HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

JEFFERSON ADAMS
Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

10. Middle Eastern Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed, 2009.
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Although a relative latecomer to the world of intelligence activity, Ger-
many has managed to engage in more of it than most other countries. This is partly because, under some regimes, it evinced a particularly suspicious nature (although the same could certainly be said of the So-
viet Union). But the main cause is that, during certain periods, Germany not only spied on its enemies but was probably busier spying on its own citizens. There is no question that the Nazi regime (like the Soviet re-
gime, especially under Stalin) was almost as worried about the enemies within as those without, although it was too busy fighting a war to do much about it. But following World War II, the German Democratic Republic, created in the eastern sector of a divided Germany, was the world record holder. While spying on its own, it was also amazingly active in spying on the Federal Republic of Germany, in the western sector, as well as spying on the United States and other members of the “free world”—on its own behalf and for the Soviet Union. To keep an eye on one another, East Germany, in the course of its 40-year ex-
istence, recruited almost 1 percent of its rather small population into a vast and segmented espionage apparatus. This degree of thoroughness certainly generates a lot of activity, which forms a major portion of this book, but it also helps show just how diversified and sometimes par-
oid this field of endeavor can become.

This sort of complexity, as well as the fact that the German intel-
ligence apparatus has been more thoroughly investigated and dissected than most, makes the Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence a particularly interesting volume in a series that is attracting a scholarly and also popular public. Like the others, it starts with a list of acronyms, a rather substantial one, given the many players, and without which it would be hard to follow the literature on the topic. Next comes the chronology, not covering as long a time span as some, but uncommonly
dense in certain crucial periods. An introductory essay then provides the historical overview. But the core of the book remains the dictionary section, with literally hundreds of entries describing spies of all sorts, an abundance of intelligence organizations, and some of the more significant cases and typical features of spycraft as practiced in Germany. This is rounded out by a bibliography, surveying the growing range of publications on espionage (some of them by the spies themselves) and taking stock of the existing literature. Admittedly, much of this output is in German, as not everything has been translated, which only makes the historical dictionary more important as a means of understanding and evaluating one of the more systematic efforts at intelligence and counterintelligence.

This volume was written by Jefferson Adams, a specialist on the massive espionage industry of the former German Democratic Republic but also very knowledgeable about intelligence and counterintelligence matters during Germany’s many metamorphoses beginning in the 18th century. His first article on intelligence appeared in 1988 and received a special award from the National Intelligence Study Center in Washington, D.C. Besides having conducted archival research in Germany, he has been a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and held academic posts at Harvard University, New York University, and Sarah Lawrence College, where he is currently the Adda B. Bozeman Professor of History and International Relations. Over the years, his courses on intelligence have proven especially popular. In addition to teaching, he has written numerous articles and reviews, along with editing and translating Beyond the Wall, the memoirs of double agent Werner Stiller. For more than a decade, Adams served as program director and chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association and is at present the senior editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. There is no question that this book represents a comprehensive and engrossing addition to the expanding coverage of this series. Moreover, it underscores just how far a country can go in using espionage as a tool, a lesson that can be both intriguing and occasionally depressing.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor
My own induction into the world of intelligence came about largely by happenstance. After being engaged as a consultant for a book club, I received, as my first assignment, the manuscript of a new examination of the Richard Sorge spy ring in Tokyo. It immediately occurred to me how little I knew of this important episode—and about espionage activities in general—despite having had a former member of the Office of Strategic Services as my doctoral dissertation advisor. Even though the intervening years have seen large proliferation of intelligence courses at the college level, the topic remains a missing dimension in far too many instances. This work was conceived as a reference tool not just for those with a special interest in the field of intelligence but also for those engaged in the study of German history. Especially in the contemporary period, an account that omits the espionage factor would be akin to studying anatomy and ignoring the circulatory system.

A few words should be added about the dictionary itself. The definition of what constitutes Germany has been a vexing question for centuries. For purposes of this book, Austrian officials and institutions have been included along with a number of important Baltic and Sudeten Germans; Swiss Germans, however, appear only because of an interaction with a German figure or agency. Another issue concerns the distinction between espionage and resistance to Nazi rule during the Third Reich. Although the line is often hazy, only persons with a clear connection to intelligence work have been considered. Also, because of its cumbersomeness, the term Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) has been shortened to Nazi Party. Code names of operations have been accompanied by an English equivalent when necessary; code names of persons are indicated only by the original designation.
Lastly, my debts of gratitude are numerous, but two deserve special mention. One is to the interlibrary loan department of the Esther Raushenbush Library at Sarah Lawrence College for tracking down even the most obscure sources. The other is to my friend and colleague Professor Elfie Raymond for her keen editorial eye.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfNS</td>
<td>Amt für Nationale Sicherheit (Office of National Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APN</td>
<td>Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (Foreign Intelligence Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ast</td>
<td>Abwehrstelle (unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BfV</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGS</td>
<td>Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BND</td>
<td>Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSI</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Bureau for Security in Information Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BStU</td>
<td>Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVT</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Austrian Federal Agency for State Security and Counterterrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheka</td>
<td>Vserossiyskaya Chrezvyachaynaya Komissiya po Bor’bes Kontrrevolyutsiyey i Sabotazhem (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Corps (U.S. Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Mark (currency of the Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FAK  Frontaufklärungskommando (front reconnaissance commando)
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FDJ  Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FHO  Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East)
FHW  Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West)
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
FWHD  Friedrich-Wilhelm-Heinz-Dienst (Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz Service)
GDR  German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik)
GFP  Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police)
GMS  Gesellschaftliche Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit (Societal Collaborators for Security)
GRU  Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff)
HNaA  Heeresnachrichtenamt (Austrian Army Intelligence Office)
HVA  Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit)
IM  Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborator)
IRA  Irish Republican Army
ISHR  International Society for Human Rights
JHS  Juristische Hochschule des MfS (School of Law of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit)
K-5  Kriminalpolizei-5 (Criminal Police-5)
KgU  Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group against Inhumanity)
KGB  Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Committee of State Security)
KNSSt  Kriegsnachrichtenstelle (war intelligence center)
KO  Kriegsorganisation (war organization)
KoKo  Kommerzielle Koordinierung (Commercial Coordination)
KPD  Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party)
KSC  Czechoslovakian Communist Party
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Counterintelligence Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MfS</td>
<td>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGB</td>
<td>Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Ministry of State Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>British Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI6</td>
<td>British Secret Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIB</td>
<td>Mainzer Informationsbüro (Mainz Information Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKFD</td>
<td>Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee for Free Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKGB</td>
<td>Narodnyy Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet People’s Commissariat of State Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>Nachrichtenoffizier Berlin (Intelligence Officer Berlin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>Operationsgebiet (operational area); Organisation Gehlen (Gehlen Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGPU</td>
<td>Obyedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravleniye (Soviet Unified State Political Directorate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OibE</td>
<td>Offizier im besonderen Einsatz (officer in special deployment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMS</td>
<td>Comintern International Liaison Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of Policy Coordination (U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services (U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OV</td>
<td>Operativer Vorgang (operational case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIAS</td>
<td>Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (Radio in the American Sector)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RSD  Reichssicherheitsdienst (Reich Protection Service)
RSHA  Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office)
SA  Sturmbteilung (Storm Division)
SD  Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service)
SDS  Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (German Socialist Student Association)
SED  Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SIPO  Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police)
SIRA  System der Informationsrecherche der Aufklärung (System of Reconnaissance Information Research)
SIS  Secret Intelligence Service (Great Britain)
Smersh  Soviet Military Counterintelligence
SOE  Special Operations Executive (Great Britain)
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
Stapo  Staatspolizeilicher Dienst (Austrian State Police Service)
Stasi  Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security)
StB  Statni tajna Bezpecnost (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service)
SS  Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad)
SUPO  Suojelupoliisi (Finnish Security Police)
SWT  Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik (Sector for Science and Technology of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit)
UFJ  Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen (Investigative Committee of Free Jurists)
USAREUR  U.S. Army in Europe
VA  Verwaltung Aufklärung (Administration for Reconnaissance of the NVA)
VS  Verband deutscher Schriftsteller (German Writers’ Association)
ZAIG  Zentrale Auswertungs und Informationsgruppe (Central Evaluation and Information Group)
ZfCh  Zentralstelle für das Chiffrierwesen (Code Coordination Bureau)
ZKG  Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe (Central Coordinating Group)
# Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>The first Habsburg political police force is organized by Johann Pergen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td><strong>23 March</strong>: August von Kotzebue is assassinated as a suspected Russian spy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Prussia sends its first military attaché to Paris.</td>
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<td>1833</td>
<td>Chancellor Klemens von Metternich of Austria establishes the Mainzer Informationsbüro.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td><strong>March</strong>: Metternich is forced to resign. <strong>May 18</strong>: The Frankfurt National Assembly meets for the first time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Frederick William IV of Prussia appoints Wilhelm Stieber to monitor dissident activity. Austria-Hungary sets up its military intelligence office as the Evidenzbüro.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>August Schluga Baron von Rastenfeld is engaged as a Prussian agent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Otto von Bismarck unifies Germany under Prussian leadership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>William II becomes emperor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Germany embarks on a new naval expansion program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>German military intelligence (Abteilung IIIb) is formed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td><strong>November</strong>: The German government denies involvement in the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>A central intelligence collection agency for the Second Reich is established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>The imperial naval intelligence unit (“N”) is authorized.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td><strong>25 May</strong>: The unmasking of Alfred Redl as a Russian spy prompts his suicide in Vienna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td><strong>August</strong>: World War I begins. Alexander Bauermeister supplies vital intelligence at the Battle of Tannenberg. <strong>26 August</strong>: The wreck of the <em>Magdeburg</em> results in the loss of German naval...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
codes. **September**: Richard Hentsch makes a controversial assessment at the Battle of the Marne. **6 November**: Carl Hans Lody is executed in London as a spy.

1915 Elsbeth Schragmüller assumes responsibility for military espionage regarding France. **December**: Franz von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed are expelled as spies from the United States.

1916 **30 July**: German agents explode the installation on Black Tom Island in New York harbor.

1917 Alexander Helphand channels secret German subsidies to Bolshevik revolutionaries. Maximilian Ronge becomes head of the Evidenzbüro. **March**: The authenticity of the decoded Zimmermann Telegram is confirmed by its author. **5 October**: Mata Hari is executed in Paris for espionage.

1918 **29 October–4 November**: A sailors’ mutiny takes place in Kiel. **9 November**: Emperor William II abdicates and the Weimar Republic is proclaimed. **11 November**: The armistice between the Allies and Germany is signed, ending World War I.

1919 **15 January**: Revolutionary activists Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht are murdered while en route to prison. **11 August**: The Weimar constitution is announced.

1921 German military intelligence is reconfigured as the Abwehr.

1922 Clandestine military collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Soviet Red Army begins. **24 June**: Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau is assassinated.

1923 **1 January**: French and Belgian troops occupy the Ruhr. **25 October**: The communist uprising in Hamburg is suppressed. **8–11 November**: Adolf Hitler leads an abortive coup in Munich.

1926 **10 September**: Germany joins the League of Nations.

1929 **6 January**: Heinrich Himmler is appointed SS-Reichsführer.

1931 **8 June**: Hans-Thilo Schmidt offers to sell Enigma information to the French. **10 August**: Reinhard Heydrich begins to form the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).

1933 **30 January**: Hitler is appointed chancellor by President Paul von Hindenburg. **27 February**: The Reichstag is set on fire. **23 March**: The Enabling Act is passed. **10 April**: The Forschungsamt is established by Hermann Göring. **26 April**: The Gestapo is created, with Rudolf Diels as its first director.
1934 The SD manufactures evidence for the Night of the Long Knives of 30 June. 1 April: Diels loses his position as head of the Gestapo in a power struggle with Himmler. 25 July: A Nazi coup in Austria fails.

1935 Full-scale production of the Enigma cipher machines commences. Hitler forbids espionage activity in Great Britain. 2 January: Wilhelm Canaris takes command of the Abwehr. 15 September: The Nuremberg racial laws are enacted.

1936 7 March: German troops march into the demilitarized Rhineland. 17 June: Himmler assumes control of the unified police forces of the Third Reich. 18 July: The Spanish Civil War begins. 1 August: The Olympic Games open in Berlin. 25 October: A German-Italian pact establishes the Berlin-Rome Axis.

1938 Fremde Heere, the intelligence unit of the General Staff, is divided into eastern and western sections. 4 February: Hitler takes over as supreme commander of the Wehrmacht. 13 March: “Greater Germany” is created by the annexation of Austria. 20 June: Liselotte Herrmann is executed as a communist spy. 28 September: The plan of Hans Oster and Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz to assassinate Hitler fails. 29 September: The Munich Conference grants the Sudetenland to Germany.

1939 The Rote Kapelle begins to form around Harro Schulze-Boysen and Arvid and Mildred Harnack. 23 August: The Nazi-Soviet Pact is concluded. 31 August: The Gleiwitz incident is staged to make Poland appear as an aggressor against Germany. 1 September: World War II begins with the invasion of Poland. 14 September: Wolfgang zu Putlitz flees to Great Britain. 21 September: Heydrich issues guidelines for the Einsatzgruppen in occupied Poland. 1 October: The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) is formed under Heydrich. 9 November: Two British Secret Intelligence Service officers are abducted by the SD in the Venlo Affair.

1940 20 May: Tyler Kent is arrested in London as a Nazi spy. 23 October: Hitler negotiates unsuccessfully with Francisco Franco of Spain. November: Richard Sorge begins to warn Moscow of Hitler’s impending invasion of the Soviet Union.
14 December: Heinrich Müller is appointed head of the Gестapo.


1942 Three Nazi spies are executed in Britain and six in the United States. Members of the Rote Kapelle are arrested by the Gестapo and executed. Ernst Hanfstaengl is engaged as an intelligence aide to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 20 January: Heydrich convenes the Wannsee Conference to implement the Final Solution. 1 April: Reinhard Gehlen takes command of Fremde Heere Ost. 27 May: Heydrich is fatally wounded in Prague by members of the Czech resistance.

1943 14–24 January: The United States and Great Britain agree at Casablanca to secure the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers. 30 January: Ernst Kaltenbrunner is appointed head of the RSHA. 5 April: Several members of the resistance group within the Abwehr are arrested. 12–13 July: The Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland is established near Moscow. 18 August: Fritz Kolbe has his first meeting with Allen Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 2 September: Otto Skorzeny’s commando unit rescues Benito Mussolini from Italian captivity.

1944 26 January: Argentina breaks relations with Germany and arrests a large number of Nazi spies. February: Erich Vermehren of the Abwehr defects to the British in Istanbul. The Abwehr is absorbed by the RSHA. The Cicero Affair comes to light. 6 June: The Allied invasion of Normandy commences. 20 June: Hitler survives an assassination attempt at Rastenburg.

1945 9 April: Wilhelm Canaris is executed. 29 April: Karl Wolff negotiates an early surrender on the Italian front with the OSS. 30 April: Hitler takes his own life in Berlin. 8 May: Germany surrenders unconditionally. 23 May: Himmler commits suicide in British captivity. 9 June: The Soviet Military Admin-
istration in Germany is established at Berlin-Karlshorst. **17 July–2 August:** The Allies meet in Potsdam.

**1946 June:** The Organisation Gehlen is formed under the aegis of the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps. Schellenberg testifies against Kaltenbrunner before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. **16 October:** Kaltenbrunner is executed.

**1947**

K-5 functions as an auxiliary purging instrument of the MVD (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs) in the Soviet occupation zone of postwar Germany.

**1948**

10 April: Otto Ohlendorf of the SD is sentenced to death. **24 June:** The Soviet Union imposes a blockade of the western sectors of Berlin, causing a massive airlift by the United States and Great Britain.

**1949**

12 May: The Berlin Airlift ends. **15 September:** Konrad Adenauer is elected the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). **1 December:** Fritz Tejessy is appointed director of the first domestic intelligence organization in the FRG.

**1950**

9 February: The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) is officially formed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). **16 February:** Wilhelm Zaisser is named the first head of the MfS. **March:** Ursula Kuczynski flees to the GDR from Great Britain. **7 November:** The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) is established in the FRG under Otto John.

**1951**

1 March: The central Soviet interrogation and detention prison at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen is transferred to the control of the MfS. **16 August:** The foreign intelligence service of the GDR is established as a camouflaged unit.

**1952**

13 May: The GDR Border Police are subordinated to the MfS. **20–27 November:** The show trial against the so-called antistate Slansky conspirator center takes place in Prague. **15 December:** Markus Wolf is appointed head of GDR foreign intelligence.

**1953**

5 March: Joseph Stalin dies. **April:** The BfV experiences its first major embarrassment in the Vulkan Affair. **18–23 July:** The MfS loses its ministerial status owing to its alleged failure during the Uprising of 17 June. Zaisser is also dismissed and replaced by Ernst Wollweber. **November:** Operation Feuerwerk begins in the GDR.
1954  20 July: John disappears in East Berlin and later holds an international press conference.

1955  5 May: The FRG receives state sovereignty and becomes a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO).
14 May: The GDR becomes a member of the Warsaw Pact.
15 May: The State Treaty of Austria proclaims the country’s neutrality, and the occupying powers depart by the fall. 24 November: The MfS regains its ministerial status.

1956  Kurt Fechner organizes postwar Austrian military intelligence.

4 February: Robert Bialek is kidnapped from West to East Berlin. 22 April: The Soviets make public their discovery of the Berlin Tunnel. 1 May: The Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) under Markus Wolf is officially sanctioned. 1 April: The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is designated a federal agency under Gehlen. 4 July: The first U-2 flight by the United States over Soviet territory is launched from Wiesbaden. 17 August: The Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party) is banned in the FRG.

1957  The BND begins clandestine cooperation with the Israeli Mossad. 1 November: Ernst Wollweber is dismissed and replaced by Erich Mielke as head of the MfS.

1958  27 October: Walter Ulbricht declares East Berlin to be sovereign territory of the GDR.

1959  24 June: Klaus Fuchs is released from prison and becomes an East German citizen two days later.

1960  11 May: Adolf Eichmann is kidnapped by Mossad in Argentina and brought to Israel for trial. 28 October: Alfred Frenzel is arrested in the FRG as a Czechoslovakian spy.

1961  13 August: The GDR begins construction of the Berlin Wall, causing a reduction in spy traffic between the two Germanys. 6 November: Heinz Felfe of the BND is arrested as a double agent.

1962  10 February: East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel helps arrange the first Cold War spy exchange, trading Rudolph Abel for U-2 pilot Gary Francis Powers. October–November: The Spiegel Affair strains the relationship between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the BND.
1964 6 November: Richard Sorge is posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union.

1967 31 August: Tamara Bunke is killed in Bolivia while accompanying Che Guevara. 15 December: The MfS Wachregiment is named after Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet Cheka.

1968 West German entrepreneur Hannsheinz Porst is unmasked as an East German agent. 1 May: Gerhard Wessel replaces Gehlen as head of the BND. 21–28 August: The Prague Spring reform movement is suppressed by troops of the Warsaw Pact.

1969 28 September: Willy Brandt forms a new government pledged to improve relations with the GDR.

1971 3 May: Erich Honecker succeeds Ulbricht as the leader of the GDR. July: The Sektor für Wissenschaft und Technik becomes a separate unit in the MfS.

1972 1–15 June: West German police arrest the core of the Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction terrorist organization. December: Intelligence ties are formed between the HVA and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.


1974 24 April: Günter Guillaume is arrested as an East German operative. 3 May: The GDR Defense Council confirms the use of weapons against border violators.

1975 15 September: Günter Nollau of the BfV is pressured to retire.

1976 2 June: Lothar and Renate Lutze of the FRG Defense Ministry are arrested. 16 November: Singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann is expatriated by the GDR and sparks a major debate in the MfS.

1977 7 April: The murder of the FRG’s chief federal prosecutor in Karlsruhe marks the beginning of a series of terrorist crimes known as the “German autumn.”

1979 18 January: Werner Stiller of the HVA defects to the FRG.

1981 26 June: Werner Teske of the HVA is secretly executed for planning an escape to the West. 13 December: Martial law is declared in Poland.
1982  1 October: Helmut Kohl becomes chancellor of the FRG.

1983  22 April: BfV chief Richard Meier retires after a suspicious automobile accident.

1985  10 March: Mikhail Gorbachev is elected state and party leader in the Soviet Union. 11 June: A major East–West spy exchange takes place on the Glienicker Bridge between Potsdam and Berlin. 19 August: Hansjoachim Tiedge of the BfV defects to the GDR. 24 August: Margarete Höke of the Federal President’s Office is arrested as an East German agent.

September: Heribert Hellenbroich is dismissed as head of the BND and replaced by Hans-Georg Wieck.

1986  5 April: La Belle discotheque in West Berlin is bombed by terrorists.

1987  5 March: Wolf retires from the HVA and is succeeded by Werner Grossmann.

1989  3 April: The GDR suspends the order to shoot along the inner-German border after the last killing in February. 2 May: Hungary begins dismantling its fortifications on the Austrian border. 25 September: Monday night demonstrations begin in Leipzig. 3 October: The GDR closes its border to Czechoslovakia. 4 November: More than 500,000 protesters gather at the Alexanderplatz in East Berlin. 6 November: Mielke orders the district MfS offices to destroy all incriminating records. 9 November: The Berlin Wall is inadvertently opened through the confusion of the East German leadership. 17 November: Mielke resigns his office amid mounting protests; the MfS is renamed the Amt für Nationale Sicherheit (AfNS) under Wolfgang Schwanitz. 6 December: Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski surrenders to West German authorities. 7 December: Mielke is arrested.

1990  Gabriele Gast of the BND and Klaus Kuron of the BfV are unmasked as former GDR agents. The British-American signals intercept facility on the Teufelsberg in West Berlin ceases operations. 13 January: The AfNS is to be disbanded. 15 January: East German dissidents occupy the state security headquarters complex. 19 February: The Round Table approves the destruction of state security electronic databases. 8 March: By government order, all Stasi agents are no longer bound to their original...
agreement. **9 March:** Mielke is released for reasons of health. **31 March:** All GDR state security employees are dismissed. **24 August:** The GDR’s People’s Chamber decides on a “law regarding the safeguarding and use of personal data stored by the former MfS.” **3 October:** The unification treaty between the two Germanys is signed; Joachim Gauck is named chief administrator of the voluminous Stasi files.

**1991**

Gregor Gysi is accused of being a Stasi spy. **17 January:** The Bundestag elects Helmut Kohl the first chancellor of reunified Germany. **20 June:** The transfer of the seat of government from Bonn to Berlin is narrowly approved by the Bundestag. **6 September:** Lothar de Maizière resigns all offices following allegations that he was a Stasi informer.

**1992**

The Bundesnachrichtendienst secures the release of two German hostages held by pro-Iranian Lebanese captors. New domestic surveillance offices begin to form in the individual states of the former GDR. Citizens can inspect their Stasi files for the first time.

**1993**

**January:** Christa Wolf and Heiner Müller are exposed as Stasi informants. **14 January:** Charges against Erich Honecker are dropped due to illness. **22 July:** German combat troops are sent to Somalia. **26 October:** Mielke is convicted for the murder of two Berlin policemen in 1931. **7 November:** NATO spy Rainer Rupp receives a 12-year prison sentence.

**1994**

**31 August:** A ceremony in Berlin marks the departure of the last Soviet troops from Germany. **8 September:** The remaining military forces of the western Allies leave.

**1995**

**1 August:** Mielke is released from prison for reasons of health.

**1998**

Markus Wolf’s prison sentence is overturned. **20 April:** The Baader-Meinhof/RAF terrorist group announces its self-dissolution. **27 September:** National elections result in a new Social Democratic/Green coalition government headed by Gerhard Schröder.

**1999**

Arthur Anderson’s reconstructed Stasi file confirms his role as a major informant in the avant-garde literary scene.

**2000**

**28 September:** The Bundestag confirms Marianne Birthler as the new administrator of the Stasi files.
2002  **3 August:** The Schröder government rejects possible participation in a U.S.-led coalition against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. **1 December:** Austrian intelligence undergoes a major reorganization.

2003  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency returns the Rosenholz files to Germany. **10 April:** The headquarters of the BND are to be moved from Pullach to Berlin by 2011. **17 September:** The Militärischer Abschirmdienst receives authorization to act abroad because of the increased number of German armed forces on foreign assignment.

2004  BfV head Heinz Fromm protests the attempted recruitment of German citizens by the Russian Federal Security Service. **23 June:** Access to Stasi files is tightened following a legal challenge by former chancellor Kohl. **13 July:** Former BfV chief Holger-Ludwig Pfahls is arrested in Paris on charges of bribery and tax evasion.

2005  Germany’s highest court rules that Manfred Stolpe cannot be called a Stasi informer. **22 November:** Angela Merkel becomes the first female German chancellor and forms a grand coalition government.

2006  **7 April:** A parliamentary inquiry is authorized regarding the activities of the BND during the Iraq War.

2008  **July:** The BND mediates a prisoner exchange between Hezbollah and Israel.

2009  **May:** Karl-Heinz Kurras, the West Berlin policeman who killed Benno Ohnesorg in 1967, is exposed as a former Stasi agent.
German achievements abound. Whether in World Cup soccer competition or the production of luxury automobiles and precision cameras, Germany has maintained an enviable record of accomplishment. Given the preeminent role that the country has also played in the field of intelligence, a number of questions come to mind. Was it Germany’s lack of natural boundaries as das Land der Mitte that made it so vulnerable to foreign powers and their covert operatives? At the same time, was it the absence of stable political institutions that helped foster a recurring atmosphere of domestic subterfuge and conspiracy? And perhaps most importantly, what marks do its many spies and intelligence organizations ultimately deserve?

Certainly a host of popular images come to mind regarding German espionage. In The Invasion of 1910, the prolific Edwardian novelist William Le Queux wrote alarmingly of 100 advance German agents in London, passing unnoticed but working in unison, each little group of two or three with its allotted task. Upon the outbreak of World War I, the Times of London, reflecting a widely held opinion, asserted that “in their eager absorption of the baser side of militarism, the Germans seem to have almost converted themselves into a race of spies.”1 Emotions ran no less high in World War II. In 1939, Hollywood’s first explicitly antifascist feature film—Confessions of a Nazi Spy—played to an enthusiastic international audience and actually included footage from the trial of an agent recently captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Even though the Soviet Union replaced Nazi Germany as the dominant threat after 1945, it was Berlin that emerged center stage in the East–West conflict and became hauntingly evoked by John le Carré’s acclaimed novel The Spy Who Came in from the Cold.

Fortunately, the scrupulous scholarship of the past several decades on both sides of the Atlantic now allows for a far more dispassionate
and objective inquiry into Germany’s espionage past. It should be stated at the outset, however, that the country has no major claim to make regarding the provenance of its intelligence tradition. Both Spain and Great Britain can point to gifted individuals in the Elizabethan period, while the Russian practice of espionage derives from the Oprichnina, created during the 16th-century reign of Ivan the Terrible to purge signs of disloyalty in the population. It was not until roughly 200 years later that the first significant stirrings of intelligence work began to occur in the German lands. For the shrewd 18th-century enlightened despot Frederick the Great, a covert network of informants quite understandably became an indispensable tool. Not only did he face an array of formidable neighbors in his quest for great-power status, but Prussia—or “mes états” as he frequently stated—was a scattered possession, lacking a plentiful treasury and sparsely endowed with natural resources. Even though he created no organized system of information-gathering, individual spies proved to be an acknowledged asset in the warfare that comprised the bulk of his long reign.

The innovations ushered in by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars found strong resonance in Prussia as well. It is certainly true that the chief military theorist of the age, Carl von Clausewitz, accorded intelligence little value. As he noted in On War, “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are uncertain.” Nevertheless, a recommendation made by Colonel Christian von Massenbach in 1800 was to have profound implications for the future. He urged that officers earmarked for high command spend time beforehand in the major capitals of Europe in order to acquire greater familiarity with rival countries. Stationed in the diplomatic missions, these military attachés, while admonished to avoid any domestic political involvement and observe utmost caution in their personal behavior, carefully scrutinized the daily press and developed extensive social contacts. As Prussia struggled to unify Germany in the latter half of the 19th century, the attachés proved their worth in more than one instance. Particularly those officers serving in Paris prior to the Franco-Prussian War were able to provide detailed and accurate reports regarding the manpower changes and mobilization plans of the French army, thereby contributing significantly to its swift defeat in 1871. It was also a German military attaché in Paris, Maximilian von Schwartzkoppen, who emerged as a key protagonist in the Dreyfus Affair.
In Vienna, quite a different set of priorities dominated after 1815. The Austrian chancellor, Klemens von Metternich, realized that newly unleashed forces of nationalism posed a dire threat to the existence of the multiethnic Habsburg Empire. As a means of monitoring suspected subversion—and building on the work of forerunners such as Johann Anton Pergen, the founder of Austria’s first secret police force—Metternich established the Mainzer Informationsbüro (Mainz Information Office), which ran a far-flung network of informers unrivaled in Europe at the time. Austria could also claim expertise in the realm of cryptography, having earlier formed the Geheime Kabinets-Kanzlei (Secret Cabinet Office), one of the most renowned black chambers of the 18th century.

Yet the institutionalization of intelligence in Germany took place in a rather haphazard manner without any firm guiding hand. One might have expected Otto von Bismarck, the wily iron chancellor who brought about the country’s unification, to have played a more decisive role in this regard. Granted, he engaged Wilhelm Stieber just prior to the Austro-Prussian conflict in 1866 and helped him acquire the title of Germany’s first spymaster. But Bismarck relied on many other sources of information—especially his own foreign envoys—and assigned to Stieber primarily those tasks that lay outside the world of bourgeois respectability, such as spying on political opponents and reading other people’s mail. Even though Stieber was the recipient of several state awards, his reputation among the general public remained an unsavory one, and his intelligence bureau vanished with his departure from government service. Bismarck, who tried to avoid personal meetings with his spy chief whenever possible, mentioned him only fleetingly in his memoirs.

The situation was further complicated by the desire of the Prussian General Staff to be independent of Stieber and possess its own information-gathering unit. At the prompting of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the first military secret service in German history came into existence in 1867 and steadily expanded its operations during the next decades, especially in France and Russia. Major resistance, however, came from the Foreign Office. Already displeased with the installation of the military attachés in its embassies and possessing its own off-the-record contacts, diplomatic officials saw a further intrusion on their turf. These unresolved tensions were merely a portent of what was to follow in the 20th century.
As in other countries, World War I marked a watershed for Germany in nearly every respect. With the ardent support of Erich Ludendorff of the General Staff, military intelligence—based in Abteilung IIIb (Department IIIb) under the direction of Walter Nicolai—gained complete domination over political intelligence and even took on tasks such as censorship, propaganda, and ideological policing. But Nicolai’s organization was hardly a monolith. The imperial navy had had sole responsibility for Great Britain since 1902 through its division simply called “N,” which was disinclined to share information with its rival army counterpart. For Russia and the Balkans, Nicolai had to rely on the cooperation of the Evidenzbüro of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. Most puzzling of all was the overall estrangement between those who collected intelligence and those who evaluated it.

Whereas some exceptional individuals emerged in the course of the war—Elsbeth Schragmüller, Alexander Bauermeister, and August Schluga Baron von Rastenfeld to name but a few—German efforts fell short on many occasions. Already in the opening months, it was the mistaken intelligence report of Richard Hentsch at the Battle of the Marne that stopped the German offensive and led to the stalemate in the trenches, and it was the sinking of the Magdeburg that ultimately gave the British a working knowledge of the German naval codes. Then there were missed opportunities, nowhere more so than in the United States. In sharp contrast to the British, who mounted a brilliant covert propaganda campaign directed by Gilbert Parker, authorities in Berlin failed to enlist the sympathy of the large German-American population in the United States and instead resorted to such maladroit acts as the Black Tom Island explosion and the Zimmermann telegram. In a similar vein, the attempt to foment various native uprisings in Britain’s colonial empire came to naught. Only Germany’s clandestine support of the Bolshevik revolutionaries—designed to destabilize the Russian government and force its withdrawal from the war—met with any notable degree of success.

Defeat in World War I brought forth the new military intelligence organization of the Abwehr. By adopting a name that implied purely self-defense, it could circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and operate in the open. As the country quickly became a magnet for international espionage, the Weimar government faced not only the presence of the British, French, and Polish services but agents of the
Third International, or Comintern—a covert ideological force emanating from Moscow convinced that the key to world revolution lay in Germany. In fact, the language of the Comintern was German, and words such as Treff (meeting) and Verbindungsmensch (liaison) came into regular use throughout the communist underground. Chastened by the abortive insurrections of 1923 and eager to acquire new technologies, Soviet military intelligence turned increasingly to industrial espionage and managed to form a network of more than 3,000 informers in various German firms. Walter Krivitsky, one of those Soviet officers involved, later remarked: “Out of the ruins of the Communist Revolution, we built in Germany for Soviet Russia, a brilliant intelligence service, the envy of every nation.” It is noteworthy as well that two of the young German operatives involved—Wilhelm Zaisser and Ernst Wollweber—were destined to head the East German security apparatus in the 1950s.

Besides crippling communist espionage operations, the Nazi accession to power in 1933 inaugurated an era of often bewildering complexity regarding the collection of information and the surveillance of perceived enemies of the Reich. Some older institutions remained intact along with their personnel. The Foreign Office, for instance, continued its practices virtually unchanged until the innovations of Joachim von Ribbentrop in 1936, when he revived its cryptological section under the name “Pers Z” (Personal Z) and later set up his own espionage service called “Informationsstelle III.” The Abwehr also continued to function but underwent major reforms by its new head, Wilhelm Canaris. In the sprawling empire that he developed at home and abroad, older methods of collection were combined with more novel forms of irregular warfare. To a large extent, the organization became Canaris’s personal instrument, subject to his keen intellect and enigmatic personality. In addition, it came to harbor many of the most ardent opponents of the Nazi regime. Hans Gisevius once summed up the Abwehr as performing “well in small matters and very badly in large.”

Its immediate rival was the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service), created by Reinhard Heydrich initially to combat enemy infiltration within the Nazi Party but increasingly bent on total domestic surveillance. Working in concert with SS head Heinrich Himmler, Heydrich had managed to wrest control of the Gestapo from Hermann Göring and also eliminate the Sturmbatteilung in the Night of the Long Knives. A collision course with the Abwehr was avoided by a gentlemen’s
agreement with Canaris—the so-called Ten Commandments—even though Heydrich hardly relented in his desire for his own comprehensive system of policing and control. A unity of sorts was achieved in 1939 with the formation of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office), but this umbrella organization could barely mask the festering antagonisms among the various security organs. Also worthy of mention is the Forschungsamt (Research Office), located in Göring’s Air Ministry and probably the most objective source of collected information.

What, one may ask, was the relationship of Adolf Hitler to this tangled web of competing jurisdictions? Hitler never concealed the immense faith that he placed in his own intuitive powers—what he phrased his “sleepwalker’s assurance”—as demonstrated in the successful reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Then, too, as was the case throughout the political structure of the Third Reich, subordinates were often given overlapping areas of authority to encourage tensions along horizontal lines and help ensure the primacy of the Führer. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the staggering amount of intelligence aggressively collected and analyzed played no part in the decision-making process. A regular reader of the daily digests of the foreign press and excerpts of the wire service cables, Hitler could appear quite informed on world affairs, just as he made occasional tactical adjustments based on new evidence. The salient point is that his informants changed constantly, and no person or agency had guaranteed access to his office. As a result, he was prone to select mostly information that comported with his own views and served to legitimize his decisions. Those wishing to gain Hitler’s ear—and be heard from again in the future—knew better than to present any intelligence of a contrarian nature and thus purposely tailored what they had to offer. While this phenomenon can hardly be called a unique one in modern governments, it clearly attained exaggerated proportions during the Third Reich.

The opening phase of World War II witnessed some stunning victories by German forces, especially in France through the Ardennes offensive developed by the Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West). But the Soviet Union soon came to represent the greatest challenge to German intelligence operatives. During the 1920s, under the cloak of strictest secrecy, the Reichswehr and the Red Army had developed a mutually supportive arrangement, whereby military leaders on both
sides were able to gain almost full knowledge of one another’s capabilities. Hitler, however, quickly ordered an end to such cooperation, just as he prohibited German agents from entering Britain in the hope of fostering closer ties. When the massive Barbarossa offensive began to stall, it became glaringly clear how much the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO; Foreign Armies East) had underestimated the strength of Soviet forces. In a move that would have profound repercussions extending well into the postwar period, Reinhard Gehlen was appointed head of the FHO in the spring of 1942 and gained a reputation among his peers for his skill as an evaluator.

World War II further saw intense activity on the code-breaking front. Because of the subsequent fame surrounding the breaking of the Enigma keys at Bletchley Park, there has been a tendency to overlook German achievements in this area. Not only were many of the French codes read, but the naval intelligence unit managed to break several codes used by the British navy, especially those related to the convoy traffic in the Atlantic. Aided immeasurably by Tyler Kent, German cryptanalysts had some early success in tapping into American diplomatic traffic, but that ended rather quickly and was more than offset by the compromised dispatches of Hiroshi Oshima back to Tokyo. Probably the most significant effort on the part of the Germans involved the detection of the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) by the Funkabwehr (Radio Security Service).

Although Germany’s intelligence agencies lay in ruins in 1945, the situation actually provided fertile ground for Gehlen. As relations with the Soviet Union began to cool rapidly, the United States suddenly realized how little was known about their emerging antagonist. Shrewdly gaining the confidence of his American captors, Gehlen was able to provide both a large archive of important documents related to the situation in the East and a number of experts from his former FHO staff. This nucleus grew into the Organisation Gehlen (OG) and operated for the next 10 years—from 1946 to 1956—under the direct control of U.S. authorities, first the army and then the Central Intelligence Agency. Especially noteworthy was Operation HERMES—the OG’s massive collection and collation of debriefings of former German prisoners of war and refugees returning from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Yet this U.S.-German relationship was not without a certain friction, and Gehlen heartily welcomed the transition of the OG to the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service) in 1956. No longer responsible to the Americans but to the Chancellor’s Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Gehlen also started to develop bilateral relations with other foreign intelligence agencies, including those of Israel, Egypt, and Switzerland. The BND’s main personnel, however, showed little change, and critics took particular issue with the number of former SS officers who had been recruited. Moreover, as a result of Heinz Felfe—a former SD officer who had become a communist double agent and risen to dominate the BND’s counterintelligence branch—Gehlen’s entire operation suffered an almost fatal blow. Because of his close relationship with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, he managed to survive in office, but following his retirement, his successor, Gerhard Wessel, initiated a series of major reforms aimed at reducing the BND’s overly conspiratorial atmosphere.

To handle domestic affairs, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV; Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) was established in the earliest days of the FRG. So as to avoid any resemblance to the Gestapo, scrupulous attention was given to its restricted mandate. But problems surfaced early on, particularly when its first director, Otto John, mysteriously appeared in East Berlin and held an international press conference. Like the BND, the BfV quickly became a prime target for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS; Ministry of State Security), as evidenced by two highly successful double agents, Hansjoachim Tiedge and Klaus Kuron. The FRG further created a third intelligence unit—the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Counterintelligence Service)—to shield the newly established Bundeswehr, but it, too, did not remain completely immune from enemy penetration.

In the “other Germany”—the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—the institutionalization of intelligence took a decidedly different course. Although the MfS can be traced to a secret decree in 1950 by the parliament of the GDR, the new security apparatus was in essence an offspring of the Cheka, the original Soviet organization formed under the chairmanship of Felix Dzerzhinsky. That meant not only a secret police that functioned primarily as the “sword and shield” of the reigning Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) but close Soviet supervision of all MfS operations for the immediate future. Over time, the tentacles of the security apparatus under the leadership of Erich Mielke extended into nearly every sector of GDR society. In statistical
terms, the dense surveillance that it achieved was unparalleled in history, even among other Eastern bloc states. According to one historian’s calculations, the number of full-time MfS employees in 1989 relative to the population of the GDR was 1:180, whereas in the Soviet Union, the figure came to 1:595; other members of the Warsaw Pact such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia trailed further behind.\(^5\)

Moreover, the MfS—despite the existence of a separate directorate for foreign intelligence within its ranks (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung)—often combined operations at home and abroad in such a way that they became practically indistinguishable. A military counterintelligence organization (Verwaltung Aufklärung) also came into existence, but even though it was formally connected to the Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army), the MfS acted as an overseer, often inserting its own officers in disguise. In addition, it had task forces in readiness, trained in terror and sabotage, in the event of war or heightened domestic tension.\(^6\)

Yet, as unrest grew in the GDR during the fall of 1989, the MfS proved unable to control the opposition groups, and a major fissure opened vis-à-vis the leadership of the SED as well. At the conclusion of the nonviolent revolution that resulted in the dissolution of the MfS and the reunification of the two Germanys, the country broke new historical ground by the passage of the Stasi Records Act of 1991. Although Western intelligence organizations would doubtlessly have preferred to see these potentially incriminating documents destroyed, the unwavering determination of East German dissidents prevailed, and citizens were given the opportunity to examine their personal Stasi files under careful supervision.

Writing in 1923, Walter Nicolai defined the role of intelligence as “warfare in peacetime,” for he sensed that competition among the major powers would become increasingly more sophisticated and ruthless.\(^7\) However prescient the observations of the former spymaster at the time, his concept of intelligence would hardly find overwhelming acceptance in today’s Germany. Indeed, controversy continues to surround the FRG’s two major intelligence organizations. In the case of the BND, critics are prone to level the charge of incompetence, stressing how ill-conceived operations abroad often boomeranged, thereby leaving hapless agents to fend for themselves. Even though numerous reforms have taken place—the current organization bears scant resemblance to Gehlen’s original creation—the BND has been less than successful in presenting a persuasive case for itself. Unlike the situation in the United
States, memoirs by former employees are a rarity, and access to official documents has been virtually impossible for historians. Likewise the debate about the proper role of the BfV after nearly a half-century shows few signs of resolution. Although the arguments advanced by both sides tend to echo those voiced in other democratic societies, the German case possesses a particular historical poignancy. Should extremist political parties be subjected to government surveillance? All too aware of how the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic was subverted from within by the Nazi Party and then destroyed entirely—what Hitler proclaimed as a “legal revolution”—proponents of strong governmental security measures stress the ever changing threats that the country faces and the need for undiminished vigilance. Their liberal critics maintain that the fledgling democracy of the 1950s has developed strong roots, having weathered a number of major storms, and that parties of the extreme right and left should be free to compete in the political arena as long as their behavior violates no existing laws. Moreover, the fear of domestic abuse by security agencies with police powers runs far deeper in German society than elsewhere in the West—a clear result of the searing experience of the Gestapo in the Third Reich and the Stasi in the GDR.

New conditions since the end of the Cold War have created a quite different set of priorities for the BND and the BfV. No longer having to grapple with the seemingly ubiquitous agents dispatched by the GDR and the deadly left-wing terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s, the FRG turned its attention first to the right-wing violence that accompanied reunification and more recently to the upsurge of Islamic radicalism. Still, just as the record of the intelligence community during the past half-century has yet to find a historical consensus, so, too, the debate regarding individual rights versus national security will undoubtedly persist for many years to come.

NOTES

ABHORCHDIENST. The codebreaking unit of the German army during World War I, the Abhorchdienst was established at Neumünster (Schleswig-Holstein) in 1916, relying heavily on the recruitment of mathematicians. In sharp contrast to the long-standing French Bureau du Chiffre and the Austro-Hungarian Kriegschiffregruppe (War Cipher Group), not only was the Abhorchdienst a latecomer but it failed to develop the same level of competence. See also ADFGVX CIPHER; FIGL, ANDREAS; POKORNY, HERMANN.

ABSCHÖPFEN. A verb meaning “to skim,” abschöpfen refers to eliciting relevant information from a person without divulging the fact that an intelligence service is involved.

ABSCHOTTUNG. The compartmentalization of information for security purposes, Abschottung generally operates according to the principle of “need to know,” although drawing a precise line is often difficult for intelligence agencies.

ABTEILUNG IIIB. The military intelligence unit of the General Staff until the end of World War I, Abteilung IIb (Division IIb) was created as a section in 1889, replacing an earlier understaffed and generally ineffective unit. This move reflected a major shift in German foreign policy, which came to regard Austria as an intimate ally and Russia as an estranged antagonist. Accordingly, Waenker von Dankenschweil, the former military attaché in Bern and new director of the section, formalized close ties with the Evidenzbüro in Vienna for sharing information and other joint endeavors, while
a far more vigilant posture was taken in the eastern border regions stretching from Silesia to East Prussia. By 1893, following reports of a heavy infiltration of Russian agents, a number of intelligence posts had been constructed along the frontier, all staffed with experienced officers. Nevertheless, counterintelligence remained a largely neglected branch, and Russian spies had little difficulty in exploiting this porous situation. Meager funding posed an additional problem, thus limiting the army’s coverage to Russia and France. “N” (naval intelligence) handled matters involving Great Britain beginning in 1901, while the United States and Italy received no attention at all.

With the outbreak of World War I came Section IIIb’s upgrading to the status of an Abteilung under Walter Nicolai as well as the establishment of a press and propaganda office under its direction. Its personnel likewise grew from 77 officers in 1915 to 188 three years later. At the same time—in a relationship characterized by much mutual suspicion—actual intelligence assessment was handled by the Fremde Heere. Whereas the static frontline conditions in the West limited the role of intelligence-gathering, greater opportunities arose regarding Russia, as shown by the activities of Alexander Bauermeister. Yet as the war situation deteriorated, Nicolai not only increased the propaganda effort but began to demand information about persons suspected of undermining morale within Germany—a move bitterly criticized by his left-wing opponents. Following the armistice, the chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg, ordered the dissolution of Abteilung IIIb effective 20 November 1918 and replaced it with a new but short-lived department. See also NACHTRICHTENOFFIZIER BERLIN.

ABWEHR. Ultimately an intelligence branch of the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces), the Abwehr traces its origins to January 1921, when, according to the Treaty of Versailles, the German military was restricted to defensive operations. Although Abwehr, or “fending off,” connotes counterintelligence, the group was engaged in information collection from the outset, relying principally on human intelligence sources. It was first headed by Friedrich Gempp, a former deputy to Walter Nicolai, the head of Abteilung IIIb during World War I, and consisted of a meager group of three officers and seven former officers along with a clerical staff. Three main sections emerged
within several years: reconnaissance, cipher and radio monitoring, and counterespionage. In 1927, Gempp was succeeded by Günter Schwantes. The intelligence branch of the German Navy merged with the Abwehr the following year. The group’s headquarters remained in Berlin at Tirpitzufer 74/75 until 1943, when it was moved to Zossen just outside the city.

Schwantes was replaced briefly in 1930 by Ferdinand von Bredow, who later became a victim of the Night of the Long Knives. Another short tenure was that of Konrad Patzig, a naval captain who faced serious differences with Defense Minister Werner von Blomberg. Following the selection of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris in January 1935, the Abwehr experienced a significant expansion, growing from an organization of fewer than 150 persons to nearly 1,000 in a three-year period. It included civilians as well as army and navy personnel. Under Canaris, the Abwehr was initially divided into five sections: secret espionage abroad (Hans Piekenbrock), sabotage (Helmuth Groscurth), counterespionage (Rudolf Bamler), foreign liaison (Leopold Bürkner), and administration and organization (Hans Oster). In 1938, the replacement of the War Ministry with the Armed Forces High Command brought about a new name—Amt Ausland/Abwehr (Office of Foreign Intelligence)—although the term Abwehr continued to be commonly used. A keen rivalry with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) also began to develop in spite of an understanding—the “Ten Commandments” agreement—reached between Canaris and SD head Reinhard Heydrich early on.

At the beginning of World War II, a specialized Abwehrstelle was established in cities throughout the Reich such as Bremen, Hamburg, Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland), and Vienna. In addition to officers attached to military field operations, the Abwehr maintained formal representation with allied countries such as Japan and Italy. In occupied lands, Abwehr activities were generally under the control of local Wehrmacht officers. In neutral countries, diplomatic cover proved to be the norm. Especially well-formed were the espionage networks in the Balkans, Portugal, and above all Spain, where Canaris enjoyed a close relationship with Francisco Franco and his intelligence chief dating from the Spanish Civil War. Established prewar networks also existed in South America, principally in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.
The Abwehr’s wartime performance was a decidedly mixed one. It scored a number of important successes, notably in the invasion of France in 1940, the **Nordpol** deception operation in Holland, the detection of the **Rote Kapelle**, and numerous exploits involving the **Brandenburg Division**. On the debit side, the Abwehr’s surveillance of the Red Army prior to the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union proved inadequate, just as the various attempts to infiltrate Great Britain, Canada, and the United States failed completely. By the end of 1939, no German agents were working in Britain, and the majority of those who attempted to enter the country during the war were turned around by the Twenty Committee, the unit of British military intelligence charged with counterespionage and deception. A plan to use the Irish Republican Army to subvert British forces based in Northern Ireland never came to fruition, nor did the attempt to lure Ireland into an alliance with Germany. Major Allied invasions—especially in North Africa in 1942 and in Italy in 1943—were likewise inadequately assessed beforehand.

The Abwehr also harbored a large number of conspirators against the Nazi regime (according to Allen Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, at least 10 percent of Abwehr operatives were consciously anti-Hitler). The unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Führer in 1938 can be traced to Abwehr personnel, among them Oster, Groscurth, and Canaris. During the war, the conspirators operated through various secret channels to the enemy, which could be justified, if questioned, as part of their normal undercover business. Further complicating matters were a number of Jews engaged by the Abwehr—a group that included **Ernst Bloch**, **Edgar Klaus**, **Richard Kauder**, and **Ivar Lissner**.

Although Heydrich had sought a unified intelligence apparatus under **SS** command, it was not until February 1944 that Hitler, enraged by Canaris’s defeatist attitude toward the war and recent reports of his organization’s incompetence, made such a move. Following the forced retirement of Canaris and the absorption of the Abwehr by the **Reichssicherheitshauptamt**, many seasoned officers such as **Hermann Giskes** submitted their resignation. **Georg Hansen** took charge on an interim basis but was later arrested and executed because of involvement in the failed conspiracy of 20 July 1944.
ABWEHRSTELLE (AST). A field unit responsible for Abwehr espionage activities, an Abwehrstelle replicated the tripartite division (intelligence, sabotage, and counterintelligence) of the Berlin headquarters. An Ast could be found in each of the 21 military districts of Germany. The larger Asts had further subsidiary units: subposts, outposts, and report centers. Their work varied according to local conditions as well as historical and geographical factors. Ast Hamburg, for example, dealt principally with Great Britain and the United States, while Ast Wiesbaden focused on France and the Low Countries.

During World War II, this system was introduced into the occupied territories, bringing the total number of Asts to 33 by 1942, yet the foreign units never attained the importance of their domestic equivalents. On average, each Ast and its subsidiaries employed some 150 people, although there was often much variance in numbers (for example, 382 in Paris and only three in Cherbourg), and they rose and fell in rank during the war. While administratively attached to local military authorities—and under the operational command of Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris—the Asts in practice tended to be largely autonomous. This lack of coordination resulted in much inefficiency of effort, but it made enemy penetration of one unit far less injurious to the whole network. See also KRIEGSORGANISATION.

ACKERMANN, ANTON (1905–1973). A veteran communist and head of the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN), Anton Ackermann was born Eugen Hanisch in Thalheim (Saxony) on 25 November 1905. A communist activist during his youth, he studied at the International Lenin School in Moscow and spent the Nazi period in exile in Czechoslovakia, France, Spain, and the Soviet Union. Returning to Germany in 1945, Ackermann joined the new Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) and subsequently became a Politburo member as well as the party’s chief ideologue.

His most notable appointment was as head of the APN, the new political intelligence apparatus created in August 1951 under the cover of the Institute for Economic Research. Ackermann, who came into bitter conflict with Andrei Grauer, his mistrustful advisor from the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), was dismissed by SED chief Walter Ulbricht in December 1952, ostensibly for “reasons of health.” An even more serious setback occurred
after the Uprising of 17 June 1953, when he was linked to a faction led by Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Herrnstadt and had to forfeit his party functions and position in the Foreign Ministry. No disciplinary action was taken, however, because of the 1956 thaw, and Ackermann was given other assignments until his retirement in 1961. He ended his life by his own hand on 4 May 1973.

ADFGVX CIPHER. A German code during World War I believed to be unbreakable, the ADFGVX cipher was invented by Fritz Nebel, an army communications officer, in order to provide a secure means of encryption for mobile military units. It was introduced on 5 March 1918. Aware that the Germans were planning a major offensive in the West prior to the arrival of American troops, the French Bureau du Chiffre managed—largely through the efforts of Georges Painvin—to present its first solution of the code in early April. Yet despite claims to the contrary, this cryptanalytical success occurred after the German attacks had subsided and thus too late to have sealed the fate of the war.

ADOMATIS, HANS-JOACHIM. A West Berlin journalist with close ties to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Hans-Joachim Adomatis worked as a freelancer after World War II and then in 1968 became editor of the Berliner Liberale Zeitung, a publication of the Freie Demokratische Partei. His open advocacy of closer ties between the two Germanys attracted the attention of the MfS, and he was recruited in November 1972 under the code name GEORG HANSEN. At its behest, Adomatis joined the German Journalists’ Union as well as the Volunteer Police Reserve of West Berlin. His wide-ranging reporting continued until his final meetings with his handler in January 1990. Since his file had not been destroyed during the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, Adomatis was tried in 1993 and given a one-year suspended sentence.

AFU. The standard transmitter-receiver used by the Abwehr, Afu derives from Agenten-Funk (or agent radio). Developed during the 1930s and remarkably powerful for its size, this hand-keyed, battery-powered Morse apparatus could fit into an attaché case along with portable aerial and repair tools. It was tuned by quartz to a preset fre-
quency, although a replacement one could be requested from Abwehr control in the event of poor or nonexistent reception. Agents received basic training in the construction of Afus and were instructed to keep their messages short—usually 50 to 100 letters—through the use of operational abbreviations. Individual three-letter identification codes were changed on a regular basis.

AGENTENZENTRALE. A common designation used by the German Democratic Republic, Agentenzentrale (agents’ head office) referred to anticommunist organizations composed of presumed enemy agents (the word Agentur was also employed at times). Whether actual intelligence personnel were involved seemed beside the point. During the 1950s, some of the primary targets included the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen, Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, and the Ostbüro der SPD. Members of the latter group were often called Schumacheragenten, after Kurt Schumacher, the first chair of the postwar Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit was further convinced that the penetration of one organization necessarily led to the penetration of another. Later the term Feindobjekt (enemy object) gained more widespread usage. See also KUNDSCHAFTER.

ALBERT, HEINRICH FRIEDRICH (1874–1960). A lawyer who served as a spy in the United States during World War I, Heinrich Friedrich Albert was born in Magdeburg on 12 February 1874. Appointed commercial attaché and financial advisor to Ambassador Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff in 1914, he also established contact with Franz von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed, the leaders of a spy ring engaged in various sabotage efforts in the country, and functioned as their paymaster. When Albert carelessly left his briefcase in a New York streetcar on 24 July 1915, it was seized by a member of the Secret Service, thereby giving U.S. authorities a comprehensive picture of the well-financed German operations, especially the bogus Bridgeport Projectile Company. To avoid an open admission of its violation of diplomatic protocol, the government arranged to have the documents published in the New York World without attribution. Albert nevertheless weathered the negative publicity (“the minister without portfolio”) and—unlike Papen and Boy-Ed—left only after
the entry of the United States into the war. Albert subsequently had a successful career in international business before his death in Wiesbaden on 1 November 1960.

ALDINGER, ZACHARIAS (1806–1840). An important informant working for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Zacharias Aldinger was born in Dörzbur (Württemberg). Enlisted in April 1834 and assigned to penetrate revolutionary émigré circles in Switzerland, he became the first MIB agent active outside Germany. Under the code names Baron Eyh and Albert, he arrived in Bern posing as a political refugee and began to work as a teacher and optician. Despite some influential contacts with the Italian revolutionary leader Giuseppe Mazzini and members of a fervently nationalistic student group, his erratic work style led to meager results. Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich called him an “honest and alert reporter” but frequently had to urge him to apply himself in a more diligent and thorough manner.

In 1836, officials in Zurich discovered Aldinger’s true identity when he became a suspect in the murder of a Prussian student informant, Ludwig Lessing. Although a lack of evidence resulted in his acquittal (and Austria’s role was not compromised), both the Swiss and exile press characterized the false baron as a high-living spy in the pay of a foreign power. Imprisoned for one year owing to other charges and then expelled from Switzerland, he was no longer considered viable as an agent. With a severance payment from Austria and a new passport in the name of Karl Gross, Aldinger moved to Hungary and faded into anonymity.

ALMÁSY, LÁSZLÓ (1895–1951). An Abwehr officer who had developed an expertise regarding the eastern Sahara Desert, László Almásy was born in Borostyánkő in western Hungary (now Bernstein, Austria) on 22 August 1895, the son of a nontitled lesser noble family. After studying in a boarding school in Great Britain and obtaining his first pilot’s license there, he served with the Austro-Hungarian air force during World War I. Afterward, he worked as a representative of an Austrian automobile company in Hungary. A drive along the Nile from Egypt to Sudan in 1926 whetted his interest in the area and led to repeated archeological expeditions and
eventual residence in Cairo. With the outbreak of World War II, he had to return to Budapest, where he was recruited by Nikolaus Ritter of the Abwehr. Not only had the 1939 German translation of his book *The Unknown Sahara* come to the attention of Abwehr officials, but Almásy appeared convinced that a revolt against British rule might be sparked among a group of younger Egyptian military officers. Government officials in Budapest further agreed to his temporary transfer from the Hungarian air force reserve to the Luftwaffe. After an initial briefing in Hamburg, he was given the rank of captain and assigned to Tunis as second in command of Ritter’s special unit. Later in Tripoli, Almásy advised the quartermasters of Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps about the topography of the Libyan desert, although Rommel turned down his request to lead a German battalion to Upper Egypt. The initial plan to spark a rebellion in the Egyptian army had to be abandoned when the key figure, General Aziz el Masri, failed to materialize at the prearranged spot. When two subsequent attempts by Ritter to infiltrate agents into Cairo misfired, he transferred the command to Almásy.

According to the revised directives of Operation *Salaam*, agent *John Eppler* and radio operator Hans-Georg Sandstede were to be transported by automobile through enemy-held desert terrain by a seven-man team headed by Almásy. Despite encountering a number of obstacles, the mission fulfilled its objective, and Almásy was promptly promoted to major and awarded the Iron Cross First Class by Rommel himself. The sequel, however, proved to be a double disappointment. In September 1942, Eppler and Sandstede were arrested in Cairo by the British, while Rommel showed no interest in Almásy’s plans for a unit specializing in unconventional warfare.

In summer 1942, suffering from an acute form of amebic dysentery, Almásy left North Africa for medical treatment in Nazi-occupied Athens. The following year, after his return to Budapest, his brief memoir of the North African campaign—*Rommel seregenel Libyaban (With Rommel in Libya)*—appeared, although it had been heavily edited by the Abwehr and made no mention of Ritter or Operation *Salaam*.

At the end of the war, Almásy served briefly as a translator for the occupying Red Army but was soon imprisoned and interrogated at length by the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal
Affairs). Even though his trial for wartime treason in the communist People’s Court resulted in an acquittal, rumors circulated that he had conveyed information about Soviet military movements to MI6 via a clandestine radio, and he was rearrested two months later. British intelligence, working with a senior Egyptian official, assisted in his escape from prison and eventual return to Cairo. Hardly had King Farouk named him the director of the new Cairo Desert Institute than his fragile health took a decided turn for the worse. Treatment at a hospital in Salzburg, Austria, was to no avail, and he died there on 22 March 1951.

ALTEN, JÜRGEN VON (1923– ). A senior official in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) suspected of an Eastern bloc affiliation, Jürgen von Alten was a legation counselor in the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany before embarking on an intelligence career (code name Cäsar). With his appointment in 1974 as head of collection came knowledge of many different aspects of BND operations, including training procedures, radio surveillance, and joint endeavors with other services. When the suspicion arose that he could be a double agent, his superiors feared a disaster of the magnitude of the Heinz Felfe case, and he was suspended in May 1976. Yet the feeble basis for this action proved to be merely a confusion of names, and he was rehabilitated in January 1977. Still deemed a potential risk and barred from further employment at the BND, Alten was transferred to a lesser but well-remunerated government position.

AMT FÜR NATIONALE SICHERHEIT (AfNS). The short-lived successor organization to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Amt für Nationale Sicherheit (Office of National Security) was established by the reform government of Hans Modrow on 17 November 1989. Headed by Wolfgang Schwanitz, a former deputy of Erich Mielke, it attempted to preserve the essential structure of the MfS by making minimal concessions in the face of mounting public protest. The main changes included the reduction of the full-time staff by half, primarily on the county level, and the divestment of auxiliary functions such as passport control. Despite assurances that the AfNS would operate according to “constitutional principles,”
there was no mention of the vast numbers of *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter* (unofficial collaborators) or of any significant changes in the senior leadership. At a top-level staff conference, Schwanitz in fact urged the “reativification” of the informer network while maintaining “strict-est secrecy and conspiracy.”

Not surprisingly, the new organization found no acceptance in the general population and quickly acquired the derogatory nickname “Nasi.” On 6 December, unable to control the escalating events, most of the leading generals and colonels—among them Rudi Mittig, Gerhard Neiber, Paul Kienberg, and Alfred Kleine in the East Berlin headquarters and Josef Schwarz, Manfred Hummitzsch, and Dieter Dangriess in the regional administrations—were dismissed. With the continuing occupation of regional and district offices by citizens’ committees and the emergence of the Central Roundtable in East Berlin calling for the dissolution of the AfNS, the Council of Ministers finally decided to disband the agency on 14 December. The Modrow government subsequently tried another approach by separating the security forces into a reduced domestic service headed by Heinz Engelhardt and a foreign intelligence branch headed by Werner Grossmann, but these plans had to be abandoned on 12 January 1990.

The process of dissolution stretched over a long period and came to be supervised by Peter-Michael Diestel working with a special committee. It officially ended with the reunification of Germany in October 1990. This final phase was marked by much rancor and disillusionment. Not only were there bitter feelings in the ranks toward the AfNS/MfS leadership, but three major generals in the regional administrations—Gerhard Lange, Horst Böhm, and Peter Koch—committed suicide. According to the new unification statutes, those discharged were barred from further state service and had to seek employment elsewhere. Some former officials sold confidential information to one-time enemy intelligence organizations, principally the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* and the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (the former paid some 200 ex-MfS officers a total of 480,000 DM). *See also* REISSWOLF.

**ANDERSON, ALEXANDER (1953– ).** Considered the most notorious informer in the avant-garde literary world of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR), Alexander (Sascha) Anderson was born in Weimar on 24 August 1953 and adopted by a couple in Dresden with professional ties to the cultural establishment. Anderson was trained as a typesetter and later studied filmmaking for three years. He allegedly served a jail sentence for forging checks, although his name is missing from official records. Beginning in 1975, and working under the code names David Menzer, Fritz Müller, and Peters, he came to be classified by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in the top category of Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborators), prized especially for his extensive and factually detailed reports.

Following his move from Dresden to East Berlin, Anderson emerged as a dominant figure in the alternative cultural scene in the Prenzlauer Berg district, known as much for his entrepreneurial energy and connections as for his poetic and musical output. In 1986, he relocated to West Berlin, where his focus became the city’s emigrant community of former East German writers and dissidents. For the MfS, Anderson represented a new type of agent whose main purpose was to subvert potential dissident groups from within, promoting, in this case, a wholly aesthetic and apolitical artistic credo. In fall 1991, Wolf Biermann, the popular satirist and songwriter who had been expelled from the GDR in 1976, publicly accused him of having informed on writers and artists throughout the 1980s. Despite Anderson’s initial denials, the amount of corroborating evidence—more than 1,000 pages—proved overwhelming, especially when portions of these reports were published. The revelation of other leading GDR writers with prior Stasi connections—Rainer Schedlinski, Heiner Müller, Christa Wolf, and Monika Maron—soon followed, and a major political and literary controversy ensued. In his stylized autobiography Sascha Anderson (2002), he fully acknowledged his 15-year role as a Stasi spy but left his personal motives generally unclarified.

ANDREAS. See BERNHARD.

ANMELDUNG. The systematic screening by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) to identify East German Illegaler (covert operatives) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Operation ANMELDUNG (Registration) was conceived by Heinz Marx and based on
data about previously exposed agents. It revealed a favored technique of the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA)—disguising its operatives as actual people who had earlier emigrated from the FRG and presumably wanted to return. In 1979, after a meticulous examination of all resettlements and visits from abroad, the BfV recommended the investigation of more than 100 individuals and the immediate arrest of 17 (15 were successfully exfiltrated to the German Democratic Republic). For HVA chief Markus Wolf, Operation Anmeldung represented a significant setback, causing “years of confusion” before its tactics were ascertained and new methods devised.

**ANTHROPOID.** The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) code name for the plan to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich during World War II, Operation Anthroïd was originally conceived by Edvard Beneš, the former president of Czechoslovakia and head of the London-based government in exile. By removing Heydrich, who had been appointed Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia on 27 September 1941, Beneš hoped to show that Czech defiance of Nazi rule had not been completely extinguished. The technical details of the operation were left to his intelligence chief, František Moravec, who assembled an assassination team of Czech soldiers trained by the SOE. After two postponements, a new date was set for 27 May 1942. As Heydrich was being driven to work from his country estate outside Prague in an open-topped Mercedes, two Czechs—Jan Kubíš and Josef Gabčík—attempted to ambush him at a sharp bend in the road. When Gabčík’s sten gun failed to fire, Kubíš threw a grenade at the rear of the limousine, fatally wounding Heydrich. Although both attackers escaped, they were later reported to the Gestapo by Karel Curda, a member of a second SOE team called Out Distance.

Acting on orders from Adolf Hitler, harsh Nazi reprisals for Heydrich’s death began on 9 June, when 1,000 Czech Jews were transported from Prague to SS extermination camps in a special train marked “AaH” (Attentat auf Heydrich, or Assassination of Heydrich). Other transports followed, and the entire Bohemian village of Lidice was razed to the ground and its male population killed as a symbolic gesture. (The term Heydrichiade was coined to describe the terror that ensued.) Because of the thousands ultimately arrested or put to death by Nazi occupation forces, the widespread resistance
among the Czechs anticipated by Beneš never materialized. Even after the war, Beneš, embarrassed by the scale of the reprisals, categorically denied his involvement in the assassination to former resistance leaders. It was not until 1964 when Moravec gave an unapologetic public lecture that many of the details of Anthropoid became known.

**AQUILAR.** A rescue operation disguised as an Abwehr mission, AQUILAR was conceived in 1941 by two officers stationed in the Netherlands—Karl Heinrich Pannhorst and Walter Schulze-Bernett—who successfully transported 176 Dutch Jews to safety in neutral European countries. See also BLOCH, ERNST; DOHNÁNYI, HANS VON.

**ARCO.** The German code name for the Soviet spy ring operating behind German lines on the eastern front, ARCO had been dubbed Michal by the Russians and consisted of two Polish officers, Mikołai Arciszewski and Jozef Meier. They had been flown to occupied Poland by Soviet aircraft in August 1941 and operated successfully from February to May of the following year. The Funkabwehr, however, determined their location, resulting in their capture and presumed execution.

**ASCHER, GABRIEL.** A German journalist and informant for the Abwehr, Gabriel Ascher immigrated to Stockholm in the early 1930s. Following his conversion from Judaism to Catholicism, he arrived in Rome in 1935 and secured a position as secretary to Friedrich Muckermann, an anti-Nazi Jesuit. Ascher resigned his position several years later and resumed his journalistic activity as the Vatican correspondent for the Basler Nachrichten, but the prospect of the new Italian racial laws convinced him to return to Stockholm.

Acting on behalf of Joachim Rohleder, Hans Wagner, the chief of the local Abwehrstelle, recruited Ascher in early 1941 to return to Rome and utilize his extensive ecclesiastical contacts. Although his arrival on 3 May was met with considerable suspicion, he obtained knowledge of the secret mission of Josef Müller to the Vatican. Ascher’s damaging report was suppressed by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris in order to protect Müller, while Ascher became the object of close surveillance by Stockholm police. Despite the decision not to
file formal charges, he was detained in a Swedish mental institution until the last months of the war.

**ATLAS.** A failed attempt to foment an Arab uprising against British rule in Palestine during World War II, Operation **ATLAS** involved a five-man commando team—three Germans and two Arabs—that had been formed in Berlin in early 1944. Kurt Wieland was in charge of technical matters, while Abdul Latif assumed responsibility for the political connections. With the support of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, then living in exile in Berlin, their plan was to arm subsidized Palestinian villagers and bring the already strained relationship with Jewish communities into open conflict. Yet mismanagement plagued the operation from the outset. After being paradropped off target in October, the group not only became separated and lost their radio equipment but received a cold reception from the Palestinians. Within a week, Wieland and two of his men had been captured and interrogated. British intelligence had also been aided by the recent defection of **Erich Vermehren**.

**AUER, THEODOR (1899–?).** A **Gestapo** officer posted to North Africa during World War II, Theodor Auer was born in Cologne and received a law degree before entering the foreign service. In 1934, while serving at the London embassy, he became a member of the Nazi Party and later the Gestapo. His key assignment was in French Morocco beginning in October 1940, first ostensibly as the head of the German economic office in Casablanca and then as consul general the following year. According to his own account, the recruitment of informers required little effort, and a large network was soon established, much to the displeasure of Vichy officials. At one point, Vice Premier François Darlan implored the German embassy to expel Auer, citing his blatant homosexual behavior, but no action was taken. His diplomatic career continued after the war, and he was appointed the first ambassador to Sri Lanka from the Federal Republic of Germany in December 1958.

**AUGSBURG, EMIL (1904–?).** A **Sicherheitsdienst** (SD; Security Service) officer who later served in the **Organisation Gehlen** (OG) and the **Bundesnachrichtendienst** (BND), Emil Augsburg was born
in Lodz, Poland. Fluent in Russian and Polish, he worked at the List Verlag in Leipzig as an editor. Joining the SD in May 1936, he was assigned to the Wannsee Institut in 1937. As a senior assistant to the director, Michael Achmeteli, he was responsible for questions regarding the nationality groups in the Soviet Union. During World War II, his activities fell under the heading of “special tasks” in the field, but injuries sustained during an air attack in Smolensk in September 1941 forced his return to Berlin and further research at the institute.

At the end of the war, Augsburg fled to Italy with the aid of the Vatican. He was engaged by the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps as a specialist in Soviet affairs in 1947–1948 (pseudonym Dr. Althaus). Reinhard Gehlen likewise prized his remarkable expertise and extensive contacts with the anticommunist émigré community and therefore recruited him for the OG and subsequently the BND. Fearing possible Soviet coercion because of his SS past, Gehlen insisted that Augsburg work outside the Pullach headquarters in Karlsruhe. Suspicion that he might be a double agent continued to mount, especially after some of his contacts were exposed as Soviet spies in the mid-1960s. After attempts to obtain his voluntary resignation failed, Augsburg was dismissed from the BND in 1966 for conducting unauthorized intelligence work.

**AUSSENPOLITISCHER NACHRICHTENDIENST (APN).** The first foreign intelligence service established by the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst was formally attached to the Foreign Ministry and disguised as the Institute for Economic Research. Officially founded (but never publicly announced) on 1 September 1951, it was initially headed by Anton Ackermann, who was replaced by Markus Wolf the following year. Each of its four original subsections had a Soviet advisor, and nearly all of their activities were directed against West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. A counterintelligence unit headed by Gustav Szinda was added later and sought to penetrate the West Berlin police as well as the intelligence and security services of the Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite Wolf’s attempt to tighten security within the APN, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz exposed its activities in Operation Vulkan in April 1953. Renamed
Hauptverwaltung V and later Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, it became part of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.

AUSSPÄHEN. A term designating the clandestine and unauthorized gathering of information, Ausspähen is used only in reference to the activities of an enemy intelligence organization. Beschaffen is the preferred expression for one’s own procurement of secret information.

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BAD AIBLING. The site of a major U.S. signals intelligence installation during the Cold War, Bad Aibling is located 50 kilometers southeast of Munich and was a spa town in the late 19th century. The former Luftwaffe facility in Bad Aibling had been used by American occupation officials for housing prisoners of war, displaced persons, and orphans but was transferred to the U.S. Army in 1952. Gradually it became outfitted as a listening post, directed principally at the Eastern bloc. In 1971, it fell under the joint administration of the U.S. National Security Agency and Department of Defense and came to be regarded as a key asset in the overseas intelligence communications system.

With the end of the Cold War, the continued existence of the vast facility—replete with parabolic antennas and satellite communications equipment and employing about 1,800 personnel—provoked sharp criticism within the European Union. Repeatedly accused of intercepting private and commercial communications, the United States decided to close the facility in 2002. See also TEUFELSBERG.

BAHNHOF FRIEDRICHSTRASSE. A key crossing point for East German spies following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse (Friedrichstrasse Train Station) had earlier served as the city’s central terminal for both local and long-distance travel. Placed under the direct supervision of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the station was the only border crossing between East and West Berlin located at a rail and subway stop. Typically an agent coming from the West would leave a document
case in a locker in the Western section of the station, which would be retrieved by an MfS case officer with a special permit to enter the border zone. When an agent needed a special radio or other object, the process worked in reverse. Further reflecting its high-security status, customs officials at the station included *Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz* (officers in special deployment).

**BAHR, HERBERT (1913– ).** An Abwehr agent arrested in the United States, Herbert Bahr was born in Klosterfelde (Brandenburg) on 27 August 1913 but moved to Buffalo, New York, at the age of 13. A gifted student, he returned to Germany in 1938 to attend the Technical College in Hanover. On 30 June 1942, apprehended by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation upon disembarking from the exchange ship *Drottningholm*, Bahr readily conceded his Abwehr affiliation and Jewish refugee cover. A Newark court sentenced him to 30 years in prison.

**BANDELOW, KARLI (1905–1954).** A high-level spy in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) working for the *Organisation Gehlen* (OG), Karli Bandelow was a civil engineer in the State Secretariat for Motor Vehicles and Road Transport. Recruited for the OG by his girlfriend Käthe Dorn, he procured information about strategically important bridges and highways and also conveyed the details of his meetings with Polish engineers. As a result of Operation *Pfeil*, Dorn, Bandelow, and Ewald Misera, an official in the East Berlin railway headquarters, were arrested in early August 1954, accused of sabotaging the transportation system of the GDR. The widely publicized trial led to the execution of Bandelow and Misera on 11 November in Dresden; Dorn received a prison sentence of 12 years and was released on 1 September 1964.

**BARBIE, KLAUS (1913–1991).** A Gestapo official in France later engaged by American intelligence, Klaus Barbie was born in Bad Godesberg on 25 October 1913, the son of village schoolteachers. In April 1933, he joined the Hitler Youth and eagerly embraced its ideology. A member of the SS two years later, Barbie was assigned to the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD; Security Service) and sent to Bernau for training. His first major posting was in Amsterdam following the 1940
invasion of the Low Countries, where his responsibilities included the deportation of Jews. Even more significant was his transfer to Lyon, a major refugee center, after the reoccupation of the south of France in November 1942. Based at Hôtel Terminus in Lyon, Barbie developed an extensive informer network aimed at disrupting resistance activities and continuing the deportation of Jews. Known for his brutal methods, he gained particular notoriety because of the torture and execution of resistance leader Jean Moulin. Barbie was personally awarded the Iron Cross First Class with Swords by Adolf Hitler.

In spring 1947, hiding in Munich because he was a declared war criminal, Barbie applied for a position with the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps under an assumed name. For the next three years, working from a safe house in Augsburg, he helped direct operations involving former SS officers, French intelligence, and Soviet activities in the Soviet and U.S. zones in Germany. Not only was knowledge of his employment kept from French and American authorities, but Barbie was resettled under the name Klaus Altmann in Bolivia in 1951. When the French government learned of his presence there in 1972 and requested his extradition, the Bolivian government declined to act. Eleven years later, however, a new regime in Bolivia—coupled with a different administration in Washington, D.C.—complied with the request of the French (the German government refused to try him because of the presumed weakness of its legal case). The United States conducted a full-scale investigation of the relationship with Barbie and sent an official apology to the French government. Although Barbie had been tried twice in absentia in Lyon and sentenced to death, a statute of limitations had annulled those rulings. His new trial in 1987 for “crimes against humanity” resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment, as France had abolished the death penalty. Barbie died of cancer on 25 September 1991.

BARCZATIS, HELENE (1912–1955). One of the most prized informants in the German Democratic Republic working for the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Helene (Elli) Barczatis was born in Berlin and held several clerical positions before her appointment as personal secretary to Minister-President Otto Grotewohl in April 1950. The previous year, she had become acquainted with Karl Laurenz, a lawyer and Social Democrat whose criticism of the ruling commu-
nist party led to his expulsion for “petty bourgeois behavior” and loss of his government job. Recruited by the OG, he in turn enlisted Barczatis (code name Gänseblümchen), who regularly supplied him with detailed confidential information from Grotewohl’s office. Laurenz then met with his control officer several times weekly in West Berlin.

Although the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit had been alerted early on about the couple’s potential espionage, Barczatis was highly regarded by Grotewohl, and no concrete evidence had been produced. In late 1951, close surveillance (code name Sylvester) was instituted, covering at least five informers. Their arrest did not occur until 4 March 1955 after Barczatis was spotted taking home a report on preparations for an industrial fair in Leipzig. During their secret trial six months later, Laurenz conceded his guilt but attempted to protect Barczatis, maintaining that she believed the procured information was only intended to aid his journalistic career. Both were found guilty of “malicious boycott agitation” and executed by guillotine in Dresden on 23 November 1955. In his closing statement before the court, after pleading in vain for clemency, Laurenz remarked that the “joke of my fate” involved having written a doctoral dissertation on capital punishment in history.

BAUER, LEO (1912–1972). A German communist who worked for Soviet intelligence but later resettled in the West after his imprisonment, Leo Bauer was born in Skalat, Galicia (now Ukraine), on 18 December 1912, the son of a watchmaker. Breaking with his family’s Jewish religion after their move to Chemnitz, he joined the Social Democratic youth group before transferring his allegiance to the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1932. The advent of the Nazi regime resulted in his brief detention and subsequent exile in France. In 1939, following his participation in the Spanish Civil War, Bauer was interned at Le Vernet, France, but escaped to Switzerland the next year. At war’s end, he was elected to the Hessian state parliament as a communist, but he moved to East Berlin in 1947 and became the principal editor at the radio station Deutschlandsender as well as an informant for Soviet intelligence.
His new position, however, proved short-lived. In August 1950, Bauer was arrested and charged with having cooperated with Noel Field, who had been convicted as an American agent by a Budapest court. In late December 1952, after intensive interrogations at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen and Karlshorst, a Soviet military tribunal handed down death sentences for Bauer and Erica Glaser (a former lover whom he had lured to the German Democratic Republic to prove his loyalty). With the death of Joseph Stalin the following March, they were both sent instead to Soviet labor camps in Siberia. In 1955, owing to new diplomatic ties between Bonn and Moscow, his 25-year sentence ended, and Bauer returned to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he resumed his journalistic career and also became an advisor to the Social Democratic leader Willy Brandt.

**BAUERMEISTER, ALEXANDER (1899–1940).** The leading German spymaster on the Eastern front during World War I, Alexander Bauermeister was born in St. Petersburg, the son of a prosperous businessman. Active as an agent of Abteilung IIIb prior to the war, he left the Russian capital in 1914 and was given new intelligence responsibilities based in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia). His primary accomplishment—together with Ludwig Deubner, a professor at the University of Königsberg—was the acquisition and decoding of Russian military communications, which contributed significantly to the major German victory at Tannenberg in late August. Bauermeister also assumed a prominent role during the armistice negotiations between Germany and Russia in November 1917. After the war, numerous publications appeared under his pseudonym Agricola, including a popular account of his various exploits, Spione durchbrechen die Front (Spies Break Through: Memoirs of a German Secret Service Officer). He died in Rome in 1940.

**BAUERNSCHEID, KARL EDUARD (1801–1875).** An Austrian spy who briefly worked for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Karl Eduard Bauernschmidt was a student of law as well as a trainee of the Polizeihofstelle (Police Ministry) in Vienna. His mastery of several foreign languages coupled with his clear literary talent made him especially well suited for the surveillance of foreign journalists, a primary aim of Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich.
Bauernschmid’s work commenced with the establishment of the MIB in 1833. He requested a release two years later, prompted in part by having aroused suspicions of being a spy during a stay in Frankfurt am Main. Nevertheless Metternich had praise for his zeal, ability, and usefulness. Bauernschmid became a proofreader in Graz before embarking on a notable career as a freelance writer. He was also an Austrian delegate to the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848.

BAUMANN, GERHARD (1912–1996). A top long-term agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Federal Republic of Germany, Gerhard Baumann served on the eastern front during World War II. Known as an anticommunist and staunch defender of the German military tradition, he worked as a freelance journalist after the war, cultivating ties with the Organisation Gehlen and the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria. His HVA recruitment occurred in 1957 under a falsche Flagge (false flag) maneuver: his Leipzig handler pretended to be a French operative. Given the code name schwarz and remunerated on a regular basis, Baumann became a copious source of secret information, much of it obtained via two senior officials of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, Kurt Weiss and Paul Münstermann. Not until 1994 was his activity exposed, and although Baumann professed that he was unaware of HVA complicity. Charges were dropped because of his unfitness to stand trial.

BAUMANN-ZAKRZOWSKI, WINFRIED (1930–1980). Commonly known as the “Red Admiral,” Winfried Zakrzowski was born in Scharley (now Stolarzowice, Poland) on 17 May 1930. After his family resettled in Straslund at the end of World War II, he entered the Karl Liebknecht maritime officers’ school despite his desire to become a journalist. In 1955, he began his intelligence career in the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), focusing on Western naval forces. Although his record continued to show much promise, deepening personal problems led to alcoholism, which in late August 1970 caused his dismissal as head of an operational division and expulsion from active military duty. Following his arrest in December 1973 for embezzlement, Zakrzowski began to turn his life around by remarrying, adopting his wife’s name, Baumann, and finding new employment at a labor union newspaper.
By 1977, Baumann had established a working relationship with the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) through an East Berlin doctor, Christa-Karin Schumann, whose brother lived in Heidelberg. Baumann’s hope was that information gained from his earlier position in the VA would lead to his safe exit from the German Democratic Republic. During a Christmas visit in 1978, Schumann’s brother brought a radio transmitter to East Berlin, which she was to use to receive and decipher coded messages. A courier from the BND, Horst Hering, also met several times with Schumann and made arrangements for the exfiltration of her and Baumann via Hungary during Easter 1979. Yet an oversight by the BND—a missing entry stamp in the forged passport—caused its cancellation.

In the meantime, the postal division of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit intercepted one of Schumann’s letters to a cover address in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and detected the secret ink that had been supplied by the BND. MfS head Erich Mielke personally ordered the arrest of Schumann and Baumann to take place on 5 June 1979. Because a search of their apartment had also revealed the plans for a second escape attempt via Poland, Schumann was forced to maintain contact with the BND while in prison. Her attempts to convey a secret warning went unnoticed by the BND, and Hering was arrested at the Poznan train station and flown back to East Berlin for trial.

The East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel was assigned to represent all three accused spies, but Baumann refused his services. Whereas Schumann received a sentence of 15 years and was part of a 1987 spy exchange, Baumann was executed in Leipzig by a pistol shot in the back of the head on 18 July 1980. Afterward, BND head Klaus Kinkel, who had overseen Baumann himself, stated that there had been no possibility of interceding on his behalf, even though Vogel had notified FRG authorities of the trial several months in advance. In 1993, Baumann was posthumously rehabilitated by a Berlin court.

BAUN, HERMANN (1897–1951). A highly capable intelligence officer for both the Abwehr and the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Hermann Baun was born in Odessa, Russia, on 17 December 1897. Fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, he kept in close contact with
Russian affairs even after moving to Leipzig. In 1939, he joined the Abwehr, attracting the attention of Wilhelm Canaris, who described him as possessing “a special gift for intelligence work.” Beginning in June 1941, all clandestine frontline operations against the Soviet Union came under Baun’s initial command, including the systematic interrogation of many prisoners of war. Since the Fremde Heere Ost had no intelligence service of its own, Reinhard Gehlen, despite a certain wariness, came to depend on Baun for much of his information and included him on his personnel chart of spring 1943. Impending defeat, however, caused Baun, like Gehlen, to begin negotiating in 1945 with the U.S. military regarding a new organization directed primarily at the Soviet Union.

As the postwar OG took shape, Baun was given responsibility for intelligence collection, yet the lack of prior consultation by Gehlen left a permanent residue of bitterness. Preferring the traditional counterespionage method of enemy penetration, Baun further objected to Gehlen’s desire to conduct domestic surveillance on behalf of the Americans. For their part, U.S. authorities found Baun a disorganized and somewhat unsavory personality, thus permitting Gehlen to remove him from his initial position in April 1947 and give him new responsibilities. Baun’s final fall from grace involved the charge of minor embezzlement, which led to his dismissal in 1950. Baun died on 17 December 1951.

Bautzen. The site of two notorious political prisons, Bautzen is a city located in eastern Saxony that traces its origins to the medieval era. The Bautzen I prison, a yellow-clinker building (hence its nickname “gelbes Elend” or “yellow misery”), was completed in 1904. Reversing its reputation as a relatively progressive penal institution, the Nazi leadership used it to incarcerate opponents of the regime such as communists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. After 1945, it came under Soviet administration, housing not only former Nazis but also suspected enemies of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (at least 2,800 people died in captivity). The German Democratic Republic assumed control of the prison in February 1950.

The Bautzen II prison is a large auxiliary construction located south of the city that was used by the Nazis and Soviets for interrogation and became best known through its grim association with
the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit during the period 1956–1989. The number of inmates averaged 150–180 and included dissidents as well as foreigners arrested for espionage or for assisting GDR citizens to commit Republikflucht (flight from the republic). Whereas Bautzen I still functions as a correctional facility, Bautzen II was declared a memorial site in 1993 to commemorate the injustices that had taken place in both prisons.

BAZNA, ELYESA. See CICERO AFFAIR.

B-DIENST. The codebreaking unit of the Kriegsmarine, the B-Dienst (B-Service) or Funkbeobachtungsdienst was headed by Max Kupper and grew dramatically from 2,000 prewar employees to nearly 20,000 in the course of World War II. It proved enormously successful in compromising the British navy’s communication system, applying German city names to British naval codes to distinguish one from another. Kriegsmarine Commander in Chief Karl Raeder stated that half of his operational intelligence derived from this unit. Besides learning about convoy operations and routing patterns, the B-Dienst maintained a network of directional finders that could fix the approximate locations of radio transmissions in the Atlantic. The unit was also successful with French, Danish, and Soviet naval codes.

By 1943, however, the British had significantly improved the security of their codes, while the American systems proved invulnerable to the German cryptanalysts. Another problem was organizational, as the B-Dienst remained purposely segregated from key operational commanders and could only pass on raw, often irrelevant information. At the same time, many of the activities of the B-Dienst overlapped with those of the Forschungsamt in the Air Ministry.

BEATER, BRUNO (1914–1982). The earliest deputy minister of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Bruno Beater was born in Berlin on 5 February 1914, the son of a worker. A member of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of World War II, he deserted to the Red Army in July 1944 and became active as a propagandist for the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland. With his return to Germany in 1945 came several local police positions before his early entry into the MfS as head of the underground section of the greater
Berlin administration. Rising steadily thereafter, Beater (code name Krüger)—described as a “tough intriguer” by Markus Wolf—was appointed first deputy to Erich Mielke in 1964 and became a full member of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in 1973. The defection of Werner Stiller in 1979 confirmed his long-standing suspicion of the political reliability of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. Beater died on 9 April 1982, shortly after his retirement.

BECKER, JOHANNES (1912– ). The chief Latin American operative of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) during World War II, Johannes Becker was born in Leipzig on 21 October 1912. After serving in the army for several years, he left for Buenos Aires in 1937 as the sales representative of a German firm but returned to Berlin with the outbreak of World War II. Because of his familiarity with Latin America, he was placed with the SD and given seven weeks of espionage training. Becker’s initial assignment focused less on military matters and more on popular reaction to the wartime propaganda of both belligerents and the difficulties facing German businesses blacklisted by the British.

Arriving in Argentina in early June 1940, under the code name Pepe, he managed to establish a full-fledged network of agents in addition to a functioning clandestine radio system in a relatively short period. His ring’s most notable success was smuggling large amounts of urgently needed items—platinum, mica, liver extract, and industrial diamonds—through the Anglo-American blockade via Spain to Germany. Becker’s entire enterprise threatened to collapse in the aftermath of the Hellmuth Affair and the decision of the Argentine government to arrest all suspected German spies in the country beginning in January 1944. Despite his salvage attempts and his own altered physical appearance, Becker was taken into custody on 16 April 1945. None of the captured SD agents, however, were convicted. According to a U.S. intelligence report in 1947, Becker had settled on an Argentine farm under the protection of a well-known loyalist of President Juan Perón.

BEHRENDS, HERMANN (1907–1948). A senior official of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) and close associate of
Reinhard Heydrich, Hermann Behrends was born in Rüstringen (Lower Saxony) on 11 May 1907, the son of an innkeeper. In 1932, after completing his doctorate in law at Marburg, he joined the Nazi Party and became the local SS leader in Wilhelmshaven. His earlier friendship with Heydrich then led to his appointment as head of the SD office in Berlin in January 1934, which became heavily involved in preparing for the purge of the Sturmabteilung during the Night of the Long Knives. Keenly ambitious, Behrends was assigned in 1936 the directorship of Office II in the main SD headquarters and thus had responsibility for Jews, churches, Freemasons, and other perceived enemies of the Third Reich. In 1937, he became deputy to Werner Lorenz of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, or Ethnic German Liaison Office, which gave the SD a further network of listening and observation posts in the frontier areas. Yet another assignment brought him directly into Heydrich’s scheme to implicate General Mikhail Tukhachevskiy of the Red Army as a German informer by passing forged documents to the Czechs.

During World War II, Behrends held a number of important executive positions, notably as the senior SS and police commander in Serbia from April to October 1944. Captured in Flensburg in July 1945, he was interned in Wales before being returned to Yugoslavia. Following his trial in Belgrade for his counterinsurgency operations against Yugoslav partisans, Behrends was hanged on 4 December 1948.

BELL, GEORG (1897–1933). An intelligence operative engaged by Sturmabteilung (SA) leader Ernst Röhm, Georg Bell was born in Nuremberg on 21 July 1897, the son of a clock manufacturer. After serving in World War I and completing his studies in electrical engineering, he worked for several firms before moving to Munich in 1925. His anti-Bolshevism led him to participate in the Chervonets Affair, although he was acquitted in 1930. The following year, Röhm engaged Bell to develop domestic and foreign contacts, as well as acquiring funds that would bypass the Nazi Party and go into the coffers of the SA. After his testimony in a libel trial in October 1932, Bell fell out of favor with the Nazi leadership and began to write for an oppositional Catholic weekly. Despite fleeing to Austria, he was shot to death in Durchholzen on 3 April 1933 by an SS raiding squad.
German communists later maintained—quite erroneously—that Bell’s prior knowledge of the Reichstag fire was the main motive behind his murder.

**BENCKENDORFF, ALEXANDER VON (1783–1844).** The Baltic German who devised Russia’s first modern internal security system, Alexander von Benckendorff was born in Reval (now Tallinn, Estonia) and served in the Napoleonic Wars. After helping to quell the Decembrist revolt in 1825, he was authorized by the new tsar, Nicholas I, to create the Third Section the following year, ostensibly to gather “information about all events, without exception” and to arrest or exile “dangerous or suspicious persons.” Benckendorff proceeded in a determined manner and, ironically, modeled his centralized agency after a proposal of Pavel Pestel, a grandson of German immigrants and the chief of the revolutionary southern league of army officers. By forming close ties with the paramilitary Corps of Gendarmes, the Third Section extended its unprecedented reach to both urban and rural areas of Russia. Still, Benckendorff refrained from using his authority for petty or evil purposes and remained generally well regarded, reflecting the values of many educated Russians. It was not until 1832 that the first agents were sent abroad to monitor exile dissidents such as Alexander Herzen, but with only minor success. Benckendorff’s tenure ended with his death.

**BENECKE, BERTHOLD (1889–?).** The early head of the Abwehr in Norway, Berthold Benecke was born in Hanover. In July 1937, using the cover of the Nordic representative of a German firm, Ruhrstahl AG, he conducted an extensive tour of Scandinavia, taking particular notice of the Norwegian iron ore mines in South Varanger. The following year, Benecke, under the alias Dr. Altvater, returned as the head of the Kriegsorganisation in Norway. However, one important recruit, former Russian ballerina Marina Goubininia, was a double agent for the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). Despite some successful work, Benecke’s involvement in Norwegian politics—notably his efforts to expose Vidkun Quisling as a liability to a more acceptable collaborationist regime—angered the fascist politician’s German sponsors and led to Benecke’s dismissal in June 1940.
BEREZINO. See SCHERHORN.

BERG, HERMANN VON (1933– ). An important undercover diplomat of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Hermann von Berg was born in Mupperg (Thuringia) on 29 March 1933. An early member of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth), he joined the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in 1950 and began his studies at Karl Marx University in Leipzig four years later. From 1962 to 1966, while working simultaneously for the disinformation department of the HVA (code name Günther), von Berg directed the international liaison division of the GDR Press Office.

His engaging manner—combined with his reputation as a liberal critic of the state—led to cordial relations with the journalistic establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) while also allowing him to serve as a secret channel in the top-level negotiations between the two Germanys. Although von Berg’s instructions were merely to listen and not to advance any positions, the information that he delivered was highly prized by the HVA, and he received a state award in 1971 and an economics professorship at Humboldt University the following year. However, he was unwilling to secure any recruits from his West German contacts. In January 1978, the manifesto of a “League of Democratic Communists” published in Der Spiegel was traced to von Berg, who underwent a lengthy interrogation by the Stasi and became the object of an especially comprehensive investigative procedure known as an Operativer Vorgang (code name Tal). Afterward, he submitted an emigration request, which was approved in May 1986 following the intervention of Willy Brandt. Von Berg resumed his teaching at the University of Würzburg and then returned to Humboldt University in 1992.

BERGER, HELGE (1941– ). A secretary in the West German Foreign Office and an agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Helge Berger was trained as a multilingualist in Paris. Hardly had she assumed her first position than one of the Romeo spies (pseudonym Peter Krause) recruited her in 1966 by posing as a British MI6 officer in a falsche Flagge (false flag) operation. For the next 10 years, her various postings, which included Warsaw and Paris in addition
to Bonn, allowed her to divulge important diplomatic information to the HVA under the code name nova. Tips provided by a defector led to her arrest by West German authorities on 15 May 1976. Sentenced to a five-year prison term by a Düsseldorf court, Berger resumed her secretarial work in the 1980s.

**BERLIN-HOHENSCHÖNHAUSEN.** The main interrogation headquarters of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Berlin-Hohenschönhausen was established in a militarily restricted zone of an East Berlin suburb but not indicated on any public map. At the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet occupation forces turned this former Nazi welfare kitchen into its central detention center, “Special Camp 3,” containing more than 300 cells and interrogation rooms. Those initially apprehended as “enemy elements” included alleged spies, terrorists, Nazi activists, and members of police and intelligence organizations. According to official Soviet records, 886 persons died between June 1945 to October 1946 in the overcrowded and ill-maintained facility; other estimates calculate the total at more than 3,000. During the next five years, it served as the headquarters for the Central Investigation Department of Soviet State Security.

In 1951, the Soviets transferred Berlin-Hohenschönhausen to the newly established MfS. Until its official closing on 3 October 1990, thousands of prisoners passed through its facilities. Many included well-known dissidents and disgraced party leaders—Walter Janka, Rudolf Bahro, Paul Merker, Ibrahim Böhme, Bärbel Bohley, Ulrike Poppe, and Jürgen Fuchs—as well as leaders of the Uprising of 17 June 1953, two kidnapped officials of the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen (Investigative Committee of Free Jurists), and members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the majority of those interned consisted of citizens of the German Democratic Republic attempting to emigrate officially or commit Republikflucht (flight from the republic). Highly refined psychological methods increasingly replaced an earlier emphasis on physical torture. Strictly isolated from one another and disoriented by a deliberately irregular routine, prisoners were subjected to months of interrogation by a skilled MfS staff in order to extract incriminating statements.
In addition to the prison, labor camp “X,” and two departments charged with instituting criminal proceedings, the restricted zone was also the site of several other MfS units: the Operative Technical Sector, which produced eavesdropping systems, hidden cameras, and false passports; the Armaments and Chemical Services Department, which administered the weapons used by MfS personnel and coordinated preparatory steps in the event of war; administrative elements of the Behind the Lines Services, which oversaw MfS construction projects and vehicles; and part of the Espionage Data Center of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. The complex at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen constituted the largest MfS deployment in East Berlin apart from the main headquarters in Berlin-Lichtenberg. Ironically, MfS chief Erich Mielke was briefly held in custody in Berlin-Hohenschönhausen prior to his own trial. The Hohenschönhausen Memorial public trust foundation now conducts public tours of the facilities.

**BERLIN TUNNEL.** A joint British and American plan to tap Soviet communication lines through an underground excavation, the Berlin Tunnel was conceived over a three-year period and received approval from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on 20 January 1954. The British Secret Intelligence Service (which had mounted a similar operation in Vienna between 1948 and 1955) dubbed the operation **stopwatch**, while the CIA used the code name **GOLD**. As part of their advance planning, the Americans recruited several agents in the East Berlin post office, notably a woman called the “Nummer Mädchen” (numbers girl), who conveyed essential information in determining which lines to tap. Another source in the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) supplied official maps indicating the location of the cables. To disguise “the construction of a subterranean passage approximately 1,800 feet in length, one-half of which will be in Soviet territory”—as stipulated in the original plan—German contractors were engaged to erect a large warehouse in Rudow near the East Berlin border (a cupola was placed on top to give the appearance of a meteorological installation). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the six-foot-diameter tunnel in late February 1955, allowing British telecommunications experts to make the actual tap in the lines that ran along the Schönefelder Chaussee in the Soviet Zone.
Even though knowledge of the tunnel had been passed to the Soviets by the British double agent George Blake, the intelligence yield for the British and the Americans was substantial. It included hard data on Soviet political actions and intentions in Berlin, the Soviet atomic energy program, Soviet and East European military cooperation under the Warsaw Pact, and Soviet radio intercept operations. Among the hardest-hit targets were the Soviet military intelligence and counterintelligence units in Germany, thereby providing invaluable information for cross-checking and analyzing information obtained from double agents run by the CIA and other friendly Western services. Fearful that Blake might be compromised should any countermove be undertaken, the KGB had allowed the transmissions to continue and even withheld knowledge of the tunnel from their key representative in Berlin, Yevgeny Pitovranov, until a later date.

Heavy rains in spring 1956 finally gave the Soviets an opportunity to announce their “discovery” of the tunnel. On 22 April, an investigation of short-circuiting problems revealed the existence of the tap chamber, even though the digging team only slowly realized what they had uncovered. Within hours of the tunnel’s discovery, the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin issued a strong official protest to the American commander, and two days later, members of the international press were allowed a firsthand inspection of the “American spy tunnel.” Soviet authorities made no mention of British complicity, and there is no evidence that the newly formed West German Bundesnachrichtendienst had also been involved in the operation.

News of the tunnel further intensified the bitter relations that already existed between East and West Berlin. Willy Brandt, the leader of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands who later became mayor of West Berlin, announced that he would visit the site on the condition that four political prisoners held in the GDR (including recently kidnapped Robert Bialek) accompany him. Amid extensive publicity, Brandt arrived at the Brandenburg Gate on 28 April and, not surprisingly, found none of the four men. The East Germans soon turned the site into a popular tourist attraction, replete with guided tours and a mobile snack bar. By the end of June, however, the tours had ended. The tunnel entrance was blocked and the Schönefelder Chaussee resurfaced. On the Western side, the warehouse and other adjacent buildings remained occupied by the U.S. Army until the
1980s. In 1997, when the metallic tube was unexpectedly unearthed during a construction project, a 45-foot section was salvaged and made the centerpiece of the Allied Museum at Clayallee 135 in Berlin.

**BERLIN WALL.** See ROSE.

**BERNHARD.** The Nazi wartime plan to counterfeit and distribute enemy currencies, Operation **BERNHARD** traces its origins to a proposal made in late summer 1939 by **Alfred Naujocks**, then head of the document forging and special projects division (unit VI B) of the **Sicherheitsdienst** (SD) in Berlin. According to Naujocks’s plan, false pound sterling bank notes would be dropped over Great Britain by German planes with the aim of destabilizing the economy. The plan, known initially as Operation **ANDREAS**, was forwarded by SD chief **Reinhard Heydrich** to Adolf Hitler, who approved it, stipulating that U.S. currency be exempted.

Its implementation soon encountered a number of difficulties. As the British had devised a number of safeguards for their bank notes, the skilled SD personnel in Najocks’s unit required more time than anticipated to duplicate the linen-based paper, develop matching ink, and ascertain the serial numbering system. By late spring 1941, the first test samples were sent to several banks in neutral countries, and authorities concluded that the counterfeit £5 and £10 notes were of sufficient authenticity to be put into circulation. Najocks’s initial plan never materialized because of British air defenses and a shortage of fuel.

The larger problem, however, lay in the rivalry-ridden SS hierarchy. At least three department heads within the **Reichssicherheitshauptamt**—**Otto Ohlendorf** in domestic intelligence, **Heinz Jost** in foreign intelligence, and **Heinrich Müller**, the Gestapo chief—secretly worked against the plan, and it was only Heydrich’s support that had allowed the operation to go forward. His falling out with Naujocks in mid-1941 meant a temporary halt until **Walter Schellenberg** was named acting head of foreign intelligence. Schellenberg proceeded cautiously, making only periodic decisions about when the approximately £500,000 already printed might be used.
Following Heydrich’s assassination and the appointment of **Ernst Kaltenbrunner** as his successor, the project became reconstituted in 1942 as Operation **BERNHARD**. Because of Germany’s worsening military situation, the counterfeit money, originally intended merely for general circulation, would be used to make critical purchases in neutral countries and to finance foreign intelligence operations, such as the **Cicero Affair**. Production fell to the forgery unit (now VI F 4), headed by Najocks’s highly competent former assistant Bernhard Krüger, from whom the operation derived its new code name. Krüger received not only expanded workspace at Sachsenhausen, the concentration camp just north of Berlin, but also an additional supply of skilled workers drawn from the ranks of the inmates, as government ministries and banks had refused any cooperation in this endeavor. With a staff of some 140 workers, the production unit soon reached an output of 400,000 bills a month. In the interest of economic stability, military authorities opposed the distribution of the currency in Nazi-occupied countries, but intelligence operations faced a critical shortage of foreign currencies and therefore relied heavily on these counterfeit bills throughout Europe, especially in Italy and Yugoslavia.

At the suggestion of **Heinrich Himmler**, designs for caricatured British postage stamps—presumably to indicate smoldering domestic and colonial discontent—were also produced, but Schellenberg had little enthusiasm for the idea and delayed any further action. More serious was Kaltenbrunner’s order to start production of U.S. currency, even though Krüger thought the move came too late to have a significant impact. Nevertheless, the difficult duplication process commenced in fall 1944, and the first specimens, while not of the same high quality as the British notes, appeared early the following year.

By that time, however, Sachsenhausen appeared increasingly vulnerable to air raids and ground attacks. Rather than terminate the operation, as Himmler originally proposed, Krüger recommended a transfer of the staff and equipment to Austria, and both Himmler and Hitler concurred. Hardly had printing resumed the following April at the new facilities in Redl-Zipf than Himmler ordered the immediate destruction of everything connected to the operation, including all records, plates, supplies, and prisoner personnel. Delegating this task
to his assistant, Krüger disappeared with the genuine currency that he had amassed from various illicit dealings, such as the sale of forged passports and identity papers (he eventually reappeared and found postwar employment at an electrical equipment firm). Many boxes of currency and other materials were thrown in the Traun River and Lake Toplitz, while the workers found a safe haven at the Ebensee concentration camp, where they were liberated by American forces shortly thereafter.

In 1943, the British government had become aware of the false currency and, to avoid a panicked public response, merely announced that bank notes larger than £5 would no longer be issued. Not until Germany’s military defeat did the Allies learn of the startling dimensions of the operation. Investigators concluded that 9 million bank notes—in denominations of £1, £5, £20, and £50—with a total face value of £140 million had been printed and inventoried. As nearly two-thirds of that amount could not be accounted for, newly designed pound sterling notes were released in fall 1945, but for many years the counterfeit currency continued to surface throughout the world.

The final sequel occurred in 1959 when Stern magazine, after having located Krüger and others, dispatched a team of divers with specially designed equipment to Lake Toplitz. In addition to finding an assortment of Nazi war materiel, they recovered a dozen boxes of the false currency along with plates and record books. See also EDEL, PETER.

BERNSTORFF, JOHANN HEINRICH COUNT VON (1862–1939). The German envoy to the United States during World War I who was connected to various espionage activities, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff was born in London on 14 November 1862, the son of the Prussian ambassador to the Court of St. James. After a brief stint in the army, Bernstorff embarked on a diplomatic career and served in Dresden, Munich, London, and Cairo before his appointment to the United States in fall 1908. As tensions mounted in Europe, his overriding goal was to preserve American neutrality. At the outbreak of war, Bernstorff promptly created a press office in New York City, but its amateurish propaganda efforts met with little success. Moreover, a number of undercover operations in the United States, ranging from the large-scale forgery of passports for German reserve officers
and agents to planning anticolonial agitation in the British Empire and eventually to the explosion at *Black Tom Island*, contributed to a dramatic rise in anti-German sentiment.

Key operatives such as Kurt Jahnke and Franz Rintelen disdainfully avoided the liberally inclined ambassador, while Bernstorff revealed a very mixed attitude and generally sought to know as little about these matters as possible. His tenure abruptly ended with the revelation of the *Zimmermann Telegram* in early 1917. Feeling deeply discouraged that his advocacy of a mediated peace had been rebuffed, he returned to Berlin and accepted an ambassadorship to Constantinople. After the war, Bernstorff staunchly supported the Weimar Republic and the League of Nations, but with the advent of Nazi rule in 1933, he chose to live in exile in Geneva, where he died on 6 October 1939. Regrettably, his main autobiographical account—*Erinnerungen und Briefe* (*The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff*)—omits any mention of wartime espionage in the United States, even those instances that he had denounced to the Foreign Office.

**BEST, WERNER (1903–1989).** The chief architect of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA) as well as the Reich commissioner for occupied Denmark, Werner Best was born in Darmstadt on 10 July 1903, the son of a postal official. In 1927, he completed a doctorate in law following studies at Frankfurt am Main, Freiburg, Giessen, and Heidelberg. A political activist and organizer, he became drawn to “national revolutionary” circles and was twice imprisoned by the French during the Ruhr occupation. He joined the Nazi Party in 1930. In 1931, Best had to resign his position in the Hessian Justice Department because of his involvement in the Boxheim affair. Documents had been found bearing his imprint and outlining measures to be taken by the Nazis in the event of a communist insurrection.

Despite his momentary fall from grace within the party, he remained a Nazi delegate in the Hessian legislature and, in 1933, became appointed police commissioner of the state. Yet conflict soon developed with his new superiors and prompted his removal. Best’s reputation, however, attracted the notice of SS head Heinrich Himmler, who directed him to Reinhard Heydrich, head of the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD). Appointed initially to the SD district based in Stuttgart that encompassed Baden and Württemberg, Best advanced
rapidly during the following years. The construction of the RSHA in 1939 was largely based on his ideas, and he became head of Section 1 for a brief period. His departure from the RSHA stemmed from a dispute with Heydrich, who came to regard his deputy as overly legalistic. (Best later called Heydrich “the most demonic personality” in the Nazi leadership.) After leaving the RSHA, Best headed the civil administration in occupied France for two years.

The climax of Best’s career was as Reich Commissioner of Denmark from November 1942 until the end of the war. Although evidence exists that he sought to sabotage the implementation of the Final Solution, a Copenhagen court sentenced him to death in 1949 following his extradition. Granted clemency in Denmark in 1951, Best nevertheless faced a series of legal charges in the Federal Republic of Germany. The most serious one—complicity in the massacre of thousands of Jews and Polish intellectuals in occupied Poland—resulted in his arrest in 1969, but he was released three years later owing to frail health. Best died in Mülheim an der Ruhr on 23 June 1989. See also SCHUTZHAFT.

BEURMANN, EDUARD (1804–1883). A prized journalist working as an agent for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Eduard Beurmann was a lawyer in Bremen before deciding to become a writer. In Frankfurt am Main, he became well established in various literary circles, particularly the group Young Germany, and in 1836, together with Karl Gutzkow, began publishing the journal Telegraf für Deutschland. That same year, Beurmann was recruited by Joseph Clannern von Engelshofen, the later head of the MIB. Following secret assignments in Paris and Brussels, Beurmann reported regularly from Frankfurt. In 1841, he assumed the editorial direction of the Journal de Francfurt and further emphasized its pro-Austrian bias. His submissions to the MIB, which also mirrored his conservative convictions and political astuteness, continued until 1847.

BIALEK, ROBERT (1915–1954). The inspector general of the East German Barracked Police who defected to the West and was later kidnapped, Robert Bialek was born in Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland) on 23 June 1915, the son of a Social Democratic family. Joining the German Communist Youth association in 1933, he was arrested
the following year by the Gestapo for preparing for acts of high treason and was imprisoned in Silesia until 1939. Bialek’s illegal work promptly resumed, and he enthusiastically greeted the arrival of the Red Army in May 1945. His first postwar position in Dresden establishing a new communist youth organization was followed by his appointment to the People’s Police.

Much less doctrinaire than most of his communist comrades, Bialek achieved a reputation for energy, sober assessment of matters, and rhetorical skill. Yet his ascending career was purposely derailed by leading party officials, including Erich Mielke. His demotion to minor posts coupled with his deep disillusionment following the Uprising of 17 June 1953 led to his defection to West Berlin later that year. Bialek soon became known for his critical writings and weekly commentaries for the British Broadcasting Company that were beamed to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). That he also worked undercover for the Ostbüro der SPD (code name Bruno Wallmann) only increased the danger he posed in the eyes of the GDR. On 4 February 1956, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit orchestrated his forced return to East Berlin in a drugged state. Bialek died either en route or shortly thereafter at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen. One of the suspected accomplices in his abduction, Herbert Hellwig, had to appear before a Berlin court in 1997.

BIERMANN, WOLF (1936– ). A prime dissident target of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Wolf Biermann was born in Hamburg on 15 November 1936, the son of a communist dockworker later killed at Auschwitz. Moving to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1953, he studied at Humboldt University in East Berlin. His attempts to develop a cabaret theater featuring his own highly irreverent compositions met with repeated denials by government authorities. In 1965, when a collection of his poems was published in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), not only was Biermann denied the right to perform, publish, or travel outside the country, but the MfS began one of its most intensive surveillance efforts under his assigned code name LYRIKER. He received permission to perform again publicly in 1976, including a visa for a West German tour. But following a concert in Cologne on 13 November, the GDR denied his reentry and revoked his citizenship. A large wave of protest on
Biermann’s behalf resulted, prompting heated discussions within the MfS.

His close surveillance continued undiminished during his residency in the FRG. Among the many informers engaged by the MfS to monitor his professional, financial, and personal situation was his manager, Diether Dehm, and Dehm’s companion, Christa Desoi. Their mission was also to render him impotent as a political and artistic figure, but it met with only limited success. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Biermann inspected his own massive security file, which comprised 69 volumes and involved the work of 197 MfS officials and 213 informers. Another controversy erupted in October 1991, when, upon receiving the Georg Büchner literary prize, he bluntly denounced the avant-garde poet Alexander Anderson as a Stasi spy. See also OPERATIVER VORGANG.

BIRTHLER, MARIANNE (1948– ). The second head of the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU; Federal Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic), Marianne Birthler was born in Berlin on 22 January 1948, the daughter of a working-class family. Prior to the 1989 revolution, she worked in the Export Ministry of the German Democratic Republic before resigning and starting a new career as a youth leader and civil rights advocate. After reunification, she served in the Bundestag and then in the provincial Brandenburg government as education minister.

In September 2000, upon the expiration of the term of Joachim Gauck, Birthler was selected by a large majority in the Bundestag to head the BStU, where she inherited a brewing dispute over the Stasi transcripts of the intercepted telephone conversations of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Kohl demanded that the agency withhold any material pending his private review, but Birthler maintained that the law contained no provision for such personal exceptions. After the Federal Administrative Court ruled in July 2001 that “persons of contemporary history” such as Kohl be protected, Birthler temporarily closed the BStU website along with all exhibitions and information centers, and nearly all applications for historical research were denied. In June 2004, the Federal Administrative Court reached a
compromise that tightened the accessibility of Stasi information collected through spying and prohibited the release of this material without the written consent of the person concerned. Although both parties declared victory, Birthler held that the ruling would undermine many future historical projects.

**BLACK TOM ISLAND.** The site of the most publicized act of German sabotage in the United States during World War I, Black Tom Island served as a major munitions depot in New York harbor. On 30 July 1916, as nearly 2 million pounds of ammunition were awaiting transport to the Allied powers in Europe, a huge explosion rocked the area, completely destroying the depot and grazing the nearby Statue of Liberty with shrapnel (a plaque in Liberty State Park marks the site of the blast). A related explosion occurred at the assembly plant of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company in Kingsland, New Jersey, on 11 January 1917, likewise involving the destruction of war materiel bound for overseas.

Although Michael Kristoff, a young Slovakian immigrant living in Bayonne, New Jersey, emerged as the person who probably ignited the incendiary devices at Black Tom Island, the actual organizers of the plot were never identified beyond a reasonable doubt. Two prime suspects, Kurt Jahnke and Lothar Witzke, were later located and questioned. Other likely participants in both incidents were Friedrich Hermann, Paul Hilken, Friedrich Hinsch, Raoul Gerdts, Carl Ahrendt, Wilhelm Woehst, and Theodore Wozniak. After the war, the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, the owner of the depot, sought damages against Germany with the U.S.-German **Mixed Claims Commission.** Agreeing that Germany had been responsible, the commission announced a settlement figure of $50 million in 1939.

**BLAU, HAGEN (1935– ).** A highly regarded agent of the **Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung** (HVA) serving in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hagen Blau was recruited in 1960 while a student of Chinese and Japanese at the Free University in West Berlin. After completing his doctorate the following year, Blau (code name **detlev**) entered the Foreign Ministry with the encouragement of his case officer. A political counselor during the mid-1970s, he gave the East Germans access to extensive
intelligence related to Great Britain. Married to a Japanese woman, he was also an important source of information during his posting in Tokyo. It was not until after the fall of the Berlin Wall that an ex-HVA officer, Werner Roitzsch, revealed Blau’s double identity to authorities. On 15 November 1990, he received a six-year prison term.

**BLAUMEISE.** A clandestine relationship that the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) established with the Israeli Mossad, Operation BLAUMEISE (Bluettit) began at the initiative of Reinhard Gehlen in 1957, eight years prior to official diplomatic ties between the two countries. Despite the large number of former Third Reich officials engaged by the BND, Mossad head Isser Harel believed that Israel’s security requirements outweighed any emotional or moralistic considerations. At the same time, the BND realized that the huge influx of immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into Israel could aid in the quest for information about the military activities of the Warsaw Pact, especially after having lost so much of its network due to Heinz Felfe. Some U.S. intelligence officials thought that incriminating evidence about ex-Nazis in the West German government was being suppressed by Mossad in return for favored treatment by the BND.

The BND liaison was Wolfgang Langkau, a confidant of Gehlen, while Shlomo Cohen, the chief of station in Paris, represented the Mossad, succeeded later by David Kimche. Mossad proceeded cautiously at first and tested the BND to ascertain whether other East bloc penetrations had occurred. According to Markus Wolf of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, however, the Israeli services remained completely impervious to his efforts. Gehlen granted the Israelis operational freedom on West German soil as well as excerpts from his agency’s daily briefings to the Chancellor’s Office, while BND officers soon became frequent visitors to Tel Aviv. This intimate cooperation between the two services continued under Harel’s successor, Meir Amit, and achieved special significance in matters of counterintelligence, radio surveillance, and laser technology. To help track members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Europe, Mossad also maintained close contact with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
BLEICHER, HUGO (1899–2000?). An exceptionally adroit Abwehr agent working in wartime France, Hugo Bleicher served in World War I and afterward became a businessman. Because of his knowledge of French and Spanish, he was recruited by the Abwehr and assigned to Paris during the occupation. Frequently posing as a potential defector under the pseudonym Colonel Henri, Bleicher penetrated several networks of the British Special Operations Executive. Among those arrested as a result were Peter Churchill and Odette Samson. Bleicher also recruited Mathilde Carré, who not only betrayed members of Réseau Interallié, a French-Polish intelligence network established by Roman Garby-Czerniawski, but also became his mistress. In June 1945, Bleicher was arrested by the Dutch police in Amsterdam and placed in British Camp 020 to avoid his immediate return to France. He was later convicted by an Allied court. His memoirs, *Colonel Henri’s Story*, were published in 1954 to refute lingering claims of excessive brutality on his part.

BLITZ. The third of a series of “concentrated blows” to eliminate enemy espionage networks in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Operation BLITZ (Lightning) took place between early December 1954 and spring 1955. The first stage involved the arrest of members of various resistance groups, notably the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen, and the Ostbüro der SPD. The second stage, code-named Frühling (Spring), was even broader and struck especially at the British MI5 using information supplied by Kim Philby and George Blake.

On 12 April, the GDR Council of Ministers announced the arrest of “521 spies and subversives.” A massive propaganda campaign followed in the press, accompanied by numerous show trials during the summer. Of those arrested, the majority (149) occurred in East Berlin, while 10 arrests were made in the highly sensitive Wismut organization. Despite the success of the operation, GDR officials had to confront the fact that the number of working-class persons apprehended was significantly larger than those from the lower-middle and middle classes. *See also* FEUERWERK; PFEIL.
BLOCH, ERNST (1898–1945). An Abwehr officer responsible for the rescue of a prominent Jewish leader in Poland, Ernst Bloch was born in Berlin on 1 May 1898, the son of a Jewish father and a Gentile mother. A volunteer in World War I who received the Iron Cross First and Second Class, he subsequently remained on active duty as a career officer and earned a doctorate in economics at the University of Berlin as well. In 1935, the new head of the Abwehr, Wilhelm Canaris, recruited Bloch to direct the Foreign Economic Intelligence Department, which gathered data on the industrial capacity of foreign countries. Four years later, Canaris obtained an authorization signed by Adolf Hitler declaring Bloch of “German blood.”

Moreover, he was asked by Canaris to head a secret mission to rescue Joseph Isaac Schneersohn, the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, then living in Warsaw (the long chain of those involved in this effort had originated in the United States). After locating Schneersohn in late November 1939, Bloch and his team helped him embark on an escape route that led from Warsaw via Berlin and Riga to Stockholm and eventually New York City. Afterward, Bloch resumed his previous responsibilities with the Abwehr until April 1943, when his request for a command on the eastern front was granted. When the rejection of his prior Aryanization resulted in his dismissal from the Wehrmacht the following year, he returned to Berlin and participated in the final struggle for the city. Bloch died on 30 April 1945 while attempting to repel the attacks of the Red Army.

BLUM, EBERHARD (1919–2003). The fourth head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Eberhard Blum was born in Kiel on 28 July 1919. Raised in Holland, he served in the Wehrmacht on the eastern front during World War II but was not a part of Fremde Heere Ost. After finishing his university studies, he joined the Organisation Gehlen in April 1947 as a personal consultant (code name HARTWIG) to the director. Subsequent positions in the BND included the supervision of the personnel division and a residency in London from 1964 to 1968. Sharp differences with the new BND president Gerhard Wessel led to Blum’s abrupt transfer in 1970 to Washington, D.C., where he remained until his own assumption of that office on 27 December 1982. Well regarded by his American colleagues,

**BOHEMIA.** The first major counterintelligence success of the Organisation Gehlen, Operation **BOHEMIA** involved the defection of two key Czech military intelligence officers to the West. Ottokar Feifar, who became head of the department dealing with the Allied occupation zones of Germany on 1 April 1948, agreed to abandon his post and make a full disclosure in exchange for resettlement in the United States. Feifar also persuaded his colleague, Vojtech Jarabek, to accompany him. On 8 November, the two men traveled by car from Karlovy Vary to a point near the Bavarian border and then crossed undetected on foot. More than 40 men and women were promptly apprehended by U.S. Military Police and placed on trial as a result of information they provided. The most important agent, Joromir Koska, received a sentence of 20 years, and the Czech military service had considerable difficulty in recovering from the collapse of this network.

**BÖHME, IBRAHIM (1944–1999).** An informer for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in the ranks of the East German dissidents, Ibrahim (originally Manfred) Böhme was born in Leipzig on 18 November 1944 and raised as an orphan. Trained as a mason, he later was a teacher until his brief arrest in 1965 owing to a lecture on Robert Havemann. After joining the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in 1967, he was recruited by the MfS as an informer (code names **maximilian**, **paul bonkarz**, and **dr. rohloff**). Böhme’s reputation as a critic of the regime grew, as he took issue with the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and opposed the expulsion of **Wolf Biermann** from the German Democratic Republic in 1976. Besides losing his party membership, he was held in **Berlin-Hohenschönhausen** for 15 months in 1976–1977 for “subversive agitation.” His subsequent support for **Solidarity** in Poland resulted in a second occupation ban, forcing him to take a series of odd jobs.

In November 1989, Böhme, a talented organizer and speaker, emerged as a prominent member of citizens’ movement and was one of the founders of the East German Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD). Yet in March 1990, his role as an MfS informer for more than 20 years became known, and he soon resigned his position as head of the party. Despite the existence of his own MfS reports and taped recordings of meetings with his control officer, Böhme flatly denied any Stasi complicity. Especially noteworthy were the charges made by the dissident writer Rainer Kunze, who, in his own file, discovered Böhme’s involvement in his surveillance and expatriation. In 1992, following the merger of the two branches after reunification, the SPD removed him for “serious behavior injurious to the party.” He died in Neustrelitz (Mecklenburg) on 22 November 1999.

BOLSCHWING, OTTO ALBRECHT VON (1909–1982). A Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) officer active in Palestine and Romania, and later an advisor to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing was born on 15 October 1909, the second son of a Junker family. After joining the Nazi Party in 1929, he began a career with the SS and—owing to his facility with languages—became involved in overseas SD operations. His first assignment was in Palestine, where he posed as a monk in Nazareth and then as a businessman in Haifa. By encouraging Arab leaders to cooperate with Jewish groups struggling for independence, he hoped to rid the country of British domination. In mid-1935, following his expulsion by British authorities, he was summoned back to Berlin to assist with the Jewish Affairs Office. As a consultant, he worked with Adolf Eichmann in drawing up plans to reduce Jewish influence in Germany, which included the use of terror and the forfeiture of property.

In March 1940, Heinrich Himmler dispatched Bolschwing to Romania, giving him full responsibility for all SD activities. Bolschwing soon threw his support behind the intensely anti-Semitic and ultra-fascist Iron Guard Movement, which had been excluded from the otherwise pro-German dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonescu. While a measure of cooperation resulted—King Carol II was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, and several members of the Iron Guard became part of the new government—open hostility resurfaced early the following year. When Antonescu responded to the attack of the Iron Guard with military force, Bolschwing gave
refuge to their top leaders in the SD residence located in the German Embassy compound. Despite Himmler’s approval of this action, it ran counter to Hitler’s desire to have Romania’s firm support in the impending invasion of the Soviet Union (Romania was to supply the largest foreign contingent on the eastern front). Bolschwing was therefore recalled and placed in a Gestapo prison until 1943.

Bolschwing’s decision to marry a half-Jewish Austrian woman brought about his dismissal from the SS and inaugurated a new phase in his life. As her half-brother was connected to the Austrian resistance movement O-5, Bolschwing became a secret operative stationed in the Tyrolean Alps in late 1944. As a resistance fighter, he established a working relationship with the U.S. Army and helped to capture numerous high-ranking Nazi officials. He next formed a relationship with the rapidly expanding Organisation Gehlen (OG) and attempted to reactivate his old SS network in Romania. Very little materialized, however, as the leaders of the Black Guard were preoccupied with their own internal battles. Just as he was about to lose his position with the OG, a new opportunity arose in the context of the preparation for Austrian independence by the CIA.

In fall 1949, after only a cursory check of his past activities, the CIA approved his recruitment because of his cultivated manner and self-professed expertise regarding Austria and Romania. Even though his superiors knew that his contention of never having joined the Nazi Party was a falsehood, this fact remained suppressed, and he continued to be promoted. In July 1953, the CIA even recommended granting him U.S. citizenship to enable his return to Austria as an officer. While his naturalization application gained final approval six years later, officials in Washington blocked any future role as an intelligence officer. After finding employment with an American pharmaceutical firm in New Jersey, Bolschwing was nominated for a State Department post in India in 1961. Against the backdrop of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, the CIA informed Bolschwing that his previous affiliation with the Jewish Affairs Office would remain confidential but that it would not commit perjury on his behalf. At the CIA’s request, he withdrew his application, thereby delaying his exposure as a war criminal. Not until 1981 was he stripped of his citizenship by a U.S. Federal Court following an investigation by the
Justice Department. A terminal illness prevented his deportation, and he died in the United States the next year.

BORCHARDT, PAUL (1886–1953). A noted archeologist arrested as an Abwehr spy in the United States, Paul Borchardt was born in Berlin. Although he had served in World War I as an undercover agent in the Near East and subsequently received a professorship in military geography in Munich, Nazi officials confined him at Dachau in 1933 because of his Jewish ancestry. In 1939, released through the efforts of Wilhelm Canaris and disguised as an Abwehr agent to facilitate his departure from Germany, Borchardt arrived in Great Britain and offered his assistance to MI5 as a Jewish anti-Nazi spy. When perplexed British officials declined to classify him as a restricted “enemy alien,” he continued on to the United States, where, under the code name Robert, he became associated with the spy ring headed by Kurt Frederick Ludwig. Captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 8 December 1941 and placed on trial, Borchardt emphasized his overriding loyalty to Germany and was given a 20-year prison sentence. His early release on 7 July 1952 occurred as a result of intervention by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had been petitioned on Borchardt’s behalf by a former Abwehr officer in Munich.

BORM, WILLIAM (1895–1987). A prominent West German politician who served as an agent of influence for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), William Borm was born in Hamburg on 7 July 1895, the son of a furniture salesman. After serving in World War I and studying economics at the University of Berlin, he founded his own firm for electrical acoustical devices. During World War II, the Nazi government deemed his economic leadership as a factory manager necessary for the defense of the country. In 1950, Borm was arrested at an Autobahn border crossing by the People’s Police of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Two years later, a court in Greifswald sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment because of “war and boycott agitation.” As his early release in 1959 neared, he was recruited as an agent by the HVA and given the code name Olaf.

Borm’s rapid ascent in the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) began first in West Berlin and then on the national level. Elected to the
Bundestag in 1965, he became a member of the legislative leadership in 1970 and of the European Parliament in 1971. Throughout this period, he met regularly with his HVA handlers, and by 1969, HVA chief Markus Wolf was personally directing matters, even writing the draft of a speech delivered by Borm to the Bundestag in October of that year. According to Wolf, the relationship with Borm functioned on so many levels that “we could exert influence on the party, even if on a modest scale.” Despite its small size, the FDP was a pivotal coalition partner and played a major role in defining a new policy of cooperation between the two Germanys. As the grand seigneur of the party, Borm, deeply sympathetic to the GDR, consistently took positions critical of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and supported the West German peace movement. He also hired the GDR-trained spy Johanna Olbrich (alias Sonja Lüneburg) as a secretary in 1969 and recommended her to other leading FDP members.

In 1982, when the FDP abandoned the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and resumed its earlier partnership with the Christlich-Demokratische Union, Borm resigned and organized his own splinter party, thereby causing the HVA to lose interest in him. The recipient of several prestigious West German awards, he also received an honorary doctorate from the University of Leipzig in 1985. He died in Bonn on 2 September 1987.

BOS, HANS-WALTER (1950– ). A petty officer of the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) who worked as a double agent for Western intelligence, Hans-Walter Bos served initially in the National People’s Army (NVA). In October 1980, after completing a training course, he was assigned to Division VI of the VA and sent to the military attaché of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Bern, Switzerland, as an instructor and driver. When Bos was later arrested for shoplifting, Swiss intelligence convinced him to serve as a double agent and supply information regarding VA organization and operations in the country. The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit soon confirmed a substantial increase in Swiss surveillance of East German personnel stationed in Zurich, Geneva, and Bern, without discovering its origins.

Because of his recall to the German Democratic Republic in 1982, Swiss intelligence engaged the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND),
which helped Bos to continue filming and delivering confidential information. Approximately six months later, he was reassigned as a driver to the NVA delegation at the disarmament negotiations in Vienna. Through its own double agent in the BND, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung learned that secret documents related to the NVA and the negotiations in Vienna had been obtained by the West Germans. The number of suspects was narrowed to Bos, yet fearful of revealing the identity of its inside agent, counterintelligence officials refrained from taking direct action and merely kept critical information under tighter security. Not until the unexpected defection of Hansjoachim Tiedge in August 1985 was a pretext found to arrest Bos. An internal damage assessment revealed a considerable loss, even if no operational sources had been in danger of exposure. His lifelong prison sentence, announced in 1987, ended three years later with the collapse of the GDR. Afterward, he established a private detective agency in Berlin.

**BOY-ED, KARL (1872–1930).** A naval officer expelled as a spy from the United States during World War I, Karl Boy-Ed was born in Lübeck on 14 December 1872. Trained as an officer, he became a protégé of the influential architect of the German fleet, Alfred von Tirpitz, and was sent in 1911 as the naval attaché to Washington, D.C. With the outbreak of World War I, he established an office in New York under the name Nordmann and worked with Franz von Papen in organizing various sabotage operations. Both men were declared persona non grata and expelled from the United States in December 1915. An advocate of unrestricted submarine warfare, Boy-Ed headed a naval press office for the remainder of the war. Hostility toward him never diminished in the United States. Although he was married to an American, his attempt to obtain a visa in 1926 was denied by the State Department amid considerable publicity. Boy-Ed died after a horseback-riding accident on his estate near Hamburg on 14 September 1930.

**BRANDENBURG DIVISION.** A disguised commando unit of the Wehrmacht operated by the Abwehr, the Brandenburg Division owed its inspiration to Captain Theodor von Hippel and his experiences during World War I. While serving under General Paul von
Lettow-Vorbeck, Hippel had witnessed the successful guerrilla war conducted against Allied colonial troops in East Africa and proposed, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the formation of small elite units trained in sabotage working behind enemy lines. The idea found little favor among the traditional Wehrmacht officers but was adopted by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris in 1939 and assigned to the sabotage section under Erwin Lahousen. Originally called the Bau-Lehr-Kompanie zbV 800 (or Special Purpose Construction and Training Company No. 800), it was composed primarily of ethnic Germans from abroad who possessed a second mother tongue. Because of its rapid growth—and the fact that the main barracks and training ground were located in the town of Brandenburg an der Havel—the company was named the Brandenburg Battalion on 15 December 1939. Designated a regiment six months later, it reached divisional strength at the end of 1942.

In addition to developing an expert knowledge of foreign languages and customs, the Brandenburgers became well-versed in parachute jumping, demolition methods, covert operations, and the use of enemy weapons and equipment. There were also units designed for specific local conditions, such as the company of skilled cross-country skiers equipped with dog sleds appropriate to the frozen terrain of the northern Soviet Union.

The Brandenburgers, operating in units of anywhere from two to 200 people, saw duty in nearly every military theater between 1940 and 1944. Their single most important achievement arguably took place in early August 1941, when a detachment of 62 Baltic and Sudeten Germans led by Adrian von Foelkersam penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union in order to secure the oil fields at Maikop. Driving Red Army trucks and clad in uniforms of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the detachment simulated an artillery attack on the city and managed to persuade the Soviet troops to evacuate, thereby allowing German troops to enter without firing a shot.

At the same time, numerous accounts have tended to exaggerate the scope of their exploits. Because of the high risks involved, the casualty rate of the Brandenburgers was well above the norm for other German forces. Moreover, whether in such targeted countries as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, India, or South Africa, their successes
proved merely short-term and had no lasting military significance. After the dissolution of the Abwehr in early summer 1944, most of the Brandenburgers were transferred to the Panzergrenadier Division Brandenburg and saw frontline combat on the eastern front. Another group of 800–1,000 men became part of the SS-Jagdverbände (Hunting Teams) led by Otto Skorzeny. At the end of the war, many worked as mercenaries or advisors in various parts of the world. See also JABLONKA PASS; KOENEN, FRIEDRICH VON; PFUHLSTEIN, ALEXANDER VON.

BRANDT, WILLY (1913–1992). The first Social Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and formerly a wartime informant, Willy Brandt was born Walter Frahm in Lübeck on 18 December 1913. A leader in the youth section of the left-wing socialist splinter party Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei, he took refuge in Norway following the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 and started his underground work, changing his name to Willy Brandt as a precaution against the Gestapo. Brandt’s participation in the Spanish Civil War as a liaison with a militia of the POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification) led him to denounce the “blind terror” unleashed by communists against fellow-leftists on orders from Moscow; he was in turn labeled “an agent of Franco.” His attitude changed dramatically with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. A file was established on Brandt (code name POLYARNIK), which revealed that information was conveyed to the residency of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in Stockholm, but he was never considered a bona fide agent, as his ardent desire to hasten the defeat of Adolf Hitler caused him to maintain contact with British and American intelligence officers as well.

After his return to Germany and election in 1957 as the resolute anticommunist mayor of West Berlin, a joint disinformation operation of the KGB and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit sought to distort his wartime record by portraying him as an agent of British and American intelligence—even the Gestapo—but it failed to achieve the desired effect. When Brandt became chancellor of the FRG in 1969 and inaugurated a policy of détente (or Ostpolitik) many members of the Bundesnachrichtendienst registered their sharp disapproval regarding this change of direction toward the
Eastern bloc. At a critical juncture in April 1972, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) under Markus Wolf helped save the Brandt government in the Bundestag by bribing opposition delegates Julius Steiner and Leo Wagner. Yet at the same time, the HVA succeeded in placing Günter Guillaume in Brandt’s immediate entourage as a personal aide. Guillaume’s unmasking triggered the chancellor’s resignation on 4 May 1974, although there existed other, more fundamental reasons. While Brandt wrote several different accounts of his life, his numerous dealings with espionage received no more than a broad-brush description. He died in Unkel (Rhineland-Palatinate) on 8 October 1992. See also BAUER, LEO; FREDERIK, HANS; SIEVERS, SUSANNE; WEHNER, HERBERT.

BRAUN, JOSEF (1907–1966). A highly prized agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) who penetrated the early Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), Josef Braun was born on 5 April 1907. After joining the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1927, he fought in World War II, spending the final years in an American prisoner of war camp. In 1952, following his return to East Berlin, Braun received instructions from the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the forerunner of the HVA, to join the SPD in West Berlin. His initial designation was source 501. Braun’s ascent in the party ranks was swift, culminating in his election to the Bundestag.

HVA chief Markus Wolf called Braun “a source of incalculable value” and personally supervised his work under the code name FREDDY. Braun’s activities were twofold: to relay information regarding developments at the highest levels of the SPD; and as an Einflussagent (agent of influence), to steer policy decisions in a manner favorable to the GDR. Evidence also suggests that he reported his conversations at the West Berlin party headquarters with East German dissident Wolfgang Harich in November 1956. Harich was arrested shortly thereafter in the GDR. Braun’s career ended when he died suddenly in 1966.

BRAUNE BLÄTTER. Written reports of the Forschungsamt that were distributed to a select circle of leading Nazi officials, the Braune Blätter (Brown Sheets) were multigraphed in purple on light-brown
paper. Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring had ultimate authority for their contents and distribution, which occurred by courier under strictest secrecy. They had to be returned within a month for destruction. Known for their strict objectivity, they had increasingly less influence on decision-making as Germany’s wartime situation worsened.

BREDOW, FERDINAND VON (1884–1934). An early head of the Abwehr assassinated during the Night of the Long Knives, Ferdinand von Bredow was born in Neuruppin (Brandenburg) on 16 May 1884, the son of an old military family. After serving on the western front throughout World War I, he joined the Reichswehr and became a member of the Abwehr in 1925. When Bredow came to head the expanding organization four years later, his admiration for the British Secret Intelligence Service caused him to gather as much information as possible in order to emulate its best operational features. Through the Hungarian military attaché in London as well as decrypted signals, the Abwehr also obtained inside knowledge about the scope of intelligence cooperation between Great Britain and France in 1930.

Bredow’s greater allegiance was to his mentor Kurt von Schleicher, the ambitious chief of the General Staff who became a presidential chancellor in 1932. Bredow was replaced at the Abwehr by Konrad Patzig and became Schleicher’s cabinet-level deputy responsible for his private “information bureau.” Bredow’s advocacy of a military coup in January 1933 to prolong the Schleicher government was rejected by his chief, and his anti-Nazi strategy of parliamentary co-option failed to prevent Adolf Hitler from gaining power later that month. Both Bredow and Schleicher soon became prime targets of Reinhard Heydrich and were among the numerous people shot to death by the SS on 30 June 1934.

BRIEFTAUBEN. A long-established means of delivering messages, Brieftauben, carrier pigeons, were used during World War I as a communications link with secret operatives behind enemy lines. To counter the extensive carrier pigeon network that Heinrich Himmler developed during World War II, the British trained a number of predatory peregrine falcons. According to MI5 records, at least two captured pigeons were classified as prisoners of war.
BROCKEN. The site of a former major signals intelligence installation of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Brocken is the highest peak in the Harz Mountains as well as northern Germany. A staple of legends and folklore—the most German of all mountains according to 19th-century writer Heinrich Heine—it achieved modern significance with its early weather station and the world’s first television tower in 1937. Although the Brocken was captured by American forces at the end of World War II, the Soviet military government gained possession in late April 1947 and erected its own listening post (code name JENISSEJ). Because of its proximity to the border of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the area became a restricted military zone with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

Five years later, the creation of Main Department III devoted to signals intelligence and directed by Horst Männchen led to the installation of an MfS listening post on the Brocken (code name URIAN) with a staff of several dozen technicians. Their chief priority was monitoring the intelligence and defense agencies of the FRG as well as military-related industrial concerns. The bizarre form of the main building constructed in 1986 gave rise to the popular designation “Stasi Mosque.” In early December 1989, eager groups of East German protesters were drawn to the Brocken and demanded the reopening of the summit to the public. See also STÖBERHAI.

BRUNNER, ALOIS (1912–?). A notorious SS protégé of Adolf Eichmann who was later engaged by several intelligence organizations, Alois Brunner was born in Nadkut, Hungary (now Rohrbrunn, Austria), the son of a peasant family. Joining the Nazi Party in 1931, he became a member of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) eight years later and was Eichmann’s close assistant. His initial work in Vienna organizing Jewish emigration was followed by a similar position in Berlin. In early 1943, while stationed in Thessaloniki, Brunner supervised the deportation of more than 40,000 Jews to the death camps before being dispatched to France to reorganize the Drancy facility and oversee mass arrests throughout the country. His last major assignment involved the destruction of the last remaining Jewish community in Slovakia.
At the end of the war, by presenting false papers in the name of Alois Schmaldienst, Brunner managed to elude capture and eventually settled in Essen. In 1954, while a French court issued a death sentence in absentia, he decided to flee via Egypt to Syria and adopt yet another name, Georg Fischer. Not only was a relationship established with the Syrian service—particularly regarding the procurement of foreign arms—but the Bundesnachrichtendienst later appointed him its resident in Damascus. Members of the Israeli Mossad kept their sights firmly set on Brunner but only succeeded in inflicting bodily injury—the loss of one eye in 1960 and four fingers through a 1981 letter bomb.

BUNDESAMT FÜR SICHERHEIT IN DER INFORMATIONSTECHNIK (BSI). A government agency charged with ensuring the inviolability of high-technology information systems, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Bureau for Security in Information Technology) was established on 17 December 1990 and placed under the direction of the German Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its main functions had been previously performed by the Zentralstelle für das Chiffriermachen (ZfCh), a branch of the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Located in the Bad Godesberg section of Bonn, and staffed with about 300 people, the BSI was initially headed by Otto Leiberich, the former director of the ZfCh who had been named the BND’s top mathematician in 1962. The BSI was also directed to help evaluate information legally obtained by other German security organs. Critics accused the government of attempting to create a version of the U.S. National Security Agency, albeit on a far smaller scale, while its defenders stressed that eavesdropping operations lay outside the BSI’s stated mandate.

BUNDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ (BfV). The principal agency charged with investigating subversive activities in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) was specifically authorized by the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of 1949. Fearful of creating a Gestapo-like organization, legislators observed the Trennungsgebot, the order separating intelligence and police functions, prohibiting the new agency from making arrests, conduct-
ing house searches, and interrogating individuals or asking the police or other government bodies to use these powers on its behalf. Unlike the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation or the British MI5, the BfV is a federal structure that shares powers and cooperates with but exercises no direction over analogous offices (Landesämter) in each of the German states. It is in turn responsible to the federal Interior Ministry and, since 1978, is overseen by the Parliamentary Control Commission of the Bundestag. With headquarters in Cologne and a training school nearby, it was divided into eight major branches (later reduced to six): organization and administration, central special questions and data processing, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, counterintelligence, security protection, foreign extremists, and terrorism. Its initial staff of 50 grew to 1,600 in 1977 and then over 5,000 by 1989.

Problems plagued the agency from the outset. Backed by British authorities but opposed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, its first head, Otto John, mysteriously appeared in East Berlin in 1954 and set in motion one of the most perplexing cases of the Cold War. Another BfV head, Hubert Schrübbers, was found to have had a previous career in the Third Reich as a prosecutor of political crimes and was dismissed after 17 years in office. Likewise damaging to the BfV’s reputation were the Vulkan Affair, the Traube Affair, and the double agents Hansjoachim Tiedge and Klaus Kuron. Nevertheless, the agency can take credit for unmasking Eastern bloc operatives in each of the FRG’s major political parties, among them Karlfranz Schmidt-Wittmack, Alfred Frenzel, Hannsheinz Porst, Karl Wienand, and Günter Guillaume. Initiated in 1978, Operation anmeldung proved to be an effective means of detecting Illegaler (covert operatives), who had been dispatched in large numbers to the FRG by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. Supporters of the BfV contend that its early warning system has promoted the general political stability of the FRG by the timely identification of extremist parties and movements. See also Cellers Loch; Scientology Organization.

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung. See Staatspolizeilicher Dienst.
BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTE FÜR DIE UNTERLAGEN DES STAATSSICHERHEITSDIENSTES DER EHEMALIGEN DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK (BSU). The government agency charged with managing the massive files and other surviving materials of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic) was created by the Bundestag in December 1991. A heated controversy had preceded the passage of this act. Some argued for the destruction of the files, predicting murder and mayhem were they to be used in determining the culpability of MfS collaborators. Western intelligence agencies also chafed at having the clandestine practices of the security services exposed to the general public. Yet the view championed by East German dissidents that individuals had the right to see how they had been monitored and persecuted by the MfS prevailed. In addition to the surviving files that measured some 185 kilometers in length, hundreds of bags of shredded documents were preserved as well, and a laborious reconstruction process began in 1995.

Based in Berlin with a network of 14 district offices, the BStU grew from an initial workforce of 600 employees to over 3,000, composed predominantly of East Germans. With the former Lutheran minister and civil rights activist Joachim Gauck at its head, the BStU soon became more commonly known as the Gauck-Behörde, or Gauck Agency. As an administrative body, it has the responsibility of providing government agencies and private corporations with relevant data but cannot make recommendations regarding dismissals. By February 1997, according to BStU estimates, 42,066 people were removed from their civil service positions and 12,800 others lost their jobs because of a past Stasi connection. At the end of 2006, more than 6 million people—East and West Germans as well as numerous foreigners—had applied to inspect their personal files. A survey conducted several years earlier indicated overwhelming satisfaction by those who had undergone this historically unprecedented experience.

The BStU’s most problematic episode stemmed from former Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s legal challenge regarding the publication
of Stasi transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations, which provoked the dogged resistance of the new director, Marianne Birthler. In March 2004, the Federal Administrative Court reached a compromise that sought to protect “persons of contemporary history.” Although the employees of the BStU continued to have unrestricted access, the impediments for scholarly research increased significantly. See also REISSWOLF.

BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST (BND). The foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) came into official existence on 1 April 1956, largely as a continuation of the Organisation Gehlen based in Pullach. During the following decades, it underwent numerous reform and structural changes, eventually resulting in eight main departments and more than 6,000 employees. Attached directly to the Chancellor’s Office and headed initially by Reinhard Gehlen, the BND became the object of severe criticism, not only because of the number of former Nazi officials it had engaged but also owing to its penetration by numerous communist double agents, Heinz Felfe being the most notorious.

With Gehlen’s retirement in 1968 came dramatic reforms under Gerhard Wessel, who ended all domestic surveillance and recast the organization more in the mold of a traditional civil service. A new signals intelligence program was also inaugurated. It is noteworthy as well that Wessel’s successors beginning with Klaus Kinkel were no longer drawn from the armed forces and that the Bundestag began to exercise oversight in 1978. While lacking the extensive powers of its counterpart in the United States, the Parliamentary Control Commission nevertheless possesses greater authority than most similar bodies elsewhere in Europe.

During the 1960s, the BND’s exclusive focus on the Warsaw Pact—and the German Democratic Republic in particular—gradually expanded to larger global concerns, especially through the efforts of Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky. The next decade even saw secret financial support extended to social democratic parties in Spain and Portugal. By the 1990s, the BND had operations in some 70 countries along with signal installations throughout the FRG. The organization maintained its traditionally close ties with the United States and
Israel (Operation Blaumeise), and an important intelligence-sharing relationship developed with France. Spheres of influence were agreed upon, the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure assuming prime responsibility for Latin America and Africa, and the BND taking the lead role in Germanic and Slavic Europe.

Incidents such as the Rabta Affair and Plutonium Affair—as well as the unmasking of double agents Gabrielle Gast and Alfred Spuhler following German reunification—continued to darken the public image of the BND. Moreover, throughout its history, various chancellors came to view the organization somewhat askance and never embraced it fully. One of its most acerbic detractors, Helmut Schmidt, characterized it simply as a “band of dilettantes.” In a move designed to bring the BND closer to political decision-making and alter its relatively insular culture, the government of Gerhard Schröder authorized in April 2003 the transfer of its headquarters from Pullach to Berlin, to be completed over the next eight years.

See also Blum, Eberhard; Hellenbroich, Heribert; Langemann, Hans; Langkau, Wolfgang; Stöber-Hai; Wieck, Hans-Georg; Zentralstelle für das Chiffrierwesen.

Bunke, Tamara (1937–1967). A spy closely associated with the guerrilla revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Tamara Bunke was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 19 November 1937, the daughter of teachers who, as communists and Jews, had fled Nazi Germany two years earlier. The family returned to Germany in 1952, settling in Stalinstadt (now Eisenhüttenstadt), and Bunke went on to study political science at Humboldt University in East Berlin. Her fluency in German, Russian, Spanish, and English—coupled with her ardent ideological convictions—led to her recruitment by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). In 1960, she was assigned as the translator for Guevara, who had come to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as the head of a Cuban trade delegation. This personal encounter only served to deepen her enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution, and in May 1961, she made her first visit to the country. Although her contact with the MfS appears to have ceased at this point—her control officer, Günter Männel, defected to West Berlin one month after her departure—Cuban intelligence chief Manuel Piñeiro was so
impressed by her “excellent qualities” that he handled her personally. In March 1964, she completed extensive espionage training and was assigned the code name TANIA.

Selected for an assignment in Bolivia, where her background would be useful for penetrating the influential German émigré community, Bunke first returned briefly to Europe to familiarize herself with her new identity as Haydée Bidel González. Cuban officials decided, however, that this cover contained too many inconsistencies and therefore devised a new persona, Laura Gutiérrez Bauer, necessitating a second trip to Europe to confirm the biographical details. In La Paz, posing as an unmarried ethnologist of independent means, Bunke had no difficulty establishing a circle of valuable contacts as well as obtaining a Bolivian residency permit in January 1965. Her plan to secure citizenship was furthered later that year through a calculated marriage with a Bolivian engineering student (her actual lover, dating from her training period in Cuba, was Ulises Estrada, Piñeiro’s officer for African and Asian affairs). In early 1966, showing emotional strain despite her unflagging revolutionary commitment, she received a one-month counterintelligence refresher course in Brazil from an experienced Cuban officer code-named MERCY.

Later that spring, Bunke journeyed to Prague to visit Guevara, then recovering from his failed adventure in the Congo but also preparing for a new expedition in South America. Mostly by default, Bolivia was selected as the site of his next guerrilla offensive, and Bunke received a new set of codes along with instructions to continue her deep cover work. After arriving in Bolivia and setting up a camp at Ñancahuazú, Guevara dispatched Bunke on two missions to Argentina to help mobilize the local guerrilla movement. Her desire to be closer to actual combat, thereby forfeiting her valuable undercover status, provoked harsh words from Guevara. Nevertheless by late March 1967, she and two other noncombatants had become part of his small military force.

Bunke’s fate was decided by a peasant collaborator who had been turned following his capture by the Bolivian army. On 31 August, with his assistance, Bolivian soldiers ambushed Bunke and nine fellow guerrillas as they were fording the Río Grande at Vado del Yeso. Her body was found several days later and buried in nearby Vallegrande; in 1998, her remains were transferred to Cuba and
placed in the mausoleum dedicated to Guevara. Following her death, Bunke became a highly venerated figure in both Cuba and the GDR with many youth brigades, children’s nurseries, women’s groups, and schools bearing her name.

BUSCH, HEINZ (1931– ). An officer of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) who defected to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Heinz Busch was born in Belgard (now Bialogard, Poland). Joining the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in 1954, he served as a counterintelligence officer at the Moscow embassy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and studied afterward at the Frunze Military Academy. In 1975, following three years of teaching at the Juristische Hochschule des MfS, he was appointed head of military evaluation within Division VII of the HVA.

Considered an exceptionally loyal and persuasive spokesman for the HVA, Busch was selected to meet with members of the citizens’ committees as public criticism of the Stasi dramatically escalated in fall 1989. Yet immediately prior to his scheduled appearance before the Central Roundtable in East Berlin on 14 January 1990, he decided to defect to the BND instead. Although Busch’s responsibilities with the HVA had involved the examination of original documents, the true identity of the sources was purposely kept concealed. Nevertheless, his knowledge proved of immense value to the BND, notably in the unmasking of Rainer Rupp. In several publications, Busch wrote about the inner workings of the military espionage conducted by the GDR.

BUTLAR, RUDOLF WALRAB BARON VON (?–1983). An early chief of security for the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Rudolf Walrab Baron von Butlar began his intelligence career as a radio operator with the Organisation Gehlen under the cover name of Bernhardt. Following the transition to the BND, he headed the Hauskapelle that helped unmask the double agent Heinz Felde and subsequently became responsible for overall security. Butlar’s appointment as the BND resident in Tehran in 1972 ended prematurely because of serious illness. Returning to Pullach, he held the relatively insignificant post of inspector for the remainder of the decade.
CANARIS, WILHELM (1887–1945). An enigmatic anti-Nazi admiral who headed the Abwehr, Wilhelm Canaris was born in Aplerbeck (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 1 January 1887, the son of a Ruhr engineer descended from a northern Italian family. After entering the imperial navy in 1905 and attending the Kiel Naval College, he served as an officer at the outbreak of World War I. During the battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914, his cruiser, the Dresden, was scuttled, but Canaris eluded capture by the British. Placed in a Chilean internment camp afterward, he escaped. Using a false passport with the name “Reed Rosas,” he passed through enemy controls and was back in Germany by October 1915. His assignments then included setting up a network of informers in Spain to report on enemy shipping movements and assuming a U-boat command in the Mediterranean.

Although Canaris participated in the abortive Kapp Putsch in 1920, his reputation as a career naval officer remained untarnished. It was also clear that he had an aversion to routine bureaucratic paperwork and a decided preference for more difficult and dangerous assignments. In order to circumvent the restrictions placed by the Versailles Treaty on naval rearmament, Canaris was sent again to Spain in 1925, where he helped negotiate a secret agreement that allowed for the design, construction, and testing of submarines, torpedoes, and fire direction equipment. With the Nazi accession to power in 1933, Canaris had little difficulty cooperating with the new regime, finding it far preferable to its predecessors and seeing no viable alternative for the time being.

The key moment in his career occurred with his appointment as head of the Abwehr on 1 January 1935. Yet there loomed a critical jurisdictional rivalry in light of the emergence of the Sicherheitsdienst led by Reinhard Heydrich, who had earlier served under Canaris. Socially intimate neighbors in Berlin, they soon concluded the “Ten Commandments” agreement, giving the Abwehr sole responsibility for military intelligence. Increasingly, however, Canaris viewed the Nazi regime with deep antipathy, telling his predecessor, Conrad Patzig, in 1937 that it was composed solely of “criminals who will bring Germany down.” Under his protection, prominent anti-Nazis such as
Hans Oster found refuge in the Abwehr, and acting together in 1939, they dispatched Josef Müller to explore the possibility of averting war through the intercession of the Vatican. But Canaris’s opposition to the regime was tempered by his participation in the war effort and his reluctance to join the inner circle of anti-Nazi conspirators. Many contemporaries—struck by his divided personality—found his deeper motives inscrutable.

Although the Gestapo had amassed a considerable collection of incriminating reports on the Abwehr chief, Heinrich Himmler appeared unusually hesitant to take any action, even after learning about Canaris’s role in persuading Francisco Franco not to conclude an alliance with Germany in 1940. Walter Schellenberg, anxious to absorb the Abwehr under his command, felt convinced that Canaris possessed damaging information on Himmler. Finally, on 11 February 1944, following the defections of several Abwehr members, including Erich Vermehren, Canaris was relieved of his duties—ostensibly for lack of performance. He was later appointed head of the Office for Commercial and Economic Warfare. Despite no evidence of direct involvement, he was arrested by Schellenberg in the aftermath of the 20 July attempt on Adolf Hitler’s life.

Canaris’s undoing was the discovery of his personal diaries at his former office in Zossen (contrary to his orders, parts of them had been left undestroyed in an armored safe). The main charges lodged against him involved his knowledge of the Abwehr conspiracy against Hitler since 1938 and his sheltering of Oster and other resistance activists. After undergoing repeated interrogations and a summary trial spearheaded by Walter Huppenkothen, Canaris was hanged at Flossenbürg concentration camp on 9 April 1945—only days before the liberation of the area by Allied troops. According to a fellow prisoner, Hans Lunding, Canaris’s last statement affirmed his devotion to his country and proclaimed his “clear conscience.” See also FELIX.

CAPRICORN. A black propaganda effort of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the final months of World War II, Operation CAPRICORN was devised by Howard Becker of the Morale Operations Branch in order to bolster resistance to Nazi rule in the Munich area. For a period of nine weeks beginning in February 1945, 61
carefully scripted broadcasts by a fictitious resistance fighter named “Hagedorn” were beamed to the local population, emphasizing the hopelessness of the military situation and encouraging the removal of Nazi officials. These radio addresses further sought to dissuade from the construction of a much-feared Alpine redoubt. When they ceased on 27 April, Hagedorn announced the occupation of the radio station by American forces and gave the signal for a general insurrection. One measure of the operation’s success was that no Germans detected the American provenance of the broadcasts. See also SOLDATENENDER CALAIS.

CARNEY, JEFFREY M. (1963– ). A military intelligence specialist who spied extensively for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Jeffrey M. Carney was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and joined the U.S. Air Force in 1980. Two years later, he was posted to Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin, assigned to an electronic security group. Recruited in 1983 by the HVA and given the code name Kid, he began copying high-level material, including intercepted Warsaw Pact communications. Despite a transfer in 1984 to Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas, his espionage work continued (more than 100 classified documents were eventually transmitted). In September 1985, a combination of factors—his disillusionment with the air force, his fear of detection, and his homosexuality—prompted him to defect to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) via the East German embassy in Mexico City.

Settling in East Berlin, Carney had the task of intercepting and translating telephone communications of U.S. military commanders and embassy officials stationed in Germany. Not only did he receive a GDR military award for his efforts, but in 1988 he was granted citizenship under the name Jens Karney, allegedly born in Dessau. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Carney’s identity reached U.S. authorities through a former officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. On 21 April 1991, he was taken captive at his home in Berlin-Friedrichs- hain by agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation and eventually pleaded guilty to charges of espionage, conspiracy, and desertion. Although the military tribunal stipulated a 38-year sentence, he was released from the maximum-security prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2002. Carney’s ardent wish to resume his life in
Germany was blocked by government officials, who refused to honor his former status in the GDR and issue a replacement passport.

CARRÉ, MATHILDE (1908–1970?). A French double agent during World War II, Mathilde Carré, the daughter of a decorated French army officer, was educated at the Sorbonne. A teacher in Algeria before the war, she returned to France in 1940 and became a nurse, nicknamed “La Chatte” (The Cat) for her quiet manner of movement. At a reception center in Toulon, Carré met a Polish officer, Roman Garby-Czerniawski, who persuaded her to join the French-Polish intelligence network, Réseau Interallié, that he had just established. Her activities became known to the Abwehr through a double agent, and she was taken into custody in Paris on 17 November 1941. Not only were Garby-Czerniawski and numerous other Interallié agents arrested as a result of her interrogation, but she was recruited for the Abwehr by Hugo Bleicher, who also became her lover. Her code name, VICTOIRE, remained unchanged.

Hoping to penetrate the British Special Operations Executive, the Abwehr permitted Carré to travel to London in February 1942. She was immediately placed under surveillance and later arrested. Attempts to turn her into a triple agent failed, and she remained interned for the remainder of the war. In 1949, her trial for collaboration took place in Paris and resulted in a death sentence, which was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. Released in 1954, Carré wrote her autobiography, J’ai été la Chatte (I Was the Cat) several years later.

CASEMENT, ROGER (1864–1916). The British diplomat who sought German assistance for the Irish nationalist cause during World War I, Sir Roger Casement was born in Sandy Cove near Dublin, Ireland, on 1 September 1864, the son of a Protestant father and Catholic mother. During nearly 20 years in the British foreign service, he was a consul in Portuguese East Africa, Angola, Congo Free State, and Brazil. His revelation of the exploitation of native labor by white traders in the Congo attracted international attention, while his report on the maltreatment of Putomayo indians in Peru earned him a knighthood in 1911. Ill health, however, brought about his retirement the following year, and he returned to Ireland.
With the outbreak of World War I, Casement, viewing Germany as a natural ally for Irish independence, undertook a mission as the self-chosen representative of the Revolutionary Directory of the Clan na Gael based in the United States. Although his arrival in Berlin via New York in late October 1914 boded well, his various proposals, such as the formation of an anti-British brigade of Irish prisoners of war, found no resonance, and his attitude toward Germany turned from admiration to bitter denunciations. Hearing of an uprising planned for Easter 1916, German authorities agreed to ship 20,000 weapons to Ireland, although Casement believed that such inadequate resources, underscored by the absence of troop support, would spell certain failure for the rebels. Hoping to avert this outcome by issuing a warning in person, he returned to Ireland on a German submarine but was arrested on the Kerry coast on 24 April. His trial in London for treason resulted in a death sentence. Stripped of his knighthood, Casement was hanged at Pentonville Prison on 3 August.

CELLER LOCH. A failed attempt to penetrate the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF; Red Army Faction) by West German authorities, Celler Loch (Celle Hole) was an operation undertaken by the Lower Saxony regional office for constitutional protection (Landesverfassungsschutz) and the federal office for border protection (Bundesgrenzschutz). On 25 July 1978, when a bomb exploded, blowing a hole in the outside wall of the high-security prison at Celle, it bore the marks of a rescue operation for the convicted RAF terrorist Sigurd Debus. Eight years later, the German public learned that the incident had been staged in order to infiltrate an informant into the RAF. Not only did the plan misfire at the time, but the later revelation unleashed an acrimonious debate about the proper methods of combating terrorism in a democratic state. A parliamentary inquiry was convened in Hanover in December 1986, but no criminal charges against state officials resulted. Five years earlier, Debus had died in prison as the result of a hunger strike.

CENTRAL-NACHRICHTEN-BÜREAU. See STIEBER, WILHELM.

CHANEL, COCO. See DINCKLAGE, HANS GÜNThER VON.
CHAPMAN, EDWARD (1914–1997). A flamboyant British double agent during World War II, Edward Chapman was born in Burnopfield, County Durham, on 16 November 1914. A known safecracker, he was sentenced to two years’ hard labor by the Royal Court of Jersey. German forces overwhelmed the channel island in early July 1940, and upon his release, Chapman volunteered his services to the Abwehr as a spy. He received rigorous sabotage training at the Nantes section under the command of Stephan von Gröning (pseudonym Stephan Graumann). In December 1942, Chapman (code names FRITZ and FRITZCHEN) was inserted by parachute near Oxford, assigned to blow up the De Havilland aircraft factory in Hatfield, which manufactured the highly effective Mosquito bomber.

Yet already during his training period, Chapman had begun to collect information that might be useful to his home country, while British intelligence had been monitoring Fritz’s movements, thanks to the cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park. Following an intense debriefing by MI5, Chapman was enlisted as a double agent (code name ZIGZAG) and began to send wireless messages back to Germany under the supervision of Ronnie Reed. Several weeks later, the factory in Hatfield was camouflaged with painted tarpaulins, so it would appear completely destroyed to German aerial reconnaissance, and a planted news item appeared in the Daily Express. Although Chapman had also devised a plan to assassinate Adolf Hitler, no action was taken. In March 1943, armed with a tight cover story, he returned to France via Lisbon and Madrid in order to acquire additional information about German operations. After feigning the sabotage of a British ship in Portugal, Chapman was sent to Oslo and reunited with Gröning.

Despite the strongly dissenting view of the head of the Paris Abwehr station regarding his bona fides, Chapman was considered an exceptional asset, not only receiving generous compensation but becoming the sole British recipient of the Iron Cross (which he later presented to Reed). After D-Day, his final assignments involved locating Britain’s presumed submarine tracking device and reporting on the effects of the V-1 and V-2 weapons. He continued to cooperate with MI5 in devising deception operations, but his new handler, displeased with his indiscreet and unreformed demimonde lifestyle, secured Chapman’s dismissal on 28 November 1944. Legal charges
against him were dropped, while Gröning, who only learned of his double role much later, remained on friendly terms and attended the wedding of Chapman’s daughter in 1979. Chapman died outside London on 11 December 1997.

CHERVONETS AFFAIR. A counterfeiting scheme based in Germany to undermine the Soviet economy, the Chervonets Affair came to light in August 1927 when authorities in Frankfurt am Main discovered large quantities of false bank notes ready for shipment to the Caucasus. Among those charged were Georg Bell and two Georgian exiles—Sadathierashvili and Karumidze—although the latter claimed that oil magnate Henri Deterding had largely financed the operation. Also under suspicion was General Max Hoffmann in the Reichswehr Ministry, but he died prior to the completion of the investigation. In 1930, the court concluded that since the counterfeit money had not gone into actual circulation, no crime had occurred, and the defendants, acting from “selfless political motives,” were therefore not guilty.

CHIFFRIERABTEILUNG. The cryptanalytical unit of the Armed Forces High Command, the Chiffrierabteilung (Cipher Division), commonly known as “Chi,” was formed immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II. It was based on a small radio intelligence unit assembled by Erich Buschenhagen in 1919. From its main office at Tirpitzufer 80 in Berlin, Chi maintained major listening posts at Treuenbrietzen outside the city and Lauf an der Pegnitz near Nuremberg, along with a host of secondary stations. During the war, the number of employees reached 3,000 under the general supervision of Erich Fellgiebel. Its primary task was to solve military-related cryptograms and disseminate the results, although much of its work duplicated the efforts of Pers Z and the Forschungsamt. Further compartmentalization was found in the area of cryptography, as each service branch developed its own codes with little regard for Chi’s coordinating committee. Chi scored a notable success in 1941—breaking the code used by the American military attaché in Cairo and thereby giving General Erwin Rommel a clear picture of enemy forces in North Africa. But new Allied security measures soon made such high-level strategic information virtually inaccessible.
CICERO AFFAIR. Widely acknowledged as Nazi Germany’s most successful wartime enemy penetration, the cicero Affair revolved around Elyesa Bazna, code-named cicero by the Germans, because of the eloquence of the documents he appropriated from the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. Bazna, born on 28 July 1904 in the Balkan town of Pristina in the western Ottoman Empire, had held a series of odd jobs before becoming a servant to a number of European diplomats based in Ankara. Without undergoing a background check, he was employed as a personal valet by the British ambassador. On 26 October 1943, Bazna visited the German embassy with two rolls of film and asked for £20,000 as payment (each subsequent roll would cost £15,000). Ludwig Moyzisch, an Austrian journalist who had joined Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) and was assigned to the Ankara embassy two years earlier, became Bazna’s case officer. Until late February 1944, Bazna continued to photograph papers that the ambassador had removed from his embassy offices for study at his residence.

These documents contained correspondence, telegrams, and reports about top-level conferences in Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran, planned war strategies, and Allied efforts to persuade Turkey to enter the war as a partner. While they also indicated that there would be no invasion against Nazi forces in the Balkans but rather somewhere in the West, no mention was made of Operation OVERLORD (the Normandy invasion) as often claimed. Even after the British ambassador began to suspect a leak and new security measures were put in place, Bazna escaped scrutiny and left his employ a free man. By that time, he had accumulated roughly £300,000 (or $1.2 million). More than half of that amount, however, had been paid in counterfeit bank notes produced by Operation BERNHARD.

While the British operated under a false sense of security, the Germans managed to gain very little from this extraordinary cache of documents. The main problem derived from the strong personal rivalry between Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and SD chief Walter Schellenberg, which affected the ultimate evaluation of the papers. Besides the deep suspicion that Bazna might be an agent provocateur, too many points ran counter to basic Nazi assumptions about the war and its winnability. Further complicating this situation was the figure of Cornelia Kapp, who had concluded an espionage
agreement with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) just prior to accidentally becoming secretary to Bazna’s case officer Moyzisch. For nearly three months before her defection, she conveyed details about Bazna to the OSS, yet the strained relationship with the British Special Intelligence Service caused the Americans to withhold vital information about the breach in the British embassy.

After the war, Moyzisch was interrogated by the Allies but never charged with a crime. Bazna’s role remained generally unknown until Moyzisch published his memoirs in 1950, Der Fall Cicero (Operation Cicero), which prompted Bazna’s own account (with Hans Nogly), I Was Cicero (1962). Both books were self-serving and contained numerous factual errors. Bazna’s attempt to seek compensation from the West German government proved futile, and he died penniless as a night watchman in Munich on 23 December 1970.

CLARK, JAMES MICHAEL. See STAND, KURT ALAN, and SQUILLACOTE, THERESA MARIA.

CLAUSEN, MAX (1899–1979). The radio operator of the Richard Sorge spy ring based in Tokyo, Max Clausen was born Max Christiansen in Husum (Schleswig-Holstein) on 27 February 1899, the son of a shopkeeper. After serving in World War I, he found employment in the merchant navy and joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1927. Recruited shortly afterward by Department IV (intelligence) of the Soviet Red Army, he received training as a radio operator in Moscow and was sent to China on several assignments. Dissatisfaction with his work, however, led to his recall to the Soviet Union in August 1933.

On the suggestion of Richard Sorge, whom Clausen had met earlier in China, he eagerly joined the spy ring being assembled in Tokyo. Clausen’s first radio communication with Moscow took place in February 1936 from the home of Günther Stein, a naturalized British subject working in Japan as a journalist with ties to Soviet intelligence. Clausen (code name FRITZ) posed as the owner of a prosperous firm—M. Clausen Shokai—which made blueprint presses (the profits partially covered the costs incurred by Sorge’s operation). Yet by 1940, a number of factors—Sorge’s condescending attitude toward him, a serious heart attack, fear of detection, and
the increasing attraction of the business world—began to weaken Clausen’s commitment to his radio work and the communist cause. He consequently began transmitting only a fraction of the intelligence reports conveyed to him.

Following his arrest by the Japanese police on 18 October 1941, Clausen cooperated with investigators. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, and his Russian wife, Anna, received a sentence of seven years as a reluctant accomplice. Both, however, were freed on 8 October 1945, following the American victory over Japan, and returned to the Soviet Union. A year later, they were residing in Berlin, where Clausen, adopting the name Christiansen-Clausen, was employed by several East German firms before his death on 15 September 1979. See also TRADITIONSPFLEGE.

CLEMENS, HANS. See FELFE, HEINZ.

CLISSMANN, HELMUT (1911–1997). An Abwehr officer with strong ties to Ireland, Helmut Clissmann was born in Aachen on 11 May 1911. Beginning in 1934, he attended Trinity College in Dublin as an exchange doctoral student and established ties to various nationalist groups, including members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In 1939, while serving as the representative of the German Academic Exchange, he was recalled from Ireland along with other German nationals. After continuing his work for the German Academic Exchange in Copenhagen, Clissmann was called to active duty in 1940 and posted to the emerging Brandenburg Division, owing to his educational and linguistic skills. His recommendation that his old IRA friend Frank Ryan be released from a Spanish jail found a sympathetic ear in Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, who used his influence with authorities in Madrid to effect the release.

In August, an attempt to infiltrate Clissmann (code name LEHRER) back into Ireland failed when the designated Breton fishing trawler was sabotaged before leaving Brest. Another operation (code name WALFISCH) planned for November to establish a liaison between Clissmann and Welsh and Scottish nationalists likewise had to be abandoned. During the remaining years of the war, Clissmann saw duty in Denmark, France, and North Africa before becoming an advisor on Irish affairs in the German Foreign Office. Classified a
prisoner of war in 1945, he underwent intense interrogation by British intelligence because of his long-standing ties to the IRA. His return to Ireland was facilitated by his Irish wife and the country’s foreign minister three years later. As an Irish citizen and businessman, Clissmann became one of the founders of the Irish section of Amnesty International. He died in Dublin on 6 November 1997.

C-MASSNAHME. A tactic used by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, a C-Massnahme (C-measure) involved the systematic confiscation of personal letters and packages. Established in 1950 under Division M, it was designed “to track all enemy activity and halt its dangerous repercussions.” Division M not only maintained separate facilities in the larger post offices of the German Democratic Republic but relied on increasingly refined technological methods to monitor about 98 percent of all domestic and international postal traffic. In addition, the state gained an important source of revenue, as more than 32 million DM was collected in the period 1984–1989.

COLONELS’ AFFAIR. See EGLI, KARL-HEINRICH; WATTENWYL, FRIEDRICH MORITZ VON.

CONDOR. See EPPLER, JOHN.

CONRAD, CLYDE LEE (1947–1998). A U.S. Army sergeant convicted by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of having committed treason for the Eastern bloc, Clyde Lee Conrad was born on 28 August 1947 in Bergholz, Ohio. Recruited by Zoltan Szabo for Hungarian military intelligence in 1975 and assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Bad Kreuznach three years later, he used his position as a classified documents custodian to convey top-secret information through a courier system involving two brothers, Imre and Sandor Kercsik. Conrad also enlisted his assistant Roderick J. Ramsay. Among the data delivered to both the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian services were details about the troop mobilization plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the location of barbed wire and antitank traps, and the positioning of nuclear-capable artillery. Although Conrad retired from the military in 1985, he remained in the area with his German wife and family and continued his es-
pionage activity with ever greater vigor and ingenuity. His was ar-
rested by West German authorities on 23 August 1988—the result of
a lengthy investigation (code name CANASTA PLAYER) by American
counterintelligence officials. On 6 June 1990, owing to the unusual
gravity of the case, Conrad became the first spy to receive a life sen-
tence while in the FRG. The Coblenz court also fined him 2.2 million
DM, the estimated amount of his remuneration. The Kercsik brothers
were each given an 18-month sentence by a Swedish court. Ramsay,
arrested in Florida, received a 36-year prison term. Nine months after
Conrad’s arrest, Szabo decided to cooperate with Austrian officials
and spent only a token period in jail. Conrad died in prison of heart
failure on 8 January 1998.

COPPI, HANS (1916–1942). A communist activist and member of
the Rote Kapelle, Hans Coppi was born in Berlin on 25 January
1916. Arrested in January 1934 because of his anti-Nazi efforts,
he was placed in the Oranienburg concentration camp and released
the following year, finding employment as a lathe operator. With
the outbreak of World War II, Coppi (code name STRAHLMANN)
joined the resistance group led by Harro Schulze-Boysen that soon
formed the nucleus of the Rote Kapelle. Despite his meager technical
training, sole responsibility for the secret radio transmissions from
Berlin to Moscow was assigned to Coppi, and numerous malfunc-
tions occurred as a result. In early August 1942, once the Gestapo
had ascertained the identity of individual members of the apparatus
(Schulze-Boysen’s wife divulged his name under interrogation), both
Coppi and his spouse Hilde were taken into custody and brought to
trial. He was hanged at Plötzensee Prison on 22 December. Seven
months later, Hilde Coppi was executed in the same facility, even
though her role had been only a minor one.

COSSEL, MAXIMILIAN VON. The executor of the first known
successful air-land commando raid, Maximilian von Cosssel was a
Prussian officer transported behind enemy lines in Russia by pilot
Rudolf Windisch in early October 1916. Cosssel then destroyed a
strategic railway bridge near Rowno-Brody. The following day,
Windisch returned, and the two flew back across enemy lines.
Both were decorated later that month by Emperor William II, and
their exploit served as a model for many similar missions during World War II.

**COUNTERMAN.** In West German counterintelligence, a *Counterman* was an employee of a foreign espionage organization who had been engaged as an agent for the West. Often that person would be given a mixture of real and doctored information to pass on to his or her superiors, as was the case with *Joachim Moitzheim*. The German term probably derives from the English word “countermaneuver.”

**CREMER, FRIEDRICH (1920– ).** A West German physician and politician, Friedrich Cremer (code name *bäcker*) was also an agent of the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA). Cremer was photographed with HVA chief *Markus Wolf* during a summer trip to Scandinavia in 1978. The spymaster’s physical appearance had long eluded Western authorities, but with the defection of *Werner Stiller* in 1979, that photograph became the means of identifying Wolf. Cremer, who was a delegate of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands in the Bavarian Landtag, was convicted by Bavaria’s highest court as an enemy agent on 16 May 1980 and sentenced to two and a half years in prison. Released after 14 months, he resumed his practice as a doctor.

**CROISSANT, KLAUS (1930–2002).** A West German lawyer and agent of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, Klaus Croissant was a Stuttgart lawyer who gained prominence through his defense of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF; Red Army Faction). Becoming a convert to the RAF himself, he was arrested on 23 June 1975 but violated his bail and sought political asylum in France two years later. After authorities returned him to the Federal Republic of Germany, a Stuttgart court found him guilty of supporting a terrorist organization and sentenced him to two and a half years in prison. *See also* HEINRICH, BRIGITTE.

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**DAHMS, ALEXANDER (1942– ).** A West German *Perspektivagent* (sleeper agent) for the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), Al-
Alexander Dahms was a law student in Prague when recruited in 1963 near Bratislava. Although the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) rejected his application for employment, he was hired by the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS; Federal Border Protection) and became the police director in the Coblenz office. Motivated by ideological conviction, Dahms (code name Dämon) was viewed by his HVA superiors as an overly zealous eccentric but nonetheless valuable source. His confidential information pertained not only to BGS but also to other FRG security organs, thereby allowing the HVA to give added protection to its agent network. Dahms was one of four West German agents identified by Werner Roitzsch following reunification, and in 1996 he received a six and a half-year prison sentence.

DALUEGE, KURT (1897–1946). A senior police official in the Third Reich and later acting Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, Kurt Daluege was born in Kreuzberg (now Kluczborz, Poland) on 15 September 1897, the son of a government official. An officer-candidate in World War I decorated with the Iron Cross, he subsequently received a degree in construction engineering from the Technical College in Berlin. Daluege moved from a paramilitary Freikorps unit to the Sturmabteilung and then—at the request of Adolf Hitler—to the SS in 1928. In addition, he was elected to the Prussian Landtag as a Nazi delegate prior to 1933.

The first years of the Nazi regime saw him associated with Hermann Göring and the early Gestapo in Prussia, but his allegiance soon shifted to Heinrich Himmler, who came to prize his bureaucratic and organizational skills. In Himmler’s reconfiguration of the Reich’s security forces in 1936, Daluege emerged as the head of the uniformed police, or Ordnungspolizei, and transformed them into a comprehensively Nazified and militarized force. Following the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, he also became acting Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, although serious illness the following year forced his resignation and convalescence on a country estate for the remainder of the war. Given his leading role in the destruction of Lidice and other terrorist measures undertaken against the Czech population, he was tried by a Prague court and executed on 24 October 1946.
DASCH, GEORGE. See PASTORIUS.

DE MAIZIÈRE, LOTHAR (1940– ). A prominent East German politician obliged to resign because of an alleged past affiliation with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Lothar de Maizière was born in Nordhausen (Thuringia) on 2 March 1940, the son of a lawyer. After reasons of health forced him to abandon a career as a violist, he obtained a law degree in 1975 through a correspondence course at Humboldt University. Remaining in East Berlin, de Maizière worked for the Solicitors’ Council and became the vice president of the Federal Synod of Protestant Churches in 1985. His rise to political prominence occurred during the tumultuous months of late 1989 and early 1990. A leading official of the Christlich-Demokratische Union of East Germany, de Maizière became minister for church affairs in the reform cabinet of Hans Modrow but left a few months later. In April 1990, following the first free elections in the German Democratic Republic, the People’s Chamber appointed him minister-president of the new coalition government. A vocal supporter of a rapid merger with the Federal Republic of Germany, de Maizière helped bring about the final unification treaty.

Although he received a new position as minister without portfolio in the cabinet of Helmut Kohl, charges of having previously been an MfS informer increasingly undermined his public standing. At issue was an agent code-named CZERNI, whose 1,000-page file had been destroyed in December 1989 but whose general identity appeared to match that of de Maizière. In addition to residing at the same street address in East Berlin and possessing a weekend property in Tornow, they were both members of the Federal Synod and had access to information from the Solicitors’ Council. De Maizière admitted to contact with the MfS, but solely in a professional capacity and never as an enlisted informer. By September 1991, the controversy had resulted in his complete retreat from political life and return to private practice.

DECHIFFRIERDIENST. The codebreaking unit of the Austro-Hungarian Evidenzbüro, the Dechiffrierdienst was established following the Italo-Turkish War of 1911 and was one of the few European op-
operations of its kind already functioning at the outbreak of World War I. See also POKORYN, HERMANN.

DECKNAME. A Deckname, or cover name, is a code name chosen to conceal the actual identity of an intelligence operative. Informants for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit were generally allowed to devise their own name, which usually bore a relationship to their main occupation, such as FIGARO for a barber or PÄDAGOGE for a teacher.

DEGE, WILHELM. See HAUDEGEN.

DEHM, DIETHER (1950– ). A well-known German songwriter, left-wing politician, and agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Diether Dehm was born in Frankfurt am Main on 3 April 1950. Although he completed a doctorate in remedial education in 1975, his attraction to the radical protest movement in West Germany proved stronger. Years earlier under the name “Lerryn” (a combination of his nickname Larry and Lenin), he had started composing and performing his own activist songs. His first contact with Herbert Thur, a Stasi recruiter, occurred at a youth camp in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1970, and an agreement was concluded the following year at a meeting in Leipzig. According to an MfS report, the young Social Democrat (code name WILLY) was motivated primarily by political conviction. Soon large quantities of information dealing with left-wing groups at the university and artistic circles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) found their way to East Berlin. His wife, Christa Desoi, became increasingly involved in his activities, and in 1976 the MfS recorded her recruitment as an agent (code name CHRISTA).

An important role fell to Dehm and Desoi after the expulsion of Wolf Biermann from the GDR in 1976. They had met the popular singer-songwriter shortly before through journalist Günter Wallraff, who housed the dissident during his first months in the FRG. Dehm followed the instructions of the MfS to strengthen his relationship with Biermann in order to provide a full accounting of his mood and activities in the FRG. When Dehm became Biermann’s first Western manager, he attempted to neutralize the negative public image of the
communist regime by the selective scheduling of concerts and the avoidance of critical political forums. In November 1977, Dehm and Desoi each received a 500 DM bonus in recognition of their efforts. Biermann later terminated his contract with Dehm and organized his concerts himself. By December 1978, according to their MfS case officer, Dehm and Desoi repeatedly failed to appear at prearranged meetings.

Dehm’s high-profile career continued to prosper, not only as a successful author, composer, and theatrical entrepreneur but also later as a Social Democratic politician. In 1993, he was elected to the Frankfurt municipal council and the following year to the Bundestag. When allegations of his earlier Stasi connection began to circulate, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) held extensive and often acrimonious arbitration proceedings. Even though Dehm had revealed his earlier activity to Biermann in 1988, he disputed the charges and even threatened Joachim Gauck (whose office possessed the Stasi files) with legal action. In the end, the SPD decided to drop the charges when Dehm agreed to leave the party and join the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). In 1996, a Frankfurt district court declared that Dehm could be publicly referred to as a Stasi informer. His candidacy for the Bundestag remained unsuccessful under the PDS banner, but he regained a seat in September 2005 as a member of the newly formed Linkspartei (Left Party).

DEM’IANOV, ALEKSANDR (1911–1975). An Abwehr agent in the employ of Soviet counterintelligence, Aleksandr Dem’ianov was the son of a tsarist army officer killed in 1915. In the late 1920s, he was admitted to a polytechnic institute in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), but his “gentrified origin” soon led to his expulsion. A denunciation by one of his friends then resulted in an interrogation by the Soviet secret police. Rather than send him into exile, officials decided to use his connections to the Russian émigré community as well as Moscow’s cultural elite and recruit him as an informer. It was Dem’ianov’s prominent social standing and pro-monarchist family background that attracted the attention of the Abwehr and the Gestapo prior to the outbreak of World War II. Indirectly approached in Moscow by a member of the German Trade Commission, he re-
sponded positively to his Soviet handler and was later given the code name Max by the Abwehr.

In December 1941, pretending to be a deserter from the Red Army, Dem’ianov crossed over on skis to German lines near Gzhatsk, southwest of Moscow. Highly mistrustful of his story (he had unknowingly traversed a newly laid Soviet minefield completely unscathed), the Germans staged a mock execution, but he held fast to his version and was transferred to an Abwehr camp in Smolensk. He was given training in secret writing, radio operations, and general tradecraft and received the code name Heine. Before paradropping him deep behind Soviet lines near Arefino, the Abwehr tested him again by having groups of Russian partisans visibly maltreated outside his apartment in Minsk for three days. In the meantime, the Soviets thoroughly briefed all of Dem’ianov’s relatives so that his bona fides would appear all the more credible to the Abwehr.

Once in Moscow, he initiated a carefully prepared Funkspiel (deceptive radio transmission) and refrained from making any requests from the Abwehr for the following four months. Many of the couriers dispatched to Dem’ianov were turned as well. In 1942 and 1943, he crossed German lines to meet with his Abwehr controllers, despite the evident risk of detection. His main objective—the Soviets dubbed his activity Operation Monastery—was to underreport the strength of the Red Army and to predict major offensives that were in fact merely diversions. The effectiveness of this disinformation was borne out on at least two occasions: just prior to the battle of Stalingrad and during the battle of Kursk in May 1943. Soviet counterintelligence also enlisted Dem’ianov for a key role in Operation Scherhorn the following year. The fact that in his postwar memoirs Reinhard Gehlen, head of Fremde Heere Ost, wrote of Max as the source of “genuine” information testifies to the expertise of Soviet counterintelligence operations.

DEUTSCH, ARNOLD (1904–1942). A highly successful operative of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) active in Great Britain prior World War II and responsible for the recruitment of the “Cambridge Five.” Arnold Deutsch was born in Vienna on 21 August 1904, the son of a poor Slovakian trader. A brilliant student conversant in several languages, he received a doctorate in
chemistry with distinction from the University of Vienna at the age of 24. With a serious interest in philosophy and psychology as well, he abandoned his family’s orthodox Judaism, joining the Austrian Communist Party in 1924 and involving himself in the “sexpol” movement of the Austrian psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, which held that the abolition of the bourgeois family would eliminate the Oedipal complex and that fascism was the result of both political and sexual repression. Following his graduation, Deutsch pursued a dual career for several years: as a secret courier for the Comintern International Liaison Department (OMS) traveling to Greece, Romania, Palestine, and Syria; and as the director of the Münster Verlag in Vienna, which published the works of Reich and other kindred authors. Deutsch’s Austrian wife, Josefine, likewise became an OMS recruit and was later given the alias Liza Kramer.

In 1932, while in Moscow, Deutsch underwent training as an Illegaler, or covert operative, for the OGPU (the Soviet state political directorate). Josefine was trained as a radio operator. His first posting as a member of the OGPU’s international department (INO) took him to France where, using the alias Stefan Lange and code name stefan, he established secret border-crossing points on the northern and eastern frontier and started to outfit French fishing boats for clandestine wartime radio communication. Shortly afterward in Germany, a warning by the Soviet agent Willy Lehmann prevented his arrest by the Gestapo.

The most illustrious chapter in Deutsch’s life began with his transfer to England in early 1934. Arriving in London, he used his true name, declared his profession as “university lecturer,” and indicated he was there to conduct research. He took a postgraduate course in psychology at the University of London and started to cultivate a circle of faculty and students. A year later, Josefine joined him, and they moved to a spacious apartment in Hampstead (next to one owned by mystery writer Agatha Christie). Almost immediately, Deutsch implemented a shrewd new strategy of his own: targeting certain young radical students who had potentially influential careers ahead of them, obtaining their agreement to work undercover, and then providing them with a fresh noncommunist political identity. According to his calculations, the later discovery of a communist affiliation could simply be dismissed as...
a passing youthful indiscretion, especially given the large number of left-wing students at the time.

Deutsch’s first recruit was Kim Philby, who later recalled the absolutely captivating manner and keen sense of humor of the man known to him merely as “Otto.” Soon four other students from Cambridge University—Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross—followed the same path as Philby. By the early years of World War II, each of these five agents held key positions with the British Foreign Office or the intelligence community and could supply the Soviet Union with an abundance of high-level information. Altogether, according to KGB records, Deutsch succeeded in recruiting 20 agents and maintaining contact with 29 during his four-year posting in England. Some have attributed this exceptional performance to his tactful approach, treating those in his charge less as subordinates and more as comrades in a common idealistic cause under his tutelage. Clearly the detailed individual profiles contained in Deutsch’s reports reveal a penetrating understanding of his agents’ character and motivation. Four traits, he concluded, were prerequisites for recruitment in this academic milieu: an inherent class resentfulness, a predilection for secrecy, a yearning to belong, and an infantile appetite for praise and reassurance.

Although two security alerts in 1935 caused Deutsch to take added precautions to evade MI5 and Special Branch surveillance, an even greater danger loomed in the Soviet Union with the advent of Joseph Stalin’s massive purge of the party apparatus. Not only were his three different NKVD superiors in London victims of the terror, but Deutsch’s Jewish-Austrian origins, lack of Soviet citizenship, and unorthodox early career put him under considerable suspicion. Deutsch was recalled to Moscow in November 1937, and his wife and child were instructed to return nine months later, but Deutsch managed to evade any criminal charges, probably because he was considered more a technician than a revolutionary. Nevertheless, upon the advice of Lavrenti Beria to find temporary work outside the NKVD, he became affiliated with the Institute of International Economics. In 1941, as Soviet intelligence began to recover from its decimated state, Deutsch was proposed as a covert operative who would work in the United States, but the outbreak of war in the Far East curtailed his voyage via the Indian Ocean. A second attempt in
November 1942 proved fatal. He died en route when his Soviet ship, the Donbass, came under German submarine attack in the North Sea and sank.

DEVILLERS, HENRI (1914–1942). An Abwehr spy who penetrated the ranks of the French resistance, Henri Devillers was born in Vincennes in November 1914. Captured in 1940 during the German offensive and placed in a prisoner of war camp, he agreed to work for the Abwehr after learning that his sister had made a similar arrangement in Paris. By posing as a Gaullist, he managed to gain the confidence of the leaders of the Combat organization—Henri Frenay, Maurice Chevance-Bertin, and Berthie Albrecht—and became a courier for the group. Copies of documents entrusted to him, however, found their way to the Abwehr, and numerous arrests of Combat members resulted. On 25 February 1942, Devillers was apprehended in Lyon, having been identified by the Travaux Ruraux, a secret Vichy counterintelligence network. Much to the anger of German authorities, a French military tribunal found him guilty and ordered his execution by a firing squad on 19 June 1942 at Fort Montluc.

DICK TRACY. The retrieval of the Luftwaffe’s wartime aerial photographs of the western Soviet Union, Operation DICK TRACY was conducted jointly by British and American intelligence beginning in May 1945. Led by Luftwaffe officers following the German surrender—and unbeknownst to the Soviet military leadership—the Anglo-American team succeeded in recovering aerial photographs and supplementary documents from an air intelligence unit near Potsdam. Not only did this material prove exceedingly useful to the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force, but the operation foreshadowed later German intelligence cooperation within the Western alliance.

DIELS, RUDOLF (1900–1957). A key figure in the establishment of the Gestapo as well as its first head, Rudolf Diels was born in Berghaus (Hesse) on 16 December 1900, the son of a farmer. After volunteering for service in the final years of World War I, Diels studied law at Marburg and joined the Prussian Interior Ministry in 1930. Clearly ambitious and able, he was appointed two years later to a
senior advisory position with the police section by the Social Democratic minister Carl Severing and charged with combating both Nazi and communist extremism. Following the Nazi seizure of power, Hermann Göring became the new minister-president of Prussia and sought Diels’s professional counsel in reorganizing the police force, especially its political branch.

The result was the law of 26 April 1933, which established the Prussian political police as a separate entity and was the genesis of the Gestapo. Under Diels’s direction, its personnel increased from 60 to 250. One of his major assignments included the interrogation of Marinus van der Lubbe, the prime suspect in the arson of the Reichstag. He disbanded numerous “unofficial” concentration camps, run primarily by the SA, and provided Göring with secret files about Göring’s political adversaries. Yet Diels’s tenure lasted only a year. His removal from office on 1 April 1934 occurred as the result of a power struggle between Göring and SS chief Heinrich Himmler, who took over Gestapo operations himself.

With Göring’s assistance, Diels managed to avoid the intrigues of Reinhard Heydrich of the Sicherheitsdienst and, after briefly serving as deputy police president in Berlin, was appointed head of the local government in Cologne. In 1940, he assumed the same position in Hanover but was dismissed because of his refusal to execute a local Nazi official’s order to arrest Jews in the city. The following year saw his appointment as director of transportation on the Black Sea. After the failure of the 20 July 1944 conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, Diels, who had married a cousin of Göring the previous year, managed to escape arrest by the Gestapo due to Göring’s intervention.

Interned after the war, Diels appeared as a prosecution witness before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and was also called to testify by Göring’s defense lawyer. Diels’s postwar career in the Federal Republic of Germany included an administrative post in Lower Saxony and a position as undersecretary in the Interior Ministry in Bonn. He died in a hunting accident on 18 November 1957. His autobiography, Lucifer ante Portas (Lucifer before the Gates), was published in 1950.

DILGER, ANTON (1884–1918). An American physician and practitioner of bacteriological sabotage during World War I, Anton Dilger
was born in Front Royal, Virginia, on 13 February 1884, the son of German immigrants. At the age of 10, he moved to Germany and attended high school in Bensheim (Hesse). In 1912, he completed his medical studies with highest honors at Heidelberg and Munich, writing his dissertation on the propagation of animal cells in tissue culture. Later that year, a personal invitation by Queen Elenore led him to wartime Bulgaria, where he directed several field hospitals. His experience in the two Balkan wars gave him a specialized knowledge of battlefield wounds and bacteriological infections and also prompted an award and gift from the royal couple in 1913, despite Bulgaria’s ultimate defeat.

With the outbreak of World War I, unable to volunteer for service in the German army because of his American citizenship, Dilger became a “noncombatant surgeon” at the Military Reserve Hospital in Rastatt, not far from the western front. The following summer, however, saw a new mission on behalf of the General Staff’s Political Section. Returning to the United States and establishing a medical practice in Chevy Chase, Maryland, he secretly began a sabotage campaign in his basement laboratory. His objective was to aid the German war effort by hindering the further shipment of horses and mules to Great Britain for use on the battlefield. Using cultures he brought from Germany, he prepared vials of liquid containing deadly anthrax and glanders bacteria, which were then given to hired dockhands to be administered with needles to the animals in the harbor corrals (the largest British one was in Newport News, Virginia). He also worked closely with his paymaster Paul Hilken and other German agents active on the eastern coast of the United States. Nevertheless, most of animals shipped across the North Atlantic to the Allies managed to survive, due in large measure to the efforts of British veterinary officers. Dilger’s bacteriological sabotage went undetected by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and only became known during the postwar investigations of the U.S.–German *Mixed Claims Commission*.

Leaving the laboratory in the hands of his older brother Carl, and adopting the pseudonym Albert D. Delmar, Dilger returned to Germany in early 1916 and resumed his work in field hospitals in Rastatt and Karlsruhe. His next intelligence mission was to broker a foreign-aid agreement with Mexico that would convert it from a neutral na-
tion to a German ally, and to arm elements of the Mexican army in the Sonora province to invade the United States. Despite a personal meeting with President Venustiano Carranza of Mexico shortly after his arrival in mid-August 1917, the plan came to naught, as Dilger’s promises of immediate military aid were inordinately delayed by the German Foreign Office. Dilger had further instructions to settle the disputes that had developed in Mexico among various German operatives, yet not only were there tensions among his own staff, which included Frederick Hinsch and Frederick Herrmann, but a bitter rivalry soon ensued with Kurt Jahnke, the German Admiralty’s confidential agent. Moreover, all of the General Staff’s agents in Mexico with the exception of Dilger were being monitored by the Americans.

In mid-December 1917, frustrated by his failed attempts to procure funds for his Mexican project, Dilger journeyed to Spain to take advantage of better communication ties to Berlin. Although “Delmar” received the Iron Cross Second Class in recognition of his sabotage and espionage work in a “most secret” cable sent the following month, he felt little solace. His entreaties to his superiors regarding the viability of his Mexican strategy continued to go unheeded. In late August, Dilger was advised by the Political Section to drop the invasion plan altogether but still create the illusion of a continuing Mexican threat. But Allied agents were closely tracking Delmar’s activities, even though the connection to Dilger had not been established. The ironic final blow occurred when he fell victim to the influenza pandemic that struck Europe in 1918. According to hospital records, Dilger, having registered under the name Donde, died on 17 October at the German sanatorium in Madrid. Numerous discrepancies, however, fueled speculation that his death may have been staged or had another cause.

DINCKLAGE, HANS GÜNTHER VON (1896–?). A Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) officer who maintained a wartime liaison with Coco Chanel in Paris, Hans Günther von Dincklage joined the Abwehr in 1928 but later became associated with the SD. Assigned to the Paris consulate as a press attaché following the conquest of France in 1940, he soon met the famous fashion designer at the Hôtel Ritz, where she resided, and a public affair ensued. With the approval of SD head Walter Schellenberg, Operation MODELLHUT
DOHNÁNYI, HANS VON (1902–1945). A leading jurist and Abwehr member of the anti-Nazi resistance, Hans von Dohnányi was born in Vienna on 1 January 1902, the son of professional Hungarian musicians. After completing his legal studies, he emerged as a civil servant, first in Hamburg, then in Berlin at the Reich Ministry of Justice beginning in 1929. His early opposition to the Nazi regime, strengthened by his marriage to the sister of theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, led him to assemble a list of party misdeeds and to participate in the attempted military coup of September 1938. The following year saw his transfer to the Abwehr under the sponsorship of Hans Oster. One of Dohnányi’s most notable endeavors (code name U7) was the enlistment of Jews as presumed agents in order to facilitate their escape. Arrested on 5 April 1943 for alleged currency violations, Dohnányi was initially released but later placed in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Following the failure of the conspiracy of 20 June 1944, papers were found that linked him conclusively with the resistance. An SS court found Dohnányi guilty of high treason on 6 April 1945; he was hanged three days later at Sachsenhausen.

DOMASCHK, MATTHIAS (1957–1981). An East German dissident who died mysteriously while in the custody of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Matthias Domaschk was born in Görlitz (Saxony) on 12 June 1957. Trained as a precision engineer, he worked at the Carl Zeiss state-owned company in Jena and was an active member of the local Protestant church’s youth group. His protest of the expatriation of Wolf Biermann in November 1976 led to his first arrest and questioning by the MfS. Undeterred, Domaschk traveled to Prague the following year via motorcycle to meet with members of the newly formed oppositional group Charter 77. While
fully informed about his venture, the MfS refrained from taking any immediate action.

After seeing no viable alternative, Domaschk completed his compulsory military service and returned to Jena in spring 1979. His protest activities continued to be closely monitored by the MfS. On 10 April 1981, while en route to a birthday celebration in East Berlin, he and his friend Peter Rösch were arrested on the train and transferred to a MfS pretrial detention center in Gera. Presumably this action was taken to prevent any disruption of the Tenth Rally of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands scheduled in East Berlin that weekend. Domaschk underwent a grueling interrogation under the supervision of Horst Köhler (his initial examiner in Jena), eventually signing an agreement to serve as an informer (code name Peter Paul). Yet on 12 April, immediately prior to his scheduled release, MfS officials discovered his body hanging in his cell from an overhead heating pipe.

Domaschk’s death was officially declared a suicide, a not uncommon occurrence in these facilities. His friends and relatives rejected this explanation outright, and Domaschk became a poignant symbol of state repression among dissidents. Praised for his “imaginativeness” in dealing with young students and clerical groups in Jena, Köhler advanced in 1985 to a new position in domestic counterintelligence at the main East Berlin headquarters. Following reunification, legal action against Köhler and the other MfS personnel involved resulted only in small monetary fines. A street in Jena, however, came to bear Domaschk’s name.

**DOMBROWSKI, SIEGFRIED (1916–1977).** An East German military intelligence officer who defected to the West, Siegfried Dombrowski was born on 13 October 1916, the son of a delivery driver. A communist activist in his youth, he was given illegal assignments in 1933 but was arrested and imprisoned by the Nazis four years later. In 1944, after the Russians took command of the Maidanek (Majdanek) concentration camp, Dombrowski and some 25 other German communists were brought to the Soviet Union to attend the Antifa school in Krasnogorsk. With his return to Germany in September 1945 came a series of administrative positions in the Berlin and Neubrandenburg areas. In 1951, he became an
informer for the East German military counterintelligence (code name REBELL).

In 1955, having completed several military training courses, Dombrowski joined the fledgling military intelligence agency of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Administration for Coordination. Although the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) cautioned its chief Karl Linke about his contacts with West Berlin, the warning went unheeded, and he soon became part of the organization’s inner circle as one of Linke’s deputies. He continued in that position under Linke’s successor, Willy Sägebrecht.

On 5 August 1958, Dombrowski—along with his wife, his two sons, and 71,700 DM—fled to West Berlin and found refuge at the operations base of the U.S. Central Intelligence Organization. A thorough debriefing lasting several weeks took place at the interrogation camp at Oberursel in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). While Dombrowski had brought no official papers and possessed only partial knowledge of the agent network, he nevertheless proved an exceedingly valuable source of information about the organization’s internal structure (including the reasons for Linke’s recent removal). The defector’s first public appearance occurred at a press conference on 22 January 1959, where he read a carefully prepared 17-page statement detailing the extensive espionage directed at the FRG by the GDR. Dombrowski and his family were resettled in the FRG under the name Hirsch and given extensive police protection.

DREYFUS AFFAIR. See SCHWARTZKOPPEN, MAXIMILIAN VON.

DRONKERS, JOHANNES (1896–1942). An Abwehr spy executed by the British, Johannes Dronkers was a Dutch postal worker picked up from a small yacht found drifting near Harwich in May 1942. After he and his two companions underwent three weeks of questioning, his detailed cover story collapsed when a Dutch intelligence officer presented evidence of his true identity. Dronkers then confessed that he had been in contact with the Abwehr since 1938 and that his assignment was to report on a variety of military matters in Great Britain to contacts in Stockholm and Lisbon. While the two other men had been provided merely as cover and were therefore released,
Dronkers was found guilty and hanged at Wandsworth Prison on 31 December.

**DU MOULIN-ECKART, KARL LEONHARDT COUNT (1900–1991).** A short-lived chief of intelligence for the Sturmabteilung (SA) of the Nazi Party, Karl Leonhardt Count Du Moulin-Eckart was born in Munich on 11 January 1900, the son of a university professor. Attracted to the early Nazi movement, he was a participant in the abortive Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, but charges of treason were later dropped. Afterward, he practiced law in Munich. His close friendship with SA leader Ernst Röhm led to his appointment as head of intelligence on 13 April 1932 (he occupied room 50 in the Brown House). Du Moulin-Eckart’s task was to place agents inside the Reichswehr and rival paramilitary groups and simultaneously guard against hostile penetration of the SA.

His position—as well as the very existence of the SA—became increasingly precarious with the rise of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) under Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich. Arrested during the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, Du Moulin-Eckart was sent to the newly established concentration camp at Dachau, where he worked as a librarian. As part of a larger campaign against homosexuality, particularly within the Nazi Party, Du Moulin-Eckart faced yet another trial but was acquitted. His eventual release occurred several years later. He died in Oberviechtel (Bavaria) on 31 March 1991.

**DUQUESNE, FREDERIC (1877–1956).** The central figure in the largest Abwehr spy ring arrested in the United States, Frederic “Fritz” Joubert Duquesne was born in Cape Colony, South Africa, on 21 September 1877, the son of a prominent Boer farmer and businessman. Following his early education in England and military schooling in Belgium and France, he returned to South Africa in December 1899 to fight in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Witnessing the scorched-earth policy of Herbert Kitchener against the Boers instilled in him an intense lifelong hatred of the British. His own undercover plan to take revenge by laying ruin to Cape Town was betrayed and led to his arrest and trial. Banished to a prisoner of war camp in Bermuda, Duquesne managed to escape and arrive illegally in the
United States in July 1902. He found employment as a journalist—writing and lecturing principally about African game hunting—and became a naturalized citizen in 1913.

The outbreak of World War I revived his determination to help bring about the defeat of England. While on a trek through Central and South America, Duquesne applied to the German embassy in Manáos, Brazil, to work as an agent for the imperial navy, as the intelligence department was seeking foreigners willing to disrupt commercial traffic bound for enemy countries. Journeying along the coast between Brazil and Nicaragua and alternately using his own name or one of his two aliases, he was responsible for numerous explosions on British ships. Following the sinking of the *Tennyson*, however, his name became known to British intelligence, causing him to feign his own death at the hands of Bolivian Indians. Yet 12 days after the obituary appeared, he announced his narrow escape from the attack.

Duquesne returned to the United States in May 1916 and later took credit for signaling the German submarine that sank the cruiser *Hampshire* with Kitchener on board, although the story lacks any credible foundation. In December 1917, a New York judge charged him with filing two bogus insurance claims—one following the sinking of the *Tennyson*, the other after an explosion in a Brooklyn warehouse. Fearing extradition to England and probable execution, Duquesne managed to have himself declared first insane and then later a paraplegic. He soon escaped from the prison ward at Bellevue Hospital and spent the next 13 years working in advertising and publishing under a pseudonym (during his lifetime, he employed at least 39 different names). Despite his rearrest in May 1932, a legal technicality saved him from prosecution.

Duquesne next became engaged as the intelligence officer for two recently merged pro-Nazi organizations—the Silver Shirts and the Order of '76. A more serious proposition, however, came from Nikolaus Ritter of the Abwehr in December 1937. Aware of Duquesne’s past services to Germany as well as his perpetual lack of funds, he had little difficulty enlisting him as an agent during a recruiting trip to the United States. In February 1940, while operating the bogus “Air Terminals Company,” Duquesne was contacted by William G. Sebold, ostensibly on orders from Ritter but actually reporting directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
During their subsequent meetings, Duquesne provided Sebold with ample information—notably about the scope of America’s military preparations—to be transmitted by shortwave radio to Abwehr officials in Hamburg. Having captured these meetings on film—and also fearing that Duquesne might begin to commit outright sabotage—the FBI arrested him and 17 other members of the Ritter ring in June 1941 (the total number ultimately apprehended was 33). Single.out by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover as the “most important” of the prisoners, Duquesne received a sentence totaling 20 years (18 for espionage and two for violating the Registration Act) along with a $2,000 fine. Released after serving his full term, he died 15 months later in New York City on 24 May 1956.

**DYNAMO.** See SPORTVEREINIGUNG DYNAMO.

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**EBNER, HERMANN (1805–1856).** A journalist working undercover for the *Mainzer Informationsbüro* (MIB), Hermann Ebner was originally a court musician in Electoral Hesse. Beginning in 1832, he edited the conservative Frankfurt am Main newspaper *Oberpostamtzeitung* and contributed to numerous German journals. He resigned his editorial position in 1834 and started to work for the MIB employing the pseudonym Dr. Lichtweiss and submitting weekly reports. Of particular value were his close relations to the Frankfurt literary circles around Karl Gutzkow and Ferdinand Freiligrath. In 1846, Ebner’s plans for a weekly political-literary publication to be entitled the *Frankfurter Beobachter* received much encouragement from MIB head Joseph Klanner von Engelshofen, who believed it would “open lucrative sources for his undercover work.” The demise of the MIB shortly afterward brought an abrupt end to the project.

**EDEL, PETER (1921–1983).** A graphic artist, writer, and informer for the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS), Peter Edel was born Peter Hirschweg in Berlin on 12 July 1921, the son of a Jewish merchant. Trained as a graphic artist prior to World War II, he was taken into custody for anti-Nazi activities in 1943 and then
imprisoned at Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen. Because of his artistic skills, the Sicherheitsdienst compelled Edel to work in the forging of English bank notes under the auspices of Operation BERNHARD. Transferred to the Mauthausen concentration camp in the last months of the war, he was liberated by Allied troops and remained in Austria for several years, working as a book illustrator and writer. With his move to East Berlin in 1949 came a number of positions, notably as an executive member of the writers’ association of the German Democratic Republic, as well as several state awards. His two-volume autobiography, Wenn es ans Leben geht (When Life Itself Is at Stake) appeared in 1979. Two years later, Edel (code name THOMAS) became an informer for the MfS focusing on literary matters. He died on 7 May 1983 in East Berlin.

EGLI, KARL-HEINRICH. A Swiss intelligence officer who spied for the Evidenzbüro during World War I, Karl-Heinrich Egli headed the geographic section of the army’s general staff as well as its main counterintelligence arm. In 1909, under his direction, a reciprocal intelligence-sharing arrangement developed with the Austrians, which not only continued in defiance of Switzerland’s declared neutrality with the outbreak of World War I but was considerably strengthened after Italy’s entry into the war. Dressed in civilian clothes, Egli was even given tours of the Austrian front lines. When this relationship was uncovered in December 1915 and publicized in the francophone Swiss press, military authorities were compelled to suspend Egli along with Moritz von Wattenwyl, the director of Swiss military intelligence. This “Colonels’ Affair”—as it became known—culminated in a military tribunal, which, lacking any concrete evidence, absolved both men of the most serious charges. In March 1916, they received a mild punishment followed by an honorable discharge.

EICHE. See SKORZENY, OTTO.

EICHMANN, ADOLF (1906–1962). The chief of the Jewish Office of the Gestapo during World War II, Adolf Eichmann was born in Solingen on 19 March 1906 but moved to Austria during his youth. His engineering studies left uncompleted, he worked at various jobs before being persuaded by his compatriot Ernst Kaltenbrunner to
join the Austrian branch of the Nazi Party and the SS (Schutzstaffel, or Protection Squad) in April 1932. Returning to Germany, Eichmann found a position in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) and in early 1935 became the official responsible for Jewish questions at the main office in Berlin. Through a Zionist intermediary associated with the Hagana, he visited Palestine under cover in the hope of arranging a full-scale resettlement, but the results proved “meager” in his estimation. Following the 1938 Anschluss with Austria, his new Viennese command gave him sole authority for matters related to Jewish “emigration.” The procedures that he instituted—the rapid “conveyor belt” processing of applications along with open violence in the streets, the confiscation of Jewish assets to subsidize the emigration of the poor, and the use of Jewish collaborators—made a deep impression on his SS superiors and found imitation elsewhere in the Third Reich.

In December 1939, Eichmann was transferred to the Gestapo and given responsibility for Jewish affairs and evacuation. His position within the Reichssicherheitshauptamt received additional consolidation after the Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942, which he attended as the recording secretary. As Nazi policy underwent a fundamental shift from expulsion to extermination, Reinhard Heydrich assigned Eichmann the task of coordinating the groups involved in the arrest, transportation, and death of Jews. In August 1944, he reported to the SS chief Heinrich Himmler that about 4 million had been killed in the death camps and 2 million by the Einsatzgruppen. In contrast to Himmler’s later willingness to enter secret negotiations with the World Jewish Congress, revealed no weakening of resolve as the Nazi regime’s end drew near.

Captured and placed in an internment camp by the U.S. Army, Eichmann escaped, eventually settling in Argentina in 1950 under the name Ricardo Klement. On 11 May 1960, a team of Israeli Mossad agents abducted Eichmann at his home in a Buenos Aires suburb and brought him to Jerusalem to stand trial. Convicted for crimes against humanity and the Jewish people, Eichmann was hanged at Ramleh Prison near Tel Aviv on 31 May 1962.

EIGENDORF, LUTZ (1956–1983). A top-ranking East German soccer player who died under mysterious circumstances after defecting
to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Lutz Eigendorf was born in Brandenburg an der Havel on 16 July 1956. In 1970, after attending an elite school for aspiring young athletes in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), he was delegated to the BFC Dynamo, the soccer team under the official patronage of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). He also worked briefly as a civilian sports instructor for the People’s Police and served for three years in the Felix Dzerzhinsky Wachregiment. His first of six appearances on the GDR national team occurred in August 1978.

In 1979, following a friendship match between the BFC Dynamo and the 1.FC Kaiserslautern on 20 March, Eigendorf sought political asylum in the FRG. MfS chief Erich Mielke reacted with dispatch, for not only was Eigendorf his favorite player on his personally sponsored team, but just a few months earlier the defection of Werner Stiller had severely jolted his security forces. When attempts to lure Eigendorf back to the GDR failed, the MfS kept his family members under surveillance and eventually used Peter Hommann (code name PETER) as an informer in contact with Eigendorf’s wife (whom he later married). The MfS obtained detailed information about Eigendorf from a number of informers in the FRG (notably Buchholz, Schlosser, and Kroll).

In summer 1982, Eigendorf, who had not refrained from public criticism of the GDR, left the 1.FC Kaiserslautern to play for the Eintracht Braunschweig. A late-night automobile accident resulted in his death on 7 March 1983. Although a blood test revealed an elevated level of alcohol, witnesses maintained that Eigendorf had not drunk excessively prior to the fatal mishap. That the accident took place within days of a friendship match with BFC Dynamo in Stuttgart added to the likelihood that the MfS had orchestrated his death, particularly as a warning signal to any potential defectors. See also SPORTVEREINIGUNG DYNAMO.

Einflussagent. Known in English as an agent of influence, an Einflussagent is less concerned with collecting information than with having a covert impact, usually within the government or media. The overriding aim might be to topple or cripple a regime or to steer public opinion in a particular direction. In the Federal Republic of
Germany, William Borm was a prized Einflussagent working for Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. See also BRAUN, JOSEF.

EINSATZGRUPPEN. Mobile killing units employed during World War II, the Einsatzgruppen (deployment teams) took formal shape immediately prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Composed of elements of the Gestapo (Secret Police), the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), and Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police), and numbering about 3,000 people altogether, the Einsatzgruppen were under the command of Reinhard Heydrich of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office). Their function was implementing “on their own responsibility executive orders concerning the civilian population.” Each of the groups—designated A, B, C, and D—was attached to a particular army command, but a double line of authority existed, leading ultimately to Heinrich Himmler. The smaller Einsatzgruppen commando units possessed their own motorcycles, trucks, drivers, mechanics, translators, and kitchen and clerical staff, thereby reinforcing their relative autonomy and rapid movement.

Prime targets of the Einsatzgruppen and their numerous collaborators were Jews, gypsies, communist officials, and Russian prisoners of war. Often entire villages were destroyed as the attacks continued from the Baltic to the Black Sea. After the war, graphic testimony was given by a leading participant, Otto Ohlendorf, at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, and a series of prosecutions—the Einsatzgruppen Trials—took place between September 1947 and April 1948 before a U.S. military court. All 24 defendants were found guilty on at least one charge, yet only four of the 13 death sentences were carried out.

ELSNER, BERNHARD (1927– ). The commander of the Felix Dzerzhinsky Wachregiment for many years, Bernhard Elsner was born in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) on 30 January 1927, the son of a coachman. Trained as a machine fitter, he joined the Wehrmacht as a volunteer in the last months of World War II. Following his capture on the eastern front, he spent 1945 to 1949 in a Soviet prisoner of war camp.
Returning to the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and taking a position with the People’s Police, Elsner became a member of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) two years later. His first assignment was with the Guard Regiment Adlershof, which later became the Felix Dzerzhinsky Guard Regiment. During his long career with the MfS, Elsner became the commander of the Guard Regiment in 1972 and was promoted to brigadier general in 1976. He underwent special training at a military institute in Moscow and then at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy of the National People’s Army in Dresden. In 1987, he was appointed an officer for special tasks in the MfS’s Main Training Division.

The demise of the East German State Security resulted in Elsner’s dismissal in 1990. He then served as secretary to ISOR (Initiativegemeinschaft zum Schutze der sozialen Rechte der ehemaligen Angehörigen der bewaffneten Organe und der Zollverwaltung der DDR), a lobbying group that attempted to secure pension benefits for former members of the GDR armed forces and customs administration.

ELSTER. See GIMPEL, ERICH.

ENGEHLARDDT, HEINZ (1944– ). The last acting head of the remnants of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Heinz Engelhardt was born in Angerapp (now Ozyorsk, Russia) on 9 February 1944, the son of an electrician. Completing his high school education, he entered the MfS in 1962 and eventually became director of the regional administration in Frankfurt an der Oder. Following disbandment of the Amt für Nationale Sicherheit on 14 December 1989, the government of Hans Modrow embarked on a new strategy by separating the state security forces of the German Democratic Republic into a domestic and foreign branch. The former, dubbed the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, with a staff of 10,000, was to be headed by Engelhardt. Although this plan was abandoned on 12 January 1990, he remained an advisor to the committee charged with the dissolution of the security apparatus until the following spring. Afterward, Engelhardt found employment as the branch manager of a travel agency (founded by other MfS officers) in Berlin-Weissensee.
ENGELMANN, BERNT (1921–1994). A prominent and prolific West German writer who became an informer for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Bernt Engelmann was born in Berlin on 20 January 1921, a grandson of the publisher Leopold Ullstein. A soldier in the Wehrmacht, he joined a resistance group in the latter years of World War II and was placed in the Flossenbürg and Dachau concentration camps. After the war, he became a journalist, first with the newsmagazine Der Spiegel and then with West German state television. During the following decades, he wrote approximately 50 books with a worldwide readership. Many dealt critically with the ruling elites and their questionable pasts. He was also an ardent Social Democrat who counted Willy Brandt among his friends.

By the mid-1970s, Engelmann had established a close working relationship with Division X (disinformation) of the HVA. Günther Bohnsack, former head of Division X, maintained that Engelmann (code name ALBERS) regularly met with HVA chief Markus Wolf in Eichwalde near East Berlin. From 1977 to 1984, Engelmann served as the head of the Verband deutscher Schriftsteller (VS; German Writers’ Association)—a position useful for advocating policies that served the interests of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Particularly controversial was the close relationship he developed with the head of the official GDR writers’ association, Hermann Kant (code name MARTIN), who likewise served as an informer to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. As a result, many dissident GDR writers who had fled to the West resigned from the VS in protest. Bohnsack further noted that much of the material appearing in Engelmann’s books had been supplied to him by the HVA. For example, Das schwarze Kassenbuch (Black Cash Account Book), written in 1973 and alleging the secret financing of the Christlich-Demokratische Partei by West German industrialists, was viewed by the HVA as part of a major disinformation campaign. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office investigated Engelmann on suspicion of espionage, but no charges were filed. He died in Munich on 14 April 1994.

ENGELS, ALBRECHT (1899–?). The most important Abwehr spy working in Brazil, Albrecht Engels was a lieutenant in the Reichswehr and saw combat on the western front during World War I. In
1923, attracted by the country’s economic prospects, Engels left for Brazil as an employee of the Siemens firm. Other positions soon materialized, including chief engineer for the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG; German General Electric) for South American operations. He not only became a naturalized Brazilian citizen but was appointed in 1939 to the AEG board of directors with special responsibilities for South America. During a European vacation that summer, he was recruited in Genoa by a former friend, Jobst Raven, who worked in the Abwehr section charged with gathering economic data on foreign countries. From Rio de Janeiro, Engels (code name Alfredo) sent reports detailing U.S. industrial and military production and American trade with Latin America, drawn primarily from business associates and open sources.

Engels’s apparatus—known as the Bolívar network—quickly expanded. He made contact with the Abwehr operation in Mexico headed by Karl von Schleebrügge (code name Morris) and Georg Nikolaus (code name Max) and found several radio technicians, notably Beno Sobisch and Ernst Ramuz. Other important recruits were a Brazilian business acquaintance, Herbert von Heyer, and a Portuguese immigrant with a deep hatred of the British, Antonio Gama Pinto. Also working closely with Engels was Hermann Bohny, an assistant naval attaché in the German embassy who supplied funds along with the use of the diplomatic cable and pouch. Besides collecting their own data, Engels’s group functioned as a relay station and coordinator within the western hemisphere, especially for agents based in the United States, Ecuador, and Argentina. Discord arose, however, with the arrival of Abwehr officer Joséf Starziczny, who began his own rival operation in Rio de Janeiro.

Although Engels enjoyed a reputation for reliability, discretion, and resourcefulness, his network came under greater scrutiny following Brazil’s decision in January 1942 to back the United States and break relations with the Axis countries. Through radio intercepts and the joint surveillance of the British Security Coordination and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, various Abwehr agents were apprehended, including Engels, who voluntarily surrendered to authorities on 18 March 1942. The Brazilian National Security Tribunal sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
ENGELSHOFEN, JOSEPH CLANNERN VON. The second and final head of the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Joseph Clannern von Engelshofen had been sent on numerous intelligence missions to southwest Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium before his appointment as the successor to Karl Gustav Noé in late 1841. His confidential reports revealed not only a high intellectual caliber but also considerable openness in literary and journalistic matters. Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich later noted that Engelshofen possessed the “calm and clearheaded awareness” required for the direction of his office and recommended him for a special court honor. His tenure ended with the dissolution of the MIB in 1848.

ENIGMA MACHINE. See SCHERBIUS, ARTHUR; SCHMIDT, HANS-THILO.

ENTEN. See RIAS.

EPPLER, JOHN (1914–?). An Abwehr operative involved in Operation Salaam, John Eppler was born in Alexandria, Egypt, the adopted son of a judge, Gaafer Pascha. Joining the Abwehr following the advent of the Third Reich, he received the wartime assignment of collecting information in Cairo and trying to foment an anti-British revolution as outlined in Operation Salaam. Yet only months after reaching the Egyptian capital via a hazardous 1,700-mile desert journey led by László Almásy, both he and his radio operator, Hans-Georg Sandstede, were arrested and tried by the British in July 1942. Their death sentences, however, were not carried out, and both men were released on 17 July 1946. Subsequently, Eppler wrote his memoirs—Geheimagent im II. Weltkrieg: Zwischen Berlin, Kabul, und Kairo (Operation Condor: Rommel’s Spy)—and attempted unsuccessfully to retrieve his unpaid Abwehr salary from the Federal Republic of Germany in 1971.

ERNST, HELMUT. A prized West German source for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, Helmut Ernst (code name HENRY) was a journalist recruited in 1960. His high-level military information came from two women with whom he had close contact: one, code name HEIKE, worked as a secretary in the Federal Office for
Military Technology and Procurement in Coblenz; the other, code name BLANCHE, held a similar position in the Federal Defense Ministry. Heike’s daughter, code name LILO, served as a courier. A serious automobile accident in December 1973 led to Ernst’s unmasking, as police discovered spy equipment along with microfilms of confidential documents in the car’s trunk. Owing to his negotiating skills, no sentence was ever imposed.

ERNST, KARL GUSTAV. A spy arrested in London on the eve of World War I, Karl Gustav Ernst was born in Huxton, England, of German parents. A successful barber, he carried out a number of tasks under the direction of Gustav Steinhauer of German naval intelligence. After his overseas correspondence came under the scrutiny of the mail interception unit of British counterintelligence headed by Vernon Kell, Ernst was taken into custody on 4 August 1914, tried, and given a seven-year prison sentence.

EVA. A well-financed penetration of the Vatican by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) during the 1960s, Operation EVA came to public notice in 1982 because of confidential information supplied by former BND officer Hans Langemann to the magazine Konkret. Key agents in Rome included Emilio de Mistura and Aristide Brunello. To counter the efforts of the German Democratic Republic to secure worldwide diplomatic recognition, the BND had hoped to gain greater clarity regarding the Vatican’s intentions, particularly through Agostino Casaroli, a close advisor to Pope Paul VI. The uproar that ensued, especially among Bavarian Catholics, prompted the creation of a parliamentary investigatory committee. The code name for the operation likely refers to Eva Braun, the mistress of Adolf Hitler, who once resided in the Pullach complex that later became the headquarters of the BND.

EVIDENZBÜRO. The military intelligence branch of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, the Evidenzbüro (Register Office) was founded in Vienna in 1850 under the direction of Anton Ritter von Kalik, although its forerunner can be traced to the Napoleonic period. Despite its unremarkable performance in the wars of 1859 and 1867, it began to work closely with Abteilung IIIb—designated as “Confidant
Number 184”—around the turn of the century, especially given the Austrians’ superior network of more than 100 agents in Russia. Yet those assets were severely diminished afterward, partly as a result of budget cuts but also because of the long-term betrayal of Alfred Redl. As a result, the Evidenzbüro remained ignorant of the full scope of Russia’s rearmament program and incorrectly assessed the mobilization of enemy troops on the eastern front in 1914.

In the area of signals intelligence, however, exceptional innovation and proficiency were shown. Building on their prewar training, the cryptanalysts led by Hermann Pokorny managed to break the Russian and Italian codes early on, and by April 1917 this group had expanded into a multisectional unit unofficially known as the Dechiffrierdienst. During the war, most intelligence operations were transferred to the Army High Command at Baden bei Wien, while a skeletal staff remained in Vienna working under the original name. Nearly all of the records of the Evidenzbüro were hurriedly destroyed following its dissolution in 1918. See also FIGL, ANDREAS; RONGE, MAXIMILIAN.

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FALLSCHIRMAGENT. An intelligence operative transported by plane and dropped by parachute into a targeted area, a Fallschirmagent was a relatively common phenomenon during World War II. Whereas missions involving Great Britain had to be abandoned after June 1941, aerial insertion on the eastern front continued throughout the war. Both the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) relied on special Luftwaffe squadrons such as those under the command of Karl-Edmund Gartenfeld. Wearing a parachute dyed dark brown, a Fallschirmagent made the jump at night, although the vagaries of weather often caused disconcerting postponements. In the latter stages of the war, reduced-size radios were developed and eliminated the need for a separate parachute drop. See also KAMPFGESCHWADER 200.

FALSCHE FLAGGE. The German equivalent of the espionage expression “false flag,” a falsche (or fremde) Flagge refers to a deliberate
misrepresentation by a recruiter to gain a more favorable reception by a potential agent. The procedure, also known as *fremde Flagge*, was successfully used with Gerhard Baumann and Margarete Lubig.

**FAUST.** A large-scale infiltration of Allied agents into Nazi Germany following the Normandy landing, Operation *faust* had its origins in October 1943 and was directed by William J. Casey of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). More than 100 missions were dispatched between September 1944 and April 1945 via England, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. The recruited agents included religious dissidents, Spanish Civil War veterans, political refugees, and underground labor groups throughout occupied Europe. Losses were less than anticipated, partly owing to the weak German border controls and also to the carefully rehearsed cover stories provided to the agents beforehand in the prisoner of war camps. The first and one of the most successful of the these missions involved Joseph Kappius and his wife Änne, who served as a courier disguised as a Red Cross nurse.

**FECHNER, KURT.** The first head of the Austrian *Heeresnachrichtenamt* (HNaA), the Army Intelligence Office, Kurt Fechner (code name *DR. FRIEDRICH*) previously served in the *Abwehr* during World War II as the chief of Leitstelle Süd-Ost in Vienna. By relinquishing the archives of his office to American military authorities after the war, he established a cordial relationship with the main occupying power in Austria. With the withdrawal of the United States in 1955 and the creation the following year of the Gruppe Heeresnachrichten, the precursor of the HNaA, Fechner was selected its first head. Because of his earlier association with the Abwehr, criticism persisted among some officers that the HNaA took its signals more from the West German *Bundesnachrichtendienst* than from Austrian operatives. He was succeeded by Alexander Buschek in 1962.

**FELFE, HEINZ (1918– ).** A former *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD; Security Service) official who became a major Soviet agent in the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND), Heinz Felfe was born in Dresden on 18 March 1918. After joining the *SS* (Schutzstaffel, or Protection Squad) in 1939, he became an official in the SD, rising to the rank of
lieutenant before the end of the war. In 1945, he was a British prisoner of war in the Netherlands. Following a brief period of working for the British Secret Intelligence Service, he returned to his legal studies in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Through the efforts of Hans Clemens—a fellow Dresdener, former SD comrade, and freshly recruited KGB agent (code name KHANNI)—Felfe was introduced to the Soviets in 1950 and agreed to work undercover as well. Clemens, who also secured a position in the newly formed and rapidly expanding Organisation Gehlen (OG) in the FRG, gave his strong endorsement of Felfe, paving the way for his appointment in November 1951.

Assigned the code name PAUL by the Soviets, Felfe was keenly ambitious to make his mark as a double agent. After his first posting at the Generalvertretung in Karlsruhe, he was promoted to the main OG headquarters in Pullach in 1953 and given the code name FRIESEN. Fortuitously placed at the Soviet Union desk in the counterintelligence department, he impressed his colleagues by announcing the formation of an informer network in Moscow led by a Red Army colonel. The Soviets supplied Felfe with a mixture of genuine and fabricated intelligence, not only as part of a disinformation campaign but also as a means to help advance his career. Given the primacy that Reinhard Gehlen placed on the number and quality of sources produced by a staff officer, it was not surprising that he expressed unusual admiration for Felfe after their first meeting in 1954. Four years later—as the remarkably detailed information continued to flow—Felfe headed the Soviet Union desk in the BND. Through Felfe, Moscow received knowledge of BND operations, including its secret telephone directory, the names of its resident officers abroad, lists of informers’ cover addresses, and interrogation transcripts.

Even though Felfe had aroused suspicion among numerous colleagues, his arrest did not occur until November 1961, following an investigation set in motion by a defector from the Polish Secret Service. Clemens and another coworker, Erwin Tiebel, who served as courier, were also apprehended and put on trial. In an attempt to curtail the extensive damage, Gehlen offered an amnesty to any BND accomplices of Felfe who agreed to sever their ties with the KGB. The final report confirmed the loss of nearly 100 informers, along with codes, dead drop locations, and courier channels. No less
significant was the wave of deep mistrust felt by both existing and prospective BND agents in Eastern Europe. Despite the gross mismanagement revealed by the trial, Gehlen refused to assume personal responsibility in the matter and managed to remain in office.

Sentenced to a prison term of 14 years, Felfe served only six before being exchanged for 21 German citizens held in the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Clemens was released halfway through his 10-year term because of poor health and died shortly afterward. Tiebel received a three-year sentence. Returning to East Berlin, Felfe completed his doctorate in law and became a professor of criminology, retiring in 1983. His memoirs—*Im Dienste des Gegners* (*In Service of the Enemy*)—appeared in 1986. The book contains numerous inaccuracies, having been a joint effort of the KGB and the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* to discredit the Western services. From all indications, his activity on behalf of the KGB stemmed from deep ideological conviction, although he also confirmed being the recipient of a regular pension from the Soviet Union. See also KRICHTBAUM, WILLI; WITTIG, CARL.

**FELIX.** An abortive German plan to seize Gibraltar from Great Britain during World War II, Operation *felix* was scheduled to be launched on 10 January 1941. According to the 12 November 1940 directive of Adolf Hitler, advance reconnaissance units dressed in civilian clothes were to be followed by Luftwaffe attacks on the British fleet in the harbor and the assault of German troops on the mainland. Minimal Spanish and no Italian participation was also envisioned. Yet Hitler’s meeting with Francisco Franco at the Hendaye border station on 23 October 1940 failed to secure the Spanish leader’s cooperation in this operation. Although Wilhelm Canaris of the *Abwehr* had helped draw up the siege plans, his strong desire for the preservation of Spain’s neutrality led him to brief several key Spanish officials prior to the meeting. Partly as a consequence, Franco’s demands proved excessive, and the western Mediterranean was soon abandoned as a strategic target.

**FELIX DZERZHINSKY WACHREGIMENT.** The only unit of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS) that regularly appeared in military uniform and openly bore arms, the Felix Dzerzhinsky
Wachregiment was named for the founder of the Soviet Cheka. The genesis of this unit, however, can be traced to the early years of the MfS’s existence. In 1962, military service became compulsory in the GDR, and the three-year obligation could be fulfilled in the regular armed forces or in the Wachregiment (Guard Regiment). While the latter had a more exacting political requirement for gaining entry, there was less compulsion for ideological loyalty than among the regular MfS employees, and many soldiers returned to civilian life after their tour of duty. The unit was renamed the Felix Dzerzhinsky Wachregiment on 15 December 1967.

In 1989, the regiment counted nearly 11,000 soldiers in its ranks and was commanded by Brigadier General Manfred Döhring. It possessed its own large arsenal, ranging from armored cars and antiaircraft artillery to grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and helicopters. Its main responsibilities included securing not only all MfS buildings and installations but also the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands and the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, along with the residences of leading party functionaries—more than 100 objects in the East Berlin environs. The regiment was occasionally used for economic purposes, such as assisting with the grain harvest, and could be viewed on many ceremonial occasions, as it also maintained its own orchestra and choir. See also ELSNER, BERNHARD.

FELLGIEBEL, ERICH (1886–1944). A leading signals intelligence officer during World War II and a member of the anti-Nazi resistance, Erich Fellgiebel was born in Pöpelwitz (now Popwice, Poland) on 10 April 1886. His long army career began in 1905 as a cadet in a Prussian signals battalion and extended through World War I and the Weimar Republic. In August 1938, he was appointed to head both army communications and a communications division of the Armed Forces High Command (including the Chiffriedienststelle), even though Adolf Hitler, while recognizing his exceptional expertise, distrusted him from the outset.

As one of the chief conspirators in the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler, Fellgiebel had the vital task of blocking all communications from the Führer headquarters during the assassination attempt. When Hitler emerged with only superficial injuries, Fellgiebel then
indicated in a coded telephone exchange with a fellow signals officer in Berlin that “something terrible” had happened and that the Führer was alive but gave no further details. One of the first persons to be arrested, he was sentenced to death on 8 August and hanged at Plötzensee Prison on 4 September. The Bundeswehr barracks in Pöking (Bavaria) were named in his honor after the war.

FELTEN, PETER (1943– ). A journalist who worked for the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Peter Felten was based in Cologne at the Kölnische Rundschau and began his undercover collaboration in 1974. Four years later, responding to a classified advertisement placed in various West German newspapers, Felten (code name lese) established contact with the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) and agreed to a meeting in East Berlin. His detailed report to the BfV afterward noted that the VA would remunerate him for military information related to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet when Felten’s dossier (code name herne) underwent a parallel investigation by the VA and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, counterintelligence officials of both agencies confirmed his tie to the BfV. After delivering bogus information for several months, Felten was arrested at a meeting in East Berlin and sentenced to 12 years in prison. In 1981, he was exchanged for Christel Guillaume, wife of the “chancellor spy” Günter Guillaume.

FEUERSTEIN, DIETER (1955– ). A West German engineer who acquired key military technology for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Dieter Feuerstein was born in Neu-Ulm (Bavaria), the son of covert operatives for the German Democratic Republic (GDR). His parents not only cultivated his early communist convictions but helped secure his recruitment as an agent in 1974 (code name petermann). Feuerstein’s study of aeronautical engineering in West Berlin—undertaken specifically at the HVA’s insistence—led to an appointment at the large military manufacturing firm of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm in 1983. There he had access to the planning and construction of fighter aircraft such as the Tornado and Jaeger 90. Hundreds of filmed pages were thus conveyed to the HVA via a toter Briefkasten, or dead drop, on GDR-bound trains, supplemented by regular meetings with his instructor and control
officer. Membership in right-wing political organizations provided further cover.

Unmasked in 1990 by Frank Weigel, a defector from the Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik, Feuerstein was given an eight-year prison sentence in 1992 by a Munich court but received an early release two years later. Whether he was prepared to continue his espionage career with the KGB after the fall of the Berlin Wall remains the object of conflicting testimony.

FEUERWERK. The first of a series of “concentrated blows” against Western intelligence operatives and anticommunist resisters in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Operation FEUERWERK (Fireworks) took shape under the direction of Erich Mielke in late October 1953. Relying on information supplied by double agent Hans Joachim Geyer, the operation was directed principally at agents working for the West Berlin branch of Organisation Gehlen, although anyone previously identified as an “enemy of the state” was also to be taken into custody. Its execution lasted only two days and, according to an official count, resulted in more than 100 arrests. In addition, Ernst Wollweber used this operation as well as those that soon followed—PFEIL and BLITZ—to publicize the dangers posed by enemy agents to the general public.

FIGL, ANDREAS (1873–1967). The founder of the Austro-Hungarian cryptanalytical bureau, Andreas Figl was born in Vienna on 22 June 1873, the son of a hotel owner. Although his military career with the infantry ended in 1910 because of an accident that left him blind in his right eye, he was reactivated the following year and assigned to the Evidenzbüro, where he began to construct the army’s first codebreaking unit. Among Figl’s notable achievements during World War I were early successes against Russian cryptograms and the reorganization of radio interception operations on the Italian front (dubbed “Austrowest”), which extended into Albania as well.

After the war, Figl received a long-term appointment in the Foreign Ministry and wrote the book Systeme des Chiffrierens (Systems of Codemaking) in 1926. Its sequel was suppressed by the Austrian government for security reasons, much to his displeasure. Following his retirement in 1936, he moved to Salzburg but joined other
Austrian experts two years later as part of the radio surveillance group within the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. He died on 11 November 1967.

FINK, HEINRICH (1935– ). A leading East German theologian who was an informer for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Heinrich Fink was born in Korntal, Bessarabia, on 31 March 1935. Following his studies in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), he became a professor of Protestant theology at Humboldt University in East Berlin in 1979. His recruitment as an informer by Main Department XX/4 (church affairs) of the MfS occurred in June 1968. Highly regarded by his superiors, including MfS head Erich Mielke, Fink (code name heiner) regularly submitted reports on a wide range of issues, from confidential conversations with students to contacts with church officials and theologians outside the GDR.

Although Fink became dean of Humboldt University following the fall of the Berlin Wall, knowledge of his Stasi connection caused his dismissal in 1992. Firmly denying any complicity, he was elected to the Bundestag as a delegate of the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus in 1998. Nevertheless, Germany’s highest court upheld the charge, and his thick MfS file, once considered destroyed by his handler in late 1989, was painstakingly reconstructed from pieces of shredded paper.

FISCHER, WILHELM. A liberal journalist who worked undercover for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Wilhelm Fischer was born in Prussia and served as a judge after completing his legal studies. Attracted to journalism as a full-time occupation, he became the editor of several liberal newspapers in succession—the Rheinischer Postillion, the Badische Zeitung, and the Mainzer Zeitung—as well as a correspondent for a number of other German publications. Beginning in May 1841, his reports to the MIB, which concentrated on how the German press reflected the viewpoints of various political parties, were submitted under the code name DR. LORENZ. A confidential assessment of the previous year characterized Fischer as an “ultraliberal journalistic agitator of the first rank,” and he openly acknowledged his underlying commitment to liberalism, freedom of the press, and Prussia. Rather than viewing his admission as an im-
pediment, MIB head Josef Clannern von Engelshofen considered such “honorableness” the mark of an excellent agent, while Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich welcomed the keen insights that a member of the journalistic opposition could provide.

FLÄMIG, PAUL GERHARD (1919– ). A West German politician with ties to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Paul Gerhard Flämig served in the Luftwaffe during World War II before being taken a prisoner of war. In 1946, he joined the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and was a Bundestag delegate from Hesse from 1963 to 1980 as well as a member of the European Parliament, sitting on important committees dealing with scientific and technological issues. His recruitment by the HVA as an agent (code names Walter and Julius) occurred in 1973 and continued for the next 15 years. Unmasked on 22 January 1993, Flämig denied the allegations, although his activity was later confirmed by HVA chief Markus Wolf and the Rosenholz documents. Because of his poor health, the court in Frankfurt am Main terminated his trial in late July 1998.

FLOSSENbüRG. A Nazi concentration camp where numerous German and Allied spies perished, Flossenbürg was established in May 1938 in the Oberpfalz region of Bavaria near the town of Flossenbürg. Only days prior to its liberation by U.S. troops in late April 1945, it was the site of the trial and execution by hanging of Wilhelm Canaris and Hans Oster of the Abwehr. The executions of several dozen Allied spies occurred there as well.

FOELKERSAM, ADRIAN VON (1914–1945). A member of the Brandenburg Division and the SS-Jagdverband under Otto Skorzeny, Adrian von Foelkersam was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, on 20 December 1914. Following his studies in Berlin and Vienna, he joined the Abwehr in 1939 and was assigned to the newly created Baulehr Kompanie z.b.V. 800 (Special Purpose Construction and Training Company No. 800), which later became the Brandenburg Division. His most celebrated exploit—securing the oil fields in Maikop in the Caucasus—earned him the Knight’s Cross on 14 September 1942. Transferred to the SS-Jagdverband in 1944, Foelkersam became Skorzeny’s assistant and participated in deposing
the Hungarian regent, Miklós Horthy, in Operation **Panzerfaust**. Foelkersam was killed in action near Hohensalza (now Inowroclaw, Poland) on 21 January 1945 and posthumously promoted to SS-Sturmbahnumführer (captain).

**FOERTSCH, VOLKER (1934–)**. A senior official of the **Bundesnachrichtendienst** (BND) accused of working for Russian intelligence, Volker Foertsch was the son of a Wehrmacht officer and a student of economics at Hamburg and Munich from 1954 to 1957. Already affiliated with the **Organisation Gehlen** in 1953 (code names **förster** and **fleming**), he made the transition to the BND and rose impressively through the ranks. The zenith of his career occurred in 1989 with his appointment as head of collection, thus giving him knowledge of all agent networks and current operations. Conflict with BND-President Konrad Porzer led to his reappointment as director of security in 1994.

Even more serious were the remarks in 1995 of a former Soviet KGB officer, whose description of a mole within the BND appeared to fit Foertsch. Further incriminating comments reached **Pullach** in October 1997 from a source within the Russian army, code-named **rübezahl**. Investigations by the BND, the **Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz**, and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office produced no conclusive evidence of Foertsch’s complicity. Adamantly denying the charge and suspecting a disinformation campaign at work, he chose to resign on 16 December 1998. Four years later, the BND officer responsible for obtaining the Rübezahl information, Norbert Juretzko, was found guilty by a Munich court of falsifying documents, along with financial transgressions. In 2004, Juretzko published his own version of events, *Bedingt Dienstbereit* (Fit Only for Certain Duties), which prompted further legal action by the BND.

**FOMFERRA, HEINRICH (1895–1979)**. A veteran communist and underground fighter who worked briefly for the **Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** (MfS), Heinrich Fomferra was born in Essen on 19 November 1895, the son of a miner. A soldier during World War I, he joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) at its inception and was jailed on several occasions for his participation in insurgent activities. His training in Moscow in 1930 led to a position in the
M-Apparatus of the KPD and the courier section of the Comintern. After duty in the Spanish Civil War, Fomferra returned to Moscow and was sent on various secret missions to Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, where he was arrested in 1942 and given a 12-year prison sentence. With his liberation by Slovakian partisans two years later came a short interlude in the country’s provisional interior ministry.

While associated with the K-5 in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, Fomferra sharply criticized the number of former Nazis and Wehrmacht members selected for administrative positions and the seeming indifference of the party leadership under Walter Ulbricht to revolutionary politics. His own appointment to the newly established MfS in 1950 proved to be short-lived, as he was dismissed along with Wilhelm Zaisser in the aftermath of the Uprising of 17 June 1953 and assigned to the Border Police. Significantly, however, he was summoned in 1957 to help design a sabotage unit alongside Gustav Röbelen that targeted the Federal Republic of Germany. Fomferra published two autobiographical sketches following his retirement in 1959. He died on 31 May 1979.

**FONTANE, THEODOR (1819–1898).** A celebrated German writer of Huguenot ancestry who was once falsely arrested as a spy, Theodor Fontane worked as a journalist during the Franco-Prussian War. During a tour of the front lines in fall 1870, he ventured from the Prussian war zone into enemy territory to visit the birthplace of Joan of Arc. On 5 October, while inspecting a bronze statue of her next to the chapel in Domrey, Fontane was arrested as a spy by a group of French irregulars. Not only were a revolver and dagger found in his possession but, lacking any medical credentials, he was improperly wearing a Red Cross badge. Fontane was imprisoned first in Neufchâteau, then in Langres, and finally in Besançon.

After Fontane’s transfer on 29 October to the island of Oleron off the Atlantic coast, his plight belately became known to the Berlin public. His release in December occurred primarily as a result of the pressure exerted by the soon-to-be German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, who described him as “a harmless scholar” on “a scientific trip.” Should he not be released, Bismarck threatened to retaliate by handling any French citizens caught in similar circumstances no differently. Fontane’s own account, *Kriegsgefangen: Erlebtes 1870*
(Prisoner of War: Lived Experiences), appeared several months later.

FORSCHUNGSAMT. The chief agency conducting communications intelligence for the Third Reich, the Forschungsamt (Research Office) was authorized by Hermann Göring when he took over the reins of the Prussian government in 1933. When he became Reich air minister in 1935, its offices in Berlin were moved to larger quarters in a converted apartment complex in the Schillerstrasse. The Forschungsamt obtained its information by monitoring wireless communications and radio broadcasts, tapping German foreign telephone and telegraph lines, and, in conjunction with the Abwehr, inspecting mail. The richest source of information proved to be not the “A” line, or telephone listening stations, but the “B” line, or wireless receiving stations. The Forschungsamt was divided into six branches that were later elevated to bureaus: administration; personnel; distribution of incoming requests and sorting of incoming reports; cryptanalysis; evaluation; and technical equipment development and management. The finished products—known as the Braune Blätter—were distributed in strictest secrecy to a small number of select officials. Adolf Hitler relied on these reports quite heavily in the prewar period, notably during the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938.

By 1941, in addition to a network of substations in greater Germany and the occupied territories, the number of employees had grown from an initial staff of six to more than 6,000. Its three directors included Hans Schimpf, Prince Christoph of Hesse, and Gottfried Schapper. Despite the high degree of personal control exercised by Göring and the attempt to employ only Nazi loyalists, the Forschungsamt, dominated by radio engineers and intelligence specialists, conducted its research with an extraordinary degree of independence and objectivity. It remained generally aloof from jurisdictional and political disputes involving other intelligence organs. Yet its wartime reports, often pessimistic about Germany’s prospects for victory and forthright in assessing responsibility, were read less and less frequently. Beginning in 1943, its headquarters had to be moved from Berlin to Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland), then to Bavaria, and finally to Schleswig-Holstein.
FORSCHUNGSSTELLE. A World War II intelligence unit designed to monitor transatlantic telephone communication, the Forschungsstelle (research post) was established in 1940 and based in the Netherlands. Within two years, under the direction of Kurt Vetterlein, the unit intercepted and unscrambled telephone calls between the United States and Great Britain. Yet many of the conversations involved only minor officials, and even those between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill yielded little substance, as Allied officials assumed that the communication link was not secure. In 1944, the unit was transferred to Bavaria for the remainder of the war.

FRANKE, ARTHUR (1909–1992). The third head of East German military intelligence, Arthur Franke was born in Berlin on 5 August 1909 and trained as a cabinetmaker. He joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1930. When Adolf Hitler came into power, Franke took refuge in Czechoslovakia under the pseudonym Pavel Hanke and then fought in the Ernst-Thälmann Battalion during the Spanish Civil War. Interned in France, he was returned to Germany in 1941 and spent the last years of the war in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he met Willy Sägebrecht.

Franke was appointed to several party positions during the Soviet occupation period, and in 1951 he became head of the political section of East Germany’s new air police, the nucleus of the future air force. By 1959, he had advanced to second in command of the Verwaltung für Koordinierung, the unit charged with military intelligence, which was headed by Sägebrecht. Several months later, Sägebrecht was dismissed and Franke took charge. His tenure saw not only the construction of a new seven-story headquarters building in the Oberspreestrasse but also the replacement of many senior officers with younger, more adept university graduates. All the cadres, in fact, underwent a personal review by Franke. More than any other East German military intelligence chief, he participated in the meetings with informers and covert operatives (frequently using the name General Stein). He also fostered strong relations with the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) within the larger context of the Warsaw Pact. Following his reluctant retirement in early 1975, Franke headed the diving division of the Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik (Society
for Sport and Technology) for the next 12 years. He died in Berlin on 23 October 1992.

FREDERICK THE GREAT (1712–1786). The first German ruler to demonstrate a full appreciation of espionage in warfare, Frederick the Great (Frederick II) was born on 24 January 1712, ascending to the Prussian throne in 1740. Despite the strong literary and philosophical pursuits of his youth, most of his energies as king of Prussia were directed to the battlefield, first in the two Silesian wars (1740–1742 and 1744–1745) and then in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763).

In his desire that Prussia’s military engagements be “short and lively,” he found spies an invaluable asset. “Marshal de Soubise is always followed by a hundred cooks,” he once stated, but “I am always preceded by a hundred spies.” In a set of instructions to his generals written prior to the Seven Years’ War, Frederick devoted a section to espionage, dividing spies into four categories—common spies, double spies, high-ranking spies, and coerced spies—and not hesitating to recommend harsh methods of persuasion if necessary. Two highly placed informers in Prussia’s service included the Austrian ambassador’s secretary in Berlin, who submitted regular reports, and a chancellery clerk in Dresden, Frederick Wilhelm Menzel, who reported on the Saxon cabinet’s confidential correspondence with Vienna and St. Petersburg. “These wretches are useful,” Frederick observed; “they are like compasses that guide navigation while the somber clouds of politics leave them in the dark.”

Although a strict and frugal monarch, he insisted that spies should be compensated generously for the great risks they take. By the end of his reign, Frederick had acquired Silesia and stood for the military status quo in Europe. He died in Potsdam on 17 August 1786.

FREDERIK, HANS. A West German journalist and publisher with ties to the KGB and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Hans Frederik was born in Austria. As a member of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, he was interned by the Gestapo in 1938. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country in 1956, he agreed to work as a journalist for the KGB and moved to Munich. The firm Humboldt-Verlag was founded, producing a defamatory book on Willy Brandt in 1961. Although the publishing house
went bankrupt, Frederik began a new venture—Verlag Politisches Archiv—based in Landshut. Especially noteworthy was his 1971 account of the Otto John affair, which included an interview with an official KGB spokesman, “Colonel Karpov,” who denied that John was either abducted or forcibly detained in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After the collapse of the GDR, internal documents revealed that Frederik (code name Fredy) had maintained a close relationship with the active measures or disinformation unit of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. In addition to generous subsidies, the HVA had provided him with documents and prepared manuscripts that discredited leading West German politicians such as Herbert Wehner, Franz Josef Strauss, and Karl Schiller.

FREMDE HEERE. The unit of the German General Staff charged with intelligence assessment, the Fremde Heere (Foreign Armies) was formed following the outbreak of World War I as the Nachrichtenabteilung (Intelligence Division). It was renamed Fremde Heere in 1917. The unit obtained most of its raw data from Abteilung IIIb and was led initially by Richard Hentsch. Although officially disbanded after the war, it continued to function disguised as an army statistical office until its reinstatement in 1931. Seven years later, a bifurcation of responsibility along geographic lines created the Fremde Heere Ost and Fremde Heere West.

FREMDE HEERE OST (FHO). The principal body responsible for collating and analyzing intelligence concerning the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East) was officially established on 10 November 1938. Its initial head, Eberhard Kinzel, was replaced in March 1942 by Reinhard Gehlen, who served until April 1945. In Gehlen’s major reorganization, the FHO was divided into six groups containing several subsections: Group I prepared daily situation reports; Group II analyzed Soviet military operations; Group III translated captured documents, radio transmissions, and Soviet propaganda and periodicals; Group IV focused on Scandinavia; Group V drew up situation maps; Group VI was charged with general administration. Given the scope of its assignments, the staff was a relatively small one, consisting of 50 officers, 70 noncommissioned officers, and 60 clerks.
Possessing no intelligence collection agency of its own, the FHO had to depend on numerous sources, including the Abwehr, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Foreign Office, and the Luftwaffe—all exceedingly protective of their own domain. Moreover, the lack of agents deep in the Red Army’s rear made the FHO highly vulnerable to large-scale deception schemes, such as Operation Scherhorn. An overriding failure of German intelligence was its underestimation of the magnitude of Soviet attacks and counterattacks at critical junctures in the war.

FREMDE HEERE WEST (FHW). An intelligence branch of the Armed Forces High Command, the Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) was created on 10 November 1938 and focused on the armies of Western Europe, Great Britain, the upper Balkans, and the United States (except for one brief interlude after Adolf Hitler’s declaration of war). Based in Zossen, just south of Berlin, it was headed successively by Ulrich Liss, Alexis von Roenne, and Willi Bürklein. With only a limited number of standard intelligence sources at its disposal, the FHW depended to a large degree on the accumulated general knowledge of its staff. Large guidebooks were compiled on individual countries and covered such topics as military geography and organization, armaments, training, and education. Most notable was its strategic conceptualization in the campaign against France and the Low Countries in 1940.

FREMDE LUFTWAFFE. The main intelligence branch of the Luftwaffe, the Fremde Luftwaffe (Foreign Air Forces) was headed by Josef Schmidt until October 1942. Because intelligence enjoyed little prestige within the air force command, much rivalry and friction developed in a highly decentralized atmosphere (10 different groups, for example, were charged with radar monitoring). As a result, its analytical capacity was severely limited.

FRENZ, WOLFGANG (1936– ). An extreme right-wing political functionary and informer for West German counterintelligence, Wolfgang Frenz was a founding member of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in 1964. Having been engaged in 1959 as a paid informer by the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (LfV)
in North Rhine-Westphalia, he was in a prime position to report on the NPD’s activities in this populous region. Yet because of Frenz’s blatantly anti-Semitic publications, the LfV terminated the relationship in 1995.

Knowledge of his undercover role only surfaced when the government of Gerhard Schröder attempted to ban the NPD following a series of right-wing hate crimes during the late 1990s. Frenz was scheduled by the government to testify in the hearings before the Bundeshofgericht, the Federal Republic of Germany’s highest court. In January 2002, however, the judges discovered that they had not been apprised beforehand of Frenz’s role as an informer, and they angrily refused to proceed. This debacle not only caused considerable embarrassment to the government but raised the question of whether extremist parties like the NPD were being inadvertently subsidized through the deployment of paid agents. For his part, Frenz unsuccessfully sued the government for his presumed loss of income as a nonmedical practitioner.

FRENZEL, ALFRED (1899–1968). A leading Czechoslovakian spy active in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Alfred Frenzel was born in Josephstahl (now Josefuvi Dl, Czech Republic) on 18 September 1899. Trained as a glassmaker, he joined the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in 1922 but left for Great Britain prior to the absorption of the Sudetenland by Germany. Following his service in a Czech unit of the Royal Air Force during World War II, he immigrated to Bavaria in 1947 and joined the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. During the electoral campaign of 1953, a rival Bundestag candidate accused him of trafficking in drugs and concealing his communist past, thereby forcing Frenzel to swear under oath that he was innocent of those charges.

Although he prevailed in the election and obtained a seat on the parliamentary defense committee, his case was closely monitored by the new Czechoslovakian intelligence service, Stani tagna Bezecnost (StB). Under the direction of Boumil Molnar of the StB’s First Directorate, Frenzel was threatened with exposure of his political and criminal record unless he consented to work as a spy. An agreement was reached in July 1956, and he received the code name ANNA. In return for large sums of money—and the promise of a villa and car
should he decide to defect to Czechoslovakia—Frenzel delivered high-quality information related to the defense plans of both the FRG and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In September 1959, the StB dispatched a new control officer, Jindrich Augustin, to the FRG under the assumed name Franz Altmann. A year later, having been alerted to irregularities in his tax records, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz arrested Augustin at the Cologne airport and found six rolls of film concealed in a baby-powder can; the find also confirmed Frenzel’s complicity. On 18 April 1961, Frenzel was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 15 years in prison. In 1965, he was exchanged for four West Germans held in Czechoslovakia. He died on 23 July 1968. Augustin’s five-year sentence had ended earlier in December 1961 due to a spy exchange as well.

**FREUNDE.** An East German referring to the Soviet Union and its citizens, Freunde, or friends, was the expression frequently invoked by members of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit for their colleagues in the KGB. Male members of the KGB were sometimes referred to as Kolya.

**FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN, WESSEL BARON VON (1899–1944).** A member of the Abwehr conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, Wessel Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven was born in Gross Born, Courland (now Latvia), on 10 November 1899, an old Westphalian noble family. In 1918, he enlisted in the Baltic-German Landeswehr and, following the formation of an independent Latvia, became an infantry officer. In 1922, he left Latvia to join the Reichswehr in Weimar Germany. Despite an initial sympathy for the National Socialist program, his disaffection began with the Night of the Long Knives in 1934 and was further reinforced by the war crimes associated with Operation Barbarossa.

In August 1943, with the aid of Wilhelm Canaris, Freytag-Loringhoven secured a position in the Abwehr as head of Department II (sabotage and subversion). An active member of the anti-Hitler resistance as well as a friend of Claus Count Schenk von Stauffenberg, he helped supply explosives from Abwehr booty for the attempted assassination of the Führer on 20 July 1944. When the plot
went awry, realizing that Reichssicherheitshauptamt chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner was about to discover his involvement, he committed suicide on 26 July 1944 at Mauerwald, the Armed Forces High Command camp near Lötzen, East Prussia (now Gżycko, Poland). Under the newly implemented Nazi principle of “kith and kin,” his wife and four sons were taken into custody and remained separated until the end of the war.

FRIEDRICHSTRASSE TRAIN STATION. See BAHNHOF FRIEDRICHSTRASSE.

FRIEDRICH-WILHELM-HEINZ-DIENST. See HEINZ, FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

FRITSCH AFFAIR. An attempt by Adolf Hitler to eliminate opposition to his war plans within the Wehrmacht, the Fritsch Affair was sparked in January 1938 when the Führer objected to General Werner von Fritsch’s promotion from commander in chief of the armed forces to minister of war. The pretext was provided by a report prepared by Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich and conveyed to Hitler by Hermann Göring, which falsely accused Fritsch of homosexual activities. At a hastily summoned interview, a notorious Berlin male prostitute and blackmailer, Otto Schmidt, appeared as a witness. Although Fritsch firmly denied the charges, maintaining that he had never seen Schmidt before, Hitler remained unpersuaded and soon announced that the general had resigned for “reasons of health.” Acquitted of all charges by a military court on 18 March but barred from further access to a high office, Fritsch only belatedly realized that the concocted affair was aimed at the army as a whole and had little to do with him as a person.

FROBENIUS, LEO (1873–1938). A leading ethnographer and agent provocateur during World War I, Leo Frobenius was born in Berlin on 29 June 1873, the son of a military officer. Largely self-educated as a social scientist, he made 12 trips to Africa between 1904 and 1935. Highly critical of the impact of British colonial rule, he persuaded the German High Command to fund his seventh trip in winter 1914–1915. Its object was to persuade the Abyssinians to join
the Central Powers. The mission proved a failure after Frobeni
us declared himself a German officer to Italian authorities. Consid-
ering his presence a threat to Italy’s neutrality, they threatened him with
internment. After the war, he founded an institute in Frankfurt am
Main (which included a noted collection of facsimiles of prehistoric
paintings and engravings) and later became a professor at the univer-
sity. He died on 9 August 1938 in Biganzolo, Italy.

FRONTAUFKLÄRUNGSKOMMANDO (FAK). Literally, “front
reconnaissance commando,” a Frontaufklärungskommando was
a small mobile Abwehr unit deployed near the front lines during
World War II for a variety of purposes. See also WALLI.

FUCHS, JÜRGEN (1950–1999). A writer, psychologist, and promi-
nent dissident in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Jürgen
Fuchs was born in Reichenbach (Saxony) on 19 December 1950.
Following his required military service, he studied social psychol-
ogy at Jena. His first literary publications began to appear in 1971,
but four years later his writings were banned throughout the GDR
and his university degree was revoked because of “damage to the
university’s reputation.” Detained for 10 months at Berlin-Hohen-
schönhäusen in 1976, he later described the intense experience in
his book Vernehmungsprotokolle (Interrogation Record). Despite his
subsequent deportation to West Berlin, officials of the Ministerium
für Staatssicherheit (MfS) continued to make Fuchs the object of
Zersetzungsmassnahmen (decomposition measures) to isolate and
weaken him. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification, he
worked for the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssi-
cherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Re-
publik, the government agency in charge of the files of the MfS. He
came, however, to take a critical view of its operations—specifically
its employment of former MfS officers and its bureaucratic mode of
operation—as reflected in his 1998 novel Magdalena. Strongly sus-
pecting that the MfS had surreptitiously exposed him to radioactive
material, Fuchs died of leukemia in Berlin on 9 May 1999.

FUCHS, KLAUS (1911–1988). The nuclear physicist who delivered
atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union, Klaus Fuchs was born in
Rüsselsheim (Hesse) on 29 December 1911, the son of a Quaker minister. As a student of physics at the University of Leipzig in 1930, he joined the Sozialistische Demokratische Partei but abandoned it two years later while at the University of Kiel, becoming a member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). In 1933, Fuchs was branded a political criminal by the Nazis and, obeying the orders of the KPD, immigrated to England to complete his studies. He received a doctorate from the University of Bristol in 1936, and in spite of his communist affiliation, the British Home Office granted him an unlimited residence permit. Although interned briefly on the Isle of Man and in Canada after the outbreak of World War II, Fuchs was released in 1941 because of his potential value as a nuclear physicist. Impressed by his scientific papers, Rudolf Peierls invited him to join his laboratory in Birmingham, which was involved in the top-secret project of developing an atomic bomb to be used in the war against Adolf Hitler (code name TUBE ALLOYS). Upon the recommendation of Tube Alloys, Fuchs became a naturalized citizen in June 1942, declaring that he would “bear true allegiance” to the British crown “according to law.”

Fuchs, however, was anxious to lend active support to the Soviet Union, and in fall 1941 he was advised by his friend and fellow communist Jürgen Kuczynski to contact the Soviet embassy in London. Fuchs was assigned a control officer from the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), Simon Kremer, to be replaced the following year by Ursula Kuczynski, Jürgen’s sister. All the scientific research information at his disposal was relayed to Moscow. With his appointment as a member of the British mission to the Manhattan Project in December 1943, Fuchs’s access to nuclear secrets increased significantly. Fuchs’s NKGB controller, known to him as Raymond, was Harry Gold, a biochemistry technician born in Switzerland of Russian parents. By August 1944, Fuchs (code names REST and CHARLES) had moved to the bomb design and assembly laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, unaware, however, that several other scientists there likewise maintained undercover links to the Soviet Union. While the precise contents of Fuchs’s reports cannot be determined, he did possess wide knowledge, especially regarding the theory and design of a gaseous diffusion plant and the implosion method for assembling an atomic bomb.
In June 1946, at the conclusion of the Manhattan Project, Fuchs returned to England, eventually becoming head of the theoretical division of the atomic energy establishment at Harwell, where the British were developing their own plutonium bomb. His espionage continued in this period under a new handler, Aleksandr Feklisov, albeit at a reduced rate. By September 1949, however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting on information gathered from the Venona intercepts of Soviet intelligence communications, had opened a case file on Fuchs. British authorities were notified, and Fuchs openly confessed to MI5 on 27 January 1950, characterizing his double life as “controlled schizophrenia.” Because the Soviet Union had been an ally of Great Britain during the war, the charges against him did not involve treason but rather violation of the Official Secrets Act. He was given the maximum sentence of 14 years but was released after nine years owing to good behavior.

Aided by the intercession of his father, a new life and career opened for Fuchs in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), even though the loss of British citizenship was, according to him, his deepest wound. After arriving in East Berlin on 24 June 1959, he promptly married Margarete Keilson, an old friend and former Comintern agent, and became a citizen of the GDR. Fuchs was then named deputy director of the Institute for Nuclear Physics at Rossendorf near Dresden, where he remained for the next 15 years. Besides receiving several prestigious state awards, he added his voice to the East German government’s campaign for nuclear disarmament. He died on 28 January 1988.

**FÜHRUNGSOFFIZIER.** An intelligence officer directly responsible for an individual agent, a **Führungsoffizier** was the common designation of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. The three main intelligence services of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, rely on other terms. The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz and the Militärischer Abschirmdienst employ V-Mannführer, and Verbindungsoffizier is the standard designation of the Bundesnachrichtendienst.

**FÜLLE, REINER (1939– ).** A well-placed agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), Reiner Fülle (code name Klaus) worked as a deputy administrator at the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe. The defection of his case officer, Werner Stiller, in January 1979 resulted in Fülle’s arrest, but he managed to flee his captors when one slipped on an icy patch. After taking refuge in the Soviet mission at Baden-Baden, Fülle was smuggled to the German Democratic Republic in a wooden box. Disillusionment, however, soon set in, and arrangements were made with West Berlin authorities for his redefection via Hungary with an FRG passport in September 1981. In a further twist of events, the HVA learned the inside details of this operation from a defector the following year. A Stuttgart court sentenced Fülle to a six-year prison term.

**FUNKABWEHR.** A unit of the Armed Forces High Command designed to monitor enemy wireless communications, the Funkabwehr (Radio Security Service) was established in 1940 under Hans Kopp. Its most notable breakthrough occurred on 26 June 1941, when tracer teams at the Funkabwehr station at Cranz, East Prussia (now Zelenogradsk, Russia) made their first discovery of the Rote Kapelle. As final defeat loomed, the Funkabwehr was dissolved on 30 April 1945.

**FUNKSPIEL.** A Funkspiel, or radio “playback” game, was the transmission of controlled information over a captured agent’s radio so that the agent’s parent service had no knowledge the agent had been turned. A Funkspiel was effectively employed during World War II by the Germans against the British, as in Operation Nordpol. Soviet counterintelligence also used the tactic successfully against the Germans. See also DEM’IANOV, ALEKSANDR; SCHERHORN; ROTE KAPELLE.

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**GARAU, HORST (1939–1988).** An East German double agent for the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Horst Garau was an educational councilor in Cottbus who, with his wife Gerlinde, a teacher, initially worked for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) as couriers to Great Britain and the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). In October 1976, however, Garau divulged information to authorities in West Berlin and became an agent for the BfV (code name SCHNEIDER); Gerlinde (code name DÜRER) was likewise engaged. To safeguard his identity, no action was taken against the agents Garau identified in the FRG, and the HVA made no move against him after learning about his BfV affiliation from Klaus Kuron in 1982, in order to protect its new inside source. The pretext for the arrest of the Garaus in Cottbus was provided by the defection of Hansjoachim Tiedge in 1985. Although Gerlinde was released after four months on condition of complete silence about her experiences, Horst Garau was sentenced to life imprisonment and died at Bautzen on 12 July 1988. The official explanation was suicide by hanging, but the circumstances remain ambiguous.

GARBO. See PUJOL, JUAN.

GAST, GABRIELE (1943–). Simultaneously the top-ranking woman in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and a highly prized asset of Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Gabriele Gast was born in Remscheid (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 2 March 1943, the daughter of an upper-middle-class family. A member of the youth group of the center-right Christlich-Demokratische Union, she studied political science at the University of Aachen. In 1968, while conducting doctoral research in Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz) on the political role of women in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), she became enamored of an East German intelligence officer, Karl-Heinz Schneider (alias Karl-Heinz Schmidt). Following her recruitment, she was trained by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit and given the code name GISELA. In 1973, a strong recommendation by her dissertation advisor—the well-known Sovietologist Karl Mehnert—helped Gast secure a position as an analyst at the BND, where she came to head the Soviet and East European desk. She also helped prepare the weekly intelligence briefings for Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

This highly placed agent attracted the personal attention of HVA chief Markus Wolf, who met with her seven times between 1975 and 1986. He was impressed by Gast’s “flawless” work and described her as “a brilliant analyst in her own right.” While her relationship with Schmidt became more problematic and diminished in significance,
she remained strongly committed to her espionage career. After the GDR’s collapse, she was arrested, having been exposed by a former HVA officer, Karl-Christoph Grossmann. In 1991, a Bavarian court sentenced her to six years and nine months imprisonment; she was released in 1994 and returned to Munich. Her memoirs, *Kundschafterin des Friedens: 17 Jahre Topspionin der DDR beim BND* (Scout for Peace: 17 Years the Top GDR Spy at the BND) appeared in 2000 and bitterly took issue with the unequal treatment of East and West German spies following reunification. Gast appealed her protracted trial to the European Human Rights Court, which ruled in 2000 that no violation had occurred. *See also* ROMEO SPIES.

**GAUCK, JOACHIM (1940– ).** The first head of the German government agency charged with the management of the massive files of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS), Joachim Gauck was born in Rostock on 24 January 1940, the son of sea captain. In 1951, his father was arrested as a suspected Western spy and deported to Siberia but was released four years later. Soon thereafter, Gauck began his theological studies in Rostock and, following his ordination, became pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran church in Lüssow (Mecklenburg). After returning to Rostock in 1971, he became a founding member and spokesman of the dissident group New Forum. During fall 1989, his weekly church services were also closely tied to the city’s mass demonstrations against the ruling communist government.

Gauck’s selection the following year as a New Forum delegate to the Volkskammer (People’s Chamber) of the German Democratic Republic allowed him to introduce legislation that would safeguard the extensive official records of the MfS that had survived the fall of the Berlin Wall. Contrary to those who called for their destruction, Gauck wanted the files to be reassessed for their political, legal, and historical meaning. On 3 October 1990, following an almost unanimous vote by the Volkskammer, the president of the Federal Republic of Germany appointed him Sonderbeauftragter für die personenbezogenen Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes der DDR (Special Commissioner for the Personal Files of the Former State Security Service of the GDR). The agency he headed—the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik—became more commonly known as the Gauck-Behörde (or Gauck Agency). Despite considerable controversy surrounding the opening of the files for personal inspection, the Bundestag reelected him to a second term without significant opposition. The recipient of numerous awards for his speeches and public service, Gauck retired in 2000, legally ineligible for another term, and was succeeded by Marianne Birthler.

GEHEIME FELDPOLIZEI (GFP). The counterintelligence unit charged with the security of the German armed forces during World War II, the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) was originally attached to the Abwehr and placed under the command of Willi Krichbaum in November 1940. Like Krichbaum, however, all senior officials belonged to the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) directed by Reinhard Heydrich, and many had had criminal police experience in the pre-Nazi era. Despite their title, members of the GFP wore regular military uniforms and openly displayed their insignia, but they could don civilian clothes or other uniforms if necessary. Ultimately comprising a force of nearly 3,000, they were deployed principally on the eastern front, where intense ideological and partisan warfare became a common occurrence. Those stationed in occupied countries such as Norway and Denmark functioned more like military police. According to the structural reorganization of 1 October 1944, the GFP was placed under the auspices of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the main security office.

Following the GFP’s dissolution in May 1945, many of its personnel discarded their uniforms and insignia to hide their affiliation from the Allied armies. Some had obtained false identification papers issued by the Berlin headquarters as the end approached. Although the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg excluded the GFP from its list of criminal organizations, it stated that GFP personnel had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity on a “wide scale.” To his American captors, however, Krichbaum persistently portrayed the GFP in a more favorable light, stressing his own close ties to Wilhelm Canaris and his estrangement from Heydrich (testimony to the contrary was presented by Walter Schellenberg). No prosecution of GFP officers ultimately took place, and
many, like Krichbaum, found new positions in the Federal Republic of Germany.

**GEHEIME KABINETS-KANZLEI.** The most accomplished and celebrated black chamber in early modern Europe, the Geheime Kabinets-Kanzlei (Secret Cabinet Office) had its origins in the long reign of Habsburg emperor Leopold I (1658–1705). Based on the French *cabinet noir* and headquartered in the Stallburg in Vienna, this clandestine mail interception system primarily sought to gather information regarding political developments in France, Hungary, and the German principalities. Outside the Austrian lands, monitoring stations were established by the Thurn und Taxis imperial postal monopoly in cities such as Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt am Main.

The closely guarded but well-remunerated cabinet personnel—called *Logisten*—developed special skills that were often handed down from father to son. Novices learned, for example, how to take the cast of a seal, how to open letters without revealing they had been opened, and how to handle texts written in secret ink or codes. Given the stringent daily schedule and the mental exertion required, the 10-person cabinet staff rotated on a weekly basis. Considerable prestige also accompanied these positions, for not only were bonuses personally conveyed by later Habsburg rulers—notably Charles VI and Maria Theresa—but some cryptanalysts even advanced to noble rank. While the territorial coverage was reduced after 1740 when the Habsburgs lost direct control of the Thurn und Taxis postal system, the institution managed to endure until the revolutionary upheaval of 1848.

**GEHEIMHALTUNGSGRAD.** A system for designating the various degrees of secrecy, *Geheimhaltungsgrad* (also *Verschlusssachengrad*) today includes the following categories in ascending order of classification: *Verschlusssache*, *Vertraulich*, *Geheim*, and *Streng Geheim*. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has an even more confidential category under the rubric “Cosmic.”

**GEHLEN, REINHARD (1902–1979).** The chief of intelligence on the eastern front during World War II and founder of the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelligence Service), Reinhard Gehlen was born in Erfurt on 3 April 1902, the son of middle-class parents. Eager for a military career, he joined the reduced Reichswehr in 1920, received his commission as a second lieutenant in 1923, and was appointed to the prestigious Cavalry School in Hanover in 1926. Following Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power and the expansion of the army (including the official resurrection of the General Staff), his prospects brightened considerably. In 1935, Gehlen passed the rigorous Staff College course with distinction, allowing his entry into this elite group. Assigned to the operational sector, he attracted the attention of Franz Halder, the army chief of staff, who increasingly depended on Gehlen’s advice and appointed him his senior aide in June 1940. After winning the Iron Cross Second Class during the Polish campaign, Gehlen became involved in preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union under Adolf Heusinger (who later became the first inspector general of the West German Bundeswehr).

Once the invasion was under way and showed continuing signs of stalling, Halder voiced his frustration at the “lapses in the intelligence service,” which prompted Heusinger to recommend Gehlen as the new director of Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the General Staff’s intelligence service on the eastern front. Gehlen, who had no prior experience in intelligence work and knew no foreign languages but was strongly endorsed by Heusinger for his organizational skills and almost limitless capacity for work, assumed the new position on 1 April 1942. Instead of simply compiling statistics, the FHO now began to issue reports containing its own judgments regarding the enemy’s operational intentions. Gehlen also took pains to assemble the most qualified staff he could find. Although his systematic approach to the processing of intelligence marked a major innovation for the German army, the FHO’s analytical record was mediocre at best, hampered in large measure by the lack of its own collection organization. Arguably its most egregious error was failing to predict the Soviet offensive in June 1944 (code name Bagration), which resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center, roughly 350,000 men.

Although Gehlen had convinced Andrei Vlasov, one of Joseph Stalin’s most capable commanders who had been captured by the
Germans in 1942, to form an anticommunist liberation army, and recruitment among frontline Soviet units proved successful, Hitler dismissed the notion of Germany underwriting a Russian military unit as “extraordinary nonsense.” At that point, Gehlen concluded that Hitler was incapable of rational argument and would lead Germany to ruin. Nevertheless, despite allowing several anti-Nazis in the FHO to engage in conspiratorial discussions, he kept his distance from the military resistance to Hitler and expressed surprise following the failed plot of 20 July 1944. Moreover, the abolition of the Abwehr earlier that spring had forced him to form close ties with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) under Walter Schellenberg, and by the end of the year, he had been promoted to brigadier general and was charged with the evacuation of the General Staff in the event of an emergency. As the German position continued to degenerate in the face of the Red Army, Gehlen’s realistic reports, strongly endorsed by the new army chief of staff, Heinz Guderian, only aroused Hitler’s ire, and both men were dismissed in April 1945. Fearful of assassination by SS chief Heinrich Himmler, Gehlen, along with members of his staff, remained in hiding until their capture by American soldiers in a small Bavarian village the following month.

Convinced of the artificiality of the Allied alliance and that Germany would be needed by the United States and Great Britain in their eventual struggle against the Soviet Union, Gehlen had already taken steps to ensure a postwar role for himself. Because he knew in advance that the Americans would be occupying Bavaria, copies of the comprehensive FHO archives had been placed in 50 sealed drums and buried in the vicinity of Bad Reichenhall. Gehlen’s plan soon came to fruition, primarily because his American interrogator in Wiesbaden, John Boker, shared his convictions regarding the Soviet Union and realized how little intelligence the U.S. Army had in its possession. Most of the archives were unearthed, and Boker assembled several former FHO members, including Gerhard Wessel and Heinz Danko Herre.

Although this group worked tirelessly and produced some insightful reports on the Soviet Union, the problem for Gehlen was twofold: convincing the Americans of his future usefulness, and preventing his cooperation from being viewed as treason in German eyes. Still technically a prisoner and liable for war crimes prosecution, he was
sent to Washington, D.C., for further questioning over the objections of Boker and his superior, Edwin Sibert, the head of army intelligence in the American occupation zone. There Gehlen established a personal and intellectual rapport with his interrogator, Eric Waldman, an Austrian Jew who had enlisted in the U.S. Army during the war. Gaining Waldman’s support for the reconstitution of his group as an operational branch of U.S. Army intelligence, Gehlen returned to Germany in June 1946. There he found that Hermann Baun, another former FHO member, was to be in charge of collection, while Gehlen would head the evaluation unit. With Waldman emphasizing the need for a single intelligence head, however, Gehlen arranged that he would retain authority over two subordinates: Baun charged with collection and Wessel with analysis and collation. The Americans gave the Gehlen project the code name rusty. In his later memoirs—attempting to answer his German critics—Gehlen stressed that according to his gentleman’s agreement with Sibert he was working “with” and not “for” the Americans and that no operation was undertaken contrary to Germany’s self-interest.

The Organisation Gehlen (OG) was based initially in Oberursel in the Taunus and moved the following year to Pullach outside Munich. The recruitment of personnel began in fall 1946. The establishment of the U.S. Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) in 1947 raised the question of the OG’s continued existence. After a nearly two-month investigation, James Critchfield concluded that no other viable alternative in Germany existed, thus providing the basis for the relationship that officially started on 1 July 1949 under the code name zipper. Gehlen resisted Critchfield’s attempts to gain a fuller knowledge of the OG’s structure and sources, and with the establishment of West Germany’s first elected government under Konrad Adenauer in 1949, Gehlen began to bypass the CIA whenever possible. His key ally was Adenauer’s closest aide Hans Globke, who supported the OG’s formal integration into the German government and supplied him a special fund, approved by the CIA, to conduct domestic surveillance as well.

Gehlen adroitly maneuvered against two competitors, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz and Otto John, and on 1 April 1956, after considerable political debate, the Bundesnachrichtendienst came into official existence. Although Gehlen’s title changed from general director to
president, the structure of his organization remained fundamentally intact. Moreover, with few oversight mechanisms in place and answerable primarily to the Chancellor’s Office, he essentially retained the same freedom of action as under the Americans. Despite a critical article by Sefton Delmer in the British press that portrayed Gehlen as an unreconstructed Nazi, he maintained cordial relations with German journalists and even had some on the BND payroll. Reflecting the conspiratorial tone that prevailed within his organization, Gehlen (code name DR. SCHNEIDER) impressed many with his aloofness and cultivated aura of mystery.

Gehlen kept the BND’s main focus on the German Democratic Republic, which had already launched a series of high-level disinformation and penetration operations. Yet Gehlen, convinced that postwar British intelligence was seriously compromised, ignored repeated warnings that the BND contained enemy operatives as well. The revelation in 1961 that Heinz Felfe, chief of the counterintelligence section for the Soviet Union, was a longtime KGB agent came as a severe blow. Not only were the BND’s inadequate vetting procedures brought to light but its entire network of agents in Eastern Europe was destroyed. Remarkably, Gehlen survived in office. Adenauer again extended his supporting hand and resisted calls for Gehlen’s resignation.

Soon that relationship took a different direction. During the Spiegel Affair the following year, Gehlen’s name surfaced as the likely source of a warning to the magazine Der Spiegel of an impending police search for incriminating material. At one point, Adenauer wanted his intelligence chief arrested but was told that insufficient legal grounds existed. The chancellor’s advanced age and imminent departure from office prevented him from pursuing an investigation, while Gehlen’s role remains unclarified. Despite relinquishing most of the BND’s daily business to two close associates, Gehlen continued to serve under Adenauer’s successor, Ludwig Erhard, who showed little interest in intelligence matters. In 1967, the new chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, although skeptical of the BND reports he received, nevertheless extended Gehlen’s tenure beyond the mandatory retirement age. Gehlen left the BND in 1968 when extensive reforms advocated by the chancellor’s state secretary, Karl Carstens, became effective. Ignoring his own admonition to colleagues that a
BND officer should never write memoirs, Gehlen’s Der Dienst (The Service) appeared in 1971, provoking controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. Gehlen died on 8 June 1979 in Berg at Lake Starnberg (Bavaria). See also GENERALVERTRETUNG.

GENERALVERTRETUNG (GV). The primary subdivision of the Organisation Gehlen, a Generalvertretung (General Agency) was largely autonomous and headed by persons with considerable prior experience, such as Hermann Giskes and Joachim Rohleder. While the GV in Karlsruhe concentrated on Eastern bloc counter-espionage, others had a geographic focus: Munich for Austria and Czechoslovakia; Darmstadt for Poland and the Soviet Union; Bremen for the German Democratic Republic. It was the task of each GV to discover new sources of information, supervise its own branches, and forward collated material to the appropriate sections at the Pul- lach headquarters.

GERECKE, GÜNTHER (1893–1970). An early agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in the Federal Republic of Germany, Günther Gerecke had volunteered for service during World War I. Imprisoned several times during the Third Reich for his opposition to Adolf Hitler, he found his landed estate expropriated by officials of the Soviet occupation zone at the end of World War II. Gerecke resettled in the Western zone and became one of the founders of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) as well as an important official in the government of Lower Saxony. In June 1950, to underscore his dissatisfaction over Konrad Adenauer’s German unification policy, a personal meeting was arranged in East Berlin with the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Walter Ulbricht. The result was the loss of Gerecke’s political office. Leaving the CDU, he founded the splinter party Deutsche Soziale Partei and became an MfS agent. Because of the imminent risk of exposure, he was exfiltrated to East Berlin and then presented at a press conference on 26 July 1952 as a patriotic critic of the Adenauer government. Gerecke died in the GDR on 1 May 1970.

GERLACH, MANFRED. A leading East German aeronautical engineer recruited by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) in 1956,
Manfred Gerlach had been a returnee to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) two years earlier. A specialist in the manufacture of jet engines, he headed the research and development division of a company in Pirna (Saxony) and was a member of the Scientific-Technical Council of the aircraft industry. With such a large purview—including knowledge of joint Soviet-GDR projects—his information was highly valued by the BND. His recruiter and control officer was Helga Bock, the wife of another important figure in German aeronautics. Their meetings frequently took place in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, as Gerlach managed to take advantage of scientific meetings and vacations outside the GDR. After his arrest in 1959, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

GERLACH, RUDOLF (1887–1946). A German agent at the Vatican during World War I, Rudolf Gerlach was a Bavarian priest who became a private chamberlain and close confidant of Pope Benedict XV following his assumption of office in September 1914. According to evidence obtained by Italian counterintelligence, Gerlach channeled German subsidies to anti-interventionist newspapers during the period of neutrality and later used the papal diplomatic pouch to communicate with his handler, Franz von Stockhammern, based in Switzerland. When discretely informed of these findings, the Vatican permitted Gerlach to be escorted by Italian police to the Swiss border on 5 January 1917. Several months later, after his name appeared in a list of individuals charged with treasonous activity, an Italian military tribunal sentenced him in absentia to life imprisonment. Despite his adamant claims of innocence and firm support by the Vatican, the Gerlach Affair confirmed the widespread suspicion in Western capitals that the Holy See covertly sought the victory of the Central Powers. With his personable manner, Gerlach suffered no diminution of status in German and Austrian diplomatic circles and also managed to persuade the Vatican to release him from his priestly vows.

GERSTEIN, KURT (1905–1945). An anti-Nazi informer and saboteur within the ranks of the SS, Kurt Gerstein was born in Münster (Westphalia) on 11 August 1905. Trained as an engineer and mining assessor, he joined the Nazi Party and the Sturmabteilung in 1933 but soon came into open conflict over his activities as a Protestant
In 1935, Gerstein was arrested, held for several weeks, and expelled from the party. Uncertain about the future, he began the study of medicine in 1937. A brief concentration camp confinement took place the following year.

In August 1941, wanting to learn more about the Nazi euthanasia program, he joined the Waffen-SS. With his background in engineering and medicine, he soon headed the technical health services division, where his duties included supervision of the disinfection process involving highly poisonous gases such as Zyklon B. In August 1942, inspecting the Belzec death camp in occupied Poland, he learned of the mass extermination under way. Despite orders to maintain silence on penalty of execution, Gerstein informed hundreds about these crimes, among them the secretary of the Swedish legation, the papal nuncio in Berlin, the Protestant bishop of Berlin, and friends in the Dutch underground who then notified British officials. No one, however, saw fit to take any action. Nevertheless, Gerstein continued in his position, trying to thwart operations whenever possible.

In April 1945, Gerstein surrendered to the French military authorities in Rottweil (Baden-Württemberg), declaring his willingness to serve as a witness in the prosecution of top Nazis, but his claims about his own subversive role were rejected. Charged with murder and sent to Cherche-Midi Prison in Paris, Gerstein committed suicide on 25 July, apparently overwhelmed by his double life as a resister and a loyal SS officer. While in French custody, he wrote several reports (in French and German) with exceptionally detailed descriptions of the gassing of Jews at Belzec. They were later entered as evidence before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and at the Jerusalem trial of Adolf Eichmann.

GERSTENMAIER, EUGEN (1906–1986). A member of the anti-Nazi resistance and the object of a disinformation campaign by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Eugen Gerstenmaier was born in Kirchheim unter Teck (Baden-Württemberg) on 25 August 1906. Trained as a Protestant theologian, he opposed the Nazi regime from the outset and was briefly held by the Gestapo. He later traveled abroad on behalf of the resistance and became a member of the Kreisau Circle at the invitation of Helmuth James Count von Moltke. Gerstenmaier took part in the failed 20 July 1944 conspiracy
against Adolf Hitler and was immediately arrested in the Berlin Bendlerblock. Skillfully playing the role of a naive, apolitical theologian, he managed to escape execution but was sentenced to seven years in prison.

After the war, Gerstenmaier rose to prominence in the Christlich-Demokratische Union and was elected president of the Bundestag in 1954. Considering him a major target, the HVA embarked on an intensive disinformation campaign in the early 1960s under the impetus of Hans-Joachim Seidowsky. Besides attempting to exacerbate the political differences between Gerstenmaier and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, these reports employed forged documents that depicted Gerstenmaier as a former Nazi agent who had betrayed at least 17 members of the Kreisau Circle to the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service). This effort failed to achieve the desired results and was abandoned in 1967. Gerstenmaier also came under criticism for his claims for government compensation benefits related to his thwarted academic career during the Third Reich. Although legally justified, the amount seemed excessive to many. He resigned from office in January 1969. His death occurred on 13 March 1986 near Remagen (Rhineland-Palatinate).

GERUCHSKONSERVEN. The collection of body odors of suspected dissidents by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Geruchskonserven consisted of pieces of cloth stored in sterile glass containers, sealed and labeled by local MfS workers. These samples—obtained either directly from the person or from articles of worn clothing—were submitted to specially trained dogs—Differenzierungshunde—for positive identification in the event of a legal infraction, such as an unauthorized demonstration or placard. Evidence obtained through this procedure was officially sanctioned by the German Democratic Republic.

GESELLSCHAFTLICHE MITARBEITER FÜR SICHERHEIT (GMS). A unique category of part-time agents working for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Gesellschaftliche Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit (Societal Collaborators for Security) was created following a 1967 proclamation by Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), calling for greater efforts to
protect the “socialist human community.” This new type of informer supplemented the body of well-established *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter* (unofficial collaborators) but possessed a far more circumscribed knowledge of covert methods. Stationed principally in places of work, residence, and leisure activities, the GMS numbered about 33,000 prior to the collapse of the GDR. Although originally intended to serve as models of dedicated citizenship, they had become over time almost indistinguishable from other MfS informers.

**GESTAPO.** The acronym for the secret political police force of the Third Reich, the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) originated in the efforts of the individual Nazi-controlled regional governments to enforce strict ideological conformity following Adolf Hitler’s accession to power. In February 1933, the largest such force—based on an earlier branch of the Berlin police—was formed in Prussia under its prime minister, Hermann Göring. Two months later, it was renamed the Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt or Gestapa (the acronym was invented by a postal official designing a stamp that required a shorter name and later evolved into the more common term). To emphasize its separation from the traditional police force based in offices on the Alexanderplatz, the main body of the new organization was moved to the former school of applied arts at 8 Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse. A special section devoted to the suppression of Bolshevism occupied the house of the murdered communist revolutionary Karl Liebknecht.

By April 1934, **SS** chief Heinrich Himmler, an arch rival of Göring, had gained control of the Gestapo and brought the units in the other states under centralized command. A law of 10 February 1936 spelled out its broad mandate: “The secret political police have the task of investigating and combating all activities that could endanger the state throughout the entire country.” Structural changes placed the Gestapo, led ostensibly by Heinrich Müller, alongside the criminal police and border police in the *Sicherheitspolizei* headed by Reinhard Heydrich. With the creation of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* in 1939, the Gestapo received the designation of Amt IV and—due to ever increasing bureaucratic complexity—had to compete and cooperate simultaneously with other security branches.

Despite the menacing reputation that it acquired, the Gestapo possessed a relatively small number of full-time personnel. Its network
of agents was likewise minimally staffed and in the early years of the Nazi regime was used primarily to eliminate political opponents on the left. As a result, both the communists and the social democrats proved unable to rebuild their illegal apparatuses. A large degree of cooperation came from the general population, as an estimated 5–10 percent of all Germans were willing to engage in political denunciations, although many of these reports stemmed from personal animosity and conflicts.

Operating without judicial restraints, the Gestapo had the power of preventive arrest and often resorted to brutal forms of torture to extract information. It could also place people under *Schutzhaft*, or “protective custody,” in concentration camps. During World War II, many Gestapo members joined with those of the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD; Security Service) to form the *Einsatzgruppen*, the mobile death squads that accompanied the Wehrmacht into Poland and the Soviet Union. The Gestapo also ruthlessly attempted to suppress all partisan activity in the occupied territories and played a key role in the deportation of Jews to the death camps. In 1946, it was declared a criminal organization by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

**GEWITTER.** A massive Gestapo roundup of former political deputies and officials from the Weimar Republic, Operation *gewitter* (Thunderstorm) was launched on 22 August 1944. Although this synchronized action throughout Germany occurred in the aftermath of the failed 20 July conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, it had been planned much earlier. Some 5,000 putative opponents of the Nazi regime were taken into custody and placed in concentration camps, among them Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher. Yet the resulting unrest in the general population caused Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller to doubt whether the aim of the operation had been achieved. Most of the detainees were therefore released within two to four weeks, although a number died due to mistreatment.

**GEYER, HANS JOACHIM.** An East German double agent within the *Organisation Gehlen* (OG), Hans Joachim Geyer was also a successful author, known for the popular John Kling spy novel series, which appeared under the pseudonym Henry Troll. In 1952, after
applying for a position with the OG, Geyer (code name TRELL) worked initially in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an investigator and later courier. Following the **Uprising of 17 June 1953**, Geyer left his family in the GDR in order to become a desk officer, then deputy director of the OG’s West Berlin branch. This post gave him the opportunity to photograph confidential documents in the evening with his Minox camera and relay them the following morning to the **Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** (MfS), which had engaged him as an operative two years earlier in Dresden.

When he erroneously believed his cover had been blown after learning that two criminal police detectives had visited his apartment, Geyer fled to the GDR on 29 October. His action unleashed a full-scale search in East Germany as part of Operation **FEUERWERK** for the 58 OG agents he had identified to the MfS. At least 20 were immediately apprehended, including the editor of the **Berliner Zeitung** and leading functionaries of the East German bourgeois parties. Those who escaped to West Berlin received letters assuring them of “complete liberty, accommodation, and a well-paid job” in the GDR upon their return. On 9 November, Geyer appeared at a press conference with a seven-page prepared script to provide encouragement to potential defectors. The Geyer episode exposed OG’s lax security precautions, notably the excessive number of agents run by a single office and the blackmail potential of immediate family remaining behind in the GDR.

**GIMPEL, ERICH (1910– ).** A Nazi spy who landed in the United States near the end of World War II, Erich Gimpel was born in Merseburg (Saxony-Anhalt). Trained as a radio engineer, he received an offer in 1935 to work for the Telefunken corporation in Peru. In order to obtain an exemption from military service, he had to report to the diplomatic legation in Lima, which asked him to observe and report on shipping patterns in the port. In 1942, after Peru declared its support for the United States and severed relations with Germany, Gimpel was interned briefly in Texas before returning to Germany on a neutral Swedish ship. The repatriation agreement forbade his entry into the armed forces, but the German Foreign Office found his fluency in Spanish an asset and employed him as a courier between Berlin and Madrid, then a magnet for both Allied and Axis spies. He also attended schools in Hamburg and Berlin run by the **Abwehr**.
During the summer of 1944, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt proposed that he work abroad, specifically in the United States, under its auspices. To complete his training, Gimpel was sent to the A-School West located near The Hague, where he was introduced to his future partner, William Colepaugh, an American of German descent. Their short-term mission in the United States, code-named Elster, was to gather technical data from open sources and not to develop a spy network. Outfitted with forged identity papers as well as special photographic and radio equipment, they crossed the North Atlantic in a U-1230, a new class of submarine with a reduced crew of 36 men. On 29 November 1944, the submarine passed undetected by the naval base at Bar Harbor, Maine, into Frenchman Bay, where the two men disembarked that evening in a rubber raft and made their way first to Boston, then to New York City.

On 3 December, a British freighter was torpedoed eight miles from Mount Desert Island, raising the possibility that spies might have been deposited on the coast, yet the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found nothing when agents searched the Maine coast. Colepaugh, however, conflicted in his loyalties and fearful that Germany was losing the war, went to the FBI with a fabricated double-agent story and provided a detailed description of Gimpel. A massive manhunt ensued throughout the country. Arrested at a Times Square newsstand on 30 December by the FBI, Gimpel proved outwardly cooperative and stood trial before a military tribunal at Governor’s Island. Members of the Office of Strategic Services visited him while he awaited trial, but he refused any offer that could be construed as betrayal of his country.

Although both Gimpel and Colepaugh were found guilty of espionage and sentenced to be hanged, the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt prevented the execution from being immediately carried out. The capitulation of Germany in May 1945 spared them a second time. Stating that “it is customary to hang spies during a war, but it is also customary to pardon them when the war is over,” President Harry S. Truman decided to commute both sentences to life imprisonment. Incarcerated in a series of American facilities—Leavenworth, Alcatraz, and Atlanta—Gimpel was eventually paroled in 1956 and returned to West Germany before resettling in South America. His memoir—Spion für Deutschland (Spy for Germany and Agent 146: The True Story of
a German Spy in America)—appeared in 1957 and included the claim that information about the atomic bomb project had been acquired and transmitted to Berlin, but the FBI transcripts of his and Copelaugh’s testimony make no mention of this allegation. The supposition that the mission involved primarily sabotage, notably of heavy water production in the United States, also lacks corroborating support. Germany apparently gained nothing of value from Gimpel’s exploit.

GIRAFFE. The procurement of confidential material regarding Russian high-tech military equipment and codes, Operation GIRAFFE was a joint endeavor of the Bundesnachrichtendienst and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency following German reunification. A group of Russian officers agreed to serve as informants during the withdrawal of former Red Army troops from the Federal Republic of Germany between 1991–1994. Despite the seeming success of the operation, the BND later charged two of its own ex-officers with the misuse of funds valued at 100,000 euros and designed for agent recruitment and payment.

GISEVIUS, HANS BERND (1904–1974). A key member of the Abwehr resistance to Adolf Hitler, Hans Bernd Gisevius was born in Arnsberg (Westphalia) on 14 July 1904. Completing a doctorate in law in 1929, he joined the circle of “young Rightists” and became a member of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei as well as the Stahlhelm veterans’ organization. Accepted into the Prussian civil service in August 1933 and aspiring to head the state’s newly created political police, or Gestapo, he conspired with another official, Arthur Nebe, to remove Rudolf Diels from that position by charging he was a crypto-communist. When their attempt failed, Gisevius found his career derailed and was forced to take a number of minor postings in the Prussian and Reich ministries.

As the military intrigue against Hitler formed in 1938, Gisevius was drawn into that group through Hans Oster, a deputy head of the Abwehr, and reported on the Gestapo. General Erwin von Witzleben, the Berlin military district commander, also employed him as a liaison to the Oster group, providing him with a cover name and an office. With the outbreak of World War II, Oster helped bring Gisevius into the Abwehr and installed him as an undercover agent
in Zurich. As a vice consul in the German consulate (code names Dr. Berndt, Dr. Schlich, and Gustav), Gisevius attempted to establish foreign contacts on behalf of the resistance. Whereas the British Secret Intelligence Service suspected he was a double agent, Allen Dulles, station chief of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Bern, found Gisevius credible, especially after learning from him that the legation code system had been broken by the B-Dienst of the German navy. Assigned the code names Luber and 512, Gisevius met often with Dulles beginning in January 1943, reporting on the German resistance and on the early development of the V-1 and V-2 rockets and ballistic missiles in Peenemünde.

Briefed in advance, Gisevius returned to Berlin to participate in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944, hoping also that he might be appointed foreign minister in a future German government. The failure of the assassination attempt compelled him to go into hiding until late January 1945, when, using forged papers provided by Dulles’s office, he escaped to Switzerland. After the war, he testified before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg against Hermann Göring and for Hjalmar Schacht and Wilhelm Frick, and he published his two-volume memoirs, Bis zum bitteren Ende (To the Bitter End). Unable to find an important postwar role in Germany, Gisevius eventually settled in Switzerland after living for some years in the United States and West Berlin. He died on 23 February 1974 during a trip to Müllheim (Baden).

GISKES, HERMANN (1896–?). An Abwehr counterintelligence specialist who later served in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Hermann Giskes was the son of a tobacconist. After serving in World War I, Giskes became a wine salesman in the Rhineland. He joined the Wehrmacht in 1934 and was transferred to the Abwehr four years later. His greatest success during World War II was Operation Nordpol, which neutralized Allied intelligence and covert operations in occupied Holland. After the war, Giskes was among the original recruits for the Organisation Gehlen and made the transition to the BND in 1956. His wartime exploits were recounted in Spione über-spielen Spione (London Calling North Pole).

GLEIWITZ INCIDENT. See TANNENBERG.
GLIENICKER BRIDGE. The site of three major East-West spy exchanges during the Cold War, the Glienicker Bridge connects Potsdam with Berlin over the Havel River. Having undergone numerous changes—from its original wooden frame in the 17th century to a neoclassical brick design by Prussian architect Karl Wilhelm Schinkel to the steel-girded structure of the early 20th century—the bridge was destroyed during the struggle between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in late April 1945. Reconstructed in 1949, it was dubbed the “bridge of unity,” although rising tensions between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to its restricted access two and a half years later. Construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 resulted in even tighter security measures, which limited use of the bridge to personnel assigned to the Soviet military headquarters in Potsdam and the military liaison offices of France, Britain, and the United States accredited to it. Many of these military attachés, officially sanctioned by existing treaties, were in fact unacknowledged spies.

The first spy exchange occurred on 10 February 1962. Francis Gary Powers, whose American U-2 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, was exchanged for Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, a Soviet spy convicted in a major trial in New York City in 1957. More than two decades passed before a second exchange happened on 11 June 1985. According to the arrangement, 25 spies who had been confined in Poland and the GDR were exchanged for four people earlier apprehended by U.S. authorities. The final and most publicized instance took place on 11 February 1986, when Anatoly Shcharansky, a Soviet prisoner of conscience whom the Americans adamantly insisted was not a spy, was traded along with Wolf-Georg Frohn, Jaroslav Jaavorsky, and Dietrich Nistroy for Eastern bloc operatives Hana and Karel Koecher, Jerzy Kaczmarek, Detlef Scharfenorth, and Yevgeny M. Zemlyakov.

Most exchanges between the GDR and the FRG, which were also facilitated by the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, occurred at the Herleshausen-Wartha border crossing in the mountains near Eisenach. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, normal traffic resumed on the Glienicker Bridge on 10 November 1989. See also STANGE, JÜRGEN.
GLOBKE, HANS (1898–1973). The object of a major disinformation campaign by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Hans Globke was born in Düsseldorf on 10 September 1898. Earning a doctorate in law at Giessen, he entered the Prussian civil service in 1921 and was transferred to the Interior Ministry in 1929. A merger of the Prussian and Reich ministries in 1934 gave him the responsibility of coauthoring all papers dealing with racial questions involved in martial law. In this capacity, Globke wrote a semiofficial commentary on the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935. Yet as his defenders pointed out, he never joined the Nazi Party, and he attempted to prevent a more strident legal interpretation by Nazi ideologues. Besides his close contacts with the German civilian and military resistance, Globke met regularly with the Catholic bishop of Berlin and supplied him with confidential information gathered within the Reich administration.

In 1953, Globke’s selection as state secretary of the Federal Chancellery solidified his close relationship to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Globke provided the main conduit for Reinhard Gehlen to the Bonn government and played a key role in the elevation of the Organisation Gehlen to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in 1956. Following the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli Mossad in 1961, the MfS helped coordinate the attempt to link the two men in the public’s mind. Its culmination was Globke’s trial in absentia in East Berlin in July 1963 and a sentence of life imprisonment. Adenauer, however, stood firmly by his trusted aide until the end of his government three months later. Globke died in Bonn on 13 February 1973.

GOLD, FRANZ (1913–1977). A Soviet agent and later officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Franz Gold was born in Botenwald near Brünn (now Brno, Czech Republic) on 10 October 1913. Trained as a butcher, he became active in the communist party of Czechoslovakia. His military service began in 1935 with the Czechoslovak army but was terminated with the country’s annexation by Germany in 1938. Arrested briefly by the Gestapo, Gold later fought in the Wehrmacht but was captured by the Red Army in 1940 and sent to the Antifa school in Gorki. Besides helping to cofound the
Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, he commanded a partisan unit during the Slovakian uprising in 1944.

Gold’s intelligence work for the Soviet Union continued in earnest following his relocation to Dresden in 1946. Two years later, he was named director of the German Institute for Social and Economic Problems in Berlin-Weissensee, a cover organization for Soviet intelligence. With the founding of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in 1950, a new position materialized as head of the personal security division, which Gold held until his retirement in 1974. He died on 8 May 1977.

GOLIATH, INGE (1941– ). A long-term agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, Inge Goliath (code name HERTA) was born Inge Hanke. She was recruited in 1966 by one of the Romeo spies, Wolfgang Goliath (code name NERZ), and they married the following year. Her subsequent position as secretary to Werner Marx, the leading spokesman of the Christlich-Demokratische Union for foreign affairs, gave her access to confidential papers on defense strategy and Cold War policies. In the wake of Operation ANMELDUNG, Inge and Wolfgang Goliath were exfiltrated to the German Democratic Republic in March 1979 and resettled outside East Berlin. She also held a press conference exposing the “machinations” of her former employer.

GOLTZ, HORST VON DER (1884–?). A German agent active in North America during World War I, Horst von der Goltz was born Franz Wachendorf in Coblenz (his name change occurred later at the suggestion of the German government). After leaving Germany in 1912 and serving briefly in the U.S. Army, he relocated to Mexico and enlisted in the revolutionary army of Pancho Villa. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, the German consul in Chihuahua recruited Goltz for the espionage organization of Franz von Papen based in New York. Their first sabotage efforts were directed at bombing the Welland Canal in Canada to hinder troop and armament movements to the European front. Working with a false passport in the name of Bridgeman Taylor, Goltz engaged a small group of men, but the plan was canceled at the last minute by Papen for reasons still unclear.
Goltz traveled to Berlin in October 1914 to discuss further missions with both the Foreign Office and Abteilung IIIb but was arrested by the British when attempting to return to the United States. In January 1915, the confiscation of incriminating papers belonging to Papen caused Goltz, facing a likely death penalty, to reveal his true identity and offer state evidence. Amid much publicity, he was released from British captivity in order to testify at the New York trial of Hans Tauscher, his explosives expert in the Welland Canal conspiracy. Tauscher was acquitted, and Goltz received asylum in the United States. Occasionally prone to exaggeration, his memoirs, *My Life as a Secret German Agent*, appeared in 1917. The next year, Goltz played the role of a villainous German spy in the Hollywood propaganda film *The Prussian Cur*.

**GÖRSDORF, DIETER (1936– ).** An agent of the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) active in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Dieter Görsdorf entered the Nationale Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) at the age of 18. To prepare for a career in the intelligence division, he attended the school for naval officers in Straslund. He then received several assignments before being selected by the VA in 1965 as an undercover agent. Hearing of exploits firsthand from Max Clausen made a strong impression on him. Görsdorf’s further instruction included intensive briefings on the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stationed in the FRG, details about ordinary life in West Germany, and the biography of Herbert Fährmann—the man whose identity he was to assume despite being 10 years younger.

In 1967, Görsdorf spent five months in Canada, where Fährmann had eventually immigrated after leaving the GDR (they even met once without Fährmann suspecting Görsdorf’s real purpose). Arriving in Bremen directly from Canada, Görsdorf found employment with an electrical appliance manufacturer and began to cultivate relationships in conservative political circles. A move to Wilhelmshaven in 1969 brought a new job and more opportunities to collect military information from his political contacts, but his ultimate goal of joining the Militärischer Abschirmdienst remained elusive, since a background check would have revealed that Fährmann had living relatives in the GDR. Nevertheless, Görsdorf managed to acquire
considerable information by participating in local military exercises and training courses through organizations such as the Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde. Equipped with extensive coding material, he received at least 152 radio messages within a nine-month period.

On 20 May 1974, he was apprehended by West German authorities, who had been monitoring his activities since he entered the country. Görsdorf’s true identity came to light when a distant relative living in the FRG recognized his photograph in a newspaper report about the arrest and produced an older picture showing him in an officer’s uniform of the GDR navy. A court in Celle found him to be a “dangerous agent” and sentenced him to four and a half years in prison. Several months later, in July 1976, Görsdorf was included in a spy exchange and received a prestigious state award upon his return to the GDR. Reinstated in naval intelligence, he later served in a ministerial branch dealing with technology and armaments until the official dissolution of the GDR military establishment on 30 September 1990.

GÖRTZ, HERMANN (1890–1947). The head of an ill-fated Abwehr mission to Ireland during World War II, Hermann Görtz was born in Lübeck on 15 November 1890, the son of a lawyer and judge. After becoming a lawyer himself, he saw active duty as a reconnaissance pilot in World War I. His law practice failed to prosper in the postwar years, and in 1935 he unsuccessfully applied to rejoin the Luftwaffe. Görtz, however, was accepted by the Abwehr as a civilian volunteer agent for a secret mission to England. His plan was to spy on Royal Air Force bases while posing as a writer conducting research for a novel. As Adolf Hitler had just forbidden espionage activity against England in the hope of forming an alliance, Görtz took the precaution of resigning his membership in the Nazi Party, which he had joined six years earlier. British MI5 learned of Görtz’s activity, and in November 1935 he was arrested and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. In February 1939, he was released and returned to Germany.

Despite the public embarrassment over his first mission, Görtz was reemployed by the Abwehr to conduct undercover work in Ireland. As Ireland’s policy of neutrality effectively served German strategic interests, any involvement in domestic politics was to be avoided. According to Operation MAINAU, Northern Ireland was deemed the
main target, using information gathered in the south and working directly with the banned Irish Republican Army (IRA). Görtz (code names GILKA and BRANDY) parachuted into Ireland in May 1940. Yet mishap followed mishap, from the loss of his radio at the outset to the arrest of his principal IRA contacts. His accomplishments nil, Görtz repeatedly attempted to return to Germany but was apprehended by Irish authorities in late November 1941 and imprisoned for the duration of the war. His intercepted messages from prison led to the arrest of at least a dozen others connected to his activities. The Irish government later decided to turn over all captured German spies to the Allied forces in Germany. Convinced that death awaited him in his homeland, Görtz took his own life on 23 May 1947, the day of his scheduled departure, and was later interred at the German military cemetery in Ireland.

GRAMSCH, WALTER (1897–?). The first major agent of the Organisation Gehlen (OG) in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Walter Gramsch had been a senior employee of the state railways prior to World War II. A captain in the army reserve and a member of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), he also participated in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944 and was arrested by the Gestapo. After the war, despite his appointment as a high-level civil servant in the provincial government of Saxony-Anhalt, the forced merger of the SPD with the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in the Soviet occupation zone proved a bitter blow and led to his recruitment by the OG in 1947 under the self-selected code name BRUTUS.

Due to his extensive knowledge and quick grasp of a situation, Gramsch made a favorable impression on Ernst Wollweber, then chief deputy of the GDR’s Shipping Ministry. Beginning in 1949, appointments occurred in rapid succession until Gramsch headed the section on the use of shipping and ports. Yet a primary task of Wollweber continued to be the sabotage of enemy ships (the British were a particular target), and to that end, a training school was established in the former university area of Ladebow near Greifswald. Gramsch’s close proximity to Wollweber allowed him to submit reports not only on the operational details of these commando activities (ultimately dictated by Soviet authorities) but also on his political
views and personal life. In the aftermath of the failed *Uprising of 17 June 1953*, the flow of material, according to Reinhard Gehlen, actually doubled, reflecting Gramsch’s determination to cause maximum damage to the ruling communist regime. Aware, however, that suspicions had been aroused, he was exfiltrated by the OG to the Federal Republic of Germany in late November 1953.

**GREGORI, THEO (1929– ).** The head of the *Verwaltung Aufklärung* (VA) who was quietly removed from office, Theo Gregori was born in Rochlitz (Saxony) on 31 July 1929. Trained as a carpenter, he joined the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* in 1947 and was appointed to the Barracked People’s Police two years later. He attended the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1955 and began to rise through the ranks of the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA).

Prior to the anticipated retirement of VA chief *Arthur Franke*, Gregori was designated his successor and transferred from the NVA. In addition to an orientation by Franke, his preparation included immersion in all facets of intelligence work at the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) academy in Moscow. With his appointment as chief of the VA on 1 February 1975, Gregori became the first occupant of that position whose career had been formed entirely in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann urged him to complete the integration of the military attachés into the organization and to reduce the influence of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS). Gregori, however, proceeded cautiously and introduced no basic changes in the organization during his first year.

Despite certain strengths—his intimate knowledge of the military establishment and his fluent Russian—the laissez-faire approach he adopted prompted increasing criticism by top VA officers. Moreover, the military counterintelligence unit of the MfS launched an investigation of Gregori in 1977 (code name *manipulator*), including surveillance of his home and office. Despite documented evidence of his often neglectful conduct of affairs (nearly 100 penetrations of the VA informant network by enemy organizations were alleged) and his flagrant use of state property for private purposes, no action was taken until five years later. On 22 September 1982, after GDR head of state Erich Honecker decided to waive formal charges against him, Gregori was ordered to resign for reasons of health. Also im-
complicated was Gregori’s special assistant, **Hans Pfotenhauer**. Other VA officers, deliberately not apprised of the actual circumstances, found the official explanation unpersuasive. Two years later, Gregori found a position as an inspector at a large merchandising office in East Berlin. In 1999, under the auspices of the **Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik**, Gregori viewed the MfS documentation for the first time and rejected its findings in a three-page written statement.

**GREIF.** See **SKORZENY, OTTO**.

**GRENZSCHLEUSE.** Literally a “border lock or floodgate,” a *Grenzschleuse* is a place on a country’s frontier where people, objects, or information can pass through safely and undetected by authorities.

**GRENZTRUPPEN.** The armed forces responsible for guarding the inner-German border, the Berlin Wall, and the Baltic coastline, the Grenztruppen of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) underwent numerous organizational changes to keep pace with the ever-increasing refinement of the border security system. Despite turning over the functions of border security to local German police units in 1946, Soviet military authorities retained operational control and could dispatch special police commandos when necessary (as was the case during the Berlin Blockade). After the founding of the GDR, the Grenztruppen were placed under the authority of the **Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** (MfS), then the Interior Ministry, and in 1961 the Ministry for National Defense. Soviet advisors remained until 1958.

The Grenztruppen were responsible not only for the prevention of *Republikflucht* (flight from the republic) but also the collection of information regarding the West German border agencies and the troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stationed nearby. Given the threat of defection by the troops themselves, the MfS exercised keen oversight through the use of *Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz* as well as informers from among the local population living near the border. At the time of their dissolution in 1990, the Grenztruppen numbered about 47,000.
GRIEBEL, IGNATZ (1899–?). An early Nazi spy active in the United States, Ignatz Griebel served as an artillery officer during World War I and emigrated from Munich in 1925 after completing his medical studies. He soon became a U.S. citizen as well as a respected leader of the Yorkville German community in New York City. Griebel’s ardent support for the new Nazi regime led him to offer his services as a spy to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in 1934. Initially connected to the Maritime Bureau of the Gestapo, he received his main instructions from the Abwehr substation in Wilhelmshaven headed by Erich Pfeiffer. In 1937, Griebel met in Berlin with Wilhelm Canaris, Hans Piekenbrock, and other senior intelligence officials.

Through his social network, Griebel recruited German-American engineers to obtain technical information about the American defense industry. The capture of Günther Rumrich in 1938, however, ended his growing spy ring. Because of Griebel’s complete willingness to divulge names and details when questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he was released, thereby giving him the opportunity to flee the country on a North German Lloyd liner bound for Hamburg. He relocated his medical practice to Vienna and apparently withdrew from further undercover work.

GRÖNDAHL, KNUT (1941– ). A ranking figure in the chancellory of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and an agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Knut Gröndahl joined the Ministry for All-German Affairs after completing his legal studies at Freiburg. Befriended and recruited by Wolfgang Hartmann while a student, Gröndahl (code names TÖPPER and HANSON) began to deliver confidential information from his new post beginning in 1973. According to HVA chief Werner Grossmann, his quasi-diplomatic appointment in 1986 to the office of the FRG’s permanent representative to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in East Berlin forced a painful decision. So as not to jeopardize the first visit of GDR leader Erich Honecker to the FRG, Gröndahl was deemed operationally inactive. Unmasked in 1993, he was sentenced in 1996 to a three-year prison term. The trial revealed that his ideologically motivated espionage received no monetary compensation from the GDR.
GROSCURTH, HELMUTH (1898–1943). A senior Abwehr officer involved in the military conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, Helmuth Groscurth was born in Lüdenscheid (Westphalia) on 16 December 1898, the son of a Protestant army chaplain. After serving in World War I, Groscurth studied agronomy but decided on a career in the Reichswehr. His first assignment after joining the Abwehr in 1935 involved military reconnaissance of France and Belgium and later of Italy and Abyssinia. In June 1938, Wilhelm Canaris appointed Groscurth head of Division II, charged with preparing wartime sabotage in enemy territory and maintaining secret contact with German and other ethnic minorities, notably in the Sudetenland. The post was transferred to Erwin Lahousen at year’s end, and Canaris gave Groscurth responsibility for a new liaison unit—Abteilung zur besonderen Verwendung—that was intended to provide the General Staff with comprehensive, reliable information and thereby curb the growing influence of the SS. Groscurth’s tenure, however, encountered opposition from Commander in Chief Walther von Brauchitsch and lasted only until February 1940.

A conservative nationalist with strong Christian convictions, Groscurth had been a key participant in the earlier military plot against Hitler, while the atrocities of the SS in Poland had aroused his outspoken indignation. Several field commands later, he was taken prisoner by the Red Army in February 1943, following the battle of Stalingrad. His death on 7 April 1943 was the result of typhus contracted in captivity. Not until after the war did Groscurth’s private and official diaries come to light. Covering the period from August 1938 to February 1940 and supplemented by other firsthand materials, they were published in 1970.

GROSSMANN, WERNER (1929– ). The final head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Werner Grossmann was born in Oberebenheit (Saxony) on 6 March 1929, the son of a carpenter. Trained as a mason after the war, he joined the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in April 1952 under the pseudonym Werner Olldorf and soon established his credentials in the foreign intelligence branch. Grossmann’s work was supplemented by studies at the Soviet Communist Party school in Moscow in 1966–1967 and by a degree from the Juristische Hochschule des MfS in 1972. A self-proclaimed
pragmatist, he succeeded Markus Wolf in 1986 as head of the HVA and deputy minister of the MfS. One of his most notable acts was to obtain the consent of the citizens’ committees to destroy the bulk of the HVA files in 1990. He also eluded prosecution because of the 1995 high court ruling that exempted MfS personnel if their activities had been confined to the German Democratic Republic. Grossmann’s memoirs, *Bonn in Blick* (*Bonn in View*), appeared in 2001 but discussed only cases already known to the public.

**GRUNERT, ROLF.** A West German police official with ties to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Rolf Grunert was a senior detective in the Hamburg police force as well as chair of the Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter (Federation of German Detective Officers). Close observation of his movements by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz led to his arrest in May 1977. Found guilty of espionage on behalf of the HVA, Grunert received a prison sentence of two and a half years in December 1978. Eight years later, he moved to the German Democratic Republic.

**GUILLAUME, GÜNTER (1927–1995).** Known as the “chancellor spy” in West Germany’s most dramatic espionage affair, Günter Guillaume was born in Berlin on 1 February 1927, the son of a musician from a family of Huguenot origin. Possessing only a rudimentary education, Guillaume became a technical editor and photographer for the East Berlin publishing house Volk und Wissen. Recruited and trained by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in 1955, Guillaume (code name Hansen), along with his wife, Christel, immigrated the following year to Frankfurt am Main. By registering beforehand with his mother-in-law, a Dutch woman who lived in Frankfurt, he avoided the espionage check that political refugees faced in the emergency shelters. Guillaume took over his mother-in-law’s small coffee and tobacco shop in the center of town, while Christel (code name Heinze), whose recruitment as an agent did not occur until 1958, found employment as a secretary.

Among the radio messages he soon began receiving from East Berlin was a request that he and his wife align themselves with the right wing of the local Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). Posing as an unabashed anticommmunist and engaged initially as a
writer and photographer for the party’s district chapter newspaper, Guillaume became so involved that within a year the cover of managing the small shop was dropped. A series of various party positions followed, culminating in his election to the Frankfurt city council in 1968. During this same period, as a secretary to a SPD Bundestag deputy and member of the party leadership, Wilhelm Birkelbach, Christel was acquiring far more valuable information, notably the description and evaluation of two different North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Group North military exercises.

In a display of his organizational skills, Guillaume directed the successful 1969 political campaign of the conservative SPD Bundestag deputy, Georg Leber. This election also marked the SPD’s first victory in a national election. As the new chancellor, Willy Brandt, began to assemble his government, the name of Guillaume was enthusiastically advanced by Leber (who became labor minister and later defense minister). Despite opposition from the Bonn personnel office regarding his lack of qualifications and questions by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) about his security credentials, Guillaume became an assistant in Brandt’s office, dealing with the trade unions and political organizations. Exceptionally eager and hardworking, yet also possessing a jovial down-to-earth demeanor, he emerged after Brandt’s reelection in 1972 as one of three aides directly responsible to the chancellor. Present at all departmental meetings in the chancellor’s office and at the party headquarters, Guillaume remained in close proximity to Brandt on a daily basis. Their relationship also developed strong personal ties, and the two families were known to socialize together. Guillaume usually conveyed information verbally to two couriers (code names Arno and Nora), whose identities are still unknown, during meetings in local restaurants, hotels, and automobiles. The high point of his espionage career took place during Brandt’s vacation in Norway in June 1973, when all of the chancellor’s correspondence passed through Guillaume’s hands and some classified material—including a confidential letter from President Richard Nixon regarding NATO nuclear strategy—was photocopied by an MfS colleague.

BfV head Günther Nollau had informed Interior Minister Hans-Dieter Genscher that Guillaume was under suspicion of espionage, but because the evidence appeared inconclusive—intercepted
birthday greetings sent in the late 1950s from East Berlin had matched
the birth dates of the Guillaumes—he was to be left in place and
observed only on special occasions. Brandt reacted incredulously
after being belatedly briefed and tested his aide himself by some-
times leaving carefully ordered papers on his desk in the evening.
West German security officials later received much criticism for
handling matters with such evident unprofessionalism, for it was
not until nearly a year afterward—on 24 April 1974—that Guil-
laume and his wife were arrested at their Bonn residence. Clad
only in a bathrobe, he defiantly asserted, “I am a citizen and of-
ficer of the GDR. Do respect that.” This open admission not only
constituted a serious breach of his own espionage training but was
probably the only evidence that could guarantee a conviction. In
addition, after becoming aware of his surveillance, neither he nor
his superiors took any steps to facilitate the family’s escape from
West Germany.

Although Brandt announced his resignation several weeks later
citing “negligence” on his part, a government inquiry the follow-
ing year, headed by Theodor Eschenburg, concluded that the Guil-
laume affair provided the “occasion” but was not the root cause of
the chancellor’s fall from power. For the GDR, the affair seemed a
Pyrrhic victory. While the MfS had achieved an almost ideal pen-
etration, attracting the extraordinary interest of the KGB, the amount
of high-level intelligence acquired by Guillaume was, according to
the surviving System der Informationsrecherche der Aufklärung
data bank, surprisingly small. Most likely, Markus Wolf, the head
of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, never anticipated that his
officer would ascend to such heights in the Brandt government, as
evidenced by the fact that the Guillaumes had kept their own names
following their immigration to Frankfurt. Knowing that a security
check could be the couple’s undoing at any time, Wolf had proceeded
with extreme caution. Moreover, having earlier bribed a deputy of the
opposition Christlich-Demokratische Union (Julius Steiner) to save
the chancellor from a no-confidence vote in the Bundestag, he deeply
regretted Brandt’s departure from office and its negative impact on
the West German policy of Ostpolitik (or liberalization of relations
with the Warsaw Pact countries)—“the greatest defeat we had suf-
fered up to that time” in his words.
In 1975, a Düsseldorf court found the Guillaumes guilty of treason, sentencing him to 13 years of imprisonment and her to eight years. In 1981, despite government assurances that they would serve their full sentences, the Guillaumes were exchanged for a number of convicted Western spies. Upon his return to East Berlin, Guillaume was lauded by the GDR leadership, promoted to lieutenant colonel, and given the country’s highest decoration, the Order of Karl Marx. The Guillaumes divorced the same year, and their son, Pierre, later applied for permission to return to West Germany. Although no longer active in the HVA, Guillaume was awarded a doctorate from the Juristische Hochschule des MfS in 1985, and three years later his lengthy memoirs Die Aussage (The Testimony) appeared. Immune from prosecution following the reunification of Germany, he testified at the 1993 trial of Markus Wolf, now calling himself a “partisan of peace.” On 10 April 1995, he died near Berlin as Günter Bröhl, having remarried and adopted his new wife’s name. Christel Guillaume died in March 2004.

British writer Michael Frayn’s 2003 play Democracy explored the complex personal relationship that developed between Brandt and Guillaume. In the same year, a German television film, Im Schatten der Macht (In the Shadow of Power), featured Willy Brandt’s youngest son, Matthias, in the role of Guillaume.

GUSTAV. A commando action intended to eliminate an escaped French general, Henri Giraud, Operation GUSTAV originated in an order conveyed to Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, largely at the urging of Adolf Hitler. Yet Giraud, who fled from the Königstein fortress near Dresden on 19 April 1942, managed to arrive safely in North Africa via Vichy France, as the order was ignored by both Canaris and his assistant Erwin Lahousen. They held that such an action ran counter to established rules of warfare and therefore fell outside the Abwehr’s operational jurisdiction. Giraud became a leading figure in the French Committee of National Liberation, frequently clashing with Charles de Gaulle.

GYPTNER, RICHARD (1901–1972). A Comintern emissary who later had a diplomatic career in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Richard Gyptner was born in Hamburg on 3 April 1901. Trained as
a shipyard worker, he took part in the November Revolution of 1918 and joined the German Communist Youth League the following year, soon holding his first leadership position. Gyptner also worked for the Communist Youth International, traveling between Berlin and Moscow; he was elected to its executive committee in 1922 and then reelected in 1924. Working under different code names—Magnus, Richard, and Alaric—he also handled various assignments for the secret apparatus of the Comintern. Engaged in illegal work in Germany in 1933, he was eventually forced to flee. He was also briefly in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. His son Rudolf, born in 1922, was trained in undercover work in the Soviet Union and sent to occupied Poland in August 1944 as a radio operator. German forces, however, captured and shot him two months later.

Gyptner returned to Germany in 1945 as a member of the “Ulbricht Group,” the first German delegation arriving from the Soviet Union. He served briefly as the vice president of the People’s Police. His ambassadorial postings included the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, and Poland. Retiring in 1964, he died on 2 December 1972.

GYSI, GREGOR (1948–). A leader of the East German reform communist party who was accused of earlier involvement with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Gregor Gysi was born in Berlin on 16 January 1948, the son of a diplomat of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Although trained in his youth as a cattle farmer, he studied law at Humboldt University in East Berlin, becoming in 1971 one of the few licensed attorneys in the GDR. He defended many notable dissidents, including Rudolf Bahro, Robert Havemann, Lutz Rathenow, Ulrike Poppe, and Bärbel Bohley. A member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) since 1967, he later became a vocal advocate of reformist policies in the spirit of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the GDR in 1990, Gysi emerged as the general secretary of the SED’s successor, the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), and gained a seat in the Bundestag in the first postunification elections. His quick wit and relative youthfulness made him a natural leader in the eyes of many East Germans.

In 1992, accusations circulated that Gysi had been a Stasi informant who passed on information to the MfS regarding his dissident
clients. When the charges surfaced again in 1996, the Bundestag revoked his parliamentary immunity and proceeded with an investigation. The May 1998 report concluded that Gysi—working under the code name GREGOR, then NOTAR—had been an active collaborator with the MfS from 1978 until the collapse of the GDR. Relying on extensive documentation that had been evaluated by the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, the report maintained that Gysi had not only supplied important details to the department combating political opposition to the regime but even made suggestions of his own. A parliamentary majority endorsed these findings, despite dissents by the Freie Demokratische Partei and the PDS.

Gysi strenuously denied the allegations, maintaining that the NOTAR file was based either on information from someone else in his office or on electronic surveillance obtained without his knowledge. His appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe was denied but gave him a legal opening, as any designation of him as a Stasi informer is expressly forbidden. He also retained his seat in the 1998 Bundestag elections, although two years later he resigned his position as parliamentary leader of the PDS. With the victory of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and the PDS in Berlin’s 2001 municipal elections, he was appointed deputy mayor and senator for economics, labor, and women’s issues. Resigning abruptly after only six months in office, presumably because of a minor scandal, he made a political comeback as the PDS’s lead candidate in the 2005 national election. Gysi also promoted the formation of the new Left Party. His autobiography, Das war’s. Noch lange nicht (That Was It—Not by Any Means), appeared in 1997.

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HAASE, DIETER (1937– ). An eccentric West German Bundeswehr reserve officer recruited by the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Dieter Haase was born in Berlin on 26 August 1937. In 1961, between his legal studies in Würzburg and the Free University of Berlin, Haase had his first contact with the VA through an uncle living in
East Berlin. His desire was to obtain the code name 006 (in order to be placed ahead of James Bond), but that never came to pass. A member of the Christlich-Demokratische Union, he became active in military circles in Würzburg and in 1965 began his dissertation on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the direction of Friedrich August von der Heydte, the head of the Institute for Military Law and a conservative delegate to the Bavarian Landtag. This relationship led to contact with the leading Bavarian politician, Franz Josef Strauss, and Bundesnachrichtendienst head Reinhard Gehlen.

The information that Haase obtained (working in conjunction with both his wife and uncle) was highly prized by the VA, and he received a special award in 1963 for his reports on the NATO Fallex exercises the previous year. He also photographed material on psychological warfare. In March 1970—a week after the couple’s divorce—his wife identified him as a spy, and he was taken into custody. His trial before Bavaria’s highest court belatedly began in 1976. Besides engaging and then dismissing more than 30 lawyers, he assumed the “combat” name Jesus Christus Mohamed 79. Sentenced to 11 years for treason, he was pardoned in 1979 by the president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Karl Carstens. Haase subsequently became a founding member of the Green Party in Lower Saxony. His muddled memoirs, Mein Name ist Haase—ich weiss zuviel?! (My Name is Haase—I Know Too Much?!), appeared in 1993.

HAASE, WERNER (1918– ). A member of the Organisation Gehlen (OG) kidnapped and placed on trial in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Werner Haase had served in the Wehrmacht during World War II. After joining the OG, he was assigned to the West Berlin branch and given the task of laying a telephone cable to facilitate a less hazardous communication link with agents working in the GDR. Yet in a display of daring and overeagerness, he proceeded without the authorization of his superiors. In mid-November 1953, Haase was taken prisoner by an East German commando unit on the western side of the Heidekampgraben, having been betrayed by two coworkers. Along with six other OG defendants, he was tried before an East Berlin court the following month. Despite a sentence of life imprisonment announced on 21 December, a spy exchange three
years later involving East German agent Ule Lammert enabled his return to the Federal Republic of Germany. In his memoirs, Reinhard Gehlen expressed special praise for Haase’s “intrepid work” and “exemplary courage during his trial.”

HALL, JAMES W., III (1957– ). An American military intelligence officer found guilty of spying for the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union, James W. Hall III joined the U.S. Army in September 1976 and spent four years at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, before his assignment to the Federal Republic of Germany as a communications analyst. In late 1982, while stationed at the Teufelsberg signals intercept station in West Berlin, he concluded an agreement with the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA). Given the code name Paul, he became one of the most well-compensated spies of the period, receiving an estimated $100,000 during the next six years for the high-level information he delivered. Hall’s intermediary was an affable civilian mechanic of Turkish citizenship at the facility, Huseyin Yildirim (nicknamed “Meister’), who had initially spotted Hall as a potential recruit.

After returning briefly to the United States in 1985 for further training, Hall was assigned to the military intelligence battalion of the Fifth Army Corps in Frankfurt am Main and eventually promoted to head of electronic warfare and signals intelligence operations. Klaus Eichner, the HVA officer who evaluated Hall’s information, termed it a “gold mine.” The material included the 4,000-page National Sigint (Signals Intelligence) Requirements List, a report code-named Canopy Wing detailing the electronic measures in the event of full-scale warfare with the Eastern bloc, and classified material regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative program. The HVA cautioned Hall at one point to slow down his activity lest he arouse suspicion. Even after his return to the United States in July 1987 to undergo training as a warrant officer and to head a new signals intelligence project at Fort Stewart, Georgia, he continued to deliver information to the GDR.

Through an East German defector code-named HAGEN, Hall became the object of an investigation and, in December 1988, was lured into a meeting with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation posing as a Soviet operative. Hall subsequently pleaded guilty in a military court in Washington, D.C., maintaining that his motivation
was monetary gain and not ideological commitment. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison, fined $50,000, and given a dishonorable discharge. Despite the reservations of the National Security Agency, Yildirim, who was believed to have enticed other army intelligence personnel into his network, was tried before a federal court in Savannah, Georgia. In September 1989, found guilty of conspiring to commit espionage against the United States and acting as a courier for Hall, he received a life term. The lax security measures in place at the time also received extensive criticism.

**HANFSTAENGL, ERNST (1887–1975).** A cultured member of Adolf Hitler’s inner circle who eventually became an intelligence advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ernst Hanfstaengl was born in Munich on 2 February 1887. His father was a prosperous art publisher, and his mother was an American descended from a distinguished New England family. To prepare him to take over the New York branch of the family firm, Hanfstaengl was sent to study at Harvard University in 1905 and did not return to Munich until after World War I. Shocked by the political and economic chaos of the early 1920s, he was impressed by Hitler’s oratory and formed a close personal tie, not only lending some financial assistance to the Nazi movement but also helping to provide an entrée to Munich’s upper-class society. He participated in the abortive Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, and it was to the family’s country home south of the city in Uffing that Hitler fled in its aftermath. Known for his sardonic wit and love of practical jokes, “Putzi,” as he was nicknamed, was also a gifted pianist and often provided a musical diversion at informal gatherings of the party leadership.

In 1931, Hitler appointed him the party’s foreign press secretary because of his many contacts abroad. Although Hanfstaengl retained this position following the Nazi seizure of power, his advocacy of more moderate positions on political and racial matters, combined with his “cosmopolitanism,” soon caused his relationship with Hitler to wane. In addition, his candid assessment of other leading officials—Joseph Goebbels in particular—did not go unnoticed. Had Hanfstaengl not been attending a Harvard reunion at the time, it is quite probable that he would have been another victim of the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934. Two and a half years later, after being
ordered by Hermann Göring to fly to Francisco Franco’s headquar-
ters in Madrid on a mission and discovering en route that he was to
be paradropped behind Republican lines, he escaped via Switzerland
to London (later Göring unconvincingly wrote Hanfstaengl that the
incident was intended merely to prod him into reconsidering his re-
cent utterances).

With the outbreak of war, Hanfstaengl was seized and interrogated
by British officials, who concluded that his flight from Germany had
been “due to a personal feud,” not a change of political conviction.
He was shipped to a spartan internment camp in Canada, but on 30
June 1942, at President Roosevelt’s insistence, he was summoned to
a U.S. Army base outside Washington, D.C. Despite deep misgiv-
ings by the British, Roosevelt had been persuaded by John Franklin
Carter, a New Deal journalist and the head of the president’s personal
intelligence service, that Hanfstaengl could provide unique firsthand
insights into the Nazi ruling elite. Besides knowing him personally
from their Harvard days, Roosevelt favored a competitive approach
to information gathering and especially relished the human and
idiosyncratic element so often missing in conventional reports. He
acceded to the British demands that Hanfstaengl remain under tight
security and his whereabouts be kept strictly confidential, but he was
provided with comfortable living quarters, including a piano, and his
son served as one of his guards.

In the first phase of what was called the S-Project, Hanfstaengl
supplied biographical information on 400 leading Nazis, analyzed
Hitler’s speeches, and even speculated about how the Führer’s reign
might come to an end. Roosevelt showed a keen interest in Hanfs-
taengl’s 50-page intimate portrait of Hitler and circulated it among
many of his top advisors. The more pro-active phase of the S-Project
concerned psychological warfare. In addition to critiquing German
and American propaganda efforts, Hanfstaengl was asked to prepare
scripts for possible broadcasts to Germany, as the American presi-
dent believed that the German people might topple the Hitler regime
from within. As German victory became increasingly less probable,
Roosevelt’s attitude hardened, revealing no distinction between the
Nazi leadership and the ordinary citizenry. The significance of the
S-Project steadily diminished until it officially ended in June 1944.
Not only had Hanfstaengl’s intelligence reports become more erratic
but the British threatened to make his presence in the United States an issue in the upcoming presidential campaign.

Hanfstaengl was returned to British custody, where he remained until 1946. Back in Germany, he wrote his memoirs, *Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus: Memoiren eines politischen Aussenseiters* (*Between the White and Brown House: Memoirs of a Political Outsider*), published in 1970, although relatively few pages deal with the S-Project. He died in Munich on 6 November 1975.

**HANSEN, GEORG (1904–1944).** The final caretaker head of the Abwehr, Georg Hansen was born in Sonnefeld (Thuringia) on 6 July 1904, the son of a forester. After briefly studying law, he chose to become a career military officer. His first intelligence work was in 1937 in Fremde Heere, where he had responsibility for the British Commonwealth and the United States. In 1939, his focus shifted to the Near East and the Balkans as head of Group I of the Fremde Heere Ost until his transfer to the eastern front in 1942. With the departure of Hans Piekenbrock in March 1943, he took charge of the Abwehr’s foreign intelligence collection (Division I) and corrected much of the laxness that had occurred. Following the removal of Wilhelm Canaris and the transfer of the Abwehr to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in February 1944, Hansen was named Canaris’s successor on an interim basis. His active participation in the military conspiracy against Adolf Hitler led to his arrest in the aftermath of the failed 20 July 1944 plot. Sentenced to death by the People’s Court, Hansen was executed at Plötzensee Prison on 8 September.

**HANSTEIN, WOLFRAM VON (1899–1965).** An important agent working for Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Federal Republic of Germany, Wolfram von Hanstein was born in Berlin on 25 February 1899, the son of a well-known writer and academic. After receiving his early education at a military academy, Hanstein was an active Freikorps member and participated in the abortive Kapp Putsch in 1920. In addition to studying law, Hanstein learned the publishing business and took over the Voco Verlag in Leipzig in 1925, which moved to Berlin the following year. A number of children’s books, detective stories, and historical novels also appeared under his name and various pseudonyms. Although his opposition to National
Socialism eventually caused his expulsion from the official writers’ association, Hanstein nevertheless found employment during World War II scripting and directing educational and industrial films.

When the Red Army arrived in 1945, Hanstein, then living near Dresden, provided names of Nazi party members to the MGB, and his Voco Verlag was allowed to operate as the only private publishing firm in the Soviet occupation zone. Yet his frequent trips to the Western zone and contact with members of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands aroused suspicion among Soviet authorities that he might be a double agent. Hanstein was arrested in 1951 and sentenced to death for alleged cooperation with American, French, and West German intelligence. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and in October 1955 he was repatriated to the German Democratic Republic. Hanstein then started working for the HVA.

Following his resettlement in the Federal Republic of Germany the next year and the reestablishment of the Voco Verlag as cover, Hanstein became associated with leading anticommunist and human rights organizations, such as the Liga für Menschenrechte (League for Human Rights), which, as deputy general secretary, he managed to splinter by the end of 1958. He also maintained frequent contact with a close associate of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Heinrich Krone, and the minister of all-German affairs, Ernst Lemmer. The defection, however, of Hanstein’s immediate superior, Max Heim, resulted in his arrest on 18 May 1959. Sentenced to six years in prison, Hanstein, according to HVA chief Markus Wolf, diligently continued his espionage work during his incarceration, identifying three fellow prisoners who became later recruits. After his early release owing to severe illness, he returned to the GDR and died in East Berlin on 12 June 1965.

HARNACK, ARVID (1901–1942). A government economist during the Third Reich and a member of the inner circle of the Rote Kapelle, Arvid Harnack was born in Darmstadt on 24 May 1901, the son of a prominent academic family. Following World War I, his early nationalist sentiments were increasingly supplanted by an attraction to the Soviet communist model, which was further strengthened by the advent of the Great Depression. A student not only at several German universities, Harnack spent two years at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison, where he met Mildred Fish, who became his wife. With advanced degrees in law and economics, he entered the Reich Economics Ministry in 1933.

The previous year, however, during a study tour of the Soviet Union, he was recruited as a clandestine agent (code name CORSICAN). Known for his very serious and industrious demeanor, Harnack proved to be a highly motivated agent, even joining the Nazi Party in 1937 to add to his cover. Two years later, he began to coordinate his efforts with Harro Schulze-Boysen based in the Air Force Ministry. Despite her literary orientation, Mildred also played a major role in his resistance and intelligence activities. Yet once the Abwehr discovered the existence of the Rote Kapelle in July 1942, their lives were doomed. On 7 September, Arvid and Mildred Harnack were arrested and brought to trial several months later. Harnack, defiantly proclaiming his allegiance to the Soviet Union, was found guilty and executed at Plötzensee Prison on 22 December. Although found complicit as well, Mildred was retried at Adolf Hitler’s insistence because the death sentence had not been initially imposed. She died on 16 February 1943. Both became objects of veneration in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

HASCHKA, LAWRENCE LEOPOLD (1749–1827). The author of the Austrian national anthem and a spy in the service of the Habsburgs, Lawrence Leopold Haschka was born in Vienna on 1 September 1749. As a youth, he joined the Society of Jesus but resigned following its suppression in 1773 and supported himself as a journalist and poet. After a brief period of anticlericalism, he rallied to the Habsburg cause in the wake of the French Revolution and was recruited as an informer by Count Franz Josef von Saurau. The creation of an Austrian national anthem also became the responsibility of Sarau, who commissioned Haschka to provide a patriotic text to accompany the music of Franz Josef Haydn. The anthem was first performed on 12 February 1797—the birthday of Emperor Francis II—in theaters throughout Austria. Besides writing a large number of odes, Haschka held several state posts before his death in Vienna on 3 August 1827.
HASS, KARL (1912–2004). A senior Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) officer prosecuted for his participation in the Ardeatine Massacre, Karl Hass was born in Kiel on 5 October 1912. A group leader in the Hitler Youth, he joined the SD in 1934 and was assigned to the press section at the Berlin headquarters. In summer 1943, following the fall of Benito Mussolini, he was placed in charge of counterintelligence in Rome. The most notorious incident under Hass’s supervision occurred on 24 March 1944 at the Ardeatine Caves just south of Rome, where 335 Italians were murdered in retaliation for a bomb attack in the Via Rasella that had killed 33 Germans. On orders from the Gestapo, Hass also lured Princess Malfada of Savoy, the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III, to the German embassy; she later died at the Buchenwald concentration camp.

Although captured by the Americans at the end of the war, Hass worked for several years in Germany and Austria for the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps. His emergence from obscurity occurred in 1996 as the result of an immunity agreement for his testimony against a fellow SD officer, Erich Priebke. On the eve of taking the stand at the military trial in Rome, Hass unsuccessfully attempted to flee. He was indicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Because of his frail health, however, he remained at a nursing home near Rome until his death on 21 April 2004. See also KAPPLER, HERBERT.

HAUDEGEN. The last and most successful of Germany’s secret Arctic weather stations during World War II, Operation HAUDEGEN was under the command of Wilhelm Dege, a geographer fluent in Norwegian and long familiar with the area. After arriving in mid-September 1944, he and his trained team of 11 men—equipped with provisions for 18 months—set up the facility in a remote fjord on Nordaustlandet, the northernmost island in Svalbard (Spitsbergen). Deemed essential for timely weather forecasting for military operations in northern and central Europe, the meteorological data was recorded at intervals of several hours and conveyed to Berlin via radio. Hydrogen-filled radiosonde balloons were sent aloft every afternoon to measure conditions in the lower levels of the stratosphere. Besides submitting these reports, the group pursued scientific research related to polar regions in general.
Unlike many earlier manned Arctic stations—Nussbaum, Holzauge, Bassgeiger, and Edelweiss I and II—Haudegen escaped detection by Allied forces and continued to function until the end of the war. Not only did the Norwegian rescue ship need specific instructions regarding the weather station’s location, but Dege’s group had the distinction of being the last German military unit to surrender, nearly four months after the cessation of hostilities. His detailed account of the yearlong endeavor, Wettertrupp Haudegen (War North of 80), appeared in 1954.

HAUPTGEGNER. A term derived from Soviet usage—glavni protivnik, or “principal adversary”—Hauptgegner was also employed extensively by the German Democratic Republic in reference to the United States. Nevertheless, many officers of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung were wary of recruiting Americans for espionage, fearing it might be a trap. Great Britain was ranked in the second category of interest along with France and Sweden.

HAUPTSTELLE FÜR BEFRAGUNGSWESEN. A covert organization of the security services of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Hauptstelle für Befragungswesen (Main Office for Questioning) was established in 1956 to interview refugees and immigrants from Eastern Europe. Although it operated under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry, the staff was drawn primarily from the newly created Bundesnachrichtendienst and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz and included several American representatives. Branches were found in all major West German cities and at the reception camps in Berlin-Marienfelde, Giessen, and Friedland.

Closely monitored by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, it sought, above all, to obtain information about military installations in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the activities of the Warsaw Pact forces, and important factories, laboratories, and scientific research institutions. In some instances, the interviewees were recruited as spies as well as encouraged to divulge the names of relatives and friends in the GDR who could also be of assistance. The information obtained was shared with those North Atlantic Treaty Organization members having troops stationed in the FRG, notably...
the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

HAUPTVERWALTUNG AUFLÄRUNG (HVA). The foreign intelligence branch of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung had its origins in the Außenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst, which was disguised as the Institute for Economic Research. Reconstituted as Main Division XV of the MfS in 1953, it received the designation HVA three years later. Its mission was twofold: to gather information from abroad; and to work in coordination with the domestic branches of the MfS in eliminating opposition to the communist regime of the German Democratic Republic. The widespread conviction that all dissident activities could be traced to the machinations of Western intelligence organizations reinforced this interlocking relationship between foreign and domestic operations.

By 1989, the HVA had grown to a full-time force of 4,744 in its East Berlin headquarters and its suboffices in the regional administrations, although the total number of MfS personnel dealing with foreign intelligence has been estimated at twice that figure. To a large extent, it was an elite force, carefully selected for its political loyalty and higher level of education, which was augmented at the HVA’s own training school at Gossen. The central complex in the Lichtenberg district was divided into 21 departments, ranging from disinformation and counterespionage to the Sektor für Wissenschaft und Technik. Skillfully overseeing this vast empire from its earliest days was Markus Wolf, whose retirement in 1986 brought Werner Grossmann to the helm. The KGB base in Karlshorst also maintained a powerful presence, first by dictating the initial modus operandi and then by insisting on unlimited access to all information collected.

The HVA extended its reach throughout the world, notably in Africa and the Middle East. But roughly three-quarters of its activities were concentrated in the Federal Republic of Germany, not only because of its commanding strategic and economic importance within Europe but also owing to the greater opportunities for espionage that a common language and culture provided. The remarkable number of penetrations throughout the structure of the FRG can be traced
to the patient and psychologically refined cultivation of *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiters* (unofficial collaborators) as well as a massive infusion of carefully trained *illegaler* (covert operatives). By the 1980s, the main targets of the HVA extended beyond government ministries and advanced technological firms to include human rights and environmental groups. Although HVA leaders managed to destroy the bulk of their records following the communist regime’s loss of power in 1989, many details of the organization’s activities have been reconstructed through the *System der Informationsrechercher der Aufklärung* and the *Rosenholz* data.

**HAUSKAPELLE.** A colloquial term referring to a counterintelligence unit designed to monitor employees of the same organization, *Hauskapelle* (resident orchestra) became a common expression in the Abwehr. Used as well by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, it is expressly sanctioned by current German law, although its methods of detection were left unspecified. The term *Kapellmeister* (orchestra conductor) refers to the head of the unit.

**HAVEMANN, ROBERT (1910–1982).** A prominent East German chemist and Marxist dissident who had earlier ties to the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS), Robert Havemann was born in Munich on 11 March 1910. In 1933, he completed his doctorate in physical chemistry in Berlin but was removed from the prestigious Kaiser Wilhelm Institute because of his membership in the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. He worked as a scientific assistant at the University of Berlin until his collaboration with a resistance movement became known to the *Gestapo* in 1943. Despite the death sentence issued by the People’s Court, the Nazi government preferred that Havemann conduct research of military importance from Brandenburg jail.

In 1945, Havemann returned to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute as head of administration, but his published criticism of the American hydrogen bomb project led to his dismissal by the Office of the U.S. Military Government several years later. Not only did a new position materialize at Humboldt University in East Berlin, but Havemann eagerly embraced the communist government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In late February 1956, he agreed to become an informer for the MfS and was given the code name *Leitz*. A signed pledge was waived because of his prior record of cooperation
with both the MfS and Soviet intelligence. According to surviving documents, at least 60 meetings with his control officer took place, and more than 140 pieces of information were delivered, many of them containing incriminating details about his associates.

Yet his increasing disillusionment with the regime, culminating in a series of critical lectures during 1963–1964 and an interview with a West German newspaper, resulted in Havemann’s discharge from the university as well as the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Besides making him an object of intense scrutiny, the MfS attempted to isolate him by pressuring former colleagues and sympathizers. On 26 November 1976, 10 days following the expatriation of his friend Wolf Biermann, Havemann was placed under house arrest (nonstop surveillance of his property in Grünheide outside Berlin involved more than 300 MfS personnel). Although his official house arrest ended three years later, GDR officials used the charge of currency and customs manipulation to try to prevent his writings advocating a democratic Marxism from reaching the West. In early 1982, Havemann, together with the East Berlin pastor Rainer Eppelmann, issued the Berlin Appeal, which called for a complete demilitarization of both Germanys as a prerequisite to peace. He died shortly afterward on 9 April 1982 in Grünheide.

HEERESNACHRICHTENAMT (HNaA). The intelligence branch of the Austrian army, the Heeresnachrichtenamt (Army Intelligence Office) was founded in early 1956 as the Gruppe Heeresnachrichtenwesen under Kurt Fechner (the official name change occurred in 1972). It obtained most of its equipment from the U.S. military following its departure from Austria in 1955 along with the other occupying powers. Situated across the border from Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, the extensive signals intelligence unit at the Königswarte in Lower Austria became the HNaA’s most significant installation. Additional listening posts existed in other provinces.

Its first major challenge was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which resulted in the arrival of nearly 200,000 political refugees in eastern Austria. In 1968, under the leadership of Alexander Buschek, the HNaA obtained early information about the military plans of the Warsaw Pact regarding Czechoslovakia. Austrian Defense Minister Georg Prader openly boasted at the time, “We are 10 times better informed than the Americans with all their capabilities.” In 1991, its
reconnaissance determined that the Slovenian defense forces would be able to withstand the Yugoslavian army. Although the military counterintelligence section (Abwehramt) became a separate unit in 1985, the HNaA, headquartered in Vienna at the General Command Barracks in the Hütteldorfer Strasse, remains the second largest intelligence agency in Austria.

HEIDEMANN, GERD. See HITLER DIARIES FORGERY.

HEILMANN, PETER (1922– ). An important long-term agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) based in West Berlin, Peter Heilmann was placed by the Gestapo in a forced labor camp in 1944 owing to his status as a half-Jew. He escaped before the end of the war and later became a functionary in the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth). East German authorities jailed him in 1951 on suspicion of espionage, and shortly before his release five years later, Heilmann agreed to become an informer for the MfS. Moving to West Berlin and rising in the leadership of the German Socialist Student Association, he began to submit exceptionally detailed reports, first under the code name JULIUS MÜLLER, then ADRIAN PEPPERKORN. Heilmann’s chief employment, beginning in 1970 and ending with his retirement in 1988, was at the Evangelical Academy in West Berlin, a politically progressive adult education center that maintained cordial relations with the German Democratic Republic. Yet his unabashed enthusiasm for the communist regime alarmed even his long-standing MfS case officer, Horst Gerlach, who repeatedly urged greater caution to prevent his unmasking. Gerlach regularly edited his lengthy taped meetings with Heilmann before submitting them to his superiors.

Heilmann’s 33-year role as an informer came to light in December 1992. Following a trial in Berlin in April 1999, he was sentenced to 20 months in prison. His wife, Gertraude, likewise an agent employed at the Evangelical Academy, received 12 months probation. Heilmann expressed no regrets and declared his willingness to perform the same tasks again.

HEIM, MAX (1925– ). The second major defector to the West from the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Max Heim was trained
initially as an airplane construction worker. Serving in the Wehrmacht, he was taken prisoner by the Soviet Red Army in 1945. His return to the German Democratic Republic led to his appointment as an editor for the radio station Deutschlandsender in 1952 and as a member of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit the following year. Rising through the ranks of the HVA, Heim came to head the subsection targeting the ruling Christlich-Demokratische Union in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Besides providing valuable information about the structure of the HVA, his defection to the FRG on 15 May 1959 resulted in the unmasking of nearly a dozen East German agents, including Wolfram von Hanstein. Heim’s assertion, however, that the HVA maintained 2,000–3,000 agents in the West seemed exaggerated to officials of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency at the time.

HEIMSOOTH, KARL-GÜNTHER (1899–1934). A right-wing neurologist and Soviet agent, Karl-Günther Heimsoth joined a Freikorps unit following combat in World War I and became a close acquaintance and correspondent of SA leader Ernst Röhm as well as a spokesman for homosexual rights. Although a member of the Nazi Party since May 1933, he was also seeking a reconciliation between nationalists and the National Bolshevik groups. He had been recruited as an informant for the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) the preceding year. Following a Gestapo interrogation in February 1934, Heimsoth disappeared; his body was reported found a month later in Berlin.

HEINRICH, BRIGITTE (1941–1987). A prominent West German journalist, Green politician, and agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Brigitte Heinrich was born in Frankfurt am Main on 29 June 1941. With the advent of the student protest movement, she became the press officer for the German Socialist Student Association in 1966–1967 and, several years later, the president of the student parliament at the University of Frankfurt. Heinrich also maintained close ties to various terrorist groups and was arrested for illegal trafficking in weapons and explosives in 1974. Although adamant in her denial of all charges—and released from custody shortly thereafter for reasons of health—she received a 21-month prison sentence in 1980. This verdict quickly became a major cause célèbre,
as many left-wing groups and individuals mobilized on her behalf. In order to accommodate the position offered to her by the alternative West Berlin newspaper *taz*, she was given a daytime release while serving her sentence.

Heinrich developed a close personal relationship with Klaus Croissant, a lawyer known for his defense of the terrorists Andreas Baader and Ulricke Meinhof. Having himself been recruited by the MfS in 1981 and given the code name *taler*, Croissant helped arrange Heinrich’s initial contact in April 1982 with two officers from the terrorist subsection of Main Division XXII in Erfurt. Hesitant at first, she expressed her willingness to serve as an MfS agent at their second meeting two weeks later in East Berlin. Not only did Heinrich (code name *beate schäfer*) provide detailed personal information about the revolving editorial staff of her newspaper, but the MfS also noted her efforts as an agent of influence in combating the “antisocialist and anticommmunist” forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. After her election to the European Parliament in 1984, a comprehensive training session was arranged in Yugoslavia disguised as a vacation. Her subsequent reports focused primarily on her own Green Party delegation. Heinrich died of a sudden heart attack on 29 December 1987.

**HEINZ, FRIEDRICH WILHELM** (1899–1968). A former anti-Nazi *Abwehr* officer who formed an early intelligence unit in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz was born in Frankfurt am Main, the son of a merchant. In 1916, he volunteered for service in one of the Berlin guard regiments and saw combat on the western front. After the war, unable to pursue a military career in the restricted Reichswehr, he was drawn to the elite unit of the Freikorps led by Hermann Ehrhardt and participated in the abortive Kapp Putsch of 1920. With the dissolution of the Ehrhardt Brigade, a secret association, *Organisation Consul* (OC), was formed from its remnants with the aim of bringing the Weimar Republic to the brink of civil war. This group, including Heinz, performed reconnaissance work on behalf of the Deutscher Übersee-Dienst (German Overseas Service), the military’s sub rosa intelligence organization designed to circumvent the espionage prohibition contained in the Versailles Treaty. Based in the French-occupied industrial Ruhr region, the OC
concentrated on collecting information about the workers’ parties, the unions, and the paramilitary groups engaged in periodic sabotage against the French.

Heinz’s relationship with the rising Nazi Party was an ambivalent one. Although the OC had maintained a loose connection with the early movement, he was critical of “mistaken policies” pursued by Adolf Hitler and Erich Ludendorff that led to the abortive 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Heinz preferred the social revolutionary wing led by Otto and Gregor Strasser. Although propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels had high regard for Heinz and supported his rise in the Nazi Party, his association with the Strasser brothers led to his later expulsion, and Hitler remained personally opposed to his readmittance to the party. On the evening of the Reichstag fire, Heinz was arrested and mishandled, and only the support of some old friends spared him from the purge of other renegade ex-party members.

Prompted by the official abolition of the Stahlhelm, the paramilitary veterans’ organization that he had rejoined, Heinz decided to reactivate his military career in 1935. Wilhelm Canaris, an earlier acquaintance, welcomed him in the Abwehr, where he became a press officer responsible for the dissemination of army propaganda. His immediate superior, Hans Oster, introduced him to resistance circles known to both Oster and Canaris. On 28 September 1938, Heinz, who had organized a support commando of some 30 young officers, students, and workers trained in firearms, was to force his way into the Reich Chancellery, overpower the SS guards, and shoot Hitler on the spot (Heinz had persuasively argued against putting him on trial). Although it was probably the best planned of the many attempts on the Führer’s life, the willingness of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to reach an accord with Hitler in Munich took the wind out of the conspirators’ sails, and the plot came to naught.

During World War II, Heinz was a regimental commander in the Brandenburg Division and participated in the offensive against the Soviet Union. Witnessing the pogrom against the Jewish residents that followed the capture of Lviv, Heinz officially protested the murder of innocent women and children. That act coupled with his support for the Ukrainian independence movement led by Stepan Bandera resulted in his removal from active duty. Due to Canaris, Heinz received a new task: the formation of the training school Quenzgut near
the city of Brandenburg, where Arabs, Syrians, Indians, and others sympathetic to the Third Reich received instruction in undercover work. Reassigned to the Brandenburg Division in 1943, he became involved in the partisan struggle in Yugoslavia and, on his own initiative, attempted to form an alliance with the Cetniks, or followers of Draza Mihailovic, against the communist forces under Josip Tito. Although Heinz was recalled to Berlin and placed in a reserve unit because of further comments critical of the regime, Canaris succeeded in blocking formal charges of insubordination. Following the failed assassination attempt of 20 July 1944, Heinz came under suspicion, but his clever denials secured his release. Less than two months later, however, the Gestapo came into possession of secret documents implicating Heinz in the plot. Warned in time by his superiors, he faked his own death and evaded the intensive search launched by the Gestapo, thus becoming one of the few anti-Hitler Abwehr officers to survive the reprisals.

After the war, Heinz joined the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and was for a brief period the mayor of Bad Saarow-Pieskow, a lakeside spa near Berlin. Yet it was still undercover work that formed his main interest. As the head of his own private agency in Berlin, he delivered information to various Western countries about developments in the Soviet occupation zone, especially pertaining to the size and location of Red Army units. French officials were most impressed by his reports and concluded a formal arrangement in 1947, assigning him the code name Tulpe. During the Berlin Airlift the following year, the French transported him to Neuwied (Rhineland-Palatinate) and, as a cover, gave him permission to establish a publishing firm, the Michael Verlag. His increasing contact with U.S. intelligence officials, however, angered the French, and the relationship soon ended. Heinz relocated to Wiesbaden in the American occupation zone and began writing for periodicals such as Life, Time, and the U.S.-sponsored Neue Zeitung in Germany.

Few expressed surprise at seeing Heinz’s name on a list of candidates to head the domestic security arm of the new West German government. British authorities, however, found his entrepreneurship excessive and put their support behind Otto John, who became the first head of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). Heinz’s other main competitor was Reinhard Gehlen, who attempted to
block the appointment of a man he regarded as a dangerous turncoat. Nevertheless, because the new chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, wanted additional channels of information, a military intelligence division within the revived Zentrale für Heimatdienst (ZfH; Internal Services Center) was established and headed by Achim Oster, the son of Heinz’s former superior. In 1950, Heinz was persuaded by Oster and ZfH head Gerhard von Schwerin to form an intelligence network, whose findings would remain privy to the chancellor and whose existence would be hidden from other government ministries.

What became known as the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Heinz-Dienst (FWHD) had its first office in Bad Godesberg and then Wiesbaden, growing from a staff of three to more than 30 by 1953. Focused primarily on the remilitarization efforts of the German Democratic Republic, it possessed roughly 170 informants, many drawn from Heinz’s earlier contacts, and included posts in Austria and Italy. The FWHD also monitored right-wing and left-wing extremist groups in the FRG and found early cooperation with the BfV. By contrast, relations with the rival U.S.-sponsored Organisation Gehlen were never cordial and reached a critical point in spring 1953 when a parliamentary commission indicated that the FWHD possessed greater potential as West Germany’s official foreign intelligence organization. To prevent that outcome, Gehlen purposely aroused John’s suspicions of Heinz, and as a result, a thick dossier of grievances was compiled by the BfV. Although most of the charges had little credibility, Schwerin’s successor, Theodor Blank, decided to send Heinz on vacation.

His difficulties continued to multiply. Two allies of Gehlen—Adolf Heusinger and Hans Globke—occupied influential positions in the Adenauer government and actively sought Heinz’s dismissal. A severe blow came in November 1954, when, after being charged with misstating his military rank after the war, he was found guilty of perjury and given a six-month prison term. Although a court later suspended the sentence, his reputation was further tarnished by a controversial visit to Karlshorst in East Berlin in mid-December. According to Jakob Kolb, his longtime associate who had recently been dismissed as head of the Berlin office because of financial irregularities and recruited by the KGB, Heinz had accepted an offer by Soviet intelligence. This charge, however, was firmly denied by
Heinz, who accused Kolb of having kidnapped him, and by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, which concluded in 1956 that he was merely being sounded out.

Even though the bizarre disappearance of Otto John several months earlier overshadowed this episode and Heinz reemerged in West Berlin the following day, his career had come to an end. Because of lingering suspicion that he might be a Soviet agent, the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps kept him under observation for many years. His assistant, Johannes Kirsch, became his immediate successor as head of the FWHD, which, after being renamed the Archiv für Zeitgeschehen (Archives for Contemporary History), was officially dissolved on 31 March 1956. Heinz died 12 years later outside Wiesbaden.

HELD, STEPHEN. An activist with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who served as a courier to the Abwehr, Stephen Held was the son of an Irish woman and adopted son of her German immigrant husband. Calling himself a member of the IRA Army Council, Held arrived unannounced on 20 April 1940 at the Hamburg apartment of Oskar Karl Pfau of the Abwehr. There he presented a military scheme for the invasion of Northern Ireland dubbed Plan KATHLEEN (German documents use the name ARTUS). It envisioned landing 50,000 troops near Derry assisted by an IRA ground offensive from the south. Although Abwehr officials dismissed the plan as “dilettantish,” they assured Held that a German liaison officer would be dispatched very soon. Held left Berlin three days later and returned to Ireland. He later provided a safe house for Hermann Görtz at his residence at Templeogue. On 22 May, however, a police raid resulted in the discovery of Görtz’s parachute, transmitter, and 19 coded messages. His explanation unpersuasive, Held was arrested early the following morning. A five-year prison sentence was announced on 26 June.

HELENBROICH, HERIBERT (1937– ). The first person to have headed both the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Heribert Hellenbroich was born in Cologne on 14 May 1937. Following his study of law and political science, he joined the BfV in February 1966. Hellenbroich rose to deputy director in 1981 and head two years later. A new appoint-
ment brought him to the helm of the BND on 1 August 1985. Later that month, however, in one of the most serious defections in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hansjoachim Tiedge, a senior counterintelligence official at the BfV, offered his services to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. That Tiedge’s glaring personal problems had been ignored by his former superior was “totally incomprehensible” to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Hellenbroich was removed immediately from the BND. He then worked as a private security consultant until his retirement in 1998.

HELLMUTH AFFAIR. The failed attempt to broker an arms sale to Argentina during World War II, the Hellmuth Affair centered on Osmar Alberto Hellmuth, the son of a German immigrant born in Buenos Aires on 23 November 1908. A prosperous insurance salesman, Hellmuth was lured into becoming a secret intermediary by a German agent, Hans Harnisch, who promised him a personal meeting in Berlin with the head of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), Walter Schellenberg, and possibly with Adolf Hitler. Because the United States had refused to sell arms to Argentina in light of its declared neutrality, the military government of Pedro Ramírez gave its endorsement and devised a cover for Hellmuth as auxiliary consul in Barcelona. The future Argentine dictator, Juan Perón, then minister of war, also played a key role in formulating the final plan, which involved the procurement of various arms and precision instruments along with the guarantee of safe passage for a large tanker from Greece.

Hellmuth sailed for Europe on the Cabo de Hornos but was removed from the ship by the British in Port of Spain, Trinidad, on 29 October 1943. After he revealed the details of his mission under interrogation at Camp 020 in Great Britain, authorities pressured the Ramírez government to disown Hellmuth publicly as a German spy and order the arrest of all other operatives in the country, including Johannes Becker, thereby avoiding the greater embarrassment of a full disclosure. The United States, however, desired even bolder action and succeeded in forcing Argentina to break its diplomatic relations with the Axis on 26 January 1944. Realizing the extent of this debacle for Germany, Adolf Hitler ordered a full-scale investigation, but escalating problems on the eastern front caused the inquiry to be
postponed indefinitely. Hellmuth returned to Argentina in October 1945 and was cleared of the espionage charge two years later.

HELPHAND, ALEXANDER (1867–1924). A key figure who helped supply German funds to the Bolsheviks in prerevolutionary Russia, Alexander Helphand was born in Berezino, Russia, on 8 September 1867, the son of middle-class Jewish parents. Associated with illegal political groups in his youth, he immigrated to Switzerland in 1886 to study economics at the University of Basel. Although he never lost contact with Russian revolutionary circles, German social democracy began to exert a greater attraction for him (his socialist code name was PARVUS). In 1891, he became a reporter on Russian affairs for the daily press and for the Neue Zeit, the theoretical journal of German socialism. In 1902, he established his own publishing house in Munich. In this period, he and his friend Leon Trotsky advanced the concept of “uninterrupted” (or “permanent”) revolution, which was later adopted by V. I. Lenin. Adamantly opposed to the gradualist revisionist views of Eduard Bernstein and embracing the notion of a mass spontaneous uprising, Helphand returned to Russia to take part in the 1905 Revolution as one of the leaders of the St. Petersburg Soviet. He was arrested early the following year and sent to Siberia, but by late 1906 he had escaped and returned to Western Europe.

Helphand resettled in Turkey in 1910. Although his activity as a journalist continued, his role as a business advisor to Russian and Armenian merchants in Constantinople allowed him to amass considerable wealth and influence. He also concluded that a successful revolution in Russia would require the outside assistance of the German government. With the advent of World War I, he became connected to the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, an organization sponsored by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and directed at the dissolution of the Russian Empire. Helphand additionally approached the German ambassador in Constantinople, stressing their common goal of toppling the tsarist regime and requesting money and authorization to meet with radical Russian émigrés.

Following an initial rebuff from Lenin, who regarded him as a renegade and “social chauvinist,” Helphand moved his headquarters to Copenhagen in mid-1915 and established the Institute for
the Study of the Social Consequences of the War as a cover for his espionage activities. His intimate knowledge of the Russian political left impressed Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German ambassador to Denmark (and later Germany’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union). In 1917, Helphand convinced Brockdorff-Rantzau that Lenin, if granted safe passage to return to Russia, would overthrow the Provisional Government, take command, and conclude a separate peace with Germany. After this plan was adopted and set in motion, Helphand acted as a covert liaison, meeting with a member of Lenin’s entourage in Stockholm and then with German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann in Berlin to finalize the details of financing Bolshevik subversion in Russia.

Helphand further nourished the hope of reconciling the German socialists with the Russian Bolsheviks. Yet the stance of his new periodical, Die Glocke, antagonized Lenin and Trotsky, and his offer to broker a peace settlement in 1917 between the Bolsheviks and the German Social Democrats in Stockholm was rejected by both Lenin and the German government (according to his calculations, the German working class would force a settlement acceptable to the Bolsheviks by the threat of a general strike in Germany). His ecstatic praise for the victorious Bolsheviks immediately turned to bitter denunciations. Remaining in Germany, Helphand became an advisor to President Friedrich Ebert. He died in Berlin on 12 December 1924. See also KESKÜLA, ALEXANDER.

HEMPEL, HEINZ (1941– ). An Illegaler (covert operative) assigned to Norway by the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Heinz Hempel was born near Leipzig. A member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands at the age of 18 and a student of chemical engineering, he had just begun work at a dye factory in Wolfen when the VA persuaded him to join their ranks in April 1964. After successfully petitioning the Norwegian embassy for citizenship papers in the name of Ludwig Bergmann, Hempel proceeded via West Berlin to Oslo and found acceptance by the real Bergmann’s mother as her son. The actual Bergmann, who had been born in Norway under the auspices of the Lebensborn program of Heinrich Himmler and then taken to Germany, was kept under Stasi surveillance lest he attempt to reconnect with his mother. Although Hempel effectively maintained his
cover until the fall of the Berlin Wall, his intelligence contribution proved negligible.

HENCKE, ANDOR. See INFORMATIONSTELLE III.

HENTIG, WERNER-OTTO VON (1886–1984). A career diplomat and coleader of a secret mission to Afghanistan during World War I, Werner-Otto von Hentig was born in Berlin on 22 May 1886. Following studies at Grenoble, Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia), Berlin, and Bonn, Hentig received his doctorate in law in 1909 and entered the Foreign Service. His initial assignments included Beijing, Constantinople, and Tehran. After volunteering for cavalry service with the outbreak of World War I and fighting on the eastern front, he was recalled in 1915 for a secret mission to Afghanistan together with Oskar von Niedermayer. The objective was to create a mass uprising in India against the British, which was to be set in motion by the Pastouns in the border region with Afghanistan. Hentig replaced Wilhelm Wassmuss, who had abandoned the original group without explanation while en route to Kabul. Hentig was to handle the diplomatic negotiations with Habibibullah, the amir of Afghanistan, while Niedermayer would bear responsibility for all military matters. Despite this division of labor, each man considered himself the actual leader of the expedition—the original instructions from Berlin had been vague in this regard—and mutual antipathies simmered beneath the surface.

On 19 August 1915, the expedition arrived at the Afghan border after a grueling and dangerous seven-week journey from Isfahan, Persia (Iran). They were first escorted to Herat, the walled capital of the amir’s western domains, and then received permission to proceed to Kabul. The first audience with the amir was outwardly amicable, as Hentig and Niedermayer presented their case along with letters from the German emperor and the Turkish sultan. But the amir was a shrewd negotiator and reluctant to break his alliance with the British. Several months later, Hentig prepared a secret report to the German envoy to Tehran, explaining that negotiations alone were insufficient and that military pressure had to be placed on Afghanistan in order to bring it into the war. The Persian courier, however, delivered the report to his former Russian employers, who in turn passed it to the
British. In December, the amir offered a treaty of friendship between Berlin and Kabul, but the terms amounted to little more than an insurance policy for Afghanistan should Russia and Great Britain falter in the war, and contained few benefits for Germany. When the amir made additional demands before the signing of the treaty, Hentig realized that the mission was a lost cause and decided to depart Kabul on 21 May 1916.

To minimize the risk of capture, Hentig and Niedermayer left Afghanistan in opposite directions. Hentig’s group took an eastward route through the Pamirs to Chinese Central Asia, where they attempted to cause trouble for the local British and Russian communities by spreading rumors of an imminent Muslim uprising. Following a protest by the British and Russian consul generals in Kashi, Chinese troops captured Hentig’s group and escorted them to Beijing. Traveling via the United States and Norway, Hentig returned to Germany in 1917 and was then dispatched to the embassy in Constantinople. To his consternation, Niedermayer, who had arrived months earlier, became an acclaimed and decorated hero, whereas his own role received minor attention (their lingering personal dispute was never resolved). Hentig’s account of his mission, *Ins Verschlossene Land* (Into the Closed Land), was hurriedly published in 1918. He returned to Kabul in 1969 as the honored guest of King Muhammad Zahir Shah to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Afghan independence. Hentig died in Lindesnes, Norway, on 8 August 1984.

**HENTSCH, RICHARD (1869–1918).** The army intelligence officer responsible for the decision to halt the German advance into northern France in 1914, Richard Hentsch was born in Cologne on 18 December 1869, the son of a lower-middle-class family. After joining the Royal Saxon Army in 1888 and graduating from the Kriegsakademie (War Academy), he held a series of staff positions. At the beginning of World War I, the German General Staff appointed Hentsch head of its intelligence evaluation branch, the future *Fremde Heere*. He also became the liaison officer between the General Staff and the commanders of the five armies advancing into northern France.

On 9 September 1914, General Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the General Staff then based in Luxembourg, ordered Hentsch to visit the First and Second Army headquarters and, equipped with sweeping
powers, make any necessary adjustments. His inspection revealed that the flank of the First Army under General Alexander von Kluck was endangered and could no longer continue its offensive drive to the Marne River. Hentsch therefore ordered the two armies to retreat to the Aisne River and establish a defensive line there. As a result of the battle of the Marne, the Germans failed to capture nearby Paris, and the deadly stalemate of trench warfare ensued.

Hentsch’s decision has been the object of considerable controversy. At his request, a formal inquiry headed by General Erich Ludendorff took place, concluding in May 1917 that Hentsch had been “justified” in reaching his decision and had not violated Moltke’s oral instructions. Whether or not his battlefield assessment was correct, the retreat proved to be an enduring psychological blow for the troops and the officer corps. For Adolf Hitler, Hentsch’s name became synonymous with military betrayal. While serving as the chief of staff to the military administrator of occupied Rumania, Hentsch died in Bucharest on 13 February 1918.

HENTSCHKE, HERBERT (1919–1991). A Soviet agent and senior officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Herbert Hentschke was born in Oberseifersdorf (Saxony) on 20 December 1919, the son of a worker. After immigrating to Czechoslovakia in 1934, he moved to Moscow and found employment as a locksmith. Twice arrested by the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) during the Stalinist purges, Hentschke was released and then trained at the Comintern school in Kushnarenkovo for behind-the-lines intelligence work in Belorussia beginning in 1944. Returning to Germany in 1945, he was appointed to various party and police positions before becoming an early member of the MfS. Hentschke’s most notable assignments included representing the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung with the Cuban secret service in Havana between 1971 and 1974 and directing the MfS administration at Wismut until his retirement in 1981. He died on 28 October 1991.

HERING, HORST (1920– ). A double agent in the employ of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Horst Hering worked as a journalist in Bavaria after serving in the navy during World War II. Known by his Stasi code name ALEXANDER and his BND code name
Sissi, he was assisting with the exfiltration of Winfried Baumann and Christa-Karin Schumann as a courier when his arrest in Poland occurred on 16 June 1979. Returned to the German Democratic Republic, Hering was given a life sentence, but a spy exchange allowed his return to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1982.

**HERMES.** A successful initiative of the Organisation Gehlen (OG) that commenced in summer 1947, Operation HERMES obtained comprehensive information about the Soviet Union through systematic questioning of returning German prisoners of war. The results of an initial screening by OG members at the West German reception camps were first forwarded to the main headquarters at Oberursel. If the person’s information was deemed accurate and promising, a further interview took place, the OG official posing as a representative of the Historical Research Institute in Wiesbaden. The resulting analyses, painstakingly assembled and frequently reaching book length, focused on such topics as Soviet industry, armaments, communications, and the morale of the population. That tank and aircraft production had increased since 1945 proved especially alarming to American military authorities, who also received the finished reports.

**HERRE, HEINZ-DANKO (1909–1988).** A veteran West German intelligence officer, Heinz-Danko Herre was born in Alsace, the son of an army major. Despite his preference for frontline duty, Reinhard Gehlen persuaded him to become his deputy in the Fremde Herre Ost in April 1942, particularly in light of his extensive knowledge of Russia. The following year, he launched Operation SILBERSTREIF (Silver Lining), a propaganda campaign designed to induce Red Army soldiers to defect. He later had responsibility for the Vlasov liberation army. In 1945, Herre was at Gehlen’s side during the negotiations in Washington, D.C., that led to the establishment of the Organisation Gehlen. Herre (code name HERDAHL) also played a key role in Operation HERMES, and he headed the analytical section of the OG beginning in 1952. Shortly after the transition to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) in 1956, his focus shifted to the communist bloc, and he ended his career in 1970 as the BND Resident in Washington, D.C.
HERRMANN, LISELOTTE (1909–1938). A communist spy executed by the Nazis who became a celebrated figure in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Liselotte Herrmann (nicknamed “Lilo”) was born in Berlin on 23 June 1909, the daughter of an engineer. She studied chemistry at the Technical College in Stuttgart and then biology at the University of Berlin. She was a member of two communist youth groups before joining the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in 1931. In July 1933, approximately 100 Berlin students including Herrmann received a notice of dismissal for having signed an anti-Nazi petition in defense of “democratic rights and freedoms.” In December, her husband and fellow communist, Fritz Rau, was killed during a Gestapo interrogation.

Following the birth of her son, Herrmann returned to Stuttgart in 1934 to work in her father’s engineering firm as a shorthand typist. Having already established contact with the KPD’s secret military section before leaving Berlin, she became a technical assistant to Stefan Lovasz, the head of the illegal apparatus in Württemberg. In one instance, information collected by Artur Görlitz about armament production at the Dornier-Works in Friedrichshafen and the construction of an underground munitions factory near Celle was given to Herrmann, who conveyed it to a KPD Instrukteur in Switzerland.

Her betrayal by other agents led to her arrest and detention in December 1935. In 1937, a Stuttgart court found Herrmann guilty of treason and imposed the death sentence. Despite protests from abroad, she was executed along with Lovasz and Görlitz on 20 June 1938 at Plötzensee Prison. In the postwar period, the GDR, without referring to her espionage career, made Herrmann the object of widespread veneration. In addition to circulating countless reproductions of her and her young son, authorities affixed her name to streets, schools, and other facilities, many of which were renamed following the 1990 reunification.

HERRNSTADT, RUDOLF (1903–1966). A gifted communist journalist and Soviet spy, Rudolf Herrnstadt was born in Gleiwitz (now Gliwice, Poland) on 18 March 1903, the son of a Jewish lawyer. In 1922, he broke off his legal studies at Berlin and Heidelberg to become a professional journalist and later a member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. In 1929, during his posting in Prague as
a correspondent for the Berliner Tageblatt, the party directed him to Department IV (intelligence) of the Red Army. Arriving in Warsaw in 1932, Herrnstadt, known for expertise in Central European affairs, cultivated members of the German community, including Ambassador Hans-Adolf von Moltke, who provided both advice and contacts. Within several years, Herrnstadt’s formidable spy ring included Ilse Stöbe, his mistress and a fellow journalist; Rudolf von Scheliha, a counselor at the German embassy; Gerhard Kegel (code name khvs); and Kurt and Margarita Völkisch (code names vs and LtsL), embassy employees. By all accounts, the information they provided to Moscow prior to World War II was of inestimable value.

Forced to spend the war years in Moscow, Herrnstadt returned to Berlin in 1945 to establish its first postwar newspaper and later to head the central party organ, Neues Deutschland. In the aftermath of the Uprising of 17 June 1953, he and Wilhelm Zaisser were accused of factional transgressions. Herrnstadt was stripped of his position and party membership. Prior to his death on 28 August 1966, he found employment at the State Central Archives in Merseburg (Saxony-Anhalt).

HESS, MARKUS. A computer hacker who sold stolen software and information to the KGB, Markus Hess was based in Hanover and worked with four other associates in the Chaos Computer Club. In 1987, with the assistance of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, Clifford Stoll, a systems administrator at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California, tracked the intruder whose object was the collection of classified data from various American military defense facilities. After West German authorities were notified, Hess was arrested and tried, receiving a suspended sentence on 15 February 1990. Two accomplices—Dirk-Otto Brzezinski and Peter Carl—were likewise found guilty but served no prison time, while charges were dropped against Hans Hübner because of his young age. Karl Koch committed suicide on 23 May 1989 after being the first to confess his role to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Stoll’s account of his dogged pursuit of the hackers appeared as The Cuckoo’s Egg in 1989.
HESS MISSION. A quixotic attempt by Rudolf Hess to broker a negotiated peace with Great Britain, the Hess Mission began with his dramatic solo departure from Augsburg in a Messerschmidt BF 110 bomber and his arrival by parachute in a field near Glasgow, Scotland, on 10 May 1941. One of the earliest members of the Nazi Party, Hess had risen to the position of deputy Führer, although his influence within the inner circle had diminished significantly since the outbreak of war. His plan—using the Duke of Hamilton as an intermediary—was to bring about the rapprochement with Great Britain that had eluded Adolf Hitler, stressing that Germany had no designs against the British Empire and would confine its sphere of influence to continental Europe. But Hess, posing as Captain Albert Horn, was immediately captured and then interrogated by the Secret Intelligence Service. Whereas Prime Minister Winston Churchill reacted with a certain bemused detachment, Hitler was stunned by this display of insubordination and angrily attributed it to Hess’s mental instability.

Various conspiracy theories circulated—one maintaining that British intelligence had helped to arrange this mission, another that it had been authorized by Hitler in advance. Joseph Stalin, haunted by the fear of imminent betrayal, was firmly convinced of such a scenario. Yet all credible evidence—including the findings of Walter Schellenberg—indicates that Hess acted alone, hoping that, if successful, this act would help restore his high standing with the Führer. Schellenberg nevertheless was convinced that Hess, in addition to his predilection for astrology, had been influenced by the British secret service and its collaborators. After spending the remainder of the war in British captivity, Hess received a life sentence from the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. He committed suicide at Spandau Prison in August 1987. Three years later, the Soviet KGB released several of its wartime files on Hess (labeled Black Bertha), insisting that the mission bore Hitler’s imprimatur and that the British secret service played a role as well.

HESSE, HORST (1922–2006). An East German double agent who penetrated U.S. Army intelligence in the Federal Republic of Germany, Horst Hesse was born in Magdeburg and trained as a mechanic. After being wounded and captured as an infantry corporal in
the Wehrmacht and held as a British prisoner of war, he returned to Magdeburg in 1945 and served with a border patrol unit of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). His injuries, however, prevented further police work, and in 1951 he found employment as a furnace tender in a local metalworking factory.

In January 1954, receiving an invitation from a former neighbor, Friedrich Vogt, to visit him in West Berlin at Vogt’s expense, Hesse reported the letter to authorities. A GDR State Security officer urged him to accept the offer and submit a report afterward under the code name JÜRGEN. At their meeting, Vogt secured his cooperation in providing information and photographs regarding Soviet troops stationed in the Magdeburg area. Working under the code name LUX, Hesse not only made a series of return visits to West Berlin with the requested material but also suggested the names of other potential East German recruits—all, however, under the guidance of his handler. The next step involved a staged incident in August whereby Hesse’s presumed role as a spy for the West became known to East German authorities. Interrogated by the Magdeburg police and later expelled from the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), Hesse fled to West Berlin claiming that he had been irrevocably compromised. This deception had its intended result, and by December he had been declared a political refugee. He was assigned to the Public Opinion Research Detachment, a unit of the 522nd Military Intelligence Battalion of the U.S. Army located in Würzburg.

Hesse’s main duties—coordinating radio contact with established agents in the GDR and recruiting new ones—were carried out to the satisfaction of his American superiors. Soon his work required monthly trips to West Berlin, which he also used for covert meetings with both his East German handler and his wife (code name HELGA) at a safe house in the eastern sector. His wife also visited him occasionally in Würzburg and submitted reports on her observations. Both were monitored for signs of marital discord or weakening of “class-consciousness.”

Rather than individually apprehend those persons identified by Hesse to his handler, GDR State Security officials decided to “liquidate” the U.S. Army’s intelligence unit in Würzburg with one dramatic action (code name SCHLAG). To take advantage of the traditional festivities that precede the religious holiday of Pentecost,
it was planned for the evening of 19 May 1956. Volunteering to stand guard alone in the office, Hesse was joined there by two other team members, and they removed two large Mosler safes containing highly classified material. Their contents were then placed in duffel bags for transport by car through the Helmstedt border crossing. Ten days after Hesse and his colleagues arrived in the GDR, Premier Otto Grotewohl announced that 137 American agents had been arrested. *Neues Deutschland*, the official organ of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, also warned East German citizens not to accept free food packages from the West because of their use as a recruitment device. The total number convicted of espionage, however, was considerably lower, as many had only received recruitment packages and not indicated any further interest.

Hesse held a press conference on 10 July and was later relocated to Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz). Readmitted to the SED, he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the East German police. In 1957, his memoirs—*Agentenfunkstelle Görzenberg Antwortet Nicht Mehr* (The Agent’s Wireless Station at Görzenberg Is No Longer Responding)—appeared, composed with the help of a ghostwriter. In 1962, the feature film *For Eyes Only: Streng Geheim* (Strictly Secret) was released. Based largely on Hesse’s exploits, it maintained—contrary to all known evidence—that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was planning a military attack on the GDR and thus attempted to supply a justification for the newly constructed Berlin Wall. Hesse died at Schwedt an der Oder on 16 December 2006.

**HEYDRICH, REINHARD (1904–1942).** The head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) and one of the chief architects of the Final Solution, Reinhard Heydrich was born in Halle on 7 March 1904, the son of an actress and a musician. Joining the German navy in March 1922, he came under the tutelage of Wilhelm Canaris, who introduced him to intelligence work. An indiscretion with the daughter of a naval officer, however, led to his dishonorable discharge in 1931. With no job prospects at hand, he joined the Nazi Party and was soon serving in the ranks of the SS. His initial assignment by Heinrich Himmler was to form a counterintelligence unit within the party—the forerunner of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service).
Impressed by his self-confidence, cold-blooded technocratic skills, and Aryan appearance, Himmler engaged Heydrich in development of the Gestapo. His role in the Night of the Long Knives in 1934 earned him a promotion, and within two years he had control of the Sicherheitspolizei. His targets were numerous, not only Jews and Marxists but also Catholics and representatives of the old order. Even party members and colleagues feared him. His method was rarely direct confrontation but rather carefully calculated subterfuge. When rumors began to circulate that Heydrich possessed Jewish ancestry through his father’s line, a special investigation was ordered. Despite its conclusion that the allegation had no factual basis, he continued to be haunted by this possibility, which aggravated his own highly suspicious temperament and singular pursuit of power.

In 1939, Heydrich was appointed head of the new RSHA, giving him authority over the Gestapo, the criminal police, and the SD. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hermann Göring commissioned him to carry out “a total solution of the Jewish question in those territories of Europe which are under German influence.” Heydrich accordingly convened the Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942 to harmonize the activities of the relevant government and party agencies. The extermination of Polish Jewry was code-named Operation Reinhard.

Heydrich was also named the successor to Constantin von Neurath as Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia. Taking up residence in Prague in late September 1941, he inaugurated a new policy toward the Czech population, first ruthlessly eliminating most of the resistance movement within a matter of weeks, then promoting improved living conditions for workers and peasants through a variety of measures. Czech exiles in London grew increasingly alarmed over the success of this pacification program and developed plans for his assassination—Operation Anthropoid. As Heydrich was riding in an open Mercedes on the outskirts of Prague—unarmored and unescorted—a two-man Czech squad fatally wounded him with a grenade thrown under the car. After his death on 4 June 1942, the most elaborate funeral in the history of the Third Reich was staged in Berlin, featuring eulogies by Hitler, Himmler, and Canaris. Moreover, the entire village of Lidice was razed to the ground as part of the savage reprisals. A monument to Heydrich with a perpetual SS
honor guard was maintained at the assassination site until the end of the war. See also BERNHARD; EINSATZGRUPPEN; SALON KITTY; TANNENBERG.

HIMMLER, HEINRICH (1900–1945). A pivotal figure of the Third Reich as head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler was born in Munich on 7 October 1900, the son of a Roman Catholic schoolmaster. After obtaining a degree in agriculture from the Munich Technical College, he worked as a laboratory assistant in a fertilizer factory and then as an unsuccessful poultry farmer. His strong attraction to the fledgling Nazi Party led him to participate in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, and he was the party’s deputy propaganda chief between 1925–1930. Most significant, however, was his appointment in 1929 as commander of Adolf Hitler’s personal bodyguard, the Schutzstaffel (SS; Protection Squad). In 1931, Himmler assigned the formation of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service), the counterintelligence unit of the party, to his protégé Reinhard Heydrich.

Following the Nazi seizure of power, various police organizations increasingly fell under his purview, beginning in Bavaria and extending to all of Germany by June 1936. In this process, Himmler revealed his determination, despite his taciturn demeanor, to unleash the full powers of the state against all perceived opponents of the Nazi regime. The creation of the first concentration camp at Dachau in 1933 and the bloody elimination of the rival SA the following year bore his imprint. With the outbreak of World War II came the opportunity to put his racial theories into practice. In October 1939, Hitler appointed Himmler the Commissar for Settlement in a newly annexed section of Poland, which resulted in the massive replacement of Jews and Poles with people of Aryan descent, especially from the Baltic region. Himmler also ardently promoted the breeding of SS men with women possessing ideal Nordic traits, even if it involved multiple sexual relationships.

In August 1943, as the tide of the war turned against Germany, Himmler was given the post of interior minister—a tacit recognition that Hitler’s authority now rested primarily on police repression, not public adulation. The failure of the army conspiracy against Hitler on 20 July 1944 further strengthened Himmler’s hand. In an ill-considered move, he was given the command of Army Group
Vistula, which proved unable to halt the advance of the Red Army into Pomerania. Yet as early as mid-1942, anticipating the eventual defeat of his country and working secretly in concert with SD chief Walter Schellenberg, Himmler had begun to explore the possibilities of a negotiated peace that would ensure his position in a postwar Germany. In late 1944, Himmler even agreed, mostly through the influence of his masseur Felix Kersten, to make some humanitarian concessions regarding the destruction of European Jewry. His secret peace overtures, as relayed via Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, not only failed to impress the Western Allies but were revealed by the press in late April 1945. Hitler angrily denounced this move as “the most shameful betrayal in human history” and expelled him from the party in his final political testament. Assuming a false identity—Heinrich Hitzinger of the undercover military police—Himmler attempted to return to Bavaria but was captured by British troops and brought to Lüneburg (Lower Saxony). On 23 May, before any interrogation took place, he committed suicide by swallowing a vial of potassium cyanide concealed in his mouth. See also NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES.

HINDRICHS, ARMIN. A valued agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) active in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Armin Hindrichs was imprisoned at Bautzen during the 1950s. After agreeing to work for the MfS, Hindrichs (code name TALAR) resettled in the FRG in 1960 and became associated with the Gesamtdeutsches Institut, a federal research center in Bonn regarded as a primary enemy target by the MfS. In 1972, Hindrichs joined the staff of the leader of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands in the Bundestag, Herbert Wehner. Reflecting the importance of his high-level information, Hindrichs was transferred to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung in 1978. A Düsseldorf court found him guilty of espionage in 1996 and issued a three-year prison sentence.

HIPPEL, THEODOR VON (1890–?). The creator of the special forces unit of the Abwehr, Theodor von Hippel served as a junior officer in World War I in German East Africa (now Tanzania) and observed firsthand the success of irregular warfare against Allied colonial troops. Joining the Wehrmacht in 1935, he attempted to
persuade his superiors of the necessity of small elite units—fluent in other languages and highly skilled in sabotage methods—that could create major disruption behind enemy lines. Although rejected by traditionalist officers, his idea found favor with Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, who authorized in September 1939 the secret formation of the Bau-Lehr-Kompanie zbV 800 (or Special Purpose Construction and Training Company No. 800) under Hippel’s command.

A rigorous training center was established on a country estate near Brandenburg, and within several months, as more volunteers materialized, the unit was upgraded to the status of a battalion and eventually became known as the Brandenburg Division. Despite his promotion to major in October 1940, Hippel was unable to realize his vision fully and therefore requested a reassignment “for reasons of health.” In 1943, commanding a German-Arabian unit in Tunisia, he was captured by American troops and held as a prisoner of war.

HIRSCH, KURT. A Bavarian journalist and agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Kurt Hirsch was born in Austria and drawn to left-wing activism at an early age. Following the Anschluss in 1938, he was arrested and placed in the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps until his liberation by U.S. forces at the end of World War II. Despite his membership in the postwar Austrian communist party and work for the Soviet news agency TASS, his alleged disenchantment with the Russians caused him to seek political asylum in Switzerland in 1948 and move to the Federal Republic of Germany a year later.

There Hirsch established close contacts with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and came to specialize in detailed exposés of neo-Nazi activity in the country. In 1970, motivated by ideology, Hirsch (code name HELM) formalized his relationship with the disinformation division of the HVA, which then supplied him with abundant subsidies and material as well as an East German passport bearing a false name. Although the contents of his reports received a high rating, his primary function was as an Einflussagent, or agent of influence, who would sway public opinion. Suspicion of his HVA connection surfaced in 1987 and caused the SPD to terminate its funding of his fortnightly information service Blick nach rechts. Although the Rosenholz documents confirmed his affiliation
and an investigation was launched in 1993, it was suspended three years later because of his poor health.

**HITLER DIARIES FORGERY.** A major journalistic scandal originating in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1982, the Hitler diaries forgery concerned a set of 62 handwritten volumes presumably written by Adolf Hitler. The actual author was Konrad Kujau (whose various aliases included Konrad Fischer, Peter Fischer, and Heinz Fischer). Born in Loebau (Saxony) on 27 June 1938, and rootless at war’s end, Kujau began a life of occasional employment and petty crime, including forgery. In the 1970s, residing near Stuttgart, he developed a flourishing business trafficking in Nazi military memorabilia illegally obtained from the German Democratic Republic (GDR). His talent for drawing also led him to produce a series of paintings employing Hitler’s style, which he then sold as genuine items. For one of his prime customers, the industrialist Fritz Stiebel, Kujau forged a slim diary in Hitler’s hand as well.

The other central figure in this affair was Gerd Heidemann, a prominent reporter for *Stern*, West Germany’s leading illustrated magazine. Born in Hamburg on 4 December 1931, Heidemann had shown an early passion for photography and, at the age of 24, became a permanent member of the magazine’s staff. Although his ability as a writer was limited, he soon gained a reputation for his dogged persistence in tracking a story and traveled to numerous exotic locales. Heidemann also had a strong penchant for Nazi memorabilia, which led to frequent purchases, including the former yacht of Hermann Göring. In January 1980, Stiebel showed Heidemann the purported diary, which aroused his desire to inspect the other volumes.

Slowly the paths of Kujau and Heidemann converged, and an agreement resulted. Insisting on total anonymity, Kujau would deliver the volumes in regular intervals, supposedly from an East German general who had found them at the site of a plane crash near Dresden in the last months of World War II. Heidemann, on behalf of *Stern* and its parent firm, Gruner und Jahr, would pay roughly 2.5 million DM. Despite some early indications pointing to the inauthenticity of the volumes, Heidemann appeared no less intent on proceeding with the project and visited Börnersdorf in the GDR, the site of the plane crash, to investigate matters further. In spring 1982, the
diaries underwent their first forensic analysis. But only relatively small samples had been sent by the magazine to experts for a handwriting examination. When the findings (including one from the Federal Archives in Coblenz) proved positive, the magazine sought to increase its profits by selling the rights of syndication to various foreign publications. A hasty inspection and validation by Hugh Trevor-Roper, the former Regius Professor of History at Oxford and a wartime member of British intelligence, helped convince publisher Rupert Murdock to make arrangements for installments of the diary to appear in the London *Sunday Times*. *Newsweek* likewise displayed interest.

On 25 April 1983, *Stern* made its first public announcement regarding the diaries’ existence, sparking a heated debate throughout the world. A new series of tests was therefore performed by the Federal Archives, this time examining the chemical composition of the ink, paper, glue, and bindings. Less than two weeks later, authorities announced that the documents had been produced with materials of postwar vintage. More extensive handwriting analysis and a closer analysis of the contents provided added confirmation of their inauthenticity. Shortly afterward, learning that *Stern* had paid a total of 9 million DM and realizing that only a quarter of that amount had reached him, Kujau became irate and eventually made a confession to West German police. Heidemann maintained that he had simply been duped by Kujau. At the conclusion of a lengthy trial, Kujau and Heidemann were sentenced to about four and a half years imprisonment; Kujau’s wife received eight months probation. The judge further stated that the publishing company had acted “with such naiveté and negligence that it was virtually an accomplice in the fraud.” Following his release, Kujau used his new celebrity to start a lucrative business selling acknowledged forgeries. He died in September 2000.

Another dimension to Heidemann’s earlier life came to public attention in the summer of 2002. According to the records of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS), he had been recruited as an agent in August 1953 and given the code name GERMARD. His subsequent assignments came to include photographing the school for military police in Oberammergau, restricted USAREUR installations near Kaiserslautern, and the naval border police outside...
Lübeck. Although praised by his superiors for “outstanding work” and eager to acquire the extra funds, he became fearful of detection and withdrew his services in July 1955. Heidemann’s file remained active (later under the code name Rose) and was transferred from the domestic counterintelligence department to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) headed by Markus Wolf in July 1978. Not until eight years later—16 months following his guilty verdict—did HVA officials place his file in the archives as inoperative. While conceding his early relationship with the MfS, Heidemann declared that he had been a double agent from the outset and had conveyed all his payments to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz office in Hamburg. A later head of the Hamburg office refused to confirm or deny Heidemann’s statement.

The controversy over the Hitler diaries also became a contentious issue in Cold War politics. Some authorities in the United States and Britain (including a former deputy director of MI6) suspected that the diaries formed part of an East German disinformation campaign designed to sow discord among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while both the Soviet Union and the GDR saw the publication as a belated attempt to rehabilitate Hitler. No documentary evidence exists, however, to support either allegation.

HOfer, heidrun. A secretary at the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) recruited by the KGB, Heidrun Hofer was the daughter of a former Abwehr officer. Her seduction by one of the Romeo spies—an East German Illegaler (code name Roland) who claimed to be a member of a right-wing patriotic society—occurred while she was working in the Paris office of the BND in 1971. He then introduced Hofer (code name Rosie) to another Illegaler (code name Vladimir), in reality Ivan Dmitryevich Unrau, an ethnic German born in Russia in 1914. At their meeting in Innsbruck, Austria, in late February 1973, Unrau—claiming to be a leader of the neo-Nazi underground—outlined the information that the KGB required. The following year, Hofer was transferred to the BND headquarters in Pullach and worked successively for the West European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization liaison departments. On 21 December 1977, driving across the Austrian border to meet her control officer, she was arrested by West German authorities. Hofer confessed, then
attempted suicide by jumping from a sixth-floor window, leaving her critically injured. The charges against Hofer eventually expired and were dropped in 1987.

HOHENLOHE, STEPHANIE VON (1891–1972). A resilient and resourceful international figure widely suspected of being a Nazi agent, Stephanie von Hohenlohe was born Stephanie Richter in Vienna on 16 September 1891, the illegitimate daughter of Jewish parents. On 12 May 1914, she married Prince Friedrich Franz von Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schillingsfürst in London, but their union ended in divorce six years later. After working as a volunteer Red Cross nurse during World War I, she chose Hungarian citizenship with the demise of the dual monarchy and continued to cultivate her ties among international high society. A critical relationship was formed with the British press magnate Lord Rothermere, who engaged her services as an informant and liaison. Although he had come to support the monarchy’s restoration in Hungary and Germany, it was the appointment of Adolf Hitler as chancellor that provoked his greatest interest. Desiring a personal interview, Rothermere appointed Hohenlohe as his emissary, who made the arrangements and then served as hostess for their meeting in Berlin in December 1934. (The relationship with Rothermere later deteriorated and ended in an unsuccessful lawsuit by Hohenlohe alleging the promise of an annual lifetime retainer.)

Hohenlohe received the relatively restricted Gold Medal of the Nazi Party in 1937. Her role as a liaison between members of the British elite and officials of the Third Reich continued, culminating in a meeting at the Berghof between Hitler and Edward, Duke of Windsor, accompanied by his wife Wallis Simpson. Hohenlohe also began an intense affair with Friedrich Wiedemann, one of Hitler’s four personal adjutants. When Hitler learned of the affair in 1939, Wiedemann was dismissed, while SS chief Heinrich Himmler produced evidence linking Hohenlohe with British intelligence. Appointed consul general in San Francisco, Wiedemann was joined by Hohenlohe the following year, and both were kept under close surveillance by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A meeting took place on 27 November 1940 between Hohenlohe, Wiedemann, and William Wiseman, former head of the British Secret Intelligence Service in the United States, but nothing materialized
regarding their plan for a negotiated peace between Great Britain and Nazi Germany.

Describing her as “extremely intelligent, dangerous and cunning,” and as a spy “worse than 10,000 men,” the FBI blocked the renewal of Hohenlohe’s temporary visa and urged her deportation. Estranged from Wiedemann but determined to remain in the country, she seduced Major Lemuel B. Schofield, director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. In a confidential memorandum to Attorney General Francis Biddle, Schofield stressed her potential usefulness in enlightening the American public about the threat posed by the Third Reich and how Hitler might be overthrown. Placed in an internment camp in Seagoville, Texas, Hohenlohe cooperated with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, providing intimate knowledge of Hitler. Released in 1945, she convinced authorities that the persistent charge of being a Nazi spy had no basis in fact and received permission to stay in the country. A new career as an international journalist commenced following her return to Europe in 1959. She died in Geneva on 13 June 1972.

HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN, PRINCE KRAFT ZU (1827–1892).
A Prussian army officer and military writer, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen joined the Prussian Guard Artillery in 1845. Following the outbreak of the Crimean War, he was sent to Vienna as the first military attaché in 1854. Despite the defensive alliance between the two states, Habsburg officials repeatedly ignored Hohenlohe’s request for information concerning the state of the Austrian army. He nevertheless worked out an accurate order of battle by scrutinizing the daily Viennese press, supplemented by salon gossip and the reports of professional agents. He was thus able to warn Berlin of military moves by Austria that threatened the existing treaty. His skillful methods of analysis and appraisal were held up as a model for his successors. Hohenlohe later served with distinction in the Seven Weeks’ War with Austria and the Franco-Prussian War. After his retirement in 1879, he wrote a four-volume autobiography, Aus meinem Leben (From My Life), which appeared in installments posthumously between 1897 and 1908.

HOHENLOHE-LANGENBERG, PRINCE MAXIMILIAN EGON ZU (1897–?). A German and American informant during World War
II and member of the anti-Nazi resistance, Prince Maximilian Egon zu Hohenlohe-Langenberg belonged to a Sudeten German noble family and was a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. To protect the vast family estates in the Sudetenland, he supported Adolf Hitler’s move against Czechoslovakia in 1938 and made his services as a diplomat available to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service). Yet the unleashing of war the following year caused him to convey his strong disapproval to Nazi officials, including Hitler. As a firm believer in the old-style European concert of powers, he also journeyed to Switzerland, where Allied diplomats such as Sir David Kelly of Great Britain displayed interest in his proposals for a mediated peace. The Vatican also used him as an intermediary to convey warnings to Nazi officials in Berlin.

In early 1942, Hohenlohe found an ally in Walter Schellenberg, head of the SD, as both men wanted to see the removal of Hitler and a compromise peace with the Allies. Hohenlohe, employed as the general agent for the Skoda works in Western Europe, then contacted Sir Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador in Madrid, and relayed their proposal. On 7 April 1943, contact was also made with Allen Dulles, the head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Bern. Despite a warning by the American ambassador to Spain, Carleton Hayes, that Hohenlohe was unscrupulous and not to be trusted, Dulles, who had known him since World War I, thought he could be useful, bearing in mind that his main concern was his property interests. Hohenlohe was assigned the code name BULLS-PAUL. In appealing for a reconciliation of the Western powers with Germany, Hohenlohe cautioned Dulles that otherwise not only the German resistance but the Nazi government might seek a separate agreement with the Soviet Union.

HÖHER, WOLFGANG (1914–1959). An East German double agent in the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Wolfgang Höher served as a Wehrmacht officer during World War II and was released from a Soviet prisoner of war camp in 1949. Joining the OG shortly afterward, he became head of its counterintelligence office in West Berlin. In June 1952, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency warned the OG of a probable Eastern bloc connection, but no immediate action was taken. On 13 February 1953, Markus Wolf responded to Höher’s growing fear of exposure by having him drugged in a West Berlin
bar on Wittenbergplatz and returned to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), presumably as the victim of a kidnapping. Not only were important OG networks compromised as a result of his activity, but Höher served as a witness for the prosecution in several GDR trials, including that of Werner Haase. As a further propaganda ploy, a brochure entitled Agent 2996 enthüllt (Agent 2996 Exposes) appeared in 1958. Höher remained in Leipzig until his death the following year.

HÖKE, MARGARETE (1935–). A secretary in the office of the president of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) who was seduced by one of the East German Romeo spies, Margarete Höke worked in the mobilization and security departments. In 1968, she attracted the attention of Hans-Jürgen Henze, an illegaler (code name HAGEN; pseudonym Franz Becker) with ties to the KGB, and an amorous relationship gradually developed. She complied with his request to obtain material from her office to help supplement his feigned dissertation on the role of the president in the FRG.

Several years later, hoping to appeal to Höke’s right-wing political outlook, Henze claimed to be a member of a patriotic organization based in Brazil that needed inside information about the Bonn government. A written contract was concluded, stipulating a monthly payment of 500 DM for confidential material obtained from her office. Through Höke (code name DORIS), the KGB acquired the mobilization plans of the Chancellor’s Office and the West German ministries, secret weekly reports of the foreign ministry to the president, and accounts of his meetings with foreign diplomats. In 1976, although Henze returned to the German Democratic Republic, he continued to meet with Höke in Bonn and Zurich, where her deliveries were made. Suspended because of a security scare in 1979, Höke was reactivated the following year under the code name VERA. Her information now included confidential details about the deployment of Pershing II missiles in the FRG as well as the government’s wartime command and control system. Arrested in 1985, Höke readily confessed and received a sentence of eight years and a fine of 33,000 DM (presumably the sum total of her KGB payments). She gained early release from prison on 21 December 1989.
HORATZEK, JOHANNES (1896–?). A veteran intelligence operative, Johannes Horatzek entered the Abwehr in 1924. Because of his Czech background and fluent Polish, he developed numerous contacts in East Central Europe. In 1939, while director of the West Prussian substation at Elbing (now Elbdag, Poland), Horatzek obtained Poland’s military mobilization plans prior to the German attack. The Abwehr station in Warsaw then came under his direction for the duration of the war. In 1950, despite their contrasting personalities, Horatzek was selected by Fritz Tejessy as his main assistant in his new intelligence organization based in Düsseldorf.

HORST, LOUIS VON (1865–1947). A German-American businessman falsely accused of espionage by the British during World War I, Louis von Horst was born in Tuttlingen (Württemberg) on 16 December 1865. He and his family immigrated to the United States five years later. Horst left school at the age of 16, and in 1889 he and his two brothers founded a company that became the largest producer and trader of hops used in the brewing industry. Because of Horst’s extensive patronage, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha conferred on him the honorary hereditary title of “Baron” in 1899. Two years later, the brothers decided to divide the company, and Horst assumed direction of the English branch. As his large hops ranches in California allowed him to offer his product at a lower price than English suppliers, his company became the object of large-scale protests by competitors and protectionist groups.

On 31 August 1914, Horst was arrested by Scotland Yard and placed in a detention camp as an enemy alien, where he remained for the duration of World War I. An MI5 report of March 1917 categorized him as “an undoubted German spy,” primarily on the basis of his humanitarian support for striking British dockworkers in 1912, his links to the suffragette movement, and his connections to certain Irish nationalists. Fearing the death penalty if found guilty, Horst refrained from going to trial, even though the evidence produced by the government was highly circumstantial. In addition, neither the United States nor Germany was willing to declare him a bona fide citizen. In March 1919, he was expelled from Britain to Germany as an “undesirable alien.” Despite the loss of his company, Horst managed to reconstruct his hops business in the interwar period. He died in Coburg in 1947.
HÖTTL, WILHELM (1915–1999). An Austrian Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) officer who established contacts with multiple intelligence organizations in the postwar period, Wilhelm Höttl was born in Vienna on 19 March 1915, the son of an Austrian civil servant. A member of the Nazi youth group at the age of 16, he joined the SS two years later and performed illegal work for the SD. Following the Anschluss of 1938, he continued his SD work on a legal basis, concentrating on Jewish and Freemason matters, while also completing his doctorate in history at the University of Vienna. By December 1940, owing to his “outstanding achievements,” he headed the intelligence division of the local SD office. The following year, however, his superior, Friedrich Polte, took issue with his propensity for scheming, initiated an investigation, and had him transferred to the eastern front as a war correspondent.

Only with the appointment of fellow Austrian Ernst Kaltenbrunner as head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in January 1943 was Höttl able to resume his intelligence career. The investigation abruptly dropped, he returned to Vienna to take over the Italian desk, playing an important supplemental role in the German rescue of Musсолini (Operation Eiche). His earlier network of 24 key informants in southeastern Europe was reactivated, and a skilled corps of Hungarian cryptanalysts supplied him with much information. Following the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, he remained in Budapest, serving as the chief SD intelligence officer and political advisor to Edmund Veesenmayer, the Reich plenipotentiary in Hungary. Kaltenbrunner maintained after the war that Höttl was his best source of information on the country.

With German defeat an increasing certainty, Höttl contacted Allen Dulles, station chief of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern. In spring 1945, Dulles, whose goal was both a separate peace with Austria and a split in the ranks of the SD, met several times with Höttl (code name ALPBERG). Although the OSS knew of Höttl’s role in the deportation of Hungarian Jews, it was hoped that he might provide information about the Alpine Redoubt, presumably an impregnable fortress being readied for the last ferocious battle of the war but which never materialized. His promise to arrange a meeting between Dulles and Kaltenbrunner remained unfulfilled, and he surrendered to the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) in
May 1945. American authorities concluded that Höttl was probably playing a double game and decided that he would only be used as a witness at the Nuremberg Trials (his most notable contribution was estimating the number of Jews killed by the Nazis at six million).

Transferred to the Klessheim prison camp in Salzburg, Austria, Höttl secured his release in December 1947 by convincing CIC officials of his value as an intelligence asset. Two networks were set up under his auspices: one, code-named MONTGOMERY, was directed at Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine; the other, MOUNT VERNON, dealt with the Soviet zone in Austria. Serious irregularities began to surface, however—not just evidence of financial chicanery, but mounting proof that Höttl had been engaged by the Soviets as well. At the same time, Höttl offered his services separately to the French and the West Germans, notably Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz. Höttl also established a publishing house in Linz—the Nibelungen Verlag—which in 1950 issued his first and quite successful book, Die geheime Front (The Secret War) under the pseudonym Walter Hagen (the names of his two sons). Arrested and inconclusively interrogated by the CIC in March 1953, he was released the following month. While an offer from Yugoslavia to work undercover in Trieste never went beyond some initial discussions, a second book appeared in 1955 dealing with his role in Operation BERNHARD, and he positioned himself as an intelligence expert unsullied by his Nazi past and his communist connections. Höttl’s final autobiographical account—Einsatz für das Reich (Mission for the Reich)—appeared in 1997. He died in Bad Aussee, Austria, on 27 July 1999.

HUPPENKOTHEN, WALTER (1907–1979). The head of the counterintelligence section of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Walter Huppenkothen was born in Haan (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 31 December 1907, the son of an industrial foreman. In 1933, after completing his legal studies at Cologne and Düsseldorf, he joined the Nazi Party and the SS. His brief tenure with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) was followed by his transfer to the Gestapo in fall 1935. With the outbreak of World War II, Huppenkothen’s activities shifted to Poland, where he served with one of the Einsatzgruppen and directed the Gestapo during the military occupation of Lublin.
Recalled to Berlin in June 1941, Huppenkothen was appointed head of the counterintelligence division (Group IVE; after 1944, Section IV a 3) of the newly formed Reichssicherheitshauptamt. He further belonged to the special commission that was formed under Ernst Kaltenbrunner following the conspiracy of 20 July 1944. Huppenkothen’s most notorious assignment was carried out in early April 1945 as the ruthless prosecutor in the summary court proceedings against Hans von Dohnányi at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and against Wilhelm Canaris (a long-standing enemy), Hans Oster, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer at the Flossenbürg concentration camp. Shortly afterward, he was captured by U.S. forces and held for four years. On 19 June 1956, after numerous trials, West Germany’s highest court found him guilty as an accessory to murder in seven instances and imposed a six-year prison term. Huppenkothen was also required to testify at the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961. He died in Lübeck in 1979.

_ILLEGALER_. An intelligence professional dispatched to a foreign destination under a false identity, an _Illegaler_ (illegal) does not necessarily operate illegally but rather secretly. Employed extensively by the _Ministerium für Staatssicherheit_ during the Cold War, these covert operatives usually entered the Federal Republic of Germany via a third country and developed their legend over time before being activated. As a result of Operation _ANMELDUNG_ in 1979, more than 100 such operatives were identified and investigated. _See also_ HEMPEL, HEINZ; KUNZE, ROSALIE; LUDWIG, HERBERT; RAKOW, WERNER; RUNGE, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH; SOSNOWSKI, GEORG; STOEBER, KARL-HEINZ.

_INDISCHE LEGION_. An _Abwehr_ unit composed of Indian volunteers and recruits, the Indische Legion (Indian Legion) was conceived in April 1941 following the arrival in Berlin of Subhas Chandra Bose, the leader of the radical wing of the All-Indian Congress. Bose had escaped from British house arrest in Calcutta with the assistance of both the Abwehr and the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs). The first members of the legion were drawn from Indian prisoners of war captured in North Africa as well as Indians living in Germany. Further efforts by Bose produced 6,000 additional volunteers, although the nucleus of the new army was limited to 300 people sent to a special training facility at Königsbrück near Dresden.

The Abwehr envisioned a campaign that would advance via the Caucasus into India and spark an anti-British revolt. In a preparatory move, Operation bajadere was launched in January 1942, paradropping an elite force of 100 into eastern Persia (Iran) so they could commit acts of sabotage in their homeland. Yet the later German reversals at El Alamein and Stalingrad meant that the planned offensive had little chance of materializing. The main body of the Indische Legion was surreptitiously transferred to Southeast Asia and became part of the failed Japanese invasion of India through Burma. Those soldiers remaining in Europe were absorbed into the Waffen-SS in August 1944.

INFORMATIONSSTELLE III (INF III). The intelligence service of the German Foreign Office during World War II, Informationsstelle III (Information Post III) was formed by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in order to lessen his dependence on the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst for secret information and to improve his personal standing with Adolf Hitler. Operations began in April 1941 under the direction of Andor Hencke, a career diplomat then serving in Berlin. Forswearing “active espionage” and relying instead on information obtained from German newspaper and wire service correspondents, businesspeople, and local German residents, Hencke established acquisition posts in the missions located in neutral countries as well as those aligned with Germany. A particular emphasis was placed on the Balkans. Yet by 1943, owing in part to courier problems, the quality and quantity of the reports had declined significantly, and the service was terminated prior to the end of the war. Hencke later conceded that the accomplishments of Inf III were of “no great significance.”

INOFFIZIELLE MITARBEITER (IM). Informers working for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Inoffizielle Mitarbei-
(unofficial collaborators) formed the key component of the vast surveillance
and intelligence network of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). These agents
were described by Ernst Wollweber as his organization’s “respiratory organs.”
Prior to 1968, their official name was Geheime Informatoren (secret informers),
a term derived from Soviet practice, even though the designation IM had been in use
since the MfS’s founding in 1950.

Five major ministerial guidelines—three during the 1950s, one in 1968,
and one in 1979—enumerated the functions of the many different IM categories
and stressed the necessity of regular meetings along with the systematic cultivation
of the agent’s trust by the Führungsoffizier, the officer directly responsible for
an individual agent. The most prevalent type of agent—the IMS—had the
task of providing information about specific security concerns and helping to
identify individuals engaged in subversive activity. The IMBs—the most prized
category that included Alexander Anderson, Rainer Schedlinski, and Paul Wiens—
were significantly fewer in number and assiduously sought to infiltrate and influence
groups considered hostile to the state. By the mid-1980s, there was on average one IM
for every 120 citizens of the GDR, with the highest concentration in the area
surrounding Cottbus and the lowest in the region of Halle. Women and minors
formed only a small percentage of the total number of agents. Likewise voluntary
denunciations were viewed with considerable skepticism, as the MfS much preferred
to select and develop their own IM candidates. The entire procedure—from
the initial contact to the signing of an oath of commitment—could
be completed within a few weeks but might extend up to seven
years. In certain special cases such as those of Robert Havemann
and Manfred Stolpe, the written pledge was waived. A Deckname
for the IM was selected at the outset and used exclusively thereafter
as a security precaution. Clandestine meetings generally took place
on a weekly basis, mostly at a konspirative Wohnung but also in
restaurants and parks.

The motivation to become an IM varied greatly and usually invo-
olved a complex number of reasons. While compromising materi-
als might be used in the recruitment process, prime emphasis was
placed on avoiding outright coercion and finding points of mutual
agreement. Even though IMs received some financial remuneration,
the sums were generally small and preference was given to rewards such as an automobile, an apartment, a telephone, or a coveted job or place at a university. By no means the norm, there were nevertheless numerous instances of refusal to collaborate from the outset. Recruitment of West German citizens normally occurred in the GDR and most frequently on the recommendation of an active IM. Procedures ranged from Romeo spies and falsche Flagge operations to ideological enticement and blackmail.

Some IMs had an additional function beyond collecting political and economic information. In the event of a military conflict with the Federal Republic of Germany, a special network had been established to provide material and logistical assistance to trained partisan fighters from the GDR. A number of these IMs were given instruction in sabotage. During the 40-year existence of the GDR, about 6,000 West Germans worked in different capacities as IMs. Especially noteworthy was the length of their commitment, as many were active for more than 10 years. See also ROSENHOLZ.

**INSIDERKOMITEE.** A revisionist group of former members and agents of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, the Insiderkomitee (Insider Committee) was founded in 1991 to defend the reputation of the German Democratic Republic and its security apparatus. In addition to its publications and website, protest activities have taken place at the memorial at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen. Government authorities declined in 2007 to declare the group “anticonstitutional” and place it under regular surveillance.

**INSTRUKTEUR.** An intelligence operative charged with servicing agents in enemy territory, an Instrukteur (instructor) arranges meetings on a regular basis and is authorized to make certain field decisions. A Kurier (courier), by contrast, functions primarily as a messenger.

– J –

**JABLONKA PASS.** The site of an Abwehr incursion immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Jablonka Pass is a key
strategic point in the Carpathian Mountains between Poland and Czechoslovakia. On 26 August 1939, not having received word of the delay of the Polish invasion, an advance 70-man unit of the Abwehr under the command of Albrecht Herzner attacked a critical rail station and tunnel and captured some 800 Polish soldiers. A German combat division was then prepared to advance from its camp in the High Tatra. This untimely incursion, however, compromised the effect of Operation TANNENBERG—the plan of the Sicherheitsdienst to paint Poland as the instigator of hostilities. See also BRANDENBURG DIVISON.

JÄHN, SIGMUND (1937– ). The first German to orbit in space, Sigmund Jähn joined the air force of the Nationale Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic in 1955. A graduate of the USSR Juri Gagarin Air Force Academy, he was accepted into the Soviet cosmonaut unit in 1976. His two years of preparatory training required “performing services” for the East German military attaché in Moscow, whose office was directly controlled by the Verwaltung Aufklärung. While on board the Soyuz 31 and Soyuz 29, however, Jähn carried out no known intelligence assignment during the nearly eight-day flight in 1978.

JAHNKE, KURT (1888–1945). A spy active from the eve of World War I to the conclusion of World War II, Kurt Jahnke was born near Gnese (now Gniezno, Poland) on 17 February 1888, the son of a Pomeranian landowner. Enlisting in the German navy shortly after 1900, he subsequently worked for the International Customs Service based in Peking and established his first contact with the Chinese secret police. Following a brief return to Europe with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he immigrated to the United States in 1909 and joined the U.S. Marine Corps. His postings included San Francisco, Pearl Harbor, and the Philippines before a case of malaria forced his discharge 10 months later. Based in San Francisco prior to 1914, he operated a lucrative shipping and smuggling business between the Pacific ports of the United States and Mexico and those of East Asia. His adroit ability to alter his appearance was reflected in the numerous aliases he employed, such as Aveenky, Yeenky, Yahuke, Kurt or Kort Boden, Albert E. Steffens, Jan Peter Cronje, and
José Iturbide. U.S. Military Intelligence described him as a “charming, cultured gentleman.”

In the course of World War I, Jahnke offered his services to the intelligence and sabotage sections of German naval intelligence (“N”). His job, as he later stated, was “to collect information about the American munitions production and send it on to Germany.” In the United States and Mexico, one of his primary contacts was the radical labor organization Industrial Workers of the World. A postwar investigation by the U.S. and German Mixed Claims Commission found Germany responsible for the enormous explosion at Black Tom Island on 30 July 1916, although Jahnke’s involvement was never definitively established. According to the testimony given to his Russian captors at the end of World War II, the diversionary acts he organized in 1917 resulted in the sinking of 14 American steamers.

Following a short period in Mexico, Jahnke returned to Germany in January 1921. Two years later, he undertook acts of sabotage against the French during their occupation of the Ruhr. Jahnke’s undercover involvement also aided the secret military contacts that developed between the Reichswehr and the Red Army in the course of the 1920s. With the advent of the Third Reich, the intelligence service that he had established—the Jahnke-Büro (Jahnke Office)—became housed in the Nazi Party Chancellory under the aegis of Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess. The intermediary involved was SA leader Franz Pfeffer von Salomon, whose protection helped keep the sub rosa activities of the Jahnke-Büro out of the realm of open controversy. Because of Jahnke’s wide circle of important contacts, many leading Nazis relied on his semiofficial intelligence for pieces of information.

Jahnke’s opposition to the war with England as well as his disdain for Hitler and SS Chief Heinrich Himmler put him clearly out of favor, especially with Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Although his intelligence operation was dismantled by Heydrich, Jahnke found a position in 1941 working under Walter Schellenberg, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the Sicherheitsdienst. Schellenberg relied on this “remarkable” man especially for intelligence about East Asia and Russia. Jahnke also told him that the full value of a secret service depended on the number and
quality of the double agents it enlisted. In 1943, Jahnke’s Berlin villa was destroyed, and afterward he led a secluded life, mostly on his Pomeranian estate. Shortly following his capture and interrogation by the Soviets in 1945, he was executed.

JAMIN, ERICH (1907–1976). A director of K-5 and later senior official in the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Erich Jamin was born in Witten (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 20 March 1907, the son of a locksmith. A member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands since 1929, he was arrested by Nazi officials for treasonous activities and placed in Brandenburg Prison in 1936. He was later transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and then to a prisoner’s unit of the Wehrmacht captured in 1944 by the Red Army. Released in 1947, Jamin returned to Germany and took charge of K-5 the following year. With the formation of the HVA came a variety of new responsibilities, such as security clearance, underground operations, and relations with the People’s Police. He retired in 1965 and died on 29 December 1976.

JÄNICKE, HORST (1923–2006). A long-serving deputy head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Horst Jänicke was born in Strausberg (Brandenburg) on 4 January 1923. Trained as a baker, he was recruited into the Wehrmacht in 1941 and fell into Soviet captivity four years later. Following his release in 1949, Jänicke returned to the German Democratic Republic and became active in various capacities for the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. His entry into intelligence work coincided with the establishment of the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst in 1952, which evolved into the HVA.

Named second deputy of the HVA in 1971 and first deputy in 1986, Jänicke had particular responsibility for developing ties with Third World countries—notably Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola—in the wake of the greatly expanded international diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic. He also assisted with the escape of targeted Chilean communists following the coup of August Pinochet in 1973. Despite his retirement in February 1989, Jänicke, together with former HVA chief Werner Grossmann, attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a general amnesty agreement for
all officers and their agents after German reunification. He died in Berlin on 1 January 2006.

JEBSEN, JOHANN (?–1944). An Abwehr defector involved in the British Double Cross system, Johann Jebsen was born in Hamburg and studied at the University of Freiburg, where he developed a friendship with Dusan Popov. In 1940, Jebsen joined the Abwehr to avoid frontline duty and was instrumental in recruiting Popov (code name IWAN), unaware that he had already concluded an agreement with the British. Three years later, stationed in Lisbon, Jebsen voiced his growing disenchantment with the Nazi regime to Popov, which led to his enlistment by MI5 beginning in September 1943 (code name ARTIST). The British especially valued his detailed information about Abwehr operations and procedures and its problematic relationship to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). In late April 1944, in a joint Abwehr-SD operation, Jebsen was kidnapped and brought to Germany for interrogation in the false bottom of a trunk. The charges concerned alleged currency violations, not his double allegiance, as was greatly feared in London. He presumably died shortly thereafter in the Oranienburg concentration camp.

JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES. A Christian sect targeted by both Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a subversive organization, the Jehovah’s Witnesses adhere to a strict set of nonconformist and apolitical beliefs. They numbered about 25,000–30,000 in Germany when they came under early attack by the Third Reich on ideological grounds. Already in 1933, police twice occupied their offices and printing site in Magdeburg and confiscated their religious literature. A nationwide ban came into effect two years later. Because of their absolute refusal to bear arms for any political regime, many were placed in concentration camps and kept segregated from other prisoners. Of the 2,000 sent to the camps, roughly 1,200 lost their lives, despite their disavowal of political resistance and reputation for general trustworthiness. Heinrich Himmler even held up their “fanatical faith” as an example to his own SS troops. The GDR banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses early on in August 1950. According to official propaganda, they served as agents of American imperialism and therefore posed a grave danger to the new
socialist state. Show trials and imprisonment followed, with more than 2,000 members placed in confinement between 1950 and 1962. This policy of strident confrontation evolved into a more subtle infiltration of their Bible study groups by agents of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), as authorities remained convinced of the group’s basic conspiratorial nature. Defectors from the Jehovah’s Witnesses were also utilized by the MfS in the GDR’s larger antireligious disinformation campaign. Their membership, however, remained numerically constant throughout the period. See also BERLIN-HOHENSCHÖNHAUSEN.

JOHN, OTTO (1909–1997). A highly enigmatic counterintelligence official of the early Cold War who was convicted of treason by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Otto John was born in Marburg on 19 March 1909, the son of a land surveyor. After studying law in Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, he joined the legal offices of the civilian airline Lufthansa in 1937. He not only resisted joining the Nazi Party but through the influence of his superior, Klaus Bonhoeffer, became convinced of the necessity of toppling Adolf Hitler prior to 1939. During the war, John functioned as a liaison between the German resistance and British and American diplomats in Madrid and counted among those involved in the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. Although his younger brother was later shot by an SS commando team, John escaped via Madrid and Lisbon to London, where he became a collaborator with British intelligence, specializing in the broadcast of propaganda to Germany over Soldatensender Calais. At the end of the war, John assisted the British legal team at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and also in the prosecution of other German military officers.

In December 1950, strongly endorsed by the British, he became the first head of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), although some questioned his suitability for this key security post. In late July 1954, John, accompanied by his friend Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, a flamboyant West Berlin gynecologist, made a mysterious trip to the eastern sector and was taken to a KGB safe house in Karlshorst. He confirmed his defection on 11 August at a major press conference in East Berlin. His action, he explained, had been prompted by an overriding desire for a reunited Germany, which was being thwarted
by a West German government filled with too many unreconstructed Nazis and which could be better advanced by the German Democratic Republic (GDR). So convincing was John’s performance fielding questions from Western journalists that the Bonn government’s earlier charge of kidnapping quickly evaporated. A transcript of the press conference was issued under the title *Ich wählte Deutschland* (I Chose Germany) and included approving letters from both East and West Germans. For the nascent GDR struggling for world recognition, John’s defection had inestimable propaganda value.

KGB officials soon interrogated John in Moscow, where he revealed secrets and details about the internal operations of his office while at the same time proving resistant to recruitment attempts. Returning to the GDR in early December, he enjoyed relative freedom but had little political influence. At one point, John provoked the ire of celebrated author Thomas Mann, to whom he falsely attributed certain utterances highly critical of the West during an interview in Weimar. But life in East Germany soon lost its luster, and John solicited the aid of Danish journalist Hendryk Bone-Henryksen, who drove him from his Humboldt University office through the Brandenburg Gate to West Berlin on 12 December 1955. A plane then transported John to Cologne, where he was deferentially questioned and later arrested.

Approximately a year later, a West German court found him guilty of treason and sentenced him to four years in prison. By that time, John, completely reversing his earlier explanation, was claiming that his friend Wohlgemuth (who had remained in the GDR and later committed suicide) had given him a sedative and brought him to East Berlin against his will, and that all his actions in the GDR and Soviet Union had occurred under duress. No confidential information, he contended, had been divulged. After serving only 18 months of his sentence, John was released and began an uphill campaign for rehabilitation. In 1969, his account, *Zweimal kam ich heim: Vom Verschwörer zum Schützer der Verfassung* ( Twice through the Lines), appeared. Although Theodor Heuss, the first president of the FRG, voiced his early support, most observers remained unpersuaded, notably the West German courts, which repeatedly denied his request for an appeal. His state pension was annulled, but he received a small living allowance beginning in 1986. After resettling with his wife in
Austria, John died in Innsbruck on 26 March 1997. See also WITTIG, CARL.

JOST, HEINZ (1904–1964). The first head of the foreign intelligence division of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service), Heinz Jost was born in Holzhausen (Hesse) on 9 July 1904, the son of an apothecary. A student of law at Giessen and Munich, he passed his bar exam in 1927 and joined the Nazi Party the following year. The assumption of power by Adolf Hitler in 1933 helped bring about his appointment as police inspector in Worms and later Giessen. In July 1934, ignoring his lack of outstanding credentials, Reinhard Heydrich added him to his expanding SD staff and charged him with the conduct of foreign intelligence. This position—as head of Branch III—was formalized two years later, while Jost received additional responsibilities as deputy chief of counterintelligence with the Gestapo. Yet his preoccupation with internal party struggles prevented an active espionage system from developing, and other SD divisions began to develop their own contacts abroad.

Increasingly dissatisfied, Heydrich discontinued Jost’s counterintelligence position in October 1939 and transformed Branch III into Department VI of the newly created Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Jost’s hold on this office was shortlived. Heydrich, citing reasons of health, replaced him with a new protégé, Walter Schellenberg, in June 1941. After a period of unemployment, Jost served as head of one of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet Union. In January 1945, his early retirement was ordered by SS head Heinrich Himmler. After his capture by Allied forces in April, Jost counted among those indicted in the Einsatzgruppen Trials held in Nuremberg in 1948. His life sentence was commuted three years later, and he moved to Düsseldorf as a real estate broker. He died in Bensheim (Hesse) on 12 November 1964.

JUNGES DEUTSCHLAND. A secret society with the objective of inciting a national revolution in Germany, Junges Deutschland (Young Germany) was founded in April 1834 in Bern, Switzerland, by five Germans, including Carl Theodor Barth and Franz Strohmeyer. Its direct inspiration stemmed from the Italian revolutionary leader Giuseppe Mazzini, who had established Giovine Italia (Young Italy)
three years earlier and was living in Swiss exile. Mazzini’s larger plan called for the formation of Young Europe based on the concepts of freedom, equality, and “religioni di patria” (devotion to country) and consisting of four national groups: Italian, German, Polish, and Swiss. Largely because of diplomatic pressure applied by Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich, Swiss authorities soon intervened and forced Mazzini and his followers to leave the country.

Barth, who headed the Junges Deutschland group in Bern, left for England but returned later to Switzerland to organize a German workers’ association. By contrast, Strohmeyer, departing the country in 1837, agreed to be an informant for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Metternich’s foreign surveillance operation. Despite sharing the identical name and many of the same revolutionary goals, Junges Deutschland had no direct ties to the circle of literary intellectuals around Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Börne. Both groups, however, were closely monitored by MIB agents. See also LESS-ING, LUDWIG.

JURETZKO, NORBERT. See FOERTSCH, VOLKER.

JURISTISCHE HOCHSCHULE DES MfS (JHS). The leading educational and research institution of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Juristische Hochschule des MfS (MfS School of Law) traces its origins to the Schule des MfS (MfS School) established on 16 June 1951 in Potsdam-Eiche. Initially concerned with instilling military and ideological discipline, it counted some 200 students in the first class. Although renamed the Hochschule des MfS (MfS College) in 1956, it did not acquire the status of a university until 1965, when it officially became the JHS. In 1968, on the 75th birthday of East German leader Walter Ulbricht, the right to award doctoral degrees was granted.

Unlike other schools of jurisprudence, however, the JHS was unknown to the general public and unlisted in the GDR’s published list of institutions of higher learning. It focused primarily on reinforcing Marxist-Leninist principles and developing specific operational skills; legal and constitutional issues received only peripheral attention. As the stated objective was to bring together theory and practice, those admitted to the school had to have completed at least three
years of active service. The vast majority of JHS dissertations (*Diplomarbeiten*) dealt with issues involving *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, while the second most frequent topic concerned the security measures at the West Berlin and West German border. Many of these classified documents then served as teaching tools in other instructional situations.

Even though more than 3,000 officers attended the JHS during its existence, they represented only a small fraction of the total number employed by the MfS. The careers of the 407 high-ranking officers who earned a JHS doctorate were enhanced by the addition of an academic title, yet it was never a stated requirement. Despite possessing the same status as the director of a main MfS division, the last JHS rector, Willi Opitz, complained of rarely having the opportunity to meet with Chief Minister *Erich Mielke*. The JHS (briefly renamed the College of the Office for National Security) was dissolved in January 1990. The German Unification Treaty of August 1990 expressly noted that law degrees obtained at the institution could not be equated with those obtained elsewhere and did not confer the right to practice law.

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**K-5.** A forerunner of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS), K-5 (Kriminalpolizei-5; Criminal Police-5) was the first organized political police force operating in the Soviet occupation zone after World War II. In an effort to coordinate regional criminal police functions, the German Interior Administration used the designation K-5 to apply to “other types of criminal offenses,” which ranged from assassination, sabotage, and crimes against humanity to the circulation of rumors and slogans critical of the reconstruction. Although all pre-1945 police officials were barred from its ranks, its brutal methods reminded many of the *Gestapo*, as it ruthlessly sought to secure the preeminent role of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Assigned prime responsibility in August 1947 to carry out denazification by Order 201 of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, K-5 authorities proceeded to arrest not only real and alleged Nazis but also many social democrats and other middle-class politicians. Thousands of people were sentenced to Soviet forced labors camps or the 10 similar internment camps located throughout the zone.
In May 1949, K-5 was separated from the other criminal police departments and placed under the auspices of the Interior Administration, whose vice president, Erich Mielke, assumed direct responsibility. K-5, however, remained beholden to the MVD (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security), carrying out orders and collecting information at their behest. With Soviet advisors active at every level, no official investigation could be conducted without their approval. In September 1949, many of K-5’s tasks were transferred to a newly created Main Administration for the Protection of the National Economy, also headed by Mielke. When the MfS was officially established in February 1950, only about 10 percent of nearly 1,600 K-5 employees met the Soviets’ strict vetting requirements and made the transition. See also JAMIN, ERICH.

KADE, GERHARD (1931–1995). A West German academic, peace activist, and agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Gerhard Kade was an economist at the University of Hamburg who researched and wrote prolifically on disarmament issues. After conceiving of a new group called Generale für den Frieden (Generals for Peace) in 1980, he made secret arrangements with the HVA for money and assistance and was assigned the code name SUPER. Although the organization comprised only a small section of the peace movement, it featured influential former military commanders from countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Wolf von Baudissin and Gert Bastian represented the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Besides receiving an annual subsidy of 100,000 DM from the HVA, Kade also had consultations with members of the KGB, which helped supply the basis of his pro-Soviet, anti-NATO position papers and interviews. Of particular concern was the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles in the FRG. In all likelihood, the generals remained unaware of Kade’s Eastern bloc connections. Kade died on 4 December 1995.

KALTENBRUNNER, ERNST (1903–1946). The head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) during its final phase, Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born in Ried, Austria, on 4 October 1903, the son of a lawyer. Following schooling in Linz, he studied law at Graz from
1921 to 1926, receiving a doctorate as well as taking a prominent part in the student fraternity Arminia, whose boycotts and demonstrations targeted Jewish students and professors, various foreign student groups, and the Catholic-monarchist association Carolina. Dissatisfied with the indecisiveness of the Austrian Home Guard, Kaltenbrunner switched his membership to the Nazi Party in 1930 and joined the SS three years later. Twice arrested by the Austrian government, he lost his license to practice law and spent six months in prison on a conspiracy conviction (the charge of high treason was dropped after a lengthy investigation).

In recognition of his efforts toward the 1938 Anschluss with Germany, he was named minister of state security in Austria in the pro-Nazi cabinet of Arthur Seyss-Inquart and promoted to SS major general. He soon took command of the police functions in the newly formed districts of Vienna and the Lower and Upper Danube and also established an extensive intelligence network extending into southeastern Europe. On 30 January 1943, Heinrich Himmler named him head of the RSHA, thereby giving him control of the Gestapo, the criminal police, and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). At his inauguration, Himmler noted that “a long period in illegality” was “always a good school, but particularly for a head of the State Security Office.”

While keeping some procedures intact, Kaltenbrunner sought to expand the SD, even though a deep animosity existed between him and SD chief Walter Schellenberg (who testified against him at war’s end). During Kaltenbrunner’s tenure, the SD and Abwehr merged, resulting in the dismissal of Wilhelm Canaris. Kaltenbrunner also headed the investigation of the failed plot on Adolf Hitler’s life of 20 July 1944 and played an active role in the implementation of the Final Solution. A trip to Budapest following the occupation of Hungary in March 1944 was specifically undertaken to expedite the deportation of Jews to Auschwitz. Kaltenbrunner took a keen interest in the formal legal regulations and various methods of execution used in the death camps, particularly the gas chambers. His extreme harshness further extended to Allied parachutists and prisoners of war, many of whom perished under his orders.

As the prospect of a German victory grew dimmer, Kaltenbrunner, with Himmler’s concurrence, dispatched two intermediaries to make peace overtures to Allen Dulles, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services
station chief in Bern, Switzerland. Dulles, however, had no intention
of reaching an agreement with the two declared war criminals and
hoped merely to exploit some of the cracks in the top leadership.
Kaltenbrunner, employing a forged passport in the name of military
doctor Josef Unterwogen, moved his headquarters to a villa in the
Styrian Alps near Altaussee.
Aided by Austrian resistance fighters, a patrol from the U.S. Third
Army captured Kaltenbrunner in April 1945 and placed him in a
military prison near Nordhausen. By November, he counted among
the 24 leading Nazi officials facing charges by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal in Nuremberg. Suffering a cerebral hemorrhage shortly
before the trial, he attended the sessions intermittently. His adamant
claims of innocence (“I have only done my duty as an intelligence
officer, and I refuse to serve as a substitute for Hitler”) proved to no
avail, and the court found him guilty of both war crimes and crimes
against humanity. He was hanged at a Nuremberg prison on 16 Oc-
tober 1946.

KAMPFGESCHWADER 200 (KG 200). A Luftwaffe formation
designed expressly for covert operations, the Kampfgeschwader 200
(Battle Wing 200) was officially organized on 20 February 1944 and
equipped with a variety of aircraft, including some captured Allied
planes. The first unit handled agent insertion and support functions.
Other units were posted throughout Europe wherever needed and
flew to destinations in North Africa and the Middle East. KG 200
also oversaw plans for German suicide missions patterned after the
Japanese kamikaze efforts, but Adolf Hitler squelched the notion in
March 1945. The initial commander of KG 200, Heinrich Heigl, was
replaced in October 1944 by bomber pilot Werner Baumbach, who
remained in charge until May 1945, despite having earlier written to
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring about the futility of continuing the
war. See also FALLSCHIRMAGENT.

KAMPFGRUPPE GEGEN UNMENSCHLICHKEIT (KgU). The
most militant of the early underground organizations directed at the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Kampfgruppe gegen Un-
menschlichkeit (Fighting Group against Inhumanity) was established
in October 1948. Based in West Berlin, it was initially headed by
Rainer Hildebrandt, a staunch anticommunist who had been imprisoned by the Nazis on numerous occasions. The group attracted the attention of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which, after a year of indirect funding, began a direct subsidy of half of the KgU’s expenses. The OPC further sought to professionalize the group’s activities and to encourage more aggressive undertakings in the GDR. Ernst Tillich, a theologian associated with the Confessing Church during the Third Reich and the group’s business manager, took over the leadership in November 1951. Hildebrandt, in protest, completely severed his ties.

The KgU’s sabotage campaign—blowing up railway bridges, desecrating communist monuments, and damaging factory machinery—lasted only a short time. In 1952, two members of the group—Johann Burianek and Wolfgang Kaiser—were apprehended in the GDR and received death sentences in separate show trials. Moreover, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit managed to recruit the KgU’s security chief, Karl Siegmund, which led to mass arrests as well as death sentences for members of the Weimar chapter led by Gerhard Benkowitz. State security officials further maintained that a close relationship existed with the Ostbüro der SPD, even though Tillich had been expelled from the Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands after becoming the leader of the KgU.

Of various destabilizing activities, few were more irritating to the East Germans than the falsification of state documents, including postage stamps depicting the country’s leader, Walter Ulbricht, with a noose around his neck. Nevertheless, not only had enemy penetration of the KgU crippled its effectiveness, but it was the object of increasing complaints in the West German and West Berlin press. Critics maintained that its amateurish methods had ruined the lives of many young East Germans drawn to its cause, just as the leadership had squandered its role by acrimonious squabbling. Tillich submitted his resignation in April 1958 and was replaced briefly by Adolf Hellwig. Despite the wishes of the OPC, pressure from the West German Ministry for All-German Affairs brought about the group’s dissolution in March 1959.

KANT, HERMANN (1926– ). A popular East German author and an informer for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Hermann
Kant was born in Hamburg on 14 June 1926, the son of a florist. Trained as an electrician, he was inducted into the Wehrmacht during the final stages of World War II. As a Polish prisoner of war for four years, he participated in the founding of an Antifa Committee in Warsaw before returning to Germany and earning an advanced degree in German literature in 1957 from Humboldt University in East Berlin. His writings—particularly his debut novel *Die Aula* (The Auditorium)—earned him numerous literary awards as well as a large audience in both Germanys. He also ardently embraced the ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED).

Kant’s most controversial public action occurred in 1978, when, as the new president of the Schriftstellerverband der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Writers’ Association of the German Democratic Republic), he demanded the removal of nine prominent authors who had openly protested the government’s expatriation of Wolf Biermann. Renewed criticism of Kant followed in the wake of German reunification. When allegations began to circulate pointing to his active cooperation with the MfS, Kant denied any connection and successfully took legal action. Yet extensive MfS documentation soon came to light, indicating that close contact had begun in 1957 and that Kant, under the code name *martin*, had conveyed incriminating reports against other writers (one handler noted that their meetings gave him much “amusement”). Later, however, Kant came under surveillance by another MfS informer, Gerhard Henniger, the secretary of the Schriftstellerverband. Kant’s role as an informer formally ended in 1976, primarily because of its incompatibility with his rising status in the SED.

KANTER, HANS-ADOLF (1925– ). An influential West German lobbyist as well as a key asset of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Hans-Adolf Kanter began his lengthy espionage career in 1948. An early member of the communist-dominated Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth), he switched his allegiance to the youth organization of the Christlich-Demokratische Union in the Rheinland-Palatinate the following year. His long association with the future chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Helmut Kohl, also started in this period. During the 1960s, with the aid of the HVA, Kanter established a financial consulting office in Bonn and
published a professional newsletter, which contained many articles written by his East German *Instrukteur*, Dr. Werner K. In addition, Egon Bahr, a prominent Social Democratic politician and the main architect of the West German policy of Ostpolitik, rented a house belonging to Kanter. The installation of eavesdropping devices thus allowed the HVA to obtain critical knowledge regarding the negotiating positions of the FRG toward the German Democratic Republic.

In 1974, Kanter obtained a senior staff position with the Flick Organization in Bonn, which gave him a new range of contacts through his political lobbying efforts. Although the Bonn office was closed as a result of illegal spending practices that came to light in 1981, Kanter’s importance for the HVA continued to grow. With the election of Helmut Kohl as chancellor in 1982, Kanter utilized his friendship with Philipp Jenniger, the state secretary of the Chancellor’s Office, to gain access to important internal government information. Although under the code name *Fichtel* he had submitted some 1,200 reports to East Berlin and was the longest serving known spy in the FRG for the HVA, Kanter received merely a suspended sentence of two years in March 1995.

**KAPPIUS, ÄNNE.** See KAPPIUS, JOSEPH.

**KAPPIUS, JOSEPH (1907–1967).** An underground Allied agent active during the final phase of World War II, Joseph (Jupp) Kappius was born in Bochum on 3 March 1907. A trained construction worker, he became a member of the International Socialist Militant League in 1933 and performed a variety of illegal functions before leaving Germany four years later. Interned in Australia from 1939 to 1944, he was selected and trained for Operation *Faust* by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In early September 1944, Kappius (alias Jack Smith) was paradropped by the British in the Ruhr area with the aim of restoring the trade union movement in this key industrial region. Acting as his courier was his wife Änne, who had received instruction from the British and returned to Germany via Switzerland disguised as a Red Cross nurse.

The OSS supplied Kappius with a safe address in Bochum and instructed him to develop a network of agents, commit acts of sabotage in strategically important factories, and use subversive methods
to lower German morale. Although the weapons and explosives he ordered never arrived and his group was temporarily penetrated by a Gestapo informer, the underground movement he created remained largely intact and came to include contacts in the Deutsche Bank, the Reichsbahn railway, and the Stinnes and Krupp steel companies. In the last days of the war, Kappius’s group prevented the escape of several Nazis as well as the destruction of food supply depots and factories. Flown back to England by the Americans on 9 April 1945, Kappius later returned to Germany and became an elected representative of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands in North Rhine-Westphalia. He died on 30 December 1967.

KAPPLER, HERBERT (1907–1978). A leading SS official in Rome and principal perpetrator of the Ardeatine Massacre, Herbert Kappler was born in Stuttgart on 29 September 1907. Assigned to Rome as a liaison to the Italian police in 1939, he became the city’s Gestapo chief following Italy’s defection from the Axis. In this capacity, he ordered a mass reprisal for the partisan bombing that had killed 33 Germans in the Via Rasella. On 24 March 1944, 335 Italians were executed at the Ardeatine Caves south of Rome. Arrested by British forces the following year, Kappler was tried by an Italian military court in 1948 and given a life sentence. A diagnosis of terminal cancer resulted in his transfer to a military hospital in Rome. On 15 August 1977, Kappler’s wife smuggled him out of the hospital in a large suitcase and back to the Federal Republic of Germany, where the Bonn government refused Italy’s request for extradition. Kappler died shortly thereafter on 9 February 1978 in Soltau (Lower Saxony). See also HASS, KARL.

KARLSHORST. The East Berlin district where Soviet military and intelligence forces were headquartered after 1945, Karlshorst soon became synonymous with the MGB and later KGB residency. Originally a Wehrmacht school and then the seat of the Soviet Administration in Germany, the main building was located in the Zwieseler Strasse and occupied by the KGB from 1954 to 1991. The largest KGB operation outside the Soviet Union, it employed about 600 workers. Having sustained only light damage during World War II, the area further provided housing for the security personnel.
KARMASIN, FRANZ (1901–1970). A German nationalist leader in Slovakia and later spy for Hungary, Franz Karmasin was born in Olmütz (now Olomouc, Czech Republic) on 2 September 1901. One of the founding members of the Karpatendeutsche Partei, he served in the Czechoslovakian parliament from 1935 to 1938. Following the German invasion and the establishment of a separatist Slovakian government, President Jozef Tiso appointed Karmasin state secretary for German affairs. In 1947, however, he was tried in absentia by the Czechoslovakian government for his wartime activities and sentenced to death. Fleeing via Austria, Karmasin resettled in the Federal Republic of Germany under the alias Franz Dibak and took a prominent role in the activities of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, while at the same time working as an agent for Hungarian intelligence. He died on 25 June 1970 at Steinebach am Wörthersee (Bavaria).

KASISKI, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1805–1881). A former Prussian army officer responsible for a major cryptographic breakthrough, Friedrich Wilhelm Kasiski was born in Schlochau (now Czluchow, Poland) on 29 November 1805. After retiring from active duty in February 1852, he published his slender but famous work *Die Geheimschriften und die Dechiffrierkunst* (Secret Writing and the Art of Deciphering), 11 years later. The book contains a procedure for breaking polyalphabetic substitution ciphers, especially the hitherto impregnable Vigenère cipher, by analyzing the gaps between repeated fragments in the cipher text. The “Kasiski test” proved a milestone in the art of codebreaking. A contemporary of Kasiski, Charles Babbage, appears to have discovered a similar method but never made his results public. Kasiski died on 22 May 1881 in Neustettin (now Szczecinek, Poland), seemingly unaware of the contribution he had made.

KASTNER, HERMANN (1886–1957). A prominent East German politician who spied for the Organisation Gehlen, Hermann Kastner was born in Berlin on 25 October 1886. A professor of constitutional and administrative law and a member of the Saxon provincial assembly prior to 1933, he maintained contact with resistance circles during the Third Reich and was arrested several times by the Gestapo. His political career resumed after the war as head of the newly
established Liberal-Demokratische Partei in the Soviet occupation zone. In 1949, he became vice president of the first government of the German Democratic Republic.

The previous year, however, acting on the advice from a clergyman and old friend from Meissen, he had made contact with the American secret service and began to deliver detailed information about the East German communist elite as well as high-level officials from the Soviet Union. Upon the advice of his case officer, Carol Tarney, Kastner (code name HELWIG) switched his allegiance to the OG several years later. At the same time, he enjoyed the confidence of Vladimir Semyonov, the political advisor to the Soviet Military Government, but their joint plan for a neutralist reunited Germany (with Kastner at the helm) came to naught with the failure of the Uprising of 17 June 1953. Although Kastner’s stream of information regarding Soviet policy toward Germany continued to flow, his situation became increasingly precarious. Reinhard Gehlen arranged his exfiltration to the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1956, and Kastner became a lawyer in Bonn. He died of a heart attack on 4 September 1957.

KAUDER, RICHARD (1900–?). One of the most productive Abwehr operatives assigned to the Soviet Union, Richard Kauder was born in Vienna on 6 September 1900, the son of a Jewish mother and a former colonel in the Austro-Hungarian army. A mechanical engineer by training, he became a sports equipment salesman in Berlin before returning to Vienna in 1932 to sell real estate. In 1938, Jewish persecution caused him to leave for Budapest, where he was turned over to the Gestapo for lack of proper residency papers but released. In 1939, alerted by his mother, the Abwehr approached him as a potential recruit, but Kauder refused the offer and was rearrested by the Gestapo. While in prison, he agreed to the Abwehr offer on the condition that his mother be immune from persecution (his own application for “Aryanization” was never approved).

Stationed initially in Budapest and using the cover name Richard Klatt, Kauder also made official trips to Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Slovakia. In 1941, he was transferred to the Abwehr station in Sofia. There he took over the remnants of an espionage system that included a radio network established prior to World War II by
the White Russian émigré general Anton Turkul. The two transmitters—one presumably inside the Kremlin, the other behind the Ural Mountains—were code-named max and moritz. When the latter stopped its transmissions, the entire operation became known as MAX. Kauder relayed an expanding number of reports via the Vienna office to the Abwehr headquarters in Berlin, where they were considered of utmost importance.

Despite his protection by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, anti-Jewish measures regarding secret agents compelled him to relocate his operation to Budapest in August 1943 under the auspices of Hungarian intelligence (code name karmany). In addition, he was supplying some information to the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) through Wilhelm Höttl, one of its main Balkan experts. Kauder’s most determined enemy was the head of the Abwehr station in Sofia, Otto Wagner, who long suspected that a secret tie to Soviet intelligence existed. Following his arrest in February 1945 on the grounds of being a double agent, Kauder was interrogated in Vienna. Evidence now suggests that Soviet intelligence, realizing the high priority that Berlin gave his reports, had used Kauder’s channel to supply controlled information, and that only later did he realize his manipulation as a mere conduit. In late May, he was captured by U.S. forces.

KAUDERS, FRITZ. See DEM’IANOV, ALEKSANDR.

KAULBARS, VLADIMIR. An Abwehr confidant of Wilhelm Canaris, Vladimir Kaulbars was a White Russian aristocrat who settled in Berlin following the Bolshevik Revolution. He soon became closely acquainted with Canaris, who enlisted him as an agent during World War II for secret missions to Sweden and Russia.

KEGEL, GERHARD (1907–1989). A journalist, diplomat, and Soviet agent, Gerhard Kegel was born in Preussisch Herby (now Herby, Poland) on 16 November 1907, the son of a railway worker. During his legal studies at the University of Breslau, he helped found a socialist student group and, in 1931, joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. His recruitment in Warsaw by fellow journalist Rudolf Herrnstadt for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence)
occurred shortly thereafter. To establish his credentials with the new regime, Kegel jointed the Nazi Party in 1934 and was assigned to the commerce division of the German embassy in Warsaw the following year. The outbreak of war in 1939 caused his brief return to the Foreign Office in Berlin before his new appointment at the German embassy in Moscow. Kegel (code name KURT) was among those who warned Soviet leader Joseph Stalin of the impending German attack in 1941. In addition, many confidential documents from the embassy were delivered to his control officer, Pavel Petrov.

Following his return to Berlin, Kegel established contact with the GRU’s chief representative there, Ilse Ströbe, but was inducted into the Wehrmacht in 1943 and sent to the eastern front as a translator. Although his defection to the Red Amy in January 1945 resulted in his captivity and interrogation in Moscow, he was allowed to leave for Germany six months later. Besides resuming his journalistic work and serving as an editor of the Berliner Zeitung under Herrnstadt, Kegel became closely associated with the regime of Walter Ulbricht and represented the German Democratic Republic at the United Nations in Geneva between 1973–1976. His formulaic autobiography, In den Stürmen unseres Jahrhunderts (In the Storms of Our Century), appeared in 1984. Kegel died in Berlin on 16 November 1989.

KEMPTER, FRIEDRICH (1904–?). An Abwehr agent who headed a small but effective espionage network in Brazil, Friedrich Kempter was born in Constance (Baden-Württemberg). After completing his studies at Tübingen, he left for Brazil in the wake of the 1923 inflation. He worked at various odd jobs until his 1938 appointment as manager of a minor information agency owned by a Swiss immigrant. The outbreak of war the following year and the resulting British blockade led to his dismissal due to a slump in business activity. Kempter applied to one of the agency’s former clients based in Hamburg and Cologne, not knowing that it also served as a recruiting front for the Abwehr. Enrolled officially on 1 March 1940 despite the absence of any formal espionage training, Kempter (code name KING) established a radio communications station and sent detailed reports on shipping activity in the Rio de Janeiro harbor. Within a short time, however, U.S. officials learned of Kempter’s activity through radio intercepts, and in a joint operation with Brazilian au-
thorities, he and his three associates were arrested in March 1942 as part of a massive spy roundup throughout the country. Sentenced to 25 years in prison on 6 October 1943, Kempter was released as part of a general Christmas amnesty five years later.

KEMRITZ, HANS. A Berlin attorney and controversial multiple agent, Hans Kemritz joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and was an Abwehr major during World War II. Captured and interrogated by Soviet forces in 1945, he secured his release by agreeing to help the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) locate and turn former colleagues and acquaintances. Invited to “business meetings” at his East Berlin law office, they were confronted afterward by Soviet officers and given the choice of cooperation or arrest. Kemritz (code name Savoy) was further pressured by the U.S. Counterintelligence Intelligence Corps (CIC) to become a double agent in order to thwart the NVKD’s recruitment scheme.

When Kemritz’s situation began to threaten another CIC double agent, he was resettled in Bad Homburg (Hesse) in 1947. On 4 November 1950, authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany arrested him for having assisted in the kidnapping of at least 20 people who had been incarcerated in Soviet camps. U.S. officials, however, provoked a serious rift with the FRG by insisting that a person could not be prosecuted for having obeyed the instructions of an occupying power. Two years later, Kemritz was brought to the United States and eventually resettled in Uruguay.

KENT, TYLER (1911–1988). An American embassy code clerk in London who passed on secret information in the hope of a negotiated peace with Nazi Germany, Tyler Kent was born in Manchuria on 24 March 1911, the son of the U.S. consul. After completing his studies at Princeton and the Sorbonne and showing a remarkable aptitude for languages, he entered the U.S. State Department and was assigned to the Moscow embassy under William C. Bullitt, the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union.

In October 1939, Kent was transferred to the London embassy. Within days, MI5 spotted him with a suspected German agent. He also became associated with the extremist Right Club, founded by a member of parliament, Archibald Ramsay, whose main targets
included Jews, Bolsheviks, and Masons. Through Anna Wolkoff, a naturalized British citizen and the daughter of a White Russian admiral, Kent met Antonio del Monte, the assistant Italian military attaché, known to him as Mr. Marcaroni. It was del Monte who formed the link to Berlin, although the Italian operation had in all likelihood been penetrated by the Soviet Union.

On 20 May 1940, Kent was arrested at his London residence in Glouster Place, where MI5 officers found 1,929 secret documents along with two duplicate sets of keys to the embassy coderoom and the names of various people under surveillance by British authorities. Although U.S. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy had agreed beforehand to waive Kent’s diplomatic immunity, he first underwent interrogation in the ambassador’s office, explaining that his actions had been calculated to prevent Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt from conspiring to bring about America’s entry into the war. At a closed trial in the Old Bailey, Kent was found guilty of violating the 1911 British Official Secrets Act and given a seven-year sentence. Wolkoff was arrested as well and received a 10-year sentence. In September 1945, Kent was released and deported to the United States. Despite his pronounced anticom- munist views, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted six investigations of a possible Soviet connection but found no conclusive evidence.

KERSTEN, FELIX (1898–1960). The physical therapist of Heinrich Himmler who sought the release of Nazi concentration camp prisoners during World War II, Felix Kersten was born in Dorpat, Estonia, on 30 September 1898, the son of a Baltic German family. After earning a degree in agricultural engineering in Schleswig-Holstein, he was drafted into the German army during World War I but volunteered to join a special legion of expatriate Finns fighting against Russian domination of their homeland. Despite being granted Finnish citizenship, Kersten returned to Berlin for training as a physical therapist after the war. As his career prospered, his main residence shifted to The Hague, where Prince Hendrik of the Netherlands was one of his main clients. After the outbreak of World War II and the flight of the Dutch royal family, Kersten resumed his career in Germany, becoming a physical therapist to Himmler, who needed
his therapeutic massages for the relief of acute stomach pain. The Finnish ambassador to Germany urged Kersten to remain, despite his reluctance, and provide intelligence reports from the Nazi inner circle. Other clients included Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, labor leader Robert Ley, Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, and the Italian foreign minister (and son-in-law of Benito Mussolini) Galeazzo Ciano.

In March 1941, learning of Adolf Hitler’s plan for the forced resettlement of 8.5 million “undesirable” Dutch citizens in the conquered territories in the east, Kersten, according to his later memoirs, managed to persuade Himmler that the logistical work involved would take a heavy physical toll, and the operation was indefinitely postponed. On 10 May, in the aftermath of the Hess Mission to England, Kersten was arrested and interrogated by the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reinhard Heydrich, until Himmler intervened. Ever more dependent on Kersten’s treatments, Himmler also introduced the therapist to Walter Schellenberg of the Sicherheitsdienst in August 1942. Believing that the war should be concluded as soon as possible and that Himmler should take the reins of power following the forced removal of Hitler, Kersten and Schellenberg conferred with a representative of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Stockholm in 1943, although no further action was taken by the Americans and contact ceased.

Kersten’s most notable achievement was arranging a meeting at his estate outside Berlin between Himmler and Norbert Masur of the World Jewish Congress on 20 April 1945. These negotiations resulted in the humanitarian rescue of approximately 60,000 Jews remaining in the Nazi death camps. Kersten’s wartime memoirs, Totenkopf und Treue (The Kersten Memoirs, 1940–1945), appeared in 1952. His long-delayed application for Swedish citizenship was finally approved in 1953, especially after the Dutch government determined him to be a victim of Nazi aggression. On 16 April 1960, en route to receive the Legion of Honor in Paris, he died of a heart attack near Düsseldorf.

KESKÜLA, ALEXANDER (1882–1963?). An Estonian nationalist who served as an intermediary between the German government and the Bolsheviks, Alexander Kesküla participated in the 1905
Russian Revolution as a student in Tartu. Sentenced but amnestied after three months, he remained illegally in Estonia as a key Bolshevnik organizer for two years. His university studies resumed in Berlin and Leipzig in 1908, followed by Zurich and Bern two years later. At the outbreak of World War I, he offered his services to the German ambassador in Bern, stressing his contacts with a broad spectrum of revolutionary figures, and had his first and only meeting with V. I. Lenin. Kesküla’s overriding aim involved securing Estonia’s independence from tsarist rule, which entailed limited collaboration with both the Germans and the Bolsheviks. He repeatedly emphasized Lenin’s pivotal position in the revolutionary movement as well as the compatibility of Bolshevik foreign policy objectives with German war planning.

In spring 1915, the German government issued Kesküla a passport in the name of Alexander Stein and—with a generous stipend—instructed him to establish an intelligence network based in Scandinavia. According to the arrangement, Kesküla obtained information from Lenin’s circle via a fellow Estonian, Arthur Siefeldt, who infiltrated small sums into the Bolshevik organization in Switzerland. Kesküla also helped finance the publication of writings by Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin in Sweden. A further line of communication for intelligence about Russia was established with revolutionary Finnish underground groups, which also received large German subsidies.

Kesküla’s relationship with the Germans—a completely separate enterprise from that of Alexander Helphand (whom he regarded as a charlatan)—ended in late 1916. To the astonishment of the postwar German Foreign Office, Kesküla regarded the moneys he had received as a type of loan and decided to repay the full amount, albeit at the height of the 1923 inflation. He also was deeply disappointed in the independent Estonia that emerged and never set foot in the country.

KIESSLING AFFAIR. An attempt to dismiss a Bundeswehr general because of alleged homosexuality, the Kiessling Affair originated in the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD; Military Counterintelligence Service) in fall 1983. On 15 September, after receiving a report from MAD chief Helmut Berendt regarding Günter Kiessling, a four-star general and deputy commander of the European forces
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Defense Minister Manfred Wörner confronted the general with the accusation that he was homosexual and therefore a security risk because of the blackmail potential. Although Kiessling denied the charge, a second MAD report issued by Berendt in early December provided additional evidence. When Kiessling’s forced retirement became known, the German press began its own investigation, and the weakness of the witnesses’ testimony became glaringly apparent. After a heated debate in the Bundestag, Chancellor Helmut Kohl brought the affair to an end by ordering the dismissal of Berendt and the reinstatement of Kiessling by Wörner on 1 February 1984. Kiessling retired from active duty shortly afterward. Wörner, despite loud calls for his removal, became general secretary of NATO in 1988.

KINKEL, KLAUS (1936– ). The first civilian head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Klaus Kinkel was born in Metzingen (Baden-Württemberg) on 17 December 1936. Receiving a doctorate in law from the University of Cologne, he joined the Interior Ministry in 1970 and later became a protégé of Hans-Dietrich Genscher. On 1 January 1979, when the direction of the BND came under Kinkel’s authority, an attempt was made to infuse it with new energy while avoiding any drastic personnel changes. Nevertheless, by the end of his tenure in December 1982, his increased stress on human intelligence had not stemmed the number of agents unmasked in the German Democratic Republic, and his refusal to support the assessment of the BND analytical division regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created much resentment in the ranks. In his subsequent political career, Kinkel served as justice minister, foreign minister, vice chancellor, secretary of the Freie Demokratische Partei, and a member of the Bundestag before his retirement in 2002. See also BAUMANN-ZAKRZOWSKI, WINFRIED.

KIPPENBERGER, HANS (1898–1937). A key communist functionary executed by Joseph Stalin, Hans Kippenberger was born in Leipzig on 15 January 1898, the son of a clergyman. After serving in World War I, he joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) and helped direct the 1923 uprising in Hamburg. Its failure prompted his exfiltration to Moscow and several years of intensive
training under the supervision of GRU chief Jan Karlovich Berzin. Returning to Germany, Kippenberger reorganized the secret military apparatus of the KPD, extending its reach into the army, police, and major political parties. Kippenberger was elected to the Reichstag in 1928, thereby obtaining diplomatic immunity as well as a seat on the military commission. Much of the large-scale industrial espionage conducted in Germany by the Soviet Union can be traced to Kippenberger’s efforts.

The Nazi seizure of power caused him to seek refuge in Prague and then Paris. Ordered back to Moscow, Kippenberger was arrested on 4 November 1936 and accused of being an agent of the Reichswehr. Denounced by Herbert Wehner and tried in secret, he was shot to death on 3 October 1937. As a result of the de-Stalinization initiated by Nikita Khrushchev, his name was rehabilitated in the Soviet Union 20 years later.

KIRCHER, ATHANASIUS (1601–1680). A gifted scholar and mathematician who made significant contributions to the art of cryptography, Athanasius Kircher was born in Geisa (Hesse) on 2 May 1601. After attending a local Jesuit college, he moved from university to university amid the strife of the Thirty Years’ War. A member of the Jesuit order, Kircher finally left Germany in 1631, settling first in Lyon and Avignon and then ultimately Rome, where most of his 44 wide-ranging works were published. *Oedipus aegyptiacus* (1652–1655) called attention to Egyptian hieroglyphics and became a guide for later generations of aspiring cryptanalysts, while *Polygraphia nova et universalis* (1663) contained three different systems for cryptographic writing. Kircher’s reputation was further enhanced by his invention of the magic lantern (a precursor of the motion picture projector) and his exploratory descent into the crater of Mount Vesuvius. He died on 28 November 1680.

KIRN, DIETRICH (1917– ). An Abwehr officer active in Afghanistan and the Caucasus during World War II, Dietrich Kirn headed *Frontaufklärungskommando* (FAK) 200 (code name *Pathan*) beginning in September 1941 with the purpose of fomenting unrest against the British. In the final stage of the war, he led FAK 202, which was chiefly concerned with organizing Ukrainian partisans
behind Soviet lines. A recipient of the Knight’s Cross in December 1944, Kirn wrote under the name Dietrich F. Witzel after the war.

KLAUS, EDGAR (1879–1946). A Baltic German agent who worked for multiple services, Edgar Klaus was born in Riga, the son of a baptized Jewish family. After studying geology in Russia and working for several banks, he returned home but was deported to the Volga region during World War I. Afterward, a position at the Danish consulate in Riga allowed him to establish contact with the German Foreign Office. In late 1919, following the outbreak of civil war in Latvia, Klaus fled to Germany with his Danish passport.

At the beginning of World War II, the Abwehr used Klaus as an informer and liaison in Lithuania. In April 1941 (under the name Prittwitz von Gaffron), he met in Berlin with Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris and strongly advised against breaking the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. A month later, he complied with Canaris’s request to collect military information from Russian sources in Stockholm and relay it to Berlin through the Abwehr representative at the German embassy. Detailed reports (under the code name general schönemann) about Soviet offensive strength warned against a quick collapse of the country, while a Soviet proposal for a separate peace conveyed by Klaus was rejected by Adolf Hitler in November 1943.

The Reichssicherheitshauptamt, believing Klaus to be a spy for French and Soviet intelligence, ordered his arrest by the Gestapo on the grounds of fraudulent activities. Protected by Canaris, he also attracted the attention of Walter Schellenberg in 1944, who, while completely mistrusting his reports, nevertheless used him in the negotiations regarding the rescue of Jewish concentration camp inmates. In summer 1945, while Klaus was interned in Sweden, U.S. intelligence officers considered engaging him, but his record raised too many unresolved questions. Although his return to Germany was approved by American and British authorities, he died of a heart attack on 1 April 1946, the day of his planned departure.

KLEINJUNG, KARL (1912–3003). A head of military counterintelligence in the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Karl Kleinjung was born in Remscheid (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 11 March 1912, the son of a worker. Initially a youth activist, he joined
the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1931 but was forced to immigrate to Holland, then Belgium, after a deadly street battle with an SA group in 1933. After serving as an undercover courier, Kleinjung fought in the Spanish Civil War, working closely with Soviet counterintelligence officers, including Leonid Eitingon. His job as a locksmith at a Gorky automobile factory came to an abrupt end with the German invasion in 1941. Originally designated as a radio operator for the Rote Kapelle in Berlin, Kleinjung instead received further partisan training and, in September 1943, carried out the order to eliminate Wilhelm Kube, the commissar general of White Ruthenia. (Ironically, because of Kube’s recalcitrance regarding the extermination of Jews, his death was enthusiastically greeted by Heinrich Himmler.)

Following his return to Germany in 1946, Kleinjung held several police-related positions during the Soviet occupation period before joining the newly established MfS, first as head of the East Berlin regional office and then as chief officer at the Soviet-East German uranium mining installation Wismut. His longest tenure—from 1956 to his retirement in 1981—was as director of Main Division I, which entailed the protection of the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1996, Kleinjung was among those charged by a Schwerin court with the April 1976 murder of dissident Michael Gartenschläger by GDR border guards. A central issue revolved around his 26 April 1975 memorandum urging the “Vernichtung” (annihilation) of those causing “provocation” at the frontier, which he rejected as implying intentional murder. Eventually cleared of all charges, Kleinjung died in Berlin on 20 February 2003.

KLOSE, HANS-HELMUT (1916–2003). A naval commander who conducted clandestine missions for Great Britain during the early Cold War, Hans-Helmut Klose joined the German Kriegsmarine in 1936. Because of his considerable experience with fast patrol boats during World War II, MI6 enlisted Klose to assist with Operation JUNGLE—the insertion and exfiltration of Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, and Polish agents in the Baltic region. Using a modernized fast patrol boat from the old Kriegsmarine, he made his first drop of six agents at Palanga, Lithuania, on 30 April 1949. Klose’s meticulous planning and shrewd diversionary tactics help explain the success
of his various assignments, which also came to include signals and electronic intelligence raids. Beginning in March 1951, a plausible cover was provided in the guise of the British Baltic Fishery Protection Service.

Nevertheless, suspicion grew that Soviet counterintelligence had managed to penetrate the spy networks in the forests of Courland. Because of the increasing loss of agents, MI6 suspended operations after the last two landings on Saaremaa, Estonia, on 20 November 1954 and 21 April 1955. Klose was subsequently named the first fast patrol boat commander of the new West German navy and later commander in chief of the fleet before his retirement in 1978. His undercover activities were a topic that he left undiscussed, although a critical, propagandistic television docudrama was produced in the German Democratic Republic in 1971.

KLOSS, HERBERT SIEGMAR. A West German journalist who targeted the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD) on behalf of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Herbert Siegmar Kloss was recruited in the late 1970s by Herbert Köhler and given the code name SIEGBERT. His most successful ploy, as devised by the HVA, was to pose as an author conducting research for a book on the MAD, the West German military counterintelligence service. Beginning in early 1984, Kloss met with senior officials and even submitted parts of his manuscript for their corrections and suggestions. Altogether the HVA received information on nearly 200 MAD employees along with details of the counterintelligence agency’s own security measures. In January 1992, following his exposure, Kloss was given a prison sentence of three and a half years.

KNOCHEN, HELMUT (1910–2003). The senior officer of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) in occupied France, Helmut Knochen was born in Magdeburg on 14 March 1910, the son of a schoolteacher. A student of history and English, he obtained a doctorate from the University of Göttingen in 1935. Already a member of the Nazi Party prior to its accession to power, Knochen abandoned his desire to become a professor of literature and entered the SD in 1937, assuming the task of monitoring the refugee press in France and the Low Countries for the next three years. His successful role in
the Venlo Incident led to a new assignment as head of a small commando group in France in June 1940.

Following France’s capitulation, Knochen, based at the Hôtel du Louvre in Paris, became the main representative of Heinrich Himmler in the occupied zone, although the German military administration tenaciously resisted any encroachments on its domain. During the conspiracy against Adolf Hitler of 20 July 1944, Knochen was arrested under orders of the military governor, Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel. Despite being released after the coup’s failure, he was recalled to Berlin by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, stripped of his rank, and transferred to the Waffen-SS for the duration of the war. Afterward, two separate tribunals dealt with his fate. In June 1946, a British court found Knochen guilty of the execution of captured airmen and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Several months later, he was extradited to France and, after a long internment, tried before a Parisian military tribunal for his involvement in the deportation of 200,000 Jews to extermination camps. A presidential decree, however, commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment in April 1958. Four years later, he was given a full pardon and allowed to return to Germany. He died in Offenbach am Main (Hesse) on 4 April 2003.

**KNOPPE, WOLF-DIETHARDT** (1935–). A West German pilot who sold stolen military equipment to the KGB, Wolf-Diethardt Knoppe joined the Bundesluftwaffe in 1956. Working in conjunction with Manfred Ramminger, a freelance architect, and his Polish-born employee, Josef Linowski, Knoppe removed various items from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization air base at Zell, Bavaria, between 1966–1968. One of those items was a Sidewinder air-to-air missile, which was transported by car from the base, disassembled, and then shipped to the Soviet Union. On 7 October 1970, a Düsseldorf court sentenced Knoppe to three years in prison; Ramminger and Linowski each received a four-year term.

**KNUTH, MARIA** (1907–1955). An agent of the Polish secret service, Maria Knuth (born Maria Holzportz) was active in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Knuth had suffered partial facial paralysis as the result of a bombing attack in the closing months of World War II. An aspiring actress, she was recruited under the code name AGNES
in 1947. Three years later, she received the assignment of cultivating male officials involved in the FRG’s rearmament program. When her activities became known to West German counterintelligence officials, an undercover agent, using the name Dr. Petersen, convinced Knuth of his disillusionment with the rearmament program and willingness to obtain a position for her in his office. Bogus information was conveyed to her, and she was arrested at a toter Briefkasten in May 1952. Eight months later, a Cologne court sentenced her to four years in prison, where she died of cancer.

KOCH, HANS (1894–1959). An East European specialist who worked for the Abwehr, Hans Koch was born in Lemberg (now Lviv, Ukraine). During World War I, he served as an intelligence officer with the Austrian army and saw combat against the Russians. Taken captive after the Russian Revolution, Koch was released in 1921 and went to Vienna, where he earned doctorates in philosophy and theology. His subsequent academic appointments included the directorships of the East European institutes in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) and Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland). With the outbreak of World War II, Koch was assigned to the Abwehr because of his expertise and charged with establishing contact with Ukrainian nationalists and overseeing propaganda designed for enemy troops. In 1941, he also became the liaison with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Koch’s postwar career included several years as a Protestant minister in Austria before serving as director of the East European Institute in Munich between 1952–1959.

KOEDEL, SIMON (1881–?). An unusually productive Abwehr agent working in the United States during World War II, Simon Koedel was born in Bavaria on 30 October 1881. After immigrating to the United States, serving in the army for three years, and obtaining citizenship, he was recruited as a Perspektivagent by the Abwehr during a trip to Germany in the mid-1930s. His activation in September 1939 led him to join the American Ordinance Association, which then gave him access to several otherwise restricted defense sites. A movie projectionist by profession, Koedel occasionally posed as a longshoreman to gather shipping information in the New York City area. His 21-year-old daughter, Marie, was encouraged to mix with
sailors at waterfront establishments to acquire data regarding the convoy traffic to Europe. Some 600 messages—sent either via the German naval attaché in Washington or by regular mail to cover addresses abroad—were ultimately registered by the Abwehr. Alerted by suspicious coworkers at the movie theater, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Koedel in October 1944. He was given a 15-year prison sentence; his daughter was sentenced to seven and a half years.

KOENEN, FRIEDRICH VON (1916–1944). The commander of a North African Abwehr unit during World War II, Friedrich von Koenen was born in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) on 28 June 1916. Raised in German South West Africa (now Namibia) he joined the Abwehr’s emerging Brandenburg Division in 1941 and assumed command of the Tropenkompanie (Tropical Company; later named Tropenabteilung Koenen, or Tropical Division Koenen) in North Africa. Its members were handpicked, fluent in other languages, and used equipment acquired from Allied forces (such as a British Spitfire aircraft). Deployed on numerous commando and reconnaissance missions, the Tropenkompanie served as an advance unit for Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. One particular success occurred in February 1943, when Koenen conducted a raid against American troops at the village of Sidi-Bou-Zid, Tunisia, and captured 27 tanks and armored troop carriers along with large supplies of guns and munitions. A Knight’s Cross was awarded to him later that year. Transferred to Yugoslavia, Koenen was killed in action on 22 August 1944 near Visegrad, Croatia.

KÖHLER, ARTHUR (1935– ). An early Perspektivagent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Arthur Köhler was recruited in 1955 and given the code name Kolb. Enrolling as a law student in the Federal Republic of Germany, he was expected to become an official in the Chancellor’s Office or the Foreign Office, but authorities arrested him at a meeting with his handler in March 1962. After serving a sentence of two and a half years, Köhler returned to the German Democratic Republic.

KOKO. See SCHALCK-GOLODKOWSKI, ALEXANDER.
KOLBE, FRITZ (1900–1971). One of the most prized Allied agents during World War II, Fritz Kolbe was born in Berlin on 25 September 1900, the son of a saddle maker. In 1914, he became a dedicated member of the Wandervögel, a middle-class youth movement that rejected material gains in favor of a simple, more self-reliant life. After his brief military service toward the end of World War I, he completed his university education and became a junior diplomat with the German Foreign Office in 1925. His first posting took him to Madrid, where he remained until 1936. Despite his unequivocal rejection of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi movement—an evaluation from the mid-1930s found him unfit for admission to the Nazi Party, and he never sought membership himself, contrary to the repeated urging of his colleagues—his career remained essentially intact. The death of his wife cut short his next posting in Warsaw, but in late 1937 he was assigned to the German consulate in Cape Town, South Africa.

Recalled to Berlin at the outbreak of war, Kolbe became a personal assistant to Karl Ritter, a hardened professional diplomat who had just been appointed liaison between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht supreme military command. Increasingly convinced that his own minor resistance activities possessed no more than symbolic value and that the Nazi regime could only be toppled from the outside, Kolbe made numerous attempts to travel abroad in order to relay to the Allies the highly sensitive, top-level information that crossed his desk. In summer 1943, he traveled to Bern, Switzerland, as a courier, and through Ernst Kocherthaler, an anti-Nazi acquaintance from his years in Spain, sought contact with British authorities. Still reeling from the disastrous Venlo Incident and under strict instructions from the Foreign Office to beware of double agents, they rebuffed Kocherthaler, causing Kolbe to turn next to the Americans.

Seeing the copies of the documents in Kolbe’s possession and speaking to him at length, Allen Dulles, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) station chief in Bern, took an immediate interest. After a further investigation of Kolbe’s credentials, an agreement was struck. Kolbe, however, declined any remuneration, citing his principled opposition to totalitarian regimes—Nazi as well as Soviet—and his desire to shorten the war. Assigned the code name GEORGE WOOD, he had five more meetings with Dulles while also enlisting friends and unsuspecting colleagues to help bring abundant material to Bern.
In sum, Kolbe delivered 1,600 pieces of diplomatic correspondence between the Foreign Office and 30 German missions in Europe and overseas (these documents became known in the OSS as the “Kappa messages,” while the “Boston series” is the name of the shorter compilation). They included reports from the army and air force attachés in the Far East; information about German espionage activities in Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Britain, Ireland, and Turkey (notably regarding the Cicero Affair); efforts to extract more raw materials and labor from the occupied countries; and even a hand-drawn map of the area surrounding Hitler’s secret “Wolf’s Lair.” In his conversations with Kolbe, Dulles showed particular interest in his assessment of the mood in Berlin amid the heavy Allied bombing. Some intelligence and military officials continued to doubt his bona fides, but he had the complete confidence of Dulles, and a number of his highly classified cables reached the desk of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

After the war, despite his desire for reinstatement in the Foreign Service, Kolbe was rejected by West German authorities, as many of them believed him to be a traitor to his country. After working at various odd jobs, he resettled in Bern, where he died on 16 February 1971. Whereas his singular achievement had been extolled by both American and British intelligence officials at the end of the war, the first sign of recognition by the German government did not occur until September 2004, when Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer announced the naming of a conference hall in the German foreign ministry in Berlin to commemorate his actions.

**KONSPIRATIVE WOHNUNG (KW).** The equivalent of a safe house in English, a konspirative Wohnung is a residence maintained by an intelligence service for clandestine meetings, often between an agent and handler, or for hiding a defector. The secret headquarters of terrorist organizations such as the Red Army Faction also fall under this rubric. Larger complexes known as konspirative Objekte (KO) were used extensively by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.

**KONZENTRATION.** An intensified approach to dealing with former Nazis and war criminals by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Operation KONZENTRATION (Concentration) began with a directive to all branches by Erich Mielke on 2 March 1965. To
avoid unexpected revelations within East Germany about suspected Nazis—and to aid the disinformation campaigns directed at the Federal Republic of Germany—Mielke ordered an end to the previous case-by-case procedure and instituted greater centralization and systematization. The MfS also increased its efforts to obtain copies of all Nazi documents from foreign archives, especially those in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Placed in the MfS’s own archive, these records remained restricted from other state institutions as well as individual citizens. This operation can be viewed as a tacit admission that the German Democratic Republic faced a serious problem concerning the number of suspected Nazis in its own population.

KOPATZKY, ALEKSANDR GRIGORYEVICH (1923–1982). A prized Soviet double agent active in numerous intelligence organizations in Germany, Aleksandr Grigoryevich Kopatzky was born in Siurozh (Bryansk Oblast) and attended a military espionage school in Novosibirsk following the German invasion in 1941. After parachuting behind enemy lines in October 1943, he was captured by German forces and agreed to work as an undercover agent against the Red Army. During the final months of the war, he was an intelligence officer with the anti-Soviet Russian Army of Liberation under General Andrei Vlasov. Imprisoned briefly by the Americans in May 1945, Kopatzky attracted the attention of the Organisation Gehlen (OG) because of his anti-Soviet credentials. Also, he married the daughter of a former SS general in 1948. His spurious reports, however, led to his later dismissal by the OG.

In 1949—under mysterious circumstances—Kopatzky volunteered to work once again for Soviet intelligence (under the successive code names ERWIN, HERBERT, and RICHARD) and managed to infiltrate an anticomunist émigré organization based in Munich. In 1951, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in West Berlin recruited him (under the pseudonym Franz Koischwitz). This mistake resulted in extensive damage, including the kidnapping of Vladimir Kivi, a fellow CIA agent of Estonian background, to East Berlin, as well as the unmasking of more than 100 American intelligence officers and agents in the German Democratic Republic. But Kopatzky’s duplicity was not immediately discovered by authorities.
To facilitate his application for U.S. citizenship, the CIA changed his name to Igor Orlov because of a drunk driving charge and in 1957 sent him for further operational training to Washington, D.C. Although Kopatzky returned to Germany and Austria on several new assignments, suspicion about his KGB affiliation began to form in the early 1960s, notably after the defection of Anatoli Golitsyn. Despite dogged investigations by the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, no case was ever proven, and “Orlov” remained the proprietor of a picture-framing gallery in Alexandria, Virginia, until his death in 1982.

KOPKOW, HORST (1910–1996). A Gestapo counterintelligence specialist who later advised British intelligence on Soviet espionage, Horst Kopkow was born in Ortelsburg (now Szclytyno, Poland) on 29 November 1910, the son of a hotelier and merchant. Trained as a pharmacist, he was attracted to the Nazi movement in his youth and joined the SS in 1932. During World War II, he headed the antisabotage section of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Department IV A 2) and played a key role in the destruction of the Rote Kapelle espionage network. The special commission formed to investigate the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944 also came under his command. While hiding in Flensburg, Kopkow was captured by British forces on 29 May 1945, having been betrayed by a Gestapo colleague, and was then interrogated at Bad Nenndorf.

Despite Kopkow’s responsibility for the torture and death of hundreds of Allied agents, MI6 considered his exceptional knowledge of Soviet espionage to outweigh questions of wartime criminality, and further debriefings were conducted in London. Declared dead in 1948, he continued his undercover work for MI6, residing in Gelsenkirchen under the name Horst Cordes. He was also reunited with his family as an “uncle” and found regular employment with a textile manufacturer, eventually becoming the factory director. He died of pneumonia on 13 October 1996 in Gelsenkirchen. Eight years later, MI6 declassified parts of his file, prompting harsh criticism of its postwar protection of Kopkow.

KÖSTRING, ERNST (1876–1953). A well-informed military attaché stationed in the Soviet Union prior to World War II, Ernst Köstring
was born in Moscow on 20 June 1876, the son of German parents. As a cavalry officer during World War I, he had the task of assembling an anti-Russian army in Ukraine in 1918. Afterward, Köstring studied the Red Army and then—given the title “Representative of the Reichswehr attached to the Staff of the Red Army”—served as military attaché to Moscow from 1931 to 1933. His primary goal was to forge closer links between the military establishments of both countries. When he returned to Moscow for his second tour of duty in 1936, the “exemplary secrecy in military matters” that he confronted made his assignment exceedingly difficult. Based on meager sources, Köstring’s reports rarely contained any hard data on the Red Army, and after witnessing the purges of Joseph Stalin, he remarked that it was no longer of “international importance.”

In August 1942, he was made “general in special mission for problems of the Caucasus,” and became inspector of Turkish volunteers in Russia the following year. His command included more than 100,000 Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Turkestani, and North Caucasians willing to fight with the Wehrmacht. After surrendering to U.S. forces in May 1945, Köstring was brought to Washington, D.C., for interrogation and released the following year. His account of the interwar military relations between Germany and the Soviet Union appeared posthumously in 1966.

KOTZEBUE, AUGUST VON (1761–1819). A German dramatist believed to be a Russian spy, August von Kotzebue was born in Weimar on 3 May 1761, the son of a ducal legation counselor. After completing his legal studies at Duisburg, he entered Russian service through the influence of the Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg and rose to become president of the magistracy in the province of Estonia. An extremely prolific writer, Kotzebue gained celebrity throughout Europe principally because of his plays, which showed him to be a master of dramatic effect. His departure from Russian service in 1790 was followed by sojourns in Paris, Mainz, Vienna, Weimar, and Berlin. Kotzebue returned to St. Petersburg after the military defeat of Prussia by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1806, eventually becoming the Russian consul general in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) as well as an outspoken opponent of the French emperor.
His unhappiness with this position, however, led him to devise a new arrangement with Tsar Alexander I, whereby he would relocate to Germany as a foreign correspondent and report on current trends in politics, science, religion, and law. The tsar accepted his proposal on the condition that he uphold Russian interests in Germany and avoid controversy. In 1817, Kotzebue returned to Weimar and established the *Literarisches Wochenblatt* (Literary Weekly). Critical of the exaggerated patriotism of the Deutschtümler, or hyper-Germanophiles, it took particular aim at the Burschenschaften—the new student fraternities dedicated to a moral and nationalist revival of Germany.

As a consequence, not only was one of Kotzebue’s books burned at the Wartburg Festival staged by the Burschenschaften in October 1817, but Karl Sand, a theology student at the University of Jena, resolved to bring Kotzebue’s life to an end. On 23 March 1819, after declaring him “a traitor to the fatherland,” Sand plunged a knife into the writer at his residence in Mannheim. Afterward, Sand claimed that his victim was a “Russian spy.” While it is true that Kotzebue was on the payroll of the Russian government and served as a spokesman for its policies, no attempt had been made to keep this affiliation confidential. In addition, the reports he submitted tended to echo his published observations and contained little if any covert information. While Sand was tried and executed, Kotzebue’s death provided a pretext for the prompt enactment of the Karlsbad Decrees proposed by Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich. Besides banning the Burschenschaften, removing certain university professors, and expanding press censorship, they established an investigative commission based in Mainz to ferret out revolutionary conspiracies.

**KRÄMER, KARL-HEINZ (1914–?).** A valued but controversial agent of both the Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Karl-Heinz Krämer was born in Obernkirchen (Lower Saxony) on 24 December 1914. In 1937, while pursuing his legal studies at the University of Hamburg, he joined the Nazi Party. After working briefly in London under the German ambassador, Joachim von Ribbentrop, he was drafted into the Luftwaffe with the outbreak of war and assigned to the Abwehr post in Hamburg headed by Nikolaus Ritter. In May 1941, Krämer’s undercover work took him to Stockholm to obtain military information about Great Britain and the United States. His
first major contact—the freight manager of a Swedish firm based at Bromma Airport—was the nucleus of a network known under the code names SIEGRIED and SIEGRIED B. By November 1942, Krämer was attached to the German mission and sending a steady stream of maritime and aviation intelligence allegedly obtained in Britain by agents code-named HEKTOR and JOSEPHINE.

Doubts about the authenticity of Krämer’s reports arose in different quarters. Upon investigation, MI5 determined that he had no highly placed source in the British Air Ministry and that his cleverly crafted reports merely reflected information obtained from the daily press and conversations with Swedish officers and foreign envoys, notably the Japanese military attaché Makato Onodera. Within the Abwehr, Friedrich Busch, his most adamant critic, acknowledged that his initial Swedish contacts had been genuine but concluded that more than 100 HEKTOR and JOSEPHINE reports constituted an “intelligence swindle.” Another alleged source—obtained during a visit to Switzerland in fall 1943 and code-named EISBERG—also came under review. That Krämer steadfastly refused to provide the actual identity of these agents contributed to growing doubts about his handsomely remunerated submissions.

Yet there were also supporters, most significantly SD head Walter Schellenberg, who had a high estimation of his work and whose personal relationship with Krämer reflected a considerable degree of mutual trust. In December 1944, he had to recall Krämer to Berlin to prevent his arrest by Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller. Schellenberg vouched for his reliability to Müller, presenting 200 positive General Staff evaluations of the intelligence from the JOSEPHINE reports. Krämer was redeployed to Stockholm, where certain Finnish sources were further cultivated. Ultimately the Swedish government, citing his involvement with the initial Bromma agent, declared him a persona non grata on 30 April 1945 and forced his departure two days later.

KRASE, JOACHIM (1919–1988). A top inside source of military information for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Joachim Krase served in the Wehrmacht during World War II and entered the Bundeswehr in 1956. Two years later, he attended the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD; Military Counterintelligence Service) training...
facility in Bad Ems and was posted afterward to Kiel. In 1968, when he offered his services to the MfS, he met with some suspicion, but soon an arrangement was reached under the direction of Günther Kratsch, who was later replaced by Wolfgang Lohse as his control officer. Steady promotions in the MAD hierarchy led to Krase’s appointment as deputy director in 1980. With his easy access to highly confidential material, he provided a wealth of information to the MfS, including details of Poseidon missile sites and the location of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Despite his retirement in 1984 owing to poor health, Krase continued his espionage while visiting MAD installations throughout the FRG. His last meeting with Lohse was in Salzburg, Austria, in 1987. It was not until after his death by cancer in 1988 that his 18-year career as a mole became publicly known. See also SELBSTANBIETER.

KRAUS, GOTTHOLD (?–1997). The first East German defector to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Gotthold Kraus was a banker by profession. In November 1951, he was hired by the German Democratic Republic’s new Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN; Foreign Intelligence Service) to prepare the annual budget for its cover operation, the Institute for Economic Research. His superiors were impressed by his work, and he soon headed a department within the APN. Kraus, however, had offered his services to the CIA’s Berlin Operations Base in September 1950 and began to convey information to the Americans about the APN’s operations in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

Although advised by the CIA to exercise greater caution and selectivity so that his “semi-sleeper” status could be maintained, he was highly anxious to leave the German Democratic Republic. When Markus Wolf became head of the APN and instituted tighter security measures, Kraus decided to cross over into the French zone of West Berlin with his family on 3 April 1953. Because of the extensive information he brought—the identification of numerous staff officers and other personnel, safe house locations, and the Soviet advisors and their vehicles—the APN suffered a major setback in Operation VULKAN. After his debriefing, he and his family settled in the Washington, D.C., area, but he later returned to the FRG to testify in several spy trials. In an unpublished memoir completed before his death,
Kraus speculated that his defection delayed the erection of the Berlin Wall. Already the object of rumors during his tenure at the APN, it was not constructed until August 1961. See also ROSE.

KRAUSE, ALFRED (1930–2001). The sixth head of Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Alfred Krause was born in Dresden on 28 April 1930. He joined the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) in 1945 and the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) the following year. His connection to the armed services of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) began in 1948 with his appointment to the political section of the People’s Police in Dresden. On 15 October 1953, he also agreed to work for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) as an informer (code name FritZ Möbius)—a relationship which, according to official records, lasted for more than 25 years. His military career continued to be linked closely to the SED and included training in the GDR and Soviet Union.

Following the abrupt dismissal of Theo Gregori on 22 September 1982, Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann designated Krause his successor as head of the VA. Lacking firsthand knowledge of running agents and given no transition period, Krause embarked on an extensive bureaucratic reform of the agency, primarily along more clearly defined military lines of authority. Some VA officers referred to the process as “Krause’s organizational marathon.” Reversing the policy of his predecessor, he encouraged a closer working relationship with the MfS (several of his relatives were members as well). Above all, his aim was to acquire detailed information about “Western preparations for war” and to develop a system of rapid response within his agency.

As public protests accelerated in late 1989, Krause’s autocratic style of leadership came under heavy criticism, and he attempted to make some necessary adjustments. When the crisis deepened the following year, he ordered the destruction of all official records, especially those related to the VA’s network of undercover agents, but achieved only partial success. He was discharged on 30 September 1990 and involved in several court cases afterward. Krause died in Berlin on 19 November 2001.

KREBS, RICHARD (1904–1951). A key Comintern agent and later defector and author, Richard Krebs was born near Mainz on 17
December 1904, the son of a sailor. Returning from several years at sea and joining the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in May 1923, he participated in an abortive uprising in Hamburg the following October. His formal training occurred in 1925–1926 at a Comintern school housed in Leningrad’s old Duma building. On assignment in the United States, he was arrested in Los Angeles during the maladroit murder attempt of a suspected informer. Released in 1929 after three years in San Quentin Prison, Krebs resumed his undercover work, first as political chief of the Comintern’s Marine Section based in Hamburg and then as inspector general of communist activities in Great Britain.

Following Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, he returned to Germany but was captured in the aftermath of the Reichstag fire. Extreme torture resulted in Krebs’s recruitment by the Gestapo, but he still acted under Soviet command. Abducted by Stalinist agents during a posting in Copenhagen and marked for probable execution in the Moscow purges, he fled via Paris to the United States in 1938. The communist press retaliated by labeling him “one of the most important spies of the Gestapo,” intending to discredit him in the West, but to no avail. In 1940, his best-selling autobiography, Out of the Night, appeared under the nom de plume Jan Valtin, giving the American public one of the first insider accounts of the intricate worldwide web of Soviet subversion and espionage—in his words, “a vast maze of imposing façades and underground passages.” The British edition was cut due to wartime censorship, and the German translation was delayed until 1957. Krebs served as a volunteer infantryman in the U.S. Army during World War II and became an American citizen in 1947. He died of pneumonia on 1 January 1951.

Krichbaum, Willi (1898–?). A senior SS officer and later Soviet double agent in the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Willi Krichbaum was born on 7 May 1898. A veteran of World War I, he joined the Gestapo in 1933 and became closely associated with Reinhard Heydrich. In 1936, he was appointed the frontier inspector southeast and then head of the Geheime Feldpolizei after the outbreak of war. Although known as a ruthless foe of the anti-Nazi military conspirators, Krichbaum escaped prosecution after the war and was engaged as a personnel recruiter for the OG. Among the numerous former...
colleagues he helped bring into the fledgling organization were two KGB moles, Hans Clemens and Heinz Felfe. Krichbaum’s own double allegiance—dating from at least 1950—did not come to the attention of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency until 1963.

**KRIEGSNACHRICHTENSTELLE (KNS).** An outpost located in German border towns or in occupied territory during World War I, a Kriegsnachrichtenstelle (war intelligence center), engaged in both information gathering and agent recruitment. Established in November 1914, the largest KNSt on the western front was located in Antwerp. It also operated a spy school for missions directed at France and Great Britain. Operations involving Russia were coordinated by the KNSt Berlin-Ost beginning in July 1916. Other KNSts could be found in Lörrach, Strasbourg, Wesel, Lindau, Hamburg, Bucharest, Sofia, and Piraeus.

**KRIEGSORGANISATION (KO).** An Abwehr residency directly subordinate to Abwehr main headquarters, a Kriegsorganisation (war organization) was located in an embassy or consulate of various neutral countries. Beginning in 1938, these stations could be found in Madrid (KO Spanien), Korwo (KO Litauen), Belgrade (KO Jugoslawien), Bern (KO Schweiz), Lisbon (KO Portugal), Ankara (KO Naher Osten), Tabris (KO Iran), and Sofia (KO Bulgarien). During World War II, the KO Spanien under Wilhelm Leissner emerged as the largest, with some 30 substations in the country. The work of the KO was not necessarily directed at the host country, which served rather as a launch pad for further operational activity. Most of the male staff, including agents recruited from the local German population, belonged to the armed forces but maintained the outward appearance of civilians. *See also ABWEHRSTELLE.*

**KRÜGER, BERNHARD.** See BERNHARD.

**KRÜGER, BRUNO (1924–1955) and SUSANNE (1925–1955).** An East German husband and wife who were kidnapped and executed for fleeing to the West, Bruno and Susanne Krüger both worked for the regional administration of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in Schwerin. An interrogation officer, Bruno left for West Berlin
on 27 August 1953, while Susanne, a secretary, followed nine days later. As defectors, they testified before various groups, including the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, and the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen. Determined to set a stern example to other MfS employees, Ernst Wollweber, the new state security head, ordered their return to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Following their separate abductions, a trial was held before the GDR’s leading court. Both were found guilty of “malicious war and boycott agitation” and guillotined in Dresden on 14 September 1955. Afterward in Order 224/55, Wollweber specifically cited their act of treason and warned that “the power of the working class reaches beyond all boundaries.”

KUCZYNSKI, JÜRGEN (1904–1997). A prominent economic historian and Soviet spy, Jürgen Kuczynski was born in Elberfeld (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 17 September 1904, the son of a statistician. Following his studies in Germany and the United States, he joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in 1930 and established close relations with various Soviet officials. In 1936, he moved to Great Britain, joining his father, a lecturer at the London School of Economics, and became the British underground leader of the KPD while building ties to the growing anti-Nazi expatriate community. A front organization that he founded, the Freier Deutscher Kulturbund (Free Germany Cultural Union), claimed 1,000 members by 1939.

Although MI5 had placed the family under surveillance, Kuczynski’s internment at the beginning of World War II ended quickly, and he was engaged in 1944 as an analyst for the Strategic Bombing Survey by the U.S. Army Air Force. Unknown to the Allies, however, was that he had been recruited by his sister Ursula Kuczynski for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), and he had helped fellow refugee Klaus Fuchs begin his career as a Soviet spy in 1941. His connections to Soviet intelligence first came to light in 1947 and were confirmed three years later when Fuchs named Kuczynski as his first contact. Meanwhile, Kuczynski had resettled in East Berlin and emerged as one of the leading academics and government advisors of the German Democratic Republic. His voluminous literary output included several autobiographical accounts, and his involvement in
communist party politics continued after the reunification of Germany in 1990. He died in Berlin on 6 August 1997.

KUCZYNSKI, URSULA (1907–2000). A spy who transmitted atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union, Ursula Kuczynski was born in Berlin on 15 May 1907, the daughter of a leading economic statistician and left-wing sympathizer. Trained as a bookseller, she joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands at the age of 18 and became a writer for the party newspaper, Die Rote Fahne. During a trip to Moscow in 1930, she and her architect husband, Rudolf Hamburger, were persuaded to work undercover in China. The next year, while employed at the Soviet telegraph office in Shanghai, Kuczynski was contacted by Richard Sorge, who had established a spy ring there on behalf of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence). He gave her the code name sonja and recommended that she return to Moscow for training in espionage and radio communications.

Following her three-month course at the GRU school, Kuczynski was assigned to Mukden, Manchuria, to assist Chinese partisans engaged in sabotage operations against the Japanese occupation army. Separated from her husband, she lived with an Illegaler known as Ernst. In 1935, the British arrested Hamburger in Shanghai for espionage activity, and fear of her possible exposure led to a new posting in Warsaw, where she was joined by her husband. In addition to receiving further training in Moscow, she was promoted to the rank of major and received the Order of the Red Banner in 1938.

Her request for a new mission resulted in an assignment to Switzerland, where the GRU networks had been severely damaged as a result of Stalin’s purges. Advised not to join any communist party, she rented a villa above Montreux, living there with her two children. Working with the Hungarian-born Comintern agent Sándor Radó (code name dora), she helped lay the foundation for the Lucy spy ring, which was to produce exceptional wartime intelligence for the Soviet Union. When she again faced the possibility of exposure, the GRU decided that placing her in Great Britain had even greater long-term potential. She was now divorced from Hamburger, and in May 1940, to facilitate her emigration, a marriage was arranged with one of her Swiss assistants, Leon Beurton, a young naturalized British citizen of French origin who had fought in the Spanish Civil War.
Living outside Oxford, she built an espionage network that included her father and her older brother, Jürgen Kuczynski. While her father maintained ties to highly placed Labour Party officials, her brother was engaged by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Other spies under her purview were Erich Henschke, a double agent in the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, and Melita Norwood (code name Hola), an employee of the government’s atomic research project Tube Alloys and the longest serving known Soviet agent in Britain. Most significant of all, however, was her relationship with Klaus Fuchs, who was also working at the atomic research facility in Birmingham. She encouraged him to continue his activity as part of the team of British physicists designated for the Manhattan project in the United States. On his return to Britain in 1945, their relationship resumed, and more details of the British atomic bomb project soon found their way to Moscow.

In 1947, Allan Foote, a British communist and former associate from her clandestine work in Switzerland, broke with the party and gave her name to MI5. Despite a brief interrogation, nothing came of the matter. When Igor Gouzenko defected in Canada, however, the GRU broke off communications with Kuczynski, because he was in a position to link her to Fuchs. After Fuchs was arrested and confessed in January 1950, she decided to leave the country. On the eve of Fuchs’s trial, she and her two children departed on a “vacation” for East Berlin and were later joined by her husband. The government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) offered her a position in the press affairs office, while the Soviet Union bestowed the honorary rank of colonel in the Red Army and a second Order of the Red Banner. Kuczynski left her government position in 1956 and embarked on a prolific literary career under the nom de plume Ruth Werner (worldwide sales of her works totaled approximately one million). Her autobiography, Sonjas Rapport (Sonia’s Report), appeared in 1977, but no mention was made of Klaus Fuchs or her first husband, who had apparently died in the Gulag. “We wanted to help the people in the Soviet Union in their efforts to prevent war,” she asserted in a later afterword, “and when war broke out against German fascism, to win it.” Following the reunification of Germany, which she adamantly opposed, Kuczynski became an advisor to the communist successor party. She died in Berlin on 7 July 2000.
KUEHN, BERNHARD OTTO (1894–1956). An Abwehr spy working for the Japanese in Hawaii, Bernhard Otto Kuehn served as a naval officer in World War I and joined the Nazi Party in 1930. After an arrangement was reached with the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin, Kuehn (code name jimmy) and his family moved to Hawaii in 1936, ostensibly to study Japanese at the University of Honolulu. Even though the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation had learned of his true identity by 1939 and monitored his close contact with Takeo Yoshikawa, the chief Japanese operative in Hawaii, no action was taken until the attack on Pearl Harbor. Arrested the following day and tried in secret on 19 February 1942, Kuehn was sentenced to death but later received a commutation to 50 years of hard labor. Given the very low appraisal of his abilities by a Japanese intelligence officer, it appears most unlikely that he contributed anything of substance to the planning and execution of the air strike. In 1948, upon his release from prison, Kuehn and his family returned to Germany.

KUJAU, KONRAD. See HITLER DIARIES FORGERY.

KUNDSCHAFTER. A quasi-heroic term employed by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, a Kundschafter (scout) referred to communist intelligence operatives fighting on the “invisible front.” By contrast, individuals working for Western services were consistently designated as common spies. See also TRADITIONSPFLEGE.

KUNZE, ROSALIE (1930– ). A well-placed Illegaler in the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rosalie Kunze agreed in Dresden to work for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit to avoid disclosure of her recent illegal abortion. In 1955, following a year of extensive training in East Berlin, Kunze (code name INGRID) arrived in Bonn posing as Roberta König and soon obtained a position as secretary to the deputy chief of the West German navy. Her delivery of highly confidential documents continued until her arrest in 1960. Sentenced to four years in prison, Kunze declined to return to the German Democratic Republic afterward. Also apprehended were Horst and Evelyn Schötzki, her Führungsoffizier and his wife, who received sentences of five years and one year respectively.
KURJO, ANDREAS. An agricultural specialist who worked for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Andreas Kurjo was recruited while a student in West Berlin in 1970. Given the code name Thaer (and later Alexander), he proved to be an exceptionally prolific agent, concentrating initially on the agricultural institute at the Technical College before becoming a leading figure in the West Berlin trade fair organization and an advisor to the agricultural attaché at the U.S. embassy in East Berlin. In May 1992, a court gave Kurjo a suspended sentence of one year along with a fine of 4,000 DM.

KURON, KLAUS (1936– ). A highly prized double agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Klaus Kuron was born in Recklinghausen (North Rhine-Westphalia) and joined the BfV in the late 1960s. Despite the expertise he developed regarding East German counterintelligence, his career advancement was stifled due to lack of a university degree. Frustrated by his lack of recognition and in need of additional funds for his family, Kuron made contact with the HVA in September 1981, and a lucrative monthly salary of 4,000 DM along with pension provisions was arranged after a meeting with Markus Wolf near Dresden. Working under the code names Berger and Stern, he earned effusive praise from his HVA superiors. That his BfV division chief (and later defector) Hansjoachim Tiedge suffered from multiple personal problems only facilitated his activities. At least 18 East German double agents, including Horst Garau and his wife Gerlinde, were identified by Kuron, but they were merely downgraded to lesser positions temporarily in order not to arouse undue suspicion.

Following the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1990, Kuron’s first HVA handler, Karl-Christoph Grossmann, divulged his name to West German authorities. Although offered the opportunity to relocate to the Soviet Union under the aegis of the KGB, Kuron preferred to stay in Germany and face the legal consequences. In 1992, a Düsseldorf court found him guilty of treason and sentenced him to 12 years in prison and a fine of 692,000 DM based on his HVA earnings. Released in 1998, Kuron settled in a small town near Remscheid (North Rhine-Westphalia). See also MOITZHEIM, JOACHIM.
KURRAS, KARL-HEINZ (1927– ). A West German policeman and highly prized agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) who was responsible for the killing of an unarmed student demonstrator, Karl-Heinz Kurras was born in Barten, East Prussia (today Barciany, Poland) on 1 December 1927. A Wehrmacht volunteer at the end of World War II, he was arrested for illegal arms possessions by Soviet authorities in 1946 and spent three years in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In April 1955, despite his ideological motivation to move to East Berlin and join the People’s Police, MfS officials engaged him as an agent (code name OTTO BOHL) with instructions to retain his position at the Charlottenburg branch of the West Berlin police. In December 1962, at his request, he also became a member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED).

By January 1965, Kurras had arrived at his main goal—a counterintelligence posting in the West Berlin criminal police. As a result of his efforts, the MfS acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the innermost workings of its opponent’s security operations: the identity of Western agents in the German Democratic Republic; advance warning of impending arrests of East bloc operatives; details about persons who had escaped across the sealed border and their accomplices; and the modus operandi of the police including their interaction with West German and Allied intelligence officials. In addition, Kurras’s calm and obliging manner impressed his MfS superiors, and his remuneration increased on a steady basis.

On 2 June 1967, during a violent demonstration against a state visit by the shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Kurras fatally shot Benno Ohnesorg outside the city’s opera house—a signal event in the mass left-wing protest movement in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The MfS reacted immediately, ordering Kurras to destroy his records and cease activities henceforth. A West Berlin court acquitted him of a manslaughter charge later the same year, and he subsequently rejoined the police force. No evidence indicates MfS complicity in the killing—his longtime case officer, Werner Eiserbeck, characterized it as “a most regrettable mishap”—although the SED sought to exploit the event in its ongoing propaganda campaign against the FRG. Prior to his retirement from the police force in 1987, Kurras attempted to revive his relationship with the MfS, but at a meeting in East Berlin in March 1976, Eiserbeck gave him no
assurances. It was not until May 2009 that researchers accidentally discovered Kurras’s 17-volume MfS dossier and brought the case to light, causing much public consternation. See also MEYER, TILL.

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LA BELLE DISCOTHEQUE BOMBING. The site of a notorious terrorist attack during the Cold War, the La Belle Discotheque was located in the Schöneberg district of West Berlin. Because of the large number of U.S. military personnel among its regular patrons, officials at Libya’s embassy (or People’s Bureau) in East Berlin, acting on orders from Tripoli, selected the club as a target in retaliation for the American sinking of two Libyan ships in the Mediterranean. Two of the individuals involved—Ali and Verene Chanaa—were German citizens who had been working as informers in West Berlin for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit since 1982. Verene Chanaa transported the bomb to the discotheque in a travel bag and activated the time fuse. When it exploded in the early morning of 5 April 1986, two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman were killed and more than 200 others injured.

Telex incepts by the United States from the East Berlin mission confirmed Libyan involvement and led to President Ronald Reagan’s decision to bomb Tripoli 10 days later. In 2001, a Berlin court ruled that the Libyan secret service was responsible for the act and sentenced the Chanaas along with Yasser Chraidi (a Palestinian accredited to the Libyan mission) and Musbah Eter (a member of the Libyan ministry of propaganda) to prison terms ranging from 12 to 14 years. Germany’s highest court upheld the verdict in 2004, the same year that the Libyan government agreed to pay $35 million in restitution. Evidence from the MfS’s files emerged during the trial that confirmed the crucial logistical support provided to the terrorists by Main Division 22 (Terrorism Defense). See also MAISON DE FRANCE; MYKONOS; WIEGAND, RAINER.

LAHOUSEN, ERWIN (1897–1955). An Abwehr officer involved in the anti-Nazi resistance, Erwin Lahousen was born in Vienna on 25 October 1897, the son of an Austrian field marshal. Lahousen served in the infantry during World War I and secured a position in the
reduced armed forces after the war. Posted near the border in Lower Austria, he collected information about the newly formed Czechoslovakian army. In 1935, following additional training, he was appointed to the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service) in Vienna. His expertise regarding the Czechoslovakian army was also recognized in Berlin and prompted a visit in January 1937 by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris and other senior officials.

After the Anschluss of 1938, Lahousen became the first Austrian officer selected by Canaris to join the Abwehr, even though Heinrich Himmler of the SS, aware of the anti-Nazi record of Lahousen’s older brother, had attempted to block the appointment. Initially assigned to Division I (Secret Information Service), Lahousen was designated head of Department II (sabotage and subversion) in January 1939. Not only did the operations undertaken by the newly created Brandenburg Division fall under his direction, but he became part of the Abwehr conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, supplying on one occasion the explosive device used in an attempt on the Führer’s life during a flight from Smolensk to Rastenburg on 13 March 1943.

In the wake of the German defeat at Stalingrad on 2 February 1943, Lahousen—for reasons left unstated—requested reassignment as a regimental commander on the eastern front, and by late August, Department II was headed by his successor, Wessel Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven. On 17 July 1944, while commanding Jäger Regiment 41, Lahousen received severe combat wounds and was taken to a military hospital. The unsuccessful 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler occurred during his recovery, and no action was taken against him; he had, in fact, been awarded the Iron Cross for bravery a day earlier. His arrest by U.S. forces in late April 1945 took place while he was still under medical care.

The highest-ranking Abwehr officer to survive the war, Lahousen served as a key prosecution witness before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Released during the trials was an abstract of his diaries covering his Abwehr activities from 17 August 1939 to 3 August 1943, which had purposely omitted any mention of his resistance work. He also underwent extensive debriefing by both British and American intelligence. Released from captivity on 4 June 1947, Lahousen chose to live in Tyrol, then under French control, as the risk of being abducted in Vienna by Soviet forces and put on trial was too great; nine
former Abwehr officers from the Vienna office had already suffered this fate and later perished in the Gulag. He died in Innsbruck of a heart attack on 24 February 1955.

LANG, HERMANN (1902–?). An important Abwehr spy working in the United States, Hermann Lang had emigrated from Germany in 1927 and found employment as an engineering inspector in a New York armaments factory. Following his recruitment by Nikolaus Ritter in 1937, he obtained blueprints for the Norden bombsight, then considered the country’s most valuable military secret. They were dispatched by courier via the Hamburg-American Line to Germany, where the Luftwaffe constructed a model of the original. Betrayed by William G. Sebold, Lang was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 30 July 1941 as part of the large spy ring headed by Frederic Duquesne. He received a sentence of 18 years for espionage.

LANGBEHN, CARL (1901–1944). The personal attorney and friend of SS chief Heinrich Himmler who was also involved in the anti-Nazi resistance, Carl Langbehn was born on 6 December 1901. A well-connected lawyer in Berlin, he developed a strong distaste for the Nazi regime by 1938 and began to cultivate ties with resistance figures, such as Johannes Popitz and Ulrich von Hassell. He also maintained a close friendship with Himmler and prevailed upon him to release his former law professor, Fritz Pringsheim, from a concentration camp.

As Himmler and Walter Schellenberg began to formulate their plan for a separate peace in August 1942, Langbehn served as the intermediary with Allen Dulles, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Bern. In September 1943, after returning from a trip to Switzerland, Langbehn was arrested by the Gestapo on the basis of an intercepted Allied radio message. His trial for high treason occurred in the aftermath of the failed 20 July 1944 plot against Adolf Hitler. Himmler, fearful that his own seditious actions might come to light, insisted on a speedy verdict and the omission of a formal confession. Langbehn was executed at Plötzensee Prison on 12 October 1944.

LANGEMANN, HANS (1925– ). A senior official of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the Bavarian Interior Ministry who revealed
significant classified information to the press, Hans Langemann served with a reconnaissance unit on the eastern front during World War II and studied law afterward. Recruited by the BND in 1957, Langemann (code name Sacher) scored an early success in Vienna by enabling the defection of Heinz Kupfer, an officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. A similar attempt (Operation Snowball) under diplomatic cover at the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley, California, ended in ignominious failure, but Langemann recruited a prominent East German at the Rome Summer Olympics. Several other enlistments in Rome helped lay the foundation for Operation Eva, which took shape two years later under his direction. Moreover, as a key figure in the strategic service division under Wolfgang Langkau, Langemann developed a far-flung network of agents in France, Austria, Greece, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, and South Vietnam.

In 1970, two years after the departure of Langkau, Langemann left the BND for a new position as head of domestic security in the Bavarian Interior Ministry. Major controversy, however, erupted in 1982 with his revelations about Operation Eva to the magazine Konkret. Langemann also had plans for a roman à clef but was turned down by various publishers. Arrested and placed on trial, he was given a suspended sentence of nine months in September 1984. The court’s leniency can be partially attributed to medical testimony about his mental instability.

LANGKAU, WOLFGANG. The founder of the strategic service division of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Wolfgang Langkau served in the Waffen-SS during World War II and joined the Organisation Gehlen afterward, becoming the head of its West Berlin substation in 1953. With the official establishment of the BND three years later came the opportunity to expand his influence through the newly created strategic service division, which was directly responsible to Reinhard Gehlen. Langkau (code names Langendorf and Holten) especially prized his role as the BND liaison to Israel’s Mossad and maintained a separate office in Munich, as the Israelis feared a Soviet penetration of the Pullach headquarters. Close ties also existed with the Japanese imperial house and the rulers of Taiwan and South Korea. He additionally served as Gehlen’s principal contact to the leading West German political parties. Yet the reforms inaugurated in 1968 by Gehlen’s successor, Gerhard Wessel, included
the termination of his exceedingly intricate and often suspect strategic service division—sometimes dubbed the “Langkau apparatus”—and he resigned in protest.

LAUKHARD, FRIEDRICH CHRISTIAN (1757–1822). A German writer, soldier, and spy who deserted to the French, Friedrich Christian Laukhard was born in Wendelsheim (Rhineland-Palatinate) on 7 June 1757, the son of a Protestant pastor. His theological studies at the University of Giessen left him disappointed, and he succumbed to an undisciplined and dissolute lifestyle. Eventually earning a doctorate from the University of Halle but deeply in debt, Laukhard entered the Prussian army in 1783 and fought in the battle of Valmy in 1792. In late September 1793, posing as a deserter, he delivered a bribe to the French revolutionary commander of Landau, his distant cousin Georg Friedrich Dentzel. Dentzel’s irate reaction caused Laukhard to join other deserters and prisoners of war who were being transferred to southeastern France. There he served in a sans-culottes unit until his return to Germany in 1795. Prior to his death on 28 April 1822 in Kreuznach (Rhineland-Palatinate), the notorious writer set down his academic and military observations in a richly detailed, multivolume autobiography.

LAURENZ, KARL. See BARCZATIS, HELENE.

LAUSCHANGRIFF. See TRAUBE AFFAIR.

LEHMANN, EBERHARD (1930– ). An officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) who cooperated with Western authorities after German reunification, Eberhard Lehmann had been an active member of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) and joined the East German police force at the age of 18. In 1950, he was transferred to the newly created MfS and served in the military counterintelligence division for 10 years. Because of the debacle in the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) involving the defection of Siegfried Dombrowski and the need for greater security precautions, Lehmann was assigned as one of the Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (officers in special deployment) to the remodeled organization, where he remained until 1975. Returning to the regular ranks of the
MfS, he completed a doctoral dissertation on Richard Sorge at the Juristische Hochschule des MfS in 1979 and assumed a number of responsibilities, including safeguarding the East German embassy in Moscow and surveillance of foreigners living in the German Democratic Republic. He also continued to have connections to the VA.

In 1990, fearing the lack of a retirement income following the demise of the MfS, Lehmann established contact with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz and was given the code name Glasschüssel. Unknown to him, however, was that his handler, Klaus Kuron, had been in the employ of the MfS since 1981. In any event, Lehmann identified between eight and 20 agents in the Federal Republic of Germany who had earlier worked for the VA. His testimony was used in numerous later trials but was always cited as originating from an anonymous source.

LEHMANN, WILLY (1884–1942). A valuable Soviet spy working within the Gestapo, Willy Lehmann was born near Leipzig on 30 May 1884. A member of the Berlin police force, he was recruited by the Soviets during the early 1930s and given the code names breitlenbach, breitmann, and dike. During his long career, he provided a vast array of information, including the counterintelligence methods employed by the Nazis, reports on new weapons systems, and details on liquid-fuel rockets. The last meeting with his Soviet handler was on 19 June 1941, during which he confirmed the scheduled date of 22 June for the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The capture of a Soviet agent, Albert Barth, in August 1942 led to Lehmann’s secret arrest and execution.

LEISSNER, WILHELM (1892–?). A key Abwehr officer assigned to Spain, Wilhelm Leissner was born on 3 May 1892 and served in the imperial navy during World War I. Afterward, he immigrated to Nicaragua and opened a small publishing firm. Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Wilhelm Canaris persuaded him to return to Germany and join the Abwehr. Dispatched to Madrid as head of the Abwehr’s Kriegsorganisation, Leissner assumed the role of a respected businessman (pseudonym Gustav Lenz) connected to an import-export firm dealing in strategic metals. With the outbreak of World War II, he transferred all operations to the German
embassy, located at 4 Castellana, and established a network of some 30 suboffices throughout the country as well as in the Canary Islands, Portugal, and North and South Africa.

LEMOINE, RODOLPHE (1871–1946). An agent and recruiter for the French Deuxième Bureau, Rodolphe Lemoine was born Rudolf Stallmann in Berlin on 14 April 1871, the son of a wealthy jeweler. After marrying a French woman in 1918 and adopting her surname, he moved to France and became a naturalized citizen. Known for his shadowy financial dealings, he began working for the Deuxième Bureau under the code name rex. The high point of his espionage career was his involvement with Enigma spy Hans-Thilo Schmidt, whom he first met at Verviers in November 1931. Lemoine tried to establish an exchange of cipher information with a Soviet Illegaler (covert operative), Ignace Reiss, who posed as an American intelligence officer named Walter Scott. After some information had been passed, Reiss revealed his true identity and made a recruitment attempt by blackmail, but Lemoine (Soviet code name joseph) resisted.

On a visit to Cologne in March 1938, Lemoine was arrested by the Gestapo but released. The Deuxième Bureau then ended his close ties with Schmidt. Following Germany’s defeat of France in 1940, given his extensive knowledge of the Enigma project, French officials wanted Lemoine to be evacuated to England, but he remained in the country and came under German surveillance. After his arrest was ordered by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, he was brought to Paris from his Saillagouse villa and made a full confession on 17 March 1943. Presumably because of his long period of inactivity, the offer of becoming a double agent for Germany met with a refusal. The Allied advance into France necessitated Lemoine’s transfer to Berlin, where he was later apprehended and interrogated by the French. He died in August 1946.

LESSING, LUDWIG (1812–1835). A student informer for the Prussian government murdered in Switzerland, Ludwig Lessing was born in Freienwalde (Brandenburg) on 3 November 1812. Following his arrest and expulsion from the University of Berlin for revolutionary agitation, he moved to Zurich in summer 1833 and later enrolled at the university as a law student. Assigned to report on German political
exile circles, Lessing was found stabbed to death outside Zurich on 4 November 1835. Among the prime suspects were Zacharias Aldinger and members of Junges Deutschland, but no conclusive evidence emerged from the official investigation.

LEUTERITZ, FRANZ (1940– ). The architect of the radioactive-tracing program of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Franz Leuteritz was recruited in 1967 while working on his dissertation in Leipzig. Highly knowledgeable about nuclear measurement technology and X-ray fluorescent analysis, he completed his doctorate at Humboldt University and rose quickly in the Technical Operations Sector. Leuteritz’s most important function was as head of Operation wolke (Cloud), whose objective was to monitor dissident activity by attaching radioactive devices to people and objects. The first methods were devised by 1972 and found extensive use thereafter, sometimes as often as 100 times a year. Although the tracking devices were designed to avoid direct skin contact, MfS records indicate minimal concern for the health hazards involved. Among the awards received by Leuteritz was the prestigious Friedrich Engels Prize First Class in 1983.

LEVERKUEHN, PAUL (1893–1960). A member of a secret mission to the Turkish-Persian frontier during World War I and the senior Abwehr officer in Istanbul during World War II, Paul Leverkuehn was born in Lübeck on 31 July 1893, the son of a justice of the peace. His legal studies were interrupted by military service during World War I. Assigned to intelligence work in May 1915, he took part in the expedition led by Max von Scheubner-Richter to provoke an anti-Russian uprising in the north Caucasus and stop the supply of oil from the vast reserves at Baku. Leverkuehn’s task involved organizing supply and support from his base in Mosul, and keeping Scheubner-Richter informed about developments in eastern Turkey via coded telegrams. Both men, however, were forced to return to Germany in August 1916 because of severe cases of dysentery and malaria.

In the postwar period, after completing his law degree at Göttingen, Leverkuehn held various banking and diplomatic positions, which included advisory work for the U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission. While working in the United States, he became acquainted with
lawyer William Donovan, future head of the Office of Strategic Services. Leverkuehn’s conscription in 1939 led initially to an Abwehr assignment in Tabriz, although it ended in failure when his identity became known to Persian counterintelligence officers. Following a brief sojourn in Paris for the Foreign Office, he returned to Turkey in July 1941, establishing a Kriegsorganisation substation in Istanbul and developing a network of Turkish and Arab agents who supplied him with a stream of abundant information. The operation came to an abrupt halt in February 1944 because of the crucial defection of coworker Erich Vermehren and his wife. Recalled to Germany, Leverkuehn was arrested by the Gestapo on 16 July—an action that ironically provided him with an alibi for the attempt on Adolf Hitler’s life four days later.

In fall 1945, Donovan engaged Leverkuehn as a special consultant for the compilation of evidence for the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Several years later, he regained his law practice and helped in the defense of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein before a British military court in Hamburg. Leverkuehn, who entered the Bundestag as a member of the Christlich-Demokratische Union, also became engaged in the early efforts at promoting European unity. He died on 1 March 1960.

LICHT. A major confiscation of private property in the German Democratic Republic, Operation LICHT (Light) commenced on 10 January 1962 with an order by Erich Mielke to all regional administrations of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). They were instructed—in strictest secrecy—to seize all unopened safes and lock boxes in former “capitalist” warehouses and large industrial concerns, castles, manor houses, villas, and museums. Churches, monasteries, and “similar cultist places” were added to the list a day later. Although Soviet officials had already conducted searches of this nature in 1945, the bounty again proved considerable. Jewelry, coins, stamps, handwritings by celebrated figures, stock certificates, and works of art were transferred to the Ministry of Finance for potential sale abroad. The MfS also retrieved voluminous Nazi records, some with the membership lists of “fascist organizations” and information about Gestapo agents, which were then placed in its expanding archive. See also KONZENTRATION.
LIEBETANZ, REINHARD (1936– ). An officer of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) suspected of being a double agent, Reinhard Liebetanz came under questioning when his colleague Hansjoachim Tiedge defected to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in August 1985. Liebetanz headed the BfV division responsible for investigating neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremists. In the wake of the Tiedge scandal, Liebetanz charged his friend Eberhard Severin with applying “massive pressure” to induce him to defect to the GDR as well during a vacation trip in Austria. Among the threats was the revelation of Liebetanz’s homosexuality. Liebetanz, however, reported the incident to the Austrian police. Severin, in reality an agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit infiltrated during the mid-1960s, disappeared along with another East German operative. Despite the absence of formal charges, Liebetanz was removed from the BfV as a security risk and transferred to another federal office.

LIKUS, RUDOLF (1892–?). A top aide and intelligence advisor to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Rudolf Likus was a former journalist and an early member of the Nazi Party. His appointment to head a subdepartment in the Foreign Office in 1940 made him the chief intelligence liaison with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and with various embassies, both German and foreign. Ribbentrop also persuaded Heinrich Himmler to provide an SS commission to his former schoolmate. Likus’s most notable achievement was the partial penetration of the residency of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in the Soviet embassy in Berlin through the recruitment of Orest Berlings, a Latvian journalist. Likus also avidly collected information about secret Vatican diplomacy. Too often prey to the deceptions and rumors that circulated in neutral states, he was soon eclipsed by Informationsstelle III following its creation by Ribbentrop in 1941.

LINDNER, PAUL. See RUH, ANTON.

LINKE, KARL (1900–1961). The first head of East German military intelligence and the target of a successful operation by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Karl Linke was born in Görsdorf (now Hrádek, Czech Republic) on 10 January 1900, the son of working-class
parents. After eight years of school, he became a weaver and joined the Sozialistische Arbeiterjugend Österreichs, the Austrian socialist organization for working-class youth. His wartime service began in 1918 and included a year in an Italian prisoner of war camp. To avoid being inducted in the new Czechoslovakian army, Linke moved to Germany and worked in the lignite coal industry in a small town near Cottbus. His return to Czechoslovakia in 1923 coincided with the expiration of his eligibility for military service. In 1924, he joined the Sudeten German branch of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (KSC), which his father had helped bring into existence. Linke received ideological and organizational training before beginning his role as an agitator in several labor disputes. A warrant for his group’s arrest led to his return to Germany in 1928.

In Berlin and also briefly in Chemnitz, Linke was affiliated with the Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung (Workers’ Illustrated Newspaper), the driving force of the proletarian press with strong ties to the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands and the Comintern. On assignment in Czechoslovakia, he came into conflict with authorities by illegally photographing iron and steel works in Witkowitz (now Vlkovice, Czech Republic). In 1930, the KSC approved his transfer to Moscow, where he resumed his career as a weaver and achieved the status of master. Linke also attended evening classes at the Communist University of National Minorities in the West, which prepared its students for political underground activities in their native lands. Despite completing an officers’ course in preparation for duty in the Spanish Civil War, he remained in Moscow, first at the Ministry for Light Industry and then at the Chamber of Commerce, and managed to emerge untouched by Stalin’s purges. Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 caused him and his son Heinz to enlist in the People’s Militia. Having met the requirement of Soviet citizenship, both were among the relatively few foreign-born communist members of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and performed behind-the-line duties in the German-occupied areas. While Heinz was killed in January 1944, Linke held a key position as a commissar and party secretary for the Chrabrecy unit. In September, he joined another group of partisans supporting the ultimately unsuccessful Slovakian revolt against German rule. Wounded, he was back in Moscow the following spring.
After the war, he returned to Czechoslovakia and resumed his career as a weaving manager. Because the Soviet Control Commission required his skills as a translator, he moved to East Berlin with his family in December 1949. After becoming a citizen of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and joining the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in 1951, he numbered among the first designated officers in the paramilitary Barracked People’s Police, the forerunner of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA). Linke was appointed head of the Administration for General Questions, which had the task of monitoring the three occupation armies in the Federal Republic of Germany and guarding against enemy military preparations in the GDR. When the NVA obtained its official status in 1956, Linke’s intelligence organization was renamed Verwaltung 19 and placed under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of National Defense.

Criticism of Linke began to be voiced. According to Soviet occupation officials, the high expectations of his office were not being fulfilled, while some GDR military commanders resented his lack of traditional combat experience. Yet the fatal blow to Linke’s career was caused by his housekeeper, Anna Kubiak, whom the CIA had recruited with the promise of resettlement in the West. She had previously been employed by the KGB resident in East Berlin, Yevgeny Pitovranov. After much valuable information had been gathered by Kubiak, especially regarding the East German relationship with the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), her final instructions in late June 1957 were to leave a letter to Linke suggesting his defection or recruitment. Linke notified the relevant MfS division, which initiated—under the code name PARTISAN—a thorough investigation of more than 250 persons employed as domestic help and tradespeople in the restricted Karlshorst compound. An electrician involved in the CIA operation was identified but managed to escape to West Berlin. Kubiak likewise resettled in West Berlin, and, despite an intensive search, was not discovered until 1972. Four years later, the MfS deemed the case not worthy of further pursuit.

Because of his past service and unblemished political record, Linke received a relatively mild reprimand for negligent behavior. In addition to his loss of office, the only other penalty was a demotion to colonel—an outcome that many of his colleagues in Verwaltung 19 found far too lenient. Unable to obtain permission to return to
Czechoslovakia, he and his wife resettled near the border in Zille. He died on 16 May 1961.

LINSE, WALTER. See UNTERSUCHUNGS AUSSCHUSS FREIHEITLICHER JURISTEN.

LISS, ULRICH (1897–?). The first chief of the Fremde Heere West (FHW), Ulrich Liss was born in Mecklenburg and served in a frontline artillery regiment in World War I. He was also a prize-winning rider and ardent Anglophile, having visited Great Britain on several occasions. Upon the division of Fremde Heere into two branches in 1938, Kurt von Tippelskirch appointed Liss to head the FHW, which had responsibility for military intelligence regarding Western Europe and Britain, the upper Balkans, and the United States. Although staff officers remained in key positions, Liss additionally hired civilians with particular skills and knowledge from having lived abroad; he also broadened the functions of the FHW to include assessments of a hostile power’s intentions, not just capabilities. In war games using oversized maps or sand tables at army headquarters, Liss frequently assumed the role of the enemy commander in chief.

Under his direction, the FHW performed almost flawlessly during the campaign against the Low Countries and France in 1940, especially through its concept of the Ardennes offensive. Yet it later failed to anticipate the Allied landings in North Africa. Given a field assignment in March 1943, Liss took command of a regiment on the eastern front and was promoted to general. He was severely wounded and taken prisoner by the Red Army in January 1945. Remaining in Soviet captivity until 1955, Liss returned to Germany and in 1959 published his firsthand account *Westfront 1939–1940* (Western Front 1939–1940).

LISSNER, IVAR (1909–1967). A key Abwehr agent based in Manchuria who gathered information on the Soviet Union, Ivar Lissner (Robert Hirschfeld) was born in Riga, Latvia, on 10 March 1909, the son of a Jewish businessman. Immigrating to Germany after World War I with his parents, he became a Nazi Party member by 1933 and later joined the SS. Despite his legal training, his main celebrity stemmed from his work as a travel writer. As the principal
Far Eastern correspondent for two leading Nazi publications—*Der Angriff* and the *Völkischer Beobachter*—Lissner established useful contacts among Japanese intelligence and army officers. The discovery of his father’s Jewish ancestry in 1939, however, led to his arrest by the Gestapo and a ban on his publishing career. While he had rejected an earlier recruitment attempt, Lissner now agreed to work for the Abwehr (code name IVAR) on the condition that his parents be allowed to leave Germany. Based in Harbin, Manchuria, his intelligence network stretched to eastern Siberia and included a broad range of human sources. Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris extolled his “extraordinarily comprehensive” reports—more than 200 had been submitted by spring 1943—as the only reliable source of information on Asiatic Russia, especially the border region with Manchuria.

Yet Lissner also had detractors who repeatedly sought his removal, above all Josef Meisinger, the Gestapo official assigned to the German embassy in Tokyo. When Lissner provided details of Meisinger’s failure to detect the successful penetration by Richard Sorge, the police attaché took revenge, and Lissner was arrested on 4 June 1943 by Japanese military police, suspected of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Released from prison after the war, Lissner returned to Germany and resumed his career as a writer. He died in September 1967 in Cheières-sur-Ollon near Montreux, Switzerland. His autobiography *Mein gefährlicher Weg* (My Dangerous Path) appeared posthumously in 1975.

**LITHIA.** The first major counterintelligence success of the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Operation LITHIA was authorized in November 1947 as a joint endeavor with U.S. Army Intelligence. Its target was the Kundermann Ring, a large-scale Czechoslovakian spy network that had infiltrated certain émigré espionage groups managed by the United States and Great Britain. On 8 November 1948, the OG helped bring about the defection of two leading Czech military intelligence officers based in Karlovy Vary—Ottokar Fejfar and Vojtech Jarabek—which quickly led to the arrest of 18 agents. A further 28 persons were placed under surveillance. In the trial held three months later, an American military court sentenced the key member of the ring, Jaromir Koska, to 20 years of hard labor.
LIZIUS, BERNHARD. One of the most prized informers working for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Bernhard Lizius was originally a law student in Aschaffenburg and editor of the opposition newspaper Bayerisches Volksblatt. On 2 April 1833 he, along with some 40 other students, participated in the Frankfurter Wachensturm, the storming of the watchtower and police headquarters in Frankfurt am Main. Their plan to seize the treasury of the German Confederation in order to finance a revolution went awry, and most were arrested. Although sentenced to life imprisonment, Lizius, with the assistance of sympathetic prison guards, escaped on 31 October 1833 and fled to Strasbourg. After resettling in Bern, Switzerland, he began to work for the liberal newspaper Schweizer Beobachter.

In July 1836, Lizius conveyed to the Austrian mission in Bern his willingness to work as an undercover agent, stressing his knowledge of secret associations in Germany and Switzerland as well as his professional connections to Bavarian and Rhenish newspapers. Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich directed him to the MIB, the main foreign intelligence collection office for the Habsburg monarchy. Assigned the code name SCHÄFER, he submitted copious reports from Switzerland, France, Belgium, and England regarding revolutionary organizations and the exile press. Metternich bestowed particular praise on Lizius’s political acumen, noting that he knew how “to separate the grain from the chaff.” His activities ended in 1848 with the dissolution of the MIB. Afterward, Lizius moved to Frankfurt and established a publishing house.

LODY, CARL HANS (1877–1914). The first wartime German spy to be executed in Great Britain, Carl Hans Lody was born in Berlin on 20 January 1877, the son of an old Prussian family of government officials and military officers. After attending the navigation school at Geestemünde and serving one year in the imperial navy, he found employment as a tour guide with the Hamburg-American Line. His brief marriage to a German-American woman in Nebraska ended in 1913, and he returned to Germany. Already known to German naval intelligence (or “N”), Lody received an invitation to join its ranks from its director Fritz Prieger in May 1914. He was first posted to southern France but in August received a new assignment to Britain. Based in Edinburgh, he was to report on enemy naval activity in the
Firth of Forth. His cover included an American passport in the name of Charles A. Inglis.

British authorities, however, began to intercept Lody’s amateurishly prepared reports, causing consternation among his superiors in Berlin. Against a backdrop of heightened spy fever, he tried to take refuge in Ireland but was arrested at Killarney in October. During his public court martial in London, he surprisingly became a sympathetic figure to the British public, for despite his “not guilty” plea, he freely acknowledged his connection to “N” and described it as an “honor.” Even in the weeks following the announcement of his death sentence, Lody continued unflinchingly to affirm his patriotic convictions. His execution before a firing squad at the Tower of London took place on 6 November 1914. Not only was he posthumously awarded the Iron Cross Second Class by the German government but both MI5 and the House of Commons paid tribute to his honor and devotion to country. Lody’s name was also later revived during the Third Reich. In 1934, a memorial plaque was affixed to the Burgtor in Lübeck, and the following year a destroyer was christened in his honor.

LÖFFLER, GERD (1939– ). An agent of the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) involved in technological espionage, Gerd Löffler was born in Bremen on 30 May 1939. A student of physics at Freiburg and Hamburg, he joined the Christlich-Demokratische Union shortly before completing his studies in 1966. His doctoral dissertation found international recognition, and in 1973 he and a partner founded an electronic data processing firm in Hamburg, Systemtechnik GmbH. When seeking further business connections regarding computer software applications and related matters, a reply from a Dresden-based company arrived. Löffler, who regarded the division of Germany as artificial, felt no hesitation in meeting with a presumed representative of the company in East Berlin—in reality, however, a technologically astute officer of the VA—and an amiable relationship developed. Feeling no pressure to obtain specific scientific or military information, Löffler (known to the VA as händler) presented material related to data processing, energy matters, and environmental concerns. Despite a growing suspicion that espionage might be involved, he was reassured that his East German partner worked for a government
energy agency and not the Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit. In 1978, his value to the VA was further enhanced by his elevation to the Hamburg city parliament as a specialist in energy and environmental policy.

In September 1990—approximately six months after the last meeting with his case officer in Rostock—Löffler was placed in custody because of “credible” evidence from an unnamed source in the former German Democratic Republic. The city parliament revoked his immunity, and his home was thoroughly searched. Shortly before the trial was to begin in August 1991, Löffler fled to Austria, despite having posted bail of 50,000 DM. Three years later, German officials arrested him at the Austrian border, and he was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. In 1995, he resumed his residence in Austria.

LORENZEN, URSEL. A secretary at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels and an agent for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Ursel Lorenzen was recruited in 1968 by one of the Romeo spies, Dieter Will. Her position as the personal assistant to a top-ranking British envoy, Terence Moran, gave her access to highly classified information, including the procedures involved in NATO’s crisis management assessments. Warned by the HVA of her impending arrest by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, she left Brussels for East Berlin on 5 March 1979. At a later press conference, she stressed that her defection had been motivated by reasons of conscience. In 1989, Lorenzen was the subject of a sentimentalized three-part series produced for East German television.

LOTZ, WOLFGANG (1921–1993). An important spy in Egypt working for Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, Wolfgang Lotz was born in Mannheim on 6 January 1921, the son of a Jewish actress and a non-Jewish theater manager. Following their divorce and Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, his mother took Lotz to Palestine in 1933, where (changing his name to Ze’ev Gur-Aryeh) he became an expert equestrian and horse trainer as well as a guard for the Haganah. During World War II, given his fluency in German, English, Hebrew, and Arabic, Lotz proved to be a valuable interrogator of German
prisoners of war for the British army in Cairo. With the formation of the state of Israel in May 1948 came a period of service in the country’s new army. Recruited by Mossad in 1956, Lotz underwent intensive training with the aim of penetrating the growing number of German advisors engaged by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, particularly for its rocket program. Further preparation in developing his cover as an unreconstructed Nazi necessitated returning to Germany, where the Bundesnachrichtendienst gave him additional instruction and false papers.

Arriving in Cairo in late 1960 and posing as a wealthy horse breeder, Lotz soon found entry into influential German and Egyptian circles. Among the subjects in his reports back to Tel Aviv were arms depots, air hangers, communication centers, and missile bases. He also had the assignment from Mossad to intimidate German scientists working in Egypt through threatening letters and packages containing explosives. Arrested on 22 February 1965, Lotz blended fact and fiction, conceding his espionage activity to investigators but maintaining that, as a German ex-soldier desiring a horse farm and racing track, he had been blackmailed by the Israelis. His sentence of 25 years of hard labor ended shortly after the 1967 war as the result of a spy exchange between Israel and Egypt. After returning to Tel Aviv and writing his memoirs, The Champagne Spy (1972), he and his German wife moved to Munich around 1978. He died on 13 May 1993.

LUBIG, MARGARETE (1936– ). A foreign-language secretary at the Federal Defense Office recruited by one of the East German Romeo spies, Margarete Lubig was introduced to Roland Gandt in Vienna through her sister, Marianne Letzkow, in 1961. A minor actor and later theater director in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Gandt posed as a member of Danish intelligence operating under journalistic cover, and a rapid romance developed. Lubig (code name rose) also agreed to procure confidential documents from her superior’s office at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Fontainebleau outside Paris, and later from the military attaché’s office in Rome. A devout Roman Catholic, Lubig felt compelled to reveal her sins, thus prompting the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) to stage a confession in a church near Copenhagen, using an East German agent, Karl-Heinz Hüppe, in lieu of a genuine priest.
Lubig’s activity continued until her early retirement in 1989. The following year, however, the defection of HVA officer Heinz Busch led to the discovery of her espionage for the GDR. In light of her full cooperation with authorities, the Düsseldorf court gave her a suspended sentence of 18 months. Her sister, likewise recruited by “Danish intelligence,” had died prior to the 1996 trial.

LÜBKE AFFAIR. A major disinformation campaign conducted by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Lübke Affair centered on Heinrich Lübke, a member of the Christlich-Demokratische Union who was elected the second president of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1959. Although Lübke had been imprisoned by the Nazis for 20 months, and had also stressed that German citizens should not conceal their past, the German Democratic Republic began in 1964 to characterize him as a Gestapo agent and “concentration camp master builder” during World War II. At the core of the allegation was Lübke’s role as a senior engineer with the company managed by Walter Schlempp that had responsibility for new construction at Peenemünde, including a workers’ barracks. To intensify the charges, numerous documents were falsified by the MfS and supplied to West German publications such as Stern and Der Spiegel. Although no proof existed that he had committed any war crimes, the unrelenting publicity caused Lübke to resign his office in late June 1969, three months prior to the expiration of his second term. According to MfS records, the director of the agitation division considered the campaign closed at that point.

LUDWIG, HERBERT (1938– ). A very successful Illegaler placed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) by the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Herbert Ludwig was born in Straslund. Following the completion of his studies at the University for Economics in Berlin-Karlshorst in 1960, he held several local government positions. Because of his strong physical resemblance to Jürgen Kindt, a West Berliner who had recently moved to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Ludwig was selected by the VA to assume his identity and begin a new life in the FRG. Arriving in Hamburg in May 1965, Ludwig found employment with Lufthansa airlines as an electronic data processor, even though there existed few opportunities for
gaining important military information. A more advantageous situation materialized with his appointment to the data processing center of the Bundeswehr in fall 1972.

As repeated security checks by the Militärischer Abschirmdienst revealed no irregularities, Ludwig continued to work undetected at the Bad Neuenahr facility until 1990. His administrative status gave him unrestricted access to all data systems and hence to a wealth of confidential material, including the disposition and equipment level of all Bundeswehr units. Given the sheer volume of material that Ludwig acquired, a second agent, using the false identity of Dieter Grube, was dispatched as his assistant. Posing as a student at the University of Coblenz and working part-time at a gas station, Grube had the task of securing the material for transport to the GDR.

When Ludwig was arrested in April 1990, there was little doubt as to the extraordinary comprehensiveness of his penetration, which the former VA chief Alfred Krause acknowledged afterward. Found guilty of espionage in June 1993, Ludwig was given a suspended sentence of five years and fined 100,000 DM.

LUDWIG, KURT FREDERICK (1903–?). An Abwehr agent apprehended in the United States, Kurt Frederick Ludwig was born in Ohio but raised in Germany. Recruited by the Abwehr and trained in Berlin, he was dispatched to New York City by his case officer, Ulrich von der Osten, in March 1940. His task was to construct a spy network to obtain information about U.S. military capabilities, especially aircraft production and transatlantic shipping to Great Britain.

Ludwig (known by at least 50 different male and female code names) recruited eight subagents, including Paul Borchardt, but his frequent written communications to cover addresses in Lisbon and Madrid—ostensibly from a leather exporter named “Joe K”—aroused the suspicion of a British censorship station in Bermuda. After mastering the formula of the secret ink employed by Ludwig, British officials notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of their discovery. On 23 August 1941, following closer surveillance of his movements from Florida to Washington State, the FBI arrested Ludwig outside Seattle. Tried in March 1942, he, Borchardt, and Rene Froehlich received prison sentences of 20 years, while the oth-
ers were given lesser terms. Ludwig remained confined at Alcatraz Island until his deportation in 1953.

**LUMMER, HEINRICH (1932– ).** A popular West German parliamentarian who was the object of a failed recruitment attempt by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Heinrich Lummer belonged to the Christlich-Demokratische Union and served as a member of the West Berlin Senate. On a social outing in East Berlin in 1973, he met Frauke Borchardt (code name *susanne rau*), claiming to be an art dealer, and a sustained affair developed. Upon his appointment as senator for interior affairs in 1981, the HVA threatened him with the release of intimate photographs should he prove uncooperative. Lummer, however, refused to be blackmailed and reported the incident to counterintelligence authorities. It did not become public knowledge until summer 1989.

**LUNING, HANS.** A Danish intelligence officer imprisoned in Germany during World War II, Hans Lunding was arrested in Copenhagen by the Gestapo on 29 August 1943 during a full-scale crackdown on resistance activities. Taken to Berlin and sentenced to death by a Nazi court, he was consigned in July 1944 to the Flossenbürg concentration camp. Wilhelm Canaris was placed in a neighboring cell the following year, and Lunding was witness to Canaris’s last utterances through a wall-tapping code. Whereas the former Abwehr chief was executed shortly before the arrival of Allied troops, Lunding survived and returned to Denmark in July 1945, becoming chief of Danish military intelligence five years later. He also served as an undercover liaison to the British and Americans at the headquarters of Admiral Karl Doenitz, the Third Reich’s final head of state. In 1955, Lunding devised a secret plan to rescue Otto John while en route from East Berlin to Helsinki via Copenhagen, but John’s Soviet captors canceled the trip at the last minute.

**LÜNEBURG, SONJA.** *See OLBRICH, JOHANNA.*

**LÜTTICH, EBERHARD.** An operative of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) whose capture caused a serious rupture in U.S. operations, Eberhard Lütich had worked as one of the camouflaged
Offizierte im besonderen Einsatz before his successful resettlement as an Illegaler (code name BREST) in Hamburg in 1972. After he was hired by an international moving company, the HVA engineered his transfer to New York, where his espionage responsibilities included overseeing American activities as a troubleshooter and reporting on transport routes used by the U.S. military for its equipment. Operation ANMELDUNG, however, resulted in Lüttich’s arrest in Hamburg in 1979. To obtain a lighter sentence, he revealed his extensive knowledge of HVA methods and personnel to U.S. and West German authorities. Calling his loss “a particularly heavy blow for us,” HVA chief Markus Wolf decided to recall all remaining agents in the United States and start anew.

LUTZE, LOTHAR (1940– ). A key figure in one of the most serious espionage cases in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Lothar Lutze emigrated from the German Democratic Republic in 1952 and was trained as a clerk. After becoming an agent for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in November 1959 (code name CHARLY), he served in the Bundeswehr and then in 1972 recruited his wife Renate Übelacker (code name NANA) along with his friend Jürgen Wiegel, an employee in the naval section of the Defense Ministry. While Lutze acquired an advantageous post in the weapons department, it was his wife’s position as the chief secretary to the head of the personnel and welfare section that allowed some of the ministry’s most valuable secrets to be conveyed to their handlers, Frank and Christine Gerstner. Altogether 612 documents related to the FRG and 397 concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) found their way to East Berlin. Especially prized by the Warsaw Pact were the alarm plan of the Bundeswehr and the details of the NATO oil pipeline in Western Europe.

In early June 1976, all of the principals were arrested as a result of Operation ANMELDUNG. A Düsseldorf court sentenced Lutze to 12 years in prison and the others to seven years. Although returned to the GDR in April 1987, Lutze served longer than any other spy in the FRG. The case, however, had even wider repercussions, becoming the object of a parliamentary investigation and resulting in the resignation of Defense Minister Georg Leber in February 1978.
LUXBURG AFFAIR. A serious rupture in Germany’s relationship with Argentina during World War I, the Luxburg Affair had its origins in the ciphered traffic between Berlin and Germany’s diplomatic missions in Latin America. Unknown to the Germans, Room 40, the cryptographic unit of British naval intelligence, succeeded in decrypting a series of notes sent by Karl von Luxburg, the German ambassador to Argentina, and relayed them to Washington, D.C. Not only had they been transmitted from the Swedish legation in Buenos Aires—in violation of the country’s declared neutrality—but their contents included some highly inflammatory remarks. Besides referring to the Argentine foreign minister as an “Anglophile ass,” Luxburg recommended that submarine attacks on Argentine shipping be carried out “without leaving a trace” of German involvement. In September 1917, President Woodrow Wilson authorized the publication of the messages in the American press without disclosing their British source. Argentina immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, while Sweden suffered an international embarrassment.

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MADEMOISELLE DOCTEUR. See SCHRAMMÜLLER, ELSBETH.

MADER, JULIUS (1928–2000). The leading writer on espionage in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as well as an officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Julius Mader was born in Radzein (now Radejcin, Czech Republic). Expelled from Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1958, he resettled in the GDR and, 11 years later, earned a degree in economics from the Deutsche Akademie für Staats und Rechtswissenschaften (German Academy for Political Science and Law). While employed at the GDR publishing house Die Wirtschaft, he attracted the attention of the agitation division of the MfS and began his collaboration in 1958. Four years later, the MfS designated him one of the Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz with the rank of captain. To the general public, Mader (code names DOCUMENT, X 54, JÄGER, and FAINGOLD) appeared to be merely a freelance writer. Because of
his ready access to inside information, his books and articles contain a wealth of detail, but their tone is also highly tendentious and propagandistic. Their chief aim was to expose and condemn the intelligence services of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and to cast a heroic light on the communist espionage tradition. With one exception—*Gelbe Liste: Wo ist die CIA?* (*Yellow List: Where Is the CIA?*)—they were all published in the Eastern bloc. Yet numerous articles by Mader also appeared in the Western press. He became a highly visible figure in the GDR, not only because of his weekly column “Geheimdienste” (intelligence services) in the popular *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* beginning in 1972, but also owing to his frequent appearances at state offices, factories, and schools, where he warned of the dangers posed by Western spies and urged vigilance on the part of all citizens.

Although his 1979 book on the *Rote Kapelle* seemed uncharacteristically critical of the Soviet spy network and clouded his relationship with the MfS, works by Mader continued to be published as late as 1988. The MfS awarded him a medal of honor in 1989 to mark the 40th anniversary of the GDR. Mader wrote, cowrote, or edited 32 books, which sold about 5.2 million copies in 18 languages (they enjoyed an especially high reputation in the Soviet Union). He died in Berlin on 17 May 2000.

**MAERKER, RUDOLF (1927–1987).** A West German journalist and politician considered a major asset by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Rudolf Maerker was active in his native Rhineland as a functionary of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) after World War II. He later moved to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), becoming a propagandist for East German radio. A Stalinist purge caused him to return to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952 and begin to work for the Ostbüro der SPD (code name RUDI BAUMANN). After its dissolution, his rise in the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) continued, and by 1967 he was the local party chief in Bonn. He also became known as a freelance journalist with an expertise regarding the GDR.

Yet Maerker’s ideological commitment to the communist regime had not abated. A Selbstanbieter, or walk-in volunteer, he formalized his relationship with the HVA in October 1968. For more than
two decades, his voluminous reports, routinely dictated on a tape recorder, focused on internal party matters as well as the activities of the West German peace movement. Ranked in the highest category of *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, Maerker (code name max) managed to escape detection and was posthumously honored by the affixing of his name to the Bonn SPD headquarters. The first positive identification of Max occurred in 2000 during the Düsseldorf trial of a former HVA officer. Additional details emerged from the *Rosenholz* data four years later.

**MAGDEBURG.** The vessel whose wreck precipitated Germany’s most damaging intelligence loss during World War I, the *Magdeburg*, a “four stacker” or small cruiser, was built for the imperial navy in 1912 and belonged to the Baltic fleet. Dispatched into action at the beginning of the war, the ship performed several tasks successfully, including the mining of Latvia’s naval port. On 26 August 1914, it ran aground on the small island of Odensholm at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Finland. After a German torpedo boat proved unable to dislodge the cruiser, the captain, Richard Habenicht, ordered his crew to set demolition charges to prevent the enemy from acquiring the undamaged vessel.

Before the abandonment of the cruiser was completed, the charges began to detonate prematurely. In the confusion, one of the thick blue-bound codebooks (*Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine*) was tossed overboard; another copy and the cipher key were also lost in the water. A nearby Russian ship, the torpedo boat *Lejtenant Bura-kov*, sent a boat with armed men to the German cruiser. Following Habenicht’s surrender, the Russians found a copy of the codebook in the captain’s locker. The two other lost codebooks were later found on the stony seabed by a Russian diving team. Recognizing the value of their find, the Russians sent the undamaged codebook to their British ally and kept the two waterlogged copies.

Under the direction of Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the codebook was delivered to the secret codebreaking agency then in its infancy. The initial difficulties faced by the British cryptanalysts were soon overcome by the acquisition of another German codebook (*Handelsschiffsverkehrs-buch*) from a merchant ship off Melbourne, Australia. The expanded codebreaking staff moved
to a larger workspace in the Old Admiralty Building—Room 40 (which became the undercover designation of the naval codebreaking unit). Within four months after the outbreak of hostilities, the British were thus privy to the most confidential information of the German navy.

**MAINZER INFORMATIONSbüRO (MIB).** The main source of foreign intelligence for the Habsburg monarchy prior to the revolutions of 1848, the Mainzer Informationsbüro (Mainz Information Office) was established in 1833 by Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich. The city of Mainz, on the left bank of the Rhine River opposite the influx of the Main River, was selected for its central location and proximity to France, where the July Revolution had erupted three years earlier. Metternich’s initial plan was to engage representatives from four major states—Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Württemberg—to form a network covering all of Germany (“true strength,” he commented, “lies in centralization”). In the end, however, the MIB became a purely Austrian creation, especially after France also declined to participate. Metternich further insisted that this system of surveillance could only function properly when kept hidden from public view.

Under the initial direction of **Karl Gustav Noé**, a former high commissioner of the Viennese police, the MIB sought primarily to uncover any nascent plans for revolutionary insurrection in Germany. Information gathered was evaluated and then sent by courier, usually in one- to two-week intervals, directly to Metternich in Vienna. MIB agents usually offered their services for monetary gain, a reduced penal sentence, return to their homeland, or the prospect of further state service. Most preferred were reliable and well-educated people who had direct contact with revolutionary circles. Soon the MIB’s network became the most extensive in Europe—stretching from Edinburgh and Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) to Barcelona and Malta. Its relatively high cost of maintenance underscored the importance it held for the Austrian chancellor.

The MIB never uncovered any far-reaching conspiracies, but it closely monitored the rising tide of revolutionary sentiment, especially in the German press. The names of prominent writers such as Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne, Georg Herwegh, Karl Gutzkow,
August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben, and Heinrich Laube also appeared frequently in the confidential reports. Having managed to recruit only a single Polish agent (Stanislaus Roczinski) and two Italian ones, it obtained nearly all of its information from German informants. Among the most noteworthy were Zacharias Aldinger, Bernhard Lizius, Franz Strohmeyer, Hermann Ebner, Eduard Beurmann, Jakob Singer, and Wilhelm Fischer. In 1841, Noé was succeeded by Josef Clannern von Engelshofen, who directed the MIB until its disbandment in 1848. See also JUNGES DEUTSCHLAND.

MAISON DE FRANCE. The site of a terrorist bombing on 25 August 1983, the Maison de France serves as the French cultural center in West Berlin. Working in conjunction with the counterterrorism directorate of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Johannes Weinrich, a close aide to Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (or Carlos the Jackal), had a 24-kilogram bomb placed in the building in order to force the release of two colleagues imprisoned in France. The explosion killed one person and injured 23 others. Although Weinrich fled to the German Democratic Republic and then settled in the Middle East, he was extradited from Yemen, tried by a Berlin court, and given a life sentence in January 2000. A key piece of evidence was a letter from Weinrich to Sanchez detailing the attack. It had been intercepted by the Hungarian service, relayed to the MfS, and discovered after reunification. In April 1994, following his extradition from Greece, the head of the MfS counterterrorism directorate, Helmut Voigt, had been given a four-year sentence for his involvement. See also LA BELLE DISCOTHEQUE BOMBING.

MÄNNCHEN, HORST (1935–2008). The head of signals intelligence for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Horst Männchen was born in Berggiesshübel (Saxony) on 3 June 1935, the son of an iron caster. He entered the MfS in 1953 as a radio operator but was dismissed in 1961 for disciplinary reasons. His reinstatement in 1963—approved by Markus Wolf—brought him to the technical department of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, where, encouraged by Bruno Beater and aided by a new degree in high-frequency radio technology, his career prospered. On 26 June 1971, Männchen was given his own MfS department to monitor telephone conversations
not only in the German Democratic Republic but also among leading officials in the Federal Republic of Germany. Generously subsidized by the government and occupying the Ministry for Science and Technology complex in Berlin-Wuhlheide, Department III had a staff of 2,361 by 1989 and some 80 installations in the GDR, most under military cover. Diplomatic missions abroad were also used.

Männchen maintained liaison relations with other Eastern bloc states—especially Czechoslovakia—while helping fraternal countries such as Cuba construct their own installations and stay abreast of fiber optic cables, satellite connections, and similar technological innovations. With the dissolution of the state security apparatus in December 1989, his successful career came to an end, although unlike most high-ranking MfS officers, Männchen cooperated fully with Western authorities. He died in Berlin on 12 January 2008.

MÄNNEL, GÜNTER (1932– ). An early defector from the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, Günter Männel (code name lange) headed the division concerned with operations related to the United States. Arriving in West Berlin in June 1961, he was later debriefed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency at Camp King (Hesse) and revealed the names of dozens of Eastern bloc agents active in the Federal Republic of Germany. Männel also warned of a highly placed KGB mole in the Bundesnachrichtendienst, but he only knew the Soviet code name paul. See also BUNKE, TAMARA.

MARINE-EVIDENZBÜRO. The Austro-Hungarian naval intelligence service, the Marine-Evidenzbüro was established in 1900 at the Adriatic naval base and arsenal of Pula at the southern tip of the Istrian peninsula. Its major efforts were directed at the Mediterranean naval squadrons of Great Britain, France, and Italy during World War I. Of particular significance were the sabotage activities directed by its Resident in Zurich, Rudolf Mayer. Like its army counterpart, the agency ended in 1918.

MARTINOVICS, IGNAZ VON (1755–1795). An important Hungarian agent working for the Habsburg secret police and later executed as a French Jacobin conspirator, Ignaz von Martinovics was born in Hungary, the son of a Serbian army officer. Trained for the Franciscan
order but in reality a declared atheist, he was a professor of natural sciences for several years at Lemberg (now Lviv, Ukraine) before being pronounced incompetent by the faculty in Pest. His recruitment occurred shortly following Leopold II’s accession to power in 1790. Requiring greater knowledge of the separatist conspiracies of various Magyar magnates, the new emperor engaged the former police chief of Pest, Franz Gotthardi, who in turn secured Martinovics’s cooperation in submitting confidential reports and trying to influence Hungarian public opinion in a manner favorable to the Habsburg monarchy. In April 1793, the head of the Austrian secret police, Johann Anton Pergen, sent Martinovics on a fact-finding tour of Hungary and Transylvania. His reports stressed the omnipresence of revolutionary opinions, even the threat of mutiny by several Hungarian regiments. Further implicated were a number of Freemasons, Illuminati, Jesuit theocrats, itinerant Poles, and subversive Americans, although many of his assertions were found to have been invented.

Unknown to both Pergen and Gotthardi, however, were Martinovics’s own revolutionary machinations. In the fall of 1792, he composed a critical letter to Leopold’s successor, Francis II, supposedly from the Italian count Giuseppe Gorani (Gorani had published a series of letters to European monarchs in the Parisian Moniteur earlier that year). Yet the issue of the Moniteur containing Martinovics’s letter, which pointedly accused Francis of having betrayed the liberal policies of his predecessor and threatened his removal from the throne of Hungary, never reached Vienna, presumably having been intercepted by Austrian censors. Gotthardi, who continued to regard Martinovics as his most valuable secret agent, had repeatedly attempted to secure some additional rewards for his service, but without success. In the summer of 1793, disgruntled by this rejection, Martinovics circulated his letter among a like-minded circle of acquaintances.

Recognizing that two types of potential revolutionaries existed in Hungary, Martinovics organized both the nationalist Society of the Reformers of Hungary, directed at disaffected nobles, and the Society of Liberty and Equality for French Jacobin sympathizers. According to his plan, neither group was to know of the other’s existence, and once the members of the former had served their purpose, they would be liquidated. Although some 200–300 people were recruited within several weeks, Martinovics was arrested in Vienna after a plot
involving several Austrian Jacobins was uncovered. Hoping to ingratiate himself with the police by revealing the identity of other leading Hungarian Jacobins, he was nevertheless found guilty of being the prime conspirator in a series of secret but fairly conducted trials. In May 1795, Martinovics was beheaded in Buda after first having to watch the execution of four of his closest Hungarian collaborators.

MAROGNA-REDWITZ, RUDOLF COUNT VON (1886–1944). A senior Abwehr officer and member of the anti-Nazi resistance, Rudolf Count von Marogna-Redwitz was born in Munich on 15 October 1886, the son of a Bavarian-Austrian noble family. Severely wounded in combat, he completed his service in World War I associated with Abteilung IIIb. His intelligence responsibilities continued with the postwar Reichswehr, disguised under the sham German Overseas Service. Prior to 1938, Marogna-Redwitz was the leading Abwehr officer in Munich, concentrating on Czechoslovakia and maintaining relations with Austrian defense officials. His Catholic and monarchical background made him ill-disposed to the Nazi regime from the outset. After being named head of the Vienna Abwehrstelle in 1938, he used his position to aid many victims of persecution, especially Jews who were enlisted as agents by his subordinate Emmerich von Boxberg. In light of the mistrust shown by the Sicherheitsdienst and the Gestapo, Reinhard Heydrich pressed for Marogna-Redwitz’s dismissal, but Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris unflinchingly kept him at his post. Working closely with Hans Oster and Erwin von Lahousen, Marogna-Redwitz emerged as a key figure in the conspiracy of 20 June 1944. Its failure, however, resulted in his arrest. He was executed at Plötzensee Prison on 12 October 1944.

MASSING, HEDE (1903–1981). A successful Soviet recruiter who defected to the United States, Hede Massing was born Hede Tune in Vienna. Her marriage in 1920 to Gerhardt Eisler, a leading figure of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, brought her to Berlin but ended several years later in divorce. After a second relationship with Julian Gumperz, a wealthy Marxist publisher born in the United States, she later married the sociologist and spy Paul Massing. Her interest in espionage whetted by Richard Sorge in Berlin, Massing began to work for the Soviet GRU (military intelligence) under
Ignace Poretsky in 1931. After first serving as a courier, she used her U.S. passport to move to New York, where she was joined by her husband after his release from a concentration camp. In the mid-1930s, they were transferred to the new foreign intelligence branch of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs).

As a recruiter (code name REDHEAD), Massing focused on the strong anti-Nazi sentiments of New Deal liberals, such as Noel Field, who dominated the federal government. Although she and her husband were summoned to Moscow at the height of the Stalinist purges and interrogated by the NKVD, they managed to return to the United States and quietly drop from Soviet service. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact sealed their disillusionment. During World War II, Massing found a job making gun mounts for a shipyard in New Jersey. In the winter of 1946–1947, prompted by an investigation of her first husband, Massing was debriefed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). She testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and at the second perjury trial of Alger Hiss. Until her death in March 1981, besides continuing to cooperate with the FBI, Massing served as a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency. Her autobiography, *This Deception*, appeared in 1951.

**MASSING, PAUL (1902–1979).** A German sociologist associated with the Frankfurt School as well as a spy for the Soviet Union, Paul Massing was born in Grumbach (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 30 August 1902. In 1929, after receiving a doctorate from the University of Frankfurt am Main, he took a position in the German Department of the International Agrarian Institute in Moscow. On his return to Berlin with his wife Hede Massing in 1931, he reluctantly joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands and became engaged in the anti-Nazi resistance. This activity resulted in his arrest and solitary confinement in the Oranienburg concentration camp in 1933. Released five months later, Massing joined his wife (who held a United States passport) in New York and began working for the foreign intelligence section of the NKVD under the code name VACEK.

Despite their growing disillusionment—underscored by the onset of the Moscow purge trials—Massing and his wife returned to the Soviet Union in October 1937, determined to observe conditions firsthand and to avenge the sudden death of their NKVD controller
Ignace Reiss (pseudonym Ignace Poretsky). Although they underwent intense interrogations and were kept under close surveillance, the couple managed to return to the United States in 1939, largely because of the adverse publicity that would have otherwise resulted. Massing resumed his teaching career, first at Columbia University and then at Rutgers University until 1967. In the immediate postwar years, he also cooperated with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his knowledge of the Soviet espionage apparatus and testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Massing later separated from his wife and retired in Germany. He died on 30 April 1979 in Tübingen.

MASSON, ROGER (1894–1967). The controversial head of Swiss military intelligence during World War II, Roger Masson held the rank of colonel brigadier. Beginning in 1939 and aided by close ties to Bureau Ha, a private intelligence service established by Hans Hausamann, Masson’s small operation proved exceptionally well informed. One of Masson’s principal concerns involved the possibility of a Nazi invasion and annexation of Switzerland. Through an intermediary, he arranged a clandestine meeting with Walter Schellenberg, head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, on 8 September 1942 in Landshut, just across the German frontier. Masson’s initial objective was not to exchange information but to reassure top German officials of his country’s strict neutrality and determination to resist any foreign aggressor. Because he was so impressed by Schellenberg’s cultivated manner, three additional meetings—all held in Switzerland—took place during the following 13 months and even included the commander in chief of the Swiss army, Henri Grisan. Several additional matters, such as releasing a Swiss consular agent held in German custody, were also discussed.

Other Swiss army and intelligence officers took sharp issue with Masson’s private channel to Berlin, and he became the object of two official investigations during the war. Criticized for placing excessive trust in Schellenberg and allowing his adjutant, Hans Wilhelm Eggen, to enter the country despite an immigration ban, Masson claimed that Nazi Germany had abandoned its hostile designs toward Switzerland as a result. Yet when the public learned of this secret connection through an unauthorized interview with the London Daily
Telegraph, the vehement reaction brought about Masson’s early retirement in fall 1945. Afterward, however, Masson remained loyal to Schellenberg by assisting both him and Eggen in their legal travails.

MAST, HEINRICH BARON VON (1897–?). An Abwehr officer with multiple later affiliations, Heinrich Baron von Mast served as an Austrian counterintelligence officer on the Piave front beginning in 1917. Also associated with the Viennese secret service during the interwar period, he transferred to the Abwehr in 1938 and was posted to the Abwehrstelle in Nuremberg. His major function, however, was to protect Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris from the rival Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Beginning in 1943, it was the task of Mast and other former Austrian intelligence officials to hide incriminating documents collected by Canaris for use in a projected trial of Adolf Hitler. Although the papers found their way to Austria and then Slovenia, Mast and his associates were captured by the Gestapo and placed in the Mauthausen concentration camp.

Following their release in 1945, Yugoslavian leader Josip Tito gave them the Canaris archive—disguised in a British diplomatic pouch—with instructions to proceed to French-occupied Tyrol. Despite being made a colonel in the French Deuxième Bureau, Mast established a connection with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps in early 1948 and took part in several missions. Under its sponsorship, he opened an oriental rug store in Linz, where the papers were then secured. A further intelligence affiliation developed with the Organisation Gehlen (OG). Working in conjunction with Wilhelm Höttl and heading the Linz station—under the cover of the Nibelungen publishing house—he supplied the Pullach headquarters with much valuable information based on sources as distant as Rumania, Bulgaria, and Italy. In January 1952, Mast and Höttl left the OG in favor of the service headed by Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, yet their vast informant network made them feel quasi-independent of any intelligence overseer. When Heinz’s service foundered shortly afterward, Mast resumed his connection with the French, which lasted well beyond their departure from Austria in October 1955.

MATA HARI (1876–1917). A Dutch dancer and spy executed as a German agent during World War I, Margaretha Zelle was born in
Leeuwarden, the Netherlands, on 7 August 1876, the daughter of a prosperous tradesman who went bankrupt. Following her marriage to a much older Dutch colonial officer, Rudolf MacLeod, the couple moved to Java and had two children. They divorced in 1902, and Zelle sought her fortune in Paris. Unsuccessful as a studio model, she began to develop an expressive dance style posing as a Javanese princess, inspired by her vision of a secret Hindu temple ceremony. The Indian name she adopted—Mata Hari, or Eye of the Dawn—had already been chosen prior to coming to France. After making her debut in March 1905 at the Musée Guimet, a private establishment for oriental art, she performed to enthusiastic audiences at the Trocadero and L’Olympia as well as in several exclusive Parisian salons. Her success spread abroad and was mirrored by her likeness in numerous commercial objects. Yet just as rapid as her rise to prominence was her decline. Facing younger competition and subject to increasing criticism, she began to use prostitution as a means to support her impulsive and lavish lifestyle.

At the outbreak of World War I, living in Berlin, she came under suspicion of being a spy for Russia. Following her return to Holland, she made two trips back to Paris. Just prior to the latter one in May 1916, a relationship developed with the German consul in The Hague, Karl Cramer, who was also connected to the secret service headed by Walter Nicolai. She may have received the designation Agent H 21 at that time. For roughly six months, French counterintelligence officials from the Deuxième Bureau monitored all of Mata Hari’s movements in Paris, concluding that she had ample funds at her disposal and that most of her escorts were military officers. After her most significant attachment, a Russian captain named Vladimir Maslov, became injured, she sought permission to visit him at a clinic in a restricted military zone. The Deuxième Bureau agreed to her request on the condition that she work for France as an undercover agent. One million francs would be paid to her in addition. Although the head of the Deuxième Bureau, Georges Ladoux, later claimed that she once had a romantic liaison with Crown Prince Wilhelm, no evidence connects her to any member of the Hohenzollern family.

Lacking a clearly defined set of instructions from either France or Germany, Mata Hari began to work on her own initiative. One of her major new acquaintances was the German military consul
in Madrid, Arnold von Kalle, with whom she exchanged pieces of information. What she obtained from Kalle was communicated to Ladoux in Paris, while Kalle sent her observations to his superiors. Another romantic affair developed with the French military attaché in Madrid, Joseph Denvignes, whom she alerted regarding Kalle’s undercover work. Unknown to Mata Hari, however, was a second French double agent in Madrid, Marthe Richer (alias Marthe Richard, or Agent H 32 on the German list). On assignment from Ladoux, she targeted the German naval attaché Hans von Kroch and obtained high-level intelligence—including the code used by Kalle to communicate with Cramer in The Hague. The Deuxième Bureau soon had concrete proof that Mata Hari was on the payroll of the Germans.

A further complication occurred when Mata Hari was detained by British authorities in Falmouth en route from Madrid to Amsterdam. As she matched the general description of the German spy Clara Bendix, it was only with difficulty that “Mrs. Zelle MacLeod” managed to convince them of her true identity. Yet when Scotland Yard tried to confirm her contention of being a French spy, Ledoux not only denied any connection but named her as a German agent. Forced to return to Madrid and then lured back to Paris, she was arrested on 13 February 1917. To be accused of “intelligence cooperation with the enemy” came at a highly unpropitious moment, for in light of France’s worsening military and economic situation, rumors had started to circulate that a conspiracy from abroad was the ultimate reason. Moreover, Mata Hari’s own naiveté—combined with the inadequate legal representation by a former lover, Edouard Clunet—weakened her position considerably.

Unpersuaded by her protestations of innocence—that her contacts with German officers had occurred only in a romantic context and that any information conveyed had been strategically worthless—the six-member military tribunal found Mata Hari guilty of espionage. She died on 15 October 1917 before a firing squad at the Vincennes fortress outside Paris, and her unclaimed body was taken to an anatomical laboratory for students. Despite the prosecution’s assertion that her work as a German agent resulted in “indescribable damage” to the French military, most authorities have concluded that her activity had no discernible impact on the course of the war.
MAULWURF. The German equivalent of a mole, a Maulwurf is a high-level enemy agent concealed within an intelligence organization or government structure. These agents are expected to procure exceptionally valuable information, as was the case with Gabrielle Gast, Klaus Kuron, and Alfred Spuhler during the Cold War.

MAYER, HANS FERDINAND (1895–1980). The anonymous author of the Oslo Report conveyed to British intelligence, Hans Ferdinand Mayer was born in Pforzheim on 23 October 1895. In 1922, after studying mathematics, physics, and astronomy at Karlsruhe and Heidelberg, he joined the Berlin laboratory of the Siemens and Halske electronics firm and, in 1936, headed its communications research department. In 1939, during a business trip to Oslo, Mayer composed two letters in his hotel room describing the weapons systems being developed in Germany. Accompanied by a prototype proximity fuse used in bombs and artillery shells, they were mailed on separate days—November 1 and 2—to the British naval attaché in Oslo, who forwarded them to the Secret Intelligence Service in London. These seven pages of information—dubbed the Oslo Report—aroused some initial skepticism but were verified in large part by R. V. Jones, the newly appointed scientific advisor. While a few of its estimates (such as the production levels of the Junkers SS light bomber) proved to be overstated, other data gave the British invaluable knowledge on a variety of topics, especially radar technology, and thus the ability to develop effective countermeasures.

Arrested in August 1943 for listening to the British Broadcasting Company, Mayer spent the remainder of the war in a series of concentration camps. Following his liberation from Buchenwald, he worked at a U.S. Air Force base in Ohio before accepting a professorship at Cornell University. Although the first public mention of the Oslo Report was made by Jones in 1947, its author preferred to remain unacknowledged until after his death. Mayer returned to direct the research department of Siemens and Halske in 1950 and died in Munich on 18 October 1980. Jones revealed Mayer’s name nine years later in his autobiography.

MAYER, RUDOLF. An Austro-Hungarian naval officer who oversaw extensive sabotage operations in Italy during World War I, Rudolf
Mayer was assigned by the Marine-Evidenzbüro to its office in Trieste in 1906. With the entry of Italy into the war, Mayer’s headquarters were relocated to Zurich, where he posed as the Austro-Hungarian vice consul. Through his well-developed agent network in Italy, numerous acts of sabotage began to occur: the explosion of three warships in Brindisi; the destruction of various munition depots and hydroelectric plants; and most significant of all, the sinking of the battleship Leonardo da Vinci on 2 August 1916 in Taranto.

Increasingly certain of Mayer’s involvement, Italian authorities offered a substantial reward for any information, which proved to be sufficient enticement for one of his agents, Livio Bini. Two professional safecrackers were engaged, who broke into Mayer’s Zurich office in late February 1917, removing codebooks, lists of secret operatives, maps of mined Italian harbors, and other material. Although the gravity of the incident caused Mayer to return to Austria and resign within a few months, he resurfaced in Switzerland later that year under the auspices of “N” (German naval intelligence).

MEIER, RICHARD (1927–). A highly regarded head of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Richard Meier was born on 6 January 1927. His career with the BfV began in 1957, and in 1964 he became head of counterintelligence. Although Meier left to direct the collection division of the Bundesnachrichtendienst in 1970, he returned to the BfV as head on 15 September 1975, replacing Günter Nollau. Among his main accomplishments was Operation ANMELDUNG, which disrupted the large-scale infiltration of East German spies into the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet due to an automobile accident in Austria—he was severely injured and his traveling companion killed—Meier’s tenure ended on 22 April 1983. His book Geheimdienst ohne Maske (Secret Service Unmasked) appeared in 1992.

MEISEL, HILDE (1914–1945). A militant left-wing writer and operative of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, Hilde Meisel was born in Vienna on 31 July 1914, the daughter of a Jewish merchant. Although raised in Berlin, she established residence in London in the early 1930s and eventually became a British citizen through a sham marriage with John Olday. Her strong
anti-Nazi convictions led her to write a series of articles and books, under the name Hilda Monte, in conjunction with various socialists based in Great Britain, including the neo-Kantian group headed by philosopher Leonard Nelson. Beginning in 1942, Meisel also prepared manuscripts for the British Broadcasting Company designed for German audiences.

Desiring more direct involvement, she underwent training by the OSS at Camp O outside London and, under the code name Crocus, was paradropped into France near Lake Geneva in September 1944. Her main objective was to establish contact with resistance groups in Austria. On 17 April 1945, after being shot by a border patrol near Feldkirch while returning from Vienna to Switzerland, Meisel committed suicide. Authorities were unable to ascertain her true identity at the time.

**MEISINGER, JOSEF (1899–1947).** A senior SS official stationed in Poland and Japan during World War II, Josef Meisinger was born in Munich on 14 September 1899. A combat veteran of World War I, he was attracted to the Nazi Party and participated in the abortive Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Meisinger served in the Bavarian police force until he came to the attention of Reinhard Heydrich, joined the SS in March 1933, and accompanied Heydrich to Berlin the following year. His responsibilities as a key official in the Reich’s new police force included detecting inner-party conspiracies, suppressing abortions and homosexual activity, and preventing intimate relations between Jews and non-Jews. In this capacity, Meisinger clumsily prepared the dossier at the center of the Fritsch Affair and was deprived of his office after the general’s rehabilitation.

With the outbreak of war came a field assignment in Poland, where he headed the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) in German-occupied Warsaw from October 1939 to March 1941. Yet the extreme measures instituted by Meisinger alarmed his superiors and resulted in his reassignment to Tokyo as the police attaché and liaison to the Japanese secret service (Walter Schellenberg later characterized him as “so utterly bestial and corrupt as to be practically inhuman”). At one point, while meeting with local occupation officials in Shanghai, Meisinger called for the execution of some 17,000 exiled European Jews, but the Japanese government decided
to override his proposal. He also unsuccessfully promoted a propaganda scheme devised by Ignácz Trebitsch-Lincoln. Concerned as well with the security of the German embassy and charged with the investigation of Richard Sorge, Meisinger established a congenial relationship with the Soviet spy and protested his arrest by the Japanese in October 1941. In another major miscalculation, Ivar Lissner, the most valuable agent of the Abwehr working in the region, was apprehended two years later at Meisinger’s instigation on the basis of rash and distorted charges. Nevertheless, he remained at his post in Japan until his capture by U.S. forces in September 1945. Returned to Poland, he was found guilty of war crimes by a Warsaw court and hanged on 7 March 1947.

**MELDUNGEN AUS DEM REICH.** The secret wartime public opinion reports compiled by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), Meldungen aus dem Reich (Reports from the Reich) owed their conception and direction to Otto Ohlendorf. As head of Office III of the RSHA, he not only oversaw a research staff of 24 persons well-versed in various disciplines but relied on a battery of carefully chosen, unremunerated confidential agents in diverse occupational groups. Their task was to compile remarks overheard in public and private settings about such issues as the fall of France, the invasion of the Soviet Union, food rationing, Allied bombing, and attempts on Adolf Hitler’s life.

Beginning in early October 1939, the reports appeared in mimeographed form several times a week and were normally 15–20 typed pages. The first 34 issues were called Berichte zur innenpolitischen Lage (Reports about the Domestic Situation) before the new title was adopted. Written in a sober and candid tone, they contained an assessment of the public mood regarding current events along with individual stories and examples. Crime statistics—strictly banned from the public press—also found their way into these reports. Taken as a whole, they charted larger trends in German society, notably the lack of enthusiasm for the war from the outset and the growing desire for a peaceful settlement.

The Meldungen had considerable influence on many in the Nazi leadership as Germany’s prospects for victory worsened. But to Ohlendorf’s frustration, they—in contrast to the steady stream of battlefield
dispatches—rarely reached Hitler himself. Because of objections from Joseph Goebbels and others, these reports were replaced in mid-1943 by *SD-Berichte zu Inlandesfragen* (SD Reports on Domestic Matters) and distributed to a considerably smaller circle. They ceased to appear on a regular basis after July 1944.

**MERCKER COMMISSION.** See WESSEL, GERHARD.

**MERKER, PAUL (1894–1969).** A leading Comintern figure later tried in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for alleged ties to Western intelligence, Paul Merker was born in Oberlössnitz (Saxony) on 1 February 1894, the son of working-class parents. A waiter and hotel employee in his youth, he served as a soldier during World War I. In 1918, he joined the Independent Socialists and two years later the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), emerging as a militant in the trade-union section. Although Merker was elected to the Prussian parliament and also sent to Moscow as the German representative of the Profintern, conflict developed with the party over trade-union tactics. In April 1930, owing to “leftist deviation” on his part, his responsibilities in the KPD secretariat and politburo were terminated.

Merker (code name MAX FISCHER) spent 1931–1933 as a Comintern agent in the United States and, in 1935, was reelected to the KPD central committee. While working for the party apparatus in Paris, he was arrested by the French in 1940 and placed in an internment camp in Vernet. His escape in 1942 brought him to Mexico, where, acting as president of the Free Germany Committee for Latin America, Merker directed communist activity among German emigrants. In addition to his regular contributions to *Freies Deutschland*, the bi-weekly journal of German communists in Mexico City, he wrote a 950-page study of Nazi Germany. Despite his non-Jewish origins, this analysis focused on the issue of anti-Semitism and marked a sharp departure from current communist orthodoxy.

Returning to Germany in July 1946, Merker became a member of the central committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) and politburo and was given responsibility for agricultural matters. Suspicion, however, began to mount that he had established wartime ties with American intelligence. In August 1950,
pointing to his contact with Noel Field, a former American communist spy who had become the director of the Unitarian Service Committee, the SED stripped him of his executive functions and party membership. His situation only worsened in the wake of the Rudolf Slansky trial in Prague. Arrested on 4 December 1953—four days after Slansky’s execution as a “traitor, saboteur, spy, and Zionist”—Merker was placed in Brandenburg Prison in East Berlin and underwent prolonged interrogation by both officials from the MfS and the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs).

Despite repeated death threats to his family as well as scripted encouragement by a planted cellmate, Merker refused to make a public confession and was therefore tried secretly on 29–30 March 1955. According to one of the charges, he was a paid agent of Jewish capitalists in New York and Mexico City who had helped him and his wife in their wartime escape from France. Concluding that Merker had pursued deviant policies “in close association” with the Slansky group in Prague, the GDR’s highest court sentenced him to eight years in prison. Ten months later, however, shortly before Khrushchev’s “secret speech” and the advent of de-Stalinization, he was released from prison. The court then rescinded its earlier verdict, declaring that the evidence was insufficient to support a “condemnation” of the man. In spite of his promise to remain silent about the matter (public knowledge of the secret trial and sentence remained suppressed until the demise of the GDR), full exoneration never occurred. Readmitted to the party but not allowed to hold office again, Merker worked as a proofreader in the Volk und Wissen publishing house. He died on 13 May 1969.

MERTINS, GERHARD (1919–1993). A major West German arms dealer engaged by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Gerhard Mertins was born in Berlin and served in a parachute regiment during World War II. After working briefly for Volkswagen, he established an export firm in Switzerland focusing on Africa and the Middle East. In mid-1965, an agreement was reached between Mertins (code name URANUS) and the BND, whereby his firm Merex, relocated to the Federal Republic of Germany, would sell arms to neutral countries at low prices in order to undercut the influence of the Soviet bloc. On 26 November 1975, after reviewing eight transactions
involving Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and India, a Bonn court found Mertins and his closest colleagues innocent of any legal infraction, since they had been operating according to guidelines set by the federal government. In 1980, Mertins even received compensation for the financial losses caused by the trial. No government or BND officials were ever charged.

MEYER, TILL (1944– ). A prominent West German terrorist with links to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Till Meyer was born in Luckenwalde near Berlin on 31 March 1944, the son of a Wehrmacht soldier killed shortly thereafter. At the age of 15, he left school in search of adventure but, repelled by his experience working on a freighter, soon returned to West Berlin. Minor conflicts with the police ensued, including a three-week detention in jail. Following a series of odd jobs to support his new family in Trier, Meyer revealed a growing interest in left-wing writers and student protest movements and resettled in West Berlin. The emergence of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF; Red Army Faction) in 1970 marked a new stage in his radicalization. Ardently embracing the concept of urban guerrilla warfare, he helped found a second group—Bewegung 2. Juni (Movement of 2 June)—named in honor of the student Benno Ohnesorg killed by police several years earlier on that date. Sentenced to a three-year term for an armed incident in Bielefeld, he escaped from prison in November 1973 and began to implement the group’s new strategy of kidnapping important figures in exchange for the release of fellow radicals incarcerated by the state. During their first attempt, West Berlin’s highest ranking judge, Günter von Drenkmann, was killed in error. The group later abducted Peter Lorenz, head of the West Berlin branch of the Christlich-Demokratische Union, and traded him for five political prisoners.

On 6 June 1975, Meyer was apprehended and sent to prison. After his efforts to flee and a hunger strike proved futile, a commando team of two female movement members facilitated his escape. Unwilling to assist the West Germans in their pursuit, authorities in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) gave the trio unimpeded entry and permission to fly to Prague. Yet after their arrival in Bulgaria—to their complete bewilderment—government officials in Sofia decided to cooperate with the West Germans and approved
their extradition. Meyer’s retrial in October 1980 resulted in a 15-year prison term. The following years saw not only increasing dissension within the movement but also Meyer’s disillusionment with urban guerrilla warfare and his desire to pursue other means. Because of his rejection of armed struggle, he obtained an early release from prison in November 1986. For roughly two years, he wrote for the left-wing alternative newspaper *taz* but found fault with its extensive coverage of East German dissidents whom he regarded as “reactionary.” A career as a freelancer followed his resignation.

In light of his fresh political perspective, the MfS began to show renewed interest in Meyer. In 1987, at his second meeting with officers from the “political extremism and terror” division, he agreed to collect material concerning militant left-wing groups in West Berlin—specifically the RAF, the Revolutionary Cells, and the Autonoms. Disinformation, particularly regarding ex-terrorists who had taken refuge in the GDR from West German authorities, was also added to his list of responsibilities. Meyer found this activity rewarding and developed a congenial relationship with his case officer, whom he helped to escape abroad following the collapse of the GDR. Not until 1992 was Meyer’s own *Stasi* connection revealed, yet because of the destruction of relevant MfS documents, the state prosecutor had to drop all charges. He returned to Trier as a journalist. A discussion of his relationship with the MfS is included in his unrepentant memoirs *Staatsfeind* (*Enemy of the State*), which appeared in 1996. See also KURRAS, KARL-HEINZ.

**MICRODOT.** A photograph of a document or image reduced to the size of a period at the end of a sentence, the modern microdot was developed by Emmanuel Goldberg, a professor at the Dresden Technical University, and presented at the Sixth Annual Congress of Photography in Paris in 1925. Dubbed a “Mikrat nach Goldberg,” it represented a major breakthrough in secret communications and was employed extensively by the Abwehr. First introduced to the microdot by Dusan Popov in 1941, J. Edgar Hoover, director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, called it “the enemy’s masterpiece of espionage,” although both men wrongly attributed its invention to a nonexistent Arnold Zapp.
MIELKE, ERICH (1907–2000). The long-serving head of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) whose name became nearly synonymous with the organization itself, Erich Mielke was born in Berlin on 28 December 1907, the son of working-class communists. Leaving school at age 16, he became a dispatcher clerk. His career as a committed communist began first as a member of the party’s youth organization, and then in 1927 as a member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. In addition to working as a reporter for the party newspaper Die Rote Fahne, he was known as a street militant and belonged to a so-called self-defense group. On 9 August 1931, at the Bülowplatz near the party’s main headquarters, he and a comrade, Erich Ziemer, shot two policemen in the back to avenge the death of a worker the previous day. Mielke then fled to the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, under the alias Paul Bach, his cadre training commenced. A brief period of study under Wilhelm Zaisser at the GRU’s military-political institute was followed by several years at the International Lenin School. With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Mielke, under the alias Fritz Leistner, was dispatched to Spain to serve in the International Brigades as an aide-de-camp to Zaisser. The victory of Francisco Franco in 1939 forced Mielke to Belgium, where his journalistic career, under the name Gaston, was briefly revived. A year later, as Richard Heller, he moved to southern France and worked as a woodcutter. In December 1943, posing as a Lithuanian named Richard Hebel and unsuccessfully applying for a visa to Mexico or the United States, he was arrested by the Gestapo and placed in a hard labor unit of the Todt Organization. Contrary to the subsequent myth that expunged the war years spent in Belgium and France and depicted his return to Germany alongside the triumphant Red Army, Mielke was in the French and American zones in 1945 and reentered Berlin as one of the “western emigrants”—many of whom he then ordered arrested as alleged American or Zionist spies between 1950 and 1953.

During the Soviet occupation period, Mielke assumed a key role in building the new police force after being named second vice president of the German Administration of the Interior in September 1946. The following year, a new subdivision—Nachrichten und Informationen (Intelligence and Information)—was established under his direction to keep the public abreast of fresh government initiatives and collect
information on any “negative occurrences.” Concerned that enemy agents were not only spreading illegal propaganda but also involved in espionage, sabotage, even assassination, Mielke instructed the provincial information offices that their task was “to know everything and to report everything worth knowing.” The role of the police thus came to include the suppression of any real or potential opposition to communist domination of the zone. Into each of the police units he introduced a well trained Politkultur (political-cultural) officer, whose task was to heighten awareness of the enemy and ensure conformity with party priorities.

With the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in November 1949, Mielke headed the Main Administration for the Protection of the People’s Economy, a division of the Interior Ministry and the forerunner of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), which was established the following year. As a protégé of party chair Walter Ulbricht, he appeared well positioned to assume leadership of the new ministry, but Soviet authorities, pointing to the wartime gap in his biography, preferred that he take a subsidiary position under Zaisser. As a result of the MfS’s failed performance during the Uprising of 17 June 1953, Zaisser was dismissed and the ministry downgraded to the status of a secretariat within the Interior Ministry. Because Soviet suspicion of Mielke had not completely abated and some financial irregularities on his part had come to light, he remained second in command under the new head of state security, Ernst Wollweber. When its ministerial status was restored in 1956, Mielke regained his former position as state secretary. The next year, Ulbricht succeeded in removing Wollweber and appointing Mielke in his place.

As the new minister of state security, he showed much greater compliance than his predecessors with the demands of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), stressing how “the decisions of the party are the benchmark of our Chekist work.” He received the Order of Karl Marx in 1957, became a member of the National Defense Council in 1960, and supported the building of the Berlin Wall (Operation rose) the following year. Even so, Ulbricht never sanctioned his participation in the deliberations of the Politburo. Only after Erich Honecker came to power in 1971 was Mielke granted admission to this body. The two men had a long-standing
relationship in security and intelligence matters, and Mielke had helped engineer Ulbricht’s ouster from power. They further found agreement on the silencing of prominent dissidents such as Robert Havemann and Rudolf Bahro. Although certain legal procedures had been followed in these instances, Mielke candidly expressed his belief in execution without a trial to colleagues in 1982.

During his long tenure, the MfS underwent an enormous expansion, in both its numbers and the tasks it assumed. Convinced that all internal dissent could be traced to the machinations of Western intelligence organizations, Mielke was even more vigilant during the 1970s when the policy of détente meant increased contact between East and West German citizens. He emphasized the role of the Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, regarding these collaborators as the main weapon against the external enemy as well as insurance against hostile and negative behavior at home. Hunting and sports were also abiding passions. In addition to maintaining a private game preserve near his villa in Wandlitz, he presided over the sports league Sportvereinigung Dynamo, an extension of the MfS with a network of informers recruited among the trainers, masseurs, journalists, and athletes.

An unrepentant Stalinist, Mielke opposed the reform policy of glasnost initiated in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and later came to criticize the KGB. Yet he was unable to stem the increasing signs of disintegration that culminated in fall 1989. On 7 November, Mielke submitted his resignation and left the Politburo the following day. During a televised appearance before the People’s Chamber, realizing that his defense of the MfS was drawing protests from the audience, he helplessly cried out, “But I love, I love all people,” causing the delegates to erupt in laughter. Not only were his MfS colleagues appalled by his performance but the SED Central Committee voted on 2 December for his removal from the party because of serious violations of its statutes.

Five days later, Mielke was arrested by GDR authorities and charged with abuse of his official position. While more indictments followed including treason, mail tampering, theft, and crimes against humanity, a judge declared Mielke unfit to stand trial for reasons of health. State prosecutors, however, then decided to pursue the decades-old murder charge involving the two Berlin policemen and obtained permission for his limited participation in the trial. In 1993,
he was found guilty and sentenced to a six-year term. Diagnosed as senile (after being given an unconnected “official” red telephone to bolster his spirits, he responded by dialing and conducting imaginary conversations), Mielke was released from Moabit Prison in August 1995. He died in a Berlin nursing home on 21 May 2000. Although he was buried in the Zentralfriedhof, his unmarked grave lies outside the section reserved for communist heroes. See also K-5; PRAGUE SPRING.

MILITÄRISCHER ABSCHIRMDIENST (MAD). The third major member of the intelligence community of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Counterintelligence Service) came into existence in 1956 alongside the Bundeswehr. Known initially as the Amt für die Sicherheit der Bundeswehr (Office for the Security of the Bundeswehr) and led by Gerhard Wessel, it drew heavily from the Organisation Gehlen for its top personnel. Its functions grew to include not only protection against enemy sabotage and espionage but detection of “anticonstitutional” tendencies within the armed forces. With its main headquarters in Cologne and 12 substations throughout the country, the MAD currently employs about 1,300 civilian and military personnel.

Despite the MAD’s relatively quiet existence, one scandal occurred in 1978 when the secretary of Defense Minister Georg Leber, falsely suspected of espionage for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), was placed under surveillance. Although Leber had not authorized this illegal action, his failure to inform the Bundestag afterward resulted in his resignation. Even more serious was the Kiessling Affair, which prompted the detailed recommendations of the Höcherl Commission in 1984, among them the appointment of more civilians in senior MAD positions. The most damaging known penetration of the agency involved its deputy director, Joachim Krase, who had offered his services to the MfS in 1968.

MINISTERIUM FÜR STAATSSICHERHEIT (MfS). The vast security and intelligence apparatus of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security) traced its official founding to a law of 8 February 1950 passed unanimously by the provisional People’s Chamber, even though none
of its duties and areas of jurisdiction were specifically enumerated. It was modeled on the Cheka, or Soviet secret police founded by Felix Dzerzhinsky in 1917, as well as the illegal apparatus of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands active in the years prior to 1945. Lying outside the control of GDR officials, the new ministry was heavily coordinated by the large KGB staff stationed at Karlshorst. Each head of a main MfS unit had a corresponding Soviet instructor. Slowly the KGB presence receded, and the MfS began to establish its own identity under its first director, Wilhelm Zaisser. The staff grew rapidly—to 8,800 in 1952—and military titles replaced the earlier police designations.

The MfS played a key role in large-scale purges in the GDR. Staff turnover was high, and defections to the West were not uncommon. The first severe setback for the MfS occurred in the context of the Uprising of 17 June 1953. Although the ministry had been aware of mounting discontent over the hardline policies of GDR leader Walter Ulbricht, it stood helplessly by when popular protests erupted in East Berlin and spread to other regions of the GDR. In numerous towns such as Jena and Merseburg, even the local MfS offices were occupied by protesters. In the end, Soviet troops had to extinguish the uprising.

As a result, Zaisser was replaced by Ernst Wollweber, and the ministry was downgraded to a state secretariat within the Ministry of the Interior for the next two years. Unlike Zaisser, who had preferred a quiet, less conspicuous approach, Wollweber unleashed a full-scale public relations campaign, especially after the arrest of several hundred alleged agents in Feuerwerk. Party discipline was strengthened, and the subordination of state security to the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) repeatedly affirmed. According to a 1954 decision of the Politburo’s Security Commission, the SED apparatus could not be spied on by the MfS unless a request had been made regarding a specific individual. Even so, the relationship between Wollweber and Ulbricht showed increasing signs of deterioration, primarily because of their different approaches to de-Stalinization following Nikita Khrushchev’s landmark speech in 1956. Branded a revisionist by Ulbricht, Wollweber lost his position on 1 November 1957 and was replaced by his ambitious lieutenant, Erich Mielke, who would remain in office until the fall of 1989.
The main headquarters of the MfS—a vast sprawling complex under tight security—was located in Berlin-Lichtenberg. Although an executive collegium consisted of Mielke and 13 leading generals, it was increasingly dominated by the first minister and met on an irregular basis. Mielke’s commanding position could also be seen in the number of staff units under his direct control. Immediately below Mielke were four deputy ministers who also belonged to the collegium. Even though these generals had a record of loyalty dating from the GDR’s earliest years, the units under their direct command were decidedly fewer than those of the first minister. Three of them oversaw departments involving domestic surveillance, while the fourth had responsibility for the foreign intelligence operations of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung.

The MfS also maintained a formidable presence outside the capital; nearly half of the full-time employees were assigned to the district and county administrations. Among their main responsibilities were securing the GDR borders and preventing Republikflucht (flight from the republic), monitoring manifestations of dissent, providing security for government installations, and recruiting Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborators). Although MfS workers enjoyed material benefits not available to the average GDR citizen, the daily pressure was considerable, and alcoholism a not infrequent occurrence. Holding mostly secretarial positions, women became noticeably less visible toward the top of the institutional hierarchy and never headed a main department. In addition, the staff was increasingly drawn not from the working class but from families whose parents worked in the police, army, and security forces or in other branches of the state and party apparatus. Because of increased exposure to the West through the policy of détente, the MfS experienced its largest growth between 1968 and 1982, and it replaced its earlier emphasis on kidnappings and physical torture with greater reliance on Zersetzungsmassnahmen (decomposition measures), which exerted pressure through psychology and disinformation.

As popular protest mounted against the Stasi in fall 1989, Mielke resigned on 3 November, and a new security organization, the Amt für Nationale Sicherheit, took its place. This reform attempt quickly failed, and many former MfS staff members turned against their leaders. Moreover, citizens’ committees occupied Stasi offices through-
out the GDR to prevent the destruction of documents ordered by Operation **REISSWOLF**. On 15 January 1990, the largest demonstration occurred at the East Berlin headquarters, as several thousand protesters stormed the complex and demanded the right to inspect their files, thus adding their voices to the effort that later culminated in the **Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik**. The dissolution of the security apparatus was officially completed with the German Unification Treaty of 3 October 1990. See also **BERLIN-HOHENSCHÖNHAUSEN**; **JURISTISCHE HOCHSCHULE DES MfS**; **OFFIZIERE IM BESONDEREN EINSATZ**; **SPORTVEREINIGUNG DYNAMO**.

**MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION.** A joint U.S. and German interwar arbitration panel, the Mixed Claims Commission was established according to a treaty signed in Berlin on 10 August 1922. Whereas American citizens and firms sought compensation for damages incurred during World War I, the German government was anxious to unfreeze assets that had been earlier impounded. Before its disbandment in 1939, the commission dealt with 20,433 claims, notably involving the sinking of the **Lusitania** and the explosion at **Black Tom Island**. Although the commission functioned remarkably well in its early period, Nazi intransigence over claims of sabotage during the period of U.S. neutrality led to bitter acrimony in the end. See also **DILGER, ANTON**; **LEVERKUEHN, PAUL**.

**MOITZHEIM, JOACHIM.** A double agent working for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Julius Moitzheim was a former student of the Jesuits, who, as a young soldier in World War II, was taken prisoner by the Soviet army. Later recruited by the HVA and given the code name **wieland**, he began working in the Cologne area in 1979. His attempt to recruit a member of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) misfired, and, under the threat of imprisonment, he was engaged as a **Counterman** of the BfV by **Hansjoachim Tiedge** and **Klaus Kuron** on 29 February 1980, code-named **keil**. Retaining his loyalty to the HVA, he reported his recruitment to his East German superiors and thus became a double agent. During the following years, the BfV supplied him with a
mixture of genuine and doctored secret information, which, according to HVA chief Markus Wolf, contained “some valuable undiscovered pearls.” Moitzheim also helped identify the handwriting of Kuron when he initially contacted the HVA. It was not until 1990 that Moitzheim was apprehended and sentenced.

MOLTKE, HELMUTH JAMES COUNT VON (1907–1945). A prominent Abwehr member of the German opposition to Adolf Hitler, Helmuth James Count von Moltke was born in Kreisau (now Kryzowa, Poland) on 11 March 1907, a great-grandnephew of the renowned Prussian field marshal. Trained in Germany as a lawyer and opposed to Nazism from the outset, he spent extended periods in London and Cambridge between 1935 and 1938, even becoming qualified to argue cases before the English bar. Also dating from this period is the formation of the Kreisau Circle—a diverse anti-Nazi group of individuals with religious and socialist leanings. The group was named after the Moltke family estate.

Following the outbreak of World War II, Moltke joined the Abwehr as a specialist in international law and law of war. In this capacity, he sought to ensure humane treatment for prisoners of war and to aid individual victims of the Nazi regime. As the war turned increasingly against Germany, his primary concern became the conclusion of a peace with the Western Allies at the exclusion of the Soviet Union. With the approval of Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, Moltke undertook a secret trip to Turkey in early July 1943 and met with several older acquaintances, including station chief Paul Leverkuehn. Yet his desire to discuss his proposal directly with another trusted acquaintance, Alexander Kirk, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, never came to fruition, despite a second trip to Istanbul in December. The major stumbling block for the Americans was the Allied policy of unconditional surrender, which Moltke had hoped to circumvent.

As the Sicherheitsdienst grew ever more suspicious of Abwehr members with potential ties to the resistance, Moltke came under scrutiny. His attempt to warn his colleague Otto Kiep of the impending arrest on 12 January 1944 of the Solf Circle—an opposition group providing support for persecuted persons or those living underground—led to his own apprehension one week later. Confined
in the Ravensbrück concentration camp where Abwehr documents continued to be delivered for processing, Moltke did not face prosecution until after the abortive assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944. Found guilty of treason based on his Christian beliefs rather than his tenuous links to the conspiracy, he was hanged on 23 January 1945 at Plötzensee Prison.

MOYZISCH, LUDWIG. See CICERO AFFAIR.

MUELLER-STAHN, ARMIN (1930–). An actor and hero of a popular television espionage series in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Armin Mueller-Stahl was born in Tilsit (now Sovetsk, Russia) on 17 December 1930, the son of an East Prussian bank official. Abandoning a career as a musician, he became an actor and appeared in several important East German films during the 1960s. In 1972, Mueller-Stahl was selected to play the role of Werner Bredebusch in the highly successful television series Das unsichtbare Visier (The Invisible Visor). As an officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Bredebusch (alias Achim Detjen) worked undercover in the Federal Republic of Germany, exposing the attempts of leading Nazis to flee to South America and the plans of the government to build nuclear weapons.

Yet because Mueller-Stahl signed a petition objecting to the expatriation of Wolf Biermann in late 1976, the series replaced him with Horst Schulze, and new roles never materialized. In 1980, his request to move to West Berlin was approved, and his high-profile career resumed without difficulty. The MfS also maintained a file on Mueller-Stahl, having enlisted one of his closest friends in the GDR as an informant.

MÜLLER, HEINER (1929–1995). A renowned East German writer who maintained contact with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Heiner Müller was born in Eppendorf (Saxony) on 9 January 1929. A protégé of Bertolt Brecht, he began his literary career in the 1950s and ultimately achieved recognition as a dramatist, poet, essayist, and theater director. Although his base was East Berlin, a number of his most famous plays premiered in the Federal Republic of Germany. A committed communist,
Müller once claimed that his main target on the stage was “German history.”

In January 1993, Müller (code names Heiner and Zement) and the writer Christa Wolf were found to have had ties to the MfS. Known for his cynical and elusive manner, Müller pointed out that the Stasi was the only authoritative institution with which one could have a dialogue about actual conditions in the German Democratic Republic. His reputation—in contrast to that of Wolf—remained generally intact, and only in a later expanded edition of his autobiography, *Krieg ohne Schlacht* (War without Battle), was his MfS affiliation broached. He died of cancer in Berlin on 30 December 1995.

MÜLLER, HEINRICH (1900–1945?). The head of the Gestapo during World War II and a key figure in the mass murder of Jews, Heinrich Müller was born in Munich on 28 April 1900, the son of a government administrator. During World War I, he attended flight school before volunteering for duty on the western front and earning an Iron Cross First and Second Class. Profoundly influenced by his military experience, he joined the Bavarian police in 1919 and was assigned to the political division. His study of Bolshevik police methods helped him develop an expertise in the surveillance of communist party functionaries. With the Nazi accession to power, his knowledge was even more desirable, and he soon became a protégé of Reinhard Heydrich. By the spring of 1934, Müller was a member of the SS and counted among those middle-level personnel selected to work in the new Berlin headquarters. Devoted to his work—now directed at the most important oppositional groups within the Third Reich—he continued his rapid bureaucratic rise, despite a conspicuous lack of ideological conviction. His official acceptance into the Nazi Party—at the insistence of Heinrich Himmler—did not occur until 1939.

With his appointment in 1940 as head of the Gestapo (Amt IV) within the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Müller became one of the most powerful and ruthless men in the Third Reich. In countless instances, his rapid response coupled with a shrewd tactical sense helped prevent major acts of sabotage. Müller also showed no hesitation in employing harsh repressive methods in the occupied areas and, as a participant in the Wannsee Conference of January 1942, in
MÜLLER, JOSEF (1898–1979). An anti-Nazi lawyer dispatched by the Abwehr to seek a peace agreement with Great Britain via the Vatican, Josef Müller was born in Steinwiesen (Bavaria) on 27 March 1898, the son of a farmer. After military service in World War I, he became a lawyer in Munich active in the Bayerische Volkspartei. A devout Catholic who opposed Adolf Hitler from the outset, Müller joined the Abwehr in September 1939 with the encouragement of Wilhelm Canaris and Hans Oster. Their secret plan was to use his connections with two close advisors of the newly elected Pope Pius XII—Robert Lieber and Ludwig Kaas—to enlist the pontiff’s aid in negotiating a peace agreement with Britain following the removal of Hitler from office. As cover, Müller’s mission was ostensibly to investigate developments related to the question of Italy’s entry into the war. Despite several trips and a positive response at the outset, the plan failed to achieve tangible results. An especially severe blow for Müller was the irate reaction of Armed Forces Commander in Chief Walther von Brauchitsch in April 1940 to the “X-report,” which summarized the British conditions at that point (Müller was identified simply as X for security reasons).

On 5 April 1943, Müller’s long-term surveillance by the Gestapo culminated in his arrest and interrogation. Suspected of having divulged the date of the German offensive in the West to the Belgian legation at the Vatican, he conceded nothing after prolonged
questioning and was held in a number of concentration camps for the remainder of the war. His political career resumed following his release from Dachau in April 1945. A cofounder of the Christlich-Soziale Union as well as its first chair, Müller served as the Bavarian minister of justice from 1947 to 1952 and became a persistent critic of Reinhard Gehlen owing to his former Nazi connections. His memoirs, Bis zur letzten Konsequenz (Until the Final Conclusion), appeared in 1977. Müller died in Munich on 12 September 1979.

MÜLLER, RICHARD (1942– ). A West German entrepreneur involved in illegal Eastern-bloc technology transfers, Richard Müller developed more than 75 sham companies in Switzerland, France, Sweden, and South Africa. Although 10 employees in the Lübeck region were arrested and charged, Müller evaded authorities with the assistance of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit and moved to the German Democratic Republic in 1984. After his work for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) ended, he presented himself with his attorney to the state prosecutor in Lübeck in April 1989. According to the legal settlement, Müller received a two-year suspended sentence and a fine of 1.5 million DM. Despite his claim of having lost money on balance through his business dealings, he retired to a large landed estate near Kiel.

MÜLLER, VINCENZ (1894–1961). An enigmatic veteran military commander in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) courted by Western intelligence, Vincenz Müller was born in Aichach (Bavaria) on 5 November 1894, the son of a tanner. Assigned to the German military mission in Turkey during World War I, he continued his career afterward in the Reichswehr and became a personal attaché to Kurt von Schleicher. During World War II, Müller’s service centered on the eastern front, first as chief of staff of the 17th Army, then as commander of the encircled units of the 4th Army. After surrendering to the Red Army in July 1944, he joined the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, having developed anti-Nazi convictions prior to the war. Ideological training at the Antifa school at Krasnogorsk was completed before returning to Germany in September 1948.

Establishing himself as both a politician and soldier in the new GDR, Müller served in the People’s Chamber for eight years as well
as becoming chief of the General Staff of the Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army) in 1956. Although he maintained ties to Soviet military intelligence and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), his name emerged as a potential defector for the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps and the Organisation Gehlen (OG), which conducted their own separate operations. The OG operation, code-named schwaben and stretching from 1950–1954, used Müller’s old regimental colleague Hermann Teske. But these attempts failed. Nevertheless, Müller came under increasing suspicion by the MfS and retired in 1958. Described as a suicide owing to mental instability, his death on 12 May 1961 resulted from a fall from the balcony of his East Berlin residence. His memoirs, Ich fand das wahre Vaterland (I Found the True Fatherland), appeared posthumously in 1963, although questions have been raised regarding their authenticity.

MÜNSTER, HUGO ZU. The Prussian military plenipotentiary (or Flügeladjutant) in Russia during the Crimean War (1853–1856), Hugo zu Münster enjoyed a privileged position in St. Petersburg with daily access to the tsar. Moreover, unlike military attachés stationed elsewhere, he could bypass ministerial officials and communicate directly with the Prussian monarch. But Münster, ardently pro-Russian, promoted a policy completely at variance with the diplomatic legation, thereby encouraging the reactionary camarilla in Berlin. Frustrated at not having access to Münster’s reports, Otto von Manteuffel, the minister-president of Prussia, engaged a spy to learn their contents. Ultimately the public scandal led to a change of procedure, making the minister-president a regular recipient of all submissions by the military envoy to Russia.

MUSIL, ALOIS (1868–1944). An explorer and orientalist who worked undercover for the Evidenzbüro during World War I, Alois Musil was born in Vyslov (Moravia), the son of a poor farmer. Following his ordination as a Catholic priest in 1895, he made extensive trips to the Near East and became well known for his findings, especially his archeological discovery of the eighth-century Qusayr Amra hunting lodge in Jordan. Musil’s appointment to the theological faculty of the
University of Vienna in 1905 led to close personal ties with members of the reigning Habsburg family.

Because of his exceptional geographical and linguistic knowledge as well as his acquaintanceship with ranking figures in the region, he was recruited at the outbreak of World War I to help coordinate military and diplomatic efforts on behalf of Germany and Austria. His special assignment to northern Arabia aimed at reconciling three feuding princes—Ibn Rashid, Ibn Saud, and Nuri ibn Shaalan—and gaining their support for Turkey’s war against Great Britain. Despite an auspicious beginning, the mission fell short of its ultimate aim, due primarily, in Musil’s opinion, to the “complete indifference of the tribes toward the holy war and pan-Islamic ideas.” While frequently compared with his British counterpart T. E. Lawrence, Musil thought Lawrence’s mastery of Arabic was defective and believed that money rather than charisma had secured Lawrence followers among the Arabs.

After the war, Musil became a citizen of Czechoslovakia and resumed his prolific scholarly career at Charles University in Prague. Even though some objections were raised regarding his Habsburg connections, the appointment had the endorsement of President Tomáš Masaryk. Musil left this position in 1938 following the German occupation of the country and retired to the Moravian countryside.

**MYKONOS.** The site of a terrorist attack on 17 September 1992 orchestrated by the Iranian government, Mykonos was a Greek restaurant in Berlin-Wilmersdorf. After a protracted trial that concluded on 10 April 1997, a Berlin criminal court found an Iranian, Kazem Darabi, along with three Palestinian Hezbollah members, guilty of murdering four Kurdish-Iranian dissidents with automatic weapons. Also implicated was the head of the Iranian secret service, Ali Fallahiyan, for whom an international arrest warrant was issued. In the diplomatic crisis that ensued, nearly all the members of the European Union withdrew their envoys from Tehran for several months. In 2004, the installation of a memorial plaque in front of the restaurant provoked the objection of Iranian officials. Darabi and his main accomplice were released in 2007, despite their original sentences of life imprisonment. *See also* MAISON DE FRANCE.
The intelligence department of the German imperial navy, “N” (Nachrichten-Abteilung) was formed in 1901 and located in the Naval Staff Building in Berlin. Its original name—Nachrichtenbüro, or intelligence office—was quickly dropped. While the creation of “N” reflected the large naval expansion enthusiastically endorsed by Emperor William II in the late 1890s, the jurisdictional dispute between Alfred von Tirpitz, the secretary of the Naval Office, and the chiefs of the naval staff complicated matters in the beginning. Nevertheless, the initial group of four persons grew significantly, particularly after the outbreak of war in 1914 (no precise figures exist concerning its ultimate size). “N” remained closely associated with the imperial navy throughout its existence and never developed much institutional independence. Its three directors—Arthur Tapken, Walther Isendahl, and Paul Ebert—were all drawn from other naval branches. Cooperation with Abteilung IIIb, its army counterpart, was minimal, as each organization worked in strict secrecy and tended to view the other as a competitor.

From the outset, “N” focused its intelligence-gathering almost exclusively on Great Britain and the seeming omnipresence of the Royal Navy. German battleship commanders were instructed to recruit agents in their respective ports of call and seal the agreement with a handshake. Agents knew only their Hauptberichterstatter (immediate superior) and received a number based on one of the seven different global divisions created by “N” (200–299 for Europe, 300–399 for East Africa, etc.). Other sources of agents included the large steamship companies, notably the Hamburg-American Line headed by Albert Ballin (who met once with Isendahl), and the German Foreign Office. Although the latter did not want its reputation tarnished by the revelation of an official link to “N,” it proved cooperative in providing the names of potential recruits.

By 1911, an extensive network of agents had developed with the capacity to monitor the movement of enemy warships. This Kriegsnachrichtenwesen (war intelligence system), however, soon became a casualty of World War I. While British counterintelligence led by Vernon Kell never achieved a realistic picture of German agents active in the country (most went undetected), direct com-
munication with the Berlin headquarters became a major obstacle once Germany’s overseas cables were severed in August 1914. Moreover, the navy’s frequently changing operational plans made the task of long-term intelligence-gathering nearly impossible. In the end, “N” proved no match for the formidable Royal Navy and had no discernible impact on the outcome of the war. With the German defeat in 1918 came the dissolution of “N,” which was supervised by Fritz Prieger, the former head of the foreign intelligence collection division.

NACHRICHTENOFFIZIER BERLIN (NOB). A special military intelligence unit during World War I, the Nachrichtenoffizier Berlin (Intelligence Officer Berlin) was established in April 1915 by Walter Nicolai, the head of Abteilung IIIb. One of its main tasks was to remedy the lack of information about Russia through its substations in Stockholm, Flensburg, Budapest, Piraeus, and Galatz. Besides developing innovative procedures for the interrogation of prisoners of war, it spawned its own technical section, which devised a system of secret codes and manufactured false documents and invisible inks. Yet as its influence grew, Nicolai came to regard the NOB with suspicion.

NACHRICHTENSTELLE FÜR DEN ORIENT (NfO). A bureau designed to translate and distribute pro-German and pan-Islamic propaganda during World War I, the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Information Service for the East) was formed at the urging of Max von Oppenheim in late 1914. Attached to the Foreign Office, it was based in Berlin and staffed by orientalists recruited from the universities. Because of his lack of administrative talent, Oppenheim was succeeded by the diplomat Karl Emil Schabinger Baron von Schowingen in the spring of 1915. By March 1916, Eugen Mittwoch, an Egyptologist from the University of Berlin, directed the NfO with a budget of 300 million marks. An additional target was European opinion, both within the Central Powers and the neutral countries, in an attempt to counteract the negative popular images of Islam. According to its own claims, more than 1,000 publications were produced between October 1914 and July 1918—or a total of 3 million copies in nine European and 15 Eastern languages.
Nevertheless, the NfO encountered numerous obstacles—petty rivalries among the loosely organized staff, its wide geographical orbit, and differences with wartime ally Turkey—and the overriding goal of sparking crippling colonial revolts against the British, French, and Russians never came to fruition. After the war, having been transformed into the Orient-Institut (Oriental Institute) by the Foreign Office, it gave financial assistance to numerous Egyptians, Turks, Arabs, Afghans, and Indians who, in light of their wartime support for Germany, were not welcome in their home countries and forced to live abroad.

NADOLNY, RUDOLF (1873–1953). A diplomat who directed covert support to government opposition groups in Russia during World War I, Rudolf Nadolny was born near Lötzen (now Giżycko, Poland) on 12 July 1873, the son of a landowner. After earning a law degree from the University of Königsberg and joining the Foreign Office in April 1902, he held positions in Russia, Persia, Bosnia, and Albania prior to the outbreak of war. The War Ministry activated his reserve status and assigned him to a Berlin facility for Russian prisoners of war before giving him an intelligence post in Abteilung IIIb. Nadolny created a relatively independent operation known as “P” (or Politik), located in an office on the Königsplatz, that was designed to bolster revolutionary forces in Russia through subversive activities. His former connections in the Foreign Office were enlisted to aid his efforts. He also directed the legation in Persia in 1916 before its dissolution the following year.

After the war, Nadolny worked closely with President Friedrich Ebert and then returned to diplomatic service with postings in Stockholm, Ankara, and Moscow, although political differences with the Nazi government caused him to resign in 1934 after only six months in the Soviet Union. He returned briefly to public life following the end of World War II and died in Düsseldorf on 18 May 1953. See also HELPHAND, ALEXANDER; KESKÜLA, ALEXANDER.

NATIONALKOMITEE FREIES DEUTSCHLAND (NKFD). A Soviet-created resistance movement against Nazi rule in Germany, the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee for Free Germany) took shape in July 1943 following the surrender of
Wehrmacht forces at Stalingrad. Conceived by the propaganda division of the Red Army, the initial group—25 prisoners of war from the Krasnogorsk camp and 13 communist exiles—was soon joined by some 100 members of the League of German Officers headed by Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach to form essentially a single organization. Its aims included a democratic German state that ensured individual rights and peaceful coexistence with other European countries. Besides publishing the weekly newspaper *Freies Deutschland* (with a patriotic black-white-red masthead) and transmitting radio broadcasts into Germany, the NKFD recruited agents for sabotage work within the Wehrmacht. The organization was officially dissolved in November 1945, although considerable apprehension persisted among the Western allies for several years afterward.

**NAUJOCKS, ALFRED (1911–1960).** A prominent Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) official often used for special tasks, Alfred Naujocks was born in Kiel on 20 September 1911. An engineering student at the University of Kiel for a brief period, he was also known as an amateur boxer who engaged in street brawls with communists. He joined the SS in 1931 and the SD three years later. His first major assignment involved the abduction of Rudolf Formis, a member of the dissident Nazi organization Black Front, who was broadcasting anti-Hitler propaganda from a secret radio station a short distance from Prague. Once Formis was located, an armed encounter took place at his hotel, and he was fatally shot by Naujocks. This unintended outcome—along with the string of clues inadvertently left for the Czech police—angered his superior, Reinhard Heydrich, but did not result in his dismissal.

As part of Heydrich’s plan to sow discord between Stalin and the Red Army general staff, Naujocks fabricated compromising materials against Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was ultimately tried and executed in June 1937. Even more noteworthy was Naujocks’s involvement in Operation TANNENBERG, the staging of provocative actions against Germany on 31 August 1939 intended to justify Hitler’s invasion of Poland. A few months later, Naujocks played an important supporting role in the Venlo Incident, having led the SS unit that kidnapped two British intelligence officers near the Dutch border city. As head of the forgery subsection, Naujocks also
conceived Operation **BERNHARD**, the plan to flood England with counterfeit bank notes.

For disobeying one of Heydrich’s orders, Naujocks was dismissed from the SD in 1941 and transferred to the Waffen-SS. After being wounded on the eastern front, Naujocks served as an economic administrator to the German occupation troops in Belgium. His main responsibility, however, was the elimination of members of resistance movements there and in Denmark. In November 1944, he surrendered to the U.S. Army and was placed in a camp for war criminals. Fearful that the information he had provided Allied authorities would not give him immunity from prosecution, Naujocks escaped from custody before a trial could take place. No further action was brought against him, and he settled in Hamburg as a businessman. He also sold his exploits to the press as “the man who started World War II.” Naujocks died on 4 April 1960.

**NEBE, ARTHUR (1894–1945).** An SS lieutenant general who headed the criminal police but supported the anti-Nazi resistance, Arthur Nebe was born on 13 November 1894, the son of schoolteacher. Following volunteer combat duty during World War I, he abandoned his study of medicine and economics and joined the Prussian criminal police in 1920. Besides rising to the rank of police commissioner, he also wrote a major treatise on criminology. Nebe’s disillusionment with the laxity of the Weimar Republic led to his joining the SS and the Nazi Party in 1931. Following Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, Hermann Göring appointed him to the Gestapo, and in 1937 he was instructed to reorganize the criminal police system of the Third Reich. With the creation of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in September 1939, Nebe became head of Amt V, the criminal police division. At Hitler’s request, he directed a special commission that investigated the attempted assassination of the Führer in the Munich Bürgerbräukeller on November 9, concluding (contrary to the wishes of Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler) that Georg Elser was the sole perpetrator.

Nebe’s wartime service included command of one of the Einsatzgruppen between June and late October 1941. Based in Minsk and covering the area of the Moscow front, this extermination battalion was responsible for 46,000 deaths, although evidence exists
that Nebe inflated these numbers to account for executions purposely never carried out. Moreover, working with a friend of Hans Bernd Gisevius, he conveyed inside information regarding the Gestapo’s hunt for members of the anti-Hitler resistance. As an important link in the assassination plot of 20 July 1944, Nebe agreed to have police squads on alert to arrest prominent Nazi functionaries in Berlin once Hitler’s death had been established. When the plot failed, he fled on 24 July to an island in the Wannsee, erroneously believing that the Gestapo had discovered his involvement. Betrayed by a former mistress, a criminal inspector named Heide Gobbin, Nebe was arrested four months later and court-martialed. He was hanged in Berlin on 3 March 1945.

NEIBER, GERHARD (1929– ). One of the four deputy ministers of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Gerhard Neiber was born in Neutitschein, Czechoslovakia (now Nový Jičín, Czech Republic), on 20 April 1929, the son of a worker. Following World War II, he held several police positions in Erfurt before becoming an early member of the MfS. After working in different capacities in Weimar, Erfurt, and Schwerin, Neiber headed the MfS regional administration in Frankfurt an der Oder between 1960–1980. He received a doctorate from the Juristische Hochschule des MfS in 1965.

Appointed deputy minister to Erich Mielke in 1980, Neiber became responsible for border control and later for counterintelligence in the army and police. Particularly noteworthy was the counterterrorism unit (Department XXII) under his command, which grew to more than 800 employees and maintained contacts with the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Red Army Faction in West Germany, and the Basque separatist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. Dismissed in 1990, Neiber faced charges six years later for his alleged involvement in the attempted murder of an “escape facilitator” in Hamburg.

NEUMANN, FRANZ (1900–1954). A leading German émigré scholar who functioned as a Soviet double agent within the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Franz Neumann was born in Kattowitz (now Katowice, Poland) on 23 May 1900. A lawyer in Berlin, he maintained a close affiliation to the Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands. The advent of Nazi rule forced him to emigrate to England, where he earned a doctorate in political science at the London School of Economics. In 1936, Neumann joined the neo-Marxist Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in exile at Columbia University in New York City and later became an American citizen.

His main intelligence work began in early 1943 with his appointment as deputy chief of the Central European Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS. Known as the intellectual leader of this group and author of the weighty treatise *Behemoth*, Neumann insisted that a military defeat of Germany would not be sufficient to eradicate National Socialism and that new forms of political warfare were needed to combat an intertwined military, bureaucratic, and industrial ruling class. At the same time, according to the Venona decryptions, Neumann (code name RUFF) was supplying various reports to the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). A new assignment materialized at war’s end with his appointment as a chief U.S. consultant to the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg and led to his brief return to Europe. He left government service in 1947 and resumed teaching at Columbia, aware that many of his predictions about postwar Germany had not come to pass. Neumann died in an automobile accident in Visp, Switzerland, on 2 September 1954.

**NEUMANN, FRITZ.** See T-APPARAT.

**NICOLAI, WALTER (1873–1947).** The chief of German military intelligence during World War I, Walter Nicolai was born in Brunswick on 1 August 1873, the son of an infantry commander. He embarked on a military career in 1893, studied at the War Academy in Berlin, and became a member of the General Staff in 1908. His chief assignment was to examine Russia’s strategy toward the West in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (he also added the mastery of Japanese to his prior knowledge of Russian). His further reconnaissance of Russia while based in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) from July 1906 to March 1910 earned him high marks from his superiors. In addition to relying on open sources, Nicolai created a network of agents—mostly Polish and Russian Jews—who submitted reports
primarily on Russia’s Baltic provinces and the military districts of Vilnius and St. Petersburg.

In 1913, Nicolai replaced Wilhelm Heye as head of Abteilung IIIb. In this capacity, he obtained funds for an expanded service, directing most of its attention toward France (Great Britain was handled exclusively by naval intelligence, or “N”). Following the outbreak of World War I, Nicolai’s responsibilities expanded to include counterintelligence and sabotage as well as war propaganda through his own press office. He was not, however, involved in the government’s decision to provide subsidies to V. I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks in order to destabilize Russia. Nor was he inclined to heed the warnings of Franz von Papen concerning the likely entry of the United States into the war. After becoming ill with influenza during the revolutionary upheaval in Germany in November 1918, he was informed that his services were no longer needed. His retirement became official on 27 February 1920. Although he energetically attempted to revive his intelligence career, no call ever came.

Believing that Nicolai possessed inside knowledge of the secret services of the Third Reich, Soviet authorities captured him in September 1945 and brought him to Moscow for interrogation. After these sessions proved futile, Nicolai wrote sketches of life that became part of the comprehensive personal archives held by the Soviet government and not accessible to researchers until 1996. He died on 4 May 1947 in a Moscow prison hospital under mysterious circumstances and was rehabilitated by the legal branch of the Russian army in 1999.

NIEDERMAYER, OSKAR VON (1885–1948). The military leader of Germany’s mission to Afghanistan during World War I and later the resident director of the Reichswehr’s secret liaison office in the Soviet Union, Oscar von Niedermayer was born in Freising (Bavaria) on 8 November 1885, the son of a government official. Prior to 1914, he served in a Bavarian artillery regiment as a career officer, traveled in Persia (Iran), and gained a fluency in the Persian language (Farsi). These credentials led to his selection as second in command to Wilhelm Wassmuss for an undercover mission to gain the cooperation of Afghanistan against the British in the war. After Wassmuss’s unexplained departure from the group in January 1915,
Niedermayer was made its military leader, although dissension soon developed with Werner Hentig, who had taken charge of diplomatic matters. When the mission failed to achieve its objective, the two men returned to Germany in 1916 from opposite directions, and Niedermayer was assigned various military and intelligence responsibilities for the remainder of the war. His role in the Afghanistan expedition nevertheless earned him election into Bavaria’s most prestigious military order.

After finishing his doctoral dissertation on Persia at the University of Munich in 1919, Niedermayer joined a special Reichswehr task force designed to develop secret contacts with the Red Army. As this collaboration deepened under the leadership of his mentor Hans von Seeckt, his career shifted to Moscow, where Niedermayer (code name SIEBERT) remained from 1924 to 1932. Afterward came a teaching position at the University of Berlin, which included the directorship of its institute for security studies. In 1942, despite his critical attitude toward Adolf Hitler and the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Niedermayer commanded a division on the eastern front composed of Muslims from Azerbaijan and Central Asia who had become German prisoners of war.

The failure of the 20 July 1944 conspiracy against Adolf Hitler resulted in Niedermayer’s arrest by the Gestapo and imprisonment at the Wehrmacht prison near Torgau (Saxony). In May 1945, with the arrival of the Red Army, Niedermayer hoped that his old Soviet comrades would provide him a lifeline. Instead, he was taken to the Lubjanka in Moscow for interrogation and found guilty of espionage by a special court. Hardly had his 25-year prison term begun when he died at Vladimir, southwest of Moscow, on 25 September 1948. Niedermayer was rehabilitated by the Russian Federation as a “victim of political repression” in 1997.

**NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES.** The killing of 77 leading Nazis and more than 100 others at the direction of the Hitler regime, the Night of the Long Knives (also known as the Röhm Purge) occurred on 30 June 1934 and was directed principally at members of the Sturmabteilung (SA) led by Ernst Röhm. Alarmed by his adamant call for a “second revolution,” both the Reichswehr and the SS found common cause in halting the rapidly escalating ambitions of the SA.
An expanded “Reich list” of people to be arrested or shot circulated beforehand among Hermann Göring, Werner von Blomberg, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich. Röhm was captured at the Bavarian resort of Bad Wiessee in the presence of Adolf Hitler and, unwilling to take his own life, was killed in his jail cell two days later. Other important victims included Gregor Strasser, Erich Klausener, Kurt von Schleicher, Ferdinand von Bredow, and 13 Reichstag deputies.

In a lengthy speech before the Reichstag on 13 July, Hitler attempted to justify these murders, claiming that a vast conspiracy to overthrow the Reich had been eliminated, but tacitly conceded the criminality of the purge. Its ranks depleted by over 40 percent within a year, the SA ceased to be a major player in the Third Reich, while the SS shed its subordinate status and was made directly responsible to Hitler. During the 1950s, two former SS officers—Kurt Gildisch and Sepp Dietrich—received prison sentences in the Federal Republic of Germany for their role in the affair. See also DU MOULIN-ECKART, KARL LEONHARDT COUNT.

NOÉ, KARL GUSTAV (1789–1885). The first head of the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Karl Gustav Noé entered the senior administration of the Viennese police following the completion of his studies in 1822. His early assignments with the political police included the diplomatic congresses at Verona and Milan. In 1828, Noé journeyed to Brussels to investigate the secret activities of revolutionary refugees. In 1830, he examined firsthand the repercussions of the Warsaw uprising in Galicia. Even in the eyes of his opponents, he gained a reputation for intellectual discernment and adaptability. Following his appointment as high commissioner in 1831, he advocated a series of reform measures designed to help the plight of poor farmers.

In 1833, Noé became head of the MIB, the newly created foreign intelligence office for the Habsburg monarchy. From all accounts, Noé (employing his supplementary name of Norberg) directed its activities in a circumspect and successful manner. On the instructions of Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich, he made two notable trips to Paris in 1836 and 1838 to gain French cooperation, but neither mission bore fruit. His requested resignation took effect on 23
October 1841. Afterward, he held a series of police-related positions in Vienna, Innsbruck, and Linz before his retirement in 1850.

NOLLAU, GÜNTER (1911–1991). A lawyer and third president of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Günter Nollau was born in Leipzig on 4 June 1911. His legal career began in Cracow, Poland, in 1942 and shifted to Dresden at the end of World War II. Accused of murder by East German authorities, he fled to West Berlin in 1950 and began his association with the BfV. On 1 May 1972, Nollau was named head of the organization, replacing Hubert Schrübbers, whose past role as a Nazi prosecutor of political crimes had come to light and forced his early retirement. But owing to the apparent negligence of the BfV during the Günter Guillaume affair, Nollau’s tenure also ended prematurely. Leaving office in mid-November 1975, he continued to insist that he had given adequate warning about Guillaume to Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. A prolific author, Nollau published his memoirs, Das Amt (The Office), in 1978. In addition, he remained one of the most outspoken critics of Reinhard Gehlen. Nollau died in Munich on 7 November 1991.

NORDPOL. A highly successful Abwehr deception during World War II, Operation NORDPOL (North Pole) was directed at the underground resistance network in Holland supported by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Whereas the Abwehr assigned the code name NORDPOL, the German name ENGLANDSPIEL was adopted by the Dutch. It began in November 1941 when Hermann Giskes, the head of Abwehr operations in the Netherlands, captured the first Dutch radio transmitter and pretended that it was still operated by the resistance. Expanded to a joint operation with the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), NORDPOL continued until March 1944 and yielded much valuable information about SOE activities in Western Europe. More than 50 Dutch agents returned to the Netherlands by the British were captured by the occupying Germans and eventually executed. Still controversial is the fact that the coded warnings back to London by the Dutch radio operators went unheeded. Giskes’s own account, Spione überspielen Spione (Spies Outplay Spies), appeared in 1951.
OBERDÖRFFER, MANFRED (1910–1941). An Abwehr operative killed during a mission to Afghanistan, Manfred Oberdörffer was a specialist in tropical diseases who had participated in several expeditions to Africa and Asia. His objective in Afghanistan was to reach the Fakir of Ipi, an Islamic leader hostile to British rule, in order to foment an uprising on the Indian frontier. In mid-July 1941, disguised as a leprosy study group, Oberdörffer (code name KELL) and Friedrich Brandt, a lepidopterist (code name ARMA), were en route to Gorwekht but had been betrayed by their chief Waiziri contact. In an ambush in the Logar valley south of Kabul, Oberdörffer was killed and Brandt wounded. The Afghan patrol confiscated all of their equipment, including the Survey of India charts essential to the assignment. While the German legation was officially rebuked for the Logar incident to preserve the appearance of Afghanistan’s neutrality, the German minister received a private apology from the Afghan premier. The premier further assured Germany of Afghan support in the event of armed conflict but strongly insisted that, given the vast British spy network and German ignorance of the region, similar ventures be avoided in the future.

OBERG, KARL (1897–1965). The supreme SS and police commander in occupied France, Karl Oberg was born in Hamburg on 27 January 1897, the son of a professor of medicine. A volunteer during World War I, he received the Iron Cross First and Second Class for service on the western front. After the war, he was involved in various right-wing activities before joining the Nazi Party in 1931 and the SS (the following year, becoming an early recruit of Reinhard Heydrich for the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service). Oberg’s rapid rise ended in 1935 because of friction with Heydrich. Returning to the SS, he held positions in Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Zwickau prior to the outbreak of World War II.

Responsible for the harsh measures taken against Jews and Poles as the SS and police leader in Radom, Poland, Oberg was transferred to Paris on 7 May 1942 as the personal representative of Heinrich Himmler. This move altered the relationship to the
military administration under Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel, as it gave Oberg ultimate authority over all police agencies in the country. His major tasks were combating the French resistance and organizing the deportation of Jews to the death camps. After the Allied invasion of Normandy and liberation of Paris, Oberg fled the country and took command of the Weichsel Army under the direct orders of Himmler in December 1944. U.S. Military Police arrested Oberg in a Tyrolean village in June 1945, and he was subsequently sentenced to death by two different courts, one in Wuppertal, the other in Paris following his extradition in October 1946. In 1958, as part of a general Allied policy regarding war criminals, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and later reduced to 20 years. His pardon in 1965 by President Charles de Gaulle allowed his return to Flensburg, where he died on 3 June.

OBERLÄNDER, THEODOR (1905–1998). An Abwehr officer during World War II and a controversial member of the postwar government of Konrad Adenauer, Theodor Oberländer was born in Meiningen (Thuringia) on 1 May 1905. As a student of agriculture and economics in Hamburg and Berlin, he adamantly rejected the Versailles Treaty and was active in several nationalist youth groups. By 1930, he had obtained a second doctoral degree at the University of Königsberg and embarked on an 18-month world tour to obtain firsthand knowledge of foreign agricultural methods. Interested above all in Germany’s eastern neighbors, he returned to Königsberg to direct an institute for East European economics. His growing reputation led to a professorship in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland). Although Oberländer had joined the Nazi Party in 1933 to help advance his career, a major conflict developed with Erich Koch, the East Prussian Gauleiter (district leader), and led to the loss of his academic positions. Unwilling to support Hitler’s radical aims in Eastern Europe—and drawing on his well-cultivated connections—he found refuge in Wilhelm Canaris’s Abwehr in 1937 and also managed to obtain a professorship at the Ernst Moritz Arndt University in Greifswald. Oberländer enthusiastically greeted the return of the Sudeten Germans through the Munich Agreement and took part in numerous military exercises on the Czech-German border as a reserve lieutenant.
Oberländer’s belief that Hitler had no further territorial ambitions and that no world war loomed was soon shattered. Despite having accepted a position at Charles University in Prague in September 1940, Oberländer began to direct his main energies to a new Abwehr project—the Nachtigall (Nightingale) Battalion, a joint German and Ukrainian volunteer force designed to foment opposition to Joseph Stalin from within the Soviet Union. Aided by his recently acquired knowledge of the Ukrainian language, Oberländer had the responsibility of coordinating the heterogeneous elements in the battalion. Hardly had the unit been deployed—notably in Lviv in late June 1941—when authorities in Berlin, fearful of the emergence of an independent Ukraine, ordered its dissolution. Despite his disappointment, Oberländer accepted another Abwehr assignment involving the creation of the Bergmann (Miner) unit, a German-Caucasian force, which he commanded but which had to retreat in late December 1942. His widely distributed memoranda critical of the harsh German occupation policy in the east resulted in his dismissal from the Wehrmacht the following fall—an act orchestrated by Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS. Narrowly escaping confinement in a concentration camp, Oberländer attempted to revive his academic post in Prague. In March 1944—in a sharp reversal of SS-policy—he was assigned to the Vlasov army as a liaison officer, only to be captured shortly afterward by American troops.

Given his expertise in Soviet and East European affairs, the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps expedited his denazification at war’s end and offered him a position in its main analytical unit in Frankfurt am Main. Following the formation of the first government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Chancellor Konrad Adenauer turned to Oberländer in 1953 to head the federal ministry for expellees, a group that included roughly 12 million people. To his numerous critics, the chancellor justified the appointment on pragmatic grounds.

Oberländer later became the object of a defamation campaign by the KGB and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). On 3 July 1959, Nikita Khrushchev fired the opening shot by accusing the Adenauer government of harboring former Nazis such as Oberländer. A month later, the Association for the Victims of Nazism, working in collaboration with the Eastern bloc security services, charged him with the wartime deaths of 310,000 Jews, Poles, and communists.
Under the direction of Albert Norden, a longtime communist activist and the regime’s head propagandist, the government of the German Democratic Republic took this case to its highest court and tried Oberländer in absentia, finding him guilty of war crimes committed in Lviv and in the Caucasus and sentencing him to life in prison.

Although Oberländer offered his resignation to Adenauer, the chancellor refused, fearful that his departure would only encourage more attacks of a similar nature. In the end, Adenauer gave in to the pressure that was building in the FRG (including his own party), and Oberländer left the government on 3 May 1960. Yet the matter was far from resolved. Not only had Adenauer promised a government investigation that could help facilitate his rehabilitation but Oberländer brought scores of legal challenges to his critics. In 1965, a Polish commission examined the witnesses’ testimony during the East Berlin trial, concluding that it was incorrect on all major points and that the SS and the Ukrainian militia, not Oberländer’s Nachtigall Battalion, were responsible for the deaths in Lviv. Since the MfS kept this document concealed from public view and continued to disseminate forged material, it was only after reunification that Oberländer’s legal rehabilitation in Germany finally occurred. Oberländer, however, had died four days earlier, on 4 May 1998, in Bonn.

ODESSA. An acronym for the Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen (Organization of former SS Members), Odessa was allegedly a secret international network designed to protect SS and other Nazi officials from prosecution for war crimes by Allied, German, and Austrian authorities following World War II. The organization’s existence, however, has never been confirmed, not even by the Central Authority for the Investigation into Nazi Crimes in Ludwigsburg. Nevertheless, numerous Nazi criminals and collaborators relied on certain avenues of escape—dubbed ratlines—which included the alleged Odessa route: Tyrol, Rome, Genoa, then South America or the Near East.

OFFIZIERE IM BESONDEREN EINSATZ (OibE). A disguised arm of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (officers in special deployment) were full-time officers who worked in key positions in the economy, military, media, arts,
and bureaucracy of the German Democratic Republic, including the diplomatic service. Equipped with a detailed legend, they operated undetected by their colleagues and reported regularly to a control officer (Führungsoffizier). In contrast to Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, who functioned primarily as informers, the OibEs also sought to influence the decision-making process in their assigned vocational sphere. While they drew the regular salary of their position, a supplement was added commensurate with their MfS rank. An MfS ordinance of 17 March 1986 set forth the rules governing their activities. Originating in the late 1960s and used extensively by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, they came to number approximately 3,000, among them the currency dealer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and the espionage author Julius Mader.

OHLENDORF, OTTO (1907–1951). The outspoken head of the domestic division of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), Otto Ohlendorf was born in Hoheneggelsen (Lower Saxony) on 4 February 1907, the son of a prosperous Protestant farming family. Already a member of the Sturmabteilung at age 18, he was transferred to the SS two years later and also became a member of the Nazi Party. Following his studies in law and political science at Leipzig and Göttingen, a scholarship allowed him to spend a year at the University of Pavia studying Italian corporatist institutions, which met with his ultimate disapproval. Upon his return to Germany, Ohlendorf had little success in launching an academic career.

In 1936, owing to the intervention of his former tutor and well-known economist, Professor Jens Jessen—and by reactivating his SS membership—Ohlendorf found a position in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) as director of Department II/23 (Economy). Attracted to an intelligence organization that aspired to be a corrective to certain Nazi state policies, he soon aroused the enmity of Robert Ley and Richard Darré because of his critical reports and therefore asked to be released from his duties. His superior, Reinhard Heydrich, reduced his SD work to “honorary duties” and allowed him to join the National Trade Group in 1938. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Ohlendorf was made director of Office III (German-settled areas) of the newly formed RSHA, which included responsibility for research into domestic public opinion.
His comprehensive reports—*Meldungen aus dem Reich*—started to appear shortly thereafter.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union, Heydrich appointed him leader of one of the *Einsatzgruppen*, Task Force D, presumably to eliminate any potential opposition on his part and make him complicit to the mass extermination in the east (*Heinrich Himmler* once referred to him as “a product of too much education”). From June 1941 to July 1942, convinced of the historical necessity of this policy, Ohlendorf strove to deploy his unit as effectively as possible, thereby killing more than 90,000 Jews, gypsies, communists, and other persecuted groups in southern Ukraine and Crimea. Following his return to Berlin, he focused on the public opinion research conducted by his office and also received a position in the Ministry of Economics. Despite strong criticism from Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann, Ohlendorf’s office continued to function until the spring of 1945. Besides drawing up plans for Germany’s postwar economy, he also proposed a new domestic intelligence service under his direction to the successor government of Karl Dönitz.

After surrendering to the Allies on 23 May, Ohlendorf became a leading defendant in the Einsatzgruppen Trials in Nuremberg. Astonished to hear this accomplished lawyer and economist give such an unapologetic account of the atrocities committed under his command, the presiding judge described him as a “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” figure. After being held in detention for more than three years, Ohlendorf was hanged on 8 June 1951 at Landsberg (Bavaria).

**OHNESORGE, BERND (1944–1987).** An agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who committed suicide in Bulgarian captivity, Bernd Ohnesorge was trained as an animal laboratory technician in Hamburg. Financial difficulties, however, led him to immigrate to the German Democratic Republic in 1966, where he was recruited by the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS) and dispatched to report on U.S. forces based at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin. Although his largely fictitious submissions resulted in his dismissal by the MfS shortly afterward, Ohnesorge managed to find a position with the CIA and underwent training at Langley, Virginia, in spring 1983. Yet his plan to recruit a high official in the Bulgarian Defense Ministry through an affair with his wife proved
illusory, causing him to offer his services instead to the Darzhavna Sigurnost while in Sofia. When the information he provided was checked with the MfS and found to be mostly invented, Ohnesorge was tried before a Bulgarian military tribunal and given a 15-year sentence in April 1985. His self-immolation occurred in a penal facility at Stara Zagora on 15 December 1987, and a Bulgarian aircraft transported his remains back to Hamburg. An inquiry by the German Foreign Office in 1997 elicited no clarifying documentation from authorities in Sofia.

**OLBRICH, JOHANNA (1926–2004).** One of the best-placed agents of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Johanna Olbrich was born on 26 October 1926. Initially a schoolteacher in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), she became the chief consultant in the Ministry for People’s Education in 1960. She was recruited by the HVA in 1964 while attending a party seminar in East Berlin and underwent training for resettlement in West Germany. Given the alias Sonja Lüneburg and the cover career of a hairdresser, she was taken to the FRG via Colmar, France, in 1967. After first finding employment with an insurance firm in Hamburg, she moved in 1969 to Bonn, where William Borm, a leading member of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and an important asset of the HVA, engaged her as a secretary. Borm in turn recommended her to two other colleagues in 1973.

Employed for one year with Karl-Hermann Flach, the general secretary of the FDP, Olbrich began working for a rising figure in the party, Martin Bangemann, who subsequently became the party whip in the European Parliament in Strasbourg and the economics minister in the government of Helmut Kohl. When Olbrich lost a false passport with her photograph in Rome, she was exfiltrated to the GDR via Lübeck. She was arrested outside Berlin shortly after reunification on 11 June 1991. Sentenced to prison, she was later released with probation. She died in Bernau near Berlin on 18 February 2004. A short autobiographical sketch, *Ich wurde Sonja Lüneburg* (I Became Sonja Lüneburg), appeared in 2003.

**OPERATIONSGEBIET (OG).** A term employed by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Operationsgebiet (area of operations) derived
from military usage and referred principally to West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Among members of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, it could also apply to capitalist countries bordering on the Federal Republic and to the United States. During the Solidarity crisis of 1980–1981, OG was used as an unofficial reference to Poland by members of Main Division II. See also WESTARBEIT.

OPERATIVER VORGANG (OV). The most painstakingly organized and comprehensive investigative procedure of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), an Operativer Vorgang (operational case) was set in motion when signs of subversive or potentially subversive activity appeared, even when the identity of the suspected person or group was unknown. Sometimes several cases were combined to form a Zentraler Operativer Vorgang (ZOV; central operational case). The ministerial guidelines issued in 1976 stressed the need for cooperation among the control officers and the paramount importance of informers in acquiring the requisite evidence. By the widespread use of OVs—as many as 5,000 cases each year between 1985–1988—the German Democratic Republic sought to avoid the negative international publicity associated with formal criminal proceedings and court trials.

One extensive OV (code name SCHILD) involved the close surveillance of a Catholic student group in Leipzig from 1969 to 1974 and resulted in more than a dozen volumes of collected materials. Prominent writers were also frequently targeted and included Rainer Kunze (code name LYRIK), Franz Führmann (code name FILOU), Erich Loest (code name AUTOR), and Rainer and Sarah Kirsch (code names ATELIERKREIS and MILAN, respectively). Scientists likewise were singled out, as demonstrated by the elaborate OV code-named MOLEKÜL initiated in 1965 against Werner Hartmann, an expert in molecular electronics and a pioneer in microelectronics.

OPERATIVE ZIELKONTROLLE (OZK). An automated telephone eavesdropping system developed by Main Division III of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Operative Zielkontrolle (Operational Targeting Check) had its origins in the late 1970s. By eliminating the more cumbersome manual dialing method, the OZK could be programmed for short- and long-term periods. The majority
of the eavesdropping requests were initiated by the **Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung**, although other MfS main divisions—along with the KGB and the Czechoslovakian service—made use of this system. Only in special instances could Main Division III start the process itself. To preserve the secrecy surrounding its existence, the OZK could not be cited as a source in an MfS report, and an informer was normally substituted instead. A further technological advance was in place by 1985, which involved automatic voice recognition on the basis of collected speech samples (or *Stimmenkonserven*). People living in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, especially former East German citizens such as **Jürgen Fuchs** and Roland Jahn, counted among the prime targets.

**OPERATIV-TECHNISCHER SEKTOR.** See SCHMIDT, GÜNTER.

**OPPENHEIM, MAX BARON VON** (1860–1946). An archeologist, diplomat, and intelligence operative who attempted to spark a Muslim uprising against Great Britain during World War I, Max Baron von Oppenheim was born in Cologne on 15 July 1860, the son of a wealthy banking family. Drawn to the Orient and fluent in Arabic, he undertook extensive travels and research financed by his family. From 1896 to 1910, Oppenheim, an ardent Anglophobe, worked for the Foreign Office as an attaché at the German consulate in Cairo, cultivating ties with Egyptian nationalists and other dissidents while writing numerous memoranda on Muslim affairs stretching from Morocco to China. His conviction that pan-Islamism could subvert Germany’s potential European enemies made a strong impression on Emperor William II, who referred to Oppenheim as the “feared spy.”

With the outbreak of World War I, he was recalled to head the Islamic section of the Foreign Office’s political office. One of his early proposals was the creation of the *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, although his lack of administrative talent led to his departure the following spring. The British, anxious about Oppenheim, monitored his travels, warning Indian officials of his capacity to do “infinite harm.” By early 1916, their fears receded, as he was in Constantinople promoting German economic propaganda among the Ottomans. Oppenheim returned to archeological exploration and writing after the war,
his larger design for an Islamic revolution against the British in Egypt and India having failed to materialize. He died in Landshut (Bavaria) on 15 November 1946.

**ORGANISATION CONSUL (OC).** A clandestine paramilitary organization that operated during the early Weimar Republic, Organisation Consul (Organization Consul) was formed in Munich after the failure of the Kapp Putsch in 1920. The initial group—employing the cover name Bayerische Holzverwertungsgesellschaft (Bavarian Timber Assessment Company)—drew its membership primarily from the ranks of the Ehrhardt naval brigade, a leading Freikorps unit under the command of Hermann Ehrhardt that had been officially dissolved in the wake of the putsch. The name derived from one of Ehrhardt’s aliases, Consul Eichmann. Within six months, there were four offices in Munich alone; by the following year, the OC counted no fewer than 5,000 members throughout Germany, along with a large cache of munitions. Their journal *Wiking*—self-described as “the fighting paper of former Freikorps members and nationally minded people”—appeared weekly.

The group’s ultranationalist objectives included combating Jewish and socialist influences as well as subverting the new democratic regime. To that end, the OC carried out two major assassinations. On 26 August 1921, while taking a walk in the Black Forest, former Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger was shot by two OC members, Heinrich Schulz and Heinrich Tillessen, who then fled to Hungary with false passports. On 24 June 1922, Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau was shot in Berlin with a submachine gun; the two assassins, Erwin Kern and Hermann Fischer, committed suicide to avoid capture by police several days later. The OC also attempted to murder socialist leader Philip Scheidemann by spraying prussic acid in his face.

**ORGANISATION GEHLEN (OG).** The forerunner of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the Organisation Gehlen (Organization Gehlen; also Org Gehlen) began operating in June 1946 under the direction of Reinhard Gehlen. With practically no access to up-to-date reports about the Soviet bloc, the United States agreed to provide the funding—first through the U.S. Army and then after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Housed modestly in
two residences in the Taunus between Falkenstein and Kronberg, the initial staff of 50 was largely drawn from the remnants of Fremde Heere Ost and divided into two sections—one dealing with collection under Friedrich Baun, the other concerned with evaluation and analysis and directed by Gerhard Wessel. In December 1947, the OG moved to the small town of Pullach outside Munich, where extensive facilities within the compound made the staff and their families generally independent of the outside world.

Gehlen (alias Dr. Schneider) embarked on a major recruiting campaign, seeking not only those with prior intelligence experience but also many ex-Wehrmacht officers, such as Adolf Heusinger, who would use the OG as a transitional home prior to the official founding of the Bundeswehr. Although the U.S. Army had banned all former members of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), there was keen competition among the occupying powers for anyone with connections to the feared Nazi underground. Former diplomats and civil servants were also engaged, as Gehlen’s objective was to create an all-embracing civilian intelligence service “capable of carrying out every kind of espionage work against the enemy.”

Following the productive interrogations of returning German prisoners of war (Operation Hermes), the OG concentrated on building an extensive agent network in the Soviet occupation zone and often using a toter Briefkasten (prearranged hiding place for transferring information). Throughout the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, a labyrinthine system of stations and substations camouflaged as business firms soon appeared. When friction began to develop with the CIA concerning the OG’s independence, an agreement was reached in 1949 whereby the Americans had access to the names of the Germans’ top 150 field agents. In addition, besides receiving all written reports and evaluations, CIA officers would act as liaisons to each of the OG’s main departments. James Critchfield headed the American team.

As the OG expanded into Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, serious conflicts with the Eastern bloc services became inevitable. Confronted by the seeming omnipresence of OG agents, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit under Wilhelm Zaisser responded by deploying a number of successful double agents. Even more damaging was the major counteroffensive launched by Zaisser’s successor,
Ernst Wollweber, that culminated in Operations feuwerk, pfeil, and blitz. Despite these setbacks, the OG could claim several major victories, such as the recruitment of Hermann Kastner. Notably, the OG forbade sabotage activities from the outset, preferring instead to build a voluminous archive of names and information.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s desire to have his own intelligence service coincided with Gehlen’s ultimate aim, and thus the official transition of the OG to the BND took place on 1 April 1956. As late as 1970, some 25–30 percent of the BND’s workforce had been previously associated with the OG. See also GENERALVERTRETUNG; HERRE, HEINZ-DANKO.

OSHIMA, HIROSHI (1886–1975). The Japanese envoy to Nazi Germany who became an unwitting source of high-level information for the United States, Hiroshi Oshima was the son of a prominent family and a graduate of the Imperial Army Academy and the War College. Following postings in Vienna and Budapest, he came to Berlin in 1933 as the military attaché and was soon befriended by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The first of many meetings with Adolf Hitler took place in the fall of 1935. Appointed ambassador three years later, Oshima remained in Germany for the duration of the war except for a brief period in 1939.

Unknown to him, however, U.S. Signals Intelligence broke the Japanese diplomatic code shortly before the start of his second tour of duty as ambassador. As a result, all of his frequent and comprehensive communications to Tokyo were deciphered and made available to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, General George Marshall, and the senior intelligence staff. Not only was Oshima given daily briefings once war commenced, but nearly all Japanese intelligence in Europe filtered through his office. Some of his best reporting concerned the initial stages of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, as he even flew to the East Prussian base of operations for long conversations with Ribbentrop and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Also invaluable were his detailed descriptions of German defenses along the Atlantic coastline of France following an inspection tour in the fall of 1943. Despite his intense admiration for National Socialism and his advocacy of close German-Japanese relations, his synopsis
of major German defeats such as the battle of Stalingrad was also strikingly candid.

In the final stages of the war, Oshima reluctantly relocated the embassy to Bad Gastein, Austria, before being captured by U.S. troops, interrogated, and returned to Japan for trial. Although the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentenced him to life imprisonment, Oshima was granted clemency in 1958 and died 17 years later, unaware that his wartime dispatches had been intercepted and read by his country’s main adversary.

OSLO REPORT. See MAYER, HANS FERDINAND.

OSTBÜRO DER SPD. A special branch of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) working undercover in the Soviet occupation zone and later the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Ostbüro der SPD was founded in April 1946 as a response to the forced merger of the East German Social Democrats and the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. As initially envisioned by SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, the Ostbüro was a point of contact for SPD members and other resistance groups in the Soviet zone, a collector and disseminator of information about the communist regime, a counterintelligence network directed against Soviet and East German spies, and a support group for political refugees fleeing to the Western zones.

Based originally in Hanover and later in West Berlin and Bonn, the Ostbüro was headed respectively by Rudi Dux, Günther Weber, Siegmund Neumann, and beginning in November 1948, Stephan Thomas. One objective was to disseminate newspapers and other publications in the Eastern zone. Persons connected to the Ostbüro figured as prime targets of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and the East German K-5. The Ostbüro secretary Heinz Kühne was kidnapped from West Berlin in the winter of 1948–1949 and forced to reveal the names of other SPD members engaged in resistance activities. Because couriers were such a vulnerable link, greater reliance was placed on broadcasts by RIAS. In 1952, balloons were introduced as a means of infiltrating printed matter into the GDR.
Although similar eastern bureaus were maintained by the West German trade union federation as well as two other political parties, they were significantly smaller and never played as active a role. The Ostbüro der SPD was officially dissolved in January 1971, largely because the party wanted to normalize relations with the GDR and regarded any subversive activity on its part as a relic of the early Cold War.

OSTEN, ULRICH VON DER (?–1941). A senior Abwehr officer accidentally killed in the United States, Ulrich von der Osten saw service in the Spanish Civil War under the pseudonym Julio Lopez Lido. Afterward, still based in Spain, he directed the Abwehr division responsible for Great Britain and, beginning in 1940, the United States. In that capacity, he traveled via Japan to meet with one of his chief agents, Kurt Frederick Ludwig, in New York City but was fatally injured by an automobile while the two men were crossing Times Square on 18 March. The confiscation of Lido’s luggage by the Federal Bureau of Investigation then led to the discovery of his true identity and that of other German operatives active in the country.

OSTER, HANS (1888–1945). The deputy head of the Abwehr and a staunch anti-Nazi, Hans Oster was born in Dresden on 9 August 1888, the son of a Protestant clergyman. Following service in World War I, he had early intelligence experience as a Reichswehr staff officer at Münster, spying on the demilitarized Rhineland. In 1932, an affair with a married woman forced his resignation, although he found a position with Hermann Göring’s newly established Forschungsamt the following year. A few months later, Oster entered the Abwehr in a civilian capacity, and in late 1935, upon the initiative of the new Abwehr chief, Wilhelm Canaris, he was reactivated as a serving officer. His advancement steadily continued, first as director of Abwehr headquarters beginning in 1938 and then as chief of staff during World War II.

An early opponent of Adolf Hitler, Oster used the resources of his office to build a far-flung network of both military and civilian resisters. He played a leading role in the military conspiracy of September 1938, arguing that Hitler should be arrested and declared
mentally ill by medical authorities. In early October 1940, Oster took an even bolder step and informed his friend, Gijsbertus Sas, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, of the impending invasion of the Low Countries, but to little effect. A similar warning to the Norwegian ambassador to Germany likewise went unheeded. In addition, he helped individual Jews to escape Nazi persecution through various Abwehr front organizations.

Although Oster’s myriad activities remained protected by Canaris, he became the object of a Gestapo investigation and was forced from his office in mid-1943; further contact with Abwehr members was expressly forbidden, and permanent surveillance instituted. His arrest occurred immediately after the failure of the conspiracy of 20 July 1944. The case against Oster was cinched when papers detailing the prewar coup attempt were accidentally found in Zossen by members of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. After gaining possession of the bulk of Canaris’s diaries, Ernst Kaltenbrunner ordered summary court proceedings at the Flossenburg concentration camp. Both men were condemned to death on 8 April 1945 and hanged the following day.

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PALME REAL. A joint signals intelligence project between Cuba and the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Operation PALME REAL (Royal Palm) originated in 1982 with the intention of eavesdropping on the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. Supervised by Horst Männchen, the endeavor was planned for a duration of only two months, but its success—what officials called the acquisition of “indispensable strategic and operational-tactical information”—resulted in its extension to August 1985. As a token of gratitude from Cuban officials, the MfS received the blueprints for a 10-meter parabolic satellite dish.

PANZERFAUST. See SKORZENY, OTTO.

PANZINGER, FRIEDRICH (1903–1959). A senior Gestapo officer recruited by the KGB after World War II, Friedrich Panzinger was
born in Munich on 1 February 1903. Joining the Bavarian police in 1919, he subsequently worked alongside Heinrich Müller as a mid-level official. In 1937, a promotion brought him to the Gestapo office in Berlin, and two years later, he joined the SS. From January 1941 to July 1944, Panzinger headed Group IV A of Branch IV of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), specializing in communist subversion. His most notable assignment was to direct the special commission charged with interrogating members of the Rote Kapelle. Based in Riga from September 1943 to May 1944, Panzinger additionally served as commander of the Sipo and Sicherheitsdienst in the Baltic states. The flight of Arthur Nebe following the failure of the 20 July 1944 conspiracy gave him responsibility for the criminal police division within the RSHA.

Following his arrest in Linz, Austria, in 1946, Panzinger was sentenced by the Soviet Union to a 25-year prison term as a war criminal. In 1955, however, an agreement with the KGB allowed him to return to the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet rather than seeking to penetrate the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) as instructed, Panzinger revealed his mission to authorities, who then decided to use him as a double agent in Operation PANOPTIKUM (Collection of Curios). This attempt to infiltrate the Soviet service failed because his case officer, Heinz Felfe, was himself a KGB mole. Moreover, the Bavarian Justice Ministry wanted to press charges against Panzinger for the mass murder of Russian prisoners of war. Although the BND had interceded on his behalf, a miscommunication resulted in his arrest, and Panzinger committed suicide in his jail cell on 8 August 1959.

PAPEN, FRANZ VON (1879–1969). A prominent German politician involved in spy operations during both world wars, Franz von Papen was born in Werl (Westphalia) on 29 October 1879, the son of an old Catholic noble family. Papen served in a cavalry regiment and was later appointed to the Army General Staff. In 1913, he was designated military attaché at the German embassy in Washington, D.C., and at the legation in Mexico City. His main efforts in Mexico were designed to bolster the dictatorship of General Victoriano Huerta. With the outbreak of World War I, Papen established a clandestine office in Manhattan, which undertook a
wide range of espionage activities—recruiting agents throughout the country, disrupting grain and arms shipments to Europe, and fomenting unrest against British rule in Ireland and India. At the end of 1915, he and Karl Boy-Ed were declared persona non grata by the U.S. government and returned to Germany. Very little effort was made to cover Papen’s tracks. An inspection of his papers while en route by British officials uncovered the financial records of his sabotage activities. The following spring, U.S. authorities found other incriminating documents in his former New York office, then under the direction of Wolf von Igel.

Papen’s political career during the Weimar Republic culminated in his brief appointment as chancellor in 1932, owing primarily to his close relationship with President Paul von Hindenburg. Although chosen by Adolf Hitler as his vice chancellor the following year, he resigned three days after the purge of 30 June 1934, having narrowly escaped execution himself. Nevertheless, by the fall, he was appointed a special envoy to Vienna and became ambassador to Austria in 1936, all the while helping to prepare for the Anschluss of 1938. Papen’s final espionage involvement took place during his tenure as ambassador to Turkey from 1939 to 1944. Most significantly, he gave his approval to the undercover work of Elyesa Bazna in the Cicero Affair. In May 1943, a secret mission to Ankara approved by Wilhelm Canaris and designed to secure Papen’s cooperation with the resistance proved unsuccessful. Five months later, however, he made an overture to an agent of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, stating his willingness to help overthrow Hitler in exchange for certain concessions, but the negotiations foundered. Another offer by Papen to the British was also rebuffed.

Arrested by the Americans in June 1945, he stood trial before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and was acquitted of all charges. Although he had never joined the Nazi Party, a German denazification court imposed a sentence of eight years’ hard labor and forfeiture of property, which was rescinded on appeal two years later. Papen’s selective autobiography Der Wahrheit eine Gasse (Franz von Papen: Memoirs) appeared in 1952. He died in Obersasbach (Baden-Württemberg) on 2 May 1969.

PARVUS. See HELPHAND, ALEXANDER.
PASTORIUS. An unsuccessful Nazi sabotage attempt in the United States, Operation PASTORIUS originated in the Abwehr in the spring of 1942, apparently as a directive from Adolf Hitler. The Abwehr officer responsible for the operation, Walter Kappe, had been active in various pro-Nazi groups in Cincinnati, Ohio, and named the operation after Franz Daniel Pastorius, the leader of the first group of German emigrants to the United States and founder of Germantown, Pennsylvania. The eight men selected for the operation were German born but had acquired a knowledge of American life and customs from time spent earlier in the country. Two of them were naturalized citizens. With one exception, all of them had returned to Germany after the outbreak of war. Although their three-week training course at a farm outside Berlin provided them with ample knowledge regarding the use of explosives and the intricacies of the American railway system, it failed to develop any sense of group cohesion.

Their principal objective was to cripple the production of magnesium and aluminum essential for aircraft construction. Transported by two submarines across the Atlantic, one group of four landed at Amagansett, Long Island, on 12 June; the second group came ashore four days later at Ponte Vedra Beach south of Jacksonville, Florida. The leader of the first group, George Dasch, decided the final outcome of the mission. After confiding his disenchantment with Germany to another member of his group, Ernest Burger, an early Nazi activist who had been arrested by the Gestapo in 1940 and served time in a concentration camp, Dasch contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He proceeded to explain that he and Burger, as staunch anti-Nazis, had already intended to betray the operation prior to leaving Germany and had simply desired asylum in the United States. Hoping that this voluntary admission would absolve him of any wrongdoing, he nevertheless could not satisfactorily explain his return to Germany in May 1941. Based on information that Dasch provided, the remaining members of both groups were apprehended within a matter of days. The version of events released to the public made no mention of the saboteur’s betrayal and gave full credit to the FBI’s efforts.

On 2 July, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing a military tribunal to determine the men’s fate. The procedure had not been used since the American Civil War, but the
government’s case appeared too weak for a civil court, since no act of sabotage had taken place. All were found guilty of various breaches of law, including conspiracy, and six were executed. Dasch received a 30-year prison term and Burger life imprisonment. In addition, hundreds of German aliens suspected of being Nazi sympathizers were arrested, and the assets of Axis-controlled companies were expropriated and sold. Because three of the saboteurs had been waiters, the FBI ordered all hotels, restaurants, and clubs in Washington, D.C., to dismiss any German or Italian nationals working in service positions.

In April 1948, President Harry S. Truman commuted both sentences, and Dash returned to Germany amid much public hostility. Neither the book that Dash wrote justifying his actions—*Eight Spies against America* (1959)—nor his attempts to return to the United States proved successful, and he died in Germany in 1991. Burger faded into obscurity following his return.

**PEARSON, ROBIN (1955– ).** A British academic who served as a long-term penetration agent for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Robin Pearson was recruited while a visiting student from Edinburgh at the University of Leipzig in 1977. According to his HVA handler, Bernhard Kartheus, Pearson (code name ARMIN) appeared a likely candidate at the outset, given his strong communist sympathies. His initial assignment of spying on other British students in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) expanded to include fellow academics as his own career progressed. Of particular interest were those with ties to East European dissidents and to the British Ministry of Defence. After assuming a position in 1985 as a lecturer in economic history at the University of Hull, Pearson developed a plan for sending students to the GDR, where they might be recruited as he had been. When knowledge of his 12-year undercover work came to light in September 1999 (his was one of only two HVA files involving Britons that survived intact), Pearson was suspended from his teaching responsibilities. The British solicitor general, however, declined to press charges, and he was soon reinstated at the university.

**PERGEN, JOHANN ANTON (1725–1814).** The founder of the first secret police force in Austria, Johann Anton Pergen was born in
Vienna on 15 February 1725, the son of a judicial official. After serving as an imperial page and completing his law studies, he entered the Habsburg diplomatic service in 1747. Although his performance as provincial governor in Galicia proved disappointing to the Viennese court and resulted in his recall, Pergen emerged as a key figure in the entourage of the new emperor Joseph II in 1780. He proposed that the police—hitherto concerned with regulating the broader aspects of municipal administration—be focused on issues of law and order and subject only to the directions of the emperor. Moreover, this police force should be based on the Meldepflicht—a compulsory registration system to be extended beyond Vienna to include the entire Habsburg realm. Only with such a general requirement in place, he contended, could foreign travelers suspected as spies be properly monitored.

The reorganization of the police in September 1786, included creation of the Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police), which would be disguised as part of the regular police agencies and would report directly to Pergen on vital state security matters. Despite its foreboding title, the force initially consisted of three agents. This new responsibility, however, gave Pergen direct access to the emperor, who took a keen interest in the day-to-day details of police activities. Pergen further urged the provincial governors to report any signs of local dissatisfaction and to exercise vigilance in regard to suspicious foreigners and persons spreading “sects and errors” among the populace. He also recommended recruiting servants as confidential agents and intercepting letters, although it should be done with great care “not to offend citizens’ freedom or the reputation of the mails.”

Among the problems confronting the Habsburg monarchy were the escalating separatist ambitions of the Hungarian magnates angered by the reform measures of Joseph II. Alerted by the emperor that certain Magyar nobles were plotting with Prussia to depose the Habsburgs as kings of Hungary and elevate a Prussian prince to the throne, Pergen took action. His undercover investigation produced evidence of Hungarian separatist plots in Vienna. Because a public trial might stimulate sympathy for the conspirators and compromise the system of secret informants, Pergen and the emperor created the special category of Staatsverbrecher (state criminal)—a person who had presumably committed high treason and whose fate would be decided by the emperor alone (and remain unknown to the
general public). At least 13 cases were handled in this fashion between 1782–1789, nearly all of them involving espionage. Pergen’s recommendations, often taking a more lenient tack, did not always accord with the judgment of the headstrong emperor, as in the case of Franz Rudolf Gossing, a Bavarian contact person for various Hungarian dissidents whose abundant testimony while in captivity failed to save him from a life sentence.

With Leopold II’s accession to the throne in 1790, the centralized system suffered major setbacks. The Habsburg police force in Hungary was dismantled, leaving municipal authorities to keep public order, while persons earlier convicted as *Staatsverbrecher* were amnestied. Concerned about threats stemming from the French Revolution, Leopold nevertheless ordered the surveillance of all foreigners as potential French agents, and he commissioned the former head of Pergen’s police in Pest, Franz Gotthardi, to recruit a group of Hungarian informants. Pergen, who faced reduced funds and increasing interference, submitted his resignation in early 1791, convinced that the emperor’s undermining of his police system would have the gravest consequences.

Following Leopold’s death in 1792, the new emperor, Francis II, reinstated Pergen as head of the secret police, which included jurisdiction over the prison system and surveillance of all foreigners. Francis was impressed by his performance and sought his advice on other matters. Yet it turned out that one of Pergen’s Hungarian agents, Ignaz von Martinovics, was a French sympathizer, and a series of Jacobin trials took place in 1794. Before his retirement in 1804 due to failing health, Pergen sought to consolidate the powers of the secret police, recommending to the emperor that all foreigners unable to prove legal and steady employment be expelled from Vienna. The recipient of numerous state honors and rewards, Pergen died on 12 May 1814. See also SAURAU, COUNT FRANZ JOSEF VON.

**PERS Z.** The cryptanalytical unit of the German Foreign Office, Pers Z (Personal Z) traced its origins to a unit established in December 1918 by the new Weimar government. Its later name, adopted in 1936, referred to its secret location in the personnel department of the Foreign Ministry’s political intelligence bureau. Initially headed by Curt Selchow, a former captain in army signals intelligence, it steadily
increased from a staff of 20–30 to a peak strength of nearly 200 during the war years. It also outgrew its offices in the Wilhelmstrasse and occupied a number of locales in the Berlin area.

Although the Foreign Ministry had established a cipher office in the late 19th century, its functions consisted primarily of developing secure diplomatic communications and precluded eavesdropping on foreign governments. Pers Z, by contrast, purposely sought to break the codes of other countries. The unit succeeded in accessing the diplomatic traffic of 34 powers, including Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the Vatican. One major exception was the Soviet Union after its adoption of one-time pads in 1927. But Per Z’s solution of the Turkish cryptograms, accomplished under the direction of Hermann Scherschmidt, provided detailed wartime information from Turkey’s diplomatic mission in Moscow. Results proved less impressive later in the war, especially after the United States changed to a more secure strip-cipher system.

Working in relative isolation, the cryptanalysts rarely received direction from senior Foreign Ministry officials and approached their work as more of an intellectual challenge than a pressing intelligence matter. Moreover, since no evaluation process existed, Pers Z simply transmitted the raw decrypts to the office of Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop; only a handful ever reached Adolf Hitler. The only significant cooperation with a related agency involved the Forschungsamt, which designated one of its officers as a liaison.

Despite orders in 1945 to destroy all of Pers Z’s cryptological material and organizational documents, 90 steel cases were captured by British forces at Schloss Burgscheidungen (Saxony-Anhalt) and flown to London. A trainload of crates were found by the Red Army and never surfaced again.

**PERSPEKTIVAGENT.** The equivalent of a “sleeper,” a Perspektivagent (or Warteagent) is a spy who refrains from active espionage for a long period, often a matter of years, in order to become well established in the host country. The postwar division of Germany provided highly propitious conditions for such agents, whom counterintelligence officials found nearly impossible to detect. As the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit stressed, a Perspektivagent was activated only after a careful assessment of the individual’s situation.
PETERSHAGEN, RUDOLF (1901–1969). A German military commander and convicted Soviet spy, Rudolf Petershagen was born in Hamburg on 4 June 1901, the son of a merchant family. His career as a professional soldier began with his entry into the Reichswehr in 1924. After taking part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938, Petershagen saw combat in France, the Balkans, and the Soviet Union. Severely wounded at Stalingrad and transported to the field hospital in Greifswald, he was appointed military commander of the old university city following his recovery. His most notable decision—contrary to his instructions—was to surrender Greifswald to the advancing Red Army on 30 April 1945.

After being held in Soviet captivity until 1948, Petershagen returned to Greifswald and became involved in local politics. His activities as a Soviet spy, however, proved less than adroit. The U.S. Counterintelligence Corps learned of Petershagen’s recruitment attempts in the Federal Republic of Germany and arrested him on 9 November 1951 during a trip to Munich. Although given a 12-year prison sentence for espionage by a U.S. military court, he was released on 21 September 1955 and returned to the German Democratic Republic. His autobiography Gewissen in Aufruhr (Conscience in Turmoil) appeared in 1957 and was subsequently filmed by East German television. Petershagen died on 13 April 1969 in Greifswald.

PETTER, ROBERT (1915–1941). A Swiss-German Abwehr spy captured and executed in Great Britain, Robert Petter served as a chauffeur to the French consul in Hamburg prior to World War II. On 30 September 1940, Petter, Karl Drücke, and Vera Eriksen were brought by an amphibious aircraft to the coast of Scotland between Buckie and Port Gordon. After traveling alone by train to Edinburgh, Petter was arrested at Waverley Station while attempting to retrieve his luggage, which contained a wireless set and codebook supplied by the Abwehr. Further incriminating evidence included his forged passport in the name of Swiss national Werner Wälti. Following his interrogation at Camp 020, he was tried at the Old Bailey and hanged with Drücke on 6 August 1941.

PFAHLS, LUDWIG-HOLGER (1943– ). A former head of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) convicted of bribery
and tax evasion, Ludwig-Holger Pfahls completed his legal studies at Freiburg in 1971. After serving as an aide to Bavarian politician Franz-Josef Strauss, he headed the BfV from August 1985 through March 1987. His appointment as a junior defense minister from 1987 to 1992 was followed by a career as a lobbyist for private firms. When an international arrest warrant was issued in 1999, Pfahls went underground and eluded authorities for five years. Captured by French police in Paris on 13 July 2004 and extradited to Germany, Pfahls admitted that he had received 3.8 million DM in bribes from Canadian-German dealer Karlheinz Schreiber for arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 1991 and had failed to declare this income. In August 2005, a court in Augsburg sentenced him to two years and three months in prison.

**PFAUS, OSKAR KARL.** The most significant Abwehr liaison to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) prior to World War II, Oskar Karl Pfaus was raised in Illingen (Baden-Württemberg). After immigrating to the United States in the 1920s, he became a founder of the German-American Bund and a worker for the Deutscher Fichte-Bund, an organization that distributed Nazi propaganda worldwide. Following his return to Germany in 1938, his fluency in English attracted Abwehr officials in Hamburg, and Pfaus (code name STIER) was assigned to meet with IRA officials to discuss possible cooperation. In February 1939, posing as a correspondent for the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, he arrived in Dublin and made contact with the IRA command staff, which agreed to hold further talks. In Paris in November 1943, Pfaus attempted to locate Irish nationals who had information regarding Allied military preparations for the invasion of continental Europe. But his main contact, Father Kenneth Monaghan, a priest at Chapelle Saint-Joseph, was also a British army chaplain with ties to MI6. As a result, nothing of consequence materialized.

**PFEIL.** The second and largest of the three major “concentrated blows” against suspected Western intelligence operatives in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Operation PFEIL (Arrow) took place in August 1954 and was supervised by KGB and East German officials, including Ernst Wollweber and Erich Mielke. Of the 547 spies arrested, 277 belonged to the Organisation Gehlen, 176 to the
U.S. secret services, and 94 to the French. Many of these agents had achieved high-level positions in industry and even the embryonic East German army. These well-publicized mass arrests buttressed the GDR’s allegation that the Uprising of 17 June 1953 had been orchestrated by Western intelligence organizations, although no evidence has emerged to support this charge. See also BANDELOW, KARLI; BLITZ; FEUERWERK.

PFIFFIKUS. A major effort of the Organisation Gehlen to infiltrate the Soviet Union during the early Cold War, Operation PFIFFIKUS (Crafty Thing) targeted any citizen of the German Democratic Republic who had reason to travel to the USSR. That usually meant students, academics, scientists, and engineers, who, according to a Gehlen directive, were assured “a graduated fee depending upon the importance of the source delivered.”

PFOTENHAUER, HANS (1934–1982). A prominent officer of the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) who died under mysterious circumstances, Hans Pfotenhauer was born in Schwarza-Rudolstadt (Thuringia). Initially trained as an electrician, he underwent military instruction and joined the Barracked Police in 1952, specializing in technical intelligence matters. Promotions and awards soon followed, as he was widely esteemed in the newly formed National People’s Army for his amiable manner and remarkable know-how. By 1966, he oversaw the entire technical communications systems of the VA. Two years earlier, however, the military counterintelligence unit of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) had recruited him as an informer (code name PETER BAUER) within the VA.

In 1974, Pfotenhauer was assigned to the incoming VA chief, Theo Gregori, as a special assistant. The following year, Gregori made him responsible for the acquisition of all equipment obtained from the West, such as eavesdropping detector devices and electronic sensors. As Pfotenhauer’s network of business contacts expanded at home and abroad, the MfS noticed an increasing selectivity in his reports, particularly after it began its own investigation of Gregori for channeling state property into private use. Although Pfotenhauer’s home and office were monitored, he received an award for his work as an informer in 1980. Gregori’s abrupt removal from office on 22
September 1982, however, caused him deep concern for his own future. On 2 October—only hours after a meeting with his control officer—Pfotenhauer died by hanging from a stair railing at his home in Berlin-Mahlsdorf. Even though he had told his control officer of his optimistic belief that he would be reinstated by the VA the following week, his death was officially recorded as a suicide.

PFUHLSTEIN, ALEXANDER VON (1899–?). The last commander of the Brandenburger Regiment, Alexander von Pfuhlstein was born in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) on 17 December 1899. Assigned to head the Abwehr office in Hanover in 1938, he achieved distinction as an infantry commander on the eastern front and was awarded the Knight’s Cross in August 1942. On the recommendation of Hans Oster (who knew him to be a fellow critic of the Nazi regime), Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris appointed Pfuhlstein to head the Brandenburger Regiment beginning 1 April 1943. His chief task was to reorganize a group that had suffered heavy casualties in the Soviet Union and convert it from a commando unit of the Abwehr to a reserve force of the Armed Forces High Command.

At the same time, the Brandenburger Regiment under Pfuhlstein was to play a role in the attempted assassinations of Adolf Hitler in 1943 and 1944 by keeping Nazi Party forces at bay in the Berlin area. After the failure of the 20 July 1944 plot, Pfuhlstein was arrested and, under Gestapo interrogation, provided testimony that heavily implicated Canaris. Pfuhlstein’s release from prison, and demotion from the rank of colonel to the status of a common soldier, occurred later that year.

PIEKENBROCK, HANS (1893–1959). A close associate of Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, Hans Piekenbrock was born in Essen, the son of a wealthy Catholic family. Abandoning his legal studies in 1914, he served in the cavalry and remained in the reduced armed forces after World War I. His transfer to the Abwehr in 1936 placed him in charge of intelligence collection (Division I), and a warm relationship with Canaris developed. Yet despite his numerous attempts to intensify penetrations into the Soviet Union—even through the enlistment of the Austrian and Hungarian services—the results proved superficial. During World War II, now a general, Piekenbrock
left the Abwehr in late March 1943 and was given the command of an infantry division fighting on the eastern front. He was taken prisoner by the Red Army in early 1945, declared a war criminal, and remained in captivity for the next 10 years. He died in Essen on 16 December 1959.

**PILSUDSKI, JÓZEF (1867–1935).** An agent of the Evidenzbüro prior to becoming the leader of Poland after World War I, Józef Pilсудski began his underground activities against Russia at an early age and was imprisoned in Siberia from 1887 to 1892. His staunch advocacy of a Polish state independent of Russia led him to an association with the Austro-Hungarian secret service in 1906. During World War I, direct ties existed between the Evidenzbüro and Pilsudski’s Polish Legion. Yet after the Russian Revolution, the German government became the main barrier to a sovereign Poland. In response, Pilsudski refused to swear fidelity to German and Austrian forces and was therefore arrested and imprisoned in Magdeburg in July 1917. The armistice of November 1918 brought about his release, and he soon emerged as the first head of the new Polish state.

**PLATZDASCH, GÜNTER (1952– ).** A West German publicist who served as an agent for the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Günter Platzdasch was born in Eisenach on 6 December 1952. Schooled in the Federal Republic of Germany, he not only became a member of the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) but by 1970 had established contact with East German military intelligence. While he initially reported on the U.S. Army installations near Frankfurt am Main, the VA’s long-term plan involved his placement in the press office of the Bundeswehr. Drawn to Eurocommunism, however, he became critical of both the DKP and the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, particularly following the expatriation of Wolf Biermann in 1976.

Expelled from the DKP, Platzdasch terminated his relationship with the VA and resumed his studies at Marburg and Frankfurt am Main. A position at the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) followed in 1988, although he left shortly thereafter. Denying charges of serving as an Einflussagent for the Ministerium für Staats sicherheit, he later accused the ISHR of being a neo-Nazi front.
Settling in Jena in 1991, Platzdasch established a career as a lawyer and journalist. The following year, he attended the burial of Arthur Franke, the former head of the VA, despite documented charges by authorities in Frankfurt am Main of having committed treason.

**PLÖTZENSEE PRISON.** A penal institution in Berlin dating from the 19th century, the Plötzensee Prison gained notoriety during the Third Reich as the site of numerous executions of persons convicted of high treason. Among them were two spies working for Poland, Benita von Falkenhayn and Renate von Natzner, who were beheaded with the ax in February 1935. Liselotte Herrmann and three accomplices were guillotined there in June 1938. The number of executions in Plötzensee escalated dramatically during World War II and included members of the Rote Kapelle and 90 people involved in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944, among them Arthur Nebe. An estimated 2,890 people lost their lives at the Plötzensee for various crimes between 1933 and 1945. A memorial center exists today on the premises.

**PLUTONIUM AFFAIR.** A scandal centering on the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the Plutonium Affair began with the arrest of three men—a Colombian and two Spaniards—at the Munich airport on 10 August 1994. With the confiscation of 363 grams of plutonium from a flight originating in Moscow, the Bavarian interior minister proclaimed “a successful strike against the international nuclear mafia.” Yet as more details emerged, the German media charged the BND with ignoring safety precautions and endangering lives through this sting operation (code name hades). In May 1995, a special Bundestag committee investigated the matter, concluding that BND officials in Munich and Madrid were not complicit and no procedural irregularities had occurred. The precise origin of the plutonium was never determined.

**POKORNY, HERMANN (1882–1960).** The leading Austro-Hungarian cryptanalyst during World War I, Hermann Pokorny was born in Kremisier (now Kromeriz, Czech Republic). Raised with a knowledge of German and Czech, he also came to master Polish, Bulgarian, and Russian in the course of his training as an army officer. At the beginning of World War I, his main task was to monitor “alien conditions” for
the **Evidenzbüro** through the reports sent by enemy troops, military attachés, embassy staff, and intelligence agents. As head of the Kriegschiffreigruppe (War Cipher Group), Pokorny succeeded in breaking nearly all of the Russian code keys from September 1914 to March 1916, helping Austro-Hungarian forces to counter several major offensives of the Russian army. He emerged from the war as the army’s most decorated intelligence officer.

Following the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, Pokorny chose to become a Hungarian citizen despite his Moravian origins. The army readily put his exceptional talents to use, beginning with an assignment in 1920 to the Crimea as a nonofficial observer. Afterward, he continued to translate and evaluate Soviet military and political literature. In 1945, the office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that negotiated reparations issues with the victorious powers came under his direction. In 1955, his pension was revoked by the communist regime. Pokorny died in Budapest in 1960. His autobiography—*Emlékeim* (**Memories**)—appeared posthumously in 2000.

**PONGER, KURT (1914– ).** A Soviet double agent, Kurt Ponger was born in Vienna but immigrated to the United States in 1938 and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. At that time, he joined the U.S. Army and, because of his language skills, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). A position as a civilian interrogator for the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg followed after the war. Ponger and his younger brother-in-law Otto Verber, likewise a Jewish-born native of Vienna and OSS veteran, resettled in the Soviet sector of the Austrian capital and established the Central European Press as a cover for their espionage activity.

Ponger’s Soviet affiliation, dating from 1936, only slowly came to light following several years of surveillance by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Arrested in January 1953 along with Verber, he confessed to conspiring to collect and deliver U.S. defense secrets to Moscow and was sentenced to 5–10 years in prison in Georgia; Verber was given 3–10 years. Ponger further conceded his cultivation of Wilhelm Höttl and Wilhelm Krichbaum as penetration agents against the Organisation Gehlen. Ponger and Verber were later paroled and allowed to return to Vienna.
POPOV, DUSAN (1912–1981). A key British double agent during World War II, Dusan (“Dusko”) Popov was born in Dubrovnik, Croatia, the son of a prosperous Dalmatian family. He studied at Freiburg, then worked in Belgrade as a commercial lawyer. In 1940, urged to perform an assignment for the Abwehr by a close university friend, Johann Jebsen, Popov sought the advice of a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer attached to the British legation in the Yugoslav capital. He instructed Popov to join the Abwehr as a double agent. His initial code name of scout was changed to tricycle after he recruited two other double agents, balloon and gelatine.

Brought to London, Popov began to reply to lengthy Abwehr questionnaires regarding coastal defenses and the location of antiaircraft batteries, and he traveled to Lisbon twice in early 1941 to meet with his German handler. Not only was he handsomely paid, causing him to decline any compensation from the British, but the Abwehr selected him for a key mission to the United States to establish a new network following the fiasco of William G. Sebold and his spy ring. After arriving in New York in mid-August, Popov contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and presented the questionnaire given to him by the Abwehr, which was concealed in the form of a microdot. American atomic energy research and the military installations on the island of Oahu were of particular interest. Yet his cooperation with the FBI and the U.S. military was minimal, owing to Popov’s extravagant lifestyle and clashing modus operandi. His reports increasingly meager in content, Popov returned to Lisbon in October 1942 for new instructions from the Abwehr. He then reestablished himself in London, building a new network headed by his elder brother Ivo (code name dreadnought). For the remainder of the war, both men participated in numerous deception schemes, which, relying heavily on supposed Yugoslav émigré circles, were designed to mislead the Nazi regime about the planned Allied invasion of Europe.

In the immediate postwar period, Popov continued his relationship with the SIS by working in Krefeld under commercial cover. But his financial affairs grew murkier and led to a short prison sentence in Marseilles in 1959. After working for a German cocoa firm in Cape Town, he settled in Opio in the French Maritime Alps and wrote his memoirs, Spy Counterspy (1974), which made a number of controversial claims, especially regarding the FBI’s alleged negligence
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He died in Opio on 10 August 1981.

**Popp, Dieter (1938– ).** A long-term agent for the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA) resident in Bonn, Dieter Popp was born in Berlin and worked as an insurance agent. He offered his services to the VA in 1966. In 1969, Popp (code name *Asriel*) moved to Bonn to penetrate the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. Through the cultivation of a homosexual relationship with Egon Streffer (code name *Aurikel*), a well-regarded civilian employee in the planning section in the ministry, highly confidential material was regularly conveyed to East Berlin, beginning in 1970 and ending shortly before Streffer’s death in 1989. Unmasked in May 1990, Popp was tried and given a six-year sentence for aggravated espionage. His deep sense of injustice regarding the treatment of former Eastern bloc spies led him to head an Internet-based organization after his release from prison in 1994. *See also Romeo Spies.*

**Porst, Hansheinz (1922– ).** A highly successful West German entrepreneur and agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Hansheinz Porst was born in Nuremberg on 8 November 1922, the son of the owner of a photography firm. After working in the family business and assuming its leadership in 1960, he built through innovative marketing techniques a popular nationwide chain in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and, with its profits, constructed a large printing-press complex replete with workers’ housing outside Nuremberg. Strongly influenced by his cousin Karl Böhm, an avowed communist prior to World War II and resident of the German Democratic Republic, Porst also developed an attachment to Marxism, which led him to early contact with the HVA. Beginning in 1955, his control officer was HVA chief *Markus Wolf,* who encouraged Porst to join the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), a small but pivotal party favored by West German entrepreneurs. Yet Porst was so committed to the communist cause that he also requested membership in the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Although denied at first, his membership was secretly approved in 1958.

While Porst functioned as a generous patron of the FDP, much of the financing was supplied by the HVA (such as 75,000 DM for
the election campaign of 1961). Additional assistance to Porst, who showed an aversion to the mundane details of espionage work, was provided by Alfred Pilny (code name *optic*), a liaison officer who had been resettled in the FRG. In addition to the information that both men conveyed regarding internal party matters, Porst helped persuade FDP leader Erich Mende to enter a coalition government with the Christlich-Demokratische Union as minister for all-German affairs in 1963. Responsible for Porst’s unmasking as a spy was his own private secretary, Peter Neumann, to whom he had indiscreetly disclosed his East German connection. In order to protect himself, Pilny provided further corroboration. Following his trial for treason, Porst, completely unrepentant, was sentenced on 8 July 1969 to two years and nine months in prison. Released after only 15 months, Porst later ceded his firm to the employees, who were forced to declare bankruptcy shortly thereafter.

**PRAGUE SPRING.** The communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia led by Alexander Dubček, the Prague Spring of 1968 became an object of utmost concern for the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS). In March, the first alarm was sounded by Erich Mielke, who urged increased surveillance of all citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) working in Czechoslovakia, as well as greater controls on tourist traffic between the two countries. As events intensified, Mielke took even harsher steps, including disciplinary action against those in the GDR who expressed support for the “counterrevolution.” Following the military intervention by the Warsaw Pact, the MfS assisted with the restoration of the Czechoslovakian state security apparatus, which had been a prime target of the reformers.

**PRINZ-ALBRECHT-STRASSE.** *See* GESTAPO.

**PUJOL, JUAN** (1912–1988). A double agent who played a key role in British deception operations during World War II, Juan Pujol was born in Barcelona, Spain, on 14 February 1912. Having developed an intense hostility toward the Third Reich during the Spanish Civil War, Pujol, a hotel manager at the time, offered his services to officials at the British embassy in Madrid in January 1940. Their
rejection prompted his new plan of becoming an Abwehr agent, which, he reasoned, would make him more attractive to the British. Accepting him as an ardent Nazi sympathizer, Karl-Erich Kühlenthal, an Abwehr officer based in Madrid, oversaw his training as a spy and instructed him to proceed to London, where, under the code name Arabel, he was to recruit his own network of agents. Kühlenthal never came to doubt Pujol’s authenticity.

After moving to Lisbon yet pretending to be in London, Pujol began to submit imaginatively conceived reports to Kühlenthal and his staff. Only after MI5 became concerned about the volume of radio traffic coming from this source and made further inquiries was Pujol eventually accepted as a genuine agent. He was flown to England in April 1942 and assigned to Tomás Harris, head of MI5’s Spanish subsection. Because Pujol appeared to be “the greatest actor in the world,” he received the code name Garbo, and together the two men created an even more elaborate deception. Through a fabricated network of 27 subagents, some 2,000 messages were conveyed to the Abwehr Kriegsorganisation in Madrid. The final one, sent in May 1945, noted that despite the shocking death of Adolf Hitler, the memory of “our dear chief” will continue to “guide us on our course.”

Pujol’s main contribution was to help divert attention away from Normandy prior to the D-Day landings in June 1944 and encourage the belief that the Allied troops would be arriving at Pas-de-Calais. Remarkably too, he was awarded the Iron Cross (in absentia) by the unsuspecting German government as well as the MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire) by the British. After the war, Pujol chose to be resettled in Venezuela, where his identity remained undisclosed until 1984. His account of his exploits—Operation Garbo—also appeared in that year.

PULLACH. The headquarters site of the Organisation Gehlen (OG) and later the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Pullach is a town south of Munich on the Isar River. The large compound includes two earlier complexes: the Reichssiedlung Rudolf Hess, constructed between 1936 and 1938, which contained well-appointed residences for the Nazi Party elite; and the Führerhauptquartier Siegfried, a wartime facility overseen by Martin Bormann and intended for the emergency use of Adolf Hitler. Occupied by U.S. forces in the final
months of the war, Pullach became the new location of the OG in December 1947 and was given the name Camp Nicholas. Apart from its spaciousness, the compound’s primary advantage lay in its relative isolation and general self-sufficiency. With on-premises stores, schools, and other amenities at their disposal, the families of the full-time employees were encouraged to minimize their interaction with the outside world. Their relatively hermetic existence was further reinforced by fences and barbed-wired walls surrounding the property. Mail was initially addressed simply to Heilmannstrasse 30.

This geographic remoteness was not without its critics, among them one later BND president, August Hanning, who termed it “an error at birth.” In April 2003, to expedite crisis decision-making, the government of Gerhard Schröder stipulated the transfer of the BND headquarters from Pullach to Berlin. Because of the large costs involved, this plan was revised in 2006: only the collection and analytical units would be relocated to Berlin; the technical facilities would remain in Pullach.

PUTLITZ, WOLFGANG ZU (1899–1975). An anti-Nazi diplomat who worked for British intelligence, Wolfgang zu Putlitz was born in Laaske (Brandenburg) on 16 July 1899, the son of an old Prussian noble family. After serving in the Uhland Guards regiment in Finland during World War I, he completed a doctorate in economics in Berlin in 1924 and entered the German diplomatic service. Following postings in Posen, Washington, and Paris, he arrived in London in 1934 as head of the consular division and was recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). His prime motivation lay in his strong personal opposition to the Nazi regime. The valuable intelligence that Putlitz provided the SIS continued after his transfer to The Hague in May 1938 as the second-ranking diplomat in the German mission. Yet soon thereafter, learning that the Gestapo had accumulated evidence regarding his activities, Putlitz demanded his exfiltration from Holland. On 14 September 1939, the local SIS officer flew him and his valet to London, where authorities recommended his relocation under a new identity to Jamaica. Nazi officials had declared a death sentence for high treason.

During World War II, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services engaged Putlitz to compile a list of leading Nazi officials. But the Americans, like the British, found his temperamental personality
aggravating and soon terminated his services. After his return to Lon-
don in January 1944, he worked with Otto John in preparing gray
propaganda broadcasts to Germany over Soldatensender Calais.
Among his British friends at the time were Guy Burgess and Anthony
Blunt, two fellow homosexuals in the employ of Soviet intelligence.
At the conclusion of the war, the SIS dispatched Putlitz to the British
occupation zone, where he served as an aide to the minister-presi-
dent of Schleswig-Holstein but returned to become a British citizen
in 1948, unhappy with his initial reception in Germany. In the same
year, he testified for the prosecution during the Wilhelmstrasse tri-
als of German diplomats. Following the defection of Burgess to
Moscow, Putlitz took refuge in the German Democratic Republic in
January 1952. His less than forthcoming memoirs—Unterwegs nach
Deutschland: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Diplomaten (The Put-
litz Dossier)—were published in East Berlin in 1956. He died on 3
September 1975 in Potsdam.

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RABTA AFFAIR. A scandal that surfaced in 1988 involving the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the Rabta Affair had its origins in
the illegal participation of West German firms in the construction of
a chemical weapons factory at Rabta, Libya. Although the BND had
notified top officials in the Helmut Kohl government of this situation
in August 1987, no action was taken until press reports the follow-
ing year forced the issue. The ensuing controversy led not only to an
acrimonious debate in the Bundestag but to severe strains between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, whose intel-
ligence sources had discovered this link as well. Although a parlia-
mentary investigation later exonerated the BND and its president,
Hans-Georg Wieck, their image was considerably tarnished at home
and abroad. In June 1990, a Mannheim court sentenced the principal
contractor, Jürgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, to a five-year prison term
for tax fraud and export violations.

RAETHJEN, HANS DIETER (1939– ). A former member of the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) who helped train Muammar
Qaddafi’s security guard in Libya, Hans Dieter Raethjen served in a parachute regiment in the Bundeswehr. Transferred at his own request, Raethjen (code name HATON) worked in the illegal arms and Near Eastern divisions of the BND from 1968 to 1974. According to his later sworn testimony, a telephone call in 1978 from his former superior, Cornelius Hausleiter, convinced him to take on a special training assignment with the unit responsible for Qaddafi’s personal protection. Resigning from the Bundeswehr, Raethjen established a sham munitions firm in Munich named Telemit and recruited a team of 13 specialists. Despite a number of complications, coupled with the reluctance of the BND to provide any assistance, the training of Libyan troops continued under Raethjen’s direction until February 1983. Afterward, he resettled in Sweden. Even though media attention led to a Bundestag inquiry in 1995, the government disclaimed responsibility, and no prosecutions resulted.

RAKOW, WERNER (1893–1937). A senior German communist functionary and Soviet agent, Werner Rakow was born in Latvia, trained as a banker in Hanover, and found employment in St. Petersburg prior to World War I. After being interned as a citizen of an alien country, he joined the Bolsheviks in 1917 and returned to Germany with Karl Radek the following year. Rakow’s main responsibilities were to serve as a liaison between the newly founded Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) and the Comintern and to direct the KPD’s secret apparatus. He also began to employ the pseudonyms Felix Wolf and Vladimir Inkov. An assignment in 1922 with Department IV (intelligence) of the Red Army took him briefly to Vienna and the Balkans.

His career began to falter after the failure of the 1923 communist insurrection in Germany. Following his posting as a Comintern Illegaler (covert operative) in the United States between 1925 and 1927, Rakow was recalled to Moscow as a suspected Trotskyist and expelled from the party. Although he later regained admittance and was given a position in a German-language publishing house, the Stalinist purges resulted in his arrest and execution on 14 September 1937. Rakow’s two brothers, Paul and Nikolai, met with the same fate.
RAUFEISEN, ARMIN (1928–1987). A West German geophysicist who spied for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Armin Raufeisen was born near Tilsit (now Sovetsk, Russia) on 13 November 1928. Displaced by World War II, his family moved to a small village near the Erzgebirge mountains in Saxony. After working in the Wismut mines, Raufeisen was trained as a geophysicist and recruited as a Perspektivagent by the HVA in 1957. Resettled in Hanover, he found employment with a large nuclear energy corporation and began to send confidential information to East Berlin. The defection of HVA officer Werner Stiller in January 1979 triggered Raufeisen’s exfiltration to the German Democratic Republic. Soon disillusioned, he sought to return to the Federal Republic of Germany with his family. The rejection of his exit application led him to attempt an illegal border crossing in 1981, but he was arrested and given a life sentence for Republikflucht (flight from the republic) and aggravated treason. On 12 October 1987, Raufeisen died in a hospital in Leipzig-Meusdorf under unclarified circumstances.

RAUFF, WALTER (1906–1984). A leading functionary of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service), Walter Rauff was born on 19 June 1906. An active navy officer until 1935, he joined the SD three years later and rose to head the office for technical affairs of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Well acquainted with Reinhard Heydrich, Rauff received orders to develop mobile gas chambers for use on the eastern front. Although the first ones arrived in December 1941, they never became popular because of frequent malfunctions. In late 1942, he left Berlin to head a task force in Tunis and subsequently became the SS and police chief for northern Italy, based in Milan. In both locales, he had a reputation for exceptional ruthlessness.

Captured by Allied forces in 1945 and placed in a prisoner of war camp in Rimini, he escaped, first going to Syria and then Ecuador and Chile. In 1958, his application for a naval pension from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany alerted authorities to his whereabouts, but a request for extradition was denied because of a Chilean statute of limitations. In 1972, however, he made a deposition before a West German prosecutor regarding another war
criminal. Unrepentant to the end, Rauff died in Santiago on 14 May 1984.

RAUSSENDORF, KLAUS KURT VON (1936– ). An agent of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Klaus Kurt von Raussendorf was recruited in 1957 by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit while a student of history and German at the Free University of Berlin. His commitment was prompted by ideological concerns. In 1960, encouraged by his case officer, Raussendorf (code name BREDE) found a position as an attaché in the Foreign Office in Bonn and rose to the rank of privy councilor. Not until the testimony of ex-HVA officer Werner Roitzsch to West German authorities in 1990 did his identity as a spy become known. Raussendorf was sentenced to a six-year prison term in June 1991.

RECKZEH, PAUL (1913– ). A physician who also worked for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Paul Reckzeh (code name ROBBY) was an informer for the Gestapo during World War II. In 1943, he was responsible for the betrayal of members of the Solf Circle, a bourgeois resistance group. Arrested and interned by Smersh (Soviet Military Counterintelligence) in late May 1945, he was prosecuted five years later during the Waldheimer Trials conducted by the German Democratic Republic. His sentence of 15 years for submitting “derisive comments about non-fascists” to Nazi authorities was suspended two years later, and Reckzeh headed to West Berlin to start a medical practice. Threatened with arrest, however, he found asylum back in East Berlin in March 1955 and obtained a position as a senior physician at the hospital in Perleberg (Brandenburg), but further advancement was blocked.

Reckzeh’s first approach by the MfS occurred in November 1956. Despite his description of himself as a “very active Nazi” and his disinclination to sign a formal agreement, further meetings took place, and his limited cooperation was secured. Yet he also remained under MfS observation, particularly after a witness came forward with the names of people he had earlier betrayed. It was not until after reunification that any new legal proceedings against Reckzeh were initiated.
In 1993 they had to be abandoned by the Berlin State Prosecutor’s Office for insufficient cause.

**REDL, ALFRED (1864–1913).** The notorious Austro-Hungarian intelligence officer who conveyed voluminous information to Russia on the eve of World War I, Alfred Redl was born in Lemberg in Austrian Galicia (now Lviv, Ukraine) on 14 March 1864, the son of a railway freight clerk. An exceptionally able and ambitious student, he passed the entrance examination for cadet school at the age of 14. Two years later, he enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian army and was promoted to battalion adjutant at 25. At the urging of admiring superiors, he attended the Imperial War College and graduated a first lieutenant.

In 1901, Redl became head of espionage and counterespionage and, seven years later, deputy chief of the General Staff’s Evidenzbüro. He initiated innovative techniques, including the use of hidden surveillance cameras and interrogation rooms with phonograph discs. He also apprehended a network of Russian spies based on secretly gathered fingerprints and concluded an intelligence-sharing agreement with Germany. His career reports repeatedly noted his loyalty to senior commanders as well as his popularity among his fellow officers. Redl, however, had a strong attraction to extravagant living and homosexual affairs. Following his recruitment by Russia in 1907, his first handler was Colonel Mitrofan Marchenko, the Russian military attaché in Vienna, whose early report described Redl as a cynic—“more clever and false than smart and talented”—but made no mention of his homosexuality, quite contrary to many subsequent accounts alleging blackmail as a primary enlistment device. In exchange for exceptionally large sums of money, Russian authorities managed to acquire the details of Austro-Hungarian mobilization plans, particularly concerning the network of fortresses along the eastern Galician frontier, as well as numerous other secret documents. In 1910, when Redl was promoted to colonel and transferred to Prague as chief of intelligence with the army’s VIII corps, his sphere of knowledge contracted somewhat, but his reports continued unabated.

Unknown to Redl, German intelligence officers of Abteilung IIIb had intercepted some of the payment envelopes addressed to “Nikon Nizetas” and alerted their Austrian counterparts to the possibility of an undercover arrangement. An investigative team
headed by Redl’s former protégé Maximilian Ronge was then established. Although the surveillance officers missed Redl at his next pickup at the Viennese post office, they found his penknife sheath inside the taxi that had transported him back to the hotel. When other incriminating evidence confirmed Redl’s guilt, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the army chief of staff, sought to limit the damage by keeping the affair as secret as possible. A brief interrogation in Redl’s room at the Hotel Klomser resulted in an immediate confession, although he erroneously maintained that his activity had begun only a year earlier and was fairly perfunctory in nature. Given a revolver with which to shoot himself, he died on 25 May 1913. An inspection of his Prague apartment revealed the meticulous records of his long-term espionage work as well as evidence of his homosexual liaisons. Austro-Hungarian officials issued a terse communiqué, reprinted by Viennese newspapers, stating that the “highly gifted officer” had suffered a nervous breakdown. By 29 May, a more accurate version appeared in the international press.

Not only Emperor Francis Joseph but many in the general public expressed their consternation at Redl’s betrayal. One result was the demotion of August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz, the head of the Evidenzbüro, to reserve status the following year. Another was the disruption of Russian and French undercover activities in Switzerland utilizing the information in Redl’s records. Even so, the Evidenzbüro’s large network of informants working in Russia around 1900 had been eliminated by the time of Redl’s unmasking. Although the General Staff knew that Redl had had nearly total access to its secret files and that the war plans were in Russia’s possession, they merely ordered some tactical revisions and left the prewar strategic assumptions in place. Ironically, in the aftermath of the battlefield disasters experienced by the Habsburg army in 1914, Conrad disavowed his own responsibility and pointed to Redl as one of the main culprits.

REHDER, HANS (1912–1985). A West German physicist in the employ of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Hans Rehder headed the department for small transmitters at the Telefunken electronics firm and was also a consultant to the East German Ministry
for Machine Building. In 1957, deeply in debt, he expressed his willingness to sell scientific secrets to the German Democratic Republic and the following year acquired the code name GORBATSCHOW, most likely derived from the Gorbatschow vodka brand and his own fondness for alcohol. By fall 1960, his wife (code name MARIA) had been recruited as his assistant.

A new position as head of automation at the AEG likewise gave Rehder access to the company’s archives, and abundant information continued to flow on a regular basis to East Berlin until his retirement in 1977. Especially prized was material related to military technology and the computer industry. Roughly one-third of the information was relayed to the KGB liaison officer in Karlshorst. Rehder’s final work for the MfS, which went undetected as well, involved intercepting radio messages sent by Western intelligence and ascertaining their broadcast frequencies.

REICHENBURG, WILHELM (1922–). A West German naval captain who worked for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Wilhelm Reichenburg was a freelance journalist after World War II and joined the Bundeswehr in 1967. Three years later, he began his 14-year career as a source of secret military documents for the HVA under the code name ADMIRAL. A position as a defense advisor to the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria followed Reichenburg’s retirement from active duty in 1976. According to HVA chief Markus Wolf, an attempt to warn him in Amsterdam of his impending arrest failed, and he was taken into custody on 1 August 1984. A Bavarian court sentenced him to a six-year prison term.

REICHSSICHERHEITSDIENST (RSD). The unit charged with the personal protection of Adolf Hitler, the Reichssicherheitsdienst (Reich Protection Service) originated in March 1934 as the Führerschutzkommando (Führer Protection Group) on the orders of SS head Heinrich Himmler. Initially restricted to the state of Bavaria, it was headed by Johann Rattenhuber, a Bavarian police captain, and staffed by criminal-police officers from the region. After some bureaucratic skirmishing, the unit acquired a new name—the RSD—in 1935 and was theoretically subordinated to Himmler. Rattenhuber, however, remained the commander and took the bulk of his orders
from Hitler himself or one of Hitler’s immediate subordinates. The RSD’s importance was underscored by the elaborate initiation of all new recruits, administered annually in Hitler’s presence on 9 November—the anniversary of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch—at the Feldherrnhalle in Munich.

REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT (RSHA). The unified security and intelligence service of the Third Reich, the Reichssicherheithauptamt (Reich Security Main Office) came into official existence on 1 October 1939. Created by Heinrich Himmler, it sought to give coherence to the maze of confused jurisdictions that had existed previously, although the result was even greater bureaucratic complexity. It was headed by Reinhard Heydrich until his assassination in June 1942 and then, after a six-month hiatus, by Ernst Kaltenbrunner until May 1945. Even the Abwehr eventually lost its separate status and became part of this enormous apparatus in mid-1944. Unlike two of its main components—the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst—the RSHA was not declared a criminal organization by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

REIF, WOLFGANG (1937– ). An East German diplomat and agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Wolfgang Reif was serving as vice consul at the embassy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Jakarta, Indonesia, when his initial recruitment by the CIA under the code name GREIF took place in 1978. Faced with escalating personal problems, he decided to leave the CIA and begin an association with the BND in April 1980. Yet after his return to the GDR and the stabilization of his marriage, some suspicious correspondence was subjected to careful handwriting and chemical analysis by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit and led to his arrest on 20 December 1981. Although his life sentence was later reduced to 15 years, his actual release occurred in December 1989 following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

REILE, OSCAR (1897–?). A veteran counterintelligence officer and author, Oscar Reile served in World War I and became a police officer in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) in 1923. After joining the
Abwehr in 1933, he was made head of the counterespionage station in Trier, one of the two main installations responsible for the western front. The conquest of France in 1940 brought Reile new responsibilities as leader of a special commando unit in the country. In 1943, he directed the Abwehr’s counterintelligence section headquartered in the Hôtel Lutetia in Paris. His purpose was not only to infiltrate various resistance groups but also to uncover information about the planned Allied invasion, especially by breaking the open-code voice messages relayed to France by the British Broadcasting Company. In 1944, he led a Frontaufklärungskommando in France and the Low Countries.

After the war, Reile’s expertise attracted the attention of Reinhard Gehlen, who appointed him in 1949 to head Department III (domestic collection and evaluation and counterespionage) in Organisation Gehlen and, after 1956, the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Reile later criticized Gehlen for the excessive secrecy that permeated the organization. Following his retirement in 1961, Reile wrote several well-regarded accounts of Abwehr activities before and during World War II.

REISSWOLF. The attempt to destroy all incriminating materials belonging to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Operation REISSWOLF (Shredder) began in early November 1989 shortly after a directive was issued by MfS head Erich Mielke. His successor, Wolfgang Schwanitz, intensified this effort, although the heads of the regional and county offices had considerable discretion as to how to proceed. Above all, Schwanitz advised, the destruction of the records should occur in a “very intelligent and inconspicuous” manner. These documents included the evaluations of reports submitted by informers, data regarding the manipulation of elections, and the lists of reserve cadres. A supplementary order stated that highly sensitive material should be transported from the various county offices to the appropriate district office. The most important items were then to be sent to the main East Berlin headquarters in the Normannenstrasse under the code name ARCHIV BERLIN.

In a related move, the KGB dispatched a special commission to East Berlin in early December and demanded that all documents of operational interest be collected within a week and sent to Moscow.
Items of lesser significance were destroyed at a Red Army facility using a flame thrower. At that point, the close relationship that had existed between the MfS and KGB for nearly 40 years effectively ended.

Already in late November 1989, citizens’ groups throughout the German Democratic Republic had spontaneously formed to protest the destruction of the records. On 4 December, the district office in Erfurt was peacefully occupied by some 300 persons after black smoke arising from the interior court had been seen for several days. This example rapidly spread to other towns and cities, thereby helping to salvage a large portion of MfS material. By contrast, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung in East Berlin succeeded in destroying nearly all of its records. According to its last director, Werner Grossmann, the shredders were active around the clock and had to be occasionally refrigerated to prevent overheating.

**REPUBLIKFLUCHT.** The criminal charge directed at citizens who attempted to escape from the German Democratic Republic, Republikflucht (flight from the republic) acquired legal status on 11 December 1957. A person found guilty faced a maximum three-year prison term, while more severe penalties were applied to members of the Grenztruppen and to individuals who organized escape activities. Anyone assisting an escape could be imprisoned for up to two years. More than 75,000 East German citizens and 5,500 border guards were incarcerated under this statute. *See also* SCHLICHHT, GÖTZ.

**RESIDENT.** The chief representative of an intelligence organization stationed abroad, a Resident can be either officially recognized by the host country or working surreptitiously in violation of its laws. The operations base of a Resident and his or her support staff is known as a Residentur—typically a diplomatic mission, consulate, or commercial enterprise, such as an airline company or press agency.

**RIAS.** The object of major attacks by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an alleged spy center, RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor; Radio in the American Sector) was originally established as DIAS (Drahtfunk im amerikanischen Sektor; Wire Broadcasting in the American Sector) in West Berlin in February 1946 by the U.S.
military government. Telephone lines were used for several months before the construction of two transmitters, first in Berlin-Britz, then in Hof (Bavaria). Although RIAS had no official intelligence status, its popular broadcasts in German reached a large East German population, thus prompting repeated demands by the Soviets to close the facility.

Determined to expose RIAS as the “espionage headquarters of the American secret service,” the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit launched Operation Enten (Ducks) in the spring of 1955. Because their names appeared in a RIAS employee’s notebook stolen by an East German informer, 49 people of widely different backgrounds were arrested in the GDR for their presumed contacts with the radio station. Five of them—Joachim Wiebach, Richard Baier, Günther Krause, Willi Gast, and Manfred Vogt—were placed on trial for the “fabrication and circulation of rumors that put peace at risk.” On 27 June 1955, Wiebach was condemned to death by guillotine (at the insistence of GDR leader Walter Ulbricht), while the others received sentences ranging from eight years to life imprisonment. The radio station continued to broadcast throughout the Cold War. Although the West German government assumed the bulk of its funding during the 1960s, general supervision of RIAS remained with the United States Information Agency until a new agreement was concluded after German reunification.

RICHTER, URSULA (1933–2002). An agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) active in the Federal Republic of Germany, Ursula Richter was the main secretary of the Bund der Vertriebenen (League of Expellees), having been infiltrated from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1964. Richter came to the attention of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz in the early 1980s, although it turned out that she was purposely used to divert attention from Klaus Kuron, a key MfS agent within the counterintelligence agency. On 17 August 1985, she returned to the GDR with one of her recruited agents, Lorenz Betzing, a Bundeswehr aide based in Bonn.

RINTELEN, FRANZ (1878–1949). A spy who infiltrated the United States during World War I, Franz Rintelen was born in Frankfurt an
der Oder on 19 August 1878, the son of a legal official with banking interests. He spent several years working in a London banking house before departing for New York in 1905, where he was employed by another financial institution. In 1907, Rintelen returned to Germany. Following the outbreak of World War I, the young naval lieutenant was attached to the Admiralty Staff dealing with the procurement of financial support for German cruiser warfare. His advocacy of more aggressive submarine activity, however, met with a stern reprimand from the office of Chancellor Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg. Nevertheless, the chief of the Admiralty Staff, Gustav Bachmann, continued to praise Rintelen’s “fine education and extensive knowledge” as well as his “honest, open personality, great energy, quick comprehension, and [his] lively, impulsive temper.”

Rintelen’s espionage career began on 22 March 1915 upon his departure for the United States with a false Swiss passport in the name of Emile Victor Gaché (his other aliases included Edward V. Gates, Fred Hanson, Fred Haywood, Fred Jones, Fred Brown, Fred Harrison, Miller, Mueller, and d’Costa). Rintelen’s official assignment was to halt the flow of war materiel across the Atlantic to Germany’s declared enemies. According to surviving records, he managed to reenergize a faltering sabotage campaign begun earlier that year. One aspect involved recruiting a group of diverse agents from German ships who placed time-delayed incendiary devices on vessels leaving New York harbor with military cargo bound for the Entente. Another plan called for the penetration of American labor groups in order to foment strikes in munitions factories.

Rintelen’s other arena of activity concerned Mexico, a country heavily courted by Germany at the time. Specifically he worked toward the establishment of a pro-German government headed by Victoriano Huerta, the exiled former president, with the ultimate aim of provoking a diversionary war between the United States and Mexico. Despite the investment of considerable funds—Rintelen deposited $800,000 in one of Huerta’s accounts—the plan never came to fruition. Through the diligent efforts of Emanuel Victor Voska, a Czech with close ties to British naval attaché Guy Gaunt, eavesdropping devices were planted in the New York hotel rooms where Huerta conferred with Rintelen and other Germans involved in the scheme. This information was conveyed to the Americans, who then arrested
Huerta at the border crossing at El Paso, Texas. Huerta’s appeals to the German ambassador, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, were of no avail.

Meanwhile Rintelen, after spending only four months in the United States, received instructions to return to Germany, probably because of complaints lodged against him by two other conspirators and rivals, Franz von Papen, the military attaché, and Karl Boy-Ed, the naval attaché. Yet the British had kept a close watch on Rintelen’s movements and arrested him when his commercial liner underwent a routine naval inspection off Ramsgate on 13 August 1915. Although the Americans sought to have him extradited the following year, the British continued to hold him in a prisoner of war facility outside Derby. With the entry of the United States into the war, however, Rintelen had to face charges in New York of “perjury . . . conspiring in restraint of foreign commerce, conspiring to secrete bombs on vessels, and conspiring to attack vessels.” Given a 20-month sentence in November 1918, he was released from the federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, at the end of the war and obligated to return to Germany immediately.

In February 1921, he was promoted to lieutenant commander and awarded the Iron Cross, but the new Weimar government showed no interest in honoring his request for the reimbursement of personal funds and salary lost during his assignment in the United States. As his feelings toward Germany became increasingly embittered, a new attitude toward Britain began to take shape, seen most dramatically in the surprising friendship he formed with Reginald “Blinker” Hall, the wartime director of British naval intelligence who had agreed to Rintelen’s extradition to the United States.

Rintelen’s decision to release his memoirs only intensified this situation. Rejected by the Ullstein publishing house in 1931 upon the strong recommendation of the Foreign Office, The Dark Invader (1933) and The Return of the Dark Invader (1935) appeared instead in English versions. Particularly after the Nazi regime attempted to block their publication in German, he sensed the danger of remaining in the country and moved to Great Britain. In 1940, despite his desire to become a naturalized citizen and even don the uniform of a British naval officer, officials placed Rintelen in an internment camp near Liverpool for the duration of the war. After returning to civilian life
at war’s end, he died in London on 30 May 1949 following a collapse at the South Kensington station.

RIPPERGER, ERICH (1909–1979). An interim head of the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Erich Ripperger was born in Albrechts (Thuringia) on 9 April 1909. A trained toolmaker, he joined the communist youth organization in 1923. In 1931, anxious to leave depression-stricken Germany and help build the new Soviet state, he emigrated and found employment in a Moscow tool factory. After serving in two of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, Ripperger returned to the Soviet Union in 1939 only to find that his brother had died as a victim of the purges by Joseph Stalin. His wife and son disappeared into the Gulag after 1941. Escaping arrest himself, he underwent special training in the Soviet Union to prepare him for a new role in postwar Germany.

Following his arrival in East Berlin in December 1945, Ripperger’s first assignment was to help rebuild the communist party structure in Thuringia. Two years later, his wife and son returned to Germany. Yet his position as a political instructor for the People’s Police gave him little satisfaction, and with the approval of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), he was transferred in 1955 to the VA, then headed by Karl Linke. When the penetration by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency forced Linke’s removal on 25 July 1957, Ripperger became his successor, despite feeling already overwhelmed by the agency’s rapid growth the past two years. On 31 August, Willy Sägebrecht took command of affairs, while Ripperger remained charged with operational matters.

The defection of Siegfried Dombrowski the following year, led to yet another reshuffling of the agency’s leadership. Sägebrecht remained the titular head until a new successor was named the following year, while Ripperger assumed responsibility for all daily business, even though he had received a reprimand for insufficient vigilance. Because of his weakened health, he took an early retirement in August 1963. Ripperger died in East Berlin on 21 January 1979 and was buried in the section for outstanding communists in the Zentralfriedhof.

RITTER, NIKOLAUS (1897–?). A senior Abwehr officer assigned to operations against Great Britain and the United States, Nikolaus
Ritter served as an air force officer in World War I. In 1927, after completing his university education in Cologne, he was appointed sales manager of a textile firm in New York. In 1935, Friedrich von Boetticher, the German military attaché in the United States, convinced him to leave his position and join the Reichswehr. Based at the Abwehr substation in Hamburg, Ritter (code name DR. RANTZAU) began to plan air espionage operations directed at Great Britain and the United States. One of his early and most notable successes involved Hermann Lang, who acquired drawings that allowed for the reconstruction of the famous Norden bombsight, one of the Americans’ most closely guarded secrets. Another of Ritter’s agents obtained the plans for an advanced automatic pilot device.

Yet there were also major failures, such as the ill-fated U.S. spy ring led by William G. Sebold and the prompt capture of William Colepaugh and Erich Gimpel. Even more injurious to Ritter’s later reputation was the case of Arthur Owens (code name JOHNNY), one of his first British recruits, who turned out to be a double agent for MI5 (code name SNOW) and led to the formation of the Twenty Committee, the unit of British military intelligence charged with counterespionage and deception. According to British postwar interrogation reports, Ritter knew as early as 1941 that all German agents in the country had been compromised, but he refrained from telling his superiors, presumably to avoid the likely repercussions. In any event, he was reassigned to North Africa and played a role in Operation SALAAM, which also ended in failure. Initially silent after the war for fear of prosecution, Ritter published his memoirs, Deckname Dr. Rantzau (code name DR. RANTZAU), in 1972. Left unmentioned, however, was any awareness on his part of the elaborate British deception scheme.

ROENNE, ALEXIS VON (1903–1944). A senior intelligence officer with the Fremde Heere Ost and Fremde Heere West as well as a staunch opponent of the Nazi regime, Alexis von Roenne was born on 22 February 1903, the son of a Baltic German noble family. After Reinhard Gehlen took command of Fremde Heere Ost in April 1942, Roenne headed Desk IIz, which was in charge of the interrogation camps for Russian prisoners of war, and played a key role in the formation of the anti-Soviet army of liberation led by General Andrei
Vlasov. In March 1943, Roenne became head of Fremde Heere West and concentrated on gathering information regarding the Atlantic front. Whether his reports deliberately drew attention away from the planned Allied landings in Normandy—and thus helped ensure a defeat for the Nazi regime—remains an unresolved issue. Although his Christian beliefs prevented his participation in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944 against Adolf Hitler, Roenne’s close contact with anti-Nazi officers, including Claus von Stauffenberg, led to his arrest by the Gestapo and execution at Plötzensee Prison on 12 October.

ROESSLER, RUDOLF (1897–1956). Considered the single most valuable source of German military information for the Soviet Union during World War II, Rudolf Roessler was born in Kaufbeuren (Bavaria) on 22 November 1897, the son of a forestry official. After serving in World War I, he was a reporter in Augsburg before working as a literary critic in Berlin. The advent of Nazi rule caused him to immigrate in 1934 to Switzerland, where he founded the small publishing firm Vita Nova in Lucerne. Among his connections he cultivated in Germany were officials in various branches of the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Strongly opposed to the policies of Adolf Hitler, they supplied him with high-level information that was initially passed by Roessler to Bureau Ha, a private Swiss intelligence agency run by Hans Hausamann, and after 1941 to the Soviet Union under the code name lucy. These sources, however, remain known only by their various code names, the most important being WERTHER. Although GRU (Soviet military intelligence) officers termed Roessler’s first dispatches unreliable, their suspicion soon abated, and his reports assumed top priority. Of particular importance was advance information concerning the Wehrmacht’s plans at Stalingrad and Kursk.

At the end of the war, Roessler worked on behalf of Czechoslovakia until his arrest by Swiss officials in 1953. Charged with violating Swiss neutrality and given a 22-month sentence, he died impoverished on 11 December 1956.

ROGALLA, JÜRGEN (1933– ). The head of North American operations for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Jürgen Rogalla was born in Rostock on 19 February 1933. He began his long career
with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in 1951 based in Mecklenburg. Further training led to his transfer to the HVA as one of the camouflaged Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz in 1961. The following year, Rogalla (code name Jürgen Krüger) headed an HVA advisory group dispatched to Ghana to support the autocratic government of Kwame Nkrumah. The military coup that deposed the African dictator led to Rogalla’s arrest in 1966, although he was exchanged shortly afterward for Ghanaian prisoners being held in the German Democratic Republic. The holder of a doctorate from the Juristische Hochschule des MfS, Rogalla directed the HVA division responsible for the United States, Mexico, and Canada from 1973 to 1990, assisting, for example, in the exfiltration of Jeffrey M. Carney. According to Markus Wolf, the offer of nearly $1 million by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency failed to secure his cooperation after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

ROHLEDER, JOACHIM (1892–1973). A counterintelligence expert for the Abwehr and later member of the Organisation Gehlen (OG), Joachim Rohleder served in the infantry during World War I and subsequently became a businessman in Argentina. After returning to Germany and joining the Abwehr, he directed the German counterintelligence unit Condor during the Spanish Civil War under the alias Riemenschneider. In 1938, Wilhelm Canaris expanded his responsibilities to include the whole of the Abwehr—a position that he held until the organization’s absorption by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Following Rohleder’s interrogation by Allied officials in 1946, Reinhard Gehlen appointed him head of the OG’s Generalvertretung in Munich.

RÖHM PURGE. See NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES.

ROITZSCH, WERNER. A former officer of Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) who revealed important sources to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Werner Roitzsch joined the HVA in 1956. In 1983, as one of four assistant directors of Division A VI, he was assigned the task of preparing false documents for agents working in the Federal Republic of Germany. Unwilling to take his technical skills to Moscow in 1990,
Roitzsch turned to West German authorities and revealed the names of his leading agents. Of these, Klaus Kurt von Raussendorf, Hagen Blau, and Ludwig Pauli were prominent officials in the Foreign Office, while Alexander Dahms was the police director of the Coblenz office of the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Protection).

ROMEO SPIES. Male intelligence officers who seduced female secretaries and professionals for purposes of espionage, the Romeo spies were extensively utilized with much success by Markus Wolf of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. Such spies underwent a rigorous screening process and were then given a false identity, which made later marriage a fairly remote possibility. A prime target was the West German government complex in Bonn because of the large number of single women in important secretarial positions. The relationships arose primarily out of ideological motivation or simple attraction; money or blackmail did not normally play a significant role. Not until 1979 with the arrest of Ingrid Garbe (code name IRIS), a secretary in the West German mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Brussels, did the first case come to light. Her partner bore the alias Hans-Joachim Heisinger.

Among the most prominent East German Romeos (and their seduced partners) were Karl-Heinz Schneider (Gabrielle Gast), Wolfgang Goliath (Inge Goliath), Roland Gandt (Margarete Lubig), Peter Krause (Helge Berger), and Dieter Will (Ursel Lorenzen). The KGB also used East German illegals as Romeos, as in the case of Hans-Jürgen Henze (Margarete Höke). Mostly because of cultural differences, similar attempts in the United States proved unsuccessful, and only in rare instances, such as with Dieter Popp and Egon Streffer, was a homosexual liaison involved. Wolf later expressed some regret for the emotional distress and the destroyed careers that had resulted but dryly added that he “was running an intelligence service, not a lonely-hearts club.” See also ILLEGALER.

RONGE, MAXIMILIAN (1874–1953). The last director of the Evidenzbüro, Maximilian Ronge was born in Vienna on 9 November 1874. A career officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, he was transferred to the Evidenzbüro in 1907 and became a protégé of Alfred Redl, whom he helped expose as a double agent in 1913. His elevation
as head of the Evidenzbüro in 1917 came as the result of his diverse experience in various intelligence branches, from counterespionage to cryptography. In addition, Ronge was known for his selection of highly talented subordinates—Andreas Figl and Hermann Pokorny in particular—and for his skill in bureaucratic infighting.

With the dissolution of the Evidenzbüro in 1918 came a position in the new Austrian republic dealing with the return of prisoners of war and civilian internees. Ronge also wrote several detailed personal accounts of wartime espionage, among them the 1935 Meister der Spionage (Master of Espionage). Despite his retirement in 1932, Ronge was recalled the following year to form the Staatspolizeiliches Sonderbüro (Secret Police Special Bureau), although it proved unable to prevent the assassination of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss by Nazi agents. Ronge’s refusal to join the SS following the Anschluss of 1938 resulted in his internment in the Dachau concentration camp; only a letter addressed to Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris and containing a “declaration of loyalty” secured his release. After World War II, Ronge assisted with the construction of a new Austrian intelligence organization but died on 9 November 1953, two years prior to its official inauguration following the removal of occupation forces from the country.

ROSBAUD, PAUL (1896–1963). A major Allied source of information about Nazi scientific efforts, Paul Rosbaud was born in Graz, Austria, on 18 November 1896, the illegitimate son of Anna Rosbaud and Josef Hennisser. During World War I, he saw combat in Italy as a member of the Austrian army and was a British prisoner of war for two months (his Anglophilia, he later maintained, could be traced to the “polite and correct” treatment accorded him at that time). While his older brother Hans became a renowned classical music conductor, Rosbaud earned advanced degrees in X-ray cinematography and metallurgy—including a doctorate from the Technical College in Berlin—before becoming a scientific advisor to the periodical Metallwirtschaft in 1928 and then joining the Springer Verlag as science editor in 1933. Also that year, Frank Foley of the British Secret Intelligence Service enlisted Rosbaud’s services in Berlin.

Rosbaud’s extensive travels coupled with his close contacts—notably with physicists Walther Gerlach and Otto Hahn—made him
an exceptionally valuable asset for the British. As fears mounted regarding German nuclear development during World War II, Rosbaud was able to convey well-founded assurances that the program had not progressed beyond the research stage. Most of his messages reached London through the French resistance network and the secret Norwegian intelligence service XU. At the end of the war, Rosbaud resettled in Great Britain, continuing his scientific writing and publishing but modestly taking no credit for his clandestine anti-Nazi efforts and even destroying many of his personal papers. He died of leukemia in London on 28 January 1963. In 2006, because of many still unanswered questions surrounding his wartime espionage, the Rosbaud family initiated legal action against MI6 to release all relevant files.

ROSE. The closely guarded plan to erect a physical barrier between the two sectors of Berlin and around the periphery of the city, Operation ROSE was implemented on 13 August 1961 and required 300 tons of barbed wire to cover the entire distance. This plan reflected the urgent desire of Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), to stem the increasing exodus of East German citizens to the West as well as the flow of Western goods into the country. Once the approval of Moscow had been secured, a mere handful of GDR officials learned of the operation in its totality. Within the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) only its head, Erich Mielke, participated in the major planning sessions, and it was not until 11 August that certain senior officials were briefed by Mielke. The deliberate exclusion of Markus Wolf of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung caused him to react with “pure professional fury,” as no consideration had been given to the difficulties that his agents and couriers would encounter at the newly sealed border.

While 4,500 armed MfS operatives stood by on combat alert along with members of the GDR and Soviet armies, the construction work and the closing of the streets and railway lines that straddled the border were carried out by police teams, border troops, and factory paramilitary units. Only 13 designated crossing places between East and West Berlin were exempted. Afterward, Security Secretary Erich Honecker, who had supervised the details of the operation, termed it “a defeat for Western intelligence,” which generally believed that
any action of this sort would not occur until the signing of a separate peace treaty between the GDR and the Soviet Union scheduled later that fall. The actual erection of the massive Berlin Wall did not commence until after the Western allies had decided that no military or economic response was appropriate. See also GRENZTRUPPEN; SEIFFERT, WOLFGANG.

ROSENHOLZ. The index cards of the central data system of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) retrieved after its dissolution, Rosenholz was a designation given by an official of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). In 1992, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency obtained these microfilmed documents under circumstances not yet clarified. The following year, BfV officials were allowed to come to Langley, Virginia, and take handwritten notes on versions that had been transferred to computer discs and dealt with German citizens. Of the 1,929 people investigated, 66 eventually received a prison sentence of more than two years. Despite repeated requests for access to the originals, the material remained in American possession until 2000. An arrangement was finally reached whereby, for the next three years, a total of 381 CD-ROMS were sent to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

Because the HVA had succeeded in destroying nearly all of its operational files, the Rosenholz data—last updated in 1987–1988—proved crucial to researchers from the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik seeking to document the full scope of East German espionage in the FRG. Essentially a reference tool containing no full-text submissions, Rosenholz comprises three types of recorded information: F 16 index cards, F 22 index cards, and statistical sheets. The names of some 200,000 people (including both agents and persons of interest) and 57,464 incidents were recorded. Rosenholz further provided the key to the tapes of the System der Informationsrecherche der Aufklärung (SIRA), which listed merely a registration number and the agent’s code name. See also REISSWOLF.

ROTE DREI. The Abwehr designation for three radio transmitters based in Switzerland that conveyed high-level German military information
to the Soviet Union during World War II, the Rote Drei (Red Three) included those operated by Alexander Foote in Lausanne, Edmond and Olga Hamel in Geneva, and Margarita Bolli in Lucerne. Forming part of a larger network under the direction of Hungarian-born Sándor Radó (code name DORA), all four were apprehended by Swiss authorities in fall 1943. See also ROTE KAPELLE.

ROTE KAPELLE. The most acclaimed Soviet spy network during World War II, the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) received its designation from the Abwehr, which discovered the group’s existence shortly after Adolf Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union. In Abwehr nomenclature, an “orchestra” was any enemy espionage circuit. Its shortwave transmitters were called “pianos,” its radio operators “musicians,” and its organizer the “conductor.” Devised by the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and maintaining only loose internal connections, the Rote Kapelle had begun initially in Belgium and then France under the direction of Leonard Trepper, who concealed his apparatus behind sham companies such as Simex. Another major center was in Berlin, where resistance groups led by Harro Schulze Boysen and Arvid Harnack were utilized by Soviet intelligence unbeknownst to the majority of their members. The third group—known as the Rote Drei—was headed by Sándor Radó and had three radio transmitters in Switzerland.

After an intensive investigation, the Gestapo arrested the first agents in Belgium in spring 1942. More than 120 people ultimately were apprehended in Berlin alone, and under the special command of Karl Giering of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, a Funkspiel (deceptive radio transmission) was devised to sow confusion in Moscow. Using six of the eight seized radio transmitters in Belgium, France, and Holland and obtaining the outward cooperation of Trepper and others, Giering began broadcasting in mid-August with the intention of deepening Soviet suspicion about its Western allies and also gaining more information about clandestine communist activity in France. In August 1943, Giering was replaced by Heinz Pannwitz, who, for security reasons, reduced the military-related content. While Trepper managed to include secret warning signals, it remains unclear how the GRU reacted to this stream of disinformation.
Of the 118 individuals tried before closed military tribunals, 45 received death sentences by hanging or the guillotine. Because of the loss of most of the Gestapo interrogation records and the court minutes—coupled with the inaccessibility of Soviet archives until the 1990s—the Rote Kapelle has been the object of widely differing interpretations. Whereas the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic paid tribute to its exploits in glowingly heroic terms, several Western writers were more skeptical about its importance, noting that the information obtained came from second- and third-hand sources and not from the top military command. After the war, U.S. and British intelligence officers, while aware of Gestapo mistreatment of Rote Kapelle members, showed no interest in prosecution but were anxious to expand their knowledge of Soviet tradecraft. See also FUNKABWEHR; PANZINGER, FRIEDRICH; STRÜBING, JOHANN; WENZEL, JOHANN.

ROTSCH, MANFRED (1924– ). One of the most productive Soviet spies operating in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Manfred Rotsch was an engineer trained in Dresden between 1948 and 1952. In April 1954, shortly before resettling in the FRG, he agreed to work undercover for the KGB (code name Emil). Rotsch’s subsequent position as head of the planning department of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, the country’s largest arms manufacturer, proved a lucrative source of technological information, especially regarding the Tornado, the new fighter bomber designed for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Milan antitank missile. Rotsch, who projected a conventional bourgeois image, also stood as a candidate of the conservative Christlich-Soziale Union in local Bavarian elections. Betrayed by a French agent of the KGB, he was arrested on 24 September 1984. Convicted of treason in 1986, he was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison but was released as part of a spy exchange in August 1987. Later the same year, Rotsch and his wife left the German Democratic Republic and returned to their home near Munich.

RUH, ANTON (1912–1964). A U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent with secret ties to Soviet military intelligence, Anton Ruh was born in Berlin on 20 February 1912 and trained as a printer
and lithographer. He also performed illegal work as a member of the German communist youth organization. Arrested by the Nazis in 1933, he was released six months later and took refuge in Prague. Besides smuggling political leaflets into Germany from his secret printing shop, he returned to Berlin six times before the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Although the Czech underground helped him flee to England, the outbreak of World War II resulted in his internment and later deportation to Australia. In November 1941, Ruh made the voyage back to England and found employment as a welder. He also became a member of the communist-dominated Free Germany Committee of Great Britain based in Hampstead, as well as a GRU agent under Ursula Kuczynski.

In the final stage of the war, realizing that behind-the-lines logistical information was lacking, the OSS in London organized Operation Hammer. In light of their Berlin roots, Ruh and his friend and fellow exile Paul Lindner were asked to participate. In addition to parachute training, they were instructed on the new wireless transmitter/receivers developed for the OSS and how to deal with the elite Waffen-SS troops and military patrols. On 2 March 1945, their two-man hammer team parachuted into Germany with communications gear, forged work orders indicating their status as skilled defense workers exempted from military service, and a roster of contacts in the underground resistance. After refamiliarizing themselves with Berlin, they began their reconnaissance work and succeeded in conveying important information regarding bombing targets.

With the entry of the Red Army into Berlin, Ruh and Lindner were held captive and underwent harsh interrogation by Smersh (Soviet Military Counterintelligence). They were released to the U.S. Army near Leipzig on 16 June 1945 and flown to Paris for debriefing. Although the OSS recommended that both receive a military decoration for their services, officials also concluded that their communist background rendered them inappropriate for postwar military intelligence work. Ruh returned to the Soviet sector of Berlin and became involved with customs operations. Surviving the purges of the early 1950s of those Germans who had returned from the West, he rose in the GDR hierarchy to become head of the Office of Customs and Goods Controls and then, shortly before his death on 3 November 1964, the East German ambassador to Rumania. On 5 April 2006, the
U.S. government posthumously awarded both Ruh and Lindner the Silver Star for their wartime service in the OSS.

**RUMRICH, GÜNTER (1911– ).** The first Abwehr spy apprehended by the U.S. government, Günther Rumrich was born in Chicago, the son of the secretary of the Austro-Hungarian consulate. Although raised in Europe, he returned to the United States in 1929 and drifted from job to job. In March 1936, after deserting from the U.S. Army and short of funds, he read the memoirs of Walter Nicolai and directed a letter to him in Germany, requesting employment as a spy. His application approved, Rumrich (code name CROWN) received instructions to obtain detailed information about coastal defenses, shipping and industry, and new developments in aviation. When very little of substance materialized, more elaborate schemes were devised by Rumrich and his associates.

In February 1938, he attempted to obtain 35 passport blanks in New York City by posing as a top official from the State Department. (The false passports would have been used primarily to penetrate the Soviet Union with agents disguised as American sailors.) Having been alerted by the British MI5 to the existence of an extensive German spy ring, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Rumrich along with Erich Glaser, Johanna Hoffmann, and Otto Herman Voss. Fourteen others, including the key figure Ignatz Griebel, were indicted but managed to escape. Rumrich pleaded guilty and received a sentence of two years. Actual footage from his trial was incorporated in the 1939 film *Confessions of a Nazi Spy*, Hollywood’s first major anti-Nazi effort. Following the invasion of Poland, a confiscated copy of the film was shown to Wilhelm Canaris and other members of the Abwehr.

**RUNDE ECKE.** The popular name given to the former regional headquarters of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in Leipzig, the Runde Ecke (Round Corner) on the Dittrichring was completed in 1913 and originally housed the offices of a fire insurance firm. After World War II, the building was successively used by the U.S. Army, the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and the K-5 before its transfer to the MfS in 1950. On 4 December 1989, the Runde Ecke was occupied by demonstrators led by the Leipzig
citizens’ committee. It later became a museum that attempts to preserve the original Stasi working environment.

RUNGE, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH (1928– ). A KGB Illegaler in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) who defected to the U.S. Central Intelligence Bureau (CIA), Yevgeny Yevgenievich Runge was born in eastern Ukraine as an ethnic German. After escaping the forced evacuation to Central Asia at the outset of World War II, he acquired German citizenship during the occupation of Ukraine and was taken to German-controlled areas with the retreating Wehrmacht. Following a brief period in an American prisoner of war camp, Runge settled in East Berlin and received a degree from the Political Economy Institute of Humboldt University in 1954. His contact with a Soviet intelligence officer led to his recruitment as an Illegaler and induction into the KGB as a junior lieutenant in 1955. The following year, at the KGB’s insistence, he married Valentina Rusch, a Soviet agent working in the FRG. Settling in Cologne, they opened a small business as cover. Two agents—a waiter at diplomatic receptions and a steward at the French Military Liaison Mission in Bad Godesberg—were soon operating under Runge’s direction.

As a security precaution, Runge was recalled briefly in January 1960 to East Berlin and later Moscow. By the fall, however, convinced that his cover was still intact, the KGB reassigned him to Frankfurt am Main. He was also given responsibility for handling a new agent, Heinz Sütterlin, a photographer who had been recruited by the MfS and then transferred to the KGB. Sütterlin (code name walter) courted and married Leonore Heinz (code name lola), a secretary in the Foreign Office in Bonn. The voluminous documents she provided, however, were only of marginal value. Moreover, when Runge began to suspect hostile surveillance of her husband, the KGB recalled him once again to Moscow in early 1967. Against his protestations, not only was Runge’s operation in the FRG terminated but he was now suspected of being a double agent for West German counterintelligence.

Despite the resolution of these security concerns, Runge along with his wife and son defected to the CIA in October. His testimony revealed the intensive activities of KGB illegals in West Berlin, despite the erection of the Wall, and led to the arrest and
conviction of the Sütterlins. Heinz Sütterlin received a six-year sentence but escaped to Dresden via Yugoslavia in 1971; Leonore Sütterlin committed suicide in her detention cell on 15 October 1967 after hearing the confession of her spouse. The repercussions within the KGB included letters of reprimand to all officers connected to the Runge case.

**Rupp, Rainer (1945– ).** A highly productive spy for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung based at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, Rainer Rupp was born in Saarlouis (Saar). In 1968, while an economics student at the University of Mainz, an East German intelligence officer named Kurt helped persuade him to work for the HVA as a spy. After completing his academic studies with distinction in Brussels, Rupp (code name Mosel) obtained a research position at the Institute for Applied Economics and soon started working at NATO headquarters. In 1972 he married Ann-Christine Bowen, a secretary with the British military mission at NATO, and convinced her to spy as well. Both received basic espionage instruction in East Berlin.

Under the code name Türkis, Ann-Christine smuggled highly classified material from the NATO Integrated Systems Management Agency, although the birth of their first child in 1977 brought an end to her activity. Rupp, known as Topas after 1979, continued his resolute espionage career until the collapse of the GDR in 1989. Thousands of pages of photographed documents found their way to East Berlin and later Moscow, evoking effusive praise from HVA chief Markus Wolf and KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov. This material included plans for the use of nuclear weapons in time of war, catalogues of troop strengths and armament levels, reports on military exercises, descriptions of NATO alarm systems, and information about the Strategic Defense Initiative. According to Wolf, a prime asset of Rupp was his ability to summarize and make accessible the often-arcane language of the official reports. While Rupp later maintained that he worked completely for idealistic aims and received no monetary compensation, evidence pointed to payments totaling 550,000 DM.

As a result of information conveyed to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in 1990 by Heinz Busch, a former military analyst in the
HVA, the Rupps were arrested in Saarburg in 1993 while visiting relatives. On 17 November, he was sentenced by a Düsseldorf court to 12 years in prison and fined 300,000 DM for betraying secrets that could have been decisive in time of war. Ann-Christine received a 22-month suspended sentence. In 1998, the prominent writer Martin Walser made a public plea for Rupp’s early release, while the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus named him a parliamentary advisor on foreign and security affairs. Following his discharge in July 2000, he became a freelance journalist and frequent contributor to left-wing publications such as *Neues Deutschland* and *Junge Welt*.

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SÄGEBRECHT, WILLY (1904–1981). A communist functionary who briefly headed East German military intelligence, Willy Sägebrecht was born in Gross Schönbeck (Brandenburg) on 21 February 1904. A committed communist since his youth, he headed a section of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands of Berlin-Brandenburg from 1929 to 1931 and was elected in 1932 to the Prussian parliament. His participation in illegal activities, however, led to his arrest and confinement in various Nazi prisons and concentration camps from 1934 to 1945.

At the end of the war, Sägebrecht resumed his party work and established close contact with the new political and security elite in the Soviet occupation zone. In 1954, after the founding of the German Democratic Republic, he received the rank of colonel in the Barracked People’s Police, the forerunner of the Nationale Volksarmee, and concentrated on propaganda campaigns directed at the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite Sägebrecht’s lack of military training and experience, Defense Minister Willi Stoph appointed him head of the Verwaltung 19 (Administration 19) in September 1957. The transition proved difficult, as his colleagues came to resent his aloof manner. Only with the political subsection did Sägebrecht show any degree of involvement.

Eleven months later, his tenure abruptly ended with the defection of his assistant, Siegfried Dombrowski, to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Rather than replace Sägebrecht immediately, Stoph
kept him as the titular head, thereby allowing time for a thorough search for a successor and then the opportunity for the new chief, Arthur Franke, to become acquainted with operations. Although an internal investigation by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit found Sägebrecht unqualified for his position, the official order of 31 August 1959 maintained that his early retirement occurred for reasons of health (he had suffered a serious heart attack the previous March). His memoirs, Nicht Amboss, sondern Hammer sein (Not to be Anvil but Hammer), appeared in 1968. He died in East Berlin on 8 April 1981 and was buried among the honored communists in the Zentralfriedhof. His brief intelligence career continued to be omitted from his official résumé. See also VERWALTUNG AUFKLÄRUNG.

SALAAM. An Abwehr operation in Egypt during World War II, SALAAM had the objective of sending information to General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps and installing an agent of influence in Cairo who would help ignite an anti-British revolution. Under the leadership of László Almásy, a hazardous 1,700-mile automobile expedition across the northern Sahara Desert brought agent John Eppler (code name KONDOR) and radio operator Hans-Georg Sandstede to the Egyptian capital in early May 1942. The capture of a radio operator in Rommel’s headquarters by a New Zealand desert patrol led to their arrest and conviction three months later.

SALIS CONSPIRACY. An abortive attempt to merge the Austrian provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg with Switzerland following the Napoleonic Wars, the Salis Conspiracy can be traced to Count Johann von Salis-Soglio, head of the Grisons canton. An ardent opponent of the ideas of the 18th-century Enlightenment, he was convinced that many Habsburg ministers belonged to the secret sect of the Illuminati and that Austria lacked the will to combat such subversive influences. His plan called for the inclusion of the two Austrian neighboring provinces, presumably because those living in Alpine regions were more inherently mistrustful of rationalist doctrines.

Through an agent in South Tyrol, Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich learned of Salis-Soglio’s plan by early 1817 and instituted a police watch. Intercepted correspondence further revealed the involvement of Salis-Soglio’s brother, Hieronymus, an officer in
the British army. Learning of the existence of a draft constitution in early 1819, Metternich directed one of his field marshals to warn the Salis brothers of the possible consequences of their conspiracy. Their immediate compliance so impressed the chancellor that they were offered positions in the Habsburg secret service. Surviving Austrian records, however, contain no indication of their response.

**SALON KITTY.** A Berlin brothel equipped for espionage purposes on the eve of World War II, Salon Kitty originated as an idea of Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Sicherheitsdienst, who delegated its implementation to Walter Schellenberg. Already known as an establishment frequented by a prestigious clientele since the early 1930s, it bore the name Pension Schroeder and was located on the fourth floor of Giesebrechtstrasse 11. Its owner was Kitty Schmidt, an opponent of the Nazi regime. In June 1939, when captured by the Gestapo at the Dutch border attempting to flee the country and threatened with imprisonment, she agreed to cooperate with Schellenberg.

Salon Kitty was soon reopened, having been outfitted with hidden microphones in the walls of each room and monitoring and recording equipment in the basement. Twenty highly attractive, multilingual, and politically reliable prostitutes also received intense training in espionage techniques and were required to submit a report after each client. Although some indiscretions on the part of foreign dignitaries (such as Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano of Italy) and ranking Nazi officials came to light, the overall results were generally mediocre. The deteriorating conditions in Berlin began to take a toll on the number of visitors, and Allied bombing in July 1942 led to the salon’s closing. Schmidt died in 1954, not having broken her silence about the operation even after the war. The fate of the 25,000 recorded discs and tapes remains unknown.

**SALVADORI, DOMENICO.** An Italian-born agent of the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Domenico Salvadori had been an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army convicted of desertion. Recruited by Josef Klanner von Engelshofen in 1837, Salvadori (code name roger bells) agreed to monitor Italians living abroad. Three years later, he was pardoned and given permission to return temporarily to his homeland. His reports from Brussels, Paris, Marseilles, and
Geneva were well regarded by Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich and continued until the dissolution of the MIB in 1848.

**SANDBERGER, MARTIN (1911– )**. An SS official who headed one of the Einsatzgruppen in the Baltic and later the administrative branch of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Martin Sandberger was born in Berlin on 17 August 1911, the son of a corporate director. In November 1933, he received a doctorate in law from Tübingen, where he had been a leading student activist for the Nazi Party, which he had joined in 1931. His rapid ascent in the SD began in 1936 and resulted in his appointment as head of the Central Immigration Office North-East shortly after the outbreak of World War II.

Despite his later declaration of opposition to the Final Solution, he nevertheless followed Hitler’s orders and headed one of the Einsatzgruppen that eliminated Jews and other Nazi targets in the Baltic states between June and December 1941. He also directed the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD in Tallin, Estonia, until fall 1943. Early the following year, Sandberger was appointed head of administration for SD-Ausland, reporting directly to Walter Schellenberg as a member of his inner circle. Following his interrogation by British intelligence at the end of the war, a court in the American zone sentenced him to death in April 1948, but a clemency board under John J. McCloy, the U.S. high commissioner for Germany, later commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Numerous dignitaries in the Federal Republic of Germany, including President Theodor Heuss, spoke on Sandberger’s behalf, and he was released in 1958.

**SAURAU, COUNT FRANZ JOSEF (1760–1832)**. A Habsburg police official during the era of the French Revolution, Count Franz Josef Saurau was born in Vienna on 19 September 1760. In 1789, he was summoned by Johann Anton Pergen to serve as his assistant and help counter all manifestations of French subversion. Both men achieved considerable publicity as a result of the Jacobin trials in 1794. Saurau also gave the impetus for the composition of the Austrian national anthem by Franz Josef Haydn, which was dedicated to Emperor Francis II in 1797. Saurau’s administrative and diplomatic skills led to a number of subsequent positions, including governor of Lombardy in 1815. He died in Florence on 9 June 1832.
SATTLER, JAMES F. An American foreign policy consultant with ties to the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, James F. Sattler was recruited in 1967 and given intensive training in codes, microphotography, and clandestine drops. According to his later testimony, information and documents that he received from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and from individuals and government agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and France were transmitted to East Berlin, for which he received approximately $15,000.

Beginning in 1972, Sattler held a part-time position with the non-governmental Atlantic Council of the United States. Four years later, after applying unsuccessfully for a post as a minority staff consultant with the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, he learned that his denial was the result of a Federal Bureau of Investigation report concerning his connections to officials in Eastern Europe. To avoid criminal charges, Sattler filed a foreign agent’s registration statement with the U.S. Department of Justice. In that statement, he described his past activities, including the instructions he received during his last visit to the German Democratic Republic in November 1975. He was to obtain a position with access to classified information and return clandestinely to East Berlin to be debriefed. Sattler’s sudden disappearance after making this admission was never explained.

SCHALCK-GOLODKOWSKI, ALEXANDER (1932– ). A colonel in the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) who developed a vast shadowy financial empire to keep the German Democratic Republic (GDR) solvent, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski was born in Berlin on 3 July 1932, the son of stateless Russian parents who was later adopted by a German couple. Trained initially as a precision engineer, he also studied economics and joined the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) in 1955. Outwardly, he occupied the position of state secretary in the Ministry for Inter-German and Foreign Trade. In reality, however, Schalck-Golodkowski was one of the camouflaged Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (OibE) and a 1970 graduate of the Juristische Hochschule des MfS (his coauthored doctoral dissertation with Heinz Volpert was entitled “Combating Imperialist Harassment in the Field of Foreign Trade”).
In 1966, he established a trading organization called Kommerzielle Koordinierung, (KoKo; Commercial Coordination), which in 1976 became independent of the trade ministry and in 1983 a separate unit within the MfS. He thus enjoyed exceptional autonomy, responsible only to Erich Mielke and Erich Honecker. Moreover, Schalck-Golodkowski, an imposing figure with a deeply resonant voice, had developed a host of international contacts as well as a thorough understanding of Western markets (including its unwritten practices). His overriding aim—to acquire hard currency to offset the GDR’s chronic trade deficit—was disguised by the series of sham companies that KoKo operated. Among the wide variety of transactions concluded were weapons contracts with both Iran and Iraq, the acquisition of embargoed Western computer equipment and other high-technology goods, the sale of rare German art objects and antiques to wealthy foreign clients, and the procuring of Western consumer items for the party elite. In the mid-1980s, he also negotiated two massive credits from West German sources that totaled nearly 2 billion DM, notably with the aid of the conservative Bavarian leader Franz Josef Strauss. According to Schalck-Golodkowski’s calculations, KoKo along with its subsidiaries raised nearly 25 billion DM between 1967–1989.

On 1 December 1989, prompted by West German press revelations of his activities, the GDR People’s Chamber voted to investigate charges of corruption and abuse of power. Fearing reprisals, he and his wife, Sigrid (likewise an OibE in the MfS), fled to West Berlin the following day. On 3 December, he was officially removed from the SED’s Central Committee, along with a number of other former luminaries. As cooperation with West German authorities appeared the most prudent course, he provided extensive testimony to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in the following years. A special fact-finding parliamentary committee was also established and released its 4,500-page final report in 1994. It revealed, for example, that in 1989 Schalck-Golodkowski’s network included 180 covert companies and raised 7 billion DM. Despite more than 50 different legal charges lodged against him, only two guilty verdicts resulted: dealing in illegal arms and breaking an embargo. He was given a suspended sentence in each case, which allowed him and his wife to retire to a lakeside villa in Bavaria. In his autobiography published in 2000,
Deutsch-deutsche Erinnerungen (German-German Memoirs), he not only defended his actions as director of KoKo but also conceded the superiority of the West German social market economy over a centrally planned Marxist system.

SCHEDLINSKI, RAINER (1956– ). A prominent East German alternative writer and a major informant for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Rainer Schedlinski was born in Magdeburg on 11 November 1956. While working at a variety of jobs, he made contact with the alternative literary scene in Magdeburg and began publishing poetry in an underground publication. In 1979, his name attracted the attention of local authorities because of mail sent by his brother in the Federal Republic of Germany (who was helping people escape to the West). Schedlinski was recruited by the local MfS office and given the code name GERHARD. After some initial displeasure, his case officer saw potential owing to his wide circle of literary acquaintances. In 1982, he was drafted into the East German army, but a mental breakdown and attempted suicide led to a six-month confinement in a psychiatric clinic.

In April 1983, Schedlinski moved to the Prenzlauer Berg district in East Berlin, where his literary career started to flourish and his colleagues included Lutz Rathenow, Detlef Opitz, and Alexander Anderson. His reports were described as “comprehensive and diverse,” and he was officially placed in the highest category of informer. Like Anderson, Schedlinski sought to reinforce the apolitical and highly theoretical literary outlook within this group of potential dissidents, notably as editor of ariadnefabrik, their principal periodical and a recipient of MfS funding. When it ceased publication in 1989, he found a position at the newly established Galrev publishing house. His unmasking as an agent in January 1992 sparked much publicity in the German press. Faced with overwhelming evidence, Schedlinski conceded his past role but tried to minimize its impact, stressing the information that he purposely withheld and describing the MfS as no more than a “receptionist” within the state’s power structure.

SCHEITHAUER, HELMUT (1929–1968). A member of the Verwaltung Aufklärung found guilty of murdering two of his agents, Helmut Scheithauer was born in Limbach (now Slovakia) on 21
October 1929. A baker by training and a member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, he entered the East German police force in 1952 and, following additional instruction, was transferred to military intelligence operations four years later. By 1964, he held the rank of major.

Two of his agents—José Kautz-Coronel and Julio Torrentes-Avellan (code-named PRIMEL and VERGISSMEINNICT)—were Nicaraguan students at the Technical College in Munich. Recruited in 1957 through classified advertisements, they had the task of obtaining information about the U.S. armed forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Scheithauer also used them in a mission to Spain in 1959 regarding military operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and then later in West Berlin. After contact with them abruptly ended in fall 1961, two bodies were discovered—one shortly thereafter in the forest near Gross Marzehns (Brandenburg), the other a year later less than two miles from that spot. Both wore Western clothes and had died from a gunshot wound in the back of the head.

It took the Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit (MfS) nearly four years to confirm the identity of the corpses. According to the results of the inquiry, Scheithauer, who had been regularly pocketing part of their compensation, murdered the two students with his service revolver out of fear that his misdeeds would become known (the students had complained of being underpaid and begun to balk at their next assignment). During interrogation by the MfS, he admitted to having embezzled other funds as well. Scheithauer was executed in 1968, although none of his VA colleagues learned of the circumstances that led to his death.

SCHELIHA, RUDOLF VON (1897–1942). A career diplomat and Soviet agent, Rudolf von Scheliha was born in Zessel (now Cieśle, Poland) on 31 May 1897, the son of a landed aristocrat. A decorated volunteer in World War I, he completed his legal studies at Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland) and joined the Foreign Office in 1922. Scheliha was recruited as a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) agent by Ilse Stöbe and Rudolf Herrnstadt in 1937 while a legation secretary in Warsaw. Under the code name ARIER, he proved to be an exceptionally productive and well-paid source whose work continued
following his transfer in 1939 to the intelligence branch of the Foreign Office in Berlin. Several of his reports to Moscow, beginning in late December 1940, indicated that Adolf Hitler was preparing an imminent military offensive against the Soviet Union. After the discovery of the Rote Kapelle, however, Scheliha was arrested on 30 October 1942 by the Gestapo when he returned to Berlin from Basel. He was executed at Plötzensee Prison on 22 December.

SCHELLENBERG, WALTER (1910–1952). The head of foreign intelligence during the latter part of World War II, Walter Schellenberg was born in Saarbrücken on 16 January 1910, the son of a piano manufacturer. After studying jurisprudence at Marburg and Bonn, he practiced law for a short period in late 1936. Schellenberg had joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and, impressed by “the better type of people,” indicated the SS as his choice for a required “active organization.” In 1937, he went to Berlin to work in the finance and personnel section of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service).

Fluent in English and French as well as exceptionally hardworking and ambitious, Schellenberg attracted the attention of SS chief Heinrich Himmler and SD head Reinhard Heydrich. Their patronage led to his appointment as director of Office IV E (counterintelligence) of the newly organized Reichssicherheitshauptamt in August 1939. Adding to his credentials was the successful outcome of the Venlo Incident three months later. But another assignment, related to Operation seelöwe (Sea Lion), the ill-conceived abduction of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, was eventually circumvented by Schellenberg and ended in failure. He was also unable to carry out Adolf Hitler’s order to eliminate his former rival Otto Strasser in Lisbon.

Nevertheless, an important promotion in June 1941 made him head of Office VI (foreign intelligence) and thus closer to his goal of a unified intelligence service. A major setback occurred the following year with the assassination of his protector Heydrich and the appointment of his bitter adversary, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Yet not only did Schellenberg survive this struggle with the help of Himmler, but his intelligence department came to function without the apparent weaknesses of the rival Abwehr. Centralized control and planning were introduced, along with a new cipher system, and unproductive agents
and staff were eliminated. But his increasing apprehension about the
outcome of the war led him to establish covert diplomatic channels in
two neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden (his relationship with
Swiss military intelligence head Roger Masson was particularly
noteworthy). Most startling of all was his humanitarian engagement
in the final stages of the war, as thousands of concentration camp
inmates—Jews and gentiles—were saved as a result of his interces-
sion alongside Count Folke Bernadotte representing the Swedish Red
Cross. Even Himmler’s agreement was obtained by Schellenberg in
late April 1945.

In the wake of the German military collapse, Schellenberg found
refuge with Bernadotte in Sweden, where his “Trosa Memorandum,”
the basis of his later memoirs, was written. He voluntarily returned to
Germany in June 1945 and served as a witness before the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, principally against Kaltenbrunner
(their courtroom confrontation showed no diminution of their intense
mutual antipathy). His own prosecution took place before an American
military tribunal in the Wilhelmstrasse trials of 1948–1949. Schellen-
berg was found guilty on two counts: for his membership in the SD and
SS (which had been declared criminal organizations by the International
Military Tribunal); and for his complicity in the death at Auschwitz of
two Russian prisoners of war involved in Operation Zeppelin. His
sentence of six years’ imprisonment (to commence from mid-1945) was
relatively lenient, largely due to the court’s recognition of his belated
humanitarian efforts. In December 1950, Schellenberg was released
from confinement on medical parole and moved to Switzerland. Dif-
ficulties with his residency permit caused him to relocate to a small
town in Italy on Lake Maggiore. He died on 31 March 1952 in Turin.
Schellenberg’s unapologetic yet not completely reliable autobiography
appeared first in an English translation (The Schellenberg Memoirs),
which was later reissued as The Labyrinth and followed by a German
version (Memorien) in 1959.

SCHERBIUS, ARTHUR (1878–1929). The inventor of the Enigma ci-
pher machine, Arthur Scherbius was born in Frankfurt am Main on 20
October 1878, the son of a businessman. After studying at the Techni-
cal College in Munich, he completed his doctoral dissertation at the
Technical College in Hanover in 1903, then worked for several major
electrical companies in Germany and Switzerland before founding his own firm—Scherbius and Ritter—in 1918. His design for a new cipher machine based on rotating wired wheels was submitted to the patent office on 23 February 1918 (thus predating a similar design by Dutch inventor Hugo Koch filed the following year). Scherbius approached both the imperial navy and the Foreign Office with his multi-rotor machine but was rebuffed.

His next step was to enter the commercial market through a new corporation—Chiffriermachinen Aktien Gesellschaft (Cipher Machines Stock Corporation)—with himself and Ritter on the board of directors. Launched in 1923, the corporation gave wide publicity to the Enigma machine, as it was now called. In addition to illustrated advertisements that appeared in trade publications, it was exhibited at the congress of the International Postal Union. Soon the German navy, recognizing a more secure cryptosystem was necessary, turned to Scherbius, and a somewhat different version than the commercial one was in production by 1925. Nevertheless, the corporation continued to struggle for profitability. The commercial market failed to materialize, and the German army and navy had only purchased several hundred machines each by the end of the decade. Meanwhile Scherbius, whose inventions (such as the asynchronous motor) had never ceased, became the victim of a fatal accident involving his horse-drawn carriage, and he died on 13 May 1929. The corporation, however, survived, and by 1935—owing to Hitler's rearmament program—full-scale manufacture of the Enigma machine was under way to supply the German armed services.

**SCHERHORN.** A major deception scheme organized by Soviet counterintelligence, Operation SCHERHORN (also known as BEREZINO and BENNSTRECKE) began in the late summer of 1944. Acting on the orders of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet General Staff sought to persuade its German counterpart to divert scarce resources to units trapped behind Soviet lines. Presumably these units would be able to inflict considerable damage on the rear of the Red Army and then be able to rejoin the main body of the Wehrmacht.

The scheme centered on the commander of an obscure unit, Gerhard Scherhorn, who had been captured outside Minsk on 9 July 1944 (his unit was part of a larger force of 1,800 German soldiers
defending a position near the Berezino River, which had been defeated after a two-week battle). Following the recruitment of Scherhorn, Aleksandr Dem’ianov was engaged as an intermediary, sending fabricated information via radio that had been prepared by the NKGB (Soviet State Security). Scherhorn was depicted as a valiant commander trapped in the Berezino forest, unwilling to surrender, but urgently needing relief supplies and assistance.

Despite initial suspicions by the Germans, this *Funkspiel* worked flawlessly from September 1944 to May 1945. According to an NKGB evaluation, Soviet counterintelligence captured 25 German agents and intelligence officers, 13 radio sets, 225 cargo packs (containing uniforms, ammunition, food, and medicine), and more than 2 million rubles. To add to the credibility of the deception, the messages contained mixed signals; while one boasted of having successfully attacked a Soviet supply column, others asked that some scheduled airdrops be canceled due to the approach of enemy troops. At one point, the rescue of Scherhorn by Otto Skorzeny and his commando team was contemplated—with Adolf Hitler’s approval—but soon abandoned. On 23 March 1944, however, Hitler not only announced the promotion of several officers singled out by Scherhorn for recognition but advanced him to the rank of colonel and awarded him the Knight’s Cross. With the general collapse on the eastern front, the Armed Forces High Command notified Scherhorn on 5 May 1945 that his efforts could no longer be supported. He remained in Soviet captivity until 1949, when his return to Germany was approved.

**SCHEUBNER-RICHTER, MAX VON (1884–1923).** An intelligence operative during World War I and an early Nazi activist, Max von Scheubner-Richter was born in Riga on 9 January 1884. A member of the university student corps, he helped organize the self-defense of German settlers in the region during the 1905 revolution. Afterward, he moved to Munich to pursue an engineering degree and became a German citizen. Scheubner-Richter’s service in World War I included a minor post in Erzurum, Turkey, as vice consul, which provided cover for his intelligence activities, most notably an attempt, with Paul Leverkühn, to provoke an anti-Russian uprising in the north Caucasus and stop the supply of oil from the vast fields of Baku. Severe illness, however, forced both men to return to
Germany in August 1916. Two years later, he received a new assignment in the Baltic countries as head of the army press bureau, although his attempts to stem the increasing Bolshevik presence proved futile and he was taken prisoner and condemned to death.

Following the intervention of the German government, Scheubner-Richter escaped to Berlin and established the news agency Der Aufbau. Had the Kapp Putsch succeeded in 1920, he would have likely headed the new government’s secret service; its failure resulted instead in his return to Munich and first encounter with the fledging Nazi Party. A mutual attraction developed between him and Adolf Hitler, who came to benefit both financially and politically from Scheubner-Richter’s upper-class connections, especially with other right-wing Russian émigrés. With his deep antipathy toward Bolshevism, he emerged as a prolific writer on the Eastern policy of the new party as well as the business manager of the Deutscher Kampfbund, an amalgam of leading extreme right-wing paramilitary organizations in the city. On 9 November 1923, Scheubner-Richter was fatally wounded during the Beer Hall Putsch that he had helped orchestrate (had the bullet been fired a foot to the right, Hitler might have been killed instead). Whereas the first part of Mein Kampf was dedicated to all 16 persons lost to the movement during the skirmish with the Bavarian police, it was Scheubner-Richter whom Hitler considered the only “irreplaceable” figure.

SCHEVITZ, JEFFREY (1941– ). An American sociologist and peace activist accused of spying for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Jeffrey Schevitz arrived in West Berlin in 1976. Working as a researcher at the Free University and then at the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe, he relayed large quantities of documents and information on a variety of topics to the HVA until 1990. Schevitz was arrested by German police in 1994. In his defense, he disclosed a covert relationship with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, claiming he had been engaged to spy on both Germanys, although his presumed case officer and only corroborating witness, Shepard Stone of the Aspen Institute, had already died. On 11 November 1995, a Stuttgart court gave Schevitz an 18-month suspended sentence. His wife, Beatrice Altman, charged as an accomplice, received a fine of $7,000.
SCHLICHT, GÖTZ (1908–?). A long-term East German informer working in the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen (UFJ), Götz Schlicht completed his doctorate in law at Humboldt University in 1949 and held a number of positions in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), including teaching prospective judges. Arrested in September 1952 for “boycott agitation” by distributing UFJ printed matter, he received a 10-year prison sentence but secured an early release five years later by agreeing to work for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) under the code name DR. LUTHER (later DR. LUTTER).

Schlicht’s ties to the UFJ were reestablished after he moved to West Berlin. Although he never rose to a prominent position in the organization, his posting at the refugee center at Berlin-Marienfelde between 1957–1968 enabled him to provide invaluable information to the MfS regarding persons involved in Republikflucht (flight from the republic), including their motivations, connections, and escape routes. The recipient of several prestigious awards by the GDR, Schlicht continued to submit reports using his editorial affiliation with the Institute for All-German Affairs (the last meeting with his MfS handler occurred on the day prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall). After his case came to light in December 1992, authorities decided not to press charges, owing to his advanced age. Showing no regret in retrospect, Schlicht maintained that intelligence work did not allow for “pangs of conscience.”

SCHLUGA BARON VON RASTENFELD, AUGUST (1841–1917). A highly prized long-term spy for Prussia and Germany, August Schluga Baron von Rastenfeld was born in Zsolna, Hungary (now Zilina, Slovakia). After attending the Polytechnical Institute in Vienna, he joined an Austrian infantry regiment and saw combat at Magenta and Solferino in 1859. In 1863, Schluga resigned from the military in order to manage the family estates. Yet he had made a secret arrangement with the small, newly established intelligence department within the Prussian General Staff. In 1866, Schluga delivered to Berlin the Austrian order of battle plans along with profiles of several key military commanders. Owing to the rapid defeat of Austria in the ensuing war, the Prussians continued to use Schluga’s services to obtain information about their principal antagonist, France. Designated
by the German military attaché in Paris as Agent 17, he skillfully ex-
exploited connections in the French capital prior to the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870–1871, although heightened security measures in France
carried him to relocate afterward to Switzerland.

With the outbreak of World War I, Schluga’s activities in France
resumed. He reported on morale in the capital and conveyed internal
information from the ministries. In addition, the head of Abteilung
IIIb, Walter Nicolai, called Schluga “my best teacher for the train-
ing of my own intelligence officers with regard to selection, instruc-
tion, and debriefing of their agents.” Deteriorating health took a toll
on his submissions, and he ended his intelligence work in 1916.
While several accounts maintain that he died in Germany the follow-
ing year, Nicolai stated that he arranged Schluga’s internment, first
in Wiesbaden, then in occupied Brussels, where his death occurred
before the end of the war.

SCHMALSCHLÄGER, HEINRICH. The commander of German
military counterintelligence on the eastern front during World War II,
Heinrich Schmalschläger served during World War I as a cavalry of-
licer. A mattress manufacturer during the interwar period, he joined
the Abwehr in 1935. In early September 1939, Erwin Lahousen
gave him responsibility for securing the files of the Polish secret
service in Warsaw as head of a Frontaufklärungskommando.
Numerous arrests resulted, including that of Abwehr officer Günter
Rudloff. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union, Schmalschläger
headed a counterintelligence unit (Walli III) that engaged Russian
and Ukrainian anticommunists to infiltrate Soviet partisan groups
in the German-occupied territories. Some of the captured agents
were turned and their radios used for a Funkspiel. After the war,
Schmalschläger worked with the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps
before joining the Bundesnachrichtendienst.

SCHMEISSER AFFAIR. An early crisis in the government of Konrad
Adenauer, the Schmeisser Affair involved Hans Konrad Schmeisser,
a West German who had been engaged as an agent by French intelli-
gence between 1947 and 1951 under the code name RENÉ LAVACHER.
In July 1952, the newsmagazine Der Spiegel published an article,
including allegations by Schmeisser, that government aide Herbert
Blankenhorn had provided confidential information to the French in exchange for safe passage to Spain for him and the Adenauer family if the Soviets invaded the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, Blankenhorn had presumably attempted to secure 800,000 DM from the French for the 1949 election campaign. The chancellor reacted angrily, ordering the seizure of all copies and charging Schmeisser and the magazine with libel. The government’s case, however, was dropped in 1955. Afterward, Schmeisser completed his studies at Erlangen and became a lawyer.

SCHMENKEL, FRITZ (1916–1944). A highly celebrated Soviet partisan during World War II, Fritz Schmenkel was born on 14 February 1916 in Warsow (now Warszewo, Poland), the son of a working-class family. Drafted into the Wehrmacht in December 1938, he was arrested shortly after the beginning of the war because of his antifascist attitude. After serving an 18-month prison term, he volunteered for service on the eastern front. In November 1941, however, Schmenkel deserted his unit in the Smolensk region and joined a group of Belorussian partisans. Overcoming their initial suspicion, he was given a special course in counterinsurgency and, under the cover names Ivan Ivanovitch and Vanja, paradropped behind German lines in late December 1943. Captured, Schmenkel was executed on 22 February 1944 after a court martial in Minsk. After the USSR posthumously named him a “Hero of the Soviet Union” in 1964, the German Democratic Republic attached his name to numerous streets and schools as well as an aerial fighter squadron of the National People’s Army. See also TRADITIONSPFLEGE.

SCHMIDT, GÜNTER (1929– ). The head of the Operativ-Technischer Sektor (OYS; Technical Operations Sector) of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Günter Schmidt was born in Johanngeorgenstadt (Saxony), the son of a worker. Although a member of the Hitler Youth, he joined the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands after the war and acquired an education in telecommunications and electrical engineering. Appointed to the MfS in 1953, Schmidt rose quickly, becoming acting head of telephone tapping four years later. His expertise coupled with deep political loyalty resulted not only in his promotion as director of the OTS in 1967 but numerous honors
for his work, including three medals from Cuba and a friendship order from North Vietnam. At the time of its dissolution in 1989, the OTS had 1,131 employees and was divided into a dozen specialized subsections ranging from spy containers to false documents.

SCHMIDT, HANS-THILO (1888–1943). The cipher official who betrayed details of the Enigma machine to France, Hans-Thilo Schmidt was born in Berlin on 13 May 1888, the son of a baroness and a history professor. Although he was awarded an Iron Cross in World War I, the military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty meant that, unlike his older brother Rudolf, he could not continue his army career. After his soap factory venture became a casualty of the rampant postwar inflation, Schmidt turned to his brother for assistance and obtained a position at the Chiffrierstelle as a civilian clerk (his brother had previously headed this office and ironically given his approval for the adoption of the Enigma machine). Yet this ill-paying job brought little satisfaction or direction to his life, prompting him in June 1931 to contact the intelligence officer at the French embassy in Berlin and offer confidential items for sale.

Once his bona fides were established by Rodolphe Lemoine, frequent meetings between Schmidt (code name asche) and his handlers took place in various European locales. Even though the French received considerable information about the Enigma machine—from copies of the instruction manual and operating procedures to lists of the key settings—their cryptanalysts made no discernible headway, and the purloined material was passed on to specialists in Great Britain and Poland. Meanwhile Schmidt continued to supply additional military data from his new position at the Forschungsamt beginning in 1938. It was the arrest and confession of Lemoine in Paris that led the Gestapo to Schmidt in Berlin on 1 April 1943. In mid-September, without being apprised of the circumstances of his death while in prison, his daughter was summoned to identify the corpse. His brother, stripped of his military rank, made secret burial arrangements.

SCHMIDT, IRMGARD (1930– ). An East German student enlisted as a Soviet agent, Irmgard Schmidt (code name STEPHANIA) was trained in the German Democratic Republic and dispatched to West Berlin
in May 1953. Her objective was the headquarters of U.S. Air Force intelligence at Tempelhof Airport, where she enticed several officers into an intimate relationship and thereby secured a position in the Order of Battle section. When Schmidt’s unusual interest in official papers and unlocked safes aroused some suspicion, she was merely transferred to another office. Yet when she agreed to marry a German employee of her former section if he would provide confidential information, he reported the incident to American authorities. Given a bogus report, which she concealed in a cigarette package, Schmidt was arrested en route to East Berlin and then tried before the U.S. High Commission court in December 1954. Despite her guilty plea and explanation of having been blackmailed by the Soviets, the court sentenced her to five years in prison.

SCHMIDT, WULF (1911–1992). One of the most prized British double agents during World War II, Wulf Schmidt was born in Abrenra, a town in Jutland then in German possession but given back to Denmark in 1919. After completing his military service with the Danish army, he abandoned his plan to study agriculture at the university and took a job at an Argentine cattle ranch and then at a banana plantation in the Cameroons. Returning to Abrenra in 1939, Schmidt responded to an advertisement for people fluent in several languages and became a member of the Abwehr (code name HANSEN). His first secret mission took him from Hamburg to Copenhagen and was executed flawlessly.

Owing to his fluency in the language, Schmidt’s next assignment involved a paradrop into England to conduct reconnaissance prior to a presumed German invasion. After landing outside Cambridgeshire on 19 September 1940, he was taken into custody at a local cafe. Unbeknownst to both him and the Abwehr, Goesta Caroli, a Swedish agent who had preceded him, had been apprehended by the British and divulged the details of Schmidt’s arrival. Besides matching Caroli’s description, he was carrying a genuine Danish passport bearing his real name and a forged British identity card with the name Harry Williamson. Disheartened by the discrepancy between the Abwehr’s bleak picture of England and actual conditions, as well as by the inadequate preparations for his assignment, Schmidt accepted MI5’s offer to work as a double agent. Because
of his resemblance to music hall comedian Harry Tate, he received the code name TATE.

On 16 October, under MI5 supervision, Schmidt sent his first wireless message from Roundbush House, Radlett, to the Abwehr in Hamburg. More than 1,000 reports followed in the course of the war (his last message about mine-laying in the Kola inlet was dated 2 May 1945). The British placed a high value on his work, first for counterespionage purposes and then later in deception operations. Likewise, the Germans not only supplied him with generous funds but awarded him the Iron Cross First and Second Class, although the medal was given to his brother in Germany for safekeeping. When Schmidt returned briefly after the war to retrieve his award, he was a British citizen and had security protection. He became a photographer for a local newspaper in Watford and also one of Britain’s leading breeders of canaries. He died of cancer on 19 October 1992.

SCHMIDT-WITTMACK, KARLFRANZ (1914–1987). A center-right West German politician who spied for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Karlfranz Schmidt-Wittmack was born on 27 July 1914. An officer in the Luftwaffe during World War II, he studied law afterward and began his own business in Hamburg. In October 1953, he was elected to the Bundestag as a member of the Christlich-Demokratische Union and assigned a seat on the Committee for National Security Questions. At the same time, he reported to the HVA under the code name TIMM. In 1954, at the insistence of state security chief Ernst Wollweber, he and his wife were brought to East Berlin as a propaganda coup. At a press conference on 26 August 1954, the government of Konrad Adenauer was accused by Schmidt-Wittmack of concealing important information about its foreign policy and security plans. Remaining in the German Democratic Republic, he became vice president of the Foreign Trade Commission. He died on 23 October 1987.

SCHNELLER, ERNST (1890–1944). A key figure in the development of the intelligence network of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), Ernst Schneller was born in Leipzig on 8 November 1890. An army officer in World War I, he joined the newly established KPD in 1920 and was elected to the Saxon Land-
tag the following year. A teacher, he took particular interest in a complete reform of the education system. Although he served in the Reichstag from 1924 to 1933, his main expertise lay in expanding and perfecting the party’s underground network. As a member of the KPD’s Central Committee and head of the Reichsparteischule in Berlin-Fichtenau, he took charge of the M-Apparat, which continued to seek a revolutionary overthrow of the country. In 1928, he also became a candidate for the executive committee of the Comintern.

In the aftermath of the Reichstag fire, Schneller was arrested on 28 February 1933 and found guilty of high treason. In July 1939, he was transferred from the Waldheim prison in Saxony to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Schneller’s attempt to foment an uprising among the inmates resulted in his execution on 11 October 1944. Numerous streets and schools in the German Democratic Republic were later named in his honor, although most returned to their original designation after 1990.

SCHOLZ, ALFRED (1921–1978). A prominent senior counterintelligence official of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Alfred Scholz was born on 11 February 1921 in Gross-Ullersdorf (now Velké Losiny, Czech Republic), the son of a carpenter. Entering the Wehrmacht in 1941, he was captured by the Red Army the following year and later served as a scout for a partisan brigade in Belorussia and the area surrounding Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland). A number of police functions in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany followed after 1945 and culminated in his appointment in 1950 as head of the main investigative organ of the MfS, where he showed little hesitation in personally administering the harsh interrogation techniques developed by the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). A close confidant of Erich Mielke, Scholz shared the conviction that the “hand of the enemy” must be zealously sought in each individual case. In 1958, the Minister’s Working Group, the largest of the administrative organs at Mielke’s disposal, came under his direction. He was designated deputy minister of the MfS in 1975. After his death on 11 August 1978, Scholz was honored as one of 34 “chekists of the first hour,” replete with a large commemorative coin and an MfS unit bearing his name.
SCHRAGMÜLLER, ELSBETH (1887–1940). The sole female intelligence official engaged by Abteilung IIIb during World War I, Elsbeth (originally Elisabeth) Schragmüller was born in Schlüsselburg (Westphalia) on 7 August 1887, the daughter of a former Prussian army officer. After attending Germany’s first girls’ school in Karlsruhe, she completed a doctorate in political economy at Freiburg in 1913. Anxious to serve her country at the outbreak of World War I, Schragmüller pressed authorities for a frontline assignment and proceeded to occupied Brussels, finding a position with the postal interception bureau of the German military administration. Her well-informed reports and strategic understanding led to her transfer as head of a subsection of the Kriegsnachrichtenstelle in Antwerp. From early 1915 until the end of the war, Schragmüller’s office had prime responsibility for intelligence matters involving France and other areas of the Western theater. She placed particular value on French deserter-spies as a source of information and also assisted in the preparation of Mata Hari, whose performance proved to be a disappointment. According to IIIb head Walter Nicolai, the term “Mademoiselle Docteur” was coined by Schragmüller and used when addressing her agents.

After the war, Schragmüller became the object of numerous erroneous and exaggerated stories. There was, for example, no dramatic descent into insanity or morphine addiction. Rather she returned to a university position at Freiburg and later toured as a lecturer on her wartime experiences. A short autobiographical piece appeared in 1929. Despite the denial of officer status owing to her gender, Nicolai believed that Schragmüller would have been recalled to intelligence service in World War II, but she died in Munich on 24 February 1940. Although the depiction of her life envisioned by Leni Riefenstahl fell victim to a 1933 army ban on all German-made spy films, the director G. W. Papst completed a version in France four years afterward entitled Mademoiselle Docteur.

SCHULMEISTER, KARL (1770–1853). The foremost spy in the extensive intelligence network of Napoleon Bonaparte, Karl Schulmeister was born in Neufreistett (Baden-Württemberg) on 5 August 1770, the son of a Lutheran clergyman. A smuggler in the Rhenish border region, he was recruited for French service
by Jean-Marie-René Savary and introduced to Napoleon in 1805. Later that year—disguised as a Hungarian nobleman exiled from France on suspicion of espionage—Schulmeister arrived in Vienna and managed to be appointed chief of intelligence for Karl Mack von Leiberich, the commander of the Austrian army. The rapid defeat at the battle of Ulm in mid-October can be traced in part to the spurious information supplied by Schulmeister and the crucial Austrian military plans he conveyed to Napoleon.

Various missions followed involving Ireland, England, and Russia. Schulmeister also gained a reputation for ruthless efficiency while serving as commissioner of police in Vienna during the second French occupation. His services, however, were terminated after Napoleon’s marriage to Austrian archduchess Marie-Louise in 1810. Having amassed a considerable fortune, Schulmeister retired to his Meinaau estate but rejoined Napoleon after his escape from Elba. The French emperor’s defeat at Waterloo in June 1815 resulted in Schulmeister’s immediate arrest. Forced to pay a huge ransom to the victors, he never recovered financially and worked as a tobacconist in Strasbourg. He died on 8 May 1853.

SCHULZE-BOYSEN, HARRO (1909–1942). A Luftwaffe intelligence officer and pivotal figure in the Rote Kapelle, Harro Schulze-Boysen was born in Kiel on 2 September 1909, a grandnephew of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. In 1923, he took part in the clandestine struggle against the French occupation in the Ruhr and was briefly jailed. Despite his upbringing in a conservative monarchist environment, Schulze-Boysen gradually moved to the left and became a fierce opponent of the Nazis, notably as editor of the opposition newspaper Der Gegner. The ban of the publication in April 1933 also resulted in his arrest and detention in a concentration camp outside Berlin. Released shortly afterward owing to his mother’s intervention, Schulze-Boysen completed aviation training at Warnemünde and joined the intelligence branch of the newly established Reich Air Ministry of Hermann Göring in 1934. By 1938, his early contact with the Soviet embassy in Berlin had grown into a full-fledged relationship, as he conveyed information about the German Condor Legion in Spain and helped identify undercover Nazi agents in the International Brigades.
Certain liabilities notwithstanding—his impulsive, passionate nature, his unfamiliarity with secret radio codes and techniques, and his conspicuous role in organizing anti-Nazi resistance efforts—Soviet authorities selected Schulze-Boysen (code name STARSHINA) along with Arvid Harnack in the Economics Ministry to head the espionage apparatus in Berlin at the outset of World War II. Later based at the Luftwaffe installation at Wildpark Werder near Potsdam, Schulze-Boysen was privy to all the diplomatic and military reports originating from the air attachés in German embassies and legations. Although lax security facilitated his large collection of confidential information—ranging from new developments in weaponry to offensive military plans in the Soviet Union—Gestapo officials learned of his affiliation through Abwehr radio intercepts and arrested him on 30 August 1942. Under interrogation, he and his wife, Libertas, revealed the names of other members of the Rote Kapelle. They were executed on 22 December 1942 at Plötzensee Prison. In the postwar period, a sharp division of opinion emerged over whether Schulze-Boysen should be viewed as a courageous resistance fighter, as assiduously depicted by the German Democratic Republic, or as a zealous, uncritical spy in the service of Joseph Stalin.

SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, GERÓ VON (1901–1971). An assistant to Allen Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Geró von Schulze-Gaevernitz was born on 27 September 1901, the son of a distinguished political scientist and liberal politician. During his early years, he traveled to Russia and worked in the United States, lured by the stock market boom of the 1920s. Through his American mother, a daughter of the wealthy financier Otto Kahn, U.S. citizenship proved easy to obtain. At the outbreak of World War II, possessing little experience in diplomacy, Gaevernitz offered his services to American authorities in Bern, Switzerland, in the struggle against Adolf Hitler. His initial assignment was as a liaison to German exiles in the U.S. legation, where he was a friend of military attaché Barnwell Legge. He also made numerous trips between Germany and Switzerland prior to Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States.

The arrival of Dulles in Bern marked the beginning of an unusually fruitful wartime collaboration. At their first meeting in November 1942, Gaevernitz impressed Dulles (who had earlier known
his father) by his serious commitment to the German resistance to Hitler. Known as 476 according to the OSS rolls, he became a full-time executive officer, unlike most of the other numbered sources. An attempt to provide him with cover as an attaché for the Office of Economic Warfare met with the stern disapproval of the State Department, and Gaevernitz therefore remained outwardly a private citizen engaging in diverse business activities. His chief function was to screen individuals desiring an audience with Dulles, as neutral Switzerland teemed with exiles, spies, Nazis, anti-Nazis, and sheer curiosity-seekers. Particularly noteworthy was Gaevernitz’s role in bringing Hans Bernd Gisevius of the Abwehr to his chief’s attention. Gaevernitz also coordinated the efforts of an informal group of exiled politicians calling themselves “Das demokratische Deutschland” (Democratic Germany), who were concerned about the postwar configuration of the country.

The official Allied policy of “unconditional surrender” adopted at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 severely complicated the work of Gaevernitz and Dulles. While bound to respect its provisions, they nevertheless gave a measure of “quiet encouragement” to the German resistance, especially those involved in the plot of 20 July 1944 to assassinate Hitler. Gaevernitz figured prominently as well in Operation SUNRISE, the secret negotiations that resulted in an early surrender of German forces in northern Italy. Yet his plan to have captured German officers accompany advancing Allied armies as an advisory force was rejected by the staff of U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

With the military defeat of Germany, Gaevernitz, along with Dulles, advocated a lenient and less categorical occupation policy. Remaining in Switzerland, he attempted to rehabilitate the German contacts he had brought to the OSS and compiled a card file of Germans who should and should not be consulted by occupation authorities. His last major cooperative effort with Dulles was a written account of Operation SUNRISE, The Secret Surrender (1966). Two years later, Gaevernitz revised a motion picture script based on the book. He died on 6 April 1971 in the Canary Islands.

SCHUMANN CHRISTA-KARIN. See BAUMANN-ZAKRZOWSKI, WINFRIED.
**SCHUTZHAFT.** A term signifying “protective custody” frequently invoked by the Nazis, Schutzhaft meant in practice the internment in concentration camps of those deemed enemies of the regime by the Gestapo. Its origins can be traced to the emergency decree of 28 February 1933 following the Reichstag fire. Further legal refinement was provided by the jurist and SS official Werner Best.

**SCHWANITZ, WOLFGANG (1930– ).** The head of the short-lived Amt für Nationale Sicherheit (AfNS), Wolfgang Schwanitz was born in Berlin on 26 June 1930, the son of two bank clerks. Trained as a merchandiser, he joined the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) in 1951 and held a variety of positions. He also attended the Juristische Hochschule des MfS, writing his 1973 dissertation on combating signs of subversion among youth. Schwanitz’s reputation as a staunch MfS loyalist was solidified by his selection as a deputy minister to Erich Mielke in 1986. Following Mielke’s ignominious departure during the tumultuous events of November 1989, Schwanitz became director of the AfNS, the successor organization to the MfS, although his credentials as a reformer possessed little credence for many citizens of the German Democratic Republic. The dissolution of the AfNS a month later spelled the end of his intelligence career. Following reunification, Schwanitz emerged as a vocal rebutter to critics of the MfS.

**SCHWARTZKOPPEN, MAXIMILIAN VON (1850–1917).** A German military attaché in Paris who played a central role in the Dreyfus Affair, Maximilian von Schwartzkoppen was born in Potsdam on 24 February 1850, the son of an old family of Prussian officers. A veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, he assumed the post of military attaché in Paris in 1892, assuring Count Georg Münster von Derenberg, the German ambassador to France, that no espionage activity would occur on his watch, quite unlike the practice of his predecessors. When Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, a French infantry officer, appeared at the German embassy in July 1894 and offered to sell highly confidential military information to prevent his family from financial ruin in return for money, Schwartzkoppen reacted with indignation. Nevertheless, his superiors in Berlin advised him to pursue the matter, and an agreement was soon reached. Esterhazy’s first
delivery in mid-August included the newly revised mobilization plans of the artillery in return for 1,000 francs. Schwartzkoppen, who chose not to apprise the ambassador of this arrangement, later justified it as serving the higher interest of the German army.

The following month, however, a torn-up memorandum (bordereau) was found in Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket by Marie Bastian (code name Auguste), an illiterate cleaning woman employed by the Statistical Section, the primary counterespionage unit of the French War Office. When the fragments of the document were pieced together and submitted to a handwriting analysis, suspicion fell on Alfred Dreyfus, who was hastily convicted of treason in a secret court-martial. Schwartzkoppen claimed afterward that the memorandum had never reached his hands, a dubious assertion in light of his habitual negligence in dealing with personal and official papers throughout his tenure in Paris. (Even some of the intimate correspondence with his Italian counterpart, Alessandro Panizzardi, which alluded to their stable of French informants and suggested a homosexual liaison between the two men, was carelessly tossed in the wastebasket and eventually reached the Statistical Section via Bastian—or the voie ordinaire (usual channel) in official parlance.

In November, when the newspaper La Patrie announced that letters from Dreyfus to Schwartzkoppen were in the possession of the French government, the German ambassador flatly denied his embassy’s involvement. Schwartzkoppen truthfully told him he had never met Dreyfus, but no mention was made of Esterhazy, whose espionage activity was continuing at an even faster pace. In early 1895, however, their relationship sharply deteriorated, as Schwartzkoppen complained that Esterhazy’s reports contained gross inaccuracies and boasts of nonexistent connections.

Another key document retrieved from Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket reached the Statistical Section in March 1896—the so-called petit bleu, a small special delivery letter on thin blue paper addressed to Esterhazy. Despite the mystery surrounding its authorship—it bore Schwartzkoppen’s code name c but was not in his handwriting or that of his mistress—Esterhazy was clearly implicated. His fervent appeals for assistance from the German officer went unheeded, as did later requests by the defenders of Dreyfus for Schwartzkoppen’s testimony. Still claiming their noninvolvement with Dreyfus, Berlin
officials preferred to see France remain embroiled in this ever-polarizing controversy. On 2 November 1897, Schwartzkoppen was recalled from Paris and given the command of a guard regiment in Berlin. His account of the Dreyfus affair, *Die Wahrheit über Dreyfus: Aus dem Nachlass* (*The Truth about Dreyfus from the Schwartzkoppen Papers*) appeared posthumously in 1930 and left little doubt regarding Dreyfus’s innocence.

SCHWARZWÄLLER, ERNST (1905–1977). An operative for multiple intelligence services, Ernst Schwarzwälder was raised in Stettin and trained as a businessman. After joining the SS and the Nazi Party in 1933, he became an agent of the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) in the Stettin region. Promoted to a full-time position, he directed the SD branch office in Schneidemühl from 1939 to 1945.

Six years later, a former SD colleague persuaded Schwarzwälder, then the head of a wholesale grocery firm in Hamburg, to work for the *Organisation Gehlen* (OG). His office briefly became a meeting place for agents, and he attended a training course in Bavaria. Financial difficulties, however, caused him to respond in 1954 to an advertisement by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) promising West German operatives “complete freedom, a domicile, and a well-paying position.” Officials of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS) raised no questions about his Nazi past, as he not only relayed detailed information about the OG but supplied the names of 10 potential recruits. Given the code name HOLTZ (and later HIRSCH), Schwarzwälder earned high marks for his activity, targeting especially several former OG colleagues. For security reasons, the MfS recalled him to East Berlin in April 1959, where he held a press conference displaying documents stolen from Franz Göring, a former SD colleague then employed by the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*. Despite receiving substantial remuneration along with a number of state awards, Schwarzwälder saw his privileges gradually reduced and his counsel only occasionally sought. Following his death on 10 October 1977, MfS officials extolled his “outstanding accomplishments” for the GDR.

SCIENTOLOGY ORGANIZATION. A prime object of surveillance by the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV) since 1993, the
Scientology organization was judged by two of Germany’s highest courts to be not a religion but a commercial enterprise. A report issued by the BfV on 12 October 1998 further concluded that its “agenda and activities are marked by objectives that are fundamentally and permanently directed at abolishing the free democratic basic order.” While this surveillance was upheld by a Cologne court in 2004, another in the Saarland ruled a year later that the monitoring of the Scientology organization in that region could not be supported by its meager results.

SEBOLD, WILLIAM G. (1899–?). A German American who became a double agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), William G. Sebold was born Wilhelm Debowski in Mülheim an der Ruhr. After serving in a German army engineering corps during World War I, he left a merchant ship docked in Galveston, Texas, and took up residence in the United States. Following a series of industrial jobs, Sebold acquired American citizenship in 1936 and found steady employment two years later as a mechanic in a San Diego aircraft plant. A desire to see his family again prompted him to return to Germany in February 1939 and take a temporary position at a steam turbine factory in Mülheim to finance the trip.

In probing the Mülheim police records under his original name, the Gestapo discovered that Sebold had been jailed for smuggling and unspecified felonies in 1920. Under the threat that his undisclosed criminal record would be relayed to American authorities and his new citizenship revoked, he reluctantly agreed to work as a German agent. Approved by Nikolaus Ritter of the Abwehr, Sebold was sent to the training school in Hamburg. Beforehand, however, Sebold had apprised officials in the American consulate in Cologne of his situation and was instructed to continue the charade until his return to New York. With the completion of the intense four-month course came a new identity as Harry Sawyer (code name TRAMP) and the names of various collectors in the United States to be contacted. Sebold was to resign his job in San Diego and set up a sham company in New York—the Diesel Research Company—which would serve as a conduit for information to be transmitted to Germany. Because of the proficiency he demonstrated at the training school, Sebold would also be placed in charge of shortwave radio communications.
Following his arrival in New York in February 1940, the FBI not only obtained the names of those connected to the Ritter ring but also began to record and film meetings that took place in Sebold’s office. While more than 300 reports were collected—especially from the ring’s most prized member, Fritz Duquesne—the material sent to Hamburg was prepared by the FBI. In 1941, following increasing complaints by Ritter to Sebold about garbled information and faulty transmission, the FBI shut down the operation and arrested all 33 agents. At the trial, Sebold’s testimony helped secure the conviction of the 14 who had pleaded not guilty. During the proceedings, photographers were not permitted to take his picture, and afterward he received a new identity from the FBI. As a farmer in either Texas or California, he faded into obscurity.

SEDLNITZKY, JOSEF VON (1778–1855). A police minister who supervised espionage activities in post-Napoleonic Austria, Josef von Sedlnitzky was born in Troplowitz (now Opavice, Czech Republic) on 8 January 1778, the son of a Habsburg government official. After he completed his law studies at the University of Vienna, his career as an aspiring administrator included posts in Galicia, Moravia, and Silesia. Appointed minister of police in May 1817, he had responsibility for conducting espionage within the Habsburg monarchy as well as abroad. While some of his agents were members of his ministry, most were from the main police force in Vienna. Occasionally he relied on informants, such as the banker Baron Trecnh during the Congress of Aachen in 1818 and, for some years, Abbé Prince Alteri at the Papal Court. In addition, since close scrutiny of the Habsburg mails was a general practice, Sedlnitzky registered complaints whenever new postal arrangements interfered with the official reading of private correspondence (Chancellor Klemens von Metternich was convinced that no other European government could match the expertise of the Habsburg interception system).

One of Sedlnitzky’s responsibilities involved keeping close surveillance on numerous French expellees being sheltered in the Habsburg lands as a security measure for the restored Bourbon monarchy. The most notable of these was Joseph Fouché, Napoleon Bonaparte’s powerful former minister of police, who had settled in Bohemia and was the object of an elaborate police watch. Sedlnitzky’s early years
in office saw some notable successes, and his long tenure ended as a result of the 1848 revolution. He died in Baden near Vienna on 24 June 1855.

**SEeadler.** A plan to pit the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against Great Britain during World War II, Operation **seeadler** (Sea Eagle) was originally devised by Edmund Veesenmayer in spring 1941. Its goals included acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland that would necessitate the deployment of British troops, the establishment of an Irish underground resistance in the event of British or American attacks, and the transmission to Germany of relevant intelligence. To convey a financial subsidy of £40,000 to the IRA, Veesenmayer designated **Helmut Clissmann**, a member of the Abwehr and former exchange student at Trinity College in Dublin who was well versed in the language and possessed numerous local contacts. Bruno Rieger, another member of the Abwehr, was selected as the radio operator. The final proposal of 24 August 1941 also involved IRA activist Frank Ryan, who would explore a possible reconciliation between his group and the government of Eamon de Valera.

Although Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop raised no objections to the plan, Adolf Hitler withheld his endorsement, much to the disappointment of Veesenmayer. Convinced that a German victory in the east was imminent and would dramatically alter the political configuration in Western Europe, the Führer preferred to put the plan on hold. Veesenmayer’s entreaties for immediate implementation proved in vain, and the plan was never revived.

**Seidowsky, Hans-Joachim (1932– ).** A key agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) with a multifaceted career in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hans-Joachim Seidowsky was born near Leipzig, the son of Jewish immigrants from Lithuania. A student of philosophy at Humboldt University in East Berlin after World War II, he completed a doctorate on the relationship between the Vatican and the Kremlin during the interwar period. In 1952, he obtained a position in the governmental department on church affairs and became an agent of the MfS (code names *gerhard* and *jochen*). His tactic for infiltrating both Protestant and Catholic religious circles was to pose as an idealistic Marxist critical of the current regime.
Owing to his success, Seidowsky’s activities assumed an increasingly international scope, aided by his appointment to executive positions within the state television establishment. In addition to helping mount a disinformation campaign against Eugen Gerstenmaier, the president of the West German Bundestag, he cultivated close contacts with leading journalists and religious figures in Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Despite some suspicion within the MfS regarding his travels aboard, Seidowsky’s services to the GDR received official recognition in 1973. The following year, he began to work under the direct orders of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. His assignments included making preparations for the state visits of Erich Honecker to Italy in 1985 and the FRG in 1987. While the collapse of the GDR in 1989 prevented his appointment as ambassador to the Vatican, he found a position with an international film company in Berlin after reunification.

SEIFFERT, WOLFGANG (1926– ). An important communist activist and later critic of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Wolfgang Seiffert was born on 16 June 1926. In the early 1950s, he became the secretary for agitation and propaganda in the West German branch of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ; Free German Youth) and editor of its GDR-subsidized magazine Junges Deutschland. When the FDJ was declared illegal by West German authorities in 1953, he was taken into custody and sentenced in 1955 to four years in prison. Shortly afterward, however, he escaped to the GDR. There Seiffert held a position in the West Department of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), charged with handling relations with communists in the West German trade unions and directing a newspaper for their membership. An intimate of Erich Honecker, he counted among the small number of SED officials apprised in advance of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Operation ROSE). Seiffert also directed the Institute for Foreign and International Law and, beginning in 1972, was listed as an Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter affiliated with the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. In 1978, suspected of being a double agent, he was expelled from the SED but permitted to accept a guest professorship in international law at Kiel University, where he decided to remain. His writings
subsequently took a negative stance toward both the SED regime and the West German policy of Ostpolitik.

**SEKTOR WISSENSCHAFT UND TECHNIK (SWT).** The chief unit for the acquisition of scientific and economic intelligence for the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), the Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik (Science and Technology Sector) grew dramatically under the initial leadership of **Heinrich Weiberg** and received its official designation in 1971. Weiberg was replaced in 1975 by **Horst Vogel**. By the time of its dissolution in 1989, it had some 500 staff members as well as nearly 40 percent of the HVA’s foreign agents, thus underscoring the high priority placed on obtaining new technology from the West in defiance of the trade embargo on dual-use exports. Also privy to this information was a KGB liaison officer based in **Karlshorst**. As a result, no Eastern bloc country delivered as much stolen scientific data to the Soviet Union as the German Democratic Republic.

Whereas Weiberg’s first group possessed scant scientific expertise and focused on developing operations abroad, the addition of an evaluation section in 1962 marked the evolution to a more professional staff. The construction of the Berlin Wall the previous year also had a significant impact, giving the biannual Leipzig Trade Fair added importance as a recruiting ground for visiting Western scientists and engineers.

The achievements of the SWT were considerable. **Markus Wolf** considered the reestablishment of the renowned optical firm Carl Zeiss Jena “a child of the HVA.” Moreover, well-placed spies, such as **Dieter Feuerstein**, delivered critical material from major defense-related firms in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). At the same time, its failures included the feverish attempt to produce a one-megabyte computer chip during the 1980s. Ultimately, despite its ambitious goals and the many contributions of SWT agents, the GDR economy could not overcome its structural impediments to innovation and production and compete successfully at the international level.

The extensive penetration of the FRG by the SWT was first confirmed in January 1979 by a former officer, **Werner Stiller**. Another important defector in April 1990 was Frank Weiglet, an officer responsible for rocket science in the military technology subsection.
**SELBSTANBIETER.** A "walk-in" in American usage, a Selbstanbieter is a person who voluntarily decides to work for an intelligence organization. Motives can be widely varied. During World War II, Elyesa Bazna, the key figure in the Cicero Affair, offered his services to the Germans for large sums of money, whereas Fritz Kolbe worked for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services with the sole aim of defeating Adolf Hitler. Should the person already be a member of another intelligence organization, as was Paul Thümmel, the term employed is Selbstgesteller, or self-presenter.

**SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD).** One of the principal intelligence organizations of the Third Reich, the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) originated in October 1931 following reports that enemies had infiltrated the ranks of the Nazi Party. To investigate these charges, the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who then assembled a small staff based in a Munich suburb. With the model of the British Secret Intelligence Service in mind, he sought to infuse his unit with a sober, methodical spirit while recruiting fresh talent from his travels throughout Germany. Relocating to Berlin after the Nazi seizure of power, the SD saw a rapid growth and was declared the sole intelligence apparatus of the party by Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess in June 1934. The creation of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in 1939 made the SD a state institution, even though its officials remained party functionaries, and its mandate overlapped considerably with other security branches. By 1944, it had 51 major installations, more than 6,000 full-time employees, and an estimated 30,000 agents. Unlike the rival Abwehr, its expanding foreign branch, directed by Walter Schellenberg beginning in 1941, experienced remarkably few penetrations by hostile services.

An elitist organization, the SD attracted a large number of highly qualified young academics, including Franz Six and Otto Ohlendorf, to its senior positions, and it established its own research centers, such as the Wannsee Institut. Playing a key role in the implementation of the Final Solution, the SD also supplied much of the personnel of the Einsatzgruppen, the mobile killing units that accompanied the Wehrmacht into Poland and the Soviet Union. Heydrich remained its head until his assassination in June 1942. He was succeeded by Ernst Kaltenbrunner six months later. Despite its
designation as a criminal organization by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, numerous former SD officials found their way into the Organisation Gehlen, in several instances as freshly minted Soviet agents.

SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI (SIPO). A union of the Gestapo (Secret Police) with the Kripo (regular detectives), the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) was created when Heinrich Himmler became chief of all German police in June 1936. To lead the new organization, he appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who also continued to head the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service). Initially remaining within the Interior Ministry, the Sipo was placed under the newly established Reichssicherheitshauptamt in October 1939. See also GEHEIME FELDPOLIZEI.

SIEBERT, BENNO VON (1876–1926). A Russian diplomat who relayed voluminous documents to the German Foreign Office prior to World War I, Benno von Siebert was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, on 22 May 1876, the son of a Baltic German family. After completing his secondary education in Heidelberg, he returned to St. Petersburg and attended several prestigious institutions before his acceptance into the Russian diplomatic corps in 1898. His initial foreign postings included Brussels, Washington, and London. While in the United States, he established contact with the German diplomat Hilmar Baron von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen, who remained his key liaison until the end of the war, even though the first delivery of Russian documents did not occur until after Siebert’s move to London in 1908. Totaling more than 5,000 items and covering a wide range of topics, these deliveries continued in rapid succession until the eve of World War I and aroused no suspicion among his Russian colleagues. Access to these papers was limited to five individuals including the German chancellor.

Siebert resigned from the Russian diplomatic corps in 1914 and joined a banking firm in London. The next phase of his cooperation with the German Foreign Office took place between fall 1917 and summer 1918 and concluded with a two-week tour of the German-occupied Baltic provinces to ascertain the mood of the residents. His detailed report was regarded as highly reliable.
On 14 March 1919, the former translator in the German Foreign Office broke his silence about the secret acquisition of the prewar diplomatic documents. Siebert immediately appeared at the consulate in Bern, Switzerland, not only confirming his involvement but urging the publication of selected items as evidence of the Entente’s bellicose plans prior to 1914. Appearing under his own name in 1921, the volume contained many of the documents he had earlier conveyed to Berlin. Moving to Munich, Siebert devoted the remainder of his life to the question of Germany’s responsibility for the war, rejecting the “sole guilt” article of the Versailles Treaty and placing much blame on Great Britain and France. He died on 29 April 1926. Confirmation of his prewar espionage appeared posthumously in the memoirs of two former German diplomats, Friedrich Rosen (1932) and Theodor Wolff (1934).

SIEVERS, SUSANNE (1920– ). A mysterious journalist who worked for a variety of intelligence agencies, Susanne Sievers began a press service around 1950 in conjunction with the Ostbüro der SPD. Because of her frequent research trips to the German Democratic Republic, counterintelligence officials of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit apprehended her at the Leipzig trade fair in 1951. Although sentenced to eight years in prison for espionage, she made an agreement with the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) to establish a salon in Bonn and submit reports under the code name Lydia. According to HVA chief Markus Wolf, the salon attracted prominent political figures and provided his agency with valuable information.

In 1961, with the assistance of HVA agent and publisher Hans Frederik, Sievers, under a pseudonym, released a series of personal letters that SPD leader Willy Brandt had written during an affair with her. In the same year, Sievers’s contact with the HVA ceased, and she worked briefly in the West German Defense Ministry under Franz Josef Strauss. Afterward, her employer became the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which assigned her the code name Ferrari. First posted in Rome, she later became BND station chief in Hong Kong, running subunits in Tokyo, Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. In 1970, following his election as West German chancellor, Brandt instructed his BND overseer, Horst Ehmke, to have Sievers dismissed.
SIEWERT, EBERHARD (1934– ). The director of strategic intelligence for the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Eberhard Siewert was born on 24 March 1934, the grandson of a well-known communist resistance fighter during the Nazi period. After completing his studies at the University for Economics in Berlin-Karlshorst, he joined the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) in 1956 and was assigned to the intelligence division. Following the appointment of Arthur Franke as head of the Verwaltung für Koordinierung in 1959, responsibility for devising new methods of infiltrating NVA officers into the Federal Republic of Germany fell to Siewert. Franke emphasized that this new unit—Division 4—would be more concealed than any other and that Siewert would answer only to him. In 1980, Siewert became head of the strategic intelligence division of the VA, a position that he held until the organization’s dissolution in 1990.

SILBER, JULES CRAWFORD (c. 1880–?). A self-proclaimed spy during World War I, Jules Crawford Silber was born in Silesia. While spending his childhood in South Africa, he acquired a command of English, which enabled him to serve as a liaison for the British with Boer prisoners captured during the Boer War. Despite his residency afterward in the United States, the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 prompted him to act as a spy for Germany in Great Britain. After first contacting a German military attaché in the United States and then obtaining a Canadian passport, Silber found a position with the MI5 postal censorship office in Edinburgh.

According to his 1932 book Die anderen Waffen (The Invisible Weapons), he conveyed a wealth of critical information to German authorities. His presumed clandestine activity undetected by the British, he left the position only when postal censorship was discontinued in 1919. Yet there exist no records of Silber or traces of his work with military intelligence in any of the relevant German archives. Only a letter of commendation from the director of MI5 postal censorship, Edward Gleichen, confirms that a certain J. C. Silber worked as an assistant censor during the war.

SINGER, JAKOB EDUARD (?–1848). A journalist employed as an agent by the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Jakob Eduard Singer not only wrote for numerous German newspapers but was
well known because of his recollections published in 1836, *Portofoglio eines deutschen Journalisten* (Portfolio of a German Journalist). Beginning in May 1838, his reports were submitted from Hanover, Berlin, and Dresden, while after June 1840, he was based principally in Leipzig. Contemporaries noted Singer’s rather bizarre appearance, querulous manner, and a need for admiration. Nevertheless, in the view of Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich, his reports possessed “the ring of truth and were free from [his] usual exaggerations.” Singer worked for the MIB until its dissolution in 1848, dying shortly thereafter in Munich.

**SIX, FRANZ (1909–1975).** A leading SS functionary and academic, Franz Six was born in Mannheim on 12 August 1909, the son of a furniture dealer. A student of sociology and political science at the University of Heidelberg, he received his doctorate in 1936, followed by positions at the University of Königsberg and the University of Berlin (where he was the first dean of the faculty for foreign countries). Drawn to the Nazi Party, Six joined the SA in 1930 and became a member of the Sicherheitsdienst in 1935. His chief function was to conduct research into opponents of the Nazi regime, which included the creation of a comprehensive card index. Despite friction with Reinhard Heydrich, Six was appointed head of Office VII (Research and Evaluation of World Views) of the newly formed Reichssicherheitshauptamt in 1939. He also trained with an artillery unit of the Waffen-SS in Berlin-Lichterfelde.

Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Six was appointed chief of the Moscow Advance Command of one of the Einsatzgruppen—a motorized unit of some 30 men—and was to secure all the official documents in the capital with the arrival of German troops. While in Smolensk, he participated in the killing of more than 200 civilians, including 38 Jewish intellectuals. During the final two years of the war, he headed the cultural-political department of the German Foreign Office. His wartime activity in the Soviet Union was examined at the Einsatzgruppen Trials in 1948. Unable to link him with certitude to any of the atrocities, the court sentenced Six to 20 years in prison. Released from Landsberg (Bavaria) in 1952 by a clemency court, he became a marketing director and private business consultant in the Federal Republic of Germany.
SKORZENY, OTTO (1908–1975). An SS officer known for his daring commando operations during World War II, Otto Skorzeny was born in Vienna on 12 June 1908, the son of a middle-class family with a tradition of military service. An engineering student at the University of Vienna, he was also an accomplished fencer, receiving a prominent facial scar in one of numerous duels. Initially a member of the student Freikorps and the Austrian Heimwehr, he joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and played a minor role in the 1938 Anschluss. With the outbreak of war, Skorzeny—barred from the Luftwaffe because of his age—obtained a position in the bodyguard regiment SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler in Berlin. His subsequent military service abroad—in France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union—culminated in the award of the Iron Cross for bravery under fire.

In April 1943, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, his compatriot in the SS hierarchy, named Skorzeny to head a special sabotage unit of the Sicherheitsdienst, prompting him to study the techniques developed by the British and the Americans. Several months later, when Benito Mussolini was removed from power by the Italian Grand Council, which desired an armistice with the Allies, Hitler selected Skorzeny to rescue his Italian ally from captivity in Operation EICHE (Oak Tree). On 12 September, Skorzeny’s force of 90 soldiers silently landed in gliders at a heavily defended and almost inaccessible ski lodge at the Grand Sasso in the Apennines. The Italian soldiers guarding Mussolini were taken by surprise, and a light Storch aircraft, which narrowly averted a disaster on takeoff, transported him directly to Vienna. The exploit earned Skorzeny not only a promotion and a Knight’s Cross but also worldwide recognition owing to Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda apparatus.

Following the failure of the 20 July 1944 conspiracy against Hitler, Skorzeny mobilized a special SS unit in Berlin composed of officers loyal to the Führer. In October, Hitler, learning Hungary wanted to defect from the Axis alliance and make peace with the Allies, again called on Skorzeny. Dubbed PANZERFAUST (Bazooka), the plan involved seizing the Citadel in Budapest, the formidable fortress where the head of state, Miklós Horthy, and his entourage resided. To avoid an unprovoked attack on the city, Skorzeny first devised a kidnapping scheme whereby Horthy’s son, Niklas, would be held hostage in order to force Horthy to comply with Hitler’s wishes (this opera-
tion derived its name MICKI MAUS from a play on the son’s nickname Nikki). In a surprise ambush on 15 October, the son was seized by Skorzeny’s men, rolled up in a Persian carpet, and taken to an aircraft bound for Vienna. Within a few days, Horthy weakened under the extreme pressure and resigned from office, allowing Skorzeny to occupy the Citadel with minimal resistance and the leader of the radical Hungarian fascist party to take the reins of government.

The last major special forces operation under Skorzeny’s command—GREIF (Griffin)—occurred in conjunction with the Ardennes offensive of December 1944. A brigade composed of several thousand English-speaking German soldiers, outfitted with American uniforms and military vehicles, was organized to seize two bridges on the Meuse and spread chaos behind American lines. Only a handful of these disguised commando teams succeeded in penetrating enemy territory and inflicted merely minor damage. The greatest impact of the operation was unintended, as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, rumored to be the object of an assassination or abduction plot by German special forces, became a virtual prisoner of his own troops for a short period.

In the final months of the war, Skorzeny received a further promotion and was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross, Germany’s highest military honor. But on 15 May 1945, he surrendered to American forces in Styria and was held as a prisoner of war. Two years later, at the U.S. war crimes tribunal in Dachau, Skorzeny was acquitted of having committed illegal practices during the Ardennes offensive, largely because of a British intelligence officer’s admission of having directed operations in German-occupied France no less irregular in nature. Following his release by the Americans, German authorities arrested him, but in July 1948 he escaped from the internment camp in Darmstadt and fled to Spain, where he resumed his prewar career as an engineer and later began an import-export firm based in Madrid.

Skorzeny’s name frequently surfaced in connection with the rumored secret organization Odessa and its efforts to organize escape routes for ex-SS officers. Reports also circulated that he was an advisor to Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Juan Perón of Argentina. In 1952, the German government cleared him in absentia of all wartime criminal charges; the Austrian government followed suit in
1958. With ample funds at his disposal, he bought a country estate in Ireland the following year and began breeding horses. Skorzeny died in Madrid on 5 July 1975. His memoirs, *Meine Kommandounternehmen: Krieg ohne Fronten* (*My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando*), appeared shortly afterward. According to his sister, his longtime alias was Rolf O. S. Steinbauer.

**SMOLKA, HANS-PETER.** An Austrian journalist who became a Soviet agent, Hans-Peter Smolka was the London correspondent for the *Neue Freie Presse* beginning in 1933. Acquiring British citizenship in 1938 and adopting the name Peter Smollett, he was recruited the following year by fellow Marxist Kim Philby and given the Soviet code name abo. Following the failure of a small press agency launched jointly with Philby, Smolka worked as a *Times* correspondent and then, in 1941, became head of the Soviet Relations Division at the British Ministry of Information. On his initiative, a profusion of pro-Soviet events started to take place in Great Britain, even though much mistrust persisted in Moscow regarding his bona fides. After the war, Smolka helped convince the director Alexander Korda to film *The Third Man* in his native Vienna. He died in 1980 with his role as a Soviet spy still concealed from public view.

**SMOLKA, MANFRED.** A former East German border police officer executed as a spy, Manfred Smolka had fled to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1958 to protest the instructions of his superiors to shoot attempted escapees on sight. On 22 August 1959, near the border with Upper Franconia, he was abducted on the territory of the FRG while trying to rescue his remaining family in the German Democratic Republic. Under the code name verräter, officials of the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS) concluded that his death would be justified on “educational grounds.” On 12 July 1960 Smolka was executed in Leipzig for espionage and treason (presumably he had offered his services to the American secret services). Afterward, MfS chief Erich Mielke, convinced that Smolka’s case of “desertion and treachery” constituted the “severest of crimes,” ordered a description of his offenses to be circulated among all members of the security apparatus. In 1994, the GDR state attorney
who prosecuted the case in Erfurt was given a 10-month suspended sentence and ordered to pay 10,000 DM to the Smolka family as compensation.

**SNIGOWSKI, BRUNO (1921– ).** A double agent working in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for Polish intelligence, Bruno (Bronislaus) Snigowski was born in Dortmund of Polish parents. In 1948, he was willingly repatriated to Poland and recruited by Polish intelligence. Assigned to the FRG, he became a protégé of the Christlich-Demokratische Union and gained a position in the Amt Blank, the forerunner of the defense ministry. Snigowski’s intense spy activity ended with his arrest on 17 July 1953, and he was sentenced to a five-year prison term 10 months later.

**SOLDATENSENDER CALAIS.** Disguised as a German radio station in occupied France broadcasting to troops on the western front during World War II, Soldatensender Calais was in reality transmitting skillfully prepared gray propaganda from Woburn, England. Its dusk-to-dawn programming began on 24 October 1943 and ended on 30 April 1945. It was renamed Soldatensender West after the Normandy landings. The station’s aim was to lower fighting morale and create dissension on the home front. Despite repeated warnings by the German Armed Forces High Command about these broadcasts, postwar interrogations revealed that soldiers along with many civilians had been regular listeners. Much of the effectiveness of the propaganda can be accredited to Sefton Delmer, a Berlin-born journalist recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service, who gave the broadcasts—a mixture of music, news, interviews, and political commentaries—a remarkably authentic flavor. The Deutsche Volkssender (German People’s Radio) in Moscow, also pretending to be broadcast from within Germany and calling on Germans to rise up against Hitler, was specifically modeled after Soldatensender Calais. *See also* CAPRICORN.

**SOLIDARITY.** An object of intense concern for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Solidarity was the independent anticommunist resistance movement in Poland led by Lech Walesa. Further heightening the fear in East Berlin that unrest could spill across the border was the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, a Pole, as Pope
John Paul II in 1978. Remaining generally independent of Poland’s own security service (which the HVA considered much too lax), operations concentrated on securing agents in the circles around Walesa and the prominent intellectual Adam Michnik, as well as ascertaining the intentions of Western governments and labor unions. Besides the special working groups established in the HVA’s East Berlin headquarters and the provincial offices near the Polish border, at least 500 agents were eventually involved. Yet the active measures specifically designed to influence public opinion—and to counter the émigré section of West German intelligence in Poland—proved to have no discernible impact on the Solidarity movement’s widespread appeal and ultimate triumph. See also WOLKE.

SONDERDIENST SEEHAUS. The German foreign broadcast monitoring service during World War II, Sonderdienst Seehaus was located in Berlin-Wannsee in the Swedish Pavilion, a structure originally brought from the Vienna World Exhibition of 1872–1873. Converted from an exclusive lakeside restaurant in 1940, it was equipped with special antennas and disguised as the Rundfunktechnische Versuchsanstalt (Radio-technical Experimental Institute). The Sonderdienst Seehaus came to employ 500 people (monitors, officers, and translators) and was attached to both the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry. The deteriorating wartime conditions in Berlin prompted its relocation to southwest Germany in mid-April 1945. Although the building once again housed a restaurant immediately after the war, it was converted to private dwellings in 2003–2004.

SORGE, RICHARD (1895–1944). A German journalist and celebrated Soviet spy active in China and Japan, Richard Sorge was born in Adjikent, near Baku, Russia, on 4 October 1895, the son of a German petroleum engineer and a Russian mother. In 1906, the family returned to Berlin, where Sorge attended school and joined the Wandervögel youth group. At the age of 19, he eagerly volunteered for service in World War I, earning an Iron Cross but incurring severe leg injuries on the eastern front. His disillusioning war experience—coupled with the Bolshevik victory in Russia—led Sorge to reassess his political convictions and embrace the communist cause. Although he completed a doctorate in political science at Hamburg
University in 1919, it was his role as an agitator and propagandist for the newly formed Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) that absorbed his energies.

Sorge’s work as a bodyguard for a prominent Soviet delegation at a Frankfurt convention in 1924 resulted in his transfer to Comintern headquarters in Moscow, where he became a member of the Soviet Communist Party and a Soviet citizen (while still keeping his German passport). Writing under the pseudonyms R. Sonte and I. K. Sorge, he compiled confidential reports for the international liaison department about the domestic affairs of Germany and other European countries. Frequent clandestine trips expanded the Comintern’s intelligence network. In 1929, his desire to be relieved of organizational work and devote his career to espionage came to realization with a new position in Department IV (intelligence) of the Red Army headed by Jan Karlovich Berzin. Rather than return to Europe, Sorge accepted an assignment to China, much to his superiors’ satisfaction.

Given the code names RAMSAY and VIX, he made arrangements in Berlin for his legal cover as a writer for two specialized agricultural and sociological journals. His first posting was in Shanghai during an early stage of the conflict between the Chinese nationalists and communists. Among his closest friends was the pro-communist American writer Agnes Smedley, who introduced him to a number of people who came to form his Tokyo spy ring, among them the Japanese journalist Ozaki Hotsumi. His radio operator in Shanghai was Max Clausen, who had been charged with improving secret communications between China and the Soviet Union. One of his most successful recruits was Ursula Kuczynski, a fellow German communist who eagerly responded to his overtures and received personal instruction in tradecraft. Recalled to Moscow in December 1932, Sorge was praised for his work in China and given new instructions to obtain information about Japan’s intentions toward the Soviet Union. A brief return visit to Berlin gave him the opportunity to renew his journalistic contacts and, through the geopolitical theorist Karl Haushofer, obtain letters of introduction to the German ambassadors to Japan and the United States.

Arriving in Yokohama on 6 September 1933, Sorge proceeded to the German embassy in Tokyo to register as a German national and apply for membership in the overseas organization of the Nazi Party.
A lucrative friendship developed with Eugen Ott, the senior military attaché at the embassy who became the German ambassador in 1938. Notwithstanding the elaborate security maintained by the Japanese government, Sorge’s spy ring began to take shape. With the exception of Clausen and Branko de Vukelic (who handled photography), all of its nearly 40 members were Japanese, drawn mostly from the banned communist party. Ozaki, because of his affable personality and rising stature as an advisor to the Japanese prime minister, Prince Konoye, was an especially valuable asset. Yet Sorge’s principal source was Ott, who, despite knowledge of his wife’s adulterous affair with Sorge, entrusted him on two occasions with the German cipher tables used in communications with Berlin. At the same time, given his penchant for writing and research, Sorge maintained an active career as a newsman, notably with the prestigious *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

One of Sorge’s most notable accomplishments was obtaining a copy of the Abwehr debriefing of G. S. Lyushkov, the Far Eastern chief of the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) who had defected to the Japanese in 1938. Knowing what the Japanese had thereby ascertained aided in the subsequent victory of the Red Army at Nomonhan, a township on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. Sorge also submitted some of the earliest reports on German preparations for war against the Soviet Union, although Joseph Stalin dismissed his ominous warnings out of hand. In addition, there was widespread suspicion that Sorge might be a double agent engaging in disinformation. Further lessening the impact of his espionage on Soviet decision-making was Clausen’s increasing disillusionment and decision to edit many of his radio transmissions. To friends, Sorge expressed his fear of returning to the Soviet Union and facing possible execution.

During the interrogation of a suspected communist subversive, Japanese authorities inadvertently learned of Sorge’s spy ring. Ozaki’s arrest and confession led police to Sorge on 18 October 1941. After a prolonged investigation and court trial, he and Ozaki were hanged on 7 November 1944. The USSR flatly denied any connection to Sorge until 1964, when he was posthumously proclaimed a “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Thereafter his exploits became celebrated through film, books, and commemorative stamps in both the USSR and the German Democratic Republic.
SOSNOWSKI, GEORG (1896–1942?). A Polish officer who penetrated the Reichswehr Ministry, Georg Sosnowski had served in the Austrian army during World War I before transferring in 1918 to the Polish army as a cavalry captain. In 1926, on the instructions of the Polish General Staff, he moved to Berlin as an *Illegaler* (covert operative) posing as a nobleman, Baron Georg von Sosnowski Ritter von Nalecz, with ample funds at his disposal. Seducing three secretaries of aristocratic background in the Reichswehr Ministry—Benita von Falkenhayn, Irene von Jena, and Renate von Natzmer—he convinced them to provide carbon copies or stenographic notes of high-level correspondence. Of particular value were details about the secret military cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union and the German mobilization plan.

In 1933, Sosnowski developed a relationship with exotic dancer Lea Niako (real name Lea Kruse), who helped the *Abwehr* expose his intelligence network. On 27 February 1934, Sosnowski and the three secretaries were arrested. While Falkenhayn and Natzmer were executed at *Plötzensee Prison* a year later, both Sosnowski and Jena received life sentences. Included in a spy exchange between Poland and Germany, he was released in April 1936. The following year, Sosnowski was convicted by a military court in Warsaw for embezzlement of state funds and placed in a prison in eastern Poland. Captured by the Red Army in 1939, he was turned over to the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). His rigorous interrogation yielded the names of two sources whose information, according to the deputy director of Soviet foreign intelligence, Pavel Sudoplatov, proved useful during the first two years of the war.

SPIEGEL AFFAIR. A major political scandal in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Spiegel Affair was sparked in October 1962 when the popular investigative newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* made a series of scathing accusations against the West German Defense Ministry on the basis of leaked documents from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Under the title “Conditionally Prepared for Defense,” the article maintained that the FRG was a major potential target in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, that the country’s civil defense measures were inadequate, that the Bundeswehr lacked a credible mobilization plan, and that a rift had occurred with the United States.
regarding nuclear strategy. Set against the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis, these charges had particular resonance.

According to a former KGB officer, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, the groundwork for this article had been laid in Moscow in May 1961 by Department D of the First Chief Directorate specializing in disinformation. Insisting that no active collaboration between the KGB and the magazine had taken place, he stated that the documents in question had been passed on to the unsuspecting journalists by a trusted source with the ultimate aim of forcing the West German defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, from office. While firmly refusing to divulge its sources, Der Spiegel denied the allegation in print and in court.

Clearly a bitter relationship existed between Strauss, an often abrasive right-wing politician from Bavaria, and Rudolf Augstein, the aggressive founder and chief editor of the magazine. Augstein had spearheaded a campaign against Strauss for some years, fearing that he might become Konrad Adenauer’s successor as chancellor. In two instances, Strauss had sued the magazine for libel but received only partial vindication. But this time, Strauss was much bolder. Contending that the publication of secret material was a violation of West German law, he and Adenauer directed the Federal Criminal Police to search the magazine’s main office in Hamburg and a branch in Bonn. Augstein was arrested on 27 October and charged with treason, while the author of the article, Conrad Ahlers, was detained abroad by Spanish police and put on a return flight to Frankfurt am-Main. Also arrested was Adolf Wicht, the head of the Hamburg office of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), who was charged with having alerted Augstein about the initial investigation. Adenauer, deeply suspicious of further BND complicity, summoned its chief, Reinhard Gehlen, to a lengthy interrogation in Bonn.

What had begun as a dispute over the adequacy of the FRG’s military defenses rapidly became a matter involving freedom of the press and other basic democratic safeguards. A storm of protest followed Augstein’s arrest and imprisonment. With many finding the government’s actions too reminiscent of Gestapo tactics during the Third Reich, the entire West German press struck an unusual note of unanimity in condemning what had transpired. The most damaging element proved to be Strauss’s misrepresentations to the Bundestag regarding his role in the affair, and on 30 November, the embattled
defense minister submitted his resignation. Although Adenauer saved his coalition government and announced the formation of a new cabinet shortly thereafter, he retired at the age of 88 the following year. Der Spiegel emerged from this affair with enhanced power and prestige and a hugely expanded readership. Within the BND, Wicht was rehabilitated and later received a promotion, but the bond that had existed between Gehlen and Adenauer was never restored.

SPIELMATERIAL. False or misleading information, Spielmaterial (play material) is often provided to a double agent to confound the operative’s original service.

SPORTVEREINIGUNG DYNAMO. A professional sports league for the personnel of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), the Sportvereinigung Dynamo (Dynamo Sports Association) was founded on 27 March 1953 and named expressly after the long-standing Soviet state security sports organization. The chair of the Sportvereinigung Dynamo, MfS chief Erich Mielke, allocated considerable funds to develop its extensive facilities for a variety of sports. A passionate soccer fan himself, he took a particular pride in the establishment of a world-class team in the capital city—BFC (Berlin Football Club) Dynamo—which operated under the auspices of the sports association. Its long winning streak of 10 consecutive national championships began in 1979 and was often attributed to the special considerations accorded the team both on and off the field. In addition to the main stadium and training facilities located in Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, branches existed in each district of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to spot and develop younger talent for BFC Dynamo. Contrary to Mielke’s desire, the team never achieved popularity among the general public and was frequently an object of derision. A prime objective of the MfS was to stem the exodus of star sports players to West Germany (Republikflucht) that had taken place during the 1950s. As a result, a large network of informers had been recruited among the trainers, masseurs, journalists, functionaries, and key athletes throughout the GDR. The MfS further supervised the illegal doping program that had begun in the Sportvereinigung Dynamo in 1964 and had spread to other athletic groups with Mielke’s authorization.
After the collapse of the GDR, the soccer team adopted the name FC Berlin to minimize its widely known past Stasi affiliation, but in 1999 its earlier name was restored. Not only did the quality of its players drop precipitously in the immediate post-reunification period, but the team also attracted a large following of hooligans and neo-Nazis. See also EIGENDORF, LUTZ.

SPUHLER, ALFRED (1940– ). An officer of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) who spied for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Alfred Spuhler had been a soldier in the West German Bundeswehr since 1958 before an accident during a maneuver resulted in the loss of his left eye. Transferring in October 1968 to a BND cover organization, the Amt für Militärkunde (Office of Military Information), he gained a proficiency in military intelligence and telecommunications. His dissatisfaction over West German rearmament and the seemingly exaggerated depiction of the Soviet threat caused him to contact members of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, who helped arrange a meeting in fall 1971 with the HVA in East Berlin. By the following spring, having recruited his older brother Ludwig, a technician at the Max Planck Institute for Astrophysics in Garching (Bavaria), Spuhler signed a formal agreement.

The division of labor between the two brothers (code names PETER and FLORIAN) allowed not only for the collection of voluminous information—sometimes totaling 400 pages a week—but also for a rapid delivery time. A new position in subject area 12 AB of the BND gave the younger Spuhler (BND code name Pergau) access to the computer database of information regarding all informants active in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). As a result, the identity of some 300 West German agents became known to the HVA. Not surprisingly, the GDR bestowed numerous awards on both brothers.

Following their arrest on 29 November 1989, a Munich court sentenced Alfred Spuhler to a 10-year prison term and the repayment of 60,000 DM earned as an agent. According to the judge, his actions had rendered the BND “transparent,” thereby allowing it to become effectively an “instrument of the enemy.” His brother received a sentence of five and a half years, while their HVA control officer, Günter Böttger, walked away with a suspended 14-month sentence. On 16 December 1994, Alfred Spuhler was released on probation.
SPY EXCHANGES. See GLIENICKER BRIDGE.

SQUILLACOTE, THERESA MARIA. See STAND, KURT ALAN, and SQUILLACOTE, THERESA MARIA.

SS. An elite quasi-military organization of the Nazi Party, the SS (Schutzstaffel; Protection Squad) originated as a personal bodyguard for Adolf Hitler in 1928 under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler and rapidly grew to a force of more than 50,000 within five years. After the Nazi seizure of power, the SS eliminated its major competitor, the Sturmabteilung, during the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934 and increasingly penetrated the surviving police units of the Weimar Republic. Of particular importance was the early creation of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) under Reinhard Heydrich.

Himmler saw the SS not merely as a special body of loyal troops but as the disciplined core of a new racial order. An elaborate hierarchy of titles along with redesigned uniforms was introduced, and special typewriters had a key with the pseudo-runic version of the letters “SS.” An aura of mystery and invincibility was cultivated, and the general public gained no glimpse of its often chaotic and intrigue-filled inner workings. By 1939, the SS was broadly divided between the Allgemeine-SS (General SS) and the Waffen-SS (Armed SS). Charged with handling police and racial matters, the former was centered in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, while the latter, rigorously trained for battlefield combat, performed no discernible intelligence functions.

Despite its formidable presence in the Third Reich, Hitler never allowed the SS to gain a commanding position, preferring instead to issue his orders to a series of subordinates with overlapping responsibilities. Himmler was never considered by the Führer as a viable successor. Although the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg declared the SS to be a criminal organization and a number of officials were executed after 1945—among them Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Kurt Daluege, and Otto Ohlendorf—the majority were treated with leniency, some even finding postwar intelligence careers with the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps and the Organisation Gehlen. See also EINSATZGRUPPEN.
STAATSPOLIZEILICHER DIENST (Stapo). The domestic secret service branch of the post–World War II Austrian police, the Staatspolizeilicher Dienst (State Police Service) was established as part of the interior ministry and charged with counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Its specific functions included the protection of key state officials and foreign diplomatic personnel along with official buildings and residences. Certain administrative functions—issuing passports, registering foreigners, and regulating associations and public meetings—also fell under its purview. In the early postwar years, the Österreichische Kommunistische Partei and extreme right-wing groups received the bulk of Stapo’s attention; in later decades, radical student groups, peace and antinuclear organizations, and environmental and animal rights associations were also closely monitored. In 1993, according to a new police security law, oversight responsibilities were assigned to a special permanent subcommittee of the Nationalrat (National Council). While a significant expansion of Stapo’s investigative and monitoring powers took place in 1999–2000, a new security law advisor and judicial complaint procedure were also introduced.

In December 2002, the Stapo was replaced by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (BVT; Federal Agency for State Security and Counterterrorism) located in Vienna. Modeled after the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz and the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the new agency streamlined the procedures for notifying decision-makers such as the newly created Austrian National Sicherheitsrat (National Security Council) and for maintaining communication abroad with other security groups. The BVT attracted international attention in November 2005 with the arrest of British historian David Irving in Vienna for having violated Austria’s laws regarding Holocaust denial.

STAHLMANN, RICHARD (1891–1974). A longtime communist revolutionary who became the first deputy foreign intelligence chief of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Richard Stahlmann was born Artur Illner in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) on 15 November 1891, the son of a carpenter. Leaving school at the age of 14, he began his vocational training as a cabinetmaker. With the outbreak of World War I, he was inducted into the army and saw
frontline combat on both the eastern and western fronts. In July 1917, a fierce engagement in Flanders led to his capture by the British. Although ill-informed about Germany’s political situation upon returning to Königsberg in late 1919—and taking no part in the November Revolution—Illner soon joined most of his family in the new Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). Despite his rapid rise in the local woodworkers’ union, his greater desire was to put his military skills to use on behalf of the party. First in the Königsberg area and then in the Ruhr, Illner showed such ability in organizing the transport of weapons that in October 1923 the KPD ordered him to terminate his vocational and union responsibilities and become a member of the military-political apparatus.

Assigned to Berlin the following year, he worked for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) disguised as an employee of the Soviet Trade Commission. But the stabilization of the Weimar Republic soon brought an end to armed revolutionary activity, and Illner was among those selected for further training in Moscow. Since a warrant for his arrest had been issued, he chose the name Richard Stahlmann to mask his identity before leaving Berlin. After becoming a citizen of the USSR and a member of the Soviet Communist Party, he studied at the GRU’s newly established school for undercover agents, completing the course in April 1925.

Sent to China in 1927, Stahlmann was to assist the communist Chinese forces with their planned insurrection in Canton and attempt to persuade Kuomintang soldiers to defect. In the debacle that resulted, he escaped and returned to Moscow, bringing with him members of the Chinese delegation (including Chou En-lai) to the Comintern’s sixth World Congress. In June 1928, Stahlmann was designated a member of the Comintern’s Military Conspiracy Commission, which attempted to plant communist cells in the standing armed forces of West European countries. His missions achieved only limited results. In Czechoslovakia, he had to flee after an initial success, while Great Britain never opened its doors to him. After six months in Alsace-Lorraine, a border incident forced his return to Moscow in the summer of 1931.

Wanted by police throughout Europe, he enrolled in the training course at the International Lenin School, where he came into contact with Wilhelm Zaisser and Erich Mielke, both later heads of the
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. In summer 1932, under orders of Georgi Dimitroff, the secretary of the Comintern’s West European Bureau, Stahlmann assumed the editorship in Berlin of the new periodical Balkan Federation. In the aftermath of the Reichstag fire the following year, he and his wife took refuge first in Vienna, then in Zurich, where the magazine was revived under the name Balkan Correspondent. When its editorial office was transferred to Paris and the less overtly communist European Voices took its place, he spent only a short time in the French capital before embarking on an assignment in Spain.

In late 1936, following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Stahlmann arrived at a small village in Estremadura with instructions from the GRU to organize a multinational unit designed to cause disruption behind enemy lines. Its success led to the task of transforming a commando group into a motorized partisan battalion. Maintaining close contact with officials from the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) as well, he supplied “special cadres” trained in sabotage operations along with reliable persons to help track down suspected Trotskyists. In December 1937, he was recalled from Spain to assist his ailing wife with the publication of European Voices. The outbreak of war, however, hastened his departure from Paris and brought him eventually back to Moscow.

The Comintern next sent Stahlmann to Stockholm to investigate the foundering attempts to reestablish contact with the KPD. In a joint report, he and Herbert Wehner, the head of the Comintern’s German section, concluded that grievous errors had exposed the Berlin-Stockholm nexus to the Gestapo and that the head of the operation, Karl Mewis, should be relieved immediately. They also began to explore how the KPD could be rebuilt in Germany with the infusion of new instructors. These plans never materialized, for not only did a dispute develop between the two men, but Swedish police apprehended Wehner in February 1942. Narrowly avoiding arrest six months later, Stahlmann remained undercover in Sweden for the next three years to fulfill his other set of instructions from the GRU—to build a partisan group, to signal the departure of Luftwaffe aircraft via radio, and to disrupt the Wehrmacht’s lines of communication.

Already in 1944, Stahlmann had been selected for important postwar work in Germany. He arrived in the spring of 1946 and was
first sent to Schwerin to establish a courier network along the East-West zonal boundary and guard the party against enemy infiltration. Within a few months, a new task—officially described as the development of the Central Committee’s transportation section—became his main focus. His responsibilities included managing the illegal border crossings of the cadres, maintaining coded contact with the West German communist party as well as supplying it with financial assistance, and smuggling party propaganda into the Western zones. Stahlmann also showed no hesitation in carrying out actions against party members who had fallen into disrepute. In 1950, he organized the abduction of Kurt Müller, the vice chair of the West German communist party and a Bundestag member, who then underwent a brutal interrogation by Erich Mielke and spent five years in Soviet captivity.

The high point of Stahlmann’s career came with the establishment of a new foreign intelligence service of the GDR in August 1951. Disguised as the Institute for Economic and Scientific Research, the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN) was initially headed by Anton Ackermann in conjunction with MGB advisor Andrei Graur. But Stahlmann, the deputy director, became its de facto head, and because of his connections to senior party officials, he managed to procure needed equipment and funds for the poorly outfitted operation. A larger question concerned his ability to make the transition from the era of illegal activity and partisan fighting to a more modern intelligence operation. Many of his personnel selections dated from his Comintern period, especially the Spanish Civil War, while his training methods for new recruits showed little change from his days in Moscow.

It therefore came as little surprise when his much younger colleague, Markus Wolf, was chosen to head the APN in late 1952. Stahlmann, who had always preferred serving the party on the barricades rather than behind a desk, put up no resistance and was slowly relieved of his responsibilities. Especially after being cited by the Central Party Control Commission in the Ernst Wollweber affair, Stahlmann had to leave the foreign intelligence branch in January 1958. His transfer to the Cadres and Training Division of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) lasted only two months before Mielke ordered his retirement. While Stahlmann’s testimony was
used prominently against Wehner in Operation Wotan in 1961, a later internal MfS investigation concluded that Mewis, not Wehner, had revealed his name to Swedish authorities. Stahlmann died on 25 December 1974.

STALLMANN, RUDOLF. See LEMOINE, RUDOLPHE.

STAND, KURT ALAN (1955– ), and SQUILLACOTE, THERESA MARIA (1958– ). An American husband-and-wife team engaged by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Kurt Alan Stand and Theresa Maria Squillacote first met in 1974 at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, drawn together by their common attraction to radical left-wing causes. Stand, whose communist father had immigrated to the United States to escape the Nazi regime, had been recruited two years previously while in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and given the code name JUNIOR. As requested by his handler, he enlisted another student, James Michael Clark (code name JACK), in 1976 and then his new wife in 1980 (code names RESI and SCHWAN). Reflecting their ideological convictions, the couple named their two children after the martyred German communists Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

Stand and Squillacote received several training sessions in the GDR as well as forged British passports with the names Alan David Jackson and Mary Teresa Miller for their numerous trips abroad. As a lawyer, Squillacote found a temporary position on the House Armed Services Committee and then in the Office of the Undersecretary for Acquisition Reform in the Department of Defense, while Stand became the representative of an international union of food industry workers. Clark was a paralegal for the U.S. Army until 1989. They communicated with the HVA in the language of Christian missionaries, referring to coded signals as the “voice of God.”

The trio’s identity came to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Acting on information contained in East German documents, the FBI initiated close surveillance and made Squillacote the center of a sting operation. To a special agent posing as a pro-communist South African spymaster, Squillacote boasted of her past work for the HVA and agreed to obtain confidential Pentagon material. Following the
arrest of the trio in October 1997, Clark agreed to provide testimony and therefore received a reduced sentence of 12 years. Squillacote and Stand were given prison terms of 21 and 17 years respectively. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court turned down their appeal without comment.

STANGE, BERND (1948– ). A prominent East German soccer trainer and key informant of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Bernd Stange was born in Gnaschwitz (Saxony) on 14 March 1948. In 1971, following a minor career as a player, Stange became assistant coach of FC Carl Zeiss Jena in 1971, which subsequently twice won the league title as well as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Cup. Among his players, he acquired the nickname Lügenbaron (Lying Baron) because of his resemblance to the legendary Baron Münchhausen. Approached by an officer of the local MfS unit in Jena, he signed a formal agreement on 5 November 1973 and was assigned the code name KURT WEGENER. His immediate task was surveillance of his team members to detect political deviations and prevent defections to the West.

As Stange became assistant trainer for the GDR national team in 1980, and head coach in 1982, the MfS used his professional contacts among other coaches and sports journalists in the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite high marks for his thorough commentaries and ideological soundness, the MfS abruptly terminated the 13-year relationship in late August 1986 for reasons left unspecified in its final report. Returning to Jena and then assuming posts in Leipzig and Berlin, Stange found his career in post-reunification Germany untenable when rumors of his Stasi affiliation were confirmed in February 1995. He then received permission to inspect the file of KURT WEGENER. Afterward, a number of positions abroad materialized, including in Iraq, where he was head coach of the national soccer team between 2002–2004 in an arrangement negotiated by Saddam Hussein’s son Uday.

STANGE, JÜRGEN (1928– ). A West Berlin attorney involved in numerous East-West spy exchanges, Jürgen Stange started meeting with his East German counterpart, Wolfgang Vogel, in the late 1950s. Their first major transaction involved the transfer of Rudolf
Abel and Francis Gary Power at the Glienicker Bridge on 10 February 1962. Later that year, Stange and Vogel expanded the scope of their negotiations to include the purchase of political prisoners in the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany. See also VOLPERT, HEINZ.

STARITZ, DIETRICH (1934– ). A leading West German academic authority on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) who worked for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Dietrich Staritz was born in Berlin. Although raised in the Western sector, he began attending Humboldt University in East Berlin in 1956 and became a member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) the following year. Political differences with the regime following the arrest of his brother caused him to return to West Berlin in 1958. There he gained a prominent position in the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS; German Socialist Student Association) and was engaged as an informer by the MfS in September 1961. Under the code name ERICH, Staritz reported on conflicts within the SDS and provided names of many potential recruits. In addition, he became an informer for the West Berlin office of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), receiving the code name RABE in April 1963. His dealings with the BfV were also recounted in his reports to the MfS.

After working as a reporter for the newsmagazine Der Spiegel between 1968 and 1972, Staritz became a professor at the University of Mannheim and gained recognition for his works on the GDR. In 1973, the MfS terminated his activity, concluding that “an effective and reliable working relationship” was no longer possible. When his MfS file became known after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he denied ever having caused any scholarly damage to anyone. As a professor emeritus, Staritz became a contributor to the former SED newspaper Neues Deutschland.

STARZICZNY, JOSÉF. An Abwehr operative in Brazil during World War II, Joséf Starziczny was born in Upper Silesia of Polish parents. After serving in the imperial navy during World War I, he obtained a degree in mechanical engineering in 1922 from the Technical College in Breslau (now Wroclaw). At the outbreak of World
War II, the Abwehr enlisted Starziczny (code name Lucassen) with the intention of paradropping him into England because of his knowledge of the country. Declining the mission, he was assigned instead to Brazil to construct new radio transmission centers.

Traveling under the name Niels Christian Christiansen, Starziczny reached Rio de Janeiro on 6 April 1941 and established a communications link with the Abwehrstelle in Hamburg the following month. Yet dissension soon developed within the Brazilian network, compounded by Starziczny’s extravagant lifestyle and lack of familiarity with the Portuguese language. Arrested in March 1942 as part of a massive spy roundup in the country, he not only confessed but gave authorities his complete records, including all the messages sent and received and the payments made to his informants. Despite his cooperation, Starziczny’s release from prison did not occur until 1958. He stayed in Brazil afterward, settling in Niterói and opening a radio repair shop.

STASI. The common acronym for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Stasi gained widespread usage during the revolution of 1989, when East German citizens made the secret police of the German Democratic Republic their most passionate target of protest. While some experts avoided the colloquial term, contending that it minimized the more sinister aspects of the MfS, it nonetheless spread throughout the world and became synonymous with all-encompassing state surveillance. Within the MfS, the term was eschewed because of its negative connotations.

STAUBWASSER, ANTON. The head of intelligence for Army Group B under Erwin Rommel in 1944–1945, Anton Staubwasser had served previously in Fremde Heere West (FHW) for three and a half years and gained expertise regarding the organizational structure of the British army. Yet in this new situation, he had no independent sources and was wholly dependent on information supplied by the head of FHW, Alexis von Roenne. Aware that Roenne knowingly inflated his order of battle figures concerning the anticipated Allied landing in northern France, Staubwasser complained afterward that he could only guess which details “could be accepted as true.”
STEFFEN-DIENSTBACH CASE. A major instance of Soviet industrial espionage in Weimar Germany, the Steffen-Dienstbach case involved the penetration of the large chemical complex of I. G. Farben. The operation was directed by Erich Steffen, camouflaged as the head of a communist trade union organization as well as a member of the Soviet Trade Legation, and it used the contacts of Karl Dienstbach, an intelligence operative and discharged employee of the firm, to gather information on specific industrial processes. One worker, however, reported his encounter to the authorities, and after being monitored for two months, Steffen, Dienstbach, and other engineers and employees were arrested in April 1931.

Although incriminating evidence was found in Steffen’s home, the Foreign Office blocked the prosecution’s attempt to search the Soviet Trade Legation in Berlin, a known center of espionage activity. The defense maintained that the group was interested only in gathering data on the working conditions in the chemical industry, to be published afterward in a trade union journal. As a result, the sentence was a lenient one—10 months in prison for the three main participants and four months for the others—but Steffen was eventually lured to Moscow, where he died during the Stalinist purges. The public clamor over the case led to the Decree on the Defense of the National Economy signed by President Paul von Hindenburg on 9 March 1932. Whereas this law increased the maximum prison term permissible, the Nazis, once in power, made industrial espionage an offense punishable by death.

STEIMLE, EUGEN (1909–1987). A senior officer of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service) convicted of war crimes, Eugen Steimle was born in Neubulach (Baden-Württemberg) on 8 December 1909, the son of a farmer. A Nazi activist while a student at Tübingen and Berlin, he joined the SD in April 1936 and became the district leader in Stuttgart within a matter of months. Considered a “remarkable success” by his superiors, Steimle was given command of a special forces unit in 1941 and again the following year. He also attracted the attention of Walter Schellenberg, who appointed him to head the West European section of the SD from February 1943 to May 1945. After the war, a Nuremberg court found Steimle guilty of having murdered at least 500 people while serving in the
Soviet Union. His 1948 death sentence was subsequently revised to 20 years’ imprisonment due to new information. Released in 1953, Steimle found employment as a high school teacher in Wilhelmsdorf (Baden-Württemberg). He died there on 9 October 1987.

STEINER, JULIUS (1924– ). A West German politician with ties to several intelligence organizations, Julius Steiner was born in Stuttgart on 8 September 1924. During the 1950s, he was an informant for both the Bundesnachrichtendienst and the Landessamt für Verfassungsschutz in Baden-Württemberg. A member of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU), he was elected to the Bundestag in 1969. On 27 April 1972, the attempt of the CDU to topple the government of Willy Brandt failed because Steiner, along with Leo Wagner of the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union, abstained from a vote of no confidence. At a press conference in June, Steiner confessed to having received a 50,000 DM bribe from Karl Wienand, the whip of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. Wienand, however, denied the charge before a parliamentary committee investigating the matter. Yet in his 1997 memoirs, Markus Wolf, former head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), stated that 50,000 DM had been given to Steiner in order to keep Brandt in office, as his foreign policy initiatives were viewed as highly advantageous to the German Democratic Republic. In 2006, the HVA connection to Steiner and Wagner was further confirmed by the Rosenholz data.

STEINHAUER, GUSTAV. A German spy responsible for pre–World War I espionage in Great Britain, Gustav Steinhauer was born in Berlin. After several years in the imperial navy, he held various jobs throughout the world, including a position with the Pinkerton Detective Agency in Chicago, but returned to Germany in the early 1890s. Reflecting a major reorientation of German foreign policy, the navy engaged him to conduct intelligence missions to Britain. During the Agadir crisis of 1911, he assumed the disguise of an optical goods salesman, and on his last mission in July 1914, his assignment involved surveillance of British warships in Scottish ports. Yet “N” (naval intelligence) also gave Steinhauer responsibility for recruiting agents—a task he performed with much less aptitude. Not only was his amateurish network composed mostly of demimonde figures and
former criminals, but its overly centralized communications system played directly into the hands of the British mail interception office.

During the war, “N” shifted its main intelligence-gathering to neutral European ports, and Steinhauer established a branch of the new Marine Interrogation Service in Esbjerg, Denmark. With the assistance of an Australian journalist, Steinhauer’s memoirs, Der Meisterspion des Kaisers (The Kaiser’s Master Spy), were published in 1930. He later took issue with the title, contending that the British had embellished his actual role. See also ERNST, KARL GUSTAV.

**STELZER, THEODOR.** An Abwehr agent stationed in Norway and a key member of the anti-Nazi Kreisau Circle, Theodor Stelzer had opposed the regime of Adolf Hitler from the outset. In 1933, charges of high treason were lodged against him for having written and distributed seditious material. Nevertheless, Stelzer escaped a trial and was recruited by Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris at the beginning of World War II. Overtly serving as the chief of army transport under General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, he secretly established contact with the Norwegian underground—at Canaris’s behest—and aided their efforts to impede the German occupation army. When recalled to Berlin following the failure of the conspiracy of 20 July 1944, Stelzer did not attempt to escape to Sweden but confronted the charges against him truthfully. According to his Christian beliefs, any act of political murder including the coup was viewed as immoral. Confined to the state prison at Moabit in Berlin, Stelzer was released on 25 April 1945, as the warden feared the advancing Red Army and was persuaded to set the inmates free.

**STIEBER, WILHELM (1818–1882).** One of the most successful and innovative spies in the service of 19th-century Prussia and Germany, Wilhelm Stieber was born in Merseburg (Saxony-Anhalt) on 3 May 1818, the son of a minor civil servant. Contrary to the wishes of his father, he abandoned theology during his studies at the University of Berlin and graduated with a law degree in 1841. He became a civil service trainee at the Berlin Criminal Court and later worked with the criminal police. His unconventional methods, however, aroused the mistrust of his colleagues, and a reputation for unscrupulous behavior
His attachment to the Prussian monarchy—and Friedrich William IV in particular—led to his appointment in 1850 as head of the Berlin Criminal Police. Not only had Stieber served as a royal bodyguard during the turbulent 1848 Revolution but the escape of the notorious revolutionary Gottfried Kinkel from Spandau prison in 1850 had convinced the monarch of the need for a stronger police enforcement. Building on his previous work in gathering incriminating material on German radicals connected to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in London, Stieber established a separate department that monitored dissident activities through a wide network of informants. He also compiled a general handbook of communist conspiracies.

In 1858, because of the worsening health of Friedrich William IV, his reform-minded brother, the future William I, was appointed regent and sought to curb what he considered the excessive police and spy presence in Prussia. Stieber soon faced charges by the state prosecutor of having willfully deprived people of their personal liberty, although the court eventually acquitted him following his threat of invoking the monarch’s responsibility in these cases. Dismissed from active police work and given a reduced salary, Stieber nevertheless attracted the attention of the Russian embassy, which was anxious to track various political activists who had fled the tsarist regime to Prussia. His undercover work earned him a substantial fee as well as several awards by the Russian government.

The last and most important phase of his life came via Otto von Bismarck. With the outbreak of the Austrian-Prussian War in 1866, Bismarck proposed that Stieber head the newly formed Feldpolizei (Field Security Police), which was approved by the war minister, General Albrecht von Roon. Its functions included safeguarding the main headquarters, preventing the infiltration of enemy agents, and acquiring information about the Austrian military. As the successful war lasted only a matter of weeks, Bismarck retained Stieber’s services by appointing him head of yet another new body, the Central-Nachrichten-Büreau (Central Intelligence Bureau). Any criticism of his new intelligence chief was sternly rebuffed by Bismarck, who, following an unsuccessful attempt on his life, quipped that Stieber was the only “useful policeman” in all of Prussia. Nevertheless, no
personal ties ever developed between the two men, and Stieber is barely mentioned in Bismarck’s three-volume memoirs.

The overriding purpose of the Central-Nachrichten-Büreau was to collect information about activities hostile to the Prussian government, both at home and abroad. Stieber’s first major operation was directed against the Welfen Legion, a group formed by the recently defeated Hanoverian monarch George V to regain his former kingdom, now incorporated in Prussia. Stieber succeeded in capturing the king’s couriers and confiscating his secret bank accounts (Stieber’s bureau was itself financed off the books by the disposed monarch’s former properties). Ultimately, Prussian agents so thoroughly penetrated the Welfen Legion that Bismarck knew their plans better than the Hanoverian king.

Shortly before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Stieber traveled to Paris to collect information about new military equipment acquired by the French army. He then visited Switzerland, the hub of spy activities during the war, to meet with his agents. During the war, the direction of the Feldpolizei again became his chief responsibility. Even though Stieber was ostensibly under military command, Bismarck called on him with special instructions. In one instance, he asked Stieber to reprimand the mayor of Reims for having proclaimed his allegiance to the new government in Paris, thereby provoking objections from the military leadership for unauthorized interference. Still the Prussian military command under Helmut von Moltke clearly profited from information acquired from one of Stieber’s agents, the Austrian August Schluga Baron von Rastenfeld, who, as a Paris newspaper correspondent, had close ties to the French war ministry. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Stieber had the task of blocking communication—including balloon traffic—between Paris and the unoccupied provinces.

Awarded the Iron Cross, Stieber returned to Berlin and his earlier espionage post, this time concentrating on Bismarck’s chief political rivals, the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party. As very little lay concealed from public view, the bureau lost much of its rationale and was dissolved in 1873 by Roon, Bismarck’s successor as minister-president of Prussia. One more opportunity for service arose in 1877 when Stieber was approached by the Russian government and asked to organize a military police force in the impending war
STILLER, WERNER (1947– ). A major defector from the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) to the Federal Republic of Germany, Werner Stiller was born in Wessmar (Saxony-Anhalt) on 24 August 1947, the illegitimate son of a Silesian immigrant. He took a leading role in the official communist youth organizations, although the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 aroused in him the first stirrings of doubt about the legitimacy of the ruling regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Nevertheless in 1970, while a student of physics at Karl Marx University in Leipzig, Stiller agreed to be an informer for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. A full-time position with the HVA followed shortly after the completion of his doctorate in 1971. Choosing the code name stahlmann, he was assigned to a subsection of the Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik (SWT) and given responsibility for the recruitment of Western physicists who could supply the GDR with much needed research data.

Although Stiller received numerous commendations for his work and advanced to first lieutenant, his increasing disillusionment with life in the GDR caused him to make contact with the Bundesnachrichtendienst in May 1978. It occurred through a new acquaintance, Helga Mischnowski, whose brother, living in the Federal Republic of Germany, then alerted officials of Stiller’s desire to defect. On 18 January 1979, fearing that his detection was imminent, Stiller made a daring escape from the Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse to West Berlin, using a falsified assignment sheet and stolen departmental border pass and bringing with him about 20,000 microfilmed documents from the Normannenstrasse headquarters.

The damage to the HVA was severe. Besides giving Western officials their first detailed knowledge of the SWT, his information led to the immediate arrest of 17 GDR spies (15 were warned in time and exfiltrated). Among those later caught and convicted were a number of Stiller’s own agents: Reiner Fülle (code name...
KLAUS), Gerhard Arnold (code name STURM), Rolf Dobbertin (code name SPERBER), and most important of all, Karl Hauffe (code name FELLOW). In addition, Stiller identified Markus Wolf from a photograph taken earlier in Stockholm, thus giving Western officials their first confirmation of the HVA chief’s physical appearance. Wolf, who characterized Stiller as the “only outright winner in one of the sorrier sagas of my career,” instituted a series of stringent counterintelligence measures within his agency. A further repercussion was the arrest and execution of Stiller’s SWT colleague Werner Teske in June 1981.

While the GDR’s highest military court sentenced him to death in absentia, Stiller, equipped with a new identity as Klaus-Peter Fischer, completed a business administration degree at Washington University in St. Louis in 1983. He subsequently worked as an investment banker in New York, London, and Frankfurt am Main before becoming an entrepreneur in Hungary. Written with the assistance of the BND, Stiller’s memoirs, *Im Zentrum der Spionage* (*Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy*), appeared in 1984. To cause further disarray in the HVA, the book purposely exaggerated the length of Stiller’s secret relationship with the BND.

STÖBE, ILSE (1911–1942). A journalist and Soviet agent, Ilse Stöbe was born in Berlin on 17 May 1911, the daughter of a carpenter. After joining the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1929 and serving as secretary to the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Theodor Wolff, she was posted to Warsaw in 1932 and recruited for Soviet military intelligence by Rudolf Herrnstadt, who also became her lover. After several of his key sources were transferred to Berlin and Bucharest, Stöbe (code name ALTA) served as the communications link. With the outbreak of World War II came a new position in the information division of the Foreign Office as well as a close association with the resistance group around Arvid Harnack. Having emerged as a principal Soviet operative, Stöbe was arrested on 12 September 1942 by the Gestapo along with other members of the Rote Kapelle. She was guillotined on 22 December at Plötzensee Prison. Stöbe had the distinction of being the only female spy honored on a commemorative coin of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.
STÖBERHAI. The site of a major Cold War listening post maintained by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Stöberhai is a mountain in the Harz range in the north of West Germany. The facility was constructed primarily to counter the installation at the Brocken, located only several kilometers away in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1957, the Bundeswehr built the initial facility, which saw several expansions during the next decades, including an underground atomic bomb shelter. The main 70-meter concrete tower, rising from a 16-story building, began operation in late February 1967. The chief priority was ascertaining troop movements of the Warsaw Pact (knowledge of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was gained prior to the event) as well as projected military targets in the West. Flight training also figured as an important prerequisite for those charged with monitoring radio transmissions. Because of the added presence of French military personnel, contact with West Berlin could be maintained, which was otherwise barred to the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The distinctive architectural form of the Stöberhai listening post was repeated in facilities along the border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. They became known by their identifying initial: A (Klaustorf), B (Thurauer Berg), C (Stöberhai), E (Schneeberg), and F (Hoher Bogen). Although a costly modernization project was undertaken immediately after German reunification, authorities decided to close the Stöberhai facility permanently in 1992. It soon fell into disrepair, and on 25 September 2005 the tower was officially demolished by a large quantity of explosives. One year later, a memorial plaque was dedicated at the site. See also TEUFELSBERG.

STOEBER, KARL-HEINZ. An Illegaler (covert operative) dispatched to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) by the Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Karl-Heinz Stoeber was a native of Dresden. In 1965, Stoeber assumed the identity of Heinz Dieter Pichtotka and spent nearly two years in Finland in preparation for the assignment. After obtaining genuine identity papers from the West German embassy in Helsinki, Stoeber, posing as a trained physicist, entered the FRG and settled in the Ruhr region. Further cover was provided by membership in right-wing political organizations. Stoeber’s reports
and estimates gleaned from numerous conversations proved quite satisfactory to his VA superiors.

On 9 March 1967, Stoeber was arrested, as the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz had observed him entering the Soviet embassy and later ascertained that his identification papers had been issued by West German officials in Scandinavia. Stoeber declared himself a “proud citizen of the German Democratic Republic” in a manner not unlike that of Günter Guillaume. Serving only part of his three-year prison sentence, he returned to the GDR, where friends and relatives had been led to believe that the trained engineer was part of a transportation project in Mongolia.

STOLPE, MANFRED (1936– ). A prominent East German politician accused of being an informer for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Manfred Stolpe was born in Stettin on 16 May 1936. After completing his studies at Jena in 1959, Stolpe became a lawyer for the Protestant Church in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and ultimately its chief negotiator with government officials. In 1970, despite the absence of a written agreement, the MfS registered him under the code name sekretär, and for nearly 20 years, regular meetings took place between Stolpe and his main MfS contact, Klaus Rossberg. Neither had church leaders authorized his actions nor were they apprised of these discussions by Stolpe himself.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and his election as minister-president of the state of Brandenburg, Stolpe’s past relationship with the MfS came to light, causing a controversy of unusual and prolonged intensity. While he explained that it was part of a strategy to “outwit” the GDR through its own instruments of power, his critics—especially many former dissidents—contended that Stolpe had been grossly co-opted (one piece of evidence pointed to his acceptance of a prestigious state award in an MfS safe house). An investigative committee of the Brandenburg state legislature found no “actionable involvement” on his part, and even more significantly, in 2005 Germany’s highest court ruled in Stolpe’s favor after an opposition politician referred to him on television as a former MfS agent. Besides remaining a highly popular figure in Brandenburg, he served as federal transportation minister in the cabinet of Gerhard Schröder from 2002 to 2005.
STOTZINGEN MISSION. The covert attempt to establish a German foothold in southern Arabia during World War I, the Stotzingen Mission was conceived in late 1915 with Turkish permission and headed by Othmar von Stotzingen, a reserve officer with proven credentials. Hoping to take advantage of Great Britain’s recent military defeats in the Middle East, the elaborate plan called for the construction of a propaganda and intelligence outpost in the Yemeni port of Hodeida that would also provide support for German military operations in East Africa. Yet on 5 June 1915, Stotzingen and his party were caught unawares in the midst of an anti-Turkish revolt led by Husayn ibn Ali. While Stotzingen and two of his five men managed to escape and return along the Red Sea coast to Syria, some incriminating documents were left behind in the melee and were passed on to the British by Husayn.

STROHMeyer, FRANZ (1815–1848). A one-time radical journalist who served as an agent for the Mainzer Informationsbüro (MIB), Franz Strohmeyer began publishing the Wächter am Rhein in the aftermath of the July Revolution in France in 1830. When the Frankfurt Central Investigation Committee banned the publication because of its “revolutionary machinations and journalistic misconduct,” he fled via Strasbourg to Switzerland and became editor in chief of the Schweizer Freiheitsfreund. In 1834, Strohmeyer joined three other exile Germans in Bern to found the secret society Junges Deutschland. His expulsion from Switzerland three years later, however, resulted in his recruitment by Bernhard Lizius for the MIB. Strohmeyer’s regular submissions began in 1843, appearing under the cover names Linder and Dr. West. Forced to leave France, he relocated in London as the English correspondent for the Badische Zeitung, but by 1844 he was reporting from Paris, Lyon, and Strasbourg. His assignment to monitor the growing communist movement brought him back to Switzerland for a short period. His final position was in Constance as editor of the Tagesherold. Falling gravely ill in spring 1847, Strohmeyer died the following year.

STRÜBING, JOHANN (1907–?). A former Gestapo official forced to resign from the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Johann Strübing entered police service in 1927. Assigned to the main
Berlin office of the Gestapo in 1937, he came to direct the wartime subdivision dealing with enemy agents who had been paradropped or were involved in radio operations. With the discovery of the Rote Kapelle by the Funkabwehr in June 1941, Strübing methodically tracked down 116 of its members and assembled the special commission charged with their interrogation. After the war, given his expertise in counterintelligence, Strübing (code name STAHLMANN) was recruited for the new BfV. Yet with the public revelation that the security organs of the Federal Republic of Germany had engaged many ex-Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst officers, his service was terminated in 1963.

STÜLPNAGEL, CARL HEINRICH VON (1886–1944). An army intelligence officer and military governor of France during World War II, Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel was born in Darmstadt on 2 January 1886, the son of a Prussian general. After embarking on a military career in 1904, he served in World War I and afterward held various positions with the Reichswehr. In March 1933, army intelligence—formerly disguised as T 3 but now restored to its older name Fremde Heere—fell under his direction, and a significant expansion occurred, although most of its information was still gleaned from the daily and military press. In 1936, he was promoted to general and given the command of a division, while his successor at Fremde Heere, Kurt von Tippelskirch, sought to consolidate his initiatives.

Stülpnagel’s attitude toward the Third Reich became increasingly critical, especially following the Night of the Long Knives, and he participated in the attempted military coups against Adolf Hitler in 1936 and 1939. Even more noteworthy were his actions following his appointment as military governor of occupied France on 3 March 1942. Despite implementing harsh measures against members of the French Resistance, Stülpnagel allowed his staff headquarters at the Hôtel Majestic in Paris to become the center of the German military conspiracy in the country. Hearing the first news of the attempted assassination of Hitler on 20 July 1944, his followers arrested 1,200 key members of the SS and Sicherheitsdienst in their quarters near the Arc de Triomphe. The failure of the coup resulted in Stülpnagel’s immediate dismissal and recall to Berlin. At the World War I battlefield
outside of Verdun, he tried to commit suicide but only managed to blind himself and mutilate one side of his face. A month later, on 30 October 1944, he was hanged at Plötzensee Prison.

SÜTTERLIN, HEINZ and LEONORE. See RUNGE, YEVGENY YEVGENIEVICH.

SUNRISE. The secret negotiations that brought about the unconditional surrender of German forces in northern Italy in 1945, Operation SUNRISE received its name from Allen Dulles, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) station chief in Bern. His main German counterpart was Karl Wolff, the senior SS officer in Italy. In early March, at their first meeting at an OSS safe house in Zurich, Wolff maintained that he was acting on his own initiative and making no demands for personal immunity. His stated purpose was “to end useless human and material destruction.” On the Allied side, however, the Soviet Union objected vehemently, fearing betrayal by the Americans and the British through the conclusion of a separate peace, while Wolff encountered strong opposition from his SS superiors, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Heinrich Himmler, who were engineering their own exit strategy. Meeting with Adolf Hitler in Berlin, he successfully pretended his aim was to persuade the Americans to join with the Germans against the Soviets.

Although Dulles had initially been instructed to terminate discussions with Wolff, the order was reversed on 26 April; three days later, surrender documents were signed at Allied headquarters in Caserta. The SS general also received special protection from Dulles’s aide, Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz, in face of the threat posed by Italian partisans. This bold operation had particular significance, for not only was a costly last-ditch stand by German forces averted, but these troops were prevented from finding sanctuary in a rumored Alpine fortress and waging a guerrilla campaign. See also WAIBEL, MAX.

SYSTEM DER INFORMATIONSRECHERCHE DER AUFKLÄRUNG (SIRA). The electronic databank of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), the System der Informationsrecherche der Aufklärung (System of Reconnaissance Information Research) originated in 1969 with the acquisition of a Siemens mainframe computer
and counted the Sektor Technik und Wissenschaft as its first user. Each piece of information collected abroad by the HVA was given a registration number, a brief description, and a numerical grade according to its importance and became part of the database. Resembling a large library catalog, SIRA contained none of the actual documents and reports.

Although members of the HVA succeeded in destroying nearly all their files in 1989–1990, four magnetic tapes were overlooked in the general turmoil. Eight years later, they were restored with the aid of a former East German telephone technician and included 484,881 entries beginning with the inception of the system. Yet because only code names were indicated, it was necessary to acquire the Rosenholz material before the real identity of the agents involved could be ascertained. SIRA has proven an invaluable tool in determining the scope of HVA activities and in evaluating the performance of individual spies such as Günter Guillaume.

**SZINDA, GUSTAV (1897–1988).** A Soviet intelligence operative who later worked in the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Gustav Szinda was born in Blindgallen (now Blakaly, Poland) on 13 February 1897, the son of a carpenter. Trained as a machine fitter, he was a soldier in World War I and resettled in Gelsenkirchen afterward. A member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands since 1924, he was engaged in illegal work following the Nazi accession to power and immigrated to Amsterdam in 1935. Szinda’s participation in the Spanish Civil War included the command of the XI International Brigade, the direction of counterintelligence for the International Brigades, and membership in the central committee of the Spanish Communist Party. Transferred to Moscow in 1939, he was entrusted with a variety of wartime tasks, culminating in a teaching position at Antifa School 12.

Szinda returned to Germany in late December 1945 and directed the new People’s Police in Mecklenburg. By 1949, his responsibilities extended to all police matters on behalf of the central committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Known as a former street fighter and implacable interrogator, he headed the counterintelligence section of the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst after its founding in 1951. From 1958 until his retirement in 1965, he directed
the MfS regional administration of Neubrandenburg. A recipient of the GDR’s Service of the Fatherland Award, Szinda died on 23 September 1988. His life story, *Das Leben eines Revolutionärs* (The Life of a Revolutionary), was recorded by Helmut Sakowski and later appeared in print. This standard communist panegyric contains few insights into his career.

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**TANNENBERG.** A covert action designed to cast Poland as the instigator of World War II, Operation TANNENBERG was prepared under the direction of Reinhard Heydrich of the Sicherheitsdienst. According to the plan, immediately prior to the German invasion, SS men posing as Polish insurgents were to storm three targets in Upper Silesia near the Polish frontier: the customs house at Hochlinden (now Stodoly, Poland); the forestry station at Pitschen (now Byczyna, Poland); and most importantly, the radio station at Gleiwitz (now Gliwice, Poland). Yet when Alfred Naujocks and his team entered the station on 31 August 1939, their unfamiliarity with the broadcast equipment meant that the brief anti-German call to arms was heard only in the immediate region. Nevertheless, the body of a murdered Polish sympathizer, Franz Honiok, was left behind to give credence to the staged event. Gestapo head Heinrich Müller had supplied some dozen concentration camp inmates—referred to internally as Konserven (canned goods)—whose corpses, clad in Polish uniforms, were distributed at the sites as well.

Appearing before the Reichstag the following day to explain why the Wehrmacht had been mobilized, Adolf Hitler referred to the provocations of Polish soldiers inside the German border, while members of the foreign press were invited to inspect the Gleiwitz facility. Although it had no discernible impact on the Anglo-French declaration of war, Heydrich never expressed any regrets over the operation. See also JABLONKA PASS.

**T-APPARAT.** A short-lived covert unit of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, the T-Apparat (Terror Apparatus) was established in 1923 to spark a communist insurrection through acts of terror. It was
also called by its opponents the “German Cheka,” having been mod-
eled after the Soviet secret police. Its leader was Felix Neumann, a typesetter by profession, who attempted to assassinate Hans von Seeckt, the chief of the Army Command. Although the plan failed when Seeckt’s horse balked, Neumann later killed a communist barber suspected of being a police informer. His open boast about the deed led not only to his arrest but also to the apprehension of Peter Skoblevsky, a key Soviet agent and former commander during the Russian Revolution. Both were sentenced to death for high treason in 1925 but later exchanged for several German students imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Neumann subsequently joined the Nazi Party. Skoblevsky was executed during the purges of Joseph Stalin.

TECHNISCHER DIENST. A secret right-wing, stay-behind army funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Technischer Dienst (Technical Service) was part of the Bund Deutscher Jugend (Association of German Youth), an anticommunist youth alliance founded in 1950 as a response to the East German Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth). Led by Erhard Peters, the Technischer Dienst trained young Germans, including many former World War II soldiers, to be guerrilla fighters in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. A scandal broke out on both sides of the Atlantic after Hans Werner Otto, a former SS officer and the group’s security chief, divulged details to police in Frankfurt am Main in September 1952. In early January 1953, authorities in Hesse banned both the Bund Deutscher Jugend and the Technischer Dienst, although no prosecutions resulted.

TEJESSY, FRITZ (1895–1964). An early West German authority in matters of domestic intelligence, Fritz Tejessy was born in Brünn (now Brno, Czech Republic), the son of a Jewish merchant. After serving as an Austrian officer in World War I, he settled in Kassel as the editor of a local organ of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands. An appointment to the Prussian Interior Ministry in 1928 gave him responsibility for preventing the subversion of the police by extremist groups, especially the National Socialists. Following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power, Tejessy was forced to begin a long odyssey as an immigrant, first to Czechoslovakia and ultimately to the United
States in 1938. Remaining politically detached, he found work as a weaver in a New Hampshire factory and obtained American citizenship in 1945.

Prompted by a crisis in the textile industry that cost him his job, Tejessy returned to Germany in September 1949. Using his prewar connections and his spotless political record, he secured a position in the Interior Ministry of the North Rhine-Westphalian government based in Düsseldorf. Although officially called an information office, it was in actuality a fledgling intelligence organization designed originally to combat the black market and other corrupt practices and established without the knowledge of British occupation officials (approval was granted in May 1950). With his main assistant Johannes Horatzek, Tejessy engaged freelance agents to penetrate extremist organizations seeking to undermine the new democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). His first comprehensive list included political parties such as the Deutsche Reichspartei, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, and the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), as well as groups such as the Nauheimer Kreis that called for the neutralization of postwar Germany.

Strictly adhering to the letter of the law in procuring information, and maintaining high standards regarding the selection of his staff, Tejessy described his endeavor as “applied political meteorology.” Following the establishment of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) in November 1950, he became an increasingly adamant spokesman for the regional offices, warning against the dangers of overly centralized operations. The first scandals of the BfV—Operation Vulkan and the Otto John affair—occurred, in his opinion, as a direct result of a top-heavy approach. Although he had to transfer some of his most valuable agents to the BfV, his primary sources of information continued to involve exchanges with regional colleagues throughout the FRG. As the KPD had established its headquarters and the majority of its front organizations in North Rhine-Westphalia, Tejessy maintained that it was better controlled through extensive penetration by his agents rather than by outright prohibition. Unlike many at the time, Tejessy also saw right-wing extremism as an acute danger. His 11-year tenure ended in December 1960 because of age restrictions. He died in Bonn, largely forgotten, four years later.
TELEPHONE EAVESDROPPING AFFAIR. The revelation of illegal surveillance techniques in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Telephone Eavesdropping Affair was sparked in 1963 by Werner Pätsch of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). Operational details—including assistance provided by U.S. security personnel—were conveyed by Pätsch to the lawyer Josef Augstein, brother of the publisher of the newsmagazine Der Spiegel. Responding to articles in Der Spiegel and Die Zeit, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer appointed a commission headed by Judge Max Silberstein to undertake a thorough investigation for violations of the law. As a result of his report, not only were numerous practices revised, but BfV officials found to have had an earlier Nazi affiliation (such as Richard Gerken) were promptly dismissed.

“TEN COMMANDMENTS” AGREEMENT. An understanding that sought to minimize the jurisdictional conflict between Wilhelm Canaris and Reinhard Heydrich, the “Ten Commandments” agreement originated in a conference held on 17 January 1935 with representatives of the Abwehr, the Gestapo, and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service). According to the 10-point program (which was reclarified the following year), the Abwehr retained responsibility for all military intelligence and counterintelligence while acknowledging that executive action such as the power of arrest belonged to the Gestapo. The primary task of the SD was defined as the collection of political intelligence, but any information would be shared between the SD and the Abwehr if it had bearing on the other’s field. This overlap, however, allowed for greater encroachment on Abwehr territory as the Gestapo and SD continued to expand their authority. Following further negotiations, Canaris and Heydrich presided over a large joint gathering on 18 May 1942 at the Hradshin in Prague to explain the revised “Ten Commandments” agreement to top officials. According to Walter Schellenberg, the Abwehr chief viewed this new compromise with mild resignation, fearing that it provided no more than a respite from Heydrich’s drive for unbounded dominance.

TER BRAAK, JAN WILLEM (1914?–1941). An Abwehr agent who operated briefly in Great Britain during World War II, Jan Willem
Ter Braak was born Engelbertus Fukken in the Netherlands. Para-dropped on 2 November 1940 near Haversham in Buckinghamshire, he proceeded to Cambridge and pretended to be working for the Free Dutch Forces based in London. His growing concern of being detected caused him to commit suicide at a Cambridge air raid shelter on 29 March 1941. Although Ter Braak was the only infiltrated German spy to have eluded capture during the war, the state of his radio equipment indicated to British authorities that he had failed to make contact with his Abwehr handler.

TESKE, WERNER (1942–1981). An officer of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) executed as a would-be defector, Werner Teske was born on 24 April 1942. In 1969, while pursuing a doctorate in economics at Humboldt University in East Berlin, he agreed to work full-time for the HVA, having already served as an Instrukteur for two years. His career in the Sektor Wissenschaft and Technik (SWT) appeared to prosper, as he was the recipient of numerous awards and bonuses for his agent recruitment. Yet his performance started to falter and led to disciplinary action in 1978. Chafing at the regimented atmosphere of the HVA and anxious to return to academic life, Teske had already begun to collect material and plot his escape to the West.

More serious infractions surfaced, including evidence of embezzlement, following his dismissal in August 1980. After a search of his apartment and the discovery of a large cache of secret departmental documents, Teske was arrested on 11 September and interrogated for more than six months. Looming in the background was the highly damaging defection of his SWT colleague Werner Stiller the previous year. In the end, even though no Western organization had been contacted and Teske had delayed his planned escape in order not to leave his family abandoned, a secret military tribunal issued a death sentence, which was carried out in Leipzig on 26 June 1981. He thus became the last person to be executed in the GDR prior to the abolition of capital punishment in 1987. Informed merely that he had died in an accident, Teske’s wife and daughter had to relocate and assume new identities. Stiller, in a 1992 interview, ruefully conceded that Teske would have received a life sentence in all likelihood had his own defection not occurred.
TEUFELSBERG. The location of a key British and American signals intercept facility during the Cold War, the Teufelsberg (Devil’s Mountain) was a large hill in the British sector of West Berlin, also known to locals as Monte Klamotte (Mount Junk). The hill began to take shape after 1950 when the rubble of 400,000 bombed houses was deposited over the partially completed Nazi defense research and educational institute designed by Albert Speer. At a height of 115 meters, the highest elevation in the city, the Teufelsberg was initially conceived as a recreation site and outfitted with ski lifts. Soon, however, the British and Americans, recognizing its ideal location for receiving unobstructed signals from the Eastern bloc, requisitioned the area. Although the ski lifts were removed because of the interference they caused, a nearby ferris wheel in Zehlendorf was left in place after the accidental discovery that it actually enhanced reception.

The 13 Signal Regiment and the Royal Air Force’s 26 Signal Unit staffed the facility for the British. The United States employed linguists, analysts, and researchers from the National Security Agency. In the final years, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command oversaw operations. Containing highly advanced electronics and signals equipment, the station had the capacity to monitor the microwave networks that converged inside the German Democratic Republic and also to tap wireless communications systems throughout the city. High security was maintained around the restricted area. Even so, a major penetration occurred between 1982–1985 following the recruitment of the U.S. Army analyst James W. Hall III by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung.

In 1991, the British and Americans closed the facility and moved the electronic equipment, but the large white, mushroom-domed structures remained a dominant presence on the hilltop. Plans for the construction of a luxury hotel and apartments (along with a spy museum) became a casualty of Berlin’s overbuilding following reunification. See also BAD AIBLING.

THOMAS, STEPHAN (1910– ). The longtime head of the Ostbüro der SPD, Stephan Thomas was born Stefan Grzeskowiak in Berlin, the son of a Polish worker. After 1933, he performed illegal work for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. After World War II, released from a British prisoner of war camp, he received a position with the
British Broadcasting Company and later with the police department in Hanover. Most significant was his leadership of the Ostbüro der SPD from November 1948 to its dissolution in 1971.

THÜMMEL, PAUL (1902–1945). A double agent in the Abwehr who worked for Czech and then British intelligence, Paul Thümmel was born in Neuhausen (Saxony) on 15 January 1902. Trained as a baker, he assisted in the formation of the local Nazi Party organization in 1927. After Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, his friendship with SS chief Heinrich Himmler helped him secure a position in the Abwehr branch in Dresden. Yet as a conservative nationalist in the mold of Abwehr head Wilhelm Canaris, Thümmel increasingly feared that Nazi policies would plunge Germany into a ruinous war. In March 1937, František Moravec, the head of Czech military intelligence, received a letter from Thümmel containing secret German mobilization plans and offering further information in return for money. Despite his initial suspicion, Moravec agreed to the arrangement, and Thümmel, assigned the code name a-54, soon became the Czechs’ most prized asset.

Even after the 1938 Munich Agreement delivered Czechoslovakia into German hands, he continued to supply Moravec with high-level material, including plans for the total occupation of the country in 1939. That event, however, forced the air evacuation of Moravec and his senior officers to London with the assistance of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station chief in Prague, Harold Gibson. Moravec permitted his service to be run as a surrogate of SIS, while Thümmel’s information regarding planned military offensives against Holland, Belgium, France, and Great Britain was conveyed through the Czech resistance. After the seizure of the radio transmitter of his new Czech contact Václav Morávek, the Gestapo increasingly directed its suspicion at Thümmel as the probable traitor. Arrested on 13 October 1941, he denied all charges and enlisted support not only from Canaris but from Himmler and Nazi Party leader Martin Bormann.

Despite Thümmel’s release in late November, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, continued to pursue the case, looking at the circumstantial evidence of several other related instances of espionage. On 22 February 1942, Thümmel was rearrested at a routine conference in Prague and taken to a remote
Gestapo office in Kladno for interrogation. Thümmel conceded his contact with the Czech resistance but insisted it had occurred as part of an Abwehr penetration operation. He was released on the condition that Morávek’s whereabouts be disclosed. On 22 March, not having received Thümmel’s attempted warning, the Czech officer was killed in an exchange of fire with Gestapo agents in Prague. Two months later, Heydrich sent a report to Bormann identifying Thümmel as a double agent and requesting his removal from the party. Thümmel spent the following years confined in Theresienstadt (now Terezín) under the name of Peter Toman, a former Dutch military attaché in Prague. His case never came to trial, and he was executed on 20 April 1945.

THUR, HERBERT. An East Berlin journalist and recruiter for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Herbert Thur worked under the code name Duo from 1961 to 1985. Prime targets were unsuspecting summer tourists from the Federal Republic of Germany whom he cultivated at Lake Balaton in Hungary and at vacation resorts on the Bulgarian coast. His enlistment of Diether Dehm occurred at a youth camp in the German Democratic Republic.

TIEBEL, ERWIN. See FELFE, HEINZ.

TIEDGE, HANSJOACHIM (1937–). A senior counterintelligence official in the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) who defected to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Hansjoachim Tiedge was born in Berlin on 24 June 1937. Following his legal studies in Munich and Frankfurt am Main, he entered the BfV in September 1966 and came to have responsibility for all espionage related to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as head of Division IV in January 1982. Yet his various personal problems—alcoholism, gambling debts, and the accidental death of his wife—reached such a point that the only alternative, in his mind, was to defect to the HVA. Arriving on 19 August 1985 in the GDR and presenting himself by his code name Tabbert, he proceeded to divulge highly sensitive internal information, including the nature of ongoing intelligence operations in the country as well as the identity of all East Germans working for Western agencies. One immediate repercussion was the
dismissal of his former BfV superior, Heribert Hellenbroich, only recently appointed head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst. A further result was a superficial damage assessment by the BfV (code name TITUS), which failed to uncover the continuing betrayal of Klaus Kuron, a subordinate of Tiedge.

Despite his disappointment not to have been debriefed by Markus Wolf himself, Tiedge enjoyed a privileged new life, ranging from private medical treatment and well-appointed accommodations to a doctorate in law from Humboldt University in 1988 (his dissertation was an extensive exposé of the BfV’s counterintelligence methods). Fearing prosecution in a reunited Germany, he relocated to Moscow with the assistance of the KGB in 1991 and assumed a different identity. In 1998, another controversy arose with the publication of his lengthy memoirs—Der Überläufer (The Defector)—as copies were initially impounded by German authorities suspecting further damaging revelations.

TIPPELSKIRCH, KURT VON (1891–1957). The head of Fremde Heere prior to World War II, Kurt von Tippelskirch was born in Berlin on 9 October 1891, the son of a Prussian general. An officer in the elite corps that guarded Emperor William II prior to 1914, he was severely wounded at the first battle of the Marne and spent the remainder of World War I in French captivity. Afterward, his knowledge of other languages became a key factor in his appointment to Fremde Heere, at that time a disguised unit known as T 3. With its expansion and division into two branches in 1938—Fremde Heere West and Fremde Heere Ost—the new army chief of staff, Franz Halder, designated Tippelskirch as the overall supervisor (or Oberquartiermeister IV). His tasks did not involve the evaluation of raw intelligence and formulation of reports but consisted instead of coordinating the pieces into a unified whole and validating the experts working under him. Briefings with Halder took place on a regular basis.

Anxious to see combat, Tippelskirch was replaced by Gerhard Matzky on 5 January 1941 and given command first of a battalion, then a regiment, and finally an army in the offensive against the Soviet Union. Although a plane crash in July 1944 caused his brief hospitalization, he returned to active duty during the final stages of the war. Following his surrender to Allied forces, Tippelskirch was kept in
captivity in Wales and Germany until 1948. His history of World War II, published in 1951 and relying on other eyewitness information as well, was the first full account to appear in the postwar Federal Republic of Germany. He died in Lüneburg (Lower Saxony) on 10 May 1957.

**TITINEN’S LIST.** The names of 18 Finnish citizens suspected of having had ties to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, Titinen’s List refers to Seppo Titinen, a former director of Finland’s security police, Suojelupoliisi (SUPO). In 1990, after receiving the information from authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany, he and President Mauno Koivisto decided that the list, containing no additional details, did not merit further investigation and should remain sealed. Yet as the controversy grew, the two men, no longer in office, joined with several leading politicians in calling for publication of the list in order to end widespread speculation. SUPO officials, however, firmly resisted reversing the original decision and cited the importance of confidentiality in the exchange of information between intelligence services.

**TOTER BRIEFKASTEN.** An espionage tactic known in English as a dead drop, a toter Briefkasten uses a prearranged hiding place where an agent leaves information or objects—usually in specially designed containers—for a handler to retrieve at a later time. A set of prearranged signals ensures that the adversary is not aware of the drop. The locations for drops—typically parks, cemeteries, bridges, railway station lockers, and cracks in walls—should be inconspicuous but readily accessible. The Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) often relied on a hollow wooden toilet-paper holder on trains that passed through the German Democratic Republic from Western countries. The HVA also equipped agents with large stainless-steel spikes with a cavity for documents, money, and false papers that could easily be inserted into the ground.

**TRADITIONSPFLEGE.** A term meaning the preservation of tradition, Traditionspflege became an important institutional aspect of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). Through Traditionspflege, the MfS sought to foster a greater esprit de corps by honoring communist spies who had worked against the Nazis as well as former
MfS officers who had had long, distinguished careers. Among the first group were Fritz Schmenkel, Richard Sorge, Max Clausen, Ilse Stöbe, Arvid Harnack, and Harro Schulze-Boysen, while the latter included Richard Stahlmann, Alfred Scholz, Gustav Szinda, and Franz Gold. In addition to introducing new recruits to the past exploits of these figures, the MfS issued special coins, plaques, and other commemorative items. See also KUNDSCHAFTER.

TRAUBE AFFAIR. An illegal eavesdropping operation conducted by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the Traube Affair revolved around Klaus Traube, a nuclear physicist suspected of maintaining ties with the terrorist Red Army Faction. Having received the authorization of Interior Minister Werner Maihofer, Operation Müll (Trash) began on 30 December 1974 with the installation of listening devices in Traube’s home. The BfV further contacted his employer, Kraftwerk Union AG, resulting in his dismissal as managing director of Interatom in Bensberg (North Rhine-Westphalia). The surveillance of Traube, however, yielded no proof of a terrorist connection.

In 1977, when a BfV employee, Karl Dinhofer, discovered this incident and relayed the supporting BfV documents to a journalist, a major scandal ensued. After the story appeared in the newsmagazine Der Spiegel, Maihofer submitted his resignation on 8 June 1978. The espionage term Lauschangriff (bugging action or attack) also entered the popular vocabulary, having been invoked in the documents reprinted by the magazine. Initial charges against Dinhofer were dropped when a Cologne court determined that the eavesdropping operation had no legal justification and violated article 13 of the West German Basic Law, which specifically underscores the sanctity of one’s domicile. Afterward, Traube became a major figure in the antinuclear movement and directed an alternate energy institute at the University of Bremen from 1990 to 1997.

TREBITSCH-LINCOLN, IGNÁCZ (1879–1943). An international adventurer, confidence man, and intelligence agent during World War I, Ignácz Trebitsch-Lincoln was born in Paks, Hungary, on 4 April 1879, the son of a prosperous Jewish merchant. After briefly studying drama in Budapest, he left for England, where his conversion to Christianity occurred in 1899. A sojourn in Canada as a
missionary was followed by his return to England and his improbable
election to the House of Commons in 1910 as a naturalized citizen,
although financial difficulties brought a quick end to his political
career. Subsequent business maneuvers involving dubious Galician
and Romanian oil companies likewise came to naught.

With the outbreak of World War I, Trebitsch-Lincoln offered his
services as a double agent to the British naval intelligence bureau
under Reginald Hall but was rebuffed. He then turned to the Ger-
mans, meeting with the consul general in Rotterdam, and was given
a minor assignment to report on shipping activity in British ports.
His fear of arrest, however, caused him to flee to the United States,
where, rejected by the German government as well, he wrote a two-
part newspaper expose boasting of his exploits as a master spy and
underscoring his humiliating treatment by the British. To quell the
negative propaganda, Hall and his colleagues retaliated by securing
Trebitsch-Lincoln’s extradition. Yet despite his defiant admission of
being a German spy, he was charged only with financial fraud. In
July 1916, a London criminal court found him guilty and imposed a
three-year prison sentence.

Released in 1919 and stripped of his British citizenship, Trebitsch-
Lincoln became involved in various right-wing nationalist intrigues
in Central Europe, beginning in Berlin as a participant in the Kapp
Putsch and concluding with his deportation from Austria in 1921.
The remainder of his life was spent primarily in China. Initially an
arms dealer and political advisor to several warlords in northern
China, he converted to Buddhism in 1925 under the name Chao Kung
and founded a monastery in Shanghai. In early 1941, his freelance
espionage career was briefly revived through a plan—promoted
by Gestapo official Josef Meisinger but overruled by the Foreign
Office—to establish a German radio station in Tibet that would un-
dermine British rule in India. He died in Shanghai on 6 October 1943.
His two autobiographical works—Revelations of an International
Spy (1916) and Der grösste Abenteurer des XX. Jahrhunderts!? (1931; The Autobiography of an Adventurer)—should be approached
with considerable skepticism.

Treff. Derived from the verb treffen (to meet), a Treff involves a
confidential exchange of information or instructions between an
agent and a control officer (or Führungsoffizier). Elaborate precautionary steps are mandatory—signals, passwords, and circuitous travel routes—and may even include a preliminary Vortreff. During the interwar period, Treff became the international term employed by members of the Soviet intelligence apparatus.

TRENNUNGSGEBOT. A restriction designed to prevent the institutional fusion of intelligence and police functions in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Trennungsgebot (separation order) originated in 1949 at the insistence of the three Western allies and members of the Parliamentary Council who feared the emergence of a second Gestapo. While this rule remained embodied in the revised legislation of 1972 and 1990 concerning the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), there have been numerous instances of explicit collaboration. To develop common antiterrorist strategies, for example, the joint Koordinierungsgruppe Internationaler Terrorismus that was created on 21 September 2001 included representatives from the BfV, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Militärischer Abschirmdienst, and several law enforcement agencies. In 2002, new legislation permitted an expanded exchange of information regarding the monitoring of asylum seekers.

TROSSIN, JULIUS (1896–1941). An agent for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Julius Trossin was a member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands who served as a courier for the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) between Hamburg and the United States as well as France and the Baltic states. After his arrest by the Gestapo on 6 July 1933, he agreed to act as a double agent in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) uncovered his true identity and imprisoned him. In fall 1941, invading German forces killed Trossin along with 157 other inmates of the prison.

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ÜBERLÄUFER. Known in English as a defector, an Überläufer refers to an intelligence professional who physically leaves his or her own service and reveals information to a foreign one. A major coup for the British Secret Intelligence Service during World War II
was the defection of Abwehr officer Erich Vermehren in Istanbul. The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) viewed the potential threat of such persons with utmost concern. Following the defection of Werner Stiller to the West in 1979, a colleague, Werner Teske, was suspected of making a similar move and sentenced to death. Hansjoachim Tiedge heads the list of important defectors from the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz to the MfS.

ÜBERROLLEN. A technique of placing agents in enemy territory, Überollen (roll over) is employed when advancing armies gain new ground and undercover personnel are left in place. In the later stages of World War II, this practice was used on both the eastern and western fronts.

UNTERSUCHUNGSAUSSCHUSS FREIHEITLICHER JURISTEN (UFJ). A leading anticommunist organization based in West Berlin, the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen (Investigative Committee of Free Jurists) was formed in October 1949 by lawyers who had fled the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was financed primarily by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in its early stages. The first leader of the UFJ was Horst Erdmann (pseudonym Dr. Theo Friedenau), a former notary public from Belzig (Brandenburg). With the stated aim of conducting “a new and better Nuremberg,” the organization had little difficulty in establishing a network of lawyers throughout the GDR willing to report and document the many human rights infractions of the communist regime. Unlike the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, the UFJ expressly rejected paramilitary methods.

Because the UFJ was viewed as an unusually potent underground organization in the GDR, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) made it a priority target. The first victim was Walter Linse, a lawyer originally from Chemnitz and head of the UFJ’s economic section, who was scheduled to attend the inaugural meeting of the International Commission of Jurists in West Berlin. Kidnapped on 8 July 1952 prior to the opening of the meeting and subjected to an intense interrogation at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, Linse was claimed to have been carrying a voluminous report on GDR industry, trade, and economic planning intended for American intelligence. While his abduction provoked a
large public protest in West Berlin, the MfS transferred Linse to the Soviet MGB on 3 December 1952. Tried and convicted the following year by a military tribunal, he was taken to Moscow and shot to death (his rehabilitation by the Russian government occurred in 1996). On 20 August 1958, Erwin Neumann, Linse’s successor as head of the economic section, was kidnapped by the MfS while on a sailing expedition on the Wannsee in West Berlin. He was given a life sentence for espionage and placed in solitary confinement in Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, where he died on 3 July 1967.

The MfS also conducted numerous defamation campaigns, such as Operation Wiedersehen (Reunion) against individual members of the UFJ. Erdmann came under particular fire and had to concede that parts of his résumé had been falsified. Following his resignation on 6 July 1958, a highly capable former judge, Walther Rosenthal, became the new director. Although by no means as effective as in its early years, the UFJ survived the construction of the Berlin Wall and was officially absorbed by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs on 25 June 1969. See also SCHLICHT, GÖTZ.

UPRISING OF 17 JUNE 1953. The first major revolt within the postwar Soviet bloc, the Uprising of 17 June 1953 was sparked by increased work quotas instituted by the communist regime of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The grievances of the demonstrators, however, extended well beyond economic considerations, as unrest spread from East Berlin throughout the GDR and ultimately required the intervention of Soviet troops. Although GDR leaders characterized the uprising as “a putsch organized by provocateurs working inside and outside the state,” there exists no evidence that Western intelligence organizations played an active role. In addition to the harsh retribution that followed—18 people were sentenced to death and more than 1,300 received prison sentences—the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit underwent significant alterations in light of its flawed performance. See also ZAISSER, WILHELM.

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VALTIN, JAN. See KREBS, RICHARD.
VEESENMAYER, EDMUND (1904–1977). A prominent SS functionary involved in numerous subversion operations, Edmund Veesenmayer was born in Bad Kissingen (Bavaria) on 12 November 1904, the son of a teacher. Receiving a doctorate in political science from the University of Munich in 1928, he taught at the Political-Economics Institute of the Munich Technical College for four years. Shortly after meeting Wilhelm Keppler, Adolf Hitler’s advisor on economic matters, Veesenmayer joined the Nazi Party in November 1932. A year later, he became a member of the SS, and by 1934 he had obtained a position in the Führer’s economic affairs office in Berlin. Despite his membership in the SS, his assignments stemmed from Keppler in the prewar period and then from the Foreign Ministry during the war.

In the wake of the failed 1934 Nazi putsch in Austria, Veesenmayer’s first foreign operation involved making secret preparations for the eventual Anschluss. His main tasks included bringing the rival factions of the outlawed Austrian Nazi Party into alignment with the gradualist approach favored in Berlin, forcing the resignation of Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, and establishing key economic connections between Austria and Germany. For his efforts, he was promoted by Heinrich Himmler to SS-Standartenführer (lieutenant colonel) on 13 March 1938—the day of the Anschluss itself. He next played a key role in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by assisting the Slovakian People’s Party led by Jozef Tiso. Initially reluctant, Tiso eventually succumbed to the pressure applied by Veesenmayer and others, and a treaty confirming the subservience of the new Slovakian state to Nazi Germany was signed in March 1939.

In late August, Veesenmayer was selected by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop for an information-gathering mission to Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland). Acting for the first time on his own initiative, he undertook a variety of measures designed to heighten tensions between Poland and Nazi Germany. Although he achieved no major results—the “Danzig question” remained a secondary issue among the events leading to the outbreak of war—he was awarded the Danzig Cross Second Class for his efforts. Between 1940 and 1943, undercover activities in Ireland became part of his responsibilities with the Foreign Ministry. But the
operation he designed to bring Ireland into a wartime alliance with Germany—Operation **Seeadler**—never received permission to proceed, as his superiors did not want to jeopardize Ireland’s declared neutrality.

Far more significant was Veesenmayer’s activity in the Balkans. Prior to the German attack on Yugoslavia, he had been dispatched to Zagreb to support the aspirations of an independent Croatian state, which, under his guidance, became a member of the Triple Alliance in May 1941. Not only were Hitler and Ribbentrop pleased with the outcome of his mission, but he received the highest award of the Croatian government. Regarded by the Foreign Ministry as an expert on Southeast Europe, Veesenmayer was sent to occupied Serbia as a political advisor. Among his recommendations to quell the partisan warfare was the removal of all male Serbian Jews from the country. Shortly after his return to Berlin in late 1941, his promotion to SS-Oberführer (colonel) became official.

Veesenmayer’s most notorious activity took place from March 1944 to the end of the war, when he acted as the German envoy and plenipotentiary in occupied Hungary. Despite his initial success in helping to forge a friendly government under Döme Sztójay, the competition between the SS and the Foreign Ministry increasingly restricted his sphere of action. Ultimately he had to abandon his plans for greater Hungarian autonomy in conjunction with Miklós Horthy and submit to the harsh demands of the SS. That meant specifically expediting the deportation of Hungarian Jews.

Fearful of falling into Soviet captivity with the advance of the Red Army into Hungary, Veesenmayer surrendered to American forces outside Salzburg, Austria, in May 1945. After having to return to Hungary for a lengthy interrogation, he eventually faced an American court in Nuremberg at the Wilhelmstrasse Trials, which dealt with officials of the Foreign Ministry. On 2 April 1949, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity. A review resulted in his release from Landsberg (Bavaria) two years later. Following a short period of employment in Iran, Veesenmayer returned to a commercial position in Darmstadt. He died there on 24 December 1977. No memoirs ever appeared, as he steadfastly maintained that his role in the Third Reich had been vastly overestimated.
VENLO INCIDENT. The abduction of two British intelligence officers by members of the Gestapo in the Netherlands, the Venlo Incident had it origins in a deception operation conceived by Walter Schellenberg, chief of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD; Security Service). To capture British operatives who had been making contact with the German resistance, he lured them with the prospect of meeting with disgruntled Wehrmacht officers who supposedly wanted to see Adolf Hitler arrested because of heavy losses in the recent Polish campaign. Initial contact was made through Johannes Travaglio, a former operatic tenor posing as an adjutant to a Luftwaffe general, while Schellenberg assumed the role of Major Schämmel, a presumed member of the General Staff. With the approval of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and officials at MI6, the opportunity was seized, and two British officers—Sigismund Best and Richard Stevens—had several meetings with members of the German contingent in late October 1939 near the Dutch-German border.

The operation took an unexpected turn on 8 November, when a powerful bomb exploded during the anniversary celebration of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. While Hitler remained unscathed due to his early departure from the Bürgerbräukeller, Heinrich Himmler immediately ordered Schellenberg to undertake reprisals against the British secret service, which, according to the Nazi leadership, bore prime responsibility (the actual perpetrator was Georg Elser, an obscure cabinetmaker and communist sympathizer). At a meeting with the two British officers near Venlo, a Dutch city a few miles from the German border, an SS detachment of 12 men under the command of Alfred Naujocks was also in attendance. On the arrival of Best and Stevens at the designated café, submachine-gun fire suddenly erupted, and both men surrendered. Dirk Klop, a Dutch intelligence officer who had accompanied them, attempted to escape but was seriously wounded. All three were abducted across the border by the SS within a matter of minutes.

Whereas Klop later died in a Düsseldorf hospital, Best and Stevens underwent a rigorous interrogation in Berlin, revealing details about SIS operations in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere in Europe. They spent the remainder of the war in several Nazi concentration camps until their liberation by the U.S. Army in April 1945. Best’s memoir The Venlo Incident appeared in 1950, though only a small
section deals with the actual event. For Hitler, the gains were numerous. Besides dealing a severe blow to British intelligence, he managed to link the incident in the mind of the German public with the attempt on his life and—in light of Klop’s involvement—use it as a pretext for the invasion of the Netherlands the following year. Moreover, given the improbability that the British would again trust a German professing anti-Hitler connections, it proved to be added insurance for the regime. For Schellenberg, who regretted not being able to develop the relationship with Best and Stephens further, the incident helped to advance his career significantly. He was awarded the Iron Cross First Class by Hitler himself.

VERBER, OTTO. See PONGER, KURT.

VERMEHREN, ERICH (1919–2005). A senior Abwehr official who defected to the British during World War II, Erich Vermehren was born in Lübeck on 23 December 1919, the son of a lawyer. Because of his repeated refusal to join the Hitler Youth, the Nazi government forbade his acceptance of a Rhodes scholarship to attend Oxford University. His passport was also revoked, thus precluding any travel outside Germany. Vermehren, who became a lawyer, converted to Roman Catholicism in 1939 after meeting his future wife, Countess Elisabeth von Plettenberg, who earlier had clandestinely distributed the anti-Nazi encyclical “Mit brennender Sorge” and wasbriefly imprisoned by the Gestapo.

In late 1943, despite an exemption from military service because of a childhood injury, Vermehren obtained a position in the Abwehr with the assistance of a cousin in the Foreign Office, Adam von Trott zu Solz, and Paul Leverkuehn, the station chief in Istanbul. Following a brief course in espionage techniques, Vermehren arrived in Istanbul with the intention of defecting with his wife to the British. In light of an earlier approach in Lisbon, Nicholas Eliot, the representative of Secret Intelligence Service’s counter espionage subsection in Istanbul, was already aware of Vermehren’s desire. Hardly had Vermehren been joined by his wife than a summons was issued by the Gestapo to return to Berlin in connection with the arrest of his friend and anti-Hitler conspirator Otto Kiep. They, however, refused and, in early February 1944, made final plans for their escape. Traveling via
Cairo and Gibraltar, they arrived safely in London and found accommodation at the South Kensington apartment of the mother of Kim Philby. They then briefed the British intelligence officer regarding members of the Catholic underground resistance in Germany.

Although Vermehren’s defection had been disguised as a kidnap-ping to protect the family from Nazi reprisals and was not intended to become public knowledge, British propaganda heralded the event—purposely exaggerating Vermehren’s importance—in order to cause disarray among Nazi officials. In reality, he had brought little of intelligence value, but his departure infuriated Hitler and became the trigger for the dismissal of Abwehr chief Wilhelm Canaris on 11 February. The Vermehrens remained in England, holding various jobs and changing their surname to de Saventhem. After also living in France and Switzerland, they returned to Germany before her death in 2000. He died in Bonn on 28 April 2005.

VERREPT, IMELDA (1944– ). A spy at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) working for Verwaltung Aufklärung (VA), Imelda Verrept was born in Geneva, Switzerland. After attending a Flemish Catholic lycée, she remained in Belgium working for the newspaper De Nieuwe before entering a convent in Brussels for two years. Her desire to become a secretary proficient in foreign languages led to a position with a U.S. military liaison group based in Belgium and then to the international secretariat of NATO in 1972. Routine security reviews by Belgian officials revealed no irregulari-ties in her background. The following year, a friendship developed between Verrept and Wieland Gludowacz, an officer of the VA pos-ing as an Austrian. They would eventually marry. After Gludowacz convinced her that many of her Catholic beliefs were compatible with the socialist aims of the German Democratic Republic, Verrept agreed to obtain high-level information regarding NATO and its member states.

During the next five years, Verrept emerged as a prime asset, but the VA also realized that West German counterintelligence officials had become increasingly cognizant of Eastern bloc military espionage. For this reason, Ursel Lorenzen, a spy working at NATO for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, was exfiltrated in April 1979. After weighing the risks, the VA opted for security, and in spring
1980 Verrept and Gludowacz took a circuitous route to the GDR. As was the case with Lorenzen, a full-scale propaganda campaign immediately ensued depicting Verrept as having left for “reasons of conscience,” which sparked much speculation in the West German press. Verrept then worked as a translator, and the couple, after settling in the East Berlin area, frequently recounted their activities at the VA training school in Klietz. Yet concern for her daughter caused Verrept to decline interviews for a serious biography, and the couple’s married name was withheld at their request.

VERWALTUNG 19. See VERWALTUNG AUFKLÄRUNG.

VERWALTUNG AUFKLÄRUNG (VA). The intelligence branch of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA; National People’s Army) of the German Democratic Republic, the Verwaltung Aufklärung (Administration for Reconnaissance) went through a number of different designations before receiving its final name in 1966. Based on the model of the Soviet GRU (military intelligence), the first unit—the Verwaltung für Allgemeine Fragen (Administration for General Questions)—was formed in September 1952 and attached to the Barracked People’s Police. It was located in Berlin-Pankow and had an initial staff of 50 working under the direction of Karl Linke. A reorganization in 1956—concurrent with the creation of the NVA—changed its name to the Verwaltung 19 (Administration 19) and placed it under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense. Military attachés were also transferred to the VA beginning in 1974. By the time of its dissolution in 1990, it counted 1,146 full-time military and civilian employees.

Relying on human intelligence, open sources, and its own signals facilities, the VA focused primarily on the Allied military units stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as well as that country’s own emerging armed forces. Yet as sharp competition with the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung developed, little effort was made to coordinate their espionage efforts. Moreover, a unit within the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS)—Main Division I—had responsibility not only for guarding against enemy penetration of the armed forces but also for maintaining the correct political posture among the soldiers. To that end, the MfS relied on its Inoffizielle
Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborators) and placed its own Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz (officers in special deployment) in the ranks. At the same time, all-important intelligence collected by the VA automatically found its way to Moscow.

Despite the considerable tensions that persisted with the MfS and the flawed performance of three of its leaders—Linke, Willy Sägebrecht, and Theo Gregori—the VA succeeded in placing agents in key positions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the West German Bundeswehr. In 1989, according to the VA’s final head, Arthur Krause, 138 agents remained in place, 10 of them acquired prior to 1982 and considered top-level sources. In its final phase, the VA existed briefly as an “information center,” as all of its agents were discontinued effective 31 March 1990. Official dissolution followed on 2 October. See also FRANKE, ARTHUR; ZEISE, MANFRED.

VÖLKEL, WALTER. A West Berlin academic at the Free University who spied for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Walter Völkel (code name WALTER ROSENOW) utilized his position at a research institute that studied the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to deliver confidential material beginning in the late 1970s. His assignment was to monitor individuals in West Berlin critical of the GDR and to help carry out Zersetzungsmassnahmen (decomposition measures), or psychological pressures and disinformation, devised by the MfS. Völkel was among the authors of the official GDR handbook published by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. His unmasking in spring 1992 resulted in his immediate dismissal from the university.

VOGEL, DIETER. A double agent employed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Dieter Vogel was a Hamburg businessman who had fled to Switzerland owing to charges of tax evasion in early 1978. Recruited four years earlier by the CIA, Vogel was then instructed to use his fugitive status to gain entry into the HVA. His first assignment under the code name HORN included sojourns in Canada, El Salvador, and Argentina, where he gathered data on people of potential interest to the HVA. A bolder plan called for Vogel, beginning in January 1980,
to pose as a CIA operative and attempt to enlist Wilhelm Keil, the head of the emigration surveillance division of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). That Vogel conveyed this information to the CIA and BND was revealed to the HVA by another agent. Arrested in August, Vogel underwent intense interrogation at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen before being tried for aggravated espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment the following year. Prison officials at Bautzen termed his March 1982 death a suicide by hanging, although documented evidence exists to the contrary.

VOGEL, HORST (1931– ). The last deputy director of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Horst Vogel was born in Theissen (Saxony-Anhalt) on 11 May 1931, the son of a locksmith. After first following in his father’s footsteps, he was recruited for the HVA in March 1955 and later earned a degree in chemical engineering from the Technical College in Merseburg-Leuna. Vogel’s steady rise through the ranks included his appointment as head of the Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik in 1975 and then as deputy director of the HVA in 1987. Following the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic, he became a vocal defender of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.

VOGEL, WOLFGANG (1925–2008). The most prominent lawyer in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and a negotiator involved in numerous spy exchanges, Wolfgang Vogel was born in Wilhelmsthal (now Boleslawów, Poland) on 30 October 1925, the son of a Catholic rural schoolteacher. During World War II, he served as a navigation instructor in the Luftwaffe. Resettling in Jena after the war, Vogel studied criminal law there as well as in Leipzig. His mentor, Rudolf Reinartz, assisted him in obtaining a position in the new GDR Justice Ministry in August 1952. In the reprisals that followed the Uprising of 17 June 1953, Reinartz was dismissed and defected to the West. Ignoring his urging to follow his lead, Vogel remained in East Berlin and agreed to work with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) as an informant (code name eva, later georg). His long-term handler was Heinz Volpert, who was replaced in 1986 by Gerhard Niebling, head of the MfS Central Coordination Group.
Under the secret sponsorship of the MfS, Vogel established a law practice in the GDR but was also accepted for membership in the West Berlin bar in November 1957. This dual status helped make him a central figure in arranging the first spy exchange of the Cold War: on 10 February 1962, the American U-2 pilot Gary Powers, who had been held in the Soviet Union, was traded for the convicted atomic bomb spy Rudolf Abel. Vogel’s international reputation was thereby established, and he became a trusted partner in the eyes of many Western officials. In addition, he negotiated the emigration of more than 250,000 GDR citizens and the sale of 34,000 political prisoners to the Federal Republic of Germany. His main Western negotiating partner was Jürgen Stange.

Vogel’s name came under a dark cloud during the 1989 revolution, especially owing to his close association with Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski. Vogel nevertheless briefly assisted with the legal defense of former GDR leader Erich Honecker before retiring in mid-1991 and moving to Schliersee (Bavaria). Accusations by former clients of having been blackmailed led to a series of trials, although Germany’s highest court ultimately ruled in his favor in 1998. Despite his highly ambiguous and lucrative role as a communist intermediary, Vogel maintained that he had a “clear conscience” regarding his career. He died on 21 August 2008. See also GLIERNICKER BRIDGE.

VOLPERT, HEINZ (1932–1986). The head of the special tasks unit of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) charged with obtaining hard currency for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Heinz Volpert was born in Rastenberg (Thuringia) on 21 December 1932. He joined the MfS in 1951 and held a number of local positions before being appointed head of the underground division at the main East Berlin headquarters in 1956. A new position in 1971 made him directly responsible to Erich Mielke and included responsibility for the sale of political prisoners to the Federal Republic of Germany (nearly 3.5 billion DM were ultimately obtained). As the case officer and friend of Wolfgang Vogel, Volpert was the key link between the East German lawyer and negotiator and the MfS. Volpert also worked closely with Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, having coauthored a doctoral dissertation with him at the Juristische

**VULKAN.** A major blow to the Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN) of the German Democratic Republic, Operation VULKAN (Volcano) involved the defection of Gotthold Kraus to the Federal Republic of Germany on 4 April 1953. Although the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had played an instrumental role, the new Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) took credit for the operation. Because at least half a dozen key operatives had been apprehended as a result, Markus Wolf was forced to undertake a major reorganization of the APN. At the same time, the widely publicized arrest of 35 East German agents included several innocent businessmen, thereby causing the first major embarrassment of the BfV. Among those convicted—and given relatively lenient sentences—were ringleader Ludwig Weiss, Hans Bogenhagen, and Josef Gebhardt.

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**WAETJEN, EDUARD.** An anti-Nazi Abwehr agent and leading informant of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Eduard Waetjen was a jurist from Bremen whose mother was American. Although an early supporter of Germany’s expansionism under the Third Reich, he developed close contact with Helmuth James Count von Moltke of the anti-Nazi Kreisau Circle and with Hans Oster of the Abwehr. Waetjen’s overriding aim was a separate peace with the United States, which he discussed in Ankara in 1942 with Franz von Papen, the German ambassador to Turkey. The following year, while stationed at the German consulate in Zurich as an Abwehr agent, Waetjen contacted Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief in Bern, and began to supply information based on his wide network of international contacts. In 1944, Waetjen (code name Görter) replaced Hans Bernd Gisevius as Dulles’s main informant regarding the German military conspiracy against Adolf Hitler. Although a Gestapo file existed regarding Waetjen’s contact with Moltke’s
group, it escaped the notice of the relevant officer. After the war, Waetjen lived in Ascona, Switzerland.

**WAIBEL, MAX (1901–1971).** A key liaison in Operation **SUNRISE**, Max Waibel was the head of Swiss army intelligence during World War II and a confidant of Allen Dulles, the Bern station chief for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. It was Waibel who, in February 1945, alerted Dulles to the possibility of achieving a negotiated cease-fire with German forces in northern Italy under the command of **Karl Wolff**. Waibel initially came under sharp criticism for his unauthorized role in helping to bring about this capitulation but was posthumously honored by the Swiss government for obeying his conscience and thereby preventing further wartime destruction. After the war, Waibel was instrumental in establishing a working relationship between Swiss authorities and the **Organisation Gehlen**, particularly regarding communist subversion. His account of **SUNRISE—1945: Kapitulation in Norditalien** (Capitulation in Northern Italy) appeared in 1981.

**WALLI.** The designation of the **Frontaufklärungskommando** on the eastern front during World War II, Walli consisted ultimately of three groups, the first having been established in Suleyovek, Poland, by **Hermann Baun** in June 1941.

**WANNSEE INSTITUT.** A research body focused on the political, economic, and administrative structure of the Soviet Union, the Wannsee Institut was originally a private foundation located southwest of Berlin that **Reinhard Heydrich** annexed to the **Sicherheitsdienst** (Security Service) in 1936. Camouflaged as the Institute for Research of Antiquity and lodged in the seized Villa Oppenheim, it was first headed by Michael Achmeteli, a Georgian émigré who had earlier been the ambassador to Germany from the short-lived Georgian republic. Researchers were recruited from among advanced students at the University of Berlin, specifically those from the Baltic states or parts of the former Russian empire with appropriate language skills.

In 1942, Hans Koch, an Austrian university professor who had previously headed the institute, returned as its director. To protect its valuable holdings from increased Allied bombing in the Berlin
area, the institute moved to Schloss Plankenwart near Graz, Austria. In this period, members of the institute worked closely with the staff of Operation Zeppelin, often causing them to be confused with one another, especially since Zeppelin’s Berlin detachment came to occupy the old premises of the institute. The surviving material of the Wannsee Institut was transferred to Organisation Gehlen after the war.

WANZE. A colloquial expression for a hidden eavesdropping device, a Wanze is normally powered by tiny batteries or tied to the building’s electrical circuit. A small transmitter then allows any conversations or activities in the room to be monitored and recorded.

WASSMUSS, WILHELM (1880–1931). A diplomat who attempted to foment a Muslim uprising against the British in the Middle East, Wilhelm Wassmuss was born in Salzgitter-Ohlendorf (Lower Saxony) on 14 February 1880. He joined the German Foreign Office as a translator in 1906 and became the consul in Bushire, Persia (Iran), six years later. Because of his fluency in Persian (Farsi) and Arabic, his travels among the tribes of southern Persia, and his hardened personality, Wassmuss was selected for a joint Turkish and German mission designed to bring Persia and Afghanistan into World War I. His role was to lead the German group—numbering several dozen men—and handle the diplomatic negotiations with the Afghans. Second in command was Oskar von Niedermayer, who had also traveled extensively in the region. To disguise their expedition as it passed through neutral Romania, they posed as a traveling circus troupe, although their equipment was detected by a customs inspector and had to be replaced.

In January 1916, after dissension arose between the Turks and the Germans as well as in the ranks of Wassmuss’s team, he handed the command to Niedermayer and departed on his own, clad in Persian garb and posing as a Muslim. His objective was to reconnect with tribal leaders he knew in southern Persia and convince them to embark on a holy war, forcing the British to commit their limited troops to that region. On 5 March, he and two companions were captured by a group of horsemen in the pay of the British. Wassmuss escaped but had to leave behind a crucial German diplomatic codebook, which
the British later used to help decipher the **Zimmermann Telegram**. His plan to extend the anti-British campaign to India also had to be abandoned because of the loss of specially prepared incendiary leaflets.

After establishing a base of operations in Shiraz, he resumed contact with his principal allies, the bellicose Tangistani tribesmen, but proved unable to lure the leaders of the Bakhtiári into hostilities against the British. A bounty for Wassmuss’s capture was proposed by Percy Cox, the chief British political officer in Basra, but was overruled by the Foreign Office in London. When the Tangistani attacked the British residency in Bushire in July, they were repulsed. Wassmuss’s focus then shifted to Isfahan, the new base of operations, and Kermanshah, which controlled the supply route from Baghdad into the country. He next targeted the small, isolated British consulate in Shiraz relying on the local gendarmerie, which was sympathetic to his efforts. The British commander, Frederick O’Connor, and his staff were easily captured and were to be traded for Germans being held in India. Yet in the process of negotiating with the British, Wassmuss unknowingly let O’Connor, a former Indian Army intelligence officer, communicate with his superiors in Bushire employing a secret code. These officials approached the Tangistani and offered to trade fellow tribesmen held prisoners for the British hostages. When the exchange finally took place on 10 August 1916, Wassmuss vented his deep frustration that his plan regarding the German hostages had been thwarted. He remained at large in Persia for the remainder of the war, proving to be primarily a nuisance rather than a threat to British interests. O’Connor described him as a solitary figure living “in extreme simplicity in the native manner” and riding “continuously about the country, from place to place, from tribe to tribe, in every extreme of climate, and always at the mercy of these treacherous, fanatical people.”

Apprehended by Persian authorities in 1918 and transferred to the British in Tehran, Wassmuss escaped but was quickly recaptured. Despite demands for a trial for war crimes, he was permitted to return to Germany. Aware of his unfulfilled promises to the Tangistani, Wassmuss tried to bring modern farming techniques to the tribesmen and raise their standard of living. His attempt ended badly, and
he again returned to Germany, dying impoverished in Berlin on 29 November 1931.

**WATTENWYL, FRIEDRICH MORITZ VON (1867–1942).** The head of Swiss military intelligence who cooperated with the Central Powers during World War I, Friedrich Moritz von Wattenwyl assumed his position in 1909. With the outbreak of war, the German military attaché stationed in Bern, Busso von Bismarck, called on Wattenwyl to implement an intelligence-sharing agreement that had been concluded in 1906. A profuse exchange of high-level information—primarily concerning France, Great Britain, and Russia—soon resulted. Alerted by a Swiss Francophile cryptanalyst, the government first sought to terminate this violation of the country’s declared neutrality by quietly reassigning Wattenwyl and his colleague Karl-Heinrich Egli. Yet the press managed to learn of the so-called Colonels’ Affair, and a major public scandal erupted. To quell this discontent, Wattenwyl and Egli were tried before a military court in Zurich in late February 1916, but owing to a paucity of hard evidence, the verdict was mild: 20 days in jail and an honorable discharge for both officers.

**WEBER-DROHL ERNST (1879–?).** An Abwehr agent apprehended in Ireland, Ernst Weber-Drohl was born near Edelbach, Austria. Employing the name “Atlas the Strong,” he developed a career in the United States and Ireland as a professional wrestler and muscleman performer. His familiarity with Ireland—coupled with his passable English—attracted the attention of the Abwehr office in Nuremberg, and in early 1940 Weber-Drohl was selected to convey money, instructions, and a radio transmitter to contacts in the Irish Republican Army (IRA). After arriving via a U-37 submarine in Killala Bay on 8 February, Weber-Drohl proceeded to make his delivery, despite having lost the radio transmitter when his rubber boat capsized.

Hunger strike—not unlike many IRA prisoners—and was released eight days later to avoid any negative publicity. For reasons still unclear, his final arrest occurred on 13 August 1942, and he was kept at Montjoy Prison and the Athlone internment camp for the remainder of the war.

**WEHNER, HERBERT (1906–1990).** A former communist functionary widely suspected of treason while a leader of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), Herbert Wehner was born in Dresden on 11 July 1906, the son of a working-class family. After a brief affiliation with an anarcho-syndicalist group, he joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in 1927 and rose to district leader for Saxony within two years. In 1930, owing to his political skill and rhetorical ability, Wehner became the youngest delegate elected to the Saxon parliament. Shortly afterward, however, the KPD central committee decided to use him as a “technical secretary” based in Berlin and working closely with KPD chair Ernst Thälmann. In the wake of the mass arrests that followed the Nazi takeover in 1933, his knowledge of local conditions as an underground organizer helped the party set up an alternate system of illegal cells. Despite exerting little influence on the outcome of the Saar plebiscite in January 1935, he later emerged at the Brussels party conference as a member of the exile-KPD’s central committee and was assigned the task of forging a united front with German émigrés in Paris.

In December 1936, in the midst of the Stalinist purges, Wehner was recalled to Moscow along with other members of the exile-KPD. In the fevered atmosphere of accusations and counteraccusations, Wehner (alias Herbert Funk) not only denounced several dozen comrades as traitors (including Hans Kippenberger) but was himself the object of similar defamatory remarks. During an interrogation a year later, officials from the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) feigned a recruitment attempt but in actuality used the opportunity to gather evidence against him in preparation for his arrest. Wehner’s fortunes changed dramatically with the waning of the terror and the removal of NKVD chief Nikolai Yezhov, and in early 1941 the Comintern dispatched him to Sweden as an *Illegaler* (alias H. M. Kornelis). Although he was seriously considered for NKVD recruitment prior to Adolf Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, his
earlier warning of its inevitability caused officials to reconsider his suitability. In February 1942, he was arrested by Swedish authorities and charged with “endangerment of Swedish freedom and neutrality.” His defense—that through underground contacts he was laying the groundwork for a popular revolt in Germany against the Hitler regime—found little credence with the Stockholm court, and he was sentenced to one year of hard labor. He was also banned from the KPD in June 1942 on grounds of treason.

Following his release from an internment camp in July 1944 and later resettlement in Hamburg, Wehner broke with his communist past and joined forces with the SPD. Supported by party chair Kurt Schumacher, he was elected to the first West German parliament in 1949 and, by the end of the next decade, was considered the SPD’s chief tactician, popularly known as Uncle Herbert. Particularly noteworthy was his role in the formulation of the Bad Godesberg Program of 1959, which called for a less doctrinaire and more pragmatic approach to political and economic issues, and his speech endorsing the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More than any other politician, he moved the party toward participation in the Grand Coalition of 1966–1969, in which he served as minister for all-German affairs, and then helped secure the SPD’s first electoral victory in 1969.

Angered by Wehner’s reversal of political course, the leadership of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had launched an intensive disinformation campaign by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) as early as 1951. Under the operational name WOTAN, these attacks on his integrity focused primarily on his wartime activities in Sweden. According to various articles that appeared in the GDR press, his fear of returning to Germany had led him to engineer his own arrest, and he had then revealed the names of German antifascists who were later executed. A key figure in the anti-Wehner campaign was Hans Frederik, whose book on Wehner—Gekennzeichnet vom Zwielicht seiner Zeit (Marked by the Twilight of His Time)—appeared just prior to the 1969 elections and became widely read in the FRG, reinforcing the suspicions that many conservatives already harbored toward the ex-communist minister.

In May 1973, Wehner met with East German leader Erich Honecker as part of his efforts to improve relations according to the new policy
of Ostpolitik. This emotional reunion—Honecker had worked under Wehner at the time of the Saar plebiscite—marked the beginning of a more cordial relationship between the two Germanys, and Honecker ordered the MfS to reevaluate Wehner’s history, particularly his alleged treason while in Sweden. The resulting report absolved Wehner of all charges, and wotan came to an official halt in 1978. The GDR leadership ignored copies of Wehner’s handwritten notes, supplied to them by the KGB in 1967, in which he had revealed the names of more than 20 alleged Trotskyists among the German emigrants and offered to help the NKVD in their “processing.” Not until 1993 were the relevant documents from his NKVD file published.

In the aftermath of the Günther Guillaume affair of 1974, Wehner aroused the displeasure of Willy Brandt, who, despite the lack of tangible evidence, firmly believed that the loss of his chancellorship could be traced to his fellow social democrat and longtime rival working secretly in conjunction with the GDR. Wehner’s autobiography, Zeugnis: Persönliche Notizen 1929–1942 (Witness: Personal Notices 1929–1942), which was written during his Swedish captivity, appeared in 1982, and he retired from public life the following year. After a long period of illness, he died in Bonn on 19 January 1990. In 1997, Markus Wolf, former head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, described Wehner as “a person of irreconcilable differences” and a long-term Einflussagent of the MfS, but he soon issued a correction, stating that “never and in no way” had Wehner offered his services to the GDR. See also WIENAND, KARL.

WEIBERG, HEINRICH (1911–1984). The founding head of the Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik (SWT) of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Heinrich Weiberg was born in Berlin on 20 January 1911, the son of a bookbinder. A member of the Wehrmacht during World War II, he was held in Soviet captivity from 1945 to 1949. Returning to Germany and briefly working in a sulfuric acid factory, the former chemistry student joined the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in 1951 and was assigned to its foreign intelligence division. Under his unassuming, academic-style leadership, the SWT steadily took shape, receiving official status in 1971 and becoming one of the HVA’s most significant divisions. Weiberg left the SWT
in 1975—appointed a senior officer for special tasks—and retired from the HVA in 1980. He died on 30 May 1984.

**WEIRAUCH, LOTHAR (1908–1983).** A leading member of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Lothar Weirauch was born in Laurahütte (now Siemianowice, Poland). A member of several nationalist youth groups, he joined the Sturmabteilung in 1930 and the Nazi Party four years later. In 1937, Weirauch completed his law degree and became active in legal circles in Breslau (today Wroclaw, Poland) and various projects of the local Nazi Party. Greater responsibilities fell to him during World War II as head of the racial resettlement division in Cracow, which included supervision of mass deportations of Jews to the death camps.

In 1948, Weirauch, for reasons still unclear, made contact with the leadership of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands and was later transferred to the MfS (code names x and kx). His rise to prominence in the FDP began in North Rhine-Westphalia and concluded with a key appointment to the Ministry of All-German Affairs in 1963, thus allowing him to convey important information to his East Berlin handler. Although Weirauch and several others had been charged as accessories to wartime murder by prosecutors in Dortmund, the case was dropped in September 1964 for lack of conclusive proof. Yet later faced with incriminating documentation gathered by a Polish war crimes commission, the MfS leadership permanently broke with Weirauch in 1967. It was not until the unmasking of Kurt Gröndahl in 1993—a decade after Weirauch’s death—that his MfS complicity came to light.

**WENDLAND, HORST.** See WESSEL, GERHARD.

**WENZEL, JOHANN (1902–1969).** A Soviet agent active in the Rote Kapelle, Johann Wenzel was an East Prussian by birth and joined the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in 1923. After working in its intelligence apparatus, he fled to Moscow in 1933 and was recruited by the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) the following year. His training in radio communications at a Red Army school enabled him to establish a small spy ring in Brussels in 1936 (his code names
included HERMANN, GERMAN, HANS, and WANJA). Its success led to its expansion in Western Europe and Germany, and it came to form part of the network headed by Leonard Trepper three years later.

On 30 July 1942, Wenzel was arrested by the Gestapo in Brussels and found to have in his possession confidential information, such as the precise production figures of German aircraft and tanks. His cooperation was secured following an intensive interrogation in Berlin and even extended to helping track down Trepper, divulging courier routes, and revealing Soviet codes and methods, although it may have been only a maneuver on Wenzel’s part. In November, he eluded his guard at his quarters in Brussels and lived in the Belgian underground for the next two years. Yet after joining other surviving members of the Rote Kapelle in Paris, he was taken to Moscow after the war and interrogated again. Wenzel’s sentence of 15 years in prison was announced in June 1947. Released eight years later, he was allowed to resettle in the German Democratic Republic and work as an instructor at a machine and tractor station until his death.

WERBEN. A verb meaning “to attract or enlist,” werben commonly refers to the recruitment of new agents. See also INOFFIZIELLE MITARBEITER.

WERNER, RUTH. See KUCZYNSKI, URSULA.

WESEMANN, HANS WALTER (1895–1971). A refugee from Nazi Germany who became a Gestapo spy, Hans Walter Wesemann was born in Nienburg (Lower Saxony) on 27 November 1895, the son of a farmer. After serving in the artillery during World War I, he began a career in journalism, writing for the socialist newspaper Vorwärts, and completed a doctorate in German literature. Despite his unabashedly hostile depiction of the Nazis, their accession to power and his forced exile caused him to reconsider his options. While living in London in 1934, Wesemann offered his services as an informant within the German émigré community to embassy officials, who in turn arranged a meeting with the Gestapo in Berlin. Besides the continuation of his reporting on Germans living abroad, his assignment was to stifle the flow of information critical of the Third Reich.
Wesemann’s most notorious act was aiding in the abduction of Berthold Jacob, a fellow exile journalist based in Strasbourg. Yet when the incident took place in Basel in early March 1934, not only did the Swiss police promptly arrest Wesemann, but the Swiss foreign minister managed to secure the release of Jacob by threatening public exposure of Gestapo activities. After completing a three-year prison sentence, Wesemann obtained a German passport and went to Caracas with his Venezuelan fiancée in May 1938. While the Gestapo severed all ties to him—quite contrary to his own wishes—Venezuelan authorities forced the couple to resettle in Nicaragua in 1940. An exposé by ex-Nazi Otto Strasser further compounded his problems, and he spent the remainder of the war years in U.S. internment camps. Avoiding deportation to Germany after 1945, Wesemann eventually returned with his wife to Caracas, where he died on 23 October 1971.

**WESSEL, GERHARD (1913–2002).** A former intelligence officer during the Third Reich who became the second head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Gerhard Wessel was born in Neumünster (Schleswig-Holstein) on 24 December 1913, the son of a Protestant pastor. In 1932, he joined the Reichswehr and was serving as an infantry staff officer when World War II commenced. After finishing his training at the General Staff College and working briefly as an intelligence analyst, he was transferred in 1942 to Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the division responsible for monitoring all Soviet military activity. When Reinhard Gehlen was appointed the new head of FHO and began his reform of the failing organization, Wessel counted among the few officers retained. He rose to become Gehlen’s assistant and eventual successor in April 1945, despite having written the bleak assessment that had provoked Hitler’s ire and caused Gehlen to be removed from office.

The working relationship between the two men resumed in June 1946 with the establishment of the Organisation Gehlen (OG). Wessel not only assumed the direction of the analytical branch but used his rhetorical skill in staff meetings and social occasions to bolster his more reclusive superior. Even though Adolf Heusinger (the later inspector general of the Bundeswehr) took over his position several years later, Wessel remained one of the dominant OG figures. In
1952, when Heusinger was named head of the military division of the Blank Office (the forerunner of the West German Defense Ministry), Wessel became part of the intelligence staff. With the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1956, he occupied a number of important positions, beginning with its counterintelligence branch, which later became known as the Militärischer Abschirmdienst.

When the Spiegel Affair and the unmasking of Heinz Felfe darkened the image of the BND in the early 1960s, Wessel’s name circulated as possible successor to Gehlen. Yet it was not until 1967 that Gehlen, under pressure from the new government of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, finally agreed to leave his post. Wessel, Gehlen’s own preference, easily persuaded the chancellor of his qualifications and became the new BND president on 1 May 1968. From the outset, however, his concept of a modern intelligence service differed markedly from that of his predecessor, despite their close past association. Having recently served as the German military representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he wanted the BND to shed its excessive secrecy and become more integrated with other state institutions. When a three-member commission under Reinhold Mercker investigated internal complaints of BND mismanagement at the highest level, its 200-page report remained highly confidential—not even available to Wessel—but its main recommendations called for the cessation of domestic surveillance, greater oversight, and closer proximity to the Chancellor’s Office in Bonn.

Wessel’s arrival in Pullach met with stiff resistance. Some officers thought Horst Wendland, head of the organization and acting vice president, was Gehlen’s natural successor, and they resented Wessel’s role in building up the military’s counterintelligence service at the BND’s expense. But Wessel, believing that Wendland was part of the pattern of abuse at the BND, blocked his further advancement. Realizing that his future prospects were bleak, Wendland resigned and shortly afterward committed suicide. A few hours later in the Eifel region, his friend, retired Admiral Hermann Lüdke, likewise took his life (presumably he had been recruited under a falsche Flagge by the Czechoslovakian service). As a number of other suicides by military and government figures followed in rapid succession, the general public grew alarmed that a major conspiracy was afoot, thereby increasing the urgency of Wessel’s reform program.
The victory of the Social Democratic coalition the following year compounded Wessel’s problems. Anxious to exert his control over the BND, the new director of the Chancellor’s Office, Horst Ehmke, filled the empty vice presidential position with Dieter Blötz, an SPD functionary from Hamburg with scant intelligence experience. Two other key posts went to party officials as well. Wessel had little direct contact with the new chancellor, Willy Brandt, whose primary goal was to open an era of détente in East-West relations. Contrary to his desires, Wessel saw an ever-widening polarization occurring between the BND and society at large. Many officers felt themselves under political assault from the left and closed ranks all the tighter. Given the radicalization of the youth culture at the time, recruitment of specialists from the universities proved increasingly difficult. Moreover, two senior divisional chiefs whom Wessel had appointed—Robert Borchardt from the Foreign Office and Heinz Burchardt from the Defense Ministry—resigned in frustration several years later, having never been accepted as legitimate by their veteran colleagues.

The BND president nevertheless persevered under these constraints. Because he considered the acquisition of intelligence from abroad to be the organization’s essential task, all domestic surveillance was terminated. Wessel dispatched supervisors to the outstations in order to end questionable practices in collection. Among the new divisions he created was one devoted to modern technology, which became the largest group of employees. Efforts were also undertaken to improve the public image of the BND, while contacts with other secret service organizations were expanded. Although many of his reforms never fully materialized, Wessel rationalized his tenure by stating that the worst had been prevented. Even though his critics—Gehlen foremost among them—had hoped for his early departure, Wessel did not retire until 1978. He died in Pullach on 28 July 2002.

WEST-ARBEIT. The broad spectrum of activities directed against the West by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, West-Arbeit (western operations) was organized not only in geographic terms but also structurally and according to areas of responsibility. This expanded definition meant that the boundary between foreign intelligence and domestic policing was often impossible to discern
and that operations abroad were not the sole prerogative of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. See also OPERATIONSGEBIET.

WIECK, HANS-GEORG (1928– ). The first career diplomat to head the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Hans-Georg Wieck was born in Hamburg on 28 March 1928. After joining the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1954, he held ambassadorships to Iran and the Soviet Union before becoming the permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) representative in Brussels. His appointment to the BND in September 1985 followed the abrupt dismissal of Heribert Hellenbroich and was widely viewed as an attempt to reassure NATO allies of the integrity of the FRG’s security agencies. Besides giving greater access to politicians and journalists, Wieck concentrated on reviving recruitments in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after a series of arrests by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. In 1986, under his direction, the systematic polling of 600 visiting GDR citizens on a half-yearly basis was instituted, even though the BND’s findings found little acceptance in Bonn (three-quarters of those questioned, for example, consistently desired German reunification). Wieck left the BND voluntarily in September 1990 and became ambassador to India prior to his retirement in 2001. Two years later, he and Wolbert Smidt, another former senior BND official, founded a public forum on intelligence in Berlin.

WIEGAND, RAINER (1939–1996). A ranking counterintelligence officer of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) who defected to the West, Rainer Wiegand joined the security forces in 1958. By 1981, he led the task force (Arbeitsgruppe Ausländer) that oversaw all foreigners—visitors, residents, and diplomats—in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). He also directed penetrations by double agents of organizations and military installations based in West Berlin and was responsible for operations in Latin America and the Middle East, such as efforts to protect Iraqi communist students from attacks by Saddam Hussein’s secret service.

Yet knowing that international terrorists were being harbored in the GDR with the explicit approval of the leadership caused Wiegand to reassess his commitment to the MfS. In mid-1985—acting contrary
to orders—he began to engage his own Arab agents to investigate terrorist attacks being planned at the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin. His detailed reports urging action to curtail these activities were disregarded, and on 5 April 1986, the La Belle Discotheque bombing occurred in West Berlin. The MfS then launched a disinformation campaign to shift responsibility to the Americans.

Two years later, his disillusionment complete, Wiegand prepared for his future defection by making contact with the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) through a double agent and by assembling copies of important documents showing the terrorist links. Despite increasing tension with his superiors, Wiegand continued in his post until his furtive departure from the GDR on 31 December 1989. Following extensive debriefings by the BND and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, he resettled in Munich and established a management consulting firm. For the trial of the accused perpetrators of the La Belle Discotheque bombing, the prosecution engaged Wiegand as a key witness, but shortly beforehand, on 17 June 1996, he and his wife died in a mysterious automobile accident while traveling on business near Lisbon, Portugal.

WIENAND, KARL (1926– ). An influential politician in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and a key agent of influence for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Karl Wienand was born in Lindenpütz (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 15 December 1926. After serving in the Wehrmacht and incurring severe wounds, he joined the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands in 1947 and rose steadily, becoming the party’s parliamentary manager 20 years later under the guidance of Herbert Wehner. His HVA recruitment by Alfred Völkel, one of the camouflaged Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz, occurred in 1970, and Wienand was assigned the code name Streit.

According to later HVA chief Werner Grossmann, this back channel between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic functioned “brilliantly” until 1990, even when Wienand no longer held an official position. Yet his name also became connected with a number of scandals, above all the unresolved case of the Bundestag vote of Julius Steiner in April 1972. Despite Wienand’s denials, a Düsseldorf court convicted him in June 1996 of committing espionage and stipulated a two-and-a-half-year prison term along with the
recovery of 1 million DM in agent payments. Although pardoned in 1999 by President Roman Herzog because of his failing health, Wienand faced additional legal problems three years later concerning irregularities in the construction of a Cologne garbage facility.

**WIENS, PAUL (1922–1982).** An influential East German writer and an informer for the **Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** (MfS), Paul Wiens was born into a Jewish family in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) on 17 August 1922. After spending his childhood in Berlin, he left Germany for Switzerland in 1933, studying philosophy in Geneva and Lausanne. In 1942, he was arrested in Vienna for illegal activity and spent the remainder of the war in Austrian internment. A publishing position attracted him to East Berlin, where his career as a writer began to prosper. In addition to composing lyrical poetry, he cowrote the screenplay for the 1958 film *Sonnensucher* (*Sun Seekers*) directed by Konrad Wolf. His relationship with the MfS began modestly in November 1961, five months after being selected as head of the Berlin Writers’ Association. Working under the code name **dichter**, Wiens supplied incriminating information about other writers in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as well as those encountered at international conventions in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

An even more productive phase commenced in 1972. His **Führungsoffizier**, Rolf Pönig, praised not only Wiens’s linguistic ability in Russian, English, French, Italian, and Serbo-Croatian but also his “brisk intellect and operational agility.” Among the long list of literary figures appearing in his voluminous reports are Wolf Biermann, Heinrich Böll, Hans Magnus Enzenberger, Stephan Hermlin, Heiner Müller, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Christa Wolf. Wiens also attracted young aspiring writers, showing no hesitation in reporting signs of ideological deviation on their part. On occasion he performed tasks expressly for the KGB, and in 1980 his official status was elevated to the top category of **Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter**. Shortly after assuming editorial direction of *Sinn und Form*, the GDR’s leading literary journal, Wiens died in East Berlin on 6 April 1982.

**WILLIAMSON, HARRY.** See SCHMIDT, WULF.
WILLMS, WILHELM. A double agent working for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Wilhelm Willms operated a tobacco shop in Hamburg. As an officer of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, he purposely allowed himself to be recruited by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in 1981. Two years later, however, he was unmasked during a visit to the German Democratic Republic and given a life sentence. His release occurred on 12 August 1987 as part of a spy exchange with the FRG.

WILLNER, HERBERT (1926– ). A spy for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Herbert Willner was born in China, raised in Dresden, and drafted into the Waffen-SS during World War II. A Soviet prisoner of war until 1950, he then studied journalism at Leipzig and was resettled in the FRG in 1961, where a close association developed with the Freie Demokratische Partei and its affiliated Friedrich-Naumann Foundation. Also recruited was Willner’s wife, Herta-Astrid, who, at his urging, obtained a position as a receptionist in the Chancellor’s Office. Warned by the HVA of their precarious situation, they were both exfiltrated to the German Democratic Republic in September 1985. Although fear of prosecution after reunification caused them to flee abroad, they returned to Germany in 1995 after the statute of limitations had expired.

WISMUT. A Soviet and East German uranium mining operation located in the Erzgebirge mountains near Zwickau (Saxony) along the Czech border, Wismut began to function in 1947. Even though it was formalized in 1954 as a joint venture between the two fraternal countries, all of the processed ore from this unusually rich deposit was shipped to the Soviet Union for its atomic energy program, while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) supplied a labor force that numbered nearly 130,000 at its height. Department W of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) was charged with overseeing the region, having been given the full status of a provincial administration in November 1951. Not until April 1982 was it absorbed by the regional office in Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz). In light of the deplorable housing and working conditions, many employees attempted to flee to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the
early years. According to local MfS records, the period June–December 1955 alone saw an exodus of 931 persons.

Because of the Soviet Union’s limited availability of uranium, Wismut was of great strategic interest to Western intelligence. After a Soviet logistics officer code-named Icarus defected in June 1950, security at the mining and processing sites was tightened dramatically, thus making the recruitment of agents seemingly impossible. A later and important source of information to British and American authorities was provided by the construction of the Berlin Tunnel, since one of the tapped Soviet communication lines connected the KGB unit at Wismut with the Karlshorst headquarters in East Berlin.

At the end of 1990, uranium operations ceased, and the company became the property of the FRG. A large reclamation project was then undertaken to deal with the lingering hazards of radiation as well as the vast ecological devastation of the region. The surviving MfS records are now located in Chemnitz.

WITTIG, CARL (1900–1980). A German journalist and operative for multiple organizations, Carl Wittig played a dual role prior to World War II, working for the intelligence branch of the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Jan Hájek while also serving as an agent for the Sicherheitsdienst in 1936–1937. Wittig ran afoul of the Nazi regime in 1939 and was placed in a concentration camp for the remainder of the war. Afterward, his journalistic career resumed in Frankfurt am Main along with his involvement in international espionage. Reputedly an agent for the Czech Statni Bezpechost (code name witz), he also developed ties to the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.

Wittig also served as a witness for the prosecution in the trial of Otto John in 1956. Six years later, however, while traveling in the German Democratic Republic, Wittig was arrested as a Western spy and sentenced to 15 years at Bautzen. He was released in June 1969 for more than 80,000 DM, part of the routine purchase of political prisoners by the Federal Republic of Germany. Although John then accused him of perjury, a court in Frankfurt decided in Wittig’s favor in 1971.

WITZKE, LOTHAR (1896–?). The only German spy sentenced to death in the United States during World War I, Lothar Witzke was a
lieutenant in the imperial navy when his light cruiser, the *Dresden*, sank off the coast of Chile during an encounter with British forces in March 1915. Interned in Valparaiso, he escaped to San Francisco, where Franz von Bopp, the German consul and spymaster for West Coast operations, recruited him as a courier. Recommended in turn to Karl Jahnke, Witzke worked under his tutelage to help stem the flow of munitions from New York to the Allies. Both emerged as prime suspects following the explosion at Black Tom Island and underwent interrogation.

The entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 caused Witzke to shift his operations to Mexico. One scheme sought to sabotage the Tampico oil fields, a vital source of fuel for the British navy, but it was never implemented. For a venture planned at the Arizona border, Witzke formed a new team, unaware that its two leading members, Paul Altendorf and William Gleaves, were reporting to the Americans and the British respectively (although neither knew of the other’s affiliation). On 1 February 1918, carrying a Russian passport under the name Pablo Waberski, Witzke was arrested in Nogales by U.S. authorities. Incriminating evidence found in his Mexican hotel room included a codebook and a coded message, which was deciphered by the military cryptanalytical unit in Washington, D.C. On 17 August, despite his protestations of innocence, a military tribunal at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, sentenced him to death by hanging.

Concerned, however, about the legal procedures followed in the trial, President Woodrow Wilson commuted the sentence to life imprisonment in May 1920. Intense pressure by the German government ultimately secured Witzke’s release in November 1923. He returned to Germany and was awarded the Iron Cross First and Second Class. According to Nicholas Ritter, Witzke occupied a position in the Abwehrt beginning in 1938. After World War II, he lived in Hamburg and served as a temporary member of the municipal parliament.

**WOLF, CHRISTA (1929– ).** A prominent East German writer whose connections with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) led to a major post-reunification controversy, Christa Wolf was born in Landsberg on the Warthe (now Gorzow Wielkopolski, Poland) on 18 March 1929. Her parents owned a grocery store. Much critical
acclaim greeted her first novel, *Der geteilte Himmel* (*The Divided Heaven*), in 1963, which was followed by numerous other works. She gradually acquired the reputation of a “loyal dissident,” tolerated by government authorities because of her staunch belief that East German socialism held greater promise than Western-style capitalism.

In the revolution of 1989, Wolf along with many other writers and intellectuals opposed the absorption of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany and advocated a democratically reformed socialist state. In 1990, she published *Was bleibt* (*What Remains*), a story written in 1979 detailing the extensive MfS surveillance of her and her husband at that time. In early 1993, however, it was revealed that she had been recruited as an informer and was active between 1959–1962 under the code name MARGARETE. Her defenders pointed out that her thin file contrasted dramatically with the volumes of information collected about her during nearly 30 years. Meetings with her handlers were infrequent, they insisted, and no harm came to anyone. Her critics countered that she had been unwilling to risk her privileged position, had mounted only a sham critique of the regime, and had posed as a martyr of the system. For many, the debate went beyond the question of Wolf’s MfS complicity and seemed to symbolize the most problematic aspects of German reunification. See also ANDERSON, ALEXANDER; KANT, HERMANN; MÜLLER, HEINER; SCHEDLINSKI, RAINER.

**WOLF, FELIX.** See RAKOW, WERNER.

**WOLF, GISELA and HANS.** An *Illegaler* couple working for the *Verwaltung Aufklärung* (VA), Gisela and Hans Wolf were originally married in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. When they later became covert operatives for the VA, Hans Wolf, an engineer, assumed the identity of Hans Kälin, a Swiss citizen who lived in the GDR, while his wife, Gisela, a journalist active in cultural affairs, took the name Ursula Meisner. Their assignment required the Wolfs to undergo a legal separation so that a new marriage under their new identities could take place in Switzerland. They were resettled in Zurich in 1967. Although Gisela’s employment as a press officer at the Sulzer Corporation had no direct military connections, it provided an effective cover, since the main mission of the Wolfs
was primarily logistic—establishing “an illegal residence for liaison and maintenance” in a neutral country.

Yet recruitments never materialized, and no network was established. Some information regarding Swiss military and security arrangements, however, was conveyed to East Berlin before their arrest in 1973. Among the evidence found by Swiss police was a radio transmitter hidden in a hall chest in their residence. On 21 June 1975, the Wolfs were sentenced to seven years in prison. After serving their full terms, they returned to the GDR in 1982. Gisela was fatally injured in a traffic accident in 1986. Hans died in 1991.

**WOLF, MARKUS (1923–2006).** The long-serving head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), Markus Wolf was born in Hechingen (Baden-Württemberg) on 19 January 1923, the son of a Jewish doctor, writer, and communist activist. After the family left Germany for the Soviet Union in 1933, he completed his education in Moscow and was admitted to Institute for Aircraft Construction. Gaining Soviet citizenship in 1939 and becoming a member of the communist youth group Komsomol, he was chosen to attend the Comintern’s training school in Kushnarenkovo in 1943. The dissolution of the Comintern shortly afterward led to his appointment as an editor and radio commentator in Moscow.

In late May 1945, Wolf returned to Germany and assumed a position at the Soviet-controlled Berliner Rundfunk under the alias Michael Storm. Although his coverage of the Nuremberg Trials as a special correspondent earned him particular recognition, a career in diplomacy loomed with the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. He became connected with the new East German mission in Moscow and gave up his Soviet citizenship the following year. In 1951, Wolf returned to East Berlin and, abandoning his diplomatic career, became a member of the newly created Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst (APN), disguised as the Institute for Economic Research. His main efforts as the deputy director of the counterintelligence division focused on West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), since other foreign countries were not initially in the purview of the East Germans. Wolf’s rise through the ranks was rapid. In November 1952, he succeeded Anton Ackermann as head of the APN, which became Main Division
XV of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) within a year, and his promotion to major general followed six months later. Under the reorganization of Ernst Wollweber in 1956, Main Division XV received its final designation—HVA—and Wolf was named a deputy minister of state security.

The HVA’s intelligence operations were largely run by a staff of Soviet instructors until 1960. Wolf maintained a low profile, despite his close personal and political ties to Moscow. Western officials referred to him as the “man without a face,” for not until a visit to Stockholm in 1978 was he photographed and then later identified by the HVA defector Werner Stiller. By that time, however, his reputation as a skilled espionage practitioner had been firmly established. His most spectacular placement was Günter Guillaume, the so-called, “chancellor spy,” who worked in the office of West German leader Willy Brandt. (Wolf later termed the eventual outcome as “the greatest defeat we suffered up to that time.”) Many of his most notable successes involved the deployment of Romeo spies, and sometimes he met personally with top female agents such as Gabrielle Gast. Another favored method was what he termed “seamless penetration,” which relied on the reuse of passports confiscated from West Germans emigrating to the GDR.

On 15 November 1986, Wolf retired from the MfS. Although he said it was to pursue a literary career, the records of National Defense Council stated that the move had occurred for reasons of health. Yet another explanation was given in 1992 by his superior Erich Mielke, who pointed to Wolf’s second divorce and new marriage, stating his private life had unduly interfered with his official duties.

During the revolution of 1989, it appeared that Wolf might emerge as a political reformer in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the GDR. On 4 November, he took the unusual step of speaking before a huge demonstration at the Alexanderplatz in East Berlin, openly conceding his past MfS affiliation and trying to protect his former colleagues as much as possible. Undeterred by the generally hostile reception, he pursued his reform plan for the MfS with the new government of Hans Modrow in early December. His proposal took sharp issue with Mielke’s autocratic style and concept of total surveillance and called for the rehabilitation of certain party members and an investigation of internal abuses, even though—in Leninist fashion—no
legal separation from the ruling party or oversight mechanisms were mentioned. Wolf simply exhorted the younger cadres to follow in the footsteps of the original Bolshevik Cheka.

Yet just as this plan came too late to have any chance of implementation, Wolf also declined his party’s invitation to become a candidate for political office. He further expressed his bitter disappointment over Mikhail Gorbachev’s unwillingness to intervene militarily on the GDR’s behalf. In October 1990, facing an arrest warrant in the newly reunited Germany and having refused an offer of resettlement and employment by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Wolf took temporary refuge in Moscow. His attempt to persuade Austria to provide a place of hiding failed, and in September 1991 he surrendered to German authorities at a border crossing. In the uncharted legal landscape, it was unclear whether Wolf, formerly based in the GDR, could be held responsible for having conducted espionage against the FRG. Although a Düsseldorf court found him guilty in December 1993 and stipulated a six-year prison term, the FRG’s highest tribunal later overturned the ruling on the grounds that HVA officers could only be tried for acts committed under West German jurisdiction. A second attempt by state prosecutors in 1997 focused on a series of kidnappings rather than outright espionage and resulted in a two-year suspended sentence. In addition to numerous interviews and other publications, Wolf’s principal memoirs, *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg* (*Man without a Face*), appeared in 1997. He died on 9 November 2006 in Berlin.

**WOLFF, KARL (1900–1984).** The chief SS commander in Italy and former chief of staff to Heinrich Himmler, Karl Wolff was born in Darmstadt on 13 May 1900, the son of a district court magistrate. After volunteering for service in World War I and earning the Iron Cross First and Second Class, he participated in a Freikorps unit in 1919. He then worked as a clerk in several businesses before becoming head of an advertising firm in Munich. His rise in the SS proceeded rapidly after he joined the Nazi Party in October 1931. Following Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, SS-head Heinrich Himmler not only recommended Wolff as the part-time adjutant to the new military governor of Bavaria, Franz Ritter von Epp, but made him a member of his own staff. One of his chief functions was to manage
Himmler’s expanding treasury. In 1936, Wolff made a secret alliance with Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Sicherheitsdienst and a key subordinate of Himmler, to defeat their common enemies in the Nazi hierarchy. Wolff’s own position as chief adjutant to Himmler solidified once Heydrich assumed his responsibilities as Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia. Promoted to the rank of SS-Obergruppenführer (lieutenant general) on 3 May 1940, Wolff was additionally Himmler’s main liaison officer to Hitler during the first years of World War II.

A long illness lessened Wolff’s importance to Himmler, and he was named highest SS and police Führer in Italy and plenipotentiary to Benito Mussolini in September 1943. Wolff’s role was to strengthen the German position in Italy amid deteriorating political and military conditions. According to his later recollection, Hitler even gave him private instructions to depose the pope and other clerics and assume control of the Vatican (Wolff’s stalling presumably prevented this operation from taking place). Once Mussolini was reinstated in the puppet Salo regime, Wolff had the task of forcibly recruiting Italian workers for the German armaments industry and combating increasing partisan activity. But with the Allied military advance and the evacuation of Mussolini to Germany, he decided, in concert with Himmler, to make secret contact with the enemy. In February 1945, a Swiss intelligence intermediary, Max Waibel, delivered a plan to Allen Dulles, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services station chief in Bern, calling for an armistice on the entire Italian front. Through Operation SUNRISE, the surrender of German troops occurred on 2 May 1945, six days before the actual end of the European war.

Although Wolff was taken captive by the Americans and imprisoned in Nuremberg, no charges were filed in order to obtain his testimony against other Nazi figures (he attempted in vain to keep the SS from being classified as a criminal organization). After his transfer to a British prison in Minden (Lower Saxony) in early 1948, a denazification court in Hamburg-Bergedorf found him guilty and sentenced him to a five-year term. When a successful appeal reduced his sentence, Wolff was released in June 1949 and began working as an advertising executive in Cologne. During the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961, published comments by Wolff
about Himmler drew attention to his own wartime activities and caused the Bavarian Ministry of Justice to charge him with “abetting the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews.” A second arrest warrant accused him of providing “psychological assistance” during a massacre in Minsk in August 1941. Wolff’s denial of any knowledge of the death camps proved unpersuasive, as did the testimony of his friend Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz stressing the number of lives saved through Operation Sunrise. On 30 September 1964, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In late August 1969, however, Wolff was released owing to poor health. He died on 17 July 1984 in Rosenheim (Bavaria).

**WOLKE.** A joint undertaking of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) and Polish counterintelligence, Operation Wolke (Cloud) originated in 1983 and was designed to aid the Polish martial law regime under Wojciech Jaruzelski in combating the Solidarity movement. Relying on the technological expertise of Main Division III of the MfS (whose assigned personnel and equipment arrived in a special aircraft from East Berlin), the operation specifically targeted the U.S. embassy in Warsaw. The Poles provided a concealed base of operations near the building. Other key aspects, such as devising legends and determining the means of transporting and storing operational materials, were decided in consultation, even though the two services had a strained record of cooperation.

By penetrating the embassy electronically, the Poles and East Germans attempted to ascertain the activities of covert agents and any hostile attempts to tap into the radio communications system in Warsaw. The operation also focused on Solidarity’s clandestine radio transmitter and explored methods of blocking its broadcasts. At the conclusion of Wolke in 1986, a comprehensive report was delivered by MfS head Erich Mielke to the Polish interior minister and the KGB.

**WOLLENBERG, ERICH (1892–1973).** A leading communist military and intelligence strategist who later broke with Joseph Stalin, Erich Wollenberg was born into a middle-class family in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) on 15 August 1892. A medical student in 1914, he volunteered for military service and saw frontline combat.
Wounded several times and feeling increasing disillusionment with the war effort, Wollenberg became drawn to the Independent Socialists, the nucleus of the later Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), and led a group of revolutionary sailors in Königsberg during the 1918 upheaval. The following year, he resumed his medical studies in Munich and emerged as a key figure in the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, commanding the infantry of the Dachau Army Group. The three-year prison sentence that resulted only served to harden his Marxist-Leninist convictions.

In late 1922, Wollenberg returned to Königsberg as an editor and propagandist, targeting shipyard and railway workers as well as members of the German army and navy. Given the code name Walter, he also belonged to the Military-Political Apparatus of the KPD and helped lay the groundwork for a projected 1923 communist revolution in Germany. His base of operations next shifted to the French-occupied Ruhr area, where he helped channel the discontent of striking workers into an armed but ultimately unsuccessful insurrection in Bochum. In August 1923, he was given the command of the southwest area of Germany, where the much-anticipated revolution likewise came to naught.

Charged with “high treason, murder, and illegal use of explosives” (a German court referred to him as one of the most dangerous men in the country), Wollenberg was ordered by the KPD to Moscow in 1924. There, after completing his military studies at a Comintern military school, he held a number of positions and became a close friend of Karl Radek. By the late 1920s, he headed the military cabinet of the Marx-Engels Institute, which trained German communists for undercover work. He also wrote works such as Als Rotarmist von München (As a Red Army Member from Munich), which appeared in 1929.

In April 1931, Wollenberg returned to Germany as head of the agitprop division of the Red Front Fighters Group and editor of the newspaper Die Rote Fahne. In June 1932, an encounter with members of the Sturmbteilung at a Nazi Party rally in Berlin left him severely injured. He returned to Moscow in December, alarmed that the KPD—acting on orders from the Soviet Union—refused to regard the Nazis rather than the Social Democrats as the main enemy.
Wollenberg’s increasing disillusionment with Stalin’s leadership led him to find common cause with the opposition group centered around Nicholas Bukharin and Jan Karlovich Berzin, the head of Soviet military intelligence. Because of his vocal criticism of KPD strategy, he was ousted from the party on 4 April 1933. Using a false passport in the name of Wilhelm Rüdiger, which had enabled him to return to the Soviet Union, he took refuge in Warsaw and Prague before continuing to Paris. His overriding aim was to combat both Hitler and Stalin—“the enemy brothers” as he characterized them. In the meantime, a major Stalinist purge directed against the “counter-revolutionary, terrorist, Trotskyist Wollenberg-Hölz spy organization” was carried out in Moscow by the NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), which by 1938 had claimed the lives of 70 persons associated with the two men (Max Hölz was also a KPD militant who had run afoul of the party and died mysteriously in the Soviet Union in 1933).

Following the Allied landings in November 1942, Wollenberg joined the American forces in French North Africa and became a press officer for the U.S. Army in Bavaria at the end of the war. His journalistic career continued afterward in Munich, and he became a member of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands in 1951. Despite his harsh critique of Stalin, no expression of regret for his revolutionary activity in Germany and work with the early Red Army ever appeared in his subsequent writings. In 1964, Wollenberg moved to Hamburg, where he died nine years later.

WOLLENBERGER, KNUD (1953– ). An agent of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) who informed on his own spouse, Knud Wollenberger possessed dual East German and Danish citizenship. Trained as a mathematician and recruited by the MfS in 1972 under the code name DONALD, he infiltrated the Danish and U.S. embassies to obtain knowledge of their security systems. A position at the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) next brought him into contact with his future wife, Vera Lengsfeld, a founding member of an early peace and ecological group in Berlin-Pankow as well as the daughter of an MfS officer.

For the next decade, Wollenberger reported in detail about his wife’s growing role in the dissident movement. Her protest of the
installation of Soviet missiles in the GDR resulted in her expulsion from the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in 1983 along with an occupational ban; her livelihood afterward derived from beekeeping and translation work. Following a peace rally in January 1988, she was arrested for “inciting mob action” and held for one month at Berlin-Hohenschönhausen before being deported to Great Britain on a restricted visa. She returned to participate in the revolution of 1989. Only after an inspection of her MfS file did her husband’s role as a longtime informer come to light. Although Wollenberger defended his actions as an attempt to shield her from authorities, she obtained a divorce and, as Vera Lengsfeld, continued her political career in the Bundestag, first with the Green Party and then with the Christlich-Demokratische Union. Lengsfeld’s 1992 account—Virus der Heuchler (Virus of the Hypocrites)—elucidated the wide range of MfS surveillance techniques. The final sequel to this highly publicized case was Wollenberger’s belated admission of guilt and request for forgiveness, which Lengsfeld willingly granted.

WOLLWEBER, ERNST (1898–1967). An expert in maritime sabotage and briefly head of state security for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Ernst Wollweber was born in Hannoversch Münden (Lower Saxony) on 28 October 1898 to working-class parents. Lacking funds to continue his education, he became a sailor on Germany’s internal waterways at the age of 14. He was inducted into the wartime navy in 1916. Assigned to the elite submarine division, Wollweber gained knowledge of the use of explosives just as his political views were becoming radicalized. At the conclusion of the war, he participated in the sailors’ mutiny in Kiel and, in early 1919, joined the newly established Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD).

Wollweber was elected to the Central Committee in 1921 and the following year was a delegate to the Fourth Comintern Congress in Moscow. In 1923, he returned to the Soviet Union for further training and began his long association with Department IV (intelligence) of the Red Army. Back in Germany, he was identified by a police informer as an Illegaler and sentenced in December 1924 to three years’ imprisonment for high treason, which, because of a scandal involving the prosecuting attorney, ended after only two months. Known as an effective speaker since his youth, Wollweber took to
the campaign trail at the party’s urging and was elected to the Prussian Landtag in 1928 and the Reichstag in 1932. Under the protection of parliamentary immunity—and with generous government travel allowances at his disposal—his espionage activities continued undeterred.

After the Nazi accession to power, Wollweber’s next destination was Copenhagen, where the Comintern had relocated its all-important West European Bureau. He reactivated an earlier sailors’ union network based in Hamburg before being called to Moscow in 1935 to initiate even more aggressive undercover action. What became known as the “Wollweber League” was to appear independent of Moscow and all local communist parties, even though it received critical logistical support from Department IV. Composed of some 300 sailors and dockers throughout northern Europe and China, it sought to sabotage the ships belonging to the members of the anti-Comintern Pact—Germany, Italy, and Japan. The result was the sinking of 250,000 tons of shipping and the deaths of 10 sailors. High-ranking Nazi officials such as Joachim von Ribbentrop and Reinhard Heydrich explicitly pointed to the Wollweber League’s complicity in their reports, and Wollweber (code name ERNST TOLSTY) was charged accordingly. He was finally apprehended in Sweden in 1940 and held in custody for the next four years. On 15 November 1944, the Soviet Union arranged his transport from Stockholm back to Moscow.

Wollweber returned to Germany in early 1946. During the occupation period, he became head of the general directorate of navigation. Given the alarm expressed at the time by Norwegian and Swedish officials, it seems most likely that his sabotage activities had resumed, even though solid evidence is lacking. Upon the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949, he was designated the director of shipping in the Transportation Ministry. In the aftermath of the Uprising of 17 June 1953, Wollweber succeeded the dismissed Wilhelm Zaisser as head of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), now a downgraded state secretariat within the Interior Ministry. GDR head of state Walter Ulbricht would have preferred his own candidate, Erich Mielke, but accepted Wollweber due to the insistence of Soviet authorities. Acting on the spurious explanation that the uprising or “fascist putsch” could be traced to the
work of enemy Western agents, the new state security chief began a policy of “concentrated blows” at such targets as the Organisation Gehlen and the Ostbüro der SPD. An estimated 600–700 people were abducted from the West and brought to the GDR in the course of three major arrest actions—Feuerwerk, Pfeil, and Blitz—as well as individual kidnappings. In marked contrast to his predecessor, Wollweber gave state security operations a higher public profile through frequent sensationalized press conferences and factory visits. By November 1955, the state security apparatus had regained its status as an independent ministry.

With the advent of de-Stalinization following Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech in February 1956, Wollweber’s differences with Ulbricht came into open conflict. Whereas the GDR leader favored as little accommodation to the new direction as possible, Wollweber believed that some tactical adjustments were necessary, especially in the handling of dissidents such as Wolfgang Harich. He further sought alterations in the prison system, relaxing somewhat the methods of interrogation and the conditions of detention, and instituting a hiring freeze on new full-time MfS personnel. His clash with Ulbricht came to a head following the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. On 1 November 1957, Wollweber announced his resignation for “reasons of health” and two months later, along with Politburo member Karl Schirdewan, was removed from the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). The key issue was Wollweber’s relatively independent background and his lack of subservience to Ulbricht. A subsequent party meeting rebuked him for “attacks against the work style of Comrade Ulbricht.” Yet he suffered no show trial and, unlike his predecessor, remained a member of the SED, quietly retiring in East Berlin and remarrying in 1960.

Three years before his death on 3 May 1967, Wollweber dictated a portion of his memoirs to his new wife, stressing that the GDR had not overcome the cult of personality and was prone to an artificially optimistic and ineffectual propaganda style. In 1974, she gave the 55-page manuscript to Ulbricht’s successor, Erich Honecker, in the hope that her husband might be rescued from the status of “unperson” that had followed his resignation. Honecker kept the document, but it never surfaced. Her copy, however, was finally published in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
WORGITZKY, HANS-HEINRICH (1907–1969). The first vice president of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky served as an intelligence officer with Army Group Center on the Eastern front during World War II. He joined the Organisation Gehlen in December 1946 and received important posts in Bremen and Hamburg. With the official establishment of the BND came his appointment as vice president on 24 May 1957. Known for his organizational skills and collegial attitude, Worgitzky (code name Wagner) sought to reform the intelligence process by relying less on informers in the Soviet bloc and increasing the role of technology and open sources. He also helped shift the BND’s exclusively anticomunist focus to greater worldwide coverage. His influence began to wane owing to the mistrust of his superior Reinhard Gehlen, and he was restricted to fringe areas prior to his retirement in March 1967. After a long illness, Worgitzky died on 13 December 1969.

WOTAN. See WEHNER, HERBERT.

WÜNNENBERG, KARL. A marine engineer and German naval reserve lieutenant involved in American espionage during World War I, Karl Wünnenberg established his residence in New York City around 1900. After undergoing training at the “N” spy school in Antwerp in 1915, Wünnenberg (code name A13) returned to the United States and—together with Albert Sander—began to recruit American journalists for intelligence missions to Great Britain. Besides monitoring merchant ships and locating antiaircraft gun bases, these agents were to compose newspaper articles with an anti-British bias. Two of them—George Vaux Bacon and Roslyn Whytock—made full confessions to MI5, prompting the arrest of Wünnenberg and Sander by U.S. authorities in early 1917. After pleading guilty, each received a two-year prison sentence and a fine of $2,500.

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YILDIRIM, HUSEYIN. See HALL, JAMES W., III.
ZAISSER, WILHELM (1893–1956). A Soviet intelligence officer and the first head of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Wilhelm Zaisser was born in Rotthausen (North Rhine-Westphalia) on 20 June 1893, the son of a policeman and later teacher. Only months after Zaisser had passed his own qualifying examination and assumed a teaching position, the outbreak of World War I resulted in his military duty with an infantry regiment in Lorraine. Transferred to the eastern front, he was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class. In November 1918, his German nationalist outlook underwent a major transformation during an assignment along the Ukrainian-Russian border. With the collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy, many war-weary German soldiers like Zaisser ignored their orders and developed a camaraderie with members of the Red Army, impressed by their discipline and organization. The salvation of defeated Germany, he concluded, lay in revolutionary Bolshevism under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Returning to Germany, he resumed his teaching career in March 1919 in a working-class school in Essen and joined the newly formed Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) six months later. The following March, when Essen emerged as the center of the Ruhr uprising, Zaisser played a leading role as a member of the central military command. Although the so-called Red Army of 50,000–80,000 armed men gained control of the region between Dortmund and Düsseldorf, government forces subdued the uprising by Easter, and Zaisser took refuge at his parents’ home. Alerted by an informer, the police arrested Zaisser and several others in January 1920, and a highly publicized trial—accompanied by the mobilization of KPD members—commenced the next month in Kassel. While the press referred to him as “the leader of the Ruhr Red Army,” the court sentenced him to only four months in prison in contrast to nine months given to one of his associates.

His teaching license revoked, Zaisser began full-time KPD work as a journalist, first at the Ruhr-Echo in Essen and then at the Bergische Volkstimme in Barmen. By 1923, coinciding with the French occupation of the Ruhr, he was head of the KPD’s clandestine military-political (or M) apparatus for the region. To sharpen their skills,
he and 11 other M leaders devised and took part in a short-term course in Moscow, which included planning for the revolutionary overthrow of the Weimar Republic.

Foreign assignments, however, took precedence, and in 1925, under orders of Department IV (intelligence) of the Red Army, Zaisser was a military advisor in Syria to Druse tribes struggling against French colonial occupation and also to Abd el-Krim, leader of the Rif tribes of Morocco, who was battling the combined forces of the French and Spanish. After a year back in Berlin, where he was responsible for all political-military training within the M-apparatus, he was dispatched in June 1927 to Manchuria. Disguised as a German businessman, he gained access to the court of P’u Yi, whom the Japanese installed shortly afterward as the ruler of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Despite his involvement in the communist-led Canton uprising in December, Zaisser escaped the massive reprisals. In Shanghai, under his direction, a branch of the Stahlhelm, the largest of the German military veterans’ organizations, was founded. This cover allowed Zaisser, who also posed as a representative of the Ford automobile firm, to establish relations with important German diplomats and military officers, including the former Reichswehr chief of staff, Hans von Seeckt.

Recalled to Moscow in March 1930, Zaisser began an extended period of teaching, initially in Prague as Comintern Instrukteur, then for three years as the assistant director of a secluded M-school just outside the Soviet capital. Using the alias Werner Reissner, he taught military and street-fighting tactics as well as espionage trade-craft to 20–30 German communists each year. In August 1936, after working briefly as a translator and editor in Moscow, Zaisser left for Spain disguised as a tourist but primed for military action in the civil war. Within months, the newly formed XIII International Brigade composed of 21 different nationalities came under his command. Employing the nom de guerre General Gomez, Zaisser led his unit from the Albacete base to combat in various locales throughout the country.

In July 1937, as plans for the Brunete Offensive were taking shape, Zaisser strenuously objected to the projected deployment of his brigade beyond its capacity—the equivalent, in his view, of a “military crime.” Prior to the offensive, Soviet officials removed him from
his command but discovered afterward that barely one-quarter of his brigade had survived. He also resisted an NKVD (Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) order from Alexander Orlov to discharge a group of Yugoslav soldiers suspected of being enemy agents. Zaisser’s insubordination did not result in his arrest, and he was ordered back to the Albacete base, where military instruction once again became his chief responsibility. In September, he was elevated to the central command of all the international brigades, but facing defeat the following summer, the Republican government ordered their demobilization.

Returning to Moscow in early September 1938, Zaisser found that two close associates from the M-apparatus, Hans Kippenberger and Heinz Neumann, as well as his Soviet mentor Jan Karolvich Berzin had fallen victim to Stalin’s purges. Nevertheless, he was able to resume his earlier position as an editor and translator, and he became a Soviet citizen in 1940. His most significant wartime activity began in the spring of 1943 following the surrender of the German army at Stalingrad. For the next three years, under the general supervision of the NKVD, Zaisser assumed a leading role in the Antifa schools aimed at turning German prisoners of war into communist activists, first in Jushua, then in Krasnogorsk. He was also involved in planning for postwar Germany. As a member of the KPD’s working group for military matters, he gave particular attention to the creation of a peace movement within the Wehrmacht and a new armed activist unit for the party.

Despite his numerous requests, his return to Germany was delayed until February 1947 (he complained of not being considered a German because of his long association with the Soviets). A steady ascent in the hierarchy of the Soviet occupation zone soon followed. After initially heading the police force of Saxony-Anhalt, he became deputy minister-president of Saxony in 1948 and in 1949 was appointed vice president of the German Interior Administration with special authority over the Border Police and the Ready Units. On 8 February 1950—approximately six months after the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—Zaisser was named head of the newly created MfS. Although some in the East German leadership, including Walter Ulbricht, would have preferred Erich Mielke (who became Zaisser’s assistant), the Soviets wanted a more reliable

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functionary in this key position. Zaisser himself showed considerable reluctance, hoping instead that he might receive the defense portfolio. He approached this fresh assignment with his characteristic low-key but resolute demeanor, eschewing the hasty strong-arm tactics of the Nazis in dealing with opponents and preferring the more calculated, long-term techniques learned from the Soviets.

While Mielke was given considerable latitude in enlarging and developing the ministry’s personnel, the list of Zaisser’s main responsibilities continued to grow. Not only were suspect members of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) and the rival bourgeois parties identified and brought to trial, but MfS agents began to be placed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet Zaisser’s relationship with the SED showed strains from the outset. His main target of criticism was Ulbricht’s overly authoritarian leadership and his transformation of the secretariat into a personal instrument of power. Their deep-seated conflict came to a climax in the aftermath of the Uprising of 17 June 1953—a spontaneous revolt throughout East Germany against the hard-line policies adopted by the Ulbricht government. The MfS proved unable to control the protesters, and Soviet troops had to be dispatched. In the divisive party discussions that followed—complicated by the leadership struggle in Moscow after Stalin’s recent death—Zaisser believed that major blame would be assigned to Ulbricht and a more moderate course adopted. Instead, he and his ally Rudolf Herrnstadt were charged with counterrevolutionary “factional activity,” and the MfS was forced to assume prime responsibility for the events of 17 June.

Zaisser’s career ended on a bitter note. Although he was among the first East Germans to receive the Karl Marx Order, and even voted for his own removal from the Central Committee during his last Politburo meeting, his plea to remain an “ordinary” SED member went unheeded; he was removed as an “enemy of the party” on 12 January 1954. Moreover, his name was banished from all official publications and internal MfS documents, and his wife was compelled to leave her position as minister of education. Employed for a time as a translator of V. I. Lenin’s works for an East German publisher, Zaisser died of a heart attack in East Berlin on 3 March 1956. His wife’s repeated attempts to secure his rehabilitation met with no success during her
lifetime. Not until April 1993 was his name officially restored by the successor party to the SED.

ZANGE, HINRICH (1911– ). A spy for the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung who targeted political circles in the Federal Republic of Germany, Hinrich Zange was born in Saatz (now Žatec, Czech Republic). Educated in Prague and trained as a lawyer, he was inducted into the Wehrmacht during World War II. In 1946, he was deported from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. Presumed irregularities in his law practice resulted in his arrest and conviction in 1952. Recruited by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit while in prison, Zange was resettled in Bonn with the purpose of penetrating two West German political parties, the Freie Demokratische Partei and the Christlich-Demokratische Union. Counterintelligence authorities, however, succeeded in unmasking him, and on 26 May 1961, he was sentenced by a Cologne court to two and a half years in prison. Zange’s wife, who ran a beauty salon, received a six-month sentence as his accomplice.

ZEHE, ALFRED. The first known East German operative captured in the United States, Alfred Zehe was a professor of physics at the Technical College in Dresden who served as a consultant and courier for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). In a joint operation of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Office of Special Investigation, officials at the East German embassy in Washington, D.C., were offered classified information in return for a cash payment. At their insistence, the evaluation of the material took place in Mexico City, where Zehe met with undercover American agents (he regularly spent half the year at the University of Puebla). Contrary to his instructions never to visit the United States, Zehe later attended a scientific conference in Boston and was arrested on 3 November 1983.

Although an aggressive defense was mounted involving the top East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, Zehe complicated matters by expressing his desire to defect to the United States (which was firmly rejected by U.S. officials). On 21 February 1985, however, reassured by the MfS of the possibility of a spy exchange—and that no retaliatory measures against him or his family would be
taken—he pleaded guilty to the eight counts of the indictment. His sentence amounted to a fine of $5,000 and eight years’ imprisonment. But on 11 June, Zehe was part of a spy exchange along with three other Eastern bloc operatives and returned to the German Democratic Republic.

ZEISE, MANFRED (1940– ). The final caretaker head of the Verwal tung Aufklärung (VA), Manfred Zeise began his military studies in 1976 at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy in Dresden. In 1980, after gaining experience in agent surveillance, he was appointed head of the VA’s newly established school for advanced studies. He became deputy head of the VA in 1985. While the exodus of East German citizens to Hungary and Czechoslovakia was taking place in the summer of 1989, Zeise completed additional studies at the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) school in the Soviet Union. Following the dismissal of VA chief Alfred Krause on 30 September 1990, Zeise took command of the organization’s remaining fragments during the final two days prior to German reunification. After the official dissolution of the VA on 2 October 1990, Zeise continued to reside in Berlin.

ZELLE, MARGARETHA. See MATA HARI.

ZENTRALE AUSWERTUNGS UND INFORMATIONSGRUPPE (ZAIG). The division of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) charged with the assessment of public opinion within the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Zentrale Auswertungs und Informationsgruppe (Central Evaluation and Information Group), together with its subdivisions (Auswertungs und Kontrollgruppen; Assessment and Control Groups) on the regional and county levels, drew its information from myriad sources, including Western media. Formed in 1965 and headed by Werner Irmler, it grew to a force of 423 employees until its dissolution in 1989. Its weekly reports and information bulletins were distributed to the party and state hierarchy throughout the GDR, the list varying according to the topic at hand. ZAIG was directly responsible to MfS chief Erich Mielke, who made the final determination of the content and routing of the information.
Although written with a strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the policy priorities of the regime, the ZAIG reports often contained candid observations on the actual state of affairs, particularly when domestic grievances peaked in the late 1980s. Possibly owing to their sheer bulk (897, for example, were produced in 1976) and lack of analytical precision, they tended to be disregarded by their recipients. Nevertheless, they were marked “top secret” and had to be promptly returned. GDR leader Erich Honecker later conceded that he paid “scant attention” to them, complaining that the MfS had not supplied him and his colleagues with “very reliable” information.

ZENTRALE KOORDINIERUNGSGRUPPE (ZKG). The main unit of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) charged with combating flight and emigration from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe (Central Coordinating Group) was established in December 1976 along with subsections in the 13 regional offices. MfS chief Erich Mielke saw this move necessitated by the advent of détente, which meant increased contact with the West and hence greater potential for enemy subversion. Especially alarming to him was the influx of visitors from the Federal Republic of Germany, whom he believed the “imperialist secret services” and other undercover groups were manipulating to destabilize the country.

The initial efforts of the ZKG were concentrated on combating illegal flight from the GDR (Republikflucht) and the so-called “criminal traffickers in human beings.” By 1983, the focus had shifted to those seeking permission to leave the country, presumably inspired by external organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Society for Human Rights in Frankfurt am Main. Although the ZKG originally had merely a coordinating function and numbered 20 employees in its headquarters and 86 in the regional offices, a steady expansion of its responsibilities and personnel occurred. In early 1987, when its final organizational structure was in place (six departments along with a new unit devoted to other Eastern bloc states, particularly Czechoslovakia), the ZKG counted 185 workers and 261 in regional offices. Not only was it headed by Gerhard Neiber, a veteran officer who served as one of the four deputy
heads of MfS, but its employees had a noticeably higher educational background than found elsewhere in the security apparatus.

While drastic measures came to be employed against individual GDR citizens—ranging from job discrimination and the suspension of driver’s licenses to interrogation and imprisonment owing to treasonable activity—the ZKG proved powerless in halting the escalating emigration movement, notably during the summer of 1989. Its only tangible success involved the penetration and suppression of key organizations assisting those fleeing the country.

ZENTRALFRIEDHOF BERLIN-FRIEDRICHSFELDE. The chief burial site for prominent German communists, including many spies, the Zentralfriedhof Berlin-Friedrichsfelde (Central Cemetery Berlin-Friedrichsfelde) opened officially in 1881. It was rededicated by East German authorities in 1951 with a large stone monument inscribed “The dead exhort us.” Among the intelligence figures interred there are Anton Ackermann, Richard Stahlmann, Bruno Beater, Ernst Wollweber, Erich Jamin, Alfred Scholz, Max Clausen, Klaus Fuchs, and Markus Wolf. To prevent its desecration, the grave of Erich Mielke was left unmarked.

ZENTRALSTELLE FÜR DAS CHIFFRIERWESEN (ZfCh). A unit of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) devoted primarily to the encoding of information for the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Zentralstelle für das Chiffrierwesen (Code Coordination Bureau) traces its origins to 1947, when a small group of military cryptologists was assembled by Erich Hüttenhain, the ex-chief of cryptanalytical research for the Wehrmacht, at the U.S. Army base outside Oberursel (Hesse). This group subsequently became part of the signals intelligence unit of the Organisation Gehlen, which, headed by Hüttenhain, concentrated its attention on Eastern bloc military transmissions. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a cryptographic service (Sektion 114) in 1950 under Adolf Paschke, it was closed five years later owing to the FRG’s decision to rearm. By 1956, all coding and decoding responsibilities were consolidated in the newly created BND. A further reorganization took place in 1989, when the ZfCh was transformed into an expanded Zentralstelle für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Central Agency for Security in Information Technology).

**ZEPELIN.** A twofold attempt to obtain better wartime intelligence regarding the Soviet Union and establish a partisan movement behind enemy lines, Operation ZEPPELIN originated at the insistence of Heinrich Himmler in August 1942. Walter Schellenberg, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the Sicherheitsdienst, responded by creating a special sabotage unit equipped with its own signals network. Its headquarters at Wannsee southwest of Berlin consisted of a small oversight staff, mostly young academics recruited because of their expertise regarding Poland and Russia. By spring 1943, the field operation—three main commando units, each attached to the Army Groups North, Middle, and South—was in place, but it began to deteriorate during the Wehrmacht’s subsequent retreat. The commandos also possessed their own military units or “auxiliary battalions,” which were employed primarily for fighting Soviet partisans. Yet the number of volunteers from among the Russian prisoners of war declined significantly as the prospects of a German victory diminished, while morale suffered due to a shortage of radios, aircraft, and other equipment. In late 1943, some troops were reassigned to Western Europe to prevent redefection. Soviet security forces posed a further problem, as they used apprehended agents to track down other spies and saboteurs.

To salvage the operation, Schellenberg convened an emergency meeting of ZEPPELIN officials in Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland) early in 1944. The previous emphasis on mass undertakings was abandoned in favor of smaller, more carefully trained and supervised agents. Harsher security measures could also entail a summary death sentence, as was the fate of some 200 soldiers sent to Auschwitz. Above all, operational missions began to stress the collection of intelligence and political subversion—especially in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus—rather than outright sabotage.

No attempt was made to coordinate with the overlapping activities of the Abwehr, which together with Schellenberg’s operation never inserted more than 2,000 men into Soviet-held territory during the entire course of the war. Probably the most successful aspect
of zeppelin was Sonderlage L, a camp established at Blaumau in Lower Austria, where willing Russian engineers, scientists, and technicians helped provide important information regarding Soviet agricultural and industrial production along with dissident activities in the country. Because the main complex of training facilities had been evacuated to the region of Marienbad (now Marianske Lazne, Czech Republic) beginning in late 1944, it was American and British officials, not the Red Army, who interrogated the surviving zeppelin personnel the following year. See also WANNSEE INSTITUT.

ZERSETZUNGSMASSNAHMEN. During the era of détente the primary means of combating dissent in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Zersetzungsmassnahmen (decomposition measures) reflected a stronger emphasis on psychological rather than physical repression, along with the possibility of ideological rehabilitation. As set forth in the 1976 operational guidelines, Zersetzungsmassnahmen included isolation and disorientation of a target by rumor and deception. The MfS might spread false allegations, for example, of a person’s excessive drinking, immoral sexual acts, spying for the West, or professional deficiencies. Harassment could take the form of frequent late-night phone calls, the repeated delivery of unordered items, and fictitious notices placed in newspapers. Repeated failures on the job could produce in the target a severe loss of self-confidence and hence less inclination to engage in subversive activities. Conversely, rewarding the person with trips to the West or professional advancement could lead to a compromising situation and charges of corruption.

While many detailed examples were included in the MfS’s educational materials, officers were implored to respond “creatively” to individual cases and not rely on clichéd formulas (the number of possibilities, it was noted, had “no limit”). Leading religious and literary figures in the GDR counted among the most frequent targets of these techniques. Described by the dissident writer Jürgen Fuchs as “a quiet form of terror,” the Zersetzungsmassnahmen proved exceedingly difficult to detect and expose as human rights violations according to the Helsinki Accords of 1976.
ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM. The intercepted and decrypted message that hastened the entry of the United States into World War I, the Zimmermann Telegram can be traced to Arthur von Kemnitz, an East Asia expert in the German Foreign Office. His proposal—to provide financial support to the Mexican government so it could reconquer lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona—was endorsed by Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann, who then advised the German ambassador in Mexico City, Heinrich von Eckhardt, to make the offer of an alliance. However remote the prospects of success, Zimmermann calculated that a large-scale military entanglement in Mexico would keep the United States at bay and prevent further arms shipments to Europe.

Because of the urgency of the matter—unrestricted submarine warfare was to be announced on 1 February 1917—three copies of Zimmermann’s encrypted confidential note were sent on 16 January: one by radio from Nauen (Brandenburg) to Sayville, Long Island; a second via the Swedish transatlantic cable from Stockholm; and a third on the American cable from the U.S. embassy in Berlin. Its first recipient was the German ambassador to the United States, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, who then cabled the message to Mexico City.

Unknown to the Germans, however, was the interception of the telegram by the British and its decryption by the naval intelligence unit known as Room 40. Relying on copies of various German codebooks obtained earlier, it also decoded Zimmermann’s second telegram, which had added Japan to the proposed alliance. To cover their tracks—and keep the Germans convinced of the inviolability of their codes—the British secured a copy of the first telegram that had been received by the Mexican Telegraph Office. After the document was passed to the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, President Woodrow Wilson released it on 1 March to the American press, which was already filled with dramatic stories of German sabotage and submarine warfare. Zimmermann’s inexplicable but candid acknowledgment as the author of the telegram removed any doubts about its authenticity. On 2 April, his hope for a negotiated peace dashed by the public clamor, Wilson announced to Congress the end of the country’s policy of neutrality. See also MAGDEBURG.
Appendixes

APPENDIX A:
HEADS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EVIDENZBÜRO

Anton Ritter von Kalik 1850–1864
Georg Ritter von Kees 1864–1866
Josef Ritter Pelikan von Plauenwald 1866–1869
Franz Weikhard 1869–1870
Ludwig Edler von Cornaro 1870–1871
Rudolf Ritter von Hoffingen 1871–1876
Adolf Ritter von Ledihnh 1876–1879
Karl Baron von Ripp 1879–1882
Hugo Ritter Bilimek von Waissolm 1882–1886
Edmund Ritter Mayer von Wallstein und Marnegg 1886–1892
Emil Baron Woinovich von Belobreska 1892–1896
Desiderius Kolosvary de Kolosvar 1896–1898
Artur Baron Giesl von Gieslingen 1898–1903
Eugen Hordiczka 1903–1909
August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz 1909–1914
Oskar von Hranilovic-Cvetasssinn 1914–1917
Maximilian Ronge 1917–1918

APPENDIX B: THE THIRD REICH

Heads of the Abwehr

Konrad Patzig 1932–1934
Wilhelm Canaris 1936–1944
Heads of Fremde Heere Ost

Eberhart Kinzel 1938–1942
Reinhard Gehlen 1942–1945
Gerhard Wessel April–May 1945

Heads of Fremde Heere West

Ulrich Liss 1938–1943
Alexis von Roenne 1943–1944
Willi Bürklein 1944–1945

Head of the Sicherheitsdienst

Reinhard Heydrich 1931–1939

Heads of the Gestapo

Rudolf Diels 1933–1934
Hermann Göring 1934–1935
Reinhard Heydrich 1935–1940
Heinrich Müller 1940–1945

Heads of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt

Reinhard Heydrich 1939–1942
Ernst Kaltenbrunner 1943–1945

Heads of the Forschungsamt

Hans Schimpf 1934–1935
Prince Christoph von Hessen 1935–1939
Gottfried Schapper 1939–1945

APPENDIX C: THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Directors of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit and Its Successor Organizations

Wilhelm Zaisser 1950–1953
Ernst Wollweber 1953–1957
Erich Mielke 1957–1989  
Wolfgang Schwanitz November–December 1989  
Heinz Engelhardt 1989–1990  

**Heads of Foreign Intelligence**  
Anton Ackermann 1951–1952  
Markus Wolf 1952–1986  
Werner Grossmann 1986–1990  

**Heads of Verwaltung Aufklärung and Its Predecessors**  
Karl Linke 1952–1957  
Willy Sägebrecht 1957–1959  
Arthur Franke 1959–1974  
Theo Gregori 1974–1982  
Alfred Krause 1982–1990  
Manfred Zeise September 1990  

**APPENDIX D: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**  

**Presidents of the Bundesnachrichtendienst**  
Reinhard Gehlen 1956–1968  
Gerhard Wessel 1968–1978  
Klaus Kinkel 1979–1982  
Eberhard Blum 1982–1985  
Heribert Hellenbroich August 1985  
Konrad Porzner 1990–1996  
August Hanning 1998–2005  
Ernst Uhrlau 2005–  

**Presidents of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz**  
Otto John 1950–1954  
Hanns Jess 1954–1955
Hubert Schrübbers 1955–1972
Günther Nollau 1972–1975
Richard Meier 1975–1983
Heribert Hellenbroich 1983–1985
Gerhard Boeden 1987–1991
Eckart Werthebach 1991–1995
Hansjörg Geiger 1995–1996
Peter Frisch 1996–2000
Heinz Fromm 2000–

Heads of the Militärischer Abschirmdienst

Josef Selmayr 1955–1964
Heinrich Seeliger 1964–1967
Armin Eck 1967–1972
Paul Albert Scherer 1972–1977
Klaus Vollmer 1980–1982
Elmar Schmähling 1982–1983
Helmut Behrendt 1983–1984
Hubertus Senff 1984–1987
Winfried Schwenke 1987–1991
Georg Baron von Brandis 2008
INTRODUCTION

The first notable works on intelligence began to appear in Germany with the advent of the Cold War. As it became increasingly evident that World War II had not resolved major tensions in the heart of Europe, it was equally clear that the country would once again be a magnet for international espionage, as it had been during the Weimar Republic. In 1952, a
pathbreaking work by Johannes Erasmus—*Der geheime Nachrichtendienst* (*The Intelligence Service*)—appeared in a scholarly series under the aegis of the University of Göttingen. Such was the strong interest it evoked that a second edition was issued within two years. Erasmus focused on the myriad legal questions that surround the operation of an espionage service, emphasizing, at the same time, its deeper historical roots by citing Hugo Grotius, Carl von Clausewitz, and Heinrich von Treitschke.

Other important books soon followed by such writers as Gert Buchheit, Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Margret Boveri, Heinz Höhne, and Hermann Zolling. Yet these works have tended to be the distinct exception in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In his richly detailed study of the interaction of German and Russian espionage over the centuries—*Der Krieg im Dunkeln*—Höhne stressed the failure of professional historians to give due credit to the intelligence dimension in reconstructing the past—a prejudice only reinforced by the mass media’s tendency toward sensationalism and even demonization. Admittedly, it is a common complaint of intelligence scholars in other Western countries, but from all indications, the German case seems especially pronounced.

The havoc caused by two world wars is certainly a contributing factor. In the case of World War I, the bulk of the military records were a casualty of the revolution that erupted in November 1918 as well as the British bombing of Potsdam in March 1945. Nevertheless, some documents ended up in the Bavarian and Württemberg war ministries prior to 1919 and are now housed in the archives in Munich and Stuttgart. The primary source remains the Gempp Report, the 14-volume official history of Abteilung IIIb written by a prominent veteran of the organization between 1927–1944. Intended for the internal use of the Abwehr, it includes some background chapters on the prewar period beginning in 1866 and is considered quite reliable overall. After the Allies found a rough typescript draft, a microfilm copy was made for the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and the original returned to the German Federal Archives in Freiburg. Likewise housed at Freiburg are the surviving records of German naval intelligence.

Obtaining primary sources regarding World War II has posed far fewer obstacles for researchers. Even though numerous documents were destroyed both accidentally and deliberately in the final phrase of the war, large quantities survived. As David Kahn pointed out in his pioneering history of German military intelligence, *Hitler’s Spies*, the Americans and the British microfilmed the records of the Wehrmacht, the various ministries, the Foreign Office, and the SS, making them accessible at the National Archives while returning the
originals to three main repositories in Germany. Important supplements have been provided by Allied postwar interrogations and the transcripts of various war crimes trials.

Much can be still learned about German wartime intelligence in the archives of other countries. A case in point is a recent study by a young British scholar of the aggressive counterespionage efforts of the Vichy government. Using the Moscow Collection—three tons of documents repatriated to France from the former Soviet Union during the 1990s—Simon Kitson was able to show that French officials arrested 1,500–2,000 agents working for Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1942, despite an official policy of collaboration between the two countries. Another notable corrective to conventional thinking about World War II was provided by Robert W. Stephan’s *Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Deception Operations against the Nazis*. Because of the considerable literature about the brilliantly executed Double Cross system by the British, it is all too easy to overlook the accomplishments of Soviet operations.

The Cold War period presents a starkly contrasting historiographical picture. On the one hand, no comprehensive studies based on original sources have yet to appear on any of the three major intelligence organizations of the FRG—the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or the Militärischer Abschirmdienst. For many years, in spite of a few factual discrepancies, Höhne’s work on Reinhard Gehlen has served as the standard source on the BND and was recently supplemented by *Gegen Freund und Feind*—an account written by two West German investigative journalists, Peter F. Müller and Michael Mueller. The refusal of the BND to declassify any of the documents relating to its 50-year history has been a prime deterrent for scholars. A further obstacle is the paucity of autobiographies and diaries published by former officials, although much can be learned from the court transcripts of numerous spy cases as well as various parliamentary reports.

On the other hand, the literature dealing with the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS or Stasi) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has grown to immense proportions since 1990. An exhaustive bibliography was compiled by the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU, Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic). It is worth recalling, however, that during the 40-year existence of the GDR, academics and writers—with only a few notable exceptions such Karl Wilhelm
Fricke—paid little heed to the Stasi, despite its centrality in the life of the state. At this point, the best comprehensive introduction—accompanied by an annotated listing of specialized works—is *Der Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945–1990* by Jens Gieseke, one of the in-house BStU historians. The GDR’s other main intelligence organization, the Verwaltung Aufklärung (Administration for Reconnaissance) of the Nationale Volksarmee, has received some belated attention, most extensively by Bodo Wegmann in *Die Militäraufklärung der NVA*. In various works—especially *Die unterwanderte Republik* and *Der diskrete Charme der DDR*—Hubertus Knabe has provided thoroughgoing documentation regarding the extraordinary penetration of the FRG by East German operatives. The oft-posed question regarding the use of Nazi war criminals by the MfS has been painstakingly documented by Henry Leide in *NS-Verschwörer und Staatssicherheit*. Although a comparative history of the intelligence services of the two Germanys has yet to be written, a major step in that direction was taken by *Konspiration als Beruf: Deutsche Geheimdienstschefs im Kalten Krieg*—a well-researched compilation of biographical portraits of leading figures on both sides of the Berlin Wall.

This selected bibliography has put primary stress on sources in English; the German titles included are limited to those of unusual merit. In addition, many important articles have appeared in three indispensable periodicals—*Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, and the *Journal of Intelligence History*. Also worthy of special mention are two other volumes in this present series: *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence* by Nigel West and *Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence* by Robert W. Pringle.

**GENERAL AND REFERENCE**


GERMANY AND AUSTRIA THROUGH WORLD WAR I


THIRD REICH AND WORLD WAR II


Codebreaking


Organizations


**German Resistance**


### Operations Abroad


**Rote Kapelle**


Wilhelm Canaris


Reinhard Heydrich


Walter Schellenberg


Richard Sorge


**Other Individual Cases**


**DIVIDED BERLIN**


**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**


**Reinhard Gehlen**


**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**


**WEBSITES**


About the Author

Jefferson Adams is the Adda B. Bozeman Professor of History and International Relations at Sarah Lawrence College in Bronxville, New York. He received his B.A. from Stanford University and his Ph.D. in modern European history from Harvard University. The recipient of numerous fellowships and awards, he also taught at New York University and was a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University.

Besides having offered many courses on intelligence history, Adams served for over a decade as both program director and chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. He is currently the senior editor of the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and a member of the American Council on Germany. His articles and reviews, focused especially on East German State Security, have appeared in various print and electronic publications, and he was a contributor to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. His edited translation of *Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy* by Werner Stiller was published in 1992.