Relations between Jews and Muslims were primarily peaceful during the medieval and early modern periods. But as the essays in this volume demonstrate, centuries of respectful coexistence deteriorated quickly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, leading to the tensions with which we are more familiar today.

A companion volume to The Convergence of Judaism and Islam, this collection of essays explores the Jewish-Muslim relationship from the nineteenth century to the present. Its contributors reveal how—and why—the paths of Jews and Muslims began to diverge two centuries ago. Each group reacted quite differently to colonial rule; the Palestine Question and the Arab-Israeli crisis helped to sour relations; and the rise of nationalism added to the growing tensions. With contributions from a wide variety of scholarly disciplines, this book offers a comprehensive analysis of the complex dynamics between the two groups in more recent times.

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The Divergence of Judaism and Islam

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Acknowledgments

This volume is devoted to the intricacies of Judeo-Muslim relations in the modern period. It attends to the most central topics that shaped and characterized this relationship from the final quarter of the nineteenth century to the present time.

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As this volume went to press one of our authors, Dr. Hanita Brand, passed away prematurely. She was a dear colleague whose memory we shall always cherish.
Introduction

Michael M. Laskier and Yaacov Lev

The Divergence of Judaism and Islam is a thorough exploration of Judeo-Muslim interaction from the end of the nineteenth century to the onset of the third millennium, focusing on the declining multiethnic Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, Arab lands, Central Asia, post–World War II Germany, and Australia.

Our contributing authors treat the Judeo-Muslim relationship with a rich sampling of interdisciplinary approaches that include education, history, political science, anthropology, sociology, economics, and modern Hebrew and Arabic literature. The fifteen essays cut a swath across a panoply of themes incorporating a variety of cultural, literary, and social scientific perspectives. Through original and updated research, they provide insights generating a synergistic impact on a diverse reading audience eager to approach the tangled and fragile relationship with an eye open to nuance.

These works accentuate different aspects from our own. They adopt other methodologies or orientations. In the first place, they tend to focus mainly on Jewish communities per se within Islamic lands and less on the profound complexities inherent in Judeo-Muslim life. The main emphasis is placed on Jews living parallel Muslim society. In our volume, Muslims and Jews are treated with equal attention insofar as their positive interactions and divergences. Second, we go well beyond Arab and other Muslim milieus to assess the Judeo-Muslim relationship in the Balkans, the European Union, and Australia. My own [Laskier] North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century is essentially a political history of Maghrebi Jewry. It does not lend itself to social, economic, cultural, anthropological, and sociological analyses. Zohar’s book covers a host of themes related to religious and cultural factors and cuts across the medieval and modern periods, surveying too much in one monograph. The book written by Stillman and the edited counterparts by Simon, Laskier, and Reguer are either sourcebooks or textbooks. Stillman’s book is a continuation of his previous book on Jews in Muslim lands, covering the period well into the latter half of the twentieth century. Its strength lies in the presentation of an in-depth analysis supplemented by significant primary sources published as documents.

Conceptually and methodologically, our project examines this complex relationship through four phenomena and developments: (1) common interests; (2) political modes of existence and social mobility in transitional societies; (3) challenges emanating from the Arab-Israeli and other regional upheavals due to rising nationalist tides; and (4) notions of conflict resolution via political and interreligious dialogue.

The main thesis here differs markedly from that of our first edited volume, The Convergence of Judaism and Islam: The Religious, Scientific, and Cultural Dimensions. As this title suggests, the first book expounds on cultural, religious, and intellectual convergence and effervescence in the Middle Ages and the early modern period. In this separate volume about the interrelationship within a changing world, important aspects of commonalities and interdependence that persisted are raised. Nevertheless, problems of divergence often outweigh those of coming together, with mounting tensions overshadowing the relationship.

Insofar as Jewish-Muslim interdependence and/or shared destinies are concerned, these prevailed in key provinces of the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the Balkans throughout the ages, Uzbekistan
well into the twentieth century, and precolonial Morocco. This also proves to be the case presently in Germany and Australia between Muslim immigrants striving to adapt to their new surroundings and the more deeply implanted Jewish communities. Jews of several Balkan states and in post-Ottoman Turkey weathered many crises, and most of their communities remained relatively intact over a long period of time—Turkey to current days, the Balkans until the mid-1940s. The dissolution of some Balkan communities or the significant depletion of their populations resulted from Nazi oppression rather than Muslim-Jewish animosities. Like their Muslim counterparts, the Jewish communities in Germany and Australia today are asserting themselves politically and socially. This, however, cannot be said for Jews of Arab lands in recent decades. By the 1990s, the Jewish communities of Central Asia, too, met a similar fate of population decline and downward mobility.

Unlike modern Turkey and Iran, the Arab Middle East and Maghreb succumbed to European colonial domination. Several lands, notably Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, were colonized at different periods in the nineteenth century. Palestine, too, was very much exposed to European colonialism as well as to gradual demographic changes in the wake of Jewish colonization that gained momentum under the British Mandate. Excluded from the colonial sphere of influence was Yemen, yet a case study about Yemeni Muslim-Jewish particularisms and commonalities in a noncolonial setting is part of our book. Yemen underwent vital transformations, some of which were evident throughout the Arab world and included Jewish communal self-liquidation attributed to domestic considerations.

The decline of Arab and Muslim influence globally in all areas during the twentieth century, in sharp contrast to rising European supremacy, had dire consequences for the Judeo-Muslim relationship. At a time when Jews and Christians lent support to foreign domination, Muslims began to espouse political, nationalist, and Islamist ideologies that did not bode well for these minorities. Gone were the days of intellectual and religious convergence.

The Jews prospered under colonialism more than the Muslims, abandoning their old neighborhoods in favor of the modern urban agglomerations built by the Europeans. Even in rural areas, such as southern Morocco, Jews adapted to modernity. They became better educated through the colonial schools and the transnational educational network of French
Jewry known as the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU). The Muslims felt more at ease with the traditional Jews who shared lifestyles similar to theirs. With the exception of their elites, ordinary Muslims usually regarded European schools as centers for antireligious influences. As Jews distanced themselves from the Muslims through European education and adapted to French, Spanish, Italian, and English cultures and languages, acquiring whenever feasible foreign nationalities, tensions and mutual distancing sharpened. For not only did Jews opt for emulating Europe, they began to support European colonial penetration at the expense of the national sovereignty or autonomy cherished by the Muslim majority. Besides the problems of colonialism and nationalism aggravating Jewish-Muslim relations adversely, two other factors figured significantly. One was attributed to European fascist currents during the 1930s and 1940s embraced by nationalist forces in the Arab world with long-range repercussions. Jews were held responsible for causing the world’s ills and were depicted as parasites. The Palestinian-Jewish struggle in Palestine that fueled anxieties in Middle Eastern/Maghrebi nationalist circles and wider public opinion was the other factor. The accumulated tensions triggered pogroms between November 1945 and June 1948. The upheavals in Libya and Morocco and their victimized Jewish communities are clear indications of these misfortunes.

Since the 1950s, the transition from colonial subservience to decolonization in the age of rising sovereign Arab nation-states hardly improved relations. The Palestine question, the reality of Israel, and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict often bore little relevance. This holds true for Central Asia in recent times as Russian domination of Uzbekistan and other parts of the region drew to a close. Arab nationalist leaders frequently advocated and implemented the notion of national homogeneity whereby non-Muslim minorities were relegated to the status of “inauthentic” members of the nation-states, not full-fledged nationals. For their part, the Jews found it difficult to adjust to the postcolonial setting. Many among the educated were weary of efforts in the nation-state to promote cultural, linguistic, and political Arabization at the expense of European culture, which they felt would inhibit social progress. They also feared economic marginalization. All these factors hastened the process of Aliyah (migration to Israel) or relocation to Europe and the Americas.

The end of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first held some hope for a Judeo-Muslim entente in Israel, Palestine, and...
the European Union. Modest progress, such as the 1993 Oslo peace process, however encouraging, was short-lived to be interrupted by military confrontation. Other efforts toward better understanding in the Muslim milieu and beyond showed no better results and ended in intercommunal animosities, religious extremism, and narrow political interests. At this juncture, the beginning of the second decade into the twenty-first century, the situation remains clouded.

The first section of the book, “Common Interests versus Latent and Overt Tensions,” begins appropriately with Avigdor Levy’s chapter, “Ottoman Attitudes toward the Modernization of Jewish Education in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” This study has a dual purpose: to assess the extent of modernization through education among the Jews of the Ottoman Empire, and to show the interdependence and common interests manifested both by the Ottoman authorities and the Jewish communities in promoting modern learning. In the modern schools that they created, as well as in the French-inspired AIU school network, the Ottomans envisioned the essential vehicle to reinforce European-oriented reforms aimed at halting their decline vis-à-vis Europe. The AIU schools depended on the Ottoman administration for granting them legitimacy to operate their oeuvre throughout the empire in the Jewish milieu. The Ottomans who needed the influence of the AIU readily obliged. They regarded the Jews as loyal forces anxious to achieve social mobility, a vital element to further Ottoman aspirations.

Julia Phillips Cohen’s “‘Zeal and Noise’: Jewish Imperial Allegiance and the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897” and Ömer Turan’s “Sharing the Same Fate: Muslims and Jews in the Balkans” fit well with Levy’s opening chapter. They, too, elaborate upon Judeo-Muslim interdependence and a sense of common destinies. As shown by Cohen, Jews constituted the single largest ethno-religious group in Salonica and a smaller but active minority in Izmir during the late nineteenth century. Cohen corroborates Levy’s findings regarding Ottoman patriotism and loyalty and explains the motives behind Jewish support for Ottoman Muslims in the context of the empire’s war with Greece in 1897. In fact, she suggests that many Jews went so far as to identify with Islam itself during this period as an expression of their commitment to the empire. This pattern of Jewish allegiance to multilingual and multireligious empires can be found elsewhere and is perhaps most notable in the Hapsburg context. Under the late Ottoman state as well, Jews sometimes even surpassed
the Muslims in their exuberance for imperial causes, much to the con-
sternation of Jewish communal leaders who worried that the behavior of their coreligionists might have a negative effect on their interactions with Greek Orthodox Ottomans in the midst of the empire’s war with Greece. Indeed, some observers suggested that the solidarity Ottoman Jews expressed with Muslims during the conflict came at the expense of Greek Orthodox–Jewish relations.

Turan’s study is quite on par with Cohen’s, except that his work adopts a macro approach and crosses from modern to contemporary history. He covers central Balkan cities like Edirne and Salonica in the heyday of Ottoman rule and subsequently Romania and parts of Yugoslavia before and after its disintegration in the 1990s. Turan paints a somber picture of Jewish persecution by Christians and their rescue by Muslims. In post-Ottoman attacks by Christian nationalists on both Muslims and Jews, common fate becomes significant. The consequences of the Serbian nationalist tides in the final decade of the twentieth century—the killing of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and the departure of Jews from Sarajevo to other lands—are cases in point.

“‘We Don’t Want to Be the Jews of Tomorrow’: Jews and Turks in Germany after 9/11,” by Gökçe Yurdakul and Y. Michal Bodemann, and “Jews and Muslims ‘Downunder’: Emerging Dialogue and Challenge,” by Suzanne Rutland, exemplify the problems Jews and Muslims contend with in the Western world. The chapter on Germany is more in line with the preceding studies on the former Ottoman Empire and the Balkans accentuating commonalities, shared destinies, and the necessity for interdependence.

The Judeo-Muslim connection in Germany, a member-state of the European Union, centers on the large Turkish-Muslim community that seeks to emulate German Jewry of the past and present. Turkish Muslim immigrants in the new geography familiarize themselves with the German-Jewish narrative of historic sufferings and associate their own concerns over racism with the ostracizing of Jews under the Third Reich. Muslim communal leaders compare the Holocaust with the fire bombing by German rightist extremists of Turkish houses in Mölln (1992); they use today’s Jewish community organizations as examples of how to organize as a minority; and Turkish immigrant associations claim minority rights identical to those of German Jews from the authorities.

Simultaneously, Muslim leaders evinced some solidarity with their
Jewish compatriots, notably in Berlin, where attempts were made to forge an alliance against discrimination. The situation in Germany is different than in France, where Muslim-Jewish tensions in the past ran high and even resulted in violence. Anti-Muslim activity following 9/11 attributed to racist elements reinforced fears—real or imaginary—that the fate of the country’s Turkish Muslim minority in the twenty-first century might not differ from the Jewish tragedies of the previous century.

Rutland presents a less idyllic appraisal of Muslim-Jewish interaction in Australia and relates more to latent and overt tensions. In the first thorough study of its kind, she engenders aspects of this relationship based on vast field research. As in the European Union, Australia has absorbed numerous Jewish immigrants after World War II and, since 1970, major waves of Muslim immigrants. A country that prior to 1945 implemented tough immigration policies and remained relatively homogeneous for hundreds of years now confronted the challenges of multiculturalism. The Jews, as a group, are largely of European origins. The Muslims, however, were far more heterogeneous coming from Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iran, being both Sunnis and Shi’ites. Rutland addresses the problems of Muslim integration, anti-Muslim sentiments, and the concurrent increase of anti-Jewish trends among both Muslims and the extreme right occurring since the early 1990s. Despite the goodwill of some Australian political leaders, the authorities failed to cope successfully with the animosities nurtured by the growing Muslim population toward the Jews as well as the hatred of the Australian Christian majority against Muslims.

The efforts and resources channeled to soothe tensions were meager. Australian multiculturalism today is not one of accommodation but of aggression. In this sense, as late as 2011, there are no better prospects there for accommodation than in the Netherlands, which in the past encouraged Christian-Jewish-Muslim multicultural dialogue. In France, assimilation of all elements of the population to the society, promoted long ago as an alternative to the multicultural model, has thus far failed, too. The Christian animosity toward Muslims is one thing. The main reason for Muslim-Jewish tensions, as in France, has probably less to do with the Israel-Palestine issue than with Muslim frustration over low socio-economic burdens. The Muslims resent the privileged social position of Australian Jews, and young Muslims, radicalized by militant imāms and inspired by Islamist philosophies of the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi and
Egyptian Salafi streams, regard the Jews as their enemies and allies of the establishment. Rutland’s analysis more closely resembles the German case study in one aspect: Australian Muslims replaced the Jews as the new and main undesired “others.”

The second section of this book, “Socioeconomic and Political Interaction in Arab Lands and Central Asia: Toward Jewish Immigration,” focuses on the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial scenes in Arab lands and Central Asia. The common threads weaving through are Judeo-Muslim existence prior to Jewish communal disintegration through immigration and, in the case of Libya and Uzbekistan, the actual immigration process.

Except for Aden, Yemen was an independent entity beginning in 1918 under the Imamate. Bat-Zion Eraqi Klorman’s essay, “Yemen: Muslim and Jewish Interaction in the Tribal Sphere,” analyzes the striking resemblance of tribal dissension in Yemen and Arab-Berber unrest in southern Morocco where local chieftains were resentful of the Sharifian Sultanate and central authorities. In both Yemen and Morocco, there existed a sizable Jewish minority that benefited from Muslim protection yet lived a precarious existence. The partial exposure of Yemen to Europe in the twentieth century—similar to the Moroccan situation—helped connect the population to the world economy but weakened the economic foundation of the tribes, Jews included. The study elaborates on the *dhimmi* status of the Jews, the latter’s response to tribal customary law, and the Muslims’ attitude toward Jewish religion and customs. Based on oral history and written sources, Eraqi Klorman provides the historical, social, and economic background for the eventual Jewish immigration to Israel.

In his essay, “In Search of Jewish Farmers: Jews, Agriculture, and the Land in Rural Morocco,” Daniel J. Schroeter connects with Eraqi Klorman’s conclusions about Jewish-Muslim life in rural Yemen. Although both studies describe Jewish societies in a tribal setting destined to be dissolved through immigration, Schroeter’s analysis centers on a country that was dominated by a French administration. For many decades it was reported by different people—Israeli immigration emissaries of the Jewish Agency, foreign travelers, and officials of the colonial administration—that major pockets of Jewish farmers existed throughout rural Morocco.

Schroeter, a social historian who studied Moroccan rural society up close, challenges what he regards as no more than a myth. True, there
were pockets of agricultural Jews in the central High Atlas Mountains and elsewhere in the country, but no more than that. The majority of them were petty merchants and artisans. Often they sold the agricultural products of the Muslims in the rural markets (suqs), which was part of the economic coexistence between the two groups. Jews who did pursue farming were largely landless and held land owned by Muslims in usufruct. As Schroeter observes, “The fact that most Jews were in professions other than agriculture, the occupation of the vast majority of the Muslim population, was to the Jews a mark of their distinction, indeed even demonstrating their superiority over non-Jews.” After many years since the resettlement of most of Moroccan Jewry in Israel, older Muslims remembered this distinction.

Dalit Atrakchi’s essay on “The Moroccan Nationalist Movement and Its Attitude toward Jews and Zionism” attests to some of the dominant political complexities faced by Muslims and the dilemmas confronting Jews. Atrakchi tackles à la fois the tension looming large between local nationalists and Zionism in mid-twentieth-century Morocco, its relevance to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the status of Moroccan Jewry in the transition of their country from a colonized entity to an independent nation-state. She confirms that Morocco’s geographical remoteness from the Middle East conflict was hardly a factor in the decision whether or not local nationalists ought to identify in solidarity with the Arab struggle over Palestine. This affected Judeo-Muslim relations negatively mostly in the urban areas.

At the same time, Moroccan Jewry contributed to the weakening of Judeo-Muslim understanding. They refused to take the side of the nationalists in the struggle for statehood, hoping quietly that French and Spanish colonial presence would endure indefinitely. Finding themselves positioned between the colonizers and the colonized, the Jews were pressured by each side to embrace its cause. It became apparent to the nationalists that the Jews—at least inwardly—supported the colonialists. These realities convinced the majority of Jews that they should opt for departure to Israel, France, and the Americas.

In Libya, the tumultuous atmosphere clouding Muslim-Jewish coexistence was far more pronounced. This is clearly shown by Rachel Simon’s “Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya,” especially during the Italian colonization (1911–43), the British Military Administration (1943–52), and independent Libya. Under Italy, Jews had benefited from modernization;
the more successful ones slowly adapted to Italian language and culture. Nonetheless, as Italy promoted fascist ideologies, the Jews, more than the Muslims, became vulnerable to sanctions that in 1938 included anti-Semitic racial legislation. The temporary Italian-German control over Libya from 1940 until 1943 exposed them to great dangers that were almost as severe as European Jewry at the time. While the British Military Administration eliminated these dangers, the tenuous conditions of the Jews were revived in November 1945 and June 1948. On both occasions Muslim-inspired anti-Jewish violence erupted into pogroms due to economic, nationalist, and religious factors, as well as the intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

By 1952, most Jews had left Libya. Simon does not neglect the fate of the few thousands who remained. Though unharmed for the most part between 1952 and 1967, Jews were marginalized; their legal status became de facto inferior, and they were denied Libyan citizenship. In contrast to Morocco where, during the decolonization phases, modest efforts were made to win Jewish support for nation-building, it became clear that Libya followed the policies of neighboring Egypt under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser: a policy of national homogeneity whereby non-Muslims were dismissed as mere “undesirables.” The June 1967 War revived violence perpetrated against the Jews and prompted them to leave for Israel and Italy. With the overthrow of the Sanussi monarchy and the rise to power of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in 1969, the orientation toward national homogeneity gained additional legitimacy that culminated in the final dissolution of the remaining Jewish community.

Until recently, the Jews of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and their evolution from Soviet control to nationhood received scant attention. The Jews’ predicament in this part of Central Asia and their relations with the Muslims are somewhat analogous to the challenges Jews encountered in Arab lands and different in other ways. Alanna E. Cooper’s closing chapter of this section, “Where Have All the Jews Gone? Mass Migration from Independent Uzbekistan,” is a unique historical-cultural anthropological undertaking. It is based on written sources and fieldwork in Uzbekistan and it includes some comparative analysis with Jews of Arab lands. The emphasis here is on Bukharan Jews, a community whose population dwindled due to immigration from 35,000 in 1989 to 1,000 in 2009. Most of the immigrants settled in Israel and the United States. Although Muslims and Jews alike confronted many hardships once the Russians pulled
out and Uzbekistan became an independent nation-state in 1991, the Jews struggled with greater difficulties.

Like Jews of Arab lands in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bukharan counterparts felt marginalized because they were, in Cooper’s words, “outside of the nationalist project” and felt they were “on the weaker side of tense Muslim-Jewish relations.” Like the Jews of most Arab lands, who feared that the end of European domination would signify a return to Arab domination and the loss of everything gained under colonialism, Jewish immigration from independent Uzbekistan carried similar concerns. Many worried that they would suffer the humiliations prior to the arrival of the Russians sixty-five years earlier. The majority believed that their lives were improved under Soviet influence. As with Arabization of language and culture in the Maghrebi states during decolonization, which stirred anxiety among Jews who adapted to Western languages, Bukharan Jews spoke Russian and Tajik. They found it increasingly challenging to adopt Uzbekistan’s new language policies promoting Uzbek at the expense of Russian and Tajik. Consequently, they faced obstacles in gaining admittance to local universities and finding employment. Bukharan Jews in the new Uzbekistan were nationally and ethnically non-Uzbeks and thus regarded as out of place. Political, linguistic, and economic factors notwithstanding, despite certain apprehensions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hardly figured into the relationship.

The section “In the Shadow of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: History, Ideology, and Political Strategy” encompasses historiography, sociology, modern literature, contemporary history, and political science. Rachel Maissy-Noy’s study, “Issues of Jewish History as Reflected in Modern Egyptian Historiography,” is the first of its kind based almost exclusively on Arabic source material. Interwoven into Maissy-Noy’s analysis are components of ancient, medieval, and modern Jewish history seen through the lenses of Egyptian historians. These historians turned their attention to Jewish historiography only following the June 1967 War and their writings displayed strong and significant political overtones concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle for Palestine. They developed a narrative about Jews and Zionism, attacking their ancient and modern written sources. The dominant Zionist idea that Palestine was eternally Jewish because Jews descended from a God-chosen ancient nation is described as a concoction and a fabrication. The overwhelming majority of Egyptian historians also downplayed the prolonged forced exile and
persecutions in the dispersion as reflected in Jewish and Zionist sources. They regarded these as an excuse to legitimize the Jews’ return to the “land of their forefathers” and as a ploy to seize Palestine in its entirety from the Arab Muslims.

Maissy-Noy’s approach relying on Arabic sources is reciprocated by Hanita Brand’s literary Arabic perspective in “The Road Not Taken: Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini and His Chickens.” This is an intriguing account of a novel written by Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini, a Palestinian intellectual and a relative of the former mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Ḥusseini. Published in 1943, Ishāq Mūsā’s *Memoirs of a Hen* is the story of a hen and her chicken coop. The hen relates how one day a family of outcast chickens invaded her domain and caused friction. All efforts by the hen to settle the tensions proved difficult. In interpreting the motives behind the story, Brand, who also interviewed Ishāq Mūsā in October 1979, raises two questions: Was the novel specifically devoted to the Zionist-Palestinian conflict that gained notoriety at the time? Or did it go beyond this “narrow” issue in the quest to promote a world devoid of hatred and universal peace at the height of World War II? Brand concludes that the plot resembles the conflict in Palestine.

Perceptions about the legitimate rights of Arabs and Jews in Arabic sources are also found in Hebrew literary works. An innovative study prepared by Carmela Saranga and Rachel Sharaby, “Space as a Demon and the Demon in the Space: Jewish-Muslim Relations in the Israeli Space in A. B. Yehoshua’s Literary Works,” attests to it. Saranga and Sharaby dissect the oeuvres of A. B. Yehoshua, one of Israel’s most renowned novelists, and expose his worldview about modern-day coexistence. Moreover, they interpret his descriptions concerning the destinies of the two peoples in the Israeli space through different geographical settings. For instance, Haifa, Yehoshua’s current home, symbolizes for him an island of sanity and accommodative multiculturalism. On the other hand, Jerusalem, his place of birth, is the lost paradise, a divided city geographically, socially, and culturally. There, the prevalence of “unhealthy” sentiments of mutual resentment is translated into tensions that threaten to ignite dangerous confrontations.

The challenges of accommodative cultural interaction are clearly evident in Ben Mollov’s “Interreligious Dialogue and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Empirical View.” A political scientist at Bar-Ilan University,
Mollov maintains that a religiously based intercultural dialogue is imperative to effect perception moderation. It is the best outlet to alter narrow-minded Israeli and Palestinian perceptions by emphasizing the commonalities of Judaism and Islam. Mollov’s argumentation is invigorated by empirical findings, for he and his colleagues have been actively involved in meetings with religious Palestinian Muslims.

The debate about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its resolution is by no means monopolized by the Palestinians and Israel’s neighboring states. Over the years it extended to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Iran, and Turkey. Despite geographical remoteness, political leaders of Arab Libya often exceed the role of mere spectators, as is abundantly evident from Yehudit Ronen’s study on Libya, “Zionism and Judeo-Islamic Relations in the Middle East: Libya’s Ideological and Political Position.”

Ronen focuses entirely on the post-1969 revolutionary period of the inter-Arab arena and Israel. No organized Jewish communities remain in Libya at this time. In many ways, Judeo-Muslim relations may be defined here as “Jewish Israel and the Muslim world.” Attention is shifted to the revolutionary regime’s attitudes toward world Jewry and Israel. If until the 1990s Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi attacked “world Zionism” and denied Israel’s right to exist, this perception has evolved to some degree since then. In 1993 Qadhafi encouraged Libyan Jews who left their homeland in the 1950s and 1960s to return and promised to indemnify them for properties expropriated in the past. Although nothing emerged from these declarations, a less radical attitude toward Jews, Israel, and Zionism became evident in the post–cold war era. The weakened position of the Russian ally, the determination to end Libya’s international isolation, the desire to mend fences with the United States, and the influence of Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s dynamic and well-educated son, all explain this new strategy, which in any case lacks clarity. Saif al-Islam became the spokesperson of the Libyan regime’s “new face.” He raised issues of Judeo-Muslim coexistence and their historic meanings, identified with Jewish sufferings over the Holocaust, and treated the Arab-Israeli conflict less emotionally. Nevertheless, as long as contradictory statements emanate from Libya, insisting on the transformation of Israel into a bi-national state for Palestinians and Jews, rather than backing the idea of the two-state solution, the feasibility for change is remote. As Libyan politics manifested great unpredictability in the past four decades, and in light of
the upheavals in the country that were ignited in winter 2011, one cannot say with utmost confidence whether a post-Qadhafi era will inaugurate the desired changes or make matters worse.

One final point is germane to our analysis in modern and contemporary times. Previous essays here accent the special historical bonds between Jews and Muslims in Turkey—once the seat of the Islamic caliphate—and its Ottoman possessions and the struggle against their common enemies. The Jewish-Muslim interaction and interdependence continued in secular Turkey, expanding since the late 1940s to special ties between its government and the state of Israel. During the cold war and its immediate aftermath, both joined ranks to stave off common challenges in the Middle East, including Soviet Russian, Syrian, and Iraqi bellicosity. They fortified military and intelligence links while open diplomatic relations between the two countries endured for decades. Nevertheless, after 2000, the picture began to change as Ankara began to level harsh and unfounded accusations at Israel over a variety of political and military issues. The weakening of Turkish secular institutions, including the military establishment, and Turkey’s growing identification with Islamist Iran, the Hamas-led Palestinian government, and Syria may damage or scuttle the Ankara-Jerusalem nexus in the coming years. Moreover, it has an adverse effect on the 25,000 Jews living in Turkey. Are the developments merely attributed to Israeli-Palestinian-Syria hostilities? Are they symptomatic of a growing process of Turkish Islamist radicalism? Is this unfavorable trend irreversible? We have no answers.

In our companion volume, The Convergence of Judaism and Islam, Norman A. Stillman made the following astute observation: “The lack of a resolution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the heightened tensions between Jews and the Muslim populations in several Western European countries, . . . and the sorry state of Muslim-Jewish relations worldwide . . . would all seem to indicate that, for better or for worse, Muslims and Jews still share a destiny that is intricately intertwined.” Our genuine hope—mixed with caution and concern—is that better times will loom large on the horizon.
SECTION I

Common Interests versus Latent and Overt Tensions
Jews have traditionally occupied a significant, and sometimes even dominant, place in several areas of Ottoman science, medicine, culture, and education. In the sixteenth century, Jews introduced to Ottoman society new forms of the performing arts, printing, and a range of new technologies and methods of production. These were used by the Ottomans in the exploitation of mineral resources and the manufacture of textiles, arms, munitions, and other products. However, the area particularly dominated by Jews for a long time, from the fifteenth through the mid-seventeenth centuries, was medicine. The well-known sixteenth-century travelers Nicholas de Nicolay and Pierre Bellons de Mans reported that Jewish physicians dominated the field of medicine in the Ottoman Empire and that they were more knowledgeable and numerous than the physicians of any other group. Many Jewish physicians and scientists served in the Ottoman court. A few had established dynasties of physicians. Most famous was the Hamon family, whose sons served Ottoman sultans for some two hundred years, from the early sixteenth century into the eighteenth.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a period considered to be one of decline for both the Ottoman Empire and its Jewish community, Jews lost their primacy in the field of medicine. Still, even then, individual Jews continued to occupy a disproportionately important place in the Ottoman medical profession, serving the court, the government,
and the households of viziers. A major figure was Moses ben Raphael Abravanel (d. 1738), an Ottoman Jew who converted to Islam and became known as Hayatizade Mustafa Feyzi. He made numerous contributions in Turkish to Ottoman medical literature and rose to become chief physician (hekimbaşı) to the sultan. He occupied this office for twenty-two years, from 1669 to 1691, an exceptionally long term. Hayatizade also established a dynasty of physicians that, with few interruptions, monopolized the office of chief physician for over eighty years, until 1753.

Another Jewish convert to Islam who made important contributions to Ottoman sciences and education in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is known to us only by his Muslim name, Hoca Ishak Efendi (d. 1834). Originally from Arta in Greece, he was a mathematician and taught at the Army Engineering School, becoming the school’s director in 1830. During his tenure, he restructured and improved the school’s curriculum, and he is considered a pioneer in the modernization of Ottoman education. He published in Turkish various works of science, including *Mecmua-i Ulum-u Riyaziye* (4 vols., 1831). The work was highly significant because it was the first presentation in Turkish of contemporary mathematical and physical sciences, which necessitated coining new scientific terms in Turkish. Most of Ishak’s neologisms were based on Arabic words, but also on European terms, and they became established in writing and teaching. Apparently, Hoca Ishak remained on close terms with the Jewish community of Istanbul and came to its assistance on a number of occasions. Among Jews he was affectionately known as the rabbi, or ḥakham, of the Admiralty (Tersane), the quarter where the engineering school was located.

Other Jews who were prominent in government service included the dentist Jacob Bivaz, who entered the palace in the late 1830s and continued to serve there for some thirty years. In 1844, a Moravian Jew, Dr. Sigmund Spitzer (1813–94), became physician and political advisor to Sultan Abdul-Mejid. He also played an important role in the modernization of the medical school. During the reign of Abdul-Hamid II (1876–1909), several Jewish physicians and dentists were employed in the palace. These included Elias Pasha Cohen, Isidore Pasha Greiwer, Leon Behar, David Hayon, and Sami Günsberg.

I presented this somewhat detailed historical introduction to underscore the following point. It is true that as a community, the Jews had suffered great decline, both materially and culturally, in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. But contrary to common belief, even during this period there were always Jews, or Jewish converts, who were in the forefront of Ottoman science, medicine, and secular education. This was an important factor as the Ottoman Empire entered the period of reform, the Tanzimat, which actually began in 1826 with the suppression of the Janissaries, the main obstacle to reform, by Sultan Mahmud II. And this greatly influenced Ottoman attitudes toward the modernization of Jewish education. But there were also other factors.

The Greek uprising (1821–32) and the emergence of an independent Greek state (1832) through European intervention demonstrated to the Ottoman ruling elite the existential threats of separatist nationalism. It was immediately apparent that Greek independence could set a precedent for other separatist national movements, for further European intervention, and for the eventual dismemberment of the empire. To counter this threat, the Ottoman government articulated an official ideology of Ottomanism, or Ottoman patriotism, intended to assure the non-Muslim minorities that their future within the Ottoman state was secure and preferable to what it might be in the small national successor states. Equally, or perhaps even more importantly, the European Powers had to be convinced of that. Thus, among the main principles of Ottomanism were pluralism and equality before the law. On November 3, 1839, in an impressive ceremony attended by the foreign diplomatic corps, the Ottoman government proclaimed the Imperial Rescript (Hatt-ı Hümayun), also known as Noble Rescript (Hatt-ı Şerif) of Gülhane. This document formally introduced the new policy of Ottomanism. It included a commitment to equal justice for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of religion, and the “perfect security” of their lives, honor, and property. The stated purpose of the rescript was to promote every subject’s “devotion to the state (devlet) . . . and love of country (vatan mahabbeti).”

Sometime in the mid-nineteenth century, and perhaps as early as 1835, a new term, milel-i erba῾a, entered the Ottoman political lexicon. Literally meaning “the four communities,” it came to denote the officially recognized four religious communities that constituted the Ottoman polity—”Muslims, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks” was apparently the official order. The purpose of this term was to denote that the Ottoman Empire, while a Muslim state, was also a plural society within which the minorities’ special status was officially recognized.

The need to redefine the nature of the Ottoman polity on the basis of
pluralism brought the Ottoman government to reassess the status of the Jewish community, whose usefulness became immediately apparent. In contrast to the numerically strong Christian communities, which in many areas constituted sizeable majorities, the Jews were practically everywhere throughout the Ottoman domains a small minority, which could not possibly entertain separatist ambitions. Moreover, the Serb and Greek uprisings, in the course of which many Jewish and Muslim communities were attacked by the rebels, underscored the mutuality of interests that the two groups shared. These events demonstrated that the Jews, like the Muslims and the Ottoman government, had everything to fear from the rise of national states in the Balkans and much to gain from the continued survival of the Ottoman Empire. Thus it became a matter of state interest to advance the position of the Jewish community and grant it greater prominence in political and public life. The government took great care to ensure that Jewish representatives were appointed to the newly instituted municipal, district, provincial, and state councils. In some cases the Jews were overrepresented, as they constituted only slightly more than 1 percent of the population. For example, in the Şura-yı Devlet (Council of State) established in 1868 as a central legislative body to represent all Ottoman communities and interests, there were 2 Jews out of a total number of 38. In the first Ottoman parliament of 1877–78, where the government determined the number of representatives for each religious community, the Jews had 4 deputies out of 119 in the first session and 6 deputies out of 113 in the second session. Devereux calculated that in the second session the Jews were represented by 1 deputy for every 12,500 males, whereas the Christians had 1 deputy for every 110,058 males and the Muslims had 1 for every 147,953 males. The Ottoman government was also interested in Jewish participation in government service and the civil bureaucracy. Since few Jews were competent to hold such positions, as of the 1840s the authorities exerted particular pressure on the Jewish community to send suitable students to state educational institutions.

In the history of Ottoman educational reform in the nineteenth century, it is possible to distinguish two distinct phases. In the first, beginning in 1826 with the suppression of the Janissaries and the foundation of a modern army, the main goal was to provide the state, and particularly the military, with technical schools. These included an officers’ school, military engineering schools (one for the army and another for the navy), a music school to train regimental bands, and a medical school to provide
the military with physicians and surgeons. Even the new schools for boys ages 10 to 15 were intended primarily to prepare boys for the military schools or for service in the state bureaucracy. The second phase began in the 1860s with the establishment of secular elementary schools intended for the public at large, for both Muslims and non-Muslims. This was codified in 1869 by the Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Public Education) intended to develop a general secular public education system, in addition to the existing Muslim religious educational system, the schools of the religious minorities, and the foreign schools. It was the first time in Ottoman history that the state assumed responsibility for public education, which until then was almost exclusively the preserve of the religious establishment. Among other things, the 1869 regulation was also intended to bring under closer government supervision the schools of the non-Muslim communities, as well as the foreign schools that had proliferated throughout the empire. But for lack of an effective supervisory capacity, the last goal remained largely a dead letter.16

During the first phase of Ottoman educational reform, although the Ottoman government sought to recruit students from all religious communities for their state schools, Muslim and Jewish students were particularly prized because of their perceived greater loyalty to the state.17 The government was particularly interested in Jewish enrollments in the Imperial Medical School (Tıbhane-i Âmire) established in 1827. We know of at least one Jewish student who graduated from the school as early as 1834. To encourage the enrollment of Jews, in 1847 the sultan ordered that the school employ a rabbi to lead daily religious services; that a special kitchen be set up where Jewish dietary laws could be observed; and that Jewish students be allowed special leave every week to observe the Sabbath at their homes. In 1847, 15 Jews attended the medical school together with some 300 Turks, 40 Greeks, and 29 Armenians. In the following year, there were 24 Jewish students, and their numbers continued to increase. The school’s director at that time was Dr. Sigmund Spitzer.18

Jewish students were also encouraged to enroll in the prestigious Imperial Lycée of Galatasaray when it was opened in 1868. Again, arrangements were made to meet the religious requirements of the Jewish students as well as those of Muslims and Christians. Thirty-four Jews were among the 341 students enrolled in the first year. The Jews thus constituted 10 percent of the school’s student population, which was approximately twice their relative share of about 5 percent of the capital’s
population. In subsequent years, growing numbers of Jews attended state secondary and higher educational institutions. Thus it is important to note that the first organized effort to modernize and transform Ottoman Jewry through education came from the state, and its main purpose was similar to that which guided the government’s efforts in creating a modern-oriented Muslim elite, namely, government service.

While the first successful, though limited, attempts to modernize Ottoman Jewry through education were initiated by the Ottoman state, western Jewish philanthropic organizations assumed the leading role in this area in the late nineteenth century. But the Ottoman state institutions played a pioneering role in creating a modern, educated Jewish elite whose members facilitated the work of western Jewish organizations. Already in 1848, twelve years before the establishment of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), Jacques de Castro, a graduate of the Ottoman medical school and a senior medical officer at the military hospital at Haydarpasha in Istanbul, wrote to the editor of Archives Israélites, the Jewish journal in Paris, urging western Jewry to help improve the educational standards of the Jews of the Levant.

Several attempts were made to establish modern Jewish schools in the Ottoman Empire in the 1850s, usually through the cooperation of western and local modernist Jews. This is how the first modern Jewish school was founded in Istanbul in 1854. The school was immediately embraced by the top westernized Ottoman bureaucracy, especially Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman foreign minister and a leading figure of the Tanzimat reform movement. When conservative rabbis forced the school to close in 1858, the Ottoman authorities immediately intervened on the side of the Jewish reformers, and the minister of education, Hayrullah Efendi, issued an order that the school be reopened.

A new era in modern Jewish education in the Ottoman Empire began in the 1860s with the establishment of modern schools sponsored by the AIU. The AIU’s aims were to work everywhere “for the emancipation and moral progress of the Jews,” as well as for their integration as productive and loyal citizens within the general societies of their respective countries.

The AIU’s mode of operation varied from place to place and over time. In general, however, it provided some of the funds necessary to establish and operate its schools; it also provided principals, teachers, curricula, a plan of action, and leadership. Its success depended, however,
on the material and moral cooperation of the local communities or, at the very least, on the support of some leading elements within them. Also crucial was the attitude of the Ottoman authorities. In spite of their strong French cultural orientation, the AIU schools were set up as local community institutions. Although many of these schools enjoyed close relations with French consular agents wherever those were located, unlike foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire, legally they were not under the protection of France or any other foreign power. Furthermore, their curricula stressed modernity, patriotism, and loyalty to the state. The Ottoman authorities saw them, therefore, as complementing the work of the state schools. During the Tanzimat period, the modernizing and often French-speaking Ottoman bureaucratic elite had been supportive of modern education in general, in the belief that such education would help create a secular enlightened citizenry, dedicated to the ideals of pluralism and Ottoman patriotism.

Midhat Pasha, the well-known reformer and “father” of the first Ottoman constitution of 1876, is a case in point. After he became governor of the newly organized Danube province in 1864, he supported the establishment of a Bulgarian printing press. Midhat, who admired the French language and French culture in general, sent four Muslims and two Bulgarians to study in France. He established the first official provincial newspaper in the empire, published in both Turkish and Bulgarian, and supported the foundation of a municipal library in Rusçuk, the provincial capital. Above all, Midhat was a strong believer in secular education. He was concerned about Bulgarian separatism encouraged by Russian influence. To counter this threat, Midhat devised a plan to establish mixed schools for Muslim and non-Muslim children. The plan encountered strong opposition from both Muslim and Christian leaders, however, and in the end it was not realized. Still, Midhat’s dedication to secular education is reflected in the following statement he made in 1867: “In forty or fifty years people will not build churches or mosques anymore, but only schools and humanitarian institutions.”

In his dealings with the Jewish community of Rusçuk, Midhat urged its leaders to establish a modern Jewish school. Indeed, Midhat’s efforts to develop modern education in the Danube province paved the way for the establishment of AIU schools in Rusçuk after his departure, for boys in 1873 and for girls in 1874. When he became governor of Baghdad in 1869, Midhat was instrumental in developing and expanding the local
AIU school. Again, in 1880, when he served as governor of Damascus, Midhat played an important role in the reopening of the AIU school of that city after it had remained closed for over a decade. The supportive attitude of the Ottoman bureaucracy had, in effect, ensured the success of the AIU educational work within the Jewish community.

With the ascendance of Abdul-Hamid II to the throne, the attitude of the Ottoman administration toward foreign schools had drastically changed. The sultan regarded these institutions with suspicion and hostility as colonial instruments designed to undermine the empire. This led Abdul-Hamid to expand the Ottoman state educational system. But the Ottoman government could do little to curb the continued expansion of foreign schools due to the opposition of the European powers.

This had little relevance to the AIU schools. Although Abdul-Hamid was opposed to Zionism, he considered Jews a positive element that could favorably contribute to the state’s well-being. He encouraged Jewish immigration to the Ottoman Empire, except to Palestine. Indeed, as of 1890, the AIU’s educational activity greatly flourished and its network expanded in the large urban centers and was further extended to smaller communities. By 1912, the AIU operated 115 schools in the Ottoman Empire of which 71 were for boys and 44 for girls with a total enrollment of some 19,000 students. In Istanbul, about 35 percent of the school-age population attended AIU schools.

Indeed, the AIU leadership in Paris could not have been more pleased with the attitude of the Ottoman government with regard to its activities, as is reflected in the following passage in the AIU annual report for the year 1893:

There are but a few countries, even among those which are considered the most enlightened and the most civilized, where Jews enjoy a more complete equality than in Turkey. His Majesty, the Sultan, and the government of the Porte display towards Jews a spirit of the largest toleration and liberalism. In every respect, Abdul-Hamid proves to be a benevolent sovereign and a protector of his Israélite subjects. . . . The Sultan, as well as his officials, know that Jews are among the most obedient, faithful, and devoted subjects of Turkey.

In addition to a major school system, the AIU established in the Ottoman Empire a network of related organizations that included alumni
associations, mutual-aid societies, and reading clubs. The AIU became, thereby, a major factor in shaping the worldview of Ottoman Jewry. The graduates of the AIU schools and those who subscribed to its ideology were known in the Jewish community as “Alliancists,” and by the late nineteenth century they had emerged as a major opinion group. In several important areas, the AIU’s ideology overlapped with that of the Young Turks. Many of the Alliancists became active in the ranks of the Young Turks or were close to them. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the reconvening of the Ottoman parliament, three of the four Jews serving in the new Chamber of Deputies—Emanuel Carasso, Vitali Farraggi, and Nissim Masliyah—were graduates of AIU schools and members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the main Young Turk group.35

Under the Young Turk regime, many Jews held important positions in the Young Turk movement and in the government. Of all the Ottoman minorities, the Jewish community was the only one to provide the CUP with a frontline leader, Emanuel Carasso, and an important ideologue, Moise Cohen Tekinalp.36 Other Jews held important positions in the government. For example, Ezekiel Sasoon served as undersecretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and subsequently in the Ministry of Commerce; Nissim Russo held an equally important position in the Ministry of Finance; Vitali Stroumsa became a member of the Supreme Council for Financial Reform; and Samuel Israel (Izisel) was chief of the political section of Istanbul’s police force, a most sensitive and powerful position.37

Modern Jewish schools received the support of successive Ottoman regimes throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because they advocated basic principles that were commonly shared by the reforming bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period, Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, and the Young Turks. And these principles were modernity, patriotism, and loyalty to the state.

Notes


6. During this period we find a significant number of reports about Jews who, for one reason or another, converted to Islam. See also Zvi Keren, *The Jewish Community of Rusçuk: From the Periphery of the Ottoman Empire to Capital of the Tuna Vilayeti, 1788–1878* (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2005), 85, 108–109 (Hebrew).


20. Cohen, Jews of the Middle East, 131; Levy, Sephardim, 110–11.


28. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 145.

29. Keren, Jewish Community of Rusçuk, 213–32.


33. Chouraqui, *Cent ans*, 161–66; Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, 117, 130, 139–40, 193n89. As far as enrollments in AIU schools, there were considerable differences among the various Jewish communities. In Izmir, for example, only 14 percent of Jewish children attended AIU schools, compared to 50 percent in Edirne. Rodrigue, *French Jews*, 92.


36. Feroz Ahmad, “Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914,” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 1:425–28.

This chapter explores how Ottoman Jews’ manifestations of patriotism during the empire’s 1897 war with Greece affected their relations with their neighbors, both Christian and Muslim. It does so by examining the cases of two Ottoman port cities situated in the eastern Mediterranean basin, each with a sizeable Jewish population. The first section of the chapter concentrates on the Jewish community of Salonica, an Ottoman city perched at the top of the Aegean, where—by a number of accounts—Jews constituted the single largest demographic group in the urban fabric. The second section shifts the focus to Izmir, also an Aegean port city, with a Jewish population about a third the size of Salonica’s Jewish community. There, Jews found themselves living as a minority in a city with much larger Muslim and Christian populations.

Needless to say, these demographic differences made the circumstances each community faced distinct. Yet the backdrop of an Ottoman state framework lent the Jewish communities of Salonica and Izmir many structural similarities as well. In part because they considered their empire an Islamic state, Jews in both places came to express a pronounced sense of identification with local Muslims and even with Islam per se during the late Ottoman era, a trend that intensified as hostilities erupted with Greece in the spring of 1897. Although this occurred as a result of both strategic and spontaneous acts of self-positioning, ultimately, as war beckoned and tensions grew in the early months of 1897, the Jewish
leaders of each city found themselves confronting similar challenges, many of which they had not anticipated.

The Case of Salonica

In late April 1897, local Jewish journals marveled that the recently announced war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece had not led to any disturbances in the nearby Ottoman port city of Salonica, despite the city’s proximity to the theater of war and its intimate involvement in the conflict. Although it housed the depot for soldiers departing for and returning from the front on a daily basis, Salonica had somehow managed to remain free of the violence besetting the nearby countryside. Reports spoke with admiration of the “perfect calm” that reigned in the city while battles raged not far away. One article published by the Jewish-run Journal de Salonique just a few days after the outbreak of hostilities explained the situation thus: “The incidents occurring on the [Greek-Ottoman] border have not damaged in any respect the excellent relations maintained . . . between all of the different [religious] communities.”

The fact that general order had been maintained in a city that housed Jewish, Muslim, Greek Orthodox, and other Christian groups was impressive, especially because spontaneous urban conflicts between Ottoman Muslims and Christians were recorded elsewhere in the empire in 1897. In these other areas, local Muslims and Christians appeared to be reenacting on their own streets the war between the Ottoman and Greek states with whom they identified or were identified by others. What was different, then, about Salonica that had kept its inhabitants quiet and cooperative, as the city’s journalists noted with great pride?

As it turns out, the situation was not entirely as peaceful as the local press made it out to be. Moving beyond the newspapers’ claims of peace and quiet, a variety of sources also point to other, unwritten stories of intercommunal relations during the war, stories that can help us to piece together a more complete picture of underlying patterns of socialization and conflict in Salonica around the turn of the twentieth century. Tensions or conflicts of any sort, however, were touchy subjects for the journalists and communal leaders trying to mold the image of their community according to their own ideal vision. For this reason, they preferred to focus on those acts that fit this vision or could be used to further it.

Without a doubt, most of the patriotic displays offered by Salonican
Jews during the war matched the hopes of their communal leaders perfectly and were featured prominently in their publications; most were organized and orderly acts of patriotic sentiment that met with the approval of all authorities and evinced Ottoman Jews’ positive identification with the state. This positive identification was marked by signs of gratitude for the empire, which became a great and beneficent protector in the eyes of many Ottoman Jews. As I will argue here, it also often translated into special displays of affection for local Muslims. (In the context of the war, Muslims came to embody the protective force of the empire more than ever, as they filled the ranks of the Ottoman army.) Throughout 1897, such acts received continual praise in the pages of the Ladino and French Jewish newspapers of Salonica and garnered attention even from local Ottoman papers and representatives. At this time, the city’s Jewish journalists announced that their coreligionists across the empire were proving their unflagging loyalty to the state by outdoing their usual shows of patriotism.

The first notices of active Jewish involvement in the war effort began to appear in Jewish periodicals of the city, namely, *La Epoka* (in Ladino) and the French-language *Le Journal de Salonique*, in late April, some two weeks after the official outbreak of hostilities. At this time, the papers recounted the story of two Jewish youths from Salonica who volunteered to fight “alongside their Muslim compatriots” as soon as the pair had heard the announcements of war. The pages of *La Epoka* assured readers that these two young men, reportedly unable to suppress their intense feelings of patriotism, hailed from “honorable Salonican families.” Their request was met with flattering words by the marshal in charge (Kazım Paşa), and their departure brought an enormous crowd to the train station. Immediately before leaving, the two were heard shouting out in Turkish, “Padişahımız çok yaşa!” (Long live our sultan!). The young men’s cries had come “straight from the bottom of their hearts” and had inspired the thousands gathered there to repeat the call, readers learned. The article concluded enthusiastically, noting that over 50 Jewish men had already applied to volunteer as Ottoman soldiers. The newspaper predicted that approximately 150 young Jewish men from Salonica would be enlisted soon, though it did not explain where this number came from.

News of Jewish volunteers to the army soon gave way to other news of Jewish involvement in the war effort in general and support for the Ottoman army specifically. Jews joined efforts organized by Muslim men,
women, and youth groups in Salonica. In particular, they began to participate in new patriotic projects such as those of the recently organized Red Crescent Society. When subscriptions to the Red Crescent effort were listed in the papers, the names of Jewish philanthropists regularly appeared alongside the names of Muslim philanthropists. The papers also wrote of how Jewish women’s societies sent money to the temporary hospitals organized near the battle fronts. Around the same time, a group of Jewish youths began collecting money to have beds sent to the front lines, another action that paralleled Red Crescent projects. Soon notices appeared of Jewish doctors from Vienna and Ottoman Jewish medical students recently returned from their studies in Paris volunteering their services in the border region where the fighting was taking place. Subscriptions in honor of the displaced Muslims of Crete saw constant donations from Jews as well as Muslims in the city. Salonica’s Jewish press also published notes from the chief rabbi of Crete, telling of how 100 Muslim families from that island had been given shelter in the homes of local Jews.

By the second week of May, the actions of a new group established by Jewish youths in the city captured the special attention of Ladino and Ottoman journals in Salonica. The society made its debut by organizing a special reception for wounded Ottoman soldiers returning from the front to Salonica’s train station. As the wagons of beleaguered fighters pulled to a stop, they were greeted by the group, which offered each soldier his own silver-plated watch and chain as well as a pack of cigarettes. Reports noted the soldiers’ gratitude for the gesture. Over the weeks that followed, the story of this “most moving” of efforts offered to the state’s heroes by the young Jewish men of Salonica circulated through various papers of the city as well as the Ottoman capital.

Indeed, most acts of patriotism demonstrated by Ottoman Jews merged so well with the ideal visions of the Jewish leaders of the city that the journalists’ job was made easy; they recounted the news immediately and with pride. Yet, since their larger project aimed at shaping their readership’s self-perception, memory, and even behavior, they were also willing to do what they deemed necessary to change reality, or even bury it, if they believed that it might endanger the public face of their community or the maintenance of stability in the city more generally.

We see this approach made explicit in a correspondence published in La Epoka not long after fighting had ceased: at this moment, the city’s
Jewish journalists openly discussed their goal of consciously shaping the way their community would be seen by contemporaries and by future generations. Discussing the Jewish “patriots” who had volunteered as soldiers during the short war, the paper issued a call for all 41 of the Salonian Jewish youths who had ultimately become Ottoman soldiers to register their names at the office of its press. The information gathered about each young man was limited, the piece explained, but La Epoka’s editors hoped to publish a list that would include each soldier’s full name along with a brief biographical sketch.

Soon after reading this notice, a correspondent writing from Adrianople (Edirne) suggested that the paper consider publishing photographs of each of his “brave young compatriots.” The following issue of La Epoka quoted the reasoning behind the Adrianople correspondent’s suggestion in more detail: “During the Russo-Turkish Campaign,” the piece read, “many Jews from Salonica enrolled in the army. What memory has remained of those patriots? None! If we do not attempt to collect the photographs of those who proved willing to go to war this time, within a few years, perhaps even in a matter of months, the memory of their service will be reduced to the newspaper articles written during the war.” In other words, he concluded, “they will be forgotten.” Another contributor to the paper remarked that it was indeed very important to “always maintain an active memory of the Jewish participation in the last campaign [and] . . . to do more than take the photographs of these young volunteers.” “We also need to include details about each action taken by Jewish communities on the patriotic occasion of the war,” he added, “and publish them together in a brochure that every Jew should keep as a prized possession.”

Added to the above acts of patriotism, that brochure, if it did appear, might have included other “positive” patriotic acts, such as the special communal prayers for Ottoman victories recited throughout the war, Jewish schoolgirls who sewed soldiers’ uniforms, or sentimental stories about poor Jewish pupils who bought patriotic supplements of Ottoman newspapers in order to support their Muslim peers recently orphaned by the war. It might have mentioned the Jewish girl who visited ailing soldiers, or the doctors who volunteered to heal them, or those who made public appeals to their fellow Jews to turn in their hats and “take out their fezzes,” so as to display their patriotism more evidently on a day-to-day basis as they walked down their city’s streets. It might have
also mentioned the Jewish man who risked his life to warn members of an Ottoman regiment near Larissa that the bridge they planned to cross was loaded with dynamite. Many of these acts were planned, and all of them were officially condoned, but they were not the only forms of patriotism that Ottoman Jews exhibited during the war.

There were also clear instances of Jewish identification with the empire and with Muslims that concerned rather than pleased the Jewish leadership. These acts of patriotism were often spontaneous and constituted what I will call negative acts of patriotism; that is, they were always defined in opposition to a third party who became the adversary. When one such chaotic moment threatened to turn violent within the city itself during the height of the war, the Salonican Jewish press faced a dilemma. The disturbance did not match its reports of ethno-religious harmony in the midst of war, nor did it fit with its position that “the Salonican resident represents the ideal of the malleable and governable citizen.”

To complete our picture of Jewish patriotism in the Ottoman Empire, we need to look elsewhere for other stories, both those that were not told in contemporary Jewish papers and those that were mentioned within their pages only in other contexts. One such case surfaced in Salonican Jewish newspapers some two months before war was declared.

In early February, *Le Journal de Salonique* called for the serious attention of police concerning the “scandalous activities” taking place in an open space behind Hamidiye Boulevard every Saturday. There, the article explained, numerous gangs of young Greek Orthodox and Jewish ruffians gather and “arrange themselves in the order of battle.” At this point, they begin throwing stones, which “at times rain down with such fury that they leave the site of battle and injure innocent passers-by on the boulevard.” Local Greek and Jewish leaders had done all they could to discourage this behavior, the piece suggested, but nothing had worked to combat the “instinct of aggressiveness which reigns among these little scoundrels.” At this point, the article concluded, only the strong hand of the police could help.

The fighting appears to have been a form of ritualized violence. It was not new but rather a “chronic sickness” that was taxing the nerves of those who cared about the community, a piece appearing the following day in *La Epoka* explained. The Ladino article urged that rabbis address the problem in sermons throughout the city’s synagogues, decrying both the activity itself and the profanation of the Jewish Sabbath.
warned the parents of these troublemakers to see that they quit their violent ways and thus avoid punishment by the authorities. It is noteworthy, however, that the fights occurring between Salonican Greek and Jewish youths only made the news when journalists or other communal figures decided it was time to intervene. Since such battles were disagreeable to Jewish leaders, they would either work to halt them or keep silent. The approach Salonica’s Jewish journalists took to the rock fights illustrates their conscious use of the tactics of interventionism and silence, alternately, when faced with what they felt were the unacceptable actions of members of their own community.

The case of these urban battles is important for another reason as well: it offers an example of how intercommunal relations in the city were not as idyllic as Le Journal de Salonique and La Epoka would claim two months later, as they referenced the harmonious atmosphere of Salonica during the Greco-Ottoman War. In other words, despite the surface of calm and apparent cooperation between all groups in the city during the conflict of 1897, relations between certain groups of Jews and Greeks in the city remained embattled.

While both papers hinted only obliquely at the question of how many people took part in the rock fights or of how large an audience came to watch them each Saturday, both clarified that they considered the spectators of these rows guilty as well. Still, their reports concentrated their attention mostly on the Greek and Jewish rock throwers themselves, pointing out their youth, their lack of education, and their low social station, all factors which suggested that the unfortunate pattern might still be “corrected.”

Yet, on 28 April 1897, some ten days after war with Greece was declared, an incident occurred that greatly upset those in charge of the Jewish community of Salonica. This event seems to have involved large numbers of Jews hailing from a wide variety of backgrounds and ages, making it more disturbing than the routine rock fights that journalists ascribed to a group of lower-class Jewish and Greek youths. What is more, it occurred in a central location in the town, under the eyes of many, including foreign observers.

That day, as a trainload of wounded Greek prisoners returning from the battlefield passed through Salonica, local Muslims and Jews reportedly gathered at the train station and began taunting the train’s passengers. The Greek minister of foreign affairs later reported to the French
embassy in Athens that the crowds, consisting of Salonican Jews and Muslims, had exceeded 15,000 souls. While this number may easily be an exaggeration, it nonetheless gives us an impression of the significant figures involved and, at the very least, the enormity with which the event came to be painted by some. Apparently, the threats the Jews and Muslims hurled at the Greek prisoners did not stop for over an hour, as they followed the railcars that made their way across Salonica’s streets until ending at its famous White Tower, where the prisoners were to be held.

Although various accounts indicate that the Jews and Muslims of Salonica had come out together to confront the Greeks who represented their “enemy,” certain consular and foreign reports suggested that Jews had been at the center of this outburst. In fact, one Athenian paper accused the entire Salonican Jewish community of having participated in the disturbance. The clear hyperbole of this last claim aside, the fact that Jews had been especially visible during the troubles posed a great problem for the leaders of the Jewish community and for its journalists, who responded to this event only with silence. In fact, throughout the following weeks, they did not mention the disturbance even once. The intercommunal brawls and fighting that had previously occurred offstage, so to speak, in peacetime, and away from their cities’ centers, had been disturbing but manageable enough. Once war broke out, and tensions were suddenly cast in such clear political molds, their former methods—calls to the chief rabbi for sermons and to the police for action—no longer sufficed.

The total silence of the Jewish press offers a reminder of the more complex and sometimes uncomfortable aspects of the very patriotism these journalists espoused and attempted to foster among their readership. The silence of the local papers on the subject seems indicative, also, of the limitations of their influence over their own communities. In the case of the stone-throwing boys, local journalists had interceded and, at least for a time, succeeded in bringing the issue to the attention of the larger community and the authorities, halting much of the violence as a result. This time, the story of the harassment of Greek prisoners in Salonica had been picked up abroad and by the Athenian press in particular, which blamed Salonica’s Jews for the incident.

While some of the more overtly political tensions of the April train depot incident may have superimposed themselves onto previous patterns of ritualized violence, such as the rock fights, these had now taken
on novel, urgent, and political layers of meaning in the context of wartime for all involved. This added dangerous undertones to such tensions, which could no longer be dismissed simply as the work of uneducated youths. Each time an urban conflict arose in the midst of the war, it became more clearly cast as a symbolically charged political act.

Also striking was the total sense of confidence and ownership of the public space that Salonican Jews had exhibited during the incident, as they goaded the Greek prisoners passing through the town. With the additional police surveillance of wartime, and the new presence of Ottoman soldiers in the city, the Jews—already the single largest religious group in Ottoman Salonica—appear to have felt a bolstered sense of security in 1897. Their great success in performing patriotic acts, and the applause with which these had been met by local Ottoman officials and journals, may have contributed even further to such spontaneous manifestations.

One contemporary observer, a representative of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) in Salonica, expressed his concern about the excessive “zeal and noise” that had accompanied the Jews’ public demonstrations of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire during the war. He worried that the Jews had abandoned their usual reserve and thus turned local Greeks against them.35 Indeed, though contemporary Jewish observers do not seem to have been inclined to mention this fact, there were plenty of historical precedents of Greek-Jewish tensions created during earlier conflicts that might have given reason to be wary.36 Moreover, the Alliance representative’s discomfort with the Jewish community’s excesses further exposes the undercurrent of intercommunal tensions in late Ottoman Salonica, tensions that appear to have deepened during the war. Disorganized and unplanned acts such as these greatly disturbed Jewish elites in Salonica, who hoped to erase either their practice or their memory, or both. Despite the claims of Jewish journalists to the contrary, the war raging off in the distance had, in fact, also found its way home to the streets of Salonica.

The Case of Izmir

The Jewish papers of Izmir also spoke of harmony among the different groups living together in their city.37 At the start of the year, a recently founded Ladino journal, *El Meseret*, published an article describing the cooperation and openness that abounded in Izmir. It told the story of a
young man who early one morning awakened his neighbors with alarming cries. As they soon realized, he was drowning near the docks and calling for help. “It was early in the morning,” the paper recounted, “most people were still asleep, some were already in the synagogue reciting their prayers.” (The event occurred in the neighborhood of Karataş, where many Jews lived.) “All those around responded rapidly and ran out . . . everyone yelled to the man to approach, but as he tried he lost all his remaining strength and began to sink. If it had not been for a Jewish boy . . . who tied a rope around his body . . .”38

The story, as we can surmise, ends happily and with a Jewish hero. For the time being, however, the helpless drowning man remains unidentified. “No one knew to which religion this man belonged, or how he had fallen into the sea,” but this did not stop them from saving him, the notice furthered. As it turned out, the man was Greek. The paper proudly pointed to this fact in order to demonstrate the level of intercommunal respect and support present in the city: the denizens of Izmir risk their lives for the sake of their fellow man, readers learned, without taking note of or inquiring after his religion.

A variant of this ideal vision of interethnic “blinders” was echoed in the columns of El Meseret on 19 February, in a piece which reminded its audience that “our magnanimous sultan protects all of his citizens without distinction of race or religion.” This time, the article described the regular weekend promenades that residents of Izmir were known to take in and around the city. Thankfully, the article explained, the sultan took good care of all Ottomans: “the surveillance of the police is not wanting, there is no reason to be afraid, and we all find safety and peace” during the excursions.

Yet the same article which had begun with discussions of the sultan, safety, and peace continued with a warning. Despite these near-perfect conditions, it explained, “we Jews take our outings in such a strange manner that we invite malicious gossip. And so it is that every year the non-Jewish journals of our city relate at least one or two unpleasant incidents . . . which, even if they do not shame our entire nation, clearly do not bring us any honor. And why is this? It is because . . . we go walking a la europea (in European fashion), men and women together, hand in hand, with drinks and food. These good people believe themselves to be acting like Europeans without understanding the European way. They go just to
have fun and forget that they are not at home—that they are in a public place . . . a place which is open to all eyes.”

The article further detailed how “alcohol, a poor counselor,” was leading Jews of both sexes to get drunk, sing, prance around, and shout, which in turn spawned the laughter and ridicule of non-Jewish passers-by. Consequently, brawls would break out, the women tried to interfere, and in the end, the article explained, “Jewish men and women get tangled with non-Jews, the public tries to intervene, and the blame is laid upon the Jew or, better put, upon ‘the Jews.’” The paper admonished its readership, noting that as Jews they occupied a precarious position and that they must maintain “serious caution in their actions and movements.” In light of these comments, the paper’s earlier insistence on the invisibility of communal boundaries can be seen more clearly for what it was—the excessive protestations of a journal intent upon shaping both its readers’ behavior and the way they interpreted their reality.

While the context of interethnic violence was notably different here, the immediate solution proposed by the Ladino press of Izmir coincided with the approach advocated within the pages of Salonica’s Jewish papers in response to the mischief of the stone-throwing Jewish and Greek youths in that city. Noting that for years the veteran Ladino newspaper of Izmir, *La Buena Esperansa*, had dedicated editorials to the unsettling subject of the outings (and the brawls that often resulted from them), *El Meseret* called upon the chief rabbi to ensure that rabbis across the city denounce these activities once and for all by giving sermons on the matter in their synagogues. The piece further suggested that their spiritual leader enlist the force of the police, since “it is within their power to prevent these people from getting drunk in public.”

The moral that *El Meseret’s* author drew from these “scandalous activities,” however, represents a drastic departure from the conclusions drawn by Jewish elites in Salonica in response to the rock fights. In that case, journalists and representatives of the Alliance alike concluded that such exchanges were a sign of essentially “premodern,” unenlightened behavior that could be rectified through “modern,” western-style education. Not so here. The piece from Izmir did not treat such clashes as vestiges of a disagreeable past, but rather as the result of embarrassing and mistaken attempts among local Jews to be “modern” by aping the manners of westerners. “Rather than imitate the Europeans, many of whose
customs do not suit us, we would be well served to imitate the Turks, removing from our midst various European customs which we enact only awkwardly and which bring us great moral and material harm,” it explained.41 By offering this interpretation, El Meseret used the occurrence of regular disturbances to offer its readership a moral and political lesson: Ottoman Jews were to be made aware, if they were not already, of their special affinities with their Muslim neighbors and thus to consciously strengthen these connections as a result of their reading.42

Expressing the editors’ gratitude to those responsible, subsequent reports indicated that the campaigns against the ill-advised drunken strolls were proving successful. By March, however, a new problem had arisen, “an even dirtier wound,” the paper reported, “worse than the earlier-mentioned outings.” Now, apparently, the Sabbath excursions were being undertaken by “newly Europeanized Jewish youths” who rent boats and conduct themselves in such a manner that they almost invariably end up overturned.43 The message was clear: those involved were told that they were lucky to have ended up with only a bath, but that they were behaving irresponsibly and risking their own lives as well as those of the people who came to their aid.

Although the story itself did not sound wholly unfamiliar, in sharp contrast to the case of the drowning Greek man saved by a Jewish youth some months earlier, the news this time did not bring with it a message of a city blind to communal boundaries. Now, as the tables had turned and Jews were in need of rescue from the city’s waters, the paper’s stance had changed radically. Not only did it acknowledge that communal divisions were important elements of the local landscape, the article also declared that the shameful actions on the part of some local Jews would have repercussions for the city’s Jewish community as a whole. The journal’s editors were attempting a balancing act, it seems, as they sought to reinforce their ideal of intercommunal harmony as well as their sense of obligation to respond to the reality of Izmir’s streets. Calls to halt embarrassing and disgraceful behavior of Izmir’s Jews continued in the following months, evincing an underlying anxiety about the place of the small Jewish minority within the larger social fabric of Izmir.44

These coincided, however, with exuberant accounts of Jewish patriotism and identification with the Ottoman Empire as war approached. Jews in the city and its outlying areas held special ceremonies for their military and prayed for its rapid and total victory. They also gave public
speeches in Ladino as well as Turkish emphasizing their dedication to the cause and to their state; many donated money, clothing, or supplies to funds created for the mostly Muslim soldiers of the Ottoman army. In fact, this particular form of identification was made concrete through Jewish participation in Red Crescent Society activities and other projects aimed directly at aiding Muslim populations displaced by the war, notably those in Crete. Alignment with local and even distant Ottoman Muslims had become an integral part of how Ottoman Jews expressed their loyalty to the empire during the war, in Izmir as well as Salonica.

The Ottoman Jewish press praised those who undertook such patriotic activities and duties and called upon every community member to make his or her contribution, however small, to the war effort. El Meseret, for its part, began a special fund-raising campaign, announcing that half of all income made from new subscribers would support the Ottoman military.45 La Buena Esperansa publicly called upon a certain “Madame Joselin,” resident in Izmir, explaining that “during the time of the Russo-Turkish War, she had been the president of a Jewish women’s charitable society and at numerous times expressed her sympathy with the soldiers of the imperial army.”46 The author of the article, explaining that he did not understand why Madame Joselin had failed to heed the call of duty this time, apparently compelled her to take action: a subsequent issue announced that she had managed to bring her society back together and that the group had already sewn 100 shirts for the Ottoman soldiers stationed in the region.47

As with the appeals for sermons and police surveillance to counter displeasing behavior among the local Jewish community, here too the paper made use of its coercive power in order to mold the behavior of its audience. While the irresponsible actions of Jewish youths in Salonica and Izmir had drawn severe criticism and elicited calls for harsh measures, highly respected and influential members of the community were not immune to receiving public lessons in propriety, patriotism, or both, through the pages of the Ladino press. Even the esteemed “Madame Joselin” had been publicly singled out and scolded, however indirectly and gently, when her activities did not match up with those which her community’s journalists had in mind for her and her philanthropic society.

Perhaps even more striking is the fact that, as in Salonica, there would also come a moment for the Jewish community of Izmir when, in the midst of the Greco-Ottoman conflict of 1897, the patriotism of the local
Jewish population appeared to have run amok. This development posed a challenge for the leading elites of Izmir’s Jewish community, who had until then glibly reported upon the spectacular shows of patriotism being performed by Jews throughout the war. Perhaps only quite by chance, this moment arrived just a few days after the disturbance in Salonica.

The first notices of the troubling episode in Izmir came not from the local Jewish press but rather from the pages of Ottoman journals. A representative of the Alliance based in Istanbul noted the occurrence in his reports back to Paris as well, although he referred to Ottoman papers as his source. The story sounded familiar enough when it began: it told of exuberant young Jewish men, caught up in a wave of patriotism, presenting themselves as volunteers in the imperial army. But its predictability stopped there. The Jewish leaders of Izmir suddenly confronted the unforeseen and—for them—clearly negative consequences of their community’s sometimes overly exuberant patriotism. As Jewish youths across the empire presented themselves as volunteers for military service, a large group of young Jewish men from Izmir reportedly came forward with a new interpretation of this request: in addition to proclaiming their desire to serve in the ranks of the Ottoman military, they also made it known to local officials that they intended to convert to Islam.

The numbers of those who actually underwent this process vary according to the source, yet by all counts, the conversions took place over the space of a couple of days. The largest group was announced by the Ottoman-language paper Sabah, which claimed that some sixty-five Jews had converted to Islam while voluntarily enlisting in the army in a show of total dedication to their empire. The same paper soon cited another nineteen youths who had requested and undergone the same treatment. By 12 May, it noted, thirteen more were taken into the army with similar requests and preparations made for their conversion to Islam.

Not surprisingly, this news, which showed up in private Jewish sources such as the correspondence of the Alliance, did not find its way so easily to the Jewish press. Leaders within the community were no doubt taken aback by this chain of events. While conversions were known and in fact somewhat routine occurrences within the Jewish community, they usually occurred on a smaller scale and for seemingly more personal reasons, primarily economic ones. The reality of any sort of conversion en masse, then, was so out of the ordinary as to lead to suspicions that foul play might have been involved or perhaps large-scale disaffection with
the community or some of its representatives. Yet this was not the explanation offered by the sources of the time. Rather, they pointed only to the will of these Jewish youths to serve their country and to their deep sense of Ottoman patriotism. As there seems to be no evidence of the use of coercion at this moment, and as it is well known that Jews elsewhere in the empire were being accepted as volunteers within the ranks of the Ottoman army without becoming Muslims, the occurrence of such large-scale conversions appears all the more perplexing.

Indeed, the leaders of the Jewish community in Izmir had great difficulty formulating either an explanation or a response to the news. Perhaps not surprisingly, and much as the Salonican Jewish press had done, most of the local Jewish newspapers stayed silent on the subject. La Buena Esperansa, the oldest Ladino periodical of the city, was the only local Jewish paper to respond: it dedicated a short section to the topic, although the notice was hidden within its pages and without a subheading of its own. The editors did not hide their dismay or their thinly veiled criticism of the choice of these youths who had left their community: “It is being said by [various Ottoman] journals that all of these conversions have been animated by the patriotic sentiments of those who desired to serve among the ranks of the Ottoman army as volunteers. In reality, we are unable to explain the motives which obliged these youths to abandon their religion, since they were perfectly able to serve their homeland without any obligation to convert.” As a testament to this, the paper offered the example set by young Jewish men elsewhere in the empire: “We are aware that in Salonica and in the area of Bursa various young Jews have enlisted themselves as volunteers in the army, while still holding fast to the religion of their forefathers.”

Here, it seems, the Jewish population had taken the vision of an Ottoman patriotism which knew no bounds as well as a sense of solidarity with Muslims to new extremes. As for the Jews enacting this form of identification, perhaps they felt they were simply pushing such patriotic projects to their logical conclusion. For the leading elites of their community, however, the disturbance at the train depot in Salonica and the group conversions in Izmir represented the excesses of the very loyalty and patriotism they had been trying to foster all along.

Finding their messages distorted and misread, they approached with silence the troubles that now cast such a long shadow at the height of the 1897 war with Greece. In the end, Ottoman patriotism and identification
with local Muslims, both goals which the Ottoman Jewish press had advocated vociferously throughout the conflict, seemed to have slipped just beyond the control—and even the comprehension—of the Jewish journalists who had perhaps done the most of anyone in their communities to advance these campaigns.

**Conclusions**

Overall, we can conclude that Jews in Salonica and Izmir largely took the occasion of the brief Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 as an opportunity to find a new and extraordinary means of displaying their attachment to the empire. The positive elements of this identification often translated into acts of solidarity with local Muslims on the ground, such as when Jews volunteered to fight alongside soldiers on the front or lent their support to Muslim refugees from Crete or to the projects of the recently (re)organized Red Crescent Society.

In both cities, Jewish acts of patriotism predominantly fit the positive vision put forth by the Jewish elites and journalists who intentionally sought to influence their local Jewish community with an eye on safeguarding its public image and security. The press encouraged and lauded strong Jewish identification with the Ottoman Empire and its primarily Muslim subjects and soldiers. Its abstract calls for solidarity with the Muslims quickly transformed into concrete acts of sympathy for the Muslim war-wounded or refugees in particular.

Yet the increased period of tension occasioned by the conflict also had the potential to spark more violent, spontaneous shows of solidarity with the empire and with local Muslims, as was the case of the train depot incident in Salonica. Here, we begin to see what we might call the ugly underbelly of Ottoman Jewish patriotism: the Jews’ strong sense of alignment with the Ottoman Empire could in fact entail highly negative elements as well, such as when identification with the Ottoman side of the conflict and feelings of camaraderie with local Muslims were accompanied by the recognition of the foil of a Greek “enemy” in their midst.

The Alliance official who had warned of this process a few months after war had erupted seemed to understand that excessive “zeal and noise,” even if directed positively toward the majority population, or one’s government, was a formula for trouble. In the city where he was
stationed, he had seen overly enthusiastic acts of patriotic identification spill over into violence. Tensions between the city’s Jews and Greeks, if already present in certain forms, gained a clearly political charge in the wake of the war.

Negative forms of patriotism also exposed the rift that existed between the ideal visions of Jewish community leaders, invested in shaping the public face of their community, and the ways in which many among the popular classes chose to express and enact their attachment to the empire. In the case of Izmir, the strong identification with local Muslims, trumpeted time and time again in the pages of the Ottoman Jewish press throughout the war, may have even inadvertently contributed to the mass conversions to Islam, which left a perplexing and unsettling legacy for the community’s leadership. *La Buena Esperansa*, the only Jewish newspaper of the city which had not remained silent in the face of the conversions, did not return to the issue after voicing its timid protest. The pages of Salonica’s Jewish journals similarly registered their own communal scandal—the taunting of the Greek prisoners of war at the city’s train station—only in the most limited and indirect manner.

On 31 May, a small notice, without a headline, appeared in *Le Journal de Salonique*. It read: “A convoy of fifty-seven Greek prisoners arrived in our city yesterday. At the [train] station, the honorable English consul . . . presented each soldier a package of various sweets and cigarettes. From the station all the way to the White Tower, where they were to be held, the prisoners were the object of [the population’s] sincere curiosity.” This clearly served as proof, the article pressed on, that “we are far from the calumnies being hurled at our population by the Greek press of Athens!” Despite this fleeting reference to the troubling accusations then being leveled against Salonican Jews, neither the author of this notice nor any other Jewish journalist in the city provided further hints as to the content of these “calumnies.” Consciously inserting only the positive version of events into the pages of their papers, the city’s Jewish journalists were evidently keen to rewrite the history of their own community. They did not entirely succeed in erasing the unsettling events they had witnessed from the historical record, however. Through alternate sources and even through careful readings of the press itself, we can begin to put the story of Ottoman Jewish patriotism back together in its entirety.
Notes

The material presented in this chapter is drawn from my larger book project, entitled *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Belonging*.

1. The Jewish communities of Izmir and Salonica were both part of a larger Judeo-Spanish culture sphere that spanned the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean littoral. Sephardic customs and culture prevailed among Jews in these regions for centuries, beginning with the arrival of large numbers of Jewish refugees expelled from Spain in 1492. The Judeo-Spanish vernacular that developed in this context (here called Ladino) was still the common language of Jews of the “core” Ottoman lands, including Salonica and Izmir, during the period under study. For the most comprehensive study on the subject, see Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th–20th Centuries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

2. According to the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* entry on Salonica, the Jewish population of the city stood at 80,000, out of a total population of 173,000 in the 1890s. One source from 1897 put the number of Salonica’s Jews at anywhere between 70,000 and 80,000: Pierre Mille, “En Thessalie: Journal de Campagne. Première Partie,” *Revue des Deux Mondes* 67, no. 4 (October 1897): 610. Another contemporary offered the figure of 70,000: *Il Vessillo Israelitico* 45, no. 4 (April 1897): 120. The numbers offered by the Ottoman census begun in the early 1880s are significantly lower, suggesting a Jewish population of approximately 34,500 Jews out of 103,500 total residents. Such census data is known to have undercounted, however, and also did not include foreign Jews residing in the city as Jews. Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 135.

3. The number of 22,516 Jewish residents in Izmir is offered by contemporary population data cited in *El Meseret*, 2 April 1897 (and also published in the Salonican paper *La Epoka* around the same time). A figure of approximately 25,000 is offered for 1905 (out of a total urban population of 201,000) by the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* entry on Izmir, which notes that the population had declined significantly since 1868, when it estimates that there were some 40,000 Jews residing in the city. In this case as well, Ottoman census records from the late nineteenth century give a lower figure of 15,000. Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 123.

4. As with the case of the Jews in Salonica, some sources suggest that the Greek Orthodox population constituted the single largest religious group in Izmir. See, for example, Charles Dudley Warner, *In the Levant* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1876), 256, which claimed that of just over 200,000 inhabitants of Izmir, 90,000 were Greek Orthodox and 80,000 were Muslim. Other sources suggest lower numbers for the Greek Orthodox population, indicating that in 1890 “there were 52,000 Ottoman Greeks and 25,000 Hellenic subjects in a city of 200,000.” Vangelis Kechriotis, “The Greeks of Izmir at the End of the Empire: A Non-Muslim Ottoman Community between Autonomy and Patriotism” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Leiden, 2005), 54. These last figures are also compatible with
those of the Ottoman census from the time. See Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 122.

5. *Le Journal de Salonique*, 22 April 1897. The Salonica correspondent of an
Italian Jewish journal also spoke of the calm in the city during the war: *Il Vessillo
Israelitico* 45, no. 4 (1897).


7. Tensions in Izmir are mentioned in AMAEF-Nantes, Consul of Izmir to
Istanbul, E 241, 4 April 1897. Also see Henri Nahum, *Juifs de Smyrne*, XIXe–XXe
and Izmir in “Salonique et la Guerre Gréco-Turque de 1897: Le fragile équilibre
d’une ville Ottomane” (master’s thesis, University of Paris, 2002), 72–74. I am
indebted to Lévy for sharing her work with me. Its many insights, based on
extensive research done with French sources from the city, helped direct me
toward the richness of this moment in the city of Salonica.

8. For different (yet related) examples of how Ottoman Jewish journalists
undertook a process of transforming their readers, see Sarah Abrevaya Stein,
*Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian and Ottoman

9. A third Ladino paper, by the name of *El Avenir*, of Jewish nationalist lean-
ings, appeared in Salonica on 15 December 1897, less than two weeks after a
peace treaty had finally been signed.


11. On Jewish participation in Red Crescent efforts in 1897: *Tercüman-ı Hak-
kat*, 5 May 1897; *El Meseret*, 7 May 1897; *Sabah*, 8 May 1897; *El Tiempo*, 10 May
1897. For an excellent analysis of the role of the Patriotic Mobilization during
the reign of Abdülhamid II and particularly during wartime, see Nadir Öz-
bek, “Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime,

12. See, for example, *Le Journal de Salonique*, 15 April 1897.

13. On Jewish doctors arriving from Paris, see *Journal de Salonique*, 10 May 1897, and
also *El Tiempo*, 14 June 1897.


16. Ibid. They reportedly had some 250 of these watches made. This figure
is mentioned in David Recanati, ed., *Zikhron Saloniki* (Tel Aviv: Committee for
the Publication of Books on the Salonica Community, 1972), 1:165. For Ottoman-
language reports: *Asır*, 12 May 1897; *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, 21 May 1897; *Sabah* 21
May 1897; *Asır*, 6 June 1897; *Malumat*, 22 July 1897.


20. Ibid. As of yet, I have not been able to verify whether such a brochure
did appear. However, the Jewish volunteers of the city were later officially
decorated with war medals in a ceremony held in Salonica. See Asir, 30 September 1897; Il Vessillo Israelitico 45, no. 10 (October 1897).

21. La Epoka, 14 May 1897.
23. This is especially striking because it is not clear to what extent these Jewish schoolchildren would have been able to understand the Ottoman-language papers they were purchasing.
24. On the girl who visited the wounded soldiers, see El Tiempo, 31 May 1897.
25. El Meseret, 30 April 1897.
26. See, for example, Sabah, 21 May 1897; Sabah, 22 May 1897; La Epoka, 28 May 1897; El Meseret, 28 May 1897.
27. Le Journal de Salonique, 22 April 1897.
29. I refer here to ritualized violence (with the work of David Nirenberg in mind) as an instance of violence reenacted among parties on a cyclical basis, following either a weekly calendar (as in the case of rock throwing, occurring every Sabbath) or a yearly one (as in the case of Christian-Jewish conflicts, which often arose around Easter). See David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Indeed, La Epoka had discussed the Greek-Jewish rock-throwing rituals performed by Greek and Jewish youths “on the Sabbath and holidays” as a familiar phenomenon nearly a decade before the cited instance. See La Epoka, 3 May 1889.
30. La Epoka, 12 February 1897.
31. This is not to say that Greek-Jewish relations in late Ottoman cities were characterized exclusively by such confrontations. There is also significant evidence of cultural and economic exchanges between Ottoman Jews, Greek Orthodox, and other Ottoman Christian communities. Such confraternity and socializing constituted patterns that did not necessarily “make the news” on a regular basis, however. A full picture of Greco-Jewish relations in the late Ottoman Empire—although beyond the scope of the present chapter—would necessarily take all levels of intercommunal sociability into account. One such example is provided by Henri Nahum, who describes how Christians and Jews celebrated religious holidays together in Izmir: “Around the [Jewish] holiday of Purim, Greeks, and Armenians would come in large numbers to promenade and dance through the illuminated streets of the Jewish quarter.” Nahum, Juifs de Smyrne, 85.
33. Acropolis, 2 May 1897. A translation of this article is included in the archives of the Alliance (AIU). Representatives of the Jewish community forwarded the question to the British consul in Salonica at the time, asking that he help calm the situation by acknowledging that most of Salonica’s Jews were not to blame for the incident (which he agreed to do). See PRO/FO 78/4828, 9 June

34. Acropolis, 2 May 1897.

35. In the collections of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Série Grèce, IC 40, 25 June 1897.

36. In fact, although none of the sources I have encountered from 1897 acknowledged this, the patterns created during this war were reminiscent of those developed in other conflicts, most notably the Greek War of Independence (1821–32). This instance of revolt against Ottoman rule also led to increased tensions between Ottoman Greeks and Jews, as Jews came to identify, and be identified, as the ultimate allies of the Ottoman Empire. For a useful review of these developments, see Lagos, “The Metaxas Dictatorship,” 68–84, and Fleming, Greece, 57–58, 62.

37. These were El Meseret, La Buena Esperansa, and El Nuvelista/Le Nouvelliste. The last of these sometimes also printed small pieces in French (in Latin characters), although in 1897 its use of French was quite limited.

38. El Meseret, 22 January 1897.

39. El Meseret, 19 February 1897, emphasis mine.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. In fact, this message merged almost seamlessly with the journal’s mission, announced in its very first issue. There, its editor explained that he hoped the paper would serve as the “interpreter between the Jewish community and the Ottoman authorities.” El Meseret, 15 January 1897. The Ladino paper would soon include a page in Ottoman Turkish as well; its owner was a local Muslim, a fact constantly repeated in the paper to reinforce the Jewish-Muslim partnership present in the city.

43. El Meseret, 12 March 1897.

44. Indeed, wartime in Izmir had brought an uncomfortable situation for the local Jewish community. As it turns out, Greek citizens residing in Izmir, as well as local Ottoman Greek subjects, began to depart to fight on the side of Greece, reportedly accompanied by the “cries of massive crowds that had come out to support them” as they left. Nahum, Juifs de Smyrne, 21.

45. El Meseret, 30 April 1897.

46. La Buena Esperansa, 3 May 1897.

47. La Buena Esperansa, 7 May 1897.

48. See Sabah, 8 May 1897. Also recorded in (AIU) Série Turquie, IC 4, 17 May 1897. I am grateful to Nazan Maksudyan for providing me with these issues of Sabah during the earliest stages of my research on this topic.

49. Sabah, 11 May 1897. Other Ottoman newspapers give different numbers:
reports from İkdam dated 5, 8, 10, and 13 May 1897 together suggest that sixty-eight Jewish men from Izmir converted before joining the army during the war. Tercüman-ı Hakikat, 5 May 1897, and Sabah, 5 May 1897, offer the first examples of this pattern, citing four and one convert-volunteers in Izmir, respectively.

50. Also cited in (AIU) Série Turquie, IC 4, 17 May 1897. Henri Nahum’s work on the Jews of Izmir alludes to the conversions of young Jewish men attempting to prove their loyalty to the empire, but provides no citation. Nahum, Juifs de Smyrne, 156. Elsewhere he concludes that cases of out-marriage and conversion were extremely rare. Ibid., 56. This view of conversion in the late Ottoman world departs somewhat from the picture presented in Leah Bornstein-Makovetsky, “Jewish Converts to Islam and Christianity in the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” in Minna Rozen, ed., The Last Ottoman Century and Beyond: The Jews in Turkey and the Balkans (Ramat Aviv: Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Center, 2002), 2:83–127 and in Selim Deringil, “‘There Is No Compulsion in Religion’: On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839–1856,” Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 42, no. 3 (July 2000): 547–75.

51. Shortly before the mass conversions in Izmir described here, El Meseret published an article describing the economic and social causes of conversion, particularly the pressure placed on Jewish girls unable to secure a suitable marriage partner within their own community. See El Meseret, 30 April 1897. Various Ottoman Jewish charities and philanthropists worked to give dowries to the Jewish poor in part to counter this trend. For one such case, Anri Niyego, Haydarpaşa’da Geçen 100 Yılımız (İstanbul: Gözlem Gazetecilik Basın ve Yayın, 1999), 45, discusses the Ottoman Jewish philanthropist Jacques Bey de Leon, who became known for helping poor Jewish women “in danger of converting.”

52. La Buena Esperansa, 7 May 1897. The same article cites the Ottoman papers Ahenk and Hizmet of Izmir as reporting sixteen and sixty-five conversions, respectively—the latter being the same number reported on 8 May by Sabah.

53. According to the series of reforms known as the Tanzimat (including the Gülhane Edict of 1839 and the Imperial Rescript, or the Hatt-ı Hümayun, of 1856), conversion would not have been necessary for military service, which became open to everyone, at least theoretically. In reality, however, most non-Muslims did not serve even after this point, but rather paid a military substitution tax known as the bedel-i askeri until universal military conscription was made obligatory in 1909. On this, see Benbassa and Rodrigue, Sephardi Jewry, 69.

54. Emphasis mine.

55. La Buena Esperansa, 7 May 1897.

56. Le Journal de Salonique, 31 May 1897.
Sharing the Same Fate

Muslims and Jews of the Balkans

Ömer Turan

For centuries, Muslims and Jews lived together in peace under Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Both groups were brought into and settled in the peninsula by the Ottoman government between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. The sixteenth century was the so-called golden age for both groups. During the following centuries, both suffered from the interventions and invasions by Austria, Russia, and Germany. They were also considered threats by newly emerging nation-states and were forced to leave the places where they had lived for centuries. Despite the fact that these groups had very different histories and social, economic, and cultural traditions, they shared their relations with the Christian nations and states of the Balkans during the Ottoman and post-Ottoman periods. Focusing on the common features of these groups, this article is an attempt to reinterpret the Jewish and Muslim histories in the Balkans mainly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Settlements and Classical Ages

The Ottoman Empire conquered the Balkans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Even though the peninsula was on the main trade roads, the centuries of Crusades, a weak Byzantium, and endless struggles of hegemony made the peninsula unsafe and underpopulated. The Ottomans allowed the Christians to observe their religion and customs. Following the Ottoman invasion of the Balkan peninsula, Turks
of Anatolia were sometimes compelled and at other times encouraged to settle in the Balkans. Many of the Sephardi Jews expelled from Spain were also settled in the Ottoman Balkans.¹ Thessaloniki and Edirne were the most important cities in the Balkans where the Jews were settled.²

The Ottoman Turks brought Islam into the Balkans. The Jewish presence on the peninsula had a long past. In spite of difficulties, Greek-speaking Jews called Romaniots had been living on the peninsula for a long time. Because of the Christian persecutions, the Jews of Byzantium supported the Ottoman conquests in Anatolia and the Balkans. Therefore, the Ottoman leaders rewarded the Jews. They trusted the Jews and saved them from the Christians.³ Under Ottoman rule, Jews’ lives, dignity, and faith were all protected from the attacks of Catholics or Orthodox Christians. For the first time in this part of the world, Jews were considered equal with Christians, under the Ottoman millet system. Like the Muslims, Greeks, and Armenians, the Jews constituted a separate millet. Their organizations were based on their origin, language, location, professions, aims, etcetera. In the millet system, the Ottoman Jews maintained Halakhah, their religious law, in their rabbinical courts with their own judges. Jews and Muslims thus lived together in the Empire and the Balkans under the protection of the Ottoman sultan in the sixteenth century. While Jews mostly engaged in trade in the urban centers, the Muslims dealt mainly with administrative, military, and agrarian affairs. Under the prosperity of the empire, Jewish cultural life flourished.⁴

The Ottoman lands were a safe place for the Jews. Therefore, leaders of Jewish communities in the Balkans wrote letters to those who were still persecuted and invited them to migrate. The letter of Isaac Tsarfati, the leading rabbi of the Edirne community, is well known. He came to the Ottoman lands and noted the prosperity and freedom of the Ottoman Jews; consequently, he wrote a letter to his coreligionists, described the situation in the Ottoman Empire, and invited them in the 1430s.⁵ As a result of this practice, the Jewish populations in Balkan cities, such as Thessaloniki, Monastir (Bitola), Edirne, and Nikopol, generally increased. Thessaloniki was the biggest Jewish city in southeastern Europe.⁶

**Anti-Semitism among the Christian Nations of the Ottoman Empire**

As a result of the capitulations (privileges given to Europeans in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century), European traders began to
cooperate with the Christians in the empire. From this time the Chris-
tians began to gain power and the Jews began to lose their privileged
positions. Parallel to this development, anti-Semitism began to be seen
in the Christian groups of the Ottoman Empire. It had religious, histori-
cal, economic, and psychological roots. Olga Todorova states, “A specific
continuation of the Gospel motif about the Jewish decadence, the idea
of ritual murder by the Jews, was born in Western Europe in the age of
the Crusades and became accessible to the Orthodox world a couple of
centuries later.”

In Ottoman society, the first blood libel accusations were observed in
1530, when Armenian priests and notables of Amasya, a small town in
Central Anatolia, accused the Jews of the city of slaughtering an Arme-
nian boy. They attacked the Jews and plundered their quarter. Sometime
later, the Greeks similarly accused the Jews and ravaged their quarter.
Accusations continued. Western diplomats began to be involved in the
blood libel troubles in the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century.
These kind of accusations and attacks of the Greeks and Armenians were
supported by the local European consuls. The same anti-Semitic climate
also existed in the Balkans. From the Balkan Orthodox angle, the Jews
were killing Christian children for their blood in order to add it to their
bread, and they were treacherous and unclean in the physical and moral
sense. “The Jew in folklore is an acting enemy of Christianity.”

The nineteenth century has been defined as the age of nationalism in
European history. The idea of nationalism was born in Western Europe
and transported to the East. In the Balkan conception of nationalism, “the
other” had an important role. In Balkan nationalism, “the other” was the
Ottoman, and the Jews were their partners and historical enemies. Balkan
Christian revolutionaries perceived Muslims and Jews as threats to their
existence. From their point of view, the Muslims represented Ottoman
rule. Since the Jews voluntarily became subjects of the Ottoman Empire
and therefore were protected by the authorities, Christian nations of the
Balkans generally adopted a negative policy toward them. They associ-
ated the Jews with the Ottomans. When the Serbian revolts were destroy-
ing the Ottoman towns in 1804, they did not distinguish Jews from the
Muslims. They labeled the Jews Turkish protectees and spies. During
the Greek Revolution, revolutionaries put the Jews in the same chilling
category as they put the Turks, namely, aliens. Therefore, being a Jew was
even more dangerous than being a Turk.
From the Bulgarian perspective, the conception was similar. Although Shealtiel claims that anti-Jewish activities in Bulgaria began only in 1939, anti-Semitic remarks can be found in Bulgarian literature and folklore of the Bulgarian revolts, including the work of Ivan Vazov. The Bulgarian revolutionary press was openly anti-Semitic. The Jews were portrayed as dishonest, corrupt, and avaricious people in the speeches of Bulgarian National Revival figures. After describing the cruelties of Bulgarians toward the Muslims and Jews during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, Sir Austen Henry Layard, the British ambassador at Istanbul, stated that “the hatred of the Bulgarians for the Muslims proceeds more from religious animosity and prejudice than from any other motive. The Bulgarians can certainly not complain that they have been misgoverned or oppressed by the Jews.”

The Jews and Christians were competing for places close to the Ottoman Palace and trying to hold commercial and financial superiority in Istanbul for centuries. The execution of some Jewish bankers in the 1820s ended the rivalry, and the Jews were the losers. As a result of modernization, brought to the Jews of the Ottoman Empire through state schools, schools of Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the other European organizations, a growing Jewish middle class emerged during the late nineteenth century. “Equipped with modern education and skills, increasing numbers of Jews were steadily able to make their way into the liberal professions, new sectors of commerce and finance, governmental service, and the trades.” Even though the Jews still were poorer than the Greeks and Armenians, the development of the Jews in the economic and social fields increased anti-Semitism among the Christian Balkan nations.

The Attacks on Jews and Muslims

Since Muslims and Jews were considered the enemy during the revolutions, whenever the central government could not protect them, both groups were attacked. These attacks began even before the nineteenth century. In the second half of the eighteenth century, as anarchy increasingly prevailed in these areas, the Jews came under the attack of Greek insurgents and bandits. At that time, several long-established Jewish communities—including those of Chalcik (Eğriboz), Thebes (Istifa), and Navpaktos (Inebahtı, Lepanto)—were either abandoned or destroyed.
During the Greek revolt, in many places, such as Chios and Epirus, Jews and Turks cooperated against the Greeks. At the beginning of the revolution, in Moldovlachia, Jews were at the sides of the Turks against the Greeks. Because Turks and Jews were the target of Christians, Antonios Miaoulis, one of the Greek revolutionaries, noted that three to four thousand Turks and Jews in the besieged town of Nafplion were killed by the Greeks. Revolutionaries killed about 10,000 Jews and Turks when they entered the capital city of Morean Peninsula, Tripolis. Some sources claim that the Greeks hated the Jews more than they hated the Turks. When Tripolis was attacked, some Jews offered a large amount of money to the Greek army to be released. However, as Colonel Voutier explained, “All the money in the world could not save them from the anger of Greeks, who hate them more than Turks.” Because of Jewish support for the Ottomans, the Greeks of Odessa reacted in the same way and assaulted local Jews. Therefore, many Jews, like Turks, escaped to the Ottoman territories to save themselves.

During the Serbian rebellions of 1806–1807, the rebels attacked both Muslim and Jewish quarters of Belgrade, looted their homes, and killed their residents. Some of the Jews who paid ransom were allowed to escape to Zemun. About 3,000 Jews and Muslims who remained in the city were forced to convert to Christianity. Some other Jews were driven from the city. They spread to Zemun, Banat, Bosnia, Bulgaria, or Austria. The refugees in Vienna approached the Russian ambassador, complaining about the atrocities committed by the Serbs against the Jews. At that time the Serbian rebels were receiving aid from Russia, and they were under the strong influence of Russia. The leader of Serbian rebels, Karadjordje, did not deny it, but explained that “the Jews were in the service of the Turks.”

When Ruse and Nikopol were occupied by Russia in 1807, Muslim and Jewish villages and city quarters were attacked and mosques and synagogues were burned. Similar atrocities took place in 1811 and 1829. During the Bulgarian revolts and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, Muslims and Jews were considered enemies to be exterminated. Especially during the war, Russians and Bulgarians committed atrocities against the Muslims and Jews of Vidin, Nikopol, Ruse, Kazanlik, Stara Zagora, Kiustendil, and Plovdiv. Their houses were burned, and they were forced to leave what had been their homeland for centuries.
Migration to Turkey

During the declining period of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims and Jews of the Balkans and surrounding areas suffered from the interventions and invasions of the Hapsburg Empire and Russia. The Christian Balkan and Slavic countries put pressures on the Muslims and Jews and forced them to leave. Both groups considered the Ottoman Empire and Turkey to be a safe haven. Muslim migrations to the Ottoman lands from Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued. The best known cases are migrations of Circassians from the Caucasus and Crimea to Turkey after the Crimean War, Turkish migrations from Bulgaria during and after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, Bosniak migration from Bosnia after the Treaty of Berlin, and Turkish migration from Macedonia during the Balkan Wars.20

Sometimes with the Muslims, sometimes on their own, the Jews of the above mentioned areas also migrated to the Ottoman Empire from the Slavic and Balkan states. The Ottoman government was always compassionate and receptive not only for the Muslims but also for the Jews. The anti-Semitic measures of those under the leadership of Boghdan Chmielnicki caused the Jews of Ukraine to be massacred, and they therefore took shelter in Ottoman lands. The attitudes of the Ottoman government toward Muslim and Jewish refugees from Crimea in mid-nineteenth century were very positive without discrimination. After the Crimean War of 1853–56, Muslims and non-Muslims of Crimea were forced to leave the peninsula. They arrived in Ottoman lands, and the sultan issued a firman and accepted all of them without any religious discrimination. They were going to be settled in and around Dobrudja. Since they had to leave all their property and lands in Crimea, they were to receive free food, homes, agricultural equipment, and lands.21 In a letter to the governor of Silistre, the Ottoman government ordered no religious discrimination while assisting them.22 The Jews of Kerch applied to the Ottoman government to be settled in an appropriate place. The Ottoman sultan allowed them to settle somewhere in the Balkans.23 Since they had different traditions, they were also allowed to live under their own rabbis.24

Except during the Crimean War, Jewish and Muslim migration to Turkey continued from Bulgaria during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, from Eastern Roumelia during the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern
Roumelia in 1885, and from Greece during the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. Jews of Russia and Central Asia who came to the Ottoman Empire because of Russian persecution should also be mentioned. Even though it did not materialize, Abdul-Hamid II thought of a mass settlement of Jewish refugees from Russia and other countries in Eastern Anatolia in 1893.25

During the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, Greece occupied western Thrace and Thessaloniki, where Jews and Muslims had been living for centuries. Greek and Bulgarian soldiers destroyed the mosques and synagogues, attacked Muslims and Jews, and killed many of them. Greek persecution forced the Jews and Muslims to flee to Ottoman lands.26 Some European journals, such as the Times, Le Temps, and the Jewish Chronicle covered the attacks on the Jews and Turks and Greek soldiers’ assistance to the aggressors.27 According to Tevfik Biyiklioğlu, during the Balkan Wars and World War I, more than 200,000 Muslims migrated to Turkey from Thrace, Macedonia, and Epir, which came under Greek rule. Many Turks from western Thrace, which became Bulgarian, took refuge in Ottoman lands.28 Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia passed to Serbia after the Balkan Wars. Muslims of these regions were forced to accept Christianity. Following the Turkish army’s return, the Turks and other Muslims of the area began to migrate to the Ottoman territories. Turkish and Muslim migrations to Turkey continued during the following years as well.29

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the number of Jewish communities in the Ottoman cities increased by about 50 percent because of migrations from the Balkan countries. For instance, in Bursa there were 2,179 Jews in 1883, but their number increased to 3,500 around 1900. The Jewish population of Silivri was 1,200 in 1896 and reached 2,024 in 1907. The number of Jews in Istanbul was 40,000 in 1886 and reached 65,000 in 1904; in the same period, the number of Jews increased from 20,000 to 35,000 in Izmir. The number of Jews in Thessaloniki was 30,000 in 1880, grew to 60,000 in 1900, and reached 90,000 in 1908.30 The Jewish population of Edirne increased from 4,000–5,000 in 1870 to close to 20,000 in 1912.31

The journal of Angele Gueron, the director of the Alliance Israélite Universelle School for Girls in Edirne, reflects the feelings of an intellectual Jewish woman who considered herself an Ottoman patriot during the siege of Edirne during the Balkan Wars. This paragraph was written when the Bulgarian army entered the city full of promises:
This page in history approaches its end with ominous signs. The Bulgarians will undoubtly give us beautiful cities and magnificent edifices. They will give us a foretaste of Europe. But we Jews have much to be thankful for to this Ottoman society that is so far from progress—this is true—and yet, it is so humane. Who knows after how many days of suffering we will lament the [ruling] hand of the Turks that was so gentle towards the Jewish population.32

Turkey was the safe haven for the Jews during World War II. Many Jewish families left Germany and came to Turkey. Hundreds of Jewish scholars also came to Turkey and worked in Turkish universities.33 Between 1934 and 1944, about 37,000 European Jews also used Turkey as a transit site to emigrate to Palestine.34

**Greece**

The attacks on the Jews and Turks in Greece were not limited to the period of Greek revolts. After the establishment of the Greek Kingdom in 1830, the remaining Jews and Muslims were still targets for the Greeks. One of the most interesting attacks on the Jews was the case of Pasifico in 1847. During Easter, traditionally the Greeks in Athens stoned and burned an effigy of Judas Iscariot, which was called “Jewish.” Before Easter, the Greek government canceled the ceremony because an important British figure of Jewish origin was to visit Athens. The Greeks were angered by that decision, and they sacked and burned the house of the Portuguese consul, Don Pacifico, a Jew born in Gibraltar and therefore a British citizen. The British government asked for compensation for the Pacifico’s losses several times. Finally, the British navy blockaded Piraeus, the port of Athens, and the Greek government agreed to pay compensation.35

In 1891, Jews and Muslims were attacked in the Ionian islands. Many were killed, and the rest escaped to Ottoman territories. In 1897, Greeks organized a revolt in Crete, and Muslims and Jews took refuge in Ottoman lands. They were settled in Izmir.36

The fate of the Muslims and Jews of Greece in the twentieth century was no different than in the previous age. In the great fire of 1917, the Muslim and Jewish quarters of Thessaloniki were burned. Only Greeks from Anatolia were allowed to settle in the quarters.37 The Greek army occupied Anatolia after World War I, killed civilians, seized Turkish and
Jewish properties, occupied their houses and shops, and burned their quarters in western Anatolia. The occupation continued for three years. After the War of Liberation, the Turks regained western Anatolia in September 1922. The exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was decided at the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922–23. Muslims of Greece and Greeks of Turkey were exchanged. The only exceptions were Greeks of Istanbul and Muslims of western Thrace. Greeks of Turkey who were exchanged were settled in the houses of Muslims who left Greece in the exchange. Those Greeks accused the Jews of not supporting their fight against the Turks. Registering in different election zones, the Greek government prevented the cooperation of the Jews and Turks of western Thrace during elections. Several decisions were made in order to destroy the Jews economically. Jewish schools were closed. Education in the Greek language was made mandatory.38

In 1936, the Venizelos government was dismissed and the bans on the Jews were lightened. However, the beginning of World War II brought heavier days for the Jews of Greece. Germany and her allies occupied Greek lands. Bulgaria occupied western Thrace and eastern Macedonia. More than 10,000 Jews were sent to death camps. Western and central Greek lands—Lesvos, Chios, and Thessaloniki—were occupied by the Italian troops. The situation of the Jews of those places was not as bad as the others. However, in those places that fell under German occupation, the Nazis and their Greek collaborators sent the Jews to Nazi camps in September 1943. Approximately 56,000 Jews of Thessaloniki were sent to camps. Jewish houses, shops, and synagogues were given to the Greeks. Anti-Semitic regulations in Greece were not completely canceled until after World War II. The number of Jews in Greece was 10,000 after World War II and 6,000 in 2010. They are still under religious, educational, and political pressure.39

Both the Treaty of Athens, which was signed after the Balkan Wars, and the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed after the Turkish War of Independence, mentioned the Muslims as a minority in Greece. However, the Greek government did not recognize their Turkish identity. Cemiyet-i İslamiye, their representative organization, had become inefficient.40 The Greek government involved itself in the religious life of the Muslims, did not recognize its elected religious leaders (muftis), put their pious foundations under government control, and forced the Turks to leave Greece. Halit Eren points out that there are about 150,000 Turks in western Thrace,
and if there had not been such heavy oppression, the population of the Turks in western Thrace might have been about 600,000.41

Serbia

During the Serbian rebellion, most of the Muslims and Jews who were living in and around Belgrade were killed or forced to leave their homes. The remaining Jews faced heavy pressure from the Serbians after its autonomy. After Prince Milos Obrenovic was deposed, in 1839, anti-Jewish laws and practices followed. Jews were forced to close their shops on Sundays and national holidays. They were accused of murdering a Christian in Smederevo, like the Damascus blood libel of 1840. They were stripped of all civil rights. They were obliged to live in only certain parts of the cities. Their property was confiscated. In fact, in 1859 during his second term in the Principality of Serbia, Milos Obrenovic abolished all the anti-Jewish regulations, but after his death in 1860, the Supreme National Serbian Committee reversed his edict. In 1861, the representatives of the Jews appealed to the new Serbian prince and demanded their rights. They dared to mention that even before the Principality, during Ottoman rule, they had enjoyed equal rights with the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Jews were accused of being Ottoman spies. Anti-Jewish activities continued in Serbia after 1862 as well. Serbian-educated elite, intellectuals, newspaper editors, parliamentarians, and writers were the leaders of anti-Jewish campaigns in the country.42

Serbia gained its independence in 1878. According to the Berlin treaty, the rights of the Jewish and Muslim communities were guaranteed; Serbia agreed to consider all the religious sects as equal. However, the equality of the citizens in the Kingdom of Serbia was only instituted in the constitution of 1888. During the reign of Peter I, in the early twentieth century, the Jews of Serbia were allowed to live in peace undisturbed for a generation.43 There were 60,000 Jews in the Serbian-Croatian and Slovenian Kingdom in the 1920s. Most of them were living in the cities. There were anti-Semitic tendencies in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana. Their national church also involved itself in anti-Semitism in the 1930s. Ustasha ideology, which developed in the second half of 1930s, received many elements from Nazism, including anti-Semitism. The first examples of anti-Semitism were propaganda, and then some new laws
against the Jews were issued. In 1940, it turned into mass deportation and killings.\textsuperscript{44}

In October 1940, about six months before the beginning of the war in the Serbian-Croatian and Slovenian Kingdom, anti-Jewish laws were promulgated. All Jews in Belgrade, Serbia, and Banat were killed by the summer of 1942. “Serbia was the first European state to be declared \textit{Judenrein}.”\textsuperscript{45} As a result of anti-Semitism in Yugoslavia and the migration to Israel, the population of the Jews dropped to 6,000 after World War II.\textsuperscript{46} Due to the war and other difficulties, most migrated to Israel, the United States, and Europe. The number of Jews in Serbia is not more than 1,000 at present.

Serbia eliminated its Muslim population during the early nineteenth century. However, after the Balkan Wars, it incorporated today’s Macedonia and Kosovo, and after World War I, it annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Muslims migrated to Turkey from Bosnia before the Balkan Wars\textsuperscript{47} and from Macedonia and Kosovo during the Balkan Wars, Muslims were still dominant in those regions. Even though the Serbian-Croatian and Slovenian Kingdom was propagating that “we are brothers and religion is not very important in our brotherhood,” Muslims were second-class citizens in this new state. Therefore, many Muslims, Turks, Albanians, and Bosniaks migrated to Turkey. Between 1918 and 1941, the number of Muslims in the Serbian-Croatian and Slovenian Kingdom was about 1.5 million. After World War II, the Kingdom became Socialist Yugoslavia under the leadership of Marshal Tito. The second-class citizenship status of the Muslims continued in Yugoslavia. Anti-religious policies of the Socialists were applied harshly toward the Muslims. Their properties were nationalized. Some of their rituals were banned. Several mosques were closed, and religious leaders were arrested. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslims, especially from Macedonia, migrated to Turkey.\textsuperscript{48}

During the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the suffering of the Muslims increased. Following Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina also separated from Yugoslavia in 1992. Serbian nationalists attacked the Muslims, burned their houses and mosques, raped the women, and carried out the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Bosnians. In her war diary dated 18 August 1992, Zlatka Dizdarevic describes how the last seven hundred Jews were leaving Sarajevo where they had lived for five
hundred years. The Jews did not want to leave their Muslim compatriots behind and wanted the latter to join them. Stephen Schwartz describes Jewish religious and cultural achievements in Bosnia under Muslim rule and explains how Bosnian Muslims and Sephardi Jews got on well in the past and present. Obviously, he has no positive remarks about Serbs. Sarajevo was called the little Jerusalem of the Balkans in the past, but now it has very few Jewish families left, if there are any at all. The last mosque of Belgrade, Bayraktar Camisi, was burned five years ago. Similar cruelties were conducted against the Muslims in Kosovo by the Serbs.

**Romania**

Russian influence increased in the Romanian Principalities after the Turks lost the 1828–29 Ottoman-Russian War. Legally they were dependent on Istanbul until 1878, but in practice the representatives of the Russian tsar were the most influential figures in the country. In that period, as a reflection of the anti-Semitic climate in Russia, they put anti-Semitic articles in their constitutions. The rights of the Jews were limited. In order to limit their increase and power, an article ordered the deportation of the Jews in the Moldovian constitution. Citizenship rights were not given to the Jews of Romania. For instance, the sentence of “only foreigners of Christian religion may become Romanians” was put in the constitution of 1866.

Emphasizing that Romania was a Christian Roman country, several laws were issued against Jewish religious, educational, economic, and cultural life after Romanian independence in 1878. Between 1899 and 1904, one-quarter of the total Jewish population of Romania (41,754) left the country. Many of them drifted toward Turkey. They were hoping to create agricultural colonies there. When Carol Iancu analyzed the factors in the rise of anti-Semitism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Romania, he put religious factors above other economic, political, and xenophobic factors. He comments, “Whereas prior to 1878, it was the lack of assimilation which seemed to justify hostility toward the Jews, after that date, it was rather the fear of such assimilation which explains the severe legislative measures taken against them.”

Even though Romania had to sign a treaty concerning minority rights like the other Balkan countries at the end of World War I, it was not willing
to practice the articles of the treaty. For instance, Romanian citizenship was not given to all the Jews who were living in the country. Romania, in those years, had the biggest Jewish population of all the Balkan countries. According to the census results of 1930, most of Romania’s 756,930 Jews were traders and industrial workers. Alexander Kittroeff claims that the reason for anti-Semitism in Romania between the two world wars was economic more than religious and national, and the Romanian church simply condoned it.

Before World War II, the anti-Semitic winds of the Balkans passed from Romania as well. Fascist governments that began in 1937 adopted the “Romanization” policy. The agricultural lands of all non-Romans, Turks, Jews, etcetera. were confiscated. Jews who were working in the industrial and trade sectors were dismissed. The Jews were baselessly accused of inviting the Soviets in 1940 and 1941. In Jassy, 8,000 Jews were killed. Some authors claim that the number of deaths was higher. When 185,000 Bessarabian and Bukovina Jews were sent into exile in Trans-Dniistra on the Romanian-Ukranian border, only 30,000 survived. It is claimed that the number of Jewish deaths of Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Trans-Dnistria was 380,000. The Romanian government and the Nazis agreed to deport 350,000 central Romanian Jews to Nazi camps, beginning in September 1942. However, this did not happen. After World War II, the Communist regime took over Romania. Although some authors claim that the Jews filled all the posts in the Communist Party, Hildrun Glass rejects this idea. He explains that the Jews in Romania were not empowered. The number of Jews in Romania was 428,000 in 1949 and 100,000 in 1967. This means 75 percent of the Romanian Jews left the country in less than twenty years. Most of them went to Israel. Migration of the Jews continued. At present there are about 10,000 Jews living in Romania.

The Muslims of Romania were living in the Dobrudja region. According to the figures of Ubicini, there were 134,662 Muslims and 87,900 non-Muslims in Dobrudja in 1879, one year after Romanian independence. At the beginning of Romanian rule, Muslims and Bulgarians were the largest groups there. Therefore, the Romanian government did not recognize the political rights of the inhabitants of the region. The government began to apply a new settlement policy. It changed the rules of landownership. Romanian officers treated the Muslim population badly, and the
Turks of Dobrudja began to migrate to Turkey. Including the war period migrants, Müstecip Ulküsal claims that 100,000 Muslims of Dobrudja migrated to the Ottoman lands between 1877 and 1886.59

Romania recognized the political rights of the inhabitants of Dobrudja in 1909. It also gave some rights to the Muslims. The Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish National Struggle prevented Turks from migrating to Turkey. In 1921, the Romanian government put a new land law into application. Generally in Romania one-third of the land was nationalized, but in Dobrudja half the land was taken from the owners, most of whom were Muslims. Heavy taxes followed. Romanians from the other regions and Vlachs of Macedonia were settled in Dobrudja. Sometimes conflicts arose between new settlers and the Turks. The Romanian officers supported the newcomers. Bulgarian revolutionaries also attacked the Turks. Their aim was to force the Turks to migrate to Turkey. The Romanian government could not protect the Turks. As a result, Turkey and Romania signed a migration treaty in September 1936. Between 1936 and 1939, 30,000 Turks moved to Turkey. During World War II, migration stopped. After the war, the Communist regime did not allow the Turks to migrate to Turkey.60 Under Communist rule, the educational system of the Turks changed several times. The Turkish press was banned. Religious life was limited. Properties of the Turkish pious foundations were taken. Turkish social and cultural institutions and associations were closed.61 After the collapse of the Communist regime in Romania, the Muslims, like the other minorities, gained the rights of publication and education in Turkish, establishing cultural and political organizations. However, they are one of the least prestigious groups in the country.

Bulgaria

As a result of the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War, the Berlin treaty was signed and the Bulgarian Principality was established. Even though the aim of the war was the extermination of the Muslim presence in the Balkans, the total number of Muslims in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia in 1880–84 was 802,587, and Muslims constituted 26.9 percent of the population. The Berlin treaty guaranteed religious, political, social, economic, and cultural rights to Muslims, but their rights were circumscribed. Muslim refugees were not allowed to return to their homes. Their homes were set on fire or given to Bulgarians, and they had to return to Turkey in
order to save their lives and dignity. The lands of the Turks were taken. Their remaining mosques were destroyed on the pretext of city plans. Muslim pious foundations were plundered. Therefore, the Turkish migration to Turkey never stopped. Bulgaria achieved independence in 1908. According to the census of 1910, the number of Muslims decreased to 601,999, only 13.9 percent of the population.62

During the Principality, the number of Jews in Bulgaria was not comparable with the Turks of Bulgaria. However, their problems were not much different. Jews were not allowed to go to the military school or the school for reserve officers, nor were they allowed to find employment at the Bulgarian national bank and other prestigious institutions. There were some laws against Jewish doctors and professionals. Anti-Semitic organizations were established, and anti-Semitic books and journals were published. The anti-Semitic conferences of Tr. Bozhidarov are worth mentioning. They claimed that even though Jews were born in Bulgaria, they were still foreigners; therefore, they had to be expelled from Bulgaria.63

The first years after World War I were the least problematic for the Turks and Jews of Bulgaria. Probably the Turkish-Bulgarian alliance during the war, the Treaty of Neuilly, which Bulgaria signed afterwards, and the tolerant policy of the Agrarian Party, which governed postwar Bulgaria played roles in this calm. Due to the Agrarian Party’s tolerant policy, non-Bulgarian minorities took back some rights that had been lost. Following the assassination of Agrarian leader and prime minister Aleksandar Stamboliyski in 1923, semi-fascist parties ruled Bulgaria. Those governments followed anti-Turkish and anti-Semitic policies. Some organizations, including Rodna Zashtita in northern Bulgaria and the Thrace Committee in southern Bulgaria, declared that “other races have no right to live in Bulgaria” and attacked the Turks. As a result of this kind of pressure, from 1923 until World War II, about 200,000 Turks of Bulgaria migrated to Turkey.64 Apart from the ones that have already been mentioned, Otets Paisiy, Koubrat, Ratnik, and the Legionaries were the other leading nationalist and fascist organizations. Those organizations were encouraged by the government and the officials to attack Jewish shops and law offices.65

Under the influence of Nazi Germany, the Law of Protection of the Nation was issued in Bulgaria in 1940. Due to dissatisfaction with that law, more restrictive measures were taken against the Jews. The Jews were obliged to wear special signs on their clothes and homes. They could
not move freely and had to pay extra taxes. In order to please Germany and retain its rule in parts of Aegean Thrace and Macedonia, which were annexed in the spring of 1941, the Bulgarian government agreed to send 12,000 Jews to death camps. They were listed, and some of them were arrested already. However, because of internal and external developments, such as the battle of Stalingrad, the plan was not implemented.\textsuperscript{66}

After World War II, the Jews began to receive their rights back. However, because of the difficulties they faced, from the establishment of Israel on 15 May 1948 until May 1949, 70 percent of Bulgarian Jews, 32,106, went to Israel.\textsuperscript{67} In July 1949, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided not to permit Jews to return to Bulgaria. A campaign was launched against Jewish educational, cultural, and health institutions in 1951.\textsuperscript{68} By December, only 7,676 Jews remained in Bulgaria: 4,259 in Sofia and 3,417 in the countryside. Some Jewish organizations and schools were stopped. In the early 1950s, a series of anti-Semitic trials were planned in Eastern Europe due to the impact of the anti-Jewish persecutions in the USSR shortly before the death of Stalin. It was going to be launched in Bulgaria, but it did not happen. First of all, the Jews who remained in Bulgaria were Communists. That is why they did not migrate to Israel. However, after 1955, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to oppose Jewish organizations.\textsuperscript{69} Jewish institutions were eliminated and nationalized. Heavy conditions narrowed the field of work for remaining foundations. By the issue of the Law of Religion in these years, religious institutions were nationalized. Vladimir Paounovsky claims that the result of democratization in Bulgaria beginning in 1989 was the free publication and circulation of anti-Semitic publications.\textsuperscript{70}

Even though the pressure on the Turks in Bulgaria during World War II was less than that put on the Jews, they still faced several difficulties. Before the war, more than 10,000 Turks migrated to Turkey each year. However, this number dropped to 7,004 in 1940, 3,803 in 1941, 2,672 in 1942, 1,145 in 1943, and 489 in 1944. After the war, private and pious foundations’ properties were nationalized. Their schools were annexed by Bulgarian ones. Their religious life was largely stopped. In 1950, a new treaty of migration was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, and about 150,000 Turks moved to Turkey in 1950 and 1951. Then the doors were closed permanently. The Bulgarization campaign of the Turks began. Turkish publication was first limited and then completely prohibited,
speaking the Turkish language was banned, and Turkish names were changed to Bulgarian ones. Their Turkish identity was denied. The Turks who objected to these actions were either sent to prison or killed.71 In the summer of 1989, the Bulgarian government was obliged to open its doors, and about 350,000 Turks migrated to Turkey. Because of the unrest in the country, the Communist Jifkov regime collapsed in November 1989. Turkish names as well as political and cultural rights were given back. Despite the fact that their number is more than one million and the Turkish Party “Rights and Freedom” has been a coalition partner of the Bulgarian government for a long time, the Muslims are the least prestigious and most neglected ethnic group in Bulgaria after the Gypsies. They are far more backward than the Bulgarians in many fields.72

Conclusion

This work is an attempt to draw parallels between the histories of Jews and Muslims of the Balkans during the Ottoman and post-Ottoman periods. The Jews never constituted the majority in any part of the Balkans. They lived in the city centers, dealing mainly with trade, finance, and industry. The Muslims constituted a large portion of the total population, even the majority in many places. They were administrators, landowners, and army members in the cities during the Ottoman period and farmers in the countryside afterwards.

It can be claimed that Muslims and Jews were living in the Balkans in peace for hundreds of years while the Muslims, the Ottoman Turks, were able to keep the peace and protect them from attacks by Christians. When the Ottomans weakened and had to leave the Balkans, both the Muslims and Jews were attacked, and they were obliged to leave. The last two hundred years show that whatever the name of the regimes in the Balkan countries—principality, kingdom, Communist dictatorship, or democracy—the degree of pressure on the remaining Muslims and Jews changed but never completely disappeared. Depending on internal sociopolitical conditions or the international political climate, of course, sometimes the Jews and sometimes the Muslims had “untouched years” in different parts of the peninsula at different times. However, these exceptions did not change the rule. Generally they were unwanted inhabitants of the countries. They were considered a potential danger for the countries’ existence. Their religious and ethnic identities were denied,
and their economic, cultural, and religious institutions, including schools and pious foundations, were banned or kept under pressure. Their economic and cultural achievements, mosques, synagogues, and cemeteries were destroyed.

Notes

1. Jewish migration to the Ottoman Empire was not limited to the Iberian Peninsula in the fifteenth century. From the fourteenth century until the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Jews who were persecuted in Spain, France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia came to the Ottoman territories. However, Sephardi migration to the Ottoman lands was the biggest one. Even though their migration continued for about a century, 1492 was chosen as a symbolic year of the Sephardi Jews’ arrival. In the Ottoman archives, there is a letter dated 1892 signed in the name of the Jews of the World to thank the Ottoman sultan for accepting the Jews four hundred years earlier. Prime Minister Ottoman Archives (hereafter BOA), Y.MTV, No. 61/51. The Jews of Turkey also established a foundation to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of their arrival.


3. Stanford Shaw, Turkey: Land of Refuge, conference text given at Ankara Chamber of Commerce, organized by Altay Foundation in 2005, 7–11. Y. Ercan claims that even before the Ottomans, Muslim Turks and Jews always had good relations. Under Seljuki rules, Jews had close relations with the sultans and good economic positions. For instance, Ibn Samha, a Jew, was the representative of the Seljuk sultan Meliksah and his vizir, Nizamülmülk. Another Jew, Sadüdevle, was vizir of the Anatolian Seljuk State in 1291. The famous Arabic traveler Ibn Batuta wrote that when he visited the palace of Aydinoglu Mehmet Bey in Birgi, he saw an old Jewish doctor sitting before the Islamic scholars. Yavuz Ercan, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Gayrimüslimler (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2001), 31.


5. Epstein claims that Tsarfati could not send such a letter without permission from the Ottoman authorities. See Mark A. Epstein, “The Leadership of the Ottoman Jews in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 102.


16. Ibid., 94–95.
17. Efthyniou, “Official Ideology and Lay Mentality,” 33–43. Since the Ottoman Greeks considered the Jews their religious and national enemy, their hatred continued after Greek independence. In 1859 the governor of Izmir sent a report to Istanbul, explaining that the Greek attacks on the Jews increased due to their religious feast and the anniversary of Greek independence and that some Greeks were arrested. See Çağrı Erhan, Yunan Toplumunda Yahudi Düşmanlığı (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001), 83–84.
19. Zvi Keren, “The Fate of the Jewish Communities of Kazanlik and Eski-Zağra in the 1877–8 War,” in The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, 113–30; for the Muslims and Jews of Stara Zagora and Kazanlik during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, see Hüseyin Raci Efendi, Zağra Müftüsünün Hatıraları, Tarihçe-i Vaka-i Zağra (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, n.d.).
21. BOA, AAMD, No. 87/71; BOA, Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, no. 266. For the settlement of the Tatars in Dobrudja, see Mark Pinson, “Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tartars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854–1862,” Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1972–74), 37–56.
22. BOA, Irade Dahiliye, no. 22622.
23. BOA, Irade Dahiliye, no. 23899.
24. BOA, Irade Dahiliye, no. 6857.
25. Abdulhamid II allowed the Jews to settle almost anywhere in the Ottoman Empire except Palestine. Levy, The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire, 118.
27. Erhan, Yunan Toplumunda, 33–35.
30. Paul Dumont, “Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Braude and Lewis, 212.
32. Ibid., 191.
34. After the establishment of Israel, between 1948 and 1951, 34,547 Jews, 40 percent of the Jewish population, migrated to Israel; 27,473 Jews of Turkey also migrated to Israel between 1951 and 2001; 3,000 of them returned to Turkey. There were 20,000–25,000 Jews in Turkey in 2003. Şule Toktaş, “Turkey’s Jews and Their Immigration to Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 3 (May 2006): 505–19.
36. Erhan, Yunan Toplumunda, 30–32.
38. Erhan, Yunan Toplumunda, 43–45.
39. Ibid., 46–59, 66–73.
41. Halit Eren, Batı Trakya Türkleri (Istanbul, 1997), 159. For the migrations from Greece to Turkey, also see Hikmet Öksüz, Batı Trakya Türkleri (Çorum: Karam Yayıncılık, 2006), 57–94.
43. Ibid., 64–65.
47. Estimations range from 65,000 to 300,000 for the period of 1879–1910. See Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam, 195–97.
48. Ibid., 224–96.


62. For further information on the effect of 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War on Bulgarian Turks and their situation during the Bulgarian Principality, see Turan, *The Turkish Minority*, 119–296.

63. For anti-Semitic publications of that period, see Paounovsky, “Anti-Semitism in Bulgaria,” 60–65.

64. Ömer Turan, “Turkish Migration from Bulgaria,” in *Forced Ethnic Migrations on the Balkans: Consequences and Rebuilding of Societies* (Sofia: IMIR, 2006), 84–85.


72. For the Turks of Bulgaria, after Bulgaria achieved democracy, see Ömer Turan, “Bulgaristan Türklerinin Bugünkü Durumu,” *Yeni Türkiye*, no. 3 (March–April 1995): 294–301.
In its edition of 23 September 2004, the German magazine *Stern* published a cartoon showing a heavily mustached man crawling through a cat hole in a door labeled “European Union,” trying to gain entry into Europe. Some imitation Arabic writing appears above the cat hole, and a suitcase with a Turkish flag stands next to the man. This cartoon caused an uproar in the German Turkish community. Vural Öger, a prominent German Turkish businessman and a member of the European Parliament from Germany’s Social Democratic Party, wrote an open letter to *Stern* calling the cartoon defamatory, obscene, and welcome material for neo-Nazi propaganda. Öger closed his letter as follows:

A young Turkish man with a German passport, not only born but also raised here, had heard about Hitler’s beginnings in history class and said that this drawing was just like ones in [the Nazi paper] *Der Stürmer*. Except that the Jews would have received different noses. Here in the *Stern*, the nose was replaced by the mustache. But everything else is the same racist garbage. (*Hürriyet*, 2 October 2004).

In this article, we attempt to show how interethnic relations play out between Turks and Jews in Germany. We will explore how the numerically largest and most recent immigrant group, the Turks, take the small
Jewish minority in Germany, pivotal because of its long history in Germany as well as the recent past, as a model for their own future insertion in German society.

Öger’s reaction to the cartoon in Stern demonstrates that German Turks are not only knowledgeable about the German-Jewish narrative but also have learned to use it adeptly for their own purposes. Accusing Germans of anti-Turkish racism per se is only partly effective. Rhetorically far more effective is to associate Turkish concerns with those of the Jews. This strategy compels Germans to listen to Turkish intellectuals because, on this point, the German environment is vulnerable—it represents a fundamental usage of the Jewish narrative by the Turkish leaders.¹

We suggest that immigrant leaders refer to historical minorities in order to create a common perception of struggle against discrimination and racism in the receiving country. At the same time, they formulate their claims for membership rights within a historical framework in order to receive political recognition from state authorities. As the above example would suggest, Turkish immigrant leaders draw upon the Jews and Jewish history because, in Germany, many Turkish immigrants “take Jews as a concrete example of minority, in terms of history and organization.”² They build upon a German Jewish model in three main areas. First, they compare the Holocaust and the fire bombings of Turkish houses in Mölln in 1992 and Solingen in 1993. Here, leaders in Turkish immigrant associations stress the similarities between the racism against Turks and anti-Semitism.³ Second, they use the Jüdische Gemeinde (Jewish Community) and the Zentralrat der Juden (Central Council of Jews) as examples of how to organize as a minority. Lastly, Turkish immigrant associations claim minority rights analogous to those of German Jews, whose ritual practices have been officially recognized by German state authorities.

In the following article, we explore how Turkish immigrant associations use Jewish associations as organizational models. We also address references made by the executive members of the Turkish immigrant associations regarding the Holocaust and anti-Semitism, as they organize antiracist campaigns. We then discuss how the Turkish immigrant associations take the Jewish trope as a model to claim group rights. We conclude by addressing the significance of the integration process of immigrants, looking at their interaction with historical minorities.
Immigrants and Minorities

Nation-states draw distinctions between two groups: minorities and immigrants. On the one hand, a minority is the “other” who does not belong to an imagined homogeneous nation—someone who is almost one of “us” but not quite. Minorities become members of the state involuntarily through occupation of land or federation. Immigrants, on the other hand, become members of the state—permanent residents or full citizens—through voluntary immigration. Since they consent to being in a “minority situation” in the receiving country, immigrants are expected to learn the language of the majority, conform to its values and norms, and assimilate into the host society.

Sujit Choudhry refers to Will Kymlicka’s assumption that “immigrants have waived their right to live in accordance with their own cultures through the decision to immigrate to a society in which they knew that they would constitute a minority.” Minorities have not waived that right, because they were involuntarily incorporated into the majority. Therefore, minorities possess shared memories, values, practices, and institutions whereas, according to Kymlicka, immigrants are unable to construct this institutional completeness that the minorities enjoy.

Minority associations make demands for distinctive social, political, and cultural rights that recognize their differences. Take, for example, the case of German Jews who receive state-collected taxes for synagogues and welfare organizations, have the right to practice religious slaughtering, and maintain religious schools. Through such “recognition of difference,” they are able to maintain a certain level of institutional completeness that includes their own community organizations, newspapers, bookstores, restaurants, and schools. In other words, minorities may possess group rights that allow them to establish and run their own institutions and pursue their own values, norms, and lifestyles.

Immigrants’ associations, however, are assumed to be social services to facilitate the incorporation of immigrants into the broader society. They may provide “cultural events,” such as folk dances, language courses for second or third generations, or traditional celebration days. But they are not expected to make claims on the state authorities or to politically mobilize immigrants. In contrast to the situation of minorities, immigrant associations must facilitate incorporation rather than maintaining institutional separateness. In this context, we argue that the boundaries
between immigrants and minorities are not clear-cut. In fact, some immigrant communities consciously choose specific historical minorities as their models. Therefore, in order to understand the process of immigrant incorporation, it is not sufficient to analyze macro structures, in terms of the political structure of the receiving country and majority-minority relations. In fact, it is essential to have a framework that distinguishes between minorities and explores immigrant and minority relations, to understand what kind of strategies immigrants create to incorporate into the mainstream society.

Ideally, liberal states introduce clear-cut policies for immigrants and minorities according to the principle of “consent in incorporation.” However, the difference between these two groups is not always obvious. Immigrants do not always incorporate into the host society in the same unilinear and developmental fashion. In some cases, the children and grandchildren of immigrants still consider themselves foreigners. Similarly, ghettoizing immigrants into residential clusters can be seen as aiding in the construction of a minority. Moreover, immigrants associate themselves with minorities and claim that discrimination against immigrants is an extension of historical racism against the minorities in that country. Accordingly, immigrant associations hope to achieve social, cultural, and political recognition by drawing parallels to the minority associations. For example, Turkish immigrant associations emphasize the relationship between “anti-Semitism and racism”; they state that they want “minority rights instead of immigrant rights,” and they say “no to assimilation.” Their campaigns and projects aim to set up “non-discriminatory schools and workplaces, and generally a non-racist social structure.”

The fact that immigrant associations interact with minorities does not imply their solidarity. In fact, many immigrant groups and minorities are in conflict with each other. The historical minorities may hold some political and economic power that they have earned as privileges in the past. The lack of these rights and privileges may cause resentment among immigrants. Nevertheless, all these differences and rivalries show that there is an important relationship between minorities and immigrants that is overlooked in the literature. In order to bring these into discussion, we briefly introduce the Jewish and the Turkish communities in Germany.
German Jews versus German Turks

The Jews

Since the introduction of a new citizenship law (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*), the German state has partially discarded the idea of *ius sanguinis* (law based on ancestral origin) and has started naturalizing the migrant population. According to the citizenship law, immigrant children born in Germany after the year 2000 will be granted German citizenship and their parents’ native citizenship. In order to be granted permanent German citizenship, however, a child born in Germany has to give up the citizenship of his/her parents’ native country between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three.15 According to December 2002 estimates, 7.34 million migrants live in Germany, and Turks represent the largest group with 1.998 million. According to 2003 estimates, there were 565,766 Turks with German citizenship in Germany, approximately one-fourth of the whole Turkish immigrant population.16

Obtaining German citizenship is not as complicated for many Jews. German law facilitates the acquisition of citizenship for former German citizens (and their descendants)—Jews mostly, who were persecuted during the Nazi period—irrespective of which other citizenships they may hold.17 Moreover, on account of the Holocaust, special conditions have been set up to encourage Jewish immigration to Germany. These new Jewish immigrants are eligible to apply for expedited citizenship. It is estimated that there are 5,000 Jews in Germany who are of German origin.18

Germany, the argument went, is the last country in which Jews would want to live.19 Over the past decades, Germany has been turned into a land of memorials to the Holocaust. Among these, the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin occupies a site the size of two football fields across from the Brandenburg Gate and is surely one of the most valuable pieces of real estate in Germany, both symbolically and materially. Another site of memory, the Jewish Museum in Berlin, was opened to the public in 2001. The building, designed by Jewish architect Daniel Libeskind, is attached to what was to become the Berlin Museum, with almost organic passages, thereby symbolically implying that Jewish history is embedded in the history of Berlin.20 The small population of Jews in Germany notwithstanding, the Jewish past exists primarily as
museums and monuments in Germany today, albeit often under police protection and sometimes surrounded by barbed wire.²¹

Today, however, German Jews are no longer “sitting on packed suitcases,” and especially for Russian Jews, Germany has become an attractive country in which to live. Obviously, the welfare system that provides generous health care privileges can be counted as a major reason that Russian Jews along with all other immigrants are attracted to Germany. With the arrival of Russian Jews, Jewish life in Germany became livelier. National Jewish organizations are thriving, such as the Zentralrat der Juden or the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle (Jewish social services) and their own local Jewish congregations (Jüdische Gemeinden), community organizations and cultural centers in Berlin and elsewhere (for example, the Jüdische Kulturverein), newspapers (e.g., *Jüdische Allgemeine*), bookstores, synagogues, restaurants, cemeteries, and museums. Their congregations have the church tax collected by the state from Jewish community members in order to finance the communities. The Zentralrat der Juden, some rabbis, and community leaders enjoy national political recognition, and the Jüdische Kulturverein in Berlin and other Jewish groups organize cultural events. Moreover, Jews are entitled to practice *sheḥita*, the religious slaughtering of animals, and have their own schools. As they maintain a certain level of institutional separateness, however, it is questionable how or whether they feel at home in Germany, and some of the discussions in Berlin’s Jüdischer Kulturverein concern whether or not a Jew should also call him/herself a German.²²

German Turks

Only seventeen years after the conclusion of World War II and the atrocities it involved, Turks started migrating to Germany.²³ When the Federal Republic needed a labor force to rebuild the country, the government decided to import guest workers from nearby countries.²⁴ Turkish migrant workers were usually unskilled or semiskilled peasants who were running away from the lack of choice, scarcity of land, unemployment, and limited social services at home.²⁵ Some of them managed to reunite with their families under the Family Reunification Law of 1972, while others decided to stay permanently in Germany, leaving their families behind in Turkey.²⁶ By 1980, there were 115,000 Turkish people living in Berlin alone.²⁷
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a chaotic social environment and cheap labor from East Germany led to mass unemployment in the western part of Berlin. As the federal subsidy for industry was phased out and plants were dismantled, many Turks who worked in these factories lost their jobs. Those who came to Germany as workers in the 1960s and 1970s became increasingly dependent on welfare after 1989. The mass job dismissals have had long-term effects. According to 1997 statistics, it was estimated that 18 percent of the Turks in Berlin were unemployed. This number was even worse in the areas that have a Turkish majority: 26.2 percent in Kreuzberg. In February 2000, the federal commissioner for foreigners, Marieluise Beck, stated that “the unemployment rate among migrants remains at almost 20 percent, demonstrating that foreigners continue to be subject to unemployment twice as often as Germans.”

The problem of unemployment is exacerbated by discrimination against immigrant children in the education system. Second- and third-generation German citizens of Turkish background and Turkish immigrant children complain that they are not given equal opportunity in the education system. “While only 8 percent of German young people and adults remain without vocational training, the rate of unskilled Turkish young people is five times higher, at about 40 percent.”

**Racism and Anti-Semitism: Fallout from 9/11**

As elsewhere in the Western world, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 cast a dark shadow over all Muslims in Germany and at the same time, perhaps paradoxically, intensified anti-Semitism. Interethnic relations in general became affected. On the one hand, many Muslims, Turkish Muslims included, accused Jews of being responsible for 9/11. Just after the attack, many adopted a widely held conspiracy theory that the Jews working in the World Trade Center were informed beforehand about planes crashing into the towers, and so they did not come to work on that day. Just like Turks in Turkey, however, German Turks are a diverse group. Many Western-oriented Turkish Muslims have been supporters of Jews, whereas others have sided with Arabs against the Jews on account of Israeli policies toward Palestinians. For example, a statement by Öger is evidence of how Turks want to distance themselves from Arabs: “The actors of political Islam are not Turks. Jihad is not Turks’ business. Palestine
is not the problem of Turks." In this sense, many Turks distanced themselves from Arab immigrants who feel strongly about the Israel-Palestine conflict.

While Arabs and Turks are both Muslim peoples, Turkey, on account of Kemalist modernization, has sought to be a part of the West. The policies of recent Turkish governments have been cautiously pro-Israel. Turks have collaborated with Israel on many occasions, including the 1999 capture of the Kurdish leader Öcalan in Kenya. Anti-Arab sentiments in Turkey were exacerbated by the 2003 synagogue bombings in Istanbul. In order to protest the Istanbul bombings, on the anniversary of the Mölln pogrom on November 22, a group of immigrants in Berlin organized the Migrants’ Initiative against Anti-Semitism. Emphasizing that the Jews were not alone in their struggle, initiative leaders organized a demonstration to show their solidarity with Jews in Germany.

The spokesperson of the TBB, Safter Çınar, sent a note to Jüdisches Berlin, the monthly bulletin of the Jewish Community in Berlin, saying that Turks were in solidarity with the members of Berlin’s Jewish community. Indeed, the next issue of the Jüdisches Berlin published interviews and articles of Turks and Turkish Jews, as well as photographs from a joint Chanukah party that was organized by the Jüdischer Kulturverein. The articles and interviews refer to the days of the Ottoman Empire, when the millet system provided for the Turkish majority to coexist with Jews and other ethnic and religious minorities. It further emphasized that Jews who fled Germany after 1933, like those who fled from the Spanish Inquisition after 1492, found shelter as refugees in the Ottoman Empire. Thus Jüdisches Berlin condemned the synagogue bombings in Istanbul and provided public space for Turks to show their solidarity with Jews.

Fallout from 9/11 posed a twofold challenge to Turkish leaders in Germany: they had to attempt not to be painted with the anti-Arab/anti-Muslim brush, and they had to combat anti-Semitism in their own ranks, which had assumed a new intensity among both Turkish immigrants and the radical Right. Within the Right, the increased anti-Semitism accompanied increased racism against Muslims. Neo-Nazi graffiti, such as “What the Jews have behind them is what is still to come for the Turks,” virtually forces Turkish German leaders into an alliance with Jews, according to the theorem, “The enemies of my enemies are my friends.” Accordingly, a photo taken during a street protest in Berlin and displayed at the Jewish Museum in Berlin during a short-term exhibit on Jewish history...
in Germany responded to this slogan: a group of Turkish immigrants carries a banner that reads, “We don’t want to be the Jews of tomorrow.”\textsuperscript{44} In other words, the neo-Nazis use the Jewish narrative negatively, and the immigrants respond by employing the cultural repertoire of German-Jewish relations positively for their own objectives.\textsuperscript{45}

The Türkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (Turkish Federation of Berlin-Brandenburg, TBB), the secular and social democratically oriented immigrant association, applies the German Jewish trope as a master narrative to show that racism in Germany today is an extension of anti-Semitic history. On 22 November 2002, the TBB organized a commemoration in Berlin for the tenth anniversary of the Mölln pogrom, one of several racially motivated fire bombings in Germany to occur after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the night of 23 November 1992, Nazi skinheads firebombed a house in the northern German town of Mölln. In the fire, three members of a Turkish family were killed: a fifty-one-year-old woman, her ten-year-old grandchild, and her fourteen-year-old nephew.\textsuperscript{46} This attack and others in Solingen, Rostock, and elsewhere brought about a broadly based movement of protest in Germany, drawing attention to the increasing number of racist attacks against immigrants. In 1993, Turkish shop owners in Berlin closed down their shops for an hour. Banners in their windows demanded safety and equal rights for immigrants in Germany.

The parallels to the commemoration of Kristallnacht, the Nazi pogroms of November 1938, were apparent.\textsuperscript{47} The Mölln commemoration began with the laying of a bouquet of flowers at the National Memorial to the Victims of War and Tyranny, the central German national memorial in the Neue Wache on the Unter den Linden in Berlin—this memorial commemorates an array of victims ranging from fallen German soldiers and the anti-Nazi resistance to murdered Jews. It continued with speeches at Berlin City Hall. Guests included the minister of health for the state of Berlin, Dr. Heidi Knake-Werner, Leah Rosh, chair of the Supporting Committee for the Establishment of a Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, and the president of the Berlin Senate and the former mayor of Berlin, Walter Momper. Leaders of the Jewish Community and the Jewish Cultural Association were in the front rows. As the spokesman of the TBB, Safter Çınar, began his speech, it was apparent that the presence of people from the Jewish community was not coincidental.

At the same time, Çınar’s speech employed the Jewish trope: the history of Jewish-German relations was evoked in order to assert that
German Turks are Germans. Çınar compared the pogrom in Mölln to anti-Semitic events in Germany during Nazism. Reminding the audience of the Holocaust, he emphasized that German Turks, as residents of Germany, should be ready to shoulder this part of German history. Çınar referred to former chancellor Helmut Kohl’s statement that the new generation of Germans is not responsible for the anti-Semitic German past because they were not living at the time—his much quoted “grace of late birth.” Çınar, on the other hand, allying himself with a left-liberal German position, emphasized that neither is there a grace of late birth nor a grace of foreign birthplace. According to him, if Turks want to be residents of Germany, they are responsible for German history and take upon themselves German national memory:

As residents of this country, we must share responsibility for this past crime. I don’t know how to define this share—maybe it doesn’t need any definition—we must take on our share of responsibility. And we must be ready to carry this responsibility with us. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to formulate it as follows: There can be no grace of late birth . . . and there can be no grace of another birthplace.48

After various anti-Semitic incidents, the TBB has shown solidarity with the Jewish Community in Berlin. One example of the collaboration between these two associations occurred during the 2002 federal elections, when the Free Democratic Party (FDP) politician Jamal Karsli compared Israel’s tactics in the West Bank to “Nazi methods.” The vice president of the party, Jürgen Möllemann, went on to offend a leader of the Central Council of Jews, Michel Friedman, by stating that Friedman’s behavior inspired anti-Semitism. With these anti-Israel and anti-Semitic political tactics, Karsli and Möllemann hoped that their party would gain right-wing German and Muslim votes in Germany.49 But in response, the TBB joined members of the Jewish community in front of the FDP’s headquarters to protest the anti-Semitic election campaign. In the European edition of a major Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet, Möllemann’s anti-Semitic campaign aimed at attracting Muslim votes was severely condemned.50

In return for its showing solidarity, the TBB received a positive response from the Jewish Community in Berlin. The Mölln commemoration is an example of Jewish support—a few Jewish representatives attended the event and brought greetings. Moreover, when the TBB established
an antidiscrimination network to influence the preparation process of the new antidiscrimination law and then organized a seminar to inform the public about this law, some members of the Jewish community were present. In this and similar projects, the TBB has cooperated with the Jewish community of Berlin against discrimination and racism.\textsuperscript{51}

**Jewish Institutional Structures as Organizational Models**

While the TBB attempts to form an alliance with the Jewish community and employs the Jewish narrative in its substance, the Turkish Community of Berlin (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, henceforth referred as Cemaat, as it is known among Turks), one of its Turkish nationalist and religious counterparts, employs Jewishness as a model. It focuses on, and emulates, the Jewish institutional structure in order to receive recognition for Muslim religious rights in Germany. Accordingly, for the first time, (Turkish) Muslims see themselves as a diaspora and are looking for models of diasporic life. The vice chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, for example, recently observed that Muslims lack a theology of integration. The old scriptures rarely, if ever, explained how to behave in non-Muslim societies.\textsuperscript{52}

Jewish institutional structures are used as models for religious Turkish associations in order to achieve the type of community solidarity and collective unity they believe to be present in the Jewish associations. Although Jewish organizations have different interests and are often in conflict, these conflicts are not readily apparent to the mass media or to outsiders. Unaware of possible contention within Jewish associations, the executive committee member of the Cemaat, Ahmet Yılmaz, glorifies their strong fellowship:

I wish from Allah that no other nation would live the difficulties that the Jewish nation had experienced, but [I wish from Allah that he would] provide their solidarity to everyone. There is a Jewish community that speaks for all Jews. My heart wishes that all Turkish organizations will come together under the same roof, and keep equal distance to all [German political] parties.\textsuperscript{53}

Although Yılmaz’s yearnings have not been realized, his organization has modeled its organizational structure on the Jewish Community in Berlin, in both its hierarchy and its religious orientation. Indeed, the
original name of the Cemaat, Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, mimics the Jewish Community’s official name, Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin.\textsuperscript{54}

In the German corporately oriented democracy, state authorities would welcome a strong representation by Turkish immigrant organizations that could represent their common interest—and discipline the Turkish community. However, Turkish immigrant organizations are far from unified. The controversy around the headscarf is one example. The TBB campaigns strongly against the use of the headscarf in public, whereas the Cemaat supports it—not by holding public campaigns but by providing social services for women with headscarves or assisting them with employment. As a result of this Turkish fragmentation, German state authorities play down the role of immigrant organizations as their interlocutors.

Some political leaders of the Turkish immigrant communities, such as the foreigners’ commissioner of the Tempelhof-Schöneberg borough in Berlin, Emine Demirbüken, resent political disunity among Turkish immigrant associations. She draws parallels between the Jewish community and the young Turks and stresses that it is essential to demonstrate the economic and intellectual potential of Turks to German society:

The Jewish community combines its members’ economic power with their brain power. Turks also have economic power here. We have many people who are bilingual, who can speak perfect German and Turkish. Why can’t we combine our economic power with our brain power? Why don’t we show our power to the Germans? Why can’t we force them to take us seriously? If we don’t do this, then they will always stereotype us as members of a society who do not want to learn German, whose women are battered by their husbands, and whose daughters are locked up at home.\textsuperscript{55}

Demirbüken argues that a consolidation of its organizational structures would lead to a change in the Turkish guest worker stereotype. Despite their economic achievements, many Turks in Germany still follow traditional practices such as conservative child-rearing habits. Moreover, many Turkish immigrants, forcibly and voluntarily, are isolated from German society and do not speak German, a problem Germans today decry as the “parallel society.” However, young Turks are better educated and have better language and social skills than their immigrant parents. According to Demirbüken, Germans will take the Turkish community
more seriously when they have to deal with young German Turks as their counterparts in the immigrant associations. Just as in the Jewish associations, she looks for economically and socially capable people to be in the Turkish frontline.

**Using the Jewish Master Narrative to Claim Group Rights**

Some leaders of the Cemaat openly state that they demand religious rights similar to those of Jews. They argue that the German state authorities should recognize the religious and national differences of Sunni Turkish immigrants. The Cemaat and other religious Turkish associations demand permission for ritual slaughtering of animals, for the Islamic call to prayer in public, and for provisions enabling burial according to the Islamic rite. One important difference between the Jewish and Muslim associations is fiscal status. While churches and synagogues as statutory corporations (Körperschaften) in public law receive state-collected taxes (Kirchensteuer) on their behalf, the mosques do not have this right. This issue causes much resentment among Muslims in Germany, especially because their number far exceeds the number of Jews. They are, however, not sufficiently unified to establish political lobbies to demand the status of corporation in public law.

The most striking examples of religious claim-making and the use of the Jewish narrative involve disputes over religious education of Turkish Muslim children, wearing of the headscarf in public places, and the right to eat religiously processed meat. The religious education of Turkish immigrant children in Germany has been a much debated problem for years. While children are legally allowed to read and memorize Quran verses in Arabic as a community service in many Sunni mosques, some Muslim associations gained the right to teach Islam classes in German schools. For example, in Berlin, the Islamic Federation has the privilege of teaching Islam courses in secondary schools, albeit in the German language. Jews, however, are allowed to have their own religious education and high schools in Germany.

Along with the problematic practice of teaching Islam courses in secondary schools, a controversial public debate erupted over whether Muslim women teachers could attend classes wearing the traditional headscarves in public services and schools. In a 2003 decision, the constitutional court of Germany left it up to the individual Länder (states)
to legally enact a ban on wearing the headscarf in schools. Most states were in favor of the ban, particularly the states that were governed by the conservative Christian Democrats, such as Baden-Württemberg. Until recently, it would have been unthinkable to ask a Jewish man, for example, to remove his *kippa* (skullcap) in Germany. This double standard, tolerating Jewish practices while opposing Turkish ones, is another reason why Turks have associated themselves with Jews and asked for equal recognition in public space. The secular immigrant organizations, such as the TBB, on the other hand, identifying with the Jacobin character of the Turkish constitution, supported the ban on all religious symbols from the public sphere.

Granting *ḥalāl*, ritual slaughtering of animals, has been an important cultural struggle for Turkish immigrants in Germany. *Halāl* slaughtering requires that the animal’s throat should be cut with a sharp knife and the blood be drained from the vessels. This contradicts the German regulation that animals should be stunned by electric shock before slaughtering. Although Jews are allowed to practice similar slaughtering practices, known as *sheḥita*, the situation for Turks periodically becomes controversial, especially before the Ramadan feast, which requires a mass sacrifice and ritual slaughtering of certain animals, such as sheep and cattle.

Recently a Turkish butcher, Rüstem Altınküpe, struggled to provide *ḥalāl* meat to his clients during Ramadan. He was supported by various Turkish and Muslim associations and organizations that claimed a right to practice their religion in Germany. After days of public campaign in the media, and bureaucratic struggles with the German state, the Muslim community (i.e., the butcher) gained the right to slaughter animals with a sharp knife, but under very strict conditions.

M. Y., the head of the law office of Milli Görüş, a conservative religious immigrant organization that is associated with political Islam, finds it natural to work with the German Jewish community on this and similar subjects. He participated in a discussion in the parliament of North Rhine–Westfalia to defend Muslims’ right to slaughter animals according to Islamic ritual:

In one instance, I took part in a discussion in North Rhine–Westfalia [parliament] about slaughtering according to Islamic ritual. I talked to these people for a long time. I presented all the rational arguments: freedom of religion, anti-discrimination laws, etc. But they
argued very harshly and often emotionally against us. They did not listen to my arguments. Following me, a rabbi spoke. He said, “You have no right to talk like that. In 1933 as well, as an anti-Semitic measure, ritual slaughtering was outlawed. Following these anti-Semitic measures, 6 million people were murdered.” Suddenly, the discussion fell silent. Nobody wanted to speak to that. I think if I was in that situation, I could not accept these drastic arguments, and I would leave the discussion. But in this country, following the increasing anti-Semitic politics, six million people were murdered. So no one can simply leave while the rabbi is speaking. That would be a scandal. So they listened to the end. When we left, I told him, “Many thanks. So that is how one has to express oneself. Our situation is different.” He said to me, “I know that they keep grudges against me. That is in their genes. The best you can do is to be standing close to us Jews. As minorities we have to fight discrimination together. To us they have to listen. Your words will not be listened to.”

Obviously, this is not simply about slaughtering animals and eating meat; it is about practicing the laws of one’s religion, as do Christians and Jews. While Jews and Muslims are often in opposition to each other, Turkish Muslims point to the parallel with German Jews to claim religious rights from the German state.

Conclusion

Our aim in this article was to show how immigrant associations refer to historical minorities as models to create a common ground of struggle against discrimination and then make political claims. We have argued that social scientists rarely look at the ways in which immigrant groups orient their behavior to those who arrived before them. Both immigrants and minorities orient themselves to other minority or immigrant groups. This is one way in which societal structures are being reproduced and that give ethnic-cultural communities (globalization notwithstanding) their own character within particular nation states. As we have demonstrated, Turkish leaders certainly have taken note of Jewish communal behavior, and Jewish leaders have done the same vis-à-vis the Turks. Turkish leaders in Germany use the German Jewish trope to establish
associational ties, organize campaigns against anti-Semitism and racism, and make claims to German state authorities.

Although Turkish immigrant leaders take the German Jewish trope as a model, there are three major questions that need further research. First, how does the Jewish community in Germany react to immigrant groups who take them as a model? In our preliminary research, we found that the presence of Jews at some Turkish commemorative events is still minimal overall, and while Jews are an important reference for German Turks, Turks play a minimal role in Jewish debates except by default, as fellow targets of neo-Nazism and as a religious community with occasionally or potentially similar political and legal claims.66 This pertains especially to seeing the religious needs of the respective communities recognized by the German state. Individual Jews have played, and are playing, an important role in the fight against racism, neo-Nazism, and in fostering closer relations with the Turkish and/or larger Muslim community. One of these organizations is the Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, a foundation started by Annetta Kahane following some racially motivated killings by neo-Nazi skinheads; another, the Jüdische Kulturverein, founded by Irene Runge, caters mostly to Russian immigrants and East German Jews, also in Berlin. It is indicative, however, that—probably on account of their East German Jewish background—both women have remained marginal to the Jewish leadership in Berlin and the Jewish community in Germany at large.

A second question that demands further research is the issue of class differences between Turks and Jews. In both communities, we found that culturally and in terms of class, Turks and Jews inhabit different worlds. Most Jews are solidly middle class, in many if not most cases, with higher secondary degrees and often some university education. A small but significant number of Jews are recognized public intellectuals in Germany. Most Turks, on the other hand, arrived as guest workers and are proletarianized peasants with minimal education, as Navid Kermani has observed.67 In contrast to Britain and France, virtually no Muslim elites have arrived in Germany, and even among most German-born Turks and Muslims at large, both their class and education are still clearly distinct from those of the Jews.68 There is, however, a small but significant stratum of educated, middle-class Turks, very much at the level of their Jewish counterparts, even though they still inhabit different worlds and their encounters with Jews are few and far between. The issue of
class should be studied in detail to lay out the effect of class differences between Turks and Jews on their interethnic relations. The last question that needs further research is this: How typical and cross-nationally valid is the relationship between Turks and Jews? In a way, it’s unique because of the Jewish past in Germany. Jews and Turks are marked by a special relationship in Germany, but other cases may multiply this immigrant/minority relationship.69

The main conclusion, however, is that immigrant groups interact with other immigrants and historical minorities in the process of integration and take them as models. Therefore, in order to understand the immigrant incorporation process, it is not sufficient to analyze only the majority/minority relations. Rather, we need to look at how immigrants perceive themselves and how they draw upon historical issues of the receiving country, specifically with respect to historical minorities.

Notes

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1. By using the term leaders in immigrant associations, we would like to refer to the executive committee members of Turkish immigrant associations in Germany. These leaders are usually the secretary general, spokespeople, and presidents of immigrant associations. We differentiate between members of immigrant associations and their leaders. The leaders’ perspectives do not always reflect those of the members. In other words, members of immigrant associations do not always share the views of immigrant leaders who associate Turkish existence in Germany with German Jewish history.

3. Of course, the impact of the Holocaust in Germany can not be compared to any fire bombings. However, we believe that the leaders of the Turkish associations in Germany make this comparison to point out the similarities between racism and anti-Semitism.


5. Sujit Choudhry, “‘National Minorities and Ethnic Immigrants: Liberalism’s Political Sociology,’” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 10, no. 1 (2002): 55. We use the word *minority* for the sake of brevity here. Minority should be read as any group that does not fit the ideal of a homogeneous national collectivity and that has been involuntarily incorporated into the state, such as Jews, Kurds, and Arab Israelis.

6. Ibid., 60–61.


17. Article 116 par. 2 of the German Constitution reads: “Former German citizens, who between January 30, 1933, and May 8, 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after May 8, 1945, and have not expressed a contrary intention. . . . The above-mentioned group of people mainly includes German Jews and members of the Communist or Social Democratic Parties.”


22. This is discussed in Y. Michal Bodemann, In den Wogen der Erinnerung: Jüdische Existenz in Deutschland (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 2002), 185. The boldest statement, most recently, is by Micha Brumlik, who has spoken firmly of German Jewish patriotism in “Dies ist mein Land” (This is my country), Jüdische Allgemeine, 23 December 2004. The title alludes to Lea Fleischmann’s book title, Dies ist nicht mein Land (1986).

23. Immigration from Turkey to Germany includes not only Turks but also Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities, such as Alevites and Yezidis.


26. Lenie Brouwer and Marijke Prister, “Living in Between: Turkish Women in Their Homeland and in the Netherlands,” in One-Way Ticket: Migration and


28. Gökçe Yurdakul, “Mobilizing Kreuzberg: Political Representation, Immigrant Incorporation, and Turkish Associations in Berlin” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006); see also Joppke, “Multicultural Citizenship in Germany.”


36. It is important to note that the Turkish government’s pro-Israeli attitude does not necessarily reflect the beliefs and values of Turkish people toward Israelis and Jews. Many Turks are neither supportive of Israeli policies nor sympathetic to Jews. Also note that this pro-Israeli tendency of the government has recently changed to a pro-Palestinian one.


44. This is a slogan that is written on a banner while Turkish immigrants are at a public demonstration against racism in Germany. The picture is available in a booklet prepared for the Ausländerbeauftragte by Gerdien Jonker, *Muslime in Berlin* (Berlin, 2002).
46. Unless otherwise indicated, “Turkish” shall mean here persons originating from Turkey, regardless of ethnic origin.
53. Interview with Ahmet Yılmaz, Executive Committee Member of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, 8 May 2003.
54. See Kastoryano, *Negotiating Identities*. The preposition zu is somewhat antiquated and rarefied, and it is therefore remarkable that the Cemaat would adopt this form.
56. This part of the discussion deliberately excludes other religious groups than Sunnite Muslims who migrated from Turkey to Germany, such as Alevites, Yezidis, and Assyrians.

60. At issue was the following: A German schoolteacher of Afghan origin, Feresteh Ludin, insisted on wearing the hijab in the school. When she was fired, she complained that she was being discriminated against on the grounds of her religious beliefs. When her case was brought before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the constitutional court of Germany,) it ruled that “Germany’s constitutional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom in state-run schools.” The court then left it up to the individual Länder to legally enact a ban on wearing the headscarf in schools. Some of the Länder have now outlawed the headscarf.


64. The name Milli Görüş refers to the political ideology created by the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) in Turkey during the 1970s. Because of its religious activities that threaten public order, political parties that are associated with Milli Görüş ideology were banned by the constitutional court in Turkey. Milli Görüş appeared as a diasporic network of Turkish Muslims in Europe, specifically in Germany. However, it has a big disadvantage: it is listed with the Bundesverfassungsschutz (the intelligence agency of Germany) as a “threat” to German democracy. They are seen as part of political Islam, which prevents immigrants from achieving full integration into German society. See Werner Schiffauer, “Das Recht, anders zu sein,” Die Zeit, 18 November 2004. The report states that Milli Görüş pursues anti-integrative efforts, specifically on Islamic education of children. Moreover, the report provides many examples from the statements of the Milli Görüş publications, specifically anti-German and anti-Semitic statements in the Milli Gazete. The label of “threat” to German democracy largely restricts Milli Görüş activities and campaigns
and puts Milli Görüş members under suspicion. See also Bodemann, “Unter Verdacht.”


66. Nevertheless, the anti-Turkish pogroms have resonated with Jews individually. Bodemann reports such an incident where a young Jewish man was severely shaken by the Mölln pogrom. Y. Michal Bodemann, *A Jewish Family in Germany Today: An Intimate Portrait* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 22.


68. In fact, Kermani’s observation is not totally true. There are a significant number of Turkish engineers and economists who came to study in German universities and have worked in German factories throughout the years; Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the Milli Görüş movement, is one of them. These people may not be “intellectuals” in the sense that Kermani would like, but they are considered technocrat intellectuals in Turkey. See Nilüfer Göle, *Mühendisler ve Ideoloji* (Istanbul: Metis, 1986). Moreover, many Turkish intellectuals came to Germany in the 1980s to run away from the military coup in Turkey. However, Kermani is right on one point. France and the United Kingdom had the opportunity to establish schools in their colonies that educated the population in French or English. Now they have intellectuals from their colonies who can communicate perfectly in these languages. Since Germany did not have colonies in this sense, they had fewer intellectuals.

Until 1970, there were very few Muslims in Australia. However, Muslim/Jewish relationships have emerged as an important issue with the rapid increase of Muslim immigration to Australia after 1972. This chapter will provide the background context of Australian immigration policies and multiculturalism and outline the significant demographic differences, in terms of both migration patterns and socioeconomic profiles, including areas of settlement of Jews and Muslims. It will discuss the emerging problem of anti-Muslim feelings in the general Australian community, especially since the first Gulf War of 1991, and the concurrent growth of anti-Semitism. It will also analyze the reasons for these racist tendencies in Australia, including the rising level of antipathy. The federal government has attempted to address these problems through a variety of initiatives. While the efforts to create greater understanding between Jews and Muslims, as well as with the broader Christian community, are to be commended, these efforts have been piecemeal and too limited to deal seriously with the problem. They can be said to reflect government tokenism in dealing with this issue, which has not yet received the attention or the funding that it requires.

**Australian Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism: A “Fair Go for All”**

The desire to exclude Asian migrants, who were described as the “yellow peril” in the nineteenth century, was a key factor in the federation of the
Australian colonies in 1901. One of the first acts of federal Parliament became known as the “White Australia” policy. It virtually excluded all Asian immigrants, as well as those from the Muslim countries of Malaysia and Indonesia. Government policy was that the Australian population should be 95 percent Anglo-Celtic, and there was no separate immigration department. In 1945, the government decided to sponsor immigration from Europe, and a department of immigration was created, but the focus was still on white Christians. The official policy was to sponsor Anglo-Celtic conformity. Migrants were encouraged to learn English, Anglicize their names, and avoid speaking their native language.

The election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972, after twenty-three years of conservative Liberal government, marked a major sea change in immigration policies. For the first time, non-Christian, non-European immigrants were allowed to enter Australia, providing the basis for Muslim immigration. Attitudes supporting pluralism were also fostered, which “symbolised the acceptance that multiculturalism had replaced assimilationism or even integrationism as the basis of a national immigration policy.” In 1974, the Labor minister for immigration, Italian-born Al Grassby, established a committee to examine community relations as they affected the integration of migrants, identify sources of discrimination, and suggest ways to remove or ameliorate undesirable attitudes or practices. He appointed Walter Lippmann, a German-born prewar Jewish refugee, to chair this committee. Its recommendations included allowing ethnic groups to maintain their own cultural heritage. The federal government accepted its recommendations, and an office of multicultural affairs was created, with state governments establishing various bodies to promote the rights of ethnic education, radio, and television directed to ethnic communities. The Liberal government under Malcolm Fraser further reinforced multiculturalism from 1975 to 1981. Later, under John Howard, these policies were updated, reaffirming the promotion of cultural diversity and supporting “the right of each Australian to maintain and celebrate, within the law, their culture, language, or religion.” The 2001 census showed that 23 percent of Australians were born overseas, and 20 percent had at least one parent born overseas, with two hundred languages being spoken and a wide variety of religions.
Demographic Profiles of the Two Communities

The migration patterns of Jews and Muslims to Australia have been very different. Jews have been present from the start of European settlement, as there were over a dozen Jewish convicts who arrived with the British First Fleet in 1788. During the nineteenth century the Jewish population increased slowly. Jews escaping the failures of the 1848 revolutions in Central Europe and Tsarist persecution from 1881 to 1920 preferred destinations such as the “goldene medina” in the United States. As a result, by 1933 there were only 23,000 Jews in Australia. The major influx of Jews occurred immediately before and after World War II with around 9,000 Jewish refugees from Nazism arriving in 1938–39 and 27,000 survivors between 1945 and 1961. Jewish migration to Australia then leveled off. While there has been further immigration from South Africa, Russia, and Israel, Jews in Australia have never accounted for more than 0.5 percent of the overall population.

In contrast, until 1970 the number of Muslims in Australia remained tiny. In the nineteenth century, some Muslim Afghan camel drivers arrived to work in the desert areas. From 1901, under the “White Australia” policy, non-Christian Middle Eastern immigrants were considered undesirable. After December 1972, people were allowed to migrate from Asia and the Pacific regions. At first most Muslim immigrants came from Malaysia and Indonesia, then Pakistan and India, and more recently from Turkey, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. In all, Muslims have migrated to Australia from 120 countries. Lebanese Christians started to migrate to Australia in the nineteenth century, but the arrival of Lebanese Muslims is a more recent phenomenon, and today they form the largest ethnic group, constituting 10 percent of Australian Muslims, followed by the Turkish Muslims, constituting around 8 percent. Thus the Muslim community in Australia is multiethnic with the different ethnic groups forming their own communities and mosques.

While the Jewish community has continued to constitute approximately 0.5 percent of the total Australian population, the Muslim community has grown rapidly since 1971, when it numbered only 20,000, constituting 0.2 percent of the population. A quarter of a century later, in 1996, Muslims had increased tenfold to 200,000, that is, 1.1 percent of the population, and by the 2006 Australian census they had increased to 340,000, that is, 1.6 percent of the population. In comparison, the Jewish
community numbered 86,000 in 2006, and although the community is growing in absolute size, due to immigration rather then natural growth, its proportion in the general population declined from 0.5 to 0.4 percent.

Both the Jewish and Muslim communities are concentrated in the two main urban centers of Melbourne and Sydney. The Melbourne Jewish population numbers around 50,000 and the Muslim population is 93,000, while the Sydney Jewish population is 40,000 and the Muslim population is 161,000.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Jewish immigrants in Melbourne moved from Carlton, the first area of settlement, to the southeastern suburbs of St. Kilda, Caulfield, Prahran, and Malvern with some settlement in Doncaster, while in Sydney, they moved from the city center to the eastern suburbs of Bondi and Bellevue Hill, with some settlement in the northern suburbs, around St. Ives, developing after 1945. This shift to these suburban areas reflected a move up the economic ladder into the merchant and professional classes. This trend strengthened in the second half of the twentieth century. The Jewish postwar migrants largely became self-employed, establishing clothing factories, with some then entering into property development. Since the 1980s, employment has been dominated by managerial and professional occupations with a high rate of young Jews completing doctoral studies. Most young Australian Jews enter the workforce with a university degree.

Muslims have very different settlement patterns. They tend to be in the lower socioeconomic echelons of society and face problems of low educational standards, unemployment, and other issues relating to adjustment to Australian society. In Sydney, most Muslims live in the southern and western areas, which are more working-class and where property is much less expensive, while the Jewish community lives in the eastern and northern suburbs. In Melbourne, most Muslims live in the northern and western suburbs, while the Jewish center is in the southeast. Thus, while living in the same cities, there is minimal social interaction between the two religious communities.

A number of reasons explain the lower socioeconomic status of Muslims. First, they are a newer immigrant group, so they have had less time to acculturate and integrate into Australian society. Attitudes in sharia law about borrowing money on interest make it harder for those Muslims who are more stringent in their religious practices to achieve the traditional Australian goal of owning one’s own home, even though Islamic banks have been established to overcome this problem. Muslim women tend to marry earlier and have larger families. Those who maintain traditional Muslim observance do not work after they get married, adding to the financial stress of families. Because of the higher birth rate, 50 percent of Muslims are under the age of 25, compared with 34.5 percent for the Australian population in general. In addition, the unemployment rates of Muslims are three times higher than the national Australian average, so many depend on social welfare from the government, with this
moving into the second generation. Many also come from cultures where literacy rates for a long period were not high, due to the traditional Muslim pattern of focusing on the oral tradition and rote learning rather than reading, discussing, and explaining religious texts.\textsuperscript{10}

**Muslims as Victims**

Anti-Muslim feeling has developed significantly since 1990, largely because Muslims are seen as problematic and a threat to Australian society. This attitude has been fed by a number of events. Already during the 1991 Gulf War there were significant attacks on Australian Muslims, with women wearing the \textit{hijab} being the major targets.\textsuperscript{11} The arrival of illegal boat people, especially asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{12} was highlighted by the incident of the Norwegian freighter MV \textit{Tampa} in August 2001 when the Australian government refused to allow the 440 refugees who had been on board the capsized boat to land on Australian shores. The events of September 11, 2001, “changed the life of most Muslims in the West including Australia.”\textsuperscript{13} The Bali bombings in 2002, when 88 Australians died with many more injured, were blamed on Islamic extremists. Public opinion was further inflamed by incidents of gang rape involving Muslim youths, which were highlighted by the media.

In the weeks after September 11, members of the Arabic community suffered abuse, with significant increase of anti-Arab vilification and hijab-wearing women and children again being a key target of abuse.\textsuperscript{14} Muslim women, who were easily identifiable, were insulted and spat at, and their veils were pulled off.\textsuperscript{15} Arabic newspaper staffs received bomb and death threats, and mosques were desecrated by arsonists. The worst attacks occurred in Queensland, where one Brisbane mosque and another Muslim institution were damaged by fire.\textsuperscript{16} The viciousness of the anti-Muslim feeling was expressed on talk back radio and in hate mail such as “You are all Muslim fanatic terrorist criminals” and “You are all marked for death.”\textsuperscript{17} In 2003, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission established the Isma (meaning “listen” in Arabic), to investigate the victimization of Arab Muslims in Australia after September 11. Its findings stressed the disturbingly high level of abuse and attacks on people who were clearly identifiable by dress, language, name, or appearance and asserted that the negative media portrayal of Arabs and Muslims contributed to this situation.\textsuperscript{18} An Australian Muslim scholar has argued
that Muslims have replaced Jews as the new “others” as “Muslims in the West, like Jews before us, grapple with the same issues that Jews of the past did: integration or isolation, tradition or reform, intermarriage or intra-marriage.”

Members of the Muslim community and academic scholars argue that media comment has heightened Islamophobia in Australia. The media focus on the Muslim background of gang rapists resulted in Muslim women being further targets of ethnic hatred. A 2004 study by Dr. Paul White highlighted the problem of anti-Muslim media comments creating a sense of alienation among young Muslims. White interviewed more than eighty young Lebanese Australians. He noted that “Lebos. Wags. Ninjas. Towel heads. Wogs. Terrorists. Osama bin Laden. Stupid Arab. Abos. Bimo Lebs. Greasy Legs. Camel-spit. Lebanese Shit. Lebanese are lesbians. Yous are scums, yous are all rats. Go back to your own country” were all insults that young Lebanese Australians have to endure in their daily life in Sydney. Understandably, most of the respondents emphasized their feeling of not being accepted into Australian society due to this racial stereotyping, which they claimed was fostered by politicians, the media, and police statements. The majority of those interviewed called for “mutual tolerance and acceptance as they were all Australians.”

Similarly, journalist Peter Manning conducted a study of the media for one year before and after September 11, 2001, and found stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims. A strong critic of Israel who opposes the concept of a “Jewish state,” Manning virtually equated sympathy for Israel with anti-Muslim extremism.

The difficulties of Arab Muslim acculturation and integration were highlighted by the riots at the Sydney southern beachside suburb of Cronulla in December 2005, which were followed by violent reprisal attacks by young Arab Muslims. Racist groups, such as White Pride, and Christian religious extremists used the assault by Muslim youths on two lifeguards to attack all Muslims. This strong negative reaction to Muslims in Australia has created a sense of ambivalence and even alienation toward Australia. Andrew Markus has noted: “Alienation is not, however, to be explained simply in terms of failures within Australian society and government. Radicals within the Muslim community reject secular and pluralistic institutions. They present a major problem for Australian society—one that is magnified in Muslim-Jewish relations.” Muslims have been both the victims and the victimizers in Australia, particularly
in the western and southern suburbs of Sydney where the largest percentage reside. This has presented a problem and a challenge to the Jewish community in Sydney.

Jews as Victims

As in other parts of the world, anti-Semitism and racist beliefs have been part of Australian history. Even though Jews never numbered more than 0.5 percent of the population, anti-Semitic prejudice existed already in nineteenth-century Australia. However, at no point in time did it take the form of an “institutionalized” anti-Semitism. Since their arrival in 1788, Jews were never subjected to anti-Jewish laws or regulations, persecution, or expulsion, let alone pogroms or murder. Anti-Jewish sentiments and campaigns erupted in the late nineteenth century, with the established press and political leadership opposing the immigration of unwelcome Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe. Again, before and after World War II, the fear of a “flood” of Jewish refugees arriving as a result of Nazi persecution and the Holocaust was expressed. In the early 1980s there were bombings at the main Jewish social club in Bondi and the Israeli consulate in the city center. However, there was no formal monitoring of the number of anti-Semitic incidents until October 1989. Since that time, Australian Jewish leader Jeremy Jones has compiled annual reports documenting incidents, as well as activities of groups and individuals responsible for purveying anti-Semitism. These incidents include abusive emails, graffiti such as “Bomb the Jews,” threatening mail and reports of telephone threats, verbal harassment and abuse, including the bullying of Jewish children at school by some Muslim children, and actual physical violence against individuals and institutions. Most such attacks are anonymous, making it difficult to determine responsibility.

In his introduction to the 2002–2003 anti-Semitism survey, Jones noted that there were “over 500 reports of anti-Jewish violence, vandalism, harassment, and intimidation.” He presented a graph showing that since September 11 the number of incidents has almost doubled, with 63 percent of such attacks occurring in New South Wales.

There was another peak of anti-Semitic incidents in 2006 during the Second Lebanese War. During this period, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into the Canberra Jewish Center when there were 130 people in the upstairs hall. Arson attacks also occurred in unoccupied synagogues, with
ongoing physical attacks, vandalism, and anti-Jewish, anti-Israel graffiti. There was a further increase of anti-Semitic attacks in 2007, even though there was no clear trigger such as the Second Lebanese War. It is unclear whether this increase was due to extreme right-wing groups, religious fanaticism from both Christians and Muslims, or extreme left-wing anti-Zionism, which tends to inflame anti-Semitism.

Whatever the cause, this increased anti-Semitism has placed a huge security burden on the Jewish community. In 2004, during a parliamentary debate on anti-Semitism, John Brogden, New South Wales Liberal opposition leader, stated: “On Saturday tens of thousands of Jews across New South Wales and Australia will attend synagogue. However, unlike other people involved in religious observance, they will pass security guards as they walk through the door. Thousands of children attending Jewish schools in this country will also pass security guards as they walk in and out of their school gates. Very few, if any, other religious groups or followers of a faith have security guards at their places of worship.”

Fig. 6.2. Increase in anti-Semitic episodes since 1990 (ECAJ, Report on Anti-Semitism, 2004).
Maintaining security at all Jewish communal institutions is needed because, according to the Australian police, Jews are a popular terrorist target, but this has placed a significant financial burden on the Australian Jewish community.

From September 2000, members of parliament expressed deep concern and stressed their opposition to anti-Semitic attacks. Following the doubling of the number of anti-Semitic incidences in 2003, the following motion was presented to the federal parliament:

Parliament takes note of

(a) the long history of anti-Semitism and its lethal capacity to influence many people to express hatred and carry out violence against Jewish people;
(b) [an] alarming rise in the incidence of violent anti-Semitic acts in many countries which have killed Jews and non-Jews alike, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and memorials and targeted assaults on individual members of the Jewish community; and
(c) [a] disturbing upsurge of anti-Semitic propaganda in print, on the Internet and circulated through emails, often in the form of false accusations that Jews are involved in conspiracies against other people.

Parliament then announced “its unequivocal condemnation of anti-Semitism” and resolved “to condemn all manifestations of anti-Semitism in Australia as a threat to the freedoms that all citizens should enjoy equally in a democratic society” and “to take all possible concrete actions at a national level to combat this threat to our peaceful and diverse nation.”

Following extensive debate in both houses, it was passed with strong bipartisan support. The point was made that the core of multiculturalism was the importance of tolerance and the acceptance of diversity. A similar motion was also passed by the New South Wales state parliament on February 24, 2004, again with strong bipartisan support. Despite these well-intentioned resolutions, anti-Jewish incidents have increased, with a few violent incidents occurring in both Sydney and Melbourne. Kevin Dunn’s 2004 study showed that while racist feelings toward the other groups in Australian society—the Aborigines, the Asians, and also Muslims—is related to age, so that the younger age groups hold less racist attitudes toward these groups than those over sixty, there is no parallel
decline in attitudes toward Jews. The younger age groups are only slightly less prejudiced toward Jews than the older Australians.30

In analyzing the reasons for the increasing number of attacks on the Jewish communities, two main groups seem to be involved: the nationalist right-wing racists, who also attack the Muslim community, and the radical Muslims. To date, very few arrests have been made in relation to attacks on the Jewish community. However, the arrest of two key figures, Jack van Tongeren, white supremacist and leader of the neo-Nazi Australian Nationalist Movement (ANM) in Western Australia, and the Muslim convert Jack Roche illustrates the groups’ fermenting hatred. Van Tongeren was arrested and imprisoned for an arson attack on an Asian restaurant, while Roche was arrested for conspiring to attack the Israeli embassy in Canberra and a key Melbourne Jewish figure, Chabad Rabbi Yossi Gutnick. Roche cooperated with the authorities and only served a short period in prison. However, his plans showed that Muslim radicals do not distinguish between Jewish and Israeli leaders and institutions when planning their targets.

**Anti-Jewish Feelings among Muslims**

The fact that Arab Muslims have been less successful in integrating at every level of Australian society—economically, culturally, educationally, and socially—creates resentment, especially among younger Muslims. This resentment has been heightened by the anti-American feelings engendered by the Iraq war, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the belief in the power of the Jewish lobby. One outcome of this is that, as in other parts of the world, Muslims have themselves fostered ethnic hatred and support of jihad. Taj al-Din al Hilaly, mufti of Australia until 2007, has made a number of problematic and anti-Semitic statements. In 1988, in a speech at the University of Sydney entitled “Islam and Judaism: Can They Co-exist?” he said that Jews were “the underlying cause of all wars.”31 Over the years Hilaly has continued to ferment ethnic tension and opposition to western values. In addition to Hilaly, there are a number of home-grown Australian imams who have radicalized by themselves, largely due to exposure to the Wahhabi philosophy sponsored from Saudi Arabia and also to the Egyptian Salafi movement. Saudi Arabia funds many Australian Muslim schools and institutions.32 Bernard Lewis claims that such schools are established in order to “promote their
version of Islam,” and his argument that this “indoctrination is provided in private schools, religious seminars, mosque schools, holiday camps, and, increasingly, prisons” applies to Australia. It can also be argued that Saudi funding was provided to stop other Islamic groups, especially the non-Salafists, from funding Muslim schools and other institutions.

A recent phenomenon has been the conversion of a number of Aborigines to Islam while they are in prison.

Some underprivileged young Muslims are drawn to firebrand preachings of radical Muslims and clerics. In 2002, Imam Imran Hosein gave a lecture on Jerusalem in the Quran, which was a strong attack on Jews, Judaism, and the state of Israel. Sheikh Khalid Yasin, an African American convert and radical Islamist, has visited Australia on a number of occasions. In Sydney in July 2005 he stated that non-Muslims cannot be trusted or be true friends as they do not know what sanctity means.

A description of his charismatic appeal, especially to young Muslims, noted: “The Muslim youth have copped an absolute battering in the media since 1998, which has, and I’ve seen it first-hand, which has affected their self-esteem and their confidence. Khalid Yasin instils a lot of pride in the youth and reminds them that, as Muslims, they’ve got a lot to be proud of.” Commentators note that some young Muslims are being drawn to the preachings of hardline imams, such as Sheikh Mohammed Omran in Melbourne and Sheikh Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud in Sydney.

Muslim bookshops located in the Sydney suburb of Lakemba and the Melbourne suburb of Brunswick sell Islamic literature preaching hatred or violence as well as anti-Semitic publications such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Arabic. For example, a children’s board game with the aim of conquering Jerusalem, with many symbols of violence, was sold at a Muslim bookstore in Sydney in 2005. Much of this material emanates from Saudi Arabia and is translated in London. It includes titles such as Ideological Attack and Defence of Muslim Lands, with the latter advocating suicide bombings and jihad.

Many problematic websites are easily accessible. For example, the “Mission Islam” website promotes blatantly anti-Semitic material. It includes the Protocols and a section entitled “The Truth about the Talmud,” which, according to the 2007 ECAJ report on anti-Semitism, “contained a list of fraudulent and out-of-context statements designed to portray Judaism as ridiculously and violently hostile to all non-Jews.” Another
anti-Semitic publication, Nida’ul Islam, which includes provocative material against Jews, is also readily available on the web. A number of Muslim websites, such as “Islamic Sydney” and “MuslimVillage Forum,” allow anti-Semitic correspondence and chat. The Forum on MuslimVillage, which receives 100,000 posts a month, mainly from adults ages 22–25, also posts some pro-Jewish material, and some non-Muslims join and post anti-Muslim material. However, the site is moderated, and the anti-Muslim posts that are allowed through are not as problematic as the anti-Jewish posts. In addition, the average reader would be Muslim and so less likely to be influenced by anti-Muslim posts, whereas the anti-Jewish material can “have the effect of normalizing anti-Semitism among Muslims.” The founder and administrator of the website, Ahmed Kilani, does block some contributors, so more care could be taken with anti-Jewish material. There have also been links between far right websites and groups, such as the Australian League of Rights, and Muslim groups and speakers.

There have been a number of instances where the Arabic press, which is mainly run by Christian Arabs, has published anti-Semitic material including promoting the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, resulting in legal proceedings being undertaken by the Press Council of New South Wales at the instigation of the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies. The longest case running was with the Christian Arabic newspaper An Nahar, but action has also been taken against An Nahda, which revived the blood libel accusation in 1986, and Al-Moharrer Al Arabi in 1994, in regard to an offensive article entitled “Blood for Zion’s Unleavened Bread.” In recent years, An Nahar has been more pro-Jewish.

Jewish children and teachers in government schools with large Muslim populations have experienced both verbal and physical abuse. While anti-Muslim feelings in schools have been researched, no research to date has been undertaken on anti-Jewish feelings among Muslim children in high schools. To fill this gap, five teachers in schools with a high percentage of Muslim children in the southern and western areas of Sydney were interviewed about their attitudes toward Jews in their schools, such as a school in the Fairfield area with 265 Arabic-speaking children out of a total school population of 873. The teachers all reported a veneration of Hitler and Nazism with statements such as “Hitler did the right thing,” “Hitler did not go far enough,” a tendency to draw swastikas on their desks, hatred of Israel, and general antipathy towards Jews. They
also expressed the belief common throughout the Muslim world that the Jews were responsible for September 11 and that no Jews were killed in the attack because they had been warned in advance. One non-Jewish teacher from a Sydney high school with a high concentration of Muslim students commented that “even his moderate Lebanese students believe that Israel is responsible for September 11,” while another student came to him and asked: “Why do all the teachers hate Hitler? After all, he only killed Jews?” Another teacher commented that there was graffiti in her school saying, “F—k all Jews” and “Kill all Jews.” The Jewish teachers interviewed feared that their students would realize that they were Jewish and harass them. As one teacher put it: “I am not able to come out. I want my students to know I am a person like anyone else—just flesh and blood.” Two different stories about mobile phones illustrate the depth of the problem. In one boys’ school, the teacher said the boys’ favorite video-clip that they watch on their phones is of American journalist Daniel Pearl saying, “I am a Jew, my mother is a Jew,” and then watching him being beheaded. In a girls’ school, one student came to the teacher saying, “My friend pulled her mobile phone apart yesterday and when I asked her why, she said that the Jews control all the communications and that they could listen in on her conversations. Is that true, Miss?” There are very few Jewish children attending schools with a high percentage of Muslim children due to the demographic differences discussed above, but in a few cases Jewish parents have had to remove children from schools with a high Muslim population because of ongoing verbal attacks.

The radical Muslim organization Hizb ut-Tahrir is active in Sydney and other parts of Australia, although it is banned in several European countries, including Germany, and many of the Muslim countries. They believe in the reestablishment of the Khilafa (Islamic Empire) and wish to bring the West under an umma—“one Islamic state with no territorial boundary.” They also believe that any country that was governed by Islamic law for a set period of time has to return to Islam. They seek to attract university-educated young people to their cause. Their leader, Wassim Doureihi, strongly promotes sharia law and has defended suicide bombers, including the London attacks. Osman Badr, president of the Muslim Students Association at the University of Sydney in 2005 and a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, also stated during a sermon at the Friday prayers after the bombings that “the attacks were retribution for what is
happening in Palestine and Iraq and they were bringing the war home to those who were funding it."48 In a discussion on the topic “Should Muslims subscribe to Australian values?” held in Sydney in April 2006, the conclusion of Hizb ut-Tahrir was “a firm no.”49 The group also held a meeting in August entitled “Israel is an illegal state which no Muslim will ever recognise.” At the end of the meeting, one speaker warned that all Jews in Israel needed to have a foreign passport as they would have to return to the lands they came from. Another radical group is the Federation of Australian Muslim Students and Youth (FAMSY), which has supported the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in the past and claimed that the Australian government is carrying out a war against Islam. It is difficult to know to what extent these radical views represent mainstream Muslim society because there are so many Muslim ethnic groups in Australia and no authoritative research has been conducted on the topic.50 American researcher Steven Emerson argues that these groups, whom he describes as the “cultural Jihadists,” make the “military jihad possible.”51 From her study of Muslims in Australia, Nahid Kabir has argued that “militant Islamic activities and worldwide terrorism have impacted negatively on moderate Muslims in the West” and have contributed to discrimination against Muslims in finding employment.52

Anti-Muslim Prejudice among Jews

Fear of and prejudice against Muslims can also be found, in varying degrees, in some segments of the Jewish community, including some in positions of religious leadership. This is more of an undercurrent that might be expressed by Jewish children or individuals. However, there has been no known incident of Jewish violence against Muslims in Australia while the official Jewish leadership, both religious and lay, opposes any discrimination toward Muslims and is highly critical of verbal and physical attacks. Indeed, a number of Jewish leaders have been active in promoting interfaith initiatives that aim to counter anti-Muslim feelings in the community, as will be discussed in the next section.

Government Responses

The failure of some Arab Muslims to integrate successfully into Australian society and the growth of radical Islam has challenged the accepted
multicultural policies of the 1970s and 1980s. In response to developments in the 1990s, the Liberal government of John Howard (1995–2007) introduced a much more conservative approach to multiculturalism, with a new focus on “social cohesion” and “citizenship,” including a new citizenship test. Thus the Howard government promoted the view that Australian multicultural policies advocate that all groups do share “mutual civic obligations.” In 2006, the website dealing with Australian multicultural policy stated: “All Australians are expected to have an overriding loyalty to Australia and its people and to respect the basic structures and principles underwriting our democratic society. These are the Constitution, parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language, the rule of law, acceptance and equality.” Both the media and politicians have stressed this concept of the core values of Australian society.

The Howard government tried to sponsor dialogue between the religious groups to create greater cohesion. In 1999 there were some moves to create a more formal Muslim, Christian, and Jewish dialogue group, but these did not come to fruition. After September 11, 2001, the commonality of the fear of attack and the need for increased security led to the creation in 2003 of the Australian National Dialogue of Christians, Muslims, and Jews, supported by the National Council of Churches in Australia, the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC), and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ). The federal government also allocated a budget of $35 million to engage Australian Muslims as part of its 9/11 response. It appointed a reference group with a series of working groups, hosted and funded a series of conferences broadly labelled National Security for a Diverse Community, and provided funding to other groups working in this area. Other important initiatives in interfaith dialogue include the New South Wales–based Women’s Interfaith Network, the government-sponsored Australian Partnership of Ethnic and Religious Organizations, and the “Living in Harmony” projects.

The National Dialogue at the federal level aims to build bridges and create a better understanding of key issues during this period of increased ethnic and religious tension. Peta Jones Pellach outlined the three main areas of discussion as follows: “Matters of national importance where a religious perspective is pertinent; matters of theological interest that are of significance to all the partners in the dialogue; religious ideas and
practices that are unique to one of the participants in the dialogue and require explanation in order to create understanding." Possibly the most challenging of the three discussion areas relates to exploring religious concepts that are unique to one faith group such as Evangelism, the Exodus, the Trinity, Jihad, and the Jewish concepts of Israel and the love of Zion, meaning Jerusalem, which is the basis of modern Zionism.

Living in Harmony grants from the federal government aim “to develop grassroots projects to promote Australian values and help people to realize the opportunities of living in Australia.” The program allocates priority to projects that promote interfaith activities; assist new and emerging communities; develop understanding in schools; and assist indigenous Australians. In 2006 the federal government allocated 1.5 million AUD for this program.

One key program that has received ongoing support, initially called the “Goodness and Kindness Program” and then renamed “Together for Humanity,” brings a Muslim, a Christian, and a Jew together to do presentations in primary schools demonstrating the common moral basis of the three Abrahamic faiths. This program has prepared a list of twenty-two actions that students from all three faiths should aspire to do, such as “Get to know someone who seems different from you.” The main educational force behind this program is a Chabad rabbi, Zalman Kastel, who has moved from his Chabad upbringing in Crown Heights, largely isolated from the secular and non-Jewish worlds, to devoting almost all his energies to this project. “Together in Humanity” is run by a board with representatives from the three faiths, and Rabbi Kastel is the main employee. He initially worked with Kuranda Seyit, who is the founder and director of the Forum on Australia’s Islamic Relations (FAIR) in Sydney, which seeks to meet the needs of Muslims and publishes a regular newspaper.

Project Abraham is another program that has received Living in Harmony grants. It started in Adelaide, again as a Jewish initiative, and has sought to reach out across the different states of Australia, including New South Wales, Victoria, and the North Territory, as well as South Australia. It explores the religious and historical commonalities between Christianity, Islam, and Judaism with the aim of creating a model for peace and respect and has produced a workbook that outlines the basic attitudes of the three religions toward central beliefs, holy texts, religious holidays,
and life cycle events. Project Abraham has taken a different approach from “Together for Humanity,” as the latter does not seek to explain each of the religions but rather takes basic moral principles and shows their commonality across the faiths.

The Living in Harmony program has a number of strengths. It draws on grassroots support and expertise, with each project being sponsored and operated by specific some paid workers, but each project also draws on the organizations that foster community building and social cohesion. The government funding provides the possibility of principle of volunteerism. At the same time, the government’s approach is really one of minimalism and tokenism. The total amount allocated is tiny in proportion to the overall federal budget, but at the same time the concept is effective “pork barreling,” as the government wins support from community groups and appears to be dealing with the problem of racism.

A major problem of this approach is that funding is allocated on an annual basis and there is a less than 10 percent success rate each year. Each group that plans to apply has to start work in February, submit the application by the middle of the year, but only find out in October whether the application has been successful. Thus a lot of time is spent on applying for funding. In addition, each group does not know until close to the end of the academic year whether the funding will continue. The pressure of the annual process of grant application results in burnout, with groups deciding not to continue. In this way, effective programs and the cumulative knowledge are lost. Another problem is that the Ministry for Immigration and Citizenship is not a popular post, and there has been an ongoing changeover of ministers, with most having little knowledge, understanding, or commitment to the program.

Individual religious and ethnic associations have also worked to sponsor Jewish/Muslim dialogue. Within the Jewish community, this has been done through the Jewish Boards of Deputies and Community Councils in each state. For example, the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies runs a program with Affinity Interfaith Dialogue called “Youth Encounters” that brings students from religious-based schools of the three Abrahamic faiths together for an intensive day after undertaking an educational program in their own faith, as well as “Journey of Promise: YOU, ME, aUStalian,” which was a joint program of ten Jews, ten Muslims, and ten Christians, also sponsored by a Living in Harmony grant. As
one student commented on the advantage of these programs: “Living in a multicultural society, it’s completely necessary to understand other religions.”

After September 11, 2001, a sector of the Muslim community formed the Affinity Intercultural Foundation to counter prejudice against Muslims in New South Wales and promote interfaith dialogue. It is led by Mehmet Ozalp, who has a Turkish background. Largely supported by Sydney’s Turkish community, Affinity supports an annual Interfaith Dialogue Conference and Women and Interfaith Dialogue and has links with the Pitt Street Uniting Church and some Catholic organizations, as well as the Jewish community. The formation of Affinity is an important initiative, but the road to dialogue is not straightforward. The organization has held functions on Friday nights, effectively excluding Jewish participation.

Affinity’s Victorian counterpart, the Australian Intercultural Society (AIS), carries out similar functions in Melbourne. A recent initiative, in conjunction with the Australian Catholic University (ACU), has been the establishment of the Fethullah Gülen Chair in the Study of Islam and Muslim-Catholic Relations. According to the AIS November 2007 newsletter, this is the first of its type and will act as a “prototype” and “assist second and third generation Muslims with learning Islam correctly from its true sources, increase academic research in the field of interfaith dialogue, and provide a means for community related activities and take the important message of dialogue to the wider Australian community.”

Both Affinity and AIS are influenced by the “community of Gülen,” which has been defined as a “neo-Nur” movement. One of the major influences in Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy was the Kurdish holy man Said Nursi, who resisted the Kemalist modernization and secularization process in Turkey in the 1920s and sought a way to deal with modernity within Islam. After coming into conflict with authorities in the 1920s, Nursi committed his philosophy to seeking to “build a pious and modern Muslim personality, one which is tolerant but firm about the core values of Islam.” After Nursi’s death in 1960, his writings became the focus of study groups, or Dershanes, which sought to build communities and develop the Nur (meaning “light”) networks. The most influential Nur network is Gülen’s neo-Nur group. Gülen, who owns a media network and runs hospitals, schools, and universities in Turkey and abroad, has
stressed the importance of building educational networks. Gülen draws on European enlightenment concepts and supports democracy and interfaith dialogue, having met with both Christian and Jewish leaders. He has tried to develop a new, moderate vision for contemporary Islam, and he is opposed to both Iranian revolutionary Islam and Saudi Wahhabism.

The initiative of creating a chair in Islamic studies by the Australian Catholic University and AIS has its complexities. In his scholarly book on Islamic political identity in Turkey, M. Hakan Yavuz argues that Gülen is not a liberal, because he “gives priority to the community and the state over individual rights,” and while he speaks in favor of gender equality, women have been excluded from higher positions in his movement in Turkey. In June 1999 the Turkish regime attacked him for being a threat to the secular state, and he took refuge in the United States, where he now lives. Gülen is seen by some as a controversial figure, and one Catholic scholar, Father Paul Stenhouse, has argued the need for prudence on behalf of the Australian Catholic University in terms of this new Melbourne chair named after him. He claims that Nursi’s declared goal is “Islamic supremacy” and that Gülen “wants to re-institute the Caliphate and establish an Islamic State in Turkey: an Islamic State that will extend from the Balkans.”

Thus it can be seen that under the Howard government, social policies became more conservative, particularly in response to the growing militancy of radical Islam, both within Australia and abroad. At the same time, the government has tried to sponsor dialogue and to seek ways to improve intercommunity relations in Australia. Included in these efforts are support for Muslim groups that promote dialogue, such as Affinity, and efforts to teach about Islam at the university level.

As noted, most of these efforts toward dialogue and understanding are due to the work of NGOs, who do not seek or want government assistance or guidance. However, the challenge of successfully integrating the recent Muslim immigration into Australian society and of creating harmonious relations between the faiths is too great to be left to individual NGOs, each with its own agenda and limited finances. This integration requires a much more pro-active government approach, as only government agencies can provide the level of funding required and an overall vision for the country.
Conclusion

The problem of Muslims, in terms of being both victims and victimizers, is complex. The Australian experience has shown a diverse and multi-ethnic Muslim community that has rapidly increased since 1972 from 0.2 percent of the population to 1.6 percent in 2006. In the same period, the Jewish community has remained relatively static, as it is only replacing itself through immigration, not natural increase. The Muslims in Australia have experienced discrimination, stereotyping, and both verbal and physical attacks, which have increased during the first Gulf War of 1990–91, the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, the Bali bombings in 2002, and the second Gulf War. The height of these interracial tensions occurred during the Cronulla riots of 2006 in Sydney. In this same period, Jews have experienced a significant increase of anti-Semitism that appears to be sponsored by members of the radical right-wing fascist groups and radical Muslim groups. The influence of Saudi Wahhabism, radical preachers in mosques, and prejudices learned at home have meant that a number of Muslim children in schools in the southern and western suburbs of Sydney, where the highest proportion of Muslims preside, are growing up with strong prejudice and stereotypical views toward Jews and Israel, which have contributed to verbal and physical attacks on Jews in Australia. While some Jewish children have expressed anti-Muslim feelings, there is no evidence that this has expressed itself in physical violence, and Jewish leaders have strongly criticized anti-Muslim prejudice.

This study demonstrates that Australia is experiencing a growing problem of racial and religious tension with its Muslim population, which also affects its Jewish population negatively. Education and sponsoring dialogue as well as dealing with the socioeconomic divide through specially designed support programs are approaches that the Australian government could foster. However, to date, the government has failed to introduce a comprehensive policy, and the initiatives that have been introduced, such as the Living in Harmony projects, are piecemeal, minimalist, and thus represent only tokenism.

Notes

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10. For example, in Turkey before 1930, the printing of books and general literacy were quite low. The traditional ʻulema in Turkey did not feel a need to explain their decisions and did not try to develop an understanding of Islam. See M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 165.


16. *Australian*, September 15 and 24, 2001; *Sydney Morning Herald*. According to Jewish leader Jeremy Jones, in one case “a mentally ill firebug” carried out the attack. Email correspondence, January 24, 2008.
23. For Manning’s highly critical stance on Israel, see ibid., 237; email correspondence with Jeremy Jones, January 24, 2008.
27. Ibid., 17, 14, 15.
31. Hilaly is a very controversial personality. Entering Australia in 1982 on a three-month tourist visa, he was granted permanent residency in 1990, due to political factors. The electorate of the Labor MP, Paul Keating, later prime minister from 1992 to 1995, included a large Muslim population and the Lakemba mosque led by Hilaly.
32. The largest Muslim school in Australia is the Malek Fahd Islamic School, established by the Australian Federation of Islamic Council (AFIC) in October 1989 with 87 children ages 3 to 8. In 2008 there were over 1,800 children ages 3 to 17. See http://www.mfis.com.au/. Named after King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, one website claimed it received a grant of $12 million from the Saudi royal family in 1989:http://sydneynearlydailyphot.blogspot.com/2007/06/malek-fahd-islamic-college-greenacre.html.
34. Email comment by Jeremy Jones, January 24, 2008.


41. Material supplied by a Muslim colleague (name withheld on request).


43. Table of secondary non-English-speaking background student enrollment by school supplied by Dr. Ken Cruickshank from his study Teenagers, Literacy, and School: Researching in Multilingual Contexts (London: Routledge, 2006).

44. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, 133. Lewis claims that this popular belief is because suicide bombings cannot be justified under Muslim law, so this belief enables them “at once to appreciate and to disown the attacks.”

45. Interview with a Sydney high school teacher, June 2006. Name withheld on request.

46. Interview with T4, who teaches at a school in the St. George area where 248 of 615 students are Arabic speaking, the majority of them Muslim.


48. Interview with a Muslim student from the University of Sydney, June 2006. Name withheld on request.


55. Press release by Andrew Robb, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration, December 4, 2006.


57. Interview with Rabbi Zalman Kastel, Sydney, August 17, 2007.


59. The portfolio in charge of the Living in Harmony grants has moved from immigration, multiculturalism, and citizenship.


61. For example, in June 2007 Affinity organized a “Social Cohesion Public Symposium” at Macquarie University, Sydney, which was held on a Friday night.


67. Written comments from Jeremy Jones, email correspondence, January 24, 2008.
SECTION II

Socioeconomic and Political Interaction in Arab Lands and Central Asia

Toward Jewish Immigration
Yemen

Muslim and Jewish Interactions in the Tribal Sphere

Bat-Zion Eraqi Klorman

Yemeni society is tribal in character. Although modern changes, mainly during the twentieth century, weakened tribal organizations, they did not eliminate them, and they are still functioning and affecting the state and its individual citizens. The tribes are sedentary, make their living from agriculture, and are organized as an armed political unit. Until the 1970s, 97 percent of the Yemeni population lived in tribal-rural districts in tens of thousands of small settlements. Similarly, about 85 percent of the Jews lived in tribal-rural areas, alongside Muslim tribesmen in hundreds of small, even tiny, settlements. The remainder lived in the capital of San’a’ and in a number of small towns.

Unlike large parts of the Muslim world where colonial powers introduced changes in the status of the Jews and promoted their civil rights, Yemen was not under direct western colonial control, and such processes never occurred there. After the 1630s, following a century of Ottoman occupation, Yemen was governed by Zaydi imams. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans took over the Red Sea coastal plain, and in 1872 they reoccupied central Yemen and remained until 1918. The rest of Yemen continued to be governed by Zaydi imams. After the Ottoman withdrawal, once again a Zaydi leader took over the government of Yemen, Imam Yahya ibn Muḥammad al-Mutawakkil (1918–48). Subsequently, Zaydi imams ruled Yemen until the republican revolution of September 1962. While officially recognizing the imams’ sovereignty, in practice the Yemeni tribes resented the central government’s attempts to
control them, thus resembling the Atlas tribes in southern Morocco that
defied the authority of the Sharifian sultans since the sixteenth century.\(^1\)
The increasing interests of western powers in the Red Sea, mainly follow-
ing the British conquest of Aden in 1839, exposed Yemen to their indirect
influences. The regional and local political changes thus encouraged a
slow process of modernization that resulted in connecting Yemen to the
world economy. The import of industrial goods and the opening of new
economic opportunities, within Yemen and outside, weakened the eco-
nomic foundation of the Jews, which was based on the crafts and small
industry.

This article will focus on Muslim-Jewish relations in Yemen in the
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, until most of the
Jews emigrated from Yemen. It will examine Muslim-Jewish contact in
the tribal regions and will virtually ignore urban Jews, who although be-
ing small in number were more organized and better educated and have
been dealt with in a number of scholarly works. The article will focus
on tribal protection, the Jewish response to tribal practices and custom-
ary law, and the Muslim attitude toward the Jewish religion and Jewish
customs. It will also elaborate on the Jews’ position in society as it relates
to their perception as possessing mystical-magical knowledge and their
discernment as “others.” The study is based on both oral history and
written sources. It relies on personal interviews with Yemeni Jews now
living in Israel, as well as on letters, archival documents, memoirs, itiner-
ary writings, and relevant published research.

**Tribal Protection**

Under the imams, heads of the central government, the Shari’a was the
official legal code. Thus, during the entire period under consideration,
Jews were legally defined as *dhimmi*, protected people. Like in parts of
North Africa, where there were no other significant religious minorities,
the term *dhimmi*, originally designated by the Shari’a to describe non-
Muslims living under Islam, became equivalent to Jews.\(^2\) The Jews were
granted religious freedom and assurances of personal security and prop-
erty in exchange for their acknowledgment of Muslim political and social
supremacy, which was conveyed by the payment of the *jizya* (poll tax)
and obedience to a collection of discriminatory restrictions as detailed
in the Shari’a. For example, Jews were required to wear distinguishing
clothes; they could ride a donkey only sidesaddle and were not allowed to ride horses at all; and their homes could not rise above Muslims’ houses. These restrictions were more strictly observed in the capital of San’ā’ and its surroundings and in a few towns where the imam exercised direct control. (The Ottomans tried to equalize the Jews’ legal status to that of other Jews in their empire, but were halted by the vigorous opposition of the Yemeni population and religious scholars.)

However, most Jews resided in areas dominated by tribal Shaykhs who did not strictly enforce these laws. The Jews usually kept their houses close to each other so that they could sustain communal life and observe the Sabbath and religious holidays. But frequently, in small villages, their homes were near their Muslim neighbors. The tribesmen maintained their independence and customary laws (‘urf), which included regulating their relations with the Jews. Thus, while roofs in the Jewish quarter of San’ā’ were indeed lower than Muslims’, there was no difference in height between Jews’ and Muslims’ houses in rural districts. In the north and the northeast of Yemen, Jews even carried arms, much like the tribesmen. In the tribal areas, the Jews lived under the protection of the Shaykhs and other members of the tribe in a sort of client-patron relationship. Each Jewish household had special ties with a Muslim jar, who acted as patron and helped in times of need. The Muslim jar sometimes had more than one Jew (who was also called jar) under his protection. The Jew was expected to give his jar gifts on special occasions. Jews who wished to reside in the territory of a certain tribe had to ask for the tribe’s consent and protection, without which their safety would be threatened. Granting of protection was generally announced in public in a special ceremony, such as that described by Abraham Ovadia, whose family received, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the protection of Shaykh Nasir Mabkhut of the Hashid tribe:

On Thursday, the day of the weekly market, the Shaykh’s messengers approached us and took me, my brother, and my two sisters to the marketplace, which was crowded with Arabs, as customary on this day. My father was already there. . . . We climbed on a little hill in the market, the seating place of noble persons who were appointed judges on various matters. They lined us up, and one of the men loaded his gun and shot one shot in the air. He then cried loudly: “Listen, oh people, pray for the Prophet!” He repeated this
three times. Silence and terrible stillness took over the market. The announcer continued: “Shaykh Naṣir Mabkhut informs you that this respectable Jew,ʿAwad ibn Saʿid Yaʿqub [Ovadia’s father], is under our protection and he lives in our land. Shaykh Naṣir expects everyone of Ḥashid to help him in all matters. And whoever harms him in water, Shaykh Naṣir Mabkhut shall avenge him in blood. This Jew, each one of you is his jar. Peace upon you and the blessing of God.”

“Whoever harms the Jew in water, we shall avenge him in blood” was a well-known expression that announced the formulating of ties of protection. The protection was thus defined as a sort of blood covenant, reflecting the actual blood relations that connected the tribesmen in bonds of mutual responsibility and tribal obligations. Offending his Jew was hence taken by the Muslim jar as an offense to his honor. The protection commitment sometimes led to extreme consequences, such as a Muslim father and son fighting each other because each was jar to one of two quarrelling Jews. On occasion, tribes went to war because a Jew had been attacked, as it would have been shameful for them not to respond. Notions of honor and shame similarly regulated Muslim-Jewish relations in the tribal areas of North Africa during the nineteenth century and early twentieth, especially concerning itinerant Jewish peddlers. On the Yemeni scene, however, these codes also related to Jews living within the tribe. Shame and obligations toward the Jews were connected not only with viewing them as a weak group within the tribe but also with perceiving their men as having a blurred gender identity, as not being “real men,” and comparing them to women. Therefore Jewish men were not considered a danger to Muslim women’s honor and modesty. While strange Muslim men were forbidden to enter the house and remain alone with the women of the household, Jews were allowed to do so.

**The Integration of Jews into Muslim Tribal Society**

The Jewish role in the tribal economy served as a main vehicle for their integration into the surrounding society. Most of the Jews worked as artisans and suppliers of services to Muslim tribal farmers; they also engaged in retail trade and peddling. The tribesmen wanted Jews to live
in their village and work there.\textsuperscript{12} While Jewish commerce in Sanʿaʾ was conducted mainly in workshops and shops in the Jewish quarter or in the market of the Arab city, trading with their products and with other goods, the actual economic foundation of Jewish life in rural areas was the ‘\textit{umla}. This was the permanent liaison between a Jewish artisan and a number of Muslims, each called an ‘\textit{amil}. Throughout the year, the artisan provided the farmer with all the services and goods he needed for his farm and household; at harvest time, the farmer paid his debt in field crops. Each party could engage in a number of ‘\textit{umla} agreements, the Jewish artisan with several Muslim families in his village, in other villages, or even with an entire village, and the Muslim farmer with different artisans according to his needs.\textsuperscript{13} The Jews also participated in the weekly area markets where farmers gathered and sold their produce. In addition to its economic advantages, the ‘\textit{umla} relationship contributed to the social solidarity between Jewish and Muslim members of Yemeni society, creating strong, almost mystic, bonds of fidelity between the two parties.\textsuperscript{14}

However, the political and economic developments that were mentioned above, and the entrance of industrial goods into Yemen that competed with the local products in price, quality, and diversity, undermined the traditional foundation of the Jewish economy. Starting from late in the nineteenth century, more and more Jews were pushed from the crafts toward retail trade and peddling. Jewish peddlers became a familiar phenomenon in the rural-tribal landscape. The typical peddler wandered around several villages, his route drawn within the tribe’s territory. Often, he also acted as a craftsman, carrying out necessary chores for the tribesmen.

This period also witnessed increased Jewish labor migration, mainly to the port city of Aden, which became a vital anchor for the movement of goods to and from Yemen. In Aden there operated many small plants with technology more advanced than that known in Yemen and which relied on cheap labor from Yemen, Muslim and Jewish. Across the Red Sea there appeared other attractive sites for Jewish migrant labor—Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti—which were also dominated by western colonial powers. At the same time, Jewish immigration to Palestine was intensified. Between 1881 and 1914, nearly 8 percent of Yemeni Jews moved to Palestine. This immigration movement was renewed in 1920, after the conclusion of World War I.\textsuperscript{15}
Furthermore, Jews frequently sought justice within the tribal institutions by appealing to its courts. Alongside the Shari’a, the official code, in Yemen there was a tribal civil system based on customary laws, ‘urf, which sometimes contradicted the Shari’a. The Jewish community was granted legal autonomy, and its members were subordinated to Jewish religious law and judges in all matters except for capital punishment. The Jewish legal system governed religious life, kept the community cohesive as a separate social-religious group, and preserved social boundaries with the surrounding society. Such boundaries were especially evident in matters of marriage and ritual slaughter—both were considered a taboo that would not be crossed.

However, in all matters that did not concern religious and family laws, the authority of the Jewish court competed with that of the local tribal shaykh or the district qadi. Jews appealed to the Muslim judicial system mainly because their courts lacked power of enforcement but also because of their integration into the tribal system and their trust in its juridical institutions. Muslim law is more favorable to women than Jewish law in matters of inheritance. In Jewish law, and according to Yemeni Jewish custom, a daughter does not inherit from her father (she inherits only if he has no sons), and a wife does not inherit from her husband. In contrast, Muslim law stipulates that female heirs receive a share equal to half of that of the male heirs. As a result, Jewish women in towns and even in rural areas sometimes appealed to the Muslim court for a more favorable ruling. Furthermore, even matters of family law, the core of Jewish legal autonomy, were often prearranged in the Muslim court and only afterwards received final legal validity from the Jewish court. In remote tribal settlements, far from the effective authority of the Jewish court, family matters were occasionally governed in accordance with tribal practice, despite the fact that this contradicted Jewish law.

Muslim Attitudes toward Jewish Religion and Customs

Throughout the period under discussion, Yemen remained a traditional society and did not undergo any process of secularization. Yemeni society, urban and rural, was religious (though often tribesmen did not observe many of the Shari’a laws). This society maintained that its well-being depended on the good conduct of its members and their obedience to religious and customary laws; such behavior would ensure that the
social order would not be disrupted and that the people would not be punished by Heaven. The basic Yemeni attitude toward the Jewish religion stems from Islam, which views Judaism as a legitimate monotheistic religion and therefore tolerable. The Jews were expected to observe their own religious laws and thus contribute to the general well-being. Public deviation from Jewish religious law was not acceptable, and a good Muslim would not hesitate to rebuke such behavior.\(^{21}\)

Two Jewish religious principles were best known to the Muslims of Yemen: the dietary laws and observance of the Sabbath. Jews knew that the Muslims of Yemen were familiar with the requirements of Jewish dietary law; therefore, they did not refrain from eating at their tables. Many Jewish craftsmen and peddlers traveled around the tribe’s territory for weeks, even for months, working in the villages and coming home only for the Sabbath or on holidays. As there were often no Jewish settlements en route, they stayed with Muslim acquaintances and, in return, gave their hosts something from their merchandise. These travelers ate milk products and bread in their hosts’ vessels and in the homes of Muslims in which they worked.\(^{22}\) A Jewish peddler in the Rada’ district relates: “I remember an Arab woman at whose house I stayed and I ate there. She used to say, ‘ya yahudi, eat! You are on my conscience. I am responsible. If there is a sin it would be on me.’ That means that the milk vessel is not used for meat dishes, and the Arabs know it. The Arabs have faith. They are religious.”\(^{23}\)

Jews also ate food prepared by Muslims in other circumstances. In the village al-Jum’ah of the Khawlan district, in the first half of the twentieth century, the Jews were required to pay the \textit{Jizya} by working one day a year in the fields of the village shaykh. On this day, the shaykh used to provide them with breakfast and lunch: \textit{’asid} (meal porridge) and \textit{samna} (clarified butter) and sheep’s milk, “and we even ate in their vessels!”\(^{24}\) Jews participated in their Muslim neighbors’ important life cycle events, like weddings and mourning ceremonies.\(^{25}\) In such cases, the Muslims respected the dietary laws of their Jewish guests:

When Sayyid Salah passed away [circa 1920], we went to his funeral, about twelve people from Rada’. After the shaykh was buried, his sons did not let us return to Rada’, by any means. They said that the Jews would stay [as their guests] for a whole week. They gave us a special house, laborers to help us, and even took
the trouble to bring a *mori* [rabbi] to slaughter for us for a whole week. . . . In the morning we ate milk products, *samna*, and in the evening meat.26

Likewise, Muslims ate in Jewish homes and participated in Jewish wedding festivals.27 All of the above clearly show how comfortable Jews felt in the Muslim tribal society.

Observance of the Sabbath was the second Jewish religious principle respected by Yemeni Muslims. The Arabs knew of the Sabbath both from their contacts with Jews and from Muslim sources. For example, *surat al-baqara* (The Cow) of the Quran28 dictates that the Jews ought to observe the Sabbath and that whoever desecrates the Sabbath will become a monkey. The Sabbath is seemingly perceived as a punishment for Jews who rejected Islam, a perception which implies the existence of tension toward them. Hence, along with the Muslims’ genuine desire that the Jews observe their religion for the sake of the general well-being, the Sabbath often became a way to monitor the Jews and control them. This dialectic is apparent in the following examples. Haim Habshush, who traveled in Yemen in 1870, tells of a Jew who at a time of drought joined his fellow Muslim villagers in gathering locusts for food. He persisted in this task even on the eve of the Sabbath and did not listen to his Muslim neighbors, who asked him to stop. The tribesmen then brought him to trial before one of their judges, and he was sentenced to a few months imprisonment.29 And Reuben Sharʿabi (born in 1911 in the Bani Wahban territory in Sharʿab district), tells of being rebuked on account of the Sabbath by ʿAli Qaid, the village shaykh. He recalls that one Friday afternoon he was late in returning home from his commercial dealings. He hurried toward the village, riding on his donkey, and reached home a few minutes before the Sabbath began. But he recounts:

Before I managed to enter my home and unload the pack from the donkey, Shaykh ʿAli arrived in my house, angry and shouting loudly: “*Ya Rubein, ya yahudi*, you desecrated the Sabbath!” . . . I came to him and told him: “Honorable Shaykh, you are mistaken. The Sabbath did not begin yet, as the sun has not set. There is at least a quarter of an hour left until the Sabbath.” But the Shaykh insisted: “I am not wrong, but you are wrong! The Sabbath enters before the sun sets. And you still have to care for the donkey and wash
for the Sabbath, and there is no doubt that you have desecrated the Sabbath! You should have arrived earlier!"\(^{30}\)

In some places, the tribesmen were careful not to disturb the Jews during the Sabbath and even refrained from conversing with them.\(^{31}\) At times, Muslim tribesmen even used to gather during the Sabbath and the High Holidays near the synagogue and listen attentively to the prayers, while encouraging the Jews to pray wholeheartedly.\(^{32}\) In the town of Dhamar, for example, Muslims used to come on Thursdays to the place where children were taught Torah and listen to their reading of the Tafsir (Rabbi Saadia Gaon’s Arabic translation of the Torah), “and at the end would kiss the book like we did.”\(^{33}\)

**The Jews’ “Otherness”**

In many societies, the minority “other” is perceived as mysterious, having extraordinary powers, sometimes demonic and vicious, sometimes possessing heavenly and benevolent capabilities. Much like the Freudian concept of the “uncanny,” this “other” arouses fear and horror, but is also attractive and tempting.\(^{34}\) Similar perceptions were held by the Muslims of Yemen regarding the Jews, both as individuals and as a community. The Jews were regarded as possessing mystical-magical knowledge that can do good but also magical knowledge that performs sorcery.\(^{35}\) The tribesmen of northern Yemen, wrote Abraham Tabib in 1932, “perceive the Jews as a representation of godliness . . . and therefore treat them with concealed reverence . . . , saying that whoever mistreats the Jews will not prosper.”\(^{36}\) The phenomenon of Muslim supporters of Jewish messianic pretenders, mainly in the nineteenth century, can be understood in this context. The Jewish messiahs Shukr Kuḥayl I (1861–65) and Shukr Kuḥayl II (1868–75) were both viewed as performing wonders, as messengers sent to announce the End of Time, and as apocalyptical anti-messiahs whose appearance was a sign of the imminent messianic days and the coming of the *mahdi*.\(^{37}\)

Similarly, it was widely believed that Jewish prayer, communal but also individual, can affect rainfall (an idea known also in Jewish communities in North Africa).\(^{38}\) In time of drought, Muslim neighbors in the tribal areas, even the imams of Sanʿa’, used to ask the Jews to pray
for rain (at times parallel to summoning the Muslim congregation for a special prayer for rain). These ceremonial prayers were usually conducted in the Jewish cemetery, using Torah scrolls. However, others believed that Jews were capable of disrupting the climatic cycle and halting rainfall.

The belief in the Jews’ mysterious powers went hand in hand with convictions that governed the daily life of Muslims and Jews in traditional Yemen: magic/sorcery (sihr), demons (jinns), the evil eye (ʿayn), and the like. Such beliefs (comparable to those which ruled the life of believers in other societies in different times and places) relied on both Muslim and Jewish sources. Jewish demonology was thus intertwined with Muslim demonology, creating a complex set of beliefs of a hidden mysterious world. Because of the physical closeness and diverse cooperation of Jews and Muslims in the tribal sphere, which is the center of our discussion, the assimilation of this syncretistic complex of ideas was deeper there than in the urban arena, where the Jews lived in a special quarter separated by walls from the Muslim city. Much like other societies, in order to somewhat manage the world, Yemeni society ascribed to some gifted persons the ability to apply means that could protect them from the harmful intentions of mysterious beings or, conversely, manipulate them to cause trouble. Many such renowned experts were believed to be Jews. Furthermore, as most of the Jewish men were literate (while only a few of the tribesmen knew how to read and write), their literacy was often interpreted as mastering sacred hidden knowledge. Gamliʿeli writes, “Yemen’s gentiles believed that the Jews, who know the book, are great experts in this matter. Every Jewish peddler was perceived by them as a baʿal ḥefeṣ, capable of mastering demons and spirits and forcing them to do as he pleases.” Consequently, the tribesmen often asked their Jewish acquaintances, or even unknown Jewish passers-by, many of them peddlers, to write amulets for them.

A number of Torah scrolls, ḥefeṣ (literally: object), were widely believed in Yemen to cause miracles. These scrolls attracted not only Jews but also Muslims who sought a blessing or a cure. Distinct from the sacredness of a holy Torah scroll, which is unrelated to time and space or to a specific personality, there were powers, recognized by Jews and Muslims, as embodied in the combination of a specific man and a specific book. Such a person was known as a baʿal ḥefeṣ, literally the owner of an object, meaning a holy book. The book was believed to contain mystical and
magical knowledge. Only the right person could “open the book” and apply its knowledge to perform wonders.

Also, some Jews were famous for possessing specialized magic skills such as the ability to converse with demons. Demons known in the Muslim surrounding were also active in Jewish society. Some were demons of the house—they were neighbors of the family, lived at home, and were active mainly at night. If not disturbed, they lived peacefully with the people of the house. Others were demons of the outside—they were found in the open landscape, on the roads, and near water resources. These demons often attacked humans by surprise, intending to harm them. A most famous demonic figure was Um al-Ṣubyan (mother of the youth), who impersonated a woman or an animal. She scared the people and sometimes harmed them. Often demons entered the body of a certain individual and dominated him. In this mystic reality, Jews were known to possess the powers to control the demons and to exorcise them from humans, both Jews and Muslims.\textsuperscript{49}

Occasionally the Jews’ magical powers were interpreted by the tribesmen as sorcery intended to cause damage. Our sources speak of Jews who performed sorcery and also of Jews whose actions were incorrectly inferred by the tribesmen as sorcery. When their evil action was “discovered,” these Jews were punished. For example, baʿal ḫeṭeṣ Busi Shalom of the village Hamd Sulayman in the Sharʿab district (who was active at the beginning of the twentieth century) aroused the concern and fear of the area’s tribesmen: “They sensed that something was wrong about this Jew. They suspected that he was causing trouble with their women, that he instigated wives to dislike their husbands and created hatred between them. Therefore, they ambushed him on the road, tied him in a sack, and threw him into a reservoir.”\textsuperscript{50}

The transmitting of magical knowledge from Muslim to Jew is known in the medieval Muslim world.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, as Yemeni Jews also sought the services of Muslim tribal medical experts, bodies of knowledge originating in Yemeni Muslim society in matters of magic, medicine, methods of treatment, medical herbs, and the like were embraced by the Jews and implemented in their practice.\textsuperscript{52} This two-way transmission of magical knowledge was not confined to men, but also existed between Muslim and Jewish women. Thus the sisters Ghazal and Ḥamama of al-Jawf in the first half of the twentieth century practiced Darb al-Fal, foretelling the future by means of mixing stones. They learned this vocation from
a Muslim woman and thereafter became renowned professionals who rendered their services to Jews and Muslims.\textsuperscript{53}

The Jews, on their part, internalized the beliefs of the tribal society with regard to their capabilities. They wrote about themselves, quoting the tribesmen as saying: “You are the people of the book and you have wisdom; you can even control the demons.”\textsuperscript{54} Folk tales collected in the twentieth century tell of famous Yemeni Jewish scholars of the past, presenting them as wondrous figures who greatly impressed the Muslims of Yemen and even the imam. Similar folk tales can be traced in other Jewish communities that cultivated tales about the wisdom of the Jews in comparison with the gentiles’ ignorance, thus compensating for the low social status of the Jews in society. In Yemen, however, these stories can be interpreted in relation to the Jews’ unique magical knowledge. One example relates to Rabbi Shalom Shabazi, the famous seventeenth-century poet. It tells of the imam who came to Shabazi and asked him to save Yemen from the terrible locust plague that befell the country. Rabbi Shabazi read the Zohar, he invoked some Kabbalistic techniques of combining holy names, and soon the locusts disappeared. Another Shabazi folk tale tells of the imam who fell ill and the best Muslim physicians were unable to cure him. All the Muslims went to the mosques and prayed for him, but his health continued to deteriorate. A rumor then spread at the imam’s court about “a Jew whose name is Shabazi, who lives in a small modest house, who is knowledgeable in miracles and performs wonders.” They immediately brought Shabazi to the imam, and he shouted: “Out with the disease!” The imam opened his eyes and then rose healthy from his bed.\textsuperscript{55} Similar are the tales about Rabbi Zekharia Tabib (ha-Rofe—the physician), the fifteenth-century author of the medical textbook \textit{al-wagij}. It was said that he could cure diseases that no Muslim physician could treat and also that he alone had solved the murder of the imam’s son.\textsuperscript{56}

Jews sometimes exploited the perception of their “otherness” and mystical knowledge to strengthen their positions against the Muslims by applying cunning and manipulation. They would pretend, for example, that they were forced to do an evil deed, i.e., steal crops, by a demon that had possessed them, and thus they escaped punishment. On other occasions, Jews would pretend to know how to write amulets or master the demons in order to obtain material gains from the tribesmen.\textsuperscript{57}

These shared beliefs in magic and sorcery thus created a common Jewish-Muslim society, based on an imagined corpus of hidden capabilities
and sacred books that carry mystical knowledge. Yet, at the same time, these beliefs enhanced the perception of the Jew as the “other” and contributed to positing him outside the inner circles of the tribal society.

Conclusion

Most Yemeni Jews lived in rural areas among the Yemeni tribes. Their mingling in the tribal society enabled the development of organic relationships through which each group adapted cultural components of the other. Muslim-Jewish relations in tribal Yemen should be understood as deriving from the Jews’ dhimmi position and from the nature of their interactions with the tribal society. The Jews were connected to the tribe through protection customs and agreements and were regarded as a weak group whose position in the tribe was regulated by concepts of “shame.” They were integrated into the tribe’s economic system, and they provided vital services to Muslim farmers. Yemeni Muslim society respected and encouraged the Jews to observe their religion and even used its superior position to monitor their religious conduct. In addition, Jewish and Muslim relations were characterized by interaction in the mystical sphere and a belief in the Jews’ magical skills. The Jews represented mysterious beings, possessing supernatural powers that could cause either good or bad. Their mystical-magical knowledge and practice contributed to the creation of a sort of popular Muslim-Jewish syncretistic religion, but also intensified the Jews’ perception as the ultimate “other.” Much like the formulation by Freud, the Jews’ “otherness” represented the “uncanny” to which the Muslims were attracted and at the same time they feared. They were needed and respected, feared and disliked. This analysis presents the complexity of the Jews’ position in the society and concludes that while they were integrated into tribal society, they nevertheless remained outsiders.

Notes


5. Abraham Ovadia, Netivot Temam ve-Zion (Tel-Aviv: Afiqim, 1985), 35.

6. Cf. protection granted to a Jew by the ʿUmaysi tribe in the Khowlan district: “Our protection is given to you. Do not be afraid. Whoever throws water on you, we shall cover him with blood.” Nissim Binyamin Gamli’eli, Hevyon Teman: Memoirs, Stories, Folk Tales (Ramle: author, 1983), 18.


11. Cf. Goldberg, Jewish Life, 75, about Jewish peddlers in Libya who were allowed to enter Muslim homes and have direct contact with the women of the household.

12. In March 1982 interviews, Pinhas Qapara explained: “The Arabs need the Jews, the Jew is like the salt of their life,” and Yahya Eraqi related that the tribesmen of the Mran district in northern Yemen pleaded that he move to their village, “since it is impossible that whenever we need to fix a gun we have to go to the village of al-Hajar.”


15. For immigration from Yemen to Palestine and its motives, see Bat-Zion


28. For the commandment to observe the Sabbath, see Quran, 4:154, 16:124; the punishment for those who desecrate the Sabbath, Quran, 2:65, 7:163–66.

29. Ḥabshush, Mas‘ot Habshush, 100–101; encouraging and helping a Jew in Ḥaydan at the beginning of the twentieth century to keep the Sabbath, Madar Halevi, “Yehasim”; and see Muslims respecting the Jews’ Sabbath in Ezra Qehati, Yaqirai be-Teman, 53; in Khawlan district, Gamli‘eli, Ḥevyon Teman, 73.

30. Reuben Shar‘abi, Yehi Re‘uben, 43–44.

31. Ḥabshush, Mas‘ot Habshush, 100; Ezra Qehati, Yaqirai be-Teman, 53.

32. See Garama, Yehudei al-Agbari, 19, regarding the Zaydi tribesmen of al-Agbari; Efrayim Ya‘aqob, ed., Temana (Nahariya: Hadrei Teman, 1995), 116–19, regarding Hugariyya south to Ta‘izz; Madar Halevi, “Yehasim.”

33. Yosef Asta, Hayyei Yosef (Tel-Aviv: Afiqim, 1987), 37.


35. Magic and mysticism do not have defined and distinguishing borders. As to magic and sorcery, I generally related to magic as a practice that intends to achieve profits and to sorcery as a practice that is directed toward causing harm. For definitions of magic, see Moshe Idel, “Yahadut, Mistica Yehudit u-Magia,” Jewish Studies 36 (1996): 25; Avriel Bar-Levav, “Magia be-Sifrut ha-Musar,” Tarbiz 72, no. 3 (2003): 394–95.


39. See, for example, Tabib, Shoei Teman; Madar Halevi, “Yehasim”;Ya‘aqov Sappir, Sefer Masa‘ Teman, annotated by Avraham Ya‘ari (Jerusalem: ha-Aḥim Levin Epstein, 1951), 192–93; Efraim Ya‘aqov, ed., Mavo le-‘Eretz al-Hugariyya by Mori Yosef Rada (Nahariya: Hadrei Teman, 1995), 101; Zihra Garama, Yehudei al-Agbari, 19–20; Reuben Shar‘abi, Yehi Re‘uben, 32–33. For Imam Yahya calling on the Jewish community of San‘a‘ to conduct a special prayer for rain in 1946, see AZM S6 3802.

40. For example, Sappir, Sefer Masa‘ Teman, 192–93; Tabib, Shoei Teman, 26; Madar Halevi, “Yehasim”; Ya‘aqov, Mavo le-‘Eretz al-Hugariyya, 101; Garama, Yehudei al-Agbari, 19–20; Reuben Shar‘abi, Yehi Re‘uben, 32–33; Benei Moshe, Ba-Mesila Na‘ale, 35–36; S. D. Goitein, From the Land of Sheba: Tales of the Jews of Yemen (New York: Schocken 1947), 87; for Imam Yahya who asked the Jewish community of San‘a‘, in 1946, to perform a special public prayer and plead for rain, see Central Zionist Archives (CZA), S6 3802; for the cemetery as “communication center” serving to transmit requests for rain and other pleas, see Avriel Bar-Levav, “The Other Place: The Cemetery in Jewish Culture,” Pe‘amim 98–99 (2004): 14–17 (Hebrew).
41. Tabib, Shavei Teman, 26; Ya’aqov, Mavo le-’Eretz al-Ḥugariyya, 101.

42. See, for example, Ya’aqov Sappir’s observations regarding the widespread belief among Jews and Muslims in sorcery, invocations, and practical Kabbala, in Iggeret le-Teman (Mainz, 1869); Eraqi Klorman, Messianic Community, 133–34; Shimon Greidi, “Shedin ve-Ruḥot be-emunat Yehudei Teman,” in Shevut Teman, ed. Y. Yesha’yahu and A. Zadoq (Tel-Aviv: mi-Teman le-Zion, 1945), 155–65; Libbi, Bi-Nitivot Moshe, 36–37, about the abundance of jinn in the homes and in the open space; Gamli’eli, Ḥevyon Teman, 83–84; Reuben Shar’ abi, Yeḥi Re’uben, 77–78; Gamli’eli Ha-Qamea’, 43–47, 164–70; Ḥabshush, Masʾot Ḥabshush, 6; Sa’adia Hoza, Sefer Toldot ha-Rav Shalom Shabazi (Jerusalem: Yosef Ḥasid, 1973), 35, 39, 44, David, Derekh Ge’ulim, 33; Aharon Ben David, “Shedin ve-Ruḥot be-Mishkenot Yehudei Sfon Teman,” in Halikhot Qedem be-Mishkenot Teman, ed. Shalom Seri and Yisrael Qeisar (Tel-Aviv: E’ele be-Tamar, 2006), 91–108. For the Dor De’a movement of the beginning of the twentieth century and its fight against beliefs in the evil eye, demons, and the like, see Bat-Zion Eraqi Klorman, “Enlightenment, Judaism, and Islam and the Kabbala Dispute in Yemen,” in Religious Radicalism, ed. Meir Litvak and Ora Limor (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2007), 147 (Hebrew).


46. About Jews writing amulets for Muslims, ibid., 20, 28, 64–68, 134–38, 170; Madar Halevi, “Yehasim”; David, Derekh Ge’ulim, 31; Sabari, Bi-Shvilei Teman, 81–84. Yahya Garama of al-Agbari is a remarkable example of a renowned expert, whom the tribesmen of the region used to consult. Garama, Yehudei al-Agbari, 19.

47. Erich Brauer, “Saint Tombs and Torah Scrolls Performing Wonders,” in

48. See ba’al hefeṣ Mori Sulayman al-Jarufi from the Khawan district, who served for a long time as the tribesmen’s consultant and physician. Gamli’eli, Ḥevion Teman, 32–60. Yahya ’Urqabi from Rada’ wrote amulets and “opened the book” for the Muslims in his area. Gamli’eli, Ha-Qamea’, 27–31, 41–42. And see Zekharia Dori, Traditional Medicine among the Jews of Yemen (Tel-Aviv: Afiqim, 2003), 41 (Hebrew).

49. For example, Nissim of al-Radma, in the Yarim district, who became a successful healer during the 1930s and treated many Jewish and Muslim patients, by means of summoning demons for curing purposes. See Mordechai Yishari, Hayyiti ben ‘aruba be-Teman (Rosh Ha’ayin: author, 1989), 213–20; for other Jews acting in the first half of the twentieth century both in gathering demons and exorcising them, see Gamli’eli, Ha-Qamea’, 47–49; Ben David, “Shedim,” 97, 103–105; Garama, Yehudei al-Agbari, 19.

50. Shim ‘on Me’uda, interviewed by his son Efraim Amihood, 1996; see also ba’al hefeṣ Mori Sulayman al-Jarufi’s accusation of sorcery in Gamli’eli, Ḥevion Teman, 48–50; and Gamli’eli, Ha-Qamea’, 134–38, about a Jew who was punished when it was discovered that he was hired by one Muslim family to write an amulet whose purpose was to destroy the head of the rival Muslim family.


52. For example, Gamli’eli, Ḥevion Teman, 32, 191; Reuben Shar’abi, Yeḥi Re’uben, 77–78; Yeḥi’el Ḥabshush, Hayyei ha-Yeled be-Teman (Tel-Aviv: Ḥabshush Family, 1991), 55–57.


54. Gamli’eli, Ha-Qamea’, 47.

55. Dov Noy, “Rabbi Shalem Shabazi in the Folk Tales of the Jews of Yemen,” in Bo’i Teman, ed. Yehuda Ratzaby (Tel-Aviv: Afiqim, 1967), 121–22 (Hebrew); Hoza, Sefer Toldot, 14–15. For other tales about Shabazi’s supernatural powers, see ibid., 16, 19–22, 34–35.

56. Goitein, From the Land of Sheba, 84–87.

It is commonly assumed that once exiled from the ancient land of Israel, Jews were transformed from being a society of primarily rural farmers to urban dwellers engaged in other occupations: commerce, peddling, and well-defined crafts. Farming pursuits by Jews were mainly confined to urban and suburban cultivation of vineyards, orchards, and other forms of intensive agricultural production. Apart from these limited domains, both in the Christian and Islamic worlds, Jews had abandoned the land and agriculture.

Historians have offered a number of explanations for this fundamental transformation. The abandonment of agriculture and the alienation of Jews from the land have been explained in part by heavy taxation, expropriation of Jewish landholdings, and general restrictions on Jewish land tenure, although there is little evidence that there were any important legal restrictions on Jewish economic activities in the period of Muslim expansion.1 A somewhat different explanation offered is that in contrast to non-Jews, a significant number of Jewish farmers were literate, giving them advantages in skilled professions needed in the new cities that developed with expanding urban settlements in the Abbasid period and later with the development of urban life in Western Europe.2 Even if Jews may have voluntarily moved away from agricultural pursuits for other, more lucrative occupations, it could also be argued that social structure inhibited Jewish landownership and farming. In Europe, Jews were outside the feudal system of land tenure, while in the Middle East and North
Africa, Jews were also outside the rural social system, which was based on communal lands and tribal lineages. Another reason attributed to the decline of agriculture was the restrictions of the Sabbath, more onerous for agricultural pursuits when Jews lived as a minority population.

How much in fact Jews were alienated from the land and agriculture is a subject of debate, and it now seems clear that in the Mediterranean region, in both Christian and Muslim regions, Jews continued to own rural land and pursue agriculture to a greater degree than was once believed. The Geniza provides plenty of evidence that Jews were engaged in agriculture and owned farmland in Egypt and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. In North Africa, evidence since the Middle Ages shows that there were Jews who were farmers and herders. Travel literature from the sixteenth century refers to Jewish farmers. Evidence of Jews cultivating the soil comes not only from the occasional observation of travelers but also from responsa literature, rabbinical discourse on legal questions from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

It is, however, undeniable that a large measure of alienation from the land took place and that over the course of the first millennium Jews shifted from agriculture to more urban occupations. Even where Jews owned agricultural lands in the Muslim Mediterranean world, they often did not cultivate the fields themselves but relied instead on Muslim sharecroppers. For Jews the transition away from tilling the soil became a symbol of exile, and for Gentiles it became a Jewish stereotype.

In the years preceding and following the emancipation of Jews in Western Europe, the debates about removing the civil disabilities of the Jews often revolved around the supposedly unproductive nature of Jewish professions. For adversaries to Jewish emancipation, this essential nature of the Jew was what made their integration undesirable. For both Jewish and non-Jewish advocates of emancipation, Jewish productivity was a necessity for admittance to society. What was required was the “regeneration” of the Jews, which implied, among other things, the normalization of Jewish economic and professional life. More specifically, there were calls for Jews to return to agriculture. The pursuit of agriculture as part of the revitalization of Jewish life was called for by both those who saw it as a means to integrate in the societies where Jews lived and by Zionists, who saw the “return to the land” as a sacred duty for the national restoration of the Jewish people. The result of this ideology, whether Zionist or assimilationist, from the mid-nineteenth century resulted in the
establishment for Jews of agricultural colonies and schools and communal farming settlements in Palestine, North Africa, the United States, and Argentina.

This is the context for understanding the discovery, real and imagined, of Jewish farmers in Morocco in modern history. This chapter will therefore trace the encounter of Jewish farmers with foreign travelers in the nineteenth century, with the French colonial administration, with the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and finally with Zionist emissaries. Each had its own ideological and stereotypical views of Jewish farmers. These views, however, had political implications that affected the real world of Jewish farming, the relationship of Jews to agricultural production and the land, and finally Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco.

Since antiquity, Jews have lived scattered throughout rural Morocco, especially in the southern parts of the country. Following the Muslim conquest of the region, Jews continued to inhabit the region. Throughout the post-conquest centuries, new Jewish communities were constantly being formed and reformed in what has remained predominantly Berber areas, with the Jews filling in specific niches in the rural economy, especially crafts, trade, and peddling. While the particular economic role that Jews played in the rural economy was recognized, the extension of new Jewish settlements and the Jews’ acquisition of property potentially posed problems and raised legal concerns. The question of Jewish property was sometimes contested between local political authorities and the Jews, and Muslim jurists were divided on the question of Jews and landownership. The issue often arises on the subject of whether dhimmis are entitled to construct new sites of worship in lands controlled by Islam. And while Muslim jurists might rule against the building of new synagogues following the conquest of Islam, this was contradicted by the reality of new communities formed, whose existence required building synagogues and obtaining land to bury their dead. Local Muslim authorities would often assert their own authority, sometimes over the objections of Muslim jurists, in extending their own control over Jewish landownership. The Jews, in turn, would legitimate their own right to residence by tracing their origins to pre-Islamic antiquity, perhaps to counteract the Muslims’ perception of Jews as outsiders who required the protection and control of the Muslim authorities.

Ownership of agricultural plots of land, for the most part, was retained by Muslims, although Jews often held land in usufruct. On some
occasions, however, Jews would buy and sell agricultural lands to Muslims, obtaining some precarious autonomy but often to the consternation of the local Muslim authorities. Jewish control of agricultural land did not lead to Jewish farming activities, and where Jewish farmers did exist (in relatively small numbers and in a few specific locations), evidence suggests that they did not own the land they worked. The fact that most Jews were in professions other than agriculture, the occupation of the vast majority of the Muslim population, was to the Jews a mark of their distinction, indeed even demonstrating their superiority over non-Jews. Thus Jews were generally not associated with agricultural labor, and they even looked down upon working the land, a memory still kept by the Muslim population.

The stereotypical image of the alienation of Jews from the land and from agriculture explains why the existence of Jewish farmers in Morocco elicited such interest. Jewish agriculturalists in Morocco were even legendary, mythical in character, catching the attention of the few foreign travelers in the interior of Morocco in the nineteenth century. John Davidson, a British traveler in Morocco in 1835–36, who was killed during his journey en route to Timbuktu, claimed in his journal to have inspected more than one hundred villages of Jews and Berbers never before seen by Europeans. He regards the lifestyle of the Jews to be similar to the Berbers. Although he visited many locales, he heard only secondhand about a district called Coubba, supposedly nearly as big as Marrakesh, where

there are no less than 3,000 or 4,000 Jews living in perfect freedom, and following every variety of occupation; that they have mines and quarries which they work, possess large gardens and extensive vineyards, and cultivate more corn than they can possibly consume; that they have a form of government, and have possessed this soil from the time of Solomon; in proof of which he stated they possess a record bearing the signet and sign of Joab, who came to collect tribute from them in the time of the son of David. 10

The existence of Jewish farmers, imagined or real, surprised European observers, challenging their stereotypical image of Jews. “The most curious thing in the country,” wrote one traveler in the late nineteenth century, “seems to be certain tribes of Jews who are semi-independent, not confined as elsewhere to the towns, but agriculturists.” 11

Most well known for Jewish farmers in the twentieth century was
the community of Oulad Mansour on the northern flanks of the central High Atlas Mountains, one of the few places in Morocco where most of the Jewish community cultivated the soil. Nahum Slouschz, the first scholar to write extensively about the history of North African Jews, observed Oulad Mansour in 1913:

The most striking feature about this picturesque village is the fact that the majority of its Jewish population follow agricultural pursuits. Of its twenty-five families, fifteen or sixteen live by cultivating the soil. The strip of land that they cultivate and which extends about a hundred and fifty hectares along the river bank, belongs to Arab proprietors of Zemran, to whom the Jews are forced to pay an annual tribute. They raise wheat, barley, and fruit, above all figs and dates.”

Jews were engaged in agriculture in some of the other villages of the general area of the western High Atlas, such as Ait Rehalt (fifteen kilometers to the southeast of Oulad Mansour), Ait Saadelli, and Ait Hakim in the Ghoujama, and several villages in Ait Bou Oulli. Slouschz found that in the two mellahs of Tougana, several families cultivated the soil.

In most cases, however, Jews were not farmers, and with much greater frequency, when acquiring land, cattle, or flocks, they employed Muslim sharecroppers (*khammas* or “fifth(s),” meaning they received a fifth of the production) or entered into partnership with Muslims in which the Jew owned the livestock and the Muslim looked after the animals, not unlike the Jews of the Muslim Mediterranean world in the Middle Ages. Thus Jewish landowners were higher in the social hierarchy than the mainly black *khammas*. Often Jews owned small plots of land where the women cultivated some vegetables and where fruit grew, such as figs, apples, pomegranates, and grapes. In the communities of K’tawa and M’hamid in the southern Draa valley, Jews owned land and palm trees before the arrival of the French, usually in association with the Berbers. In the High Atlas region of Sidi Rahal, Jews owned considerable land before the Protectorate, although Muslims worked the land. In other locations, such as in the Ghoujama of the High Atlas, Jews did not own land or raise animals; instead, they entered into associations with Muslims. Thus a form of interdependency developed: Jews who were dependent on the Muslims for agricultural and livestock products financed the Muslims’ needs. Evidence from Ifrane (sometime written
“Oufran” (by Jews) of the Anti-Atlas region suggests that Jews practically did not work the land, did not own cows, goats, or sheep (though they owned a higher percentage of donkeys), and very minimally harvested trees (olives, dates, almonds). The trees (unlike in M’hamid) did not belong to the Jews in principle, but rather were declared “rented” by the Jews; in reality they were Muslim properties held as security by Jewish lenders, and the production of the harvest constituted the interest paid by the Muslim debtors. Even in the exceptional community of Oulad Mansour, although Jews often owned their own cattle, only a few Jews actually held title to their land as private property. Most of the Jews of Oulad Mansour rented small plots of land, usually paying the Muslim owner a portion of their production.

Foreign control was extended before colonial rule along the coasts, and through the pressure of foreign powers and the system of consular protection, foreigners acquired the right to own land. Among the major beneficiaries were Jewish protégés of foreign powers, some of whom began to acquire considerable lands in the regions surrounding the ports, often through Muslims who mortgaged their land and then, after defaulting in the repayment of loans, gave up their titles to the lands. The expansion of commerce along the coast and the beginnings of commercialized agricultural production also affected land tenure in the interior of the country. Jews in the Sous region of southwestern Morocco, through their association with Jewish merchants in Essaouira, were able to acquire deeds to property from defaulted debtors, alarming the local Muslim authorities, who appeared to be largely unsuccessful in prohibiting the practice.

It was not only the connection of protégés to foreign merchants that led to an increase in Jewish landownership. Connections to powerful potentates might also help Jews acquire land. Perhaps the most significant example was the relationship to the dominant family in southern Morocco, Madani al-Glawi and his brother Thami al-Glawi. In the years before the establishment of the protectorate, the Makhzan came to rely increasingly on the “grand qa’ids” to control the south. Ishu’a Corcos, the wealthy and powerful leader of Marrakesh’s community, was tightly connected to the Glawi family. The Glawi brothers became closely aligned to the French, who helped bolster their position as virtual rulers of the regions to the south of Marrakesh, with literally dozens of “Glawi” palaces and strongholds in the Atlas mountains and valleys to the south of Marrakesh. After the death of Madani, Thami, the “Pasha of Marrakesh,” became the
singular most powerful leader of the central High Atlas. Significantly, in the five casbahs that Glawi constructed for his deputies in the south, there were either mellahs or significant Jewish population in the area under his control. Jews also became closely linked to Glawi and his agents. Corcos served as a key intermediary for Glawi, through the former a conduit for the production of his many landed properties. Corcos himself was able to acquire considerable landed property.

The transition to colonial rule brought some uneven changes in the relationship between Jews and the land in rural areas. While it might seem like the extension of French control and the elimination of legal restrictions would facilitate easier acquisition of rural land by Jews, this was often not the case. Local circumstances, some of which predated the French conquest, were often determining factors. Here we have seen a wide range of possibilities. In some areas, Jews were not allowed to own land, either the surrounding fields or the houses they lived in. In some cases, Jews owned the trees but not the land itself. Elsewhere Jews indeed owned land and were able to take possession of land when a debtor defaulted. However, in the small mellahs of the High Atlas, it was often only a few Jews who actually owned the land by title as individual holdings (mulk). In some locations, often when a powerful chief owned the land, Jews rented their land and houses. As we have seen, Jews farmed in only a very few places; in many more instances, Jews either employed sharecroppers if they owned the land or held land as usufruct usually the result of the Jews loaning money to the Muslim property owners who farmed and harvested their land in association with the Jews. This was based on a contract, referred to in Arabic by a more generic term, rahn, whereby a debtor transfers to his creditor the possession of his property, which was then held as usufruct until the debt was reimbursed. In theory, this usually lasted for three years, but in reality it was understood that there was no intention to pay off the debt. This may have been the most common means by which Jews acquired property, although in theory, the land was more often held as usufruct rather than by title of ownership. This sometimes led to disputes about actual ownership, since by this means Jews might hold land for generations.

The situation of landownership was also far from static, and many factors could alter the status of Jews in relation to the land. On the one hand, Jews may have taken advantage of environmental crises of the twentieth century and bought land from destitute Muslim owners.
Jews’ niche in the rural economy meant that often they were the only local population with liquid capital at their disposal and thus capable of purchasing land. Yet other factors may have impeded their access to rural lands in the colonial period. Some Jews complained that pacification actually led to the decrease in Jewish landownership, since formerly Jews would loan money needed by Muslims whose resources were constantly depleted by fighting. One military officer wrote in 1951: “The Jews are convinced that in the past, well before the pacification, they were rich. They owned land and lent money to Muslims that was wiped out in wars. With the calm, the Jews lost everything.”

Another factor that may have worked to the disadvantage of Jewish landowners was the measures adopted by the colonial system to establish a more documented system of land tenure. In rural areas, many Jewish landholdings may have been acquired through oral agreements, rather than written title, which were passed down through generations. Furthermore, Muslim notaries would be reluctant to formalize land transfers to Jews. Alfred Goldenberg, one of the leading educators for the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Morocco after World War II, wrote about the mellah of Tissent in Ait Bou Oulli that “no Jew has land belonging to him because the notaries (῾udul) do not want to register deeds that would make the Jews landowners.”

Even more significant was legislation enforced during World War II. The French authorities developed, through banks in Marrakesh and Agadir, a system of credit, which enabled many Berber debtors to free their lands from their Jewish creditors. Furthermore, there were several administrative measures from 1941–42, the period when the Vichy regime began to implement discriminatory laws against the Jews’ economic and professional activities, to the detriment of Jewish ownership of land. A decree (dahir) was issued that annulled the mortgages (rahn) held as security, allowing the owners to reclaim their lands. While there were Jews who got around their loans by disguising them in sales of merchandise, some French officials actively sought to redeem land that had been pledged to Jewish lenders. To a certain extent, Jews were able to circumvent the measures adopted during these years. Despite the availability of credit through banks and efforts to suppress loans at interest, Jews continued to find clients because, unlike the government that required reimbursement at a fixed date, from the Jews it was possible to obtain a prolongation of the debt.
suppression of loans against security caused Jews to lose considerable property, sometimes lands that they had held for generations. Some Jews saw these measures as a turning point, unable to regain the lands that they had previously held and adding to the impoverishment of their communities caused by years of drought, famine, and epidemics, a reason for emigration following World War II.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite the decline of some of the rural communities following World War II, interest in Jewish farmers actually began to intensify in Morocco in the 1940s and 1950s for ideological reasons that were rooted in the notion of revitalizing the Jewish people through agriculture, an important component in the modernist agenda of European Jewry since emancipation. The notion of the “return to the soil” found expression not only in European ideas about the “regeneration” of the Jewish people but also in Zionism and even Jewish support for Moroccan nationalism. Clearly, however, European Jews did not “return to the land,” and they continued to concentrate in urban professional life. However, creating Jewish farmers remained an important goal in the expansion of European Jewish influence to the Jewish communities of the Mediterranean basin, as well as part of the agenda for colonial emancipation in the Maghrib.

The Alliance Israélite Universelle, since its foundation in 1860, embraced this ideology. The creation of the Mikveh Israel school near Jaffa in 1870 was part of this agenda.\textsuperscript{33} The Alliance was not interested in national redemption in their ancestral homeland in this period. Rather, it wished to bring modernity to the traditional Jewish community of Palestine or, as Aron Rodrigue calls it, part of its “Palestineophile” orientation.\textsuperscript{34} Once established, it was also hoped that graduates of the AIU schools would be sent there so that they could return to their native lands as farmers. In Tunisia, an agricultural school was created at Djédeida, twenty-five kilometers from Tunis in 1895, with the hope of extending its influence among North African Jewry’s urban poor. To the AIU, agriculture seemed the only way the young graduates of the schools could progress in a predominately agrarian country. Otherwise, the students would leave school every year and have no other choice but to turn to “peddling and petty commerce.” Land was also purchased in 1903 at Reghaïa near Algiers to employ Algerians graduating from the Djédeida farm school. The Djédeida school, however, failed to produce more than a handful of Jewish farmers, and with low enrollment, it closed in 1919.\textsuperscript{35}

The idea of creating a new generation of Jewish farmers out of the
urban poor was also a very important part of the Alliance’s ideological goal in Morocco. From its very origins in Morocco in 1860s, the Alliance considered ways to provide agricultural training to Moroccan Jews. The director of the AIU schools in Tangier, Samuel Hirsch, later became head of the Mikveh Israel school in Palestine. He rejected, however, a proposal in 1873 by the Austrian consul in Tangier to provide land he owned outside Tetuan for an experimental farm school, expressing fears of insecurity and the lack of the rights of Jews to own farmland. Instead, he proposed that the AIU develop a program with French settlers in Algeria where Moroccan Jews could emigrate. The “discovery” by Nahum Slouschz of the Jewish farming community of Oulad Mansour in 1912 was followed by a visit by the director of the Alliance school in Marrakesh in 1913, who reported on the Jewish farmers of Oulad Mansour to the president of the AIU:

These brave souls, in my opinion, are worthy of interest. The Central Committee will certainly also think so. The most useful work that can be introduced is agricultural work. It is of interest to attach this population to the soil which it cultivates itself, giving it the means to become landowners. A young man trained on your farms of Djédeida or Mikveh Israel, who is Arab speaking, would be a valuable guide.

However, little concrete action was taken in Morocco to try to realize the aim of producing Jewish farmers until the mid-1930s, once the French military was firmly in control of all Morocco. A program was developed at Souk al-Arba in the Gharb, through the help of a retired leader of the AIU in cooperation with French settlers and Muslims, to encourage urban Jews to “return to the land.” Jewish farmers, however, were to develop modern farming techniques patterned after the French colonial settlers. Wealthy Jews had purchased rural land near the major cities increasingly since 1912, and it was hoped that this would provide the opportunity to extend Jewish agricultural training. In 1936, an agricultural training center was established in Marrakesh, the École Professionnelle Agricole, which developed a whole program in modern agricultural techniques and training, subsidized by the AIU and protectorate authorities. Its French director was a graduate of the École Coloniale d’Agriculture of Tunis. Students enrolled, first from Marrakesh and then from other towns, and graduates were able to find employment on the expanding
European farms. After World War II, a second agricultural school was opened in Meknes.38

Elias Harrus, the director of the École Professionnelle Agricole in Marrakesh after World War II, was particularly fascinated by the exceptional case of Oulad Mansour and visited the community frequently, periodically bringing his students from Marrakesh to the “Jewish agricultural village.”39 He observed that its inhabitants took pride in the distinctive agricultural nature of their community, a continued source of their identity decades later after they were settled in various parts of Israel. Harrus observed the heartiness and pride of both the men and women (a perception, it should be noted, that they maintained about themselves once in Israel). He reported how one woman “didn’t hesitate to argue . . . in the middle of the field, with Arabs who were not respecting her cattle. This is a far cry from the self-effacing and fearful silhouette of the Jewish woman of Demnat, who is happy when she isn’t the recipient of insults or stones.”40 While still in Morocco, the Jews of Oulad Mansur recounted their speed as workers during the harvest, even their daring and strength, and while exhibiting very close ties and good relations with the Muslim population, they also recounted stories that showed that they did not fear the “Arabs.” This identity of a daring community was perhaps even amplified after settling in Israel—the ability of this strong community to defend itself—yet at the same time, the good ties with Muslims in Morocco are remembered in contrast to the current conflict with Arabs.41

Harrus saw the special case of Oulad Mansour as a symbol for the future. Recognizing that Morocco was an agricultural country, he saw in Jewish farmers the prospect for the “future of our children.” Unsurprisingly, this modernist agricultural venture did not lead to a major “return to the land” by Morocco’s Jewish youth, nor to a transformation of the livelihoods of the Jewish rural sector in modern Morocco. This last Jewish initiative to find and create Jewish farmers came with the major push toward emigration to Israel on the eve of Moroccan independence. Prior to the 1950s, a relatively small number of Zionist emissaries were sent to Morocco.42 But beginning in 1950, Israeli emissaries from the Jewish Agency began to actively seek recruits among Moroccan Jews. As the struggle for Moroccan independence unfolded in the 1950s, anxiety about the Jewish future in Morocco mounted. In 1955, a year before Moroccan (and Tunisian) independence, North African Jews represented 87 percent of the new immigrants to Israel. This mass emigration of Moroccan Jews
deeply affected the Jews of the rural south: between 1952 and 1957, about 40,000 or half the southern communities were brought to Israel.43

Oddly enough, it was a controversy over restricting immigration of Moroccan Jews to Israel that sparked a renewed interest in Jewish farmers. Overwhelmed by the masses of new immigrants and unprepared for the huge influx of Moroccan Jews, the Israeli government began implementing regulations based on a quota system called seleqṣeya (selection) to restrict the numbers of less “desirable” immigrants, requiring medical exams before authorizing aliyah, seeking the largest percentage from young people already involved in Zionist youth movements, breadwinners under the age of thirty-five who could support their families, establishing quotas for people over the age of thirty-five, and demanding that candidates commit themselves to agricultural labor for two years. Although this policy was designated for other countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, it most affected Morocco with its impending mass emigration on the eve of struggle for independence.44 The seleqṣeya regulations created a stir among the tightly knit communities of southern Morocco, who were usually unwilling to leave behind family members and relatives and were vigorously protested by North African Jews in Israel.45 The Israeli scholar of Jewish North Africa, H. Z. Hirschberg, witnessed the impact of this policy during his visit to Morocco in 1955. Writing about the mellah of Tamnugalt, he observed that in the hope of immigrating to Israel, many Jews sold their houses and plots of land to neighbors, but meanwhile the “selection” order was implemented, disqualifying many candidates for emigration and leaving them in limbo without further livelihoods.46 It is in the context of restrictive immigration policies that Jewish farmers in rural Morocco were “discovered,” in all likelihood with the aim of improving their chances to qualify for aliyah.

In 1952, when the Jewish Agency began actively seeking recruits from the rural communities, leading the aliyah department in Casablanca was Ze’ev Khaklai.47 Despite the stiff opposition of some of the Moroccan Jewish religious leadership, representatives from rural villages came to the Jewish Agency office in Casablanca asking to emigrate. In May, Khaklai went on his first systematic tour of the Atlas Mountains, discovering that in comparison to the Jews in the urban ghettos, the village Jews were more suitable for aliyah because of their relatively good health and capacity to work. He found that they wanted to emigrate, but only on the condition that they all emigrate together without separating the elderly
from the young. Khaklai emphasized that for the villages it would be impossible to apply the selective quota system. He traveled again with the director-general of the aliyah department in Jerusalem, Yitshak Rafael, and a representative from the Ministry of Health, Dr. A. Matan, to determine the suitability of the different communities for aliyah.

What facilitated the emigration of a large sector of Moroccan Jews was an ideological shift in Israel in this period, a coming to terms with the mass immigration of newcomers who did not have the same training and indoctrination in the Zionist youth culture of the elite ḥaluṣim. This paved the way for the plan that unfolded in 1954 of settling non-elite immigrants in uninhabited regions of the Negev and border regions of the country and directly affected the effort to move rural Moroccan Jews to Israel.

The most important Zionist recruiter in the Atlas Mountains prior to Moroccan independence was Yehuda Grinker, who took advantage of the mounting tensions arising from the liberation struggle. Inspired by the labor ideology of returning to the soil, and hearing rumors about Jewish farmers in the Atlas Mountains after his arrival in Morocco, Grinker was determined to discover Jewish farmers, cattlemen, and sheep herders wherever he went. Departing from Marrakesh and Demnat to the remote surrounding villages in the mountains on several excursions, Grinker “discovered” Jews everywhere working the soil. Arriving in Ait Arba on Simhat Torah in October 1954, Grinker writes: “How could I not be deeply impressed by these strong men, their livelihoods connected to nature and to land?” Following the seleqṣeya regulations, Grinker began to register families for aliyah. He was told of some twenty-six villages where Jews worked the land. News of his mission spread among the High Atlas communities, who were interested in emigration. Grinker traveled to various Jewish communities in the High Atlas. “The more I traveled in these villages and became closely acquainted with their Jews, I became more and more convinced that these Jews represented the best and most fitting human material for immigrant settlements.” Grinker was determined to sign up and facilitate the emigration of the Atlas Jews, despite the obstacles of the quota policy. He rang alarm bells of the imminent danger that the Atlas Jews faced and militated against the seleqṣeya regulations and in favor of their emergency emigration.

In light of Grinker’s alarmist pronouncements about the risk of massacres, it is difficult to say if Grinker knowingly exaggerated the extent of
Jewish agriculture in order to improve their chances as candidates for aliyah, or if the Jews of the Atlas themselves, aware of the obstacles in place for aliyah, were responding to Grinker’s quest for Jewish agriculturalists by representing themselves as farmers. What is clear, however, is that Grinker’s mission contributed to the myth of Jewish farmers in Morocco that helped facilitate the settlement in Israel’s periphery.

Conclusion

What emerges from this study of Jewish settlement in rural Morocco is a rather complicated and diverse picture of relations between Jews and Muslims that was often contingent on local circumstances and historical change. It questions some of the generalizations about Jewish life in Muslim lands that are based either on the theory of dhimmi status or on the more general stereotypes of Jews and their alienation from the land. It also challenges assumptions made about the impact of colonial rule on Muslim-Jewish relations, demonstrating that the changes brought to the countryside were not only uneven but also sometimes to the detriment of the Jews up until the time of the mass departure of arguably the last rural Jewish community of the Muslim world.

Notes

7. A good case in point is the example of a fatwa issued in the early seventeenth century by a prominent jurist, ‘Issa al-Suktani al-Susi, which declared
illegal and ordered the destruction of a newly constructed synagogue in Iligh in the Sous region of Morocco, where a new Jewish community had been established. Oral tradition by the *sharifian* family of Iligh maintained that the same jurist issued a *fatwa*, which argued that since the Jews of Iligh were “people of the book” who had submitted to Muslim authority and who pay their capitulation tax (*jizya*), they had the right and the means to practice their religion, hence legitimizing the synagogue. (In fact, the synagogue was not destroyed, and the Jews obtained land for a cemetery.) There is no written record for the latter *fatwa*, but the two counter explanations illustrate the way in which new Jewish settlements came into being. Paul Pascon and Daniel Schroeter, “Le cimetière juif d’Iligh, 1751–1955: Étude des epitaphs comme documents d’histoire démographique,” in *La Maison d’Iligh et l’histoire sociale du Tazerwalt*, ed. Paul Pascon et al. (Rabat: Société Marocaine des Éditeurs Réunis, 1984), 121–22.


9. Ibid.


22. At the time that the community was studied in 1950–51, Flamand mentions two property owners, equaling about 15 hectares. *Diaspora*, 86.


27. Flamand, *Diaspora*, 86.


30. Ittihad, Notes prises par M. Goldenberg.


49. Ibid., 58–59.


53. Ibid., 126.
In the 1940s and 1950s, Morocco went through a bitter and painful struggle to achieve its independence and, later, to realize political unification and social unity. The challenge for independence was led by the Moroccan Nationalist Movement, which included a few political parties headed by the Istiqlal (Independence Party).

One of the most challenging issues for the people of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement and their leaders was the status of the Jews, the largest minority group in Morocco. On the eve of Morocco’s independence, its Jewish population numbered between 250,000 and 280,000 and was concentrated in three main areas: French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, and the International Zone of Tangier. There were Jewish communities in the larger cities and in many villages throughout Morocco, both along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and in the mountainous inland areas.

The general focus of this chapter is on the somewhat complex and special relations between two groups: the leaders and the Moroccan public opinion molders who stood at the forefront of the Moroccan challenge for independence and were later the leaders of the independent country, and the Moroccan Jewish community. Although there had been tension during various periods of Morocco’s long history, the relationship between the two groups was influenced mainly by a culture that was shared by both sides. Our emphasis is on the second half of the twentieth century when two developments affected this relationship: the above-mentioned
The Moroccan Nationalist Movement and Its Attitude toward Jews and Zionism

struggle for independence and unity within Morocco, and the struggle over Palestine, the “Land of Israel”—Jews versus Arabs, Zionists versus Palestinians.1

The advocates, leaders, and activists of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement, as well as the people of the Istiqlal and members of the various other parties and factions of the movement, were very involved in the question of the political and social status of Moroccan Jewry. So, too, was the monarchy. Sultan Muḥammad Ben-Yussuf, who became King Muḥammad V in 1957, and the people of the makhzan, the sultan’s senior clerks, discussed this issue on various occasions. From the time of the Arab conquest of the Maghrib until the twentieth century, the Jews lived under dhimmi status, which means under the protection of the Muslim rule.2 The changes that Morocco was undergoing in the twentieth century, generated by the end of the French Protectorate and the beginning of Morocco’s renewed independence, led to changes in the status of the Jews—changes that threatened both the old order and local traditions.3

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle over Palestine, which was important to Jews as well as Nationalists, greatly complicated the situation. In this matter Moroccan Nationalists had an almost unified position, which was consolidated at the very outset of the struggle: they supported the Palestinian Arabs, both morally and in practice. This support derived from their religious identification and their attachment to Holy Jerusalem (al-Quds) and El-Aqsa, and their identification with any and every Arab struggle for independence, wherever it existed. Arabs in general, and Moroccans in particular, were inclined to equate the Jewish and Zionist identities, especially following the establishment of the state of Israel. The Moroccan Nationalists now viewed the Jewish community in Morocco as an enemy-related factor, a perception that led to tensions between Muslims and Jews in Morocco and created yet another change in the traditional social and political composition in the country.4

In order to understand these transformations, I will examine three components more closely:

a. the status of the Jewish communities and the upheavals they underwent in the second half of the twentieth century;
b. the influence of the Zionists and the establishment of the state of Israel on the relationship between the Muslims and the Jews of Morocco;
c. the reactions of the Nationalists, the Istiqlal, and its leader, ‘Allal al-Fassi, as the exemplification of attitudes toward the Jewish community and toward 'aliya, Jewish emigration to Israel.

The most significant changes in the lives of Morocco’s Jews occurred with the implementation of the French protectorate in 1912, which affected the attitudes and the status of the Jews, mainly of those living in the cities. Their integration into the new educational institutions, which championed European characteristics, also affected their status and allowed for entry into the French administration systems as well. At the beginning of the French protectorate, Jews cultivated hopes of a change in their legal and social status. They were prepared to accept the many facets of French cultural influence and believed that in this way they were serving their own needs and interests as well.5

Most researchers have assumed that the Muslims perceived foreign colonization as a national calamity. Most Jews living in Muslim countries did not share this view. Although the French policy of “divide and rule,” common throughout the territories they colonized, was instituted in Morocco as well, and despite the fact that they made use of the Jews in order to establish their rule there, the latter were never fully integrated into French society and always remained outsiders. Moreover, as the Jews made efforts to get closer to the French, the Protectorate instigated considerable agitation in the Jewish-Muslim relationship. In the first years of the Protectorate, most Jews were in a conflicted predicament: while restrictions formerly imposed on them were canceled and the traditional discrimination toward them as dhimmis was eased, they continued to be treated as protected subjects of the sultan. They were thus unable to take part in local politics or be integrated into the higher levels of either the local administration systems or those of the French protectorate.6

The penetration of Zionism into Morocco as an alternative to the other two processes for Moroccan Jews led to the virtual “self-destruction” of the Jewish community of Morocco. This was seen toward the end of World War II with a large-scale Jewish emigration. The emigrants’ main destination was Palestine—from 1948 the state of Israel—while a small number emigrated to France and other European countries and to North America. It is estimated that in the early 1970s, only 20,000 Jews remained in all of Morocco.

Zionist activity in northwest Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia)
had begun around 1900 and had slowly seeped into areas where there were large concentrations of Jews. Local branches of Zionist organizations were founded, and a communication mechanism with the Zionist organizations of Europe was established. Nevertheless, Zionist activity in Morocco was very limited. The important change began toward the end of World War II, mainly among the younger elements of the Jewish communities, when emissaries of the Jewish Agency, the Hagana, and the Mossad Le-‘Aliya Bet arrived in the country. Recruiting young Moroccans into this new movement and training them for ‘aliya to Ereṣ Israel, immigration to the land of Israel, resulted in two waves of emigration, the first in 1943–45, and the second in 1947–49. Three main factors led to the Jews virtually falling into the Zionists’ lap: first, the failure of the colonial authorities to change the legal, social, and political status of the Jews, leaving them in their continued dhimmi status under the makhzan and the sultan; second, the recent political developments and changes that enabled Jews to emigrate to Israel; and, finally, the poverty and suffering from a low standard of living, especially of those residing in the mellahs, the old Jewish neighborhoods in the larger cities.

On top of all these we may add another catalyst: the riots that broke out on 7 June 1948 in the cities of Oujda and Jerada, close to the border between Morocco and Algeria, which served as a transfer station for Moroccan Jews on their way to Israel. In these riots forty-three Jews were killed, dozens were injured, and property was greatly damaged. It is believed that the riots were brought on by the speech given a short while earlier by Sultan Muḥammad Ben-Yussuf, which inveighed against the Zionists and cried for solidarity with the Arabs fighting in Israel. Claims have been made that the French authorities not only knew about these impending events but also goaded and collaborated with the instigators as a provocation against the heads of the Moroccan Independence Party, who could later be blamed for committing murder. These events are considered the most significant in the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Morocco and an important formative element in the emigration process of Moroccan Jews.

Between 1949 and 1956, the activities of various ‘aliya operatives intensified greatly. The establishment of the state of Israel signaled the promise of change and, at a time when their future in Morocco was highly uncertain, of a new and better future for a large number of Jews. There was also a messianic dimension, especially among Jews of the distant,
isolated towns and villages in the Atlas and Anti-Atlas Mountains, where the appeal of a messianic delivery was very strong. Many of those who immigrated to Israel during these years were brought from these areas, and the Jewish presence in these towns and villages, which had existed for hundreds of years, was almost totally ended.\textsuperscript{11}

The third wave of emigration and ‘\textit{aliya} took place mainly after Morocco became independent in 1956, but had actually begun in 1954. The Moroccan Nationalists had begun to rebel against the French authorities in 1954, due to the exile of Sultan Muhammad Ben-Yussuf to Madagascar a year earlier. This was the first time that a clear division between pro-French elements, comprising both foreigners and native government officials, and Moroccan Muslims appeared. It is important to note, in this regard, the ambivalence toward the Jewish community of the entire spectrum of the Nationalist Moroccan Movement. Although they wanted the support and cooperation of the Jews, the Jews were identified with Zionism and as enemies of the entire Arab world. The Jews were put in the same category as the other aliens in Morocco, and they identified with France. In light of the developing warm relationship between Morocco and the independent Arab countries, especially the bond between Morocco and Egypt, and later on Morocco’s acceptance into the Arab League, numerous Moroccan Jews felt that they no longer had a place in the newly independent country and that it was time to leave. After Muhammad V (now king) issued a decree closing the offices of Cadima (the covert name for the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department), which had operated openly since 1949, ‘\textit{aliya} turned into illegal emigration through Misgeret (Framework). Misgeret functioned from 1956 until 1961 under the aegis of the Mossad, Israel’s secret service. Following the death of King Muhammad V in February 1961, the newly crowned King Hasan II lifted many of the restrictions over emigration. However, Hasan II, and many Moroccan politicians as well, emphasized that although those who wished to leave the country could do so, the place of “his Jews” was in their “natural habitat,” that is, in Morocco.\textsuperscript{12}

In the 1930s, the Independence Party of Morocco (Istiqlal) was dichotomized into moderates and conservatives. The conservatives, those considered more radical, came from Spanish Morocco and were graduates of the Al-Qarawiyyin College in Fez (the most important religious institution in Morocco). ‘Allal al-Fassi was the leader and ideologist of
this more radical stream of the Istiqlal. Al-Fassi and his followers were greatly influenced by the “disturbances” in Palestine in the years 1929 and 1936–39, and they espoused clearly anti-Jewish sentiments. The more moderate members of the Istiqlal, such as Ahmad Balafrej and Muḥammad al-Kholti, who had graduated from the French Protectorate schools and from colleges and universities of the metropolitan areas, searched for ways to recruit Jewish support in their struggle for French government reforms that would better the entire population of Morocco, Muslims in particular. Already in 1933, al-Kholti wrote an article in the newspaper *L’Action du Peuple* in which he discussed the need for Jewish-Muslim cooperation as a positive starting point for the implementation of urgent reforms in various areas, such as the legal system, and for calls for full equalization between Jews and Muslims. Among other things, al-Kholti pointed out, “this understanding, which is based on honesty and loyalty,” would be the embarkation point for both youth parties and would lead “the implementation of urgent reforms in the field of law. . . . We want to prove that the Muslim youth of our day are filled with tolerance and love toward the entire human race and aspire to cooperate in joint undertakings. . . . But this harmony cannot exist unless Jews and Muslims are united and equal in the eyes of the law.”

Simultaneously, however, anti-Semitic propaganda was being disseminated throughout Morocco, especially after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, and then, even more forcefully, following the Spanish Civil War and the triumph of Generalísimo Franco (especially in the Spanish zone of Morocco). It is noteworthy that European settlers were usually behind this propaganda and that only a few of the claims and accusations were spread by Moroccan Nationalists. Assertions were made that Jews were agents of the European imperialist exploiters, that they were their agents in Palestine, and that they were harmful to the interests of both the Europeans and the Muslims. These claims were repeated by other radical Arab intellectuals, such as Shakib Arslan, the spokesman of the Muslim Brothers, Hoda Shaʿrawi, of Young Egypt, and others from Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere. The Great Arab Rebellion that took place in Palestine in 1936–39 had a pronounced effect on the Nationalists in Morocco, although their support remained in the form of unrestrained declarations of support of the Palestinian struggle. Supporters of the Jerusalem Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Ḥusayni, were active in North Africa, where
they declared that they were anti-Zionists and anti-British, although they were less verbal and practical than their idealistic brothers in a number of other countries in the Arab Middle East.15

During the period of Vichy rule in Morocco, 1940–43, the public’s attention was focused on Europe and on the call for war. Almost all Zionist activity came to a halt, anti-Jewish activities were hardly felt, and Nationalist activities came to a standstill as well. The leaders of the Nationalist movement, headed by ‘Allal al-Fassi, were either in prison or in exile. A sequence of events toward the end of the warfare in North Africa greatly affected the relationship of the Nationalists with Jews and Zionism. The first was the conquest of Morocco by American forces in the Lapid Operation in November 1943. Paradoxically, the end of the Vichy rule in Morocco led to a worsening of the condition of Moroccan Jewry after Moroccan Nationalists claimed that Jews had identified with the French Vichy rule and had carried out their commands. Anti-Jewish riots, in which a significant number of Jews were injured, occurred in Casablanca and in other cities.16

After the release of ‘Allal al-Fassi from prison in 1944, the establishment of the Istiqlal as the unifying body of all nationalist streams in Morocco, and the foundation of the Arab League in March 1945, another element was added to the prevailing anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist attitude: total identification with the Mashreq, the brave fighters against Zionism. The Arab defeat in the Palestinian War (1947–49) did not harm Arab solidarity in al-Fassi’s opinion. On the contrary:

In order to achieve solidarity within North Africa, we maintained continued good relations with liberation movements—Arab and others. . . . We proved our support many times. . . . When Arab forces entered Palestine to release it from the Zionist groups, our party organized a boycott on Zionists in Morocco.17

Sultan Muḥammad Ben-Yussuf, in a speech delivered on 23 May 1948, asserted that Zionism must be fought, especially after the establishment of the state of Israel less than two weeks earlier. In his speech, the sultan expressed “frustration by the fact of the very existence of Israel,” whose existence, he hinted, was one of the identifying focuses of Moroccan Jews.18 He went so far as to camouflage his threat toward the Jews by warning them, “lest they forget” their Moroccan identity and the protection he gave them. Although he added that not all Moroccan Jews are Zionists
and not all of them identify with the rule in conquered Palestine, the radical elements of the Istiqlal interpreted his words for their own purposes. It is assumed that the Moroccan Nationalists understood, at this point, the “double standard” espoused by some of the elite Jews, whose identity fluctuated between various combinations of national, French, and Moroccan identity. They related to them as toward a manipulative factor in Moroccan society. As stated, the sultan’s speech and various concurrent events are considered the catalysts of the riots and murders in Oujda and Jerada about a month later.

The public forum of the Istiqlal was—and still is today—the daily al-῾Alam. In the period discussed here, many articles appeared in al-῾Alam concerning the subject of Zionism. In June 1947, the newspaper published an article under the headline “The Modern Crusaders,” which stated that the Jews, as Zionists, play the part of the destructive Crusaders in today’s modern world. They are “trampling, blood-thirsty soldiers” whose aim is to “conquer the entire world.” They have different beliefs and opinions, and all kinds of ideologies, but “no true belief and no real ideals”—it is just the lust for money that drives them forward. Their only goal is to gain control of the entire universe. During the 1947–49 war, the Moroccan newspapers called upon Muslims of all socioeconomic strata to donate funds on Arab Palestine’s behalf and to boycott Jews and Europeans. In Fez, the wife of ʿAllal al-Fassi and the wives of other leading notables rallied on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs and the war effort against Israel. In Casablanca, the women of the local bourgeoisie donated their jewelry for this cause. Muslims in several major urban communities were encouraged to boycott Jewish and European business firms if their representatives were known to espouse pro-Zionist sentiments or to have collected funds on Israel’s behalf.

The Nationalists’ reactions to the riots in Oujda and Jerada typify their overall approach to the Jews: They claimed their people neither participated in the riots nor initiated them, but took their time before they criticized them. They expressed remorse about the events, called harming the Jews “contemptible steps,” but simultaneously accused them of bringing these sorry events upon themselves by supporting Zionism and the state of Israel. Aḥmad Balafrej claimed that the Zionist propagandists should have foreseen these outcomes, just as the Nationalists should have warned their people of the consequences of their actions.

The scene’s situation changed again shortly before and after Morocco
received its independence: France’s exile of Sultan Ben-Yussuf on 20 August 1953 and the riots that broke out the following year created a further polarization of the Jews and the Muslims. The majority of Jews felt no real bond to the Nationalist Movement, and only a few of them, most of whom were young, educated, and westernized and held leftist world-views, were members of the Nationalist parties. They belonged to the left wing of the Istiqlal headed by Mehdi Ben-Barka, who left the party in 1959 and established the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). Both of these parties, as well as the Parti Démocratique d’Indépendance (PDI), tried to attract Jews by defining the situation as a Zionist problem and not as a Jewish problem. However, only a number of Jews answered their call. The Istiqlal party, headed by ʿAllal al-Fassi and Ahmad Balafrej, claimed they were devoted to equal rights for the Jews, and to show how easy it was for the Jews to join the party, they exempted them from swearing their allegiance to the Istiqlal party on the Quran.23

In a report sent by Meir Grossman (an Israeli emissary to the Casa-blanca Jewish community) sent to the Jewish Agency headquarters in Jerusalem, he claimed that the Istiqlal was trying to create an alternative to the leadership of the Jewish Communities Council by pretending this was an attempt to “create a solidarity between Jews and Muslims, in order to enable the Jews to take part in Morocco’s political life.” Jewish community leaders considered this an attempt to increase the involvement of those Jews connected to the Istiqlal in the inner politics of the Jewish community by those who believed in complete integration of the Jews in Moroccan society.24

In an interview of al-Fassi by Arnold Mandel, for the Jewish-French newspaper L’Arche, dated Paris, October 22, 1958, al-Fassi explained his approach:

My position concerning Zionism isn’t only against [Zionism]. In New Morocco, all political parties that receive instructions from outside must be banned. Do you know that the Zawiya [Muslim mystical orders] are prohibited in Morocco, despite the crucial role they played in our history? Are we considered anti-Muslim because we do not approve of the existence of Muslim orders? In this respect we are . . . as anti-Jewish as we are anti-Muslim.25

Although al-Fassi stated that he was not against the study of the Hebrew language and Judeo-Arabic as part of the heritage of the Moroccan
nation, he also stated, at the end of 1958, that Jews must be returned to their traditional *dhimmi* status in Morocco, not, of course, in a humiliating or degrading and inferior sense, but as part of the maintenance of a sound, intact social order and as “foreigners.” Other leaders in the party considered the Jews “an electoral asset” and as “potential partners of the national interest in the time of post-colonization.”

In his different addresses, al-Fassi added to and clarified the strong bond between the Moroccan nation and other Arab nations: Morocco, he asserted, is linked to the other Arab nations by love based on decades of affiliations. “The Arab spirit,” as he calls it, provides Morocco with strength and confers upon it the right to be included in the brotherhood of Arab nations. It is interesting that despite being an enthusiastic religious exhorter, a modernist, and a religious reformist, al-Fassi accepted the division of the Middle East and the Maghreb into “nation-states.” He does not challenge the fact that the individual countries were established under Western influence and Western pressure, nor does he desire the formation of a complex but unified Muslim country on the model of the Muslim Empire of the Golden Age, as did other Islamic reformers before him.

In conclusion, the image that crystallizes is one in which the leaders of Morocco’s Nationalist parties, particularly the Istiqlal, did not clearly differentiate between Judaism and Zionism or between religious observances and national and political identification. This lack of clarity was also characteristic of the sultan/king, the Istiqlal’s followers, and the fanatic nationals of other parties who, whether for inner-party needs or political interests, frequently blurred the boundaries between the two. It is reasonable to assume that the polarization and distancing that occurred between the various Moroccan native bodies and the Jewish community was caused by the strong reverberations of political developments—those occurring both within Morocco itself and elsewhere.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the leaders of the conservative wing of the Istiqlal, headed by ʿAllal al-Fassi, voiced resolute support for both Nasser’s policy and that of the Arab League concerning inter-Arab issues. Morocco became active in the struggle against Israel; they received the League’s “Jerusalem File” and convened inter-Arab meetings concerning the issues. However, the involvement with internal problems did not leave the Moroccan Nationalists enough maneuvering space in the arena of inter-Arab and international issues. They made do by openly
and explicitly expressing their support of all struggles against Israel, sweeping support for an immediate and final solution to the Palestinian problem (especially that of the refugees), and symbolically aiding the countries at war with Israel by sending some supplies and a few small units of soldiers to help.

In the course of time it became clear that much of what was said was only chaff blowing in the wind. The declarations were not practically validated to any significant degree, and not only did independent Morocco not participate in the struggle against Israel and the “Zionist entity,” but, since the 1960s, it also maintained one form or another of contacts with Israel. At first these were clandestine intelligence connections, but later they became partly open, and since the late 1970s there have been almost totally open connections. It is now known that King Hasan II had an “open communication channel” with various Jewish organizations, especially in France, Canada, and the United States. In 1976, a Jewish-Muslim organization was established in France by Moroccan intellectuals; its aim was to stabilize the relationship and coexistence between Moroccan Muslims and Jews. This organization received the king’s (unofficial) patronage and approval (the mere fact that it was activated with consent shows that it had approval). Finally, it is known that Morocco served as the bridgehead for secret diplomatic activities in the 1970s, in order to expand communication channels between the Israeli and Egyptian leaders. This mediation subsequently led to the visit of the president of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, to Israel in November 1977. Morocco thus takes part in inter-Arab activities, but does not completely disqualify and reject Israel, and, moreover, its leadership provides for the possibility of communication between the Arab countries and the “Zionist entity.”

Notes


2. This legal status of Jews was awarded to all those of the monotheistic religions by the rulers of the Islamic states by reason of their being Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book). They were allowed to practice their religion under special conditions.
3. Tsur, Qehila Qru’a, 5–13.
5. Ibid.
7. The Hagana was the defense force of the Jewish Community (Yishuv) and the Zionist movement prior to the establishment of the state of Israel.
8. Illegal immigration, also called Ha’apalah, was conducted at the initiative of immigrant groups in Europe, the Jewish Agency, and in some cases with the help of the United States and even the Nazis. In Palestine, ‘Aliya Bet was organized beginning in 1939 by the Mossad Le-‘Aliya Bet to bring immigrants to mandatory Palestine after immigration was restricted by the British White Paper of 1939.
10. Tsur, Qehila Qru’a, 15–17; Michael M. Laskier, The Jews of the Maghreb in the Shadow of Vichy and the Swastika (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Diaspora Research Institute, 1992), 102–106 (Hebrew).
16. Laskier, Israel and the Aliya, 55–65; Tsur, Qehila Qru’a, 17–22, 75–76.
18. Laskier, “The Aliya of Moroccan Jews,” 317–18; Assaraf, Yehudey Marrōqō, 232–36. It is to be noted that in 1955 the sultan met delegates of the Jewish Agency and assured them he was personally committed to the Jewish community of Morocco and would guarantee their safety and rights. See CZA Z6/925, 7 November 1955, Discours du Trône.
20. Ibid., 192.
22. Citation from al-‘Alam in ibid., 191.
28. Ibid., 377. See also a report from a meeting between Alex Eastermann as well as officials of the Jewish Agency with Abderrahim Bouabid, then the permanent delegate of the Istiqlal Party in Paris, considering the relations between the two organizations in CZA Z6/925, 11 October 1955.
Jews have lived in Libya since time immemorial, long before the Arab conquest that brought the region into the realm of Islam. Since then, Muslim law regarding non-Muslim monotheists has become a major factor in determining the status of Libyan Jews and their relations with the authorities and the society at large. This religiously defined attitude toward Jews remained prevalent in Libya during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though the region underwent four regime changes, including two non-Muslim ones: Ottoman 1835–1911, Italian 1911–43, British Military Administration (BMA) 1943–51, and independent Arab since 1952.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, 20,000 Jews lived in Libya amid about a million Muslims. At its peak, in the late 1940s, the community numbered some 35,000 Jews, amid a million and a half to two million Muslims. Most Jews lived on trade and crafts. About a tenth of the Jews, mostly the rich merchants and big contractors, held a foreign nationality, mainly Italian.

During the Ottoman period, the authorities treated the Jews as dhimmis.1 The population at large often despised the Jews, but the Ottoman military and officials usually tried to protect them, as did local chiefs, recognizing their economic importance. During most of the Italian period, the status of individuals and communities was based on Fascist ideology, which regarded the interest of the state as paramount. Thus Jewish-Muslim relations during this period were not based on the relations between the Jews and the state. During the BMA, many Muslim political exiles returned to Libya, increasing local awareness of political developments
in the Muslim world and the Middle East, including the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine. Moreover, the British army stationed in Libya included Jewish volunteers from Palestine as well as Arabs and British servicemen who had previously served in Palestine. This and the discussions over the political future of Libya increased Zionism and Arab nationalism, harming Jewish-Muslim relations in Libya and resulting in mass Jewish emigration to Israel (1949–51). The Sanusi monarchic period was strongly influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, shaping Jewish-Muslim relations until the emigration of the rest of the community in 1967 (following the Arab-Israeli War) and 1969 (following Qaḍafi’s revolution).

**Legal Status**

The legal status of the Jews of Libya underwent significant changes during the period under review. During the Ottoman period, most Jews were Ottomans, and the authorities based their position toward them on the Omar Covenant. These regulations came to be considered in Libya as mandatory social customs, and most of the population was ignorant of their religious origin. Some of these regulations were officially abolished in the Ottoman Empire following the nineteenth-century reforms (*tanzimat*). Nonetheless, the application of the reforms in this sphere in Libya was not complete because the Muslim majority continued to regard these regulations as socially binding. In addition, the abolished poll tax (*jizyah*) had been replaced by a military exemption tax (*bedel askeri*), even though general military conscription did not take place in Libya until 1911.2

Jews holding European nationalities benefited from privileges accorded to them through the Capitulations Agreements between the Ottoman Empire and several European powers. These Jews continued to enjoy their privileged position despite attempts by the authorities to limit them.3

When Libya was under Italian rule, the population did not automatically receive Italian citizenship. Those who already were European citizens kept their status, and the rest received Libyan citizenship, which did not enable them to participate in Italian political life. The legal position of the Jews worsened from 1938 onward with the gradual application of the Italian anti-Semitic racial legislation in Libya.4 The BMA abolished the Italian racial legislation in 1945, only following its official abrogation in Italy.5
Legal discrimination resumed in post-1952 independent Libya when the legal status of the Jews became de facto inferior to that of the Muslim majority. Although the Libyan constitution accorded all those born in Libya, who did not hold foreign citizenship, eligibility for Libyan citizenship, in fact most Jews, contrary to Muslims, did not receive it. Only a few Jews became Libyan citizens and received Libyan passports; the rest were deprived of political rights, and when they wanted to travel abroad, from 1954 they received a one-time *laissez passer*. Moreover, since 1953, passports and later also the *laissez passer* of Jews were marked “YL” and a sequential number, clearly indicating that their bearers were Libyan Jews.⁶

**Administration and Judiciary**

Following the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms, the principle of equality of all subjects before the law was applied to the Jews as was the integration of all sectors of the population in the administration and the judiciary. Council members in Libya were appointed according to a religious-based scheme, but no elections took place within the Jewish community or the population at large. Community notables were appointed to the provincial and regional administrative councils, to the town and local councils, and to the judicial councils.⁷ Jewish representation, however, did not reflect their relative size within the population. It should be remembered that only Ottoman Jews, many of whom were the less politically and economically active members of the community, could be appointed to these bodies. Moreover, one had to be a male property owner in order to be eligible for appointment. Still, their opinion was heard and at times it even influenced the final decision. The councils also took into consideration the religious restrictions of the Jews, and as a result Jews did not have to participate in meetings that took place on the Sabbath and on Jewish holidays. Jews also had some influence on the authorities as a result of the political inclinations of the governors: occasionally, some governors who favored liberal reforms used to consult secretly with communal leaders and foreign Jews.⁸

The inclusion of Jews in the various administrative and judiciary bodies continued under Italian rule, but they were now subject to Italians and not to Muslims. One area in which the Muslims had a sizeable representation from the 1930s was the military, which included many Muslims in
the lower and middle ranks. This was also the case with the police with whom the Jews came in contact more often than with the military. Even during the Italian period one could notice a phenomenon which had been prevalent during the Ottoman period and became more obvious in the 1940s, namely, the identification of the local policemen with the Muslim majority, resulting in slackness in fulfilling their duty of protecting Jews and ignoring criminal activity.

Following the application of the Italian anti-Semitic racial legislation in Libya from 1938, Jews were to be removed from the state and public administration as well as from economic bodies that conducted business with the state. The authorities did not hurry to carry out these instructions in Libya due to the vital importance of Jews in these positions. The Muslims did not benefit from the racial legislation and were even afraid that eventually it might also be applied to them.9

With the suspension and abolition of the racial legislation under the BMA, Jews could return to state and public administration. Nonetheless, the internal and external Jewish exiles caused by the war affected a large number of Jews and prevented a swift rehabilitation of the community and the reintegration of Jews in the bodies from which they had been removed. For this reason and the policy of the BMA, personnel requirements of the civil administration and the security forces were often met through the import of Arab clerks and technicians, mainly from Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, who became known as the “Red Fezes.” These newcomers had higher professional qualifications and political consciousness than the indigenous Muslims. Consequently, the “Red Fezes” had a considerable influence on the political process in Libya in the 1940s and the changing attitude of the local Muslims toward the Jews.10

As part of Libya’s preparation for self-rule, the British established in 1947 a twenty-one-member magistrate’s court (mahkamah ahliyah), six of whose members were Jewish. Three Jews were members of the twenty-one-member Tripoli municipality.11 In 1949, sixty Jews served in the Tripoli police force, and several served in the police of small Tripolitanian towns and remained in their position until the last Jews left the region.12

Under the new Libyan constitution, only one of the six Jewish judges remained as a civil judge, and he also filled the role of the Jewish rabbinic court of law, which was disbanded in 1954. The judge for Jewish affairs had the authority over personal status and was also supposed to rule over inheritance. But following disagreements according to which
law to rule—Jewish, Muslim, or Italian—even the sole case regarding inheritance that was brought before him was not decided. In 1954 the last Jewish officers of the Libyan police were dismissed, and in 1958 the Jewish communal council of Tripoli was dissolved and replaced by a Muslim representative. This ended Jewish participation in the administration and judiciary in Libya, ending even Jewish internal administrative autonomy. By then, some 6,000 Jews remained in Libya, including some 1,200 holding Italian citizenship. Since even those who lacked a foreign citizenship or who were ready to renounce it could not become Libyan citizens, Jews could not integrate in the state and public administration of independent Libya. One should remember, though, that many Jews owned medium and large businesses, and most of them usually preferred to remain in the private sector and act as middlemen between the state and public sector vis-à-vis local and foreign private businesses, rather than join the administration.

Security

In Libya, the protection that the state accorded the Jews was mainly in the hands of the same elements that often conspired against them. Consequently, the Jews suffered at times from inappropriate protection involving cases of murder, robbery, and attacks on private property and places of worship. During most of the period under review, the reasons for attacking Jews were mainly economic, social, and religious, against small-scale targets; in the mid-1940s a growing nationalist fervor was added to private motivation and the dimension of the targets increased.

The Ottoman regime in Libya tried to protect the Jews. The central authority installed guards in places destined for trouble and even returned some Jewish babies who had been kidnapped. This was not always the case regarding middle and junior administrators, soldiers, and policemen who were mostly local inhabitants whose interests often rested with the population among whom the Jews lived. As a result, one can often notice that following acts of robbery, murder, and synagogue arson, the local authorities did not hasten to find the culprits and punish them, despite forceful and repeated demands from the central authority. Local policemen at times did not protect the Jews and even joined the aggressors. Consequently, Jews often preferred to reach an agreement with the local authorities and maintain a *modus vivendi* with the population amid whom
they lived rather than attain a prestigious victory, because this might not have solved the problem and might have even resulted in arousing anger and desire for revenge.\textsuperscript{17}

In order to improve their security far from the reach of the central government, the Jews of the Tripolitanian hinterland developed a wide network of relations and pacts with tribal chiefs who protected the Jews who lived among them in return to a symbolic state of slavery. This system remained in force even following the formal abolition of slavery in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{18}

The Italian authorities took care of the security of the population in the areas under their control. This excluded areas of variable size in Libya that were under Muslim rebel control during the first two decades of Italian rule. Rebel-controlled areas were only sparsely inhabited by Jews. The Jews usually felt themselves safe in Libya, except those living in rebellious regions or in war zones during World War II.\textsuperscript{19} During the 1920s Jews in Amrus and Zawiyah on the Tripolitanian coast used to keep frightening, violent dogs in order to protect themselves from Muslim attacks. In addition, since the police during the Italian period continued to be manned mainly by local Muslims, it did not always act vigorously to suppress quarrels in which Jews were harmed by Muslims or Italian Fascist civilians and soldiers. But these events were rare. In general, the security of the Jews was good during the Italian period. Even during World War II there were not many attacks on Jews and their property, and when this happened—except for harm resulting from the racial legislation—it was caused mainly by Italians and Germans. The Muslims did not take advantage of the serious deterioration of the status of the Jews resulting from the racial legislation in order to harm them. There were even instances when Muslims tried to rescue Jewish acquaintances from work and concentration camps and ease the life of the inmates. Muslims also helped Jews who escaped from coastal towns, which were bombarded by British airplanes.\textsuperscript{20}

Widespread violent attacks by Muslims against Jews took place in Libya only since the BMA period. These outbreaks occurred mainly in and around Tripoli, though some happened also in Benghazi. They were characterized by a combination of socioeconomic pressures and a growing nationalist zeal. Arab political exiles, who returned to Tripolitania following the British occupation, started forming political organizations with the help of the Red Fezes while taking advantage of the severe
economic condition. They tried to deepen their hold among the masses and draw them to nationalist, Pan-Arab, and anti-Zionist ideology, resulting at times in anti-Jewish attacks.

The first major anti-Jewish riots erupted in Tripoli and its surroundings, from Misurata in the east to Zawiyah in the west, on 4 November 1945. This happened during a period of severe economic hardships coupled with growing nationalist, Pan-Arab, and anti-Zionist incitement. For four days, Arab masses rioted in the streets with no hindrance, robbed, burned, and destroyed Jewish homes and businesses, and harmed many Jews. In many instances the religious affiliation of the victims was checked, and houses were marked accordingly. Most of the Arab police did not even try to restrain the masses, and the traditional Muslim leadership did not condemn the riots when they occurred. In Kusabat (eastern Tripolitania) many Jews converted to Islam in order to escape the massacre. Only the delayed intervention of the British army put an end to the violence.

The riots claimed the lives of 130 Jews. In addition, hundreds of Jews were injured, some 4,000 became homeless, and property that valued 300 million Military Administration Liras (MAL) was lost. Inhabitants of mixed towns and neighborhoods were harmed the most: Jews living in the old quarter of Tripoli managed to block the entrance to the neighborhood, which was almost exclusively Jewish, and its inhabitants were not harmed. Thus, moving out from exclusive Jewish neighborhoods to modern and religiously mixed ones, which was considered a sign of progress and fraternity, became a source of disaster.

Following these events, some 600 Arabs were detained, but less than half of them stood trial. Charges were brought against 289, 85 were acquitted, 2 received death sentences, the rest were sentenced for 15 years or less, and 6 received suspended sentences. Four Jews were also convicted for disorderly behavior and sentenced to three to four years in prison. British authorities and the traditional leaders of both Jews and Muslims established a Peace Committee headed by the head of the Jewish community and the chief Muslim judge of Tripoli. The committee, together with the local press, called for tranquility. The traditional leaders of the Muslims and the Jews alike were eager to cooperate as they felt their own position being threatened by the nationalists on both sides who rebelled against the authority of the “old guard” and attracted the masses, especially the youth. The British authorities, too, were denouncing the
activities of the Arab nationalists and forbade overt Zionist activity in Jewish clubs.

Serious riots erupted again on June 12 and 13, 1948, in Tripoli, four weeks after the establishment of the state of Israel. The atmosphere in Tripoli was charged due to an economic crisis and political agitation as part of the national struggle over the political future of Libya. To this was added a strong anti-Israeli incitement, which acquired anti-Semitic overtones, diffused by numerous Tunisian and Algerian volunteers who passed through Libya on their way to join the Arab front in the war on Palestine. The hostile anti-Jewish atmosphere in Tripoli was further strengthened by radio broadcasts that reported on developments in Palestine and were heard in the streets. This was on top of an economic crisis and drought, which filled Tripoli with poor, unemployed villagers. The outcome of these riots, however, was not as severe as those of 1945 because the Jews put into practice their secret training in self-defense and used the weapons they had procured illegally and had been trained in using. Moreover, the British army got into action much faster than in 1945 and restored law and order. As a result, 13 Jews were killed, several dozens were injured, and 1,600 Jews from the mixed neighborhoods remained homeless with many seeking refuge in the old city. In addition, much Jewish property was lost. This time, too, the old Jewish neighborhoods were better protected than the new mixed ones.

In Benghazi, Arab masses rioted for six hours on June 16, 1948, but were stopped by the police: one Jew was killed, several were injured, a synagogue was burned and property looted. The main reason for the different condition of the Jews in both parts of Libya was the control Idris al-Sanusi had over developments in Cyrenaica, which was much stronger than that of the traditional Muslim leadership of Tripolitania, resulting in better security.

During the last three years of the BMA, Jews did not suffer from widespread attacks. Still, prior to the mass emigration there were frequent attacks on itinerant Jewish peddlers on deserted roads, as were kidnap attempts, some of which were successful, of young Jewish women by Muslim men. Similar incidents had happened in the past, but they became much more frequent on the eve of Jewish emigration to Israel. The audacity of the Muslims increased, the readiness of the British authorities to intervene in small disturbances decreased, and as a result the feeling of insecurity among the Jews grew. The atrocities of November 1945 and
the additional reminder of June 1948, coupled with the overall feeling of insecurity due to the frequent attacks on Jewish peddlers and young Jewish women, brought numerous Jews to the conclusion that they were not safe under the BMA, not to mention an independent Libyan state under Arab Muslim rule. The 1945 riots were a turning point in Jewish-Muslim relations in Libya following which the Jews no longer regarded Libya as their homeland, and many tried to leave clandestinely: some 2,500 Jews left illegally before 1949.26

Following the British recognition of the state of Israel in February 1949, Britain allowed free Jewish emigration from Libya to Israel.27 Once the news reached Libya, indigenous Jews started to organize mass Jewish emigration. Within a very short period of time, Jewish emigration from Libya was openly directed in Tripoli by officials of the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah (immigration), emissaries of the Jewish Agency and the American Joint Distribution Board, working with numerous local Jewish volunteers. Due to the atmosphere of insecurity in the hinterland, the emigration officials decided to evacuate all the Jewish inhabitants of the Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican hinterland. Consequently, within a few months, thousands of Jewish evacuees moved willingly to Tripoli, in preparation for emigration to Israel. Only a few hundred Jews remained in Benghazi—all the rest of the centuries-old Jewish community of the hinterland of Libya had willingly contributed to its peaceful liquidation. Rural Muslims occasionally voiced their reservations and sorrow regarding the departure of the Jews and at times had even put pressure and economic boycott on the remaining Jews.28 In some cases, the Muslims stopped to trade with Jews and employ them. Furthermore, many Jews had found it difficult to find buyers for their real estate properties even when they were ready to sell them much below their market value. On the other hand, some Muslims reminisced on the “good old days” while others warned the Jews of the difficulties awaiting them in Israel. In some villages, the Muslim population organized a farewell ceremony, in which they tried to persuade the Jews to remain. During the legal, free, and direct emigration operation (1949–51), over 31,000 Jews emigrated to Israel in a well-organized fashion in Israeli ships and through Europe. Only 6,000 Jews remained in Libya, mainly in Tripoli with a few hundred in Benghazi: some remained due to the enormous property they owned that they could not take with them, while others stayed due to old age and sickness.29
For fifteen years, from early 1952 until June 1967, Jews enjoyed relative security in Libya. The last anti-Jewish attack took place on 5 June 1967, when the Six Day War broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This attack did not come as a surprise. Before the war, the Muslim population was incited by mosque preachers to join the anti-Israeli *jihad*. The anti-Zionist propaganda in the media was strong, and a week of identification with Palestine was planned to start on 5 June. The Jewish community announced its neutral stand regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this declaration did not prevent the anti-Jewish outburst on the first day of the war. By then, most Libyan Jews were scattered in the new, religiously mixed neighborhoods of Tripoli, deprived of any self-defense or even communal organization and lacking any political affiliation. Following a few hours of Muslim rioting in the streets of Tripoli, military forces intervened. Aiming to protect the Jews, the army evacuated them to a military camp in the outskirts of Tripoli. Within a few days the community and the authorities reached an agreement to temporarily evacuate the Jews from Libya, and tempers calmed down. A hasty departure to Italy under military guard took place with the refugees being allowed to take with them only light personal equipment and £20 per person. Most of the community escaped in this manner and only about one hundred Jews remained. Later on, Jews were allowed to take out larger amounts of capital, and some returned to Libya briefly, mainly to liquidate their businesses. The number of Jews gradually decreased, and only a few individuals remained in the 1980s.

During the period under review, when protection by the authorities was not sufficient, there were several attempts by Jews, mainly in the Tripoli area, to organize self-defense. During the Ottoman period this defense was mainly in the hands of a group of Jewish strongmen (*biryonim*) who cast fear over those threatening vulnerable Jews, mainly traders, peddlers, and women. This group, headed by a chief and his deputy, used to compete in wrestling matches every Saturday afternoon on the Tripoli city wall adjacent to the Jewish quarters. In 1850, the Ottoman authorities forbade these matches due to an accident that took place during their course and even demanded the dismantling of the group. By then, the Ottoman authorities increased their involvement in introducing law and order and the regime opposed the existence of independent security forces that were not under its direct command.

A different kind of defense was organized at the end of the Ottoman
period. It was based on some 160 Jews, the first to be mobilized to the
Ottoman army in the Tripoli region. They were legally armed and un-
derwent basic military training in 1911, shortly before the Italian inva-
sion. They protected the Jewish quarters of the old city of Tripoli against
attempts by Muslims to penetrate the enclosed Jewish neighborhood
and harm the inhabitants during the short interregnum in early Octo-
ber 1911. Afterwards, the Jewish soldiers disarmed themselves and gave
their weapons to the Italian authorities. The latter, however, returned the
weapons to the Jews when the Italians felt the need to arm population
elements loyal to the regime in order to defend themselves from penetra-
tion attempts by hostile Muslim groups from the region under Ottoman
and rebel control.\textsuperscript{32}

The last Jewish self-defense organization in Libya was a clandestine
force that was organized following the November 1945 riots.\textsuperscript{33} This group
of Tripolitan Jews bought weapons, mainly from the “underworld” and
were trained by Palestinian Jews serving in the British army and by a
special emissary from Palestine, but gradually the organization came un-
der local command. Members were divided into small compartmental-
ized cells and collected money from the community. In addition to their
activities in passive defense and their organization against the riots of
June 1948, they started to place bombs in Tripoli in order to deter Arab
attackers and force the British police and military to increase their protec-
tion of the Jewish inhabitants. The British authorities, aided by informa-
tion provided by the leadership of the community, managed to detect
seven members of this group in November 1948. Explosives, weapons,
and invoices for donations for the operations were found in the homes of
the detainees, who were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{34}
Following the November 1948 arrests and the announcement of free emi-
gration to Israel in early 1949, these violent acts ceased. The protection
of the Jewish community had improved as a result of the concentration of
the majority of the Jewish population in Tripoli and the presence of Israeli
and international representatives on the scene as well as the desire of the
British authorities to guarantee a swift and orderly emigration to Israel.

Thus, during this period, there were attacks against the Jews, but these
were mainly small-scale local and privately motivated events, on eco-

demic, religious, or romantic grounds and the central authorities had
usually tried to protect the Jews. When the Jews felt that the authorities
were unable or unwilling to protect them, they organized self-defense or
reached agreements with local sources of power. Organized and widespread attacks on political grounds started only in the mid-1940s, following Arab nationalist agitation in Libya on the eve of its independence and as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Politics

Jewish involvement in political life in Libya was limited and tended to be among the European or Zionist circles rather than among the Muslims. Most of the Jews were small craftsmen and traders who were not interested in politics. Moreover, most of the men received only limited traditional Jewish education, which hindered their involvement in the political life of the society surrounding them. Those Jews who showed some interest in political involvement were often graduates of the European educational institutions, and many of them held European citizenship. They distanced themselves from the local Muslim population and only a few tried to get involved in politics. In the mid-twentieth century this involvement resulted to a large extent from British pressure and fear for the destiny of the community if its members would not show favor to the political national process in Libya. Still, most Jews were careful not to be openly identified with any Libyan political grouping: it seemed to them that the safest approach would be not to express any political position.

One can divide the political activity during the late Ottoman period into two phases: before the 1908 Young Turk revolution and after it. In the first period, and especially under the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909), the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were careful to refrain from overt political activity that could be regarded as subversive. Overall, Ottoman Jews were considered to be a loyal element of the population. During the Hamidian period, Libya was one of the Ottoman provinces to which political exiles and prisoners were sent following purges in the centers of power. Consequently, echoes of Ottoman national political activities of Jews in Libya can be found among Jewish political exiles who were sent there from the center of the empire. Most of the Muslim population rejected the exiles, and this tendency was manifested following the Young Turk revolution. On the other hand, between 1900 and 1904 there were some signs of budding Zionist activity in Libya. This involved a few foreign citizens who established contacts with the Central Zionist Organization, but their activity did not receive much response.
Zionist activity did not really penetrate Libya at that period, possibly due to fear of retribution by the authorities.37

Following the Young Turk revolution there was at least one local Jew, in Benghazi, who was involved in Young Turk circles.38 Other Jews were ready to participate in evening courses in Turkish organized by Turkish officers and officials for the local population.39 This apparently was the extent of local Jewish involvement in Young Turk activities in Libya. In contrast to the limited participation of Libyan Jews in the political life of the Ottoman regime, some Jews who held Italian citizenship demonstrated more energetic involvement in propaganda in favor of Italian rule in Libya. These included editors and journalists who following the 1908 revolution founded local periodicals, which were financed by the Italian consulate general in Tripoli. These periodicals praised the Italian policy toward Libya and even called for the strengthening of its presence and influence in the region.40

During the Italian period, most Jews did not support the Muslim anti-Italian uprising, although the few who lived in rebel-controlled areas had no other choice. In general, the community supported the Italian regime, even when its character changed as the Fascists gained power in 1922. Still, many Libyan Jews were angry with the Italian regime, which refrained from providing them with Italian citizenship. Thus there was no significant Jewish involvement in political life in Libya, though some Jews were members of the Fascist Party and attended its clubs. Even when the regime changed its attitude toward the Jews and started to legislate anti-Semitic racial legislation in 1938, the essential Jewish support for Italy did not change: they presumed that this new policy was forced upon Italy by Germany, and their belief was strengthened by the fact that the authorities in Libya had reservations regarding this policy and were slow to implement it.

The Italian authorities tried to prevent the development in Libya of competing non-Italian nationalism—especially Libyan nationalism—mainly by leadership liquidation and regional isolation. Leaders of the Muslim revolt were killed, imprisoned or in exile and the regime made it difficult for local Muslims to be in contact with Muslims outside Libya. As a result, the knowledge and interest of Libyan Muslims regarding the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine were poor and did not have repercussions on Jewish-Muslim relations in Libya. Zionist activity was not regarded as a threat to the Italian regime, and it developed in Libya as
a branch of the Italian Zionist Association. The number of registered Libyan Zionists was not high, but their influence on education and culture was strong. The desire to learn Hebrew and literature increased, especially among the youth. This activity, which was cultural-social in essence, did not arouse objections from the Italian authorities or the Muslims, who were not interested in the cultural life of the Jews—just as the Jews were not interested in Muslim cultural activities.

National awakening among the Muslim population of Libya re-emerged during the BMA, with the return of political exiles. Arab political life was also strengthened by the Arab clerks and technicians, mainly from Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, who came to Libya during this period and manned middle ranks in the military and administration (the “Red Fezes”). Political life, however, was different in the various parts of Libya. In the east, Idris al-Sanusi, whose base of support was in Cyrenaica, stood for moderate and conservative policy. In the west, the young nationalist Tripolitians were more radical in their politics and wanted to sweep the masses to their side in any possible way. As a result, the character of political activity in eastern and western Libya developed differently. Moreover, the support in Tripolitania was divided among several leaders and groups, often leading to vocal and extreme politics. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, Idris was then the undisputed dominant figure, advocating moderation. Thus the struggle among the various political groups in Tripolitania radicalized local ideology and activity. The various Muslim political streams wished to get the support of the masses in their positions in the ideological struggle over the future political character of Libya. Since the political vigilance of the Muslims of Libya was dulled under Italian rule, there was a greater importance than usual for the Tripolitanian nationalists to draw support to their side by taking advantage of the economic crisis. The Jews, who were known to support Italy, became a victim in this struggle for political power, because some of them grew very rich following World War II and the British occupation and were blamed by some Tripolitanian leaders for the hardship of the masses. One can say that the November 1945 riots broke to a large extent on this economic background, to which was added nationalist commentary, anti-Jewish in part. In this early stage, anti-Semitic undertones were not emphasized by the Muslims. During the 1948 and 1967 disturbances, the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine took center stage. During the early stages of the Libyan national struggle, the Tripolitanian population was
not interested in developments outside its narrow boundaries, but the new leadership hoped to take advantage of broadening the scope of interests to include developments in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For that reason there was extensive reporting in the Tripolitan Arab press on the eve of the November 1945 riots on the situation in Palestine, stating that the partition plan there would cause the liquidation of Jewish life in Arab lands. There was also a widespread reporting on the 2 November Balfour Day demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria, which were accompanied by violence, robbery, and the arson of synagogues. This was the beginning of having national issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, take center stage in the attention of the masses in Libya.

The Jewish community had usually kept a neutral stand during the struggle over the political future of Libya. Most Jews, though, hoped that Italian rule would resume, because they regarded the period of Italian rule as very comfortable, secure, and flourishing, despite the calamities of WWII. Still, there were some expressions of support for Libyan nationalism in the community, mainly from official representatives of the community.

The British wanted to use education in order to bolster Libyan nationalism toward the establishment of an independent Arab Libyan state. Their goal was to create a national education system for all the inhabitants of Libya, with the exception of the Italian citizens, based on the Arab educational system. This decision meant the liquidation of a separate Jewish-Hebrew education within the framework of state education. The British claimed that the Jews should be integrated in the Arab society and that in Cyrenaica they should be “Sanusis of the Mosaic Religion.” Still, the British agreed that Jews would be allowed eight out of thirty-four hours a week for Jewish studies. Arab educators from Palestine were invited to plan the Arab education system of Libya. One result of this was the increased awareness by the local Arab population of developments in Palestine. The British authorities refused to provide state funding for separate Jewish schools, on the grounds that Hebrew, contrary to Arabic and Italian, was not an official language in Libya. As a result, the Jews, who wanted to preserve their unique identity, decided to get communal and external funding for their schools, mainly from AIU and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), and operate a private educational system in order to maintain its independence. In late 1945, because of the riots and the increase of Arab nationalism, Jewish
schools were afraid to demonstrate Hebrew identity and Zionism. As a result, the Benghazi Hebrew School decided that pictures and maps with Zionist connotations should be removed from the walls, the “Blue Box” for the collection of donations to the Jewish National Fund disappeared, and teachers forbade the students to sing Hebrew songs in the street. The Arab teachers, who taught Arabic in the Hebrew schools, felt they were setting the tone, and the Jews hesitated to respond to it.45

Already in 1943, Libyan patriotism started to have implications on the behavior of Libyan Jews. On Fridays and Muslim holidays, national flags were raised in Benghazi on all shops, Arab and Jewish alike. The Jews were afraid to raise Zionist flags or do anything that could be viewed as separating them from the Muslim majority.46 If one could interpret the raising of local flags and the avoidance of Hebrew and Zionist manifestations as a wish not to annoy the Muslims, this is not the case with the clear support of the Jewish communal council of Tripoli—and especially of its president, Zachino Habib—for the establishment of an independent Libyan state.47 In early 1946 Habib initiated Jewish support for the “United Libyan Front,” which called for the unity and independence of all Libyan provinces. Ex post facto it was realized that this move had brought a temporary easing of the tension between Arabs and Jews. The readiness of the official representatives of the Jewish community to accept the Arab demands for Libyan independence was manifested also during the meetings of this leadership with the UN delegation of the committee of inquiry which was sent to Libya. The representatives of the Tripoli community stated in March 1948 that the community supported an independent Arab state in Libya.48 The six representatives of the Benghazi community stated on 30 April 1948 that the community supported Libyan independence and keeping contact with the National Arab Congress and emphasized their good relations with the Arabs.49 These positions, though, did not represent the views of the majority of the community, most of which wanted the return of the Italian regime. But due to the feeling of increased insecurity, many preferred to leave Libya immediately and permanently.

There was much nervousness in late 1947 in the Jewish community due to the growing anti-Jewish atmosphere. Although there were no clear signs of an organized movement against the Jews, the masses tended to frighten them. In October 1947 announcements were distributed in Benghazi, calling for the establishment of a conscription center for volunteers
to fight on the Arab side in Palestine. The Muslims were called to unite in the struggle for Allah in order to purify the world from the Jews. It was also stated there that the Jews had established a government in Palestine and with the protection of the treacherous authorities of the British Mandatory regime were active in suppressing the Muslims subject to them.50 A further deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations in Cyrenaica occurred in 1948, and the British authorities attributed this to the developments in Palestine. There were also minor incidents, which the president of the Benghazi Jewish council defined as discrimination in trade on racial background and which caused a deterioration of the economic status of the Jews.51 These developments increased the Jews’ desire to emigrate to Israel.

Following the British approval of free emigration from Libya to Israel, official representatives of the state of Israel and the Jewish Agency came to Libya in early 1949. They operated in Libya freely without hiding their identity: their offices bore public signs and the Israeli Independence Day was celebrated with local Muslim officials in attendance. The Israeli representatives met with senior government officials, including ministers. In late 1951 there were some officials in Israel who hoped that this representation could remain and operate in Libya after independence and even become an official representation of the state of Israel. The Israeli immigration officer in Libya felt reinforced in this belief when he referred to himself as the representative of the state of Israel in his blessings to King Idris on his birthday and as Idris thanked him using the same term.52 This event, however, resulted from an oversight and did not reflect an official Libyan policy toward Israel. Although the Libyans continued to treat the Israeli and Jewish Agency representatives with respect, and the latter were even invited to the Libyan Independence Day celebrations,53 it was made clear to them that once the mass emigration from Libya to Israel was concluded, their task would also be complete. The emissaries were not expelled, but the entrance of their replacements was not approved, and official Israeli presence in Libya ended in late 1952.

Economy

Economic interdependence, based on professional specialization, developed between the Jewish minority and the Muslim majority in Libya. Until the departure of the Jews from Libya, they were in charge of most
trade. Thus, some 80 to 90 percent of the trade houses in Tripoli were in Jewish hands. The indigenous Muslims were mainly farmers and herdsmen—as well as administrators, soldiers, and policemen. The vital economic role of the Jews got them the protection of the society among which they lived. Jewish peddlers made their lengthy rounds in the countryside safely, sometime returning home only for the High Holidays and Passover. The trust was mutual: Jewish peddlers were the sole non-kin males who were allowed to have direct contact in private with Muslim women, and when peddlers spent the night with Muslims, their hosts knew which foods were allowed to Jews. Still, there were many instances of tension resulting from Jewish control over trade, capital, and some crafts. Violence on this background was manifested mainly at times of political and security unrest—mainly in the late Ottoman period and the BMA—when the protection of the authorities was not always manifested in a decisive manner. In these periods, incidents of robbery and murder of Jewish peddlers and moneylenders increased as did attempts to seize control over Jewish real estate in the countryside.

The vital economic role of the Jews was felt especially when they refrained from work or migrated in protest of government policy or harassment by their neighbors. During the late Ottoman period, the Jews held several prayer assemblies in protest of decrees imposed by the authorities. These gatherings of the whole community caused a complete economic standstill in Tripoli and forced the authorities to withdraw the decrees. In another case, the Jews left the town of Zawiyah because of Muslim religious scheming; once the Muslims felt that their economic life depended on the Jews, they promised not to plot against them once they returned. When the mass Jewish emigration started in 1949, the Muslim population, especially in the small towns and villages of the hinterland, expressed fears regarding the loss of the economic services that the Jews used to provide. After 1952, most of Libya remained without Jews. Many Muslims entered into partnerships with the small number of remaining Jews, mainly the wealthiest, who continued to control big businesses, especially international trade and the growing oil market, but gradually Muslims took over economic positions vacated by Jews.

In order to prevent the escape of capital from Libya during the mass Jewish emigration, the authorities limited to £250 the amount of capital and property that a family was allowed to take out of the country.
The authorities tried to prevent the escape of Jewish capital by putting property whose owners had left Libya under state custodianship and at risk of expropriation. Warnings to this effect had been voiced by Libyan leaders already in 1952, and real measures were taken from 1961 on. In order not to be accused of anti-Jewish legislation, the laws which were legislated for this purpose were not explicitly against Jews but covered all those who had left Libya, especially those who had kept contacts with an enemy state: Israel. These developments coincided with Libya’s joining the Arab boycott against Israel, which in 1957 opened an office in Tripoli overseeing the boycott. The law of 21 March 1961 put under the Custodian over Enemy Property all the possessions of anyone who had emigrated to Israel or who maintained contact with it. Additional laws forbade real estate businesses with Jews, and companies had to include on their board at least 51 percent Libyan citizens, namely, Muslims. The situation had aggravated further following Mu’mmar al-Qa’dafi’s 1 September 1969 revolution. On 7 February 1970, the property of anyone living permanently outside Libya was put under state custodianship. Following a number of additional statutes, the legislative process was completed with the 21 July 1970 law that returned to the Libyan people all the properties that were put under custodianship. The law stated that the government would establish a committee that would decide on compensation for these properties in the form of government bonds, to be paid off in fifteen years. Such a committee was never established, and no compensation was ever paid.58

At that stage there were virtually no Jews left in Libya. Some 6,000 Jews, most of them very wealthy, left Libya in June 1967 following the Six Day War, when they were allowed to take with them only £20 each. Until that time, they continued to control the international trade, and many of the trading houses in Libya were owned by Jews, although they usually had to operate with a Muslim partner. The growing oil market of the 1960s also benefited many of the Jews who remained in Libya, some of whom became extremely wealthy. A large number of this group moved to Italy in the late 1960s, and some of them continued to be active in the economic life of Libya from their new base, with the help of local partners. Thus, from a state of Jewish-Muslim economic interdependence, Libya became the owner of Jewish property, with only a few Libyan Jews, who were by then living in Italy, still involved in Libya’s economy as conditions allowed.
Religion

The Ottoman authorities, in line with the Covenant of Omar, did not intervene in Jewish religious life, and they enabled Jews to fulfill their religious obligations. Thus, for example, they cooperated with the community regarding the settings of Sabbath limits (῾eruv) in 1876 and keeping the Sabbath and kosher food in state circles (elected assemblies and the military).59

Jews and Muslims in Libya shared many similar customs and popular beliefs resulting from their long coexistence. Worship of saints, sacred sites, and various objects was very common in the region. Some of the objects of adoration were shared by Jews and Muslims, and quite often Jews and Muslims went on pilgrimage to tombs of each other’s saints. This phenomenon led at times to struggles over the ownership of these sites and objects. Since the Muslims were the majority who were also in control of the state until 1911 and again from 1952, they sometimes used their power to take control over holy sites. This process grew stronger following the abandonment of various regions by Jews in the late Ottoman period and even more so on the eve of Libyan independence. This demographic change served as a major catalyst for numerous Muslim attempts to seize control over Jewish holy sites and even burn and desecrate them.60 In order to avoid conflicts with the Muslim society, especially when hardly any Jew remained in an area, the Jews usually did not try to make good these distortions of justice. This was so even when a non-Muslim regime, namely, the Italian, was ready to help the Jews in this regard, due to its desire to acquire the goodwill of the Jews at the start of its struggle against the Muslim rebellion. This Muslim behavior can be viewed as a desire to take control over sites which had been sacred to both religions, but might also reflect the intent to increase control over land and buildings.

Culture

Jews and the Muslims influenced one another and shared many popular beliefs, customs, and ways of expression, resulting from their lengthy coexistence, but their cultural developments proceeded in separate spheres and directions.
Most Libyan Jews spoke Arabic, but it was a special Judaized dialect that was written in the Hebrew alphabet. At times, Jews even used a special secret language, especially when trying to strike an economic deal, so that Muslims would not understand them. Yet while Jews and Muslims could usually understand each other, their scholarship and publications were in their own languages and scripts. When the Jews started to use a language other than their own for cultural, political, or economic activities, it was Italian (and some French) rather than classical Arabic. Cultural life of the adult population took place in separate spheres: there was no mutual scholarly activity of Jews and Muslims, they published separately and conducted separate cultural circles.

The Jewish community had its own educational institutions, providing religious education for boys. Gradually, Jews started to attend general schools, but they were hardly involved in the local Muslim educational system. Since the late nineteenth century, when Jewish education was not solely religious, Jews preferred to complement it with European education (e.g., Italian and French) rather than with local Arab or Berber. Still, it is evident that in many of the nontraditional Jewish schools, Arabic was taught, and during the late Ottoman period, at times even Turkish was taught. Moreover, between 1908 and 1911, many Jews attended evening classes for the study of Turkish that were organized by Young Turks. During the Ottoman period, there were a few Jews who studied in state and private Muslim schools, as there were some Muslims, sons of senior Turkish and Arab officials, who studied in the AIU school. But these cases were few and exceptional.

There were several kinds of Jewish educational institutions in Libya. The most common and veteran ones provided boys with traditional religious education under private tutors, in synagogue classrooms, and in Talmud Torah schools. To these were added, since the late nineteenth century, Jewish European institutions of the AIU, local modernized traditional schools and study circles, and Hebrew schools, mainly following World War II. The emphasis was, in various degrees and according to the institution and the period, on traditional education for boys or of Western and Hebrew-Zionist education for both genders.

During most of the Italian period, many Jews studied in the Italian state schools, with the exception of the period when Jews were prevented from attending state schools due to the racial legislation. Simultaneously,
independent Jewish educational institutions continued to exist and develop further, such as the Zionist Hebrew studies in the framework of the cultural department of the Zionist organization “Ben Yehudah” in Tripoli.

After World War II, Hebrew education was further developed on the basis of previous activities and with the help of the Palestinian Jewish soldiers. This activity focused on Tripoli and Benghazi, but existed also in some smaller towns. This soon became a political issue when the British wanted to integrate Jewish education within general Arab education. While the Jews were ready to educate their children to be loyal citizens and to know Arabic and Libyan history, they refused to be part of the Arab educational system. Whereas many Jews regarded European education, either Italian or French, as an appropriate cultural challenge, their attitude toward Arab culture was different. Despite being close to Muslims in their vernacular language and customs and at times even in their popular religious beliefs, Jews were not ready to completely integrate in their culture with its predominantly Muslim character. This reservation increased with the strengthening of the national character of both cultures and their educational systems. In addition, the Jews viewed the culture of their local Muslim neighbors as inferior to theirs and regarded the Arab schools as having lower standards than theirs or the European schools. Following the decision of the Jews to operate a private educational system, community members had the choice between Jewish schools, the Italian state schools or those of the AIU, which operated in Libya until 1960.

Cultural life of the adult population in Libya took place on separate spheres as well. There was no mutual scholarly activity of Jews and Muslims. They published separate periodicals in their own languages and scripts, and conducted separate study and cultural circles. When reaching outside the community, Libyan Jews maintained ties with the Jewish world and Italy. These contacts were at first mainly religious, economic, and familial. They were later complemented by contacts with the Zionist movement and the Hebrew press. Jews were hardly involved in Libyan or regional Arab politics, press, or literature. Jewish-Muslim relations in Libya were thus different from those in some Muslim countries (e.g., Egypt and Iraq) in which Jews were involved in local culture and politics. The political and cultural marginality of Libya and the fact that political and cultural life had a late start there contributed to this dissociation.
Moreover, Libyan Jews had contacts with Italy and Zionism long before Arab nationalism spread in Libya and consequently Jewish contribution to the latter was minimal.

Conclusion

Jews and Muslims lived in close proximity in Libya. They were economically interdependent and had social and cultural ties on the popular level, but there were also differences between the status, conditions, and aspirations of the two communities. One difference was in their legal status: from being a “protected people” among the Muslims in the Ottoman state, the status of the Jews deteriorated under independence, when they could hardly become Libyan citizens. Jews were rarely part of the security forces, which were basically a Muslim domain. This had at times severe repercussions on Jewish life, which the Jews tried to remedy by establishing various organizations of self-defense and contacts with powerful chiefs. Jews were also hardly part of the administration, and to the degree that they were, it was still proportionally less than their share in the population. As for the social-cultural sphere, Jews and Muslims had shared customs, beliefs, and practices on the popular level, but Jews used a special Jewish dialect of Arabic, different from that of the Muslim majority, and their interests regarding higher culture were different from those of the Muslims. Once Jews started to become interested in cultural issues outside their own community, these were directed to Europe, not to the Arab and Muslim worlds. Until the late Ottoman period, nationality was not a dividing issue, but in the early twentieth century, Zionism started to take root among the Jews. Local Libyan and Arab nationalism was slower to develop, and only since the mid-1940s the national issue started to be a dividing factor, with hardly any Jews becoming members of Arab national groups. Thus, although on the popular and economic levels there were close contacts between Jews and Muslims, they were apart on the legal, administrative, cultural, and national levels.

Notes

2. Ibid., 12–20; Mordecai Hacohen, Higgid Mordecai (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1978), 45, 145, 284, 288, 292.
5. Ibid., 185ff.
8. Hacohen, Higgid Mordecai, 168–69; Frigia Zuaretz et al., eds., Yahadut Luv (Tel-Aviv: Committee of Libyan Communities in Israel, 1982), 71; Simon, “The Jews of Libya,” 8, 10.
23. Dr. I. Schwarzbart, Report, 10 May 1949, CZA, S20/556.
24. Ha-Ṣofeh, 21 and 22 November 1949; Eisenberg, 53.
27. Simon, “From ‘Zion Circle,’” 307; British Foreign Office to the governor of Benghazi, 31 January 1949, PRO, FO 371/73906.
38. British consul in Benghazi to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 August 1908, PRO, FO 195/2271.
40. Ibid., 32–33.
42. Report of the community on the November riots, PRO, FO 371/53509.
46. Amnon to Eliyahu, Memorandum on Benghazi, 23 June 1943, CZA, S25/5217.
49. Report on the visit of the Committee of Inquiry, PRO, FO 371/69379.
52. The British Representation to the African Department in the Foreign Ministry, Tel-Aviv, 19 December 1951, PRO, FO 371/97329; Simon, “From ‘Zion Circle,’’” 309, 314.


57. *Ha-Ṣofeh*, 18 November 1949; Simon, “From ‘Zion Circle,’” 332.


60. Ibid., 25.

61. Ibid., 22–23.
On a chilly evening in the late winter of 1997, Essya Yitzchakov1 and her children spent their last hours in the Jewish quarter of Samarkand, Uzbekistan, sitting on the floor, surrounded by the boxes and bundles they would bring with them to the United States. Only one small table remained in the cavernous space that was once home. Still, when I arrived to bid them farewell, Essya extended her hospitality in warm Central Asian fashion. “Have some tea,” she said, gesturing for me to enter. When the pot was emptied, she tucked it into a carton and proceeded to wipe down the tablecloth; the last bit of cleaning she would do in this house.

Moments later, a van pulled up. Misha, Essya’s son, swung open the iron gates and began working with his sisters to load their belongings. Essya stood watching. Absent was her husband, Ilya, who had passed away a year before and whom she was leaving behind in Samarkand’s cemetery.

When the contents of the house were all crammed into the van, the family members hovered by the door of the vehicle, unable to bring themselves to step inside. Essya caught sight of her daughter’s tears. “These are all my things I am leaving behind here,” she snapped. “You, though, will find a rich smart husband there in America. You do not cry!”—a painful articulation of the rupture between the Bukharan Jews’ millennia-long past in Central Asia and their future lives, scattered in distant lands.
The Yitzchakovs are just one family, but they are among the many thousands who have left Central Asia, where Bukharan Jews have made their homes for centuries. I begin with the details of their leaving because it is an aspect of the story of the Jews’ recent migration from Uzbekistan that is largely absent in both scholarly as well as popular reports. While much media attention has been given to the Bukharan Jews’ migration from their Central Asian homes, it has mostly been portrayed as a flight, in which little consideration has been given to what these immigrants have left behind. Likewise, in the popular portrayal of their en masse departure as an escape—rather than as a choice—the various factors people weighed when making the difficult decision to leave are absent. This essay is meant to begin to fill in these blanks. It is not only an effort to tell the story of the end of the Jewish community in this particular corner of the world, but also to suggest an approach that might be used to tell the story of the mid-twentieth-century mass migration of Jews from Muslim lands in North Africa and the Middle East.

**Background: History and Culture of Central Asia’s Jews**

The Jews’ migration at the turn of the last century can only be understood in the context of their long history in the region. While little information is available about how and when Jews appeared in Central Asia, the data available suggests that the first to arrive were among those who were exiled—or whose ancestors were exiled—from the land of Israel in 586 bce at the hands of the Babylonians. They were among those who moved eastward, probably as merchants along trade routes spreading out from Babylonia (contemporary Iraq) into the territory that is today Iran. They moved further east to Afghanistan and to the fertile river valleys and oases of present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This area, classically called Transoxiana, was controlled by various Turkic and Persian empires for centuries. The Jews who settled there spoke Persian and were closely connected to other Jews in the Persian sphere of influence (such as those in the territories that would become modern Iran and Afghanistan).

The Jews of Transoxiana also shared much in common with their neighbors. Unlike the Turkic nomadic peoples who lived in the area that would become present-day Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, the people among whom the Jews lived spoke Persian and were sedentary inhabitants of Transoxiana’s urban centers.
By the late fifteenth century, Uzbek dynasts (settled people of Turkic lineage) conquered the land and divided it into loosely governed territories called “khanates” or “emirates.” The Jews of the region clustered primarily in the Bukharan Khanate, where the cosmopolitan silk-route cities Samarkand and Bukhara were located. Although these Jews were still closely identified with the Persian-speaking Jewish population of the larger geographical region, it was the emergence of the Bukharan Khanate that set in motion the formation of their separate identity as “Bukharan Jews.”

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Russians began colonizing the area, taking control of large parts of the khanates’ territories. In 1920, when the Soviets incorporated the region into the USSR, they faced little local resistance, as the khanates’ boundaries had not coincided with existing linguistic or ethnic borders.

With no sense of national (or even proto-national) identity in the region, the Jews were not viewed as foreign inhabitants. Rather, their inclusion in and exclusion from the population among whom they lived was derived from two other aspects of the region’s social patterns. The first was linked to the dynamic between the sedentary and nomadic peoples, and the second was related to the fact that unlike the majority of non-Slavic people in Central Asia, they were not Muslim.

The Jews were sedentary like most others who lived in the khanates’ urban centers. Among these sedentary peoples, however, a distinction was drawn between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. The Tajiks, who were of Persian stock, had always lived in the settled areas, whereas the Uzbeks, who were of Turkic stock and were descendants of the region’s nomadic conquerors, had become sedentary over time. Despite these differences, contemporary scholars posit that these identities were not significant boundary markers. Neither Tajik identity nor Uzbek identity was strong enough to unify groups in a call for special rights or distinct sovereign territories. Nineteenth-century travelers note that Uzbeks and Tajiks lived side by side, they did not distinguish themselves with much “precision, consistency or linguistic significance,” nor did they have distinct cultural traditions. Indeed, vis-à-vis the Kyrgyz, Turkomen, and Kazakhs, who were still largely nomadic, the Uzbeks and Tajiks shared a strong sense of commonality. So, while terms “Uzbek” and “Tajik” did carry some historical value for the people who asserted these identities, their shared culture, which set them off from neighboring nomadic groups, more
strongly informed their conceptions of who they were. In this sense, the Jews very much belonged to this group, sharing most elements of the settled peoples’ culture, including dress, cuisine, architecture, language and custom.\(^5\)

However, historians make it clear that as Jews living in a predominantly Muslim society, they were still outsiders. As *dhimmi*, they were allowed a degree of tolerance and protection in return for their acceptance of certain discriminatory measures.\(^6\) In Central Asia, like other areas under Muslim rule, these measures included numerous prohibitions. Jews were allowed to repair existing synagogues, but were not permitted to build new ones. They were allowed to build homes as long as they were no higher than any Muslim home in the area. They were not permitted to ride donkeys or horses, but had to transport themselves by foot alone. They were required to pay a special poll tax, which the Muslim receiver acknowledged by delivering a slap in the face. Jewish men were not permitted to wear elaborate, fashionable belts and could only close their robes with a “simple rope.”\(^7\) So too, Jewish men were not permitted to wear turbans like Muslim men. Instead, they were allowed only a particular style hat called a “tilpak,” which signified their identity as Jews.\(^8\) Their homes were also marked as Jewish by a dark or dirty cloth that they were forced to nail to their front doors.\(^9\) Finally, the evidence of a Jew was inadmissible in any court cases that involved a Muslim.\(^10\) Such restrictions were not adhered to evenly during the many centuries that the Jews lived in Central Asia under Muslim rule. In periods of economic and social stability, the restrictions were generally relaxed, whereas in periods of hardship or crisis, they tended to be more strictly enforced.

In the late nineteenth century, Russia’s encroachment upon Central Asia brought improvements in communication and travel, new avenues for trade, and new forms of technology. Russian colonial efforts also introduced western, secular ideologies to the region. As new worldviews began to undermine the traditional ones that were dominant in the area, the stigma attached to the Jews was also undermined. Under colonial rule the label *dhimmi* began to lose its meaning, and the lines dividing Muslim and Jew lost their harshness.

The distinction between Muslim and Jew further eroded as a result of the antireligious policies that the Soviets imposed on Central Asia when the area came under their control. Synagogues were shut down, as were
mosques. Khomlos where children studied Jewish traditional teachings were shut down, as were kittabs. The Soviets also saw to it that celebrations of rites of passage, such as weddings and births, came under government control. Public aspects of these events came to be structured around civil idiom rather than around traditional religious practice. The result was a further blurring of differences between Jews and Muslims.

The fading of these differences, however, should not be overstated. Soviet antireligious campaigns were not as harshly enforced in Central Asia as they were in western parts of the USSR. Furthermore, the region’s slow pace of industrialization and urbanization allowed the traditional organization of society to remain largely intact. People had little incentive to leave their hometowns in search of employment, education, or high culture. Geographic mobility, therefore, remained low and social boundaries remained high. In Uzbekistan, intermarriage between Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks was rare, and the locals maintained use of their native language—as opposed to Russian—as their first language. Similar patterns were found among Central Asia’s Jews. Almost every city and town in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that was home to a Jewish community had a Jewish mahallah (residential quarter). Throughout the Soviet era, Jewish populations remained concentrated in these mahallahs, which functioned as centers of Jewish life. The communities’ physical boundaries reinforced their social boundaries. Rates of intermarriage with non-Jews remained low, and a strong sense of Jewish identity persisted.

In 1989, on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 35,000 Bukharan Jews lived in Uzbekistan and 10,000 in Tajikistan. By 1993, the first time I visited the region, a majority had already emigrated, leaving behind only some 20,000. Over the years, that number continued to dwindle. With less than 1,000 remaining in Central Asia today, Bukharan Jews have worked to rebuild community life in their new homes in Israel, the United States, and Austria. They have opened schools, created newspapers, built synagogues and community centers, and formed theater groups in an effort to maintain cultural and social continuity with the past while also adapting to the new circumstances they encounter.

This article focuses on their emigration, the reasons for the sudden massive population upheaval, and the factors they considered in deciding to leave their longtime Diaspora homes. Given the Bukharan Jews’ deep roots in the region and the ways in which they had come to resemble
their Muslim neighbors, while also remaining separate, the reasons were nuanced and multifaceted. I will attempt to capture this complexity by analyzing the process from a variety of angles.

Methodological Considerations

Since 1924, Central Asia’s Bukharan Jews lived within the realm of the Soviet Union, concentrated primarily within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1991, Uzbekistan became independent. Today, the country has a population of some 28,000,000, most of whom are Sunni Muslim. Ethnically, the country’s population consists mainly of Uzbeks (80%). Minority groups include Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5%), Kazakhs (3%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), Tatars (1.5%), and others (2.5%).

During the Soviet era, it was difficult to enter the republic, much more so to gain access to the small Jewish community living there. However, in the early 1990s, when I began graduate work in cultural anthropology and first considered traveling there, travel restrictions to the region had eased. While I was alarmed by media reports that focused on the Jews’ mass migration under conditions of panic and duress, conversations with researchers and Jewish aid workers who had recently returned from the country convinced me that it was, in fact, safe to visit. Indeed, I encountered no difficulties as I traveled through the country’s urban areas, visiting Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, the cities with the largest Jewish communities.

During that research trip, I took a keen interest in the way that local Jewish religious practices and understandings were being reconstituted in the wake of the Soviet era. While this topic eventually became the focus of my dissertation, there was no avoiding the fact that I was collecting information in the midst of dramatic population change. The sense of emptying out pervaded everything I saw, every conversation I had, and it became a running theme throughout my field notes. There was not a single person who did not have a child, a sibling, an aunt or uncle who had not emigrated, and everyone was interested in discussing whether they should leave, too, and if so, where they should go. Over the course of five trips to Uzbekistan between 1993 and 1999, I had conversations with some 150 individuals there about the topic. In these discussions, people constantly weighed what they would be leaving—both the good
and the bad—against what they imagined they would find upon resettle-
ment. As illustrated below, this difficult decision-making process has
been shortchanged by the media.

Mass Migration as Portrayed in the Media

During the Soviet era, few westerners had the opportunity to visit Soviet
Central Asia, and little attention was given to the region in the press.
Beginning in 1989, when the Soviet empire teetered, about to collapse,
dramatic political changes began to attract the attention of journalists.
Against this backdrop, articles about Bukharan Jews appeared that
mainly focused on their large migration to the United States and Israel.
While these articles offered a variety of reasons to explain their mass mi-
gration, the most often-cited was the oppression they suffered as a result
of rising Muslim fundamentalism. The appearance of articles with this
angle coincided with four particular political events.

The first was the advent of glasnost in 1989, Gorbachev’s policy of po-
litical openness. Press reports about Bukharian Jews at this time focused
on the connection between the decentralization of power in the Soviet
Union, the emergence of nationalist movements, and the accompanying
“rise of Moslem fundamentalism in the Central Asian republics.”15 Mi-
gration, the press explained, was due to the swelling tide of anti-Jewish
sentiment indirectly caused by the inauguration of glasnost.

The second event that prompted press reports about Bukharan Jews
was social unrest in May 1990 in Andizhan, located in Uzbekistan’s Fer-
gana Valley, near the border of Tajikistan. An outbreak of mob violence
there led to the looting and destruction of Jewish, Armenian, and Russian
homes, as well as a Communist party building.16 The media described
local Jews as “‘terrified’ in the wake” of these riots. Follow-up articles
reported on a surge in emigration applications from Andizhan’s Jewish
community as well as from other neighboring Jewish communities in
response to this violent episode.17

The third event was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the cre-
ation of the independent states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 1991.
Press reports once again highlighted the precarious situation of the Jews
as a result of rising Islamic fundamentalism.18

The final event to prompt media attention about Bukharan Jewish
migration was the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, when President Rakhmon Nabiyev, who had been Tajikistan’s Communist Party leader during the Soviet era, was overthrown by the Democratic Islamic coalition. Reports focused on the “wave of panic” among all ethnic minorities in response to Muslim fundamentalism. Articles about the Jews in particular reported on the large number of visa applications to Israel and on the direct flights from Dushanbe to Tel Aviv that were arranged by the Jewish Agency for Israel.19

In the years following these four particular historical moments, descriptions of Bukharan Jews’ flight from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have continued to appear in the press. Emphasis is still on the oppression they face as Jews living in a Muslim fundamentalist society. In 1993, for example, the Northern California Jewish Bulletin reported that the Jews in Uzbekistan live as “second class citizens” as the local Muslims’ attitude toward them has been “benevolent tolerance, but never fully accepting them as equal members of Uzbek society.”20 In an article published in 1994 about Bukharan Jewish immigrants New York, the New York Times described them as “refugees who fled their homes to escape growing xenophobia and Islamic fundamentalism.”21 Likewise, in 1995 the Jewish Press Magazine referred to the “pressures of fundamentalism” leading the Jews in the region to the “conclusion that they must leave . . . for the sake of their children’s future, if not for their own safety.”22 In 1997, an article about the Bukharan Jews again appeared in the New York Times, which referred to their “centuries of oppression in their predominantly Muslim homeland.”23 And in 2001, the journal Central Asia and the Caucasus referred back to the 1990 riots in Andizhan, noting that the Jews who remain there live in insecurity, unable to forget the event, “where Jewish homes were burned and ruined, their property ransacked.”24

While the dominant story told about Bukharan Jews in the press has been about the oppression they have suffered in the face of Muslim fundamentalism, the media has also focused on their difficult economic conditions in Central Asia. Those who have written these articles have been Western tourists to Uzbekistan who were surprised to discover that Jewish community life there was flourishing. Religious activities had resumed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and international non-profit Jewish organizations (including the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency for Israel, Bnei Akiva, Chabad, and Midrash
Sepharadi) were given official permission to establish schools, run after-
school activities, organize adult education programs, and run summer
camps. Impressed by the Jews’ religious freedoms and by the lively array
of Jewish community activities, visitors were also puzzled. If Bukharan
Jews were faring well—in spite of the media attention devoted to their
oppression—why were they leaving? These tourists generally turned to
an analysis of the economic situation for answers.25

Two such reports were published by participants in a trip organized
by the American Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
in 1997. The visit was political in nature, aimed at strengthening ties be-
tween Uzbekistan and Israel. Eager to further this relationship, President
Islam Karimov met with the group personally and delivered a statement
about the warm, long-standing relationship between his country’s Jews
and their Muslim neighbors. In addition, local government officials were
given instructions to monitor the group’s itinerary, which was carefully
organized to convey the message that local Jews dwell in comfort and
security.

Living in Samarkand at the time, I was witness to a flurry of activity in
the city in the days prior to the visit. Carrying out the order of the mayor,
city officials paid several visits to the synagogue located in the “new
city,”26 to ensure that the building’s wooden floors were scrubbed, the
rugs cleaned, the windows washed, and the walls given a fresh coat of
paint. This effort to spruce up the Jews’ physical surroundings extended
beyond the synagogue property. The street was refurbished with a new
layer of pavement, and all homeowners (Jewish and Muslim alike) who
lived nearby were instructed to have the exterior of their homes painted.

The group’s state-sponsored itinerary did not include a visit to the
winding, unpaved residential streets of the Jewish quarter, located in Sa-
markand’s historic “old city.” However, a local Jew—spontaneously and
of his own accord—offered to give an informal tour of this neighborhood
during a few unscheduled hours. Given a glimpse of living conditions
there, participants were shocked and dismayed. In an article that one of
the visitors wrote upon her return, she explained that she was “led . . .
through back alleys . . . where the city’s poorer Jews live. . . . The horrid
living conditions in the ghetto, with its open sewers . . . made it clear
that pride was one of the few possessions these people had left.”27 An-
other described her surprise upon entering the Jewish neighborhood to
discover the “muddy streets,” the “poor ramshackle houses and shops,” and the “crumbling ghetto inhabited by poor Jews.” It was these sites that provided the tourists with an explanation for the Jews’ mass migration from the region. A portion of the Jewish population—it seemed—was sequestered in a crumbling ghetto on the margins of society. Despite the opportunity to “rebuild” Jewish life in Uzbekistan under the reign of the “benevolent Karimov,” the chance to “abandon their poverty” and their marginalized position in society was apparently a more compelling option.

In sum, the media attention given to the Bukharan Jews since 1989 depicts their life in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as a bleak existence. In the early years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, emphasis was placed on the persecution they suffered at the hands of Muslim fundamentalists. While this story has continued to appear in the press, a second reason was offered once the region stabilized: the Jews’ abject material conditions. In both these approaches, migration is portrayed as an escape, the only natural answer to the Jews’ long-standing condition of oppression under Muslim rule, which was exacerbated once Uzbekistan gained her independence.

In this presentation there is no room for a depiction of the home that Essya and her children left behind. More broadly, the communities, families, and lives the Jews built for themselves over the many centuries that they dwelled in Central Asia are forgotten. By portraying immigration as a choice, in which individuals made difficult, conscious decisions about what they would lose and what they would gain by leaving their ancient Diaspora homes, I am attempting to portray the mass migration as a complex process that cannot be fully understood without highlighting their condition of marginalization as well as their deep ties to their Diaspora homeland.

Reconsidering the Reasons for Leaving

Economic Situation

Like the Muslims who lived in Uzbekistan’s urban areas, Jews lived in the new parts of the cities, which were developed under Russian and Soviet rule, and in old parts of the cities, which existed prior to the colonial era. As the press reports indicate, the streets of these older areas
are narrow, winding, and mostly unpaved, and the homes are made of mud and brick. These urban structures, which may appear shabby and even “horrid” to the Western eye, are in fact resilient, vernacular forms. The streets were designed for foot traffic, and their layout reflects the neighborhoods’ organic growth. The homes were made from indigenous, natural materials, which keep the interior spaces cool in the hot summers and warm in the winters.

While some of the homes in these residential quarters do not have indoor bathrooms, and hot water is not always available, most do have electricity, phone lines, and running water. Most significantly, in assessing the standard of living, it is critical to note that from the street, any casual visitor would see only the homes’ tall, blank walls and iron gates. But when these gates are thrown open, an invited visitor would see that the homes in which Bukharan Jews lived (like those of their Muslim neighbors) were multi-unit structures built around courtyards. In the days before the Jews’ great migration, grandparents, their sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren dwelled together in these homes. Each nuclear family lived in its own single unit, and together they shared the courtyard space, which was used through much of the year as a place for cooking, eating, and relaxing. The courtyard was also used for entertaining large groups of friends and relatives during weddings, memorial services, and other family events.

When people thought about immigrating, one of the major issues taken into consideration was that they would be leaving these spacious living conditions for cramped apartments. Indeed, it was not uncommon for extended families, which lived in multi-unit homes in Uzbekistan, to move into a single apartment when they first arrived in Israel or the United States. This not only meant severely cramped living conditions but also the loss of large, private outdoor space, which had been so integral to family life in Uzbekistan. Given this set of circumstances, it is clear why so many of the people whom I visited in Uzbekistan showed me around their homes—which many Westerners might call “ramshackle”—and say, “Why should we move? We have everything we need here.”

Despite this strong feeling of self-sufficiency, people also had a sense that it was impossible to plan for a financial future in Uzbekistan. During the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s currency changed three times, totally devaluing people’s assets. Berta, for example, told me that a year after she and her husband deposited money
from the sale of their car in the bank, that sum could not even buy them a shirt. Financial instability also manifested itself in severe faults with social welfare systems including health insurance, unemployment, and social security. Corruption in the university system was rampant, where grossly underpaid professors would regularly accept bribes from students in exchange for good grades. Public culture also suffered a decline. Explaining why she was encouraging her nineteen-year-old son, Misha, to move to Israel, Nina noted, “There used to be things for the kids to do here. Now they have nowhere to go. There are no movies and no cafes open.”

In short, a feeling of economic chaos prevailed in the post-Soviet era, along with the sense that there was no one accountable for keeping the instability in check. One man aptly summarized this sensibility: “During the Soviet period, we knew what the laws were. We believed in the head of government, even though he was in Moscow. Now we no longer feel sure of ourselves or strong.” Nevertheless, in deciding to move to the United States or to Israel, people did not feel they were leaving behind this financial insecurity. Indeed, they constantly weighed the chaotic economic situation in Uzbekistan, with the total sense of helplessness they feared they would experience upon migration with the prospects of not being able to learn the language, find a job, negotiate the system, or buy a house. While people were quite aware that salaries were many times higher in Israel and the United States than they were in Uzbekistan, they were also staggered by the reports of the cost of living there. And for those who had food, a house, and the cultural knowledge to negotiate Uzbekistan’s bureaucracy (even if it was in a state of flux), the fear that they would not be able to make a living upon immigration was palpable.

Social Position

Press reports that focus on the Jews’ fear of rising nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism depict them as occupying a marginal, stigmatized position in the wider society in which they lived. In fact, Bukharan Jews occupied a complex social place. Throughout their long history in the region, they were both outsiders, in that they were marked and perceived themselves as a minority, but they were also “Central Asians,” who strongly identified with the other local ethnic groups. Both these senti-
ments—that of feeling marginalized and that of feeling at home—were weighed when making decisions about whether or not to emigrate.

Their sense of marginalization stemmed both from the feeling of being outside of the nationalist project and from the feeling of being on the weaker side of tense Muslim-Jewish relations. Members of the older generation carried the collective historical memory of the humiliation to which the Jews were subjected prior to the arrival of the Russians in the region in the late nineteenth century. Never specifically invoking the term *dhimmi*, people did cite specific examples of subjugation, such as being forbidden to ride on a horse and having to build low doorways, which would force everyone to crouch upon entry. One elderly man spoke about the Jews’ support for Russian colonial efforts, because they forbade the Muslim rulers to persecute the Jews. Another quoted a great-grandfather who was said to have often exclaimed, “I finally began to live when the Russians arrived.” However, even among these elderly people, this era of Jewish persecution under Muslim rule was portrayed as a distant past. Although the Soviet Union had dissolved and Uzbekistan had become independent of Russian rule, I never heard anyone suggest that this era might return. By the time I arrived in 1993, it seemed clear that President Karimov—who had been the republic’s Communist Party leader during Soviet days—would remain in power. Unlike President Nabiyev in neighboring Tajikistan, Karimov was able to squelch all Islamic oppositional forces (gaining an abysmal human rights violation record in the process).

Regardless of this relative sense of religious security, a number of people did describe experiences of prejudice against them as Jews in a Muslim society. “The Muslims think all the Jews have gold buried in the courtyards,” one man told me. Another man said, “The Uzbeks and the Tajiks may hate each other, but they all hate the Jews.” This feeling of being persecuted as Jews in a Muslim society, however, paled in comparison to the feeling of being marginalized from the Uzbek national project—not because they were Jews but because they were not Uzbek. This sense most strongly manifested itself in discussions about language.

Throughout the Soviet era, the Jews, who were primarily educated urban dwellers, spoke Russian, which they had learned in school. They also continued to speak their native language, Tajik, a Persian language that was also spoken by the large Muslim, ethnic Tajik minority living in
Samarkand and Bukhara. With these language skills, they rarely found themselves marginalized prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Once Uzbekistan became independent and new language policies were instituted, however, Jews began to find it difficult to gain admittance into universities and to get jobs because they did not speak Uzbek. They also began feeling marginalized as Russian faded from its position as the primarily public language. Israel, a middle-aged man in Bukhara, explained, “Nationalism is growing. Who the hell knows what will happen? Before perestroika, I felt at home. Afterward, I began to feel different, like an outsider. There has been a cut in Russian broadcasting, and there are no longer Russian newspapers on sale. I can’t understand a bit of Uzbek, and it’s too late for me to learn.” Another woman in Bukhara expressed a similar sentiment. “I’ve lived here for fifty years, and I don’t know Uzbek. Now the language is everywhere.” Mazal, a middle-aged woman in Bukhara, explained that while the new language policies did not discriminate against Jews per se, they were bringing an end to Uzbekistan as a multicultural society. “Bukhara used to be a city with many different nationality groups. But now the Russians have left, the Tatars, the Armenians. Each has gone to their own place. Karimov did this. He made it so that only the Uzbeks are staying.”

In sum, Bukharan Jews in Uzbekistan expressed feelings of marginalization both in terms of their religious identity as Jews among Muslims and in terms of their national (or ethnic) identity as non-Uzbeks. These two factors may have been particularly potent in the first months after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, as the Jews in Uzbekistan may have feared that Tajikistan’s civil war would spread across the border. They were, however, set against the backdrop of Bukharan Jews’ strong ties to the local space and the sense that they were at home in the region.

This feeling of belonging was due in large part to their long history in Central Asia. Having lived in the area for well over a millennium, the Jews’ presence there stretches back long before the arrival of the Uzbeks themselves. Furthermore, Bukharan Jews have no collective memory of having lived in any other Diaspora home. Unlike the Jews in Turkey, for example, who carry the collective memory of their ancestors’ long sojourn in Spain, Central Asia is the only home Bukharan Jews have known since their forebears’ expulsion at the hands of the Babylonians in ancient times. This deep connection to place was well articulated by an elderly man who began an interview by explaining, “I was born in
Samarkand. My father, too. My grandfather, too. Grandfather’s father, too. Great-great-grandfather, too, in Samarkand. Bukharan Jews have lived in Samarkand for two thousand years.” Even the Bukharan Jews’ spoken language is testimony to their deep connections to the local space. Rather than being a language that is derived from experiences in a previous home—such as Yiddish, a Germanic language that marked the Jews as outsiders in Poland—Bukharan Jews speak one of the region’s many Tajik dialects.

In addition to feeling that they belonged to the local space, the Jewish and Bukharan aspects of their identity had become strongly intertwined during the Soviet era, further binding them to their Central Asian Diaspora home. When the region was incorporated into the USSR in the 1920s, heavy restrictions were placed on emigration and travel, mail was monitored, and it became close to impossible to get access to religious books printed abroad. The ties Bukharan Jews had formed with Jewish communities in Europe and Palestine during the colonial era were suddenly severed. Tight boundaries were drawn around their own small communities, which became largely impermeable to the influences of Jewish life outside.29

Confined in Soviet Central Asia, Bukharan Jews stopped identifying themselves in relation to other Jewish groups. In Israel and the United States, Bukharan Jewish music, dance, costume, and cuisine is celebrated as one “brand” of Jewish culture within a multiethnic Jewish world. But in Central Asia, Bukharan Jews simply saw themselves as Jews and their culture as a Jewish variant of local culture. When I asked people to describe what was unique about Bukharan Jews, their answers never hinged on a comparison between themselves and other Jewish groups. There was one exception: they distinguished themselves from the Ashkenazi Jews living in Central Asia, most of whom arrived in the region during World War II after escaping or being forced out of their homes in Eastern Europe.30 Unlike the Bukharan Jews who maintained their Jewish practices and a strong sense of Jewish identity throughout the Soviet era, the Ashkenazi Jews in Central Asia tended to be highly assimilated—both structurally and culturally—into the region’s Russian population. The reference to themselves as “Bukharan Jews” and to the others as “Ashkenazi Jews,” then, implied a comparison between those who continued to practice Judaism and to strongly identify themselves as Jews throughout the Soviet era and those who did not. We are the chistiye
evrei (real or pure Jews), they would tell me, whereas they are impure or “half Jews.” This strong distinction is highlighted in the low rates of intermarriage between the groups.31 Bukharan Jewish identity was so tightly linked to locality that marriage with those Jews who were not “of Central Asia” was not considered a Jewish marriage at all.

Just as Bukharan Jewish identity came to be equated with being of the local space, so too did their religious practice become particular to the Central Asian scene. This localization was an outgrowth of the ban on religious practice during the Soviet era. In Central Asia, far from the center of Communism, the Jews (like the Muslims) of the region, were able to continue transmitting their religion, but only privately. Authorities would turn a blind eye to religious observance as long as it was conducted quietly and discreetly. Ritual experts, for example, continued to slaughter meat throughout the Soviet era. However, there could be no formalized manner to train new shoḥtim (ritual slaughterers), no institutionalized process for authorizing them, and no way to certify their meat as kosher. It was only through informal and personal channels that people determined who was a legitimate slaughterer and what was kosher meat. The transmission of religious norms in other areas of life also occurred informally and mimetically, rather than through the study of abstract principles and texts in institutional settings. The result was the development of a highly localized structure of religious authority, as well as the emergence of religious practices that were peculiar to this local community. For example, using inherited copper pots came to be understood as integral to the process of matzah baking, and using different hands for the two tasks involved in salting meat—one hand for applying the salt and the other hand for removing the meat from the water in which it soaked—was understood as necessary to ensure that the meat was kosher.

The tight links between local space, ritual practice, and Jewish identity were further reinforced by Bukharan Jews’ demographic patterns. Low mobility rates during the Soviet era coupled with low levels of intermarriage yielded a high rate of marriage among Bukharan Jews who lived in the same city.32 The result of this marriage pattern was the creation of tight-knit Jewish communities, with few social ties outside of their respective cities. Furthermore, because the Jewish population in each town and city never exceeded several thousand, over the course of several decades, the ties between neighbors and friends came to overlap strongly
with kinship ties. “We are all cousins here,” people often answered in response to my questions about the relationships between them.

Ritual practice, then, which was so intimately linked to local space, also became strongly connected to the articulation of kinship bonds. This overlap between kin group, local space, and ritual practice was most strongly articulated in the frequent memorial services that Bukharan Jews hold in honor of the deceased. These services, held twenty-one times during the first year after an individual dies, and once a year for decades following a death, were generally conducted in the home where the deceased had resided with his or her extended family. The services included speeches in memory of the deceased, an elaborate meal, and the recitation of evening and afternoon prayer services. The Soviets did little to monitor or ban this mourning ritual. Taking place in the domestic sphere, they were not subject to the same surveillance as those activities that took place within institutional structures. As a result, despite the fact that Soviets shut most of Central Asia’s synagogues, prayer services continued to be held throughout the twentieth century. In the domestic setting, however, the obligation for daily prayer became deeply connected to the memories of particular individuals and the honor of particular families, rather than an experience that was part of an abstract and universal system of religious law.33

In short, religious practice, Jewish identity, social relationships, and place had become so strongly intertwined for Bukharan Jews that it was hard to imagine one without all the others. Ironically, then, the prospect of migrating to the United States or Israel—where Judaism can be practiced openly and without stigma—was linked to a fear that the transmission of Jewish identity and practice might become impossible. The decision to leave, therefore, was not a simple calculation: persecution and marginalization as a Jew in Central Asia versus the freedom to be Jewish without oppression. Rather, the calculation involved a careful consideration of how to best negotiate the sudden tearing asunder of the links between one’s identity, practice, kin group, community, and home.

Chain Migration

The fissures that ripped apart this complex relationship began to appear in 1989, when migration restrictions were eased and the first Bukharan Jews packed their bags and left. Like a heavy wind that begins to dislodge
a sturdy tree from the ground, their migration initiated the dramatic rupture that would follow. When a man left with his wife, for example, her sister might soon follow, and then that sister’s parents-in-law, then their siblings, those siblings’ children, and so the chain of migration continued. By the time I arrived in 1993, everyone I met had a child, parent, sibling, or cousin in the United States or Israel.

Those who remained behind watched as the homes of their friends, relatives, and neighbors were sold off, one by one, to Muslim families. Mazal commented, “It’s terrible what has happened in [the Jewish mahallah in] Bukhara in the last few years. It used to be that only Jews lived here. . . . People would bring out benches and sit on the streets and talk. Now people don’t know where they’ll be tomorrow.” Likewise, fifteen-year-old Nelya told me nostalgically of the days when she and her friends would roam freely through the narrow streets of Samarkand’s Jewish mahallah. Now their movements were more circumscribed as they were living among outsiders and no longer felt the neighborhood belonged to them. Although inhabiting the same space that they always had, the Jews rapidly became strangers in their own homes.

The paradox of this chain migration, which was occurring in the context of new religious freedoms offered to the Jews in the post-Soviet era, and the influx of monies from various international non-profit organizations, was pronounced and painful. One middle-aged man explained, “Now it’s easy for Jews to live here. We can speak our language [Hebrew], and pray in our synagogues. We don’t want to leave now, but we do anyway. It’s not because of the United States that we are leaving, but because of our relatives who call for us.” In other words: we are not going because we want to live in the United States per se, or because we want to leave Uzbekistan. We are going because our relatives have left. This was a common trope. People who were preparing to immigrate often told me that they felt compelled to leave because their relatives had. Rafael explained, “Early on, many people left out of foolishness, and now we have to follow them.” Another woman said simply, “We are leaving because we are leaving.”

Despite the powerful pull exerted by relatives who had left, the decision to leave was complicated by a similar counterforce: another set of kinship ties, tugging those who still remained in Central Asia to stay exactly where they are. Among Bukharan Jews, family relationships are
reckoned not only among the living but among the deceased as well. Long after they are gone, they continue to hover amid their extended kin groups—who honor them, speak about them, and pray in their memory—on a frequent and regular basis. Memorial services are held so often that the deceased—whose framed images preside over the space in which these events occur—appear almost as active agents, continuing to maintain their social networks even in death. They also mingle with the living through their continued presence in the Jewish quarter.

In Samarkand, those who live in the Jewish mahallah inhabit the neighborhood’s twelve districts. Everyone knows, though, that there is an adjacent “thirteenth district”: the cemetery where the souls of their relatives reside. On my first visit to Samarkand, my hosts made sure that this site was included in my itinerary. “You haven’t seen all of Jewish Samarkand until you’ve been to the cemetery,” they told me. They were not urging me to visit the cemetery to pay homage to the leaders and heroes buried there or to learn about the city’s Jewish past. Rather, they were pointing out that my collection of ethnographic information about Bukharan Jewish life in the present was not complete until I visited the thirteenth district.

Wandering among the gravestones of the Uzbekistan’s crowded Jewish burial grounds, I sensed an eerie similarity to my experiences at large social gatherings, where I attempted to sort out the names and relationships between the guests. In the cemetery, vivid etchings portray who is buried beneath each shiny onyx headstone: a tall soldier standing erect, a round-faced smiling baby, a middle-aged man with a mustache, an elderly lady covered in a scarf beside an elderly man in a karakul hat. Meandering among these monuments, one cannot help but wonder about the lives and character traits of each of these figures, whose features are engraved in fine detail on their grave markers. Like hosts at a social event, cemetery caretakers help answer these questions. Parading around with the visitors, they stop at the stones of various individuals to introduce them by telling where they were born, what they did for a living, and who their family members were and by recounting a story about them. I do not know what sorts of tales cemetery caretakers told prior to 1989, but in the midst of mass migration, there was one single, often-repeated theme: that of abandonment. “Here Rafael Abramov is buried. His son has moved to Phoenix and his daughter to Tel Aviv. His
brother died here ten years ago, and his sister moved with her family to
New York. Everyone is gone now. There is no one left to visit his grave.”

Those making the decision to immigrate know this story of abandon-
ment well. They hear it when they visit the cemeteries, and they hear it
at memorial services. An eloquent orator summarized this message at
one of the many such services I attended: “A man does not die when his
heart stops or when he closes his eyelids. A man does not die when he
is wrapped in a shroud or when he is put into the grave. He dies when
his grave is [left untended and] grown over with grass.” Admonishing
people not to leave their deceased behind, he pleaded with those who—
despite the warning—would choose to go anyway. “Do not forget the
graves of your deceased,” he cautioned, entreat ing people to return often
to visit those whom they have left behind in the cemetery.

Abandoning the deceased is a serious issue that people took into con-
sideration when deciding whether or not to emigrate. When I asked fifty-
six-year-old Uri, for example, if he planned to leave, he was still unsure.
“Well, you can’t just up and go so quickly. I have relatives who have left
and a neighbor who plans to, but our ancestors are buried here in the
cemeteries. We have a history here.” In my conversations with Boris on
the same topic, he lowered his head as he spoke about his reluctance to
leave the site of his father’s burial, and he wondered if he might move
his father’s remains with him to the United States. Dora, on the other
hand, had resolved to emigrate, but not without regret. “All of my family
members are buried together. We are leaving these graves behind.” Some
elderly people expressed fears about their own burial in a foreign land.
Several told me they were afraid to leave because they had heard that in
Israel and the United States their remains would be scattered rather than
given a proper burial. Despite reassurance that the deceased are buried in
cemeteries in Israel and the United States just as they are in Uzbekistan,
there was no alleviating the existential dread of dispersion. With the rup-
ture of the tightly bound connection between history, place, community,
and personal identity, the individual would, in fact, come undone—even
without the physical scattering of the body’s remains.

In sum, the powerful pull to emigrate—exerted by the living branches
of the family tree—was countered by the tug to remain. Eventually, the
Bukharan Jewish population in Uzbekistan did become dislodged, its
branches and leaves scattering in the winds of social and political change.
But this process did not occur without resistance from the powerful root system that had been holding the population steady for centuries.

**Conclusion: A Comparative Framework of Analysis**

This chapter focused on the various factors individuals weighed in making the difficult decision to leave their age-old Diaspora homeland in Central Asia. While the analysis is specific to the Bukharan Jewish case, I believe the approach can also be used to shed light on the reasons for the Jews’ mass migration from North Africa and the Middle East in the middle of the twentieth century.

Why and under what conditions the Jews of Arab lands left their homes are the subject of intense debate that has become inextricably tied to the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In particular, the way that the story of the Jews’ mass departure from North Africa and the Middle East is told has become strongly informed by competing agendas surrounding contested Israeli and Palestinian claims to land. At one end of the debate are those who draw on the Zionist narrative to argue that Israel is a necessary safe haven for the Jewish people who have long been subject to persecution in the lands of their dispersion (particularly Arab lands). From this perspective the Jewish emigrants from North Africa and the Middle East are refugees who were expelled under duress. At the other end of the debate are those who draw on postcolonialist theory to argue that a wedge was drawn between the Jews and their Muslim neighbors largely due to the emergence of Jewish nationalism and the state of Israel, both artifacts of colonialism. From this perspective, the emigrants are displaced people who were transferred from their homes by the Israeli Zionist establishment.

The case of the Bukharan Jews tends not to trigger such extreme political reactions because Uzbekistan—though a Muslim country—is not Arab. Furthermore, their migration—unlike that of the Jews from Arab lands—did not occur against the background of Israel’s declaration and fight for her independence. This more neutral case, then, lends itself to a nuanced analysis rather than one designed as part of an effort to bolster a particular political agenda.

Despite these keys differences between the cases, there are also important similarities. Several decades preceding the Bukharan Jews’
emigration, Central Asia came under Russian colonial rule. Likewise, several decades before the Jews’ emigration from North Africa and the Middle East, the region was colonized by Western powers. Under colonial rule, the status of the Bukharan Jews as dhimmi—like the Jews in North Africa and the Middle East—began to erode. As secular governance was introduced, restrictions against the Jews in these regions were lifted and they gained new rights. They were permitted to leave their residential quarters and settle in new parts of the city. They were extended rights to own property, encouraged to engage in trade, and given access to secular education. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the colonial power retreated from Central Asia, and new sovereign states were born. At this moment in their history, the Bukharan Jews faced the difficult question of belonging. Central Asia had been their home for more than a millennium, but would they (or could they) join in the project of state-building? This question was also pressing for the Jews in North Africa and the Middle East, when the colonial powers retreated from these regions. In Uzbekistan, the question was answered with a resounding no. As in North Africa and the Middle East, within a decade of the rise of independent states, almost all of the Jews had left.

These structural similarities suggest that the analytical approach I have taken can inform further study of circumstances surrounding the Jews’ departure from North Africa and the Middle East. First, my analysis does not foreground the story of those Bukharan Jews who went to Israel—roughly half of the immigrant population—over those who resettled elsewhere (primarily in the United States, but also in Canada, Austria, and Germany). While the midcentury migration from Arab lands is generally framed in terms of resettlement in Israel, Jews from North Africa and the Middle East—like those from Uzbekistan—moved in great numbers to other countries as well, including Britain, France, and Italy. When Israel as a destination ceases to be the centerpiece of the narrative, key factors that are not directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be taken into consideration.

Second, by using ethnographic tools of analysis, the story of the mass migration can shift from a focus on macro-political processes to one that also takes into account the experiences of individuals navigating dramatic, difficult changes in their life circumstances. This framework allows for the portrayal of individuals not only as passive actors, subject
to the forces of exile or expulsion, but also as active agents, navigating a new political stage and making decisions about how to contend with difficult transformations.

Finally, an honest ethnographic approach also makes a serious attempt to separate the worldview of the researcher and author from that of the people whom she or he is studying. The narrative of the Bukharan Jews’ mass migration from Uzbekistan that has appeared in the English-language press has been largely informed by Western fears of Islamic fundamentalism. Likewise, the narrative of the Jews’ mass migration from North African and the Middle East has been largely informed by politically charged concerns about the Arab-Israeli conflict. The analysis in this chapter is an attempt to focus, instead, on the views and understandings of those people who were themselves making migration decisions. This approach depicts the mass migration as a nuanced process that mirrors the complex space the Jews occupied in Muslim lands, as individuals who were marginalized in certain respects but who were also deeply invested and tied to the people and lands in which they lived.

Notes

1. Names have been changed to protect the privacy of all individuals.
3. Transoxiana was bound in the south by the Persian province of Khorasan and by the Amu Darya (in ancient times called the Oxus River) and in the north by the Syr Darya (in ancient times called the Jaxartes River).


11. In 1979, only 6 percent of the married Uzbeks living in Uzbekistan’s capital city, Tashkent, had married non-Uzbeks. Survey data indicate that in 1991, 39 percent of the Uzbeks living in Tashkent spoke Russian either with some difficulty or with great difficulty, and 5 percent did not speak Russian at all. Ju. V. Arutjunian, *Uzbekistan: Inhabitants of the Capital* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Science, 1996), 89, 186.


16. The number of homes destroyed is disputed. On 10 May 1990, Walter Ruby reported that forty Jewish and Armenian homes were burned, with the ratio being “approximately equal in number” (*Jerusalem Post*, “Four Arrested for Torturing Jewish Family in the Caucasus”). On 16 May, Ruby reported that sixteen Jewish homes, twelve Armenian homes, and five Russian homes were “burned to the ground” (*Jerusalem Post*, “Frightened Jews in USSR’s Moslem Regions Desperate to Flee to Israel”). In David Waksberg’s “Report on Events in Andizhan, Uzbekistan, May 2, 1990,” issued by the Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews, more than fifty Jewish homes were said to have been “looted and burned to the ground.”


18. In an article entitled “USSR Breakup Raises Questions about Emigration,” Garth Wolkoff reported, “There is concern here about the cultural attitudes toward Jews in the six Moslem republics,” and “growing Moslem fundamentalism may inspire the Central Asian republics eventually to curtail Jewish emigration, particularly if they fall under the influence of neighboring Iran.” *Northern California Jewish Bulletin*, 3 January 1992. Likewise, in an article entitled “Danger Stalks New Republics,” Robert Leiter reported, “If prices for goods continue to skyrocket, it could lead not just to discontent but also to social unrest and violence directed at Jews. . . . [We] are most concerned about
the Moslem Central Asian republics, where the growth of Islam has everybody worried.” *Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia*, 17 January 1992.


26. The “new city” is an area of Samarkand that was developed and planned in the late nineteenth century under Russian colonial rule.


30. According to demographic statistics gathered by the Jewish Agency for Israel, the population of Ashkenazi Jews in Uzbekistan in 1989 numbered 60,000. They were concentrated in the Uzbekistan’s most populous cities. Most lived in Tashkent. According to M. Zubin’s article, “The Jews of Samarkand in the Year 1979,” there were 4,121 Ashkenazi Jews in Samarkand. *Pe’amim* 35 (1987): 170–77. Fewer lived in Bukhara (personal communications with Ashkenazi and Central Asian Jewish residents in Bukhara, as well as local community leaders).

31. Although official statistics on intermarriage between Bukharan Jews and Ashkenazi Jews are unavailable, during the course of five months of ethnographic research in Samarkand, I learned of six cases of Bukharan Jews in Samarkand who had married non-Jews and only two who had married Ashkenazi Jews.

32. Based on a survey of 113 couples. See Alanna E. Cooper, *Negotiating Iden-

SECTION III

In the Shadow of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

History, Ideology, and Political Strategy
Issues of Jewish History as Reflected in Modern Egyptian Historiography

Rachel Maissy-Noy

Someone once said that history is written by the victors. This study, however, deals with the opposite case, where the defeated wrote the history of the victorious side. We examine Egyptian writings during the years 1967–2006 on the history of the Jews.

There are about sixty prominent Egyptian scholars who have been writing about Jews and Judaism since the 1960s, not to mention those who dealt with Zionism. These historians came from the fields of history, religion, law, psychology, sociology, and political science. Some of them know Hebrew very well and use the primary sources in this language. More than one hundred of their historical writings were the source material for this research. Among those researchers are Mustapha Kamal ῾Abd al-῾Alim and ῾Abd al-Muḥsin al-Khashab, who dealt with Jewish history in ancient times. Among those dealing with the Jews in the Middle Ages are Qasem ῾Abddu al-Qasem from Zaqaziq University, Faṭima al-῾Aamer and Huwayda ῾Abd al-῾Azīm Ramaḍān from ῾Ein Shams University, and Zubayda Muḥammad ῾Aṭa from Ḥilwan University. Researchers of Jewish life in modern times include Siham Naṣṣar from Ḥilwan University, ῾Ali Shalash, and ῾Abdu ῾Ali ῾Arafa. Other researchers are Aḥmad ῾Uthman and Ṣaber ῾Tuʿayma, who devoted their research to refuting the claim of the Jews about their bond with the Land of Israel, based on the findings of archaeological and Bible criticism; Ahmad Shalabi from Cairo University, Ḥasan Zaz, Ḥasanen Fuʿad ῾Ali, and ῾Abd al-Ghani ῾ABBud from ῾Ein Shams University, who researched the development of the Jewish faith. Reference is also made to the works of Ḥasan Khalifa...
from the Center for Oriental Studies of Cairo University and that of 'Abd al-Wahab al-Masiri, one of the most important experts who has done extensive research, especially for the encyclopedia on terms regarding Jews, Judaism, and Zionism.

**The Motivation for the Egyptian Research**

The main claim of Egyptian historiography is that Zionist historiography invented a history for the Jewish people and that it constructed religious, cultural, historical, and military myths based on lies in order to prove the rights of the Jews to the territory of Palestine. Egyptian historiography focused its attack on the Zionist narrative according to which the Jews are the descendants of an ancient nation chosen by God to inherit Palestine but that historical circumstances forced them to be exiled from their country for about two thousand years, during which time they never stopped yearning for Zion. Their situation in the Diaspora was mostly full of humiliation, suffering, oppression, and persecution, which led to the creation of a national movement that gathered the dispersed and brought them back to the land of their forefathers.

This narrative is interpreted by Egyptian historiography as imaginary and as a means of taking control over Palestine. Thus, in their desire to counter that narrative and their devotion to the Palestinian cause, Egyptian researchers devote their research to refute what they called “Lies of the Zionist Historiography.” Among those so-called lies they criticize the genealogical link of the Jews to the biblical Children of Israel; the topic of the chosen people and the Promised Land; the question of the authenticity of the Bible as a historical source; the question of the nationality of the Jews; and the question of the existence of a Jewish problem in the Diaspora, especially in Islamic countries. They write mostly in Arabic and aim their histories at Arab readers. The main reason for this is their concern that Arab youth might accept the Zionist version as true.

It is, however, interesting to compare this hostile attitude with the tone and ambiance of three publications written before 1967 by Christian Arabs. The first is by the Egyptian historian Shahin Maqaryus, published in 1904; the second is by Emil Zaydan, published in 1914 in the Egyptian journal *Al-Hilal*; and the third is by the Iraqi historian Yusuf Rizq Alla Abu Ghunayma, published in 1924. These books are characterized by a sympathetic approach to the history and culture of the Jewish people.
Their positive attitude regarding the contribution of the Jews to world culture is obvious, and they even express reservations about the blood libel and the persecution of the Jews by the mob. However, except for these three books, it seems that whatever was written about the Jews was critical and unsympathetic. It is enough if we look at some of the book titles to realize this trend: Israel: The Torah: Misleading History, The Real History of the Jews from Their Appearance to Date, Delusions in Jewish History, The Jews of the Arab World—False Claims of Persecution, The Jews and the Legend of Historical Rights.

Egyptian historiography cannot, of course, be considered en bloc, since it covers a wide spectrum that starts from the rightist, Islamist angle, which examines historical events through a religious prism, up to the leftist social one, which is mainly secular and whose historical vision is based on materialistic concepts such as economics and society. Between these two extremes there are various religious undercurrents, but the main characteristic of them all is their evaluation of the national dimension as the main motivation for the course of history. In fact, three different ideological streams can be distinguished in the Egyptian discourse, each implying a specific attitude toward the past: the nationalist-institutional stream, the revisionist-leftist, and the Islamist. This division was introduced into academic research at the end of the 1960s by Yehoshafat Harkavi. About two decades later, it was confirmed by the Orientalist Emanuel Sivan, and it can be said that it is also accepted by Arab researchers.2

The common interest of these three streams is their negative approach toward Jews, Judaism, and Zionism. For instance, national historians consider Zionism to be a competitive factor and present its supporters as a danger to the Arab nation. The leftist researchers refer to them as a societal enemy by presenting them as capitalists who exploit the socially weaker classes. The Islamists, on the other hand, point out that they are heretics who compete with Islam about divine truth.

Among these streams and substreams there are differences. This is expressed by the nature of their source material and claims, as well as the terminology, symbols, and linguistic codes that served each of them to describe the Jews, Judaism, and Zionism. There is a clear tendency among Islamist historians to deal with issues relating to the Jewish faith and refer to it as the main cause for the conflict between Jews and Muslims. These historians base their claims on their holy scriptures and concentrate,
more than others, on religious aspects in the course of Jewish history. Historians of the nationalist and leftist streams, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the economic activities of the Jews and their influence on world diplomacy. These researchers deal mostly with the historical and political causes of the conflict and base their claims on secular research disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, Bible criticism, sociology, demography, and international law. But above all they show great interest in the Zionist movement, its aspirations and arguments, and insist on presenting it as the main cause for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, the common aim of all of them is to shatter the Zionist narrative and build on its ruins, using the very same elements for a counter-narrative presented to the world for historical reevaluation. In fact, in their introduction to their research, most of the researchers promise to present to the readers the real history of the Jews, devoid of any fabrication and forgery. Their historical narrative emphasizes five main theses: First, there was no Jewish problem in the Diaspora, especially not in the Islamic countries. On the contrary, the Jews in the Diaspora lived an honorable life and reached a high economic and social standard in ancient, medieval, and modern times. Moreover, safeguarded by the Islamic world and under its influence, the Jews managed to create monumental works in philosophy, poetry, and grammar. Second, if there was a Jewish problem, it emanated from the negative behavior of the Jews toward their environment and not from the harshness of Muslim rulers, as claimed by some Zionist historians. According to the third thesis, the Jews do not constitute a nation, since Judaism is exclusively a religion and not a nation, given that prior to the emergence of the Zionist Movement in the nineteenth century, the Jews, scattered all over the world, showed none of the common characteristics of a nation such as origin, language, history, and common national aspirations. The fourth thesis is based on conclusions from the sciences of biblical criticism and archaeology, which argue that the Bible, on which the Jews base their bond to Palestine, cannot be used as a reliable historical source to describe the past. The fifth thesis is the conclusion from the previous four ones. It refutes the ideological basis of the Zionist Movement and presents it as a camouflage for a colonialist movement driven by economic interests. The following sections expand on two of these theses.
Themes in the Egyptian Narrative

There Is No Jewish Nation

Most of the Egyptian historians included in this research agree that Judaism is a religion and not a nation. This statement emanates from the Arab concept that religion is not a main component of nationhood. Moreover, it is based on undermining several foundations of the Jewish nationhood such as blood relationship, common history and land, a unique cultural heritage, and national aspirations. The first claim in this context is that the Jews did not maintain any genealogical continuity from the days of their forefathers until today, since over the course of time they assimilated, freely and without coercion, with their new environment. The second claim is that since the Jews were exiled from their land and scattered all over the world, their historical continuity was interrupted, and they became part of the historical development of the countries in which they settled. According to the third claim, the Jewish nation did not create or preserve unique cultural characteristics, seeing that its entire culture has been copied from the surrounding ancient cultures in the Near East, starting with the principles of the faith and the stories of the Bible and up to poetry, grammar, and philosophy. And, finally, the claim that, since the Bar Kochba revolt, the national aspirations of the Jewish nation ceased to exist and its bond to the Holy Land was reduced to the metaphysical level only. This is proved by the fact that the Jews integrated completely into the countries in which they lived, and throughout most of their life in the Diaspora they had no operative intention to return to the Holy Land and establish an independent state there. In the following sections, each claim is discussed in detail.

Blood Relations: The Polemic with the Claim of Racial Purity

There is a common claim in the research literature that casts doubt on the Jewish claim that the Jews maintained their genetic uniqueness from ancient times until today. Some historians call it “the claim of the purity of the Jewish race” and regard it as a myth intended to explain the rights of the present-day Jews to Palestine. The counterargument is that already in ancient times the Hebrews merged with the Canaanites, worshiped their idols, and intermarried. This claim is based on verses from the Bible that indicate mixed marriages between the Hebrew and the Canaanite
nations. Among the frequent examples in Egyptian historiography to illustrate this were Zipporah, the black wife of Moses, David, who had Moabite blood in his veins, and Solomon, who was a descendant of the Hittites. Another example of the existence of mixed marriages is when Nehemiah, leader of Shivat Zion (the Jews’ return to Judea after the Babylonian exile), ordered the Jews to divorce their foreign wives. Zubayda Muhammad ‘Aṭa mentions this as an outstanding example of the extent of mixed marriage on the leadership as well as on the personal level.4

Another claim concerning the genealogical distance of Jews today from Abraham is that during the course of time and due to historical circumstances the Jews assimilated with their environment, freely or under duress. In addition, they were joined by tribes of various races and cultures, and as a result of that mingling, the Jewish race lost its genetic distinctiveness from the biblical Jews. At this point, the researchers use the conclusions of anthropological research, which indicates a racial blur that manifests itself in the conspicuous physical differences between the European Jews and those from Asia and Africa. One of the most important historians who paid attention to the distancing of the Jews of today from the biblical ones is Jamal Ḥamdan. At the end of the 1960s he wrote a comprehensive study of this subject in al-Yahud Antrupulujiyyan (Jews from the Anthropological Angle). This study was devoted entirely to the anthropological aspect in order to prove that most of today’s Jews do not belong to the Semitic race. Ḥamdan tried to base his conclusion on two levels: biological and statistical. Biologically, he analyzed anatomical characteristics of contemporary Jews, such as height, body and skull structure, and color of hair, skin, and eyes. From the significant differences he found in these characteristics among the Jews themselves, he concluded that the anatomical variables were related both to mixed marriages and to conversion processes that were very common in ancient and medieval times. Consequently he stated: “There is no Jewish community today which has not undergone biological mingling with the environment. Therefore we cannot say that they represent the ancient Jews of Palestine, with the exception, probably, of the Samaritans, who are the only group, claim many, which remained in Palestine throughout history in perfect seclusion.”5

On the second level Ḥamdan relied on statistics of Western research according to which the number of Jews after the Edict of Hadrian in 138 ce was about forty thousand people, whereas some five hundred years
later, their number in the Roman Empire amounted to seven million. That means in his view that the huge demographical increase was not due to natural propagation but due to the joining of various ethnic groups during those five hundred years. The emirates of Ḥimyar and Ḥidyab converted to Judaism in antiquity, and tribes from the Arabian Peninsula as well as barbaric tribes from North Africa converted to Judaism for various reasons.

Another popular claim used by Ḥamdan and other researchers in order to break the genealogical bond between the contemporary Jews and the biblical Children of Israel was the theory of the Khazars, which says that most of the European Jews are the descendants of the Khazarian people. This theory was already presented in the 1950s by none other than the Jewish historians Nathan Pollack and Arthur Koestler. That drove Zubayda َAṭa to the conclusion that not only did the Hebrew race mingle with the Canaanite nation in antiquity but that the bond of contemporary Jews with Palestine is also doubtful. She explains it by the fact that the meaning of the Khazar theory is that most contemporary Jews do not belong to the Semitic race at all: “This proves that the forefathers of the Jews arrived from beyond the Volga and not from Trans-Jordan, nor from the Land of Canaan but from the Caucasus.” It should be mentioned here that the implications of this argument on the Israeli/Arab conflict are very obvious in the Palestinian historiography, as bitterly expressed by the Palestinian historian Saleḥ al-Rukub: “The Arab Palestinians, the true descendants of Abraham, have been replaced by another nation who have nothing that attaches them to this land.”

Moreover, some historians trace the movements of the Sons of Abraham from the end of the nineteenth century BCE up to now, in the attempt to sever the bond between biblical Jews and modern Jews. Therefore, they make a strong distinction between four terms: Hebrews, Children of Israel, Sons of Moses, and Jews. The Hebrews are defined as a group of nomad tribes which arrived in Canaan under the leadership of Abraham. This was the name given to them by the local nations due to the fact that in their language it meant that they came from across a river or a desert. Some researchers identify this group with what is known in the classical sources as َApiru (Habiru), emphasizing their inferior origin.

The second group is the Children of Israel, the sons of Jacob, who lived in Canaan and migrated to Egypt during the years of famine. According to these researchers, Jacob’s children assimilated with the Egyptians to
the degree that one could no longer point out the link between them and the groups that left Egypt about four hundred years later. In this context it is important to mention the theory that the biblical phrase that indicates the change of Abraham’s grandson’s name from Jacob to Israel is an example of the forgery of the holy scriptures. The researcher Sa’d Salman ‘Abdalla, for example, maintains that Jacob and Israel are two separate figures, and each one appears independently in the Quran. His conclusion is: “The story that Jacob is Israel is nothing more than perverse propaganda of the authors of the Torah who wanted to relate themselves to Abraham and his grandson in order to find for themselves a social lineage.”

The third group is the Musawiyun (the people of Moses). This group is presented as a heterogeneous union between the Hyksos and the slaves who had joined Moses, who was Egyptian himself, when he escaped from Egypt after the breach of confidence between him and Pharaoh. The researcher Fu’ad ‘Ali Hasanen, who devoted special attention to this stage in Jewish history, claims that the Musawiyun were mostly of Egyptian origin, their language was Egyptian, and they even received the Ten Commandments in hieroglyphs.

The fourth group is the Jews connected to Judah, Jacob’s fourth son. According to Saber ‘Abd al-Rahman Tu’ayma, Zubayda Muḥammad ‘Aṭa, Kamal Aḥmad ‘Awn, and others, this group dispersed in the Diaspora after the defeat of the Bar Kochba revolt and assimilated among the Gentiles. During the pre-Islamic period, the survivors of this group were joined by Arab tribes from the Arabian Peninsula and Berber tribes from North Africa. All those were joined by inhabitants of the aforementioned kingdoms of Ḥimyar, Ḥidyab, and Khazaria, who had converted to Judaism. Moreover, it is emphasized that they had accepted Judaism as a religion, without identifying with it as a nation. This claim is reinforced by the fact that none of those tribes had any aspirations to unite with the Jews in the land of Israel. Time and time again, most researchers cite racial mingling as an antithesis to the claim of purity of the Jewish race. But alongside the efforts to disconnect the Hebrews from the Jews, we may note a dilemma resulting from the approach of Zubayda ‘Aṭa and Hasan Khalifa regarding the origin of the Hebrews. Those two researchers include Hebrews within the Canaanite nation both as to their geographical origin and their cultural affinity. Zubayda ‘Aṭa,
for instance, tries to prove from biblical verses that genealogically the Jews are part of the Canaanites:

We may say that the Bible verses prove that the Jewish nation who lived for a certain period in Palestine is a fusion of various races—Amorites, Hittites, Moabites, Edomites, and Arabs who intermingled to such an extent that there was no longer a Jewish race . . . so that the Canaanites and not the Hebrews became most of the people who worshipped God Jehovah.¹³

Yet as we can see, according to this definition, the Jews are as much the original inhabitants of the Land as the Canaanites. Thus, in fact, inadvertently, Zubayda ᾿Aṭa supports the right of the Jews to the Land, as being part of its original inhabitants. This point is furthermore enforced by Ḥasan Khalifa, who claims that the Hebrews were in fact of Arab origin:

The name Hebrew was given to a group which emigrated or arrived together with the ancient Arab emigration waves from the heart of the Arabian peninsula to the northern parts of the ancient Near East. It settled in the area of Palestine, together with other groups who had arrived earlier and were known as the Canaanites and the Phoenicians in the western part of Syria and Palestine. Based on this, it is most probable that the early Hebrews are of ancient Arab origin. And perhaps the best proof for the Arab origin of the Hebrews is the linguistic similarity of the words Arab and Hebrew [in Hebrew: ערבי/עברי, just a change of letters].¹⁴

In addition to the rupture of the genealogical bond among these four groups, there was an obvious effort to disrupt the historical and ideological continuity between the immigration of Abraham to Canaan and the immigration of the Children of Israel from Egypt. Thus, whereas Abraham’s departure for Canaan is presented as a religious mission, the entry of the Musawiyun to the Land of Israel was presented either as an infiltration of small and unimportant groups to the outposts of Canaan or as a brutal invasion of land that did not belong to them.¹⁵

*The Question of Historical Continuity*

The prevalent view in the research literature regarding Jewish historical continuity is that since the crush of the Bar Kochba revolt, Jewish history
came to an end and Judaism marked the main existence of the exiles. Thus, wherever the Jews settled down, they integrated into the existing societies and became an inseparable part of their social and cultural history. This means that as time passed outside the Jewish territory, their belonging to one nation was cut off, since they lost the tradition of a common past on a common land. This view is clearly expressed by Ḥasan Khalifa, who writes:

Jewish history differs from general human history by being a history of groups and minorities dispersed in various countries. This means that there is no general Jewish history in the traditional sense. Nor is there a general political history in the accepted historical sense, since the political significance of the history of any nation or people is reflected in the states that this nation built during its ancient, medieval, or modern history. This rule does not apply to Jewish history because the lack of a state turned this history into a dependent and non-autonomous one. . . . And therefore, the political periods according to which Jewish history is divided are not Jewish periods or such emanating from Jewish history, but rather the historical periods of various nations who ruled the Jews.16

The Question of the Existence of a Specific Jewish Culture

Another common claim suggests that all written works of the Jews had been copied from the surrounding culture. According to Ḥasanen Fuʿad ῾Ali and Ḥasan Ẓaẓ before him, this had already begun in antiquity when the Hebrews adopted the main principles of the faith of the peoples in the ancient Near East. This idea was supported by the archaeological excavations in Tel el-Mardikh (Ebla) and Ras Shamra (Ugarit), where archives of clay tablets were found inscribed with texts that preceded the biblical texts and that described events parallel with the story of the Deluge, the code of laws and commandments, and the war hymns.17

Another cultural characteristic for which originality was doubted is the Hebrew language. One of the most prominent opinions on this matter is that the Jews lost their national language at an early stage of their historical development. This assertion must be examined in light of the fact that language is understood by historians of the nationalist stream to be one of the main characteristics of nationhood, if not the most important one. In his book Comparison between the Religions, Aḥmad Shalabi remarks
that spoken Hebrew disappeared around 200 bc, which, according to him, proves the disappearance of an important national characteristic of the Jewish nations already in antiquity. This opinion was shared by the historian Ahmad Sousa, a Jew of Iraqi origin who converted to Islam. The quotations from it by Egyptian historians show that his ideas were obviously popular in Egyptian research. He claimed that the Jews never had one specific language. According to his point of view, the Jews adopted an ancient language and claimed that it was theirs even before they entered Canaan. Like Hasanen Fu’ad ʿAli and Hasan Ẓaz before him, Sousa claims that the Children of Israel spoke the Egyptian language and only when they came to Canaan did they adopt the Canaanite language. Thus the language spoken by David and Solomon was Canaanite as well. Sousa maintains further that during the Babylonian Exile, the exiles had adopted Aramaic language in order to write the Bible. The Hebrew of today, he says, is a later stage in the development of this Aramaic and has no relation to the ‘Apiru language they had spoken about two thousand years earlier.

Alongside language, the uniqueness of medieval Jewish secular and religious writings was also doubted. According to Qasem ʿAbdu, for example, the long period the Jews had lived in a foreign neighborhood turned them culturally into an inseparable part of the surrounding society. Qasem ʿAbdu and Shaḥata Rayya, who studied Jewish medieval history in Egypt and the Mahgreb, respectively, claim that most of the Jewish writings about linguistics or poetry and philosophy were influenced by renowned Muslim scholars. Rayya examines the main writings of Jewish philosophers and poets in medieval Spain as compared with the Muslim writings and concludes: “We have found no specific Jewish creativity but showed that Jewish creation is based on patterns of enlightenment and the Islamic Arab culture.” Similar things were written by Qasem ʿAbdu al-Qasem, who presented the writings of the greatest Jewish philosophers as imitations of their Muslim peers:

Most of their works belong to the Egyptian literature with regard to form and contents. The reason is that the language in which the Egyptian Jews wrote was in most cases Arabic. Their poetry, too, is Arabic with regard to meter, rhyme, sound, and melody. Moreover, even what was written in Hebrew was an imitation of Arab poetry. Also, if we examine the prose, we can see that it, too, was written
in Arabic. Even the commentaries of the Bible and the Talmud, the writings about questions and answers as well as the discussions among the various sects and religions, are the product of their life in Egyptian society.21

The Question of the National Aspirations of the Jewish Nation

The suppression of the Bar Kochba revolt is considered by Aḥmad ‘Usman, ‘Ali Isma’il al-Sayyid, and many others not only as the end of the past but also as the end of the Jewish future. They claim that from that event onward, the national aspirations of the Jewish nation ceased to exist, and that during all the years in the Diaspora, guided by their rabbis, they concentrated only on preserving their religion. Others thought that the end of the Jewish nation had come even earlier. Ḥasan Ẓaẓ, for instance, claims that the end of the Jewish nation in the sense of nationhood had come following the destruction of the First Temple.22

Zubayda Ἶṭa is also preoccupied with that subject. In her opinion, medieval Jews had no national aspirations, as she described it, using the medieval term Ḥṣabiyya (tribal fanaticism). She claims that they had never thought of leading a revolution or of establishing an independent state. On the contrary, on the basis of Jewish historians such as Ashtor, Goitein, and Mark Cohen, she says that the Jews have always wanted to integrate into their environment, support the government, and even serve it in the state administration. That was how they behaved during the Fatimid regime in the Maghreb and in Egypt, as well as during the Muslim reign in Andalusia. One of the proofs she quotes from the Geniza documents is that even when they had been far from home for business or studies, in their letters they expressed their longing for their homeland and not for the Land of Israel.23

Zubayda Ἶṭa also points out the similarity in the relations of medieval Jews to the Holy Land and the relations of the Reform Jews in Europe in the nineteenth century to Zionism. She thinks that medieval Jews endeavored to integrate into Muslim society out of the same principle that hundreds of years later guided the members of the Reform Movement. In both cases, she claims, the supporters of integration with the environment considered that the solution for the Jewish problem was in obtaining equal rights and complete absorption into the local society rather than by establishing an independent Jewish state. This opinion of
hers, in fact, reflects the opinion of most Egyptian historians who regard Judaism as a religion, not a nation.

So far we have discussed the question of the Jews being a nation. Now we come to the second thesis regarding the existence of a Jewish problem in the Islamic countries.

There Is No Jewish Problem

The reason for the creation of the theory of Jewish suffering lies, according to Egyptian researchers, in the tactical purposes of the Zionist Movement. According to them, the Zionists wanted to awaken the national conscience of the Jews and at the same time address the conscience of the world, hoping to mobilize international support for the Zionist enterprise. This approach was adopted especially by historians dealing with the modern age. In fact, ‘Abdu ‘Arfa ‘Ali and Maḥmud ‘Abd al-Ẓahir mention the educational network Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Society for Israeli-Egyptian Research as making use of the theory of Jewish suffering in the Arab world.24 This opinion is reflected also in the research of ‘Ali Shalash and Siham Naṣṣar, who present the Jewish press in Egypt as a propaganda machine and a mouthpiece of the Zionist Movement. Similar opinions can also be detected among historians who dealt with the Middle Ages. One example is Zubayda ‘Aṭa, who says that “the Zionist Movement invented the claim of a persecuted nation in order to awaken feelings of guilt in the Europeans and thus overcome their objection to the Jewish enterprise.”25

The above-mentioned researchers react to the Zionist claim about the living conditions of the Jews in the Diaspora by stating that the Jews enjoyed a life of affluence and prosperity in all the Muslim territories for most of the time. As evidence, they present a list of achievements in the fields of economy, culture, and politics where Jews had been successful during their stay in the Diaspora. This reaction, as we shall see later on, was unanimous in most of the research literature regarding all periods.

Jewish History Prior to Islam

Jewish life in Egypt in antiquity has been researched, among others, by Muṣṭafa Kamal ‘Abd al-‘Aalim and al-Khashab Abd al-Muḥsin.26 Both studied the history of the Elephantine community that settled in Egypt
during the Persian period, as well as the history of the Leontopolis community that settled there during the period of Ptolemaic rule about three hundred years later. ʿAbd al-ʿAalim and Abd al-Muḥsin describes the atmosphere of tolerance created by Egyptian rulers, whether under a Persian, Hellenist, or Roman regime, who granted the Jews economic, cultural, and religious freedom to integrate into most of the economic, military, and administrative branches of the government. Their histories mention the names of Jewish personalities who rose to high positions under Ptolemaic rule, such as Dositheus, son of Dromilus, and Tiberius Julius Alexander, nephew of Philo of Alexandria, who even became prefect of Egypt. But most of all, these two historians emphasize Onias IV, the head of the Jewish community during the Hellenistic period, who was named a county governor and who built for his community a small temple in Leontopolis modeled on the temple in Jerusalem.

Other researchers who describe Jewish history in antiquity deal with the three main areas of Jewish concentration: Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula. They, too, describe the idyllic way of life of the Jews in their environments and indicate that the rulers were not hostile toward them. In order to demonstrate this claim, they present a list of Jewish personalities of high administrative and financial rank who had served as counselors in the palaces of the rulers. Among other prominent examples of Jewish success, they mention Joseph’s high position in the court of Pharaoh and Onias in the court of Cleopatra. Other names are those of Pekah and Nedebiah in Sennacherib’s court, but above all the story of Esther and Mordechai in the court of Xerxes, king of Persia.

Moreover, the story of the aforementioned independent Jewish kingdoms, Ḥidyab, Ḥimyar, and Khazaria, occupies an important place in the Egyptian narrative and serves as a typical example of the religious and political influence of the Jews in the antiquity and early Middle Ages.

Apart from these political achievements, monumental spiritual successes are also mentioned, such as the Bible translation into Greek in the third century bc as proof of the cultural integration of the Jews in the Hellenic world. Also extensively mentioned is the story of the prosperous Babylonian talmudic schools (yeshivas) of Sura, Pumbeditha, and Neharde’a as proof of the tolerant atmosphere that enabled the Jews to develop their spiritual and creative lives. Part of this list of achievements includes the editing and distribution of the Babylonian and Jerusa-
lem Talmuds and their renown in the Jewish world—an accomplishment described as the height of Jewish achievement of all times.31

**Jewish History in the Middle Ages**

Egyptian historiographers, in writing about the history of the Jews in the Middle Ages, made intense efforts to refute the claim of Jewish suffering. This was expressed by a tendency to absolve the Arabs and Islam of the charge of tyranny attributed to them in Western and Jewish historiography. Early research that dealt with the Egyptian Jews of that period was conducted at Zaqaziq University in the 1980s by Qasem ‘Abdu Qasem. The research examines the period between the Arab conquest of Egypt up to the arrival of the Ottomans. About a decade later, the publishing house Al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-‘Aama lilkitab started publishing a research series based on doctoral theses, each of which dealt with the situation of the Jews in Egypt in any one of the periods from the Arab conquest up to the end of the Ottoman period. These works presented a detailed picture of social, economic, and religious Jewish life in Egypt. Among them was also the thesis of Zubayda ‘Ata, who also dealt with the period researched by Qasem ‘Abdu; the thesis of Nariman ‘Abd al-Karim Ahmad, who concentrated on the beginning of the Islamic period; that of Fatima al-‘Amer, who dealt with the period from the Arab conquest to the end of the Fatimid period; and Maḥasen Muḥammad al-Waqqad, who wrote about the Mamluks based on archival documents.32

The common interest of these works is the need to respond to claims made in Jewish research about the social and religious discrimination of Jews imposed by the ‘Umar Convention. The above-mentioned researchers used similar means and methods to refute these claims. The first part of each research presents the tolerant approach of the Quran and the Ḥadith toward the protected charges, reviewing the relevant important Shari’a approach. The second part of the research presents a number of capitulation contracts that determined the relations between the Muslims and the conquered nations. By analyzing the clauses of these contracts, the researchers wish to demonstrate that the spirit of tolerance described in the first part was in fact at the very core of Islam. In this context the ‘Umar Convention is presented as one of the capitulation contracts that had no intention of limiting or humiliating their protected charges. On the contrary, its entire purpose was to allow them to live their lives safely
by paying a poll tax. The last part of the research contains examples from Arab and Jewish sources, proving that the Jews enjoyed equal rights and opportunities by mentioning names of Jewish personalities who reached senior positions in the rulers’ courts.

It was also pointed out in these studies that the Jewish situation in the Middle Ages cannot be described as monolithic. The caliphs of the ʿUmayyad dynasty are generally described as religiously moderate and tolerant toward the Jews, as were the caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty. The latter are generally presented as enlightened rulers who enabled the Jews to live in relative peace compared to that which had prevailed earlier in the Christian world. The Fatimid period, too, except for the years of al-Ḥakem Biʿamr Alla’s reign, is described as a positive period for the Jews, which the researchers call “the golden age of Egyptian Jewry.” This definition is based on many testimonies both in Jewish and Arab sources that point out the employment of many Jews in senior government posts at a relatively higher rate than their numbers in the general population.33

On the other hand, the Egyptian historiographers are not unanimous about the situation of the Jews under the reign of the Mamluks and the Ottomans. The reason for that is probably the different approach of the researchers from the various streams of thought about the legitimacy of the rule of these dynasties. Islamist historians, for instance, like Saber Ṭuʿayma or ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Murshidi, who consider the Ottoman Empire to be one link in the glorious line of Islamic caliphates, find no fault with the attitude of the Ottoman rulers toward the Jews. They describe the rulers’ attitude generally as fair, stemming from the tolerance of Islam. Historians from the nationalist streams, on the other hand, who consider the Ottomans foreign invaders of the Arab world, indicate that the main motive for the behavior of the Mamluks and Ottomans toward their subjects was the levied taxes. Qasem ʿAbdu, for example, explains the tyranny toward the Jews, whenever it existed, by the intention to please the religious sages and the people who were not pleased with the high rank of the Jews.34

However, apart from the differences of opinions among the historians about the attitude of the Mamluks and Ottomans toward the Jews, the researchers were unanimous about the tolerance of the Muslims toward the conquered nations. It was usually mentioned that, since the beginning of Islam, basic principles were set down according to which Islam was to be propagated by peaceful and tolerant ways. These principles had
been expressed in every message sent by Muḥammad to the leaders of the countries he was going to fight against, as well as in the peace agreements signed with them after they surrendered. As proof of this, one verse of the Quran was mentioned at the head of every message sent by Muḥammad to his commanders on the front: “Prepare yourselves against your enemy as much military in cavalry as you can in order to scare them and deter others . . . but when they tend to peace, do so too and put your trust in Allah.”

Further proof for the tolerance of Islam in its early period is the taxation policy. The common policy was that the taxes were fair and levied in a friendly manner, taking into consideration what the protected charges could afford. One of the examples for that was the verse quoted from the Quran that forbids mistreating taxpayers: “Allah does not require from a person something he cannot afford.” In addition, the researchers mentioned the pious sage Abu Joseph, who was employed as a judge [qadi] in the court of Harun al-Rashid and who advised the caliph to treat the People of the Book with compassion according to the spirit of the Quran and the Ḥadith. To prove this, Nariman Abd al-Qarim quoted from his book the words attributed to the Prophet: “So said the Prophet to whom we pray and wish peace: ‘Anyone who discriminates against an ally or forces upon him to pay more than he can afford or humiliates him or takes anything from him not out of his own free will, shall have to stand before me on the day of judgment and explain his doings.’”

Yet another proof of the tolerant atmosphere is the freedom granted to the Jews regarding residence and worship. All this is based on the descriptions of Arab chroniclers such as al-Maqrizi and Qalqashandi, who documented in their books the Jewish neighborhoods in Fustat and Cairo with their houses of prayer and bathhouses. But what was emphasized, above all, was the freedom of employment enjoyed by the Jews. Proof of this is the list of court physicians, the most important of whom was Maimonides, who served as a doctor in the court of Saladin, and Abu Saʿd Yitzhak al-Israeli, the physician of ʿUbayd Allah. Other figures mentioned were those responsible for the treasury and the counselors who served in the courts of the rulers, like Yaacov Ibn Qlas in the court of Qafur al-Ahshidi, Abu Saʿd al-Tastari, who was the head of the office of the wife of the Fatimid caliph al-Muntasir, and also Hasdai ibn Shaprut, Ibn Nagrila, and Shmuel Ha-Nagid, who served in high-ranking positions in the courts of the Arab rulers in Spain.
The claim of a free social and economic atmosphere is reinforced by what the researchers had discovered in sale and purchase contracts in the Cairo Geniza as well as in the documents of Santa Catherina. These documents prove that the Jews worked in a variety of fields and were not excluded from any occupation except the military. Furthermore, it was emphasized that they owned a great deal of private and public property and that many of them were merchants who entered into business partnerships with Muslim merchants and sometimes, as in the case of Nissim Nahari and Ibn ʿUkal, even with the ruler himself. According to Qasem ʿAbdu, all these examples prove that the Jews were an integral part of Egyptian society and were not considered a separate national entity. He therefore writes:

After all these examples, I think it is necessary to say that the society offered the Jews maximum opportunities to use their skills for its service. They were not considered a foreign community or a boycotted one. They were treated as part of the Egyptian public and the only difference was their religion.

Hitherto we have presented the claims of the researchers with regard to the tolerant atmosphere that prevailed during the Middle Ages. It seems that it will be quite easy to proceed from here to refuting the claim of Jewish suffering. In fact, what is clear to the reader is that, compared with the extensive description given by the researchers of the economic and administrative achievements of the Jews in the Middle Ages, they related only marginally to the hostility expressed toward the Jews. It is true that the ʿUmar regulations about the special dress code of the Jews are mentioned, pointing out the rulers who strictly enforced them. But again and again it is emphasized that most rulers tended to ignore these regulations and implemented them only in periods where the behavior of the Jews was “irregular,” as they call it. In cases, for instance, where Qasem ʿAbdu mentions the hostility of the environment toward the Jews, he shows understanding and compassion with the agitation of the Muslims, since, according to him, this agitation was inflamed by the ostentatious behavior of the Jews who were deviating from the religious commandments of the ʿUmar Convention. In general, in cases where he admits the existence of an aggressive act against the Jews, he describes it as an exception that does not prove the rule. One of the typical expressions therefore
is the following: “These events always had a pattern of single cases with no element of perseverance or consistency. They cannot refute the notion that the social relations between the Muslim Egyptians and the Jews and Christians were to a large extent natural and in most cases good.”

As to the existence of decrees by the rulers about establishing a dress code and limiting the freedom of employment, he claims that they were inconsistently implemented and that the restrictions were gradually removed and even disappeared entirely during some periods. To prove it, he quotes the Jewish researcher Shlomo Goitien, who stated that among the Geniza documents there were no signs of the special clothing or other regulations relating to the period of al-Ḥakem bi’Amr Allah. Moreover, he writes that the fact that the researchers discovered extensive documentation of the Sultans’ decrees about the restrictions of the Jews regarding administrative positions and clothing (mainly during the Mamluk period) proves that the protected charges did not always abide by these restrictions and therefore they had to be enforced again and again by new decrees, because “if the regulations were implemented, there would have been no need for these decrees.”

At this point it should be mentioned that even in cases where Qasem discovers that the Jews were not to blame for the hostility toward them, he blames not the Arab population but their Mamluk and Ottoman rulers, whom he considers representatives of a foreign power. From his point of view, ignoring the spirit of the ‘Umar decrees by the rulers led to the agitation of the crowd, who were generally more religious than the rulers and who considered ignoring the ‘Umar regulations as contempt for religious decrees.

Jewish History in Modern Times

Among the researchers who deal with the history of the Jews in modern times, the important ones are Aḥmad Shalabi, Saber Abd el Rahman Tu’ayma, and Ḥasan Ẓaẓ. They discuss the principles of the Jewish faith as they had learned it from the Bible and the Mishna, the Talmud, and the Aggadah. The main aim of these works is to trace the relations of modern Jews with their environment and point out the ideas of the chosen people and the Promised Land as the source of the problem in these relations. Research of social and economic importance can be found in the works

Like the research about antiquity and the Middle Ages, most of these researchers show a common interest in three main issues. First: rejecting the existence of a Jewish problem in the Arab countries, especially in Egypt. Second: the ingratitude of the Jews toward the Arab countries that hosted them generously and the part they played in facilitating Western colonialism. Third: how the Zionist Movement ruined the good relationship between Arabs and Jews and caused the Jews from the Arab countries to take a political misstep. Of these three we shall focus on the first issue that is related to our topic.

The above-mentioned researchers are unanimous in claiming that the integration of the Jews in commerce, industry, entertainment, press, and politics was due to tolerant factors such as the royal courts, the nationalist movement, and the Egyptian man in the street. In order to demonstrate this, Shalash and ‘Abdu ‘Ali ‘Arafa present, for instance, ten pages with names of Jewish lawyers, doctors, and entrepreneurs who worked in Egypt during the second half of the twentieth century. In this context the researchers point out that even in 1937, when Egypt was influenced by anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda, 103 Egyptian companies out of 308 were registered under Jewish ownership. In addition, they mention Jewish personalities who occupied important positions in the parliaments of the Arab countries. The names mentioned were, for instance, Moshe and René Qattawi, Rabbi Ḥaim Naḥum Efendi, and Joseph Pichotto. This list of achievements is supplemented by the Jewish institutions that Egyptian rulers allowed the Jewish community to establish and operate, such as synagogues, schools, hospitals, old age homes, and various charity organizations.

The preoccupation with the claim of Jewish suffering in Arab countries that is characteristic of Egyptian historiography of the Middle Ages becomes even more intense concerning the history of the Jews in modern times. This is due to the emphasis found in the Zionist historiography of Jewish suffering and persecution and the necessity for a national Jewish movement. The polemics over this claim is especially prominent in the research of ‘Abdu ‘Ali ‘Arafa, Siham Naṣṣar, and ‘Ali Shalash, who declare that their aim is to expose the reader to the fact that the situation of the Jews in Egypt was comfortable to such an extent that it did
not justify their joining the Zionist movement. Hereafter, we will deal with ʿAlī Shalash’s stand in his book regarding the Freemasons in Egypt, which seems to represent the approach of the others on this matter.

In the chapter “There Is No Jewish Problem in Egypt,” which he dedicates to refuting the claim of the suffering of the Jews, Shalash describes the acceptance of the Jews as equals by most classes of Egyptian society. His point of view was that, in principle, a minority can prosper in any country only as long as it is supported by the official policy of the rulers and the public, who grant it an atmosphere of freedom. According to him, this was the situation in Egypt, and the fact that the number of Jews there increased considerably during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the best proof for this. In the introduction to his research, this tendency was expressed most clearly:

The reader of this research will finally come to the obvious conclusion that the Jews prospered in Egypt in the modern age until 1948 to an extent comparable only to that in Germany during the period prior to Hitler and in the United States from the very beginning. Such prosperity of the Jews did not emanate from special genius or from hereditary skill, as claimed by their historians, but came originally from two vital factors: the official non-hostile approach of the state they lived in and the popular and tolerant stand of its population.47

Like Qasem ʿAbdu and Zubayda ʿAṭa, who emphasize the fact that the Jews were considered by the Egyptians as part and parcel of Egyptian society in the Middle Ages, Shalash, too, wishes to prove that the Egyptian rulers and intelligentsia considered the Jews an integral part of the modern Egyptian nation. This point is connected to the approach that the Jews are not a people and that they, too, considered themselves an integral part of the peoples among whom they lived. Shalash finds a decisive proof for it in the feeling of a common fate shared by some of the Jewish younger generation regarding the national problems of Egypt and the cooperation of the Egyptian national leaders with the Jews born in Egypt in the building of an Egyptian national consciousness. As an example, he mentions the contacts of al-Afghani and the Jewish journalist Yaʿakov Ṣanuʿa, united by their hostility toward the British and the policy of the Hidaui Ismaʿil, one of the Turkish viceroys who ruled Egypt. In this context he mentioned the role of Jewish youth in the establishment of
Misr al-Fatat, a secret society that was organized in Alexandria during the reign of ‘Isma’il with the main aim of awakening the political consciousness of the Egyptians against the corrupt policy of the Hidaui. Shalash further mentions the relationship between Ya’akov Şan’u’a and the national leader, Aḥmad ‘Urabi, who both opposed the corruption of the royal family and called for “Egypt for the Egyptians.”

But the most interesting relationship between the Jews and Egyptians about the national issue is the encounter of Muṣṭafa Kamal and the Jewish politician Benjamín Ze’ev Herzl [prior to the first Zionist Congress] to discuss the national issue.

Another important fact brought up by Shalash as proof of the feeling of a common fate between the Jews and their environment is the integration of the Jews in the Egyptian parties, especially in the Wafd party. Among the members of this party he mentions the lawyer Felix Ben Zaken, whom he presented as both a Zionist and an ardent defender. He also mentions Zaki Shweika, who was friendly with Muṣṭafa al-Naḥḥas, and Jozef de Pichotto, a member of parliament representing Wafd, as well as Albert Mizraḥi, the editor of the newspaper Al-Tas’ira. Another famous personality mentioned by Shalash in this context, as well as in the research of ‘Awatef ‘abd al- Раහman and Siham Naṣṣar, was Leon Castro, lawyer and journalist and later the head of the Zionist movement in Egypt.

Apart from this official stand, Shalash describes the positive approach to the Jewish people manifested by famous journalists such as Fares Nimer and Shahin Maqaryus as expressed in their newspapers, Al-Muqtaṭaf and Al-Muqaṭam. He also describes in detail the nonhostile attitude of leading intellectuals toward world Jewry and with regard to the Zionist idea. To support this matter, he mentions the sympathy of the mainstream Egyptian intelligentsia headed by Rifa‘a al-Taḥṭawi, Ṭaha Ḥussain, and ‘Abbas Maḥmud al-‘Aqqad, at least until the 1920s, to the special situation of World Jewry:

Rifa‘a al-Taḥṭawi and his students, Ṭaha Ḥussain, al-‘Aqqad, al-Mazini, and Haikal as well as al-Afghani and his students/disciples, like Muḥammad ‘Abdu and Luṭfi al-Sayyed and others, manifested only tolerance toward the Jews, turning a blind eye to Zionist activity in Egypt. The other stream was limited. It was represented by personalities like Rashid Riḍa and ‘Isma’il Maẓhar, a student
of Luṭfi al-Sayyed, who did not differentiate between Zionists and Jews since the 1940s.⁵¹

This proves to Shalash that the Jews of Egypt were not rejected by the Egyptians nor did they feel any rejection or hostility toward them. However, in his opinion, the purpose of Zionist historiography was to disseminate a false historic version according to which the Jews in Egypt suffered constant persecution, only in order to justify their preference for Zionism.⁵²

Conclusion

A review of the Egyptian historical literature over the last three decades reveals several main findings. The first indicates that the approach of the mainstream in Egyptian historiography has been essentially uniform with regard to Jewish history and that it continues to doubt fundamental events that were claimed to have occurred in the Jewish past. Another point is that the themes that have preoccupied the Egyptian historiographers since the second half of the 1970s, with a prevailing feeling of military victory, are not very different from those it dealt with during the 1950s and 1960s, when it suffered from a sense of military defeat by Israel. Moreover, one may say that Egyptian historiography predominantly maintained the same claims made during the years of defeat, and apart from adopting ideas from archaeological research and biblical criticism, it does not contain any important ideas that were not expressed earlier.

Also, the growing number of studies published during the last three decades and the unsympathetic approach expressed in most of them proves that wide circles of Egyptian academicians tend to maintain their attitude toward the Jews as their religious or political enemy. It is likewise important to mention that the peace process between Israel and Egypt did not lead to any modification of the approaches of historians belonging to the nationalist stream, who have always considered the Jews as invaders in the region. It also did not considerably change the approach of the Islamist historians who ever since the beginning of the polemic between Islam and Judaism in the Middle Ages have regarded the Jews as a religious enemy. Furthermore, the need to create a counternarrative to the Jewish one has prevailed and even intensified.

It therefore seems that the motives of the historians of the old
generation as well as the new one remain identical. As it is clearly declared in many introductions and conclusions of their studies, Zionism was and is still considered a threat to the Arab world. Therefore, despite the fact that some Egyptian philosophers and leaders realized the importance of recognizing the state of Israel and viewed the peace process with it in a favorable light, important parts of Egyptian academia persist in refusing to recognize the historic narrative of the Jews.

This unsympathetic approach of Egyptian researchers to the Jewish narrative can be explained by the fact that historical examination is essentially selective and is far from reflecting an objective historical picture. This is even more obvious when it comes to writing the history of a nation with which one has religious, cultural, and territorial conflicts. Another possible explanation for all this is that the expectations of the Egyptian intelligentsia from the peace process have not been fulfilled, and as a result it has strengthened their belief that the internal conditions in Egypt and in other Arab countries do not as yet release them from the role they have assumed or which was imposed on them to support the Arab people in facing the Zionist challenge.

Notes

This article is based on a doctoral dissertation written for Bar-Ilan University under the supervision of Professor Michael Laskier, to whom I extend my sincere thanks for his encouragement, support, and guidance.


6. Ḥidyab (Also known as Adiabene) was a Jewish emirate that existed on
the left bank of the Tigris in the north of Iraq between 36 bc and 115 ac. Ḥimyar existed in Yemen from 115 bc to 525 ad.

7. Ḥamdan, al-Yahud Antrupulujiyyan, 73.


17. Ya’ir Hofman, Sugiyot bevikoret ha-mikra (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1997), 81–86.


38. A collection of about five thousand documents which were preserved in the Santa Catherina Monastery in the Sinai Peninsula. These documents include purchase and selling contracts from the Byzantine period and the first years of the Arab conquest, bills of private property, and a Hekdesh document.
43. Qasem, *From the Muslim Conquest*, 24.
48. This does not mention the religious Miṣr al-Fatat party founded by  
Aḥmad Ḥussain in the 1930s, which held a hostile attitude toward the Jews.

49. Shalash, *The Freemasons in Egypt*, 82; Siham Naṣṣar, *Mawaqif al-Ṣaḥafa al-
Miṣriyya min al-Ṣahiyuniyya khilal al-Fatrah bayna 1897–1917* (Cairo: al-Hayʿa al-
Miṣriyya al-ʿamma lilkitab, 1993), 379.

50. Regarding this matter, Shalash mentioned that Ṭaha Ḥussain was the  
supervisor of Israel Wolfensohn for his doctoral thesis presented to the Academy  
of Science at Cairo University, “The Jewish History in the Arab Countries  
from the Days of the Jahaliya and the Islamic Period.” Shalash, *The Freemasons  
in Egypt*, 87.

51. Ibid., 84.

52. Ibid., 86.
The Road Not Taken

Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini and His Chickens

Hanita Brand

I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken,” 1916

The Road Not Taken

This is an account concerning a unique response by a Jerusalemite Arab, a Muslim intellectual, to the cultural, ideological, and political repercussions of the encounter between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, as it is reflected in a literary work he wrote. The following discussion is based on an analysis of the work itself, the debates surrounding it among Arab critics, and personal interviews with the author, including one I had with him in October 1979.

In 1943, Dr. Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini (=al-Ḥusaynī), a relative of the notorious Mufti of Jerusalem, Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusseini, published a novella, Memoirs of a Hen (Mudhakkirāt dajāja).1 In this book, a hen is telling the story of her arrival at a new chicken coop (“home,” in her words), and she describes how life goes on in it. In his preface, the author maintains the pattern of realism in which this fantastic fable is cast: “This story depicts the life of a hen that lived in my home. Bonds of friendship and love came to pass between us, and I used to feed her with my own hands and watch her life day by day. The incidents which she recounts really happened
to her: they do not exceed the usual in the lives of chickens.”2 When I visited Dr. al-Ḥusseini in 1979 at his home in Jerusalem for the interview mentioned above, he took me to his backyard and showed me where the chicken coop used to be. He repeated with much grace the same words about the hen and told me that he used to feed his chickens every day by himself and that he loved observing them for hours.

Toward the end of her story, the hen tells how suddenly, one day, a family of outcast chickens was thrown inside their chicken coop. By that time all the other adult chickens had been taken away from the place, and there remained only the children of one of the hens, a young generation to which our narrator became spiritual mother and educator. The heroine-hen tells of the opposition to these new invaders by the young hotheads in the now-crowded chicken coop and of the frictions between the two groups. “There is no space in our shelter for all of us,” says the leader of the hotheads. “We have two options: either give up our shelter, or else hold on to it and chase the foreigners out.” The youngsters quickly decide on the second option, shouting, “This is the just way!”3 The wise hen describes how she came to the decision to settle things in peaceful ways rather than by force. She then sends the youngsters away to preach her message of peace and harmony to the world, and she stays with the new arrivals, trying to create a life of peace and harmony.

The novella was seen by many as a parable of a solution to the greatest problem that has beset the Middle East for decades and does not seem to go away even now—the Arab-Israeli conflict. Al-Ḥusseini’s solution, however, is “the road not taken,” neither by his fellow Palestinians, nor by the Jews, nor, I fear, even by the author himself. Perhaps it was too optimistic, perhaps too unlucky. The novella and the author, though, received much attention. This should not come as a surprise, since Dr. Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini was one of Jerusalem’s best-known intellectuals: born in Jerusalem in 1903 or 1904 to the established and respected family of al-Ḥusseini, one of the ruling elite of the Arabs in Palestine at the time, he received his primary and secondary education in Palestine and continued to his higher education in Egypt, where he came under the influence of the great intellectual leaders of the era, such as Ṭāhā Ḥussein (Husayn), Manṣūr Fahmī, and Aḥmad Zakī.4 He completed his academic studies in London, where he received in 1934 a doctoral degree in the School of Oriental Studies at London University under Professor H.A.R. Gibb.
By the time he published *Memoirs of a Hen*, Dr. al-Ḥusseini was back in Palestine, working as a lecturer at the Dār al-Muʿallimīn teachers’ college and as the British government’s chief inspector for the teaching of Arabic in Palestine. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, al-Ḥusseini left the country, moving first to Lebanon and then to Egypt, where he lectured, among other places, at the American University. He was elected a member in various Arab scholarly academies in Egypt and Iraq, including al-Azhar’s Academy for Islamic Studies. In 1952 al-Ḥusseini moved to Canada and accepted a post at McGill University in Montreal. Under the Israeli Law of Family Unification, he returned in 1973 to Jerusalem with his wife and lived there until his death in 1990 at the age of 87.

As for *Memoirs of a Hen*, its history was no less complex than the life of its author. For Arab critics, it looked defeatist, since the hen sends away the young generation to preach to the world the sermon of peace and harmony she has taught them and stays alone with the new arrivals in the chicken coop. Against these accusations, George Kanazi (=Jūrj Qanāziʾ), professor in the Department of Arabic Language and Literature at Haifa University, wrote an essay in which he emphasized the utopian nature of the work and its educational purposes. As early as 1943, al-Ḥusseini advised his readers to “think well of this humble creature, and soar with her for a while in an ideal universe, free from any hatreds and feuds.” Kanazi justly reiterates this classification of the book in 1981 and further elaborates: “*Memoirs of a Hen* is indeed a book containing a humanistic philosophical idea whose aim is reforming human society in general, through personal reformation. Thus it constitutes an unmistakable call for changing the [prevailing] educational and cultural systems, so that the next generations are raised on the love of truth, virtue, and righteousness.” Kanazi finds these characteristics to be proof of the readers’ and critics’ mistakes in their interpretations of the novella as pertaining to the Middle East conflict: “Unfortunately,” he writes in the critical introduction to his translation of the work, published in 1999, “the book was misinterpreted and misunderstood from the very beginning, and as a result, its evaluation was basically negative.” I do not think this last conclusion is validated by the text.

Over half a century later, I would like to take this story and do some justice to it, not only in terms of its political message and as an interesting
literary genre but also as a cultural document, expressing a moment in Middle Eastern history where, justifiably or not, mental roads still seemed open, curiosity for the “Other”—with all its misunderstandings—persisted, and people could still dream. If the political road today seems to lead us all in an entirely different direction, to an entirely different solution, the attitude and atmosphere that *Memoirs of a Hen* created is something we urgently need nowadays.

**Critical Perspectives**

Whatever the ideological and political reactions to this work, there is no doubt that *Memoirs* swept the readers—friends and foes alike—in a beautiful flight of the imagination. Due to its popularity, the book came out in three editions. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Yāghī, a professor of Arabic language at the University of Jordan and an authority on the modern intellectual history of Palestine, the book created quite a stir when it was published. Yāghī mentions that it was an immediate success when it came out in the Iqraʾ series of the Dār al-Maʾārif publishing house in 1943, whereby “in a poll conducted by the publisher . . . among Arab readers, they chose it as their favorite book of all those published in this series.”\(^8\) Another scholar in the field, Dr. Taysīr al-Nāshif, adds that the book earned its author a prize of 70 dinars for being elected as the readers’ favorite book.\(^9\) No wonder: the story had all the elements of a best-seller. It combined surprising characters, an attention-grabbing plot, a fable-like atmosphere, a philosophical dimension, and even an emotional aspect. Among the story’s many layers, the wise hen also teaches us her tenets of constructing and/or developing a successful and righteous human (and avian) character, molded in such a way that would allow one to live together with others in peace and at the same time to achieve a state of satisfaction, fulfillment, and happiness in his, her, or its own life. She critiques and ridicules the giant creatures she meets outside her coop (whom we understand to be human beings) for being greedy, vile, and mean—creatures who understand only the language of power. She finds such characteristics also among her fellow chickens and sets out to rectify them. But in addition to the philosophical and ethical nature of *Memoirs*, the story is full of adventure, suspense, fear, irony, and happiness, as well as some of the most beautiful avian love passages, verging on poetry in
their use of imagery and expressive language. These passages appear when twice the hen falls in love: first with her new husband in her new chicken coop, and later on with the leader of the young generation.

As was pointed out and elaborated by Professor George Kanazi, the utopian nature of Memoirs is quite clear. Kanazi mentions that they continue a genre extant in Arabic and world literature since classical times. He summarizes the principles proposed in the book as the basis of the desired character as follows: love, rejection of materialism, active implementation of principles, rejection of the use of force, preference of the general interest, and a new hierarchy of values upon which everyone is to be measured for their worth, at the top of which are creatures who possess reason, ethics, and radiation. However, Kanazi thinks all these characteristics are based on a dichotomy of good and evil as the one proffered by Muḥammad Bahnassī’s understanding of the term fitra (“innate character”) as elaborated in his book Al-Islām wa-nazʿat al-fitra. According to this dichotomy, “God created His creation divided into two parts: the first are the people of happiness, whom He prepared for the good life, thus easing that person’s road to all that is good . . . and the second are the people of misery and mischief, for whom He eased the road to hardships, i.e., prepared them for evil, by entering it into their hearts, tongues, and limbs.” Kanazi states that “there is no need to discuss this matter further, other than saying that the hen herself—author of these memoirs—entertains these ideas, as she believes most creatures tend to evil rather than to good,” adding that “the wise hen belongs to the first category of Creation, the people of happiness.” This assessment is not born by the text, as there are actually no creatures belonging to this first category, that of the happy creatures, other than the hen herself. Even kind and positive creatures, such as some of the hen’s friends and the entire younger generation that she educates, are flawed to some extent. Additionally, Memoirs usually does not adopt such a rigid, almost Manichean dichotomy as described by Bahnassī in his book, but a rather more relaxed, ameliorative approach, whereby characters are not preordained, or doomed to exist within their prescribed category, but rather are subject to reforming efforts. A more suitable interpretative grid is needed here. As will be explained below, such a grid is provided by the Romantic notion of fitra, seen as the natural disposition, the basic nature of human beings that is inherently good before it is changed by modern society and molded into a more sophisticated and materialistic constitution. Such a
notion allows for reforming efforts to act upon the creatures and change them for the better, by peeling off the corrupt layers of materialism and bringing them back to their original purity.

But the question that besets Kanazi’s thorough interpretation is “Why then did so many construe this story as centered on the Palestinian question?” Kanazi’s answer is that this is a mistaken interpretation, initiated by the preface to the book, written by the eminent Egyptian intellectual writer and scholar Ṭāhā Ḥussein. And truly enough, Ḥussein did introduce the hen several times in his preface as a Palestinian hen: “We read [al-Ḥusseini’s] rendering [of the hen’s memoirs] and shared with the Hen of Palestine her feelings of sadness and happiness, and of joy and pain,” writes Ṭāhā Husseini. And he adds: “She finds—as every Arab from the people of Palestine and indeed from the whole Arab Middle East finds—universal justice, the nobility of Arabism, and [the Arabs’] right for modern glory that is not surpassed by their glory of olden times.”

These were not incidental words. The Palestinian interpretation had been very much on Ṭāhā Ḥussein’s mind since he first read Memoirs, although not necessarily connected to the lofty emotions he expressed in his preface: as was mentioned in an article and an interview with al-Ḥusseini by Meir Abul’afia, published in Moznaim in 1988, Ṭāhā Ḥussein (who at the time was one of the editors of the Iqra’ series) initially rejected al-Ḥusseini’s manuscript because of what he called its “political orientation.” It was only with the help of the Jerusalemite professor David Hirsch Banett’s endorsement that the manuscript was finally accepted. However, Kanazi’s explanation of the source of the mistaken Palestinian interpretation only adds complexity to the problem, since now it includes a sharp intellectual mind as Ṭāhā Ḥussein’s among the mistaken readers of the novella. Throughout the debate, spanning decades and involving an ever larger circle of readers, critics, and scholars, both Arabs and Jews, another question arose: that of the author’s place in the interpretation of his ouvre. George Kanazi assigned it a privileged place, while others objected to this supremacy of the author’s standing.

The circle grows now even further, as I add my own voice to the debate—something I should have done years ago, in the 1980s, after my interview with the author. There are several theoretical points that have to be added here: one is that by accepting Kanazi’s didactic, utopian interpretation of the novella, I do not find the Palestinian interpretation to be invalidated: one does not cancel out the other. A literary work of art can
be utopian in nature and still pertain to the here and now. Indeed, though George Kanazi reminds us that the Greek word *utopia* means “no-place,” or “nowhere,”¹⁷ his example of Plato’s *Republic* is a good case in point: it is quite evident in the case of this masterpiece that while being utopian, it did not exclude the people of ancient Greece from applying the author’s proposals and erecting what he thought was a more successful polity than the one he witnessed around him at the time. In his *Republic*, Plato envisioned the order that he actively tried to impose on his society. While he rejected the kind of polity in which his family had played a distinguished part, he personally aspired to political activity and a suitable political post, and tried to influence several rulers to establish a Platonic government. These are not the acts of a person who only thinks of a no-place. The ruse of a no-place is only meant to work as a clever device for persuading people to read his composition and act upon it. And since Plato wrote in Greek, the people who were supposed to be influenced by his work were his fellow Greeks. Furthermore, the here and now were integrally connected to his composition not only as an immediate place where his principles were supposed to be implemented but also as the initial source of inspiration and influence on his notions of the ideal republic. Thus, as C. M. Bowra states, while Greece was on its way to unite into a larger political entity in the fourth century BC, “Plato and Aristotle still regarded the city-state as the logical end of social development and framed their conceptions of ideal societies on it.”¹⁸

In fact, no author of a utopian work writes it in order not to be heeded by his fellow citizens. To this we should add the fact that *Memoirs* was written in Palestine in 1941, during World War II, according to Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini himself in a letter published in 1983 in the journal *Al-Karmil*: in the author’s words, he was writing it “as I looked at the world from above, while at the time the World War was raging ablaze.”¹⁹ His words stress the connection to the here and now, albeit on an international rather than a national scale, something he repeated in his interview with Abulʿāfiya, after feeling that he might have talked too much about Palestine: “Don’t connect the book with the problem of the state of Israel,” he tells his interviewer, “because the book was written in 1940 and has no connection [to it].”²⁰ Although the state of Israel was not yet established in 1940–41, the Middle East conflict was very much alive at the time. I will come back later to discuss the ever-increasing need of the author to stress the non-Palestinian point. But even if we accept his
words and see the international message of *Memoirs*, at least indirectly they do mean that solving national conflicts by peaceful means applies also to the Middle East, if not exclusively so. In other words, like Plato’s *Republic*, *Memoirs* does not exclude the Palestinians from applying the author’s proposed principles to solving their national problem. As the author watched the world self-destruct, he surely also saw the escalating violence around him, some of which involved members of his own family. Thus the readers might have been justified in reading a Palestinian solution proffered in the book, albeit one of which they did not approve.

A Suitable Interpretative Grid

But the discussion needs to go even further. The question of the author’s place in the interpretation of his work needs to be examined in depth. The contributions of new literary and semiotic theories can throw light on this issue. Even though the debate about the writer’s place in the interpretation of his or her work is fierce, one thing that current literary theories make clear is the inability to ignore the readers’ place in the artistic contract between the progenitor/s and receivers of a work of art. In this sense, we are dealing with at least a two-sided affair. And semiotic theories do not suffice themselves with only two participants in an artistic transaction: they add the general cultural surrounding of a work of art, including its epoch. This is what I referred to earlier as “the here and now.” The here and now means not only the political or social dimensions but the whole conceptual framework in which a work is conceived, executed, and understood by its immediate receivers—all that goes into understanding a work of art—something to which both the progenitor/s and receivers are privy, and which—at times—later generations, or people from other cultures, do not always understand or fully grasp.

One such term that discusses this notion of a text is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s adaptation of Husserl’s term *horizon*, although Gadamer’s use of *horizon* was geared toward his own scholarly interests, which included dealing with classical texts such as Plato’s. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, one needs to understand a text in a larger context, which consists of its own cultural and conceptual horizon. According to Gadamer, “Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word has been used in philosophy to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy.” But understanding does not mean—and should not be confused with—agreement,
just as “in a conversation, when we have discovered the other person’s standpoint and horizon, his ideas become intelligible without our necessarily having to agree with him.” In this broad understanding of a text, there is space enough for both the writer and the readers, while also allowing a place for idiosyncrasies, disagreements, and a variety of interpretations.

Let us go back to our text. If we look at the story itself in the context of its horizon, a Palestinian interpretation is indeed possible, though only to a certain extent. While the novella certainly contains an international or universal didactic message, it also includes a possible Middle Eastern one, particularly at the end. The basic situation at the end of the plot does resemble the Jewish-Palestinian one. A situation with a group already existing in the chicken coop, referred to by the hen as “home,” and another group, the newcomers, to which there is a growing resistance, matches the state of affairs of Palestine in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Most Arab critics read the story this way and objected to the final dénouement, in which the hen sends away the only other chickens remaining from the previous group and stays alone with the new arrivals. This they saw as defeatist. This part was also recognized by George Kanazi as having a potential to be interpreted in this manner—which is why he gave it as one of his reasons for the need to stress the author’s opposite claim and see the Palestinian interpretation as inadmissible, “as it associates the author with views he never entertained and with ideas that do not fit those he publicized in his lectures and written publications.” This point was stressed by al-Ḥusseini in his letter to Al-Thaqāfa in 1943: “The local political problem did not cross my mind at all, and had it crossed, the line of development [of the plot, it] would have of necessity differed.”

The author was defending his honor and reputation as a loyal Palestinian, which were tainted by the Arab critics’ Palestinian interpretation. And truly enough, his loyalty should not have been put in doubt: if one looks at the other writings of al-Ḥusseini, one can see how in books and articles published in various journals, al-Ḥusseini wrote about the importance of Palestine and Jerusalem in the intellectual history of the Arabs and Islam, for example, mentioning local names of famous authors and ‘ulamā’, or great libraries that existed throughout history in the place. This, of course, also played out against him, as it validated a special focus on matters Palestinian in his oeuvre and explains why so many readers
associated the Memoirs as well with Dr. al-Ḥusseini’s known engagement with his city and nation.

However, another aspect of the novella’s intellectual horizon is left out by most Arab critics, probably because it clashes with their current political and ideological inclinations: Ishāq Mūsā al-Ḥusseini was also tremendously respectful and open to Western influences, and merged them with his inherited Arab and Islamic worldview. He was constantly engaged in an ongoing interreligious dialogue. For instance, together with a Christian priest, the Franciscan Father Stephan Salihm, he translated from French a composition by the Franciscan scholar Father Augustus about Arabic poetry recitation. Additionally, as mentioned earlier he studied for his PhD in the University of London under the supervision of Professor H.A.R. Gibb, and was greatly impressed by the Western orientalists. Yāght mentions that in al-Ḥusseini’s book about the orientalists in London “he expressed his great admiration for the [research] methods used by them.” What I can add from my own interview with al-Ḥusseini is that he was also engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Zionist Jews in Palestine and was influenced by some of their ideals, such as modernizing agriculture and a communal way of life. This was not a popular orientation in the 1930s and 1940s, and would be even less so as time passed. He even went as far as joining the Zionist agricultural school of Miqve Yisrael—few Arabs went that far in their contacts with the Jews in Palestine—only to leave it quite early on. As he told me with a smile, “Getting up at dawn to milk the cows was not my idea of an adequate lifestyle for me.” I remember leaving the interview with names like Miqve Yisrael and Karl Netter reverberating in my mind, names that had just been uttered in our conversation. Dr al-Ḥusseini spoke with such ease about his Palestinian national heritage side by side with a familiarity and acceptance of Zionist endeavors such as Miqve Yisrael. I left his house with a growing appreciation that this was indeed a truly unique Palestinian Arab intellectual, both loyal to his own people and broad-minded enough to accept others.

The Road Taken

What is lacking in the debate about the novella is the consideration of its horizon. Memoirs was written at a very peculiar time: a time of change, of
an abrupt move away from one era, and one style of writing, to another era, with its own new style. The move away was from a religious Romantic style of writing that was influenced by the theosophical teachings that suffused Arab Romanticism, particularly its poetry. The greatest representatives of this kind of writing were the poets and philosophers Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān and Mikhāʾīl Nuʿayma. As is the case with all Romantic literature, theirs too had great respect for nature in its two meanings, both the nature we see outside around us, and our inner makeup—our innate character. But what was particular to their special brand of Romanticism was its unique religious Weltanschauung, which gave it its theosophical nature. Within it all monotheistic religions were welcome, and ideals of communality and equality were married to a universal religious belief in which there prevailed a message of tolerance and forgiveness. If George Kanazi were to include and apply in his otherwise thorough analysis of the work its particular religious theosophical worldview, the ideal character proposed by the hen, which he summarized in his research, would faithfully represent this Arab theosophical Romanticism. Quite a few Arab writers, including Palestinians, wrote in that vein up to the 1940s. But around that time, due to the escalating conflict in Palestine among other reasons, there was an abrupt move away from it into a message of vengeance and violence, particularly in Palestinian writings.

I have written elsewhere about another Palestinian writer, a Christian poetess whose work underwent just such a change: Najwā Qaʿwār Farah. Up to the 1940s she wrote mostly Romantic poetry of the kind described above. Then she turned to writing Palestinian nationalist stories. In one of her stories, “Nidāʾ al-aṭlāl” (The Call of the Ruins), published in a collection in 1956, a Palestinian father, who becomes a refugee after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, bequeaths to his son a handwritten message of tolerance, punctuated by such phrases as “it is better for us to suffer wrong than to cause wrong, for the evil deed is foul,” and laying the blame for the Palestinian Nakba (calamity) on the human heart, rather than on “the British, the Arab leaders, or the Jewish leaders.” As was noted by Avrahm Yinon, who translated this story into Hebrew, after the book was printed, the publisher decided to change some of the original lines of the father’s speech in which he spoke of mutual tolerance based on righteousness and mercy. A revision was pasted into each copy, on which were written new lines calling for vengeance, including such
phrases as “there is no peace without justice, and there is no mercy and no pity before justice is rendered.”

Around the time of the change in the cultural horizons one could find both attitudes—old and new—expressed by the same people. Thus in 1942 a close friend and colleague of al-Ḥusseini, the Jerusalemite Christian Palestinian writer and intellectual Khalīl al-Sakākīnī (1878–1953), a fierce anti-Zionist Arab leader, was asked by an American journalist who visited Jerusalem, “What is the solution to the conflict?” He replied, “It will be solved in one of two ways: either our land will remain ours, or it will be taken away from us by force,” echoing almost precisely the words of the young hotheaded chicken in the Memoirs. But al-Sakākīnī was also against wars, and he advocated even in 1948, “Return your swords to your shields and do not fight anyone; there is enough room on earth for everyone,” even as he knew that no one would listen to him.

A move toward nationalism happened also in Hebrew literature of the same era, though on a smaller scale. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century one could still find stories like Ḥemda Ben-Yehuda’s “Ḥavat bney Rekhav” (Bney Rekhav’s Estate), published in 1903, in which a Bedouin tribe is seen as a lost Jewish tribe and is eventually turned into the ideal Zionists—a Hebrew-speaking avant-garde tribe of shepherds and cultivators of the land. But the stories of the 1950s already conformed to the more familiar definition of nationalism.

That clash between the two types of ethos clearly marked the history of the debate over Memoirs. While the novella was written in the old style, expressing a message of tolerance and communality, the debate took place already inside the new era, where a message of struggle had the priority. In fact, one can see, when viewing the responses to the Memoirs by Arab critics, an escalation in the phrasing of the criticism leveled at the story as time passed. While the earlier criticism usually only politely hinted at the problem, the more recent critiques were harsher in tone. Thus al-Sayyid al-Dālī writes in 1943: “The reader might be surprised to learn that Arab unity was discussed in these Memoirs by that hen in a way as never before. Indeed, the reader’s level of surprise might increase when he learns that the Palestine problem was also raised in these Memoirs. Rather than overtly stating this—suffice it to just mention it here.”

But in 1981, Fārūq Wādī writes that “consciously or not, [al-Ḥusseini] created a Palestinian hen that betrays Palestine.” In this climate, the author
had to defend his loyalty to his nation more frequently. Al-Husseini’s subsequent writings also manifested an increased influence of the new ethos. While, as I indicated above, he always wrote about Jerusalem and Palestine before and after the change, in his later writings he tied this topic to the national struggle. Thus he wrote in 1966 *Literature and Arab Nationalism*, and in 1969 *The Arabism of Jerusalem*.

The last point I will make here regards the textual aspect of the view expressed by most Arab critics and scholars according to which sending away the young chickens from the chicken coop is seen as a defeatist act. One needs to remember that the chicken coop is not left empty. Our narrator-heroine does remain in it. But few Arab critics from the Nationalist period would have allowed such an important role in nationalism to a female. As the message of nationalist struggle grew in importance and influence, the male element took prime place, encroaching on the female public space. This point too appeared in other Palestinian stories, and it finds some parallel tendency in Hebrew literature of the same era, as is dealt with and analyzed in my research on this topic. Even writers who allowed or even preached women’s equality shied away from it later on in their nationalist stories. In *Memoirs*, the feminist aspect is dealt with at length, though the author claimed in the interview with Abul’afiya that “the woman issue did not cross my mind [when writing *Memoirs*],”35 echoing the same phrasing of denial he used regarding the Palestinian interpretation. This statement too is not borne by the text: the narrator hen sees as one of the desired tenets for her ideal society the ability of females to fend for themselves and take an equal share in life’s burdens and pleasures. First she thinks: “My thoughts were turned to the need to arm ourselves with the same strength with which our husband armed himself. We need to be prepared for defending ourselves in hard times, so as not to be at the mercy of fickle fate. What is to prevent a female from being just like the male in taking arms against misfortunes and facing [life’s] horrors? Until when will we remain a burden on the male, making him bear our responsibilities and hardships?”36 Later on, she tries to persuade the other hens to learn to enjoy life, by venturing outside the chicken coop on their own. “You, my sister,” she tells one of the hens, “are kind of heart and great of soul. If you were able to go out of your shelter, you would see outside wondrous things indeed.”37

No doubt, the hen’s significance at the end of the story was not accepted by Arab critics. Her remaining in the chicken coop was not seen as
proof for the Arab’s continued existence at home, together with the new arrivals. They rather preferred to see it as a vacated home. They went along their new road, leaving *Memoirs of a Hen* behind.

**Notes**

1. Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusseini (=al-Ḥusaynī) (1897–1974) was the Mufti (the Muslim religious head) of Jerusalem from 1921, a position held before him by his father and brother. But rather than being known as a religious leader, he was more known—since becoming a national leader of the Palestinian Arabs at the end of World War I—as the one who advocated, instigated and headed a fierce and ruthless armed struggle against both the Jews and the British. He was notorious for being a pro-Nazi sympathizer and for siding with the Axis powers in World War II. He even set a Palestinian Bureau in Berlin and Rome during that war. He also reached several agreements with Hitler.

2. Dr. Isḥāq Mūsā al-Ḥusaynī, *Mudhakkirāt dajāja* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma῾ārif bi-Miṣr, Silsilat “Iqra’” 8, n.d.), 9. All translations quoted from the Arabic and Hebrew sources in the article are mine.

3. Ibid., 152.

4. For details on Ṭāhā Ḥussein, see infra, note 13. Manṣūr Fahmī (1886–1959) was one of the intellectuals who dared write about “the Woman’s Question” in Islam, criticizing her isolation from the public sphere. In fact, this was the subject of his PhD dissertation for the Sorbonne, published in 1913. But unlike his predecessor, Qāsim Amīn—the most famous Egyptian intellectual to write about the subject, he later backed away from his advanced views after the storm his book caused in Egypt and the harsh criticism his writings received. Aḥmad Zakī was an intellectual who, like Ṭāhā Hussein, was both an academic and politician. Born at the end of the nineteenth century, he headed the Egyptian University in Cairo, and went on to be elected to the last Egyptian government before the 1952 Free Officers’ coup. He later moved to Kuwait, to become Editor-in-Chief of the magazine Al-῾Arabī in 1958. He retired from this office at the end of the 1970s.


8. ῆ Abd al-Raḥmān Yaḡḥī, Ḥayāt al-adāb al-fīlasīṭīn al-ḥadīth min awsal al-nahḍa ḥattā al-nakba (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Tijārī lil-Tibā’a wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī’, 1968), 519. The book is based on the doctoral dissertation the author wrote at the University of Cairo under Dr. Suhayr al-Qalamāwī in the Department of Arabic Language there.


12. Qanāžī’, “Qirā’a jadīda,” 128 and 130, respectively.

13. Ṭāhā Ḥussein (=Ḥusayn) (1889–1973) was one of Egypt’s greatest cultural icons in the first half of the twentieth century. A writer, professor at the Egyptian University in Cairo, intellectual, and controversial political and cultural leader, he is mostly remembered today for three of the many books he published in his lifetime. His first famous book, *Fī al-shīr al-jāhilī* (On Pre-Islamic Poetry) from 1926, was his most controversial. In it he raised some questions regarding the period of early Arabic poetry, which is understood to be pre-Islamic. It cost Ṭāhā Hussein his job at the university and brought about calls for his trial and imprisonment. His most famous oeuvre is his autobiography, *Al-Ayyām* (The Days), which was first published serially in *Al-Hilāl* and then in book form in 1929. Considered to be one of the most beautiful literary works of modern Arabic literature, it is written in a haunting lyrical style. In it Hussein describes in sarcastic pathos his experiences growing up blind in a poor Upper Egypt village without modern amenities and general education, and then his rise to academic achievements, stardom, and fame. He proceeded to write a book on the future of education in Egypt in 1938, and managed to be appointed Egypt’s minister of education in 1950 in the ill-fated government of Muṣṭafā al-Nahḥās, which resigned after a period of riots in 1952, ushering the rise to power of the Free Officers and President Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir.


16. Ibid.


22. Ibid., 303.

23. Qanāžī’, “Qirā’a jadīda,” 120.


26. Miqveh Yisrael, an agricultural school located near Jaffa, was operating at the time under the French-Jewish organization Alliance Israélite Universelle.
It was established through this organization in 1869–70 by Karl Netter, a French Jewish philanthropist, writer, and Zionist activist who was the first to be influenced by the efforts and agitation of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer for the return of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael. The school trained its students in scientific methods of farming and was involved in the Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine. Karl Netter died in 1882 during his last visit to Palestine and was buried on the grounds of the school.


31. Ibid., 232.


37. Ibid., 120.
Space has a broad semantic meaning that makes it difficult to present an exhausting definition. Nonetheless, it is clear that it is a basic dimension of existence and dictates the way in which we identify and understand reality and our position within reality.\(^1\) Space receives the meaning afforded by the people who are active within it. Without people and their activities, it is impossible to discern space, and without them, it is meaningless.\(^2\)

Space is shaped as part of the structuring of social power relations, in which one party causes others to act in order to achieve a desirable goal. The image of space and its symbolic essence are an essential part of each party’s material essence, and it is an object for the hegemonic group’s ideological activity.\(^3\) Foucault claims that the bureaucratic encoding of everyday spaces, according to which every person and every event has a proper place, turns space into an ethical and hierarchical indicator of events and the people who take part in these events. Practical and
symbolic encoding of the space controls our life via routine uses of binary metaphors, such as north-south, near-far, east-west. The foundation of these metaphors is the border between the center and the periphery and between “us” and “others,” and signifies inclusion and exclusion.4

A. B. Yehoshua is a master of the threads that are melted into plots, figures, and spaces, which create a focus for interpreting his philosophical understanding of “the life of the tribe.” His plots contain a repetition of the “conceptual theme,” a repetition that is as essential as a genetic code that generates these effects. This is a repetition of the “logical fatality” that binds small social mechanisms (man, woman, nuclear family, extended family) with large social mechanisms (tribe, nation, and national history).5

In his works Yehoshua repeatedly relates the “life of the tribe” using defamiliarization, which is a literary means that alienates a theme in order to emphasize it. Defamiliarization is found not only in the presentation of grotesque, realistic, and other figures but also in the descriptions of place, space, and time. Yehoshua uses strange combinations of background materials and condenses them. This is how an experience of space that is Paradise and that includes the dark side of Hell is created in some of his stories. Space becomes demonic in these descriptions of Paradise and is characterized by a distorted and demonic carnival atmosphere.

Yehoshua’s diverse works reflect social, political, and cultural issues that pertain to past and present Jewish-Muslim relations in the given space. His direct and indirect references to these issues are found in many of his works: Facing the Forests, The Lover, and “The Last Night.”6 They also appear in The Liberated Bride and Mr. Mani and indirectly in A Journey to the End of the Millennium and The Mission of the Human Resource Man.7

In these works Yehoshua refers to the question of a common destiny and the bond between the two peoples. An intimacy between the Jewish hero and the Arab hero exists in the novel Facing the Forests. In The Lover and A Journey to the End of the Millennium, Yehoshua presents the bond between the Jew and the Arab as a closeness that sometimes exceeds the bond between the Israeli and a Jew from the Diaspora. Nonetheless, in The Liberated Bride he emphasizes the need for separation between the two peoples, which stems, in his opinion, from the demonic situation of being possessed. In this situation each party is pulled to the other side and sometimes pays with its life.
Yehoshua is a political writer, and his worldview crystallizes in his books into a clear and concrete outlook, with the borderless Israeli zone at its center. Disputing and neurotic figures move within this zone in a continuous journey. Some are accompanied by an escort who is also a driver, a messenger—a demon who leads them into a parallel land, a parallel space, and an existence that has a grotesque and distorted decor.

He connects the individual’s neurotic existence with that of the people and applies the principle of “life on the brink” and “on the brink of catastrophe” in his stories. In Yehoshua’s work the space is found at the center of the Israeli’s awareness. He enters and leaves the space as someone possessed. His wanderings exaggerate his disturbed mental condition and his rejection of the idea of being a child of the land and its master.

Gurevits and Eran also point to the Israeli’s reluctance to be totally involved in the land. In their opinion, the Israeli existence does not connect the Israeli with his country. On the one hand, the place is the country and everywhere else is “the other place,” and on the other hand, the place, in the thoughts and beliefs of the Jewish people, is outside of the place and is not identical with the land. The Israeli place is depicted as a site of ambivalence, of belonging and alienation, of being close and distant, of lowering and raising, of freedom and commitment, of realization and abstraction.

In his essay “Exile as Neurotic Solution,” Yehoshua claims:

With us, the elementary and primary relation between a people and its homeland is not natural. We were melted as a people in exile, and exile as our melting pot has penetrated into the cells of our existence. The special relations that were formed between the people and God begin in the desert, in a no-man’s land, in the intermediary zone between the exile and Israel. We will see how the people always return and search for this no-man’s land throughout its history, and especially when it wants to find an answer or seeks spiritual renewal.

According to Yehoshua, the Jew carries two essences within him: one of leaving Israel and one of coming to Israel and settling there. The nation revives in the desert, which is a place of death, but is also sterile and pure. However, the renewal of the people in its land is dependent on a conquest that has a spiritual meaning. According to Yehoshua, the desert
experience exists in the soul of the people, and they are therefore afraid to enter the land. This fear of the space, which must be protected and conquered, does not enable them to maintain a moral existence, because another people exist in this space.

However, in his essay “Between Right and Right” Yehoshua claims that the full moral right to conquer part of Israel or any other country by force is not a historic right but the right of the troubled existence. The ongoing conflict between the Muslims and the Jews in Israel has created a feeling of suffocation, creating claustrophobia that motivates the heroes of his works in space.

Yehoshua’s heroes refer to different regions of Israel with an attitude of closeness, intimacy, and longing on the one hand, and rejection, fear, and even disgust on the other hand. However, the heroes of his works are also drawn to the fear and disgust that invade the forbidden places, yearning to “know them.” His heroes must know the place, as expressed by the hero in The Liberated Bride who adamantly claims that his job is to know.

The places that serve as a background for Yehoshua’s stories are part of the mother archetypes—the earth. According to his worldview, the mother is given by the father—God—to the people, and the son must be very careful of its honor and sanctity. This situation heightened the fear of the land because it turned from mother to wife (the father’s wife), and therefore any careless contact without the father’s permission turns into incest.

This attitude toward the zone pulls the heroes to journeys that include elements of incest, such as in The Liberated Bride, where incestuous relations between a father and his daughter take place in a guest house in Jerusalem, and the Arab watchman is aware of this and protects the second daughter from her father. This incest is a symbol of the desecration of the land.

In his stories, Yehoshua presents figures that deviate from the accepted Zionist norms: the student in Facing the Forests, who sets fire to a forest, or Gabriel, who defects from the Israeli Defense Forces, and the daughter of the car mechanic who finds love in the arms of an Arab car mechanic in The Lover. These are neurotic and detached figures, who move in a journey “in air” over archetypical spaces, where the entire space cultivates a different code of existence.
The Experience of Jerusalem Space

The main space in Yehoshua’s works is the space of the city of Jerusalem. Already in the novel *Three Days and a Child*, Jerusalem is described as “a hard city, sometimes very hard. Its modesty, its softness which is not softness, is not to be believed.” According to Gurevits and Eran, Jerusalem is like a small, jealous, violent, crude, and even crazy island. The city is not assimilated into Israeliness. In it the Israeli swings between Judaism, which is not native, and nativity, which is not his.

Such also is Yehoshua’s Jerusalem. It is mentioned in *The Lover* (386), where the hero is described as someone who “shakes from the intensity of its harsh beauty,” although the city “appeared dirty, neglected.” And in *Mr. Mani*, all roads lead to Jerusalem. In this novel of conversations, the city is described in different periods. In the third conversation, which occurred in Crete in 1918, a Jewish British soldier, Colonel Horowitz, describes the city to his commander: “The city itself, sir, is small and pitiable . . . absolutely boring. The population is very heterogeneous, a great mixture of small and closed communities, poverty and ignorance on the one hand, and messianic arrogance on the other hand” (*Mr. Mani*, 152).

Descriptions that border on the grotesque and the delusional are found alongside the realistic descriptions of the city. The space is described as a demonic zone or a zone with a tendency toward demonism. In the first conversation (1982), the woman Yael from kibbutz Mashabei Sade describes Jerusalem as a freezing place where she feels she is sinking. She refers to Emek Refaim (the valley of the ghosts) neighborhood and claims that only those who live in Jerusalem do not mind living in a neighborhood with such a name and compares them with those who live in Tel-Aviv who would have rebelled against such a name (30).

In the fifth conversation, which took place in 1848, Avraham Mani talks about his son Joseph, who was murdered in the alleys of the city, and says, “This is what Joseph taught me, that everything connects in this city and there are no barriers . . . and it is possible to go from one house to another without going into the alley” (321). He describes the city as having mazes and cellars, ascending and descending slopes that enable going into and out of one world to another. Joseph melts borders and develops a worldview that costs him his life. According to this worldview, “there must be a connection between all people in Jerusalem” (325). He decides to tell the “others”—the Muslims—that they are “Jews who
do not yet know that they are Jews” (323). The name “others” creates demonic associations, and indeed these “others” who do not accept his opinion turn out to be demonic murderers who refuse to turn into “hy-brid creatures” lacking a clear identity.18

The atmosphere is also delusional in “The Last Night.” The main figure in this story is a dog, Horatio, who is a literary theoretician and the image of the author. This dog observes Jerusalem and the “collective rabble awareness that bursts out of boundaries,” which is also expressed in the novel Mr. Mani.19 The dog has a monologue in which he describes his travels in Jerusalem with a stray female dog. They recognize the city by “the stone walls, the billboards . . . the smell in the air, this coolness” (222). The dog also describes the city as “a fateful city that is converged in a limited and bisected area” (223), where in his opinion “here is a fright-en ing, obligating collective essence” (224).

In his wanderings he stands in dim doorways, inhaling the smells of the “national depths” and the “smell of the fear of history” (226). In the alleys of Meah Shearim he is frightened by the sight of burning garbage cans and calls the city “crazy” (227). He asks: “This Jerusalem, how can one be rid of it, a real trap?” and he wants to escape from the city, claiming: “No monologue will grow here, only a dark lamentation” (227). When he reaches Tel-Aviv, he declares, “This is my home” (228). Tel-Aviv is perceived by Yehoshua as a city with clear borders and as completely Israeli.20

The motto of the second chapter in A Late Divorce can shed light on the roles of space in Yehoshua’s works. “The things fall apart. The center is falling apart. Anarchy is wrapped around the world” (39). Space in Yehoshua’s work is a space without clear borders, a space in which there are uncontrolled wanderings in and out. The absence of control creates a carnival-like atmosphere, and already in “The Last Night” the dog takes a “carnival-like walk.”

According to Bakhtin, a syncretic process is created in the carnival, which is characterized by the blurring of social boundaries.21 The social-hierarchical inequality is temporarily abolished. Absolute order turns into relative order in the carnival, thanks to the laughter, and a new modus of interrelations between the self and the other is created. The eccentric carnival outlook is based on a passion for exchange and change. Usurpation of the usual and the accepted and life that has deviated from its normal course have turned into “an upside-down world.” Jerusalem,
in the dog’s eyes, is an upside-down world. It turns from a holy city into a fatalistic, crazy, and demonic city in which literature determines history and life has deviated from its normal course.

Yehoshua’s attitude toward Jerusalem is expressed in interviews. As he sees his birthplace, Jerusalem is a meaningful symbol and metaphor. In his opinion, a “dimension of fear” exists in Jerusalem, and it “appears in all of my works. . . . This is a strong source that supplies me with energy. When I touch Jerusalem I immediately know where I am. I accept its symbolism. I receive such a concentrated dose of its energy, its mysticism, and all in a dose that I need. . . . But if I were still living there it would have crushed me.” Jerusalem can, in his opinion, be maintained as a concept in the Jewish imagination, in the Diaspora, without also referring to it physically.22

In Yehoshua’s opinion, the unification of Jerusalem did not benefit the Land of Israel, and the Land of Israel of Jerusalem today is mainly the “Palestinian territories.” With the unification of the city he felt that “we are getting mixed up in something that is connected to very deep myths related to different peoples and different religions.”23 Therefore, “It was time to depart the magic of Jerusalem and set out” (The Liberated Bride, 50).

The Lost Paradise

Eliade claims that by nostalgia for Paradise we want always to be in the heart of the world of reality. This is a yearning for lofty forms, for sacred space. In his opinion, each person has a wish for Paradise, which is actually a yearning for eternity. This yearning proves that man believes that such a Paradise can be achieved here, on earth, and in this time.24 In describing such a Paradise, Yehoshua creates a grotesque experience and proves that every Paradise also has a lower compartment.

The peak of this experience of describing Jerusalem is reached by Yehoshua in The Liberated Bride. In this work Yehoshua describes the figure of a scholar of Middle Eastern culture investigating the reason for his son’s divorce from his daughter-in-law, whose family runs a guest house in Jerusalem. The scholar’s wanderings across the spaces of the Galilee, Haifa, the West Bank, Lod (Ben-Gurion) airport, and Jerusalem illustrate his search for the lost Paradise. His wanderings are, to a large extent, wanderings into a parallel, demonic world. The scholar reaches the guest
house in Jerusalem, in whose cellar his son discovered incest between his father-in-law and sister-in-law. When the son reveals this secret to his wife, Galia, he is thrown out of the guest house. In this novel, Jerusalem is a city laden with symbols. The guest house is a microcosm of the Israeli experience and Israeli space. It is the antithesis of the heavenly Paradise. This Paradise contains contradictory aspects. On the one hand, there is the need to know and as a consequence to pay the price and abandon Paradise. On the other hand, there is the need to cope with yearning for it and to accept the knowledge that Paradise cannot be achieved in Jerusalem in this time.

The Middle Eastern scholar who journeys to Jerusalem wants to free himself of the yearning for Paradise by repeatedly entering it. He is accompanied on his journeys to and from Jerusalem by Rashad, his Arab driver, who is described as a “driver or guide” and “the haunt of the haunt” (Liberated Bride 553), and Fuad, the Arab watchman, who holds the keys to the archives and is called the “future partner and guardian of the secret” (548). Both lead him in a borderless space. They are experts at breaching borders, and the wandering Israeli is reflected in their eyes as a sick creature. As Fuad says: “You Jews are always coming and going. It will make you sick in the end” (283).

Gurevits and Eran also describe a restless attitude toward local space. The Israeli always moves on the way to the place. He is never found inside. His attitude toward Israel is characterized by restlessness that stems from the absence of a complete identity between him and his land. The native is always planted in place. He is born in it and is bound to it. An overlapping exists between the place in its physical sense and the place as a world of meanings, language, memory, and belief. However, Yehoshua’s Israeli has no such naturalness, but rather a feeling of basic alienation, because of the disconnection between the Jewish and the Israeli identity.

As indicated, Yehoshua places the demonic relations between Jews and Arabs and the question of the bond and their common fate at the center of his works. There is intimacy between the Jewish hero and the Arab hero in the novel Facing the Forests. In The Lover and A Journey to the End of the Millennium, Yehoshua presents the bond between the Jew and the Arab as a closeness that sometimes exceeds the one between the Israeli and the Jew from the Diaspora. Nonetheless, in The Liberated Bride he emphasizes the need for separation between the two peoples that stems,
in his opinion, from a demonic situation of being possessed. In this situation, each side is drawn toward the other.

The “other” supplies the characteristic necessary to identify the collective “self” and is found on the social border, beyond it or near it, for example, the ethnic minority or the person who believes in another religion. Being in a status of “on the border” turns the other into a natural target for hatred. The otherness confronts us with the question of borders. The border closes any identity inside its borders and enables it to construct a world of “me” and “us” versus “them.” Identity simultaneously contains positive and negative components, inclusion and exclusion.29

In Yehoshua’s work, the heroes blur, cross into one another’s space, and thus break the law. The orientalist is enchanted by the possibility of crossing borders30 and wandering from Galilee to Jenin, to the West Bank, and to Jerusalem, where he discovers sickness, rot, and mediocrity.

A study of Yehoshua’s works reveals that the subject of blurred borders is a repeated motif.31 The hero crosses borders already in his early work *Facing the Forests* (published in 1963). His house is open to the forest on one side, symbolizing the absence of borders. Later the hero causes a disturbance of law and order and sets fire to the forest. Yehoshua believes in clear identities and in clear border lines between them. He is afraid of the Jews’ partial identity and their ability to “penetrate into the life fabric of others without borders and without taking responsibility.” In his opinion, “going out beyond the border (in the manner of the settlers) is a Jewish phenomenon . . . because Jews do not want borders. Jews want everything to be open, so that it will be possible to go from here to there, so that it will not be defined, and therefore . . . disengagement is the need to become free of our obsession for other peoples and to return and converge in our territory.”32

The restlessness of Yehoshua’s heroes in the geographic space intensifies the sense of their being mentally stuck. Crossing personal borders involves crossing national borders, where a desperate attempt to find cause and effect for what is happening in the world exists at both levels.33 All of his main figures are in the image of the dog Horatio, who is tied to a cut-off chain, peeks into emotionally charged places, gets hurt, and wants to return home to Haifa. Yehoshua places Haifa, from which the orientalist goes out on his wanderings in *The Liberated Bride*, as an antithesis to Jerusalem. Haifa, according to Yehoshua, is “an accessible
city, very present... that easily connects to the landscapes of the Galilee and the valleys.”

Haifa is Yehoshua’s place of residence, and in his eyes it is an island of sanity in which he is able to work and maintain a normal life with the city’s Arabs. In one interview, Yehoshua claims that the good and high-quality Israeli heterogeneity is embodied in Haifa. The ideal of the entire country exists there. If Jerusalem is the lost Paradise in which incest and other sicknesses exist, and it is exposed in all its ugliness, Haifa is a “healthy” city.

Yehoshua’s attitude toward the Arabs of Israel is space-dependent. In Haifa, harmonious relations exist, but in Jerusalem, the Jewish-Arab relations are demonic. Yehoshua says the following about this duality: “The Arabs of Israel are part of my identity. They are a component within the identity of this country; therefore, I feel human warmth toward them and even a kind of intimacy out of which I can sometimes say harsh things about them... They are not total strangers even when they are enemies. And the appearance of the Arabs in my books is always easy and luring.”

The Galilee in Yehoshua’s writing is a different Paradise. This space is an autonomy in which the Arabs created a Paradise for themselves. The orientalist who attends the wedding of his student Samhar is invited into a space in which the Arabs are the majority and the Israelis are the visiting minority. Rauda, sister of Rashad, the orientalist’s driver, wants to return to this Paradise. Rauda, who was born in the Galilee, is married to an Arab from the occupied territories. She is allowed the “right of return,” but her children are not. Her son, who crosses the border, is sought by hunters who think that he is a hybrid creature, perhaps a cat, perhaps a lamb. Yehoshua thinks that these hybrid children are a symbol and a warning for the existence of Israeli Palestinian Arabs, whose identity problem may create a demonic predator.

In the occupied territories, in Jenin, a nun sings the song of the lost Paradise. This is the heavenly Paradise expressed through art. This nun sings her song also in a place called “Beit al Sakakini” in Ramallah. The Arabs perform the play The Dybbuk as a parody in this house, according to their interpretation. They sing songs from the times of ignorance, the jahiliyya, before the time of Islam, which emphasize the need for separation between the two peoples. In spite of the idea expressed in one of the
songs, according to which “Thy soul merges with mine as with fragrant musk, amber” (436), this mix is dangerous. Therefore, one should disengage from it before the “knives” (sakakin) are expressed in Jenin and Paradise turns into a demon.

The places mentioned as Paradise also have a demonic potential—the Galilee, including Haifa, which is seemingly a harmonious city. The concept that any space may have two faces is expressed by the orientalist’s mother in her visit to Haifa: “You’ve made yourselves a little Paradise, but what will you do when some wild beast comes charging out of it?” (Librated Bride, 276). This idea, that each Paradise has an animalistic potential, also appears in the description of the guest house’s cellar, which has a “chimney that was rammed into the ceiling like the tooth of an ancient, petrified mammoth” (503). The church in the West Bank, which can only be entered by passing through the cellar behind it, serves as another Paradise.

The idea that one must pass through various compartments, such as a cave or a cellar, in order to reach Paradise is already found in an ancient rabbinic legend. According to this legend, there are seven Paradises, with the first being the Cave of Makhpelah. The soul is supposed to pass through six Paradises before it arrives, if it is worthy, in the seventh Paradise.

According to this legend, if a person manages to pass the first Paradise, he reaches the second, where angels and servants feed him. The earthly Paradise of the guest house in The Liberated Bride is characterized, similarly to the legend, by servants who feed the orientalist. According to the nun in The Liberated Bride, the heavenly Paradise expressed in her song is not intended for the Jews who robbed an earthly Paradise for themselves. As the abona (priest) in this work says: “Such is the song of Paradise, sometimes it’s in Arabic sometimes in Greek, Inshallah, the day will come when you Jews, too, if only show some magnanimity will sing in Hebrew” (227).

Demonological Folk Infrastructures

The descriptions of the demonic zone and the demonic relations between the two peoples in Yehoshua’s writings draw their ideas from demonological stories from the Middle Ages. These stories deal with the theme of marriage between a man and a she-demon and their lives in demonic
zones, such as “A Jerusalem Tale,” “The Ring,” “The Kiss,” and “The Goldsmith and His Two Wives.”

In “The Kiss,” a man meets a demon in the forest who leads him into a parallel world. There he is forced to marry a she-demon. When he is allowed to return to his home, he is forced to promise to return at a particular time. When he does not fulfill this command, he is killed with a kiss by the she-demon. In “The Goldsmith and His Two Wives,” demons live in the cellar where a dead man is found. When the rabbis ask the demons to vacate the house, they claim that their father was married to two women, one human and the other a she-demon. When their she-demon mother died, their father bequeathed the cellar of the house to them. According to this version, the two women lived under one roof.

In “The Ring,” an engaged lad is led to a castle by a demonic figure and there is forced to marry another woman whom he only hears. Upon his marriage, the woman and the castle disappear. This version opens with the idea of the parallel worlds: “The kingdom of Satan is measure for measure and scope for scope as the kingdom of man.” The essence of these stories is in the journeys taken by the people. They find themselves in a parallel land of demons, which leads them to their death or mutism. They disappear into a place whose borders are unclear, which is a kind of lost Paradise that turns out to be a demonic zone, or they live in a space that serves as a Paradise with a lower compartment, and sometimes they even bequeath it to their offspring.

Yehoshua’s novel Facing the Forests contains motifs of the demonological folk stories of the Middle Ages. Yehoshua refers to the demonic space of the “other”—the “forest”—which comprises a microcosmos for Israeli reality. The hero is a Jewish forest keeper who meets an old Arab whose tongue has been cut out in the forest. The Arab wishes to expose his Paradise, which is his lost village, under the covered space of the forest. The fire that will be kindled in the forest is inevitable, and in an absurd manner the Arab gets the idea for setting the fire from the Jew. There is a three-walled house in the forest, exposed to the landscape and to the space. There is no clear inside and outside, only what is on the surface and what is hidden underneath.

In Facing the Forests, a Jew also finds himself in a forest, where he meets an Arab whom he perceives as a demon. The laws are broken in the forest when he is joined by a woman with whom he has relations characteristic of relations with a she-demon. This woman is described as someone who
turns into a “shadow” in the darkness and “the forest bewitches her” (119). Contrary to the demonological stories, in which the man leaves the land of the demons and the forest and returns to his home, it is the woman who abandons the forest and enters the world outside the forest. Similarly to the demonological stories, the Arab in this story accompanies the hero into the land of the demons. However, the situation can also be viewed the other way around, with the figure of the demon being interchanged between the Jew and the Arab.

Yehoshua claims that “we have a tendency to drive the non-Jews crazy. By delving deep into the identities of other peoples, we threaten them. . . . Our lack of clarity and our invasiveness scare them and lead to these sick interactions between us and them.” In Yehoshua’s works, space is divided into areas in which the figures move in and out of their circles or up and down in forced journeys from the focus to a delusional space and cross borders. They search for the areas of pain above and below the surface, and at the end of the process they discharge themselves or are discharged out of the circle against their will.

In *A Journey to the End of the Millennium*, Yehoshua integrated the figure of an Arab partner, Abu Lufti, into the story’s web. Abu Lufti leads his partner, Ben Atar, through the forests of Europe into a parallel land of demons called Worms. In this land Ben Atar is banned because he does not maintain clear borders and does not observe the laws and also because of his uncontrollable passion to enter the other’s space.

Yehoshua’s figures are drawn to the forbidden, and sometimes they pay for this with their lives, as does Joseph ben Avraham in *Mr. Mani*, who wanted to convert the others to Judaism and was murdered. However, there are also heroes who are directed by figures who lead them to their oblivion in a parallel world dominated by demons, such as Rashad in *The Liberated Bride*. Rashad is described in this work as occupying the lower compartment of Paradise: “Protean driver, messenger, brother, cousin, uncle, displaced citizen, and dybbuk for a day” (503). This description is indeed a surrealist description of something part human, part demon.

According to Yehoshua’s worldview, release is embedded in the need to place borders, to unite within your community, to return from the north to the south, to come up from the cellars and to return to the land that will solve the distress of existence. However, because of the heroes’ inability to live in the given space, they choose an alternative space.
This is the Ben-Gurion Airport, where the real sexuality of the Jews’ state bustles: “Here, and here alone . . . was the erotic epicenter of the Jewish state. The Jewish heart might throb in Jerusalem and the Jewish brain might grow sharp or soft in Tel-Aviv, but the passionate focus of Israeli life was here” (285).

The question of the demonic zone also arises in the novel *The Mission of the Human Resource Man* (2004), but in another and surprising form. The heroine is a foreign worker who was killed in a terrorist attack in Jerusalem. The Arab responsible for the explosion is not a focus in the work but exists in the background in terms of the realization of the potential of the demon in *The Liberated Bride* and of a situation that is the result of the absence of borders. In this book Yehoshua claims, “I tried to return the spiritual significance of Jerusalem by means of the foreign and beautiful woman. Suddenly I noticed that Jerusalem became tattered in the Jewish-Arab conflict and we as well as the Palestinians are completely losing its global spiritual dimension.” The solution for Jerusalem is, in his opinion, to upgrade it to some kind of spiritual level. According to him, this book expresses the passion of all of our sufferings.

In a demonological novel of the Middle Ages, *Ma῾ase Yerushalmi* (A Jerusalem tale), a father warns his son not to go on voyages by sea. But the son does not heed the father’s advice and runs into danger of death in the land of the demons. Similarly, in *The Mission of the Human Resource Man*, Yehoshua tells of a mother who wants to return her murdered daughter’s body to Jerusalem so that she will also have the right to cross the borders into the land that is like a Paradise that will receive her, but it is also a demonic zone in which her daughter was murdered. The wanderings into other spaces, such as Russia or Jerusalem, are to a great extent wanderings into a parallel land. The heroine finds herself in an alienated demonic zone and a dangerous land of demons, which causes her death. However, the human resource man also finds himself in a delusional Russian space.

**Conclusion**

Yehoshua perceives space as the foundation of the world and as a starting point for any orientation. According to this approach, the place is the basis of the identity, where the individual connects to the world and through the world to himself. Two peoples, Jews and Arabs, live in the
Israeli space, which is the basis for the Israeli’s identity. In this space the borders are breached, the laws are broken, and a “disturbed internalness” bursts out. In this space, the cultural forms are in a constant process of hybridization originating in cultural variance and interpretation. With Yehoshua, this hybridization creates a demonic web encompassing heroes and space.

If we were to draw the desired geographical map versus the existing map to which Yehoshua directs his worldview, and we labeled it with a colorful legend, we would obtain a map in which space consists of clear borders. The non-united Jerusalem that existed until 1967 was a kind of Paradise painted in colors of tranquility, perhaps pink, and its other part in a spiritual color that expresses the lack of its physical belonging to its inhabitants, and that it is only a spiritual element that exists over the surface, a kind of Jerusalem in the heart or a divine Jerusalem. However, this map, which may perhaps have three dimensions, would have cellars that are to be avoided even if there is a tunnel or detour that leads into them. These cellars are located under the areas of the West Bank and under unified Jerusalem. In contradistinction, the colors of the map for the north, the Galilee and Haifa, would be chosen from harmonious green colors.

It is possible to draw another map in which all the colors are mixed together, and one color sometimes dominates the others, like tiny spots or bold strokes of the paintbrush. This map will be suitable not as a geographic map but as a surreal and terrifying map. It is definitely a map that should be made known, as are Yehoshua’s stories, which contain physical and spiritual journeys. These journeys take place in a space that is a Paradise, in both its lower and upper compartments.

Notes

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4. M. Foucault, “Questions on Geography,” in Power/Knowledge (New York:
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11. “Between Right and Right,” 78.


13. The Liberated Bride, 229. In the Bible the verb “to know” also has a sexual connotation. See, for example, Genesis 4:1.


15. These figures are analogous to the figure of “the tale of the floating French baby” from the allegorical Algerian fairytale which the Arab student from the Galilee translates for the orientalist. This neglected, orphaned French baby is adopted by a Muslim woman who throws it in the air from a moving train and it floats, laughing, in the wind (The Liberated Bride, 179–81).


20. According to Gurevits and Eran, “On the Place,” 40–44, in Jerusalem the Israeli swings between Judaism that is not native and nativity that is not his own. Tel-Aviv, on the other hand, is free of confusion because it is entirely Israeli.


25. The name Galia refers to an earlier story, “Galia’s Wedding,” in which motifs of searching for the bride and the deportation from Paradise appear, as well as the motive of the possessed. In this story there is a demonic journey into a parallel world from which the hero is cast out of his Paradise. See “Galia’s Wedding,” in A. B. Yehoshua, *Until Winter 1974* (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1975), 45 (Hebrew).


27. This work contains another character, Yoel, who left Israel and claims that “Israeliness should be liberated from its locality and be given wings . . . to try and extract something more spiritual out of it towards the world.” *Liberated Bride*, 469.


31. For example, the hero of Yehoshua’s *Molcho* (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1987) melts borders and tries to disrupt law and order. Many other figures in Yehoshua’s works act in this manner.


36. Yehoshua draws his attitude toward the Arabs from his father, who was an orientalist and a teacher of Arabic and wrote books about them. See ibid., 26–28.

37. Yehoshua begins the chapter that deals in the hunters with a motto by Kafka: “I have a strange pet, half kitten, half lamb. It’s a hand-me-down from my father, but only now has it begun to grow from Kafka.” *The Liberated Bride*, 520.
38. The name of this city, Jenin, reverberates with opposites. Janna means Paradise, and Jinnie means demon.

39. Sakakin in Arabic is the plural of the word knife and is also the name of a person in Islamic history, Khalil al-Sakakini (Sakakini means “knife-maker”).


41. This cellar is also called “aggregating pot” and is the home of Rashad’s sister, Rauda, who wants to return to her home in the Galilee.


43. On the earthly and heavenly Paradise, see Hop, “A Look into the Sick Root of Paradise.”

44. The theme of marriage to a creature who appears to be a woman but is actually a she-demon has been used since the days of the Talmud and the consolidation of the rabbinic literature. The Hebrew formulations of the story evolved in the Orient and in the West and even developed into a novel, Ma’ase Yerushalmi. See N. Abarbanel, Eve and Lillit (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1994), 47–70 (Hebrew); C. Saranga and R. Sharaby, “Expression of Otherness in the Works of A. B. Yehoshua,” Alpayim 34 (2009).


47. See Saranga and Sharaby, “Expression of Otherness.”

48. In an interview, Yehoshua claimed that Jerusalem is too symbolic. Its level is burdensome for him, and people such as Berl Katznelson understood that it had something that threatens the Zionist enterprise and they recoiled from it. Golani, “The Conversation,” 190; Shavit, “Yehoshua’s Passion,” 26.

49. Shavit, “Yehoshua’s Passion.”


Are there possibilities for religiously based intercultural dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians as a means to effect perception moderation and conflict resolution? Citing both qualitative and quantitative survey data of Israelis and Palestinians, along with Jews and Arabs within the state of Israel, who have been involved in dialogue, our study suggests that, contrary to accepted assumptions, religion can, in fact, help to moderate mutual perceptions and serve to potentially facilitate constructive mutual accommodations.¹

Integrating macro-level political science approaches including federalist thinking as articulated by Daniel J. Elazar, along with micro-level social psychological analysis, I argue that religiously based intercultural dialogue can help modify mutual Israeli-Palestinian perceptions as the sides discover similarities between Islam and Judaism that can serve as a basis for constructive intergroup encounters and relationship building. Further, it has the potential to foster understanding on the macro level aimed at clarifying deeper narratives that are fundamentally based on religious worldviews but that at the same time offer a perspective and possibility of “transcendent” contact as some narrative reformulation takes place on both sides along with the possibility of developing elements of a constructive vision for the “Holy Land.”
This chapter explores the relevance of religiously based conflict resolution efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of the developing area of religion and conflict management. The work will draw primarily upon research and field efforts undertaken between 1994 and September 2000. The goal will be to analyze micro processes and extrapolate these dynamics toward macro processes including federal approaches to dialogue in the Middle East.

**Religion and Conflict Management**

The post–cold war world has seen a proliferation of ethnic conflicts as documented in the literature and even the possible contours of intercivilization conflict, as advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, which is deeply related to the assertion of cultural identity, an assertion connected, particularly in the Middle East, to religious foundations. Indeed, in a broader way Robert J. Fisher has identified the centrality of cultural identity “as reflecting the unique heritage and way of life of the people that is contrasted with other cultures.” Clifford Geertz has emphasized the importance of religion to society, and Huntington points to the critical link between culture, religion, and civilization.

In underscoring the centrality of religion to culture in the Middle East, it is important to recall that religious traditions explicitly or implicitly underlie the collective ways of life and values of both Arabs and Jews, even for many who may not follow strict religious observance in their personal lives. Indeed, it is my assumption that religious culture is the direct or at least implicit foundation of national identities among Arabs and Jews in the Middle East in general and the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

Given the centrality of religion to identity and conflict in the Middle East, it is vital to connect the role of religion in peacemaking in a variety of ethno-national conflict venues, which is achieving scholarly recognition only fairly recently. Indeed, work in this area has pointed to the potential of religion to serve as an exacerbating as well as a moderating influence on the attitudes of parties involved in intense interethnic conflict. The key question to be addressed here is how religion can serve as a factor contributing to the moderation of conflict as opposed to its escalation.
Empirical Results and Processes

The hypothesis of research conducted by our teams of researchers is that culture, which is substantially rooted in religion, can be a basis for improving perceptions between Israelis and Palestinians in the context of efforts to moderate the conflict. Several projects were conducted and/or evaluated by these teams, with summaries of processes and results now offered.

In 1994, a group of Palestinian students from the Hebron area and I co-initiated a series of dialogues with Israeli students from Bar-Ilan University. These meetings continued until the start of acute Israeli-Palestinian violence in the fall of 2000 and focused on commonalities between Islam and Judaism. They eventually led to spin-off cooperative efforts, facilitated by the leading partners of the dialogue themselves. Participants reported on a warm atmosphere in these face-to-face meetings and attributed that achievement to the discovery of commonalities in the other’s religious culture.

Specifically, it should be noted that approximately ninety students on each side were at some point directly involved in the process. The activity led to the participation and graduation of a Palestinian student from the Beit Ommar village, in proximity to northern Hebron, from Bar-Ilan University’s International Program in Business Administration. Similarly, it facilitated the participation and graduation of another Palestinian student in the Peace Studies Program at Notre Dame University.

Strong friendships developed between the principal organizers, as they responded to each other during illness and joy and expressed condemnation and condolences to each other in the wake of violent events on either side, even during the period of acute Israeli-Palestinian hostilities.

As the Bar-Ilan–Hebron dialogue began as an ad hoc effort under difficult circumstances, no hard quantitative data was collected to measure perception changes among the participants, although a more thorough description of the process and interactions has appeared elsewhere.

However, together with Chaim Lavie, who reported on the impact of an Israeli-Palestinian interreligious dialogue held in Gaza in February 1999, I have been able to provide quantitative data. In this weekend (Sabbath) encounter in which approximately eighty participants on each side participated, Jewish and Muslim prayer rituals were discussed, the
services of both religions were conducted, and the religious dietary requirements of the Jewish guests were respected. Israelis and Palestinians were asked to fill out questionnaires reflecting their mutual perceptions, both before and after the encounter.

According to research compiled, there is a potential for the interreligious encounter to change mutual perceptions in a more positive direction. Based on sample control data collected among both Israeli Jewish students at Bar-Ilan University and Palestinian Arab students at several Palestinian universities, it was found that religious students on both sides held the most negative preconceptions of each other. However, data collected from the participants at the Gaza encounter (admittedly a small sample based on a single encounter) indicated that perceptions among Palestinian Muslim participants shifted to a more favorable position than any other subgroup among the Palestinian participants.\(^{11}\)

These quantitative findings added further credence to the anecdotal evidence offered by Mollov and Musa Barhoum,\(^{12}\) in regard to the dialogue initiated by them, which involved students from Bar-Ilan University and Palestinian students from the Hebron area. Dialogue, religion, and similarities in structure and practices between Islam and Judaism became a constructive basis for interactions and relationships as students began to perceive something important and familiar in the other side.

The Bar-Ilan–Hebron dialogue underwent a number of phases. Face-to-face dialogues continued regularly from January 1995 until mid-1997 and involved approximately ninety students on each side. Important spin-offs also laid the groundwork for a computer mediated dialogue (CMC) to take place.

**A First CMC Dialogue**

Facilitated by the application, admission, and participation of a Palestinian student from the village of Beit Ommar (from the northern Hebron area) to the International MBA Program at Bar-Ilan University as a spin-off from the earlier dialogue phase, sixteen participants (paired into eight groups) from Bar-Ilan University and the Beit Ommar village participated in an experimental e-mail dialogue for two months during the late spring of 1998. Their dialogue focused on Muslim and Jewish holidays and was conducted in English (as were the face-to-face dialogues).
Furthermore, the very fact that this e-mail dialogue took place was a major accomplishment, as these efforts had to take place in an unstable political environment, given the ups and downs of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the post-Oslo agreement era, and required the ability and will to cross and solve various technical barriers by both sides.

The frequency of exchanges between participants varied, but clearly the interreligious dimension helped encourage the communication process, which the participants reported upon in favorable terms.

**The Second CMC Dialogue**

The first dialogue, although limited in scope, established the infrastructure for further contacts and indicated that such virtual communication could be successful across the Israeli-Palestinian divide. Encouraged by this first success and in cooperation with Muhammad Awad, the Palestinian student who had graduated from Bar-Ilan’s business administration program and remained on the school’s staff as a teaching assistant, a research assistant, Naomi Slotki, and myself, plans were made to initiate a new e-mail cycle. These plans were developed in conjunction with Dr. David Schwartz of the Business School, under whose auspices the earlier dialogue was conducted, and Prof. Gerald Steinberg, director of the Program in Conflict Resolution at Bar-Ilan University. We sought, however, to create a more sophisticated framework that would focus communications on a more specific topic and generate quantitative data concerning the impact of such communications on both cognitive acquisition and mutual perceptions.

To that end Awad, Slotki, and I agreed that content exchanges should once again focus on the interreligious dimension of Israeli and Palestinian culture, but be specifically directed to two holidays, Ramadan and Rosh Hashanah, in order to make the dialogue less open-ended. Such focus was important as the e-mail effort was meant to explore possibilities for precise data transmission and comprehension across the Israeli-Palestinian divide in order to serve business activity, as well as to facilitate positive relationships necessary for both conflict resolution efforts and effective commercial activity. To test cognitive acquisition we prepared short examinations on both Ramadan and Rosh Hashanah that would be taken by the participants both before and after the activity. We also decided to have the participants fill out the perception questionnaires of
the type that Lavie and I used in earlier research, both prior to and at the conclusion of the planned two-month cycle.

We believed it was important to commence and conclude the e-mail cycle, involving eight participants on each side, with face-to-face workshops in contrast to the first virtual dialogue in which there was no actual contact between the participants.

During the two-month e-mail cycle, sixty-five messages were exchanged between the eight pairs of dialogue participants, which was considerably more than the number of messages exchanged in the 1998 e-mail dialogue. The organizers, who monitored the exchanges, were particularly impressed by the richness of the message content and the clear evidence of both the Social Information being conveyed and the Content Information, two categories delineated in the developing literature on computer mediated communications.13

Furthermore, as in the Israeli-Palestinian interreligious dialogue held in Gaza, questionnaires evaluating the mutual perceptions of the Israeli and Palestinian participants were distributed both before and after the two-month e-mail dialogue. While a complete description of empirical data gathered from this effort has been presented elsewhere,14 the data indicated that perceptions began and essentially remained positive. We presume, therefore, that students willing to participate in such an ongoing effort represented a select group whose predisposition for contact was already high.

The Concluding Workshop: Intercultural Dialogue Evaluated

The best corroboration of the potential of the Israeli-Palestinian intercultural dialogue, rooted in religion and facilitated by e-mail, came from the participants themselves at the concluding workshop held on 3 April 2000 at a Palestinian school at the edge of Bethlehem, which was also accessible to the Bar-Ilan students. In that gathering the Palestinians evaluated the dialogue favorably, with one comparing it with a dialogue he had once participated in with a more general secular/political orientation that had been less positive. He remarked that concentrating on religion “is the best way to enter into many things.” Another of the Palestinians suggested that religion brings you nearer to creation, which, in fact, makes “you think about the creator.”

One of the three visiting American Jewish students (who participated
with the five Israelis) described his satisfaction at participating in the
dialogue and referred to his Jewish Day School experience in which he
had no exposure to Islam and how much he appreciated the opportunity
to learn more about that culture.

The Potential Importance of the Interreligious Dialogue

In view of these several efforts described, the question should certainly
be posed as to why and how focus on an interreligious dialogue has the
potential to move opposing sides toward some attitudinal moderation
when religion is assumed to act as an escalatory influence in many of the
explosive international/interethnic disputes occurring throughout the
world. Indeed, some of the most prominent and widely accepted conclu-
sions in the field of social psychology relevant to intergroup relations can,
on the basis of our experiences, offer insights into why and how such in-
tercultural dialogue rooted in religion has the potential to act as a positive
factor in Israeli-Palestinian relations. On the most basic level, theoretical
literature suggests that individuals will change their negative attitudes
toward another group when they discover that others hold attitudes or
beliefs similar to their own.\(^{15}\)

The importance of discovering commonality in the other is being in-
creasingly acknowledged by other researchers concerned with intergroup
reconciliation with attention to the interreligious element. For instance,
referring to post-Apartheid efforts at reconciliation in South Africa, Kries-
berg has indicated that “insofar as reconciliation entails members of one
communal group coming to believe that members of another communal
group share important qualities with them, reconciliation contributes to
constructive accommodations. Such beliefs are fostered by religious con-
victions that all humans are made in the image of God.”\(^{16}\)

In this regard we can also refer to an example from Northern Ireland
by Colin Knox and Joanne Hughes (the former a political scientist, the
latter a social anthropologist), who reported on the favorable impact of
intercultural activities and dialogue connected to religion upon Protes-
tant and Catholic participants.\(^ {17}\)

Furthermore, in his work *Theatre of Power*, Raymond Cohen cited the
particular importance of religious symbolism with its potential for build-
ing links between Israel and Egypt. He recalled the late president Anwar
Sadat’s proposal for the building of a mosque, synagogue, and church on Mount Sinai (Jabal Musa) as a means of “bridging the psychological gap between separate nations involved in a quest for reconciliation and friendship.”

Both in the Bar-Ilan–Hebron dialogue and the Gaza encounter, the organizers focused formal discussions on the similarities of structure and practice between Islam and Judaism. Indeed, both sides were surprised to learn of the great similarity in rituals and even terminologies in their religions.

The requirements that social psychologist Yehuda Amir identified as being necessary for successful intergroup encounters also seemed to find expression in the two dialogue experiences. Amir particularly emphasized the importance of equal status contacts as being essential for such encounters, and from our experience a religious focus can offer greater possibilities for equal status contacts than those of another source. For in Israeli-Palestinian dialogues with a more secular/political focus, Palestinians frequently complain that they cannot meet their Israeli counterparts as equals because they lack an equal status political framework such as a state of their own. However, in a dialogue with an interreligious dimension and framework, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs could meet as equals, with each side appearing as representatives of their respective religious traditions and heritages, rather than as members of political entities that may or may not be equal.

Amir also emphasized the importance of “intimate” as opposed to formal or merely casual contact and cooperative versus competitive relations. In the two dialogues, an emphasis was placed on providing ample opportunities for informal interactions over refreshments or during meals so that informal bonds could be developed. Furthermore, the sense of sharing some larger commitment to religious ideals and practices also seemed to have the effect of bringing the sides together and helping to create an environment favorable to constructive relationship building which Harold Saunders has identified as a central objective of sustained dialogue to achieve relationship transformations.

In this connection it is also relevant to refer to Herbert Kelman’s extensive work in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Although he has made a strong case for encouraging the parties to reflect on the key elements of their identity and to ultimately develop a “transcendent identity,” he was
less clear as to how that process could be facilitated. I suggest that the intercultural dialogue with roots in religious heritage can provide an approach for accomplishing that goal.

From the Micro to the Macro

As I have emphasized, the discussions that occurred in both the Bar-Ilan–Hebron dialogue and the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Gaza focused on commonalities in religious practice, which allowed both groups to perceive something familiar in the other. But there are additional layers in this process. Religion, as noted, was utilized as a medium to channel discussion at least initially from charged, immediate political issues to a topic that could help “humanize” each side to the other. However, religion also ultimately explains the fundamental basis and attachment that both groups have to the land they both claim.

Thus, after some type of relationship or trust was established, each side came to challenge the basis of the other’s connection to the “Holy Land” in general and Jerusalem in particular. With each side recognizing that a fundamental clash of interests, informed by culture, is evident in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the two sides recognize that two choices are then present.

As suggested earlier, culture with its basis in religion is a central foundation for identity. According to one specialist in conflict management, Marc Ross, “culture shapes what people consider valuable and worth fighting over,” and an increasing number of conflicts today have been considered to be “identity-based” struggles. Thus, in a real sense, when Israelis and Palestinians conduct a religiously based dialogue, they are dealing with the core issues of their political conflict, which are informed by religious cultural heritage.

They have two choices: fight to the death, or try to reach some type of accommodation based on equilibrium of forces and aspirations, which is vital to the stability of any social system in which several actors are present and in conflict.

And once there is a viable equilibrium, informed by the knowledge that a stalemate exists, the basis can then be created to work toward win-win solutions through cooperative efforts that will potentially advance the welfare of each side. The exact drawing of borders or precise treaty provisions is outside the domain of practitioners of “people-to-people”
peace building; however, their challenge is to transform relationships and move the Israeli-Palestinian conflict toward a more positive reality. This is along the lines of what Kelman has suggested concerning the development of a “transcendent” identity between Israelis and Palestinians, who both have a commitment to being on the same land, and Gopin, who has sought to tap the potential of world religions toward building peace in the form of promoting “constructive conflict.”

We would also note that the importance of interreligious dialogue as an approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace building lies in the very fact that it brings together the population sectors on both sides, which have seemed to be the most resistant to peace efforts. Interreligious dialogues between dedicated adherents can be fruitful and can bolster overall prospects for peace.

It is also important to note a methodological issue involving the combination of disciplinary tools necessary to manage the type of dialogue described here. As a political scientist nurturing the first contacts with the students from Hebron, I could not have effectively done so without an appreciation for the dynamics of interest and power occurring between Israel and the Palestinians on the macro level. However, this approach has been augmented by the data reported by Chaim Lavie, a social psychologist, concerning micro-level perception change, along with other essential insights, such as those emanating from anthropology. For a dialogue of this sort to have significance with possible implications for the macro level, a variety of disciplinary tools need to be employed.

The Contribution of Federalist Thinking

In attempting to extend the importance of the interreligious dialogue to the larger Middle East, it is relevant to refer to another concept—that of federalism—which can readily be integrated and applied to the type of work described here to form a more coherent strategy for interreligious dialogue. The effort to find similarities between Islam and Judaism in its very foundation suggests a pluralistic diverse Middle East divided along ethnic and religious lines.

Thus the attempt to apply interreligious dialogue as a tool for building peace in the Middle East can be further enhanced by the insights and contribution of the eminent Israeli political scientist Daniel J. Elazar at Bar-Ilan University, who was a pioneer and seminal thinker in the areas
of both federalism and the Jewish political tradition. In his own life and work, Elazar combined a variety of contrasts that seemed to parallel and influence his extremely broad political thinking. Elazar, for instance, took great pride in his Sephardic heritage in an academic milieu in which the dominant background was Ashkenazi, and he sought to articulate the essence of the Jewish political tradition to a wider international academic community while emphasizing the key elements of federalism to Israeli academia.

Elazar described key elements of federalism as relating to the idea of power sharing and maintaining both unity and diversity. This is particularly relevant during the current era in which most states are no longer homogeneous in terms of their population. In a major integrative work published in 1987, Elazar attempted to distill the essence of federalism and convey its relevance to contemporary international problems. Citing the rise of conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims in venues throughout the world, he offered the “federal principle as one possible resource for resolving these problems.” Furthermore, he asserted that “the essence of federalism is not to be found in a particular set of institutions” but in the regulation of “particular relationships among participants in political life,” or as he wrote succinctly, “thinking federally.”

The relevance of federalism as a conceptual organizing principle for advancing dialogue is further supported by Elazar’s insights in a monograph composed in 1994, Federalism and the Way to Peace. He sought to capture its essence with relevance to the effort to improve intergroup relations in these terms: “While federalism is normally understood as having to do with political structures, in fact the federal idea speaks principally to the character of human relationships.”

The Judaic Basis of Federalism

As mentioned, Elazar was also a pioneer in studying the Jewish political tradition. In countless writings he emphasized the basis of federalism as rooted in the Jewish idea of Brit (covenant). Elazar described Brit as regulating the relationships between diverse entities, such as the tribes of Israel and particularly between man and God. Indeed, he saw the notion of Brit as the foundation of the federal idea—as fundamental to the Jewish experience. In his treatise on federalism’s biblical foundations, which draws upon a multitude of themes, narratives, and traditional Jewish
commentaries, he illustrates the essence of a “federalist” approach to society and stability as opposed to a strictly “statist” approach. These distinctions, described as follows by Elazar, are significant as we describe our applications of his thought to conflict resolution efforts.

It is no exaggeration to say that the contrast between the statist and the federalist approaches to political life reflects the difference between the systematic and prismatic approaches to understanding civil society. The systematic approach seeks to define everything precisely, to set boundaries that cannot be crossed; hence the statist approach emphasizes questions of sovereignty as a means of defining ultimate boundaries. The federalist approach, recognizing how all of God’s universe is interconnected, seeks rather to establish separate cores and to understand how each core has to be responded to differently from different perspectives. Boundaries need not be so clear. Interaction is more important than definition [emphasis mine], which explains the federalist emphasis on multiple polities related to one another, united yet separate.30

Applying Federalism to the Middle East

Elazar tried to apply federalist principles to helping to ameliorate the Arab-Israeli conflict. He often reflected that the nation-state framework was not indigenous to the Middle East given the trans-state identity of the Arab world, along with what he regarded as the ambivalent attitude of traditional Judaism toward unbridled state sovereignty.31

He believed, for instance, that given the clear conflict of interests of the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, solutions could more productively be sought in orientations that de-emphasized crystal-clear solutions of definition and sovereignty and instead emphasized modes of informal sharing in line with federalist thinking. Also significant was the fact that he recalled the millet arrangement of the Ottoman Empire. This potentially was a most viable precedent, which allowed for cultural expression and identity in the framework of a larger whole, whose conceptual essence Elazar believed still had relevance for the contemporary Middle East, and in a sense, for our discussion of interreligious dialogue within it.32 In his important work, Two Peoples One Land, in which he analyzed the dynamics of and possible approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, he recalled the possible application of some aspects of the former Ottoman millet and capitulation systems. He emphasized in this regard that “it is not a question of outsiders having special status in the region, but rather of the peoples of the region being able to work out special status arrangements for each other across national boundaries, without eliminating either the boundaries or the people.33

The Arab-Jewish schism in the Middle East involves interstate or Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as relations within the state of Israel, particularly in terms of relations between the Jewish and Arab sectors. In this area the interreligious dialogue, involving similarities between Islam and Judaism and federal approaches to managing this conflict, is also germane. While there are numerous social and cultural schisms within Israel, the most difficult division and intergroup tension exist between its majority Jewish group and its Arab minority, which accounts for approximately 18 percent of the population.

Can the interreligious dialogue, which seemed to hold positive potential on the Israeli-Palestinian track, also be applied to Jewish-Arab relations in Israel? According to several dialogues that Lavie and I tracked,34 a similarly positive result was discerned between Jews and Arabs, all citizens of the state of Israel.

While these dialogues took place between citizens of the same state, the intercultural component with a relationship to federalist thinking remains strongly germane. Various observers of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel have maintained that such relations cannot be divorced from regional dynamics. Thus the Jewish public of Israel meets the Arab world on three levels—its own Arab population, the Palestinians living within the Palestinian Authority, and the larger Middle Eastern and Arab world. When there is either progress or conflict on any of these levels, the other tiers of interaction are affected.

Such an insight enhances the importance of federalist thinking as articulated by Elazar given the international reality of increasingly multicultural schisms within nation-states. Despite the vision of the traditional nation-state from the time of the French Revolution, most nation-states today are no longer ethnically homogeneous.35 In increasing numbers of nation-states whose stability once rested on an overwhelming homogeneous population, policy makers find themselves challenged to maintain the cultural and national core of their societies while responding to the identity and cultural needs of ever larger ethnic minorities. In countries
as varied as Canada and Malaysia, societies with large ethnic minorities and varied subgroups are faced with the need to maintain their cohesion despite this heterogeneity.36

By applying elements of a federalist model (with links to the Jewish tradition itself), as articulated by Elazar, to regional and intrastate dynamics, Israel can retain its central narrative as a Jewish-Zionist state while still allowing for diverse subculture identities to be retained in its Jewish and Arab sectors. This in effect allows for “diversity within unity.”37 Indeed, one interpreter of Israeli society has pointed to the benefits of federally oriented efforts to manage Arab-Jewish tensions within Israel.38

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the potential of interreligious dialogue between Islam and Judaism in the contemporary period to positively affect perceptions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jewish-Arab interactions in general. Drawing upon fieldwork either conducted or analyzed by me and my colleagues, it suggests that the discovery of similarities by Israeli and Palestinian students in their respective heritages has the potential to moderate perceptions, which is a critical tool in advancing sustained dialogue and relationship building—a key element in helping to promote peace.

From this most basic level of discovering similarities, interreligious dialogue in the Israeli-Palestinian context has the potential for clarifying the existence of a “constructive” stalemate, as both sides discern the depth of commitment that they have to being on the same land, which is evident from the clash of mutual claims and convictions. This can then serve as a basis for eventually transforming the conflict as “people-to-people” efforts are carried out between the two populations aimed at generating the active relationship building necessary for the possibilities of conflict transformation and even a mutually positive commitment to the “Holy Land”; this while not relinquishing respective identities as Israelis and Palestinians.

The approach to interreligious dialogue is further enhanced by the work of Daniel J. Elazar in the area of federalist thinking. The attempt to “think federally,” which offers the possibility of maintaining both unity and diversity, has important implications to the Middle East. According
to Elazar, strict statist definitions and interactions ought to be tempered with other forms of organization that are culturally based, such as the millet framework of the Ottoman Empire, and traditional Jewish perspectives, which have been ambivalent toward unbridled state sovereignty.

The case for interreligious dialogue is further reinforced by other insights from the literature in this period of increased regional and global polarization. Indeed, Samuel Huntington concluded his well-known analysis concerning the clash of civilizations with the suggestion that the West would have “to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations. . . . [This process] will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations.”

While the current period of increased regional tension in the Middle East has dampened possibilities for Israeli-Palestinian peace building, which began in the 1990s, current painful events need not necessarily sound the death knell for future efforts. Various researchers have acknowledged that potent interethnic identity conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can regress back into violence. Thus emphasizing the importance of maintaining a “vision” of peace even during a crisis can provide the creative energy to enable processes to eventually go forward again, when contextual conditions allow.

I have presented here a review of findings and analysis to encourage further exploration in both theory and practice of the use of religious culture as a basis for dialogue and perception change to occur between Israelis and Palestinians along with a federally oriented approach to dialogue.

Notes


6. This key issue has been treated in important works such as R. Scott Appley, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); and Mark Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).


11. In this particular case, perceptions of the Israeli Jewish participants, both religious and secular, have always been favorable.


Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991).


33. Elazar, Two Peoples—One Land, 11.

34. Mollov and Lavie, “Arab-Jewish Women’s Inter-religious Dialogue Evaluated.”


37. Daniel J. Elazar reflected on the relevance of the federalist approach to conflict resolution in Israeli society in works such as “The Role of Federalism in Political Integration,” in his Federalism and Political Integration (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), 13–58, and Building a New Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). His work has also been used as the basis of a field experiment I initiated within the framework of the Program in Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University, which has been reported on in the following article: Ben Mollov, Zev Kalifon, and Gerald Steinberg, “Federalism and Multiculturalism as a Vehicle for Perception Change in Israeli-Jewish Society,” International Journal of Conflict Management 15, no. 2 (2004): 144–66.


Since 1 September 1969, Mu’ammarm al-Qadhafi has led Libya with an iron fist, dominating the country’s domestic and foreign affairs. One of the focal issues on the agenda of the new regime was the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was viewed through the filters of Pan-Arab ideology inherited from Egypt’s president, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (1952–70). An unequivocal rejection of Zionism and a negation of the right of the state of Israel to exist characterized the Libyan perception of the conflict throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Nevertheless, during the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Libyan state underwent a series of substantial changes—some initiated from within the country and others imposed or triggered from outside. These changes affected Libya’s internal agenda and foreign affairs, making their impact felt on Tripoli’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to Jewish-Muslim relations. One of the significant changes was Qadhafi’s partial sharing of political power with his son Saif al-Islam, albeit informally, allowing him wide room for his diplomatic and political initiation. At that juncture, Libya was experiencing particularly difficult times. Its sole international supporter, the Soviet Union, had collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, destabilizing the Libyan state and exposing it to the perilous
pressure of the Western world led by the United States. The imposition of stringent UN sanctions on Libya, widely known as the Lockerbie sanctions, caused untold harm to the Libyan state and society and was a telling illustration of Libya’s vulnerability in the reality of the “New World Order.”

Yet significant new prospects for extricating Libya from its prolonged suffering appeared in the offing at the end of the 1990s in the wake of the suspension of the Lockerbie sanctions. For Qadhafi, this opened an unprecedented window of opportunity for rehabilitating his country’s global standing and for reinvigorating Libya’s internal affairs. Qadhafi was acutely aware of both the threats and prospects inherent in these new circumstances, and he believed that there was a need to embark on a dramatic shakeup. He placed his son Saif al-Islam—a fresh, daring, and loyal figure—in a position of significant political influence, a move which various circles in Libya and abroad have interpreted as his first act in preparing Saif al-Islam for the Libyan “throne.”

Indeed, it was not long before Saif al-Islam began to generate far-reaching changes in both the internal and external affairs of the country, shocking those who had adhered so rigidly to Qadhafi’s ideological and diplomatic agenda over the past three and a half decades in power. One of the areas in which Saif al-Islam has unmistakably left his impression is the Libyan discourse on the cluster of topics pertaining to Zionism, Jewish-Muslim coexistence, and Israeli-Arab dialogue. Particularly significant among these issues was his extraordinary approach to the Holocaust and to the Arab-Israeli conflict where he clearly deviated, at least verbally, from the long-standing negative Libyan position.

This article surveys and analyzes Qadhafi’s and Saif al-Islam’s seemingly irreconcilable positions toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and other related topics, examining the differences and the motivations behind them, while also dealing with the question of whether this divergence has indeed been substantive or merely tactical in nature. The chapter also deals with the question of whether one may identify the initiation of a bridging process between Muslim Arab Libya and the Jewish Israeli state. The period reviewed addresses the major part of Qadhafi’s reign, covering the years 1969–2006. The discussion draws primarily on Libyan material, while relying on a broad range of primary Middle Eastern and Western sources as well.
Waving the Banner of Hatred toward the Jewish State: Motivations and Gains

Once in power, Qadhafi missed no opportunity to express his virulent hatred toward and unequivocal negation of the right of the “Zionist entity” to exist. Accordingly, Qadhafi and his state-controlled media never employed the term “the state of Israel,” using instead pejorative terminology such as the “Zionist enemy” or the “so-called state of Israel,” as well as other denunciations aimed at delegitimizing Israel.

This attitude of utter rejection reflected the rising nationalist and Pan-Arab sentiment of the young Libyan army officer, who had experienced the humiliation caused by the painful defeat of the Arab Muslim world and Nasser by Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967. Distressing as well was the disregard of this war by the pro-Western king Idris al-Sanusi, who had ruled Libya since its independence in 1951. The king’s position, which Qadhafi perceived as degrading and treacherous, reinforced his motivation to seize power and fight alongside “our Arab Muslim brothers” with the aim of eliminating the “Jewish state” and thus restoring Arab nationalist pride. The Egyptian model of the 23 July 1952 military coup, which overthrew King Faruq and installed instead the “Free Officers Revolution” under Nasser’s leadership, clearly served as a model for Qadhafi’s own successful military coup and the establishment of his “revolutionary” regime.

Concurrently, the searing blow of 1967 fed Qadhafi’s enmity toward the “imperialist” West, particularly the United States, which he believed was responsible for Israel’s military victory and for other evils afflicting the Arab Muslim world. Since that watershed, Qadhafi increasingly referred to the “two arms of evil”—the Jews and the Americans—who shared, according to his perception, the aim of crushing the Arab Muslim world. Appellations such as “the Zionist-American tyranny in the Middle East” and “the two-headed devil” became common in his relentlessly hostile rhetoric, as well as in the terminology of other anti-Israel leading figures in the Arab Muslim world.3

Qadhafi’s anti-Israel and anti-Jewish venom flowed not only from his nationalist, ideological, and cultural convictions but also from essential political considerations pertinent to the very survival of his regime. Positioning the destruction of the “Zionist entity” at the center of his agenda was vital in crystallizing its identity, in galvanizing popular support, and
in helping the new leadership to burst forth into the Arab Muslim world, the only important foreign arena for Libya at that time. Such goals lent legitimacy to his regime.

Moreover, being geographically remote from the borders of Israel, Libya could afford to be as belligerently provocative as it wished without risking military repercussions as long as Tripoli refrained from participating directly in any military activity against Israel. Taking these stipulations into consideration, Qadhafi enthusiastically called on the Arab world to “fire bullets instead of publishing slogans in red headlines.”

Precisely because of his professed devotion to fighting for the Arab cause against Israel and his oft-stated willingness to commit his country’s military resources to an all-Arab jihad aimed at annihilating the “Zionist enemy,” Qadhafi was shocked when Egypt and Syria excluded him entirely from the October War of 1973 against Israel. Following this bitter blow and other caustic failures in the Arab arena, particularly the souring relations with Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (since Nasser’s death in fall 1970), Qadhafi turned away from this scene in the mid-1970s, shifting his focus to Africa and the Soviet Union.

Concurrent with the dramatic foreign policy changes, Qadhafi implemented his “Popular Revolution” within the country with enthusiasm, binding it to almost every facet of Libyan life. These upheavals injected new tensions and a measure of instability into the state’s system and society, resulting in increasing popular unrest. This culminated in 1975 in a dangerous plot planned by Major ‘Umar al-Muḥayshi, aimed at overthrowing Qadhafi’s regime. Although thwarted by the security forces, the attempt shocked Qadhafi’s associates. They promptly promoted themes familiar and recognizable to the Libyan masses, as well as to circles in the state’s ruling echelons, doing their utmost to rally them around Qadhafi’s leadership.

Within this context, ratcheting up the rhetoric against the “Zionist enemy” and pledging to further the struggle against it served this goal well. The anti-Israel campaign was highly rewarding for Qadhafi’s political prestige. The most astounding successes were the uprooting of Israel’s diplomatic presence in Africa during the 1970s and the leading role Libya played in the newly established Arab Front of Steadfastness and Resistance against Egypt’s “treacherous” peace process with Israel in the late 1970s. These areas of high-profile activity, presenting the Libyan head of state as a most devoted guardian of the Arab Muslim cause, injected new
vitality into Libya’s foreign policy and bolstered Qadhafi’s political position at home. Achieving these aims took on some urgency in spring 1979, as Libya’s prolonged military intervention in Idi Amin’s Uganda proved to be a total failure.

It was not surprising, therefore, that Qadhafi continued to cling to the widely consensual goal on the Libyan agenda of annihilating the “Zionist state,” a mission he considered to be a “zero-sum game.” The Arab-Israeli conflict, he reiterated during his first years in power and on many subsequent occasions, was “beyond the point of negotiations and peaceful solutions.” This conflict, he repeated, is “national and religious” and not limited to a territorial dispute. “This is a struggle over existence, a struggle over culture. One of us will survive and the other will be extinguished.”

**A New Peak of Animosity: In the Aftermath of Israel’s War in Lebanon**

While assuming a central role in the anti-Egyptian front, Libya rekindled its anti-Israel ardor during the 1980s, stating that “only the Arab rifle, blood, and sacrifice will bring about the liquidation of the Zionist entity.” Qadhafi and his tightly controlled media further declared that the Arabs have no alternative but to destroy Israel, “since the struggle is over their very survival,” warning that “the unstoppable [Zionist] death train is approaching from Tel-Aviv, determined to annihilate the Arabs and build an empire on their ruins.”

This belligerent message gained new momentum in the wake of Israel’s military invasion of Lebanon on 2 June 1982, which dealt a serious blow to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasir ‘Arafat’s leadership. Being forced to withdraw from Beirut and thus losing their last autonomous base in Lebanon, to Qadhafi’s chagrin, the PLO also moved its headquarters to Tunis. Not only did he unequivocally object to the Israeli involvement in this arrangement and to the PLO’s withdrawal from further fighting in Lebanon, but he also became frustrated over the indifference of the Arab countries to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli army in Lebanon. Although Libya also took no direct military action to aid the Palestinians, it pained Qadhafi to watch the further disintegration of the Pan-Arab ideology he held so dear. Angry, the Libyan head of state intensified his venomous rhetoric in the wake of
the Palestinian upheaval in Lebanon, not confining his hatred to the state of Israel alone but speaking out against Jews living outside it as well. This was illustrated, for example, when the “Radio of Vengeance and Sacred Hate,” allegedly a Libyan station, incited North African Arabs to rise up and kill Jews living in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. While Libya denied hosting this radio station, Tripoli nevertheless praised its message. Qadhafi’s strong enmity was fed by his view that a powerful global alliance composed of “Zionism, imperialism, and Arab reaction” had set itself the goal of taking action against Libya and the whole Arab world. A typical allegation of this supposed conspiracy was the repeated statement that the “Zionist enemy has U.S.-made and Saudi-financed cluster bombs to destroy 150 million Arabs.”

The Palestinian uprising, the intifada, which broke out in the late 1980s against Israel’s control of the West Bank and Gaza, once more provoked Qadhafi, and he called on the Palestinians “to extend the uprising all over the region from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea and from south Lebanon to southern Palestine.” Even if the world decided “to establish a state for the Jews,” he argued, “the Arabs refuse to agree that it would be at our own expense. The Arabs do not need to pay for Hitler’s crimes.” In this spirit, he reiterated his call to liquidate “the Zionist occupation” and repeated his opinion that Israel “has no right to exist.”

Paradoxically, during the late 1980s, while Qadhafi maintained his stream of invective toward Israel and persistently called for its removal from the map, the militant Libyan Islamist opposition called for his removal from power, citing among other evils the claim that he was the “hireling of Zionism.” At the same time, Qadhafi, who waged war against the Islamists, used exactly the same terminology, accusing them of being “Muslim traitors who are acting under the wing of Zionism [and under the impact of] the Zionist Intelligence Agency.” This ironic “game of words” encapsulates what has been portrayed as hatred toward Israel or in its equivalent term, Zionism, and has become deeply interwoven in Libyan discourse and politics.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the rising tide of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union became an especially sore point for Qadhafi. He perceived this issue as an adverse eventuality, especially in light of the subsiding hostilities of the cold war and a tipping of the balance of power in the Middle East increasingly in favor of the United States—Israel’s ally and Libya’s sworn
foe. Perceiving this immigration in terms of its strengthening effect on Israel and, therefore, as a direct threat to the Arabs, the Libyan head of state referred to this issue on numerous occasions, sternly recommending to Jewish immigrants that they remain in their present countries. Otherwise, “we propose an alternative homeland for them in the Baltic Republics, Alaska, Alsace-Lorraine, or on the Volga River.” He further argued that “the presence of Jews in greater numbers [in Israel] will entice them to seek the realization of their historical dream of a greater state stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile,” extending even to “Mecca and Medina.”\(^{14}\) The Jews who are already living in “Palestine,” he went on, “have to leave Palestine immediately and return to their own countries, including the Arab countries” and implicitly to Libya as well. “It is necessary to eliminate the Jewish state from the Middle East [and] establish [instead] a democratic Palestinian state.”\(^{15}\)

**The Post–Cold War Era: Cracks in Qadhafi’s Wall of Hatred toward Israel?**

Despite his uncompromising rejection of Israel’s right to exist, Qadhafi allegedly revealed an interest in establishing discreet contact with the “Jewish state” in early 1990. Ardently desiring to end the Lockerbie morass, which he regarded as America’s political persecution of his regime, he may have believed that by softening his hostility toward Israel, the American administration, which he believed was strongly influenced by the Jewish lobby in Washington, would reciprocate in kind. According to an Israeli security official, Libya asked him, through an influential Arab mediator, to pave the way for secret contacts between the two countries. Nevertheless, and for whatever reason, the alleged attempt did not bear any tangible results at that juncture.\(^{16}\)

Although there is no other reference to this affair, the timing of the initiative would have been logical, shaped primarily by the alarming collapse of the USSR, which had provided Libya with a counterweight against the United States. This upheaval dramatically heightened Libya’s urgency to reduce the level of hostility with the Americans. Reducing tensions with Israel may have been perceived as a stepping-stone to a similar reduction in hostilities with the United States. Libya was very much in fear of an imminent U.S. air attack similar to that of 1986, which almost killed Qadhafi.\(^{17}\) This fear was further fed by a series of American
moves, primarily the renewed accusation that Libya was manufacturing chemical weapons and that it was involved in international terrorism, most prominently, the suspicion that it was responsible for the explosion of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. The successful military operation of the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf, which defeated Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and reflected the fundamental power shift to the detriment of anti-American Arab states including Libya at the beginning of 1991, further enhanced Qadhafi’s anxieties.

Meanwhile, the Lockerbie sanctions, which were imposed by the UN on Libya in April 1992 and which, in tandem with the unilateral U.S. sanctions imposed upon Libya in 1986, continued to exert particularly heavy pressure on Qadhafi’s political position as well as on the country’s socioeconomic well-being. In spring 1993, a year after the imposition of the UN sanctions, and in a totally surprising deviation from his chronic antagonism, Qadhafi made extraordinary overtures to the Jewish world, particularly to the Jewish lobby in the United States and indirectly to Israel as well. He invited all Jews who had left Libya in the late 1960s to return to “their country” as residents or visitors. He also announced that he would soon implement a law passed in 1970 providing compensation to Jews who had left property in Libya that had been expropriated by the state. Moreover, he declared that Libya would soon host a conference in Tripoli for representatives of the three major monotheistic faiths, including Jews from Israel. Lastly, he announced he would permit Libyan citizens to perform a pilgrimage to Muslim holy sites in al-Quds, i.e., Jerusalem. Nevertheless, he still carefully avoided mentioning “the state of Israel” when elaborating on these events.

This series of unprecedented declarations was soon followed by the arrival in Jerusalem of approximately two hundred Libyans, portrayed by Tripoli as pilgrims, who came to “al-Quds instead of Mecca” at the end of May 1993. Pro-American Saudi Arabia, which fully complied with the UN sanctions, including an embargo on air travel to and from Libya, prevented any Libyans wanting to perform the hajj in Mecca from entering the country directly from Libya by air. The Libyan pilgrims crossed the Egyptian land border into Israel and were greeted by Israel’s minister of tourism, ‘Uzi Bar’am, and by the Israeli businessman Ya’akov Nimrod, who had engineered their trip with the help of the Saudi tycoon ‘Adnan al-Khashoggi. It is not clear whether this visit had any connection to the alleged Libyan rapprochement attempt of 1990, but separate
statements made by Israeli and Libyan figures gave the impression that Qadhafi intended to soften his hitherto utterly hostile attitude toward the “Jewish state” and perhaps even recognize it.

However, the euphoria caused by the visit dissipated as suddenly as it had arisen due to various complications on both sides. The visit thus ended earlier than planned and in a virulently hostile tone. Salim al-Tajuri, the head of the pilgrim delegation, seized the rostrum in a special press conference he held in the hotel in Jerusalem to call “all Muslims all over the world to liberate al-Quds and turn it into the capital of the Palestinian state.” Moreover, he stressed that the “pilgrims’ visit does not in any way mean a recognition” of Israel “because it is our conviction that [Israel] is neither a state nor a definite geographical location, but merely a name of one of the prophets mentioned in the Holy Quran.” He concluded his outburst with the well-known Libyan argument that the Jews who came to Israel after its independence in 1948 “should return to their countries of origin, while the four million Palestinians [who, he claimed, were living outside Palestine] should return to it and create there a democratic Palestinian state.” Concerning the Jews originating from Arab countries, he made a clear distinction, however: “We consider them brothers who coexist and live with us.”

All in all, this rather odd and singular episode, aimed at bringing about a breakthrough that would end Libya’s distressful times under the U.S.-led and UN-imposed Lockerbie sanctions, petered out and was never mentioned again by Qadhafi in public or by the state-controlled media. Moreover, one may assume that this humiliating visit, during which Libya was labeled a “pariah state” by a senior Israeli official, and during which the Libyan pilgrims were harassed in the al-Aqsa area by embittered Palestinians who had been barred by Israel from praying in the mosque for security reasons, caused Qadhafi a great deal of political inconvenience. Consequently, and while trying to mitigate internal criticism of this venture, he reverted to his former position on Israel with even greater vitriol, aimed at fending off domestic pressures coming especially from the radical anti-Israeli circles, in the army and the top political and ideological echelons.

Continuing to zealously wave the banner of military annihilation of the “Zionist state” and total rejection of any political settlement with it whatsoever in the aftermath of the pilgrims’ visit, it was no surprise that Qadhafi unequivocally opposed the Oslo Accords, signed between the
PLO and Israel in fall 1993, as well as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, signed by the two parties in late spring 1994. In this vein, Qadhafi also totally rejected the peace agreement signed by Israel and Jordan in May 1994, reiterating on many occasions his long-standing argument that the Arab-Israeli and Muslim-Jewish conflict was about existence and not an issue of territory and rights subject to political bargaining. Furthermore, the U.S. and Egyptian sponsorship of the political dialogue between “the artificial Jewish state” on the one hand and the Palestinians and Jordan on the other, further evoked Qadhafi’s outrage. Libya warned once again that the “Jewish state” must be destroyed; otherwise, “it might realize its Old Testament dream of establishing a Jewish state from the Nile to the Euphrates by swallowing up Arab land and imposing its presence by the force of weapons of mass destruction and the massive military arsenal it possesses.”

This kind of statement presented Israel as the embodiment of all evil in the region. Typical of such denunciations was the Libyan accusation that the Israeli government had planned the attack launched by an Israeli settler and a member of the fringe religious-nationalist Kach movement against worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque at the Cave of the Makhpelah in Hebron on 25 February 1994, in which more than thirty Palestinians were killed. A Hamas suicide attack on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv later in the fall of that year, resulting in the deaths of over twenty Israelis, prompted Libya to applaud the fida’i operation [an attack in the spirit of Islamic self-sacrifice]. Embellishing on Qadhafi’s message, Libya’s official media stated that the real danger for the Arab Muslim nation definitely comes from the “Jewish Zionist enemy,” and therefore Israel must be deprived of its “nuclear umbrella” as well as its “biological and chemical weapons.” If not, the Libyan leader intimated several times, Israel will use its weapons of mass destruction in order to “strangle” the Arabs and the Muslims, “enslave them and take their water and oil, and it will continue until it takes Mecca and not just al-Quds [Jerusalem].”

Qadhafi’s anti-Israel sentiment was further fueled by Israel’s expanding ties with the Gulf states of Oman and Qatar and with the North African states of Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania. In contrast to the full diplomatic relations established with Mauritania, Israel’s diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Morocco failed to reach this status. These diplomatic exchanges were diametrically opposed to Qadhafi’s principle of rejecting all political dialogue with the “illegitimate” state of Israel. While
finding it politically inexpedient at the height of the Lockerbie sanctions nightmare to confront the “treacherous” core Arab states, Mauritania, a country on the fringes of the Arab world, became an easy target for Qadhafi’s retaliation and an outlet for his frustration over Arab states’ links with Israel. Therefore, Qadhafi withdrew Libya’s recognition of Mauritania “as an Arab country,” recalling the Libyan ambassador from Nouakchott in late 1995 in strong protest at its establishment of official diplomatic relations with the “Israeli enemy.”

While focusing major attention during the second half of the 1990s on combating the perilous Islamist threat to his regime’s survival and on coping with the nadir of Libya’s domestic and foreign circumstances as a result of the UN sanctions and the sharp price decline in the global oil market and, hence, in Libya’s oil revenues, Qadhafi lessened his preoccupation with the annihilation of the “Jewish state.” It was, however, the second Palestinian intifada, which broke out in fall 2000, that refocused his attention on the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on “detested Zionism.” Portraying the “Jewish state” in early 2001 as a reckless and imperialist aggressor and as the source of all evil, he warned the Arab Muslim world of what he claimed were Israel’s ambitions to conquer “Syria, Lebanon and even Iraq . . . and even Judaize North Africa” (emphasis added). By accentuating the religious aspect of the conflict, Qadhafi drew attention to the Judeo-Islamic facets of the dispute, thus broadening its scope to include not only Arabs but also Muslims all over the world.

Further referring to what he argued was a conspiracy between Israel and the United States to extend Israeli control over the Middle East, he stated that “the U.S. would help [the Israelis] to occupy the Gulf. In the end, [Washington] would prefer that the oil be in the hands of the Israelis rather than of the Arabs because the latter are moody and unpredictable. . . . Therefore, the Israeli borders might be extended from Iran to the Atlantic and to the Turkish borders.” Detailing further his apocalyptic vision, Qadhafi warned that since “the Israelis claim that Mecca was built by Abraham,” they think that “Mecca is theirs and Medina is also theirs. They like to make inane biblical claims such as this.”

The “Isratin” State Formula: Same Old Antagonism in a New Format?

In the aftermath of the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands in early 2001, in which one of the two Libyan nationals suspected of responsibility for the
bombing was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, Qadhafi faced new international circumstances that included extreme risks as well as new prospects. He made a strenuous effort to employ this window of opportunity in his country’s relations with the West to settle the chronic dispute between them once and for all. Assisted now by his son, Saif al-Islam, and exploiting the more tolerant attitude of the United States toward Libya following al-Qaida’s terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, the Libyan head of state made conciliatory gestures toward Washington, and in the same context, he lessened his hitherto belligerent references to the Arab-Israeli conflict and other related issues in order to placate the Americans. In any case, Qadhafi’s attention to his Arab environs, which had “betrayed” Libya by fully complying with the devastating UN sanctions throughout the 1990s, were consigned to the margins of his foreign policy agenda. Moreover, Qadhafi repeatedly threatened to withdraw Libya from the Arab League in protest of what he perceived to be the League’s complete impotence in dealing with the UN sanctions on Libya and the League’s failure to take a radical line toward Israel and toward the Arab states that had established diplomatic ties with Israel. While generally adhering to a policy of decreased focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qadhafi could not afford to remain silent on the Saudi Peace Initiative, which was central to the Middle East agenda in early 2002, cynically portraying it as “a gift from heaven to both the U.S. and Israel.”

Nevertheless, Qadhafi’s time was now taken up mostly by his attempts to take advantage of the opportunities opened in Libya’s relations with the West and with the United States in particular in the post-Lockerbie sanctions era. Thus his public references to the Arab-Israeli conflict became less frequent and less bellicose in nature. Instead of his previous position calling for the annihilation of the “Jewish state,” he now proposed that “the sole possible solution” to the prospects of the Jews living in the “so-called Israeli state” was “to establish one democratic state for both the Palestinians and the Jews, . . . a state lying between the [Jordan] river and the [Mediterranean] sea . . . called Isratin.” Seizing upon the public forum at the Arab summit in March 2005 to further promote his “Isratin” idea, Qadhafi stipulated that “the so-called state of Israel . . . is definitely an illegal state. In 1948, a group of people came and unilaterally declared they have formed a state. [But] that land has two owners. Unilaterally declaring a state by any of the two owners is illegal. [This option is also illegal by international law, he elaborated, and thus it] cannot
be recognized. Personally, as along as I am alive, I will never recognize either an Israeli state or a Palestinian one.”

Other reasons for his persistent negation of the two-state solution included his assertion that the area is too small to accommodate two countries. “It is like trying to put two bodies into one item of clothing or two men wearing the same pair of trousers.” The Libyan head of state also claimed that two separate states “would come into conflict because the land of each, they believe, forms part of the land of the other and each mini-state would feel threatened by the other party.” Among other objections, Qadhafi further contended that the West Bank and Gaza are too small to contain all the Palestinian refugees who would return and that the fact that there are Arabs living in Israel and Jews living in the West Bank precludes such a solution.

While clinging to his “Isratin” formula, Qadhafi avoided publicly calling for the annihilation of the “Zionist entity” throughout 2005 (unlike Iran’s president, who, in a series of vituperative speeches against Israel, stated that “it must be wiped off the map”). Qadhafi was anxious at this time to maximize the beneficial normalization process with the West and the United States in order to further the interests of his state and his leadership position, aware that brandishing his flag of anti-Israel sentiment would tarnish his shiny new reconciliatory and pragmatic image and, in turn, damage his rehabilitation in the international community.

At the same time, however, the Libyan head of state found it important to state in early 2006 that “I agree with America on everything but Iraq and Palestine,” thus signalling for both external and internal consumption that he had not removed the Arab Muslim cause, especially that of the Palestinians, from his agenda.

Saif Islam’s New Rhetoric: Arab-Israeli Coexistence and the Holocaust

Saif al-Islam has played an important role in drawing Libya into a new era in its political history, satisfying his father’s dire need for fresh input into the state’s leadership to present mainly to the outside world in order to promote Libya’s interests in its challenging times at the turn of the century. Trusting his son completely, Qadhafi gradually expanded Saif al-Islam’s responsibilities, allowing him a great deal of room in Libya’s dealings in diplomacy and with the international media. Indeed, being
the product of the new media-savvy generation, while radiating charm and having mastery over the English language as well as an understanding of the Western mentality and political culture, Saif al-Islam became an attractive interviewee for the foreign media. Consequently, he was widely quoted on a range of topics, including relations between Islam and Judaism and Arab-Israeli coexistence.

One of his most astonishing declarations was his exceptional public recognition of the Holocaust—the “genocide of the Jews” in his words. His extraordinary statement, the like of which had never publicly been uttered by any Libyan official, was made early in 2005 when the world was marking the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. Seizing upon the opportunity presented by the World Economic Forum in Davos and presumably moved by the atmosphere that surrounded the international community’s efforts at this time to sanctify the memory of the Holocaust, Saif al-Islam stated that “it is not right to deny the genocide . . . because it indeed transpired . . . and if there are Arabs that deny it, then, in my opinion, this is not right.”

However, Saif al-Islam did not repeat this statement in public, presumably facing strong criticism by various circles in his country’s ruling echelons, primarily figures from the powerful “Revolutionary Committees.” These organs, established by Qadhafi in the late 1970s in response to mounting opposition against his regime, were responsible for preventing any deviation from its ideological and political “revolutionary” principles. This included the deeply rooted rejection of the “Zionist state.” However, during the early 2000s, the militant Revolutionary Committees, who have played the role of the regime’s watch dogs for almost three decades, have become a political burden for Qadhafi due to their rigid adherence to policies and tactics first designed in the 1970s. They have tried to block the new spirit of pragmatism that has entered into Libya’s domestic and foreign affairs, clinging to causes and slogans that even Qadhafi has relinquished, such as a total commitment to the Arab world and a public call for the total annihilation of Israel. It was not surprising, therefore, that these Revolutionary Committees have reduced the breathing space Saif al-Islam needed for opening Libya up to the West and for promoting domestic reform. It was not long before the Committees and Saif al-Islam clashed.

The representation of the Holocaust has become a major criterion in the examination of attitudes about Jews in general and about Israel.
in particular, in Libya and the broader Arab Muslim world, as well as among radical right-wing movements in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, Arab and Muslim circles have taken Nazi symbols, terminology, and ideology and projected them onto Zionism and the state of Israel, attempting thereby to portray the Jews and the Israelis as having metamorphosed from victims to victimizers. This perception has gained further credence during the last two decades, which have witnessed violent confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians in the form of the two bloody eruptions of *intifada*. Moreover, the Palestinians, whom Libya has consistently supported, view the Holocaust within the context of the general Arab struggle against Zionism and of the Palestinian 1948 “*naqba*” (catastrophe).35

Despite Saif al-Islam’s extraordinary declaration concerning the Holocaust, there was a total absence of public debate or official reaction in Libya on the topic in the aftermath of his statement. Saif al-Islam’s voice remained a lone opinion within his country’s top echelons, and even this remained a onetime event. Either Qadhafi was ideologically and emotionally not ready to adopt such a position, or he feared serious political repercussions from the various ruling circles, particularly from the Revolutionary Committees, should he back his son’s statement or even allow him to repeat it. Nevertheless, Saif al-Islam was not alone. Since the mid-1990s, a new trend has become discernible among Arab intellectuals who have begun calling for a new approach to the Holocaust, acknowledging the Nazi atrocity as a crime against humanity, while separating its human aspects from the discussion of the Holocaust’s political repercussions.

What motivated Saif al-Islam’s public recognition of the Holocaust remains unknown. On the one hand, it is possible that it was Tripoli’s way of testing the waters of both internal and international reaction to a potentially more moderate official line regarding a broader change of attitude toward Jews and the state of Israel. Alternatively, it could simply be Saif al-Islam’s personal opinion, unrelated to any formal shift in Libyan policy, and consequently it was his self-confidence in being able to freely express his views that allowed him to voice such an idea. In either case, his declared recognition of the Holocaust has become especially prominent when placed in the context of Muslim and Arab Holocaust deniers who have portrayed it as a “myth,”36 while denouncing “Jewish Nazism” against “Muslim Arab victims.”37

Later in 2005, Saif al-Islam proved again that he did not harbor the
traditional anti-Zionist and anti-Israel ideology of the ruling circles in Tripoli. “Libya has no problem dealing with Israel since Libya views itself as an African [country] as opposed to an Arab country. . . . Libyans do not need to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves.” He stated clearly that “Libya is thousands of miles away from Israel and we need not pursue a confrontation with them [i.e., the Israelis].”

During the summer of 2005, Saif al-Islam reiterated his position that Libya’s “state of war with Israel is practically over. . . . We participated in the war when Egypt fought [against Israel] and when the Palestinian factions fought [against it]. But if the Palestinian factors are negotiating today and sitting at the same table as the Israelis, Egypt, Jordan and all the Arab countries who are having direct ties and negotiations with Israel and they have embassies [there]—the story is over.”

Saif al-Islam’s repeated message should be viewed in light of Israel’s implementation of its disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, conducted in full view of the international media. This move was rewarded by a subsequent measure of Arab and Muslim reconciliation with Israel, most prominently the lifting of Bahrain’s economic boycott of Israeli products and the meeting of Israeli Foreign Ministry officials with their Pakistani counterparts on 1 September 2005 in Istanbul. This meeting was followed by Islamabad’s declared readiness to begin a dialogue with Israel.

Significantly, however, Saif al-Islam avoided reiterating his opinion vis-à-vis Israel and Judeo-Islamic relations in the last quarter of 2005, seemingly obeying the orders of his father and other top officials of the regime. At this time, Tripoli certainly did not need any further destabilizing or discordant input into its rigid political and ideological agenda, especially in light of the unwanted rumors on both a planned secret visit by Qadhafi to Israel and on his intention to play a role in the process of Arab Muslim normalization with Israel. Concurrently, Israeli and Arab sources reported on the exchange of contacts between the two countries’ representatives, including a meeting between Libyan officials and Israeli MPs Ilan Shalgi of the Shinui Party and Ephraim Sneh of the Israel Labor Party. In addition to these rumors, it was alleged that General Musa Kusa, the director of Libyan Intelligence, secretly visited Israel in August 2005 and met Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. These rumors were denied by Libyan officials, including Foreign Minister ’Abd al-Rahman Shalqam. Whatever the truth, the alleged contacts did not bear any discernible fruit. Moreover, Saif al-Islam’s alleged adoption of his father’s
“Isratin” formula as the only acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflected the increasing constraints on his political autonomy, at least with regard to airing his views on the highly charged issue of Libya’s somewhat softened attitude toward Israel. This was further attested to by the statement released by a top Foreign Ministry official, Sa’id ‘Uraybi Hafyanah, who stressed in June 2005 in response to Saif al-Islam’s relatively pragmatic approach to Israel that the willingness of “the engineer,” namely Saif al-Islam, to enter into dialogue with Israel “does not reflect official Libyan policy but rather his own business.” In any case, Hafyanah reiterated that Libya supports “a single state solution as the [sole] permanent means for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and “eschews efforts at normalization with Israel in the interim as long as there is bloodshed in the region.” Hafyanah’s statement followed an earlier statement by Libya’s foreign minister, Shukri Ghanem, which declared that Israel is “a mistake in the political geography.”

Conclusion

In spite of Saif al-Islam’s verbal breach of the ideological wall of his country’s rejection of Israel’s right to exist, Libya’s official position toward Israel seemed to have remained substantially intact. At least publicly, the Libyan government at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century did not release any official statement signaling a dramatic change that explicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist. Yet the negative intensity of the rhetoric and the frequency of official verbal attacks aimed at Israel have noticeably decreased, seemingly reflecting a greater degree of pragmatism than hitherto exhibited.

More than anything else, it was the Libyan interest in a rapprochement with the West, and with the United States in particular, that prompted the ruling elite in Tripoli to reevaluate and readjust the country’s foreign policy positions accordingly, a process in which Saif al-Islam has been especially influential throughout the 2000s. It appeared that Qadhafi’s son came to the conclusion that it was vital for Libya to update its policy positions to suit the post–cold war era and the consequent U.S.-led “New World Order” and thus to rehabilitate the country’s enfant terrible image and gain international respectability. Saif al-Islam’s extraordinary breach, however minor, of the long-standing wall of antagonism toward Israel primarily reflected Libya’s desire for diplomatic reconciliation with
Washington. Signaling a softer approach toward Israel seemed to be an effective stratagem for promoting Libya’s own vital interests.

By allowing his son to be the one to articulate changes in Libya’s rhetoric toward Zionism, the state of Israel, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qadhafi was able to remain ideologically and politically aloof from this process. This, in turn, enabled him to maintain his agenda and prestige. Significantly as well, the change in the rhetoric toward Israel also provided Qadhafi with a pressure valve for expressing his outrage toward the Arab Muslim world for its “betrayal” when Libya was suffering from the Lockerbie sanctions. In the early 2000s, it became increasingly apparent that Tripoli’s regional and international priorities were changing in an unprecedented manner. This also coincided with some generational changes in the country’s leadership, as figures well versed in the culture and mind-set of the West were placed in positions of official responsibility. Still under his father’s dominant leadership but enjoying a measure of tangible impact of his own, Saif al-Islam clearly affected the shaping of Libya’s decision-making machinery throughout the 2000s. While Qadhafi matured ideologically during the stormy anti-Israel, Pan-Arab Nasserite era, his son has ascended to a politically influential position in an era that sanctified the principle of the territorial state and its own explicit interests as a first priority.

Notwithstanding the dramatic upheavals Libya has witnessed during his long tenure in power, Qadhafi remained captive to his hostile sentiments toward Israel and found it difficult to relinquish them. Indeed, after resuming diplomatic relations with Washington in 2005, there was no longer any incentive for him to relax his lifelong negative opinions of Israel. From 2005 through 2010, Libya had carved for itself an important niche on the U.S. foreign policy agenda and on the global political and economic map. Having renounced international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the Libyans no longer needed to placate the West. Therefore, one did not find in recent years significant statements by either Saif al-Islam or other top Libyan officials which advocated even a relatively conciliatory approach toward the legitimacy of the state of Israel or in favor of a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The nationwide bloody rebellion that erupted against Qadhafi in winter 2011 may or may not lead to a change in regime and thus it is premature to speculate whether or not political changes would necessarily work to Israel’s advantage.
Notes

1. For background on the Lockerbie dispute, the resulting sanctions, and their destructive effect on Libya, see Yehudit Ronen, “The Lockerbie Endgame: Qadhafi Slips the Noose,” Middle East Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 53–59; Geoff Simons, Libya and the West (Oxford: Centre for Libyan Studies, 2003), 141–63. On Libya in the “New World Order,” see Yehudit Ronen, Qadhafi’s Libya in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008).


3. Jamahiriyya Review, Tripoli (monthly), e.g., October, November, and December 1982. The “two-armed devil” perception was not Qadhafi’s invention, and it has been prevalent in other Arab and Muslim circles. One telling example was the nickname “Jews,” which Iraqi people have used when referring to the American soldiers fighting in Iraq. See Thomas L. Friedman, “Jews, Israel, and America,” New York Times, 24 October 2004, quoting Scott Pelley of CBS’s 60 Minutes, reporting from Baghdad. Other examples of this “two-armed devil” concept, randomly selected, include a Friday sermon delivered at the mosque of Um al-Ma’arik [mother of all battles] in Baghdad, calling on Allah to destroy the “Jewish and American idolatry forces.” Iraqi TV, 31 January 2003, quoted by Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), no. 464, 2 February 2003; a Friday sermon delivered in Teheran by Ayatollah Mohamed Emami Kashani in which he stated that “Zionism, which partly exists in Tel Aviv but is mainly based in the White House, acts to harm Islam,” quoted in al-Ahram Weekly, Cairo, 19–25 May 2005; and the oath of al-Qaida’s “Jihad Fighters” in Afghanistan to slit the throats of “the two enemies of Islam,” the Americans and the Jews, al-‘Arabiyya TV, 5 August 2005, quoted by MEMRI, no. 953, 9 August 2005.


8. Washington Post, Reuters report, 13 April 1985, as quoted by Robert O. Freedman, “Moscow and the Middle East,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey,


11. Radio Tripoli, 7 August 1988, Daily Report, and al-Jamahiriyya, Tripoli, 19 November 1988. The theme that the Arabs and the Muslims should not pay for Hitler’s crimes has been repeated by various Arab and Muslim figures, including Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. See, e.g., New York Times, 29 October and 15 December 2005.


15. Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency (JANA), Tripoli, 11 October 1990. Qadhafi reiterated his idea that the Israelis should return to their countries of origin later in the 1990s. See, e.g., al-Fajr al-Jadid, Tripoli, 12 February 1995.


22. For more details on the Hebron attack, see Filastin al-Thawra, 6 March 1994. For Qadhafi’s praise of the Hamas attack, see al-Zahf al-Akhdar, Tripoli, 21 October 1994.


26. Tripoli TV, 24 January 2001, BBC, quoting Qadhafi’s lecture to political science students at the Fath University in Tripoli.


28. Algiers TV, 23 March 2005, BBC.


30. See Iranian president Ahmadi-Nejad’s argument on the myth of the Holocaust as “an excuse used by the Europeans to create a Jewish state in the heart of the Islamic world,” as well as the “myth” position stated, though later denied, by Mahdi ’Akef, the spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. See Associated Press from Tehran, quoted in the *New York Times*, 15 December 2005, and Mideastwire.com, 26 December 2005, referring to ’Akef’s interview in *al-Hayat*, 24 December 2005.
37. ‘Abd al-Bari ‘Atwan, the chief editor of *al-Quds al-‘Arabi*, in an interview with al-Jazira TV, 2 November 2005, MEMRI TV Project, clip no. 999, 7 November 2005. This Holocaust denial drew further strength from Western Holocaust deniers, most noteworthy among whom are Roger Garaudy, David Bardash, and David Irving. An Iranian political analyst who unequivocally rejected the Holocaust even claimed that as written in “the Bible Book of Esther,” the “woman was incited into killing around 170,000 Iranians” in what is known today as the city of Susa. This number constituted “23–24 centuries ago the entire population of the country,” and therefore the Jews were those who had committed genocide against others. See Majid Goudarzi, MEMRI TV Project, clip no. 1005, 23 January 2006.


44. See http://www.akhban-libya.com, 21 November 2005, quoting Saif al-Islam. However, this message is not typical of him and was not an official quotation.


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