Greek Philosophical Terms:
A Historical Lexicon
The glory and the bane of Greek philosophy is its lack of a past. Drawing on nothing more than common speech and the elastic potential of the Greek language the Hellenic philosophers not only formulated a problematic within which all subsequent thinkers cast their own reflections, but devised as well a sophisticated and complex terminology as a vehicle for their thoughts. Both the terms and the concepts they employed have since been overgrown with a millennium and a half of connotation that not even the most determined can completely strip away. The contemporary philosopher or theologian may attempt to rethink the concept, but he is betrayed in the utterance. For what the thinker has striven to clear away the reader or listener supplies anew. “Soul” and “God” carry their history heavily with them.

By a not too peculiar irony we read their philosophical future back into our Greek past in a variety of ways. One has experience of a Whiteheadian and Nietzschean Plato, a Thomistic and Hegelian Aristotle, and even an Existential Diogenes. As in much else, the Greeks invented this particular historical fallacy. It is clear that the Stoics read themselves back into Heraclitus; and the Neoplatonists, Plotinus into Plato.

It is an obvious necessity to make some sort of attempt at coming to the Greeks on their own terms. This can, I think, best be accomplished not by the usual chronological and historical approach that, for all its divisions into “schools” and “successions,” obscures rather than illuminates the evolutions we might otherwise discern in ancient philosophy, but rather from the direction of the problematic as revealed by a consecutive treatment of some of the basic concepts. This can be done in a number of ways and on different scales, but the method and scale adopted in this work is the one most conformable to the needs of what may be termed an “intermediate student” of the subject, not the beginner who is making his first acquaintance with Greek philosophy and who would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and, perhaps, a dictionary of basic terms, nor, on the other hand, the professional scholar who would require a treatment both more massive and more nuanced.
Greek Philosophical Terms

Since such a "student" may be presumed to have some familiarity with the material it has been judged safe to substitute, in a fairly thorough way, a terminology transliterated directly from the Greek for their English equivalents in a modest effort at lightening the historical baggage. Jargon can be more easily cured than preconceptions, and it is this hope that prompts the frequency of stoicheion for element and physis for nature. There is, moreover, a complete English-Greek cross-index at the end.

The following treatment, then, singles out a few of the trees from the forest that threatens to overwhelm all of us at times, and attempts to trace their progress from acorn to fully grown oak. It also essays, if the metaphor may be indulged a bit longer, to display some of the interlocking root structure. Each entry is thoroughly cross-referenced, and if these references are pursued there will emerge a fairly complete philosophical context for each term. Every entry will supply some information, but meanings must be sought in the larger complexes. Finally, each entry is designed to be read with the texts of the philosophers themselves, and there are full textual citations at every step of the way. These are the final elements in the construction of a fruitful context where the prior history of the concept will illuminate a philosophical text, while the text will embellish the understanding of the term.

Both originals and translations of Plato and Aristotle are easily at hand. For the earlier and later philosophers the following will cover all but very few of the citations made in the text:

Pre-Socratics

K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers, Oxford, 1948; a translation of the fragments in Diels.


Post-Aristotelians


The following authors are also frequently cited:


I would like to express my gratitude to the Arts and Science Research Fund of New York University for a subvention toward the preparation of the manuscript of this work, and particularly to the two selfless workers who turned the inscrutable text into clean copy, Eileen Markson and Kristin Helmers.
Philosophers have been uneasy about language almost from the beginning. The sculptor may curse his stone or the painter his oils, but neither contemplates suing for divorce. The philosopher, on the other hand, lives constantly in the shadow of infidelity, now suspecting metaphor, now tautology, or occasionally succumbing to the ultimate despair, the fear that he is dealing with nomina tenuia. The Greeks' bouts with these maladies were occasional and mild; they were spared, moreover, the final indignity of desertion to mathematics, though the flirtation was long and serious. They trusted in names and their self-assurance was such that they could even afford to be playful about them. And when they came to devising names for the strange new things that they themselves had wrought, they approached the task with both confidence and inventiveness.

Prephilosophical language had been shaped by popular usage and the more transcendent intuitions of religion and mythology. The former was, of course, marked by its predilection for things; but there was, in addition, an accumulating store of more or less abstract terms flowing from the moral sensibilities of the epic tradition. Dike, time, arete, though calculable in purely material terms, were already at hand as abstracts and the first generation of philosophers, who still subscribed to most of the poetic conventions, drew heavily upon this epic vocabulary. But for the rest, there were things: gold, chariots, the soul (psyche), spears, and the spirit (thymos), all material objects and all capable of fairly precise localization.

But there was another factor at work as well. The search for understanding no more began with Thales than logic with Aristotle. All primitive men try to come to terms with the more numinous aspects of their environment through the media of ritual and myth, and the Hellenic version of the latter was a particularly rich and imaginative attempt at organizing and explaining higher levels of reality in some coherent fashion. Myth is, among other things, explanation and, what
ever dimensions its moralizing content might assume, the didactic element is never completely absent.

Myth was the immediate forerunner of philosophy and provided it not only with certain embryonic conceptualizations, but with insights into the working of the world as well. Myth already presupposes a world order, what the philosophers would call a kosmos, but bases it chiefly upon the genealogical relationships between the gods whose family structure, derived from human paradigms, both preserved and explained the order of terrestrial reality. It also embodied the notion of what was later to be called causality, though in its mythological form it might be better termed the principle of responsibility, since both it and the patterns of order are founded on the characteristic mythological principle of anthropomorphism. The divine (theion) had been personalized by myth into a god (theos) and could thus be linked and systematized and held responsible for phenomena.

The earliest philosophers, for all their revolutionary achievements, were indebted to the mythological world view. Eventually the anthropomorphic bases upon which it had been constructed came under attack, but the effects were not at first critical since the pervasive hylozoism of those early thinkers enabled them to explain action and reaction in terms of the life and movement naturally inherent in material things. Once Parmenides had denied the hylozoistic premise, however, the mythological personalized god reappeared, not, to be sure, in his grosser Homeric shapes, but as an artist who molds or a thinker who moves, both unmistakably personalized but deprived of physical aspect and will.

Thus, at the end of the philosophically abhorred infinite regress there was preserved what can be fairly identified as the god of the mythologers. What the philosophers had, in effect, done was to lay exclusive claim to the entire intermediary area of secondary causality. Myth was banished from these regions and causality replaced responsibility. But before this could be done or, rather, in the course of doing it, a new form of discourse had to be shaped and a new language to express it. If Thales did, indeed, say that water was the arche of all things (Aristotle, Meta. 983b), the wonder of it all is not so much the substitution of water for Zeus (the mythologers had already personified Oceanus to serve the same genetic end), as the intrusion of arche for the mythologer’s pater. Thales (or perhaps Anaximander) was in search of a starting point other than the common mythological one of father and chose a term, arche, already in fairly common use, to express the new concept. The older senses of arche continued to be employed, but a radical new dimension had been added to the language.

What did the philosophers do to language? At first they did nothing since they did not know, fortunately perhaps, that they were philosophers and so continued to use words in their common acceptances, which, as a matter of fact, tended to be rather concrete, individualized senses: the hot and the good were both some thing. The great terminological changes introduced by the philosophers—and an inspection of usage suggests that they took place only gradually—were tied to the “discoveries” of incorporeality and universal predication or, to put it more baldly, the realization that there were things and things. The dimensions of this new order of reality, which was not tied to objects in the ordinary sense and which could be generalized, were only gradually understood, and the stubborn “thisness” of language, consecrated by an epic tradition that revealed in the physical, never completely disappeared. Its most obvious aftereffects are probably to be seen in the persistent Greek habit of philosophizing through metaphor. Just as the geometer might offer a proof “by construction,” so the philosopher was perfectly content to substitute analogy for analysis.

Language began to change. Prephilosophical staples like eras and chronos (both of which myth had already appropriated for its own purposes), eidos, physis, and the already mentioned arche developed new connotations, while other old words like hyle and stoicheion were expropriated for radical new purposes. The concrete yielded to the abstract, as poion, “just such a thing,” gives way to polutes, “quality” (in Thcet. 183a Plato apologizes for the awkward new term). Indeed, this progresses to the point where only names (Callias, Socrates) will serve to denote the individual, or to such Aristotelian peculiarities as “this something or other here” or the untranslatable to ti en einai. The combinatorial powers of the language are tapped to describe the new complexities (hypostasis, hypokeimenon, symbebekos, entelechon), and there appears a veritable treasure trove of abstract terms to identify newly isolated processes (apodeixis, synagoge, phrmosis, genesis, kinesis, eisbathes, noesis).

All these refinements and new formations led, in time, to a sophisticated technical vocabulary that bore little resemblance to common usage. Literary considerations also came into play. A Stoic pamphlet addressed to a popular audience will obviously make more concessions to the general than a commentary by Simplicius, but the impression of popularity in the former work may be heightened by the passage of technical terms into common parlance. Plato went to some pains to
vary his terminology in what seems to be a deliberate attempt to resist the congealing of technical terms, and the implication of the Socratic-centered Platonic dialogue is still that two reasonably educated citizens can sit down and discuss these matters. Whether this is the truth of the matter or mere literary rhetoric we cannot tell. But no such premise is visible in Aristotle who insists on a standardized technical usage. With Aristotle the professionalism implicit in the founding of the Academy comes of age in language.

Philosophical language did become technical even though standardization was, and remains, an unfulfilled dream. Since the ancient philosophical tradition was strongly oriented to schools there was a certain degree of consistency within, say, the Platonic or Peripatetic school. But even here the pervasive post-Aristotelian thrust toward syncretism tended to muddy the conceptual waters: Plotinus’ use of *eidos* will owe something to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics without, at the same time, specifying either the debt or its extent.

Whether this terminological virtuosity was for good or for ill may be debated. But it is clear that in manufacturing a new currency for a new way of seeing reality the Greeks were borne by the counterterms themselves into a world far removed from this material one. Most of the philosophers were at one in agreeing that this world of concrete, discrete beings is an exceedingly disorderly place and that “there is no science of the individual.” Such was not true, however, of the newly isolated universal terms that, like the gods of the new disreputable mythology, could be manipulated and, once endowed with an order of reality, could be constructed into a world of order and stability. The Platonic *eidos* and the Aristotelian *kategoria* are, each in its own way, the Greeks’ ultimate tribute to language, and the Proclean *kosmos noetos* undoubtedly its most baroque monument: a universe in which every concept is matched with its appropriate universal term and the whole arranged in a hierarchical order of mathematical precision and exceeding beauty.
adíaphoros: without difference, morally indifferent or neutral state

1. Since the end of man is, according to the oldest Stoic formulae, to live harmoniously with nature (see nomos 2), the good will consist in those things which are helpful or have some value toward this kind of life, while evil will reside in those things which make no such contribution (D.L. vii, 94, 105). Between these two absolutely helpful and harmful classes of acts (justice, prudence, moderation, etc., on the one hand, cowardice, injustice, immoderation on the other) there exists another group of things like life, health, and pleasure that are characterized as morally indifferent (adíaphora) in that they have no immediate connection with the end of man (D.L. vii, 101–103). They do, however, contribute to or impede that end indirectly and hence are further divided (D.L. vii, 105–106) into preferable acts (proérgomena), acts to be avoided (apoproérgomena), and absolutely indifferent acts, the first category constituting the “duties” (officia) of the Roman ethicists and defined as those acts for whose performances some reasonable defense (eu logos, probable) can be given (Cicero, De fin. iii, 17, 58).

2. These latter distinctions provoked considerable controversy in both the Stoa and the Academy. There was no question that one had a moral obligation to choose the good; what was at stake was the moral implications of dividing the adíaphora into justifiable and nonjustifiable acts. There were those moral rigorists like Aristo of Chios and the Sceptic Pyrrho who denied that any moral value at all could be attached to those reasonably defensible and so “befitting” (kathekonta) activities (Cicero, De fin. iv, 25, 68). Further, the Sceptics’ attacks on epistemological certitude had its inevitable effects in the moral sphere and we find the two eminences of the New or Sceptical Academy, Arcesilas and Carneades, advancing a theory that once certitude has been undermined the moral act can only be that for which some reasonable defense can be made, the former approaching the now central kathekonta by applying an intellectual criterion (rationally probable, eu logos; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 158), Carneades by putting forth an experimental one (the practically probable, pithanon; idem, Pyrrh. i, 227–229).
3. That these attitudes, coupled, in the case of Carneades, with a trenchant criticism of Stoic epistemology, had an effect on the thinking of the Stoa in ethics is clear from its own focusing on the correct choice of the *kathekonta* as the central problem of the moral life (Stoaeus, Eccl. 11, 76) and its retreat from Zeno's earlier insistence that virtue alone (in this context, life according to nature) suffices for man's happiness and its admission of the need for satisfactions flowing from a correct choice of the *kathekonta* (D.L. vii, 123).

*aer*: air
1. For Anaximenes the *apeiron* of Anaximander and the *arke* of all things was air (Aristotle, Meta. 844a: Simplicius, In Phys. 24, 25), probably because of its connection with breath and life (cf. pneuma). It was, as were most of the pre-Socratic *archai*, divine (*theion*), Cicero, De nat. deor. 1, 10, 26. The later popularizer of *aer* was Diogenes of Apollonia who made it the substance of both soul (*psyche*) and mind (*nous*), frs. 4, 5, an affinity parodied by Aristophanes, Clouds, 227 ff.: what is striking in Diogenes' conception is, of course, the association of a purposeful activity with his *aer- nous* (see telos).
2. The connection *aer-pneuma-psyche-zoe-theion* remained a constant one. The air-like nature of the soul is raised in Phaedo 69e—70a: Cebes fears it, but from another point it suggested a sort of impersonal immortality: the body might perish, but the *psyche* would be absorbed into the purest part of the *aer*, i.e., *aither* (*q.v.*), as yet undistinguished as a fifth element (see Euripides, Helen 1104–1116; Sapph. 833–834). Since the heavenly bodies (*eunariai*) dwell in the *aither* another possibility was that the soul might be absorbed into the stars (see Aristophanes, Peace 832). This belief was incorporated into later Pythagoreanism, but with the reservation of *aither* to the supranatural world; it was the *aer* between the moon and the earth that was filled with *daimonones* and heroes, D.L. viii, 32; compare Philo, De gigant. 2 and 3 where the *daimonones* are now angels, and the consequent identification in De somn. 1, 134–135 of the *aer* and Jacob's Ladder (*Genesis* 28, 12–15; see kenon).

*agathon*: something good, the good, an ultimate principle, *summum bonum*
1. Plato, perhaps displaying his Socratic heritage, gives one of the ethical *eide* a central position in his hierarchy: in the *Republic* (see 494e–500e) the form of the Good stands at the center of the Platonic state, and it is the chief duty of the philosopher to contemplate it, ibid. 540a (for the problems arising from its transcendence at this stage, see *hupcrorwsia*). It is, moreover, the term of the process of dialectic (*dialektike*, *q.v.*). Plato's turning toward the conditions of the *kosmos* in the later dialogues is reflected in his general reflections on the Good in the *Philebus*, the contrasting claims of pleasure (*hedone*) and wisdom (*phronesis*) to be the highest good are being examined, and the conclusion turns to an examination of the "mixed life" (see *hedone* and the mixed result of the operation of *nous* and *amanthe* in the *Timaeus*), which is found to combine both pleasure and wisdom (59c–54a). What is notable here is not only the blending of the *eide* in this life, but the presence of measure and proportion (64a–66a) and, more importantly for Plato's growing theism, the advancing emergence of a transcendent, intelligent cause of good in the universe (see *ibid*. 26c–27a and *theos*, *nous*).
2. Aristotle is critical of Plato's theory of the Good (see *Eth. Nich.* 1, 1096a–1097b), but what he understands by that is clearly the *eidos-agathos* theory of the *Republic* (see *ibid*. 1056a and *Eth. Eud.* 1, 1217b). Yet he accepts (*Eth. Nich.* 1, 1094a) a Platonic definition of good as "that at which all things aim"; for Aristotle, this is happiness (*eudaimonia*) (ibid. 1, 1097a–b), defined as activity (*praxis*) in accordance with virtue (*aretê*), *ibid*. 1, 1100b; and the highest virtue is *theoria*, i.e., contemplation for its own sake, *ibid*. x, 1177a–b (for the highest type of *theoria* and hence the Cosmic Good, cf. *telos*). The Epicureans return to the position rejected by Socrates (*Gorg.* 495c–495d), Plato (*Phil.* 55b–c), and Aristode (*Eth. Nich.* vii, 1153b–1154a), namely that pleasure (*hedone*) is the highest good (D.L. x, 139). In the Stoa the good was identified with the profitable (D.L. vii, 9 and 101–103).
3. Plotinus' "theology" of the Good is to be found in *Enn*. vi, 15–42, including (34) a description of the hierarchy of goods leading up to the Ultimate Principle; the One (*hen*), which he identifies with the Good, is the final unification of the Socratic and Parmenidean strains in the Platonic tradition.

*agénétos*: ungenerated, uncreated (universe)

In *De coelo* 1, 279b Aristotle says that all his predecessors agreed that the *kosmos* had a beginning. Xenophanes is, perhaps, to be excluded from them, on the basis of an interpretive reading of frs. 14 and 26, and surely the entire Eleatic school stemming from Parmenides, with its banishment of *genesis* from the realm of being (*see on*), is also to be excepted, as Aristotle specifically does in *Meta*. 960b. In *Tim. 88b* Plato clearly says that the *kosmos* is subject to *genesis*. Aristotle, who earlier in his career had supported the same position (*De phil.* fr. 18), takes this to mean that it had a beginning in time and criticizes it severely (*De coelo* 1, 279b). But there was another interpretation of the passage, as Aristotle himself (*loc. cit.*) is aware, put forth by Xenocrates (see Plutarch, *De an. proc.* 2013a), and
adapted by most later Platonists, that *genesis* here means "in a perpetual state of change" (see on). The same interpretation, adapted to his emanational theories, can be seen in Plotinus (see Enn. II, 9, 2). Aristotle is emphatic in his belief that the universe is both ungenerated (*agenetos*) and incorruptible (*aphthartos*). This becomes the basic position, but Philo, by reason of the account in Genesis, must, of course, stand outside it (see De opif. 2, 7–9).

**ágnostos:** unknown, unknowable

1. Because of the transcendence of God certain problems arise in the possibility of his being an object of knowledge. A simple agnosticism is held by Protagoras (Diels, Fr. 804b) where the question is separated into knowledge of whether the gods exist, and what their nature is; the *agnosia* problem treats more properly of the latter (on the question of their existence, cf. *theos*).

2. Because of the importance of transcendence in the Platonic tradition, the question of the knowability of God was central there; the Platonic proof text on the difficulty of knowing God was Tim. 28c, supported by the pessimistic remarks in Parm. 141b–142a, Symp. 211a, and especially, Ep. vii, 344b–d. As is indicated in the texts cited, the problem is the transcendence of the supreme principle, the “Good beyond Being” of Rep. vi, 509b (see *hyperousia*). But if the essence of God could not be apprehended directly, the same and similar texts of Plato suggest alternative ways of knowing God, ways highly developed in later Platonism (e.g. Albinus, Epit. x and Maximus of Tyre, vii and xviii; compare Porphyry, *Elem. theol.*, prop. 123). The major ones are:

   a) by inductive return to the source (*epagogê, the medieval *eminence*); see Symp. 200c–211c and compare Plotinus, Enn. vi, 6.

   b) by analogy (*analogia*); see Rep. vi, 508a-c and compare Plotinus, Enn. vii, 7, 36; because Proclus denied any participation (*methesis*) between the One and the rest of reality (*Elem. theol.*, prop. 29), he is barred from the *via analogiae*.

   c) by "removal," negation (*aphairesis; the *via negativa*); see the first "hypothesis" of the Parmenides, which later Platonists took in a very unhypothetical sense; compare Plotinus, Enn. vii, 7, 32–d by mystical union (*ekstasis*); cf. Symp. 210c–211a, Ep. vii, 340c–d; compare Enn. vii, 9, 9–11 and, for Plotinus' personal experience, Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* 83; see ken.

**ágrapha dûgmatata:** unwritten doctrines

One of the common methods used to obliterate the difference between what Aristotle says about Plato's *eide* and the preserved account in the dialogues is to presume that Aristotle, as a member of

the Academy, had access to unpublished material (had not Plato said in Ep. vii, 341c that he would never publish anything on the ultimate principles?). There are only two possible references to such material in Aristotle; in De an. i, 404a he refers to something called “On Philosophy,” possibly a reference to his own dialogue by that name, though later commentators took it as a reference to a Platonic lecture (cf. Simplicius, *In De an.* 28, 7–9), and in Phys. ii, 209b where he refers to Plato’s “unwritten doctrines” (*ágrapha dûgmatata*). What were these *ágrapha dûgmatata*? The one identifiable possibility is a single lecture “On the Good” that Plato gave to a disenchanted public who came to hear about happiness, but were treated to mathematics, geometry, and astronomy instead (Arato, *Harmonics* 11, 30–31); it was attended by Aristotle and other members of the Academy, who took notes that they later published (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 151, 453; cf. *arithmos*).

For a related problem as it concerns Aristotle, cf. *exoterikoi*.

**ágraphos nûmos:** unwritten law

See *nomos*.

**aidios:** everlasting, perduration in time (*aidios kata chronon*)

Although the distinction in terminology is not always maintained by the philosophers, the concepts of “everlasting perduration in time” (*aidios*) is separate and different from “eternal” (*eternos*), i.e., not belonging to the order of time (chronos), but to the order of eternity (*aimos*, q.v., and Plotinus, *Enn.* iii, 7, 3); “eternal” is used loosely to describe both concepts, e.g., the “eternity of the *kémos*”; *aidios* is really a question of the occurrence or the possibility of occurrence of corruption (*phthora*), and so the concept will be discussed under *aphthartos*; see also *aion, chronos*.

**aion:** life-span, eternity

1. In its earliest and nonphilosophical use, *aion* means a life-span; its conceptual introduction into philosophy may be seen in Parmenides, fr. 8, line 5, where the denial of becoming (genesis) in true being (see on) leads to its corollary, the denial of the temporal distinctions “past” and “future” and the affirmation of total present simultaneity. Melinus interprets this as *aperior*, without limit, going on forever (frs. 2, 3, 4, 7), a notion later distinguished as *aidios* (q.v.), perduration in time, and the same type of interpretation may be seen in Aristotle, *De an.* 10, 279a, where *aion* embraces “all time even to infinity [*aperior*].”

2. The fundamental distinction between time (chronos) and *aion* that is implied in Parmenides is made fully explicit in Plato, *Tim.* 37d where time is created to serve as an image (*ekhmos*) of the state of the
aisthēsis: perception, sensation

1. Perception is a complex of problems rather than a single question. It enters philosophy modestly enough as an attempt on the part of the early physikoi to explain the physiological processes involved in perceiving an object. A variety of solutions were worked out, mostly in terms of the contact, mixture, or penetration of the bodies involved. There were, of course, certain anomalies as, for example, the case of vision where contact was apparently absent, but the first major crisis did not occur until grades of knowledge were distinguished and sense perception was separated from another more reliable type of perception that had little or nothing to do with sensible realities or sensible processes. Aisthēsis found itself involved in the epistemological doubts raised by Heraclitus and Parmenides and debarred from any genuine access to truth (see aletheia, doxa, epistēme).

2. Other changes were afoot as well. The particle or somatic theory upon which the physikoi's theory of perception was based began to be replaced by theories on change that took as their point of departure a new dynamic view of the “powers” of things (see dynamis, genesis). Aristotle, who was a dynamist, incorporated the analyses worked out for change in sensible beings into his metaphysic and for the first time aisthēsis became a philosophical question as well as a physiological one.

3. A third major change was precipitated by the growing belief in the incorporeal nature of the soul (psyche, q.v.), the principle of life in beings and the source of their sensitive activities. What then was the general relationship between the immaterial soul and the material body, and the specific one between that part or faculty of the soul known as aisthēsis and that part of the body which it employed, its organon? What had once been a simple contact between bodies was now extended to a chain of causality that began with a perceived body and its qualities, and passed, via a medium (this in the still perplexing question of vision), a sense organ, and a sense faculty to the soul, becoming, at least for those who held the immateriality of the soul, noncorporeal at some point in the process.

4. Finally, beginning with Parmenides' attack on aisthēsis and his exaltation of epistēme as the only genuine source of truth, it was no longer possible to treat thought (noēsis, phronēsis) as merely a quantitatively different form of aisthēsis, but as different in kind, and increasing attention was paid to both the faculty and the process of this higher type of perception (see noēsis, noēsis).

5. These, then, are some of the complexities of the problematic of aisthēsis. The chief ancient authority on the subject, Theophrastus, whose treatise On the Sense is the major source of what we know of the ancient theories, prefers to approach the question from a physical point of view. The opening paragraph of his work distinguishes two types of explanation of how aisthēsis occurs. One school bases it on the similarity (homoiōsis, q.v.), the other on the opposition (enantion) of the knower and the thing known. The first group includes—on the testimony of Theophrastus—Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato; the latter, Anaxagoras and Heraclitus.

6. The reference to Parmenides is, of course, to the second part of his poem, “The Way of Seeming” (see on, epistēme). We know that Parmenides had scant epistemological respect for aisthēsis (cf. fr. 7), and it is not at all clear that the theories put forth in the “Way of Seeming” are indeed his. But what emerges from Theophrastus’ summary (De sens. 3–4) is that “Parmenides” held that sensation and thinking (phronēsis) were identical (whatever else he may have believed, it is certain that the genuine Parmenides never held that), and that knowledge arises from the presence of identical opposites (enantiai) in the subject and object of knowledge, so that, for instance, even a corpse, being cold, can perceive cold.

7. Whosesoever theory this actually is, it had a marked effect on Empedocles, who had a fairly elaborate theory of sensation and who, unlike Parmenides, took the senses seriously (fr. 3, lines 9–13). For Empedocles material things are constituted by mixtures of the four basic elements (stoffeia, q.v.) “running through each other” (fr. 21, lines 13–14). Each object gives off a constant stream of effluences (aiporhētai, fr. 9g) that enter the congruent passages (poroi) in the appropriate senses and sensation ensues (Theophrastus, De sens. 7; Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 11, 924b). But it is not merely a question of symmetry between the effluence and the pore; what is also required is that like comes in contact with like on the level of substance: we see earth with earth, fire with fire (Aristotle, Meta. 1000b).
8. When it comes to a question of thought (phronesis), Empedocles seems to be moving toward a distinction between it and sensation, but still on the quantitative level. For him, as for the Atomists, it is a special type of sensation that occurs in the blood (hence the heart as the seat of thought) since the blood appears to Empedocles to be the most perfect blend of the two (fr. 105; Theophrastus, De sens. 9).

9. The Atomists, who had reduced all things to the atoms (atoma) and the void (kenon), appropriately reduced all sensation to contact (Aristotle, De sens. 442a), and explained its operation in terms clearly derived from Empedocles. Here too bodies give off effluences, now called idola (q.v.; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De sens. 56, 12), that are similar in shape to the thing whence they are emitted. These enter the sentient, or rather, penetrate between the atoma of the sentient, and sensation results (Aetius 11, 8, 10).

10. This may have been Leucippus' theory; but as far as the troublesome question of sight is concerned, Democritus seems to have added certain refinements, again suggested by Empedocles. The visual image (emphasis) occurs not in the eye of the beholder, but is due to a contact in the air between the object and the beholder. When once formed the emphasis travels back along the air and, being moist, is admitted by the moist eye of the beholder (Theophrastus, De sens. 50; compare Empedocles in Aristotle, De sens. 437b-438a). This explanation is interesting not only insofar as it turns attention to air as a medium of perception, but also in indicating, by the reference to the moisture of the emphasis and the eye, that Democritus has likewise founded the possibility of sensation, as distinct from the mere mechanics, on the principle of "like knows like."

11. Theophrastus (ibid. 49) remarks that the Atomists explain sensation in terms of change (allostias). This can hardly be qualitative change as understood in the Aristotelian sense since the Atomists are on record as having reduced all the pathos of a thing to quality (see pathos); it must refer rather to the motion of the impinging atoma disturbing the position of the atoms in the percipient (compare Lucretius 11, 246-257). All sensations can be explained in terms of the various shapes and movements of the atoma in contact with the percipient (Theophrastus, De sens. 66); what we experience as sweetness and heat and color are no more than subjective impressions (fr. 9; cf. nomos, pathos).

12. Empedocles and the Atomists, then, are firmly within what Theophrastus calls the "like-knows-like" tradition. Here too belongs Diogenes of Apollonia for whom the areke of all things was aor (q.v.), which does equal service as the principle of all cognition (Theophrastus, De sens. 39). Knowledge occurs when air outside the organism is mixed with that which is within, both the purity of the entering air and the diffusion of the resultant mixture determining the type of cognition. Thus phronesis is the result when both the inhaled air is purer and the mixture of blood and air is spread throughout the body (ibid. 44; cf. the satiric remarks in Aristophanes, Clouds 227-233).

13. At the head of the opposite tradition stands ALCMAEON of Crotona, an early disciple of Pythagoreanism whose opinions we know only in a summary unaccompanied by much evidence or detail (Theophrastus, De sens. 45-46). He maintained that the like is known by the unlike, that the brain is the seat of the psyche (see kardia), and, more importantly, that there is a difference between aisthesis and phronesis. It is this distinction that sets man apart from all the other animals and thereby grounds an intellectualist ethic, as well as being at the root of the quest for the higher, immaterial faculty of the soul, the logos (see Empedocles of Crotona and the dianoetike of Aristotle (see psyche), and the progenitor of the exalted role of nous (q.v.) in the subsequent history of Greek philosophy. But we only know that Alcmaeon made this distinction; we do not know on what grounds, though it is almost certainly tied to the well-known Pythagorean belief in an immortal soul (see psyche, alhata, palingenesia).

14. "Like knows unlike" appears again with Anaxagoras, and here it is based on the empirical evidence that sensations, especially tactile sensations, rest on contrast, e.g., we feel the cold because of the heat within us (Theophrastus, De sens. 27), a theory that is in perfect accord with Anaxagoras' doctrine of "a portion of everything in everything" (see stoeicheion). Further, every sensation, since it is a change, is accompanied by pain (pneum; compare hedone).

15. In the Theaetetus (153a-157d) Plato presents a theory of sensation that is ostensibly attributed to Pythagoras or some such variety of a Heraclitan relativist. But since it is not refuted in the sequel and coheres with other passages in the dialogues, it is not unlikely that it represents Plato's own views on sensation as well. It hinges on the point, frequently made by Heraclitus, that among the aistheta the only reality is change, or, to put it in the language of more sophisticated generation, the aistheta are not really substances but qualities (see pathos; Plato makes the same point in Tim. 49b, 50, and compare stoeicheion); they are powers (dynamis) with the capacity of either affecting (poiein) other things or being affected (paschein) by them (Theaet. 156b). It may likewise be true, as earlier thinkers had maintained, that the kosmos is nothing else but kinesis (loc. cit.), but here too further refinements are possible. Even at this stage (see Theaet. 131c) Plato is capable of dividing the generic kinesis (q.v.) into alteration (allostias) and locomotion.

16. It is within this context that the Platonic theory of sensation unfolds. It finds its most generic statement in Phil. 331-34a and Tim.
6A. The dynamis of the agent acts upon the body of the patient. If the affected part is an immobile one in which earth predominates (e.g., bone, hair) the affection is not spread; pain or pleasure might result, but not sensation. But if it is mobile, like one of the sense organs, the affection spreads until it reaches the consciousness (phronimion) and sensation results (compare Tim. 45c, and see psyche 17).

17. Both these passages would seem to suggest that perception is a pure possibility in the percipient; but when Plato turns to a discussion of sight he returns back to Empedocles and Democritus for the theory that makes the image (emphasis) a cooperative production of both the object and the subject. Both are essentially qualities in a state of change (alloiosis), but once brought within range of each other, and with the aid of the light of the sun (Tim. 45b), the dynamis of whiteness in the object and the quality of light in the eye initiate locomotion and this “gives birth” to color, which causes the eye to be seeing and the object to become a colored thing (Theaet. 156c–e). These qualitative changes, when reported to the soul, result in sensation (Tim. 45d–c, 81c–d). The Theaetetus passage goes on (157a) to draw the Heraclitan moral: if the subject and object are not within range of each other we have no very certain idea of what the dynamis in the object is really like (see Plotinus’ changes, see sympathy 18).

18. Plato appears, however, to be speaking out of both sides of his mouth. His theory, as thus described, is strongly dynamisistic in its linking of the pathē with the powers and in suggesting that the dynamis is a real quality inherent in the perceived object (cf. Theophrastus, De sensa. 60). But he has also, in his other account of post-cosmic genesis (q.v.), reduced all bodies to the geometrical solids and so, in the last resort, his account of the sensible pathē in Tim. 6A ff. smacks of a variety of Atomism with its reduction of quality to quantity in the order of shape (schema), position (thesis), and movement (kinēsis), in this instance, of course, locomotion.

19. Aristotle rejects both the Atomistic and Heraclitan taint visible in Plato’s theory of aisthesis. But in its most general terms, aisthesis is the reception of a sensible eidos without its matter. Aristotle can, like all his predecessors, explain sensation in physical terms, and he does so subsequently by applying the physical doctrine of the “mean.” But first he locates the entire problem of cognition within the cadres already enunciated in the Physics and the Metaphysics: act (energeist) and potency (dynamis). To perceive something means two things: to be able to perceive something whether one is perceiving it or not, and actually to perceive. Thus, any sensible faculty of the soul, though it may be the eidos or oúia of the organ in which it operates (just as the psyche as a whole is the oúia of the entire body; De an. 11, 412), it is, nevertheless, a capacity (dynamis) with respect to the perceptible object: it is potentially (dynamē) what the object is actually (entelechēia; ibid. 11, 418). This coheres with what was said of the relationship of energēia/dynamis in the central passage on the subject in the Metaphysics: energēia is prior to dynamis (the object must be red before the eye “becomes red,” see De an. 11, 423b) and the energēia ends as an actuality in the thing moved (vision is in the eye; ibid. 11, 426b); see energēia and Meta. 1050a.

20. Sensation may be described, then, as an alteration (alloiosis) in that it represents the passage from potency to actuality of one of the sense faculties. In this way too Aristotle can resolve the problem of “like knows like.” Anaxagoras was correct in suggesting that “like knows unlike” since otherwise change could not take place; but this is only the way in which the process begins; when it ends the subject has become like the object known (De an. 11, 417a–418a).

21. The explanation becomes somewhat clearer when Aristotle turns to describing the sensation process in purely physical terms. Physical bodies have perceptible qualities that differentiate them; these are the “opposites” (enantia, q.v.), hot-cold, moist-dry, etc. The perceiving subject too, being corporeal, possesses them. But if it is to perceive them in another, the appropriate organ (organon) must be in a state of balance with regard to these extremes. Aristotle sees the capacity to perceive as a kind of mean or proportional state (mesotes, logos) between these extreme opposites so that it is “actually neither, but potentially both” (ibid. 11, 423b–424a).

For Aristotle’s distinction between sensation and thought, see noesis; on the question of a medium (metevo) for sensation, see sympatheia.

22. Aristotle goes to some pains to distinguish mere contact from the sensation of touch. Plants are alive and thus have a nutritive soul (threptike psyche); i.e., they are affected by things; they absorb the form as well as the matter of the things other than themselves. But they do not perceive, as animals do: the function of the aisthetike psyche, the distinctive oūia of animals, is to receive the form of sensible things without the matter (ibid. 11, 424a–b) and so be subject to the consequent pathē of appetite (araxis), pleasure (hedone), and pain (ibid. 11, 431b). This distinction disappears in Epicurus; an eidos without hyle was and remains unthinkable in the Atomist tradition. Sensation is again reduced to contact, and the different sensations explained in terms of the shape, arrangement, and motion of the oúia (see Lucretius 1, 361–477, especially 424–435). Where the contact is not immediate, as in vision, the theory of influences is once again invoked: bodies give off outlines of themselves in the form of eidos (q.v.; the simulacra of Lucretius IV, 49–50 ff.) thus, if the eye be turned toward them, impress their pattern on the eye and set in train sensation (D.L. x, 46–50).

23. But some of the old Democritean positions now seem unen-
able. Epicurus still holds to the essential corporeality of the soul (cf. D.L. x, 63), but its relationship to the body has been redefined (see the remarks of Lucretius iii, 370 ff.), and a new ingredient added, the mysterious “nameless element” (see psyche 27 for both developments). It is the organic grouping (see holon) of the latter’s atoms that transmits sensation, which is the motion of the atomes, to the other constituents of the soul, thence to the rest of the body (Lucretius i, 242–251, 271–272), a process that is possible only because the soul atoms are contained within the sheath (stegezon) of the body (D.L. x, 64; see genesis).

24. From the time of Aristotle a new affirmative note appears in the epistemology of aisthesis. For Aristotle himself the senses are incapable of error with regard to their proper objects (De an. i, 428b), but in Epicurus it becomes, in one form or other, the only criterion of truth (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. viii, 9; D.L. x, 31; Lucretius iv, 479, sec energeia, prelepeis). Among the Stoics the same assent to the truth of the senses is found (SVF ii, 78). This assertion of physiological accuracy is, however, of little significance since for them, as for Aristotle, truth in its primary sense is a noetic function. It is only when the ‘impressions’ (typosis) on the sense organs are carried, via the pneuma (q.v.; see psyche), to the rational faculty (hegemonikon, q.v.) and there assimilated to (see katalupta) that primary truth is possible; see phantasia, noesis 16.

25. The operation of aisthesis is just part of the larger Stoic problem of the materiality of the pathē (q.v.). Zeno’s use of the expression “impression [typosis]” on the hegemonikon (SVF i, 58; Aristotle had used the same expression: De mem. 490a) provoked a reaction on the part of Chrysippus who attempted to palliate the materiality of the image by substituting expressions like “alteration [heterostasis]” in the hegemonikon (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 233, 237) or by reducing all the pathē to judgments (krises; SVF iii, 461; see noesis 17).

26. Plotinus’ account of sensation begins with the acceptance of the Aristotelian premise that the soul is an eidos of the body (En. i, 1, 4 but see kyle 11). The composite, i.e., the animal, senses because of the presence of the soul (1, 1, 7), but the soul itself is impassible (apathē); its faculties are like reflections of itself that enable the things that possess them to act (1, 1, 8).

27. The soul in and of itself is capable only of intellectual activity. How then, is the contact with the sensible (aistheton) achieved? This is the function of the corporal organs of the body (iv, 5, 4) that are capable of serving as intermediaries. The organon is the material thing that is affected (pathēm), and the pathos of the organ represents a proportional mean (meon kato logos) between the sensible object and the noetic subject (iv, 4, 25); the language smacks of Aristotle but

the concept clearly owes something, as does indeed the Aristotelian mean itself, to the Platonic notion of limit (cf. peras). In this way the pathē, which are corporeal in the organ (and this is a type of aisthesis), are noetic when they are received by the soul (and this is true aisthesis; i, 4, 7). The function of the organ, then, is to convert the impressions (typosis) on the senses into activations (energetai) of the soul so that the impassibility of the soul may be maintained against the Stoics (compare i, 6, 1). The process of judging these intelligible forms transmitted from the sense is discursive reasoning (dianoia; i, 3, 9); see noesis 19–20.

For the extension of the similarity principle beyond the bounds of aisthesis, see sympatheia.

aisthesis koine: common sense, sensus communis

In Aristotelian psychology the “common sense” is a faculty of the psyche that has as its function 1) the perception of the “common sensibles” that are the object of no single sense: movement and rest, number (arithmos), shape, size (De en. 418a, 425b), 2) the perception of things incidentally sensible (loc. cit.), 3) the distinction between senses (ibid. 431a–b), and 4) the perception that we perceive (ibid. 425b).

aistheton: capable of being perceived by the senses; the object of the senses, the sensible (opposite of noetic)

The sensibles (aisthetes) are frequently contrasted to the Platonic forms (eidos; see Phaedo 78d–79a, Tim. 28a–c), and as such can lead only to opinion rather than to true knowledge (see dòxa, episteme). But they are not the lowest objects on the epistemological scale; they are only reflections of the true reality of the eidos, but beneath them are the “images of images,” shadows, reflections, etc. (Rep. 519d–510a; cf. ethon, mimēsis). Plato’s growing interest in the world of the aisthēta in the later dialogues is reflected in their being granted a quasi-being (Soph. 204b), and in his devotion of a large part of the Timaeus to a description of their creation and operation. For Aristotle the sensible singular object is the only true reality (see toto ti, on, politeia); some are appropriate to individual senses, others are common, De an. i, 424a (see aisthesis koine). For the materialists of the Atomist tradition all of truth and all of reality is in the aisthēta, so Epicurus in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. viii, 9; see aisthesis, eidolon.

aither: ether

An etymology (fanciful) is given in Plato, Crat. 410b. It is the purest form of aer (Phaedo 109a–110b, Tim. 58d). For Aristotle it constitutes a fifth element (quinta essentia), moving naturally in eter-
nal circular motion, the stuff of the heavens (De coelo 1, 268b-270b). The “fifth element” soon makes its appearance in the Academy as well, in Philip of Opus’ Epitomeis 98b4 where it has the added virtue of corresponding to the fifth “Platonic body” (see stoicheion). The presence of ather, with its “natural” (physiæ) circular movement (De coelo 1, 269b) also leads to Aristotle’s dropping the theory of heavenly bodies possessed by souls; see ouranist. Cicero (citing Aristotle?) suggests that now is also composed of ather (Acad. post. 1, 7, 26); see soon, stoicheion, kosmos, aphtharton; for the material element involved, see hyle.

Aitia (or aitía): culpability, responsibility, cause
1. Since metaphysics is defined as a study of ultimate causes, Aristotle begins his work on the subject by a detailed review of his predecessors’ search for causes (Meta. 983a-993a; recapitulated 988a-b). Plato has no formal treatment of causality as such, though there is a criticism of the pre-Socratic search for a moving cause in Phaedo 85d-90d, Timeaus 46c-47e, and Laws 89ac, where the earlier physicists are blamed for mistaking accessories (synathetia), which operate from necessity (anankë) and without intelligent design (technē), for the only genuine cause of motion, the psyche (compare Aristotle De an. 414a and symbebekos). But in PhIL, 263b-270c he reduces reality to a formal (see peras), an efficient (see demicourgoi), and a “material” (see apeiron) element.
2. Aristotle’s own doctrine of four causes—formal (eidos), material (hyle; see also hypokeimenon), efficient (kiniton), and final (telos)—is to be found in Phys. 11, 194b-195a and Meta. 1015a-1014a. One peculiar development of the doctrine is the identification of the material cause with the premises of a syllogism that necessarily “cause” the conclusion (cf. Anal. post. 11, 94a, Phys. 11, 195a). There is another, more ethically oriented division of the types of causality in Eth. Nich. 1112a. Later philosophers made some additions to the Aristotelian analysis: Philo’s logos is the instrumental cause of creation (De cher. 55, 126-127), and Seneca (Ep. 65, 8) has a list of five.
For unintended causes, see tyche.

Aithêria: truth
The presence and even the possibility of truth is closely related to the Greek distinction between doxa and episteme (99v.) and their proper objects. Thus there is really no critical problem until Parmenides distinguishes being from nonbeing, associates the latter with sense perception, asserts that there is no truth in the phenomenal world of doxa (Diels, frs. 2331, B11, B30), and contrasts the latter with the “Way of Truth” (ibid. 2834). As a corollary of this and of the realization of the arbitrary nature of laws and customs (see nomos), Protagoras propounded his theory of the relativity of truth, described in Plato, Theæt. 151e-152e, 161e-167a. Aristotle’s theory of truth and falsity rests on the assumption that truth is not in things (Meta. 1097b-1098a), nor in our knowledge of simple substances (where only knowledge or ignorance is possible), but in the judgment, i.e. the joining together of concepts which do not correspond to the reality (Meta. 1097b, De an. 111, 430e; see doxa). For Epicurus all our sense perceptions are true and thus aithêria, sensation, is the ultimate criterion of truth (Sexius Empiricus, Adv. Math. viii, 9; Lucretius, De rerum nat. iv, 469-479; see prolēpsis). The Stoic criteria are described in D.L. vii, 54.
The possibility of error and falsity is discussed under doxa and noesis.

Algós: pain
See hedone.

Allegoria: allegorical interpretation, exegesis
See mythos, theos.

Allofôsis: change, qualitative change, alteration
See pathos, metabole, aisthêsis.

Analogia: proportion, analogy

Anamnéesis: remembrance, recollection
Plato’s acceptance of the Pythagorean theory of rebirth (see palingenesia, psyche) provided the opportunity for solving a serious epistemological problem, i.e., how does one know the unchanging realities already formulated by Socrates as ethical definitions and en route to becoming the Platonic eidos, particularly if sense knowledge (see doxa) is so clearly untrustworthy? There will be later solutions, like cûros and dialectike, but in the first instance it is anamnéesis that guarantees this knowledge. In Meno 90e-86c Socrates had illustrated the possibility of eliciting, by means of diagrams (these will reappear in Rep. 510d; see diagrama, mathematika) and proper questioning, knowledge of objects incapable of being perceived by the senses; in Phaedo 72a-77a it is offered as a proof of the preexistence of the soul and connected with the doctrine of eidos. We have knowledge of the eidos that we cannot have acquired through the senses, therefore it must have been acquired in a prenatal state during which we were in contact
with the forms. The theory appears once again in a mythical and
religious context in Phaedrus 249b-c, and at least by implication in the
vision granted the souls before their birth in Tim. 41e-42b (compare
the vision in Phaedrus 247e-248b, and the difficulty in recalling it, ibid.
249e-250d); see eidos.

anänkē: necessity
1. The pre-Socratic use of anänkē is not uniform; in Parmenides
(Diels, fr. 284g7), it governs all things in an almost providential
manner, in a not very different fashion from its personification in the
“Myth of Er” in Plato’s Rep. 614c-614d, and the Orphic figure in Empedocles
(Diels, fr. 115). But with the Atomists (see D.L. ix, 45: Diels,
fr. 67a2) we enter the area of the mechanical necessity of purely
physical causes operating without purpose (telos).
2. For Socrates and Plato true causality always operates with
purpose, while the operations of the physical elements are merely
conditions or “accessory causes” (synsēs) (see Phaedo 99b, Timaeus
46c). Yet anänkē too has its role in the formation of the kosmos: reason
(nous = Demiourgoς) overcomes physical necessity (Timaeus 47e-
48a). Necessity, the quasi-cause, is only worth studying for its relation-
ship with nous, the divine (theion) cause.
3. In Aristotle anänkē has varied meanings (see Meta. 1015a-c),
but as in Plato the physical necessity in matter must submit, not so
much to nous as to the purpose (telos) in his new understanding of
physiks (Phys. 11, 208e). The role of anänkē in syllogistic reasoning
should also be noted: the conclusion of a valid syllogism flows necessarily
from the premises (And. pr. 1, 24b).
For necessity in a providential sense, see heimarmene, pronoia.

anapλκrosis: filling up
See hēdône.

apâthia: unaffected, without pathē (q.v.)
1. The Aristotelian concept of virtue, founded, as it is, upon
the doctrine of the mean (meos, q.v.), has no place for the state of
apathēia. It does, however, have a significance in his psychology: it is
the apparent apathēia of nous that suggests that this faculty, unlike the
psyche, is incorporeal and immortal, since the pathē are always
associated with matter (De an. 403a, 408b).
2. The situation with Epicurus is somewhat more complex. Since
both pleasure and pain are pathē (D.L. x, 34), there can be no
question of apathēia being a virtue in this hedonistic philosophy. But
the highest type of pleasure is, for Epicurus, precisely static (see
hedône), and this state of equilibrium or freedom from disturbance
(ataraxia) has at least a superficial resemblance to apathēia.

3. The radical point of difference between Epicurus and the
Stoics in this regard is the latter’s insistence that all the pathē are
irrational movements against nature, at least as defined by Zeno (SVF
1, 205, 206; see hēmone). This created difficulties for Chrysipus who
failed to see how irrational affects could occur in the rational faculty
(hegemonikon; see SVF III, 458, 461). But though the intricacies of
this were debated, the Stoic was at one in agreeing that the pathē were
both violent and unnatural and hence should be extirpated (see Seneca,
De ira i, 8, 3-5; SVF 1, 207, III, 138). Thus it would seem that the Stoic
is concerned with eradicating the pathē, the Peripatetic with moderat-
ing them, and the Epicurean with discriminating between the good and
evil among them (see Seneca, Ep. 1, 81, 1), attitudes reminiscent of the
different approaches to katharsis (q.v.) as harmonization and purga-
tion.

4. The practice, if not the enunciation of apathēia had its origins
in the Cynic and related movements immediately preceding Zeno, and
was frequently accompanied with the charge that its practitioners were
merely indulging in insensitivity (Seneca, Ep. 1, 38, 3). The Stoics were
at some pains to distinguish their version of apathēia from insensitivity
or from mere stupidity (D.L. viii, 117; Seneca, Ep. 1, 9, 3). Indeed, it
is likely that it was exactly this type of criticism that resulted in the
later Stoic’s not altogether consistent distinction between good (eupath-
ēia) and evil pathē (D.L. vii, 116).

ápeiron: unlimited, indefinite
1. The arche (q.v.) of all things was, according to Anaximander,
the ápeiron, the unlimited. The term is capable of various constructions
depending on how one understands the limit (peras, q.v.) that is being
denied in the compound word. Aristotle includes in his Physics a
lengthy discussion of the various meanings of the word (202b-203a),
some of which, e.g. spatial infinity, may be rejected as being anacler-
monic to Anaximander’s thinking. What is involved in his idea of ápeiro-
ν is perturbation in time (see Diels, fr. 185 and alldos, aphthartos), an
infinite supply of basic substance “so generation [genesis] and destruc-
tion [phukíra] not fail” (Aristotle, Phys. 1, 208b), and, finally, inde-
termination, i.e., without internal limits within which the simple phys-
ical bodies, air and water, were not as yet distinguished (Diels, fr. cit.
Aristotle, Phys. 1, 287a). It is also possible that Anaximander visual-
ized this huge mass of material that surrounds our kosmos (Aristotle,
ibid., 203b) as a sphere, and so without limit, i.e., beginning or end, in
that sense as well.
2. The subsequent history of the concept as understood by Anaximander lies in the direction of an interest in the exact nature of what is outside the furthest sphere of *ousan* (q.v.), which marks the limit of our universe (see *kenon*). With the Pythagoreans new considerations lead into other aspects of *apeiron*; Limited and Unlimited stand at the head of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites cited in Aristotle, *Meta.* 986a. This is no longer the *apeiron* of Anaximander, but either the spatial limit (or its absence) inherent in the Pythagoreans' geometrical approach to number and bodies (see *arithmos*), or else a musical concept where limit (or *peras*) is thought of as the imposition of some finite measure (in terms of music, *harmona*; in terms of mathematics, proportion or *logos*) upon a continuum infinite at either end. This type of dual infinity is the reason, Aristotle conjectures in *Phys.* 111, 206b, why *apeiron* passed into the notion of "indefinite dyad" (see *dyas*). The latter of the two points of view is probably the one that lies behind Plato's employment of *peras* and *apeiron* as principles of being in *Philo.* 230—236b (the earlier use, *ibid.* 156c—178, seems to refer to a mere indefinite multiplicity of particulars).

3. The prominence of *apeiron* in the Philo of保证ed its continued use as a metaphysical principle in the subsequent Platonic tradition, but with somewhat different emphases. For Plato *peras* and *apeiron* appear as co-principles in much the same way the *chora* of the *Timaeus* exists side by side with the *eidos*. Indeed, Aristotle saw both the *apeiron* and *chora* as the Platonic equivalents of his co-principle of being, *hyle* (see *dyas* and *Phys.* iv, 209b). Plotinus accepted the identification of *apeiron* as a material principle, but his more rigorous monism led him to subordinate it to the One as a kind of evolutionary "moment" when, as "Otherness," it issues from the One and is without definition (*aoristos*) until it turns and contemplates the One (*Enn.* 17, lines 1—13; see *hyle* and compare Proclus' triad of "moments" in *Empl. theol.*, prop. 35: immanence, procession [*proodos*, q.v.], and reversion [*epistrophhe*, q.v.]); see *trias* 3.

4. Another factor in the continued interest in *apeiron* as an ontological principle was its inclusion, through its identification with the material principle, in the problematic of evil; see *hakon*.

aphairesis: taking away, abstraction

1. For Aristotle the chief objects of abstraction are the "mathematicals" (mathematike, q.v.; *Anal. post.* 1, 81b, *Meta.* 1066a—b), and the process is described in *De an.* 111, 431b as "thinking [noesis] of things that are embodied in matter as if they were not." The objects of the science of Physics are separate substances in an ontological sense (see *eikon*), but since they embody *physik* and are subject to change, they are not conceptually separable from matter (*Meta.* 1025b), a mistake the Platonists make (*Phys.* 11, 194a), while the objects of Mathematics are not separate substances in the ontological sense, but can be separated from matter conceptually; see *mathematike*, *hyle*.

2. The fact of the basic unknowability of matter and the consequent necessity of grasping it by analogy (*Meta.* 1056a, *Phys.* 1, 191b; Plato had the same difficulty; see the "bastard reasoning" of *Tim.* 56b) leads Aristotle to a somewhat more detailed exposure of how the aphairesis process works. Primary here is his distinction between sensible and intelligible matter (*aistheta* and *noetik* *hyle*; see *Meta.* 1056a, 1045a. Plotinus uses the same terms but in a different sense; see *hyle*). The latter is the kind of matter that the mind grasps in the abstractive process when it contemplates sensible things (*aistheta*) but not *qua* sensible, i.e., as mathematical bodies composed of form and spatial extension (*megethos*; see *mathematike* and compare *Meta.* 1056b, 1977b), or by analogy, the potential principle in definition, i.e., the *genos* with respect to the difference (*Meta.* 1045a; see *diaphora*).

aphartos: indestructible; for the indestructibility of the soul, cf. *athanatos*

1. In Aristotle's discussion of the possible meanings of the term (*De ccelo* 1, 28b) he accepts as the primary connotation "that which exists and which cannot be destroyed, i.e., it will or might cease to exist," and while he finds agreement among his predecessors that the world is a product of *genesis* (see *agentos*), there are those willing to admit its destruction (*ibid.* 1, 279b). Among these latter there are some who posit a single destruction and others who maintain that the destruction of the *kosmos* is recurrent. Aristotle does not specify who the first group are, but Simplicius, in commenting this passage, identifies them as the Atomists, and the identification seems likely (see Diels, frs. 67a1, 68a4; compare Epicurus in D.L. x, 73 and Lucretius, *De rerum nat.* v, 235 ff.). Among the proponents of cyclic destruction Aristotle names Empedocles, whose theory of the mixing of the four elements through Love and Strife is indeed cyclic (cf. fr. 17, lines 1—13), and Heraclitus. The position of Heraclitus is much more obscure; fr. 36 denies any dissolution of the *kosmos* and Plato specifically distinguishes between the position of Empedocles and Heraclitus on the question of the destruction of the *kosmos* (*Soph.* 224c). There are, on the other hand, passages in later authors suggesting that Heraclitus held a doctrine of periodic conflagration (cf. *ekpyrosis*). At first sight Philo too seems to maintain the destructibility of the *kosmos* (*De opif.* 37); but his actual view is based on a distinction found in Plato; in *Tim.* 41a—b, when talking of the heavenly gods (*ousan*), Plato says that
the union of their bodies and souls could be dissolved but they will not be because they are the handiwork of the Demiourgos. Philo similarly feels that the kosmos, though naturally destructible, will not be destroyed because of a providential divine sustenance (De Decalogu 58).

2. A similar argument appears in Plutarch, Enn. ii, 1, 3-4, where it is the Soul that holds the kosmos together eternally, but here the relationship is not the volitional, providential one found in Philo, rather it is founded on the mimetic element in the Platonic tradition, e.g. time is an eikon of eternity (aion) and this world is a reflection of the intelligible universe (kosmos noctos); further, creation in the sense of “procession” (see prôdos) and “return” (see epistrophè) are both perdurative in nature.

apôdeixis: pointing out, demonstration, proof

In technical Aristotelian methodology apôdeixis is a syllogistic demonstration that, if the premises are true and primary, will lead to episteme (Aristotle, Anal. post. 1, 71b-72a). Individuals are not subject to definition and hence undemonstrable (Aristotle, Meta. 993b); see dialektike, katholou.

aporia: with no way out, difficulty, question, problem

1. Aporia and its cognate verb forms are closely related to dialectic (dialektike, q.v.) and hence to the Socratic custom of interlocutory discourse. According to Aristotle’s analysis (Meta. 982b), philosophy begins with a sense of wonder (thauma; Aristotle makes the point here that philosophy and mythology share wonder as a common point of departure) growing from an initial difficulty (aporia), a difficulty experienced because of conflicting arguments (see Top. vi, 145b). Both the aporia and its attendant wonder can be paralleled in Socrates’ frequent protestations of his own ignorance (e.g. Meno, 86d, Soph. 244a), and in the nolle contendere brought on by his own deliberate interrogation (elenchos) (see Theet. 210b-c and katharsis).

2. But this initial state of ignorance, compared by Aristotle to a man in chains (Meta. 993a3), yields to a further sense where aporia, or, more specifically, diaporia, an exploration of various routes, assumes the features of a dialectical process (Meta. 995a-b; see dialektike), and where the investigation of the opinions (endoxa, q.v.) of one’s philosophical predecessors is a necessary preliminary to arriving at a proof (De an. 1, 493; Eth. Nich. vii, 1145b). Thus, the aporices are posed, previous opinions on these problems are canvassed, and a solution (aporia: lysis, the latter literally a “loosening,” maintaining the metaphor of the chaining in Meta. 995a32) is worked out. The solution may take a variety of forms, e.g., validating the endoxa (Eth. Nich. vii, 1145b), positing a hypothesis (De coelo ii, 191b-292a), or even (Eth. Eth. vii, 1235b, 1246a) allowing the existence of a reasonable (eulcgon) contradiction. But whatever the solution, the posing of the problem and the working from problem to solution, which is the heart of the philosophical method, is a difficult and onerous task (Meta. 996a).

aporia: painlessness
See hêdône.

aporrhoia: effluences
See diasthèsis.

archê: beginning, starting point, principle, ultimate underlying substance (Urfstoff), ultimate undemonstrable principle

1. The search for the basic “stuff” out of which all things are made is the earliest one in Greek philosophy and is attended by the related question of what is the process whereby the secondary things came out of the primary one or ones. Or, to put it in strictly Aristotelian terminology: what is the archê (or archai) and what is the genesis of the synthètes?

2. The pre-Socratic search for an archê in the sense of a material cause (Aristotle had located the investigation within his own categories of causality; see endoxon for the method involved) is described by Aristotle in Meta. 983b-985b, and the word archê may have first been used in this technical sense by Anaximander (Diels 12a4). The first candidates for the basic ingre dient of things were individual natural substances, e.g. water or moisture (Thales; see Meta. 983b) and air (see aer), but with Anaximander’s suggestion that the archê was something indeterminate (apeiron, q.v.) an immense abstractive step away from the purely sensory had been taken. It opened the possibility that the archê was something more basic than what could be perceived by the senses, even though the apeiron was, at this stage, unmistakably material. Thus Anaximander opened the line of enquiry that led to the single spherical One of Parmenides (see on, hen) with its related distinction between true knowledge (episteme, q.v.) and opinion (doxa, q.v.), and to the plural geometrical and mathematical archai of the Pythagoreans (see arithmos, monas) and the atoma (q.v.) of Leucippus and Democritus.

3. What might be termed the sensationalist tradition continued to seek the ultimate irreducible entities in sensibly perceived bodies until Empedocles standardized them at four, the stoicheia (q.v.) of earth,
air, fire, and water, but there is scarcely anyone except Empedocles himself who accepts these as true archai; rather they are stages between the still more remote archai and the higher complexities of composite bodies (synthētai).

4. The search for archai then takes a new tack. Both Parmenides and Empedocles had been emphatic in their denial of change, the former by attributing it to an illusion of the senses, the latter by maintaining the eternity of the stoichēta. But it was a stricture that was soon violated; Anaxagoras and the Atomists, each in their own way, reassert genesis and so, too, the possibility that the Empedoclean stoichēta change into each other.

5. A new analysis of genesis by Plato and Aristotle rejects the old notions of change as mixture or conglomeration or association, and concentrates instead—the lead had been given by Anaxagoras (see frs. 4, 12)—on the old notion of contrary “powers” (see dynamis, enantion, pathos). This is well within the sensualist tradition since these powers can be sensibly distinguished (reduced by Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 11, 325b, to the sense of touch, haphe); but there is a nod as well in the direction of the apeiron with the isolation of the other great archē of change, the undefined, imperceptible substratum (see ἡψικείμενον, ὑποδοχεῖς, kybe).

6. This, then, is the eventual solution (among the “geneticists”; the Atomist and Pythagorean versions continue to flourish) of the problem of the archai of physical bodies: opposed powers, some of which can act (see poiein) while others can be acted upon (see paschein), a material substratum in which change occurs, and, eventually, an initiator of change (see nous, kinōn).

7. A related problem is that posed by the resolution of proof (epoideis) back to its ultimate archai, the first premises of knowledge or the ultimate principles upon which a syllogism rests. For the Platonists for whom true knowledge is essentially innate, based as it is on a prenatal exposure to the eidos (see anamnesis, paingenesēs), the question is of little moment, except, perhaps, in the later theory of dialectic where the entire anamnesis approach to knowledge tends to recede into the background (see διαλεκτική). As for the sensualist who founds all knowledge on sense perception, he is forced, for the validation of the premises of noetic knowledge, either to identify aisthēsis and noēsis (so the Atomists, though Epicurus hedges a bit with his notion of “self-evidence”; see enargeia), or to link the two, as Aristotle did, with the concept of intuition (see epagoge, nous).

For another orientation to the question of the archai of physical bodies, see synthētai; for the process whereby the archai become more complex entities, see genesis; for the existence of two ethically opposed archai, see kakon.

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**aretē: excellence, virtue**

1. The concept of virtue had a long evolutionary history in Greek culture before its incorporation into the problematic of philosophy. The pre-Socratics, whose chief concern was with a corporeal physis (q.v.) were not much interested in speculations about aretē; there are some random thoughts on the subject, as in Heracletus’ designation of prudence as the highest virtue (Diels, fr. 12) and Democritus’ insistence on the interior character of aretē (Diels, frs. 62, 96, 244, 264), but there is no true philosophical attention to aretē until the generation of Socrates.

2. Socrates’ own identification of virtue and knowledge was a commonplace for his successors (Aristotle, Eth. Eud. 1, 1216b, Eth. Nich. vii, 1145b), and the “Socratic dialogues” of Plato are directed toward a search for the definitions of various virtues, e.g. Laches 190c–190e; and it is probably a hypostatization of these definitions that culminates in the Platonic theory of forms (see eidos). For Plato there is an eidos of aretē (Menex 72c) and of the various species of aretai (Perm. 195b); in Rep. 448b–d he describes the four “cardinal virtues” desirable in the ideal state, a discussion that has as its correlatives the classes of men in the state and the divisions of the soul (see ψυχή, sophrosyne).

3. For Aristotle virtue is a mean (meson, q.v.), and he distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues (Eth. Nich. ii, 1103a–b). The Socratic intellectualist approach to virtue is still visible in Aristotle, but it is tempered by a recognition of thevolitional elements as well (see proaireis). For the Stoic the essence of virtue was “living harmoniously with nature” (see nomos).

For other aspects of morality, see praxis, phronēsis, adiaphoron, δίκη, and, for its ontological correlatives, agathon, kakon.

**arithmōs: number** (see also arithmos sidetikos and arithmos mathematikos)

1. The Pythagorean consideration of number is obscured by an initial major difficulty: the general inability of the pre-Socratics to distinguish between the concrete and abstract, and the consequent lack of distinction between arithmetic and geometry. The original Pythagorean insight was probably the reduction of the basic intervals of music to mathematical ratios (see harmonia), which they extended to the principle that things are, in effect, numbers (Aristotle, Meta. 1090a). And these “things” include, to the confusion of Aristotle, not only sensible material things, but abstractions like justice, marriage, opportunity, etc. (Meta. 985b, 990a, 1078b), and qualities like white, sweet, and hot (ibid. 1092a). Again, for Aristotle mathematical number was
abstract (see mathematika), and he could distinguish between sensible solids and geometrical bodies (ibid. 997b). But for the Pythagoreans arithmos was corporeal and had magnitude (ibid. 108b, 108b; see megethos, asymmetron), a not unlikely possibility considering the Pythagorean habit of constructing solids out of the spatial arrangement of those points (Aristotle, Phys. 111, 203a; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. x, 28a; a method of generating solids later replaced by the "fraction" method of moving a point into a line, Aristotle, De an. 409a; Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. x, 38a). But while it is probable that the early Pythagoreans thought of numbers as corporeal, it is unlikely that they said that they were at a time before the concrete and abstract were distinguished. The first man to have said they were corporeal was Echphantus (Aetius 1, 3, 19) who posited a type of number-atomism.

2. Since the common Greek view was that number was a "plurality of units" (plethos monadon; see Meta. 205a and monas), the question arose as to the generation of the unit itself; its constitutive elements are described as "the odd and the even" and "the limited and the unlimited," the latter serving a similar role in Plato as the principles of numbers and eidos (see dyas, peras).

3. The most perplexing aspect of ancient number theory is Aristotle's repeated assertions that Plato taught that the eidos were numbers (e.g. Meta. 207b), a position that must be distinguished from 1) the existence of the eidos of numbers (see arithmos eideitikos) and 2) the existence of the "mathematical" as an intermediate grade of being (see mathematika, metaux). But nowhere in the dialogues does Plato seem to identify the eidos with number. To meet this difficulty some have postulated a theory of later "essential" Platonism known to Aristotle (but see agraphe dognais), while others have attempted to see the emergence of the eidos-arithmos theory described in such passages as Phil. 25a-e, the reduction of the physical bodies back to geometrical shapes in Tim. 53c-60a (see stochclona), and the increasing stress on a hierarchy among the Forms (see Soph. 254d and genos, hyperosis, which, according to Theophrastus, Meta. 6b, would suggest the descending series: archai (i.e., monas/dyas or peras/apeiron, q.v.), arithmos, eidos, aistheta. Still other say that Aristotle either deliberately or unknowingly confused the position of Plato with those of Spensippus and Xenocrates (see mathematika).

4. For Aristotle number is only mathematical number, the product of abstraction (see mathematika, aistheta), perceived not by a single sense but by the "common sense" (De an. 111, 425a-b; see aesthesia homeo). The rebirth of Pythagoreanism in the early centuries of the Christian era assured the continued survival of the eidos-arithmos theory (see D.L. 111, 25; Porphyry, Vita Pyth. 48-51), so that, for Plotinus, number has a transcendent position among the intelligibles (Enn. vi, 6, 8-9).

**arithmos eideitikos:** ideal number

That there are eidos of numbers in Plato just as there are of other entities is a matter of no dispute (cf. Phaedo 101b-c), and Aristotle is correct in saying that they are singular (Meta. 987b) and "incomparable" (ibid. 108a), i.e., incapable of being added, subtracted, etc., from each other. Plato also asserted, on the testimony of Aristotle, Phys. 111, 206b and Meta. 1073a, that the ideal numbers went only to ten.

For the identification of eidos and arithmos, see arithmos.

**arithnos mathematikos:** mathematical number; the abstract numbers that are the object of mathematics

See mathematika, metaux, aipairesis.

**asymmetron:** incommensurable (scil. megethos, magnitude)

1. The discovery that the diagonal of a square could not be described in terms of a proportion (logos) with the length of its side probably followed upon the working out of the Pythagorean theorem. In antiquity it was attributed to the Pythagorean Hippasus who was crowned for his revelation of the irrationality (a-logos) of the diagonal of the square (Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 247; the proof of incommensurability is given by Aristotle in Anal. pr. 41a). Proofs for the incommensurability of $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$, etc. followed quickly (see Plato, Theaet. 147d-148b).

2. Philosophically these discoveries raised serious questions as to the nature of number (arithmos, q.v.) and the relationship between arithmetic and geometry. Incommensurability began and, for the most part, remained a geometrical problem; these, after all, incommensurable magnitudes (see Euclid, Elem. x, passim). Where the difficulty arose, and Hippasus' fate bears testimony to its gravity, was in the Pythagorean insistence on a correspondence between numbers and things. Numbers for the Greeks were the integers and there were no integers to express the new incommensurable magnitudes. One reaction, witnessed by Aristotle, was to distinguish between number and bodies and thus cut geometry loose from arithmetic (see megethos). The other, which had some support in the Academy (see Epinomis 990b-991b), was to attempt to incorporate $\sqrt{2}$ into the family of the arithmos.
ataraxia: without disturbance, equilibrium, tranquillity of the soul
See hedone.

athanatos: immortal, the incorruptibility of the psyche; for the incorruptibility of natural bodies, see sphyhatatos

1. The belief in the immortality of the soul begins with its association with aer, the vital element in life (see Anaximenes, Diels, fr. 1382), and the vitalistic assumption that what is alive is divine (Cicero, De nat. deor. 1, 10, 25; see theion) and so immortal. Hence there is no pre-Socratic attempt to demonstrate that the soul as such is immortal; it is part of something else that is immortal. The problem of psychic, individual immortality arises with the new shamanistic, religious view of the psyche (q.v.) as the real person, locked in the soul as in a prison; but here too it is rather religious exposition than philosophical argumentation, a preference best seen in Plato's four great eschatological myths: Phaedo 107c–114c; Gorgias 523a ff.; Republic 614b–616d; Phaedrus 246a–249d. But Plato also has what he calls "proof" (apodeixis; see Phaedrus 245c). The proof from anamnesis (q.v.) reaches back into religious Pythagoreanism (Phaedo 72c–77a), while that from the kinship to the eidos (ibid. 76b–80c) is purely Platonic.

2. These are unitary proofs pertaining to the soul as a whole, but the distinction of the mortal and immortal parts of the soul in the Timaeus (see psyche) introduces a new direction; not even in his earliest writings does Aristotle maintain the immortality of the entire psyche; it is only nous that can make that claim (Eudemos, fr. 61; De an. 1, 408b, 111, 420a). The materialist is normally led to deny the immortality of the soul; so the Atomists (see Lucretius, De rerum nat. III, 830–1094), and so, in the first instance, the Stoics (SVF I, 148, 11, 809; D.L. vii, 157), though later, with Poseidonius (Cicero, Tus. 1, 18–19; compare De republica vi, 26–28), they affirmed a kind of astral immortality (see aer). For Plotinus there is never a question of the soul's immortality; what is discussed is the individuality of the immortal soul after its separation from the body (Enn. iv, 3, 5).

atomon: "uncut," indivisible material, particle, atom

1. Parmenides' criticism of Milesian vitalism and its unexplained genesis and kinesis bore its fruit in the views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who reduced all genesis to one or other type of mixture of indestructible matter (see Empedocles, Diels 31A28, 30; Anaxagoras, fr. 1a) and who posited a source of motion that was different from the thing moved (see kinous). But both Empedocles and Anaxagoras had posited a plurality of types of basic substance and so had failed to meet the Parmenidean hypothesis that true being is one (see on and Melissus, fr. 8). Out of this complex of problems and partial solutions grew the Atomist position: the existence of both being and nonbeing (i.e., the void; see kenos), being in the form of an infinite number of indestructible indivisible particles substantially identical and differing only in shape and size, by the aggregation (synthesis) of which sensible things come into existence (Diels, frs. 67A14, 68A37; Aristotle, Meta. 985b, see genesis).

2. The atoms have eternal motion (Aristotle, De coelo iii, 308b; see kinesis) and the most mobile are the spherical soul or fire atoms (idem, De an. 1, 405a1); all sensation is reduced to contact (idem, De sensu 442a1); all other sensible qualities are merely convention (nomos; Democritus, fr. 9; see pathos). The later variations by Epicurus and Lucretius may be found in D.L. xi, 685–328, 489–634, 11, passim.

For the Pythagorean version of number-atomism, see arithmos, monas, megethos; for the atomon eidos as the in syntax species in division, see diaphora, diairesis, eidos; for the kinetics of Atomism, see kinesis; for the formation of compound bodies, see genesis; on the general question of indivisible magnitudes, see megethos.

autarkia: self-sufficiency

Self-sufficiency is a characteristic of happiness (eudaimonia) as a goal of human life (Aristotle, Eth. Nik. 1, 1097b), and thus of the contemplative life, which is the highest good for man (ibid. x, 1177a). Thereafter autarkia as a quality of virtue becomes a commonplace in both the Stoic (D.L. vii, 127) and the later Platonic tradition (Plotinus, Enn. 1, 4, 4).

autonaton: spontaneity
See tyché.
boileis: wish
See proairesis: known 9.

boileis: deliberation
See proairesis.

chôra: land, area, space
See hyle, hypodoche, topos.

choristôn: separate, hence 1) separate substance
2) conceptually separate (see aphiariesis)

Separateness is a characteristic of substance (ousia) that, unlike the other kategorai, is capable of separate existence; all the other modifications of being exist in something (Meta. 1098a-b, 1099a28, 1099a32). One of the most frequent Aristotelian charges against Plato is that he gave the ousia, which Aristotle understands in the sense of a universal (katholou), a separate substantial existence, i.e., he hypothesized them (see Meta. 1086a, 1087a).

On the separability of the agent intellect, see nous, ousia.

chronos: time

1. Time as a personification, Chronos, appears in the quasi-mythical cosmogonies before assuming a place in the philosophical cosmologies. Chronos for Kronos, the father of Zeus, was a fairly common substitution (see Plutarch, De Iside 32), and the first to have done so may have been the sixth-century proto-philosopher Pherecydes (D.L. 1, 119). Whoever its originator, a powerful Time is a staple in the poets (cf. Pindar, Ol. 11, 17 and fr. 145), and particularly in the tragicians (Oed. Col. 607-623 is only one of a great many examples from Sophocles, who was especially fond of the figure) where Time is a figure of might who not only stands at or near the head of the genealogical process, as in the cosmogonies, but rules and governs the kosmos.

2. The thought of one poet on time bears particular note since it is remarkably similar to what an almost contemporary philosopher was saying on the same subject. Solon, in fr. 12, line 3, uses the expression “in the court [dike] of Chronos,” and an almost identical figure occurs in the preserved fragment of Anaximander where the elements “make reparation [dike] to each other for their injustices according to the assessment [taxis] of Chronos.”

3. The figurative language disappeared as philosophical speculation drew apart from its mythological origins, so that, for instance, when even the poet-philosopher Empedocles is speaking in a context akin to that of Anaximander, chronos appears with considerably less suggestion of personification (fr. 30). Where both Anaximander and Empedocles would agree, however, is in placing time outside the kosmos, which is, in turn, somehow regulated by time.

4. A change begins to appear with the Pythagoreans for whom the kosmos was both a living, breathing creature (zoon, q.v.) and the principle of Limit (peras). Outside the kosmos are only various manifestations of the Unlimited (apeiron), which the kosmos “inhables” and upon which it imposes Limit (cf. Aristotle, Phys. 205a3, 215b; Aetius 17, 9, 1). Among these apeiron, we are told (Aristotle, fr. 22c), time. It is likely that the inhaling process involved limiting the raw, perdurative aspect of time (perduration is an early feature of the apeiron, q.v.) by its reduction to number (arithmos), an association that continued through all subsequent discussion of time.

5. This Pythagorean insight, despite the fact that it is glimpsed only fitfully through Aristotelian asides, was of great importance. It distinguished an unlimited, extracosmic time from a numerable, cosmic time and, in effect, moved the latter into the context of quantity. Plato continued along the same path but added considerable new dimensions to both Pythagorean notions of time. He took over the concept of aion (q.v.), which had occurred in pre-Socratic thought as a designation of the life-span of the universe, and applied it to extracosmic time, not now seen as an undefined Pythagorean apeiron, that probably included some kind of unregulated motion, but as the motionless mode of the cide (Tim. 37d). Cosmic time, on the other hand, is identified with the periodic revolution of the heavenly sphere (Tim. 35c; Aristotle, Phys. 215a-b and Simplicius, ad loc.). Chronos for Plato is, in short, “an everlasting likeness [eikos], moving according to number, of eternity [aion] that rests in the one” (Tim. 37d). Thus the stability and unity
of *aion* are contrasted with the movement and plurality, or better, the numerability of *chronos*, and the whole incorporated into his theory of *mimesis* *(q.v.)*.

6. For both Plato and Aristotle time and motion are closely associated in a kind of reciprocal relationship. Plato, as we have seen, identified the two, and though Aristotle is critical of that identification (*Phys. 216b*), he does assert their close relationship (*ibid. 220b*). He likewise agrees with Plato that the best unit for measurement is regular, circular motion because it is primary and best known (*ibid. 223b*), but he does not specify, as does Plato, that this is the diurnal movement of the heavens, a position also criticized by Plotinus (*Enn. 111, 7, 9*). But where the two men most clearly part company is in the absence in Aristotle of the contrast between time and eternity and all the demurrage apparatus of the *mimesis* theory.

7. Its existence as an *eikon* allows Plato to assign, at least by implication, an ontological status to time. It even has a purpose in the scheme of things, to enable men to count (*Tim. 39b*). But Aristotle, for whom time is "the calculation of motion," is not convinced. Time is not synonymous with movement but must be calculated from movement. And calculation demands a calculator: hence, if a mind did not exist, neither would time (*ibid. 223a*). It is the recognition of sequence that makes men aware of time (*ibid. 219a*).

8. The Epicurean contribution to a philosophy of time consisted chiefly in an attempt to define its mode of existence. Time is not a *prolepsis* *(q.v.),* a universal grasp built up over a series of experiences, but rather an immediate perception (*D.L. x, 72*). It seems to be a quality associated with the actions and movements of things, in short, "an accident of an accident*" (*Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. x, 219; compare Lucretius i, 459-461*). Such distinctions tend to be blurred in Stoicism, which assumed all such entities, including time (*SVP II, 1142*), under the general rubric of "bodies." But in general the Stoa stayed well within the Platonic and Aristotelian guidelines *(without, of course, the Platonic furbelows of *aion* and *eikon*), substituting the more corporeal "interval" for *arithmos*, but preserving the link with motion (*SVP II, 509, 510*).

9. Plotinus devotes considerable attention to the problem of time, considering it, as did Plato, closely bound to the question of eternity. Any attempts to separate the questions, as Aristode did, are doomed to failure (*Enn. 111, 7, 7-10*). Plotinus is impatient with philosophical treatments of time in terms of number or measure of motion (*see Enn. 111, 7, 8*), even with Plato’s identification of time and the movement of the heavens. Instead he casts the problem of both *aion* and *chronos* in terms of life, the former representing the life of the intelligibles (*Enn. 111, 7, 11*).

2). Time, on the other hand, is a kind of degeneration of this total self-presence due to the soul’s inability to accept this *tota simuliclitias* (compare the similar degeneration of *theorie* into *praxis* in the soul: see *physio*); time, then, is the life of the soul progressing from state to state (*Enn. 111, 7, 11*).

daimon or daimônion: supernatural presence or entity, somewhere between a god (theos) and a hero

1. The belief in supernatural spirits somewhat less anthropomorphized than the Olympians is a very early feature of Greek popular religion; one such daimon is attached to a person at birth and determines, for good or evil, his fate (compare the Greek word for happiness, *eudaimonia*, having a good daimon). Heraclitus protested against this belief (*fr. 115; see *etkia*), but not with any great effect. In the chamanistic view of the *psyche* *(q.v.)*, daimon is another name for the soul (*Empedocles, fr. 115*), probably reflecting its divine origins and extraordinary powers. Socrates is at least partially in the archaic religious tradition when he speaks of his "divine something" *(daimonion it)* that warns him to avoid certain actions (*Apol. 31d*; its operation is considerably wider in Xenophon’s account in *Mem. 1, 1, 4*); notable is Socrates’ constant use of the impersal form of the word or synonym "divine sign" *(see Phaedrus 244b)*, perhaps the rationalist’s slight correction of what was a popular contemporary belief in divination, divine dream messages, prophecies, etc., a belief that Socrates shared (*Apol. 21b, 33c; Grito 44a, Phaedo, 66e; see *mantike*). It is probably a mistake to think that either Socrates or his contemporaries distinguished altogether too carefully between the *daimonion* and the *theion* *(q.v.)*, since the Socratic defense against atheism in *Apol. 27d* rests on an argument that to believe in *daimones* is to believe in gods.

2. The idea of the *daimon* as a kind of “guardian angel” is still visible in Plato (*Rep. 620cd*), though there is an attempt to escape the fatalism implied in the popular belief by having the individual souls choose their own daimon (*Rep. 617e*). Whether this individual daimon is within us or not was much debated in later philosophy. At one point (*Tim. 90a*) Plato himself identifies it with the soul, and a reflection of
DEMIOURGOS: maker, craftsman

1. Plato’s description of the maker of the lower gods, the soul of the universe, and the immortal part of the human soul is in Timaeus 29d–30c; he uses the preexistent eidos as his model, ibid. 30c-31a (see mimesis). The demiourgos is probably to be identified with the intelligent, efficient cause posited by Plato in Phil. 27b (compare Soph. 265c). But he is not omnipotent: he makes the kouros as good “as possible” (Timaeus 30b) and must cope with the countereffects of “necessity” (anaqke), ibid. 470b-48a.

2. The demiourgos continues to play an important role in later Platonicism: what is chiefly notable is that, with the transcendance of the supreme divine principle, the demiurgic function is performed by a secondary emanation, by the Logos in Philo (De cher. 35, 136-137, De spec. leg. 1, 81) and Nous in Numenius (see Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 11, 17-18) and Plotinus (Enn. 11, 3, 18). The ethical dualism of the Gnostics appears in their making the demioourgos create the world without a knowledge of the eidos (see Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1, 53, 3); see mimesis, techne.

diairesis: separation, division, distinction

1. Division, a procedure that did not interest Socrates since the thrust of his enquiry was toward a single eidos (see epagoge), becomes an important feature in the later dialogues where Plato turns his attention to the question of the relationship between eide. Expressed in terms of Aristotelian logic diairesis is part of the progress from genus to species; but as is clear from a key passage in the Parmenides, where he first puts the question (193d-e), Plato did not see it as a conceptual exercise. The dialectical search of which diairesis is part has as its object the explication of the ontological realities that are grasped by our reflection (logismos).

2. The pursuit of the interrelated eide begins with an attempt at comprehending a generic form (Phaedrus 235a); this is “collection” (synagoge, q.v.). It is followed by diairesis, a separation off of the various eide found in the generic eidos, down to the infima species (Soph. 253d-e). Plato is sparing of details in both the theory and practice of synagoge, and, while the Sophist and Politicus are filled with examples of diairesis, there is relatively little instruction on its methodology. We are told, however, that the division is to take place “according to the natural joints” (Phaedrus 265c). What these becomes clearer from the Politicus: they are the differences (diaphorai, q.v.) that separate one species from another in the generic form (Pol. 262a-263b, 265b).

3. The method of division raises certain serious questions, so serious, indeed, that they might very well shake confidence in the existence of the eide (see Phil. 35a-b). Describing the relationship of sensibles to the eide in terms of participation (methesis) suggests the subordination of things to the eide, a subordination at the heart of the Platonic metaphysics. And though Plato avoids the term methesis, preferring the expression “combination” or “communion” (koinonia; earlier, in Phaedo 100d, Plato had apparently contemplated using koinonia to describe the relationship of sensibles to the eide) when describing the interrelationship of the eide (see Soph. 251a-e), the difficulty persistently refuses to disappear. Does not the arrangement of the specific eide under the generic eidos suggest the very same principle of subordination among the eide themselves? Do the species constitute the genus or are they derived from it? Plato clearly did not see the eide in this way (see Soph. 251a-253d), as Aristotle himself is willing to admit (see Meta. 923a), but it may have been at least one of the reasons why Speusippus, who practices diairesis, but in a radical form (see Aristotle, Anal. post. 11, 97a and diafora), denied the existence of the eide.

4. Aristotle, however, is convinced of the incompatibility of the existential indivisible eide and the process of diairesis (Meta. 10989a-b). His own theory of division is set forth in Anal. post. 11, 96b-97b: one must divide the genus by differences (diaphorai, q.v.) that pertain to the essence, must proceed in the correct order, and, finally, be all-inclusive.
With Epictetus \textit{diaseresis} reappears in a moral context; see \textit{proairesis}.

dialetikè: dialectic

1. On the testimony of Aristotle dialectic was an invention of Zeno the Eleatic (D.L. ix, 25), probably to serve as a support for the hypothetical antinomies of Parmenides (Plato, \textit{Parm.} 128c). But what was a species of verbal polemic (what Plato would call \textquoteleft eros\textquoteright) or disparition; see \textit{Soph.} 224e–226a, \textit{Rep.} 193b, \textit{Phaedrus} 261c) for the Eleatics was transformed by Plato into a high philosophical method. The connecting link was undoubtedly the Socratic technique of question and answer in his search for ethical definitions (see Plato, \textit{Phaedo} 75d, 76c; Xenophon, \textit{Mem.} 1, 1, 18; \textit{meno}; a technique that Plato explicitly describes as dialectical (\textit{Crat.} 390c). With the hypothesization of the Socratic definitions into the Platonic \textit{eidē} (perhaps reflected in the transition from \textit{Phaedo} 93d–100a to \textit{ibid.} 101b; see \textit{eidos}; the role of dialectic becomes central and is the crown of the ideal curriculum described in the \textit{Republic} after ten years devoted to mathematics the philosopher-to-be will devote the years between thirty and thirty-five to the study of dialectic (\textit{Rep.} 531d–534e, 537b–539e).

2. What is dialectic? The question is not an easy one since Plato, as usual, thought about it in a variety of ways. There is the view of the \textit{Phaedo} and the \textit{Republic}, which envisions dialectic as a progressively more synthetic ascent, via a series of \textquoteleft positions\textquoteright (\textit{hypothesis}; q.v.); the theory of Forms is one such in \textit{Phaedo} 100b), until an ultimate is reached (\textit{Phaedo} 101d, \textit{Rep.} 511e). In the \textit{Republic}, where the context of the discussion is confessedly moral, this \textquoteleft unhypothetized principle\textquoteright is identified with the good-in-itself (\textit{auto te agathon}; \textit{Rep.} 533b–d) that subsumes within itself all the lower hypotheses (\textit{ibid.} 533c–d).

3. If the dialectic of the \textit{Phaedo} and the \textit{Republic} may be described as \textquotelogical\textquoteright (\textit{Rep.} 537c), that which emerges from the \textit{Phaedrus} onwards is decidedly \textquotedblleft diacritic\textquotedblright (see \textit{Soph.} 226c, 239d). It is introduced in \textit{Phaedrus} 265c–266b (compare \textit{Soph.} 253d–e) and consists of two different procedures, \textquotelocation\textquoteright (\textit{synagoge}; q.v.) and \textquotedivision\textquoteright (\textit{diaseresis}; q.v.), the latter process in particular being amply illustrated in subsequent dialogues like the \textit{Sophist}, \textit{Politicus}, and \textit{Philebus}. The earlier dialectic appeared similar to the operations of \textit{eidos} (q.v.), but here we are transported into an almost Aristotelian world of classification through division: ascent has been replaced by descent. While it is manifest that we are here still dealing with ontological realities, it is likewise clear that a crucial step has been taken along the road to a conceptual logic. The term of the \textit{diaseresis} is that \textit{eidos} which stands immediately above the sensible particulars (\textit{Soph.} 239d), and, while this is \textquoteleft really real\textquoteright (\textit{ontos on}) in the Platonic

4. Aristotle abandons the central ontological role given to dialectic in Plato's \textit{Republic}; he is concerned, instead, with the operations of the mind that culminate in demonstration (\textit{apodeixis}). Dialectic is not strict demonstration (\textit{Anal. pr.} 1. 248b–d; \textit{Top.} 1. 1006–b) in that it does not begin from premises that are true and primary, but from opinions (\textit{endoxos}) that are accepted by the majority or the wise. The irony of this distinction is, of course, that Aristotle's own procedure is most frequently what he has described as \textquoteleft dialectical\textquoteright (see \textit{endoxos}). But as a theoretician Aristotle has little love of dialectic (cf. \textit{De an.} 1. 403a; \textit{Top.} 105b), and suggests in \textit{Meta.} 987b that it, or rather the confusion between thought and reality, may have been Plato's undoing.

5. For the Stoics dialectic is reduced to logic, i.e., a study of the forms of internal and external discourse (D.L. vii, 49; cf. \textit{logos}, \textit{nomos}), while in the same breath they extend its preserves to embrace ethics and even physics (\textit{ibid.} vii, 48, 89). The result is that logic is no longer an instrument (\textit{organon}) of philosophy as understood by the Peripatetic school (the collection of the logical treatises into an \textit{Organon} post-Aristotelian, though Aristotle certainly foresaw the propaedeutic role of the \textit{Analytics}; cf. \textit{Meta.} 1005b).

6. The rehabilitation of dialectic in its Platonic sense was undertaken by Plotinus (\textit{Enn.} 1, 3). It is once again, as in the \textit{Republic}, a cognitive approach to the intelligibles (see \textit{noesis}), but with distinctly Stoic overtones: dialectic is an education for virtue and so includes both actions and objects as well as the \textit{noesis}.

diánoia: understanding

On the Platonic line \textit{diánoia} is a type of cognition between \textit{doxa} and \textit{noesis} (\textit{ibid.} 510d–511a; for the special objects of \textit{diánoia} on the Platonic line, see \textit{mathematike}). In Aristotle it is used as a more general term for intellectual activity. Where it is opposed to \textit{noos} (= intuitive knowledge) it means discursive, syllogistic reasoning (Aristotle, \textit{Anal. post.} 11, 100b), and (\textit{ibid.} 1, 89b) it is subdivided into the following species: \textit{episteme}, knowledge pursued for its own sake (see also \textit{theoria}), \textit{techne} (knowledge applied to production), and \textit{phronesis} (knowledge applied to conduct). In Stoicism it is identical with the \textit{hegemonikon} (\textit{SVF} 11, 459).

For its location in the general context of intellect, see \textit{noesis}.

diaphora: difference, specific difference

1. The presence of \textit{diaphora} is explicit in the Platonic dialectical process of division (\textit{diaseresis}; q.v.) where the \textquoteleft generic form\textquoteright is di-
vided according to kinds (Soph. 253d–e), or, as he puts it in Phaedrus 256f, “at the natural joints.” What these “natural joints” are is described more fully in Pol. 262a–263b, 265b. The genus must be divided only where it separates into two specific Forms. To divide a genus into parts will not do since a part (meros) and a specific Form (eidos) are not the same thing (ibid. 262b). The diaphoria, therefore, must distinguish species.

2. This makes sense in a system of concepts, but creates great difficulties if the eidos are autonomous, indivisible substances, as Plato undoubtedly saw them; there is no place in the Platonic theory for either “generic” or “specific” Forms (see diaphoria). Plato’s successor Speusippus, who denied the eidos, used an exhaustive method of diaphoria, attempting to include all the diaphori, presumably since, with the disappearance of the hypostatized eidos, it was the diaphoria that gave the new concept eidos its content (see Aristotle, Anal. post. 11, 97c).

3. In Aristotle the process of diaphoria proceeds by dividing the genus by means of specifically distinct diaphori down to the infima species where the activity will terminate in definition (horismos; see the definition of horismos in Top. 1, 102b). In Top. v.1, 143a–145b there are elaborate rules for the choice of diaphoria in diaphoria.

4. As for the ontological aspects of the problem, in the Metaphysics Aristotle moves the discussion into the categories of matter and form. Genus stands to diaphora as sensible matter to form, and so may be characterized as “intelligible matter” (hyle noetos; the characterization is not particularly felicitous since he uses the expression in another sense as well; see hyle, epaphoria), while all the diaphori are resumed in the final one, that of the atomon eidos or infima species, and serves as its essence (ousia) (Meta. 1038a, 1045a).

diathesis: disposition

See hesis.

dike: compensation, legal proceedings, justice

1. As is the case with most Greek ethical terms, dike had a fairly complex history before its incorporation into the problematic of philosophy. From the time of Homer dike had been bound into it the transgression of certain limits, probably those dictated, in the first instance, by the class structure of society, and the payment of a compensation for this transgression. With the decline of an aristocratic class consciousness dike began to be seen as something pervasive in the society, applicable to all citizens alike, and guaranteed by Zeus himself. The limits within which the new dike was operative were now defined by written law (nomos, q.v.), and a new abstract term dikaiosyne, “righteousness,” “justice,” came into use to describe the moral quality of the man who observed the limits of the law and was thus “just” (dikeos).

2. The first usage of dike in a philosophical context occurs in the only extant fragment of Anaximander (Diels 1234) where the elements (stoeicheia), which are naturally opposed forces (see eantia), are required to make reparation (dike) to each other for their mutual transgression in the process of genesis-phthora. The limits that are violated here are not those of a human society but the order implicit in the world seen as a kosmos (q.v.), this in an era before the operation of the physical world was made discontinuous with that of human life. One notes a correction in Heraclitus (fr. 80): the strife between the elements is not, as Anaximander would have it, a species of injustice that demands compensation, but the normal order of things, the tension of opposites that is the reality of existence.

3. Although the fragments of Democritus betray a certain interest in ethical behavior in general and justice in particular (see frs. 45, 174), this is the ethical concern of a philosopher rather than an attempt to construct a philosophical ethic. The impetus for such an attempt lay in the Sophists’ attacks on the bases of conduct on the grounds that they were tied to a relative, arbitrary law (see nomos). Thus was the notion of dike drawn into the controversy surrounding nomos vs. physis, and issues in a series of Sophistic positions that described justice as consisting solely in obedience to the arbitrary laws of the state, laws that were, in turn, the instruments whereby the powerful in the society sought to preserve their position: thus Archelaus (Diels 60A1), Antiphon (Diels 87b44), and the attitudes embraced by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias (e.g. 483a–484a) and Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic (e.g. 338c).

4. The Socratic reply to these positions may, of course, be viewed merely as a refinement of his general thrust of the virtues (specifically including dikaiosyne; see Aristotle, Eth. Eud. 1, 1215b) into the realm of permanent, cognitively grasped definitions (see arete); but there is besides the impassioned defense of justice and law as an inviolable social contract in the Crito. Plato’s own answer to Socrates’ antagonists is to be found in Republic II–X, and is embodied in an investigation of justice as it exists on the larger scale of the polis (Rep. 369a), whence it emerges as a kind of cooperative disposition to do one’s own work (see 433b, 446b).

5. This does not respond to Callicles’ contention that the unjust always seem to have a better time of it; the wicked do, indeed, prosper. Plato has no great assurances to give about the fate of the just in this life—though he is sure the gods will not neglect them (Rep. 613a–b;
compare Laws x, 899e-90b) — but it is in the future life that justice receives its ultimate reward, as depicted in glowing terms in the "Myth of Er" in Republic x.

6. Aristotle's major treatment of justice occurs in Eth. Nich. v where it is divided into a) "distributive," i.e., dealing with the division of goods, honors, etc. among those who participate in a political system, and b) "corrective," i.e., regulatory of the inequities in either transactions or crimes (1130b-1131a). In both instances justice is a kind of proportion (analogia), and thus too can be assimilated to the doctrine of the "mean" (see meson). Aristotle is firm in his rejection of the Sophists' contention that what is just is merely a matter of convention; there are at least some activities that are just by nature (1134b). Finally (1137a-b) he introduces the notion of the equitable or the decent (epieikeia) that tempers the legal demands of justice, "what the lawgiver would have said if he were there" (compare Plato, Polit. 294a-295c).

7. For the Stoics dikaiosyne is one of the four cardinal virtues (SVF 1, 190), defined by Chrysippus as "the science of distributing what is proper to each" (SVF 111, 262), and based on nature, not convention (D.L. vii, 128). Carneades the Sceptic returned, however, to the Sophists' contention that law is a convention set up by men on strictly utilitarian grounds, a position that he can illustrate by the conflicting counsels of prudence and justice (Cicero, De republica iii, 11, 18-19; Lactantius, Inst. v, 16, 3-6). See arete, nomos.

dōxa: 1] opinion, 2] judgment

1. Opinion: the distinction between true knowledge (episteme, q.v.) and an inferior grade of cognition goes back as far as Xenophanes (fr. 34), but the classic pre-Socratic exposition of knowledge is to be found in Parmenides' poem (fr. 8, lines 50-61) where sensation (aisthesis) is relegated to the position of "seeming" or "opinion" (dōxa). The distinction is based on the ontological status of the object of sense perception (aistheta) that, because of their exclusion from the realm of true being (ontic), cannot be the objects of true knowledge.

2. The distinction is incorporated, on the same grounds, into Platonic epistemology, though by now the position had been buttressed by the insistent Sophists' attacks on aisthēsis as relative (see Plato, Theaet. 166d-167a, citing Protagoras). In Rep. 476e-480a Plato sets Parmenides' distinction as a series of epistemological and ontological correlatives: true knowledge is of true reality, i.e., the eidē, while ignorance is of the completely nonreal. Between the two there is an intermediate stage: a quasi-knowledge of quasi-being. This intermediate faculty (dynamis) is dōxa and its objects are sensible things (aisthēta) and the commonly held opinions of mankind. The results are later schematized in the Diagram of the Line (Rep. 509d-511c) where the realm of dōxa is further refined by being divided into belief (pistis, q.v.) whose objects are the sensibles, and "knowledge of appearances" (eikasia, q.v.), a category of cognition introduced by Plato's view of the nature of productive activity (see techne, mimēsis).

3. The dichotomy between episteme and dōxa remains fundamental to Plato, even though he betrays a growing interest in the sensible world (see aisthēton, episteme.)

4. Judgment: Plato's view of dōxa, founded as it is on the separation of the eidē from sensible things, finds no support in the Aristotelian view of reality, but there is another context within which the problematic of dōxa may be treated. The question of truth and error arises particularly in the realm of judgment, a problem that also has its origins in the Parmenidean premises about being (on, q.v.): since only being can be thought or named, how is it possible to make a false judgment, that is, a definition about nonbeing (fr. 3; fr. 8, lines 34)? In Soph. 263c-264b Plato shows that, just as there is false assertion or discourse (logos), so too there is false judgment (dōxa) that is the externalization of this discourse. The possibilities of false judgment are discussed in Theaet. 181c-182d, but since the true position waits upon the solution of the problem of nonbeing (see on, hétéron), the final analysis is not put forth until Soph. 283b-284d: error (pseudos) is a judgment (dōxa) that does not correspond to reality, either to the "reality" of the sensible situation, or to the true reality of the eidos in which the sensible participates.

5. Aristotle's treatment of episteme and dōxa moves into another area. Knowledge is either immediate (see nous) or discursive (dianoia, q.v.). The latter may be described as episteme if it proceeds from premises that are necessary, dōxa if the premises are contingent (Anal. post. 1, 88b-89b), i.e., if they could be otherwise, and indeed Aristotle defines dōxa as "that which could be otherwise" in Met. 1039b.

6. When discussing the types of syllogisms in Top. 1, 100a-b Aristotle approaches the contingency of dōxa from a somewhat different angle. A demonstrative syllogism (apodeixis, q.v.) rests upon premises that are true and primary. It thus differs from a dialectical syllogism (dialektike, q.v.) whose premises are based on en doxa, which are now defined as opinions that are accepted by the majority or the wise. For the implications of this for Aristotle's method, see en doxon.

7. The Epicurean view of dōxa shares both Platonic and Aristotelian traits. It is opinion, a certain spontaneous movement in us that is akin to but distinct from sensation (aisthēsis, q.v.). For Epicurus all
dyas: dyad, pair

According to one account of Pythagoreanism preserved in a late author (D.L. vili, 29), the Dyad was derived from the Monad (monas); but on the basis of the “Table of Contraries” in Meta. 98a, the Monas and Dyas would seem to rank as co-principles, and if the Monas is associated with the Good (agathos) (Aetius, 7, 18); see Eth. Nich. 109b), so the Dyas is ranked with kham (ibid. 110b, 29).

Aristotle makes various attempts to identify a material principle in Plato (see hyle): in Meta. 98b and 98a it is the dyas, and finally, in 101a and 109b, the indefinite dyas (aristos dyas). Plato may himself have used the expression, but not in the dialogues; perhaps in his lecture “On the Good” (see Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Meta. 55; Simplicius, In Phys. 453-455, and agropha dogmata). From Phil. 29c-29d we know that Plato used the apeiron as an archet, and Aristotle conjectures in Phys. III, 29b that the reason why the “indeterminates” is twofold is that it is a spectrum unlimited in either direction. Plato’s own successor, Speusippus, identified it with plurality (Aristotle, Meta. 1087b); see arithmos.

dynamis: active and passive capacity, hence 1] power and 2] potentiality

1. The “powers” make their first appearance with Anaximander, not, as later, as qualities of things, but as the things themselves; opposites (see enantia) that are separated off from the apeiron: the hot and the cold (Diels, fr. 11410) and have almost the status of elements. With Anaximenes (Diels, frs. 1345, 97, 141) the distinction between substances (earth, fire, water) and their qualities (“powers”), hot and cold has begun. Empedocles’ theory of elements (see stoeicheion) shifted attention to the substances away from the dynamic qualities, but with Anaxagoras the primary role is once again given to the opposed powers (frs. 8, 12, 13, 14). The Atomists stand in another tradition: the Pythagorean number theory had, in effect, reduced qualitative differences to quantitative ones (see arithmos), and Democritus follows them in reducing the perceptible qualities to contact (haptik) with geometrical shapes (Diels, fr. A135; cf. pathos); they are no longer dynamic but merely conventional (monas), ibid. 2b.

2. Plato is aware of the dynamis both as a medical term (Phaed. 370c-d, and see etia) and in their relationship with the elements (Tim. 31a), and these powers, also called pathos, exist in the Receptacle (hypepdechomene) before Nous begins its work. But once the primary bodies have been formed, these powers disappear and the sensible qualities are reduced, in true Atomist fashion, to the geometrical shapes of the elementary particles (ibid. 60a-68d; see genesis).

3. In Aristotle the powers (generally called poiès or pathos) once again are central. Empedocles’ stoeicheia were irreducible, and Plato’s reducible back to the geometric figures (Tim. 53c-56c); both of these Aristotle opposed his own theory of the composition of the stoeicheia from (a) underlying matter and (b) the presence of one of each set of the powers: hot-cold, dry-moist (De gen. et corr. 394a-395a). Thus change or reduction of one element into another consists of the passage of one opposite to another in the substratum (see hypokeimenon, genesis).

4. All of these usages pertain to dynamis as a “power,” but in the Metaphysics Aristotle develops another sense of dynamis, i.e., potentiality, and he distinguishes the two in Meta. 1045b-1046a; potentiality cannot be defined, but only illustrated (ibid. 1048a-b), e.g. the waker is potentially the sleeper; the passage from potency to actuality (energeia) is either through art or by an innate principle (ibid. 1049a); energia is logically and ontologically prior to dynamis (ibid. 1049b-1050a), hence the necessity of a first mover (see kinein) always in a state of energia (ibid. 1050b).

5. The Stoic doctrine of the “powers” pushed Aristotle’s theory of the elements one step further; each stoeicheion had one power instead of one each of the opposed sets: fire had heat, air had cold (these were the active [poiein] qualities); earth had the dry and water the moist (passive [pathein] qualities; see SVF II, 580), and the stress on fire in the system (see pyr) is clearly a function of its being the most active power. Indeed, the Stoics reduced all of reality to two basic archai: the active (poiein) and the passive (pathein, q.v.; cf. D.L. viii, 133).

6. We see, then, that for the Milesians and their successors dynamis was an active force in things, first thought of as a separate natural entity but then refined, from Plato on, into the notion of an active quality (poiein, q.v.). In post-Aristotelian philosophy, however, the name is frequently applied to the great number of intermediarv movers or intelligences associated with the plants of the aither or the daimeon who inhabit the air (see nous 17), and identified by Philo as angels (cf. De sigvnt., 6-6).

7. But there were other factors at work in the Phibonian notion of dynamis. In Scripture God is said to have “powers,” translated by the Septuagint as dynamis, and these Philo identifies with the Platonic idea (De spec. leg. 46-46; for the distinction between eidos and idea, see nozton 2). Thus they assume the role of the transcendent noeta in the mind of God and, as the immanent eidos, become a creative force in
the universe. In Philo it is the latter that give order to the universe while they, in turn, are controlled by the transcendent God (De fuga 101). The same treatment can be seen in Plotinus. The noetata that exist in a unified form in the cosmic nous (see noeton 5) are described as a universal dynamis with boundless capacity (Enn. v, 8, 9). But each of these is potentially (and in the sequel will be actually) a separate eidos and so an individual dynamis (v, 9, 5) that will later be operative in both the noetic and sensible world (iv, 4, 36).

3. But the noetic and sensible world descends, according to the Neoplatonic vision of the universe, in a uniform causal series from a single source (see proodos) and is linked together by a cosmic sympatheia (q.v.). A corollary of this, and a characteristically symmetrical touch, is that all the entities in the series, noeta and astheia, are also subject to the thrust of return (epistrophē, q.v.) to their source. Epistrophē was hardly a novel concept. It is implicit in the Pythagorean view of the soul as a divine part that tries to restore its true harmony (harmonia, q.v.). It may be seen, as well, in the related Platonic notions of katharsis, eros, diatektikē (q.q.), and the call to "assimilation to God" (see homoiōsis). But here as elsewhere, including Plotinus, the return, in whatever form, is a function of the conscious soul and particularly its intellectual faculty. After Plotinus, however, it is extended to the entire range of creation (see Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 39).

9. There were, to be sure, some precedents for this. Plato had allowed to plants a certain choice of the good life (Phil. 22b); Aristotle's physis (q.v.) works toward a telos, and he had spoken, moreover, of genesis in the sensible world as an imitation of the activity of the divine nous (see Meta. 1050b and kainon 9). But these were not the immediate progenitors of Proclus' symmetrical epistrophē; they are rather to be sought in the later development of the notion of dynamis. The Stoics had already developed a theory of logos spermatikos (q.v.) that, somewhat like the Aristotelian physis, governed the growth and development of things. But here the stress is on the rational (logos) element; from the time of Poseidonius this yields to the more dynamic concept of a vital force (zōikē dynamis; see sympatheia 9) in all beings that are linked together by the affinities of sympatheia. This was systematized into a vast body of knowledge, the study of the innate affinities and antipathies of natural objects. This is the "physics" of late antiquity, associated with the name of Bolus of Mendes.

10. These sympathetic dynamais are not, at this point, magical, but they soon become so under other influences. The religious view of late antiquity, perhaps influenced by the earlier demands that the gods act in such a way that they preserve their transcendent immobility (see nous 2), was that the gods no longer worked in person but through their dynamais in things. These dynamais could be and were personified; Philo's usage has already been noted (6 supra) and the philosophers found it a convenient way to reconcile the multiple gods of mythology with their own monotheism (see the fragments of Porphyry's On the Images of the Gods: Macrobius, Saturnalia 1, 17–23; Proclus, Theod. Plat. v–vii; it also gave them ample scope to display their by then highly developed powers of etymologizing: see enomai 7). It is this religious point of view that is given its classic theoretical justification in props. 144–145 of Proclus' Elem. theol., where he affirms that the distinctive characteristic of the divine powers (theiai dynamais) radiates downward in the casual sequence and is found on all levels of reality.

11. This view of the dynamais in things goes far beyond the Bolean physics that attempted to discover and use, largely for therapeutic purposes, the occult sympathy between natural objects; here we have the theoretical ground for the magical art of theurgia (see mantiaka 4–5) that seeks to manipulate the gods through their occult "tokens" (symbola) in natural objects and that, since Iamblichus, was a standard part of the Neoplatonic repertory (see De myst. v, 23; Proclus, In Tim. I, 139, 120).

For related questions in the history of dynamis, see genesis, pathos, poiein, stoicheion; for its Aristotelian correlative, energeia.

échein: 1] to have, 2] to be in a certain state; see hexis

"Possession" is one of Aristotle's kategorai. It appears as such in Cat. 1b–2a, but is omitted in other listings, e.g. Anal. post. 1, 8b. "To be in a certain state" (pos echein) is one of four Stoic categories (SVF II, 369); it is discussed by Plotinus (Enn. v, 1, 25), who also uses this Stoic term in discussing psyche (Enn. iv, 7, 4) and hyle (ibid. II, 4, 1).

cidolon: image

In the Atomists' theory of visual perception (aisthēsis, q.v.) images of the same shape as the body are given off by the perceived object and enter the pores of the viewer (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De sensu gē, 22; Plutarch, Symp. viii, 735a). In Epicureanism these enter
Eidos: appearance, constitutive nature, form, type, species, idca

1. *Eidos* was a well-established and fairly sophisticated term long before its canonization by Plato. Its first meaning, and the usage is current in Homer, is “what one sees,” “appearance,” “shape,” normally of the body, and pre-Socratic philosophy continued to use it in this sense (see Empedocles, frs. 13, 135, and Democritus, cited in Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1110). By the time of Herodotus *eidos*, and its cognate *idea* had had some use, been broadened and abstracted into “characteristic property” (1, 203) or “type” (1, 94). Thucydides’ use is similar (see 11, 81), and in one instance (11, 50) he speaks of “the *eidos* of the disease,” an expression that leads into the development of the term in contemporary medical circles. Here *eidos*/*idea* had apparently been isolated as a technical term, frequently linked to the notion of power (*dynamis*, q.v.), and meaning something approximaitely like “constitutive nature” (see Hippocrates, *V.M.* 15, 19; *Nat. hom.* 2, 51; *De arte* 2).

2. Whatever the exact interpretation of the latter texts, it does seem clear that there was an approach to the form of things that was not necessarily tied to its outward appearance (though its connection with *dynamis* suggests that its identification rested upon an awareness of its visible effects), but rather to some kind of inner intelligibility (*(De arte* 2) significantly connects *eidos* with the imposition of names; see *Onoma*).

3. Was there a parallel development among the philosophers? Both Plato and Aristotle seem to suggest that there was. Plato, in a rare glance at the history of philosophy (see *eidos*), says that discussions on the nature of reality have polarized into factions, which he calls the Giants and the Gods. The first are materialists (*Soph.* 246a–248a; compare the somewhat different but parallel attitudes in *Phaedo* 168a–d and *Laws* 8, 898a–890a) and Plato is probably referring to the Atomist tradition. The Gods, on the other hand, are described as “friends of the *eidos*” (*ibid.* 248a–249d) and they hold a theory of suprasensible reality that is indistinguishable from Plato’s. They are not the Eleatics since they believe in a plurality of such entities (see *Parm.* 130–134).

4. Their identity has been sought in a passage in Aristotle where we are told (*Meta.* 987b–e) that Plato followed the Pythagoreans in many respects, attributing to Plato only verbal differences from the Pythagoreans and some refinements introduced under the influence of the Heraclitean Cratylus and of Socrates himself.

5. Were the Pythagoreans the originators of the *eidos* theory? There have been those who thought so, arguing, *inter alia*, from the strongly Pythagorean environment of the *Phaedo* where the theory is propounded by Plato for the first time. But there is little to support this from the strictly Pythagorean evidence and the statement is an isolated one in Aristotle, added, perhaps, when he came to the conclusion that Plato had identified the *eidos* with number (*arithmos*, q.v.).

6. The origin of the theory must be sought closer to home. Socrates had been interested in defining ethical qualities (see *Meta.* 987b), probably as a reaction against Sophist relativism (see *Nomos*), and there is reason to believe that the Platonic *eidos* were hypostatized versions of just such definitions (*logos*; see *Phaedo* 99e, *Meta.* 987b, and compare the connection with predication, *infra*). Indeed, in the “Socratic dialogues” one can see Socrates himself moving in just such a direction (see *Lysis* 210a, *Euthyphro* 5d, 6c; the *Euthyphro* passages actually use *eidos*, but the meaning is still close to “appearance”; in *Meno* 73c–e the usage has already become more abstract). But, on the testimony of Aristotle, Socrates “did not separate the universal definition” (*Meta.* 1075b), i.e., it had no transcendent, subsistent (*chorismen*, q.v.) existence.

7. For Plato the *eidos* did exist separately (see *Tim.* 52a–e) and the reasons may be sought: in epistemological considerations as well as in the ethical ones that troubled Socrates and that were almost certainly operative upon Plato as well. We have already noted the suggested influence of Heraclitus on Plato (see *Meta.* 987a, 1075b) to the effect that, given the changing, fluctuating nature of sensible phenomena (see *rhoe*), true knowledge (*episteme*) is impossible, impossible, that is, unless there is a stable, eternal reality beyond the merely sensible. The *eidos* are that suprasensible reality and so the cause of *episteme* and the condition of all philosophical discourse (*Phaedo* 63c–e, *Parm.* 135b–e, *Rep.* 508c ff.). For the further epistemological corollaries, see *daimon*, *episteme*, *noesis*.

8. Though the *eidos* are the centerpiece of Platonic metaphysics, nowhere does Plato undertake a proof for their existence; they first appear as a hypothesis (see *Phaedo* 205b–209d) and remain so, even though subjected to a scathing criticism (*Parm.* 130–134). They are
known, in a variety of methods, by the faculty of reason (nous; Rep. 530b-b, Tim. 51d). One such early method is that of recollection (anamnesis, q.v.), where the individual soul recalls the eidos with which it was in contact before birth (Mem. 80b-85b, Phaedo 72c-77d; see palingenesis). Without the attendant religious connotations is the purely philosophical method of dialetikē (q.v.; see Rep. 531d-535b; for its difference from mathematical reasoning, ibid. 510b-511a; from eristic, Ph tł. 150d-160a). As it is first described the method has to do with the progress from a hypothesis back to an unhypothetized arche (Phaedo 100a, 101d; Rep. 511b), but in the later dialogues dialetikē appears as a fully articulated methodology comprising “collection” (synagōgē, q.v.) followed by a “division” (diareitēs, q.v.) that moves via the diaphoria, from a more comprehensive Form down to the atomon eidos. Finally, one may approach the eidos through erva (q.v.), the desiderative parallel to the earlier form of dialectic (see epistrophe).

9. The relationship between the indivisible, eternal eidos and transient, sensible phenomena (aisthēta) is described in a number of different ways. The eidos are the cause (aitia) of the aisthēta (Phaedo 100b-101c), and the latter are said to participate (methēxis, q.v.) in the eidos. In an elaborate metaphor, pervasive in Plato, the aisthēton is said to be a copy (eikon, q.v.) of its eternal model (paradeigma), the eidos. This act of artistic creation (mimesis, q.v.) is the work of a supreme craftsman (demiourgos, q.v.).

10. There is little question of the transcendence of the eidos (cf. Tim. 51b-52b), but Plato’s use of methēxis suggests a degree of immanence as well (Phaedo 103b-104a, Tim. 50c; and see genesis), and this is the point of much of the criticism in the Parmenides (see 130a-132b) and in expanded passages in the Metaphysics. Where, then, is one to locate the eidos? Here analogy comes into play. Just as the aisthēta are contained in some sort of organic unity that is the kosmos, so the eidos exist in some “intelligible place” (topos noetos, Rep. 506c, 517b; the expression kosmos noetos, q.v., does not occur until later Platonism) located “beyond the heavens” (Phaedrus 247c). The image becomes sharper in Tim. 50c-d where the eidos are organized within the “intelligible living being” (zoon noetos). See also erva.

11. At first glance there appears to be a Platonic eidos for each class of things. Thus there are ethical eidos (Parm. 130b, Phaedrus 250d), mathematical eidos (Phaedo 101b-c; see arithmos eidetikon), eidos of natural objects (Tim. 51b, Soph. 266b; compare Meta. 1070a), even trivial ones (Parm. 130c). What is perhaps more surprising is to find eidos for artificial objects (Rep. 508b-510d, Soph. 266b, Ep. vii, 343d; compare Meta. 991b), relations (Phaedo 74a-77a, Rep. 479b, Parm. 133c), and negatives (Rep. 476a, Theaet. 158a, Soph. 257c). Behind all of this stands the presumption of methēxis: since the sensible participate in the eidos they must be named univocally (homonomos) with them (Parm. 133d, Soph. 254b; see D.L. ii. 11, 13), and so the modes of predication may be taken as criteria for the existence of the various eidos. Are then, the eidos merely ideas or concepts? The question is actually raised in the dialogues, only to be denied (see Parm. 132b-c, 134a).

12. At various points in the dialogues Plato seems to grant a preeminence to one or other of the eidos. Thus, both the Good (Rep. 501e-503b) and the Beautiful (Sympos. 210a-212b) are thrown into relief, to say nothing of the noetic hypotheses of the One in the Parmenides (137c-142a; see hen, hyperseuma). But the problem of the interrelationship, or, as Plato calls it, “combination” or “communion” (koinonía), and, by implication, of the subordination of the eidos is not taken up formally until the Sophist. It is agreed, again on the basis of predication, that some eidos will blend with others and some will not, and that it is the task of dialectic to discern the various groupings, particularly through the diacritic method known as diareitēs (q.v.; Soph. 253b-e).

13. To illustrate the process Plato chooses (ibid. 254b-255c) five eidos—Existence (on, q.v.), the Same, the Different (heteron, q.v.), Motion (kinesis, q.v.), and Rest, which he calls (254d) “greatest kinds” (megista genē). Both words in this expression are open to differing interpretations. A reading of megista as a true superlative, “the greatest,” and of gene as “genera” or “classes” leads to the discovery of Platonic summa genera, the equivalent of Aristotle’s categorial. The passage was so read by Plotinus (see Enn. vi, 1-3) who speaks of the gene of being. But there is grave doubt as to whether gene should be read as genera in the Aristotelian sense; Plato’s usage is frequently to employ genos as a synonym for eidos, and so the expression in question may mean nothing more than “some very important eidos.”

For some other aspects of the Platonic eidos, see arithmos, mathematika, metauxis, nomos, dyas.

14. In his Metaphysics Aristotle subjects the eidos-theory to a lengthy critical analysis (see 987a-988a, 990a-992a, 1078b-1080a; compare the contemporary Aristotelian dialogue, De phil. frs. 8, 9). Assessments of the validity of this critique hinge on two essential and obscure points: the distinction between Plato and his successors on the subject of the mathematika (q.v.), and the existence and Aristotle’s use of sources unavailable to us (see agrapha dogmata).

15. The chief difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian view of the eidos is that for the latter the eidos is not (except in the cases of the first mover and/or movers, and that of the nous “that comes from outside”; see kinesis, nous) a separate subsistent (choriston,
Eidos

q.v.), but a principle of complete substances. It is the formal cause of things (Phys. ii. 194b), a correlate of matter in composite beings (ibid. i. 190b), and the intelligible essence (ousia) of an existent (Meta. 1013a, De gen. et corr. ii. 335b; see ousia). In knowing things we know their eidos (Meta. 1010a), i.e., the appropriate faculty (nous or aisthesis) becomes the thing it knows by reason of the eidos of the known object entering the soul (De an. iii. 431b-432a). Eidos is, in brief, an actualization (energeia, entelecheia, q.v.; Meta. 1050b, De an. ii. 412a).

16. As in Plato, Aristotle's eidos, considered from a logical point of view, has an intimate connection with predication. The conceptual eidos is the universal of predication and the subject of definition (Meta. 1053a, 1053b). But they differ from the Platonist version of the eidos not only by reason of the fact that they are not hypostatized into substances, but also because they are "classified," i.e., they range up from the atomon eidos, which cannot be broken down into narrower species but only into individuals (and this "division" of the infima species is a function of its connection with matter not by reason of the presence of a diaphora [q.v.]; see hyle), through ever wider eidoi, called gene, up to the summa genera, the kategorias (q.v.); on the eidos as universal, see katholou.

17. The eidos continued to be important in later philosophy. The Aristotelian eidos that are immanent in matter and direct the entire teleological structure of the individual existents were incorporated into Stoicism as the logos spermatikos (q.v.). The Platonic transcendental version of the eidos seems to have given way under the Aristotelian critique, but they reappear in the Platonic tradition with Antiochus of Ascalon (Cicero, Acad. post. 8, 32-33). But it was a perilous time for orthodoxy and very quickly the eidos are being construed as the thoughts of God (Philo, De opif. 4, 17-20; Albinus, Epit. 9, 1-2). Even though Plato had denied a purely noetic status to his eidos (see supra 31), the notion may have found some support in the Academy (see Aristotle, De an. iii. 429a). But it was doubtless Aristotle's designation of God as nous (q.v.) that was the mediating factor here, encouraged, to be sure, by the entire Platonic mimesis metaphor with its very strong suggestion that what Aristotle called a formal cause exists first as a paradigm in the mind of the craftsman before becoming immanent in things. Thus by positing the eidos as the thoughts of God, a position that continues down through Plotinus (see Enn. v. i, 4) into Christianity, and at the same time keeping the Aristotelian eidos as immanent formal causes with an orientation toward matter (see Philo, De opif. 44, 129-130), an at least partial solution to the dilemma of immanence vs. transcendence was reached. But the problem continued as a serious one in Platonism, discussed at length by both Plotinus (Enn. vi. 4) and Proclus (Elem. theol., prep. 93); see noeston a.

For the epistemological difficulties arising from transcendence, see agnostos; for the hierarchization of the eidos in later Platonism, hypostasis; for the eidos of individuals, hyle; for the location of the eidos in both their transcendent and immanent manifestations, nous; noeston.

eikos: image, reflection

Eikasia, the state of perceiving mere images and reflections, is the lowest segment of the Platonic Line (Rep. 509e). The eikòn has a qualified type of existence (Tim. 30c) and a not very complimentary role in Plato's theory of art (Rep. 533e-559a; see techne, mimesis). The visible universe is the eikon of the intelligible one that embraces the eidos (Tim. 30a-c; see kosmos noetos), and time is an image of eternity (see chronos). In Plotinus soul is an image of nous (Enn. v. 1, 3), the created world is an image of its Father (Enn. v. 8, 12), and matter (hyle) an image of being (on) (Enn. i, 8, 3), etc.; see kosmos, mimesis, doxa.

ekei: there, wonder

The next life, so Plato, Phaedo 61e, 64a; the intelligible world, the kosmos noetos, Plotinus, Enn. ii. 9, 4; ii. 4, 5.

eklampsia: shining forth; emanation, radiation

In Plotinus the metaphorical explanation of the creation process (see Enn. v. i. 6, iv. 3, 9, etc.) that flows from the One without diminution. It is a more specific metaphorical expression for the concept that finds its most general statement in procession (proèdos, q.v.).

ekpyrosis: conflagration

According to late authorities Heraclitus held a theory of periodic destruction of the world by fire (D.L. 1x, 3). It was part of early Stoic doctrine (SVF 1: 98), but was dropped by Panactius (Philo, De cet. 76), who maintained the eternity of the kosmos; see aphthartos, genesis.

ékstasis: standing out from, ecstasy, mystical union

Seek agnostos.

élenchos: scrutiny, refutation, interrogation

See aporia, katharsis, epagoge.

enantia: opposites

1. The doctrine of the original existence of opposed natural substances first appears in Anaximander (Aristotle, Phys. 187a). Four are later isolated by Heraclitus (fr. 126), and posited as the four irreducible elements by Empedocles (fr. 17; see stoicheion). Opposition, as a
general force, plays a considerable role in both Pythagoras and Heraclitus. There is a list of ten sets of Pythagorean opposites in Meta. 99a that Aristotle identified with the elements (stoicheia). In Heraclitus the function of the opposites is both more explicit and more obscure; there is an essential unity (logos) of opposites, a unity that is not obvious, but that maintains the unity-plurality in the opposites (cf. frs. 1, 10, 54, 60, 88). Parmenides' theory of sensation is based on the excess of one of a set of opposites (Diels, fr. 234.46).

2. In the early Phaedo (70c) the passage from one opposite to another is the coping stone of Plato's theory of genesis, as it is to be for Aristotle (Phys. 188a-189b; see genesis). That these are qualities (poikiletes) and not substances (Forms) even for Plato is clear from Phaedo 102b-103b. Aristotle reduces the basic enanias involved in genesis among the elements to hot and cold, dry and moist (De gen. et corr. 11, 329b-330a); see poion, dynamis, genesis, logos, dike.

energeia: clarity, self-evidence

Epicurean sensualism reduced all knowledge and all truth back to sensation (aisthesia) since what are described as the three criteria of truth, aisthesis, prolepsis, andpathos, are either one form or other of sensation itself (see pathos) or the result of repeated sensations (see prolepsis). Thus Epicurus finds himself in much the same position as Aristotle when the latter comes to speak of the primary premises (archai) of a syllogism. Since there is nothing more basic than the archai of a syllogism, how is their validity to be established without recourse to circular argument? And just as Aristotle resorts to an intuitive grasp of the archai (see epigege, nous), so Epicurus has aisthesis serve as the guarantor of its own validity, and this by reason of its clear and self-evident nature (energeia; see D.L. x, 38, 48, 52; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 216), a quality that is also present in prolepsis (D.L. x, 33).

For the extension of judgment beyond the clear evidence of the senses and the consequent possibility of error, see doxa.

endoxon: opinion, general opinion

1. In the Anal. post. Aristotle sets forth in some detail a method of scientific procedure that he designates “demonstration” (apodeixis) and that can be described as the progress, via the syllogistic route, from known premises to new, true, and valid conclusions. As theory it is admirable, but as method it is given the lie in most of the Aristotelian corpus, where the actual procedure followed is more often apopemon (see aporia and the schematic passage in Meta. 99a-b).

2. This latter course, which sees philosophy as starting from problems that demand solution, is thoroughly Socratic, as is the consequent soliciting of opinions that are then dialectically worked toward a solution. What the historical Socrates did in conversation and Plato refined into the literary form of dialogue, Aristotle analyzed into method: “A syllogism is demonstrative (apodeixis) when it proceeds from premises that are true and primary . . . ; it is dialectical when it reasons from endoxa . . . Endoxa are propositions that seem true to all or to the majority or to the wise” (Top. 1, 100a-b).

3. It is this procedure, termed dialectical (dialeitika, q.v.), that is frequently invoked by Aristotle in the course of his philosophizing, stripped, to be sure, of its ideal syllogistic rigors.

4. The definition of endoxa in the above cited text suggests that opinions have both a quantitative and qualitative basis. The first seems Socratic, i.e., canvassing what may be termed the “common-sense” view, and this approach is followed at various points in the ethical treatises (see Eth. Nich. vii, 1145b), as well as at the very opening of the Meta. (99a). In this latter text Aristotle is seeking the nature of sophia and the procedure he adopts is to start from commonly held views of what a wise man is. And he can take this tack because of a presumption that is left unspoken in Plato: the intuitive and progressive nature of philosophy where the truth is not the preserve of any one man but the result of a continuous and cumulative investigation (Meta. 99a-b).

5. But the definition of endoxa in the Topics opens the possibility of an appeal to qualitative opinion, to the “professional” rather than the “common-sense” view, to “what seems true to the sophoi.” Thus begins the history of philosophy, cast not in the role of an independent historical discipline, but as part of the method of philosophy, the major premise, so to speak, in a dialectical syllogism. In Aristotle considerations of the opinions of his philosophical predecessors are always woven into his own investigations. The first to effect a physical separation of the historical material was Aristotle's own student Theophrastus whose Opinions of the Natural Philosophers was a free-standing work and the ancestor of all the succeeding doxographical collections (see Theophrastus' parallel detachment of the character sketches from their ethical context in his Characters).

6. The historical approach to philosophy is not completely unknown to Plato; he gives at least one review of the course of pre-Socratic speculation (Soph. 242b-243b; see eidos), and some of the central dialogues engage in dialectical discourse not with some representative of the common opinio, but with dramatic recreations of an earlier generation of philosopher-sophists (e.g. Parmenides, Protagoras, Gorgias). The difference in Aristotle's attitude is expressed in the previously cited text of the Meta. (99a-b): philosophy is cumulative, evolutionary, progressive. Plato's delineations may be historical
but there is no evidence of a concept of philosophy as part of man's social history; indeed, the implications of the anamnesis (q.v.) theory is that each man must emerge from the Cave; mankind makes no progress in this regard.

7. Aristotle's historical perspectives appear early; the fragments (e.g., 3, 6, 7) of Book 1 of the early dialogue On Philosophy show Aristotle pursuing the evolution of sophia in a context even wider than that of the Metaphysics. Here he has before him a historical panorama that embraces not only the Greek sages of the past but a wider purview that takes into account not only the religio-mythical quest for truth (see mythos, aporia), but the wisdom of the East as well; in short, a tradition that begins with the Egyptians, passes through Zoroaster, and climaxes in Plato.

8. The fragmentary nature of the dialogue does not permit much speculation on the methods employed there, but there is abundant evidence for Aristotle's use of his predecessors in the preserved treatises. Book 1 of the Metaphysics includes a survey (483b-488a) of previous opinions on causality; Physics I has a similar review (184b-185b) on the archai. The De anima presents a history of the speculations on the nature of the soul (403b-412b), and De gen. et corr. on the nature of genesis (3.14a-3.17a). Each of these passages has its own proper thrust. At times, as in the Metaphysics passage, the endoxa provide a confirmation to Aristotle's own theorizing; or, again, as in the De anima, they set out and limit the terms of the problem, the solution of which will begin afresh in Book 11 (see 405b). But in every case the positions of other philosophers are presented from a problematic rather than from a historical point of view and, in addition, are subjected to a critique in greater or lesser detail, again from the problematic point of view. Thus the review in Meta. 1, chaps. 3-5 is followed, in chaps. 5-10, by a criticism of previous speculation.

9. Aristotle's presentation and criticism of the work of his predecessors, and particularly of Plato, has been much criticized (see agrapha dogmata). The problem seems to arise from the fact that while Aristotle had a point of view that enabled him, or even demanded of him, that he incorporate the earlier history of the quest for sophia into his own investigations, it was this strictly procedural approach, which saw history only as aporia (q.v.) or hystas, that prevented him from doing strict justice to the historical reality of his predecessors' work.

10. In the period following Theophrastus two further developments become visible. First, the collection of endoxa that in Aristotle serves to delineate the evolutionary nature of philosophical enquiry is turned to new purposes. The marked strain of scepticism that powerfully shaped the problems and methods of post-Aristotelian thought down to the beginnings of the Christian era found a new use for the doxographical technique, employing it now, in a manner quite the opposite of the Aristotelian usage, to reinforce, on historical grounds, a position of methodical doubt. How can it be, they ask, that we have any guarantee of certitude when the great philosophers of the past were in such contradiction on the basic questions of philosophy? Chapter and verse are cited and the cumulative effect is to persuade the reader that the only reasonable course is a sceptical suspension of judgment (epoché; see Cicero, Acad. pr. 48, 148 and Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1, 36-38). Such is, for instance, the transparent purpose of the doxography in Cicero, Acad. pr. 36, 125-147, borrowed, no doubt, from some former teacher in the sceptical New Academy.

11. The New Academy also plays a part in the historiography of the period. The polemic of the age of Cicero is dominated by a struggle over the orthodoxy of the various schools. Philosophy had already passed into its "classical" stage and the battle for a protective place under the mantles of the past masters was at its height, a battle in which one of the favored techniques was the writing—and rewriting—of the history of philosophy. Again the chief witness are the pages of the Academica of Cicero. Two views emerge, the Sceptic and the Stoic. The first sees the pre-Socrates as a series of proto-Sceptics, the movement coming to a climax in the aporia (q.v.) of Socrates. Plato's dogmatism is more apparent than real and the New Academy from Aratus to Carneades is in the mainstream of Socratism, as were the Cyrenaics (Acad. post. 12, 42-46, 23, 72-74, 76). The Stoic view of history, derived from the Academic Antiochus by Cicero but probably attributable to the Stoic Panaxus, tends to disregard the pre-Socratic and begin the modern philosophical tradition with Socrates whose alleged scepticism was, in any event, nothing more than irony. It then proceeds to syncretize the Old Academy and Peripatetics into a single system differing in name but essentially in agreement (Acad. post. 4, 15-16). The system of Zeno derives from that source and is nothing more than a correction of Platonism (ibid. 9, 25; 12, 43), while the Arcesilian New Academy is really an aberration (Acad. pr. 6, 16). It is in this fashion that Middle Stoicism can locate itself in the Platonic tradition (with visible philosophical effects in Poseidonius; see noesis 17 and psyche 29) and Antiochus effect his "restoration" of the Old Academy by championing Stoic doctrines (see Cicero's apt characterization in Acad. pr. 43, 192).
the additional Aristotelian refinement of privation (ephesis) that answers Parmenides' objections on the subject of non-being. But at the end of this treatment Aristotle refers to another line of approach, which he will develop more fully elsewhere, viz., an analysis based on dynamis and energiā (Phys. 1, 191b).

2. This analysis, explained in the Metaphysics, presents methodological difficulties since neither dynamis nor energiā is susceptible of definition in the ordinary sense, but can only be illustrated by example and analogy (Meta. 1048a). But it is, nonetheless, of prime importance in that it transcends the mere kinetics of the Physics: we are now in the heart of an analysis of being (ibid. 1045b-1048a), an analysis that will enable Aristotle to deal with the transcendent, imperishable entities of the supranatural world and the Prime Mover.

3. The relationship between kinesis and energiā is first explored. We are told that it is movement that first suggests the notion of energiā (ibid. 1047a), but that there remains a difference in that kinesis is essentially incomplete (ateles), i.e., it is a process toward some yet unfinished goal (note that the kinesis of the elements ceases when they have reached their "natural place"; see stoicheia), while energiā is complete; it is not a process but activity (ibid. 1048b).

4. Equally illuminating is Aristotle's derivation of energiā from function (ergon, q.v.). Function is that which a thing is naturally suited to do, i.e., the making or doing for which it has a capacity (dynamis). Thus we have the notion of energeia, the state of being at work, functioning (ibid. 1050a). Quickly Aristotle binds in the related notion of end (telos). Since function is the end, energiā is obviously related to entelecheia (q.v.), being in a state of completion. In this way energiā is described and delimited: it is the functioning of a capacity, its fulfillment and actualization, normally accompanied with pleasure (for the ethical implications of this, see hedone), and prior to potency in definition, time, and substance (ibid. 1049b-1050a).

5. The priority of energiā in substance introduces important new considerations. Dynamis is the capacity of a thing to be other than it is; it does not exist necessarily. This may refer to either its onesis or the various dynamais toward changes of quantity, quality, or place. Thus the eternal movement of the heavenly bodies, being eternal, is pure energiā; it cannot be otherwise even though they may have dynamais for accidental change of place (ibid. 1050b; the eternal cyclic genesis of the elements is a nomos of this; see genesis).

6. At the end of this dialectical process stands the ultimate energiā that in the last resort stands behind and actualizes every dynamis in the universe, the Prime Mover (see kinōn) whose absolutely pure energiā is noēsis: "Life is the energiā of nous; he is that energiā" (ibid. 1072b).

evnoia: concept

According to Stoic epistemology (SVF 11, 83) man is born with his reason like a "papyrus role ready for writing" (the first appearance of the tabula rasa image). Through sensation various images (phantasia) are presented to the reason for its "apprehension" (katalepsis). If these are apprehended and held, they become, in effect, concepts (evnoiai) of the mind. Of these some occur naturally, i.e., without formal instruction, and are termed "preconceptions" (prolepsis, q.v.); others develop through formal education. The evnoiai are mere concepts; they have no external or concrete reality (SVF 1, 65); D.L. vii, 6), but they do serve as an important criterion of truth, or rather one class of them, the "common concepts" (koinai evnoiai, notiones communes), which are identical with the naturally acquired, though not innate, prolepsis (SVF 11, 473). They embrace a certain knowledge of the first principles of morality (SVF 11, 619, 218), of God (ibid. 11, 1009), and of the afterlife (Cicero, Tusc. 1, 13, 31, 31).

For the connection between the concept and its name, see evnoia. On the possibility that the Platonic Form may be only a concept (noēma), see eidos, noēsis; for its role in Stoicism, noēsis 16.

entelecheia: state of completion or perfection, actuality

1. Although Aristotle normally uses entelecheia, which is probably his own coinage, as a synonym for energiā (q.v.), there is a passage (Meta. 1050a) that at least suggests that the two terms, though closely connected, are not perfectly identical. They are related through the notion of ergon (q.v.); ergon is the function of a capacity (dynamis) and so its completion and fulfillment (telos, q.v.). Thus the state of functioning (energiā) "tends toward" the state of completion (entelecheia), especially since Aristotle has already pointed out (ibid. 1046b) that energiā differs from kinesis in that the latter is incomplete (ateles), while the former is not.

2. The most curious use of entelecheia in Aristotle is probably its substitution for eidos in the definition of soul, which thus becomes (De an. 11, 421a): "the first entelecheia of a natural body that potentially has life."

culhousasmos: divine indwelling, possession

See mantike.

epagoge: leading in, leading on, induction (Socratic, Aristotelian; for Platonic "induction," see synagoge)

1. Aristotle, in a passage where he is describing the origin of the theory of Forms, remarks that Socrates was the first to employ "induc-
The materialism of the pre-Socratics did not permit them to distinguish between types of knowledge; even Heraclitus, who insisted that his logos (q.v.) that is hidden, could be grasped only by the intelligence, was, when he came to explain nous (q.v.), a thorough-going materialist: knowledge was sensation of the like-knows-like type (see homatos). Heraclitus certainly held to the permanent order of the universe, surrounded as it was by an obvious process of change, but the succeeding philosophers preferred to emphasize the element of change ("all is in flux"; see rheo), and the consequent worthlessness of sense knowledge (see Plato, Crat. 402a; Aristotle, Phys. viii. 255b). A proponent of this designation of aitia is Cratylus (see Aristotle, Meta. 1010b) who was a formative influence on the young Plato (idem 987a).

Sensationalist perception theories were discredited, and when Socrates describes just such a process in Phaedo 96b, he is not happy with it; but it does suggest that the distinction between doxa and episteme was pre-Socratic. In the Phaedo context the differentiation does not appear to be any more than a distinction between levels of conviction; but the true father of the radical distinction that appears from Plato onward is the one pre-Socratic unconcerned with "saving the phenomena," Parmenides, whose poem sets over against the world of perception and opinion the realm of true being and pure thought (noema, fr. 8, lines 34-36, 50-51). This is also the realm of Plato's eide (q.v.), immutable, everlasting, the ground of true knowledge (episteme). Eidos and episteme are locked together from their first implicit appearance in the Meno (as a corollary of anamnesis, q.v.), through a similar argument in Phaedo 75b-76 that strongly insists that true knowledge (episteme) of the Forms cannot come through the senses and so we must be born with it. The broadest statement of the collocation episteme/eide vs. doxa/aistheta is given in Rep. 476a-480a, and illustrated in the following Diagram of the Line (509d 511e) and the Allegory of the Cave (514a-521b). Sensation (aistheta) reasserts its claim to true knowledge in Theae. 166d; this is rejected as well as the alternative "true judgment accompanied by an account" (logos, q.v.), ibid. 187b, but this too is refined and criticized (ibid. 201c-210c). The answer unfolds in the sequel, the Sophist: the only true knowledge is a knowledge of the eide and its method is dialectic (dialektike, q.v.). Even as late as the Timaeus the distinction between episteme and doxa and their differing objects is stressed (29b-d).
3. Plato's transcendent eido are replaced by Aristotle's immanent variety (see eidos), and the change is accompanied by a shift in the object of episteme. For Aristotle true scientific knowledge is a knowledge of causes (aitia), which are necessarily true (A mus. post. 1, 76b), while opinion (doxa) is about the contingent (symbebebos, ibid. 1, 88b). Episteme is demonstrative, syllogistic knowledge (see apodeixi, ibid. 1, 71b), and sense knowledge is a necessary condition for it (ibid. 1, 81a-b; see epagoge). This is all in a logical context; the causes mentioned above are the premises of a syllogism and the causes of the conclusion. Aristotle takes up episteme in a logical context. Aristotle gives his breakdown of causes of being, and the knowledge of the ultimate causes is the highest type of episteme, wisdom (sophia, q.v.; for episteme as a mental activity, see noesis).

4. In Meta. 1085b-1086a Aristotle gives his breakdown of episteme in the sense of an organized body of rational knowledge with its own proper object; the alignment is as follows:

**Episteme**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>praktike</th>
<th>poietike</th>
<th>theorettike</th>
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<td>(see praxis)</td>
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<th>mathematike</th>
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<td>(see mathematika)</td>
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For another, later division, see philosophia; for the Platonic "division of the sciences," see techne.

5. Aristotle frequently uses episteme alone for episteme theorettike in contrast with practical or productive "science," e.g. Eth. Nic. vi, 119b; see praxis, techne.

epistrophe: return

The "return" of the Platonic tradition is distinct from, but connected with, the epistemological problem of knowing God (for the connection, see Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 39). It differs in that it is a function of desire (arexis). Its ontological ground is the identification of the transcendent One with the Good (Plato, Rep. 506b, Phil. 203d; Plotinus, Enn. v, 5, 13; Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 8) that is necessarily an object of desire, and the identity of the efficient and final cause, the effect, in Middle Platonism, of combining Plato's demiourgos with Aristotle's nous. The dialectic of the epistrophe is the reverse of that of procession (proodos), and is worked out in Proclus, Elem. theol., props. 31-39.

epithymia: desire

The desiderative (epithymetic) is one of the three parts of the soul in Plato's Republic, iv, 434d-441c (a distinction that Aristotle finds unsatisfactory [De an. 452a-b], but that is maintained by Plotinus, Enn. v, 1, 5 and 6). It is perishable and, according to Timaeus 70d-e, is located below the midriff. Aristotle makes epithymia but one of the three operations of the desiderative faculty (see cressis) of the sense-endowed soul (De an. 414b). The object of epithymia is the pleasant (ibid.). Epicurus divides desires into the natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither (D.L. x, 127; Cicero, Tuscul. v, 33, 93). For the Stoics epithymia is one of four chief affections (with pain, pleasure, and fear) (SVF 1, 211); and just as fear is a flight from anticipated evil, desire is an appetite for an anticipated good (SVF 111, 391); see also hedone.

ergon: work, deed, product, function

1. Ergon, the common Greek word for something done or made, is used by the philosophers in a two-fold sense: either as the activity of a thing or as the product of that activity. Aristotle frequently marks the distinction (e.g. Eth. Nic. i, 1044a) and it leads him to the further point, a capital one in his ethical speculations, that some activities have as their end (telos) a product (not necessarily an "object"; a frequent Aristotelian example is that health is the ergon of medicine), while others have as their telos the activity itself (see Eth. Eud. 1219a). This is, in general, Aristotle's distinction between the activity known as poiesis and that called praxis (q.v.; see episteme, techne).

2. This distinction between poiesis and praxis, production and action, is an ethically oriented one, but it has metaphysical implications that go far deeper. These are set out in Meta. 1090a where Aristotle refines the concept of ergon into that of "being at work" (en-ergieia). This latter state is the end (telos) of being (at this point energia is related to en-telecheia, "being at completion"), whether the activity issues in an external ergon or not. The only difference is that in poiesis the energia is in the thing made, while praxis is the energizing of the doer. Thus movement exists in the thing moved, but sight is an energia in the see and life an energia in the soul (compare the definition of soul under psyche).

3. This identification of telos/ergon/energia (and, as the same passage continues, with eidos and nous) leads to another important meaning of ergon as the function or proper activity of a thing. Prelim-
nary here is the use of ergon, activity, as opposed to the things that happen to a subject (pathemata; see De an. 1, 403a and pathos, paschêin). Both of them, the erga and the pathemata, are important from a methodological point of view since they, together with the dynamis (q.v.), define the field of study of the physikos or natural philosopher (De an. 1, 402b, De coelo 111, 576b; compare aphantresis). Thence the usage shades off to proper activity or function both in a physical (see De gen. anim. 731a) and an ethical sense (Eth. Nich. 1, 209b), and even in more general expressions, like “the proper function of philosophy” (Phys. 11, 149b) and “the function of dialectic” (Soph. El. 836a-b).

4. Ergon as function plays its role in Aristotle's ethic, just as it had for Plato before him. Both men are concerned to set up a norm of behavior, and both resort to phenomenological standards, attempting to connect excellence (arete, q.v.) with function (ergon). Plato defines this latter as “that which the thing in question does alone or best” (Rep. 530a) and has excellence consist in the specific power that allows that function to operate well. Aristotle's approach is somewhat different. For him arete is a certain high level of performance with regard to the function, a high level that is guaranteed by not taking any man as the norm but rather keying function on the performance of the “serious man” (spoudaios; Eth. Nich. 1, 199a).

5. What, then, is the ergon of man? For Plato it is the activities that only man can perform: management, rule, deliberation; and the arete peculiar to man that allows him to perform them well is dikê (q.v.). For Aristotle the ergon of man is an “energeia of the soul according to logos,” and, since the good of a thing is described in terms of its function, the good of man is this activity on a level of excellence (Eth. Nich. 199a).

Eros: desire, love

1. Eros is one of the many personifications that appear in the prephilosophical cosmogonies. But unlike most of the others that represent states, e.g. Night, Chaos, Earth, Heaven (see the remarks of Aristotle in Meta. 109b), Eros is a force. In the Orphic cosmogonies he unites all and from these unions is born the race of the immortal gods (see Aristophanes, Birds 700–70a); in Hesiod he is among the first to emerge from Chaos and draws all else together (Theog. 216-220); according to Theocydides (as reported by Proclus, In Tim. 11, 54), when Zeus wishes to create (demiourgein) he changes into Eros. Eros, then, is a motive force on a sexual model used to explain the “marriage” and “birth” of the mythological elements, a species of “First Mover” in the ancient cosmogonies, and was recognized as such by Aristotle (Meta. 954b). And even as the mythological trappings began to fall away in the speculations of the physikoi Eros, the mover, or now, more frequently, Aphrodite, continued to play a role in conjuring the opposite powers (see empatia, dynamain). Such is, for example, the case in Empedocles where it is Love (philê) and Aphrodite that unite the elements (fr. 17, lines 20–26; Diels 312A2; Aristotle, Meta. 982a, 1075b, see moral forces at work as well). In Parmenides she is the daimon (q.v.) “who guides all” (fr. 42, line 3), an image that persists in Greek literature (see Euripides, Hipp. 447–450, 1278–1281) and is still visible in Lucretius' opening invocation of Venus “who alone governs the nature of things” (1, 22).

2. All of these instances of the employment of love have to do with the raising of a human emotion to the level of a cosmological force, an operation that is particularly clear to Empedocles (fr. 17, lines 22–24). And in one of the most extended treatments of eros by a philosopher, the Symposium of Plato, the same approach is still in evidence. The speech of Eryximachus (185e–188e) shows the extent of this principle of “attraction” in nature, and this and similar notions, familiar to both the mythologers and the physikoi, fill most of the other discourses. The speech of Socrates, however, strikes out in a new direction where human love is used as an important moral and epistemological concept.

3. Socrates as “the lover” (erotikos) was a commonplace at Athens. He appears as such in Xenophon (Mem. 1, 6, 23; Symp. iv, 27) and the notion is frequently combined with the familiar irony: I know nothing, save about eros (see Theag. 128b, Lys. 204b, and compare Alcibiades' remark in Symp. 216d). That there were physically erotic traits in Socrates' relationships with the young men of Athens can scarcely be doubted; but his eros had another side as well, as Alcibiades, who had tried to seduce him (Symp. 217a–219d), discovered; Socrates could distinguish between passion and its object.

4. The philosophical question of love, here called philê, friendship, is first raised in the Lysis where Socrates, in searching for a definition of this attraction between men, suggests that perhaps it is analogous to the attraction of like to like (homoioc, q.v.) that had already been enunciated by the poets and the physikoi (Lys. 214a-c; for the prime importance of this principle in perception theories, see aisthesis, passim). This is rejected, as is its converse, that unlike is attracted to unlike (216b). He settles, finally and without a great deal of conviction, on a principle that went back to medical theory and had important applications in contemporary theories of pleasure (see heidonê): desire (epihymê), and its consequent, love, is directed toward the filling of a lack (erudêta) and its object, therefore, is something that
is appropriate (eikhiston; compare the later development of this in Stoicism under eikhistos), i.e., something that is neither identical nor completely dissimilar and yet deficient in our constitution.

5. The theme is resumed in the Symposium: love is a desire directed toward the beautiful (kaiilos) and necessarily involves the notion of a want or lack (endeiav; see 201b). Socrates then begins to cite the doctrine learned from a wise prophetess, Diotima. Eros, now invested with the trappings of myth, is a great daemon (q.v.), one of the intermediaries (metaxia) between the divine and the mortal (202d). Then, suddenly, the Socratic irony is explained: Eros is also midway between wisdom (sophia) and ignorance in that the man who has no sense of his own deficiency will have no love of wisdom (philosophia; 204a). Love is defined as the desire that the good be one's own forever (206a), the quest of a mortal nature to be immortal (207d) that it accomplishes by begetting (genethes; compare Aristotle's somewhat similar use of genesis under anámen 9).

6. At Symp. 206e Diotima pauses (a break seen by some as the dividing line between Socratic and Platonic eros) and then launches into a final treatment of the true eros. Concursus with beautiful bodies begets beautiful discourses (logoi). The lover weans himself away from a single body and becomes a lover of all beautiful bodies (in Charm. 154b Socrates had confessed that all youths seemed beautiful to him), thence to beautiful souls, laws and observances, and knowledge (episteme), always freeing himself from bondage to the particular, until "suddenly" there is revealed to him the vision of Beauty itself (211b; the suddenness of the vision is stressed again in Ep. vii, 341). This is immortality.

7. What has been revealed is, of course, the transcendent eide. Socrates has much more to say on the purely psychological side of love in his first speech in the Phaedrus (237b–244d; defined, 238b–c, as an irrational desire toward the enjoyment of beauty). But he later recants and promises a palinode (243b–c), and it is here that eros and sophia are rejoined. The irrationality of love is really a type of divine madness (theia mania, 245b–c; so too is manike, q.v., which explains the presence of Diotima in the Symposium), and it is present in the soul as a reflex of the remembrance (anamnesis, q.v.) that the soul has of the eide that were revealed to her before her "loss of wings" (248c; see kathodos). It is the soul of the philosopher that first regains these wings by the exercise of her recollection of the eide and by governing her life accordingly (249c–d); the philosopher is stimulated to this by the vision of earthly beauty. It is beauty that particularly stirs our recollection because it operates through the sharpest of our senses, sight (249d–250d).

8. Platonic eros is a twofold activity: it is a communication with

and a movement toward the transcendent world of the eide, and at the same time it is the pouring out into the soul of the beloved, whose (male) beauty is an image of God, those "streams from Zeus" that enter his own soul (252c–253a). The beloved does not disappear into a mist of sublimation but remains a necessary partner in the quest for the eide (compare Ep. vii, 341c–d). What is sublimated in these relationships that are archetypally represented by Socrates and his young disciples is the purely sexual activity. Plato is aware that restraint here is difficult and not always successful, but he is not inclined to judge too harshly (255b–256a).

9. After Plato eros and its connected notions disappear from the exalted positions given them in these dialogues and take up a more modest stand in ethics under the rubric of friendship (Aristotle devotes Book viii of the Eth. Nich. to philia; its wider aspects, humanitas and philanthropia, were much in vogue in Stoicism: Cicero, De off. 1, 50–51; and see oikeiosis) or that of passionate love. Epicurus, and, indeed, most of the philosophers, were opposed to this latter on the grounds that it destroyed the ataraxia (q.v.) of the serious thinker (see D.L. x, 118), but the violent diatribe directed against cupid6 by Lucretius (iv, 1058–1287) suggests a personal rather than a philosophical aporia.

10. As might be expected the Platonic eros reappears in Plotinus, prefaced, in Enni. 1, 6, by an aesthetic of sensible things. Plato had attempted something similar in the Hippasus Major where beauty is defined first in terms of the useful and then of the pleasurable (299e, 299e; compare the parallel argument in Gorg. 474c). Plotinus goes another way; beauty (kallos) is not, as it was for the Stoics (see Cicero, Tuscul. iv, 33), a question of measure (metron) or the symmetry of parts since this would be to suggest that beauty is confined to composites and cannot explain the beauty of a single star in the heaven at night. Plotinus' own explanation (1, 6, 2–3) is a curious blend of the Platonic transcendent Form that is shared (kotanoia, methexis) by the object and the immanent Aristotelian eidos or Stoic logos. But the true essence of beauty is simplicity, a simplicity that is found preeminently in the One (vi, 7, 32). From these sensible beauties one passes, in approved Platonic fashion, to practices and sciences, thence by a purification (katharismos, q.v.) of the soul to the contemplation of the highest beauty that is the Good (1, 6, 6). To accomplish this the soul must put off the garments acquired by it during its descent (kathodos, q.v. and compare ouchia). We see the Beautiful with an interior vision by becoming assimilated to it (1, 6, 9).

11. All of this is markedly Platonic in image and language. But there has been an equally notable shift in emphasis. Philosophy as a communal project between lovers is no longer in evidence in Plotinus for whom the return to the One is a "flight of the alone to the Alone"
(vi, 9, 11). The method of Plotinus is no longer dialogue, with its dialectic implications, but introspection, and his goal is an unio mystica (see hen 15). In Plato the veneration of Aphrodite Pandemos is one stage, and perhaps a stage that is never transcended, toward the worship of Aphrodite Urania. In Plotinus, who was "ashamed of being in a body" (Porphyry, Vita Plot. 1), the two goddesses are at odds. Earthly love is compared by him to the rape of a virgin on the way to her Father (vi, 9, 9).

éthos: character, habitual way of life

Heraclitus: "A man's éthos is his daimon," Diels, fr. 119. In Plato it is a result of habit (Laws 752e), and moral rather than intellectual (dienicía) in Aristotle (Eth. Nich. 1139a). Types of éthos at various ages in life are described by Aristotle, Ref. 11, chaps. 12-14. In Stoicism éthos is the source of behavior, SVF 1, 203.

cétymon: true, true sense of a word, etymology
See onoma.

eudaimonia: happiness

It does not, according to Democritus, consist in external goods (Diels, frs. 217c, 171, 40). The just man is happy, so Plato, Rep. 353b-354a, and the best life is the happiest (idem, Laws 664a). Happiness is the ultimate practical good for men (Aristotle, Eth. Nich. 1, 1097a-b), defined, ibid. 1, 1098a, 1100b. It consists in intellectual contemplation, ibid. 1177a-1178a. In Stoicism happiness results from the harmonious life (D.L. vii, 8; see nosmos), yet it is not an end (telos), but a concomitant state (Seneca, De vita beatæ 8 and 13; Plotinus, Enn. 1, 4; 4, 1, 4, 14); see theoría.

eupátheia: good or innocent emotion, affect
See apateía.

exòtirikoi lógoi: external discourses, popular works

1. One of the literary problems attendant upon the study of Plato's philosophy is the possibility that at least part of his thinking may not have been committed to writing, i.e., to expression in dialogue form (see agraphe dogmatos). In the case of Aristotle we know for a certainty that the extant treatises do not represent his entire literary output. There were known in antiquity a series of dialogues published by Aristotle while still a member of the Academy, and the preserved fragments of which indicate a considerably more Platonic outlook on various problems, most notoriously his theory of the soul, than that which emerges from a reading of the treatises.

2. Modern scholarship locates the dialogues within the problem of Aristotle's philosophical evolution, but an ancient literary tradition, beginning with Cicero (De fin. v, 12; compare Aulus Gellius, Noctes Att. xx, 5, 1) read the differences between the dialogues and the treatises not as a function of an intellectual evolution, but rather as the difference between two distinct, albeit contemporary, types of literary composition: external discourses (exòtirikoi lógoi), i.e., quasi-popular works designed for a wide audience, and lectures (akratontikoi lógoi) delivered in the Lyceum to more technically trained groups of students.

3. Exòtirikoi lógoi are, indeed, cited in the preserved treatises, and while some of the references conveniently fit what we know of a given dialogue (e.g. the reference in Eth. Nich. 1, 1102a could fit the Protrepticus), there are other instances (e.g. Phys. 217b and Pol. 1323a when compared with Eth. Nich. 1, 1093b) where it cannot be so, and the meaning here of exòtirikoi lógoi is more akin to "arguments current outside the Peripatetic School."

génésis: birth, coming-into-being, becoming (as opposed to being), process, passage to a contrary, substantial change

1. Even in its earliest attested usage (II, XIV, 201, 246) génésis is something more than a biological process and the two meanings of "birth" and "beginning in being" are intertwined in the pre-Socratic texts. The presence of the word in the extant fragment of Anaximander has been attributed by most to the language of the Peripatetic epitomizer of the text (Theophrastus via Simplicius, Phys. 24, 17), but both the expression and the notion are unmistakable in Xenophanes (frs. 29, 30) and Heraclitus (frs. 3, 36) in speaking of the "birth" and "death" of physical bodies.

2. The pre-Socratics were immensely interested in change. Having decided upon one or a number of elemental principles (see arche), either natural bodies, like water or air, or substantivized versions of what were thought of as "powers" but were later to be considered as qualities (see dynamis, pathos, poion), e.g. the hot, the dry, etc., they discussed the mechanics of how one could become the other. This is
what Aristotle was later to call “absolute becoming” (genesis haplē), change in the category of substance as opposed to the various changes (metabolē, q.v.) in the categories of accident (De gēn. et corr. 1, 319b-320a). Thus in Anaximenes, who postulated aer (q.v.) as his arche, simple bodies come into being from the condensation and rarefaction of aer (Simplicius, Phys. 24, 26), while for Anaximander, whose arche is an indefinite substance (apērion, q.v.), the genesis of percepts involves some sort of separation process (Aristotle, Phys. 1, 187a).

3. In all of these thinkers, for whom life and movement are inherent in things, there is an insistence on change—Heraclitus is only the loudest voice in a chorus—and on the clearly perceptible fact that one body becomes another. The most eloquent proof of this is the fact that to deny change Parmenides had to deny perception.

4. But Parmenides did not hesitate to do either, and henceforward genesis, which had been a given of sense, becomes a problem. Parmenides explicitly denies the possibility of any type of change since coming-to-be in any of its modes implies the logically indefensible proposition of passing from nonbeing to being, and nothing can come from nonbeing (fr. 8, lines 19–21; compare lines 35–41 that would seem to imply the pre-Parmenidean technical use of genesis; see on).

5. Thus the Parmenidean “Way of Truth”; his successors, however, seem to have taken their cue from the “Way of Seeing.” By abandoning the strict monism of Parmenides and resorting to the older doctrine of “opposites” (entia, q.v.), both Empedocles and Anaxagoras were able to restore at least a secondary genesis in terms of the interplay of these opposite qualities or elements (stoicheia, q.v.). Simple coming-into-being (i.e., from nonbeing) is still unthinkable, but by resorting to various degrees of mixture (krasis) and association (synkrasis) composite bodies could come into being (Empedocles, fr. 9; Anaxagoras, fr. 17; see Aristotle’s résumé in Phys. 1, 187a; see stoicheion).

6. The case of Anaxagoras is quite complex. First he is concerned to observe the Parmenidean prohibition against absolute genesis. Nothing can proceed from nothing and so everything that seems to become something else must have been that something else to begin with, or, as Anaxagoras himself put it, “all things have a portion of everything” (fr. 12; in fr. 11 he excludes nous that is external to the system; for the reasons, see kinesis, hikon); and so it follows (fr. 17) that there is no such thing as genesis or phthora but only aggregation (synkrasis) and separation (apokrisis), i.e., by the arrangement of preexistent matter. *Genesis*, understood as Anaxagoras understood it, begins, then, from a primordial mixture (neima), the ingredients of which are imperceptible (save perhaps air and fire, which have already begun to predominate in this nonhomogeneous mass) and are infinite in number (fr. 1). In it were the various Milesian dynamēs (q.v.), like the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, etc., as well as the Empedoclean stoicheia and natural composite bodies, and what Anaxagoras calls "seed? (spermata) (fr. 4).

7. These latter are the true stoicheia of Anaxagoras (Aristotle, De coelo 111, 302a; see stoicheion) and, like the original meigma itself, they contain portions of everything. The original mixture was without movement, firmly clasped in a Parmenidean death grip. As in Empedocles, kinesis comes from the outside, supplied by nous that causes the mixture to rotate. The speed of the rotation effects the separation (apokrisis) of the "seeds" (fr. 12) that are qualitatively different (see fr. 4 and pathos). By aggregation (synkrasis) these are formed into compound bodies wherein predominate one or other of the types of "seed" (see fr. 12 and Aristotle, Phys. 1, 187a).

8. The Atomists, by eliminating the dynamēs, considerably simplified the operation (though they had marked difficulties in “saving the phenomena”; see pathos, stoicheion). The atom is brought into collision by their eternal motion (see kinesis) and it is by this contact (hesis) that the higher composite bodies are formed. Some atom (haple) bounce back into the void; others, because they are “hooked” or angled, catch together and, as further collisions result, perceptible bodies are built up (Simplicius, De coelo 285, 11). This is the Atomists’ version of the composition of bodies by association (synkrasis) and it reappears, in more sophisticated form, in Epicureanism (D.L. x, 43; Lucr. ii, 85–111). Here there is an attempt to explain the three states of matter in terms of density expressed in the distance between the atoms in the “association,” with the added refinement that certain bodies (e.g., liquids) result from the containment of one type of atom within a sheath (stegazon) composed of another type, an explanation that also applies to the enclosing of the soul within the body (D.L x, 65, 66; see holon 9).

9. That *genesis* had become the central question of post-Parmenidean philosophy is clear from Socrates’ remarks in Phaedo 96a, a question that, as the same passage indicates, was being pursued in terms of a search for causes (cēsis, q.v.) and that had intrigued the young Sophists. For Plato himself *genesis* is a somewhat secondary problem in the light of his distinction between the idea, the realm of true being (ontos on), and this sensible world that is characterized by becoming (Tim. 49d–50a). Thus being is the only subject for true knowledge (epistēme), while *genesis* can afford nothing better than opinion (doxa), the “likely account” of the Timaeus.

10. But having thus paid his debt to Parmenides, Plato does, on occasion, turn his attention to genesis; once in the context of attempting to elucidate his theory of participation (metēresis) in the Phaedo, and,
again, in his account of the kosmos aesthetes in the Timaeus. The first, in Phaedo 106b-106b, which is enormously interesting as being the forerunner of Aristotle's own theory of genesis, rests on a premise that is not generally emphasized by Plato, i.e., the immanence, in some form or other, of the eidos (see eidos); the passage is replete with expressions like “the smallness in us.” There is, moreover, the insistence that the immanent eidos are not themselves subject to genesis. Genesis has to do with things and is nothing more than the replacement, in a subject (Phaedo 106e), of one form by its opposite (enamtion, q.v.).

11. The same point of view appears in considerably more detail when Plato comes to speak of the Receptacle (hypochoche) in the Timaeus (49a ff.) and that is described as the “Nurse of Becoming.” Plato begins by pointing out that the four Empedoclean “roots” are not irreducible elements; since they are constantly changing they are really qualities (ibid. 49d), even though, on the noetic level, there are eidos of these four principal bodies. Thus he rejects all the post-Parmenidean theories of mixing and association, based as they are on the irreducibility of the stoicheia. The permanent thing in the process is the Receptacle, the quasi-being in which genesis takes place (ibid. 49e). The Platonic analysis of genesis yields, then, the eternal transcendent Forms, immanent mimetic versions of them that pass in and out of the Receptacle (ibid. 50c; Plato, loc. cit., promises to describe the difficult relationship between the immanent qualities and the transcendent eidos, a promise apparently unfulfilled), and, finally, the Receptacle itself that, like the Aristotelian hypopheimenon (q.v.), has no characteristics of its own (ibid. 51a-5b).

12. All of this is, however, precocious genesis, the situation “before the ouranos came into being” (ibid. 52a). The qualities, together with their associated “powers” (dynamis, q.v.; see phusis, paschein), drift about the Receptacle in chaotic fashion (ibid. 52d-53a). But then nous begins its operation and puts order into the chaos by constructing the primary qualities of earth, air, fire, and water into the four primary bodies of the sensible world (ibid. 55c) by identifying each of the “elements” with one of the primary geometrical solids capable of being inscribed in a sphere (see stoicheion). This looks like a Pythagorean version of Atomism. Aristotle has detected the atomistic parallels (De gen. et corr. 1, 336b; see aisthesis), but the Pythagoreanism is equally clear when we see that the geometrical solids are, in turn, reducible to planes, with the distinct suggestion that the reduction process leads back to lines, points (Tim. 53d, 53e), and even beyond into the shadowy realms of the Pythagorean archai (see arche, archimnos, and the related references).

13. Aristotle has little patience with Pythagorean archai whether in their Timaeus geometrical form or in their more arithmetical varieties, and he criticizes Plato's version (De gen. et corr. 1, 336a-336b); but he was obviously more taken by Plato's precocious genesis and his own analysis reflects it. It is Aristotle's contention that Parmenides' theses on nonbeing had frightened his successors off the subject of true genesis and into reducing all becoming to either qualitative change (alloiosis, q.v.) or merely shifting around the ingredients (Phys. 1, 187a; De gen. et corr. 1, 1-2). His own approach is strongly to reaffirm the role of the stoicheia as the ultimate irreducible bodies out of which all things are made and to insist, on the evidence of the senses, that the stoicheia do change into one another in a never-ending cycle (De gen. et corr. 11, 331a, 337a; see energeta). There is, in short, genesis. The Parmenidean knot is cut by an explanation of the peculiar nature of the nonbeing involved in genesis; it is not absolute nonbeing but a relative type that Aristotle identifies as “privation” (steresis, q.v.). This provides the final piece in the puzzle of becoming. Genesis is possible because the stoicheia have their own archai, viz., a material, undefined substratum (hypochoimenon, q.v.) common to them all, sets of immanent, perceptible qualities, and the steresis of the opposed (enamtion) qualities. Genesis is thus defined as “passage to the enanatmion” (Phys. 1, 190a-190b; De gen. et corr. 324a, 328b-331a).

14. Aristotle disallows the post-Parmenidean association (synkrisis) of genuine genesis (De gen. et corr. 1, 337a) and, though misis is allowed to play a role, it is not in genesis, in one stoicheion becoming another, but in the forming of the next generation of bodies, the syntheta or composite bodies (ibid. 11, 334b-335b).

15. Genesis, then, is affirmed and defined and set over against the various other changes (metabola) that occur in substances-in-being: locomotion, alteration, growth. But among all these types of change kinesis (more properly, phora, q.v.) takes precedence, even to genesis (Phys. VIII, 160b-261a; compare Plato's grouping in Laws x, 894b-c and see kinesis), since there must be a continuous kinesis to ensure the everlasting cycle of genesis: this is the movement of the sun around the elliptic (De gen. et corr. 11, 336a-b; compare Rep. 506b; the sun is, of course, a moved mover; the argument will eventually lead to the primary cause, the unmoved mover; see kinein, nous). Genesis is, in turn, key to on sets of opposed qualities that are active (poiein) and passive (paschein, q.v.).

16. Eudicus, as the faithful offspring of the Atomists, has no genuine genesis (see kinesis), but the Stoics appear to follow closer to the Aristotelian pattern. They extend, it is true, action and passion, which in Aristotle are characteristics of the qualities inherent in the stoicheia, deeper into the nature of things by associating the former with logos (q.v.) and the latter with hylie (q.v.), the two Stoic co-principles.
of reality (STV, 1, 84, 493), but they continue in a somewhat more traditional fashion by affirming the four basic physical bodies or stoicheia, two of which are active (air and fire), and two passive (earth and water) (STV II, 418).

17. But there have been alterations as well. Fire is now the hot (see D.L. vii, 159), not, as in Aristotle, a set of qualities, viz., hot and dry (De gen. et corr. ii, 331a). Further, since the Stoics have given a primary to fire (see ppy), this is the first element and, in a sense, a kind of Urstoff; the others are derived from it by a process not unlike the condensation/rarefaction of Anaximenes (D.L. vii, 422) and return to it at the periodical conflagration (ekpyrosis, q.v.).

18. Other difficulties arise. Despite the Aristotelian trappings, the Stoics are compelled, by their reduction of everything, including perceptible qualities, to body (see poion), to explain change in a fashion not radically different from the Atomists. They eschewed atomic "hooks," however, and turned to a theory of the interpenetrability of bodies that rests on the distinction of various types of mixtures, and particularly the varieties called mixis (for dry bodies) and krasis (for wet) where the two ingredients of the mixture totally interpenetrate each other without, at the same time, losing their own proper characteristics, a theory used to explain the relationship of soul and body as well (STV II, 467, 471), and strongly attacked by both the later Peripatetics and Plotinus (see Enn. II, 7, 1 and STV II, 473).

For the complementary notion of passing-out-of-being, see phthora; for genesis as process and its bearing on ethical theory, hedone.

Genos: kind, genus

Genos is generally used in Plato as a synonym for eidos, e.g. Soph. 253b, and elsewhere as "type," approaching the Aristotelian genus, e.g. Theaet. 228e and Soph. 253d, where dialectic has to do with dividing the forms according to "kind" (genos); compare the "collection" (synagoge) into one generic "form," Phaedrus 265d, but this is still probably ontological rather than predicational. Aristotelian genus: Aristotle, Top. 1029a-b, 1100-1265. For Aristotle the kategoriai are the gene of being (De an. II, 412a), the summa genera that cannot be subsumed into anything more general (see Anal. post. II, 100b, Meta. 1014b). In Soph. 254d Plato discussed the "most important gene" (Existence ['osia], motion, rest, sameness, difference; see eidos, pauche ton pantos), and Plotinus, in Enn. vi, 1-3, has apparently combined these gene with the Aristotelian modes of predication (kategoriai) and produced the gene of being; see eidos, diafora, katholou.

gnôrimon: knowable, intelligible

1. Though the notion that the knowability of things is relative has its Platonic precedents, it is fundamental to Aristotelian epistemology, particularly as it applies to the objects of metaphysics. The distinction is set forth clearly in Anal. post. i, 715b-716a: things are knowable (gnôrimon) in two different senses; what is innately (physi) more knowable is not necessarily better known to us (prohemen). The practical application of this principle is twofold. In metaphysics one should begin with the things more intelligible to us and our way of knowing, and proceed to what is intrinsically more intelligible (Meta. 1025b); in ethics men should be educated to see that what is intrinsically good is also a good for them (Eth. Nic. vi, 1239b; the ethical parallel is cited in Meta., loc. cit.).

2. The root of this principle is to be sought within the more general cadres of Aristotle's theory of knowledge, since the difference in the grades of intelligibility is not due to some defect in the object but rather in our way of knowing (Meta. 993b). The foundation of all our cognition is sense perception (aisthesis, q.v.), and even syllogistic demonstration (apodeixis) rests upon some sort of induction (epagege, q.v.), i.e., to a process that begins with the perception of particulars (Anal. post. ii, 100b). Scientific knowledge (episteme) has to do with the universal (katholou), and even though sense perceptions immediately grasp a kind of "concrete universal" (see Phys. i, 18a), this is not the universal of science that is apprehended only by reason (logos).

3. The role of philosophy, then, is to proceed from what is intelligible to us, i.e., the glimmer of intelligibility that one has through immediately perceived sensibles (aistheta), to what is intelligible of itself (physi).

4. The Platonic antecedents of all this are clear. The language of Meta. 1029b cited above is reminiscent of Plato's distinction between the really existent (ontos on) intelligibles and the quasi-real (pos on) status of the sensible world, and Aristotle's description of the defects of our sense knowledge (Meta. 993b) echoes the imagery of the Allegory of the Cave in Rep. 516a. For both philosophers true intelligibility is a function of immateriality (see Meta. 1078a), and while they would agree that the highest type of knowledge is the study of the intelligible-in-itself (see episteme, dialectike, theologia), where they differ is in their attitudes toward a study of the sensibles. The Platonic curriculum in Republic X is structured to lead away from the sensible to the intelligible; the immateriality of the Aristotelian eidos (q.v.) guarantees the value of a study of the aistheta (compare the parallel difference between the Platonic [synagoge] and the Aristotelian [epagege] induc-
gnōsis: 1) knowledge; 2) Gnosticism

1) The common Greek general term for knowledge. Typical of this ordinary usage is Aristotle, *An. Post.* 11, 99b–101b, where gnōsis and its equivalents embrace sense perception (aisthēsis), memory, experience, and scientific knowledge (epistēmē). For the special problems involved in the knowledge of God, see agnostos; 2) at some time before the Christian era the term began to take on another meaning; perhaps transitional in this process is the use of “true gnōsis” as a synonym for Christian doctrine, Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* IV, 33, 8. Its final technical meaning is a superior, secret knowledge that guarantees salvation to the “spirituals” (pneumatikoi), Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I, 4, 2.

haphē: contact, touch, sense of touch
See genesis, arche, dynamis, aisthēsis.

harmonia: blending of opposites, harmony

1. The discovery, generally credited to Pythagoras, of the reduction of musical intervals to mathematical ratios had an extraordinary effect on the development of Greek philosophy: first it suggested that number was the constitutive principle of all things (see arithmos); it was used to explain mixtures (see holon); it likewise spawned the theory of the psyche as a harmony of opposites, described by Plato, *Phaedo* 86c–86d (refuted by Socrates, 91c–95e), and Aristotle, *De an.* 1, 407b–408a (see psyche). But the language of both the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts suggests that harmonia is not so much a mathematical-musical concept, but owes more to medical theory (Alcmaeon? see Actius V, 30, 1). Any attempt to found a theory of the soul on the harmony of physical opposites is, of course, going to lead to a denial of the soul’s immortality; it is certain that Pythagoras held the immortality of the soul (see psyche, palingenesia), and so his theory of harmony was much more likely to have been mathematical rather than physical.

2. Another line of the harmonia theory leads to the extension of the ratio concept to either the sound or the distances of the planets and the development of the doctrine of the “harmony of the spheres” incorporated by Plato into his “Myth of Er” (*Rep.* 617b), and described by Aristotle, *De caelo* 11, 290b–291a and Cicero, *Somn. Scip.* 5. The ethical implications may be seen in the notions of katharsis and sophrosyne (c.q.v.), in Plato’s description of the “mixed life” in *Phile.* 64a–66a (see agathon), in Aristotle’s doctrine of the “mean” (meson), and in ancient theories on the nature of physical pleasure (see hedone); for Heraclitus’ theory of “harmony,” see logos. Pythagorean “harmonics” is a feature of the education of the philosopher in Plato, *Rep.* VII, 530c–531c, where it is transitional to the study of dialectics (compare *Timaeus* 47b–48a and see psyche tou pantos).

For the Stoic ethical formula “harmoniously with nature,” see nomos.

hédone: pleasure

1. The first discussions on the possibility of pleasure being the end of man probably took place in the heightened ethical—and subjectivist—climate of the generation of Socrates and the Sophists. But the direct evidence is faulty and one must generally resort to reconstructions out of the Platonic dialogues. For example, in the *Gorgias* (*491a–492c*) Socrates debates the question with an otherwise obscure Sophist named Callidctes who upholds the hedonistic position. He does it in terms of a psychophysiological theory of sense pleasure that was apparently in vogue in the fifth century and beyond, that of depletion (kenosis) and refilling (aneplerosis). According to a medical theory put forth by Alcmaeon of Crotona health consisted in a state of balance (isonomia) of the elements in the body (see Actius V, 30, 1). This theory had wide philosophical implications (see harmonia, agathon, meson), and particularly in its adaptation, perhaps by Empedocles (see Diels 311a50), to explain the origin and nature of pleasure. According to this view a depletion (kenosis) of one of the vital elements of the body leads to an imbalance, and the resultant painful sense of want (*enodia*) creates desire (*epithymia, oraxios*, c.q.v.), or the thrust toward a complementary “filling up” (aneplerosis). It is this latter redressing of the natural isonomia of the body that is responsible for pleasure.

2. Socrates uses this theory in the *Gorgias* to refute the radical hedonist Callicles, by pointing out that on these grounds the hedonist will be ever unsatisfied. The same theory appears again in *Tim.* 64c–65b (on the Atomist antecedents of this passage, see patush), *Rep.* 585a, and *Phel.* 31b–32b, but in these two latter passages at least it is
overlaid with a growing awareness of the psychic as opposed to the purely somatic nature of pleasure, and the identification of the body as an instrument of pleasure (see Rep. 58c6, Phil. 41c), a distinction that allowed Aristotle eventually to deny the applicability of the konomos-anapleosis theory (Eth. Nich. 1173b). What led to this was undoubtedly the recognition of the obvious existence of a pleasure attendant upon intellectual activities (Rep. 585b-c, Phil. 316-32a); in both these passages Plato makes some attempt at adapting the konomos theory to this new type of pleasure, but without a great deal of success, as well as the more subtle psychological analysis of the role of memory in the pleasure of anticipation (Phil. 326-326; this analysis leads, 39a-40c, to a further discussion of the possibility of false pleasures due to our habits of "phantasmata exogethemena".)

3. Having expanded the horizons of pleasure (true/false, mixed/unmixed, psychic/somatic) Plato attempts to integrate it into the good life in the Philebus. The purely hedonistic position is rejected, as it was in the Gorgias, as well as a kind of radical antihedonism (Phil. 44b) that denied the existence of pleasure. Plato's own view is a moderate one, that the good life is the "mixed life," i.e., a life containing both the pleasurable and the intellectual (phronesis, q.v.; Phil. 20a-b, 39c-61c).

4. This position that attempts to reconcile the conflicting claims of hedonism and Socratic intellectualism may look to disagreements within the Academy itself. We are aware, from Aristotle, that Speusippus had denied that pleasure was in any sense a good (see Eth. Nich. vii, 1125b, 11253b), a stand apparently referred to in Phil. 530-550. Speusippus reasoned that a) pleasure is a process (genesis) and process is a means and not an end, and b) on the theory of the mean (meson, q.v.) both pleasure and pain are extremes and hence cannot be a good. In the Philebus passage Plato concurs in the first argument, at least insofar as it pertains to physical pleasure, but would not admit that it speaks to the higher, unmixed pleasures described in Phil. 51a-52b. As far as Speusippus' second argument, that the good resides in the mean or neutral state between pleasure and pain, Plato is aware of the state (Phil. 426-444) but does not see it as a good; he is unwilling to banish pleasure from the good life.

5. Nor will he accept the empirical hedonism of another contemporary Academician, Eudoxus, who held that pleasure was the only good for man since all creatures pursue it (Edh. Nich. x, 1172b). This is not exactly the hedonistic view put forth by Plato, who had suggested (Phil. 60a-b) that all men ought to pursue pleasure in order to pursue pleasure, since it is the highest good, and though the presence of pleasure in the Platonic good life in the Philebus and the associated allusion that phronesis is not an entirely sufficient end to man (Phil. 27b) may be a concession to the force of Eudoxus' point, the line against hedonism is firmly held.

6. Eudoxus is chosen by Aristotle as the exemplar of the hedonistic school, probably because of the latter's long association with the Academy. But an even more prominent proponent of the position, one of Plato's own contemporaries, was Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic group, whose hedonism was at least as thoroughgoing, if better known to us, as Eudoxus'. Pleasure is the end of all activity and the object of all choice, as proven by our instinctive, untutored choice of pleasure. Thus all pleasure is good, and physical pleasures better than those of the soul (D.L. ii, 87-88). And further, since happiness, i.e., pleasure calculated over a lifetime, is a kind of delusion since only the present is real, each moment's pleasure is to be sought for itself (Aelian, Var. hist. xiv, 6).

7. Aristotle, true to his historical method (see endoxon), reviews both the hedonist (Eth. Nich. x, 1172a-1174a) and antihedonist (ibid. vi, 1125b-11253b) positions. He is satisfied with neither, nor, indeed, with Plato's retorts to them. He denies that pleasure is a process (ibid. x, 1173a-b), but would prefer to call it an activity (energeia) or, more fully (ibid. vii, 1135a), "the unimpeded activity of a characteristic state [hexis] in accordance with nature." In accordance with this definition the entire moral status of the hedonist are worked out in terms of the energesia with which each is properly associated. First, pleasure is a whole, complete in each moment of time, much like the act of seeing (ibid. x, 1174b). Pleasure is something that is superimposed upon and completes an activity when the latter is unobstructed, e.g. by a defect in the subject or object of that activity (ibid. x, 1174b). Eudoxus was almost correct: all men do seem to desire pleasure, but it is because all men desire to live and pleasure completes the basic activity of living; it is life that is desirable, not the pleasure (ibid. x, 1175a). In short, it is activities that are good or evil, not their superimposed pleasures (ibid. x, 1175b).

8. From these varying points of view evolves the hedonism of Epicurus. Like Eudoxus he is a hedonist on empirical grounds: pleasure is the good sought by men (D.L. x, 128). But the proof is the more sophisticated one of Aristippus that points to instinctive, unlearned behavior (D.L. x, 137; see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. xi, 56). Here there is a correlation with his atomically based theory of sensation (atassesis, q.v.): just as sensation is the criterion of truth, so the movements or experiences (pathē) of pleasure and pain, which are conceived of as types of atomic dislocation (see Lucretius ii, 563-560), serve as criteria of good and evil since pleasure is what is natural, and so good, while pain is alien to nature, and so evil (D.L. x, 34).
9. Epicurus accepts the \textit{kenosis-endeia-etithymia-anapleosis} analysis of pleasure and pain (D.L. x, 144; compare Lucretius iv, 88-876) and insists on the primacy of physical pleasures, particularly those of the stomach (Athenaeus xii, 545). He also accepts the corollary that pleasure, being physical, must be measured by quantity (\textit{poson}) not quality (\textit{poia}; cf. Eusebius, \textit{Prepar. Evang.} xiv, 40, 3). But by subjecting the process to an even closer analysis Epicurus detects another, purer type of pleasure than the corrective “filling up” of a bodily want that is, after all, subtly mixed with pain (see Socrates' perceptual remark in \textit{Phaedo} 60b). This purer pleasure is not, then, the kinetic pleasure of \textit{anapleosis}, but the static (\textit{katastamataike}) pleasure of equilibrium, the absence of pain (\textit{alges}) from the body (\textit{aporia}) and the absence of disturbance from the soul (\textit{ataraxia}) (D.L. x, 131). This position may owe more than a little to Speusippus' neutral state (see Clement Alex., \textit{Strom.} ii, 22, 133), but what is clear is that Epicurus was moving away from the more mechanical explanation of Aristippus who held only kinetic pleasure (D.L. x, 136) and downgraded the psychic side of pleasure. Epicurus, on the other hand, since he strongly maintained the experiential reality of past and future, a position that magnifies mental pleasures (and pains), shifts the focus of emphasis from “the pleasant moment” to “the happy life” (D.L. x, 137, 233). Thus it is the activity of the mind that holds the keys, viz., memory and imagination, to pleasure over the long run, the happy life, and that controls and tempers Epicurean hedonism.

\textit{he\textbf{g}emonik\textit{on}}: \textit{directive faculty of the soul}

In Stoicism the \textit{hegemonikon} governs the other psychic faculties and is seated in the heart (SVF i, 143; ii, 936; ii, 875). According to Chrysippus, all psychic states (including virtues, vices, and \textit{pathe}) are changes in the rational faculty (\textit{hegemonikon}; SVF ii, 659; Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Adv. Math.} vii, 233). It is a \textit{tabula rasa} at birth (SVF ii, 83), an internal, independent principle (Marcus Aurelius, vii, 18; vi, 8); see \textit{nous}, \textit{psyche}, \textit{aisthesis}, \textit{kardia}.

\textit{heimarm\textit{ene}:} an allotted (\textit{portion}), fate

The Stoics identified fate with \textit{logos} and \textit{pronoia} and Zeus (SVF ii, 913, 597). The growing transcendence of God in later Greek philosophy (see \textit{hyperousia}) leads to the reseparation of these and \textit{heimarmene}, Philo, \textit{De migr. Abr.} 179-181; ps-Plutarch, \textit{De fato} 572f-573b; see \textit{pronoia}.

\textit{hen}: one, the One

1. The pre-Socratic search for an \textit{arche} for all things normally ended in a single principle, the reduction of the variety of existents back to a single stuff, with no emphasis, however, on the uniqueness of the principle. The first dualists were apparently the Pythagoreans, “apparently” because the judgment rests on the exegesis of a difficult text in Aristotle, in addition to the fact that at some later date the Pythagoreans became monists and, as is usually the case with Pythagorean sources, the discrimination between early and late is not a simple matter.

2. In \textit{Meta.} 986a Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans made the ultimate \textit{stoicheia} limit (\textit{posai}) and the unlimited (\textit{autopon}); they are the elements of odd and even, and these latter produce the one (\textit{hen}), whence proceeds the whole series of \textit{arithmoi}. This would seem to draw the distinction between pairs of opposed \textit{stoicheia} (limit-unlimited, odd-even) and their product, \textit{hen}, which is the \textit{arche} or starting point of number. But a few lines later in the same passage Aristotle goes on to say that some Pythagoreans line up their \textit{stoicheia} in two parallel columns, the left containing limit, odd, one, etc., and in the right, the unlimited, even, plurality. If we take into account what seems to be a later development in the school (see \textit{infra}), we thus have three very different points of view on the one: the one as posterior to the \textit{stoicheia}, the one as a \textit{stoicheion}, and the one prior to all else.

3. These speculations are based on physical and mathematical considerations (moral implications are not, of course, absent in these Pythagorean views; also in the left column in \textit{Meta.} 986a is "the good"; see Eth. Nich. 1096b), but the next appearance of the one is in a context dominated by logic (compare Aristotle's remark in \textit{De gen. et corr.} i, 325a). This is the "Way of Truth" of Parmenides where he seeks to illustrate that if being (\textit{on}) is, then it is one in the sense of being both unique (\textit{monogenes}; fr. 3, lines 11-13) and indivisible (\textit{adiareton}; ibid. lines 22-23).

4. To support the contentions of Parmenides, Zeno had constructed a number of dialectical antinomies. These take the form of posing a hypothesis, in this case that there are a plurality of beings, and showing that the conclusions that flow from it are just as absurd as the ones raised against Parmenides' One Being (\textit{Parm.} 128a-c). Plato constructs just such a set of hypotheses and places them in the mouth of Parmenides himself in the dialogue of the same name. The subject is the one (\textit{to hen}). The passages that follow (\textit{Parm.} 1376 ff.) involve a number of obscurities, not the least of which is whether the one under discussion is the One Being of Parmenides or Plato's transcendent Oneness itself (the Greek expression is ambiguous and in 135c Parmenides suggests that he would like to extend the dialectic of Zeno to the \textit{eidos}; but compare 137b). Again, is this Zenoan eristic or Platonic \textit{dialektike} (it is called \textit{gymnasia} at 135c-c)?

5. Whatever modern scholarship says on the subject, and it
tends to see the latter half of the dialogue as logical considerations about One Being, the judgment of the latter Platonic tradition is clear. The hypotheses of the Parmenides become for it a sacred text on the One as a transcendent hypostasis. It is cited more often than any other work except the Timaeus in the Enneads, and Proclus wrote a full-scale commentary on it.

6. Did Plato have a special doctrine of the One? As far as the unity of the individual eidos is concerned, Plato maintains throughout that they are indivisible (Phaedo 78d, Rep. 476a), and he goes so far as to call them heads or monads (Phil. 15a-b, 162-e). But we are considerably less informed on the eidos of One or Oneness itself. Plato does address himself to the one (hen) and the many (plethos) as a dialectical problem in Phil. 139-180d. He mentions as already solved the question on many-in-one on the level of organic unities like man (147d-e; see holon), but there remains the perplexing question of the monadic eidos and its distribution through the plurality of material things (150c; the question is posed as if it is going to be solved, but it is not; see methesis, mimesis) and the related problem of the interrelationship (keinonia) of the eidos. To solve this he resorts to the Pythagorean (or, as he calls it, Promethean; 15e) solution of converting hen and plethos with peras and atelron, which are, in turn, integrated into his own procedure of collection (synagogue) and division (diatresis, q.v.). These latter are, in effect, a dialectical movement from many to one, and vice versa, but the one to which syngagia attains is in no wise a transcendent One but rather a generic eidos of the type described in Soph. 253d-e as “one eidos extending through many eidos that lie apart.”

7. The Sophist also raises the question of the One itself, i.e., the eidos of hen, against Parmenides (245a-b), not now of the Platonic dialogue, but the philosopher of the “Way of Truth.” If the spherical One Being is such as Parmenides describes it in fr. 8, lines 42 ff., then it is a whole made up of parts and so must differ from the One itself, which is perfectly simple. But the text has no sequel short of informing us that there is an eidos of one. When, later in the same dialogue (254d ff.), Plato comes to discuss the “greatest kinds” of eidos, the One is nowhere in evidence and Plotinus must devote a somewhat longish explanation of why its omission is appropriate (Enn. vi. 2, 9-12).

8. The importance of one in Plato is, then, except for the curious business of the Parmenides, of no more special importance than the other eidos and perhaps less than the megista gene of the Sophist. What is more striking, however, is the position it seems to assume in the nearly contemporary Academy. Aristotle’s own treatment of one is to class it among the “transcendentals”: oneness, like being, is predicated analogously through all the kategorai (Meta. 1003a-b, 1083b).

But as for unit-one, this can be nothing else but the arche of a mathematical series (ibid. 1016b), and so he is convinced that Plato must have held that One was a separate substance (ibid. 1016a; refuted, 1016a-1016b) and the arche of all the eidos since One and Being are the enuma genera of which all the eidos are species (ibid. 1096a, 1096b). The origins of this belief are somewhat difficult to understand, but they are obviously connected with his oft-repeated allegation that Plato identified the eidos with numbers (see arithmos 3). A further remark carries us in the same direction. Aristotle also states that Plato identified the One with the Good (ibid. 1016b), and we know that this is based on more than a reading of the famous passage on the transcendent Good in Rep. 599b since we are informed from another source (Aristoxenus, Elem. harm. ii. p. 29) that Plato made this identification in his lecture “On the Good” (see agrapha dogmati) that also had to do with mathematics.

9. Aristotle goes on to say that Speusippus, Plato’s successor, avoided the difficulty because, even though he made the One an arche, he did not identify it with the Good (ibid. 1016b) but made this latter the result of an evolutionary process (ibid. 1012b-1013a). Speusippus’ views on the archai themselves are likewise reported. He substituted for the Platonic eidos the mathematika (q.v.; Meta. 1068b), deriving the numbers, in prescribed Pythagorean fashion, from One and Plurality (ibid. 1085b, 1087b). The One of Speusippus is not, then, an ultimate principle in a monist system, but one of two co-principles of number. Xenocrates belongs to the same tradition; he made the eidos numbers (1086b, 1086a, etc.) and derived them from the Monad and the Dyad, based on an exegesis of Timaeus 55a (Plutarch, De prrcl. an. 1012d). He goes on to identify the One with the Father and Zeus, the First God, nux, while the Dyad may be called Mother of the Gods and the World Soul (Aetius i. 17, 39).

10. In all these theories of archai it is notable that the One remains as a stable factor; it is its correlate that shifts nuances: the atelron of the Pythagoreans, the polarized Infinite Dyad of Plato (cosmian diad; Meta. 987b; see Phys. 206b; the diad does not appear in the terminology of Phil. 248a-250a but what is described is dual in nature) and Xenocrates, and the pluralistic plethos of Speusippus and the Pythagoreans. A considerably different view appears in the Pythagorean revival of the first century where writers like Eudorus (in Simplicius, Phys. 181) and Alexander Polyhistor (D.L. viii. 25) describe a Pythagoreanism that held that the Infinite Dyad itself derived from the monas.

11. The affinities between Pythagoras and the Academy were soon exploited by both sides. Aristotle himself had already linked the two (see mimesis and compare the frequent juxtaposition of Speusip-
The derivation of the transcendent Platonic principles of the later dialogues in terms of Pythagorean number theory is particularly marked, and one such account by a later Pythagorean, Moderatus of Gades, has been preserved by Simplicius (Phys. 230a-231a). Present in it are all the later Neoplatonic hypotheses: the first, beyond Being; the second One, which is really real, intelligible, the eidos; and the third One, which participates (methexis) in the first One and the eidos. The stress on the One in Moderatus' tract is revelatory of its Pythagorean point of view. A similar account of the three hypotheses by the Academic Albinus shows its orientation toward the Philebus and Timaeus by describing all three of the hypotheses as nous (Epit. x, 1-2). But there is something of Aristotle here as well: the first nous, besides being the demoiourgos (ibid. xii, 3) and the Father and cause of all goodness and truth, thinks itself (ibid. x, 3). It was the One that eventually triumphed over nous. The second-century Pythagorean Numenius, whom Plotinus studied, had already reduced nous and the demiurgical function to the second place (see Nous 18) and his "First God" is absolutely one and indivisible (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xi, p. 531).

12. This is, in essence, the One, the first hypothesis of Plotinus, that is beyond Being and completely without qualification (Enn. vi, 9, 3). Oneness is not predicated of it (vi, 9, 5); indeed, nothing is in it: it is what it is, i.e., it is its own activity and essence (vi, 8, 12-13). Two corrections are in order, however. It is not a numerical unit (monas, vi, 9, 5), nor is it the Aristotelian thought about thought (vi, 7, 57); see Nous 18).

13. The transcendence of the One, affirmed with increasing emphasis in the later philosophical tradition, leads to a crisis in cognition (see agnostos). Plotinus confronts the problem of this transcendent first principle that is beyond Being, apprehension, and description by an application of the theory of mimesis and a remarkable resort to introspection. The question of mimesis may be approached from two directions. One, properly Aristotelian, is that of the unity of the person (see Meta. 100b5). From it one progresses, through ever higher grades of unity, to the absolute simplicity that is the One (vi, 9, 1-2). From a more Platonic point of view, intellecction is a kind of movement, rotary in the heavens but deranged in us because of the contradictory motions coming from the body (Tim. 37a-38a; Laws x, 597d; see Nous 11). For Plotinus the One is the immobile center of all of these motions, and in a metaphor of dancers around a choirmaster he explains our irregular motions (e.g., sensation, discursive reasoning) by our turning away from the director toward the spectators (vi, 9, 8; on the "attention" principle see Nous 21, Nous 18, and the extraordinary remarks in 1, 4, 10). In both cases, then, the true unity is to be sought within ourselves. The One is known not by reasoning, which is necessarily an exercise in plurality, but by the presence (parousia) in us of unity (vi, 9, 4). The grasp of the One is accomplished by interior reflection, the "flight of the alone to the Alone" (vi, 9, 11), which seeks to render the soul completely simple (vi, 9, 7). In the intelligible world this mystical union with the One is a permanent experience, the true heavenly Aphrodite; but here it is only occasional, and we experience rather the vulgar courtesan Aphrodite (vi, 9, 9; on Plotinus' own occasional mystical union with the One, see Forgy, Vita Plot. 36:3).

14. Just as Plotinus proceeds, in Enn. vi, 9, 1-2, from relative unity to absolute oneness, so Proclus derives the absolute One from the presence of ones that participate (methexis) in Oneness (Enn. theol., props. 1-6; for the method, cf. trias). There is, as in Aristotle, a transcendent final cause (prop. 5), as well as a transcendent efficient cause (prop. 11); these are identical with each other and are the One (props. 12-15).

For the other Neoplatonic hypotheses, see Nous, psyche tou pantos, psyche; for the manner of progression, proodos, trias.

hexis: Henad

Although the term is used in Plato, Phil. 152a and by Neopythagoreans to describe the eidos (so Plotinus, Enn. vi, 6, 9), it is best known as a feature of Proclus' Neoplatonism where the Henads are plural unfoldings of the unity of the One, transcendent sources of individuality; see Proclus, Enn. theol., props. 113-125. They are identified with the traditional gods.

heteron: the other, otherwise

In Plato the other is one of the major forms that pervades all the other forms, Soph. 255c-e. Some apparent nonbeing is merely the "other," ibid. 259a (see on). Heteron is a principle in the construction of World Soul, Tim. 52a. In Plotinus it is the principle, inherent in Nous, of the plurality of the eidos (Enn. vi, 22; iv, 3, 5); it produces matter, ibid. 11, 4, 5; see prop. i, hexis.

hexis: state, characteristic, habit

For Aristotle there are three states in the soul: emotions (pathos), capacities (dynamis), characteristics (hexis) (Eth. Nich. 1105b). Hexis is defined (ibid.) as our condition vis-a-vis the pathos. Aristotle is a hexis (ibid. 1106a); only the beginnings of our habits are under voluntary control (ibid. 1114b). The Stoics disagreed with Aristotle and considered arate a pathos rather than a hexis (SVF 1, 202, 393). A peculiarly Stoic development of the term is the grouping of hexis with the four binding powers of things: hexis, physis, psyche, nous, and is
translated, when used in this sense by Seneca (Nat. Queses, 11, 2) as uni- 

nity (see the peculiarly similar use of hesis in Plato cited under pithora). Among these hesis is the unities of inorganic matter (see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 11, 29; Philo, Leg. coll. 11, 31, Quad Deus 35; SVF II, 457-458, 714-716). Hesis is defined, in the category of quality (poiesis), and distinguished from the more transient state, disposition (diathesis), Cat. 80-90.

**holon:** whole, organism, universe

1. A critical moment in discussions of change occurs when Aristotle rejects, at a single stroke, the earlier theories that absolute genesis (q.v.) could take place by association (synkrisis) or disassociation (diakrisis) of particles and asserts that it comes about when this whole (holon) changes into that (De gen. et corr. 1, 317a).

2. The question of wholeness had been raised previously. In the Parmenides wholeness is denied of the One because it connotes the presence of parts and, consequently, that the One is in some sense a plurality (132c-d); the unity (hen) of the One must be something quite distinct from "wholeness" (see Soph. 244c-245c).

3. The problem in Parmenides is a logical and conceptual one having to do with the notion of divisibility; with Empedocles the physical issue arises. It is Empedocles' desire to keep Parmenides' unity and at the same time posit a plurality of elements (stoicheia, q.v.) that adds this new dimension. Genesis is cyclic for Empedocles: the four "roots" are eternal but they are in a constant process of transformation (fr. 17, lines 1-13), passing, in the process, in and out of a sphere in which they are perfectly blended (frs. 27, 28). It is this sphere, obviously a compromised descendent of Parmenides' One. Being, that first suggests that the elements can be submerged in some sort of a unified whole where their individual characteristics are lost, at least to sight. Now this is accomplished he does not say, except to remark that the sphere is covered with a harmonia. The term (as q.v.), a mathematical one, had a great vogue in Pythagorean circles, and the suspicion of just such an influence on Empedocles is strengthened when, later in the cosmic cycle, the four elements begin to combine into compound bodies (frs. 96, 98). Here we are told that flesh and blood and bones are formed of fixed numerical proportions of the elements that are all linked together by the "divine bonds of harmonia."

4. This is the first attempt at explaining organic compounds in terms of the numerical proportion (logoi) of their ingredients. The same mathematical approach is visible in Anaxagoras, who held that bodies, even though they were composed of "seeds" that contain a portion of everything in them, have their identity from the quantitative predominance of one or other of the types of seed within them (frs. 6, 12; see Aristotle, Phys. 1, 187a).

5. Neither Plato nor Aristotle was much taken by this method, though it is not apparent how it could be applied to colors (see Tim. 68b, with a slight sceptical note; De sensu 449b). Plato preferred the more geometrical approach of composing compound bodies out of differently shaped particles (see genesis, stoicheion; he does, however, resort to numerical proportion for the composition of the marrow in Tim. 79c), while Aristotle felt how one of these pre-Socratic mixture techniques really explained the presence of a new "whole" or something original in no way lost its individual entities but merely became imperceptible to sense; the true holon should be homogeneous (homioneres) throughout (De gen. et corr. 1, 327b-328a; on the logos of the mixture, see Meta. 993a, 993a, 642a).

6. The influence of the physikoi is much less in evidence in Plato's more philosophical approach to the question in Theaet. 203e ff., where Socrates proposes, as an alternative in a dilemma, that the whole (holon) is something more than the total (pan) of its parts. The suggestion is not, however, pursued here, nor in his account of genesis. But in other places Plato is well aware that in a whole as opposed to a sum a crucial factor is the positioning (thesis) of the parts and that in the true holon the parts have a fixed spatial relationship to each other and to the whole. He applies this to the arrangement of parts in a tragedy (Phaedrus 268d) and, in the Laws, to the parts of the cosmos. The latter is a particularly interesting example since it stresses the teleological function of the parts with respect to the whole (X, 98c, 99b). Position (thesis) had, of course, been important among the pre-Socratics (see aisthesis, genesis), and it is not unlikely that its occurrence in Plato had Pythagorean origins (see Parm. 145-b, Aristotle, De coelo 288a, and compare Poet. 145b).

7. Aristotle's approach to wholeness is twofold. A whole is, by way of preliminary, something that has several parts (mere, moria; Meta. 1023a) that are potentially (dynamis) present in the whole (Phys. VII, 250c; De gen. et corr. 1, 334b). The notion is not necessarily limited to physical bodies: Aristotle discusses the mere of tragedy (Poet. 1450a, 1450b), the mere of the soul (De an. 131, 442a-b; see psyche), and eidos as a part of the genus (Meta. 1043b). But if it is true, as has been noted (De gen. et corr. 1, 317a), that genesis is of a whole from a whole, what is it that differentiates this holon from a mere aggregate of particles and makes it something over and above a total (Meta. 1045a)? The total (pan) is something that has merely a positioning of parts (ibid. 1044a); a whole has an internal cause (aition) of unity that is its eidos or ousia (qq.v; ibid. 1041b).
8. But the eidos is also the energeia (q.v.) and the entelecheia (q.v.) of a being, and so by the juxtaposition of these notions the Aristotelian concept of holon broadens out to include both function (ergon, q.v.) and finality (telos, q.v.). The eidos of living beings and the unitive cause of all their functions is the psyche. In this fashion parts (more) are transformed, by the notion of function, into organs (organa). An organ is the part of a living creature that is directed toward an end or purpose that is an activity (praxis; De part. anim. 645b); nature (physis), the internal principle of growth in these beings, has made the organs to perform certain functions (ibid. 693b), and a body so constituted is an organism (see ibid. 642a, and compare the definition of soul in De an. 11, 413a as the entelecheia of an organic body). The organon, then, is the physical part of a living being matched to each of the latter's potencies (dynamis) to enable them to function (De gen. en. i, 716s; iv, 765b).

9. A somewhat similar idea appears in Epicurus' notion of the systema. Democritus had reduced all the pathe of things to those directly associated with extended bodies qua extended, and relegated all the rest (e.g. color, sound) to a subjective impression of the senses (fr. 9; see aisthesis, pathos). But for his latter-day followers there were certain pathe that, though not present in the individual atomon, were present in an aggregate of them. In this sense the whole (systema, akroisma, or, as Lucretius calls it, concilium) is more than the sum of its parts (see D.L. x, 69). What is the difference here? First, there is the question of the position (thesis) of the atomon relative to each other, thus forming a pattern that is the superadded factor that allows the atomon to be colorless but their aggregate to be colored (Lucretius 11, 757–771; see Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1110c). But in addition to this formation of a spatial pattern in the aggregate, the atoms also have their own individual movement, and it happens that when they are formed into concilia their movements harmonize and other aggregate pathe come into existence (ibid. 11, 109–111). In this way it is in the concilium of the soul-atoms, contained within the sheath of the body, that the motion which is sensation occurs (D.L. x, 64: see aisthesis). For the various types of Epicurean concilia, see genesis.

10. The Stoic emphasis on the world as an entity under the unitive and providential direction of logos (q.v.) led to a fairly consistent use of “universe” (holon) as a synonym for kosmos and is particularly evident in Marcus Aurelius' description of men as the organs (as opposed to mere parts) of the universe (holon; Iam. vii, 13). The Neoplatonists reverted instead to the Parmenides and Theaetetus texts, Proclus devoting props. 66–69 of the Elem. theol. to a consideration of wholeness, both as an unparticipated eidos (holotes pro meron) and as participated in by various wholes-with-parts (holotes ek meron) that have wholeness as one of their pathe.

On the question of the unity of the soul, see psyche.

Hómoiós: like, similar

1. One of the most common Greek theories of knowledge was based on the dictum “like is known by like.” Two aspects can be detected: 1) the knower cannot know an object without some sort of identity of elements between them, and 2) in knowing something we also, at the same time, become more like it. The first aspect is seen at its boldest in Empedocles’ fr. 105: “we see earth with earth, water with water,” explained (Diels 31A86) by the fact that things give off effinences and knowledge results when these fit into the corresponding passages in the senses; compare the similar theory in Democritus (Diels 68A195: see aisthesis). There is a more sophisticated version in Plato’s Tim. 45b–46a where vision is explained by the going out of a beam of fiery light that coalesces, “like to like,” with the similarly constituted rays of the sun; the intrusion of an object into this heterogeneous beam causes sensation. Aristotle, who criticizes both versions of the theory (De an. 1, 404b; De sensu, 437b–b), solves the problem by his theory of dynamis: the knower is the object potentially (ibid. 436b). The second aspect, the knower becomes the known, reflects the fully developed Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge (see noesis), and, in an ethical direction, those of homoiosis, katharsis, harmonia; see also oinomia.

a. For the use of medical homoeopathism by the philosophers, see katharsis; the perception theory is located in its larger context under aisthesis; for similarity in the procession-reversion diastole of Neoplatonism, see protodos; for its role in the action and passion on a cosmic scale, sympatheia.

Homoiosis: assimilation (to God)

Originally a Pythagorean idea (see Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 137), assimilation to God was later adopted by Socrates and Plato as descriptive of the end of philosophy (Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, p. 49 and Theaet. 176a). The notion was also current among the Peripatetics; see Cicero, De fin. v, 4, 11; Julian, Orat. vii, 185a; and the famous call to make ourselves immortal in Eth. Nich. 1177b. It is central in Plotinus, Enn. 1, 6, 6. For its philosophical origins, see psyche, homoiosis, harmonia.

Hormé: impulse, appetite

Aristotle uses horme as a somewhat negligent synonym for orexis (q.v.), but with the Stoics it becomes the standard technical term for
hóros or horísmós: boundary, definition

The Socratic contribution to philosophy was induction (epagogē, q.v.) and definition, and these in the context of ethics (Aristotle, Meta. 1076b). True definition was impossible according to the Cynics (Aristotle, Meta. 1043b; Plato, Theaet. 191c). Definitions are the starting point of demonstration (Aristotle, Anal. post. 11. 90b). There is a distinction between nominal and causal definitions (ibid. 93b-94a). The parts of the definition are enumerated in Top. 1. 109b. There is no definition of matter, only of eidos (Aristotle, Meta. 1095b-1095a), nor of individual sensible substances (Meta. 1096b). Properly, definitions are only of species, and of everything else in a secondary sense (ibid. 1096a). The Sceptics refused to define anything (D.L. IX, 108); see diaphora, idion, cūsia.

hýle: material, matter

1. Hýle, a purely Aristotelian term, does not have its origins in a directly perceived reality—as is true in the case of extension or magnitude (megethos, q.v.)—but emerges from an analysis of change (Phys. 1, 190b-191a); it is not known directly but by analogy (analogia, ibid. 191a-b). The difficulty in grasping the nature of matter is that it seems to be outside the range of knowledge (Meta. 1056a): when one has stripped away (aphairesis, q.v.) all the qualities of an existent, there seems to be nothing left. Nor does matter fit into any of the kategoríai (q.v.), since they are predicated of it, while it is predicated of nothing; it is not even a negation (Meta. 1054a). It is, in short, potency (dynamis), just as form is act (De an. 11, 412a).

2. Once the peculiar nature of hýle has been delimited it can take its place among the four causes of things (Phys. 1, 194b; sec citéas), where, like the eidos, it is an immanent (enthyparchon) cause (Meta. 1076b). It serves another function as well: it is the principle of individuation. Since the eidos is indivisible (atomon) it can merely serve to constitute a being within a given genus or species; the individuals within the infima species are numerically distinct by reason of their matter (Meta. 1054a, 1055b; the individuation of pure forms, e.g. God, intelligences, is not treated; see kinōn 12 and compare diaphora 4).

3. Hýle, then, is the primary substratum of change (hýkeimenon, q.v.; Phys. 1, 192a), the “thing” that receives the new eidos (Meta. 1056b; for the Platonic antecedents, see genesis). But to call it a “thing” is misleading. Hýle is like a substance (to de, see Phys. 1, 190b, 192a), but it is not such because it lacks the two chief characteristics of substance: it is neither a separate existent (chorision, q.v.) nor an individual (Meta. 1025a).

4. Just as there are various types of change (see metabole), so too there must be various types of matter that serve as the substrata for these changes (see Meta. 1046b). Most notable of these is the matter associated with a change of place (hýle topike; see phora) that implies none of the others, or, to put it in another way, is not necessarily accompanied with “genetic and destructible matter” (hýle gennetai phtharon), and so is not subject to genesis and pithora (q.v.; Meta. 1046b, 1046b, 1056b, 1056b). Thus is established the possibility of the indestructibility of the heavenly bodies whose only change is that of local motion (see aither, ouranion). For the distinction of the matters involved in substantial (genesis) and qualitative (allíosis) change, see steicheion.

5. For Aristotle the composition of an individual, a Socrates or a Callias, is an extremely complex procedure that may be conceived as the imposition of a succession of increasingly specific eides. Each of these forms is imposed on a progressively more informed matter, and so there are distinctions in hýle ranging from a first matter (prote hýle, materia prima), the substratum of the form of the primary bodies or steicheia (q.v.), earth, air, fire, and water, through a series of more highly informed matters down to “ultimate matter” (exchathe or telomathian hýle), the matter of this Individual existent (De part. anim. 11, 645a; see Meta. 1046a).

6. Aristotle was not unaware that Platonism (and its more remote ancestor Pythagoreanism) had been moving in a similar direction (Phys. 1, 192a). But they either followed Parmenides and labeled the material concept as pure nonbeing (me on, see on), which it clearly was not since it both preceded and survived genesis (indeed, matter is eternal), or else they identified it with the “great and the small” (Meta. 987b; see dyas), which is, in Aristotle’s mind, a rank confusion between a genuinely nondetermined principle and a privation. It was this inability to distinguish between hýle and stereos that prevented the Platonists from arriving at a valid concept of matter. Closer to
Aristotle's own thinking was the Platonic Receptacle (hypodeche) of Timaeus 49a that is (ibid. 51a) invisible and characterless, and that, like the Aristotelian hyle, is indescribable and known only indirectly by a kind of "bastard reasoning" (ibid. 52a–b). There are, of course, differences. What begins as a "receptacle" or "matrix" (see Phys. 1, 192a) is surely different from substratum, but even further removed from the Aristotelian hyle is its final description as "area" or "space" (choe; Tim. 52b), a figure that, on the testimony of Plotinus (Enn. 11, 4, 11), prompted some later commentators to suggest that it involved the notion of volume.

7. In Stoicism, where all is material, the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form is nonetheless preserved in the distinction between an active (poiein) and passive (paschein) principle (D.L. vii, 134). Both are material but the first is eternal, "first matter," which is identified with logos (SVF 1, 87). The basic difference between Aristotle and the Stoics is, however, in the realm of magnitude. The Aristotelian analysis of change had led to the concept of matter as a substratum, as pure potentiality (dynamis; see Meta. 1039b. De an. 412a, 434a), akin to substance, while magnitude (megethos, q.v.) is an accident, i.e., a form, in the category of quantity (poson). Hence Aristotle, and Plotinus after him (see Enn. ii, 4, 8–12), affirm the incorporeality of magnitude, while the Stoic analysis, based on action and passion, leads to the opposite conclusion (D.L. vii, 56; Cicero, Acad. post. i, 11, 39).

8. Plotinus' views on matter, found primarily in Enn. ii, 4, are a reaction to both Aristotle and the Stoics and are based upon his reading of the Platonic proof-texts on apeiron in the Philebus (150–173a, 230c–25b). Like Aristotle, Plotinus admits the existence of an intelligible matter (hyle noote). But whereas the intelligible matter of Aristotle was a purely conceptual entity involved in the process of abstraction (apokhesis, q.v.), the Plotinian version has a definite ontological status: it is the intelligible counterpart (the argument presumes the existence of a kosmos noetos [q.v.] in parallel with our kosmos asthetos) of sensible matter, and its existence is proved by the divisibility of the genera of the eide, as is indicated in the Philebus (Enn. ii, 4). Corporeal matter, then, is an image (eidolon) of intelligible matter.

9. Plotinus also opposes Aristotle on the relationship between matter and privation (steresis). Aristotle had chided the Platonists on not distinguishing between them (Phys. 1, 193a), but Plotinus reaffirms (11, 14–15) the identification: matter is privation; it is, moreover, the Platonic indefinite or unlimited (apeiron, q.v.; see also dynas, which is described as indefinite, caristos). But unlike the Platonic chora (extended corrections of the chora image in iii, 6, 12–19),

Plotinian matter is derived from the One (ii, 4, 5, v, 1, 5; see Proclus, Elem. theolog., props. 57–59).

10. Finally, Plotinus confronts Aristotle on the question of individualization. In Meta. 99b Aristotle had maintained that the logic of the Platonists' arguments would require them to posit an eidos of every individual thing. Aristotle escapes this necessity, as we have seen, by making hyle the cause of individual differences. But Plotinus (Enn. v, 7) admits the existence of eidos of individuals to this same end.

For the equation of matter and evil, see kakon; for the pre-Socratic "materialists," eidos.

hyperothesis: beyond being, transcendence (divine): on the question of the transcendence of the Forms, see eidos

1. The notion of transcendence begins properly with Parmenides' position of an existent, and then proceeding to deprive it of all characteristics save uneness (fr. 8, lines 1–90). Plato explores the dialectical possibilities of this in the Parmenides, and especially in the first "hyperthesis" (see 141d–142a) where he demonstrates that this One cannot even be said to "be." This may be dialectic, but on other grounds Plato is convinced of the transcendence of his supreme principle: in Rep. 500b the Good is beyond being, and compare the various texts cited under aagnostos.

2. Stoic materialism had radically reduced divine transcendence (SVF 1, 87 and see psy), but in the first century of the Christian era divine transcendence once again comes to the foreground due to a revival of Pythagoreanism and Zoroastrianism (see eidos), coupled with the introduction of the Semitic tradition of transcendence, visible in Philo, De opif. 2, 1–9 and in Leg. all. iii, 61, where the Logos is transcendent as well. The doctrine becomes a staple in Middle Platonism (see Apollonius, Epit. x, 1–4), where it is closely connected with attempts to devise an epistemological approach to God (see aagnostos). Divine transcendence finds its most famous exponent in Plotinus and his doctrine of the One (kenos), Enn. vii, 9, 3, and 5, followed by Proclus, Elem. theolog., prop. 20; see also hypostasis, theos.

hypodeche or hypodechomené: receptacle

According to Plato it is in this receptacle that genesis takes place, although the receptacle itself is always the same, Tim. 50d–51b. It is also called chora (area), ibid. 52a, and granted a quasi-existence (pos on), ibid. 52c. (For the ontological aspects of this, see on and genesis)

Aristotle identifies Plato's "receptacle" with matter (hyle), Phys. iv, 205b. For Plotinus the "receptacle" is "second" or sensible matter,
hypokeimenon: substratum

Aristotle's analysis of *genesis* in the *Physics*, based, apparently, on a Platonic prototype (see *genesis*), leads him to the isolation of three principles (archai) involved in all changes from one thing into another: the immanent form (*eidos*, q.v.), the privation (*steresis*, q.v.) of the form of the thing it is going to become, and, finally, the substratum (hypokeimenon) that persists through the change and in which the *genesis* takes place (*Phys*. 1, 190a-b). Its name is dictated by its function; thus from a predicational point of view the substratum is that of which other things are predicated and which is not predicated of anything else (*Meta.* 1028b-1029a). But the passages in the *Physics* are considering hypokeimenon in the context of material change, and so it is not merely a logical concept but, together with eidos, a genuine co-principle of being (*Phys*. 1, 190b), what is, from a slightly different point of view, matter (*hyle*) and, like matter, is known not directly but analogically (ibid. 191a). Both the logical and ontological aspects of hypokeimenon persist in later thinkers: it is the first of the four Stoic *kategorai* (q.v.), *SVF* II, 569, and identified with matter in Plotinus, *Enn.* II, 4, 6; see *hyle*, hypodoche, symbebekos.

hypólepsis: judgment

See *doxa*, *noesis*.

hypónoia: underlying sense, hidden meaning

See *mythos*.

hypóstasis: standing under, hence, substance; real being, frequently in opposition to appearances

In Plato's system all the *eide* are hypostases in that they are really real (monos on), but the notion of hypostasis does not formally appear until later Platonism began to arrange the most important *eide* in an ontologically descending hierarchy, perhaps on the analogy of number (see *monas*), since it early appears in a Neopythagorean numerical interpretation of Plato (Moderatus in Simplicius, *Phys.* 250c-251a). It is clearly a product of syncretism, a blending of the Parmenidean One (see *hen*), Aristotle's Intelligence (see *nous*) combined with Plato's *Demoiourgos*, and Plato's World Soul (see *psyche ton pantos*). These three supreme archai of being are already in evidence in Albinus (*Epit.* x) and Numenius (in Eusebius, *Prac.* Evang. xi, 17), but their integration into a complex metaphysical and ethical world view is the work of Plotinus: One, *Nous*, *Psyche* (the latter subdivided, see *physis*), see the summary passages in *Enn.* II, 9, 11; *V. 21, 7, 42 and Proclus' dialectic derivation in *Eleem. theol.*, prop. 20.

For the individual hypostases, see *hen*, *nous*, *psyche ton pantos*; for their progression, *proodos*, *trias*.

hypothesis: suggestive, posited starting point, hypothesis

The tentative definition suggested by Socrates' interlocutors, Xenophon, *Mem.* IV, 6, which Socrates himself explains more fully in *Phaedo* 100e-c where it serves as a kind of criterion against which to measure the congruence of "deductions"; the theory of forms is just such a hypothesis here. Again (ibid. 101d) the pushing back of the hypothesis to something more basic is described, back to what in *Rep.* 513b is called the "unhypotetized principle" (see *Parm.* 125e). In Aristotle the "primary" (ex arches) hypotheses are the undemonstrable first principles: axioms and postulates (*Anal. pr.* I, 24a, 72a; see *noesis*, *nous*, *epagege*).

idion: property

In terms of Aristotelian logic a property is not something that reveals the essence of a thing, like "animal" (the *genos*), but that belongs to an essence and to that essence alone, e.g. "grammar-learning" as applied to a man. Unlike an accident (see symbebekos), it cannot belong to anything else, i.e., every man is a grammar-learner and vice versa, *Top.* 1, 102a. Together with *genos*, *diephora*, and symbebekos, it constitutes the four "predicables" treated ibid. 1, 101b-104a. Their relationship with the ten *kategorai* or "predicaments" is dealt with ibid. 1, 109b; see symbebekos.

isomoiria: equal share, balance, equilibrium

See *meon*.

isonomia: equal share, balance, equilibrium

See *keodone*. 
kakon: evil

1. Before Socrates made ethics a subject of philosophical discourse considerations of good and evil had been the preserve of the poets and the lawgivers. But the increasing awareness of moral relativism and the Sophists' assertion of the purely arbitrary character of law (nomos, q.v.) led Socrates to seek for absolute standards of moral conduct.

2. But the Socratic emphasis is on virtue (arete) and good (agathon). Indeed, from his intellectualistic point of view there would seem to be no such thing as evil, since no one errs willingly, but through ignorance (Aristotle, Eth. Nich. vii, 1146b). Plato continued in this tradition with his lengthy discussions of the possibility of false judgment (see Socrates).

3. But there were new considerations as well. Plato is more aware of the volitional element and admits that the soul can cause both good and evil (Laws 895d; compare Thetet. 170a and see psyche), and the hypostatization process that led him to convert Socratic definitions into ontological realities suggests, in one place at least, the existence of an eidos of evil (Rep. 476e). This is perhaps consonant with, or at least explicable, in the context of the ethical origins of the theory of eidos, but the assertion, in Laws 895e, that there is an evil as well as a good World Soul (psyche tou pantos, q.v.) to move ethical dualism, pervasive in the early Plato on the level of body and soul, onto the cosmic stage, perhaps the result of increased contacts with the Iranian tradition.

4. Aristotle rejects both the eidos of evil and the evil World Soul in Meta. 1031a. The characteristic Aristotelian doctrine associates moral evil with excess as a correlative of his theory of the "mean" (see meinon). In Eth. Nich. 1106b Aristotle quotes with approval the related Pythagorean judgment that evil is to be identified with the indeterminate (apeiron; compare the Pythagorean "Table of Opposites" in Meta. 980a, and see kinainon). In post-Aristotelian philosophy the implications of both the Platonic and Aristotelian positions were explored. The Epicureans, with their thoroughgoing sensualism, stand somewhat apart: all evil can be equated with pain (alges, pones) either of the body or the mind

(D.L. x, 128; see hedone). and its existence poses no theological problems since the gods do not concern themselves with the world (D.L. x, 123–124). But for the Stoics and their doctrine of providence (pragma, q.v.) evil is more of a problem: how to explain the presence of evil in a universe governed by an all-good God? One suggestion (its history was venerable) was that evil is God's instrument for educating and chasting men (Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. 104c; Seneca, De prom. passim). The other relied on the organic nature of the universe as a whole: "all things work unto good" (Plutarch, op. cit., 105a; Seneca, Ep. 74, 20). But there is another possibility, the one broached by Plato in the Laws and that openly admits the existence of a radical, subsistent principle of evil, whether theistic as in the Laws and Iranian Zoroastrianism (so Plutarch, De iside 46, 45), or metaphysical, e.g. matter.

5. Both the Pythagoreans and Plato had, as noted above, admitted the indeterminate (apeiron) as a co-principle of being, and the former at least had identified it with evil. Aristotle had equated it with his material principle (hyle) but had failed to draw the conclusion that matter and evil are to some extent synonymous. There are, to be sure, some hints of this in both Plato (Pol. 273b; Tim. 69c) and Aristotle (De gen. anim. iv. 70b; matter resists form), but the exploration of the ethical qualities of matter remained for later philosophers.

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7. Stoics (and Epicureans) monism tended to obscure rather than illuminate the problematic of matter but there were other forces at work. There was, for one, the Neoplatonic interest in the Timaeus that served to reinforce the equation of Plato's share with Aristotle's hyle (so Moderatus cited in Simplicius, In Phys. pp. 230–231). Again, and more importantly, there was the growth of the oriental tradition of ethical dualism whose most important witness is Plutarch's De iside, and which found its natural philosophical ally in Aristotle's eidos/hyle dichotomy. By the time of Numenius, evil (kakon, malum) is firmly identified with matter (hyle, sibra) and the position was held by a variety of Gnostic sects (see Corpus Hermeticum 1, 1–5).

8. Plotinus, who opposed the Gnostic view of the universe and, indeed, any type of dualism, was, nonetheless, affected by the identification of matter and evil. His solution to the problem of evil unfolds within strictly controlled limits. First, it is not a question of dualism: matter is generated from the One under the guise of "Otherness" (Enn. ii, 4–5). This refers first and foremost to intelligible matter (hyle noesis; see hyle). Proclus doubts whether this should be called matter at all: Theol. Plat. iii, 9) that is always defined and hence the possibility of evil in the kosmos noos is ruled out (Enn. i, 8–2). On the question of sensible matter (hyle aristikete) Plotinus, while admit-
ting that it is the cause of evil (1, 8, 4), is, at some pains to point out that it is not a substance but a privation (stereosis), the absence of any good (1, 8, 11).

9. Proclus opposes this on a number of counts: he fails to see how a privation, which is essentially a negation, can be the cause of anything (De mal. subst., p. 240) and so prefers to revert to the Platonic (and more voluntaristic) position that the soul is the cause of evil or, to put it another way, that the evil in the kosmos is moral and not metaphysical (op. cit., p. 253).

On *original sin* as a source of evil, see kathodos.

kállos: beauty
See eros.

kardia: heart
1. Behind the long-standing debate on the seat of the soul that was conducted in philosophical circles there stands a prephilosophical physiology that had, in effect, decided the question and that, supported by the massive authority of Homer, tended to dominate even the accumulating medical evidence to the contrary. The Homeric hero both feels (Il. ix, 156; xii, 493; etc.) and thinks (Il. ix, 609; xxi, 296) with the phrenes or midriff, whence the later phrenesis, thought or wisdom.

2. A great number of thinkers went along the same path, encouraged no doubt by medical theories of vital heat carried through the system by the blood. The thermal theory of thought finds its chief propagator in Heraclitus who identified the soul with fire (fr. 38) and connected it with consciousness (Diels 223a:6). In Empedocles the blood appears as a factor linked with perception, and the seat of perception is located in the heart (fr. 105). Perhaps Democritus too is to be placed here, though the evidence is contradictory (rational faculty in the breast in Aetius iv, 4; 6; in the brain, ibid. iv, 5, 1), and it was not, in any event, their vital heat that suggested the comparison of soul and fire atoms to Democritus, but rather the latter's shape and mobility (Aristotle, De an. i, 405a). Aristotle calls the heart the arché of life, movement, and sensation (De part. anim. 666a–b), and though the Epicureans dispersed the soul all over the body (see psyche), the rational faculty (Lucretius: animus) was in the breast (Lucretius iii, 142–142), as it was for the Stoics (SVF ii, 679).

3. The other school of thought, which located the seat of perception in the brain (enkephalos), had its origin in Pythagorean medical circles, specifically with Alcmacon of Crotona (Theophrastus, De sensa. 26; see also aisthesis) who maintained that there were passages (poιoι) connecting the senses to the brain, a position he was said to have arrived at by actual dissections on the optic nerve (Diels 241a11) and that reappears among the philosophers with Diogenes of Apollonia. Here the physiological reasoning is crossed with more philosophical considerations, i.e., that air (aer, qv.) is the divine arche of all things, and the source of life, soul, and intelligence (frs. 4, 5). How perception occurs we are told by Theophrastus (De sensa. 39–44). Man inhales air that travels, via the various senses, to the brain. If the air is pure and dry, thought (phronesis) takes place (see aisthesis and compare the similar Hippocratic text in Diels 64cg).

4. Socrates had heard of the brain theory as a young man and was interested in it (Phaedo 96b). He must have passed his interest on to Plato who, in the Timaeus, locates the rational part (logistikon) of the human soul in the head (44d) and makes the brain the source of the reproductive powers (73c–d; see psyche).

5. But even though the question continued to be debated (see SVF ii, 885; Cicero, Tusc. 1, 9, 19), it was the view of Aristotle that prevailed. Aristotle knew, to be sure, the medical assertions of the connection of the senses with the brain, but he was not convinced by the evidence (Hist. anim. 514a). What he finds more persuasive is that there is no sensation in the brain itself (De part. anim. 666a).

6. Plotinus, however, following the Platonic tradition, continues to locate the arche of sensation in the brain, or as he carefully puts it, "the point of departure [arché] of the operation [energeia] of the faculty [dynamis], since it is the arche of the kinesis of the instrument [organon]" (Enn. iv, 3, 23).

Katálēpsis: grasping, apprehension
The act of grasping an impression (phantasia): the act is a primary one in Stoic epistemology, and described by Cicero, Acad. p. 1, 11, 49–42; apprehension is the criterion of truth for the Stoics, Scuatus Epiphanes, Adv. Mael. vii, 152; the volitional element is underlined, ibid. viii, 337; see phantasia, prolepsis, ennola, noesis.

Kategoríaí: accusations, predications, categories,
prædicamenta, summa genera (scil. entis)
The ten (in some lists only eight) most general ways in which a subject may be described; a logical structuring that corresponds to the real existence of things: the *chte* of being in Meta. 1003b21 or, again, the summa genera of being (se genera). The most complete list is given in Cat. ib–22: substance (ousia), quantity (poion), quality (poion), relation (pros ti), place (poion), time (poion), position (katai), state (choeia), action (poleio), affection (pachieia); for their relationship with the four predicables, see Top. 109a–b and idem. Aristotle's kategorai are criticized by Plotinus in Enn. vi, 1, 1–24. The
Stoics reduced the categories to four: subject (hypokeimenon), quality, state, relation, SVF II, 366; these are discussed by Plotinus, Enn. vi, I, 25-30.

Katharisis: purgation, purification

1. Katharisis, a word with both religious and medical implications, seems to fluctuate between affirmative and negative functions at the hands of the philosophers. Among the Pythagoreans katharisis had, as might be expected, strong religious connotations. Katharisis is a purification of the soul, effected, we are told (Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 110), through mousike (q.v.), i.e., by rendering it harmonious; indeed, this is philosophy (ibid. 137). This Pythagorean identification of katharisis and philosophia is found in Plato (see Phaedo 67a-d); and the analogy with music runs through the dialogues. In Phaedo 61a Socrates equates philosophy and music, and in the Republic (431e, 432a, 432d) music is the foundation of the master virtue (see ouranos).

2. But when Socrates informs us, in Soph. 206a ff., that his art is "cathartic," we have passed over to other grounds where the function of katharisis is described as "the removal of evil from the soul" (ibid. 207d), just as the medical art does for the body. Here the problem is not seen as a kind of imbalance (see hodeon) that can be set aright by harmonization, but as the presence of something essentially alien to the system. Medical men are familiar with this type of purgation (Crat. 409a), and it may be extended, by analogy, to a misuse by tyrants practiced upon the state (Rep. 567c). Socrates effects his katharisis of the soul by the best possible purgative, interrogatio (siemikos) that cleanses the soul of false opinions (Soph. 230d).

3. Aristotle applies the theory to music (Pol. 1241b-1342a): some music is educational, presumably the "harmonizing" type of the Pythagorean tradition; but there is also "cathartic" music in the medical, purgative sense. This latter type has its effect by the homoeopathic principle of producing exactly the same effect that one seeks to cure. Plato knows of this practice (see Rep. 560c, Laws 790c-791b), and as is clear from these passages in Plato and Aristotle, both men were aware that the homoeopathic principle enunciated by physicians had already been extended to the cure of certain psychic states, most particularly religious possession or enthousiasmos (see mantike). Aristotle took the further step and incorporated it into his theory of art, with the well-known result of tragedy's being defined in terms of effecting a homoeopathic katharisis/purgation of the pathe of pity and fear (Post. 1449b).

4. Plotinus discusses the relationship of katharisis and arete in Enn. I, 2, 4; with Plato he makes katharisis a necessary condition to assimilation to God (ibid. I, 5, 6; see homoeosis).

Kathodos: descent, fall (of the soul)

1. The origins of the figure of the fall or banishment of the soul from its natural, immortal abode are religious, as appears from its first occurrence among the philosophers in Empedocles' Purifications (fr. 115): it may have been held in some form by Heraclitus as well; see frs. 62, 68; Plato, Gorg. 492e-493b; Plotinus, Enn. iv, 8, 1) where the banishment is the result of a primal crime (bloodshed or flesh-eating; frs. 136, 137, 139) committed by one of the daemons (q.v.) whose natural lot was immortality. Because of this crime it is subjected, for the period of a "great year" (30,000 seasons in Empedocles, fr. 115, line 6; the figure varies elsewhere), to successive reincarnations in this world of change.

2. This account is closely tied to the Pythagorean view of the immortal soul (see psyche) and the attendant doctrine of palingenesia (q.v.). This type of belief is common in Plato and expressed in a series of great myths (see athanasia). Plato knows Empedocles' version (and, apparently, the related myth of the devouring of Dionysus by the Titans, the creation of man from the ashes of the latter, and the consequent "Titanic nature" of mortals whose Dionysiac spark is thus embedded in a Titan element that is the direct result of an "original sin"; see Laws 799c) and employs it, with characteristic Platonic changes, in Phaedrus 248c-249d. The soul loses its wings and falls into the sensible world. But whereas the emphasis in Empedocles is on the immortal soul's coming into the cyclic kosmos, the fall consequent upon sin (its nature is not specified) is used by Plato to explain the presence of the soul in the body and is integrated, via the link between recalllection (anamnesis, q.v.) and the eido, into Plato's epistemological and metaphysical doctrines.

3. The question of the descent of the soul, its manner and its purpose, continued to exercise the thinkers of the Platonic tradition, and the best testimonial to their interest is undoubtedly the essay devoted to the question by Plotinus (Enn. iv, 8) and the passages of Iamblichus' De anima preserved in Stobaeus. A great variety of views are recorded, and the mechanics and landscape of the trip through the spheres, compounded of Plato's remarks (the prenatal vision of the spheres given the soul in Phaedrus 247c-248c and Rep. 616d-617d, and the suggestion, in Rep. 614d, that the descent, at least for some, is through the heavens) and a great deal of astronomical lore, are lovingly detailed. Typical is Porphyry's allegorical interpretation of the "Caves of the Nymphs" in Od. xiii, 102-112 (with some of the details bor-
rived from Numenius; cf. De animo nymph. 21, 28); Odysseus' travels become, in this symbol-embraced age, the archetypal enactment of the soul's wanderings: *ibid.* 54–55 and Macrobius' account of the *descensus animum* in his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis (I, 11, 1–12, 18); atypical is Plotinus' internalization of the phenomenon (Enn. IV, 8, 1).

4. Why this occurred at all is considerably more perplexing. The *Phaedrus* announces it as an "ordinance of Necessity," but proceeds to link it with a mischance (syntychia) of the soul (248c). The Timaeus shows a different point of view. The *kosmos* must contain all the beings of the *kosmos* *nostos* (q.v.), otherwise it will be incomplete; for this reason mortal creatures are brought into creation (41b–d). Plotinus subscribes to this view that the engagement of the soul in a mortal body is the fulfillment of a divine purpose and dictated by the very nature of the soul (Enn. IV, 8, 7). The same view is taken by Proclus (In Alc. 328, 23; compare Elem. theol., prop. 206).

5. But in this same passage of Plotinus there is at least the suggestion that the soul is somewhat to be blamed for its "excessive zeal," and in Enn. v, 1, 1 we are given a still clearer account of its "audacity" (tolma) and joy at its own independence that causes it to flee God. The prenatal sin theory, though hardly consonant with the rest of Plotinus' thought, was held by other thinkers. According to Iamblichus (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 375), Albinus is among this number in making the fall a result of free choice, but this may refer to the common Pythagorean motif of the soul's choice of life before *palinysis* (Rep. 617e: "the chooser is responsible; God is blameless"). Macrobius (1, 11, 11) speaks of a "longing for the body" (apparitum corporis). But the best-known adherents of the doctrine were undoubtedly the Gaetetics who thought the material world an essentially evil place and for whom the fall of the soul was a commonplace (see Plotinus, Enn. 11, 9, 19).

**katholou:** universal

1. *Katholou* is an Aristotelian technical term, though there is evidence for its evolution in Plato (cf. Meno 276a, Rep. 392a–e). Aristotle defines the universal in *De interp.* 17a 18 "that which by its nature is capable of being predicated of several subjects," e.g. "man" is a universal, *Callias* is a singular. It is frequently identified with *genos* (see *Meta.* 1049b, 1049b–1049d). Aristotle specifically rejects the claim of the universal to be substance, and yet in the *Anal. post.* and elsewhere he is constant that only the universal can be defined (Meta. 1093a, and is the true object of science (epistein; *Anal. post.* 1, 87b–90a, De an. 11, 417b). Aristotle severely criticized Plato for his pos-

tating the universals (Meta. 1086a–1087a): Socrates, however, did not make this mistake (ibid. 1073b).

For the perception of the universal in Epicurus, see *prolepsis*; for the possibility of a "concrete universal," *enorimor.*

**keisthai:** position, situs

One of the ten *kategorial* in Aristotle, Cat. 1b–2a; in other places, e.g. *Anal. post.* 1, 83b, both *keisthai* and *echin* (state) are omitted from the list. In the list in Cat. 1b Aristotle's own examples of *keisthai* are "lying," "sitting"; it is a relative term, *ibid.* 6b (see *pros* it).

**kenon:** void, vacuum

A void is admitted by the Pythagoreans as a separating element between natures, and, particularly, numbers (Aristotle, *Phys.* 1v, 213b). It is attacked by Parmenides (Diels, fr. 8, lines 6–11), and denied by Melissus as sheer nonbeing (Diels, fr. 7). For both Empedocles and Anaxagoras air is corporeal, and hence to be distinguished from the void, which is denied as nonbeing (Aristotle, *Phys.* 1v, 259a, *De oooio* 1v, 309a). The Atomists embrace the Parmenidean paradox and assert the existence of the nonbeing void, which, together with the "full," they make the new principles of the universe (Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* 1, 325a, *Meta.* 985b). It is discussed, defined ("place [topos] with nothing in it"), and denied by Aristotle (Phys. 1v, 213b–217b). *Kenon* is affirmed by Epicurus as a good Atomist (D.L. 13, 38–42), but denied by the Stoics (D.L. VII, 149; see *topos*).

**kénosis:** emptying, depletion

See *hedone*.

**kínesis:** motion, movement, change

1. Motion presents no problem for the Milesian philosophers; it is an unquestioned part of their pervasive vitalism (see *zoe*), and it is in this spirit that both *Anaximander* (Diels 12A11) and *Anaximenes* (Diels 12A9, 13A6) posit an eternal motion. It is noteworthy too that when Xenophanes wishes to temper the contemporary anthropomorphism he denies his God *kínesis* (Diels 21A5, 28). *Kínesis* is present in all reality in Heraclitus, as illustrated in the famous river image (see Plato, *Crat.* 409a, *rhoe*; and *episteme*).

2. Suddenly all of this is changed with Parmenides' attack on all forms of change (see *genesis*, *on*), and particularly motion (see fr. 8, line 96), undoubtedly as a result of his denial of the void (*kenon*) on the grounds of nonbeing, thus depriving body of a place into which to move (see Plato, *Theat.* 180e). Zeno's four arguments contrived to
support the position of Parmenides and deny the possibility of motion (see Aristotle, Phys. vi, 239b; answered, ibid. 263a-b) are, of course, polemical and derived ex hypothesi against the Pythagorean reluctance to relinquish the void (see megethos).

3. Genesis (q.v.), at least on the secondary level, recovered from Parmenides' assault, and his successors tended to substitute some derivative of kinesis, e.g. mixture or association, for the ground previously held by genesis properly so called. But what was now markedly different was that kinesis was no longer natural or inherent in things, as with the Milesians, but required some type of agent (kinoun, q.v.) operating from outside the system. An external force to explain kinesis appears in Empedocles and is identified as Love and Strife (fr. 17), and in Anaxagoras' nous (frs. 12-14); all of these forces are still, however, material.

4. At this point the only serious proponents of an inherent, natural motion in bodies are the Atomists. Democritus held such an eternal motion for the atoma that moved in all directions (Aristotle, De coelo iii, 306b; D.L. ix, 44), a movement that he called "vibration" (palmos; Actus i, 23, 3) and that occurs by necessity (Aristotle, Phys. ii, 136a; D.L. ix, 45). It is from the resultant collisions that aggregates are formed (see genesis) that in turn move into a vortex or whirl (dine), gradually finding their places in the kosmos (Diels 67A14).

5. Epicurus' explanation is somewhat different. For him the atomia have, in addition to size and shape, weight (eros) as one of their primary characteristics (D.L. x, 54). Thus their eternal downward motion would seem to be derived rather than an inherent property (D.L. x, 61; Lucretius ii, 83, 217). Their collision and consequent aggregation into bodies is brought about by a swerve (parenklisis) in their parallel motions (Actus i, 12; Lucretius ii, 216-253; Cicero, De fin. i, 6, 19; compare genesis).

6. At Soph. 248c-249a Plato departs from his Parmenidean viewpoint. Where earlier there was a firm insistence on the unchangeable nature of the eide (see Phaedo 78d), now kinesis too has its place in the world of reality. The soul, for instance, which is akin to the eide (Phaedo 76b-79b), is self-moving (and hence immortal) and the source of movement in others (Phaedrus 245c-246a; for the Platonic causal category of "self-mover," see Laws v, 894c), including the heavenly bodies (see ourania). Indeed, in Soph. 254bd Plato maintains that kinesis is one of the most important eide, and it seems to serve for him the same function that metabole (q.v.) does for Aristotle: a generic term for change that has as its species at least locomotion (phora) and qualitative change (alloskinesis; see Theaet. 181c) and that is expanded, in Laws x, 594b-c, to embrace ten distinct species, including, as the Aristotelian metabole does not, both genesis and phthora (qq.v.). None of these is, of course, the eidos of kinesis mentioned in the Sophist, but the tenth (really, as Plato points out, the arche of all the others) self-moving motion is the soul, which mediates between the other nine and the eidos (see psyche).

7. Aristotle attacks the Platonic position in Phys. iii, 206b where he declares that there is no kinesis apart from things. He then offers his own definition (ibid. iii, 201a) of kinesis as "the actualization [entelechos] of a potentiality [dynamis] qua potentiality." It occurs only as a metabole, i.e., a change in the category of quality, quantity, or place (ibid. v, 226a). The latter kinesis, i.e., locomotion (phora), is primary (ibid. viii, 265b-266a), taking precedence even over genesis (q.v.).

8. Aristotle follows Plato back along the road to the inherent Milesian motion by describing physis (q.v.) as the principle and cause of kinesis (Phys. ii, 195a); this does not, of course, free him from the necessity of the external, self-moving cause; see kinoun. Kinesis is, together with nutrition, sensation, and thought, one of the four main functions of the psyche (De an. 413a-b), and is resolved into the operation of desire (orexis) in conjunction with what is perceived as a real or apparent good (ibid. iii, 422a-433b). For Aristotle's theory of "natural motion," see stoicheia, aitia; for the application of kinesis to perception, aisthesis; on the possibility of actio in distans, sympathia.

**kinoun**: mover, agent, efficient cause

1. The problem of an external agent or arche for movement is not a problem for the early physikoi since in their vitalistic view kinesis was inherent in things (see kinesis 1). But once Parmenides had denied that kinesis was an attribute of true being, the obvious phenomenon of motion in the physical world had to be explained by recourse to an external mover that would give at least the initial impetus to kinesis.

2. The first such attempt is the "Love" and "Strife" of Empedocles (fr. 17, lines 19-20; compare Diels 31A28), drawn from an analogy with the motive forces operative in man (ibid., lines 22-24; compare Aristotle, Meta. 1085a, who stresses the moral aspect of these forces and sees them as a manifestation of moral dualism; see kukos 3). Shortly thereafter there is an epoch-making shift away from the moral to the intellectual sphere: Anaxagoras' source of motion is intelligence (nous), which is not only the initiator of motion but a guiding force as well (see nous 3; noesis 4). The lineaments of Aristotle's God are already present: noesis, kinesis, telos.

3. Plato's earlier preoccupation with the immutable eide apparently excluded any serious consideration of kinesis. But in the later
dialogues, particularly in the Sophist, Philebus, Timaetus, and Laws, there is a full-blown theory of kinesis (q.v. 6) with two related points of focus: the attribution of the principle of self-motion to the soul (see psyche 19) and the admission of kinesis, by reason of its being a function of soul, to the realm of the “completely real” (pantos ona; Soph. 248c–249b). There is, moreover, an eidos of kinesis (ibid. 254c) and, indeed, it is one of the megalia gena (see eidos 19).

4. Motion, then, occurs on three levels in Plato: as the transcendent eidos of motion; as the self-motion of soul, which holds an intermediary position between the eido and sensible particulars and which is the arché of motion described in the Laws x 86b; and, finally, as the various types of secondary motions in the kosmos described in Laws x, 93b–94c.

5. In terms of this analysis Plato’s proton kinoun or First Mover is the ecstatic part of the semi-transcendent or World Soul (see psyche tou pantos). There seem to be, moreover, grounds for identifying the nous of the Philebus and Timaetus with this same World Soul, even though it is mythically described as creating the World Soul (see nous 6). We have, then, not merely a kinoun but a final and exemplary cause as well. The demiuurgos (q.v.) is good and makes the world to be as similar to himself as possible (Tim. 296a–9aa) and, we are told, the human soul is made of the same “stuff” as the World Soul (ibid. 411d). But not only is the kosmos related to the kinoun as eikon to paradigmata, the movement known as “procession” (prosodoq, q.v.) in later Platonism; there is, as well, a “return” (epitrophe, q.v.). The immediate result of the self-moving motion of the World Soul is the perfect circular motion of its own body, the visible universe (ibid. 344a, 366, 40a–b). This regular visible and eternal motion of the heavens provides, in turn, a model by which men should regulate the harmonia (q.v.) in their own souls (ibid. 47b–c; astronomy, of course, only preliminary to the higher thrusts of the “return” effected by eros and diadithetai: see ourano 2).

6. The same passages in the Timaetus introduce another consideration: the heavenly bodies are also “a race of Gods.” Each is endowed with intelligence and it is this intelligence that explains the axial rotation of the stars, rotary because “each always thinks the same thoughts about the same things” (ibid. 396a–40a; on this rotary motion compare Rep. 436b and Laws x, 898a). Plato seems to be in some doubt about the mode of connection between these heavenly bodies and their guiding intelligences. Some suggestions are made in Laws x, 898a, but Plato is uncertain whether their soul is an immanent motor, like our soul, or an extrinsic force that may be either corporeal (possibly the theory of Eudoxus that the stars are carried around by the corporeal sphere in which they are embedded, a theory adopted by Aristotle; see 7, 11 infra) or incorporeal (the Aristotelian “object of love”). But whatever the exact relationship, the Platonic tradition maintained its belief in these planetary movers to the end (see ouranio 2).

7. Among the various causes involved in genesis Aristotle specifies the kinoun or agent that initiates change (Phys. ii, 194b). What is coming into question here are Aristotle’s revised notions of motion of (q.v. 9). Physik has dislodged psyche from much of the ground held by the Platonic soul, most notably from its position as the source of purpose (telos; Phys. ii, 194a) and movement (ibid. viii, 256b–253a) and, given the existence of things in motion, must there be a single cause of motion, a “first mover” (proon kinoun) that is itself unmoved (ibid. 256a–256b): everything that is moved is moved by something and there cannot be an infinite regress of such movers (ibid. 256a and vii, 242a–243a). Thus there is an eternal First Mover and an eternal first mover, the latter the sphere in which are embedded the fixed stars (viii, 26oa–266a), moving in an eternal, circular locomotion (locomotion is prior to all other forms of change, even genesis; ibid. 26oa–b and see genesis 15).

8. But Aristotle apparently did not always hold this view. The line of reasoning cited above from the Physics is essentially an argument from energia/dynamis (q.v.) that rests on the premise that the passage from potency to act demands the prior presence of an agent already in act that leads, via the denial of infinite regress, to an eternal energia that cannot be other. But there is also “Platonic motion” whereby the soul is the source of motion. In this way Plato explained the axial rotation of the stars, and it was the same explanation that Aristotle himself relied upon in attributing souls to the stars in his early Platonizing dialogue On Philosophy (fr. 24 = Cicero, De nat. deor. ii, 44; here the motion is called “voluntary”). But cannot the heavenly bodies also be moved by their physik, which Aristotle has substituted for the psyche as an internal source of motion? This seems to be the theory held in the De coelo where the motion of the “first body,” i.e., the sphere of the fixed stars, is the “natural” eternal, circular motion of the fifth element, aither (q.v.; De coelo 1, 208a–270b; see stoicheion 17). The fixed stars themselves move because they are embedded in this sphere (ibid. ii, 298b–290b). But even though he is capable of giving this explanation of the motion of the stars in terms of the physik of the sphere, he is somewhat embarrassed as to what to do with his Platonic legacy of the star souls (compare ibid. ii, 292 and 69a).

9. This would seem to be a view different from that of the transcendent mover of the Physics (although there are a number of dubious and/or obscure references to just such a transcendent mover in
Do coelo, e.g. 279a–b). But it is, nonetheless, the kinoun of Physics viii that is taken up and elaborated in the Metaphysics. At the end of the former work it is stated that the proton kinoun is without magnitude (megathos, q.v.). This leads to an immediate difficulty since, in the Aristotelian system, all kinesis is effected by contact (hathe; see sympatheia 7). To answer the difficulty Aristotle resorts to a principle borrowed from nature. The perception of the good gives rise to appetite (aresis, q.v.) for that good, in rational beings the object of rational desire (boulēsis; see De an. III, 433a and prosoaresis), and in irrational nature by its imitation of the movement of the heavenly bodies expressed by the constant passage of the elements from one into the other (see Meta. 1060b; De gen. et corr. 11, 337a; and genesis 15). In this way the proton kinoun is the good of the entire universe “as an object loved” (Meta. 1072b), and the kosmos and all its parts “move toward” it by their mimēsis of its energēia translated into physical terms: the heavenly bodies by their perfect circular revolutions and corruptible bodies by their cyclic genesis-phthora. Man’s mimēsis is somewhat more direct; he is capable of the same kind of energēia as the proton kinoun, i.e., noēsia, but he performs it only intermittently because it involves a passage from potency to act and so is wearisome (Meta. 1060b, 1072b; see noēsia 21, nous 10).

10. Within the categories of act and potency the Prime Mover must be an immaterial substance eternally actualized (Meta. 1071b). What is this energēia? It is at this point that the whole Platonic world of the eide is swept away. Aristotle no longer needs the eide to explain universal predication (see katholoub), and their static qualities ill accord with his own search for an archē of movement (particularly if he thinks of the eide as numbers; see Meta. 99a9 and arithmōs 3). What is left, in effect, is Plato’s World Soul of the Sophist-Philebus-Timaeus: a transcendent substance, a living nous that imparts motion to the kosmos. And it is precisely in these terms that the Aristotelian proton kinoun is described: ouxia aídios, nous, see (Meta. 1072b–1073a; for the subsequent career of this illustrious trio, see trias). There are, of course, corrections. The Platonic World Soul has a World Body, the kosmos aisthetos; this would be dynamis and limitation in the Aristotelian system. Plato’s psyche had involved kinesis; Aristotle’s nous enjoys the odd “activity of immobility” (energeia akinesis; Eth. Nici. vii. 1154b): its energēia is noēsia (see nous 9).

11. But Chapter viii of Book Lambda of the Metaphysics introduces a new difficulty into the kinetics of the system. One unmoved mover had been posited earlier to explain the eternal circular motion of the sphere of the fixed stars. But there are other eternal circular motions in the kosmos and so there should be as many unmoved movers as is necessary to explain the complicated motions of the spheres, the exact number to be calculated by the astronomers (Meta. 1073a–b; the numbers offered by Aristotle in the following passages are forty-seven and fifty-five). They too must be intellectual substances that move the spheres as final cause (see Meta. 1074a).

12. What is the relationship of these unmoved movers to the spheres and to the proton kinoun of the rest of the argument? Aristotle nowhere explains. To make them the souls of the spheres would be to return to the “Platonic motion” of On Philosophy and make it impossible to explain how they are always in act; to make them immaterial forces external to the body of the sphere (would, in that event, the sphere have an immanent soul in addition?) is to raise the question of their individuation. If they are not united to a body how do they differ one from another since matter is the principle of individuation (see hyle 2 and compare diaphora 4 where the genus is said to supply an “intelligible matter” for the species)? It has generally been assumed that they are somehow subordinated to the proton kinoun described as ruling the entire universe (Meta. 1070b, 1072b, 1076a and see 9 supra), and this despite the fact that they are unmoved. In fact, the argument on the basis of which they are posited in the first place necessitates that they too be intellectual eidos perfectly actualized, a consideration that would seem to eliminate their having any desire (aresis), and consequently a lack of fulfillment, toward the proton kinoun.

13. Aristotle, then, admits a variety of movers. There is the immanent principle of natural motion of things, physis (q.v.). There is also, as an immanent principle, psyche, not the Platonic model that Aristotle himself had once held, but the immanent eidos that moves the substance in which it inheres “by thought or choice” (see psyche 20). It is present in all animate things but it does not meet (nor does physis) the general requirement of the theory of energēia/dynamis that demands an external, prior cause of motion. Thus there must be at least one transcendent mover that is a complete intellectual substance (on the “separateness” of intellect, see nous). As to the question of whether there are more than one such, at least at some point in his career, in Lambda viii of the Metaphysics (which was not necessarily written at the same time as vii and ix) Aristotle held that there was more than one, a position that continued to exercise the Peripatetic tradition and provoked a refutation from Plotinus (Emo. v. 1, 9).

14. After Aristotle the question of a transcendental cause of motion recedes into the background. The poetic function of the cosmic cause is retained, as is the plurality of intermediary intelligences (see nous, daimon), but its causal activity is seen as making rather than moving. The reasons are twofold. There is, in the first place, the radically different Stoic concept of God who becomes immanent and operative in matter, much in the manner of Aristotle’s physis (see
calls vitalist grounds but "divine" setting in identify Law (see figures borrowed from the ethical sphere (see attempt at restoring this cosmic harmony in the soul (see T he same proportions)), through the predecessors (first one to describe the universe (see arithmos) (Anaximander, Diels, fr. 1243; Anaximenes, Diels, fr. 1382), and in any event it is difficult to trace its exact evolution through the stages: order, order of this universe, the universe as order. It had certainly reached this final connotation by the time of Empedocles (fr. 134), while the related notion of man as the microcosm of the universe appears with Democritus (fr. 34). Whatever the origins of the original insight, the Pythagoreans did have a theory of kosmos: the universe was a kosmos because it could be reduced to mathematical proportions (harmonia), since the arché of all things was number (arithmos) (Aristotle, Meta. 985b), with its ethical corollary of attempting to restore this cosmic harmony in the soul (see katharsis).

The same basic idea had been expressed by the Milesians, not in the mathematically oriented formulae of Pythagoras, but in a series of figures borrowed from the ethical sphere (see Anaximander, Diels, fr. 1249, 111, and dice; Empedocles, fr. 30) to explain cosmic process, replacing the sexual metaphors of earlier myths.

2. Heraclitus is the first: we know of to take the further step and identify this cosmic order with "law" (nomos) (fr. 114), thereby setting in motion a train of thought leading to the notion of Natural Law (see nomos). Heraclitus called the law that ensured this order "divine" (theos), but this is only one of several strands leading to a belief in the Divinity of the kosmos; the others are the Vitalism of the Milesians (see see, pyr) and a belief in the Divinity of the Heavenly bodies (see ouranos). There is some late evidence (D.L. viii, 25) that the Pythagoreans held the Divinity of the kosmos, as may have Xenoplatonists as well (Diels, fr. 2143; Aristotle, Meta. 986b). Plato calls the kosmos a "visible God" (harpas theos) in Tim. 92c, not on vitalist grounds but because of the ethical role it plays in his harmonic-

koinonia: combination, communion See diairesis, eidos.

kosmos (scil. aisthetos): ornament, order, the physical, visible universe (see kosmos noetos)

1. There is a tradition (Actus II, 1, 1 and D.L. viii, 48) that the first one to describe the universe as a kosmos was Pythagoras; but the notion of the universe as an order turns up in the fragments of his predecessors (Anaximander, Diels, fr. 1243; Anaximenes, Diels, fr. 1382), and in any event it is difficult to trace its exact evolution through the stages: order, order of this universe, the universe as order. It had certainly reached this final connotation by the time of Empedocles (fr. 134), while the related notion of man as the microcosm of the universe appears with Democritus (fr. 34). Whatever the origins of the original insight, the Pythagoreans did have a theory of kosmos: the universe was a kosmos because it could be reduced to mathematical proportions (harmonia), since the arché of all things was number (arithmos) (Aristotle, Meta. 985b), with its ethical corollary of attempting to restore this cosmic harmony in the soul (see katharsis).

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katharsis theory (see ouranos). His mimetic point of view led him to posit another kosmos not apprehensible by the senses, as ours is, but only by the intelligence (see kosmos noetos).

3. In his early De philosophia, fr. 18, Aristotle reaffirms the divinity of the kosmos, echoing the Platonic formula "visible God"; but by the time of the later treatises most of the Platonic theology has disappeared in the wake of a revised theory of physics (q.v.). In the fully developed Aristotelian system there are only two divinities (see theos) and one of them, the First Mover, is outside the kosmos (De coelo 1, 275a-b). The other is the outer sphere of the kosmos, the sphere of the fixed stars and the domain of ather (q.v.); this is divine because of its eternal circular motion (ibid. 11, 284a).

4. Stoic pantheism restores the divinity of the kosmos (SVF ii, 1027) and, following upon the theories of fire (see pyr) and pneuma, considered it a living, ensouled, and intelligent being (D.L. vii, 135-139). The Sceptics denied both of these positions (Cicero, De nat. deor. iii, 9, 22-24). The organic nature of the kosmos was defended by Posidonius and was the point of departure for his theory of sympatheia (q.v.). As against the Gnostics, who viewed it as the product of evil and ignorance (see Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1, 4, 1-2; 1, 5, 3), both Philo and Plotinus defended the sensible universe, both calling it a "son of God" (Quod Deus, 6, 31; Enn. v, 8, 12) in its function as an image (eikon) of its ultimate transcendent source (see Enn. ii, 3, 18).

kosmos noetos: intelligible universe

1. One of the problems arising from Plato's theory of Forms is the question of their location. Plato is emphatic that the eidos do not exist in any place (Symp. 211a; compare Aristotle, Phys. iii, 203a). There are, however, other passages that indicate that they do have a "location" in a wider sense of the word (Rep. 508c, 508b; Phaedrus, 247c-e). The figurative language of the Timaeus forces him to be more explicit; his theory of mimesis (q.v.) suggests a model of which the visible universe (kosmos aisthetos) is an image (eikon), Tim. 50c-d. This is the intelligible universe that "contains" the main families of eidos (loc. cit.; see teos). "Contains" is a difficult word; it is not at all clear how Plato saw the higher groupings of the eidos (see the chief parallel text, Soph. 255d; but here the context is dialectical).

2. The intelligible kosmos reappears in Philo, but with two major differences; Plato's eidos were eternal, Philo's are created (De opif. 4, 18), and they are embraced, as a total kosmos noetos, within the divine mind, ibid. 2, 17-20 (see eidos), and this is one of the meanings of Philo's Logos (q.v.). Philo's Logos becomes Platonism's nous that em-
braces within it all the noeta (Enn. vi, 2, 21) as the objects of its thought.

krasis: blending, mixture

See genesis.

logismos: reasoning, discursive thought
See noesis.

logistikon: rational faculty
See psyche, nous, pathos, oniros.

logoi spermatikoi: seminal reasons, rationes seminales

The Stoic logoi spermatikoi, which are designed to explain both plurality and teleology in a monistic system, appear to be patterned after the Aristotelian eidon (q.v.) in its role as physis. The logos (q.v.) considered as a unified entity contains within itself, on the analogy of animal sperm, the growth powers of exemplars of all the individuals (SVF II, 1027; D.L. vii, 125). These individual logoi are imperishable (SVF II, 717), i.e., they survive the cyclical conflagration (ekpyrosis) that consumes the kosmos and are the seedlings of the next kosmos (ibid. 1, 497). Despite their paradigmatic character they are more Aristotelian than Platonic in that they are immanent in matter (ibid. 1, 1074). They also play a major role in Plotinus: they reside in the psyche (Enn. ii, 3, 14; iv, 3, 10) where they are the cause of its movement (ibid. iv, 3, 15); the logoi contain all the details of the being (ibid. i, 2, 1) and are the reasons why individuals differ (ibid. iv, 4, 12a); unextended themselves only by the matter in which they inhere (ibid. iv, 9, 5).

For their development into the occult powers, see dynamis.

logos: speech, account, reason, definition, rational faculty, proportion

1. A major difficulty in the interpretation of logos is determining when this common and amorphous Greek word is being used in a technical, specialized sense. Thus Heraclitus, in whom it first plays a major role, frequently employs it in its common usage, but he also has a peculiar doctrine that centers around logos in a more technical sense: for him logos is an underlying organizational principle of the universe, related to the common meaning of logos as proportion (frs. 1, 50), the rule of change so frequently associated with Heraclitus' thought (e.g., frs. 60, 111). And this harmony, which is really a tension of opposites, is not to be understood in the sense of a cyclic return, but as a stable state (frs. 10, 51). This logos principle, though it is hidden and perceptible only to the intelligence (frs. 54, 124; see noesis 1), is still material, as can be seen from the identification of the Heraclitan logos with cosmic fire (compare frs. 41, 64; see pyr), and his description of the process of thinking (Dica, fr. 22A; see noesis); on the theory of tension, see tonos.

2. Plato also used the term logos in a variety of ways, including the opposition between mythos and logos (see mythos), where the latter signifies a true, analytical account. This is common usage, but it leads off into an epistemological theory. In Phaedo 76b Plato marks as a characteristic of true knowledge (episteme) the ability to give an account (logos) of what one knows. In Theaet. 190c-19d this aspect of logos is incorporated into the definition of episteme: true opinion (doxa) accompanied by an account. Socrates discusses what logos would mean in this context (ibid. 208b-210a), and from his analysis emerges a description of logos as the statement of a distinguishing characteristic of a thing (ibid. 208c). The validity of this is denied on the ground of its being of no value in the case of sensible, individual beings (compare Aristotle, Meta. 1039b).

3. But when this conception of logos is moved higher up the Platonic scale of being it obviously does have a role to play; in Rep. 534b Plato describes the dialectician (see dialektike) as one who can give an account (logos) of the true being (or essence, ousia) of something, i.e., the term of the process of division (dialeitikos) described in the Sophist, the Aristotelian definition (see horos) by genera and species; indeed, Aristotle frequently uses logos as a synonym for horos, horismos. Another typical Aristotelian use is logos as reason, rationality, particularly in an ethical context, e.g., Pol. 1332a, Eth. Nich. vi, 1134a, and frequently in the combination "right reason" (orthos logos, the Stoic recta ratio), Eth. Nich. ii, 1103b; vi, 1134b. He also understands logos as mathematical proportion, ratio (Meta. 991b), a usage probably going back to the Pythagoreans, even though it is unstated in their fragments (see apeiron, peras, harmonia; for the application of logos as proportion to the question of mixtures, see holon; to sensation and the sense organ, aisthesis; and, in general, meson).

4. The Stoic point of departure on logos is Heraclitus' doctrine of
an all-pervasive formula of organization, which the Stoics considered divine (see nomos). Logos is the active (poious) force in the universe (D.L. vii, 154), creative in the fashion of sperm (SVF 1, 87; D.L. vii, 135; see logoi spermatikes). As in Heraclitus it is material and identified with fire (see pyr.), Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 11, 39; SVF 11, 1027. It is also identical with nature (physis, q.v.) and Zeus (see Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus; SVF 1, 237). This pervasive presence in the universe develops in several directions: since it is a unity it grounds the theory of cosmic sympathy (see sympathia) and of natural law and the ethical imperative “to live according to nature” (see nomos). Stoic linguistic theory further distinguished interior logoi (= thought) and exterior logos (= speech) (SVF 11, 135; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. viii, 275; see nomos), a distinction that clearly influenced Philo’s notoriously difficult vision of logos.

5. Philo knew the distinction between interior and exterior logos and could apply it in an orthodox Stoic fashion (De vita Mos. ii, 137); and it was perhaps this distinction, together with the Jewish scriptural tradition about the “Word of God,” that led to his new treatment of logos. In the first instance logos is the Divine Reason that embraces the archetypal complex of eidos that will serve as the models of creation (De opif. 5, 20). Next, this logos that is God’s mind is externalized in the form of the kosmos nous (q.v.), the universe apprehensible only to the intelligence (ibid. 7, 29). It is transcendent (Leg. alli, iii, 175–177), and it is God, although not the God (De somni. i, 227–228), but rather the “elder Son of God” (Quod Deus 6, 31). With the creation of the visible world (kosmos aisthetos) the logos begins to play an immanent role as the “seal” of creation (De fuga 2, 12), the Stoic “bond of the universe” (De plant. 2, 8–9) and heimarmene (q.v.; De mut. 23, 135). Philo differs from the Stoics in denying that this immanent logos is God (De migre. Abr. 32, 179–181); for the providential role of Philo’s logos, see prooemia. Philo gives his logos a distinct role in creation: it is the instrumental cause (De cher. 35, 186–187); it is also an archetypal light (ibid. 28, 97), this latter image reappearing in Plotinus, Enn. iii.1, 2, 16. But there is a difference between the two thinkers; what was in Philo both logos and nous is divided in Plotinus who uses the logos concept in a fashion akin to the Stoic logoi spermatikes (q.v.; see Enn. iii.1, 2, 16 where nous and logos are distinguished.

mantike: divination

1. Although the terminology remained fluid one may, with Cicero, De div. i, 11, distinguish two distinct types of communication, frequently of future events, vouchsafed by the gods to men: one, the direct communication through a human “medium,” the prophetai, possessed by a god, typically Apollo, and hence a spokesman for that god. A variant of this was the apparition of a god to an individual in a dream (omenos, q.v.). The second method, which was less idiosyncratic since it could be learned instead of appearing as a more or less fortuitous divine favor, was the “reading” of various natural phenomena such as the habits of birds (aërius), the entrails of various sacrificial animals (harpusic, for the physiological theory see omenos), the physiognomy of the palm (ichromancy), or the use of lots (cleromancy) or arbitrarily chosen passages of a favored author (compare the medieval sortes Vergiliana and sortes Biblicae).

2. Plato associates the method of direct communication through a medium with a divinely inspired madness (mania). The examples he cites are those of the priestesses and prophets at Dodona and Delphi and the Sibyl (Phaedrus 244b–c). He then proceeds to link this “divine madness” with that of the inspired poet who is also, in a sense, “possessed by a god,” enthousias (ibid. 245a), an analogy that makes its first appearance in literature with Democritus (frs. 17, 18; see Apol. 22b: the notion may be Socratic).

3. The concept of possession (entousiasmos) that provides the theoretical ground for the inspired utterances of the prophet is not susceptible of exact definition. The ancients themselves were aware that it was an irrational state (see Plato, Apol. 22b–c; Ion 535c), and a later more psychologically sophisticated and curious age was well informed on the various psychic phenomena attendant upon entousiasmos (see Iamblichus, De myst. 3, 4–7, 110–112), as well as the possibilities of a homoeopathic “cure” (see katharsis).

4. The distance between Plato and Iamblichus is marked by another significant change: the decline of the institutionalized oracular sites like Delphi and Dodona with their organized mediumship, and the rise of individual prophetai who trafficked in a great variety of psychic phenomena and who frequently claimed miraculous powers. Such types, e.g., Apollonius of Tyana and the Alexander of Lucian’s satire,
belong properly to the history of religion. But they share with the contemporary Neoplatonic school of Iamblichus a penchant for the miraculous and the wonderful. It need hardly be noted that in Neoplatonism the various species of wonder-working were accompanied by a fairly elaborate philosophical theory based at least in part on the Stoic notion of universal sympathy or sympatheia (q.v.).

5. This Neoplatonic theurgia or “working upon god” consisted chiefly in the manipulation of certain objects to produce a divine presence in either a statue or a human medium (see Proclus, In Tim. 111, 155, 18; Iamblichus, De myst. 111, 4–7). Indeed, such binding of divine powers has an oracular end and the ancient world’s most famous collection of oracular responses, the Chaldean Oracles, is cited continuously in the Neoplatonic tradition from Porphry to Proclus, the latter writing an extensive commentary on them.

The philosophical ground of divination is discussed under sympatheia; that of theurgia, under dynamis 10–11.

mathematika: mathematical numbers and entities; the objects of the mathematical sciences

1. A reading of the Metaphysics yields a variety of views on the ontological status of the mathematical numbers (arithmoi mathematikoi) or mathematika. According to Aristotle’s account the Pythagoreans maintained that mathematical number is in sensible things as their arche (Meta. 987b, 1000a; see arithmos), while for Plato, who also held the existence of another class of Ideal Number (see arithmos eideitikos), they constituted a class between the eide and the aistheta, the so-called “intermediaries” (metaxu) (Meta. 997b–998a). Finally, there is an unidentified group who made the mathematika immanent but not constitutive of or identical with the aistheta (Meta. 998a, 1076a).

2. Aristotle is critical of all these views, particularly the Platonic one. Does this latter appear in the dialogues? The evidence rests primarily on an interpretation of a section of the Diagram of the Line in Rep. v, 510b–c where the intelligibles (noeita) are divided into the objects of noesis (q.v.) and dialexia. The latter is described first by its methodology, which uses images in its reasoning process, and then (510d), by its subject matter, e.g., “the Square itself” and “the Diagonal itself,” phrases that in their formulation and singularity could refer with equal appropriateness to the eide and to the intermediary class of mathematika that, as Aristotle says (see metaxu), are characterized by their plurality. But noeit is clearly the eide as its object (511b–c), and so it may be legitimate to infer that the objects of dialexia belong to another class, i.e., the metaxu.

3. Aristotle’s own theory of mathematical number is found in Meta. 1076a–1078b; he rejects all three previously cited positions. Certain qualities of the aistheta are abstracted and studied as if they were separate from matter (for the “matter” of mathematika, see aisthesis, blyke). The abstractive process (eikonesis, q.v.) actualizes what was present only potentially in sensible things. But for all that the mathematika have no separate (choriston) substantial existence.

4. Plato’s successor Speusippus replaced the entire structure of the eide with mathematika, generating first the arithmoi mathematikoi and then the geometrical magnitudes from the One and the Infinite Dyad (Meta. 1028b, 1086b; see dyad). Another early Academic, Xenocrates, identified the mathematika and the eide (Meta. 1028b, 1069a, 1078a). For Plotinus mathematical number is an image (eidolon) of the Ideal Numbers (Enn. vi, 6, 9; see arithmos).

megethos: greatness, magnitude

1. According to Aristotle (Meta. 106a) magnitude is a measurable quantity (poxon, q.v.) that is potentially divisible into continuous (synexechos) parts in one, two, or three dimensions, i.e., lines, planes, and solids. These latter are the subject matter of geometry, a science whose generic subject is magnitude (Ebd. Nich. vi, 1143a); but magnitude is not, however, an attribute of the units (monades) that constitute number, as the Pythagoreans assert (Meta. 1059b). Aristotle also attacks what seems to be a later species of Pythagoreanism that was moving toward Atomism and that defined its units as “indivisible magnitudes”: mathematical units are indivisible units and hence cannot have magnitude (ibid. 1083b); see arithmos, monas.

2. The question of an indivisible magnitude (eikonesis or atomon megathos) raises for Aristotle the whole question of primary bodies, i.e., bodies that cannot be reduced to others and so are the subject of genesis and change. The monist tradition (for Empedocles and the pluralists, see stoichelon) stemming from Parmenides is represented by the Pythagoreans, Plato, and the Atomists.

3. The Pythagorean position that reduced bodies, through number, to units is, in effect, demolished as soon as the distinction between the mathematical unit (monades), the geometrical point (stigma), and a body with extension (megathos) is established, as Aristotle seeks to do in various places (see Meta. 1080b, 1085b, 1096b; De an. 409a). Thus the ambiguities of an only partially mathematized Pythagoreanism are resolved into a physical Atomism. Since magnitude is extended in three dimensions it is conceivable that the primary body might be either line, plane, or solid. The latter is, of course, Leucippus’ atomon (q.v.) that has magnitude but cannot be divided because it is so small (Dica 564). We also know that Plato reduced his primary solids to triangles, accompanied by an enigmatic hint that further reduction was
perhaps possible (Tim. 53 c–d). Finally, the ancient tradition asserts that the Academician Xenocrates maintained the theory of indivisible lines (so Simplicius and Philoponus commenting on Aristotle’s Phys. 1, 187a, according to Simplicius’ account, p. 142, Xenocrates admitted that they were theoretically divisible but because of their smallness effectively indivisible).

4. Aristotle opposes the theories of indivisible magnitudes in whatever dimension (De gen. et corr. 1, 315b–317c; De lineis inreabilibus, which is an Aristotelian pseudograph, deals with the problem in g63a–b). He realized that it was Zeno and his paradoxes that had driven philosophers to this position (Phys. 1, 187a). Aristotle’s solution dismisses Leucippus’ and Xenocrates’ contentions about size. He is not discussing actual physical division but conceptual division, and the argument here hinges on the notion of a continuum (synochôs; Phys. vi, 231a–b) that, by eliminating the view that a line is a row of contiguous or successive points, both undermines the Pythagorean void (kaos, q.v.) between units and at the same time sets the stage for a solution of Zeno’s paradoxes, since the same arguments pertain to both time and movement that are per accidens magnitudes (Meta. 1027a).

On the problem of irrational numbers or, better, incommensurable magnitudes, see asymmetron; for the relation of magnitude to matter, see hyle.

mêon: nonbeing
See on.

méseon, meșótes: mean
The Pythagoreans looked upon existent things as a “just balance” (isomóin) between opposites (enantia), see D.L. viii, 56. Plato begins to move this “mean” position into the area of ethics in Phil. 293c–296d (where the extremes are called “unlimited” [apêiron] and the quantified, mixed, “limit” [peras]). The mathematical overtones are apparent in this text and the medical ones appear in both Phaedo 58c–c (see harmonía, hêdône) and in Aristotle’s early Eudemus, fr. 7. Aristotle’s classic identification of virtue (aretê) with the mean of emotions (pálke) and acts (praxeis) is to be found in Eik. Nich. 1169a–1110b, where he makes specific reference to limit (peras) as good; see dikê.

For the application of mesên to perception, see aisthêsis; as a factor in deriving the elements, stathêkion; in the derivation of the hypostases, trias.

metabolé: change
Aristotle’s most generic term for passage from one state into another, whether on the level of substance where the metabolé is called

genesis, or in one of the three categories of quality (see pathos, genesis), quantity, or place, where the metabolé is called kinesis; see Phys. v, 224a–228b, and kinesis; for the matter implied by the various changes, see hyle.

metavû: intermediaries
1. In the Platonic view of reality there are a class of “intermediaries” that come between the Forms (eides) and the sensible, particular things (aisthêta). Like the eides they are eternal and unchanging, but unlike the Forms they are plural (Aristotle, Meta. 987b). This class, which represents the objects of the sciences of mathematics and geometry, embraces both mathematical numbers and geometrical magnitudes (ibid. 991b, 997a; see mathemáita). Thus Aristotle. The only support for the existence of the general class of the metavû in the Platonic dialogues themselves is the mention of plural forms in Phaedo 5 and Parm. 129b. The existence of the mathematical numbers is, however, somewhat more strongly attested (see mathemáita).

2. The real “intermediary” in the Platonic system is Plato’s later doctrine of the psyche; see the important admission of life, soul, and nous into the world of quasi-being in Soph. 248–249d, and the striking description of psyche (Tim. 90a–d) that “lifts us from earth to heaven”; this, of course, Aristotle accepts (for its evolution, see psyche 29, 35).

On the question of a medium (metavû) for sensation, see aisthêsis, sympatheia.

metempsýchôsis: transmigration of souls
See palingenesia.

mêthexis: participation
Metâhexis is the term used by Plato to describe the relationship between the eides and sensible particulars; see Phaedo 300d, and Parm. 130c–131a (where participation is criticized as implying division). Aristotle sees nothing but a verbal difference between metehexis and the other Platonic term, “imitation” (mimêsis), Meta. 97b. Plotinus prefers to use other metaphors, but metehexis becomes important again in the systematization of Proclus: prop. 65 of the Elem. theol. discusses the metaphysical implications of metehexis, while props. 133–135 lay out the series of projections consequent upon metehexis.

For the more general context, see eidos; some of the difficulties arising from metehexis are touched upon in diáiresis; for its use in Proclus, see trias.
mimēsis: mimicry, imitation, art (i.e., fine art; for the applied sciences, see techne)

1. Mimēsis, in all its shades of meaning, is of central importance in Plato. We read in Sophist 265b that the productive arts (poietikai technai; see techne) are divided into divine craftsmanship and human craftsmanship (called in Rep. 597d–e phytourgia and demιourgia), and that there is, in addition, another type of productivity shared by both God and man that does not produce “originals” but merely copies (eikones). This is mimēsis, the art of the poet, the painter, the sculptor, or that of the actor who, unlike the others named, does not use tools but creates the image in his own person (Soph. 267a; Plato uses mimēsis for the craft of the actor as well, but for purposes of distinction “mimicry” is probably closer to what the context demands).

2. The craftsman (demιourgos), then, whether human or divine, produces on two levels: “originals” or real objects, and imitations or images that can only more or less approximate the reality of their models. Plato is not always consistent in his application of this theory. In Rep. 596b the divine craftsman creates the original, i.e., the eidos of the bed, the carpenter produces the physical bed that is only an eikon vis-à-vis the eidos but is the “original” for the bed of the painter. In Soph. 265c–d the originals made by the divine craftsman are not the eidos but the natural objects of this world, while the products of his mimetic activity are the shadows and mirages in this world. Finally, in the Timaeus the divine demιourgos does not create the preexistent eidos and this world seems to be the product of his mimetic activity (Tim. 30c–31b).

3. The confusion doubtless arises from the differing contexts and clearly one should not rest too heavily on the Form of Bed or the divine demιourgos as its creator; most of what Plato wrote suggests the exclusion of eidos for manufactured objects and of any maker for the eidos (see eidos). But one point is clear: the activity known as mimēsis has as its product an entity whose ontological status is inferior relative to that of its model. Thus, on the cosmic level this principle sets the relationship between this world and the world of eidos, it grounds Plato’s theory of knowledge, and in the moral sphere it is the point of departure for his attack on “art.”

4. Mimēsis is one of the explanations (see also methēsis) or, better, one of the images offered by Plato to express the relationship of the eidos to sensible particulars. It finds a fairly elaborate expression in Parm. 123e–133e, and again in Tim. 30c–d where the demιourgos (q.v.) takes as his model (paradeigma) the intelligible living creature (zoon noetos) that embraces all the Forms and thus creates the kosmos. The same principle is evident even earlier in Crat. 298a–c, and by implication in the theory put forth in Phaedo 74a–75b Aristotle (Meta. 987b) states that the explanation derives from the Pythagoreans who held that things “imitate” numbers and he subjects it (ibid. 991a) to a harsh criticism. Although mimēsis as applied to sensible particulars falls into disuse, the concept that the intelligible world (kosmos noetos, q.v.) is the paradeigma for the sensible world remains current in later Platonism; see Philo, De opif. 6, 25; Plotinus, Enn. v, 8, 12.

5. The distinction between a “true” reality and a mimetic reality will have obvious epistemological implications and these are rendered explicit in the scheme of the Line in Rep. 593d–511e. True knowledge (episteme, q.v.) will be of the “originals,” while opinion (doxa, q.v.) is the best one can hope to attain in confronting imitative being. But even here there are distinctions: sensible particulars (see aishteion), though imitations of the eidos, are in some sense “original” when compared to certain physical phenomena that are images of other phenomena, e.g., the shadows and mirages that are God’s “joke” (see Soph. 264b, 265b–c) on the physical world. This knowledge of images (eikasia; see eikon) is the lowest segment of the Line (Rep. 593e), but at this point in the Republic Plato says nothing about man’s “joke” on the world, i.e., art: (more fully, techne poietike mimetike; for the genus and differentia, see techne).

6. The subject of man’s mimetic activity is explored in Rep. 595a–608b. Plato distinguished craft (demιourgia) and art (mimēsis) in the Sophist in the context of a search, via division (diairesis, q.v.), for the infima species that is the sophist. In the Republic passages the context is strongly ethical and the emphasis somewhat different. The poets were the traditional teachers of wisdom, but in the Republic Plato had replaced them with the philosophers; he vindicates his own position by attacking the poets’ qualifications to teach wisdom.

7. Plato’s objection to the fine arts is twofold: they are untrue and they are injurious. They are untrue in the ontological sense that has already been discussed: their claim to reality is tenuous since they are imitations of imitations (Rep. 597e). But in addition they are guilty of the falsity of discourse: they lie. Plato consistently judges art by its own contemporary claim of realism and he finds the poets’ portraits of gods and heroes to be inexact in that they portray as evil what is essentially good (Rep. 377d–e). Furthermore, art has a distinctly moral end (ibid. 491b), and even though there are obviously evil men whom the arts might realistically portray, by choosing to portray such they create harmful moral effects in the viewer and even, if it is a question of dramatic art, in the performer himself (ibid. 392c–393b, 606e–609a).

For the mimetic origins of language, see onoma; for its application to time, chronos; for a mimetic element in Aristotle, energeia.
mixis: mixture
See genesis, holon.

monas: unit, the one
The unit is either the primary arche of the Pythagoreans (D.L. viii, 25) or, together with the Dyne, one of the primary co-principles (Aristotle, Meta. 986a), ethically associated with the good (agathon), and considered a god (theos) (Aetius 1, 7, 18), even though the position of limit (peras) and apeiron at the head of the list would suggest that they were more primary. Aristotle is quite explicit that number (arithmos) has its own more basic elements (stoicheia), i.e., “Even” and “Odd” (Meta. 986a). According to Aristotle all philosophers agree in making the monas the arche of number (arithmos); yet the Pythagoreans are peculiar in that their units have spatial magnitude (ibid. 1086b) that is indivisible (ibid. 1086b), a confusion between the arithmetical unit and the geometric point, which was cleared up later (Nichomachus, Arith. intro. 11, 5 and 7). Aristotle’s own definition of the monas is “substance without position,” clearly distinct from the “point” (stigma) that is “substance with position,” Anal. post. 1, 572; see arithmos, megethos.

mousike: the Muses’ art, music
See katharsis.

mythos: myth
1. The traditional attitude of philosophy toward myth is expressed in the contrast mythos-logos, where the latter is intended to signify a rational, analytic, and true account (see Plato, Phaedo 6b, Tim. 26e, etc.). It runs parallel to the distinction theologos-physikos (see theologia), but the relationship of the former pair is somewhat more complex. It is clear that both Socrates and Plato had strenuous moral objections to the traditional myths (Euth. 6a-c, Phaedrus 229c-230a, Rep. 376e-380c), a type of criticism that went back at least as far as Xenophanes (see fr. 11). One attempt to meet this type of attack was the belief that there was an underlying sense (hypomena) to the old myths. This was apparently popular in fifth-century philosophical circles (see Prodicus, Diels, fr. 85), Anaxagoras (D.L. II, 11), and Anthes (Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 52, 4–5; compare Xenophon, Synp. 11, 6). Plato will have none of hypomena (Rep. 378d), but in the subsequent literature the use of an allegorical interpretation (allegoria), either moral, physical, or cosmogonical, to extract the hidden sense became a potent method of reconciling philosophy and the traditional material in the poets. The Stoics were particularly active in allegoria (see Cicero, De nat. decr. II, 24, 25, 64, 65, and passim; the Stoic facility in etymologizing names was of considerable help here; see 209c), and with Philo allegoria passed into the service of accommodating philosophy and scripture (cf. Leg. all., passim).

2. But mythos was not quite so easily dismissed. Aristotle felt that there was a point in the early cosmogonies where logos and mythos overlapped (Meta. 982b, 1074b; see aporia, endoxon), but the presentation of the latter was childlike (Meta. 1000a; compare Plato, Soph. 243e), and Plato, for one, was sceptical of the results (see the heavy irony of Tim. 403–414). Yet the dialogues are filled with myths that play a central part in the development of the argument, as for instance, in the Phaedo and Republic (eschatological; see athanatoe), Phaedrus (psychological), and Timaeus (physical). Nor is the technique new with Plato; it can be seen in Protagoras (if the myth in Protagoras 320c–323a is his own and not Plato’s), in the proem to Parmenides’ poem (fr. 1) and the half-disguised abstractions of Pherecydes’ myths (D.L. 1, 119; compare Aristotle, Meta. 1091b); see theos.

noses: the operation of nous (q.v.), thinking (as opposed to sensation), intuition (as opposed to discursive reasoning)
1. Subtle differences between the mere perception of an object or objects, i.e., sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) and another kind of psychic awareness that goes beyond the sense data and perceives less tangible things, like resemblances and differences between objects, is already present in Homer and is identified with the organ called nous. With the philosophers the difference becomes a problem. Heraclitus suspects the unreliability of sensation for the perception of the true nature of things. He is tireless in his assertion that “nature loves to Hide” (see fr. 123 and logos 1), and this hidden reality is clearly beyond the reach of men who trust too implicitly in their senses (fr. 107). How the other faculty that is capable of discerning the hidden logos of things might operate is not immediately apparent, though we are told (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 129) that the nous that is within us is activated by its contact, via the channels of sensation (aisthetikos potei), with the divine logos in the universe, a contact that is maintained in an atten-
united fashion during sleep by breathing (see pneuma). The senses, then, are obviously some sort of condition for noesis, though not, as is clear from fr. 107 and its congers, identical with it.

2. Aristotle remarks (De an. iii. 427a; Meta. 1099b) that the pre-Socratics generally made no distinction between noesis and aisthesis. It is easy to understand why he thought so since they all attempted to explain the operations of the psyche in purely physical terms, a procedure that, according to Aristotle (loc. cit.), cannot account for error (pseudos) since like must know like (see homoioi, aisthesis). From one point of view this is true; but it is likewise true that since Parmenides’ assault on sense perception in terms of the instability of its object (see on 1, episteme 2) it became an epistemological necessity to distinguish between the obvious perils of aisthesis and a “true knowledge” more or less independent of the senses.

3. These attempts can be seen in Empedocles’ doubts about the reliability of our sense perception and the need of divine assistance (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 122-124). But the limitations of sensation here seem to be due to our misuse of them rather than to any inherent weakness of their own (fr. 9, lines 9-13). When he comes to explain the possibility of error (called ignorance and opposed to phronesis; Thophrastus, De sens. 9), Empedocles resorts to a mechanistic explanation of how the effluences (aporrhoai; see aisthesis 7) of one sense object are symmetrical only with the pores of its proper sense organs, and so cannot be judged by the others (Thophrastus, op. cit. 1). If thought is anything to Empedocles it is a special type of sensation that occurs in the blood by reason of its being a perfect mixture of all the stichiea (ibid. 9).

4. It is somewhat more perplexing to find Anaxagoras, the eminent proponent of nous, in Aristotle’s catalogue of those who failed to distinguish sensation and thought. In the fragments we do find the usual statements casting doubts on sensation (e.g. fr. 21), but there is no explanation of noesis. Indeed nous does not seem to be a cognitive principle at all but rather a cosmological one. It initiates motion (and in this it has obvious affinities to soul; see psyche 1, 7, and passim) and it guides and rules all (fr. 12). What Anaxagoras is obviously offering is the presence of some intelligent and hence purposeful principle in the universe. But it appears the nous is an immanent principle as well and we are told that it is not present in everything (fr. 11). Alcmeon of Crotona, who had already sharply distinguished phronesis from aisthesis, maintained that the former was characteristic of men only (Thophrastus, De sens. 25), but we have no idea of the extension of the immanent nous in Anaxagoras. Presumably it would cover the same territory as psyche, i.e., the entire animate world.

5. For Diogenes of Apollonia, who also addressed himself to the problem, aer (q.v.), the intelligent and divine arche, is continuous and present in all things that are (fr. 35), but it is present in varying degrees. The degree is based on the dryness and warmth of the air, the distinctions of texture that explain progressively higher cognitive acts (Thophrastus, op. cit. 40-45). In this way are explained the complete absence of cognitive activities in plants and the relatively higher degree of phronesis in man as compared to the other animals (ibid. 44).

6. The Atomists’ theories of sensible qualities (see aisthesis 11, pathos 4) demanded refinements in the cognitive faculties. Many so-called qualities are merely subjective impressions and the true nature of the atomon is not visible to sight. Hence Democritus draws the distinction (fr. 11) between a genuine and a bastard knowledge; the latter is sensation and the former, presumably (the text breaks off), reason, the operation of the logos that is located in the breast (Actus iv, 4, 6; see kardia 2 and psyche 7). But even though phronesis and aisthesis have different objects and different seats, the mechanics of their operation are the same (Actus iv, 8, 5; iv, 8, 10).

7. To resume the pre-Socratic attitude: there were solid epistemological grounds for making a distinction in kind between thought (noesis, phronesis; in the epistemological context, episteme) and sensation (aisthesis; in the epistemological context, doxa), and, indeed, the differentiation could be specified when it came to giving them different locations in the body (aisthesis tied to the sense organs; the higher faculty in a central location, though not always distinguished from the more generic notion of psyche; see kardia). But the operations of this higher faculty could be distinguished from those of sensation only in degree, e.g., finer or warmer in composition.

8. Plato, while adhering firmly to the Parmenidean epistemology (see episteme 2), has, in addition, a new spiritualized conception of soul that, though originally posited on religious grounds (see psyche 13), is incorporated in Plato’s theory of knowledge (ibid. 14). It is this pure unitary soul of the Phaedo that becomes the epistemological correlate of the eido and, being absolutely different in kind from the body, can perform all the cognitive activities that the post-Parmenidean philosophers associated with nous but were unable to explain on the level of substance. But the problem is considerably more complex than this. Even in the Phaedo the soul is the arche of all cognitive activity: sensation is perception by the soul through the body; phronesis is an operation of the soul alone (Phaedo 79d; see aisthesis 15-16).

9. In the Phaedo the distinction between the two operations is largely in terms of the objects known: in the Republic it reappears, in a much more complex form, based as well upon the internal operations of the soul. This latter is now divided into three parts (see psyche 13) and the upper part, the logos (ibid. 16), is responsible for noetic
activity. But the psychology is far more sophisticated here, and in the Diagram of the Line in *Rep.* vi the noetic activity is explained in some detail. The distinction drawn previously (*Rep.* iv, 476a-480a) between *episteme* and *doxa* is maintained here, but we discover that there is more than one type of *episteme*. The upper part of the Line that represented knowledge of the *noeta* (*ibid.* 509e) is further subdivided into what Plato calls *noesis* and *dianoia* (*ibid.* 511d).

10. These two operations of the *logistikos* have been much debated; one school of thought sees *dianoia* as that activity of the mind which has as its object the "mathematical," while the objects of *noesis* are the *eide* (see *mathematike* 2); the other school sees *dianoia* as discursive reasoning in general and *noesis* as immediate intellectual intuition, in much the same way as Aristotle (see *Anal. post.* 11, 106b; *epagogos* 3) and Plotinus (see 18–19 *infra*) distinguished between *logismos* and *noesis*. What is clear, however, is that the method of *noesis* is that known to Plato as *dialektilike* (q.v.; *ibid.* 511b) and the way of life based upon it is *philosophia* (q.v., and compare *phronesis*, *theoria*).

11. There are certain passages in Plato, echoed by Aristotle, that give somewhat more of a purely psychological insight into the workings of the intellectual process. Both men seek to derive *episteme* from the Greek word to "stand" or "come to a halt" (*epistemon*) and so explain intuition as a "coming to a halt" in the midst of a series of sense impressions, the "fixing" of an Intuitive concept (*Crat.* 437a; *Phaedo* 66b; *Anal. post.* 11, 106a; *Phys.* vii, 247b). But this psychological approach is overwhelmed by a flood of "physical" considerations. *Noesis* is an activity and so must be located within the general categories of change and *kinesis*. Plato speaks of revolutions in the World Soul (*Tim.* 37a) and in the immortal part of the individual soul (*ibid.* 433a). This owes nothing, of course, to introspection, but is based upon considerations of the revolutions of the body of the *kosmos* that reveal the motion of its own soul (*ibid.* 345b) and provide a visible moral paradigm for the motions of our own soul (*ibid.* 47b, and see *ouranos* 2-3: for sensation as motion, see *ibid.* 49c; and for the larger question of motion in the soul, *psyche* 19).

For the operation of cosmic *noia* in Aristotle, cf. *nous*, *kinoun*.

13. The Atomists considered the soul, which was distributed throughout the body (Aristotle, *De an.* 1, 409a; *Lucretius* iii, 370), to be the seat of all sensation (for the mechanics of this, see *aisthesis* 29–33). But given that soul ( psyche) and mind (nous) are substantially the same (*De an.* 1, 409a), it would seem to follow that sensation and thought are identical, and so Aristotle concluded (*Meta.* 1069b; see *Aetius* viii, 8, 5; iv, 8, 10). As for its operation, since *noia* is nothing more than a kind of aggregation (see *holon* 10) of soul-atoms in the breast, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the *eidola* penetrate beyond the surface sense organs, reach the interior of the breast, and so cause this higher type of perception (see *Lucretius* iv, 722–727).

14. But we have already seen that the earlier Atomists had attempted to distinguish, by the purity of its constitution and its location, mind from soul. The Epicureans preserved and refined the distinction and it is specifically present in Lucretius' consistent use of *anima* for *psyche* and *animus* for *nous* or *dianoia* (*mens* is somewhat too narrow in connotation for the latter since the *animus* is the seat of volitional as well as intellectual activity; iii, 145). He clearly separates the two at iii, 396–416 where he argues that part of the *anima* may be lost (e.g., in the loss of a limb) and a man still survive, but the loss of the *animus* means the instantaneous end of the organism.

15. For the Epicurean *noia* operates somewhat in the fashion of the senses. It too may directly perceive the *eidola* given off by bodies but that are not, in this case, grasped by the senses. Such are, for example, the accidental mixtures of *eidola* that give rise to the imagining of centaurs and chimæras (*Lucretius* iv, 129), visions seen in dreams (iv, 749–776), and the *eidola* of the gods (v, 148–149; Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1, 49). These operations are akin to Aristotle's *noia* thinking of indivisible concepts (*De an.* iii, 430a); there is, as well, intuition *componendo et dividendo*, i.e., evaluating and passing judgment on the data of sensation. The images (*phantasia*) in which the *eidola* are grouped are passed along to the *dianoia* or *noia* where they accumulate into general "preconceptions" (*prolepseis*, q.v.). These in turn serve as a standard of comparison for judgments (*hypo-lepseis*) about individual sensible things (D.L. x, 33). This is the area
of opinion into which error enters (see doxa 7; the Epicurean criterion of truth and error is discussed under energeia). Finally, the mind is also capable of entering the realm of the imperceptiblizes (adele), i.e., to perform a discursive reasoning process (logismos, the ratio of Lucr. nosis) dealing with entities not immediately perceptible to the senses, a class that would, of course, include the atomz themselves (see D.L. x, 32).

16. The Stoic version of noesis, the operation of the hegemonikon (q.v.), is properly kathalepsis or apprehension. The process begins with an impression (typosis) on the senses that results in a sensible image (phantasia; see aisthesis 24–25). These are borne, via the pneuma (q.v.), to the hegemonikon where it is first assented to (symkatasthesia, adesnoi) and is thus apprehended (katalepsis, q.v.; Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 40–42). In this way what was a sensible image (phantasia) becomes an intelligible image or concept (ennoia, q.v.). In the earliest years this is almost an unconscious process and the child builds up various "preconceptions" (prolepsis, q.v.) under whose influence the hegemonikon matures to the point where it is capable of creating its own conscious ennoiai (SVF 11, 83). According to this same text, the full operation of the hegemonikon begins at the age of seven, or at least between seven and fourteen, a judgment not based on the observation of rational behavior in adolescents but on the onset of puberty and the first production of sperm (see SVF 11, 764, 783). As in Epicureanism, noesis is not only of the aistheta but ranges freely over a wide area of thought, creating its own ennoiai by recourse to the principles of similarity, analogy, privation, opposition, etc. (SVF 11, 97).

On the Stoics' primary prolepsis of good and evil, see oikiosis.

17. This theory did not remain completely intact. Chrysippos made some important revisions that had as their effect the reunification of the psyche under the aegis of the hegemonikon so that even the pathé became intellectual judgments (kriseis; SVF 111, 461) and, in direct opposition to Plato's vision of the tripartite soul, volitional activity was subsumed under the intellectual (SVF 11, 85g; see aisthesis 25, pathos 12). This is followed by a strong Platonizing reaction under Poseidonius who opposed Chrysippos on the intellectual nature of the pathé and restored the Platonic partition of the soul (Galen, Placita Hipp. et Plat. 248, 480). There follows from this a sharper distinction between psyche and nous (particularly apparent in Marcus Aurelius 111, 18; xxi, 3) with emphasis on the divine and immortal nature of nous as opposed to the other parts of the soul (see sympatheia s), etc., by reason of the presence of this daimon in it (so Galen, op. cit. 448; Plutarch, De genio Scer. 591c–f; Platonic inspiration in Tim. 90c and see daimon), a new interest in the medial position of the soul (see psyche 29).

18. Middle Platonism concentrated its attention on the cosmic aspects of nous (q.v.) and it is not until Plotinus that we have any significant contribution to the workings of the immanent nous. As did Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus distinguishes two types of intellectual activity, one intuitive and one discursive. The former, noesis, is, in the first instance, the life and energeia of the cosmic hypostatized nous. It is not, however, an activity of the One since for Plotinus even so self-integrated an act as noesis bespeaks duality and so is anathema to the One (Enn. vi, 6, 3; with passing reference to Plato's remarks in Soph. 254d and Parmenides 126a on the role of the "Other" [heteron] in being and therefore in intellection). What need, Plotinus asks (vi, 7, 4), would the eye have to see something if it were itself the light?

19. Noesis, then, in its genuine form is a unity of subject and object that, though they differ only logically, constitute a plurality (plethos). It is characteristicly internalized: the noeta that are the objects of noesis are in the nous that knows them (vi, 2, 21). Noesis, which is the life of nous, casts forth its image (eikon) in the form of an energeia in the lower hypostasis of the soul. This is logismos or discursive reasoning, an operation that, unlike the immediate and internalized noesis, comprehends the phantasmatia of objects outside itself, offered to it by sensation, and makes judgments (kriseis) concerning them by invoking rules (kanones) transmitted from nous, q.v., or, as he puts it elsewhere, by composition and division (synagoge, diareesis; v, 3, 2; see the Platonic antecedents of these terms under dialethike). What he refers to here is a knowledge of the eidoi supplied by the nous that contains them and that make possible our comparative judgments (cf. v, 1, 13; v, 3, 4; and compare Phaedo 74a ff.).

20. The soul is capable of two activities: when "turned upward" it gives itself over to noesis/logismos; when "downward," to aisthesis and the operation of the other faculties (vi, 2, 22; see aisthesis 26). Sensation uses a medium, an image (phantasia), separated from its model and yet different from the thing in which it resides; nous is immediate: knower and known confront each other directly and become identified (v, 3, 8). But we do not have noesis in its purity. Noesis is a vision of unity; our image of it, logismos, deals with plurality, and the more one frees oneself from the composing and dividing that is our imitation of noesis and turns instead to a contemplation of self, the more one will be assimilating oneself to the true operation of nous (v, 3, 6). Why the soul is forced to endure this logismos is part of the general condition of its descent into a body (see kathodos). It is, like its external manifestation, language, a weakness, a sign of the soul's preoccupation with areas not akin to itself (iv, 3, 13).

21. In this passage (iv, 3, 18) Plotinus makes use of the principle of attention (phrontis) to explain the degeneration of noesis into logis-
mos (compare the elaborate metaphor in iv, 3, 17 where the soul's preoccupation with the material is compared to that of a ship's captain toward his ship and its cargo; for the further degeneration of thought into activity, see physik 9) and he resorts to a similar type of explanation in confronting another problem. If nous is a faculty in the soul, how is one to explain the intermittent nature of noesis in man as compared to its continuous exercise in the higher principle? Aristotle had already faced the question and had suggested that while the objects of noesis are always in the mind, they are not always present to the mind; in short, man must choose to think (De an. 11, 417b).

Further, this activity can last for only brief periods in man since it involves a passage from potency to act and so fatigues the thinker (Meta. 1050b, 1072b; Eth. Nich. 1175a). For Plotinus it is a question of awareness. The immanent nous is always in operation, but we, because our attention is turned elsewhere, are not always aware of it (iv, 8, 8). This view, based as it is on a desire to keep the human soul perpetually linked, via the nous, to the kosmos noetos, Proclus finds a novelty in the Platonic tradition (in Tim. iii, 330-334) and therefore returns to the position of an intermittent functioning of noesis in the "descended" soul (Elem. theol., prop. 211; see kathodos and psyche 35).

noetón: capable of being grasped by the intellect; the object of the intellect, the intelligible (opposite of aestheton)

1. The noetón is the object of the operation of the faculty of nous. Among the pre-Socratics, where the distinction of nous from the general cognitive principle of the psyche was a very gradual one (see noesis 7), the objects of the former faculty were not very closely considered. They do, of course, constitute "true knowledge" (epistemé, q.v.), for Heraclitus the knowledge of "the nature that loves to hide," for Parmenides the knowledge of "true being." With Plato the distinctions become sharper. The noetae are the objects of the faculty of the soul called logos tóton (see psyche 15-18); they are, in short, the transcendent eidos. But for Aristotle the eidos are immanent (see eidos 15) and so further distinctions are in order. The eidos in things can be considered from two points of view. With respect to the substance in which it inheres, it is the formal cause of that substance; with respect to the nous of another, it is potentially intelligible (noetón) by that nous. But before it becomes actually noetón it must be carried to and presented to that nous. This is the function of the phantasmata that is like a visual image except that it is without matter: the nous thinks the noeta in the phantasmata (De an. 11, 431b-432a). In the final analysis, then, the noeta gra noeta are in the nous, first potentially, then actually. This transition from potency to act occurs in the nous pathétíkos

(see nous 11). But in terms of Aristotelian act-potency theory, the noeta should all be present in act in the nous poietikos (see nous 12). But Aristotle never says this, resorting to a comparison of the operation of the agent intellect to that of a light source: the active intellect illumines the passive intellect (ibid. 111, 432b).

2. During the period of Middle Platonism a number of revisions were made in the eidos-theory, part of what was very probably an extensive syncretizing of Platonism and Peripateticism (badly put in Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 17-18) in such a fashion as to include both the Platonic transcendent eidos and the Aristotelian immanent eidos within the causal nexus schema (its progressive development can be traced in Seneca, Ep. 65, 8 and Basil, the Great, De spiritu sancto, 39). Authors of the period began to draw a distinction between the eidos that is immanent in things as their formal cause and the idea that is the exemplary cause of natural things (Seneca, Ep. 58, 19; Albinus, Epit. 11, 8; compare Aristotle, Meta. 1070a). They appealed to such Platonic proof-texts as Tim. 85e and 50c-d (see Chalecius, in Tim. 304, 9 where idea = species intelligibili and eidos = natura corporis; on the general question of the immanence of the Platonic eide, see genesis 10-11) and the constant invocation of the example of the artisan, with its overtones of the Platonic demiourgos, seems finally to have led to the explicit description of the idea as "the thoughts of God" (Philo, De opif. 17-20; D.L. 11, 12-13; Seneca, Ep. 65, 7; Albinus, Epit. 11, 11: noesis theorai). This was not, of course, a completely novel concept. It does seem alien to Plato for whom the nous demiourgos, for all its being a God, was markedly subordinate to the transcendent eide (see nous 6). But Aristotle speaks (De an. 111, 432a) as if someone in the Academy were holding that the nous was "the Form" (topos eidos) and, as we have already seen, the direction of Aristotle's own theorizing would seem to suggest that the noetae are actually present in the nous poietikos and, possibly, in the cosmic nous as well (see nous 9).

3. Two points are to be noted in the subsequent history of the transcendent noeta, the ideai of Albinus, which serve as the exemplary cause of things. First, since Albinus' first principle is a nous and a demiourgos (see nous 15), there is nothing to militate against the noeta being the thought (noesis) of God. But between Albinus and Plotinus the transcendence of the One has displaced nous from the first place in the hierarchy of hypostases, and the question immediately arises as to whether the noetae are the thoughts of the One and, indeed, whether there is any noetic activity at all in the One. Secondly, granting that the noetae are in the cosmic nous, what exactly is their ontological status?

4. The question of the noetic activity of the One was almost
certainly raised by Aristotle's description of the *energeia* of the First Mover as *noesis* (see *nous* 9). Such a position is irreconcilable with Plotinus' view of the One and he devotes an entire essay (Enn. v, 6) to a refutation of Aristotle's view. The arguments are drawn from a variety of sources (they are, in fact, so schematic as to suggest a Platonic repertoire on the subject) but they hinge essentially on the necessary plurality in any type of *noesis* and on the ontological status of the *noeta* that, in Plotinus' view, are not thoughts at all. Proclus, however, returns to a more Aristotelian position. There is a cognitive activity in God that is undivided, necessary, and perfectly determined, even though its objects are not; this is possible because God's knowledge (*gnosis*) is not of particulars in themselves, but in himself as in its cause (*Elem. theol.*, prop. 124); *trias, nous* 9.

5. The second point, the ontological status of the *noeta*, is taken up by Plotinus in *Enn.* v, 9, 7. The possibility that the *eidos* were mere ideas or concepts (*noemata*) had already been raised and denied in *Phars.* 152a-c. But the Academy went through a sceptical period under Arcaelius and Carrareschi during which the transcendent *ideai* fell into disfavor (see Cicero, *Acad.* 1, 17; for the restoration of the *ideai* by Antiochus of Ascalon, *ibid.*, 1, 30-33) and it was evidently still very much of a problem for Plotinus. He denies their purely conceptual reality. The *noeta* are not properly described as the thoughts (*noesises*) of the cosmic *nous* because, unlike thoughts, their existence does not depend upon being thought: here thinking and thought are identical: *nous* eternally energized is the *noeta* (see *v*, 9, 5). Further, if they were thoughts, there would have to exist objects of thought (*noemata*) prior to them. The *noeta* exist of themselves, not because *nous* thinks them (*v*, 9, 7). They are present in the cosmic *nous* as a unity in the way that a genus contains all its species (*v*, 9, 6) or a science contains all its theorems; it is we who separate them in our discursive mode of thought (*v*, 9, 8; see *noesis* 19-20).

6. For Plotinus there are two grades of *noeta*: the *ideai* that exist in a state of unity in the cosmic *nous*, and those that have a plural existence in our immanent, human *nous* and that are given to us by the transcendent *noeta* that is the *dator formarum* (see *nous* 21). In *v*, 9, 8 he says that these latter are "close to reality [idealetheiai]," but in general he does not much insist on a difference between the two, and we are told that each of us is a *kosmos noeta* (q.v.), i.e., we have within our souls all the *noeta* (III, 4, 3). The emphases are somewhat changed in Proclus. The two men disagreed on the question of the degree of contact between the transcendent and immanent *nous* (see their different explanations of the intermixture nature of human intellect under *noesis* 21), and this disagreement is reflected in their views of the *noeta* in our souls. According to Proclus (*Elem. theol.*, props. 194-195) the soul possesses the *eidos* of sensible things (i.e., the *logoi* *sporadikoi*) in an exemplary manner (*paradigmatikoi*), without matter and without extension (see *physis*). It possesses the intelligible forms, the *noeta* in a reflected manner (*etikoi*); it does not embrace the genuine articles but mere radiations (emphases) of them.

For *hyle noeta*, see *epairia*; for the relativity of intelligibility, *gnorimia*. The faculty that grasps the *noeta*, whether on a cosmic or human level, is treated under *nous* and *psyche* and its operation under *noesis*. The earlier history of the *noeta qua Forme* is discussed under *eidos*.

**nomos:** custom, convention, constitutional or arbitrary law

1. The intrusion of *nomos* into philosophical discourse in the fifth century followed upon the shift of the notion of nature (*physis*) from the physical to the ethical realm. This may have been a result of medical influence ("On the Nature [*physis*] of Man" appears as a title in the Hippocratic corpus), but can be seen as well in the ethical coloring of the concept of *kosmos* (q.v.). From the other side there was an increasing understanding of the purely arbitrary and relative nature of *nomos* (see the two anecdotes in *Herod*. 111, 38). The first explicitly to embrace the position that justice and injustice are a question of *nomos* and not *physis* was Archelaus (D.L. II, 16), though it already seems to be implied in Heraclitus (fr. 105). The view became a common one among the Sophists, and their relativist views, whether in morality (Protagoras in *Protagoras*), politics (Thrasymachus in *Rep.* 11), or epistemology (Protagoras at 152a), are frequently cited by Plato. Plato's own ethical and epistemological absolutism is not, of course, based on any defense of the old-fashioned notion of *physis*, but on the unchanging *eidos*, and, as he grows older, on the existence of God. In *Laws* 716c Protagoras' *homo mensura* theory is finally corrected: *God is the measure of all things* (*theia nomos*).

2. The idea of a divine law had already been advanced by Heraclitus, fr. 114 (see *kosmos*), and there were subsequent appeals to "unwritten law" (*agraphe nomos*), which, far from being mere convention, has a divine sanction (so Xenophon, *Mem.* IV, 4, 5-25; Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 986-971, Ant. 448-450; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1389b, 1372a-b). But none of them rests on a philosophical conception of a *physis* that grounds *nomos*; this appears in Stoicism with its doctrine of *physis* as an immanent *logos* (Seneca, *De beneff.* IV, 7-3), and its definition of virtue as "living according to nature" (D.L. II, 36-37), where "nature" is to be understood in both its cosmic and individual sense (idem 111, 8g). It is this "nature," the *divina ratio* (see *logos*) that is immanent, eternal, and immutable (Cicero, *De leg.* II, 4, 8; De
nomothétés: law-given
See onoma.

nous: intelligence, intellect, mind
1. A search for order or an ordering principle is implicit in both Greek mythology and philosophy from their beginnings, in the myths by the application of a genealogical arrangement back to an original source or “father” to the welter of gods drawn from a variety of sources, and among the Milesian philosophers by their search for an arche (q.v.). This latter quest for a “father” of things received its initial check with the discovery of a “father” who consumed all his “sons,” i.e., the on (q.v.) of Parmenides. But regress to a source is only one type of order, and thinkers with a very different cast of mind were investigating the problem in other directions. There is, Heraclitus insists, an order hidden under the appearances of things, an order that he describes as logos (q.v. 1). The Pythagoreans went further still: they discovered that this order could be expressed in mathematical terms (see harmonia) and, made explicit, that it could be applied to the universe as a whole (see kosmos).
2. The kinetic conditions imposed by Parmenides had led his successors to posit some sort of external mover to explain change in the sensible world (see kinesis 2, koinon 1). To do so Empedocles had reached into the moral sphere for hypostatizations of the human motive forces of “Love” and “Strife” (see kinoun 2), but for his choice of a mover Anaxagoras turned to another tradition. What Parmenides had done in ontology had already been accomplished in theology by Xenophanes. Part of Xenophanes’ struggle against anthropomorphism (see mythos 1, theos 1) was his insistence that God must be completely immobile (fr. 28), the argument here is based on “what is fitting,” prepon, a recurring aesthetic, moral, and theological motif) and one who accomplishes his ends by the power of his mind (nous) alone (fr. 25). These sentiments are pregnant with future developments. Apart from establishing, here at the onset of theological discourse, the intellectual nature of God, Xenophanes’ view confronts the question of His activity in the world and draws the conclusion that this must take place without any change in God himself (see Aeschylus, Suppl. 96–103).

3. Anaxagoras turns to Xenophanes’ notion of God as nous in positing a motive force that causes the original “mixture” to rotate and separate off into the various elements (see genesis 7). For Empedocles’ moral hypostases has been substituted an intellectual principle, nous, that is separate from the mass upon which it works (fr. 12; but it is also curiously immanent; see noesis 4). Its operation is described as “ordering” (diakeusenesis), and it knows all things, past, present, and future (fr. 12 cont.). Here, then, the Heraclitian and Pythagorean order in the universe, governed, according to Heraclitus (fr. 64), by the all-pervasive fire, is put under the tutelage of a purposeful intellectual force whose knowledge embraces not only the past and present but future events as well.

4. The aer of Diogenes of Apollonia, which in its warmed state is nous (see noesis 5), is more a Milesian arche than a post-Parmenidean kinoun (see noesis 4), but has an even more strongly developed sense of purpose (teles, q.v.). Both Socrates (Phaedo 97b) and Aristotle (Meta. 984b) had criticized Anaxagoras for his mecha-
nistic use of nous, but Diogenes is somewhat more careful in his handling of the problem. The operation of aer-nous is witnessed by the fact that all things operate according to a principle of measure (metron) and in the best way possible (fr. 3; his own example is the regular succession of the seasons).

For the subsequent history of these teleological motifs, see teles.
5. In addition to the nous immanent in human souls (the logistikos; see psyche 15, 18) whose operation is to know the eide and rule the other parts of the soul (see noesis 8–9), there is, in Plato, a cosmic nous. This cosmic reason emerges in Phil. 260–270 where it is called “the maker” (demiourgos, poios), the “cause of the mixture” that is the world of genesis. Almost the same terms are applied to the demiourgos (q.v.) of the Timaeus where the kosmos poios is called the work of Nous (476). Now nous is an essential property of the gods shared by only a few men (ibid. 51c) and it seems more than likely that this cosmic Nous is divine (see Phil. 30d, Tim. 30f). It rules everything (Laws 875c–d), has ordered the universe (ibid. 965e), and its revolution, reflected in the motion of the heavens, is a moral paradigm for man (ibid. 897d–898a; see noesis 10).

6. But any attempt to locate this divine Nous, the cosmic cause of the universe, within the framework of Plato’s general metaphysics is greeted with frustration, and not least by reason of the “mythical” nature of the account in the Timaeus. On a number of occasions we are informed that nous must exist in a soul (see Soph. 249a, Phil. 30c,
Tim. 30b), and there are no grounds for thinking that this refers only to
human intellects. If this is true it locates nous, cosmic or otherwise,
beneath the eide. The intermediary status of the soul in the Platonic
system is well attested (immortal and immaterial like the eide; plural
and subject to pathikos like the aistheta: see psyche 14 and, for the later
tradition, 29), and we are told quite specifically that nous has a depend-
ent relationship on the eide that are the cause of nous' being in the soul:
nous is the ability of the soul to perceive the eide (Rep. 506a). Thus
are frustrated any attempts at finding a transcendent God or gods in
Plato (in the Phaedrus Plato says the gods owe their divinity to their
nearness to the eide), or even to identify it or them with the Good that is
"beyond being" in Rep. 506b. Another school of thought, however,
sees the cosmic nous as the nous of the World Soul (psyche tou
pantos), dismissing as myth the fact that in the Timaeus the World
Soul is created by the demiourgos (49c).

7. In this fashion, then, Plato fulfills the desideratum of Socrates' complaint against Anaxagoras' nous first, it is stated in terms
already formulated by Diogenes that the kosmos is as it is because it is the
work of an intelligent cause, framed to be "as good as possible" (Tim. 30a-b), and then, in a peculiarly Platonic formulation, that it is an
image (eikon, q.v.) of the intelligible, a visible god (ibid. 49c; on the
general theory, see mimesis).

8. Aristotle's transcendent principle is first and foremost a
"mover," developed out of a series of arguments that derive from the
nature of kinesis and genesis (see kinoun 7-10) and that Aristotle, like
Anaxagoras, chooses to identify with an intelligent principle, nous. But
unlike Anaxagoras, he is now confronted with a "separation" between
the material and the immaterial and so must resort, even in the case of
this efficient cause, to the motive force of final causality (see kinoun 7,
sympathesia 7). He has, as well, a more highly developed explanation of
intellec tion (noesis) based upon his theory of energéia/dynamis and that
he must also apply to his proton kwnon.

9. In the De anima Aristotle had described knowledge, in all its
manifestations, as becoming another, but only with respect to its form,
not its matter (111, 425b, 431b-432a). To speak more specifically of
noésis (q.v. 12), it is a passage from potency to act (energeia) in
becoming the intelligible form of another, and this is effected by
knowing this intelligible in its sensible image (111, 431b). Now the
proton kwnon is described as nous and its energéia as noésis (Meta.
1072b), but it is clear that this must somehow differ from the oper-
atons described in the De anima. In the first instance, cosmic nous is not
activated by something else since this would be to say that it is in
potency to something else and thus not an unmoved mover. The cosmic
nous, then, does not become its object; it is its object, and this eternally
since its object is always present (loc. cit.). God thinks himself; he is
thought about thought (nòsis noésis; ibid. 1074b), or perhaps
thought about himself thinking. This activity is explicitly contrasted to
all other forms of thought, episteme, aisthesis, doxa, diatasis, the first
object of whose operation is "another" (allos) and then themselves
thinking, but this latter only incidentally (perergon; loc. cit.; for the
corollary of this, developed by Proclus, that God knows himself di-
rectly and the plural noésis only incidentally, see notion 4).

10. In a number of places Aristotle compares human and divine
noésis. Since man is a composite (synthetos) comprising body and a
noetic soul, his noésis is intermittent and wearisome because it involves
a passage from potency to act (Meta. 1050b, 1072b; Eth. Nich. x,
1175a). But noésis, for all the wearisome nature of its operation in us,
is, nonetheless, the proper function (ergon, q.v.) of both God and
man. And when we practice contemplation (theoria) we most ap-
proach the life of God and most contribute to our own happiness (Eth.
Nich. x, 1175b-1176a, 1176b). But human noésis differs from its divine
counterpart by more than its intermittency. The former is not only
mediate (i.e., it knows the noéta in visible images), it is also discursive;
judges by combining and separating concepts (see noésis 18).
Aristotle does have an intuitive form of human knowledge, which he calls
nous, but it seems to be posited on epistemological grounds and never
appears in a "mystical" context (see epagoge 3, gnorimon 3).

11. The functioning of the Aristotelian faculty of nous is clear in
its general outlines, but the strict application of the principles of act
and potency lead to a number of obscurities. There seems to be a
distinction of faculty within the soul. The intellect must be potentially
anything that it will know actually. But any passage from potency to
act demands a principle already in act (the same argument that leads
to the First Mover) and so Aristotle posits another intellect that
"makes all things." These are distinctions (diaphoroi) that occur in
the soul and the two intellects stand to each other as matter to form
(De an. 111, 430a). One, the passive intellect (pathethikos nous), later
called "ny Rede consists of "the sun," is separable (choristos), unaffected (apatheia), unmixed (amiges), and essentially an energéia. When it is
separated (choristhésis), it alone is immortal and everlasting (allos).

12. All of this occurs in one brief passage in the De an im (111,
5), and it, together with a parallel passage in the De gen. anim. 11, 733b
that states that the nous, which alone is divine and has no commerce
with any physical energéia, comes "from outside" (hýtra), has provoked
more comment than any other text in Aristotle. It appears
clearly enough that we know because the nous pathethikos is energized,
i.e., it becomes the intelligible form of the object known by reason of
the operation of another “part” of nous that is already in act (see \textit{Meta.} 1049b). But the origin and precise nature of the operation of this latter nous poietikos or agent intellect, as it came to be known, was fiercely debated.

13. Most of the later complexities stem from a series of essays on the subject by the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias who distinguished another phase between the nous pathetikos and poietikos. This is the intellect in \textit{habitus} that results from the purely passive intellect (also later identified with the imagination) becoming potentially intelligible by being illuminated by the nous poietikos and thus acquiring a “state” (\textit{hexis, habitus}) of intelligibility (\textit{De intellectu}, p. 197). He further measures the nous poietikos as it is described in the \textit{De anima} against that of the First Mover in the \textit{Metaphysics} and concludes that the agent intellect is, indeed, the first cause (\textit{proton aitia}; \textit{De anima}, p. 89), an identification that was later to be accommodated to the Neoplatonic belief in a series of intermediary intelligences, where the last emanation, Aristotle’s nous poietikos, becomes the bestower of forms, i.e., the intelligible forms are not extracted from the material \textit{phantasia}, as in Aristotle, but are given to the human intellect by a higher intelligence (see \textit{infra} and noeton 6).

14. The Epicureans recognized nous (Lucretius: \textit{animus}) as a cognitive faculty distinct from \textit{aisthesis} (see \textit{noesis} 14), but in a materialist system devoid of providence (\textit{prosmia}) it is given no important cosmic role. In Stoicism, however, the human nous or hegemonikon (see \textit{noesis} 15) is a manifestation of the cosmic nous or logos that pervades, directs, and governs all (D.L. vii, 135, 136). To call the logos both nous (in its providential aspect) and \textit{physis} (in its creative aspect) is to blur the distinction that Aristotle had drawn between the two, but the more Aristotelian (and Platonic) view once more begins to prevail in the tradition from the time of Poseidonius when nous reappears as a characteristic of men alone, immortal, a product of the superluminary world (see \textit{noesis} 17, \textit{sympatheia} 5). The Platonists of the period, on the other hand, could assert the transcendence of nous without the immanental restrictions imposed by the Stoic tradition.

15. Since the revival of the \textit{coido}-theory with Antiochus of Ascalon (see Cicero, \textit{Acad. post.} i, 30–33 where Varro gives the philosophical point of view of Antiochus) there was a new interest in the problems of causality in the \textit{kosmos noetos}. To resolve some of the problems Platonic scholars of the period did not hesitate to have recourse to Aristotle. Thus the purely Platonic elements grow out of a synthesis of the Good beyond being of the \textit{Republic}; the One of the \textit{Parmenides}, the nous of the \textit{Philebus}, and the \textit{deinaiourgos} of the \textit{Timotheus}: the first cause is nous, the source of all good in the universe, beyond qualification and description (Albinus, \textit{Epit.} x, 1–4; on the “unspeakable” cause, see \textit{agnostos}). This protos nous of the \textit{Philebus} is also the \textit{deinaiourgos} of the \textit{Timotheus} who looks to the \textit{eidos} in his creation of the \textit{kosmos}, save that the \textit{eidos} are now located in the mind of the deinaiourgos (ibid. xii, 1 and noeton 2).

16. But there is an Aristotelian side to this as well. The first nous thinks himself, and, though he is himself unmoved (\textit{akineto}), he moves others as an object of desire (\textit{akinetos; loc. cit.}). Aristotle had further designated the protos nous as God and his later commentators identified both with the nous poietikos of the \textit{De anima}. Albinus, while he describes the protos nous as thinking himself in the prescribed Aristotelian fashion (\textit{Epit.} x, 3), has a further subordinate principle, a second transcendent nous that is always energized and that is “the nous of the whole heaven,” a description that at least suggests the protos nous of the \textit{Metaphysics}. What seems likely is that Albinus has distinguished the final and efficient causality that Aristotle had united, and assigned the first to the protos nous that moves “as an object of desire” (X, 2) and the second to the subordinate nous. There is, finally, a third transcendent nous, a faculty of the World Soul (X, 3). Visible here are all the motifs of Neoplatonism: three transcendent hypostatized principles that may be denominated, in terms of their emphases, the Good, nous, psyche, all the causality proceeding from the first, even here described as “like the sun” or “Father.”

17. Present too is another trait that is characteristic not only of later Platonism but of the entire philosophical tradition after Aristotle. Plato had considered the stars as intelligent living beings (see \textit{ouranios} 6) and Aristotle had given to each an intelligent mover (see \textit{kinous} 11–12; \textit{ouranios} 3). Middle Platonists incorporated this too into their systems. The planets are intellectual living beings dwelling in the \textit{aether} (Albinus, \textit{Epit.} xiv, 7) and beneath them are the \textit{daimones} of the \textit{aer}, also gods, children of the “Father,” more perfect than men and responsible for omens and prodigies (ibid. xv, 2; Maximus of Tyre xi, 12; Apuleius, \textit{De deo Sacr.} 6; see \textit{daimones} 3–4, \textit{psyche} 35).

18. As has already been indicated (see \textit{infra} supra), the nous-deinaiourgos in Plato seems to be subordinated to the eidos, and thus to the Good of the \textit{Republic} as well. Albinus’ first nous embraces all of these entities, but thereafter new emphases are to be seen. The protos nous begins to yield to the \textit{her-agathon} of the \textit{Parmenides} and \textit{Republic}, and the nous-deinaiourgos function to center on the second hypostasis. These are the views of Numenius (see Eusebius, \textit{Prap. Evang.} xi, 356d–358b), as they will be of Plotinus, stolen, as some said, from Numenius (see Porphyry, \textit{Vita Plot.} xvii, 1). But there are differences as well. The second hypostasis of Numenius is twofold; its primary function, which is \textit{noesis}, degenerating into discursive \textit{dianoia} by reason of its involvement with matter (Eusebius, \textit{op. cit.} xi, 537;
Middle Platonism on the paradigms existing in other things: they form true Forms. They give rise to the highest and lowest sides (see psyche tou pantos, physis).

19. Plotinus follows the general Platonic tradition in making nous the second of the three hypostases (q.v.). It is the demiurgos in that it supplies the psyche with the logos that are the forms of sensible things (Enn. v, 9, 3), but in general the creative function belongs more properly to physis, the lower part of the psyche, whose contemplation lapses into activity (praxis; III, 8, 4). Proclus puts more stress on nous as the arche of this sensible world, but he agrees with Plotinus that creation (see also prododos) is a consequence of theoria or noesis (Elem. theol., prop. 174).

20. The first principle, the One, is perfectly self-sufficient and needs nothing; the cosmic nous, on the other hand, has a need of itself, a need of thinking itself, and so its operation of noesis is, in a sense, a return to itself (Enn. v, 9, 3). Nous is the energeta and logos of the One (v, 1, 6; compare Philo's view under logos 5) and a type of pluralistic externalization of the absolute unity of the One, just as our discursive reasoning is an eikon of the relatively unified operation of the cosmic nous (see noesis 19). The proper activity of nous is a direct intuitive grasp of the noeta as a unity, not in the sense that the nous "thinks" the noeta, but rather it is the noeta (see noeton 5).

21. The cosmic nous, a Platonic heritage, is linked with the reasoning power immanent in man by a species of Aristotelian bridge. The Aristotelian distinction of dissolution of nous into an active energeta and a passive dynamis is taken up and modified by Plotinus. In Enn. v, 9, 3 Plotinus asks himself, in his usual aporetic fashion, if there is a nous choristos, and then proceeds to answer by distinguishing between a nous that is in the soul as an eidos in matter and a nous that "gives the form to the soul as the maker [poieses] gives form to the statue." Thus the Aristotelian nous poietikos is transformed into the dator formarum. The same passage goes on to draw a distinction between the eide themselves. The eide that the nous gives to the soul are "close to reality," those received by matter are "images and imitations" (eidola, mimetnata; see noeton 6).

22. There are, then, three degrees of reality among the Plotinian eide. The lowest, the eide aesthetes in material things, are eikones of the true Perus. They serve both a cognitive and paradigmatic end. As existing in others they form the basis of sensation on the Aristotelian model (see aesthetes 26); as existing in oneself they are the causal paradigms of the production of other beings (see logos spermatikos, physis). There are, too, the eide noeta or, as they are called from Middle Platonism on, the ideal, which exist primarily in the cosmic

Nous where they constitute the kosmos noetos (q.v.) or, after bestowal, in the immanent human nous where, as "traces of nous," they provide the grounds for certain of our judgments (see noesis 19 and, for a more comprehensive treatment of the ideal, noeton).

ochema: vehicle, chariot, astral body

1. As appears from the history of the psyche (q.v.), a number of apparently irreconcilable strains were present in its development almost from the beginning: the materialist view that sees the psyche as a refined form of one or other of the elements, and eventually, as the pneuma, a kind of fifth element akin to ether (q.v.); the spiritualist view flowing from the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as a divine substance different in kind from the body; and, finally, the Aristotelian entelechiesa (q.v.) theory that attempts to explain the psyche in terms of the function of the soul (see ergon, energeta) of some body.

2. Later Platonism was, in effect, forced to come to terms with the entelechiesa view by reason of Plato's interest in function in the Timaeus. This they attempted to do by means of a theory that, in its most general terms, states that the soul has another quasi-physical body or ochema, usually acquired during the prenatal "descent" through the heavens (kathodos, q.v.; see Plotinus, Enn. iv, 3, 15; Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 1, 12). This becomes progressively heavier and more visible as it descends through the moist aer (Porphyry, De anatro nymph. 11). With their usual textual piety the Neoplatonists professed to discover the origin of this doctrine in Plato, and particularly in Tim. 41d-e where the demiurgos saves each soul in a star, "as in a chariot" (ochema; compare Phaedrus 247b), preliminary to embodying some of them on earth and "storing" others in the planets (ibid. 42d). But when it comes to explaining the nature of these "vehicles," no resort is made to Aristotle.

3. Aristotle had described pneuma (q.v.) as the seat of the nutritive (dchreptike) and sensitive (aisthetike) soul and analogous in composition to ether that is the material element of the stars (De gen. anim. 736b-737a). Thus the "vehicle" of the soul is described by the Neoplatonists as an aetherial (aitherodes) and light-like (augoeides)
body (Iamblichus, De myst. iii, 14; the sidereum and luminosum corpus of Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 1, 12 and 11, 13).

4. The theory is set out, with a considerable number of refinements, in Proclus, Elem. theol., props. 205-209. Each human soul is initially under the influence of the divine soul (see psyche, carunial) in one or other of the planets (prop. 204; see Tim. 42a and Proclus, In Tim. iii, 280). The astrological implications of this are obvious, but there was a general Neoplatonic consensus that the theiai psyches of the planets were not responsible for evil (Plutarch, Enn. ii, 3, 20; Iamblichus, De myst. i, 18; Proclus, In Tim. iii, 313). The astral body of the individual soul is consequently related to the body of the planetary soul (prop. 204; compare Enn. iv, 4, 31, and see sympatheia). But this is the immortal, immaterial body permanently attached to the soul (props. 206-207); there is another perishable body that the soul acquires during its descent, composed of increasingly material “mantles” (chitones; prop. 209; see In Tim. iii, 297). This is mortal and, though it survives death (just long enough, it would seem, to endure the corporeal punishments of the type described by Plato in Phaedo 114a), is eventually dissipated. The human individual soul, then, according to the revisionist version of Proclus, has three bodies: the immortal, immaterial “starry” (astroiodes) or luminous body associated with the immortal part of the soul; the “spiritual” (patunmaton) possessed by the mortal parts of the soul and the various deimanes of the universe; and, finally, the fleshly body of the soul’s sojourn on earth (In Tim. i, 296, 298; Theol. Plat. iii, 125).

oikeiosis: self-appropriation, self-acceptance, self-love

1. The Epicurean exaltation of pleasure (hedone, q.v.) followed a tradition going back as far as the Cyrenians in taking as its starting point an analysis of man’s instinctive, unmediated impulses. The Stoics used the same point of departure in ethics but their inspection suggested to them that it was not pleasure that was primary, but rather what they termed oikeiosis, the acceptance of one’s own being and the means of preserving it, the instinctive impulse (horne, q.v.) toward self-preservation (D.L., vii, 85; Cicero, De fin. iii, 5, 15; its opposite is allotriasias, self-alienation). The oikeiosis is not completely absent from Epicureanism where it is the “appropriateness” of the object perceived that produces the pleasure or pain (see pathos); it is merely a shift of emphasis from the cause of pleasure to the process itself.

2. Oikeiosis has ever-widening circles of application: it operates, in the first instance, toward oneself, then toward one’s offspring and family, and, finally, culminates in “love of the whole human race” (carios generis humani; Cicero, De fin. iii, 19, 62–63; v, 23, 65), thus providing the ground for the Stoic emphasis on a social ethic based on nature rather than convention. See nomos, physis.

on, onta (pl.): being, beings

1. The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of Parmenides’ series of logical dichotomies between being and nonbeing (me on): that which is, cannot not be; that which is not, cannot be, i.e., a denial of passage from being to nonbeing or genesis (q.v.; fr. 2), and its corollary, a denial of change and motion (fr. 8, lines 26–35, 42–53; for the theological corollaries of this, see nous 2). Secondly, being is one and not many (fr. 8, lines 22–25). And finally, the epistemological premises: only being can be known or named; nonbeing cannot (fr. 3; fr. 8, line 34); see doxa. Being, in short, is a sphere (fr. 8, lines 42–49). Most of the later pre-Socratics denied this latter premise (cf. stoicheia and atomon), as did Plato for whom the really real (to onta on) were the plural eides, and who directed the latter half of the Parmenides (175b–186c) against it.

2. The solution to the nonbeing dilemma (for its epistemological solution, see doxa and heteron) and the key to the analysis of genesis began with Plato’s positing of space (see hypodocho) in which genesis takes place, and which stands midway between true being and nonbeing (Tim. 52a–c). For Plato, as for Parmenides, absolute nonbeing is nonsense (Soph. 296d), but there is a relative grade illustrated not only by the Reception cited above, but by sensible things (eistheta) as well (Soph. 246b; Tim. 35a, 292). Among the Platonic hierarchy of Forms, there is an eidos of being; indeed it is one of the most important Forms that pervades all the rest (Soph. 254b–d; compare this with the peculiar nature of on in Aristotle, Meta. 1003a). Further, Plato distinguishes real beings (ontes onta) from those that have genesis, and in Timaeus 28a he works out an epistemological-ontological correlation: onta are known by thought (noesis) accompanied by a rational account (logos); generated beings are grasped by opinion (or judgment, see doxa) based on sensation (eisthesis).

3. Since being is the object of the science of metaphysics (Meta. 1031a) Aristotle’s treatment of on is much more elaborate. The first distinction is between “being qua being” (to on he on), which is the object of metaphysics, and individual beings (onta), which are the objects of the other sciences. This is the view in Meta. 1009a, but Aristotle is not consistent on the points elsewhere (see Meta. 1025b; Phys. 193a, 194b; De an. 426b) he states that metaphysics studies being that is separate and unmoving (see theologia). Again, “being” is peculiar in that it is defined not univocally or generically, but analogously through all the categories (Meta. 1003a), and in this it is
like "one" (hen) (Meta. 1053b) and "good" (agathon) (ibid. Eth. Nich. 1, 1096b); see katholou. There follows a basic distinction (ibid. 1017a-b): something "is" either accidentally, or essentially, or epistemologically, or in the dichotomy act (energeia/potency (dynamis)). The epistemological "being" (see doxa) is dealt with elsewhere (see Meta. 1027b-1028a, 1051a-1152a), as is potency/set (see Meta. Theta passim), so Aristotle here concentrates his attention on what "is" essentially. It is something that falls within the ten kategorias (Meta. 1017a) and is, primarily, substance (ousia; ibid. 1028a-b). A somewhat different point of view emerges from Aristotle's breakdown of the various senses of nonbeing (me ona) in Meta. 1098b and 1082a: something is not either as a negative proposition, i.e., a denial of one of the predicates, or as a false proposition, or finally, kata dynamin, i.e., by being something else only potentially but not actually. It is from this latter that genesis comes about (see also dynamis, energeia, stereios).

4. In the Plotinian universe the One (hen) is beyond being (Enn. v, 9, 3; compare Plato's description of the Good beyond Being in Rep. 590d and see hyperousia). The realm of being begins on the level of ousia since both being and nous are contained in nous (ibid. v, 5, 2; v, 9, 7). Nonbeing is treated in much the Platonic and Aristotelian fashion: matter (hyle) that is only a replica (ekhon) of being is only quasi-being (Enn. 1, 8, 3). Philo, with his strongly developed feeling of divine transcendence (see hyperousia), restricts true being to God alone (Quod deter. 44, 16b), and introduces into the discussion the metaphysical interpretation of the famous phrase in Exod. 3, 14: I am who am; see hypodoche, hyle, genesis.

Oneo: dream
1. The common Greek attitudes toward dreams may be illustrated from Homer where they are considered as both objective realities, not very different in quality from waking experience, and as manifestations of an inner experience, some aspects of which shade off into symbolism (see II. xxii, 129 ff.; Od. xix, 547 ff.). But of more speculative consequence was the distinction found in Homer (Od. xix, 550 ff.) between dreams that issue from the "gate of ivory" and that are nothing more than "glimmering illusion, fantasy," and those from the "gate of horn," that are portents of things to come, if only mortals know how to interpret them. That the Greeks made such an effort from an early date is clear from the presence of a "dream interpreter" in ll. v, 148.

2. Macrobius, in his commentary on the Somnium Scipionis (1, 3, 2), divided portentous dreams into the symbolic, the visionary, and the oracular, to which others added direct converse with a god or a daimon (q.v.), e.g., Socrates in Crito 45b, Phaedo 60e, or the admonitions that frequently led, on the testimony of Plato (Laws 509a-510b, Epinomis 555c), to religious dedications and foundations. Attempts to induce such dreams were most frequently associated with incubation or sleeping in a sacred place, a practice also designed to provoke medical cures.

3. The dream enters philosophy with Heraclitus who treats it as a subjective turning-inward (fr. 8q), while Xenophanes begins a long rationalist tradition by complete denial of divination (Diels 214a2; see manteia) including, presumably, dreams. There is an attempt at theory in Democritus who accounted for dreams by the entry into the soul of various eidola (q.v.) or images, some of which foretold the future; and from which men derived their notions of the gods, or better, of the daimones since some of these visitations were baleful (fr. 166). These same visions were for Epicurus proofs for the existence of the gods (Lucretius, De rerum nat. v, 1169-1182; Aetiou 1, 7, 24), presumably because of their clarity and universal occurrence. The sentiment is echoed almost exactly by the Christian Tertullian, De anima 47, 3; see energeia, prolepisis.

4. Plato believes in the prophetic (and divinely inspired) nature of dreams, and in Tim. 21a-72b offers a curious physiological explanation of how they work. They have their origin in the liver, which is the instrument or medium by which the rational part (logistikon) of the soul communicates its thoughts, transformed now into visual images, the appetitive faculty (epithymetikon). It is the presence of these images in the liver that gives rise to dreams and at the same time explains the practice of divination (manteia) by the inspection of animals' livers.

5. Aristotle's earliest view on dreams is close to that of Epicurus and Democritus: in the De philosophia (fr. 10), though by now he is working his way clear of Plato's eidous-theory, Aristotle still accepts the notion of the separability of the psyche from the body, a phenomenon that may be experienced in dreams, as had earlier been pointed out by Pindar (see psyche). For Aristotle it is exactly this experience of the soul in dreams that leads to man's conviction as to the existence of the gods. But by the time he had come to write the treatises De inveniendis and De divinatione per somnum he had worked out a completely physiological explanation of dreams, and explicitly denies (De div. 46ab) their divine origin, though still allowing their occasionally prophetic nature.

6. Aristotle's attempt to place dreams in a purely psychophysiological context was foredoomed to failure. The increasingly religious and ethical interests of post-Aristotelian philosophy led to a reassertion of the divine origin of at least some dreams, while false dreams could be written off to the convenient physiological causes, so Cicero, De dio.
62, 127-128. Typical of their intrusion into later philosophy is Iamblichus' preoccupation with dream phenomena in his Life of Pythagoras, where the now legendary older philosopher is made to counsel his disciples to induce prophetic dreams by nightly "mood-music" (§5), and the proper diet (106-107, compare D.L. viii, 24, where the well-known Pythagorean taboo on beans is explained in this way). On a more popular level the testimonia range from the famous "dream book," the Sacred Discourses of Aelius Aristides to the still extant Oneirocriticon of Artemidorus of Ephesus, a systematic treatise on the interpretation of dreams.

**όνομα: name**

1. The philosophical problems attendant upon language are introduced by Heraclitus' insistence on the fact of change and the ambiguity of both phenomena and our ways of naming them (see frs. 67, 32). But they appear in a more rigidly conceptualized formula with the Sophists' distinction between nature (physis) and convention (nomos, q.v.). Gorgias, for one, denies all connection between the word and the object described ( Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 84), thereby raising the question of the "correctness" of names. Proclus gave expensive lectures on the subject (Plato, Crat. 384b), and we know from Xenophon, Mem. ii, 14, 2, that it was a frequently discussed topic at Athens.

2. Plato takes up the question in detail in his Cratylus where the position that names have a natural connection with the things named is maintained by the Heraclean Cratylus (382a: see rhoe), and the theory of the conventional origin of language by Hermogenes (384d). Socrates' position is that things have a permanent quality of their own (the eidos-theory is presumed throughout; for medical investigation along these lines, see eidos), and that the function of language is a social one: the name is an instrument to teach us about the nous of a thing and to enable us to distinguish it from other things (388b-c). It follows then that there must have been a wise legislator (nomothetes) who has imposed names on things using a kind of ideal name as his model (393a-396c).

3. There follows (403a-b) a theory as to the mimetic origin of language: the name is a phonetic mimic (q.v.) of the object, a gesture in sound. But for all the etymological mockery in the Cratylus it is clear from a number of passages in Plato that he takes seriously the philosophical content of names: they are a constituent of every statement (logos; Soph. 261c-262c) and part of the process leading toward episteme (q.v.; Ep. viii, 344a ff.).

4. Aristotle agrees with Plato on the mimetic character of language (Rhet. 1404a20), but sounds only become names when they take on a meaning established by convention (De interp. 16a), i.e., when they become symbolic. Again, like Plato, Aristotle is much indebted to linguistic analysis as a philosophical tool: the kategorial are, in the first instance, modes of predication.

5. Epicurus was concerned with a solid epistemological basis for philosophical discourse and was at some pains to insist on an intimate connection between the concept (enmola, q.v. and see prolepsis) and its name, i.e., on the world of thought (already tied to the world of objects by his sensualist theory of aisthesis; see aistheta and eidos) and that of language (D.L. x, 37-38). The name, therefore, must be clear and immediate evidence of the concept (ibid. x, 33; compare energeia). He then proceeds (ibid. x, 75-76) to offer his theory of the origins of language.

6. Speech flows from man's natural desire to express his own feelings (pathê). Lucretius considerably expands this stage of development (De rerum nat. v, 1088-1090), tracing the evolution of language from gesture (following Plato, but rejecting, in the same passage, both the Platonic and Stoic nomothetes), through animal sounds, to the babbling of children. On this point the Epicureans and Stoics parted company in a radical fashion: for the latter speech is a function of logos and hence only men have true speech; animals and children emit mere sounds that are "like speech" (Varro, De ling. lat. vi, 56; Seneca, De ira 1, 3). After this original natural-mimetic stage Epicurus allows for the use of a conventionalized standardization (loc. cit.).

7. Between Aristotle and the Stoics occurred great advances in linguistic research connected with the Alexandrine elucidation of the text of Homer. The results may be witnessed in the not always happy etymologizing (enmola, an adjective meaning "true" in Homer, is substantivized into signum, the true sense of a word) in post-Aristotelian philosophy and particularly in the developed and sophisticated theories of Stoic philosophical linguistics. The linchpin of Stoic theory is the close relationship between interior logos (thought) and exterior logos (speech; see logos). Thus the onoma signifies the thing because the connection is by nature (physis) and not, as Aristotle said, by convention (SVF II, 140). But the Stoic explanation of "nature" is much closer to the Socratic exposition already cited from the Cratylus. The Stoics too believed that the connection between names and the true nature of things springs from the wisdom of a primitive lawgiver who "imposed" names upon things (see Ammonius, In de interp. 25, 19; 26, 23; compare SVF II, 1065, 1070), just as Adam is described as doing by Philo in Leg. all. ii, 14-15. In this fashion exterior logos reveals the inner essence of things, and the Stoics consequently paid a great deal of attention to etymologies, which in turn led them into complex discussions of whether names were related to things through the etymological
principle of analogy (analogia) or its converse, anomaly (anomalia; Varro, De ling. lat. i x, i, citing Chryssippus; see the notorious derivation of luceus from non lucendo in Quintilian 1, 6, 29). Stoic etymologizing becomes pervasive in all subsequent philosophical literature.

órexis: appetite

The appetitive (orektikon) is that faculty of the soul which pursues (Aristotle, De an. 431a). It embraces the three functions of desire (epithymia), spirit, and wish (ibid. 414b), and is, in conjunction with sensation (aisthesis) or intellect (noesis), the ultimate cause of motion in the soul (De an. 111, 433a–b; see kinoun 9). Aristotle's general treatment of órexis is in De motu anim. chaps. 6–8; for its role in Platonism, see epistrophe; in Stoicism, horne.

órganon: instrument, organ, Organon
See aisthesis, dialektike, helon.

ouránioi: heavenly bodies

1. The belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies is an old one among the Greeks. In Apol. 266 Socrates says that everyone believed in them, all, perhaps, except Anaxagoras who was tried on a charge of impiety, part of which involved the divinity of the ouránioi (D.L. 11, 12). Indeed, the belief was so ancient that both Plato (Crat. 397c–d, Laws 885e; compare Laws 896d where the emphasis is somewhat different) and Aristotle (De phil., fr. 10) trace back the beginnings of man's belief in God to a contemplation of the heavens. The motives are various: the identification of air-pneuma-life (see aer), coupled with the apparent eternity of their motion, and the discovery of the order (kosmos) in their movements; the argument from everlasting motion is specifically attributed to the Pythagorean Alcmaeon by Aristotle (De an. 1, 452a; compare Cicero, De nat. doct. 1, 27).

2. Plato accepted their divinity (Rep. 506a) and gave them an important place in his cosmology (Tim. 38c–39e); they were, in fact, the only material things made by the demiurges. In both the Laws (896d–896e) and the Epinomis (981e) they are said to possess souls, and to move by the most perfect deliberation (Epinomis 982d). The exact connection between the bodies and souls of the ouránioi is not specified, but three possibilities are outlined in the Laws (see kinoun 3).

3. When he wrote his early dialogue On Philosophy Aristotle still believed in the Platonic star souls and gave them a role in his theory of the causality of motion (fr. 24; see kinoun 8). But when he came to write the De coelo he was somewhat ambivalent on the subject. They are still present (11, 292a) but they seem to have no role in the motion of the stars, which is now explained in terms of the physis of the material composing the sphere in which they are imbedded, i.e., aither (q.v.). In the Metaphysics they are nowhere to be seen and when Aristotle comes to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies he resorts instead to a theory of multiple prime movers that can be and have been constructed as the souls of the various planets but are much more likely separated intelligences (see kinoun 11–12).

4. This is not to say, however, that Aristotle ceased believing in the divinity of the heavenly bodies; he merely discarded them as philosophical causes. For him, as for Plato (see Tim. 39e) they were "visible Gods" (see Met. 1082a) and more divine than men (see Phys. 11, 166a and Eth. Nich. vi, 1141a). And again the reason is the apparent lack of any change in their activities, a fact confirmed by millennia of astronomical records (see De coelo 1, 276b). In the same passage Aristotle avers to another type of historical argument. All men believe in gods and they have invariably located them in the heavens, linking, he argues, the conceptually immortal to the visibly incorruptible. Again, in Met. 1074b he resorts to a confirmatory proof from the popular religious belief in the divinity of the planets, a tradition passed down in the form of a myth. Aristotle may here be referring to the fairly recent custom of associating the planets with the gods of Greek mythology. The first such reference in Greek literature is in Tim. 38d where Plato speaks of the "holy star of Hermes," and the first full list occurs in Epinomis 987b–d where the origin of the custom is described as Syrian.

5. In succeeding periods the belief in the heavenly bodies was encouraged by the growing importance of astrology and so it frequently turned out that their influence on human affairs was debated more vehemently than their existence. There is a long polemic against the astral gods in Lucretius v, 110–145 (compare Epicurus in D.L. x, 77), probably directed against the Stoics since it contains arguments against the divinity of the earth and sea as well. Stoic pantheism did tend to move in that direction (see SVF 11, 1027), and the specific doctrine of the divinity of the heavenly bodies could be connected, as Aristotle had done in the De coelo, with the nature of the aither (so the Stoic in Cicero, De nat. doct. 11, 29–43), and precisely because of its fiery substance and rapid movement, infallible indications of life and intelligence. But these positions were strongly criticized by the Sceptics (ibid. 111, 23–24, 51) who were opposed to all sorts of divination (mannikte, q.v.).

6. The argument that the rapidity and fiery quality of the aither is an indication of its intellectual nature goes back ultimately to perception theories like those of Diogenes of Apollonius (see aisthesis 12, noesis 5) but has more immediate origins in the young Aristotle. Plato
had maintained that the stars were composed of a fiery stuff and were intelligent living beings (Tim. 40a-b), and that human souls first came into existence in the stars before being incorporated on earth (ibid. 43d-e). And it is for this reason, according to Plato, that the divine intellect in us is located in the head (see kardia 4) so that it may be closest to its "heavenly congener" (ibid. 99a). These suggestions were taken up by Aristotle and incorporated into his doctrine of the "fifth element" (quinta essentia; see aether) that is the substance from which both the heavenly bodies and our nous is made (De philosophia, fr. 27 = Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 26; this is, of course, incompatible with his later theory of nous as a spiritual energia; see nous 11). We are further told (Cicero, Tusq. 1, 22) that he coined a new term to describe its perpetual and uninterrupted motion, endeilecheia (compare the similar approach to aither in De coelo 1, 270b). Also Aristotelian may be the corollary mentioned by Cicero (De nat. deor. 11, 42-43) that the stars feed upon the aither.

7. The theory continued to thrive in all its ramifications. It reappears in the revival of Pythagoreanism at the turn of the Christian era (D.L. viii, 26-27) and plays a part in Poseidonius' theories of soul (see Cicero, Tusq. 1, 42-43 and compare sympatheia 5). For Philo the heavenly bodies are "intellectual animals" (see nostrae or, better, each is an intelligence (nous) remote from evil (De opif. 7)). The cult of these heavenly gods, encouraged by the consuming interest in astrology and demonology (cf. Macrobius, In Somn. Scip. 1, 12, 14; Plutarch, De defec. orac. 41d-1), must have appeared at times on the brink of overwhelming the patiently constructed rationalist position. This seems to be the mood of the defensive struggle put up by Plotinus. As a good Platonist and as a somewhat reluctant heir to the Peripatetic tradition, he accepted the doctrine of celestial intelligences and the stars as living beings (Enn. v, i, 2) that lead a life of goodness and happiness (iv, 8, 2). But he is firm in his detailed resistance to the contemporary astrology (iv, 4, 30-45; see sympatheia 8).

For celestial immortality, see aed, apathertas; for the question of astral bodies, oikoumen; on the movement of the heavenly bodies, kinein; and on their intelligences, nous.

ouranos: heaven

1. Heaven is a generative principle in the ancient cosmogonies (see Plato, Tim. 40d-e; Aristotle, Mete. 109ba). It first appears in a strictly philosophical context in a difficult passage of Anaximenes (Dicle 12477) where he is represented as positing "innumerable ouranos that are gods." Henceforth the Greek view of heaven as a single entity is at least partially replaced by that of a multiplicity of heavenly spheres that envelop the earth and carry the sun, moon, and planets, while the final outermost sphere carries the fixed stars (see Aristotle, De coelo 1, 270b). In this same passage in the De coelo Aristotle points out that ouranos is also used in the sense of the entire universe, and indeed Plato had still used the terms ouranos and kosmos interchangeably (Phaedrus 247b, Pol. 265a, Tim. 25b; see also kosmos).

2. In addition to the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies (ouranvcai), the heaven had another connection with religion: tied to the increasing astronomical sophistication and the consequent identification of the heaven as an extraordinary "order" (see cosmos) was the belief that the role of the philosopher was the contemplation of the eternal verities on high. Best known in this regard are the series of anecdotes about Anaxagoras (see D.L. ii, 2 and 7; Lamblichus, Protrept. 51, 6-25; perhaps Aristotle's remark about Xenophanes in Meta. 96b 5 should be understood in the same sense). The same motif is present in Philo, De opif. 17, 53-54, now combined with a providential creation; God created the heavens so that man, in contemplating their harmonie, might be drawn further upward to the study of philosophy.

3. For Plato too the spectacle of the heavens has a distinct educational effect: in Rep. 528e-529c astronomy serves as an introduction to diatekthik (compare Laws 804a-822d, 967a-968a); a vision of the order of the heavens is a feature of the myth of the soul's destiny in both the Phaedrus 246l-247c and the Rep. 619e-621d. The nuance is slightly different in Tim. 47a-e; here the contemplation of the heavens is directed toward a restoration in the harmonia (q.v; see kinein 5) in the soul. By the time of the late Academic Epicurean 980a-988c these considerations have been incorporated into (and overwhelmed by) the prevalent astral theology (see ouranv i 7). Heaven then becomes the dwelling place of these heavenly gods, Olympus (so Epicurean 977b; see Tim. 300e-406 and the remarkable fragment of Critias preserved in Sexus Empiricus, Adv. Math. ix, 34).

ousia: substance, existence

2. From the fact that Socrates cites Dorian dialectical variants of ouisia in Crat. 203c it has been conjectured that the philosophical origins of the term are Pythagorean. The word has, however, in accordance with Plato's usual technique of variable terminology, a number of different meanings in the dialogues. Thus, it sometimes means existence as opposed to nonexistence (Theaet. 178c, 219b); it is applied to the existence of sensible things in Theaet. 186b, and probably the phrase "coming into being" (genesis eis ouisia) in Phil. 261 is a similar usage. But in other places it is explicitly contrasted to genesis and the world of becoming (Soph. 239b, Tim. 297) as the mode of being of the "really real" (eotas en see Rep. 560b, where the Good is beyond even ouisia, and compare hyperouisia). Ousia even approaches
Plotinus criticizes and rejects the Aristotelian usage as "essence" in *Phaedo* 65d, 92d, and *Phaedrus* 245e where it is equivalent to "definition."

2. Aristotle's search for substance begins in the *Categories* where it is described as that which is not said of a subject or not present in a subject, e.g. the particular man or the particular horse. This individual (*tode tiv*) is substance in the primary sense, but "substance" may also be used to describe the genus (*genos*) and the species (*eidos*), and of these *eidos* has more of a claim to be substance since it is nearer to the individual primary substance: to call an individual tree "an oak" is more revelatory of what it is than to call it "a plant" (*Cat.* 2a-b). Aristotle is further convinced that the problem posed by metaphysics, and indeed by all of philosophy, i.e., "what is being [on]?" really comes down to "what is *ousia"? since being is, first and foremost, substance (*Meta.* 1028b).

3. In *Meta.* 1069a Aristotle distinguishes three types of *ousia*: 1) sensible (*aisthetos*) and everlasting (*aither*), i.e., the heavenly bodies that, because the natural motion of their element, *eidos,* is circular, are also everlasting (see *epitheta*); 2) the sensible and perishable, i.e., what everybody recognizes as substances, plants, animals, etc.; and 3) the unchangeable (*akinetos*). All the substances in classes 1 and 2 are composites, and Aristotle sets about determining which of their components have the best claim to be called substance (*Meta.* 1028b—1041b). The choice is narrowed down to four: the substratum (*hypokeimenon*), genus (*genos*), the universal (*katholos*), and the essence (*ti esti*). The results are the same as those reached in the *Categories*: it is the essence or *eidos* that has the best claim to be substance (*ibid.* 1041a—b), not now as a predicational entity, i.e., "species," but as the inherent formal cause in compound beings (see *eidos*). It fulfills the two prerequisites of substance: it is separable (see *choristos*) and, as embodied in matter, individual (*tode tiv*) (*ibid.* 1092a). Aristotle deals with the first two classes in the *De coelo* and the *Physics* and then takes up the question of unchangeable substances in a later book of the *Metaphysics* (1071b—1073a). Their existence is necessary because both motion (*kinesis*) and time (*chronos*) are everlasting (1071b). To account for this perpetual movement there must be an unmoved substance, i.e., something that moves as final cause: this is the First Mover (*ibid.* 1072a—1073a; see *kinon* 7—10). There are a number of such movers, and their exact number must be determined by astronomical calculations (47 or 55*?) (1073a—1074a; see *kinon* 11—12).

4. The Aristotelian category of substance as *hypokeimenon* becomes, for the Stoics, matter (*SVF* 1, 376, 11, 369). Ontologically it is used in the same sense, see Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* vi, 1; xii, 30. Plotinus criticizes and rejects the Aristotelian analysis of substance

(...)

palingenesia: rebirth, transmigration of souls

(metempsychosis is a very late word)

That Pythagoras held such a doctrine is attested by his contemporary Xenophanes (fr. 7), and there is the later, more dubious testimony (D.L. viii, 4—5) that he remembered four of his own previous reincarnations. That the quality of the reincarnations is tied to an ethical scale is clear from Orphism and from Empedocles (frs. 115, 117, 127, 148, 147). Plato has heard of this doctrine (*Men.* 81a) and in *Phaedo* 710c—720e he incorporates it into his proofs for the immortality of the soul, and, in a more Orphic context, in *Phaedrus* 249a and *Tim.* 42b—c, where the successive rebirths are tied to moral purity. Its most elaborate presentation is in the "Myth of Er" in Rep. 614b—621b. For Herodotus' mistaken notion as to its origins see *Hist.* 1, 123.

The philosophical presuppositions of *palingenesia* are closely linked with the nature and separability of the soul, see *psyche*; its epistemological use may be seen in anamnesis (q.v.), and some of its religious aspects in *katholos*.

parádeigma: model

See mimesis.

parénklisis: swerve (of the atoms)

See kinesis.

páschein: to suffer, be affected, passion

1. Passion (*páschein*), the general state of which *pathos* (q.v.) is the formalized affect, is, together with its correlative, action (*proiein*), a function of the ancient notion of "power" (*dynamis*, q.v.). But their isolation and conceptualization seems to have been the doing of Plato (but see *Gorg.* 476a—e where their facile manipulation suggests an earlier usage) who divides change (*kinesis*, q.v.) into active
and passive aspects (Theaet. 156a; compare Laws x, 944e) that he later calls hallmarks of the world of becoming (genesis; Soph. 248c).

2. The association of action and passion with genesis remains constant, not in the sense of qualitative change or locomotion as Plato suggests (Theaet. 156c), but in the technical sense of the Aristotelian genesis (q.v.), i.e., substantial change, and particularly the passage of one element (stoicheion) into another. The key to action and passion is contrariety (enmion, q.v.); identical things cannot act upon each other (Plato, Tim. 57a; Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 1, 326b). Thus the powers or qualities involved in genesis must be generally the same but specifically different, and genesis can be defined as "passage to the contrary" (Aristotle, op. cit. 1, 324a).

3. But mere contrariety is not enough; the contrary powers must have the capacity for action and passion. It is significant that when Aristotle is attempting to discern which powers are present in the genesis of the elements he rules out "the light" and "the heavy" precisely on the ground that though they are contraries, they do not have poiein and paschein (ibid. 11, 329b).

4. In Aristotle paschein is one of the ten kategoriai (q.v.; Cat. 1b-2a), and his examples are "is cut," "is burnt." Like poiein it admits of both contrariety and degree (ibid. 11b). In Stoicism the "pathe" (paschein) is identified with matter (hyle), the agent (prionon) with logos (q.v.; D.L. vii, 134). Both Aristotle and the Stoics distinguish between the active and passive elements or, better, the qualities in them (Meteor. iv, 37b; Phys. i, 418; see genesis).

For the active and passive archai of movement, see, respectively, kinesis and physeis; for their metaphysical import, energeia and hyphe; for their role in perception, aesthesia; for action in distance and the question of contact, sympatheia.

**Pathos:** event, experience, suffering, emotion, attribute

1. The history of the word pathos is beclouded by a multiplicity of connotations. In its most general acceptance it means "something that happens," either in reference to the event itself (so Herodotus v, 4; Sophocles, O.T., 732) or the person affected (so Plato, Phaedo 96a: "my experiences"), the latter type of use considerably enlarged into ethical directions, as for example, in the "instructive suffering" of the tragedians (see Aeschylus, Ag. 177). Philosophical speculation goes off into two different directions from this point, investigating pathos as both "what happens to bodies" and "what happens to souls," the first under the general rubric of qualities, the second under that of emotions. The bridge is provided by the materialist theories of sensation that reduce sense knowledge to a pathos of the senses that, in turn, is capable of triggering the pathes of the soul.

2. But to discuss the pathes as "what happens to bodies" is to set the terms in a way they were not understood until the time of Plato. He was certainly capable of distinguishing between a body (or subject) and what happens to it (see Tim. 49a-50a), but there is little evidence that the pre-Socratics were capable of such distinctions and the implied isolation of a "quality"; the pre-Socratic ancestor of quality, dynamis (q.v.), was looked upon as a "thing." This is perfectly clear in Anaxagoras' treatment of the "seeds" (see stoicheia 12-13). At first there is only a mixture (meigma) that contains "all things [phrontemia] together" (fr. 1.), and these latter turn out to be not only the conventional Empedoclean stoicheia but the pathes/dynamis as well: the moist and the dry, the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark (fr. 4). None of these is perceptible, because they are fused in the meigma.

3. By the instigation of a rotary motion by nous various "seeds" are separated off (apokhrisis) and they too contain a portion of everything but are qualitatively distinct (see fr. 4, init.), presumably due to the predominance of one or other of the pathes. Why are they not therefore perceptible? They are not perceived because of their minute size and it is only when they associate (syntheseis) into large composites that these latter become perceptible and sensibly different because of the predominance of one type of constituent (Aristotle, Phys. i, 187a).

4. In Atomism the pathes have a more restricted role. In this view there exist only atoms (atoma, q.v.) and the void (kenon), and the former have only two qualities, size and shape (Diels 68a37; perhaps also weight, see Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 1, 326a, though this seems a later addition to Atomism; see kinesis). This leads to the position that all perception and, indeed, all sensible knowledge may be reduced to contact or touch (haphe; Aristotle, De sensu 442a; on the question of intellectual knowledge, see noesis 6). We are aware of other types of sense experiences, of course, but they are merely subjective and conventional (nomos), passive impressions (pathes) of the senses to which we accord some type of reality (Theophrastus, De sensu 61, 63).

5. What is clearly at stake here is the distinction between the active powers (dynamis) inherent in things and that have the capacity to act (poiein) and passive activations (pathes) of the body acted upon (paschein, q.v.). Democritus had severely delimited the active qualities (poien, q.v.) by rejecting the entire pre-Socratic mechanism of the opposites (enantia, q.v.) and reducing all "activity" to touch. Thus his stress on the subjective quality of sense knowledge would appear to be the result of purely theoretical considerations, though it agreed with the more ethical strains of relativism (which had epistemological corollaries) being promulgated by the Sophists (see nomos).
6. In Plato the ethical pathe appear, at least in places, as a function of materiality: they appear in the moral, corporeal parts of the soul and are present there as a result of the soul’s conjunction with the body (Tim. 44a–b, 69c). He follows the Atomist position both in making the pathe a species of perception and in attempting to reduce sensation (aisthesis) to contact (ibid. 61c–62c). Where he departs from it is in noting that when the contacts are excessive there results pleasure and pain (ibid. 64a–64b). This rather materialistic explanation is not Plato’s only or final word on the subject (see hedone 2–3), but it is interesting in that it provides the link between pathos as a physical quality and patheos as an ethical phenomenon.

7. The ethical side of the pathos is revealed by other considerations. Plato holds, again, in places, the tripartition of the soul (see psyche 15). Are the pathos characteristics of all parts of the soul or only of the two lower and corporeal parts? Plato is not at all clear on this. In the Timaeus (loc. cit. and 69c–d) they seem to be excluded from the logistikos, while in the Laws (877a) and Phaedrus (245c) this is not so. Indeed, the whole doctrine of the tripartite soul seems to be based on the recognition of the existence of conflicting pathos, and we are told quite clearly in the Republic (580d, 581m) that each part of the soul has its own appropriate pathos. To all appearances Plato never quite reconciled the incorporeal, separate, and somewhat remote logistikos, perhaps derived from Pythagoreanism and necessary to his theory of palingenesia and a knowledge of the eidos, with the more “engaged” soul of his ethical analyses of conduct.

8. In Meta. 1092b Aristotle succinctly resumes his predecessors’ use of pathos as experiences of a body. Since he has already distinguished dynamis (q.v.) into its two meanings of power and potentiality, pathos may be used in both these senses or, to locate it within the category of substance and accident, it is a capacity for change in a subject (hypoikeimenon) or else the actual change itself, and particularly qualitative change. Thus change in the category of quality (aloiosis, alteration) is defined as “change [metabole]” with respect to pathos (Meta. 1065b; for its difference from genesis, change with respect to usia, see stoicheion 15).

9. In the Ethics Aristotle gives his full attention to the pathos of the soul. In the Phaedrus (245c) Plato had already described the soul as the subject of experiences (pathos) and the source of activities (erga), and Aristotle makes these the subject matter of morality (Eth. Nich. 11, 1106b; see pratias; the third state of the soul, hexis, q.v., is merely our disposition toward the other two). Virtue consists in a man’s achieving a mean position (meson, q.v.) with respect to them; see arete.

10. The truly psychic nature of the pathos is illustrated by the fact that they are accompanied by pleasure or pain (ibid. 11, 1105b). But this is not to be construed as indicating that they are completely immaterial even though they are the affects of the incorporeal soul. The pathos are always accompanied by certain purely physical changes and it is for this reason that the psyche cannot be considered a separate substance but rather the enelecheia of a body (De an. 1, 408a). And when the same criterion is applied to the nous, its very lack of pathos suggests that it is immortal (ibid. 1, 408b); see nous.

11. By the time Atomism appears in its Epicurean version, the Platonic and Aristotelian refinements on pathos can be marked. The subjective element, prominent in Democritus, has been tempered (see holon), and while the pathos are still essentially tactile sensations, they are now distinguished by the concomitant presence of pleasure or pain. It is these latter that now become the center of attention in that they reflect the appropriateness (oikeion) or nonappropriateness (ellotropon) of the object perceived and thus provide criteria for the choice of good and evil (D.L. x, 34, 129; see hedone. For the newly expanded role of “appropriateness” in Stoicism, see eikheiosis).

12. Apparently Zeno held that all the pathos, which were defined as “excessive impulses” (harmoi, q.v.; essentially the same idea is expressed in Tim. 42a–b), were irrational movements of the soul (D.L. vii, 110), while Chrysippus preferred the more intellectualist position of looking upon them as a state of the rational faculty (hagemonikon; SVF ii, 459, 11, 828; see aisthesis 5, noesis 17). For the Stoic the virtuous life consists not in finding a mean for the pathos, as in Aristotle, but in extinguishing them entirely. The wise man, then, is one who has reached the stage of apatheia (q.v.). The four main pathos are pain, fear, desire, and pleasure (D.L. vii, 110; they are defined SVF ii, 391; compare the Platonic and Aristotelian lists in Tim. 42a–b and Eth. Nich. 11, 1105b; see also noesis 17).

For the pathos of matter, see paschein, dynamis, poion, onoma; for the cure of the ethical pathos on the homoeopathic principle, katharsis; for their extirpation, apatheia; for their connection with perception, aisthesis.

péras: limit

Though the notion of limit is obviously an ingredient in Anaximander’s aperes (absence of internal determination?), it begins to play a formal role among the Pythagoreans for whom, on Aristotle’s testimony, it was, together with the unlimited, an ultimate principle of reality, standing behind even number (Meta. 986a). Limit stands at the head of one of the Pythagorean tables of opposites cited in Meta. 986a, and in Eth. Nich. 1106b is explicitly connected with the Good. The Pythagorean péras may be related to their discovery of numerical
proportions in musical harmony (see Aristotle, De coelo 290b12). Such seems to be the intent of Plato's use of peras in Phil. 236a-260c; for its ethical implications, see meson, agathon, harmonia.

For limit as a factor in the definition of number, see poiesis; for a possible Plotinian adaptation, aisthesis.

*phantasia: imagination, impression*

Plato uses the term *phantasia* as a blend of judgment and perception (Theaet. 195d). For Aristotle imagination (*phantasia*) is an intermediary between perceiving (*aisthesis*) and thinking (*noesis*), De an. 11, 427b-429a (compare the analogous position of *phantasia* in Plotinus, Enn. iv, 4, 12). It is a motion of the soul caused by sensation, a process that presents an image which may persist after the perception process disappears. *Phantasia* is defined by Zeno as "an impression in the soul" (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 230), an "impulse from the outside" capable of being grasped (katalêpsis) by the soul and asserted to (Cicero, Acad. post. 1, 11, 40-42). Its seminal nature was changed from "impression" to "alteration" by Chrysippus (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 228-233, 239) who also maintained that if and not the *katalêpsis* was the criterion of truth (D.L. vii, 54; see *katalepsis*).

For the role of "fantasizing" in the creation of "false pleasures," see hedone; for further remarks on its role in intellect, noesos.

*philosophia: love of wisdom, philosophy*

1. By the traditional Greek account Pythagoras was the first to use the term *philosophia* (see D.L. 1, 12; Cicero, Tusc. v, 3, 8), and endowed the word with a strongly religious and ethical sense (contrast the neutral "Ionian" usage in Herodotus 1, 30), which can best be seen in the view of the philosopher put forth by Socrates in Phaedo 69c-69e. In Aristotle it has lost these Pythagorean overtones (the same process is visible in Plato, see *phronesis*): *philosophia* has now become a synonym for *episteme* (q.v.) in the sense of an intellectual discipline seeking out causes (Meta. 1006a). In the same passage Aristotle mentions "first philosophy" (pros *philosophia* or "theology" (see *theologia*; "metaphysics" is a later word) that has as its object: not mutable things as does physics (also called "second philosophy," ibid. 1037a), or those connected with matter, as does mathematics, but being (on) that is eternal, immutable, and separated from matter. This is the same science called *sophia* in Meta. 981b-983a.

2. The division of philosophy into physical, ethical, and logical probably goes back to Stoicism (D.L. vii, 39; Cicero, Acad. post. 5, 19), and it was also the Stoics who broadened *philosophia* to once again embrace the practical as well as the theoretical: see Cicero's definition, De fin. 111, 2, 4 as ars vitae; see *sophia*, ouranos.

For the methodology of philosophy, see *aporia*, dialektike, endoxon.

*phorêsis: locomotion*

According to Aristotle all locomotion can be reduced to 1) circular motion around a center, or 2) rectilinear motion toward or away from a center (De coelo 266b). Circular motion is primary (De coelo 269a; Phys. vii, 265a-265a) and is the natural motion of either, the fifth element from which the heavenly bodies are made (De coelo 269b-270b), while the rectilinear motions are natural to the other four elements; see *kinesis*, *stochiai*.

*phronesis: wisdom, practical wisdom, prudence*

1. There was always believed to be some sort of intellectual control in virtue, witness the remark of the Cynic Antisthenes (D.L. vi, 13) and Plato, Rep. vi, 508b where the Cynics are probably referred to as identifying the good with *phronesis*. For Socrates this intellectual insight into the transcendent ethical values becomes synonymous with virtue (*arete*), see Xenophon, Mem. iii, 9, 4; Plato, Gorg. 460b; Meno 83a-84a (but compare Phaedo 69a-b, where it is only one ingredient of true *arete*); Aristotle, Eth. Nich. 1144b.

2. With Plato's more metaphysical concerns *phronesis* begins to lose its practical and ethical coloring until it means the intellectual contemplation of the *eidos* (see Rep. 509a ff.), and in the Philoebus it is commonly used as a synonym for *nous* as the highest type of knowledge (225, 226, 65b; see *hedone*), a usage common enough among the pre-Socratics in their discussions of the similarities and differences between sense knowledge and thought (see *aisthesis*, noesos). In the early *Protrepticus* (fr. 52) Aristotle still holds the Platonic position, but in *Eth. Nich*. vi, 1140a-b *phronesis* is once again restricted to the moral sphere, while the *theoria* side of the Platonic *phronesis* is separated as (theoretical) wisdom (*sophia*), see ibid. 1143b-1145a. Despite his hedonism *phronesis* still plays a central role in Epicurus (D.L. x, 131), as well as in Stoicism (Plutarch, *De vit. mor. 2*; SVF iii, 258), and Plotinus (Enn. 1, 2, 7; 1, 6, 6).

On the seat of *phronesis*, see *kardia*.
phthora: passing away, corruption

Phthora, as the term of the process known as kinesis, is a correlative of genesis, the beginning of the process, and must be seen in that context (so Anaximander, Diels 1231). Thus, beings that are without kinesis, like the or of Parmenides (fr. 8, line 26) and the eide of Plato (Phaedo 76a), lack both genesis and “passing away” (see Parmenides, fr. 8, line 27 where the corollary is specified). Within the world of the sensibles (aistheta) Plato had a highly developed analysis of change (see meta) in which genesis-phthora occur in the category of what is for Aristotle “substantial change.” In one of these passages (Laws 894a) there is a quasi-definition of phthora as “change into another constitution [hexis].” In Aristotle genesis is perpetual because each phthora is, in effect, a new genesis (De gen. et corr. 1, 318a); see Genesis.

The question of the corruption of the kosmos is discussed under aphthartos, and that of the soul under atunatos.

physikós: student of physis (q.v.), natural philosopher

See theologos, apheiresis, ergon.

physis: nature

1. Although the word itself is not strongly attested until the time of Heraclitus (it appears earlier in the titles of works by Anaximander and Xenophanes), it is clear that the inquiry which uses the methodological approach known as logos and later known by Pythagoreans as philosophia (q.v.), had, as its general subject matter, physis. Such was the understanding of both Plato (see Phaedo 76a) and Aristotle (Meta. 205a) who calls the early philosophers physikoi, i.e., those concerned with physis. It meant these different but connected things: 1) the growth process or genesis (so Empedocles, frs. 8, 53; Plato, Laws 894c; Aristotle, Phys. 195b); 2) the physical stuff out of which things were made, the arche (q.v.) in the sense of Ursos (so Plato, Laws 891c; Aristotle, Phys. 195b, 193a); and 3) a kind of internal organizational principle, the structure of things (so Heraclitus, fr. 123; Democritus, fr. 242).

2. Meanings 1) and 2) must be seen in the context of the theism of the pre-Socratics: this “stuff” was alive, hence, divine, hence immortal and indestructible (see Aristotle, De an. 1, 411a, Phys. 111, 203a–b; Plato, Laws 967a; compare Epinomis 963d). Thus the physis of the earliest philosophers had movement and life, but with Parmenides’ emphatic removal of kinesis from the realm of being (see on), the notion of physis was in effect destroyed, the initiation of movement passing to outside agents, e.g. the “Love and Strife” of Empedocles (see Diels, fr. 31428) and the nous (q.v.) of Anaxagoras, or, and in the eyes of Plato this is the more religiously pernicious doctrine (Laws 883c), movement was random and necessary, probably a reference to the Atomists (see tyche). What Plato finds faulty in contemporary views of physis is its materiality (Laws 892b) and the absence of design (techne; see Soph. 265c). It was to correct these two misconceptions that Plato substituted psyche (q.v.) as a source of movement.

3. With Aristotle there is a general rehabilitation of physis that takes over many of the functions of the Platonic psyche: it is defined (Phys. 11, 194b) as “the principle [arche] and cause [aitia] of motion and rest for the things in which it is immediately present.” Like psyche, it is spiritual because it is primarily form (Phys. 11, 194a), and it works toward an end (teles; Phys. 11, 194a). Two difficulties arise: in replacing psyche with physis Aristotle has severed the connection between movement and life, and, on the other hand, between purpose (teles) and intelligence (nous). The first is solved by extending physis down into the realm of the inanimate elements and positing the doctrine of “natural movement” for each (see stoikeion, kinein), but in Phys. it he reveres to a more Platonic position: “ensouled.” I.e., living things, have within them both the principle of movement and the initiator of movement, and they thus differ from inanimate things that have within them the passive (paschein) principle of movement, but not the active (poiein), which consequently must operate from outside (Phys. 11, 205b–205a): thus all motion, in effect, requires an efficient cause (kinein). On the second question, the connection between teles and nous, he is likewise ambivalent; juxtaposed in Phys. 11, 193a are two arguments for the teleology of physis, one of which suggests the presence of nous while the other denies it.

4. Stoic monism led to the identification of God-nature-fire (SVF 11, 1277; Cicero, De nat. deor. 11, 44, 57). In its immanent, active role physis is logos (Seneca, De benef. 11, 7) and, on the level of the individual, existent, the logoi srmatikoi (q.v.). It is a moral principle, in that the purpose of man was to live “harmoniously with nature” (for the Stoic “natural” morality and the theory of the interconnection of nature, see nomos and sympatheia respectively).

5. Plotinus’ doctrine of nature is bound up with his view of soul; both the soul of the universe (see psyche tou kosmou) and the individual, immanent souls of men have two different aspects: an upper, contemplative side, soul proper (though in Enn. 4, 18 it is called phronesis), and a lower side, physis, that is forever turned away from nous and whose result: weakening of its contemplative power causes it to lapse from theoria into activity (praxis); it produces not mechanically but as a weakened form of contemplation (Enn. 311, 8, 8–5). Within the individual physis is the vegetative faculty that operates
without thought and without imagination (Enn. iv, 4, 13); see psyche, telos.

pistis: 1) faith, belief (subjective state); 2) something that instills belief, proof

1) The term occurs both in Parmenides (fr. 1, line 30; fr. 8, line 50) and in Empedocles (frs. 3, 4, 114), but it is doubtful whether it is being used in any technical sense. In Plato’s “divided line” the mental states that are not true knowledge (episteme) but have to do rather with “opinion” are divided into two classes: one has to do with images (eikones) of sensible things, while the other, described as pistis, is the perception of sensible things (Rep. 509e-511c). Pistis does not play an important role in Aristotle’s epistemology; rather, he was concerned with it in the context of the relationship between proof and conviction; 2) pistis (subjective conviction) is the object of the art of rhetoric (Rhet. i, 1355b), and the various means of persuasion are outlined in Rhet. i, 1356a.

plethos: plurality

According to Aristotle (Meta. 1003a) a plurality is that which is potentially divisible into noncontinuous (me symphexes) parts. Thus one possible definition of number (arithmos, q.v.) is “a plethos with limit” (peras) (loc. cit.). This discrete, measurable quantity that is thus contrasted with the continuous, measurable quantity that is magnitude (megethos, q.v.).

For the final Platonic solution to the problem of the One (hen) and the many (plethos), see trias §.

pneuma: air, breath, spirit, spiritus

1. Pneuma, which means air or breath (the cognate Greek verb is used in both senses in Homer), is used in the former sense when it first appears in Anaximenes. Pneuma or aer, he says, binds the cosmos together just as our psyche, which is also aer, binds together our body (fr. 2; the language of the fragment has impressed many as being somewhat too “modern” for the genuine sentiments of Anaximenes). The identification of air and breath, implicit in the analogy of Anaximenes, is made explicit by the Pythagoreans when they maintain that pneuma and void are inhaled by the universe (Aristotle, Phys. iv, 213b).

2. But the connection of respiration and the vital principle leaps, as it does in the concept of psyche itself, to a further connection with cognition in the speculation of some fifth-century writers. According to Diogenes of Apollonia, aer (q.v.) is the arché of all things and the warm air within us is soul (fr. 5; the same passage points out that the air within us is warmer than the surrounding air but considerably cooler than the air around the sun; compare Cleantus, 10, infra and see nous). We are then told (Theophrastus, De sens. 39, 44) that it is the source of cognition, both sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) and thought (phronesis). The internal air must be dry and hot (compare Heraclitus’ fiery soul) and circulates through the body with the blood (see kardia). A similar theory appears among the medical writers (see De morbe sacro 16).

3. Aristotle continues to make use of pneuma in its ordinary sense of air, breath, and wind, but he introduces, in addition, something called innate (symphyton) pneuma that is some type of hot, foamy substance analogous in composition to the element of which the stars are made (for the growth of this suggestion into the astral body of the Neoplatonists, see ochema). It starts from the heart and its function is to provide the sensitive and kinetic link between the physical organs and the psyche (see De gen. anim. ii, 736a-737a). This pneuma is present in the sperm and transmits the nutritive and sensitive soul from progenitor to offspring (ibid. 735a).

4. Aristotle’s philosophical interest in pneuma was not considerable, but it is given a central position by the Stoics. Pneuma is a composite of air and fire (SVF 11, 442) and it is a heated version of this that is soul (ibid. 1, 135). This pneuma, which is innate (symphyton), is circulated with the blood throughout the body (ibid. 11, 885; see psyche 28) in the same way that God, who is also called pneuma, is spread throughout the kosmos (ibid.; see Poseidonius’ view, ibid. 12, 1009), varying only by its degrees of tension (ionos, q.v.). Each pneumatic system has its hqegemonikon (q.v.) or ruling part: that of man in the heart (kardia, q.v.; that of the kosmos in either the aether (q.v.; see Zeno and Chrysippus, ibid. 11, 642-644) or in the sun (so Cleantus, ibid. 1, 499).

5. Such a materialistic view of the soul found little sympathy among either the Aristotelian functionalists or the Platonic adherents of a divine, immaterial soul. Plotinus suggests (Enn. iv, 4, 7, 4) that the Stoics themselves, ab ipso veritate coacti, saw the inadequacy of their views and so were constrained to add to the hylic pneuma some sort of qualitative or formal notation, calling it “intelligent [enmoun] pneuma” or “intellectual [noeron] fire.”

6. But even before the time of Plotinus other currents were transforming the Stoic concept. Some Stoics were themselves disenchanting the hegemonikon from the corporeality of pneuma (see nous), a position strongly suggested by the Stoic ethic that drew a sharp distinction, moral and intellectual, between man and the other animals (see Cicero, De leg. ii, 7; 22; Seneca, Ep. 131, 14). There was, moreover, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition that made the same distinction and, though it continued to use the expression pneuma or spiritus, employed it in a spiritualized, nonmaterial sense. Thus Philo describes
man as created of an earthly substance and a divine spirit (thelon pneuma), but goes on to point out, commenting Gen. 11, 7, that the latter is a part (or as he calls it, "a colony") of the divine nature, and this is nous (De opif. 135).

poietin: to act, action
Action is one of the ten Aristotelian kategorias listed in Cat. 1b-2a; his examples are "cuts," "burns." Both action and passion (paschein) admit of contraries and degrees (ibid. 11b). But in an ethical context Aristotle distinguishes (Eth. Nich. vi, 1140a) between poietin, in the sense of "to produce" (hence poietike episteme, productive science) from prooietin (to act), (hence praktike episteme, practical science); see paschein, poietike, praxis, episteme, ergon.

poietike (scil. episteme): 1] productive science, art;
2] poetics
1) The proper term used by Aristotle for the productive or applied science is techne (q.v.); 2) the poietike techne par excellence is poetics, to which Aristotle devoted an entire treatise, which is only partially preserved.

poioi, poioites: what kind, quality
Democritus distinguished between primary qualities based on the shape and characteristics of the atomen, and secondary or derived qualities, like sweet, bitter, warm, cold, etc., which are conventional (Sexius Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 295) and essentially subjective and passive (see pathē). Some of Plato's side are, of course, hypothesized qualities, e.g., the ethical qualities in Parm. 136b and yet Plato, who was the first to use the abstract poioites (Theav. 186a), was well aware of the difference between quality and substance (see Tim. 49a-50a; for Plato's theory of sensible qualities, see atistics). Poia is one of the ten Aristotelian kategorias listed in Cat. 1b-2a and discussed ibid. 8b-11a (compare pathē). In Epicurus the primary qualities of the atome are shape, size, and weight (the latter an addition to Democritus), D.L. x, 54. Stoic materialism demanded that even the qualities of the psyche be bodies, SVF II, 797; see enantia, dynamis, symposebebas, genesis.

ponos: pain
See aisthesis, apateia, hedone.

poson, posoteis: how much, quantity
One of the ten Aristotelian kategorias listed in Cat. 1b-2a and discussed ibid. 4b-6a. Time is a continuous quantity, as is space, ibid.

5. In the Epicurean ethic quantity and not quality is the criterion for the choice of pleasure, Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xiv, 21, 3; see megethos, hedone.

potē: when, time
One of the ten Aristotelian kategorias listed in Cat. 1b-2a; his own examples are "yesterday," "next year"; see chronos.

pous: where, place
One of the ten Aristotelian kategorias listed in Cat. 1b-2a; see topos.

praktike (scil. episteme): science of action
See praxis.

praxis: action, activity
According to Aristotle, when actions follow upon a deliberate choice (proairesis) they may be judged moral or immoral (Eth. Nich. i, 156a), and hence fall within the scope of the "practical" sciences (episteme praktikei), i.e., ethics and politics, which have as their object the good that is aimed at by action, ibid. 1094a-b; see ergon.

proairesis: deliberate choice
Though there must have been some previous discussion of moral choice (see Aristotle, Eth. Nich. iii, 1111b), the first preserved treatment is that of Aristotle (ibid. 1111b-1112a) who defines it (1112a) as "an appetite, guided by deliberation [bouleusis], for things within our power." Choice is always of means; it is only wish (boulesis) that is directed toward the end (ibid. 1111b; see known g). Two things are to be noted about choice: it is precisely this that brings human actions (praxis) within the realm of morality; secondly, by positing this voluntary act (it is not pure voluntarism; proairesis is preceded and based upon the intellectual act of bouleusis; see ibid. 1140a), Aristotle moved discussions of morality out of the area of intellect (the Socratic position: see arto, kapon) into that of will. The early Stoic embraced the intellectualist position (arto = episteme; see SVF III, 296), but with Epictetus proairesis once again becomes central; it is the condition of man's liberty (Diss. 1, 29). Yet, even here there is a strong intellectualist strain. Proairesis is preceded by diairesis, the distinction between what is in one's power and what is not (Diss. 1, 9, 24: 1, 2-3), and proairesis itself seems more like judgment than choice (ibid. iii, 9, 1-2).
prolepsis: prior grasp, anticipation, preconception

In the Epicurean epistemology there was one ultimate criterion of truth, sensation (aisthesis; see also aletheia); but there were, as well, the subsidiary criteria of the emotions (pathē; see hedone) and a mental apprehension described by Epicurus as prolepsis (D.L. x, 31), and by Lucretius as noptia (De rerum nat. iv, 476). Prolepsis operates in much the same way as the Stoic kathalepsis (q.v.), except that the prolepsis is the result of a repeated apprehension of the same type of object, e.g. men, and hence is a universal concept, a kind of residual, composite “Man” based on many sensations of “men.” It provides a kind of standard against which the truth of subsequent apprehensions can be judged. The Stoics used prolepsis in much the same manner (thus for both Epicurus and the Stoae we have a prolepsis pres. gods; compare Cicero, De nat. deor. i, 42–44 and SVF i, 176). It is given a new turn in the direction of anthropocentrism by Chrysippus (see Porphyry, De abstinentia ii, 20) where the rest of the kosmos is subject to the good of man. Stoic pronôia, identified as it was with physis, was essentially immanent.

1. The earlier history of the concept of providence is to be seen in the emergence, from Diogenes to Aristotle, of a notion of an intelligent purpose (telos, q.v.) operating in the universe. In all of these thinkers it is clearly associated with the intelligent God whose features begin to appear in the later Plato (see Laws 899 where the denial of pronôia is reckoned blasphemy) and in Aristotle. For the Stoics the immanent purpose of evil in the universal was one ultimate criterion of truth, sensation (aisthesis; see also aletheia); but there were, as well, the subsidiary criteria of the emotions (pathē; see hedone) and a mental apprehension described by Epicurus as prolepsis (D.L. x, 31), and by Lucretius as noptia (De rerum nat. iv, 476). Prolepsis operates in much the same way as the Stoic kathalepsis (q.v.), except that the prolepsis is the result of a repeated apprehension of the same type of object, e.g. men, and hence is a universal concept, a kind of residual, composite “Man” based on many sensations of “men.” It provides a kind of standard against which the truth of subsequent apprehensions can be judged. The Stoics used prolepsis in much the same manner (thus for both Epicurus and the Stoae we have a prolepsis pres. gods; compare Cicero, De nat. deor. i, 42–44 and SVF i, 176). It is given a new turn in the direction of anthropocentrism by Chrysippus (see Porphyry, De abstinentia ii, 20) where the rest of the kosmos is subject to the good of man. Stoic pronôia, identified as it was with physis, was essentially immanent.

2. Later Platonism, like the newly appeared Semitic tradition, was transcendent and believed in a series of intermediate deities (see daimon), with the result that pronôia began to be distributed throughout the entire range of deities (Plutarch, De fato 572f–573b; Apuleius, De Platone 1, 12). As the supreme principle grows more remote, its direct involvement in pronôia becomes markedly less. So in Philo, De fuga 101, the Logos exercises providence through the immanent dynamis, just as in Plotinus (Enn. iv, 8, 2) the World Soul has a general providence and the individual souls a particular providence for the bodies they inhabit; the One, of course, is beyond providence (Enn. vi, 8, 17). Implicit in this distinction between general and particular providence, i.e., between command and execution, is the reconciliation of the necessary transcendence of God and the necessary immanence of providential activity; compare Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 122.

For the problems arising from the existence of evil in a providential system, see kakon; on pronôia without contact, sympatheia; on God’s knowledge of particulars, noetos 4.

prôodos: going forth, procession

1. In its most general terms “procession” is later Platonism’s attempt to solve the Parmenidean difficulties of unity and plurality. If the One (hen) is, and is transcendent (see hypostasis), whence the subsequent plurality of the kosmos, Plotinus, who faces the question on various levels (e.g. the unity and plurality of the soul in Enn. iv, 3, 2–6; see psyche), frequently resorts to metaphorical explanations, and particularly to the figure of the sun and its rays (see ekklasis). But the metaphysical basis of the solution to the question “If one, why many?” rests on the nature of the One, and particularly its perfection (telos; Enn. v, 4), and the identification of the efficient and final cause (see Tim. 29e and compare Enn. iv, 8, 6; v, 4, 2; hence the later bonum est diffusum sui).

2. This provides the ingredients for Proclus’ more systematic derivation of the hypostases (q.v.). He begins (Elem. theol., prop. 21) by citing a mathematical parallel of the series generated from the monas (q.v.). For Proclus this is a better figure than ekklasis since it allows transit in both directions in the series, thus permitting the important ethical correlative of procession, “return” (epistrophê, q.v.).

3. There follows (props. 25–30) a description of prôodos itself. Every complete or perfect being (teletón) generates (props. 25, 27; compare Enn. v, 1, 5), but the cause remains undiminished and immoveable (menon; prop. 26), as, indeed, had already been understood by Plato (Tim. 42a). This principle, designed to safeguard the integrity and transcendence of the arche, is a commonplace in Plotinus (see Enn. v, 1, 6; v, 2, 1) and comes particularly to the fore with the introduction of a Creator-God into the system (see Augustine, Conf. 1, 3). The effect is similar (homoios) to the cause (prop. 29) and so the effect is both present in the cause and proceeds from it (prop. 30; see Enn. vi, 5, 9). Thus there is a triad of three “movements” (kathodos): the effect (aitia) remains (menon) in its cause, proceeds (prôodos) from it, and returns to it (epistrophê; prop. 35) qua good (see Proclus, Theol. Plat. 11, 95).

4. The applications of these principles are immense. The similarity principle, here expressed in the outgoing procession, will be applied in the counter epistrophê (prop. 32) and so will provide a means for both the moral ascent of the soul to its source (for an ethical view of its “fall,” see kathodos) and the epistemological grounds for the cognitive approach to God (see Enn. 1, 8, 1 and agnostoi; for the similarity principle in the wider context of cognition, see homoios, aisthesis). It
gives, moreover, a view of the entire kosmos, in both its sensible and intelligible aspects, as a magnificent organism (holos, q.v.) with its parts linked in a relationship of compatibility (sympathies, q.v.) and descending, in an unbroken chain of analogous beings, from a common arche.

For the position of proedros in a more general ontological context, see trias.

prophetes: spokesman, medium, prophet
See mantike.

pros ti: relation
In Plato there are aide of relatives that are immanent within things, see Phaedo 744-774, Rep. 479b, Parm. 194b-8, and Soph. 255a-3 where the relative character of the Form "Different" is clearly acknowledged (and denied by Aristotle in Meta. 99b5). In Aristotle relation is one of the list of the ten kategoriai in Cat. 1b-2a. It is further described ibid. 6a-3b. Hyle is a correlative of eidos and so falls in this category (Phys. 11, 196b), as does at least one aspect (the "useful") of Plato's notion of the Good (Eth. Nich. 1096a). Pros ti is one of the four Stoic kategoriai (STV II, 365).

For the relativity of intelligibility, see gnorimon.

psukhos: error, falsity
See deka, noesis.

psyche: breath of life, ghost, vital principle, soul, anima
1. One of Aristotle's most detailed excursions into the history of philosophy (see endoxon for the method and principle involved) occurs in Book I of the De anima where he reviews and criticizes his predecessors' opinions on the nature of psyche. As he sees it, earlier speculation came to the soul from two angles that tended to coalesce: the soul as the principle of movement (kinesis) and of perception (aisthesis). This seems to be correct, though, of course, a great deal of the evidence on the subject consists only in what Aristotle chooses to cite. But there are two additional facets in the history of psyche that Aristotle largely ignores: the prephilosophical use of the term and psyche as a religious phenomenon.

2. The connection between life and movement on the one hand and consciousness on the other is not at all obvious in Homer who designates two separate entities to explain life and consciousness. For Homer psyche is the "breath of life" (and also, in what may be a completely different stratum of belief, an individualized "ghost" that lives on in an attenuated fashion after death) that escapes, normally,

from the mouth of the dying hero (this connection with the head may be the suggestive beginning of the later theory that located the seat of the soul in the brain; see kardia and compare pneuma). In contrast there is the thymos, the spirit, located in the midriff (phrones) whereby a man thinks and feels (see kardia).

3. The Homeric psyche was closely associated with motion in that its departure turned the aggregate of churning limbs that was the hero's "body" into a soma or motionless corpse. The thymos too is connected with motion in a sense later explored by Aristotle; it is the promptings of thymos that impel the hero to activity.

4. The philosopher, unlike the poet, concludes rather than describes. We can see this habit of mind at work in Thales. Since, he maintains (Aristotle, De an. 1, 405a), the power to cause kinesis is an indication of the presence of soul, should not one conclude that even something as seemingly inanimate as a stone is ensouled since the Magnesian stone (magnet) is capable of moving other things? The thought here is especially bold since it bypasses completely the presence of air or breath. But the more archaic attitude reappears with Anaximenes who does, however, betray a certain boldness of his own in extending the soul-principle to the universe at large (fr. 2; see pneuma).

5. The connection between psyche and breath is intermittent among the pre-Socratics. Anaximander said the soul was "airy" (Antius iv, 3, 2), as did Anaxagoras (ibid.). Heraclitus makes breathing part of the cognitive process (Diels 221a6; see aisthesis), but only during sleep when the other senses are sealed off from the cosmic logos. Diogenes of Apollonia, on the other hand, strongly maintains the connection between the psyche and aer (q.v.; see pneuma) because life depends on it (fr. 4, 5).

6. This link with the Homeric past becomes more and more tenuous as the Homeric psychology itself is revised. By the sixth century the psyche had absorbed the functions of the Homeric thymos and was then the term used to describe the psychic totality of man, while at the same time the physical aggregate of limbs and bodily parts was yielding to soma, not now as a corpse, but as the physical unity that has psyche as its psychic correlate.

7. Thus released from its immediate pneumatic associations, psyche finds its place, as Aristotle suggests, within the larger cadres of motion and perception. Typical in this regard are the views of the Atomists and Empedocles. The former had reduced reality to atoma and the void (hados) and were evidently concerned with the soul as the source of motion when they described it as an aggregate (synthesis; see generis) of atoms that are spherical and fire-like on the grounds that these atoms are the most mobile and most competent to cause motion in others (Aristotle, De an. 1, 405a). There are, of course,
difficulties here, largely arising from the relationship between soul and body and that between soul and mind or spirit (nous). Where is this aggregate that, by reason of the movement of its own atoma, is capable of moving the body (see ibid. 1, 46b)? The answer is preserved by Lucius who tells us (III, 370–395) that Democritus held that soul and body atoma were juxtaposed (apposition, parathesis; see Diels 68a64), an arrangement Lucius found indefensible (see noesis 6).

8. A higher, more reliable type of perception had been distinguished from mere sensation from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides (see aisthesis, episteme, doxa, noesis), and, despite Aristotle’s conviction that they thought the two were the same, the Atomists did make a serious attempt, even within the confines of their materialistic system, to distinguish psyche and nous both in terms of function (see noesis) and location (see kardia).

9. Although the Atomists were keenly interested in sensation (for their theories, see aisthesis), the sensation approach to soul is even more apparent in Empedocles. Aristotle sees behind the reduction of soul to one or other of the elements (stoeicheia) of physical bodies the assumption that “like knows like” with the consequence that, if the soul knows, it must be composed of the same material as the thing known (De an. 1, 409b). He cites Empedocles as the chief witness to this view (fr. 109). But it is clear enough that Empedocles, who may have said that this similarity (homoioites, q.v.) was the reason why sensation occurs, did not mean to suggest that each of his four elements was the soul. Rather, it seems more likely that it is blood that is a perfect blend of the elements (frs. 105, 95; this also links the theory with considerations of natural heat; see kardia). There is a third possibility and Aristotle considers (and rejects) this as well. Perhaps, as in the case of blood, the Empedoclean soul is not the mixture but the proportion (logos) itself (ibid. 1, 468a; see holom).

10. Aristotle cites this latter possibility as one instance of a more general school of thought that attempted to define psyche as a harmonia (q.v.; ibid. 1, 467b and compare Pol. 134a6). Plato too knows the harmonia theory; it was advanced by Simmias in the Phaedo (85c–88d) and subsequently refuted by Socrates (92c–95c). The origins of the theory have been much debated. The word harmonia is Pythagorean and there are Pythagorean affinities in the Phaedo (Echecrates holds the theory [88d]) and he was a Pythagorean [D.L. viii, 46]; Simmias had studied with the Pythagorean Philolaus [6rd]; see the late evidence for him in Diels 44222, 25). But nowhere does either Plato or Aristotle identify it as Pythagorean and the theory, at least as it appears in the Phaedo, has to do with the harmonia of physical opposites (emantia, q.v.).

11. But the theory of a balance or equilibrium of opposite powers (dynameis) of a body is not the same thing as the numerical proportion as worked out by the Pythagoreans. And, though it may have Pythagorean affinities, it seems to stem from medical circles that used it to explain health as an equilibrium (isononia) of opposite qualities in the human body and where it is associated with Alcmaeon of Crotona (Plutus v, 30, 17; it appears too in the speech of the physician Eryximachus in Symb. 188a). But there is no evidence that Alcmaeon applied it to the soul (see De an. 1, 465a).

12. What, then, was the Pythagorean doctrine of soul? There was, in fact, more than one, and this strange ambivalence is equally apparent in Empedocles. The Pythagoreans reduced all things to the arche of number (arithmos, q.v.) and so it comes as no surprise to discover that they considered soul and nous as “properties [pathè] of numbers” (Aristotle, Meta. 945b). This may be a version of a mathematical harmonia theory, but the same cannot be true of the view, dismissed in De an. 1, 467b as a Pythagorean mythos, which suggests that the soul is completely distinct from the body and that it is possible for “any chance soul to enter any chance body.” And turning to Empedocles, while the theory that the soul is blood makes perfect sense within the framework of his mechanistic explanations of the elements and their mixtures, what is to be said of the view, put forth in his Purifications, that the soul is a daimon (q.v.) that committed an “original sin” (see kathodos) and undergoes a series of reincarnations (fr. 115)?

13. What has appeared here, at the center of the Pythagorean tradition in philosophy, is another view of psyche that seems to owe little or nothing to the pan-vitalism or pan-deism (see theon) that is the legacy of the Milesians. All the implications of this new belief that the divine nature of the soul is radically different from all other things may be seen in the famous passage from Pindar (fr. 131), one of its first appearances: the soul that is of divine origin survives the death of the body; its operation can best be observed in dreams where it is active while the body slumbers. The origins of this new belief in the special divinity and immortality of the soul and its basic difference from and antagonism to the body are somewhat obscure; one suggestion is that it came to the Greeks through contact with Thracian shamanism. But whatever its origins the belief appears, with all its ramifications, in Pythagoras, Empedocles, and the Orphic literature, and its most notorious forms are the doctrine of bilocation and reincarnation (palingenesia, q.v.) and its associated theory of recollection (anamnesis), the antagonism between body and soul that becomes so familiar from Plato’s metaphor of body/prison (soma/sena; see Crat. 406c, Phaedo 66b) and a series of eschatological myths that also appear in Plato (see ethanates).

14. Plato’s debt to the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the soul is
closely marked in the earlier dialogues. In Charm. 15f1-157a all the
traditional motifs of these “ancient account” (palaios logos: Phaedo 72c;
see Meno 81a, Ep. vii, 335a) are present: the psyche is a unitary,
immortal (athanatos, q.v.), subject to a cyclic rebirth into a body that is
the source of all its ills. The end of life, and the definition of
philosophia (q.v.), is a purification (katharsis, q.v.) that is a prepara-
tion for death and the return of the soul to its natural habitat. Asso-
associated with this complex is the theory of recollection (anamne-
sis, q.v.; see a later authority in D.L. viii. 4 Pythagoras
remembered his previous incarnations; for Empedocles, see ibid. viii.
77) and it is this that leads Plato to more novel considerations. In the
Phaedo, anamnhesis suddenly shifts to the level of episteme (q.v.) and
what is recollected is not the details of some other life but a knowledge
of the Forms (eidos). The psyche is the faculty whereby we know the
eidos (65a-87b) and this because the soul is most akin to the eidos
(78b-79b), like them immortal, immaterial, and invisible.

15. Gradually the more radical aspects of the difference between
body and soul are modified in Plato. In many respects this represents a
return to the more traditional categories by acknowledging that vari-
sous somatic functions also belong to the soul, which in the Phaedo
strives to operate only in the nectic sphere and apart from the senses.
This accommodation is accomplished by the tripartition of the soul
(Rep. iv, 438c-444c). The psyche, like the politia itself, is divided
into three parts: the rational (logistikon), the “spirited” (thymoeides),
and the appetite (epithymesikon), with virtues and pathos (q.v.)
appropriate to each. The division appears again in Rep. ix, 58c2-58a1,
in Phaedrus 245b-246b, 255c-255b, and again in Tim. 69d-72d where the
parts are assigned their appropriate bodily seats, linked together by the
spinal marrow (73b-d; the connection of the brain (enkephalos) with the
spinal column was well known, though denied by Aristotle, De
pari. anim. 11, 632a; see also kardia).

16. As the functions of the soul are expanded from the Republic
on, the upper part or logistikon begins to take on the characteristics
of the unitary psyche of the Phaedo. It is divine, created by the demi-
rours (Tim. 41c-d), lodged in the head (ibid. 44d; see kardia), vouch-
safed a prenatal vision of the eidos (Phaedrus 247b-248b, Tim.
42e-42a), and subject to cyclic palinogenesis (Phaedrus 248c-249d,
Tim. 42b-d). It is, moreover, immortal, as contrasted to the two other
parts of the soul that are mortal and created by lesser gods (Tim.
630c-d; see Rep. x, 51b-612a, Pol. 309a-c).

17. One of the difficulties arising from Plato’s treatment of the
soul is the fact that he clearly has posited the tripartition of the soul
on ethical grounds, while the unitive soul of the Phaedo is suggested by
epistemological considerations. Since the psyche of the Phaedo is
clearly enough the logistikon of the later dialogues, we may integrate
their functions and see it as the cognitive arche of a nonsensory dianoia
(Phaedo 79a, Soph. 248c) and the ethical ruler of the two lower parts
of the soul (Rep. iv, 441e; Phaedrus 245c-245d). But it is less clear
what the cognitive powers of the lower parts of the soul are, if any.
That sensation (aisthesis, q.v.) involves the soul as well as the body is
mentioned more than once; pleasure, we are also told, extends from the
body to the soul (Rep. ix, 58c4) and, in Phil. 331c-341a, this ethical
pathos (q.v.) is extended to include the cognitive pathos of sensation as
well (compare the parallel passage in Tim. 64b). But the temptation to
locate sensation in the thymoeides, somewhat in the fashion of an
Aristotelian psyche aistheteia, must be resisted. The Timaeus
lodges the logistikon in the head and at the same time makes the brain
(enkephalos) the seat of sensation (44d, 73b). The logistikon, it would
appear, is the only cognitive part of the psyche. Its normal and natural
function is dianoia or logismos, but because of its connection with the
alien body at birth it is assailed by various pathes of that body and when
these reach the soul sensation results (Tim. 42e-44a; for the mechanics
of these bodily pathes, see aisthesis, 15-17). The function of the thymo-
ecides, located in the breast, is, on this view, to receive communications
from the logistikon and act upon them (ibid. 69d-70b). The epithymet-
ikon, located in the abdominal cavity, receives no message from the
logistikon, but its headlong pursuit of physical pleasures is occasionally
tempered by the presence of the liver, which is the seat of dreams
(oneiros, q.v.) and the basis of divination (mantike, q.v.; for a later
ground for divination, see sympatheia 8).

18. The logistikon then can hardly be called the arche of sensa-
tion as that might be understood by the pre-Socratics. It is rather a
rational Pythagorean “other self” and the faculty of “true knowledge” in the Parmenidean sense. It is capable of episteme
because of its similarity to the things known, the eidos (Phaedo
79b; in Soph. 248c-249b, with its changed perspectives, it is granted a
share of the “really real”), and is capable of sensation faute de mieux.

19. In Tim. 43a-d and Laws x, 596e-607b Plato makes a distinc-
tion between primary motions that are proper to the soul and secondary
motions that originate in the body and come into the soul, and in Phil.
33c he describes sensation as a kind of shaking (seismon) that
is peculiar to the body and to the soul and at the same time common to
both. Thus Plato is led to approach the psyche in another fashion that
is more akin to the other pre-Socratic motif of kinesis. One of Plato’s
major proofs for the immortality of the soul, i.e., the logistikon, is the
fact that it is always in motion (aektikton) and hence must be self-
moved (autokineton), otherwise genesis would fail (Phaedrus
245c-e). The argument is not entirely new; it was used by Alcmaeon
who did not, however, argue from self-motion but from the fact that the soul was act in motion (Aristotle, *De an.* 1, 405a). Plato's, on the other hand, derives from self-motion, the self-motion of nous that has a share in reality (*Soph.* 249a-b) and is related to the *eidôs* of kinesis (ibid. 254d where it is one of the *megêsa* gene; see *eidôs* 13 and *kinesis* 9). This then is not one of the many types of secondary causality detailed in *Laws* x, 893b–894a, but the primary motion with which the catalogue ends, "real" motion that moves itself and that is the archê of kinesis (*Laws* x, 889b; compare *Phaedrus* 243d). He is prepared to go even further. Self-motion is the essence (*eudêa*) and the self of the soul (*Phaedrus* 245e).

20. Aristotle takes up this theory in *De an.* 1, 406b–407b and objects to it on a number of scores, but chiefly because he thinks that thereby Plato has reduced the soul to a magnitude (*megethnê*) q.v.). To his way of thinking the *kinesis* would have to be circular locomotion (see *noêsis*) so that Plato, like Democritus, has the soul move a body by being in motion itself, instead of seeing that the soul moves things by being their final cause and thus may be said to originate movement by thought (*noêsis*) or choice (proairesis; ibid. 1, 406b). For Aristotle's other approaches to the question of the soul as the archê of kinesis, see kinous 8 and physik 3.

21. He next deals with the view that the soul is self-moved number, the theory of another member of the Academy, Xenocrates (ibid. 1, 406b–409b; see *Plutarch, De proer. an.* 1012d). Now number is an aggregate of units (*plethor monaden*; see *Meta.* 1053a), and, apart from the absurdities of applying the now popular fluxion theory of moving points into lines, etc. (see arithmos), the theory of Xenocrates appears to open the same type of mechanistic charges made against Democritus.

22. Aristotle cuts into the heart of the pre-Socratic theories. The soul, it is true, is a moving principle, not in the mechanistic sense of Democritus or as he understood Plato and Xenocrates to say, but as the final cause: it moves by thought and desire (*De an.* 111, 433a–b; *Meta.* 1072a–b; for some of the difficulties involved in this, see sympatheia 7). But it is not self-moved except accidentally (ibid. 1, 406b–406b), since what moves others does not necessarily have to be in motion itself (*Phys.* viii, 256a–256b).

23. His own treatment, however, deserts the category of kinesis (which he shifts over to physik, q.v.) and moves in another direction. Earlier on, during his more Platonic period, Aristotle had treated the soul as if it were a complete substance (*Eudemus*, frs. 45, 46) that had little need of the body (ibid., fr. 41). But in the *De anima* it is quite otherwise. A complete substance is an individual being, a toûto ti (q.v.), and one such is the "living or ensouled body" (*soma empy-

24. Plato frequently gives the impression that he is more interested in soul than in the soul. The proof of immortality already cited from the *Phaedrus* is set out to cover "all soul." In the detailed passages in the *Timaeus*, moreover, where Plato describes the composition of the soul from its elements (43b–30b), it is the World Soul (psyche ton pantos, q.v.) to which he refers; the individual souls are second- or third-rate versions of it (ibid. 41d). For Aristotle, however, it is the individual living being that is the paradigm and the method of approach is to investigate its various activities. In this way he proceeds to an investigation of the faculties (dynameis) of the soul of a living organism.

25. Plato had divided the soul into parts (mere; see 15) and at times his language suggests that the parts of the soul are really individual souls within the same being (see *Tim.* 69d–e and the open question in *Laws* ix, 869b). Aristotle also calls them parts, but he treats them as faculties (see *De an.* 111, 433b), i.e., *dynameis* in the word's primary sense of the power to effect change in another or in itself qua other (*Meta.* 1046a and see *dynameis* 3). There are a great variety of these *dynameis*, but they are the most appropriate way to study the nature of the soul (De an. 111, 415a). Aristotle proposes to work his way from the most fundamental, the nutritive *threptike* (ibid. 1, 414a–415a), through the ascending series (each higher *dynameis* presupposes the existence of the lower), to the sensitive (*aisthetike*; see *aisthesis*), and finally to the distinctive faculty of man, the *noêsis* (see *nos*; *noêsis*).

26. Aristotle is clear on the subject of personal immortality. Since the soul is the formal and final cause of an organically qualified body it cannot survive the dissolution of the union with that body, except, perhaps, as part of the species (ibid. 1, 415b). But there is nothing to prevent a faculty of the soul from being separable (*choristic*; ibid. 1, 408b) and this is actually so in the case of the *noês* (q.v.; ibid. 111, 430a).

27. For Epicurus and Lucretius soul is a composite body made up of various atoms (*D.L.* x, 63). But this is a far cry from the mere aggregation of fiery atoms proposed by Democritus. First, the notion of body has been refined to that of an organic compound (*concilium*; see *holon* 10). Secondly, the relationship of the soul and the body is now specified as the *atôma* of the soul being spread throughout and contained within the sheath (*stegos*) of the body (*D.L.* x, 43, 64). The *atôma* that go into the composition of the soul are no longer merely
“fiery” but include breath (pneuma) and air (see Lucretius III, 231-336). There is a more startling addition, the atoms of an “unnamed element” that are not like any of the others but are subtler, smoother, and more mobile than any other kind of atom (D.L. x, 63; Actius iv, 3, 11: the quastra naturae of Lucretius III, 241-257). It is this latter that begins the movements that are sensation (see aisthesis 23 and holon 16) and transmits them to the rest of the body (ibid. III, 282, 281).

28. The Stoic theory of soul illustrates the curiously qualified materialism of their positions. In a definition reminiscent of Heraclitus the soul is material fire or heated pneuma (Cicero, De fin. iv, 12; D.L. VII, 157 and compare Plotinus’ critique in Enn. iv, 7, 4; further details on the Stoic view under pneuma 4-5). It has eight faculties: the hegemonikon (q.v.), the five senses, and the speaking and generative faculty (SVF I, 143; see noesis 16), each represented by a stream of pneuma stretched out to the appropriate organ and reaching back to the hegemonikon (SVF II, 836) and relating to it the various sense impressions (phantasie), impulses (hornai), and affections (pathes) to which the senses are prone (for the revisions in Stoic psychology, see noesis 17).

29. The later Platonic tradition, with its highly developed theory of sympatheia, expands Plato’s suggestion of the similarity of the psyche to the eidos (see 28 supra and compare metaxu 2) to give it a strongly emphasized medial position between the noëta and the aistheta (see Simplicius, In De an. i, 2, 30, citing Xenocrates; Plutarch, De prob. an. 106b, citing Poseidonius; on the efforts to fill the gaps in the scala naturae, see sympatheia 2). Plotinus strongly affirms this (Enn. IV, 8, 7), but he also perceives the paradox in the Platonic view: how to reconcile the heavenly, immortal soul of the Phaedo and the Phaedrus, whose sojourn in the body is compared by Plato to an incarceration with the immanent and directive soul of the Timaeus, which has a distinctly benign function vis-a-vis the organism (Enn. IV, 8, 1)? The former attitude raises the entire problem of the descent of the soul into matter (see kathodos); the latter, the vitalistic function of soul seen as nature (physik).

30. Soul, taken as a single entity, is a hypostasis (q.v.), a production of nous and its image (eikon; Enn. v, 1, 2), and in turning toward nous it becomes itself fertilized and produces, in the opposite direction, various activities that are a reflection of itself and the terms of which are sensation (aisthesis) and growth (v, 2, 1). Soul, then, by the very nature of things has a double orientation: it is turned toward its source, the intelligible, and it is turned toward the world, which it vitalizes (see noesis 20).

31. But the soul is more than a unitary hypostasis; its turning downward away from the One (hen) has caused it to become multiple, and Plotinus is constrained to explain at some length the relationship of the various souls that vitalize bodies to the unitary hypostasis of which they are parts (IV, 3, 2-9). They are not, of course, material parts of a material whole. They are unified in that they have a common origin and a natural operation; they are divergent because they operate in and on different bodies (IV, 3, 4). This gives rise not only to a plurality of souls but also grades of souls (IV, 3, 6), ranging from the World Soul (psyche tou pantos), which is still close to the intelligible source and whose activities are consequently closer to that of nous, down to the souls of plants, the furthest extension of the soul principle away from nous. The distinction is a useful one: the unitive nature of soul enables Plotinus to affirm the systematic structure of the plural souls in terms of cosmic sympatheia (q.v.; see Enn. IV, 3, 8), and the distinction of grades provides a basis for a continued belief in reincarnation (palinthesis; Enn. III, 4, 5).

32. The function of soul, then, is to vitalize and govern matter (see Enn. IV, 3, 9). How this is accomplished is explained in a series of metaphors: the soul illuminates matter like a light that, though remaining at its point of origin (on this motif, see probos 3), sends forth its rays into a gradually deepening darkness. Or it vitalizes matter in the same way that a net, inert out of water, spreads out and seems to come alive when cast into the sea, without at the same time affecting the sea (IV, 3, 9). It is in this fashion that the soul of the universe affects its body, the sensible kosmos.

33. As for the individual souls, the question here is considerably more complex due to the obvious diversity of functions. Aristotle’s view of the soul as an entelecheia of the body seems to suggest too close a functional connection between the soul of the body and Plotinus rejects it (Enn. IV, 7, 8). Instead he turns to the microcosmic principle: each human soul has, like the World Soul, a “part” that remains turned toward the intelligible and is unaffected by the descent into the body (IV, 3, 12). But the fact that it has gone forth to a body, from the heavenly bodies (ouanosi) down to the plants, leads to a diminution of the natural power of the soul. Thus its normal nondiscursive intellectual activity (see noesis) degenerates to lower forms of activity: theoria becomes diaskoia and, eventually, praxis (IV, 3, 18; see physis 2, noesis 20).

34. The individual soul, once in “in” the body (the localization is not, of course, spatial; the soul is “in” the body in the same sense that light is “in” the air; IV, 3, 22; see kardia), sends out a series of reflections of itself, the first of which is aisthesis, followed by the other faculties (I, 2, 8). These enable the material body to act without in any way affecting the soul (I, 2, 5-7; see aisthesis 20-27).
Proclus begins his treatment of the soul by applying to it his familiar doctrine of the mean (see trias). There are three types of soul: the divine (including the souls of the planets; see ouranos and, for their influence, ochema), those capable of passing from intellect to ignorance (see noesis), and an intermediate grade that is always in act but inferior to the divine souls (Elem. theol., prop. 164). This mediating grade, in addition to being demanded by Proclus' triadic principle, had a previous history in the tradition. These are the daemones already defined by Plato as intermediaries (Symm. 202a), integrated by his pupil Xenocrates into the various grades of intelligence (logos; see Plutarch, De def. orac. 416c); and divided by Proclus into angeloi, daimonoi, and heroes (In Tim. 111, 165, 11).

Plato's view of soul as substance is still in evidence in Proclus where it is described (Elem. theol., prop. 168) as both life (zoe) and a living thing (zoon). Its intermediate position is affirmed (prop. 190), and, having such, participates in both eternity (aion, q.v.) by reason of its ousia and in time by reason of its energia (prop. 191; see Plotinus, Enn. v, 4, 15). Peligenesia is still maintained (prop. 206), but Proclus denies that the soul can be reborn into animals (In Rep. II, 312-313).

On the faculties of the soul, see aisthesis, noesis, nous, orexis; its immortality, athanasia; descent into the world, kathodos; periodic rebirth, peligenesia; its astral body, ochema; for the interrelation of soul and body in Stoicism and Epicureanism, genesis; for attempts at distinguishing psyche from nous, noesis; on the World Soul, psyche tou pantos.

psyche tou pantos: World Soul

1. The existence of a soul for the entire world seems to be another example of Plato's use of analogous reasoning (see kosmos noestos): if the kosmos is thought to be a living organic unity (see zoon), it follows that it, like the other animals, must have a soul. This line of reasoning appears in Pol. 269d-271b (though here the psyche is not yet a source of continuing motion), in Philo, 701, and, finally, in a completely integrated fashion in Tim. 34a-37c. It is composed by the deminvergent from intermediary types (i.e., mixtures that combine elements appropriate to the intelligible world of being and the sensible world of becoming) of Existence (ousia), the Same, and the Other, three of the five most important eide mentioned in Soph. 254d. Aristotle's explanation of why these mixtures were chosen is based on the epistemological principle of "like knows like" (De an. 1, 404b; see homotes, aisthesis). These ingredients are arranged in bands in certain harmonic intervals (Tim. 35b-36b), and thus the World Soul becomes, in true Pythagorean fashion, a paradigm not only for the harmonious movement for the heavenly bodies, but for ethical restoration of harmonia in the individual human soul (ibid. 90c-d; see katharsis).

For the existence of an evil World Soul in the Platonic system, see kathom.

2. Aristotle no longer needs psyche to explain motion (see physis), and so the World Soul is quietly dropped. It reappears, however, in the late Platonic tradition (see Philo, De migre. Abr. 32, 179-180; Albinus, Epit. x, 3) and becomes one of Plotinus' hypostases (q.v.); Enn. v, 2, 1. The viewpoint is now much more complex: the World Soul has an upper and lower part, the former engaged in contemplation (theoria), the latter corrupted into activity (praxis) and called physie (q.v.); it is divisible, yet indivisible (Enn. iv, 3, 4); unlike the World Soul of Plato, however, it produces the sensible world, Enn. v, 2, 2; see proodos.

pyr: fire

Though fire is present in the systems of both Anaximander (Diels, fr. 126a10) and Anaximenes (13a7), it is, for both of them, a product, while for Heraclitus, the universe (kosmos) is a fire (Diels 222b30), not as an arche but rather as "archetypal matter," probably because of its connection with psyche and life (fr. 36) and, hence, with ether (q.v.). Among the Pythagoreans fire held the central position in the universe (with the earth as a planet!), Aristotle, De coelo 11, 335b. It was given its place as one of the four elements by Empedocles (see stichelion). Fire plays a fundamental role in Stoic physics as the element with the most active dynamis, the hot (see dynamis). Of prime importance here is the connection between fire and life (SVF 11, 29) and, through the intermediacy of the psyche, with the pneuma, the medically derived principle of vital heat, which the Stoics understood as a combination of fire and air (SVF 11, 757) and as an all-pervasive force in the kosmos (ibid. 11, 473); see ekpyrosis, logos.
rhoë: flowing, stream, flux

From the time of Plato on, the position of Heraclitus and his followers, one of whom, Cratylus, apparently exercised some influence on Plato (see Aristotle, Meta. 987a), was described in terms of the metaphor of “flowing” or “streaming” (so for Heraclitus, Plato, Crat. 402a; for his followers, Crat. 440c–d and Theaet. 179d–181b; the celebrated expression “everything is in a state of flux” [panta rhe] does not occur until Simplicius, Phys. 1313, 11). Whether Heraclitus himself used the expression or whether, indeed, it is an exact description of his view of change may be debated, but what is notable is that this popular tag (the Heraclitans contemporary (genesis, q.v.; Theaet. 152e–153a is a good example of metabolie, kinesis) As far as the technical language of philosophy was concerned, rhoë was never more than a striking image.

schéma: appearance, shape
See aisthésis, stoicheion.

sophia: wisdom, theoretical wisdom
The original meaning of the word connects it with craftsmanship, see Homer, II. xxv, 412; Hesiod, Works, 651 (compare Aristotle, Eth. Nich. vi. 1141a). By the time of Herodotus it also embraced a more theoretical type of preeminence, Hist. 1, 29 (Seven “Sages”), iv, 95 (Pythagoras as a sophistes). Heraclitus (Diels, fr. 129) says that this sophia of Pythagoras is nothing but polymathy and malpractice. For Plato there is an implied distinction between true sophia that is the object of philosophia (see Phaedrus 278d) and that, like phronesis, is to be identified with true knowledge (episteme) (Theaet. 145c), i.e., a knowledge of the eidos, and, on the other hand, the practitioner of false sophia, the sophistes of the dialogue of the same name. For Aristotle sophia is the highest intellectual virtue, distinguished from phronesis or practical wisdom, (Eth. Nich. 1141a–b, 1143b–1144a), and also identified with metaphysics, the prote philosophia in Meta. 980a–989a. The “sage” (sophos) becomes the Stoic ideal of virtue, see SVF I, 216; III, 548; D.L. vii, 121–122, and the critical portrait in D.L. vii, 123 and Cicero, Pro Mus. 29–31; see also, philosophia, phronesis, episteme, endoxon.

sophrosyne: self-control, moderation
1. Sophrosyne is the subject of one of Socrates’ ethical enquiries, as described in the Charmides, where no solid definition is reached. Its etymological meaning as “moral sanity” is discussed in Crat. 411e, but the true Platonic position of sophrosyne is rooted in the Pythagorean notion of harmos (q.v.). The two concepts are brought together in Rep. 430e–432a, and later, 442c, it is closely linked with Plato’s tripartite division of the soul (see psyche): sophrosyne is the harmonious subjection of the two lower parts to the ruling, the rational part (compare Phaedrus 237c–238a where the harmos embraces only two elements).

2. For Aristotle sophrosyne is the mean (meson) between the extremes of pleasures and pains (Eth. Nich. ii. 1107b); its area is
restricted to body pleasures (ibid. 111, 1118a) and particularly those of touch and taste. Zeno (Plutarch, Stoic ref. 1034c), like Plato (Rep. 435b), makes sophrosyne one of the four chief virtues (Eth. Nich. 1, 1107a). The more intellectualizing Stoa denied this distinction (see ariste), and defined sophrosyne as the “knowledge of the good to be chosen and the evil to be avoided” (SVF 111, 256, 262). Plutinus has a similar definition (Enn. 1, 5, 6), but relates it to a purification preparatory to the “return” (epistrophe); see katharsis.

spérama: seed
See stoicheion, pneuma, noesis 16.

spoudaíos: serious man
See ergon.

stérēsis: privation
Stérēsis, which Aristotle defines (Meta. 1011b) as “the negation of something within a defined class,” is one of the three essential elements in Aristotle’s analysis of genesis in Phys. 2: the permanent substratum (hypoikeimeno) and the passage of one form to its opposite (enantion) demands the existence of a lack of that second form in the substratum (Phys. 1, 191a–191b). Thus stérēsis both permits genesis and solves the Parmenidean problem of nonbeing (see on). For Plotinus evil is not a substance but rather a stérēsis of good (Enn. 1, 5, 6).

stigmé: spot, point, geometrical point
See megethos, monos.

stoicheion: letter of the alphabet, primary body, element
1. The comparison of the basic bodies of the physical world to the letters of the alphabet, and so, by implication, the introduction of the term stoicheion into the language of philosophy, probably goes back to the Atomists. In this context the comparison is an apt one since the letters, like the atoma, have no significance of their own, but by manipulating their order (taxis) and position (thesis) one can construct them into aggregates with different meanings (Aristotle, Meta. 985b; De gen. et corr. 1, 335b; see genesis). But the earliest attested use of the term stoicheion is in Plato, Theat., 205c where it is obvious that Plato still feels the original connotation of “letter of the alphabet.” By the time of Aristotle the original meaning is largely ignored and stoicheion means the basic ingredient of a composite (see Meta. 1014a).

2. The reality behind the term is, of course, far more venerable. It is the object of the Milesian quest for the primary something or Urstoff of which the physical reality of the world is made, an attempt to trace the undeniable fact of change back to its starting point. The candidates for this arché are well known: the most important substances in man’s experience, and generally those with mythological credentials as well (see arché).

3. There is an important development with Anaxamander. The search for a single arché had suggested a kind of linear genesis whereby the other bodies were derived from this single starting point. But when Anaximander thrust the arché back beyond the perceptible material substances (see apeiron), he effectively made all perceptible bodies secondary and so led the search for a starting point off into new nonsensible directions, but he intruded into the problem the possibility of a cyclic genesis whereby the perceptible substances pass into each other in a continuous cycle. Such a mutual transformation of the basic bodies becomes a commonplace in much of Greek philosophy (see Plato, Phaedo 72b, Tim. 46b–c; Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 1, 337a), leading, after Parmenides, to the belief in an external agent, itself unmoved, to keep the cycle in operation (mediated, in Aristotle, by the eternal movement of the sun along the ecliptic; see genesis, kinesis, kinoun), and even the stoiche of Empedocles seem to undergo such cyclic change (frs. 17, 26).

4. The quest for the arché came to term in Parmenides who, reversing Anaximander’s perfectly undefined apeiron, posited his own perfectly defined on (q.v.). But perfect definition provides not only an arché but a telos as well, and so Parmenides was led to deny sensibly perceived change (see genesis, kinesis) and, indeed, the validity of sensation itself (see episteme). The Parmenidean on is the absolute radical stoicheion.

5. Empedocles and the Atomists, by restoring plurality and the void (kenos), reopened the possibilities of secondary genesis and rehabilitated sense knowledge. The Milesian search for basic ingredients was resumed and Empedocles himself took the lead and selected, as the four basic bodies (or “roots” as he called them) of this material world, earth, air, fire, and water, the canonical four elements (fr. 6; see Aristotle, Meta. 985a). “Selected” is the appropriate word in the circumstances since these were by no means the only candidates; there were at hand a great number of substantivized “powers” (dynamai), e.g. “the hot,” “the cold,” “the light,” “the heavy,” etc., that had been isolated up to this point.

6. To all appearances Empedocles was both the first and the last to hold that these four were the irreducible primary bodies and the efforts of his successors were bent toward reducing these “so-called
elements" (the phrase is Aristotle's; see Meta. 1066b) to something more basic, as well as to how they came to pass into more complex bodies.

7. One group, taking its lead from both Anaximander and Parmenides, held that the archai of physical bodies were themselves not perceptible to sense and thus were to be sought in entities that had no other characteristics than mass and position. Such was the atomon of Leucippus and Democritus and the mathematical atom of the Pythagoreans, the mones (q.v.; see arithmos). These are the real "elements" that could, in turn, be constructed into more complex bodies, the atoma by the process of association (synkrisis), the monads by the geometrical construction of points into lines, thus to surfaces and bodies; see genesis.

8. But since both groups had so denuded their basic particle of characteristics they were somewhat hard pressed to explain how such "nothings" could issue in the strongly characterized "something" that was the Empedoclean body. What of the undeniable presence of the sense-perceived qualities (pathemata aisthetika; see Tim. 6.13d) of these latter? In both cases there is a marked inclination to reduce all sensation to touch or contact (haptos; see Aristotle, De sensu 442a), with the strong suggestion, at least on the part of Democritus, that all other sense experiences are subjective conversions (fr. 9; see eisthesis, nomos).

9. We are not quite so well informed on the Pythagorean answer to the same question posed to them by Aristotle (Meta. 1093b): how do you possibly explain white and sweet and hot in terms of number? A suggestion of an answer appears in Plato. The Timaeus includes two approaches to the question of the elements. One is a description of the state of things before the universe came into being (Tim. 523d) and relies on a dynamic, nongeometrical analysis of genesis (q.v. and see infra). But the later (ibid. 535f.) postcosmic account is markedly geometrical and, if not purely Pythagorean, has strong affinities in that direction.

10. This Platonic account follows Atomism in reducing the Empedoclean stoicheia to aggregates of more basic bodies, the latter characterized chiefly by their position and shape (schema). But while the Atomists were apparently chary of pushing the notion of shape (on the testimony of Aristotle, De coelo iv, 303b, they did say that the atoma of fire were spherical), Plato has an elaborately worked out system whereby each of the elements is associated with one of the regular geometrical solids capable of being inscribed in a sphere (the so-called "Platonic bodies"): the cube (earth), the pyramid (fire), the octahedron (air), and the icosahedron (water) (Tim. 553–558).

the remaining figure, the dodecahedron, is reserved for the sphere of the heaven (ibid. 555; see aither, megethos). Up to this point the account could pass as a somewhat suspicious version of Atomism. But where it betrays its Pythagorean forebears is in the fact that these geometrical solids have their own archai; they are constructed out of planes, with at least the suggestion that the reduction could go further (ibid. 539–44). The Atomist atoma, on the other hand, are indivisible bodies (see Aristotle, De gen. et corr. i, 305b for a comparison of the two systems). And here too sensation is reduced to contact with various combinations of these bodies, which in turn give rise to sensible experiences (Tim. 516f; see aisthesis).

11. Though Pythagorean monadism antedated Atomism, it was not its immediate antecedent. The Atomist tradition rather saw the line of descent come down from Empedocles through Anaxagoras to themselves (see Lucretius i, 890–920). Anaxagoras rejected Empedocles' contention that there were four irreducible bodies (passage from one to the other would still be the taboo genesis, q.v.), but held instead that there are an infinite number of infinitely divisible bodies, known as homoiomereis, "things with like parts," as Aristotle called them, or "seeds," the term employed by Anaxagoras himself (fr. 4). These are Anaxagoras' stoicheia (Aristotle, De coelo 111, 302a), originally submerged in a precosmic mixture, then separated off by nura, the initiator of movement in the system (frs. 9, 15), and which by their aggregation form perceptible bodies (see genesis, holos).

12. These homoiomereis are obviously different from the atoma in that they are infinitely divisible (see fr. 3 and megethos; Lucretius objects to this aspect of the theory in 1, 844–856); but there is, in addition, the suggestion that the "seeds" carry within them their own archai, viz., all the things that are (or will be) are "in" these basic particles (see fr. 12). What is this "everything" that is "in everything," i.e., in each "seed"? It embraces not only the Empedoclean stoicheia (see Lucretius 1, 840–841, 853) and natural bodies such as hair, flesh, and bone (fr. 10), but the sensible pathes and opposed "powers" as well (fr. 4; see Aristotle, Phys. 1, 187a). The reappearance of these powers (dynamais, q.v.) was to have important consequences.

13. Aristotelian physics chose a path other than that which led back to one or more archai that transcended sense perception. In Aristotle's mind the attempt to differentiate the stoicheia by shape is senseless; the real solution is in the study of the functions and powers of things (De coelo 111, 307b). It was, in effect, a return to the sensible dynamais of Milesian philosophy that had never lost their vogue in medical circles and that Anaxagoras had recently reemphasized. But
this was more than the substitution of other “bodies” for the four of the Empedoclean canon: it rested on the important distinction between a body and its qualities (see poion).

14. The formulation of this distinction was certainly not originally Aristotle’s. Plato was well aware of it and explicitly states it, by way of preface to his account of precosmic genesis, in Tim. 49a–50a: the Empedoclean stoicheia are not really things at all but, rather, qualities (poioiotes) in a subject. Such a statement was, of course, impossible for someone who viewed the hot, the dry, etc. as things (chremata), as it is likely Anaxagoras did.

15. Here, then, already in Plato, was a clear resolution of the question of the stoicheia; they had their own archai: a substrate and immanent qualities capable of passing in and out of that subject. Thus was opened the possibility of the transformation of the elements into each other (see genesis). And this is, in general, the same tack as that taken by Aristotle. The Platonist substrate is refined into hyle (q.v.), which is the common subject for all four of the stoicheia (it should be noted that this hyle, the substrate for the elements, is imperceptible; thus genesis, or substantial change, differs from allaioses, or qualitative change, in that the latter has a perceivable matter; see De gen. et corr. 1, 319b). Finally, Aristotle adds the notion of privation (steresis) to facilitate the passage of the qualities/powers.

16. But there are other marked changes as well. For Plato the source and cause of movement is psyche (q.v.; see Laws x, 866a, 877a), while physical bodies have of themselves only a kind of random motion, agitation rather than movement (Tim. 52d–53a); and in the later postcosmic or Pythagorean-type account of the formation of the stoicheia Plato has, as might be expected, even less to say about motion: kinesis is notoriouly absent from geometrical bodies. It is otherwise in Aristotle. All natural bodies have their own principle of movement that is physis (q.v.; Phys. ii, 112b), a radical departure from the entire Parmenidean strain of speculation in which inherent motion was anathema (see kinesis, kinoun).

17. Thus for Aristotle the simple bodies that are the stoicheia have their own simple natural motion (De coelo i, 285a). Their operation is governed by the principle already set down (Phys. iii, 203a) that kinesis is the actualization of a potency. In this case, however, the privation (steresis) is that the element is not in its “natural place,” since motion and place are correlative concepts (De coelo i, 276a–277a). Thus lightness is the capacity for linear motion away from a center, a motion that will cease when the subject has reached its natural place; and heaviess is the contrary (ibid. iv, 311a–311b). In this fashion Aristotle derives fire from absolute lightness and earth from absolute heaviness (ibid. iv, 311b–312a), and then, in a more curious fashion, air from relative lightness and water from relative heaviness (ibid. iv, 312b; compare Plato’s parallel derivation of air and water as the mean terms in a geometric proportion in Tim. 31b–32a). And by relying on the same argument, from simple motions Aristotle derives the existence of the fifth element that has as its motion the other kind of simple kinesis, perfect circular motion (see aither for the difficulties this involves in the theory of the First Mover, see kinesis, see aither).

For the transformation of the elements and for the Stoic attitude toward them, see genesis; for the stoicheia of the soul in Platonism, see psyche tou pantos.

symbebebexos: accompaniment, accident (logical), accidental event (see tyche)

1. The early history of the ontological reality behind the notion of symbebebexos was fought out on the fields of quality (poion, q.v.; see also dynamics). The radical in this history was Democritus who was inclined to deny any objective existence to qualities (D.L. ix, 7; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 125), while Plato was enunciating an archaic point of view when he hypostatized them (the suprasensible mode of hypostatization represented by the ouch is, of course, quite alien to his predecessors). Plato was, nonetheless, well enough aware of the difference between things and the qualities of things and goes out of his way to correct the general pre-Socratic relification of qualities (Tim. 49a–50a; see genesis, pathos).

2. Plato’s remarks occur in a treatise on this sensible world of material things; Aristotle’s analysis of the same phenomenon is in his logical works, and so the emphasis is quite different. The distinction between a thing and its quality is broadened to embrace that between a thing or subject (hypokeimenon) and its attribute or accompaniment (symbebebexos). The latter is defined as something that “belongs to a thing, not of necessity or for the most part, . . . but here and now” (Meta. 1025a). Unlike the genos or the definition, it does not express the essence (ti esti) of a thing, nor, like the property (idion), is it necessarily linked with that subject (Top. 1, 102b). Since there is no necessity (they can be otherwise) in such accidental beings, it follows that there can be no demonstration (apodeixis) and hence no scientific knowledge (episteme) based on them (Anal. post. i, 75b–b; Meta. 106b). Symbebebexos is one of the “preuicables” (see idion).

3. One would have thought that Epicurus would adhere to Democritus’ Atomistic point of view and restrict all reality to the atoms and the void (kevlos). But since he has accepted sensation (aisthai, q.v.) as an infallible criterion of truth, he cannot fall back upon convention (nomos) as the origin of sensible qualities. And so Epicurus has a fully
developed theory of accidents (see D.L. x, 68-89). These perceptible and hence corporeal qualities that adhere to bodies may be divided, as in Aristotle, into those that are necessarily connected with the nature of bodies and so always present in a body, and those that happen to a body from time to time. The first class, Aristotle's iden, Epicurus calls sympoephen, precisely reversing the Aristotelian nomenclature. For the second class of qualities he devises the new term "accident" (symptoma). Examples of symptoma are the sensibles qualities of composite bodies (Plutarch, Adv. Cal. 1110) and sensation that is a symptoma of the "unnamed element" present in the soul (D.L. x, 64; see holon, psyche). There are even more complicated entities, such as time, that can be described as nothing else but "accidents of accidents" (see chronos).

4. The Stoics kept the Aristotelian doctrine of subject and accidents but in an altered form. The distinction between a subject and its attributes is preserved (SVF ii, 369), but the attributes are reduced to three: quality, state, and relation, the latter presumably attributes of the primary active principle of the universe, logos (D.L. vii, 134; see logos, poiein).

symmetria: symmetry
See aisthesis 6, 6 and compare asymmetron.

sympatheia: affected with, cosmic sympathy
1. The theory of cosmic sympathy, associated by modern scholars with the philosopher Poseidonius, rests upon a series of premises present in Greek philosophy almost from the beginning. The Milesians had seen the world as alive and the Pythagoreans as an ordered whole (see kosmos). And though Plato's interests had earlier lain in other directions, he devotes a full-scale treatment to the order and operation of the sensible world in the Timaeus, undoubtly his single most widely studied work in the later tradition. Here he describes the kosmos as a visible living creature (zoon), having within it all things that are naturally akin (hata phusin syngene; Tim. 403).

2. Stoic pantheism led in the same direction. God as logos pervades the universe as our soul pervades our bodies (D.L. vii, 159; see pneuma) and as physis he vitalizes the whole (Seneca, De benev., iv, 71; see logoi spermatikoi). Thus the kosmos is a unity (D.L. vii, 140), an organism (holon, q.v.) rather than a totality (pan; SVF ii, 522-524), a rational living being (zoon logikon; SVF i, 111-114).

3. Refinements appear in the era of Poseidonius, many of which are attributed directly to him. First, the earth itself is a living being, pervaded throughout by a vital force (zotike dynamis, vis vitals; Cicero, De nat. deor. ii, 33, 83) and so, it is argued by Plotinus somewhat later, also endowed with sensation (Enn. iv, 4, 26). Things cohere by a unifying force within, a force that seems to be different tensions (tonos, q.v.) of the pneuma: in inorganic matter it is called hesis; for plants, physis; for animals, psyche; and for men, nous (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. ix, 81-83; Philo, Quod Deus 25). That these are not radically distinct orders of reality is clear from certain natural phenomena, like growth of rocks as long as they are in contact with the vila vitalis of the earth (Plotinus, Enn. iv, 4, 27), and the presence in nature of zoophytes (Nemesius, De nat. hom. 1, 590a-b), all calculated to fill the gaps of the scala naturae (a common theory since Aristotle's classic description in Hist. anim. 586b-593a; for its application to the spiritual world, see trit 4).

4. From the insight into the natural interrelationship (sympathia; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii, 129) of both organic and inorganic things proceeds the doctrine of sympatheia or their mutual interaction, illustrated by a great variety of natural phenomena and particularly by the complex of effects exercised by the sun and the moon over life on earth (Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. ix, 78-80; Cicero, De nat. deor. iv, 7, 19), and prominent later in Marcus Aurelius, Philo, and Plotinus.

5. Poseidonius was apparently very interested in the sun and the moon. Cleanthes had already located the hegemonei of the universe in the sun (see pneuma; it is frequently referred to as the "heart of the kosmos" as well, based on an analogy with the location of the seat of the soul; see hordia) and Poseidonius makes it the source of all physical life (D.L. vii, 144). He may have been the author of the belief in its spiritual powers as well, and specifically of the view that the nous or nous comes from and returns to the sun, the psyche from and to the moon, and that the body begins and ends as earth (see Cicero, Tusc. 1, 18-19; Plutarch, De facie 28-30; and compare noxie 17, ouranioi 7). But even at this point purely religious considerations must have been at work as well, even though the full impact of solar theology is not visible until somewhat later (see Corpus Hermeticum xvi and Julian's Hymn to the Sun).

6. Plotinus, whose entire emanation theory is grounded on a solar image (see ekampsia, proodos), adopts both the effective role of the sun (Enn. iv, 4, 31; compare the role of the sun in Aristotle's theory of generation; see genesis) and the doctrine of cosmic sympathy. The kosmos is a living organism (zoon) all of whose parts are suffused by the universal soul (psyche tou panton, q.v.). The parts interact not by reason of their being in contact but because of their similarity (homoiote; Enn. iv, 4, 32).

7. This latter consideration raises for Plotinus the important questions of contact (hupheta) as a necessary condition of action and passion and the presence of a medium (metaxu) in perception. Aris-
toll had answered the first affirmatively, maintaining that all movement \( (\text{kinesis}) \) necessarily demands contact \( (\text{Phys. vii, 242b; viii, } 328a) \), though this clearly cannot be maintained in the case of the Prime Mover \( (\text{see kinesis}) \) that is immaterial and moves things \( \text{as something loved} \) \( (\text{Meta. 1072a}) \). There is a possible escape in \text{De gen. et corr. i, 323a} where Aristotle appeals to someone being “touched by grief,” but the \text{proton kinon} does seem to pose an unassailable example of \text{actio in distensa}. On the second point too Aristotle holds that there must be a medium between the object perceived and the operative sense organ \( (\text{De am. ii, 419a}) \). Plotinus, however, consistent with his views on \text{sympatheia}, denies the necessity of a medium of sensation \( (\text{Enn. iv, } 5) \).

8. \text{Sympatheia}, conceived of in these terms, enables Plotinus to settle some related problems, that of providence \( (\text{proeit不可思议}) \), astrology, divination \( (\text{manteik}) \), and magic. The transcendence of God is preserved in this theory since his providence may be exercised indirectly through the interrelation of things \( (\text{Enn. iv, } 8, 9) \) and neither the World Soul nor the star souls need direct contact with the things they affect \( (\text{so, earlier, Philo, De megre. Abr. 179-181}) \); deliberation \( (\text{proaireisis}) \) is also excluded \( (\text{Enn. iv, } 4, 31) \). The planets by their various movements have a variety of effects on things; they can both produce \( (\text{poiesis}) \) and portend \( (\text{semasia; Erm. iv, } 34-35) \); compare \text{Enn. ii, } 3, 7, which admits astrological divination within the context of a general attack on astrology; for the relation of individual men to individual planets, see \text{echema, ourenosi } 7 \). In this way is established a theoretical basis for divination \( (\text{manteik}, q.v.) \) that consists in the reading of just such portents, an approach long current in Stoic circles \( (\text{see Cicero, De div. ii, 14, 33}) \). But Plotinus extends the argument a step further and maintains the possibility of the manipulation and use of the sympathetic powers of things; these magical activities are not, however, of a preternatural nature; they are merely another example of \text{sympatheia} and the wise man who resorts instead to contemplation is well above them \( (\text{Enn. iv, } 4, 40-44) \).

The successors of Plotinus had a somewhat different attitude toward these powers; see \text{dynameic} 6.

\text{synagogē}: collection

The Platonic type of “induction” \( (\text{for the more normal type of induction, i.e., a collection of individual instances leading to a universal, see \text{epagogē})} \) that must precede a division \( (\text{diʼeresis}) \) and that is a survey of specific forms \( (\text{eide}) \) that might constitute a genus \( (\text{Phaed. } 262d, \text{Soph. } 253d) \). An example is \text{Soph. } 226a, and the process is also suggested in \text{Rep. } 533c-d, and \text{Laws } 656d; see \text{diʼeresis}.

\text{synațion: accessory cause}

\text{See citation } 1.

\text{synêcheia: continuity}

For the continuity of physical bodies and the problem of the \text{continuum, see megathos;} for the continuity of the physical world, \text{sympatheia } 3; for that of the spiritual world, \text{manteik } 4.

\text{synkrisis: aggregation, association}

\text{See genesis } 6-3, 14; \text{holon } 8-9; \text{pathos } 3; \text{stoicheion } 7.

\text{syntheton: something composed, composite body}

1. The problem of the \text{syntheton} or composite body is closely related to that of the \text{archai and stoicheia} on the one hand, and to that of \text{genesis} on the other. It depends for its solution on the judgment as to what exactly are the basic bodies or units out of which more complex natural entities come into being. Thus the enquiry would logically proceed from the ultimate \text{archai} to the primary perceptible bodies, i.e., the \text{stoicheia}, the grouping of these into \text{syntheton}, to the question of the composition of the most all-embracing \text{syntheton}, the \text{kosmos} itself \( (\text{see agents}) \).

2. The \text{syntheton} then may be considered on three different levels: the traditional \text{stoicheia} themselves as composite bodies, natural bodies as \text{synthete}, and the \text{kosmos} as a \text{syntheton}, and in each case the appropriate questions are “how did they come to be,” “what is their \text{genesis},” and “what constitutes their unity?”

\text{See, in ascending order, arche, stoicheion, genesis, and for their unity, hen, hexis, holon, tonos.}
1. Generally speaking Plato has no theory of technē. As frequently happens, a word that ends in Aristotelian as a carefully defined and delimited technical term is still employed by Plato in a nontechnical and popular way. The contemporary usage of technē was to describe any skill in doing and, more specifically, a kind of professional competence as opposed to instinctive ability (physēs) or mere chance (tyche). And it is precisely in these senses that Plato uses the term (Rep. 381c; Prot. 312b, 317c); nowhere does he trouble himself to give an exact or technical definition for this word whose common acceptance suited him perfectly well.

2. Where technē does enter technical philosophical discourse is in the Sophist and the Politicus. Here Plato is concerned with coming to an understanding of the sophist and the statesman by means of the dialectical method (diaitēsite, q.v.) that consists of the processes of collection (synagoge, q.v.) and division (diaireis, q.v.). There is scant evidence of any collection here, but the divisions are elaborate and, to a certain extent, overlap. In both instances they begin with technē and, even though in Pol. 258b he calls the genius to be subdivided “knowledge” (epistēme), it is clear from the context that it does not refer to the technical use of that term as it appears, for instance, in the Analogy of the Line (see epistēme), but rather to what he had previously called technē.

3. By collating the two dialogues it appears that Plato divides the “arts” into acquisitive (Soph. 219c–d), separative (of which Socrates’ cathartic art is an example; ibid. 226a–231b), and productive (poētike). The “acquisitive arts” include the acquisition of knowledge that may in turn be used for either practical (praktike, e.g., building; in general the applied sciences correspond to the Aristotelian technē; Pol. 260d–e; contrast: the Aristotelian usage of praktike, q.v.) or theoretical (gnōstike; Pol., loc. cit.; see the Aristotelian theorēma) ends. Here Plato further distinguishes the “theoretical arts” into the “directive” (epistētike, e.g., statesmanship) and “critical” (kritike, Pol. 260b). His sole example of the latter is “reckoning” (logistikē; Pol. 255e), but presumably this is the division that would embrace the study of philosophy or, as Plato would prefer to call it, dialectic.

4. The “practical arts” of the Politicus probably overlap the “productive arts” (poētike; defined Soph. 219b, 265b). These may be divided into the products of divine craftsmanship (some wish to say they are produced by nature, physēs, but Plato prefers the theistic explanation since intelligence is a concomitant of all technē; Soph. 265c) and of human craftsmanship (ibid. 265e). The former produces natural objects, e.g., the elements and the more complex bodies that come from them; the latter, manufactured objects (the praktike epistēme of the Politicus).

5. But there is a further extremely important distinction to be made here (Soph. 266a–d). Both human and divine productivity are capable of creating both originals and images (eikonēs), and it is the epistemological correlation of this image-producing that appears as the lowest segment of the Line in Rep. 509e. Plato’s generic name for image-productivity is imitation (mimesis), and while its divine manifestation, e.g., shadows, dreams, mirrors, is of little or no interest in this context, human mimesis is the basis of the entire Platonic aesthetic. See mimesis.

6. As defined by Aristotle (Eth. Nich. vi, 1140a) technē is a characteristic (hexis) geared toward production (poētike) rather than action (praktike). It arises from experience (empeirēka) of individual instances and passes from experience to technē when the individual experiences are generalized (see kathō这里是 into a knowledge of causes: the experienced man knows how but not why (Meta. 98a). Thus it is a type of knowledge and can be taught (ibid. 98b). It also operated rationally, with logos (Eth. Nich., loc. cit.), and its goal is genesis, which distinguishes it from purely theoretical knowledge (theoria, q.v.) that has to do with being (on) and not becoming. Its rational element further distinguishes it from tyche or chance, another possible factor in genesis. Again, it is an external not an internal principle of genesis, which sets it off from physē (q.v.; Phys. 11, 199a). Finally, since it is productive rather than practical it differs from phronēsis (q.v.; Eth. Nich. vi, 1140b); see also, in this same context, ergon.

telos: completion, end, purpose

1. Although it had obvious antecedents in Heraclitus’ notion of the celestial fire governing all (fr. 64) and in Anaxagoras’ use of mind (Nous, q.v. 3), a clearly defined sense of purpose in the operations of the kosmos does not appear in Greek speculative thought until Diogenes of Apollonia. In his view the arche of all things is aer (fr. 4), which is both soul (when warmed) and intelligence (Nous; fr. 5; cf. Nous 4), and which is divine and governs all things for the best (fr. 3),
the latter attribute apparently suggested by the periodic renewals in nature.

2. Socrates was extremely interested in the teleological motif; he had examined Anaxagoras' theory of nous from this point of view (Phaedo 97d) but found it disappointing; it was the same old mechanistic explanation of things (ibid. 97a), what Plato would call a confusion of symvlasta for atis (q.v.), and Aristotle (Meta. 985a) concurs in this evaluation of Anaxagoras' teleology. But there are grounds for thinking that Socrates found somewhat greater satisfaction in Diogenes (see Xenophon, Mem. 1, 4, 5–6). Plato's own approach is the same; particularly in his concern with the visible world in the later dialogues. In the Timaeus (47e) there is a general contrast between the works produced by nous and those that came about by necessity (ananke), and in the Laws (886e) we find that the latter are identified with the blind workings of nature (Phys. q.v.) and that the former are by design (techne). Psycho initiates movement, but it is its association with nous that guarantees the purposeful outcome of this movement (Laws 897b).

3. There is a radical change in Aristotle: for Plato nous was the dominating factor in the teleological scheme; for Aristotle nous operates only in the human sphere of techne, purposeful design, and, indeed, all the artisan is doing is attempting to imitate physi, which has its own purpose (telos) as well as being a source of movement (Phys. 11, 195a, 195b); it is, in short, the "final cause" described ibid. 11, 195b. The doctrine of teleology is basic in Aristotle: it appears in his earliest works (see Preparata, fr. 11) and it finds its completion in the Metaphysics. It is explained in various places that the telos is the Good (Phys. 11, 195a: Meta. 1013b), and in Meta. 1072b the ultimate Good, and hence the final cause of the entire kosmos is the First Mover, the oinosi oinos of 1074b (see koina, nous).

4. Aristotle's student Theophrastus apparently had some difficulties with teleology (Theophrastus, Metaphysics IV, 14–15, 27), but it never lost its place in philosophy, particularly with the ever-increasing theism of the later Schools; in this context it becomes divine providence (pronymia, q.v.).

For the role of telos in Aristotle's analysis of change, see ergon, energia, entelechon; in Neoplatonic emanation theories, theoos.

theion: divine

1. The ascription of divinity to the ultimate are (first philosophy) is a commonplace in pre-Socratic philosophy. The motivation seems to be twofold: the legacy of a primitive animism, most obvious, perhaps, in Thales' movement toward a pan-vitalism (Aristotle, De an. 1, 405a) and the further statement that "all things are full of gods" (ibid. 1, 411a; see Plato, Laws 869b and physi). Closely connected with this is the identification of life through the presence of motion; the only exception to this seems to be Xenophon's, whose critique of anthropomorphism led him to deny motion to his God (Diels, fr. 21425), and places him well outside the tradition.

2. The equation kinesis-theion focuses gradually onto motion that is regular and/or circular (see physis, achroni); the second motive appears explicitly in a fragment of Anaximander (Aristotle, Phys. 111, 209b) where the philosopher's "Unlimited" (apeiron, q.v.) is called theon "because it is immortal [athanatos] and indestructible." Here is a direct association of the chief property of the Homeric gods, their immortality, with a material archon (see Diels, fr. 1251 where the epic strain in the language is even more pronounced). Aristotle goes on to say (Phys., loc. cit.) that most of the "physical speculators" called their originative are (first philosophy) divine. This seems to be true and the process of de-divinization to have begun with Parmenides' strokes against the vitalism of being (see on); if genesis and kinesis no longer pertain to being, they must be produced from an outside source, the "mover" (kinon) evident from Empedocles on. And, with the attribution of intelligence (nous) and purpose (telos, q.v.) to this mover, the stage is set for the disappearance of theion and the arrival of noion in philosophical speculation; see theos.

theologia, theologic: 1] accounts about the gods, myth, 2] "first philosophy," metaphysics

1. Theologia first appears in Plato, and the term is used both by him (Rep. 371a) and by Aristotle (Meta. 1004a, 1017b) to designate the activity of the poets who gave cosmogonical accounts. Aristotle particularly uses it in contrast with the philosophical speculations of the physikoi (e.g. Meta. 1075b); in effect, it is parallel to the distinction between mythos and logos (qq.v.).

2. In Meta. 1026a a sharply distinct meaning emerges. Aristotle had divided the theoretical sciences into three classes, of which the third deals with substances that are "separate" (for the sense, see cheiriction) and without kinesis; this is the "first philosophy" or theologike, so called because such substances are the realm of divinity (for another view of the subject matter of theologike, see on).

3. Theology later expanded to once again embrace all discourse about the gods, and this new understanding of its scope may be seen in the division of theology into "mythical, physical, and political," a division originating in the Middle Stoa (see Augustine, De civ. Dei vi, 5, citing Varro; compare, ibid. iv, 27 and Eusebius, Praep. Evangel. iv, 1).
theory: viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life

According to some, the contemplative life as an ideal is a tradition going back to Pythagoras (see Cicero, Tusc. v, 3, 8–9 and D.L. viii, 8), but the authority is a later Academic and so the ideal may be no older than Plato who gives a digressive sketch of such a life in Theaet. 173e–175d, and identifies the highest type of human activity with the contemplation of the Good (Rep. 540a–c) and the Beautiful (Sympos. 206b–213a). The theme appears early in Aristotle (Protrepticus, fr. 6), and reaches its fullest development in his discussion of the contemplative life in Eth. Nic. x, 1177a–1179a. It is the chief activity of the Prime Mover in Aristotle (Met. 1072b; see nous 10), and of the soul in Plotinus (Enn. vii, 19, 8), but in a much more extended fashion than Aristotle had ever envisioned (see Enn. iii, 8, 2–7). For Plotinus activity (praxis) is a debased form of contemplation (see physics), but the later Neoplatonic tradition, probably beginning with Iamblichus (see De myst. ii, 11) tended to rank theurgia (see manteik 4–5) above theoria.

theos: God

1. As a philosophical term “the divine” (theion, q.v.) is much older than the notion of a personalized God. Indeed, there are among the philosophers a strong strain of scepticism about such anthropomorphized figures present in Greek mythology (see mythos, the well-known emptic critique by Xenophanes [frs. 11, 15], and Plato’s ironic remarks in Tim. 40d–e). Even where the old mythological apparatus is used by the philosophers, as in Empedocles (see fr. 6), it is only to reduce the Olympians to natural forces. The earliest trace of a personal God in philosophical analysis is probably to be seen in the identification, by Anaxagoras and Diogenes, of intelligence (nous, q.v.) 3 as a motive and purposeful factor in cosmology. Nous was, of course, divine (theion), and with its Milesian legacy of psyche it could scarcely be otherwise; where it fell short of being God was in its obvious lack of transcendence (see Anaxagoras, fr. 14; Diogenes, fr. 5).

2. Plato’s sharp distinction between the sensible (asiatetos) and the intelligible (nous) provided the grounds for transcendence, but in the earlier dialogues he is still in the grip of the Parmenidean denial of kinesis to true being (see on), and so there is no place for a dynamic God in the static landscape of the eidos. The great theological breakthrough occurs in the Sophists and the Philoerus in the former (248e–249b) when soul and intelligence are granted a place in the realm of the truly existent, and in the latter (286–296) when cosmic nous is described as the efficient cause of the universe and identified with Zeus. This is undoubtedly the demieourgos (q.v.) of the Timaeus who when stripped of his metaphorical trappings is cosmic nous and whose transcendence is considerably limited by its subordination to the eidos (see nous).

3. Beyond the Timaeus, however, lies another theological motif: the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies (see ouranios). Aristotle is still under their influence in his dialogues, but the treatises display only two gods, or better, one God and one divine substance: the First Mover as it is described in Met. 1072a–1073a, and the aither (q.v., see aphthartos) of De ccelo i, 268b–270a. The existence of both are deduced from kinesis: aither is divine because its movement is eternal (De ccelo i, 268a), and the First Mover is God because its movement is unmoved (Met., loc. cit.; see nous).

4. The Epicureans are not atheists; they admit the existence of gods, but deny their creation of the world or provident rule over it (D.L. x, 123–124, 139; Lucretius, De rerum nat. ii, 646–651, v, 165–174, 1183–1197; for the role of the dream in the Epicurean proof for the existence of the gods, see omnia). Stoic materialism tended to thrust God back to the level of a Milesian theion (see SVF i, 87), but their monism was not absolute and their distinction between active and passive principles (see phusik) allows them to identify God as some sort of a creative, immanent element and hence his, or rather, its definition as “creative fire” (pyr technikon). SVF ii, 1027; D.L. vii, 115. Nor were other, more spiritualized implications absent: God is also logos (q.v.) and nous (D.L. vii, 135; SVF ii, 148). The Cynics were the first philosophical school to make a systematic use of allegorical exegesis (allegoria) to reconcile a philosophically derived monotheism against popular polytheism (see Aristoteles under mythos), and in this, as in much else, they were followed by the Stoics. But it is clear that the monistic position led to panhelia, just as the parallel movement on the level of popular religion was leading to henotheism and to genuine monotheism (see Seneca, De benef. iv, 7–8). Seneca at least must be excluded from Stoic pantheism (Ep. 65, 12–14), and possibly Clearchus whose Hymn to Zeus (= SVF i, 527) does not read like a pantheistic tract.

5. A variety of factors led away from a unified Godhead; Stoic monistic materialism was rejected and Platonic transcendence reasserted, now with the notion of a hierarchy of transcendent principles (see hypercousia, hypostasis). Difficulties with providence (pronoia) also led to a distinction between command and execution and the consequent attribution of both the creative (see demieourgos) and providential activities of God to a secondary principle. The "second God" is already visible in Philo, De somni. i, 227–229, De cher., 126–127, and
particular in Numenius (cf. Eusebius, Prosp. Evang. xi. 17, 18, 22),
finally ending in Plotinus' conception of nous, Emn. v. 5, 3.

For the "third God," see psyche tou pantos; for another treatment
of the various versions of Cosmic Reason, nous.

_Theourgia:_ wonder-working
See manike 4-5; dynamis 10-11.

_Thesis:_ position, positum, convention
(as opposed to nature, physis)
In the Stoic discussions of morality the term thesis generally
replaces the nomos (q.v.) employed by the Sophists in drawing the
distinction between a morality based on convention and the operation of
a physical universe controlled by an unalterable nature (physis, q.v.).
Another aspect of this same polarity, and one particularly discussed by
the Stoics, was the question of the philosophical status of language, and
specifically the relationship between things (onta) and their names
(onomata); see onoma.

The problem of position and place is discussed under topos; for
thesis as an element in Atomistic change, see genesis; in sensation,
_Thymos:_ spirit, animus
See nous, psyche, kardia.

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See nous, psyche, kardia.

_Ti esti:_ what is it? the what-it-is, essence
That which responds to the question of "what is it?" by revealing
the essence (ousia) of the thing, i.e., by definition (haires) through
genos and diaphora (Aristotle, Top. viii. 153a); see ousia.

_Tode ti:_ this something, individual
For Aristotle the concrete individual exists; the singular as
opposed to the universal (katholou), Meta. 109a; it is substance
(ousia) in the fullest and primary sense, Cat. 2a.
See ousia, and, for the principle of individuation, _hyle._

_Tonos:_ tension
Taking as their point of departure a celebrated aphorism of
Heraclitus that describes the logos of the world as "a tension, as in a
bow or a lyre" (fr. 51; see logos 1), the Stoics attempted to explain
the constitution of the _koinon_ and of the things in it in terms of the tension
of the _pneuma_ (q.v.) or soul principle within them (see SVF 1, 514
where the cosmic tonos is symbolically identified with Heraclitus). The
states of tension in the _pneuma_ are distinguished on various levels.

Present in organic things there is _hexis,_ characterized by a "ionic
motion" (see ibid. 11, 496) of a feeble type that does no more than
circulate within the being and give it unity (ibid. 11, 498; see _hexis._
The next higher stage is _physis_, the _tonos_ of plants whose stronger
movements manifest themselves primarily in the capacity for growth
(autesis; see ibid. 11, 768-712). Next there is _psych_, the grade that
belongs to zoa characterized by movement in terms of reaction to
outside cognitive and desiderative stimuli. Finally, there is _logos_,
the strongest and purest _tonos_ of the _pneuma_, signaled by the capacity
for self-induced motion (see, in general, for the grades, ibid. 11, 458-462
and, for the types of motion, 11, 998). This doctrine, present even in the
early Stoic, found its most general application in Poseidonius' theory
of cosmic sympathy (see _sympatheia 3._

_Topos:_ place
The pre-Socrates up to the Atomists associated being with spatial
extension so that even the Pythagorean _aritheios_ has magnitude (see
Aristotle, Meta. 708b, 1083b), and the supposition forms the hypothesis
of one of Zeno's arguments quoted in Phys. iv. 209a: "if all that
exists has a place. . . ." Plato's interest in the question is rather in the
area (chorus) in which _genesis_ takes place (Tim. 52a-c), a role analo-
gous to that played by _hyle_ in Aristotle, hence Aristotle's charge that
Plato identified _chorus_ and _hyle_ (Phys. iv. 208b). Aristotle's own
approach is from the point of view of _kinesis_, which underlies the entire
discussion of _topos_ in Phys. iv. 208a-213a, and he defines _topos_ (ibid.
213a) as the "fixed boundary of the containing body"; since objects can
change place, the latter is obviously different from the objects in it
(ibid. 208b).

For Aristotle's theory of "natural place," see _stoicheia_; on the
question of the "place of the Forms" (topos eidos), eidos 17 and
_natos._

_Trias:_ triad, triadic structure
1. One of the more characteristic features of later Platonism is
the presence of a triadic structure in its _hypotheses_ (q.v.). Its
employment is rather modest in Plotinus whose great hypostatic triad of _Hen,
Noos, Psyche tou pantos_ (q.v.) seems based on historical considera-
tions of symmetrical rather than any a priori triadic principle. Emn. v. 1,
7, for instance, is quite unschematized, and 11, 9, 1 only slightly more
so.

2. The same is true of Plotinus' other great triad: Being (on),
Life (zoë), and Intellect (nous). This has its ground in the Platonic
tradition's exegesis of a celebrated text in _Soph. 248c_ where Plato
admits into the realm of the "completely real" (pantelos on) change
(kinēsis), life, soul, and thought (phronēsis). Whatever the exact motives and import of Plato’s introducing this radical shift in position (see kinēsis 6), it had an undeniable effect on his successors. It is prominently used by Plotinus to refute the materialism of the Stoics: being is not a corpse; it is possessed of life and intelligence (Enn. iv, 7, 2; v, 4, 2).

3. But his most frequent use of this set is in connection with the structure and operation of the transcendent nous, and here there is probably the converging influence of another potent text, this time of Aristotle where he describes the life of God as the energetic (q.v.) of nous (Meta. 1074b; on the denial of this to the Plotinian One, see noēton 4). For Plotinus being, life, and intelligence are all characteristics of nous on the cosmic level; it has an interior energetic that is life and that brings together being and thought (vi, 7, 13). It also seems to be related to another triad, which comes to full term in Proclus. Life is a thrust outward, an undefined (aoristos) movement away from a source. It receives its definition by turning back to that source; and this turning back is nous (see Enn. ii, 4, 5 and compare aoristos 3).

4. The landscape is quite different in Proclus. On, zoe, nous are still prominent, more prominent, in fact, than in Plotinus (see Elem. theol., props. 101–103), but here they are dominated by a triadic principle with the force of ontological law: every cause (aition) proceeds to its effect (aition) by a “mean term” (meson). This arithmetical principle is, in turn, an operational mode of a still broader view that sees the spiritual world as the same type of uninterrupted continuum as was concurrently being propagated for the physical world (on the absence of interruptions in the scala naturae, see sympatheia 3). These principles find explicit statement in Proclus (op. cit., prop. 29) and probably go back to Iamblichus (see Proclus, In Tim. ii, 313; Sallustius xxvii, 31; on the continuity of the spiritual world in Plotinus, see Enn. ii, 4, 3).

5. Proclus’ applications of the principle of triadic structure are manifold. In addition to being-life-intellect there is cause-power-effect (for the middle term of this, see dynamis), definite-indefinite-mixture (the “Philebus triad”; see pheras, apeiron), remaining-procession-return (see proodos, epistrophe), and the particularly characteristic one of unparticipated (ametheoton)-participated (metechomenon)-participant (metechon). This latter triad codifies and canonizes later Platonism’s final answer to the Parmenidean hypothetical dilemma: if One, how Many? The One is unparticipated, but it produces something that is capable of being participated (metechomenon; for the reasons for this production, see proodos 3), capable because it is participated by a plurality of participants (metechonia) (Elem. theol., prop. 23).

The second term, the mean in the progression, is superior to its participants since they depend upon it for their completion (prop. 24). The same proposition states the principle in summary: the unparticipated is unity-before-plurality, the participated is unity-in-plurality, i.e., one and none, while the participants are not-one, yet one in their source (see a similar schema under holon 11).

týchē: chance

As a metaphysical term týchē falls under the general heading of accidental cause (symbheboxe), i.e., a cause having an unintended effect. Aristotle distinguishes such accidental causes (which are efficient causes, Phys. 11, 198a) into those where there is no deliberation, automaton (spontaneity), and those where there is some degree of rational choice (proairesis), in which case it is týchē (Phys. 11, 197a–198a). The role of týchē as a causal principle finds its strongest appeal to the Atomists (see D.I. 9, 45; Aristotle, Phys. 11, 196a24) where chance is equated with a kind of blind physical necessity (ananke) operating without purpose. The identification of chance and physical necessity is made quite specific by Plato in his castigation of current physical theories (Laws x, 896c). Aristotle’s final view on týchē is to separate it from material ananke and to render it inferior to both nous and physis, the two causes that operate with purpose (telos), Phys. 11, 198a.

týposis: imprinting, impression

See aisthesis, noēsis.
particles that have mass and movement but no life (see kinesis 4) and by the necessity for the other post-Peripatetic philosophers to supply an external source of movement (see kinesis 1-2).

2. But even though life ceased to be something innate in things, its connection with soul remained constant and Plato's proof of the immortality of the soul hinges on that very point (Phaedo 105b-107a). Plato's notion of an eidos of life is not improbable in the light of the connection between the skel and predication (see sidus 11), and he does seem to mention such at Phaedo 306d (though the remark here could refer to something immanent). But what is far more revolutionary is his admission, in Soph. 248a, of all the Parmenidean undesirables, life, soul, intellect, change, into the realm of the really real (see psyche 18, kinesis 6), and his consequent interest in the "intelligible living being" (see zoön).

3. For Aristotle life is immanent not transcendent and his approach is functional (see ergon 3, psyche 23). He defines zoön as the capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay (De an. II, 412a) and gives (413a) more elaborate criteria for determining the existence of life: the presence of mind (nous), sensation (aisthesis), movement, nourishment, decay, and growth. Its seat is in the heart (De part. anim. III, 665a; see kardia and compare pneuma 3).

For time treated in terms of life, see chronos; for the Neoplatonic triad of Being, Life, Intellect, trias.

zoön: living being, animal

1. Although Anaximander has something that looks like a theory of spontaneous generation (Diels 12130, 11, 90; fish generated from the operation of the sun upon the moist slime; men born of fish; on the primacy of fish, compare Philo, De opif. 65-66), Empedocles has the most complete zoology of the pre-Socratics (summary passage in Aetius v, 19, 5; frs. 57-62). Plato's zoology is to be found in the Timaeus where the lower animals evolve in a fashion consonant with his earlier theory of palingenesia (q.v.; Tim. 91d-92c). What are sketches and remarks in earlier thinkers becomes, in Aristotle, a science, elaborated in a whole series of treatises, and particularly the De generatione animalium.

2. A feature of the Aristotelian treatment is the famous scala naturae, a graduated linking of all the forms of life found in the Historia anim. 598b-589a (see sympatheia 3). At the top of the series stands man whom both Plato (Tim. 90a-c) and Aristotle (Pol. 1253a, 1253b) tended to separate off from the rest of animated beings by reasons of his possession of a rational faculty (nous) that was immaterial. The earlier Stoic materialism tended to blur this distinction, but a later Platonizing movement within the school reseparated nous from psyche (see nosos 17) and the results of this can be seen in the sharp distinctions made between animal instincts and human reason (Seneca, Ep. 121, 19-25) and the consequent absence of morality toward or in the animal kingdom (Cicero, De fin. 1.11, 67; Philo, De opif. 73).

3. But if there was a difference between the material and the spiritual that effectively separated men from the beasts, there was also a connection between the two realms. In terms of the Platonic theory of mimesis (q.v.) the sensible world was a reflection of eikon of the spiritual. But the sensible world was not merely a collection of random animalized parts; it was seen, from the very beginnings of Greek philosophy, as some kind of ordered whole. A. kosmos endowed with movement and so with life. This was the primitive view of Anaximenes (Aetius i, 3, 4) and the early Pythagoreans (see Aristotle, Phys. iv, 215b), and this is still the view of Plato who calls the visible kosmos that embraces all living creatures an animal (zoon; Tim. 305) with a soul (see psyche tev pantos). This in turn has a model, an "intelligible living being" (zoon noetos) that embraces within itself all the intelligible creatures (ibid. 306c-d). When he comes to describe the parallel classes of zoön contained within the sensible and intelligible animal he mentions only four: the heavenly race of gods, winged things, aquatic animals, and those that dwell on dry land (ibid. 306-402; with the introduction of aither [q.v.] this becomes five in the Epinomis 98b-c). In the later Platonic tradition these intelligible animals grow and multiply. Philo, for example, confronted with two accounts of creation in Genesis, can explain them as the creation of the sensible and the intelligible world, and is not a whit embarrassed at the prospect of having "intelligible grass" and "sensible grass" (De opif. 129-130; Leg. att. I, 24). Plotinus too traces out in detail the congruence between the intelligible and the sensible zoön (Enn. vi, 7, 8-12).

On the intelligible world, see kosmos noetos; and for its contents, noetos, further on the kosmos as a living organism under symphatiea, holon.
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