their own misrule.

In the second half of the last century the Chinese were almost wiped out in the great rebellions which shook the whole northwestern section of the Manchu Empire. Since then they have filtered back into the area. With the exception of criminal exiles sent to Sinkiang under the Manchu regime, the Chinese who have
Hunanese and men from the lower Yangtze Valley have long formed the bureaucratic elite; Tientsin men hold the strongest position in trade; Shansi men control the camel caravans carrying goods across Mongolia between Sinkiang and North China, and Kansu Province has been the principal source of farming colonists.

When Tso Tsung-t'ang, a Hunanese general who had served under the Manchus against the Taiping rebels, undertook the task of suppressing the Moslem revolts, the army he commanded was composed largely of Hunanese. Many of them remained in Sinkiang after the completion of the campaign. Some became landowners and officials in the Provincial Government, in which they long exercised such a dominating influence that Sinkiang was called a "Hunanese colony."

Tso's expeditionary force was accompanied by large numbers of Tientsin merchants who sold to the army en route and then settled down in Sinkiang. They were later joined by their families, many of which brought more goods along with them, so that Tientsin traders soon appeared throughout the urban centers of the province.

During the rule of Yang Tseng-hsin, who remained as Governor of the Province after the Revolution of 1911, a number of fellow provincials from Yunnan came to take advantage of his position in the province. A few Kansu Chinese came in during the ascendancy of Ch'in Shu-jen. Later some 10,000 Chinese troops from Manchuria, interned in Siberia when they had retreated after fighting against the Japanese, were "repatriated" by the Soviet Union to Sinkiang after Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a native of Manchuria, became Governor of Sinkiang. Still later refugees from the Honan famine of 1944 were transported into the province by the Central Government authorities to take up land expropriated from Kazakhs.

In addition to the above-mentioned Chinese, other groups, distinguished from the main body by their adherence to the Moslem faith, have also settled down in Sinkiang. Many were first placed in Sinkiang by the Manchu Emperor Ch'ien-lung after he had crushed the Jungar Mongols in the eighteenth century. Later other groups of Chinese Moslems sought refuge in the area as the aftermath of Moslem uprisings in the northwestern part of China proper. These are the Dungans (in Chinese transcription, T'ung-kan). Most of them were from Kansu Province, some from Ninghsia, others from Shensi.

So important is the religious factor in distinguishing between Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese that often they are considered as two distinct peoples. In Sheng Shih-ts'ai's classification the main body of Chinese are designated as "Han" and the Moslem Chinese as "Hui." The former number some 202,000, and the latter 92,000. The term "Hui" is short for "Hui-hui"; and, although it derives from a medieval transcription of the name of the Uighurs, it is applied to all Moslems. The term "Dungan," for the Chinese Moslems - used invariably by the Russians in Tsarist times, and also in the Soviet literature dealing with the small colonies of Moslem Chinese in the Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics - is of Turkic origin. Its meaning is obscure, but it may mean "the returners." This etymology is supported by the folk tradition that the Chinese Moslems are the descendants of mercenary troops who entered China from Inner Asia and later settled down and took Chinese wives. Thus when they were moved westward again, into Sinkiang, in the eighteenth century, they were said to be "returning" toward their ancient homes.

Like the main body of Chinese, those of Moslem faith are to be found in many cities of Sinkiang but chiefly in those in the northern part of the province. They are also important in the caravan trade, in the running of inns and caravanserais, and in the military forces. Some have also taken to the land.

Enjoying a virtual monopoly of the provincial administration, the non-Moslem Chinese have upheld the bureaucratic tradition of scholarship and learning. Apart from the official class, however, the Chinese in Sinkiang appear to be no less illiterate than those in the rest of China. Illiteracy is especially high among the
Moslems because such scholarly incentives as exist among them consist mainly of acquiring a modicum of ability to read the Koran in Arabic.

The influence of Islam on the status of women appears to be somewhat less baleful. Sinkiang Moslem women generally enjoy more freedom than their sisters in Islamic countries of the Near East, and those who belong to the Chinese Moslem community rank high in this respect. The institution of purdah, for example, does not exist among them.

The most marked influence of Islam among the Chinese has been as a political force, to unite those of Moslem faith against Chinese not of the faith. Chinese Moslem society is even stronger in patriarchal authority and clan loyalty than "heathen" Chinese society. The principle that well-to-do members of a clan have a responsibility for the welfare of their poorer distant relatives, as well as advantages over them, is given a heightened authority among Moslem Chinese by the feeling that they form a minority which must keep its ranks closed; whereas among non-Moslem Chinese, the precept is often honored but not conscientiously observed. In times of civil war and peasant rebellion, especially, Moslem war lords armies normally combine military discipline and community loyalty; they are not merely troops and officers, but clansmen and chieftains. Even in periods of widespread peasant unrest, therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Moslem communities are usually able to lead Moslem peasants against both non-Moslem peasants and non-Moslem landlords. Often what starts as a Moslem peasant revolt is taken over by Moslem landlords and converted into a movement to expand the whole Moslem community against the non-Moslem community, and to prevent the Moslem community from being infiltrated either by Chinese nationalism or by ideas of social revolution.

The essentially nonreligious character of the internecine wars among the two main groups of Chinese in Sinkiang, however, in spite of the appeal to Islam in closing the ranks of the Chinese Moslems, is indicated by the failure of the Moslem Chinese to establish anything more than temporary alliances with their co-

religionists of other nationalities. During the great uprising of the third quarter of the last century the Moslem Chinese sided for a time with their Uighur and Kirghiz coreligionists against the Chinese-Manchu regime, subsequently came to blows with their Uighur comrades in arms, and with the collapse of the revolt were virtually exterminated by the Imperial forces. The revolts of the early 1930's displayed the same feature of initial alliance, followed by final break, between Moslems of Uighur and Chinese origin.

If these examples indicate the instability of the religious tie between the Chinese Moslems and others of the same religion in Sinkiang, the harmonious relations which developed later in the 1930's between the Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese demonstrates that under certain conditions the two groups are able to relegate the differences between them to a subordinate importance. It appears then that the Chinese population in Sinkiang is confronted by two possible lines of development. One is to focus around the religious issue all other differences of interest until the process of cleavage results in the formation of two definitely separate nationalities. The other is to subordinate their differences, to the point where religion is no more a barrier to common nationality than it is among Americans, English, and other peoples.

In the past, the precipitant of hostility between Chinese Moslems and non-Moslems within Sinkiang has often been the arrival of reinforcements from outside the province. In every period of insurrection, when war bands of Chinese Moslems from Kansu, Ninghsia, or Ch'inghai (Kokonor) have invaded Sinkiang, the Chinese Moslems of Sinkiang have risen to join them. They considered each other not only coreligionists but kinsmen. Together they not only fought non-Moslem Chinese, but massacred whole communities. When, on the other hand, the non-Moslem Chinese received reinforcements, they were equally savage in their repression of the Dungans. The record in bloodiness was set by the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang. When they took Uighur towns, surrender was usually accepted without massacre because the
Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendency of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

In this situation, an important aspect of the mentality of the ruling bureaucracy was the habit, among English-speaking officials, of referring to the non-Chinese peoples of the province in true sahib style as "the natives." That political careerists regarded Sinkiang as a juicy melon to be sliced was further indicated by a comment made by a former high official in the provincial administration:

One might say that China is like a bankrupt family, which is so embarrassed financially that it can hardly continue to exist, but whose ancestors, fortunately, have left it an estate in the west. If need be, there is still this vast country to fall back on.23

In this period the dominant trend of Chinese policy was to disregard the possibilities of securing the adherence of Sinkiang to China by the consent of the peoples of Sinkiang, and to rely instead on a show of force which was formidable for the day but not backed up by the probability of reinforcements for the morrow.

Russians. The 13,400 Russians living in Sinkiang derive almost entirely from émigrés who fled from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917—most of them during the years 1919–1921—or from families that were already in Sinkiang when the Russian Revolution broke out. This was a period of intense civil strife in the Semirechie region, now part of the Kazakh S.S.R., where Cossack bands led by Amenkov, Dutov, and Bakich held positions along the frontier until the collapse of Admiral Kolchak forced first one group and then another to cross into Sinkiang. Here they were disarmed and given the choice of remaining in the province or proceeding farther east.

Most of the Russians live in a few urban centers like Kulja, Chuguchak, and Urumchi. As the group with the highest average

23 Aitchen K. Wu, "Will China Lose Its Far West?" Asia, XXXIX (1939), p. 675.
of technical training in the province, the Russians have been useful both in time of peace and in periods of internal strife. They have served as automobile drivers and mechanics, aided in the training of provincial military forces, and made use of their military experience in actual combat. Their participation in the military struggle on the side of Sheng Shih-ts'ai was an important factor in his victory over Ma Chu-yung in 1934. On this and other occasions, travelers and reporters on the scene, not to mention writers thousands of miles away, have often suggested or flatly stated that these Russians were Soviet Russians rather than White Russians. Both the extent of Soviet influence in the province and the characteristics of Soviet methods of operation have been distorted by such reports.

During the period of Yang Tseng-hsin the Russians in Sinkiang managed to get along fairly well. They encountered hard times in the interval from the death of Yang in 1928 to the establishment of Sheng's authority in 1933–1934, and again after his turnabout in policy in 1943. Normally, they lead an existence much like that of other Russian émigré communities in China—which means that they have their own organizations, publish their own newspapers, and otherwise attempt to preserve their cultural identity. In general they accommodate themselves to shifting political tides in so far as these do not threaten their very existence. It was a measure of their disquietude that so many of them threw their support behind the program of the Kulja group in opposition to the Chinese administration.

Although the Sinkiang Russian community owed its original formation to the anti-Soviet feeling of its members, this attitude has been considerably tempered with the passage of time, especially as a new generation, not directly involved in the struggles of the civil war period, has begun to assert itself. In line with changes in attitude taking place in many émigré communities throughout the world, a growing number of Russians in Sinkiang have taken advantage of the new Soviet policy toward expatriates to identify themselves with the U.S.S.R.

There is now a question whether the Russians in Sinkiang are citizens of China or of the Soviet Union. An important subsidiary problem is the fact that when a Russian living abroad is granted a Soviet passport he is not automatically free to return to the Soviet Union at his own discretion. In the past, the Soviet authorities in China have at times given Soviet passports and protection to Russian exiles, without granting them permission to return to the Soviet Union. Turkic nationalists like Masud Sabri consider that the Russians have Soviet citizenship and hence cannot be counted among the nationalities in Sinkiang. In this attitude there is a suggestion that Soviet citizenship is incompatible with Sinkiang residence. Yet it is probable that many Russians would like to have both. Given an administration which can make use of their abilities, the Russians, because of their technical qualifications, could make important contributions to the progress of the area. This is the best they can hope for in an area where they can never represent more than a minute fraction of the population.

**Manchus.** The Manchus of Sinkiang include the Solons and the Sibos, who are not, tribally speaking, true Manchus. All three belong to the Manchu tribal coalition, which conquered all of China and all but disappeared from sight when their rule was terminated in 1911. Only in Sinkiang have the Manchus been able to preserve the characteristics which set them off from other peoples. Manchus, Solons, and Sibos are listed together as numbering 12,362 people.

The first significant numbers of Manchus came to Sinkiang in the second half of the eighteenth century in the course of the campaigns against the Jungar Mongols. Following their victory the Manchus attempted to consolidate their holdings by placing administrators and troops in key positions. A city was built in the strategic Ili Valley as the center from which to administer the region as a whole and to command the Manchu garrisons stationed throughout the province. In contrast to most garrisons, which consisted of a few isolated troops, stationed in important urban centers and forbidden by Manchu dynastic law to engage
in either agriculture or trade, those in the Ili area were established as military colonists. One garrison consisted of Solons from the upper course of the Nonni River in Northwestern Manchuria, famed for their skill in archery. The Solons were regarded by the Manchus as a valuable auxiliary tribe, but their original language, as still spoken in Manchuria, is different from Manchu, though related to it. Another garrison consisted of Sibos, from Central Manchuria, who were often employed in the province as scribes and clerks. The Sibos are also not regarded as "true" Manchus. They appear to be of captive or semislave origin, and were perhaps a tribe akin to the Manchus who resisted Manchu unification at the beginning of the seventeenth century. They had a reputation for not succumbing to Chinese influence and for retaining command of their own language and customs. Both groups were given rich lands in the Ili Valley, the Solons on the right bank of the river and the Sibos on the left bank.

During the 1911 Revolution most of the city Manchus in Sinkiang were massacred, but the village communities defended themselves and survived. At present the Solons number 2500 and the Sibos 9200 out of the total number of "Manchus" in the province. With the exception of some 1700 in the Chuguchak region, virtually all of those classed as Manchus are in the Ili Valley. Here they continue to predominate in a few villages on either side of the river in territory that is predominately Kazakh or Uighur.

For the most part, the Manchus live by agriculture — though this is supplemented also by sheep raising and hunting. To a considerable extent they have succeeded in maintaining their traditional way of life, even to the point of preserving their military ability. Nevertheless they are also in the forefront of current developments in the province. Many speak other languages beside their own, including Russian. At one time there was even talk among them of replacing their Manchu writing with a script based on the Latin alphabet. The Sibos in particular have been highly praised for distinguishing themselves in carrying out tasks assigned them by the Kulja regime, such as delivering grain and clover.

Despite the fact that Sheng Shih-ts'ai split these people into three distinct groups — Manchu, Solon, and Sibo — they display so little difference that these divisions may be considered of minor importance. The original differences in speech appear to have been lessened by the use of Manchu as an official language in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the three forms as now spoken in Sinkiang are mutually comprehensible. The literary language of all three is Manchu. In other respects too the points of similarity are such that the three groups must be considered as essentially one people.

Despite their small numbers, the military ability, tradition of service in administration, and generally forward-looking attitude of the Manchus make them a force to be reckoned with in the province. They appear to have adopted a position in support of the Kulja program against the former Chinese administration. To be sure, their long-term existence as a people is in doubt. Yet their immediate future must involve a measure of local self-government if they are not to constitute a thorn in the flesh of the surrounding majorities.

Uzbeks. The Uzbeks in Sinkiang are scattered outposts of the main population group in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. All told there are only 8000 of them in the province. They reside for the most part in the cities — as merchants, traders, and anti-Soviet refugees — more than three quarters of them being located in Kashgar, Kulja, and Chuguchak.

The Uzbek nation as a whole is now composed of two main ethnic layers: the old Iranian groups which inhabited the southern Inner Asian oasis region, and the Turkish tribes of the so-called "Uzbek confederation" which in the sixteenth century conquered this region. Under the influence of the culture of the Iranian agricultural oasis dwellers, the Uzbeks soon abandoned their nomadic economy and went over to a settled, agricultural
economy. They absorbed many elements of the higher Iranian culture which they had conquered, to such a degree that for a time Persian was the only language in which literature was written and in which the courts functioned; though the Turkic Uzbek language prevailed over Iranian as the language of the common people.

In the nineteenth century, most of the territory of the Uzbeks was conquered by the Russians. Several Khanates remained nominally independent, but were actually in a vassal relationship to Russia. After the Soviet Revolution the Uzbeks first formed part of the Turkistan Soviet Republic, and later were reorganized in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituent Union Republic of the Soviet Union. The Uzbeks comprise the majority of the population in their own Republic. They live also in scattered groups in the Tajik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics, and in northern Afghanistan as well as in Sinkiang.

Uzbek is a Turkic language, but it has become strongly Iranianized in the cities. Actually there are two Uzbek languages: the Iranianized city Uzbek, and the more purely Turkic country Uzbek.

While the Uzbeks are Sunni Mohammedans, the mystical teachings of the Sufis were of considerable importance in their religious development.

Tatars. The Tatars in Sinkiang number less than 5000 people. More than four fifths are concentrated in the two cities of Kulja and Chuguchak. Some are descendents of Tatar traders who settled in Sinkiang in the days of the Tsar. Others derive from anti-Soviet refugees who entered the province after 1917. Despite their small numbers they exercise considerable influence, as the group with the highest average of education among the Turkish-speaking peoples.

Most Tatars come from the Volga region which today comprises the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They are the descendants of the inhabitants of the Kazan Khanate which was formed in 1438 on the territory of the former Volga Bulgarian Empire as a result of the collapse of the Golden Horde.
CHAPTER V Geography and Economic Development

Mountains, Deserts, Steppes, and People

Nowhere in the world is the influence of geography on people more dramatic than in Inner Asia. Sinkiang lies in the heart of a continent, as remote as possible from moisture-bearing winds from the oceans. On three sides it is enclosed by mighty mountain masses and on the eastern side by wide stretches of barren plateau. The snow-clad Tien Shan or Heavenly Mountains, rising to heights of 20,000 feet, extend across the province from west to east, dividing it into two unequal parts. The southern two thirds are the Tarim Basin, the land of oases and deserts. The northern third is Jungaria, traditionally the land of the nomads. The total area of the province is about 600,000 square miles, or twice the size of Texas.

The Tarim Basin is a desert which at its lowest point is actually below sea level. Here men cannot live and farm by rainfall, which averages less than four inches a year. Water is the gift of the great mountains which fringe the desert on the north, west and south, rising in places to more than 20,000 feet. From the melting upland snows and glaciers, rivers cut their way down to the central oval desert. Where each river leaves the foothills, men dig canals to spread the water out in a fan, forming an oasis, so that the edge of the desert along the foot of the mountains is dotted by a series of oases. A trade road, looping around the desert, links the oases like beads on a string, forming a U with the open end toward the east.

In Jungaria there is a little more rain, as much as ten inches a year in the more favored places, and here the desert is neither so vast nor so forbidding as in the Tarim Basin. There are fringes of grazing land on the slopes of the Altai in the north, the Tien Shan in the south, and other ranges in the west, but the herds must move frequently and the men who own them must move too, leading a nomadic life. Men learned to live in this land of poor rainfall only by learning how to master the animals which ate the grass which they themselves could not eat.

In addition to irrigated agriculture there is some dry farming in Jungaria, particularly in the river valleys along the Soviet frontier. Along this frontier, which rarely follows the watershed, three important rivers have their source in Sinkiang and their main course in Soviet territory. They are the Black Irtish, the only Sinkiang river whose waters reach the sea, and the Emil and the Ili, which are routes of communication between Soviet and Chinese territory.

The broad and fertile Ili Valley is enclosed between two arms of the Tien Shan which open toward the west into Soviet territory. It thus forms a distinct region which has closer geographic ties with Soviet territory than with Sinkiang itself. Its forests, mines, rich mountain pastures, and fertile arable lands offer the best prospects for economic development north of the Tarim Basin, but it has never enjoyed a sufficiently long period of peace and sound administration to permit exploitation of its resources. It has been fought over during the successive waves of migration and was largely depopulated in the eighteenth century. At present the valley supports an agricultural and nomadic population of less than half a million.

Both oasis agriculture and pastoral nomadism are such highly specialized ways of life that throughout the history of Inner Asia men never learned how to combine them. Cultivators and herdsmen fought each other, traded with each other, and sometimes ruled each other, but they never fused together in a new, mixed, and permanent society.

The totally new factor of machine-powered industrialism is
now beginning to penetrate the lives of both cultivators and herdsmen. Industrially equipped engineering could lead water to fields which the oasis cultivator, working with his broad-bladed mattock, the traditional Inner Asian ketman, could never reach. Modern industry could process the wool and hides of the livestock breeder in ways which the nomadic society was never able to evolve. In addition, it could exploit mineral resources in ways which would make it possible to put together, out of the unjoined fragments which lie scattered through Sinkiang, a new, many-sided society of farming, livestock breeding, mining, industry, technology, and levels of education previously out of reach. Of the primary industrial materials, Sinkiang has oil, coal, and probably iron in large but unknown quantities. It has water power. Of the scarcer industrial materials, it has copper. It also has gold.

The industrial civilization is approaching Sinkiang from two sides at once. From China, American planes sometimes fly in. A few American trucks and cars are already there. American bulldozers have pushed better roads nearer and nearer. One strategic road has already crossed a corner of the Tibetan plateau to the line of southern oases. American geologists have prospected the mineral resources. American arms equipped the Chinese forces which held the province in the last years of Kuomintang rule. Soviet industrialization stands much closer to the frontiers of Sinkiang. It has already transformed the face of Soviet Inner Asia with mines, factories, new irrigation works, hydroelectric dams, and more facilities for advanced industrial training than there are in the whole of China. Soviet trade is essential to Sinkiang; and the only non-Chinese natives of Sinkiang who have had modern university training have received it in Soviet territory, not in China.

Today in Sinkiang, however, industry is still negligible, and the two principal types of economy are pastoral nomadism and oasis farming. Most of the oasis farming is in the Tarim Basin, where man brings water to the desert by irrigation. The homeland of nomadism is Jungaria, where man adapted himself to geography by abandoning agriculture and taking to the herding of animals.

Pastoral Nomadism

Figures for 1943 show 11,720,000 sheep and goats in Sinkiang, 1,550,000 cattle, 870,000 horses, and 90,000 camels. Most of these are in Jungaria, and most are pastured in steppe land by nomad Kazakhs and Mongols. Smaller numbers are owned in the alpine pastures of the Kirghiz, and others by settled people on the fringes of cultivated land. Sheep, followed by beef cattle and draft cattle, are the most important market animals, and wool and hides are of course also sold. The Chinese provincial authorities like to demand horses from nomads in payment of taxes, which limits the number for sale. Camels are bred both for use by the nomads themselves in their migrations and for sale to Chinese trading caravans.

There are great variations in the techniques of herding animals. Cattle, horses, and camels each prosper best on a different kind of pasture. The best feeding grounds for one kind may lie quite distant from the best range for the other kinds. There are even considerable differences between animals as similar to each other as the yak and the cow, or the sheep and the goat. In the steppe pastures, sheep tend everywhere to prevail as the basic form of property; so much so that the sheep is the unit of exchange value, in terms of which the prices of other kinds of property are quoted. The basic reason for this is that in the steppe environment the grasses which can be eaten by sheep are more numerous and more widely distributed than the preferred feed of any other kind of animal. By skillful herdsmanhip, the different kinds of animals can be maintained in combination. Much depends on the selection of pasture, on deciding how long to remain on a pasture, when to move, and how long to make the marches. Nomads do not break

1 Chang Chih-yi, unpublished field notes.
2 A count taken in the steppe area of Tannu-Tuva, where conditions are in general similar to a great part of Jungaria, showed 600 plant varieties, of which cows eat 56, horses 83, but sheep as many as 570.
camp and move just for the sake of happy vagabondage. If the drives are too long or have to be made over unfavorable inter­vening country, the animals lose condition or go lame; and lame cattle cannot graze well. Therefore every shift of camp is an equation which has to be worked out in such a way that the benefit of the fresh pasture is greater than the damage done by moving. Moreover there are often times when it is preferable or even compulsory to graze some kinds of stock at a distance from others.

Pastoral nomadism always has a fringe of farming, which may be either rainfall farming or irrigated farming. In past history, at times when the power of the nomads was ascendant, these margins were cultivated for the benefit of the nomads by subject, tributary, or hired people drawn from settled communities. Recently, when the authority of a settled state has been paramount in Sinkiang, as in similar periods in the past, two processes developed. On the one hand, poorer nomads took to agriculture. Some of them became permanent farmers, breaking away from their ties with the nomadic community and no longer submitting to its authority. Others spend part of the year growing hay and grain for richer members of their clan or tribe. On the other hand, the authority of the settled state deliberately pushes colonization by cultivators out into nomad territory, sometimes for strategic reasons and sometimes merely for profit.

When the Manchus overthrew the Jungar Mongols late in the eighteenth century, they used farming colonists to displace nomads. Colonization continued under the Chinese Republic and is still continuing. It is economically profitable to the Chinese authorities to expropriate land from nomads and sell it to colonists, and it has been considered politically profitable when it results in quarrels between Uighur colonists and Kazakh and Mongol nomads. Chinese refugee colonists have also been brought in from Honan, in central North China; to make room for some of these, machine guns mounted on trucks were used to exterminate Kazakh camps. (Personal information from American observer.) There is also some voluntary development of agriculture by nomads. There are Mongols in the Baitik Bogda who are both herders and cultivators. Farming began among some of the Torgut Mongols along the Chingho, west of Manass, at the beginning of the present century. In 1943, Kazakhs dug an irrigation canal from the bank of the Kunges, one of the main affluents of the Ili. Two kinds of change take place along the southern foot of the Tien Shan. Uighur owners of sheep in the oases send them up to the alpine meadows of the Kirghiz to pasture, and near Bai and Uch-Turfan Kirghiz, crowded out of these pastures, have taken to farming in the Taushkan and Kharabagh Valleys.

Oasis Farming

There are two kinds of oases in Sinkiang: the oases of the south, which are sharply isolated from each other by desert stretches, and the oases of the north, which have fringes of land in which rainfall farming can be carried on, or still wider fringes of grazing land. The typical characteristics of oasis life are therefore much more sharply accentuated in the south.

The first oasis makers were probably men who lived along the banks of the rivers in the desert, and in the marshes, where they caught fish, hunted, and gathered wild food crops. A “crop” of the Lopiks of the Lob Depression, the most primitive surviving community in the Tarim Basin, is the tender shoots of the marsh reeds. When irrigation began, it seems to have been practiced first on the lower courses of the rivers, where the soil was soft and the engineering problem required only the digging of simple ditches from the banks of the streams. In the course of time, as knowledge of engineering developed, the tendency was for the oasis to move upstream toward the boulder slope at the edge of the foothills, but not back into the gorges where the engineering problems were far too great. There were three reasons for the upstream shift: out on the plain, the slow speed of the water


silted up the canals; the flat level did not allow sufficient drainage from the fields, which gradually accumulated salts; the Inner Asia has been blamed for the abandonment of ancient communities upstream had first access to the water. The drying up of oases found out in the desert, but it is probable that the causes just described are more important than any change of climate in the last two thousand years.

Oasis engineering remains extremely simple. The basic pattern is a main canal from the river, branching into smaller canals, which branch in turn into the ditches which deliver water to the fields, all arranged so that water flows by gravity from level to level, without the pumping or bailing devices which are widely used in China and in Soviet Turkistan to lift water from lower to higher levels.6

Of the rivers of Sinkiang, the most important for irrigation is the Yarkand Darya, known in its upper reaches as the Zarafshan.7

Two kinds of weirs are used to divert water from the river into the takeoff canal. Field notes of an Academia Sinica expedition describe a solid weir which was examined at the point where the Aksu Darya forks into two streams, the Kone Darya or Old River and the Yangi Darya or New River. A fork of this kind is often formed when a river channel silted up and later a freshet of high water comes down the choked channel; the force of the water bursts out at one side of the old main channel, and a subsidiary stream is formed, flowing away from the main stream. Since the Old River irrigates the oases of Aksu and Avat, a solid weir was built to divert some of the water of the New River back into the Old River. Trunks of the toghrak, or wild desert poplar, were used as stakes. Between these, cribs were woven with smaller branches and twigs and filled with stones and rubble. A weir of this kind is of limited efficiency. When the river reaches flood level in July and August the weir is battered down, too much of the water of the Aksu Darya discharges into the New River, and the crops in the oases fed by the Old River are imperiled. Solid weirs are used on the larger streams. On smaller streams, where the irrigators hope to be able to control the flow of water, draw-weirs are made with openings or sluices. In some localities, such as Kargalik, instead of building permanent sluice gates or panels the sluices are closed temporarily with rubble.

The Yarkand Darya has also repeatedly changed its course. Thus the brilliant Chinese scholar Hsu Sung described how two tributaries of the Yarkand Darya joined in the second decade of the nineteenth century to form the oasis of Merket, but Sir Aurel Stein's maps show that the present junction is far downstream from Merket. It is this change of river channels that has probably caused the present severe shortage of water in Merket, the foremost cotton-growing oasis in Sinkiang.

The Khotan Darya, the Konche Darya, and the Kaidu Gol provide enough water for the branching canals and settlements along their courses. The Aksu Darya, the Muzart, which flows to the Kucha oasis, and the Kizil Su or Red River flowing through the Kashgar oasis all fail to supply enough water for the oases on their lower courses.

In volume of discharge the rivers of the Tarim system are far behind the two great rivers of Soviet Inner Asia, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya.8 The total discharge of all streams in Sinkiang is about 3,400 cubic meters per second, of which about 70 per cent is in the Tarim Basin. The total length of irrigation canals in Sinkiang was reported in 1943 to be 28,000 kilometers. The technique of utilization is defective in many ways. The lack of drainage to provide for washing out the salts deposited by irrigation has already been mentioned. There is a lack of storage lakes and reservoirs and even small-scale tanks, as a result of which it is estimated that from a third to a half of the potential supply runs to waste. A standard calculation, in irrigation engineering, is that a discharge of one cubic meter per second should irrigate over 6000 acres, whereas in Sinkiang the figure is estimated at 2500 acres.

A number of special practices in irrigation deserve description. Of these the most important is the kariz, or underground irrigation channel, which is the characteristic feature of the Turfan oasis. A kariz is built by starting at ground level in the area which is to be irrigated and tunneling at a slight upward incline into the fan of detritus heaped up along the foothill range where it is hoped that water will be found. The tunneling is continued until the water table is reached. From the slope under which the tunnel runs, shafts are sunk down to the tunnel for ventilation. When the underground water is brought out to the open plain, it is carried farther by an ordinary canal. The length of a kariz

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varies from less than a mile to several miles. In addition to Turfan, there are a few kariz in the oases of Fichang and Guma, and some years ago they were tried, without much success, on the outer slopes of the extreme eastern Tien Shan, north of Barkul, using skilled workers from Turfan. A kariz may be very small: field notes show one in the Komul oasis irrigating only six and a half acres, which is close to the average for this oasis. The most recent figures show the following statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of kariz</th>
<th>Total acreage irrigated by kariz</th>
<th>Average irrigated acreage per kariz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turfan³</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>28,000 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toksun</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>10,700 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komul¹⁰</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>3,700 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,031</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The construction of kariz involves a heavy capital expense. Stein, some forty years ago, estimated the cost of a single long kariz in Turfan at over 500 pounds.¹¹ A long kariz recently constructed cost 50,000 Sinkiang dollars. The risk of failing to find water deters peasants from joining together to dig a kariz, and construction is therefore usually undertaken by wealthy landlords who hire labor. Their reward, when they are successful, is a monopoly of the water, which they sell to the peasants in return for a share of the harvest. This form of enterprise is so profitable that some landlords sell all their land and invest entirely in kariz.¹²


¹³ This capitalistic turn in the digging of kariz is probably a late development. It is likely that in the eighteenth century, when Turfan was ruled by the Khojas, kariz were built by exercising the feudal power to demand unpaid labor as an obligation to the lord.

There is a controversy concerning the origin of the kariz which has a bearing on the ancient routes by which knowledge of various kinds was transmitted through Inner Asia into China and from China. Huntington asserted that the kariz was introduced into Sinkiang from Iran or Transcaspia, about 1780. Pelliot and Stein held almost the same view. On the other hand the eminent Chinese historian Wang Kuo-wei believes that it was first brought to Sinkiang from China after the opening up of the Western Regions in the Han Dynasty. These references do not exhaust the problem, for the kariz principle was used by the Greeks on Samos, and by the Etruscans in Italy in the sixth century B.C. In Central Arabia it is known as saqi, and in Morocco as foggara. Subterranean irrigation canals were also built by the Incas in Peru.

Springs and subterranean flows are supplementary sources of water in some oases. About 50 per cent of the water for irrigation in Komul comes from springs, as against 25 per cent each from kariz and rivers. In Kulja and several other large oases springs are used to irrigate rice fields, which require a very steady flow of water. In the miniature oasis of Kumish, south of Toksun, a spring with a discharge of only three cubic meters a day is the sole source of water for the irrigation of about eight acres of land. Closely related to springs are the streams which disappear in boulder fans and emerge again later in or beyond an oasis. The flow of such streams, which are called sai, is apt to be fluctuating; but except where they have been tapped by kariz, they are an important source of water which has not been fully utilized.

"Tanks"—as they are called in India—or small pits are used for the storage of drinking water in the towns of some oases, but not as reservoirs for irrigation water except in the dying oasis of Maralbashi. Most of the river water is taken off by oases lying upstream from Maralbashi, forcing the cultivators to store water when they can get it and keep it until they need to use it. Unfortunately the main reservoir has now silted up, so that unless a new one is dug the oasis will sooner or later have to be abandoned.
Pivot of Asia

A unique irrigation device was introduced into the oasis of Komul by the Chinese administrator Chang Yao in the nineteenth century. Because of the exceptionally porous sandy soil in this oasis, he had water carried for miles across the desert in wooden troughs lined with felt. This device is too expensive for present costs.

Although agriculture in northern Sinkiang is also irrigated, cultivation is not so sharply isolated in oases as it is in the south. The main water supply for irrigation comes from the Ili, Manass, and Black Irtish rivers.

Of these the Ili is formed by the confluence of three rivers, the Kash, the Kunges, and the Tekes. The volume discharged by these three rivers at high water is 100 cubic meters per second for the Kash and Tekes and 30 cubic meters per second for the Kunges.

The Manass is a slow river, but when in flood it is troublesome. It cuts extra flood channels which discharge into marshes just below the Manass oasis, and consequently its terminal lake, Telli Nor, farther out in the plain, is steadily drying up.

The headwaters of the Irtish are in the Altai, where the snow level is much lower than in the Tien Shan. The spring flood therefore comes down six weeks earlier on the Irtish than it does on the Manass, which is beneficial for spring planting.

Wherever irrigation is practiced, water rights are even more fundamental than land ownership. In Sinkiang, there are two bodies of custom and practice with regard to water. One is associated with the kariz. The other prevails much more widely, has a complicated history, and a number of variants.

The rights, obligations, and customs associated with the simple practice of leading water in ditches from rivers undoubtedly go back to the ancient form of communal enterprise in which all the members of the community contributed their labor, and the water was shared out not to individuals with proprietary rights in particular fields, but to kinship groups cultivating fields to which they had a collective title.

In a community which is still lacking in large-scale private money capital, however, it is not surprising that the line at which work actually starts is still determined by the necessity for public labor, which must be assembled and directed by the exercise of public authority in some form. A typical recent example is the digging of an irrigation canal in the small oasis of Chira. As six villages were affected, three hundred men were assembled from these villages under the authority of their own village headmen. The village organization, however, can be superseded by the higher administrative authority of Chinese officials. The general rule is: local undertakings on a moderate scale are carried out within the limits of such co-operation as can be organized by village elders or headmen; enterprise on a large scale requires the intervention of a Chinese official.

At levels below the intervention of Chinese officials, traces of very ancient practices are found. Field investigation in a village in the oasis of Kucha revealed the survival of the "ketman of labor," a concept which combines units of labor, land, and water. The ketman is a broad-bladed mattock, the most ancient Inner Asian agricultural tool, which to this day is more widely used than the plow. A "ketman of labor" is the work of one man contributed throughout the digging of a canal, which entitles him to a "ketman of water," enough to irrigate from ten to fourteen acres.

In this village, however, the uniformity of the concept proved not to be reflected in uniformity of water rights. Of the total population about 8 per cent were landlords and rich peasants; but this 8 per cent owned about half of the total water supply. At the other end of the scale 17 per cent of the population had no water rights whatever, and were forced to purchase their water with a share of their crop. In between these two groups, one half of the water was owned by 75 per cent of the households. These families, classified as middle and poor peasants, had rights to an average of one third of a ketman of water for each household.

The shuffle which takes place between the contribution of labor and the allocation of water rights is accounted for in various ways. According to the Islamic principle of maqat, he who first
applies water to land has the right to both water and land; but by a legal reasoning which is not difficult to follow, the ancient prescriptive communal right of the man whose labor helps to bring the water to the field can be superseded by the claim of the man who organized the labor and directed the enterprise.

Thus in 1940, in the large oasis of Aksu, the Chinese district magistrate ordered the digging of a canal to open a new settlement at Sachintze, about forty miles south of the district city. Each head of a household applying for land in the new settlement was allotted a section of about one hundred feet on the bank of the main canal. He was then entitled to as much land reaching back from this canal frontage as he could clear and as much water as he needed to irrigate it. Land and water rights were thus combined, and were in proportion to the amount of labor at the disposal of the settler.

It is not surprising to find both that quarrels over water rights are chronic, and that those who are powerful and successful within the community in other ways are usually successful also in maintaining and increasing their water rights.

More than a hundred years ago, at a time when the Chinese or Manchu imperial authority in Sinkiang was exercised only in questions of high policy and rarely interfered with questions of local custom, a Chinese writer recorded the abuses of the Begs or local notables, and the efforts made by the Chinese administration to “persuade” them to concede some of their water rights to poor peasants. In the eighteenth century, a Manchu writer noted that Begs or landed gentry had rights over households of chakar or serfs who were obliged to till their land for them. By their claim on the labor of these serfs, the Begs under the doctrine of mawat also claimed the right to water from canals dug by the serfs. Chakar serfdom still survives here and there. Field investigation revealed a landlord in Kucha with over two hundred households of chakars, from whom he claimed both labor services and rent in kind.

When the water finally gets to the field, its allocation to the cultivator is calculated in terms of the flow for a certain number of hours, according to the width and depth of the canal. Millers have the right only to run water over the wheel, and must then return it to the canal. Such matters, together with the maintenance of registers and the supervision of upkeep, are under the authority of an official called the mirab, who is locally elected, which means that in his election the locally influential families usually determine the choice. In addition, Moslem religious officials have certain traditional rights, especially of adjudication. Within localities, disputes are most frequent in the spring, when each cultivator is eager to be the first to get water on his land. Between localities, the most important disputes are between upstream and downstream communities. Disputes have been going on for twenty-five years between Yarkand, which is big and powerful, and Merket, which is smaller but rich in the cultivation of cotton. Quarrels can be carried from lower to higher authority. A dispute between the villages of Punak and Malihalihan, in the subdistrict of Chira, was carried up to the district administrator of Khotan, who decreed that for two days each month in February, April, and June Punak should turn over its flow of water to Malihalihan. The intervention of higher authority is a traditional opportunity for the collection of bribes by Chinese officials.

Oases vary greatly in size but closely resemble each other in structure. Every oasis has a village or town, sometimes a walled city at its center. Larger oases may have several such towns. These centers are called “bazasars” and serve as market places for farm produce. In the larger bazasars there are also artisans such as blacksmiths, carpenters, coppersmiths, cobblers, and wheelwrights. Smaller bazasars, which cannot support many permanent shops, have their market day on different days of the week and the merchants and artisans visit them in rotation.

Around the bazasars are the farms, each with its own homestead. An important function of an oasis bazaar is the distribution
of night soil to the farms as fertilizer, and the farms which are nearest to the bazaar and therefore receive the most night soil form a zone of intensive garden cultivation producing vegetables and fruits for sale to the nonfarming population. In Kucha, a fairly large oasis, fertilizer is generously applied within a radius of five miles from the district city. Within this zone there is one orchard of seventy-five acres which produces apricots as a cash crop for the market. Beyond this inner zone, the amount of fertilizer applied decreases rapidly, and two other zones may be distinguished. In the near one rice, corn, wheat, and cotton may be grown and wheat and corn, when manured, may be grown in rotation. In the third zone practically no fertilizer is used and here hardier crops such as millet, kaoliang (sorghum millet), and potatoes are planted, and fallowing must be practiced. When some fields must lie fallow, the small farm is at a great disadvantage in competition with the large farm. In this zone the cost of transport to market rises rapidly, and the price of land falls.

Beyond this third zone there is usually no water and the desert begins abruptly. Sometimes on the fringe of an oasis, however, there is a thin zone of grazing. Sheep are pastured here, and at the edges of roads, and in land within the oasis too rough for irrigation. Sheep are also pastured in a few places in the scrubby land where dying rivers reach the desert. The shepherds are the Dulani, a people of uncertain but probably nomad origin who live a gypsy-like life and keep apart from the settled Uighurs of the Tarim oases. Both Uighurs and Dulanis breed a sheep which is better for mutton than for wool.

Most food is consumed in the oasis where it is grown, though some oases have a surplus for sale while others are not self-sufficient. The diet of an Uighur villager is largely cereals. The consumption of sugar, fats, and meat is meager except among the wealthy, and there is practically no milk in the diet. The daily calory intake of an adult villager, as estimated in Khargalik in 1943, was 1215 calories of wheat flour, 1215 of corn flour, and 150 of mutton.

According to recent field-survey figures, which make possible rough estimates rather than accurate statistical tabulation, the annual wheat crop of Sinkiang is about 253,000 tons, representing about 44 per cent of the total crop of grains, beans, and seeds. Corn reaches 331,000 tons, or 28 per cent. Rice is about 71,000 tons, or 6 per cent. Barley, kaoliang (sorghum millet), oats and peas are classed together because they are largely used as feed grains. In Jungaria they are grown, largely by rainfall farming, to sell for feed to the long-distance camel caravans which, when times are peaceful, trade into the Outer Mongolian People’s Republic, through Inner Mongolia to North China, and across the desert gap into Northwest China. The total crop reaches about 119,000 tons, or 10 per cent. Millet, soy beans and green beans, often in alternate rows in the same field, reach 71,000 tons or 6 per cent. Sesame, rapeseed, and linseed account for 71,000 or 6 per cent.

In subsidiary production, melons are grown in all oases. Dried melon rind is exported by caravan from Komul to China, as a delicacy, and the raisins of Turfan rival the melons of Komul in reputation. In gorges in the hills at the edge of Turfan, and also of Khotan, the growing of grapes is a local specialty.

The branches of willows growing along the banks of canals are cropped regularly for fuel. Another form of fuel, the use of which decreases the supply of fertilizer, is animal dung collected by old men and children who follow animals at pasture and scour the roads. The most important source of fuel, however, is the desert tamarisk gathered beyond the oasis.

Some peculiarities of Sinkiang agriculture are that winter wheat is grown north of the Tien Shan where, in spite of the cold, the seeds are protected by a cover of snow, but only spring wheat can be grown south of the Tien Shan, where lack of a snow cover exposes the seed to being frozen in the ground. Wheat is tending to be displaced by rice in oasis fields which are becoming alkalinized by irrigation. On the other hand the yield of rice is lower than that of corn, because the Uighur farmers do not transplant
the young rice shoots as Chinese farmers do. On the average, the amount of labor expended on a unit of land is about the same in Sinkiang as in China proper, but the yield is somewhat less.

Cotton is the most important commercial crop in Sinkiang. It is known to have been grown in Turfan as early as the Tang Dynasty (618-907). By 1750, it was used to pay taxes in Yarkand. In 1776 it was described as ranking next to the wheat crop in importance, and it has been one of the leading exports to Russia since 1890. The cotton belt lies south of the Tien Shan. Turfan and Merket (on the northern edge of the Yarkand oasis) lead in production, followed by Yarkand, Khotan, Kashgar, and Aksu.

Two varieties are grown, native and American. After failure in experimenting with Sea Island cotton in Tashkent in the 1870's, two Russian merchants named Belyakov and Lakhtin experimented very successfully with the Upland variety in 1883. After 1885 American species began to supplant the native type in Ferghana and Samarkand. A few years later Russian dealers set out to improve the quality grown in Sinkiang by distributing American seed. Up to 1942 large quantities of seed were imported yearly from the Soviet Union, especially two varieties of American origin called "Shredder" and "Novrozki." From American long-staple varieties of 25 to 29 mm., 32-count yarns can be spun, while the short-staple Inner Asian variety can be used only for 24-count yarns. In 1943, 100,000 acres of cotton were planted, 73 per cent with native cotton and 23 per cent with seed of the American varieties.

Silk is a second ancient crop of commercial importance. The most noted silk oases have always been Khotan and Yarkand. While farms in the Tarim Basin average from 4½ to 6 acres in size, larger than the 4.2 acres given for China proper, the larger size of the families means, in Khotan for instance, only .58 acres per capita as against .68 acres in China proper.

There are many farms, of course, which are much smaller than the overall average. The field survey referred to above, covering sixty-five households in two villages in the Khotan oasis, showed that the smallest farm was 1.08 acres and the largest farm was 18 acres. A further breakdown of the figures shows that rich peasants in this group of sixty-five households had average holdings of 11.1 acres, middle peasants 5.7 acres, and poor peasants 2.8 acres. The farms of the poor peasants are too small for the

India. The silkworms are fed on leaves from mulberry trees grown along the roadways; there are also a few groves of wild mulberry. In recent years the Russians attempted to improve quality by importing eggs of the Baghdad, Oro, and Ascoli varieties. Silk production reached 350,000 kg. in 1942, but fell drastically to 100,000 kg. in 1943.

The basic producing unit in oasis agriculture is the family group living together under one roof. This group often includes married children, which makes it slightly larger than the average farm family in China. In Central China (Wukiang) an average farm family consists of four persons, in North China (Paoting) of six persons, in Northwest China (Kansu) of 6.87 persons. A field survey in Khotan showed 7.95 persons, and in Kashgar a typical family consisted of an old couple, two sons, and three daughters-in-law. In the tiny oasis of Kumish a similar family consisted of parents, three sons, two daughters-in-law, and a daughter and her husband, or nine in all.

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168 Pivot of Asia

15 Kuropatkin, p. 126.

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18 Fei Hsiao-tung, Peasant Life in China, New York, 1939, p. 29.
19 Farm survey conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences, Academia Sinica.
20 Farm survey conducted by the National Resources Commission of China.
21 Geo. B. Cressey, Asia, Lands and Peoples, New York, 1944, p. 84.
22 Uighur farmers, however, do not measure their land by its size but in terms of the amount of seed which can be sown on it. The Uighur measure for this purpose is the charak, which varies both from place to place and according to the seed measured. In Kashgar, the charak equals 24 pounds of
efficient use of draft animals, and it is a problem how to employ efficiently, on a tiny farm, the labor potential of the large Uighur family.

**Trade and Finance**

Today as throughout the past the biggest share of Sinkiang's trade is with territories to the west rather than with China, which lies to the east. In trade with Sinkiang the Soviet Union has inherited an advantage created by geography. The richest parts of Sinkiang lie along the western frontier, and goods from these districts can reach the Soviet Union by relatively easy trade routes. It will be difficult to change the circuit of trade even by building rail and road communications with China, because these new trade routes would have to cross many hundred miles of barren land in which there are no markets and no pay loads to be picked up.

Both farming and herding contribute to the trade of Sinkiang. Theoretically, both oasis farmers and steppe or alpine herdsmen can live without trade. Each way of life is capable, at a pinch, of providing everything that is needed to sustain the community. Historically, however, no long-continued period of "pinch" of this kind can be identified. There are proofs of trade from the Neolithic Age onward. In practice, only farmers and herdsmen who are so poor that they have no surplus whatever to sell are "pure" farmers and herdsmen. When the Chinese first came to Sinkiang in the Han Dynasty, the annals record that they found trade between oases: the little "kingdoms" of Shan-shan (near Lob Nor), Pu-li, and I-nai drew grain from the larger oases of Charchen, Yarkand, and Kashgar. Since oases like Charklik and Turfan frequently fell under the rule of the nomad Hsiungnu, there must have been periods of three-cornered trade between the Chinese, the nomads, and the oases, alternating with periods of war.

It is hard to disentangle early trade from early diplomacy. In one aspect, the celebrated Silk Route trade through Inner Asia was a long-distance trade in a luxury commodity passing over the oases rather than entering into their economic life. At the same time, however, oasis rulers carried on trade in a disguised form, by sending embassies with gifts to the Chinese Court. The Chinese sent back more valuable gifts, since this was cheaper than military expeditions as a way of entering the oases and holding a flank position against the Hsiungnu nomads. Some at least of the silks sent as presents must have been sent on by the oasis rulers as diplomatic gifts in the other direction, to the kingdoms in Russian Inner Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. Similar presents must also have been sent to the nomads, since the oases were caught in a squeeze between nomads and Chinese, and while nomads and Chinese were maneuvering for power, the little kingdoms were maneuvering for appeasement.

The later forms of trade take familiar forms: where commodities of trade value can be produced, they make it possible to abandon a subsistence economy and to buy food and other necessities. At the present time there is trade in grain from oases which do not have large towns to oases which do — from Chira to Khotan, from Kharakash to Kashgar, and even from Yarkand, where the urban population is smaller in proportion to the farming area, to Kashgar which is the largest city in the province. Komul, which has an annual deficiency of 50,000 bushels, buys grain from Mulcho and Kuchengtze. Turfan, where the food-growing area is reduced by the growing of raisin grapes, buys grain from the nearby oasis of Toksun. Grain movements in Jungaria cover still greater distances. Grain is sent more than 400 miles from Kulja to Urumchi, this being possible because for several months in the winter the road is covered with packed snow, over which carts move easily, carrying a good pay load. The Altai brings grain from Kuchengtze, and beyond, which is possible because of cheap
camel transport, the camels feeding on desert pasture as they go.

Grain, cloth, and tobacco are the staples for sale from the oases to nomads. The return trade consists of sheep, goats, and cattle for slaughtering, cattle and horses as work animals, better quality horses for riding, and wool and hides as raw materials for artisan handicrafts.

One of the striking characteristics of the external trade of Sinkiang is that trade with China is essentially, in both its economic and its political aspects, trade with a foreign country. In spite of Chinese sovereignty, and the fact that Sinkiang has had a "standardized" provincial administration since 1884, the Chinese administrators of the Provincial Government have always had a strong tendency to make themselves into independent satraps. Under the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang drew an Imperial subsidy from Peking, and this political income was more important than the turnover of trade. Since 1911, under the Republic, the province has most of the time been "on its own," and its governors have manipulated all trade, including trade with China, neither for the purpose of building up the provincial economy nor in order to create an economic nexus between Sinkiang and the rest of China, but primarily to accumulate personal wealth in negotiable forms which could be deposited in safe haven somewhere outside of Chinese territory.

Geography also hampers trade between Sinkiang and the rest of China. The greatest expanses of desert in and adjacent to Sinkiang lie on the side toward China. The distance by camel caravan from Kuchengtze through Inner Mongolia to railhead in Suiyuan Province is at least 1200 miles. The distance is even greater by cart or caravan from Komul across the desert to the Kansu Corridor, then by cart through Kansu to railhead in Shensi Province; and cart transport is more expensive than camel transport. It is not surprising that, even in the early 1930's before the years of wartime disruption, only 12.5 per cent of Sinkiang's external trade was with China.

Historically, after the age of the Silk Routes and of medieval trade, tea became important in trade between China and Kashgar by 1750.28 Sinkiang still imports tea from China, together with silk and the factory-made cotton goods which compete with homespun cotton, and profitable but inessential goods like porcelain, cigarettes, flashlights, and Western-style men's hats. Luxury exports to China are raisins, jade, and furs. Bulk exports are sheep's wool, camel's wool, and the intestines of sheep (for making sausage casings). The quantity exported to China is entirely dependent on the Russian market, because the much shorter distance to railhead in Soviet territory makes it impossible for China to compete when Russia is willing to buy.

Trade with the Mongolian People's Republic has always been of minor importance. Mongolia is a pastoral country, and it adjoins the pastoral regions of Sinkiang, so that all that Sinkiang can export is grain, which can be cheaply carried by camel caravan.

Trade with India, amounting in the early 1930's to 5 per cent of Sinkiang's external trade, is limited by the fact that the main trade route, over the Karakoram to Leh, crosses five passes of more than 17,000 feet. The average loss in caravan animals is in the neighborhood of 40 per cent; and from Leh more passes have to be crossed on the way down to Kashmir. British policy has always encouraged trade between India and Sinkiang, but in the last fifty years the development reached has been anything but healthy. Indian merchants, settled in the southwestern oases, invest their profits partly in usury, which leads to lawsuits and ill-feeling. They also invested, until recently at least, in buying and growing charas or Indian hemp, a plant closely related to marijuana, which provided compact, high-value loads that could profitably be carried over the high passes to India. This trade in a dangerous narcotic, which in 1937-1938 represented 42 per cent of the total value of exports to India, was made the target of a political drive against British interests in Sinkiang during the "anti-imperialist" phase of the governorship of Sheng Shih-ts'ai in the late 1930's.

These limitations of trade in other directions make it plain why trade with Russia is the only mechanism which can pump vitality

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28 Kuropatkin, op. cit.
into the economic life of Sinkiang. In the early 1930's it reached 82.5 per cent of Sinkiang's foreign trade. The most populous and productive areas lie closer to Russia than to any other market. The situation is one which is completely open to the manipulation of Soviet policy, but it was not created by Soviet policy.

Cotton has been the most important export to Russia from the oases since 1890. In 1926-1927 the Soviet customs returns listed 2676 metric tons of cotton imported from Sinkiang. While cotton averages perhaps a little less than 10 per cent of the total value of exports to the Soviet Union, its relative importance is shown by the fact that more than half of the crop in the Turfan oasis, the largest producer, is normally sold to the Soviet Union, and when the Chinese authorities cut off trade in 1943, because of bad political relations, the effect of the resultant fall in prices was widespread.

From the pastoral regions, livestock are the most important export to the Soviet Union, followed by livestock products like wool and hides. Because the Soviet statistics do not give ad valorem figures, it is difficult to state the values of these exports, but it is evident that they greatly exceed the value of exports from the oases. Before the first World War and the Russian Revolution, in 1913, 300,000 head of sheep alone were sold to Russia, representing about 10 per cent of the total number of sheep in the Kulja and Chuguchak regions. Trade fell abruptly during the Revolution and civil war, and did not begin to recover until about 1925. In 1926, 90,000 sheep were exported. One Russian author states that in the first half of 1926 sheep alone accounted for 32 per cent of Russia's purchases from Sinkiang, while all livestock together accounted for 48 per cent. Another Russian author states that between 1930 and 1933 livestock and livestock products provided from 79 to 93 per cent of Soviet purchases from Sinkiang.

This trade is of benefit to both sides. From 1913 to 1924, when

\[ N. \text{ Stefanov, "The Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. in Central Asia," in Planned Economy, Moscow, Oct. 1928 (in Russian).} \]
\[ P. M. \text{ Fesenko and others, Iran, Afghanistan and Sinkiang, Moscow, 1936, p. 346 (in Russian).} \]

trade with Russia was at its lowest, Sinkiang suffered severely. Cotton had to be sold at prices low enough to make possible caravan transport for at least 1500 miles from Turfan to railhead in Suiyuan, followed by rail carriage to Tientsin, and finally sea shipment to Shanghai, where it competed with American cotton. During this period of depression and low prices American and German firms and a few Chinese merchants from Tientsin set up plants in Sinkiang for processing sheep intestines which they exported, together with wool and furs, to the distant sea coast, importing in return Japanese textiles, American shoes, sugar, and other manufactured articles. As soon as trade with Russia began to revive, prices rose and these firms could no longer compete.

Russian writers state that the growth of large consuming cities in Soviet Inner Asia accounts for the increasing demand for meat from Sinkiang. The cotton-growing Soviet regions are the chief purchasers. Thus the shift from diversified farming to specialized farming, especially in Uzbekistan, accompanied by industrialization all over Soviet Inner Asia, has increased the demand for livestock from Sinkiang and thus in turn increased the degree of commercialization in the pastoral economy of the Sinkiang nomads.

The oases of Sinkiang, with their relatively large population and demand for consumer goods, buy more from the Soviet Union than they sell. Northern Sinkiang, on the other hand, with its small population and large production of livestock, sells more to the Soviet Union than it buys, and is therefore able to use some of its cash balance to buy from the oases. Soviet-Sinkiang trade as a whole, therefore, has a circular motion — out of Jungaria into the Soviet Union, out of Soviet territory into the oases, and out of the oases into Jungaria, completing the circle. As a consequence, whenever trade with the Soviet Union falls off, the internal trade of the province also suffers.

In normal times, the velocity of the circulation of trade is en-
hanced by the fact that the balance is in the favor of Sinkiang. The amount of the favorable balance, unfortunately, cannot be determined. The Sinkiang provincial statistics have never been systematically kept, and the Soviet statistics lack some kinds of information. The ruble used in Soviet statistics has been more than once revalued, and in addition Soviet exports are valued f.o.b., expressing the amount received for them without the addition of freight charges, while imports are valued c.i.f., so that the cost of insurance and freight is added to the cost of the goods themselves.

In relative terms, Russia’s frontier trade with Mongolia and Sinkiang as early as 1905 far exceeded trade with China proper, and it is probable that the same situation exists today. By 1932, Mongolia and Iran were first and second in Soviet trade with countries in Asia, while Sinkiang stood third, followed by Turkey and Afghanistan.

Soviet trade with Sinkiang follows the typical “colonial” pattern of purchasing raw materials and selling manufactured goods. In 1932, cotton textiles accounted for 72 per cent of Soviet sales to Sinkiang, followed in importance by metals and ironware, sugar, electrical equipment, crockery and glass, petroleum, matches, and silkworms. Soviet financial policy, however, deliberately reverses the conventional pattern of draining wealth from the “colonial” market by buying cheap and selling dear. As early as the Second Conference of National Commissariats of Foreign Trade in 1923, the policy was adopted of rebating prices on Soviet manufactured goods destined for countries in Asia.

Price, rather than quality, probably accounts for the boast of a Soviet writer in 1926 that “in Kashgar our textiles have driven British-Indian goods out of the market by their superior quality. Twenty years ago no manufacturing country could concede the superior quality of Soviet goods; but it is true that at the present

In concluding this chapter, it should be said that in the year 1948 economic life in Sinkiang was in full crisis. Trade with the Soviet Union had practically ceased, and inflation within the province had become malignant. A little historical background must be sketched in to make the situation understandable.

The old Tsarist Russian ruble was formerly accepted in Sinkiang, and was in fact preferred to Chinese currencies. Branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank operated in Urumchi, Kashgar, Kulja, and Chunguchak; they financed foreign trade, and provincial funds were placed on deposit with them. In 1913 the Russian ruble exchanged for eight Urumchi taels. In 1917, with the Russian Revolution, the ruble fell to .63 taels but did not collapse completely because all branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank outside of Russia were taken under French protection and managed to keep operating for some years. By 1919, however, the old ruble was worth only .10 taels. A year or two later it was utterly worthless, while the new Soviet currency was suspect and unwanted.

A multiple provincial currency, sponsored by the Chinese Governor, Yang Tseng-Ishin, then became the medium of trade and account, as described in Chapter III, by the Governor’s policy of never issuing paper to the value of more than 20,000,000 taels. At the same time he allowed a number of taxes, including the land tax, to be paid in money instead of in kind. Money thus
came back into the treasury as well as going out, and inflation was avoided.

In this period the Governor allowed trade with the Soviet Union to be opened. It was carried on at first chiefly by Moslem traders, many of them Russian-born Tatars. They took goods across the Soviet frontier and sold them to the Soviet state purchasing agency, and then bought goods from state commercial agencies and returned with them to Sinkiang. Then, in 1926, the Governor allowed the Soviet-Sinkiang Trade Agency, or Sovsintro, to begin business with offices of its own established in Sinkiang. Trade and prosperity recovered until the assassination of the conservative old Governor, who had been an able administrator, in 1928.

A new period then began, which lasted until 1934. This period was marked by the Moslem insurrections, the invasion of Chinese Moslems from Kansu, and finally the Soviet intervention—which have already been described in Chapter III. The important oases of Komul, Khotan, and Kashgar withheld their taxes from the provincial treasury, which thereupon resorted to the printing of money. The devaluation of Sinkiang currency was rapid. In 1928 it had taken only three Urumchi taels to buy a Chinese dollar; by 1934 it took forty.

In 1934 Sheng Shih-ts’ai, with Soviet support, became the successful contender in the provincial civil war. Trade with the Soviet Union was restored, but it took some years to stabilize the currency. Then, in 1939, a new convertible paper currency was issued by the Provincial Commercial Bank as the only legal tender in the province. It is generally believed in Sinkiang that the success of this monetary reform was made possible by loans without interest from the Soviet Union.

In 1942, however, Sheng Shih-ts’ai came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would either be defeated by Germany or would not recover its former power. Hitherto he had pursued a reform policy, both political and economic. From this time on, he began to combine printing-press inflation with trade monopoly and the collection of the land tax and livestock taxes in kind, refusing for the receipt of taxes the money issued by his provincial treasury. He had already set up a Provincial Trading Company, which was his personal agent in business; but up to this time it had competed with private trade. In Kashgar, for instance, it handled only about 23 per cent of the trade, less than the proportion handled by an Uighur firm called “Ittifatsherket.” In 1942, however, a monopoly of provincial trade was granted to the Provincial Trading Company, which operated on a capital of 2,500,000 United States dollars. Through this company the Governor purchased wool, livestock, cotton, furs, and other products at compulsory prices lower than the market prices, transported them on his own trucks, and sold them to Sovsintro in exchange for Soviet manufactures. Until 1943 raw materials, though bought at compulsory prices, were paid for in manufactured goods; but further inflationary pressure was then created by paying for such purchases partly in goods and partly in paper money. The Khotan branch of the monopoly, for instance, paid only 15 per cent of the price of furs and 20 per cent of the price of silk and cocoons with manufactured goods. The abuses of this monopoly caused so much discontent that General Chang Chih-chung was compelled to liquidate the company in 1946.

A new period began in 1943. Governor Sheng, having miscalculated the strength of the Russians, was cold-shouldered by them and had to come to terms with the National Government. The already badly inflated currency of the National Government began to pour into the province, adding to the existing provincial inflation. In 1943 the Provincial Commercial Bank alone was receiving national currency notes at the rate of a million dollars a day. The price index of wheat flour, taking June 1940 as 100, had already increased to 865 by December 1942. In 1945 it jumped to 75,000 and by September 1947 it was 517,500.

Inflation was compounded with other critical developments, some of which had been long maturing, to form an explosive situation. In the first place, there has been a large increase of popula-
Less than forty years ago the population of Sinkiang was registered at 2,003,981. The latest official figures give 3,305,051. Neither figure has the reliability that is demanded of statistics in advanced countries, but it is probably true that the population has increased by at least a third and perhaps more. This increase means more peasants on the land in the oases, more who are willing to settle as colonists in nomad territory thereby increasing friction with the nomads, and more who migrate every summer as seasonal laborers from the Tarim oases to Jungaria and even into the republics of Soviet Inner Asia.

Pressure on the land has had a number of bad effects. Peasants are compelled to plant all land every year, leaving none fallow. As a result, one village sampled in the Yarkand oasis showed a decrease in the yield of wheat from fifteen-fold to only five-fold. The example may be exceptional in its severity, but it is representative of a trend.

Pressure on the land also aggravates the problems of land tenure. Increasing trade, especially trade with Russia since 1890, speeded up the change from diversified, self-sufficient agriculture to commercialized agriculture. After 1884 the old mulkdar or feudal landholders, who had been exempt from taxes, were compelled to pay a land tax to the Chinese provincial authorities. These two trends together caused money standards to supplant the old standard of hereditary status. The landholder with feudal rights called “the Beg,” a term of aristocratic connotation, began to be replaced by a new class called bai — a term meaning simply “wealthy,” a curious parallel to “plutocrat,” which began to come into general use in England in the period of rapid social change marked by the Reform Bill of 1832. The parallel is made closer by the fact that many new bais were former Bega, just as in England many new directors of joint stock companies were holders of old landed estates.

The condition of the peasant is governed by the fact that while he lives in a system which is increasingly penetrated by money values, he is also bound down by strong survivals of the old order.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{\text{2}}}\text{Wang Shu-nan, } Hsinch"iang T'u Chih, Ch. I, pp. 5-7.\]
CHAPTER VI  Social Structures: The Living Past

The Feudal Heritage

HALF A CENTURY AGO, when Western travelers in Sinkiang were most frequent, stagnation was the aspect which they found most striking in the societies of both the oasis dwellers and the steppe nomads. Here in the heart of Asia, time seemed to be standing still. In human society there seemed to be an unending continuity and repetition, but no evolution.

Yet the archaeologists among these travelers, by their startling discoveries of the past as reflected in wall paintings and manuscripts, revealed that the social history of Sinkiang, like its cultural history, had been complex. Here, for twenty centuries of recorded history, the civilizations of India, Iran, and China had interacted. The cultures of settled peoples and pastoral nomads had never ceased to work upon each other. A number of the religions of Europe and Asia had here lived for long periods side by side. To this day, no other Chinese province is so diversified ethnologically, linguistically, in the political importance of its religions, and in the contrasts between the economic systems enclosed within its administrative framework.

Cycles of Centralization and Decentralization

Throughout their long history the societies of Sinkiang have, in fact, been climbing the ladder of evolution; but, like other societies, they have at times slipped back several rungs down the ladder. This alternation between evolution and devolution can be most simply described in terms of an alternating centralization and decentralization of social and political structures.

The geographical factors favored decentralization. A population separated by deserts and scattered in oases, mainly self-sufficient and similar to each other, tends to develop social microcosms with no strong superstructure to unite them into a larger state. Similarly in the wide steppe the tribal needs of pastoral nomads are satisfied by the formation of small social units. The evolution of larger, more centralized units requires the stimulus of interaction between the pastoral society and urban and agricultural society. In Sinkiang, the most important agency in keeping the pendulum of social change swinging has therefore been the alternation between centralization under powerful empires and decentralization, with reversion to small social units, in periods between great empires.

This alternation, in turn, was influenced by a recurring phenomenon: the tendency of the ability to conquer to outrun the ability to integrate economically and to administer efficiently. Great empires repeatedly broke up because, instead of becoming more cohesive through the circulation of trade, they found it impossible to organize a profitable interdependence of production in different regions. The mechanism of administration was so crude that too high a proportion of revenue was eaten up by the costs of collecting revenue. The costs and hazards of transport were so high that there was always a tendency for trade to be profitable only if the goods could be virtually confiscated from the original producer.

To a large extent, ancient and even medieval trade was carried on in things which the original maker, grower, miner of metals, or hunter of valuable furs did not produce for profit, but surrendered as tribute under some form of organized compulsion. Empires based on the economics of compulsion fell apart all the more readily, when they lost the power to compel, because in each of their component parts the really essential economic life was relatively self-contained.
In periods both of centralization and decentralization the societies of Sinkiang have reflected different aspects of a slowly evolving feudalism. We have no historical description of a truly "primitive" society in Sinkiang; though the Stone Age finds prove that primitive peoples did once exist there, as in China itself. But the oasis "kingdoms" which the Chinese described some two thousand years ago were feudal, rather than primitive or tribal, both in their structure of rank and power and in such relationships as war and the collection of tribute. Nor do the Chinese chronicles describe steppe nomadism at a truly primitive level, but rather at the level of the formation of war bands and the development of early institutions to regularize personal loyalty which can be called "early feudal" or "proto-feudal." ¹

In general, it can be said that both the oasis society and the steppe nomad society tended to evolve toward higher feudal forms of development in periods of centralization, and to devolve back toward earlier forms in periods of decentralization. The main difference between the oasis society and the steppe society was that devolution in the steppe society tended to be more extreme, and to fall back to the war-band stage of development at the very threshold of feudalism.

A description of the societies of Sinkiang in terms of feudalism must in itself be a test of theories of feudalism. Many Western writers on feudalism are not prepared to admit that there is any society in Asia that can properly be described as "feudal." Lack of material from Asia in Western comparative studies of feudalism is, however, in the main attributable to the lag in Western studies in the social sciences as a whole in Asia.

A more serious difficulty is the fact that there are no criteria of feudalism to which equal acceptance is given by all students of the subject. Thus Dr. Helen Maud Cam, writing of English feudalism, points out that "the social, the economic, the legal and the constitutional historian approach it with different mental assumptions." To the social historian, it is the consecration of inequality or the insistence on subordination. To the economic historian it is the organization of land cultivation by the exercise of rights over persons. To the legal historian it is the contractual relationship guaranteed by land and determined by tenure. To the constitutional historian landholding is the source of political power, and government functions are bound up with land tenure.

"Thus in studying different periods," she concludes, "the social, the economic, the legal and the constitutional historian will each apply his own test to the state of things he finds, and declare that this is, or is not, "genuine feudalism," while his conclusions will be hotly questioned by those who use a different criterion." ²

On the other hand a great deal of the most important modern literature on Inner Asia, including Sinkiang, is in Russian; and even in Tsarist times the vocabulary of feudalism was usual among Russian scholars in dealing with the societies of Asia. With the Soviet writers, this practice becomes universal. On the other side of Sinkiang, Chinese sources are of the greatest importance for early and medieval history, and Chinese scholars are doing increasingly important work in the analysis both of historical data and of contemporary problems. The terms of feudalism are quite as important in the work of these Chinese scholars as they are in the Russian literature. In China today, scholars are divided by a controversy similar to the famous nineteenth-century debate between "Westerners" and "Slavophiles" in Russia. As in Russia, the heart of the discussion is whether the Chinese culture is so much a thing apart that it is inappropriate to use the terms used in discussing other cultures, or whether the phenomena of Chi-

¹ An interesting attempt to describe what may be called the "process of emergence" of feudalism has been made by Professor S. Yushkov in his article "On the question of the pre-feudal ('barbarian') state," in Questions of History, No. 7 of 1946, Moscow, 1946, pp. 45-64 (in Russian). The article is of particular importance because it attempts to compare as "contemporary" (in Toynbee's sense) material taken from ninth and tenth century Kievan Russia, sixth to ninth century Anglo-Saxon England, and eleventh and twelfth century Mongolia.

² Helen Maud Cam, "The Decline and Fall of English Feudalism," in Liberties and Communities in Medieval England, Cambridge, 1944, p. 208; paper originally read before the International History Conference at Zürich in 1938.
Chinese history are comparable to other historical phenomena, and can therefore be intelligibly described in universally accepted terms. Western scholars, even when dealing with an outlying province like Sinkiang, must keep abreast of the discussions among Chinese social scientists.

The Residue of History

In their first great historical period of penetration into Inner Asia under the Han Dynasty, for about two hundred years before and two hundred years after the birth of Christ, the Chinese were concerned primarily with defending the frontier of civilization in China against barbarian incursions from Mongolia and Inner Asia. The maintenance of this frontier was, for the state itself, a perpetual expense, not a profitable expansion. Trade was there, and individuals grew wealthy by it, but the Chinese were not "imperialists" planting the flag farther and farther forward in order to have trade follow it. They were not opening up colonial conquests in order to get at bulk supplies of cheap raw materials—the costs of transport were too high—nor was there a surplus of production in China forcing them to seek new markets.

The curiosities and luxuries brought to China through the Inner Asian trade contributed to the ostentation of the court. On the other hand the commodities going by caravan from China to Inner Asia consisted in large part of tribute collected by nobles and by the state, before being consigned to the hands of privileged merchants, and therefore were in fact a tax on the people. Certainly the volume of goods leaving China was not determined by the buying power of Inner Asia, because the Chinese records show clearly that the amount of trade allowed was politically regulated.

In this period the standard of Chinese policy was to see that the settled oases were not used as bases by the steppe tribes and exploited by them as sources of food and subordinate manpower. To some extent, Chinese garrisons were established in the oases. In addition, the petty rulers of the oases were brought on state visits to the Chinese Court, and occasionally they were punished if they aided the nomads—and if China at the moment was strong enough to punish them.

Relationships of this kind, as we know from the history of other countries, are part of the origins of feudalism. The rulers of the oases, whom the Chinese called "kings," had their own kind of power in their own states; but when they became the personal instruments of Chinese policy—and also when they were made personally responsible for tribute to the nomads—the kind of power which they had in their own states was altered. They could then properly be called "vassals."

The parallel Chinese policy among the nomads was to encourage war between tribes in order to prevent unity of the tribes against China. In spite of everything the Chinese could do, however, the nomads at times had the upper hand. They then thrust in between China and the oases, exacting a severe tribute from the oases and demanding disguised tribute or subsidy from China. Feudalism was fostered by these relationships. The frontier chieftain who in return for a subsidy or a regional monopoly of trade undertook to keep other "barbarians" at a distance was in fact experimenting with early forms of feudalism, and with the feudal identification of power with personal status and personal obligations.

When China could not hold these frontier chieftains under control as vassals, a decentralized feudalism succeeded the imperially centered feudalism. Nomad chiefs, in competition with each other, laid parts of North China under tribute. In the four hundred years of confusion between the fall of the Han Dynasty in A.D.
220 and the founding of the Tang Dynasty in 618, a decentralized feudalism with no strong imperial overlord spread from the Great Wall far into China.

In the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, on the other hand — when under the Tang Dynasty the power of China was even more broadly asserted over Inner Asia than it had been under the Han Dynasty — the local feudalisms of Inner Asia were again oriented toward the imperial center of China, either in subordination or in opposition.

Thus the society of the Orkhon Turks of Outer Mongolia had at one time been tribal. Both in their period of subjection to the Chinese from 630 to 680, however, and later when they themselves began to conquer other nomads and to become the overlords of oases, their institutions began to redefine the obligations of subjects and the rights of rulers in a manner that showed an emerging feudalism.

In the oases, in this period, the Chinese pilgrim Hsuan Tsang in the early seventh century said of Turfan that high officials met every morning to make administrative decisions. They did not keep records, but there was already a rudimentary bureaucracy, as officials were assigned to look after the land, the census, and irrigation. In Kucha, the “king” and his high officials met in council in the middle and at the end of every month, and the decisions of this council were also discussed with the heads of the monasteries before they were promulgated.

In the eighth century, all the households in Lukchun, near Turfan, were in 716 mentioned as listed by the officials according to whether they paid tribute or not. A document unearthed by Sir Aurel Stein at Dandan Oilik, near Khotan, dated March 23, 768, mentions annual tribute paid by the peasants in the form of crops. These peasants may have been individual serfs, or they may have been collective tribute-payers of the kind described by Vinogradoff in his discussion of the origins of serfdom:

In a state of backward agriculture and natural economy it will sometimes be more profitable for the conquerors as well as the conquered to leave the dependent population in their own households and on their own plots, at the same time taxing them heavily in the way of tribute and services. . . . We shall not be astonished to find, therefore, in the Hellenistic states of Asia a population of peasants who seem to have been in a condition of hereditary subjection and adherent to the glebe or the great estates of the Seleucid kings.

This kind of system, Vinogradoff thought, might be traced as far back as the Persian monarchy. He added: “In any case these peasants were certainly not slaves, while, on the other hand, their condition was closely bound up with the cultivation of the estates on which they lived.”

The next great period of decentralization was in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries when no one empire held either the whole of China or the whole of Inner Asia. In this period overlordship passed, on the whole, from settled peoples to nomads or peoples of nomad origin in North China, Northwest China, and Inner Asia. The trend toward a feudal development of society, however, continued. In periods of Chinese empire, as we have seen, frontier chieftains were accepted as vassals whose duty was to hold in check the more distant tribes; and conversely, when nomads ruled over settled lands they took into their service part of the ruling class, whom they deputized or made vassals for the collection of tribute.

In this period the Uighur Turks, nomads by origin, who had branched off from the stock of the Orkhon Turks of Outer Mong-

*Much the most detailed attempt that has yet been made to reconstruct the society of the Orkhon Turks and related peoples is that by A. Bemshtam, Social-Economic Structure of the Orkhon-Yenisei Turks of the VI-VIII Centuries, Moscow, 1946 (in Russian).

†Hsuan Tsang, in the edition entitled The Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions, Shanghai, 1922, Vol. I; also Li Kuan, Research on Sinkiang, Chungking, 1944, p. 191 (both in Chinese).
golia, built up the most powerful state in Sinkiang. The oases of Komul and Turfan were the main Uighur centers; and the Uighurs became of special importance when, after being conquered by the Mongols at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were able to provide the Mongols with bureaucrats who could read and write, plan the regular collection of taxes, and handle the engineering problems of an irrigated agriculture.

Accompanying the Mongols, their influence reached eastward into China and westward as far as Russia. Vernadsky points out that the Uighurs had three kinds of large landed estates: those of local nobles; those of members of the family of the Khan or supreme ruler, and those of the Khan himself. Other lands seem to have been granted in return for military and other services, and resembled the fief in Europe, and Vernadsky even suggests that this form of land grant, when used by the Mongols in Russia, may have had an influence on the development of the Russian *pomestie.*

Out of the Mongol conquests at the beginning of the thirteenth century arose the greatest centralized empire that ever occupied China and Inner Asia. Its subdivision between descendants of the “golden clan” of Jenghis, its attempts to create a centrally controlled bureaucracy controlling the subdividing tendency of feudal inheritance, and its trade all revealed a rapidly developing feudalism. Both in the sudden burst of its original conquests and in the relatively rapid weakening of its administrative structure, the Mongol Empire is the best of all illustrations of that discrepancy between the effective geographical ranges of military conquest and economic and administrative integration which played so great a part in the alternating cycle of centralization and decentralization.

The limits of bureaucratic centralization under feudalism are shown by the failure of Jenghis Khan’s own concept of empire. He provided for feudal kingdoms and smaller fiefs grouped around an imperial center, with bureaucratically appointed governors who, in each domain, would represent the imperial interest and authority; but real power soon reverted to the local authority.9 Within fifty years the major Mongol kingdoms and empires began in fact to become independent of each other, though ceremonial respect for the Great Khan was maintained for longer. Within a hundred and fifty years the whole system had fallen to pieces.

This period was matched by the next three hundred years of decentralization—from the middle of the fourteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century. In China, this was the time of the Ming Dynasty; but although the dynasty was strong in China, its range of penetration into Inner Asia was extremely shallow.10 In Sinkiang and the heart of Asia—the region which, in this period, was most distant from any center of imperial power—the society of the nomads showed the readiness with which it could, after being built up into a vast system of empire, fall apart into small tribal fragments. This process of devolution showed that in spite of the unlimited mobility of which a nomadic society is capable, the natural unit of survival is a relatively small cluster of families or clans, moving within a relatively restricted geographical orbit of migration, maintaining its livestock in good condition through the changing seasons of the year.

In the same period the settled oasis society “devolved” back to its essential unit—the self-contained oasis. As in the past, however, the self-sufficiency of the individual oasis as an economic unit of production and a social unit of organization was modified by the similarity of all cases to each other, which encouraged uni-

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formity of culture. In this period of political disunity and decentralization, the expansion of Islam continued to enhance the cultural uniformity of the oasis world.

The ascendancy of Islam among the religions of Inner Asia had begun before the Mongol Empire and continued through that period and on into the time of political disintegration. The Arabs under Kutayba invaded Western Turkestan and perhaps reached Kashgar at the beginning of the eighth century.13 By the middle of the tenth century — when Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and other religions were still strong in the settled oases — Satuk Bughra Khan of the Khara-Khanid Turks, who were at that time in control of Kashgar and other oases, was converted to Islam.14 In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Inner Asian rulers who claimed imperial Mongol descent rapidly went over to the language and culture of the Turks and to the religion of Islam. In the meantime the conversion to Islam of the Uighur Turks of the Urumchi-Turfan region had been going on since the eleventh century, though Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity lingered until the sixteenth century.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century the development of the institutions of Islam in Sinkiang made a long step forward with the arrival in Kashgar of the Khoja Makhtum Azyam, a learned theologian of Bokhara and a descendant of the Prophet.15 He was granted land by the Khan of Kashgar, and from the later struggle for the control and revenue of this estate there developed a new mode of politics, that of the Khojas.

The two sons of the first Khoja founded rival sects which were at the same time political factions, that of the Ak Tagh or White Mountains and that of the Khara Tagh or Black Mountains. At first the heirs of the Khoja line were attached to and patronized by the rulers of the greater oases, and received successive grants of land, both in what is now Sinkiang and in what later became Russian Turkistan. Eventually they themselves became rulers, but the combination of religious authority and secular rule did not put an end to the rivalry between the two sects and did not provide unity or continuity of rule.

Land was held both by the Khoja family and by mosques as corporate institutions. Some of the deeds granting land to the Khojas show that there were grants which conveyed titles and privileges in addition to the land. Grants to mosques were called wakf, and the wakf-lands gave rise to a special class of managers with rights and interests of their own (see Chapter V). Since the grants included rights over the serfs on the land, a clerical feudalism became established parallel to secular feudalism.16

In the first half of the seventeenth century, while the Manchus were gathering headway for their conquest of China from the east, the oases of southern Sinkiang passed completely under Khoja rule. In 1622 the leader of the White Mountain faction, Mullah Fazil, with the aid of the powerful Khojas of Khokand, captured Kashgar. Shortly thereafter Khoja Hidayat Ullah, also known as Hazrat Apak, whose shrine at Kashgar is still venerated, became the ruler of all the oases of the Tarim Basin. Though a Moslem “saint,” he negotiated with the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and was alternately in alliance and at enmity with the Jungar Mongols of northern Sinkiang.17 His bearing exercised a marvellous effect on the people, and his appearance amongst them produced the most extraordinary manifestations of fascination. Some wept with joy, some sang with delight, others danced and leaped and whirled around, and others again fell senseless to the ground.

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13 See W. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, translated from the original Russian [1906] and revised by the author with the assistance of H. A. R. Gibb, London, 2nd. ed., 1928, especially Chapter II.
14 According to Barthold, op. cit., pp. 254-255, this event must be regarded as a mixture of history and legend; but the rapid spread of Islam among the Inner Asian Turks at this time is beyond doubt.
17 Kuropatkin, op. cit., p. 103.
whilst all were irresistibly attracted to him by an ecstatic devotion of spiritual love.""}

We have some notes on the theocratic feudalism of the Khokjas made by the Portuguese Jesuit Father Bento de Goes, who reached Yarkand, then the capital of the Kashgar kingdom, toward the end of 1603. In February, 1604, he described Yarkand as an emporium on the long overland route between China and Europe. The severity of Moslem rule was such that as soon as the Friday service was over, twelve men left the mosque with scourges to punish those who had not attended the service.

Both trade and mining were administered under the feudal practice of granting privilege and monopoly. The right of organizing and leading a caravan was sold by the "king" to the highest bidder, who then became an "ambassador," with absolute authority over those traveling with the caravan. He recovered a part of his investment by selling positions under his authority to four associates, who also received the title of ambassador; another seventy-two privileged travelers also paid for their places in the caravan.

Similarly, the monopoly for exploiting the famous jade of Khoktan was also for sale. "For a high price the king sells the quarrying rights to some merchants, without whose consent no one is allowed to take away any stone as long as the contract lasts." 17

It was a little more than a century after their conquest of China that the Manchus invaded Sinkiang in 1755. Their campaign was aimed at the Jungars or "East Wing" of the Western Mongols, called Kaluks by the Turkish-speaking peoples of Inner Asia and by the Russians. The Jungars at this time had for decades, under a succession of military leaders, been fighting savagely among themselves, had been intermittently exercising overlordship in Tibet and over the oases of the Tarim Basin, and more recently had several times defeated the Northern Mongols or

Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia. It was the breaking of the Jungar power that rounded out the Manchu Empire by giving the Manchus control over Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

There were two distinct phases of this conquest. In the north, the power of the Jungars was broken by terrible massacres. It is said that half of the population was killed, 20 per cent died of disease, another 20 per cent fled into the steppes of Southern Siberia, and only 10 per cent survived, scattered through the land. Such figures, deriving from the eighteenth century, do not represent statistical accuracy, but they do indicate with rough accuracy the scale of devastation. 18

In the south, there were massacres in some of the smaller oases and deportations from some of the larger oases in order to deplete their military man power. From the Kashgar region some 12,000 people were deported to the Ili Valley and settled on state lands. It is from these deportees that the Taranchis (literally "cultivators") of the Ili region are descended. 19 Militarily and administratively, however, the problem of the Tarim Basin was easier to handle than that of Jungaria; the Manchus established garrisons, and then imposed an imperial superstructure on top of the existing social order.

In Jungaria, the terrible massacres made it necessary to bring in a new population, under state supervision. The population became highly diversified, and ever since that time the administration of Jungaria has involved problems of the conflicting interests of different peoples. In order to replace some of the Mongol population, some of the tribes akin to the Jungars who had been at war with the Jungar federation and had fled to Russia were invited back; those who did not return but remained in the region

16 Ney Elias, in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1897, pp. 6-7.
18 See Ch. IV.
of the lower Volga are the Mongols whom the Russians call Kal-
muks. The princes of the returning Mongol tribes were treated
as favored vassals of the Manchu Emperor.

In addition, settlements were established wherever cultivation
was profitable. The settlers included the Taranchis, deported
from the Tarim Basin; Manchu troops settled as military colonists;
and a certain number of Chinese and Chinese Moslems. Under
this colonization policy the land under cultivation in Ili and Jung-
garia increased from an estimated 240,000 mu (approximately
40,000 acres) at the end of the eighteenth century to an
estimated 700,000 mu (approximately 116,666 acres) at the end
of the nineteenth century.

In Sinkiang, as in China itself a century earlier, where the Man-
chus had come to power at the end of a period of terrible devas-
tation, early Manchu policy endeavored to bring land back under
cultivation by a policy of lenient taxation. Thus in Turfan and Komul Uighurs bringing land back under cultivation were
allowed about five acres to a household, with seeds, implements,
and working animals furnished by the state. For the first four
years, after deducting seed grain from the harvest, 60 per cent
of the remaining grain was to be kept by the cultivator and 40
per cent paid to the state. From the fifth year, a somewhat higher
land revenue was to be assessed.

In Ili and Jungaria the Manchu settlers, being regarded as un-
questionably loyal to the Manchu dynasty, were granted land at
the rate of roughly three acres for each man (presumably each
man of military age), with seeds, implements, and work animals.
Some especially favored Manchus received six acres. Chinese
criminal exiles, in contrast, received only two acres. The Manchu
land could be considered as held on feudal tenure, inasmuch as
all Manchus, Solons, and Sibos were subject to call for military

service. In 1812, however, an imperial decree allowed the gar-
rison commander at Kulja to divide the Manchu-held land as
permanent private property, exempt from tax. Under the terms of
grant, such land was not to be leased to others for cultivation,
and if farm hands were hired, they must be Manchus. In the
course of time, however, these terms became a dead letter and
the land was freely leased and even sold to Chinese cultivators,
officials and merchants.

In their main lines the structures of both the settled and the
nomad societies of Sinkiang, as administratively revised under the
Manchu Empire, outlasted the great Moslem rebellions of the
nineteenth century and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. They
even proved strong enough to contain the gradual commercial-
ization of economic life during the past hundred years. Only now
are they finally breaking down, caught between a securely estab-
lished socialized state in Soviet territory and a rapidly spreading
social revolution in Chinese territory.

As they break apart, these structures reveal a multiple strati-
fication, the layers of which can be classified both socially and
historically. Socially, they are graduated from arbitrary powers
and privileges at the top to disfranchisement at the bottom. His-
torically, the stratification is more confused. In the alternating
cycles of feudalism centralized under a strong imperial overlord-
ship and feudalism decentralized under local oasis-states and
rulers of nomad tribes, the incoming phase never completely
swept away and replaced the institutions and administrative prac-
tices of the outgoing phase. Some of the characteristics of de-
centralization always lingered here and there, though unevenly,
in the strongest phases of centralization; and conversely, even
when oases were most completely independent of each other po-
litically, and nomad tribes rejected the overlordship of other
nomad tribes, the larger community of the oasis society as such
and the society of the pastoral nomads as such was never entirely
obiterated.

in "Sacred Military Records, as cited, Ch. 4, figure for 1795.
Wang Shu-nan and others, Hsinchiang T'u Chih, or Sinkiang Gazetteer,
compiled in 1911, published at Tientsin in 1923, Ch. 30, pp. 2–3 (figure
for the period 1900).
Hsinchiang T'u Chih as cited, Ch. 25, p. 11.
As both societies break up, they first dislodge the top structure of the Chinese administrative bureaucracy. This bureaucracy represents all that is left of the centralizing overlord power of China in Inner Asia. It may soon be succeeded by another bureaucracy, as the Communists take over power in China; but for the moment it is breaking up.

Though for nearly forty years it has been ruling in the name of a Chinese Republic, this bureaucracy is essentially the same, both in its functions and in its lack of function, as that which the Manchus set up in the eighteenth century. Economically, it is a surtax on the total revenue of Sinkiang. Politically and administratively it has functioned to keep Sinkiang the same color on the map and to maintain, internationally, the convention that in Inner Asia the domains of the Chinese touch the domains of the Russians. Yet it has never integrated Sinkiang with China, making the life and wealth of Sinkiang a part of the life and wealth of China. The individual Chinese bureaucrat has returned from Sinkiang wealthy; but the Province of Sinkiang has contributed little to the State of China.

Below their own level, the Chinese cut into but at the same time conserved the feudal powers of the local ruling classes. The village elder, the landholding oasis magnate, the Mongol prince, the Kazakh chief — whatever they might be called — were forced to yield a double tribute: one to maintain the Chinese bureaucracy as such, and one to enrich the individual Chinese bureaucrat; but in order to enable them to yield this tribute, they had to be enabled to collect it, and for this purpose their traditional powers were maintained. In this way the surtax necessary to support the Chinese bureaucracy was in fact collected from the oasis farmer and the nomad herdsman.

Trade, in spite of the steady penetration of commercialization in the form of a money economy, preserved the essential feudal characteristic of privilege: both the Chinese bureaucrat and under him the "native headmen" prevented the operation of a free market by selecting individual merchants to whom they extended their protection, enabling them to evade taxes and to become monopolists, sometimes locally and sometimes on a provincial scale. In this way the provincial revenue from trade was cut down, but individually the protected merchant got rich, and enriched the individual bureaucrat or the clique of associated bureaucrats to whom he paid a tribute for his protection.

At the bottom level the individual cultivator and herdsman collected tribute from none, and paid out — in rents and taxes, in forced labor for special projects and in "customary services" to his immediate rulers — the tribute which those above him divided according to their position in the stratification of privilege. Though no legislation declared them to be serfs, both cultivator and herdsman were in fact survivors of the feudal system of enserfment, having duties but no rights, and being prevented from selling their services in a free market by administrative enforcement of the rights of all those above them to collect tribute in kind, forced labor for the community or the province, and "customary services" to individuals. Even the nominal significance of private property in land or cattle, among the poor, was blurred by debt obligations which prevented them from acting as free agents.

When a society breaks up, it never breaks up at random. Every society has its own kind of cohesion, and usually its cohesiveness is unequally distributed over different parts of the society. Between the units of cohesion are lines of stress; and cleavages, when they take place, usually follow these lines of stress. In considering the influences coming from Russia now at work upon the societies of Sinkiang, and the influences that may be expected to develop rapidly from a China in which Communists are consolidating their power, we must take into account both the influences themselves and the balance between cohesion and cleavage already existing within the societies on which they work.
At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

During the years of the second World War and the years of rapid change that followed it, the situation in the territories adjoining and surrounding Sinkiang has changed even more profoundly than the situation in Sinkiang itself. For more than half a century all writers have described Sinkiang as a partial vacuum which was being filled competitively from China, India, and Russia. The Sinkiang of today, teeming with its own nationalism, can no longer be considered a vacuum; and the most important aspect of its position is that it stands between a Communist-dominated China and a Communist-controlled Soviet Union.

Until this change took place British policy in Sinkiang was directed partly from London, partly from Britain's position as the imperial power ruling India. British policy alternated between two aims: that of establishing a sphere of influence, especially in the Kashgar region and the Tarim Basin, tacitly conceding to Russia a sphere of influence in the Ili Valley and Jungaria, and that of co-operating with the Chinese authorities and supporting the full claims of Chinese sovereignty, thus indicating that the extension of Russian influence would be undesirable. In the last years of Kuomintang rule, and after Britain negotiated withdrawal from India and Pakistan, British policy settled down to the second of these two alternatives, because the British interest is to prolong a relatively weak Chinese overlord rule in Inner Asia, whether under the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communists, rather than to accelerate the development of a strong Russian overlord rule, or overriding interest.

In the same period Russia and its dominions in Asia passed from a centralized imperial rule under the Tsars to a federated structure of Soviet Communist Republics. China began its revolutionary changes before Russia but completed them later. Before 1911 the authority of the Manchu Empire had been weakening both in China and in the frontier territories and in 1911 it was overthrown. From 1912 to 1926 China was a republic in which power was divided between war lords; there was no firm central authority either in China or in the frontier territories. After 1927, China was a republic governed by the Kuomintang, whose central authority tended to increase within China, but to decrease in Sinkiang and other frontier territories. Finally, China has now passed under the ascendency of the Communists, and a trend toward federalization can now be foreseen. Within this federative trend, it is likely that the new Central Government of China will have more authority in the frontier territories of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang than any Chinese government for many decades.

All of these changes must be evaluated in themselves and in their relation to and interaction on each other. The Sinkiang of today cannot properly be described as a vacuum. It has become a crossroads at which meet a number of different nationalisms and the policies of two great powers, China and Russia. These two great federative states are similar to each other in their Communist orientation, but not identical with each other in their domestic interests.

The Russian Revolution and Its Effects

A unique colonial revolution took place within the general Russian Revolution. The colonial domains of the Tsar adjoined and merged into the Russian lands. The degree of interpenetration between Russians and subject peoples was much greater than it could possibly be in any overseas colony. All of the British in
India, for example, were isolated within India as well as isolated from Britain. The British foreman in a textile mill in Bombay, as much as the tea planter or the British civil servant, felt himself to be one of the ruling caste, and was just as ready to resist Indian demands for equality in competition. Conversely, it was extremely rare for the Indian who went to Britain for a university education to be able to make a career in Britain. He had to return to India, and more often than not he had to accept employment that was both below the level of his qualifications and under the orders of a British supervisor whose qualifications might be less than his.

In Russian Central Asia, on the other hand, the time-expired Russian soldier who settled in a city like Tashkent often worked with his hands, in some artisan employment in which he shared the market and the competition with non-Russians. The Russian colonist farmed land adjacent to an Uzbek village. In some ways, the standing of Russians was higher than that of Inner Asians; but both formed part of the subject population of Russia as a whole. Where the Tsarist government bore heavily on the subject people, both Russians and non-Russians felt its weight.

The "upper classes" also interpenetrated. The Inner Asian whose father could afford a Russian education for him was able to enter the general Russian service, military or civilian, not a separate colonial service. One example among many is Valikhanov, the son of a Kazakh "sultan," who graduated from a Russian cadet school and carried out a brilliant early reconnaissance of unknown and hostile Kashgar at the end of the 1850's. He held a Russian, not a colonial military commission, was lionized in St. Petersburg, and was a friend of Dostoevsky in Dostoevsky's years of exile. He was a schoolmate and a lifelong friend of the great explorer Potanin; and for Potanin he was not a "trustworthy native" to be taken along on expeditions as an interpreter or subordinate, but an independent colleague who conducted his own daring expeditions.²

lution and civil war in which some of the non-Russians were on both sides of the fight among Russians. As the revolution deepened from a political struggle into a class war, the lines of cleavage more and more grouped together the possessors, Russian and non-Russian, fighting to preserve at least something of the old order, and the dispossessed, Russian and non-Russian, trying to take complete possession of the new order.

In many of the regions in which the Russians were in a minority, the outcome of the revolution was determined by non-Russians who took the side of the Russian Bolsheviks. Before the final outcome, however, there were two intermediate stages, and during each of these stages, and after the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution, there were important migrations out of Russian territory which carried the effects of the revolution into the adjoining lands of Inner Asia.

In the first of these intermediate stages non-Russian nationalists came into power or almost within reach of power in their own territories. In Inner Asia there were two groups of these nationalists. One — including such potentates as the Emir of Bokhara and lesser representatives of the old systems of nobility and chieftainship which had been subjected to the Russians — was not guided by political theory. Individuals of the group, rather than the group as a whole, simply tried to resume as much as possible of the power that they had had before the Russians came. If the power they could take into their hands was not enough to make them feel secure, they were inclined to look for protection to the British, who were intervening against the Russian Revolution from the side of Asia as well as from the side of Europe.

The second group — many of whose members stemmed from families in the first group — was led by non-Russians who had had some years of Russian schooling and who, very often, had held positions in the Russian service. This group had some idea of political theory and modern politics. On the whole, its ambitions did not go beyond local autonomous government, with members of the group holding higher positions than they had formerly held — especially, of course, the top positions once held by Russians. For allies, this group looked to the Russian Mensheviks; as the Mensheviks weakened and failed, they also looked to the British; when the British intervention failed, those who could gave up the struggle and fled into exile — a few to Europe, but many more to Iran, Afghanistan, and Sinkiang.

The second stage, marked by the British intervention, began where the first had ended. The British intervention was directed from Iran and Mesopotamia. It endeavored to mask Afghanistan, where suspicion of British policy was very strong, and it also operated, to a minor though significant extent, from Kashgar in Sinkiang. Beginning as an attempt to prevent German and Austrian prisoners of war interned in Russian Turkistan from being repatriated to Germany, and to prevent accumulated stocks of cotton from being delivered to Germany after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it quickly turned into an attempt to prevent the Bolshevik Revolution from seizing the Baku oil fields, and to complete the cordon sanitaire around Russia. As they failed and withdrew, the British carried along with them an ebb tide of people fleeing from the Revolution, both Russians and people of every Inner Asian nationality.

Nor did emigration end with the Bolshevik victory. With each new phase of Bolshevik policy, and especially during the bitter struggle over collectivization, which was virtually a new civil war, new waves of refugees sought an escape into Sinkiang and the other Inner Asian lands around the Soviet frontier. In this way the primary effect of the Russian Revolution was to spread alarm far and wide beyond the Russian frontiers.

In time, however, a second or long-term series of effects began to become apparent. These effects were enhanced by the fact that


everywhere in Inner Asia the Soviet frontier is in one sense artificial: because it originated in the Tsarist conquests, and stops where the Tsarist conquests stopped, it everywhere divides similar peoples from each other instead of separating different peoples from each other, as has been pointed out in previous chapters. The same languages are spoken on both sides of the Soviet-Turkish, Soviet-Iranian, Soviet-Afghan, and Soviet-Sinkiang frontiers. And, in most cases, they are spoken by people who are minorities under both the sovereignties under which they live. The effects in Inner Asia of the Soviet Revolution must therefore be studied especially from the standpoint of peoples who are minorities in the states under which they live, and who talk in the same language and against the background of a common cultural and social tradition about the different conditions under which they live on the two sides of the frontier that divides them.

Five principal phases, which followed each other in chronological order, can be distinguished among the long-term effects of the Soviet Revolution.

1. As the possessors of advanced skills, refugees from the Soviet Revolution became an elite in Sinkiang. Among the Russians, especially, there were doctors, geologists, and other scientists; engineers, mechanics, and many artisans. Among the Uzbeks, Tatars, and others there were also many whose literacy, skill, and experience in trade—or proficiency as carpenters, builders, leather tanners, or metalworkers—put them above the average level prevailing in Sinkiang. Having escaped from the disorder and insecurity of revolution, they now found that the country to which they had come was culturally and politically even more backward than the one from which they had escaped. They learned that if the superior skills which gave them the qualities of an elite were not enough to make them a political elite, and frequently not enough even to assure them economic security, it was because of the backwardness of the society in which they had settled, and the corruption or incompetence of the officials to whom they now had to defer.

2. Having fled because there was no force in Russian Inner Asia capable of resisting the Revolution, the refugees now found that there was no adjoining state capable of intervening successfully against the Revolution. As the years of the interwar period went by, they found that in Sinkiang and in every other territory in Asia adjoining their old homes there was not a single anti-Russian government that was able to build up political and military strength as fast as the new Soviet Republics of Inner Asia, or to open up educational and employment opportunities as fast. In their old homes, there was still suffering, and often persecution of those who had belonged to the old order of politics and society; but this was the suffering of revolutionary dislocation, and the same dislocation also offered new careers for those who were willing to work hard and those who were able to profit by education. In their new homes, however, there was also suffering: the suffering of old and stagnant societies, in which opportunities were decreasing, rather than increasing. Even the rich man might suddenly be impoverished if he fell foul of a corrupt official; and there was a steady production of landless peasants in the rural districts and beggars in the towns.

3. In the atmosphere of rapid change and spreading insecurity after the second World War, both the refugees and the peoples among whom they live have begun to fear the Soviet Republics of Inner Asia, and the Russia standing behind them, more in some ways but less in other ways. They fear them more, as the source of a power that may reach out and take over the adjoining territories or parts of them. They fear them less, because in comparison with most of the adjoining territories, such as Sinkiang itself, Afghanistan, and Iran, and even to some extent Turkey, they have become a focus of stability and of that "law and order" which all stabilizing empires proclaim. The Soviet Republics do not offer security for the investments of the rich, but they do offer a new kind of security, never known before in the "back blocks" of Asia—in a multiplying number of careers, especially for the young and especially for those who pass through universities and technical training schools of all kinds.

4. A cycle has, in fact, been completed. The old Russia was
Pivot of Asia once the greatest and most stable state in Inner Asia. As far as men of the Inner Asian peoples could hope for modern training and modern careers at all, it was in Russian employment or the Tsarist service. A "Russian-trained man" was a man who had escaped from the old ruts of the tribal or oasis life. Even when the Tsarist Empire fell, the refugees who scattered into other Inner Asian countries were respected for their superior knowledge and skills. In the new cycle, the new Russia has regained this position. Its ideology is feared by those whose social or economic advantages are protected by the old orders that still stand just beyond the Soviet frontiers; but these old orders are old, and they are weak, and all know it. The present influence of the Soviet Union beyond its own borders in Inner Asia therefore bears heavily on the stress lines of class conflict and economic inefficiency in weak social structures that have little confidence in themselves. This influence has, especially, a marked tendency to divide the old and the young. Among those who are old enough to know that they could not adapt easily to great changes, fear is strong. Among those who are young enough to know that they could take advantage of new opportunities in education and the making of careers, there is a stir of curiosity and adventure.

5. The gathering momentum of Soviet prestige is enhanced by the withdrawal of other powers that were once great in Inner Asia. The overlord power of China in Sinkiang is diminishing. Even the Communists, triumphant in China itself, have to handle the Inner Asian frontiers of China more by negotiation than by the issuing of decrees. With British power withdrawn from India, neither the Union of India nor Pakistan has the kind of power that can project its influence as deeply into Inner Asia as that of Britain once did. British power has also receded in Iran, and has not been fully replaced by American power. The American influence in Iran is that of a country which is strong enough to fight Russia, but not that of a country with the knack—which Britain once had—of simultaneously propping up both a weak government and a decaying social order. In the short run, the American influence greatly strengthens the Iranian Government. In the long run, on the other hand, there is an ironic resemblance between American influences and Russian influences: both promote modernization, and new social ambitions, much more rapidly than the traditional British type of policy. The difference is that Communist Russians, out of theoretical conviction and by planned methods, dismantle social structures that have survived from the Middle Ages; Americans, pursuing economic efficiency and promoting education to serve economic efficiency, unheedingly undermine medieval institutions as they go along, and destroy the prestige of the way of thinking that goes along with the institutions.

Sinkiang under the Japanese Shadow

In measuring the recession of the old forms of empire and overlordship in Inner Asia in their relationship to the rise of the Soviet forms of power and prestige, it becomes clear that the retreat of Britain began long before it became visible. The withdrawal, carried out with such skill and orderliness by the British Labour Government, after the war, had been made inevitable by the Baldwin-Chamberlain years of appeasement of Germany and Japan under a Conservative Government. The consequences of the policy that culminated in Europe at Munich can be instructively studied in Inner Asia in the decade between Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Pearl Harbor in 1941.

After World War I, observers of the Japanese General Staff were sent to Sinkiang. There seems to have been a plan for providing Japanese military instructors in the Ili region, but the project failed for lack of funds. By the 1930's, Japanese interest in Moslem lands and Moslem politics had been systematically organized. Contacts were made in Turkey and Iran as well as in Sinkiang, and also among Chinese Moslems in China proper. The names of three paid Japanese agents, Moslem with Turkish

names, are given by a well-informed German writer. One of them had been in Germany. They penetrated into Soviet Turkestan as well as into Sinkiang, and while the German writer says that he does not know what they accomplished in Soviet territory, he asserts that "they did succeed in arousing the feelings of the Sarts [Uighurs] in Sinkiang, and it is undoubtedly through the propaganda of these men that the Sart Rebellion of 1933 and 1934 took place."

The year 1933 was critical for another reason. At the end of February and the beginning of March, the Japanese overran the province of Jehol and annexed it to their puppet state of Manchukuo. In this campaign a hundred thousand square miles of territory, much of it mountainous and all of it extremely primitive in communications, was taken in only ten days — by the use of motorized columns. It was this campaign of 1933, and not that of the Germans in Poland in 1939, that first demonstrated on a really large scale the military potential of air-supported motorized columns, carrying their own maintenance and disregarding old precepts by moving with their flanks exposed and leaving enemy troops in their rear to be mopped up later.

In previous years the American explorer Roy Chapman Andrews had shown that motor vehicles could range widely through Mongolia, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin had shown that a motor caravan could penetrate through Inner Mongolia to Sinkiang, and the French Citroën expedition had made the journey in the reverse direction. The Japanese campaign in Jehol therefore demonstrated that at any moment a Japanese column could strike all the way to Sinkiang, cut communications between China and Soviet territory, and put the Japanese Army in a position to make bids for alliance both to Turkish-speaking Moslems in Sinkiang and to the virtually independent war lords of the Chinese Moslems in Northwest China.

All through the first years of their resistance to Japanese invasion the Chinese were never free of the danger of such a flanking move. The danger did not lessen until the increasing dispersion of Japanese forces after Pearl Harbor made it difficult for them to assemble the vehicles and supplies for such a drive. It was this danger that was the primary justification for the stationing of a Russian motorized unit at Komul, in Sinkiang. Only motorized mobility could counter the danger of a raiding Japanese motorized column. The Chinese had no units of the kind needed; the Russians did, and for this reason the Chinese Government, though intensely suspicious of the Russians, did not protest against Russian occupation of the oasis at the point of convergence of motorable routes from China, from Inner Mongolia, and from Soviet territory.

Immediately after the Jehol campaign, and until Soviet aid enabled Sheng Shih-ts'uai to consolidate himself in power in Sinkiang, the shadow of Japan stretched visibly into Inner Asia. Ma Chung-ying, the Chinese Moslem adventurer who challenged Sheng Shih-ts'uai for power, had at least two Japanese advisers at his headquarters. In addition Ma's chief military adviser, a Turk from Istanbul named Kamal, may have had Japanese connections. Kamal had studied as an officer in both Germany and France before 1914. In the first World War he was taken prisoner by the Russians, and after the war he reached Harbin, where he taught Turkish in a school. It may be conjectured that he was sought out by the Japanese agents at this time.

Be that as it may, Ma himself is described by the German source already cited as "practically and morally supported" by the Japanese, by the Chinese National Government (which considered him a dangerous troublemaker in his native province, Kansu, and was satisfied to see him move into a more distant one), and by "the British régime in India," all of whom "hoped, through a

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5 Anonymous, "Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien," Berichte des Asien Arbeitskreises, Vienna and Peking, No. I, February 1939. The author is described as having spent twelve years of travel in Central Asia, and was apparently a Nazi Intelligence agent.

6 See Owen Lattimore, Introduction to Martin R. Norins, Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, New York, 1944, p. 17.
Tungkan [Chinese Moslem] regime, to set up an obstacle to the penetration of Soviet Russian influence.\(^8\)

Willingness to flirt with Japanese penetration into Sinkiang as a lesser danger than Russian penetration, in spite of the damage done to Chinese control over Sinkiang and to British interests in that province, was a characteristic of the appeasement policies of the time, in Asia as in Europe. For, curiously enough, even the Nazi writers whose articles were published for the purpose of stimulating anti-Soviet feeling did not attempt to conceal the fact that it was Japan that was taking the initiative and that the Russian policy in Sinkiang was defensive in nature and designed to counter a Japanese penetration that had already begun.

Thus the anti-Soviet exile Fuad Kazak states that Japanese expansion was making the Soviet Union feel insecure along its entire frontier with China.\(^9\) The German writer already cited, attributing the uprising at Komul in 1933-1934 to Japanese agents, goes on to say that “this thrust of Japanese policy toward the west must have been the main ground on which Soviet Russia considered it necessary to bring the Province of Sinkiang under its knout.”\(^10\) And finally in 1934 Yurenev, then Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, said to Ambassador Grew that General Hayashi, who had just become Japanese War minister, “had constantly worked against Soviet Russia, particularly in Sinkiang.”\(^11\)

In the same interview with Mr. Grew Mr. Yurenev made a remark which opens the way to an understanding of the British policy of that time. “He also said that according to his information England is showing a distinct pro-Japanese tendency. England, he said, is in a very difficult position because she has good reason to be afraid of Japan becoming too strong.”\(^12\) The Soviet Ambassador seems to have detected a hesitancy in British policy that is echoed by a double note running through the British writing of this period: hope that Japan might take over part of the traditional British opposition to Russia, and anxiety because, while the Japanese might at some time in the future clash with Russia, they were in the meantime, year by year, encroaching on British trade and political interests everywhere in Asia. This double note was sounded characteristically by Sir Eric Teichman, the greatest British political expert of his time on the Inner Asian frontiers of China. Summing up the situation in Sinkiang, he referred half in complaint and half in sympathy to the Japanese who, claiming “to be the bulwark against the advancing waves of bolshevism in the Farther East, render confusion worse con­founded by the steps which they find it necessary in their own interests to take in Inner Mongolia and North China.”\(^13\)

Under the double pressure of fear of Russia and nervousness in face of an unpredictable Japan, British policy as reflected by British writers was intensely suspicious of Sheng Shih-ts’ai, especially in the reform period of his administration of Sinkiang, and looked with favor on Moslem religious politics as a safeguard against nonreligious nationalism. The Moslem leaders in southern Sinkiang, who held out longest against Sheng Shih-ts’ai, were accordingly looked on with favor; they were described as friendly to British travelers, and as having “formed friendly relations with the British Consul-General” at Kashgar.\(^14\) Later, when a fresh Moslem-led rising against Sheng Shih-ts’ai broke out in 1937, The Times said that “these events would seem to mean the temporary collapse of Soviet political influence in Kashgaria.”\(^15\)

The British policy, or drift, was not successful in any way. The Japanese never quite came to the point of going to war with Russia. British influence waned even in the Kashgar-Yarkand-Khotan

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\(^8\) Anonymous, op. cit., pages 7, 9, and 15. It should be noted, as a sign of the confusion of the times and the versatility with which individuals turned and twisted, that after their defeat both Ma Chung-ying and Kamal eventually passed under Russian protection.


\(^10\) Anonymous, op. cit., p. 6.


\(^12\) Grew, op. cit., p. 125.


\(^15\) The Times, 21 August, 1937.
region, in which it had always been strongest; and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the years in which his policy was most active, most progressive, and most successful, bracketed the British with the Japanese as imperialists menacing Sinkiang. Partly as a device for turning the pressure of the nationalisms of the Uighurs and others away from his administration, he directed it against the British. The shadow of Japan over Sinkiang never hardened into the reality of a Japanese invasion or even raid; but in the years in which British policy appeased Japan the shadow of Britain over Sinkiang wore thinner.16

The Chinese Revolution Reaches Sinkiang

It was only after Russian revolutionary influences had become strong and well established in Inner Asia, and after the decline of British power and prestige in the 1930's had obviously begun that the effects of China's own revolution really began to penetrate into Sinkiang. In the 1911 Revolution, all that really happened in Sinkiang was that the title of the Manchu Empire passed to the Chinese Republic. The governing group remained essentially the same, guided by the strong hand of Yang Tseng-hsin. That same strong hand sealed Sinkiang off from the stormy events and heady ideas of the Second or “Great” Revolution of 1925–1927.

Revolutionary developments began with the Moslem and nationalist risings at the beginning of the 1930's, which were rebellions against Chinese rule that turned into revolutions against the traditional social orders of Sinkiang. By an odd twist, however, it was these rebellions that gave the first opportunity of action for those Chinese in Sinkiang whose minds were also turned toward revolution.

There seems little doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, at the time he came to power, was a mixture of the revolutionary and the military adventurer. In the Northern Expedition of 1927 he had accompanied the famous First Army column which was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek with Ho Ying-ch'in as Chief of Staff and Pai Chung-hsi as Assistant Chief of Staff, and had himself served in the Planning Section of the Staff. He had, therefore, watched at close hand those military leaders of the Kuomintang who boldly used class conflict to create a situation in which they could control the balance of power. They developed, and for a time seemed to have perfected, a method of riding the revolutionary tiger without losing control of it and becoming unable to dismount. Sheng Shih-ts'ai may well have thought, when he first assumed power in Sinkiang, that he too could use the methods of revolution without losing control of the process of revolution.

What Sheng Shih-ts'ai faced in Sinkiang was not revolution, but a widespread rebellion which could not be suppressed by force with the military resources at his command. On the other hand, he had no mandate to protect the vested interests of the colonial Chinese families that had long been established in the province. He was a newcomer. There lay before him the opportunity to take command of the situation if he could do so by use of the means available to him.

These means included:

2. Getting the Russians to repatriate, into Sinkiang, Chinese troops which, after being defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria, had retreated into Siberia and had there been interned. As a Manchurian Chinese himself, he could present himself to these troops as a sympathetic commander, while they in turn had no local political loyalties in Sinkiang, and made him independent of reinforcements sent from China.
3. Concessions to Uighur and other non-Chinese political leaders at the expense of the old Chinese official clique in Sinkiang—a clique to which Sheng was not bound, and whose interests he did not have to defend, if by abandoning them he could create new interests allied to himself and dependent on his new policy.

16 For contemporary expressions of Chinese hostility to Britain on the subject of Sinkiang, see Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia*, Random House, New York, 1941, p. 307 and note, citing the most important independent Chinese newspaper, Ta Kung Pao; also Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, 1944, pp. 48 and 56, also citing Chinese sources.
As was shown in Chapter III, Sheng's "nationality policy" was worded as if it had been based on concessions to peoples, but was in fact directed primarily to winning over some of the leaders of those peoples, whose ambition was simply to hold offices that had been open previously only to Chinese.

4. The recruiting of a new body of Chinese experts and advisers who, like himself, were not tied by common interests to the old regime, and would support his two bold policies of dealing with the Russians and making greater concessions to the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang than their Chinese rulers had ever made to them before.

The first three points have been dealt with earlier in this book, in Chapter III. They are mentioned again here only because of their connection with the fourth point, which concerns the manner in which the characteristics of the Chinese Revolution became, after so long a delay, transplanted to Sinkiang and began to operate there.

Sheng had no difficulty in collecting Chinese, previously strangers to the province, who were far enough to the left to go along with him enthusiastically in his first years of radical innovation. Between the loss of Manchuria in 1931 and the formation of a united front between Communists and Kuomintang at the beginning of 1937, China was a bitter and disillusioned country. Thousands of ardent patriots, who did not want to follow the Communists, were disappointed in the Kuomintang's refusal to make a stand against the Japanese and its insistence, instead, on continuing the civil war against the Communists. Afraid of the Communists as "too revolutionary," but eager for reform, they were ready to rally to a leader like Sheng Shih-ts'ai who was proclaiming internal unity, democratic reforms, and unlimited hostility to imperialism.

Nor were Chinese who felt this way easily frightened by Sheng's friendly association with the Russians. Many Chinese were in favor of good relations with Russia, in view of the clear menace of Japan. To keep one foreign nation balanced against another was an old Chinese tradition; a great many Chinese feared that this technique was being turned against them when they were warned that, because of Russian Communism, they must not seek friendly relations with Russia even in face of the rapidly increasing encroachment of Japan.

In addition to leftists and liberals, Sheng Shih-ts'ai also enlisted Chinese Communists. These were not concealed Communists; Sheng invited them to enter his service, and employed them deliberately for the sake of their techniques of popular organization, and also as economic and financial experts, feeling sure that he could take the upper hand over them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. When, in his opinion, Russia at the time of Stalingrad had become so weak that he thought it prudent to come to terms with the Kuomintang, he arrested both his Communist and his liberal assistants and tortured and killed many of them, including a brother of Mao Tze-tung. Only at the end of the war with Japan were a few of them released from jail and allowed to go to Yenan.37

The men of whom Sheng Shih-ts'ai made use brought with them into Sinkiang the thought, the emotion, the methods of organization and some of the factionalism that had been developing in revolutionary China for more than twenty years. Their scope of action, however, did not lie within a Chinese environment. Whether they turned to the problem of strengthening the state or to the problem of reforming society, they found themselves part of a Chinese minority surrounded by peoples of several nationalities, all of them differing from the Chinese, and from each other, in their responses to social and political issues.

In this situation theories of nationalism and the policies based on them became of more and more importance in determining all political alignments. Among the Chinese, at one end of the scale stood those who considered that they must maintain themselves as the ruling people, treating the non-Chinese as subjects. Next to them stood Chinese who, in contrast, considered themselves

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37 For the foregoing information I am indebted to unpublished notes by Miss Anna Louise Strong of her interviews in Yenan with some of these surviving Communists.
generous and progressive because they believed that non-Chinese should acquire equal status, as individuals, as fast as they could acquire the Chinese language and assimilate themselves to the Chinese culturally; but this attitude was not accepted as "progressive" by non-Chinese who had their own loyalties to their own languages and cultures. At the other end of the scale stood Chinese who believed in conceding full citizenship to all non-Chinese, combined with independence—including independence in education—in the use of non-Chinese languages, and local self-government based on recognition of the language community rather than on the territorial unit; but while these Chinese were considered liberal and progressive by the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and others, they were considered dangerously radical and disruptive by other Chinese.

Among non-Chinese, the appeal to nationalism also evoked many responses. There were individuals whose hereditary position or political privileges were so closely associated with Chinese rule that they hesitated to approve any change. There were others who wanted, as individuals, to rise to positions formerly held only by Chinese, but did not want to change the structure of government and administration in any other way. There were Uighurs who considered that the Uighurs, as the most numerous nationality, constituting an absolute majority, should take over the province and should have the same rights over minorities that the Chinese had formerly had over all Sinkiang. There were Kazakhs, Mongols, and others who wanted to be as independent of the Uighurs as of the Chinese. And, finally, there were radical nationalists who wanted to change the social order as well as the political structure: to unseat their own Begs, Sultans, and Princes as well as to govern themselves without the Chinese District Magistrates.

All of these groups and tendencies worked out their relationship to each other in a pattern of constantly changing coalitions. In the politics of reform and revolution, coalitions are the characteristic phenomena. They are formed by groups which have interests in common to defend or to assert and which, in forming the coalition, emphasize convergent interests and avoid emphasis on divergent interests. The coalition breaks up when one of its component groups has secured the interest that it thinks most essential, and is unwilling to risk this gain by pushing ahead in support of interests more essential to other groups. New coalitions then form, grouped on the one hand around those who wish to stabilize the situation and on the other hand around those who still have unsatisfied interests to assert.

Sheng Shih-t'ai, in the first phase of his rule, achieved considerable success by building around himself a left-of-center coalition of progressive, radical, and Communist Chinese—together with non-Chinese leaders, to whom he granted more freedom of political action than ever been granted by any previous Chinese Governor. In the second phase of his rule he tried, and eventually failed, to build a new right-of-center coalition by combining representatives of the Kuomintang, freshly sent in from China, with those of his own followers whom he considered personally loyal to himself rather than to political principles.

After the fall of Sheng and the end of the war with Japan, different factions of the Kuomintang, frequently weakened by purely factional quarrels with each other, formed a series of unsteady coalitions in which they enlisted representatives of the most conservative interests among the non-Chinese, especially the Uighurs and Kazakhs. These Chinese-controlled coalitions were opposed by the Kulja coalition in the Ili Valley and western Jungaria, which rested on leftist and pro-Communist groups among the non-Chinese nationalities, but at the same time sought to maintain contact with moderate representatives, such as Chang Chih-chung, within the right-wing coalition which dominated most of the Tarim Basin and eastern Jungaria.

The Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and the Russian Frontier

In coalition politics of this kind the shifts of allegiance of Osman Bator, the freebooting Kazakh leader, who has been fre-
quently interviewed by American correspondents, were typical. First, as a military leader with an independent following, he sought to take advantage of Chinese military weakness by joining the IIi coalition. Later, failing to dominate the IIi coalition, he went over to the Chinese side, where by this time his price had risen because popular sympathy was turning away from the conservative Uighur and other leaders who had accepted Chinese protection.

During this phase of Sinkiang politics the IIi coalition, holding territory along the Soviet frontier, received aid and comfort from Soviet Kazakhstan. The coalition of Kuomintang officials and generals, conservative Uighur figureheads supported by the Kuomintang, and Kazakh auxiliaries received subsidies and American arms from the American-supported government at Nanking. This phase ended when the advances of the Chinese Communist armies across the Yangtze cut off the Kuomintang outposts in Sinkiang from any hope of support from within China.

An entirely new situation was thus created. Ever since the Russian Revolution, the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang had stood between a government controlled by Russian Communists on the one side and a government controlled by non-Communist or anti-Communist Chinese on the other side. They now stand between a government controlled by Russian Communists and a government dominated by Chinese Communists.

In this new situation the aims of the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists, as Marxists, are generally the same; but the domestic interests of the Chinese Republic and the Soviet Union are not necessarily identical. In the Soviet Union the Russians are the dominant people; but there are vast territories inhabited by many millions of people who are not Russians. In the Chinese Republic the Chinese people are the overwhelming majority; they dominate China much more decisively than the Russians dominate the Soviet Union; but in the Chinese Republic also there are vast territories inhabited by peoples who are not Chinese. The geographical center of gravity of the non-Chinese territories of China lies in Sinkiang. The frontiers of Sinkiang touch the Inner Asian Soviet Republics, the most important block of territory in the Soviet Union inhabited by peoples who are not Russians and not Slavs.

This situation gives a new aspect to old problems and creates new problems of its own. There is the question whether, in the Soviet Union, the interests of the Russians are to override the interests of the other peoples, and the question whether, in the Chinese Republic, the interests of the Chinese are to override those of all others. These are old problems, the development of which has long been watched warily by the neighbors of Russia and China. In addition, there is now the new problem of the relationship between the Soviet Union and China: are the interests of the Soviet Union, as a state, to be made paramount over those of China, as a state?

If statesmen were efficiency engineers, and no more than that, a very good case could be made for annexing parts of Sinkiang to the Mongolian People's Republic and to the Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Tajik Republics of the Soviet Union, and for setting up most of the Tarim Basin as an Uighur Republic, also to be annexed to the Soviet Union. In terms of the affinities of peoples, languages, and cultures, geographical accessibility, the most economical laying-out of modern communications, and the rapid promotion of material progress, the natural orientation of Sinkiang is toward Mongolia and the Soviet Union, rather than toward China. On the other hand, however, the material and sentimental interests of China in Sinkiang, though they have been much abused, are real; and so are the interests of Sinkiang in its connection with China, if this connection is wisely handled.

The probability is that the Chinese Communists will, as Chinese, renounce no sovereignty in lands long claimed as Chinese. At the same time, it is to be expected that they will attempt to apply new policies—not only to Sinkiang, but to Inner Mongolia, to the districts in which Chinese Moslems predominate in Ninghsia and Kansu, and to such parts of Tibet as they can penetrate. It is to be expected that, as Marxists, they will model these policies on those of the Russians in Soviet Asia. The Sinkiang of
the near future is, therefore, likely to resemble what already exists under the Kulja coalition in the Ili Valley and western Jungaria, since the Kulja regime has clearly followed Soviet models to a considerable extent. It is also to be expected that in the vast mass of China — and the equally vast masses of its adjacent territories, with their uneven populations and poor communications — it will be impossible to match practice exactly to theory.

The Chinese Communists, however, like the Russians, are under two urgent pressures: to convince non-Communist governments throughout Asia that they have established a powerful new state, which cannot be overthrown; and to convince the peoples under those governments that, where the Communists win, the people who lose are outnumbered by those who gain.

China itself, the homeland of the Chinese, is cut off from most of the rest of Asia by mountains and jungles. Sinkiang, in its pivotal position in the heart of Asia, will most rapidly transmit to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran the news that passes from mouth to mouth where few people read or hear the radio — news of the meaning in their lives of great political changes in China. Once more, as in the days of the rise of the Han Empire, more than two thousand years ago, Sinkiang has become in fact a pivot around which revolve politics, and power, and the fates of men.

**APPENDIX I Ancient Art and Modern Archaeology**

Much of our knowledge of early Central Asian history has come as a result of late nineteenth and early twentieth century efforts of European scholars to explore the ruined cities which had lain long buried under the sands. The most widely known of these archaeological expeditions were carried out by Sir Aurel Stein under the sponsorship of the Government of India, and by Professors Albert Grünwedel and Albert von Le Coq of the National Ethnological Museum in Berlin. Others were undertaken by D. Klementz (1897–1898), the Berezovsky brothers (1906), and S. Oldenbourg (1909–1910), all Russians; Paul Pelliot (1906–1909), French; and Tachibana (1910–1911), and Otani (1902 or 1903), both Japanese.

Stein made three trips, in 1900–1901, 1906–1908, and 1913–1916; his primary area of concentration in Turkistan was the network of desert routes and oases from Khotan to Lob Nor. The materials which Stein brought back have been deposited partly in the British Museum in London and partly in the Museum for Central Asian Antiquities in New Delhi. A considerable portion of his finds are reproduced in plates — one full volume of which accompanies each of his three detailed reports: *Ancient Khotan, Serindia,* and *Innermost Asia.* (These books also deal with Stein's explorations and excavations in some of the northern oases of the Tarim Basin as well as in Iran and western China.)

The four German "Turfan" Expeditions (so-called from the
goal of the first party) worked along the northern route from Maralbashi to Turfan in the years 1902-1903, 1904-1905, 1905-1907 and 1913-1914. Their collections were shipped back to Berlin, where the greater part of the wall paintings were destroyed by Allied bombing in the recent war. Excellent pictures, however, are available in the seven volumes of Le Coq’s *Die Buddhistiche Spätantike in Mittel Asien*; in Le Coq’s *Chosoch*, and in Grünwedel’s *Alt-Kutscha*. Grünwedel’s narrative reports on the first and third expeditions, *Bericht über archäologische Arbeiten* and *Alt-buddhistische Kultstätten*, are also illustrated lavishly with line drawings, plans, and sketches made on the spot by the author.

At first indifferent to these expeditions and their work, the Chinese Government later took note of the great packing cases of art treasures being shipped out of the country. Archaeological operations were thenceforward discouraged and officially hindered in every way. But already by the time of the first World War the known sites had been practically denuded. Easily available ruins had already suffered greatly from the local population who, as good Moslems, felt bound to destroy heathen idols and especially to deface representations of human beings. What the European excavators uncovered but did not remove has largely succumbed to the elements and to the later efforts of treasure seekers.

Important artistic discoveries were made at about a dozen spots. Starting at the southern edge of the Taldamakan Desert near Khotan—which was the capital of an ancient kingdom—we find the sand-covered ruins of a settlement at Dandan Oilik, and of a great stupa (dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) at Rawak. Farther east, near the place where the Niya River dies in the dunes, lie the indications of another town. A ruined Tibetan fort at Miran, in the neighborhood of Charklik, guards the ruins of a much earlier group of Buddhist shrines. On the northern rim of the desert atop spurs of the foothills of the Tien Shan range stand the temples at Tumshuk, close to Maralbashi, and the great temples at Subashi and Duldur-akhur above the Kucha oasis.

Also in the environs of Kucha, which is known to have been the center of a large and thriving principality, are the *Ming Oi* (literally “thousand houses”) of Kyzyl, Kumtura, and Kiris. Those cave temples are cut out of the solid rock of cliffsides where rivers coming down from the high mountains have cut steep ravines. At Shorchuk, between Korla and Kharashahr, stand the ruins of an ancient walled town with many temples and burial monuments; as at Kucha, the local people refer to the shrines as *Ming Oi*.

The Turfan Depression, with its twin oases of Turfan and Kharakhoja, is particularly rich in artistic remains. Two old towns could be traced here: the more ancient one was in utter ruins but Khocho (“Chotscho”), the capital of the Uighur Kings of Turfan from the ninth through the thirteenth century, had numerous temples, monasteries, and tombs which generously rewarded excavation. In the rocky ravines near Khocho are great clusters of shrines and monastic dwellings both cut out of the cliffs and built on the banks. Most notable are the temples and stupas of the Tuyok Valley and the Sangim Gorge, and the great monastery terrace of Bezeklik (also sometimes called *Ming Oi*).

One further site which should perhaps be included is Khotan itself. Although structural remains of the old capital are limited to doubtful mounds of debris, large quantities of interesting metal and pottery objects of undoubted antiquity have been dug up in the oasis.

With few exceptions the structures of which any traces remain are of a clearly religious character. They can usually be distinguished as shrines, temples, burial monuments, or various parts of monastic establishments. Everywhere but in the Turfan basin, the religion is exclusively Buddhist. A few of the buildings in the old city of Khocho display murals of Nestorian Christian and Manichaean inspiration, and manuscript remains in the area confirm the coexistence in Turfan of these three faiths for several centuries.

Apart from temples cut out of rock, construction is generally of sun-dried bricks, stamped clay, or some sort of mud plaster
strengthened by twigs and beams. As might be expected with such building materials, the architecture is generally simple and undistinguished. A few structures rise twenty or thirty feet; some boast true arches and some have several stories. In general the models followed are Indian and Iranian. The three basic elements of every shrine, whether rock-cut or free-standing, are a square or circular cell, a large statue or symbol of Buddha, and a passage permitting processions to go completely around the Buddha image.

In addition to the central Buddha figure the temples were often decorated lavishly with other sculptured Buddhas, Bodhisattvas (beings destined to attain Buddhahood) goddesses, Lopakalas (guardians of the directions), and so forth. The statues ranged in dimension from slightly over life-size figures in almost full relief to small sitting Buddhas surrounded by aureoles which were used as decorative elements together with floral and leaf motifs. Commonly the figures were made of stucco or mud strengthened with reeds or straw at the core.

They appear to have been cast in molds, often with separate forms for face, hair, ears, arms, legs and other parts; then joined together and attached to the wall. Variations could be introduced in the facial expression in the finishing-off process before the statue was completely dry. Afterwards it was coated with a thin layer of clay or plaster, painted with water colors, and gilded with gold leaf. Although in many cases the pigments have been washed away or destroyed, all figures seem to have been originally touched up in this way. In some temples whole walls were covered with a succession of such statues but sculptural representations of scenes comprising more than one figure are rare.

Even more striking than the statues are the mural paintings. Almost every inner wall and ceiling is completely covered with frescoes. Large dramatic compositions depicting scenes in the life story of the Buddha or the various future Buddhas are framed in decorative bands and flanked, perhaps, by row upon row of seated Buddhas. Overhead vaults are filled in with stylized moun-

tain landscapes made up of many small segments each of which illustrates a Buddhist legend. Winged Gandharvas (a kind of angel) and celestial musicians may be fitted into triangular spaces above eye level so as to give the impression of floating above the worshiper. Animals real and fabulous, flowers, trees, palaces, war equipment, and pleasures of the hunt are among the many subjects included in the relations of the various myths or the surrounding ornaments. Well-known divinities of classical Greece as well as many-armed Indian gods are to be found adopted into the Buddhist pantheon. Some frescoes consist of assemblages of these divinities. Others depict Buddhist heavens and hells. A frequent sight is that of Buddha preaching to a group of monks. Monks are also pictured together with benefactors — noblemen through whose contributions the holy work of temple decoration has been financed.

The donors are typically represented in the clothing of the locality and the age, as contrasted with the monks and divine figures whose costume is prescribed by the canons of Buddhist art. Even more interesting are the facial and other physical characteristics of these patrons. Here we have an astounding variety of human types — European and Levantine as well as eastern Asiatic. The evidences would point to a succession of alien conquests with each new set of rulers inscribing themselves as patrons of the existing Buddhist monasteries. Since, however, the warriors generally came from peoples of lower material and artistic level, their tastes did not greatly or immediately affect the content and style of the monastic art. The paintings appear to have been made either by monks themselves or by artists working under rather close religious supervision.

All frescoes are in tempera or water color applied directly to the smoothed and plastered wall while the surface was still wet. In each group of shrines the palette is limited to a modest number of colors and tones. The few colors used are employed with considerable effect. Gold leaf is occasionally added. In some instances the drawing appears to have been by means of tracings
or stencils; more typically the murals were sketched in with a free hand. A distinctive feature is the emphasis on outlines, which are almost invariably darkened and slightly thickened.

In addition to these sculptures and frescoes, there were found several examples of smaller arts. Particularly noteworthy are painted wooden panels which were deposited at the feet of Buddha statues as votive offerings. Some paintings on paper and on fabric appear to have been designed for the same purpose, or for temple banners. The illustrated Manichaean manuscript fragments found in Khocho are amazingly similar to the early medieval Christian book art.

Among the wooden items are small reliquary caskets and statuettes, as well as carved ceiling beams, brackets, and other structural elements.

Woven or embroidered textiles seem to have been in large part imported into Central Asia from China, Persia, and other areas. Although Khotan was reputedly famous for its rugs, it is impossible to prove that any particular rug fragments are of Khotanese manufacture.

Among the various ruins the earliest period is represented by the secular dwellings at the Niya site, and by the stupas of Miran. Amid the shifting sands and scrub-covered cones in the desert north of the present village of Niya, Sir Aurel Stein was able to trace remains of a whole community. In addition to the ever-present stupa there were ancient houses, courtyards, cattlesheds, arbors, orchards, trellises, irrigation canals, and even a footbridge over the old river bed. Broken wooden posts rising above the gaunt earth proved to be the original supports of wattle and plaster walls of old residences.

Some houses of substantial size suggested that the occupants were men of position. From the drift-sand filling the floors of the rooms Stein was able to salvage fairly well-preserved wooden beams and brackets fallen from the ceilings, and fragments of furniture such as chair legs. These were carved with animals, rosettes, pots of leaves and other decorative motifs particularly characteristic of the Gandhara school of sculpture which flourished in the area of India's northwestern frontier in the first and second centuries after Christ. This art is often described as "late classical," or referred to as Graeco-Buddhist, since its content was Buddhist while the style was strongly affected by the Greek art of the Hellenistic (post Alexandrian) kingdoms of western Asia.

Stein also uncovered at Niya a large central hall with stuccoed walls still standing several feet high. These were decorated in tempera with a colorful design of floral scrolls and festoons. Coins and dated documents on wooden tablets indicated that the settlement was abandoned near the end of the third century A.D.

In the time of its prosperity Niya seems to have been included in the territory not of ancient Khotan but of the kingdom of Kroraina which stretched to the shores of the Lob lake. The rulers of Kroraina were probably most closely allied in culture and language with the Kushan kings of Gandhara and northern India; but in the Tarim Basin they came under Chinese hegemony. Ruins of a town called "Lou-lan" (the Chinese transliteration of Kroraina) were discovered by Sven Hedin near the edge of the old lake bed; and Aurel Stein found in the homes and shrines of Lou-lan carved woodwork of the same types as at Niya.

Further remains of the Krorain realm are the third- and early fourth-century temples at Miran, where the earliest of the Central Asian wall paintings were found. The frescoes originally adorned the interior walls of two small domed shrines. Both were square structures on the outside and circular within, with a small stupa in the center. In each the passage around the stupa was decorated with a band of painted busts: youthful winged male angels in one shrine, garland-bearing lads interspersed with a great variety of cosmopolitan-looking men and women in the other. The upper wall and dome showed more conventional religious scenes such as Buddha preaching to a group of monks, and Buddhist legends.

In coloring, painting technique, and total effect, these Miran murals resemble amazingly the Hellenistic frescoes of approximately the same period which have been discovered at Fayum in Egypt and Dura-Europos in Syria. An inscription on the thigh
of a white elephant in one of the Miran pictures records the name of the painter as "Tita," which Sir Aurel Stein takes to be a rendering of the Roman name Titus. Stein fancies that the artist was a "Roman Eurasian" who had followed his calling eastward along the highroad to China. A larger temple also at Miran displayed along its base a series of statues of seated Buddhas about double natural size. The stylized hair curls, elongated ears, and elaborate drapery of these figures once again suggested that they followed the Gandhara models.

Stein also discovered a vast gallery of statues of a similar type lining both the inner and outer faces of a wall enclosing the court of a great stupa at the desert site of Rawak, not far from Khotan. Buddhas and other sacred figures of varying dimensions were ranged side by side, with little apparent order. While most of these figures were draped in classical flowing garments, the Dvarpalas (Guardians of the Gates) wore a secular costume consisting of long under- and overcoats, trousers, and boots. No manuscripts or coins, however, could be found to give definite clues to the age of the ruin.

Far superior to the Miran and Rawak sculptures and much closer in feeling to the art of the ancient Hellenistic world are the statuettes of wood and clay and the broken-off heads of statues found at Tumshuk, by Pelliot and Le Coq. Just north of the oasis town of Maralbashi, the Tumshuk ruins are not far from Kashgar and Yarkand, where routes through the high Pamirs lead into the Tarim Basin from the west. Three flat-topped cliffs rising above the marshy plain bear the remains of temple clusters of various dates. The earliest shrines appear to have been destroyed by fire before the beginning of the fifth century. It was in these that the Gandhara-style pieces were found. A few surviving fresco fragments include a frieze of kneeling monks and a scene of Buddha preaching to armed and regally garbed followers.

The great mass of painting and sculpture illustrating the middle period in Central Asian art—from the fifth century to the eighth century A.D.—comes from the neighborhood of Kucha.
death of Buddha. Several depictions of the burning of Buddha’s corpse are notable for the intensity of sorrow communicated by the mourners.

Although the compositions are intricate and the available space tightly packed with figures and background designs, the main contours stand out clearly. Color schemes are based on muted brown, flesh, and rust tones, accented with bright blue and green.

The donors portrayed in the Kyzyl caves (usually on the wall near the entrance) are at first glance astonishingly like knights and ladies of medieval Europe. Tall, fair-skinned, and red-haired, they wear dresses and armor of the style prevailing in Persia under the Sassanian Dynasty from the third through the seventh centuries. The cloaks and gowns appear to be of fine brocade or richly embroidered material. An unusual hair arrangement in which the top locks are cut to a length of about four inches and allowed to fall loose on either side of a center part is characteristic of both men and women. Frequently a stylized flower, perhaps a development of the classical cornucopia carried by certain figures in the Gandhara sculptures, is held in the hand.

Both the style of the paintings and the decorative motifs employed give evidence of a blending of Indian, Persian and late Hellenistic influences. Many resemblances can be pointed out between these Kyzyl murals and the famed wall paintings of the Ajanta cave temples in Central India, which were executed at roughly the same time. Only rarely, however, do the figures in the Kyzyl pantomimes approach the sinuous grace and delicacy of the best work at Ajanta. Perhaps the closest comparison, outside of the Tarim Basin, is with the frescoes in the caves surrounding the colossal Buddha in the valley of Bamian, near Kabul, in Afghanistan. Chemical analysis has indicated that identical pigments were used. This tie between Kucha and Bamian, which had been a Buddhist center since about 100 A.D., suggests one path along which Buddhist art progressed into Central Asia.

At Kumtura, about nine miles east of Kyzyl along the Muzart River, is another group of cave temples. As at Kyzyl the various temples could be placed approximately as belonging to the fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth centuries. Similar architectural styles were followed and similar medieval-looking benefactors were depicted. In subject matter and treatment the paintings are clearly related, but in some of the Kumtura caves is an unmistakable Chinese element, nowhere glimpsed at Kyzyl. The eyes of the Buddhas are just slightly tilted, the landscapes are more freely drawn, and typical Tang Dynasty cloud forms appear overhead.

Sculptural remains brought from Kyzyll and Kumtura consist mainly of severed heads of goddesses, Bodhisattvas, Brahmans and other personages. The statues were sometimes grouped on balconies, sometimes arranged in separate niches along the walls. The heritage of the Graeco-Buddhist traditions of Gandhara is amply demonstrated in facial features, hair treatment, head ornaments, and, where full figures are shown, in the drapery.

Contemporary with the Kyzyl and Kumtura caves but quite different in style are the group of shrines belonging to an old monastery at Dandan Oilik (in the words of local treasure seekers, “the place of houses with ivory”) in the desert near Khotan. Each shrine originally consisted of a square inner cell enclosing a large Buddha statue on a pedestal. This cell was surrounded by a square perambulatory. Both inner and outer walls were decorated with paintings — for the most part of large Buddhas or saints in a checkerboard pattern. On the whole these figures are stiff and rather indifferently drawn. A few representations of legendary scenes include one particularly graceful water nymph of decidedly Indian inspiration. The donors, pictured as tiny figures kneeling at the feet of the large Buddhas, are markedly Chinese or Mongol in appearance.

Decorative stucco reliefs of small Buddhas, saints, and flying Gandharvas, and remains of larger statues, followed the Graeco-Buddhist pattern but achieved no particular distinction. Perhaps the most interesting art finds of the Dandan Oilik site are the considerable number of rectangular wooden panels each about a foot long. They were apparently intended as gifts to the shrine from secular patrons. On these tablets appear sure-handed and
spirited sketches of Buddhist divinities and legends, some in full color. A particularly attractive drawing shows Rustan, the great Persian hero, as a handsome four-armed Bodhisattva.

Dandan Oilik, by all indications, was abandoned gradually, because of increasing difficulty of irrigation, around the end of the eighth century.

The art of the ancient city at Shorchuk near the Kharashahr oasis reaches into the third and final stage of the Buddhist culture of the Tarim Basin. On the direct route eastward from Kucha to Turfan, Kharashahr was never so important a political power or Buddhist center as its neighbors. Nonetheless great numbers of temples and shrines were found both in the old town and on the ridges of the mountains at its side; there were also a few cave temples cut out of the hills. Most of the shrines appear to have been destroyed by fire in the tenth century, but to have existed for several hundred years before that. The ruins were particularly rich in statuary, many pieces retaining the original coat of bright paints. As well as the familiar Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and goddesses in more or less pure Hellenistic style, there were found deities of distinctly oriental appearance and some remarkably realistic horses and camels. Many examples were provided of the variety of heads which could be produced by skillful use of a limited number of molds.

The Shorchuk wall paintings ascribed to the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries demonstrated even more clearly than the sculpture the intermingling of eastern and western peoples and cultures. The Buddhas, monks and Gandharvas of these frescoes have consistently Far Eastern features, but each monk carries between his prayer-joined palms a long-stemmed flower reminiscent of those held by the donors of Kyzyl. The benefactresses at Shorchuk are slant-eyed, long-nosed, and rather stocky women who can be identified with considerable confidence as belonging to one of the tribes of Western Turks which held sway over Kharashahr for some centuries. The use of deep colors and the presence of stylistic details such as very cursive outlines show strong Chinese influences.

The latest phase of Central Asian art is most amply illustrated in the Turfan region. The oases of Turfan and Kara Khoja, strategically placed for intercourse both with China to the east and the grazing lands of Jungaria to the north, served as the seats of more or less powerful kingdoms from before the beginning of the present era. The various archaeological explorations found not only two old capitals, Yar Kho ("the city on the ravine") and Khocho (Kao ch'iang in Chinese; also Idikutshahri and Dakianus) but a number of semi-isolated monastic establishments in the environs. Pieces of sculpture, paintings on paper and silk and various other small objects of art were purchased from local treasure seekers as well as directly excavated. In the circumstances, the dating of many finds is only conjectural. Several markedly Hellenistic heads fall in this category.

Certain buildings within the old city of Khocho and a few of the sites at Toyuk, Chikkan Kol, and Bezeklik have been clearly shown to belong to the sixth and seventh century. The extant wall paintings in these ruins are on the whole similar to those of the Kucha and Kharashahr oases. In some of these temples, painted medallions on the ceilings substitute for the earlier carved-out imitations of the lantern roof.

From the middle of the eighth century Turfan came under the rule of the Uighur Turks. Before coming to Turfan the ruling Uighur Khans had been converted to Manichaeism, a religion of Persian origin based on the opposition of Light (signifying Good) and Darkness (symbolizing Evil). In Turfan the Uighurs appear to have patronized Buddhism as well as Manichaeism and seem to have permitted Syrian or Nestorian Christians to follow their own faith. A mural which seems to be Christian in character was found covered up by an inner wall in a small temple outside the city walls of Khocho. A priest, in vestments which are clearly neither Buddhist nor Manichaean, holds incense in one hand, a vessel of holy water in the other. He appears to be blessing three persons of smaller stature who approach him, each carrying a long-stemmed leafy branch. The worshipers have the slant eyes of the Orient but the priest appears Byzantine.
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A fine Manichaean wall painting showing a priest of Persian features, possibly Mani himself, dressed in full canonicals and followed by several ranks of white-gowned and tall-bonneted electi (devotees under special vows of purity and abstinence), was similarly discovered behind a single layer of bricks. Presumably temples were cleared in this way for other types of worship. Illuminated pages of Manichaean religious texts and Manichaean temple banners, also found in various places in and near Khocho, show the disciples in the same costumes. Both men and women (electi and electae) are pictured, sometimes with hands clasped at the bosom and hidden muff-like in the robe, sometimes carrying or writing in books. In the book roll fragments and pages, the pictures and text, in a special Manichaean script, are combined to produce a total effect very similar to the early Christian codices of medieval Europe. Bright clear colors are used and the designs are kept fairly simple. Although unmistakably related to the general development of Central Asian art, the Manichaean finds actually constitute a separate and exotic growth with roots deep in third-century Sassanian Persia from which Mani himself sprang.

Buddhist art in Uighur times is best exemplified by the wall paintings of the vast majority of the temples at Bezeklik (“the place where there are decorations”) near the village of Murtuk. Here a great phalanx of free-standing structures and rock-cut caves, some with structural ante chambers, occupied a protected ledge between the river and the mountains. Hundreds of separate temples were still preserved in various stages of disrepair at the beginning of the present century.

A splendidly preserved set of murals was discovered in the temple which Le Coq numbered 9. Separate panels depicted groups of Indian monks in yellow with their individual names supplied in an Indian script, and Far Eastern monks in violet with both Chinese and Uighur names. All carried single long-stemmed flowers. The main pattern of decoration consisted in a series of Pranidhi or prayer scenes. Each one shows a large standing Buddha elaborately garbed and bejeweled and surrounded by an elongated aureole. From five to ten figures are disposed about the Buddha in vertical columns on either side. Usually the two at the base kneel and present gifts such as food, lamps, or trays of flowers. A small Chinese house in a compound frequently is found in a top corner. Some of the worshipers are highly individualized and would seem to be portraits of particular monks or in one case of secular persons who are perhaps merchants. Other monks, however, and characters identifiable as Brahmans, spear-bearers, goddesses, youthful Bodhisattvas, and so forth appear in highly schematized fashion. The facial features of the Buddhas and the stylized attendant personages approximate a single type with narrow eyes, long noses, heavy jowls, and often a hairline mustache. The monks who seem to be drawn from life, however, exhibit much more variety. Several have red hair with blue or green eyes; some show red or gray stubble on the shaven pate, cheeks, and chin. Story elements are reduced to an almost unnoticeable minimum—a tiny raft underneath the feet of the Buddha, for instance, indicates that a seagoing legend is involved. Detail, in fact, rather than composition differentiates one Pranidhi scene from another. Profusion of ornament, sureness of line, and careful symmetry all contribute to an effect of great elegance and sophistication.

Occasionally tiny figures of donors are tucked in near the feet of the Buddha in the Pranidhi scenes. Full-scale pictures of the Uighur benefactors adorn small walls near the entrance of the inner temple. Like portraits of Uighur nobles in other shrines they show strong-visaged men with small mustaches and waist-length braids of black hair. They wear tall headdresses and floor-length gowns of embroidered material. The women have an elaborate puffed coiffure topped by a sort of crown. Once again each benefactor holds a blossoming stalk. Considerable care has been taken to present these donors as individuals and the names of many are inscribed on vertical tablets near the heads.

In addition to Pranidhi scenes and portraits of donors, the Bezeklik murals and the other wall paintings in the Khocho area dating from the Uighur period (ninth through twelfth century...
Appendices

A.D.) cover a wide array of subjects associated with the Mahayana sect of Buddhism. There are representations of the particular heavens associated with various deities, and elaborate depictions of the tortures of hell. Chinese motifs appear in every context: deities sit in the windows of Chinese-style houses; children with Chinese-style pigtails sport on balconies. Particularly frightful demons with flowing hair, popping eyes and several arms are also common.

The end of Buddhist art in Turfan appears to have come with the invasion of Jenghis Khan and the period of Mongol wars. The Uighur kings, who held on to the area a short while longer by submitting to Mongol suzerainty, turned with the Mongols to Islam. But great numbers of the people remained Buddhists right up to the fifteenth century. Many of the temples at such places as Bezeklik and the Sangim Gorge probably continued in use as places of worship and pilgrimage to that time.

Between the early murals of Miran and the latest work in the Turfan area lie almost a thousand years. Throughout this millennium a characteristic form of temple art flourished in the oasis kingdoms and reached occasional heights of outstanding excellence. This remarkable stream of creative production brings into question previous references to the area as no more than a highway connecting the ancient Eastern and Western Worlds, and to its civilization as the culture of the Silk Road. Considering the relatively small dimensions of international trade in ancient times, it would seem extremely unlikely that several dozen or even several hundred camel caravans a year could have supplied the economic foundations for such extensive artistic and religious enterprise. On the other hand the region abounds in evidences of much wider areas of cultivation supporting a much larger population in former periods than today. This agricultural prosperity, based on the known richness of the soil when properly irrigated, would go much further than the commerce of the silk route to explain not only why the Tarim Basin could afford so many monasteries and temples, but why it attracted a continuous stream of invaders.

Ancient Art and Modern Archaeology

Western scholars have generally approached Sinkiang as a peripheral area, a sort of transmission belt through which classical Greek forms, motifs, and techniques were passed on to China and Japan. Later recognition was granted to Persian and Indian influences, and even traces of contact with Byzantium. Attraction has also been devoted to the westward expansion of elements of Chinese civilization. The accumulated archaeological evidence, however, suggests the need for revision of these older attitudes. At first (as at Niya and Miran), a mere outpost of the Hellenistic world of western Asia, the Tarim Basin later developed a unique synthesis of alien and indigenous cultural elements. The Kyzy tableaux and mountain landscapes, the Rustam from Dandan Oilik, the goddesses and friars of Shorchuk, the Uighur nobles of Bezeklik — to cite only a few examples — could have been created nowhere else in the world. On grounds of the distinctive character and the intrinsic value of its productions, Buddhist Central Asia clearly ranks as an art center of international importance.

ALICE THORNER
Appendix II Literature and Oral Art of the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz

There is very little written literature in the Uighur language and almost all that remains comes from periods before the Mongol conquest. The earliest known documents relate to the period of the first Uighur campaign in Jungaria and are purely religious. Most of them are undated fragments and their approximate sequence can be deduced only from the historical sources which give some — though quite contradictory — information as to the religious development of the Uighurs after they moved south. It is known that after they appeared on the territory of present-day Sinkiang, in the eighth century, they were converted to Manichaeism by Soghdian missionaries.

That Manichaeism was widespread among the early Uighurs in Sinkiang is confirmed by a number of religious documents, written in Uighur, propounding the Manichaean dogma and prayers.

The main Uighur Manichaean document is the Khuastuanit, a Manichaean prayer of penitence which according to Radlov surpasses in linguistic purity almost all other early Turkic documents. The Khuastuanit is of great importance not only as an early document of the Uighur language, but also through its content, which is an aid to the understanding of Manichaeism. Since the prayer contains not only the enumeration of the sins of the penitent but also the list of the dogmas of Manes against which he has sinned, it can serve today as a kind of catechism of this Western religion as seen by the Turks.

An important characteristic of these Manichaean documents is that they are written in a new script, hitherto unknown to the Turks, and radically different from that of the Orkhon inscriptions. This script was taken over by the Uighurs with the adoption of Manichaeism. It was originally a Western (Semitic) script, and subsequently played a considerable role in the cultural history of Asia, since it was adopted later by the Mongols, after their conquest of the Uighurs. With the Mongols it spread again to the West and was later adopted by the Manchus, with some modifications. It became known as the “Uighur” script and was used by the Uighurs until they became Moslems, when it was displaced by the Arabic script.

In the eleventh century two other cultural streams made themselves felt among the Uighurs, who by then were settled in the Tarim Basin. One, Nestorian Christianity, was from a Western source, as was Manichaeism, and the other, Buddhism, from a Southern source. According to the eleventh century work on the Turkic languages by Mahmud Al Kashgari, the bulk of the Uighurs at that time still represented a dam against the further spread of Islam, although some Islamic influence was already visible. The existence of Christianity among the Uighurs is testified to by a number of fragmentary texts, such as the “Adoration of the Magi.”

The prevalence of Buddhism is indicated by a number of fragments containing philosophical treatises dealing with Buddhist theology and fragments from the literature of the Lives of Bud-


Ibid., p. 132.

Ibid., p. 36.


The religious literature is not original but is composed of translations from foreign sources.

In contrast to these religious documents almost the only remaining secular work is the *Kudatku Bilik*, written toward the end of the eleventh century by a consciously secular literary man, Yussuf from Balasagun, a chancellor (hijib) at the court of Boghra Khan. The name of the book signifies "happiness bringing knowledge" or "the knowledge befitting a ruler" (kut meaning happiness, but frequently used also in *Kudatku Bilik* in the meaning of "majesty"). The work itself is purely didactic in character, concerned with the duties of a ruler, and clad in the form of the instructions given by the Wazir Öktülmish to his son who is about to enter the service of a Khan. Such works were extremely popular during this period in the Orient, as they were in the Middle Ages in the West. But *Kudatku Bilik* differs from Western didactic works, which usually abounded in historical and legendary material. Such historical material is completely absent in *Kudatku Bilik*, which is purely allegorical. The work is concerned with the duties of the ruler toward the ruled, the qualifications for the various classes of officials and an evaluation of a number of moral precepts. Though it is obviously written under the influence of Mohammedanism, it is not a glorification of Islam and the religious content appears superficial and external. The only religious content is in the introduction, which contains the traditional formulae of glorification of God and the Prophet, and in a few pious exclamations in the body of the text.

*Kudatku Bilik* provides much interesting data about the social and political life of the Uighurs at the end of the eleventh century. From it we learn that Uighur society of Kashgar was divided into three components: the simple people, the *kara am* (compare the Kazakh *kara suyek*); the scientists (*tapukci*), and the government officials. To the *kara am* belonged: merchants (*satikci*), peasants (*taranchi*), and the cattle breeders (*igdishchi*). To the

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Another kind of people are the artisans, 
They create art with their hands, so as to earn their living.
They are all indispensable to you,
Cultivate them, they will bring you advantage, O Great One,

From them come all the works of the earth,
How many amazing things they make.
With them you must associate and you must treat them well.
Make them happy and live yourself in happiness.
If they work for you, — give them gifts without fail,
Give them food and drink. Give them abundant food.10

As to the merchants, the ruler is advised to

Deal with them, hold open your gates for them.
Treat them well
so that your good name will spread.
It is these who will carry your name through the world,
who will spread your reputation, good or bad. . .
If you want to be sure to become famous,
let the merchant have just pay for his goods.
If you want to create a good name for yourself, O Lord,
treat well the caravan people.13

Of striking interest is the rational philosophy which permeates
the whole work. Knowledge and science are not only highly
praised and recommended to the ruler as his most trusted guides,
but are considered more important than princely glory and riches.
The following section, entitled “Man’s honor derives only from
knowledge and understanding,” may serve as an example of the
high regard for learning expressed in Kudatku Bilik:

He created fire, wind, water, and earth,
And to Man He gave virtue, knowledge and intellect. . .

Consider knowledge as high, intellect as great
With those two things He has elevated His slave. . .

10 Abdykalykov, Pankratova, op. cit., p. 72.
literary documents. From then on, the bulk of Uighur cultural production was limited to oral art, as was that of the nomadic Turks of Inner Asia. Since the Uighurs are the only major Turkic people who did not come in direct contact with the Russians (with the exception of the Taranchi in the Ili Valley), Uighur oral art has not been recorded to the same extent by Russian linguists and ethnographers as has the oral art of the other Inner Asian Turks, and we are limited to a few scattered texts of the Tarim Basin Uighurs—the texts of Le Coq, Grenard, Jarring and Katnov-Menges. Most Russian texts have been taken down from the IIi Basin Uighurs—the texts of Le Coq, Grenard, Jarring and Katnov-Menges. Most Russian texts have been taken down from the Ili Taranchi (the texts of Radlov, Pantusov and Malov) but, since the Taranchi were separated from the Uighurs only in the eighteenth century, they share a common heritage of folklore. Since their settlement in the Ili Valley, however, a new and additional body of oral art has grown among the Taranchi, dealing primarily with their fate as exiles and their oppression by the Chinese.

The following genres exist in Uighur oral art: (1) proverbs, (2) popular tales, (3) fairy tales and legends, (4) songs, and (5) historical tales about the Ili Valley (Taranchi tales).

Proverbs give us not only an indication of Uighur customs and ethics, but also reveal strong influences of other cultures, particularly the cultures of the neighboring nomadic Turks and of Iran and India. Iranian influence is strongest and is evidenced in a proverb such as: “Forty people ate forty sheep in one day” (said about careless housekeepers), which is almost literally the same as an Afghan proverb. Other proverbs clearly hark back to Indian tales of the Panchatantra and the Jatakam. So the proverb “Waiting for the testes of the male goat, the wolf died of hunger,” goes back to the sixth tale of Part 2 of the Panchatantra, which tells of the greedy jackal Pralobhaka (“the greedy one”) who waited for fifteen years for the testes of the bull to fall off and in his greed forgot to catch...

24 Thorburn, Banna or Our Afghan Frontier, London, 1876, 250, No. 29, quoted by Le Coq, op. cit., 2.
25 Le Coq, op. cit., 27, No. 133.

Another series of proverbs which develop the moral that man often provokes his own downfall takes us back to the Indian story cycle Jatakam. One of the Jatakam tales tells of the sparrow who, trying to stop two goats from fighting, flies between them and is crushed. We have only to compare this with the Uighur proverb, “Two stallions are fighting and a fly is squashed,” to see the parallel. The Uighur proverb, “When the mouse shall die, it scratches the testes of the cat,” also has its counterpart in the Jatakam series, such as the tale about the goat which is about to be saved from slaughter because there is no knife, whereupon the goat digs up a knife accidentally from the ground and is squashed with it. This story also occurs in a Greek tale and is echoed in an Arab proverb “Don’t be like the sheep which perished by digging with its hoofs.” There is some controversy as to the way this story came to Sinkiang and became an Uighur proverb. Frauenk claims that its origin was Greece, whence it traveled to the Arabs and with Arab merchants to Sinkiang and India. R. Pischel, however, avers that the fact that it occurred in the Jatakam proves its Indian origin.

Many of the Uighur tales belong to general Turkic and Iranian Inner Asian story cycles and are the offspring of Inner Asian written folk tales. Such is the story of Hamra, which roughly follows the theme of the popular Inner Asian written tale by the same name about the love of two supernatural beings for a young man. Others again are retold versions of romances of the famous fifteenth-century Uzbek poet, Ali-sher Newai. Such are the tales...
Appendices

of Shirin and Saipul Mueluek.29 These are stories full of fantasy and the supernatural in which the lyrical romanticism of Iran is clearly visible. Despite their strong demoniacal elements, they are definitely Mohammedan in content.

The Uighur fairy tales show some relics of what once must have been an epic tradition. It is a common characteristic of Inner Asian culture that the epic character of the folklore suffers with the settling of the once nomadic tribes and the subsequent influence of sedentary, non-Turkic cultures, particularly of Islam with its taboos against the shamanistic traditions which were originally so important a part of these nomadic cultures.

A typical Uighur fairy tale with epic elements is that of Shim Tömür batyr30 (hero) and the fight of this hero with the seven-headed monster, Yalmiingish. The theme of this tale reminds us of the typical heroic epos as we find it still today among the nomadic Inner Asian Turks, with its stress on the strength and heroism of the individual batyr who can singlehandedly defeat a whole army and the most powerful monsters. The form also has strong elements of the epic tradition, in the constant repetition of key formulae (which serve as convenient pauses for the improviser before each episode), and in the typical slow action of the story. Here we have no longer an epic poem, but a prose tale. In all these epic fairy tales, however, we still have the remnants of a former poetic epos in the frequent versified soliloquies and key phrases which go through all the stories.

Many of the simple, nonepic legends and fairy tales appear to be borrowed, often from the Indian story cycles such as the Bharatakadvatrimsika. Such is the tale of the peasant31 who is told by a passer-by that after his donkey has given certain signs, such as breaking wind, he will die. After the donkey breaks wind the peasant really believes he is dead. This tale has become part of a general Eastern story cycle and occurs in an almost identical version even in the Russian fairy tales.

The Uighurs do not seem to possess the same propensity for song as the nomadic Turks, where the song literally lives with the people and describes every aspect of their lives. Uighur songs are considerably more individualistic than those of the nomads. They show none of the zest and strength of the nomadic songs and with a few exceptions are rather lyrics on personal themes. The majority of the songs which have been collected are love songs, primarily concerned with rejected love. They are highly erotic, ornamental, pictorial and sometimes almost dreamlike and show markedly the influence of Iranian lyrics, as in the following example:

On whatever path you may be walking
There I shall walk too.
If you are a flower blossom
I shall be its leaf.
The peach has blossomed, oh my love
On your body.
I have become a bad one,
Lying on your bosom, oh my love.
How beautifully you danced
In circling movements
Among our friends
Appearing in beauty.
Do you want to leave?
Who insulted you that you wish to go away?
You have left my body,
Whither will you bring my soul?
You cannot know, my love
The pain which is inside me.
I have burned myself on the flame of love.
You could not stand it if it were you who was burned.
The waters of Kara Hodzha
Flow from shaded gardens,
The dark-browed, beautiful young woman
Lights the flames of love in the heart.
My love, did you come to see me?
Or to burn me with the flames of love?
Did you come, oh my love, to revive
The fire which first you enflamed
And then extinguished...?

Side by side with these personal songs, so strongly influenced by the Iranian poetic tradition, there is a small group of songs which are not personal in character, but are concerned with the past of the Uighur people. These are the songs which the Uighurs call kuchak or kuchuk and which Grenard defines as ballads, which are in essence "very short epics." These songs are probably the closest approach of Uighur art to an epic tradition. In form at least they contain many epic stylistic devices, such as frequent repetition of key phrases and strongly rhythmic verse. It is only the form of these songs, however, which is reminiscent of the epos. Their content, as we shall see later, is usually not epic in character.

The kuchuk is not as alive among the Uighurs as the epic song is among the nomads. Grenard remarks on the difficulties he had in recording these songs because of the scarcity of people who knew them. Of the few people he found who were able to recall some of the kuchuk, only a few were able to recite more than part of the song. This is in strong contrast to the nomadic cultures, where the epic tradition is still so strong that almost everybody can recite at least parts of an epic poem.

Most of the kuchuk which were recorded by Grenard tell of the Yakub Beg revolt, which is depicted as a purely religious war, the sole aim of which was to "raise the banner of Islam" against the Chinese infidels. There is nothing epic in the content of these songs. There are no descriptions of the brave, conquering hero who symbolizes the feeling of strength of the tribe, which we find in the epics of the nomads. On the contrary, here the hero does not conquer, but suffers a martyr's fate, as a result of his faith and his participation in the revolt. It is interesting to note that there

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If you come to the house of flowers,
You will see only wilted flowers...
When will Mahmud Khan return to his own town of Artysh?
Mahmud Khan is walking on the summit of the mountain of Komul,
A gun in his hands and a tear in his dark eyes...
Mahmud Khan's children have become orphans.
Have you no more strength, Mahmud Khan?
Mahmud Khan has left Kashgar.
If he were still there, justice would be dealt out equitably
And the prayers of the orphans and of the travelers could be heard...

There are many more Taranchi texts than texts of the Uighurs proper, because of the great interest of the Russians in folklore. Taranchi oral art seems to be identical with that of the Uighurs, with one major addition — the oral art which has sprung up since the settling of the Taranchis in the Ili Valley. This "newer" folk-
lore is concerned with the tragic fate of a people driven from their homeland and forcefully settled in a foreign region. These Taranchi songs and tales are full of bitter complaints about oppression by the Chinese, about forced labor and about the constant struggle of the Taranchis for their rights against the Chinese, and are interesting because, unlike most Uighur folklore, they are not concerned with personal, private matters and grief, but with the social grief and oppression of a whole people.

A great tyrant by the name of Gong became Chiang Chun in the Ii Mountains.
He said: We must take a tax from the rich Taranchi . . .
[But] the imposition of taxes exceeded all measures of oppression.
Demanding taxes, they hit and beat the Taranchi and bound their hands.
The Chiang Chun lost all his sense. The cup overflowed and poured over.
Not finding means to pay the heavy taxes, the people had to sell their beloved children.
They took camels and horses from the rich and bread from the poor. 37
These mountains, high mountains, impede the road of the poor.
If a poor man dies, who will cry over him? Only a poor man will cry over a poor man.
The tears of the resettled people have not dried yet on the Yamatu Ford and on the road to Tokuztara. 38

Taranchi prose tales frequently exhibit the same kind of subject matter. A typical tale is the story of Nozugum. 39 This tale, which has a strong epic character, tells of the defeat of the Muslim rising against the Chinese in Kashgar. The Chinese massacre the men and send the women to Ili as wives for the Kalmuks. The

Although religious ideas and religious leaders have played an important part in Uighur society, it is possible to exaggerate their importance. A case in point is the common assertion by Western writers, who base themselves mainly on Uighur informants, that the great uprisings in the second half of the nineteenth century were initiated by representatives of the Moslem clergy. Unpublished documents by Uighur eyewitnesses of the uprisings indicate, however, that they began among the peasantry and the poor of the cities. 40 Representatives of the Moslem aristocracy joined the movement later and made themselves the leaders.

The chief cultural heritage of the Kazakhs is in their folklore and music; the two combine in their epic poetry. In addition there is a body of literature known as the "book songs," predominantly religious in character, which were written for the propagation of Islam.

Unlike the literature and oral art of the Uighurs, Kazakh folk art is primarily social, concerned with the collective problems of

* During such risings, and especially in the period of turmoil under Yakub Beg, many people fled into Russian territory. Both the Tsarist officials and interested scholars took down a great many "depositions" or personal narratives of these refugees. The University of Kazan, which because it was in the heart of the Russian Tatar region was an important center of Turbic studies, became the great repository of such documents; many of which, however, were not carefully studied until after the Bolshevik Revolution.
clans and tribes, or of the Kazakh nation. Through the efforts of Russian ethnographers, a vast number of ancient legends, songs, and epics have been preserved which are the property not only of the wandering bards but of the whole nation, parts of them being known to every nomad. Many of the epics are not purely national in character, but are handed from people to people. Thus there are many epics which are equally famous among the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz, or the Kazakhs and the Oirat.

The Kazakhs are an extremely musical people and the song and the epos which are sung by wandering improvising singers to the accompaniment of a primitive stringed instrument, the dombra, represent the greater part of their folklore heritage. Every phase of life is recorded in songs: birth, marriage, battle, joy, unhappiness, death. The nineteenth century Kazakh writer and educator Abai Kunanbaev characterized the importance of the song in the life of the Kazakh nation in a poem in which he said:

The song will open the door to the world for you
The song will open the door of death for you.
Listen to it, Kazakh, follow its wisdom.
The song travels with you all your life.42

Songs are not only sung and spread by the wandering professional bards, but are part of the daily life of the people. A popular part of a Kazakh celebration is the singing competition between two individuals. In such duels, both the words and music are entirely improvised and the winner is the one who can improvise the longest.

Of particular interest are the prescribed songs, sung on occasions such as weddings and funerals, which provide a striking insight into the cultural and social life of the people. These, in contrast to the other songs of the Kazakhs, have fixed texts and music. Thus the traditional wedding song (Zhar-Zhar) clearly reflects the role of the woman in society. The majority of wedding songs have dramatic content and consist of a dialoguelike singing between a group of young girls and a group of young men. They echo the old custom of bride purchase, marriage often against the will of the partners, the inheritance of the wife of the deceased by his successor in the family, and in general the totally subordinate position of the woman. The gay chorus of the young men asks the girl to hurry with the marriage. This is answered by the sad chorus of the girls, bewailing their loss of freedom.

Other traditional forms are the farewell song (koshtasu), the song of sad news (estirtu), and the mourning song (shoktau). The farewell song has many variations, as have the other traditional songs. It might be composed by a dying father or mother, telling the family of last wishes, speaking of the heaviness of parting from life and of unfulfilled dreams. Another favorite type of farewell song is the farewell to the family and the native land. In the period of forced migrations due to outside aggression, these songs were particularly widespread. Thus for instance there is preserved today a farewell song, composed by the famous eighteenth century akyn (bard) Bukhar Zhirau on the occasion of the forced migration of a group of the Kazakhs from their traditional grazing grounds as a result of pressure from the Jungars:

A caravan is marching from the heights of the Kara Tau . . .
How hard it is to bid good-bye to our native land!
Tears stream from dark eyes . . .
What times must we live in! Oh, times of misery!
The tears from my eyes form seas and lakes.
What times of hardship!
Happiness and richness have forsaken us.
Dust rises from the wandering caravan —
Worse than the icy storms of December.42

As among other nomads, tales and legends play a great role among the Kazakhs. While Kazakh tales show the strong influence of neighboring cultures, and particularly of the Arabian Nights, there are also many original tales of magic, animal tales — which

42Abdykalykov and Pankratova, op. cit., p. 185.
are particularly popular because of the close association of the Kazakh cattle breeders with animals—and tales dealing with the struggle for good pasture land. Thus, for example, the tale of Zhupar tells of the mother of a great family who leads her children away from the rest of the clan, which has become poor because of cattle starvation.

The heroic epics is of particular importance among the nomads. It is usually connected with actual historical events such as the falling apart of the Kazakh Khanate (Shora Narokov), the fight against the Kalmucks (Er Targyn), the struggle with the Uzbeks (Kambara). The authors of these epics are generally unknown and the epos is spread by the traveling epic bards, zhyrshi (from zhyr, song, which is the only term the Kazakhs have for the epos). The meter of the epos is usually a seven- or eight-footed verse, with a varying number of lines to a stanza. There is no steady rhythm in the verse. The musical quality is achieved by instrumentation and is built on tonal repetition and alliteration. The more dramatic parts of the epos are rendered in a fast and declamatory meter (zheldirme—the trotting race). The origin of most of the epics appears to be very early. The fact that the term "Kazakh" rarely occurs, and that the heroes are called "emigrants from Nogaila" leads to the conclusion that at the time of the origin of most of the epics the Kazakhs were still part of the Golden Horde.

A typical heroic epos is that of Er Targyn, which proclaims the virtues and prowess of the typical epic hero, who by his strength, alertness, and sometimes almost supernatural powers, is able to defeat singlehanded the greatest armies and the most powerful supernatural beings and to extricate himself from the most awkward situations. In this particular epos, the hero, a fugitive from his own Khan, finds refuge in the land of the Crimean Khan and by his great power helps him defeat the Kalmucks. For this he is promised the Khan’s daughter, whom he wins only after a prolonged struggle with the Khan, who doubts his social status. Side by side with heroic elements the epos contains long and effective lyrical passages, dealing with the love between Er Targyn and the Khan’s daughter, Ak Zhunus.

Quite different from the heroic epos are the lyrical tales, which are concerned mainly with romantic subjects of love and suffering. The most popular of these is the Romeo and Juliet-like tale of Kozy Korpesh and Bayan Slu which is found in Uighur folklore under the name of Taji Pasha and Sora Khanim, and among the Oirats under the name of Kioziuk. This is the tale of two lovers who had been promised to each other by their respective fathers before their birth. Because of the death of Kozy Korpesh’s father, however, Bayan Slu’s father breaks the contract, not wishing to marry his daughter to an orphan. The two lovers are unable to find their happiness together in life. It is only after their death that they can find peace from persecution and on the two adjoining graves arise two bushes which grow together, like the roses that sprang from the graves of Barbara Allen and her lover.

In the nineteenth century, when the Kazakhs were fighting for their independence in a series of risings against the Russians, their songs became the main propaganda weapon for the rallying of national sentiment. Many of the foremost bards also became political leaders, and we have from this period a whole series of songs about the various phases of the struggle for independence.

Contact with the Russians and particularly with the Russian exiles who were sent into the Kazakh steppes made for a great cultural development, despite the Russian policy of denationalization and Russification. This period witnessed an impressive growth of written literature, not only concerned with Kazakh themes, but also containing new themes reflecting the influence of Russian literature and, through it, of Western literature in general. After the establishment of the Soviets and their program of cultural development for the national minorities, the Kazakhs on the Soviet side of the border developed a flourishing young litera-

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44 L. S. Sobolev, Pesni stepei, Moscow, 1940, pp. 12–13.

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Table, based not only on the traditional forms of Kazakh oral poetry, but also on such Western literary forms as the novel, the short story, and the drama. The rapid rise in literacy enabled the new literature to become truly the property of the people. The new themes are concerned with modern problems such as the Civil War, the Five Year Plans, the building of a socialist society and the war against Nazi Germany.

Despite the fact that there are available no texts collected from the Sinkiang Kazakhs, it may be assumed that the social and national upheaval of the Kazakhs on the Russian side of the border has influenced the oral art of the Kazakhs in Sinkiang, particularly since the Russo-Chinese border never presented a serious barrier to the movement of nomads.

The main cultural heritage of the Kirghiz, like that of the Kazakhs, is in their tradition of oral art and in a strongly developed sense of music; but epic poetry is even more strongly developed. Many of the Turkic national tales, legends, and heroic episodes have been amalgamated by the Kirghiz into a huge national epos, which has recently been completely recorded for the first time by Soviet ethnographers and folklorists. This national epos, *Manas,* deals primarily with the Kirghiz struggle against the Kalmuks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which is depicted as a religious fight of the Mohammedan true believers against the infidels. It gives a detailed picture of the life and customs of the Kirghiz, with descriptions of battles, family life, marriage, death ceremonies, feasts. According to Radlov in the nineteenth century and to recent Soviet ethnologists, this epos is still very much alive among the Kirghiz people, and practically every Kirghiz can recite parts of it. Since the Soviet Revolution, the Soviet Kirghiz have developed a considerable body of new literature, in which they have taken over the Western forms of the novel and the drama, in addition to the use of their old traditional epic and poetic forms.

"The most recent and most complete translation into Russian is: U. Dzhekishev et al., eds., *Manas,* Moscow, 1946, 370 pp.

### APPENDIX III International Boundaries on the Pamirs

In the decades of Anglo-Russian rivalry described in Chapter II, the eventual junction of the expanding frontiers of the British and Russian Empires was an open question. In 1895, however, as part of the easing of relations between Britain and Russia, a Pamir Boundary Commission was empowered to lay down a jointly recognized frontier.

This Commission consisted of a Russian Mission under General Shveikovskii, which surveyed the approaches from the northern side, and a British Mission under General Gerard, which surveyed the approaches from the southern side. The two Missions met at Lake Victoria "and from that point to the eastward demarcated the line which was thereafter to divide Russian from British interests in highest Asia." This phrasing is cited from the article "Pamirs" in the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), by Sir Thomas H. Holdich, who as Colonel Holdich had been an important member of the British Pamir Mission of 1895.

The principal sources for the description of the frontier thus established are:

3. Article "Pamirs," by T. H. H. (Sir Thomas H. Holdich),
The Anglo-Russian survey resulted in an “Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with regard to the spheres of influence of the two countries in the region of the Pamirs” (1895). The essential paragraphs, cited here from Habberton’s book (Appendix III, pp. 91-92) are:

4. Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the former to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of demarcation.

5. Her Britannic Majesty’s Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the East end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Ameer of Afghanistan, that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain, and that no military posts or fortifications shall be established in it.

In The Indian Borderland Holdich unofficially but authoritatively describes the effect of this wording (p. 284):

[It] defined a buffer between ourselves and Russia. It is not an imposing buffer — this long attenuated arm of Afghanistan reaching out to touch China with the tips of its fingers. It is only eight miles wide at one part, and could be ridden across in a morning’s ride.

Neither Afghanistan nor China, though their interests were affected, took part in this important survey and frontier delimitation. Afghanistan may be considered to have accepted tacitly rather than explicitly its acquisition of a corridor of territory reaching to China. Holdich noted in his 1911 article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica that “All the head of the Little Pamir, with the Wakhan valley, is consequently Afghan territory, but no military posts have been established so far.” On the other hand Afghanistan has effectively exercised its jurisdiction in this territory. Thus Sir Aurel Stein in his Ruins of Desert Cathay (London, 1913, 2 vols.; Vol. II, pp. 63-65) describes how he was escorted through the region in 1906 by an Afghan patrol sent up especially for the purpose, and mentions that the Afghan authorities collected a yearly tithe from the herds of the Kirghiz of the Pamirs.

The effect of the 1895 delimitation may therefore be summarized by saying that it was essentially an Anglo-Russian agreement, and that its most definite result was to set a precise boundary beyond which Russia would not expand in the direction of India. This result was achieved by creating a new sector of the Russo-Afghan frontier, by drawing a line from previously recognized Afghan territory to a point on what both the Russians and the British agreed to recognize as the Chinese frontier.

This part of the demarcation did not create a buffer between British and Russian territory, but merely a line between Russian and Afghan territory. The buffer was created by the further agreement of the British to recognize as Afghan “the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the East end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier.”

The Russians, both Tsarist and Soviet, have stood permanently on the 1895 demarcation as far as it concerned both their own claims and British claims. Nor, as far as the Pamir sector of their frontier is concerned, have they had any disputes with either the Chinese or the Afghans.

The British, right up to the end of their rule in India, stood on their 1895 demarcation of the new Wakhan valley frontier with Afghanistan and had no further contact with the Russians across the buffer.
The Afghans appear to have remained satisfied. The only question that is still open, therefore, is the question of Chinese frontier claims in the Pamir region.

The result of the 1895 delimitation, and the relative efficiency of the Afghan buffer between British and Russian territory, may be diagrammed as below:

As this diagram shows, the stability of the complex of Pamir frontiers as a whole, from the time of the Anglo-Russian delimitation in 1895, did not depend solely on the Anglo-Russian agreement and Afghan satisfaction with that agreement. Where each country had a frontier with China, it also depended on mutual Russo-Chinese, Afghan-Chinese, and Anglo-Chinese satisfaction with that frontier. If, for example, either the Russians or the British had at any time expanded into Chinese territory around the end of the Afghan buffer or corridor, that strip of Afghan territory would have ceased to be a complete buffer, and the British and Russian frontiers would again have been in direct contact.

In this connection it is significant that the British heritage in India and on the Pamirs has now fallen to two heirs, Pakistan and the Union of India. These two heirs are in dispute over the state of Kashmir, including its little tribal dependencies of Gilgit, Hunza, and Nagar in the high Hindu Kush. A part of the Pamir complex of frontiers is therefore open to definition or re-definition between the Union of India, Pakistan, and China.

At the time of the Anglo-Russian delimitation of 1895 China, as a weak state, avoided commitment. The Chinese policy, then and later, was to avoid as far as possible the determination of Chinese rights by any of the Great Powers, and to endeavor to keep open a number of traditional claims, however vague, to sovereignty and suzerainty to the west and south of Sinkiang. Among the claims to suzerainty, rather than sovereignty, was the receipt of “tribute” from Hunza, in spite of the fact that Hunza was garrisoned by Kashmir troops under British officers. To make it worth the while of the Mir of Hunza to continue sending the tribute, the presents bestowed on the tribute-bearing delegation exceeded the value of the tribute itself.

The British, for their part, tolerantly permitted the continuation of this old custom, which is mentioned as late as 1922-1924 by C. P. Skrine, who was then British Consul General in Sinkiang, in his book Chinese Central Asia (London, 1926, p. 21). At the same time the Mirs of Hunza, for their part, traditionally claimed not only pasturage rights for the tribesmen of Hunza on the Pamirs, but the right to collect grazing fees from others who pastured their herds in some of that territory. These customary rights, once recognized as far as the high grazing grounds of Sarikol, have been encroached on by the Chinese authorities of Sinkiang, who in 1936 seized three hundred sheep and two men of the Mir of Hunza in Sarikol. (See K. P. S. Menon, Delhi-Chungking, Bombay-London, 1947, pp. 28 and 31.)

The Pamir frontier between the old British Empire in India and Chinese territory in Sinkiang must therefore be called an unstable frontier. In what was once British territory, the Gilgit-Hunza-Nagar fringe of Kashmir is now controlled by Pakistan, while Kashmir proper is disputed between Pakistan and the Union of India. In the resulting atmosphere of uncertainty, the question of common frontiers with China, and especially with Russia, has
once more become of interest. The interest is more sensational than really important, since the routes of travel are so poor that they carry only a thin traffic, and the terrain so desolate that it does not permit either the movement of large bodies of troops or the stationing of strong garrisons. Nevertheless, in contrast with the old tendency of British maps to show no direct contact between the British-Indian frontier and Russian territory, recent newspaper maps tend to show a common frontier between territory claimed by Pakistan (or the Union of India) and the Soviet Pamirs.

The history of this uncertainty can be partly traced. It concerns the British-Indian frontier with Sinkiang, not the Russo-Chinese or Afghan-Chinese frontiers, for while there is no record of formal Chinese acceptance of the Russo-Chinese and Afghan-Chinese frontiers as far as they were affected by the Anglo-Russian delimitation of 1895, neither is there any record of dispute.

In 1895, the British attitude appears to have been that Sarikol and the Taghdumbash Pamir belonged to China if they belonged to anybody. In the Pamir Commission Report, in Chapter VI, "Report on Survey Work," by Lt. Col. R. H. Wahab (R.E.), on p. 49, there appears the following passage:

Beyond the desirability of improving our geographical knowledge of the region, it was important to ascertain where the recognized frontier of China actually lay, and this could best be determined by pushing on in an easterly direction until signs of effective occupation were reached. Accordingly, Colonel Holdich and Major Wahab, with two surveyors, left camp on the 4th day of September, 1895, crossed the Bayik pass on the 5th and reached the Taggdumbash stream, head branch of the Yarkand river, on the 6th; here a small outpost, garrisoned by four Chinese soldiers, was found. On the 7th Colonel Holdich, accompanied by Mr. Macartney, started eastwards down the valley towards Tashkurgan, while Major Wahab marched west up the Taghdumbash Pamir. No signs of Chinese occupation were seen in this direction, though the nomad Kirghiz whose tents were found

It seems legitimate to read into this passage a British readiness, at that time, to accept a Chinese claim to the entire Taghdumbash Pamir. On the other hand it is also arguable that the British at that time were prepared to see the Russians take over the Kirghiz population of the Taghdumbash Pamir, west of the tiny Chinese outpost mentioned by Lt. Col. Wahab. The passage supporting this view occurs in Chapter IV of the Pamir Report, by Colonel Holdich, "General Geographical Description of the Pamirs," on p. 39, where Holdich states that the nomad population is...

... entirely Kirghiz, and it may, I think, be taken for granted that it will soon be entirely Russian... The total population of non-Russian Kirghiz that we encountered could not possibly have amounted to more than a few hundred. There is doubtless a tendency on their part toward accepting Chinese domination, which is due to the easy terms on which they are permitted to live within Chinese territory, and the absence of direct taxation; the skins of certain wild animals killed by their hunters forming the chief tribute claimed by Chinese authority at Tashkurgan. But the security for life and property will inevitably lead them to the Russian fold eventually, especially as there is no ethnographical distinction whatever between the Kirghiz of the Alichur or Alai-Pamir and those of the Taghdumbash. There seems, indeed, to be a certain historical fitness about the return of the Kirghiz to a Christian Government, if they are, as they seem to be, a survival of the medieval Nestorian Christian communities of Asia.

Paragraph 5 of the Pamir Agreement, which has already been cited, should be compared with both of the foregoing passages. In this paragraph the British engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from
the East end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Ameer of Afghanistan.

This wording does not state explicitly, but does allow it to be inferred that — in the British view at that time — south of the Russian frontier, and north of the British frontier, what territory was not Afghan was Chinese. The inference is supported by the map of India between pages 376 and 377 of Vol. XIV of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Eleventh Edition, 1911), where a clearly drawn frontier recognizes the entire Taghdumbash Pamir as Chinese, as far south as the Killik Pass. In contrast with this map, however, the text of Sir Thomas Holdich's article in Vol. XX of the same edition of the Encyclopaedia, which gives the names of the Pamirs recognized as Russian, does not mention the Taghdumbash Pamir in this enumeration and thus by default does not either allocate it to China or claim it for Britain. Holdich, moreover, was responsible for a striking discrepancy of wording. Although, in his unofficial Indian Borderland and in the “Narrative of Proceeding” which he contributed as Chapter II of the official Pamir Boundary Report, in which he referred to a “trijunction” of the “three great Empires” — that is, Britain, Russia, and China, without mention of Afghanistan. If the purpose of creating an Afghan buffer was to prevent junction of the British and Russian frontiers, then why was there still a “trijunction” of the British, Russian, and Chinese frontiers? Habberton, in Chapter V of his Anglo-Russian Relations, rightly criticizes the looseness of Holdich's wording.

In the absence of any official statement on the subject, it yet seems possible to put forward a rational explanation. Through the Pamir Boundary Commission, the British had attained a major objective: they had secured Russian confirmation of a line beyond which Russia would not expand. Anglo-Russian friction died down. It seemed desirable to emphasize a buffer between British and Russian territory rather than contact of British and Russian frontiers. The British maps, accordingly, emphasized a meeting of Afghan and Chinese territory that separated British and Russian territory.

On the other hand, there had been no formal demarcation of the British-Chinese frontier in this region. It therefore seemed undesirable to make any definite statements in writing, conceding specific territory in the Pamirs to the Chinese.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that British maps on the whole continued to delineate a meeting of Afghan and Chinese territory up to the time of the Russian Revolution. As late as 1920, indeed, in the map attached to Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia, by Ella Sykes and Sir Percy Sykes, the buffer continues to be shown as an Afghan-Chinese buffer. Sir Percy Sykes was British Consul-General in Kashgar in 1915. By 1926, however, when C. P. Skrine (who had also been Consul-General in Kashgar) published his Chinese Central Asia, the map attached to the book showed no Anglo-Chinese frontier on the Pamirs, and left it possible to infer that British territory went on around the end of the Afghan buffer and met the Russian frontier.

Similarly, and with special clearness, the map attached to Between the Oxus and the Indus (London, 1935), by Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, who over a period of a good many years traveled intensively and extensively both on the Pamirs and in Sinkiang, unmistakably delineates British territory spreading around the end of the Afghan buffer and a “trijunction” of British, Afghan, and Soviet Russian territory, rather than of British, Russian, and Chinese territory.

Pursuing the hypothesis further, it may be suggested that this change reflected not only the change from friendliness between the British and the old Tsarist regime to hostility and suspicion between the British and the new Soviet regime, but growing British concern over the decay and instability of Chinese rule in Sinkiang.

It does not seem far-fetched to suggest that the British, by altering their usage in the drawing of maps, were diplomatically making preparations for the possibility either of Soviet expansion
Appendices

into Sinkiang, or the coming of a regime in Sinkiang that might be more friendly to the Soviets than to the British regime in India. In either event, it might well have seemed to the British that it would be better to claim as strong as possible a frontier in direct contact with the Russian frontier, than to try to support a weak or perhaps even unfriendly Chinese regime in its claims to territory separating British and Russian territory.

The argument is now irrelevant, to the extent that British rule over what was once a string of outposts of the Indian Empire has now lapsed, but it may have left a legacy by influencing the form in which Pakistan and India may dispute the new frontier to be drawn between themselves, and the claims which these two states may eventually make when there is a question of the formal demarcation of their frontiers with China.

(For the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, see Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," Middle East Journal, Washington, D. C., III, January and April, 1949.)

APPENDIX IV  Sinkiang and China’s First Foreign Loan

The subject of China’s first foreign loan has been thoroughly muddled by a series of writers since 1914. Prior to that date Valentine Chirol (Director of the Foreign Department of the London Times) made the perfectly clear statement in the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Cambridge, 1910, VI, p. 200, that China’s first borrowing was to help finance the northwest expedition under Tso Tsung-t’ang. Chirol’s assertion was based, it would appear, on his own account in supplementary volume III (p. 31) to the Tenth Edition of the same encyclopaedia, London, 1902. In 1914, however, S. R. Wagel, in his pioneer work, Finance in China, Shanghai, 1914, made the absurd statement that China’s first foreign loan “was negotiated in 1865, when she borrowed money from Russia to equip an expeditionary force to Ili.” Wagel’s version was turned around a few years later by Chia Shih-yi, who observed — in his detailed Financial History of the Republic, Shanghai, 1916, p. 1070 (in Chinese) — that China’s first loan was negotiated in 1885 in order to pay indemnity to Russia in connection with the Ili Treaty.” Chia’s dating was accepted in 1929 by D. K. Lieu in his Foreign Investments in China, Shanghai, 1929, p. 13, and by A. G. Coons, in his Foreign Public Debt of China, Philadelphia, 1930, p. 1. C. F. Remer, in his standard work on Foreign Investments in China, New York, 1933, p. 68, simply follows Lieu.

So far as the versions of Wagel and Chia are concerned, the
first fact to note is that no treaty of 1865 between China and Russia seems to exist in the Chinese, Russian, or English collections on the subject, nor in the official Barbarian Records of the Manchu Empire. There was a Treaty of St. Petersburg negotiated in 1851 between China and Russia, under which Russia gave back to China part of the Ili territory. On this occasion China paid an indemnity to Russia of 1,431,664 pounds and 2 shillings. This is the exact sum which China and Lieu assert was borrowed by China in 1865. It would appear, therefore, that they, followed by other writers, have ascribed to 1865 events which occurred in a somewhat different context in 1881. On the basis of available evidence, it may be assumed that China's first foreign loan was negotiated in 1867-1868 from foreign merchants (wa shang) in Shanghai, to get funds for Tso Tsung-t'ang's northwest expedition.

Evidence for this position is furnished by official records for the Ch'ing period. The Shih Lu contain an authorization of January 3, 1868, for Tso Tsung-t'ang to borrow one million taels from foreign merchants (wa shang), on the security of the maritime customs; at the same time he was also authorized to obtain an advance of one million taels from the customs receipts proper. The text on this matter reads as follows:

Tso Tsung-t'ang had previously petitioned for a loan from foreign merchants, but the Foreign Affairs Office objected because the interest charged was too high. The Foreign Office therefore suggested that the sum demanded by Tso for military purposes be obtained from two sources: (1) half from customs tariff; (2) the other half from loans from foreign merchants to be negotiated by the various local customs. This plan was considered satisfactory. Thereupon Tseng Kuo-fan was instructed to secure one million taels from the customs to be remitted immediately to Tso Tsung-t'ang for military purposes.

As to the other one million taels, the various customs offices in the country should make out forms to be approved by the viceroy. These forms are to be transmitted to Hu

Sinkiang and China's First Foreign Loan

Kuang-yung and Ying Pao-shih who will carry on the negotiations with the foreign merchants.

The two million taels are to be returned from funds to be contributed by the various provinces for the purpose of bandit suppression.

—Ta Ch'ing shih-lu ("Veritable Records" of the Ch'ing Dynasty). Jan. 3, 1868.

In his book on Tso Tsung-t'ang, Bales gives a slightly different version of the British effort at mediation. He also adds some fresh material based on the Nien Pu, vol. VIII (not available at the Library of Congress); it may, therefore, be worthwhile to reproduce his version here (W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Shanghai, 1937):

The British Minister in Peking, Sir Thomas Wade, approached the Tsungli Yamen with the proposition that Yakub Beg would surrender to the Chinese if he were allowed to keep his kingdom under the overlordship of China. The government was cool to the proposal and Sir Thomas did not press it. The matter was reported to Tso, and in a letter to Tseng Yuan-fu, he said:

Yesterday I received a letter from the Tsungli Yamen saying that Sir Thomas Wade had stated that he was authorized to arrange the surrender of Yakub Beg. It is the first intimation I have had that Yakub Beg wants to surrender. If the British make such a proposal there must be some reason for it. Let us examine the circumstances. When I wanted to borrow money in Shanghai the British would not loan me any. [Cf. footnote 6 above. Tso's remark underlines the need for further investigation of the foreign loans to China in this period.] A Shanghai paper said that the Sinkiang campaign should by all means be abandoned. This paper even reported that my army has been defeated and driven back through the pass at Chiyukuan. These circumstances throw some light on the British proposals. Nien Pu, VIII, p. 17.
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The analyst says that the British Government took up the matter with Kuo Sung-t’ao, Chinese Minister in London, representing to him that it would be a good thing for China to set up a Moslem state in Central Asia and intimating that the Kingdom of Kashgaria would be ideal for the purpose. Kuo Sung-t’ao seemed to be rather favorable to the idea but when the matter was referred to Tso he bristled all over. He informed the Tsungli Yamen that the matter of Yakub Beg was purely a domestic question and that neither England nor anyone else had any concern whatever with it; that if Yakub Beg wanted to surrender he should come to Suchow, where he would be treated as one in rebellion against Chinese authority; that the question was entirely outside the province of the Tsungli Yamen and solely within his own jurisdiction; and that if England wanted a Moslem kingdom set up in Central Asia she should furnish the territory of which she had an abundance in northern India. (Nien Fu, VIII, pp. 18 and 27; Bales, pp. 360-361.)

APPENDIX V Regions of Sinkiang

The physical framework of Sinkiang falls into six divisions. Taken, from north to south, they have been described by Dr. S. Ting of the Academia Sinica as:

1. The Northern Highlands, forming the northern rim of Jungaria. Most of this region reaches an altitude of 5000 feet, with some peaks of 13,000 feet in the great Altai range which forms most of the frontier with the Mongolian People’s Republic. There are two subregions, the Burgun plateau and, between it and the Altai, the sunken valley of the Black Irtish. The waters of the Irtish flow into the Ob, and all across Siberia to the Arctic Ocean. No other streams from Sinkiang reach the ocean; all die in inland deserts or salt lakes.

2. The Jungarian Basin, at an elevation of 600 to 1500 feet, comprises two subregions, the Manass Basin and the Chingho plain, both overlooked from the south by the snowy crests of the Tien Shan, which, however, are often invisible because of the dust haze over the lowlands. The Manass River slows abruptly as it comes out of the mountains, and feeds a wide area of swamps. In the Chingho plain three rivers, the Ching, Kur, and Borotala, converge to form Ebi Nor, a lake with no outlet at an elevation of 700 feet. Its ancient shorelines are 300 feet above the present surface, and in the plain around it there are both swamps and sand dunes.

3. The Tien Shan range forms a region in itself, occupying nearly a quarter of the area of Sinkiang. For several hundred miles its crests are crowned with snow. The highest peak
is Khan Tengri, Lord of Heaven, with an altitude of over 23,000 feet. Below it is the greatest glacier, the Muzart, which is overlooked by magnificent cliffs of marble and porphyry. On the northern slopes of the main range there are deep evergreen forests and rich meadows, while the southern slopes are dry and unforsted. Through gaps in the range run the main routes from Jungaria in the north to the Tarim Basin in the south. At the northwestern end of the range the Ili Valley, or Kulja plain, has an elevation of 2800 feet. With a rainfall of ten inches a year, this is the richest region in Sinkiang. Other subregions are the Turfan Depression which, under the shadow of peaks that range up to nearly 20,000 feet, drops to a depth of nearly 1000 feet below sea level; the Barkul Basin, and the Uch-Turfan Plain. The Bai Basin, though classed by some geographers with the Tarim Basin, is also assigned by Dr. Ting to the Tien Shan, because of its geological formation.

4. The Tarim Basin is a system of concentric zones. The rim of the basin is formed by the Tien Shan in the north, the Kunlun in the south, and the Pamirs and Alai in the west and northwest. At the foot of this rim there is a narrow belt of boulder fans enclosing the vast central desert of drifting sand dunes, the Taklamakan. The slope of the inner basin is from about 4000 feet in the west to about 2500 feet in the east. Into it flow the Khotan Darya, the Yarkand Darya, the Aksu Darya and the Konche Darya, which combine to form the Tarim River. Lesser streams like the Keriya and the Niya die in the desert before they reach the Tarim, while the Charchen reaches the Tarim only at its dying eastern end. The waters of the Tarim do not always reach their ancient terminal depression, the desert lake of Lob Nor, but end in vague reedy marshes. The oases of the Tarim Basin are formed on the rivers at the points where they leave the narrow, hard boulder fan to enter the wide desert.

5. The Pei Shan Highlands close off the eastern end of the Tarim Basin. The Pei Shan proper, or North Mountains, are a desert range forming the northern edge of the “Kansu Corridor” which reaches out from Northwest China to Sinkiang. The north-
ern ranges of these mountains are called by the Mongols Mechin Ola or “Ape Mountains.” Grouped with them, in Dr. Ting’s classification, is the plateau called by the Chinese Heinghsingshsia or “the Ravine of the Apes.” In this whole region there are very ancient legends of “man apes” which capture human beings. Connected with these highlands are the Lob Plateau, known in Chinese as the White Dragon Heap, which rises east of the Lob Depression and marks the divide between the Tarim and the Sulu Rivers, and the Kuruk Tagh or Dry Mountains. The flat tops of all these heights mark the 5000 foot level of an ancient connected plateau. The Kuruk Tagh in particular are a very ancient formation of metamorphic rocks. Included under Dr. Ting’s classification with the Pei Shan group instead of the Tien Shan formation is the subregion of the Kharashahr Basin, an intermontane trough enclosing the lake called Bagrach Kol at an altitude of 3300 feet, with desert to the east of it, sand dunes to the south, and swamps on its northern and western shores.

6. The Kunlun Highlands form the southern rampart of Sinkiang. Seen from the desert they form a mountain wall, but at their crest begins the northern plateau of Tibet, with heights of over 20,000 feet.
APPENDIX VI The Soils of Sinkiang

The Soils of Sinkiang have been formed by mechanical weathering caused by shortage of rainfall, dryness of the air, and high variation between day and night temperatures. Alkaline soils have formed where water seeping through alluvial fans along the edges of the foothills has deposited soluble salts on flat land below the fans.

Brown forest soils and the grassland soils of high meadows are found on the upper slopes of the Tien Shan. Going down the northern slopes of the Tien Shan, chestnut soils are found on the gentle slopes at the base of the range, succeeded farther out on the plain and in the depressions by alkaline soils, desert soils, and sand dunes. On the southern, drier side of the range, the vertical distribution is much more irregular. At the higher altitudes there is less brown forest soil and grassland soil than on the northern side. The foothill ranges are covered with barren rocks on exposed slopes, but there are light-colored chestnut soils and alkaline soils in hollows among the hills. In areas lying between drifting deserts and boulder fans the higher soils are alluvial, the lower soils alkaline; and farthest out from the mountains there stretch desert soils and sand dunes.

The northerly slope of the Kunlun, overlooking the Tarim Basin, matches the southerly face of the Tien Shan, except that there are no forests high up on the Kunlun and the soils found there are chiefly immature. There is no information about the soils of the Altai or northern rim of Jungaria.

Chestnut soils from lower mountain slopes on the southern edge of Jungaria and in the Kulja plain vary from dark to light brown.

Their typical natural cover is short grass. Thin chestnut soils are suitable only for grazing, but thick layers permit dry farming. Alkaline soils are found in poorly drained lowlands and where irrigated alluvial soils have been alkalinized. Their crop productivity is low. They have been noted particularly between Kharashahr and Bugur, in Kharashahr, Yangi-Hissar, and Yarkand, and on both sides of the Khotan Darya and the Tarim. Desert soils which are low in organic matter but can be utilized for farming if irrigated are found in the oases of Komul, Pichang, Turfan, and Toksun.
APPENDIX VII Oil in Sinkiang

It has long been known that there are sources of oil in Sinkiang. Seepage oil, thinned out with vegetable oil, was traditionally used for lighting. The crude oil was also used for axle grease.

Deposits are known to lie along the Tien Shan, both north and south of the main range. More recently, oil has been struck in the extreme south of Sinkiang, at the edge of the Tibetan plateau.

East of Sinkiang, there is oil in the western “panhandle” of Kansu; still farther east, oil has been worked on a small scale in northern Shaansi province, near the wartime Communist capital of Yanan. It does not appear to be known whether any or all of these deposits, which are the only known deposits in Chinese territory, are geologically related to the oil fields of the Caspian region, in Soviet territory, or to those of Iran in the Middle East.

In 1948, the Chinese National Resources Commission (NRC) confirmed press reports of the discovery of oil on the Sinkiang-Ch’inghai border, near the newly constructed highway connecting those two provinces. Mr. C. H. Wu, Secretary General of the NRC, stated that the field is located at Timurlik, near the border of the Tsaidam Basin, which forms the lowest part of the Tibetan plateau, between 90 and 92 degrees longitude and 36 and 40 degrees latitude. It was discovered by the exploration department of the Kansu-Ch’inghai branch of the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, an NRC subsidiary. According to Dr. Wu, a cursory survey reveals more than twenty horizons of oil sand in this field, the thickest horizon being three meters deep. All horizons occur in the Red Bed of the Tertiary Age.

Among the previously known fields, one near Urumchi has been worked at times in the past when oil could not be obtained from Russia. This field is known to be of the Jurassic Age.

A small field, known as Jushantze, is located twenty kilometers southeast of Wusu, about halfway along the main trade route between Urumchi and Kulja. The wells, which are known to be shallow, produce a paraffin-base oil under natural pressure. There is no recent information on production.

When the Russians withdrew from Sinkiang in 1942 they capped and turned over to the provincial authorities 25 wells which had been producing 49–52 gravity oil at a depth of 4600 feet. It appears probable that these wells were in the Jushantze field. Although the Russians were quoted as stating that they would return at a later date to work the field again, they took most of the oil-field machinery with them when they withdrew.

### APPENDIX VIII

**Some Sinkiang Place Names and Their Alternatives**

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