The Blackwell Companions to Sociology provide introductions to emerging topics and theoretical orientations in sociology as well as presenting the scope and quality of the discipline as it is currently configured. Essays in the Companions tackle broad themes or central puzzles within the field and are authored by key scholars who have spent considerable time in research and reflection on the questions and controversies that have activated interest in their area. This authoritative series will interest those studying sociology at advanced undergraduate or graduate level as well as scholars in the social sciences and informed readers in applied disciplines.

1. The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Second Edition
   Edited by Bryan S. Turner

2. The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists
   Edited by George Ritzer

3. The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology
   Edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott

4. The Blackwell Companion to Medical Sociology
   Edited by William C. Cockerham

5. The Blackwell Companion to Sociology
   Edited by Judith R. Blau

6. The Blackwell Companion to Major Classical Social Theorists
   Edited by George Ritzer

7. The Blackwell Companion to Major Contemporary Social Theorists
   Edited by George Ritzer

8. The Blackwell Companion to Criminology
   Edited by Colin Sumner

9. The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Families
   Edited by Jacqueline L. Scott, Judith K. Treas, and Martin Richards

10. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements
    Edited by David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi

11. The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society
    Edited by Austin Sarat

12. The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture
    Edited by Mark D. Jacobs and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan

Forthcoming

The Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities
Edited by Mary Romero and Eric Margolis
The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture

Edited by

Mark D. Jacobs and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan
For David and Lauren

For Leijia

citizens of culture, artists of democracy
Contents

List of Contributors x

Introduction 1
Mark D. Jacobs and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan

PART I PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND METHOD 15
1 Structure, Culture and Agency 17
Margaret S. Archer
2 Culture and Cognition 35
Albert J. Bergesen
3 Difference and Cultural Systems: Dissonance in Three Parts 48
Nancy Weiss Hanrahan

PART II CULTURAL SYSTEMS 63
4 Culture in Global Knowledge Societies: Knowledge Cultures and Epistemic Cultures 65
Karin Knorr Cetina
5 Media Culture(s) and Public Life 80
Ronald N. Jacobs
6 “Religion as a Cultural System”: Theoretical and Empirical Developments Since Geertz 97
Rhys H. Williams
7 Aesthetic Uncertainty: The New Canon? 114
Vera L. Zolberg
8 Pragmatics of Taste
Antoine Hennion

PART III EVERYDAY LIFE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING
145
9 Music and Social Experience
Tia DeNora

10 Consumer Culture
Daniel Thomas Cook

11 Fame and Everyday Life: The “Lottery Celebrities” of Reality TV
Andrea L. Press and Bruce A. Williams

12 Labor for Love: Rethinking Class and Culture in the Case of Single Motherhood
Maria Kefalas

PART IV IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
205
13 New Developments in Class and Culture
David Halle and L. Frank Weyher

14 Sexuality and Religion: Negotiating Identity Differences
Michele Dillon

15 Race after the Cultural Turn
Orville Lee

PART V COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND CULTURAL AMNESIA
251
16 Collective Memory: Why Culture Matters
Barry Schwartz, Kazuya Fukuoka, and Sachiko Takita-Ishii

17 Counter-Memories of Terrorism: The Public Inscription of a Dramatic Past
Anna Lisa Tota

18 Museums and the Constitution of Culture
Jan Marontate

19 Dilemmas of the Witness
Robin Wagner-Pacifici

PART VI THE CULTURE OF INSTITUTIONS
315
20 Professions as Disciplinary Cultures
Magali Sarfatti Larson

21 Everyday Life and the Constitution of Legality
Susan S. Silbey
22 The Discourses of Welfare and Welfare Reform 346
John W. Mohr

23 The Culture of Savings and Loan Scandal in the No-Fault Society 364
Mark D. Jacobs

PART VII THE CULTURE OF CITIZENSHIP: LOCAL, NATIONAL, GLOBAL 381

24 Civic Culture at the Grass Roots 383
Paul Lichterman

25 Public Vocabularies of Religious Belief: Explicit and Implicit Religious Discourse in the American Public Sphere 398
John H. Evans

26 Democracy and Globalization in the Global Economy 412
Diana Crane

27 The Autonomy of Culture and the Invention of the Politics of Small Things: 1968 Revisited 428
Jeffrey C. Goldfarb

28 Toward a Nonculturalist Sociology of Culture: On Class and Status in Globalizing Capitalism 444
Nancy Fraser

Bibliography 460
Index 500
Margaret S. Archer has been Professor of Sociology at Warwick University since 1979. Her research interests have always centered on “the problem of Structure and Agency,” which is addressed in her five key books: Social Origins of Educational Systems (1979), Culture and Agency (1988), Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (1995), Being Human: The Problem of Agency (2000), and Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (2003). She is the only woman to have been President of the International Sociological Association (1986–90) and is a foundation member and Councillor of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.


Daniel Thomas Cook is Assistant Professor in the Department of Advertising, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of The Commodification of Childhood, which explores the rise of children as consumers presently and historically, and editor of Symbolic Childhood, a compendium of original research addressing the politics of representation of children. His articles on the children and consumer culture have appeared in the Sociological Quarterly, the Journal of Consumer Culture, and Childhood.

Diana Crane is Professor Emerita of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. She has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship, been a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ) and a visitor at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center (Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio, Italy), and is the recipient of two Fulbright Awards. She was chair of the Sociology of Culture Section of the American

**Tia DeNora** is Professor of Sociology of Music at Exeter University. Her most recent book is *After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology*. She is the author of *Beethoven and the Construction of Genius* (1995) and *Music in Everyday Life* (2000). Her articles have appeared in both sociological and musico logical journals, and her work has been featured in the *Times Higher Education Supplement* and the *New York Review of Books*. She is also a co-founder and former Chair of the Research Network on the Sociology of the Arts of the European Sociological Association.

**Michele Dillon** is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of New Hampshire and past chair of the sociology of religion section of the American Sociological Association. Her publications include *Catholic Identity: Balancing Reason, Faith, and Power* (1999), *Debating Divorce: Moral Conflict in Ireland* (1993), *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion* (2003), and several research articles on religion, culture, and the life course.

**John H. Evans** is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of *Playing God? Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate* (2002) and co-editor (with Robert Wuthnow) of *The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-Based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism* (2002). He has also published a number of articles on opinion polarization in the US over abortion, homosexuality, and related issues.

**Nancy Fraser** is the Henry and Louise A. Loeb Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the Graduate Faculty of the New School University and co-editor of *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory*. The 2004 holder of the Spinoza Chair in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam, she will be a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 2004–5. Her books include *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (2003), with Axel Honneth; *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition* (1997); *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange* (1994) with Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, and Drucilla Cornell; and *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (1989). The recipient of numerous fellowships, endowed lectureships, and awards, Professor Fraser’s work has been translated into many languages, including French, Swedish, German, Turkish, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese.

**Kazuya Fukuoka** is a PhD student in political science and a research associate for the Center for the Study of Global Issues (GLOBIS) at the University of Georgia. In Japan, his works have appeared in *Kokusai Mondai* (*International Affairs*).

**Jeffrey C. Goldfarb** is the Michael E. Gellert Professor and Chair of the Sociology Department at the New School for Social Research. He is the author of numerous


**Nancy Weiss Hanrahan** is Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Women’s Studies Research and Resource Center at George Mason University. Before embarking on an academic career, Hanrahan spent ten years in the music business in New York City as a radio announcer and concert producer. Her scholarly work, which addresses issues in cultural theory and criticism, draws on both her professional and her academic experience. She is the author of *Difference in Time: A Critical Theory of Culture* (2000) and a contributor to *Critical Theory: Diverse Objects, Diverse Subjects* (2003) and *Rethinking Social Transformation* (2001).

**Antoine Hennion** is Director of Research at the École des Mines de Paris and the former Director of the Centre for the Sociology of Innovation (CSI). He is the former President of the Research Committee 37 of the International Sociological Association on the sociology of the arts, and a member of several French Scientific Committees (Musée de la musique in Paris, Mission du Patrimoine ethno-logique, Fondation Méderic-Alzheimer). His recent publications include a collective book on music lovers (*Figures de l’amateur*, 2000), a book on the use of J. S. Bach in nineteenth century France (*La grandeur de Bach*, 2000, with J.-M. Fauquet), and *Music as Mediation* (forthcoming), the translation of *La passion musicale* (1993).

**Mark D. Jacobs** is Associate Professor of Sociology at George Mason University, where he also served for seven years as founding director of the PhD Program in Cultural Studies, the first interdisciplinary doctoral program in that field in the United States. He is the author of *Screwing the System and Making It Work: Juvenile Justice in the No-Fault Society* (1990), as well as articles in such journals as *Administration and Society* and *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*. He contributed a chapter on “The school shooting as a ritual of sacrifice” to *Symbolic Childhood* (2002), edited by Daniel Cook. With Lyn Spillman, he is co-editor of a special issue of *Cultural Sociology and Sociological Publics* (vol. 33) on “Diffusing cultural sociology: intellectual fields and institutional boundaries.” He served from 1994 to 1998 on the Executive Council of RC37 of the International Sociological Association. He has co-organized two international conferences at George Mason University for the Section on the Sociology of Culture of the
American Sociological Association, and has edited *Culture* for that section since 2000.

Ronald N. Jacobs is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University at Albany, State University of New York. His publications include *Race, Media, and the Crisis of Civil Society: From Watts to Rodney King* (2000), as well as numerous contributions to journals, including articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, *Sociological Theory*, and *Qualitative Sociology*. He is a consulting editor to the *American Journal of Sociology* and is an executive board member of the International Sociological Association, RC16 (Theory).

Maria Kefalas is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Saint Joseph’s University. She is the author of *Working-Class Heroes: Protecting Home, Community, and Nation in a Chicago Neighborhood* (2003) and the forthcoming *Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood Before Marriage*, co-authored with Kathryn Edin.

Karin Knorr Cetina is Professor of Sociology at the University of Konstanz (DE), Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago, and a member of the Institute for World-Society Studies, University of Bielefeld, Germany. In addition to her three degrees, she has received several honors, including Vienna University’s Fellowship for the Gifted and she was a Ford Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellow, a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, president of the International Society for Social Studies of Science, and she is a future member of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, CA. She has published numerous papers and books, including *Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge* (1999), which received the Ludwik Fleck Prize of the Society for Social Studies of Science and the Robert K. Merton Prize of the American Sociological Association.

Magali Sarfatti Larson is the author of many books and articles on professions, the sociology of architecture and political culture. Her articles have appeared in journals in four nations, and her book *Beyond the Postmodern Façade* (1993) won awards from both the American Institute of Architects and the Section on the Sociology of Culture of the American Sociological Association. She is Professor Emerita at Temple University and had a chair in the Sociology of Work at the University of Urbino, Italy, until she resigned in 2001. She is involved in Latino community organizations and in broader progressive political activities.

Orville Lee is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of New School University. His research centers on culture and politics. Among his half-dozen articles, “Culture and democratic theory: toward a theory of symbolic democracy,” in *Constellations* (1998), won the Best Article Award from the Culture Section of the American Sociological Association.

Paul Lichterman is Associate Professor of Sociology and Religion at the University of Southern California, and Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He writes on civic, religious, and political groups, as well as cultural theory and participant observation methodology. His first book, *The Search for Political Community* (1996), received Honorable Mention in the Best Book competition of the American Sociological Association’s Section on Culture. His second book, *Elusive Togetherness: Religious Groups and Civic Engagement in*
America, is an ethnographic study of religious community service groups reaching out to low-income populations, social service agencies and other civic groups.

Jan Marontate conducts research in the sociology of the arts and technology. Since 1998 she has taught in the Sociology Department of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada. The research presented in this volume was made possible with support from the following organizations: the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Industry Canada, the Smithsonian Institution, the National Gallery of Art (Washington, DC), the Center for the History of Business, Technology and Society of the Hagley Museum and Library, the Centre de sociologie de l’innovation, École Nationale supérieure des Mines de Paris, the Forschungsinstitut of the Deutsches Museum in Munich and the Quebec Government’s Fonds pour la Formation et Aide à la Recherche.

John W. Mohr is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara where he also serves as Associate Dean of the Graduate Division. His essay “Soldiers, mothers, tramps and others” won the best article award from the Culture Section of the American Sociological Association (1996). His paper (with Francesca Guerra-Pearson) “The impact of state intervention in the nonprofit sector: the case of the New Deal,” won the ARNOVA (Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action) Outstanding Article award for 1997. He edited a special issue of Theory and Society (with Roberto Franzosi) on “New directions in formalization and historical analysis” (1997) and a special issue of Poetics on “Relational analysis and institutional meanings: formal models for the study of culture” (2000). He has been a visiting professor at La Sapienza in Rome and at the Maison des Sciences de L’Homme, in Paris. He has served as chair of the Culture Section of ASA, is co-founder, with Roger Friedland, of the Cultural Turn conference series at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and co-editor (with Friedland) of Matters of Culture: Cultural Sociology in Practice.

Andrea L. Press is Research Professor of Communication and Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where she directs the Media Studies Program. She is the author of Women Watching Television: Gender, Class, and Generation in the American Television Experience, co-author (with Elizabeth Cole) of Speaking of Abortion: Television, Women, and the Discourses of Authority, and (with Bruce Williams) of the forthcoming Media Studies in the New Media Environment. Professor Press edits a book series for the University of Illinois Press entitled Feminist Studies and Media Culture, and co-edits (with Bruce Williams) The Communication Review. She has received fellowships from the Danforth Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institute of Mental Health.

Barry Schwartz is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Georgia. From 1999 to 2000 he chaired the American Sociological Association’s Culture Section and now serves on the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission Advisory Committee. He has been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, the National Humanities Center, the Smithsonian Institution, University of Georgia Humanities Center, and the Hebrew University. In 2000, he was awarded the University of Georgia Owens Research Prize. He is the author of numerous articles and five books, including George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol (recipient of Richard Neustadt Award). His
Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory (recipient of the New York Lincoln Group Award and the New York Civil War Roundtable Award, 2000) traces popular images of Lincoln from 1865 to 1922. The second volume, Abraham Lincoln at the Millennium, traces Lincoln’s images from the Depression decade through the turn of the twenty-first century.

Susan S. Silbey is Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A Fellow of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, she published The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (1998, with Patricia Ewick), which was honored by the Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association. She is co-editor, with Herbert Kritzer, of In Litigation: Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? and co-editor, with Austin Sarat, of Studies in Law, Politics and Society (vol. 10–17). She has been editor of the Law & Society Review, and is Past-President of the Law & Society Association.

Sachiko Takita-Ishii is Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of International Relations, Yokohama City University, Japan. In Japan, she has participated in the joint research project on the Ethnic Consciousness of Korean Residents in Japan (2000–2) and the oral history project of Chinese and Japanese Residents in Yokohama Chinatown (2003). She is completing her dissertation manuscript entitled “Pilgrimage to the past, present and future: how culture matters to the Japanese American collective memory of the internment.”

Anna Lisa Tota is Associate Professor in Sociology of Communication at the Faculty of Literature and Philosophy, University of Rome III, Italy. She is Invited Professor at the Faculty of Communication Sciences, University of Lugano, Switzerland, co-founder and former chair of the Research Network on Sociology of the Arts (European Sociological Association), and a member of the board of the Research Committee Sociology of the Arts (International Sociological Association). She was President of the Committee “Gender, Generations and Culture of Differences” at the Italian Ministry for Equal Opportunities from 1999 to 2001, and Co-president of the Equal Opportunities Group at the University of Lugano. Her books include Ethnography of the Art: Towards a Sociology of Artistic Contexts (1997), Sociology of the Arts: From Traditional Museum to Multimedial Art (1999), The Contested Memory: Studies on the Social Communication of the Past (2001, ed.), The Injured City: Memory and Public Communication of the Bologna Massacre, August 2 1980 (2003). She has published more than 40 articles in handbooks and journals in English, Spanish, and Italian on arts, collective memories, and gender.

Robin Wagner-Pacifici is Professor of Sociology at Swarthmore College, and Chair of the American Sociological Association’s Sociology of Culture Section. Her publications include The Art of Surrender: Decomposing Sovereignty at Conflict’s End (forthcoming); Theorizing the Standoff: Contingency in Action (2000), winner of the 2001 Culture Section of the American Sociological Association Best Book Award; Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia Versus MOVE (1994); and The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama (1986). Her current research projects include The Deep Structure of Social Transformations: Threshold Events of Assumption and Divestment, and “Time, territory, and representation in the postmodern electoral crisis,” with Andrew Perrin.
L. Frank Weyher is a research fellow of the University of California at Los Angeles LeRoy Neiman Center for the Study of American Society and Culture and a Lecturer in Sociology. With Maurice Zeitlin, he won the 2002 Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship, Honorable Mention, from the Political Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association for their American Journal of Sociology article, “Black and white, unite and fight? Interracial working-class solidarity and racial employment equality.”

Bruce A. Williams is a research professor in the Institute of Communications Research and professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published 4 books and more than 50 scholarly journal articles and book chapters. His most recent book, Democracy, Dialogue, and Environmental Disputes: The Contested Languages of Social Regulation (with Albert Matheny, 1996), won the Caldwell Prize as best book for 1996 from the Science, Technology, and Environmental Politics section of the American Political Science Association. He is the editor (with Andrea Press) of The Communication Review.

Rhys H. Williams is Professor of Sociology and Department Head at the University of Cincinnati. He is co-author of A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New England City (1992), and editor of Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth (1997) and Promise Keepers and the New Masculinity: Private Lives and Public Morality (2001). In addition, his articles have appeared in the American Sociological Review, Social Problems, Sociological Theory, Theory and Society, and Sociology of Religion, among others. His publications have twice won “Distinguished Article” awards from scholarly societies, and he is past chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section for the Sociology of Religion. He served a term as co-editor of the journal Social Problems (1996–9) and is editor of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.

Vera L. Zolberg is the author of Outsider Art: Contesting Boundaries in Contemporary Culture (1997) and Constructing a Sociology of the Arts (1990), translated into Italian, Korean, and Spanish. She is also co-editor, with David Swartz, of The Sociology of Symbolic Power: On Pierre Bourdieu (2004). She has been a founding president of the Culture Section of the American Sociological Association, and President of the Research Committee on the Sociology of the Arts of the International Sociological Association. She has also been Co-Director of the Rockefeller funded Privatization of Culture Project for three years, and is an ACLS Fellow, among other honors.

Acknowledgment

We wish to thank Tracy McLoone, our editorial assistant, for her invaluable and gracious help with every phase of this project. Tracy McLoone is a doctoral student in Cultural Studies at George Mason University. She studies the way that young women resist the colonization of their public and private space through television, visual culture, and social interaction.
The “cultural turn” of the past few decades has reconceptualized “culture,” even while making it the central focus of scholarship in the social sciences and humanities. It rejected, among older theories of culture, the Parsonian conception that culture comprised a relatively consensual system of values and norms that provided evaluative grounding for the other subsystems of action. The varied proponents of the cultural turn objected to this and other conceptions for a number of reasons. Its emphasis on internalization of objective structures restricted possibilities for human agency. It ignored the full range of human subjectivities, even while essentializing categories of status distinction. The theory seemed to describe a cultural system too closed to accommodate the burgeoning definition of identity differences or the urgent need for dramatic social change.

Taking the diffusion of cultural authority in contemporary societies as its premise, the cultural turn embraced a more pluralistic conception of culture, one that recognizes variations in social and individual experience and expresses commitment to values of equality and tolerance. As more people of different types are recognized as cultural actors, the position of culture within society and the terms of its analysis have been transformed. Culture comes to be seen not primarily as a distinct or overarching system of belief, but as something more pervasive and integral to everyday life – indeed, as the very medium of lived experience. The cultural turn, however, reopens the two overriding problematics that older conceptions of culture had once seemed to resolve: how to maintain social solidarity amidst the celebration of difference, and how to ground normative evaluation of action amidst the decline of cultural authority.

The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture demonstrates both the promise of the cultural turn and the outlines of a path for moving beyond it. Taken together, the 28 original essays collected in this volume constitute a cutting edge of the sociology of culture. The volume is framed by consideration of theoretical issues central to the cultural turn: agency and structure, constructivism and essentialism, system and difference. Successive sections in the volume explore the operation of
culture as cultural systems and as processes of meaning-construction in everyday life; as axes of group identity and of collective memory; as the animating energy of institutions and of local, national, and global citizenship. This body of inquiry across such a broad spectrum of substantive topics reveals, unsurprisingly, significant variation in ideas and methods. Emergent from these essays, however, is a new approach to the problematics created by the cultural turn – a gathering reconceptualization of culture that starts to define a basis of solidarity in the very recognition of difference, as well as a new basis for evaluative judgment in the absence of prescriptive cultural authority. This newly emerging conception of culture is an aesthetic one, which offers possibilities for intensifying and re-imagining the experience of civic life.

**CHAPTER SUMMARIES**

The opening section of the volume explores theoretical issues emphasized in the cultural turn, issues that resonate throughout the sections to follow.

What causes the transformation or reproduction of cultural systems? How is the causal nature of culture usefully conceived, once the idea of culture as either a “prime mover” or an epiphenomenon is rejected? Margaret S. Archer argues that from structural functionalism to structuration theory to cultural Marxism, most theories of culture conflate cultural systems of ideas with socio-cultural interaction. By postulating that these terms are analytically distinct, Archer is able to predict how the variations within each of them interact to condition different cultural outcomes over time, as part of a systematic theory of structure, culture, and agency. From this perspective Archer can explain, for example, why the Reformation and Counter-Reformation generated lasting sectarian conflict rather than restoring consensus in Renaissance Europe, when both were equally concerned with preventing the actualization of secular rationalism.

What is the relationship between culture and cognition? Is culture something out there that individuals internalize, like Bourdieu’s *habitus* or Durkheim’s collective representations, or is cognition prior to culture? Albert J. Bergesen argues for a radical essentialism: it is the mind or brain that is generative of culture, but we are hard-wired for plasticity, flexibility, and indeterminacy. In his view, culture is a set of schemas that can be combined in an infinite number of ways, much like a generative grammar that provides schematic rules but allows for infinite variation in language. Applying this analysis to art, he argues that stylistic variation is not a result of the socialization of artists into various aesthetic conventions, but the product of “an art faculty that enables us to produce an infinite number of unique artistic structures from a finite set of primitives, rules, and principles.” The properly sociological moment in the study of art is of the social power that generates selection of the dominant style of any historical period.

Cultural difference has been used as a critique of universalist categories such as the human subject or the autonomous individual, and to demonstrate the gendered, classed, racialized, or sexualized nature of the presumptively culture-neutral public sphere. Because cultural differences are implicated in social stratification, they also provide frequent bases on which to make claims for redress. But a paradox emerges:
the ongoing articulation of difference does not dismantle, but actually reproduces cultural systems. To move beyond the “difference dilemma,” Nancy Weiss Hanrahan elaborates a model of gender as a cultural system in which difference functions on three levels and in time. The temporal dimension of this model allows for the contingency of differences as they play out over time, without forfeiting the systematicity that is an important feature of culture and its analysis. The articulation of difference as a political strategy, and its chances of success, are considered in light of this model.

The next set of chapters articulates new understandings of cultural systems. What have been the consequences for cultural systems of the diffusion of cultural authority? How are they restructured and to what extent do they still orient action?

How does the transformation from industrial society to knowledge society alter the relationship between culture and knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge? Karin Knorr Cetina argues that cultural forms of inquiry are necessary to investigate knowledge processes. “Epistemic culture” and “knowledge culture” are to knowledge society as national culture was to industrial society, describing the structures and policies of the general knowledge-environment that sustain or discourage certain knowledge outcomes, as well as the arrangements, processes, and principles that constitute knowledge settings.

Ronald N. Jacobs argues that the focus on general interest and nonpartisan news media in sociological research obscures alternative forms of media discourse that have important implications for civil society. He maps media content between the poles of news and entertainment, of general interest and particular interest and of nonpartisan and advocacy reporting, and describes the ways in which these different types of media inform one another to produce a rich language of civic discourse. His research on the African-American press shows how an expressive medium with a particularistic audience and advocacy orientation can be a force of civic engagement rather than civic isolation.

Thirty-five years after Geertz’s seminal essay about religion, Rhys H. Williams examines how best to describe religion as a cultural system. Does it lend itself to a structural approach or an agency-oriented approach? Is it a form of implicit or explicit culture? Is it hegemonic or counter-hegemonic? Arguing that religion can no longer be seen as either functional or epiphenomenal, Williams prefers a conception of religion as cultural repertoire. In an increasingly complex and pluralistic society, particular groups make their own interpretations of religion explicit in order to promote them, often for political protest.

Vera L. Zolberg outlines the development of the aesthetic canon through the modern period, and its apparent dissolution in the postmodern one. But there is a puzzle in this seemingly straightforward narrative. If the categories and distinctions that once supported the canon have dissolved, if more types of work are considered art, if there is now a plurality of gatekeepers and indeed, of criteria of aesthetic value, how is it that there is still something we call Art? How do we explain the persistence of Art in contemporary conditions, in which the cultural authority to name it has been dismantled?

Antoine Hennion explores the quirky, seemingly eccentric, habits and dispositions of the amateur, such as the music lover who knows the location of every CD on his shelf but whose filing system defies rational categories. Challenging Bourdieu’s notion of taste as a classification system that can be mapped onto other social
indicators, he analyzes the interactions, devices, bodies, and objects through which taste comes to have these very particular forms. Taste, he argues, is a reflexive activity: through these modalities, both the specific competencies of the amateur and the repertoire of objects that she values are produced.

The next set of chapters considers the construction of meaning and the development of subjectivity in everyday life. How do we see or make ourselves—in the flow of interaction, through our manipulation of cultural objects, or through processes of meaning-making?

Tia DeNora considers how we use music to explore our moods, get ready for work, remind us of people we love, or set the stage for parties, sex, or shopping. In her view, music is not a structure—that is, not something that acts on individuals—but a resource for action, for the production of self, emotional states, styles, and interaction situations. Her model of aesthetic agency provides an alternative to the idea that music “reflects, anticipates, or is structurally analogous to social developments or cognitive styles” and points to the role of material culture in configuring subjectivity.

Material culture is also an important element of Daniel Thomas Cook’s research on the commodification of childhood. The baby shower anticipates and configures the child as a consuming subject—even before it is born. The implications of this seemingly innocent social custom are far-reaching. Cook argues that the commodification of childhood grounds consumption in the life course, lending continuity to a consumer culture that would otherwise be only loosely organized instances of buying and selling. He asks, what are the consequences if agency and creativity “continue to move in the direction of being predominantly responses to ready-made commercial meanings?”

Andrea L. Press and Bruce A. Williams consider “reality” television and what they call “lottery celebrity.” It is luck rather than talent, the ordinariness of individuals rather than their distinction or accomplishment that makes people celebrities on reality television. What happens when our accomplishments are restricted to the here and now rather than being made available for future generations? Ironically, when everyday life is all there is, it becomes devalued.

Maria Kefalas’s research illuminates the ways in which economically disadvantaged single mothers make meaning out of their experience. Rather than a narrative of lost opportunity, poverty, and despair, the women in her study see motherhood as a way to gain control over the chaos of poor urban lives, and as an impetus for positive advancement, including education and jobs. She argues that since class privilege structures the ideology of mothering in unrecognized ways, poor single mothers are really being stigmatized not for their mothering, but for their class.

The question of identity and difference has become a central concern not only of cultural sociology but also of political sociology and the sociology of social movements. Does the articulation of difference, often associated with positive group identity, necessarily mean the breaking down of larger forms of solidarity? How are we to understand categories of identity that appear fluid in many aspects of individual and social life, yet are often reified in the structures of social stratification? David Halle and L. Frank Weyher argue for the continued importance of a class analysis that is nuanced and takes culture into account. Their research demonstrates that people inhabit mixed and often contradictory class locations based on a wide variety of economic factors such as stock ownership, women’s labor force...
participation, and the impact of globalization. The failure to recognize this complexity can account for the difficulty of discerning statistical evidence of class culture.

Michele Dillon’s research challenges the narrow view that the affirmation of identity differences attenuates a commitment to a broader communal history, that difference is somehow antithetical to commonality. She explores how gay and lesbian Catholics work to reconcile their particularistic sexual identities with church doctrine, rather than choosing between being Catholic and being gay. In doing so, they contest and rework the universalizing identity narratives of Catholicism. Her research demonstrates that traditions have multiple strands that can anchor and bridge particularistic differences, making it possible to affirm difference from within, rather than in opposition to, a cultural tradition.

Orville Lee takes a more radical approach to the question of identity difference, suggesting that race is a “structured, cultural object” rather than a permanent feature of social systems and individual identity. Given that race does not inhere in particular individuals or groups but is a socio-cultural logic that imposes racial categories and meanings on individuals, does it make sense to continue to use racial categories for the purpose of making political claims? Do we need racial categories to redress the social injustices of race, or in doing so are we reproducing the very logic that is the target of critique? Lee argues that “the abolition of racial thinking would be a basic normative condition for social emancipation from racial antagonism.”

How are we to understand “collective memory,” when unified conceptions of culture and history have been challenged by the multiple readings and interpretations of differently positioned social actors? Who has the authority to make collective memory, and how do individuals orient themselves with respect to the past?

Barry Schwartz, Kazuya Fukuoka and Sachiko Takita-Ishii ask why Japanese teenagers feel accountable for their history while American teenagers do not, even though Americans rather than Japanese think that apologizing for the consequences of past events is appropriate. Presenting an alternative to theories that demystify history and commemoration as ideological forms, the authors argue for the importance of culture as an ethos or worldview that enters into the way individuals think about their relation to the past and future.

Jan Marontate analyzes the changing nature of museum practices as these institutions shift from sites of cultural authority to sites for negotiation between museum experts, funders, subjects of museum exhibitions, and the publics that museums serve. No longer the arbiters or final interpreters of culture, museums must respond to the claims of different groups to authority over their own material artifacts and cultural information. These changing ideas about cultural rights, authenticity, and cultural authority affect not only the curatorial decisions of museums, but virtually every museum practice (from the handling and restoration of objects in collections to the manner in which exhibition catalogs are written) and engage the public as an active party to the creation of shared practices and values.

“How can we remember terror, and how can we forget it?” Anna Lisa Tota poses this question in her analysis of the commemorations of the 1980 Bologna massacre and the 1969 bombing in Milan. She argues that the commemoration of terror requires constructing adequate sites and objects of memory, such as memorial
plagues at the train station in Bologna and the bus used to transport the dead from the scene. But it was the vitality of local councils, associations of the victims’ families, and their collective ability to press the state for resources that ultimately made the difference between the remembering in Bologna and the forgetting in Milan.

Robin Wagner-Pacifici argues that in liminal moments of rapid change, multiple perspectives, and instant information, the witness who can render, record, and remember becomes especially important in making the world intelligible. But the location of the witness in both time and space generates a number of dilemmas. All witnesses, whether third party observers or actual survivors, operate both inside and outside of an event; they are at once implicated in it and freed from its mandates. What does this mean for the autonomy of the witness, and how does it frame his action?

How do social institutions live in the experience of ordinary people? How are the discourses and practices that we associate with institutions constructed or maintained? How are institutional actors accountable to the publics they serve?

Magali Sarfatti Larson sees the profession as a disciplinary culture in that it is ordered, and creates order, on the basis of its mastery of a field of knowledge and its commitment to service. Today, as part of a more general crisis of governability, professions are undergoing a market-driven reorganization that forces on them a macrodiscourse based on risk, cost, and liability. Their consequent retreat from the public sphere vitiates both their claims to competence and their promise of ethical commitment to a social function. Larson calls for a democratic reinterpretation of the professions and the art of governing through serving the public sphere.

Every time we park a car or deliver the dry-cleaning and are reminded of the limits of liability, we encounter the law. Through narrative accounts of how people define and respond to the problems they confront in everyday life, Susan S. Silbey analyzes how legality is experienced and understood as people engage, avoid, or resist the law. She argues that the complexity of competing accounts and contradictory experiences actually strengthens the law as a structure of social action – a finding with broad implications for the analysis of social institutions and of culture.

The cultural turn in the analysis of welfare was strongly influenced by feminists who questioned taken-for-granted categories of analysis, revealing their gendered character and meaning. But is it necessary to sacrifice objective measurability to pursue interpretive analysis? Just as telescopes enhance our ability to see, John W. Mohr demonstrates that scientific tools such as formal models of analysis enhance our understanding of the social construction of welfare categories and its accompanying discourses. For example, Mohr maps a Galois matrix to reveal the tight homology between acting and knowing as mutually constitutive dimensional orders.

What does the chronic nature of scandal say about our public life? Why, because of that very chronicity, did the organized theft of a half-trillion dollars through government-encouraged bank fraud over the course of two decades attract relatively little public attention? Mark D. Jacobs defines public scandals as “ambiguous and suspenseful public dramas of the struggle between good and bad faith,” and claims that they “germinate in cultures of corruption, secrecy, and suspicion along the fault-lines of and between politics and business.” His case study of the savings and loan
scandal as a narrative of bad faith illustrates the way the “no-fault society” erodes the very concept of accountability.

The final set of chapters shows the utility of a cultural approach to problems of citizenship and democracy. What does culture have to do with the constitution of public discourse and public space? How does it enable and constrain civic action?

It is almost a commonplace that the more individuals participate in voluntary associations, the stronger democracy will be. But “do actually existing civic groups live up to their theorized potentials?” Paul Lichterman analyzes the “civic customs” of two local groups – a gay coalition and an alliance of mostly Protestant churches – and finds that their styles of membership (bonding) and self-understanding with respect to the larger world (boundary-drawing) offer very different possibilities for citizenly conversation and empowerment. His cultural approach to problems of citizenship adds nuance to the simple call for more civic engagement, and establishes a critical framework for evaluating the democratic potential of civic groups.

How should we be talking about cloning or genetic engineering? What are the appropriate terms of the public bioethics debates? John H. Evans claims that “thick” discourse concerning the ends we should pursue is being eliminated from the public sphere, replaced by a much thinner discourse focused on means. Linking this historical development, in part, to the exclusion of religious discourse from the public sphere, he argues that we need to find a way to use religious discourse – as one possible conversation about ultimate ends – to enrich the debates about bioethics in a manner consistent with our democratic ideals.

What are the implications of economic globalization for the emergence of a system of global democracy? Diana Crane compares the “hegemonic” interpretation, that globalization processes are dominated by transnational corporations in the service of an economic elite, with a “civil society” interpretation. In the alternative forms of the latter interpretation, the major actors are either a global system directed by international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, or transnational social movements that form advocacy networks and public spheres. Among the cultural flows Crane considers is the emergence of a rationalistic and scientized culture of experts whose purpose is to develop rules and standards for policies that may be globally applicable.

What does the closing of a theatrical production in Warsaw in 1968 have to do with the fall of communism 30 years later? Jeffrey C. Goldfarb argues for the central role of autonomous culture in axial political change. The alternative values and conversations of the arts and sciences are not in themselves blueprints for political action. But they can open up possibilities for an expanded arena of public freedom and suggest new modes of interaction – a “politics of small things” – that can have far-reaching consequences for the constitution of democracy.

Nancy Fraser argues that problems of social injustice should be addressed through a perspectival dualism that allows us to see the imbrication of cultural and economic forms of subordination. But what are the appropriate cultural terms? Rather than understanding cultural forms of injustice through categories of identity and difference, she suggests we consider it a problem of status, of “subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a peer in social life.” This effectively links cultural injustice to the normative issue of parity in interaction
and suggests that remedies be sought within social institutions, rather than in positive images of identity groups.

**Threaded Theoretical Issues**

True to the premise of the cultural turn, these chapters attest to the weakening of many traditional forms of cultural authority. Marontate discusses how cultural relativism undermines the cultural authority of the museum, transforming it into a site of mediation among the cultural rights of numerous claimants. As Zolberg recounts, under the influence of postmodernism, not only does the canon that enshrines artistic “masterpieces” lose its authority, but so does the very boundary that defines what counts as art. Hennion’s amateur is free to resist expert opinion in fashioning her own taste in the practice of reflexive self-expression. As the authority of the state and the authenticity of collective memory come increasingly under suspicion, officially promoted memories of terror evoke counter-memories emanating from civil society, as Tota documents. The significance that Knorr Cetina attributes to “epistemic culture” provides perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the weakening of traditional cultural authority, which casts into doubt the very production of truth and knowledge. In detailing one case of the “no-fault society” that systematically corrodes any conception of meaningful public accountability, Mark Jacobs demonstrates why chronic scandal is characteristic of contemporary society. Beset by the external forces of market and managerialism, as well as the internal forces of stratification and competition, the authority of professionals narrows to its technical component, in Larson’s analysis. No longer, as Evans documents, do theologians feel entitled to voice their views about ethical issues in the public sphere.

The weakening of traditional forms of cultural authority displaces rather than negates the varied ways large and small that “culture matters.” Because, as Archer argues, cultural powers are variable, in certain conditions culture has the power to cause societal transformation. Globalization can be conceived, as Crane does, as a set of cultural flows – and the type of flows will determine whether the process is “top down” or “bottom up.” As Schwartz, Fukuoka, and Takita-Ishii find, culture produces entirely different patterns of collective memory and accountability from one nation to another. Culture naturalizes the political and economic injustices whose workings, revealed by Fraser, are disguised by status distinctions. The culture of civic groups has the power, as Lichterman demonstrates, to narrow as well as to expand citizens’ horizons. Culture so strongly influences the way ordinary people understand their class position, as Halle and Weyher show, that it becomes a central variable in understanding any action (like voting) from the point of view of class. In more mundane ways, as Press and Williams note, culture helps young people formulate and navigate the soap opera-like melodramas of their social lives. And – among many other examples contained in these pages – culture, in DeNora’s analysis, helps align cycles of physical and emotional energy with the rhythms of everyday domestic routine.

Theoretical issues central to the cultural turn naturally receive attention in these chapters. Culture mediates structure and agency. By distinguishing system integra-
tion from social integration, Archer creates room for the causal interplay between culture and agency that produces either morphogenesis (transformation) or morphostasis (reproduction). Although DeNora’s phenomenological approach challenges Archer’s structuralism, she too asserts the strength of culture’s tie to agency. “The politics of small things” – in one dramatic instance witnessed by Goldfarb, a policeman’s principled choice to interpret the work of filming as a legal act of street drama rather than the illegal making of a movie – can precipitate axial political change. By affixing a signature to a report, distilling cultural authority from the act of authorship, the witness can terminate the liminality that effectuates such axial transitions, as Wagner-Pacifici observes. There are circumstances in which culture constitutes agency rather than vice versa, as Knorr Cetina argues in emphasizing the foundational nature of epistemic cultures. The civic customs that constitute the local cultures of the groups observed by Lichterman channel their activity in the public sphere. Consumer culture, as Cook explains, both creates and constrains the agency of children. Mark Jacobs explores the structural and cultural conditions that frame the struggle between good and bad faith.

Culture mediates constructionism and essentialism. To be sure, some contributors embrace pure constructionism. Lee, for example, emphasizes that race is the effect of a socio-cultural logic, rather than any embodied group characteristic, while Mohr maps with mathematical precision the social construction of welfare categories. Yet, many other contributors pose limits to constructionism. Bergesen goes so far as to argue, against the Durkheimian grain, for a radical essentialism, suggesting that culture is generated by exercising the mind’s innate cognitive capacities. As Schwartz, Fukuoka, and Takita-Ishii claim, collective memory is not only a “mirror,” that is, a projection onto the past of the interests of the present, but also a “lamp,” that is, a guide to the future rooted in the actualities of the past. Though Knorr Cetina adopts an explicitly constructivist approach to her study of creating and warranting knowledge, such “objects of knowledge” as microbes and chromosomes enter as “doers” – agents with equal footing to humans – into the process of knowledge production. While the social construction of motherhood, in Kefalas’s account, is perversely biased by class, not even that bias can negate the “bonds of love” experienced by lower-class mothers.

Finally, culture mediates difference and system. As Silbey notes, it is the play between three narratives of the law that creates a durable structure of legality: challenges arising in one can be met by another. Zolberg suggests that uncertainty – about styles, techniques, aesthetic criteria – has both replaced the traditional canon as an organizing principle and gives art its vitality. Dillon argues that Catholic gays and lesbians can reconcile the elements of their identity with the support of religious doctrine because traditions such as Catholicism incorporate multiple strands. Similarly, Rhys Williams sees religion as a cultural system sustained by the tension between established and liberatory forms. Ron Jacobs maps differences in media content as a system in which the particular and the general, fact and fiction are interwoven. Hanrahan argues that instead of destabilizing systems, difference generates the tensions or contradictions that keep systems dynamic and ensure their duration.
Towards an Aesthetic Conception of Culture

These treatments of structure and agency, essentialism and constructivism, and system and difference employ a wide range of conceptions of culture. Culture is variously conceived – in related but distinct ways – in terms of discourses, practices, meanings, performances, boundaries and schemas, as well as of values, norms, and systems. This range of conceptions reveals the creative ferment of the field, as well as the weakened cultural authority of older sociological traditions. Emergent from these chapters, however, is at least the outline of a conception of culture – an aesthetic conception – that promises to move beyond the cultural turn, by unifying on a more general level the variety of contemporary usages.

An aesthetic notion of culture has roots in the development of the discipline. The cultural turn grew out of the transition from thinking about culture as an elite and largely aesthetic practice to understanding culture as a medium of everyday life. The diffusion of what were formerly aesthetic terms such as creativity, sensibility, and meaning into sociological conceptions of culture is not surprising in this context. But aesthetic conceptions of social life also preceded the cultural turn, notably in John Dewey’s formulation of the aesthetic dimension present in all practical activity. Dillon and Kefalas demonstrate this in their accounts of loyal gay Catholics and low-income single mothers in the process of reformulating their identities – a process that, insofar as it “comes after a phase of disruption and conflict, it bears within itself the germs of a consummation akin to the esthetic” (Dewey, 1934: 15). Hennion’s amateurs satisfy another of Dewey’s criteria for the aesthetic: “To perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. Without an act of recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art” (54). Cook in effect illustrates Geertz’s conception that art is meaningful because it “connects to a sensibility it joins in making” (1983: 101). Consumption is aesthetic in this sense when, according to Cook, it “interweaves throughout social existence serving as a key mechanism for meaningful engagement with the world” such that dominant social values are organized by and derived from it. Similarly, Schwartz, Fukuoka, and Takita-Ishii explicitly adopt Geertz’s aesthetic description of collective memory as “inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.” Finally, for DeNora as for Dewey the aesthetic is an awakened sensibility at the root of agency, “the noncognitive, emotional and sensate predilection for action.”

To describe culture as aesthetic is not to reassert the primacy of art as subject matter in the sociology of culture, but rather to use art as a model of and a model for culture. A surprising number of these chapters do so explicitly. In Bergesen’s analysis, the Art Faculty is a metonym for the cognitive basis of culture. For Hanrahan, music models the temporal dimension of cultural systems. Ron Jacobs claims that the ways “fictional media” represent public issues frame the representations of those issues by the “news media.” Zolberg’s observation that uncertainty becomes the basis of the modern canon applies to culture in general – which can no longer be spelled with a capital “C.” Tota studies the “poetics of memory display.” As Knorr Cetina characterizes the epistemic culture of particle physics, it “brings
physics close to semiotics.” Mark Jacobs argues that public scandals cannot be understood without reference to their dramatic forms.

To employ an aesthetic conception of culture in its most abstract sense is to focus on the flexible yet objective forms of culture that emerge from the play of subjectivities. This hearkens to Simmel’s great essays on culture (1968), in which he describes the emergence of cultural forms from life. The tensions between objective and subjective culture, and between life and form, that Simmel expressed are aesthetic principles that resonate in most of these chapters. Art can hold differences in suspension – the difference between form and content, subject and object, or stylistic convention and individual expression. Rather than seeing these differences as dualisms to be resolved or as dialectics to be synthesized, the tensions between them are art and art works are open to interpretation precisely because these tensions exist. As it is articulated in these chapters, it is the play of these differences that constitutes culture, that allows for both the subjective experience of meaning-making and the emergence of culture’s objective forms. These forms are not just art works and styles, but also the schemas of knowledge and meaning, forms of interaction, specific discourses, and everyday practices that we understand as culture.

This abstract dimension of an aesthetic conception of culture finds evidence in many chapters. Archer declares that the cultural system, although largely the product of socio-cultural interaction, has an objective existence as the set of all intelligibles. Silbey discovers how a social institution like the law lives in the activities of ordinary people. The diverse interactions of everyday life accumulate to produce unified and integral legal structures because people act before, with, and against the law (depending on particular circumstances), in ways that mutually reinforce the competing orientations. As a result, “legality is different and distinct from everyday life, yet commonly present.” Mohr asserts that “culture shapes and conditions social distinctions that can be treated as objective.” Kefalas asserts that “culture should be seen as a system of meaning that orients action and creates texture to human experience.” Starting from the Simmelian premise that witnessing requires a mixture of proximity and distance, Wagner-Pacifci herself witnesses the act of witnessing, painting a tableau that freezes (however temporarily) the ongoing movement of social time. Lee construes race – in its ugly, objective effect – as “a set of durable, structural, symbolically mediated relations that arise from the constitutive force of racial categories and racially defined practice.” Marontate explores how the museum embodies the collective understanding of culture constituted by the “complex interplay of material and symbolic practices.” Tota embraces a scholarly tradition in which “collective memories are conceived in the relation between form and content.” For Goldfarb, cultural freedom remains sacrosanct because it is “sociologically constituted through an ongoing and free conversation through time and space in the language of a cultural form.”

**BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN**

The outline of an aesthetic conception of culture emerging from these chapters promises to unblock cultural theory from issues that threaten to stalemate it. It embraces neither functional nor ideological conceptions of culture, while combining objectivism and subjectivism. It is possible to avoid the overdeterminations of social...
action by agency and structure by focusing cultural analysis “at the right level of
generality,” as DeNora argues. It is possible to avoid the conundrum of essentialism
and constructivism by recognizing the co-formation of a set of objects and the frame
of their appreciation; as Hennion explains, “the means we give ourselves to grasp the
object are part of the effects it can produce.” It is possible to avoid the paradox of
system and difference by viewing culture itself, in the manner of Hanrahan, as
temporal and complex, with enough flexibility to sustain its play of differences; or,
as Marontate suggests, as a mediation process through which they are negotiated.

An aesthetic conception of culture also recasts in promising ways the vexing issues
about civic life raised by the cultural turn. These chapters suggest, first, an emergent
conception of social solidarity based on the recognition of difference rather than on
the internalization of common values or on shared identity. Just as art mediates
between the universal and the particular, an aesthetic conception of culture can
account for difference as a defining feature of civic life without elevating it to a first
principle, above or in opposition to forms of solidarity. Ron Jacobs, as we have
already mentioned, shows that the particularistic nature of the African-American
press promotes civic engagement, integrating blacks not only into the African-
American community but also into the larger public sphere. Dillon argues that the
affirmation of identity differences can take place within, rather than in opposition
to, a cultural tradition – gay and lesbian Catholics reconnect with the church as they
assert a particularist identity.

Fraser suggests that the unrecognized cultural dimensions of economic difference
and the similarly unrecognized economic dimensions of status difference create
insuperable obstacles to solidarity across divides of class and status. To achieve
that goal, and to ameliorate the injustices of both economic maldistribution and
cultural misrecognition, differences in status must be explicitly recognized and
addressed. The move here is not to eliminate group difference altogether – a perhaps
desirable but admittedly remote possibility, given the ways in which conceptions of
both identity and interest are organized – but to find a basis of solidarity across lines
of difference in the principle of parity. By distinguishing between identity differences
and differences of status, between culture and political economy, Fraser articulates a
vision of social solidarity on the twin foundations of difference and equality. In
support of Fraser’s transformative politics of recognition, Lee suggests that the
deconstruction of racial thinking and racial categories is a precondition of social
justice and, by implication, of social solidarity. And in Kefalas’s analysis, economically
advantaged mothers are unable to appreciate the values shared with impover-
ished mothers for similar reasons of cultural misrecognition.

An aesthetic conception of culture also suggests a new approach to the problem of
finding a ground for normative evaluation. Although the analyses in these chapters
are presented with dispassion, they are informed by discernible, if sometimes impli-
cit, normative commitments. Many of these chapters, as noted, concern the respect
for identity differences; others, issues of transparency and accountability; still others, ways of
broadening and deepening the engagement with civic life. Even if authoritative
cultural prescriptions no longer provide objectifiable standards for judging civic
conduct, culture still shapes the very conditions and possibilities of civic life. As
these chapters illustrate, the way that culture does so makes a great difference.
Uncertainty about the canon creates opportunities for promoting multiculturalism.
If the mass media provide the last communicative space in which a politically
inclusive public life is still possible, the different forms and genres of the media can expand the language of civic discourse. The ways consumer culture shapes the very nature of childhood detract from civic training. Collective memory of the past profoundly affects civic relations in the present. For democracy to survive terror, it must commemorate terror in ways that both depend on and help sustain the health of civil society. Debates about museum exhibits involve issues of civic “representation”; the witness mediates history itself. Welfare professionals exercise control over their clients largely by discursive means; to reclaim democracy, welfare professionals need to reenter the public sphere to engage citizens in open deliberation about meeting needs. Cultural analysis explores the meaning and gradations of legality, looking beyond the given to the emergent and the durable. A culture of corruption, secrecy, and suspicion has produced an age of scandal that erodes public confidence and impoverishes the public sphere. The cultural practices of civic groups in establishing social bonds and social boundaries determines their substantially different interests in engaging the civic sphere. Autonomous culture can open up a free public space, creating possibilities for civic engagement even in repressive conditions. Explicitly or implicitly, religion can help thicken or thin political and policy discourse, and exercise an influence that is either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. The culture of globalization is similarly in the balance. Only by implementing the transformative politics of recognition can citizen groups overcome their cross-cutting differences to unite in support of their common interests.

A conception of culture that embodies this sense of civic significance is aesthetic in its capacity to reenvision the potentialities of ordinary experience. An aesthetic conception of culture honors difference and provides an expansive conception of social justice, while rejecting the kind of cultural relativism that eviscerates critique and erodes the basis of social solidarity. It imagines a civic life that is more engaged, more open, more inclusive, and more just. Democracy is itself a living work of art, in which actors cooperate with all others to live the most satisfying possible lives. The sociology of culture makes it possible for us to conceive this form of civic life as an emergent ideal, even while it compels us to recognize how remote an ideal it is.

References

Problems of Theory and Method
In every way “culture” is the poor relation of “structure.” This manifests itself in how the properties and the powers of the two have been conceptualized over time. On the one hand, where properties are concerned, there is no ready fund of analytical units for differentiating components of the cultural realm that corresponds to those delineating parts of the structural domain (roles, organizations, institutions, systems). Instead of different “cultural structures” being analyzed, by reference to the variable relationships between their parts (i.e., as different cultural configurations), cultures are still “grasped” as a whole. Consequently, whilst in the structural domain there are well-established concepts, such as a hierarchical structure, a centralized structure, an integrated structure and so forth, “culture” remains a Cinderella in descriptive terms.

On the other hand, in relation to causal powers, consistent attention has been given to how structure exercises an influence vis-à-vis agents and considerable progress has been made away from determinism and towards less hydraulic conceptions of “conditioning,” “instantiation,” or “habitus.” Again, there is no parallel for the exercise of cultural powers. Instead, the causal status of culture within social theory swings wildly from its being considered as the prime mover (credited with engulfing and orchestrating the entire social structure) to the opposite extreme, where it is reduced to a mere epiphenomenon (charged only with providing an ideational representation of structure).

My first argument is that it is precisely because cultural properties have been treated in this undifferentiated and holistic manner (they can only be “grasped” as a whole) that cultural powers have never received a rigorous analytical conceptualization (such that they sometimes have this effect, sometimes that effect, and often different effects for different groups). Specifically, (1) because culture(s) have conventionally been regarded as homogeneous, meaning that their internal components are always coherently integrated, then, (2) members of “a culture” are also presumed to share the same ideational homogeneity – a uniformity of beliefs, collective representations, central values, ideology, mythology, form of life, and so on. The
two presumptions are canonical. However, they are equally compatible with assigning maximal causal influence to culture, as society’s bandmaster (crude functionalism), or zero efficacy to culture, as the mirror of social structure (vulgar Marxism). Something is clearly amiss because both views cannot be (universally) correct.

Generically, what is wrong is the canon itself – on both counts. A priori, there is no reason why (1) the constituents of culture should be presumed to be coherently integrated, rather than harboring ideational contradictions (as well as autonomous elements, alternative sources of variety, etc.). And a priori there is also no reason to assume, (2) that all members share a “common culture.” If both assumptions are suspended, then it is possible to theorize about variations in cultural integration and their relationship to variations in social integration. In other words, the interplay between culture and agency could be examined in the same way as between structure and agency. The latter relies, as Lockwood (1964) first suggested, upon distinguishing “system integration” (in this case, the orderly or conflictual nature of parts of the Cultural System) from “social integration” (in this case, the orderly or conflictual nature of Socio-Cultural interaction between people). Then the two levels could be allowed to vary independently of one another, contra the cultural canon, and their different combinations could be hypothesized to generate cultural reproduction or transformation.

Such is the agenda for cultural analysis promoted in this chapter. It is based upon the stratified ontology of realism (Bhaskar, 1989), according to which different “levels” of social reality posses their own emergent properties and powers, which are irreducible to other levels (Archer, 1995: ch. 5). Before proceeding to discuss how to make and use the distinction between properties and powers of the Cultural System (henceforth C.S.) and the independent properties and powers of socio-cultural interaction (henceforth S-C), it is important to identify how these two different ontological levels became conflated within the canon. This is not a quest for historical origins per se, but an attempt to explain why the conflation between the “parts” constitutive of culture and the “people” as cultural agents has, (1) endured amongst theoretical adversaries (e.g., functionalists, Marxists and structuration theorists), and, (2) why the evergreen conflation of the C.S. with the S-C continues today in new forms, such as discourse theory.

**The Myth of Cultural Integration: Composition and Conservation of the Canon**

The myth of cultural integration is held here to embody “one of the most deep-seated fallacies in social science...the assumption of a high degree of consistency in the interpretations produced by societal units” (Etzioni, 1968: 146). The most proximate and powerful origins of this myth, which bonds the C.S. and the S-C indissolubly together, is the heritage of anthropology. There was substantial concord amongst early anthropologists about the main property of culture, namely its strong and coherent integration. This central notion of culture as an integrated whole, grounded in German *Historismus*, echoes down the decades. Malinowski’s (1944: 38) conceptualization of “an individual culture as a coherent whole” reverberates through Ruth Benedict’s “cultural patterns” (1961), Meyer Shapiro’s “cultural style”
(1962: 278), and Kroeber’s “ethos of total cultural patterns” (1963) to resurface in Mary Douglas’s notion of “one single, symbolically consistent universe” (1966: 69). This generic approach, based upon the intuitive grasp of cultural phenomena, entailed a crucial prejudgment, namely that coherence was there to be found – and a corresponding mental closure against the discovery of cultural inconsistencies.

From the beginning, this conventional anthropological approach conflated the two distinct levels (the C.S. and S-C), through eliding

- the notion of cultural coherence (or ideational unity and consistency) with
- the notion of uniform practices (or a community smoothly integrated into a common way of life).

Running the two together, as “a community of shared meanings,” conflated the “community” (S-C) with the “meanings” (C.S.). By so doing, the myth perpetrated a basic analytical confusion between these two elements, which are both logically and sociologically distinct. What were inextricably confounded in the myth and continued to be in the canon were

- logical consistency (i.e., the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture [C.S.]) and
- causal consensus (i.e., the degree of social uniformity produced by the ideational influence of one set of people on another [an S-C matter]).

Logical consistency is a property of the world of ideas, which requires no knowing subject, whilst causal consensus is a property of people and their interaction. The proposition advanced here is that the two are both analytically and empirically distinct; hence they can vary independently of one another. Certainly, this distinction was least visible in primitive society (although Gellner (1974: 143-4) maintained that it was not invisible) and the constancy of routine practices was readily made part and parcel of ideational consistency. The intensity of this anthropological image can be gauged from Evans-Prichard’s conflationary characterization of the Azande: “In this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he cannot think that his thought is wrong” (Evans-Pritchard, 1937: 195).

If this statement is taken as epitomizing the myth, it is very clear how the resulting canon conflates culture and agency, such that neither is granted distinct properties and powers. Therefore there can be no interplay between the “parts” and the “people,” and thus there is no source of internal cultural dynamics that could account for change. Consequently it is no accident that the locus of change was always located externally – in cultural contact, clash, conquest, or colonialization.

However, there is a special feature to note about the conflation of culture and agency in this early anthropological image of cultural coherence. Once culture had been defined as a community of shared meanings, thus eliding the “community” with the “meanings,” it really did not matter whether the assumption about coherence was attached to the consistency of meanings or to the smooth integration of the community, for the other element was incapable of independent variation. (Azande...
culture [C.S.] was a tight-meshed web in which Zande agents [S-C] were tightly enmeshed – none of their doings, including their thinking, enabled them to reflect upon collective beliefs.) The fact that both of these statements were endorsed in relation to “cold” societies simply rendered one of them redundant, and made the resulting cultural integration of primitive society an overdetermined phenomenon.

Basically, what twentieth century cultural theorists shed was simply the idea of overdetermination. The notion of a tight bonding between stable and shared practices and consistent and common meanings was a feature of the old and cold past. It ceased to be appropriate given the social differentiation and ideational diversity, taken as definitive of modernity from Durkheim onwards. However, what proved extraordinarily resilient was the conflation of culture and agency itself. Instead, the new features of modernity, and later of high modernity, were accommodated in diverse schools of thought by the development of different versions of conflationary theorizing. Conjointly, they elaborated the Fallacy of Conflation. Fundamentally, what is wrong with conflationary theorizing is that it prevents the interplay between the “parts” and the “people” from making any contribution to cultural reproduction or transformation. This is because in every version of the Fallacy, the conflation of the C.S. and the S-C withholds any autonomy or independence from one of them, if not from both, which precludes a two-way interaction between culture and agency.

FALLACIES OF CONFLATION

Conflation of the two levels of analysis always takes place in a particular direction and there are only three directions possible. The first pair make either the “parts” or the “people” an epiphenomenon of the other. They differ about which is held to be epiphenomenal but not about the legitimacy of conflation itself. Thus either version renders the dependent element inert, be it the C.S. or the S-C. Consequently, proponents of epiphenomenalism advance rather crude unilateral accounts when explaining cultural stability or change. In downwards conflation, some cultural code or central value system imposes its choreography on cultural life and agents are reduced to bearers of its properties, usually through (over) socialization. In upwards conflation, cultural properties are simply formed and transformed by some untrammeled dominant group, which successfully universalizes an ideological conspectus to advance its material interests.

However, the Fallacy of Conflation does not depend upon epiphenomenalism, or on rendering one aspect of cultural reality inert. This is shown by the remaining possibility, namely “central” conflation, where elision occurs in the “middle.” Instead, what happens is that autonomy is withheld from both “parts” and “people,” which has precisely the same effect of precluding examination of their interplay. Here the properties of C.S. and the properties of S-C are conflated because they are presented as being mutually constitutive. However, this is unlike everyday terms that involve mutual constitution, such as “singing.” There, the song and the singer have separate properties, some of which are irrelevant to the practice, such as the circumstances of the song’s composition or the marital circumstances of the singer, and some of whose interplay is vital to the practice – the song’s difficulty and the
singer’s virtuosity. Instead, in central conflation the intimacy of their reciprocal constitution amounts to an actual elision of the two components, which cannot be untied, and thus their influences upon one another cannot be unraveled. Once again, the net effect of conflation is that the possibility of gaining explanatory leverage upon cultural dynamics from the interplay between culture and agency is relinquished from the outset.

**Downwards conflation**

The transfer of the anthropological myth of cultural coherence to the Middle Ages was painstakingly crafted by Sorokin, who thus extended it beyond the confines of primitive society – a move that normative functionalists generalized to all viable social systems and that linguistic structuralists universalized. There are two common themes uniting these otherwise divergent forms of social theory. On the one hand, the preservation of the myth of cultural integration (C.S.); on the other, the introduction of the “downwards” inflection, through which the C.S. molded the S-C by shaping homologous mentalities.

Sorokin’s crucial contribution was his insistence on the internal “Logico-Meaningful Integration of Culture” (C.S.), which was apprehended by sweeping up a welter of cultural fragments to demonstrate its inner coherence. This entailed detecting the “major premise of each system” (Sorokin, 1957: 52), the key unlocking its governing architectonic principle. The presumption was that a key existed to be found, which is predicated on the assumption that Cultural Systems are coherently ordered. Civilizational exemplars were shown to be “supremely integrated” because . . . all the parts together form, as it were, a seamless garment” (8). This was his first bequest to functionalism. In turn, systemic (C.S.) consistency generated Socio-Cultural uniformity, because “the dominant type of culture moulds the type of mentality of human beings who are born and live in it” (606). This “downwards” systemic shaping of agency was the second element of his patrimony.

This heritage was foundational for the central value system within normative functionalism – as an a prioristic guarantor of agential integration through socialization. As Parsons declares, “cultural elements are elements of a patterned order which mediate and regulate communication and other aspects of the mutuality of orientations in inter-actional processes” (Parsons, 1951: 327; emphasis added). This brief formulation contains the leitmotif of systemic (C.S.) coherence, now elevated to a matter of functional necessity, and the downwards inflection, namely that central values shape social, that is S-C, integration – with the net result being the harmoniously functioning society.

If Parsons gave pride of place to an overtly coherent C.S., linguistic structuralism did the reverse. Lévi-Strauss (1968) accepted superficial systemic incoherence, but maintained that these manifestations could be deciphered as transformations upon an underlying code. Fundamentally, Cultural Systems could be decoded because ontologically the C.S. was a code, and therefore internally coherent. As is generic to “downwards conflation,” cultural agents were subordinated, being fully encased by the systemic mythology, which prevented any S-C exploitation of surface inconsistencies in it. Epiphenomena cannot act back to affect that which forms them. Hence, the S-C level was never deemed capable of introducing novel interpretations, transformative of the C.S. code.
Upwards conflation

Neo-Marxists take as fundamental precisely that which the downward conflationists had sedulously neglected, namely the role of power in the imposition of culture. What differentiates between the two types of conflation is not the end product, which in both cases reinforces the myth of systemic cultural integration, but how it is produced – for here we are dealing with a manipulated consensus. Consequently, conflation is from the bottom upwards, since it is Socio-Cultural conflict that generates the coherent C.S., through the basic process of ideological imposition. For Western Marxists, it is not merely that social relations produce systemic cultural integration, but also that capitalism as a whole can only now collapse from cultural undermining. Hence both cohesion and change at the C.S. level are generated upwards from the S-C level. Beyond this, the two versions of neo-Marxism most prominently associated with upwards conflation describe the causal process responsible for it very differently.

On the one hand, proponents of the “dominant ideology thesis” emphasize that ideological uniformity is accomplished by one class doing something to another, namely direct manipulation. To Miliband, for example, an ideological acceptance of the capitalist order is deliberately fostered by “massive indoctrination” (Miliband, 1969: 266), while in similar vein, Marcuse argues that “one-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information” (Marcuse, 1964: 14).

As Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner summarize the case, “through its control of ideological production, the dominant class is able to supervise the construction of a set of coherent beliefs” (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1980: 1–2). This contains two dubious assumptions: that the class seeking to produce a manipulated consensus will do so unproblematically, and that because a class has a consistent set of material interests, these will necessarily be given coherent ideational expression (which Marx himself ridiculed in relation to liberalism).

On the other hand, the Frankfurt School does not rely upon the indoctrination of one group by another, but rather on how the expanding pursuit of technical control in advanced industrial societies results in distorted communication for the whole human race. Material interest is still the motor, but the interest in technical control is no longer narrowly confined to a “ruling class,” and the instrument for the diffusion of its ideas is no longer indoctrination but the colonization of the lifeworld by the empirical-analytical sciences – producing a “technocratic consciousness.” When we think of ourselves and our social relations in these objectified terms, moral debate becomes inert and social critique moribund. Nevertheless, interest remains the source of S-C domination, which is then upwardly reproduced at the C.S. level as “knowledge.” Moreover, the consistency of the C.S. is greater than ever before because it is grounded in a network of scientific propositions that work – in their own domain. Consequently, to Habermas, “Technocratic consciousness is…‘less ideological’ than all previous ideologies. For it does not have the opaque force of a delusion…It is less vulnerable to reflection, because it is no longer only ideology” (Habermas, 1970: 111).
Central Conflation

This position results from a critique of the previous versions. When culture is held to work surreptitiously “behind the back” of every agent (downwards version), this omits the necessary role of human agency in constituting and reconstituting culture; when culture is seen as merely the imposition of one group’s worldview upon others (upward version), what is omitted is the necessity of culture as the medium of any action at all, a fact that would have to be faced were domination and manipulation ever overcome. Nevertheless, an element is rescued from each of the earlier versions and recombined. From downwards conflation what is salvaged is the Cultural System as a semiotic order, supplying a corpus of meanings that are necessarily drawn upon in the production of each act. From upwards conflation what is rescued and “democratized” is the continuous and indispensable contribution of S-C; all social agents are held to know a great deal about the production and reproduction of their society, which thus depends upon the skilled performances of each of its members.

Central conflation is a position from which the C.S. level and the S-C levels are held to be mutually constitutive. Now it is quite possible to endorse the “centrism” of this approach, accepting that human agents shape culture, but are themselves culturally molded, without eliding the two levels (C.S. and S-C). Indeed this is the stance adopted in the rest of the chapter. However, central conflation does elide the two because they are regarded as two faces of an inseparable “duality.” The conceptualization of their mutual constitution as a simultaneous process means that there is no way of untying the constitutive elements. The properties of the C.S. and the S-C may be different, but none is acknowledged to have the temporal priority and relative autonomy vis-à-vis the other that would grant it independent causal efficacy. The intimacy of their interconnection denies this and hence it is impossible to examine their interplay.

The resulting difficulty is that central conflation precludes any theoretical specification of the conditions conducive to cultural reproduction versus cultural transformation. On the contrary, the “duality of culture” itself oscillates between endorsing (1) the hyperactivity of agency, the corollary of which is the intrinsic volatility of the C.S., and (2) the remarkable coherence of ordering rules, associated instead with the essential recursiveness and routinization of S-C life.

In structuration theory, agential (S-C) hyperactivity is an ineluctable consequence of all systemic (C.S.) rules being defined as transformative, thus enabling “people’s” interpretations to transfigure the “parts” of the system, namely rules themselves. However, if “all social rules are transformational” (Giddens, 1979: 64), it follows that agents enjoy very high degrees of freedom – at any time they could have acted otherwise, intervening for change or for maintenance of the cultural status quo. Hence the counterfactual image of agential hyperactivity, in which these generous degrees of freedom are explored and exploited at the S-C level. Hence too, the C.S. becomes highly volatile if “change, or its potentiality is thus inherent in all moments of social reproduction” (114). This face of “duality” represents an endorsement of S-C → C.S.
The other face of the “duality of culture” is intended to rectify the previous image, but overcorrects by generating a counter image of “chronic recursiveness.” Basically, agents have to draw upon rules (C.S.) in order to act and these are thus reconstituted through interaction (S-C). Here, Giddens fully endorses the linguistic analogy by claiming that when agents ineluctably draw upon systemic rules they necessarily invoke the entire matrix constituting the C.S., “in the sense in which the utterance of a grammatical sentence presupposes the absent corpus of syntactical rules that constitute the language as a totality” (Giddens, 1979: 71). Thus the myth of cultural integration resurfaces, for it is more than dubious that the rules regulating social practices have the same mutually implicative nature as syntax.

However, in this way, structuration theory is committed to the total and totalizing coherence of the C.S. – such that agents’ inescapable use of it embroils them in its stable reproduction. The pendulum swings so far the other way that we are now presented with another overintegrated view of “man,” for the “duality of culture” ineluctably entwines the smallest item of day-to-day behavior with systemic attributes, thus generating routinized patterns of action. This face of the “duality of culture” represents the contrary endorsement of C.S. → S-C.

Taken together, the two faces of the “duality of culture” can reveal nothing about the conditions that explain when cultural transformation rather than cultural reproduction will or does occur. Because both are possible at every moment, then central conflation provides no purchase upon the processes that account for cultural dynamics. Structuration theory tells us that both structure and agency are inextricably involved, but because they are inseparable in their mutual constitution, the interplay of their properties and powers cannot be disentangled to supply an explanatory account of why cultural matters are so rather than otherwise.

THE NONCONFLATIONARY APPROACH TO CULTURE: ON ANALYTICAL DUALISM

In contradistinction to every version of conflation is the social realist approach advanced here, which is based four-square upon analytical dualism. This is quite distinct from philosophical dualism, for it is not suggested that separate entities are involved. Realists regard structural properties as emergent from and activity-dependent upon agency, whilst structural powers only exercise causal efficacy by working through agency. Therefore, it is only analytically separable components that are distinguished. The same assumptions are made in a realist theory of culture. Specifically the C.S. is conceptualized as emergent from S-C interaction and is only operative through it. The two are distinguished by virtue of their different and irreducible properties and powers. This distinction is justified as follows and turns out to be familiarly quotidian.

In developing a conceptual framework for employing analytical dualism in cultural analysis, culture as a whole is defined as referring to all intelligibilia, that is to any item that has the dispositional ability to be understood by someone – whether or not anyone does so at a given time. Within this corpus, the C.S. is that subset of items to which the law of contradiction can be applied (i.e. society’s propositional register at any given time). Contradictions and complementarities are logical properties of the world of ideas, of World Three as Popper (1972: 298–9) terms it, or, if
preferred, of the contents of libraries. We use this concept every day when we say that the ideas of X are consistent with those of Y, or that theory or belief A contradicts theory or belief B. In so doing, we grant that a C.S. has an objective existence and autonomous relations amongst its components (doctrines, theories, beliefs, and individual propositions). These are independent of anyone’s claim to know, to believe, to assert or to assent to them, because this is knowledge independent of a knowing subject – like any unread book.

However, the above is quite different from another kind of everyday statement, namely that the ideas of X were influenced by those of Y, where we refer to the influence of people on one another – such as teachers on pupils, television on its audience, or earlier thinkers on later ones. The latter depend upon causal relations, that is the degree of cultural uniformity produced by the imposition of ideas by one set of people on another through the whole gamut of familiar techniques, which often entail the use of power – argument, persuasion, manipulation, and mystification.

At any moment, the C.S. is the product of historical S-C interaction, but having emerged (cultural emergence being a continuous process) then qua product, it has properties but also powers of its own kind. Like structure, some of its most important causal powers are those of constraints and enablements. In the cultural domain these stem from contradictions and complementarities. However, again like structure, constraints require something to constrain, and enables something to enable. Those “somethings” are the ideational projects of people – the beliefs they seek to uphold, the theories they wish to vindicate, the propositions they want to be able to deem true.

In other words, the exercise of C.S. causal powers is dependent upon their activation from the S-C level. What ideas are entertained socio-culturally, at any given time, result from the properties and powers belonging to that level. Obviously, we social agents do not live by propositions alone; we generate myths, are moved by mysteries, become rich in symbols, and ruthless at manipulating hidden persuaders. These elements are precisely the stuff of the S-C level, for they are all matters of interpersonal influence – from hermeneutic understanding, at one extreme, to ideological assault and battery, at the other. It is interaction at the S-C level that explains why particular groups wish to uphold a particular idea – or to undermine one held by another group. Once they do, then their ideational projects will confront C.S. properties (that were not of their own making) and unleash these systemic powers upon themselves – which they may seek to realize or to contain. However, the S-C level possesses causal powers of its own kind in relation to the C.S.; it can resolve apparent contradictions and respond adaptively to real ones, or explore and exploit the complementarities it confronts, thus modifying the cultural system in the process. It can set its own cultural agenda, often in relation to its structurally

Table 1.1 The distinction between the Cultural System and Socio-Cultural levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural level</th>
<th>Dependent upon</th>
<th>Type of relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural System</td>
<td>Other ideas</td>
<td>Logical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Cultural</td>
<td>Other people</td>
<td>Causal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
based interests, by creatively adding new items to the systemic register. In these ways, the S-C level is responsible for elaborating upon the composition of the C.S. level. Relationships between the two levels are summarized in table 1.1.

In turn, the relations between them form the three phases of an analytical cycle made up of <Cultural Conditioning → Socio-Cultural Interaction → Cultural Elaboration>. In fact, the final phase may culminate at T⁴ (see figure 1.1) in either morphogenesis (transformation) or morphostasis (reproduction). In both cases, T⁴ constitutes the new T¹, the conditional influences affecting subsequent interaction. This explanatory framework, which operationalizes analytical dualism for undertaking practical cultural investigations, depends upon two simple propositions: that cultural structure necessarily predates the actions that transform it, and that cultural elaboration necessarily postdates those actions.

Cultural Conditioning (C.S.)

This phase is concerned with the effects of holding ideas that stand in particular logical relationships of contradiction or complementarity to other ideas. To hold such ideas is to activate the C.S. powers of constraint and enablement, but why they are held is an S-C question whose answer would require historical recourse.

“Constraining contradictions” exist when there is an internal or necessary relationship between the ideas (A), advanced by a given group, and other ideas (B), which are lodged in the C.S. – and yet (A) and (B) are in logical tension. Durkheim provides a superb historical example of this in his analysis of the logical inconsistencies in which Christianity was embroiled, from earliest times, because its inescapable dependence upon classicism confronted the Church with “a contradiction against which it has fought for centuries” (Durkheim, 1977: 22). Because the relationship between (A) and (B) is a necessary one, their contradiction could not be evaded by the simple renunciation of (B) – Christians could not repudiate the classical languages in which the Gospel was enunciated nor the classical philosophical concepts through which it was theologically explicated. Although substantively far removed, the “constraining contradiction” also confronts any explanatory theory (A), which is advanced in science, but whose observational theory (B) does not provide immediate empirical corroboration – that is if scientists think they have good reason not to jettison (A) (Lakatos, 1970).

What the “constraining contradiction” does in practice is to confront those committed to (A), who also have no option but to live with (B) as well, with a particular situational logic. According to this logic, given their continuing dedication to (A) (its abandonment is always possible because conditioning is never determinism), then they are constrained to deal with (B) in a specific manner. Since (A) and
(B) are logically inconsistent, then no genuine resolution is possible between them, but if (B) remains unaltered, it threatens the credibility or tenability of (A). Consequently, the situational logic directs that continued adherence to (A) entails making a correction of its relationship with (B) mandatory. Corrective action involves addressing the contradiction and seeking to repair it by reinterpretation of the ideas involved. The generic result will be some form of syncretism that brings about union between the antithetical but indispensable sets of ideas. Obviously, for protagonists of (A), their interest is in concentrating upon syncretic reinterpretations of (B), in order to make it compatible. However, they may be driven to more “generous” syncretic endeavors because the unificatory thrust of the corrective repairs can be deflected by their socio-cultural reception. Whether or not a syncretic formula can be made to stick depends upon how it meshes with the state of S-C integration in society.

At the systemic (C.S.) level, the direct counterpart of the “constraining contradiction” is the necessary or “concomitant compatibility,” because it bears the same formal features in reverse and its conditional influence is that of enablement. In other words, invoking idea (A) also necessarily evokes idea (B), but since the (B) upon which this (A) depends is consistent with it, then (B) buttresses adherence to (A). Consequently (A) occupies a congenial environment of ideas whose exploration, far from being fraught with danger, yields a treasure trove of confirmation and corroboration because of the logical consistency of the ideas involved. This was the generic feature that Weber analyzed as linking the religious beliefs, rationale for status distribution, and the economic ethos of Ancient India and China. A similar relationship obtained between classical economics and utilitarian philosophy. Modern examples are so abundant in natural science that Kuhn was tempted into portraying the whole enterprise as a succession of paradigms, each of which constituted a cluster of “concomitant complementarities” (Kuhn, 1962).

What emerges is an enlarged and highly consistent conspectus. It represents a substantial increase in cultural density, by which this sector of the C.S. becomes especially rich in fine and subtle distinctions and develops an elaborate vocabulary to describe them. The end product of this extensive exploration and inclusive formalization is a growth in ideational systematization (i.e., the “strengthening of pre-existing relations among the parts, the development of relations among parts previously unrelated, the gradual addition of parts and relations to a system, or some combination of these changes” [Hall and Hagen, 1969: 36]). The intricacies of caste rights, the detailed protocols for “normal science,” and the bulging libraries of exegetical literature are produced by the same systemic conditioning.

The more complex the internal structure of such a corpus of ideas becomes, the more difficult it is to assimilate new items, without major disruption to the delicately articulated interconnections. Tight and sophisticated linkages eventually repel innovation because of its disruptive capacity. This is the result of the situational logic of protection. Its implications within the conspectus is that it progressively accommodates fewer and fewer radical innovations until, in Kuhn’s words, it “suppresses fundamental novelties because they are fundamentally subversive of its basic commitments” (Kuhn, 1962: 5). Weber, of course, made the same point about the effects of complex ritualization in Hinduism being incapable of the innovative “germination of capitalism in its midst” (Weber, 1967). The implications for relations between the conspectus and its external environment is protective insulation
against disruptive incursions – the most notable example being the Chinese Edict of Seclusion.

The situational logic of protection means brooking no rivals from outside and repressing rivalry inside. The former is at the mercy of “international relations”; the latter depends upon the success of its main socio-cultural thrust towards cultural reproduction in the (relevant) population. Ultimately, whether or not this sticks and endures turns upon cui bono; nonbeneficiaries have no interest in sustaining protection.

The conditional influences of the two types of logical relations at the C.S. level (societal or sectional), just examined, are summarized in table 1.2.

### Socio-Cultural (S-C) interaction

The whole point of distinguishing between the cultural system and the socio-cultural levels is because the orderly or conflictual relationships characteristic of the one can vary independently of the other, which is crucial to the explanation of stability or change. If conditional influences were determinants, cultural stability would ensue in both cases. Yet this is not invariably the case. An economical way to explain why not is to ask what properties and powers may be possessed by agency and exercised during S-C such that the outcome is contrary to the conditioning. In other words, what accounts for discrepancies between the orderliness (or disorderliness) of the two levels? Firstly, why can social integration persist despite the existence of tensions within society’s system of ideas? Secondly, what explains a syncretic set of ideas failing to take hold in society or a systematized conspectus failing to be reproduced?

The answer to the first question (the persistence of disproportionately high S-C integration), seems to lie in the effective exercise of cultural power. Where upholders of (A) have the position and the resources to control the diffusion of information, they can practice a variety of “containment strategies” designed to insulate the majority of the population from dangerous familiarity with B. In this context, Lukes’s (1974) three-dimensional concept of power seems readily transferable to the cultural domain. Power is used to control the social visibility of contradictions and thus to prevent the eruption of S-C controversy. Its applications can vary from the straightforward first-dimensional use of censorship to the more subtle third-dimensional strategies that induce “misrecognition of symbolic violence” – percep-
tively analyzed by Bourdieu (1964), although always presumed by him to be last-
ingly successful. However, “containment strategies” are seen here as strictly tempor-
izing maneuvers, most effective against the least influential (Archer, 1988: 189–95).
Nevertheless, whilst a week may be a long time in science, exercises of cultural
power can buy centuries of quietude in the history of a civilization – especially when
ideal interests and the structural distribution of resources are closely superimposed.

One answer to the second question (unexpectedly low S-C integration), which
seems correct, is that independent Socio-Cultural discrepancies in orderliness occur
when the social (or sectional) distribution of material interests does not gel with the
situational logic of the C.S. (or subsystem) at any given time (Archer, 1995: ch. 7).
Important as this is, if that were the end of the matter it would amount to saying,
“cultural conditioning works *ceteris paribus* unless structural conditioning contra-
venes it.” It would be to retreat from advancing a theory of cultural dynamics
because only countervailing material interests (and their promotive organizations)
would constitute the properties and powers capable of resisting cultural condition-
ing. Instead, two scenarios will be sketched, which give ideal interests their due –
thus advancing a theory of cultural dynamics that parallels one of structural
dynamics, without collapsing into it.

On the “corrective” scenario, associated with necessary and internal C.S. contra-
dictions, the unificatory thrust of the situational logic can be deflected in three ways.
Cumulatively they spell a growing disorderliness in the cultural relations between
people that may ultimately precipitate a corresponding clash in the realm of ideas.
Firstly, there is progressive *desertion*. At the Socio-Cultural level no one is compelled
to take part in a syncretic enterprise. Exit is a permanent possibility and a steady
stream of deserter attends the unfolding of any constraining contradiction. Ide-
tional wranglings breed skeptics in the scientific as in the metaphysical domain, and
it has often been remarked that the ex-member of a school of thought becomes its
most virulent critic. This aggregate source of growing disorder then provides the
impetus for a bolder syncretic maneuver – a more thoroughgoing correction, involv-
ing interpretative adjustment of (A) itself. Ironically, these more radical syncretic
moves *themselves* become bones of contention among the “faithful.” Those who
were once united in their ideational difficulties fall into *schismatism* when they try to
solve them. A copybook example is the relationship between the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation, which generated lasting sectarian conflict rather than restor-
ing consensus in post-Renaissance Europe – despite both movements being equally
concerned to prevent the actualization of secular classical rationalism.

Finally, whenever the manifest systemic unity of ideas is reduced through public
wrangling, their unificatory role in society falls disproportionately. Those with an
interest in so doing can then harness social disorder to bring about a full actualiza-
tion of (B), whose contents have unintentionally become better and more widely
known as syncretic formulae made more generous adaptations to it. What is crucial
for a social group to be able to actualize a contradiction, by inducing a split along
the systemic fault-line, is that it has no cross-cutting allegiances with other social
groups to restrain it (Gouldner, 1967). This is why the French revolutionary bour-
geoisie rather than the leisured aristocracy (allied with the Clergy as the two
privileged Estates) was responsible for actualizing secular rationalism, anticlerical-
ism and laicization. The emergence of secularist Republicanism is a replication, in
the cultural domain, of the conditions Lockwood set out for profound structural
change – where social disintegration finally superimposes itself upon systemic mal-integration, forcing the latter asunder and actualizing the changes that had previously been strategically contained.

On the “protective” scenario, linked with internal systemic complementarities, a substantial drop in Socio-Cultural integration is the exclusive motor of change, for there is no tension to exploit within the C.S. itself. However, the consistent conspectus does slowly generate a sufficient differentiation of interests to unleash social disorder. The root cause is the increase in C.S. density, as the complementary conspectus is explored and then systematized. Eventually, it becomes too great to be fully reproduced (societally or sectionally) because it has become too elaborate and expensive for all to share. Consequently, C.S. density turns into the enemy of S-C equality, and the resulting hierarchy of knowledgeability progressively delineates different interest groups in relation to the CS.

As the cultural conspectus is gradually in-filled and work on systematization reduces to mopping-up, the concentration of rewards and benefits among the S-C elite (typically the intellectual hegemony of conservative old men) means that more and more of the “educated” become a category of marginals. They have made a major investment in the C.S., but are denied much return from it as it stands, yet are firmly discouraged from making cultural innovations to increase their rewards. The application of cultural power, which can maintain orderliness among subordinates, is ineffective against the marginals; culturally they are in the know and one of the things they know is that they are not rewarded for it.

The disaffection of the marginals correspondingly reduces S-C integration, but C.S. integration still remains high. The disaffected do not kick it for they have invested too much in it, but they are opportunists, ready to migrate towards new sources of ideational variety in order to increase their pay-off. Impelled by their ideal interests, boundaries (geographical, disciplinary, or paradigmatic) are crossed and the departure of these disruptive S-C elements is not resisted. In short, marginal migrants go out seeking new but complementary items (novel but consistent ideas, skills, techniques) to augment their ideal interests. From this a distinctive type of cultural change emerges – born of innovative amalgamation.

**Cultural Elaboration**

Although the above two scenarios have been presented as ones that may unreel autonomously within the cultural realm, there is no denying that in reality they are usually accelerated and decelerated by their interaction with structural factors. What is of particular importance is how far structure differentiates material interest groups that reinforce or cross-cut the Socio-Cultural alignments conditioned by the C.S. This interplay between culture and structure is even more marked when we turn, in conclusion, to the ways in which cultural elaboration can be independently introduced from the Socio-Cultural level. However, although such social conflict may well be fueled by structural cleavages and divisions, neither the form of cultural interaction involved nor the type of cultural changes induced can be reduced to epiphenomena of structure. This is because there is considerable cultural work to be done by agents when the ideas with which they are dealing are only contingently rather than necessarily related – for here, agency alone is responsible for bringing these ideas into conjunction and achieving social salience for them. It is
also because once they have done so, they have created two new forms of situational logic in which the promotion of their own ideal interests are then enmeshed.

In contrast to the “constraining contradiction,” where the alternative to a given set of ideas is also internally related to them, and thus constantly threatens them with its own counter-actualization, here the accentuation of a contingent contradiction is a supremely social matter. Accentuation depends upon groups, actuated by interests, making a contradiction competitive, by taking sides over it and by trying to make other people take their side. In brief, opposed interest groups cause the “competitive contradiction” to impinge on broader sections of the (relevant) population; it does not ineluctably confront them, as is the case with constraining contradictions, the moment that anyone asserts (A).

Perhaps the best and most important illustration of the “competitive contradiction” is ideological conflict. Were ideologies no more than passive reflections of material interests, then it would be impossible that they could advance, foster, or defend such interests. To the extent that they succeed, they necessarily do so in competition with other ideologies, which perform the same task in relation to opposed interests. In the process, their ideational conflict becomes subject to its own distinctive situational logic. In contradistinction to the “constraining contradiction,” here the situational logic fosters elimination, not correction. In the former case, agents were driven to cope with ideas that necessarily contradicted their own (compromising, conciliating, and conceding much en route), whereas those involved (and drawn into involvement) over a “competitive contradiction” have every incentive to eliminate the opposition. Because partisans of ideas (A) and (B) are unconstrained by any internal and necessary relations between these ideologies, there is nothing to restrain their combativeness, for they have everything to gain from inflicting maximum damage on one another’s ideas in the course of competition.

In principle, victory consists in so damaging and discrediting oppositional views that they lose all salience in society, leaving their antithesis in unchallenged supremacy. In practice, the cut and thrust between them has the entirely unintended consequence that far from one ideology being eliminated, both contribute to one another’s refinement. Charge is not merely met by counter-charge, but also by self-clarification and response (as is equally the case for competing scientific frameworks). Ironically, both sets of ideas undergo “progressive problem-shifts” (Lakatos, 1970: 158), thus inserting much greater pluralism into the C.S. Correspondingly, since both groups of protagonists seek to win over uncommitted agents, the effect of their refined interchanges is Socio-Culturally to increase cleavage within the population.

Finally, the existence of discoverable but wholly “contingent complementarities” at the C.S. level constitutes a source of novelty that is systemically available to human agency with few strings attached. Both the detection of these items and their synthesis are entirely dependent upon the exercise of agential powers of creativity. Certainly, the fact that such agents are on the lookout for such items is fostered by frustration of either or both their ideal and material interests, but there is nothing automatic about discontents yielding creative innovations. Certainly, too, the existence of contingent complementarities is a necessary condition for their exploitation, but the sufficient condition requires active agents to produce constructive and concrete syntheses from what is only a loose situational logic of opportunity.
When and if they do so, newly elaborated items are added to the C.S., which in practical terms represent novel areas of intensive specialization, such as radio-physics, molecular biology, experimental psychology and biochemistry. If and when they are successful (and defective syntheses are common), institutionalization usually follows, and as it does so more and more people are attracted to work upon the new source of cultural variety. In turn, variety stimulates more variety, because this interplay between the C.S. and the S-C represents a positive feedback loop. This is the exact obverse of the negative feedback mechanism that regulates the protection and reproduction of the necessary complementarity. Not only are the logics of the two kinds of complementarities the inverse of one another, but so are their results. Cultural variety is the opposite of cultural density. Variety feeds on what looks promising but is ill-defined; density deals with what feel like certainties, but are already overdefined. Variety pushes on to extend cultural horizons unpredictably; density stays at home to embellish the cultural environment systematically.

These differences are equally marked in their Socio-Cultural effects – specialization prompts ideational diversification; systematization fosters cultural reproduction. The proliferation of specialist groupings is fissiparous in its social effects, for as more and more sectional groups are carved out, they have less and less in common with one another and with the rest of society. Sectional groups, unlike polarized ones, are not defined by their opposition to others, but by their differences from everyone. The dialectics of specialization and sectionalism contribute to the progressive exclusion of vast tracts of the population from larger and larger portions of specialized knowledge. The division of the population into laypeople and experts is repeated over and over again as each new specialism emerges. This is a horizontal form of Socio-Cultural differentiation, quite unlike the vertical stratification engendered by the necessary complementarity.

**CONCLUSION**

The relationships discussed in the second part of this chapter are summarized in table 1.2 and figure 1.2.

By distinguishing between the C.S. and the Socio-Cultural levels and examining their interplay, the myth of “culture as a community of shared meanings” has been challenged on two fronts. On the one hand, four different components, constitutive of “meanings” (C.S.) have been differentiated – bodies of ideas which are syncretic, pluralist, systematized and specialized in their conditional effects upon the further development of ideas. This does something to rectify the prevailing descriptive
poverty of cultural units. On the other hand, the influences of the C.S. on the Socio- 
Cultural level (those of unification and reproduction) and the independent effects of 
agents’ own pursuit and promotion of ideas in society (those of polarization and 
sectionalism) serve to replace the undifferentiated notion of “community” (S-C). 
They point to different sequences of causal interplay between the two levels, with 
different outcomes, thus challenging every version of cultural conflation.

References

Allen & Unwin.
Archer, M. S. (1988) Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge University Press.
sity Press.
Cambridge University Press.
Paul.
Free Press.
Oxford University Press.
Brace.
Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In 
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lockwood, D. (1964) Social integration and system integration. In G. K. Zollschan and 
Malinowski, B. (1944) A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.
Sociology is right about the plasticity of humans as a species. We are profoundly flexible and take on cultural identities that are the product of socio-historical forces. Where social science is wrong, though, is our theory of the origin of that plasticity. We got it backwards. Humans are not creative and flexible because of multiple cultural identities, but have multiple identities because they are flexible. But to say humans “are” flexible sounds like Essentialism, and that sounds like the bio-substrate, and that, to the sociological imagination, sounds like fixedness, which is the opposite of openness in human response. (For the traditional sociological perspective on Essentialism see Fuchs, 2001.)

Because the biological and agentic flexibility seem inherently contradictory, sociology adopts the blank slate theory of mind (Pinker, 2002). We are empty vessels. What Essentialism we have is limited to lower order biological functions – we breath, eat, and obey low level stimulus-response processes – but all higher level cognitive and agentic functions derive from societal and cultural participation. In social thought the modern origin of this thesis can be traced to Mead and Durkheim. At about the same time as the American philosopher George Herbert Mead (1934) was thinking about the external origin of mental structures the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1965; Durkheim and Mauss, 1963) was having similar thoughts about cognitive complexity and mental classificatory structure. He also thought these were not innate, but forms of group structure internalized into the mind to provide cognitive complexity. Reflecting, perhaps, differences in their broader intellectual climates, Mead, embedded in a more individualistic American intellectual tradition, rooted the origin of mental structures (self, language, and even mind itself) in the flux of micro patterns of social interaction, whereas Durkheim, embedded in more collectivist European traditions, rooted his (collective sentiments, moral commitments), in the more macro external realities of society itself. Years later, Pierre Bourdieu (1979) would restate Durkheim’s culture-cognition fusion hypothesis.
calling internalized collective sentiments and moral order a “habitus.” This logic seems so air tight: if to say “biology” is to say “automatic response” then to say biology is to say fixed, and to say fixed is to say we do not / cannot get agentic flexibility from biology.

But biology, hence Essentialism, is not only fixed response, for brain is biology, and brain is mind, and mind is language (Chomsky, 1986), and language is the infinite use of finite means – and that – infinite use, is unfixedness. And when language is the primary means of symbolic social interaction, then that flexibility has an Essentialist origin. Most sociologists, though, think Chomsky on language is about innatism, which is mistakenly equated with fixed outcomes; but it is just the opposite. It is determined indeterminism. It is fixed cognitive mechanisms, such as the mind’s Language Faculty which provides by its very nature, creativity and freedom in language use, and hence in symbolic interaction, the capacity to play roles, and the ability to enact social identities. Here Mead and the Symbolic Interactionist tradition got it right. Human open-ended response is tied to language use; they just have a largely abandoned behaviorist model of language. The short of it is that if Chomsky is right, that language is not learned because it is already there, then to understand the agentic flexibility entailed in such linguistic based symbolic interaction we need to understand the generative capacity of the mind/brain and not the fixed and static quality of external cultural templates or schemas. The sociology of culture needs a cognitive turn.

This then is the agentic irony: we are flexible because we have very fixed sets of mental mechanisms comprised of computational procedures that have the capacity to generate an infinite number of linguistic outcomes from a finite number of more basic categories and mental representations. Categories, though, sound social, and from Durkheim and Mauss on primitive classification systems to contemporary cognitive sociologists (DiMaggio, 1997, 2002; Zerubavel, 1997; Cerulo, 2002) sociology continues to believe that the most primal partitioning of reality originates in social processes. Yet, it is increasingly clear that infants perform mental operations, make distinctions, and draw conclusions about the intentions, and minds, of others way prior to any sort of Meadian interaction that would be requisite for the socialization thesis to seem at all plausible (Johnson and Morton, 1991; Mehler and Dupoux, 1994; Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl, 1999; Bloom, 2000; Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek, 2000; Lee, 2000; Muir and Slater, 2000).

**Radical Essentialism**

The most difficult idea for sociologists to understand, therefore, is the Chomskyan insight that if we were truly open (i.e., capable of learning everything/anything), we wouldn’t be as agentically free as we are with our very specific cognitive hard wiring. But remember: it is not outcomes that are hard wired; its indeterminacy in the form of the mind/brain’s capacity to function as a discrete combinatorial system, which results in linguistic open endedness, which in turn results in the flexibility of symbolic interaction, and therefore the capacity to occupy an infinite number of social roles, interact in an infinite number of social situations, and cognitively manage, in principle, an infinite number of social selves and cultural identities. If such flexibility is rooted in biology (brain/mind mechanisms) we need to retheorize
the philosophical concept of Essentialism, for in reality it provides much of what we
know as human flexibility, choice, freedom, and free will. Such a new Radical
Essentialism, by reasoned implication, means that the insights of Postmodern
Theory into the multiplicity of selves, fractured selves, socially constructed selves,
contingent meanings, and infinitely regressing selves as signifiers, are predicated
upon very specific assumptions about an Essentialist architecture of mind. While
innatist assumptions seem the opposite of postmodern indeterminacy, the truth is
they are required to realize the postmodern theoretical project. What seems the
furthest from innatism (externalist postmodern social constructionism) is, in fact,
the most dependent upon internalist mental mechanisms (Essentialism), which are
absolutely necessary to realize the high degree of human flexibility claimed by
Postmodern Theory. This leads to the postmodern irony: Social Constructionism is
dependent upon Essentialism. Actually, there can be no Constructionism without
Essentialism.

In this regard the interesting thing about Chomsky is that while he is a radical on
political issues, his theory of human nature, based on his theory of language/mind, is
also quite radical, for he spells out how the mind, through language, generates
indeterminacy, creativity, and freedom, and if interdeterminate enough, generates
the prime postmodern assumption about the unfixed nature of human action. One
could combine any number of Postmodern theorists with Chomsky on nativist
properties of the mind and there would be no contradictions. Ironically, Chomsky
is quite critical of all sorts of postmodern theorizing and seemingly adopts a narrow
scientism, but it is his very scientistic theory of mind that provides the underpinning
for a realistic cognitive science of things like the postmodern self.

THE ART FACULTY

One place to begin to explicate the dynamics of such a Radical Essentialism is with
the sociological understanding of artistic competence, which is still predicated upon
the old internalization model where cultural forms come first and cognitive structure
second. But if models of language as a separate mental faculty now replace what had
previously been language’s purported external cultural origin, then maybe other
dimensions of culture, like art, can also be theorized as mental modules. Such a
cognitive turn in cultural theory would run counter to received sociological theory
which consistently argues that artists produce stylistic variation because of having
agreed to, internalized, or having been socialized into, various cultural conventions,
norms, plans, schemas, or habituses.

Becker, for instance, speaks of styles of art as external cultural norms, or conven-
tions, that are internalized by the individual artist, so that such “conventions dictate
the form in which materials and abstractions will be combined . . . [and] suggest
the . . . shape of a painting” (Becker, 1982: 29). This model is predicated upon the
blank slate hypothesis; form in expression is not derivative from the mind/brain but
external culture (conventions). This standard sociological idea of style as a property
of external art objects is not new, obviously, constituting the bedrock of the discipline
of Art History, which divides artistic behavior into so many taxonomic categories,
Gothic, Romanesque, Baroque, Mannerism, Minimalism, and so forth. The sociology
twist on this older tradition is to take these static external cultural patterns
and reconceptualize them as normative rules, or conventions, schemas, maps, or habitudes, which artists internalize, learn, acquire and so forth, thereby constraining their artistic behavior to mirror the external cultural template they have now made one with their cognitive architecture. Patterned artistic behavior is then explained as the product of being socialized into structures of expression, “conventions known to all or almost all well-socialized members of the society in which it exists…[that] everyone should follow”; [as they constitute] communally shared art forms” (1982: 29, 42, 225).

**Bourdieu’s circularity**

There is a circularity to this internalization logic that reaches its contemporary zenith in Bourdieu’s notion of socially patterned habits, where he argues, “the habitus is necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and perceptions” (Bourdieu, 1984: 170). Bourdieu (1979) acknowledges the importance of Chomsky’s idea of generative grammar and applies the concept to the culture/cognition interface, arguing, “the habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements and the system of classification of these practices” (Bourdieu, 1984: 170), which is virtually Chomsky’s characterization of the mind’s Language Faculty that both produces structured linguistic output and parses incoming sound to create linguistic meaning. But the mind’s Language Faculty is not “the product of the internalization of the division into social classes” (170), for it is not an external cultural template; it is not a class, group, or society specific cultural structure that can be imported to render socially specified judgements. What is the generative mechanism is the mind/brain; not the structures it produces. When Bourdieu argues that habituses include, “systems of dispositions…such as a linguistic competence and a cultural competence” (Bourdieu, 1979: 81) he is engaging in a double error, for linguistic competence is not “installed” or “internalized” from the outside, it is one of the mind/brain’s modules, and culture is not generative. It is the output of a generative process. But Bourdieu attempts to animate these external static cultural forms as having a generative property and conceives of learned habits as somehow generative, which they aren’t. Habits simply aren’t generative, nor can generativity be transferred to cultural internalizations yielding, somehow, generative socially patterned habits, what he calls habituses. This problem, though, is much more general than Bourdieu. It is sociology’s problem, as from Durkheim to the present we continue to take products of the mind and theorize them as the origins of the mind (Mead is perhaps the classic case, arguing mind arises out of social interaction). But while we may use our hands to hold things with, our legs to run with, and language and art to express things with, we do not internalize hands and legs from society, nor the mental organs that are the mind’s principles of language and art. These are the givens, not derivations.

More specifically the problem with the internalization hypothesis is the classic problem of the “poverty of the stimulus” (Chomsky, 1986). In the case of art the intricate and clearly rule governed nature of artistic behavior (painting in styles) cannot be reasonably traced to an equivalent intricacy and complexity of artistic socialization that would make sociology’s internalization hypothesis plausible. In
linguistics the question was how to account for a native speaker’s ability, in any language (English, Chinese, Navaho), to form endlessly new and never heard before sentences, given what seems to be little conscious awareness of the rules they are following, little evidence that they were instructed or socialized into these principles, and given that what experience they have had is often with partial, incomplete, or degenerate linguistic data. In short, the output is much more complicated and intricate than the input experiences to reasonably argue that they were derived from them. What is important for sociology to realize is that the same problem exists for a native painter in any style (Cubism, Realism, Neoclassicism) who can form endless new paintings within that style. Here the complexity of such artistic output is simply much greater than the complexity of artistic input experience.

In linguistics the problem of the gap between input experience and the complexity of linguistic output was solved with the default hypothesis postulating preexperiential knowledge of language, Chomsky’s well-known idea of the mind’s innate language faculty. But what of art? Might the mind also have a mental module for art? The answer, I think, is yes, and parallels with language are instructive, although not binding since the principles of the mind’s Art Faculty will be different from those of language. In this regard, as one does not speak language, but a language – English, Navaho, and so on – so one does not paint style, but a particular style – Cubism, Neoclassicism, and so on. Artists are also free to paint a virtually unlimited number of paintings in a specific style, which sociology argues derives from learned rules and principles, conventions, habituses, or schemas. But upon closer examination one cannot account for the intricate structure of artistic output in terms of the socialization experiences of artistic input, for artists seem neither aware of the rules/principles they use nor is it obvious they were instructed in them either. Also previous experiences with art styles are often fragmentary, incomplete, and of a mixed nature, such that the output of well-formed stylized paintings does not seem a direct function of their artistic input experiences. And while political, social, and economic controls do affect what is done with artistic output they seem less directly connected to the competence to produce art in the first place. What is done with the product of the mind’s artistic competence is an important part of the overall explanation of art; but the backwash model of output creating the original state of artistic cognitive architecture inverts the actual model, for artistic competence, like linguistic competence, is not learned from the environment but is given with the mechanics of our mind/brain as part of our bio-endowment.

The mind’s art module is also not the same as its visual system, which is a mistake many cognitive scientists continue to make in hypothesizing that art objects are just downloads of images the visual system constructs. In the case of drawing something seen in the environment, light does strike the external object, which bounces off and strikes the artist’s retina, which sends signals to the mind/brain’s visual system, which computes an image. But this image is not directly downloaded as motor signals to the hand to draw. Instead, it is sent to the mind/brain’s Art Faculty, where it is encoded in the rules and principles of the Art Faculty and then sent as motor signals to the hand to draw. For a diagram of these stages for the drawing of a tree, see figure 2.1.
Several naturally occurring systems are known to be based on underlying particulate units. These systems include (1) the chemical elements, whose underlying particulate units are atoms, (2) biological inheritance, whose underlying particulate units are genes, and (3) human language, whose underlying particulate units are phonemes and morphemes.

Abler, 1989

To this list I would now add art, whose underlying particulate units are things such as dots, lines, and shapes. What is important about particulate systems is that the combination of their constituents yields a new structure with properties not present in any of the initial constituents. In this regard it is said they make an infinite use of finite media, which was Humboldt’s (Abler, 1989) characterization of language’s creative or open ended ability. This stands in contrast to another type of natural system based on blending constituents, such as in geology and the weather. These make finite use of finite media. Particulate systems, and I would include art, “represent systems of hierarchically organized levels, based on dynamically stable, particulate units … [and] all exhibit change by a process of variation and selection based on these units” (1989: 1). For a visual illustration of these two principles see figure 2.2.

To understand the variation produced by particulate systems we can contrast them with blending systems, which, when their constituents are combined yield a value that lies between the two initial ones. So, combining hot and cold liquids, for instance, yields a warm liquid, a blended temperature value that lies between the initial states of hot and cold. Over time such a system results in averaging, hence a reduction in population variation, whereas when particulates are combined they both keep their initial properties and go on to form a composite structure that lies beyond those of the initial constituents. Continuous combinations and recombin-
Ations would lead to continuous diversification of artistic forms, rather than an averaging of forms, which can be seen in the fact that art history has not tended toward a blending of styles over the centuries but manages to constantly create new and unique style structures.

This is often explained as a function of human genius and creativity, which it is, but the actual model is more complex. The human capacity for art is contained in the bio-endowment of our Art Faculty, which enables us to produce an infinite number of unique artistic structures from a finite set of primitives, rules, and principles. Creativity and genius in the traditional sense of these words can use this mental mechanism to create more interesting structures – hence great art – but people with lesser creativity/genius can also use the same mechanism to create just as many new and different artistic structures. In this context the word “creativity” has two references. The Art Faculty exhibits the property of creativity as it follows the particulate principle and engages in rule governed creativity, which we can call Creativity1. This enables the infinite use of finite media in artistic behavior. Gifted or not, all artists are capable of creating an infinite number of paintings within the rules of a specific style. In this sense the man on the street and Picasso both possess Creativity1; as both have, in principle, the innate artistic competence to produce an endless number of, say Cubist paintings. What is done with this faculty of mind is the second meaning of creative which we can call Creativity2. This is usually associated with ideas like genius, originality, talent, ability, and so forth, and Picasso with his Creativity2, can create things with Creativity1 that the man on the street cannot.

The key to the Creativity1 in art lies in its operation as a particulate system. If, as reasoned before, it appears that the complex and intricate structure of art cannot be
explained by the socialization experiences of artists, then that complexity producing
capacity can be hypothesized to be an innate property of mind/brain. This innate
knowledge can be represented as rules or principles for the combination of a finite
number of artistic primitives, which in turn provides a generative blueprint for
snapping together particulates such as dots, lines, and shapes to construct an artistic
structure that is then mapped onto art materials (paint, chalk, bronze, etc.), which
results in an actual work of art. Art also has a *Recursion Rule* that allows elements
of artistic structures to be contained within themselves, so that a shape can appear
within a shape and that within another shape and so on in an infinite regress (in
principle at least). Therefore as the particulate nature of the Language Faculty, along
with the property of recursiveness, allows for the creation of a limitless number of
new and unique sentences, so too, for the same reason, does the Art Faculty allow
for an unlimited number of new and different paintings (or other art objects). This
works as follows.

The particulates of the Art Faculty snap together in a distinctly hierarchical
fashion to yield blueprints of larger composite artistic structures. For instance, we can begin
with the notion of the *dot* the smallest artistic constituent. When dots are combined
(placed next to each other) they yield a new composite structure, *line*, whose value,
importantly, lies outside the property of its constituent dots. Combinations of dots
vary in terms of their size and proximity of placement, so when smaller dots are
placed closer together the emergent composite structure is a more clear, clean, and
discrete line; and when larger dots are placed further apart the result is a more
vague, impressionistic, and fuzzy line. The former can be seen in High Renaissance,
Neoclassical, and Minimalist styles, while the latter can be found in French Impres-
sionism and Baroque style structures. The new particulate constituents are now lines
and when combined around space they yield a *shape*, a new composite structure that
lies outside the value of its constituents (lines), which themselves lie outside their
constituents (dots). At the next hierarchical level shapes can be combined to create a
new emergent structure that both contains constituents (shapes) but also has an
emergent property, a *composition*.

Like speakers combine phonemes to create words, and words to create phrases,
and phrases to construct sentences, so artists combine dots to create lines, lines to
create shapes, and shapes to construct art objects. Further, like language, these
combinations are not random, but appear to be rule-governed. For example, to
linguistically express the idea of having picked up a book, one could say, *Getted the
book I did* (the asterisk denotes an ungrammatical sentence). Normally we do not
use such a construction. We could, though, as it communicates the same meaning as
the expression *I got the book*, which we are more likely to use. Now imagine one
wants to artistically represent what one sees, say trees. This can be done any number
of ways. The trees can be painted with the top half in the gestural style of French
Impressionism and the bottom half in, say, the precise clarity of Photorealism, or
trees could be alternatively rendered in Abstract Expressionism and Cubism. Artists
have no doubt done this very thing, just as someone no doubt has said, *Getted the
book I did*. But with an almost rule-like regularity we do not combine words this
way and from the record of art history we do not seem to combine clear and fuzzy
shapes this way either, as there appears to be something like a *Consistency Rule*, for
the artistic construction of any particular shape and across all shapes within a
composition. Similarly one could render a number of trees in the Impressionist
style and compose them along a flat plane across the front of the painting, or one could render them with the clear line and compose them similarly. Both are possible, and no doubt artists have done both, but in naturally occurring artistic behavior, as seen in the record of art history, planetric composition of shapes with fuzzy or impressionistic lines tends not to occur. Instead planetric ordering is combined with clearly lined shapes, and impressionistically lined shapes are combined in a more vertical placement, receding into the picture plane. Wolfflin (1932) classically observed these associations in comparing High Renaissance and Baroque styles, but they are more general and can be found in later stylistic developments (Bergesen, 1996). In this regard there also appears to be something like Form Structure Rules governing which types of constituents can be combined to create larger artistic structures (Bergesen, 2000). In general these rules seem something like an art grammar specifying permissible constituent combinations, much like syntax does for the constituents of language.

**ART’S GENERATIVE CAPACITY**

Just as humans do not arbitrarily combine certain kinds of words to make sentences, they do not arbitrarily combine certain kinds of shapes to make paintings, as both art and language have underlying principles, or rules of grammar and style. These principles govern the combinations of particulates, whether words and phrases or lines and shapes, to create sentences and paintings. While the concept of rule is employed here, this does not mean normative cultural or social proscriptions. Instead, the so-called “rules” of the mind’s Art Faculty are meant as a characterization of the natural ways in which art constituents seem to be systematically snapped together in actual existing artistic behavior. Art faculty rules, then, are more like mathematical rules, such as the expression $3x + 2y$, where if whole numbers replace the $x$ and $y$ the expression generates an endless number of values. If $x = 5$ and $y = 4$ we know the result will have to be 23, if $x = 2$ and $y = 3$ the generated result is 12, and so on. The generative rules of the mind’s Art Faculty operate in a similar fashion. For example, we can replace the operation performed by the number 3 with one that states that shapes will be bound by a clear and clean line, and we can replace the number 2 with another operation that states that when these shapes are combined this will be done horizontally across the picture plane. This could now be rewritten as the expression *Clear clean line* ($x$) + *Compose shapes on a flat plane* ($y$). The $x$ and the $y$ can now be replaced by historically contingent subject matter, such as Christ and his disciples at the Last Supper. Then, when we perform the generative operation, this expression will yield a painting having some of the structural properties of Leonardo’s *The Last Supper* (1495–8), as the religious figures will be painted with a clear line and arranged on a flat plane across the front of the painting.

These generative art rules are independent of subject matter, so if instead of Christ and his disciples we substitute playful cupids, a nymph, and a figure from Greek mythology and perform the same operations we would generate an art object with some of the stylistic structure of Raphael’s *Galatea* (1513). The important point here is the similarity of the underlying artistic structure, or style, where the subject matter acts more as place holders (in a Saussurian sense) for the principles of art. This can also be seen if we hold the subject matter constant but vary the generative rules.
Imagine Christ and his disciples once again, but this time let the number 3 be replaced by an operation that instructs the hand to paint the figures with a more impressionistic, gestural, or fuzzy outline, and let the number 2 be replaced by another generative rule which states that if these figures are combined they will be aligned vertically, in front and in back of each other, such that they recede into the picture plane. Now, if we perform these operations the result will be an art object something structurally similar to Tintoretto’s *The Last Supper* (1592–4), where the underlying style structure is different (Mannerism vs. High Renaissance) while the subject matter is the same.

This time let us replace the operation of the number 3 with the operation of the clear clean line and replace the number 2 with the operation that aligns shapes along the flat picture plane, and instead of Christ and his disciples, insert more abstract subject matter, such as geometric shapes colored red, green, and blue, and perform the generative operations. The result would be a painting something like Ellsworth Kelly’s *Red, Blue, Green* (1963), which is three geometrically shaped fields of color painted next to each other. From the point of view of subject matter Leonardo’s *The Last Supper* is different from Kelly’s *Red, Blue, Green* – religious figures versus abstract color fields – but in terms of the underlying generative principles, or rules, regardless of the relative, variable, and contingent subject matter, these are the same style structures. And that is the important synchronic point.

Agreed, these are only two style principles, which is not enough to convincingly posit a commonality of style structure between early sixteenth century High Renaissance and 1960s Minimalist paintings. But if for the sake of argument we assume that there are other rule governed structural features common to these two styles, then we have a direct challenge to Art History’s conception of style, for there is no present theoretical model in which both High Renaissance and Minimalist painters could be considered instances of a single style. They are, as everyone supposedly knows instances of Old Master versus Modernist art. But are they? I would suggest they reflect a single style, for religious figures and fields of color are purely diachronic differences, while their deep generative principles are identical. Hence, on these grounds, they are the same underlying or deep style. From this point of view the vast edifice of Art History’s taxonomic ordering of the products of artistic behavior is largely predicated upon surface place holders rather than the deeper generative principles.

As a result sociological and art historical scholarship has often mistakenly argued for style continuity where none in fact exists. Consider the following examples. Sorokin (1937) argues that the Baroque and High Renaissance represent a continuity in style because of their similar religious subject matter. But this is only a difference in place holders and says nothing about their underlying synchronic similarities or differences. In this case they actually follow different sets of generative rules, which can be seen when we compare Leonardo and Tintoretto’s *Last Supper* paintings. Painted in the late fifteenth century, Leonardo’s is composed in accord with one set of generative rules (clear line/planetric placement of shapes) whereas Tintoretto’s, painted at the end of the sixteenth century, is generated by another set of rules (fuzzy line/recessional placement of shapes). That the subject matter is the same – Christ/disciples/dinner table – is only a surface diachronic fact and says nothing about the underlying deep structure of the art. Therefore, Sorokin was wrong about style
continuity between Baroque and High Renaissance; or correct in the lesser importance of noting shifting surface place holders.

For a second example, consider the overwhelmingly agreed upon designation of Modernism as a style that commences in the latter part of the nineteenth century, where Impressionism and Post-Impressionism are often seen as precursors of a modernist style culminating in 1950s Abstract Expressionism and 1960s Minimalism. Shapiro (1997: 323) for example, argues that the gestural renderings of Monet’s L’hotel des roches noirs, Trouville (1870) are precursors of the drips and dabs of paint of Jackson Pollock’s Number 1 (1948) and that both are instances of the broader taxonomic category of modernism. But this is another version of Sorokin’s diachronic error; defining style continuity only in terms of seeming surface similarity in artistic place holders. At the level of art’s deep structure there is no stylistic continuity between Monet and Pollock. Monet represents rules yielding gesturally outlined shapes and recessional composition, whereas Pollock follows principles dictating clear lines and a planetric ordering of space – the paintings are, as Clement Greenberg noted – famously flat. But what of Pollock’s drips; is that not an instance of a gestural impressionistic rendering of shape? Not necessarily, for shape in Pollock is the drip itself and each of them has a rather clear and clean line and they are all composed horizontally across the picture plane, whereas the Monet is comprised of shapes (hotel, flags, people) with fuzzy impressionistic lines that recede back into the picture plane, reflecting a different set of generative rules.

SOCIOLGY AND SELECTION

This chapter has largely been about the limits of present sociology of culture approaches to art styles and a brief discussion of some properties of the mind’s Art Faculty. I would like to end with a few comments upon the role of selection, which is the second half of the variation, overproduction, selection Darwinian dynamic (Abler, 1989) that characterizes particulate systems. Is there a place for the sociological in the creation of art and its styles? The answer is yes, but not as conventions, schemas, habituses, and other internalizations or conditioned responses, for they cannot account for the capacity of art to produce an infinite number of different paintings within the rule structure of a particular style, whereas this is precisely what the particulate principle accomplishes. The social, though, does enter the overall model in the process of selection, which when combined with the Art Faculty’s production of variation, constitute the two driving dynamics in the stable appearance and then change in styles of art and perhaps cultural forms more generally. As we have seen, art is capable of producing large numbers of different artistic compounds, yet in any particular period there appears to be a dominant, standard, or most prevalent composite artistic structure that is the central style of that period – Baroque, Dada, Gothic, Renaissance, and so forth. But to say there are predominant artistic composites is not to say there aren’t others at the same time, both as regional, local, or individual styles, and in opposition, or indifference to the dominant style. So while abstraction was predominant in the 1950s realism was also being painted, and no doubt others made rule governed particulate selections that resulted in structures we characterize as Impressionism, Cubism, Social Realism, or any number of other styles. No doubt some also painted the equivalent of *Getted the book I did,
that is painted half a tree in Rococo and half in Minimalism, violating the Consistency Rule, or composed impressionistically lined shapes along a flat plane, violating a Form Structure Rule as well. At any particular point in historical time, then, there are (1) artists painting within the permissible combinations of the mind’s Art Faculty, (2) artists mixing together all sorts of styles, and (3) artists making mistakes, false starts, and borrowing from earlier periods.

Most of the time, though, the rules of the Art Faculty are followed, just as most of the time we say, I got the book, not, *Got the book I did*, even though that structure communicates just as well. That is, any number of sounds communicate, as do ungrammatical sentences, but what we mean when we say humans use language is that they employ their capacity for a rule governed hierarchy of structural particulates (words, phrases, sentences) – their grammar – as the predominant way of verbally representing thoughts and communicating. Now, the same holds for artistic communication, as any number of markings can visually communicate, and unstylistic visual structures communicate as well, but when we say humans possess the capacity for art we mean they employ their rule governed hierarchy of artistic particulates (dot, line, shape) – their art grammar, so to speak. This is why there are patterns in the history of visual expression; that is, why there is art history and not simply a chronology of random markings. As humans rely upon their Language Faculty, with its rules/principles, to verbally represent thoughts, they also rely upon their Art Faculty, with its principles/rules, to artistically represent thought and to communicate.

But this just asserts that there is art. The next question is why do some styles seem to flourish, prosper, or simply survive, while others – perhaps as brilliant – are limited to only a few artists? I do not think there is an easy answer, but the variation/selection provides some insight. If art also employs the particulate principle, then the variation, oversupply, selection process is as applicable to cultural as to biological forms, for the particulate principle of the Art Faculty produces diversity of styles, and the political and economic environment provides the social conditions under which some styles will prosper and others will not. The species ability to produce an infinite number of new and different composite artistic structures represents the variation half of the equation, and relations between individual species members, grouped as classes, genders, races, sexual preferences and globally as developed and underdeveloped zones of the world, constitute the social environment within which the second half of the art equation takes place, namely the process of selection. The open ended capacity of art produces more style variation than can be sustained by the power configurations of the social environment, and such oversupply means that only some will survive, and that seems determined by which ones can be supported by the relevant social environment. Given the style constraints of their Art Faculty, artists choose from among their permissible choices, and create their composite artistic structures, some of which survive while others do not. Why, in modern art, the abstract styles survived better in the 1950s than more literal realism is just such a question, as is the one about what were the changes in the social environment that were favorable for the multicultural realist styles that survived better at the turn of the twenty-first century than the earlier abstractions of High Modernism. It would appear that some style structures endorse/support/legitimate the existing societal power structures, while others stand in opposition, subvert, and resist, and that this acts as a natural social selection mechanism.
Power dynamics then do enter the art process, but later in the dynamics of selection, not in the production of variation. That is the domain of the mind’s Art Faculty.

References


The line separating culture and politics has become increasingly hard to draw. The recent culture wars are evidence that political struggles can be played out on the terrain of culture, and both cultural symbols and cultural institutions have long been integrated into political campaigns. Contemporary scholarship in the sociology of culture also encourages us to see the connections between the two domains, illuminating the cultural dimension of political discourse and action (this volume: Evans, chapter 25; Goldfarb, chapter 27; Lichterman, chapter 24) as well as the cultural basis of social stratification (this volume: Fraser, chapter 28; Kefalas, chapter 12; Lee, chapter 15). Yet the more culture is deployed in the pursuit of political ends, including progressive struggles for social equality, the more apparent its limitations as a form of politics have become. The decidedly ambivalent results of identity politics and the politics of recognition present us with a challenge – to think again about the distinctions between politics and culture. For how can we understand the intersections between social domains if we are not sufficiently clear about what makes them distinct?

The conceptualization of culture as a distinct system, or set of systems, presented in this chapter is animated by this larger question about politics and culture. I will describe gender as one such system, paying particular attention to the issue of difference and how it functions. Rather than relying upon Pierre Bourdieu’s work on cultural difference as a model, I draw on Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, addressing the relative merits of these approaches through a short excursus. I conclude with some suggestions for rethinking the concept of autonomy that accord with new directions in cultural sociology and help to clarify the role of culture in struggles for social equality.

**Gender as a Cultural System**

Social inequality has strong cultural underpinnings. Economic and political marginalization is often supported by strategies of *misrecognition*, including negative
stereotyping and rendering invisible the real contributions of particular identity
groups. In recent years, identity politics has drawn attention to this problem
and developed counter-strategies of recognition: portraying more publicly and
more positively social groups marked by difference, or attempting to deconstruct
social hierarchies based on difference. Yet the results have been ambivalent. As
Joshua Gamson demonstrates in Freaks Talk Back (1998), the new visibility
of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered persons on talk TV shows gives
them recognition and voice at the same time that it exploits them as freaks and
promotes the policing of the boundary between licit and illicit sexual behavior. The
more, and the more sensationally, that sexual categories are questioned, the greater
the need to reassert them, to return the world to “normal” at the end of the program.
The debate over affirmative action is another case in point. The attempt to recognize
and to redress the unique historical circumstances of marginalized groups such as
African-Americans merely reaffirms, in the eyes of many, stereotypes of blacks
as insufficiently talented, intelligent, or hard-working to make it in American society
without “help.” Claims to legitimacy are undermined by the reification of difference
and the reproduction of stereotypes: what Nancy Fraser has called “backlash
misrecognition” (1997: 27).

Feminists have long debated the role of culture and the recognition of cultural
difference in the struggle for women’s equality. At the outset, equality for women
appeared to be a fairly straightforward matter of economic opportunity and full
political participation. But it became evident that both of those avenues were
blocked not only institutionally but also through cultural means. The cult of domes-
ticity and the sanctity of the family, the notion of women as nurturers rather than as
leaders, and the idea that women’s purity would be violated by their entry into the
public domain provide strong ideological justification for marginalizing women. It
seemed only logical, then, that the struggle for equality would also take place on the
terrain of culture, dismantling these “feminine” norms and recognizing women’s real
accomplishments and diverse attributes. But again the results were ambivalent.
Celebrations of women’s history were easily framed – like women themselves – as
colorful but ultimately trivial additions to mainstream historical narratives. Images
of the powerful woman attorney or the tough female cop blurred the distinctions
between masculine and feminine and provided new role models for women at the
same time that they became lightning rods for anxiety about changing gender norms.
Attempts to correct the gender balance by noting that the women in question were
also perfect, and perfectly groomed, mothers of three also backfired, creating
expectations of “having it all” that would overtax women and mark them as failures.

Yet no matter how problematic recognizing difference may be, ignoring it is not an
option. Consider the issue of workplace equality. Many early feminists argued for
women’s participation in the paid economy on the same terms as men. But it became
clear that because women are not men, any notion of workplace equality that did
not take this difference into account would continue to be prejudicial. Their
numbers in the workforce notwithstanding, if the norms of the workplace are
designed to accommodate men’s lives or if the “worker” role is gendered male,
women will always inhabit that role with a certain amount of dissonance, making
them unequal as workers – through sex discrimination in hiring, over-representation
in sexualized occupations, mommy tracks, and so on (Fraser, 1987). For feminists,
the difference dilemma has come down to this: Does the recognition of difference
reproduce the gender polarity that has been the basis of women’s subordination, or is it part of a strategy to grant legitimacy to women’s experience and mount a critique of social institutions? Given the terms in which the problem has been set up, these opposing tendencies appear irreconcilable. In fact, they constitute a false dualism that needs to be seen within a larger frame.

Let me propose a framework in which difference is instantiated in three distinct levels of culture – the symbolic order, the institutional order and the level of experience – and in time. The symbolic order comprises basic categories (such as gender differences) that serve as a potential or reservoir of meaning from which selections can be made. The institutional order is a mediating level in which such selections are encoded in specific practices (such as gendered roles for work) and used to structure expectations over time. Experience itself is the continual production of difference as events. Difference structures each of these domains of culture but the temporality of difference is unique to each. Finally, given that the articulation of difference is not necessarily consistent between these levels of culture, contradictions often emerge.

This framework is based on the idea that difference occurs in time, rather than being a more or less stable attribute of particular identity groups. A phenomenological inquiry can help clarify this. How do we know when something is different? What, really, constitutes difference? One way to think about difference is in terms of norms, that what is different deviates from something that has been established as a standard. This way of thinking about difference is implicit in both the construction and the critique of social hierarchies. Women are marginalized (or are not promoted in the workplace) because they do not conform to the “norm” of masculinity, gays and lesbians do not conform to normative heterosexuality, and so on. But what, really, are these norms? In the broadest sense, they are expectations of behavior and the term expectations is key. These standards are not static. Though they may become reified, they have a temporal reach: from a starting point some time in the past, they suggest behavior in the here and now and project it into the future. We might, therefore, answer the question of how we recognize difference by stating that difference is recognizable if it defies expectation. In that case, marginalizing difference or trying to fix categories of difference by ideological means can be seen as ways of managing the uncertainty that something different introduces into the structure of expectation.

As a temporal category, difference is also inherent in the structure of ongoing experience. For example, if I walk from one end of the room to the other without falling through the floor, nothing disturbs the structure of my expectations. I have no reason to turn my consciousness to that activity, there is no recognition of walking across the room; it is simply what I do in order to get a book off the shelf or to retrieve my cup of coffee. But I do pay attention to that activity when something anomalous occurs, something different from what I expect. If I were to fall through the floor, that would be an event. Or take the example of listening to music. For the most part, we go along with music as it goes along until something unexpected occurs that draws our attention. It could be a chord that seems out of place, a melody that is original, the introduction of an instrument that is not usually part of the ensemble, or even something surprising that is not a formal aspect of the music being heard – like an association that pops into one’s head while listening. Until something anomalous occurs we do not recognize experience.
Difference, understood as something that defies expectation, is eventful in a double sense. First, it is only when there is a break in the temporal continuum that we notice an event as a present marked out in its distinction from past and future. Difference is temporal, therefore, in that it plays with expectation, generates events and structures time. But it is also eventful in that it is always being articulated and is continually marked out in experience. Gender differences, for example, may be part of the symbolic order or encoded in social institutions. But they exist in those spaces as a potential from which specific meanings or behaviors are actualized in ongoing experience. For instance, there is some social consensus, expressed in gendered norms, that women are more emotional than men or that showing emotion is socially permissible behavior only for women. But not every instance of social interaction with a woman is structured around her emotional vulnerability. In fact, as these things are called up in everyday experience, we find that men can be emotional as well (and that we feel some relief when they are) or that women can be very levelheaded in crisis situations. In other words, the difference between men and women in this regard is subject to a high level of contingency. Difference is not derivable from the categories, no matter how formal their institutionalization, and it is never decided once and for all. It always has the ability to surprise us as an aspect of social experience.

If difference is instantiated moment to moment in everyday experience, its temporality, or relations of permanence and change, are more complex on the institutional level of culture. Here the possibility of change is always present in the practices that reproduce institutions, yet the materiality of institutions affords difference longer duration. According to one strand of social theory, institutions are crystallizations of patterns of interaction or are continually reproduced through interaction (see e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Others, such as Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*, incorporate similarly processual, if more recursive, elements in describing the reproduction of social structures. From this perspective then, and despite their tendencies toward reification, social institutions are temporal both in the historical sense and in their ongoing, day-to-day constitution. Everyday practices, such as coming to class, sitting at desks, taking notes and engaging in discussion constitute and reproduce the institution of education. Whatever else may be part of the institution, without some version of these activities, it would cease to exist in any meaningful sense. At the same time, institutions are not culture-neutral but encode and normalize differences as part of their structure. Gender differences become concrete (and are often linked to social inequality) in their institutional articulations. Many studies have demonstrated the differential treatment and expectations of male and female students at all educational levels, resulting in gendered practices such as calling on male students more frequently and praising them for their success, while women students are praised for their effort. Others (Goldberg, 1968; Paludi and Strayer, 1985) have shown that the same scholarly paper is deemed to be more persuasive if a man rather than a woman is its author. Norms of femininity and masculinity also play out in the related issues of institutional authority and pay equity at major universities. Expectations about gendered behavior transcend the specific practices of individuals and become part of the institutional reward structure, lending stability to categories of difference.

On the temporal scale, the symbolic order is characterized by long duration. It consists of ideas about masculinity and femininity that are enshrined in works of art
and letters, in cultural representations of all kinds that inform both experience and the institutional level of culture. As an aspect of cultural systems, the symbolic order functions as a reservoir of meaning from which selections are continually being made: it is a potential from which meaning is actualized in ongoing experience. It is through repeated selection of the same meaning that gender differences become habitualized, naturalized or reified over time, implying a broad but perhaps unspoken consensus. Yet the unselected options are never eliminated once and for all. It may no longer be fashionable to think it unfeminine for women to assert authority, but the notion that authority is a masculine trait remains as a potential and continues to be selected with stunning regularity. Ideas that women are uniquely connected to the spirit world as witches, or to nature through childbearing or untamed sexuality may have faded, but the meaning of gender difference still distinguishes men through their capacity to reason. Thought of in this way, the long duration of the symbolic order can be attributed to the fact that while new meanings can be added, old meanings remain indefinitely. They may, however, be selected with decreasing frequency – as a potential that is seldom actualized.

The articulation of difference in the symbolic order implies some broad consensus and is of long duration; that of everyday experience constitutes the eventful present. The institutional level of culture represents a material dimension, in the sense of specific statuses and rewards, and more complex relations of permanence and change. In part because they occupy this material dimension, institutions and institutional roles are important places of contestation. But what occurs on one level of culture resonates on the others, as these levels are only fully separable for analytical purposes. The changing role of the father is an example. Since the 1950s that role has expanded from the emotionally distant authority figure and primary breadwinner, to accommodate men who diaper their babies and sing them lullabies, and occasionally stay at home full time to do it. Fathering is more than protecting, providing, and setting the rules – it now may include the more affective and hands-on components of care. It is arguable that this development came out of everyday experience: a product of contestation between men and women over the division of labor in the family, as more women either chose or were obliged to work in the formal economy. But it has also called into question the meaning of gender difference on the symbolic level. Accompanying this development, or perhaps trying to catch up with it, the debate about masculinity rages. Recent articles from popular magazines to the New York Times question whether or not the “new sensitivity” of men is either genuine or desirable, or if it is possible for a man to be macho and gentle at the same time (Holden, 2001). A piece in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution went so far as to suggest that men on television are the new women, “seeking counseling, getting in touch with their feelings, popping Prozac and hot-waxing their backs” (Zurawik, 2003). But television commercials and Hollywood films featuring sensitive fathers tending to their children notwithstanding, there is plenty of evidence (from Census Bureau data on households without fathers, to statistics on the use of paternity leave) to suggest that as they play out in everyday experience, these changes may not run very deep. Small changes on one level of culture can resonate as radically new information on another. Discrepancies like this are quite common.

As a general rule, changes in the institutional structure run ahead of changes in the symbolic order, but behind experience. The symbolic order is slow to change: hence
the ongoing debate about masculinity at the same time as what men are actually doing as fathers, that is, their ongoing experience of fatherhood, is always and already changing. But more than mere indicators of rates of change, these distinct temporalities account for potentially wide variations in the meanings of gender difference at discrete levels of culture. The dissonance between ideals of fatherhood, their inscription into the institution of the family and the role of the father, and the actual experience of fathering – a dissonance that is often a source of great discontent – can be understood as fundamentally temporal. The temporal complexity of cultural systems, that is, the lack of correlation between temporal levels and the resultant possibility of being in more than one time at a time, adds another dimension to the argument that categories of difference are subject to a great deal of contingency. Let us start from the proposition that what is contingent is that which is neither necessary nor impossible (Luhmann, 1995: 106). Categories of difference are contingent, first, in that they do not determine behavior; there is a great deal of creativity in the way individuals inhabit them. Second, categories of difference are contingent in that they are articulated at, minimally, three levels of culture and there is no guarantee of consistency between these articulations. Third, contingency is implicit in that all difference is articulated in time and, as a result, the categories are subject to change. This is so whether we are speaking phenomenologically, as moment to moment selection from a range of possible meanings, or historically, as repeated selections become normalized in institutions and are reproduced through social experience.

The temporal complexity of difference and the contingency of its articulation result in an ongoing compulsion to choose. It is precisely because the meaning of gender difference is unstable that it must be continually articulated and marked out in experience. If its meaning were decided once and for all, there would be no need to discuss, negotiate, or contest it. Yet it is precisely this ongoing selection that reproduces cultural systems. Take the example of who pays for dinner on a first date between a man and a woman. As an economic matter, it is a fairly simple transaction. But it is loaded with gendered meanings, meanings that have currency or make sense only within the system of gender and the distinctions that structure it. If he pays, does she “owe” him anything? If she pays, is she being too forward or is his masculinity compromised? If they split it, does it necessarily mean that they want to have an egalitarian relationship? None of this makes sense outside of a set of meanings about gender difference. And here’s the rub: regardless of the outcome or how radical the choice, to the extent that any selection only makes sense within the context of gender difference, that difference is rearticulated and the system of gender is reproduced. Even the statement that gender differences should disappear, that is, even the negation of gender, is reproductive in that its meaning depends on discourses about gender that are only available within the system.

The idea that the instability of difference is a condition of duration may appear paradoxical, but in an analytical framework sensitive to time, duration is not stasis but continued production. There are many examples of thinking in time, but perhaps the best is the musical one. In the performance of any musical piece, it is instability that gets us from one moment to the next. The Western system of chordal harmony employs devices such as leading tones and harmonic resolution, creating the tension and release that we associate with musical development. In other musical forms, repetition can also serve the function of establishing expectations that are then
fulfilled or, more rarely, denied. It is instability, the unresolved, that is the dynamic element of music. Stability, on the other hand, threatens music’s duration since in musical terms the only stability is silence, the end of music as process (Hanrahan, 2000: 63). Seen from yet one other perspective, all systems embody contradictions but these contradictions do not, as commonly conceived, lead to rupture or to the eventual end of the system. In fact, just the opposite is true. As Silbey suggests in the case of the law, “if [it] were ideologically consistent, it would... self-destruct [or]... become irrelevant” (this volume, p. 342). Rather than threatening the system, these contradictions keep it animated and ensure its ongoing production.

**Excursus**

The idea that differentiation produces and maintains social systems is not unique to open systems theory. Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* as a mechanism of social reproduction is also based on this principle and it is his work, rather than systems theory, that has assumed a central place in debates within the sociology of culture. If it is reasonable to assume that the temporal basis of any theoretical model structures its conception of social reproduction and social change, how a theory conceptualizes time will have important political implications. Let me briefly compare the temporal assumptions of these two theoretical frameworks.

Bourdieu argues that domination is the result of a struggle over the accumulation of both economic and cultural capital in which specific conditions may change but the difference between conditions remain the same. As it is presented in *Distinction* (1984), social reproduction is an ongoing and competitive process in which the dominant classes, those rich in either form of capital, control the stakes, define the terms, and continually assert their difference from those of lower social standing. At the same time, middle and lower classes aspire to close the gap, to attain whatever the markers of distinction may be – designer clothes, a college degree, the latest sporting equipment. Yet the attempt is inevitably foiled. As soon as they acquire the goods, the dominant classes devalue those goods as marks of distinction. As soon as a college degree becomes available to anyone, it means nothing; now only a PhD is a mark of distinction. Those Gloria Vanderbilt jeans are déclassé as soon as they become available at discount stores. Bourdieu concludes that the difference between these groups is never diminished – the struggle is merely transposed as the stakes change. “What this competitive struggle makes everlasting,” he writes “is not different conditions, but the difference between conditions” (1984: 164). Social reproduction is, in fact, the ongoing production of this (class) difference. This same set of arguments is made in his book on gender, *Masculine Domination* (2001). The conditions of women may change, as evidenced by the growing numbers of women in the paid workplace or through women’s sexual liberation and their access to birth control. But masculine domination, the relative social positions of men and women, remains the same.

In Bourdieu’s work *habitus* is a set of dispositions or habits that either reside in the unconscious or are embodied and are reproduced in social structures. Though the market for symbolic goods may change, *habitus* approaches the status of a closed system, of reproduction by default of class or gender differences that have already been produced. Reproduction is understood as transposition, just as a melody can be
played in a different key without changing the relations between tones. Though there is some contingency in selection – not every petit bourgeois has the same taste in clothing – it is not theorized, which perhaps explains why Bourdieu’s survey results could never be reproduced. Where *habitus* is conceived as a “structuring structure” that has some permanence (hence its ability to be transposed intact), in the context of social systems structure it is subordinate to function, allowing it “to be seen as an emergent order that is dynamic and constantly changing” (Knodt, 1995: xxviii). Cultural systems based on meaning are inherently unstable. As a consequence, their reproduction is not a matter of repetition or transposition but the production of what comes next. Furthermore, in a more open and dynamic model of social systems, every instance of reproduction has the potential to produce something new insofar as it occurs at a unique point in time. Past selections may reveal a powerful social consensus about meaning but contingency is built into the system in that selection is always provisional; meaning is never decided once and for all.

As a consequence of these temporal conditions, these models are strikingly dissimilar with respect to the outcome of social reproduction. For Bourdieu, differentiation reproduces domination. Indeed, *Masculine Domination* was written in response to critics who claimed that his work failed to account for or to acknowledge the real changes feminism has made in social conditions – and they likely remain disappointed with Bourdieu’s conclusions. In the paradigm of open systems, the process is contingent with respect to questions of social justice – difference produces neither domination nor freedom as a necessary outcome. In its turn, Luhmann’s work has been criticized for its technocratic functionalism and seeming indifference to the crucial normative issues. But in the context of current debates about difference, the puzzling question is why we associate the articulation of difference with either liberation or social equality when some of our best sociological models suggest otherwise.

**Complexity and Recognition**

Recognition strategies such as women’s history month celebrations, gay pride marches or the proposed African-American museum on the national mall use culture to achieve broader political aims. Understanding that ideas about cultural difference play a role in legitimating social inequality, they are attempts to generate new meaning about difference in order to replace the misrecognition of identity groups and to redress their marginalization. I suggested earlier that the ambivalent outcomes of these well-intentioned strategies needed to be understood within a broader context, one that conceptualizes how difference functions rather than treating it as an attribute of particular social groups. It remains now to situate recognition within that new frame in order to understand its limitations and evaluate its chances of success. In what follows, I consider those prospects within the context of cultural systems. Although culture and politics are often conflated in the pursuit of recognition, I will argue that they are better understood as discrete moments in the articulation of difference and should be considered separately.

The introductory examples from talk TV, affirmative action and the experience of feminism illustrate the point that the recognition of cultural difference often leads to the reproduction of stereotypes and the reification of that difference. Once cultural
categories are destabilized, the argument goes, there is a counter-move to reassert them, whether through policing the boundaries between normative and deviant behavior or through the denial of implicit legitimation claims. But the foregoing analysis has clarified that these categories are always unstable and always contingent, despite the degree to which they become embedded in the structure of social institutions and social expectations. What appears transgressive – the destabilizing of cultural categories – is in fact only a more self-conscious moment of ongoing system reproduction. Despite the numerous ways in which difference has been used as a critical concept, exposing the exclusions of universalist categories and overturning assumptions about marginalized social groups, it does not and cannot dismantle cultural systems. Each new articulation of difference also participates in system reproduction insofar as it circulates within, invokes and elaborates an already existing set of distinctions. To the extent that recognition is based on the articulation of difference, it is a self-subverting strategy.

In addition to reproducing the system, however, new articulations of difference can add to its complexity. As a technical term, complexity means that there is no one-to-one correlation between opposite sides of a distinction such as male/female or black/white. To the extent that it generates new meaning about gender difference, recognition adds to that complexity. As a result of feminist interventions, there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between the male as provider and the female as dependent, although that distinction still structures social institutions like the welfare system (Fraser, 1989; Fraser and Gordon, 1997). The distinction between male as rational and female as natural (or irrational) is complicated by counter-examples of women intellectuals and men as nurturing fathers. Not even biological sex differences are straightforward indicators of gender difference if individuals can self-identify in ways that are inconsistent with their genitalia. In addition to gay and lesbian, bisexual and transgendered, new gender categories have cropped up recently: the metrosexual, or straight urban male who attends to the world of appearance normally occupied by women (personal grooming and interior design among them), and heteroflexibility, a term applied to adolescent girls who move between lesbian and hetero relationships without declaring themselves to “be” lesbian, straight, or bisexual (Stepp, 2004).

The last few decades have seen a great deal of complexity introduced by feminists dismantling gender dichotomies in the name of women’s liberation, and other strategies of cultural recognition have more positively and openly portrayed marginalized sexualities. But what are the real social consequences? Does this increasing complexity signal a new sexual liberation, less gender discrimination, more social acceptance of non-normative femininity and masculinity? How do we evaluate the fact that women have more sexual freedom but continue to be targets of sexual violence, that more gays are on TV but they remain the least tolerated of all social groups, that middle- and high-school students whose gender identity is unconventional are most often the targets of bullying and abuse? The recent census provides another telling example. The Census Bureau has been obliged to expand the number of categories of race and ethnicity now counted in the census as well as to accommodate the self-definition of individuals as multiracial (not just “other”). In addition to having more categorical choices, people may now “check all that apply” and in the last Census, 2.4 percent or 6.8 million people did (Jones and Smith, 2001). On the one hand, this is a clear indication of the success of cultural recognition in
simultaneously legitimizing the experience of multiracial persons and disrupting rigid racial boundaries. What is more, it is an institutional, indeed governmental, acknowledgment that the blanket distinction between black and white is insufficient to capture the experience of a large number of persons and, as a potential consequence, to structure social institutions. However, it is not adequate to say that the categories are fluid and therefore everything is up for grabs, much less that it signifies liberation. In spite of these ideational and institutional changes, race remains one of the most trenchant social divisions.

The persistence of domination at the same time that categories are in flux presents both an analytical and a political challenge. Many feminist scholars argue that the deconstruction of categories of difference has greater potential to be liberating than does the “celebration” of group difference. As Gamson (1998: 222) notes, fixed categories may be necessary for political organizing and demands for social rights, but fixed notions of difference are also the basis of oppression. According to his argument, the liberatory potential of talk TV is that it messes up the dichotomies, even if it must stitch them back together at the end of the program. Yet it does not necessarily follow that, as he suggests, if there were a mix of accepted sexualities, real tolerance would result. Muddy categories may create a space for alternatives, but there is no guarantee of tolerance, liberation, or social equality. Indeed, the only thing guaranteed is the reproduction of difference. Boundaries will continue to be drawn and distinctions will continue to be made, even if there are more ways to make them.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude with Bourdieu that while specific conditions have changed, the difference between conditions remains the same. New meanings can create alternatives to rigid gender distinctions, alternatives that are meaningful for individuals and may serve as a springboard from which to advocate for institutional change. The question is what happens to that new, potentially discrepant information in the context of dynamic cultural systems? First, it opens up a space for alternatives by generating temporal complexity. Systems cybernetic theory suggests that systems tend toward normalization and this seems irrefutable with respect to meaning. As an example, if we were walking down the street and an 8-foot-tall rabbit approached, we would assume that this was an isolated incident, perhaps someone in a costume playing a joke or selling a product – in other words, we would find some way of normalizing the information to make it consistent with what we knew, rather than allowing it to disrupt our understanding of animal physiology or the ontological status of human beings. Normalizing the information contains the potential threat to the system of meaning. However, this normalization is not always automatic: it can take time. During that time, system reproduction is ongoing but time is also in a sense suspended – just as when we first encounter the rabbit, we continue to function and to process information but our attention is arrested. The complexity of meaning that cultural recognition strategies introduce can create the space for alternatives in the time it takes to normalize discrepant information.

New meanings enter into a system that is complex with respect to time in yet another sense, given the distinct temporal structure and consequent rate of change of each level of culture. Information introduced on one level of culture will resonate with the others but the process of normalization is unlikely to occur simultaneously on all three levels. For example, the new visibility of gays and lesbians confounds
normative gender distinctions. How do we deal with this discrepant information about masculinity and femininity? One strategy is to normalize gays and lesbians by noting that they are people just like us, that they have committed relationships, even relationships in which there are normatively gendered roles of dominance and subordination such as the butch/femme distinction among lesbians. Normalization can also proceed through demonizing gays and lesbians and thereby reasserting normative gender distinctions. On the level of experience, normalization of either sort can proceed fairly quickly. The case is quite different on the institutional level of culture, where we seem to be stuck between viewing gays and lesbians as “people just like us” and impeding their access to institutional statuses and rewards. The ongoing debate about gay marriage is an example of how long institutional normalization can take. But while the delay is frustrating, the extended normalization process keeps the space for alternatives open. Once accomplished, normalization closes down that space: social acceptance comes at a price. Indeed, the issue of gay marriage has revealed a fault line not just within straight society but between those gays and lesbians who seek the legitimation of marriage and those who see it as a reproduction of the very gender arrangements that marginalize homosexuality.

Because they are complex and tend toward normalization, cultural systems can be disrupted only provisionally. Openings for alternatives are real and ongoing possibilities that may confound normalization processes and outwit hegemony, for a time, by staying one step ahead of the game. But the outcomes are highly contingent. Understood in this context, looking to the recognition of difference to correct social inequalities appears deeply problematic. If nothing else, the attempt to substitute misrecognition for recognition, that is, to replace a distorted understanding of persons or groups with a true one, fails to take into account the complexity of meaning that makes cultural systems so resilient and in fact contributes to their ongoing reproduction. While selection actualizes one meaning in the present, all other meanings remain potential – replacing them is not an option. This calls into question the very possibility of cultural forms of redress and as a consequence, the role that culture can play in struggles for social equality.

**THE AUTONOMY OF CULTURAL SYSTEMS**

Recognition strategies are based on the assumption that cultural differences are political differences or, at the very least, are used to legitimate social inequality. From there it is a short step to conflating culture and politics. This is as problematic on the practical level as it is theoretically, producing a distorted picture of what culture can actually accomplish as an aspect of social struggles. I want to suggest instead that it is not possible to assign a political role to culture without a working notion of the relative autonomy of cultural systems. The argument is twofold. First, only with such a notion in place can the constraints on the creation of new meaning and the articulation of difference within cultural systems become clear. Second, relation implies distinction: the intersections between culture and politics can only be clarified when they are understood to be distinct. On the face of it, this represents a departure from the cultural turn in sociology, which has replaced the notion of culture as a distinct domain of the arts and sciences with a more diffused idea
of culture implicated in politics, the economy, the law, and other social systems, as well as in the fabric of everyday life. What I am proposing is not a return to that older conception of autonomy, but one that sees culture and politics as discrete moments in the articulation of difference. This move appears justified not only by the issues raised in this chapter but also because, despite the dominant conceptualization, cultural sociology continues to treat culture as a distinct object of study. And while there is broad agreement that culture can be political (just as it can be economic, legal, or scientific), few scholars would suggest that culture is reducible to politics. The distinction is still there; it remains to be clarified in light of new understanding.

With respect to culture, the concept of autonomy enters the sociological literature through Max Weber’s thesis of the differentiation of value spheres but finds full expression in the work of Theodor Adorno. Beyond the idea that art was freed of courtly or religious imperatives and could develop according to its own internal logic, for Adorno art was an important space for critique. To the extent that it has a measure of autonomy from social steering mechanisms and is neither colonized by the market nor instrumentalized for political purposes, it presents an alternative to the logic of domination. What is more, art can imagine a world that does not yet exist and therefore offers a point of view, and a foothold for critique, beyond what is given. While this may seem romantic, it is hardly naive. The Frankfurt School theorists were extremely concerned with the fate of individual freedom in the face of ever larger structures of social domination, such as monopoly capitalism and authoritarian states. In totalizing conditions such as those of Nazi Germany, critical thought appeared the only possible form of resistance, a place holder, if you will, until such time that more direct political action became possible. To the extent that it retained its autonomy, art was one avenue to that critical consciousness. On the other hand, the utilization of art for political means compromised its autonomy and turned it into an instrument of domination. This was as true of the use of aesthetic media and symbols in the mass mobilizations of fascism as it was of socialist realism as an aesthetic legitimation of the repressive Soviet state.

In the structure of Adorno’s argument, it is the notion of autonomy that clarifies both the critical potential of art and its relation to politics. In other words, it is only in its difference from politics that art can be assigned a political role. That the present discussion is not about art but about culture in a broader sense does not invalidate the argument or change the structure of this formulation. Culture, like art, is not resistant to systematization, either as a form of knowledge or as social domain. What is more, a loose notion of the autonomy of culture continues to hold some sway. On the one hand, culture is a privileged domain, one in which it is possible to entertain important social issues, because it has a measure of autonomy from social steering mechanisms. But that very autonomy also means that what occurs on the terrain of culture becomes incidental, a displacement of the real material issues to the symbolic realm that renders it ineffective as politics. The problem with this formulation is that, ironically, it both privileges and marginalizes culture with respect to political and economic systems, while doing little to clarify their intersections.

The theory of open systems describes a notion of autonomy not from society but within society (Luhmann, 1990). Cultural systems are closed with respect to
meaning but open with respect to their environment, which includes other social systems (including politics, economy, science, and the law among others) and the physical environment. This openness creates the possibility of an ongoing exchange of information between systems. However, not every piece of information generated in one system is considered relevant in every other and, given the self-reference of meaning within social systems, information is subject to translation (Hanrahan, 2000). For instance, new ideas about fathering may be picked up as information and translated into the economy in the form of marketing baby products to men. In that case, new ideas about gender difference easily accord with the structure of exchange. But extended paternity leave, particularly without adverse career consequences, is an altogether different matter. Both start from the same gender premise but one is highly discrepant as economic information. What this suggests is perhaps nothing more than what has been borne out by experience time and again – that while cultural systems may generate new meanings that become available as information for other social systems, what happens to that new information is subject to the structure of meaning and the specific constraints of those systems.

Culture has some autonomy from other social systems but it is not privileged in that respect. All social systems have this kind of relative autonomy vis-à-vis one another based on their conditions of openness and closure. By the same token, cultural systems, like any other, function with internal constraints. What distinguishes culture from other social systems is not a distance from social steering mechanisms that guarantees it a measure of freedom, but the self-reference of meaning; that is, the specific differences that structure meaning within each cultural system. Cultural systems also appear to tolerate a higher level of complexity than more streamlined systems such as the economy, and may therefore have a greater potential for the introduction of new meaning. This understanding of autonomy takes culture off its pedestal but preserves an important conception of the difference between culture and other social domains. For in the end, autonomy still matters: when cultural recognition is instrumentalized as politics, it often takes the repressive form of political correctness.

If we have learned anything from the difference dilemma it is that conflating culture and politics is a mistake; muddying up the categories does not solve social problems. Cultural differences are not political differences: it is impossible simply to transpose meaning from one system to another. Cultural differences may, however, become political through translation. Some of the greatest successes of the feminist movement have been in translating new meanings about gender difference into the political, legal, and economic systems, opening the space for change on the institutional level. As a practical matter, what this suggests is that while culture and politics are discrete moments in the articulation of difference, they can be coordinated, often to great effect. As a theoretical matter, it argues for the relative autonomy of culture, not as a privileged domain of relative freedom or one that is marginal to the material social world, but as one social system among others. This formulation preserves a role for culture in struggles for social equality without either instrumentalizing it as politics or setting it up for failure on the basis of exaggerated political claims.
References


**Further Reading**


II

Cultural Systems
The rise of a cultural conception of knowledge is rooted in contemporary existence, in the current transition to a knowledge society. Today at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is argued by many, we are well on the way to an era beyond modernity and the sort of industrial economy and nation-state societies that came with it; the terms suggested to refer to the transformations and the new type of system involved include postindustrial society, postmodernity, information society, risk-society, globalization, and knowledge society (e.g., Giddens, 1990: ch. 1). Though knowledge and information appear only in some of these terms, nearly all accounts suggest that issues of knowledge and information are central to the transformation. Thus, whatever else the new era brings – the decline of the nation-state, the globalization of risks or individualization – we are also entering a period focused upon knowledge and information (and these are entangled with the other processes). The concepts of epistemic culture and knowledge culture belong to this transformation. The dominant definition of a knowledge society is economic; it states that knowledge has become a productive force that increasingly replaces capital, labor, and natural resources as central value- and wealth-creating factors (e.g., Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1993: 45). Analysts may also emphasize the presence and role of information infrastructures and the changes in economic and social organization that result from them (e.g., Lash and Urry, 1994; Castells, 1996; DiMaggio, 2001).

But a knowledge society is not simply a society of more knowledge and technology and of the economic and social consequences of these factors. It is also a society permeated with knowledge settings, the whole sets of arrangements, processes, and principles that serve knowledge and unfold with its articulation. Epistemic cultures are the cultures of knowledge settings. If the argument about the expanding presence of knowledge settings is right, what we call society will to a significant degree be
constituted by such cultures. It is for that reason that epistemic cultures can be seen as a structural feature of knowledge societies. Second, a knowledge society is also a society whose general knowledge-environment and its structures and policies matter, for example by sustaining or discouraging certain epistemic outcomes. This is what one might call the general knowledge culture, which provides a sort of scaffolding for epistemic cultures. Thus epistemic cultures and knowledge cultures rise to prominence and increase in importance with current transformations. If knowledge is now a productive force, the production cultures and the larger knowledge-related cultures that sustain them become a primary object of cultural investigation. In the following, I will take up these concepts in turn, and also say something about macroepistemics as an intermediate level of arrangements.

Until very recently, the idea of knowledge-related cultures had little currency. Knowledge creation seemed a matter of rational, cognitive, and technical procedures undertaken by scientists; it neither needed nor did it lend itself well to cultural or any other kind of social scientific investigation. Traditionally, philosophy had taken it upon itself to explore the methods of science, but philosophy being philosophy was not interested in the empirical question of how knowledge was produced. The assumption of the unity and universality of science that had emerged since the time of the Vienna Circle of philosophers contributed to the division between knowledge and culture. If there was only one scientific method and one knowledge, how could the notion of culture apply to science? What differentiation there was, it must have seemed, was captured sufficiently by distinguishing between a discipline and a specialty. These covered the fragmentation of knowledge into different object domains and the distinctions in theory and methodology that followed from this specialization.

The stories of culture and knowledge are of course not quite as separate as this suggests. For example, the impact of general culture on the rise (or nonrise) of Western science was explored by several distinguished scholars (e.g., Merton, 1970; Needham 1974). Early sociologists of knowledge developed a broadly cultural approach insofar as they addressed the “thought styles” of social groups (e.g., Mannheim, 1962). Some concepts in earlier studies, like Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm (1979) would appear to lend themselves to translations into the terms of a knowledge culture. But the first studies considered science from an exteriorized perspective that located culture in the larger environment. Early sociologists of knowledge stayed clear of the natural sciences; they were more concerned with how collective thinking in general depended on social interests and social structure. And Kuhn already stood at the threshold of a shift in perspective for which his work was instrumental. The culture concept entered into discussions of knowledge forcefully in the 1970s when a number of analysts set about the vigorous investigation of processes of work and opinion formation in contemporary and historical natural sciences, using, wherever possible, methods of direct observation (e.g., Bloor, 1976, 1987; Knorr Cetina, 1977, 1981; Barnes and Shapin, 1979; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Collins, 1981; MacKenzie, 1981; Pickering, 1984; Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Lynch, 1985; Traweeek, 1988; Collins and Pinch, 1993). This stood in contrast to earlier, distantiated studies of the social conditions and institutions of knowledge; one of the most characteristic features of the new studies was that they refocused the investigation on the core, the interiorized processes of the natural sciences. Most of these studies were interested in natural scientists’ interactional accomplishment of
knowledge claims. They challenged realist explanations of natural scientific knowledge by describing how knowledge was constructed in scientific work, and by insisting that the processes were invariably social and symbolic as well as technical. In fact, distinctions such as that between the social and the technical, cognitive or rational turned out to be problematic in light of the complex mix of variables and the shifting categorizations observed. The difficulties and demands of fact construction overruled, or so it seemed, traditional classifications. A performing science continually supplies and defines its own contexts and resources in the practical attempt to grasp and extend a research situation.

The culture concept has been a corollary of this performative and constructionist approach. Many studies understood the new approach to be broadly cultural – though they hardly provided detailed theoretical explanations of what that meant. Nonetheless, we can make sense of this understanding. For the first time in the history of the investigation of science, the studies used the anthropological method of direct observation and ethnography systematically and strategically to break open the black boxed and esoteric processes of natural scientific knowledge. Analysts also used the anthropological stance of detached observation by an outsider to distantiate themselves from assumptions about the scientific validity of the procedures observed and the truth-likelihood of results – in contrast to philosophers of science, who reflected normatively on scientific procedure. Truth and objectivity, from the new perspective, were themselves in need of empirical investigation; they became historically and culturally specific “effects” of ongoing practices and of criteria and beliefs that varied between groups and periods. Labeling the approach “cultural” also signaled the inclusive orientation that was necessary to grasp the multifarious doings of scientists and the multiplicity of contexts, resources, and possibilities drawn into research activities. It signaled what Schatzky (2000) calls a site approach – the choice of a particular physical setting as the arena of investigation. The most natural “site” was the scientific laboratory where all knowledge processes seemed to converge and from which they took off. The concepts epistemic culture and knowledge culture grew out of these studies (Knorr Cetina, 1999).

**WHAT IS AN “EPISTEMIC CULTURE?”**

Everyone knows what science is about: it is about knowledge, the “objective” and perhaps “true” representation of the world as it really is. The problem is that no one is quite sure how scientists and other experts arrive at this knowledge. The notion of epistemic culture is designed to capture these interiorized processes of knowledge creation. It refers to those sets of practices, arrangements, and mechanisms bound together by necessity, affinity, and historical coincidence that, in a given area of professional expertise, make up how we know what we know. Epistemic cultures are cultures of creating and warranting knowledge. This is what the choice of the term “epistemic” rather than simply “knowledge” suggests. The notion epistemic here builds upon earlier studies’ findings and methodological orientation in the new sociology of science, whose defining concern it has been to open up the black box that constituted scientific inquiry and make sense of the various activities observed.

But the notion epistemic culture is also more specific and is intended to suggest something more aggregate than the earlier studies had in mind: different machineries
of knowing. In other words, if the focus in the early studies was on knowledge construction, the focus in an epistemic culture approach is on the construction of the machineries of knowledge construction. Therein, and in the fact that this goal disunites the sciences and all knowledge enterprises, lies an added twist of the notion epistemic cultures. The background assumption that motivates the concept is the idea that science and knowledge may not be as unitary as has been thought; instead, it is epistemic diversity that we must assume, the fragmentation and multiple construction of the “golem” (Collins and Pinch, 1993) of science. In fact, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Cultural specificities arise, one assumes, when domains of social life become separated from one another – when they curl up upon themselves and become self-referential systems that orient more to internal and previous system states than to the outside environment. Science and expertise are obvious candidates for cultural divisions; they are pursued by specialists separated off from other specialists by long training periods, intense division of labor, distinctive technological tools, particular financing sources, and so on. The notion of an epistemic culture takes up where this assessment leaves off. It brings into focus the content of the different knowledge-oriented lifeworlds, the different meanings of the empirical, specific constructions of the referent (the objects of knowledge), particular ontologies of instruments, specific models of epistemic subjects. Epistemic unity, then, is a casualty of the cultural approach to knowledge production.

One other feature of the epistemic culture approach should be mentioned up front. It pertains to the understanding of culture. One of the more consequential moves of the new sociology of science was to switch from an understanding of knowledge as the representational and technological product of research to an understanding of knowledge as process, or in other words, to knowledge as practice. The epistemic culture approach also emphasizes practices. Culture, from the present viewpoint, includes practice, though I want to understand epistemic cultures as a nexus of lifeworlds (contexts of existence that include material objects) and life-world processes rather than as practice per se. The culture-as-practice approach, as I see it, takes culture out of the realm of the ideal, the spiritual, and the nonmaterial with which culture appears to be identified in many contemporary approaches (Smith, 2001: 4). I am not suggesting that practices should somehow be understood as outside meaning contexts. To discover practices, it is “necessary to gain a working familiarity with the frames of meaning” within which people enact their lives (Geertz, 2000: 16), and symbolic doings such as rituals or “writing” are as much practices as any others. But one does not pay attention to the content of meaning structures, say the content of a text or a symbol, only, but also to their embodied use – and to the way meaning is nested in and arises from this use. For example, the metaphors of a living being in terms of which high energy physicists approach their detector, a massive machine, are not dissociated from inquiry but formulate the forms of existence of the machine in inquiry.

Thus, the practice turn, as I see it, moves the level of cultural analysis “down” to the realm of material regularities without losing sight of symbolic regularities and the ways these are associated with the material. What the understanding of culture as a nexus of lifeworlds adds to this is a shift away from the strong association of practices with doings, routines, and human activities. The notion of a lifeworld brings into view broader referential contexts and their temporal, ontological, spatial, and other structures. It suggests rich and potentially complex
internal environments with warped geometries resulting from their turning or curving in upon themselves, and a tendency to impose and expand their own structures and concerns.

The notion of a nexus of lifeworlds and lifeworld processes is also intended to raise the sociological awareness for the phenomenon that epistemic environments are merged realms of existence and forms of life; they bring together the world of nonhuman objects with human contexts and processes. How these mergers are accomplished, and what fault lines still run between the inner and outside realms of existence of all entities involved, is an essential part of the description of an epistemic culture. Epistemic cultures turn around objects of knowledge; in many sciences material objects. Actor-network theory (e.g., Callon, 1986; Latour, 1993; Law and Hassard, 1999) has conceptualized this situation by considering nonhuman objects as agents and nodes in networks on an equal footing with human agents, and Pickering has worked the point into practice theory by proposing a scheme according to which practice is the open-ended process that results from the resistance and adaptation of human and nonhuman elements intertwined in research (1995: 9ff.). Here I propose the lifeworld metaphor as a way of drawing sociological attention to the worldlike features and imposing demands of epistemic settings and to their problematic of merging and reconfiguring different orders.

If epistemic cultures belong to knowledge societies, what “belongs” to an epistemic culture? In other words, what are typical topics of investigation in relation to epistemic cultures? A first question surely is who are the entities in an epistemic culture; for example, who or what are the epistemic subjects, those we traditionally think of as the agents in scientific practice and the authors of scientific findings? From the present perspective, culture is constitutive of agency and its properties and not the reverse. We can assume that agency is constituted differently in different cultures, as is personhood, subjectivity, collectivity, and other cognates of the term. This implies that questions of agency, objects, and their symmetry and conception cannot be decided theoretically by the analyst prior to fieldwork, but must be traced in the field. In real life, this matter gets complicated for several reasons. In the field, the categorizations of entities are open to semantic drift and reinterpretation depending on context. For example, in experimental high energy physics, a science of massive machines (detectors and colliders) and large groups of up to 2,000 physicists, epistemic agency is variously attributed to the human “collaboration,” the “experiment” (which comprises the human collaboration and the detector, among other things), and the detector itself, which may be said to be the real producer of experimental effects.

As an analyst, one may develop a further opinion on the matter based on one’s observations. For example, one may feel that the discourse between these units, including the communications contributed by machines, is also productive of knowledge claims and emergent outcomes. Not adopting a prior theory of agency and objects enables conceptualizations based on field observations, and the concepts one comes up with may differ from the ones articulated by native categorizations. Thus, one may need to allow not only for multiple agencies but also for agency to rotate between constructs, depending on what is at stake and whose perspective is brought to bear. In other words, the task is not only to discover the epistemic subject and its variants, but also to turn the shifts, drifts, and rotations that one encounters into a matter for investigation.
The notion of an epistemic culture also brings into focus questions of the cultural definition of "nonagents," the "objects" of knowledge – though putting it this way is misleading, since objects and subjects can both have active and passive elements. In particular, objects of knowledge; for example the microbes Pasteur investigated (Latour, 1988), the chromosomes in McClintock’s research on the cytogenetics of maize (Fox Keller, 1983), or a detector in high-energy physics (Knorr Cetina, 1999: ch. 5), tend to be doers in scientific research; they have powers, produce effects, may have their own internal environments, mold perception, and shape the course of an experiment. Furthermore, what is at stake in epistemic cultures is not simply the definition of subjects and objects but their reconfiguration in relation to the natural and social orders as they exist outside expert systems and in relation to each other – and this is one way in which we can give concrete sense to the merging of lifeworlds articulated in epistemic cultures. When objects are reconfigured – for example, when subatomic particles become signs that particle clashes leave in detector materials and that are prone to false appearances, fading, “ghost” production and the like – a specific intramural reality is created that brings physics close to semiotics, complete with interpretation problems and long chains of meaning reconstruction, accompanied by a certain loss of the empirical whilst gaining what some might call virtual life (e.g., through simulation).

Laboratory studies have suggested that the laboratory itself is a means of changing the world-related-to-agents in ways that allow scientists and other knowledge workers to capitalize on their human constraints and socio-cultural restrictions: laboratory research need not accommodate natural objects as they are, where they are, or when they happen – it can substitute partial, modified, and completely transposed versions dissociated from the original environment and it need not wait for natural cycles of occurrence, but can make them happen frequently enough for continuous study. This brings up not only a particular notion of the laboratory as an instrument of knowledge whose power resides in the enculturation of natural (and social) objects. It also points to another area focused on in the epistemic culture approach: the investigation of spatial arrangements that are the places of knowledge (see also Ophir and Shapin, 1991; Gieryn, 1999: 1–35). These spatial arrangements may be traditional benchwork laboratories of the kind found in molecular biology, but they may also involve “centers” (places where resources vital to a whole field come to be located), networks (e.g., email “collaboratories”) or regional agglomerations where technical skills are placed in close proximity with venture capital, specialized suppliers, and infrastructure (Saxenian, 1994). It would seem that on all levels, these systems may be associated with epistemic advantages deriving from the lifeworlds created.

I want to conclude this section by identifying another aspect of epistemic cultures: object-relations regimes, by which I mean prescribed and presupposed ways of relating to objects of knowledge and of approaching them in research. How, for example, does one in a given knowledge area gain access to the “referent,” the targeted object, and to stability in outcomes? How does a science understand and enact empirical inquiry and what strategies does it use? High-energy physics can again serve as an example. It is intensely focused on negative knowledge. Negative knowledge is not nonknowledge, but knowledge of the limits of knowing that is gained from the disturbances, distortions, errors, and uncertainties of research. In Christian theology, there was once an approach called the “apophatic,” which
prescribed studying God in terms of what He was not rather than what He was, since no positive assertions could be made about His essence. High-energy physics experiments show similar preferences. One narrows down the regions of positive knowledge by developing what one might call liminal knowledge. One delimits the properties of the objects of interest by measuring the properties of the objects that interfere with them and distort them. Thus an improved data run in the experiments observed may lead to a longer list of error terms and more refined error measurements than to an elimination of errors. Another illustration of the liminal approach is the “limit” analyses that appear to be the most frequently produced results of high-energy physics experiments. These identify the boundaries of a domain within which one has searched the terrain but “not found” the physical process of interest, hence within which the process will be unlikely to occur. The liminal approach, then, is a culturally specific elaboration of an object-relations regime. In my own research, I have not found this in molecular biology; nor have I found there the emphasis on reflexive self-understanding in which the high-energy physics approach is embedded.

MACROEPISTEMICS

The notion epistemic culture “cuts the idea of culture down to size,” relocating it in the micropractices of laboratories and other habitats of knowledge practices. It follows Geertz’s recommendation to either make culture a delimited notion or else abandon it (2000: 13). Not all places of knowledge, however, are bounded spaces. There is a case to be made for including in the empirical agenda more distributed locations, and these may be on a sizeable scale. Consider those international networks of programming wizards that assemble and upgrade between them software code, which they may make freely available to anyone interested. These networks are made possible by electronic connections, and they have global reach. Still, what we are talking about appears to be delimited groups of specialists working in one facility (that of the electronic space), and drawn together by code, which becomes their centering object. But more decentered settings involving macroactors can also be imagined. Consider first what the economist Kenneth Arrow once identified as a specific problem posed by selling knowledge: if one had the knowledge one would not have to buy it and if one did not have it one could not assess the price; one would not know the quality and validity of the knowledge. This problem, he thought, gave rise to specific institutions that verify knowledge (see also Uzzi and Lancaster, forthcoming). We can call the respective units and organizations macroepistemic actors. In the area of economic knowledge, examples of such institutions would be rating agencies that rate a country’s economic “worth,” thereby validating knowledge that circulates about the country; these would be the analyst departments of banks and investment companies, patent offices, accounting firms validating the worth of a company and price of its stock, and the like. The point is that some organizations outside the more narrow fields of academic science can be seen to have specific epistemic roles and functions; for example observer roles, representing roles, validating roles. I am not referring to the vast area of “applied research” that has long existed. The firms and subunits I have in mind take on specific knowledge-related tasks in larger knowledge contexts.
What larger contexts? One example is multinational networks and circuits of observation. Consider what some actors in the area of international finance term the “global financial architecture.” The International Monetary Fund defines this architecture as “the institutions, markets and practices that governments, businesses and individuals use when they carry out economic and financial activities” (International Monetary Fund, 2000), but this definition is too general to be useful. A recurring theme in discussions of the international financial architecture is international financial crises and their avoidance. This issue tends to turn the focus of the discussion of the architecture to codes of conduct that regulate information flows and rules of mutual monitoring between governments and overseeing agencies. An important item in these discussions are questions of transparency, the how and when and how far of disclosures of information. Transparency is what financial institutions and whole economies must achieve through self-observation, and improved transparency about the state of the whole system is what participants in the global circuit want to prevent major crises, protect the stability of the system, and jointly grow global markets. Thus on one level, the international financial system is an epistemic system: it rests on the architecture of observation rules and strategies, of the units that generate and process the observations (e.g., statistical offices, rating agencies, research departments of banks), and of the information flows that circulate between these units. Moreover, the epistemic system safeguards the economic system. Information rules and strategies seek to discover the “truth” of units’ states and other relevant developments in order to detect possible problem areas, anticipate ripple effects, and spot signs of turns in economic cycles. The idea here appears to be that while it is impossible to prevent natural disasters and to fully control social, political, and economic developments, it is possible to gain knowledge about these phenomena and to adjust to this knowledge.

The units in the circuit do not produce a single outcome and no one may fully publish their results. Nonetheless, we are confronted with a knowledge-system; it is the design of the system, for example the epistemic rights and procedures of the respective units, which is at stake in discussions of the global financial architecture. Merging lifeworlds in this case would seem to be a formidable task that includes negotiating compatibilities between different nation-state administrations and their political cultures. There are also other specificities that should be noted. I have repeatedly used the notion of information rather than knowledge in discussing this system. I use the notion to suggest a specific epistemic attitude that locates relevance not on the level of underlying laws but on the level of surface events. Information reports knowledge of events and some of their causes, but this knowledge tends not to be processed further in the system with respect to the regularities and laws that govern the events. In other words, what appears to be at stake in information circuits is not truth in the sense of lasting findings but news, knowledge of relevant developments in a continually changing environment. The shift to news implies a shift in temporality away from the large amounts of time required by research and toward speed in identifying and reporting the news content. But a deeper aspect is that information-knowledge in the area discussed tends to be interpreted with respect to an expected future and used as a basis for implementing financial moves. In this process, information-knowledge gets used up: usage changes the conditions of relevance for what counts as knowledge and information.
To conceptualize this we can think of information as embedded in a logic of knowledge consumption rather than in one of production, the one in terms of which natural science processes have been addressed. With respect to natural scientific knowledge, consumption is something of an oxymoron, since this knowledge survives its implementation, a phenomenon economists refer to as the character of knowledge as a public commodity that can be used repeatedly and transferred at no marginal costs (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1993: 628). One can take the epistemic equivalent of this nonconsumability of scientific knowledge to be the nondeciability or timelessness of truth: knowledge is a specific commodity in that its value and validity resides in the timeless qualities it discovers in a referent. Information-knowledge, on the other hand, suspends the quest for timeless qualities in favor of the quick identification of time-bound occurrences. In the area of finance, occurrences take on the status of signs that point to an expected or hoped-for future – a state of reality that has yet to be brought about. Think of a central bank adjusting the interest rate in response to economic indicators (information) that are read as signs of the future state of the economy. This adjustment may bring about changes in the economy indicated in new information, while the old information loses its usefulness. Information-knowledge may become caught up in beliefs, hopes, and expectations about the future while losing all ties to the referent – for example, when predictions are based on “technical” analysis rather than on indicators of the fundamental state of an economy. This may contribute to the phenomenon of “irrational exuberance” Greenspan identified in the behavior of stock market investors in 1996 (Shiller, 2000: 3). What is of interest here is the potentially complete decoupling of information-knowledge from its referent. The specificities of an informational epistemics and the differentiation of information cultures have yet to be worked out. But this analysis will in all likelihood have to address macroepistemic circuits and processes and the partly deliberate attempt by participating institutions to forge a macroepistemic culture.

**KNOWLEDGE CULTURES**

In this section, I want to “upgrade” the analysis further, moving from concrete macroepistemic circuits to questions of the cultural environment of epistemic settings, and of the more general knowledge culture in which specific knowledge processes are embedded. One way in which the environment enters discussions of knowledge is in the form of the assertion that different cultures have different sciences and technologies (Abir-Am, 2001; Unesco, 2001). Historians in particular have asked why “Western science” developed at a certain point in time in Europe, and how this development compares with Chinese or ancient Greek science. Culture in general also becomes relevant when anthropologists investigate “local knowledge,” the knowledge systems of non-Western societies and our own remaining “folk” knowledges. But in this case, ethno-knowledge, consisting of native taxonomies of the natural world, indigenous medical treatments, and the like, is taken to specify and exemplify general culture and cultural differences. Another corollary of the present theme is how cultural and political differences are reflected in the way research is set up and conducted. Thinking culturally here may mean asking how one cultural order translates into or influences another (Hess, 1995: 21ff.) – for example,
how conceptions of male activity and female passivity are woven into biological
descriptions of the sperm–egg relationship (Martin, 1991), or of how the Japanese
funding and evaluation system results in preferences for particular detector designs
in physics (Traweek, 1988). Hess called the prevailing relationship between such
orders “totemic,” by which he means that studies show how social categories
 correspond analogically to technical ones. Cause-and-effect relationships such as
the one implied by the argument that class experiences may influence the assump-
tions entering a statistical coefficient (MacKenzie, 1981) are harder to show and
raise questions about the credibility of such imputations. A specific category of
studies investigates how social groups “receive and rework technical knowledge”
in a process of reconstruction (Hess, 1995: 39). Two examples amongst others are
Haraway’s (1989) and Fox Keller’s (1983) studies of women scientists.

These studies broaden the scope of the cultural analysis of knowledge by studying
knowledge in relation to a culture that is not circumscribed in knowledge terms.
Here I want to follow a different track, proposing that we may also see the general
culture as a kind of knowledge culture. This will raise again the issue of a knowledge
society mentioned at the beginning. With the current understanding of society, we
tend to see knowledge as a component of economic, social, and political life. But
we can also turn the argument around and consider social, political, and economic
life as part and parcel of a particular knowledge culture. If the argument about the
current transition to a knowledge society is right, this viewpoint should become
more important. Knowledge cultures have real political, economic, and social effects
that are not neutral with respect to social structures and interests and with respect to
economic growth.

How can we further articulate these cultures? Note again that the distinction
I draw is not simply between the knowledge processes and their referential cultural
context, though this conceptualization, which is the one inherent in the studies
mentioned above, is also relevant. It is rather between the interiorized description
and conceptualization of knowledge processes opened up through empirical inquiry
(the epistemic cultures) and the description of society in knowledge terms. An
important point here is that social institutions, categorizations, and descriptions
already include such terms. A first step in articulating knowledge culture then is
to pay attention to these references. For example, national science-policy making
bodies contextualize actual knowledge production by being directly relevant to this
production, and these institutions exemplify the knowledge culture of a country.
Another example of a knowledge-related category pertaining to the wider society is
the notion of a risk society, the idea that we are increasingly confronted with risks
and uncertainties emanating from the very technological, scientific, and other
achievements of modernity. The risks are seen as ontologically threatening and
cannot simply be eliminated by more expert knowledge (e.g., Beck, 1992). From
the present perspective, the description of Western societies as risk-societies
expresses and elaborates a particular cultural viewpoint on risks: an “epistematic-
ity” that may shape the way expert knowledge is embedded in legal frameworks,
schemes of citizen-participation, and the like (Gibbons et al., 1994). The term
“knowledge culture” also points to those practices, distinctions, and beliefs that
relate to knowledge issues in indirect but specifiable ways. An example may be the
cultural organization of achievement and equality that may set the conditions for the
formation of knowledge elites. These conditions vary between different European
countries and the United States, and may not be aligned with the strongly competitive, stratification-enhancing tendencies of many sciences.

A description of society in knowledge terms can also be given by reverting directly to the idea of macroepistemics – the notion that epistemic functions and roles are also embedded in macrosocial arrangements. What are the respective arrangements on a national or transnational scale? How, for example, do the courts validate a particular vote-count and the counting standards in a democratic election – things scholars in science studies have studied (e.g., Jasanoff, 1998, 2000)? What kind and degree of disclosure and transparency is required of firms in regard to earnings and other indicators of their state and worth? What are the transparency rules in relation to national economies and political decision-making? When I introduced the idea of macroepistemics, I linked it to concrete institutional arrangements for exchanging and processing information. But the idea can also be linked to national and international regulations, to the media and their observation strategies and policies of validating evidence, to notions of privacy and protection from information that contrast with notions of freedom of information. These are the features that illustrate particular knowledge cultures.

I want to briefly discuss, in concluding, a line of reasoning with regard to knowledge cultures that is continuous with the former but still merits separate attention. The point is that the environments of epistemic settings may reproduce lifeworld characteristics of these settings. This question is about more fundamental dimensions of existence of these settings and their transfer onto and recreation in society. The extent to which lifeworld dimensions of epistemic settings are reproduced in other areas says something about the depth of current transformations and the reach of knowledge cultures. We can take sociality and temporality as relevant features. Sociality is generally understood as pertaining to forms of binding between human beings and human groups. Nonhuman objects are not normally part of definitions of sociality, though sociologists may address them in other ways. As argued before, those objects have a massive presence in expert settings. Moreover, we can maintain that expertise depends on object-relations. First, object worlds make up the embedding environments in which expert work is carried out, thus constituting something like an emotional home for expert selves. As a consequence, object-environments define individual identity and situate and stabilize selves. Second, experts develop intimate relationships with objects of expertise. They not only learn to handle and observe them but they also imagine them and understand them. They are linked to them through libidinal sequences of wantings that correspond to the lacks which objects of knowledge display, that is to their unfolding ontology: their way of continually posing new questions and transforming themselves into new objects of knowledge. I am not suggesting that the sort of relationship experts have with objects of expertise is identical with the sort we can have with human beings. But I maintain that the libidinal, reciprocal, and in other ways binding components of experts’ object ties make it plausible to construe these relationships as forms of sociality rather than simply as work or instrumental action.

The wider relevance of the shift in interpretation proposed lies with the assessment that object-relations of the sort exemplified are also present in general social life, where they reproduce aspects of epistemic cultures. Part of the epic character of the transformations many authors observe may have something to do with “objectualization,” an increased orientation toward objects as sources of the self,
relational intimacy, of shared subjectivity and social integration. One driving force behind this may be the declining functionality of human relationships perceived by many (for summaries see Knorr Cetina, 1997, 2000). In this scenario, objects may simply become the risk-winners of human relationship risk and failures, and the entities toward which attachments are redirected. But another driving force may be the objects themselves, which, in everyday life, are no longer fixed entities in the way simple instruments like a hammer are. As objects in everyday life become (high) technological devices, some of the properties these objects have in epistemic settings carry over into daily life: their unfolding nature, their intelligence, the relational demands they make, and possibilities they offer (see Turkle, 1995, for the relationship of computer users to computers). The transfer onto society of a new definition of objects sustains and enhances object-relationships as forms of binding self and other. We may take object-relations and the unfolding nature of the objects involved as an identifying characteristic of a knowledge culture.

Objects also mediate ties between humans, and one major consequence of an object-oriented culture may well be the emergence of subcultures based on such mediated relationships – which involve triangular ties between humans and the respective objects. Examples can be found in many areas of technology, in sports, and other areas. These subcultures are, potentially at least, global rather than local, in a similar manner to expert cultures, which are also global in tendency. One may speculate that lifeworld features of knowledge cultures, once they are reproduced, contribute to the emergence of global culture, with lifestyle as something that inherently involves objects becoming the basis of cultural integration. Institutional features, for example some of those discussed at the beginning of this section, point toward more geographically limited cultural landscapes. But this also implies further divides between global knowledge and its expert cultures and social groups, and those areas of practice and mentality that remain local. The latter not only include social groups locked out of global society by the digital divide but also politics and government, which so far remain predominantly national. This brings into focus potentially large areas of conflict having to do with asynchronous development across these divides.

One area where this may be particularly obvious is time; the temporalities of knowledge and expertise and the times of government frequently clash, with the latter determined by relatively fixed schedules and long procedures of collective decision-making implemented by reference to the display of legitimacy. Areas of knowledge and expertise, on the other hand, would seem to promote adaptations to the temporal requirements of objects and appear more guided by efficiency – an efficiency linked to time being seen as a major driver and generator of research and innovation value. This notion is reinforced by the competitive nature of research but also, less obviously, by the temporal requirements of care, the care that must be taken to efficiently produce and reproduce knowledge. Epistemic settings are also geared to the future in the sense that they continually open up new questions and determine new frameworks of knowing, as Rheinberger has argued (e.g., 1992, 1997). This compresses the present in the form of known, repetitive, stable activity, extending the future by requiring time for the new.

To appreciate the role of time in knowledge processes consider once more the argument that a knowledge society is one where knowledge becomes a productive force, in tendency replacing capital, labor, and natural resources. If knowledge is a
productive force with regard to the economy, which factors are productive forces with regard to knowledge? Though the immediate answer may by “labor” or “human capital” in the sense of expertise and innovation skills, this only leads to the further question of what a productive force for this kind of labor is. Here we cannot simply resort, as Marx did, thinking of factory workers, to pointing out the necessities of human subsistence. We will have to factor into the equation other generative means, for example the cognitive-emotional capital of the setting, manifest in the “regional advantage” Saxenian (1994) finds in areas like Silicon Valley. I want to argue time will also have to be factored into the equation as a value generator in the performance of expertise and innovation. In the expert settings I studied, time was always scarce, always having to be pursued, always expended reluctantly and in acute awareness of its value. The very dynamic of many of these settings, and the barriers erected against interferences with time, are indicators of specific time concepts. Needless to say, these concepts are a topic for a properly detailed investigation in its own right, which cannot be given here. But we can point to this sort of temporality as an element of epistemic cultures that is reproduced in other knowledge cultural settings, and that stands in contrast to temporal frameworks instantiated in politics, government, and associated areas.

Temporality and sociality are potential elements of change in current transitions. In this text I have argued that the transition to a knowledge society implies the growing importance of knowledge-related cultures that comprise such dimensions. We will need to investigate these cultures with respect to the interiorized lifeworlds of epistemic settings, to the architecture of and commerce in macroepistemic circuits, to the practices and “epistementalities” embodied in the referential context of research. We will also need to pay attention to the rifts and divides that the definition of culture as a nexus of lifeworld processes brings into focus. Epistemic cultures and knowledge cultures, though much more delimited notions, are to a knowledge society what national cultures were to industrial society. In understanding current transitions, we will have to look beyond the dominant economic definition of the knowledge-society transformation.

References


In introductory sociology textbooks, it is common practice to list mass media as one of the central institutions of contemporary society. Unfortunately, sociologists have not developed a research program in media studies comparable to their research on family, school, or church institutions. Drawing on some of the recent developments in cultural sociology, this chapter develops a model of mass media as a cultural, civic, and communicative system. My goal is to move beyond a hypostatized vision of “the media,” by developing an integrated framework that considers not only the different goals of media organizations, but also the different media forms (print, television, Internet, etc.) in which they work.

The chapter begins with a general discussion of mass media and the public sphere. In a civil society composed of overlapping, interconnected, and competing publics, mass media provide a common stock of information and culture, which private citizens rely on in their everyday conversations with others. This common stock of information makes intersubjectivity possible, even among those who may never come into contact with one another. By creating an open-ended space where ideas can be expressed and received by a potentially limitless and universal audience of present and nonpresent others, modern communications media – contrary to theories of “mass society” – have actually expanded the public sphere. Importantly, though, these communication media provide quite different kinds of information and culture. Further analytical differentiation is needed in order to understand the interface between media and public life.

In order to provide an adequate analytical account of these differences in media content, the second part of this chapter develops a semiotic mapping of media culture, which is based on three sets of contrasting pairs: (1) *news* versus *entertainment*, (2) *general interest* versus *particular interest*, and (3) *nonpartisan* versus *advocacy*. After describing these pairs in greater detail, I argue that most sociological research on mass media is tilted too much in the direction of general interest and nonpartisan news media, thereby obscuring alternative forms of media discourse that have important implications for civil society. As a way to show what might be
gained by focusing on other kinds of media practices, I end this section by discussing my own work on the African-American press, as well as other research on race and the media that illustrates the utility of studying overlooked forms of media content.

In the third section, I introduce an additional dimension for thinking about the media system: the material forms of transmission. While the materiality of communication has received significant attention by Regis Debray and others, it has been largely ignored by sociologists. The question, as Debray (2000) identifies it, is as follows: What are the material, diachronic, and political forms through which specific media are transmitted? The point to make here is that there are different kinds of transmission in the media system, which are likely to be related to different types of civic practice. Indeed, it is likely that each specific form of media transmission (e.g., print, radio, film, television, Internet) exhibits a gravitational pull toward specific regions of the civic-media space, and away from others; not paying attention to this puts researchers in the position of naturalizing what has actually been a historical process.

MASS MEDIA, DEMOCRACY, AND PUBLIC LIFE

One of the key events in the history of democracy was the development of the modern public sphere – a communicative space in which private people came together as a public, claimed the space of public discourse from state regulation, and demanded that the state engage them in debate about matters of political legitimacy and common concern (Habermas, 1989; Thompson, 1995). As an important part of this historical development, mass media helped to organize these communicative spaces almost from the very beginning. Print technology transformed the practice of petitioning in the seventeenth century, allowing voluntary associations to circumvent elites and bring their issues directly to the public, in the form of broadsides, pamphlets, and newspapers (Zaret, 1998). The technology of print was central to the public life of the English pub and coffee house by the beginning of the eighteenth century; news articles and literary journals were made the object of coffee house discussions, and the discussions in the coffee houses often resulted in letters that were published in the journals the following week (Habermas, 1989: 42). Without this interdependent relationship between print media and public gathering places, the ideal of a rational, debating public might never have been imagined.

As the political public sphere developed, mass media continued to be at the center of the battle for a more democratic, agonistic, and transparent political culture. In the early 1700s Bolingbroke developed a new practice of political opposition, whereby the opposition party sought to influence policy from outside of government, by mobilizing public opinion through political journalism (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 658). By the early 1800s, journalists had secured an official place in the Houses of Parliament (Habermas, 1989: 62). And mass media continue to be central to the public sphere today. In the pages of the newspaper and on the digital images of television, real individuals engage in description, discussion, and commentary about important public matters. In press conferences, politicians as well as representatives of voluntary associations make statements, challenge public statements that have been made by others, and respond to questions. On television programs like ABC
News's *Nightline* and CNN's *Larry King Live*, media personalities, politicians, and other experts debate the meaning of current events. In all of these instances, mass media provide a forum for “private” individuals and representatives of the state to discuss matters of common concern, and broadcast these discussions to between 10 and 20 million viewers (Jacobs, 2000). Indeed, in a world increasingly defined by large-scale social integration through markets, bureaucracies, and other indirect relationships, mass media are probably the only communicative spaces in which a viable, coherent, and politically inclusive public life is still possible (Calhoun, 1991; Keane, 1995; Thompson, 1995).

In addition to organizing many of the discursive spaces that constitute the political public sphere, mass media also shape civil society in other, more subtle ways. Among communication scholars, there is general agreement that the news is one of the most important sources of information that people use when talking about matters of common concern (Gamson, 1992; Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992; Entman and Rojecki, 2000). The research establishing this relationship has pointed to the ways in which the press provides a flow of cultural material from producers to audiences, who in turn use the media texts to construct a meaningful world and to maintain a common cultural framework through which intersubjectivity becomes possible. News media do not provide a one-way flow from text to putatively passive audience but, rather, a “two-step flow” where individuals incorporate news texts into their existing social networks and social environment (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Mendelberg, 1997). And while the press may not be successful in dictating what people think, it has been remarkably successful in shaping the kinds of topics people talk about (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Valentino, 1999). Thus, whenever people gather to discuss important public matters, there is a good chance that their conversation will already have been influenced — and indeed, enabled — by their involvement with news media.

While we know a lot about the relationship between civil society and news media, however, we know much less about the influence of fictional media. This is surprising, given the importance Habermas (1989) attributed to the world of literature in the historical formation of the public sphere. And if anything, Habermas’s account underemphasized the importance of music, sport, theater, and other entertainment-based cultural forms (Keane, 1984; Eley, 1992). These types of culture are certainly as important today as they were in the past, and there is little besides intellectual prejudice that explains their absence from contemporary accounts of civil society and public life (Keane, 1995: 18). Indeed, while today’s largest American newspapers have a daily circulation just over 1 million, the most popular television dramas and situation comedies have audiences of between 15 and 30 million. Blockbuster films regularly attract audiences well in excess of 20 million. Novels by authors such as John Grisham, Danielle Steele, Stephen King, and Mary Higgins Clark regularly sell more than 1 million copies. The audiences for these media are just as active as the audiences for news, using the fictional texts to talk about gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, national identity, and a host of other important public matters (Press, 1991; Liebes and Katz, 1993; Fiske, 1994). Thus, there is every reason to think that these fictional media have an agenda-setting influence of their own. In order to accurately understand the relationship between media and public life, we need a conceptual scheme that more effectively captures the full diversity of media content.
Mapping Media Content

In order to develop the most useful conceptual tools for thinking about different kinds of media content, I begin by identifying the most important cultural distinctions that organize the media environment. These binary oppositions operate in two different yet related ways. On the one hand, they help to organize mass media as a cultural field, by supplying the dominant principles of distinction and division around which actors must strategically position if they want to create status advantages for themselves (cf. Bourdieu, 1985, 1989, 1990). On the other hand, these sets of binary oppositions are also part of a larger “discourse of civil society” that helps to define the moral boundaries of solidarity and exclusion (cf. Alexander, 1992, 1997; Alexander and Smith, 1993). From this point of view, each different type of media content identifies a different form of citizenship, helping to integrate processes of universalism and particularism, rationality and theatricality, partisanship and value-free inquiry. The result is a much richer language of civic discourse than is typically captured in scholarly accounts of the public sphere, and a discourse that has the capacity to engage a fuller range of a society’s members. To be sure, many media intellectuals and academic scholars have an interest in narrowing the way we think about civic responsibility in the media. But I want to take a different approach. Before rushing to normative judgment about what “the media” should be doing to fulfill its civic function, I argue that a more thoughtful and sociological strategy should begin by mapping the full range of media content. This map takes the form of the three binary oppositions, which I describe in greater detail below.

News versus entertainment

Probably the most obvious principle of distinction and cultural significance in the media industry is the opposition between news and entertainment. For those in the news business, their authority comes from the putatively factual status of the accounts they provide to the public. This cultural significance of facticity helps to explain why news and editorial are formally separated in contemporary newspapers. It also helps to explain why the most serious sanctions in journalism are levied against those – such as Patricia Smith (formerly of The Boston Globe), Stephen Glass (formerly of The New Republic), and Janet Cooke (formerly of The Washington Post) – who commit the sin of fabrication. Finally, it helps to explain the unease that so many journalists feel as entertainment values creep further and further into the news divisions of television stations and newspapers. After all, as Zelizer (1992, 1998) has shown so convincingly, journalists claim to derive their legitimacy primarily from being eyewitnesses and chroniclers of history, not from telling good stories.

While it appears natural to us today, the distinction between factual news and fictional entertainment was actually an historical achievement. In the sixteenth century, the main defining characteristic of news was that it was new, a feature it shared with novels as a way of asserting a distinction against ancient stories and myths; the idea that news should be factual did not develop until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as journalists attempted to distinguish themselves from novelists (Davis, 1983). By the nineteenth century, journalists – together with historians
(see White, 1978) – had successfully managed to identify truth with fact. As the opposite of truth, fiction came to be criticized as a trivial diversion that got in the way of a more sober, serious understanding of the world. This suspicion of fiction continues to be felt today, particularly among those who derive their legitimacy from a hard-nosed realist epistemology. For these high priests of truth there is an obsessive, almost pathological struggle to keep fact and fiction from coming into contact – a struggle exemplified most poignantly, perhaps, by Malinowski’s diary.

For their part, those working from within the fictional, entertainment-based genres have also oriented and positioned themselves with respect to the distinction between news and entertainment. Indeed, the creators of fiction and other forms of entertainment laid claim to their own special and distinctive role in civil society, by asserting that they did a more effective job capturing the emotion and the drama of real life. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while news, history, and science were becoming linked to fact-based truth, “the arts” were increasingly coming to signify an alternative “imaginative” truth that offered a superior, transcendent reality to its audience (Williams, 1958). Rather than trying to reflect actual worlds that were constrained by “mere facts,” those in the arts instead created compelling, cathartic, and emancipatory worlds that could mobilize people to change themselves and the world around them (Benjamin, 1968; Alexander, 2002). And these “possible worlds” of fictional media have had a tremendous world-historical significance. Indeed, to the extent that the nation has formed as an “imagined community,” it has relied just as much on literature, music, and film as it has on newspapers and history books (Smith, 1979; Anderson, 1983; Turner, 1993).

Fiction and entertainment have entered the “serious” world of news and politics in more indirect ways as well. For example, during ritual events such as crisis and coronation, news media make extensive use of the more inflated genres of high-mimetic fiction, such as romance, tragedy, and epic (Smith, 1994; Jacobs, 1996, 2000). During the more mundane and quotidian moments of public life, politicians and other speakers employ literary flourishes in order to enhance the rhetorical force of their statements, drawing on the art history, theater, literature, and other forms of cultural capital they learned in school. The same is true of journalists, many of whom have literary ambitions, and equate “good writing” with the literary canon. As Barthes (1953: 26–8) has argued, these journalists, politicians, and intellectuals may have tried to free themselves from stylistic considerations of evaluation, but they remain unable to free themselves from literature, which confronts them as a cultural horizon commanding respect. Whether through its high-mimetic forms of romance and tragedy, or its low-mimetic forms of comedy and irony, the expressive media of fiction help to cultivate a more supple use of a society’s dominant cultural structures, and, consequently, a greater degree of effectiveness in the political public sphere. To ignore these fictional media, then, is to miss a great deal of discursive effervescence and creativity in civil society.

General-interest versus particular-interest

On its own, the opposition between news and entertainment is not sufficient to capture the full diversity of media content. A second important distinction has to do with the intended audience for whom the media text is being created. As Eco (1984,
1994) has argued, every author has in mind a “model reader,” who is willing to
suspend disbelief and follow the story on its own terms. Through a series of textual
instructions the author signals who this model reader is supposed to be – a good
example is the “Once upon a time” of so many children’s stories. These textual
instructions anticipate the presence of a particular kind of model reader, encour-
aging the empirical reader to adopt a specific subject position. In Hollywood,
attention is also paid to model readers and empirical readers, but the sequence is
reversed. Identifying their desired audience in advance, Hollywood directors tailor
the textual instructions of their films and television shows so that the model reader
adopts the subject position of the empirical reader. In both instances, though, there is
a target audience in mind, and a set of textual strategies designed to call forth that
audience.

While there are a myriad number of target audiences, the primary distinction in
the world of mass media is between general-interest and particular-interest audi-
ences – that is, between broadcasting and narrowcasting. Particularistic media
assume a common cultural identity among their readers, and assume that their
audience is going to use the media product to gratify that specific identity. Because
people inhabit many different identities, the range of particularistic media is quite
wide; examples include hobby magazines, scientific journals, ethnic newspapers,
religious programming, and postmodern Italian fiction, to name but a few. The
presumption of the author is that the reader will adopt the particularistic subject
position being called forth by the media text. As such, narrowcast media tend to
reproduce particularistic identities – African-American, biologist, Muslim, avant-
garde intellectual, tennis player, and so forth – and as a consequence tend to
reproduce particularistic solidarities. For some critics, too much narrow-casting
threatens the health of civil society, by creating a media world that is too segmented
and particularized, where the possibilities of common experiences and generalized
discussions disappear (Katz, 1996; Sunstein, 2001).

Of course, particularistic media have not eclipsed general-interest media, nor are
they likely to do so in the future. With the concentration of ownership increasingly
in the hands of multinational media conglomerates, there are powerful structural
forces at play encouraging the development of media products with immense audi-
ences, numbering in the millions (Bagdikian, 2000). In order to attract audiences of
this size, as well as the mass advertising that comes with large audiences, these media
corporations encourage the creation of products that have a national or even a
global interest. In order to do this, they try to avoid controversial topics that
might offend large populations. They try to brush over the existence of cultural
differences, preferring a generalized frame of middle-class, suburban, domestic
respectability. They try to avoid challenging contradictions, resolving all conflicts
through simple, well-known, and formulaic devices (Horkheimer and Adorno,
1972). Indeed, cultural critics have been harshly critical of the over-riding simplicity
and blandness of this kind of (American) corporate media, arguing that it has helped
bring about the triumph of mass culture over civilization.

Yet, if general-interest media create obvious problems for art and other forms of
high culture, they furnish equally obvious resources for civil society. As Liebes and
Katz (1993: 5) have argued, Hollywood’s blockbuster films and television programs
rely on more than a dominant distribution network or an escapist ideology to attract
their audiences; they also use universalistic themes and polyvalent plots that make
them psychologically accessible to a diverse range of audience types. In addition, the programs that become national or global sensations take on a “required” status in the realm of cultural literacy, encouraging people who might otherwise not be interested to watch the programs. The result is a shared frame of reference for millions of people, which can serve as the basis for discussion, and, ultimately, for solidarity. The major news media do the same thing, by reporting about the same events, and by publicizing a similar range of opinions. In the process, most members of a civil society get exposed to the same collective representations of “the public,” its problems, and its aspirations (Alexander, 2002). Importantly, these common representations also serve as the reference point for the more critical and particularistic commentary that so often occurs in specialized media. The result is a dialogue between universalistic and particularistic media that helps to prevent civic isolation and disengagement. Indeed, the relationship between universalistic and particularistic media is one of the most important features of the contemporary public sphere, and one that is frequently overlooked by media intellectuals and academic scholars.

Nonpartisan versus advocacy

The final opposition that shapes the media field is the distinction between partisan and nonpartisan communication. While criteria of evaluation are embedded within every representation, the explicit distinction between nonpartisan realism and political advocacy was an historical achievement in the media industry, developing in the late-nineteenth century. In newspapers, the shift toward explicitly nonpartisan reporting was the major innovation of the Anglo-American press, allowing the largest newspapers in England and the United States easily to surpass their European counterparts in circulation, and to become the first news media with a genuinely broad and inclusive mass audience (Alexander, 1988; Chalaby, 1996). Relying on their superior ability to generate large sums of advertising revenue, these nonpartisan papers were able to escape the dependence on private and state subsidies that had characterized most news media up to that time. This distinction between impartiality and advocacy continues to be a salient feature of the media field today.

Advocacy did not die with the rise of the commercial press, however. In many European countries, which have a stronger tradition of state subsidies, newspapers have tended to have a more distinct political orientation, and to define themselves self-consciously against the American model (Bechelloni, 1980; de Tarle, 1980; Lemieux and Schmalzbauer, 2000). In the United States, newspapers that have had a more difficult time attracting mass advertising – such as the African-American press, the working-class press, and the women’s suffrage press – have typically maintained a more partisan, advocacy orientation (Bekken, 1993; Steiner, 1993; Jacobs, 2000). And the same kind of relationship holds for fictional media, where commercial programming tends to take a seemingly neutral political stance while subsidized programs adopt a more partisan position.

RESEARCHING AGAINST THE GRAIN

As ideal types, the three sets of contrasting pairs described above define the extreme ends of a continuum. Nevertheless, while most media texts are mixed types, they
derive their cultural significance and their civic meaning from the structured oppositions that inform the media environment. Furthermore, each opposition helps to position specific kinds of media producers in the field, identifying their most likely allies and opponents. Thus, those in the news understand their work as fundamentally different from entertainment, and criticize instances where entertainment values encroach upon the more “serious” news world. Those who write for a general audience identify their large sales figures with quality and success, denigrating the more specialist media for failing to capture the public interest. Those who are committed to nonpartisan forms of communication criticize the political biases of advocacy media, complaining about the polarizing effects those media have on the public. On the other side, those in entertainment, particular-interest, and advocacy media have their own moral justifications, also linked to the semiotic structuring of the media field, and also buttressed by arguments about their respective values in civil society. The end result of these competing moral arguments is a polarizing discourse of media and public life, which informs different understandings of solidarity and civil society.

Unfortunately, while each type of media informs public life in an important way, academic discourse about media and civil society has largely privileged news over entertainment, general-interest over particularistic media, and nonpartisan over advocacy formats. This bias is based in part on an unintended adoption of the political worldview of social movements and other civic activists, most of whom are obsessed with news publicity, and believe that mainstream media access is the holy grail of politics (Sobieraj, 2002). The result is an unfortunate assumption, held by too many scholars: namely, that the only worthwhile function of the media is to make civil society more visible to politicians. Indeed, for political sociologists and social movement researchers, examination of the media is often limited to a myopic focus on the mechanisms of mainstream news publicity (e.g., McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith, 1996; Oliver and Myers, 1999). From their perspective, these elite news media are the gatekeepers of the public sphere; the issues and movements they cover are the ones with the most impact on the public agenda (Jenkins, 1987; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Graber, 1993). And yet, if the groups that get this much sought-after access are deprived of control over the construction of meaning and the power of naming, they will continue to be exploited, and the dominant public narratives will continue to ignore them (Melucci, 1996: 182; Price, 1995). Universalistic, nonpartisan news media, in other words, may not be the only important kind of media in the public realm.

The role of particularistic, advocacy media: the case of the African-American press

Questions about media access and cultural autonomy have been central to my own research on the African-American press (Jacobs, 2000). Recognizing the importance of news media in contemporary civil society, I argued that associations and communities needed to strike a balance between protecting their cultural autonomy and engaging other publics in discussion and deliberation. Without smaller media over which they have a high degree of control, groups become too dependent on the preferences and practical routines of “mainstream” journalists. Without access to larger media, they lose the ability to influence the larger public agenda. In other
words, a civil society consisting of multiple publics requires a media system consisting of multiple media. This is particularly true for historically excluded groups, whose experiences with the dominant media highlight the need for alternative spaces of public communication, where there is a stronger possibility of discovering common interests and developing new arguments free from the hegemonic gaze of the dominant group. And this was the importance of alternative media such as the African-American press.

African-American newspapers emerged early in the nineteenth century, carved out of the mutual aid societies, independent churches, and educational institutions of the African-American community in the Northern cities. *Freedom’s Journal* was first, published in 1827; but at least 40 different newspapers were published by African-Americans before the Civil War, and the establishment of a national black press was generally agreed upon as the second most pressing issue among African-American leaders of the time. The historical need for a strong black press was threefold: (1) to provide a forum for debate and self-improvement, (2) to monitor the mainstream press, and (3) to increase black visibility in white civil society. African-Americans could not count on the “mainstream” press of the time to publicize black voices or to represent black issues in a nonpatronizing manner. By establishing an independent black press, African-Americans were able to secure a space of self-representation: not only to craft common identities and solidarities, but also to develop arguments that might effectively engage white civil society.

The African-American press was never intended to substitute for participation in the majority media. Rather, it was designed to encourage continuous discussion about matters of common concern, to develop arguments for later engagement in the majority public spheres, and to correct the prejudices and misrepresentations that resulted from engagement in those other public spheres. On the one hand, African-American newspapers have always been advocacy media, designed for a particularistic audience that shared a common cultural identity. Importantly, though, African-Americans have never been able to get reliable access to papers such as *The New York Times*, and when they did get access it tended not to be on their own cultural terms. The presence of African-American media guaranteed the continuation of discussion, conversation, and interpretation, as well as the hope of expanding the discussion to include new participants, new venues, new narratives, and new points of difference.

Despite its particularistic audience and its advocacy orientation – or, perhaps, because of it – the African-American press has been a force of civic engagement rather than civic isolation. The black press has consistently refused to label urban rioters as irrational, or to dehumanize them as “thugs” or “animals.” Its journalists and sources have demonstrated a much stronger willingness to cast African-Americans into heroic character positions, encouraging collective mobilization around black leaders. In terms of the plots in their news narratives, black newspapers have tended to link racial crises into more ongoing, continuous, and historically far-reaching stories. It was not uncommon for circulation of these papers to surge during moments of racial crisis, as people sought out a distinctively African-American perspective, compared it with the “mainstream” media coverage, and proceeded to have discussions about important matters of racial concern. All of these features of the black press encouraged a monitoring of, and an engagement with, the more dominant public spheres. The smaller circulation and more
The role of entertainment media in shaping racial dialogue

As I have argued above, a cultural sociology of mass media starts from a recognition that the various moral justifications of media work all share a common structure: the semiotic opposition between news and entertainment. While many academics have joined together with media intellectuals and political activists in a knee-jerk dismissal of putatively trivial and escapist entertainment media, the approach taken by cultural sociologists should be more theoretically nuanced and empirically grounded. As I have already suggested, fictional media still set the standards by which all great culture is measured, and therefore influence the most sober and serious journalist or academic. In addition, fictional media institutionalize the discourse of civil society into broad narratives, mythic characters, and exaggerated plots that enable readers to develop a mastery of cultural structure precisely because they are “not real” (Alexander and Jacobs, 1998; Alexander, 2002). Fictional media also operate at a more cathartic level than news media, providing lessons in pathos, fear, suspicion, and other emotional skills that people use in their private and public lives. To the extent that mass media feed the public imagination and organize the public sphere, they do so largely through the interaction of their factual and fictional forms.

While sociologists have been slow to examine the intertextual connections between factual and fictional media, several recent studies by film and communications scholars suggest that significant insights can be gained by taking such an approach. For example, in a series of path-breaking studies of The Cosby Show, Gray (1989, 1995) and Jhally and Lewis (1992) argued that television combines a fictional portrayal of upper-middle-class black life with news portrayals of black crime in the ghetto to produce an image of self-responsibility that is more palatable for a racist culture. On the one hand, the images of success and moral responsibility found in The Cosby Show encouraged white audiences to believe that racial barriers were coming down, and that it was possible to have a wealthy, well-adjusted, professional, educated, and African-American family living next door. On the other hand, when these images were combined with the news stories about minority crime and poverty, they sent the implicit message that ghetto residents were responsible for their own misery, for not being like Cliff or Claire Huxtable. What both kinds of stories shared was a privileging of individual attributes and middle-class values; what they both hid were the social and historical factors that shaped these very different kinds of lives. The important point to make is that the ideological effect was magnified by the intertextual relationship between situation comedy and television news. On their own, news portrayals of African-American criminality would have been much less convincing.

An even more provocative analysis of factual and fictional intertextuality can be found in a recent study of race and melodrama. In Playing the Race Card, Linda Williams (2001) argues that melodrama offers its audience a story defined by stylistic and sentimental excess, in which protagonists and antagonists are locked in a titanic struggle over good and evil, and where the field of action is charged with
pathos and suffering. Despite repeated dismissal by critics, the genre of melodrama has always had a tremendous popular appeal. Indeed, Williams argues that melodrama is the most important and the most serious genre of American mass culture – in film as well as television – because its mode of storytelling is central to the establishment of a moral discourse in the American public sphere.

Williams argues that the moral discourse about race in the United States has developed through two competing melodramas. The first, initially established by Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, portrayed the suffering of African-Americans as a sign of virtue that deserved white sympathy. The second, embodied in D. W. Griffith’s *Birth of a Nation*, portrayed the virtuous suffering of white women as a sign of African-American evil and depravity. Williams shows how these two melodramas have been repeatedly re-elaborated in the world of Hollywood cinema, and ultimately have been institutionalized in American public culture. Indeed, they have become so routinized that they form the dominant tropes for representing racial crisis in the news media. Rodney King was a sympathetic figure because he signaled the melodrama of Uncle Tom. O. J. Simpson was hated because he provoked Griffith’s melodrama of the black beast stalking white women. In the end, as Williams so convincingly demonstrates, our ability to talk seriously about race has been shaped fundamentally by our participation in popular culture and fictional media. The point is that the moral geography of racial discourse is situated on a much more varied and nuanced terrain than what is found in *The New York Times* or ABC News.

**The Material Forms of Transmission**

I want to end my discussion by considering the different material forms through which mass media are transmitted. As Crane (1992) and Mukerji (1992, 1997) rightly note, sociologists who study culture too often ignore the specifically material aspects of culture. And yet, the difference between communication and culture lies precisely in the fact that culture is carried across time; it is transmitted, and recorded in a way that leaves a material trace (Debray, 2000). The channels of cultural transmission cannot be dismissed as the epiphenomenal reflex of discourses, or as the neutral background through which reward systems and gatekeeping processes play themselves out (Brain, 1992). Rather, each mode of transmission possesses its own distinctive, historically specific organization of textuality, which encourages certain modes of communication and discourages others (Lee, 1992: 417). Because of this, the history of the public sphere can be fruitfully read through a corresponding history of technological transformation.

In its initial form, the ideals of the modern public sphere were transmitted through the technology of print. As Warner (1990, 1993) has pointed out, the normative development of the “people’s public use of their reason” bears the distinctive mark of print technology. The idea that political actions should be supervised in civil society by the practice of criticism and according to standards of disinterested public virtue implied the existence of an impersonal mass audience, put into place precisely by the anonymity of print technology (Lee, 1992: 409–11; Warner, 1993: 34–5). In newspapers, pamphlets, and literary journals, individuals developed the techniques of reasoned argumentation to a mass audience; they also established the expectation
that their autonomy and their citizenship was to be pursued primarily through the practices of reading and publishing.

If print technology helped to constitute the anonymous, rational citizen as the agent of democracy, however, it also helped to establish a hierarchy of citizenship and a firm basis for exclusion. The ideal of a disembodied, rational public debating matters of common concern already presupposed an intellectual mode of communication constituted through writing, and opposed to the communicative modes of riot, revelry, and music that were more characteristic of plebeian culture (Eley, 1992: 326–30). In this respect, print privileged the agency of a rather narrow intellectual and political elite, who discussed the public good among themselves while limiting their contact with the masses to words on a page (Pfeiffer, 1994; Debray, 1996). The “civilized man” knew how to write, and took upon himself the responsibility of representing those who could not write for themselves. Indeed, the cultural importance of the nineteenth century slave narratives was that they demonstrated the African-American capacity for writing, for self-representation, and, hence, for citizenship (Gates, 1985).

Today, television has replaced print as the dominant form of cultural transmission in the public sphere. This transformation has had two important consequences. First, the ideal of the disembodied, anonymous critic has become an anachronism. Because television defined itself against print as an audio-visual medium, public figures have become increasingly visible as specific, embodied subjects (Warner, 1992). Today, we know what our journalists, politicians, and commentators look like, because we see them regularly on television. Indeed, the victory of the embodied over the disembodied critic has been carried over into print itself, where newspapers rely increasingly on color photographs to establish the identity (and hence, the authority) of public speakers, and where newspaper columnists augment their authoritative standing by appearing on television news talk shows. Habermas (1989: 206–7) complains about these developments, arguing that television has distorted the deliberative function of the public sphere by turning public debate into a stylized, staged display. Warner (1992), on the other hand, argues that the rise of television has had a more progressive effect; by uncovering the white, male, heterosexual body of the putatively disembodied public subject, it provides motivation and symbolic ammunition for identity politics movements. Regardless of who is right, though, one thing is clear; agency is now defined by its public iconicity.

The second major impact television has had on public life is a shift toward entertainment and the more dramatic forms of cultural performance. From its inception, television has been a predominantly entertainment-based industry, focusing on dramas, music, comedies, and games. News was an afterthought, provided as a public service, but limited to 15 minutes every evening. Eventually, television executives discovered that they could make money broadcasting the news, provided that they could create new and more dramatic forms of presentation. This occurred first with the live broadcast of major rituals, crises, and other media events, which attracted huge audiences and by doing so demonstrated the power of the subjunctive mode of the televised news address (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Jacobs, 1996). It developed further with political talk shows such as CNN’s Crossfire, which showed that discussions about matters of common concern could become more exciting if they incorporated the elements of sport and spectacle. The result has been an interesting blurring of news and entertainment. Politicians such as Bill Clinton and
Rudolph Giuliani were early to recognize the increasing political importance of entertainment media, adding MTV, the *Arsenio Hall Show*, *Saturday Night Live*, and other similar programs to their campaign schedules. Intellectual criticisms and hand wringing notwithstanding, these kinds of media have become a significant force in the public sphere, awaiting serious analysis by ambitious and adventurous cultural sociologists.

If television has augmented the power of entertainment in the public sphere, the rise of the Internet suggests a future where particularistic and advocacy media may also become more powerful. As Castells argues, the Internet serves democratization well, “by relatively leveling the ground of symbolic manipulation, and by broadening the sources of communication” (2001: 164). Social movements have used the Internet to establish global networks of discussion, organization, and publicity that bypass the gatekeepers of traditional media, and by doing so have managed to avoid the dangerous pitfalls inherent to a politics of publicity. Local communities, which increasingly find themselves ignored by the dominant media conglomerates, use the Internet to reproduce local forms of culture, citizenship, and solidarity. Websites, list-serves, and chat rooms are being produced for an almost infinite variety of particularistic groups who have never been able to carve out a successful (i.e., profitable) niche using print or television technology. And yet, many of these Internet users are also exposed to general-interest, nonpartisan portal sites such as yahoo.com, aol.com, and msn.com. More research is needed to determine exactly how these new forms of media practice are influencing the public sphere. Is the Internet really increasing the audience and the circulation of particularistic and advocacy media, or is it becoming dominated by general-interest sites published by media conglomerates? In what ways do Internet content providers actually inform public sphere debates? To what extent does the Internet challenge the hegemony of the televisual, with its emphasis on entertainment and iconicity? Just like the case of television, a good deal of empirical work remains to be done to chart the impact that this new form of cultural transmission is having on the public sphere.

**CONCLUSION**

What I have tried to do in this chapter is to develop a more multidimensional model of media culture and public life. This model considers news as well as entertainment media, general-interest as well as specialized media, nonpartisan as well as advocacy media. I want to conclude by suggesting several areas of future research, which would help immeasurably to specify the model in a more empirical direction.

First, more work is needed to identify the different repertoires of evaluation that media professionals and media critics have used to try to define their different visions of civic responsibility in the media. This work, which overlaps the comparative studies of evaluation that Michele Lamont and her colleagues have been doing (e.g., Lamont and Thevenot, 2000), would help to identify in a much more fine-grained manner the cultural structure of the media field.

Second, there needs to be a more thorough analysis of the ways that television and the Internet have changed the public sphere. If print culture has indeed become anachronistic, as I have suggested, then much of what stands for media criticism
may simply be part of a conservative politics of nostalgia that refuses to accept the reality of a changed media landscape.

Finally, there needs to be more work that examines the intertextual relationship between different kinds of media texts, and the effect that this intertextuality has on civic discourse. Because the space of media practices is so multidimensional, there are many opportunities for comparing different types of media situated in different regions of the conceptual space. Indeed, these types of comparisons, if pursued, would build effectively on an emerging, new media sociology (e.g., Alexander, Schudson, Calhoun, Jacobs, Hoynes, Scannell, etc.), which has moved away from a focus on markets and organizational routines in favor of a more explicit concern with civil society and the public sphere.

References


It has been 35 years since Clifford Geertz first published his influential essay, “Religion as a Cultural System” (1973; first published in 1966). That essay, a classic statement of the interpretive functionalist perspective on culture, described religion as a system of guidance, meaning, and authority in human affairs. In a graceful style that always made Geertz a joy to read, even when he was less than persuasive analytically, Geertz posited a definition of religion, and then unpacked it phrase by phrase. This chapter will examine two core theoretical issues tackled in Geertz’s formulation, and chart their developments in recent sociology of religion. I do not claim here that Geertz is the founder or source of these developments. Rather, I intend to use his formulation as an heuristic device to organize several broad intellectual currents. I consider religion as a “cultural system” to engage a variety of sociological literatures that approach religion in that way.

FOUNDING THEMES

Geertz focused on religion’s sense-making properties. Consistent with his approach to culture generally, Geertz was consumed with meaning; religion is just another cultural system that orders and organizes the world for the semiotic creatures that humans are. However, religion is distinct as a “system of symbols” in that it provides a “general order of existence” imbued with “such an aura of factuality that...[it] seem[s] uniquely realistic” (1973: 90). Religion is a meaning system anchored in a sacred cosmos; the understandings, moods, and motivations organized by this system seem real and have a unique legitimacy. The order in the cosmos and the order in the social world reinforce each other with the “borrowed authority” of the other (Geertz, 1973: 90) and provide humans with a coherent worldview, anchored in a sacred legitimacy and infused with a practical sense of facticity.
During this same period (late 1950s through the 1960s) other important voices in
the social sciences were also attacking the problem of meaning, as “interpretive”
thories arose in a number of places. For example, students of Harold Garfinkel
pushed ethnomethodology and its insights, Herbert Blumer and his students pro-
duced a “second Chicago school” within symbolic interactionism, and second gen-
eration Frankfurt school scholars such as Jürgen Habermas engaged culture and
meaning seriously. Significantly for the study of religion, Peter Berger (1967, 1979)
began to construct a “social phenomenology” of religion. Through a three-stage
process of externalization, objectivation, and internalization, (1967: 4) humans
create a society, and by extension a meaningful cosmos, that they then understand
as “out there” and ontologically real. This “reality” is then internalized. To the
extent that a variety of meaning systems become referenced on these shared under-
standings, it creates a “plausibility structure” in which each meaningful system
reinforces the other, achieving a “sacred canopy” of socially constructed meaning.

Both Geertz’s and Berger’s formulations had functionalist heritages. Religion is a
source of ultimate meaning, binding together diverse social and cultural elements,
and potentially providing solidarity and identity. Durkheim’s positing of the essence
in the social effervescence of assembled societal members resonates clearly. Further, their working definitions of religion were functional and widely
applicable. Religion could be known for its functions and its ability to provide
ultimate meaning – if not always order – in the face of potential psychic chaos and
social disruption. That chaos and disruption were seen as the preeminent threat to
human social life again has functionalist resonance.

Importantly, both Geertz and Berger focused on the conditions under which
religion’s sense-making capacity was undermined by social change, and how reli-
gious understandings functioned when challenged. For Berger, this was an account
of the secularization of the modern world, while for Geertz religion and culture	only gave way to “ideology” when religion failed to offer adequate accounts
of events. Both Geertz and Berger offered theoretical constructs that gave religion
a culture-encompassing significance; that is, rather than confining religion to
institutionally differentiated spheres, they argued that religion permeated culture’s
meaning-giving functions. However, in contrast to much structural-functionalism,
they also recognized social change and cultural turmoil. All was not functionalist
stability, at least in their empirical investigations.

For current culturalist research in the sociology of religion, Geertz and Berger
stand out as the major orienting figures, their seminal works part of the canon of
required readings for graduate students. Nonetheless, there are some important
differences in these foundational approaches. Berger was interested in a more formal
theoretical problem than Geertz – explaining the genesis of religion – and was more
interested in a systematic definitional and analytic approach to conceptualizing the
terms involved. Berger was also concerned with religion’s encounter with modernity,
whereas Geertz did not engage modernity as a concept, but studied social settings in
which cultural systems ran into each other and competing meaning-systems collided.
On the other hand, Berger was not overly interested in the methodological or
empirical implications of his work, and was engaged in a traditional cultural
analysis akin to “intellectual history.” Geertz, however, was deeply committed to
ethnographic analysis and understanding the “local knowledge” (1983) and prac-
tical meanings that humans generate to cope with life.
While Berger has probably, over time, garnered more citations among sociologists than has Geertz, Geertz has had a more significant impact on scholars conceptualizing religion as culture, and on those investigating the relations between religion and culture. Further, Geertz’s other writings on ethnographic theory and inquiry have deeply affected entire approaches to cultural analysis. Because of that influence, and due to the integrated approach to religion and culture in Geertz’s programmatic essay, I center my analysis on him.

THEORETICAL ISSUES IN STUDYING RELIGION AS CULTURE

Geertz, writing in the mid-1960s, was attempting to put culturalist social analysis on the same conceptual footing with psychology, at a time when psychoanalytic theory was becoming more widespread in American social science. The search for the “universal” human – in human nature, psychology, or evolutionary theory – robbed culture of any analytic usefulness. This was even true, critics claimed, when Parsons incorporated Freud into his theory (see Giddens, 1979: 49–53). In contrast, Geertz’s “semiotic” approach sought to gain “access to the conceptual world in which . . . subjects live” (1973: 25), without the categories and “scientific” epistemology of psychology. Culture and religion are situated, contingent, and interpretive.

At the same time, Geertz was battling on another theoretical front against Marxist and functionalist approaches to culture that considered it epiphenomenal over more determining social structural forces. Marxism and functionalism were often a type of “reflection theory” (Griswold, 1994) in which religious symbols and content were only expressive of deeper or more fundamental sociological forces. While culture might integrate and socialize individuals into society, or alternatively, mask real interests and class contradictions, one discovered the “real” forces in society – and the real sources of human action – by looking underneath or behind culture to social structure. Geertz criticized this theoretical posture, claiming that “its psychology is too anemic and its sociology too muscular” (1973: 202).

Geertz was engaging the materialist-idealist philosophical debate by arguing for a conceptual approach to culture that gave it full weight in social analysis. He was elevating “the cultural dimensions of religious analysis” (1973: 89) in order to understand cultural processes as having their own autonomous dynamic (see Rice, 1980). In formulating religion (and culture) as he did, Geertz prefigured several of the logical developments and conceptual tensions that would appear in theories of religion and culture among the next generations of scholars.

This chapter will highlight two implicit theoretical dichotomies found in Geertz’s understanding of religion as a cultural system, and show their current appearance in sociological literature on religion. First, Geertz examines, without using these terms, the theoretical dichotomy between structure and agency in understanding the forces that shape human action. This distinction is a sociological version of the philosophical debate between “determinism” and “free will.” While few sociologists would endorse a concept of unfettered free will, the influences on human action are much contested. Is action largely dictated by the social and cultural locations in which people find themselves, or do actors innovate, improvise, and “create” society in the...
process of doing social life? I will show later that shifts in the “structure” metaphor have produced a structuralist approach wherein culture has an autonomous moment.

A second theoretical opposition, also found in Geertz, becomes apparent when one turns specifically to an examination of religion’s relationship to power in society. This is a distinction in understanding religion as implicit culture versus religion as explicit cultural objects. Robert Wuthnow (1987) uses this distinction to point to a significant difference in understanding how religion and culture work. At times, actors will refer to religious symbols, ideas, identities, or beliefs explicitly, using them as the rationale for past action and the blueprint for future behaviors. Other times, the religious influence on meaning and action is in the background, unnoticed, but influential in that it lays out the terrain upon which action occurs. Religion shapes meaning by making some interpretations obvious and hiding others. After an examination of the implications of the structure–agency dichotomy within the sociology of religion, I turn to the literature on religion, politics, and social movements to examine the distinction between explicit and implicit approaches to religion as culture.

**STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION**

In one of his choicest metaphors to describe culture, Geertz posited that humans are animals who are “suspended in webs of significance” that they themselves have spun (1973: 5). This concise phrase neatly suggests two major approaches to culture in contemporary sociology – the structural and the interpretive/processual. This opposition is also expressed in Geertz’s more formal definition of culture, which he defined in part as “patterns of meaning” (1973: 89).

**Two meanings of “structure”**

One “structural” approach to religion places religion in a position wherein it is a reflection of social structural arrangements. The social structural tradition, with roots in Durkheim and Marcel Mauss on one hand, and a “sociology of knowledge” approach on the other, allows one to “read” the social or institutional realities of a society through “decoding” the cultural symbolic universe. Culture reflects society in this approach, and in most cases was the thing to be explained by reference to social structure, rather than the explanation itself (Kuper, 1999). Culture appears as the mental products and symbols that give meaning to social structures – while social structures are the “things” that are the building blocks of society. This theoretical approach gives religion little autonomy as culture – it reduces it to a reflection.

A more Geertzian approach to structure involves a focus on the “webs” that comprise a culture. This uses a different referent for “structure,” abandoning the building-oriented metaphor of social structures, and instead thinking of webs as networks of elements that form first, cultural objects, and then, cultural systems. By charting the relationships among elements that comprise cultural objects, one can find the “structures” of meaning. This structural approach focuses on the internal structure of the “cultural object” (Williams, 1996a) itself, not the relationship
between religion and its social structural environment. Meaning is found in the structure of the arrangement of the elements, perhaps analogously to the approach of structural linguistics.

One example of this approach is Witten’s (1992) analysis of sermons given in different Protestant churches. She parses the sermons as texts, looking for recurring elements and how they are arranged sequentially and in relationship to each other. The meaning of the sermons, Witten argues, is contained in the patterns of the arrangements of these elements. The “structure” is the regularity of the internal relationships. Similarly, Burns (1996) divides Catholic doctrine into “core” and “peripheral” ideological elements. In his formulation, one can understand where ideological disputes arise, and the intensity with which they erupt, by understanding their location in the core–periphery structure. Burns’s claim stands in contrast to a Weberian approach that understands ideological disputes as based on the locations and interests of the “carrier” groups who coalesce around a particular ideological formulation.

Several advantages flow from this internal structural approach to a cultural analysis of religion. First, it takes language seriously. As Goffman (1974) noted, there are implicit rules to every utterance and interaction, and these structure experience. One can analytically bracket larger forces and variables that lie outside the frame, and treat the structure and content of the “situation” as important in itself. Such an analysis of the structural “grammar” of culture does not reduce it to a reflection of social institutions. In addition, this offers a way to think about what is distinctive about religion as a cultural system – it becomes a symbol set with a particular grammar of usage, with specific properties that lend themselves to particular uses.

When used alone, however, a grammatical approach to religion becomes too formalistic and acontextual. Even grammatically equivalent expressions must be uttered and interpreted within contexts: they do not float freely in a nonsocial space. It is not just grammar, but also availability and resonance, that organize the internal meanings of discourse (cf. Williams and Benford, 2000). Thus, several scholars analyze religion as sets of cultural codes that affect meaning through their links to cultural traditions. For example, Hart (2001) distinguishes “expansive” from “constrained” modes of political discourse, based on the use of moral reasoning and rationales embedded in the discourse. These are not content related, as they can accommodate progressive or conservative visions. Rather they are “styles” of discourse that reveal sets of implicit, practical, and lived rules about what can or cannot be said, how to discuss issues, and what counts as authority. The dimensions of constraint or expansiveness involve tone, links to other political issues, and links to political and socio-cultural traditions. Hart’s examination of group organizing discourse demonstrates that how things get expressed matters to strategy and outcome. While he is not finding meaning, per se, in the structure of the discourse, Hart focuses on its properties and elements. Similarly, Kniss (1997) studies the conflict surrounding symbols within one religious tradition. He demonstrates that different types of symbols, whether abstract or concrete, have different capacities for flexibility and interpretation. The character of the symbol itself intersects with the contexts in which the religious conflict occurs, and produces different interpretations and political outcomes.
Agency in meaning

The paragraphs above outline various “structural” approaches to understanding how religion works as culture. One may turn from the structural implications of Geertz’s metaphor of the “web” toward an analytic focus on the second half of Geertz’s definition of culture, “significance,” that is, meaning. What makes this approach particularly interesting is Geertz’s further reference to the “spinning” humans do to create meaning for themselves. This metaphor emphasizes the processes and interactions humans use in order to create meaning. Geertz himself used this approach to culture ceaselessly, charting how people construct and express meaning systems, and the social and personal dissonance that arises when these systems fail to provide convincing interpretations for worldly events. For Geertz, religion formed a cultural “system” whose hallmark was coherence of meaning and integration of expressive symbols with the subjective meanings people imputed to them. One need not be as convinced as Geertz that culture forms a seamless web of meaning in order to find an interpretive and processual approach useful.

One way to study the interpretive agency people use to create meaning through their religion is to focus on how individuals assemble and arrange cultural elements into coherent identities or attitudes. For example, Dillon (1999) examines contemporary Catholic identity by interviewing Catholics with “marginalized” identities – such as gay members of the group Dignity. Dillon finds people assemble a variety of arguments for keeping a Catholic identity. They use faith, reason, a normative desire to reform the Church, and other symbolic tropes in order to affirm both personal identity and connection to a faith whose institutional hierarchies and theological expressions have spurned them. Similarly, Steve Hart (1992) interviewed a variety of American Christians about their conceptions of economic justice, and how their faith speaks to that topic. He found five “building block” principles upon which economic attitudes are built, and considerable interpretive efficacy as respondents made a variety of uses of the building blocks. Indeed, patterns that might be expected – such as pairing economic conservatism with socio-cultural conservatism – are not necessarily dominant. People put the building blocks together in a variety of ways, and use their own understandings of ideological coherence to make sense of the resulting ideational “structure.”

One can find diversity in the assemblages of meaning, even among people who share common socio-cultural locations and commitments. For example, Maxwell explores the diversity of motives among anti-abortion direct action participants, noting that, even though participants share many characteristics, they articulate a variety of motivations for activism. Further, “the complexity underlying most activists’ motivations could as quickly dissipate the impulse to sit-in as arouse it” (2002: 10). There is not a simple translation from beliefs – even strongly held ones – to behaviors. However, by contextualizing their religious beliefs within their personal circumstances and social environments, people are able to use preexisting ethics flexibly to generate great energy and persistence for activism.

Platt and Fraser (1998) and Platt and Williams (2002) push the argument for interpretive diversity even further in separate analyses of letters written to Martin Luther King Jr. Platt and Fraser examine supportive letters from movement participants, while Platt and Williams analyze segregationist letters from King’s opponents.
In both cases, the letters reveal a multiplicity of arguments for support or opposition, drawn from a variety of sources — many of which were religious. Individual letter writers often pulled from a variety of sources to formulate a rationale, and one symbol (say a particular scriptural passage) was often put to a variety of purposes by different letter writers.

While interpretive perspectives and the focus on agency are welcome as a relief from a social-structural bias in the conception of how culture works, they can result in a reductionist approach to culture, albeit from the other direction. If structural reflection theory reduced culture to nothing but expressions of more fundamental locations in social structures, a pure agentic theory gives culture itself no autonomous power. Culture becomes transparent, a mere instrumentality that agents use in pursuit of other ends. If culture is just a “tool kit” (Swidler, 1986) then cultural elements are only means, only strategic instruments directed at something “noncultural,” whatever that may be. A similar problem haunts understanding culture as meaning if that meaning is constructed purely through actors’ wills. If actors pick and choose cultural elements as they see fit, if culture is just a grab bag of elements in which any particular combination of elements provides meaning as ably as any other combination, then the content of cultural forms, or the contexts in which culture is engaged, are largely irrelevant. The agent’s choice is the only variable that matters, and culture can be dismissed as a gloss.

If pushed to an extreme, the agent-oriented approach can make culture no more significant than it is in rational choice theory (RCT), where a universal human motivation — interest maximization — considers society as nothing but an amalgam of rational calculators and again makes culture epiphenomenal. The recent debate on the application of rational choice theory to religion reveals its perils for an autonomous conception of culture. Stark and Finke (2000) claim that one can understand individual religiosity, the growth and decline of religious groups, and the religious history of a society, all based on humans acting rationally to maximize the benefits they receive from religious beliefs and religious communities. In their scheme, culture disappears as a distinct level of analysis, in either its structural or interpretive modes. Individual motivations and rational actions are the building blocks through which groups and even societies are built. Several critiques of RCT (e.g., Bruce, 1999) question the extent to which religious action can ever be “rational” in the sense of economic interest maximization and action. More germane to my purpose here are Lechner’s (1997) and Spickard’s (1998) observations that RCT, when pushed to its logical conclusions, fails to preserve a culturalist theoretical orientation.

In sum, structural approaches to religion err by slighting the sense-making work done by people “on the ground,” or by treating religion too formally as a grammatical system. Interpretive perspectives recognize that persons put various symbolic elements together in ways that create sensible (at least to them) responses to social and cultural circumstances. On the other hand, agency-oriented theories often posit individuals as too-autonomous meaning-makers, constructing their own cultural worlds without reference to the distribution of power, the organization of institutions, or the influence of cultural traditions. Geertz’s formulation of culture contained the seeds of both perspectives. People craft meaning in interactions with others, often through innovative understandings of symbols and creative use of them. And yet, people must work with the resources available, and they construct
meanings in concrete social and historical circumstances. Thinking of culture as a stock of strategies and symbols that are deployed within particular contingencies, circumstances, and social locations recognizes both dimensions of the Geertzian “webs of significance.”

**RELIGION AS EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT CULTURE**

When asking, “how religion works” in human action, sociologists of religion – even those who emphasize actor agency – have been wary of treating religion only as an instrumental means, inflected with strategic concerns. People do not just “use” religious symbols (although that happens); they are simultaneously held by them. Religion as culture comes in the form of explicit cultural objects, such as symbols, ideas, or persons that people use self-consciously to understand and explain themselves. At the same time, religion can be implicit culture, defining the mental and meaning parameters within which things make sense, or as beliefs and assumptions that guide actions even if actors themselves are only dimly aware of their influence.

Nowhere is the distinction between religion as explicit and implicit culture more clearly visible than in sociological literature that examines religion’s relations to power, politics, and collective action. Because religion is a social phenomenon and a cultural system of widely available and potent symbols, it has been an important repertoire both to those who hold power and those who would challenge it. Religion has legitimated the status quo as an earthly expression of the heavenly realm; it has also given marginal social groups the motivations to protest, and provided the rhetorical tools with which they challenge power. Religion has been either prop or challenge both through explicit manifestations and implicit worldviews (Williams, 1996b).

Religion is not only about politics and power, but it is unavoidably linked to them. Religion organizes relationships between humans and the divine, as well as among humans themselves. Politics, in a famous formulation, is about the “authoritative distribution of value” – in essence, the organization of societal power and privilege. Thus, religion and politics are both systems of organization and authority, and are inextricably linked at the cultural level. This linkage is often cooperative, often competitive, sometimes in open conflict. Politics and power were not topics that particularly engaged Geertz’s own work, except for an occasional foray into the symbolic display of power and office. However, power is an important dimension in the understanding of religion and society, and provides clear examples for analyzing religion as explicit or implicit culture.

For example, social movements have used religion explicitly to justify their actions, as when they opposed military intervention because of a commitment to the doctrine of “Liberation Theology” (Nepstad, 1996). Other times, political and religious leaders portray obedience to secular authority directly as a religious duty (Demerath, 2001; Pope, 1942). However, in other instances the workings of religion in politics are implicit – they become the cultural “wallpaper” that is ubiquitous, but so much so that one forgets to notice it. Religion helps constitute the taken-for-granted notions of “the way we do things” that is the context for collective action (Pattillo-McCoy, 1998). An effective religious system may provide meaning and interpretation for culture members, but go almost unnoticed. The
assumptions about human beings, the organizing principle of relations between humans and the divine, and how these things coalesce to form a coherent “real” world that is perceived similarly by fellow culture members, may all fit together so smoothly that the seams in the wallpaper do not even show.

The sacred canopy and cultural hegemony

As a source of social cohesion, religion often suppresses and submerges conflict, either explicitly or implicitly. Religion can reinforce power directly through explicit doctrinal justifications, such as the famed “Divine Right of Kings” attributed to the reign of Louis XIV. Less blatantly, religious doctrines, symbols, and practices can provide the cultural imagery for envisioning political society. For example, religious creation stories often recount the mythos of a specific and identifiable people, specifying their relationship to the divine and to each other. These can have political consequences, as they define who is a member of a “people” and even provide those people with claims to a particular land (Akenson, 1992). When pushed to an extreme, religious understandings of what forms a good society can be transformed from an identity-providing ethos to a system that explicitly links state, territory, and culture in a “religious nationalism.” Juergensmeyer (1993) describes religious nationalism as an “ideology of order” that competes with “secular nationalism.” Both are cultural systems that order the political world – determining what and who count as legitimate authority, outlining the relations among societal institutions and between individuals and the state. Religious nationalism is an explicit reaction to its secular counterpart, and can hold together a nation with its resonant symbolism and rhetoric.

In contrast to thinking of religion as an explicit hegemonic force, the “sacred canopy” metaphor illuminates religion’s implicit functions in “naturalizing” the social world and giving it sacred significance. The sacred canopy concept presents religion as a binding, and bonding, cultural system. Religious understandings cover the social system, binding together disparate institutions, social groups, and social processes, and bonding humans together through solidarity, shared values, and common identity. The sacred canopy and societal system become infused with both expressive content and social power. People are bound to their society, affectively, morally, and cognitively, through the society’s connection to a sacred cosmos and the meaningfulness of their place within the society. The sense of sacredness attached to the “real” is a powerful force for legitimating and justifying status quo social arrangements.

Gramsci’s (1971) “cultural Marxism” provided another conceptual tool for understanding how religion implicitly reproduces power. Recognizing that class rule required political rule, and that political rule required consent as well as coercion, Gramsci formulated a notion of “hegemony” by which he meant the constellation of social forces that reproduce the legitimacy and authority of a regime. Gramsci recognized that institutional leaders often used religious symbols strategically for narrow political purposes, but he also emphasized the extent to which elites themselves are held by their own ideology. Hegemonic understandings shape the cultural terrain for all societal members. For example, Liston Pope’s (1942) study of labor conflict in the south demonstrated that owners and managers of the textile mills, as well as the workforce, held religiously legitimated understandings of labor,
economic inequality, and social conflict. Ideology is most effective when it is implicit
and proffered sincerely, rather than explicitly and cynically manipulated.

The formulation of the sacred canopy argument most connected to political
legitimation and justification is the notion of “civil religion.” Bellah’s (1967) seminal
article made a case for an “American Civil Religion” that exists as a distinct religious
system alongside the US’s many sectarian religious traditions. Civil religion locates
the nation in a sacred cosmos, and infuses national history and destiny with divine
purpose. The nation becomes the object of religious veneration, standing alongside
the sectarian commitments that order nonpolitical dimensions of life. Bellah’s for-
mulation owed a great deal to Durkheim (Demerath and Williams, 1985; Cristi,
2001). Civil religion’s sacred object is the nation, not the regime, and its great
function is to provide a cultural basis for national solidarity while still preserving
sectarian religious pluralism.

Bellah’s civil religion concept went beyond a justifying religious gloss on political
power. For him, civil religion became inauthentic if it devolved into national self-
worship, or involved a “priestly” celebration of the American state. Civil religion
also needed “prophetic” judgment and critique, based on transcendent standards of
justice (Richey and Jones 1974). Religious nationalism, as such, prevented civil
religion from becoming the potent force it could be. Bellah’s follow-up assessment,
tellingly titled The Broken Covenant (1975), criticized particular political groups for
forsaking the element of critique in civil religion and descending into a cynical
national self-justification. Thus, for Bellah civil religion was not to be confused
with a narrow ideology, but rather was to express religion’s cohesive and critical-
reformist impulses.

In actual practice (as opposed to an optimistic normative formulation), civil
religion has not always been self-critical, prophetic, or culturally autonomous.
Wilson (1979) understood civil religion as just an extension of Protestant public
piety that nods to religious pluralism while keeping the public religious representa-
tions of the nation firmly within the cultural orbit of dominant social groups.
Demerath (2001) argues that civil religious elements are parts of a “cultural reli-
gion” – meanings and practices that have lost their explicit and sectarian connec-
tions to religion, but still form a cultural system that provides normative
frameworks. These understandings of civil religion are more Weberian than Bellah’s
Durkheimian formulation. Like the Protestant Ethic, civil religion has infused public
life with moral meaning, but the specific religious (or theological) content that
originally animated the vision has become submerged.

This is civil religion as hegemony. It framed the nation within a Protestant
religious vocabulary, and constructed national identity as something with which
white Protestants could feel at home – and to which religious minorities had

adjusted. It reinforced cultural privilege within the society, even as it purportedly
spoke for the national community as a whole. Cristi (2001) and others (e.g.,
Demerath and Williams 1985), note that the term “civil religion” itself actually
originated in the political writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. American sociology’s
functionalist assumptions, and its heritage in Durkheim, obscure the extent to which
Rousseau’s proposed civil religion was a self-consciously generated cultural system
designed to ensure allegiance and order by offering the subjects of a realm a unifying
set of religio-political symbols. Rousseau imagined a top down civil religion
rather than an emergent product of social collective effervescence. Cristi thus distin-
guishes “civil religion” from “political religion,” the latter being more a tool of political power than a grassroots source of social cohesion. In effect, Cristi charts a continuum from an implicit (civil religion) to an explicit (political religion) hegemonic function.

The extent to which religious culture is articulated explicitly as a hegemonic support for power varies across social contexts. The two most important contextual features are religious pluralism (both institutionally and culturally), and the cultural legitimacy of democratic practices. Religion as either sacred canopy or hegemony works best in religiously homogenous societies, especially when access to religious symbolism is socially restricted. Berger (1967) claimed that religious pluralism would produce secularization, as no one in a diverse society would be able to believe that his or her own religion was an unchallengeable meaning system. Relativism would hamper religion’s ability to construct the world. That clearly does not happen. Religion can flourish in pluralistic conditions, such as the contemporary US (Warner 1993). But diversity makes religion more available as a medium through which social conflict can be expressed. Religion may remain as the master cultural reservoir for the political and societal system, but the content of that reservoir becomes more ambiguous and more contested.

Following this logic, pluralism and democratic culture are two important conditions that make religion available as a counter-hegemonic force, and an important cultural component in the mobilization of political challenges. In institutionally differentiated societies, where democratic practices mean that religious truths are not the sole province of ecclesiastical elites, culture is distinct from the religious forms that may express it. They overlap, but they are not identical. Religion then becomes differentially available as a way of understanding society, only one way of articulating public life that must compete with other formulations. If social groups wish to use their religious systems as the basis for public claims, their religious reasoning and cultural justifications must be articulated explicitly.

Casanova (1994) demonstrates just this process. If public religious claims are to affect political society, they must drop pretensions to sacred canopy-style holistic commitments and instead participate self-consciously in public debate. Casanova shows the Catholic Church engaging in just this transformation in several societies, and thus becoming a force for societal change and occasionally, democratization. “De-privatized” religion can become a force for social change even as it retains significant cohesive capacity – legitimating the symbols of challenge even as the content of its cultural messages stress unity. In effect, public religion can become counter-hegemonic.

Smith (1994) provides another example of religious culture as both hegemony and counter-hegemony in his analysis of how Latin America’s dominant Roman Catholic religious culture affects attempts at societal democratization. Historically, the Church saw itself as partnered with the state in producing a coherent “Christendom” that bound all societal institutions under its spiritual (and indirect political) guidance. This produced a political culture of “monistic corporatism” that has resisted democratizing efforts, including those from within Church-sponsored “base communities.” However, these local groups do create “open spaces” within civil society and help foster the conditions for pluralism. Thus, religious forces are simultaneously hegemonic and counter-hegemonic – reinforcing the corporatist ancien régime, and sowing the seeds for democracy.
EMPOWERMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Counter-hegemonic opportunities, however, are still just opportunities, and must be realized by social actors. Religion can challenge the taken-for-grantedness of the status quo but it must engage in public action to do so. This evokes religion’s role in “empowerment,” as well as its connections to power, and inverts both Durkheim’s sociology of religion and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony by focusing on “dissensus,” resistance, and conflict. When religion is differentially available – due to social conditions of religious pluralism and democratic access to religious authority – it becomes a resource used by different groups in different ways. In these cases, public expressions of religion become increasingly ambiguous. More room develops for contested interpretations of symbols and rival meanings. More social groups gain the capacity to use religion to mobilize challenges. Religion’s contribution to the mobilization of marginal social groups, similar to the perspectives on religion as hegemony, can focus on both the explicit and implicit manifestations of religion forms.

Many movements for social and political change have used religion explicitly as a way of expressing worldly political and social claims. For example, Billings (1990) notes how labor organizers successfully drew upon scriptural references and religious beliefs to persuade Southern workers to strike; he also demonstrates that organizers who eschewed religious appeals struggled to gain a hearing. Nepstad (1996) documents the important role of religious music in the Nicaraguan uprising against the Somoza regime – including the composition of a “peasants’ mass.” Williams and Alexander (1994) demonstrate how American populism couched its mobilizing language in biblical stories and references – the lingua franca of the populations that were mobilized. Any number of accounts of the civil rights movement shows how the African-American masses were mobilized by their religious beliefs in justice (Harris, 1999), and explained themselves through biblical stories of liberation (J. Williams, 2002). And on the extreme edges of public politics, Aho (1990) and Juergensmeyer (1999) demonstrate how political violence can be generated and justified out of a religious worldview using explicit references to the war between good and evil, and the divine sanction for attempts to remake the world through apocalypse.

While elements of religious culture may explicitly justify political mobilization or offer activist leaders a set of culturally legitimate symbols, there are still processes of interpretation involved. Symbols and beliefs must be translated from one realm to another, and their relevance and salience established. Given that cultural processes of interpretation go on within communities, it is not surprising that religious communities are the sources of much public activism, particularly for marginalized populations who control few institutions other than their religious ones (see Harris, 1999). Such groups construct “internal political cultures” (Wood, 1999: 309) that then shape their abilities and strategies for working “in the world.” The processes of interpretation and articulation are key.

For example, Kopelowitz and Diamond (1998) examine two religious political parties in Israel. Each has the sanctity of the “Land of Israel” as a central sacred symbol and an important political principle. Yet the two parties articulate the symbol differently, giving one party the flexibility to participate in the political
processes of liberal democratic politics, while the second party’s concern about moral compromise makes it unable to gain a place at the national political table. One cultural code is articulated through two different discursive practices, with very different outcomes. In an obverse example, Nepstad (2001) also focuses on a single cultural object, the narrative of the life story of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, but shows how that story fostered solidarity between Latin American and North American Christians who worked together in the peace movement of the 1980s. The narrative offered a culturally resonant “plot,” and Romero’s martyrdom presented the political conflict with moral clarity. It provided cognitive and affective resources for building movement collective identity across two societies.

Part of religion’s central message is that this world, as it is, is not the final or ultimate reality. While that has often pointed believers away from concern with worldly politics, it can also be transformed into a powerful mechanism of critique, holding any given social arrangement to a higher law. No person or institution is beyond divine law, and any official or office can be challenged if they stray. Further, personal religious commitments can be the wellspring of deep motivations to take up societal causes. Believers approach their action with a mix of ultimacy and universalism, a powerful and empowering mix. These developments are not just the products of individualized beliefs. They happen within communities and are articulated within culturally intelligible discourses. Religion may well form the core cultural system in a society – the sacred canopy may have hegemonic functions – but the resources for challenge and mobilization emerge through explicit and interpretive action.

INTEGRATING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY WITH EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT RELIGIOUS CULTURE

While theoretical dichotomies are useful heuristic devices for understanding the assumptions and perspectives that inform sociological research, actual social life is more integrated. Grasping religion’s empirical role in public life requires an understanding of how structural forces and agent-driven action are intertwined and interdependent.

For example, Williams (2003) provides a structural understanding of religion as a political language by comparing it with other possible sources of claims-making authority, such as scientific expertise or ethnoracial identity. Rather than credit religious language’s political efficacy to specific content, or even the religious beliefs of potential audiences, aspects of the language itself makes it more available, and often more potent, than other forms of political discourse. The context in which religious language is used politically – in this case marked by religious pluralism and democratic cultural practices – interacts with properties of the religious discourse itself to form an efficacious cultural resource.

At the same time, language does not “work” by itself: it must be interpreted in meaningful ways. Williams and Blackburn (1996) found layers of interpretations among white Protestant anti-abortion activists discussing the relationship between faith and politics. While all were identified with Operation Rescue and used certain discursive forms consistently, the content they poured into those forms, and the implications that content had for action, varied. Similarly, Williams and Demerath
(1991) showed that religious imagery could be an effective rhetorical resource on putatively secular issues such as economic development, as well as traditional moral issues. There is clearly a translation process between formal ideology – or cultural worldviews – and the practical understandings people generate to make sense of their life situations and political issues.

There is a similar dance between the structuring properties of religious culture and the agency involved in its explicit use when one examines religion as part of the repertoire that forms a national political culture. The American political cultural repertoire is bounded – some ideas and symbols fall within it as legitimate expressions and others do not. Williams (1995; 1999b; Williams and Kubal, 1999) demonstrates these “boundaries of the legitimate” by examining the cultural models of what the good society should look like. There are “visions of the good society” that social movements and others must use when claiming their agenda speaks for the public good. Actors are constrained in what they can claim if they are interested in pursuing public, mainstream politics. Further, Williams (1999b) finds that the reigning cultural models all have religious roots, even if their specific religious content is rarely invoked now – another example of religion as an implicit element of cultural hegemony.

However, Williams’s (1999a) analysis of “public religion” shows how the implicit structuring of the sacred canopy can be variously interpreted and even challenged when religion is used as an explicit element in public life. Public religion occurs when religious acts or claims are made on behalf of the public, or to the public as an audience. The symbols employed in these expressions emerge out of the cultural repertoire of a particular socio-cultural group, whether they are publicly acknowledged as such or not. They are somebody’s culture, even as they claim to speak for a holistic public. Any expression of the good society or the public good necessarily privileges some perspectives and marginalizes others. Public religious claims, no matter how expansive or universal, are shaped and channeled by the frameworks of a particular group.

And yet, that very aspiration to universalism, and the transcendent truth that religion is thought to express, can also become an explicit tool for groups trying to challenge the status quo. This is most famously shown in the language of the Civil Rights Movement, where King and other leaders used the legitimated language of the dominant social groups and exploited its universalist and hegemonic properties as a wedge for claiming a role as part of the “public” (R. Williams, 2002). It was a civil religious language that opened space for democratic participation, rather than reinforced the power of existing arrangements. The transformation from implicit cultural system to explicit mobilizing language had profound political implications.

**CONCLUSION**

Any cultural system as widespread and complex as religion will have myriad effects upon human action. These will vary by social location and historical context. In that sense, the structure versus agency dichotomy is an “indexical” theoretical problem in that the particularities of the setting determine the relative importance of the factors involved. As societies become pluralistic and diverse social groups vie for recognition and public space, religion is likely to become an explicit cultural object, wielded
self-consciously by groups trying to distinguish themselves from others and find a language with which to explain themselves to the public while mobilizing their own. As explicit articulations of religious identity, visions of the public sphere, and calls for social stasis or change accumulate, they structure the cultural terrain in ways that affect subsequent articulations. The structure and interpretation of cultural systems, their implicit influence and explicit forms, interact to form the dynamic known as religion in society.

The scholarly developments charted in this chapter have produced portraits of religion in the contemporary world of power and meaning that are far more complicated than might be imagined. Religion is not confined to the sacred canopy of societal unity romanticized by functionalist myth, nor the ideological prop of the status quo demonized by orthodox Marxism. It is being rescued in contemporary cultural scholarship from dismissal as epiphenomena on one hand, and removed from its functionalist pedestal on the other. While religion remains important as a “cultural system,” the meaning of that phrase has become more diverse, more nuanced, and more controversial, with resulting benefit to our understandings of the social world.

References


Aesthetic Uncertainty: The New Canon?

Vera L. Zolberg

INTRODUCTION

By the second half of the twentieth century many cultural critics had become appalled by the rapid succession of styles in the visual arts. So unprecedented in the history of cultural change did they seem that sociologists such as Daniel Bell denounced them for faddishness, decadence, and a sign of anomie (Bell, 1996). Although other sociologists treated these mutations with equanimity, as objects for sociological analysis (Gans, 1985; Crane, 1987, 1992; DiMaggio, 1987, 1992), there is no doubt that certain aesthetic innovations are difficult to digest. The more general issue was whether these new forms should be taken seriously as “Art”?

Problematic today, Art used to be easy to recognize. It included paintings and sculpture, music, poetry or other literary works based on a historically grounded, theoretical rationale associated with esteemed institutions and status groups. This consensus did not imply total agreement on questions of aesthetic quality, but even artists opposed to what had become canonical styles tended to innovate within existing genres. Certainty about what is an object of art rather than some lesser thing, however, was famously thrown into question when Marcel Duchamp “assisted” Leonardo da Vinci by adding a mustache to a reproduction of his Gioconda, and gave it a new, somewhat salacious title. Later, Duchamp submitted a signed ceramic urinal to a juried art exhibition (with which he was himself associated). Although rejected, the work he entitled Fountain opened the way to other even more unlikely postulants for fellowship in the domain of Art: objets trouvés, non-unique objects (photographs, posters, sundry ephemera) (Moulin, 1978), wrapped buildings, conceptual art (shadows outlined on walls, verbal political statements).

Although these works are typically created by professional artists in a deliberate challenge to existing norms (Hughes, 1981), I want to argue that their innovations paved the way to legitimacy for acquisition by collectors, galleries and art museums of unintended art works – the results of farmers’ whittling or rural women’s quilting,
mental patients’ drawings, children’s scribbling, or colonial subjects’ carvings (Ardery, 1997; Zolberg and Cherbo, 1997). In the past, works of this sort were treated as objects of curiosity. Now that they have become aesthetic objects (œuvres) in their own right, they call into question the classificatory systems that purport to differentiate between what is art and what is not. The canon based on certainty is being gravely challenged. Implications of this transformation for sociology are the focus of this chapter.

I begin with a review of the sources of art as an intellectual domain, charted by historians and philosophers of aesthetics, musicologists, art historians and other humanists (Kristeller, 1951, 1952). This artistic sphere became the foundation for sociologists of culture, who have relied on it from their own disciplinary perspective. Unlike humanist and aesthetic scholars who emphasize art as an autonomous structure, sociologists highlight its historical context in relation to existing or emergent political, social, and economic developments (Zolberg, 1990: 53–78). Their perspective is particularly salient with respect to changing patterns of artistic innovation, whose processes were resisted by actors in established institutions. Sociologists have analyzed how, despite the opposition of established authorities, new styles sometimes gained entry, with the effect of reclassification and revalorization of genres (White and White, 1965; Crane, 1987; DiMaggio, 1987; DeNora, 1995).

But in the late post–World War II era, the extremes of the New and the density of artistic innovation began to overwhelm existing conceptual frameworks. Arguably, the most controversial development involved the integration of commercial art forms into fine art museums, and previously denigrated, largely commercial, musical forms, such as jazz, in the quintessentially prestigious venues of concert halls (Huyssen, 1986). Interpreted as what came to be characterized as “postmodernism” (Zolberg and Cherbo, 1997; Danto, 1986), this was a transformation of quite a different order than earlier innovations. For sociological understanding, this transformation requires more than a simple forcing of new styles into the previously existing paradigm based on a clear hierarchy of Fine Art and popular or commercial arts. It suggests the need for rethinking categories by reexamining boundary work (Bauböck, 1998), with the possibility that a new paradigm is necessary for framing the arts when the taken-for-granted hierarchical dimensions are no longer hegemonic.

CONSTRUCTING THE MODERN SYSTEM OF THE ARTS

Making the Western aesthetic canon

The core of artistic categories making up “the modern system of the arts” that became established in most of Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century included five art forms (painting, sculpture, architecture, music, along with the belles lettres – poetry and eloquence) (Kristeller, 1951: 497). Although at various times other forms, such as dance and garden design migrated in and out of this cultural structure, those five were the basis of what in the West came to be meant by Art. More important than the specific genres, which had counterparts in the everyday life of ordinary people, its authority rested on ideas derived from classical
writings, as reformulated in late medieval scholastic thought, and elaborated during the Renaissance by artists and writers in alliance with their patrons. This combination of intellectual and practical developments culminated in Enlightenment innovations that formed the established aesthetic structure with which all later arts and scholarship had to contend. As Paul Kristeller pointed out, Kant, the first major modern philosopher to integrate aesthetics into his philosophical system, posited the enduring qualities of art, its universalism, transcendence, and the pleasure it gave—with the Neoplatonic proviso that artistic greatness not be based on too easy enjoyment. In this regard, probably the most telling contribution of Kant to what was to become the sociology of the arts was his attribution to fine art of a seriousness equal to the theory of truth (epistemology or metaphysics) and the theory of goodness (ethics) (1952: 42).

A general and persistent challenge for aesthetics based on the modern system of the arts involved the predicament of incorporating ever-renewed media, ranging from the modern concert grand piano to the motion picture (Kristeller, 1952: 46; Knight, 1957; Seldes, 1957). For example, as concerts, dramatic performances, and operas moved from small venues to large halls, instruments had to be made with a capacity for loudness previously unimagined, and a premium was placed on powerful voices that could project to fill them. In practice, as the system became institutionalized, it gained the legitimacy of the seemingly eternal. Even when it was jolted by Romantic emphasis on originality, uniqueness and authenticity, the system withstood that challenge. Nationalist sentiments in certain countries lent its universalizing aesthetics particular local demeanors. Although it was not immune to the impact of a variety of new ideas, many deriving from the changing political and social contexts with which the system intersected, in some ways this cultural tradition remains quite durable even today.

Changing structures of patronage

Neither technological innovations alone nor developments in ideas are sufficient by themselves to account for the astonishing changes that have characterized the arts in recent times. Without rehearsing the macrostructural and historical trends that have been adduced to explain transformations in every domain of European society from the Middle Ages through modern times, we can see that certain processes and institutions have directly influenced the arts (Gerth and Mills, 1945; Hauser, 1951; Williams, 1981). Public concert series in increasingly large halls, new sources of income from publishers, and middle class audiences constrained, but also permitted composers to write for larger (and louder) orchestras. In fact, technical changes often come into being as a result of no less important alterations in the sources and structures of cultural support. Tia DeNora has shown how Beethoven, among other composers, even while maintaining ties to aristocratic patronage for its symbolic value, was able to use the new commercial possibilities to free himself from complete dependence on it (DeNora, 1995).

By now it has become a commonplace that the work of artists is deeply affected by shifts in patronage, whether from church, city states, imperial courts, guilds, aristocrats, magnates, or national governments (Minihan, 1977; Zolberg, 1983; Balfe, 1993). No one denies that support structures for cultural production are vital: those who pay the piper, while not exactly calling every note of the tune, have a great deal
to say about its dissemination (Balfe, 1993). Even humanist scholars (cultural and art historians) are aware of, and incorporate aspects of these social contexts into their studies (Schama, 1988; Kempers, 1992; Sandler, 1996).

Of the shifts from one form of patronage to another, one of the most studied centers on the emergence of centralizing absolutist nation states, in rivalry with the previously dominant church that provided new opportunities as well as new constraints, and led to alterations in the arts, the works created, disseminated, institutionalized. Whereas under church-imposed artistic canons, aesthetic considerations had been subordinated to religious dogma, the nation state system elevated secular power over the religious, permitting artists to gain support in the service of the state. Impressed by the chance of benefiting from this new source of sustenance and esteem, writers, musicians and painters sought the patronage of absolutist monarchs or royal courts. Where possible, they engaged in the founding of the new academic institution, helping to construct its hierarchy of value that privileged certain art genres above others (Heinich, 1993). It was in the context of these institutions that the modern system of the arts crystallized. New themes, formal arrangements, colors, tonalities in emulation of classical works that during the Renaissance had been reinterpreted as masterpieces rather than as offshoots of Paganism became the basis of the new canon.

An administrative institution encompassing education, regularized structures of competition and rewards for talent, the French academic system became the leader in proposing and commissioning art for public purposes (Minihan, 1977). Royal academies derived their legitimacy from the prestigious bases of humanistic classical scholarship. In contrast to the prevailing guild system that trained craftsmen, it followed, instead, Renaissance ideas and selected aspirants whom they would educate to channel their creativity via erudition and skill to make works that strove for loftiness (Pevsner, 1940). By elevating certain art forms and genres over others, they established the “great culture” that redefined art, and institutionalized the hierarchy of high art over low and within each art, the standard of merit (Corvisier, 1978; Heinich, 1993). Artists and art forms unlucky enough to be excluded from the academic institutions and the canon it embodied found themselves relegated to separate statuses: in little cultures (folk art), marginal spheres (religious or provincial art worlds), and were left largely to the mercies of market forces (Corvisier, 1978). At least in theory, financial considerations were not to be near the forefront of thinking by fine artists, who were to devote themselves to the “higher” domain of aesthetics. Following the model of the noble knight, they had to dedicate themselves to an ideal and, in return, be protected through patronage from ordinary material considerations.

Roughly in this form, the French Academy of Fine Arts came to be the model adopted by most nation states in the process of their nineteenth century formation. When new European nation states established academies in their own names, on the whole, they selected from the repertoire of available cultural structures the shared taxonomy and hierarchy of genres, in harmony with their academic structures. As long as aristocratic patronage or a well-established academic system existed, they provided creative artists possibilities of support and honor. With the collapse or demise of those structures, artists and writers were thrown into closer contact with market forces than they had been prepared for, a proximity that threatened the legitimacy of their creative works.
The modern core and the academy’s decline

Ironically, the academic institution that artists had welcomed and helped to launch in hopes of providing themselves with a prestigious and regular source of support, and freedom from interference by ecclesiastical authorities or market economics, ended up alienating their nineteenth century heirs. After its demise under the Great Revolution, the renewed academic system, as Harrison and Cynthia White have demonstrated, grew considerably, but the very success and expansion of the academic system contributed to its decay. Drawing increasing numbers of aspirants into its orbit, the institution was incapable of properly absorbing more than a relative handful of them. Disgruntled by their exclusion, would-be professional artists accused the Academy and its related institutions of being the stronghold of untalented bureaucrats who arbitrarily rejected new ideas (White and White, 1965). While the Academy was not consistently as resistant to change as artists charged, this indictment was not without merit.

Artists impatient with what they saw as an increasingly sclerotic institution were not alone in their unhappiness. Indeed, creative individuals with professional aspirations in the difficult material circumstances of a declining aristocratic patronage system had already begun to look upon their potential supporters with ambivalence. This became an especially prevalent attitude among literary and artistic creators, beginning in early nineteenth century France. Hardly addressing themselves to ordinary people, artists, writers, and musicians grew contemptuous both of traditionalist official academic institutions and the growing stratum of the newly wealthy that might provide them regular patronage in their stead. It was some consolation for them to think that artists and writers made up, as Stendhal put it, “the happy few.” Arrogating to themselves the right of total creative freedom, they grouped themselves into bands of brothers, relishing their exclusivity even if it meant alienation from common society (Graña, 1964). In the meantime, however, they were obliged to depend upon the “free market” of newspaper, novel and play writing, and whatever else they could find to make ends meet.

Howard Becker has usefully categorized artists according to their relationship to the art worlds in which they work. His two principal types of artists, “integrated professionals” and “mavericks” (Becker, 1982), correspond approximately to the distinction between artists successful in the academic system and those rejected because they would not conform to it. Mavericks, educated to be professionals but unsuccessful in making their mark in the academic system, took on the role of “independent artists,” or “anti-academics.” Rather than seek the purported eternal, transcendent value of tradition, some accepted Baudelaire’s challenge that art should capture the contemporary moment in its transitoriness (Huston, 1989; Zolberg, 1990: 59–61). For mavericks in the Romantic mode, being true to their ideas meant willingness to risk exclusion from the official sales institution, the Salon – at least until or unless they gained its recognition, and were invited to be a part of it. Not that they all opposed the stylistic strictures of the academic hierarchy; in fact, aside from a few groups of individuals, most independent artists did not actually repudiate academic aesthetics entirely and artists rejected by the official salon jury did not necessarily break new ground in art. As the art historian Lorne Huston has established, strategically planned exhibitions, such as the Salon des Refusés, drew
not only adventurous artists but also conventional, academically oriented, artists who wished to join in alliance with them for the chance to show their works (Huston, 1989). Because of the oversupply of paintings and little academic sanction, all of them were obliged to seek an alternative source of support, and some found it as a new breed of collectors emerged.

New art, new patrons

The art historian Albert Boime has noted that in nineteenth century France many patrons of the new art styles had fairly recently become financially successful in innovative entrepreneurial fields (Boime, 1976). Many of the collectors he studied shared some affinity with a number of independent artists in rejecting the academic hierarchy of genres that exalted a particular view of the past, often in the form of allegorically pretentious history painting. Beyond the economic, the new collectors were also likely to differ from conventional collectors in religious identity (Protestant or Jewish rather than Catholic), political stance (Republican, and secularist rather than monarchist), and geographic origin (provincial or foreign rather than “truly” French) and were marginal to the Parisian “establishment” (Zolberg, 1992).

It was between them and independent artists that the expanding commercial dealer system served as mediators. This new support base, from approximately the middle of the nineteenth to well into the twentieth century, stimulated artistic change that produced a succession of original art movements, or avant-gardes. Dealers and collectors, in alliance with daring critics, played the unofficial role of gatekeepers, who formed the taste of an increasingly discerning clientele (White and White, 1965). Moreover, France was not the only country in which this pattern emerged. At roughly the same time, as Raymond Williams observed, in England it was a prosperous middle class of manufacturers and merchants who were drawn to patronage of members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (Williams, 1981: 77).

Impressionism, Gothic revivalism, symbolism and other late nineteenth century artistic innovations or rediscoveries may have seemed daring at the time, but by comparison early twentieth century modern artists took art to virtually unheard of extremes. What kinds of individuals would be so daring in the face of being ridiculed by their peers? They were not, after all, artists, for whom the Romantic idea of misunderstood genius might support the drive to create in ways that much of the public found ridiculous or abhorrent. Less explicable is why the relatively few collectors they found were interested in buying their abstract paintings (Russian Constructivism), odd color combinations (French Fauvism), distorted figures (German Expressionism), and other optically bewildering works (Italian Futurism). Berated and derided for allowing themselves to be taken in by charlatans, some early risk-taking collectors responded to the mockery that some of their works occasioned by withdrawing discreetly from audacious collecting. Still, no matter how much they astonished and scandalized more conservative members of the art world, a number of them persisted in buying – and displaying – what conventional collectors refused.

Pierre Bourdieu has noted that outsiders to established statuses frequently adopt a strategy of acquiring the kind of cultural capital that may make them acceptable to those to whose status they aspire. Yet in this case, far from concealing their marginality, the collectors actually embraced it. In the early twentieth century art world, marginality took one of two forms: a marginality of eccentricity and a marginality of
exclusion. Those with a secure position in the social world of “old wealth” and high status, but who differed in subtle, lifestyle, ways from socio-economic equals from whose ranks came conservative art patrons exemplified a marginality that was defined by their co-equals as eccentricity. The second form, marginality of exclusion, characterizes those who stemmed from the social fringe, the “newly wealthy,” adherents of devalued or pariah religions, of provincial origins. In Bourdieu’s terms, though they possessed economic capital in abundance, they lacked the cultural capital, largely symbolic, that might legitimate their social standing. Among both groups are found some who may have aspired to become artists themselves. But even if they did not overtly and steadily pursue a career as a professional artist, they attached themselves to artists, writers, dealers, and other sympathizers, together making up the personnel of avant-garde movements (Zolberg, 1992).

The durable legacy of avant-garde art works depended on the intense collaboration of these groups of artists and patrons. In the international arena that was increasingly becoming the normal site of the art world, they seemed to be looking for something new, not only in art, but also in their lives. Their behavior suggests a more encompassing and complex agenda – a search for a new social identity in which art played an unusually important role. Art became a substitute moral ethic parallel to religion, and for the patrons its adoption resembled a conversion – replacing their earlier identity with another. A number of them went further by acting as apostles of the modern: through the museums and the educational programs they launched, they carried the word to others throughout the world. In the process, they laid the groundwork for what became the “tradition of the new,” an idea founded on the substitution of a new aesthetic in place of a seemingly outworn academicism of one form or another (Rosenberg, 1959; Zolberg, 1992).

**Making the Tradition of the New**

New art ideas, new artists

Tension pervades Baudelaire’s famous definition of modernity as “the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent half of art, the other half being the immutable eternal” (Baudelaire, 1962: 467). But far more radical is the motto of a founder of one of the early New York avant-garde associations, Katherine Dreier’s Société Anonyme: “Traditions are beautiful – but to create them – not to follow” (Rose, 1967: 113). In this dictum, Dreier, a colleague of Marcel Duchamp, captures the eruption of vanguard ideas that struck some observers as a liberating force but others as a misguided attack on cherished values. In his analysis of the nineteenth and early twentieth century revolutions in the visual arts, Renato Poggioli differentiates the established system of “schools” of art from these avant-garde “movements.” In the former, artists adhered to the lead of a master whose method was to be transmitted to the future. Basically “static” in form, the goal of schools was the transcendence of the immediate. In contrast to schools, Poggioli sees avant-garde movements as based on dynamism, with the goal of changing art immanent in the movements themselves (Poggioli, 1971: 20).

Fine Art recognized as a domain of official culture had been narrowly defined as hierarchically superior to other forms of aesthetic creation. It was intended to set
standards of achievement for aspiring professionals, of taste by social strivers and, considerably later, came to be redefined as a right of citizenship in states with a democratic commitment. Independent and increasingly avant-garde artists of the early twentieth century wished to explore new ways of seeing and imagining the world. Some sought to create in increasingly abstract styles that appeared to ignore what had become the traditional genres of figure, landscape, or still life painting. In one way or another, the first half of the twentieth century appeared to some critics and theorists as a unidirectional move to a pure aesthetics, one that gave no quarter to other domains of life, but focused on art as an end in itself. Even without an official academy, networks of artists, their patrons, allied critics, and members of the new museum professions who worked with them created a set of ad hoc institutions to establish an alternative to the rigid academic systems. Eventually, however, their amorphous network succeeded in building the museums and galleries to house the works they favored. Intentionally or not, they created an academy without walls. Constituting themselves as gatekeepers, they tried to enforce rules by which art that deviated from their modernism would be marginalized or consigned to a lesser standing – for middle-brow consumers rather than serious intellectuals and sophisticated amateurs.

As Kirk Varnedoe and Adam Gopnik have shown, even in the early twentieth century avant-gardists had already begun questioning conventional distinctions between the high arts and the popular arts (Varnedoe and Gopnik, 1990). Though vehemently rejected by artists and art critics committed to a modernist "pure" art, by the late twentieth century, narrowness, exclusivity, and superiority had given way to broadly inclusive definitions of the arts characterized by a striking permeability both to aesthetic and extra-aesthetic influences. Aesthetic scholars such as Irving Sandler mark the onset of what has come to be characterized as postmodernism, as a locution encompassing almost anything that deviates from the preeminent art of the post-World War II American fine art world of abstraction, formalism, sometimes minimalism, striving for aesthetic purity, detached from external social and political content. Rather than embody the hierarchical ordering once the mark of the academy (with or without walls), the new definition highlights nuance, process, and openness: not high versus low but high and low; not insider versus outsider but insider and outsider; not art versus the self but art and self (Sandler, 1996: 3–4). It is a transformation that became a source of confusion and, frequently, of dismay to many art historians and critics.

Postmodernism restored long rejected social, political, or other extra-aesthetic content, and narrative more generally. Social and political content, which tended to be conflated with the Soviet social realism or official Nazi art of either a pseudo-volkish or revived neoclassicist sort, was replaced by a number of contemporary artists who looked outside of the hermetic art world. Their meanings, however, were very different. Instead of glorifying the totalitarian state, their works criticized government policies, commercialism, consumerism, racial and, later, gender inequality, in the fine arts as well as in other domains. Perhaps inadvertently, artists previously marginalized or excluded from cultural institutions – members of minority groups, women, gays, colonial or former colonial subjects – sought and began to gain support in the art world. They were more likely to be included in gallery or museum exhibitions, or at least taken seriously, and integrated rather than being ghettoized in specialized galleries that drew primarily members of their own groups;
their works were being integrated into the universalist world of mainstream museums.

Aside from the artists themselves, this openness extended to new or previously disregarded media. The preeminence of the unique artwork was no longer as absolute as it had been when photographs, already collected by some amateurs and archived in a few vanguard museums, entered the permanent collections of the most established art museums (Sandler, 1996). Even more startling was the overt attack on the centerpiece of the canon of artistic modernism, the pure, autonomous work of art itself. As an example of this challenge, following in Duchamp’s footsteps, Appropriation artists grasped art works of the past and recreated them in such a way as to change their meaning. Increasingly, concept became more important than specific works themselves. With postmodernism there seemed to be no barriers whatever to thinking of virtually anything as an artwork.

This persistent questioning of the canon suggests that new ways of classifying and categorizing aesthetic works is called for both in art worlds and in sociological analysis. Cultural sociologists need explicitly to reincorporate this very aspect of unbounded art into their work. In this regard, Austrian social theorist Rainer Bauböck’s boundary work, developed to explain the pressure for inclusion by new immigrant groups, provides a useful analytical model (Bauböck, 1998). Although transformations of group relations brought about by immigration are not reducible to patterns of artistic change, with some modification, the patterning Bauböck discerns suggests similarities to those that characterize boundary changes in the art worlds of the late twentieth century. On the one hand this involves the movement of personnel from exclusion to inclusion (or back), and on the other it refers to attempts to include unlikely art forms in the domain of what had been a luxury product.

Crossing

Crossing assumes that boundaries between groups remain clear and relatively immobile. It is not the settled groups nor their cultural practices that are called upon to change, but those of the new arrivals. Immigrants wishing to cross from their hierarchically inferior status into the desirable and superior social space (Bourdieu, 1984) are obliged to transform themselves to conform to the standards of the established society. As John Lofland, the American social psychologist, suggests in his study of conversion to religious cults, those who wish to join (assuming they are permitted to do so) must convince the existing membership of their willingness to play their game (1979). With respect to the arts, creators (artists, writers, performers) who enter another field or adopt an existing genre different from their customary art forms need to learn how to create or perform according to the art world conventions already in force.

Difficult as this may be, it is feasible for artistic professions because, like the sciences, in modernizing societies the arts are a domain to which individuals from modest backgrounds have, at certain moments, been permitted to accede. Thus Henry Murger, the son of a concierge, learned to write in the style acceptable to the editors of the emergent popular press of mid-nineteenth century Paris. Having become a regular contributor, he eventually gained acclaim through the success of his
vignettes *Scènes de la vie de Bohème*. Similarly, Charles Dickens, also of extremely modest background (as vividly recounted in his novel *David Copperfield*), started as a struggling journalist and subsequently became one of the most successful nineteenth century English novelists. Joseph Conrad, a Polish sea captain who immigrated to England, became a successful *British* novelist. In each case, these individuals learned their craft without unduly challenging either existing genres or the contemporary organization of professional work. In the context of an expanding free commercial market in literary media, each contributed something original to their art world, even when it meant, in Conrad’s case, learning to write well in a foreign language.

Crossing of this kind has become a pervasive characteristic in art worlds, and may involve the insertion of popular forms into fine arts or vice versa. Painters, performers, writers who started as professional fine (or serious) artists may venture into the more esteemed but less paying domain, usually as willing supplicants bearing the economic and social capital of their glamorous position into the popular domain. Thus, Paul McCartney crossed over from popular rock into the serious art world by composing an oratorio in a relatively traditional format, and he continues to be a patron of esoteric medieval music performers. The other direction from serious fine art to the popular art worlds has a long history as well, though it has less to do with attempting to rise in social and cultural status than to gain economically from the larger possibilities that commercialism may permit. Most commonly, in the face of limited fine art opportunities, instrumental musicians willingly perform in a variety of venues; modern or ballet dancers accept positions in the commercial musical theater world; singers perform at weddings or other popular events. Previously, however, writers or composers who worked in more popular “paying” genres used different names, to minimize the risk to their standing as “fine artists.”

**Shifting the boundary**

In contrast to “crossing” others attempt to retain their cultural practices even if they may have to resign themselves to a position in a lesser, segregated social world. If they are insistent upon gaining entry into a fine art world on their own terms, they may try to modify existing rules, requirements or institutional structures of the domain. Aesthetic motives and career strategies overlap, as groups excluded from established art worlds – women, racial or ethnic minorities, or the disadvantaged more generally – attempt, either on their own behalf or through the mediation of influential gatekeepers, to penetrate to the center (Lang and Lang, 1990).

The case of Pop Art reveals that even determined gatekeepers may not be able to withstand persistent claims under certain conditions. Andy Warhol, a commercial artist by *trade*, succeeded in introducing the imagery of comic strips into the frame of legitimized museum quality art. Though most reputable dealers and critics were appalled by the inclusion of consumerist advertising into their work, Warhol was able to gain entry into galleries through the support of leading dealers at a time of a growing media oriented public interested in the upgrading of that visual imagery (Cherbo, 1997). Controversial as it was, Pop Art did not, at first, challenge the canonical structure of the works that it joined in museums. Even when they
were denounced as spelling the end of art, the works of Pop artists were likely to be hung in frames, displayed on sculpture stands or in museum cases, thus making a claim for the originality and uniqueness associated with art. Though superficially looking like the advertised products, it now seems evident to critics that Warhol created his iconic works one at a time, as commercial prototypes are made, and regularly contributed individualized touches even to many of his silkscreen works.

Somewhat later, the importation of commercial art forms into the domain of fine arts was achieved not by appreciably changing their appearance, but by flaunting it. This was borne out by the exhibition in the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) of Art Spiegelman’s draft drawings for his cartoon strip, *Maus*. The exhibition broke a double barrier between Art and non-art: first in that it displayed comic strips rather than a work in what had become a conventional medium. Second, the images represented a theme and narrative that highlights political history and collective memory rather than making them incidental to the pure aesthetic that had been the hallmark of the MoMA for most of its existence.

Popular music has a somewhat different trajectory than commercial visual art genres, largely because there is no exact equivalent to the hierarchical trajectory of galleries to museums through the written world of art history. Nevertheless, just as anti-academic and avant-garde art was launched into the domain of respectability by the efforts of supporters to create galleries and museums for it, and to write new art history incorporating it, a parallel process can be found in music.

Jazz provides a documented example of a musical form that moved from a shady past as a low status, regional variety of popular entertainment to a fine art of international stature (Witkin, 1998). As an art form, jazz had gained considerable cachet when it was recognized by prestigious European (especially French) intellectuals and musicians, who interpreted it as a form of protest against the horrors of slavery and the persistent discrimination African-Americans endure. Dubiously, by current standards, in the 1920s and 1930s many European intellectuals linked jazz to the idea of essentialist primitivism then popular among artists and writers. They were as fascinated by its rhythmic and modal structures as the Cubists and Expressionists had been intrigued by the sculptural forms and exoticism of African carvings. The exotic allure is implicit in the expression they used to designate both the African works and the African-American jazz, “Art Nègre,” a term that would not be used in American English today. Nevertheless, no matter how misguided and essentialist, their accolades raised the standing of these creative forms. Jazz came to Carnegie Hall and other venues of considerably greater prestige than the commercial nightclubs that had been its usual haunts, and African sculpture now resides permanently in the most prestigious American museums, and even, it seems, in the Louvre.

American national institutions such as the Smithsonian and the Library of Congress have archived jazz history and recorded performances. Since 1989 the National Endowment for the Arts has included jazz as one of its commissioning categories. New York’s Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts has created a jazz program as a separate division and a new building is being erected in the Lincoln Center complex devoted to training new performers. Today, firmly entrenched in academic and conservatory curricula, jazz has attained a stature that appears solid enough to be contested by those who consider it overly domesticated.
Blurring: a permanent revolution?

Whereas crossing assumes that the form and its creators must change, in the case of modern jazz, the genre itself is transformed through the act of deliberately blurring. Thus the composer of classical or serious music Gunther Schuller created the innovative musical form that he called “Third Stream” – between classical and jazz. Composers of popular music often incorporate melodies by “serious” composers, setting them to new lyrics, usually treated as no more than an addition to the domain of popular music. The regular practice of serious composers was to adapt existing popular musical forms into their works – peasant dances, military marches, children’s songs. In those cases, the practice was viewed as upgrading the popular to the level of Art, through the mediation of the composer (Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, Dvořák, Bartók, etc.). This might be viewed as an early form of “sampling.” But by now boundary crossing either toward the popular or the “serious” has become so common that it is increasingly difficult to specify what is the difference between high and low. As a result of these trends, the carefully erected barriers between high and low art, art and politics, art and religious rite, art and emotional expression, art and therapy, art and life itself have been breached.

These social phenomena had been peripheral to the domain of art, but when the periphery becomes valorized beyond all expectations, it is virtually impossible to find an aesthetic center. Without an autonomous domain of fine art based on a consensus of aesthetic standards and criteria, in a world in which anything can potentially be art, how can a new art form be imagined, and how is it to be recognized? My answer is that, as we have seen, artistic recognition does exist, but it is no longer identifiably situated in a single institution such as the academy, nor does it entirely reside in a nineteenth century-style dealer-critic system. Rather, it inhabits a domain composed of a fluid plurality of gatekeepers – organizations, influential individuals, publications, media, popular and commercial or elite and scholarly, each of which may be local, national or international in reach, for a time at least. Distinctions among different art forms have become increasingly multi-layered, multidimensional, and are matters of degree rather than of kind. Recognition may be founded on the fame and glamour of stardom, commercial success based on sales, critical or scholarly appreciation, depending upon the trajectory of creation and reception.

No longer does a single canon govern fine art. Instead, new standards and art forms or styles are promoted by competing groups (Huysssen, 1986: 218). Rather than begin with the assumption that a work is Art, its proponents seek to reconstruct it. Does this imply that there are no standards by which cultural works may be classified? Or are there some emergent standards separate from and irrespective of the bearers of taste? Is it an oxymoron to think of a canon based on uncertainty?

DISCUSSION: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS?

The traditional aphorism Vita brevis est, ars longa embodies connotations of the durability of art as compared to the ephemeral quality of life. This idea is seemingly contradicted by the acceleration of artistic change in the past century and a half. But
I wish to argue that the impermanence that seems to characterize the arts is not incompatible with Kristeller’s formulation of “the modern system of the arts.” Art styles have tended to rise and fall in the estimation of successive generations in the past, whether it was because of a new ruler, a new pope, or a new nation state. The belief in the idea that “art is long” has come from revivals of interest in outmoded forms, especially with the invention of the modern art museum from the late eighteenth century on, in which parallel developments occurred in the intellectual domains of aesthetics, art history, art theory, art criticism (Zolberg, 1990: 4).

The power of the idea of art is by no means dissipated, despite a history of aesthetic change, much of it marked by contention. Yet artists and others engaged in these changing art worlds have reason to be concerned about the categories of art and their quality because they govern their lifeblood socially, economically, and aesthetically. What do sociologists make of these boundary blurring innovations? Do they indicate that the West has entered a period of what Daniel Bell called “cultural declassification – an unraveling and weakening of ritual classifications?” His generally correct assessment is pervaded by pessimism, because he sees in it a sign of an aesthetic malaise in which there is a “disjuncture of culture and social structure” (Bell, 1996). Bell, however, does not speak for all sociologists. The same phenomena are viewed from a contrasting perspective by Paul DiMaggio (1987) and in somewhat parallel terms by Herbert Gans (1985). For them, this is not the result of a disjuncture of culture and social structure, but the mark of their intimate relationships. DiMaggio and Gans attribute these developments to a combination of factors among which the most salient are the growth of mass higher education and the expansion of the modern state; the transformation of local upper classes into an American elite anchored in organizations rather than in communities; an increase in the influence of commercial principles of classification as popular culture industries grow; and the emergence of relatively autonomous and competitive high culture art worlds. Not surprisingly, as global forces gain sway, similar patterns are emerging in other countries where the modern system of the arts had been adopted as well.

The arts have been a particularly problematic domain in American social scientific study because of the conventional belief that they inhabit a sphere apart from their societal bases (Zolberg, 1990: 1–18). An important aspect of this perception is that the Arts were associated, on the one hand, with elites, while popular cultural forms tended to be treated as a separate sphere of crass commercialism. Considerable attention was paid to measurements of unequal access to the most prestigious forms. However, as the boundary between high art and popular art has frayed, the old elite versus mass dichotomy has become less convincing. Richard Peterson’s introduction of the omnivore–univore dimension elucidates the porous and dynamic nature of the categories of art and of corresponding taste. In recognizing a gap between the audience experiences of arts practices today and those of the past century, particularly with respect to the supposed barrier between the high arts and the rest, Peterson noted a major shift in how status honor is conceived (Peterson, 1992: 75–92). The “fit” between social class and status group ranking had already been apparent to Weber (1968: 305–7), elaborated by Bourdieu (1984), Gans (1985), Lynes (1980), and others. But as Peterson argues, what had been seen as the highbrow–lowbrow divide is now more accurately represented by “two pyramids… [o]ne right side up and the other upside down” (Peterson, 1992: 254). It is
not precisely the hierarchical image of previous analysts. Instead, omnivores, those with a large range of appreciation of different art forms from all levels – high, low, local, cosmopolitan – are likely to be found in the higher status occupations of modern or postmodern societies, while univores – with specific taste preferences that do not extend beyond a limited range – tend to be at or near the bottom. The difference between them is not so much attachment to fine art or commercial art, but a matter of breadth. Univore tastes are specialized and focused on the limited repertories available to them; they have little contact with or knowledge of spheres beyond their locality, race/ethnicity or religion. In a sense, they are ghettoized by their limited social opportunities. Omnivores, on the other hand, are suited by education, social networks, and to some extent wealth, to living in the most varied global circles.

The omnivore and univore pattern is a recurring one that may arise under certain socio-historical conditions. For scholars of Renaissance behavior, the omnivore is strongly reminiscent of the products of “the civilizing process” to which Norbert Elias (1982) devoted his early figurational analysis. In the period of expanded possibilities of travel, the beginnings of centralized states and monarchical structures, promising young men (and some women) of more or less isolated localities were being drawn to the new opportunity structures of courts and capitals. But it was necessary for them to behave differently for a new audience and the circles of the courtly societies than they had in the familiar traditional worlds they inhabited. Cosmopolitanism and the idea of the Renaissance Man came to be the ideal, giving rise to a virtual industry of instructional and etiquette books, epic poetry, and other literary works by authorities such as Erasmus, Castiglione, Chaucer, and Shakespeare. Being considered provincial was disastrous for seekers of “fame,” or reputation. Some of the qualities they desired became institutionalized in the development of secondary education throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and their remnants persist despite the current emphasis on science and technology (Bourdieu, 1984).

Indirectly, these insights highlight persistent lacunae, especially in American sociological research, in particular when it comes to longitudinal research in the arts, artists, and audiences. Little is known about change over time in the careers of artists, from when they were students to their recognition, artistic development, persistence, fortunes. Still less is known about changing tastes among art publics. What is clear is that the artistic field is larger than ever. While not clearly bounded within categories of high and low, certain genres, especially popular forms, frequently originate in or cater to group members based on gender, race, class, status, national origin, or physical handicaps. Since art worlds embrace a part of the social fabric, and are deeply embedded in it, it is not surprising that they encompass some of the tensions associated with these groups as well. As potential commodities, they are of evident interest to commercial forces; as political symbols they have gained the attention of policymakers as well as of scholars. At worst, the label of art may privilege nothing more than a commercial product, thereby trivializing the aesthetic field. At best it may be, as Andreas Huyssen has hopefully suggested, that the domination of the fringes by the West will be replaced by a healthy resistance of the dominated in the form of a productive tension between the political and the aesthetic (Huyssen, 1986). The politically aware, including politicians and statesmen, would do well to ponder these patterns.
The entry of Latin American, Asian, and African visual and musical forms and motifs into the Western dominated canon has gained increasing legitimacy and audiences (Zolberg and Cherbo, 1997). Moreover, since any kind of art – fine, popular, commercial – may be disseminated through commercial channels of distribution, by adding the interplay of official policy with market forces, our understanding of democratization is considerably thickened. This is important to sociological research, but the study of one of the pyramids should not be at the cost of neglecting the other. Researchers would do well to bear in mind that tastes may persist, but they are not fixed, even among the most local-centered univores. These questions are challenged by the enormous changes in the ethnic make-up of American and other populations. With a broad range of educational level and aspiration, they provide an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the interactions with the varied local populations, of which cultural choices are an important, but only one part. What is clear is that the twenty-first century is multicultural, and both cultural policy-makers and sociologists are starting to face this fact.

References


In this chapter, I consider the problems facing the sociology of culture with respect to taste. I focus primarily on music and its various genres but also include comparisons with other objects of passion such as cooking, wine, and sport. The aim of my research on different forms of attachment was to steer the sociology of taste away from a critical conception that had become dominant, in which taste is conceived only as a passive social game, largely ignorant about itself. How, without endorsing the concomitant reduction of real practices to their hidden social determinants, can we incorporate sociology’s contribution? Various studies have proved the overdetermined nature of tastes, their function as markers of social differences and identities, their ritualized functioning, relations of domination between high culture and popular culture, and so on (Hoggart, 1957; Toffler, 1965; Williams, 1982; Bourdieu, 1984; Mukerji and Schudson, 1991; Lamont and Fournier, 1992; Crane, 1994). But taste is first and foremost a problematic modality of attachment to the world. In terms of this pragmatic conception it can be analyzed as a reflexive activity, “corporated,” framed, collective, equipped, and simultaneously producing the competencies of an amateur and the repertoire of objects that she values.

**Taking the Great Amateur Seriously**

The sociology of taste, master of the analysis of hidden determinants of cultural practices, has indeed produced valuable results. It has reintroduced cultural practices and tastes into a real world made of possibilities as well as constraints, relating them to material, technical, economic, and institutional circumstances and conditions, and to determining factors like socio-professional category and contact with cultural practices in youth. But it is necessary to assess the limits of this approach, namely the very restrictive theory of the actor implicit in critical sociology and, above all, the totally passive view of the amateur in Bourdieu’s radical reformulation of the classic question of cultural inequalities. At worst, the amateur is a “cultural
dope” who is wrong about the nature of what she does; at best, she is the passive subject of an attachment, the real determinants of which are unknown to her and, despite her resistance, are revealed in cold statistics. Her relationship with culture or the objects of her passion is the subject of a purely negative analysis – which shows that this attachment is not what it believes itself to be. From Bourdieu’s and his followers’ point of view, tastes are radically unproductive: the objects are simply random signs, the subjects are merely reproducing the hierarchy of social positions. Taste is culture’s way of masking domination.

I claim that sociology should take the amateur more seriously, even treat him more respectfully. By conceiving taste as a reflexive activity of amateurs (Frow, 1995; Hennion, 2001), it is possible to restore the importance of the objects concerned, of the often highly elaborate formats and procedures that amateurs employ and collectively discuss to guarantee their felicity, as well as of the nature of the activity thus deployed, the competencies involved and hence, above all, the creative and not only reproductive capacities. As Frith (1996) rightly argued against Bourdieu’s unilateral thesis on cultural domination, this is as pertinent in the case of popular culture as it is with high culture (if not more: he shows fans spending hours and hours, late at night, discussing every detail of rock records and performances). This means acknowledging what happens through these attachments and what is produced with regard to objects, communities, relations with others and with the self, and the amateurs themselves. Taste, passion, various forms of attachment are not primary data, amateurs’ fixed properties that can simply be deconstructed analytically. People are active and productive; they constantly transform objects and works, performances, and tastes. By focusing on the pragmatic and performative nature of cultural practices, the analysis can highlight their capacity to transform sensibilities and create new ones, and not only to reproduce an existing order without acknowledging it.

Popular culture and rock studies have shown the way: first they gave a voice to “lowbrow” genres, both traditional and commercial, largely ignored and despised by musicology and music studies (cf. *Popular Music*, and the International Association for the Study of Popular Music [IASPM], founded in 1981). But, even more crucial, they opened the way to a much wider understanding of music analysis in general, regarding both its production and reception. Rather than being conceived as purely technical or economical realities “beside” music itself (as precursors, see Hirsch, 1970; Gillett, 1972; Peterson and Berger, 1975; Frith, 1978), issues like media, scenery, the making of the star’s image, recording techniques, the record industry, and youth as a new market were put at the center of analyses. I undertook my own work on music mediations, showing how audiences were incorporated into production, by a study of popular “hits” created by professionals inside studios (Hennion, 1983, 1989), and another one on the same circular production of their audiences by radio stations through programming (Hennion and Méadel, 1986). On the audience’s side, musical analyses could no more be isolated from the social, sexual, generational, and political meanings of music, nor could listening be separated from its highly ritualized and collective accomplishment (Willis, 1972; Hebdige, 1979; Frith, 1981); more generally, the active practices of music lovers were put under minute ethnographical scrutiny (Bennett, 1980; Cohen, 1991).

The case of music was indeed a fine example to use here, owing both to the variety of its genres (popular, oral, highbrow, electronic, commercial, etc.) and to the
deployment of its practices on a continuum of mediations: instruments, scores, repertories, musicians, stages, media, mediums, and so on. Based on an analysis of these mediations (Hennion, 1993), it is possible to move beyond the sterile opposition between musical knowledge and social analyses that characterized classic studies on music. These studies apply a contrasting treatment to genres, depending on whether they are considered as classical or cultured music and therefore assigned to musicology, as ethnic music and consequently treated as ethnomusicology, or as modern popular music and hence more likely to be studied by sociologists, cultural studies, and historians of the present.

On the one hand we have sciences of the object rejecting social “aspects” of music as a secondary environment of the work, basically confusing music with the written score – an issue already raised by critical musicologists like Durant (1984), Kerman (1985), and Bergeron and Bohlman (1992); on the other, a sociology of music that, lacking specific affordances to grasp musical objects, has been content to turn around them, giving music a context or transforming it into a pretext for games of which the real determinations are social. Even when, in the case of popular music, critical musicologists show one’s capacity to express and achieve new identities, generations, groups, fashions, and lifestyles, music is nothing more than a neutral medium for social play, and it is still very difficult to take into account in which ways “music itself” matters.

**A Choice Ally: The History of Art**

Based on the history of art, I would like to show the necessity of effecting a dual movement that switches from a conception founded on the critical sociology of music to a pragmatic conception of taste. This supposes a shift in focus, from reflection on what can be done with music, with the sociological and musicological tools at our disposal, to a questioning of what music does. At the same time we switch from a music-centered focus to a focus on the amateur, taste, and listening (Morrow, 1989; Johnson, 1995; DeNora, 2000; Szendy, 2001). The two movements naturally correspond, with both characterizing the pragmatic change to be made in terms of the approach, on the one hand, and in terms of the object of analysis, on the other.

For that purpose, disciplines in the field of music are more of a hindrance than a help, but we can draw on the history of art. Once Marxist analyses of reflections and superstructures were largely discredited, authors like F. Haskell and M. Baxandall found paths, from opposite perspectives, enabling them to move their discipline away from the oscillation between the infinite exegesis of works and their futile replacement in a social and political context desperately unable to talk about them or to make them talk. By studying the gaze, uses, collections, gestures, the history of a work, and the formation of taste (Baxandall, 1972; Haskell, 1976; Haskell and Penny, 1981), these authors have already accomplished the switch described above, for similar reasons and with similar analytical, theoretical and methodological effects. Their work shows that the famous “works themselves,” those absolutes of beauty, have constantly changed meaning, shape, place, and direction throughout history, along with the judgments on them. Above all, they have shown that these works, through their mediums and restorations, and the way they have been
gathered together, presented, commented on, and reproduced, have continuously reconfigured the frame of their own evaluation.

The lesson is powerful. It tells us that the history of taste is not something separate from that of works, no more than the principles of reception are opposed to those of creation (notwithstanding their crucial contribution, this is a limit of Jauss’s (1982) and Iser’s (1978) reception theories). Works “make” the gaze that beholds them, and the gaze makes the works. Hence, this entangled history does not lead to a theory of the arbitrary, in the sense of the infinite variety of situations and appreciations causing doubt on the very possibility of establishing any kind of link between works and the taste associated with them. On the contrary, by putting the accent on the co-formation of a set of objects and the frame of their appreciation, this model requires ever more ties, attachments, and mediations. Gradually every step influences both future perceptions and past catalogues of works, in reconfigurations that constantly rewrite their own history to develop their future. Haskell and Baxandall show us art gradually tracing the frame in which we “understand” it, in all senses of the word; that is, all the work that was needed to identify systems of circulation, valorization, judgment, and appreciation, and, reciprocally, everything that the establishment of these networks, neatly linking up works and art lovers, has changed in the works themselves – including works from the past, right down to their most concrete features. We tried to apply this lesson to analyze the “use” – not the reception! – of Bach in France in the nineteenth century (Fauquet and Hennion, 2000).

THE PRAGMATIC TURN

Thanks to historians of art, we are better equipped to understand a more fundamental meaning of the turn to which I referred: not only a change of object (from works themselves to taste), nor even a change of method (from head-on analysis and abstraction to the meticulous study of mediations really used), but a change of status of the interpretation itself. The explained becomes the explainer. The variables serving as benchmarks are in fact the product of the history written by the works to which we apply them. Causes do not come from above, from the disciplines that focus on their object of study, but from below, from the gradual course that produced the reality under study.

This switch is expressed equally vigorously in the present: the word pragmatic conveys it perfectly (Austin, 1962; and on popular culture, Shusterman, 1992). Musics are made, they make their world and their listeners, and are measured only through what they make. Just as music is a history writing its own history, so it is also a reality making its own reality. The points of method are the same: it is necessary to go through each mediation, look at each device, see each situation and follow the way in which pieces and languages, but also bodies, collectives, objects, writings, ways of judging and ways of listening circulate, producing sets of works or styles of music, qualified and commented on, and publics ready to receive them. This general circularity relates not to the sterile arbitrariness of a play on codes, but to the co-formation of musical objects that convey increasingly elaborate differences, to listeners who are increasingly able and desirous to perceive them and, more generally, to collective frames that enable this activity to be deployed in all its diversity.
Such a pragmatics aims at restoring the performative nature of the activity of taste, instead of making it an observance. When one says that one loves opera or rock – and what one likes, how one likes it, why, and so on – this is already a way of liking it more. Music is event and advent, which means that it is perpetually transformed by any contact with its public, on whose listening it inevitably depends. Tasting does not mean signing one’s social identity, labeling oneself as fitting into a particular role, observing a rite, or passively reading the properties “contained” in a product as best one can. It is a performance: it acts, engages, transforms, and is felt.

This is where we need to take another turn, towards the amateur, the fan – the one who does something with music. We refer to any form of love or practice, and not only to the restrictive cultured sense of a connoisseurship centered on knowledge of the object itself. It is taste as an activity that interests us and not the amateur “himself” – who would take the place of the works “themselves” (before also disappearing under his social determinants, at a wave of the sociologist’s magic wand). Thus formulated, the hypothesis has no reason to relate to a subject more than to the multitude of elements necessary for the deployment of listening. This activity is above all a framework, a collective, a set of material discursive devices, the accumulation of ways of acting or practising, and of many objects and mediums on which to rely. It is also a body, a mind that accustoms itself to music – but that, precisely, is gradually produced in music, with it, and not facing it.

In fact, the pragmatic switch also requires a reform of the status of theories of taste, calling to mind the lessons of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967): the analyst is part of this great process of collective production. Her theoretical work no longer amounts to extracting a particular dimension from amateurs’ profuse activity, to transform it into an external explanatory variable. It consists in reflexively taking into account the pragmatic self-formation of taste by amateurs, not critically reducing real taste by subjecting it to a purified interpretation.

Analysis should explain the amateur’s attachments, tastes, ways of acting, and pleasures, as an activity in its own right and an elaborate competence capable of self-criticism, instead of seeing it only as the passive play of social differentiation. The latter view is now generalized to the point where amateurs often present their own tastes exclusively as pure social signals, determined by their origin. But the amateur is a virtuoso when it comes to experimentation, aesthetics, techniques, the social, the mental, and the corporeal. Far from being the “cultural dope” referred to by Garfinkel, the great amateur on whom we focus here is the model of an inventive, reflexive actor, closely linked to a collective, obliged constantly to put to the test the determinants of the effects she seeks regarding works or products. She experiments with the social and mimetic determinism of taste, the conditioning of body and mind, the dependence on a collective, a vocabulary of social practices, and, lastly, the material devices and practices invented to intensify her feelings and perceptions.

**Taste as a Reflexive Activity**

Taste is a productive activity of critical amateurs – unlike in the critical sociology of taste where it is seen as a determined attribute of passive subjects. The key concept here is reflexivity, both as central to the activity of amateurs themselves and as a method required by the sociologist in order to account for that activity (Clifford and...
Saying that the musical object or the taste for wine are not given but result from a performance by the taster—based on techniques, physical training and repeated trials over a period of time—is relating the very possibility of a description back to the amateurs’ know-how. Taste, pleasure, and effect are not exogenous variables or automatic attributes of objects. They are the reflexive result of a physical and collective practice, one that entails the use of equipment of all kinds and is regulated by methods that are themselves constantly revised. That is why I prefer to talk about attachments and practices, which lay less emphasis on labels and more on the framed activity of individuals, and leaves open the possibility of taking whatever emerges into account.

This reflexive nature of taste is a founding act of attention, suspension, a pause on what is happening—and, symmetrically, a stronger presence of the tasted object that also unfolds (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). If one drinks a glass of wine casually while thinking about something else, one is not an amateur. But if one stops even just for a fraction of a second and observes oneself tasting, the act is established. From an isolated chance event one moves on to the continuity of an interest, and the moment becomes an opportunity among others in a course based on past opportunities. That is the difference between liking and “being an amateur.” Taste is also a framed activity. It relates to both a personal and a collective history, and to an individual space in which the activity has afforded itself places, moments, means for constituting itself as such. One does not like wine or music just by chance. One likes music and one “likes music” (or a particular music): one shifts slightly away from oneself to enter into this activity which has a past and a space marked by its objects, other participants, ways of doing things, places and moments, and institutions—an issue rock makes very clear, as fans are much more likely to say “I’m a rocker” than “I like rock.” This reflexive character does not assume that there is necessarily reflection by actors, which implies a degree of calculation and awareness of what one does at a far higher level, and the passage from a simple variation in our modes of presence in situations to the level of deliberate action (see e.g. Thévenot, 1990).

The reflexivity described in this example at its most local and instantaneous level is equally present at the more global level of a domain of taste or form of amateurism, like music or the love of wine. As the domain becomes more general we see it held or strained by critiques, guides, accounts, prescriptions, norms, debates on what must or must not be done, and various types of self-descriptive discourse (Strathern, 1999). Taste is formed as it is expressed and is expressed as it is formed. Reflexivity as a tool tends to take the more classic form of writing and, characteristically, each domain spawns its own jargon that falls between the physiological or technical description of objects and the literary account of the amateur’s emotion. In this regard opera lovers’ rich magazines are not so different from heavy metal or house music fanzines. Through these coded expressions, for example of the taste of wine (red berries, roots, mushrooms, truffle, wood, etc.), neither entirely technical nor purely imaginary, taste is identified and can be shared with others. In music this intermediate language often annoys the professional as much as the listener but it gives affordances that neither subjective commentary nor technical musical analysis can provide. It can express what is happening and not say what music is or freely describe the worlds into which it drags the imagination. It is in this sense that we can say that the amateur has written music, just as the history of music has produced its amateurs—they have mutually formed each other.
Thus understood as a long-term process and construction based on mediations, bodies, objects, situations, equipments, taste has nothing to do with the naked face-to-face between object and subject. Any attachment mobilizes various elements in one way or another. We therefore considered four of them – the community of amateurs, the devices and conditions of tasting, the body that experiences, and the tasted object – without attributing any exclusive basic character to them. They define a minimal framework of components of taste as an activity. In one sense, the various attachments are based on these elements and grant each one a different significance. In another, these constructions continually redefine and reconfigure tastes by their own elaborations.

Taste as an activity is accomplished through a collective that provides a frame, the relevance of the effort, and that guarantees results, accompanies, guides, puts into words. Bourdieu rightly said that taste is always a distaste. We cannot like without rejecting (especially if it’s something we liked before): “What? How can you like that? It’s vile, worthless!” This disgust is always based in some way on others’ taste, either negatively, as in this example, or positively. The amateur’s constitution of his taste and the practical methods used to develop it are based upon the recurrent presence of a mediator, an initiator. The example set by a recognized amateur is crucial here, like when an older opera fan corrects the prejudices of a younger one who still despises Bellini or Auber: “Wait a little; you’ll see what you’ll think of them later”; or when a techno amateur shrugs at seeing his young mate’s records and lets him hear “the right thing,” far from all this “commercial” stuff. There is no taste as long as one is alone, facing objects; no amateur knows from the outset how to appreciate good things, or simply what he likes. Taste starts with the comparison with others’ tastes.

The collective is not the hidden truth of taste; it is the obligatory starting point. Some of these other amateurs serve as models, forcing the neophyte to scorn what she formerly liked and to like what until then she had disparaged. Others serve as foils, or nostalgic images of past tastes, thus helping to cast off misplaced attachments. “You only like what you were,” I once heard a rock fan say to another whose rigid tastes irritated him. The comment is profound. It indicates awareness of the fact that taste is a history determined by a past, but also that it is negotiation in the present with that past which can and must be left behind.

Far from being the great amateur’s more or less acknowledged snobbery or an unconscious game of self-definition in relation to others, this reliance on others is a good way of anticipating one’s own inclinations and of taking some guarantees by partly delegating one’s judgment to those who have other experience than oneself. This is one of the basic techniques that the novice has to get closer to good things (with tests, comparisons, consultation of guides, etc.). Conversely, as the case of rock showed to the point of cliche, the production of a taste makes its own collectives with ways of living, dressing, going out, walking, and so on, that are gradually defined and stabilized by this community. It is not precisely calculable and is based on feelings, bodies, gestures, and objects, not on a “general will.” Taste is a most efficient “group-maker.”
Taste closely depends on its situations and material *devices*: time and space frame, tools, circumstances, rules, ways of doing things. It involves a meticulous temporal organization, collective arrangements, objects, and instruments of all kinds, and a wide range of techniques to manage all that (Becker, 1982). Far from revealing a purely ritual or arbitrary nature of our tastes, the importance of these devices signals the conditional nature of pleasure and effect, the fact that it does not automatically depend on either the products or our preferences. For our study of amateurs (Teil and Hennion, 2003), I interviewed a great lover of opera and chamber music, first in an interview situation and then in his home in a special lounge where, isolated from the family and their dog, he listens to his records. The first interview was highly predictable: bourgeois milieu, sister violinist, current occupation (doctor), uncle who took him to concerts when he was young, first time he went to the opera – an unforgettable experience. But situated among the objects in the place of his passion, it was another man who opened up, revealing to another amateur his gestures, his odd little ways, his lists with items ticked off, his equipment. His taste had found its space, and there was nothing passive about it. For example, before putting them away he used to leave many new records in the bottom right-hand corner of his bookcase – until the day he had the idea of transforming this disorder into the basis of a system for arranging his records. From then on he let them move upwards to the left, depending on the last time he had listened to them. This is a typical invention of an amateur: his record library gradually changed into a reflection of his tastes. The amateur triumphed over the musicologist: his taste, not the history of music, governs his system of classification. Considering the maintenance of an amused memory of what happened and the pleasure of being the only one to know where a specific record might be (when he does know . . . ), it is easy to see in his jubilation that he is winning on all fronts!

Taste also depends on the techniques of presentation of the self that both object and amateur know how to develop: comparisons, rehearsals, comments, and discussions, tests and trials of one’s own preferences, and so on. Take, for instance, the renewal of Baroque music in the 1970s and 1980s (Hennion, 1993: 25–67). What was then presented as an aesthetic, even political, debate between two clearly distinct camps was above all a systematic questioning of all the means, mediums, objects, and devices of musical execution, such as pitch, voices, instruments, tunings, number of players, rendering of scores and ornaments, venues and formats of concerts, the status of recordings, and so on. The quarrel concerned fundamental issues less than the mediators of music. The same applies to rock and its various currents: nothing describes contrasts between styles and trends better than the type of equipment on which musicians play and the places in which they do so (Hennion, 1997). This issue is obvious in the case of techno various genres, named after their mythified places of origin (“house,” “garage,” etc.). In the end, these various technical and material mediums of taste afford an ideal entrance for the observer, as they are the main mediums of its expression in words and of discussions aimed at commenting on it, increasing it, enhancing it, or challenging some of its tricks.

Taste as a form of work also implies an engagement by the body that tastes. Here again, there is nothing mechanical. The body that tastes is not a natural given; it is the product of the activity, an engagement that goes from the training of faculties in the quasi-sporting sense of the word to the active nature of one’s conditioning at the time of tasting (or performance). Taste, amateurism, passion for an object or interest
in a practice are “corporated” activities. This word is more appropriate than “incorporated” (as used by Bourdieu) or “embodied” (as used by cultural studies). The latter two words, far from endorsing the corporeal aspect of art, music or taste, solve the issue by insisting unilaterally on the idea of a social construction of the body through devices and norms, and on the crucial fact that the body is the ideal receptacle, flexible, mute, and effective, of inculcated ways of acting and constraints of all kinds, especially social and educational.

The more neutral word *corporated* pulls in the opposite, equally important, direction. It is not only an overdetermining social of which the subject is largely unaware that imprints its mark on a body which believes itself to be natural. It is also a body that is unaware of itself, has to reveal itself, to appear to itself and to the subject gradually, as its extensive interaction with objects and its training through repeated practice make it more competent, skilled, and sensitive to what is happening. Conversely, this production of a body capable of sensing reveals more clearly the objects that it grasps, senses, and apprehends, and even its capacity to recognize what others recognize, and to share effects felt with other bodies (DeNora, 1999). As Merleau-Ponty so rightly said, if the body is the minimal medium for our feelings and actions, if it is what cannot be detached from us, not our property but nevertheless something that is our own, then, conversely, it is the body that gives substance, for us, to outside objects, through contact, apprehension, the senses. It is always the starting point for something to occur.

The case of listening and of “discomorphosis” of music (Hennion, 1981) is revealing. The record, by making of it something to *listen to*, has created a new music. Before its existence, whether at home or at a concert, music was first something to *do* (including for its audiences), and most often to do together. From the availability of a repertoire to its facility of immediate acquisition and selection, from the importance of the physical position to that of the hi-fi system that goes from the body to the sound enveloping it, from free listening to unlimited repetition, there is now actually a “listening” function. The diversity of these listenings highlights the inventiveness of amateur-users, who bring to mind Michel de Certeau’s strollers or Luce Giard’s Sunday cooks (de Certeau et al. 1980). Emphasizing listening is reintroducing the irreducible heterogeneity of a reality-event, made of folds and interweavings. Not a work and a listener, but bodies, devices, arrangements, duration, an ungraspable object, a passing moment, states that suddenly appear. For any kind of amateur, the search for those moments of musical pleasure is part of music itself: the specific preparation before a concert, reading flyers, meticulously preparing lists and checking record reviews before buying and listening to one’s new acquisitions – all of this is music, not just a means to get it.

The question then is not so much to understand how a “natural” body is determined, trained, formed, and deformed by its social environment. It first and foremost concerns the co-production of the body that loves and the loved object, through a collective and equipped activity. Exercise is the right word for this: the body exercises and gets used to the exercise, and on the way the word “exercise” slides from training to the faculty that one exercises. The more “constructed” the gesture of a tennis player, the more “natural” it becomes to her, so that the ball flies through the air much faster if she is relaxed. But this can be so only with the racket, the net, the court, the rules of the game, the opponent, and years of practice. No language, no nose, no taste for wine until the wine has become the object of a set of
practices that place it at their center. No ear, no musical emotion, without a music to listen to. It took over three hundred years of practices and inventions to create our way of loving music.

Finally, taste depends on “feedback” from the tasted object, from what it does and causes to do. This time the evidence is a paradox for sociologists, who consider everything in the taste relationship except the presence and effects of the tasted product. But this does not suggest a straightforward analysis of its “properties.” The object does not “contain” its effects (Gomart and Hennion, 1999), a point aesthetics very clearly elaborated speaking of “works.” Taste is discovered precisely from uncertainty, from variation, from a deepening of the effects of the product – and these effects do not depend only on the product but also on its moments, its deployment and circumstances. We should say “objects” in the plural, then – a score, a piece, a guitar, a rock record, a soundtrack, and so on – rather than Object with a capital O that the work of art model privileges. The plural is more appropriate: loving music is not simply a matter of a particular piece; it passes through a multitude of mediators (Hennion, 1993) beginning with the present (the sound of an instrument, the atmosphere of a hall, the grain of a record, the tone of a voice, the body of a musician) and in the duration of a history (scores, repertoires and styles, genres and more or less stable forms), as well as for each individual – a past, works heard, moments lost, desires unfulfilled, roads travelled with others, and so on.

The sociologist’s variable and reflexively controlled engagement in the practice she is observing is a classic problem. On this question of the object, a very simple experiment during our study on amateurs concerned individual singing lessons that one of us (a musician, “nothing more”) observed over a long period. The problem was not listening but hearing: the very fact of perceiving what was happening between teacher and pupil. At first all the notes concerned postures, gestures, incomprehensible words, hesitations, signs exchanged between the teacher and pupil. At the end there was nothing but voice, sound, effects on the listener, quality of vowels, relative beauty (“that’s better,” “it’s not as nice as just before”), smiles during a particular passage, success or failure of a particular repetition, with frequent use of singers’ own terminology: overture, covering, closure, resonance, and so on.

To simplify, we go from a report that is 100 percent social and 0 percent musical to the exact opposite. The experiment demonstrates the perverse effect of a sociological theory that transforms all activities into indifferent pretexts of games, the most important of which is social. The less we know, the less we risk “being had” by the actors’ belief. That is what transforming ignorance and insensitivity into sociological competence is all about! But there is no “object” of music, so obvious that it would no longer be seen as such from the inside, by the initiated, and so easy to isolate that sociologists would have nothing else to do but the social work surrounding this issue. The object is not “the music,” a given, that could be isolated from the activity; it is what arises with it, through it. Sensitivity to differences of quality is not given from the outset; it is acquired with time. The observer learns to hear at the same time as the singer learns to sing. Reciprocally, once she hears, she pays little attention to what struck her exclusively at first, when all that gesticulation seemed largely arbitrary, concerned with showing that actors’ objects are but tokens made by beliefs and conventions. The means we give ourselves to grasp the object – to be able to listen to it, in the case of music – are part of the effects it can produce.
CONCLUSION: TASTE AS A FORM OF PRESENCE IN THE WORLD?

This temporary list of basic elements is not intended to be exhaustive, nor necessarily stable. The main argument concerns the status of the elements. None of them is ever given or natural. Their content is revealed gradually, and their meaning clarified precisely through the amateurs’ explorations, trials, and experiences – the “tests of taste.” Taste is produced, not given; it is “tentative,” “to be made” through what happens, and not the recording of an external reality. It is necessary to get together (this can be a physical meeting, as is often the case, but it can also simply be an indirect influence on a community, on traditions, on accounts and writings, or on others’ taste); to train one’s faculties and perceptions (both collectively and individually), to learn tricks and ways of doing things, to have a repertory, classifications, and techniques that reveal the differences between objects; to become aware of the body that makes itself receptive to these differences and that not only learns about itself but also invents and shapes itself during the experience – as Becker (1963) showed with regard to drugs consumers.

In our comparative analysis the four elements serve as a framework to reveal various aspects of the configurations of spaces, equipped and corporated, that the world of taste constitutes. The proposed grid is a minimal language, aimed more at providing infra-theory than supra- or metadiscourse: more at going “down,” closer to actors’ categories, than “up,” towards a systematic, external model. Its main purpose is to allow comparisons to be made between various forms of attachment.

Comparison is always fertile, for both common points and differences are enlightening. Sport, for instance, enables us to focus more attention on long-term training in a particular physical, mental and technical skill, producing a body that performs better. But there is no sport without an object, either a bar setting the height at which to jump or a net separating two players. But in these two associated senses of the word object (objective to achieve and required equipment), the role of this element is indispensable for the sport to exist. No high jump without a bar – and that also means without competitions, records, rivalry, and complicity of other jumpers, coaches, styles, and schools of thought, nor the host of techniques to transmit and develop, regarding both the body and equipment. All the elements of our framework are there. However, in the case of sport, among the four elements proposed (objects, collectives, devices, bodies), the crucial issues concern above all the production of a skilled body. The case demonstrates that there is no natural body, given before it reveals itself in its own exercise. Only long, patient, hard, and laborious training ends up giving athletes the very strong feeling (that singers, for instance, also have) that they have at their disposal a “natural” body whose gestures effortlessly and spontaneously articulate their performance. The logician may see an oxymoron in what is a commonplace among all those who train: the idea that it is necessary to work to become natural. But the amateur sees no contradiction. And he is right; he simply takes possession of a collectively elaborated corporeal competency.

The case of wine is more likely to draw the analysis toward the capacity of an object to require deployment and sparingly revealing the flavors, intensities, and presences that only the taste placed in it can deliver. But, just as there is no sport without an object (or objects), there is no wine without tasters, devices, an accumulated history that has made it possible to concentrate the taste of wine in the glass of
an informed taster whose palate has become the other side of wine, the body indispensable for the wine to have “body” too.

The cases of sport and wine confirm the inadequacy of the dual music–society model that neglects bodies and devices. There is no music without the gradual collective production of listening, of a specific “ear,” ranging from the most general establishment of a frame of attention (listening to music for music) to the more local and personal habit of listening to a particular piece in the place and at the time that suits us (Hennion, 2002). The record industry has systematized this way of doing things (Maisonneuve, 2001) but it started to prevail from the late eighteenth century with the manufacturing of pianos (Ehrlich, 1976) and the development of music publishing (Peacock and Weir, 1975).

There have always been professionals, just as there has been ritual, religious, political, or social activity. What is new is the rise of the amateur, the spectator, the fan, the creation of a “targeted” public that attends precisely for a particular performance. This refers not only to a mass public and market but also to a new competency, slowly and painstakingly elaborated through devices, practices, objects, repertoires, and new social formats that produce new individual and collective sensibilities and new auditory capacities. Precisely what could we call a musical body, in the sense that prompts W. Weber (1997) to wonder whether people really listened to music in the eighteenth century, without the complex set of devices and dispositions that make up our ear. Is using the word “to listen” with regard to another century not a pure anachronism?

Taste is clearly a machine that reveals difference, but not in the sense of a reduction to a known mechanism, an available social stock of differences of another social or ritual order projected onto the fictive screen of the natural. Like the social itself, taste is not given. It has to arise, allow itself to be grasped, and can be experienced only through a trial device and a body that is itself put to the test. This is why taste is always reflexive. It is not perceiving or feeling on the basis of what one knows, but discovering oneself as a taster through work and repeated contact with that which was not perceived. Owing to this elaboration (and above all to this presentation most often offered by other amateurs playing the part of mediators), it is perceiving what one had not formerly perceived and, at the same time, sensing that one feels others’ feelings.

A final, “tentative” idea, to conclude: why not generalize this analysis of the amateur’s competencies to far more varied forms of attachment? Can the amateur’s meticulous, highly elaborate, debated knowledge not provide a model for analyzing more ordinary devices through which we are (and make ourselves) present to the situations in which we live, throughout the day? What great amateurs enable us to see more easily, owing to their high level of engagement in a particular practice, is a range of social techniques that make us able to produce and continuously to adjust a creative relationship with objects, with others, with ourselves, and with our bodies; in other words, a pragmatic presence vis-à-vis the world that makes us and that we make.

References


Further Reading

III
Everyday Life and the Construction of Meaning
Music and Social Experience
Tia DeNora

The study of music making and musical experience – too often conceived as a “specialist corner” of sociology – has the potential to illuminate more the general topic of how social orders are created and sustained and, at a more basic level, the nature of the relation between individual “agency” (e.g., musical creator or respondent) and social “structure” (e.g., aesthetic media and aesthetic convention). Music is, I suggest, “good to think with.” Thinking with music can advance the sociological understanding of culture’s mechanisms, the ways it can be seen “in action.” To think in this way requires a shift in focus from the still-vital “production of culture” perspectives (as developed during the 1980s and 1990s and still thriving) to action and situated networks of activity. More specifically it requires – in keeping with the themes of this volume – an engagement with theoretical debates concerning structure, culture, and agency, with the nature and cultural dimension of cognition, and with contingency as a long-neglected topic within sociology. To some extent, classic work in music sociology has begun to address these themes but there is still a great deal of work to be done.

(Aesthetic) Structure as a Condition of Action

The work of T. W. Adorno can be used as a springboard to the issue of aesthetic “structures” and social agency. For Adorno, music was key to understanding the psychosocial conditions of modernity. Aesthetic media were conceived by Adorno to be causal features of both social structure and individual agency. Adorno’s work focused on music as a condition of consciousness, as active in relation to knowledge production and epistemological styles. Rejecting the art–science dualism (which he regarded as a product of Enlightenment cosmology), Adorno understood musical structures as providing exemplars for consciousness – musical forms showed, in and through their unfolding through time, how material could be organized. And in their handling and presentation of material, these forms came to function, in Adorno’s
view, as much more than mere metaphors for social structural arrangement. Beyond this role, musical structures were viewed by Adorno as conditions of and models for the existential production of consciousness. They were also, in the case of “wrong” music (popular music and all those “serious” composers whom Adorno disdained) conditions of the listening subject’s subordination to an order externally imposed. “It [popular music] sets up,” Adorno wrote, “a system of conditioned reflexes in its victim” (1976: 29).

In sum, Adorno’s theoretical perspective on the agency-culture nexus is one in which the “structures” of aesthetic media predate and thus condition the consciousness (and thus agentic responses) of particular, socially located actors. It is the belief that music preexists consciousness that in turn permitted Adorno to focus exclusively upon the analysis of forms and to avoid any investigation of music’s actual production, consumption, and distribution.

In this respect, Adorno can be seen as in some ways aligned with current-day structuralist theorists of structure, culture, and agency, such as Margaret Archer (see chapter 1 in this volume). Archer describes the link between structure and agency as an emergent, stepwise process over time, from “structural conditioning,” to “interaction” (a process in which individuals are “constrained” by structures and structural conditioning) to “structural elaboration” (where the actual transformation of structures takes place). It is to this notion of “emergence” that Archer points to buttress her claim that structure exists prior to and constrains action and is thus irreducible to action.

In an extended critique, King argues, as he puts it, “against structure” and suggests that Archer “converts the temporal priority of other people’s actions into the ontological priority and autonomy of structure” (1999: 211). (The parallel between King’s criticism of Archer’s ontological priority of structure and Middleton’s (1990) critique of Adorno’s “ontologization of history” is striking.) Omitted from Archer’s perspective, King argues, is that “social situations are collaborations,” that “[a]rguing for the irreducibility and emergence of the social situation threatens to reify the new relations between individuals into something that is more than all of them” (211). On the contrary, according to King, actions are not predetermined by objective, causal structures but rather arise out of actors’ interactive, mutual orientations to their ideas (interpreted understandings) of what should be done, what roles should be followed, and so forth.

Archer has in turn countered this argument (Archer, 2000), describing the role of structure as nothing less than temporally external, and thus constraining:

to enter a role is not just to confront other people’s subjective expectations, it is to become involuntarily involved in structures and their situational conditioning. To marry entails legal responsibilities, financial liabilities, canonical obligations and juridical restrictions upon exit, all of which may prompt agential avoidance… These constraints are not reducible to intersubjectivities, which can be flouted (at a price)… agents… act with an eye to constraints. (2000: 468)

If Archer’s structuralism resonates with Adorno’s conception of musical structures as media that constrain consciousness, agency and thus action, King’s position is expressed in music sociology through the “reception” perspective. Just as King argues that structure is performed by actors, reception studies suggest that musical
structures are generated through reception, that is, through what people do with music or say about it (see DeNora, 1986). But is there not some mediating position between these competing alternatives? I think there is, and I propose we address this question by “thinking through music.”

To elucidate this issue I begin with a critique of Adorno’s structuralist perspective. From there, I work outward to a position that moves away from a conception of structure contra agency, from the idea that structure either exists and “constrains” or does not exist and is merely “performed.” I move, too, away from the overwhelmingly cognitivist conception of action that tends to dominate mainstream social theory and toward a conception of agency that recognizes embodiment and emotion as part of agency’s “content.” And I move toward a conception of the social terrain that is furnished with objects and materials – as opposed to rules and conventions. The position to which I move, as described at the end of this chapter, is toward a notion of agency as built up in relation to cultural products that are not so much “structures” as they are – at more grounded level – tools, vehicles, and models for the production of agency.

THE “RIGHT” LEVEL OF GENERALITY

Adorno’s work is undoubtedly inspiring and it clearly points to an empowered music sociology – one that is concerned with subjectivity, consciousness, and control. And yet it has been associated with theoretical problems. “For Adorno,” as Richard Middleton succinctly puts it, “the meaning of musical works is immanent; our role is to decipher it” (1990: 59). The result of Adorno’s avoidance of specific acts of listening is an additional theoretical luxury: it allows Adorno to invoke an (his own imagined) image of the audience whenever it is expedient as a means for advancing his theory and to maintain a theory of musical structures as they constrain consciousness rather than a theory of how music actually features in consciousness’ formation – how, for example, it may provide a resource for formulating knowledge and/or emotion in real time.

Because it was abstracted from any attempt at empirical observation, Adorno’s theoretical project, despite its heuristic value, was conducted at what the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch once called, “the wrong level of generality” (Murdoch 1985: 150). I suggest in what follows that many of the impasses between realists and interpretivists are neutralized if one pursues this question at the “right” level of generality, that is, specifically via a focus on how actors can be seen to interact with structures recursively and in minute, locally situated ways, sometimes specifiable to the split second. By interaction here I mean how actors can be seen to instantiate “structures” in real-time interaction, how they resort to things outside themselves to do the business of being, to produce themselves as agents, that is, as actors with particular capacities for action. By turning our attention to specific social actors as they draw upon music during their ongoing social activity it is possible to see the processes by which music comes to mediate consciousness and/or action and the instances where music “gets into” (provides a resource for producing) some aspect of agency.

The Swedish musicologist/ethnomusicologist Olle Edström clarifies this point. Describing how his group at Gothenburg became frustrated after many months of
Adorno Study-Group, Edström says, “we gradually gained a deeper insight into the pointlessness of instituting theoretical discourses on music without a solid ethnomusicological knowledge of the everyday usage, function and meaning of music” (Edström, 1997: 19, as quoted in Martin, 2000: 42). Edström’s comments by no means endorse naive empiricism; on the contrary, while all empirical projects are compromised by epistemological problems, there is nonetheless much to be gained by attention to the details and the textures of “everyday usage,” the topic of this chapter.

The focus on use entails a shift from “what” to “how” questions (and thus a shift from the agency-structure impasse) – from a concern with “what” music represents (or what its material organization might come to constrain/condition), “what” it parallels or is homologous to, and “what” it may instigate or constrain, to a concern with “how” music’s meanings may be represented and contested, “how” agents connect music to other things, and “how” music comes to be associated with particular social effects.

“Doing things with music” includes, of course, music critical analysis of the type Adorno produced (just as “doing things with accounts of social organization” involves textual practices of sociological theory). To understand “how” music works, it is thus necessary to decenter musical texts and music’s commentators and to focus, ethnomusicologically, on the spaces and times within which music is drawn into social scenarios and made to “act.” (Just as to understand how and whether a sociological theory might function ideologically ultimately involves observation of how it is invoked – e.g., as foe or ally). This focus has much in common with recent iterations of Actor Network Theory (Law and Hassard, 1999), especially as that perspective has grown less Machiavellian and more concerned with expressive action and aesthetic ecologies in recent years (Hetherington, 1998). In short, new work in music sociology has focused on how musical materials are implicated in acts of aesthetic ordering – simultaneously how they are invoked (how things are done with them) and how they may do things to those who interact with them.

The quote from Edström above alludes to a shift in focus within both musicology and sociology, from abstract theory and “macro” issues (such as systems, societal structures, and norms) to grounded theory and “micro” concerns (such as a focus on individual and collective practice). Part of this shift centers upon the concept of social agency, on how both social and musical forms (including meanings) are put together or accomplished jointly, in Howard Becker’s (1982) sense. This focus on action provides an alternative to the emphasis, found in writers such as Adorno, Attali (1985), and Shepherd (1991), on how music reflects, anticipates, or is structurally analogous to social developments, eras, regimes, or cognitive styles, an emphasis that deals with things (music) and concepts (social structures) but rarely with people, acts, and particular events.

The French sociologist Antoine Hennion once warned against overtly structuralist attempts to identify parallels and homologies between music and social structures, arguing that “it must be strictly forbidden to create links when this is not done by an identifiable intermediary” (1995: 248). By this, Hennion means that while music may be connected or structurally similar to “social” matters, when these links are merely asserted by an analyst as opposed to being specified at the levels where they operate, then the analyst is operating at a wrong level of generality, one that in fact is
merely theoretical or literary. By contrast, to establish that connections between music and social structure really exist, it is necessary to follow actors in and across situations as they draw music into (and draw on music as) social practice and in this way, follow links as they are created by, as Hennion puts it, an “identifiable intermediary.” There is plenty of precedent within cultural sociology for this more specific focus on actors and actions – the British tradition of ethnographically informed cultural studies all sought to situate discussions of music and agency at what I would like to call the “right” level of generality, one that helps to reveal the mechanisms of how music and social life are mutually related. We are a very long way here from ungrounded quarrels about which – structure or agency – is the determining variable of social life!


This focus on music as resource has recently been pursued through the study of music and emotion where music is conceptualized as a resource for the production and self-production of emotional stances, styles, and states in daily life and for the remembering of emotional states. This work connects with pioneering work in social psychology (De las Herras, 1997; Sloboda, 1992, 2000). From within sociology, it converges with work on how actors produce themselves as identifiable agents and how this production is achieved through “aesthetic reflexive” practices (Lash and Urry, 1994). Insofar as these studies involve ethnographic methods they interact with developments in the sociology of media and the arts devoted to reception – and thus resonate with King’s position outlined at the start of this chapter (see, e.g., Press, 1994; Radway, 1988; Tota, 1997).

Three studies can be used to illustrate this point, the first by Gomart and Hennion (1999), the second, my own (DeNora, 2000), and the third by Bull (2000). All three employed in-depth interviews to examine how actors use music to prepare situations within which their emotional states undergo alteration.

Gomart and Hennion refer to this process in terms of its “techniques of preparation,” techniques through which dispositions are produced and self-induced. They describe, for example, how their interviewees were involved in readying themselves for particular emotional responses that they knew, under the right conditions, music would elicit.

They describe the process of listening, in other words, as highly active, one within which listeners do not “react” but rather construct their ability to be “moved.” Listeners, “meticulously establish conditions: active work must be done in order to be moved” (1999: 227) In their accounts of music use, respondents exhibited a wealth of practical knowledge. For example, one respondent described how, on the morning of the interview she was “feeling very ‘stressed’” because she was “in the throes of moving house.” She “actively decided” to stop and to listen to some music. “I needed it. It was only ten minutes or so, you know; I didn’t listen to them all…just…to the bits I wanted…” Here, this respondent typifies strategies described by nearly all the 52 respondents who used music so as to produce themselves as types of emotional, embodied beings and to modulate their current emotional states – more or less energetic, happier, sadder, more relaxed, and so on.
Respondents made, in other words, articulations between music and desired modes of agency. They used music as a reference point, model, or reminder of some emotional correlate and they thought about what music might, under different circumstances, “work” for them. This practice was shaped by a range of proximal and distal factors, biographical associations and events associated with musical pieces or styles, conventional associations (e.g., “romantic” or “sad” music), music’s physical properties (e.g., rhythms, pace, volume), and previous patterns of use (e.g., knowledge of what would “work” on a particular occasion).

Bull’s study (2000) amplifies these points and connects them to a theory of the flâneur, as articulated in the work of Walter Benjamin. Bull examined how individuals make use of the personal stereo so as to manage their daily patterns of existence in urban environments, in particular the buffeting and strain of travel on public transport.

All three of these studies have repercussions beyond the study of music and emotions per se, and in this respect they show how current work in music sociology has relevance to the wider scholarly public in the human sciences. Gomart and Hennion’s reveals how the study of musical “passion” and the tacit practices of its achievement illuminates our understanding of agency’s constitution, here configured as euphoric states and their pursuit through media other than music – drugs for example. Comparing their music interviewees with a set of interviewees of former heroin addicts, the authors argue that, with both music and drugs, users develop skills of self-preparation for their own passivity, for the “transport” that is induced by music/drugs. My own study emphasized how the musical practical “care of self” involved not only the self-management of emotion but also the cultivation of self-identity through memory work (as when respondents described listening to music so as to recall features of the past – relationships, individuals, eras, phases, biographical events). It also showed how respondents used music to manage others than themselves, as for example, when they chose music to create ambiance and set tacit parameters for occasions and interaction styles (“romantic” occasions, “refined” occasions, “high energy” parties, etc.). Bull’s study also dealt with issues beyond music’s role in emotion management and care of self, through a concern with both the musical and music-technological mediation of subjectivity and consciousness. In this respect, it also highlighted the role played by material culture – technology – in configuring subjectivity.

Bull’s concern with music-technologically mediated forms of subjectivity and the history of this subjectivity is developed also in work by Maisonneuve (2001a) who has examined the way in which adaptations in recording technology interacted with the consumption of music and the history of the listening subject.

Like all the authors considered so far, Maisonneuve’s work shows how the meaning and semiotic force of music is created through the practices of its production and consumption. Like Bull, she is particularly concerned with the technological dimension of this process. She shows how the phonograph and the record collection vastly increased the possibilities for private consumption, in particular how they afforded music users new and more intensely personal modes of experiencing the “love for music.” These technologies facilitated an aesthetically reflexive user, one engaged in constructing her or his tastes and one engaged in self-monitoring of self-response. Maisonneuve compares the two “technological revolutions” in music distribution during the twentieth century to describe how, during each, the
social practices and concepts of listener, listening, and the music listening subject were transformed. To get empirical purchase on these issues, Maisonneuve employs the concept of the listening “set-up,” by which she means the conglomerate of technological devices, material cultural environment in which listening occurs, and the various material and textual artifacts that make up the instruments of listening – liner notes, music reviews, the phonograph or CD player, and so on. The listener is thus conceived as a node within a network of people and artifacts. One of the most significant results of the transformation of this network during the two revolutions, then, was how the listener came to be positioned in relation to the musical canon of “great” composers and works. As Maisonneuve puts it:

We thus see that “classical music” is not a steady monument of works immutable in their essence: music exists thanks to the objects and practices which let it happen every time anew, in a set-up which is always reconfigured over time, and according to the objects and agents which participate in its production and enjoyment . . . It is important to realise the fact that the relationship to music is rooted in a material culture which evolves according to techniques, objects and agents by which it exists. The very material reality of music, and hence also its aesthetic potential, are defined and modified by this material set-up. (2001a: 105)

**Music, Collective Action, Collective Memory**

Music is not only a medium through which selves are managed and forms of listening subjectivity (and their social relations) are configured. Music is also a device or template with/against which to think. Music’s properties – its structures, its harmonic relations – may come (according to how they are appropriated) to mediate the representation, experience, or knowledge of other, non-musical, phenomena.

In *Music, Gender and Education*, Lucy Green explored music as it was drawn into the service of delineating other (gendered) meanings. The acts of music performance, instrument choice, the social distribution of musical activities, all serve to further sexual stereotyping. They are read as examples of what each sex is like or best suited to when in fact the equation should be expressed in reverse: these gender performances provided the very terms with which to think about the differences between boys and girls. In this way, music gets into conventional thought patterns; it provides a template against which to gauge thought and response. Music is a map for the articulation of social and conceptual phenomena. In my own work on the history of piano performance (DeNora, 2000, 2002) I develop this idea by showing how new techniques and bodily practices of performing circa 1800, coupled with an emerging gendered distribution of repertory, provided new resources for thinking about the meaning of masculinity. These ideas were elaborated in ways that fed back into musical practice. The world of piano performance thus provided a “workspace” (DeNora, 1986) within which to articulate ideas about the difference between men and women during the nineteenth century and beyond.

Music may thus serve as a referent for other forms of cultural work. So too, it may serve as a catalyst for modes of action and motivation. This point is developed by Eyerman and Jamieson in their study of music’s link to collective movements. They describe social movement theory as overly cognitive and as failing to account
for the non-cognitive dimensions of collective action. By contrast, they point to music’s link to social movement activity as a paradigmatic resource, a medium that can be used for the constitution of exemplary action,

the various ways in which songs and singers can serve a function akin to the exemplary works that Thomas Kuhn characterised as being central to scientific revolutions: the paradigm-constituting entities that serve to realign scientific thinking and that represent ideal examples of fundamentally innovative scientific work . . . the exemplary action of music and art is lived as well as thought: it is cognitive, but it also draws on more emotive aspects of human consciousness. (1998: 23)

At the level of situated experience what does this mean? How does music “get into” or inform knowledge formation and how can we observe this process, as it were, in action? In DeNora (2000) I describe how actors orient to music as an aide for knowledge formation. The ethnographic interviews reported there threw up many examples of how respondents used music as a referent for identification work (identification of self, other, situation, event, thing). Consider my respondent, Lucy, who, earlier in the interview had described how she particularly liked the “lower sonorities” (e.g., alto rather than soprano voice, cello rather than violin) because they are, “part of the background . . . the basses and the alts . . . fill out [the music] . . . I think maybe that characterises me in life, that I don’t like being in the limelight . . . [be] part of a group . . . seeing what needs doing and doing it but not being spotlighted and being ‘out front’ sort of thing” (69).

Here, Lucy is drawing a connection between a preferred type of music, a concept of self-identity and a kind of social ideal. She “finds herself” or locates her identity in musical structures. These structures she reads as a map or model of who she is and also of who she wishes to be. She shapes up a form of understanding, produces knowledge (about herself in this case) against the structures that she finds in music. Music thus permeates her knowledge formulation and provides a basis for self-knowledge and self-conduct. In similar respects, respondents described how they would listen to particular musical examples so as to remind themselves of things, and how hearing or overhearing particular pieces (e.g., songs) has the capacity to “bring it all back.” With respect to music and memory, music did more than simply put respondents “in mind” of past events; simultaneously it recalibrated them as emotional beings, had the capacity to return respondents to the feeling states associated with those events. In this respect, the study of music and collective memory is simultaneously the study of musically calibrated subjects, the study of emotion retrieval.

**Musically Embodied Subjects, Time, and Space**

As Eyerman and Jamieson (1998) observe, social theory is often characterized by an overly cognitive bias. The work within music sociology on emotions and on the musical basis of knowledge production has gone some way toward remedying this bias. So too, it has helped to illuminate social action as embodied action.

This focus highlights the nexus of music, bodily praxis and bodily phenomena. This work develops, and establishes a sociological footing for, earlier work in
marketing, social psychology, and music therapy. There, and typically via experimental investigations in and outside the laboratory, music has been described as an “influence” on bodily phenomena – blood pressure, heart rate, and pain perception and other embodied/social matters such as the speed with which food or drink is ingested. Too often, though, within these literatures, music’s “effects” on the body are identified and measured, accompanied by little investigation of their mechanisms of operation. Often, they are posited as stimuli or their “power” is fudged by vague language, such as the term “conditioning.” To understand (and properly theorize) these issues, situated studies of how bodies interact with and respond to music in real time are useful.

For example, in my own work, an ethnographic investigation of aerobic exercise classes (DeNora, 2000: 88–102), I examined music as it could be seen to structure both physical activity (e.g., movement style, speed, duration) and the subjective dimension of that activity (e.g., the desire to move in particular ways, the self-perception of fatigue). I was interested in observing how music might work as an organizing device for this activity and its experience; in particular, to observe embodied conduct as it was oriented to musical properties.

Drawing upon participant observation, video analysis, interviews (with aerobics instructors and class participants), and music analysis, the study found that music provided a “prosthetic technology” of the body, a medium through which bodily capacities could be extended and enhanced. Music could mask the self-perception of fatigue, enhance coordination (e.g., by profiling movement and movement style), draw participants into higher or lower energy styles of exercise, and so on. During exercise sessions, music could be seen to serve as an entrainment device; that is, a device that drew the body into coordination with its rhythms, rather as does marching music when it aligns bodies to speed and regulated pulse. But beyond this, music provided cues about action styles, reminders to participants of motivation and a device through which different exercise-attitudes were established and modulated during the course of a 45-minute session. The best example of this last point could be found in the ways that instructors used music to shift participants in and out of the various stages that composed the grammar of the session – from warm-up to “core” for example, from gentle and low-energy stretching movements to high-energy power movements such as leaping, kicking and jogging, or from those high-energy phases into “cool-down” phases where movements were slowed to avoid injury. Participants’ orientation to music was rarely conscious. It was rather part of their repertoire of embodied skills, their bodily tuning in to musical environments. To speak of this tuning in is to underline, however, that music was not “operating on” participants like a stimulus or medium that “made” them do things, but rather, it served as a medium to which participants oriented and could appropriate – albeit at a non-cognitive level.

The exercise sessions were chosen to provide a setting in which the bodily parameters of action are paramount. But embodiment is critical to virtually all real-time, spatially located forms of action, for the musical organization of embodiment is nothing less than the alignment of subjects. In my own work I have pursued this issue in the context of the consumer’s body within retail outlets – a setting where organizational officials overtly seek to configure the emotional, embodied consumer (and thus his or her non-cognitive, perhaps quasi-conscious predispositions for retail conduct) by configuring the sonic environment (DeNora, 2000:...
ch. 5). I was interested in how stores used music to structure temporal and scenic parameters of the setting, to filter consumers and target preferred types of consumers, to help consumers “tune in” to the store’s “scenic specificity” – its locational style – and in how shoppers interacted with music in-store, in what consumers thought about (and whether they noticed) music in-store.

Focusing on in-store action highlighted the ways in which actors modified the external features of their conduct in relation to the aesthetic ecologies of public settings. This was most evident as bodily comportment and, on the occasions when individual volunteer shoppers were “wired for sound” and asked to “think aloud,” in the shifts of discourse register and paralinguistic features such as voice tone (DeNora, unpublished). Through this study one caught glimpses of actors aligning themselves with quasi-conscious, and primarily embodied, modes of being, conventions of being. When, in response to the slow-paced and somewhat “languorous” music of Enya, shoppers can be seen to lengthen their necks, draw back their shoulders and move in an almost balletic style (a style that – one might suggest – is associated with hegemonic femininity), or when young male shoppers can, according to the observation of one shop manager, “put a spring in their step” whenever the music of Tom Jones is broadcast on the Tannoy, one might suggest that the visible signs of embodied and subjective alignment with setting (ambience) is occurring. Here, perhaps, we can begin to see what theorists such as Archer (2000) have in mind when they allude to the “involuntary” involvement with an image (see Hochschild’s [1983] notion of emotional work as “bodily co-operation with an image”).

TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF MUSICAL AND AESTHETIC AGENCY

We have found our way back to the classic music-philosophical concern – the idea of music as a means of inculcating modes of character, citizenship and general attunement with the world. Music, in other words, can be understood as a device for aligning embodied subjectivity and, as such, it provides a resource for constituting the existential groundwork of conduct style and modes of consciousness. Examining music as it is drawn into the vortex of performed action highlights music’s role as a resource for agency’s production – music is not so much a structure as a referent for action, which, in and through the actor’s process of making reference to it, comes to mediate action, to impart some of its properties (albeit usually partial and in some translated manner) to agency. In this respect it is possible to speak of how music “gets into” action, and to understand agency (the capacity for action) as possessing an aesthetic dimension (a texture, style and feeling set).

Key to this process is music’s status as a temporal medium. As Hanrahan (2000) has described, music’s temporal properties are useful for highlighting the contingent features of social life and social structure, that is how social organization (which includes mutual orientation and situation definition) is achieved within real-time occasions. As Hanrahan notes, these features are too often overlooked by social theory (on this point see Adam, 1990). Because music is itself a medium that unfolds through time, it can simultaneously mark, construct, and package time. It may even “reverse” time, as in J. S. Bach’s Two Part Invention no. 6 in E Major, where the melody is played, as it were, backwards halfway through. Through the resources
that it offers in time, music can draw actors in, to, and through modes of embodiment over time. As I have described above, music may help actors move through states, episodes, styles or phases of conduct, emotion, or embodiment.

This tuning in and shifting can be seen also in the ways that actors orient to matters that may concern them as citizens, for example, as they listen to musically augmented presentations of the news – as on National Public Radio in the USA where music is employed both as a means of commenting/framing individual stories and also as a means for modulating from one story to the next. There are many questions here for critical music sociology (insofar as that includes the sociology of aesthetically mediated cognition). How, for example, is music employed – often tacitly and with instrumental intent – to frame stories? How are choices about such matters made? What is rejected? How is such matching accomplished and how are such musical framings received? How might it provide a real-time interpretive resource, one that may trigger emotional modes of processing the news as it is broadcast? The musical framing of “citizenship” in this way is by no means recent or linked to electronic media; the music historian Jann Pasler (forthcoming), for example, has described how, in nineteenth century Paris, music programmers sought to mold listeners as types of agents in and through the presentation of musical events, styles, and works.

In conclusion, music sociology, at least in its current configurations, draws attention to a feature of agency long overlooked – the aesthetic dimension. By aesthetic, here, I mean the non-cognitive, emotional, and sensate predilection for action as produced in relation to aesthetic materials. By examining situated examples of music as it “gets into” social experience we can illuminate the real-time and spatially located formation of sociology’s generic concern with order and action – including the social and technological relations of that formation. Music highlights the non-cognitive and aesthetic bases of such formation. And, as a sonic medium happening over time, configuring time, it calls our attention to how agency is produced in situ, in relation to various cultural resources, resources that are often deployed so as to order agency and action in relation to organizational and managerial aims. In short, music is, as Adorno argued, key to any understanding of the psychocultural features of modern social life. And the study of music through grounded empirical research can serve to illuminate the mechanisms through which music operates as an enabling and constraining medium of action, consciousness, and subjectivity.

References


De las Haras, V. (1997) What does music collecting add to our knowledge of the functions and uses of music? MSc dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of Keele.


---

**Key Readings**


I witnessed a most extraordinary social occasion a number of years ago. At my place of work located in a business office, I observed a number of women sitting in a semicircle facing one woman in the center. Along the outer ring, a few men stood watching as the woman in the middle received gifts, one by one from the others. With the opening of each present, a chorus of “oohs” and “ahhhs” of approval would circulate about female portion of the crowd.

The extraordinary aspect of this event was that many of the gifts were being given to someone who was not present – or, at least, someone who was not present in the same way the rest of us were present. The event was a baby shower. Many of the gifts were intended for the not-yet born. These were given, of course, in accordance with the known or perceived tastes and likes of the mother-to-be. What became evident to me while I observed this ritual was that a world of goods, and therefore of social relations, was being organized and invoked in anticipation of the child’s arrival. Indeed, material relations were standing for social relations, consequently ushering “the child” into social being. With and through consumer goods, the child-to-be became manifest socially as a person well before it had the opportunity to develop a self.

The example of the baby shower drives home the notion that a world of goods and its various meanings exist prior to any one child, in advance of any one person — much like a social fact in Durkheim’s sense. Baby showers organize and institutionalize the connection between motherhood, consumption and one’s initial entrée into the world. They also pose a challenge to the notion, promulgated mainly in neoclassical economic thought, that consumption involves discreet and rational “choices.” Contemporary children of the global North now enter the world already embedded in webs of market relations, already addressees for marketing messages and thus, I contend, already consumers — not purchasers in the everyday sense, of course, but beings imputed with consumer desire that are addressed as consumers by various commercial industries.
In this chapter, I make the case for the necessary, unavoidable importance of childhood to the workings of consumer culture at large and thus to the study of culture generally. I offer a perspective with which to view consumption as an integral part of culture by demonstrating how both children as consumers and childhood as a site for commercial meaning together make a culture of consumption possible. Consumer culture ensures its status as a “culture” in large part by prefiguring children (i.e., people generally) as consuming subjects who, in their practices over the life course, actively form and reform an ongoing culture of consumption. I argue that childhood, rather than something peripheral or adjunct to the consumer society, serves as a key site for the regularized creation, reproduction and expression of cultural meaning in interaction with market mechanisms and values.

WHEN IS CONSUMPTION?

The social-cultural study of consumption, despite more than two decades of sustained and growing work, remains sidelined by what George Ritzer (2001: 11–12) calls the “productivist bias” of American sociology. The analytic categories, nomenclature, and concepts forged by the “founding fathers” of social science in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries aimed at grasping the problems and consequences of production and social organization of a coming industrial order. Consequently, little attention was paid to consumption, aside from a handful of noteworthy efforts, such as Lynd and Lynd’s (1929, 1934) descriptions of the consumption practices of Middletown inhabitants in the 1920s and 1930s and the ruminations offered by David Reisman et al. in the 1950s. Consumption has remained largely caught in the centrifugal force of this founding context, often treated as little more than the endpoint of a production sequence (see Miller, 1995), rather than as integrally intertwined with social-material processes.

Consumption has not received the attention it deserves in the sociology of culture, and children’s consumption is essentially absent altogether (e.g., see essays in Smith 1998). Notable exceptions include Fine (1987, 2001), Mukerji (1997), and Mukerji and Gillespie (2002). Much of the focus of American cultural sociology has been trained on the definition of culture, on the realms of art, religion, and literature, and on concerns of inequality and institutional legitimacy (see Mukerji and Schudson, 1991; Lamont and Fournier, 1992; Long, 1997; Ortner, 1999; Bonnell and Hunt, 1999). Consumer culture appears de facto as one element or aspect of “culture” in general, as if consuming were incidental to social life and to investigating social relations through a cultural lens.

I generally concur with the position laid out by Don Slater (1997) who posits that consumer culture is the culture of the modern west. As he puts it, “consumer culture denotes a social arrangement in which the relation between . . . meaningful ways of life and the symbolic and material resources on which they depend, is mediated through markets” (8). Consumer culture for Slater (1997: 9) is bound up with creation of modernity whereby “core institutions, infrastructures and practices of consumer culture,” such as advertising (Marchand, 1985), retailing (Benson, 1986; Leach, 1993b) and shopping (Bowlby, 1985; Campbell, 1995; Miller, 1998a), developed in tandem with and informed the modern enterprise.
A culture of consumption refers not just to specific, identifiable consuming activities like shopping or retailing, but blends with cultural activity and cultural meaning as a whole. Consuming products (material things as well as experiences) extends beyond singular acts of purchasing. It does not sit on a coeval plane more or less alongside other everyday activities like laboring for wages, parenting, courting, or relaxing. Consumption, rather, interweaves throughout social existence, serving as a key mechanism for meaningful engagement with the world such that dominant social values are not only “organized through consumption practices but also in some sense are derived from them” (Slater, 1997: 24).

Consumption serves as an organizing practice of and in culture. As Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood (1979: 57) put it, “Consumption is the very arena in which culture is fought over and licked into shape.” Interrogating the nature and forms of consumption is thus inseparable from cultural analysis. As the world of goods has expanded to embrace virtually all of life in first industrial and now postindustrial society over the last century and a half, people have reciprocated and embraced consumption as a mode of life rather than as one aspect of living.

If consumption cannot be made isomorphic with acts of purchasing, then in what ways can it be understood? Raymond Williams observes that to consume traditionally meant to destroy, to waste, and to exhaust. Around the mid-eighteenth century, consumer began to be used in something of a neutral sense, relating to descriptions of bourgeois political economy and became paired with producer, in the abstract. “Consumer” has since come to be a favored descriptor for much of what used to fall under the heading of a customer. The latter implies for Williams, “some degree of regular and continuing relationship to a supplier, whereas consumer indicates a more abstract figure in a more abstract market” (1999: 17).

One need not be a customer at any given moment to be considered, and to consider oneself, a “consumer.” Being a customer no longer requires a regular relationship with a supplier but rather describes one’s role at the point of purchase; it refers to an activity. Invoking the moniker of consumer simultaneously invokes an identity resonant beyond a particular kind of activity. It implies the existence of a rights-bearing being – someone who can appeal to structures and concerns larger than the immediate commercial context for authority and adjudication. A consumer is continuous and contiguous, a customer, intermittent and isolated – at least for analytic purposes. Children, as we have seen, often are born into a world of goods and spaces designed, designated and decorated in anticipation of their arrival. The young child does not buy, is not yet a customer, but consumes and, importantly, is targeted as a secondary market by marketers and advertisers (McNeal, 1992, 1999). Similarly, the mother may not have purchased the things she received as gifts, yet she consumes them – for herself and as well as on behalf of her newborn or not-yet born (Layne, 2000).

Consumption thus arguably occurs more frequently and in more diverse contexts than the narrowly defined moment of the economic transaction. Shopping is only partially about buying – it is also about looking, desiring, considering, reflecting (Bowlby, 1985; Campbell, 1995, 1999; Miller, 1998a: 14–19; see also Bloch, Ridgeway, and Sherrell, 1989). One can “shop around” for, say, an automobile strictly for the sake of price comparison, but as often car buying is about seeing (i.e., imagining) oneself in the car, about how one might look from the vantage
point of a friend or neighbor. The imaginative transposition is necessary for the sale
to occur, if it is to occur at all, and serves as the fodder for many kinds of advertising
appeals.

Not all shopping and consuming reflect narcissistically on a person. Goods figure
integritely in an ethic of care, as Arlie Hochschild (2003) insightfully demonstrates
for a variety of contexts. For mothers and caregivers particularly, shopping and
consuming often involves and invokes others, what Miller (1998a) calls “making
love” in market places, whereby intimate relationships can be expressed, redressed,
played out, or otherwise enacted with and through the things purchased and not
purchased.

Extending beyond the confines of retail settings are increasingly diffuse contexts
for consumption where consuming (but not necessarily buying) through desire,
imagination, and deliberation appear to be inseparable from social existence. Visual
consumption, a notion well suited for tourism (Urry, 1995), applies as well to the
daily rounds of home and work in the manner of themed environments (Gottdiener,
1997; Davis, 2001). One cannot avoid advertising, in the form of corporate logos
and brand names, as these adorn the most prominent features of the everyday visual-
 experiential landscape – for example billboards, signage, clothing, automobiles,
computer terminals, cell phones, the packaging of everything bought or not bought
(Klein, 1999). Each exposure to a brand, a commercial, an acoustic or print advertise-
ment carries with it a request to make – or, at least, consider – a purchase. Daily,
even hourly, we are beckoned as consumers to consume, if not to buy. The increas-
ingly ubiquitous television/video monitor outside the home in airports, waiting
rooms, on elevators and in stores for “point-of-purchase” sales renders problematic
the boundaries between consuming and nonconsuming, desiring and not desiring
(McCarthy, 2001).

Consumer culture, then, does not refer to constellations of meaning emerging
exclusively from the retail sector or which are evident only at the point of transac-
tion. It is not only about those meanings produced by the producers of goods or
by advertisers; yet, it cannot be disentangled from them. The term designates a
variety of overarching and underlying social relations arising when, as Slater puts it,
“core social practices and cultural values, ideas, aspirations and identities are
defined and oriented in relation to consumption rather than to other social dimen-
sions such as work or citizenship, religious cosmology or military role” (1997: 24).
In general, people born into consumer culture have a more direct and intimate
knowledge of commercial goods and media than of any other realm of social
existence. Children act as consumers long before they act in the capacity of citizens,
and thus often have more elaborate things to say about products and brands, as well
as more elaborate ways to engage with them, than when political-governmental
issues are at stake.

Consuming and being a consumer are no longer options. They are inescapable
activities and identities of those living in the era of mature consumer
capitalism (roughly the 1920s onward). Understood in this expansive way, con-
sumption is the air we breathe (as Stuart Ewen [1988] puts it), not just the good
or bad air. It is the environment of life, of everyday life. Making a purchase is only
the most cleanly identifiable act along a trajectory of consumer experience
and action.
Most discussions of consumer culture either ignore or isolate the place and import of children and childhood (in addition to works cited above, see Featherstone, 1991; Lury, 1996; Ritzer, 1999; see also the essays in Glickman, 1999; Gotttdiener, 2000). The general lack of attention paid to the place of children/childhood in the fabric of social life incorporates an ongoing, age-old tendency to dismiss as irrelevant anything closely associated with women and women’s practices (Alanen, 1994; Oakley, 1993). Shopping also carries the baggage of gendered frivolity in everyday discourse as well as residing, until recently, virtually out of the purview of the academic research endeavor (but see Bowlby, 1985; Falk and Campbell, 1997; Miller, 1998a; Chin, 2001; Zukin 2004).

Nonmarketing, academic research specifically addressing children’s consumption emerged as topic of study in the 1990s largely through the efforts of scholars in fields other than sociology. Mainly historical in orientation, some document the role of children in the rising consumer culture of the early decades of the twentieth century (Nasaw, 1985; Leach, 1993a, 1993b; Cross, 1997). Others investigate how the present-day saturation of goods in children’s lives relates to historical transformations in the social understanding of children and childhood, many of which were ushered in through commercial means (Kline, 1993; Seiter, 1993; Cook, 2000a, 2000b; Langer, 2002). Another general vein of research examines children’s use of media and the role of media industries in the construction of contemporary childhoods (Hendershot, 1998; McNamee, 1998; Buckingham, 2000; Kenway and Bullen, 2001; Kline and dePeuter, 2002; Mukerji and Gillespie, 2002; see essays in Steinberg and Kincheloe, 1997, and in Kinder, 1998). Taken together, these works indicate important benchmarks for outlining the parameters and scope of the interpenetration of childhood with consumer market relations. Beyond the coincidence of topical areas, however, these works hang together only loosely as a body of research and thought.

My work argues for the recognition of childhood as a social institution, one that is central to the shaping of consumer culture. The rise and expansion of a child-world of goods, spaces and media over the twentieth century signifies a development above and beyond the opening of merely one more market essentially similar to others. The child market stands apart from others because childhood is a generative cultural site unlike any other. Childhood generates bodies as well as meanings that grow, interact, and transform to the point of creating new childhoods, new meanings, and quite often new markets, in the process effectively enabling the movement and transformation of exchange value beyond any one cohort or generation.

Consumer culture can be a “culture” and perhaps a key mode of culture because the generative aspects of childhood over time have kept consumption from being something merely episodic and intermittent, in large part by weaving commercial activity into life course movement. The twin processes of becoming an active consumer and of the commodification of childhood occur at different levels of abstraction and in different cadences of time; they nevertheless rely upon each other. Both have important social structural implications that extend through time.
To enter consumer culture analytically through children and childhood is to stand at the intersection of synchronic and diachronic time-structures, and at the point where person and social structure meet. Childhood provides intragenerational and intergenerational linkages for the time-space travel of the cultural meaning of goods and of the social relations of consumption. Absent the thread of continuity that childhood provides, there would be no consumer culture per se – only loosely organized instances of buying and selling.

**CHILDHOOD, MARKETS, AND MORALITY**

Recognizing the ways in which the institution of childhood shapes consumer culture, historically and presently, calls into question what may be called the “invasion” theory of commodification – that is, that commodities have been invading previously untouched social realms, necessarily and unequivocally “polluting” them (see Steinberg and Kincheloe, 1997). I add my voice to those who deny the pragmatic separability of culture on the one hand, and markets on the other.

Without belaboring a point argued well by others (Zelizer, 1985, 1994; Parry and Bloch, 1989; Carrier, 1997; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997; Frank, 2000; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001), I take it as a point of departure that markets arise within and are (in)formed by specific, historically embedded social relations that impart meaning to commercial activity. This view rejects the contention made in neoclassical economic thought that markets exist as free, independent entities that sort value with a blind eye and an invisible hand without regard to persons, meanings, or context.

Markets and market mechanisms indeed sort and create value, but not indifferently. Rather, the cultural view of markets which I espouse underscores the moral basis of value and valuation whereby economic exchange invariably and inevitably encodes precepts of good and bad, of right and wrong, thereby sanctioning certain kinds of activities over others. As Igor Kopytoff (1986) remarks, all goods reside in a “moral economy.” The sorting and creating of value is itself a morally infused undertaking. Economic value never stands alone unaccompanied by socially imparted meaning.

To contend that markets and culture interweave, however, is not to ignore their mutual tensions. Children and childhood, as generally understood in the cultures historically referred to as “Western,” stand as distinct cultural-semantic domains that privilege the moral aspects of economic value over the monetary-calculable components. Childhood disrupts the simple, economic calculation of costs and benefits, of profits and losses, because it continues to represent, in different ways, a challenge to the valuation of persons in exclusively monetary terms.

A lingering tension between markets and moral sentiment continues to inform the make-up of children’s consumer culture and has since at least the beginning of industrialization. Here, two opposing forms of value come into contact and conflict. There is, on the one hand, the kind of value embodied in the sentimental “nature” of children and, on the other, that which is enforced by the equalizing, rational aspects of market calculation. Viviana Zelizer (1985) identifies the historical foundations of the tension between the market and emotional valuation of children in her study of the rise of the sacred, “priceless” child in the early 1900s.
Examining debates about child labor and children’s life insurance, among other things, Zelizer argues that a child’s “value” became measured less in economic-monetary terms and increasingly constituted in sentimental-emotional ones. As first middle-class, then working-class children left the workplace, many rose to the defense of – and thereby helped create – the economically and productively “useless” child, whose worth was seen as a function of moral, not instrumental considerations (1985; see pp. 73–96 for defenses of the useless child). The result, according to Zelizer (1985: 11), is that – except in some limited cases such as bootblacks, newspaper sellers and child actors – children essentially were expelled from the “cash nexus” of American society. The emergent view of children and childhood that Zelizer documents so well sought to take the consideration of a child’s worth out of the impersonal realm of exchange and place it in the inaccessible, internal realm of the “soul” of the child and the “nature” of childhood. Children – their activities, their lifeworlds – in the process became excessively individualized or singularized, to use Kopytoff’s (1986) term, and thereby essentially decommodified.

Limiting children’s access to most forms of paid labor, however, signaled not the end of their economic participation, but a fundamental change in it. As working-class children were gradually taken out of direct production over the first third of the twentieth century, middle-class childhood arose as a site for morally mediated consumption. The child-consumer of the twentieth century stepped out of the factories of industrializing, nineteenth century capitalism to take its place in the emotional center of the twentieth century domestic sphere. This bourgeois, non-laboring child gained institutional and ideological support from the convergence of a number of large-scale, historical transformations like compulsory education and its attendant age-grading of students (see Chudacoff, 1989), the professionalization and popularization of child psychology (Seiter, 1993; Rawlins, 2002) and the development of various forms of media (Kline, 1993; Pecora, 1995). These together have supported the child-consumer as not only a possible social persona, but also as a viable one.

“Children’s consumer culture,” from this vantage, refers to historically situated, socially embedded webs of meaning that shape definitions of both “the child” and “childhood” in ways that render them more or less confluent with the world of economic consumption. Children’s consumer culture has taken shape in a space located at the intersection of childhood and markets. It is an historical accommodation whereby children and commerce exist, not in utter harmony, but in relation to each another and where the integration of children with monetary valuation gets accomplished through moral and sentimental means, not despite them. Maintaining a sense of childhood enchantment, as Beryl Langer (2002) points out, keeps the gears of commerce oiled. The interplay between sentiment and exchange in this way serves as the engine driving the emergence, growth, and transformation of children’s commercial industries and culture, not as a foil to them.

**SUBJECTIFYING THE CHILD-CONSUMER**

Since about the first decade of the twentieth century, US merchants have recognized childhood as a legitimate site for the opening, extension and expansion of markets. “Before 1890,” historian William Leach observes, “most American children, wore,
ate and played with what their parents made or prepared for them” (1993b: 85). By 1920, industries specializing in specially made and designed products for children, such as toys (Kline, 1993: 143–73; Leach, 1993a; 1993b: 85–90, 328–30; Seiter, 1993; Cross, 1997), clothing (Cook, 1995, 2000a), and nursery ware (Forty, 1986: 67–72) began to proliferate in US cities. To be sure, these children’s goods, including notably children’s books (Kline, 1993: 79–99), were being manufactured outside the home and sold in stores prior to the twentieth century.

But, it was during the first decades of the 1900s that key children’s industries began to recognize themselves as industries by forming professional bodies, publishing trade journals and making appeals for and responses to governmental action. For the toy industry, Toys and Novelties started publication in 1903 and Playthings in 1909. The first trade journal devoted exclusively to children’s clothing, The Infants’ Department, began in 1917. In 1924 the Horn Book was founded to promote books for children, although as early as 1874, Publishers Weekly listed children’s books. Creating markets for children’s goods thereby became an increasingly collective, organized, and purposeful endeavor.

The new markets and industries for children’s things may, at first, appear as adjuncts to, or special cases in, the emergent culture of consumption – something fairly unremarkable in themselves. However, both the growing quantities of goods for children and their ever intensifying presence in the daily lives of children in the early twentieth century made for more than merely one market among others. The emerging “child-world” of children’s goods, as Leach (1993a) calls it, also provided the material and institutional foundation for a fundamental change in the social construction of childhood. New notions of children and childhood arose in tandem with modern consumption, delimiting shared and contested understandings of the kinds of beings children are and should be, what their motivations are, their importance in the social world, as well as the very meaning of the movement through the early life course.

These notions took form in the persona of the “child-consumer,” which may be the enduring legacy and carrier of modern consumer culture. This figure animates children’s culture with its insatiable desire for things, with its knowledge about products, its tastes, its conspicuous display and its seemingly unquestioned identification of self with commodities. (I refer to “the child” as “it” to underscore that the child-consumer at issue is not a sentient being with a unique biography but a discursive construct with a history.) The consuming child – when configured and imputed socially and discursively as a subject with agency – effectively deflects charges of corporate exploitation because it is said to have and make choices. In this way, the child-consumer, as social construct, performs the cultural work of reconciling or otherwise circumventing the moral conundrum posed when children and markets commingle – that is, one cannot be readily exploited if one can be said to be able to choose.

The defining features of the child-consumer have been molded and remolded over the last century on the pages of dry goods and advertising trade journals, in women’s and mothers’ magazines, in marketers’ focus groups, and eventually on television commercials into what is a now widely shared public persona (see Cook, 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Langer, 2002). Less an intentionally contrived commercial persona in the early years, the consuming child came to life through retailers’ observations and anecdotes about children’s wants, requests, and interaction with sales personnel.
Merchants understood in the early decades of the century that children represented something beyond their immediate, localized, and limited purchase potential. “The child” stood not for present sales but for future loyalty, not for the penny candy purchased now but for the present and future goodwill of, and sales to, parents and relatives. As one trade magazine put it in 1915, treat “Johnny and his nickel” with respect because they represent a “buying public which has a far larger purse than Johnny’s.” The larger public is “all of his grown-up relatives and neighbors.” Not only do the candy counter and toy shop have obvious direct appeal to children, the article continues, “but the tie that holds them to older persons – their parents – is the deepest of all affections; and the man who buys things because of some direct or indirect pleasure or benefit which the purchase will cause his children, is legion” (Clark, 1915: 238).

Beyond his parental patronage and affection, “Johnny” symbolized and potentiated future sales in at least two ways. First, merchants and manufacturers recognized “the child” as a “growth machine” (Cook, 2000b) who both physically and socially changes such that her or his needs and wants transform as they mature. A market of scarcity is, in a sense, built into the growing child. Second and more fundamentally, commercial interests came to realize the child market resided not only in children acting as customers in the present tense, but also in cultivating a more abstract notion of the child consumer whose loyalties – first to specific stores, then to products, then to brands – could be harvested for years to come.

When the first, separate infants’ and young children’s clothing departments were included into department stores (around 1915), their physical structure, location, stock, and personnel were, unsurprisingly, designed to appeal to and appease the consuming mother (Cook, 1995). In subsequent decades, children’s wear retailers sought to offer service, goods, store atmosphere, and physical space built and designed to appeal directly to children, taking into account “their” presumed views, anxieties and concerns. By the later 1920s and continuing through the Depression years, merchants built entire floors for youth in which the location and progression of merchandise were age and gender graded in a strategic manner so as to invoke a sense of circumscribed propriety on the part of the targeted kids.

Importantly, these spaces were created with the consuming child, not parent, in mind as they were decorated with “age appropriate” colors and iconography. The fixtures were made accessible to children’s heights, as were mirrors. Youth/popular music, again appropriate to age group, was piped in and often fashion shows, parties, plays, and other events were staged in the stores with the dual purpose of attracting and semantically marking the space as a “children’s” place (Cook, 2003a; Cook and Kaiser, 2004).

The grouping of clothing by age categories had brought with it new, unanticipated problems. Retailers began to realize that children did not like being treated “as children” and would not be favorably disposed toward their store and merchandise unless appeased with “equal” treatment. These microtechnologies of spatial merchandising assisted in ushering in a fundamental transformation of perspective, which I believe to be historically unique and novel. Namely, their design and layout took into account and made material the assumed or imputed child’s perspective, privileging it over that of the adult’s view.
Pediocularity, or seeing with children’s eyes, has arisen as the *modus operandi* of children’s consumer culture, and is centrally positioned in public culture as well. Consumer markets are not wholly responsible for this perspectival shift, nor has this shift been singular, unidirectional, or inevitable. It has, however, the character of a historical trajectory. Intimations of it can be found early in the 1900s in Ellen Key’s (1909) call for children’s self-determining rights in her *Century of the Child*. Ellen Seiter (1993: 22), examining popular, middle-class parenting literature in the 1920s and 1930s, finds a similar emergent belief in the growing authority of the “child-centered model” which, as she says, privileges the “child’s own desires” over those of the mother. Martha Wolfenstein, in another vein, also identified a new attitude toward parenting emergent in the thirties and forties, “fun morality,” which was based on a new valuation of the child’s “impulses” as “benevolent rather than dangerous” (1955: 171). Mothers were encouraged to “follow” their children’s impulses, not interpret or direct them.

Legitimating and privileging children’s desires has been an ongoing historical and ideological process, which has had the effect of unifying the disparate values of market and sentiment. To the extent that desire can be framed as originating from within the child, it can thereby be construed as natural and thus reflective of an inner person that is unique, sacred, and thus inviolable. If children can be offered “what they want,” if they can enter social relations as already wanting, then a moral barrier has been erased or, at least, bypassed.

Forming goods, spaces and, later, persuasive messages with child’s view (whether “known” or imputed) in mind not only instantiates childhood as a privileged social location; these also lionize consumption as the arena where childhood and, to be sure, personhood are to be realized. My own work on the rise of the “toddler” as a subject and merchandising category in the 1930s discusses how the language of merchants and infant wear trade observers sought to impute willfulness, desire, self-reflection, and self-consciousness onto the one- to three-year-old as a basis for the creation of a new age-size clothing designation (Cook, 2000b). Toddlers gained not only a merchandising category but an entire panoply of lifestyle characteristics and tendencies all requisite to allow marketeers and parents alike to see them as “consumers” and thus as adjudicated social persons.

A number of key features of present-day children’s consumer culture arise out of the early practices of adjudicating the child as consumer and of organizing spaces, goods, and messages in deference to her or his viewpoint. For one, merchants came to understand that a longing to be older, to be independent – more of a “person,” if you will – was aroused and made manifest in children’s responses to retail environments when goods for differently aged children were placed in proximity to one another. In addition to segregation of goods by gender, differential placement of goods by age was required in order not to alienate older children who were seeking to distinguish themselves from the age group from which they had just departed.

In clothing departments by the early 1940s, it was becoming common practice to place older children’s styles at the front of the store and progressing in descending age until reaching the infant and layette selections in the back. This arrangement not only kept older children from being “polluted” by contact with younger children’s goods, the space also encouraged age-style emulation, often purposely designed to invoke a longing that could only be met through consumption. When accompanied
by “age-appropriate” music, iconography, and other features, spatial merchandising also offers a proprietary sense of the store or area – that is, as “belonging” to children of the targeted age-gender group (see Cook, 2000a, 2003a).

These spatially situated commercial biographies (Cook, 2003a) (i.e., the physical movements in selling space which enact changes in age status) have enabled children’s consumption to move beyond the episodic level to that of a “culture” by providing important intragenerational and intergenerational linkages. At the same time, these reaffirm the very age-style-consumption designations children apparently attempt to transcend. The movement is not lateral but always vertical where age ascendance, if not achieved in chronological years, can be pursued through personal display. Aspirational and proprietary elements of children’s consumption together infuse childhood with exchange value. The transitions between age stages, which are nuanced and symbolized by age-gender “appropriate” and “inappropriate” goods, function to create a form of scarcity upon which a series of concatenated mini-markets have come to be overlaid onto early life course progression.

Writ large, the commodification of childhood, presently and historically, prefigures and makes possible the commodification of the life course – of life itself. Goods, their meanings and distribution within and throughout various age stages, not only mark social locations; in many ways they constitute them. Virtually all stages of social existence, from the fetus (Taylor, 1992; Layne, 2000; Cook, 2003a) through youth (Palladino, 1996; Best, 2001) through adulthood (Modell, 1989) to the elderly (Hockey and James, 1993), have come to acquire market values or, at the least, cannot escape their shadowy presence. Critically, it is largely the movements between age grades that present an opportunity for the consumer to find and create identities through goods, and for the marketer to realize economic exchange value.

**Concluding Questions**

The generative quality of childhood, interlinked with the sentimental worth of children, together have forged the bedrock of modern consumer culture by providing effective, built-in mechanisms for the movement and transformation of commercial value beyond any one cohort or generation. This bedrock, I offer, takes tangible form in the child-consumer. It has been largely through postulating, catering to, and addressing – and thereby creating – the “child-consumer” that marketeers have arrived at the understanding, now commonplace and routinized, that consumption involves the person in a lifelong activity with ontological ramifications (McNeal, 1992, 1999; Guber and Berry, 1993; Acuff, 1997; John, 1999). Beyond such consequences as brand loyalties brought about through lifelong engagement in consumption, the historical commodification of childhood figures directly and fundamentally in the creation of the consuming, corporate self – a self whose identity may not be completely isomorphic with commercial products, but is no longer independent of them (see Featherstone, 1991; Lury, 1996; Slater, 1997: 201–9). When approached from the perspective of the life course through historical time, in ways only hinted at above, childhood and children cannot be seen as special cases in or appendices to consumer culture, and consumer culture can no longer be confined to that meaning-making process that occurs only when one is shopping.
Recognizing the generative role of childhood in consumer culture transforms our understanding of “the consumer.” It disrupts the view of “the consumer” as a rational, autonomous economic actor (Miller, 1995, 1998a; Carrier, 1997; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001). It also calls into question views of the consumer as an excessively creative, essentially self-authoring being apparently immune to most any corporate influence or advertising message. No longer the oversocialized “cultural dupe” of the past who makes no distinction between self and commodity and who is easily swayed by advertising and peer influence, the new postmodern “consumer” now appears as something of a “cultural genius” in media portrayals as well as academic renderings (Fiske, 1989, 1991). Fighting off the impending encroachment of imposed, commercialized meaning with every little purchase and in every nuanced adjustment of an accoutrement, the perpetually creative consumer has become something of an heroic figure in late-twentieth, early twenty-first century capitalism.

The cultural genius and the rational actor each draw upon and rearticulate the age-old Western dream of individualism. Instead of riding into some frontier town in hopes of making a new identity, the heroic consumer today roams amidst vast structures of global capital, through commodity chains and around ubiquitous advertising appeals in a quest to make up new versions of self as she (and increasingly he) goes along. Power shopping (i.e., shopping with and for the social power of self-expression) in this way offers the hope of, and outlet for, the exercise of personal agency. In a world infused with brand icons, private labels, licensing agreements, and cross-promotions, the power shopper aggressively appropriates these into conspicuously decorated shopping bags, thereby taking literal ownership of symbolic goods. The rational actor scrutinizes and purchases the same to obtain the best marginal benefit, but children are off limits in terms of theorizing about their rationality (Levison, 2000). The neoclassical actor is necessarily an “adult” – although the construct of the child as an empowered and knowing actor has gained political and institutional legitimation in recent decades as battles over appropriate ways to advertise to children have been fought and won on free market principles (see Kunkel and Roberts, 1991; Kline, 1993: 208–30; Hendershot, 1998: 61–94).

Children as well as adults, then and now, create meaning out of the fodder of the culture-at-hand (Swidler, 1998) but they do not – to paraphrase Marx – make it out of materials completely of their own choosing. To claim that consumer culture and contemporary culture cannot be disentangled is not to preclude personal agency in favor of corporate domination. Personal volition is not lost in our world of consumption. The play of children, the displays of social resistance by youth and the everyday readings of popular culture by everyone speak to the interminable viability of human creativity. Creativity, however, can be corralled and colonized to the extent that the parameters of choice and imagination are continually being structured by and filtered through market interests well before the acquisition of language and cognitive reasoning (see also Kincheloe, 2002).

The corporate, consuming self, is no longer only about narcissism (Lasch, 1979) or the predominance of other-directedness (Reisman et al., 1950), although it clearly continues to serve therapeutic needs (Lears, 1983). The questions facing those who are willing to face them center on whether the development and nurturing of the self can ever again occur without being fundamentally entangled with the interests of capital. Will agency and creativity continue to move in the direction of being predominantly responses to ready-made, commercial meanings ubiquitously
displayed on everything from drool bibs to school textbooks? Can social affiliations based on brand icons offer anything more permanent than the kind of consumer solidarity displayed by, say, those who fought to bring back Classic Coke in the 1980s? How can alternative axes that locate and define personhood be considered when the consuming self is increasingly nurtured and beckoned prior to one’s birth? And, from where, if not the business sphere and reactions to it, will new sources of culture emerge?

References


Further Reading

There was a story Andrea’s mother used to proudly relate to her when she was a little girl. Whenever she’d go to the corner drugstore, the proprietor, who thought she looked like Lana Turner, used to say, “There goes little Lana.” As she grew older, and gained weight and wrinkles, her mother clung to this memory as the proof of her own once bright “stardom.” For us, it served as the evidence of what, in Andrea’s family, seemed most important in life: glamour, and through it, the connection to a recognizable Hollywood identity.

If our recent discussions with teenagers and college students are any indication, youthful dreams of stardom have not waned. Yet the form they take is now different from the Lana Turner model prevalent in Andrea’s mother’s day. For example, we have a student, Kelly, who tells us she would do anything to get on the TV show Real World. On the show, her own “real” life would be the source of her fame. This is Kelly’s dream of fame – to her, having her life flashed on the small screen would make her fully as famous as Lana Turner was. While Andrea’s mom wanted to be Lana Turner, Kelly wants to be famous for being “Kelly,” a different ambition altogether. This chapter is about the contrast amongst a number of notions of fame and celebrity, including these two as well as others that predate them.

We argue that today the notion of celebrity is much more intimately connected to the idea of ordinary, non-distinguished life than it was in the nineteenth century or through the middle decades of the twentieth century. By “ordinary life,” we mean the undistinguished lives of everyday, non-famous, not-particularly-talented people, as opposed to the lives of celebrities or others who are distinguished in some particular way. Everyday life becomes a central focus of journalism and the arts with the rise of the realist movement in the nineteenth century, with the works of writers such as Jack London, Sinclair Lewis, and Walt Whitman. It once again becomes a focus as the alleged “media of reality,” such as photography, film, and then television, begin to be developed. We discuss the transformation in the relationship between celebrity and ordinary, everyday life over the course of the twentieth century in the US.
Perhaps there is a poignancy here in our need to learn about intimate relationships by the closer observation of others’ “ordinary” relationships with one another. One interesting question then becomes, what values are these particular “ordinary” people, chosen for certain celebrity-like qualities, espousing? What is it we learn from the close observation of their lives and relationships? And why do we turn to them, rather than others, for these lessons?

Leo Braudy (1986) offers the best historical overview of celebrity, and lays the foundation for our argument, which extends his notion into the present. In an ambitious historical study of the forms popular celebrity has taken throughout the ages starting in ancient times and continuing through the modern age, Braudy argues that fame was once based on accomplishment, on “doing” something immortal, something that led to decades of admiration and respect. So, Alexander the Great sought fame through the conquest of a kingdom larger than any that had ever existed. This model of fame did not demand instant notoriety, but took into account the kind of fame that might remain unrecognized in one’s lifetime, as in the case of unknown or even starving artists: think Emily Dickinson, or others who are not recognized in their lifetimes.

Current fame, which in Braudy’s time-line has predominated since the emergence of capitalism and the development of what is sometimes labeled the media of reality – photography, movies, and advertising – is fundamentally different. The notion of fame has moved away from its basis in transcendent accomplishment, toward a dependence upon recognition in the here and now. It is based on doing something that attracts immediate notice, rather than something of great artistic or political worth that leads to a longer-lasting type of respect. Also, with the rise of photography, film, and television, fame is tied to an “image” of the performer or artist, in a way that was not possible in a prior era. Finally, current fame demands an audience, and that audience is crucial to newer notions of celebrity. Whereas once the audience was either god or future generations, and one’s recognition in the here-and-now did not matter so much, today a current audience is the basic definition of celebrity.

This new type of celebrity fundamentally alters the notions that predated it. Current fame is fleeting. Many get, as Andy Warhol famously noted, their “15 minutes” of fame, but few can maintain the limelight, which requires celebrities to keep reinventing themselves, to perform ever more innovative or outrageous acts to keep attention focused on themselves. Fame becomes a function of the moment, rather than something tied to secure regard throughout the ages. Because of the restless search of the media spotlight few can maintain their fame through a “second act.” All of this is, of course, dependent upon the electronic media, which focus fame on an image of the physical body of the celebrity, cementing its quality of immediacy.

When occasionally famous people do manage to reinvent themselves once or several times – the Beatles are a good example of this – they begin to achieve a more enduring kind of renown, approaching the pre-capitalist type of fame that Braudy describes. Discussions of the Beatles’ music often note that we will be listening to their songs long after other pop groups and their music have been forgotten, that their songs have become an enduring part of our cultural and musical heritage (Hertsgaard, 1995). But this kind of celebrity is relatively rare now: few celebrities can sustain their fame for much more than the 15-minute flash in the pan (Sylvester Stallone is a good example of someone who has not managed to sustain
his “second act,” who could not reinvent himself; Kevin Costner is an even better one; there are many others).

In interpreting current notions of celebrity, others corroborate Braudy’s thesis in a variety of ways. For example, consider the writings of the Frankfurt School, which still offer some of the best theoretical analyses of celebrity in the era of capitalism. Leo Lowenthal, who wrote perhaps the first critical study of celebrity culture in everyday life entitled “Biographies in Popular Magazines” (1943), argues that the heroes of industry – of capitalist accomplishment – that dominated popular biographies of the nineteenth century have now been replaced with accounts of sports heroes and movie stars, or heroes of “consumption” as Lowenthal calls them. The result of this shift is that celebrity has moved from the realm of achievement – if only in business and moneymaking – to a realm closer to the everyday lives of each of us. The stories about sports heroes and movie stars that dominate celebrity accounts, Lowenthal argues, emphasize their ordinariness, the details of their everyday lives. When we read about what Jennifer Lopez eats for breakfast, we come close to imagining that our own lives are like those of the celebrities about whom we read and fantasize. After all, we could eat the same Wheaties and dry toast – wouldn’t that bring us somewhere near the orbit of J. Lo’s life? All of this works towards establishing consumption as the real motor of our daily lives.

Horkheimer and Adorno, in their famous essay “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (1972), make an argument close to this in their discussion of Hollywood movies and the delights they offer their audiences. They use as an example the case of the film that details the daily life of a secretary, viewed in the evening by a secretary who has just completed a day much like the one pictured. What is the appeal to such a viewer of the type of story she is seeing? By seeing a story about a life close to her own, pictured larger-than-life on the big screen, she can reinterpret her own experience as more glamorous and, in effect, meaningful than it is. They went on to argue that her critical faculties were redirected from any arguments against the culture industry, or capitalism, into creating fantasies about the glamour and painlessness of her own dreary workday. Thus did the culture industry absorb any possible critiques of itself by redirecting the viewing public’s energy from criticisms and more into escapist fantasies and dreams of glamour.

In general, the Frankfurt School theorists argued that celebrity was an integral part of a system of mass culture that directed our attention away from important political realities into a fantasy realm. Mass cultural fantasies played an important political role for capitalism, according to these theorists. By draining our energies away from political realities, and keeping our minds occupied with other types of activities, the cultural industry short-circuits our attempts to resist, criticize, and change society. The Frankfurt School was particularly harsh when discussing Hollywood products and stars. They saw the entertainment industry as merely playing a role for the capitalist system, a role disguised by the trappings of glamour and the film industry.

Taking a quite different approach, Goode (1978) offers an interesting analysis of heroism and prestige in the modern era. His work provides a valuable perspective on current theories of celebrity by discussing the way collectivities assign prestige to those whose achievements or ascriptive characteristics meet certain standards. In Goode’s world prestige was still tied, as for Braudy, to one’s accomplishments, or in the case of inherited wealth, the accomplishments of one’s group or predeces-
sors. Goode also analyzes the fame achieved by heroes, celebrated due to selfless action that places the good of society or the collectivity over the interests of the individual. The paradigm case is the war hero who sacrifices his own life for the common good. As with Braudy, Goode’s analysis highlights the ways in which our current regime of celebrity is radically different from the prestige system that predated it.

Gamson, in a brilliant piece of research that explores both the production and consumption of celebrity (1994), illustrates how average people today grapple with this notion of heroism when they try to analyze their own fascination with current celebrities. The image of Oprah Winfrey, or of Madonna, serve as prime examples. Both are perceived as Horatio Alger figures who pull themselves up by the strength of their own talents. And both maintain their fascination in part because they are seen as so smart and powerful that they can continue to subvert and manipulate the very publicity system that creates and maintains their visibility. Partly they are famous for their skill in manipulating the reactions of others to their own images – they are their own best public-relations experts. There is a fundamental shift, then, from Goode’s world, in which prestige is still tied to heroic action or achievement, and the world that Gamson analyzes, in which fascination derives from the manipulation of admiration itself. Manipulative skill has replaced authentic achievement, and mass audiences are barely aware of this shift.

Other analyses of contemporary theory corroborate Gamson’s vision, fleshing it out with still further illustrations from contemporary life. Marshall (1997), for example, argues that celebrity has become inherently dependent upon the audience’s connection to the celebrities themselves. He recounts in detail how the new media environment has contributed to the eroding of boundaries between producers and consumers, fans and stars, elites and non-elites. These boundaries have eroded to the point that what cinches fame now is not talent so much as the illusion of an intimate connection to the audience. As one example of this new dimension of celebrity, he cites once again the fame of Oprah Winfrey, daytime talk show hostess: “Oprah’s power as a celebrity is dependent on this intimate connection to a loyal studio and home audience. Her connection to her audience is embedded in her celebrity sign” (Marshall, 1997: 135). In a sense, Oprah is famous because of her intimate connection to the audience. Her widely heralded ability to “talk” has given her the aura of everyone’s best friend, and this secures her celebrity identity.

Another example Marshall cites is the phenomenon of the extremely popular and idolized musical group New Kids on the Block. This was a musical group that was manufactured out of ordinary, nonmusician kids, like the Monkees of an earlier era. While in the case of the Monkees there was an attempt to “hide” these origins, to allow the group to compete with musical groups contemporary to them like the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, who were surrounded by an aura of authenticity often contrasted critically with the manufactured quality of the Monkees, Marshall argues that today groups are marketed very differently. The notion of the aura of authenticity has receded, and in its place is an aura of “ordinariness,” which erodes the space between celebrities and us ordinary folk.

Marshall’s argument here exactly corroborates Frankfurt School tropes about the nature of celebrity under capitalism. Anyone can become these new musical performers. It’s not that today’s celebrities are talentless, it’s more that our notion of talent has evolved into a quality that, rather than being inherent in the lucky few chosen by
God, can be “given” to anyone if they are lucky enough (like Andrea’s mom imagining that she can be famous because she looks like Lana Turner). One has to be transformed into celebrity, and anyone could be. The idea that the New Kids on the Block are just ordinary, relatively talentless guys, like you and me, is part of their appeal, as contrasted with the kind of indigenous talent notion that sold the Beatles and other earlier rock groups and acts (Chuck Berry, Little Richard, even Elvis Presley to some extent). Like Horkheimer and Adorno’s secretary watching the starlet portraying a secretary, we the audience feel closer to them, knowing that at some level, perhaps because of their lack of exceptional talent, they are just like you and me. This type of identity ultimately augments their celebrity power. The scandal over the musical group Milli Vanilli – in which it was shockingly discovered that the group only lip-synched their songs, and actually did not do their own singing – is an excellent example of the idea that these groups still need to “do” something after they are discovered, unlike the case of “lottery celebrity” which we discuss below. Fans really cared whether Milli Vanilli were doing their own singing or not.

We argue that there is an even newer form of fame evolving in the new media environment, especially on a variety of so-called “reality” television programs. We call this new type of celebrity “lottery celebrity.” We use the word “lottery” because it captures both the distinctive ephemeral quality of modern celebrity, and the notion that it is chance or luck, rather than talent, which differentiates the famous celebrity from the unknown masses. As with lottery winners, publicity for modern celebrities often stresses their connection to ordinary people like ourselves, and the similarities between their daily lives and our own. Any achievement or talent these celebrities may have is often actually de-emphasized in favor of stories that play up their ordinariness and connection to our everyday lives. Yet, lottery celebrity further disengages fame from any form of talent or achievement than was the case before.

Today’s media coverage of celebrities resembles that of lottery winners (and sometimes the two are intermingled, as in a recent issue of People magazine [June 10, 2002], which featured both celebrities and lottery-winners on the front cover). Front-page stories of lottery winners stress the incredible ordinariness of people who win the lottery, going on to detail how ordinary the lives of lottery winners remain even when they become millionaires. One $87 million winner interviewed in this issue of People relates, “I made macaroni and cheese and hamburgers for dinner tonight... and pretty soon it will be time to go throw in another laundry. But that’s how I like it.” Indeed! The appeal of such stories is twofold. First, they are the ultimate stories of American upward mobility: we love to read of poor people becoming rich (the same issue of People featured as one of the lottery winner profiles a Super Bowl linebacker, who told us that he was “already worth $2,000,000 when he won his lottery; we react ambivalently to this story, until we are told all the good deeds he did with his winnings, which help us to justify the rich becoming richer). Second, we love to hear that wealth will not change us, nor will it necessarily make us happy: the fabulously wealthy are really just like you and me. You can see this in stories about lottery winners that emphasize how ordinary people are after they win their lottery money. We are treated in the mainstream media to endless profiles of such winners simply to reassure us that they are just like you and me, even when rich: the other side of lottery democracy is that even though poor people can quickly become rich in a democratic society, we should not think that riches would really change them!
Lottery celebrity emerged in full force with the incredible popularity of talk shows on television. Talk shows, as many commentators have argued (Gamson, 1998; Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Grindstaff, 2002), offer a certain level of celebrity to ordinary, mostly poor or lower-class people, to whom celebrity would not otherwise be available. By allowing these people to speak their minds, at least allegedly, in the public forum that the show provides, talk shows allow viewpoints to be aired that often do not have other outlets, and give people a chance to speak who might otherwise never be heard publicly expressing their opinions. Talk show analysts have often argued that talk shows empower the powerless in our society by allowing them to be heard, but that this benefit is tempered by the fact that at the same time they are often ridiculed and thereby exploited while they are speaking (Gamson, 1998; Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Grindstaff, 2002). How do talk show guests balance these effects of their participation? As a student of ours who once worked on the *Springer Show* relates, often participants become “celebrities,” at least in their own local contexts, when they return home from their television appearance. Many come from communities where not only do they know no one who has ever been on television, but also they themselves, and those they know, have never before taken a plane trip, stayed in a hotel, or ridden in a limousine, all of which they have experienced in the course of becoming talk show guests. This type of celebrity is a real draw for people who might otherwise find this experience degrading and exploitative. There is no shortage of people from similar backgrounds clamoring to become talk show guests.

Lottery celebrity reaches its ultimate incarnation in the current spate of reality TV programs. Reality programming exploded in its current incarnation with the stunning success *Survivor*, which placed a group of 16 ordinary people on a tropical island, staged a variety of obstacles for them to overcome (in addition to just surviving) and then had the participants vote one person off the island each week. The last show of the inaugural series, during which the final survivor was chosen (and won a million dollars), was the second most watched show of the year (behind only the Super Bowl, an older form of reality programming). The phenomenal ratings of this show inspired the networks to air any number of variations on the theme of ordinary people being placed in stressful situations for the chance to win large amounts of money. *Big Brother*, another reality based show, placed a group of strangers in a small house where their everyday adventures could be minutely chronicled through television cameras strategically placed throughout the domicile. Each week these roommates nominated two of their group for eviction with the viewing audience ultimately deciding which of the two was actually eliminated from the show.

Currently there is a virtual explosion of reality television shows. Popular now are ABC’s *The Bachelor II* and *Bachelorette*, shows where single people pick alleged mates from a bevy of young singles of the opposite sex; NBC’s *Fear Factor*, which places people in situations where they have to carry out a terrifying task (like eating a can of worms, or entering a pool of spiders); Fox’s *Joe Millionaire*, in which executives plucked a handsome young construction worker out of the crowd (of course, he was also a model and aspiring actor) and gave him the trappings of millionairdom, allowing him to pick a mate from among a group of young women, all of whom thought he was a millionaire but found out later he was poor (what is more important, love or money?), and *American Idol*, in which viewers vote one of
the show’s contestants to be most likely to become a “celebrity” or American idol; and MTV’s *The Osbournes*, which details minute-by-minute the decidedly pedestrian daily life of a celebrity family.

Reality programming and the various components that define it are, of course, neither new nor real. Since its earliest days television has contained live broadcasts, contrived game shows, talk shows, hidden cameras exposing ordinary people in embarrassing situations and the like. Nonetheless, over the last decade there has been an explosion in programs that attempt to mimic real life, capture and reveal it, or, put real people into surreal situations. This trend can be seen in the multiplication and mutation of talk shows, as well as in the spate of popular shows we’ve discussed above.

Current versions of reality television pluck “real” people from the population and put them on television in shows which place them in various situations that the audience will hopefully find entertaining enough to watch. This genre promises to extend television’s quality of realism into previously uncharted dimensions. Like the initial reception of photography and cinema, when the unprecedented “realism” of these media excited the public with their promise to truly “capture” reality, television has now become the new “medium of realism” with this genre.

In part, the popularity of reality television is yet another manifestation of the belief that new media technologies can reveal the unmediated truth about the world. In this sense it is not unlike the development of photography during the Civil War, of movies and radio during the 1890s to 1920s, or of the very early days of television as a mass medium in the 1950s. Just as Matthew Brady’s Civil War photographs promised a look at the truth of a conflict that was, for those far from the battlefields, incomprehensible, so too the popularity of today’s reality programming is a response to the increasing difficulty of coming to grips with the increasingly fragmented world in which we live. (While a comparison between *Survivor* and Matthew Brady’s photography may seem strained, one must remember that Brady traveled with a collection of props such as rifles and carefully posed bodies before taking his pictures.) In short, reality programming represents another in a long line of technological fixes that promise to get people closer to reality – to the personal reality of others, at least some of which remains hidden to the casual observer – at a time when direct knowledge of that reality seems crucial to an understanding of our own personal identities. Reality television extends Meyrowitz’s (1985) argument that television takes us “backstage,” into private places that the culture had previously kept hidden. It thereby makes us savvier about others’ reality, and therefore our own, while at the same time eroding the notion of privacy until in the current era it barely exists – but then again, when it is universal knowledge of our most private spaces that guarantees us fame and admiration, why would we want to hide anything?

Reality TV promises a glimpse into the ordinary, everyday lives of real people, what we yearn for from the celebrities yet never really achieve since we know how staged and artificial are all celebrity appearances and interviews. It’s interesting that one of the most popular reality TV show currently, MTV’s *The Osbournes*, actually does turn the reality cameras onto the daily life of a celebrity family, Ozzy Osbourne and his family. Started as a small segment on another MTV show, *The Osbournes* has become an incredible runaway hit with MTV viewers, perhaps because this promise of really entering the lives of celebrities is essentially fulfilled with
this new type of show (which, however, offers such an exaggerated picture of
everyday life that its staged, or at least overacted, nature is obvious even to the
uninitiated).

The *Real World* is one of the longest-running reality TV shows and is extremely
popular. It has been running for 11 seasons and is a prime example of how reality
television is based upon what we have called lottery celebrity. A show like *Real
World* plays with the notion of fame. The applicants are picked partly because they
film well, as evidenced by their demonstration tapes. Many – perhaps most – aspire
to a career in the entertainment field. But that’s not how they’re presented to their
audience – they are presented as ordinary, everyday people, who are just “this” close
to the audience. The show takes “ordinary” young people, like our students or the
waiters in our cafes (who apply, sending a 45-minute demonstration tape) and asks
them to move to a certain city (San Francisco, New York, London, it’s different
every season; the show is currently set in Chicago) for four months. Once there, the
*Real World* finds them jobs, usually all working together, one year for the park
district of Chicago (as lifeguards, and later as planners for the Halloween celebra-
tions), one year as radio DJs, one year producing public access television. The show’s
promise is that but for chance, you too could achieve the instant celebrity the *Real
World* cast achieves, at least among the 18–26 year-old age group (and those
younger) that constitutes the bulk of its fans (and of the MTV audience, the network
on which it airs).

Yet *Real World*’s promise of celebrity is fleeting. While many of its “graduates”
have aspired to careers in the media limelight, few have achieved them. Some have
gone on to talk show appearances, others to minor television positions on the MTV
network, but none have actually become bona-fide *celebrities* in any lasting sense. In
fact, probably the only *Real World* alum to achieve widespread (if not lasting) fame
was Pedro, a gay man from San Francisco who had AIDS while on the show and
later died from it. He was someone who was mentioned by political leaders includ-
ing President Clinton and his story became a familiar example through which AIDS
could be discussed.

The promise the *Real World* holds out to its viewers is slightly different from the
Hollywood story of Lana Turner being discovered at the soda fountain. The type of
celebrity offered here is almost a kind of holding-place: we become interested in the
characters of *Real World* because we are offered a glimpse into the intimate details
of their everyday life – this of course is what we *want* to know about Tom Cruise,
but never *really* get to see, despite the endless and intensive tabloid coverage in
magazines and on television. We don’t see him in bed, we don’t see him having sex
(for real, that is!), we don’t see him eating lunch, we don’t see him on the toilet – we
actually *do* see the “real-worlders” in all of these settings (yes, it is true). That in
itself almost *makes* them as interesting to us as a bona-fide celebrity like Cruise – but
not quite. Celebrity has become that much more in our grasp, on the order of the
promise Lowenthal discussed that if we only knew what Tom ate for breakfast, we
ourselves could become like him. Think what we now know about the cast members
of this show – how much more in our reach is a private life like theirs? The only
missing link here is the talent that Cruise presumably has in addition to his photo-
genic good looks that make him worthy of bona-fide celebrity adulation and status.
But if we *start* with public attention, which becomes most important, perhaps the
talent will develop from the adulation that we acquire simply by receiving this level
of exposure. Or, perhaps, talent or achievement has nothing to do with it – it’s at best a consequence, not a cause, of celebrity spotlight. At least it seems that our student Kelly’s adulation proceeds from a reasoning on this order.

Kelly is a 20-year-old college student from DeKalb, Illinois. A broadcast journalism major, her biggest dream is to be on television. She is an avid viewer of the Real World and has been since its first season, when she was 11 years old. She is enthralled, fascinated with Real World. In her words, she would “give up anything” to be on this show, since “once you’re on it, you’re famous forever.” Now, while this may be true for Real World’s somewhat limited viewership (the MTV audience), it certainly is not true more generally. Yet Kelly does not make this distinction – and indeed, when a colleague of ours teaching at the University of California at San Diego had one of the show’s alumna in her class, the other students did accord her true celebrity status.

Kelly loves the Real World cast of characters because they “have the same conflicts” that she herself does. She mentions Tonya, a current character who, like Kelly, participates in a long-distance relationship. She mentions another character, Kari, who, like everyone Kelly knows, or like many people, “is smart, but not a genius; an athlete, but not a star.” Kari’s dilemmas are ones to which Kelly and her friends easily relate. And they are experienced by a woman who now is “famous forever,” a woman who could be Kelly herself if she gets her demonstration tape made and actually applies to the show (is she afraid of a rejection that will burst forever her dream of going on the show, a rejection almost sure to come given the 10,000-plus applications the Real World/Road Rules producers receive each season?).

Sometimes the Real World does treat serious issues in a thoughtful way. For example, Cara at one point on the recent Real World Chicago talks about her feelings about her weight, after she dissolves into tears when one of the boys in the house alludes to her 7-pound weight gain by pinching her (though she gained 7 pounds while on the show, she remains extremely thin, so the discussion in the house about this issue revolves around questioning how healthy her obsession with weight is given her extreme thinness). At another point, the male African-American character discusses his feelings about racism, and his aversion to participating in a park-district play about a hanging given the history of hanging in the African-American community. Also on the Chicago season, one of the characters experiences severe health problems and sky-high medical debt because of health problems she originally developed while in foster care. As we mentioned, in its San Francisco season, Real World featured a cast member with AIDS who during and following the show became quite well known as a symbol of the AIDS epidemic, and later died a well-publicized death.

Most of the topics treated on a minute-to-minute basis on the show revolve around the cast members’ relationships with each other, and with other friends and partners they have. One could almost call this show a model of relationships for twenty-somethings in the new millennium. Kelly’s explanation of her attraction to the show revolves around the way its characters help her sort out her own relationships by allowing her to see, in intimate, everyday form, the ups and downs of their own relationships with each other and others in their lives.

Another one of our students, a graduate student, is addicted to reality television. He has watched every season of the Real World since it came on, when he was
about 12 years old. A few months ago, he told us, he checked the website group for some “gossip” – it turns out that Elka, an alumna of the *Real World* Boston, who had been brought back for a special show (*Real World Road Rules Challenge* – an offspring of *Real World* but one that in this case used some of the same characters), had been engaged to Walter at the time of the challenge show. Walter was a musician who played in a band in Europe – the two had become engaged after meeting once. Later, he saw this same character on a *Real World* reunion show and learned that she was no longer engaged. Captivated by the story of their romance, he checked the website to garner insider-type gossip as to the real story of their ending.

Why was this story so compelling to our student (presumably a mature, critical viewer, since he is pursuing a PhD)? Of course, he himself is of dating age and much concerned with his own social life. The fact that the show is about “real” people, he claims, makes it intrinsically interesting to him. And the website held the promise of getting “real” information from “insiders,” information that goes beyond what is shown simply on the television shows. This information is prized: it can bring viewers that much closer to the real life stories of the characters they are viewing. And the desire led to real disappointment when he was not privy to any of this good stuff when he did finally log on, however – there just wasn’t any insider gossip that day.

But what is the “real” aspect of the category of the “real” on reality television? Or to put it simply, are reality television shows more “real” than, say, other television fare? In this case, can we say that *Real World* is more real than for example the show *Friends*, a fictional television show, also popular with twenty-somethings and also focused on relationships in that age group? Or even than traditional daytime soaps, a genre whose audience is shrinking, which offer their viewers gossip but with an aura of unreality in contrast to today’s reality offerings? Or more traditionally popular romance novels, or other pieces of popular culture treating relationships and the stuff of everyday life?

Reality television builds on these other, more established genres. One of the striking features of reality television, apparent even to the casual viewer, is how aware most of its “characters” seem to be of the ever-present camera. It is difficult to believe that we are seeing unadulterated, “natural” behavior on these shows. Instead it almost seems as though the characters are imitating other “cool” characters they have watched on “fictional” television. In *Real World* Chicago, for example, the Kyle character plays what seems to be the “Luke Perry” role from *Beverly Hills 90210*, a show he undoubtedly watched in his own pre-teen and teen years. In fact, this resemblance is probably the single most important factor helping Kyle to be selected for the *Real World* cast. Luke Perry himself resembles what has become almost an icon of television teen manhood, dating back to the character of Bud on *Father Knows Best*. Our experience of watching these shows illustrates that the anthropological dictum that the participant observer will be forgotten once he or she is there for long enough is not necessarily the case, certainly not when the observer is a media camera whose presence promises national exposure and consequent celebrity: this inspires one to act like a celebrity, and so media-derived notions of what celebrities do, look like, and say become forces shaping behavior in this case. What makes the phenomenon of reality television and its celebrity-driven nature even more complicated is that it itself begins to influence reality in turn.
The phenomenal popularity of *Real World* and other similar and spin-off shows with the twenty-something audience makes the types of identities modeled on these shows a force in our society, though one whose impact has been little studied. Kelly’s devotion to *Real World* is a phenomenon that merits further investigation. Though it is clear from discussions with our students that they relate to the conflicts the characters on a show like *Real World* face, or that they turn to the shows for ideas about the kinds of similar relationship problems they themselves may be experiencing, what isn’t yet answered is what kinds of models are provided by these shows. A key feature of a show like *Real World* is the extensive editing that must be done given the sheer amount of footage – hours and hours, literally weeks and weeks of it – collected by the ever-present camera on which the show depends. Editing turns this stuff of everyday life into a narrative, or in the case of this show, a complex set of narratives, about particular issues, which viewers are able to follow and interpret. But the editors make the first cut, and direct viewer attention to the issues they deem important (and concomitantly hide other issues determined as less so). What are these issues? Does *Real World* take a particular perspective on issues, and systematically highlight certain issues over others? What of other reality TV shows? As the extensive soap opera literature suggests (Modleski, 1983; Brown, 1994; Liebes and Livingstone, 1994; Baym, 2000), these questions can be answered with interpretive analysis of the texts in question.

Here we argue that the difference between reality television shows and other genres is precisely the particular notion of celebrity, which we call lottery celebrity, which these shows offer. The idea that the viewer herself could easily be the person on this show is what makes his or her identification with the trials and experiences of the “characters” on these shows fundamentally different in type from the kinds of identifications viewers have been shown to make with other genres (Livingstone, 1990; Press, 1991; Baym, 2000). It gives the “wish” or yearning to be on the show a particularly poignant quality, that encourages a closer kind of identification than viewers make with other television characters. While Modleski (1983) argued that female viewers of daytime soaps were drawn into identification with characters in these texts because their rhythm closely mimicked the pace of life for housewives in the home, we argue something different: that the close identification with ordinary people who have become “celebrities” due to the lottery of reality television leads viewers actually to devalue the day-to-day moments of their own lives which do not have celebrity status, and to yearn – sometimes quite consciously – for the fundamental change that will elevate them to the level of “celebrity,” with its concomitant glamour, alleged riches, and enviability. As celebrity becomes more and more intertwined with the image of ordinary people, our yearnings for celebrity become a phenomenon even more complicated than they were in Hollywood’s golden era. Kelly wants to be discovered, and become famous, for being Kelly, nothing more – yet this is something she wants in a tangible way that affects her daily life and plans. In Kelly’s case, while she does make half-hearted plans for her future (by going through the motions of journalism school, and thinking vaguely about what her future will be), her passion and dreams focus on becoming famous through participation in a reality television show. This is the stuff of her fantasies. When one talks with her, one notices an overall change in her expression and language when the conversation turns to her real interest – the *Real World*. While this was always true...
with fans of other types of media, we argue that the possibility – though slight – that Kelly could win this lottery, and actually become a participant in this show, intensifies the move for her into this fantasy, and away from the more mundane elements of her everyday life. Reality television, by elevating everyday life to celebrity status, ironically makes everyday life that much more difficult to experience and truly value. This, we argue, is the inherent paradox of this genre.

In part, the rise of reality television shows are part of a series of other trends – the rise of celebrity academics, for example – which indicate a trend toward public life, and perhaps a decline in the notion and value of “private” life, which we argue is truly new in this media age. Where once young people would have been wary of choosing a path that led them to too public a career, and too broad an involvement with celebrity and its attendant publicity, now they seek this, for reasons that Bellah et al. hint at (1985). There is great comfort in knowing that your own problems are the same as those of the others you witness (on reality television, for example). And where else can you garner that reassurance? In fact, should you become one of the “American Idols” whose private lives become the object of intense fascination, there is reassurance in knowing that others will look to your own private dilemmas and crises for guidance in interpreting, and living, their own. If as some have argued there are no longer any moral “rules” to guide our private (and indeed, often our public) behavior, one can only aspire to become in essence a “prototype” for others, as the Real World contestants become, or as do others whom we witness at that level of intimacy. In this way “lottery celebrity” is a kind of insurance not only against anonymity, and therefore not mattering in a broader sense, but also against moral culpability.

When Cara on the Real World was found morally wanting – when she refused to visit a sick member in the hospital, and when she consistently refused to wash the dishes or pitch in with the housework – she was later excused from this fault because she revealed her own personal problems and characteristics that led her to be unable to perform these social services, to conform to the generally accepted image of the “nice person.” Others watching this show can either relate to her failings, and find comfort in sharing them and in her attempted explanations for them, or can feel superior to her due to their own abilities to transcend these problems. The show, therefore, can serve as reassurance that one’s private life and qualities are “OK,” not abnormal, not morally deficient, not grossly out of the ordinary. Achieving lottery celebrity would take this reassurance one step further – once one was known for whatever one’s particular personal qualities might be, they begin to define what is “real,” even “prestigious,” as others respond to these qualities more due to their presentation as “celebratory” rather than as qualities owned by an ordinary person and therefore to be judged accordingly. As Goode’s generally accepted hierarchies become ever more difficult to pin down in a postmodern society, one almost defined by flux and ever-changing values and conditions, celebrity status becomes a kind of wishful insurance against failing to measure up, to superior or even normal status. And in fact this begins to help us understand the popularity of “reality,” as sold on television, in an age in which reality itself becomes increasingly difficult to pin down and define – and it explains the popularity of celebrity itself as a mechanism for selling ideas and opinions that one might otherwise be unable to evaluate or even understand.
References


Further Reading

INTRODUCTION

According to proponents of the culture of poverty, culture has a causal connection to non-mainstream or pathological behavior. Contemporary cultural scholars now prefer to view culture as constitutive of a social actor’s search for meaning. If the culture-of-poverty theorists’ conception is continuous with that of their direct antecedents, theorists of differential association and of deviant subcultures, by contrast, this chapter builds on the recent work of scholars who embrace a role for culture that is antithetical to the culture of poverty’s highly deterministic approach.

Here I will employ a view of culture as a meaning-making endeavor in an analysis of the phenomenon of single motherhood among poor women. There is no denying that single motherhood offers a provocative case study for a feminist sociologist interested in culture, class, and the family. Over five decades, non-marital childbearing, with its well-documented links to inequality, have become the subjects of intense social research and heated public debate. Quantitative scholars focus almost exclusively on the structural determinants of single motherhood such as state transfer payments, educational attainment, women’s access to birth control, family structure, and poverty. One of the few “cultural” examinations of single motherhood came in the form of the Moynihan Report. The 1965 publication of the Moynihan Report introduced single parenthood — and specifically the phenomenon of female-headed households — to Americans as a crisis facing the African-American community (Moynihan, 1965). But in the 40 years since black single mothers took center stage in a national conversation about welfare and poverty, general trends for blacks now mirror the ones for whites. Two out of three black births are to unmarried black women, and one out four white births are to white unmarried women.

Moynihan’s focus on black families may not have stood the test of time, but his interest in single parenthood proved prescient. Indeed, his use of the culture of
poverty to explain welfare dependency continues to draw adherents. Proponents of the “culture of poverty” contend that nonmarital childbearing and a host of other pathological behaviors result as an adaptive response to material deprivation, and thus culture explains the poor economic performance of marginalized groups. Critics of the culture of poverty – within poverty research circles – responded by abandoning the use of culture in their analysis. They ceded culture to the conservatives and charged that cultural explanations blame the victim and ignore more important structural factors such as inequality, discrimination, and segregation that disadvantage groups. At the moment policymakers and pundits waged their culture war against poverty, more complex views of culture came to be a taboo subject among scholars interested in inequality and patterns of family formation (Pagnini and Morgan, 1996).

However, a few scholars continued to explore the role of class in the intimate domains of domestic and family life. Melvin Kohn, one of the foremost contributors to our knowledge of the role of social class in childrearing, spent 40 years studying the psychological consequences of social class and its impact on family life (Kohn, 1959, 1963). Lillian Rubin, in her classic study of working-class family life, documents that motherhood overshadows marriage (and work) as the core social identity for working-class women. Among upper-class women, a wife’s connection to her husband’s career may enhance a woman’s social esteem. Because working-class husbands (and wives) have jobs and do work, rather than careers or professions, working-class women seek to build social esteem and worth around their identities as mothers. Annette Lareau’s research on childrearing finds that class contours the experience of family life for middle-class and working- and lower-class families in particular ways. Among working and poor families, parents rely on a strategy of natural growth, in other words, providing the conditions under which children can grow, but leaving leisure activities to themselves. By contrast, middle-class parents engage in concerted cultivation by attempting to foster children’s talents through organized leisure activities and extensive reasoning.

In my first book, Working-Class Heroes, I examine the role of social class in how working- and lower-middle-class women create meaning and order in their lives through household displays. I argue that women use the immaculate appearance of their homes and their children to reinforce moral boundaries between the decent and indecent, and good and bad wives and mothers, as part of a class-based social performance that dramatizes a woman’s social worth. For my current research with Kathryn Edin, I build on the earlier ethnography in a working- and lower-middle class community to explore notions of respectability and social identity for low-income single mothers. This new project considers the social meaning of motherhood for economically disadvantaged women in a way that moves beyond the monolithic, adaptive view of culture. Over a period of five years, Edin, a team of research assistants, and I interviewed 162 African-American, white, and Puerto Rican low-income single mothers in Camden, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, about the meaning of motherhood. In these conversations, women explained how motherhood is a meaning-making endeavor that brings purpose, validation, love, and order into their lives.

These women clearly understood that poverty creates obstacles and disadvantages for raising children. While middle-class observers focus on what poor mothers fail to do, these women take pride in what they could do for their children in the face of
economic hardship. Developing a culturally driven view of motherhood among low-income teenagers and single mothers creates the possibility of interpreting behavior as expressive and purposeful rather than opportunistic and predetermined. All mothers want their children to be healthy, happy, safe, and successful. All women seek love, purpose, and meaning in raising their families. However, a mother’s social and material circumstances might lead women to emphasize different facets of mothering. Upper-class mothers do not find it very difficult to achieve the generic prerequisites of childrearing such as clothing, feeding, and keeping their children healthy and safe. In sharp contrast, poor women place a higher emphasis on hygiene, cleanliness, and “being there” or “sticking it out” for their children because lower-class mothers’ circumstances do not allow them to take such issues for granted (Lareau, 2002, 2003; Edin and Kefalas, forthcoming). In essence, class might structure the path women choose to the fulfillment and pleasures of motherhood, and the primordial bonds of love and connection remain the shared goal of all mothering. As Jessica Benjamin writes, one of the simplest and earliest pleasures of motherhood is “mutual recognition.” For “the mother who feels recognized by her baby is not simply projecting her own feelings into her child…She is also linking the newborn’s past, inside her, with his future, out of her, as a separate person” (Benjamin, 1988: 23).

Evolving Social Understandings of Motherhood

The social meaning of motherhood has evolved through time. Cultural sociologist Sharon Hays writes that when she tells audiences that the rules of “good mothering” are part of a historically constructed ideology she reports people are either “highly offended” or “deeply appreciative of what I have to say.” Hays suggests her work elicits such strong reactions because most people can say that “they have been mothered, they are mothers, they know mothers, or at least that they think they know what it means to be a mother or mothered,” and they remain convinced that the core values of motherhood “are sacred, inviolable, or at least commonsensical and that they follow from the natural propensities of mothers or the absolute needs of children” (Hays, 1996: 5).

Viviana Zelizer’s history of the social meaning of children demonstrates why we need to be careful when making claims about the “natural propensities of mothers” and “the absolute needs of children.” During the Middle Ages in Europe, adults found “children demonic, animalistic, ill-formed, and physically fragile.” Many educators of the time reminded parents of the child’s natural propensity for evil, regularly picturing children, for example, as “gluttonous animals or as demons who attempted to drain their mothers’ lifeblood” as they nursed (Hays, 1996: 22; Hunt, 1970; Badinter, 1981). Educators may no longer see children as demons, but in most cultures young children continue to be seen as economic actors expected to contribute to the household. “Children as young as two may be encouraged to take on simple tasks and by age six are considered able, for instance, to take full responsibility for the care of their younger siblings, buy and sell at market, milk cows, carry wood, clean house, fetch water and prepare meals” (Hays, 1996: 20). Margaret Mead observes, “Primitive materials give no support to the theory that there is a ‘natural’ connection between the conditions of human gestation and delivery and
appropriate cultural practices… [The] establishment of permanent nurturing ties between a woman and the child she bears… is dependent upon cultural patterning” (Mead, 1962: 54). In eighteenth-century rural America, the birth of a child was “welcomed as the arrival of a future laborer and as security for parents in later life” (Hays, 1996: 5). For over one hundred years in American life, parents saw no contradiction between appropriate childrearing and viewing one’s child as an economic resource.

By the mid-nineteenth century, concern had shifted “to children’s education as the determinant of future marketplace worth” and the view that childhood was a special period of life first took hold among middle-class, urban families. In time, urban and elite families came to abandon the view of a child as merely “insurance for old-age.” Instead the middle-class father “began insuring his own life and setting up other financial arrangements such as trust and endowments, to protect the unproductive child.” Viviana Zelizer notes, “the emergence of the economically worthless but emotionally priceless child – a value so dominant that most of us take to be natural and preordained – is actually an artifact of family life within the modern era.” She continues, “The expulsion of children from the cash nexus at the end of the nineteenth century was part of a cultural process of the ‘sacralization’ of children’s lives.” Zelizer’s term “sacralization”

is used in the sense of objects being invested with sentimental or religious meaning. And in an increasingly commercialized world, children were reserved a separate noncommercial place. Only mercenary or insensitive parents violated the boundary by accepting the wages or labor contributions of a useful child. Properly loved children, regardless of their family’s social class, belonged in a domesticated, nonproductive world of lessons, games, and token money.

The material and social conditions of working-class and poor families delayed the widespread acceptance of the “sacralization” of childhood. At its very inception, the “priceless” child was a class-bound bourgeois phenomenon (Zelizer, 1985: 5). America’s growing industrial complex meant that the economic value of the working-class child increased, rather than decreased in the nineteenth century. Asking a family to give up a child’s labor when it was so profitable was a particular hardship to working-class families often struggling to make ends meet. Indulging the impulse to view children as “priceless” was a costly proposition that met widespread opposition from many segments of society. “In time, the creation of child labor laws and state supported efforts calling for compulsory education dissolved the most obvious class differences.” By the 1930s, lower-class children joined their middle-class counterparts in a new non-productive world of childhood, a world in which the sanctity and emotional value of a child made child labor taboo (Zelizer, 1985: 5).

Rejoicing in the “priceless” child went hand in hand with another bourgeois phenomenon of the nineteenth century, the notion that a woman’s claim to moral superiority made her uniquely qualified to manage the domestic realm of a household. The “priceless” child and “the cult of domesticity” reinforced one another as these new social and cultural trends “raised domesticity and childrearing to a new higher level of responsibility” (ibid.). Among the elite segments of society, widespread adherence to a “cult of domesticity” fueled the belief in the morally sacred home and the amoral public sphere. Within these values of home and family, forged
by the elite classes, appropriate mothering and childrearing urged mothers to stay at home with their children, while men were expected to work in the paid labor force to provide economically for their wives and children. “The gendered division of labor and the widespread view that childrearing was a special calling for women intensified at the turn of the century, spreading (in ideal if not always in practice) to the working class. . . . The creation of the family wage – a salary which would support a male wage earner and his dependent family – in the early twentieth century, was partly intended to implement the ‘cult of true womanhood’ and ‘true childhood’ among the working class.” (Zelizer, 1985: 9)

Working-class and poor women have never taken for granted that they could separate the inner sanctum of the family from pernicious influence of outside forces like the market or the state. In the antebellum era, enslaved African-American women endured coerced pregnancies and the human-selling practices of slave owners. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, white urban immigrant women saw their children “being targeted and taken by child rescue charities” because progressive era activists believed immigrant women did not share their middle-class counterparts understanding of good mothering. Indeed proponents of Mother’s Aid (the forerunner of welfare and Temporary Aid to Needy Families) and the settlement house movement believed these interventions would encourage appropriate ideologies about motherhood (Gordon, 1994).

The settlement house movement was permeated with a maternalism borne out of the privileges of class. At the core of the Mothers’ Aid movement was the ideal that good mothers should devote themselves fully to the care and upbringing of their children. Among poor women, for whom paid labor was necessary for survival, such standards of appropriate mothering remained elusive. Aid programs would never provide enough to live on and among the less privileged segments of the population, mothers’ paid labor (and the labor of their children) came about because of economic necessity. Ironically enough, for centuries generations of poor mothers’ paid work has meant caring for the children of upper-class women, the very same women who would later come to view these poor women as such problematic mothers.

**Motherhood in a feminist age**

The power of maternalism, or its modern-day variant, Hays’s “ideology of intensive mothering,” comes out most clearly against the backdrop of the 1950s when “momism” reigned supreme. “It was a time when far fewer mothers of young children worked in the paid labor force than do today, more families than ever before were able to realize the middle-class family ideal, and mothers’ intense emotional attachment and moral commitment to their children seemed less contradictory” (Hays, 1996: 3). During the same period when intensive mothering may have achieved its peak, the stigma of illegitimacy forced white unmarried mothers to relinquish their children to more “appropriate” parents through adoption and African-Americans who bore children out of wedlock were stereotyped as excessively fertile and widely blamed for the pathology of black America.

When middle-class feminists in the 1970s demanded equal opportunities for education and work, they seemed to reject the values of the domestic life as a
woman’s higher calling. Middle-class (white) feminists wanted to share power with middle- and upper-class men. Leaders of the feminist movement seemed to forget that working-class women had always worked and didn’t see working on a factory assembly line as a road to liberation. Work as economic necessity – and without affordable and reliable child-care and help at home – represented a stressful proposition. By the 1950s, a time when the embourgeoisement of working-class families was at its peak, working-class women had embraced – in principle, at least – the cult of domesticity and the notion of the priceless child. Working-class women wanted to be home with their children (or at the very least, have the luxury of making the choice). Indeed, working-class men and women viewed a husband’s ability to keep his wife at home as a badge of respectability and status, not a form of oppression (see Rubin, 1976; Collins, 1990; and Kefalas, 2003).

CLASS AND MOTHERHOOD

Proponents of the culture of poverty contend the behaviors of the poor (namely teenage and single motherhood) and the distinctive system of values associated with lower-class populations create poverty. After all, the decision to bring a child into the world when one is unmarried, too young, and too poor results from one’s failure to delay gratification and reproduces the pathological matriarchal family structure. Ultimately, single mothers reject mainstream values concerning marriage and family and, in the view of conservative scholars such as Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead, choose dependency on the state over a husband.

The public’s hand wringing over the crisis of single motherhood is more than just mere moral indignation. There is no denying that single parenthood (and its most typical variant – single motherhood) hurts kids (MacLanahan and Sandefur, 1994). But in the almost four decades since the publication of the Moynihan Report, liberal scholars have shied away from discussions of poverty and culture. Today when social scientists study the “causes” of single motherhood, they overwhelmingly focus on structural analyses of welfare policy, family structure, and economics. Even though social scientists say little about culture and poverty, the culture of poverty’s influence extends far beyond academe. Currently “cultural” remedies for poverty such as marriage promotion are the cornerstones of welfare reform legislation. Existing welfare policy rewards women who successfully regulate their fertility and avoid abortions, and “sanctions” the ones who do not (Hays, 2003). Family “caps” in states such as New Jersey mean that children conceived while their families receive welfare will not qualify for additional benefits. Policymakers and taxpayers support these policies because most Americans believe that low-income single women have children “in a twisted competition with their peers to gain status, because they have insufficient knowledge or access to birth control, or so they can milk the welfare system” (Edin and Kefalas, forthcoming). Middle-class observers assume children born to economically marginalized women are impediments to a better life. However, such notions of opportunity and mobility are utterly bound up in the privilege and affluence of middle- and upper-middle-class existence. The ideologies of “intensive mothering” and “the priceless child” may be recognizable to most American women but the economic realities of lower- and upper-class lives contour how women actualize their orientations to mothering.
MIDDLE-VERSUS LOWER-CLASS MOTHERING

Upper- and middle-class women often delay childbearing until their thirties and forties when they have established their careers, married, and achieved economic security. In contrast, low-income women are blocked from the careers and educational opportunities that occupy their more affluent counterparts’ young adult-hoods. Elites live lives in which delaying childbearing is a rational strategy. Among economically disadvantaged women, for whom marriage to the men of their communities promises limited social status and economic security, delaying childbearing means risking having no children at all. As Christopher Jencks observes in a piece for the American Prospect, “The privileged segments of society rarely contemplate how low-income women might have to choose between accepting assistance or dying childless” (Jencks, 1995).

Among the elites, the gendered division of labor is an ideological compulsion demanding the separation of the morally sacred private sphere (the home) and the amoral public sphere (the marketplace and society). In the words of sociologist Sharon Hays (1996: 5), the child-centered, emotionally absorbing labor required of “intensive mothering” is incompatible with the self-interested market forces that dictate participation in the paid labor force. However, the cultural contradiction of motherhood is, at its core, a fundamentally bourgeois dilemma. In point of fact, working-class and poor women have been granted little separation of the private sphere of family and home. For the less privileged segments of the population, work is a necessity not a choice.

Welfare, educational institutions, and child welfare – institutions created and maintained by middle-class reformers – sought to protect families by imposing middle-class values on the “less fortunate.” Such institutions were permeated with a maternalism borne out of the privileges of class. Since the inception of Mother’s Aid at the start of the twentieth century, the morality of working-class and poor women as “good mothers” has been suspect. Welfare came into existence to improve the lives of women and children, but since the days of the Progressive Era, middle-class observers have been deeply troubled about the moral conduct of these wards of the state. Today welfare authorities, policymakers, and case workers continue to hope that the state’s interventions on behalf of poor families will encourage appropriate – that is, more middle class – values among the poor.

It is no secret that single motherhood has been on the rise for over a half a century. In 1940, only 4 percent of births occurred to unmarried women. By 1995, a third of all births were to unmarried women. Many Americans applaud the social and economic transformations that allow women to bear children regardless of their marital status. At the same time, others lament the moral breakdown of the traditional family and hold up single motherhood as proof of society’s decline. Regardless of one’s take on the moral debate, the work of sociologists suggests that single parenthood should be a cause for concern given the grave risks facing the children living with single parents. MacLanahan and Sandefur find that children living in single-parent households are more likely to grow up in poverty (50 percent of female-headed households live at or below the poverty line), not attend college, drop out of high school, be arrested, spend time in foster care, and become teenage parents.
Society’s high standards of mothering require vast economic, social, and psychic resources, and even the most privileged women in our society find it difficult to achieve these standards. How then do class and poverty figure into the equation? Poor, uneducated, criminal, welfare-reliant, and unmarried women appear doomed to fail as mothers under the standards of appropriate mothering produced by the middle and upper classes. While women are expected to become mothers, society questions the legitimacy of certain classes and categories of women’s claims to motherhood. (Solinger, 2000)

**Single Mothers Explain the Meaning of Motherhood**

To create a cultural snapshot of how lower-income single women construct the social meaning of motherhood, noted poverty and welfare scholar Kathryn Edin and I interviewed low-income women about the role children play in their lives and what being a good mother means to them. The women Edin and I spoke to recognize and revere the society’s institutionalized norms of mothering; it is just that the economic circumstances of their lives make it difficult (if not impossible) to enact those strategies. A cultural analysis of mothering that considers the role of class sets the stage for an understanding of single motherhood that moves beyond the culture of poverty model. Culture should be seen as a system of meaning that orients action and creates a texture to human experience. Through a cultural analysis of the narratives low-income single women use to explain how motherhood has changed their lives, it is possible to see how poor women and teenagers may be drawn to motherhood, not simply pushed by social structures beyond their control. It is not that disadvantaged populations are trapped in an all-encompassing monolithic subculture that dictates human action. Impoverished young women often choose motherhood not out of opportunism, or lack of discipline, or resignation, but rather as an affirmation of their own faith, caring, and responsibility to others. When poor women have the chance to talk about what mothering does for them, and what they do as mothers, one learns that the values low-income women seek through mothering transcend the hardships of poverty and economic deprivation.

Among the poor women Edin and I came to know, they most often describe their lives prior to motherhood as spinning out of control. Up until this point, they recall lives marred by tumultuous home lives, abusive or absent parents, disappointments in school, self-destructive peers and self-made chaos. The chaos then might take a variety of forms: running the streets, relationships with abusive romantic partners, substance abuse, depression, and what the women might even describe as their own selfishness in the form of “only thinking of themselves” or “living for the moment.” While young women readily admit their self-destructive behavior might have led to how they “end up pregnant,” the overwhelming majority of women believe steadfastly that motherhood embodies a shiny, new possibility, not an obstacle to advancement. Within the heroic struggle to be a good mother, a woman may raise both her child and herself by returning to school, getting a job, and just getting up in the morning.

When 15-year-old Destiny, a cherubic teenager with Rubenesque features and breathtaking blonde hair that falls to the middle of her back, discusses her life as a
mother, she invokes a religious fatalism to explain how nine-month-old Serena and her baby’s father, Christian, have, for a moment at least, provided her life with purpose and direction. She declares having a child at fourteen may be “a blessing.” “You know, maybe God gave [a baby] to you so you could calm down. You know, God chose you to have a baby so you could let yourself calm down. To stop being what you are to be something better. I felt that God let me to be with Christian to change, to get back to school, to calm down so I wouldn’t be hurt. That’s what I feel.”

On the surface, such cavalier fatalism might send shivers down the back of any middle-class reader imagining how a young woman, barely more than a child herself, would bring an innocent baby into the world to make the young mother’s life better. Such selfishness seems to violate the very definition of a good mother. And yet, in Destiny’s account I argue there is a heroic hopefulness and optimism that unites all women who become mothers. The irrationality is no different than the sort of fevered expectations that push upper-class women to define successful childrearing in terms of their child’s achievements and accomplishments. Destiny is more truthful and frank than the upper-class women who proclaim that the sacrifices they make for their children lead them to expect nothing in return. But, what does Destiny seek in her child: A love that will give her the strength to overcome the very real dangers of drugs, violence, and despair in her tough Philadelphia neighborhood. Does Destiny seek meaning and order in her life in her role as a mother? Destiny’s counterparts, the privileged young women living in Philadelphia’s affluent suburbs, struggle to gain purpose in their lives as well – even if they do not face the identical hurdles Destiny does. Moreover, like Destiny, they will stumble on that path to purpose, meaning, and order into their lives. However, rather than choosing young motherhood as a way to claim control and purpose, these more socially privileged women’s missteps might lead them to eating disorders or ecstasy, the “social ills” that plague the young and affluent. But, what often gets lost in the moralistic debates about teenage motherhood is that young women such as Destiny hope to create something profound and good in motherhood.

Even though the psychic healing power of motherhood does not always reform a young woman who has lost her way, the conviction that motherhood may be a do-it-yourself rehab from drugs and alcohol is a theme that came up frequently in conversations with poor mothers. Cheyenne, a 25-year-old mother of two, lives in the white section of Philadelphia’s Frankford neighborhood. Cheyenne is in the process of regaining custody of her oldest daughter who is being raised by Cheyenne’s mom, Sally. Drugs and alcohol started to take over Cheyenne’s life when she was still in high school. Even though Cheyenne says she is “clean and straight” now, on the night she and her then boyfriend decided to have a child together she sheepishly admits, “We were so high.” In a sense, Cheyenne’s first attempt at motherhood was a desperate effort to save herself and her boyfriend. Cheyenne explains matter-of-factly, “My boyfriend was a drug addict. We thought this baby was going to be our savior. This baby was it, you know, we were gonna be okay. We were in love, we’re gonna have a baby, this is gonna be great.” But drugs and self-destruction continued to consume Cheyenne’s life, and her daughter’s father soon walked out of her life.

Cheyenne’s mom eventually gained full custody of Cheyenne’s oldest daughter Colleen. When Cheyenne discovered she was pregnant again, her mother cautiously
supported the desire to continue with the pregnancy for two reasons. First, both Cheyenne and her mother believe abortion is morally wrong and, second, both women hoped that the new pregnancy might be Cheyenne’s redemption. Cheyenne now says the birth of her second daughter, whom she named Danielle, inspired her to make being a good mother the focus of her life. “I was sick of not having money and living on the street, nothing to show for my whole entire life. My oldest was really a cranky baby. We really had a hard time bonding. With Danielle, it was instant love. That kid was my whole world. She was such a happy baby and a good baby. It was easy giving her love.” Stability, Cheyenne insists, comes from being a mother. “I like the stability [being a mom] gives me, it’s very routine. I like the rewards, the stuff they make for me to have. I’m so proud. Well, yeah, this is gonna be this year’s wall [for their prizes and awards from school and assorted artwork] [pointing to the one empty corner of wall in the front room]. If I had the money, every one would be in frame.” Cheyenne beams as she promises that by end of the school year her front room will look like a doctor’s office because prizes, diplomas, and awards will cover the wall.

Cheyenne insists her children serve as an impetus to do better, to work harder, to want more, and she basks in the reflected glory of their accomplishments because a child’s success is a mother’s success as well. The middle-class observer may be troubled by the references to drugs and overcoming addiction. But all mothers know a connection to a child has the potential of giving parents superhuman powers. A bond of love to a child makes us behave in ways that would be impossible in other contexts. Without exception, parents hope that their children will outlive them. Women freely risk their lives to give birth to their children. Parents willingly and happily sacrifice so that their children can have more than their parents have achieved. As a society, we rarely consider the extraordinary power of the love of our children to transform self-interested, selfish, and self-loving human beings into creatures who would willingly lay down their lives to protect our offspring. In Cheyenne’s story there is an unsettling recognition of the powerful possibilities for heroism to be found in children and motherhood. Cheyenne believes she lacks the fortitude to recover from the sadness and self-destruction of her life on her own. It is Cheyenne’s horrible despair that leads her to see motherhood and her daughters as a potential source for the power and purpose she needs to create meaning and order in her life.

One of the other striking findings from this research is that childbearing serves as a validation for poor women who have not succeeded in other domains. Many young mothers find that parenting is something they are good at, and good parenting is a dramatic presentation of their social worth. Marilyn, a 24-year-old mother in South Philadelphia says, “When you have a baby, people don’t realize you’re raising, not only the body, but the mind. The psychology, the mentality, the emotions, you’re raising all that. You’re actually teaching another person how to speak English, speak the language…. I mean to know that I brought this person into the world and they didn’t know anything and now I’m teaching and they’re learning. That was a great feeling, just their love to me.” The way a mother dresses the child is of special salience within these social milieus, as poor mothers often feel under the watchful eye of the child welfare authorities, and fear disgruntled fathers, meddling neighbors, or vindictive kin who will claim abuse or neglect. A well-dressed child makes a shabbily-dressed mother look good, and a child swathed in
layers of warm clothing, even in a spring thaw, indicates a caring, competent, and responsible adult. Mothers also take special pride in keeping their children with them, rather than allowing them to play unattended or leaving them with just anybody who wants to babysit.

When we asked women what they thought being a good mother meant and what they could provide their children, the answers provocatively suggest how class, not the goals social actors strive to achieve, alters the path. The heroic struggle of motherhood comes out most clearly against the answer women offer to the question of “What is a good mother?” Overwhelmingly women talk about the importance of “being there” for one’s children. Being there is multilayered in its meaning. First, it refers to the choice to bear a child in less than ideal circumstances. The women speak of the “courage” of being willing to deal with the pressures of an unplanned pregnancy and not consider abortion or “giving a baby away” to relatives to care for it. Being there also means giving one’s life over to the hard work and sacrifice of motherhood. On one level this means, no longer spending free time with friends or “running the streets.” Drugs, alcohol and running off with any guy are the illicit pleasures of the irresponsible and shiftless. When a woman gives up the wild life for a child, she acts in the best interest of her child by devoting her time and energy to caring for her family. A woman who attempts to put aside her troubles as she struggles to overcome self-destruction and selfishness (even if the recovery is only temporary) becomes, in that moment, a good, decent woman.

The dreary day-to-day drudgery of caring for children is a sacrifice women regularly claim as evidence of their status as good and dutiful mothers. A good mother must spend her time with her child and it is unacceptable to leave a baby with just anyone so a mother can hang out with friends. A good mother cannot leave the care of her child to others who are not as responsible and diligent. The women we spoke to believe, without exception, that a mother is the best person to care for her children. Most women allow a weekend night to spend time with girlfriends, but children and men are often incompatible pursuits for a single mother who is truly putting her children’s interests first. Romantic relationships can be disruptive for families, as a woman’s romantic attention to a man means precious time and energy not available to children.

Nurturing and teaching your children also represents “being there.” A mother ought to be a teacher who guides a child through the world. A mother who is present and involved can help ensure a child will not go down a dangerous path. After all, for the women we interviewed, there is no greater sin than allowing your children to run wild. The absence of proper adult supervision places a child in harm’s way; this is particularly true in the toughest neighborhoods of Philadelphia and Camden.

Finally, being there refers to holding on to one’s children in spite of adversity. As one mother explained, “no matter how tough the going gets, just hang in there with them.” For women who regularly see the children of their communities lost to poverty, violence, crime, incarceration, and drugs, for women who regularly find their own families threatened by these same forces coupled with the intrusive role of welfare and child protective services, there can be no denying the incredible fragility of families. Because it is so easy to lose your children in such social contexts, a mother’s ability to “hold on” and “be there” – in spite of the hardships and dangers – embodies the definition of a good mother.
CONCLUSION

In recent years, the social structures and privilege that once protected many white, upper-class women have eroded. Now rising divorce rates, increasing numbers of women in the paid labor force, and declining real wages have pulled more and more mothers of young children into the labor force. Women of all racial and class backgrounds find themselves making tough choices about motherhood and children.

Upper-class and middle-class women still believe they can balance work and family since they can afford “help” in the form of quality day care, grocery delivery services, nannies, housekeepers, second cars, and restaurant takeout. Indeed, upper- and middle-class women have the sorts of professional class careers where their high incomes, flexible hours and self-directed work, and, of course, the status and social esteem of their work, make the pleasures and pulls of work and family a balancing act between two contradictory yet fundamentally satisfying roles. Poor and working-class women have no such delusions about the role of work in their lives. Working a line at the egg factory, data process work for a large insurance company, cleaning people’s houses for $9 per hour, or running the checkout at Wal-Mart would not be described by anyone as economically or psychically rewarding. There is no need for a balancing act since the most important and satisfying role in your life is that of mother to your children. Work is a necessary evil that makes it possible to raise your kids, and working-class and poor women want jobs that pay well so they can get home and be with their families.

But in the struggle to raise children in the toughest neighborhoods of Philadelphia and Camden, women focus on the joys of spending time with their children and revel in the pleasures of watching their children grow and learn. While upper-class mothers have the luxury of engaging in concerted cultivation to manage their children’s leisure activities as they develop their children’s talents, lower-class mothers find that the material circumstances of their lives compel them to focus their attention on the generic concerns of mothering – keeping their children clothed, fed, and safe. While class alters the approaches to mothering, more general orientations to children and mothering remain similar.

The low-income women Edin and I interviewed view motherhood as the focal point of their lives. They pursue motherhood – in the face of poverty and welfare – because children are immensely valuable. In their capacity as mothers, children give women validation, purpose, and maybe most surprisingly order. Clearly, women recognize the obstacles they will face as mothers, but they choose motherhood, in spite of the struggles, because children are the best thing a woman can do with her life. A good mother may revel in her accomplishments when she walks down the street accompanied by her well-dressed and well-behaved offspring. A baby wearing a clean, new outfit with matching shoes transforms the poorly dressed woman into a decent and respectable mother for all the world to see. Poverty and past sins become irrelevant in this socially rewarding identity as the good mother. A woman who can be there for her family, in the face of adversity, may claim that she has succeeded as a mother. Good mothering can be found in the determination of loving your children, teaching your children, protecting your children, and “being there” for your children. A mother does not fail if her daughter “comes out” pregnant before leaving high school or her son deals drugs and finds himself in jail. A mother does not even
fail if she is on welfare or falls prey to bad men and bad choices. It is foolish to think that the destruction and devastation of the ghetto will not touch you and your family. Instead women understand that good mothering means doing your best and always fighting for your kids, no matter what happens and how tough things get. A women’s wealth is her children; there is no greater accomplishment, no more important job, no stronger bond, and no more precious asset.

To revise our reviled image of single mothers, one must rethink a flawed and unclassed conception of motherhood. Class and material circumstances “structure” the values and elements social actors choose to emphasize and prioritize in cultural terms. Power and privilege grant certain groups more legitimacy to the values and meanings they utilize. Everyone wants to be a good mother, and the definition of a good mother shares broad overarching elements of raising happy, healthy, children who are loved and cared for. However, class plays a subtle, yet important, role in how these meanings get enacted. But there can be no doubt that all women seek meaning in the bonds of love to their children. The culture of poverty theorists fail to explain the problem of single motherhood among the poor, because the ideologies of appropriate mothering are seen through the hegemonic perspective of the dominant classes. Bourgeois notions of parenting and domestic life dictate “socially acceptable” understandings of appropriate childrearing. Moreover the pathological view of single motherhood fails because it denies lower-income people agency and does not fully recognize the lived experiences of the poor. It makes little sense to blame the victim when we understand human behavior as meaningful rather than opportunis-tic. Motherhood is an expressive endeavor, not an instrumental one and the way to fix the “social pathology” of the poor is to provide the structural and institutional resources to achieve “valued” goals for education, marriage, and work. Throwing poor women off welfare, sanctions, family caps, marriage reform, and waging a cultural war against the poor’s bad values cannot and will not stop any women from seeking purpose, meaning, and love in the experience of motherhood. Ultimately, the culture of motherhood is not causal but constitutive, not pathological but affirming (based on comments from M. Jacobs, May 23, 2003).

References

Benjamin, J. (1988) *Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domina-


IV

Identity and Difference
INTRODUCTION

Can we understand class without understanding its cultural dimensions, and can we understand culture without understanding its class dimensions? How are appropriately expanded conceptions of class and culture mutually constitutive?

“Class” and “culture” are concepts that are each of central importance in debates over understanding contemporary society. For that reason, the appropriate definition of these terms is, in the words of the social philosopher Steven Lukes, an “essentially contested” topic (Lukes, 1974: 9). There is no single, correct definition of these terms, just a variety of competing, often politically charged, definitions – especially in the case of “class.” We do not believe it is useful here to select a single, narrow definition of each term since to do so will usually have major implications for the conclusions that emerge in some of the key debates. For example, it is too easy to focus on a narrow definition of “class” as, say, an oversimplified relation to the means of production and to then proclaim that class analysis has lost its relevance for enabling us to understand contemporary society. Other definitions of class, as for example involving groupings based on income level or on the ownership of stocks, would, as we will argue, likely lead to a different conclusion about the relevance of class. Still, there is no space here to provide an exhaustive catalogue of the uses and definitions of “class” and “culture” in contemporary scholarship. So instead, we focus here on a few of the most salient.

Although we use “class” in several senses here, we try to ensure that for any specific use of the term the particular sense being drawn upon is clear. In fact, our various uses of the term “class” are broadly linked, since they all refer to groupings based on one or more economic criteria. Thus we use “class” to refer to objective position in the occupational/work structure; to refer to objective position based on income level or homeownership or neighborhood of residence or some combination of the ownership of these and other major consumer items; to refer to objective ownership or control of productive assets such as factories or office buildings; to
refer to ownership of such tradable financial assets as stocks and bonds; and to refer
to the way people (subjectively) envisage themselves in relation to these objective
criteria (i.e., class consciousness and identity). (This last usage overlaps with one of
the senses in which we use “culture.”) These multiple uses of class enable us to
capture the most important current developments, which would not be possible
were we to confine class to one particular economic sphere, albeit a critical one as in
the Marxist focus on the world of productive relationships, work, or occupations.
Our definitional practice is in accord with a distinguished line of researchers who
have used class in similar ways and for similar reasons to ours (e.g., Ossowski, 1963;

We believe that “culture” can be used in various legitimate senses, too, ranging
from the narrow sense that refers to the arts (literature, journalism, film, television,
art [painting, sculpture, etc.], architecture, music, dance, and so on) to a broader
sense that includes political beliefs, social attitudes, and religious beliefs, and to
the broadest sense of all, which includes not only the previously mentioned intellectu-
al, ideological, and symbolic spheres but also material life. Here we navigate
between a distinguished line of researchers who use culture in the first two senses –
namely the arts or more broadly to refer to all beliefs and ideas (i.e. the non-
matter aspects of society, e.g. Williams, 1981: 131) – and another distinguished
line of researchers who include in their use of “culture” a society’s material products
as well (e.g. Johnson, 1995; Kornblum and Smith, 1999). We note here the perspec-
tive of the editors of this volume who develop the latter view by arguing that
they intend to trace the shift from a conception of culture as a distinct system of
beliefs and values “out there,” to a conception of culture as the medium of lived
experience.

We make several, related points in what follows. First, we show that recent,
relevant economic developments are moving in multiple directions at the same
time, which suggests a need for a class analysis that takes account of this complexity.
Second, we point to the importance of mixed, and sometimes contradictory, class
locations and to the associated need for a class and cultural analysis that takes
account of this, too. Third, we take as a case study one of the most interesting, recent
multivariate studies of the relation between class (in one particular mode of defining
it, namely occupation) and “culture” (meaning political attitudes in presidential
elections and also attitudes to women’s rights issues). This study, by Jeff Manza
and Clem Brooks (1999), shows the possibilities revealed by a nuanced class analysis
of culture.

Overall, we suggest that class analysis, and therefore class analysis of “culture,” is
only “dead” – as some observers have claimed it to be – if we restrict class analysis to
an overly simple set of views, frozen in time, that, among other inadequacies, ascribe
too much causal weight to the occupational structure.

***

**SALIENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR CULTURAL ANALOGUES**

We begin with some of the economic developments of contemporary US capitalism
that are salient for classes and class consciousness and associated cultural attitudes
and behavior. The number of these developments and the multiple and varied
directions in which they could be expected to push class identity and cultural attitudes suggest that the way class operates is likely to be highly complex.

**Market investing and inequality**

The expansion of stock ownership and the trading/investing mentality is very important. Market investing (ownership of stocks or bonds or other financially tradable assets) and the set of habits and interests that go along with market investing are now so widespread in the United States as to constitute a crucial dimension of class analysis, consciousness, and culture. This is especially the case as the privatization of Social Security (particularly, the idea that people would be allowed to invest at least part of their Social Security benefits in stocks) is more widely debated and envisaged. This is not to say that groupings based on market investing will supersede other class groupings and attitudes; rather the former grouping will coexist with the others in a picture that therefore adds an additional complexity on the individual, group, and societal level.

Certainly, in times of market decline, such as the collapse of 2001–3, some of those who own stock will wish that they did not, and are likely to move to other tradable assets such as bonds. But the cultural *mentality* (as opposed to the actual extent) of trading – whether in stocks, bonds, or other such assets – is set to become as pervasive as that of home ownership (which, as of 1999 according to the US Census Current Population Survey stood at 66.7 percent of the population).

According to Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (2001), almost half (48.2%) of all households in the United States in 1998 held stock in some form, including mutual funds and 401(k)-style pension plans (see table 13.1). The increase in direct and indirect stock ownership was dramatic between 1989 and 1998, rising 6.1 and 18.7 percentage points respectively. The extent to which the United States stands out from other countries in this regard is striking. In 1996 in Britain, the country that is ranked second in terms of the distribution of stock ownership, only 25 percent of households owned stock, while in France and Germany the corresponding

| Table 13.1 Percentage of US households owning stock (in constant 1998 dollars) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Any stock holdings: |
| Direct holdings    | 10.7% | 13.7% | 13.1% | 14.8% | 15.2% | 19.2% | 6.1             |
| Indirect holdings  | —     | —     | 24.7  | 28.4  | 30.2  | 43.4  | 18.7            |
| Total              | —     | —     | 31.7  | 37.2  | 40.4  | 48.2  | 16.5            |
| Stock holdings of $5,000 or more: |
| Direct holdings    | —     | —     | 10.0% | 11.4% | 12.3% | 13.6% | 3.6             |
| Indirect holdings  | —     | —     | 16.9  | 21.5  | 22.7  | 32.2  | 15.3            |
| Total              | —     | —     | 22.6  | 27.3  | 28.8  | 36.3  | 13.7            |

figures were a meager 9 percent and 6 percent respectively. Further, if almost half the US population own stock, then it is certain that when the stock market is rising a significant portion of those who do not own stock are thinking of doing so or are wishing they could even if they cannot.

This rapid expansion of stock ownership provides evidence for a new dimension to the now long-standing idea of a (partial) “ideological victory” of capitalism, in which broad segments of the middle and working class increasingly take part in activities and ways of thinking that were once considered “bourgeois” or “capitalist.” The traditional version of this “ideological victory” consisted of working-class homeownership and the ability to maintain a standard of living that has affinities with that of the middle class. The new version extends this to the ability to engage in activities – trading stocks and bonds – that resonate with those of the “rentier” class.

These changes will coexist, we believe, with more traditional class antagonisms and attitudes, though in a modified form suitable to the new medium. Thus, despite the rapid increase in the percent of households that own stock, the actual distribution of stock and virtually all other forms of assets (except housing equity) is highly unequal and shows tremendous concentration at the top (table 13.2). For example, if we exclude stock ownership in the form of pensions, the share of common stock owned by the bottom 80 percent of households is a mere 1.7 percent.

Financial scandals such as that of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing are also likely to reinvigorate class antagonisms, albeit in the new context involving such claims as that the rules of capitalism have been rigged in favor of powerful insiders at the expense of the large numbers of small investors/employees who are now also competing in this domain. While such small investors and employees may thus rethink some of their popular enthusiasm for stock ownership, the notion of “unfairness” itself in important ways reflects the influence of the trading mentality. In short, along with the spread of a mentality that favors the practice of stock speculation is likely to spread some resentment on the part of small stock owners against the large stock owners and those seen as powerful enough to rig or otherwise bend the rules in

Table 13.2  Distribution of asset ownership across US households, by type of asset and place in distribution, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Asset</th>
<th>Top 0.5%</th>
<th>Next 4%</th>
<th>Next 5%</th>
<th>Next 10%</th>
<th>Bottom 80%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Stock excluding pensions</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Common Stock</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-equity Financial Assets</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Equity</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

their own favor. This overall picture may thus be seen as both inter- and intra-class antagonism, depending on how “class” is approached. To the extent that the “trading mentality” has won out, the small shareholders are, culturally at least, part of the same class as the large ones – both are thinking as “owners” and “investors.” Yet the clear differences in power and control between large and small investors and how these relate to the actual conduct of the businesses such shares represent, as well as other differences in the positions and statuses held by these rival parties, speaks of intra-class differentiation. As we will discuss below, the growth in inequality along other economic dimensions has not gone unnoticed either, and certainly may contribute to a renewal of class-based resentments and attitudes.

**Family/household income inequality**

While conservatives during the boom of the mid- and late-1990s were lauding the benefits of the “new economy,” many leading economists were concerned about the rise in family/household income inequality over the preceding decades. In a debate published as *The New Inequality: Creating Solutions for Poor America*, an impressive list of scholars agreed on the reality and severity of the problem (Freeman et al., 1999). According to Freeman, “any knowledgeable economist, regardless of his or her political persuasion, would readily acknowledge [the following] as true”:

In 1979, ... on an hourly basis, the top decile of men [in the US] earned four times what the bottom decile earned; by 1993 they were earning five times as much. This rise in inequality occurred in the context of general wage stagnation: the median male worker, for example, earns about 13 percent less than the median male 15 years ago – despite his being older and having more education. ... Virtually all of the past decade’s economic growth has gone to the upper 5 percent of families. Since the early 1970s, while the income of the top 1 percent of households has doubled, family and household incomes have stagnated or declined for 80 percent of the population. (Freeman et al., 1999: 7)

The class implications of this are clear to Freeman. He fears that “left unattended, the new inequality threatens us with a two-tiered society,” or what he calls an “apartheid economy” (Freeman et al., 1999: 3). Other contributors express similar concerns. For example, Tobin writes that the “unprecedented inequality of wealth, income, and wages in America is a crisis threatening the sense of community, the essential foundation of the republic” and that it “deserves urgent attention” (58).

Krugman, another contributor to the debate, wrote elsewhere:

I know from experience that even mentioning income distribution leads to angry accusations of “class warfare,” but anyway here is what the (truly) nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office recently found: Adjusting for inflation, the income of families in the middle of the US income distribution rose from $41,400 in 1979 to $45,100 in 1997, a 9 percent increase. Meanwhile, the income of families in the top 1 percent rose from $420,200 to $1.016 million, a 140 percent increase. To put it another way, the income of families in the top 1 percent was 10 times that of typical families in 1979 and 23 times and rising in 1997. (*New York Times*, January 4, 2002)

In short, “income inequality... through the late 1990s boom” continued a pattern of the previous two decades, “with the top pulling away from the middle and the
middle pulling away from the bottom” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001: 16–17). Perrucci and Wysong (1999: 27) argue that the old middle-class society model of a diamond bulging at the middle should be replaced by a double-diamond to reflect the growing wealth of the top (the “privileged class”; 20 percent of the population), separated from a much larger diamond bulging in its stagnant or descending middle (representing the “new working class”; 80 percent of the population).

When wealth rather than income is examined, another stark picture of inequality emerges. “Wealth inequality in the United States was at a seventy-year high in 1998,” according to Edward N. Wolff (2002: 8). Given that it was actually falling up to the late 1970s, the increase in inequality since then is truly astounding and potentially has strong implications for people’s perceptions of class. In the 15-year period from 1983 to 1998, Wolff notes, “The share of the top 1 percent of wealth holders rose by 5 percent. The wealth of the bottom 40 percent showed an absolute decrease. Almost all the absolute gains in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealth holders” (8–9). Comparing the rise in income inequality discussed above to that of wealth, Wolff notes similar trends with the degree of concentration for wealth considerably higher than for income: “The share of wealth held by the top 5 percent of wealth holders increased from 56 to 60 percent over these years [1983–98], whereas the share of total income received by the top 5 percent of income recipients moved upward from 16.4 to 21.4 percent” (39). Still, the increase in the share of total income received by the top 5 percent is much greater (over 33 percent larger than in 1983) than their increase in wealth (only about 7 percent larger).

Longer hours/increased female labor force participation

While the real incomes of the middle and the bottom did slowly increase during this period (albeit nothing like as fast as those of the top), the meaning of this takes on an additional aspect given that the most important factor contributing to such income growth over the last decade was the much commented upon increase in the number of hours that families worked each year. For example, a middle-class, married-couple’s family income grew 9.2 percent from 1989 to 1998, but, at the same time, the number of hours such a family worked increased 6.8 percent, or 247 more hours, over the same period (for an average of 3,885 total hours in 1998). This amounts to one member of the family working about six weeks extra at the end of the 1990s than a decade earlier; and this trend merely continues one already established in the 1980s. This increase in work effort has come from both “a rise in the number of earners per family and in the average weeks and weekly hours worked per earner” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001: 4, 23–4).

Race compounds class here, in that Hispanic and African American families are working considerably greater hours in order to earn a similar amount to comparable non-Hispanic white families (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001: 4).

Yet while many middle- and lower-class families are working more hours just to get by (even if they are doing slightly better than they did a decade ago), the “high paid” were also “putting in many more hours than in the past” (Freeman et al., 1999: 81 n. 4). Still, for those higher up the extended hours appear, not surprisingly, to have yielded much greater rewards. In the 10 years from 1989 to 1999,
for example, “The real wage of the median CEO rose 62.7%” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001: 5).

Further, “workers in the United States put in more hours per year (an average of 1,966 in 1998) than do workers in every other advanced economy except Portugal. The average hours worked in other large industrialized economies – even Japan (at 1,898), the previous world leader in hours worked – are typically well below those of the United States” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001: 12; see also Reich 2000: 6, 111–12).

There are both costs and benefits to this. While more work generates increased income, it also generates greater costs for transportation, clothing, and child-care. And more paid work comes at the expense of leisure. Generally, the increase in work hours has made the ability to balance both work and family a major challenge of family life today in the United States.

On the other hand, a good portion of the increase in work hours (and accompanying rise in income) derives from the increasing participation of women in the labor force, which (particularly in the US case which leads in this trend) can be seen as a distinct social gain. At any rate, the now central role of women as economic providers in so many families further complicates class identity and class consciousness in a variety of ways, of which the existence of so many families whose social class is arguably mixed (upper-white-collar spouse married to lower-white-collar or blue-collar spouse, etc.) is just one example.

Poverty

Trends in poverty are another important dimension of the economic, and associated cultural, picture that needs to be considered. “Despite the economic boom in the second half of the 1990s, the national poverty rate in 1998 was 12.7%, just one-tenth of a percentage point less than in 1989 and a full percentage point higher than in 1979” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001: 9). In 1999 the poverty rate did fall to 11.8 percent, almost the same rate as in 1979. Still, “The official poverty measure almost certainly understates the true level of poverty. One alternative estimation procedure implemented by the Census Bureau suggests that, during the 1990s, the true share of the population living in poverty was an average of 3.6 percentage points higher than suggested by the official estimate” (2001: 9). “In 1999, just over one in four (26.8%) US workers earned poverty-level wages – the wage required to lift out of poverty a family of four headed by a full-time, full-year worker (about $8.19 per hour in 1999)” (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001: 5).

Income mobility

The question of income mobility over time has been, and remains, a central issue for class and cultural identity. The data in table 13.3 report the position of the same people in the income distribution in 1969 and 1994.

The data support two rather different, and widely known, cultural assessments of mobility in the United States and suggest these different assessments will continue to be widely found among the public. On the one hand, significant mobility is clearly possible. Of those who were in the bottom fifth of the income distribution in 1969, 18 percent had moved to the top two-fifths by 1994. Here is material for those who
see American society as a ladder that can be climbed by those with talent and the willingness to work hard. On the other hand, fully 41 percent of those who were in the bottom fifth in 1969 were still there in 1994. Here is material for those who see American society and culture as replete with obstacles and difficulties for the disadvantaged and poor.

**Table 13.3  Income mobility in the US, by quintiles (1969–94)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1969 income group</th>
<th>Bottom fifth</th>
<th>Second fifth</th>
<th>Middle fifth</th>
<th>Fourth fifth</th>
<th>Top fifth</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom fifth</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second fifth</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle fifth</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth fifth</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top fifth</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Unpublished tabulations of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics by Peter Gottschalk (cited in Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001: 77, Table 1.19).

Globalization

Finally, most of what we have discussed so far has focused on economic developments within a single country, the United States (though many of these trends undoubtedly apply, in varying degrees, to other countries). However, another development likely to be increasingly important to the study of class and culture is “globalization.” While this too is a rather “contentious” term (e.g., salient economic relationships beyond national borders are not new as the term “globalization” implies but have long been important), it is likely that these relations have become even more important in recent years with improvements in methods of transportation and above all communications (Sklair, 2001). Nor is globalization separate from the trends in inequality discussed above. It has been associated with complex systems of out-sourcing and “just-in-time” production so that, throughout the world, “flexible work and insecure terms of employment are growing faster than any other form of work” (Beck, 2000: 84; see also Osterman, 1999: 9, 11). An indication of this trend is that “the largest US employer is now Manpower, the temporary help agency” (Barker and Christensen, 1998: 1). Such shifts in the nature of employment relations have important implications for approaches to class based on “occupational groupings,” particularly for the link between occupation and identity.

In sum, an analysis of economic developments over recent decades, and the class groupings associated with each development, suggests multiple factors that might push class identity, consciousness, and associated socio-political and cultural outlooks in various and not always consistent directions. These include a rapid increase in the mentality of owning tradable assets such as stocks and bonds, growing family/household income inequality, with the rich pulling further away from the middle and the middle pulling further away from the bottom; a mobility system that allows
some people to significantly better their income position over time while others stagnate, continued high rates of poverty; longer hours worked by households, primarily because of the increasing centrality of women in the labor force; and the growing importance of out-sourcing and part-time work. With all these factors, it would be surprising if the class identities, political behavior, and other cultural outlooks associated with this complex and mixed picture were not also complex and mixed.

CLASS, CULTURE, AND COMPLEXITY

Indeed, the number of possible permutations and combinations of class location and corresponding ways people may see their class positions is vast. Mapping these complex combinations of multiple class locations and associated class identities and consciousnesses is a daunting task for which the traditional survey research methods and questions (open ended or closed ended) are unlikely to be adequate. We do not wish to detract from these methods – which are the only ways of gathering large samples of data – but they are simply unable to capture what we believe is the complexity of a situation where many if not most people occupy multiple class positions, all of which are likely to have some impact on how they view the socio-political and cultural world. We have not here presumed to do more than map out some of this terrain.

Mixed class locations

In America’s Working Man (1984), Halle argued that better-paid blue-collar workers have not one but three basic class identities, each corresponding to an important facet of their lives. Workers have one type of class-consciousness that stems directly from their experience on the job and that fairly clearly distinguishes them from other groups of workers, such as lower- and upper-white collar workers. Workers have a second class-identity based in their lives outside of work, in their lives as actual or potential property and homeowners, as consumers, and as members of the neighborhood in which they reside (often seen in terms of an associated “class-character”). In this second identity the class structure is often more fluid and open than it is, and than it is seen as being, in the workplace. There is much less to differentiate the more highly paid blue-collar workers here from white-collar workers. Lastly, workers may interpret the world based on an identity as “Americans” or as part of the “American people” (in contrast to the government). This identity often takes a populist form (and through this relates to class) though it may move between others modes and may, for example, be transposed into one or more varieties of nationalism.

Workers’ practices and beliefs are not necessarily consistent across these three domains, and it is likely that workers employ all three of these identities on a fairly constant basis, though particular times and circumstances are likely to make the use of one or two come to the fore as more appropriate. Hence, research approaches that only deal with work, or family life in relation to class, or class patterns in voting practices and/or other forms of political behavior and attitudes, are treating a part as if it were the whole, and hence bound to misunderstand.
Critics may object that the last two identities we refer to are not class identities since they are not based on the classic conception of “class” as a relationship to the means of production. But our central point is that confining the category “class” to the world of work and occupations is to miss much of what is important in contemporary society. If ordinary people (i.e., nonsocial scientists) use the terminology of class to think of themselves in relation to other groups in their neighborhoods (e.g., as living in a middle class or a poor neighborhood) or in the political scene (e.g., as part of the “people” who are dominated by politicians and the corporate sector) then these are important and legitimate uses of class terminology.

We believe that this general principle that individuals and groups typically lead lives that place them simultaneously in more than one sector of the class structure is both generalizable and critical for understanding contemporary America. Further, this situation of multiple class locations, which nowadays surely go beyond those identified by Halle, has consequences for cultural analyses since people’s perceptions of their position in the class structure are likely to be affected by, if not to exactly reflect, this complex situation. To give just one example from among the huge number of possible and probable scenarios – a blue-collar or lower white-collar employee may, in the workplace, be a subordinated employee with limited “ownership rights” over the job; working longer hours is likely to add a further dimension of experienced subordination to this work-related situation; yet employee stock ownership plans and stock-related pension plans will give the employee “ownership rights” either in the company or in the corporate economy as a whole or both; further, outside the workplace homeownership and the possession of other major consumer goods will place the individual in an additional class grouping. At the same time there are likely to be domestic and family ramifications of any need to work longer hours. Thus most of the dimensions of “class” mentioned at the start of this discussion – namely relation to the work situation, membership in the class of stock owners, membership of one or more groupings based on income level and possession of major consumer goods such as a home – are likely to be pertinent.

In another recent addition to the class literature, Arvidson (1999), also refers to “multiple and heterogeneous” class positions. While for Arvidson these positions are all based on “work” and position vis-à-vis the means of production, his main point is that more than just capitalist class relations exist in our society. Thus, he argues, we also need to consider independent artisanal, feudal, patriarchal, and communal class relations. As in our argument, the same individual may be simultaneously involved in more than one of these relations.

Cultural complexities associated with a single class position

Not only are several dimensions of class probably simultaneously salient for many individuals, but each single dimension may, in itself, have more than one salient cultural consequence for individuals. As owners of stock, people may exult in gains or complain that the rules are rigged in favor of the rich and insiders, or both; people may complain about growing income inequality as the rich pull far away from the rest, or those at the bottom may take pleasure in pulling somewhat closer to those in the middle, or both; people may complain about longer hours worked and the cultural pressures this places on family life, or they may take pleasure in these longer hours insofar as they represent overtime earnings potential, or both; people may
note that some economic mobility is possible and/or complain that it is not sufficient. As Collins argued, “We need to be open to the possibility that the actual experience of stratification in social encounters is highly fluctuating, subject to situational contestation” (2000: 19–20).

This perspective is in some ways an extension, into the various spheres of class that we have defined above, of the concept of “contradictory class locations” that Erik Olin Wright long ago proposed for the occupational world alone. With this concept Wright intended to refer to single occupational categories that hold contradictory relationships to the means of production and exploitation (for example mid-level managers who are themselves wage laborers but supervise the work of other workers). Our approach argues for the need to look not only at class as “occupation,” but at other dimensions, too. We suggest that each of these dimensions of class may, for the individual concerned, have multiple and sometimes contradictory cultural implications.

**Moderating the claims for class analysis**

We have argued that class analysis should be widely applicable to cultural analysis given the variety of ways in which “class” (defined as groupings based on economic criteria) can be said to be salient. We have also argued that the effects of class may well be pushing in several directions in the life of each individual. One implication is that class analysis of culture needs to be undertaken with great care and subtlety.

We will now argue that class analysis of culture, to be plausible, needs to recognize the causal impact of other crucial social variables and to restrain its claims in this light. Thus one source of the critique of the usefulness of class analysis has, at least since the 1970s, been the view that class categories fail to predict central political attitudes and behavior and above all how people will vote in US presidential elections. The most convincing response to this criticism is to say that class categories are sometimes important for such analyses, but so are other categories (all of which can be referred to as “cultural categories”) such as race and gender and religion. In short, class categories are useful for understanding political attitudes and behavior, but only if used judiciously.

A recent overview of voting data on presidential elections by Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks (1999) is a model of this balanced approach to using class categories to understand crucial aspects of the contemporary world. Using the National Election Studies data for elections since 1948, and focusing on the decision for whom to vote in presidential elections, Manza and Brooks divide “class” into seven categories based on occupational location and/or employment situation. One of their most interesting findings is that one of these categories, professionals, has moved from being the most Republican class in the 1950s, to the most Democratic class in 1996. The main explanation for this realignment of professionals to the Democratic Party is, the authors argue, the increasingly liberal views of professionals on social issues such as civil rights and gender equality (and especially abortion). At the same time professionals constitute a growing proportion of the total vote both because of their increasing proportion in the labor force and because of their relatively high voter turnout, which has enhanced the competitiveness of the Democratic Party.

Here we see some of the complexities of the class-culture analysis. Cultural attitudes such as views on abortion and other women’s rights issues are found to
be especially salient in the lives of particular occupational groupings such as professionals and hence translate into cultural attitudes and behavior in the political sphere – namely support for the Democratic Party. Finally, the authors are careful to stress the limits of class analysis and to point to the salience of such nonclass factors as religion and race, as well as gender.

**CONCLUSION**

Over recent decades several scholars have suggested skepticism about the usefulness of class analysis. We have argued here that class analyses of culture are of crucial importance for understanding contemporary American society, but only if we recognize the salience of a variety of forms of class groupings. This reflects the fact that American society and culture has become highly complex and multidimensional. Many of its members are located in more than one, and often several class positions, simultaneously. Each of these positions is likely to have associated with it one or more sets of cultural attitudes. Together these multiple positions and the multiple attitudes associated with them pull, push, and interact in ways that only careful analyses can reveal.

**References**


### Further Reading


Erik Erikson, the “architect” of identity (Friedman, 1999), construed identity as the development of the self in response to the interpersonal and social world. Erikson’s (1963) enduring insight is that identity is inherently social and that social life is inherently relational. Individual identities, therefore, no matter how idiosyncratic or unique they may appear, are invariably social, the product of the diverse and overlapping communal spheres in which individuals live their lives. In recent years, sociologists have increasingly recognized that identity is not one overarching categorical status of the individual but is plural: individuals are not defined solely by, for example, gender, sexuality, race, or social class but always embody multiple social identities. These intersecting identities evolve in response to and influence individuals’ everyday practices and their long-term social opportunities and life chances. Notwithstanding the fact that in specific situations discrete aspects of an individual’s multifaceted identity are given greater attention than others, individuals always encounter the world and live their lives embodying a mix of differentiated identities.

To talk about identity then is not to talk about some static or essentialized status but to recognize that identity, while relatively coherent and providing individuals with a relatively ordered sociobiographical narrative (Giddens, 1991), is also dynamic. Identity, as Stuart Hall (1992: 225) elaborates, “is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well of ‘being.’ It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical they undergo constant transformation.”

**Identity Locations**

Given the socially dynamic and pluralistic character of identity, it is interesting to know how individuals negotiate identity, how they craft an identity that gives testimony to their histories, to who they “really” are, whilst embracing the
transformative possibilities in how they position themselves vis-à-vis their history. I have explored this question in my own recent research by focusing on how gay and lesbian Catholics maintain communal ties to Catholicism whilst simultaneously affirming the validity of their sexual and other (e.g., gender) identities. To be gay or lesbian and Catholic may strike as somewhat anomalous on a number of grounds. Two reasons in particular stand out. First and foremost, this identity designation draws attention to the persistence of religion as a meaningful source of identity. A dominant strand in sociology has been the assumption that religion’s relevance as a source of social identity and organization would disappear in an increasingly rationalized society. From a secularization perspective, therefore, it is a surprise to see that religion continues to have authority and cultural meaning especially in American society where principles of rationality and scientific progress have such a strong hold.

As many empirical studies document, religion is not privatized in terms of individual beliefs about the sacred, but is a critical source of social identity for diverse individuals and groups. Thus, for example, many new immigrants to America, similar to the earlier immigrant generations of the nineteenth century, use the ritual, cultural, and organizational resources provided by diverse religions to get established and settle down in America (e.g., Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000). The identity anchoring power of religion is not just for new immigrants. Religious identity is a salient dimension of many Americans’ lives indicated by their routine religious practices, their use of religious themes to make sense of life, and their everyday integration of religious and political values. In short, irrespective of how it is conceptualized or measured, religion continues to provide individuals and groups with a publicly accessible and legitimate way of naming or categorizing themselves.

A second reason why being gay and Catholic may strike as anomalous pertains more specifically to the status of gays and lesbians in the Catholic Church. In official church teaching, homosexuality is defined as a “disordered” condition and gays and lesbians who engage in same-sex sexual relations are denounced as “contradictory” Catholics because, church officials argue, they claim an interest in maintaining a Catholic identity while rejecting Christ’s teaching on sexuality. In the church’s universal narrative of Catholicism, therefore, to be gay and Catholic is not a valid identity; one can be one or the other but not both. Gay and lesbian Catholics who want to live out both their sexuality and their Catholicism do so therefore against a strong religious-institutional current and against strong cultural currents that continue to marginalize and delegitimate gay sexuality vis-à-vis heterosexuality.

Although the number is hard to quantify, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Catholics who are gay or lesbian leave the church and no longer identify as Catholic. Some of these turn to other Christian churches that appear more gay friendly, others participate in nondenominational religious services for gays and lesbians such as those offered by the Metropolitan Community Church, and still others disavow organized religion altogether. Undoubtedly gay (and other) Catholics who leave the church are interesting people who could well serve sociological interest in understanding various theoretical questions on identity among other issues. As I elaborated at the outset of my recent book (1999a), however, I was not interested in studying such a group. My theoretical interest lay in understanding “anomalous” identities, the worldviews and practices of precisely those who go against the grain:
who stay connected to a history or an institutional tradition even though that tradition stigmatizes and undermines their identity projects.

In their everyday practices, gay and lesbian Catholics who stay Catholic occupy a cultural space that challenges the assumption of a dichotomized opposition between the affirmation of identity differences and commitment to a broader communal history. At a time when identity is considered as a privatized and individuated design project (Berger, Berger, and Kellner, 1973: 71–4), and the politics of lifestyle (Giddens, 1991: 214) and of difference are making difference a source of subcultural celebration, gay and lesbian Catholics who choose to stay Catholic comprise a unique group whose plural identity allows for the exploration of how difference can be affirmed from within rather than in opposition to a cultural tradition. This question is of theoretical import in that it addresses critical theoretical issues central to sociology, especially those concerning the interplay of emotion and reason (e.g., Massey, 2002), doctrinal and rational argumentation (cf. Dillon, 1999b), power and cultural differences (e.g., Calhoun, 1995), and institutional conflict and social change. Answers to this question may also point to templates that can be drawn upon in ongoing policy discussions across diverse institutional spheres – in corporations, universities, government offices, and churches – about how diversity might be institutionalized in practice without undermining the “core” history or identity of a given institution or society.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY DIFFERENCES

Gay and lesbian Catholics’ negotiation of a plural identity that bridges particularistic experiences and a more universal tradition challenges the idea of a narrow identity politics or a politics of difference. The politics of difference refers to the constellation of arguments and issues that are debated under the rubric of diversity and multiculturalism (see e.g. Gitlin, 1995). At its core this debate focuses on whether the celebration of differences derived from racial, ethnic, national, sexuality, and gender affiliations, challenges the solidarity and cohesiveness of the larger community. The concern expressed is that the accent on difference may elevate identity differences to such an extent that it attenuates the shared humanity and cultural history of individuals. In this view, identity differences are seen as leading to social fragmentation as individuals and groups congregate into identity enclaves and associate only with those who are like them while avoiding interaction with those who are not like them.

The question of the relation between diversity and community is not a new one. One of Emile Durkheim’s intellectual preoccupations was whether collective solidarity could be maintained against impersonal social forces that seemed more likely to create anomic rather than social order. The question has received new vigor in the last few decades as various social and political movements and organizations seek to realize more fully the egalitarian advances of the 1960s and 70s, and thus affirm the equal rights of gays, women, and racial and ethnic minorities to be full participants in institutional processes and public culture. The concern that the affirmation of diverse group identities threatens communal cohesiveness has been fueled in part by a cultural wars rhetoric that focuses on the attitudinal polarization between liberals and conservatives precisely over issues of diversity and how cultural differences
should infuse the narrative of the nation’s history and contemporary institutional practices.

There is greater awareness today that appeals to a rhetoric of the common good or to universal values usually obfuscate the interests of particular, usually dominant and powerful, segments of the community (Seidman, 1994). Consequently, there is a much greater tendency for individuals and specific groups to highlight particularistic identities and to point to their difference vis-à-vis the dominant tradition. The affirmation and celebration of otherness, however, while welcome insofar as it draws attention to the diversity of groups who have a rightful interest in claiming a participatory role in society, often does so by running afool of shared interests. In local and national politics, this accentuation of identity differences tends to heighten inter-ethnic and inter-group tensions as appeals to group consciousness are used to divide groups that frequently tend to have much more in common than identity politics allows.

Identity differences, therefore, while culturally and historically deserving of recognition, may pose a threat to social solidarity. As a question of justice and of practical politics, the challenge then is to explore how particularistic identities may find the public legitimacy they deserve while still preserving the cohesiveness of the broader institutional and societal context in which identity differences are given visibility. There is clearly a tension between the realization of particular identities and cultural integration with a larger community of meaning, whether it be a local, national, or global community. For social conservatives with a communitarian emphasis, “too much” diversity is seen as breeding cultural relativism, fragmentation, and anomie. Thus as Amitai Etzioni (1997: 197) argues, groups committed to the affirmation of identity differences should be willing to accept a bounded or a “qualified diversity” that would allow commitment to a core set of values to be protected. For those with a postmodern inclination, on the other hand, the celebration of identity differences is generally seen as welcome precisely because it undermines the hegemonic cultural and repressive power of universalist narratives (e.g., Seidman, 1994). Similarly, some feminists argue that the struggle for equality of gender and sexual differences cannot take place within existing institutional structures but can only be emancipatory if it is done by dissociating from the inegalitarian tradition at issue. In this view, for example, feminists who want to have a religious identity must in essence become post-Christian because the Christian tradition is seen as so infused with patriarchal practices that to remain Christian is to collude with patriarchy and thus repress even a language of gender equality (e.g., Daly, 1996).

Notwithstanding the wide intellectual gulf between preservers of broad-based social ties and those who push for the autonomy of identity differences, there does appear to be a way out of this either/or approach to cultural sameness/differences. Many sociologists (e.g., Calhoun, 1995; Nicholson and Seidman, 1995) recognize that the affirmation of identity differences does not in principle at least have to be at odds with the affirmation of broader social ties. My research about how gay and lesbian Catholics enact a plural identity, one that demonstrates the validity of being gay and Catholic, provides one illustrative case of how in practice particularistic identity experiences (derived from sexuality) can be used to contest and rework universalizing identity narratives (of Catholicism) but in ways that maintain solidarity with rather than dissociate from the larger communal tradition (Catholicism).
THE DISCOURSES OF DIFFERENCE DEMARCATING GAY SEXUALITY

Long before Michel Foucault’s historical investigations traced how the Christian pastoral presented sex as “that which above all else, had to be confessed” (1978: 35), James Joyce gave the Catholic confession a penetratingly insightful and eloquent representation in his classic coming-of-age novel, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916). Stephen Dedalus, the novel’s 16-year-old protagonist, illustrates the shame and anguish that the Church’s emphasis on the sinfulness of impure thoughts and acts unleashed in young men whose consciousness of sex was rendered all the more vivid by the interrogatory practices of priests who pushed their penitents through a thorough and unceasing examination of conscience.

Although recent decades have seen a decline in the devotional importance of confession in Catholics’ lives – with just over one in ten (14 percent) attending confession (Gallup 1994: 144), the church’s discourse of sex still provides church officials with a critical discourse of power. The church’s stance on homosexuality fits within its broader teaching on sex and its natural law understanding, which assumes that there are certain self-evident, eternal, and immutable truths informing what is natural and right. In church teaching, every “genital act must be within the framework of marriage” and must be open to the transmission of new life. Hence the church’s opposition to any form of nonmarital sex and artificial birth control, and its view of homosexuality as “against nature.” As elaborated in various public statements issued by the Vatican in recent decades, although homosexuality per se is not a sin, it is “a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil and thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.” The Vatican also emphasizes that “homosexual acts” are sinful: “Homosexual activity is not a complementary union able to transmit life;…when [homosexual persons] engage in homosexual activity they confirm within themselves a disordered sexual inclination which is essentially self-indulgent” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1986: 379–80).

Catholics (and others), therefore, receive a clear cut and unequivocal message from church officials about sexual practices in general and specifically about homosexuality. The Vatican uses its elaborated teaching on homosexuality to delineate boundaries of identity difference. As indicated, it sharply differentiates between homosexuality and heterosexuality, and sees these two states comprising essential differences in sexual orientation. The church hierarchy, therefore, emphasizes identity differences, not to celebrate difference but, whether intended or not, to delegitimate the carriers of difference. The Vatican’s discourse of sexual difference thus provides an example of how, as Craig Calhoun observes, “the rhetoric of difference can be turned to the repression of differences” (1995: xiv). In the church, the emphasis on essential sexual differences conveys the clear message that some identities are to be preferred over others. The homosexuality/heterosexuality differentiation in the church, as in the larger society, and similar to other dichotomous categorizations (e.g., male/female) performs the ideological work, as Cynthia Fuchs Epstein observes, of “preserving advantage”: “Dichotomous systems of thought serve the existing power structures and organization of society by reinforcing the notion of the ‘we’ and the ‘not-we,’ the deserving and the undeserving” (1988: 233). Within the context of Catholicism, church officials render gays
and lesbians “undeserving” of ownership of Catholic identity; they are defined as “contradictory” Catholics who must choose between their religion and their sexuality.

It is not just the church, of course, that takes a negative view of gay sexuality. American culture more generally continues to be quite ambivalent about the moral status, the “strangeness” (cf. Stein, 2001), of gays and lesbians. Although gays and lesbians have won important legal victories over the last two decades and have increased visibility in mass media and in public culture, there are still many signals that they may not be as deserving as their heterosexual peers of legal and civil rights. The deep seated political and cultural expectation that gay sexuality should remain closeted, a personal secret, is most sharply institutionalized by the government’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for military personnel, under which there were 1,250 discharge cases in 2001 (Oliphant, 2002: 19).

Public opinion polls, moreover, document considerable ambiguity toward gays and lesbians. According to the General Social Survey, although there has been an increase from the 1970s (50%) to the 1990s (73%) in the proportions of those who believe that gays and lesbians should be allowed to teach in public schools, at the same time, over two-thirds (70%) of those polled believe that same-sex relations are wrong. Similarly, 65 percent are opposed to same-sex marriages (Wolfe, 1998: 72–81). From a social trust perspective and in recognition of the civic importance of “bridging” social capital, that is, of having interactions with those who are not like us (e.g., Putnam, 2000), the persistence of the underlying belief that gay sex is wrong, that in essence, it is somehow not natural, means that gays continue to be socially stigmatized thus making acceptance of gays, and social trust and interaction between gays and nongays, less likely.

In sum, the richness and vibrancy of communal life derives from social interaction across differences rather than the segregation by difference. Yet, the identity differences attendant on a gay sexuality tend to get marginalized, framed as being outside rather than constitutive of community. Thus while Catholic Church officials delineate the incompatibility of homosexuality with a Catholic identity, the problematic nature of gay identity more generally is reiterated across a range of institutional and cultural locales. To be gay, whether Catholic or not, is to embody difference and otherness in a culture of normative heterosexuality.

It is for this reason that queer theorists, for example, want to move sociologists away from the heterosexist paradigmatic assumptions that dominate identity politics. Unlike the earlier post-1960s focus on affirming group differences derived from race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality as a way of claiming legitimate cultural power for discrete groups, queer sociologists no longer see the affirmation of identity differences as necessarily emancipatory because they are tied to heterosexist assumptions. Following Foucault, theorists such as Steven Seidman (1997) see identities as regulatory and disciplinary and thus as constraining the range of ways of imagining and framing the self. Queer theorists call for a radical queering of all of sociology and not just of the study of sexuality. Emphasizing the contextual intersectionality of biographical, sexual, gender, racial, and class identities, they call for new analytical approaches that inject sexuality into “mainstream” sociological analyses of, for example, stratification, education, and gerontology, asking what happens when a (nonheterosexist) sexual lens is used in our apprehension of the social world (Stein and Plummer, 1996).
Living as they do in a society and in a church in which sexual differences matter, gay and lesbian Catholics integrate sexual difference, the source of their “contradictory Catholic” status, into a plural identity. This restores a dignity and a worthiness to their selfhood and to their variously overlapping collective identities as gays and lesbians, men and women, and Catholics.

The gay and lesbian Catholics whom I studied were all participants in Dignity/Boston, a chapter of Dignity/USA, the national association of gay and lesbian Catholics. Established in 1972, Dignity aims to be a responsive “model community which recognizes the inherent dignity of all people.” The chapter has approximately 100 members, about two-thirds of whom are male and one-third female. Almost all of the participants are white; they tend to be college educated and while ranging in age, many are in their 20s, 30s, and 40s. Through Dignity, gay and lesbian Catholics come together as a local community for weekly worship, community outreach and social activities. Since Dignity is prohibited by the church hierarchy from using facilities owned by the Catholic Church, it holds its weekly Mass and some other events in a Protestant church located in Boston’s Beacon Hill District. Dignity also has a suite of offices that it uses primarily for meetings and archival and administrative tasks. Over several months starting in the spring of 1995, after first completing a systematic content analysis of the organizational literature (newsletters etc.) of Dignity/USA, I conducted nonparticipant observation of Dignity/Boston attending its weekly liturgies, social activities, and planning meetings, surveyed the membership using a self-administered structured questionnaire, and interviewed 26 active members in-depth.

Clearly, the gays and lesbians who participate in Dignity, like other Catholics, are not consciously Catholic all day every day, or, for that matter, conscious of their sexuality all day everyday. Like “normals” (Goffman, 1963) they too have to attend to the tasks of everyday life and some of these tasks have little to do with sexuality or religion. It is evident, however, that in weaving the particularistic identity of being gay or lesbian and Catholic, individuals attend to the lived experiences of their sexual and religious histories and integrate those experiences into a new way of being that challenges the identity frames handed down in universal narratives. Just as being “Black and British” challenges Western colonialist assumptions about British (white) identity (Hall, 1992), the public presence of self-identified and practicing gay and lesbian Catholics subverts the idea that there is one way of being Catholic and the related assumption that there is one historically uninterrupted Catholic tradition. Yet at the same time, because these gays and lesbians choose to live out their identity in the context of, rather than in opposition to, Catholicism, their particularistic identity is one that is not segmented from but integrated with a more universal communal tradition (Catholicism).

What is it then that propels gay and lesbian Catholics to stay Catholic? One of the primary driving forces is their desire to preserve the charisma of their membership within the larger Catholic community. This is a history that they do not want to disavow. Many of the people in my study emphasized their deep emotional connection to Catholicism and their need to maintain involvement with Catholicism as a “community of memory” (Bellah et al., 1985). Explaining why they were attracted...
to Dignity, typically after several years of sporadic or no church attendance, many invoked the personal and cultural ties they felt toward their Catholic heritage. Catholicism, as one said, is “inescapably part of my life,” or as another mentioned, it was an “an encompassing identity.” Several of the respondents thus emphasized the importance of being able to participate in Dignity as a Catholic (and gay) community because it enabled them to continue practicing the rituals, witnessing the symbols, and enacting the experiences that conferred Catholic identity. Dignity, as many interviewees suggested, gave them a “safe space,” a “home” in which they could be in communion, both symbolically and literally, with other Catholics.

Although religious and other communal identities may be less constraining today than for previous generations (Giddens, 1991), at the same time there is an emergent realization that despite the cultural emphasis on the autonomous self and on the possibilities for reinventing the self, individual identity narratives and the meanings injected into individual lives are always intertwined with a social and historical context (cf. Bellah et al., 1985). Many individuals, as gay and lesbian Catholics highlight, perceive this connection and thus maintain the link between their personal biographies and a communal narrative precisely because these are intersecting histories. Thus as one Dignity man commented, Catholic rituals are “comforting and assuring. It gives one a historical and social perspective absent in contemporary life.”

The pull of Catholicism as a community of memory is in part a function of the tradition’s own pluralistic identity and the multiplicity of diverse strands that comprise it. As experienced by these gays and lesbians, despite the church’s condemnation of same-sex sexual practices, the Catholic tradition is much broader than any discrete aspects of its history, doctrine, or institutional structure. They thus “know” Catholicism not just for its condemnation of their sexuality but also for its rituals, its positive messages on social justice, and the various ways in which it anchored their identities while growing up – in families, neighborhoods, and ethnic subcultures. It is attachment to this broader set of meanings that enables gay and lesbian and other Catholics to retain pride in their Catholic identity.

With Catholicism experienced in such a powerfully visceral way, it should not be surprising to discover that gays and lesbians also experience their sexuality in a similarly visceral manner. All of the gay and lesbian respondents in the Dignity study experience their sexuality in an essentialist way. Similar to the findings of other studies of sexual identity (e.g., Epstein, 1987; Warner, 1995), they argued that their sexuality was natural, innate, and, as they saw it, divinely prescribed. Dignity participants’ sense of the givenness of their sexuality was thus not located solely in a biological or genetic determinism but in terms of a divine gift. Typical of the views expressed by Dignity participants was that homosexuality “is a cherished gift from God,” “it is a part of God’s creation,” and that “sexuality in general is a gift from God to be embraced and celebrated.”

On the one hand, gay and lesbian Catholics, like many other Americans, use the authority that comes from their personal experience to make moral judgments and thus in this case to arbitrate the source of their sexuality. In this view, if something “feels right” it must be good. There is a sense of personal entitlement that since this is how they are and this is how God has created them, it is natural and moral for them to be gay and to be accepted for their embodied identity. While I do not want to marginalize the very powerful emotional charge that personal experience gives
to individuals’ lives, it is also true of course that gay and lesbian Catholics have a strategic interest in emphasizing the essential naturalness of their homosexuality. In view of the Vatican’s teaching on the disordered nature of homosexuality and its stance that participation in same-sex sexual relations is a decision freely chosen, gays and lesbians can discredit the church’s position by testifying to their experience of sexuality as innately rooted, and, while a different sexuality, one that is nevertheless created by God. By presenting their sexuality as natural, gays and lesbians eliminate the possibility that they can change their sexuality in response to religious or, for that matter, secular prescriptions.

The emphasis on the naturalness or givenness of sexuality that emerges in studies of sexual identity, also points, I think, to the fact that while many academics and political activists find it emancipatory to highlight the fluidity of sexual and other identity boundaries, most people experience their identities in relatively bounded terms. It is empowering for people to be made aware of the fact that inegalitarian practices based on categorical gender, racial, and sexual hierarchies are the outcome of socio-political and not natural or biological design. As such the implications of these boundaries are fluid and mutable. It is quite a different matter, however, to assume that because social scientists emphasize the fluidity of identity boundaries, most people experience their identity as fluid (see Epstein, 1987, for a critical review of the essentialist–constructionist debate on sexuality). Some individuals clearly do experience identity in ways that transcend dichotomous either/or sexual and gender categories, as recounted, for example, in McCloskey’s (1999) memoir of transsexual change or in Stein’s (1997: ch. 6) account of ex-lesbians. But as Cohen (1996: 367) points out, individuals’ everyday reality and life chances tend to revolve around the salience of particular group memberships and participation in specific group experiences. The social embeddedness of identity relations means that “too much” fluidity would be chaotic for the microrelational world in which individuals live their lives; this becomes apparent even if we only momentarily consider, for example, the consequences of sexual and/or gender fluidity on an individual’s extant sexual and familial relationships. As Bauman (2000: 90) observes, “Changing identity may be a private affair, but it always includes cutting off certain bonds and canceling certain obligations.”

Ultimately, however, what is sociologically important is not whether or not identity is fluid, but what individuals make of their identity; how they evaluate what they experience to be their identity. Gay and lesbian Catholics accept the “fact” of their sexual identity; they do not contest their sexuality but they do contest the church’s definition of homosexuality and what it means to be gay. Similarly, they accept the historical fact of their Catholicism, but they challenge church officials’ interpretation of that history and its meanings. Gay and lesbian Catholics’ lived knowledge and ownership of Catholicism emboldens their interpretive autonomy vis-à-vis the Catholic tradition and allows them to construct the validity of a gay/lesbian Catholic identity. Thus, while the church hierarchy defines homosexuality as disordered, many gay and lesbian Catholics regard the church’s teaching on sexuality and gender as disordered, as deviating from the justice ethics illuminated in scriptural narratives of Christ’s life and institutionalized in much of the church’s own practices with respect to poverty, social justice, and ethnic minority rights. Gay and lesbian Catholics disavow, as we saw, a constructionist view of sexuality, but they see the church in socially contingent terms. Like many Catholics, they regard
the church hierarchy, its institutional authority structure, and much of church teaching including its stance on homosexuality as the outcome of social and historical processes rather than divinely sanctioned. As such, they see the church’s institutional practices and doctrines as human constructions and thus as mutable, as open to learning from, and making, history.

Indeed, the vast majority (91%) of the gay and lesbian Catholics I surveyed saw the church’s teaching on homosexuality as part of a broader constellation of sex and gender issues and as directly related to the church hierarchy’s power interests. One man in his early 50s stated, “The church is still focusing too much on sexuality and too little on commitment to Christ, peace, and social justice. The vision of Vatican II [of the church as the People of God] has yet to be realized because church leaders are too fearful of the unknown and of letting go of the past.” Another man said: “The Church’s actions on gay issues are part and parcel of its current and historical roles in issues of race, gender, religion, and international power. The hierarchy has become an organism more concerned with self-presentation and self-perpetuation than with the growth and healthy development of the people it serves.” It was the view of one woman that “Homophobia is, I believe, always linked to underlying sexism and the ‘woman issue’ is a fundamental problem in the institutional church. But even beyond that, the Church’s stance on homosexuality seems to reflect their unwillingness to let people think/discern for themselves in good conscience, their obsession with maintaining power and control, their infantilization of people and demonization of sexuality. It also epitomizes the ‘we get to say who is good and who gets to belong and you can’t get to heaven without us’ mentality that I so often experience from the institutional church.”

A social constructionist approach to Catholicism with its emphasis on the malleability of Catholic doctrines, practices, and identities empowers gay and lesbian Catholics to selectively prioritize what they consider to be core (e.g., commitment to Christ) and less central (sexuality) to Catholic identity. At the same time, however, precisely because of the visceral power of Catholicism in their lives, their reworking of Catholicism to make it more gay inclusive is constrained by their tacit and frequently contested sense of what “feels right” in terms of Catholicism. Thus while the naturalness of their sexuality empowers them to alter some of the traditional Catholic symbols in the Mass or to change the liturgical language to make it more gay- and gender-affirming, their desire to preserve the authenticity of their Catholic identity means that they are constrained from embracing radical change. They still want their contested and redrawn Catholic identity to be in continuity with the Catholic tradition, which itself, of course, has a pluralistic and not a monolithic history, with many discontinuities and ruptures. A lot of Dignity’s internal debates, therefore, revolve around the boundaries of their, and the tradition’s, ever-evolving Catholic identity.

THE MARGINALITY OF DOUBLE DIFFERENCE

Gays and lesbians engaged in practicing a gay and Catholic identity present a relatively unified front with regard to what comprises that plural articulation. But just as identity differences can cause fragmentation in the larger society, identity differences among gay and lesbian Catholics are also a source of divisiveness. As
intimated by many of the women I interviewed, lesbian Catholics experience marginality in the church in a more accentuated way than gay men. Lesbian women encounter a double marginality: the marginality of their sexuality and the marginality of their gendered identity in a church that excludes women from ordination and from leadership roles. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that lesbian women are more alienated from the church than gay men and this alienation is also evident in Dignity itself. In local Dignity communities across the United States, men outnumber women almost two to one.

Many lesbian women value the gay- and lesbian-friendly community afforded by participation in Dignity Masses and social events. As already noted, for lesbians and gays alike, Dignity provides an “open affirming community,” where their lifestyles are accepted by their Catholic peers. One woman, for example, who has been out for many years to her family and at work said nonetheless that Dignity’s Mass with its affirmation of homosexuality and Catholicism “is the place where I really forget that I’m out – I feel so comfortable.”

Yet, precisely because sexuality and gender, especially in the context of Catholicism, are so deeply intertwined, many lesbian women find it hard to be repeatedly confronted with their double marginality. They experience otherness and difference even at Dignity, which works at making itself a “model community” in which members participate in decision-making and where democratic consensus is the preferred approach to dealing with conflict over liturgy and other issues. For some of these women, the Mass, whether in a regular Catholic church or at Dignity, which occasionally includes women as co-presiders, reminds them that, as one woman phrased it, they are “participating in the sexism of a male church.” Consequently, independent of their regular participation at Dignity Masses, several of the lesbians I interviewed get together for a monthly women’s liturgy at one member’s home. In this “women-owned space,” they are “able to let go of the power of the connection to Christ the man.” For these women, Christ’s redemptive power does not lie in his maleness per se but in the exemplary ethics of justice and pluralism his life illuminated.

Many of the lesbian women at Dignity’s Boston chapter thus believe that unless the church hierarchy changes its position on women’s ordination and allows women to be priests, some of the gays at Dignity will continue to resist more gender inclusive changes at Dignity’s own liturgical services. Some of the women interviewed expressed their frustration and pain over what they see as fellow members’ reproduction of the church hierarchy’s view of women’s sacramental unworthiness. As one woman explained, “Many of the men just sort of don’t get it. They say it’s not about feminism. They say we love you but don’t mess with the Eucharist . . . I think there’s a fair amount of men at Dignity who, if the church changes its stance on homosexuality, they’re back in. That’s all they need. That’s their only issue with the church. Whereas for most of the women, because we’re women and because we’re lesbian, this is not just about being gay. It’s a whole avenue of justice issues and that’s where we are hit, because for them it’s not about claiming Eucharist; it’s about being accepted as gay.”

Precisely because church symbols and practices exclude women and gays and lesbians from full participation in the church some feminists would suggest that women and men who think they can be feminist and Catholic are somewhat misguided. They would argue that to assume the compatibility of these plural
identities essentially betrays a false consciousness – that because the church is a patriarchal male institution its practices will always be tainted by inequality even if some of those practices or the language in which they are expressed were to shift. This charge may indeed be true.

On the other hand, this feminist stance parallels to some extent the same kind of categorical reasoning used by church officials to defend church teaching. Just as church officials frame Catholic identity in terms of either/or dichotomies (e.g., you can be gay or Catholic, but not both), feminists who eschew the possibility of a feminist Catholic identity articulate a similarly monolithic understanding (i.e., you can be feminist or Catholic, but not both). In the same way that the church hierarchy’s framing of Catholic identity leaves little room for the diversity of individuals’ lived experiences (e.g., their experience of feeling and being gay), so too do some feminists underappreciate how the socio-biographical contexts of individual lives allow a mix of emotional and cognitive schemas to make some options appear more real than others. Thus, once again, because of the intersectionality of personal and communal narratives, of particularistic and more universal experiences, the visceral pull of Catholicism as a pluralistic and communal tradition can override, to some extent, the double marginality that it visits on lesbian women. One lesbian woman spoke directly to this dialectic. In recounting her intense struggle with Catholicism, she also elaborated on the richness and meaningfulness of her emotional and cultural connection to Catholicism. She stated,

I think when Catholic lesbians come out, it’s like a double oppression. Like black women have a totally different view of what oppression is about. And I think that’s true for lesbians too because when you don’t get privilege you feel it, you really can see it and you’re hurt by it. And I think that’s why a lot of lesbians just can’t stay connected with the church. I think I wanted to stay connected because my spirituality has always kept me sane. It’s always really made me feel better about myself. It’s who I was and helped me make sense of the world when nothing else did. Catholic spirituality worked for me. I’ve always been really lucky to have been exposed to the progressive stuff…the fringe stuff that keeps me alive…I just don’t know why. I have this thing about ‘No, I’m still Catholic.’ It’s like a gene thing. Nobody can take that away and tell me that I’m not. I want to stay connected to that spirituality and also this social justice stuff, you know. That’s real. And there’s a way in which ritual – there’s lots of ritual in the world – but there’s a way in the ritual, although I struggle with it at times, a way that I can’t even name. But I think in some ways it’s familiar. And it touches different parts of me…. And it isn’t always at a conscious level. It feels like an important piece of history for me that right now I still want to carry with me and sort of build…

Overall, then, the pull of Catholicism exemplified by the foregoing quotation, means that many gays, lesbians, and feminists remain Catholic not because they are ideologically duped but because, like their sexuality and gender (and race), they experience Catholicism as part of their embodied selves. The “gene thing” gives them a powerful reason to maintain their connection to the larger culture, history, and tradition of Catholicism notwithstanding their rejection of select aspects of that tradition. They are gay/lesbian and Catholic and choose not to renounce any part of that identity but instead to challenge cultural definitions that frame these as contradictory identities. Indeed, because they experience such a strong sense of solidarity with Catholicism, they are empowered to rework its symbols and practices in ways
that make it more inclusive of their gay identity. Gay and lesbian Catholics who affirm both their sexuality and their Catholicism are thus able to reconcile particularistic claims with claims to participation in a larger communal tradition. They work at “owning the identity differently,” at selectively accepting history and tradition while simultaneously repositioning themselves in relation to it and thus creating “new” combinant identities. These new identities, clearly, are not made out of whole cloth but are furrowed deep in history. The process is not without frustration and conflict, but it shows nonetheless that plural identities do not have to be either contradictory or segmented from larger communal bonds.

The temptation to celebrate communally autonomous identities in this age of rapid globalization with its proliferation of life choices means that established religious and national traditions, for example, may seem outmoded for today’s culture of diversity. Religious and national traditions are often, and quite rightly, seen as suppressing difference. Yet, while it is prudent to be critical of all traditions, we should also recognize that traditions themselves have multiple strands— they are rarely all “bad” or all “good”— and because of their larger communal frame, they can anchor and bridge particularistic differences. To argue either for a universalism that suppresses differences, or for the proliferation of segmented subcultural groups that dissociate identity from broader communal connections is a tempting response to the practical and political challenges posed by cultural diversity. But, as gay and lesbian Catholics show, it is possible to carve a middle way, one that encompasses the integrative aspects of a broadly shared history and tradition with the specificity of particular individual and group experiences. In this, they illuminate that difference does not necessarily threaten community and that in fact community is invariably forged out of diversity. More generally, they also illustrate the emergent and socially contingent nature of identity.

References


Further Reading


In everyday life, the meaning of race is often taken for granted. Race is a self-evident way that individuals and groups are categorized, cultural habits are described, and cultural artifacts like music, art, and foods are classified. Particularly in the United States, government statistics and social scientific data are collected on the racial breakdown of populations in a way that also assumes the existence of races and racial groups. Seminal studies of race in America by W. E. B. DuBois (1899, 1982) and E. Franklin Frazier (1957) in the first half of the twentieth century, as well as subsequent sociological studies of “race relations,” reflect this racial commonsense. In methodological terms, studies of race relations tend to construe race as an independent variable that exerts a causal effect on dependent variables like attitudes (i.e., prejudice), individual and group identities, and individual life chances.

In recent years, however, this social scientific racial commonsense has been unsettled by developments in cultural theory and cultural studies of race. The “cultural turn” in the social sciences, which has been energized by these developments, introduced new theoretical and methodological problems for the study of race. Existing nonbiological understandings of race have been deepened by terms such as practice, discourse, symbolic boundaries, and identity. These terms provide the framework in which the threshold for analyzing race has been pushed back from the interactions between what are assumed to be invariant racial groups to the constitution of racial groups themselves – via signifying practices and performative behaviors. From an epistemological perspective, race is no longer construed as an independent variable. Instead, it is analyzed as a dependent variable that must be accounted for both theoretically and empirically. Aside from these analytical challenges to the race relations perspective, the cultural-sociological perspective calls into question the normative meaning and strategic viability of race as a category of political action and policymaking after the end of de facto racial segregation and colonial domination – whether positively (affirmative action) or negatively (racial
One consequence of the cultural turn is that it is far easier to discuss what race was than it is to say what race is.

In spite of this difficulty, a few basic questions can still be posed: What is “race”? When sociologists study race, what kind of object are they measuring, coding, interpreting, and correlating? When we say race explains disproportionate rates of poverty, labor market segmentation, or styles of musical performance, what precisely is doing the work of an independent variable? Three answers are possible: two are sociological, the third is biological. The first sociological answer is that race is a social construction, a product of creative acts of the social imagination that describe subjective experience. The second sociological answer, found in race relations scholarship, is that race is the collective or aggregate objective experience among given groups, an experience reflecting conditions like colonialism and legal discrimination. The biological answer would hold that race is a natural characteristic of the species Homo sapiens, traceable to the distribution of genetic markers or other phenotypical characteristics. Although most sociologists routinely reject the biological answer, this answer has an undeniable advantage over the sociological ones. Because it defines race as a natural, and therefore, unalterable objective characteristic that distinguishes groups in the human population, the biological account produces a set of hypothetically stable “racial” objects: biological markers of racial difference. The social constructivist and race relations accounts lack such stability, since both the subjective experience of race and the objective experience of political and legal domination are variable. Because the constructivist account of race turns race into a product of the imagination, there is no stable object available to refer to when speaking of race. For race relations analysts, the erosion of overt forms of domination and discrimination raises the question of whether the experience of race and racism is truly collective. Thus, these answers to the question “What is race?” present a sociological conundrum: how can we attribute an independent causal force to such an unstable, inconstant object?

To state the problem directly: How should we conceptualize a sociological object that is, to use the terminology of Margaret Archer, vexatious? A vexatious sociological object is one that has no “immutable form or even preferred state” (Archer, 1995: 5). Race is just such an object. It is a durable social fact that lacks immutable form; it is a fiction, but a powerful one that has real effects on individual life chances. Cultural sociology provides important conceptual tools necessary for objectifying race, this vexatious phenomenon, as a sociological object, tools that offer a way to overcome the conceptual and methodological quandary posed when race is not construed as a biological fact. These tools enable us to study race as a set of durable, structural, symbolically mediated relationships that arise from the constitutive force of racial categories and racially defined practices. Rather than treating race, in the first instance, as an attribute inherent to individuals or groups or the structure of social systems, race might better be construed as the durable effects of a symbolic system that constructs and reproduces race as a form of social difference. It is a structured, yet contingent, feature of social life. This chapter offers an overview of what I believe is the past and the future of cultural studies of race, a future in which approaches that emphasize the political and the performative dimensions of social life will be better able to objectify the structured contingency of race as a cultural object.
While Paul Gilroy (2000: 11–53) describes the current crisis of “race and raciology” as the product of phenomena like genome research, and the globalization and commercialization of racially marked cultures and imagery, a different crisis was initiated within American sociology by William Julius Wilson’s *The Declining Significance of Race* (1980). Wilson offered a compelling historical account of how race, and particularly virulently racist ideologies, coincided with shifting historical patterns of labor force competition between black and white workers. He argued that in the wake of the end of *de jure* racial discrimination during the 1960s, a black middle class emerged that did not face intense competition with whites for white collar jobs. For this middle class, Wilson posited a declining significance of race (or racism) because racist ideologies were not mobilized against it (as a result of the absence of intense labor market competition with whites). Wilson further argued that a black “underclass” was left behind in urban centers by the exodus of the black middle class to suburbs. Consequently, this underclass group struggled with “ethnic” whites for the provision of education, housing, and health benefits from city governments that lacked the financial wherewithal to provide adequate services for those in need.

Wilson’s argument that middle-class African-Americans face different life chances because of their social class position in post-1960s America, while not particularly informed by a cultural perspective, nevertheless made plausible the idea that a middle-class social status could produce observable cultural differences (in terms of lifestyle, behaviors, and political interests). It was the notion that meaningful differences existed within the African-American community that unsettled the conventional understanding of race as an overdetermining factor in the lives of blacks (and whites) as opposed to social class. Wilson’s analytical framework also opened the door to the idea that differences in beliefs and values might arise from social class distinctions. He emphasized “social structural” conditions (related to the economy and polity) rather than cultural factors (ideologies and beliefs about race) as the defining feature of social reality that made race significant in varying ways during different historical eras.

In this respect Wilson departed from the orientation to race found in the earlier social constructionism. Early accounts of race in the constructionist paradigm contributed to a rejection of the biological definitions of race that were prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The analytical import of the view that race is a social construction can be seen in Herbert Blumer’s description of the social interactionist perspective (also a constructivist account). According to Blumer, symbolic interaction refers “to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions…. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another’s actions” (1969: 78–9). Such interpretive actions always occur with reference to a “situation”: “the action is formed or constructed by interpreting the situation” (85). From this perspective, race could be construed as an artifact of the interpretive actions of social actors rather than as a biological fact.
These social construction definitions typically transformed race from a biological or natural phenomenon into a cultural or social category. Social scientists as different as Horace Kallen, Robert Park, and Melville Herskovits understood what formerly had been biologically defined racial groups as cultural formations. This analytical break with biological conceptions accomplished the following: it freed the study of race from explicitly hierarchical, Social Darwinistic understandings of the relations between racial groups. Moreover, it shifted the focus of study from physical characteristics to social relationships between racially defined groups and set the terms for distinguishing ethnicity (defined in positive terms of a national-ethnic culture) and race (defined in negative terms of subordination, discrimination, and subjection). Two characteristic ways of studying race developed from the early social construction paradigm: the race relations approach (ranging from social-psychological studies of racial attitudes to empirical studies of racial conflict) and the study of patterns of assimilation of ethnic groups. In relation to these approaches, Wilson substituted a social structural explanation of racial attitudes and racial conflict for the cultural and psychological/cultural approach of many race relations scholars. The social structural explanation, derived from the analysis of the effect of socioeconomic status, was compatible with longitudinal, quantitative studies of the correlation of race to various instances of social inequality (economic, health, housing, etc.).

A significant reassertion of the cultural approach to the study of race came with the publication of *Racial Formation in the United States* by Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994). Arguing against three alternative views of race (ethnicity, class, and nation), Omi and Winant make the case for the specificity and autonomy of the category of race from other factors. Hence, because racial identities were not to be understood as mere consequences of class relations, their direct criticism of Wilson’s social structural or “class” model of race relations involves a reversal of the causal direction of Wilson’s variables: in other words, racial dynamics determine class position. Having emancipated the concept of race from a reduction to ethnicity, class, and nation, Omi and Winant connect a social constructivist view of race with politics: “race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (1994: 55). Racial formations are cultural and ideological movements centered around racial identities that target the state; they are projects that are “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (56). In comparison with Wilson, Omi and Winant emphasize the cultural and political dimensions of race rather than social class. Moreover, against the idea that the significance of race might be in decline (in any way), they assert that race remains “an element of social structure” (55).

Recently, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who has proposed a rigorous structuralist account of race, has rejected this political-cultural conception of race for over-emphasizing cultural and ideological processes. In an effort to move away from largely psychological interpretations of racism, Bonilla-Silva argues for a “structural interpretation of racism.” Rather than viewing racism in “idealist” terms, as the product of ideology or cultural processes, he asserts the priority of “racialized social systems,” as societies “in which economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races”
(1996: 469). In this model, social systems are always already racialized rather than being dependent on the ebb and flow of measurable racist beliefs. From this perspective, he argues that racism describes only “the racial ideology of a racialized social system” (467). For Bonilla-Silva, only a social structuralist conception provides an “adequate theoretical foundation” that can resist the reduction of race (and racism) to either class structure or irrational ideology (475).

A structuralist account of race might be taken as the best way to avoid the unavoidable sense of contingency that a social constructivist perspective introduces to the study of race, the contingency that reinforces the vexatious quality of race as an object of analysis. Yet, as Mara Loveman argues, this degree of conceptual certainty is gained at the cost of reifying race itself (1999: 891). Moreover, Bonilla-Silva’s theoretical model operates on the basis of a binary opposition of structure and culture that has increasingly been rejected in the social sciences. Since the application of structuralist approaches found in linguistics to the study of kinship systems in the work of Lévi-Strauss, cultural sociologists have drawn on conceptions of language, representations, and discourse from anthropology and humanities in ways that overcome the structure versus culture division. Cultural sociologists as diverse as Ann Swidler (1986), William H. Sewell Jr. (1992), Robert Wuthnow (1987), Clifford Geertz (1973), and Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990) have demonstrated the limitations of the conventional definition of “culture.” This definition views culture as the subjectively held ideas, beliefs, values, and motivations that reside primarily inside the heads of individuals. The break with this culture concept is the basis of a new approach in theoretical and empirical research that locates culture in publicly available, observable events and practices. By reformulating the culture concept in this way, recent cultural sociology has shifted perspective, from a functional to a performative description of culture that emphasizes symbolic practices, the structuring effects of discursive or symbolic frameworks, and the dimension of symbolic force that is put into play through the use of categories and social distinctions. From this perspective, the social effects of race that social scientists actually measure are not embodied group characteristics or subjective beliefs. Rather they are the effects of a socio-cultural logic that imposes (or fails to impose) racial categories and meanings on the bodies of individuals.

If one keeps this reformulated culture concept in mind, which treats culture as a discursive structure, then a range of works across different disciplines can be viewed as making contributions to new approaches that conceptualize race as a structured, cultural object rather than as a permanent feature of social systems or as individual identity. These approaches might be characterized as falling into, or between, structuralist and constructivist analytical frameworks. They also vary according to whether they (1) place an emphasis on the conditioning effects of racial symbolic meanings or the performance of these meanings; and (2) demonstrate the functionality or contingency of racial categories, meanings, and practices. I will discuss two areas in which these new approaches have been put into play: the study of the political use of racial categories (and antagonism) and the study of what can be called race practices.
In light of this line of research, one can see that the race relations perspective in sociology has failed to address several basic questions: What are the processes that have caused the category of race to be of practical salience in everyday life? Or, to pose this question in properly political terms: How did race come to be what (following Bourdieu) can be called a principle “vision of social division”? How did the social construction “race” become naturalized to such an extent that it can be viewed as a natural object, an object that calls forth social scientific legitimation? These questions relate to the phenomenon of symbolic power and violence: the capacity to create a world of social objects and relations between social objects that circulates in discourse and is institutionalized through various instruments of the “state” (in particular, its legal instruments). The specific form of symbolic power that is an attribute of the state is clearly expressed by Nietzsche: “The lordly right of bestowing names is such that one would almost be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an expression of the rulers’ power. They say, ‘This is that or that’; they seal off each thing and action with a sound and thereby take symbolic possession of it” (1956: 160).

Bringing the state in: the political production of race

In recent years, a range of political scientists and political theorists have embarked on studies of culture in politics that diverge from the canonical model of political culture that was organized around studies of political modernization (Pye and Verba, 1965; Almond and Bingham Powell Jr., 1966; Devine, 1972; Grew, 1978). This work focuses on institutions and their dynamics in the production of categories of citizens and noncitizens. In the American case, race figures centrally as a symbolic structure that marked off the boundaries of political membership and solidified, if only temporarily and never successfully, the notion of what it meant to be an American. The studies I will discuss illustrate the production of race in the politics of the census, and the consolidation of the American State and its political authority.

In her study of the political uses of the census in American history, Melissa Nobles illustrates the connection between political institutions and the production of racial categories and meanings. According to Nobles, “censuses register and reinforce the racial identifications germane to citizenship through the process of categorization itself” (2000: 5). Her comparative analysis of the imbrication of race and censuses in the United States and Brazil reveals differences that reinforce the claim that race is a contingent social construction. While questions about race are found on every decennial American census, Nobles points out that the reason for this “is not self-evidently – or transparently – connected to demographic concerns, since the initial impetus for census-taking was political” (26). Between 1790 and 1832 categorical distinctions were made between free white males and females, free colored persons, slaves, and Indians. The 1830 and 1840 censuses employ the categories free white persons, free colored persons, and slaves. By 1840, however, the collection of
demographic information by “race” was directly tied to theoretical developments in the racial science of the age and the growing conflict over slavery. Josiah Nott and others who supported the theory of polygenesis – that the human race comprises several unequal species – hoped the 1840 census would substantiate the view that blacks were inherently inferior, were debilitated under conditions of freedom, and, correlative, would be unfit for assimilation into American society.

Although the findings of that census (high rates of insanity among free northern blacks) were contested, the 1850 census was again used to test racial science: this time, a theory that racial intermixture produced persons who were “less fertile than their parents of pure races, and hence lived shorter lives” (Nobles, 2000: 37). Thus, the category “mulatto” was added to the 1850 census. Subsequent censuses used the categories white, black, mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon (as well as Chinese, Indian, and Japanese) until 1920, which was the last year a mixed racial category appeared in the census. In Nobles’s account, for the next 40 years the census played less of a role in “constituting racial discourse.” However, she argues that “census categorization sustained racial discourse, inasmuch as categorizing and counting by race gave it an official existence” (63). In the wake of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and attendant social policy, census politics today revolves around the use of racial and ethnic categories to measure conditions of social inequality and federal mandates aimed at ameliorating these conditions.

The politics of the construction of these categories is illustrated by the Office of Management and Budget’s Statistical Directive No. 15 (issued in 1977). This directive ordered that federal agencies and the Census Bureau utilize five official racial and ethnic categories: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, and White. After receiving criticism from new immigrant groups and people of mixed racial background, new guidelines were recommended in 1997 that would allow individuals to choose more than one racial category on the 2000 census. While this fell short of a proposal for a multiracial category, the results of the 2000 census were that over two hundred thousand African-Americans chose a second racial category (http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/census/majorgroups/us/us_state_fips.html). Brazil, in contrast, presents a striking counter-example because its census has measured racial mixtures. Therefore, the Brazilian census has helped to promote the quasi-official state representation of that nation as a “racial democracy.” It has also frustrated the desires of activists in Brazil’s black movement (movimento negro) for putative “blacks” to self-identify as such in order that statistical measures of inequality that correlate with racial divisions could be acknowledged and addressed as a problem of race or racism.

Nobles’s approach to the study of race might be characterized as the political production of race, which rests on a critique of approaches that treat race as entirely malleable: “theoretical formulations that stress the radical plasticity of race, mostly correctly, I think, risk obscuring its concrete manifestations and the institutional sites of its construction and maintenance. These scholars may view races as political in some fundamental way, but they pay little close attention to state institutions and political processes” (2000: 12). Anthony Marx’s comparative study of race and nation in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States develops from a similar standpoint. To account for contemporary race relations, Marx argues that the state must be brought into the analytical framework: “States made race: amid pervasive discrimination, official actions enforced racial distinctions or did not, with
profound consequences” (2000: 2). Behind these actions are interests that are specific to the exercise of political authority. In the cases of South Africa and the United States, the deployment of race is imbricated in the containment of social conflict.

Political and economic elites have consistently been eager to ensure the stability of their societies by building institutions of coercion and coordination. . . . But such stability was often undermined by major conflict, such as the British-Afrikaner ethnic conflict in South Africa and the North-South regional conflict in the United States, dividing prominent loyalties. To diminish these conflicts, elites acted strongly to strike bargains, selling out blacks and reinforcing prior racial distinctions and ideology in order to unify whites. The state instantiated “white nationalism,” with the torque of this enforced racial identity proving powerful enough to integrate populations otherwise at war and engaged in on-going competition. (Marx, 2000: 2)

In contrast, Brazil developed a policy of “racial democracy” rather than one of segregation and exclusion toward its black population. In Marx’s framework, this becomes explicable as an exigency of the problem of nation-building. “The Brazilian state and social hierarchy faced no challenges comparable to those posed by the Afrikaners or South, and so nation-state consolidation could proceed without racial domination but with informal discrimination” (Marx, 2000: 181). And, rather than serving class interests, the different racial orders produced in these cases represented a form of class compromise within the framework of the facilitation of state building. In sum, Marx’s comparative case study of race and nation-state formation highlights the fact that the “political production of race and of particular forms of nation-state are linked processes” (268). Yet, the function of the political production of race is not, as Bonilla-Silva’s framework suggests, one of white domination per se but rather the consolidation of state capacity and political authority.

Rogers Smith’s recent reinterpretation of American political culture also illustrates the political conditions under which racial differences and inequality are produced by political elites. His basic claim is that consensus theories of American political history underplay the significance of what he calls the inegalitarian or ascriptive tradition in American politics, which he traces from the years of the Founding through the end of the nineteenth century (and beyond). By looking at regimes of citizenship rules, Smith demonstrates that the terms of citizenship have been a mixture of liberal, republican, and egalitarian principles and ascriptive, inegalitarian ones (based on racist, nativist, paternalist, and religious forms of political exclusion). Smith gives this ascriptive tradition a dominant place alongside republicanism. Moreover, he shows how political elites, while pursuing liberal democratic notions of citizenship, employed ascriptive mythologies (of racial and gender difference) and enacted exclusionary policies that would appear on the surface to contradict their commitment to liberal democracy. However, Smith argues we should actually expect just such a mixture given the practical realities of leadership and ideological commitment in a nation as diverse as the United States.

Smith gives three reasons for the significance of inegalitarian ascriptivism (which includes a discourse of racial inferiority) in American politics: (1) Intellectuals have bestowed respectability to ascriptive viewpoints. (2) Liberalizing and democratic reforms pose a threat to “institutionalized systems of status and meaning in which a
large number of Americans have been deeply invested.” This threat leads such Americans to find rationales to preserve these traditional statuses and privileges in politics, economy, and society. (3) Egalitarian, liberal republicanism fails to provide a compelling reason for why Americans should see themselves as loyal members of this society rather than any other. Here ascriptiveism’s myths of nativist, racialist, patriarchal, or religious, superiority provide a much more compelling answer to the question of political community.

These approaches to the study of race (also see Domínguez, 1986), which explicitly bring in the political dimension of racial divisions, demonstrate the way that race came to be a salient social fact in the United States. Political rights and social recognition were influenced by the institutionalization of racial discourse in the law, federal administration, and the rhetoric of political leaders. The political production perspective highlights this institution dimension of the production of racial divisions. The racial imaginary that was articulated by the State in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was socially constructed on the basis of existing biological conceptions of racial difference. Biology is unavoidable in the classification of mulattos and quadroons in the nineteenth century and in the hardening of the “one-drop rule” of racial identity in the first decade of the twentieth century. Moreover, debates over the impact of immigration on the United States were conducted in racial terminology. As Desmond King (2000) shows, the restrictions on immigration from southern and eastern Europe imposed by the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act (1924) were premised on the racialization of national origins. The same scientific discourse of biological inferiority that was mobilized in the nineteenth century to justify the denial of full citizenship rights to blacks was extended to the imputed genetic inferiority of non-northern Europeans.

Race practices: the performativity of race identity

Although Melissa Nobles’s institutionalist criticism of discourse theories of racial identity rings true of strong claims for the radical autonomy of racial identity construction, analytical approaches inspired by such theories can provide grounded frameworks for the study of practices that engender raced identities. In other words, if one quality of institutions is the logics that set conditions of possibility for specific actions, then it is possible to understand discursive frameworks as “institutions” that are constitutive of identities and action (Lee, 1998). A wide range of cultural studies of race fit closely with a discursive approach, which illustrates the production of racialized practices and identities in social interaction.

One of the most significant works in the area of “whiteness” studies is Eric Lott’s (1995) analysis of blackface minstrelsy in antebellum America. Lott explains how the minstrel show, the most successful popular form of entertainment during the nineteenth century, attracted working-class audiences in northeastern industrial centers and articulated a white working-class identity for its mostly Irish immigrant following. By viewing blackface minstrel performance as an “ethnographic miniature” (an explicit reference to Geertz), Lott explores how minstrelsy presented and worked out various social differences and their attendant identities and interests: social class and cultural differences (employers versus “producers”; elite versus working class), racial differences (“white” versus black), and the meaning of the burgeoning North–South sectional conflict over slavery for the northern working
classes. Rather than reducing minstrelsy to its depiction as racist ideology or as an authentic expression of black culture, Lott treats the contested nature of minstrelsy as a problem for analysis. In doing so, he explores the different orientations toward minstrelsy that were taken up by performers, audiences, and critics, and the symbolic racial miscegenation invoked by the aesthetic form itself (white men in blackface performing as blacks for a white audience). He argues, “Where representation once unproblematically seemed to image forth its referent, we must now think of, say, the blackface mask as less a repetition of power relations than as a signifier for them – a distorted mirror, reflecting displacements and condensations and discontinuities between which and the social field there exist lags, unevenness, multiple determinations” (Lott, 1995: 8; emphasis in original). Because Lott does not simply interpret the meaning of blackface minstrelsy from a racialized social structure or assume the effects of such a structure, he is able to illuminate the process that, in a specific time and place, produced racial structures in the public performances and consumption of images, music, and movements. Minstrelsy becomes less the sovereign act of a dominant racial system than an ongoing negotiation over the meaning of black culture, immigrant social status, the relations between working-class whites and blacks, interracial desire, and the economic and symbolic terms of cultural miscegenation.

The construction of racial identity, the deployment of a racialized imaginary to represent a racial culture, has also been studied in contemporary settings. France Winddance Twine’s ethnographies of “brown skinned white girls” in middle-class suburbs and white mothers of transracial children in Great Britain illustrate the logic of racial construction that is impacted by social conditions and the deployment of specific practices that either mark or do not mark race. In the first case, at stake are the conditions under which a race-neutral identity becomes embodied. Twine notes that “some African-descent girls . . . in the absence of a politicized African-American residential community, acquire a white identity and not a black consciousness, prior to leaving home” (1996: 206–12). Four conditions appear to facilitate the absence of a racialized identity: first, “immersion in a family and social networks which embraced a racially unmarked, middle-class identity” (208). Second, the inculcation via parenting of a white identity as “racially invisible or racially neutral” (211). Third, a middle-class socio-economic status was a “basis for their claims to a white cultural identity” (212). Finally, Twine found that a discourse of “individualism” led to a lack of a sense of being associated with a “stigmatized group” (212). This sense of identity was challenged, however, when the girls began dating and also when they moved from home to the University of California at Berkeley: a space in which political consciousness of racial identity was present.

The emphasis Twine places on the importance of “interpretative frameworks” for her subjects’ experience of being white culturally (or biracial or black) also appears in her study of “transracial mothers.” In this case, white mothers of transracial children were subjected to racialized interpretive frames by both their “white” and “black” families and community: “White women who become transracial mothers are often perceived as transgressive in their families and communities. Transracial mothers, that is, mothers who are socially classified as belonging to a racial group considered distinct from that of their children, maybe be subjected to forms of surveillance, discipline, and moral censure usually considered restricted to women of color” (Twine, 2001: 130). These women experienced racialization in a way that
cannot be accounted for by assuming an invariant racial system and the position of different racial groups within it. Rather, “white” women became racialized by giving birth to a racialized child despite being phenotypically or culturally “white” (and in some cases, middle class). Consequently they were subjected to abuse from hospitals, schools, and the police; and “assumptions made by others about their maternity, morality, sexuality, and respectability as well as their subjection to verbal abuse, physical abuse, and the denial or withdrawal of social courtesies typically extended to white people by other white people” (133). In her interviews with black relatives, Twine uncovered what she describes as a “racial logic that can be best understood as characterized by doubts concerning a white mother’s ability to parent a child (or children) of African descent properly. It was assumed that white mothers were in fact both ‘racist’ towards their own children and racially ‘disadvantaged’ because of their social experiences as ‘white’ persons with familial ties to a white community” (Twine, 1999: 190).

The negotiation of racial meanings and the processes of racialization are perhaps best revealed in cases where racial boundaries are blurred in a way that puts the objectivity of race into question. Like Twine’s study of multiracial children and the mothers of multiracial children, the process of racialization is illustrated in Rebecca Chiyoko King’s case study of multiraciality and a Japanese-American beauty pageant. Each year during the Cherry Blossom festival in San Francisco, California, a queen is elected to represent the Japanese-American community. King points out, however, that in recent years, half of the contestants and two winners of the beauty pageant were not “racially 100 percent Japanese” (1997: 113). King uses her case study to develop “a processual model of how race comes to be imbued with meaning and how that meaning changes over time” (113). Because the competition rules of Cherry Blossom Queen Pageant stipulates that contestants must “have at least one natural parent of 100 percent Japanese ancestry,” King finds that racial identity is redefined on three levels: “First, mixed-race people must manage the clash between their own perceptions of themselves and the perceptions others have of them. Second, this clash leads mixed-race people to ‘compensate’ in order to gain authentication by others. Finally, their continued assertion of their right to be part of a group forces the wider community to collectively redefine what it means to be a member of that group” (115).

The definition of “Japanese-American” is raised for both the prospective contestants and the pageant organizers. For mixed-race contestants, it meant to “look Japanese” and to be “culturally Japanese” (King, 1997: 118). King’s mixed-race informants distinguish race from culture, so that “Japanese-ness” is understood not as a matter of looks but rather as “how much one understands the culture, how one behaves, or what manners one has which give rise to how one feels inside culturally” (120). To authenticate this vision of identity, the mixed-racial contestants stressed their Japanese-ness through the use of manners and language.

---

**NORMATIVE ISSUES AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN: RACIALISM AND RECOGNITION**

Foucault (1978) has described a new form of disciplinary power that is evidenced in nineteenth century sexology and its techniques of self-confession and physical
examination forced each individual to have a specific sex (normal, abnormal, female, male, heterosexual, homosexual). An analogous trend can be seen in the rise of racial disciplines during this same period. Much like sexology, the racial disciplines (including sociology) and their techniques (self-confession, physical examination, demography, and ethnographic observation) have required each individual to have a “race.” As long as sociologists align themselves with this disciplinary project (in the Foucaultian sense) and do not view race as something akin to a religious belief system (Parsons, 1969) that is – at a fundamental level – a matter of choice for individuals, social science, and society, sociology will continue to be an unwitting participant in the very system of racialist subordination it intends to contest.

Cultural studies of race that take up either a political or discursive/practical frame of analysis put into question the permanence and necessity of the racial imaginary that has become ingrained in popular commonsense and social scientific racial science. The cultural approaches discussed above challenge the exclusion of cultural analysis by social structuralist frameworks (such as Bonilla-Silva’s). They also raise difficulties for normative and political claims made on the basis of race or racial identity politics. If racial categories and the distinctions that are based upon them have been rooted in systematic forms of social domination, if these categories are the product of the social constructions based on various biological indicators and are not grounded in biology per se, and if the persistence of racial distinctions continues to animate symbolic and physical violence between racial majorities and minorities (and between minorities), then the abolition of racial thinking would appear to be the most basic, normative condition for social emancipation from racial antagonism. This view is unthinkable for those groups who remain committed to racialism. Following Anthony Appiah, racialism can be understood as the idea that we “could divide human beings into a small number of groups, called ‘races,’ in such a way that the members of these groups shared certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other race” (1996: 54).

The cultural approaches discussed above enable one to treat racialism as a discursive or symbolic framework that must be explained rather than taken as the self-evident foundation for ethical claims. Consequently, they afford an alternative orientation to normative arguments that assume a racialist standpoint as the foundation for making claims. Racial standpoint theorists have defended their perspective against epistemological positions that reflect the cultural turn, positions that do not accept racialist foundationalism at face value. In the view of Patricia Hill Collins, such “decontextualizing” perspectives lead to a dangerous undermining of the political authority of subaltern groups.

Once decontextualized in this fashion, because all groups now occupied a flattened theoretical space of shifting centers and margins, decentering as a strategy could be more easily appropriated by groups situated anywhere within real-world hierarchical power relations. Decentering as a resistance strategy was no longer reserved for those actually oppressed within hierarchical power relations of race, class, and gender. Instead, decentering could now serve as a loose cannon/canon that could be aimed in any direction on this new flattened center/margin power landscape. (Collins, 1998: 129)
Thus, Collins argues that decentering “provides little legitimation for centers of power for Black women other than those of preexisting marginality in actual power relations” (137).

Although Collins’s view is understandable in light of the struggle that racialized groups have had in gaining access to institutions of knowledge production, it nonetheless wrongly equates two phenomena that should be kept analytically distinct – the politics of theory (i.e., the position-taking of academics in the intellectual field) and actual politics. The elision of the difference can result in what Paul Gilroy observes: “spaces in which ‘races’ come to life are a field from which political intervention has been banished. It is usually replaced by enthusiasm for the cheapest pseudo-solidarities: forms of connection that are imagined to arise effortlessly from shared phenotypes, cultures, and bio-nationalisms” (2000: 41). It remains a paradox that the proponents of a politics of identity avoid a direct confrontation with the symbolic dimension of the politics of race: the symbolic dimension that comes to the forefront whenever the identity and boundaries of a social group are at stake. The difficulties that arise from the depoliticization of racial identity formation is apparent in Iris Young’s account of why groups rather than individuals (and their choice of group affiliation) should be the basis of a theory of justice that addresses cultural subordination. According to Young, “one first finds a group identity as given, and then takes it up in a certain way. While groups may come into being, they are never founded” (1990: 46). When applied to racial groups, this claim implies these groups exist independently of any ongoing symbolic acts of unmaking and remaking, acts that often take the form of the practical and institutional imposition of racial categories whose genesis and practical effects originated in symbolic domination. A theoretical and practical commitment to a racialist vision, in which individual identities would be defined by group characteristics that share in common a racial basis, would seem to require complicity with a system of racial domination that is, paraxodically, the object of critique. This apparent contradiction is well described by Pierre Bourdieu: “When the dominated apply to what dominates them schemes that are the product of domination, or, to put it another way, when their thoughts and perceptions are structured in accordance with the very structures of the relation of domination that is imposed on them, their acts of cognition are, inevitably, acts of recognition, submission” (2001: 13).

However, if we inquire into the conditions of possibility of racialized groups rather than posit these groups as an empirical and analytical a priori of normative criticism and political action, the symbolic investment in the category of race that originated as one technique of social domination can be brought to light. As Anthony Appiah (1992) argues, racialism in biological-ascriptive form does not succeed in explaining the racial characteristics that matter most: social and cultural behaviors. However, the social constructionist tendency to substitute culture for race (in its biological-ascriptive form) also does not overcome the gap between ascription and achievement, prediction and performance.

We can ask whether someone is really of a black race, because the constitution of this identity is generally theoretically committed; we expect people of a certain race to behave a certain way not simply because they are conforming to the script for that identity, performing that role, but because they have certain antecedent properties that are consequences of the label’s properly applying to them. It is because ascription of
The possibility of “passing,” which, depending on one’s ethical commitments, is either a mark of inauthenticity or a gesture of autonomy, is precisely what is closed down by the substitution of culture for biology. Multiculturalism, the collection of racial demographics in census questionnaires and affirmative action policies (in the United States), is what Nancy Fraser (1997) describes as an affirmative form of cultural recognition. It comports most easily with existing social policies that characterize and measure the situation of individuals in terms of their real or imputed group memberships. These redistributive policies fit neatly with a redistributive politics of recognition such as multiculturalism. However, the affirmative recognition of existing racial categories and redistribution of material and symbolic resources on this basis does not challenge or undermine the existing racialist social imagination.

It is on these grounds that Walter Benn Michaels (1995) argues against contemporary multiculturalism. Preferring to define what a person’s culture is only on the basis of the cultural practices that person actually performs, Michaels finds the assertion of group cultural differences only works to the extent that culture functions the way biology does for fixing racial-cultural boundaries. Culture must function in an ascriptive way because, if cultural identity were purely achieved, nothing would stand in the way of any individual’s adoption of any cultural identity as long as she took up the proper practices. If racial-cultural identity is dependent upon what one does rather than what one is, then practice rather than ascribed racial-cultural background is doing the work of defining identity. Michaels criticizes what he terms the “no-drop” rule of racial-cultural identity (i.e., social science’s cultural constructions of race) for missing the point concerning the problem of essentialism this rule purportedly overcomes: “Transforming the question of whether or not there is such a thing as individual racial identity into the question of whether or not race is an ‘essence’ and thus deploying race as the ground of the question rather than as its object, this debate reinvigorates and relegitimates race as a category of analysis” (1995: 134–5). Rather than pursuing a cultural concept of race that is nonessentialist, an alternative strategy would be to pursue what Fraser calls a transformative politics of recognition: “a deep restructuring of the relations of recognition” (1997: 27). In terms of race, this would entail fostering the deconstruction of binary racial oppositions and, I would argue, racialist normative claims.

One form this might take would be a focus on “hybridity” in the construction of racialized identities, on the symbolic and material forms of cultural miscegenation that appear in everyday life: from the splicing together of originally distinct cultural practices into new objects (e.g., the cross-pollination of hip-hop aesthetics, with rock and roll and jazz) and new styles in speech and fashion to the variety of individual identities that are shaped under conditions of racial-cultural contact. From a methodological perspective, different techniques would be required to “measure” race as a hybrid object – perhaps those that can be drawn from fuzzy set logic (Ragin, 2000). From a normative perspective, this orientation is not incompatible with the analytical approach to the study of race, which focuses on the institutional politics.
of the making of race and the exigencies of the performance of raced identities in social interaction. It is less compatible, however, with approaches that view race as a permanent feature of social structure.

**BEYOND BINARY, RACIALIST THINKING**

One of the chief tasks for the study of race after the cultural turn is to achieve what feminist theory accomplished long ago with respect to the sex/gender system: the separation of the body (race) from the cultural construction of the body (racialism/raciology). Until scholars of race capture the distinction between a phenotypically raced body and the racialized meanings that are deployed upon such bodies, they will fail to avoid the reproduction of a crypto-biological concept of race. However, while such a binary distinction between bodies and social constructions of race would represent an enormous advance, an additional innovation is required at the level of social construction itself. It would entail a break with the binary opposition of racial meanings (socio-cultural constructions of race). With respect to the construction of gender meanings, Judith Butler poses the limits of binary thinking as follows:

If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limits, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of “men” will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that “women” will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question), there is no reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two. The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and *woman* and *female* a male body as easily as a female one. (1999: 10)

If, following Butler, it were possible to maintain (in thought) a discontinuity between raced bodies and culturally constructed races, then racial meanings (of whatever kind) can attach to any body and the number of racial meanings would logically be unlimited by anything other than the limits of language and the imagination (e.g., Tiger Woods’s self-designation as “cablinasian” or “caucasian-black-indian-asian”).

On the other hand, if we descend from the level of logic to that of cultural analysis and political practice, there are two issues that cultural studies of race should face in the future. First, such studies must relinquish their binary constructions of racial identity and become more attuned to the measurement of racial discontinuities and hybridities that are always already there in the social world. Second, political and ethical considerations of the impact of racial formations should seek to nurture and strengthen the processes that generate discontinuities and hybridities at the level of civil rights and other institutional mechanism. Rather than lamenting
the insufficiency of racial consciousness (e.g., Brazil), rejecting efforts to recognize multiply raced identities via the census, or demonizing those individuals who transgress the limits of conventions of racial etiquette, antiracist strategies should look precisely to these violations of convention in order to redescribe how the structured contingency of race is articulated in social practices.

References


Collective Memory and Cultural Amnesia
On December 7, 2001, almost three months after the September 11 destruction of New York’s Twin Towers, President George W. Bush marked the sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor on the USS Enterprise, an aircraft carrier just returned from duty in the Afghanistan war. Television news gave Pearl Harbor unprecedented coverage, explaining its entrenchment in American memory. CBS commentator Bob Schieffer compared the Japanese assault with al-Qaeda’s: “If we should forget what they did [at Pearl Harbor] we will risk forgetting what we can do. And only then will the terrorists win.” Newspapers, magazines, and television journalists consulted experts to compare the two events. How did September 11, 2001, differ from December 7, 1941? What did the latter teach us about the former? After the Japanese American internments, would the government now protect Muslim citizens? Would September 11 occupy as large a place in American memory as December 7? Withal, commentators assumed that their viewers knew what American memory meant in the first place, a major assumption, for the Twin Towers calamity, meaning different things to so many different people, challenges rather than affirms any notion of a “collective” remembrance. How could that event mean the same thing to liberals and conservatives, blacks and whites, Jews, Christians, and Muslims, the airline and bus industries, insurance companies and stockbrokers, automobile makers and the hotel industry? The term “collective memory” has become part of popular language, but its meaning is far from clear.

Since different individuals possess different beliefs about the past, some critics have denied the possibility of an authentically collective memory. Their protests raise more problems than they solve. If collective memory is dismissed, are we to deny collective opinion (public opinion), too? Since different people say different things with different accents, do we conclude that common language is a fiction? Yet, the problem of definition remains: What, precisely, does collective memory mean?
DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY STUDIES

Collective memory is an umbrella term covering the relations between history and commemorative symbols on the one hand, and, on the other, individual beliefs, sentiments, and judgments of the past. (For detail, see Funkenstein, 1989; Olick and Robbins, 1998.) Thus conceived, collective memory does not mean “shared memory” or even interpretations on which most people agree; it means that individuals form beliefs about the past through interaction with others. When Americans were urged to “Remember Pearl Harbor” in 1942, most remembered where they were and what they were doing when they first heard about the attack over the radio or from another person. When Americans are urged to “Remember Pearl Harbor” in 2001, most remember what they have read in school, watched on television documentaries, or witnessed at the Hawaii shrines and memorials. The basic fact of collective memory is that different individuals and generations interpret and commemorate the same event differently.

French scholar Emile Durkheim, pioneered the research that made collective memory a science. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1965), Durkheim demonstrated that periodic commemoration rites were the earliest means for keeping the past alive (414–33). Durkheim’s student Maurice Halbwachs made memory a sociological specialty covering a wide range of topics: in Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire (The Social Frames of Memory, 1975), he dealt with the social context of individual remembering and forgetting. La Topographie Legendaire des Evangiles en Sainte-Terre (The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land, 1941), a study of religious commemoration, concerned the sites of events connected with the life of Christ and the origin of Christianity. The Collective Memory (1980) contains Halbwachs’s theoretical essays, written during the late 1920s and 1930s, describing the relationship between “historical,” “collective,” and personal memory.

Before 1980, the year Collective Memory appeared in English, most American sociologists ignored Halbwachs. Lloyd Warner, the only American then addressing seriously the problem of collective memory (The Living and the Dead, 1959), did not even mention him. After 1980, however, Halbwachs was cited time and again, even though his two major books, The Social Frames of Memory and The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land, were available only in French. Therefore, Halbwachs’s discoveries could not have caused the great current of collective memory research that began in the 1980s and 1990s; they were swept into it.

The culture in which Halbwachs worked during the 1920s and 1930s provides important clues to both his interest in collective memory and the enthusiasm with which his colleagues read his work. The sociology of memory, as a branch of the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936, 1952), “takes on pertinence under a definite complex of social and cultural conditions in which shared orientations diminish and are overshadowed by incompatible differences, where one universe of discourse challenges all others and statements and truth claims are assessed in terms of the social interests of those who produced them.” (Merton, 1957: 459). Collective memory became part of sociology under such conditions – the years of disillusionment and cynicism between World Wars I and II – and has since lent itself mainly to the disparaging of the past. Because collective memory studies have the
best chance of development in circumstances marked by challenges to tradition, its
“perspective can then be understood in terms of such phrases as ‘seeing through,’
‘looking behind,’ very much as such phrases would be used in common speech –
‘seeing through the game,’ ‘looking behind the scenes’ – in other words, ‘being up on
all the tricks’” (Berger, 1963: 30). Collective memory scholarship plays a prominent
role in the modern art of mistrust.

During the 1980s and 1990s, as sociology’s debunking motif matured, collective
memory studies became politicized and assimilated history and commemoration as
objects of political struggle. This new “politics of memory” not only challenges
flattering historical accounts but also emphasizes historical shortcomings. Three
overlapping perspectives – multiculturalism, postmodernism, and cultural conflict –
embody these tendencies.

Multiculturalism, an egalitarian ideology, emphasizes the virtues of “marginalized” peoples. Assuming that understandings of the past are determined by the
dominant community’s interests and sensibilities, multiculturalists conclude that
conventional history necessarily marginalizes outsiders. The elevation of Abraham
Lincoln, for example, is said to assert the supremacy of individual white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant males. Multicultural perspectives have led to a new and more
inclusive “history from below” that attends to the experiences of ordinary people as
well as prominent leaders. Relying on the doctrine of “multiple truths,” multiculturalism asserts that every minority group is entitled to interpret the past as it
pleases, independently of “Eurocentric” male concepts and proofs (American Asso-

Postmodernism’s entry into social science curricula (Rosenau, 1992) has also
affected our understanding of collective memory. The “postmodern turn,” occurring
during the third quarter of the twentieth century (1950–75), altered American
historical consciousness in many ways. Focusing on the “petit narratives” of minor-
ities – African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, women, and
homosexuals otherwise written out of the historical record – postmodern theory
feeds the multicultural program and makes traditional understandings of the past
appear wrongheaded and irrelevant. As Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv, 14, 37)
suggests, there can be no single grand narrative, only separate narratives of separate
groups.

Conflict theorists, like multiculturalists and postmodernists, treat memory as a
contested object of differently empowered communities, but their main concern is to
know how the privileged produce historical images that induce subordinate classes
to be content with their lot, and how the latter resist by asserting their own version
of the past. Conflict theory takes two forms. In the radical theory of the politics of
memory, historians and commemorative agents create a dominant ideology to
manipulate the attitudes of their audience in the service of society’s privileged strata
(Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1980; Gillis, 1994). The fascinating insights of the
radical theory are to be found in many sources, including Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger’s *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), which depicts commemoration
being used as an instrument of social control (rich people controlling the poor)
during Europe’s democratic revolutions; Ana Maria Alonso (1988) on state histories
performing a similar control function in authoritarian nations; John Bodnar (1992)
on America’s “official” and “vernacular” memory, which supports the interests of
the elite and the masses respectively; Lyn Spillman’s (1997) analyses of centennials
and bicentennials reflecting the changing distribution of power in America and
Australia.

The second, more subtle, strand of the politics of memory literature works on two
levels: on the first, societal, level, power is diffused rather than concentrated, and
commemorative objects emerge out of a context of cross-cutting coalitions, net-
works, and enterprises rather than a ruling elite’s interest in maintaining its privilege.
In the fate of artistic and presidential reputations, Holocaust memories, place-
naming and monument-making, and the organization of museums we find collective
memory’s reflecting and maintaining pluralistic networks of interest and power
second, psychological, level, the politics of memory is animated by definite cognitive
and affective dynamics. Eviatar Zerubavel (1992, 1993, 1998, 1997), for example,
shows how “mnemonic communities” maintain “mnemonic traditions,” teach new
generations what to remember and forget through “mnemonic socialization,” the
monitoring of “mnemonic others,” and the fighting of “mnemonic battles.” Thus,
remembering comes into view as a control system revealing not what can be
remembered but dictating what should be remembered. Historical beginnings,
endings, and periodizations are so conceived as to legitimate the state’s regimes
and policies, civil society’s values, and individual identities.

**PROVINCIAL TRUTHS**

Multiculturalism, postmodernism, and conflict models have enriched collective
memory scholarship, for much is at stake in the outcome of groups struggling
among themselves over the meaning of the past. Debates over historically rooted
affirmative action claims in the United States and Palestinians and Israelis fighting
over the same land in the Middle East exemplify such struggles. Since different
collectivities see the past according to their own interests and present experiences,
perception of the past sustains and often intensifies social conflict.

As a research agenda, however, the politics of memory present many problems.
Proponents believe that the past cannot be known because distortion is the rule of
historical understanding, because historical accounts are always hostage to the
conditions of the present rather than the preponderance of evidence. They over-
emphasize oppressive actions, challenge the majority’s monopolization of dignity
and virtue but rarely investigate the merit of minority claims. They assume conflict is
the natural state of society but fail to acknowledge, let alone understand, consensual
understandings of the past. Strong liberal biases cause social scientists to be fact-
oriented when addressing the “dominant” society’s sins (Columbus’s atrocities
against Indians are taken for granted) and fact-aversive when addressing the domin-
ant society’s virtues (facts about Henry Ford’s accomplishments are not facts at all,
but “constructions” designed to make us love capitalism). Rooted in a progressive
strain of thought, such theories define the national past as a burden and seek to
liberate the present from the grip of the past.

Behind these problems is the cultural and historical context in which the sociology
of memory plays itself out. Collective memory study emerged after World War I as
common values eroded and individuals became alienated from their institutions and
traditions. “In a world of change, memory becomes complicated. Any revolution,
any rapid alteration of the givens of the present places a society’s connection
with its history under pressure” (Terdiman, 1993: 3). Conditions underlying the
post–World War I memory crisis are similar to those of our own time: the weakening
of the individual’s connection to his or her society, the replacement of a traditional
sense of continuity by a momentous “psychohistorical dislocation” (Lifton, 1993:
14–17) – the breaking of the bond that once linked men and women to vital symbols
of their culture. This rupture of present and past leads Pierre Nora to assert,
“Memory is constantly on our lips because it no longer exists” (1996: 1). Only the
most provincial academic imagination would take Nora’s claim seriously, but how
do we retain the great insights of collective memory scholarship while avoiding its
excesses? Since collective memory study was inspired in the West, established in the
West, and practiced mainly in the West, its insights and excesses must be bound up
with Western values.

LOOKING EAST

Culture’s ethos and worldview require us to see the past as a force in its own right, as
less a reflection of present meanings than a source of past meanings in the present.
Culture’s tone, character, life quality, mood, moral and aesthetic character define its
“ethos.” Peoples’ ideas about who they are, their image of nature and their society,
how the order of nature and society sustains itself, make up its “worldview” (Geertz,
1973: 126–7). That commemoration is an important part of culture’s ethos; history,
a key aspect of its worldview, became apparent to one of the authors when he
collaborated in a study of the Chinese communist regime’s representation of Confu-
cius before, during, and after its 1966–76 Cultural Revolution.

Tendencies to distort the past occur when a regime’s legitimacy or a nation’s pride
is at stake, but the past of many cultures is too authoritative to be distorted. The
Chinese people’s reverence for Confucius has varied across generations, but they
have never felt free to reconstitute his life and teachings. This does not imply that
they agree totally on what his life and teachings mean. How much emphasis to place
on Confucius’s defense of slavery or on certain statements that acknowledge materi-
alism, what he had in mind in advocating universal education, whether his concep-
tion of ethics is consistent with contemporary mores – these questions have always
been subject to debate. That Confucius stood for order, hierarchy, and tradition has
always been beyond debate. To recognize that each generation has reevaluated
Confucius, assigned him more or less prestige, is not to say that it has “recon-
structed” him. Confucius’s image varies because the Chinese people have “critically
inherited” it, consciously embracing some parts, consciously rejecting others (Zhang
and Schwartz, 1997).

Heroes emerging in a tradition-weak society, like America, are susceptible
to reconstruction, while Confucius, emerging in a tradition-steeped society, resists
reconstruction. For reconstruction of the past to occur, moral sentiments must
be pliable and open to change. “If they were too strong, they would no longer be
plastic. Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that the first
pattern is inflexible” (Durkheim, 1950: 69). Asian consciousness is not totally
inflexible, but it is stable, and by comparing it to our own, we gain knowledge of
the conditions attaching the individual to his or her nation’s history.
Differences between Western and Eastern consciousness are evident in many places, especially where feelings aroused by the past are crucial factors in the management of international relations. Many of these feelings stem from the pivotal event of the twentieth century – World War II. Since we live today in the shadow of this war, national experiences of atrocity and suffering show up in national self-conceptions. Many things written about the war have provoked recriminations, regret and repentance, ambivalence, and indifference, but they are important for what they tell us about practical affairs among nations and about what we need to know to improve the present body of knowledge on culture and memory.

Given the most visible aspect of war memory, the recent wave of official apologies offered by former aggressor states and institutions to surviving victims and representatives (Trouillot, 2000), Kazuya Fukuoka, Sachiko Takita-Ishii, and I (Barry Schwartz) administered questionnaires and conducted interviews in one American and two Japanese universities between January 1998 and August 2001. We asked more than 1,500 students in these two countries to identify historical events of which they were most ashamed and most proud and to explain their choices. We also asked students to indicate whether they considered themselves and/or their generations morally responsible for the historical offenses of their forebears. To distinguish cultural preferences in judging offenses from the seriousness of the offenses themselves, we asked respondents in each country whether they considered young adults in the other country responsible for their nation’s wrongdoing.

Findings from China, Korea, Germany, and the United States (Zhang and Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz and Kim, 2001; Schwartz and Heinrich, 2004) show us how powerfully the Western ethos of dignity, which celebrates individual rights, and the Eastern ethos of honor, which celebrates individual obligations to family, community and nation, affect historical consciousness. American and Japanese university students do not and cannot represent America’s and Japan’s cultures, but our data is defensible in one respect: the difference between American and Japanese students’ judgments of the past approximates the difference between judgments of all American and Japanese adults.

Judging the past

When American students were asked to name the “three events in American history of which you do not merely disapprove but which, in your opinion, degrade the United States and arouse in you as a citizen (rather than private individual) a sense of dishonor, disgrace, shame, and/or remorse,” 41 percent mentioned slavery; 34 percent named the Vietnam War; 32 percent, offenses against American Indians. The next four most commonly mentioned events, named by less than 18 percent of the respondents, were segregation, Civil War events, internment of Japanese-Americans, and the use of the atomic bomb.

The events condemned by Americans are widespread historically. Three of the eight events displayed in table 16.1 – slavery, treatment of Indians, and the Civil War – occurred in the nineteenth century; one event, segregation, endured throughout the twentieth century; another event, the use of the atomic bomb, occurred in the mid
The events embodying Japan’s sense of historical shame are more concentrated in time (table 16.2). The three events students mentioned most frequently were part of World War II, namely, military aggression against China and Korea (War in Asia, 54%) and the “Pacific War” against the United States (Pacific War/World War II, 25%). In all, more than half the respondents named events occurring between the early 1930s and 1945 – a period of less than 15 years. American and Japanese students are similar, however, in their regret over their nations’ use of power. Both define shameful acts in terms of unjust violence and exploitation.

---

Table 16.1  Frequently named sources of “dishonor, disgrace, shame” in American history (n = 1,109)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents naming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of Indians</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internment of Japanese-Americans</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Bomb</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watergate</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Table 16.2  Frequently named sources of “dishonor, disgrace, shame” in Japanese history (n = 423)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents naming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s War in Asia[a]</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific War / World War II[b]</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics/politicians[c]</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Discrimination (Koreans in Japan)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War in General</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUM Shinrikyo Cult</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Foreign Policies</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hideyoshi’s Korean Invasions (16th century)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen Crime</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

[a] **Japan’s War in Asia** includes responses such as War in Asia (in general), Korean Annexation and Occupation (1910–45), Manchuria Incident, Sino-Japanese War (1931–45), Comfort Women Issue, Nanjing Incident/Massacre (1937), Unit 731 in China, and Twenty-One Demands Against China (1915).

[b] **Pacific War** includes responses such as War Against the US and Pearl Harbor Attack.

[c] **Politics/Politicians** responses concern politics in general (including controversy involving former Prime Minister Mori).
The difference between American and Japanese students’ identification with their nation’s past offenses is remarkable. Nine percent of Georgia students agreed with both forms of the statement “My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the enslavement of tens of millions of black people over more than one hundred and fifty years.” Nine percent agreed with the statement “My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the forced internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.” When asked about moral responsibility for the “killing, forced expulsion, and other maltreatment of millions of Indians,” the percentage agreeing was 11 percent.

American students were more lenient when asked about Japan’s young people’s responsibility: 5 percent agreed with the statement asserting that Japanese young people are responsible for their nation’s past wrongdoing. That Americans’ attitudes are general rather than specific to the Japanese is shown in their response to the statement that German young people are responsible for the Holocaust (not shown in table 16.3): 3 percent agreed.

Americans and Japanese differ most on the matter of moral responsibility (table 16.4). No less than 42 percent of Japanese agreed with the statement “My generation [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the Korean Annexation and rule (1910–1945).” Forty-two percent also agreed with the statement “My generation [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the so-called Nanking Incident” (1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Enslavement of black people</th>
<th>(2) Maltreatment of Indians</th>
<th>(3) Internment of Japanese-Americans</th>
<th>(4) Japanese younger generation’s responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16.4 Sense of moral responsibility for national misdeeds (United States)
Table 16.4  Sense of moral responsibility for national misdeeds (Japan)\textsuperscript{a}

(1) My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the Korean annexation and rule (1910–1945).
(2) My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the so-called Nanking incident (1937).
(3) My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible for the so-called Comfort Women issue during the War years.
(4) I believe that American young people are morally responsible today for the enslavement of tens of millions of black people over more than one hundred and fifty years.
(5) I believe the present generation of Germans is morally responsible for the Holocaust – Nazi Germany’s murder of six million Jews during the War II.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & (1) Korean annexation and rule (\(n = 318\)) & (2) Nanking incident (\(n = 430\)) & (3) Comfort women issue (\(n = 481\)) & (4) American younger generation’s responsibility (\(n = 315\)) & (5) German younger generation’s responsibility (\(n = 310\)) \\
\hline
Strongly Disagree & 14.1 & 12.7 & 13.3 & 8.3 & 15.8 \\
Disagree & 15.0 & 15.1 & 12.5 & 9.5 & 15.2 \\
Somewhat Disagree & 11.9 & 12.3 & 11.9 & 9.8 & 16.1 \\
Neutral & 15.4 & 15.5 & 17.7 & 17.1 & 18.4 \\
Somewhat Agree & 21.0 & 20.2 & 18.7 & 21.6 & 14.5 \\
Agree & 14.7 & 14.1 & 13.7 & 18.4 & 9.7 \\
Strongly Agree & 6.6 & 8.1 & 9.6 & 11.1 & 6.1 \\
No Response & 0.9 & 1.6 & 2.7 & 4.1 & 4.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{a} Question wording (“My generation is [or I personally feel] morally responsible”) produces no significant difference in responses.
massacre of civilians by the Japanese army). For the so-called “Comfort Woman” practice (inducting Korean women, then colonial subjects, as sex slaves during the war years), the same percentage, 42 percent, accepted moral responsibility. Japanese students also ascribed more responsibility to Americans than Americans ascribed to them: 50 percent judged American young people to be morally accountable for slavery. Interestingly, only 30 percent judged German young people to be morally responsible for World War II atrocities.

The relationship between historical writings and moral responsibility in Japan is opposite to that in the United States. The Japanese government and its textbook writers are committed to a policy of silence about the atrocities of World War II (Hashimoto, 1999), but Japanese students know about these events and feel connected to them. In contrast, American textbooks describe past transgressions in detail and American institutions routinely apologize for them; yet, American students reading these textbooks and hearing these apologies feel no relationship to the events they describe. The reasons for this difference are evident in the way Americans and Japanese explain their responses.

After eliciting responses to closed questions about individual and generational responsibility for slavery, we asked a block of University of Georgia students to explain why they accept or deny responsibility. We repeated the question by randomly substituting oppression of Native Americans and internment of Japanese Americans. We did the same in Japan after students had responded to closed questions about the Annexation of Korea, Nanking and Comfort Women.

Individuals giving the simplest response in the denial category emphasized that they could have had no connection let alone be morally responsible for any event that occurred before their birth. Among all students responding to this question, 30 percent of Americans compared to 28 percent of Japanese gave this answer (see table 16.5). Forty-two percent of Americans gave the second group of reasons, recognizing that a wrong had occurred and sometimes identifying the offender and blaming him, but insisting such blame could not extend to themselves. Only 9 percent of the Japanese students offered this reason. Some individuals, while denying responsibility, not only recognized the occurrence of a wrong but also declared their wish to learn from it, to make certain that past failures are not repeated, to abolish harmful mindsets, or even to make amends in the form of material reparations. Six percent of these respondents were Japanese, while 18 percent were American.

The second category of respondents, located in Table 5’s last row, includes those who hold themselves morally responsible for their forebears’ crimes. Individuals giving this response feel they must learn from the past, prevent recurrences of past offenses, and oppose residual racism not despite their lack of participation but because they identify themselves and their generation with that historical era in which the offenses occurred. Fifty-seven percent of the Japanese students accepted responsibility for these reasons compared to 9 percent of the American students.

**Collective Memory as a Cultural System**

Before we can ascribe to culture the differences between Japanese and American orientations toward the past, we must consider both the quality of the events to which they are responding and the time they occurred. During the second quarter of
the twentieth century, the Japanese government conducted war and persecutions that led to the death of many millions of people, mostly civilians. Throughout the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries, American slaveholders protected, even insured, their bondsman’s lives; yet, they also valued and insured the lives of their animals. The number of human beings enslaved at a given period of time never exceeded four million, but far more than a hundred million were captive during the slavery era. On the other hand, slavery ended long ago while Japanese atrocities exist in living memory, still part of many “family secrets.”

The timing of slavery and atrocity goes some way in explaining why Americans are less inclined than Japanese to accept responsibility for past wrongs, but it does not go far enough. Not only have Americans enslaved generations; their regret, as our data show, is no more or less intense than their regret over the internment of Japanese Americans in the 1940s. Recency and objective harm done by Americans and Japanese cannot account for the vast differences in their feelings about the people they have offended.

Table 16.5  Reasons for denial or acceptance of moral responsibility for past wrongs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>American respondents assess own responsibility (n = 87)</th>
<th>American respondents assess German and Japanese responsibility (n = 162)</th>
<th>Japanese respondents assess own responsibility (n = 240)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Respondent (or subject) not born at the time of offense. Not morally responsible.</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Respondent recognizes (or subject should recognize) the gravity of the offense and condemns its perpetrators, but is not morally responsible for it.</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Respondent feels (or subject should feel) obligation to address present wrongs and to prevent reoccurrence of past wrongs, but is not morally responsible for past wrongs in which he or she had no part.</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Respondent feels (or subject should feel) obligation to redress present wrongs, prevent reoccurrence of past wrongs because he or she is morally responsible for them.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The imagery of World War II and slavery differ. Japanese atrocities are relatively recent, while graphic films of mass murder, photos of living skeletons in prisoner of war camps, are unparalleled in the representations of slavery. However, if the harm of slavery and the oppression of minorities seem less serious to Americans than Japan’s atrocities against China and Korea, and if this difference affects ideas about moral responsibility, then American students would attribute less responsibility to themselves for minority oppression than they attribute to Japan for naked slaughter. In fact, Americans’ assessment of their own and Japan’s and Germany’s responsibility is similar (table 16.2); therefore, cultural differences rather than unequal gravity of past wrongs must explain their different perceptions.

Cultures identify with the past in different ways. Eviatar Zerubavel (1997) introduced the term “sociobiographical memory” to refer to the fusion of one’s personal past with the history of one’s society. Sociobiographical memory can explain the shame we feel about historical events only if we experience history as part of our own lives. The disposition to deemphasize the past and segment it from the present is more characteristic of American than Japanese culture (Kluckhohn, 1951). “We live in a society that encourages us to cut free from the past, to define our own selves,” Robert Bellah observes (1985: 154). To define ourselves and choose the groups with which we wish to identify is to define our own memories and to choose our own traditions; yet, if memories and traditions can be deliberately chosen, they can be readily abandoned.

Independence and self-determination have always been distinctive features of American culture. Alexis de Tocqueville noted in 1832 that Americans, free of the stultifying interdependencies of late-feudal Europe, have convinced themselves of their own self-sufficiency and have “acquired the habit of always considering themselves standing alone. . . . [N]ot only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart” (1945: 105–6).

The contrast with Japan’s ethos could not be greater. In Japan, “[v]irtuous men do not say, as they do in America, that they owe nothing to any man. They do not discount the past. Righteousness in Japan depends upon recognition of one’s place in the great network of mutual indebtedness that embraces both one’s forebears and one’s contemporaries” (Benedict, 1946: 98–9). Much of what Westerners call ancestor worship exemplifies this profound sense of debt, but the obligation involves neither true worship nor attitudes toward one’s ancestors; it is an “avowal of man’s, indebtedness to all that has gone before” (98).

By “indebtedness to all that has gone before” Benedict is referring to Japanese gratitude for past benefits received, but what of debts transferred to generations unborn when they were incurred? Americans, from the eighteenth century to present, have refused to honor such debts. Thomas Jefferson believed it to be “self-evident that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. . . . By the law of nature, one generation is to another as one independent nation is to another” (1975: 443; emphasis added). The Japanese, in contrast, cannot conceive themselves as being independent of the past, and this feeling enhances their shame for past wrongs.

Japanese people experience shame and guilt under different circumstances, but morality’s burden, as Benedict noted, falls on the former. Japan’s is a shame culture,
and “[s]hame is a reaction to other people’s criticism.” Where shame is society’s major sanction, men and women experience no relief when they make their fault public. “So long as his bad behavior does not ‘get out into the world’ he need not be troubled and confession appears to him merely a way of courting trouble” (1946: 223). No wonder that the massacre at Nanking and impressment of Korean “comfort women” are more frequently named as sources of shame than military aggression leading to a Pacific war and the maltreatment of British and American prisoners. Since China and Korea criticize Japan more often and more loudly than do Great Britain and the United States, the suffering of previous Chinese and Korean generations has become an enduring presence among the Japanese people.

**Cultures of Memory: Residual, Dominant, and Emergent**

Japanese and American memories differ, but they cannot be explained by separate theories – one theory for American memory, another for Japanese memory, and yet another for German and for Korean memory. There can be only one theory that explains different modes of history, commemoration, and belief in terms of common principles. One such principle is plain to see in both the United States and Japan: detraditionalization coexisting with tradition-maintenance (Heelas, Lash, and Morris, 1996). Tradition-maintenance is conspicuous in Japan; detraditionalization, in America; yet, the rate of detraditionalization is faster in Japan while tradition-maintenance, precisely because it goes against the grain of the culture, is more conspicuous in America.

The relation between tradition’s permanence and erosion is complex. “A nation,” according to Ernest Renan, “is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. . . . One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common” (Renan, 1947, 1: 903). In Japan, these memories are losing relevance, while Americans cultivate nationalism without identifying closely with their forebears. Individuals who fail to identify with their nation’s past cannot feel obligated for its wrongs, but those who identify closely with their nation’s past seek to excuse or justify them (Doosje et al., 1998). Only in the middle range, where identification is strong but not total, do individuals feel responsibility for their conduct. American culture is located closest to the first extreme, where identification with the past is minimal; Japan is located closest to the middle, where identification with the past, although presently eroding, is strong relative to America’s. The Japanese people’s weakening attachment to previous generations has the effect of strengthening their recognition of past wrongs.

Recognizing differences in degree is vital to understanding culture and memory. Diminished rather than lost engagement with the past distinguishes the United States from Japan. The adjective “diminished” must be underscored, for “dimishings” are more difficult to describe and comprehend than disappearances. In the United States, collective memories evoke a “residual” pattern of reverence, a “dominant” pattern of affectively neutral admiration and weak attachment, and an “emergent” pattern of indifference and even hostility. The relationship among these patterns is ironic. The residual pattern is exemplified by Americans’ continuing recognition of
national heroes, including George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, and history-changing events, like the attacks on Bunker Hill, Fort Sumpter, and Pearl Harbor. These exist at the preconscious level – rarely contemplated but latent in the mind of the individual and available for mobilization in the case of crisis. The residual pattern “has been effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present” (Williams, 1977: 122).

Residual patterns of belief often reflect deliberate efforts to renew ties to a past that emergent (multicultural, postmodern, antihegemonic) trends challenge; yet, the latter are sustained by established residual patterns. Millions of American viewers, for example, watch film dramas and television documentaries about slave life, debate the merits of reparations for slaves’ descendants, and read about slavery – a topic that has engaged the public more during the last several years of the twentieth century than ever before. Debates over Thomas Jefferson’s fathering children with his slave Sally Heming, the films Amistad and Beloved celebrating the spirit of freedom; The Wind Done Gone satirizing Gone With the Wind, newspapers apologizing for accepting advertisements for runaway slaves, insurance companies apologizing for insuring them, the making into a national shrine of Anderson Cottage, where Lincoln drafted the Emancipation Proclamation, the revelation that slaves helped build the US Capitol Building, the making of slavery exhibits in museums throughout the country, news about contemporary slavery in Africa and elsewhere – all these events have heightened interest in America’s slavery heritage. True, Americans do not hold themselves responsible for slavery, but they have not forgotten it. There has always existed alongside racism in America a powerful tradition of antislavery sentiment, from the Founding Fathers, who used the Exodus as a metaphor for their struggle against Great Britain, through popular literature, most notably Uncle Tom’s Cabin, to the celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation at the peak of the Jim Crow era. In our own day, the antislavery tradition is reflected in American university students ranking slavery as the nation’s primary sin.

Just as we can see residual elements still alive in American memory, we can see emergent elements in Japanese memory. Recent displays of national symbols, as Otsuka points out, do not necessarily imply nationalistic feeling: “Simply, when they sing the Japanese national anthem, kimigayo, in the stadium, they do not seem to bear in their mind pre-War Japanese history, the Okinawa issue, or even the prosperity that the anthem was meant to symbolize” (Otsuka, 1999: 384; see also Schuman, Akiyama, and Knäuper, 1998). Otsuka’s observations prompt us to ask what Western scholars, including Maurice Halbwachs, would have written if they had been born and reared in Asia. This question is difficult to answer because Asian intellectuals have borrowed so heavily from the West.

At the core of Japan’s emerging postmodernism is the emperor’s diminishing presence in the public imagination:

The Japanese imperial household is becoming less and less a site of contested memories, a place where people might critically reflect upon the meaning of their recent history and its relevance to contemporary political issues. Nor is the locus of an authentic aura to be found in the imperial household of modern Japan. Instead, the emperor and other members of the imperial household have gained a kind of fake aura in their
transformation into simply other commodities, to be consumed. As Benjamin put it about movie stars, like “any article produced in a factory.” (Fujitani, 1992: 847)

When Fujitani describes the members of the imperial family, he refers to their “fake aura,” their having become “commodities, to be consumed” and to “contested memories.” Citing Walter Benjamin in particular, Fujitani makes the emperor and family seem almost as American as the president and his family.

“Almost,” however, refers to a big gap. Newspapers, television programming, and textbooks tell us what communication and academic elites believe about the past; they do not necessarily tell us what ordinary people believe, or how they feel about what they believe. Having demonstrated the magnitude of this discrepancy in both Japan and the United States, we must hesitate before importing theories from one part of the world and applying them to another. We must be cautious about Japanese scholars projecting their own Eastern beliefs upon a changing but still tradition-directed Westernized society.

**Conclusion**

Western theories of culture are predicated on the rupture of historical continuity. Culture is self-healing, however, because the individual needs categories that only culture can provide – rules, standards of judgment, and behavioral programs acquired from moral communities of the past. No society could provide these anchor points if its temporal rupture were total (Shils, 1981: 326–7). Western elites’ assertion that the lives of their countrymen are rootless and pointless is contestable at best.

That people fail to sense past realities in themselves can only mean they no longer identify with the institutions embodying history. The more Americans look at Asia, however, the more they see the residual part of themselves and the more plausible they find the theories describing it. The premise of all collective memory research is that we remember the past as members of society, that as the structures and values of society change, different parts of the past gain and lose relevance. To say that successive generations see the same past differently, however, does not mean that successive generations create the past anew. If one examined a 1930 editorial about Abraham Lincoln in a library microfilm collection, one would have no trouble identifying it as an editorial about the Lincoln everyone knows today. Aside from new emphases and, less frequently, new facts, therefore, most of what we know about the past is inherited from previous generations. The authority of the past has eroded, but an adamantine core of memory remains on which we depend for meaning, inspiration, and moral authority (Schwartz, 1998).

When Abraham Lincoln drafted the opening line of his Gettysburg Address (“Four-score and seven years ago” – the year of the Declaration of Independence and birth of the American nation) he declared that the Civil War was a continuation of the American Revolution. That continuity made meaningful an embattled people’s sacrifice and grief. So today, we see the attack on the Twin Towers and death of 3,000 people acquiring meaning within the framework of Pearl Harbor. “Something like this has happened before,” we say to ourselves, and the way we then apprehend it provides a pattern for reacting to the present disaster. In Michael Schudson’s words, “People . . . seek information to arrive at a view. They seek to
know what is right, what is true. They seek some kind of direction when they are aimless. They seek in the past some kind of anchor when they are adrift. They seek a source of inspiration when they despair” (1992: 213).

The past is a guide for the present because it is less mutable than we have been led to believe. Living memory, witnesses, corroborating testimonies, the heritage and history industries, insider accounts, and unforgettable trauma limit the past’s susceptibility to revision – mainly in democratic societies but to some degree everywhere (Schudson, 1989; see also Schwartz, 1991, 2000). Collective memory, like all cultural systems, remains what it has always been: a pattern of “inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz, 1973: 89). This is why Pearl Harbor’s relevance rose after September 11, for no past event better articulated the trauma and meaning of sudden, massive death at the hands of an enemy. Pearl Harbor is part of the floor below which American memory cannot fall.

In America, no less than Japan, the past is more than a mirror reflecting present needs and concerns: it is a lamp elucidating our intentions, moods, and actions. The orienting power of collective memory is affirmed in Heilman’s ethnography of faithful Jews invoking the past as a means of reforming and completing (“traditionalizing”) the present (1982: 62–3), Bellah’s writing on “communities of memory” (1985), Lowenthal on the past as a source of identity, guidance, and enrichment (1994), Rusen on traditional memories as “indispensable elements of orientation” in historical consciousness (1989: 44), Schuman and Rieger’s (1992) research on the uses of past wars (Vietnam and World War II) as historical analogies to sustain support for or opposition to the Gulf War, Olick’s (1999) treatment of commemoration having a tradition-sustaining history of its own, and Schwartz and Kim’s (2001) analysis of Korean history’s most shameful events shaping individual identity.

Individuals everywhere rely on culture to sustain their perception of the past, but cultures are everywhere different. In Japan, more clearly than in the United States, collective memory is a program defining its present values and goals and a frame organizing and assessing the moral significance of present experience (Schwartz, 2000). Since all societies possess so much in common, the Japanese case can reveal aspects of collective memory that are present but opaque in the individualistic West, just as the American case can reveal what is present but opaque in the communitarian East. Considered together, Japan and the United States teach us about a wide range of experience and memory, showing why present understandings of collective memory, derived from mainly Western societies, are so inadequate.

References


Further Reading


Counter-Memories of Terrorism: The Public Inscription of a Dramatic Past

Anna Lisa Tota

How can we remember terror, and how can we forget it? How can we commemorate it? What is the most suitable cultural shape of remembering terror? By addressing the issue of the social representation of very controversial pasts, this chapter addresses the relation between the collective knowledge and memories of terrorist attacks in Italy and the process of their being fixed and shaped into commemorative social practices and cultural objects. This process may reflect tensions and contradictions between state and civil society in the public inscription of a dramatic past. A proper commemoration of terror, in fact, requires constructing adequate sites and objects of memory, but accomplishing those tasks requires a functioning civic sphere. A comparative analysis of the events of the Bologna massacre of 1980 and the bombing in Milan of 1969 will explore technologies of remembering and forgetting and analyze why in some cases civil society is successful in articulating and institutionalizing the commemoration of terror, why in other cases not, and especially what consequences for the public sphere this lack implies.

TECHNOLOGIES OF MEMORY AND FORGETTING

Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1968) in his pioneering studies argued that the past is a social construction shaped by the concerns of the present: not something given once forever, but instead a work in progress constantly shaped by institutional and individual conditions. This conception of the past has posed the question of whether there are some constraints to the social production of collective memories – if not, one would not be able to explain the deceit, unreality, and disremembering. By observing that neither are all memories allowed, nor are all different constructions possible, it has been argued that the range of different possibilities in the reconstruction of the past is determined by the competing versions of the past. Many recent
studies in the sociology of memory have documented how negotiation and competition among different social groups, social actors, and institutions represent a crucial key to understanding the making of collective memories (e.g. Schwartz, 1990; Schudson, 1992; Cavalli, 1995; Zolberg, 1998; Jedlowski, 2001). In this process the limits are established by the competition among conflicting and contrasting representations of the same event and the agents of memory usually play a crucial role in this respect.

Within the literature, a major strain has been represented by the cultural perspective: a way to investigate individual, collective, and social memory based on the analysis of particular cultural symbols and their relation to the exercise of power. In this respect, the main aim is to understand how cultural meanings are produced, how an external object (such as a memorial or a museum) can deeply intervene in the reconstruction of a certain past. Collective memories are conceived in the relation between form and content. The meaning of the past “emerges and is sustained through the dynamic interaction between the content of historical events and the forms of collective memory available to those intent on their preservation and public inscription” (Wagner-Pacifici, 1996: 301). Studies concerned with remembering at the cultural level generally focus on documenting the extent of cultural symbols in shaping the content and the meaning of an historical event.

I call the “technologies of memory” the tools through which the public inscription of a certain past is accomplished (Tota, 2001c). This term identifies artifacts “as potentials for remembering past times” with a kind of code, able to shape the content of collective memory. In some contexts there are also technologies of forgetting at work. The “socially instigated amnesia” (Douglas, 1986) is the social result, the institutional product of this kind of technology. As we will see, remembering in the case of the Bologna massacre is the result of a complex of social dynamics (the context of the city, the role played by the association of the victims, the very complex relations between state and civil society). On the contrary, the Milan slaughter represents a case of partial collective amnesia.

**THE BOLOGNA CASE, 1980–2002**

Suddenly I heard a massive explosion, an enormous explosion, I felt a great boom inside my head; then I felt it physically, a stunning bang. Next I saw a great cloud of dust in front of me, all in front of me, then all the station concourse and the piazza outside was completely obscured by this great cloud of dust and flying debris, and schrapnel... then it all went grey. (interview 3)

At 10:25 a.m. on August 2, 1980, a bomb exploded in the waiting room of Bologna station. It was the first Saturday of August. This was a massacre that shocked the collective imagination, in part because of its clear class meanings. As many people have stressed since, this was a bomb that materially and symbolically struck at the working classes. The timing and the place of the massacre revealed the type of victim the bomb was aimed at: the typical worker from northern factories, going back to the south to visit his or her relatives.
The device was placed in the second-class waiting room of the station. After the explosion a part of the building adjacent to the waiting room collapsed and debris fell onto an Adria Express train (bound for Basel), which was stationary at platform one. When the bomb exploded the train was just about to leave: the guards were already “asking for the off,” the moment when their arms were raised to show each other that the doors were closed and therefore the station supervisor could give the signal for the train to depart. Two or three minutes later the train would have left the station. If it had done so, the number of victims would probably have been even higher because another fuller train on its way to Rimini and Riccione was stationary at platform three. Still, the outcome of the massacre was terrible: 85 dead and 200 injured. One of the interviewees, who was injured by the bomb, recalled the moment in this way:

I remember only that everything was chaotic, some part of my body was stuck, but I couldn’t remember anything, because I didn’t understand what was happening… I heard screams, I heard the ambulances, I heard a great confusion so…something tragic [had happened]. I was in great pain all over, and I started to understand…to cry for help and they couldn’t find me, so…they were terrible moments. (interview 27)

The city reacted very quickly, despite the fact that most Bolognese were already on holiday. The first help arrived within a few minutes. The people who lived opposite the station came with sheets, bandages, and improvised tools for moving the rubble. They began to help the injured and to dig with their hands to free the trapped bodies. The emergency medical service immediately began to coordinate the arrival of ambulances. This service, with its own emergency number, coordinated all the information on the availability of hospital beds and ambulances (from a single point in the city); it had been set up on July 28, and had therefore been running for only two days.

From the very beginning the reaction of Bologna to the terrorist attack points out the high internal cohesion of the city, its high sense of solidarity toward the victims and their families. It shows a very active civic sphere that is destined to play a crucial role in the future process of constructing the practices of remembering.

The public understanding of terror in Bologna

When considering the public inscription of this past, it is useful to distinguish among different levels of articulating collective and public memories within the civil society: on the one side (the most general level of the whole nation), the Italian citizens, and on the other (the local level of the city), the Bolognese citizens. To those different levels correspond different interlocutors in terms of political actors: the state and the municipality. To better understand the general context in which the terrorist attack took place, it has to be mentioned that since 1980 Italy has been governed by conservative parties (except the period between 1996 and 2001), while Bologna itself has always been ruled by a leftist government, until the local election in 2000, when the conservative party won. In essence, the Bologna attack has long been recognized as fascist. Among the “memory authorities,” a very important role has been played by the association of World War II veterans “i partigiani della Resistenza” who fought against the fascists. Even if in the international context their role
has not yet been fully recognized, in the national context they have played and are playing a preeminent role in the public understanding of the recent Italian past. Besides the association of World War II veterans, the most important role at both national and local levels has been played by the association of the surviving victims and victims’ families. The term “victim” refers to very different situations that deeply affect the suitable ways of remembering (and forgetting). In fact, the interviews done in this research document that while most of the victims’ families asked for public acts of remembrance (perceived as the expression of a common solidarity of citizens and institutions), most of the surviving victims “have tried to forget as soon as possible” (interview 27), even for years avoiding participation in any kind of public commemorative ceremony. Remembering terror means something very different for each type of individual and collective actor.

Several factors are relevant to the construction of public and collective memories of terror in Italy: (1) the degree of uncertainty in attributing the responsibility (e.g., minimum in war; maximum in terrorism); (2) the moral status of the victims (possibility or impossibility of blaming the victims); (3) the degree of the victims’ anonymity; (4) the place where the event took place (if a public space, like an airport or a railway station, the common feeling that “it could have been me” is maximized); (5) the “when it happened”; (6) the possibility or impossibility of getting public acknowledgment of what happened; (7) the public definition of the criteria of being entitled to damages; (8) the ways of compensating the families for their loss; (9) the types of symbolic and economic compensations; (10) the “how controversial” the public representation of that past is.

Another relevant factor has to do with the kind of arena where the conflict over the contrasting versions of that past takes place: Is the conflict among the competing versions of that event located within the nation (e.g., between state and civil society or between local and central government) or outside it (e.g., between the East and the West or between two nations)? This factor seems to configure the alternative between the counter-memory pattern (as in the Italian case) and the memory one (as in the US, referring to the tragedy of September 11).

In the Bologna case there is a very high degree of uncertainty together with a very controversial public representation of that past articulated within the national arena. The moral status of the victims is high: They were families, workers with their wives and kids, just common people with no characteristics apt to be used for any sort of labeling process. The economic compensation is low: *Cento milioni per testa di morto* (*One Hundred Million Lire per Corpse’s Head*) (Secci, 1988) is the title of a famous book published by the victims’ association, reporting the scandal of the amount and the criteria used for defining who should have been entitled to damages. The symbolic compensation is perceived as high at the city level, because of the strong involvement of the municipality in supporting the survivors, their families and all the initiatives undertaken by the association “2 agosto,” but as low at the national level, because of the continuance of the law on state secrecy (over 20 years on) in relation to all the documents of the Bologna terrorists.

To explain why Bologna did not forget, and to document the role played by the memory authorities, analysis of the symbols of memory and the commemorative site is useful. In this case, the combination in the urban context of a thriving civil society with active memory authorities has led to the construction of several suitable objects
of commemoration, which in two decades (1980–2002) gained growing public visibility.

**Objects of memories: Bus 37**

In the imagination of some of the interviewees the memory of how the city reacted to the massacre is represented symbolically by Bus 37 and its driver. This bus had just reached the station, and was about to leave with its passengers, when the bomb exploded. Instead, it was used to transport the dead, to allow the ambulances to help those who had been injured. The driver extended his shift without stopping until he had moved all the bodies:

> I remember the bodies, poor things, put in a bus and taken away because obviously the ambulances took away the living; the dead were loaded into the bus which took them to the mortuary. . . . That was my first impression of the event, seeing those people, those sheets next to one another. . . it was an improvised hearse, and it affected me, because it was like being in a war. (interview 14)

In the citizens’ memory, over 20 years on, Bus 37 with its cargo of bodies is still an important symbol of those moments when help was organized frantically, so much so that the Bologna Public Transport Company (Azienda dei Trasporti of Bologna) has placed it in a new historical museum. In other words, this bus has become an “object of memory” in relation to the massacre: The collective memory of these events has taken form, become objectified, in this bus. Bus 37 is thus a particularly interesting element because it offers insights into the way memory is objectified in certain objects (in this case a city bus) and, also into how a memory-object, as a form of collective and individual memory of a certain moment, becomes a real commemorative artifact.

The distinction between the two notions memory-object and commemorative artifact is particularly significant in this case for analytical reasons, as it allows us to understand the institutional aspects of the process of memory-objectification that involve Bus 37. A memory object can carry individual memory of the massacre (the jumper that one of the victims was wearing that morning, for example), a collective memory (the pen-drawn plan of the first emergency assistance center set up in the council offices immediately after the massacre), but not necessarily its “social memory” (Namer, 1987). The decision to place Bus 37 in the museum is an event that sets in motion both the institutionalization of that particular memory and its objectification. In other words, while a memory-object is an objective form, a commemorative artifact is the institutionalization of that particular objective formation, which then becomes a symbol able in its own right to initiate the process of remembering an event. In the transition from “memory-object” to commemorative artifact it is as if Bus 37 moved from collective to social memory.

But how is a memory-object chosen? And above all how does a process of objectification become so successful as to give it a key meaning in social memory? Many studies have documented that objects have a mnemonic power that renders them extremely significant. This power, obviously, does not derive from the object as such but from the fact that it incorporates and projects important meanings for the particular context to be remembered. It is through these objects that a continuity
between past and present is created, and through them that the memory is kept alive. Bus 37 is a particularly successful example of objectification, because it symbolizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the relief efforts after the massacre and the speed and coordinated creativity shown by the city’s institutions and citizens in the face of such a dramatic event. Converting a city bus into a hearse is a highly tragic image (in the ways in which it highlights the broken bodies of the 85 victims of the bombing); it is also altruistic and heroic (because it reminds us of the altruism of the driver who continued to drive the bus until the next day in order to finish transporting his cargo of bodies); and it is also positive for the city (because it reminds us of the solidarity that citizens and institutions demonstrated toward the victims). The specific character of this objectification derives from this combination of images.

**Commemorating in a nonplace**

A massacre in a station also has an impact on the collective memory because the victims are, in a sense, depersonalized. It is precisely the “it could have been me” idea that renders these events more brutal. The city of Bologna has chosen to commemorate its victims in a series of sites that function as a commemorative group: the massacre is not only commemorated in the waiting room of the station, but also in other places in the city where, over the years, plaques and inscriptions have been unveiled in memory of the victims.

The commemorative site in the station is made up of three elements. There is the gash in the wall, which symbolizes the pain the bomb caused to civil society and the state, the plaque with the names of the victims, and the crater in the floor where the bomb had been left (in the second-class waiting room). On the outside wall of the waiting room (which looks out on the station concourse) is a plaque dedicated to the victims, and platform 1 has an inscription. This is the text of a prayer written by the Pope in memory of the victims and placed on the wall during a ceremony marking one of the anniversaries of the massacre.

The commemorative artifacts created in the waiting room are the most interesting for this work, because they trigger the commemorative practices inside the station itself. And the station, in current *supermodernité* terms (Augé, 1995), is essentially a “non-place,” a space that, like airports, motorways, and supermarkets, is defined by its daily functionality (a railway station, a shopping center) and have a peculiar relationship with the individuals who pass through them. This relationship is contractual (the users receive clear information on what they can and must do within the space): it gives users a kind of provisional identity that is nonetheless shared within this context (e.g., as tourists or clients), and it has the specific function of freeing people from their individual identity. In other words, because a nonplace is a place without history, it does not reflect back an identity for its users, whose subjectivity is therefore provisionally suspended. In its place, users are endowed with an alternative identity – the one documented by their passport, in the case of an airport, or, by their credit card, in the case of a megastore: “just as anthropological places create the organically social, so nonplaces create solitary contracturality. Try to imagine a
Durkheimian analysis of a transit lounge at Roissy!” (Augé, 1995: 73). A real space can never coincide with or be completely understood through an analytical category. Nevertheless, Augé’s theory allows us to highlight some potential contradictions between social processes through which the past is represented and the anthropological and cultural organization of the places where that past is staged.

What does it mean to commemorate an event in a nonplace? How do pathways of memory and the typical characteristics of nonplaces influence each other? Every time travelers reach Bologna by train or cross the station while waiting for a connection, they suddenly find themselves faced with a gash in the wall, which is at the same time a gash in memory. With the monuments elsewhere in the city, and with the numerous statues in town squares, the typical form taken by the viewer’s relationship to the object is intermittent interest. However, in this case the relationship does not work in this way at all. Ethnographic observations carried out in the waiting room of Bologna station reveal two distinct types of cognitive relationships with the commemorative site situated in the waiting room: The gash in the wall is either a fixed presence in the traveler’s eyes and mind or it is totally absent. The traveler cannot adopt the detached form of watching encouraged by the traditional layout of museums, where the visitor’s minds and emotions are separated in such a way as to produce an attitude of contemplation. The gash in the wall looks like a silent scream we can avoid looking at, but, once we have seen it, we cannot ignore it. The data documented that very few travelers sitting in the waiting room actually look at the gash: they try to sit as far away from the gash as possible and always look away from it. What happens is that during an ordinary moment of their everyday lives they find themselves confronted by terror, and above all with the kind of dismay that every one of us tries to remove from our daily lives, the awareness that “it could have been me.”

The most appropriate way of describing how this commemorative site is experienced is a sense of deep unease, which, as Goffman (1967) pointed out, can be interpreted as an indication that forms of conflict or social contradiction are present. The deep identification with the history of this real event (literally documented by the way the damage to the wall of the waiting room has been preserved) contrasts with the identity as a traveler that a nonplace constructs for us. To return to Augé, we can argue that it is precisely at the moment when, as a user of the station, we prepare ourselves to lose our previous subjective self and take on the identity bestowed upon us by our travel document (in this case, a train ticket) – as is the case with, say, a typical commuter on a local train from Bologna to Ferrara – that we come into contact with a commemorative site that conjures up real people, victims with names. And, as if this was not enough, we are also told how old they were when they died: “Angela Fresu 3.” When we are in front of the gash in the wall, we are in a waiting room, a nonplace, with all the implications this has for our subjectivity. We are in a situation of maximum distance from ourselves when we clash with the subjectivity of the victims highlighted by the plaque and the gash.

The commemorative ensemble as “living monument,” 1980–2002

The ensemble of the commemorative artifacts at the station is comprised of two plaques with the names and ages of the bomb victims, the Pope’s prayer, the gash in the wall, and the bomb crater on the floor of the waiting room. This set of artifacts
was inaugurated a year after the massacre and since then, on every August 2, a commemorative march has crossed the city of Bologna, through Piazza Maggiore and via Indipendenza, and on toward the station. The way in which the group is laid out corresponds, according to the aims of the August 2 Association, to a series of functions. First, the memory of this event is located in a place that both the citizens of Bologna and tourists visiting the city pass through on a daily basis. (This type of reasoning led the association to reject the plan for a commemorative monument on the hills around Bologna proposed by a previous mayor.) The aim is that the waiting room should be a kind of “living monument, which people pass by every day, without the need to visit it specifically” (interview 1).

Second, there was a desire to situate the artifacts in a place that “can never be used for false ends” (interview 1). Since the day of the bomb, one of the most worrying and traumatic aspects of the public experience of the massacre has been the constant circulation of false versions of events. This is probably connected to the series of coverups and false trails identified by investigators. What matters here is that the location and planning of the commemorative ensemble aims to leave few doubts. From this point of view the authorities preserving this memory consider the crater left by the bomb and the gash in the wall as guarantees of the truth, a barrier against potential revisionist versions that could falsify reality. The importance that individual elements are given within the whole commemorative ensemble has been revealed by a series of episodes over time, of which one is particularly noteworthy. Every year a chaplain and the railway workers lay out a nativity scene in the waiting room and inaugurate it with a ceremony in memory of the bomb victims; and in December 2001 a plan was proposed to exhibit all the models produced from 1980 to 2000. In 1997 the railway employees decided to set up the nativity scene above the bomb crater in the floor, which was thus hidden from view. Their aim was probably to draw attention to the gash in the wall, but the August 2 Association complained and the railway chaplain argued that from that moment on the nativity scene should be situated so as not to cover the hole:

Without wanting to create a dispute, we decided to intervene in this case to underline the fact that the bomb crater was part of the monument and could never be hidden from view...it must be there to testify to what happened...which was not the explosion of a boiler, as someone claimed after the massacre...and in fact the railway employees took our point immediately and the year afterwards the nativity scene was voluntarily moved. (interview 1)

This event, like many others over the years, is testimony to the key role played since 1980 by the victims’ families’ associations with respect in the collective remembering of the massacre. More than authorities of memory, these associations have become real guarantors of that memory. The moral force deriving from memories of the victims is translated in this case into the greater durability of certain versions of events to survive through time. The victims, or the people who are seen to be legitimately speaking on their behalf, are given the socially recognized “right to the last word” on everything relating to the way events are rewritten. Once such a right has been recognized, this group becomes a kind of barrier against other versions of the past, which have little chance to succeed in any struggle over the negotiation of memory.
In 1995, after the arrival of state funds for the reconstruction of Bologna station in preparation for a new high-speed train route, the former second-class waiting room found itself at the center of a citywide debate leading eventually to a referendum that, however, did not reach a quorum. The referendum asked Bolognese citizens for their opinions on the various plans for the station. During the debates on the future of the station, involving politicians, intellectuals and journalists both locally and nationally, the leading architect Federico Zeri argued in the *Corriere della Sera* that Bologna station was a site of memory and as such could never be rebuilt. The association intervened to disagree with Zeri. In a press release the president of the association argued that curtailing the development of the city was not the way to defend the memory of the massacre. All that was being asked was that rebuilding should not affect the commemorative ensemble and the spaces around. In any case, none of the plans proposed any interference with the commemorative area.

Since 1996, the management of the commemorative site by the local council, the railway company and the association has undergone some developments. The commemorative site has been at the center of a series of cultural initiatives organized by the Bologna Town Council and some cultural cooperatives in the city. Every year, starting on July 6 and culminating on August 2, a series of events entitled “Under the sign of solidarity” takes place in the waiting room and a part of the station known as the “Transatlantico,” an area next to the commemorative site where there are usually book sales and other commercial activities. In this area, every evening between eight and eleven, private radio stations take turns broadcasting live from the station; the waiting room and the commemorative site are filled with music, voices, noise, and people watching the radio broadcasts. In addition, Bologna’s art academy has organized a competition among its students for installations to be set or performances to be held in the station for two weeks.

Events like these link the collective memory of the massacre to various cultural activities ranging from traditional rice-workers’ songs to rock music. They are based upon a well-defined model of the commemorative site and its functions within the city, a model shaped by local institutions and pressure groups that have legitimately assumed the role of memory authorities. The public definition of the commemorative site and of the kind of actions that can be performed around it could well be encapsulated in the phrase “living monument.” Support for this definition is not to be taken for granted, especially as far as the victims’ families are concerned: what is at stake is the link between a family member lost in tragic circumstances and a rock concert set within an ambitious collective plan to transmit memory.

To understand how such a project has come to be accepted by the families of the victims we need to take into the transformation of the status of these victims that in the eyes of the association they are “the dead of the whole nation” (interview 3). Implicit in a definition of this kind is the families’ recognition that the victims have a special status, which means both that they deserve special treatment by a much wider community (i.e., more or less by the whole nation), and that they belong to the collective and not just to the families. It is this delicate cognitive and psychological shift that has allowed even some of the oldest relatives, who feel least at home with the expressive codes of rock music, to reconcile the concert as a form of commemoration with their own individual and family matters. Their intense involvement in the work of the association has allowed the families to see the victims more and more as political and national figures: Over time the dead have been transformed into “state
victims,” with all the complex emotional dynamics and institutional rewriting this has entailed. Within family and individual memories the massacre has moved from being a tragic event that destroyed the lives of a group of people, to being a political event that damaged the fabric of civil society. The interconnections between family memory and social memory explain how this public definition of the commemorative site has found favor among Bologna’s citizens and how a rock concert can be compatible with the way the victims’ families mourn.

But this definition of the site’s function is not shared by all the victims’ relatives. There are different positions within the association on the strategies of commemoration to be adopted and the role of the commemorative site. From our interviews it is clear that generational differences are important in explaining this divergence. The use of new forms of events to link the memory of the massacre to its place of mourning are judged much more positively by the younger members of the association, who want to remember what happened but also to forget the pain associated with the event. They tend to use a new expressive code that transforms memory from “mourning” into a “trustee of values and civic dignity.” And while mourning and rock music have little in common, a concert can be good way of expressing public and civic values.

In general, the results of the research reveal that the association has developed a poetics of memory display that has increasingly distanced itself from mourning and come closer to the idea of moral testimony. Moreover, the public definition of the commemorative site as a living monument, as in the annual events organized by the council, seems to allow for new ways of expressing the importance of this collective event, which has moved from “family tragedy,” to “national tragedy,” and then to a concerted effort to transmit memory. This public definition is possible only thanks to the central role assigned to the memory of the victims and to those legitimately entitled to speak on their behalf. The association has elaborated a kind of marketing project for “the sale of the memory of the massacre, as a national asset to preserve and transmit” (interview 1). Such a project is made easier to organize by the way in which, over 20 years after the massacre, family memories, individual memories, and collective memories have come together and stabilized within social memory of the event.

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

In Bologna, the authorities of memory and the civil society were successful in constructing proper sites and ceremonies of commemoration. After two decades, the public memory is still alive and we are witnessing a general process of remembering. In Milan, on the other hand, due to the weakness of the civil society the process of creating agents of memory failed, and over 30 years later we are witnessing a process of partial dislocation of the collective memories, and of partial forgetting. This has nothing to do with the normal passing of time: in fact, in 1991 there were already many evidences of the declining visibility in the public discourse of the memory of Piazza Fontana. The socially instigated amnesia has been at work since the beginning.

At the Bank of Agriculture in Piazza Fontana, Milan, in December 1969, a bomb exploded killing 16 people and injuring 88 others. Among the left-wing activists
arrested after the massacre is Giuseppe Pinelli, a Milanese anarchist, who “falls from the fourth floor office window of the police official in charge of the investigations into the bomb” (Foot 2002: 256). Three years later, in 1972, Luigi Calabresi, the chief of police in charge of the investigations, is shot dead outside his house in the center of Milan, and in 1973, during the commemorative ceremony held in his honor in the courtyard of the central police station in Milan, “a bomb is thrown into the crowd, aimed at ex-prime minister Mariano Rumor. The bomb falls among a group of by-standers. Four are killed and 46 injured” (257). After 18 years of trials and investigations, in 1987 the high court confirmed the “Not guilty” verdicts for all the accused of the Piazza Fontana bombing. A commemoration takes place every December in Piazza Fontana, but today only a few Milanese citizens take part in the anniversary ceremony. As Foot underlines:

In 1991 Corrado Stajano, a key journalist linked to the campaigns surrounding the 1969 bomb, worried openly in the satirical magazine Cuore whether the 1990s generation knew anything at all about Piazza Fontana. His concerns, entitled provocatively Piazza Lontana (“Faraway Piazza”) seemed to be confirmed the following week with the publication of a series of student essays concerning the bombs of 1969. Many clearly had no idea about the bomb or what followed. A majority attributed the outrage to the Red Brigades, a far left terrorist group formed in 1970. Others simply pleaded ignorance. The newspaper’s editor and the students’ teacher were appalled. Anxious letters flooded into Cuore. (2002: 258)

Analyzing the process of forgetting, Foot asks, “How is it that the shocking, controversial and violent events of 1969 and afterwards have been either forgotten or simply ignored? How can we tally the centrality of 12 December 1969, a centrality affirmed by all those who have written on this subject, with the apparent indifference of the 1980s generation?” (2002: 259).

In the context of the present discussion, the first question to raise has to do with the notion of cultural amnesia: can it explain how and why Milanese citizens have forgotten this controversial past? This seems to be only partially the case. If one considers the cultural forms that fixed the collective memories of Piazza Fontana, there are not as many as in the case of Bologna, but they are still considerable: memorials, volumes, movies, theatrical performances, and other kinds of commemorative rituals.

Another fact to consider is that the memorials of Piazza Fontana appear to be particularly contested: the period since the massacre has been characterized by several conflicts over the most adequate ways and forms of commemorating the massacre. Of the three memorials to Piazza Fontana, Calabresi, and Pinelli, the plaque to Pinelli represents the most contested: It remained abusiva (without any official permission) for several years, and it caused many controversies both in the national and local contexts. The most contested issue has to do with what should be written on this plaque. The controversy that divided Milan can be summarized by three different versions of that past, which are represented by three different terms to write on the plaque: “died,” “killed,” or “murdered.”

The public making of remembering in Bologna and the public making of oblivion in Milan can be understood in the interrelation between the power relations in the local and national context. The comparison shows how forgetting in the former case and remembering in the latter emerge as “natural” consequences from the very
different articulation of the power relations in two north Italian cities: Milan and Bologna. In Milan, due to the weakness of the civic sphere, which lacks solidarity, cohesion, and internal consistency, the civil society failed in forcing the state to construct adequate commemorative practices. Even if the commemorative sites of this controversial past have been constructed, they are not visible enough both in the urban context and in the public area. Therefore, the marble memories of Piazza Fontana remain memories of death, instead of representing the basis for the public inscription of a live process of public remembering.

A terrorist massacre implies the murdering of many citizens, but it also questions the public notion of everyday life, the ideal conception of the state and its role in defending the territory and the population. It could be said that terrorism explicitly questions the state’s right to rule. In this sense, when a terrorist act occurs, it always provokes a “cultural trauma” (Eyerman, 2001; Alexander et al., 2004). Commemorations play the most relevant role in repairing this kind of trauma. For this reason they are vital, and the phenomenon of “homeless memories” (Tota, 2001b), the lack of any cultural form available for the public inscription of such a dramatic past, represents a big danger for a democracy. If the civil society and the state fail in properly commemorating terrorism, the symbolic challenge to the civic values engaged by terrorist acts against the ideal conception of the state is never realigned.

If there is a pattern to the Italian experience of terror, it has surely to do with the concept of counter-memory conceived in a Foucaultian sense of a collective (group) memory grounded and based in the civil society, conflicting and competing with the state’s version of that past. In the last three decades of Italian history, the slaughters due to terrorist attacks have led public opinion to a deep distrust and disaffection toward the political system (particularly among young generations), either because the state has appeared too weak in combating and persecuting terrorism or because it has been suspected of being the invisible principal, the real executor of those crimes. For this reason, the “true” version of the past related to the bombs has usually been perceived as due to groups of social actors, particularly engaged and active in the civil society (i.e., the associations of the victims) and in strong opposition to the conspiracies of the deviant sectors of the state (deviant secret services, corrupted officers, etc.). In some cases the trials have lasted decades and most of them have ended with a “Not guilty” verdict. In this context the reconstruction of those controversial pasts has become the place and the space in which to engage in conflict against the corrupted sector of the institutions.

This structure of the relation between state and civil society has deeply affected the ways in which collective (group) memory (following Halbwachs’ notion) could be translated into a public memory, both in terms of social memory (again, in Halbwachsian sense) and cultural memory (Assman, 1992). What is here suggested is that the Italian way of remembering terror has taken counter-memory as its privileged form, as a sort of original matrix that has afterwards affected the genre of memorization (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991). In this perspective, if compared to the tragedy of September 11 in New York, the Italian cases seem to be very different in relation to the public making of collective memories. In the US case the enemy is not perceived as located within the nation, but as coming from outside. But in the Italian case the enemy is perceived to be within the state – it is the state. An emblematic example in this sense is the protest performed by a group of antiglobalization activists during the commemorative ceremony of the Bologna slaughter in
August 2, 2001: wearing white mime masks on their face and dressed in black, 85 antiglobalization activists (85 was the number of victims who died) were silently showing 85 signs with the message Noi sappiamo chi è Stato, which literally means, “We know who has been.” The last term, “been” (stato), is normally written with a lower-case “s.” If written Stato instead of stato, it means instead “the state.”

There is much evidence (Tota, 2001a, 2003) that the commemoration of terrorist events in Italy has taken as its privileged form the structure of a counter-memory: An adaptive response elaborated by the civic sphere of a democratic society against terrorist acts suspected of originating directly from the state. In this very complex context, the commemoration, through the public making of counter-memories, does not reconstruct the role of the actual state, but aims at rebuilding the ideal conception of democracy. By questioning the role played by the politicians and political parties who have governed Italy since the late 1960s, commemorative ceremonies of terror represent a space where the ideal notion of the state is socially reconstructed. The associations of the victims’ families, when they are successful in assuming their role as authorities of memory, become in this context living symbols of how a democratic society should function and of how a democratic relation between the state and citizens should be. By questioning and contesting the present state, they implicitly affirm in the public discourse an ideal notion of democracy and justice: Where such crimes either do not occur or when they do occur, the terrorists are immediately identified and punished. Through their activities the Italian associations of the victims’ families contribute to reinforce the public sphere necessary to the life of any democratic state. The most interesting aspect of this process is that by constructing counter-memories (and by questioning the state) this kind of association reconstructs and repairs also that ideal of democracy necessary to the state in order to maintain its core values. So these memories become in the end a vital resource for maintaining democratic life.

References


Museums of the twenty-first century are seen, and see themselves, as active agents in the politics of public culture. No longer are museums considered neutral warehouses for accumulating and exhibiting material artifacts. Nor can they be dismissed as mausoleums memorializing a half-forgotten, largely irrelevant past (Adorno, 1981). No longer can they uncritically embrace the “civilizing mission” – the mandate to educate citizens by inculcating tastes and belief systems of elites that prevailed when many major museums took shape (Orosz, 1990; DiMaggio, 1991a; Bennett, 1995; Poulot, 2001).

This chapter focuses on the place of museums in what sociologists have called “mediation” processes, the complex interplay of material and symbolic practices that constitute collective understandings of culture (Hennion, 1997). It also draws on notions developed by Pierre Bourdieu and Paul DiMaggio in studies of organizational structures in the field of cultural production. I contend that museums and the objects they collect and exhibit have multiple meanings in part because of changing ideas about cultural rights, authenticity, and cultural authority. These issues are negotiated on many different levels by a proliferation of characters who participate in varied (and sometimes overlapping) capacities; among them: museum workers and professional associations (curators, conservators, administrators, technicians, first-person interpreters), patrons, trustees, donors, politicians, educators, artists, collectors, critics, art auctioneers, scholars, representatives of stakeholders from cultural communities or “subjects” (dominant and marginalized), visitors, taxpayers and other publics. Competing claims of rights and authority emerge as groups refine and shape their positions with regard to museums.

The chapter begins with a brief consideration of how institutionalization processes and internal dynamics in museums have helped to establish museums and curators as cultural authorities on an organizational level and in professional contexts (DiMaggio, 1991a; Bourdieu, 1993). Next I present questions about the
authenticity of cultural content and cultural authority in the context of relations between museums (as “experts”) and their “subjects,” the groups who consider themselves stakeholders in the cultures on display. I examine various aspects of “expert–subject” relations in connection with various themes: classification and exhibition as ways of controlling cultural content, ethical approaches to the sacred and the secret, competing knowledge claims, and new practices that recognize the polysemy of museum objects. Finally I consider cultural authority and authenticity in the context of contemporary trends in relations between museums and publics: interactive processes and meaning-making, community involvement, public controversies as forms of recognition, and recent trends in the interplay of cultural values, money and power in public museums.

ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND MUSEUMS AS CULTURAL AUTHORITIES

There is considerable variation in the histories and institutional forms of museums in different countries (Levine, 1988; Poulot, 2001). Disciplinary differences also play a role in organizational models, functions, and target audiences (Kuhn, 1977; Heyman, 1996; Dauskardt, 2001; Schiele, 2001). However, many of today’s museums are the products of founding elites, who adopted not-for-profit organizational structures in what Paul DiMaggio has termed the “high culture model” (Balfe and Cassilly, 1993; Bourdieu, 1993; DiMaggio, 1991b). The apparent economic disinterestedness of this organizational model served to enhance the status of donors, patrons and other benefactors. It also gave museums and curators credibility as arbiters of cultural values.

The position of museums as cultural authorities was also strengthened by prominent international museum organizations set in place to promote international communication in the context of diplomatic initiatives, such as the International Museums Office established in 1926 and the International Council of Museums that was set up after World War II (Boylan, 1997). Professional codes of ethics further strengthen the authority of museum workers to make decisions about what constitutes authentic cultural heritage that is worth preserving (Post, 1998; Corzo, 1999; Hummelen and Sillé, 1999; Roth and Salas, 2001).

In the US, a fieldwide professional organization emerged (i.e., the American Association of Museums) in connection with the efforts of museum workers to legitimate their occupations (DiMaggio, 1991a: 267). Paul DiMaggio found substantial discord about museum form and function as well as tensions over features of a national infrastructure. Interestingly in this case these conflicts took place at the level of the museum field with relatively little conflict within individual museums. Struggles crystallized over two prominent competing sets of missions with markedly different organizational forms. The traditional museum model emphasized collection, conservation, and sacralization under the control of patrons, trustees, donors and professionals trained in disciplinary specialties (former art historians in the case of art museums). By contrast reformers believed museums should educate, exhibit, and interpret culture under the supervision of museum professionals and educators. Wide acceptance of both of these competing organizational forms as legitimate facilitated the emergence of museum professionals with commitments to social
action that diverged from interests of the founding elites. DiMaggio proposes that this debate legitimated conflict over the interpretation of the museum’s mission (DiMaggio, 1991a: 268). The resulting tradition of dissent within the museum field is not unrelated to controversies associated with culture wars in the public arena, a topic we shall return to later.

Of course tensions do occur among museum professionals within individual museums. Curators frequently disagree about their place in mediation processes as old-style humanists confront new approaches to cultural history that reposition curators as active agents in the production and reproduction of culture (Marontate, 2001). The dynamics of museum work are changing too, with increased emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration. Museums have begun to employ a wide variety of occupational groups and some have established positions for new categories of technical workers – like conservation scientists, electricians and mechanical engineers. Innovative museums, like the San Francisco Museum of Art, the Guggenheim Museums and the Tate Gallery network, are creating positions for specialists in what is now called “time-based” media or “variable media.” As well museums are creating new networks to develop fresh approaches to the preservation of new forms of cultural heritage, sometimes in concert with private collectors, like the founders of the Kramlich Foundation that funds research on the preservation of video art or the Daniel Langlois Foundation for art, technology, and science that supports research on variable media works (Marontate, 2001). Cross-disciplinary collaboration also occurs among participant networks and associations like the International Network for the Conservation of Contemporary Art set up in 2000 to develop interdisciplinary approaches related to new technologies.

New forms of technical collaboration have redefined work in museums, but traditional status distinctions of occupational groups persist, in terms of pay levels and authority. Most museums are strongly hierarchical institutions where technicians and hands-on conservators are ranked below conservation scientists and curators (who frequently have doctorates), and where directors and executive boards reign supreme (Hummelen and Sillé, 1999). Despite inequalities in museum occupations there has been an overall trend toward professionalization and structuration of organizational relations in ways that enhance the status of these groups as cultural authorities.

**Classification and Exhibition as Restrictive Practices**

The organizational processes that have shaped the museum field have not dispelled fundamental tensions over the content of museum exhibitions, notably between museum professionals (as experts) and their “subjects,” in particular cultural groups who consider themselves stakeholders in the cultures on display.

Museum professionals are key players in decisions about what might be simplistically termed “cultural content,” as participants in determining what cultural records are worth preserving and how to classify and display them. Varied considerations are brought to bear on these processes; among them: ethical issues, political and financial concerns, disciplinary norms and general social trends. In this connection James Clifford analyzed the relationship between collecting things and demarcating cultural groups in Western museums. He noted that objects in
collections classified as “cultural artifacts” are assigned different value than those categorized as “(aesthetic) works of art” or placed in other categories of collectibles, such as mass-produced commodities (Clifford, 1998: 99). Value depends on authenticity but the criteria for determining authenticity vary according to the classification.

In the case of sub-Saharan African art, Western scholars developed criteria based on a notion of “primitive society.” “Authentic” African art was to be untainted by Western intervention and was intended for use by the society that produced it. From this viewpoint art made in colonial or postcolonial contexts was inauthentic due to contact with the cash economy and with new forms of patronage from missionaries, colonial administrators, tourists, and the new African elite. This classification tradition has been criticized as an oversimplified fiction that excludes innovative African artists from the international scene by favoring anonymous, formulaic, historic works from the past (Oguibe and Enwezor, 1999). Museum classification traditions thereby have marginalized the contributions of Africans to contemporary cultural movements. In the words of Sidney Kasfir:

Ironically…that which is collected and displayed and hence authenticated and valorised as “African art” – was and is only produced under conditions that ought to preclude the very act of collecting. Seen from an anti-colonial ideological perspective, collecting African art is a hegemonic activity, an act of appropriation; seen historically, it is a largely colonial enterprise; and seen anthropologically, it is the logical outcome of a social-evolutionary view of the Other… Even if none of this were acknowledged, one cannot escape the internal contradiction in the working definition of authenticity – namely that it excludes “contamination”… while at the same time requiring it in the form of the collector. (Kasfir, 1999: 90)

Sacred Secrets in the Public Museum: Who Has Rights to Cultural Knowledge?

Tensions also arise in relations between museums and their “subjects” about ethics and ownership of cultural information or things. Sacred artifacts in museum collections, human remains and objects may have been acquired in ways that are now considered unacceptable. Repatriation laws like the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 1990 and the National Museum of the American Indian Act (1989) were intended to spur museums and other institutions to give back wrongful possessions to aboriginal groups. However these laws say nothing about how to protect sacred knowledge from being disseminated in museum contexts. In some cultures the most extreme punishments “are reserved for people who violate…traditional restrictions on the communication of cultural knowledge” (Michaels, 1994). Such information may be present in rituals, songs, dances, graphic designs, or other forms of cultural expression. Sometimes tribal secrets have been revealed to museum staff or intermediaries as proof of an object’s sacred nature or as evidence of authenticity (Marcus, 1998: 229). However the status of such information may change over time; for example in order to respect mortuary restrictions of some cultures. Museum professionals may be ignorant of transgressions, as anthropologist Eric Michaels observed:
Judeo-Christian tradition honors the dead by recalling their names and even their images. We name children, streets, and buildings after dead people, and cherish paintings and photographs of dead relatives. . . . Mainland [Australian] Aboriginal tradition prescribes nearly the opposite.

The death of an Aboriginal individual is considered so upsetting that elaborate precautions are taken to ensure that things associated with or owned by the deceased, including his or her name, are avoided by living relations. A dead person’s camp is burned . . . and even words that sound like the dead person’s name may be omitted from speech.

These restrictions have, in many areas, been extended to all recordings made of the dead person: film, video, sound and photographs. One may not exhibit the photograph of a dead person . . . for as long as a generation. This means that all photographs featuring people will eventually become restricted for some period of time . . . (1994: 9–10)

Debates about authenticity, secrecy, privacy and ownership of cultural knowledge are thus also closely related to the dynamics of the intercultural relations of museum professionals and stakeholders (or “subjects”) in the culture on display.

Universalistic Knowledge Claims versus Multiple Narratives

Museums are social organizations devoted to sharing and creating knowledge claims and narratives about “facts,” myths and memories. As such they participate in what Vera Zolberg has called the “universalistic project of enshrining transcendent values” (1996: 70). Museum professionals, many of them trained historians, often resist the notion that knowledge is socially constructed (Post, 1998; Roth and Salas, 2001). This has concrete implications for museum practices. Demands for parity of representation or affirmative action for under-represented cultural groups is a common source of friction. Are such demands merely attempts to replace one worldview with another? Can museums present valid, concurrent, different and possibly conflicting perspectives?

Consider a censured exhibition to commemorate the end of World War II at the National Air and Space Museum (NASM), part of the Smithsonian Institution, a network of museums and research institutes with headquarters in Washington, DC. The Smithsonian is called “The Nation’s Attic” because its museums display only a fraction of their collections. The exhibitions are highly visible, since most of these museums are in a national historic site of political significance for Americans known as “the Mall” (Roland, 1998). The centerpiece of the censured exhibition was to be the Enola Gay, a B-29 bomber that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in events leading to Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II. The initial text of the exhibition focused on human suffering caused by the bombing and suggested that the atomic bomb had contributed to continuing global conflict (Zolberg, 1996; Pretzer, 1998; Tota, 2001). Critics, notably war veterans and Republican congressmen accused NASM curators of “revisionism” and bias. Curators defended their rights and duties as scholars and cultural authorities. Sociologist Vera Zolberg likened the debates to the famous 1951 film Rashomon, a film that depicts four different accounts of the same crime, because there are so many versions of the
historical narratives endorsed by protagonists in the Enola Gay affair (Zolberg, 1996; Nobile, 1995; Linenthal and Engelhardt, 1996; Bird and Lifschultz, 1997).

Debates about censorship of the Enola Gay exhibition raised questions about the role of curators in the constitution of cultural narratives. I. M. Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, claimed curators who see themselves primarily as historians found it difficult to present alternative interpretations, acting as judges delivering an opinion rather than participating in a debate. Heyman insisted curators have special responsibilities because “museums are still seen as closer to temples than to classrooms . . . places more of the heart than of the intellect” (1996, I-2). He admonished curators to present more than one interpretation because they “present their viewpoints anonymously in a context where the audience takes them as authoritative statements” with the potential to be authoritarian or patronizing even when that is not the intention.

**CONSERVATION ETHICS AND THE POLYSEMY OF MUSEUM OBJECTS**

Debates about authenticity, ownership, and the authority of museum professionals come into play in surprising ways, even in what might seem to be a routine matter—the care of museum objects. Mandates of museums often stipulate limits about what can be done with their collections and many specifically prohibit the destruction of works. Strict rules determine who has the right to handle museum objects. For example, at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, employees wearing a special badge with a double red frame around their photo ID may physically touch artwork. Furthermore, conservation approaches vary according to classification of objects: aesthetic works or artifacts of historic, technical, or scientific interest. Restoration practices governing aesthetic objects often seek treatments that are invisible, whereas fragments of artifacts collected for scientific purposes are frequently reconstructed, leaving restored areas plainly visible.

Reverence for the museum object in its original state is enshrined in codes of professional conduct in museum associations but such conventions are being challenged. Increasingly conservators emphasize the importance of reversible treatments because there is a deep fear of introducing anachronism and a desire not to impose today’s visions on future generations (Van de Wetering, 1999). The awareness that every restoration is an interpretation strengthens the arguments for restraint but it is not easy to develop preservation strategies when competing value systems point to different solutions. Even in the case of historical artifacts like old homes or vehicles, changing definitions of authenticity come into play. For example historians of technology now place more emphasis on historically accurate materials and construction techniques in restorations of everyday objects, like furniture and homesteads, than they did in the past (Lubar, 1996).

Criteria for what is held to be beautiful or authentic or meaningful change, and these changes affect museum practices (Marontate, 1997). Consider the case of the astronauts’ spacesuit collection at the National Air and Space Museum. The original reason spacesuits were accepted into the collection was for use as “colorful” exhibit props, often for traveling shows (Baker and McManus, 1993). Little attention was given to the exhibition and storage conditions; the suits were stuffed with ill-fitting mannequins for exhibits and stored in buildings without climate control. “Flown
suits” were considered more significant than “unflown” suits (worn in training or intended as backup). Unflown suits were used for spare parts. Initially no one realized how important the suits are as records of engineering feats important for the history of human spaceflight beginning in the 1930s, when suits were needed to keep humans alive in high-altitude environments. Much written documentation has been destroyed by government agencies and companies in routine culling of files believed to be superfluous. Some companies involved no longer exist, and researchers are passing away. Consequently, the suits themselves constitute important (and sometimes unique) records of scientific and technological achievements.

Museum professionals sometimes disagree about the care of artistic and historic cultural works. For example, art curators often want kinetic sculptures displayed in motion to respect the artists’ intentions, whereas from a conservator’s point of view this will shorten these sculptures’ lifetime. The ethical stance that protects the integrity of artworks was developed for art of earlier periods when the object itself constituted the principal record of the creative act. Many contemporary artistic practices make reverence for the original object debatable or simply impossible. For example, works in ephemeral media, like videos, must be duplicated. Resolving conflicts is particularly problematic in the case of art in public museum collections by living artists when the artist’s opinions conflict with views of owners, museum professionals or the public.

One modern art conservation research project undertaken in the Netherlands grew out of a conflict between a curator and a conservator over the treatment of a wall-painting that was soiled with dirty fingerprints left by visitors. The curator suggested repainting the wall, believing that the artwork itself consisted of the concepts that were communicated in written instructions provided by the artist. Assistants had painted the wall, not the artist. The conservator found this unethical. The research project set up teams that used case studies to develop interdisciplinary models for balancing technical, legal, ethical, and art-historical concerns.

One team developed an original, though controversial, approach in close consultation with the artist Tony Cragg for his 1982 work One Space, Four Places. The piece is an installation in the form of four chairs and a table, constructed of scavenged materials attached to a metal frame. Some parts were in an advanced state of deterioration and the materials included mass-produced objects like detergent containers no longer made. Should conservators fashion similar-looking parts to replace damaged pieces? The artist promoted a different approach suggesting conservators develop principles for choosing replacement parts, such as “never place two objects with the same color, or the same material or with the same shape next to each other” (Hummelen and Sillé, 1999). The artist’s solution did not take into account the symbolic meaning and historical accuracy of the materials, since the artist did not deem that important. It is a radical proposal because this treatment program would eventually transform the iconography of the work, obliterating references to the twentieth century consumer society present in the original.

Museums frequently do not adopt artists’ restoration strategies because artists feel free to transform their own works introducing modifications that compromise the value of the works as an historical record of artistic practice. As a curator explained, “conservation is about preserving the past. Artists are interested in shaping the present and the future” (Marontate, 1997: 416). When the artists’ desires conflict with the duty of collectors and museum professionals to protect cultural heritage,
museum professionals stick to their mandates. One museum director observed that some artists dislike seeing their drawings covered with glass, but he believes it necessary to protect works for future generations because “the museum is the collective memory of our culture” (415).

**Interactive Processes, Meaning-Making, and the Persistence of Authoritative Expertise**

In “new museology,” mechanistic models of communication and reception have largely been superseded by theoretical approaches that consider publics as participants in the creation of shared practices and values. French sociologist Antoine Hennion has proposed that mediation processes render objects in museum exhibitions open, mobile, and integral to meaning-making practices (Hennion, 1997).

Museum professionals may be increasingly aware of the importance of public interaction for meaning-making but they have not necessarily embraced a sense of relativism. Nor have they all relinquished their claims to positions of authority. This is evident in a vogue for “living history” in exhibition strategies that employ “First Person Interpreters” – role-players without scripts who engage in conversations with visitors in historical museums like New York City’s Lower East Side Tenement Museum or Plimoth Plantation’s dockside exhibit of the *Mayflower* in Plymouth, Massachusetts (Sandrow, 2001). These interpreters develop their understanding of their characters through study of varied historical evidence about cultural practices – including documents of everyday practices like recipes and mail-order catalogs. First Person Interpreters assiduously avoid anachronisms, feigning lack of understanding when visitors make reference to developments beyond their historical period. The principle behind this is, in “having reconstituted the pot, why not the potter?” (Sandrow, 2001: 6). This involves a deep personal commitment by museum personnel. The boundaries between their own lives and that of their characters can blur, particularly at places like Plimoth Plantation, where interpreters live intensely in Pilgrim character all day every day for most of the year, they have been known to speak in period dialect when they go home at night…That’s why when Plimoth Plantation needs to hire interpreters, it advertises a job opening in “time travel.” (19)

Exhibition strategies like these show that even new interactive practices may fail to acknowledge the partiality of the viewpoints expressed in the social (re)construction of facts, truths, or realities, past and current. Although they engage publics in a freestyle mode of interaction with visitors as key participants in imagining lived experience of the past, the museum retains its authority in the interpretation of cultural practices and the constitution of collective memory.

Museum exhibitions also sometimes invite visitors to take positions (Karp, 1992; Crimp, 1993; Bennett, 1995). Imaginative devices to involve visitors in cultural issues have proliferated. At The Holocaust Museum in Washington visitors are matched with specific victims on the basis of sex and age and given biographical details of their mates. In the National Museum of American History’s exhibit “From Field to Factory” one passageway between rooms offered a choice of two doorways – one labeled “whites only” and the other “colored” – obliging visitors to situate
themselves within a single category to continue, in a powerful evocation of the lived experience of racial segregation.

Not surprisingly for sociologists, evaluation studies of whether such innovative approaches to exhibits achieve targeted objectives show that visitors participate selectively in the museum experience, in ways that do not involve a simple transfer of knowledge about the “content” of the exhibitions (Hein, 1995: 201). As Michèle Lamont and Ann Swidler have observed in research outside museums people differ in the ways they draw upon their cultural repertories or toolkits (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000; Swidler, 2001).

MUSEUMS, IDENTITIES, AND COMMUNITIES

In community-based museums publics, stakeholders, and mediators may converge. For example Black Loyalist Heritage Museum in Birchtown, Nova Scotia, Canada was created due to the efforts of local residents descended from Black Loyalists (Black Loyalist Heritage Society, 2002). Black Loyalists were people of African descent who earned their freedom from colonial slavery by escaping to serve on British lines during the War of Independence. In 1783, the British sent over 3,500 Black Loyalists to settle Atlantic Canada with promises of land. By 1784, the year following their landing, Birchtown was “the largest community of free African-descended people outside of Africa” and that year it became the site of the first documented race riot in Canada (Black Loyalist Heritage Society, 2002). Angry white laborers attacked black homes there because black laborers worked for a fraction of the wages of whites, providing tough competition in times of economic penury. (In 1791, the British-backed Sierra Leone Company offered Black Loyalists passage to Sierra Leone and approximately 1,200 returned to Africa.) Located in a wooded, sparsely populated area near a small coastal fishing and boat-building community, the site of the first settlement was largely deserted by 1990. Enormous mounds of rock covering many acres of woods mystify archeologists and historians who suspect they may have served some architectural or symbolic purpose. The Black Loyalists left few material traces other than these mounds, having come with few possessions. Forty-eight of the original Birchtown settlers were born in Africa, and one theory suggests that these mounds may provide clues to precise African origins of the freed slaves. In 1990, descendents of the Black Loyalists formed a community group that successfully opposed plans by the Province of Nova Scotia to create a landfill on the site of the first settlement. The group raised funds for archeological digs, archival research and developed plans for a museum that opened in 2000 on the site of the landing, not far from the mounds. A community-driven program links the museum with the provincial school system in ways that establish a new visibility for a group that had been ignored in history curricula.

As in this case, for some museums real community involvement means participation of people whose culture is being represented. However, competing views may exist within groups and there is a “risk of suppressing many voices by delegating to one representative of a community the authority to tell that community’s stories” (Lavine, 1992: 145). Deciding who has the authority to represent cultural interests in such cases is a thorny issue.
Public controversies as forms of cultural recognition

Nowhere do differences in perspective become more apparent than in public controversies about exhibitions. As the *Enola Gay* affair illustrates, heated debates can occur in various kinds of museums, even in history of science museums. However, some sociologists contend that controversies have a special importance in art museums (Gamboni, 1997; Heinich, 1998). Transgressions of aesthetic or moral boundaries and subsequent expressions of public outrage are common events related to the recognition of “successful” recent art and artists.

Dario Gamboni has pointed out that the rejection of art is not a new phenomenon. Two common words we use to describe forms of rejection come from major moments in the history of the willful destruction of art (Gamboni, 1997). The term “iconoclasm” (derived from the official Byzantine doctrine opposing the worship of graven images) is often used in a way that, in some respects, gives cultural legitimacy to destructive acts since it recognizes that the people who damage or destroy artworks have values. On the other hand the term “vandalism” (named for a destructive group of fifth century migrants) commonly refers to senseless acts, committed without intention and having little meaning for understanding culture. Vandals are seen as ignorant people – barbaric, aggressive, and unaware of the values embodied in the works they destroy. In Gamboni’s view “works of art are rarely – though not never – meant to be degraded or destroyed. It follows that attacks generally represent a break in the intended communication [pattern] or a departure from the ‘normal’ attitudes and modes of communication…” (Gamboni, 1997: 11).

Thus, controversy, rejection and acts of aggression are acts of communication. Studying cases of rejection can help us to understand the multiple meanings of cultural artifacts and to gain insights into more general social issues.

French sociologist Natalie Heinich takes the argument further. In her view the rejection of art by uninitiated publics has become a “normal” part of the process through which contemporary art and artists now achieve recognition. She has proposed a theory of contemporary art inspired by a French children’s game called “the hot hand” (*la main chaude*) that entails keeping one’s hand on top of others in a frantic but rules-oriented series of maneuvers (Heinich, 1998). Heinich maintains that artists, art world participants, and publics now engage in a threefold game of transgression (of norms by artists), rejection (of works by publics), and integration (of new art endowed with the critical acclaim of specialists, among them museum and gallery professionals). New art deliberately challenges the boundaries between good taste and bad, between art and non-art. The “game” of transgression, rejection, and assimilation produces an escalating sense of alienation of the general public because the values embedded in contemporary art are irreconcilable with widely held standards in civil society. New forms of art entail rejection by a public that does not understand or accept the moral and aesthetic transgressions embodied in new art.

Recent controversies are also a rich source of knowledge about contemporary social issues (Balfe and Cassilly, 1993; Barber, 1996; Hennion, 1997; Tota, 2001; Heinich, 1998; Marontate, 1999a; Halle and Yi, 2000). For example a controversy over the Tate Gallery’s award of the Turner Prize to Rachel Whiteread in 1993
provided a forum for discussion of housing shortages in Britain while garnering much publicity for participants in the events. The Turner prize, with a purse of £20,000, is awarded through a competition to a British artist under 50 years old for the “best artistic production” in the year. Every year the four finalists become the topic of public debates. In 1993 Whiteread was also the target of a series of public events led by a group of Techno-Rave musicians who insisted she also accept a second prize, the “X-prize” (of £40,000) for the worst artwork produced in the year. If she declined they promised to burn the prize money on the steps of the Tate Gallery (Marontate, 1999a). The artist's principal work that year was a concrete sculpture created using an actual house as a mold. The work inspired contradictory readings. Even Whiteread’s choice of materials – the use of concrete – was significant since it made reference to the practice of British proprietors to block toilets in abandoned houses to discourage homeless squatters. Some interpreted it as an expression of solidarity with the homeless. However, the work (called *House*) was located on the site of a planned subsidized housing development and its presence there was delaying the construction of 67 homes for people with low incomes. It had been sponsored by Artangel, a non-profit foundation that solicits funds for contemporary art. The principal patrons of this project were Beck’s Brewery and Tarmac Structural Repairs but the project was also partly subsidized by public funds. Tarmac – a construction company accused of destroying traditional urban neighborhoods and endangered wildlife habitats – contributed labor, technical assistance and materials for this expensive project and won a government award for its contributions. The artist developed a successful international career.

In a censorship controversy in 1999–2000, former New York City Mayor R. Giuliani rejected – sight unseen – the “Sensation Show” and tried to punish the Brooklyn Museum for hosting it by withdrawing funding. Discussion centered heavily on a criticism of the mayor’s repressive tactics as well as questions about his values. Giuliani claimed the art exhibited in the “Sensation Show” offended the general public’s moral standards in matters of religion and sexuality. The mayor was derided in the press for his ignorance (embodied in his refusal to view the show) and accused of self-serving political motives in courting publicity with issues that appeal to conservative voters. Some claimed Giuliani’s objections might be grounded in racism. The brunt of Giuliani’s wrath centered on artist Christopher Ofili’s use of elephant dung and images of genitalia from a pornographic magazine in a mixed-media depiction of a black virgin Mary done in a faux-naïf style. Supporters questioned the intentions of Ofili, a Catholic of African heritage. The values and motives of other protagonists in the dispute were also attacked. Commentators impugned the motives of the show’s curators, the museum, other artists, and the show’s patron Charles Saatchi who owned many of the works. Sociologists David Halle and Gihong Yi interviewed visitors leaving the “Sensation Show” and analyzed transnational telephone survey data to study public attitudes towards censorship. They found that people did not support censorship in “bounded” institutions (i.e., museums with entrance fees). Their findings provide support for proponents of commercialization of the museum field, not defenders of accessibility as a democratic right. Thus controversy provided an opportunity for public debates about cultural values and practices.
Art world reputations that survive controversies do so by converting notoriety to cultural capital and often (not incidentally) material capital. In the case of the “Sensation Show” controversy, the museum, the artists, and the patron did just that. The Brooklyn Museum was mobbed with visitors throughout the show and the museum’s director publicly defended the involvement of art collector Charles Saatchi with aesthetic decisions that could benefit him financially. Observers noted that exposure of artists in a well-publicized show in a publicly funded museum might have increased the market value of the works. Some speculated that financial interests had usurped the place of aesthetics. Debates revived when Christie’s auction house handled the subsequent sale of some of Saatchi’s collection in May 2000. This open embrace of commercial interests and management principles constitutes a rather significant break with American traditions of art philanthropy and not-for-profit models of elite involvement in museums (DiMaggio, 1991b; Ostrower, 2002).

The increasing importance of economic forces in museums is evident in the new visibility of corporate sponsors, the proliferation of shopping opportunities in connection with museums, the institution of hefty entry fees, and a general push toward fiscal independence. What does the acceptance of management principles and art market involvement in contemporary museums imply? French sociologists Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello proposed a theory about the “new spirit of capitalism” that provides some interesting tools for reflection. In their view the new spirit of capitalism is ideology that justifies commitment to an economic cycle that results in an unlimited accumulation of wealth premised on consumption. Within this perspective management is not merely a technique for profit-making but a moral imperative that shows how profit-making can be “desirable, interesting, exciting, innovative or meritorious” (1999: 95) with dire consequences for the poor.

Resistance to the control by private patrons and insistence on public access as a democratic right have historically been themes in arguments for public funding of museums. However, the peculiar mixture of art, politics, and money associated with recent major art controversies may be an indication of changing practices within cultural institutions like museums. They may also be a sign of more pervasive changes in attitudes about the interplay of culture and capital in society.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Museums occupy an uneasy place in sociological studies of culture in part because of the tension between the claim to universality of the knowledge on display and the socially partial nature of museum exhibits. This chapter has attempted to introduce the varied relationships of a complex cast of characters engaged with the negotiation of meanings and practices in the context of museums. Such mediation processes are increasingly diverse and highlight an enhanced awareness of multiple perspectives. However, fundamental debates about the ethics and feasibility of authoritative and authentic cultural “representation” are still unresolved. Institutionalization processes that have helped to establish museums as cultural authorities were premised on assumptions that are difficult to reconcile with cultural relativism, even with
respect to seemingly straightforward matters such as the principles for care of material objects in collections. By studying emerging practices, debates, and even controversies we gain insights into how museums and their publics renegotiate authority, redefine authenticity, and arrive at a sense of cultural justice in a changing world (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991). Contemporary museum professionals, their “subjects,” and their publics engage in complex, dynamic relationships that are transforming the ways in which museums of the twenty-first century shape and are shaped by culture.

References


Black Loyalist Heritage Society Web Site (October 2, 2002) <http://museum.gov.ns.ca/blackloyalists/>


Further Reading


We live in a moment of historical transformation and liminality. The contradictory but intertwined trajectories of globalization and religious fundamentalism present faster and more sophisticated ways of communicating insistently divergent world-views (Friedland, 1999), not interested so much in finding common ground as in fighting over it. It is a world in which the boundaries of states and sovereign identities are being reconfigured even as we race to identify and locate them. Instantaneous communication of traumatic events, ruptures and scandals do not give us a purchase on either interpretation or action – although certainly it demands a reflection on how interpretation and action are related (Boltanski, 1999). To study culture, particularly culture in moments of change, requires a certain kind of witnessing, an attempt to record and recover that which is, in the words of Yeats, “Past or passing or to come” (Yeats, 1962). This is an imperative that is both intellectual and normative. But what does it mean to be a witness? How do the mechanisms of witnessing actually work? And what, most important of all, is the relation between witnessing and acting?

**What Is a Witness?**

At first blush, the role of the witness in history seems a minor one. Witnesses observe the actions of others, those more central actors who are the protagonists of social and historical progress and transformation. Like the Greek chorus of the ancient tragedies, witnesses recount and extol, or lament, the fates of those humans who dare to involve themselves directly in the pitch of the universe.

But where would history be without the witness? These figures do not simply watch. They ratify and notarize, they escort the principals to sites of exchange and transition, they sanction deals and documents and signatures, and they so very importantly co-sign or counter-sign (see Honig, 1993: 212). Perhaps most crucial –
witnesses survive, render, and remember. In all these ways, witnesses give lie to the distinction between action and observation in the sphere of history.

Every witness embodies elements of all these features, though some are more directed toward the role of rememberer and some more to that of notary. In other words, all witnessing involves some ratio of performative, demonstrative, and representational acts. Through such actions as their signatures, witnesses co-author (perform) events; through their demonstrative gestures they locate and direct attention to the focal points of action; through their recounts in various media, they record what has happened, rendering it historically legible. In sum, through their taking up of a point of view, witnesses make the world intelligible.

Playing this crucial hinge role in moments of social and political transformation, witnesses are both necessary and an encumbrance. The central actors in an event must count on the witnesses to see what they are supposed to see, to record the event in a particular way, to sign their true name in the appropriate way on the right document. The quasi-autonomy of the witness is both required and a source of anxiety. What will the witness record? Will the witness attend to the scene or will he or she turn away? How will the witness recount and represent the act after its occurrence? In this regard, artists and writers are particular kinds of witnesses. Their paintings, plays, poems, and the like are essentially their signatures by which they subscribe to (underwrite) the scene.

The word “witness” has several etymological roots and historical meanings. Giorgio Agamben notes that “The Greek word for witness is martis, martyr (derived from the verb meaning ‘to remember.’). The first Church Fathers coined the term martirium from martis to indicate the death of persecuted Christians, who thus bore witness to their faith” (1999: 26). There is a paradox to this root meaning of “witness.” The act of witnessing faith, borne by the martyr in his or her very martyrdom, must rely on other, second-order, witnesses to record and remember it. Wherever selves are undergoing processes that can be understood as undoings or abnegations, the task of the witness becomes doubly complicated. In such events as martyrdoms, resignations, or surrenders, it is not unreasonable to claim that witnesses are asked to bear witness to a disappearance.

In his reflections on the etymology of the word “witness,” Agamben goes on to note that “In Latin there are two words for ‘witness.’ The first word, testis, from which our word ‘testimony’ derives, etymologically signifies the person who, in a trial or lawsuit between two rival parties, is in the position of the third party (terstis). The second word, superstes, designates a person who has lived through something, who has experienced an event from beginning to end and can therefore bear witness to it” (1999: 17). First let us consider witnesses as third parties.

Third parties are crucial to the structure and progress of disputes. They stand outside of the intense standoff of the charge/counter-charge that pits the main protagonists against each other. This “outside” is both temporal and spatial. Third parties can be figures linked to the past in their representation and embodiment of tradition and institutionalized authority. They can open an escape hatch to the future in their subscribing to a way out of the conflict. Or, given their structural position, they can simply operate in the present as a spectator with an autonomous vantage point. Credible testimony comes from third parties, or witnesses in this sense. And the variable dynamics and forms of testimony reflect the different kinds of demands placed on witnesses – moral, political, and/or legal. The report of the
witness needs to be accurate to some standard (epistemological or political) of reality. And the witness must take responsibility for ratifying that this event happened in this, rather than in some other, way. Of course, the third-party witness often finds a kind of situational zone of discretion – discretion in two senses of the word. There may be discretion in the face of action that undoes identity or is shameful. Can and does the discreet witness look away from a scene of degradation, humiliation, or exiling? Further, to what extent does the witness have the discretion of whether or not to testify, to sign, to subscribe?

As vantage points turn out to be key for credibility and intelligibility of witness reports, it is important to locate third parties spatially and temporally. Are they close enough to see or hear the exchanges and transactions at the center? Are they oriented correctly to the action? Are they present in “real time” or after the fact? After all, it is the essence of the witness to be an acknowledged presence at the scene. Jacques Derrida writes that “The witness is the one who will have been present. He or she will have attended, in the present, the thing of which he is witness. Every time, the motif of presence, of being-present or being-in-presence, turns out to be at the center of these determinations” (2000: 187). This presence of the witness must also be put in the context of situations that are ongoing and contingent. The role of the witness is a temporary one – witnesses are created or called forth in the context of ongoing actions that authoritatively claim the center stage.

Onlooking third parties to ongoing actions can have their presence felt in several ways. One, potentially significant way, is for the action’s main protagonists to wonder if witnesses might not, in their turn, transmute into central actors. For example, political scientist H. E. Goemans notes the hovering and threatening presence of third parties in ongoing two-party wars. He writes, “[T]he presence of a potential intervener allows winners to credibly commit to limit their war aims if both winners and losers know that any further demands would invite balancing behavior by a third party. The anticipation or actuality of third-party intervention in war provides the first mechanism that makes a self-enforcing agreement to end war possible” (2000: 33). In gauging the impact of witnessing, it is thus essential to specify, spatially, temporally, and semiotically, the meaning of presence and of attention.

Taking up the second Latinate meaning of witness, that of superstes, it is clear that this meaning emphasizes less the position and more the experience of the witness. The witness in this sense is one who has lived through an event and can bear witness to its having occurred. Thus the witness is a survivor, one who bears the event within him or herself. Under this rubric, witnesses combine experience with meaning, survival with judgment.

Several dilemmas are associated with this meaning of witness. What, for example, happens when there are no survivors of an event, when no one who has had the experience lives through it to record and remember it? In his book Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben addresses just this problem when he considers the Shoah: “The Shoah is an event without witnesses in the double sense that it is impossible to bear witness from the inside – since no one can bear witness from the inside of death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice – and from the outside – since the ‘outsider’ is by definition excluded from the event” (1999: 35). Here is the deeply political and moral problem of absent testimony when presence is necessary.
Another problematic feature of this understanding of witness is that of coinciding yet antithetical identities. What happens, for example, when those who were, or who might have been, the central actors in an event are called upon to be witnesses to that event? They had the experience under one optic and are called upon to give it meaning under another. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States weighs in on this question, when it takes up the problem of self-incrimination, stating that “No person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In the case of the role of the public in the political sphere, historical transformations wrought by social or political change might suppress the agentic role in a moment of general amnesty or reconciliation. We are all, or almost all, witnesses now. In his analysis of the series of newspaper articles that reproduced the Report of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa in 1996, Phillippe-Joseph Salazar raises a question about the identity of the reading public. Can these readers be simultaneously the subjects of the narrative of the Report and be witnesses subscribing to it? He writes, “The series of articles cogently argue for an argumentative fiction… by which readers have already removed themselves from the past and moved beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In sum, the new citizens are no longer subjects of the TRC’s narratives” (1999: 2).

Political dilemmas of this type recapitulate the socio-linguistic parsing of authorship of speech-acts. Erving Goffman's famous concept of “footing” tracks the varieties on a theme of identity – when a speaker is alternately understood to be the author (or not) of the words that are spoken, the animator (or not) of the utterance, and the principal (or not) who adheres to the sentiment of the utterance. These gaps, or degrees of freedom that are opened up by the role, position, and actions of the witness raises a crucial question: Can witnesses ever be thoroughly implicated in the events to which they are called upon to bear witness? Or, are they always, necessarily afforded a degree of freedom that we might call the zone of autonomy?

In her detailed analysis of the emerging conventions of visual documentation upon the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps at the end of World War II in Europe, Barbie Zelizer draws attention to the foregrounded role of images of witnessing. These witnesses included American news journalists, American military officers, German camp officials, and German civilians. They were called upon to witness the atrocities in and of the camps. Published photographs of these diverse constituencies established different visual angles for them. For example, survivors were photographed frontally, staring directly at the camera, while German perpetrators were photographed in side views. Zelizer writes, “Perpetrators were generally shown at odd angles to the camera, which showed large uniform bodies – angry stares, colorless prison garb… German civilians were also frequently depicted witnesses, and they too were photographed in various encounters with the atrocities, reburying the bodies of Nazi victims, looking at the cremation ovens, or ‘being forced to gaze’ at stacks of corpses” (1998: 102). In these photographs, framed, as Zelizer describes, in formal, conventionalized tableaus, the characteristic poses of civilians were the most elusive and ambiguous. They exist in a kind of liminal zone of responsibility and the significance of the zone of autonomy they are now, as witness, at least temporarily being afforded, is built into the role of witnessing.

This degree of freedom that witnesses find in their role introduces a strange twist on the act of confession. It is sometimes the case that by confessing to one’s own past
transgressions, one may transform oneself from a (transgressing) actor into a
witness. Phillippe-Joseph Salazar finds such speech-act switches in the Truth
and Reconciliation Hearings: “In the TRC’s case, criminals come forward as
‘witness’ of their own transgressions. The criminal is the witness, and often, the
only witness, and sometimes to a fact that no one even suspected to have taken
place” (1999: 9).

At the other end of the agentic spectrum, advocates for specific causes can undergo
a kind of metamorphosis into witnesses as their cause reaches its practical limits.
Political scientist and legal theorist Austin Sarat makes the case that lawyers
working on often futile death penalty cases ultimately transmute into historical
witnesses operating under the mandate to remember. He writes, “Given this impera-
tive to remember, the lawyer for a losing cause serves as a witness testifying against
those injustices” (1998: 322) Thus do the separate spheres of law, morality, and
history become linked through the persistence and autonomy of witnesses.

Taken together, the “third-party” understanding of witness and the “bearer-of-
experience” meaning of witness may suggest an internal contradiction or pull in
diverse directions. The former implies an outsider’s perspective, the latter that of one
who bears the experience deep within the self.

WHERE IS THE WITNESS?

To the degree that witnesses must perceive the events to which they bear witness, the
question of their location looms large. To what degree does true witnessing require
proximity to the center of events? To what extent do the institutions set up to
overcome distance (political institutions, technologies and institutions of communi-
cation) mitigate this need for proximity? Does the question of proximity serve to
differentiate witnessing from “mere” spectatorship?

If, as Martin Meisel suggests, there is “an interpretive habit of mind that associ-
ates proximity with involvement, [and] distance with detachment” (1983: 22), what
is the correct distance from the scene for a witness under the third-party rubric? Or,
alternatively, what is the correct distance for the witness under the survivor rubric
(in which we might understand the scene as residing inside the witness as opposed to
the witness inside the scene)? How do we, second- or third-order witnesses read the
meaning of the literal proximity of the first-order witnesses as an expression of
involvement or of the lack of involvement?

Such questions also suggest a need to examine the relationship between witnessing
an event (or its conclusion) and judging the event. Theorists of the act of judging
make contradictory claims about the meaning of the relation between spatial and
temporal proximity and participation. Hannah Arendt writes in The Life of the
Mind, “Thinking deals with invisibles, with representations of things that are absent;
judging always concerns particulars and things close at hand” (1978: 193). Thus,
Arendt seems to insist on one’s proximity to that which one judges. And yet such
judging seems to fall short of a reflective thinking that must recover distant and
absent things to the mind. Further, Richard Bernstein identifies a contradiction
within Arendt’s theory that pits judging sometimes in opposition to and sometimes
in tandem with action itself. He writes, “[J]udging is the capacity of the spectator
who views and judges human affairs, the human spectacle, not that of the actors
who participate. This does seem flagrantly to contradict the claim that judging is itself...a form of action – debate – which Arendt takes to be the essence of politics” (1986: 231)

Perhaps it is the doubled meaning (third-party and superstes) of witness that creates this tension. Proximity to the scene gives a kind of epistemological and political purchase on the scene – particular things can be judged. As John Durham Peters writes, “Singularity is key to the communication economics of witnessing...and ‘being there’ matters since it avoids the ontological depreciation of being a copy” (2001: 726). But distance can compensate for its deficiencies by creating a kind of zone of autonomy for free recall and chosen combinings of thoughts. It is easy to see how Arendt, among others, gets tangled in the contradictory freedoms and imperatives of distance and proximity, thinking and judging, living through and persuading others. As all witnesses operate under this double vision, albeit to varying degrees, they are both inside and outside of an event. They are implicated in it and freed from its mandates.

Such complicated understandings point to the signal importance of the modality of witnessing. How does the witness perceive the event and perform his or her task? Events can be perceived tactually, visually, aurally, and so forth. Alternatively, things can be “known” in the absence of obvious, examinable evidence” (Hanks, 2000: 85–6). Witnesses can be detailed to perceive events in very specific ways. Their location vis-à-vis the actions to be witnessed thus must provide a vantage point that allows for these ways of knowing. In his book Picture Theory, W. J. T. Mitchell parses these different ways of knowing, thereby suggesting some epistemological dilemmas of witnessing:

The “differences” between images and language are not merely formal matters: they are, in practice, linked to things like the difference between the (speaking) self and the (seen) other; between telling and showing; between “hearsay” and “eyewitness” testimony; between words (heard, quoted, inscribed) and objects or actions (seen, depicted, described), between sensory channels, traditions of representation and modes of experience. (1994: 5)

For one reading, then, witnesses must be in a position to hear oaths and other speech-acts, to see the exchanges of objects and people, to watch the main signatories sign their names. Of course this reading must immediately be confronted with the historical fact of what we might call the commissioned, commemorative witness, such as the painter, who must render the events long after the fact. This witness is often not in the position of presence.

Overlaying and intertwined with the question of available and mandated channels of perception is that of the politics of observation, and the role that distance plays in it. Scholars of the public sphere such as Hannah Arendt, Benedict Anderson, and Luc Boltanski have considered the role that distance and spatial dislocation play in alternately problematizing and making possible a realm of politics.

On the one hand, distance creates difficulties for knowing and observing others. Reports on distant conduct, exchanges, and transformations take time and may be lost or distorted. Distance undermines the sense of deeply existential knowing that comes from face-to-face interaction. On the other hand, Hannah Arendt’s theory of the political realm rests on a fundamental exigency of, precisely, “distance, the
worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located…” (1963: 81). Political acts are those very acts of crossing distance, of founding institutions that create pathways across the previously unmediated space. Luc Boltanski, in his brilliant reflections on action at a distance, writes in this regard, “In fact, distance is a fundamental dimension of a politics which has the specific task of a unification which overcomes dispersion by setting up the ‘durable institutions’ needed to establish equivalence between spatially and temporally local situations” (1999: 7).

The question then becomes: Under what rubric can we decide if any particular social or political action calls for proximal or distant participation and attention? In the case of the witness, who must perceive, and then sanction, notarize, record and/or remember, the witnessed actions through the sensory apparatus, how does that proximity relate to the political context? And further, how does such proximal witnessing reverberate outward into more distant concentric circles as second-order witnesses assay the renderings of the first-line witnesses? Finally, what becomes of the essential proximity of witnessing as these subsequent renderings communicate the event to the wider publics? In certain cases, distanced observation may take steps to meet the criteria of proximal witnessing. Thus one might read Boltanski’s adumbration of the spectator’s meeting the moral demands of spectatorship as a description of a spectator in the process of becoming a witness.

The relay of rendering suggests a necessary focus on the diverse media through which the chain of witnesses record what they have seen. John Durham Peters provides a typology of four possible temporal and spatial relations to an event, only three of which he recognizes as truly engaging witnesses: “To be there, present at the event in space and time… To be present in time but removed in space is the condition of liveness… To be present in space but removed in time is the condition of historical representation… [but] To be absent in both space and time but still have access to an event via its traces is the condition of recording: the profane zone in which the attitude of witnessing is hardest to sustain” (2001: 728).

Distinguishing between spectators, observers, witnesses, and publics may be one approach to answering these questions. But such distinction proves difficult. Spectatorship has a long philosophical history, perhaps most exhaustively considered and elaborated by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Such issues as the objectivity of the spectator, his ability to see without being seen, the relation of spectatorship to politics inflected with morality, are all taken up by Smith. For later theorists like Arendt and Boltanski, one key dilemma rests on the question of ties (or their absence) between spectator and observed, and the assessed credibility of any consequent testimony. For example, Boltanski writes that “[I]t is because the spectator is without ties and prior commitments that his report, his testimony, can be put forward as credible” (1999: 29). Perhaps this dilemma of ties or their absence presents a clue for understanding the exigencies of location of the witness.

Recalling Agamben’s etymological distinguishing between witness understood as the third party and witness understood as the survivor, we encounter a parallel tension between spectators without ties (objectivity reinforced by distance) and spectators with ties (for whom proximity is desired, and for whom spectatorship transmutes into compassion on the one side or enmity on the other). Concretely, where does the witness stand (literally and figuratively)? And where does the witness look? In order to answer these questions, attention must be partially deflected away
from the witnesses and the main protagonists themselves. It needs to be shifted to the
stage: “We need to remove the figures from the stage and examine the stage itself, the
space of vision and recognition” (Mitchell, 1994: 30).

**The Visual Order of the Witness**

The eventful stage of historical transformation will be peopled by witnesses, one
way or another. I have addressed the exchanges and recognitions taking place within
or on this stage elsewhere (Wagner-Pacifici, 2001). Here we are concerned with a
different kind of exchange – that which I would call “cross witnessing.” Witnesses
witness actors engaging in the actions on the stage. Witnesses also witness other
witnesses witnessing the action. All designated witnesses must figure into a net-
worked compositional structure. Are we likely to find them on the periphery or the
center, looking inward or looking outward? Are we likely to follow their gestures,
their physical and visual orientations, their stances as they point inward or outward?
In any of these variable configurations, the scene must cohere around and through a
central focal point where the key commitments and performative actions occur.

The witnessing of a coherent scene requires a complex perceptual apparatus able
to comprehend the alternations of narrative action and moments of suspended time.
In other words, the relation of the witness to the scene is a function of proximity,
point of view, and perception. The witness is, critically and in ways that will be
detailed, both in and out of the scene. But the scene must be conjured up out of the
ongoing movement of social time and must be congealed (however temporarily) in
order to be witnessed. As Jonathan Crary has written in regard to the historically
conditioned observer, “Whether it is a question of the stage, urban design, or visual
imagery, the intelligibility of a given site depends on a precisely specified relationship
between a delimited point of view and a tableau” (1991: 52). The suspended and
pregnant moments of tableaux, when vision is allowed to take clear form, suggest
that witnesses must not only be located specifically in space but must also be located
in time. The dramaturgy based on pictorial configuration and exposition, most
clearly articulated by nineteenth century British melodrama, captures these align-
ments and their meanings best. At key turning points in the plays, as the action
proceeds toward revelation, the entire cast on stage would freeze in their positions,
revealing the network of relations just as these relations are about to be transformed.
Time is temporarily frozen to allow the spectator’s gaze to pan the spatially arrayed
relational web. As Martin Meisel writes, “The fullest expression of a pictorial
dramaturgy is the tableau where the actors strike an expressive stance in a legible
symbolic configuration that crystallizes a stage of the narrative as a situation, or
summarizes and punctuates it” (1983: 45). In an analogous manner, the witnesses of
historical transformations are positioned to observe something that happens in “real
time” and yet must also attest to that happening by freezing time. They do this
through their acts of notarizing and sanctioning. They are called to bear witness to a
vision of the world that is remade at the very moment when witnessing becomes
relevant. As well, the painter or photographer of such scenes is compelled to create a
frozen tableau in rendering this scene. Performatives, demonstratives and represen-
tations thus differently engage and construe this pulsating rhythm of the ongoing
interactions and the crystallized moments. Different kinds of witnesses (proximal or
distant; immediate or delayed; notarizing or representing; official or unofficial) who are called upon to embody and enact these various tasks confront a very real existential dilemma of knowing where, when, and how to “look.”

Movement is hard to see, harder to describe, hardest to ratify and record. Artists in different cultures and historical periods have grappled with the question of whether, and how, to render movement in painting, poetry, and prose. Some artists, according to theorists of art and literature, have opted to freeze movement (and thus time), some to attempt narrative recapitulation, some to juxtapose different moments in the “same” scene (see Alpers, 1983; Meisel, 1983; Bryson, 1988; Jay, 1988; Marin, 1998). In Wendy Steiner’s discussion of Renaissance painting, for example, she claims that the Renaissance instituted a logic that made the image represent the perceiver’s vision of the world at a single moment of time, precluding representations of narrativity.

For present purposes, the connection between, on the one hand, the complex choices involved in rendering time’s ongoingness and rendering time’s stopping points and, on the other hand, the complex demands upon the witness, revolves around the witness’s position, orientation, and actions. The question is raised – what does it mean to testify to a vision of a world that is simultaneously being remade by (in part) the very testimonial actions of the witness?

**WHAT DOES THE WITNESS DO?**

The many possible actions of the witness have already been introduced. Witnesses live through events, they observe them, they escort principals to points of event transaction (beginnings and endings figure importantly here), and they ratify the transactions that take place. Eventually, they record and remember the events and transmit information about them to distant others (both those distant in space and those distant in time). Here we will highlight just one of the many actions of the witness, that of appending one’s signature to an official document, in order to demonstrate just how complicated a role it is.

**SIGNATORIES TO THE SCENE**

It was of course J. L. Austin who, in his mapping of how to do things with words, drew attention to the way in which the signature acts as a tether, linking the written document to its source (something not so obviously necessary in the case of the speaker of an utterance) (1975: 60). But the signature’s relation to its source is complex and contingent.

Signatures are powerful – conventional and explosive at the same time. Signatures are both unique (only one original signature in each signatory space of each document) and repeatable (each signer must be thought capable of generating unlimited, “identical” future signatures); both autonomous and linked to all other signatures of all other real and potential signatories, present, past and future. “Put your John Hancock here” links us and our contemporary mundane signings to John Hancock and other historically significant signings. We become John Hancock-like when we sign our names. Signatures create as much as authenticate the self. Further, the
ontological status of the signature itself is complex and multilayered. It is both an object and an event, which already marks it as special. It emerges out of a culture of alphabets, a culture of genealogy, and a culture of literacy. It constitutes a text of sorts. It also has elements of the pictorial and the iconic, with its distinctive loops and flourishes and its signal occupancy of very particular areas of papers and paintings. Finally, like the fingerprint (a stand in for a signature on occasion) the signature metonymically contains and leaves traces of the body on the page. “I am here,” it says, or, raising the issue of intersecting or confusingly co-habiting time-frames, “I was here.”

The “I” of the signature is a unique actant, and each incident of a signature must be recognized as uniquely belonging to that actant. Each signature is a unique event asserting its own authority and yet each is necessarily dependent on other signatures that act as counter-signatures vouching for the identity and legitimacy of the first. Signatures thus operate in a system of signatures linked to selves, witnesses, and counter-signers.

Derrida notes that “The effects of the signature are the most ordinary thing in the world. . . . In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its production” (1982: 328). In a related way, signatures act as a kind of ontological break. Their appearance announces their quality of being flung onto a surface from another dimension. They are often scrawled across the bottoms of documents that are otherwise orderly, pre-scribed, and based on formal scripts. They also signal a social commitment, breaking forth to take a stand. In the case of witnesses, the witnesses commit themselves to the event, to a certain vision of the event, to their role in the event through their signatures. They perform their witnessing through their signatures.

Signatures constitute just one action in the witness repertoire. Ultimately, a comprehensive understanding of the responsibilities and privileges of the witness rests on a consideration of all of the acts and conditions of witnessing. The approach developed here claims this is best accomplished by way of the previously introduced analytic rubric of the performative phase, the demonstrative phase, and the representative phase of action at a moment of transition. Phase switching itself can be viewed as signaling something important about boundaries. In a related manner, anthropological linguist Michael Silverstein was among the first to recognize the interdependence of the pragmatic and referential aspects of indexical items of speech (the “shifters,” whose referents shift as a function of the speech situation). Thus referentiality gives a minimally secure foundation to pragmatic action as shifters rely upon previously agreed upon meaning to intervene (and often reconfigure) the context. Silverstein notes that “[T]here is a general creative or performative aspect to the use of pure indexical tokens of certain kinds, which can be said not so much to change the context, as to make explicit and overt the parameters of structure of the ongoing events” (1995: 204). I want to suggest that a similar dynamic is at work in what I am calling “phase shifting” in the acts of witnessing. As in Silverstein’s analysis, the importance here comes not so much in the switch itself but in what the shifts tell us about the boundaries of the event context and progress.

Thus, in the shift from a demonstrative to a performative engagement, witnesses are called upon to perform their witnessing selves through taking oaths, giving testimony, and appending their signatures. In doing so, they make most obvious
their move across the boundary separating insiders from outsiders, actors from observers. These witness actions ineluctably combine the performative (oath taking, signature appending), the demonstrative (giving testimony, indicating the scene to others from a specified vantage point), and the representational (recollecting the event for chains of third parties, rendering the event in textual or pictorial media).

But highlighting the unique actions of individual witnesses raises another conceptual issue, suggested earlier in the chapter – do witnesses signify and perform differently when they are constituted as collective rather than individual entities? The Greek chorus may be said to derive its voice from its nature as an assembly. This collective entity comments on the world of men and gods, laments the fates of men, but cannot enter the fray (perhaps because it is a collectivity). Scenes of historical transformation seem to draw crowds of witnesses. As the ceremonial moments of exchange and ratification do temporarily stop the flow of action in their tableau-like suspended moments, these crowds catch their own movements to attend to the scene. Of course, the mood of the crowd of witnesses will be differently inflected in different scenes of transformative entrances and exits. The degree of anxiety will be relatively greater or more diminished. But even in the most uncontentious and predictable of occasions, the collectivity of witnesses will demonstrate the edgy quality of a boundary event.

Collective witnessing has a certain power. It is literally a public reckoning by a collectivity. And from this perspective, an understanding of society as comprising authoritative and authorizing institutions is key. Thus crowds and audiences and escorts are already differentiated and specialized witnesses. But for witnessing to be ultimately responsible and competent, it appears that it must ultimately take a singular, individual form. Individual witnesses are asked to commit themselves to a singular event by way of a performative act. While performative acts can be accomplished by a group of individuals acting in tandem, it is as individuals that witnesses ultimately cast their gaze, record what they perceive, swear their oaths and sign their names. In this way, witnesses mediate history, both practically and epistemologically. They work to ratify and convey the meanings of the exchanges and transformations of a most mutable world.

References


VI

The Culture of Institutions
In March 2002, the Pennsylvania Malpractice Insurance Bill passed the state legislature, after months of public complaints against insurance premiums by physicians, many of whom threatened to gut the Commonwealth’s health system by leaving. The bill created an authority to examine medical errors and recommend improvements, mandating hospitals and physicians to advise patients, in writing, about serious medical mistakes. While limited for the moment to Pennsylvania, the act responded to a general national crisis of escalating malpractice premiums (most particularly in specialties like ob-gyn) and internal problems of the insurance industry. This crisis helps us to outline some paradoxes that increasingly confront expert practitioners, even in the most powerful of American professions.

First among these issues is the question of boundaries. The whole project of professionalization strives to draw them tightly around a specialized knowledge base, with which professional power is inextricably linked. Institutionalized boundaries sanction the fact that societies (officially, their state) recognize that the complexity claimed for this special knowledge is not contrived but necessary. The exclusive nature of professional power rests, thus, on mastery of a legitimate complexity, and the cultural authority of recognized professions radiates from this base.

This authority is discursive: through authorized statements and practices, it constitutes an area of social life into a field – be it medicine, technical devising, personal salvation, architecture, law, various levels of schooling, or whatever specialized field with “professionalized” boundaries we may convincingly think of. These fields of legitimate complexity are claimed by the professionals who perform and speak in each, but a much broader lay public accepts them as “really existing,” if not always thoroughly bounded, areas.

In the constitution of a knowledge field, sociologists attribute a great deal of autonomy to the profession taken as a collectivity – including associations, training centers, publications, and elites who issue “serious statements.” As Eliot Freidson argues, “monopoly over the practice of a defined body of intellectualized knowledge
and skill, a discipline” is a central constituent of professionalism and its privileges (2001: 198). It may therefore seem puzzling to see Pennsylvanians physicians welcoming the Malpractice Insurance Bill as a helpful step, for it involves an incursion across the boundaries of the professional field by an external authority, which will decide what is a medical error. But the bill, limiting physicians’ exposure to legal pursuit and damage awards, is more novel as a compromise created by the confrontation of two powerful professions in an economic emergency, than as an example of professional dependence on state arbitration.

This demands that we consider professional power as inserted in a broad and complicated political field – more complicated than a profession’s relations of authorized power with “the public,” and broader than a profession’s efforts to enlist the state in its defense. This is not the field where rival occupations encroach upon each other’s jurisdictions, which Andrew Abbott’s work has emphasized (1988), but an arena of contingent outcomes. Here, professional players, pursuing the different interests of their clients or their own, enter into conflict about what are legitimate boundaries, exclusive knowledge, and permissible autonomy in applying it. The Pennsylvania Bill illustrates the contingency and the variability of the power of experts that exist within a larger field of power, inhabited by more players than suggested by the triangular relationships profession–state–rival occupations, or profession–state–relevant public.

Finally, the Bill highlights that the dependence between a central profession and the state, even a liberal state that traditionally does not do much for social welfare, is reciprocal. A modern state cannot abstain from regulating free professionals, nor let them fend alone with market dynamics. Pennsylvania was facing a shortage of physicians that risked dealing a tremendous blow to the health industry, especially in Philadelphia; against the disorder that threatened, the dawdling legislature had to act. In sum, the very contemporary and American issue of malpractice insurance remits us to the problem of governmentality that Michel Foucault placed at the dawn of modern societies and their individualized apparatus of order.

GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE MODERNIZATION OF CLASSICAL PROFESSIONS

I find it fruitful to rephrase some of our sociological issues in light of the links Foucault traced between the state, the disciplines, and discipline, or social order. As sociologists, we assume that specific cultural forms are produced, carried, and transformed by ultimately identifiable agents. Neither “government” nor the “art of government,” neither “professionalism” nor even less “the social” can be considered as subjects when we come to empirical investigation. Yet these vast abstractions place our empirical questions (per force narrow and local) within a larger historical frame, which keeps us aware of what professions have contributed to the rise of new regimes, the transformation of the class structure, and the application of practical knowledge to social and cultural change. These contributions, I believe, are subsumed under the vast processes that Foucault places under the name of governmentality, a reorganization of the social order that in France both leads to the Revolution and is completed after it.
However, we must also consider which new questions may be worth asking of the professions and their culture today, and whether we have the conceptual tools to answer them. Although this chapter cannot provide the systematic observations of new professional realities from which larger questions derive real sustenance, it aims toward the middle range of sociological theory. Indeed, our questions must ultimately tackle professions as amalgams of real agents, acting in specific contexts and real social sites.

Michel Foucault places the origins of the modern idea of governmentality in France, at the beginning of the eighteenth century. For it to emerge, Machiavelli’s “art of government” had to be transcended, and other “arts” that had appeared since 1532 had to be incorporated into the exercise of power. In the mid-seventeenth century, La Mothe Le Vayer wrote a treatise on ethics (the art of governing oneself), a treatise on economics (the art of effecting good stewardship upon persons and possessions) and a treatise on politics, the art of governing the state for the edification of the Prince. He placed them on an ascending continuum, while the police insured descending continuity, from the Prince to his subjects. The introduction of economics into politics appeared in the Prince’s pedagogy only in the metaphoric guise of the sovereign as good *pater familias*, for the central problem of politics was still asserting sovereignty over a territory. Not the law, but the science of statistics, making its appearance in the same century, would propel the issues of economics beyond the family’s estate, into the domain of *population*.

As population became the object of political economy, the family ceased to be a model of government to become the instrument of population policies. The institutions of discipline were transformed, as Foucault has shown in his extraordinary work on the prison and the clinic (1973, 1977). In a state that has *become government*, “to control the population does not simply mean controlling the collective mass of phenomena . . . at the level of their global results; to control the population also means managing it in depth, with *finesse* and in detail” (Foucault, 1994: 654).

Foucault’s thesis is that, starting in the eighteenth century and in progressive consolidation, *un ensemble de savoirs*, both theories and techniques, constituted the modern art of good government. The “disciplinary society” is constituted by capillary infiltrations of power throughout the body social, techniques of a “micro-physics of power” that makes coercion obsolete and reduces the risks inherent in masses and numbers (Foucault, 1977). Liberal thought theorizes a new relationship between government and society, while modern governmentality takes the welfare of the population as its main purpose and strategy of control. For Foucault, as Colin Gordon explains, “civil society is . . . not to be taken . . . as an aboriginal nature which repels and contests the will of government: it is (like police, or sexuality) . . . a vector of agonistic contention over the governmental relation, of the common interplay of relations of power and everything which never ceases to escape their grasp” (in Joyce, 1995: 207).

In Foucault’s work, the locus of disciplinary development is both vague (for he does not document the agency of groups or individuals in historical movements of reform) and terribly concrete, since discipline appears embodied in technologies of direct control such as the panopticon of Benthamite origin, or the method of clinical inquiry, bases and models of scientific and political control (Foucault, 1973; 1977: ch. 3). Vagueness notwithstanding, discourse is central, both as an instrument
of power and as the stake in struggles for power, while disciplines control its production.

From the control of epidemics to the trial and punishment of criminals, the process by which states become increasingly responsible for the governance of populations is concurrent, I believe, with the rise of modern professionalism. This happens in state-centered societies that promote the creation of professional corps de l’état, as well as in liberal ones where professions form or reform their self-organization. Professions and professionalism, carriers and creatures of discursive authority, rise with, and from, the new governmentality.

In earlier work, I exaggerated the discontinuities that pervasive social change induces in the phenomenon of profession (Larson, 1977). The older nineteenth century professions retained ancient forms and often ancient names as they put old institutional links with higher learning, and old mechanisms for demonstrating competence (like examination by peers) to new uses, while remaining outside the central spheres of commerce and industry. Yet even in the classical learned professions, reorganization responded to changes aggravated by the rise of capitalism; indeed, the guarantees of probity founded on the bonds of small communities or the official monopoly of elite clienteles, were not enough to satisfy the demand of the expanding middle strata of growing cities. From before the Industrial Revolution, the service of the state (and Foucault’s new art of government) required the professionalization of the civil service, while also relying on the presence of “disciplinary representatives” among lowly sectors of the population. Thus, even if old names and forms of organization of “professional” work may have persisted and appeared to expand, they functioned to organize new kinds of people for new tasks, consolidating “microphysical” order for the new regime.

My reading of Foucault has clearly placed him in a Durkheimian tradition. In 1893, at the end of The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim confidently wrote, “the ideal of human fraternity can be realized only in proportion to the progress of the division of labor... if [it] produces solidarity, it is not only because it makes each individual an exchangist, as the economists say; it is because it creates among men an entire system of rights and duties which link them together in a durable way” (1965: 406). Four years later, in Suicide, the “abnormal” forms of the division of labor had extended throughout society, with anomie the sociological equivalent of the romantic mal du siècle. Echoing Tocqueville, Durkheim deplored the passing of the older forms of organization that mediated between individuals and the “distant, discontinuous influence of the State.” To citizens faced with pervasive social pathologies, Durkheim offered possibilities of attachment and participation in decentralized occupations organized in a corporative mode, each having become “a definite institution, a collective personality.” Occupations appeared as one of the few remaining settings where people could develop significant albeit distinctive ethics (1951: 338ff.). Baffling as Durkheim might have found the diversity of professional forms – like traditional chartered societies, corps de l’état, the “semi-professions” of American sociology – he would nevertheless have accepted them all as embodiments of an ordered modernity.

In collegial or hierarchical ways, professions are organized. They affirm the usefulness of applying abstract knowledge to solving problems and improving
practice in specific areas of social life; moreover, they delineate these areas by formalizing what they know systematically about them, which *amateurs* can only know superficially. Based on training and credentials, that is what professionals claim. Their full-time commitment to determinate functions meets Durkheim’s modern categorical imperative of specialization. Their specialized corporative groups appear, thus, as inherently *nomic* (the opposite of anomic) sources of rational culture and specific norms, ideal candidates for a central role in Durkheim’s neo-corporatist order. It is not surprising, therefore, that professions should have elicited the interest of sociologists concerned with social order and equilibrium models: Herbert Spencer, whose key ideas Durkheim rejected, and Talcott Parsons, whose functionalism was derived in large part from Durkheim.

Modern professions were either impelled to organize by the European states in the professional civil service mode, or emerged from the civil society in Anglo-Saxon countries with an associational and collegial design. It was during the rise of industrial capitalism that they acquired both new content and their prevalent organizational forms. Much as professionalization had the effect of rationalizing practices, technologies, and even discourse (a kind of rationalization compatible with the requirements of capitalist production) professionalism nonetheless represented a quasi-autonomous principle of order. Even if backed by administrative power, professions acted in the name of a different kind of cultural authority; and they represented a different principle of allocating jobs and delivering services than the free market. In both the European and the Anglo-American model, professionalization movements brandished a meritocratic creed and ideas of collective welfare while seeking institutional shelter against the rigors of competition in protected markets. In this sense, professionalization is an accessory to the historical counter-movement in which Karl Polanyi included peasant and labor efforts to arrest or moderate the destructive advance of the capitalist market (Polanyi, 1957). For an influential sociologist, the professions represent, like crafts and guilds, an *occupational* principle of order in the division of labor, opposite to the free market’s fluidity and to the detailed formal hierarchies of bureaucracy (Freidson, 2001). And if we return to Foucault’s argument about the early birth of the tutelary state, we see them gravitate in the orbit of a government to which their collective discourse contributes authoritative definitions of law, health, safety, morality, beauty, salvation, and the like.

The first phases of professional modernization aimed at guaranteeing for their followers secure economic niches and genteel respectability. Non-capitalist and anti-market elements moderated self-interest, but minimal economic and social guarantees were indispensable. Economic shelter against untrammeled competition may be considered a part, or an expression of the *jurisdiction* that professions, in Andrew Abbott’s analysis, competitively claim in their fields of work. With the shelter giving some protection against the more egregious aspects of alienated labor, professionals expect (and are expected) to be *interested* in intrinsic aspects of their work. The structural positions for which professions aim in the market and in the division of labor harbor the possibility of claiming respect from clients, audiences, and neighbors, while also nurturing commitment, enjoyment, and other elements of good personal development. Ultimately, some kind of market shelter and social status are
necessary to protect a space wherein professionals can acquire, maintain, and advance not only their specialized knowledge but also the “premodern” sense of craftsmanship and the ideal of *connaissance oblige* that the corporate group displays in defense of its privileges. But there is more.

It is not only that the institutionalized pathways professions set up for imparting codified knowledge (the schedules, the standardized curricula, and methodically organized sequences of courses and examinations) support a *subculture*: the necessarily systematic and dogmatic socialization into a common discourse instills fidelity to what Pierre Bourdieu calls the *doxa* – the acceptance of a constructed area of intervention, of a language, of questions it is legitimate to ask and to seek answers for (1976: 101). The acceptance of the *doxa* is more ineluctable than the formation of an occupational identity, although both contribute to a professional ego and a normative superego. Professional modernization – its drive to create ordered markets, or to reorder areas of the social division of labor – created not only new structures, but also *ordered discourse and ordered personalities*. In this sense, professionalization made an impact of its own on the disciplining culture of the new governmentality.

For a long time, in the classic professions, and also in professions such as schoolteaching or social work or even nursing whose technical base is less complex or less credible, the economic goals embedded in the professional project were fused with social, moral and intellectual meanings and aspirations. The expectation of rewards – relatively secure jurisdictions, earnings commensurate with middle-class styles of life, the attendant social status, and a measure of public respect – made professional careers appealing to young people, drawing them through the hurdles of admission, training, examinations, and licensing. It is reasonable to think that the more arduous the process of initiation, the more likely it will be to instill *some* intellectual interest in their field and *some* commitment to their work in the successful postulants. Again, in the world of work, relative economic security, social respectability, and protection from unseemly competition by rivals or colleagues allowed professionals to develop that sense of work well done that is still a component of the folk concept “professional.”

In sum, the ordering structure of profession had interactional and intimate effects in everyday life. Beginning with the professionals themselves, professionalization internalizes the disciplinary powers that transform the Prince’s subjects into actors, subjects, and objects of the new arts of government. As Valerie Fournier has emphasized, “the professional project involves not only an occupational group appropriating a field as an exclusive area of jurisdiction and expertise, but also the making of this field into a legitimate area of knowledge and intervention on the world” (2000: 69).

Ultimately, the breadth and depth of a profession’s disciplining effect, like its place in the cultural order, depend on trust. Trust is a public property, drawn from a profession’s authority over a discourse, and supported by the bounded cognitive territory that is juridically recognized and politically negotiated. But are these collective properties guaranteed by anything more than the performance of individuals? And if individuals fail, can trust be sustained by the mastery over abstract knowledge and legitimate complexity?
THE DISCIPLINARY FUNCTION OF PROFESSIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Eliot Freidson’s important studies of medicine have established dominance and autonomy as the central defining properties of this central profession. Dominance, supported by the complex organization of the modern hospital, is an almost exclusive prerogative of medicine. Peer review, however, is conspicuously ineffective and sanctions tend to be informal (Bosk, 1979; Fielding, 1995). In the profession that has preoccupied American sociology more than any other, the ultimate and most effective ordering of professionals’ work is personal and internal, an effect of how the producers themselves have been produced.

In later work Freidson carries autonomy (restricted to diagnostic and technical judgments in the execution of work) over to other professions, as their defining characteristic and the prize of their struggles in the occupational world. As Stinchcombe has argued in a classic article, it is the cornerstone of the craft alternative to the bureaucratic organization of production. Next to the free market and the “top down” bureaucratic plan, it is a cardinal principle of order in the division of labor (Stinchcombe, 1959; Freidson 2001). Yet how autonomy is exercised, whether it is a factor of discipline for the individual practitioner and justifies trust in the profession, depends ultimately on the kind of ethical person the professional has become. In fact, one of the arguments for loosening regulations that the accounting profession advocated with great success in the 1990s was the primacy of ethics over regulation.

This individualization of collective trust has ambiguous social effects: on the one hand, since the nineteenth century, Americans reported at the same time mistrust in various professions and the highest confidence in the practitioners whom they knew personally. On the other hand, the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen tried in vain to restrict the scandals connected to the Enron bankruptcy to the mistakes and unprofessional behavior of individuals. The conviction and collapse of the whole firm, preceded by the clients’ withdrawal of trust, show that society expects collective guarantees – the more collective when the functions are more public.

In passing from medicine to other occupations, Freidson has highlighted less personal exercises of power, by means of which professions create discipline beyond their own boundaries. For Freidson, standard-setting comes close to Foucault’s notion of pouvoir: “It delineates a force so pervasive as to shape the world and control systematically the content and process of human life without having to rely on coercion” (Freidson, 1986: 227–8). The professions’ authority over discourse is what gives its representatives control over the design of objectified and disciplining norms.

The nomic effect of the professions’ authority over discourse is also central in Andrew Abbott’s work. Following Everett Hughes, he insists that work, not structure, is crucial for an understanding of professions. The link between a profession and its work Abbott calls jurisdiction, “the central phenomenon of professional life” (1988: 20). Because occupations claim exclusive jurisdictions in competition with others, the path to professional status is never an isolated sequence, but occurs within a system of professions. System competition leads to increases in the systematization of knowledge and, therefore, in abstraction (108–11).
At first glance, nothing would seem more disciplining than a system. But the system of professions cannot attain durable equilibrium: vacancies (unoccupied jurisdictions) constantly show up, starting system-wide chains of effects (we probably should say systems rather than system, for Abbott’s case studies imply that each functional area represents similar dynamics but a different system). These dynamic systems, then, are openly competitive, unstable, susceptible to the action of external forces, and ultimately stabilized and regulated by state law.

Does anything create order, structural or discursive? Inertia, for one, when a jurisdiction is established. Second, the regulatory powers of money suggest to Abbott that the “knowledge currency” (the professions’ definition and use of knowledge) will determine the resolution of systemic disturbances. This economistic model, without actors, except corporate groups, or specific motives, cancels out the normative and ethical effect that professionals have over the shared culture. Only the emphasis on abstract knowledge points to general ideological effects.

It is through structure that professions radiate their cultural messages across different milieus. At the most general ideological level, the message is one of idealized technical competence – problems can be solved, practices improved, puzzles understood, almost everything be learnt. At a more pragmatic level, profession is the model on which the entire middle class of the turn of the century aligned its aspirations of social mobility – professions epitomize secure social status, ordered careers, a middle-class style of life, the rewards of meritocracy. This is the component of economic and social ambition. Both components require a measure of exclusion, justified by meritocratic trials that reinforce the expectation of technical autonomy. So crucial is the structural link between higher education and work that if it is severed or substantially modified, the basic model shaped by professional reform movements in the nineteenth century would become seriously obsolescent.

The multiplication of what I have called techno-bureaucratic professions was not enough to make the education–work linkage obsolescent (Larson, 1977); indeed, professional careers can thrive within bureaucracies, as demonstrated by the “European” civil service model of profession. Taking as model the organizations they know best, professionals bring into other sectors the organizational norms that they learnt while in training. As DiMaggio and Powell note, the prevalence of employed professionals in large organizations is one of the major sources of isomorphism – that is, “organizational homogeneity in structure, culture and output” (1983: 151).

As these organizations become increasingly homogeneous in structure, the normative and disciplinary aspects of the organizational culture are transferred from one milieu to another. Vast sectors of the public come to expect from professionals whatever it is professions claim their practitioners can give. The more individuals understand professional status the more likely they are to want it, while the leaders of other occupations are also more likely to emulate the steps they consider crucial in professionalization. Structural isomorphism, therefore, seems necessary to explain the competitiveness of professional systems, which Abbott’s theory (1988) left unexplained. We can accept that competitiveness spreads the disciplining effects of cognitive dominance, while the effects of personal ethics remain uncertain and variable.

For Steven Brint, the nineteenth century model of professional authority fused technical competence and civic morality in the ideal of “social trustee professionalism,” offered as warrant to the public’s trust. The “incorporation of business training
into the universities began to erode the status distinction between ‘community-oriented’ professionals and ‘profit-oriented’ business people” (1994: 9). After World War II, the divergence between technical and moral aspects of profession became irreparable among the professionalized specialists concentrated in the private sector. The age of pervasive “expert professionalism” had arrived: in it, the only necessary link is between knowledge and power, although power ultimately comes to the experts from outside, as also the threats to its cognitive base and legitimacy.

The external forces of market and managerialism, as well as internal stratification and competition, tend to reduce the cultural authority of professions to the technical component of expertise. While recent empirical research has documented these processes, especially in the case of health professions (Cox, 1992; Brannon, 1994; Johnson et al., 1994; Malin, 2000), experts have never been more ubiquitous nor has expertise appeared more necessary. We can attempt to discern what aspects of their disciplinary functions should retain immunity.

The first response is that the importance of the professions’ knowledge base should logically have gained in relative effectiveness by the enormous increase in the level of average education since the nineteenth century, but the case is not clear. Mass education and the information diffused by massively influential media about all sorts of arcane matters, building (or unbuilding) the credibility of professions and professionals, should have reduced the need for institutional guarantees of competence, or made more citizens capable of exercising the caveat emptor principle in a free market of professional services. To this (which Milton Friedman has, in fact, advocated) Freidson replies that the “sovereign” buyer is seldom well informed, and anyhow often incapable of assessing information. According to the 1993 Adult Literacy Survey of the US Department of Education, some 40 to 44 million adults were functionally illiterate (21%), and another 50 million (25%) could not “understand, interpret, and apply written materials to accomplish daily tasks” (2001: 205 n.). The people capable of “de-monopolizing” the knowledge of professionals and educating themselves in specific issues are recruited from less than half the population, but that is still a very large pool.

In his remarkable study of the politics of AIDS, Steven Epstein has described how and in what conditions activists were able to enter the field in which scientific knowledge was constructed, to participate in the definition of therapeutic policy, and of what would count as “good science.” The controversies about AIDS research, he says, took place in a particular historical moment, “in which the authority of experts ha[d] extraordinary cultural centrality yet seem[ed] possessed of a curious fragility” (1996: 5). In the case of AIDS, public disputes among leading experts compounded this fragility, exposing what Bruno Latour (1993) has called the “hybridity” of scientific phenomena, by which he means that science is constructed by human beings (as much as society is) and not simply “discovered” in the separate realm of nature. The activists who penetrated the domain of experts did so with experiential knowledge that became very important for the scientists. However, the acquired expertise that they also brought to the struggle (and this, Epstein suggests, almost ineludibly) revealed a tendency toward a sort of professionalization in the conflict with expert knowledge. In the challenge to professional credibility mounted by a directly affected and mobilized group, the activists democratized the deconstruction of science in unprecedented ways: but Epstein’s work shows that their challenge was nevertheless deeply dependent on expert knowledge. Struggles that we
may take as an example of Foucaultian resistance against power created more equal relationships between experts, patients, and activists; through struggle, the players reconstructed trust, and therefore scientific credibility. Their increasing competence ultimately became a moral asset for the experts.

In addressing individual subjects, the person-oriented professions may seem closer to Foucault’s model of “capillary infiltration” and better able to evoke the resistance of those they touch, who are both the subjects of their applied knowledge and active subjects in their own right. In their person-oriented service, professions like medicine, social work, the law, the ministry, psychotherapy and more, may have a distinctive advantage, for the confidentiality of the professional’s office may well work better than public discourse for the diffusion of “capillary power.” As professionals interpret their clients’ needs, they engage in a form of “talking politics” that both confirms their authority and makes sense to politically disaffected citizens.

Today, however, the market-directed reorganization of powerful professions like medicine and law is forcing upon them a microdiscourse based on risk, cost, and liability. For instance, in an HMO, medical judgment is shaped, and frequently “distorted by the rules governing insurance coverage”; analogously, the main function of today’s lawyers – both in-house lawyers of large organizations, and free-market advertisers of their own services – is to act as “free-lance bureaucrats,” no longer offering wise counsel but clever decoding of rules and the assurance of “fair hearings for a good price” (Esquith, 1987: 250, 252).

Three years before the defeat of Clinton’s self-limited health plan, a sociologist argued that medicine was losing control over the discourse of health. The links that epidemiology establishes between individual behaviors (notably smoking) and ill-health, the attacks that self-help movements (especially those derived from feminism) conduct against the excessive medicalization of normal occurrences such as childbirth or problems such as addiction, and the rise of environmental movements all point to conceptions of health that are no longer the primary responsibility of the medical profession (Imber, 1991).

Because these factors reduce the cultural authority of medicine, they increase the possibility of public debate about health. However, it is still the case that, for the state, the field of health is the physicians’ legitimate domain: when the President appoints a Commission to recommend policy for Complementary and Alternative Medicine, out of 20 members, 10 are MDs, 2 are PhDs, and another 3 are in allied health professions. They recommend opening the field to collaboration with complementary and alternative medicines. Medicine, in fact, has been so successful in convincing the public of its efficacy that it faces an ever-growing surplus of patients in every country, especially the United States, with its anomalous lack of national health insurance. The paradox created by the very success of official medicine is that the alternative medicines to which rebuffed patients turn must now be taken seriously.

Despite encroachments, despite democratization conquered or mandated, the construction of knowledge fields is still the prerogative of professionals and experts. It is a process in which they have distinguished themselves historically from amateurs and appropriated the power of uttering “serious statements.” Acquiring this power is, in principle, not a closed path, but open to all who wish to learn. In our societies, the exclusion of those who cannot prove their learning by credentials poses the question of equity in the access to knowledge. Brint’s “social trustee” model
included what Tawney called “promoting the performance of function.” Professionals, Tawney wrote, “may, as in the case of the successful doctor, grow rich; but the meaning of their profession, both for themselves and for the public, is not that they make money, but that they make health, or safety, or knowledge, or good government, or good law…” (1948: 94). Even the market aspect of the professional project still involves the production of new needs and the interpretation of old and unrecognized ones. When professionals act as civil servants, or for the state, as in the setting of standards, the creation of social needs and their direction toward stated forms of fulfillment construct a positive image of state power. Thus, in promoting the performance of function, the professions become central players in the constitution of a public sphere, by their discourse and their applied practices. As Epstein shows for the politics of AIDS, contesting the professionals’ definition of these needs, or demanding the satisfaction of needs, or challenging the distribution of professional services are struggles that now emerge from the public sphere.

The constitution of strong welfare states has boosted the fortunes of human service professions. It has also strengthened the model of civil service professionalism, which has always been singularly underdeveloped in the United States. The welfare functions of the state and the defense of public or quasi-public service help maintain the professions’ public voice, and therefore their broader disciplinary function. Arguably, in a period where “independent” experts and “free professionals” have no legitimate power base for resisting the market’s triumph or the decay of public roles, service of the state becomes a bulwark of professional autonomy. Thus, in architecture, a “classic” but weak profession, the decline of a public role for American architects, which coincided with the abandonment of public housing, also prepared the rise of a glib postmodernism at the service of real-estate speculation in the 1980s. Elite architects, however, never ceased to emphasize the importance of institutional commissions, which allowed them to serve users and not only clients, and to assert the virtues of an architectural discourse reserved to colleagues and cognoscenti (Larson, 1994, 1997).

In a different example, the recent scandals of American accounting show that a legitimately constructed and seemingly autonomous knowledge field can be indispensable for the justification of capitalism: the authorities behaved, in fact, as if the market and the courts could take care of the Enron executives, but the public accountants had to be more publicly indicted for exposing an intolerable symptom of systemic failure. Moreover, the success of the accounting elites and their political friends in attacking state regulation had preordained the profession’s dangerous slippage into a practice too visibly wedded to the clients’ greed.

Eliot Freidson (2001) has called professionalism the third logic, or the third organizing principle of the division of labor, and studied the forces arrayed against it from the outside: the market, including the push for deregulation and the movement for consumer sovereignty that has been strengthened by triumphant free market ideology; and bureaucratic control, or managerialism, which sometimes is paradoxically brought about, as in the case of American medicine, by market excesses. But forces that would corrode the autonomy and self-direction that professionals claim also come from inside, from the weakness of corporate groups unable to maintain their founding principles. Augmenting power or wealth becomes more important than the advancement of function, which involved both the advancement of knowledge and the extension of a disciplinary culture beyond the narrow bounds
of the professional group. That, as I argued, was the professions’ nomic efficacy, their contribution to social and cultural order.

Given the diversity among professions and within each of them, it would be absurd to think that all professions and all professionals are retreating apace from the public sphere. In fact, the extent to which professions and their segments do abandon the public definition of needs may constitute a most significant factor of difference. First of all, elites never retreat from the public’s eye or public tasks of definition, if nothing else because the “powers that be” need spokesmen for the professions. Who speaks, however, and who is in the elite position may change. Second, there is the kind of professional performance that is commissioned by public or private clients and always to some extent directed by them, and which expresses itself in artifacts. The latter’s influence is not seen as an exercise of personal agency, as does medical or legal intervention, but it does not disappear, either. Such is the setting of standards or, importantly, the design of the physical infrastructure that allows and even directs our movements. As I have argued elsewhere, there is a way in which the products of architecture never cease being public. While the rationalist corporate architecture that we call “modernist” may have been disliked by most users, it could not (and still cannot) be avoided, as we cannot avoid bridges, roads, elevators, traffic lights, or even humbler contrivances which carry in them our inadvertent behavioral scripts (Larson, 1997). Professional expertise is still present in the physical determinations of our life.

I believe that the notion of profession as a disciplinary “community,” always ideological and always unconvincing, may itself be the main locus of disaggregating tensions. Observers of the professions would agree that what professionals have in common is mostly the experience of higher education. Yet when a system of higher education as deeply and invidiously stratified as that of the United States is unevenly beset by budgetary problems, it is unclear that we can assume there still is a shared, standard basis of professional knowledge. Too often, what seems to matter most for the administrators who determine professional careers is the destandardization of knowledge by prestige and resource differentials. The systematically reproduced differences in academic socialization indicate that the guarantees individual professionals tacitly bring to the use of their autonomy can no longer be taken for granted. The institutional ranking of professional schools determines assumptions of differential competence for employers and publics, deepening the inequality of careers.

Yet professions, as Tawney argued, offered not only competence but also a promise of ethical commitment to a social function. Brint suggests that we may have to look for emergent models of commitment in the peripheral professions of the public sector, which are so often the domain of women. For instance, registered nurses have reconquered the ground abandoned to lower-level health workers, and have increasingly encroached upon the tasks and skills once reserved to physicians, thanks to the hospitals’ pressure for higher productivity. The result, however, has not been exalted professional status for nurses, but an overextension of their work jurisdiction, in part because their reconquest strategy was to reform “primary nursing” (Brannon, 1994). In an almost parallel way, elementary schoolteachers who attempt to ride the waves of school reorganization redefine the functions of teaching and the scope of schooling. Strategies such as these, which involve a tacit upgrading of skill and responsibility, are costly for practitioners, whose commitments become more intense, and schedules more elastic. Lesser workers (mostly
women, in hospitals and schools) were better able to invoke the strict demarcation of private and work time than the all-important doctor, who had to be available at home and by beeper, and the school principal, who kept much longer hours than the staff. But the new intensity of commitment is signaled by extensible schedules and encroachable private time, which peers and superiors may take as a proxy for professional ethics.

Following a strategy of reprofessionalization, in these cases, requires that the players assume the full weight of professional autonomy, and concretely represent the ideal of service. However, even if these reconstructive professional strategies were widespread among subordinate professions, they would be claiming the client’s trust only by means of committed behavior at work; this could satisfy (or perhaps just augment) the public’s expectations, thus reinforcing and protecting the professionals’ jurisdiction and credibility. But we could hardly expect subordinate professions to strengthen the ideal of service within the reconstructed boundaries of a cognitive domain, for subordination starts from the knowledge base. The service strategy, separated from the mastery of legitimate complexity, cannot reintroduce the model of profession in the public sphere.

Finally, a mention must be made of the kind of expertise that emerges from the explosion of computer-based technologies. On the one hand, their potential for rationalizing and automating professional tasks is bound to redefine the internal division of labor of organizations based on expertise, narrowing the boundaries of the heartland – Abbott’s core of irreducible autonomy on which a profession bases its cognitive and jurisdictional claims (Abbott, 1988). On the other hand, the new specialties whose work is to master procedures and translations from esoteric into usable language seem to be computer-proof, insofar as they can push their abstract competence to the next frontier. In other words, they can never become mired in a substance. Here, lawyers may provide an analogy with technical writers, in their capacity to transcend substance and provide expertise that traverses all sectors of activity and all professional work. The masters of procedure may appear as meta-professions, yet it is difficult to see them as autonomously creating a disciplinary domain: for the lay society, domains must have a substance. Lawyers interpret the law but do not appear to create it. Technical writers interpret software: they make it “user friendly,” but do not make it. It may be possible that in the future, interpretation will be the main task of professions deprived of broad disciplinary functions. In this universal semiotics, professionals would no longer create codes, but expertly read their signs.

To conclude, the enormous transformation that advanced societies are traversing is still dealing better cards to professionals than to other workers, in large part because privileged workers are still attempting to follow the exclusive strategies pioneered by earlier professions. Yet the postindustrial order no longer holds professionals immune to the effects of ubiquitous fiscal crises, rationalization, or expropriation by computer, with the forced reskilling this may imply. The old and proven strategy of seeking ordered jurisdictions or sheltered markets in a disordered world and an unstable division of labor does not seem able to insure stable elite status for even the length of one professional’s worklife.

The narrowing of public function that has accompanied the rise of expert professionalism weakens the disciplining effects that marked professions as agents of governmentality and legitimators of the state. The state, in fact, may have partly
replaced them with the “microphysics of power” and the cultural authority that the media ubiquitously diffuse. The retreat of professions from the public sphere and the advancement of function may bring a loss of legitimacy comparable to that of CEOs, as they lose connection with the public creation of industry and wealth, which the United States credited to the figure of the entrepreneur. Retreating from the public imaginary has heavy costs in cultural authority.

Yet, from a reconstructed view of the professions’ worklife ethics we could abstract a conception of lifelong learning, which ends the value of fixed credentials but maintains the value of knowledge. Both the defense of learning and the elaboration of rights recombine the two nomic components of profession, the technical and the ethical. If professionals, like those who claim the benefits of the name, aspire to play a role in the reconstruction of social order, they will have to demonstrate that their competence is real (i.e., constantly updated by new learning) and they will have to invent convincing ways of demonstrating ethical standards of practice. The task is daunting for whoever knows the everyday realities of professional workplaces. But then the capacity to learn and the capacity of ethical self-regulation cannot be commodified, or purchased, or erased by automation. In a paradoxical way, the future ought to revisit the origins of governmentality postulated by Foucault: in a democratic reinterpretation, welfare is inextricably linked to an open discussion of needs, of the means to satisfy them, and of the self-policing of providers and recipients, joined in collective efforts to rediscover the arts of governing by serving the public sphere.

References

Further Reading

Today, there is a chasm in legal scholarship between the study of legal doctrine, located in the law schools and some parts of political science, and the study of legal behavior and practices, located primarily in the social sciences. Natural law, formalist, and realist jurisprudence, the three historically dominant perspectives, have given way to a cacophony of legal theories ranging from law and economics to feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, and law and literature. Nonetheless, despite the contemporary pluralism in legal scholarship, there is a recurrent dualism that reinstates within this diversity the two faces of law: its inescapable facticity, its coercion and its normative, moral weight. Voluntaristic theories see the individual subject’s ideas, intentions and motivations as critical variables in shaping the legal world. More deterministic, structural theories emphasize the power of society and material constraints in shaping the law as well as the behavior and beliefs of persons.

As I will try to demonstrate in this chapter, cultural analysis of the law promises not only to bridge the chasm between these two faces of the law, but also to restore the study of law to its central place within the study of society. In cultural analysis, law is recursively implicated in the construction of diverse and distant social worlds: social networks and organizations, dinner tables, hospitals, movie theaters, novels, and social movements. This approach focuses on the ways in which legality (as a structural component of society) is constituted through everyday negotiated transactions. In this conception, legality is not inserted into social situations; rather, through repeated invocations of the legal concepts and terminology, as well as through imaginative and unusual associations between legality and other social structures, the rule of law is made and recreated daily. Rather than read the law as a set of instructions for organizing social relations (so that any deviation from the recipe is interpreted as a failure to command, that perennial gap between the law on the books and the law in action), cultural analyses seek the multiple and diverse signs of law’s presence, which may often include imperfect reproductions of doctrinal commands. This research pays close attention to language and discourse tracing the residues of legal concepts and meanings in everyday social transactions. As a
map of the ways in which commonplace social transactions cumulate to constitute an enduring structure, this study of the constitution of legality may serve as a model for a more general form of cultural analysis.

THE PLACE OF LAW IN SOCIAL THEORY

Although law became marginalized as a subject within sociology and the social sciences generally, it originally had a central place in classical sociological theory. And, when law had this more central place, the theoretical conceptualization of law was more capacious and less circumscribed than that which came to predominate in twentieth century American sociological and legal scholarship. Durkheim, for example, gave considerable attention to law throughout his writings. In particular, he argued that law had become the embodiment of the collective conscience in an age of interdependence and reciprocity. Within societies with an advanced division of labor, law displaced the traditional role of religion, providing the grounds for a new civic ethic. For Durkheim, “law is the example par excellence of the social fact. It is a visible symbol of all that is essentially social” (Hunt, 1978: 65). Elaborating Durkheim’s insights, and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s view of the law as a great anthropological document, more recent authors claim that “the law is a fundamental framework (a skeleton someone recently called it) of all a society’s forms of association and institutions. If we know the law of any society, we have an excellent outline of the nature of the social system as a whole” (Fletcher, 1981: 33, quoted in Cotterrell, 1992: 2).

For Weber too, law was a central focus of his sociological theories, the linchpin in his explanation for processes of social change and modernization. For Weber, modernity was characterized by a shift in the forms of domination (command relationships in which obedience is experienced as both voluntary and obligatory), epitomized by the rise of formal legal rationality which itself is associated with the rise of bureaucratic administration. Nonetheless, the movement toward formal legal rationality brought with it a tension, according to Weber, between the formalism and proceduralism of legal rationality and the ever more strongly pressed demands for substantive justice, first by workers’ movements and subsequently by an expanding array of popular social movements.

Thus, Durkheim and Weber offered similar analyses of the forms and functions of law as both expressions of broader social formations, in particular the transformations toward modernity, and as channels for developing social sensibilities, interests, and actions. In other words, in classical social theory, the law is not simply the armed receptacle for values and priorities determined elsewhere as in the historically dominant natural law tradition; nor is the law merely a limited device of the modern state as conceived in positivist, analytical jurisprudence. It is part of the complex social totality in which it constitutes and is constituted, shapes and is shaped.

The American Pragmatists shared this orientation toward the law. In his oft quoted opening to The Common Law (1881), Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested what has subsequently become a cultural account of legal institutions: “The life of the law has not been logic but experience.” As Holmes insisted upon the triumph of experience over logic, he promoted a realistic account of law, ultimately a pragmatic
understanding that with time has come to be interpreted in cultural terms. Like his younger admirer Dewey, Holmes used the term experience as a name for culture (Menand, 2001: 437). By moving the focus of jurisprudence specifically, and philosophy generally, to the exploration of culture, both Holmes and Dewey sought to resolve enduring dilemmas over the legitimacy of law’s coercion and violence within an ethics of freedom and democracy.

The key to Holmes and Dewey’s pragmatic, experiential and cultural orientations lay in the conception of life as an experiment. Social change – not onward or upward, but forward, and toward a future always in the making – is constant, social relations forever open to revision. In their policy recommendations they argued that social reconstruction, to be effective and sound, should be produced through open, participatory processes. The central epistemological insight, however, lay in the recognition that probabilistic reasoning could regularize the indeterminacy of individual human behavior. In other words, Holmes, Dewey, and their fellow pragmatists adopted the insights of the biological and physical scientists that chance variation at the individual level produced pattern, if not system, at the societal level. Rather than understanding law as a series of particular disputes or general rules, we could, and should, they claimed, understand law probabilistically as a cultural system.

Nonetheless, despite the centrality of law in classical sociological theory and in philosophical and legal pragmatism, the twentieth century understanding of the relationship between law and society shifted: law was dislodged from a central role in the constitution of society to a peripheral position as a technical instrument of the modern state. What law tells us about society became less important than what law does to society. Law became defined primarily in terms of the processes of creating and enforcing formal rules, as machine rather than meaning; the social study of law became a central topic for political scientists, an allied subject for criminologists and students of criminal justice, and of relatively marginal interest to sociologists generally.

The constricted view of law developed from within sociology itself, and was happily supported by the legal profession and academy. Parsons’ work provides an important link among these communities through his narrow definition of law as the mechanism for maintaining system integration. Although Parsons locates law in a finely balanced and inevitably precarious role among complex sociological factors, his understanding, while not entirely instrumental, nonetheless contributed to and fed a limited, functionalist conception of law. Work deriving from Durkheim also ended up narrowing his conception of law’s constitutive centrality to become merely an instrument of social policy. For law to fulfill the role Durkheim assigned it as the external symbol for the internal characteristics of social life, it was important that law “exist permanently... and constitute a fixed object, a constant standard which is always at hand for the observer, and which leaves no room for subjective impressions or personal observations” (Durkheim, 1982: 82). Using law as an empirical indicator of social solidarity and structure, scholars operationalized law in very concrete, specific terms. They ended up, however, documenting not the permanence, nor objectivity, of law but its particular, dense, and elusive shape. Rather than demonstrate the effectiveness of law as an integrative mechanism, as a means of dispute resolution, or as an instrument of social change, socio-legal scholars systematically documented the law’s ineffectiveness and the ways in which intention and
doctrine are regularly interpreted, reshaped, and transformed in local situations. Thus, the empirical research that followed Durkheim’s assertion of the centrality of law was taken as refuting both his methodological claims of law’s objectivity and the implication of its centrality.

Beginning with the work of the contemporary pragmatist sociologist Philip Selznick, however, cultural analyses of law received renewed attention and energy, spawning what are now several generations of law and society scholars mapping the cultural lives of law. In his work, Selznick eschews any supernatural grounding and plays down the absolute authority of law. He suggests instead that legality is like a Weberian ideal type, which humanly made law approximates and to which it aspires. He describes legality as a socially constructed ideal, albeit an imperfectly institutionalized ideal, for limiting arbitrariness in social organizations and behavior (1959: 13). Although a product of self-reflection and systematic critique, legality is here conceived, as it was for Holmes and Dewey, as a practical norm. For Selznick, in contrast to many other jurisprudential thinkers, legality is an empirically derived concept of variable instantiation. “When a part of the law fails to meet the standards set by the ideal,” Selznick writes, it is to that extent wanting in legality. It does not . . . cease to be law, however” (1961: 97).

**THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF LEGALITY**

Some years ago, Patricia Ewick and I set out to understand how law managed to be experienced as a thing, a powerful, determining institution, while systematic observations revealed wide variation and contradiction. How does a social institution live in the activities of ordinary people? Because the word law names assorted acts, organizations, and persons, including lay as well as professional actors, encompassing a range of values and objectives much broader than those identified by idealized or narrow conceptions, law has neither the uniformity, coherence, nor autonomy that is often assumed. Yet, despite the enormous variety of forms, actions, actors, and aspirations, law seems to emerge from local interactions with the ontological integrity it claims for itself, and that legal scholars have for so long attributed to it. Specifically, we attempted to understand how legality is experienced and understood by ordinary people as they engage, avoid, or resist the law. This is sometimes referred to as the study of legal consciousness (Silbey, 2001).

As conventionally understood, however, the study of legal consciousness suffered from those same unresolved oppositions that plagued the sociology of law generally. If we adopted a notion of consciousness as determined by social forces beyond the individual (a structuralist model), the very apparently thinking and knowing subject was erased. Too determinist an account of legal action threatened to obscure the actual work people do in creating that which then comes to be observed as a legal “system.” From this perspective there was no way to account for the rich interpretive work, the ideological penetrations and the inventive strategies observed in the histories and sociologies of law, as well as those related to us by the persons with whom we spoke. On the other hand, if we adopted a notion of legal consciousness that focused on individual ideas (conventionally operationalized as attitudes or opinions), we would be unable to connect people’s accounts with their lived experiences, including the constraints operating within those particular locations. Treating
consciousness as a set of expressed preferences failed to offer a coherent report of the finite and limited range of options available to people in fashioning their interpretations and behaviors. More importantly, an approach focused on opinions failed to provide an explanation for changes that might and do occur. Finally, an individualistic, attitudinal conception could offer no help explaining the institutionalization, durability, and power of law over time. By emphasizing alternative wings of a dualistic conception of human life and experience, each model imagined only part of what, at least conditionally, we might describe as a process of ongoing mutual causation.

In contrast to these materialist and idealist perspectives, we developed a constitutive analysis that integrates human action and structural constraint. We abandoned any purely instrumental or functional notion of law as command, a set of devices for a variety of social purposes – devices that are all either effective or ineffective, purposes that are achieved or not. The purposes, ideals and doctrines of law, we argued, are a major part, but not the whole of the experience and representations of law, whether or not they are descriptions of operative practices. Law is part of the processes that contribute to composition of social forces; it is not merely a reflection of them. Finally, this cultural perspective rejects a conception of law as a linear aggregation of self-determining wills; rather, individual actions and desires are mediated through legal symbols and institutions.

Rejecting overly idealist or materialist conceptions, we use the word “legality” to refer to the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are recognized as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends. “Legality” is an analytic term rather than a socially approved state of affairs. In this rendering, people may invoke and enact legality in ways neither approved nor acknowledged by law. However, as we recognize a sense of the legal that exists independently of its institutionalized manifestations, we must also acknowledge institutionalized forms of legality. Because the designation of some actors and actions as official and others as lay is an important cultural distinction, one drawn upon and respected by the people we studied, we also retain this conceptual distinction, and use the word “law” to refer to formal institutions, actors, and actions.

We work with a notion of a reciprocal process in which actions and interpretations given by individuals to their world – and law and legal institutions as part of the lived world – become repeated, patterned, stabilized. These meanings, through repetition and dispersal, become part of the material and discursive systems that limit and constrain future meaning-making. Defining legal consciousness as participation in the processes of social construction, our research has focused on the ways in which local, concrete action accumulates into systemic institutions and structures (Ewick and Silbey, 1998, 2003). We document situations in which local processes recursively reproduce macrosocial structures and institutions and, at the same time, provide openings for creativity in reshaping those structures. In particular these constitutive/cultural analyses of legal consciousness describe the processes by which law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values in daily life (cf. Henry, 1983). Attention is directed to the local contests over signification within diverse and competing discourses that take place in most aspects of ordinary life including families (Merry, 1990; Yngvesson, 1993), religious communities (Greenhouse, 1986), medical care (Heimer and Staffen, 1998; Heimer, 1999), engineering (Espeland, 1998), gender, race or age discrimination (Bumiller, 1988), managing
handicapped identities (Engel and Munger, 2003) or poverty and public welfare (Sarat, 1990). In this cultural constitutive conception of legal consciousness, law does more than reflect or encode what is otherwise normatively constructed. Law enables, as well as constrains the possibilities of social interaction. Finally, as Selznick (1959) urged, these cultural analyses explore the meaning of legality and the gradations within it, looking beyond what is given and immediate to what is emergent and durable.

We claim that legality is a structural component of society. That is, legality consists of cultural schemas and resources that operate to define and pattern social life (Sewell, 1992). Through repeated invocations of the law, legal concepts and terminology, as well as through imaginative and unusual associations between legality and other social structures, legality is constituted through everyday actions and practices. So, legality is produced through every package of food, piece of clothing, and electrical appliance with a label warning us about its dangers and instructing us about its uses. Legality is enacted every time we park a car, deliver clothing for dry-clean, or leave an umbrella in a cloakroom, and we are informed about limited legal liabilities for loss. Newspapers, television, novels, plays, magazines and movies are saturated with legal images, while these very same cultural objects individually display their claims to copyright and participation in legality. We pay our bills because they are due; we respect our neighbors’ property because it is theirs; we drive on the right side of the street because it is expected. We rarely consider, however, through what collective judgments and procedures we have defined “coming due”, “theirs,” or prudent driving. If we trace the source of these meanings to some legal institution or practices, the legal origin is fixed so far away in time and place that circumstances of their invention have been long forgotten. As a result, contracts, property or traffic rules seem not only necessary but natural and inevitable parts of social life. This pervasiveness of law – its semiotic, visual, discursive profusion – is the daily constitution of legality.

If, as we argue, legality is an emergent, rather than necessary and determinate aspect of social relations, we need to figure out how the multitude of interactions that form everyday life come to assume the unity and consistency we recognize as a social structure and as a durable institution. How, one might ask, do the diverse, sometimes deviant and often repetitious, interactions of everyday life accumulate to produce structures with enough integrity and unity that social scientists believe we can trace the operation of structures through the outcomes produced? From our fieldwork, we have discovered a partial answer to this question, law and legality (see below for definitions of these terms) achieve their recognizable character, despite the diversity of actions and experiences, because individual transactions are crafted out of a limited array of what are generally available cultural schemas. We hasten to add, however, that those more limited, general schema, are not themselves eternal and immutable, but constantly in the making through local invocations and inventions.

**THE NARRATIVES OF THE LAW**

From 1990 to 1993, we conducted lengthy interviews with over 430 people in a random sample of residents in four counties of New Jersey (Ewick and Silbey, 1998).
We asked these people about the circumstances of their everyday lives. We inquired about any problems, conflicts, or events that were not as they wished them to be, and how they responded to these problems. We listened in their answers for the times when they invoked the law and legal categories to make sense of these events, and the moments when they pursued other non-legal means of redress or accommodation. We were as interested in the silences – the times when law could have been a possible and appropriate response and was not mentioned – as we were in the times when law was mentioned, appropriately or not.

We began the interview by asking how long the persons had lived here, what they liked and did not like about this neighborhood, and how they were the same or different from others living here. Following this general, getting acquainted opening, we inquired about any problems or conflicts respondents had had in the course of their daily interactions and relationships. The situations about which we asked were intentionally varied and comprehensive, seeking to create rather than foreclose opportunities for respondents to report diverse experiences and interpretations. We were seeking their experience and interpretations of the law and did not want to assume its place in their lives but rather discover it as it emerged in accounts of events. The list of probes included the sorts of events that are not unusual for people to define as legal problems, or to seek a legal remedy (such as vandalism, property disputes, and work-related accidents). The list also included events and situations that seem less obviously connected to traditional legal categories or remedies, such as the division of household labor, medical care, or curricular issues in schools. Although many of the situations about which we asked do not always, or often, culminate in a legal case, they all involved situations in which a person might, if they so chose, assert a legal right, entitlement, or status. The events we asked about routinely generated disputes, complaints, and cases for the legal system to process and appeared on the dockets of local courts in the state. Although most people have these experiences, most do not treat them as legal matters. We were seeking to understand just how such interpretations are made, to define an everyday event as legal or not. Thus, if a respondent claimed to have experienced a problem, we asked how our informants responded to these situations, what actions they took, and what alternatives they considered but did not pursue. We did not ask explicitly about formal legal actions or agents until the very end of the interview. We waited to see whether, where, and how the law would emerge in our respondents’ accounts. The interview was specifically designed to access the actors’ interpretations of legality, not to check the quality of their “legal knowledge,” according to some professional judgment of what constitutes the law and legality.

Out of the thousands of individual accounts of law we collected, more than 5,900 events were described, we were able to identify three schemas, or what we sometimes refer to as publicly circulating narratives of legality, running like a braided plait through the idiosyncratic stories people told us. Each of these understandings draws on different cultural schemas; each invokes different justifications and values; each expresses different explanations – capacities and limits – for legal action; and finally, each locates legality differently in time and space and positions the speaker differently in relation to law and legality (as a supplicant, player, or resister). These dimensions – what we call normativity, constraint, capacity, and time and space of law – have proved a useful way to identify the consistencies and variations among the stories of law.
In one story, “before the law” (borrowing from Kafka’s parable), legality is imagined and treated as an objective realm of disinterested action. Operating by known and fixed rules in carefully delimited spaces, the law is described as a formally ordered, rational, and hierarchical system of known rules and procedures. Respondents conceived of legality as something relatively fixed and impervious to individual action, a separate sphere from ordinary social life: discontinuous, distinctive, yet authoritative and predictable. In this account the law appears as sacred, in the Durkheimian sense of the word, meaning “set apart” from the routines of daily life. In this account, people describe the normative grounds for invoking law in terms of general, public needs and obligations. Thus, as one woman explained her refusal to take legal action when injured in an automobile accident, “I learned when I was young, in my family, that you handle these things yourself.” She contrasted this unwillingness to sue when she was injured in the accident to her energy in pursuing a complaint against a supermarket chain when she tripped on a smashed banana. In the latter incident, others beside herself were threatened with injury. “Older folks, children, anyone could have been badly injured” from such lax practices, she claimed. As legality is characterized by its universal, objective norms, it is both constrained by the rules that insure that objectivity and that enable action at a remove from the agency of any individual. In the words of another respondent, the courts can “handle the problems of ordinary people fairly well.” They are predictable, he added, “judges are generally honest in dealing with each case.” Courts are expensive, he also commented, but not so much that you would not sue them if you really needed to. “You see,” he explained, “I was afraid at one point when I first started going to court. I was nervous about it… It was a new experience, you know, so I was a little nervous. Court is always looked upon as this force.” But with experience, this social worker lately become private detective explained to us, you discover that “it’s a place you go to get justice. It is for you to get justice.” Emphasizing the sense of layered organization, he added, at least “it’s a good place to start.”

We also heard a second story of law, a story we call “with the law.” Here legality is described and played as a game, a bounded arena in which preexisting rules can be deployed and new rules invented to serve the widest range of interests and values. This account of law represents legality as an arena of competitive tactical maneuvering where the pursuit of self-interest is expected and the skillful and resourceful can make strategic gains. Rather than discontinuous from everyday life and its concerns, the law is enframed by everyday life. The boundaries thought to separate law from everyday life are understood to be relatively porous. The law as a game involves, however, a bracketing of everyday life (different rules apply; different statuses and roles operate; different resources count) but it is a bracketing that can be abandoned if need be. Respondents describe acceptance of formal legal constructions and procedures only for specified objectives and limited situations. Here respondents display less concern about the legitimacy of legal procedures than about their effectiveness for achieving desires. These stories describe a world of competitive struggles; they seem less concerned about law’s power than about the power of self or others to successfully deploy and engage with the law. In contrast to the sacred face of legality, this is the profane law, the stuff of lawyer jokes, and TV movies.
Expressing a playful, gamelike conception of legality, people describe the ways in which they collect receipts, keep copies of official papers, maintain evidence for what might be needed in the future, if legal problems arise. They talk about the ultimate gamesmen, the lawyers, and the essential necessity of experience and resources for playing the game well. One man described his journey from naive to experienced gamesman. He described an incident in which he lost a legal dispute with a former employer over a month’s unpaid wages. He had been hired by a consulting firm and had been instructed, he claimed, to be available for contracting out. During the two months, he was never given any work and was never contracted out. When he did not receive compensation for the second month, having been paid for the first, he complained to the state department of labor, which initiated an investigation. After a year, the case ended up in court. He lost. He interpreted his loss, however, to his lack of knowledge and experience, from not knowing “how to go about these things.” He attributed his defeat to his failure to document his claim and to act expeditiously. “I lost the case because I didn’t have a way to prove my claim because all the employment records were kept by the company… The only thing I had was the offer of employment by the consulting company, you know, that was the only thing that I had… So it was my word against his and I lost… I think my mistake was that I waited too long… when they were telling me that your check was in the mail. I should have been more adamant, and up front and I should have requested immediately my salary.” He summed up this particular story by observing, “No, I was not ready. I mean I didn’t have a good chance, I think that’s why I lost.”

In contrast to this story of early failure, he later described his growing expertise and more regular legal successes that illustrated his acquired skill in engaging the law to manage his relationships. Underwriting this skill was an emerging understanding of bureaucracy, an understanding that would instruct him in how to behave in relation to the law. Recognizing the futility of changing this pervasive feature of modern societies, he accepted the necessity of learning how to survive while working with it. He came to understand that people who work in bureaucracies have very limited interests. He learned to use these operating constraints to achieve his own ends. “Well, what I’m trying to tell you is, you see what the requirements are, and you try to find out what they’re looking for, and then you try to go about these requirements and see how you can satisfy them. Because that’s what a bureaucrat really does, you know. He looks at the requirements, or whatever the law specifies, and then if you meet these requirements, you have a good chance… My experience is that if you have a case… documented in a very precise way, then the law can, you can use that law in your favor.” He summarized this particular understanding, saying, “That’s another way of looking at the system, you know, identifying the right loopholes… It’s amazing what things can be done and cannot be done with… within the law.” The account of legality as game playing is not orthogonal to the notion of the objective, disinterested rule constrained and enabled system of the first story. It merely emphasizes the room within the system for intervention, agency, and the role of inequality. A third conception, however, acknowledges both the first two accounts of law and denies their persuasiveness, or their dominance.

In a third narrative, law is presented as a product of unequal power. Rather than being objective and fair, legality is understood to be arbitrary and capricious. Unwilling to stand before the law, and without the resources to play with the law,
people often act against the law, employing ruses, tricks, and subterfuges to evade or appropriate law’s power. People revealed their sense of being up against the law when they described themselves as being unable to either maintain the law’s distance from their everyday lives or unable to play by its rules. Importantly, in this third construction, people were not describing illegalities as much as activities for which the law, or official organizations, had not yet taken official notice. The actions were indecipherable by the operating rules of the organizations. In these accounts, law is arbitrary but not unconstrained. The features of modern rational law, those features emphasized in the first and second accounts – its size, visibility, the fact that it organizes the actions of many persons, occupies space, and monopolizes time – represent to many persons constraints on the law’s ability to act. Mired in formal procedure, captured by bureaucratic structures and remote from the real concerns of citizens, the law is often unable to effectively resolve disputes, recognize truth, or respond to injustice.

One woman told us what dozens of other respondents also reported. When her children’s cars were broken into, she did not claim compensation from her insurer. Although she reported the incidents to the police, she did not expect much from them because “they have so many other problems.... We didn’t, we don’t, report anything to the insurance company unless it is something really major because we’re afraid that our insurance rates will go up. My daughter’s bill was $900 and my son’s was $400. It is easier to absorb the cost.” According to this woman, neither the police nor the insurance company can fully protect her. The police cannot protect or redeem her property, and she feels that she cannot jeopardize her insurance by seeking compensation for these smaller injuries and losses when she fully expects bigger ones in the future. This account conveys a picture of two giant organizations (law and insurance), which, despite their power, fail her. Because the legal system is large and cumbersome, minor disputes and losses often cannot pass the boundary conditions for cost effective action. Precisely because her problems fell within – rather than outside – these institutionalized domains, her loss appears insignificant. Another respondent echoed this description of an unwieldy giant: “I wouldn’t go through the system, cause I think that you get hung; I don’t trust it at all. I have learned to trust me, period... I wouldn’t put myself in the hands of the law. It works nice on paper, you know... But a paper law, from what I’ve seen doesn’t work.”

Given the pervasive authority of law to define, organize, and violate the lives of individuals, it is not surprising that many persons described themselves caught within a foreign and powerful system against which they resisted. In these moments, rather than understanding legality as an arena of transcendent authority to which one defers, it is described as an ascendant power to which one conforms. Rather than perceiving legality as a game one plays in order to seek one’s interests and values, people described legality as a net in which they are trapped and within which they struggle for freedom. Rather than apprehending the law as distant from and incommensurate with mundane affairs, or as operating alongside and simultaneously with everyday life, at moments when people express a resistant consciousness, they experience legality as palpably present, substitutive of its ‘here and nowness’ for all other experiences of law, limiting movement, and curtailing meaning and action. Thus, in plotting to remake an unfair situation “as it stands” (Dewey, 1981), these accounts of law described its power and the possibilities for escaping it.
Specifically, each story of this third conception of legality recounted the way in which an aspect of social structure (e.g., role, rule, hierarchy) was deployed to achieve a momentary reversal of the more probable and expected outcome of the legal transaction. Roles are reversed when a man pretends to be a woman and gets rapid response from the police when dozens of earlier calls failed, or a young woman brings her mother to the police for child neglect through drunk driving. Hierarchy is inverted when a consumer skips over layers of bureaucratic processing to complain to the CEO of a corporation. By describing the inversions of social structure to achieve a momentary reversal of legal authority, this third story of law reveals the tellers’ consciousness of how opportunities and constraints are embedded in the normally taken for granted structures of social action. Moreover, the stories make claims not just about the structures of social action and the possibility of resistance, but also about the justice and morality of resistance to some forms of legal authority (Ewick and Silbey, 2003).

While the three stories we observed woven in and among our respondents’ accounts of law can be analytically distinguished from each other, in operation they cannot be separated as one constitutes and enables the other. These are not three separate narratives. It is as an ensemble, woven together, that the several accounts of legality create a durable structure while providing the potential for variation and change. The structure of legality is constituted by multiple schemas, recursively composed of both normative aspirations and grounded understandings of practical action, God and gimmick, sacred and profane.

We surmise that legality’s durability and strength (as a structure of social action) derives directly from this schematic complexity in popular consciousness. We believe that legality is actually strengthened by the oppositions that exist within and among the narratives. For instance, challenges to legality’s authority for being only a game can be rebutted (explicitly or implicitly) by invoking legality’s reified, transcendent purposes. Similarly, dismissals of law for being irrelevant to ordinary people and mundane matters – only a professional and reified realm of abstract reasoning – can be countered by references to law’s gamelike possibilities.

To state the matter differently, legality is much weaker and more vulnerable where it is more singularly conceived. If legality were ideologically consistent, it would be quite fragile. Either way – as solely god or entirely a gimmick – it would eventually self-destruct. For instance, if the only thing people knew about the law was its profane face of crafty lawyers and outrageous tort cases, it would be difficult to sustain allegiance and support necessary for legal authority. Conversely, a law unleavened by familiarity and even the cynicism it breeds would in time truly become irrelevant.

The various, diverse, sometimes deviant and often repetitious transactions of everyday life accumulate to produce the consistency we recognize as law because, despite the diversity of situations and interactions, there are a relatively limited number of circulating scripts or narratives of legality. Each of these understandings draws on different cultural schema with different justifications and values, explanations for law’s capacities and limits, and finally, each locates legality differently in time and space. Each of these publicly circulating narratives of law captures one of the revered and feared Janus-like faces of law. By marrying facticity and normativity in their stories of law, people discursively enact and thus sustain the rule of law.
LESSONS FROM THE CULTURAL ANALYSES OF LAW

There are four lessons we might take away that make this cultural analysis of law relevant for other analyses of culture. First, the normative plurality described in the narrative structure of legality is common to other institutions and social structures. A similar narrative plurality is repeated in medicine (Becker and Greer, 1989; Becker et al., 1961), professional sport (Alt, 1983), science, and even love (Swidler, 2001). In each instance, the cultural phenomenon is described both in terms of normative ideals and its practical enactments (Ewick and Silbey, 2001). Neither the normative ideal nor the reality of love, medicine, sport, or science is understood to be its entirety. Thus, the analysis of the conceptual or analytic content of the narratives as well as the relationships among the different accounts may provide the beginnings of a more general theory of the structure of culture.

Second, the templates of the common narratives join social theory to everyday action and meaning. Thus, just as each of the common schema of legality emphasizes a different normative value (e.g., objectivity, availability and self-interest, power), it also provides an account of how social action is constructed within that account. The “theories” of social action consonant with the dominant value (determinacy, possibility, power) describe action within each as nonetheless both institutionally constrained and enabled. A similar narrative template, drawing upon the dimensions of constraint, capacity, normativity, time/space to describe social action, can be constructed, we believe, for many other aspects of culture, synthesizing the diverse accounts that have plagued the literatures over time, thus offering the possibility of significant theoretical and empirical advance for sociology. More specifically for law, the narratives not only mediate alternative social theories, they reproduce the variety of jurisprudential conceptions of law that have for so long competed for position as the account of law’s power and authority.

Third, this dialectical set of narratives of legality is not simply the familiar opposition between ideal and practice, or capacity and constraint, but a variation between general accounts and the specific experiences of actors. A general, ahistorical, truth (the objective rational organization of legal thought and action) is constructed alongside, but as essentially incomparable to, particular and local practices (e.g. importance of and unequal quality of legal representation; the inaccessibility of bureaucratic agents; the violence of police). By emphasizing the normative ideal of objectivity and rationality, first-hand evidence and experience of discriminatory police, incompetent lawyers, and/or overworked bureaucrats, experience that might potentially contradict that general truth (and values) of rationality, accessibility, and objectivity is excluded as largely irrelevant. However, a durable and hegemonic conception of the rule of law is not achieved by simply removing law from everyday life through its rationalized concepts, abstractions, and definitions. At the same time that legality is construed as existing outside of everyday life in its professional realm, it is also located securely within it. Legality is different and distinct from daily life, yet commonly present. Everyday life may be rendered irrelevant by an abstracted, rational and reified conception of law, but the power and relevance of law to everyday life is affirmed by the story of law as a game.

The apparent incomparability of the two schemas or stories conceals the social organization that connects the general ideal of objective disinterested decision
making in ‘before the law’ to the material practices represented in the story we call ‘with the law,’ including the inequality of access, the mediating role of lawyers, the gamesmanship required to play. Thus, legality becomes a place where processes are fair, decisions are reasoned, and the rules are known beforehand at the same time as it is a place where justice is only partially achieved, if it is at all, where public defenders don’t show up, judges act irrationally and with prejudice, and where the haves come out ahead (Kritzer and Silbey, 2003). Any singular account of the rule of law and the spread of its rationality globally (e.g., Boyle and Meyer, 1998) conceals the social organization of law by effacing the connections between the concrete particular and the transcendent general. As a consequence, power and privilege can be preserved through what appears to be the irreconcilability of the particular and the general. Moreover, because legality has this internal complexity – among and within the common narratives, legality achieves hegemony. Any particular experience can fit within the diversity of the whole. Rather than simply an idealized set of ambitions and hopes, in the face of human variation, agency, and interest, legality is observed as both an ideal as well as a space of practical action.

Fourth, we focus on the issue of contradiction among the popular schemas of law because we think that this may provide an opening for explaining change over time – a central question in sociology. If one can observe similar cultural heterogeneity and contradiction in a variety of social institutions, is it possible that competing and contradictory accounts (e.g., of medicine, sports, science, family) sustain those institutions as structures of social action. Is it possible that the coexisting alternative narratives not only create a protective covering that inures institutions against more systemic challenge, but that structures actually rely upon the articulation and polyvocality of each distinct narrative in order to persist? As a corollary, might the absence of that polyvocality, or what we might call significant imbalances in the narrative constitution of a social structure, create vulnerability and increase the likelihood of structural transformation? If we are correct about social structures relying upon the contradictory cultural renderings of experience, it should be possible to trace the cultural ascendance of institutions and social structures, such as law, to the degree of contradiction they narratively encompass. By taking a broad historical view, we should be able to trace the rise and fall of institutions to the sorts of stories people tell, or are enabled to tell by the availability of diverse, and sometimes contradictory, schemas. Thus, the final lesson is the theoretical importance of focusing on the activities and accounts of ordinary every life as a means of understanding culture and society.

References


The study of social welfare has undergone a shift since the 1980s from a strongly realist to a decidedly constructionist orientation. The move is largely the result of the impact of feminist scholars such as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon whose attention to the construction of gender categories called into question key analytic assumptions of earlier research agendas. The cultural turn that took place in this arena depended on the analysis of discourse. In this chapter I explain how the concept of discourse came into and subsequently transformed the sociological study of welfare institutions. I then highlight two key features of institutional discourse that I believe need to be taken into account in future research – that it is, (1) organized within semiotic systems, and (2) constructed through mutually constitutive dimensional orders. I will develop these arguments by highlighting some findings from my own research on the history of the American welfare state.

Sociology, Social Welfare, and Social Realism

There is a longstanding connection between sociological research and the field of social welfare. These linkages were especially evident during the Progressive Era when academic departments of sociology were being founded in American universities at the same time that the profession of social work was being established and the social welfare sector was undergoing a period of intense rationalization. This conjuncture was defined by a style of pragmatic realism; sociologists saw the field of social welfare as a place in which their theories and professional expertise (on the nature of inequality, the causes and consequences of social problems, the rules of social organization, etc.) would find practical application (Furner, 1975; Ross, 1991).

After World War II, American sociology underwent a paradigm shift manifested as a refusal of a common theoretical framework, in particular, a rejection of grand theory in favor of something that Robert Merton (1957) called theories of the
middle range. The emergent paradigm built upon a common epistemology and a methodological imperative that embraced the systematic interrogation of observational data (both quantitative data as pioneered by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues but also in the qualitative analysis of social phenomena as expressed by the phenomenological turn of scholars such as Harold Garfinkel, Aaron Cicourel, and Harvey Sacks). What followed was an enormously productive period of growth in American sociology and a shift of the core subfields of the discipline toward the embrace of formal modeling methodologies. These advances came at a price. The work of science is difficult. Small variations in measurement have to be noticed, managed statistically, and incorporated into an explanatory frame. This demands specialization and an intense narrowing of the field of vision. To maintain its forward inertia science must be well articulated with a theoretical model. Thus as methods became more carefully refined, core theories began to shrink. Specialists in theory responded by devoting much of their energy to philosophical studies of method, epistemological battles over the proper domain of science, and metalevel theories of action and practice.

In the literature on social welfare institutions, the new empirically oriented research paradigm first found expression in the work of scholars like Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux whose book *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (1958) became a classic. Standing at the beginning of what has become a long and fruitful tradition of research, Wilensky and Lebeaux linked together formal methods for summarizing broad-scale indicators of social activity with a modified structural functionalism in which welfare was operationally defined as “those formally organized and socially sponsored institutions, agencies and programs, exclusive of the family and private enterprise, which function to maintain or improve the economic conditions, health or interpersonal competence of some parts or all of a population” (1958: 17). They argued that changes from one level of welfare provision to another were propelled by the forces of modernization – a concept they referred to as the “logic of industrialism.”

Other perspectives soon emerged to counterbalance this explanatory frame. Neo-Marxists (O’Connor, 1973), state capacity theorists (Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983), power resource theorists (Esping-Anderson and Korpi, 1984), and institutionalists (Thomas et al., 1987) provided alternative explanations. All of these projects (let us call them formal comparativists) share the same underlying form. Variations in the level of provision of social benefits constitute the dependent variable. Theoretical disputes revolve around differences in independent variables (features of the society that are hypothesized to explain this variation). The “logic of industrialism” perspective highlights the importance of economic and technological development as the root cause for the growth of welfare states. State autonomy theorists emphasize the character and capacities of state institutions, as well as the expertise and vested interests of state bureaucrats. Institutionalists measure features of the global social order and a particular country’s relationship to that order. These explanations are framed within conventions of understanding that are dually articulated as theoretical constructs and methodological practices embedded within a particular scientific habitus (Mohr, forthcoming). Concrete, well-metered features of the demography, the economy, the polity, the political economy or position within the world order thus come to be defined as the primary (e.g., genuine) causal factors leading to the growth of welfare activities.
“Objective” measurability is also a criterion for what comes to be conceptualized as a viable dependent variable. Initially, variation among welfare states was measured by overall expenditures in social programs. Over time these measures improved. First, outcomes were broken into types and taxonomies and data collection came to focus on the presence and absence of particular categories of social provision or, more recently, on the types of eligibility criteria that citizens can use in making claims against the state (Esping-Anderson, 1990). While both the measures and the models have become more sophisticated, so too have the theories improved. And yet, like so much of the social science that emerged during this period, this research often leaves one feeling lost in a sea of details, holding onto explanatory narratives that feel overly neat, analytic, and abstract (see Mohr, 1998, for a critique). We can notice this now thanks to the cultural turn that has taken place, largely at the behest of feminist scholars.

THE CULTURAL TURN

Feminist scholarship begins from the perspective that what matters is not the objective quality of sex, but the cultural system of meanings embodied in gender relations. Thus culture shapes and conditions social distinctions that come to be treated as objective. When feminist scholars took up the study of the welfare state they brought this sensibility to bear and quickly began to emphasize how the social categories that underlie most welfare systems – especially gendered categories such as “widow,” “mother,” “unwed mother,” and the like – are symbolic constructs that contain within them ideologically coded assumptions about gender roles, the concept of a “family wage,” the proper separation of public from private spheres as well as many other morally charged cultural prejudices. A classic example is how single mothers in the United States (in their roles as “beneficiaries” of federal support programs such as the Food Stamp or Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] programs) have traditionally been held to a type of moral policing that was not imposed on the beneficiaries of masculinized relief programs (such as unemployment assistance or retirement insurance). Whether one looks at the food stamp program in which relief applicants are given content-coded stamp books rather than cash as a way to control spending habits or AFDC type support programs in which a relief recipient’s sexual life is considered an appropriate object of scrutiny, feminized social welfare programs tend to view women as being in need of close moral supervision. In Nancy Fraser’s terms, “welfare practices construct women and women’s needs according to certain specific – and in principle, contestable – interpretations, even as they lend those interpretations an aura of facticity that discourages contestation” (1989: 146).

The idea that social welfare systems are charged with interpretative ambiguities and a rich moral discourse is not new. Historians have long emphasized how the contestation over meanings – distinctions between the worthy and the unworthy poor, for example – are fundamental features of welfare institutions. But this type of interpretative sensitivity was considerably dulled by the formal comparativists whose embrace of quantification encouraged an uncritical and unrefined acceptance of received categories. Thus, what the feminists inaugurated was a substantive change, a cultural turn that shoved the sociological study of welfare institutions
away from positivist duels over which regression line best fits what data toward a scholarly orientation in which welfare programs are investigated as "institutionalized patterns of interpretation" (Fraser, 1989). Feminist scholars highlight the complex ways in which identities are differentiated, eligibilities are given alternative moral weightings, needs are socially constructed, and benefit programs are far more complex than measures of levels of GNP could express. Indeed, one especially important contribution of feminist scholars was to remind us of how welfare demeans women at the same time that it supports them, and thus to reveal the ways in which welfare programs can be intrusive, coercive, or controlling as well as respectful, enabling, or liberating.

One way to read this is to say that feminists raised the bar on the expectations we have for providing what Geertz (1973) would call a thick rather than a thin description of welfare policies. They argued that without an interpretative analysis we are constrained in our ability to understand and, thus, to effectively compare (formally or otherwise) the social policies that are enacted at different times and in different places. More than this, feminists showed that by slighting the discursive element of social welfare institutions we jeopardize our ability to understand the causal mechanisms that bring them into being. Without attending to the complex ways in which social policies are constructed as contested systems of meanings, scholars come to focus on measurable social processes or events (often exogenous to the welfare system itself) that are at best abstract and frequently inaccurate representations of what are essentially cultural systems – the underlying institutional logics that constitute the organizational field (Friedland and Alford, 1991).

The cultural turn is, however, far from complete. Feminists have enabled us to make a huge leap – but where we will land is still unclear. We need to get past the realist project for a science of welfare institutions, but does that imply that we should surrender the goal of explaining variations in welfare policies across time and place? We need to embrace a more interpretative stance and pursue thick descriptions of institutional processes, but does that mean that we should abandon the tools of quantitative social science? My own suspicion is that the way forward, not just in the study of social welfare but in social science more generally, is to bring a more interpretative sensibility into the core of the social scientific project itself – to make science more interpretative and interpretation more scientific. To do this would be to fully accept the discursive orientation bequeathed to us by the feminist tradition and to do so in a way that also makes room for the very real advantages that can be gained from the incorporation of mathematics and technology – the two most important (and distinctive) elements of a formalist approach to scientific practice – into a new cultural sociology of institutional systems.

We have a long way to go before we can understand what such an endeavor would look like. Probably the change will require something like another paradigm shift, a movement away from the realist sensibilities of the postwar era to a more genuinely constructivist social science (see Friedland and Mohr, 2004). My goal in this chapter is to take one concept, welfare discourse, and to suggest how we might advance a cultural sociology of the topic that embraces both interpretation and formal analysis. In particular I want to focus in the remainder of this chapter on two specific suggestions for how I think the formal study of discourse will affect the way we understand social institutions.
The semiotic component of institutional discourse that I want to focus on here concerns how meanings are constructed. A key analytic innovation that Saussure (1959) bequeathed to us was the concept of a synchronic analysis of meaning. Rather than understanding the meaning of a word by tracing its origins backwards in time and developing a narrative of becoming, Saussure sought to understand how word meanings were whole and complete in the moment. The key to synchronous interpretation was the recognition that word meanings (or sounds, or other semiotically defined system elements) are embedded within a discourse structure or a *(langue)* and thus meaning should be understood as a referential system constructed out of patterns of similarity and difference within a semiotic field. In Saussure's formulation, “The content of a word is determined in the final analysis not by what it contains but by what exists outside it" (Saussure, 1959: 114). What followed from this insight was a long and hugely important tradition of interpretative work in anthropology and elsewhere that sought to explain the meaningfulness of things by understanding their position within a relational system of elements bound together in particular patterns of similarity and difference. This is the essence of structuralism.

Many scholars have sought to interpret the meaning of discourse systems in the field of social welfare. Indeed, most of the classic studies of welfare systems include some analysis of the classificatory distinctions that are embedded within the logic of the system, especially with regard to the ongoing problem of differentiating the worthy from the unworthy poor (e.g., Polanyi, 1957). These kinds of meaning systems can be fruitfully studied as semiotic fields and I think most scholars recognize this implicitly. My interest is in pushing harder on the interpretative technology of structuralism in order to further our ability to ground these interpretative acts in a systematic evaluation of discourse data. I can explain this point more clearly by discussing an example taken from my own research in which I make use of structuralist methods to analyze the discourse system of the 1907 *New York City Charity Directory* (Mohr, 1994).

First, I need to provide some context. The *New York City Charity Directory* was a large book published annually by the local Charity Organization Society, intended as a practical guide for relief workers in the city. It contained short (one or two paragraph) descriptions of nearly every organization operating in the field of social welfare during a given year. The directory was very comprehensive and it thus provides a window into what DiMaggio and Powell have described as an organizational field, “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (1983: 148). I chose the 1907 directory because it was published at the height of the Progressive Era, a period during which fundamental changes were occurring in the field of social welfare.

Michael Katz (1986) describes this as a moment of transition between “the poorhouse era” and something that he labeled “the semi-welfare state.” The former designates the institutional system of relief that prevailed in American society during the nineteenth century. The poorhouse was the pivotal organization. This was a
custodial facility, reminiscent of other custodial institutions that characterized the
time – the insane asylum, the orphanage, the reformatory, and the penitentiary
(Rothman 1971; Foucault 1979). Poorhouse inmates suffered an unpleasant fate
and the unpleasantness was at least partially intended as a part of the logic of
deterrence. The Progressive Era (including here the 10 or 15 years bracketing
the turn of the century) marked the transition to a more modern institutional
logic. The profession of social work was established, a modern set of scientific
discourses were invented, the nonprofit sector proliferated, and organizations were
rationalized in the Weberian sense of the term. It was during the Progressive Era that
public discourse on poverty was softened a bit (especially when contrasted to the
vilifications of the poor that characterized so much of the rhetoric of the 1880s) and
intertwined with a proliferating set of discourses on social problems and “progressive”
proposals for their solution.

Entries in the charity directory consisted of descriptions by each organization of
their mission, their technologies and the types of individuals who were the objects
of the organizations’ efforts. In this paper I focused on 15 of these classificatory
designations (or status identities) – blind persons, consumptives, the disabled, ex-
convicts, high-status individuals, immigrants, mothers, seamen, soldiers, strangers,
tramps, the unemployed, unwed mothers, widows, and working people. Because of
the theoretical importance of gender, I further divided each status identity into three
subsets, those that were masculinized, those that were femininized, and those that
were left ungendered. This yielded a set of 38 distinct status identities.

In the paper I argue that we can learn about the meaning that these identity
designations had within the discourse of social welfare if we formally treat them as
elements within a semiotic system. To operationalize this concept I mapped the
relations of similarity and difference among the identities by looking at how each
class of individuals was treated in the welfare system (as represented discursively in
this text). To facilitate this I divided organizational programs into 14 types of core
activities that seemed to capture the range of relief technologies that were described
in the Directory – giving money, giving food or other household necessities, provid-
ing work for pay, assistance in finding a job, temporary shelter, asylum (or long-term
shelter), incarceration (put in prison or in a reformatory), job training, domestic
training (instruction on how to keep a proper home), counseling, religious direction,
drug or alcohol (temperance) services, legal prosecution, vacation assistance, and
community services. These were further subdivided according to the auspice of the
organization performing the activity (public, religious, private nonprofit organiza-
tion, etc.) yielding a set of 70 distinct treatment possibilities. I dropped all treatment
combinations that were not applied to this set of identities and I also deleted all
status identities that were not treated by one of these practices leaving a matrix of 26
identities and 58 practices.

The resulting rectangular matrix (which has identities in the columns and treat-
ment practices in the rows) is composed of 0’s and 1’s (a 1 in a cell indicates that at
least one organization in the 1907 Directory claimed to have treated the specified
identity with a given practice). If we think of the identities as elements within a
semiotic system we can use this matrix as a map of how each semiotic term (each
status identity) is similar to or different from every other identity as defined by their
treatment within the institutional field. Network analysts have provided a wide
range of useful tools for analyzing problems of this sort. I make use of a technique
here known as blockmodeling (White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976). This involves several steps. First the matrix of identities by practices is subjected to an ordinary product moment correlation analysis, the output matrix from the correlation is then itself subjected to a correlation analysis and this process is repeated iteratively until a clear bifurcation of the identities is achieved. Those new subgroups are then each subjected to a separate analysis that produces another bifurcation and this is repeated as many times as desired (the procedure for doing this is known as convergence of iterated correlation analysis [CONCOR]). The result is a hierarchical tree of bifurcated identity clusters (figure 22.1).

Identities within each of the eight CONCOR clusters can be thought of as structurally equivalent to one another in the sense that they stand in comparable relations of similarity and difference to all the other identities in the field. Importantly, the clustering is not based on any essential attributes of people (their gender, their age, their wealth, etc.). Rather it is based on their relational identity, specifically their embeddedness within an institutional system of relief activities. Even here, however, the method embraces a relational over an essentialist logic in the sense that identities are not simply clustered together because they receive the same treatments or treatments that are substantively similar (e.g., public vs. private, punitive vs. non-punitive, physical vs. moral, etc.). Instead CONCOR puts identities in a common block location if they are subject to practices that are themselves relationally similar to one another, which is to say, practices that are applied to similar categories of people. In short, the method is very Saussrian; it defines entities purely according to their location within a system of relations.

Having parsed the identities into common structural locations with CONCOR, I proceed to blockmodel the clusters. Each cluster (block) is compared to every other by calculating the average of the correlations between all members of each set. This measure is constructed for every block pair and those pair-wise similarities that have values greater than average (.1375) are strongly related (as indicated by arrows in the blockmodel diagram, figure 22.2). Network analysts use this procedure to identify the relational locations or the “role structure” of individuals within a social network. I argue that the same approach when applied to an institutionally ordered textual field can be used to identify common discursive roles or what might also be thought of as shared structural locations within a moral order.

![Figure 22.1 CONCOR Clustering of status identities into structurally equivalent clusters, 1907 New York City Charity Directory](image-url)
We know that social welfare systems are grounded in complex systems of exclusion and inclusion and that in Progressive Era New York these were based on a system of moral legitimations organized by gender. If our analytic strategy is effective, we should expect to see evidence of this in way in which both morality and gender are mapped onto the structural model. To test this assertion, I went back to the data and looked for all occurrences of status identities that were qualified by explicit moral descriptors. Thus whenever an identity in the Charity Directory is described by terms such as “deserving,” “innocent,” “respectable,” “worthy,” or alternatively as “degraded,” “depraved,” “dishonorable,” “profligate,” “sinful” (or the like) I coded that as an instance of an explicit moral evaluation. Figure 22.3 shows how the moral qualifications are distributed across the discourse role system. Strikingly, moral qualifications only occur in four of the eight blocks, and the great majority of this discourse is restricted to blocks 3 and 5.

Looking at the blockmodel with these goals in mind (figure 22.3) suggests that there is utility in distinguishing between three major classes of identities. Tramps (a summary label for textual references to terms such as “rounders,” “vagrants,” “wanderers,” and the like) and the gendered blind (block 8, which also contains references to those designated as “deaf,” “deaf-mute,” “dumb,” “defective” and so on) go together because they are structurally equivalent (both are structural isolates). I have labeled this group as being governed by a logic of “otherness.” A second group (blocks 2 and 3) is also connected by their sharing of structurally equivalent positions within the institutional discourse system and this group is definable by what would appear to be a logic of “exclusion.” It contains categories such as “strangers” (those excluded from the entitlement of community), the “disabled” (excluded from the entitlement of labor) and “unwed mothers” (excluded from the entitlement of domesticity). Block 3 includes “ex-convicts” (excluded from legality), the “unemployed” (excluded from the entitlement of labor but without the excuse of disability), and “female immigrants” (differentiated from other immigrants by the marking of their gender). Note that this block contains the highest proportion (31%) of discursive statements that contain explicitly articulated moral descriptors.

The third group includes all other blocks (4, 5, 6 and 7 – and note that 5 and 6 are collapsible as structurally equivalent). I have labeled this sector of moral space the “Logic of Entitlement” because it contains identities that were deemed to be
legitimate recipients of social relief. Within this are three separate sublogics of identity – membership within a guild community, within a class location, or within a gendered sphere of domesticity. Many of the identities in block 4 (especially soldiers and seamen) are entitled to relief by virtue of their contributions as a member of an occupational group or as a war veteran. This is true of widows as well because their claims for relief are frequently linked to their husbands’ performance of duties in these domains. Immigrant identities represent a parallel type of status claim defined by co-membership within an ethnic community. In contrast, status identities in block 7 (mothers, working boys, girls, and women) would appear to be entitled to assistance as a result of their identification with the domestic sphere itself. Blocks 5 and 6 speak to an entitlement defined by identification with a specific class location, working men by virtue of their membership in the proletariat, high status individuals by virtue of their identification with the bourgeoisie. Notice that block 5 is the only other highly charged moral space within the field (24% of the references contain explicit moral qualification). This would seem to be a reflection of the inherent liminality of these more elite status identities within a moral order that performs the institutional function of differentiating among the categories of the poor.

Figure 22.3  Interpretive mapping of block structure, 1907 New York City Charity Directory
Notice how gender and morality co-vary in this institutional space. Following Zerubavel’s (1993) concepts of marked and unmarked cultural categories, I have designated identities as gendered whenever their various forms are differentiated within the discourse role system (these are marked in boldface type). The blind, for example, are gendered (being spread across blocks 4 and 8), but HiStatus identities (all of which are in block 5) are not. By this reckoning, the moral space governed by the “Logic of Entitlement” is gendered (including two of three blocks and 10 out of 14 identities), the space of exclusion is ungendered and otherness is evenly split. I’ve put a vertical bar on the figure designating moral ambiguity. Those blocks of identities that are never linked to moral qualifications (1, 2, 6, and 8) are morally unambiguous. Those that require frequent moral specification (3 and 5) are highly ambiguous.

Together these insights suggest a hypothesis – moral entitlement co-varies with gender, moral ambiguity does not. Given where we are in this endeavor, I would offer this up as an intriguing suggestion worthy of further investigation – no more than that. But I would also argue that the contribution here is not of any particular hypothesis, but the manner in which we have derived it. There is room for more interpretation and a clear need to explore these matters more extensively from a formal perspective. But leave that for the moment and let us turn to a second feature of welfare discourse that needs to be taken into consideration as we think about how to develop this style of cultural analysis.

**Discourses Are Mutually Constitutive and Dually Ordered**

We can advance the development of a cultural science not only by plotting the semiotic features of these discourse systems but also by modeling welfare discourse as an element within a larger structural whole. Discourse systems are in no sense pure or self-contained. They are embedded in the social world and they have porous boundaries. Other discourse systems, other institutions, other elements of reality are articulated within the meanings of poverty relief and, indeed, are constitutive of them. In this section of the chapter I want to focus on a second important feature of institutional discourse systems that I believe we must take into consideration – that they are mutually constitutive and dually ordered.

It is useful to see this problem in its intellectual context. One of the principal failings of traditional (French) structuralism was the problem of difference. What should count as difference? Most obviously in Derrida (1978) but also throughout the poststructuralist tradition scholars began to emphasize that no simple interpretative truths could be constructed but rather a multiplicity of interpretative possibilities. This rejection of epistemologies oriented toward objective truth claims pushed the French intellectual field away from the more formalistic approaches to meaning towards postmodernism. Bourdieu was an exception. Though he well appreciated the limits of semiotics as an interpretative project he sought to hold onto a pragmatic scientism that worked *with* a poststructuralist sensibility rather than against it. Bourdieu argued that the social world was made up of a multiplicity of cultural discourse systems and that these were embedded in a given material reality manifested through a constellation of practices. The duality of this linkage, the connection between ways of knowing and ways of acting, was accomplished in the
phenomenological moment through something he called the habitus, and it was accomplished at the level of the institution in a social space he called a field.

The archetypical example of duality in Bourdieu (1977, 1990) is his discussion of the relationship that inheres between the material and the ideal world, the world of practice and the world of culture. Bourdieu’s famous essay on the Kabayle House (reprinted as an appendix to 1990) with its layered analysis of the simultaneous ordering of material space in terms of both practical household demands and a cosmologically rich tapestry of understandings is a case in point. Friedland and Alford (1991) suggest the example of the buying and selling of commodities as a set of practical activities that can only exist so long as people share a set of symbolic constructions that includes the idea of private property while at the same time the concept of property can only be truly meaningful in the context of a commodified world where market behavior is regularly conducted. An earlier generation of scholars called this a dialectic but it can also be understood as a particular type of structural form. Ron Breiger (1974) originally developed this concept (as well as his own set of mathematical tools for studying its manifestations) and defined it as a type of linkage in which two independent domains (such as culture and practice) are organized through systems of difference, yet neither order exists without the other because each constitutes the difference that exists within the other. Structural duality now serves as a pivotal construct in a promising new research program on the formal analysis of institutions (see e.g. Breiger 2000; Martin 2000; Mische and Pattison, 2000; Harcourt, 2002).

I can best illustrate this concept by turning to another of my papers, an article co-authored with Vincent Duquenne (Mohr and Duquenne, 1997). The paper also makes use of the charity directory dataset. This time, however, the data come from the 1888 directory (the paper actually uses four years of data and perhaps its most important finding was that you can use these techniques to measure the degree of institutionalization over time; however, for the purposes of this discussion I will focus on just one year of data). The goal in this paper was to demonstrate a way to model the structural duality that theory told us we would find within the institutional logic of a field. Similar to before, the data are structured as a matrix of (1) prevalent categories for naming/knowing the poor (these appear as column headers in table 22.1) and (2) institutionally recognizable repertoires of action for dealing with the poor (the row entries in table 22.1). The table is binary. A 1 in a cell entry indicates that (at least) one organization in the 1888 charity directory that employed a given (row) practice also employed a specific identity term (column) when referring to the object of that action. A 0 entry means that not a single organization in 1888 linked the practice with the identity.

The analysis is inspired by a simple assumption borrowed from Wittgenstein – the structure of meanings reflects the structure of use. A set theoretic analysis of table 22.1 appears in figure 22.4. It shows the logical implications of the binary matrix as a system of sub-setting containments. A given term is below another if the set of practices applied to the former is a subset of the set of practices applied to the latter. The category “poor” has the broadest usage profile, suggesting that it conveys the most general concept of poverty. All other classifications can be seen as more specific refinements (sub-categories) of this general and all-embracing notion. Immediately below the poor is a bifurcation between the categories of the needy and the destitute, a split that would appear to capture a type of class-based differentiation, perhaps a
### Table 22.1  Poverty practices by poverty categories (binary) – 1888

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$H$</th>
<th>$I$</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$W$</th>
<th>$S$</th>
<th>$T$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>allocate money</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide food</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paid employment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paid work in own home</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment search</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advise on work/family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investigate home</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide job training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give temporary shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-term shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the distribution of poverty practices across different categories. Each column represents a different type of practice or service provided, and the numbers indicate the frequency of each practice within the given category.
reflection of the degree of severity of a person’s impoverishment. Other categories were either refinements of destitution (the indigent who were distinguished from the homeless) or a refinement of neediness (distressed presumably reflecting a more extreme or perhaps a more transient state of neediness). The only exception, the only class contradictory location among the terms indicating a category of the poor, was “misfortune” (a term that implied calamities of nature such as floods and earthquakes). Other terms were less clearly class specific. The moral designation of worthiness was restricted to being a refinement of the indigent, but the moral qualification of deservingness was a class contradictory extension of worthiness to the status of the needy. Strangers were also interstitial – partly needy, partly homeless.

A partial ordering of the practices (not reproduced here) can also be derived, but the real payoff comes from analyzing both of these orderings simultaneously in a single Galois lattice (figure 22.5). Because both orders are projected onto the same lattice structure (the smallest possible lattice in which the two can be embedded together), every point in the lattice represents the co-occurrence of the set of relief practices that are below it and the set of poverty categories that are above it. For clarity, the lattice is minimally labeled – a category is labeled at its highest occurrence, a practice is labeled at its lowest occurrence. Hence, the point labeled “Needy” is the highest point to which the category “Needy” applies. All points that fall on the lines descending from that point could also be labeled “Needy.” Reading from top to bottom, we can see the same subsetting order that was observed in figure 22.4 (the destitute and the needy are subcategories of the poor, the distressed is a subcategory of needy, etc.). The partial order of relief practices can also be retrieved from here. Reading from the bottom to the top (tracing the three lines ascending from the lowest point of the lattice), there are three first-order relief practices – give$, give food and give shelter. The inverted triangle labeled “g:give$” marks the lowest point in the lattice in which the practice of giving money occurs. Subsets of practices then flow upward from here through the lattice. Thus, putting a person in an asylum is a practical subset of providing short-term shelter. The offer of paid work is a social practice that is institutionally located somewhere between (i.e., is a proper subset of) the practice of giving people food and interring them in an asylum.

Figure 22.4  Partial order of identity categories, New York City charity directories, 1888
The great virtue of the Galois lattice is that it allows you to read these two orders against one another. While it is interesting to see that the practice of finding someone a job is (institutionally speaking) a subset of the practice of offering shelter, the really intriguing insight comes from seeing that the only difference between them is that the worthy and the deserving are both provided with shelter but not a single organization in the city of New York in 1888 publicly claimed to be trying to find work for worthy or deserving persons – try as you might, you will not be able to trace a line upwards in the lattice from Findjob to deserving or worthy. Apparently to be designated as worthy or deserving was to be located within the institutional order in such a way as to not be viewed as a candidate for regularized employment. By tracing out these kinds of cleavages (splits) in the lattice it becomes possible to discern some basic principles within the institutional system, principles that are dually ordered in the sense that they reflect co-variations (indeed, co-constitutions) in the classificatory logic of poverty specifications and in the practical repertoires of action within the field.

To cite just one more example discussed in the paper, consider again the basic bifurcation between the needy and the destitute. The lattice suggests that there are two relevant differences between these two social categories. One is whether a person was required to work in order to receive aid (paidWk). The other was whether a person would be the subject of a social investigation by a “friendly visitor.” Clearly, these distinctions mattered. The demand for labor in exchange for relief was a more punitive approach to social welfare (in 1888 just as it is today) and was traditionally reserved for those classes of aid recipients who were regarded as less worthy. The lattice diagram suggests that this difference in treatment was a fundamental basis of differentiation between the destitute (who had to work) and the needy (who did not).
While it was largely punitive, the requirement that relief applicants perform some labor in exchange for assistance was also a mechanism for knowing the poor. The symmetry here is quite informative. Social investigations were, in a sense, a more modern (and more rationalized) mechanism for accomplishing the same thing. Friendly visitors (proto-social workers) were dispatched to assess an applicants' moral character, social habits, housekeeping skills, and parenting practices in order to help diagnose the social disease (Richmond, 1917). Thus, one could say that, in 1888, the needy and the destitute were primarily distinguished by the modality of surveillance or (in Foucault's terms) the regime of power/knowledge that they were subjected to and that mediated their relationship to the institutional field of social welfare. Those classes of the poor that were expected to demonstrate their moral fortitude and economic desperation by passing a "labor test" were classified as destitute. Those classes of the poor that were subjected to the more modern, less physical (though hardly less demeaning) requirement that they subject themselves to a social investigation were classified as needy.

In the paper we provide a full reading of the lattice (and its variations across time) and contend that such a reading allows us to provide an exegesis of this cultural system that resonates with extant theoretical expectations regarding the dialectical (or dualistic) ordering of culture and practice. But more than this, we argue that the analysis allows us to bring the tools of formal analysis to bear on what are essentially interpretive problems, enabling us to construct ways of seeing the residue of historical events that highlight and bring into relief semiotic features of the institutional order that resonate with and complement other types of interpretative understandings. In short, these are methods that provide a style of knowing that can supplement and interact with more traditional readings, a style of research that has the added advantage of being replicable, consistent with hypothesis testing methodologies and well suited to styles of analytic specification that facilitate the identification of structural reductions and deeply ordered logical subsystems within the discourse itself.

CONCLUSION

The shift from a realist to a constructionist perspective in the study of social welfare is well under way. Feminist scholars inaugurated the change by calling into question taken for granted categories of analysis and by insisting on the social productivity of discourse. But the sociological study of discourse is still young, and we have far to go. I have suggested two analytic principles that strike me as being particularly worthy of further pursuit: (1) discourse is semiotically ordered and amenable to relational analysis and (2) discourse systems are interpenetrated (and constituted) by their articulations within systems of practice and this makes them amenable to analytic strategies that reveal dualities within multi-ordered relational systems.

By now it is surely apparent that another of my concerns is to develop a more formally grounded approach to understanding systems of cultural discourse. In closing I want to briefly comment on what I think the role of science can and should be in such an endeavor. Science is really about two kinds of things. On the one hand, it is about a particular type of professionalization and rationalization of the knowledge production process – about the ways in which communities of scholars are
organized, about how they are taught to ask questions and how the scientific method is to be applied. A lot of ink has been spilled over these qualities of scientific life, not all of it productively. But science is also about the use of technology in the production of knowledge and this is the part most relevant to the current discussion.

Astronomy strikes me as a useful example for thinking about the role of technology in science. Astronomers conduct their investigations on the basis of information compiled from sophisticated signal detection equipment created to measure types of wave particles that the human senses are incapable of perceiving. Beautiful images of the distant universe, iconic representations of the cosmos (think of recent news magazine covers) are essentially aesthetically rendered statistical summaries of these data-streams. Astronomers use these images (and analyses of the statistical systems that underlie them) as a way to construct an informed community dialogue about what might be going on out there. Astronomers’ relationships to this dialogue, and the instruments that enable it, are wholly human (as science studies scholars have assured us) which means that we should not be too persuaded by those who would claim that true science is defined by its privileged relationship to objective reality. Astronomers and other natural scientists are no less tied to the plodding and all too human project that characterizes institutional life. But what astronomers do have – as I also have, sitting here at my computer – is a technical system that is productive in the sense that it substantively facilitates the endeavors we pursue.

My suggestion is that cultural sociology should also invite technology in. Though they are riddled with limitations, scientific instruments are nonetheless useful in furthering the pursuit of human ends because they can extend the limitations of our physical selves. Like the astronomers, we should put our machines to work sifting through streams of data taken from the textual universe. And, like the astronomers, we should work with these machines, tinker with them, coax them to become ever more effective signal rendering devices. My sense is that we can gain a great deal from this endeavor because there is so much more textual information out there than we can possibly hope to perceive as an embodied human reader. I have tried through these examples to suggest some of the features of institutional discourse that I think a more scientific (e.g., a signal collection, analysis, and enhancement) approach to interpretation ought to consider.

Limits of time and space prevent me from taking up a variety of other equally important issues. In particular, my rather single minded focus here on laying out some strategies for discourse analysis has left aside all of the broader questions of how it is that discursive processes are themselves dually articulated at the institutional level with broader systems of social organization (including the logic and character of organizational fields) and at the subjective level with phenomenologically experienced systems of habitus, subjectivity, and tactical agency. These are matters that must be tackled head on if we are to make good on the promise of developing a fuller science of cultural discourse.

References


Scandals are ambiguous and suspenseful public dramas of the struggle between good and bad faith. They germinate in cultures of corruption, secrecy, and suspicion along the fault lines of and between politics and business. It is necessary to understand their cultural forms in order to understand their “social ground and context” (Geertz, 1973). Watergate, Pardongate, Billygate, Iran-Contra, Michael Milken, Savings and Loan, BCCI, HUD, Whitewater, Travelgate, Vincent Foster, Monica Lewinsky, Tyco, Worldcom, Enron, among so many others – the very chronicity of these recent public scandals indicate their significance. Civility depends in large part on dependable regular mechanisms of collective and personal accountability – moral, legal, administrative, political, and financial. Scandals exhibit the properties of what I have called (1990a, 1990b) the “no-fault society”: a combination of constrictive individualism, blurring of public and private, and laxity of the rule of law that not only disables those mechanisms, but erodes the very conception of accountability. At once cause and effect of declining public trust and waning confidence in public institutions, scandals mediate the attenuation of civil society.

**The Elements of a Definition**

Ambiguous and suspenseful dramas of good and bad faith...

Scandals are ambiguous and suspenseful because good and bad faith exist in dialectical struggle with each other. As a scandal is unfolding, the outcome is often uncertain. Also uncertain is which of the competing narratives is most credible. Not only do antagonists attach opposing interpretations to the same set of facts, but each side – through the manifest exercise of impression-management – attempts to establish its own veracity and sincerity by impugning the good faith of the other.

Bad faith exists in a shifting form-and-ground relation with good faith, in a “continual game of mirror and reflection” (Sartre, 1956: 110). It is the existential –
hence universal – condition of compromised sincerity or integrity – the “embarrassing constraint which we constantly experience; it is our very incapacity to recognize ourselves, to constitute ourselves as being what we are” (106). It stems from the contradiction between “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself,” which is reflexively related to the contradiction between “being-for-itself” and “being-for-others”; it embodies the contradiction, that is, between “facticity” and “transcendence.” Bad faith is “the divorce of the body from the soul” (97), an ambivalently embraced “inner disintegration in the heart of being” (116). The phrase “presentation of self” that Goffman made so famous to sociologists is found in Sartre’s exposition of bad faith.

The form-and-ground “mirror game” between good and bad faith is all the more easily disrupted because it is played unawares; “bad faith does not dare to speak its name” (113), so that “we can neither reject nor comprehend bad faith” (90). As exemplified by the too-unctious waiter, whose overperformed professional self-presentation both betrays and sustains the struggle to fit into a role so constrained within the realm of human possibility, “bad faith is a type of being in the world, like waking or dreaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself” (113). In offering, as another example of bad faith, the case of a slightly coquettish woman who has consented to go out with a particular man for the first time, Sartre describes her moment-by-moment submission (without self-acknowledgment) to the man’s seduction:

She does not apprehend this conduct as an attempt to achieve what we call “the first approach”; that is, she does not want to see possibilities of temporal development which his conduct presents. She restricts his behavior to what is in the present; she does not wish to read in the phrases which he addresses to her anything other than their explicit meaning. (1956: 96)

As part of this vulnerability to crescive seduction, bad faith also manifests itself as an overly cavalier attitude toward matters of evidence and warrant:

Bad faith apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith. It makes itself humble and modest. . . . It stands forth in the firm resolution not to demand too much, to count itself satisfied when it is barely persuaded, to force itself in decisions to adhere to uncertain truths. This original project of bad faith is a decision in bad faith on the nature of faith. (1956: 113)

. . . Germinating along the fault lines of politics and business . . .

Because bad faith is always constituted reflexively by the misfit between inner self and outer world, it is as much a property of social structures as of persons. Scandals germinate in those areas of the social structure where bad faith is most easily cultured: along the fault lines of and between business and politics. They germinate along the cross-cutting fault lines of politics: the enduring tensions between the public and private spheres, between politicians and bureaucrats, between opposing parties, between executive and legislative branches, between cosmopolitans and locals, between the government and the press, between the imperatives of political power and the constraints of due process. They germinate, too, along the fault lines of business: between private enterprise and public
regulation, between the sovereignty of the nation-state and the global scale of the market, between production and consumption, between objective and subjective value, between bricks and mortar and bits and bytes. They germinate on the fault lines between politics and business. These are among the most fertile breeding grounds of bad faith.

Even ethical persons who practice politics or business invariably find themselves acting with “dirty hands” (Sartre, 1989); on this point, Weber’s classic characterizations of politics and capitalism anticipate Sartre’s existential deontology: “He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence” (Weber, 1946a: 126). “Money is the most abstract and ‘impersonal’ element that exists in human life. The more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness” (1946b: 331). The logic of politics is grounded in the “diabolical forces” generated by the calculus of violence, just as the logic of business is grounded in the calculus of economic profit; actors exposed to the specialized compulsions of either logic must compromise their common morality.

Both politics and business are characterized by the ruthless drive for competitive advantage that constantly leads practitioners to circumvent the rules limiting their activities. Contemporary transformations of politics, economics, and communications aid this circumvention. Whether in its “critical” version as “legitimation crisis” (Habermas, 1975) or its “pluralist” version – the displacement of political conflict from elections contested by strong parties to a “politics by other means” centered around “revelation, investigation, and publicity” (Ginsberg and Shefter, 2002) – the new politics is one of, by, and for scandal. Politics polarized around partisan division, opposition research, ever vaster campaign expenditures on negative television spots, politics as a form of marketing, the blurring of politics with entertainment through a “politics of personality” – all these trends have eviscerated traditional forms of party organization, lending greater importance to the courts, the media, and ideological interest groups. Garment describes the “self-reinforcing scandal machine” as follows:

Prosecutors use journalists to publicize criminal cases while journalists, through their news stories, put pressure on prosecutors for still more action. Investigators inside government agencies know how to advance their projects by collaborating with congressional committees, while committee staffers use the investigators to bypass agency heads and gather the material for splashy public hearings. All these players are aided immeasurably by the growing public focus on the politician as a celebrity, subject to the intense, probing attention that a celebrity commonly receives. (1991: 9)

Economic globalization and the growth of the information economy similarly help break through traditional constraints on business activity. Multinational corporations operate beyond the control of sovereign national authorities, multiplying the effects of economic privatization and deregulation. When economic output consists in increasing measure of bits and bytes – information, entertainment images, speculative financial instruments – it is hard to assess value objectively. As Sassen
(1991) has described the new global economic order, the payoff comes from the velocity with which speculators move their money around the world, rather than from the volume or even the valence (positive or negative value) of their investments. Capitalism undisciplined and unconstrained takes on the giddy character of a “casino economy.”

The elements of scandal are power, money, and sex. These are the most fungible “generalized media of exchange.” In particular they can be readily exchanged for each other, and there is always demand for doing so. As a matter of public policy, as such critical theorists as Habermas (1987) and Offe (1984) have argued, the contradictions of the welfare state often force economic solutions to political crises and political solutions to economic ones. On the level of social action, politicians always seek money and businesspersons always seek political fixes. As Weber extols the leadership capacity of the patronage boss, “the boss is indispensable as the direct recipient of the money of great financial magnates, who would not entrust their money for election purposes to anyone giving public account of his affairs” (1946a: 109). Nor is it surprising that sex figures so prominently in public scandals, since social action is always embodied in desire. From Michael Milken’s “predators’ balls” to Dennis Kozlowski’s infamous toga party, and from Charles Keating’s provision of call girls at annual retreats for his clients, to the tab run by the local strip club for Enron employees, sex has figured prominently in the business plans (and routinely been treated as a corporate expense) by masters of financial fraud. And more revealing, perhaps, than the President’s trysts in the Oval Office, is the sexually explicit nature of the legal discourse in the Special Prosecutor’s official report (Malti-Douglas, 2000). Though itself the most highly rationalized form of sex, commodified eroticism may have its greatest appeal to denizens of the increasingly rationalized worlds of politics and business, since as Weber observes, “eroticism appeared to be like a gate into the most irrational and thereby real kernel of life, as compared with the mechanisms of rationalization” (1946b: 345).

As recognized by pluralists as well as critical theorists, politics and business are symbiotically joined. While businesspersons are dependent on politicians to establish terms of economic regulation, politicians are constrained to accord businesspersons a “privileged position” (Lindbloom, 1977: ch. 13) even in non-economic matters of policy, so dependent are they on businesspersons for the health of the economy. Friedrich goes so far as to argue, in a Weberian vein, that a moderate degree of corruption – defined as “private gain secured at public expense” (1972: 127) – is functional, since “in theory...a corruptless political order would have to be a completely static one” (162). This symbiosis between politics and business explains, perhaps, why the dramatic long-term decline in public confidence in business officials and institutions tracks so closely that for governmental officials and institutions (documented in Lipset and Schneider, 1983). For these reasons, as well as the ready exchangeability of power, money, and sex, I break from the developing convention (Thompson, 2000) of distinguishing from one another scandals of power, of money, and of sex. I do think, however, that it is analytically useful to distinguish “public scandals” – scandals of direct moment for the conduct of state and economy – from the “celebrity scandals” of popular culture, even despite the growing confusion of public and private, and of politics and entertainment.
In cultures of corruption, secrecy, and suspicion

The structural conditions that help breed scandals do so by helping breed suspicion (warranted and not) of bad faith. Scandals can be understood, in part, as culture wars by other means. Shils’s description of 1950s American culture, driven by apocalyptic fears of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of insurgent powers, resonates today:

The exfoliation and intertwining of the various patterns of belief that the world is dominated by unseen circles of conspirators, operating behind our backs, is one of the characteristic features of modern society. It is radical in its fundamental distrust of the dominant institutions and authorities of modern society. It is radical in its rejection of the ordinary, matter-of-fact, undramatic, unsystematic outlook of day-to-day politics in the state and in private institutions. The conspiratorial conception of society would eradicate the pluralism and privacy of institutions on behalf of a more homogeneous society and a more unitary loyalty. (1974: 31)

With enough investigative effort, some degree of systemic bad faith can be found at the heart of any organization. No less than individual actors, corporate actors are always at odds with some elements of their environments. Since there is therefore a natural antagonism, as Katz suggests, between any organization’s external and internal system of authority, coverup is integral to collective integrity. Moral authority representing the external environment can never fully penetrate an organization:

In the white-collar ranks of formal organizations, persons construct authority to govern internal relations by shielding members from external scrutiny and by declining to force members to accept their responsibilities according to externally defined norms. Accepting these practices as proper, external authorities recognize the legitimacy of a collectivity’s moral autonomy. (1977: 3)

Katz goes on to describe organizational “shielding” and “non-enforcement” practices; in effect, he describes on the institutional level impression-management practices corresponding to the ones described by Goffman (1959) that individuals use to protect “tact about tact.”

A necessary condition of scandal, then, is the breaching of those shielding and non-enforcement practices, a violation of that “tact about tact.” Civility is thus only possible, as Shils emphasizes, when “public spirit is balanced by an equal inclination of [people] to mind their own business” (1974: 21). An obsession with secrecy, in Shils’s analysis, is antithetical to the proper balance between privacy and publicity. Secrecy, as Simmel (1950: pt 4) explains, is one of the primary forms of social life, both integrative and distancing; the fascination with secrecy and the secret society at once feeds and feeds off the fascination with revelation. Struggle for control of the secret, Weber (1968) asserts, is the key to bureaucratic politics. What Shils (referring to McCarthyism) terms the “conspiratorial conception of politics and society” (1974: ch. 1), or what Hofstadter (1965) calls “the paranoid style of American politics,” subverts civility and promotes scandal.
SCANDAL AS MEDIATED CULTURAL FORM

In an age of mass communications, scandals are (in Thompson’s phrase) “mediated events.” Revelation does not turn into scandal without publicity. The media amplify accounts of the unfolding scandal, in which pundits and reporters function as narrators as well as protagonists in the drama of secrecy and revelation. “Mediated scandals are continuously narrated events, in the sense that they are constituted in part by an array of mediated narratives which are continuously refined and revised as the event unfolds” (Thompson, 2000: 76). As a result, scandals tend to unfold in a manner shaped by organizational frames and rhythms of newswork. New technologies of communication transform those rhythms, increasing still further the media’s role in the “scandal machine.” It is hard to realize how relatively recent is the influence of television on politics and business; the Internet, cable, and wireless magnify that influence. Journalism becomes more competitive, and audiences become more fragmented, as media outlets multiply. Investigative and adversarial journalism develops as an axis of competition among media outlets. The reduction of temporal and spatial constraints on news production intensifies “feeding frenzies” and “spin cycles.” As journalism blurs with politics and entertainment, the coverage of issues reduces to sound bytes. Scandals that develop to full term culminate in the riveting national spectacles described by Dayan and Katz (1992) as “media events.”

It is easy to overestimate the power of the press. Journalists are as reliant on politicians and businesspersons for information as those actors are reliant on them for publicity. The press is largely incapable of engaging an apathetic public. As Schudson claims, “political activity leads people to follow the news; news does not ordinarily lead people to political activity” (1995: 27). Moreover, as Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) demonstrate, public arenas such as the media have limited “carrying capacity” for social problems, so that the media are forced to select issues carefully. Ironically, then, the greater power of the press may inhere not in the extent of its capacity to train public attention on a potential scandal, but rather in the constraints that force it to divert attention from most other ones. With respect to most issues, the role of the press is less to incite mass outrage than to exercise a sort of “crowd control,” as Suttles documents in his groundbreaking manuscript (in preparation) about business coverage in 1929 and 1987. In both periods, the press served unduly to reassure a public with every reason to be anxious, in part through the journalistic convention of “reinventing” the world anew each day that seemingly dissolved the worrisome sweep of events into a succession of “specious presents” – a classic Sartrean tactic of bad faith. (Suttles has devised a rigorous yet inventive method of plotting “dramatisms” that opens new possibilities for capturing the cultural forms of scandals.)

The media do have the capacity to trigger a scandal, when conditions are ripe. By broadcasting leaked allegations of transgressions, they can cast into doubt a public presumption of good faith about particular issues. In Lowi’s (1988) seminal formulation, scandals are melodramatic spectacles whose rhythms follow patterns of revelation, attempted coverup, investigation, prosecution, and apparent reform. As Lang and Lang (1983) suggest, scandals are cultural objects, generated by transgression, publicized by the media, adjudged by public opinion, and kept alive by
collective memory. As scandals unfold, they exhibit properties of temporality, recursion, and contingency. As with revolutions, determining the beginnings and endings of particular scandals is problematic, as is assessing the dimensions of change they ultimately effect. Scandals are composed of sequences of occurrences, with subsequent occurrences reframing the interpretation of earlier ones. Particular occurrences are consequential, not only in directing sequences along certain paths, but also in diverting them from other ones.

Collective memory helps form – and forms around – the comprehension of scandals not just as discrete events, but as moments in the series of scandals. That is, the narrative understanding of scandals is intertextual: scandals are understood in relation to each other, with the interpretation of earlier ones at once helping to shape, and being reshaped by, that of later ones. Consequently, the process of comprehending particular scandals as episodes marked off by their own dramatic unity is also temporal, recursive, and contingent. Scandals cumulate their textures of meaning in emergent fashion, analogously to the evolution of meanings assumed by the storming of the Bastille, in Sewell’s (1996) analysis, within the sequence of events eventually understood to mark the beginning of the French Revolution. The discrete episodes that cumulate to form a narrative sequence of scandals assume their unfolding significance recursively, just as do the raw occurrences that cumulate to form any particular scandal.

**RECASTING THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCANDAL**

Sociologists have refrained from examining issues of bad faith, since by definition those issues are difficult to judge on the basis of empirical evidence. But there are demonstrable benefits to considering those issues. Reconceptualizing scandals as dramas of the struggle between good and bad faith refines the major theoretical issues that have emerged so far from the cumulating sociology of scandal (e.g., Lang and Lang, 1983; Alexander, 1984, 2003; Lowi 1988; Markovits and Silverstein, 1988; Jacobs, 1990b, 1998; Garment, 1991; Schudson, 1992; Thompson, 2000; Fine, 2001; Sarfatti Larson and Wagner-Pacifi, 2001). These are the interrelated issues familiar to sociologists of deviance: Are scandals constructed or real? Functional or dysfunctional? Normal or abnormal? About individuals or collectivities? Reconceptualizing public scandals also informs a major research problem surrounding scandals: Why do investigators, the media, and the general public pay relatively so much attention to the coverup rather than the initial transgression?

Are scandals constructed or real? Schudson explores the senses in which Watergate, the paradigmatic modern American political scandal, is at once a substantive systemic disruption (or real “crisis”) and a socially constructed spectacle. Garment emphasizes the constructed nature of scandal. In exposing the power of a broadly interlocked “culture industry,” she claims that scandals are measured not by the seriousness of the precipitating transgression, but by the societal reaction. Fine emphasizes the public and media perception of opprobrious behavior. Nevertheless shying away from what he calls “strong constructionism,” he adopts a position of “cautious naturalism.” He is enough of a constructivist to argue that scandals are classical examples of the “multiple audience” problem. Scandals may result when behavior acceptable to a local group is revealed to a group with different norms.
However, since structural conditions generate public attention in identifiable ways, “structure provides real and powerful constraints on interpretation” (2001: 25). Sarfatti Larson and Wagner-Pacifici explain the Lewinsky scandal as a mediated and partisan spectacle, whose seriousness the public was wise enough not to accept.

Are scandals functional or dysfunctional? Garment (1991) and Thompson (2000) each emphasize that scandals destroy reputations – politicians’ most precious resource – and erode trust in government. By contrast, Markovits and Silverstein (as well as Alexander, 1984, 2003) interpret scandals as Durkheimian rituals and, without dismissing the influence of political conflict, claim that “while a scandalous act invariably challenges the norms and values of the community, the public ritual…ultimately serves to reinforce the primacy of those shared norms and values” (1988: 2). If any scandal fits the model of a Durkheimian civic ritual, it is Watergate. Yet Schudson’s analysis of Watergate’s effects on Iran-Contra contradicts Alexander’s. While Alexander (1984, 2003) argues the resolution of Watergate tempered what might have been the worst partisan excesses of Ronald Reagan, Schudson argued that Watergate provided a “pre-emptive metaphor” for interpreting Iran-Contra; the absence of a “smoking gun” in Iran-Contra obscured even greater constitutional breaches than occurred in Watergate (1992: ch. 9).

Are scandals normal or abnormal? Although systemic disruptions are abnormal, scandals are “normal” in the Durkheimian senses that they naturally occur – with modest frequency – in all modern societies (for reasons collectively explained by Weber, Friedrich, Simmel, and Katz), and that indeed a modest frequency of scandal is necessary to establish and maintain social control. They are “normal” occurrences of political and economic systems, too, in Perrow’s (1984) sense of “normal accidents” as inevitable but unexpected and incomprehensible failures of complex systems. Finally, they are “normal” in the sense that they often result from practices that are “normalized,” or institutionalized in crescive fashion in the course of routine group or bureaucratic conduct. As Fine notes about a scandal involving a Hollywood figure, “practices within his own community…[were] not worthy of concern until judged by a different audience” (2001: 59–60). And as Vaughan (1996) painstakingly documents, what was first alleged to be scandalously reckless behavior by NASA engineers and administrators producing the Challenger shuttle explosion, proved upon more thorough investigation to be reasoned and deliberate compliance with every detail of bureaucratic procedure. It was, as Vaughan explains, a case of “normalized” rather than “neutralized” organizational deviance.

Is scandalous behavior individual or collective? If understood as a form of the “drift” that Matza defines, scandalous behavior has both individual and collective dimensions:

Drift stands midway between freedom and control.… The delinquent transiently exists in a limbo between convention and crime, responding in turn to the demands of each, flirting now with one, now the other, but postponing commitment, evading decision. Thus, he drifts between criminal and conventional action.… Those who have been granted the potentiality for freedom through the loosening social controls but who lack the position, capacity, or inclination to become agents in their own behalf, I call drifters.… Drift is a gradual process of movement, unperceived by the actor, in which the first stage may be accidental or unpredictable. (1964: 28–9)

Drift in effect describes the condition of bad faith.
Reconceptualizing scandals as dramas of the struggle between good and bad faith thus refines this and the other theoretical issues about scandals. Scandals may be constructed by the “scandal machine,” but the dramatic struggle they embody is real. They disrupt the normal flow of business and politics, but the bad faith that they dramatize is normal. They are functional in offering symbolic resolution to the struggle between good and bad faith; yet that resolution is only symbolic, and the politics of scandal further erodes the accountability, legitimacy, and trust at the heart of civil society. They evince the responsibility of both individuals and collectivities, since bad faith inheres in both personal choice and structural conditions. Investigators, the media, and the public concentrate their attention on the coverup rather than the original transgression because the coverup better dramatizes the struggle between good and bad faith.

Reconceptualizing scandals in this way also expands and helps reconcile the major opposing theories of scandal, those of John Thompson and Jeffrey Alexander. Thompson conceives scandals as “struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake” (2000: 245). For Thompson, scandals are credibility tests for the politics of trust. Alexander views scandals as “public degradations of individuals and groups for behavior that is considered polluting to their status or office . . . [i]n order to maintain the separation between good and evil” (2003: 117). He claims that the Watergate hearings “constituted a civic ritual . . . organizing the actual political events and figures of the Watergate episode in terms of the higher antitheses between the sacred and profane elements of the more general American civic religion” (1984: 309). Conceptualizing scandals as dramas of the struggle between good and bad faith represents in effect a partial synthesis of these two theories. It suggests that scandals can serve either as rituals of civic purification, or as credibility tests, or as both.

Alexander’s theory, in particular, seems too limited on its own to account for the empirical evidence. While it is true, for example, that public trust in government increased immediately after Nixon’s resignation provided dramatic resolution to the Watergate scandal (Lipset and Schneider, 1983: chs. 1–2; Lang and Lang, 1983: ch. 10), as would be predicted by Alexander’s theory, it is also true that Watergate represented a watershed in the long-term decline of public confidence (Lipset and Schneider), and that the number of public scandals increased rather than decreased after Watergate (Garment, 1991: 5). As Thompson argues, it is difficult to reconcile the claim that Watergate was a societal ritual of civic purification with the “contingency, unpredictability, and conflict-ridden character” (2000: 237) of the Watergate events.

And Watergate is the softest test of the claim that scandals are rituals of civic purification. Even though the unfolding of Watergate was tawdry enough – hardly the quality of a Durkheimian civic ritual – the prosecution and defense of subsequent scandals were even more tawdry and less civil. (Indeed, it was the very inability to effectively prosecute Watergate that led to the creation of the Special Prosecutor and intensified the development of the adversarial press that are central to the “scandal machine.”) Rather than Durkheimian rituals of civic renewal, they are modern forms of the Geertzian “Balinese cockfight,” whose mysteriously compelling nature can be attributed (although Geertz does not use these exact words) precisely to the need for symbolic expression of the struggle between good and bad faith in everyday public life. The essential characteristic of modern scandals is – to invoke a
term that Geertz did use about the cockfight – to express the “disquietful” nature of public life:

The disquietfulness arises, “somehow,” out of a conjunction of three attributes of the fight: its immediate dramatic shape; its metaphoric content; and its social context. A cultural figure against a social ground, the fight is at once a convulsive surge of animal hatred, a mock war of symbolical selves, and a formal simulation of status tensions, and its aesthetic power derives from its capacity to force together these diverse realities. (1973: 444)

Although Watergate – culminating in the impeachment and resignation of a President, and the electoral defeat of the successor who pardoned him – is the most fully dramatized of all scandals, even its dramatistic resolution was partly aborted. The three articles of impeachment referred primarily to activities of the cover-up: obstruction of justice, violating Constitutional rights of citizens, and refusing the subpoena of the House Judiciary Committee. (The real unsolved mystery of Watergate, incidentally, is not the identity of “Deep Throat,” but rather the contents of Larry O’Brien’s file cabinet that inspired the initial break-in. What file, containing which secret, could have been so important or fascinating?) The price of gaining agreement in the House on those three articles of impeachment was the abandonment of the most substantive charge, the secret bombing of Cambodia. Thus the catharsis afforded by Watergate was limited in its effect, since public discussion was stifled about the most serious abuse of power. Nonetheless, Watergate was a special case because of the relatively civil manner in which it was prosecuted, the significance of the stakes, the height of the suspense, the extent of bad faith revealed, and correspondingly the strength of good faith ultimately affirmed.

However, it is a mistake to assume that scandals always – or even normally – produce a net triumph of good faith over bad or any significant degree of public catharsis at all. When scandals become chronic – as the “other means” of pursuing politics or business – they compel less attention from a cynical public, even though the abuses and suspicions they involve (which may be profound) may therefore become routinized. A sociology of scandals needs to explain the normal scandals as well as the special ones. To suggest the ways in which an emphasis on the struggle between good and bad faith contributes to an understanding of normal scandals, I now turn to the case of the savings and loan crisis of the late 70s to the early 90s. Although it represented the then-greatest financial scandal in US history, it did not culminate in a “media event.” Why did the theft of a half-trillion dollars through government-encouraged bank fraud over the course of two decades attract relatively so little public interest? This is a research problem analogous to the one Sherlock Holmes encountered in “The Case of Silver Blaze”: why did that dog not bark (Conan Doyle, 1951)? How does the savings and loan scandal relate to other scandals, and what makes it such a good case study of what I call the “no-fault society”?

Savings and Loan Scandal as a Narrative of Bad Faith

The savings and loan scandal could have been scripted by Sartre to illustrate his concept of bad faith. In a literal sense, what the scandal nearly destroyed was “the
full faith and credit” of the US Treasury. Politicians succumbed to the seduction of campaign contributions and other payoffs to dismantle effective regulatory controls. The speculators and racketeers who looted thrift institutions from the 70s through the 90s showed a very different face to themselves and to each other than to depositors, shareholders, investors, regulators, and prosecutors. The looters may even have fooled themselves into thinking they were only playing by the (cooked) rules. But it took willful denial on the part of those others to accept, bit by bit, the flimsy accounting evidence presented by the crooks. By deconstructing the obvious intent and effect of the ongoing criminal activity into a series of “specious presents,” those others were complicit in the crime. Politicians then further mortgaged the nation’s financial credit to cover up the scandal, by issuing bonds as an off-budget expense to prevent financial collapse of the banking system – and once again, a compliant public looked the other way.

The sequence of occurrences that comprise the “raw stuff” of the savings and loan scandal are phenomenologically ambiguous. Although the scandal assumed its public definition primarily in the late 80s, that sequence of occurrences began at least a decade before, and in some sense extends to this day. Tellingly, the various government agencies involved never managed to produce an unambiguous account of how much the crisis finally cost, although it seems that the correct figure is on the scale of a half-trillion dollars. A skeletal narrative of the scandal might go something like this: The economic inflation of the late 70s created losses reflecting an “inverted yield curve” for thrifts. Under pressure from the industry, the government responded by essentially deregulating the thrifts. Deregulation provided inducements for thrifts to forsake their traditional mission of investing in housing for their local communities, in favor of participation in the “casino economy” (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997). So many thrifts fell into bankruptcy – for reasons subject to debate at the time – that regulators refused to close down most failed thrifts, as a way to cover up the true dimensions of the crisis. The coverup eventually failed, as it became increasingly apparent that the crisis could bankrupt the entire system of federal deposit insurance. This led Congress to hold hearings and finally to pass reform legislation.

The beginning of the end of the public drama came in 1989, with the passage of the Federal Insurance Reform and Regulation Enforcement Act. This legislation abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, replacing it with the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Resolution Trust Corporation. The latter agency issued bonds to pay contract bidders to dispose of insolvent thrifts. The Justice Department began prosecuting a relatively few thrift owners for whom they could find clear evidence of large-scale embezzlement. In the official version of the scandal, promoted by many government as well as industry officials, the insolvency of the thrift system resulted primarily from a “natural” swing of the economy. In this view, the problem resulted from a combination of bad luck and poor business judgment. A few government whistleblowers, however, and a dozen or so investigative journalists, blamed the crisis on pervasive fraud. Although with little fanfare, the latter version was ultimately proven correct.

Although unexpected (at least initially), and incomprehensible (to some degree, even to this day), the meltdown resulted primarily from organized criminal activity. In the terms of the criminologists Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman (1997), thrift insiders were guilty of unlawful risk-taking, collective embezzlement, and coverup.
In the more colorful lingo of the actors themselves, they engaged in reciprocal deals of “cash for trash,” “daisy-chain land flips,” and just plain “busting out” their banks. This activity was abetted by bribery and other forms of influence-peddling to provide a permissive regulatory and oversight environment. Charlie Keating openly boasted of his intentions and success in bribing politicians at one of his last press conferences. The numerous beneficiaries of Keating’s largess included five US Senators, the “Keating Five,” who found themselves under Congressional investigation for what they described as constituent service.

This criminal activity went largely unpunished. Federal prosecutors did make examples of the most notorious criminals, including Charlie Keating (whose 12-year sentence was reversed on a technicality after he had served 4 years in prison). But Charles Linder, for example, Keating’s original patron and mentor, was not indicted. In their initial effort to cover up the dimensions of the crisis, federal thrift regulators deemed many of the most seriously defaulted banks “too big to fail.” Indeed, thrift supervisors did not even remove from their jobs the managers of most failed thrifts. And most of those removed were awarded golden parachutes. Alan Cranston was the sole member of the Keating Five to receive Congressional censure for interfering with government regulators in the midst of an enforcement procedure. Cranston served out his term, and would not have sought reelection for other reasons in any case.

In some respects, the scandal never did reach a clear end. The terms of the bailout proved most favorable to the very people who originally brought down the system. In disposing of insolvent thrifts, the Resolution Trust Corporation had recourse to some of the same dubious accounting practices used by failed thrifts. In some cases, the same thrift failed more than one time, even after costly “rescue” by the RTC. An improving economy alleviated the process of resolving failed thrifts. But during the Clinton administration, Congress and the Treasury Department worked together to eliminate the distinction between savings and loan institutions and commercial banks (as well as the distinctions among financial institutions generally); we have witnessed a re-deregulation of banking. Reminiscent of the 80s, there has been an explosion of bank merger activity, with bank managers realizing extravagant personal payouts. And of course we are still paying off both the direct and the opportunity costs of the bailout.

**No-Fault Collapse: Corrupting the Bases of Accountability**

The savings and loan crisis fed off and fed into the three interrelated structural conditions of the no-fault society. First, **constritive individualism**: Deregulation destroyed the character of savings and loans as community-building institutions devoted to local residential mortgage lending. It did this by undoing the community basis of ownership, deposits, and loans. The effect was to encourage rampant economic individualism, by enabling individual entrepreneurs from anywhere to acquire thrifts as liquidity engines for junk bond and real-estate pyramid schemes.

Second, **the blurring of public and private**: The scandal was enabled by bribery and influence-peddling. In effect, the government privatized exorbitant speculative profits, while socializing all the risk. By such measures as increasing limits of federal deposit, insurance legislators and regulators directed the flow of deposits to those
thrift institutions that offered the highest interest rates – precisely because they were the least financially secure. Ultimately raising loan-to-value ratios to a full 100 percent allowed the new thrift owners to speculate without staking their own capital (and without even any risk to depositors). The “Southwest Plan” for resolving insolvent thrifts similarly offered risk-free opportunities for exorbitant profits. Norms of “confidentiality” prevented regulators from reporting bank fraud to the FBI or federal regulators, while making it impossible to prevent banks from commercializing client information.

Third, laxity of the rule of law: Congressional ethics manuals made no distinction between constituent service and influence-peddling. Business law was so ambiguous that bust-out schemes were not unambiguously illegal. Almost every state had a “business judgment rule,” protecting those who could claim to have acted in good faith. Federal regulators had no authority to screen potential thrift owners at all; state regulators in Texas and elsewhere had no authority to prevent the purchase of thrifts by those with known histories of bank fraud.

The interrelated structural conditions of the no-fault society not only disable the mechanisms, but also erode the very concept of accountability. Participants in the scandal were able to manipulate the financial, legal, administrative, and political conditions of accountability. As part of the initial deregulation, thrift lobbyists won the replacement of “generally accepted accounting principles” with relaxed “regulatory accounting principles,” which had the effect of allowing thrifts to represent the shakiest of loans in the most highly profitable terms. Regulators progressively relaxed loan-to-value standards as the solvency crisis grew more severe. That regulatory practices were so amenable to industry interests is hardly surprising, since member thrifts literally owned the regional Federal Home Loan Bank Boards, and industry groups had veto power over the political appointment of their supervisors. The regulatory bodies were in effect primarily advocacy groups. Among the favors Charlie Keating demanded in return for political contributions were the appointment of his best friend and lawyer to the bank board; the replacement of Ed Gray as head of the bank board, after Gray became critical of Keating; and favorable treatment in federal audits. Keating was also able to influence private accountants and auditors to produce favorable reports: Alan Greenspan, for one, issued a glowing audit of Keating’s bank and criticized regional regulators at the very time that the bank was beginning to tank.

The very complexity that makes it difficult to detect bank fraud makes it even more difficult to prove it. Mike Manning, the dogged prosecutor who finally brought down Keating, had to sift through some three million documents in the process. Revealingly, the Justice Department had to contract out for Manning’s services, since the department was short-staffed and lacked the required accounting expertise to prosecute cases like Keating’s in-house. Even Manning, despite his experience in prosecuting other cases of massive bank fraud, had to work relentlessly for years to distill a story of Keating’s criminality coherent enough to convince a jury. (And at that, Keating was convicted primarily for misrepresenting junk bond sales to retirees, only a small part of his racketeering activity.)

Also working to diffuse accountability were the mystifications and cultural lags of the “asymmetric society.” Not only, as Coleman (1982) perceived, could corporate actors hide their misdeeds behind the legal fiction of entitlement to treatment as individuals. With even more costly effect, individuals were able to hide their
machinations by assuming the masks of corporate actors. Keating’s holding company, American Continental Corporation, for example, encompassed 54 different corporate subsidiaries – all controlled exclusively by Keating to camouflage his personal wheelings and dealings.

Participants in this scandal embraced strategies of both contentious and collaborative evasion. Legislators, lobbyists, members of oversight committees, thrift owners, merchant bankers, junk-bond speculators, regulators, lawyers, accountants, appraisers, real-estate developers, and loan brokers all participated in an intricate web of diffused responsibility – as did, not least, racketeers. Actors contended to evade accountability through strategies of both reciprocal inculpation and mutual exculpation. The manifest content of their accounts displaced blame onto others, and sought constantly to reframe the modes of accountability. Thus, when discovered for financial and legal fraud, for example, miscreants might try to recast the issues in administrative or political terms, and shift the arenas for contesting accountability. On the other hand, various types of actors framed their accounts in complementary genres – the thrift manager might narrate his account as romance, the bank regulator as comic irony, and the Senator as tragic irony. Since each genre is a narrative convention that embodies a distinctive ethos, a complementarity of genres can tacitly structure competing narratives in mutually reinforcing ways (Jacobs, 1990b).

Why That Dog Did Not Bark – and What It Thereby Said

Why did the theft of a half-trillion dollars through government-encouraged bank fraud over the course of two decades attract relatively so little public interest? Why did that dog not bark?

The recognition by both political parties of their common implication in scandalous activities may well have served to dampen the public drama of mutual accusation. Neil Bush’s complicity in Silverado was roughly comparable to that of the Clintons in Whitewater. The scandalous activity was so beneficial to so many people (as is true in the initial stages of any Ponzi scheme) that no one had a material interest in providing the “leak.” Moreover, the government managed to suppress public anger over the savings and loan crisis by disguising its costs. Federal insurance covered the losses of even the largest depositors – and in some cases, even of thrift shareholders. While socializing the costs of embezzlement and fraudulent financial speculation, the government privatized and deferred the costs of the bailout through the issuance of long-term bonds (Zimring and Hawkins, 1993). The bailout costs did not enter into calculations of the federal budget deficit. This strategy accords with Habermas’s analysis of the displacement of action-spheres as a way of camouflaging the legitimation crisis of the modern welfare state. In effect, through the issuance of bonds, the government found an economic solution to a political problem – after straining the political system to find a solution for an economic one.

In addition, the savings and loan scandal did not meet the requisite dramaturgical standards: the criminal plot was too complicated to communicate superficially, and in particular there was no “smoking gun.” Ed Gray, the potential John Dean figure of the savings and loan scandal, could not establish timely enough credibility to make his voice heard. Gray, who had been politically appointed to head the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board after proving himself through long service as a loyal team player and political hack, had a conversion experience when he realized the full dimensions of the crisis and coverup. Senators friendly to Keating and then-Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan succeeded in discrediting and firing Gray when he began to blow the whistle. Unlike Watergate, in which the discovery of the Nixon tapes retrospectively established Dean’s credibility, there was no such contingency in the savings and loan scandal. The credibility contest between Dean and Nixon dramatized in the most public fashion the struggle between good and bad faith. In the case of savings and loans, bad faith won.

This dramaturgical outcome reflects the intertextuality of serial scandals. The collective memory of Watergate called out only the most dramatic feature of the savings and loan narrative: “where is the smoking gun?” Recursively, the very failure to find one reinforces only the most sensational features in the collective memory of Watergate. In turn, the hollowing-out of our collective memory of scandal shapes the dramatization of subsequent scandals. It has gone virtually unnoticed, for example, in how many striking details (down to overlapping casts of characters) Enron and the other corporate accounting scandals of the past few years recapitulate the savings and loan scandal of the not-so-distant past.

Why did that dog not bark? It was habituated to living in bad faith, and the signals it received of others’ bad faith came in bits small enough to swallow. Sartre claims that bad faith dares not speak its name, but we sociologists must, else the culture of the no-fault society will tend to stifle the quickening chorus of barks to come. Collective memory will form around descriptions of scandalous behavior that are thin rather than thick – individualized and privatized accounts of systemic wrongdoing. Scandals that become sensationalized will divert attention from those that do not, and trivialize subsequent scandals that do; in this way will they tend to reinforce the negative dimensions of the no-fault society. The effect will be to corrode further the public trust and confidence essential to a healthy civil society.

References

Suttles, G. D. (Forthcoming) *Front-Page Economics*.
Further Reading

VII

The Culture of Citizenship: Local, National, Global
WHY A CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF CIVIL SOCIETY?

At the turn of the millennium, scholars of public life quoted few sentences more frequently than Tocqueville’s paean to civic groups: “Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another” (1969: 515). Tocqueville was expounding on the virtues of participating in what he called “civil associations.” He was suggesting that these groups would temper Americans’ tendency to withdraw into small private circles, leaving society to take care of itself. Civil associations, or civic groups, inhabit what social and political theorists have called “civil society,” the realm of voluntary associations outside the family, the economy, and the state. Civil society includes community centers, service organizations, citizen advocacy groups, social movement organizations, religious congregations, and volunteer associations (Cohen and Arato 1992; M. E. Warren, 2001). These civic groups, at least in theory, are prime sites for citizens to learn about public issues, develop opinions, and create civic-minded ties with fellow citizens. Many theorists and researchers hold a vibrant civil society to be the sine qua non of democratic life.

Tocqueville’s optimistic thesis on civic groups attracted new attention in the 1990s, as many American social scientists argued that civic bonds in the US were shrinking or weakening (Bellah et al., 1991, 1985; Etzioni, 1996; Fukuyama 1999; Putnam, 2000). Robert Putnam’s recent work has contributed prominently to this ongoing conversation about American civic life, with the findings that Americans in the 1990s joined far fewer civic groups and socialized less than three decades earlier. While civic shrinkage became big news, even beyond academic circles, civic groups have long been an important object of study.

A wide variety of theorists have expected, as Tocqueville did, that local civic groups would broaden people’s social horizons and strengthen democracy. A healthy society, wrote Emile Durkheim, hosts a congeries of “secondary groups” that drag individuals “into the general torrent of social life” (1964: 28). In a quite different
tradition, social philosopher John Dewey (1927) wrote that a national, “great community” could come into being when local civic groups helped citizens define their interests in relation to a greater, common good. Political philosopher Michael Walzer (1992: 105) contends, similarly, that in civic groups, citizens articulate interests that “at least sometimes, reach further than themselves and their comrades.” Contemporary research affirms these views. Political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) has argued that government becomes more efficient and responsive when surrounded by a dense, vibrant constellation of civic groups. Civic groups can be sites for decision-making forums that can make economic development, policing, or environmental policy more responsive to local conditions, more sensitive to diverse needs and interests (Fung and Wright, 2003; Lichterman, 1996; M. R. Warren, 2001; Wood, 2002). Many social scientists have cast local civic groups a major role in bringing about a public-spirited, justice-seeking, solidarity-enhancing politics. Do existing civic groups live up to their theorized potentials?

Cultural sociology can teach us a great deal about how, if at all, civic groups empower citizens or broaden our horizons of interest. If Tocqueville was right that civic groups broaden our horizons, how does the process work? What enables ordinary citizens to become competent and broad-minded executors of local power? Civic culture is a crucial part of any answer to these questions. By civic culture I mean the symbols, meanings, and ways of doing things that create and sustain civic life. As Tocqueville’s own wording would suggest, much of civic life is constituted by communication – whether face-to-face, mass-mediated, or virtual. So it makes good sense to expect that cultural analysis will illuminate the potentials of civic groups.

This chapter shows what sociologists can learn from paying close attention to civic culture in local groups. Since the 1980s, sociologists of culture have opened up exciting new research agendas that probe the cultural traditions, vocabularies, or deep symbolic codes that shape public discourse in the large arenas of formally democratic nations, particularly the US. I will introduce a new approach to studying civic life, one that highlights the power of the customs that organize everyday interaction in civic groups. Listening carefully for these group customs helps us address, and challenge, some of the biggest theoretical claims about civil society.

Like other recent approaches to civic culture, my approach appreciates the relative autonomy of culture from other major shapers of social life (see Wuthnow, 1987; Alexander and Seidman, 1990). That means that when we study forms of civic culture – whether civic republicanism, individualism, or the routine practices of interest groups – we grant that these cultural forms have a history of their own, a causal force of their own. We do not assume, for example, that the individualism widespread in American society is nothing more than a reflection of competitive market relations. We do not assume that the virtues of good citizenship are mere ideological foils that distract average citizens from the overwhelming power of corporate decision-makers; On the other hand, civic culture does not float free of social or political structures; I am not promoting any simple “idealist” understanding of what drives social action. Different forms of civic culture perpetuate, or weaken, different social structures, different forms of inequality. Still, we can learn more about the different kinds of civic culture, their powers and their limits, if we do not simply reduce all civic culture to class interests, state structures, or positions in racial or gendered hierarchies.
This point matters a lot if we want to fashion a critical, cultural sociology of civic life. It leads me to broaden our conventional understandings of critical sociological work. Most often, practicing a critical sociology means engaging in the important enterprise of demystification. When sociologists of culture practice demystification, we ask how culture hides, distorts, or accommodates people to domination and inequality. Typically, we begin our analysis from the standpoint of social structural positions or interests. We investigate how culture acts as ideology, benefiting some interests to the detriment of others. Some of the most influential works of cultural sociology since the 1980s are brilliant works of demystification; Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of symbolic domination (1991, 1984, 1977) is a prime example. Unquestionably, it is an important project to demystify the workings of power and interest in civic culture, especially in its mass-mediated forms. As Antonio Gramsci (1971) and his followers have understood, some mass-mediated ways of representing public issues are far more accessible than others and those are often the ones that complement the interests of corporate or state power. Everyday “common sense” in the US, steeped in mass media discourse and imagery, often affirms or naturalizes social relationships that subordinate women or people of color. We can hear these “hegemonic” representations of social life in local civic groups.

In this chapter, however, I am using the relative autonomy perspective on culture, rather than the demystification perspective, in order to highlight other kinds of civic culture. Rather than silence critique, the relative autonomy perspective opens up possibilities for a different kind of critical sociology. This critical mode investigates the cultural conditions of possibility for a just, solidary society.

AN EMERGING CULTURAL SOCIOLGY OF CIVIC LIFE

Collective representations

Many sociologists have become interested in civic culture. Rather than search for a single civic culture of beliefs or values that we assume will foster democracy, as earlier generations of researchers did (Almond and Verba, 1963), we ask how culture enables and constrains civic action. In the US, there are different civic cultures, including the symbols, meanings or ways of doing things we can associate with individualism, liberalism, voluntarism or biblically inspired duty. These different cultural traditions and codes shape the ways Americans argue in public arenas, strategize in movement organization offices, volunteer in soup kitchens, and chat in bars.

Recent studies of civic and political culture often follow the set of approaches that Jeffrey Alexander has called “late Durkheimian” (1988). Though their conceptual vocabularies differ, these approaches share a focus on culture as collective representations. Following larger trends in contemporary cultural sociology, these approaches take their inspiration from Emile Durkheim’s Elementary Forms, and from some of Durkheim’s modern interpreters such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Bellah. These approaches investigate the culture through which members of society represent a good person, a good citizen, or a good society. I will sketch two of these approaches briefly.
Alexander and others pursue a program of research on deeply internalized, binary “cultural codes” that organize public discussion. The codes structure debates about who should be included or excluded as citizens, what makes institutional actors and actions praiseworthy or contemptible in a democratic society (Alexander and Smith, 1993; Kane, 1997; Alexander, 2001). According to these studies, the cultural codes are widely shared, and shape the possibilities for debate and action in the largest arenas of civil society. Alexander and Smith (1993) found, for instance, that a stable set of codes set the parameters for debate during national scandals and presidential impeachments throughout US history. While participants in these debates always had room to improvise their particular rhetoric, speakers on either side of a debate referred consistently to good actors or actions as accessible, rational, or fair, and bad actors or actions as secretive, irrational, and arbitrary. American civic subcultures, and civic cultures in other nations, have their own codes for honoring or stigmatizing actors or institutions in civic life, but these too follow a binary logic that lies behind the particular discourses citizens might invoke (Jacobs, 2000; Baiocchi, 2002).

Robert Bellah and his research team (1985, 1991) are prominent representatives of a different analytic framework. Rather than infer binary codes, this scholarship listens for the vocabularies or traditional languages through which people articulate what is good to do as a person, a group, or a society (Wuthnow, 1991; Hays, 1994). The basic argument is that language opens up – or closes down – the possibilities for public-spirited civic life. People are more likely to work for the greater good if they can talk straightforwardly about social obligations; people whose highest rationale for public action is that “it makes me feel good” are not likely to stay committed to social causes for long. The most influential work in this genre of cultural analysis is Habits of the Heart (Bellah et al., 1985). This interview study found that middle-class Americans drew from four traditions or “languages” of moral reasoning when asked to talk about their public and private obligations. Interviewees spoke the languages of utilitarian calculation and self-expression most frequently and fluently; languages of civic responsibility or biblically based obligation came more haltingly if at all. Other studies have investigated how moral languages influence civic institutions and social movements (Wood, 1999; Hart, 2001).

Civic codes and vocabularies – collective representations – are unarguably crucial features of culture. When sociologists study culture, we often take culture to be a society’s collective representations, and we often look for those representations in sacred or popular texts. But “culture” also includes less codified, often taken-for-granted, customs of interaction.

**Civic customs**

I have argued at length elsewhere that ordinary customs of interaction powerfully shape the meanings and uses of vocabularies or codes (Lichterman, 1996; Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003). The customs work together with vocabularies or codes in everyday group settings, sometimes in surprising ways. These customs influence a group’s ability to produce different kinds of goods. Like discourses and codes, civic customs are widespread. They pattern the interaction of groups throughout a society.
Different groups have different, customary ways of defining group membership itself. These civic customs are *group-building customs*. They are meaningful, apart from the meanings of the ideologies or beliefs a group upholds. Group-building customs are often implicit, though they may become painfully explicit when a member violates a custom. Whether implicit or explicit, these customs are an autonomous fact of group life; they are not simply derivatives of a group’s formally stated purpose or beliefs. An emerging body of work shows that these customs shape how a group talks about and carries out action in the group and in the world outside the group.

For instance, Penny Becker (1999) showed that even within the same religious denomination, different local congregations followed different models of how to be a congregation. They had different ways of defining “who we are” and “how we do things here,” as she put it succinctly. “Family”-style congregations defined “who we are” in terms of close, supportive ties, while “leader”-style congregations defined themselves as a people trying to advance social justice in the larger community. In her study of civic groups, Nina Eliasoph (1996, 1998) showed that the different meanings of membership in “activist” and “volunteer” groups affected how members could talk about political issues in their groups. Volunteer group members could not discuss in their groups what they worried about in private interviews – that skinheads at the local high school threatened already tense race relations, for instance. Being a member of a volunteer group meant being an upbeat, “can-do” person who carried out tasks efficiently instead of fretting about big social issues.

In my own earlier work, I showed (Lichterman, 1995, 1996) that the meaning of group membership shaped the ways that activists talked about issues and allied themselves with other groups. In some activist groups, being a good member meant making a deeply personalized contribution. For other activists, being a good member meant upholding the will of a local community and bracketing individuality. The meaning of membership mattered apart from the groups’ explicit ideologies: Different environmentalist groups had a hard time working together against industrial pollution, even though they all agreed with the ideology that minority locales are unfairly burdened with toxic dumpsites on account of “environmental racism” (Lichterman, 1995). Different styles of group membership led to miscommunication and missed connections.

Each of these studies conceptualized the meaning of group membership within different theoretical traditions. Though they used different terms (“cultural models” in Becker’s case, “civic practices” for Eliasoph, or “cultures of commitment” in my work on activists), each was getting at something fairly similar. Each was probing the styles of membership that groups sustain as they go about their ordinary business. These styles of membership powerfully shape a group’s relation to the social and cultural world outside the group. I name them “group-building customs” because I want to highlight their routine nature, and to highlight that groups recreate their very form as a group as members keep interacting.

I propose that any one society hosts relatively few sets of group-building customs. It is likely that numerous groups in American civil society share the same customs; scholars of institutional life make a similar argument (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Becker, 1999). So if we study a civic group’s customs, we are studying potentially widespread elements of civic culture, not just the unique subculture of our own case.
COMMON CUSTOMS IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE

To identify group-building customs, I listen to the ways a group’s members sustain group bonds – the ways they define obligations to one another, implicitly or explicitly. I listen to the ways the group draws boundaries, how members map themselves into the larger world of groups and institutions that are like them, not like them, or irrelevant to them. And I identify the dominant speech genre; I find out how members define the main purpose of speaking in the group – to explore issues together, to report on tasks accomplished, to criticize other groups (see Lichterman, 1999; Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003). In this short chapter, I will focus on two of these three elements of group-building customs: bonding and boundary-drawing. Arguably, all groups create some kinds of bonds between members, and most if not all public groups define themselves in relation to some larger world, even if only implicitly. But groups have different bonding and boundary-drawing customs.

These are not the “exotic” customs of far-off cultures. Still, they are very powerful. They create similar styles of engagement across groups with very different purposes. So far, students of group-building customs have discovered inductively, through ethnographic and interview research. We need more research to find out just how many sets of customs are widespread in the minority and majority cultural streams of the US. Let me introduce a few different sets of customs that I have found repeatedly in my own ethnographic work, and recognized in other studies.

Probably the best-known group-building customs in American civic life today are the ones that create interest groups. The phrase itself is a common coin, too, so I should clarify: I use the term to designate a group in which being a good member means acting strategically, as efficiently as possible, for a unitary interest. Group bonds encourage members to stick with the unitary interest, to identify strongly with it. And customarily, members draw sharp boundaries around their group, imagining it in an arena of temporary allies and competing or opposing groups also sharply bounded.

Interest groups are ubiquitous in America. They trade on such a commonsensical understanding of public life that many scholarly writers assume any rational, public group is an interest group. We could say most if not all public groups have interests to pursue, but not all groups define themselves so strongly in terms of strategic efforts and unitary interests. And even the most unquestionably “rational” interests operate only through words, images, and symbols that define what counts as a rational interest to begin with. Interest groups are not simply natural or self-evidently logical responses to objective, material reality. We create them through customs. Those customs are meaningful and valuable to group members even when they frustrate the group’s ends.

It takes a quite different set of group-building customs to create personalized groups. Members of these groups relate to one another as empowered selves, each of whom carries a great deal of responsibility. Group bonds obligate each member of a personalized group to make a deeply personalized contribution to the whole. A personalized group is not a therapy group, nor a collection of selfish individuals. Empowering individuals in these groups does not necessarily mean ignoring the common good; it means making room for individualized contributions to it.
Personalized groups tend to draw hazier boundaries between their own group and others than do interest groups. Empowering individuals more, they emphasize group boundaries somewhat less. They may imagine themselves on a big, vaguely demarcated “map” that includes political parties, social movements, cultural trends, capital flows.

Personalized customs are familiar in many grassroots political and religious groups, especially since the 1960s. Many activists practice what I have called personalized politics: they stress that personal “empowerment” must accompany empowerment of their organizations (Lichterman, 1996). They prefer to make decisions by consensus. Their political groups honor, but also expect, a great deal of individual participation – and practically any individual act has potential political significance. Members of groups like these apply their political principles to their decisions about whether to work as genetic engineers or teachers, whether to share parenting with partners or work 80-hour weeks, whether to buy organic produce or save money. Only occasionally are they the reactive, self-righteous scolds that the media have disparaged as “politically correct.” Rather, they think carefully through their social responsibility in a very personal way, and expect group involvement to reflect and nurture their quests to live a good life.

Finally, I want to introduce the customs of volunteer groups. In the most common cultural understanding, a good volunteer group member wants to help individuals “person to person” – maybe out of a biblically informed sense of compassion, or maybe because it just feels good to help other people. Group bonds obligate volunteers to carry out tasks efficiently, resourcefully. Conventional volunteers imagine themselves on a wider social map that features generic categories of person – “the needy,” “the less fortunate,” “children at risk,” and social service agencies. Volunteers customarily plug in to work slots defined by professional agencies. They commit themselves to a limited set of tasks with a clear beginning and ending. Focusing on hurting individuals, they bracket the larger relationships of power and inequality that entwine the people they help. Those relationships seem to lie at the distant corners of their social map, and worrying about them is disempowering for volunteers who want to get things done (Schervish et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1998, 1991; Eliasoph, 1998).

Different group-building customs create different potentials for civic groups. It is not that some customs are better or worse than others in any absolute sense. Rather, they carry different potentials for realizing different kinds of collective goods. Personalized groups can do some things that interest groups do not usually do well, and vice versa. Paying close attention to customs, cultural sociologists can learn a lot about why civil society does, or does not, live up to all of its theorized potential.

GROUP-BUILDING CUSTOMS AT WORK: CIVIC GROUPS AS DEMOCRATIC FORUMS

One of the greatest potentials of civic groups, in the eyes of many theorists, is that they are sites of what Jürgen Habermas has called the public sphere. They are the places in which people exchange news and views and develop opinions about public issues. Different sets of group-building customs offer different possibilities for
citizenly conversation. Interest groups tend to limit critical, open-ended conversation, while personalized groups can more easily encourage it. I want to illustrate the point with some scenarios from lesbian/gay activism in a large city (Lichterman, 1999).

Members of a gay coalition against the political right are arguing over whether or not to make federal welfare policy one of their issues. One man says that most members of the gay and lesbian community will not think that “poor people” on welfare need concern them. The man insists that gays and lesbians will care about welfare reform only if welfare can be shown to be a properly gay issue. Some coalition members urge volunteers to get out the gay vote by leafleting in gay neighborhoods on behalf of a city council candidate who says she is pro-gay. The coalition figures gays and lesbians vote for candidates who have weighed in on the correct side of specifically gay issues. In all, the coalition is assuming what many grass-roots political groups assume – that successful groups get what they want when they unify around a single, common interest and convince a constituency to identify with that single interest. They are acting as an interest group, and assuming other people act as members of interest groups, too.

Following coalition members to different meetings, I was surprised to find out that they had broad-ranging interests. At the coalition’s gay youth task force, members tried to prioritize a long line of potential issues. The issues that got the most votes of concern from the group were “attacks on critical thinking programs,” and English-only ballot initiatives. The most obviously gay youth-related issue written on the poster paper in front of the group – the Christian right’s attempts to end sex education – came in second-to-last place.

Yet, when some coalition members suggest that the coalition should take up public schools or teenage pregnancy as issues, other members suggest they are being unrealistic, or getting off the point. According to the dominant wisdom, “the gay community” cares mainly about obviously gay interests. These limits on conversation stick; broader interests get squeezed out of the conversation. What the larger public ends up hearing from the coalition is that there is a unitary gay community that cares mainly about a single, gay interest.

Interest group customs dissuade members from talking about their own varied interests or multiple group affiliations. Exploring interests seems unnecessary, ineffective, a waste of valuable time – uncustomary in a group that defines good members as ones who speak for a single category of people. When people follow interest group customs, they work at hardening group boundaries, and simplify group members’ understanding of both each other and the wider civic world: “You can belong to the group if you uphold the group interest the way other members do. Other groups are either with you or against you.” It is not news that interest groups can produce collective goods. They can win new rights or resources, or make themselves into formidable opponents (Kornblum, 1974; Rieder, 1985; Delgado, 1986). Interest group customs are much less promising means, however, for attaining other kinds of goods such as open-ended collective learning.

Some of the gay coalition members met weekly, in another building in the same city, as a self-named “queer” group. Their conversations were quite different from the ones they had as coalition members. Provocative name notwithstanding, the queer group entertained more self-critical, civic-minded talk about gay politics than did the coalition: They criticized the idea of a homogenous gay community interest,
and sometimes they criticized each other’s narrowness. They talked about how
gender and race sometimes mattered more than sexual identity for someone’s
chances in life. They said they cared about their city and its political life, and did
not want to be agents of fragmentation. The queer group was a much more wide-
ranging, critically reflective forum than was the coalition, even though both were
highly participatory and eschewed hierarchical leadership. With so many of the
same people in both groups, it is hard to make sense of the difference between
them by using notions of deep-seated interests or values.

It makes more sense to focus on how the groups followed different customs, with
different consequences. Queer group members sustained a personalized group, even
though a lot of the same people followed interest group customs in the coalition.
Instead of acting like partisans of a single interest, queer group members expected
each other to take their identities as lesbians and gay men multivalently, with a
respectful eye out for other identity groups. They allowed themselves some critical
distance from gay identity that would have been out of place if not threatening in an
interest group. Individually nuanced opinion made sense in a personalized group –
the customs made upholding rigid group boundaries less important, and valorizing
individuals more important, even when members were critical of gay community
leaders.

It might sound only logical that a political coalition of different groups needs
to work harder at suppressing differences than does a group sharing the same
identity. If that is so, we do not need to bother listening closely to group customs.
Yet, suppressing differences wasn’t so logical: The gay coalition, mostly white,
alienated an African-American, gay leader because it kept assuming that “being
political” or “being effective” meant suppressing differences in favor of a unitary
interest. Increasingly frustrated, the African-American man reminded coalition
members at one meeting that “straights aren’t all the same, neither are we” (Lichter-
man, 1999: 128). He criticized the assumption that there was a single, clear
gay interest that simply required instrumental action, not open-ended discussion.
Though coalition members had broader interests, they did not discuss them at
length or make them part of the coalition’s agenda, on pain of violating customary
understandings of the group. This man was violating group customs. No one
took up his challenge, and the coalition became largely white – and remained very
largely gay – even as members tried earnestly to broaden its base in a diverse city.
Interest group customs were not as “practical” as the common sense of both activists
and scholars often has it. Time-consuming, open-ended exploration of the
sort that the personalized, “queer” group welcomed might have been more useful
politically.

Personalized groups have their weaknesses, too: they take a lot of time, and
members often find them emotionally draining. They tend to remain relatively
marginal to mainstream, mass-mediated arenas of debate. Personalized groups
are not simply impractical; the case of the gay coalition shows that sometimes,
groups need to spend serious time talking through their members’ different
identities and interests so that the differences can enrich the group rather than
fracture it. But personalized groups run up against a widespread, institutionalized
understanding in the US: Effective politics is supposed to happen through single-
minded, single-interest initiatives that oppose well-defined foes and tackle narrowly
defined problems.
Group-building customs turn out to have practical, powerful consequences for a group’s approach to public issues. These customs are not isolated, subcultural minutiae. The scenarios here suggest that some civic groups, counter to theoretical claims, actually narrow citizens’ horizons.

GROUP-BUILDING CUSTOMS AT WORK: CIVIC GROUPS AS SHEPHERDS OF RESOURCES

Skeptics of cultural sociology may still wonder whether a cultural focus can tell us very much about how civic groups tackle “practical,” logistical, or financial issues. Many civic groups exist to serve particular kinds of people and assist social service professionals. My research on religious volunteers shows that civic customs affect a group’s ability to collect resources and serve other people. Different definitions of group bonds and boundaries make the difference between practicing ad hoc, private charity and creating shared public goods for a community as a whole. I want to use scenarios from fieldwork with religious volunteers (Lichterman, forthcoming) to illustrate the claim.

Park Cluster, an alliance of mostly Protestant churches, aimed to serve the Park neighborhood. The Cluster depended mostly on unpaid effort, assisted by staff people from an urban religious coalition. Roughly half of the Park neighborhood’s six thousand residents were African-Americans, while others were Laotian, Cambodian, or Spanish-speaking Americans of the first or second generation; most lived in low-income households. Local pastors and congregation members initiated the Cluster partly because they feared the consequences of the 1996 welfare reforms for people living in neighborhoods like Park.

Earlier in its three-year history, Cluster members followed the group-building customs of conventional volunteers. Listening to everyday conversation, I heard members situating the Cluster on a social map that featured the county’s family support agency, Family Friends, prominently. In the wider civic world, the group understood itself as a helpful adjunct to Family Friends. Volunteers from Cluster churches helped out in valuable ways: They served meals at neighborhood celebrations, tutored and ran nature programs for kids at the neighborhood center, or got their churches to donate wrapped presents for Park kids at Christmastime.

The Cluster changed over several years, and increasingly members followed what I call the customs of partnership. Group bonds in the Cluster came to depend less on people who served individuals efficiently and helped the county agency, and more on people who wanted to link the Cluster into the complicated, sometimes conflicted civic relationships in the neighborhood. At the same time, the Cluster came to define itself as a more autonomous group on a denser social map of agencies, civic groups, and distinct minority populations. No longer simply an adjunct, it became more and more an empowered civic actor relating to a variety of other groups.

During my study, several Cluster members continued to define the Cluster in conventional volunteer terms. Foremost among these volunteers was Ned. Ned questioned the need for an ongoing Cluster group at all. Why not just sign up to help out the social workers in their neighborhood office? When he discussed the Cluster with me, he liked referring to it as “this group we’re tangled up in.” Ned gave
a great deal of his time to the Cluster. I did not run into any Cluster member more often than Ned when I made my fieldworker’s visits to the neighborhood. The food pantry needed new shelves; the woman down the block with diabetes needed someone to run errands for her. Ned met these needs.

Most Cluster members wanted to do something besides “helping out.” They wanted to create partnerships in which neighborhood residents participated in writing the agenda for neighborhood service. The Cluster began funding “eviction prevention” grants for Park residents who were about to lose their apartments. It co-sponsored a public health nurse. It arranged a public forum with local school board members in the neighborhood center basement so that residents could speak directly to the board about school redistricting. As “partners,” the Cluster tried to create connections, and sponsor public goods such as the nurse and the eviction prevention fund, that would not have made sense to undertake if the Cluster was “helping out.”

Different group-building customs promoted different ways of shepherding resources. Were it up to Ned, churches in Park Cluster would relate to the county agency and the neighborhood as *aggregates of ad hoc volunteers and donors*, each “doing their bit” under someone else’s direction. In contrast, the Cluster wanted to engage churches, as *collectivities*, to make ongoing commitments of money and time for public goods for the Park neighborhood as a collectivity. And Cluster members committed themselves to discerning what goods Park residents wanted as a collectivity. Carrying out that process, the Cluster conferred with neighborhood residents and the Family Friends agency, planned new relationships, reassessed old ones, tried to develop respectful ways of relating to the neighborhood center’s black nationalist director, and, in short, tried to be proactive participants in Park’s civic life. But by custom, volunteers do not talk through the relations between groups, communities, and institutions. That kind of talk distracts from serving hurting individuals and getting things done. Ned, clearly a compassionate man, was tired of all the talk.

Eighteen months into my study, a clash of customs erupted. One Cluster member cautioned that the Cluster should distinguish between “the vision of Family Friends” and “the vision of the neighborhood center.” While the Cluster welcomed, depended on, updates and suggestions from the Family Friends social worker, it was increasingly unwilling to let Family Friends *speak for* neighborhood people. The ensuing exchange between Ned and Steven is very telling on this point. Steven said that the Cluster should be clear on whether a Cluster project involves being “a partner to Family Friends, or to the neighborhood center.”

Ned: Supporting Family Friends is supporting the neighborhood. I can’t imagine it being otherwise.

Steven (carefully insistent): Well, there have been issues—

Ned (dismissively): Oh, I’m a trouble-maker, and I don’t – that’s not—

Steven (cautioning, rising tone): There have been questions raised.

Ned (declaratively): That’s not what we’re here about.

“What we’re here about” is just exactly what the focus on group-building customs reveals. In Ned’s view, the point of meeting as a group was to carry out helpful tasks defined by county authorities, not to take responsibility for consulting with different leaders and talking through needs collectively. *The customs favored by a member*
such as Ned would not allow the group to create new public goods in partnership with the neighborhood. Talking through difficult cross-racial relationships, seeing things from diverse points of view in the neighborhood – this would take the kind of discussion and debate that violates the customs of conventional volunteering. Volunteers who define civic engagement in terms of carrying out tasks under a preset agenda do not need to spend time worrying, as Steven did, about whether their efforts promote one agenda at the expense of others.

Volunteering and partnership both produce valuable goods. Both create relationships – but different kinds of relationships. Direct, helping relationships with state agencies and served individuals are not the same as relationships between civic groups or churches. Observers have wanted to know how to promote denser civic ties in the US (Wuthnow, 1998; Putnam, 2000; M. R. Warren, 2001), especially in light of evidence that civic connections have declined over the past three decades. Civic development in a diverse, class-divided society may require not only the interpersonal service and helping relationships that volunteering accomplishes, but also the civic-minded relationships between groups that partnership cultivates. Conventional definitions of volunteering obscure the very possibility of these broader civic relationships.

**DISCUSSION: THE POWER OF CUSTOMS AMIDST INSTITUTIONAL POWER**

Recall that theorists have said civic groups open spaces to explore and debate opinions. Civic groups are said to empower citizens to act with a greater sense of interdependence; these groups strengthen social solidarity. In theory, they open up opportunities for civil society to direct itself, democratically.

Yet, civic engagement means very different things in different settings, with different consequences for public discussion and intergroup ties. The scenarios above show that not all group-building customs help people discuss issues freely and self-critically. Not all group-building customs empower people to take the same kind of “ownership” of civic life. Simple calls for more civic engagement do not address the question of what kinds of civic groups will extend democracy, or make a diverse society more solidary.

Civic customs do not evolve out of nowhere. They develop in tandem with institutional arrangements, though they are not simply effects of those arrangements and nothing more (Lichterman, forthcoming). Often these arrangements carry the power and resources of the state. It is no accident that the conventional customs of volunteering are widespread and easy to take for granted in the US. They complement an institutionalized structure of professional social service that has grown tremendously since World War II (Wuthnow, 1998). That structure becomes a prominent part of many volunteers’ social map; it informs their customs. Civic groups that depart from the customary script of volunteer service face the tensions and cross-pressures of working outside the institutional mold – and not only from their own members. Members of Park Cluster occasionally disagreed explicitly with the social service professionals who advised them. And in their own meetings they imagined a more expansive role for themselves in Park neighborhood than they did at monthly meetings with social workers, where everyone treated the Cluster mostly as a conduit for ad hoc volunteering and donating.
In a similar way, we could say institutional arrangements encouraged lesbian and gay activists to act like an interest group, and bracket their personalized politics, when they approached the realm of policymaking. Policymakers routinely deal with constituencies that claim single, discrete identities: the elderly, African-Americans, Spanish-speakers, gun owners. The lesbian and gay coalition knew that at least implicitly, and made the institutionalized world of interest group politics a big part of their own social map, part of their own customs. More reflective, other-regarding notions of interest and identity got pushed to the sidelines in the competition for resources and recognition.

Still, customs don’t correspond perfectly to institutions. Sometimes civic groups, like Park Cluster, sustain alternatives to dominant, institutionally defined roles for active citizens. Civic customs always enable and constrain the relationships that active citizens have with the state and other institutions as well as with each other. That means civic groups have at least some limited leeway to make more or less room for institutions’ influence on them, through their own customs.

**CONCLUSION: ENHANCING A CRITICAL, CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY**

Civic groups figure large in visions of a better society, from Tocqueville to Dewey to Habermas. Listening closely to everyday, civic conversation, cultural sociologists can learn a great deal about these groups. Of course there is more to civic life than local groups. There is more to civic culture than civic customs. Still, civic customs contribute to the conditions of possibility for a society that would be more democratic or more solidary than current institutional arrangements dictate.

But what is critical about the project I lay out? If we restrict critical sociology to the terms of demystification, then there is little critical value in studying civic customs. We need to be studying powerful institutions – or else different kinds of culture that we often call ideology. However, if we take culture’s relative autonomy seriously, and say that people live only through discourses, codes, or customs that have a history of their own and some autonomy from social structure, then we must broaden our definition of critical work, and ask new questions. Demystification of ideology by itself will not tell us all we need to know about culture.

Theorists have argued that civil society is more than a derivative of the capitalist economy or the bureaucratic state: Civic relations – interest group relations, for instance – may be strongly influenced by the ideologies of the market or the state, but they draw also on relatively autonomous cultural forms that will not evaporate under the illuminating beam of demystification. The gay coalition did not receive its interest group customs passively and unwillingly from dominating institutions. Those customs have a relatively autonomous history of their own. The coalition honored those customs, even though the customs sometimes frustrated the coalition’s goals, and the coalition also benefited from the goods that those customs helped it secure.

There will not be civic groups without civic culture and civic customs. Critical-thinking people will not leave the world of vocabularies, codes, and customs even after having understood the ideological role of culture in domination and atomization. People live, inescapably, through culture. If widespread cultural forms have a social force of their own, then people cannot simply undo them at will or make up
new ones immediately from scratch. That is why critical sociologists should ask about the cultural conditions of possibility for a better society, apart from analyzing the ideologies that limit democracy or social togetherness. Studies of group-building customs illuminate some of these conditions.

References


**Further Reading**

A major concern of cultural sociologists and other scholars has been the condition of “civil society,” “public life” or “the public sphere” (Putnam, 1995; Wuthnow, 1998; Wolfe, 1989). While all of these terms have varied meanings, I will focus on the “public sphere,” which is “a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these” (1995: 185–6). “Public discourse” is what is spoken in the “public sphere.”

A chapter about religion and the public sphere could discuss any number of topics, so focus is required. In a recent review, Wuthnow identifies a number of concerns about the decline of the public sphere, one of which is “the growing privatization of moral convictions and their attendant irrelevance to public debate.” He claims that in the past, “deeper values and traditions” – most notably those of a religious character – that were once articulated in the public sphere are no longer (1999: 22). The discourse of the public sphere is now, the argument goes, not “thick” but “thin,” without reference to foundational beliefs, comprehensive perspectives, or worldviews (to take but three terms used to describe what has been lost). Like many others, Wuthnow is building on the normative perspective in Weber, who bemoans the loss of substantive debates in the public sphere.

“Thick” discourse in the public sphere concerns the ends that we should pursue; what our collective values should be. “Thin” discourse is about how to achieve assumed ends that remain outside of the debate. For example, a “thick” debate about economic policy would be a debate about what the purpose of the economy is. A “thin” debate is about how to maximize GNP, which assumes that GNP is the end to pursue without deliberating about it.

It is also important to define discourse in the public sphere as “religious” and “not religious.” Religion, as commonly defined by sociologists, is ultimately about “the
meaning and life,” the “purpose of existence” and the like. Similarly, theologian Paul Tillich defined religion as about “ultimate concerns” or “ultimate ends.” Thus, religious discourse in the public sphere tends to be about ends (“thick”), and is legitimated through appeals to the supernatural or transcendent.

Given this definition I will immediately expand upon it. The main point from which the other points in this chapter flow is this: If we are to understand the changing role of religion in the public sphere, we must distinguish between different types of this “thick” religious discourse that I will call “explicit” and “implicit.” We finally arrive at the central question addressed in this chapter: Why has there been a decline in both explicit and implicit “thick” religious discourse over time? In this chapter I will first argue for the existence of “explicit” and “implicit” discourse in the public sphere, and then explain why the form of religious discourse in use has changed over time. I will conclude by presenting different normative perspectives on what the role of religious discourse should be in the public sphere.

To provide examples for my argument I will summarize how these two types of religious discourse have been used in the sector of the public sphere I call “public bioethics.” Public bioethics is the deliberation about what society’s ends should be on scientific and medical issues, such as abortion, human genetic engineering, organ transplants, human experimentation, human cloning and euthanasia. As a concrete case, I will show how deliberations over the intergenerational impacts of germline human genetic engineering were truncated by the increasing “thinness” of the debate.

**Explicit and Implicit Religion in Public Bioethical Debate**

For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Gal. 5:14).

Fletcher, 1966

If the greatest good for the greatest number (i.e., the social good) were served by it, it would be justifiable not only to specialize the capacities of people by cloning or by constructive genetic engineering, but also to bio-engineer or bio-design para-humans.

Fletcher, 1971

Both of the epigraphs above are public discourse about our public life. More specifically, they are arguments for certain collective values, claims about what ends citizens should pursue regarding subjects now considered “bioethical.” Both texts are religious, but in different ways. The first is explicitly religious discourse because it is a set of words that explicitly and ultimately references transcendent, supernatural warrants for an argument about what our ends should be. Which end should we pursue in this passage? Only one: agapé (ancient Greek for “you shall love your neighbor as yourself”). Why? Because a part of the canonical sacred text of Christians says so, a text that can only be considered authoritative if one believes its selection into the canon was an otherworldly decision.

The second epigraph was written by the same author five years later and argues for human genetic engineering and cloning based upon a strictly utilitarian calculus. Five years after the first epigraph was written the author does not promote agapé but...
“the greatest good for the greatest number,” which evokes Jeremy Bentham, not the author of Galatians in the Christian Bible. Fletcher is trying to express the same idea, but in secular terms.

The second contribution to the public sphere seems secular, but is it? I will argue that it is implicitly religious. This is an example of what theologians began to do in public bioethics at about this time: they translated their explicitly religious claims into implicitly religious claims in order to have a hearing in the public sphere. I will therefore define implicit religious discourse as a set of words that do not reference transcendent, supernatural warrants for a claim about ends, but are intended by the speaker to be secular substitutes for explicit religious discourse that they would utter if they were among people who shared their religious beliefs. Metaphorically, explicit religious discourse is a well that users of implicit religious discourse return to in order to make their judgments when facing a new problem in the public sphere. On the path between the well and the public sphere, they translate the arguments they found at the well into secular language, making them “implicitly religious.”

We can all recognize explicit religious discourse that exists in the public sphere. It is also clear that people who use explicitly religious discourse will modify what they say in order to be understood by others. The Christian Bible, the source of much discourse in the public sphere, was itself the result of authors shaping their message to get an audience in different public spheres. For example, each of the four gospel writers wrote with an eye toward converting a different group of people.

But if the public discourse is stated in a secular register, can it still be implicitly “religious” as I have defined it? That is, is this discourse a stand-in for explicit religious discourse people would utter among members of their religion? I am aware of no studies on this topic, but I believe that we can reinterpret a number of different research traditions in the social sciences and humanities to suggest that people do engage in discourse about the ends that we as a society should pursue using implicitly religious arguments.

The first research literature comprises work from scholars who argue that we now have a “naked” public sphere because of the exclusion of religion (Neuhaus, 1984; Carter, 1993). At first glance they seem to be arguing that all religion is excluded. For example, law professor Stephen Carter describes the following encounter:

two law students came up to me to tell how their classmates mocked them when, in class, they opposed abortion. The two students were Catholics and were told by classmates that because of their religion, their moral opinions on this matter were out of bounds…Had they but reached their moral positions with no reference to their religious beliefs, these students believed, they would have been welcomed into the classroom’s version of the public square. (1993: 53)

His point is about the exclusion of explicit religious discourse, which he sees as problematic. However, he acknowledges that in light of this exclusion, people translate their arguments to what I would call an implicit religious discourse: “The point is that the proposed rules to govern discourse in the public square are constructed in a way that requires some members of society to remake themselves before they are allowed to press policy arguments” (56).

This echoes a long tradition of scholarship among a specific type of theologian whose job is to speak religious discourse in the public sphere. These public
theologians, called either “Christian Social Ethicists” or “Moral Theologians” in Christianity, are deeply concerned about how to engage in “translation” without changing the message. Jeffrey Stout states his concern, which is that these theologians, “when addressing a general audience on a specific moral problem, typically search for common assumptions in a way that blurs any distinctive contributions of their religious tradition” (1988: 124). This problem of translation is, to my reading, the problem sine qua non of public theology. That these practitioners worry about this translation is also evidence of the existence of implicit religious discourse.

More evidence can be found in the worries of political theorists. Robert Audi, in a position roughly consistent with theorists such as John Rawls (1987), argues not only the standard constitutional principle that laws must have secular purposes, but also that arguments for laws must have secular motivations. “Since an argument can be tacitly religious without being religious in content,” he adds that people should be willing to act on a policy even if their religious beliefs were eliminated (1997: 29). We will evaluate this normatively at the end of the chapter, but for now the important point is that political theorists perceive that citizens translate their explicit religious discourse to implicit religious discourse.

We can find other evidence for this translation in an unlikely quarter: by reinterpreting studies of attitudes on issues being debated in the public sphere. In these studies, respondents are given little snippets of secular public discourse about an issue, such as abortion, and asked which other snippets they assent to (Wuthnow, 1987: 142). “Should abortion be legal if a woman’s health is endangered by the pregnancy?” one question asks. Note that these questions do not ask, “Does your interpretation of God’s role in creation and interaction with the world mean that abortion should be legal in the following instance?” Opinion studies consistently find that the best predictor of a citizen’s opinion on abortion, human cloning, gender roles and other issues is their religious practice (Evans, 1997b; Steensland et al., 2000), and religious practices predict voting behavior (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993). If variations in respondents’ religious practices or beliefs predict their secular discursive responses on issues and candidates in the public sphere, this suggests a well-honed translation skill.

Finally, consider the literature on America’s “civil religion” (Bellah, 1970: 168–89). While scholars use this phrase to describe different phenomena, the more important civil religion tradition for my purposes is the use of vaguely Jewish and Christian concepts to legitimate political claims. Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech is a masterful example of this tradition. His claims to “have seen the promised land” may be secular on their face, but to King, by all accounts, these claims were a secular translation of the Hebrew scriptures applied to the situation of that day. The broader point is that these secular (or at best vaguely religious) symbols would only work if the citizens were translating between an explicit religious discourse about the Israelites leaving Egypt and an implicitly religious discourse about “seeing the promised land.” King’s discourse in the public sphere was, by my definition, implicitly religious.

While it is clear that explicit religious discourse has existed and continues to exist in the public sphere, I hope that I have demonstrated that implicit religious discourse exists as well. The distinction is important because it helps us get a fuller understanding of the social forces that encourage and discourage these different types of
discourse. I will describe these forces through an examination of the history of the secularization of public bioethics.

THE DECLINE OF EXPLICIT RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

By the 1950s, explicitly religious discourse on any issue was not dominant in the public sphere. America had long progressed from a theocratic state at its founding – where most public discourse was explicitly religious – to one where there were many secular voices as well. However, explicit religious discourse was still legitimate – at least on issues having to do with science and medicine – but was competing with many secular alternatives. So, in the early days of these debates, theologians speaking explicit theology thought that it was legitimate to speak explicit religion broadly in the public sphere, beyond the core of people whom they knew shared that language. As one of these theologians at the time put it, defending his practice of speaking theology to the broadest possible audience, “readers who are not Christian are invited to read as if overhearing an ongoing conversation from which they may learn something” (Paul Ramsey to Stanley Hauerwas, in Long, 1993: 207).

For example, at Gustavus Adolphus College in 1965 a public symposium was held to have each of the listeners – presumably mostly undergraduates in a small Minnesota town – “become a truly effective member of society,” who could engage in reasoned deliberation about new genetic technologies (Roslansky, 1966: 6). On stage were a zoologist, a few biologists, a sociologist and Methodist theologian, Paul Ramsey. Explicit religious discourse was not simply legitimate because a portion of the population spoke that way, but because it could be a valuable contribution to the larger conversation. “The moral values of man are often embodied in and described by his religion,” stated the person who introduced the speakers. “Even those men who have become detached from any formally organized religious body or who no longer give even formal allegiance to a body of religious doctrine, are inextricably involved in a set of values with an origin in religions” (1966: 6). Ramsey went on to use explicitly religious discourse in his arguments.

There were many hints from the conference record that even by this point in time this use of explicit religious discourse to a general audience was a bit of an anachronism, and that explicit theology would not be welcome in future debates. People who wanted to speak explicit religious discourse in these debates would soon instead begin to speak implicit religious discourse. This change is exemplified by Ramsey himself who, according to a reviewer of his work, in order to “find some room in the modern era” was “forced to use the leveling, generalized putatively universal language of modernity” (Long, 1993: 103). Ramsey, as well as other theologians in this debate, would translate the ends derived from their explicitly religious discourse into implicit religious discourse in order to get a hearing.

What had changed? There are of course many changes, but I will focus upon three: the professionalization, democratization, and increased competition for space in the public sphere. The first and most critical part of the story of public bioethics is also a telling point about religion and the public sphere: it has been an elite affair. While the average citizens were clearly engaged in deliberation over these issues, opinion was to some extent being set by various discourse producers, in this case scientists,
theologians, and others. Here is where the first sociological insight can be found. If public opinion were being deliberated among individuals, then each person would be relatively free to draw upon explicit religious discourse as he or she saw fit. However, each elite individual was in the public sphere because of his or her relations to a group – be it the interest group he or she represented, the educational institution he or she was on the faculty of, or simply his or her profession. Individuals must account at least to some extent for the diversity of the views of the people they represent, which will move them away from all foundational claims, including religious ones. We can expect something similar when the medium of public discourse is not face-to-face discussion, but television, newspapers, and other printed sources. The newspaper must be sold and the journal circulated to a number of people with different views, which will also select against comprehensive perspectives. The first step toward the marginalization of explicit theological discourse in the public sphere is, then, the professionalization of the public sphere itself, which was under way during this time.

The public sphere has always been an exclusive, nondemocratic place. In the earliest times it might contain only people who were thought to be capable of “rational” discussion, which might have meant that only white men could participate. The public sphere in the US also had a history of exclusion, with the marginalization of people by race, gender, and other characteristics. While such exclusion undoubtedly occurs today – most obviously in that it takes resources to participate – in the past such exclusion was more severe.

One form of exclusion was pervasive discrimination by religion. Most notably, Catholics and Jews were restricted from the social locations from which they could influence the public sphere through mechanisms such as enrollment quotas at universities, the blocking of certain professional tracks, and the outright segregation of voluntary associations. Up until the mid-twentieth century, the social positions from which one could influence the public sphere were by and large reserved for mainline Protestants. However, beginning after World War II religion became less predictive of one’s social status, as a number of forces led to an opening up of the social structure (Wuthnow, 1988). To take but one example of this change, in 1930–1 53 percent of “intellectual elites” were either Episcopalians, Congregationalists or Presbyterians, whereas by 1976–7 the figure had dropped to 27 percent (Davidson, 1994: 432).

Put simply, while entrance to the public sphere was by no means democratic, discrimination by religion was lessening. Therefore, as religiously inclined speakers entered public bioethical debate they found a pluralism in religion that had not existed a few decades previously. While this transformation had probably been slowly occurring since the time of the Puritans, the tipping point was clearly the 1960s. Speakers continued to use explicit religious discourse when speaking to those familiar with this discourse, but when speaking to a general public they increasingly encountered people who did not speak the language. Given the choice between remaining silent or translating, speakers of explicit religious discourse began translating.

Beyond the increasing pluralism of religious belief in the public sphere, during the 1950s speakers of religious discourse found that a good portion of the public discourse was being made by competing groups. By the 1950s, following the perception of the scientific community’s success in helping to win World War II, as well
as massive increases in government funding, scientists had taken up a much larger role in public affairs. Scientists thought they could solve society’s problems, both technological and social, and were contributing to debates in the public sphere surrounding genetics and other issues, arguing for their ends in a secular register (Evans, 2002: ch. 2). In terms of sheer amount of public discourse, theologians and other purveyors of explicitly religious discourse were outnumbered. With more and more of public discourse being uttered in a secular tone, to continue to speak of “God’s desires for us,” or any other explicitly religious discourse, meant risking marginalization. It is clear that the theologically inclined did not want to take that risk and began translating.

THE DECLINE OF IMPLICIT RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The story of the decline of explicit religious discourse in the public sphere is not new. In fact, it is celebrated as evidence of America’s willingness to reassess its practices, acknowledge the pluralistic nature of society, and live up to the principles of freedom that it supposedly believes in. What is more interesting is that implicit religious discourse – which does not violate religious pluralism or the separation of church and state – is also in the process of being excluded. While this is nowhere near complete, and issues such as human cloning erupt with a flurry of explicit and implicit religious discourse upon occasion, the general trend is for a removal of implicit religious discourse along with all other “thick” discourse.

There are two explanations for the decline of implicit religious discourse that I believe are generalizable to all debates in the public sphere. The first, consistent with the writings of German social theorist Jürgen Habermas, is that there is a growing tendency for any type of “thick” discourse to be excluded from the public sphere: implicit religious discourse and otherwise. What occurs is that the incursion of the state and market into the public sphere begins to require that public deliberations occur using a formally rational debate about means towards given ends instead of a substantively rational debate about the ends themselves (Habermas, 1987).

By the 1970s, theologians and others who spoke explicit religious discourse in other contexts had settled upon using implicit religious discourse in the public sphere when speaking with people who did not share their explicit religious discourse. However, they were distinguishable from the other participants in the debate because they were trying to have a substantively rational debate about the ends that human genetic engineering would forward, not a formally rational debate about the means that would forward assumed or unarticulated ends as other debaters were. For example, one of the most influential texts among the theologians in the debate was about the purpose of intergenerational genetic engineering – making genetic changes in the entire human species instead of just one person. Those in this debate would repeatedly return to their theological well to try to figure out the purpose of humanity, from which they could derive an implicit religious discourse about intergenerational transmission of genetic designs. We cannot imagine a “thicker” or a more religious question. Some concluded that our purpose was to perfect nature by eliminating undesirable genetic traits from the species. Some concluded, also from
their visits to the well, that our purpose was to live within the constraints we currently have. Either way, they had an implicitly religious, substantively rational debate about this topic.

Even this implicit religious discourse about genetic engineering would not survive as it was to be shoved out of the public sphere with other substantive debate. What occurred was that the state had increasingly become the primary financial supporter of all of the research on the subjects with which bioethical debate was concerned. The war on cancer and a general explosion in the amount of funds available for biological science research made the government a tight partner with researchers. At the same time, citizens also looked to the state for protection from the moral problems generated by these new technologies.

In response, various government advisory commissions were established to determine what was ethical and unethical in these areas. While rarely having power themselves, these commissions nonetheless could often recommend policy to executive branch officials. These government commissions then became the ultimate arbiter of what is “ethical,” because it was these commissions that recommended what type of research should and should not be funded by government agencies. Note that most of this research in the country was funded by these government agencies. The discourse in the public sphere that concerned an issue on which one of these government advisory commissions was also working became slanted toward the needs and discursive requirements of this commission.

Most importantly, the discursive need of these government commissions was to have debates that assumed formal, not substantive, rationality. As historian Theodore Porter has noted, government bureaucrats – those farthest away from the democratic legitimation of elections – enhance their legitimacy by claiming not to be using their judgment or their own normative beliefs. That is, they try to appear to not be setting ends. As he puts it, in other countries government officials are “trusted to exercise judgment wisely and fairly. In the United States, they are expected to follow rules” (1995: 195).

In this context, these government advisory commissions began to favor deliberations that eschewed discussions about ends themselves and instead assumed a very few ends that were thought to be universally endorsed by the citizens (Evans, 2000). If the ends were those held by the citizens, then the government officials were not using their judgment, but could portray themselves as following the rules set by the citizens. This system has come to dominate the discourse of the professional debaters in bioethics and it does not leave much room for the implicit religious discourse. As defined above, implicit religious discourse is about ends themselves and, since this system eschews discussions of ends, implicit religious discourse is discouraged. The best evidence for this effect is that the number of theologians in these debates has declined markedly as this form of argumentation has become dominant (Evans, 2002: 38).

To return to the example of intergenerational transmission of genetic traits, this “thinning” of the debate now meant that the debate had to assume only a few ends, one of which was that any technology had to advance the autonomous decision-making of people. The dominant argument against intergenerational transmission changed from the earlier era. The dominant argument was now that changing the genes of future people was wrong because they had not given their autonomous permission for this to occur. As I have argued elsewhere (Evans, 2002), this is a very
limited way of conceiving of the problem of responsibilities to future generations – but it was all that was available after the thinning of the debate.

The second explanation for the decline of implicitly religious discourse, admittedly more speculative, is that using implicit religious discourse without discursive links to the explicit religious discourse from which it is drawn results in the loss of the connection between the two. When this occurs, implicit religious discourse simply becomes secular discourse. At least in the bioethics debates, these links were rarely made.

Theologians themselves are concerned with the translation from explicit to implicit because they fear that the connection between the explicit and the implicit will be lost and the implicit will simply become secular. To use the metaphor I employ near the beginning of this chapter, if religiously motivated participants in the public sphere do not create a discursive path to link the explicit and the implicit, then they will not return to the well of explicit theological discourse when faced with a variation in the debate, but will simply return to a secular well.

This problem is exemplified by autonomy as an end to pursue, which is one of the few ends allowed into the more formally rational debate. This end was introduced into these debates in the 1960s as a Kantian idea, where we are to have respect for persons as ends unto themselves and not means toward ends. Thus, to respect persons was to allow them autonomy over their own medical decision-making: a novel idea at the time. Ironically, one of the first persons to use the “respect for persons” discourse in these debates was Ramsey, the theologian. He claimed that he was, in my terms, using implicit religious discourse instead of explicit discourse (he was just “using” Kantian language), and that as far as he was concerned, Kant’s meaning of autonomy “does not supplant the grounds for care that I espouse,” which remained theological (Long, 1993: 205). Critics of Ramsey’s translation at the time encouraged him to “write something where it is clear that you only ‘use’ Kantian language,” because “it is indeed a tricky business of how one can use one position without buying into its deepest commitments” (206).

The link between explicit and implicit religious discourse was never made and, not surprisingly, when people tried to return to the well to address related issues in the public sphere, they returned to a philosophical well, because philosophy had jurisdiction over the Kantian legacy. A subsequent theological interpreter of the use of autonomy in these debates, Karen Lebacqz, now complains that autonomy has lost not only its religious connection, but that it has lost any social connection as well. Autonomy simply means the right to do whatever one wants, derived largely from liberal political philosophy, due to the lack of a path drawn back to Kant. Lebacqz wants to modify the principle of autonomy by drawing on the “tradition of covenant,” a Protestant theological idea (1999: 10). In my terms, connecting autonomy to the idea of “covenant” would create the discursive path back to explicit religious discourse, a path that had been lost due to underuse. This assumes that the well is what motivates the religiously inclined in the public sphere, and that discourse more directly brought from the well will be more expressive for these persons. Think of an analogy with language – native German speakers can more precisely express their concerns in German than they can when first required to translate to English.

The point is that for Ramsey and others in the 1960s, the articulation of autonomy was implicit religious discourse. However, because he and others did not invent
the discursive path between explicit and implicit, the implicit religious discourse became simply secular discourse.

What would a maintained path look like? A good example is the abortion discourse of mainline Protestant denominations (Evans, 1997a). For example, the United Methodist Church has, since 1972, advocated for the continued availability of legal abortion. The dominant discourse among secular pro-choice advocates has been liberal individualism or “autonomy”: women should be free to control their own reproductive lives. While the United Methodists agree with this position, they have also traditionally grounded that freedom of choice in a more explicitly religious discourse. That is, they have created the discursive path between the implicit religious discourse of “freedom of choice” and the explicit religious discourse of balancing the God-given sanctity of the life of the woman and the fetus. Because the Methodists have retained the path between the implicit and the explicit in their discourse, when a new issue arises and they must return to the well, they know where to find it. For example, when the human cloning issue arose, they could have claimed that cloning fell under the guise of “reproductive rights,” as many have done. Instead, they argue for banning cloning, based upon their return to the well of explicit religious discourse in Methodist theology (Hanson, 2001), not too different from the explicit discourse that legitimated the implicit religious discourse about abortion. While this path is often constructed in the public sphere, it is rarely maintained, and the loss of maintenance means the implicit religious discourse becomes simply discourse.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Most of the literature on the public sphere has a normative angle to it, at least because it assumes that having an independent public sphere is good for society. The primary argument for allowing specifically religious discourse in the public sphere – either explicit (direct from the well) or implicit (translated from the well) – is that this is the way the citizens of the US think. To not allow this type of discourse is to restrict our ability to democratically govern ourselves. I will describe the normative positions for keeping explicit and/or implicit discourse out of the public sphere by focusing on two traditional reasons given for excluding religion – loss of consensus formation and fears of conflict. I will finish by offering an argument for including at least implicit religious discourse in the public sphere.

The first normative argument for keeping religious discourse out of the public sphere is that this discourse will impede consensus formation, which is, after all, the purpose of the public sphere. Liberal political theorists have attempted to argue that not only should explicit religious discourse be excluded from the public sphere, but that implicit religious discourse should as well. According to Wolterstorff’s summary of this argument, “no comprehensive perspective – be it religious or not, be it of God and the good, or only of the good, be it an extant perspective or one newly devised – no comprehensive perspective can properly serve as the basis of decisions and discussions on fundamental political questions” (1997: 91). On a practical note, if enacted this view would remove the legitimacy of organized religious groups from the Southern Baptist Convention to Reform Judaism advocating positions in the
public sphere, as well as any other group using a comprehensive perspective, like feminists.

There have been many critiques of liberal political philosophy, and it is beyond my competence to adjudicate between them. However, Wolterstorff offers a contrary view to the liberal view. To overgeneralize from a complex position, his claim is that if people engage in discourse in the public sphere and are not understood by their fellow citizens because they are using a particularistic fundamental perspective, that is their problem. “Let citizens use whatever reasons they find appropriate – including, then, religious reasons,” he concludes (1997: 112). Advocates of what has been called deliberative democracy also suggest a greater range of allowable discourses in the public sphere (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). People will educate each other about their fundamental perspectives during debates or, if not, can debate without this deep understanding.

The second argument for keeping explicit religious discourse out of the public sphere is ultimately derived from the memory of the European experience with the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, wars fresh in the minds of the seventeenth century founders of political liberalism, like John Locke. Issues that stirred such passions, such as religion, were thought best excluded to ensure the peace, and this pattern of thought ended up being enshrined in our public sphere from its earliest days. Scholars have pointed out that concern over religious war was really the product of a certain era in European history. According to Wolterstorff,

for seventeenth-century England . . . social peace did depend on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities when discussing politics in public. . . . American society at the end of the twentieth century is a different matter. We now have behind us a long history of religious tolerance. . . . More generally: the slaughter, torture, and generalized brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause – nationalisms of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony. (1997: 79–80)

Sociologist Stephen Hart, in his study of grass-roots organizations, also supports the view that the concerns of liberal theorists are overblown, saying that “Faith-based community organizing shows none of the baleful qualities” that a liberal political philosopher would expect from the “incursion of religion into public discourse” (2001: 224). Also, on a normative note, Hart claims that the anemic quality of the political left in recent years is precisely because it has eschewed “comprehensive perspectives,” or what he would call “expansive” discourse, religious or otherwise.

In line with the concerns of liberal theorists, other sociologists have claimed that it is empirically true that unresolvable disputes in the public sphere are due to these issues being structured by implicit religious discourse. Hunter, for example, claims that since our debates over abortion, homosexuality, and the like are ultimately the result of our “worldviews,” roughly equivalent to what I have been calling implicit religious discourse, then “tension, conflict and perhaps even violence are inevitable” (1994: 4). However, other empirical research suggests that conflict is not increasing in the US (DiMaggio et al., 1996; Baker, 2002), and the conflict that exists is not structured by worldviews (Evans, 1997b).
Since scholars have begun to question whether the conflict and consensus concerns are valid, we can therefore ask whether there is any good reason to restrict the freedom of individuals to speak how they would like. Why not let people use their explicit religious discourses to try to convince one another? The primary impediment to accepting this critique, in my view, is that a people’s ability to express their view in the public sphere is heavily structured by the power they hold, and a legitimate concern is that people with certain religious views might not simply be convincing others of their correctness, but imposing them on others, due to their disproportionate power. One thinks of the influence of evangelicals on the leadership of the Republican Party. Of course, scholars like Wolterstorff would then probably ask whether being oppressed by another person’s religion is worse than being oppressed by the discourse generated by class interests.

I will finish with one additional argument for why we might want to consider allowing at least implicit religious discourse in the public sphere. One problem with debates that do not allow any comprehensive perspectives is that the debates are then very “thin.” Bruce Jennings asks whether “we want to say that in order to achieve a morally authoritative kind of consensus we want participants to deliberatively bracket their differences and search for that common ground they share, no matter how narrow or minimalist it might be?” These thin debates will also probably not be usable to ask any of the really important questions: “it is but a thin friendship that remains harmonious only so long as the friends never touch on anything that really matters to them” (Jennings, 1991: 458).

Even if we allowed “thick” secular debates, if somehow opponents of ultimate perspectives were able to remove only the implicit religious discourse, I think that we would still suffer for it. The primary problem with excluding implicit religious discourse from the public sphere is that many of the issues that are to be deliberated there are religious, but cannot be solved with a privatized, individual faith. For example, whether or not we should clone human beings can be deliberated in a secular “thin” manner, with discussions about safety and autonomy. However, cloning rightly evokes discussions of what the human species is for (what our purpose on this planet is) and beg for a collective societal response. While there are secular discourses on this topic, it seems nonsensical to discard thousands of years of religious reflection on the topic. To rule these discussions out leaves important questions unable to be discussed. Of course we need to find a way to use religious discourse, implicit or explicit, in a manner that forwards our democratic ideals. This balance remains one of the unsolved problems in the public sphere.

References


Lebacqz, K. (1999) Twenty years older but are we wiser? Presented at the Belmont Revisited, April 18, Charlottesville, VA.


Further Reading


How can the present world order be characterized? Contemporary theorists tend to approach the subject of globalization from a distinctly normative perspective that interprets current developments positively or negatively. Many observers see the current world order as being dominated by powerful countries and multinational business organizations. These hegemonic cultures privilege neoliberal economic values and goals in which markets determine the success or failure of business ventures and the welfare of citizens. Another version of the hegemonic model is the cultural imperialism thesis, which argues that, for political reasons, Western countries are attempting to impose their beliefs, values, norms and styles of life on the rest of the world. Recently, this perspective has been superseded by the media imperialism thesis which postulates that international media conglomerates based in Western countries dominate transnational flows of news and entertainment.

The type of “top-down” globalization that results from political and economic hegemony has been called “predatory globalization” (Falk, 1999). Alternatively, some observers see a process of “globalization from below,” in which democratic values and the concerns and needs of the politically weak and economically deprived are being addressed, along with a critique of “globalization from above” that manifests itself in part in antiglobalization movements. Here the emphasis is on international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) and international public spheres that form as a result of the activities of the media and of INGOs. These organizations are generally identified as constituting a global civil society, consisting of groups, social movements, and organizations that attempt to promote democratic and humanitarian values. The concerns and needs of the politically weak and economically deprived are being addressed through new forms of civil society (Meyer et al., 1997b: 175) that may eventually overcome the anarchic tendencies centered on economic interests that predominate today (Meyer et al., 1997a: 625). Rules and standards developed by IGOs and INGOs and promulgated through international and regional agreements constitute a transnational legal order that may provide the basis for a global democracy in the future.
In this chapter, I will examine and assess the evidence for these models. Underlying these approaches is the assumption that globalization can be defined as diverse flows of culture between different regions and countries. In addition to examining the content of these cultural flows, I will also discuss their structure. Can these flows be understood in terms of center-periphery models or are these flows multidirectional, as suggested by Appadurai (1990)? How dense are these cultural flows and what is the significance of subregions exhibiting high density? Castells (1997: 362) identifies the structure of counter-hegemonic forces as a “networking, de-centered form of organization and intervention.”

Transnational space can be conceptualized as consisting of organizations and clusters of organizations that vary in their orientations. Transnational organizations pursue their goals across national boundaries. IGOs include organizations oriented toward political, social, and humanitarian goals (such as the UN system) and organizations oriented toward economic governance, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. INGOs specialize in a wide variety of areas, including science and technology, economics and business, and human rights and welfare. Transnational instrumental organizations, such as multinational corporations, are another major category. Transnational networks of organizations consist of organizations, which are often social movements that are generally oriented toward the achievement of normative goals and values. These advocacy networks achieve their goals by networking with similar organizations across national boundaries. A fifth type of phenomenon in transnational space consists of relatively transient public spheres centered around discussion or debate on specific issues. Transnational public spheres form as a result of the activities of transnational organizations and networks, often in conjunction with their national counterparts.

**HEGEMONIC MODELS: GLOBALIZATION FROM ABOVE**

What are the implications of economic globalization for the emergence of a system of global democracy? On the whole, scholars portray the effects of transnational instrumental organizations in pessimistic terms. Powerful transnational corporations represent an unprecedented level of “concentrated institutional economic power throughout the world” (Boggs, 2001: 305). Among forty thousand transnational corporations operating in the global economy, one hundred control one-fifth of all assets (Evans, 2001: 635). Their management is concentrated in a few advanced countries but their activities are widely dispersed.

Contrary to claims by proponents of this system that higher levels of economic growth worldwide will lead to increased prosperity and the spread of democratic regimes, the development of huge transnational business empires has led to the dominance of economic discourses over political discourses, increasing levels of inequality between and within countries, and decline in the power of the nation-state and both national and transnational public spheres. Subordination of political goals such as sustainable development, protection of the environment, and human, health, and labor rights to the dictates of the international marketplace are symptoms of the decline of oppositional political traditions and the erosion of public life (Boggs, 2001). National political institutions are unable to oppose the goals of
transnational corporations that are unwilling to accept any form of external restraint. They have been described as having “no loyalty to any particular country, nation or community beyond their own business associates whose interests they attempt to represent and promote” (Evans, 2001: 638).

Public transnational institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund essentially serve to protect the interests of transnational business organizations (Boggs, 2001; Evans, 2001). For example, when social and environmental priorities are determined by the free market, transnational agencies that are supposed to provide regulatory controls to offset environmental devastation are too weak to function.

Boggs argues that depoliticization as a result of “corporate colonization” is most evident in the United States and is associated with “decline of both the public sphere and civic culture.” He says, “The form ‘politics’ assumes in the US is more akin to a series of electoral charades mixed with interest-group stratagems and bureaucratic decision-making, all masquerading as democratic governance” (2001: 308).

Some scholars argue that a solution may be forthcoming in the emergence of a transnational elite which would reconstitute the present economic order on a new ideological and institutional basis. Sklair (2001) defines this emerging class as including the following groups: transnational corporation executives and their local affiliates, globalizing state bureaucrats, capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals, and consumerist elites (merchants, media). He claims that it will be motivated to resolve the two major global crises: the increasing inequities between rich and poor and the negative ecological effects of global capitalism. Because of the unpredictability of free-market systems, the transnational elite will attempt to develop predictable organizational structures based on something more substantial than neoliberal economics. By contrast, Robinson (2001: 175) identifies the emergence of a transnational capitalist class controlled by a managerial elite but argues that this elite is far from unified regarding tactics and strategies for controlling the global system.

The rise of a transnational elite would have serious consequences for nation-states, which would be reduced to implementing its policies. The future of the nation-state, undermined from above by transnational powers and from below by increasing ethnic and racial divisions, is becoming a controversial topic in the literature on political culture (Berezin, 1999). Held and McGrew (1998: 235) argue that many issues, such as economic regulation, resource depletion, and environmental degradation can no longer be resolved by nation-states acting independently of one another. However, at the present time, some nation-states remain important actors, particularly the United States, which uses its military domination and economic power to dominate the global system and to accomplish its own goals (Boggs, 2001: 312). It refuses to participate in global bodies, meetings, and treaties that do not advance its own policies.

Sites argues that, in contrast to the view that transnational corporate actors are creating links between markets in different parts of the world without any assistance from nation-states, the activities of nation-states remain very important in creating the economic and social conditions for globalization. These activities cannot be explained entirely in terms of the impact of globalization; that is, as responses to external challenges. Instead, they have to be understood in relation to the political and social institutions of specific nation-states. Some East Asian states, with
extensive ties between government and business, have developed highly coherent strategies toward globalization. Others, such as the United States, lack a consistent overall strategy toward globalization but react in an ad hoc manner to economic pressures and to short-term goals, pushed by business lobbies. The state policies that result from this situation – “privatization, business deregulation and subsidization, tax retrenchment and regressivity, assaults on union power, displacement of the urban poor, initiatives to dismantle the social security state” (2000: 130) – facilitate the process of globalization. A major consequence of this approach to globalization is the loss of civic rights and benefits for citizens (131–2).

Robinson (2001: 188) is also pessimistic about the effects of neoliberal economic globalization on nation-states. National governments serve as “transmission belts . . . for the imposition of the transnational agenda” and, in the process, lose their traditional functions of maintaining internal unity and the social fabric.

HEGEMONIC MODELS: CRITIQUE

The hegemonic model of globalization assumes that transnational business corporations are monolithic – a hugely powerful center extending its influence to all parts of the world that are susceptible to economic development. The interests of these organizations are supported and promoted by international media conglomerates that dominate the global dissemination of news and entertainment. While the predominant emphasis in their version of world events is not geopolitical domination per se but commercial values and consumerism, McChesney (1999) argues that the underlying bias in the content disseminated by these organizations is that politics is unimportant because social change is undesirable. He claims that the global media system supports and benefits from vacuous political cultures and depoliticized citizenship in Western countries.

Other authors have contested the notion of imperialism which underlies hegemonic models, contending that what is actually taking place is globalization, a process of “interconnection and interdependence of all global areas . . . in a far less purposeful way” (Tomlinson, 1991: 175). Another conception of globalization proposes that it consists of a set of influences that are not necessarily originating in the same place or flowing in the same direction (Appadurai, 1990). In other words, there is no clearly defined center or periphery. From this perspective, globalization is a less coherent and unitary process than that which is implied in hegemonic models. The outcome of this process is more likely to be the hybridization of national cultures that assimilate aspects of many other cultures and consequently become more diverse, as opposed to homogenization that is implied by imperialist approaches which suggest that all national cultures will become increasingly similar.

Evidence for network models is derived from the increasing importance of regions consisting of clusters of countries whose members share one or more of the following: language, culture, and historical traditions. Economic activities are likely to be organized along regional lines rather than global lines. Hawkins (1997: 178) has shown that the telecommunications industry is organized around regional power centers. He argues that “globalism’ should really be conceptualized in terms of interregional relationships rather than fully multi-lateral ones.” This suggests that economic structures on the regional level also vary in terms of their relationships to
national and regional governments. Sites (2000: 124–5) states that “globalization is unevenly developed in an international economy that remains highly variegated and “niched” in terms of social infrastructures, organizational forms, and degrees of competition across sectors, nations, and regions.” Different nations have different conceptions of globalization and different state policies that respond to international pressures in different ways (Sites, 2000: 125).

The “imperialist” impact of Western global cultures is being offset by the development of relatively distinct and independent regional cultures within global cultures (Crane, 2002). For example, regional differences in the production and dissemination of media are increasing. The numbers of producers of media content and of countries producing such content are steadily growing, contributing to the diversification of global culture. These regional cultures are based on a mixture of cultures indigenous to a particular region and cultures outside the region. Their audiences consist of people within the region and natives of the region living elsewhere in the world, who wish to remain in contact with their cultures of origin. In some parts of the world, a conception of regional identity is emerging that provides a means of coping with cultural contradictions and tensions that are shared across national boundaries. Iwabuchi (2002) describes affluent young Asian consumers as seeking media products that represent “a common experience of modernity in the region that is based on an ongoing negotiation between the West and the non-West – experiences which American popular culture cannot represent.” In other words, cultural globalization can be understood in terms of four models that capture different and contradictory aspects of the phenomenon: cultural imperialism, global cultural networks, reception theory, and government and urban cultural policy strategies (Crane, 2002).

To summarize, the global capitalist system is perceived by some scholars as leading to the decline of any meaningful system of democratic government on the national level and increasingly homogenous and ineffective national political cultures. Other scholars argue that globalization makes available a variety of modes of organization: “transnational, international, macro-regional, national, micro-regional, municipal, local” (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995: 50). Instead of leading to homogenization, it increases the diversity of national cultures and modes of adaptation to external pressures.

**CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE WORLD POLITY PERSPECTIVE**

Most of the literature on civil society deals with the concept on the national level where it generally refers to “the arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan, quoted in Misztal, 2000: 80). Strong civic groups that represent collectively diverse interests are seen as essential for the functioning of civil society and for the existence of strong democratic institutions. These same types of actors can be identified on the international level in the form of international governmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations.

Civil society on the international level is generally conceptualized in terms of global social movements and the world polity perspective. International social
movements are concerned with values and aspirations associated with people rather than their states, including “the promotion of human rights, gender and race equality, environmental protection, sustainable development, indigenous rights, nonviolent conflict resolution, participatory democracy, social diversity, and social and economic justice” (Otto, 1996: 112).

The world polity perspective argues that the world polity is not reducible to states, transnational corporations, national forces, or national interest groups (Boli and Thomas, 1997). Instead, this perspective identifies a transnational legal world order that operates with considerable independence from states. Its cultural principles and institutions shape the actions of states, firms, individuals, and other subunits. The emphasis in the world polity perspective is on scientific groups or epistemic communities whose “rationalistic and scientized culture” integrates the stateless world polity (Meyer et al., 1997b: 165–6; 1997a: 625). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) show, these types of organizations are very different in orientation from advocacy networks, comprising environmental and human rights organizations. The latter attempt to politicize issues while epistemic communities of scientists and experts prefer to design policies based on authoritative knowledge and to persuade governments to adopt them. Unlike epistemic communities, advocacy networks also rely on nonscientific types of expertise such as direct testimony from experience and good organizers’ strategic expertise. In the process, they are able to broaden the definition of what types of information and knowledge will shape the agendas on specific issues.

Wapner (1994: 389) discusses the roles of environmental activism organizations, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE), and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). He argues that these organizations represent a new type of politics that includes lobbying governments and intergovernmental organizations but also includes a kind of “world civic politics.” He describes them as attempting “to identify and manipulate levels of power, which, although not associated with governments per se, effectively shape, order, and direct collective behavior” (390). Each of these organizations has specific goals (that are very different from one another), which it pursues through its branches in a large number of countries, a kind of “internal” networking.

Empirical studies from a world polity perspective find structural homology across countries in educational systems, women’s rights legislation, social security systems, environmental policies, and constitutional arrangements. Boli and Thomas (1997) argue that these similarities reflect an overarching world culture. Global culture in this sense implies that definitions, principles, and purposes are cognitively constructed in similar ways throughout the world and held to be applicable everywhere in the world. World polity is constituted by a distinct culture that can be identified by studying the structures, purposes, and operations of INGOs. Originating in voluntary action by individual actors, INGOs have increased dramatically in numbers in the past century (Boli and Thomas, 1997). Rules and standards developed by these organizations are beginning to provide a semblance of structure in the world order.

Boli and Thomas’s (1997) study of all INGOs founded between 1875 and 1988 found that these organizations share a set of “world cultural principles”: universalism (everyone should be treated equally); individualism (individuals or associations of individuals are the principal actors); rational voluntaristic authority (INGO
authority is cultural not organizational; their authority does not stem from a legal bureaucratic source). Goals are rational progress toward economic growth, individual self-actualization, collective security, justice, and world citizenship as a major objective.

INGOs cannot make or enforce law and generally have few economic resources but are nevertheless influential. Nearly 60 percent of INGOs concentrate on economic or technological/scientific issues. The primary concern of these INGOs is enacting, codifying, modifying, and propagating world cultural structures. Environmental and human rights organizations that are more visible to the public constitute a much smaller percentage of INGOs. Boli and Thomas claim that INGOs function as a world proto state but one that lacks political authority or access to sanctions to enforce its policies. INGOs lobby, criticize, and convince states to act on their principles. In many cases, states respond by founding agencies and creating policies.

Meyer et al. (1997a) attribute the emergence and evolution of IGOs and INGOs concerned with environmental issues to the existence of an epistemic community devoted to “rationalized and authoritative scientific interpretation” that influenced perceptions of environmental problems. They attribute the enormous growth since 1870 of international environmental associations (INGOs), environmental treaties, environmental intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and national environmental ministries to the fact that the seemingly anarchic international environment is “increasingly integrated around a common rationalistic and scientized culture” (1997a: 625). For these authors, the “environmental regime” is dominated by “policy professionals, scientists, and representatives of nation-states” in IGOs and INGOs who represent “a worldwide scientific culture.” They argue that the emergence and growth of the environmental regime was not propelled by issues on the national and local levels but by “universalistic and scientific ideologies and principles.” For example, national environmental ministries appeared only after the development of a very substantial structure of international organizations devoted to these issues.

Meyer et al. (1997a: 646–7) argue that the world environmental regime has influenced a wide range of policies and practices on the national level but it cannot be said to have solved environmental problems. They explain the latter as a consequence of the fact that the environmental sector is based on virtually unlimited discourse and association and therefore defines problems much more rapidly than solutions can be found. They do not discuss the roles of governments or transnational corporations in developing or failing to develop regulations for controlling damage to the environment from man-made chemicals and pollutants. By contrast, Newell argues that the activities of environmental INGOs have recently been directed primarily toward transnational corporations. The withdrawal of national governments from attempting to regulate the activities of multinationals that have an impact on the environment has led to increased attempts by INGOs “to create mechanisms to check and restrain corporate power” (2000: 133).

To summarize, the world polity perspective explains the emergence of global civil society in terms of a culture derived from epistemic communities that has been accepted by states in the form of rules and standards for policies in specific areas. Other scholars see global civil society as being created through the activities of transnational social movements that create ties between citizens at the national level and organizations at the international level by conveying their concerns “upward” as mediators between local issues and global institutions and by
monitoring the activities of IGOs and relaying information about their activities “downward” to local activists (Smith, 1998).

**Transnational Advocacy Networks**

Women’s organizations provide a good example of transnational advocacy networks. Women, particularly in developing countries, have been largely excluded from hegemonic institutions. Instead of being focused around central organizations with national branches, women’s organizations generally include a great many local and regional women’s groups that operate in different ways and have a variety of goals. Lacking powerful organizations around which their movements could coalesce, women have developed highly decentralized forms of global networking (Sreberny, 1998). Roseneil (1997) describes a type of networking among women’s organizations focused around the activities of groups in a particular country, Great Britain, but including links with women’s organizations in many other countries. In this case, the formation of a Women’s Peace Camp to protest the installation of American nuclear missiles at the United States Airforce Base at Greenham Common became the focus of national and transnational networks of women involved in the women’s peace movement. Similar peace camps were set up in several other countries.

Some regional groups have developed “networks of networks” linking over 200 countries. These networks of networks make it possible for women’s groups to mobilize widespread support for political initiatives. Moghadam (2000) has identified transnational feminist networks devoted to specific issues such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), comprised largely of feminist groups in developing countries, Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE), and Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUM), comprising women who live in Muslim countries or who have emigrated from Muslim countries. To summarize, the global women’s movement “is built upon grassroots organizations, which combine into networks, build networks of networks, and then utilize communications technologies to exchange information as quickly and cheaply as possible and in ways that facilitate greatest access and therefore mass participation” (Sreberny, 1998: 218–19).

Large transnational feminist networks (TFNs) are in constant touch with one another and have many members who belong to more than one network. Moghadam says, “Feminist networks tap into each other in an almost seamless web, with many points of intersection” (2000: 66). Leading members of TFNs are also in close contact with other types of INGOs.

Chowdhry and Beeman (2001) present an example of how transnational activist networks can bring about social change in a country when organizations located within the country are unable to do so. In the case of child labor in the carpet industry in India, national legislation prohibiting child labor and national activist organizations were unable to eradicate the practice of using child labor in the production of Indian carpets. In order to deal with the problem, Indian activists found it necessary to develop a transnational coalition of 65 South Asian organizations that were attempting to eradicate child labor in South Asia. They also enlisted the support of transnational organizations in the West that were active in Germany, a major importer of Indian carpets. This led to the threat of a consumer boycott of Indian carpets in Germany. These various activities finally forced Indian
manufacturers to change their attitudes toward the use of child labor and to develop a foundation that certifies Indian carpets as “child labor free.”

A less successful case of the use of advocacy networks to resolve a problem in a particular country is the case of rapid logging of tropical timber in the Malaysian state of Sarawak on the island of Borneo (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The case of logging in Sarawak received international attention because of the recent establishment of an INGO, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), concerned with the issue of tropical timber. The case was also taken up by advocacy networks consisting of NGOs and INGOs devoted to environmental issues and indigenous rights. Tropical timber logging in Sarawak had particularly devastating effects not only on the forests but on the environment and resources available to native communities in the region who were confronted with loss of their traditional forms of livelihood. Aided by representatives of national and international advocacy networks, natives mounted a campaign of resistance to logging operations, including barricades on logging roads. Transnational strategies of resistance were developed by a large number of loosely connected organizations and included consumer boycotts, tropical timber bans in certain countries, and attempts to influence corporations involved in this business.

In spite of the fact that international campaigns succeeded in reducing consumption of tropical timber in some countries, these and other efforts by international advocacy networks had virtually no effect on logging operations in Sarawak or on improving the situation of native communities. The economic benefits of logging to transnational corporations and the political backing they received from politicians in Malaysia provided these corporations with the resources and motivation to ignore international pressures and to extend their operations to other locations in the region. The advocacy networks’ campaigns were primarily successful in the transnational community. In other words, they were effective at the levels of discursive and procedural changes that influenced the activities of organizations such as the World Bank and ITTO, which became more aware of environmental issues and somewhat more likely to take them into consideration in formulating policies.

**THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

Some of the activities of NGOs and INGOs can be interpreted in terms of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. Habermas’s (1974) concept of the public sphere was originally applied to the behavior of small groups of middle-class men gathering in coffee houses and literary salons in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to discuss public issues. He argued that public spheres have largely disappeared in Western countries as a result of changes in the organization of the media that have trivialized interpersonal communication about political issues. Privately owned media conglomerates that pursue their economic goals in many different countries may represent the interests of the public and influence public opinion but do not constitute spheres of public communication that involve participation by the public. Winseck and Cuthbert (1997) distinguish between “limited/technical democracy” as compared to broader forms of democracy, such as “communicative democracy.” Limited democracy provides a minimum of democratic rights for the public whose interests are represented by experts and legislators.
In contrast to the concept of “limited democracy” (Winseck and Cuthbert, 1997), Habermas’s concept of “communicative democracy” refers to a situation in which universal public communication shapes the rules and goals of society, which are decided on the basis of argumentation rather than power. Recently, Habermas has redefined the conditions under which public spheres arise. He defines the concept of a national civil society as “composed of…more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere” (1997: 367). He now sees the national public sphere as a pluralist phenomenon, including active voluntary associations and social movements with grass-roots ties.

On the national and particularly on the international level, the concept of the public sphere is useful as a way of understanding the dialogues and debates that underlie civil society and the ways in which different types of actors contribute to these debates. Obviously, global public spheres function very differently from Habermas’s original description of public spheres of middle-class citizens discussing newspaper articles in public places. Face-to-face discussions of civil society issues take place from time to time in international meetings of delegates from national civil society associations and movements (e.g., the recent Durban conference against racism). More frequently, the international press and the Internet perform the role of ensuring communication between movements and associations with different interests. Dialogue and debate emerge from this process.

Serra (2000) provides a case study of the emergence of a global public sphere, consisting of the international press, INGOs, IGOs, and NGOs, in response to the killings of Brazilian street children. This study found that national authorities took action only when international organizations and the international press became concerned with the problem. Serra points to the way in which coverage of such issues in the international press triggered coverage in the national press in many other countries, including the country in which the problem was taking place. Her study suggests a process whereby NGOs attract the attention of INGOs, IGOs, and the international press in a form of global public sphere, whose response leads to local media coverage and action by government authorities.

Issues discussed in global public spheres tend to be those involving constituencies, such as women (Sreberny, 1998), children (Chowdhry and Beeman, 2001), and minorities (Schulz, 1998) that are ill-served by or excluded from national civil society debates in many countries, or issues such as protection of the environment (Wapner, 1994) or prohibition of landmines (Warkentin and Mingst, 2001), which are resisted by powerful interest groups on the national level.

Sparks (1998) argues that global public spheres focused around the media include very small proportions of the population and that consequently their influence is negligible. However, the numbers of people involved in these public spheres may not be an adequate measure of their influence. Instead, it is more useful to conceptualize the dynamics of these public spheres, specifically the ways in which national civil society movements and associations bring to the attention of the global civil society community civil society issues that they are unable to resolve nationally. The responses of the global civil society community, relayed through the international press, may eventually have an impact at the national level.
CIVIL SOCIETY: CRITIQUE

In contrast to Boli and Thomas’s positive interpretation of the activities of INGOs, Pasha and Blaney (1998) argue that INGOs, which supposedly provide the foundations of global civil society, are deeply implicated in the hegemonic order, in which they perform largely subordinate roles. Both INGOs and global capital operate in the same privatized international space, in which there is no formal provision for access by the huge and heterogeneous “transnational public” (Etzioni-Halevy, 2001: 154). Governments and transnational instrumental organizations develop close links with these organizations and often succeed in coopting them (160). The result is that INGOs are more likely to confer legitimacy on transnational instrumental organizations than to receive concessions to their demands from these organizations. Etzioni-Halevy (161) states, “Autonomy from governments seems to be the last thing the (I)NGOs are worried about. In some ways they virtually become arms of governments.”

INGOs are often dependent on transnational instrumental organizations and IGOs for financial support and for authorization to perform their activities. For example, transnational aid organizations channel huge amounts of funds from national governments and transnational instrumental organizations to poor countries (Etzioni-Halevy, 2001: 160). Moghadam (2000: 69) points out that support for a European women’s network comes principally from the European Union.

Pasha and Blaney also question the universality of the culture disseminated by the INGOs, arguing that these movements are dominated by Western elites and reflect “the sensibilities of the middle class of post-industrial society” (1998: 435). Moghadam (2000: 79) makes a similar point that members and activists in women advocacy networks are largely middle class and highly educated.

Nelson, in an analysis of INGO advocacy networks and World Bank policies, states that “most policy changes won by (I)NGOs strengthen the World Bank with respect to its borrowers” (1997: 469). Many of these policy changes are positive, for example environmental impact assessments and compensation for forced resettlement, but the Bank has resisted attempts on the part INGOs to strengthen the borrowers’ negotiating position with respect to the Bank. Nelson concludes (469) that INGO advocacy networks need “to develop strategies that depend less exclusively on the expanding authority of international aid donors and more directly on effective citizen action in industrialized and poor countries alike.”

Pasha and Blaney (1998: 434) argue that the negative aspects of this system are seen particularly in developing countries where neoliberal globalization has led to a decline in the power of the state, along with increased inequality within and across countries.

GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: ANTIGLOBALIZATION MOVEMENTS

The recent appearance of antiglobalization movements is a symptom of widespread popular discontent with the consequences of neoliberal global capitalism. Rather than a single coherent movement, antiglobalization is the goal of thousands of groups, representing grass-roots movements, NGOs, community groups, labor,
and social movements. Social scientists, including Bourdieu, Wallerstein, and Chomsky, have attempted to formulate strategies for reversing economic globalization (Fotopoulos, 2001: 242).

To what extent can one expect that these movements will be able to bring about meaningful changes in the present system? Fotopoulos argues that the effectiveness of these movements is limited by their diversity, lack of common goals, and lack of agreement about the means (violent as opposed to passive) for attaining their goals. Some of the groups associated with antiglobalization are critical of the contemporary socio-economic system itself and the concentration of power in its political and economic structures; others are critical of its underlying ideologies, particularly consumerism and economic growth; still others (the majority) are primarily critical of the negative consequences of globalization rather than of the system itself (2001: 268).

The effectiveness of these groups is also limited by the fact that they lack consensus concerning their goals. Some groups would like to destroy the present system, although they have no proposals for alternative types of socio-economic organization; other groups hope that, by calling attention to negative aspects of the system, elites themselves will make changes or reforms. The latter view the negative aspects of the system, which they delineate in detail, as reversible (Fotopoulos, 2001: 268). Their focus tends to be on taking part in demonstrations, bringing about changes on the local level, and creating “alternative institutions,” without developing any long-term or short-term strategies for changing the system as a whole. Falk (1998: 105) faults these movements for their lack of an ideological position that is as coherent and powerful as neoliberalism.

Fotopoulos (2001: 275, 276) views the reformist groups that predominate among antiglobalization movements as being incapable of bringing about anything more than a few reversible reforms rather than meaningful changes in the system. He sees the need for “a truly anti-systemic mass political movement against the market economy and representative ‘democracy’” (273).

**PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY**

An issue that is debated in this field, generally by political scientists, is the prospects for global democracy. How can global democracy be conceptualized? What are the factors that contribute to or inhibit the emergence of global democracy? Held (1997) argues that global democracy would entail the limitation of nation-state powers in some respects and the extension of democratic forms and processes at the transnational level. He has developed a complex model in which increasing global interconnectedness in economics, politics, technology, communications, and law plus growing permeability of national borders will lead to decreasing power of states to control economic and cultural processes. Held argues that this in turn will lead to increasing cooperation with other states, as seen in the emergence of regional agreements, such as the European Union. It will also lead to the growth of international agencies and institutions that will provide a system of global governance that will sustain and redefine the power of states.

A precondition for global democracy might be an increase in national democracy. Studies show an enormous increase in the level of democracy in
national governments worldwide (Schwartzman, 1998). In 1974, only 25 percent of the world’s nations were democratic (defined in terms of using elections to choose their top leaders). In 1996, 66 percent were democratic. This in turn raises the question of the relationship between globalization and democracy on the national level. Schwartzman identifies several types of global factors that are conducive to the emergence of democracy in developing countries (164–79), such as a favorable international climate, global economic development, and foreign intervention, usually by major powers. However, major Western powers, such as the United States, have been very inconsistent in their support for democracies in developing world countries, although in 1991 the US Congress set guidelines for foreign aid that included human rights and democracy.

In view of the discussion above of the negative effects of globalization on democracy in the United States, an increase in the numbers of democratic states seems contradictory. However, Schwartzman suggests that democracy can actually reduce the extent to which citizens, particularly those in the working class, mobilize to protect their interests, easing the country’s adaptation to pressures associated with globalization. Robinson states, “All over the world, the United States is now promoting its version of ‘democracy’ as a way to relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social, and economic change” (quoted in Schwartzman, 1998: 178–9).

This type of democracy, which emphasizes democratic institutions rather than civil and political rights and economic and social reform, has been dubbed “low intensity democracy” (Gills et al., quoted in Evans, 2001: 630). These types of regimes have pursued repressive social and economic policies without provoking as much popular resistance as an openly authoritarian regime would encounter. Evans (2001: 630) points out that, under these conditions, INGOs devoted to “poor relief” are used to silence dissent, as seen in the substantial increase in the numbers of INGOs devoted to humanitarian aid.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has compared two very different interpretations of the current global system. The hegemonic interpretation views the global system as dominated by transnational corporations and an elite based in these organizations in pursuit of neoliberal economic objectives. The civil society interpretation consists of two approaches: (1) that the global system is directed by INGOs and IGOs that share a rationalistic, legal culture that will lead eventually to global democracy, and (2) that the major actors are transnational social movements that form advocacy networks and public spheres.

Both models postulate the development of organizations or networks that have or will take charge of the global system. The hegemonic theorists conclude that the global system is under the control of a transnational elite, although they disagree about whether members of this elite are in agreement or disagreement with one another about how the system should evolve. These scholars argue that domination by a transnational elite representing transnational corporations is producing a “hollow” form of democracy on the national level in which the forms (institutions) but not the contents (rights and values) are observed. The civil society theorists are
more optimistic about the direction in which the global system is moving, placing it in the hands of epistemic communities or networks of transnational social movements. The civil society theorists are also more confident that IGOs and INGOs will eventually create a democratic world government.

Pasha and Blaney argue that proponents of civil society models underestimate the extent to which the current world order is dominated by a hegemonic system. In their view, global governance is controlled by the managers of global capital, a very narrow segment of humanity (1998: 432). However, proponents of the hegemonic model tend to underestimate the extent of diversification in the system that stems from differences in regional cultures that are increasing rather than diminishing.

The impact of civil society organizations in the form of scientific and epistemic communities, advocacy networks, and public spheres is greatest in areas where their goals do not conflict with powerful political and economic interests on national and international levels. Prospects for change engendered by antiglobalization movements face the same constraints and are not enhanced by the proliferation of groups with varying and often incompatible goals and objectives.

Conducting research on the global system provides an exceptional challenge to sociological research, which has tended to concentrate on nation-states and, on the transnational level, has largely been confined to case studies of specific groups or types of groups. Empirical research that can provide new and broader perspectives is greatly needed but will be difficult to obtain.

References


**Further Reading**


Art is “a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right [taking on] the function of this-worldly salvation.” This position, first outlined as a sociological problem by Max Weber in “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions” (Gerth and Mills, 1958), was a basic element of the Frankfurt School critiques of the culture industry and affirmative culture (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002; Marcuse, 1991). What Weber and Adorno, among others, appreciated is that culture has an importance independent of the developments of capitalism and the modern state and the logic of their administration. The arts, philosophy, and the sciences present critical alternatives to the dominant value system, which Weber observed and the members of the Frankfurt School feared was disappearing under the conditions of advanced capitalism.

I believe that the saliency of such an approach to culture continues. It makes it possible to come to a more adequate understanding of the great political challenges of the twentieth century (see Hobsbawm, 1996; and Furet, 1999), free from the “short century’s” prevailing ideologies. It further provides a way to confront overlooked prospective challenges of the twenty-first. Although there are well-known weaknesses to the critical tradition (it is too much shaped by a Marxist teleology; it is too long on theory, too short on empirical inquiry), it makes it possible to confront the problems of our times. Since 1980, I have explored this. Recently, this has led to the study of what I call “the politics of small things,” a study of the micropolitics of freedom, with autonomous culture as its infrastructure. It is my contention that the global significance of such a politics, especially important in the time of terrorism and the wars on terrorism, was in a sense invented in 1968. I will attempt to demonstrate this below, but first I must place the study of the politics of small things through a critical sociology of culture in its theoretical context.
PREVAILING APPROACHES TO CULTURE

Not all approaches to the study of culture used by sociologists help inform critical inquiry. Prevailing approaches lead us away from this. Broadly speaking, there are two different kinds of approaches moving us away from critique, with many variations on the two themes.

There is the grand approach to culture, which views it as the opposite of one or another set of key variables. This is the approach to culture that in a sense starts with a philosophical anthropology: culture is the distinctively human capacity; culture is meaning, or belief, or symbolic system, or some combination of the three. As Alexander puts it, “culture is the order of meaningful action” (Alexander and Seidman, 1990: 2) Cultural sociology is understood as being in an active polemic with some other sociological approach or approaches, and it is said to be preferable, because it gets to the heart of the matter of what it means to be human.

Less grandly, culture is seen to be just another variable, or set of variables, and some sociologists seem to want to follow the model of “bringing the state back in.” They would bring culture back into the sociology enterprise, especially comparative historical sociology. Eiko Ikegami (1995) is engaged in such a project, as is Mabel Berezin (1997), among others. In that the tasks of comparative historical sociology have been to account for the emergence of the modern state and the modern political economy, aka capitalism and its forces of production, with the cultural turn, the way cultural variables contribute to these long-term developments is studied.

Both in the grand and not so grand approaches, culture is considered as an alternative to other variables. The task for cultural sociology, according to Alexander, following Parsons, is to develop a macroscopic analysis of societies focusing on the cultural answers to the Hobbesian question. How do values, beliefs, and symbols work to explain social order? Further, beyond the conservatism of the Parsonsian framework: How do they work to explain social change? In the less grand approach, the cultural variable is related to others, to account for the history of the state, economy, or other social institutions (see e.g. Ikegami, 2004). How much weight, then, do we give to culture versus material structure, to culture versus the workings of the state and the economy? This has become the major big question for sociologists as they consider culture. But note: it turns us away from the historical embeddedness and independent significance of cultural practices, and is notably devoid of political meaning.

I am not suggesting that other approaches to culture are in some way illegitimate or in some way inferior. Rather, I am suggesting that the approach that recognizes the relative autonomy of cultural institutions, practices, and works provides special insights into fundamental political and historical problems. The starting point for such inquiry is the recognition of the centrality of culture in the development of the modern and the postmodern.

THE AUTONOMY OF CULTURE AS A SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

The notion that culture is a separate autonomous domain has gone in and out of fashion. It was initially the way to characterize modernity: as the scientific era, and
as the era when the arts bloomed anew, developing some independence from religious and political authority. Social science, and particularly sociology, has questioned this approach. It has addressed modernity primarily in terms of its distinctive political and economic institutions, rather than in terms of creativity and scholarship. In a great deal of social science, in fact, the arts and sciences have often been indistinguishable from ideology. As Foucault has put it, thought has been explained through sensation (Foucault, 1970: 240–1). Overlooked is an understanding that along with modern political and economic institutions and practices, there have been distinctive and self-determining cultural institutions and practices.

The arts and sciences have specific histories, which are no doubt shaped by the context of their creation and the interests of their creators, but it is an independent history nonetheless. There is something to the famous quote by Marx, “The ruling ideas of the time are the ideas of the ruling class.” But there is also much that is missing. Ideas live beyond their times and have a way of reaching beyond the interests of their formation. Contrary to Marx, and critics of ideology more generally, ideas reach beyond the context of their creation, and even the specification of the context is not at all certain. The ideas of the arts and sciences are the special location for their internal dialogue in complex society. They do this in an odd, strikingly nonideological way, succinctly summarized by Milan Kundera in his reflections on the novel, when he declares, “The novelist needs answer to no one but Cervantes” (Kundera, 1988: 144).

The novelist is not someone who must be an economic or political agent of a particular kind. He or she can serve the powers or oppose them, be entrepreneurial or not. But the novelist, and artists and scholars more generally, must answer the questions raised by the creators of the forms that precede them; they must argue with them, emulate them, refine and simplify them. This is the social interactive, dialogic sociological dimension of cultural forms. To the degree that they persist through time and in space, as independent activities, despite economic and political pressures and despite the accidents of history and psychology, the distinctive existence of an independent culture, the autonomy and freedom of the arts and sciences, is sustained.

We can identify specific forms because such freedom is sustained. It is only in the complete absence of freedom that ideology and culture become indistinguishable in the way that ideological critique and ideological cultural policy in their various guises would have it. Western music exists because Western musicians, and their audiences and critics, relate to the music and to each other with reference to its unfolding traditions. There may be pressures to make music adhere to a specific political project (think of the interactions between Prokofiev and Stalin), or there may be demands that music be commercially viable – consider what Nancy Hanrahan so graphically notes as the “sound of money” (Hanrahan, 2000). But just because money has a sound and it influences music does not mean that there is no distinction to be made between the sound of money and music. Just because one can hear money’s sound does not mean that music no longer exists as a social activity different from other moneymaking activities. Music’s independence is then contingent, but realized in social interaction. The same holds for science and theater, poetry and philosophy.

This is the problematic of culture that I have studied throughout my career. I started with a study of alternative theater in Poland (Goldfarb, 1980). I showed
how a cultural form persisted despite systematic constraints, analyzed the contest between the persistence and the constraints, and considered how the cultural work provided a critical understanding of socialist Poland and the possibility of alternatives. This led to a comparative structural analysis of cultural freedom (Goldfarb, 1982). I explored public life in Poland and America, as cultural activity was sustained by the sort of activity Kundera describes in his account of the obligation of the novelist. Cultural freedom is sociologically constituted through an ongoing and free conversation through time and space in the language of a cultural form. This conversation develops apart from the logic of the reproduction of the chief steering mechanism of the social order, whether of the market in the Capitalist World or of the party state in the Socialist. This framework then opened up investigations of political culture in the former Soviet bloc (Goldfarb, 1989) and in the United States (Goldfarb, 1991). Both these studies utilized the free cultural works to develop a critical stance of the dominant practices of politics. In Beyond Glasnost, I showed how the accomplishments of a critical culture formed an independent position that went beyond the language of newspeak, beyond official ideology, and opened up the possibility of an alternative democratic politics. Such politics became a reality, just months after the publication of the book. In The Cynical Society, I used the sensibility of the Central European oppositional democratic culture to do a critique of my own society. American independent cultural traditions, as they are institutionalized in our social institutions, make it possible to avoid political enervation, make it possible for Americans to realize the possibility of critical action, the political opposite of cynicism.

In the context of the end of the Cold War, I then embarked upon investigations of the constitution of democracy in Central Europe (Goldfarb, 1992) and the problem of the role of intellectuals in democratic societies (Goldfarb, 1998). In both of these studies, the tension between the practice of an autonomous culture and other social practices provided insight into central historical developments. Intellectuals have been responsible for some of the worst horrors of the twentieth century. In After the Fall, I presented an overview of those who were trying to do the opposite on the European killing fields. In Civility and Subversion, I specified a sociological depiction of the democratic role of the intellectual, to provoke talk, to develop informed discussion about the problems faced by a society. When intellectuals do more, when they provide definitive answers, they do worse. They undermine democratic capacity.

CULTURAL STUDY AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL THINGS

I believe that my studies demonstrate the fruitfulness of approaching culture as a set of relatively autonomous institutions and practices. The work in the tradition of critical inquiry is normative, but it is not ideological. Such an approach provides a critical view, utilizing the inherently critical aspect of culture. It is based on an appreciation of the role of culture in the making of the modern, and the institutionalized grounding of the role. In recent years, though, I have wanted to go further in exploring the connection between such an approach to culture and political life. It strikes me that in order to do so one has to look more closely at the relationship. To this point, I have been satisfied to consider how autonomous culture has informed
democratic politics in specific historical circumstances, in the history of Central Europe, and the United States. I observed how specific cultural developments informed political developments, and I now want to consider the mechanics of the connection. This is where the politics of small things come in.

What I am calling the politics of small things is in a sense a general and simple matter, the detailed constitution of democratic practices in everyday life. Michel Foucault explored power as sovereignty with the sovereign's head cut off (Rabinow, 1984). This is one view of micropolitics. I am interested in a complementary view of micropolitics: the constitution of democratic governance not by state constitutions and structures, but by everyday social interactions. This is something Tocqueville investigated in his classic study of democracy in America. Yet I wish to study something more specifically historical. I believe that the constitution of democratic alternatives in situational settings is an ascendant political strategy of crucial importance in the new globalized political order. As an ascendant political form with global significance, it was invented in 1968, and its grounds can be found in culture as understood in the critical tradition, but with a very important clarification.

The critical theorists offered totalized theories of the enlightenment, the consumer industry, capitalism. They overlooked the everyday details of cultural life that constitute its meaning. Cultural institutions played a role in the totality. They imagined a unified culture industry that took the critique out of culture. I believe that instead these institutions must be understood as terrain for political action, a place where there is a contest between systemic constraints, power in Foucault's sense, and the constitution of cultural autonomy. This interactive contest is inherent to the cultural life of modern society, and it is becoming of ever greater significance in the political sphere. Here I will attempt to demonstrate this by considering its manifestation in the major political change that closed the twentieth century, the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In the tension between culture and the power of party ideology, an alternative culture of politics was born, "the politics of small things." The starting point is 1968, a year of remarkable political effervescence.

1968 is remembered as a year of pivotal change in political culture in France, Japan, Mexico, Germany and the United States, among many other places. The Vietnam War was challenged in the US and abroad, authoritarian political and cultural institutions were attacked everywhere and reformed in some places. Brutal repression was used to defend the status quo in places, particularly Mexico City. Yet, change was initiated, some of it almost immediately (the educational institutions in France and Germany). Some of it took years (the shift in American public opinion about the War), or even decades (the transformation of Mexican politics). This was a year that has been much studied and nostalgically remembered. Yet, in my judgment, the most important events set into motion during that most eventful of years have not been adequately considered for their theoretical importance. I have in mind events that were instigated "behind the iron curtain."

The tragedy of the Prague Spring is of course remembered: Dubček's socialism with a human face, the hope that really existing socialism could be reformed from above, that a more dynamic economy could be introduced along with freedom of expression and perhaps even competitive elections, all ending with Soviet tanks. The events in Warsaw and their aftermath have been less broadly considered. In those events, we can observe the cultural grounding of the politics of small things.
THE CULTURAL BASES OF THE POLITICS OF SMALL THINGS

The events in Poland were sparked by the closing of a play, Adam Mickiewicz's *Dziady* (Forefather's Eve). The different responses to the play constituted a major political transformation. Beyond ordinary Polish theathergoers, one audience response gave decisive definition to the performance's meaning at the National Theater. It came from the powers. Apparently those in power in Poland and those in the Soviet Embassy deemed the production and the audience's response to it as inappropriate, an anti-Soviet manifestation. On January 30, 1968, Kazimierz Dejmek's production of this nineteenth century classic was closed down by order of the Ministry of Culture.

Then there was the unofficial response. At the last performance the audience, which reportedly included cultural figures returning from abroad showing solidarity with the theater company, was overflowing. Those without tickets sat in the aisles and on the edges of balconies. Students packed the theater, responding to written announcements nailed on doors at Warsaw University urging a large turnout.

The play includes anti-Czarist lines: "We Poles have sold our souls for a couple of silver rubles [and] the only thing Moscow sends us are jackasses, idiots and spies..." The audience strongly responded to these lines as criticism of the more contemporary Russian (Soviet) domination. While it is not clear whether this connection was highlighted in the production itself or the audience's reaction to the production, it is clear that in the interaction between performers and audience historical lines were turned into commentary on contemporary events. Here we observe one of the very exciting characteristics of theater as a cultural form (as opposed to film): the fact that the qualities of a performance, and even its meaning, are determined in the interaction between performer and audience. The politics of small things is a constituent element of theater. This characteristic makes theater a distinctively social art form, and points to the small things that are constitutive of political order and change.

Following the production, the bounds of politics expanded beyond the walls of the theater. Immediately two hundred students marched to a nearby statue of Mickiewicz (itself a symbol of Polish independence), denouncing the closing of the play. They were met by the People’s Militia. When the students refused to disperse, a number were arrested.

On February 29, 1968, the Warsaw section of the official Polish Writers’ Union refused to back a Party proposal condemning the student protests, and instead, adopted a proposal condemning the closing of *Dziady*.

On March 9, four thousand students demonstrated on the grounds of Warsaw University, demanding the reinstatement of two students who were expelled from the university as a consequence of their participation in the play. Violent clashes with the militia followed, with students chanting, “No study without freedom! We want *Dziady*! Long live the writers!” Dozens of students were arrested.

The protests spread. Students clashed with the militia in universities throughout Poland. The continual themes were protests against the closing of *Dziady* and solidarity with the Prague Spring, which was then in full swing.

The differentiated give and take between actors and audience generated political meaning, and through the give and take and in the movement of people in and out of
the theater, public space was creatively constituted. The relative autonomy of an art form constituted an independent political arena. The powers tried to stifle this and succeeded, but only in the short term. This highlights the fact that such differentiation and the sustained interaction based on the differentiation constitute the public space of civil society. Something new was emerging in People’s Poland, only for a while overshadowed by the central political stage.

The events of ’68, as they came to be known in Poland, ended with an infamous anti-Zionist, antiliberal campaign. A frequently heard slogan chanted by students throughout the country was revealing: “Down with Moczar.” This pointed to the larger political struggle that was behind the events. There in fact was a three-way political dance in progress among (1) the writers, students, and theater company, (2) the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and (3) General Moczar and the “partisans,” the ultranationalists in the Communist Party, who were pushing an anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist campaign and were challenging Gomulka for Party leadership. At the time, the challenge of the liberal students and writers and the people in theater was frontally repressed, and it seemed that the significant action was in the conflict between the relatively moderate and reactionary wings of the party. Moczar accused Gomulka of insufficient anti-Zionism; that is, he played the Polish anti-Semitic card in opposing Gomulka with his Jewish wife. Gomulka outflanked him by himself ordering what was an anti-Semitic purge of the political and cultural leadership. In the official press, Jews were “outed.” One could read newspaper stories in which Kowalik’s real name was revealed to be Schwartz, in which it was explained that he was obviously not sufficiently Polish. The elite drama played itself out. Gomulka managed to hold on to power for two more years, but then in 1970 was overthrown by a technocratic wing of the Party.

While the immediate political struggles were of transient importance (now with the collapse of Communism in Poland and in the entire Soviet bloc, the factional conflicts back then seem quite trivial), fundamental changes of political culture were then emerging, although not clearly visible. They have had much more enduring significance. The linking of the various demands, going beyond the attempts of various forms of “socialism with a human face” and “humanistic Marxism,” created a new independent public in Poland. The continuation of this discussion and its informal and sometimes clandestine institutionalization through 1989 distinguished the quality of the opposition to Communism in Poland. The interactions pointed beyond theater walls and ultimately beyond the controversies of that immediate time.

**Axial Change**

The axial change is well known, even though its interpretation is very much contested. After 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War came to an end. Soviet communism collapsed. Socialism no longer appeared as a viable systemic alternative to capitalism. Democracy became the modern political ideal without rival. Capitalism was triumphant. History ended. Globalization began. American hegemony became the clear and present danger. These are among many ways of describing the change. Each situates a political position and guides practical action. The different ways of situating positions and guiding actions constitute our
vocabulary of political debate and action. But beyond such debate and action, and, in fact, before it, lies a rediscovery of public freedom as an interactive process (Hannah Arendt calls this public freedom “the lost treasure of the revolutionary tradition,” because of its fleeting nature, see Arendt, 1963).

It is the rediscovery of public freedom as a principle and the pursuit of its institutionalization that is the key to understanding the axial change, indicating the centrality of the politics of small things. There is a sense in which this rediscovery began with the performances of Dziady in the Polish National Theater, became a part of the democratic opposition in the 1970s first in Poland and then in much of Central Europe. It then became a world historic oppositional force with Solidarność (Solidarity) in the 1980s both above and underground, culminating with the collapse of Communism, along with the democratic transitions in Latin America, Africa, East and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asia. The sequence of the account I am suggesting is not the crucial point. Rather it is the interactive constitution of public life and its culture, the politics of small things.

There is a big picture, suggested by the competing interpretations already highlighted. And there is a little picture, centered on the interpersonal experience of the challenges and changes in our political world. There is the political culture of everyday life. Slowly the capacity to speak and act in the presence of others concerning the public good spread beyond the control of the party state and, most significantly, this capacity became the end of oppositional action. The principle and the actions based upon it had nothing to do with, was set apart from, official ideology. This constituted in a newly appreciated kind of power, which gave shape to our changed geopolitical world. Consider small interactions in constituting a relatively autonomous culture life as they move toward global transformation.

THE EMBEDDED AUTONOMY OF CULTURE

The National Theater, which presented the controversial production of Dziady, was one of many theaters covertly challenging the official truth. Indeed, it was one of many officially supported cultural institutions, which used party-state support but challenged official control. There was, for example, a set of youth theaters, the Polish student theaters I studied in my first book, which operated in this way. In officially supported cultural institutions a primary norm of interaction was a strong commitment to the autonomy of cultural imagination and action. People acted as if this norm were real, and it was real in its consequences. One of the reasons why it is now unclear whether the production of Dziady was an intentional provocation is because of the strong antipolitical ethos in the cultural worlds of Eastern and Central European theater and the arts. The director, Kazimierz Dejmek, has denied that he purposively produced an anti-Soviet play. He took a piece of Polish classical literature, an assigned reading in Polish high schools, and presented it in a fresh and original fashion. Anticzarism is an historical fact, but his purpose was to produce fine theater, not anti-Soviet propaganda. To suggest otherwise is to confuse his profession with that of a hack politician. There is a conceit in such a defense, well known to artists who write between the lines. But sometimes it is the reading that is going between the lines rather than the writing. Thus, the controversy persists.
Consider, further, a work of the student theater movement just mentioned. *Akademia Ruchu* (*The Academy of Movement*) in the late 1970s and 1980s was one of the leading experimental theaters in Poland. It was officially supported and controlled. As the group’s name suggests, it experimented in movement. Some of its most innovative work occurred on the street, legally at times, illegally at others. The group played a continual cat and mouse game with the local Warsaw authorities and the militia. Their work ranged from the relatively innocuous, furling of colorful cloths in stylized dances on the sidewalks and in trams, to the provocative, forming a line out of a meat store, mirroring the long formed one waiting to get in to make difficult and rare purchases.

During one of their street performances, the militia approached them. Wojciech Krukowski, the director of the Academy, showed the officials the cameras he was using to film the happenings. He explained to them that they were making a film. Recognizing that film is controlled not in the filming but after final editing, the militia then helped the film crew get on with their work, redirecting traffic, giving the film crew the necessary conditions to get on with their work. This went on for days. The militia thus became performers in an unauthorized street theater performance.

Krukowski first informed me of these events in the 1980s. In a conversation we had in 1994, he completed his account. By then, as the director of Warsaw’s major museum of contemporary art, he had an occasion to meet with the militia official whom he had apparently misled to support his street theater productions. The official shared with the avant-garde director how he used to enjoy being “fooled” by Krukowski, how he always understood the theater’s subterfuge and supported it. Not only do creators and audiences learn how to read between the lines; so do their censors. The militia official was willing to support Akademia Ruchu in its work as long as he could deny the fact that he was doing so. People on the street, members of the militia, along with the theater group created together a momentary public space. Its independence from official control was its most important product.

Such interactive gaming was not only a theatrical matter. There was a built-in tension in all social, cultural, and political institutions of the previously existing socialist order. Officially defined as socialist, all spheres of life were subjected to ideological direction and control. But the socialist vision was also a modern one. Institutions were required to serve not only an ideological role but also an instrumental function. Farms may have been collectivized as part of an ideological script, but they still had to produce food. The great industrial works served as monuments to socialist power and the power of the working class, but they still had to produce steel, tractors, and tanks. Educational institutions still had to prepare the next generation for practical tasks, as hospitals cared for the sick and families cared for the young. There was an inherent conflict between such ordinary social practices and ideology. Where the demands of these practices ended and the demands of ideology began would always be uncertain, a matter of conflict. Censorship and the political police were thus a necessary part of the official order. This is the structural macroview of the matter. The microview, the view of the politics of small things, suggests how fluid the situation could and did become.

Social interaction required a negotiation between orientation toward and commitments to social practices and to ideology. Parents decided how their viewpoints and memories, outside official script, would be taught around the kitchen table.
Around the same tables, discussions among friends would be more or less cautious about sharing thoughts and commitments. In more formal settings, educators, industrial workers and managers, scientists and clerks, all had to go through the same face-to-face negotiations. The result from one country to another and from one period in time to another varied considerably.

Václav Havel’s classic essay the “Power of the Powerless” presents an examination of this dimension of everyday life in previously existing socialism, as he considered the potential for resistance (in Vladislav, 1986). The most famous character in his essay is a greengrocer. Havel speculates what would happen to the grocer if he did not put up the sign “Workers of the World Unite” in his shop window, along with the fruit and vegetables, what would happen if his shop window became just that and not also a location for ideological dissemination. Havel considers all the consequences for the grocer, the loss of all privileges, but he also considers what would happen if those around him together tried “living in truth,” tried living apart from imposed official ideological definition. He suggested, in the mid-1970s, that it would spell the collapse of communism. This proved to be a telling insight.

A less-known character in Havel’s essay demonstrates the degree to which living in truth was interwoven into daily life. Havel remembers working in a brewery. There was one brewer there who really knew and was committed to his work. He was a master craftsman. By expressing more concern for the quality of the product than for the party instructions concerning the solidarity of the working class and the building of socialism, his career languished, while others’ advanced. And when he publicly refused to compromise the quality of his work and the product, he lost his job. Ideology and normal productive practice clashed, and a dedicated worker suffered.

The choices the brewer faced were not that different from the office politics well known outside of totalitarian contexts. Although in this case, the office politics was linked to the master politics of the party-state, such a situation is not that exotic. We all know that people who play the corporate script well often flourish, while those who do their job do not. They do the expressive work that keeps an institution functioning and are rewarded for it.

In the specific totalitarian situation, Havel is telling us, these normal dynamics serve the party state. He is concerned with two consequences beyond personal tragedy. First, because the problem is systemic and not local, there is a general compromise in the quality of work throughout the society. The logic of party ideology is so fundamentally opposed to the logic of good work, no matter what the product, it is so beside the point, that a mediocre societal condition is the inevitable result. Second, in terms of opposition, given that this is a systemic problem, if all suspend this peculiar game of expressive politics and act more normally, the totalitarian system would be fundamentally challenged. This is the site of relatively autonomous cultural practices, the culture of theater, but also the culture of brewing, supporting the formation of a politics of small things.

**The Representation of Self (and Others) and the Public Sphere**

Havel is implicitly developing a theme of Erving Goffman’s, the interactive constitution of the social order, and this interactive constitution was manifest in the real
life Polish examples from 1968 on. Havel appreciates the fact that in his very peculiar world social interaction pulls in two very different directions: toward and away from the constitution of the totalitarian system. The way people present themselves to each other in everyday life determines the fate of the regime. The state supported by its ideology and terror demands interaction according to a prescribed script. Individuals can act together and subvert the authorized script, although they do not just freely choose, and the consequences of their bonded choices can be critical. This is less a question of instrumental purpose, than of interactive expression. The shopkeeper is not going to help or hinder the unity of the workers of the world. By putting the sign in his shop window, he presents himself as a loyal subject of the official script. By not putting the sign in the window, he presents himself in an entirely different way. Here we apprehend how Goffman’s understanding of public life can be a guide to the politics of small things.

The interactions of Havel’s greengrocer and brew master, of the Akademia Ruchu’s street performers, passersby and militia officers, and the National Theater director and actors and the theater’s audience, including the officials in the Soviet Embassy and the Polish party’s Central Committee, all involve conflicts over “the definition of the situation.” Goffman in his many works highlights how a working consensus concerning the definition of the situation is necessary for social life. Sometimes his focus is on consensus formation and maintaining social order, as in his essay on deference and demeanor (1982). Sometimes it is on the self (1972b). At times, it is on consensus disruption. At other times, it is on the work done to overcome disruption, both examined in his investigation of embarrassment (1982). Sometimes, he is concerned with how the structural complexities of modernity are worked through so that agreement on definitions of the social situations can be sustained (1990). And at other times, his focus is on what happens in the unique circumstance when the complexities are simplified through coercion (1972a). His viewpoint shifts from the individual’s and his or her project of impression management to the group’s and its operation as a team in sustaining a working consensus. We observe here how axial change has been sustained in and through the interaction order, through new patterns of presentations of self and team work.

In the old regime, people interacted drawing upon two competing frameworks, an ideological one and a nonideological one. They presented themselves in everyday life according to the ideological framework and with some distance from that framework. The makers of theater (and film, literature, social science, etc.) and censors faced each other utilizing the competing frameworks. Regime opponents tried to assert a new working definition of the situation. Moving the prevailing definition, of course, was not as easy as putting or not putting the sign “Workers of the World Unite” in a shop window. As Goffman observes, “a ‘definition of a situation’ is almost always to be found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not create this definition, all they do is to assess correctly what the situation ought to be for them and then act accordingly” (1990: 1–2).

The project of the opposition to the prevailing everyday order was to detach the nonideological from the ideological. Role distancing was required, crucial to gaming with the censor and writing and reading between the lines. Recall the director and militia activities in the street theater performances of Akademia Ruchu. The project developed, moving from the attempt to breath life into the existing balance between
the ideological and the nonideological, to the attempt to secede from the world of official ideological definition.

The tension between the ideological rendition of social action and the action independent of such definition was always there. What changed was how the tension was expressed. At the worst of times, independence could only be expressed through dutiful use of official language and prescribed cultural forms, utilizing role distance and cultural ambiguity. At better times, the official script could be artfully amended and then applied. Thus, socialist humanism and Marxism with a human face were ways to introduce liberal ideals into the socialist order. At the times of systemic challenge, such ideological games were abandoned and the more fundamental work of the secession from the ideological order proceeded.

In a student cabaret in Warsaw in 1955, the first of the alternative youth theaters in Poland presented its work. In the basements of university dorms and in cultural houses, students read to other students the slogans of the regime. With the simple movement of an eyebrow, the recited ideological clichés became their opposites. Criticism was in fact possible even without the eyebrow. The context and expectations of the audience together worked to illuminate the absurdity of official texts, and the sociality of theater made for the shared recognition of the absurdity.

Something different occurred during the events of 1968. The year started with the controversies over the production of Dziady. The play’s direct political message, from our point of view, was not its most critical significance. As politics, it was just an elaboration of the sort of work done by the alternative youth theaters, a mild tweaking of the powers, expanding upon the official notion of a “Polish Road to Socialism.” To accomplish that innovation of post-Stalinism, the authorities again promoted Polish romantic literature in schools, in film, and theater. The National Theater added a little anti-Soviet element to this, either intentionally or unintentionally. They took official ideology and applied it to the theater’s purposes. The nationalist challengers within the party did a similar thing, focusing on anti-Semitism instead of anti-Sovietism. This is a conflict among ideological interpretations, among competing attempts to capture official truth. The student demonstrations, in and beyond the theater, as long as it was centered on this conflict, as long as it was represented using the official language, its newspeak, were more of the same. But viewed from the interactive perspective, considering the face-to-face constitution of public life, something else was emerging. While the claim was being made for a liberal socialist concern for free university life, using official rhetoric, the order was not challenged. But students started to talk to each other, to interact with each other, on a more straightforward grounding. They were against censorship and for greater freedom on the universities, and they met with each other, spoke to each other and acted because of this commitment, not in order to find a more perfect road to socialism. In their defeat, the attempt was abandoned to find the formula that would justify more independence for nonideological practices, for balancing the ideological and nonideological frames. The commitment to a humane Marxism and a liberal communism seemed fruitless, and instead the commitment was to independent interaction, the commitment to a nonideological presentation of self.

That this shift was occurring became apparent in subsequent years. Slowly in the 1970s, the move from playing with the balance between the official and the unofficial to constituting a nonideological alternative came to dominate independent practices. In some ways the everyday became the model for the public. This secession
of the nonideological from the ideological represented to the participants and observers of the action a new public order.

Sustaining that secession was no easy matter. People met and acted in the presence of each other, defining and defending freedom, accomplishing this by constituting definitions of social situations in which the nonideological frame and the ideological frame have been related in ways that run counter to the existing order of things. A new way of interacting was introduced in the 1968 theater performance, and in the same fashion, but on a much larger scale, the strikes at the Gdansk shipyards sustained a free public life through changed relations in public. When a democratic opposition developed in the 1970s in Poland, crucial to its definition was that its participants publish their names and addresses in their illegal publications. In the words of the most articulate leaders of this movement, “they acted as if they lived in a free society” and a free society resulted. They presented themselves to each other as independent citizens and in the process they created an independent public (Michnik, 1987). And this independent public became the vanguard of a radical transformation in the geopolitical world.

CONCLUSIONS

In this analysis of culture and politics in the world of previously existing socialism, I have attempted to link the relatively autonomous status of culture as a set of modern institutions and practices to the politics of small things. I have shown how the persistence of an autonomous space for a cultural activity presented the possibility for a new and radical type of political activity. This took us in important directions. We observed a shift in the political culture of the opposition to the official order, a move to succession from the order of things, aptly analyzed in Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless.” I have called the systematic development of the power of the powerless “the politics of small things.” On the one hand, this is an analytic dimension of politics. People meet and talk to each other independent of the powers and develop a capacity to act on their own terms. On the other hand, in Central Europe, this had telling results. Something with world historic implications came about. In Poland, Solidarity defeated the Communist Party, not tanks or threats of nuclear arms. In Czechoslovakia, Havel was elected the first post-communist president and helped define the moral and political high ground of the post-Cold War for his country and beyond. His power of the powerless, my power of small things, was real and consequential. We have explored in this chapter that the structural infrastructure of this power is to be found in the autonomy of culture, the culture of theater, but also the culture of everyday arts and sciences far beyond the theater walls, beyond the walls of formal cultural institutions. We have seen how small political acts of independence based in the autonomy of cultural life had profound global implications.

In our present circumstance, after September 11, 2001, when it has become apparent that a new sort of totalitarianism is emergent (see Berman, 2003), the politics of small things and the autonomy of culture have again become critical. Terrorists and those who sympathetically try to understand them believe that they have no power apart from their dramatic, destructive televisual acts. The postindustrial nations and especially the hegemonic power are understood to have
overwhelming military capacity. Those who radically reject their liberal modern and postmodern secular way of life, those who are committed to the dignity of their fundamental beliefs, apparently think that they have only their willingness to sacrifice to garner the power of opposition. And those who reject terrorism, who oppose it by any means necessary, whom you are either with or against (to paraphrase President George W. Bush), speak of a “war on terrorism.” Both sides imagine a polarized struggle, in which conviction and force are focused upon political ends. Missing in the imagination of the terrorists and the antiterrorists is an appreciation of the central importance of the politics of small things.

The power generated when people speak and act in the presence of each other and develop a capacity to act in concert can be used to oppose the prevailing order of things. This is as true now as it was in 1968. In their interactions, people create facts on the ground that resist and present alternatives to those defined by military power and wealth. Stalin once quipped when addressing the position of the papal state on a pressing problem, “How many battalions does the Pope have?” But the power of the Roman Catholic Church has been very real even though it has had no military might. The power of the Polish Church in Poland played an important part in the development of Solidarity and ultimately in the defeat of Soviet power. It became a location and institutional support for people to interact and act together. This sort of power, not only terror, is available to those who oppose Israeli occupation or the American presence in Saudi Arabia or the Indian presence in Kashmir. Terror is not their only option, and the politics of small things as opposed to terror makes possible the constitution of democracy. Terror in itself assures the opposite of democracy.

Yet, in a mirrored fashion the same is true of antiterrorism. A war on terror, not in the metaphoric sense, but in the truly militarized sense, may defeat a specific antiterrorist target, but it does not assure democratic or even peaceful alternatives to terrorism. Military enemies in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were defeated, but the chaotic nature of the postwar situations in both countries requires power that has little to do with the force of arms. Mosques stand as relatively independent institutions to support political action, as churches did in Poland. Other sorts of cultural institutions, especially as they contribute to public deliberations, would support the development of political diversity, as they have in the former Soviet bloc. The importance of independent newspapers and film in Iran highlights how this would look. Any war on terror must include the development of such cultural spaces as breeding grounds for an independent and democratic politics. Warriors on terror should be self-critical as the war is being pursued.

Culture as the autonomous arts and sciences is a cosmos of independent values, as Weber maintained. They do present the opportunity for critique, as Adorno theorized. Such an approach to culture by sociologists presents a way to confront the problems of our times. This was made evident to me in my work on the opposition to a culture and a system that no longer exists, Soviet-type socialism, and in my work critically appraising the relationship between politics and culture in the United States. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the approach presents important theoretical and practical possibilities, but there are other ways to approach culture sociologically. This approach can illuminate how the politics of small things is a crucial alternative to terror and antiterror. (see Goldfarb, forthcoming)
References


INTRODUCTION

Sociologists have long appreciated the need for a theoretical paradigm that takes culture seriously. Not so long ago, their chief motivation was a wish to avoid the sort of reductionist economism that was associated with vulgar Marxism. In the best cases, moreover, the aim was to do justice to the cultural moment of social relations—not simply by adding in culture as one “variable” among others, but rather by conceptualizing its constitutive force vis-à-vis all human social practice. For some, accordingly, the point was never to vindicate idealism. Far from wishing to obscure the “hard facts” of exploitation, domination, and inequality, the best sociologies of culture sought rather to uncover the mechanisms that support them. One could characterize their project as the search for a nonculturalist sociology of culture.

Today, the project of developing a nonculturalist sociology of culture is as relevant as ever. To be sure, Marxist economism is no longer a force to be reckoned with; but in rational-choice theory it has found an equally reductive and more puissant successor. Not content merely to colonize the social sciences, that theory is currently supplying the intellectual underpinnings for neoliberal economic globalization. Thus, it urgently merits demystification. Meanwhile, cultural theory, far from being moribund, is enjoying a remarkable renaissance. Thanks in part to the spectacular rise of global media and information technology models of culture proliferate, accruing unparalleled prestige in the academy. Yet they do not provide a viable alternative. Typically one-dimensional and inclining to idealism, the cultural theories that are fashionable today are less disposed to integrate the symbolic with the economic than to substitute the former for the latter. The result is a bifurcated intellectual map on which culturalist paradigms and economistic paradigms confront one another abstractly, across an abyss. Integrative efforts, in contrast, are rare. Despite widespread lip service to the idea that culture and economy need to be
thought together in a common framework, serious attempts to devise such a framework are difficult to find.

In this context, it is worth reviving the effort to develop a nonculturalist sociology of culture. The point today would be to overcome the present dissociation of cultural and economic modes of thought. At one level, the stakes are intellectual: to correct the current tendency to substitute one truncated paradigm for another, a truncated culturalism for a truncated economism. At another level, however, the stakes are political: to correct the current tendency to substitute a truncated culturalist politics of recognition for a truncated economistic politics of redistribution. The two levels interpenetrate, moreover. A nonculturalist sociology of culture is among the indispensable conceptual preconditions for an approach that can integrate the best of the politics of recognition with the best of the politics of redistribution.

Or so I shall argue in what follows. First, however, I must explain what I mean by the dissociation of recognition from redistribution. Elsewhere, I have noted that claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types: redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and wealth, and recognition claims, which seek a more difference-friendly world (Fraser, 1995, 1997c, 2000, 2003). Examples of the first type include claims for redistribution from the North to the South, from the rich to the poor, and (not so long ago) from the owners to the workers; examples of the second include claims for the recognition of the distinctive perspectives of ethnic, national, religious, and sexual minorities, as well as of gender difference. Moreover, whereas redistribution is conceived as a matter of economics, recognition is usually deemed cultural.

To be sure, the two types of claims could – and should – be made to synergize with each other. But at present they tend rather to be separated. Proponents of egalitarian redistribution, on the defensive in the postcommunist neoliberal hegemony, typically keep their distance from “identity politics,” when they do not reject the latter altogether. Conversely, proponents of recognition, feeling the power of the zeitgeist behind them, hesitate to make common cause with those still engaged in “class struggle.” The result is a widespread decoupling of the cultural politics of difference from the social politics of economic equality. In some cases, moreover, the dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of redistribution reject the politics of recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as “false consciousness,” a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely, some proponents of recognition see distributive politics as tied to an outmoded materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with many injustices. In such cases, we are effectively presented with an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? Class politics or identity politics? Multiculturalism or social democracy?

These, I have argued elsewhere, are false antitheses (Fraser, 1995, 1997c, 2000, 2003). Justice today requires both redistribution and recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them arises. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. In moral philosophy, the task is to devise an overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for economic equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. In political theory, the task is to envision a set of institutional arrangements that can remedy both maldistribution and misrecognition, while minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought
simultaneously. In social theory, the task is to understand the complex relations between economy and culture, class and status in contemporary society.

Elsewhere I have discussed the moral-philosophical and political-theoretical dimensions of this project (Fraser, 2003). Here I shall examine some of the social-theoretical dimensions. I shall propose a nonculturalist approach to “cultural” politics and an account of its relation to the economy. Such an approach alone, I contend, permits one to integrate redistribution and recognition in a critical theory of contemporary society.

**Rethinking Recognition: The Status Model**

The centerpiece of my approach is a nonculturalist conception of recognition, which differs sharply from the usual one. Usually, recognition is viewed through the lens of identity. From this perspective, what requires recognition is group-specific cultural identity. Misrecognition consists in the depreciation of such identity by the dominant culture and the consequent damage to group members’ sense of self. Redressing this harm requires engaging in a politics of recognition. Such a politics aims to repair internal self-dislocation by contesting the dominant culture’s demeaning picture of one’s group. Members of misrecognized groups must reject such pictures in favor of new self-representations of their own making. Having refashioned their collective identity, moreover, they must display it publicly in order to gain the respect and esteem of the society-at-large. The result, when successful, is “recognition,” an undistorted relation to oneself. On the identity model, then, the politics of recognition means identity politics.

Without doubt, this identity model contains some genuine insights concerning the psychological effects of racism, sexism, colonization, and cultural imperialism. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, it is deficient on at least two major counts (Fraser, 2000). First, it tends to reify group identities – and thus to promote separatism and repressive communitarianism. Second, the identity model obscures the links between recognition and redistribution – and thus can impede efforts to integrate them.

For these reasons, I have proposed an alternative conception of recognition (Fraser, 2000). On my account – I call it “the status model” – recognition is a question of social status. What requires recognition is not group-specific identity but the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction. Misrecognition, accordingly, does not mean the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means social subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a peer in social life. To redress the injustice requires a politics of recognition, but this does not mean identity politics. On the status model, rather, it means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members.

Let me explain. To apply the status model requires examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value
constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction, then we can speak of misrecognition and status subordination.

On the status model, therefore, misrecognition is not a psychical deformation but an institutionalized relation of social subordination. Thus, it is not relayed through freestanding cultural discourses but through institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Misrecognition arises, in other words, through the workings of social institutions that regulate interaction according to parity-impeding cultural norms. Examples include marriage laws that exclude same-sex partnerships as illegitimate and perverse, social-welfare policies that stigmatize single mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers, and policing practices such as “racial profiling” that associate racialized persons with criminality. In each of these cases, interaction is regulated by an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative and others as deficient or inferior: straight is normal, while gay is perverse; “male-headed households” are proper, while “female-headed households” are not; “whites” are law-abiding, while “blacks” are dangerous. In each case, the result is to deny some members of society the status of full partners in interaction, capable of participating on a par with the rest.

On the status model, finally, misrecognition constitutes a serious violation of justice. Wherever and however it occurs, a claim for recognition is in order. But note precisely what this means: aimed not at valorizing group identity, but rather at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer. They aim, that is, to deinstitutionalize patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it.

Elsewhere, I have considered the political and institutional implications of the status model (2003). Here, in contrast, I shall explore its implications for social theory.

**CLASS AND STATUS: SOME CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS**

Let me return, accordingly, to my general project: integrating redistribution and recognition in a single framework. Given that project, the principal task for social theory is to understand the relations between distribution and recognition in contemporary society. In my view, this entails theorizing the relations between the status order and the class structure in late-modern globalizing capitalism. An adequate approach must allow for the full complexity of these relations, accounting both for the differentiation of class from status and for the causal interactions between them, accommodating both the mutual irreducibility of distribution and recognition and their practical entwinement with each other.

I begin with some conceptual clarifications. The terms “class” and “status,” as I use them here, denote socially entrenched orders of subordination. To say that a society has a class structure is to say that it institutionalizes economic mechanisms that systematically deny some of its members the means and opportunities they need in order to participate on a par with others in social life. To say, likewise, that a society has a status hierarchy is to say that it institutionalizes patterns of cultural value that pervasively deny some members the social standing they need in order to
be full, participating partners in social interaction. The existence of either a class structure or a status hierarchy constitutes an obstacle to parity of participation – and thus an injustice.

These understandings differ from some more familiar definitions of status and class. Unlike stratification theory in postwar US sociology, for example, I do not conceive status as a prestige quotient that is ascribable to an individual and compounded of quantitatively measurable factors, including economic indices such as income. In my conception, in contrast, status represents an order of intersubjective subordination derived from institutionalized patterns of cultural value that constitute some members of society as less than full partners in interaction. Unlike Marxist theory, likewise, I do not conceive class as a relation to the means of production. In my conception, rather, class is an order of economic subordination derived from distributive arrangements that deny some actors the means and resources they need for participatory parity.

According to my conceptions, moreover, status and class do not map neatly onto current ideological distinctions among social movements. Struggles against sexism and racism, for example, do not aim solely at transforming the status order, as gender and “race” implicate economic structure as well. Nor, likewise, should labor struggles be reduced exclusively to matters of economic class, as they properly concern status hierarchies, too. More generally, as I have argued elsewhere, virtually all axes of subordination partake simultaneously of the status order and the class structure, albeit in different proportions (Fraser, 2003). Thus, far from corresponding to ideological distinctions, status and class represent analytically distinct orders of subordination, which typically cut across social movements.

What status and class do correspond to, however, are two analytically distinct dimensions of justice. Status corresponds to the recognition dimension, which concerns the effects of institutionalized meanings and norms on the relative standing of social actors. Class, in contrast, corresponds to the distributive dimension, which concerns the allocation of economic resources and wealth. Consequently, each category is associated with an analytically distinct type of injustice. The paradigmatic status injustice is misrecognition, while the quintessential class injustice is maldistribution – even though each may be accompanied by the other.

These correspondences allow us to situate the problem of integrating redistribution and recognition in a broad social-theoretical frame. From this perspective, societies appear as complex fields that encompass at least two analytically distinct modes of social ordering: an economic mode, in which interaction is regulated by the functional interlacing of strategic imperatives, and a cultural mode, in which interaction is regulated by institutionalized patterns of cultural value. As we shall see, economic ordering is typically institutionalized in markets; cultural ordering may work through a variety of different institutions, including kinship, religion, and law. In all societies economic ordering and cultural ordering are mutually imbricated. The question arises, however, as to how precisely they relate to each other in a given social formation. Is the economic structure institutionally differentiated from the cultural order, or are they effectively fused? Do the class structure and the status hierarchy diverge from one another, or do they coincide? Do maldistribution and misrecognition convert into each other, or are such conversions effectively blocked?
BEYOND ECONOMISM AND CULTURALISM

The answers to these questions depend on the nature of the society under consideration. Consider, for example, a purely hypothetical case: the ideal-typical pre-state society that was often described in the classical anthropological literature, while bracketing the question of ethnographic accuracy. In such a society, the master idiom of social relations is kinship. Kinship organizes not only marriage and sexual relations, but also the labor process and the distribution of goods; relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. Of course, it could well be the case that such a society has never existed in pure form. Still, we can imagine a world in which neither distinctively economic institutions nor distinctively cultural institutions exist. A single order of social relations secures both the economic integration and the cultural integration of the society. Class structure and status order are accordingly fused. Because kinship constitutes the overarching principle of distribution, kinship status dictates class position. Absent quasi-autonomous economic institutions, status subordination translates immediately into (what we would consider to be) distributive injustice. Misrecognition directly entails maldistribution.

Now consider the opposite extreme of a fully marketized society, in which economic structure dictates cultural value. In such a society, the master determining instance is the market. Markets organize not only the labor process and the distribution of goods, but also marriage and sexual relations; political relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. Granted, such a society has never existed, and it may be that one never could (Polanyi, 1957). For heuristic purposes, however, we can imagine a world in which a single order of social relations secures not only the economic integration but also the cultural integration of society. Here, too, as in the previous case, class structure and status order are effectively fused. But the determinations run in the opposite direction. Because the market constitutes the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position dictates social status. Absent quasi-autonomous cultural value patterns, distributive injustice translates immediately into status subordination. Maldistribution directly entails misrecognition.

Effectively mirror images of each other, these two societies share one major characteristic: neither of them differentiates economic ordering from cultural ordering. In both societies, accordingly, class and status map perfectly onto each other. So, as well, do maldistribution and misrecognition, which convert fully and without remainder into one another. As a result, one can understand both these societies reasonably well by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. For the fully kin-governed society, one can read off the economic dimension of subordination directly from the cultural; one can infer class directly from status and maldistribution directly from misrecognition. For the fully marketized society, conversely, one can read off the cultural dimension of subordination directly from the economic; one can infer status directly from class and misrecognition directly from maldistribution. For understanding the forms of domination proper to the fully kin-governed society, therefore, culturalism is a perfectly appropriate social theory. If, in contrast, one is seeking to understand the fully marketized society, one could hardly improve on economism.
When we turn to other types of societies, however, such simple and elegant approaches no longer suffice. They are patently inappropriate for our own society, which contains both marketized arenas, in which strategic action predominates, and nonmarketized arenas, in which value-oriented interaction predominates. The result is a partial uncoupling of the economic mechanisms of distribution from the structures of prestige – thus a gap between status and class. In our society, then, the class structure ceases perfectly to mirror the status order, even though each of them influences the other. Because the market does not constitute the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position does not dictate social status. Maldistribution does not directly entail misrecognition, although it certainly contributes to the latter. Conversely, because no single status principle such as kinship constitutes the sole and all-pervasive principle of distribution, status does not dictate class position. Misrecognition does not directly entail maldistribution, although it, too, surely contributes to the latter. As a result, one cannot understand this society by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. One cannot read off the economic dimension of subordination directly from the cultural, nor the cultural directly from the economic.

It follows that neither culturalism nor economism suffices for understanding contemporary society. Instead, one needs an approach that can accommodate both the differentiation of class from status and the causal interactions between them. Before attempting to sketch such an approach, however, I want to explicate a tacit presupposition of the preceding discussion.

**Cultural Modernity and Status Inequality**

Throughout this discussion I have assumed that the category of status remains relevant to contemporary society. I have assumed, that is, that it is not the case that status hierarchy is an exclusively premodern phenomenon, which disappeared with the rise of “contract.” I have likewise assumed that the forms of status subordination that are extant today are not simply archaic precapitalist vestiges. On the contrary, it is a presupposition of my approach that injustices of status are intrinsic to the social structure of modern capitalism, including in its contemporary globalizing phase. Let me explain, and justify, these assumptions.

The need for an explanation arises because contemporary society differs sharply from those “traditional” societies for which the concept of status was originally developed. To appreciate the difference, let us return for a moment to our hypothetical fully kin-governed society. In that society, as we saw, cultural ordering was the primary mode of social integration, and status hierarchy was the root form of subordination. We can see retrospectively, moreover, that the anthropologists who envisioned the society tacitly assumed its cultural order had five major characteristics. First, it was sharply bounded; because intercultural contacts were restricted to the margins, there was no significant cultural hybridization, nor any great difficulty in establishing where one culture ended and another began. Second, the cultural order was institutionally undifferentiated; because a single overarching institution, kinship, regulated all forms of social interaction, a single pattern of cultural value supplied the template for the status order. Third, the society was ethically monistic; all of its members operated within the terms of a single, shared horizon of
evaluation, which was all pervasive and uniformly diffused; and there existed no encapsulated subcultures subscribing to alternative ethical horizons. Fourth, the cultural order was exempt from collective contestation; in the absence of any alternative evaluative horizon, there was no perspective from which to criticize the institutionalized pattern of cultural value, nor any perspective that supported contestation. Fifth and finally, the resulting hierarchy was socially legitimate; however much individuals may have chafed under it, they lacked any principled basis for challenging its authority. In our hypothetical fully kin-governed society, in sum, the cultural order was sharply bounded, institutionally undifferentiated, ethically monistic, uncontested, and socially legitimate. As a result, the status order took the form of a single fixed, all-encompassing status hierarchy.

None of these conditions holds for contemporary society. First, the cultural order of this society is not sharply bounded. No longer restricted to the margins, transcultural flows pervade the central “interior” spaces of social interaction. Thanks to mass migrations, diasporas, globalized mass culture, and transnational public spheres, it is impossible to say with certainty exactly where one culture ends and another begins; all, rather, are internally hybridized. Second, the cultural order of contemporary society is institutionally differentiated. No single master institution, such as kinship, supplies a template of cultural value that effectively governs all social interaction. Rather, a multiplicity of institutions regulate a multiplicity of action arenas according to different patterns of cultural value, at least some of which are mutually incompatible; the schema for interpreting and evaluating sexuality that organizes mass culture, for example, diverges from that institutionalized in the laws governing marriage. Third, the cultural order of contemporary society is ethically pluralistic. Not all members share a common, uniformly diffused evaluative horizon. On the contrary, different subcultures or “communities of value” subscribe to different, and at times incompatible, horizons of value. Fourth, value patterns and evaluative horizons are intensely contested. The combination of transcultural hybridization, institutional differentiation, and ethical pluralism ensures the availability of alternative perspectives that can be used to criticize the dominant values. In fact, contemporary societies are veritable cauldrons of cultural struggle, as social actors struggle to institutionalize their own horizons of value as authoritative. Finally, status hierarchy is illegitimate in modern society. The most basic principle of legitimacy in this society is liberal equality, as expressed both in market ideals, such as equal exchange, the career open to talents, and meritocratic competition, and in democratic ideals, such as equal citizenship and status equality. Status hierarchy violates all these ideals.

In general, then, contemporary society is light years away from our hypothetical fully kin-governed society. Unlike the cultural order of that society, with its stable, monolithic, pervasively institutionalized pattern of value, culture today bears all the marks of modernity. Hybridized, differentiated, pluralistic, and contested, it is suffused with antihierarchical norms. Today’s status order, accordingly, does not resemble that of the fully kin-governed society. Where that society instated a fixed, uncontested, all-encompassing status hierarchy, ours gives rise to a dynamic regime of crosscutting status distinctions. In this regime, social actors do not occupy any preordained “place.” Rather, they engage as contestants in ongoing struggles for recognition.
Nevertheless, it is not the case that everyone enters these struggles on equal terms. On the contrary, some contestants lack the resources to participate on a par with others, thanks to unjust economic arrangements; and some lack the social standing, thanks to unjust institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Cultural complexity notwithstanding, parity-impeding patterns continue to regulate interaction in most important social institutions — witness religion, education, and law. To be sure, such value patterns do not comprise a seamless, coherent, all-encompassing, and unbreachable web; and they no longer go without saying. Nevertheless, norms favoring whites, Europeans, heterosexuals, men, and Christians are institutionalized at many sites throughout the world. They continue to impede parity of participation — and thus to define axes of status subordination.

In general, then, status subordination persists in contemporary society — albeit in another guise. Far from having been eliminated, it has undergone a qualitative transformation. In the modern regime, there is no stable pyramid of corporations or social estates. Nor is every social actor assigned to a single exclusive “status group,” which defines his or her standing across the board. Rather, individuals are nodes of convergence for crosscutting axes of subordination. Frequently disadvantaged along some axes and simultaneously advantaged along others, they wage struggles for recognition in a modern dynamic regime.

Two broad historical processes have contributed to modernizing status subordination. The first is marketization, which is a process of societal differentiation. Markets have always existed, of course, but their scope, autonomy, and influence attained a qualitatively new level with the development of modern capitalism. In a capitalist society, markets constitute the core institutions of a specialized zone of economic relations, legally differentiated from other zones. In this marketized zone, interaction is not directly regulated by patterns of cultural value. It is governed, rather, by the functional interlacing of strategic imperatives, as individuals act to maximize self-interest. Marketization, accordingly, introduces breaks in the cultural order, fracturing preexisting normative patterns and rendering traditional values potentially open to challenge. But capitalist markets do not cause status distinctions simply to “melt in the air,” as Marx and Engels (1978) predicted. For one thing, markets neither occupy the totality of social space nor govern the entirety of social interaction; rather, they coexist with, indeed rely on, institutions that regulate interaction according to values that encode status distinctions — above all, the family and the state. Even on their own turf, moreover, markets do not simply dissolve status distinctions; rather, they instrumentalize them, bending preexisting patterns of cultural value to capitalist purposes. For example, racial hierarchies that long predated capitalism were not abolished with New World slavery or even Jim Crow, but reconfigured to suit a market society. No longer explicitly codified in law, and no longer socially legitimate, racist norms have been wired into the infrastructure of capitalist labor markets and refitted to supporting institutions — witness the US criminal justice system, where blacks are disproportionately subject to police brutality, incarceration, and capital punishment. Thus, the net result of marketization is the modernization, not supersession, of status subordination.

The second historical process is the rise of a complex, pluralistic civil society. This, too, involves differentiation, but of another sort. With civil society comes the differentiation of a broad range of nonmarketized institutions — legal,
political, cultural, educational, associational, religious, familial, aesthetic, administrative, professional, intellectual. As these institutions acquire some autonomy, and each develops its own relatively customized pattern of cultural value for regulating interaction. These patterns overlap, to be sure, but they do not fully coincide. In civil society, therefore, different loci of interaction are governed by different patterns of cultural value; and social actors are differently positioned at different sites – denied parity here or there, according to which distinctions trump which in a given setting. In addition, the rise of civil society is often linked to the advent of toleration, which permits the coexistence of different subcultures and further pluralizes value horizons. Finally, a modern civil society tends to encourage transcultural contacts; accommodating trade, travel, and transnational networks of communication, it sets in motion, or accelerates, processes of cultural hybridization. In general, then, civil society pluralizes and hybridizes value horizons, thereby serving, like marketization, to modernize status subordination.

The moral is that a critical theory of contemporary society cannot neglect status subordination. Rather, it must reconstruct classical sociological concepts for a modern dynamic regime. Thus, a critical theory must eschew the Durkheimian assumption of a single, overarching pattern of cultural value (cf. Honneth, 1995). In addition, it must eschew the traditional pluralist assumption of a series of discrete, internally homogeneous cultures coexisting alongside, but not constitutively affecting, one another (cf. Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). Likewise, it must eschew the “stable pyramid” picture of subordination, which assigns every individual to a single “status group.” Finally, a critical theory of contemporary society must include an account of the relation of status subordination to class subordination, misrecognition to maldistribution. Above all, it must clarify the prospects for emancipatory change for a time in which struggles for recognition are increasingly decoupled from struggles for egalitarian redistribution – even as justice requires that the two be joined.

AN ARGUMENT FOR PERSPECTIVAL DUALISM

What sort of social theory can handle this task? What approach can theorize the dynamic forms of status subordination characteristic of late-modern globalizing capitalism? What approach can theorize, too, the complex relations between status and class, misrecognition and maldistribution, in this society?

Earlier we saw that neither economism nor culturalism is up to the task. The same is true of a third approach that I shall call “poststructuralist antidualism.” Proponents of this approach, such as Judith Butler (1997) and Iris Marion Young (1997), reject distinctions between economic ordering and cultural ordering as “dichotomizing.” They claim that culture and economy are so deeply interconnected, so mutually constitutive, that they cannot meaningfully be distinguished at all. Far from theorizing the relations between status and class, therefore, poststructuralist antidualists advocate deconstructing the distinction altogether.

Although more fashionable than economism and culturalism, poststructuralist antidualism is no more adequate for theorizing contemporary society. Simply to stipulate that all injustices, and all claims to remedy them, are simultaneously economic and cultural is to paint a night in which all cows are grey: obscuring
actually existing divergences of status from class, this approach surrenders the conceptual tools that are needed to understand social reality. Far from advancing efforts to join struggles for recognition to struggles for redistribution, poststructuralist antidualism makes it impossible to entertain pressing political questions about how the two types of struggles might be synergized and harmonized, when at present they diverge and conflict (Fraser, 1997a, 1997b).

In general, then, none of the three approaches considered here so far can provide an acceptable theory of contemporary society. What alternative approaches are possible?

Two possibilities present themselves, both of them species of dualism. The first approach I shall call “substantive dualism.” It treats redistribution and recognition as two different “spheres of justice,” pertaining to two different societal domains. The former pertains to the economic domain of society, the relations of production. The latter pertains to the cultural domain, the relations of recognition. When we consider economic matters, such as the structure of labor markets, we should assume the standpoint of distributive justice, attending to the impact of economic structures and institutions on the relative economic position of social actors. When, in contrast, we consider cultural matters, such as the representation of female sexuality on MTV, we should assume the standpoint of recognition, attending to the impact of institutionalized patterns of cultural value on the relative standing of social actors.

Substantive dualism may be preferable to economism, culturalism, and poststructuralist antidualism, but it is nevertheless inadequate. Treating economy and culture as two separate spheres, it overlooks their interpenetration. What presents itself as “the economy” is always already permeated with interpretations and norms – witness the distinctions between “working” and “caregiving,” “men’s jobs” and “women’s jobs,” which are so fundamental to historical capitalism. Likewise, what presents itself as “the cultural sphere” is deeply permeated by “the bottom line” – witness global mass entertainment, the art market, and transnational advertising, all fundamental to contemporary culture. Contra substantive dualism, then, nominally economic matters usually affect not only the economic position but also the status and identities of social actors. Likewise, nominally cultural matters affect not only status but also economic position. In neither case, therefore, are we dealing with separate spheres (Fraser, 1989c).

Practically, moreover, substantive dualism fails to challenge the current dissociation of cultural politics from social politics. Casting the economy and the culture as impermeable, sharply bounded separate spheres, it decouples cultural injustices from economic injustices, cultural struggles from social struggles. Substantive dualism is not a solution to, but a symptom of, our problem. It reflects, but does not critically interrogate, the institutional differentiations of modern capitalism.

A genuinely critical perspective, in contrast, cannot take the appearance of separate spheres at face value. Rather, it must probe beneath appearances to reveal the hidden connections between distribution and recognition. It must make visible, and criticizable, both the cultural subtexts of nominally economic processes and the economic subtexts of nominally cultural practices. Treating every practice as simultaneously economic and cultural, albeit not necessarily in equal proportions, it must assess each of them from two different perspectives.

Such an approach I call “perspectival dualism.” Here redistribution and recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal domains, economy and culture.
Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives that can be assumed with respect to any domain. These perspectives can be deployed critically, moreover, against the ideological grain. One can use the recognition perspective to identify the cultural dimensions of what are usually viewed as redistributive economic policies. By focusing on the institutionalization of interpretations and norms in income-support programs, for example, one can assess their effects on the social status of women and immigrants (Fraser, 1989a, 1989d; Fraser and Gordon, 1994). Conversely, one can use the redistribution perspective to bring into focus the economic dimensions of what are usually viewed as issues of recognition. By focusing on the high “transaction costs” of living in the closet, for example, one can assess the effects of heterosexist misrecognition on the economic position of gays and lesbians (Escoffier, 1998). With perspectival dualism, then, one can assess the justice of any social practice, regardless of where it is institutionally located, from two analytically distinct normative vantage points.

**Countering Unintended Effects**

Perspectival dualism offers another advantage as well: it allows us to conceptualize some practical difficulties that can arise in the course of political struggles. Conceiving the economic and the cultural as interpenetrating, it appreciates that neither claims for redistribution nor claims for recognition can be contained within a separate sphere. On the contrary, they impinge on one another in ways that can give rise to unintended effects.

Consider, first, that redistribution impinges on recognition. Virtually any claim for redistribution will have some recognition effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redistribute income have an irreducible expressive dimension (Anderson, 1996); they convey interpretations of the meaning and value of different activities, for example “childrearing” versus “wage-earning,” while also constituting and ranking different subject positions, for example “welfare mothers” versus “tax-payers” (Fraser, 1993). Thus, redistributive claims affect the standing and identities of social actors, as well as their economic position. These status effects must be thematized and scrutinized, lest one end up fueling misrecognition in the course of trying to remedy maldistribution.

The classic example, once again, is “welfare.” Means-tested benefits aimed specifically at the poor are the most directly redistributive form of social welfare. Yet such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting them as deviants and scroungers and invidiously distinguishing them from “wage-earners” and “tax-payers” who “pay their own way.” Welfare programs of this type “target” the poor – not only for material aid but also for public hostility. The end result is often to add the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Redistributive policies have misrecognition effects when background patterns of cultural value skew the meaning of economic reforms, when, for example, a pervasive cultural devaluation of female caregiving inflects welfare as “getting something for nothing.” In this context, welfare reform cannot succeed unless it is joined with struggles for cultural change aimed at revaluing caregiving and the feminine associations that code it. In short, no redistribution without recognition.
Consider, next, the converse dynamic, whereby recognition impinges on distribution. Virtually any claim for recognition will have some distributive effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redress androcentric evaluative patterns, for example, have economic implications, which can work to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress prostitution and pornography for the sake of enhancing women’s status may have negative effects on the economic position of sex workers, while no-fault divorce reforms, which aimed to enhance women’s status, have had negative effects on the economic position of some divorced women – although their extent is currently under dispute (Weitzman, 1985). Thus, recognition claims can affect economic position, above and beyond their effects on status. These effects, too, must be scrutinized, lest one end up fueling maldistribution in the course of trying to remedy misrecognition. Recognition claims, moreover, are liable to the charge of being “merely symbolic.” When pursued in contexts marked by gross disparities in economic position, reforms aimed at affirming distinctiveness tend to devolve into empty gestures; like the sort of recognition that would put women on a pedestal, they mock, rather than redress, serious harms. In such contexts, recognition reforms cannot succeed unless they are joined with struggles for redistribution. In short, no recognition without redistribution.

The need, in all cases, is to think integratively, as in campaigns for “comparable worth.” Here a claim to redistribute income between men and women is expressly integrated with a claim to change gender-coded patterns of cultural value. The underlying premise is that gender injustices of distribution and recognition are so complexly intertwined that neither can be redressed entirely independently of the other. Thus, efforts to reduce the gender wage gap cannot fully succeed if, remaining wholly “economic,” they fail to challenge the gender meanings that code low-paying service occupations as “women’s work,” largely devoid of intelligence and skill. Likewise, efforts to revalue female-coded traits such as interpersonal sensitivity and nurturance cannot succeed if, remaining wholly “cultural,” they fail to challenge the structural economic conditions that connect those traits with dependency and powerlessness. Only an approach that redresses the cultural devaluation of the “feminine” precisely within the economy (and elsewhere) can deliver serious redistribution and genuine recognition.

Comparable worth epitomizes the advantages of perspectival dualism. By making it possible to theorize the relations between class and status, this approach to social theory provides politically relevant insights.

Concluding Conceptual Reflections

Elsewhere, I have elaborated the political-theoretical implications of this approach (Fraser, 2003). Here, in contrast, I conclude by explicating some conceptual implications of the preceding argument. Three points in particular deserve attention.

The first concerns the distinctions between class and status, economy and culture, maldistribution and misrecognition. In the argument made here, these were not treated as ontological distinctions. Contra some poststructuralist critics, then, I did not align distribution with the material and recognition with the “merely symbolic” (Butler, 1997). Rather, I assumed that status injustices can be just as material as class
injustices – witness gay-bashing, gang rape, and genocide. Far from ontologizing the distinction, I historicized it, tracing it to historical developments in social organization. Thus, I traced the distinction between cultural ordering and economic ordering to the historical differentiation of markets from value-regulated social institutions. Likewise, I traced the distinction between status and class to the historical decoupling of specialized mechanisms of economic distribution from culturally defined structures of prestige. Finally, I traced the distinction between maldistribution and misrecognition to the historical differentiation of economic from cultural obstacles to participatory parity. In short, I traced all three distinctions to the rise of capitalism, arguably the first social formation in history to systematically elaborate two distinct orders of subordination, premised on two distinct dimensions of injustice (Fraser, 1997b).

The second point concerns the conceptual openness of this account. In the preceding argument, I considered two modes of social ordering, the economic and the cultural, corresponding to two types of subordination and two types of obstacles to participatory parity. But I did not rule out the possibility of additional modes. On the contrary, I left open the question whether there might exist other modes of social ordering, corresponding to other types of subordination and other dimensions of justice. The most plausible candidate for a third dimension is, as Weber (1958) suggested, “the political.” “Political” obstacles to participatory parity would include decision-making procedures that systematically marginalize some people even in the absence of maldistribution and misrecognition, for example, single-member district winner-take-all electoral rules that deny voice to quasi-permanent minorities (Guinier, 1994). The corresponding injustice would be “political marginalization” or “exclusion,” the corresponding remedy, “democratization.”

A third and final point concerns the interpretation of the present political conjuncture. My argument implies that the current decoupling of the politics of recognition from the politics of redistribution is not the result of a simple mistake. Rather, the possibility of such a decoupling is built into the structure of modern capitalist society. In this society, as we have seen, the cultural order is hybridized, differentiated, pluralistic, and contested, while status hierarchy is considered illegitimate. At the same time, economic ordering is institutionally differentiated from cultural ordering, as is class from status and maldistribution from misrecognition. Taken together, these structural features of our society encode the possibility of today's political dissociations. They encourage the proliferation of struggles for recognition, while also enabling the latter’s decoupling from struggles for redistribution.

At the same time, however, the argument presented here implies that the structure of modern society is such that neither class subordination nor status subordination can be adequately understood in isolation from the other. On the contrary, misrecognition and maldistribution are so complexly intertwined today that each must be grasped from a larger, integrated perspective that also encompasses the other. Only when status and class are considered in tandem, in sum, can our current political dissociations be overcome. And only then can we hope to envision institutional arrangements that can redress both types of injustice simultaneously.

In general, then, the argument presented here relies on a nonculturalist understanding of culture. In the best traditions of the sociology of culture, it aims to
overcome today’s dissociation of the cultural from the economic. In so doing, it also
joins efforts to clarify the prospects for emancipatory change in the present era.

References

Tanner Lecture, presented at Stanford University, April 30–May 2.
University Press.
and lesbian life before Stonewall. In American Homo: Community and Perversity. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Fraser, N. (1989a) Struggle over needs: outline of a socialist-feminist critical theory of late-
capitalist political culture. In Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contem-
porary Social Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fraser, N. (1989b) Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fraser, N. (1989c) What’s critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas and gender. In
Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Fraser, N. (1993) Clintonism, welfare, and the antisocial wage: the emergence of a neoliberal
political imaginary. Rethinking Marxism, 6(1), 9–23.
Social Text, 52–53, 15(3-4): 279–89.
New York: Routledge.
Fraser, N. (2000) Rethinking recognition: overcoming displacement and reification in cultural
Fraser, N. (2003) Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, and
participation. In N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-
Fraser, N., and Gordon, L. (1994) A genealogy of “dependency”: tracing a keyword of the
U.S. welfare state. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 19(2), 309–36,
H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Black Loyalist Heritage Society Web Site (October 2, 2002) <http://museum.gov.ns.ca/blackloyalists/>


De las Harras, V. (1997) What does music collecting add to our knowledge of the functions and uses of music? MSc dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of Keele.


Lebacqz, K. (1999) Twenty years older but are we wiser? Presented at the Belmont Revisited, April 18, Charlottesville, VA.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Suttles, Gerald D. (Forthcoming) *Front-Page Economics*.


Uzzi, B., and Lancaster, R. (Forthcoming) Social embeddedness and price formation: the case of large corporate markets.


accountability, 364, 372, 375–8
Adorno, 147–50
  art as critique, 59
  and Horkheimer, 178, 428
agency, 69, 131–2, 135, 167, 328
  artistic, 40
  aesthetic, 151–2
  and structure, 1, 8, 12, 17–33, 99–104, 147–51, 156–7, 171–2, 335–7, 339–44
  faculty, 37–47
  and politics, 428–41
  as model for culture, 10–11
audience, 80, 82, 85–6, 88–9, 177, 179, 183, 186, 370–1, 433–4
autonomy, 58–60, 87, 99, 103, 125, 348, 395, 428–32, 435, 440–1
  and identity, 228
  institutional, 453
  of decision-making, 406–7
  of the professions, 323, 327, 329–30
  of the witness, 303

beliefs, 102, 104, 108, 254, 266, 385
Berger, Peter, 97–9
boundary, 115, 122–6, 295, 312, 329
discursive, 355
group, 388, 392–4
identity, 228, 244, 247
moral, 191
professional, 317–18
Bourdieu, Pierre, 119–20, 131–2, 239, 246, 355–6, 385
  habitus, 38, 54–5
business
  and politics, 365–7, 414–16, 423–4
Butler, Judith, 248, 453, 456
causation, 17–18, 25–6, 32–3, 190, 195, 217, 234, 347–8, 429, 447
celebrity, 176–87
childhood, 160–1, 164–72, 190–6, 199–200
  sacralization of, 193
Chomsky, Noam, 36–9
citizenship, 83, 91, 120–1, 156–7, 241–2, 384–6
civic culture, 383–96
civil religion, 106–7, 401
civic groups, 383–96
civic life, 12–13
civility, 368
global, 412–25 passim
collective memory, 154, 253–68, 272–84, 370, 378
cognition, 35–47, 256
commemoration, 254–7, 272, 282–4
  site of, 275–81
community, 19, 32–3, 222–3, 225, 226–7, 230–2, 294, 375
Index

disciplinary, 328
moral, 267–8
consumption, 73, 160–72
constructivism see essentialism/constructivism
contingency, 51, 53, 228–9, 232, 235, 238, 239–40, 304, 318, 370
cultural authority, 1, 8, 257, 286–8, 294, 312, 317–30 passim, 336
aesthetic, 114–28
religious, 97–8, 104–7, 221
cultural freedom, 430–1
cultural systems, 17–33, 48–60, 268
culture, aesthetic conception of, 1–2, 10–13
democracy, 13, 81–2, 107, 128, 284, 383, 394, 403, 432, 435, 440
rational, 240–1
global, 412–25 passim
Dewey, John, 10, 334, 384
difference, 1, 153, 222–5, 229–32, 236, 242, 350, 355–6, 391, 445
national, 258–68, 283–4
and system, 1, 9, 12, 48–60
differentiation,
institutional, 450–3
system, 54–5
explicit/implicit, 104–11, 398–409
of power, 224
of race, 240, 242
of welfare, 346–61
Durkheim, Emile, 35–6, 100, 108, 254, 320–1, 333–5, 371, 383, 385, 453
embodiment, 91, 138–9, 141–2, 153, 154–7, 231, 248, 367
embodied identity, 227
emotion, 151–3, 157, 166, 193–4, 196, 226–7, 231
bonds of love, 192, 194, 199, 202
essentialism/constructivism, 1, 9, 12, 35–7, 227–9, 234–49 passim, 272, 290–1, 332, 336–7, 348–9, 370–1
ethics
professional, 317–30 passim
societal, 451
experience, 39, 50–3, 58, 141, 147, 197, 255, 264, 268, 304–6, 334–6
consumer, 163
musical, 147

of identity, 223, 226–8
of motherhood, 202
fatherhood, 52–3, 60
feminism, 49, 60, 194–5, 223, 230–1, 348–9, 360
transnational, 419–20
Foucault, Michel, 224–5, 244–5, 318–20, 326, 432
Frankfurt School, 22, 59, 178, 432
Geertz, Clifford, 10, 97–100, 372–3
Giddens, Anthony, 23–4
Goffman, Erving, 437–8
government, 318–21, 330, 374–5, 405
Gramsci, Antonio, 105–6, 108, 385
Habermas, Jürgen, 81–2, 91, 366–7, 377, 404, 420–1
Halbwachs, Maurice, 254, 272
identity, 1, 35, 102, 154, 162, 170, 186, 191, 201, 220–32, 256, 264–5, 294, 305, 350–5, 455
class, 215–17
and place, 277–8
occupational, 322
race, 242–4
ideology, 22, 31, 105–6, 169, 324, 328, 348, 385, 395, 430, 436–40
of capitalism, 210
of motherhood, 192, 194–6, 202
of race, 236
institutional order, 50–3
integration
socio-cultural, 18–22, 28–30, 32–3, 223
interaction, 18, 25–6, 28, 103, 149, 254, 293, 322, 335, 337, 384, 386, 432–41, 446–8, 452–3
knowledge, 65–77, 149, 154, 290–1, 317–30
lived, 228
objects of, 70–1, 75
sacred, 289
language, 36, 39, 101, 109–10, 386
law, 332–44, 376, 436, 452–3
transnational, 412, 417–18
liminality, 70–1
Luhmann, Niklas, 55
transnational, 414
Marxism, 22, 99, 208, 444
material culture, 75–6, 90–2, 138–40, 152–3, 160–72
Mead, George Herbert, 35–6
meaning, 50–3, 68, 163–4, 166, 171, 293, 348–51, 355–6, 370
of motherhood, 190–3, 197–202
of the law, 336–7, 343
of the past, 253, 273
musical, 149, 152–3
system of, 100–5
media
mass, 80–93, 176–87, 225, 253, 369–70, 385, 412, 415–16
aesthetic, 116, 122
memory
collective, 253–68
community of, 226–7
memory authorities, 274–5, 279, 281
objects of, 256, 276–7
politics of, 255–7
technologies of, 273
morality
and childhood, 165–6, 193–4
and civic discourse, 386, 400–2, 405
and collective memory, 260–2, 264, 275, 281, 304, 308
of gays and lesbians, 225
good and bad faith, 364–6, 371–3, 378
and law, 332
and media, 87, 89–90, 187
of motherhood, 194–5
and welfare categories, 348, 353–5, 358–60
motherhood, 160, 163, 169, 190–202, 243–4, 348, 354
multiculturalism, 255–6
museum, 115, 121–2, 124, 286–98
objects, 291–3
music, 53–4, 124–5, 131–42 passim, 147–57, 179–80, 280–1, 430
narrative, 87–91, 109, 178, 180, 186, 197, 255, 290–1, 309–10
of identity, 200, 227, 221–3, 231
of the law, 337–44
of scandal, 369–70, 373–5, 377–8
networks, 71–2
actor networks, 69, 147
transnational, 412–25, 453
norms, 50, 335, 342, 343–4, 371, 447, 452
of democratic discourse, 407–9
evaluative, 1, 12–13
gendered, 49, 51, 58, 454
of interaction, 435
legal, 339
racist, 452
objectivity, 67, 339, 348
performativity, 135–6, 238, 242–4, 247, 303, 310–12, 433–4, 436–7, 438–40
popular culture, 82, 89–90, 92, 122–8, 132–3
and celebrity, 176–87
postmodernism, 37, 115, 121–2, 223, 255–6, 266
practices, 68–9, 90–2, 131–3, 136, 161, 247, 248–9, 274, 343–4, 356–60
democratic, 432
legal, 336,
museum, 291–3
professional, 321, 324, 330
race, 238
religious, 221, 227
sexual, 224,
voting, 217–18
professions, 317–30, 346, 394, 402–3
museum, 286–98 passim
global, 420–1
and private, 187, 193–6, 365–8, 375–6
race, 89–90, 190, 212, 234–49, 447, 452
recognition, 48–9, 55–8, 181, 244–8, 295–6, 445–9, 454–8
repertoire, 92, 104, 110, 155
religion, 97–111, 220–32, 398–409, 452–3
and politics, 104–11, 221, 401
ritual, 138, 227, 372
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 364–5
scandal, 210, 323, 327, 364–78, 386
schemas, 36, 37, 231, 337–44
science, 66–71, 73, 325–6, 347, 360–1, 399–404, 417–18
sexuality, 49, 220–32, 451–2, 455
Simmel, Georg, 11, 368
social movements, 104, 108–9, 448
global, 416–19, 422–3
space/place, 70–1, 138, 155–6, 168–70, 275, 277–8, 303–4, 306–10, 343–4
transnational, 413
status, 1, 444–58
structure, 100–1, 350–1
of action, 246
artistic, 42–4
cultural, 115–17
of legality, 342
social, 365
symbolic, 239
subject/object, 69, 131–42
subjectivity, 149, 152, 154–6, 166–70
symbol, 97, 104, 108, 230–2, 254, 266, 273, 275–6, 284, 348, 385
symbolic order, 50–3
systems, 68, 323–4, 334–5
semiotic, 350–1, 355–6, 360
welfare, 350–1
taste, 119, 120–1, 126–8, 131–42
over life course, 164–5, 168–70
terrorism, 253, 272–84 passim, 438, 440–1
theater, 430, 433–6, 438–40
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 264, 383–4
tradition, 101, 255–7, 264–6, 268
aesthetic, 118, 120
religious, 106, 222–3, 226–7, 231–2
transparency, 72, 75, 81
Weber, Max, 333, 366–7, 428, 457
welfare, 56, 190–1, 195–6, 327, 330, 346–61, 447, 455
witness, 268, 302–12
Zelizer, Viviana, 165–6, 192–4