RUSSIAN RULE IN
Samarkand
1868–1910
A Comparison with British India
A. S. Morrison
OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS
RUSSIAN RULE IN SAMARKAND 1868–1910
This page intentionally left blank
Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910

A Comparison with British India

A. S. MORRISON
In Memory of Paul Bergne
This page intentionally left blank
The Russian Christians (Nazarenes) came by way of the holy Shah-e Zindah to the gate of Samarkand, where they were met by the group of Iranians who at that time were powerful in the city. They received them before the gate and made submission, and invited them into the city of Samarkand. The Russian Christians hastened through the gate and set fire to a row of shops in the bazaar. When it had reached the gate of the fortress they caused the fire to abate, and made peace.

Muhammad Salih Khwaja Tashkandi, Ta’rikh-e Jadideh-ye Tashkand ff. 45ᵃ—45ᵇ
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgements

Accumulating material for this book was tremendous fun, and took me to Moscow, St Petersburg, and Tashkent several times, and once to Delhi, Lucknow, and Calcutta. It required more travel and more generous research grants than are usually available to graduate students, and I was extremely fortunate to be a Prize Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, for the seven years in which I was researching and writing my doctoral thesis and revising it for publication. The College provided food, wine, friendship, and unrivalled scholarly and financial support, and I cannot thank the Warden and Fellows enough for electing me. The other institution to which I owe a great debt of gratitude is the Institut Français d’Étude sur l’Asie Centrale in Tashkent. They arranged my visa invitation several times and provided me with an official letter for the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs which gained me access to the State Archives. Madame Akimova, the librarian, ran an excellent informal accommodation bureau, and the food is absolutely fantastic. When you’re fed up with shashlyk and plov, knowing that for a couple of dollars you can get fish with fresh aioli or a perfectly roasted loin of pork in the heart of Central Asia does wonders for morale. My thanks to Dr Vincent Fourniau, Professor Rémy Dor, and Dr Bayram Balci, the Directors during my various visits. I would also like to thank my fellow scholars in the School of History at the University of Liverpool for their help and encouragement in the latter stages of this book’s composition, and for being brave enough to give a Central Asianist a job.

In the course of my travels I have renewed old acquaintances and made many new friends, and I would like to thank some of those who provided beds, food, alcohol, and company. Misha Labovsky and Olga Vinogradova put me up in their Moscow flat for over four months in all, and at weekends their dacha provided welcome relief from the sweltering heat of the city in midsummer, with lots of singing and kvass-quaffing around the evening bonfire. At the Central State Archive of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeevich Tikhonov allowed me to work in his office throughout August when the Reading-Room was closed, and would fetch documents requested from the nineteenth-century Fonds within minutes. In St Petersburg I stayed with Valery and Larissa Karpov, who stuffed me with cheese dumplings at breakfast and took me
mushroom-picking. In return for a couple of bottles of whisky Olga and Emmanuel Berard-Perepetch also put up with my scruffy presence in their immensely elegant flat on Vasilievsky Island. In the course of four different trips to Tashkent I made a number of friends: Bahrom Kadirov met me at the railway station in his black Mercedes when I first arrived in Tashkent and gave me some insights into the world of the modern Uzbek entrepreneur. I practised my Hindi with Sirojiddin Nurmatov as he showed me around the city, and took me to three weddings in the space of a week. Professor Azad Shamatov of the Tashkent Institute of Oriental Studies also gave me the benefit of his expertise in South Asian languages. Sharaf Mirza interviewed me for Radio Tashkent’s Urdu service and invited me to dinner several times, as well as accompanying me on an expedition to the Ferghana Valley. Rinat Shigabdinov took me to the Archive on my first visit to Tashkent, and proved an excellent source of books. Most of my evenings were spent at the Navoi Opera House where Normumin Sultanov and Shukur Ghafurov welcomed me to an interesting backstage world of vodka, horse sausage, and Verdi. They organized a superb evening of singing and drinking at the Tashkent aquapark, and we eventually sang in a concert together at the Conservatoire. Franz Wennberg gave me valuable advice on dealing with the archival bureaucracy as well as accommodating me in Dushanbe, where Nargis Khojaeva arranged for me to work in the library of the Tajik Academy of Sciences. Kirill, Gulya, Muhabbat, Oumid, Ulugh Beg, and the rest of the staff at IFÉAC were always cheerful and helpful. On my most recent trip to Tashkent, while we waited in vain for permission to work in the archive, Philipp Reichmuth ensured my journey wasn’t wasted by sharing his extraordinary knowledge of nineteenth-century Turkestan with me, together with plenty of beer. Sergei Grigoriev was kind enough to supervise me while I was a stazhor at St Petersburg University at the very beginning of my research. In Delhi and Moscow I have benefited greatly from Professor Madhavan Palat’s criticism and suggestions. While I was in Delhi I was also lucky enough to be taught Persian by Dr Yunus Jaffrey, although I fear I was far from worthy of his unflagging patience and humour. I would like to thank Adeeb Khalid for all his enthusiastic support and sage counsel, both via email and on the all-too-rare occasions when we’ve managed to meet, sometimes in rather unexpected places. I won’t forget the Lahore Test Match in a hurry!

In Oxford my supervisors, Dr C. C. L. Andreyev and Dr D. A. Washbrook, provided invaluable advice and assistance as the chapters of
my thesis slowly trickled in. My D.Phil. examiners, John Darwin and Dominic Lieven, made a number of very helpful suggestions in my viva, and have given much help and encouragement since. Imre Bangha’s Hindi and Urdu classes were a blissful refuge from Russian, and never failed to produce fascinating etymological debates. I would also like to thank Sergei Andreyev, Timur Beisembiev, Hayden Bellenoit, Matthew Jamison, Yasmin Khan, Simon King, Charles Lewis, Alex Marshall, Sumita Mukherjee, Ali Parchami, Joe Perkins, Dara Price, Alim Sabitov, Berny Sèbe, Iqbal Sevea, Nariman Skakov, Peter Thonemann, Manik Varma, and Manouchehr Yousefi for help, advice, and companionship, both when travelling and in Oxford. I owe a great debt to the late Paul Bergne, whose deep knowledge of the region and its languages was an enormous help and inspiration. He managed single-handedly to get Central Asian Studies in Oxford off the ground, and without him I would have felt that I was ploughing a rather lonely furrow. Special thanks are due to Tom Welsford for helping me to get away with minimal knowledge of Arabic and plodding Persian, and for seven years of discussion, insight, and suggestions on the history of Islamic Central Asia. He has read the entire draft at various stages with remarkable thoroughness and corrected the worst howlers. The remaining mistakes are, needless to say, entirely my own responsibility. Finally I owe an awful lot to my parents, who encouraged me to learn Russian in the first place, and to my brother, whose healthy doses of cynicism help to keep my feet firmly on the ground.

A.S.M.
School of History
University of Liverpool
This page intentionally left blank
## Contents

*List of Maps and Illustrations*  
*List of Tables*  
*List of Abbreviations*  
*Glossary*  
*Note on Sources*

**Introduction**  
1

1. The Setting  
11

2. Religion and the Problem of Islam  
51

3. The Creation of a Local Administration and the Abolition of *Amlakdari*  
88

4. The Military Bureaucracy  
126

5. The ‘Living Wall’: Native Administration in Samarkand  
172

6. Irrigation  
201

7. *Qazis* and the Judiciary  
244
   
   Conclusion  
286

   Appendices  
293

*List of Original Sources*  
325

*Bibliography*  
328

*Index*  
357
Maps

1. Russian Turkestan in 1917  
2. Samarkand in 1914, showing clearly the division between the Russian and ‘native’ city  
3. The Zarafshan Valley in 1869

Illustrations

1. The Russian Orthodox Church, Samarkand (Turkestanskii Al’bom), 1871  
2. Sartskaya Shkola (Sart School) Samarkand (Prokudin-Gorskii Collection), c.1905–15  
3. Jura-Bek, the former Governor of Kitab (Turkestanskii Al’bom), 1871  
4. General A. K. Abramov, Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1868–77 (Turkestanskii Al’bom), 1871  
5. Aksakal, Samarkand (Prokudin-Gorskii Collection), c.1905–15  
6. Rice fields near Samarkand (Prokudin-Gorskii Collection), c.1905–15  
7. Kamaladdin Kuz-Falak, the Qazi of Samarkand (Turkestanskii Al’bom), 1871
The photographs in this book are all taken either from the Prokudin-Gorskii collection (a stunning photographic survey of the Russian Empire carried out from 1905–15, much of it in colour) or from *Turkestanskii Al'bum* (a collection of over 1,300 photographs commissioned by Governor-General von Kaufman in 1871, one of the most ambitious colonial photography projects of the nineteenth century). With remarkable generosity both these have been made freely available online by the Library of Congress. I would like to make particular note of the wonderful work done by Heather Sonntag in preparing *Turkestanskii Al'bum* for online publication.
**Tables**

1. Government income and expenditure in Russian Turkestan, 1869–1902  
   | 32 |
2. Area and population density in Turkestan, 1881  
   | 42 |
3. Results of the 1897 census  
   | 47 |
4. Education of military officers in Turkestan, 1875  
   | 136 |
5. Comparative educational statistics for administrators  
   | 166 |
6. Administrative divisions of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1871  
   | 178 |
7. Candidates for election as Volost Upravitel in Uralyk Volost, 1894  
   | 179 |
8. Files relating to petitions of complaint received by the Samarkand Chancellery, 1888–1908  
   | 187 |
9. Taxation in four Volosts of the Samarkand District, 1896  
   | 217 |
10. Appeals in the Okrug Courts against the decisions of the Popular Courts, 1905–7  
    | 270 |
Map 1. Russian Turkestan in 1917
Adapted by the author from the map in M. G. Bakhabov et al. (eds.), Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR, Vol. 1 Book 2 (Tashkent, 1956), facing p. 208.
Abbreviations

ARCHIVES

TsGARUz  Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan
           Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent)
           Note: References throughout for this archive are to the ‘T’ (Historical) Fonds.

GARF   Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii
           Central State Archive of the Russian Federation (Moscow)

RGIA   Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv
           Russian State Historical Archive (St Petersburg)

RGVIA  Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv
           Russian State Military-Historical Archive (Moscow)

AV     Sankt-Peterburgskii Filial Instituta Vostokovedenii Rossiiskoi Akademii
           Nauk: Arkhiv Vostokovedov.
           St Petersburg Filial of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of
           Sciences: Archive of Orientalists

OIOC   Oriental and India Office Collections (British Library)

PRP    Punjab Revenue Proceedings

PPWDP  Punjab Public Works Department Proceedings

NAI    National Archives of India (New Delhi)

S.C.   Secret Consultations

P.C.   Public Consultations

TECHNICAL

F. = Fond; Op. = Opis’; D. = Delo—The cataloguing system used in all
Russian Archives

ob = oborot, the reverse side of the folio, as the numbering within files is on
one side only

Izd. = Izdatel’stvo: Publisher or Izdanie: Publication

Tip. = Tipografiya: Printing Press

Vyp. = Vypusk: Issue

Sob. = Sobranie: Collection

Otd. = Otdelenie: Division

St Pb. = St Petersburg
## Abbreviations

**PUBLICATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Ab Imperio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Asiatische Studien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>Sobranie Vostochnykhn Rakopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR Imeni Biruni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Cahiers d'Asie Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Cahiers du Monde Russe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central Asian Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI₁ &amp; EI²</td>
<td>The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden and London, 1st and 2nd eds.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJ</td>
<td>The Geographical Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJMES</td>
<td>International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAH</td>
<td>Journal of Asian History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JESHO</td>
<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIS</td>
<td>Journal of Islamic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Krasnyi Arkhiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kritika</td>
<td>Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Modern Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
<td>Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPV</td>
<td>Pis'mennye Pamyatniki Vostoka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSZ</td>
<td>Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Russian Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEER</td>
<td>Slavonic &amp; East European Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSO</td>
<td>Spravochnaya Knizhka Samarkandskoi Oblasti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRIO</td>
<td>Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Slavic Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Turkestanskiya Vedomosti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Turkestanskii Sbornik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VO</td>
<td>Vostochnoe Obozrenie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVOIRAO</td>
<td>Zapiski Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSp</td>
<td>Zerrspiegel (<a href="http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de">http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

I have not used any ‘scientific’ method of transliteration, as these are incomprehensible to those who do not know the language in question and unnecessary for those who do. The only diacritic which I have occasionally allowed to sully these pages is the apostrophe (‘) to indicate the Russian soft sign (ѓ) and the Arabic ‘ain (א). Persian and Turkic terms and place-names are mostly taken from their Russian spellings, except where these are egregiously inaccurate. Wherever possible in the main body of text I have replaced Russian terms with English equivalents, except where this is tricky (e.g. *Volost Upravitel*), and in quotations where transliterated versions of the Russian terms are used. Where they come from Russian sources Central Asian personal names are given in their russified forms with ‘ov’ and ‘aev’ endings as they originally appear, although it is unlikely that many locals in this period would have used these themselves. All dates are according to the Julian calendar used in Russia before 1917.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Adat</td>
<td>customary law, largely applied in the Russian Empire to the law used by nomads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksakal</td>
<td>‘white-beard’. An elder, a village headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksakalstvo</td>
<td>the administrative division controlled by an Aksakal, normally with 50–200 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amlak</td>
<td>the plural of <em>Mulk</em> (see below). A piece of land with certain tax privileges attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amlakdar</td>
<td>a landowner, a tax-farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryk</td>
<td>an irrigation canal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryk-Aksakal</td>
<td>the elder in charge of irrigation canals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>a landowner or other person of importance in Turkestan, a title of respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bek</td>
<td>a Muslim Governor, subordinate (sometimes only nominally) to another ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekstvo</td>
<td>the area controlled by a Bek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinovnik</td>
<td>a civil servant. The term refers to Chin or position in the table of ranks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 I refer the pedant to T. E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert* (London, 1927), 7–8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar ul-Harb</td>
<td>‘the Abode of War’. Areas under infidel rule in Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darya</td>
<td>‘ocean’ in Persian, but in Central Asia it has acquired the meaning of ‘river’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desyatina</td>
<td>Russian measurement of area, equivalent to approximately $2\frac{3}{4}$ acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djigit</td>
<td>a term of Tatar origin used for mounted messengers, assistants, bodyguards, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doab</td>
<td>‘two waters’ in Persian: the dry region between two rivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazhdanstvennost’</td>
<td>citizenship; ‘Civic Values’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorodtsy</td>
<td>‘aliens’. A legal category describing most non-Christian subjects of the Tsar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishan</td>
<td>‘they’ in Persian. The title given to a Sufi leader as a mark of respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadid</td>
<td>‘new’ in Arabic. Collective term for Muslim reformers in Turkestan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaghir</td>
<td>a land grant in Mughal India, normally given in return for military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalat or Khillat</td>
<td>a ceremonial robe, given as a reward for good service at Timurid courts, a practice imitated by the Russians and British. Also a dressing-gown in Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kheraj</td>
<td>the principal agricultural tax under Muslim law. Normally one-fifth of the crop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoja or Khwaja</td>
<td>a religious honorific indicating descent from the Prophet’s kin, and membership of one of the Central Asian Sufi lineages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishlak</td>
<td>a village, a winter settlement for nomads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maktab</td>
<td>a school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirab</td>
<td>a water controller, subordinate to the Aryn-Aksakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudaris</td>
<td>a teacher at a madrasah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutavali</td>
<td>the manager of a <em>waqf</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufti</td>
<td>a clerk or recorder, normally working at the court of a Qazi (see below), but also the title given to the head of all Muslims in the Russian Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulk</td>
<td>a word with a multitude of meanings, the simplest of which is ‘property’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murid</td>
<td>a disciple of a Sufi Ishan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nachal’nik</td>
<td>the officer in charge, Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narodnyi Sud</td>
<td>‘popular judge’. The Russian term for a Qazi (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblast’</td>
<td>a province ruled over by a governor, with a population of up to a million in Turkestan. Known as a Guberniya in the central regions of the Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okrug</td>
<td>a military district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otdel</td>
<td>a District. Used in place of Uyezd in Samarkand until 1886, but essentially the same size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perevodchik</td>
<td>translator, interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pood</td>
<td>Russian measurement of weight, equivalent to 36 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pristav</td>
<td>assistant to the Uyezdnyi Nachal’nik, local police chief in charge of a sub-district or Uchastok of 50,000–100,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyatidesyatnik/Panjahbashi</td>
<td>an elector, so called because one was chosen from each fifty households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazi</td>
<td>an Islamic judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyid or Syed or Syud</td>
<td>one claiming descent from the tribe of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sblizhenie</td>
<td>‘drawing closer’, assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selskii Starshina</td>
<td>the Russian term for a village elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanap/Tanab</td>
<td>the native land measurement in Turkestan. Two and a half tanaps were equal to one desyatina, so they were just over an acre in area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tenga/Tanga or Tanka
the Bukharan currency, which
continued to be used in Russian
Turkestan long after the
conquest. The exchange rate
fluctuated a good deal, but seven
Tengas were normally worth one
silver rouble

Tuzemtsy
natives

Tuman/Tyumen
a group of villages, originally a
term meaning ‘a thousand’ in
Mongol

‘Ulama
the collective term for Muslim
clergy and theological scholars,
plural of Alim

Uyezd
a district in Russian Turkestan,
which could have a population
of 250,000 or more

Uyezdnyi Nachal'nik
a District Commandant, in
charge of an Uyezd

Verst
Russian measurement of
distance, equivalent to about
two-thirds of a mile

Voenno-Narodnoe Upravlenie
‘Military-Popular Government’. The
system of military rule used
in the borderlands of the
Russian Empire

Volost'
an administrative division,
normally with around 2,000
households in Turkestan

Waqf
an endowment for a mosque or
madrasah, an entail

Zakat
the commercial levy under
Muslim law. One-fortieth of the
value of the goods
A Note on Sources

The most important sources for this book are memoranda, petitions, reports, and other documents from archives in Uzbekistan and Russia. These include the Historical (pre-1917) Fonds of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Tashkent (TsGARUz), which consist largely of records of the central bureaucracy of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship together with local records for those areas of it which were later incorporated into the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. From 2000 to 2003 while I worked here intermittently I barely scraped the surface of what lies in this archive, and have largely confined myself to the records of the Governor-General’s Chancellery, the Chancellery of the Zarafshan Okrug (from 1886 the Samarkand Oblast), and the district records for Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan, and Djizak (those for Khujand are in Dushanbe). My thanks to the reading-room staff, who were extremely efficient and kept me well supplied with tea. Unfortunately since 2005 access to archives in Uzbekistan for foreign scholars has become increasingly difficult, and on my latest trip in 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused me permission to work there.

In Russia I spent the first summer of my research in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), a peculiar institution which used to be known as the Archive of the Great October Socialist Revolution. I found some surprisingly useful things there, particularly in the Fonds relating to Count N. P. Ignatiev and Alexander III, the latter of which contained what I believe is a hitherto unknown letter in English from Maharajah Duleep Singh to the Tsar, together with an 1866 report on the newly conquered Turkestan Oblast from General Kryzhanovsky, the Governor of Orenburg. The other archive I used in Moscow was the Central State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA) where I searched for the formulyarnye spiski (records of service) of officers who had served in Samarkand as well as reading reports of the early campaigns of conquest and making limited use of the records of the military courts. I was lucky enough to have two stints in the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA) in St Petersburg, which contains records from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Imperial State Council and Senate, and the personal Fonds of many of its
members. Of these the Pahlen and von Kaufman papers were much the most interesting. This archive has now unfortunately been moved from its former handsome home in the buildings of the old General Synod on Angliiskaya Naberezhnaya, and its future is uncertain. I also made some use of the papers of Alexander Ludwigovich Kun in the Orientalists’ Archive of the St Petersburg Oriental Institute (AV): some Persian documents from his Fond (together with many other archival and published sources) have been transcribed and placed on the superb Zerrspiegel website (http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de) set up by Professors Bakhtiyar Babajanov and Jürgen Paul. In 2006 I spent two months working in the National Archives of India in Delhi, where among other things I found some interesting material on an 1854 embassy from Kokand to the East India Company. In London I have worked in the India Office Library, using the records of the Punjab Government and the fascinating journals of William Moorcroft.

Supplementing this archival material are rare pre-revolutionary books and periodicals from the Navoi State Library in Tashkent (whose original building has now sadly been demolished to make way for yet another of the glass-fronted monstrosities which blight the Uzbek capital); the most important of these is *Turkestanskii Sbornik* or *Turkestan Collection*, a vast scrapbook containing articles, pamphlets, and other publications, Russian and foreign, relating to Central Asia. Begun in 1867, it runs to 594 volumes. I also worked in the beautiful reading-room of the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg. In Moscow I worked in the Lenin Library and the Historical Public Library, alternating between the two as their bookstacks were closed for maintenance much of the time. I was also able to find many texts which are unavailable in the Bodleian or the British Library at the remarkable Vostochnaya Literatura website (http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/m.asien.htm), which has a vast range of accurate paginated transcriptions of rare nineteenth-century published works: my thanks to its anonymous creators.

In addition to these contemporary Russian sources I have made limited use of Islamic chronicles written in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Central Asia, which, whilst they rarely contain any new factual information, sometimes give a very different perspective on the conquest and Russian rule. I can barely read manuscript *Nastaliq*, so I have been limited to those chronicles which have been published, some of which have also been translated into English or Russian.
I have been able to use Veselovsky’s 1904 text edition of Abu Tahir Khoja Samarqandi’s *Samariya*, a charming Persian topographical work on Samarkand and its environs composed in the 1840s.\(^1\) Two of the most important colonial-era chronicles were translated into Russian in the Soviet period: Ahmad Donish’s *Risala ya Mukhtasari az Ta’rikh-e Saltanat-e Khanadan-e Manghitiyya*, originally written in Persian in 1878, published in 1960, and translated in 1967;\(^{\text{ii}}\) and Mirza ‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami’s *Ta’rikh-e Salatin-e Manghitiyya*, originally written in Persian *c.* 1907 and published and translated in 1962.\(^{\text{iii}}\) Both these authors were close to the Bukharan *jadids* or Muslim reformers, and they were severe critics of the Manghit dynasty: Sami’s work is in the form of a ‘secret’ history to accompany an official chronicle which he had written for Emir Sayyid Alim Khan. This helps to explain the favour their texts found in Soviet times as both could be considered staunch enemies of the ‘feudal’ old order: indeed the Academy of Sciences in Tajikistan is named after Ahmad Donish. Together with these an important chronicle of inordinate length is Muhammad Salih Khwaja Tashkandi’s *Ta’rikh-e Jadideh-ye Tashkand*, composed *c.* 1900–10; this is unpublished and is to be found in the manuscript repository of the Biruni Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, under the catalogue number 11073/I. However, roughly 250 of the 1,000 folios in the manuscript have been transcribed by Bakhtiyar Babajanov and placed on *Zerrspiegel.*\(^{\text{iv}}\) It offers an interesting local perspective on the Russian conquest in particular, but it seems likely that Tashkandi made extensive use of Russian sources for his history, not least because he uses *miladi* (Christian) dates, often giving the precise day and month of an event. Such use of western published sources by Central Asian chroniclers is known elsewhere. Ron Sela has recently demonstrated that a description of the massacre of the Yomud Turcoman in a late nineteenth-century Chaghatai chronicle from Khorezm is partly derived from J. A. Macgahan’s *Campaigning on*

---

\(^1\) V. I. Veselovskii (ed.), *Samariya—Sochinenie Abu Takhir Khodzhi.* (St Pb., 1904).


\(^{\text{iv}}\) Alternatively Beisembiev suggests that it is MS No. 7791, but this may refer to a different copy. It is to be found at the following url: http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t386.html.
the Oxus, albeit via an Ottoman Turkish translation. Timur Beisembiev has rendered western scholarship a great service in publishing a facsimile, transcription, and translation of a Kokandi Chronicle called the Ta’rikh-e ‘Aliquli, Amir-e Lashkar by Mullah Muhammad Yunus Jan Shighavul Dadkhwah Tashkandi. This Chaghatai text, composed c.1900 provides an invaluable local perspective on the Russian conquest. Rather than struggle through Pantusov’s text edition of Niyaz Muhammad Khoqandi’s Ta’rikh-e Shahrukhi, probably the most important of the nineteenth-century Kokand Chronicles, I have instead made use of Beisembiev’s detailed analytical work. Mirza Shams Bukhari’s Ta’rikh-e Bukhara, Khoqand va Kashghar was composed in 1859 for the orientalist V. V. Grigoriev by a Bukharan Mirza who was living in Orenburg, having fled the Emirate during Emir Nasrullah’s reign. It contains little original information apart from a description of the Kokandian campaign in Kashgar in support of the Afaqi Khodjas against the Ch’ing in which the author had participated, but it is important as one of the few native sources on recent Bukharan history available to the Russians at the time of the conquest. The recent Iranian edition invites confusion by making no distinction between the text and Grigoriev’s copious notes.

The use of archival records from Uzbekistan has been particularly valuable in giving my work a fresh perspective on Russian Imperialism. As Willard Sunderland has remarked, the provincial archives of the former USSR have not always yielded the riches which they were widely supposed to contain in the long years when western researchers were barred from using them. In the case of the Uzbekistan State Historical Archives, however, their holdings are extraordinarily important because they constitute the main bureaucratic repository for the whole of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, which enjoyed much greater autonomy than the inner provinces of European Russia.

---

VII N. N. Pantusov (ed.), Taarikh Shakhrokhi. Istoriya Vladetelei Fergany (Kazan, 1885); T. K. Beisembiev, Tarikh-i Shakhrukh ki iistoicheskii istochnik (Alma-Ata, 1987).
VIII V. V. Grigor’ev (ed.), O nekotorykh sobytiyakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare (Kazan, 1861).
X Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field (Ithaca, NY, 2004), 231.
and St Petersburg records can give a good sense of what high policy was in Turkestan and what the Imperial Government intended should happen there. However, the gulf between intention and execution is a recurring theme of all nineteenth-century imperial history. Even if much of the time I am only able to describe what Russian administrators thought was happening in Samarkand, the local records proved essential in revealing the limitations of the colonial regime.
Introduction

It is we who can deal with Orientals.

In 1888 George Nathaniel Curzon, later Viceroy of India, undertook an expedition through Russian Turkestan along the newly completed Transcaspian Railway to Samarkand. In the preface to the book about his experiences he wrote that his intention was to compare [Russia’s] genius for assimilation with that of other conquering races. Is the apparent security of her sway the artificial product of a tight military grip, or is it the natural outcome of peaceful organic fusion? How do her methods and their results compare with those of England in India?

That is one of the aims of this book. Both power and knowledge are required for one people to be able to rule another, but it is foolish to assume that the conquerors will have a monopoly of either, or that the conquered will remain entirely passive. This history is also designed to illustrate where the balance lay between the Russians and their new subjects in Turkestan. The area I have chosen to concentrate on stretches from the Syr-Darya at the mouth of the Ferghana Valley in the east to the town of Katta-Kurgan in the west; and from the Steppes north of Djizak to the Zarafshan Mountains (an outlying range of the Pamirs) in the south. It is thus centred on the ancient city of Samarkand and the valley of the River Zarafshan or ‘gold-bearing’, on which the oases of Samarkand and Bukhara both depend. Apart from the upper Zarafshan Valley past Penjikent, this area is relatively flat and

---

3 I do not wish to engage in either obeisance to or a lengthy attack on Edward Said’s ideas on this point. Suffice to say that I consider *Orientalism* (1978 and 1995) to be a timely reminder that historians must be sensitive to cultural and religious differences and careful in their use of colonial sources, and nothing more. See instead C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information* (Cambridge, 1999), 365–76.
well-irrigated, although it also comprised the so-called ‘Hungry Steppe’ in the doab between the Zarafshan and Syr-Darya rivers. After 1886 this region made up the Samarkand Oblast (Samarkand Province), the smallest of the divisions of Russian Turkestan, but the most densely populated and one with a relatively manageable archival record. This is a work of imperial history, and the focus is on the structures, ideologies, and personnel of the Russian Empire in Turkestan. I am only too aware of the many limitations of my approach: the sources used are largely in Russian, and I make no claims to be an expert on Islamic religion and society. This is not an urban study, and the transformation of Samarkand city under imperial rule is only considered briefly. There were relatively few nomads in the Zarafshan Valley, and they had a rather different relationship with the imperial regime from the settled peoples dealt with in this book. A complete social and economic study of the Samarkand region under colonial rule would require another volume, and the use of sources in oriental languages of which I do not have a sufficient command.

The decision to write a comparative study requires some explanation. Given the paucity of research in English on the Russian Empire in Central Asia a simple monograph on the colonial administration there might be considered sufficient. If a comparison is to be made then arguably the area under European sway which most resembled Russian Turkestan was French Algeria, a homogenously Muslim territory which was administratively part of the metropolis, and which had large numbers of settlers. There are numerous important differences between India and Turkestan which render comparison difficult. Whilst India is densely settled, with a huge diversity of languages, ethnicities, and religions, Central Asia is sparsely populated, and lies on the border between the Turco-Mongol nomadic and Persian settled cultures, the latter of which is uniformly Islamic. Historically, Turkestan’s wealth was derived from its position on the great transcontinental trade routes, not

---

iv Austin Jersild in Orientalism and Empire (Montreal, 2002), 20–1, compares the French treatment of Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir, who resisted their expansion in Algeria in the 1830s and 40s, and the Russian treatment of Shamil. Both became celebrities after their capture. Some Russian officers, notably Prince A. I. Bariatinsky, even looked to the contemporary French campaigns in North Africa for inspiration during the wars in the Caucasus in the 1840s, 50s, and 60s, and forty years later the Islamophobe writer M. A. Miropiev expressed a belief that Muslims were better handled in Algeria: see D. Yaroshevsky, ‘Empire and Citizenship’, in Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples 1700–1917 ed. Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini, (Bloomington, 1997), 69–70; M. A. Miropiev, o Polozhenii Russkikh Inorodtsev (St Pb., 1901), 460–3.
from a manufacturing and agricultural base as in India. The chronology and method of the respective British and Russian annexations were in many ways dissimilar. The beginnings of British dominance in India can be dated from 1757, and conquest was motivated as much by commercial interests as by military and strategic concerns, and undertaken as a sort of ‘public–private partnership’, by a commercial company, with the British Crown in the background. The Russian conquest of Turkestan was, by contrast, an almost purely military undertaking, and very much a state enterprise. It was also very late, only really beginning with the fall of Tashkent in 1865, and some parts of the Pamirs were only annexed in the 1890s. Without sea barriers it was much harder to distinguish between metropolis and periphery in the Russian Empire. As far as its administration was concerned, there was no neat equivalent to the India Office in St Petersburg, and the Governor-General of Turkestan had considerably less autonomy than his Indian counterpart. By the late nineteenth century India was immensely valuable to Britain as a source of troops, over 200,000 of them, paid for by Indian taxes. In Turkestan the Russians did not recruit Muslims and paid for European garrisons from the centre. Finally there are the Slavic settlers, who after 1906 began pouring into Turkestan along the new railway lines in numbers never contemplated in India.

Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons both for writing a comparative study, and for choosing British India as the ‘control’ to Russian Turkestan. First and foremost, without some sort of comparison it is impossible to establish which aspects of Russian colonial rule in Central Asia were peculiarly and distinctively Russian, and which resemble those of the other European Empires. Secondly, the differing responses of colonial powers to what are often very similar problems of alien minority rule over large populations can shed a good deal of light on which imperial policies were dictated by ideology or influenced by metropolitan culture, and which were purely local and pragmatic.

The poor land communications between European Russia and Asia for most of this period render less pertinent one of the most obvious differences between the nineteenth century’s two greatest empires: that one was maritime and one continental. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and before the completion of the Transcaspian line to Samarkand in 1888, it took much longer to travel from Moscow or Petersburg to Tashkent than from London to Calcutta: even in 1897 it still took two weeks for the new Governor-General of Turkestan to
make the former journey. Before the advent of the railways, the sea was considered to be a highway, not a barrier, whilst land was the great obstacle, particularly in the case of Turkestan, cut off from Russia proper by a vast expanse of steppe that took months to cross, and by the howling wastes of the Kara-Kum and Kyzyl-Kum deserts.

The choice of Samarkand also makes the Indian comparison work rather better than might be expected. The Zarafshan Valley was densely populated, with only small numbers of nomads. Russian settlement remained lower in Turkestan than in any other Asiatic area of the Empire until the early 1900s, and even then almost all incomers were settled in the nomadic regions of Semirechie and Syr-Darya provinces, not in the irrigated and densely populated valleys to the south. Within India most of my examples are drawn from areas with a substantial Muslim population: the North-West Frontier, Punjab, Sindh, Delhi, and the Ganges–Jumna doab. These regions had strong economic and cultural ties to the settled regions of Central Asia before the colonial period. North-Western India, if not a wholly Muslim society, was certainly one with strong Islamic governmental and religious traditions. To an extent which is not sufficiently appreciated, commercial ties with Afghanistan and Turkestan were at least as strong, if not stronger, than those with the Ganges valley. Under the Mughals the two areas effectively shared a ruling elite and aristocratic culture— the Khans of Kokand, for instance, derived their legitimacy from their supposed descent from Babur. Religious ties also remained strong: the Naqshbandiya, whose founder was buried in the village of Qasr-e Arifan near Bukhara, were powerful among Indian Sufi brotherhoods, and Indian

v Varvara Dukhovskaya, Turkestansiya Vospominaniya (St Pb., 1913), 5–15.


vii Richard Foltz, Mughal India and Central Asia (Karachi, 1998).

Muslims had historically looked to Central Asia as a source of Islamic purity and orthodoxy, and continued to do so to some degree even in the nineteenth century when the Hedjaz became more important as a source of new Islamic ideas.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{x}} Punjab, Sindh, and the North-Western Provinces were areas acquired and held by military conquest rather than by commercial penetration. Their annexation came fairly late, between 1803 and 1849, in the case of Sindh and Punjab only twenty years before the Russian annexation of the settled areas of Turkestan. Even in areas with a low Muslim population, where the Mughal heritage was weak, the basic problems of a colonial administration remained the same: how to control an alien society, raise revenue, and administer justice without constant (and expensive) recourse to the bayonet upon which, ultimately, both regimes rested.

Given the weak tradition of writing about colonial empire in Central Asia, it seems sensible, rather than trying to reinvent the wheel, to look elsewhere for more developed historiographies of the encounters between European colonial powers and Asiatic peoples. Without a doubt the richest literature that exists in English relates to British rule in India. This book is heavily influenced by what is widely, if somewhat inaccurately, known as the ‘Cambridge School’ of South Asian history, which questions the assumption made by many ‘discourse theorists’ that western imperial power was always absolute, and its knowledge ‘hegemonic’,\textsuperscript{\textcircled{x}} and instead assigns a substantial role to local agency in determining the nature and effectiveness of imperial rule, whilst arguing for a degree of continuity between pre-colonial and imperial regimes.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{xi}}

Finally, as the opening quotation from Curzon suggests, comparison of the Russian and British Asiatic Empires is not a new idea. It was a powerful theme of the ‘Great Game’ literature of the mid-nineteenth century.


\textsuperscript{\textcircled{x}} See, for instance, Ronald Inden’s absurd Imagining India (Oxford, 1990), and for an extreme statement of this view Nicholas Dirks’s highly misleading foreword to Bernard Cohn’s excellent Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge (Princeton, 1996), pp. ix–xvii, together with his extraordinary rant in the conclusion to Castes of Mind (Princeton, 2001), 297–315.

\textsuperscript{\textcircled{xi}} For perhaps the most concise statement of this view applied to the British Raj, see Anil Seal, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in India’, MAS, 7: 3 (1973), 326–35; C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1988) synthesizes many of his earlier conclusions on this theme. See also D. A. Washbrook, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’, MAS, 15 (1981), 649–721.
century on both sides, as various participants and commentators assessed the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two empires squaring up to each other across the Pamirs and Afghanistan. The fact that they were immediate rivals in Central Asia meant that the confrontation generated a substantial comparative literature, the Russian side of which remains largely unused. The Russians desired global dominance, and were thwarted by Britain. The key to Britain’s power was universally acknowledged to be India, and hence it was to India that Russian military officers and officials turned their attention, seeking weaknesses to exploit and strengths to imitate. Lt-General Terentiev (1837–1909), the best-known historian of the Russian conquest of Turkestan, devoted an earlier book, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, to a comparison of the imperial aims and positions of Britain and Russia, with a ferocious refutation of much of the literature in English on the subject. General Annenkov’s (1835–99) pamphlet, *The Akhal-Tekke Oasis and the Road to India* also contained repeated comparisons of British and Russian policy in ruling Asiatic peoples, mostly unfavourable to the former. A. E. Snesarev (1865–1937) was a staff officer based in Tashkent who wrote on India and Afghanistan, and later became one of the Soviet Union’s leading Indologists: he travelled to India, and wrote a lengthy denunciation of British rule there. V. F. Novitsky (1869–1929), a captain in the Russian army who spent four months as a guest of the Indian army in 1888, wrote vividly about the social life of Indian army officers, as well as British military policy. Twenty years later Senator Count K. K. Pahlen produced a famous report on the state of the Turkestan region in the early 1900s, when its

---


xiii Gen. M. N. Annenkov, *Akhal-Tekhinskii Oazis i Puti k Indii* (St Pb., 1881); Mikhail Nikolaevich Annenkov was from the nobility of the Simbirsk Guberniya, and educated at the Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff. He took part in the Akhal-Tekke expedition of 1881, and was given charge of the construction of the Transcaspian Railway to Samarkand 1887–8. Baskhanov, *Voennye Vostokovedy*, 17.

xiv A. E. Snesarev, *Indiya kak Glavnyi Faktor v Sredne-Aziatskom Voprose* (St Pb., 1906). Snesarev, the son of a priest from Voronezh who, unusually, was educated at Moscow University as well as the General Staff Academy, was a Lt.-General by 1897, and served the Soviets after 1917. Baskhanov, *Voennye Vostokovedy*, 217–18.

xv V. F. Novitskii, *Voennye Ocherki Indii* (St Pb., 1899). Novitsky was from the nobility of Smolensk Guberniya, and educated at the Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff. By 1895 he was a Lt.-General, and he served in Manchuria and Siberia. In 1917 he voluntarily joined the Bolsheviks. Baskhanov, *Voennye Vostokovedy*, 172–3.
administration was notorious for corruption and incompetence: his recommendations for its reform were heavily influenced by the example of British India.\textsuperscript{xvi}

Curzon’s book is the most famous example of the comparative genre on the British side, but not the only one. Francis Skrine, for instance, also compared the colonial structures of the two powers, writing ‘That so much of the Russian edifice is built on Anglo-Indian models is the strongest proof of their intrinsic excellence. We were pioneers, and had difficulties to encounter with which our neighbours were never perplexed; they have profited by our experience and mistakes.’\textsuperscript{xvii} Skrine was himself an Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer, and was advancing this as an argument for resisting the demands of the Indian National Congress. However, most authors in English were more interested in assessing the potential military threat posed by Russia in Central Asia than in examining her colonial policies, and it was rare for them to imagine that Russia’s experiences in Turkestan held any lessons for British India. The British accused the Russians of brutality and crude indifference to the culture and civilization of the peoples of Turkestan, normally citing the massacre by General Skobelev of 15,000 Turcoman at Geok-Tepe in 1881, and his oft-quoted remark that ‘I hold it as a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards.’\textsuperscript{xviii} This was, to say the least, rather disingenuous, given the less than peaceful nature of the British conquest of India. British propaganda against the Russians specifically as colonial rulers was intended to dissuade the Indian population from rebelling in the dreaded event of a Russian invasion. As the exiled Maharajah Duleep Singh put it in a letter to Alexander III begging him to ‘deliver some 250,000,000 of my countrymen from the cruel yoke of the British Rule’: ‘The English have taken good care to fill the minds of the people of India (who are extremely ignorant) with false reports as to the oppressive nature of the Russian Rule.’\textsuperscript{xxi}


\textsuperscript{xvii} F. H. Skrine, and E. Denison Ross, \textit{The Heart of Asia} (London, 1899), 414.

\textsuperscript{xviii} This remark was originally made by Skobelev to the British journalist Charles Marvin in 1881 and recorded in the latter’s \textit{The Russian Advance Towards India} (London, 1882), 98–9; it was later repeated by, among others, Curzon, \textit{Russia in Central Asia}, 85.

Apart from Curzon, the most important book in English describing Russian Central Asia in this period is Eugene Schuyler’s *Turkistan*.xx The American consul at St Petersburg, Schuyler was an acute and well-informed observer, who enquired closely into the fledgling Russian administration which was being established under General von Kaufman when he made his journey in 1871–2. References to India litter the pages of his book, and he was well aware that he was witnessing a small part of the wider phenomenon of European conquest and expansion.

More of this material will appear in subsequent pages, but it is important not so much for the hard facts it contains about Turkestan, although some of these are useful, but because it reveals the way most contemporaries thought about the Russian Empire in Central Asia. British or Russian, French or American, they did not consider it to be *sui generis*, a bizarre and unique phenomenon, quite unlike the other western empires. They situated it firmly in the context of nineteenth-century European Imperialism, as another manifestation of Europe’s *mission civilisatrice*, if, perhaps, a more backward one.

It is only recently that this way of looking at Russian Imperialism has been rediscovered by historians; until 1991 provincial archives in the USSR were largely closed to foreign researchers, whilst from the 1940s onwards Soviet scholarship on Russian Imperialism was dominated by the idea of the ‘Great Friendship’ between the Russian and non-Russian peoples of the Empire, and the ‘Progressive Significance’ of Russian conquest.xxi Although the more obviously distorted arguments of the later Soviet school have now been discarded by English and Russian-speaking historians alike, comparisons of Russian Imperial rule with Western colonialism can still draw a hostile response from Russian scholars.xxxii Even in the West it has long been fashionable to argue that the Russian Empire was an entirely different beast from the European

---


xxxii See the review of Willard Sunderland’s *Taming the Wild Field* by V. I. Grachev and O. A. Rykin and my response to them in *Antropologicheskii Forum*, 6 (2007), 414–36; for an example of the unapologetic jingoism to be found in some branches of Russian historiography, see Evgenii Glushchenko, *Geroi Imperii. Portrety Rossiiskikh Kolonial’nykh Deyatelei* (Moscow, 2001).
colonial empires, a benevolent ‘Asianist’ polity where the harsh racial discrimination of British and French Imperialism was unknown. I have dealt with this issue more thoroughly elsewhere, but whilst no-one would deny that Russian Imperialism had many significant peculiarities, the bewildering heterogeneity of the Empire’s population was not reflected in the composition of its ruling elite, which was overwhelmingly European. In the Caucasus, the Far East, but most particularly in Turkestan, Russia’s colonial policies had many close parallels with those of the western European powers.

Since the 1990s the field of Russian Imperial history has been transformed, with a slew of new monographs and other publications, mostly issuing from American research programmes but also from Russia, which increasingly make some use of the historiography of the British and French Empires, even if explicit comparisons are still rare. Lately there has also been a revival of interest in Central Asia, and whilst, as Yuri Bregel put it in a paper that was bracingly contemptuous of most of the people who study this area, ‘it may or may not be a good thing’, the gloomy picture he painted then has now improved markedly, at least so far as the nineteenth century is concerned. Nevertheless, as

---


xxvii See above all Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Berkeley, 1997); Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe* (London, 2001); Daniel Brower,
Vladimir Bobrovnikov has recently pointed out, the system whereby Muslims were administered in nineteenth-century Central Asia remains ‘basically unstudied’ within Western scholarship, and I hope this book will go some way towards redressing this.

Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London, 2002); S. N. Abashin and V. I. Bushkov (eds), Ferganskaya Dolina (Moscow, 2004); J. F. Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923 (Bloomington, 2007). Sadly, for political reasons, little scholarship of value is being produced in Uzbekistan, and the political control exercised over publications there can be seen clearly in N. Abdurakhmanova and G. Rustamova, Kolonial’naya Sistema Vlasti v Turkestane (Tashkent, 1999), which begins with a quotation from Islam Karimov, whose name in defiance of alphabetic convention is carefully shunted to the beginning of the bibliography: the same treatment reserved for Marx and Lenin in Soviet times. The new historical textbook for schools, Zhumabo Rahimov, Istoriya Uzbekistana (Vtoraya Polovina XIX Veka—Nachalo XX Veka) Class 9 (Tashkent) 2001, attempts to portray the Khorezmshahs, Tamerlane, Babur, Emir Sayyid Muzaffar of Bukhara, the Jadid reformers, and the post-1917 Basmachi as an unbroken line of heroic ‘Uzbek’ nationalists engaged in a struggle for self-determination.

The Setting

BUKHARA AND KOKAND BEFORE THE CONQUEST

Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Central Asia have been little studied, reflecting a widespread feeling among historians that this was a period of cultural and political decline. The fall of the last Ashtarkhanid, Abu’l-Faiz Khan, in the wake of Nadir Shah’s invasion of Mawarannahr in 1737–47, and the rise of the Manghit, Ming, and Qonghrat Uzbek tribal dynasties in Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva, respectively, saw the extinction of Chingissid rule everywhere in Central Asia.¹ That, together with the decline of the East–West caravan trade in the wake of European maritime competition, seems to extinguish the glamour of the history of Transoxiana for most scholars.² Russian and Soviet historians of Central Asia tended to characterize the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a period of stagnation, de-urbanization, decay, and disruptive political chaos, requiring the firm hand of the Imperial power to restore stability and commercial prosperity.³

Bayly’s research in particular suggests that European perceptions of political and economic ‘chaos’ and ‘decline’ in eighteenth-century Asia following the collapse of Mughal, Safavid, and Ashtarkhanid authority after the ravages of Nadir Shah’s campaigns need to be carefully

¹ J. L. Lee, in The ‘Ancient Supremacy’. Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731–1901 (Leiden, 1996) refers to the Ming rulers of Maimuneh as Chingissids, but whilst they claimed Chingissid descent they were in fact an Uzbek tribal dynasty related to that in Kokand.
² The major recent exceptions are Anke von Kügelgen, Legitimatsiya Sredneaziatskoi Dinastii Mangitov (Almaty, 2004); Ron Sela, ‘Central Asia in the 18th century. The Age of Introspection’ (University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ph.D. thesis, 2004) and the work of Wolfgang Holzwarth, cited below.
re-appraised. Very often what seemed, or was represented by disgruntled European observers to be, ‘chaotic’ was actually evidence of considerable economic and political dynamism among post-Mughal successor states. The Mahratta Confederacy and Tippoo Sultan’s Mysore represented not only a military but also an economic threat to British interests in India, as they sought to develop their own control over commodities such as textiles and opium, or in Tippoo’s case to break Bombay’s dominance in the Malabar pepper trade. The East India Company’s campaigns during the Napoleonic Wars have to be seen not so much as a response to dangerous political chaos as a military solution to the fierce competition it faced from Mughal successor states which also espoused a policy of aggressive mercantilism.

Similarly, the unrelieved picture of chaos and decline in Central Asia requires some modification. Barthold refers to the depopulation of Khiva and Samarkand in the mid-eighteenth century, but he then goes on to chronicle the rise of the Khanate of Kokand, based on the fertile Ferghana Valley. His description of the nineteenth century in Turkestan is altogether much more positive, although he seems unwilling to pursue the implications of Kokand’s rise back to their origin in the eighteenth century: Kokand had only been re-founded in c.1740, and by 1867 it had 80,000 inhabitants and had been the capital of a new polity for over a hundred years. The state constructed and maintained a highly successful irrigation system based on the Syr-Darya, and revenues raised from this newly cultivable land were the source of much of Kokand’s wealth. The Khanate also benefited from preferential trading arrangements with the Chinese authorities in Kashgaria, where the Ch’ing had created what was, in effect, a free-trading area which also stimulated trade across the passes between Yarkand and Northern India. Between 1762 and 1821 the Kokand regime sent no fewer than forty-eight trading missions to China, some to Kashgar but many to Peking. Despite the attempted closure of the border by the Ch’ing in 1828–32, Kokandian trade with Eastern Turkestan continued to expand, and in the 1850s the Kokandi Aksakal who supervised the Khanate’s merchants in the region was still

---

4 C. A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars* (Cambridge, 1982).
6 Barthold, *A Short History*, 16.
a powerful figure; Chokan Valikhanov described how when he visited in 1858, ‘As Andijanis, we were entirely dependent on the Kokand Aksakal, who governs those foreigners who live in Kashgar and is independent, even having his own police.’ Indeed one of the envoys the Khanate sent to India in 1854 claimed that ‘Kashgâr originally belonged to Kokân’ and that the Aksakal was entitled to levy duty on all exports from Kashgar to Kokand. This was hyperbole, and Newby has shown clearly that the Ch’ing had not granted the Kokandis extraterritoriality or such extensive rights to collect customs dues, but it is a measure of Kokand’s self-confidence at the time. Further to the north Tashkent was the centre for trade across the Kazakh Steppe with Russia and Siberia and grew accordingly, becoming an independent city-state between 1784 and 1808 under the rule of Yunus Khoja. Bokhara remained the principal city and trading entrepôt of Turkestan throughout this period, and its population is normally estimated at 80,000–100,000.

Like the Mahratta confederacy and Mysore, the medium-sized Khanates which emerged in Turkestan in the mid-eighteenth century were reasonably successful states, which in the case of both Bukhara and Kokand were able to mobilize considerable resources to maintain irrigation schemes based on the Zarafshan and Syr-Darya rivers. Anticipating Bayly by almost thirty years, O. D. Chekhovich argued that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw not decline but a ‘process of progressive development’, although she was careful to qualify this by saying that all such advances were squandered in internecine warfare between the Khanates in the 1850s and 60s, thus rendering the ‘progressive’ Russian conquest necessary. She emphasized the new irrigation schemes in Ferghana and the construction of the Dargom Canal in the Zarafshan Valley, the growth of towns, and extensive trade with India, China, and Russia. She also argued that this period saw the gradual centralization of government in Bukhara, where Emir Nasrullah was able to break the power of the Uzbek tribes by creating a

10 NAI/Foreign/S.C./24 November 1854/Nos. 1–22, Account of the Khanate of Kokand, 15–16.
11 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 193–9.
12 Yu. A. Sokolov, Tashkent, Tashkentsy i Rossii (Tashkent, 1965), 32–100. Characteristically he still refers to this as a period of ‘decline’.
standing army. Holzwarth has argued that this drive towards military centralization has its roots in the admiration of the Bukharans for the ruthless military order represented by Nadirid Iran, which made a considerable impression on the first Manghit ruler, Muhammad Rahim (upon whom Bukhari claims Nadir Shah bestowed the title ‘Khan’), and would later lead to Emir Nasrullah’s policy of sidelining the Uzbek tribal elite in favour of Shia ‘Iranis’, causing considerable resentment among the former. In India the East India Company’s well-disciplined forces were a likelier model, but whatever the precise inspiration, in both India and Central Asia the early nineteenth century saw a shift from military structures based on landholding in return for service (a jaghir in Mughal parlance) to a centrally controlled, raised, and funded army centred on well-drilled infantry and artillery. The leading Indian example was the creation of the formidable Sikh Khalsa by Ranjit Singh in Punjab, and on a smaller scale the same thing was happening in Bukhara, where the Uzbek tribal cavalry was being gradually ousted by the foot-soldier or Sarbaz, trained by Anglo-Indian and Iranian adventurers. According to Nazir Kheirullah, the British letter-writer in Kabul, Bukhara’s crushing defeat of Kokand in 1852 was largely thanks to ‘the presence of a single Regiment of Infantry raised & commanded by an adventurer from Hindoostan called Abdool Summud Khan, who had formerly served under some of the French Officers in the Punjab’. Presumably this is the ‘Abdul-Samet’ whom Khanikoff describes as a Persian military adventurer from Tabriz, who entered Bukharan service after making India and Afghanistan too hot to hold him: ‘he persuaded the Amir to introduce regular troops into the country, and by that means gained such an ascendancy over Nasr-Ullah, that at present he is one of the most influential men in the Khanat [sic].’ Burnes also refers to a deserter from the 24th Bengal Native Infantry (who had formerly

16 Wolfgang Holzwarth, ‘Relations between Uzbek Central Asia, the Great Steppe and Iran, 1700–1750’, in Leder and Streck (eds.), Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations (Wiesbaden, 2005), 201–4.
served the ruler of Kunduz as a gunner) being in Bukharan Service in 1833.\textsuperscript{20} The Ming Dynasty in Kokand was not far behind: in 1854 Khudoyar Khan sent an embassy to the East India Company to request military assistance against the Russians which was led by Shahzadeh Sultan Muhammad Khan, a Sudozai prince who had fled to Kokand from Kabul after Shah Shuja’s death and the disastrous retreat of the Army of the Indus in the First Afghan War. He reported that Khudoyar already had two battalions of troops with European training.\textsuperscript{21} Among these men may have been Jemadar Na’ib, a former Sepoy of Ranjit Singh’s army who left Punjab after its annexation by the British in 1849. From 1860 to 1865 he commanded Kokand’s artillery, later serving Yakub Beg in the same capacity in Kashgar, before retiring to his native Peshawar in the late 1870s after the fall of Khudoyar Khan (who by 1869 also had a Cossack called Vlasov serving him as a cavalry drill-master).\textsuperscript{22} Although invaded by Bukhara in 1842 and again in 1852, Kokand had been extending its authority in the Steppe from the early nineteenth century, first conquering Tashkent (in 1808),\textsuperscript{23} and then drawing Aulie-Ata, Chimkent, Turkestan, and Ak-Masjid into its orbit: a long and, as it turned out, vulnerable line of towns strung out along the Syr-Darya towards the Aral Sea. Kokand also sought to establish a degree of control among the Kirghiz and Kazakhs by establishing forts such as Pishpek in nomadic regions (in this particular case in an area nominally under Chinese sovereignty),\textsuperscript{24} in a fashion rather similar to that of the Russians themselves further north.\textsuperscript{25} Thus both Bukhara and Kokand were aggressive, expansionist States in this period, but their reformed armies would prove no match for the Russian forces. Without wishing to ape Soviet historiography to too great an extent, it is clear that both States were weakened by the wars they fought against each other, whilst Kokand suffered from chronic internal instability following Emir Nasrullah’s brief conquest of the Khanate in 1842. Mussulman Quli, a leader of the semi-nomadic Kipchaks, seized power in 1844, setting

\textsuperscript{21} NAI/Foreign/S.C./24 November 1854/Nos. 1–22, 235.
\textsuperscript{22} Beisembiev, \textit{The Life of Alimqul}, 64; A. P. Khoroshkhin, \textit{Sbornik Statei Kasat-chik hya do Turkestanskogo Kraya} (St Pб., 1876), 57.
\textsuperscript{23} See O. D. Chekhovich, ‘Skazanie o Tashkente (1808)’, \textit{PPV} (Moscow, 1970), 173–6 for an account of the fall of Tashkent to Kokand, a short translated extract from the \textit{Tā’rikh-e Jadideh-yé Tashkand}.
\textsuperscript{24} Newby, \textit{The Empire and the Khanate}, 200–1.
\textsuperscript{25} See V. M. Ploskikh, \textit{Kirigizy i Kokandskoe Khanstvo} (Frunze, 1977), 140–56. There are some rather jolly pictures.
up a Kipchak ascendancy over the sedentary ‘Sarts’ of the Ferghana Valley which lasted for eight years, before being overthrown in a general massacre in 1852 which saw Khudoyar Khan restored to the throne.²⁶

This rivalry and bloodshed was in full swing even as the Russian threat grew, as can be clearly seen in the *Life of Alimqul*, where in 1852 Yakub Beg, having helped to repel the first Russian assault on Ak-Masjid, almost immediately returned to Ferghana in order to participate in the slaughter of the Kipchaks which brought Khudoyar Khan to power. Ten years later, however, Alimqul was fighting to place Khudoyar Khan’s brother, Malla Khan (reigned 1862–4), on the throne; following Malla Khan’s murder (by a Kipchak) in 1864, Alimqul spent more time fighting Khudoyar Khan than the Russians.²⁷

Internal administration, taxation, and the composition of elites within the two Khanates are covered in Chapter 3, but it is worth noting that Kokand and Bukhara had quite similar structures of government and revenue collection, unsurprising given the Ferghana region’s experience of Bukharan rule in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The principal difference lay in the much greater numbers of nomads under Kokandian authority, but the only portion of the latter Khanate which concerns us here is the territory around Khujand and Ura-Tepe, where nomads were relatively few and the patterns of settlement, irrigation, and agriculture resembled those in the Zarafshan Valley around Samarkand.

**THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST**

Many contemporary Russian historians, notably Terentiev, began their accounts of the conquest of Turkestan with a description of the fall of Kazan in 1552, representing the moment when the Muscovite State began to kick back against the ‘Tatar yoke’.²⁸ The long-term effects


of domination by the Golden Horde on the Russian psyche are too speculative to be relevant to this study,²⁹ but many officers certainly thought that their campaigns in Central Asia were a form of revenge for this earlier humiliation. The defeat and conquest of the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberian Khanates were held to be the first steps on the road to Russia’s emergence as a European power in Asia, extending the boundaries of western civilization, and holding the line against the Asiatic barbarians of the steppes. Russia had been moving south into the steppe from Orenburg and Orsk since the early eighteenth century, and Peter the Great had mounted a disastrous expedition against Khiva under Prince Bekovitch-Cherkassky in 1714–17.³⁰ However, the first of the three Khanates to suffer serious military defeat at the hands of the Russians was Kokand. By the 1830s, ‘In the area of Aq Masdjid Russian soldiers and subjects came in contact with Kokand warriors and subjects. Animosity erupted between the families of common people. The basis of friendship [between Russia and Kokand] suffered great harm.’³¹ This prompted Muhammad Ali Khan (the then ruler of Kokand) to send an unsuccessful embassy to St Petersburg in 1831. In 1847 the Russians founded Fort Raim (or Rahim) at the mouth of the Syr-Darya, and in 1852 Colonel I. F. Blaramberg mounted an unsuccessful attack on the Kokandian fortress of Ak-Masjid, which was beaten off by Yakub Beg, later to become famous as the Amir of Kashgar. In July 1853 Ak-Masjid finally fell to a force under Count Perovsky.³² This setback prompted Khudoyar Khan to send Shahzadeh Sultan Muhammad Khan’s 1854 embassy to the British at Peshawar.

Although personally impressed by Sultan Muhammad Khan when he interviewed him at Murree, Sir John Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of Punjab, was implacably opposed to the ‘Forward School’ of British frontier thinking, and refused Khudoyar Khan’s requests for military and technical assistance against the ‘budmash’ (blackguard) Russians, although it is possible that the 1866 mission of Mehta Sher Singh was a belated response to this embassy.³³ In the event, the

²⁹ See Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field*, 106–7, for a brief discussion.
³² Ibid., 39.
Crimean War would delay the Russian advance by almost a decade, but in any case it may well be that Khudoyar Khan was more concerned with acquiring Anglo-Indian expertise for a war against Bukhara. The Russian campaigns in Central Asia resumed in earnest in 1864, when the order was given to unite the Siberian and Orenburg lines of forts across the steppe, leading to the fall of Chimkent and Aulie-Ata to General Mikhail Grigorievich Cherniaev (1828–98) despite fierce resistance from the Kipchak armies of Kokand. Their commander, Alimqul, was slain during a reconnaissance mission not long after Cherniaev’s initial, unsuccessful assault on Tashkent, and without his inspirational leadership the city fell easily to a second attack in June 1865, marking the beginning of the conquest of the settled oases of Turkestan.³⁴

Early in 1866 the Russians encountered a brief setback at Djizak, where they initially retreated before what General Cherniaev thought was an overwhelming Bukharan force manning the walls of the citadel (news of this led to his recall).³⁵ As Ahmad Donish wrote: ‘They knew from their books of the might of Timur and the strength of the Uzbek army’, and it was because of this undeserved reputation, he suggests, that they had failed to appreciate how ill-armed and ill-disciplined the Bukharan army actually was. When General D. I. Romanovsky attacked the Bukharans four months later at Irdjar, the result was a rout, as Emir Sayyid Muzaffar (who had been playing chess beneath a ceremonial umbrella) was forced to abandon his (extensive) wardrobe as he took to flight.³⁶ In 1867, after Khujand had been taken from Kokand and Djizak from Bukhara, a new Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was separated from the steppe Governor-Generalship of Orenburg, consisting initially of just two Provinces, Syr-Darya and Semirechie, with the administrative capital at Tashkent.³⁷

³⁵ Mackenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, 82–3.
³⁷ PSZ Sob. 2 Vol. XLII Ord.1 (1867), No. 44, 831; there is no space here for a detailed discussion of why the Russians chose Tashkent as their capital, but it had been the terminal point for caravans from Orenburg since the early eighteenth century and its wealth was renowned. Soviet historians claim that in 1794 the independent ruler of the city, Yunus Khoja, sought Catherine the Great’s ‘protection’, and certainly there was quite a long history of diplomatic relations. See F. Azadaev, Tashkent vo Vtoroi Polovine XIX Veka (Tashkent, 1959), 14–15; see also Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 12–21.
Adjutant-General Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman (1818–82) was made the first Governor-General.³⁸ This was followed by the Russian subjugation of the remainder of the Khanate of Kokand, reducing it to a rump in the Ferghana Valley by 1868. Samarkand was taken from Bukhara in the same year, when the citadel was stormed by a force under Colonel A. K. Abramov (1836–86), who had already distinguished himself under Cherniaev at Tashkent. He was to be promoted to Major-General, and eventually made the first Nachalnik (Commandant) of the military Okrug (District) which the Russians established along the course of the River Zarafshan.

Notwithstanding the humiliation of losing Samarkand, the Emir of Bukhara was left with great latitude in domestic affairs, and even some independence in foreign policy. He was permitted to communicate directly with the Tsar, rather than through the agency of the Governor-General of Turkestan, and officially he ranked higher than the Governor-General in the table of ranks. As Ahmad Donish shrewdly observed, administering Bukhara indirectly saved the Russians a good deal of trouble and expense.³⁹ Khiva, which unlike Bukhara did not capitulate to Russian demands for trading concessions and the release of slaves until General von Kaufman’s troops were at the gates of the capital, had harsher terms imposed on it in 1872–3, and lost all its territory on the eastern bank of the Oxus. The Kokand Khanate was abolished altogether after a rebellion in 1875 and became the Ferghana Province of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship. Thereafter the administrative divisions of Russian Central Asia assumed a reasonably settled pattern, with a clear distinction between Russian Turkestan and the two protectorates. There was no parallel anywhere else in the Russian Empire for the method of indirect rule adopted in Bukhara and Khiva, which resembled nothing so much as the princely states in India, by which it may well have been inspired.

The principal changes to these arrangements came with the conquest of Transcaspia in the 1880s, beginning with a severe reverse for Russian forces under General Lomakin at Denghil-Tepe in 1879, followed by

³⁸ Von Kaufman’s family was of Austrian origin, but had been in Russian service for over a hundred years and had long since converted to Orthodoxy. He was an engineer by training, and had distinguished himself at the siege of Kars during the Crimean War. See D. V. Vasil’ev, ‘Ustroitel’ Turkestanskogo kraya (k biografii K. P. fon-Kaufmana) SROI, 5 (153) (Moscow) (2002), 45–57; A. A. Polovtsov (ed.), ‘Kaufman’, Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar’, Ibak—Klyucharev (St Pb., 1897).

³⁹ Donish, Istorinya Mangitskoi Dinastii, 80.
General Skobelev’s bloody victory at Geok-Tepe in 1881, culminating in the annexation of Merv and Pendjeh in 1885 and the concurrent construction of the Transcaspian Railway, which had reached Samarkand by 1888. The commercial and demographic consequences of this military move were very considerable, as it became possible to send large quantities of cotton from Krasnovodsk to Baku and Astrakhan, and Russian colonies grew up along the line. Although Transcaspia was initially administered from Tiflis under the Governor-Generalship of the Caucasus, and there were self-interested moves by its officials to render it a completely autonomous Governor-Generalship, by the 1890s the region had been subordinated to Tashkent. In 1894 Bukhara was incorporated into the Russian customs and fiscal boundary, cutting off the last of the steadily dwindling trickle of imports from British India. Although there were serious riots over sanitary measures for the control of a cholera outbreak in Tashkent in 1892, the most significant violent challenge to Russian rule before the turmoil of the war years was the Andijan uprising of 1898 when an Ishan from Ming-Tepe in the Ferghana Valley led his Murids (followers) in an ill-coordinated attack on the Russian garrison. Twenty-two soldiers were killed and twenty wounded, but the uprising had already been suppressed by the time the news reached Tashkent. It provoked a bout of soul-searching among Turkestan’s administrators out of all proportion to its seriousness, but despite this few lessons were learned. This became apparent in 1916, when most of Turkestan was convulsed by a mass uprising. Initially provoked by discontent at an Imperial ukaz conscripting Central Asians into labour battalions, it rapidly transformed into a violent rebellion aimed at expelling Slavic peasant settlers, with whom the nomadic population in particular competed for land and water resources. Its brutal suppression by the colonial administration and the settlers was almost the last act of the ancien régime in Turkestan.

---

42 A Persian honorific (literally ‘they’) characteristically applied in Central Asia to Sufi spiritual leaders.
43 ‘Bezporyadki v Fergane’, *TV*, 21 May 1898, No. 37; V. P. Sal’kov, ‘Andizhanskoie Vostanie’ v 1896g (Kazan, 1901). 64.
44 The standard, highly circumspect Soviet work on the Revolt is Kh. Tursunov, *Vostanie 1916g v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane* (Tashkent, 1962); we await an up-to-date English account.
The capture and subsequent occupation of Samarkand were of particular significance to the Russians; von Kaufman saw himself as following in Alexander’s footsteps by taking ‘Marakanda’, and they were well aware of the city’s imperial, Timurid heritage—as one traveller put it, ‘Samarkand is the Moscow of Central Asia’.⁴⁵ According to the Bukharan historian (and eyewitness) Sami, in 1868 the inhabitants despatched a letter to von Kaufman asking for the Russians to take Samarkand, as they were suffering so much from the brutality of Shir Ali Inaq, the Shia Hakem (Governor) and commander whom the Emir had placed in charge of the city’s defence. Subsequent events shed some doubts on this tale, but Sami does describe von Kaufman being welcomed by the city’s Aksakals as he entered through the Shah-e Zindah gate, whereupon he exempted the Samarkand region from taxes for a year, a promise he subsequently reneged upon.⁴⁶ The city also provided the Russians with one of the more important heroic epics of the conquest.

Initially Samarkand fell almost without a struggle, but von Kaufman then moved on to confront the Bukharan army at the Zerabulak heights near Katta-Kurgan, leaving behind a garrison of just 500 men under Baron Shtempel. While the Bukharans were soundly defeated,⁴⁷ the Bek⁴⁸ of Shahrisabz and Kitab, together with ‘Abd al-Malik Tura,⁴⁹ the rebellious elder son of the Emir Muzaffar, took advantage of Russian weakness in Samarkand to lead a large force from Ghusar over the pass

---

⁴⁵ V. V. Krestovskii, V gostyakh u Emira Bukharskogo (St Pb., 1887), 46.
⁴⁷ N. N. Karazin, an officer who served in Turkestan, wrote a decent short story about the battle, recently republished as ‘Zarabulakskie Vysoty’, *Pogonya za Nazhivoi* (St Pb., 1993), 471–501; Sami describes how ‘most of the Muslims, as usual, preferred flight’, *Ta’rikh-i Salatin-i Mangiitia*, trans. 86–7. He also believed that it was only the siege of Samarkand and von Kaufman’s consequent hasty retreat which prevented the fall of the Emirate altogether.
⁴⁸ Bec—a governor, or, in this case, a semi-independent ruler.
⁴⁹ Tura—a polite form of address (the equivalent of ‘Sahib’), which was habitually used for the sons of the Emir, in this case the eldest, ‘Abd al-Malik, the rebellious Hakem of Ghusar.
between the cities and besiege the citadel, and they were joined by many of the townsfolk. Sami’s account is vivid:

The Governor with the main Russian Force was facing the Bukharan Army at Katta-Kurgan. A small portion of the Russian force was left in Samarkand, which was surrounded in the citadel together with a group of Samarkand Jews and Iranians. The army of the \textit{Tura}, having seized the approaches to the fortress, placed it under siege. At that time \textit{Ishan} Omar Khan Makhdum-e Azami\textsuperscript{50} arrived with a large force, and joined with the \textit{Tura’s} forces. Many people from the tribes of the Kitai-Kipchaks and Karakalpaks, together with the Samarkand Tajiks also concluded an agreement [with the \textit{Tura}] to unite and tried to restrain the besieged and destroy the fortress wall. Over three days and nights they breached [the walls] in a few places, and some heroes fought through the breaches [in the fortress], until fickle fate changed once more and played a trick, which was the reason for the flight of the Muslims and the salvation of the besieged. The \textit{Tura} and the army were forced to leave the fortress and set off for Shahrisabz. Such a throng [of people], the number of whom could not be calculated, and such bravery and daring which is beyond the bounds of description,—[all] at once grew confused, dispersed and disappeared.\textsuperscript{51}

One officer who fought the Bukharans at Zerabulak described how, almost as soon as the battle was won, a message in German from Shtemple was brought to von Kaufman by a Persian slave from Samarkand, informing him that they had already beaten off five attempted stormings, and lost 210 men killed or wounded, almost half the garrison. The force had to march back as quickly as possible to relieve them. They arrived in time, and according to Muhammad Salih were once again welcomed at the Shah-e Zindah gate of the city by the group of Iranians who had taken refuge with the garrison in the citadel—if the inhabitants had hoped that the Russian arrival would end the temporary Shia ascendancy in the city, they were sorely mistaken. Part of the bazaar was then burned to the ground as a reprisal for the attack, whilst ‘Abd al-Malik Tura fled to Afghanistan and eventually ended his days in Peshawar.\textsuperscript{52} The hero of the siege had been a drunken, good-for-nothing Lt- Colonel called Nazarov, who was previously best known for losing most of his pay at cards, but had proved to be a lion in battle and was

\textsuperscript{50} A scion of the powerful Makhdumzada lineage of \textit{Khojas} whose founder, Sayyid Muhammad Kasani Makhdum-e Azam, was buried in the village of Dahbid near Samarkand. See N. I. Veselovskii, ‘Dagbid’, \textit{ZVOIRAO}, 2 (1888), 85.

\textsuperscript{51} Sami, \textit{Ta'rikh-i Salatin-i Manghittiya}, trans. 85.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{ZSp Ta’rikh-e Jadideh-ye Tashkand} ff 45\textsuperscript{a}–45\textsuperscript{b}. See the full quotation before the dedication on p. vii.
decorated for it, as were many other officers. Among those who took part in the siege was the young artist Vasilii Vereshchagin (1842–1904), then an ensign in one of the Orenburg line regiments and a protégé of von Kaufman. Thirty years later he wrote a vivid account, replete with incidents of heroism, in which, among other things, he claims to have reprimanded two soldiers who were grumbling at von Kaufman’s lack of judgement in leaving the citadel so lightly garrisoned. If another source is to be believed, he passed on their sentiments to von Kaufman in forthright terms:

The conduct of Vereshchagin, the artist who was in Samarkand, occasioned considerable surprise. This individual is remarkable both for his bravery and for his eccentricity. When upon his return Kaufman addressed himself with kindness to Vereshchagin, the latter replied ‘Everyone here has been cursing you from first to last.’ What? Why? ‘Because you abandoned the citadel without reinforcing it.’

Unfortunately the name of the officer who wrote this letter (the main purpose of which was an attempt to get a transfer back to St Petersburg) is unknown. Whilst he admired Abramov’s courage and cool-headedness in battle, like Vereshchagin he was highly critical of von Kaufman’s military judgement in leaving Samarkand so lightly garrisoned, and considered that had the citadel fallen it might have been the signal for a general uprising throughout Turkestan. He accused the general of being heavily under the influence of a disgraced adventurer called Pistolkors, who had urged von Kaufman to press on to Katta-Kurgan, leaving Samarkand exposed. If not quite as important to the Russians as the siege of Lucknow was to the British, the attack on the Samarkand citadel gave the military in Central Asia a heroic narrative of their own,

53 V. V. Vereshchagin, Na Voine v Azii i Evrope. Vospominaniya Khudozhnika (Moscow, 1894), 12–13; a remarkable figure in nineteenth-century Russian art, Vereshchagin was a great favourite of von Kaufman, and the General arranged for an exhibition of his paintings of the Turkestan campaign in St Petersburg in 1874 and the subsequent publication of a lavish album of prints. He courted controversy because of the stark anti-war message of much of his work (Miliutin remarked upon the furore surrounding an exhibition of his pictures in 1880), and eventually drowned on board the battleship Petropavlovsk during the Russo–Japanese War. See P. A. Zaionchkovskii (ed.), Dnevnik D. A. Milyutina, Vol. III (1878–80) (Moscow, 1950), 235; V. Sadoven’, V. V. Vereshchagin (Moscow, 1950).

54 RGIA Fond 954 Op.1 D.336 ‘Pis’mo Ofitsera (Familiya neustanovlena) s opisaniem voennykh deistviy otryada Konst. Petr. fon Kaufmana.’, 11ob.

55 Ibid., 1–4; Lt-Col. Pistolkors had been Cherniaev’s subordinate in Tashkent.

56 Skrine makes this comparison. See The Heart of Asia, 395.
and instilled a deep suspicion of the ‘fanatical’ townsfolk of the city who had lent their support to the Shahrisabz forces. The Russians survived, albeit by the skin of their teeth, and the loss of Samarkand was a heavy blow to the Emir of Bukhara which forced him to sue for terms. Possession of the city meant that the headwaters of the Zarafshan, upon which Bukhara depended, were now in the Zarafshan Okrug (later Samarkand Province) in Russian territory. In 1869, in retaliation for the attack on the Samarkand garrison, General Abramov led a column over the pass through the Zarafshan Mountains to the south of the city in order to attack Kitab and Shahrisabz, whose rulers, Jura-Bek and Baba-Bek, had assisted ‘Abd al-Malik. Having defeated their forces and forced the two Beks to flee to Kokand (they would eventually be reconciled to Russian rule and given honorary military rank), Abramov, on von Kaufman’s instructions, handed over the Shahrisabz region to Emir Sayyid Muzaffar of Bukhara rather than making a further annexation. A contemporary Persian account states that in thus destroying Shahrisabz’s independence the Nim-Padshah (‘Half-Emperor’ i.e. the Governor-General, von Kaufman) had succeeded in doing what no Bukharan Emir had managed over the previous eighty-seven years. It put the Russian relationship with Bukhara on a more amicable footing.⁵⁷

The arrangement with Bukhara was formalized in a treaty of 1873, whereby Russia was permitted to maintain a diplomatic representative and commercial agent at Bukhara (in 1885 this became a political agent or resident, ending the fiction of Bukhara’s autonomy). Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the Zarafshan Military Okrug to be a temporary acquisition that might yet be returned to Bukhara: the Emir indeed still entertained hopes of regaining Samarkand in the late 1870s. Nevertheless, although it was not formally incorporated in the empire until Samarkand Province was created in 1886, von Kaufman stated very early on that there was no question that Samarkand and the valley of the Zarafshan must be permanently annexed,⁵⁸ and by 1873 N. A. Maev, another junior officer, was able to describe a city slowly adjusting to the Russian presence, which already appeared increasingly permanent:

The bazaar, a portion of which was razed and burnt as a punishment for the treacherous attack by the Samarkandis on the Russian forces, has now been

⁵⁷ ZSp AV F.33 Op.1 D.142 ‘Rasskaz o praviteyakh Shakhrisyabza pered russkim zavoevaniem (usl.)’
rebuilt. It is much improved, cleaner and more open than it was before. It no longer has those narrow, filthy alleyways; its streets are wide, its shops spacious and light. Around the whole citadel a wide esplanade has been laid out, to give a clear field of fire over the town, should there be another attack. The citadel itself was transformed after its capture by the Russian forces. Now a small Russian settlement has grown up within it, or more accurately a military colony . . . the house of the former Samarkand Bek has been turned into quarters for the Nachalnik of the Zarafshan Okrug, Major-General Abramov. The officers and other serving individuals are accommodated in other buildings, swiftly re-made in the European manner. The mosques⁵⁹ have been turned into various storehouses, and the walls of the citadel bristle threateningly with Russian weapons, whilst the white tunics and kepis of the sentries are visible. Everything has changed; everything has taken on a new appearance, quite different from its former aspect.⁶⁰

An early resident of this little Russian enclave in the Fort described the various shifts and improvisations of social life in 1868–71, before the new Russian quarter was laid out next to the old city. These consisted largely of evening promenades around the small wooden church, together with dances, amateur theatricals to raise money for a library and reading-room, billiards in the Hotel ‘Bukhara’, and picnics around the monuments of the old city. He also referred to an explosion in the number of native brothels once the Russians arrived, claiming that this was welcomed enthusiastically by Samarkandi men in search of tea, music, and other amusements.⁶¹ In 1871 Eugene Schuyler described the beginnings of the new Russian quarter ‘gradually springing up’ amidst ‘dust and confusion’,⁶² alongside the old city whose sacred geography of mosques, madrasahs, and the tombs of saints was so vividly described in his Samariya by Abu Tahir Khoja. As in Tashkent, the tree-lined boulevards and squares of Russian Samarkand were held up as a shining example of European civilization, contrasted with the

⁵⁹ Possibly madrasahs or tombs. The Russians at this stage tended to assume that any building with a dome or iwan was a mosque.
⁶⁰ N. Maev, ‘Dzhizak i Samarkand. Putevyya Zametki’, Materialy dlya statistiki Turkestanskogo Kraya Vyp.II (St Pb., 1873), in TS, 52 (1873), 15. Nikolai Alexandrovich Maev (1835–96) was a military statistician, geographer, and ethnographer who was the Secretary of the Turkestan Statistical Commission, organizer of the Turkestan Public Library and Museum, edited Turkestanskiya Vedomosti from 1869 to 1892, and ended his career as a Major-General: Baskhanov, Voennye Vostokovedy, 149–50.
⁶¹ ‘Prokhorech’, ‘Russkaya zemlya–Samarkand’ (Moscow, 1872), 26–8, 55.
‘dark and dirty alleyways’ of the native city.⁶³ The main public buildings of the Russian town were the Officers’ Club, the wooden church with its blue domes relieved with gold stars (rebuilt in brick in 1898),⁶⁴ and the long, low white bungalow which was the residence of the Governor of the Okrug and today houses the Samarkand urban Hakimiyat. This lies on the principal thoroughfare, Abramovsky Boulevard, which runs almost to Timur’s mausoleum, the Gur-e Amir, on the fringes of the old city: the pre-revolutionary name is still used by some of Samarkand’s inhabitants. Originally it terminated at the new fortress, the construction of which in 1880 entailed the demolition of the mausoleum of Sheikh Nur ud-din Basira and the transfer of his relics

⁶³ Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 85–7; ‘S’, ‘Samarkand pri Tamerlane’ TV, 10 January 1889, No. 2.
The Setting

to a new shrine on the Afrosiab mound next to the Tashkent road. Apart from this and the burning of the bazaar in 1868, the Russians were reasonably solicitous of the old town of Samarkand and regarded its many monuments with considerable interest. However, it was not until 1899 (at the urging of N. I. Veselovsky) that the Imperial Archaeological Commission took any steps for the preservation of the Gur-e Amir, the madrasahs of the Registan, and the Bibi-Khanym mosque, the latter of which had been badly damaged in a recent earthquake.

With the arrival of the Transcaspian Railway in 1888 (a cause of great local celebration) Samarkand became, for a while, the most dynamic town in Russian Turkestan, benefiting from the fact that the railway was not extended to Tashkent until 1899. This period coincided with the Governorship of Count N. Ya. Rostovtsov, who, notwithstanding an odd belief in the effectiveness of homeopathy to treat his asthma and fever (he died of gangrene in his right leg in 1897, at the age of 65), was much the most effective and energetic Military Governor Samarkand had before 1917. He created the Hill Station and sanatorium of Kara-Tepe in the nearby Zarafshan Mountains, helped to found Turkestan’s first non-Government newspaper, Okraina, and encouraged business development. He was also active in establishing new Russian peasant settlements in the region (one, near Djizak, was named after him). This period also saw the initiation of the Spravochnaya Knizhka Samarkandskoj Oblasti, a provincial gazetteer which appeared annually throughout the 1890s, together with a flurry of related statistical publications of doubtful accuracy produced by the Samarkand Provincial Statistical Committee and the newly established Land Tax Commission. Aside from the railway and its workshops, industrial growth in the city was quite limited. By the late 1890s

---

65 Veselovskii (ed.), Samariya, Introduction, p. vii. A photograph and plan of the mausoleum (which was blown up with gunpowder) can be found at the beginning of the introduction.
68 Sahadeo erroneously indicates that Okraina was published in Tashkent—Russian Colonial Society, 5, 68; see Yu. O. Yakubovskii, ‘Graf Nikolai Yakovlevich Rostovtsov’, Russkii Turkestan (Sbornik) Vol. I (Tashkent, 1899), 58–63; despite Rostovtsov’s blessing, by 1892 the censor was already complaining that Okraina published too many articles that were critical of Government policy and publications: TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.4,290, 4–5, 9–10.
Samarkand had 111 factories, employing just 1,718 workers. A third of these were cotton-cleaning enterprises, whilst the remainder were mostly connected with food and drink: the city also developed a name for producing alcohol, the Otto Bogau brewery and the Filatov distillery being perhaps its best-known businesses. As well as a large number of public brothels (prostitution was legal in the Russian Empire, and Samarkand had 15 registered prostitutes in the Russian town and 234 in the old city in 1900), Russian Samarkand also boasted an ill-reputed Café-Chantant in the ‘Grand-Ottel’ on Alexandrovskaya Street, the centrepiece of a neighbourhood of beer bars, frequented by Sarts and lower class Russians alike. By the early twentieth century Samarkand had acquired a fairly large and increasingly radicalized population of Russian railway-workers, whose mouthpiece was the Socialist newspaper Samarkand, which began publication in 1906 when the censorship laws were relaxed and through various strategic changes of name managed to keep going for over a year. From the articles and correspondence of this and other newspapers, most obviously the official Turkestanskiya Vedomosti, emerges a vivid picture of a Russian community in Samarkand seeking to recreate elements of European civilization in the heart of Central Asia, with a music society, library, theatre, and bicycling club by the eve of the First World War—in 1906 one of Samarkand’s correspondents was complaining of cyclists riding along the pavements in the city and pushing pedestrians into the aryks (irrigation canals) that ran alongside them, a commonplace lament which would not look out of place in any European local paper today, but with one telling Central Asiatic detail. Although this is neither an urban history nor a study of Russian settler society (something which has been accomplished admirably by Jeff Sahadeo in his book on Tashkent), this transformation of the city since its fall to von Kaufman in 1868 should always be borne in mind.

---

72 Thus at various times the paper appeared as Russkii Samarkand, Novyi Samarkand, and Zeravshan-Samarkand.
73 Samarkand, No. 88 (21 July 1906).
Map 2. Samarkand in 1914, showing clearly the division between the Russian and ‘native’ city. Karl Baedeker, Russia (1914), facing p. 517.
RUSSIA’S AIMS IN TURKESTAN

The motives behind the Russian conquest were mixed, but not obscure. The Marxist-Leninist argument was always that the Russian generals conquered Turkestan at the behest of capitalist interests, to provide a captive market for Russian manufactured goods and a secure source of raw cotton for the Moscow textile mills.\(^75\) Whilst Central Asia did indeed play the role of a colony in that sense after the conquest, to suggest that this was the original motivation for it is grossly to overestimate the influence of Russia’s weak commercial class on the apparatus of the State, which as a rule was wholly unresponsive to its concerns.\(^76\) Famously, it was securing Russia’s steppe frontier which provided Prince Gorchakov with a justification for Russian expansion to present to the British Foreign Office, as he announced in his famous ‘note’ of 1864, which claimed that Russia was being inexorably drawn into Central Asia against her will owing to the troublesome nomadic tribes on her frontiers.\(^77\) At the time this was dismissed by British diplomats and the press as a cynical ploy to cover up Russian mendacity, especially after the further annexations which took place in 1865–8,\(^78\) but in fact there was a good deal of truth in Gorchakov’s assessment. The Russians were anxious to obtain a secure frontier on the steppe, which would maintain imperial prestige and prevent the disruption of trade routes by the Kazakhs, and accordingly their campaigns in the 1860s were designed to link the


\(^{76}\) See Muriel Joffe, ‘Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation’, *RR*, 54 (July 1995), 365–88 for just one instance of this indifference to the interests of commerce. I am not suggesting that the expansion in cotton production was insignificant, nor that it was not of considerable value to the Russian economy. My concern here is with the motivations for the conquest and the priorities of Russian rule, neither of which were economic.

\(^{77}\) ‘Correspondence Respecting Central Asia’, *Parliamentary Papers*, Central Asia No. 2 (1873) C. 704 (London, 1873), 70–5; Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 194; Miliutin echoed these sentiments, which originated with the War Ministry. D. A. Miliutin, *Vospominaniya 1863–1864* (Moscow, 2003), 520–1.

Orenburg and Siberian lines of forts between Perovsk and Pishpek. The subsequent conquest of the oasis region of Central Asia has long been held to agree with Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of ‘Imperialism as atavism’, based on ‘aggressiveness itself’.⁷⁹ Once the war in the Caucasus, which had offered opportunities for distinction and promotion for over sixty years, finally came to an end in 1864, ambitious officers had to look to other theatres in which to win their spurs.⁸⁰ However, Matthew Jamison has recently demonstrated convincingly that Cherniaev stretched but did not exceed his instructions in taking Tashkent.⁸¹ He had been ordered to break Kokand’s hold on the city and place it under Russian ‘influence’ (possibly with some idea of restoring it as a city-state as it had been until 1808), something which Miliutin glossed over in his memoirs.⁸² What the Russians did not appreciate was that after the fall of Tashkent a protracted war with Kokand and Bukhara was almost inevitable, not least because of the political instability in Kokand which their campaigns had caused.

The Imperial State quickly discovered that there were sound military and diplomatic reasons, if fewer commercial ones, for hanging onto the Central Asian provinces that its generals had somewhat importunately acquired. These were different from the military benefits Britain derived from India. In India the local revenues paid for a vast army of largely native troops, which made Britain a world power on land as well as on sea without straining the home exchequer. By contrast, apart from some experiments with the recruitment of Kazakhs and Turcoman into irregular units in the 1870s and 1880s, the entire garrison of 30,000–50,000 troops in Turkestan was Russian, maintained at a cost of roughly 3 million roubles a year from the central Imperial Treasury in the 1870s, an amount that rose dramatically in succeeding years.⁸³

⁸² Miliutin claimed that Cherniaev did not have official sanction to attack Tashkent and attributed it to ‘Chestolyubie’ (love of honour). Milyutin, Vospominaniya 1863–1864, 518–21.
⁸³ Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 317–18.
This expensive course was prompted partly by the lesson of the Indian Mutiny, which suggested that native troops could not be trusted and perhaps by the fact that Russia, unlike Britain, already had a massive conscript army which included some ‘wild’, Asiatic elements, in the Dikaya Divitsiya or ‘wild division’, recruited from the Caucasus, and the Cossack regiments. Nevertheless, it made Turkestan very costly to run, with expenditure in the region far exceeding income for the first forty years of Russian rule. Clearly the greedy military fiscalism which drove the British on in India played no part in Russian calculations. Without the military expenditure, the revenue from the land tax and other cesses would have covered the cost of administration with a little to spare. As it was, a subsidy was required from St Petersburg every year, most of which came from the War Ministry. It was not until 1905 that Turkestan began to show a small profit (even then the figures are suspect). This led to angry criticisms that the whole area was a white elephant and ought to be given up:

In our society you often come across people who, as soon as they hear that you have been in Central Asia—straight away come out with the question ‘And so why did you hide yourself there? What use have your conquests, your glory, been to us? The whole of Asia is not worth a farthing, and you are still spending our bloodied millions—does this benefit the Asiatics, or something?’

See Annenkov, Akhal-Tekinskii Oazis, 36.


See Appendix 1.

Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 270.
Such sentiments were still being aired at the end of the century. However, as far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned the diplomatic rewards Russia reaped from her military presence in Central Asia were held to be well worth the expense (in any case, unlike in Britain, those who paid the taxes in European Russia had no means of expressing their disapproval). It is a commonplace of nineteenth-century history that as a weak maritime power, with no direct access to the world’s warm-water oceans except at distant Vladivostok, Russia was unable to put pressure on Britain anywhere other than in Central Asia, where she could threaten India and the Indian Army, the linchpin of British supremacy. As Maurice Yapp has shown, for British strategists and diplomats it was the fear that Russia might use her position in Central Asia to foment disaffection within India which really worried the British, rather than a possible invasion.

Douglas Forsyth wrote to the Earl of Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, in August 1869:

If we could choose for ourselves and were indisposed to accept the benefits conferred by their advance, coupled with its dangers, we should confine Russia to her borders on the Caspian, whence the stories of her power and the might of her intrigue would have little effect on our prestige in India. But she has now almost reached our door and... Russian Officers have ample opportunities of making themselves personally acquainted with every inch of our territory, and of intriguing with any one of her Majesty’s Indian subjects.

As Terentiev pointed out, this was almost certainly decisive in securing British acquiescence to Russia’s unilateral repudiation, in 1871, of the Black Sea clauses of the 1856 Treaty of Paris:

We have drawn closer to India by 2,000 versts, and already our dialogues [with the British] are not as they were. Russia states that she no longer intends to

---

88 Miropiev, o Polozhenii Russkich Inorodtsev, 493–9.
90 Sir Douglas Forsyth (1827–86) was a former Commissioner in Punjab, active during the Mutiny and sent on a mission to St Petersburg in 1869. He was later twice envoy to Yarkand in the time of Yakub Beg. Katherine Prior, ‘Forsyth, Sir (Thomas) Douglas’, DNB.
91 NAI/Foreign/S.H./1869/Nos. 78–9, Mr. Forsyth’s Interview with Prince Gortschak-off at Baden-Baden, 4. British paranoia was fuelled by the fact that their intelligence was, on the whole, abominable. Apart from chance meetings with the Russian Foreign Minister at fashionable German watering-places, Whitehall seems to have relied largely upon reports in the Times of India and articles in the Journal de St Petersbourg and l’Invalid de Russe, the latter being the French translation of the journal of the Russian War Ministry, Russkii Invalid, unlikely to contain much sensitive material.
recognize those points of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 which refer to the Black Sea—and Britain hastens to agree—this same Britain, who more than any other insisted upon these points! The threat to her colonies is a chord we can play on in all sorts of questions.⁹²

Or, as Curzon put it, in her dealings with the British Empire Russia could ‘paralyse the trunk in Europe by galling the limb in Asia’.⁹³ Russia also intervened in Afghan political intrigues, causing the British no small worry and helping to precipitate the disasters of the Second Afghan War, in 1879. Prior to his accession in the aftermath of that conflict Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan had been living in Samarkand under Russian protection for almost ten years.⁹⁴ This sparring continued until the end of the century: in 1896, for instance, 10,000 roubles were placed in the Samarkand Chancellery for the use of the Afghan pretender (and Russian client) Ishaq Khan, who had been living on a Russian pension since his failed uprising against ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1888.⁹⁵ Although it seems highly unlikely that Russia ever seriously intended to invade India through Afghanistan, hawkish officers such as L. N. Sobolev kept the matter on the boil until the eve of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.⁹⁶ It became a prominent theme for the Russophobic popular press from the 1860s until the First World War, putting pressure on the British and Indian Governments; the mere threat was worth its weight in diplomatic gold.⁹⁷

The military and strategic priorities of Russian rule become still clearer when one looks at the pattern of railway construction: instead of beginning with a direct connection across easy steppe country from Orenburg to the capital of the Guberniya at Tashkent, the first railway line in Central Asia was begun in 1879 from the shores of the Caspian across intensely hostile desert (sea-water and naphtha had to be sprayed

---

⁹² Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 277. ⁹³ Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 12. ⁹⁴ A. A. Semenov, ‘Begstvo’ Abdur-Rakhman-Khana iz Tashkenta v Afganistan (Tashkent, 189–?). ⁹⁵ TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.561, 1–2ob; Marshall, The Russian General Staff, 134, 148. ⁹⁶ L. N. Sobolev, Vozmozhen-li Pokhod Russkikh v Indiyu? (Moscow, 1901); For an excellent account of how the 1907 agreement failed to settle Britain and Russia’s outstanding disputes over Afghanistan, Tibet, and Persia, see Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (London, 2002). ⁹⁷ An early example of this sort of scare-mongering is ‘England’ (J. Clarke), The Central Asian Question (Calcutta, 1869), a pamphlet which found its way into Turkestanskii Sbornik. Apart from the works by Charles Marvin listed above, see for instance Arminius Vambéry, The Coming Struggle for India (London, 1885).
upon the sand to make a steady track-bed) in order both to threaten the Afghan border and subdue the Turcoman. With great speed the line reached Kyzyl-Arvat, Ashkabad, and Merv, whence a branch line was later constructed to the barren oasis of Kushka on the Afghan border: none of these places was of any commercial significance. It then inched forward to Chardjui on the Oxus, and reached Samarkand only in 1888 and Tashkent eleven years later. There was no permanent bridge over the Oxus until 1901 and the direct Tashkent–Orenburg line was not finished until 1906.

Officials made frequent use of the terms *sblizhenie* and *sliyanie* when they expressed their aims for Turkestan.⁹⁸ In Central Asia these terms were not synonyms for ‘Russification’, in the aggressive sense in which it was understood and implemented in the European borderlands. Unlike Poland, Ukraine, or White Russia, Turkestan was not home to important locations of the Slavic historical narrative (such as Kiev), and its population did not represent a potential demographic threat if it remained unassimilated. Cultural distance was so great, indeed, that no attempt was even made to convert its peoples to Orthodoxy for fear of provoking a ‘fanatical’ reaction. Instead *sblizhenie* was understood largely in administrative and legal terms: abolishing *Voenno-Narodnoe Upravlenie*, introducing the governmental norms which existed in European Russia such as *Zemstva* and civilian courts, promoting ideas of *grazhdanstvennost*.⁹⁹ It also had a simple meaning in terms of communications: first the Transcaspian, and then the Trans-Aral Railway brought European Russia closer to Turkestan. Last, and very definitely least, given the scant resources allocated to it, came ‘cultural uplift’ or ‘enlightenment’ through education. It was hoped that locals would abandon Islam and learn Russian, but this did not amount to a desire for or expectation of their *obrusenie*:¹⁰⁰ pessimism over cultural distance

⁹⁸ *Sblizhenie*—best translated as *rapprochement*; *Sliyanie*—blending, merging. I am grateful to the late John Klier for pointing out that I must look at these terms (bandied about very freely in contemporary texts) much more carefully.

⁹⁹ Citizenship. This might seem an odd idea in a Russian context, but it was a cherished aim of the liberal members of the bureaucracy after the Great Reforms on 1861–4, when they hoped to see the growth of a strong culture of legality and equality before the law within the Empire, and an end both to local variations in Government and the entirely separate legal and administrative structures for the peasantry in European Russia with the imposition of a uniform bureaucratic ideal. See Yaroshevsky, ‘Empire and Citizenship’.

¹⁰⁰ *Russification*—although the term *Rusifikatsii* also exists and some scholars would argue that it has a distinct, more political meaning: see D. V. Vasil’ev, ‘O Politike
was too great for that. Instead a measure of *obrusenie* of the land, rather than the people, might be achieved by importing Slavic settlers, but outside the nomadic areas their numbers remained very limited. Unlike in the Volga–Kama region, because of the ban on Christian proselytization there was no powerful ideology available with which to attempt to supplant Islam in people’s affections, other than loyalty to the Tsar, which was of limited use in Turkestan (arguably the Bolsheviks would later have greater success because they did possess such an ideology). All such attempts at administrative and cultural *sblizhenie* were, in any case, stymied by hardline advocates of military rule, who considered that security priorities must remain paramount.¹⁰¹

All this helps to undermine the notion that the Russians were in Turkestan primarily for commercial or civilizing reasons. Whilst irrigation was extended, Russian settlers brought in, and cotton production encouraged, the ultimate priorities were always military, and as the military ran the place, they did their best to see that these priorities were maintained.

### TURKESTAN’S ADMINISTRATION

The military had not only taken Turkestan and the steppes for the Tsar on the battlefield; it was also the spearhead of Russian colonization in Central Asia, and this was particularly true of the Ural and Siberian (and later Semirechie) Cossacks, and the Orenburg (later Turkestan) line battalions. As M. Zinoviev recollected:

The Orenburg battalions are responsible for the founding of every Russian settlement in the Kirghiz steppe. Travelling along our never-ending frontier line, you will find forts, fortifications, steamer landings, churches, military hospitals, armouries, houses, godowns. These landing-places, forts, churches, hospitals etc. were built by the hands of the soldiers of the Orenburg battalions.


¹⁰² i.e. Kazakh. The Russians commonly described them as Kirghiz to distinguish them from their own Cossacks/Kazaki, as the word comes from the same Turkic root, meaning ‘free horseman’. The modern-day Kirghiz were known as Kara-Kirghiz or ‘Black’ Kirghiz.
Each stone, placed in our many forts, in a line from Orsk to Djizak, has been put in place by a soldier of the line... Today they use rickety siege ladders to storm the face of a five-sazhen\textsuperscript{103} wall, defended by thousands of Kokandians, and tomorrow they will become architects, mixing mortar, making bricks, erecting walls, building arches... Before you now, for instance, is the 4th Orenburg Line Battalion. Its history is the history of our territorial acquisitions in Central Asia, a history of the continuous consolidation of our influence in the East. Long ago, very long ago, in the time of Count Perovsky [the 1840s], this battalion left Orenburg, and to this day it has not returned to the motherland.\textsuperscript{104}

The army did not merely build walls in Central Asia: it was entrusted with the entire administration of Turkestan, which it would continue to dominate and control until 1917. This was the case in all the Asiatic regions of the Russian Empire, but Turkestan differed considerably even from other areas under military government. The various temporary statutes under which the region was administered from 1867 to 1886 gave von Kaufman a great deal of latitude in policy. Initially, he was allowed to carry out negotiations with neighbouring states on his own account, to establish and oversee the expenditure of the budget, set taxes, and establish the privileges of Russian subjects in the Province: he also had the power to confirm and revoke death sentences passed in the Russian military courts.\textsuperscript{105} Nowhere else in the Russian Empire did a Military Governor have this kind of independence from central control, and nowhere else was there such obvious pessimism about the region’s potential for integration into the main body of the Empire. Isolated geographically from European Russia by an expanse of steppe that took two months to cross, it was isolated still more decisively in the minds of Tsarist officials by its dense, ancient, and settled Islamic culture. In its early years under von Kaufman Turkestan was thus also administratively isolated, with many distinctive institutions within the military bureaucracy that sat loosely on a largely unreformed native administration. In 1882 von Kaufman died in post and General Cherniaev, the conqueror of Tashkent, was appointed as his successor. Cherniaev had greatly resented not being made Governor-General in 1867 and gave vent to his feelings by closing the Turkestan public library and the observatory, and

\textsuperscript{103}A Russian fathom. One sazhen = approximately seven feet.


\textsuperscript{105}Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 4: \textit{Kraevoe Upravlenie}, 11–12.
halting the compilation of *Turkestanskii Sbornik*, all pet projects of von Kaufman.¹⁰⁶ He also sought to ‘Orientalize’ the administration, giving himself much greater powers of appointment and dismissal, and reviving certain posts from Bukharan times which von Kaufman had abolished, outraging Russian settlers in Tashkent with what they considered to be over-friendliness with the natives and their leaders.¹⁰⁷ Cherniaev was dismissed in 1884 amid reports of widespread corruption and abuse of power, which prompted the first serious attempt to reform Turkestan’s administration.

Privy Counsellor Girs had been despatched from St Petersburg with a Commission to survey the province and make recommendations for reform after von Kaufman’s death. He noted among other things that the region was governed under four separate statutes, leading to considerable confusion.¹⁰⁸ The Girs Commission’s report was considered by another commission headed by Count N. P. Ignatiev, which drew up a single (but none the less provisional) statute for the entire region:¹⁰⁹ this gave a greater role (in theory) to the Russian judiciary and made a vague commitment to push Turkestan closer to civilian administration and incorporation with the rest of the Empire.¹¹⁰ Djizak and Khujand *Uyezds* (Districts)¹¹¹ were detached from Syr-Darya Province and incorporated with the Zarafshan *Okrug* to form Samarkand Province. After 1886 the Governor-General had an advisory council, or *Sovet*, made up of other army officers, which had no equivalent elsewhere in the Empire and was an acknowledgement of the peculiar difficulties faced in ruling over so alien an area. It was of limited significance and compared unfavourably with the Viceroy’s Council in India by Count

---

¹⁰⁹ PSZ Sob.3 Vol. VI (1886), No. 3, 814; Ignatiev was military attaché at the Russian Embassy in London in 1857, took part in an embassy to Bukhara and Khiva in 1858–9, and 1861–4 was head of the Asian table in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He went on to become Foreign Minister as successor to Gorchakov, and in 1881 was made Minister of the Interior on the accession of Alexander III.
¹¹¹ *Uyezd*, a district with a population of 120,000–250,000 in Russian Turkestan.
K. K. Pahlen, the last of Turkestan’s reformers.¹¹² Pahlen also remarked that there was no single ministry in St Petersburg with responsibility for Turkestan and instead decisions were referred to no fewer than twelve different departments in St Petersburg; he argued that instead something akin to the greater autonomy enjoyed by the Indian Viceroy was needed:

Detailed instructions from the Governor-General and his Council, the carrying out of legislative functions, the verification of every kopek of expenditure, the introduction of new taxes, duties, defining the rights of the natives, their relations with the newly-arrived Russian population—all this detailed work lies in the hands of and is the responsibility of the central government and is scattered in the mazes of different chancelleries and departments in St Petersburg...with such an organisation of the central organs, a firm direction of policy is not to be thought of.¹¹³

In 1906 the Muslims of the Russian Empire were granted thirty-six seats in the new State Duma, six of which were for deputies from Turkestan, whilst seven Russian deputies were also elected from the region. The franchise was strictly limited to those with property and knowledge of Russian, and elections were indirect, through four stages rather than two as in European Russia. The first Duma was dissolved before elections could be held in Turkestan. After the dissolution of the second Duma these seats were abolished, and Turkestan and the steppe region denied representation altogether.¹¹⁴ The only delegate ever elected from Samarkand was in fact an Azeri, Tashbulat Abdulhalilov.¹¹⁵ The Duma was thus a marginal and rather unimportant phenomenon in the political development of Turkestan, emphasizing both the colonial nature of its administration and the fact that the landmarks in its history were not necessarily the same as those in European Russia—despite the desires and best efforts of some of its administrators.

The terminal date of this book’s title was determined by the publication of Count Pahlen’s monumental report on Turkestan’s administration in 1910. Its nineteen volumes provide an astonishingly comprehensive account of the history and development of Russian rule

¹¹⁴ Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 233–5.
in Turkestan, and a damning indictment of the slough of corruption and idleness into which it had fallen by the early 1900s. One correspondent in *Golos Pravdy* wrote that: ‘One gets the impression that an enormous region of the Russian Empire has up until now been under the control of a whole band of criminals.’¹¹⁶ Pahlen was an extremely upright Baltic German Lutheran aristocrat. His commission toured the region in 1908 and uncovered scandals almost wherever it went, from the convicted fraudster who had been placed in charge of the Orenburg–Tashkent Railway and, together with over 200 corrupt subordinates, embezzled thousands of roubles,¹¹⁷ to the brutal despotism exercised by Russian administrators in Transcaspia.¹¹⁸ He made numerous recommendations for reform, none of which was implemented before the outbreak of war in 1914, which was swiftly followed by the chaos of the 1916 Central Asian Revolt. In view of this, and because the history of the revolution in Central Asia deserves a book to itself, I have resolved to bring this study only up to 1908–10.¹¹⁹ The Pahlen report provides an extremely frank, not to say harsh, assessment of how far the Russians had come in Central Asia since 1865: perhaps, when their rule is compared with British India, at times they will be found to have judged themselves too harshly.

¹¹⁶ ‘Reviziya Turkestana’, *Golos Pravdy* 1908g No.967, in *TS*, 494 (1908), 78.
TURKESTAN’S POPULATION

The area stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Tian-Shan Mountains, and from the northern edge of the Kazakh Steppe to the Oxus, 493,000 square miles in all, probably had a population of about 6 million at the time of the Russian conquest, a population density of twelve persons per square mile.\textsuperscript{120} India (1,714,228 square miles), had a population estimated at 250 million in the same period or 146 people per square mile.\textsuperscript{121} Apart from irrigated areas around the Oxus, Syr-Darya, and Zarafshan rivers, much of the land in Central Asia was barren or desert, and incapable of supporting a large settled population. The legendary cities of Central Asia—Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, and Kokand—could not boast populations of more than 150,000; in Samarkand’s case the population was no more than 30,000, and by 1897 this had only risen to 55,128.\textsuperscript{122} In 1881 von Kaufman gave the figures (see Table 2.) for area and population in Russian Turkestan—including Kuldja, which was handed back to China in 1884, but excluding most of the steppe, the Protectorates, and Transcaspia.

These show that Turkestan was much more densely populated than Western Siberia (where the average density at this time was 30–40 souls per German square mile) but less so than European Russia, where even provinces in the European borderlands such as Orenburg, Stavropol, and Perm had densities, of, respectively, 207, 272, and 353 souls per German square mile. However, within Turkestan the Zarafshan Okrug was without question the most densely populated area (although if the mountains had been excluded Ferghana Province would probably have produced similar figures). The Zarafshan and Ferghana Valleys, taken together with the two southernmost Districts of Syr-Darya Province, Djizak, and Khujand (both of which would become part of the new Samarkand Province in 1886), contained 85 per cent of Turkestan’s population, at an average density of 400 people per German square mile.

\textsuperscript{120} Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge, 2000), 204.
\textsuperscript{122} N. A. Troinitskii (ed.), Pervaya Vseobshchaya Perepis’ Naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897g Vol. LXXXIII, Samarkandskaya Oblast’ (St Pb., 1905) p. iv.
Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910

Table 2. Area and population density in Turkestan, 1881

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Area in German square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Population density per German square mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semirechie</td>
<td>6,936</td>
<td>716,000</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuldja</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syr-Darya</td>
<td>8,334</td>
<td>1,153,000</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>690,000</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarafshan Okrug</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amu-Darya district</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,650</td>
<td>3,150,000</td>
<td>(Avg.) 153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* fon-Kaufman, *Projekt Vsepoddanneishego Ocheta*, 13–14; von Kaufman seems to have been using geographical square miles, otherwise known as ‘German’, each of which was equivalent to 49 square verst or 20 English square miles.

mile, or 20 per English square mile, almost double the average for Central Asia.¹²³

The Tsar’s subjects in Central Asia were overwhelmingly inorodtsy, ‘aliens’,¹²⁴ granted neither the privileges nor the burdens of full Russian ‘citizenship’ or grazhdanstvo, and known generically as tuzemtsy, ‘natives’. With the exception of Bukharan Jews and incoming Russians, Germans, and Armenians, the people of Turkestan were almost all Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School, the only exceptions being the Pamiri Tajiks, who were Ismailis, and the small Shia Irani populations of Samarkand and Bukhara. In Samarkand Province 96.5 per cent of men and 98.1 per cent of women were listed as inorodtsy in the 1897 census, whilst 97 per cent of men and 98.2 per cent of women were Muslim.¹²⁵ Otherwise the population can be divided into three main groups: settled, Tajik-speaking peoples (a dialect of Persian), prevalent in eastern Bukhara, the Pamirs, and the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand; settled

¹²⁴ See John W. Slocum, ‘Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of “Aliens” in Imperial Russia’, *RR*, 57: 2 (April 1998), 173–90, for a discussion of the changing meanings of this term as it evolved as a legal category. Its most consistent meaning was that of subjects of the Tsar who were nomads and hunter–gatherers, or considered to be otherwise uncivilized, but the Jews and the settled population of Turkestan represent the most important exceptions to this rule. In popular usage the term often had explicitly religious overtones e.g. Miropiev, *O Polozhenie Russkikh Inorodtsev*.
Turkic-speaking groups, generally described as ‘Sarts’ if they lived in Ferghana or regions to the north or as ‘Uzbeks’ if they lived in or near Bukhara; and Turkic nomads, who can in turn be divided into the Kazakhs of the northern steppes, the mountain Kirghiz or Kara-Kirghiz around the Ferghana Valley, and the Turcoman tribes of the Transcaspian deserts. Apart from the Turcoman, who had distinct tribal identities and no Mongol or Chingissid heritage, and the Tajik population which was distinguished by speaking an Indo-European rather than a Turkic language, these groups often blurred into one another. Ethnically and linguistically Sarts, Uzbeks, and Kirghiz or Kazakhs could not always be clearly distinguished, and often it was their way of life which separated them. The Russians themselves may have brought about a great change in linguistic habits, as their Tatar interpreters were only able to translate from Turki and this seems to have undermined the use of Persian among clerical elites after the conquest.¹²⁶

In Bukhara much of the agricultural labour was undertaken by Persian slaves and the clerical class and ‘ulama were largely Tajiks. Those described as ‘Uzbeks’ traced their lineage to the formerly nomadic Turkic tribes which had arrived in the area in the sixteenth century with Shaybani Khan: those from the Karshi region often had links to the ruling Manghit dynasty.¹²⁷ In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the area broadly known as Miankal in the middle Zarafshan Valley around Kermehe and Katta-Kurgan seems to have had a fairly substantial semi-nomadic population, most notably the Uzbeks of the Kitai-Kipchak tribe. Bukhari wrote in c.1818 that ‘one can say that the number of nomads equals that of the inhabitants of the towns’,¹²⁸ and Holzwarth suggests that consequently the irrigation system in the region had fallen into disrepair. By the 1830s, however, there is evidence of a return to settled agriculture in the region, most notably in an increase in disputes over water with the city of Bukhara downstream.¹²⁹ Further east around Samarkand and Khujand, Tajiks made up a considerable portion of the rural population, and predominated in urban areas. In

¹²⁶ I am indebted to Paul Bergne for this observation.
¹²⁷ See Holzwarth, ‘The Uzbek State’, 331, 342–6, for a discussion of what and how many the Uzbek tribes were.
Samarkand Province itself in 1908 out of the urban population 18,367 were described as ‘Uzbeks’, 15,793 as ‘Sarts’, and 85,577 as ‘Tajiks’.¹³⁰ The Russians were not consistent in their use of these ethnic and linguistic labels but ‘Sart’ was that most commonly employed. There is still a great deal of debate over what this term meant, as usage varied considerably over the years.¹³¹ ‘Sart’ seems to have originated as a term used by nomads to describe settled people and town-dwellers, from the Indic root *Sarthavaha* meaning a merchant or caravan-leader (related to the modern Hindi word *Seth*). The earliest known use of the term is in the *Kudatku Bilik*, where it refers to the settled population of Kashgaria, and in this period it apparently could be used to refer to all settled Muslims of Central Asia, Persian or Turkic-speaking.¹³² Rashid ud-din in the *Jami’ ut-Tawarikh* writes that Genghis Khan commanded that Arslan Khan, Prince of the Muslim Turkic Qarluqs, be given the title ‘Sartaqtai’, which he considered to be synonymous with ‘Tajik’. (It is possible, however, that Rashid ud-din, who was Persian, misunderstood the meaning of this, as ‘Sartaqtai’ was the name of one Genghis Khan’s sons.)¹³³ In the post-Mongol period we find that Ali Sher Nawa’i refers to the Iranian people as ‘Sart ulusi’, and for him ‘Sart tili’ was a synonym for the Persian language.¹³⁴ Similarly when Babur refers to the people of Marghelan as ‘Sarts’, it is in distinction to the people of Andijan who are Turks, and it is probable that by this he means Persian-speakers. He also refers to the population of the towns and villages of the *vilayat* of Kabul as ‘Sarts’.¹³⁵

One of the earliest Russian ethnographers in Central Asia to address himself to the problem of the Sarts was Captain Afanasii Grebenkin, an administrator in the Zarafshan *Okrug*. In an article which, significantly, was nominally about the Tajiks of the Zarafshan Valley, he wrote that ‘Sart’ was used as another name for the Tajiks, and carried pejorative overtones of cowardice and sharp practice. He quoted an Uzbek who

told him that ‘we call a Tajik a Tajik when we eat with him, and a Sart when we insult him’, whilst those Tajiks he spoke to confirmed that the name ‘Sart’ was one given to them by the Russians and Russian Kazakhs, and that they did not use it themselves. Grebenkin concluded that ‘Sart’ was only used in those areas where Kazakhs lived alongside the settled population, which, whilst not strictly accurate, would certainly suggest that in origin it was a mildly insulting term used by nomads to describe all town-dwellers, regardless of their language or ethnicity.¹³⁶ Barthold writes that ‘To the Kazakh every member of a settled community was a Sart whether his language was Turkish or Iranian.’¹³⁷ N. P. Ostroumov (1846–1930) was firm in his conviction that it was not an ethnic definition but an occupational one, and he backed this up by quoting some (apparently common) native sayings: ‘A bad Kirghiz becomes a Sart, whilst a bad Sart becomes a Kirghiz.’¹³⁸ This confusion reached its peak in the 1897 census: Ferghana Province was held to have a very large ‘Sart’ population, neighbouring Samarkand Province very few ‘Sarts’ but a great many ‘Uzbeks’.¹³⁹ It seems that in Ferghana ‘Sarts’ spoke a Qarluq Turkic dialect very similar to Uighur, whilst in Khorezm they spoke a form of Persianized Oghuz Turkic, and that ‘Uzbeks’ spoke a Kipchak dialect closer to Kazakh.¹⁴⁰ However, these distinctions were often far from clear, and in any case were ignored outside a narrow circle of ethnographers. A good example of this vagueness can be seen in a tourist guide to Samarkand published in 1911 (fourteen years after the census which had claimed that there were no ‘Sarts’ in Samarkand),

¹³⁸ N. P. Ostroumov, Sarty — Etnograficheskie Materialy (Tashkent, 1890), 7. Ostroumov was a pupil of Nikolai Ilminsky in the anti-Islamic division of the Kazan theological academy, where he wrote a deeply Islamophobic thesis, published as Kriticheskii Razbor Mukhammedanskogo Ucheniya o Prorokakh (Kazan, 1874) and was associated with the missions to convert the Chuvash, Cheremiss, Samoyeds, and other animist Turkic, Finno-Ugric, and Uralic peoples to Orthodoxy by educating them in their native tongues, in an attempt to reduce Tatar influence over them. He was among the experts on Islam recruited by von Kaufman in 1877 to serve in Turkestan. See Paul Werth, ‘Inorodtsy on Obrusenie: Religious Conversion, Indigenous Clergy, and the Politics of Assimilation in Late-Imperial Russia’, AI, 2 (September 2000); Geraci, Window on the East, 90 and I. L. Alekseev, ‘N. P. Ostroumov o problemakh upravleniya musul’manskim naseleniem Turkestanskogo Kraya’, SRIO 5 (153) (Moscow, 2002), 89–95.
¹³⁹ Knyaz’ V. I. Masal’skii, Turkestanskii Krai (St Pb., 1913), 360.
stating that the native population were all ‘Sarts’, and that these could be divided into two types: (a) Tajiks; and (b) Uzbeks, Tatars, and Kirghiz (i.e. Kazakhs) who had adopted a sedentary way of life.¹⁴¹

 Ironically enough this description of a Sart simply as a town-dweller was more accurate than the ‘scientific’ definitions of the term concocted by scholars. By 1920 at least one ethnographer, I. I. Zarubin, felt able to claim that whilst the vague and undefined nature of the term ‘Sart’ had caused numerous problems for census officials in the past, the ‘history and significance of this term can now be considered to be accurately explained’—he defined them as ‘Turkicised Iranians’, and wrote that there were very few to be found in the former Samarkand Province.¹⁴²

 Zarubin’s confidence was misplaced, as the debate continues to this day, but most scholars, following Barthold’s lead, are happier with an occupational than an ethnic definition. The term ‘Sart’ had long been objected to by the Jādids as ‘derogatory’, partly owing to a false etymology of the word from Sary it (‘Yellow dog’), and it is clear that for many people it did have pejorative overtones—consequently it was abolished altogether by the Soviets after 1924, when it was decreed that all settled Turkic-speakers were now ‘Uzbeks’.¹⁴³

 The Samarkandi Turkic dialect, which is not vowel-harmonized and contains a substantial admixture of Persian words, became the official ‘Uzbek’ language after 1928, rather than the Kipchak ‘Uzbek’ of the pre-revolutionary years. It is thus very difficult to attach a precise ethnic or linguistic meaning to the word ‘Sart’, but when it occurs in Russian sources it is almost always as a general term for the settled inhabitants of Turkestan, often including Tajiks.

 After the conquest, proportionally larger numbers of Europeans settled in Turkestan than in India, although the absolute numbers were not so different. In 1901 there were 169,677 Europeans in India:¹⁴⁴ if one excludes Semirechie Province, which is nomadic steppe country, there were approximately 120,000 Slavs in the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, Bukhara, and Khiva combined in 1897. To put this in some sort of perspective, Algeria had 578,000 European

¹⁴¹ S. Sluchenovskii, Samarkand i ego proshloe (Samarkand, 1911), 4.
¹⁴² I. I. Zarubin, Naselenie Samarkandskoi Oblasti (Leningrad, 1926), 20.
settlers in 1896, although not all of these were French.\(^{145}\) Russian settlement in Turkestan remained limited outside the Steppe Region and Semirechie before the completion of the Orenburg–Tashkent Railway in 1906 created a direct link with European Russia. To begin with it was a highly militarized community, with a strong imbalance between the sexes. In 1876 the new Russian quarter of Samarkand had a population of 5,069, of whom 4,297 were troops and only 312 were women (71 of those living in the Russian town were Muslims, 41 of them soldiers, probably Tatars or Bashkirs).\(^{146}\) In 1886, the year when peasant settlement in the Samarkand region began, the Zarafshan Okrug had 9,397 Russians (including troops) out of a total population of 464,985, or just over 2 per cent.\(^{147}\) By 1897, when the first real census was taken (see Table 3), the Russian population of Samarkand Province numbered 13,800, of whom just 4,473 were women. This was just 1.6 per cent of the province’s

---

Table 3. Results of the 1897 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peoples</th>
<th>Samarkand Province %</th>
<th>All Russian Turkestan %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz and Kara-Kirghiz</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>39.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarts</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>18.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>13.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Turks’</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>26.78</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persians</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Masal’skii, Turkestanskii Krai, 360.

---


\(^{146}\) See Appendix 3; I. Virskii, ‘Svedeniya o Zeravshanskom Okrugs’, in N. A. Maev (ed.), Materialy dlya Statistiki Turkestanskogo Kraya Vyp.IV (St Pb., 1876), 113.

\(^{147}\) TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,133, 10.
total population of 860,021, a slight fall since 1886, although this reflects the accession of Djizak and Khujand Districts when Samarkand Province was formed. ¹⁴⁸ By 1911 there were 407,000 Slavs in the Turkestan Governor-Generalship or 6 per cent of the total population of 6,493,000. However, 204,307 of these lived in Semirechie (now part of Kazakhstan), leaving only 202,290 in the remaining provinces of Turkestan or 3.82 per cent of their population of 5,291,152. ¹⁴⁹ In the Bukharan Emirate, Russians were largely confined to enclaves in the garrison towns of Kagan, Charjui, and Termes, and were not permitted to live or own property away from the line of the Transcaspian Railway. ¹⁵⁰ In Russian Turkestan their impact, both as rural settlers and urban-dwellers, was more considerable than in the Protectorates or than that of the British in India. Some entirely new cantonment towns were constructed, notably New Marghelan (later Skobelev, now Ferghana) in the Ferghana Valley. Most towns acquired a new Russian half, the first being Tashkent whose Nouvelle Ville was begun in 1866. ¹⁵¹ By 1917 20 per cent of Tashkent’s population was European and it became an exceptionally cosmopolitan city with several theatres and libraries, attracting not just Slavs but Tatars and Armenians, whilst the native elite bought houses in the Russian part of town. ¹⁵² In 1889 Curzon had remarked that ‘Samarkand may be looked upon as absolutely Russian, if not in part European; more Russian certainly than Benares is English, and far more European than is Peshawur’. ¹⁵³ Outside the provincial centres however, the number of Russians was much smaller. In Djizak in 1896, for instance, Russian chinovniki (state servants) and their families numbered just twenty individuals, with a further 69 Orthodox people living within the fortress, numbers not so different from an equivalent station in British India. ¹⁵⁴

The social profile of the civilian Russian population in Central Asia was less middle-class than that of the British in India, and included

¹⁴⁸ Troinitskii, Samarkandskaya Oblast’, 46.
¹⁵¹ TsGARUz F.1 Op.16 D.3, ‘O pokupke zemel’ dlya ustroistva Evropeiskogo kvartala v gorode Tashkent’.
¹⁵³ Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 215.
large numbers of railway-workers and agricultural settlers. These last were the responsibility of a special ‘Resettlement Department’¹⁵⁵ in St Petersburg, established in 1896, which was also responsible for exporting peasants from the crowded Central Agricultural Region of European Russia to Siberia and the Northern Steppes. Most of them were sent to the steppe region of Semirechie, where by 1908 62.27 per cent of the population had come from other provinces,¹⁵⁶ but some were settled further south, sometimes on newly irrigated land, as on the ‘Hungry Steppe’ between Samarkand and Tashkent, and sometimes in areas where existing villages had been destroyed as a punitive measure, as happened in Ferghana after the Andijan uprising. According to contemporary observers, notably Pahlen, the Resettlement Department’s officials were cordially loathed by the local administration in Turkestan, to whom they were not answerable, and who resented the political problems caused by the creation of Russian villages in already crowded areas such as the Ferghana Valley and the replacement of hard-working, revenue-paying Sart and Kirghiz peasants with lazy, feckless, and drunken Russians and Ukrainians.¹⁵⁷ In 1898, for example, when asked by the Resettlement Department’s officials if there was room in his District for a new Russian settlement, the Djizak *Uyezdnii Nachalnik* (District Commandant), Lt-Col. Viktor Nikolaevich Rybishkin, replied curtly that there was far too little water and that colonization could not be contemplated.¹⁵⁸ The then Governor-General, Baron Vrevsky, in his report to the Interior Ministry in 1898, insisted that there was simply not enough land for Russian settlement and referred to the immense difficulties the administration of Ferghana Province had in settling 133 families from Kiev Province.¹⁵⁹ Consequently even in the late 1890s Samarkand Province had just 1,986 peasant migrants resettled on the newly irrigated lands of the ‘Hungry Steppe’ north of Djizak, and even fewer elsewhere. In any case, here as in Semirechie the newly arrived peasants from European Russia were unfamiliar with irrigated agriculture and normally let out their land to natives.¹⁶⁰ The policy


continued to find favour in St Petersburg, however, as it was supposed to reduce social tensions in the Empire’s heartland and consolidate its Asiatic borders by settling them with loyal Europeans. Only mass settlement could bring about true security in Turkestan for, ultimately, Asiatics in general, and Muslims in particular, could not be trusted and there was a good deal of pessimism as to the prospects for, or desirability of, assimilation. As Terentiev put it: ‘Absorbing Asia, we, together with this, absorb something Asiatic ourselves. Let us assume that this leads to greater assimilation with the vanquished, but for all that our strength lies in the fact that we are not like them’¹⁶¹ [my italics].

¹⁶¹ Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 329.
Religion and the Problem of Islam

All Mussalmans fell off Zam-Zammah long ago!¹

Islam, or to use the phrase most commonly employed by the Russians ‘Musulmanskii Fanatizm’, in the view of most officers represented the single greatest threat to the stability and order of the Tsar’s new possessions in Turkestan, and by far the greatest obstacle to the ultimate goal of sblizhenie or assimilation of the region to the rest of the Empire. Although Turkestan was a new and unfamiliar territory, Russia’s relations with Islamic cultures were of long standing and can be traced back at least to the fall of Kazan; they were often far from peaceful. Under the Empress Elizabeth a violent campaign of forced conversion of the pagan peoples of the Volga region saw the destruction of 418 out of 536 mosques in the Kazan district alone, as local officials sought to reduce Islamic influence over the Chuvash, Cheremiss, Mordvinians, and other non-Tatar peoples.² However, the enlightened absolutist state under Catherine the Great espoused a policy of toleration of Islam, creating a muftiate and Muslim religious assembly at Ufa, and cooperating with the Tatar and Bashkir mullahs who provided a more structured form of Islam within the Kazakh Inner Horde.³ One

³ Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 147; it was a common (but false) Russian belief that the Kazakhs were only very superficially Islamized in the nineteenth century, an assumption derived from Alexei Levshin’s canonical 1832 work on the ‘Kirghiz-Kazakhs’: A. I. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach’ikh ili kirgiz-kaisatskikh gor i stepei* (Almaty, 1996 (1832)), 313–20; Valikhanov’s writings on ‘Shamanism’ among the Kazakhs were also influential: ‘Sledy Shamanstva u Kirgizov’, *Sochineniya*, 8–36. This mistake has been repeated by many modern scholars including Martha Brill Olcott in *The Kazakhs*
historian has described this as a ‘Confessional State’, which sought to provide Islam with hierarchical erastian structures similar to those of the Orthodox Church, and played an important role as an arbiter in religious disputes. However, whilst this idea works quite well until the early 1800s, it overlooks a fundamental shift in Russian relations with Islam towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Most recently Russia’s principal encounter with Islam was in the Caucasus, in the long and bitter war against the Chechens, Circassians, and Daghestanis which had been waged since the 1780s, and came to an end only in 1864, the year before the fall of Tashkent. It had a profound impact on Russian colonial policy and, in particular, Russian attitudes to Islam. General Yermolov, in a series of brutal campaigns from 1817 to 1827, espoused a scorched earth policy which drove an ever-deeper wedge between the Russians and the inhabitants of the Northern Caucasus, ‘contracting’ the middle ground of cultural and economic exchange which had existed before. His cruelty provoked a general uprising in Chechnya in 1825, which ultimately produced the greatest hero of the anti-Russian struggle, Imam Shamil. Russia’s earlier policy had been to co-opt the aristocratic elites of the North Caucasus, in a similar manner to that employed among the Sluzhilye Tatars of the Volga, and many Circassians in particular became influential at the court in Moscow. Yermolov departed decisively from this policy when he deposed the great prince of the Kabardians in 1825 and began to annul aristocratic rights in the region. The war saw a disastrous collapse of prestige for almost all traditional North Caucasian elites, as one by one the petty Khans and Beks of the region lost their privileges and significance, from the Yelisui Sultanate in 1844 to the Mekhtulin Khanate in the late


1850s. Naqshbandi Sufi leaders and their Murids constituted the new elite, and became the backbone of resistance to Russia; all attempts to win them over failed. A deep suspicion of Islamic elites was created, and a loss of faith in the tactic of absorbing local aristocracies which had served Russia so well in the past, whilst the Muslims of the Caucasus were characterized as ‘Savages’ and ‘Brigands’, an attitude that persists to this day. As an article in the Moscow newspaper *Birzhevy Vedomosti* put it:

The example of the Caucasus should be particularly instructive for us. The Caucasus showed us clearly the necessity of an extraordinarily careful and deliberate policy when dealing with Muslims, as also the possibility that some energetic individual will skilfully use the fanaticism of the Muslim people for unusual deeds and extraordinary belligerence, the suppression of which will cost Russia enormous sacrifices in gold and lives.

The writer went on to assert that Turkestan was still more dangerous, as it was surrounded by Sunni Muslim neighbours. Many officers who took part in the Turkestan campaigns had served in the Caucasus, including Cherniav, von Kaufman, and Skobelev, and the lessons of the conflict and subsequent settlement were not lost on the Russians in Turkestan. Greater care was taken not to offend Muslim sensibilities, and in general they behaved with considerably less brutality (with the notable exception of Geok-Tepe in 1881). Nevertheless, the Caucasus campaign engendered a lasting suspicion of all Muslims, and in particular the Sufi brotherhoods, as ‘fanatics’, together with pessimism over the prospects for conversion: by 1860 Bariatinsky had concluded that any attempt to convert the Chechen and Daghestani mountaineers from Islam to Christianity would be fruitless and needlessly inflammatory. This suspicion was also extended to the Tatars and Bashkirs of Kazan, Orenburg, and Ufa, who together with the Crimean Tatars were the best-educated Muslims of the Empire, with what was now considered to

---

9 ‘Proekt novogo administrativnogo razdeleniya Turkestanskogo Kraya’, *Birzhevy Vedomosti* No. 38 (1873), in TS, 43 (1873), 155.
10 Batunsky also points out the importance of the Caucasian example to Russian religious policy in Turkestan: M. A. Batunskii, *Rossiya i Islam* (Moscow, 2003), Vol. II, 394–6.
be an unhealthy Islamizing influence over the Kazakhs of the steppes. In 1866 General Kryzhanovsky (1818–88), Governor of Orenburg, wrote of the ‘Kirghiz’ under his jurisdiction that ‘The Muslim fanaticism of the local population is not merely constantly increasing and strengthening, but is being introduced throughout the whole Orenburg region by means of propaganda from the Bashkirs.’¹²

This meant that Russian soldiers and administrators arrived in Turkestan with their attitudes to Islam already substantially formed, with a strong belief that it was not just undesirable but dangerous. Stories of Bukharan brutality under Emir Nasrullah,¹³ and the massacre of Prince Bekovich-Cherkassky’s expedition to Khiva in 1736¹⁴ reinforced this impression and suggested that Turkestan’s Muslims were, if anything, fiercer and more ‘fanatical’ than those the Russians had hitherto encountered.¹⁵ The failure of the Emir of Bukhara’s appeals to the Ottoman Sultan in 1866 and the derisory results of the attempted jihad against the Russians during the conquest did nothing to dispel this impression.¹⁶ The feebleness of the resistance encountered by the Russians at Tashkent and the Zerabulak heights was offset by such incidents as the fierce siege of Ura-Tepe,¹⁷ or the attack on the Russian garrison of the Samarkand citadel by ‘Abd al-Malik Tura and the population of the city. Together with ‘fanaticism’, the backwardness engendered by Islam was also a common theme among Russian officers and travellers in Central Asia. Kostenko wrote that ‘There are no favourable outcomes from Islam, unless it be through the intervention of outside elements. Islamism petrifies its people, so that not only are they incapable of development, but on the contrary they regress still further into a morass of ignorance.’¹⁸

Terentiev was also hostile, writing indignantly that he had never been admitted to the Orenburg Mosque, built by Bashkirs, on any of his visits to that city: ‘the Koran is the enemy of innovation, the enemy of

¹⁴ Salkov refers to this as evidence of the same ingrained ‘fanaticism’ which led to the Andijan uprising: Sal’kov, ‘Andizhanskie Vosstanie’, 124–5.
¹⁵ See Khanikoff, Bokhara, 260, 295–314.
¹⁶ Ahmad Donish is typically scathing about Emir Seid Muzaffar’s feeble response to the call for a ghazawat by the ‘ulama of Bukhara in 1867: Donish, Istoriya Mangitskoi Dinastii, 46–8.
¹⁷ Zinov’ev, ‘Osada Ura-Tyube i Dzhizaka’.
¹⁸ L. F. Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya i Vodvorenie v nei Russkoi Grazhdanstvennosti (St Pb., 1871), 85.
study, the enemy of progress in matters of science’. ¹⁹ Similar sentiments are found in the writings of the Ural Cossack officer Khoroshkhin.²⁰ This distrust of Islam is normally associated with von Kaufman, but pre-dated his appointment as Governor-General. Kryzhanovsky, who at that time had responsibility for the new Turkestan Province, reported to the Tsar in 1866 that

It is extremely difficult to determine with any certainty whether we can expect the Muslim population of the Oblast to emerge from a condition, which, whilst far from savage, is, what is worse, wrongly developed... It is easier to foresee, that for a long time the Sarts of the Turkestan Oblast will remain as traders, without energy, without will, without love of their fatherland and without all those higher feelings and qualities which are necessary for the creation of anything durable, true and rational.²¹

Kryzhanovsky had a low opinion of the fighting qualities of Central Asian Muslims but, with a small garrison of just 30,000 men for the whole of the newly conquered region, the Russians were acutely aware of their fragile military position and dreaded provoking a religious revolt. Much as they disliked and distrusted Islam, they handled religious questions carefully.

THE BEGINNINGS OF IGNORIROVANIE

When Cherniaev took Tashkent in 1865, his initial approach was very cautious and he did his best to conciliate the religious authorities in the city—the Qazi-e Kalan and the Sheikh ul-Islam.²² Kryzhanovsky considered that he had over-estimated their importance:

Immediately after our conquest of Tashkent the conviction was formed, that its administration was purely theocratic, that the clergy occupied the pre-eminent position and that in general they ruled over the minds of the people, and constituted such an important force, that to struggle against them would be a

¹⁹ Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 347. ²⁰ Khoroshkhin, Sbornik Statei, 46.
²² The Qazi-e Kalan or ‘Great Qazi’ was the chief judge of the city, and at that time the incumbent was Ishan Hakim Khoja-e Sabzari, appointed by Alimqul in 1863: Beisembiev, The Life of Alimqul, 76. Khanikoff describes the Sheikh ul-Islam as the Amir’s chief spiritual adviser and head of the ‘ulama’ in Bukhara, and apparently the position was reserved for a prominent Khoja of Juibari lineage. Presumably his Tashkent equivalent performed similar functions: Khanikoff, Bokhara, 246–7; O. A. Sukhareva, Bukhara XIX–nachalo XXv (Moscow, 1966), 291.
dangerous affair, further: It was assumed that in the population of Tashkent there was a mass of ‘fanaticised’ Muslims.²³

In his report to the Tsar he urged a much tougher stance towards Islam, but matters were taken out of his hands when in 1867 Turkestan was made a separate Governor-Generalship, with von Kaufman at its head. Von Kaufman’s religious policy lay somewhere between those of Cherniaiev and Kryzhanovsky, and he christened it ‘Ignorirovanie’, the ‘not knowing’ of Islam in Turkestan: that is, the State would cease to be Islamic and all higher Islamic positions such as Qazi-e Kalan were abolished. Furthermore, as with the North Caucasus,²⁴ Turkestan was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mufti and every effort would be made to prevent the Tatars and Bashkirs from extending their influence over its inhabitants. This marked a decisive break with previous Russian practice: there was to be no ‘Confessional State’ in Turkestan.²⁵ Von Kaufman seems to have had an almost pathological suspicion of the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs, despite the fact that they remained indispensable intermediaries for the Russian Empire on the steppe and in Turkestan, and he accused them in his own writings of spreading anti-Russian propaganda.²⁶ N. P. Ostroumov recalled meeting him for the first time after being invited to Turkestan by the General in 1877. In the course of their conversation ‘the General calmly, but with great certainty told me, that he considers the Kazan Tatars to be great fanatics and acknowledged, with reluctance, their dangerous influence on the natives of Turkestan’.²⁷

The other side of Ignorirovanie was that there would be no attempt at conversion to Orthodoxy in Turkestan for fear of provoking a reaction similar to that of the Caucasus wars or indeed the Indian Mutiny. Mul-lahs and their madrasahs should be discouraged, but not through direct Christian proselytization, which would be too provocative. Sébastien Peyrouse has documented the level of official hostility to Orthodox missionaries even on the Kazakh steppes, where they were allowed to

Religion and the Problem of Islam

proselytize, and even when the first putative anti-Islamic Orthodox mission was finally permitted to open in Tashkent in 1912 its significance was minimal and there were almost no conversions.²⁸ So long as Turkestan’s administration remained impartial between religions, Terentiev thought that the fanatics would be unable to stir up trouble among the local populace. He even went so far as to express the belief, common among Englishmen in India, that ‘an honourable Muslim’ was preferable to a rogue Christian convert.²⁹ The Russian authorities assumed that, with Islam deprived of State support, upon which they erroneously supposed it to be dependent, confronted with the evident cultural superiority of the Russians the local inhabitants would abandon their faith without the need for any more aggressive measures. N. A. Maev reflected the views of many officers when he described a meeting with the elders of Samarkand in 1873:

The Aksakals presented themselves to greet the Head Nachalnik, stroking their beards as a sign of welcome, and it was impossible to read anything in their calm, indifferent faces. Naturally we cannot expect affection and sincerity from any of those grey-bearded Muslims, brought up in a fanatical hostility to all those who are not sanctified by the laws of Mahomet. We must wait patiently for what will come when a new, younger generation has grown up.³⁰

This illusion was rudely shattered by the Andijan uprising in 1898, but doubts were expressed much earlier. Shortly before his death, von Kaufman himself seems to have had doubts about the wisdom of Ignorirovanie, as he wrote that the impoverished and marginalized status of the Orthodox Church in Turkestan might in fact be undermining Imperial prestige:

Without separating, in their conception, the state from the church...the actual greatness of state power...and our religious buildings, the fanatical spirit of the Muslim too willingly halts before the visible wretchedness of the Russian churches, seeing in this not a...proof of the even-handedness of the Orthodox and their cult, but a convincing justification for the native fanatics of Islam, who are unable to renounce...the hope that our advent in the region is fragile, and the possibility that the very rule of the unbelievers (‘Kafirs’) in this ancient and orthodox land of Islam may be brought to an end.³¹

²⁹ Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 352–3.
³¹ ZSp TsGARUz F.1 Op.27, D.10a, 2.
Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910

Nevertheless, the Russians remained consistent in their refusal to permit the promotion of Christianity long after von Kaufman’s death. In 1884 a circular from O. Shkapsky in the Governor-General’s Chancellery argued that Russia would only ever be able truly to civilize and de-Islamize Turkestan through its women, and their influence on the home, but without any concrete proposals as to how this should be done: Shkapsky was still publishing on this theme ten years later, and bemoaning the lack of progress which had been made. Such interference in the domestic sphere was considered too inflammatory for the Tsarist regime to contemplate, and not until the Soviet period would the campaign against the veil become the front line in the battle to de-Islamize and modernize the region.³² In February 1898 a petition from ‘honoured citizen’ Viddinov complaining about the lack of instruction in the Orthodox religion and ‘the history of the fatherland’ offered to native children by the State provoked a strong response from the Samarkand District Commandant on the absolute necessity of maintaining the ban on proselytization.³³ The softly-softly approach inherent in Ignorirovanie also meant that other measures which might have undermined Islam in Turkestan—the suppression of religious endowments, a ban on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the promotion of western education—were approached extremely circumspectly.

WAQF

Waqf is a permanent endowment of property, normally a source of income for mosques, madrasahs, shrines, and other institutions. However, in the interests of stability private waqfs were also sometimes created from a family’s estate (creating something like an entail). In Central Asia ‘mixed’ waqfs are sometimes found which support both a family and an institution, the former often having some control over the latter, and such was the case with at least one institution in Samarkand, the Suzangaran madrasah founded by Khoja Ahrar.³⁴ Frequently waqf land either paid a lower rate of tax or was entirely exempt, although

³⁴ Veselovskii, Samariya Text, 19; V. L. Vyatkin, Materialy k istoricheskoj geografii Samarkandskogo Vilajeta (Samarkand, 1901), 3.
much depended on the skill of successive Mutavali{s}, or administrators, in negotiating with the ruler. If the purpose of the waqf was to fund a public or religious institution then special consideration from rulers was more likely, bringing with it a degree of state control.³⁵ This is a bare outline of the situation inherited by the Russians from Bukhara and Kokand, one which was far from congenial to them.

In 1882 the Girs Commission’s report averred that the status of waqf{s was almost identical to what it had been under Muslim rule prior to the Russian conquest.³⁶ Writing in 1884, in a commentary on the Girs Commission’s proposals for the new Turkestan statute, Count N. P. Ignatiev summed up the official attitude to waqf when he wrote that

\[\text{Waqf property constitutes the main source of power for the Muslim clergy and has an influence on the maintenance of religious fanaticism. However, there is no question of treating waqf property, the income from which goes to religious and charitable institutions, in the same way as mulk land.}³⁷ \]

The question of waqf, because of its religious and political significance in the region, demands especial care.³⁸

The Commission was forced to conclude that outright abolition of waqf was still not feasible because of the probable ‘fanatical’ reaction, and recommended that the policy towards them remain unchanged. This maintained the stance first adopted in 1865–8. Existing waqf{s were to remain free of tax if they already enjoyed this freedom, but newly created ones would be subject to the usual levies, and would have to receive the approval of the Russian authorities.³⁹

In Samarkand the orientalist Alexander Ludwigovich Kun (1840–88) was given responsibility for investigating the number, value, and legitimacy of waqf estates in the Zarafshan Okrug, with a view to seeing if any of them could be resumed on the grounds of lack of documentary evidence of title. Kun had graduated from the Oriental Faculty of St Petersburg University in 1864 and was sent to Turkestan in 1867,

³⁵ R. D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia (Princeton, 1991), 9–20. This book is primarily a study of the Alid shrine at Balkh in Afghan Turkestan 1480–1889, and is highly recommended to anyone wishing further to explore waqf in a Central Asian context.
³⁶ Girs, Otchet, 352.
³⁷ Mulk—a form of private landholding, abolished by the Russians in 1873. See the next chapter.
³⁸ Ignat’ev, Ob’yasnitel’naya Zapiska, 88.
³⁹ PSZ Sob. 3 Vol. VI (1886), No. 3814, 286–7.
where von Kaufman quickly assigned him to assist General Abramov in
dealing with the tricky question of land rights in the Zarafshan Valley.⁴⁰
He made notes on fifty-five different waqfs belonging to institutions
in the immediate neighbourhood of Samarkand, describing when they
were created (most were quite recent, dating from the 1830s and 40s),
who by, how much land they had, and which mosques and madrasahs
they supported.⁴¹ Kun also collected manuscript copies of twenty-one
deeds of waqf, but his work was never completed, and certainly the mass
expropriation of waqfs, which at one time seems to have been envisaged,
ever took place.⁴² Some early problems were caused by the division
of waqf estates between Bukhara and Russian Turkestan. In 1869
Abramov remarked in a report to von Kaufman that his Chancellery
was snowed under with appeals from the owners and administrators
of waqf land, claiming that they were being unfairly taxed, while he
had no means of determining which were genuine and which were
fraudulent.⁴³ By 1870 Abramov was able to report that mosques and
madrasahs in Samarkand owned property worth 7,800 roubles a year in
Bukhara, in Bukhara city, Karshi, Hissar, and other places, whilst the
Zarafshan Okrug contained waqf belonging to Bukharan institutions
worth 1,270 roubles a year. The Bukharan Government had initially
refused to recognize the right of institutions in Samarkand to these
waqfs, as they now lay in the Dar ul-Harb, and Abramov responded
by forbidding the remittance of revenue from waqfs in Samarkand to
Bukhara, whereupon an agreement was rapidly reached.⁴⁴ In all there
were 142 separate waqfs in Samarkand, a total of 51,991 tanaps⁴⁵ of
land.⁴⁶ Their status and validity were still being discussed in the early
twentieth century. In 1891 the Governor-General ruled that all deeds of
waqf should bear the seal of one of the Khans, although this had never

⁴⁰ AV F.33 Op.1 D.33, ‘Lichnye Dokumenty A. L. Kuna’, 12ob–14ob; N. A. Maev,
‘A. L. Kun’, TV, 22 Nov. 1888, No. 46; Kun was a Catholic, the son of a Hungarian
immigrant. His premature death meant that his impact on Oriental scholarship was
limited, but he left one startling legacy in the form of Turkestanskii Al’bom, which he
edited under von Kaufman’s instructions.
⁴¹ AV F.33 Op.1 D.25, ‘Vyborki iz vakufnykh dokumentov, medresya i mechetei,
⁴⁵ Tanab, always written as Tanap in Russian. The native land measurement in
Turkestan. 2 ½ tanaps were equal to 1 desyatina, so they were just over an acre in area.
⁴⁶ TsGARUz F.1 Op.14 D.22, 43.
previously been a requirement of Muslim law in Central Asia. In 1895 a full survey of the deeds of waqf in Samarkand Province was begun at the request of the central administration. All mosques, khanakas, and madrasahs in Samarkand were required to produce documents from the Bukharan period to prove their claims, some of which were refused. Much ‘historical enquiry’ was advocated in order to establish what had been waqf in the time of the Khans, and whether it had been exempt from taxation. Their validity or otherwise was judged by seeing if they bore the necessary seals, and comparing them to translations of ‘legitimate’ deeds of waqf from the Ferghana Province made by V. P. Nalivkin the previous year, at the request of the Military Governor, for that province’s waqf commission. In 1906, writing about the results of this survey, one report suggested that most of the documents presented lacked seals, and were so unsatisfactory that the majority of waqfs could be legitimately abolished, although the author acknowledged that this might be a rather inflammatory move. One waqf which occasioned particular debate was that of Sheikh Muhammad Khoja’s khanaka, because it had been created after the conquest. Having established that this had received the personal permission of the Governor-General in 1875, its legitimacy was confirmed. Hujras, karikhanas, and khanakas came in for much scrutiny, and the former two were deemed to be ‘private’ places of prayer by the Ferghana waqf commission and, hence, ineligible for the tax exemption accorded to waqf. The Ferghana Commission was very suspicious of khanakas as well, given that they were known haunts of Ishans and other Sufi undesirables, but as public institutions held that they were entitled to exemption. The Samarkand Commissioners, however, argued that many khanakas were little more than roadside inns for Sufi brotherhoods, or private institutions for the reading of the Koran, and that only those attached to public mosques should be exempt from the land tax. Sergei Abashin has recently published a fascinating collection of documents from the late 1890s relating to the Dahbid madrasah’s waqf, showing that because of doubts over the

48 Khanagah—a sort of lodging-house for itinerant Sufi Sheikhs and their Murids, often attached to a Saint’s tomb.
49 TsGARUz F.1 Op.18 D.10,578, 7ob.
50 TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,662a, 12ob.
51 TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,147, 2, 11, 74–ob.
52 Hujrah—a place of contemplation; Qari Khaneh—a hostel for Koran readers.
53 TsGARUz F.1 Op.18 D.10,578, 8ob–9.
accuracy and authenticity of the documents presented to the Samarkand waqf Commissioners, and their strong recommendation not to recognize them, after a four-year delay the provincial administration finally decided that some of the madrasah’s endowments should be resumed, and certain tax privileges revoked.\textsuperscript{54} Such instances remained extremely rare: in the end, as the local historian Valentii Vyatkin observed in 1912, Kun’s unfinished work of the 1860s remained the most detailed survey of waqf property in Samarkand,\textsuperscript{55} as the waqf Commissioners never completed their work there; it was only in Ferghana that waqf property was ever officially registered.\textsuperscript{56}

Supervision of waqf’s was minimal, but there were occasional cases of gross mismanagement in which the authorities might intervene. Crews refers to an instance in Kokand in 1881 where the elections to the post of Mutavali (manager) of the endowment of the Chalpak madrasah had been rigged.\textsuperscript{57} In Khujand in 1900 the Mutavali of the waqf which supported the Shagi madrasah, Mullah Nabi, was found to have embezzled 1,194 roubles from the revenues.\textsuperscript{58} The choice of his successor occasioned much trouble, and the story reveals that whilst the Russians officially had no powers of appointment, they did take an interest and occasionally made an attempt to influence the decision. In this case the Mutavali was supposed to be chosen by the descendants of the Kokand Kush-begi who had created the waqf in 1824 and the inhabitants of the quarter where the madrasah was located (there is no suggestion that these principles were universal throughout Turkestan). No descendants could be found in Khujand and the District Commandant pointed out that the neighbourhood where the madrasah was located had a population of over 20,000, many of them poor, and there could be no question of allowing them to conduct a popular election. In the end the District Commandant decided to appoint his own candidate, Kamal Khoja, who was considered suitable because he had a son who was learning Russian.\textsuperscript{59} That was about as far as the Russians were prepared to go in dealing with what they themselves described as one of the ‘tap-roots’ of Islam, a religion they wanted to disappear.

\textsuperscript{54} S. N. Abashin, ‘Islam v Byurokraticheskoi praktiki tsarskoi administratsii Turkestana (Vakufnoe Delo Dakhbitskogo Medrese 1892–1900 gg.)’, SRIO, 7 (155), ’Rossiya i Musul’manskii mir’ (Moscow, 2003), 163–91.
\textsuperscript{55} V. L. Vyatkin, O Vakufakh Samarkandskoi Oblasti (Samarkand, 1912), 95–6.
\textsuperscript{56} Williams, ‘Land Reform in Turkestan’, 434.
\textsuperscript{57} Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, 272–3.
\textsuperscript{58} TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.5,999, 11–12. \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 23–ob.
HAJ

The pilgrimage to Mecca was identified with *waqf* as a major breeding-ground for Muslim fanaticism, but until the 1890s it barely registered in the official consciousness, and thereafter measures to regulate or prevent it proved ineffectual. A short official study of the *Haj* was published in 1899 as part of the wider effort to educate officials in the tenets of Islam in the aftermath of the Andijan uprising. It was hostile in tone, unsurprising given that it was largely based on an earlier book by M. A. Miropiev, who wrote at length on the role of *Haji* in stoking ‘fanatical’ hatred of unbelievers among Muslims.⁶⁰ In 1897 a circular from St Petersburg was distributed to all the provincial administrations, commenting on the problems with the disorganized state of the *Haj* as it then stood, and asking for reports on the numbers of pilgrims from each district making the journey.

In general the *Haj*, particularly in its present form, undoubtedly serves as one of the most powerful weapons for the stimulation and strengthening of Muslim fanaticism, in the sense of the striving towards religio-political exclusiveness. The basis of this is the secret acknowledgement of the sacred leader of all Sunni Muslims, whatever their nationality or government—The Turkish Sultan. He is the spiritual and temporal sovereign of all orthodox believers, and his protégé the *Sherif* of Mecca is entirely and directly subordinate to him in all matters of belief; as the high priest he unites the remaining Muslims of the whole world, who are not directly subjects of the Sultan.⁶¹

Russian dislike of the *Haj* was based partly on this exaggerated belief in the power and sway of the Ottoman Sultan and the Hashemites over the Tsar’s subjects. More generally the pilgrimage reaffirmed the separateness of the Muslim population and took them beyond the boundaries of the Empire in large numbers to places where they could not be supervised and might be exposed to dangerous ideas. There were two principal routes used by pilgrims from Turkestan to the Hedjaz. The most popular ran from Samarkand south across Bukhara and Afghanistan to Peshawar

---

⁶⁰ Poruchik V. I Yarov-Ravskii, ‘Palomnichestvo (khadzh) v Mekku i Medinu’, *Sbornik Materialov po Musul’manstvu* (St Ph., 1899), 129–56; M. A. Miropiev, *Religioznoe i politicheskoe znachenie khadzha* (Kazan, 1877).

in British India (a journey of about a month on horseback), then by train to Bombay or Surat, and thence by steamer to Jeddah. A pilgrim halting only briefly on the way could expect to reach Mecca in approximately 45 days, and would spend a maximum of 75 roubles in 1896. He might be able to make the trip for just 50, particularly as the pious Muslims of Bombay donated extensively to charities which paid for poor pilgrims’ passages to Jeddah. The opening of the Transcaspian Railway to Samarkand in 1888 meant that some now chose to travel via Krasnovodsk, Baku, Batumi, Constantinople, and Port Said instead, which took just 25 days but cost over 100 roubles one-way. The latter part of this route had become popular with wealthier Muslims from outside the Russian Empire also once the railway from Baku to Poti was completed in 1872. One interesting pilgrimage account is the Safarnamah of a Shia scholar from Persia, Mirza Muhammad Hussain Farahani, who made the journey along the Transcaucasian Railway in 1885–6. He complained of the expense and of the dirtiness and dishonesty of the Russians, particularly officials and railwaymen. Apparently the communities of Persian traders in Baku and Batumi also did their best to fleece pilgrims from their own country, and it is likely that the same was true for pilgrims from Turkestan. The speediness of the journey was some compensation for these drawbacks, but the cost alone meant most pilgrims preferred the Indian route. Officials estimated that 4,000–5,000 pilgrims, most without passports, travelled to India via Afghanistan every year. Few of these were from Samarkand Province itself—most came from Ferghana and Kashgar and some from Syr-Darya Province. Some wealthy Samarkandis, it seems, preferred the more expensive Transcaspian route, which lay mostly through Russian territory, but most did not. There were a number of guides or Dalilis in Mecca and Jeddah who looked after Russian subjects, with Sayyid Muhammad Kuchek, a Bukharan, taking responsibility for pilgrims from Samarkand, Tashkent, Khujand, Marghelan, and the town of Turkestan. Nevertheless officials claimed that the mortality rate among pilgrims was high, and that they remained vulnerable to rip-offs. Although humanitarian concerns and fear of disease played their part in the Russian concerns about the Haj, most worrying of

---

all was the fact that so many of the Empire’s Muslim subjects were travelling, passportless, into British territory and back again. There was an imperative need to somehow push pilgrims towards the Transcaspian route and prevent them from taking the cheaper road through India with its potentially subversive influences.\(^{64}\) An outbreak of bubonic plague in Bombay in 1897 provided one pretext for a ban. Colonel Chertov, then Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District, wrote the following note to the members of the native administration under his jurisdiction on 6 February 1898:

In view of the worsening of this epidemic in India, it has been decided to leave in force for 1898 the ban on Russian pilgrims passing through the area of the outbreak. Having been informed of this, I request you to announce these instructions in all places, in bazaars and at village meetings, so that they become generally known. Also you must explain and convince the people through the most influential and respected individuals of the untimeliness of the pilgrimage at the moment for all members of the native administration.\(^{65}\)

Their reliance on the native Aksakals and Volost Upraviteli\(^ {66}\) to put the ban into effect, and the methods they were expected to use, reveal clearly Russian impotence on this issue. In the general atmosphere of Islamophobic paranoia after Andijan these measures were extended, not least because the Dukchi Ishan who led the uprising was said to have spent four years in Mecca and Medina after performing the Haj.\(^ {67}\) This proved ineffective: the Russian authorities feared that interference in the pilgrimage could provoke a further violent reaction from their Muslim subjects, and the ban was speedily dropped. This left them with a dilemma: they could not prevent Muslims from going on Haj, but they were ill-equipped to supervise the activities of pilgrims once they had crossed the borders of the Empire, or to control the routes they used.

The Haj, through its attendant consequences, should undoubtedly be considered a dangerous and undesirable phenomenon in the eyes of Government. However, as by nature it is not susceptible to eradication, it must be considered simply as an inevitable and endurable evil. It should be placed under certain sensible restrictions and established on such terms as will both weaken its darker side and at the same time improve the sorry lot of the pilgrims themselves.\(^ {68}\)

---

\(^{64}\) TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.4,370, 26–7 ob, 32.


\(^{66}\) A native official, normally with responsibility for around 2,000 households in Turkestan: see Ch. 5.

\(^{67}\) Sal’kov, ‘Andizhanskoе Vosstanie’, 18–19.

\(^{68}\) TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.4,370, 6.
This led to the paradox that by the end of the nineteenth century, far from abolishing the *Haj*, the Tsarist State was actually attempting to provide subsidized transport and other facilities to make it a less risky undertaking under state control. Together with new consulates at Jeddah and Baghdad to supervise the pilgrims’ welfare, the Ministry of the Interior wanted to make it easier for pilgrims to acquire a legitimate Russian passport. Above all, however, the Russians desired to put the *Haj* on a more organized footing with the pilgrims travelling in large groups supervised by ‘reliable’ Muslims or civil servants, on special trains on the Transcaspian and Transcaucasian Railways, and Government steamers to take them from the Black Sea ports to Jeddah: in effect, pilgrimage package holidays organized by the Tsarist State. Whilst these ideas never really came to fruition, they show clearly that the Russians were not prepared to be ruthless in their struggle to undermine the pillars of Islam.

**EDUCATION**

Under von Kaufman almost no attempt was made to attract Muslims into Russian educational institutions, of which there were precious few in any case. There were some rare examples of Russian-language schools being established by private initiative, such as that set up by a former private in the 9th Turkestan Line Battalion called Sultanov (probably a Tatar), who was working as a translator in the Samarkand District Commandant’s Chancellery. However, this school closed after five years, and never seems to have had more than 15–20 pupils, mostly adults anxious to acquire Russian; in 1871 there were ten Muslims, seven Jews, and three Hindus. As indicated above, by the early 1880s the Governor-General himself was having doubts about the wisdom of *Ignorirovanie*. Attacks on this policy in the press were frequent, and none was more cogent than that of the *Jadid* reformer Iskander Mirza in *Vostochnoe Obozrenie*. In a passionate rejoinder to an article

---

defending complete Ignorirovanie of ‘fanatical’ Muslims by the Islamophobe Miropiev (published in the same journal the previous year), Mirza argued that a more active integrationist policy was needed, as the mere fact of Russian power and the failure of the Islamic State would not be enough to win the population over. Only through ‘enlightenment’ (i.e. western education) would Muslims come to embrace progress:

Naturally it may well be that Russian civilisation in Turkestan has more of a disposition towards the destruction of Islam, than the British and the French in India and Algeria, where they have hitherto been unable to do this, notwithstanding all the efforts of their enlightened missionaries; but to rely solely on the might of Russia to achieve this in relation to the religious beliefs of Russian Muslims seems to me to be unfounded. . . . it would be more expedient in this great and important matter of moral integration through the enlightenment of various religions and peoples to rely on other, more cultural methods better fitted to the end of the 19th century, such as the raising of the economic and material welfare and scientific and religious freedom, rather than on the ignorirovanie and destruction of Islam.

Furthermore the russification of the inorodtsy, especially Muslims, through enlightenment, in the sense of a moral integration, will only be possible in my view when, firstly, a mutual respect is established between these two religions—between Islam and Orthodoxy; secondly, when Russian Muslims understand that their religious education is by no means opposed to progress, and does not preclude their intellectual development in all fields of human knowledge; thirdly, when the education offered to Muslims by Russian pedagogues will be such as is suitable to them in moral and intellectual terms, and will be of use to them; finally, fourthly, and most importantly, when Russian Muslims are certain that complete toleration exists in Russia, and that religious propaganda does not follow on the heels of Russian speech.

A year after this was written, in 1884, Governor-General Rosenbach decided that some means of teaching the population Russian was needed, if only to provide clerks for the official chancelleries, and reduce the influence of Tatar interpreters. This saw the establishment of the new ‘Russian-native’ schools, which, it was hoped, would also begin to introduce the natives of Turkestan to the wonders of western thought. The new schools were intended to educate both poorer Russians and natives, although not side by side: so worried was the administration that even this modest measure might be construed as proselytization.

---

72 Miropiev, o Polozhenii Russkikh Inorodtsev, 43–4.
by stealth that Muslim children were to be taught separately, by native teachers who were largely free from official interference. Parents were assured that their offspring would be educated in all the subjects that might be expected at a traditional maktab, with the sole addition of Russian lessons.⁷⁴ Accordingly, the first Russian-native school opened in Tashkent on 19 December 1884, in the house of Said Azim-Bai, a prominent merchant and ‘honoured citizen’. Initially the school had 39 pupils, all boys, and Ostroumov described its opening in fulsome terms, as marking a new era in the enlightenment of the Sarts.⁷⁵ V. P. Nalivkin, who was the first teacher at the school, recorded a rather different impression of the native response:

The natives put on forced smiles, bowed, said that they did not know how to thank the government and local authorities for their unceasing care for them and their children, but in reality they believed none of what they said, and for a long time were unable to resolve the question of why this new school had opened, as it was scarcely needed by the population. One guessed that children would be turned into soldiers here; another opined that it was merely a frivolous notion for those who received good salaries and weren’t occupied with anything serious; a third maintained that the school was necessary for someone and for some reason, but why this was so would be difficult to discover for the time being, as the Governor-General had been sworn to absolute secrecy.⁷⁶

Another school in Samarkand opened soon afterwards, and they slowly spread throughout Turkestan. From the outset they were beset by problems of low attendance and lack of funds. The first Russian-native school in Khujand was opened in 1895, apparently in response

---

⁷⁶ V. P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy: Ran’she i Teper’* (Tashkent, 1913), 106; Vladimir Petrovich Nalivkin (1852–1918) was a leading educationist in Turkestan, and perhaps more than any other the voice of the ‘Third Element’ in that region. From the nobility of the Moscow Province, he was educated at the Pavlovsky Military Academy and entered the Orenburg Cossack brigade in 1871. After leaving military service with the rank of Staff-Captain in 1878 he served in the military administration as a civilian in various capacities, spending many years as an administrator in the Ferghana Province, before taking charge of the Russian-native schools 1885–90, and at one point becoming the Governor-General’s secretary. However, he was an outspoken critic of Russia’s record in Turkestan, becoming a member of the 2nd Duma and heading the Provisional Government’s Turkestan Committee after the February Revolution, before joining the Tashkent Soviet in 1917 and briefly controlling its armed forces. He committed suicide on the grave of his wife in 1918. See Natal’ya Lukashova, ‘V. P. Nalivkin: eshche odna zamechatel’naya zhizn’, in S. Panarin (ed.), *Evraziya. Lyudi i Mify* (Moscow, 2003), 72–94; Baskhanov, *Voennye Vostokovedy*, 70.
to popular demand, as the District Commandant reported that many influential natives had been attending evening classes to improve their Russian (it is unclear whether this was really the case, as he was under some pressure to provide encouraging reports of the progress of enlightenment). No additional money was forthcoming from the provincial treasury, and the cost was estimated to be 2,035 roubles a year, out of a town budget of just 10,000 roubles. As the town was already over 4,000 roubles in deficit, the District Commandant was authorized to raise another 10,000 roubles per annum in 1894, effectively doubling the urban tax rate, and the school was finished a year later.\footnote{TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.7844, 1, 6ob, 21, 25.}

In an effort to encourage attendance at the schools, the Russians sometimes resorted to fairly crude pieces of propaganda, such as the reminiscences of Ibn Amin Bek, youngest son of the former Khan of Kokand, who recalled his schooling and progressive Russification (including his mother’s tears) in an article (originally in ‘Sart’) for the \emph{Turkestanskaya Tuzemmaya Gazeta}\footnote{Turkestanskaya Tuzemmaya Gazeta—Turkestan Native Gazette, an official publication whose title in ‘Sart’ was \textit{Turkistan Wilayatining Gazeti}. See Ostroumov, ‘Turkestanskaya Tuzemmaya Gazeta’, in \textit{Sarty} (1908), 156–205 for a history of the paper by its long-serving editor.} which concluded ‘Listen to me, brother Muslims. Study the Russian language, send your children to Russian schools and introduce the study of the Russian language and Russian sciences to the Madrasahs. These sciences do not interfere with our faith, but are useful. Your children and grandchildren will bless you.’\footnote{Ostroumov, \textit{Sarty} (1890), 168–74.}

There were some indications that the wealthy and those with positions in the native administration were sending their children to attend the schools and the administration was anxious to enlist their loyalty and support. In 1900 Governor-General Dukhovskoi decided to organize an educational expedition for the children of ‘influential natives’ to St Petersburg and European Russia. He wanted five children from each province, and those chosen from Samarkand were an interesting, if unrepresentative group. All five attended the Russian-native schools in their respective towns, and they included one 13-year-old Tajik from Samarkand, the son of the Siab Volost Upravitel, another Tajik from Samarkand who was the son of a landowner, the 20-year-old son of the Peishambe Volost Upravitel, who was at the school in Katta-Kurgan, and two others from Khujand and Djizak, the latter of whom described
himself as the ‘son of poor parents’.⁸⁰ These excursions to Europe for young Sarts continued until 1905, when they were discontinued owing to budget cuts after the Russo-Japanese War.⁸¹

There was no indication that the appeal of a Russian education extended beyond that section of the native population which was already involved with the administration of Turkestan, and it was not merely Russian parsimony which limited the effectiveness of the new schools. Suspicion of Russian motives and religious opposition remained a problem. In 1894 Mullah Nur Muhammad, the teacher at the Russian-native school in Djizak, complained that he was being consistently undermined by an ‘Islamic conspiracy’ organized by the local Qazi, aimed at keeping children away from the school. As the District Commandant reported:

In the course of his 18 year service as a teacher at a Mahomedan school, and eight years service at a Russian-native school he has always enjoyed the honour and respect of the local people, and was received in the best society in the town of Djizak. This continued until the appointment of Mullah Ghiyas ud-din Sufiev to the post of Djizak Narodniy Sud. Since then he has noticed that all those who are on good terms with Sufiev have begun to treat him with hostility and no longer greet him. They have taken their pupils out of the school, and rumours are circulating about him in the bazaar... The Popular Judge is clearly ill-disposed towards both teacher Muhammad and to the school itself, he calls the teacher a Russian dog and will not allow Muslim children to be sent to the school, because of which out of 23 pupils in 1893 there are now only 11.⁸²

A lengthy investigation failed to establish conclusively whether or not these allegations were true, and the whole story may have been fabricated in an attempt to discredit the Djizak judge as part of some local political feud. The authorities in Samarkand did not appear to view it as an unlikely tale, however, and reacted to it with wearied familiarity: Ostroumov similarly blamed the limited appeal of the schools on Islamic ‘fanaticism’, whilst V. P. Salkov, analysing the origins of the Andijan uprising, wrote that the failure of the Russian-native schools was owing largely to the machinations of Ishans, another popular Russian belief.⁸³ Together with what the Russians regarded as religious prejudice, the

schools were handicapped by a limited curriculum and poor teaching. In 1896 the Governor of Samarkand Province reported that

The reason for the weak connection between the natives and Russian enlightenment is simply that apart from an elementary understanding of grammar, painfully absorbed by the natives over several years, the Russian-native schools give the natives no practical knowledge. The Russian-native schools produce only semi-literate people, and whilst they might be preferable to those entirely ignorant of Russian language and writing if they were to be appointed to positions in the rural administration, they are admitted to these only in exceptional circumstances, determined by the Turkestan statutes.

He suggested that the study of some practical crafts be introduced to the Russian-native schools, together with a weighting in favour of Russian-speakers in elections to the native administration. The former suggestion was not acted upon, but three years later in 1899 the Governor of the province, in a bid to reduce the influence of Tatar interpreters, launched an initiative calling for more natives educated in the Russian-native schools to be appointed as translators, clerks, and rural administrators. The response from the various Districts in Samarkand was disappointing. One applicant was found from the school in Khujand, but none at all from anywhere else, whilst there were no appropriately qualified Russians. The schools were not merely failing as agents of enlightenment and mass russification; they could not even provide the native administration with a trickle of officials literate in Russian. Pahlen concluded in 1908 that ‘The lower Russian-native schools and national seminaries have not succeeded in obtaining the confidence of the people, and in no way serve to assimilate them with Russian principles.’

In India, by contrast, although by and large the State did little directly for primary and secondary education, to a large extent missionary education helped to fill this gap, something which was impossible in Turkestan with its ban on proselytization. By the late nineteenth century the network of missionary schools, in Northern India at least, had been largely subordinated to Indian aims, and parents could send their children to them to acquire a coveted English education without fear of attempts to convert them to Christianity.
of Muslims in the Russian educational system remained extremely low until the end of Tsarist rule. As might be expected, very few attended the relatively elite institutions which had been established primarily for the children of officers and officials, and most of these were Tatars or the children of Kazakh notables: even in 1916 there were no more than 272 Muslims in Russian primary schools and 170 attending gymnasia.\textsuperscript{88} However, the Russian-native schools were intended specifically as an agency of russification, where the children of those ‘influential natives’ whose support the administration coveted might learn to speak Russian, and thus reduce the role of interpreters. They were also supposed to be the front line in the war against ‘fanaticism’ in the younger generation. Nevertheless, whilst they increased over the years from the 116 students who were enrolled in 1886, the overall numbers were not encouraging, with only 3,000 students in Russian-native schools across the whole of Turkestan in 1909.\textsuperscript{89}

Detailed information on Muslim educational institutions was assiduously collected by the District authorities, and revealed all too starkly the very limited impact which the Russian-native schools had had. By 1906 there were, by comparison, 6,000 \textit{maktab}s and 328 madrasahs in Turkestan.\textsuperscript{90} In 1876 I. Virsky believed that the Zarafshan Okrug had 968 \textit{maktab}s with 8,642 students, as well as 31 madrasahs with 999 students.\textsuperscript{91} Numbers seem to have remained fairly constant over the next 30 years. A report on Muslim educational institutions in the Samarkand District in 1907 revealed that there were 806 \textit{maktab}s, with 7,138 students, or over twice as many in this one district as attended Russian-native schools throughout Turkestan.\textsuperscript{92}

In 1891 the District Commandants in Samarkand were asked to carry out an investigation into the curriculum in the \textit{maktab}s and madrasahs in their Districts, as the Inspector of Education for the Ferghana and Samarkand Provinces had reported that Bukharan, Kazan, and Orenburg ‘mullahs’ were spreading Muslim propaganda among the Kazakhs. For some reason it was thought that these shadowy figures

\textsuperscript{88} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 84.  \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 159.  \textsuperscript{90} N. A. Bobrovnikov, \textit{Russko-Tuzemnyya Uchilishcha, mekteby i medresy Srednei Azii} (St Pb., 1906), 41.  \textsuperscript{91} Virskii, ‘Svedeniya o Zeravshanskom Okrugu’, 114–15.  \textsuperscript{92} TsGARUz F.20 Op.1 D.931, 1. Turkestan never had a debate over the incorporation of \textit{maktab}s into the state system of the kind which occurred in the \textit{zemstvo} provinces of Kazan, Orenburg, and Ufa; see Norihiro Naganawa, ‘Maktab or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education among the Volga-Ural Muslims’, in Tomohiko Uyama (ed.), \textit{Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia} (Hokkaido, 2007), 65–97.
were operating from Muslim educational institutions in Samarkand Province. The possible ‘fanaticization’ of the nomadic population of Turkestan often exercised Russian officials more than the latent ‘fanaticism’ of the settled areas. Although they had detailed figures on the numbers of Muslim educational institutions, the Russian authorities were dependent on the native administration to keep them informed as to what was actually taught in them. Unsurprisingly they generally reported that all was well, and that no ‘fanatical’ indoctrination was going on in the maktab{s} of Turkestan. The Samarkand District Commandant wrote to his superiors in Tashkent that ‘According to the reports I have received from the Qazis and Volost Upraviteli, it seems that the local mullahs in my Uyezd in the schools connected to mosques teach the native children knowledge which in spirit is not harmful to Government, and by and large they teach them literacy.’

It is quite possible, indeed probable, that this was true, as the traditional curriculum of the maktab{s} consisted of education in reading and writing the Arabic script, together with the study of some religious texts, and it was only Russian paranoia which rendered them inherently ‘fanatical’ and ‘subversive’. Nevertheless, the Andijan uprising of 1898 brought all Muslim religious and educational institutions under greater suspicion and scrutiny.

**THE ANDIJAN UPRISING AND FEAR OF PAN-ISLAMISM**

According to at least one historian the bungled attack upon the Andijan garrison in 1898 by Muhammad Ali Diwana of the village of Ming-Tepe, better known as the Dukchi Ishan, and his Kipchak followers is best understood as part of a long-standing pattern of tribal revolt against central authority in the Ferghana Valley, which can be traced back to the days of the Kokand Khanate. More recently, using

---

94 Beatrice Forbes Manz, ‘Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana under the Russians’, RR, 46 (1987), 269–71. The Kipchaks were a nomadic Uzbek tribe based in Eastern Ferghana and the surrounding mountains, who from 1845 to 1865 effectively controlled the Kokand Khanate. Manz believes the uprising should be interpreted as an attempt on their part to regain the power they once had.
a little-known biography of the Ishan, Bakhtiyar Babajanov has been able to show how he stood in a long tradition of charismatic Central Asian spiritual leaders, and argued that the uprising’s primary motivation was religious—although not in a form that was approved of by the ‘ulama—possibly because he did not belong to any recognized Khoja lineage the Dukchi Ishan was roundly condemned by Sami as a charlatan preying upon the credulity of the people of Ferghana.

In early Soviet times the uprising was deemed to be a ‘genuinely revolutionary’ movement of the oppressed labouring classes in Ferghana, notwithstanding the ‘religious colouring’ which it took on, although by the 1950s it had been reclassed as ‘reactionary’ and there were hints of the involvement of British agents.

This was not how the Russians understood it at the time: Andijan realized all their fears about the ‘fanatical’ nature of the Muslim population, the dangers of an Islamic revolt, and holy war; it called into question the whole policy of Ignorirovanie. As a consequence, it provoked a flurry of circulars and reports on the mood of the natives in the other Provinces of Turkestan including Samarkand, where the Military Governor, Major-General Fedorov, reported considerable agitation. Elections to the positions of Volost Upravitel and Selskii Starshina were temporarily suspended by order of the Governor-General, albeit with some misgivings from Fedorov, who suspected that this measure might help to inflame native opinion still further, given that the District Commandants were, as he put it, ‘insufficiently acquainted’ with the local population to be able to make informed choices, and the perevodchiki (translators) were likely to have the deciding influence.

The uprising added fuel to the debate between the advocates of military rule in Turkestan, who argued that security and strategic considerations precluded the introduction of civilian rule (and that the reforms following the Girs Commission’s report had weakened the administration), and the reformers, who argued that it was precisely this which was isolating Turkestan’s Muslims from currents

95 B. M. Babadzhanov (trans. and comm.), Manakib-i Dukchi Ishan (Almaty, 2004).
97 E. Shteinberg, ‘Andizhanskoe Vosstanie 1898g.’, KA, 91 (1938), 123–8.
100 Ibid., 115.
of change in the rest of the Empire and retarding *sblizhenie*. Both sides claimed that Andijan vindicated their point of view, but it was the military who could claim a victory.¹⁰² This was not so much because of a fear that there would be more rebellions stemming from ‘backwardness’, but because of a perceived new Pan-Islamic threat: there were suggestions that the Dukchi *Ishan* had received a *khalat* and other encouragement from the Turkish Sultan:¹⁰³ similar conspiracy theories were touted in the writings of Krymsky and Miropiev and increasingly widely believed.¹⁰⁴ Salkov’s virulently anti-Islamic book on the uprising, which among other things accused the *Ishan* of raping a minor, was circulated to all secondary schools, free libraries, and reading-rooms.¹⁰⁵

On the ‘Muslim Question’ Pahlen concluded that the new railways and strategically positioned garrisons, coupled with the loyalties of newly arrived Russian and Caucasian settlers, made Turkestan a good deal more secure against revolt than might otherwise appear. Nevertheless, there were no grounds for complacency, owing to the shadowy but growing influence of Pan-Islamism: ‘Nowadays the organisation of *Ishans* and *Murids* in Turkestan continues to exist and develop, ever more strongly linked to the general Islamist movement, both to the Volga Tatars and to the Mahomedans of the Caucasus and Turkey... The political tendency of Pan-Islamism is towards acknowledging the Turkish Sultan as leader. The danger is that the devotion of the native population of Turkestan to another power will cause a national religious crisis.’¹⁰⁶ Nalivkin was of a similar opinion, writing that ‘The chief effect of our conquest of Turkestan has been a weakening of the antagonism between different social and political factions amongst the native population of the region, in a reconciliation amongst themselves, and in a giant step towards the union of the entire local Muslim population under the influence of a foreign power.’¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Brower, *Turkestan*, is good on this debate, which is the main theme of the book. See esp. 110–13.
¹⁰³ Sal’kov, *Andizhanskie Vostanie*, 39; *A Khalat* is a robe of honour rather like a dressing-gown, with great honorial significance at Timurid courts.
¹⁰⁵ Sal’kov, *Andizhanskie Vostanie*. The title-page of the Bodleian’s copy has a label indicating this, 32.
¹⁰⁷ Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy*, 75.
The Russians were worried about the new ideas coming from the Crimean and Volga Tatars, the Ottoman Empire, and India, and believed that they were potentially dangerous. The Jadid\textsuperscript{108} Muslim reformist movements in Turkestan which arose under this influence encountered hostility and suspicion from the Russian authorities from the outset, possibly influenced by the writings of anti-Islamic polemicists such as Miropiev, who reserved his most unpleasant outpourings for the Jadids.\textsuperscript{109} It is possible that it was he, writing under the pseudonym of ‘Mirshab’, who engaged in a polemical diatribe against the Crimean Tatar reformer Ismail Bey Gaspirali in the pages of the Samarkand newspaper Okraina in 1890–1, accusing him of fostering separatism and disloyalty to the Russian State among the Empire’s Muslims.\textsuperscript{110} Ostroumov, whose hostility to Islam softened somewhat with age, was less vitriolic about Islamic reformism, but nevertheless regarded it with deep suspicion and devoted a great deal of energy to alerting officialdom and the reading public to the danger it posed to the long-term aim of the civilization and (he clearly hoped, with his missionary background) Christianization of the Empire’s Muslims. He drew parallels with similar problems the British and French had suffered with their Islamic subjects in India and Algeria, and his views were extremely influential.\textsuperscript{111}

The Jadids were known as such because their main aim was to introduce the Usul ul-jadid or ‘new method’ of teaching into the maktab\textsuperscript{s} of Turkestan. Some of the changes thus initiated, such as the introduction of benches, desks, blackboards, and maps into classrooms, were perhaps merely cosmetic; others, such as the use of textbooks printed in Cairo, Kazan, or Constantinople, were rather more substantial.

\textsuperscript{108} Jadid—‘new’ in Arabic. This was not the name the reformers used themselves, but a somewhat derogatory term used by their opponents. They preferred to refer to themselves as Tarraqiparvarlar (progressives) or later simply as Yoshlar (Youth). See Gero Fedtke, ‘Jadids, Young Bukharians, Communists and the Bukharan Revolution: From an Ideological Debate in the Early Soviet Union’, in Von Kügelgen et al. (eds.), Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia, Vol. II, 489. On Jadidism more generally, see Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform; Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Réforme et Révolution chez les Musulmans de l’Empire Russe (Paris, 1981); S. A. Dudoignon and F. Georgeon (eds.), CMR, XXXVII: 1–2 Le Réformisme Musulman en Asie Centrale. Du ‘premier renouveau’ à la Soviétisation 1788–1937 (Jan.–Juin. 1996).

\textsuperscript{109} Miropiev, o Polozhenii Russkikh Inorodtsev, 3–7, 43–50.

\textsuperscript{110} ‘Mirshab’, ‘Voina s nevvyymi i voinstvuyushchii Tatarskii Listok’, Okraina (1890), No. 232, (1891) Nos. 9, 42.

\textsuperscript{111} See N. P. Ostroumov, Koran i Progress (Tashkent, 1901) 188–211; Islamovedenie (Tashkent, 1914), 18–33.
The first new-method maktab in Samarkand was established by one Khoja Mahmud in 1905, but it was located in the suburban village of Kaftar Khan in order to avoid undue attention from the authorities.¹¹² The prominence of Tatars in the Jadid movement and the degree to which it drew the Muslims of Central Asia into closer contact with the outside world led to fears that it was a cover for Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, an attitude shared even by Russian writers who were broadly sympathetic to the modernizing aims of the new-method schools.¹¹³

¹¹³ Bobrovnikov, Russko–Tuzemnyya Uchilishcha, 67; Edward Lazzerini, ‘From Bakchisarai to Bukhara in 1893. Ismail Bey Gasprinskii’s Journey to Central Asia’,

---

**Figure 2.** Sartskaya Shkol (Sart School) Samarkand c.1905-15: the blackboard and desks indicate that this is a new-method maktab. Prokudin-Gorskii Collection, Library of Congress. Ref: LC-DIG-prok-02304 DLC
Pahlen made this connection in his memoirs, writing of the regime’s fears about the ideas flowing from Constantinople and the example of the Young Turks: ‘My attention was drawn to the eager acceptance of this modernising trend in countries as far distant as Morocco, and I was told that the influence apparently wielded by its leaders was a symptom which Russian state policy could not afford to underestimate and which it needed to watch with great care . . . I got no satisfaction from the local Turkestan officials in the chancery of the Governor-General other than the usual “Oh, it’s the influence of the mullas over the masses”.’ A series of questionnaires on pan-Islamism was sent out to the District Commandants and, according to Pahlen, promptly handed by them to their interpreters to complete. As they were all Muslims, they inevitably reported that all was quiet. Meanwhile the secret police accidentally stumbled on a group of young Jadids in Katta-Kurgan who were said to be affiliated to a Pan-Islamic ‘Secret Society’ and have connections with the Young Turks. The evidence seized consisted principally of an educational programme for the reformed maktabs of Turkestan; hardly an elaborate Islamic conspiracy, but viewed with great suspicion nevertheless.¹¹⁴

The Jadids advocated the adoption of a standardized Turkic modelled on that used by Gaspirali’s newspaper Tarjuman (Interpreter), the first and leading Muslim reformist journal in the Russian Empire. In Turkestan at that time, owing both to censorship and a shortage of lithographers and printing presses, there were few organs of Muslim public opinion other than the official Turkestanskaya Tuzemnaya Gazeta, which first appeared in 1870 and was edited by Ostroumov from 1883 to 1917. Until 1881 responsibility for censorship lay with the Governor-General’s senior assistant, who was heavily burdened with other duties. A new censorship committee for private publications was established by Kolpakovsky, the acting Governor-General, in the interim period between von Kaufman’s death and Cherniaev’s appointment. Its principal focus was to be the threat from Islam, and accordingly Kolpakovsky asked for several Orientalist scholars to be appointed in order to scrutinize the fledgling native press and more importantly publications in Persian and Arabic, which were entering from India and the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁵ A number of short-lived reformist newspapers

¹¹⁴ Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, 45–6.
¹¹⁵ TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.224, 113.
appeared in Turkestan after the relaxation of the Empire-wide censorship laws in the wake of the Revolution of 1905.\textsuperscript{116}

By comparison with the Young Turks, or Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh generation, the achievements of the \textit{Jadids} were modest. They themselves were aware of this, and one account by an ‘Indian Muslim traveller’ expresses disgust at the backwardness and lack of hygiene he saw in Bukhara, together with the vast incomes wasted by the obscurantist ‘ulama of the madrasahs. He acknowledged that the population of Samarkand was better educated, but deplored what he saw as the ‘corruption’ of Islam in that city’s madrasahs, and expressed surprise that there was, as yet, no native newspaper.\textsuperscript{117} Although the Ottoman Empire was probably more important, India was a source of some of the ideas for Muslim cultural reform which enthused the \textit{Jadids}—Miropiev snarled that this ‘religious-reform movement’ had its origins in India, whilst the \textit{Jadid} writer Murza-Alim had written that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was a particular inspiration to Russian Muslims.\textsuperscript{118}

Were there parallels to Russian thinking in British attitudes to Islam? Did they view it as a comparable threat, and how did they approach it?

\textbf{ISLAM IN INDIA UNDER BRITISH RULE}

The religious situation in India was in many ways very different from that in Turkestan, most obviously in that, with the exception of the far north-west and east Bengal, Muslims were a religious minority, albeit formerly a ruling one in many areas. British attitudes towards Hinduism and the various popular cults of India need not concern us here, although they necessarily meant that there were multiple alien religions demanding the understanding and attention of British administrators, rather than just a single one. The Russians were well aware of the Indian


\textsuperscript{117} Abd-ur Rauf Fitrat, \textit{Razskazy Indiiskogo Puteshstvennika} (Samarkand, 1913), 3, 4, 19–23, 79. This is not a genuine traveller’s account, but a piece of \textit{Jadid} propaganda by the leading reformer ‘Abd ur-Rauf Fitrat, who was later purged under Stalin and is now an Uzbek official hero. The account was designed to make Turkestanis ashamed of their backwardness; it does show that the Muslim community in India was viewed as a model for reform.

\textsuperscript{118} Miropiev, \textit{o Polozhenii Russkikh Inorodtsev}, 4.
example as they debated the correct policy to be adopted towards Islam and the advisability of Christian proselytization in Turkestan. Although Kostenko mentioned with approval a supposed British policy of fining all Muslims who used the term ‘Kafir’ to describe Christians, on the whole the Russians were rather critical of the way the British handled Islam, particularly their willingness to countenance missionary activity which they considered to be exceptionally foolish and liable to provoke Muslim ‘fanaticism’.

Terentiev wrote of meeting an Afghan who described English missionaries preaching in the bazaars in India and denigrating Islam. ‘You Russians don’t do this, and rumours about this have reached India—everyone praises you for it.’

Snesarev believed that proselytization was simply stirring up trouble for the future, and Annenkov also particularly criticized British religious policy in India. By contrast, he claimed ‘The Russians have dealt with the religious question of the native inhabitants of Turkestan entirely equitably, and as far as I know, no Russian missionaries whatsoever have appeared there.’

It is doubtful if any Russians had followed the tortuous twists and turns of British religious policy in India, as first the East India Company and then the Crown struggled to divest themselves of responsibility for administering religious endowments and sought to pursue a strictly neutral policy towards religion. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the East India Company disliked missionaries as much as the Russian administration in Turkestan did. They were barred from proselytizing on British territory, just as Orthodox missionaries would later be barred from Turkestan, and for precisely the same reason, namely the probability that they would stir up the religious prejudices of a ‘fanatical’ population. It was only domestic political pressure (of a kind that simply did not exist in Russia) that forced their admittance: the zealous evangelicals of the Clapham Sect, led by William Wilberforce, had made the opening up of India to missionary enterprise one of their two principal aims (the other being the abolition of the slave trade). When the Company’s charter came up for renewal before Parliament

119 Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya, 71; Annenkov, Akhal-Tekhinskii Oazis, 25.
120 Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 353.
121 Snesarev, Indiya kak Glavnyi Faktor, 44.
122 Annenkov, Akhal-Tekhinskii Oazis, 27.
123 The most comprehensive (and certainly the most amusing) account of this is by Sir Alfred Lyall, ‘Our Religious Policy in India’, Asiatic Studies (London, 1884), 258–86.
124 ‘Copy of a Letter from the Governor-General in Council, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 2nd November 1807; relating to THE MISSIONARIES’, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 8 (1812–13), East India Affairs, No. 6, 45.
in 1813, the Court of Directors was forced to submit to a provision giving them a responsibility to support the propagation of the Christian religion and to permit missionaries to carry out their work anywhere within the Company’s dominions.¹²⁵

It was not until the 1840s that the Company’s own servants, military and civilian, began to reflect the increased piety of their middle-class brethren at home (with serious consequences for the Indian army, in particular), but the effects had been felt elsewhere long before this. Initially many missionaries attempted to target the clergy and educated classes, both Muslim and Hindu, in the hope that high-profile and socially elite converts would persuade their co-religionists to follow suit. Whilst this met with limited success in Calcutta and among the western-educated Hindu intelligentsia, its most significant consequences were the creation of the deist Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj, a form of ‘purified’ monotheistic Hinduism. The reaction among the Muslims of Upper India was somewhat different. When Delhi fell in 1803 Shah ‘Abd ul-Aziz, the most prominent of the Delhi ‘ulama, issued a fatwa declaring the Dar ul-Harb under Hanafi law, but this was not interpreted as a call to jihad, and the reaction to the British (who had driven out the Marathas, themselves not Muslim rulers) was largely pragmatic.¹²⁶

By 1807 most of the ‘ulama had come to an accommodation with their new rulers, who preserved the fiction of the Mughal Emperor’s sovereignty together with the structures of Islamic justice represented by the Qazi and Mufti. Nevertheless, an adjustment had to be made from State patronage of mosques and other institutions, which ceased, to that of private charity. Once the prop of the State was removed, many ‘ulama saw orthopraxy as their salvation, and following the example of the eighteenth-century Naqshbandi reformer Shah Waliullah of Delhi (who studied under Shaikh Abu Tahir Madini, the same instructor who taught Ibn al-Wahhab and was Shah ‘Abd ul-Aziz’s spiritual guide) they sought it in the Hedjaz, whence they returned with ideas of purifying their religion.¹²⁷ However, there was no direct threat to the religious status quo. Until 1813 no missionaries were permitted in Delhi in any

case, and it was some time before the currents of reform in Calcutta made themselves felt here, on the fringes of Punjab.

In 1827 the Ghazi ud-din Madrasah in Delhi adopted English classes under the encouragement of Sir Charles Trevelyan, despite misgivings that this might mark the beginnings of proselytization. Two years later it received a generous endowment from Itmiad ud-Daula, the Nawab of Lucknow, and its management was taken over by British officials. It was known thenceforth as Delhi College, with both an English and ‘Oriental’ section, in the former of which many prominent Muslim reformers, most notably Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, would receive their education in subjects such as European philosophy and science.¹²⁸ This was to have important long-term consequences for the development of Indian Islam, as was increasingly frequent contact with Christianity. From the 1830s Christian missionaries were to be found participating in munazaras, or public religious debates, with the ‘ulama of the major cities of the Gangetic plain. In 1833, for instance, the Revd Joseph Wolff, later to undertake a foolhardy expedition to Bukhara,¹²⁹ took part in a munaza in Lucknow which had been organized under the Nawab’s patronage.¹³⁰ Few if any conversions resulted from these, but they did have an impact on the way Muslim scholars thought about their religion at a time when many were seeking the reasons for the eclipse of the Mughal Empire and most of its Muslim successor-states. The impulse to purify grew stronger, as did a more combative attitude towards Christianity. In the 1840s and 50s increasing numbers of refutations of Christian doctrine were produced by Muslim scholars and, in 1854, another great munaza held at Agra took place at which a group of ‘ulama worsted the Revd Pfander, a Swiss missionary, by using Christian sources to attack his arguments.¹³¹

The contribution of Christian missionaries and proselytization in general to the outbreak of the Revolt of 1857 is too involved a topic to be discussed here in detail: fear of forced conversion was almost certainly a factor in the mutiny of the Bengal army, and this was brought on

¹²⁸ Narayani Gupta, Delhi between Two Empires 1803–1931 (Delhi, 1999), 6; Margrit Pernau (ed.), The Delhi College. Traditional Elites, the Colonial State, and Education before 1857 (Delhi, 2006).
¹²⁹ See the Revd Joseph Wolff, Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara (Edinburgh, 1852).
¹³¹ Ibid., 242–5.
partly by the increasing piety of some of its officers. Syed Ahmad Khan wrote that

The Missionaries did not confine themselves to explaining the doctrines of their own books. In violent and unmeasured language they attacked the followers and the holy places of other creeds; annoying, and insulting beyond expression the feelings of those who listened to them. In this way, too, the seeds of discontent were sown deep in the heart of the people.¹³²

Many administrators read these words, and they believed that the Mutiny was provoked by insensitive and over-eager proselytizing, and more generally by attempts to modernize India too quickly. The Russians shared the former, if not necessarily the latter, part of this belief. Most Russian officers believed that the Mutiny had been a Muslim rebellion, led by the Mughal Emperor at Delhi, whose suppression had led to the complete emasculation of the former Muslim ruling class, with potentially dire future consequences. This was not a wholly unreasonable view of the events of 1857, as it was shared by many Englishmen. At the ‘trial’ in January 1858 of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, for his part in the insurrection, the prosecutor, Major Harriott, had alleged that the near-senile old man had been at the heart of a vast Pan-Islamic conspiracy stretching from Constantinople and Mecca to Delhi. Despite its patent absurdity, this allegation was enthusiastically parroted in the British press and thence filtered through to Russia.¹³³

Sir Alfred Lyall wrote that the Mahomedans had ‘seized the lead’ in the 1857 Mutiny, so that ‘English turned on the Mahomedans as upon their real enemies and most dangerous rivals’, and this judgement was a common one.¹³⁴ Some scholars and journalists considered India’s Muslim population, most especially in the north, to be the single greatest threat to British rule after 1857, and their views vividly recall Russian fear of ‘Muslim fanaticism’ and the dire predictions attached to it. Dr William Wilson Hunter was perhaps the most prominent of these. A former Bengal Civil Servant, who later became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta and edited the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, in 1871 he published a pamphlet which gave lurid warning of the possible

¹³² Khan, *Indian Revolt*, 18.
¹³⁴ Sir Alfred Lyall, ‘Islam in India’, *Asiatic Studies*, 239; see Katherine Prior, ‘Lyall, Sir Alfred Comyn (1835–1911)’, *DNB* for a full account of Lyall’s distinguished career, which culminated in the Lieutenant-Governorship of the North-Western Provinces 1881–7.
consequences of offending the *amour propre* of the Indian Muslim population, who ‘arraign us on a list of charges as serious as have ever been brought against a Government’ exemplified in the deposition of the Mughal Emperor, the execution of his sons, interference with private *waqfs*, and the abolition of the *Qazis* and their courts in 1864.¹³⁵

Hunter would have thoroughly approved of *Ignorirovanie*, and his warnings do echo the Russian belief that the colonial state interfered with Islam at its peril. However, this was only one side of Anglo-Indian thinking about Islam, and it was not that which ultimately prevailed. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s 1859 pamphlet on the Mutiny, *Asbab-e Baghawat-e Hind*, published in English translation in 1873 as *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, did much to undermine the idea that there had been a concerted Muslim conspiracy in 1857 and to soften British attitudes.¹³⁶ It also made them more confident of the support of the leaders of Muslim society. Even Lyall, who was suspicious of Islam, described the quarrel between Muslims and their British rulers as if it were a domestic tiff, rather than an existential struggle:

I believe that, to other nations who act as bystanders, the real wonder is that the blunders are not more, and that unpleasant premonitory symptoms of trouble or ill-feeling are on the whole so slight. I have attempted to sketch, though much too rapidly and imperfectly, the principal causes and conditions which have originated and still keep up among the Mahomedans a certain irksome dissatisfaction with Government, and which must long postpone a complete reconciliation between us and that high-spirited but somewhat uncompromising community.¹³⁷

This language is very far removed from the Russian assumption of unreasoning fanaticism among their Muslim subjects. Lyall was certainly being over-optimistic about the assessment by Russian ‘bystanders’ of the relations between the British and the Indian Muslims, but as Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces his views carried considerable weight. The adherence of the British after 1857 to indirect rule and ‘aristocratic’ government by Indian society’s ‘natural’ leaders meant that the security and revenue of large territories in India was to a considerable degree dependent upon the co-operation and goodwill of

---


¹³⁷ Lyall, ‘Islam in India’, 256.
Muslim landlords, tribal chiefs, petty nawabs and khans, and, indeed, Sufi Pir. Hunter considered this to be a dangerous liability, but most British officials considered Muslims (at least in the north) to be among their more ‘manly’ and reliable subjects. This can be accounted for not only by the peculiarities of British ‘martial race’ theory, but by the fact that Muslims were a minority in India and potentially a very usefully against the remainder of the population; clearly this was not the case in Turkestan. A more telling comparison would be between the reaction of the different empires to Muslim religious, social, and cultural reform groups, exemplified by the all-India Muslim Educational Conference and the Jadids in Russian Turkestan.

The British attitude towards Islamic reform movements was generally more positive than that of the Russians. The so-called Wahhabis, or ‘Hindustani fanatics’ ensconced on the North-West Frontier, certainly came in for a good deal of opprobrium. The sect was founded by Sayyid Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, almost the only member of the North Indian ‘ulama who had interpreted Shah ‘Abd ul-Aziz’s fatwa of 1803 as a call to Jihad. He and his band of 900 or so followers moved to the frontier in 1823, just after Ranjit Singh’s conquest of the Peshawar area, and initially aimed at driving out the Sikhs before turning their attention to the British after their annexation of the Punjab in 1849. The ‘ulama of the Deoband madrasah also sometimes came under suspicion because of their supposed Wahhabi tendencies and the Government of India viewed the sect with dislike when it appeared in Lower Bengal, but by and large the British regarded Islamic attempts at modernization and increased connections with the Hedjaz and Constantinople with equanimity. Lyall specifically pooh-poohed the threat posed by the Wahhabis, which had been highlighted by Hunter, and instead asserted that ‘whatever may be the real convictions of Wahabism, without doubt

138 See next chapter.
140 This is necessarily a very brief sketch of Muslim reformist movements in British India. See Abdul Rashid Khan, The All-India Muslim Educational Conference (Karachi, 2001); D. Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation (Princeton, 1978); Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India.
141 Nizami, ‘Madrasah, Scholars and Saints’, 160, 221–64.
its followers are few throughout India, and are intensely unpopular with all other sects of Mahomedans in provinces where Mahomedan loyalty is infinitely more important to the security of our Government than in Bengal proper'.¹⁴³

By this he meant Punjab, already becoming a key recruiting-ground for the Indian army. Colonel Black, the Military Secretary to the Punjab Government, agreed that ‘The presence of a small and fanatical Wahabi colony on the north-west border has for some time directed attention to the Punjab as the most likely centre of Muhammadan intrigue; but the activity and influence of these exiles has been much exaggerated. The Lieutenant-Governor does not believe that there is any part of India where Muhammadans are so well-disposed to Government as in the Punjab.’¹⁴⁴

Lyall also welcomed evidence that educated Muslims were increasingly taking an interest in western knowledge and methods of learning, and considered that the leading Muslim reformers were broadly supportive of British rule. Most notable among these was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, founder of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College (later University) at Aligarh, whose stature in India can only be compared to Gaspirali’s in Russia, but whose career differs markedly from that of any of the Jadids in the support he received from the Government of India. In some ways this was unsurprising, as Khan confined himself to domestic issues directly affecting the Muslim community and went out of his way to emphasize his loyalty to the British and promote better relations between the Muslims of India and their rulers. In a speech at Lucknow in 1887, for instance, he said that: ‘I hope that we, who are subjects of the Empire, will not seek to interfere in those matters which the Government has set apart as its own. If the Government fight Afghanistan or conquer Burma, it is no business of ours to criticise its policy... If it were my good fortune to be Viceroy, I speak from my heart when I say I would not be equally but more anxious to see the rule of the Queen placed on a firm basis. (Cheers)’¹⁴⁵

This speech, with several others which energetically attacked the fledgling Indian National Congress, appeared in a collection published by the loyalist Indian Patriotic Association. Syed Ahmad Khan could,

---
¹⁴⁴ OIOC P/1299 September 1879, N. 9a, Military Requirements of the Province, 984.
of course, be compared to prominent Muslims who collaborated with the Russians, such as the Tashkent merchant Said Azim-Bai, but he was not simply a colonial stooge. It was precisely his brand of educational reform which attracted so much suspicion from the Russian authorities when it was advocated by the Jadids. Nevertheless, he received much encouragement and assistance from the Imperial State in India. The Government of the North-Western Provinces granted 74 acres of land free of charge for the Muslim College at Aligarh, together with an annual grant-in-aid of Rs 500 and Rs 10,000 for scholarships.¹⁴⁶

Here we see a real divergence in British and Russian attitudes to Islam: the former saw it as a potential minority ally against a largely Hindu population. They took a romantic view of the glories of Muslim rule and Muslim aristocratic culture, to which they considered themselves to be the successors, and continued to promote the use of Persian and a highly elaborate form of Urdu as a mark of civility. Above all, they had no expectations that Islam would simply collapse and disappear, and instead gave encouragement to its reformers. The Russians remained stuck in a mindset which dictated that all Muslims were fanatics, which both complicated their search for local collaborators and slowed the pace of change: recent research suggests that this paranoia was entirely unjustified.¹⁴⁷ In many ways the Russians believed more wholeheartedly than the British that modernization and social change were a good thing in their colony. Their exaggerated dread of a Muslim revolt made them excessively cautious. However, whilst they handled religious elites with kid gloves, they were prepared to be more radical when dealing with secular ones.

¹⁴⁶ Khan, Muslim Educational Conference, 9.
¹⁴⁷ See Bakhtiyar Babajanov, ‘Russian Colonial Power in Central Asia as Seen by Local Muslim Intellectuals’, in Eschment (ed.), Looking at the Coloniser, 75–90 and Hisao Komatsu, ‘Dar al-Islam Under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals’, in Uyama (ed.), Empire, Islam, and Politics, 3–21, both of which make the point that most of the ‘ulama in Turkestan accepted Russian rule and, as in India, came to characterize the colonial regime as Dar al-Islam.
3

The Creation of a Local Administration and the Abolition of Amlakdari

Now, we of Jagesur owe naught save friendship to the English who took us by the sword, and having taken us let us go, assuring the Rao Sahib’s succession for all time.¹

A fundamental question for historians of the nineteenth-century European empires is how the new Imperial regimes engaged with pre-existing State structures, power hierarchies, and patronage networks. Sometimes they destroyed them, sometimes they used them, but in all non-settler societies, such as British India or most of Russian Turkestan before the early 1900s, the Imperial regime would need collaborators, or ‘clients’, drawn from the indigenous population.² The strategies adopted varied considerably: within British India alone at least five different policies for the imposition of Imperial control and the extraction of revenue can be identified, implemented at different times and in different places. Throughout India there were the Princely States, the pre-eminent model of indirect rule, where genuinely powerful rulers, such as the Maharajah of Mysore and the Nizam of Hyderabad, rubbed shoulders with petty chieftains and rajahs catapulted by the British to largely fictional princely status. As a conscious policy this was a post-Mutiny phenomenon; before 1857 the British had aggressively deposed Indian rulers and emasculated rural elites such as the Oudh Taluqdar. Indirect rule, by contrast, was designed to preserve

the ‘natural’ hierarchies in Indian society and avoid the violent social upheaval popularly supposed to have provoked the Indian Mutiny. In Bengal the British famously ‘created’ (or at least cemented in position) a class of proprietorial landowners, or Zamindars, from a post-Mughal class of tax officials through whom they hoped to be able to control the countryside and reduce the burden of collecting revenue.³ In the Madras and Bombay Presidencies an alternative policy known as ryotwari was developed by Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, and other conservative, paternally minded officials, who saw the ‘village community’ as the most powerful and praiseworthy structure of Indian society. Revenue agreements were in theory reached with each individual smallholder, and in practice with high-caste groups and village elites, whose position was greatly strengthened as a result.⁴ In Upper Burma the British were presented with a dense, carefully regulated aristocratic and administrative hierarchy after the conquest of 1885–6, which they chose to ignore entirely. The King of Ava was deposed, the Burmese aristocrats and rural gentry or Myothugyi given no role in the new administration, and their mansions demolished. Instead a purely British Indian administration based on ryotwari was introduced, largely staffed by Indians working with salaried Burmese village headmen of a type that had not existed before: here even the most local elites were recreated.⁵ In Punjab, Sindh, and on the North-West Frontier yet another policy was pursued. Here the British made their most comprehensive use of pre-existing tribal and religious hierarchies in territories under their direct control. In Sindh their principal collaborators were families of Pirs, hereditary Muslim saints, who were often also substantial landowners.⁶ Unlike the Bengali Zamindars they did not owe their power and influence to the British—instead the British were using their legitimacy, which they bought by means of pensions and other land grants. This was also the policy pursued with tribal leaders, petty Khans, and other landowners in the settled districts of Trans-Indus Punjab. Here the British were almost obsessive about identifying and using pre-existing elites and exploiting


their legitimacy. They gave them *khillats*,⁷ medals, titles, pensions, *jaghirs*, and exemptions from revenue payments. Not only did these men exercise judicial authority and collect revenue, they were initially expected to manage the troublesome relations with Pathan tribes across the Frontier, and later in the tribal autonomous areas. The extent of British dependence on these elites is revealed by the fact that when they failed spectacularly in their duties, or even connived in tribal raids, they were often given no more than a slight rap over the knuckles and a temporary reduction in their retainer from the State. Ata Mahommed Khan of Agror was one such, stripped of his position after participating in a brutal attack on a police post at Oghi in 1868 but restored to his lands two years later as ‘a matter of policy rather than justice’. He demonstrated his loyalty to his British masters by raiding the Akazai villages across the border, but was still left in enjoyment of his *jaghir* of Rs 12,000 per annum.⁸

I have dwelt on the Punjabi example as this represents the area of British India which most resembled the Muslim society the Russians came to rule over in Turkestan, though the analogy is by no means exact. All of these different means of controlling alien societies had something to recommend them, and they all had their drawbacks. Imperial regimes faced a choice between prioritizing legitimacy or loyalty among their native agents. In Punjab, Sindh, and the Princely States we can see the British choosing the former, appropriating the pre-existing legitimacy of local elites for their own ends. These agents were often extremely influential, but as they frequently owed little to the British and realized how indispensable they were to their masters, they could be dangerously independent: this was particularly true in Punjab. In Bengal the British created an elite which owed a great deal to the *Raj* but normally had little independent legitimacy, though this could be built up through patronage. Under *ryotwari* and in Burma there were substantial landowners but they did not act as local agents for the Imperial State. That no attempt was made to legitimize British rule using the old elites of the Kingdom of Ava is, on the face of it, puzzling, but had a good deal to do with the intransigence of the Burmese State before the British conquest and also the fact that Indians in Burma could be relied upon more thoroughly than Indians in India, supplying manpower which did away with the need for native

---

⁷ British Indian variant of *Khalat*, a Timurid robe of honour—by the nineteenth century in India the term had come to mean any gift in reward for service.

intermediaries. These questions of Imperial control through indigenous groups are the basic stock-in-trade of historians of Britain’s Indian Empire, and rightly so for they were also the basic building-blocks of the Raj.

In Turkestan these essential questions remain largely unanswered: did the Russians use the indigenous elites in Turkestan or did they destroy them? If the latter, did they then create new ones, on the zamindari model, or did they ignore the idea of aristocratic government altogether? Were they more interested in using existing patronage networks, or creating their own? The existence of the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva, where the ancien régime was preserved almost intact, would suggest the former. To this we might add the popular impression that the Russian Empire was intensely hierarchical, conservative, and aristocratic, an idea seemingly reinforced by the almost seamless absorption of the Baltic German, Tatar, and Georgian nobility into the Russian aristocracy, and the crucial role which they sometimes played in governing the borderlands. Furthermore, Russia watched Britain’s experiments in indirect rule over Asiatic peoples with some interest, as a contributor to the Petersburg journal Golos wrote in 1867:

In the Turkestan Oblast itself... many pressing concerns present themselves with regard to its organisation. So far as concerns the breaking of the existing order and the raising of various Asiatic institutions to the Russian level, it is unlikely that this would be profitable for us. It seems to us, that above all we should use the prepared material presented to us, and in this respect follow the example of the English.

Nevertheless, documents from the early administration of the Zarafshan Valley suggest strongly that there was in fact no systematic attempt to co-opt the former Muslim ruling elite in Turkestan after the Russian conquest.

TAXATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES BEFORE THE CONQUEST

Samarkand was the seat of a Bek under the Bukharan administration, a term whose meaning could vary. Ostensibly a Bek was a mere tax official,

11 ‘Novoe Ustroistvo nashikh pogrаничных властей’, Golos No. 193, 14 July 1867, in TS, 1 (1868), 162; Golos was the leading liberal daily in St Petersburg.
normally drawn from one of the Uzbek tribes, given certain estates for his own maintenance by the Emir, and required to submit a certain amount of revenue to the central treasury. Anything he raised over and above that from the peasantry he could keep for himself.² In practice, many Beks were much more than this, and had established more or less independent dynasties that were only nominally obedient to Bukhara. These included Shahrisabz, just over the hills from Samarkand to the south, together with the minor Bekstvos in the mountainous areas of the Upper Zarafshan, and, still further to the east, the Bek of Hissar. Whether collecting taxes on their own behalf or in order to remit them to Bukhara, the Beks stood at the head of the revenue administration.

The principal (but by no means the only) taxes in Bukhara were the usual Muslim cesses of kheraj and zakat. In Islamic juridical theory the former is a tax of 20 per cent of the harvest, but in Bukhara it was levied mostly in kind and at inconsistent rates. Mir ‘Izzatullah remarked in 1812 that ‘the proportion of produce taken from cultivators varies in different parts of the country from one-tenth as far as one-fourth’,¹³ but Hafiz Muhammad Fazil Khan, upon whose Ta’rikh-e Manazil-e Bukhara this portion of ‘Izzatullah’s narrative is based, wrote that it could be as high as a half.¹⁴ According to Semenov, there were two types of kheraj: in some regions it was levied at a rate of one tenge per tanap of cultivated land plus 7.5 per cent of the value of the harvest, or it could be double that. In other regions a different system applied, and there was no levy on the land itself, only a tax of 1/5, 1/6, or 1/8 of the value of the crop—Semenov was alive to these inconsistencies, but not very good at explaining them, possibly because he seems to have been relying heavily on Khanikoff, whose observations on Bokharan administration are frequently inaccurate.¹⁵ One basic distinction was between Abi (irrigated) land and Bahari (rain-fed) land, with the former carrying heavier rates of kheraj to reflect its greater productivity.¹⁶ Zakat was originally the tax levied for contributions to the poor, but had

¹² Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya, 61.
¹³ Capt. P. D. Henderson (trans.), Travels in Central Asia by Meer Izzut-Oollah (Calcutta, 1872), 64.
¹⁵ A. A. Semenov, Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroistva byvshego Bukharskogo Khanstva (Tashkent, 1929), 22; Khanikoff, Bokhara, 148–54.
long since metamorphosed into a commercial tax, of \( \frac{1}{40} \) of the value of goods traded. There were numerous other cesses apart from these: Semenov lists *Jizyah* (the poll tax on unbelievers), *Dallali*, *Aminoma*, *Boj*, *Su-puli* (water tax), *Tanob-puli* or *Tanap*, as the Russians called it (a special form of land tax for market-gardens, orchards, and land under cotton), *Alof-puli*, *Qosh-puli*, and, finally *Mirabona*, a cess raised to pay *Mirabs*, locally recruited men who inspected the all-important canals.

The process by which local tax officials were appointed is obscure: in general they seem to have been selected locally, from the most prominent families in their villages, and Kostenko claimed that they were ‘chosen by the people’ but that the *Beks* had some power of confirmation and removal.\(^{17}\) Taxes were collected by village headmen, or *Aksakals*, under the supervision of *Amins*. Only *kheraj*, *zakat*, and the various forms of land tax were generally remitted to the centre, the others being gathered and distributed on the spot to meet immediate expenditure. *Aksakals* were supposed both to assess and collect taxes, and they also had some police functions, though in large towns these were delegated to another official, the *Ra’is*.\(^{18}\) The *Bek* also had subordinates called *Serkers*, appointed centrally, who supervised the collection of *kheraj*; and *Zakatchis*, who collected *zakat*. These men received a proportion of the taxes they collected in lieu of pay.\(^{19}\) They were the agents of the *Kushbegi*,\(^{20}\) who stood at the head of the whole bureaucracy, and they levied their dues in the bazaars and customs houses attached to caravanserais.\(^{21}\)

The situation in Kokand (which had been in control of Khujand when the Russians took it) does not seem to have differed very materially from that in Bukhara, at least not along the lower Syr-Darya which was an

---

\(^{17}\) Kostenko, *Srednyaya Aziya*, 61.

\(^{18}\) A combination of policeman and moral censor, the *Ra’is* was allowed to inflict corporal punishment for breaches of religion. Mohan Lal describes the inhabitants of Bukhara in the time of Emir Nasrullah being scourged by ‘the Qazi’ for failing to say their morning prayers, for smoking tobacco, or taking snuff, but he has probably got the title wrong. Mohan Lal, *Travels in the Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkistan* (Delhi, 1986), 126.


\(^{20}\) ‘There is a debate as to whether or not this official was originally the ‘Master of the Royal Hunt’, but what is clear is that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries he stood at the head of the Bukharan administration. See Yuri Bregel, *The Administration of Bukhara under the Manghits* (Bloomington, 2000), 6–18.

area that had been contested between the two states for decades. The account of Kokand’s ambassador to the East India Company in 1854, Shahzadeh Sultan Muhammad Khan, offers some clues:

The following is an account of the manner in which the administration of the territory of Kokund (which is also denominated Ferghana) is carried on. The Criminal, Fiscal, Judicial and Military authority rests in one and the same person. There is a ‘Hakim’ in all the important places, the country about which is subject to his control. The following are the designations and grades of office bearers, and to the name of each Office holder is appended the word ‘Umul’.

**Designation of Office Bearers:**
- The lowest grade is Umul Bee
- The next higher is Umul Dadkhowah
- The higher again Umul Purwanachee
- And the next higher Koosh Begee, which is the highest.

Men of family and descendants of great men are called Begzadahs.

He went on to list the current holders of these offices; whilst the Governor of Marghelan, Sultan Murad Khan, was the Khan’s brother, the other Hakems were all described either as ‘slaves’ or as ‘servants of the King’, with many not even of noble descent. This suggests a relatively centralized system of Government in the settled areas of the Khanate, although in the mountainous regions authority was devolved to Kirghiz tribal leaders. Nalivkin writes that the countryside was divided into vilayets, administered by Hakems. Beneath these were lesser officials called Beks, who were ‘not to be confused with those who were sons and brothers of the Khan’. These bekstvos were further subdivided, as in Bukhara, into Aksakalstvos, where taxes were collected. Nalivkin was,

---

22 Better transliterated as Hakem, a Governor, to avoid confusion with Hakim, a doctor.
23 Umul—An Arabic prefix meaning ‘source of’.
24 Bii—according to Beisembiev (The Life of Alimqul, 18) this was the title given to a clan leader in the Kirghiz areas of the Khanate, but more generally it seems to have been given to lower grade officials in Kokand and Bokhara.
25 Dadkhowah—literally a petitioner for justice, but in this case simply a middle-ranking court title.
26 Parwanachi—one bearing a parwana, or royal letter of authority.
27 NAI/Foreign/S.C./24 November 1854/Nos. 1–22, 217.
28 Sultan Murad Bek, Khudoyar Khan’s favourite brother, later became Hakem of Tashkent and was killed in the Kokand uprising of 1875. Beisembiev, The Life of Alimqul, 27.
30 Identical to Bukharan Beks in all but name—indeed Sami uses the terms interchangeably.
unsurprisingly, scathing about the Kokand administration, asserting that most of these officials were illiterate and selected entirely owing to connections rather than ability.³¹ Khoroshkhin also wrote that tax collection in the Kokand Khanate (which still existed at the time when he was writing) was riddled with corruption, although it is unclear how much credence can be attached to these views.³²

According to Beisembiev’s work on the Ta’rikh-e Shahrulkhi, the hierarchy of titles and duties in Kokand was extremely confused, but most positions in the state administration were based on Bukharan precedent.³³ Nabiev asserts that the most important officials in Kokand were not the urban Hakems but the Serkers, shadowy figures in the literature on Bukhara but much more clearly described here.³⁴ They were essentially renters of Government revenue on a large scale, with a ‘roving’, judicial remit. As well as collecting kheraj they could settle disputes over land and water, acted as confidential advisers to Beks when they were posted in towns, and directed construction projects for the Khan. They also received petitions from Aksakals and Aryk-Aksakals. Altogether Nabiev estimated that over half the Khanate’s revenue was collected by these ‘magnates’, as he calls them (shortly before the conquest they seem to have numbered 28), and the other half by ‘chinovniki’ whose appointment and duties remain obscure. This would seem to suggest that it was the Serkers who provided the crucial, mobile link between rural officials on the land, and the Hakems and Beks in the towns.³⁵ These latter (who are not well distinguished from each other in the literature, reflecting the casual swapping of titles that Beisembiev remarks upon) were normally members of the Khan’s family and answerable directly to him.

A LANDED ARISTOCRACY? THE QUESTION OF THE AMILKADARS

The Russians normally held that a landed aristocracy as such did not exist in the Turkestan, at least not as it would be understood

³¹ V. P. Nalivkin, Kratkaya Istoriya Kokandskogo Khanstvo (Kazan, 1885), 208–10.
³² Khoroshkhin, Sbornik Statei, 45.
³⁴ R. N. Nabiev, Iz Istorii Kokandskogo Khanstva (Tashkent, 1973), 228.
Map 3. The Zarafshan Valley in 1869
in Europe: Kostenko confidently asserted, (perhaps following Burnes), that ‘in Central Asia an aristocracy and in general a privileged class does not exist’.³⁶ Nalivkin also wrote that there was nothing that could be described as a landed aristocracy in Kokand,³⁷ but this common assumption is open to question on several counts. Shahzadeh Sultan Muhammad Khan told Sir John Lawrence that in Kokand

There is a body of the nobility who hold Jageers from the King and are denominated Begzadahs. They are not servants of the King. There are about 100 such families:

Of the Highest Rank—20
Of the Middle Rank—40
Of the Lower Rank—40

I do not know the value of their estates which are both hereditary and also transferred from one to another by purchase. They do not enter service but depend for maintenance on their estates, large or small as they may be.³⁸

Meanwhile in the Zarafshan Valley there was a group of landowners/tax officials known as Amlakdars, whose precise status and importance present the historian with numerous problems.³⁹ Amlak or mulk land was notionally State land which, at some time in the past, had been sold by the Khan or Emir to a subject and his heirs, who collected the taxes due on it and then remitted a portion to the ruler, keeping the balance.⁴⁰ This distinguished it from eqta grants of tax-collection rights, which were a gift from the ruler to a subject in reward for service and in theory were resumed by the State on the recipient’s death.⁴¹ Sometimes mulk was freed from some or all obligations to the State, and in theory at least it could not be sold or converted into waqf.

The terminology of land rights in Central Asia was never very precise, and in any case changed significantly over time. When amlak, mulk, and the Amlakdars who controlled them are mentioned in

---

³⁸ NAI/Foreign/S.C./24 November 1854/Nos. 1–22, 230–1.
³⁹ The title is mentioned in the appendix to the Majma’ al-arqam but with no explanation of their precise role or status. B. A. Vil’danova, ‘Podlinnik Bukharskogo Traktata o Chinakh i Zhaniyakh’, PPV, 1968 (Moscow, 1970), 43; Bregel has pointed out that the date of composition of this text, and the identity of its author are still obscure, and it cannot be considered reliable: The Administration of Bukhara, 16–18.
⁴¹ These certainly existed in Central Asia, and in practice had often become hereditary, but they are not mentioned in the Russian sources and have probably been subsumed by them in the general category of amlak.
nineteenth-century Central Asian sources they often carry different meanings from those to be found either in Islamic juridical theory or in local texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁴² When they are mentioned in Russian sources from the 1860s onwards the confusion is even greater. The first Russian scholar to examine the complex question of land rights and tax collection in the Zarafshan Okrug in the immediate aftermath of the Russian conquest was the Orientalist Alexander Kun. His description of the Amlakdar’s functions indicates that his principal task was to tour the region assigned to him by the Bek with a large, mounted suite once a year, in order to collect kheraj from the Aksakals. Whether he had any property rights over this ‘estate’, or was entitled to keep a proportion of what he collected, is unclear.⁴³ The first published work on the subject seems to be that of M. N. Rostislavov, who wrote in 1879 that in Turkestan the term mulk referred only to ‘ushti lands (subject to a 10 per cent tax), whilst kheraji land subject to the usual assessment was known as amlak. He appears to be the originator of the Russian understanding that mulk and amlak refer, respectively, to private and State land, stating that they were separate legal concepts. However, he went on to say that in contemporary Turkestan they had become, to all intents and purposes, the same thing, namely hereditary property in private hands, and admitted that he had no idea how this transformation came about.⁴⁴ The Girs Commission’s Report was probably following Rostislavov’s interpretation in asserting that amlak land was subject to the taxes of kheraj and tanap, whilst mulk land was entirely free of them.⁴⁵

Barthold paid little attention to this question and consequently Soviet scholars, accustomed to following his lead, seem to have been in some confusion.⁴⁶ He does give the following definition of amlak or mulk land, observing that the former word was merely the Arabic plural of

---

⁴² The Arabic verbal root of mulk is malaka, to control, and its meaning and significance varies widely across the Islamic world. See I. P. Petrushevskii, Ocherki po Istorii Feodal’nykh Otношений v Azerbaidzhane i Armenii v XVI nachale XIX vv (Leningrad, 1949), 224, 229–32, 241.


⁴⁴ M. N. Rostislavov, Ocherk Vidov Zemel’noi Sobstvennosti i Pozemel’nyi Vopros v Turkestanskom Krae (St Pb., 1879), 5–7. Rostislavov was an administrator working in Samarkand Province and seems to have understood Persian, as he refers to nine Islamic judicial sources, local land deeds, and the advice of the Samarkand Qazis.

⁴⁵ Girs, Otchet, 344–5.

The Creation of a Local Administration

the latter and rejecting the view that the former was State and the latter private property:

A common form of land tenure, that is land, which in theory is considered to be the property of the state, but is held in permanent and hereditary use by those landholders who have converted it, who have the right to sell their plots...that is in practice they can dispose of it as their own property.\footnote{V. V. Bartol'd, \textit{Istoriya Kul'turnoi Zhizni Turkestana} (Leningrad, 1927), 193.}

It seems that, for once, ‘the Gibbon of Turkestan’ may have been in error here, at least so far as the legal status of \textit{amlak} was concerned. Davidovich defines \textit{mulk} land in seventeenth-century Central Asia as consisting of three types: \textit{mulk-e hur-e khalis} was not subject to taxation at all, and the owners kept $\frac{1}{3}$ of the value of the crop each year to themselves.\footnote{\textit{Mulk-e hur-e khalis} means ‘free and pure’. E. A. Davidovich, ‘Feodal’nyi zemelnyi milk v Srednei Azii XV–XVIII vv: Sushchnost’ i Transformatsiya’, in B. G. Gafurov, \textit{Formy feodal’noi zemel’noi sobstvennosti}, 40–1.} The second, \textit{mulk-e ‘ushri}, was subject to a low rate of \textit{kheraj} because it notionally belonged to the descendants of the Arab invaders, or indeed Sayyids, descended from the prophet’s tribe, and the \textit{Amlakdars} were permitted to keep $\frac{2}{10}$ of the crop, remitting $\frac{1}{10}$ to the state;\footnote{\textit{Semenov and Chekhovich disagree with these figures. More accurately, mulk-e ‘ushri} was land which paid half the usual rate of \textit{kheraj} to the centre, i.e. 10%, whilst the \textit{Amlakdar} kept another 10%, the root of \textit{‘ushri} in Arabic being ten. \textit{Semenov, Ocherki pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroistva}, 54; O. D. Chekhovich, ‘K Probleme Zemel’noi Sobstvennosti v Feodal’noi Srednei Azii’, \textit{OUN}, 11 (1976), 38–9 For a classical juridical understanding of the various types of \textit{mulk} Chekhovich refers scholars to a text called the \textit{Tarjumeh al-abkam ti’l-funi} by Husein bin Masud al-Baqari, d. AD 1122.}\footnote{Veselovskii (ed.), \textit{Samariya}, text, 9.} Abu Tahir Khoja wrote in the 1840s that the lands in the hills around the Chupan-Ata mausoleum to the north of Samarkand were subject only to \textit{‘ushr} because the inhabitants had converted to Islam voluntarily at the time of the Arab conquests and had later heroically resisted the infidel Mongols; such tax privileges were frequently linked to events during the earliest period of Islamic rule in Central Asia.\footnote{V. V. Bartol’d, \textit{Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni Turkestana} (Leningrad, 1927), 193.} The third form of \textit{mulk} listed by Davidovich, \textit{mulk-e kheraj}, was the most common type of \textit{mulk}, where the \textit{Amlakdar} kept just $\frac{1}{10}$. Whilst these definitions may be correct for the 1600s, by the nineteenth century things had changed. M. A. Abduraimov, basing his assertion on the late eighteenth-century \textit{Risala-ye Habibiye} of Ibadullah ibn Khoja Arifi Bukhari, writes that although grammatically \textit{amlak} is simply the plural of \textit{mulk}, in Bukhara at this time it had a particular juridical meaning,
as ‘State land’, with the Amlakdar the principal tax-collector, having Serkers, Amins, and Aksakals under his authority.\textsuperscript{51} In the late 1950s the ethnographer K. Shaniyazov questioned elderly inhabitants of the former Bukharan Emirate on the subject of the pre-revolutionary system of taxation. All his interviewees were in agreement that amlak and mulk were two different things: the former State and the latter private land. The rate of kheraj on amlak could be as much as $\frac{1}{2}$ the value of the crop, and it constituted the principal source of income for the Emir. Mulk estates were apparently much smaller than amlak, carried a lower tax burden (no more than 20 per cent of the value of the crop), and were usually farmed by the beneficiary himself.\textsuperscript{52} Can this be reconciled with Rostislavov’s assertion that by the 1870s the practical distinction between amlak and mulk had become blurred, and that both were effectively private property? It is unclear from either Abduraimov’s or Shaniyazov’s work what proportion, if any, of the kheraj which they collected on the Emir’s behalf the Amlakdars were able to keep for themselves, or what other powers they had over peasants or the land they farmed, so this possibility must be borne in mind.

Davidovich suggests that very often Amlakdars were not exactly landowners, in that their ‘estates’ had no clear boundaries, and they had limited ability to change the way land was used by the peasants who farmed it. Instead they had the right to rents or taxes from the land, which was then remitted in varying proportions to the State.\textsuperscript{53} Semenov further confuses the issue by saying that amlak land was devoted to supporting the military, rather like a Mughal jaghir.\textsuperscript{54} The Amlakdar is described simply as a tax-farmer by Pierce\textsuperscript{55} and had something of the same rights over a peasant’s produce. However, even if the Soviet argument that mulk-e hur-e khalis constituted a ‘feudal’ landholding seems overblown,\textsuperscript{56} Pierce’s definition must be taken as inadequate. Barthold described Amlakdars as a ‘service aristocracy’, which is perhaps the most satisfying definition. What emerges from this is that there existed a landholding, rural elite in Turkestan, which enjoyed

\textsuperscript{52} Shaniyazov, ‘Ob osnovnykh vidakh zemel’noi sobstvennosti’, 51–6.
\textsuperscript{53} Davidovich, ‘Feodal’nyi zemelnyi milk’, 40–1.
\textsuperscript{54} Semenov, \textit{Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroistva}, 54.
\textsuperscript{55} Pierce, \textit{Russian Central Asia}, 146.
considerable but often ill-defined control over quite extensive areas, and performed an important revenue-collecting function for the State.

In addition to the estates they controlled and the taxes they collected, many Amlakdars seem to have been Khojas, belonging to a religious elite on which there is an extensive literature. Normally rendered as Khwaja in India, the term is more or less synonymous with Sayyid, i.e. claiming descent from the Prophet’s kin. This is the meaning given by Khanikoff. However, Khojas derived their authority and influence largely from belonging to local Sufi lineages within the three principal Central Asian brotherhoods: the Naqshbandiyya, Yasaviyya, and Kubraviyya. Of these the Naqshbandiyya had become dominant by the seventeenth century, and within the Naqshbandiyya the most important lineage was that of Khojas claiming descent from Muhammad Kasani Makhdum-e Azam, the pupil and spiritual heir of the fifteenth-century saint, landowner, tutor to the Timurid princes, and all-round plutocrat Ubaidullah b. Mahmud Khoja Ahrar. Although he was born in Ferghana, Kasani spent most of his life in Samarkand and was buried in the nearby village of Dahbid, where in the 1890s there were still at least fifty households of Khojas claiming descent from him. Although they wielded much greater political influence in eastern Turkestan, where they were considered to be the legitimate rulers from the 1670s onwards, in the Ferghana Valley in the early eighteenth century the Makhdum-e Azami Khojas apparently had armed retainers and constituted a ‘theocratic’ elite before the Kokand Khanate was formed.

59 Khanikoff, Bokhara, 234.
63 Nabiev, Iz Istoriii Kokandskogo Khanstva, 66.
The Juibari Sheikhs, descended from one of Muhammad Kasani’s pupils, continued to hold prominent positions at the Bukharan court, as did those Yasavi sheikhs descended from Sayyid Ata (the fourteenth-century saint to whom was attributed the conversion of the Uzbeks when they were still nomads), who had a hereditary claim on the rank of Naqib.\textsuperscript{64} Khojas controlled large estates throughout the Ferghana and Zarafshan Valleys, some of it as mulk or amlak, some as waqf, and although no single individual possessed as much land or wielded as much influence as Khoja Ahrar had done, they remained powerful at the time of the conquest.\textsuperscript{65}

**THE COLLECTION OF LAND REVENUE AFTER THE CONQUEST**

These, then, were the elites and the complex (not to say confusing) system of administration and revenue collection which the Russians inherited and had, at least initially, to work with. As Pahlen writes, to begin with political (read military) considerations were paramount, and the Russians introduced little by way of reforms:

In the immediate period after our invasion of the Central Asian territories, political interests had a preponderant significance, because of which putting the revenue matters in good order and the organisation of the internal administration of the native population were not given the necessary attention. All the functionaries amongst the natives were left in their positions, and the taxes on the settled population were levied on the same principles which existed under the rule of the Khans. At first our power was not yet acquainted with the native revenue system and did not have the essential organs for the assessment of data, because of which the revenue was remitted to the treasury in very modest amounts. Out of a feeling of solidarity with the native population, and in accordance with their own interests, both Serkers and the Zaketchis took the side of the payers, which they were able to do without any danger to themselves, as the Russian power was unable to have any real control over them.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} Whilst in the Arab world the Naqib’s role was to investigate claims to Sayyid descent, nobody is quite sure what the official with this title actually did in Bukhara, but he seems to have been a military adviser of some kind. See DeWeese, ‘The Descendants of Sayyid Ata’, 615–25.

\textsuperscript{65} See O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie Dokumenty XV–XVI vv* (Moscow, 1974), which is a publication of 18 documents (land transactions and deeds of waqf) relating to Khoja Ahrar’s vast estates in Transoxiana and Afghanistan.

Von Kaufman made a similar assertion, stating that for four and a half years after the conquest the administration of the Zarafshan Okrug in particular was left unchanged from Bukharan times as far as taxes and their collection were concerned. Although Pahlen was quite right about the small amount of revenue the Russians were able to collect immediately after the conquest, both were exaggerating the degree of continuity with the Muslim regimes even at this early stage. Despite the fact that the Zarafshan Okrug was only formally annexed to the Russian Empire in 1886, eighteen years after the conquest, the Russians set about reorganizing and altering its administration in 1871, even as they hinted to Bukhara and to the British that they might be willing to hand it back. The Beks were immediately removed from the equation as most of them had fled to Bukhara or Kokand before the Russian advance, and Samarkand was no exception. Whilst some, notably Jura-Bek and Baba-Bek, the former Governors of Kitab and Shahrisabz, were eventually allowed to join the army in largely honorary positions (one a Major-General, the other a Colonel), they were not given any further role in the collection of land revenue or local administration. The Russians do not seem to have made any attempt to find substitute local dignitaries whom they could co-opt to their side. Accounts of the fall of Samarkand tend to concentrate on the military campaign, and by the time a chancellery had been established there and had begun producing documents the expropriation and expulsion of the Beks was already a fait accompli. However, the Russian attitude towards these petty rulers, and the means by which they stripped them of their powers, can be gauged quite well by this decree from Major-General Abramov, conqueror of Samarkand and Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, issued after a brief campaign in 1871 which resulted in the annexation of three mountainous Bekstvos in the valley of the Upper Zarafshan:

To all inhabitants of Magian, Farap and Kshtut.
By order of the Governor-General, all the lands of Magian, Farap and Kshtut are united to the lands of the Zarafshan Okrug and henceforth will be ruled by the Russian Government. The former Beks Hussein-Bek, Shadi-Bek and

---

67 fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otecheta, 68.
68 Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 215–16.
69 Bartol’d, Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni, 190, G. A. Akhmedzhanov, Rossiiskaya Imperiya v Tsental’noi Azii (Tashkent, 1995), 28–9; Baba-Bek was the last independent Governor of Shahrisabz. Jura-Bek his relative and Hakem of nearby Kitab. Both fled to Kokand in 1870 but were extradited by Khudoyar Khan. Beisembiev, The Life of Alimqul, 26.
Seid-Bek are banished from this land for ever. The population must submit to its Government and pray to God for the White Tsar, who in his mercy has taken them under his high patronage. All Aksakals, Qazis and Amlakdars are commanded to appear in Samarkand within a month in order to receive their marks of office. Those who do not appear within this time will be removed from their posts.⁷⁰

Hussein-Bek and Shadi-Bek were the sons of the former Bek of Samarkand, who had fled to the mountains after the Russians took the city and were still viewed as a potential subversive threat.⁷¹ In response to this appeal several Qazis and twenty-five Aksakals appeared at Penjikent, swore allegiance to the White Tsar, and were rewarded with khalats at a ceremony presided over by von Kaufman, who was visiting the Zarafshan Okrug at the time.⁷² The Amlakdars, both here and elsewhere in the Zarafshan Valley, were less fortunate. Although on the face of it they could have constituted an ideal collaborative elite, rather like the Zamindars of Bengal, within three years of the conquest of Samarkand their function had been abolished, and their ‘estates’, if such they were, brought under direct administrative control. The Russians sought lowlier collaborators.

PROBLEMS WITH AMLAKDARI

As they sought to reform the land revenue administration in the aftermath of the conquest, the Russians seem to have found the Amlakdari system as inconsistent and confusing as later historians have done. Officials complained that it eroded the tax base, and it thus seems likely that when referring to mulk they were talking only about mulk-e hur-e khalis, that exempt from all forms of taxation, and mulk-e ‘ushri, that which paid half the usual rate of kheraj. There was a widespread Russian belief that to be legitimate a mulk estate had to be inherited, and could not be bought or sold. This was certainly true in theory, but it seems that in practice the prohibition had long been ignored in Turkestan; as we shall see, this cut little ice with

Figure 3. Jura-Bek, the former Governor of Kitab.
*Turkestanskii Al’bom* (1871) Part 2, Vol. 1, pl. 9, No. 25.
Library of Congress Ref: LC-DIG-ppmsca-09951-00025
the new administration. In 1868, shortly after the conquest, we find
Captain Mikhailov, Commandant of the Ura-Tepe District, writing
to von Kaufman, the Governor-General, asking if a blanket rate of
kheraj could be applied to mulk land as well, and some of the special
privileges of the Amlakdars revoked. He remarked that the opinion
of some other officers that mulks were entirely illegal under Islamic
law could be discounted, but that the list he had from the old regime
included so many mulks that were illegal, as their current owners had
bought them rather than inheriting them, that the Russians need have
no qualms about abrogating their privileges.⁷³ His subordinate in Ura-
Tepe, Sainovsky, disagreed, and argued that the introduction of the
normal taxes on mulk land would mean considerable hardship for a class
of landless labourers:

Almost all these Mulkdars [sic] give their land in permanent rent, to peasants,
mujiks, who do not have their own land and who settle around their rented
land, and give the impression of being serfs. In order to protect landless peasants
from exploitation, customs are established and defined by Sharia.⁷⁴

As these peasants already gave a proportion of their crop to the ‘Mulkdar’
(a term which seems to be a Russian invention), they were in danger
of being hit twice if kheraj was levied by the State as well. It is
unclear from this passage whether Sainovsky is referring to small mulk
estates or large tracts of amlak land, but this statement suggests that
some Mulkdars/Amlakdars were more than revenue farmers, and held
proprietorial rights as landlords with perhaps even some control over
labour. Sainovsky’s objections to the levying of tax on mulk were brushed
aside by his superiors in Ura-Tepe. Slightly later that year the question
of mulk land came to be considered throughout the newly created
Zarafshan Okrug, where there were 70,000 tanaps of mulk land in the
Samarkand District,⁷⁵ plus an unknown quantity in Katta-Kurgan, and
it provoked a correspondence with Tashkent that lasted three years.
Very early on, the question of mulk or amlak came to be closely linked
with the question of how to deal with the Khoja lineages of Turkestan.
Abramov reported to von Kaufman on the existence of land:

Otherwise the private property of independent individuals acquired by purchase.
One out of four of the owners has documents from the father of the current
Emir, others from the previous owners of the property. The income from this

⁷³ TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.11, 16. ⁷⁴ Ibid., 11ob.
The Creation of a Local Administration

107

land does not go to the treasury, but into the hands of Khojas and other private individuals.\textsuperscript{76} He estimated that these taxes could potentially be worth 20,000 roubles a year, but that the Russian administration had no idea to whom they were being paid. Abramov added that the class of Khojas who were the main beneficiaries of mulk land were a hostile influence that needed to be contained:

These private individuals [who enjoy their land] on unknown grounds, without paying tax, are usually Khojas . . . who try to gather and arm the people against the Government, as they did under the Bukharan administration,—when they were the leaders of the popular movements, as for instance Omar-Khoja of Dahbid, who agitated the town of Samarkand, at the time when we took that town. There is no doubt that others were not far behind, often bearing the title of Khoja illegitimately. There is no way of verifying their antecedents. Because of all this Cossack elder Syrov\textsuperscript{77} proposes levying taxes on mulk land on the usual basis.\textsuperscript{78}

Samī’s account offers independent confirmation of Ishan Omar Khan Makhdum-e Azami’s contribution to the attack on the Samarkand citadel in 1868,\textsuperscript{79} but even without this concrete example of the threat presented by the Khojas and their influence over the people, given the prevailing Russian attitude towards Islamic elites sketched out in the preceding chapter, it is unlikely that they would ever have considered trying to make use of these sacred lineages, as the British did in Sindh.\textsuperscript{80} Abramov suggested that the revoking of their taxation privileges might just be a temporary measure until their rights were established one way or the other, but this was not good enough for von Kaufman, who complained that revenue receipts from the Zarafshan Okrug were too low, totalling just 6,033 roubles up to August 1868\textsuperscript{81} (the Russians had taken Samarkand in June). Mulk land would have to be assessed for tax as well and von Kaufman, who since becoming Turkestan Governor-General the year before seems to have decided that he was now an expert

\textsuperscript{76} TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.15, 1.
\textsuperscript{77} This may be the same Captain (\textit{Esaul}) V. R. Syrov who commanded a Ural Cossack Sotnia which was ambushed by a large force of Kokand cavalry at the village of Ikan near Chimkent in 1864. Their heroic resistance and eventual escape was a much lauded episode of the conquest. See Mackenzie, \textit{Lion of Tashkent}, 49–50; Mikhail Khoroshkhin, \textit{Geroiskii Podvig Ural’tsev} (Ural’sk, 1895).
\textsuperscript{78} TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.15, 2.
\textsuperscript{79} Samī, \textit{Ta’rikh-i Salatin-i Manghitiia}, trans. 85.
\textsuperscript{80} See Ansari, \textit{Sufi Saints and State Power}, 36–56.
\textsuperscript{81} TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.15, 5ob–6.
on *Sharia* and Islamic custom, remarked that ‘some of the natives, receiving the revenues from *mulk*, do not even understand the meaning of the term *mulk*’⁸² and argued that in the vast majority of cases titles to *mulk* land were fraudulent. He told Abramov that all those holding *mulk* land and claiming to be *Khojas* or *Sayyids* must be required to produce genealogies proving their descent, and if these were held to be genuine they would be put on a special list which also declared what income their *mulk* land brought in.⁸³ Otherwise they would be deprived of their privileges of levying taxes and instead have to pay the usual cesses themselves. Von Kaufman was actually quite well aware that as far as the native population was concerned the definition of a *Sayyid* or *Khoja* was a good deal less rigid than that the Russians were insisting upon, but this doesn’t seem to have bothered him: ‘Individuals—bearing the title *Sayyid* or *Khoja* because of descent from some holy man or other, or using this form of address because the people gave the title of *Sayyid* or *Khoja* to a few generations of some family or other—do not, it would seem, need to enjoy freedom from taxation, unlike those who bear the title of *Sayyid* or *Khoja* in the strict Mussulman sense.’⁸⁴

Abramov did his best to implement these measures, but the list of genealogies never arrived, and other documents outlining rights to *mulk* land which might have satisfied von Kaufman were also few and far between. He came to a somewhat different (and not wholly erroneous) conclusion as to the origin of *mulks*: ‘The origin of *mulks*, it seems, was laid down by Emir Tamerlane. Legend has it, that Timur, needing some cash, after advice from his counsellors, sold into private hands a portion of Government land, with the right of hereditary ownership and freedom from taxes in the future.’⁸⁵

Such, he argued, were the purest and most legal type of *mulk*. Unfortunately almost none of Samarkand’s *Amlakdars* had the necessary documentation from the Timurid period to substantiate their claims. Too many *mulks* had changed hands by sale too many times, which, in

---

⁸² TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.15, 2ob.  
⁸³ Ibid., 7ob.  
⁸⁴ Ibid. Von Kaufman here is almost certainly referring to the distinction between *Khoja Sayyid-Ata* and *Khoja Juibar* identified by Khanikoff (with whose book he must have been familiar), the former having ‘documentary evidence of their extraction, whilst the others belong to such families as are known to have been constantly treated as such, though their titles are lost’, *Bokhara*, 234–5, an assertion repeated by Schefer, *Histoire de l’Asie Centrale*, n. to 95: This is obviously an incorrect definition (both lineages held positions at the Bukharan court, but the former were Yasavi, the latter Naqshbandi) but it may well have influenced von Kaufman.  
his view, invalidated them altogether. A. P. Khoroshkhin, a Ural Cossack officer who almost certainly served in Samarkand at this time, tells a very similar story of Bukharan Emirs ‘some time in the distant past’ returning from campaign in urgent need of money, and alienating the right to collect taxes on particular plots of land to powerful Qazi, Khoja, and Sayyids. These rights were supposed to be supported by documents, and only to pass by descent from father to son. Now, however:

All the evidence shows that there are no grounds for considering such lands to be mulk, that is the property of private individuals, still less now because the latest pretenders have nothing in common either by blood or background with those on whom the Emir at some point bestowed the right to collect taxes. At the present time, furthermore, when we demand the original documents from them, it turns out that they struggle to produce them, because it would appear that they do not have them.⁸⁶

Whether such demands for documentary proof sprang from a genuine Russian belief that there was a ‘pure’ Islamic judicial notion of rights in mulk which had become corrupted over time, or whether this was simply a cynical excuse for getting rid of a troublesome and untrustworthy group of elite intermediaries whom they no longer wanted, there seems little doubt that the view of mulk expressed above was far more rigid and legalistic than the reality. It is still unclear whence the idea arose that mulks could not be transferred by sale, or why the Russians would not accept more recent documents from Bukharan rulers as proof of the right to collect taxes, but whatever the reason they decided that the institution of amlak or mulk as they encountered it was corrupted and illegal. Abramov claimed his resolve was hardened by petitions from the peasants who farmed mulk land. One of these indicated that, as the Amlakdars had heard rumours that the Russians would confiscate any land whose rents they received but did not farm themselves, they had started ousting their tenants, who formerly paid them a rent of ¼ of the crop.⁸⁷ It was the very presence of the Russians which had brought

---

⁸⁶ Khoroshkhin, Sbornik Statei, 167–8; Khoroshkhin was a nobleman from the Ural Cossacks, who grew up along the Ural river, learning to speak Kazakh and Kalmyk at an early age. Like so many other Turkestani officers he was educated at the Orenburg Nepluyeyskii Cadet Corps. He joined the Ural Cossacks in 1859, serving with them until 1865 when he became an administrator, although he still participated in the Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand campaigns, in the last of which he was killed before Makhram in 1875. His extensive knowledge of Samarkand suggests he served there, but I have not yet found his formulyarnyi spisok. This account of his life comes from the introduction to the collection above, by his friend and fellow-officer P. Maev.

about this change in the behaviour of Amlakdars, but Abramov did not respond to these pleas, instead using them to strengthen the argument that Amlakdari should be done away with: ‘The Amlakdari System in this respect was entirely damaging for the people’, and by 1874 the system, at least in theory, had been abolished: all 32 Amlakdari estates in the Zarafshan Okrug had been absorbed, and taxes were being levied uniformly except on waqf land, which has been dealt with elsewhere.⁸⁸

LAND REFORM

It may be that in the abolition of amlak/mulk and the flight of the Beks we have the post-conquest Russian ‘land-reform’ that was posited (without much evidence) by Pierce and Wheeler, expanded upon more fruitfully by Williams, and recently repeated by Brower and Geiss.⁸⁹ Geiss describes a mass expropriation of what he terms ‘Sart Landowners’, granting all those who worked the land private title to it. He persists in referring to amlak as State land and mulk as private property, something which can by no means be taken for granted.⁹⁰ Pierce argued that the Russians ‘recognised all land occupied by buildings and plantations as hereditary private property’, and adds that this ‘amounted to a land and tax reform of revolutionary proportions; that contemporaries did not refer to it as such may have been because revolution was not then in style’.⁹¹ In fact, they did not refer to it as such because it was no such thing. In 1872 a report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on progress in the Zarafshan Okrug averred that all land in Turkestan, with a few exceptions, must be considered State land but that it was alienated for the permanent of use of those who occupied it.⁹² In 1884, sixteen years after the fall of Samarkand, some administrators certainly believed that the Russians had not fully settled the question of whether

⁸⁸ TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.70, 103; Bartol’d, Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni, 193; fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otcheta, 69.
⁹⁰ Bartol’d, Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni, 192–3; Rostislavov, Ocherk Vidov Zemel’noi Sobstvennosti, 5–7.
⁹¹ Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 147–8.
ownership of occupied land was vested in the cultivator or the State and what rights the occupier had. In a report from the Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District to that of the Zarafshan Okrug in 1884 on the measures to be taken to prevent natives from occupying Government land, the former observed that not only did the natives enjoy de facto ownership of land they already farmed (which they could buy, sell, and inherit ‘in accordance with customary rights’, regulated by the Qazis) but that they seemed automatically to acquire the same rights over any wastelands which they occupied and cultivated, even though these nominally belonged to the Government.⁹³ Thus at this late stage there was still no clear consensus on what belonged to whom, but there is no doubt that even before the Girs Commission’s reforms were implemented in 1886 people could buy and sell land, subject to payment of the revenue attached to it. Given the frequent references to this process being based on customary law, under the supervision of Qazis, this does not seem to represent a substantive break with pre-conquest Muslim practice, let alone the sweeping reform posited by Pierce. On the question of land ownership, the Commission’s report stated, with regret, that there was a lack of translations of useful local texts such as the Tuzuk-e Timuri (actually a spurious seventeenth-century ‘autobiography’ of Tamerlane written in India), or of waqf and other landholding documents on which they could make recommendations. Accordingly, these were based on a translation of the Koran, ‘The Sharia’ (whatever was meant by this), and, most importantly, observations of the status quo in Turkestan, which they obtained by touring a number of villages. In the end they decided to recognize effective occupancy of the land by peasants, probably a much more sensible solution than any they could have arrived at through studying imperfect translations of dubious Islamic legal precedents.⁹⁴ N. P. Ignatiev, explaining the conclusions of the Girs Commission in 1884, averred that there was already de facto private property in land in Turkestan, subject to the payment of the necessary taxes and levies (mortgaging was forbidden to prevent Jews and Hindus from acquiring land), but there was no indication that this originated with the Russian conquest. The Commission believed, at least, that previously cultivators had had proprietary rights, but that land reverted to the State if it was left uncultivated for three years. Owners were allowed to inherit and transfer property according to

established ‘local custom’ overseen by the Qazis. The Commission’s report specifically attacked the notion that private property did not exist under Islamic law, and stated that it had merely strengthened existing conventions. Even so, absolute property rights were granted only in the Russian portions of towns. For the natives ‘The proposed solution of the land question preserves for the settled natives of Turkestan their practical control over the land, with characteristics closely approaching to understanding about property, but without recognition of absolute ownership’ [my italics].

Confusion over the nature of land ownership—and the vexed question of the relation between private land and the troublesome category of amlak—continued even after the Girs Commission’s report was published. An 1891 article by O. Shkapsky on amlak alleged that all land in permanent hereditary occupation in Turkestan fell into this category, and had done since the time of the Khanates. The absence of scholarly or bureaucratic consensus on this point was by then of little practical importance. The tax burden on peasants had been lightened and simplified, but the abolition of Amlakdari and recognition of private control over land in themselves made little difference to them in financial terms. Ultimate ownership was now vested in the Tsar, and hence revenue was submitted, via the Aksakals, to Russian administrators rather than Bukharan and Kokandian Beks, Serkers, or Amlakdars.

RAISING REVENUE

This still did not satisfy von Kaufman, who was under considerable pressure to raise revenue in Turkestan because of the immense cost of the annexation, and the degree to which the administration and military presence there was still being subsidized by St Petersburg. In 1868 the Steppe Commission had complained that at least a half of the potential revenue from Turkestan was being lost through inefficiency, corruption, and lack of control over collection, something the metropolitan press

---

95 PSZ Sob. 3 Vol.VI (1886), No. 3814, 255.
96 The phrase used was ‘Ukrepleniya prava sobstvennosti’, Ignat’ev, Ob’yasitel’naya Zapiska, 80–2.
97 Ibid., 84.
98 O. Sh[kapskii], ‘Shto schitat’ Amlyakovymi zemlyami?’, Okraina, 4 Feb. 1891, No. 16.
quickly seized upon. A year later Russian expenditure in Turkestan amounted to 4,233,482 roubles, and receipts to just 2,356,241 roubles. In the period 1868–72 the revenue in Turkestan fell short of costs by 19,600,000 roubles, and this ratio of income to expenditure would if anything grow worse over the next 50 years. The Governor-General spent most of 1868 complaining about low kheraj returns from Samarkand and the fact that very little zakat was being collected at the border with Bukhara. Abramov explained rather sheepishly that, ‘As the region was finally taken in June, a part of the tanap and qosh-pul levies, which in some areas are collected early—were demanded and carried off by the Bukharan officials.’ The amount came to 18,000 roubles. Local officials claimed that tax receipts from the Zarafshan Valley had totalled almost 450,000 roubles in the first year of Russian rule—this turned out to be exaggerated. After 1870 in Samarkand there are almost no further references to Serkers and Zakatchis in Russian territory except as agents of the Bukharan Government—they were envisaged as collecting revenue in the very earliest temporary statutes, but then abolished. Thus the only agents the Russians had left to work with were town and village Aksakals whom they had inherited from the previous administration. In the Zarafshan Okrug the temporary statute specifically affirmed that the boundaries of Aksakalstvos, the divisions they were in charge of, would remain the same as under the Bukharan administration, although the Russians reserved the right to combine two or more to be given to ‘especially influential natives’ to control as Amins, soon to be renamed Volost Upraviteli.

In 1872 von Kaufman decided to embark on what he called an ‘essential reorganization’ of the collection of revenue in the Zarafshan region, as he claimed the old system was incapable of further improvement. The Bukharan system of taxation was replaced in 1873, when it was simplified to zakat, tanap, and 10 per cent kheraj (reduced from 20 per cent) and some detailed surveys were undertaken by Russian officials seconded from their normal duties. One of these, Ozerov, in an

99 ‘Po povodu uchrezhdeniya novogo Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatorstva i Voennogo Okruga’, Given, No. 194, in Ts, 1 (1868), 171.
100 Terent’ev, Rossiya i Angliya, 323.
101 See Appendix 1; Skopin, Srednyaya Aziya, 54.
103 TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.15, 102 ob.
105 Ibid., 5.
106 fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otcheta, 69.
unsolicited project for the reform of the revenue system in the Zarafshan Okrug, remarked that corruption among the Aksakals had been endemic under the Bukharans and that the Russians still had no means of imposing effective control over them.\footnote{TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.46, 1.} Ultimately these investigations were supposed to have revealed that over the previous three years a total of 165,184 roubles had been withheld from the Russian authorities in the Zarafshan Okrug by the native revenue officials.\footnote{Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 5, Nalogi i Poshliny. Organy Finansovogo Upravleniya, 50–1; Ignat’ev, \textit{Ob’yasnil’ novyj Zapiska}, 100.} This may represent corruption, or simply a traditional shortfall between revenue demands and returns that pre-dated the Russian conquest. Even after the new system had been introduced and surveys undertaken, there was ample scope for men loyal to the Bukharan administration, or simply hoping to profit from the relatively chaotic situation, to cause trouble for the Russians. In August 1873 the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug reported that

The Jam Volost Upravitel has informed the Acting Nachalnik of the Katta-Kurgan Otdel, that some of the inhabitants of the village of Yangi last year did not pay the savashil zakat, and this year also do not want to pay the savashil, podosh or 33 kopek taxes, and that for all this the Aksakal Mullah Farmankul is guilty. The rebellious villagers do not pay the Russian taxes, but take them to the Bukharans.\footnote{TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.108, 17; the Savashil or Savail zakat was a tax on livestock.}

Abramov’s irritation is almost palpable, even at this remove. He recommended Farmankul’s arrest, not surprisingly, but reserved his most withering scorn for his hapless Russian subordinates in Katta-Kurgan: ‘[T]heir subjection to the Bukharan Government, and not the Russian, is understandable. . . . that the people listened to Farmankul— is also understandable. But how the administration of the Otdel, in the course of two years failed to discover that there was a village in the Otdel . . . paying its taxes to the Emir of Bukhara—that is hard to understand.’\footnote{Ibid.}

The border between the Zarafshan Okrug and Bukhara had been delineated two years before: until then the village had continued to pay its taxes to Bukhara in any case.

All those people questioned by chinovnik Rostislavov, to the number of six, explained that at the time when Mr. Zhukovsky left in 1871, having delineated...
The Creation of a Local Administration

the border—the *Aksakal* Farmankul said that the people of Yangi remained Bukharan subjects, and because of that they should pay all their taxes not to the Russians, but to the Bukharans. Three of those questioned: Babajan, Mumin-bai and Hakim-bai, added that after Mr. Zhukovsky left, *Aksakal* Farmankul levied a fine of two roubles on 16 people, in total 32 roubles, under the name of *chai-puli* (tea-money), because the people of Yangi were within Bukharan territory.¹¹¹

A neighbouring *Aksakal*, Yar Kul of the village of Kosh-Kuduk, gave the following account of how a minor native official set about subverting the sovereignty and reducing the tax-base of the Russian Empire:

Already in 1871, when Grebenkin was in charge, before the arrival of land surveyor Zhukovsky, the inhabitants of the village of Yangi met in the village of Sipkau in my courtyard. Farmankul proposed a choice to them: did they want to be Russian subjects, or Bukharan, and asked, what would they give him, if he were to make them Bukharan subjects? Some offered him 200 *kokans*,¹¹² some more, but whether he took it or not I didn’t see; he only said that for less than 600 *kokans* he wouldn’t do it... Farmankul went to the *Bek* of Ziauddin¹¹³ and suggested to him that if he wanted it, then the village of Yangi could remain under Bukharan rule. He agreed and gave him two *khalats* in gratitude, but then he said to Farmankul that he must furnish him with a letter from the *Nachalnik* of the *Otdel* which confirmed that the village of Yangi really was located in the Bukharan dominions. After this Farmankul returned and told this to the people of Yangi so that that they said that their village was in the Bukharan dominions.¹¹⁴

One puzzle here is that, at least in theory, the Russians levied lower taxes than the Bukharan administration. It could be argued that sentiment, or a desire to continue under a Muslim ruler, accounted for the desire of the inhabitants of Yangi to avoid paying their taxes to the Russians. Lt Anichkov, who was sent out to the village to investigate this, offered a slightly different explanation when he wrote to the Katta-Kurgan District Commandant on 20 March 1874. He found that there was a considerable discrepancy between the amount of *savail zakat* paid by the wealthiest inhabitants on their livestock to the Bukharans, and the

¹¹¹ Ibid., 18-ob.
¹¹² *Kokan* is slang for the Kokand *tenga*, five of which were equivalent to one rouble. The *Aksakal* probably insisted on being paid in these because they were more valuable than the Bukharan *tenga*, which was seven to the rouble (many thanks to Dr Timur Beisembiev for suggesting this explanation).
¹¹³ Just over the border in Bukhara.
amount they would have paid had they been submitting this revenue to the Russians—very often they were only paying half as much:

This significant difference between the collection of Savail-zakat by our Volost Upraviteli and the Bukharan zakat attracts the inhabitants towards the Bukharan Government, as they don’t realise that our Government has finally declared, that if they submit to the Emir—. . . the rate of the Bukharan zakat will in all likelihood be raised to enormous proportions. Apart from this there are other reasons for their gravitation towards the Emir; for instance: there are those not occupied in farming, who therefore have no sense of the charity of our government in reducing the rate of kheraj from $\frac{1}{5}$ to $\frac{1}{10}$ of the average harvest. . . . [This] firmly inclines towards their submission to the Emir, and not the Russian Government.¹¹⁵

In other words the inhabitants objected to the fact that not only had the Russians raised this form of zakat, but they were also much more rigorous in collecting it than were the Bukharans. This has to be borne in mind when assessing Russian claims about the weight of taxes under the Bukharan administration, and their generosity in reducing the burden. On the other hand, this does seem to have been a tax that fell largely on the wealthier inhabitants of the village—only 14 men are listed, owning between 40 and 400 sheep, and sometimes as many as 120 horses. Kheraj, however, was a tax that fell on rich and poor alike.

Even once their position was more firmly established, the Russians still found considerable difficulty levying taxes, principally kheraj, using the more lowly personnel they had inherited from the Bukharans. Not only were these agents unreliable, the lack of any comprehensive survey of agricultural land in the region meant that the authorities had very little idea of how many acres were being harvested each year, and with what crop. This information was essential if they wanted to maintain a revenue system based largely on kheraj, which was now to be paid wherever possible in cash.¹¹⁶ As Captain Tchaikovsky, Pristav of the Ura-Tepe Uchastok (Sub-District) explained:

The kheraj cess . . . presents really the most equitable system of taxation,—since the people pay according to the goods they actually possess, taking into account the harvest,—but given the unsatisfactory result, gross abuses and the lack of control, we are forced to wish that the kheraj cess be replaced by a different tax, and in that case a land tax would be the most satisfactory . . . The kheraj

¹¹⁶ TsGARUz F.22 Op.1 D.3, 10ob.
cess requires an endless number of eyes and hands, in order to ensure that movable objects subject to tax should not be hidden, unpaid for etc.¹¹⁷

He thought the whole system should be replaced with a simple charge per acre of cultivated land, regardless of what the crop was and how successful the harvest, as the Russians simply did not have the personnel to acquire this sort of detailed information:

Finally, using this means, we will do away with the abnormal position of our power, when—so far as tax is concerned—we do not have control in our hands, and have to be satisfied with what they give us. In this instance we will benefit in two ways, materially and morally, since the natives clearly see our failure and the ease with which they can deceive the authorities. This situation cannot be prolonged, we must, and are obliged to take into our hands that control, which at the moment, I can confirm we do not have. The sole means of verifying the current system of revenue collection is to conduct a poll of names of all the inhabitants. It is necessary only to recall our religious difference, a few verses of the Koran, Asiatic cunning—to see that the method outlined above has become a comedy, in which, once again, the comic role is played by us.¹¹⁸

An agricultural survey had been completed by 1875, giving the Russians an idea of the number of tanaps under cultivation in each village, but the labour and expense involved in regularly undertaking what in India would be called a ‘Settlement’ were too great for it to be contemplated for another twenty years. A fixed land tax based on a notional 10 per cent of the average annual value of the crop on irrigated (Abi) land, calculated according to prevailing bazaar prices, was introduced in 1876, the typical tax burden per desyatina being from 60 kopeks to 1 rouble 20 kopeks. The Aksakals were given the task of reporting how many tanaps in their villages were under cultivation, and which crops had been sown, so that no continuous reassessment of the kind required in British India under ryotwari was needed.¹¹⁹

This reduced the burden on administrators, but also, in the long term, the possibilities of raising revenue. It also meant that they were entirely reliant on the honesty of the village Aksakal in recording the number of tanaps of land each villager had under cultivation in his tetraddaftar or ledger and despite the fact that every revenue transaction required a receipt, this was to store up serious problems for

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 5ob–6.
¹¹⁹ fon-Kaufman, proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otcheta, 69–70; Ignat’ev, Ob’yasnitel’naya Zapiska, 100.
the future.¹²⁰ More accurate surveys by the new Pozemelno-Podatnyi (Land Tax) Commission, which began work in Samarkand in 1892, had by the late 1890s led to a 100 per cent increase in the amount of tax collected, but even then this normally worked out at just two or three roubles per desyatina, or less than a half of the tax burden faced by peasants in European Russia, which stood at approximately 7 roubles in 1899.¹²¹ It was also considerably lower than the land tax levied by the British over most of Northern India, where typically they raised demand by 30–40 per cent after annexation, rather than reducing it as the Russians did.¹²²

Notwithstanding these problems, revenue receipts from the Zarafshan Okrug did begin to rise steadily from 367,140 roubles in 1869 at a rate of ¹⁄₅ of the crop, to 404,885 roubles by 1876 at a rate of ¹⁄₁₀ of the crop.¹²³ Von Kaufman commented that on the whole the Zarafshan Okrug, owing to its dense population and what he referred to as a particularly ‘energetic’ Russian administration, produced much better returns than Syr-Darya Province and other semi-nomadic areas. This also reflects the fact that the Aksakals were not always the same men who had served under the old regime. From 1873 the Russians introduced a new system of indirect elections to the post of village elder (Selskii Starshina or Aksakal) which was ostensibly based on that used in European Russian villages. The question of how well the new native administration worked, and the sort of men who came forward to man it, will be dealt with later. What remains to be examined is just why the Russians chose this somewhat difficult path, and how the British reacted when confronted with a similar situation.

¹²⁰ Puzzlingly these ledgers do not appear to be kept in the Uzbekistan State Archives (they would, in any case, be in Turki and, hence, inaccessible to me). I can only speculate as to what may have happened to them—perhaps they were simply destroyed in 1917–18, or at the time of Collectivization? There is no reference to them in the Oblast and Uyezd Chancellery catalogues, or those of the central Turkestan treasury. Occasionally transcribed pages from an Aksakal’s ledger appear in Russian documents dealing with tax disputes, together with receipts.
When comparing the British and Russian strategies for the recruitment of intermediaries and collaborators in India and Turkestan, respectively, the principal difference which emerges is that the Russians showed no interest in working through landowners or aristocratic intermediaries, and instead chose to create a class of petty officials who owed their influence, such as it was, to their positions within urban and village hierarchies and, increasingly, the access they had to the power of the Tsarist State. As V. V. Barthold wrote, with characteristic insight: ‘Under the Russians the ancestral and service aristocracy lost its significance, but the significance of the aristocracy of education and commerce was entirely preserved.’¹²⁴

Turkestan’s society before the conquest was not a markedly hierarchical one, compared with some parts of India, but it did possess powerful elites which the Russians could have made use of, had they chosen. If the situation in Central Asia was not exactly analogous to that of Bengal before the Permanent Settlement of 1797, it was because the Amlakdars probably had a more genuine title to their estates than the class of Mughal tax-officials whom the British promoted to landholding Zamindars. The Raj was able to create ‘aristocratic’ elites out of much less promising material than the Beks and Amlakdars the Russians had to work with. There are parallels with British policy: the example of Burma, the awarding of khalats to minor officials, above all the period in the 1840s and 50s when the doctrine of lapse was applied to Indian States, the Oudh Taluqdars were expropriated rather like the Bukharan Amlakdars, and the ethos of British rule was more markedly Utilitarian and anti-aristocratic¹²⁵—but after the Mutiny in particular the British almost invariably sought their collaborators among the native aristocracy.

In the Peshawar and Derajat divisions of Trans-Indus Punjab the British maintained no fewer than 155 local landowning agents, all receiving various different types of Government grants, pensions, and

¹²⁴ Bartol’d, Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni, 184.
jaghirs in return for service. Captain Wace, who compiled a list of these men, concluded that to specify what those duties were was impossible—instead, they were being rewarded and brought on board for the sake of the influence they already had. D. C. Macnabb, Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, remarked that ‘though he has carefully recorded in the appropriate column where the influence of each grantee lies and the extent of that influence, he has not attempted to specify the occasions on which they should be called in for service, finding the task hopeless’. British weakness at the hands of their local agents is clear here—they were prepared to throw money at these men simply because they were influential, and without any fixed idea of what they were expected to do in return. Macnabb neatly summed up the Imperial dilemma when he wrote that

The Statement made by Captain Wace that, whereas we gave grants to these men because of their influence in their clan or neighbourhood independent of such grants, now their influence and importance may be said in a great measure to depend on the benefices they receive from Government, is one to which I am not prepared to subscribe. If the opinion formed by Captain Wace be correct, I think it speaks badly for the Jagheerdars of the Hazara District, and shows that one of the main objects of the Government in granting these jagheers, viz., attaching to our interests the natural leaders of the people, has failed.¹²⁶

A clearer but still incomplete idea of some of these services, and the extent to which the British depended on them, comes in a letter from Captain Louis Cavagnari, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat District, and later to come to a sticky end in the British Legation at Kabul. Although it only covers a small proportion of all the landowners and religious leaders along the North-West frontier, it is still quite enlightening in its lengthy descriptions of the capabilities and precise degree of influence each beneficiary exercised, as well as the services which they or their families had rendered to the Government of India in the past.¹²⁷ There followed a massive table detailing the beneficiaries, origins, and values of their jaghirs and pensions, amounts of land, family connections, and genealogies, etc.: all the information necessary, in other words, to determine just how powerful these men were and

¹²⁶ OIOC P/141 October 1871, No. 1, Beneficiaries, Peshawar and Derajat Divisions, 763; Donald Macnabb was from the third generation of his family to serve in India and built a canal out of his own pocket in Punjab. See David Gilmour, The Ruling Caste (London, 2005), 36.
¹²⁷ See Appendix 4; OIOC P/141 October 1871, No. 1, 763–5.
whether or not they were worth cultivating.¹²⁸ This is only one of hundreds of such references to ‘natural leaders’ of the people along the North-West frontier, evidence of an almost obsessive British desire to seek legitimacy through the existing rural order, capping its patronage networks and strengthening its elites in the process.

ABANDONING THE ARISTOCRACY

Why did the Russians feel it so necessary to undermine and emasculate the existing landholding elites of Turkestan, rather than working through them? The Zarafshan Okrug, until the mid-1880s, was, like Trans-Indus Punjab, a sensitive and dangerous frontier area even after the threat from Shahrisabz had been neutralized; the Beks and Amlakdars of Samarkand could, potentially, have proved useful and influential collaborators, or so the experience of Punjab might lead us to expect. There seem to be two elements to the solution of this puzzle. First, by the 1860s Russia was not itself governed aristocratically outside St Petersburg and the provincial capitals—indeed most historians of this period argue that the nineteenth century saw the progressive eclipse of the rural aristocracy in Russia and its replacement by a professionalized (if not well-educated) bureaucracy. Among the effects of the 1861 emancipation was the substitution of landowners with local policemen as the main agents of the State in the countryside, and the extension of peasant self-government along the lines adopted in Turkestan a few years later.¹²⁹ It is perhaps too fanciful to suggest that von Kaufman was applying ideas acquired during his brief tenure (1865–7) as Governor in Vilna,¹³⁰ where the Tsarist State had begun a policy of expropriating the Polish aristocracy in an attempt to break its influence in the countryside, but it does offer a possible model.¹³¹ The precedents in the Russian governmental tradition for the use of amateur, landholding rural elites as agents of the State were weaker than those in Britain, as noble landowners had long been hobbled by a powerful centre.¹³² Although most of Russia’s officers in Turkestan

¹²⁸ Ibid., 766–861.
¹²⁹ Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 398; Dominic Lieven, Russia’s Rulers Under the Old Regime (Newhaven, 1989), 3, 24–5; Empire, 244.
were drawn from the noble estate, they served in humble Orenburg and Turkestan line regiments rather than in the aristocratic Guards, and almost none of them came from landowning families.¹³³

This in itself is not a sufficient explanation—few of those who served in the Indian army and Civil Service were drawn from the British aristocracy either. However, the British professional middle classes continued to show an almost touching faith in the virtues of aristocratic government, and nostalgia for the rural idyll it was supposed to have sustained in Britain before the Industrial Revolution. In India they had the opportunity to preserve or recreate an idealized ‘feudal’ past by ruling through society’s ‘natural leaders’.¹³⁴ Perhaps more pertinently, it reduced the European manpower needed to run an administration, always a much scarcer resource for the British than the Russians, and helped to clothe alien rule in local colours: on the North-West Frontier, where these local agents retained a good deal of autonomy, this may not have been so much of a fiction. The Russians, unlike the British, did not yet suffer from a surfeit of urbanization and industrialization, nor did many Turkestani officers give evidence of having much affection for the rhythms and hierarchies of rural society.

To this we must add local factors that made it still less likely that the Russians would try to preserve or create a class of Muslim landholders in Turkestan on the model of the Zamindars in Bengal. Von Kaufman considered the whole population of Turkestan to be ‘fanatical’, but its elites, whether political or clerical, particularly so. This helps to explain his refusal to countenance the rights of Amlakdars, and instead use an extremely tendentious reading of Islamic law and custom to undermine their position. The immense suspicion with which von Kaufman and Abramov viewed the religious pretensions of many Amlakdars as Sayyids or Khojas is clear from their correspondence on this issue. Whilst they were wary of interfering directly with waqf; mułk land was more closely integrated with the structure of the pre-conquest State, and less religiously sensitive. Whatever the truth about the economic and political power of Turkestan’s rural elites, there is no doubt that the Russians saw them as sustainers and promoters of Muslim religious belief, whose influence came partly from their status as Khojas.

¹³³ See the next chapter.
Sayyids, or Ishans. Removing them was a risk and one the Russians were unwilling to take in the case of the ‘ulama, but they judged that it could be done without provoking revolt. Thus the emasculation of rural elites was also another element in Ignorirovanie, designed to demoralize and decapitate the Islamic hierarchy. The Russians were not unaware that these groups possessed influence and legitimacy that might be turned to the advantage of the colonial power, as we can see in the Protectorates. Ultimately, however, they saw the inconsistencies of Amlakdari as too irritating, and above all the risks of fostering ‘fanaticism’ as being too great. In 1882 von Kaufman remembered that fourteen years earlier the native population had had little confidence in Russian authority or justice, and had looked to traditional leaders in the countryside, particularly the Ishans of the Sufi brotherhoods, who were trying to whip them up for a ghazavat, or holy war.¹³⁵ Kaufman, in common with many other officers in Turkestan, cut his teeth fighting in the Caucasus, in a war which deeply coloured Russian attitudes towards Islam and brought about a sea-change in the Imperial policy of trying to co-opt local elites. As early as 1818 General Yermolov restricted the powers and privileges of the Agalar landowners in Azerbaijan, and expressed strong reservations over the wisdom of working through them, and interestingly Paskevich also insisted on documentary evidence of noble status when deciding on Russian policies towards elites in this region.¹³⁶ Particularly influential were the views of Prince A. I. Bariatinsky, the architect of Russia’s victory in the Caucasus. He believed that the Russians had made a grave error in adhering to their traditional policy of trying to win over and support the local nobility and tribal leaders in the North Caucasus. Instead, he felt that it was precisely these groups who had been stoking fanaticism among the local population and co-operating with the ‘ulama.¹³⁷ In a process briefly referred to at the beginning of the previous chapter, Jersild has chronicled how from the late 1850s North Caucasian elites began to lose their privileges and their role in Government. The death of Alagar-Bek in 1858 was used by General Wrangel as an excuse to abolish the Kazi-Kumukh Khanate and place a Russian officer in charge of its administration, and the Kiruin and Avar Khanates met a similar fate between 1862 and

¹³⁵ fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otcheta, 10.
1864, as they were turned into Military Districts instead.¹³⁸ Although a very small number of Muslim Transcaucasian Beks were finally granted hereditary nobility in 1901, unlike the Georgian nobility they were never fully incorporated into the Empire’s ruling elite.¹³⁹ The wider outcome of this change of direction, supported by Miliutin, was the 1867 ukaz forbidding the awarding of medals and other privileges to the leaders of Kirghiz, Kalmyk, Bashkir, and other inorodtsy tribes.¹⁴⁰ Instead, a new policy would be formulated, which attempted to separate the mass of the inorodtsy from their traditional allegiances and replace these with a new (and at first rather primitive) idea of Russian citizenship through local institutions of self-government. The example of Shamil had certainly helped to make the Russians a little wary of ‘natural leaders’ in Muslim society, and the Indian Mutiny was also interpreted as a ‘fanatical’, Muslim uprising led and orchestrated by a former leader (Bahadur Shah) whom the British had foolishly allowed to retain the trappings of office. Thus in Samarkand Province the 1897 census listed just 507 male hereditary nobles, of whom 404 were Russian and the remainder mainly Polish. Only four Tajiks, four Tatars, and two Kazakhs were members of the noble estate in the province, and Uzbeks and Sarts were entirely unrepresented.¹⁴¹ Once a key tactic in securing newly conquered regions for the Empire, by the latter half of the nineteenth century the incorporation of local aristocracies into the Russian nobility had been decisively abandoned.

By the early 1900s there was a strong body of opinion arguing for the abolition of the Protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva as well, as they were seen as fostering ignorance, backwardness, and religious extremism.¹⁴² Ultimately, most Russian soldiers and officials did not believe that indirect rule or the ‘collaborationist’ model espoused by the British were firm bases for rule in Asia. In 1898 the General Staff in Turkestan published a translation of an interview with a Russian General (name unknown) who was on a hunting expedition near Lake Balkhash, taken from the Lahore Pioneer Mail. The General was puzzled by British

¹³⁸ Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 32–3.
¹⁴⁰ Yaroshevsky, ‘Empire and Citizenship’, 69–70.
¹⁴¹ Troinitskii, Samarkandskaya Oblast’, 132.
¹⁴² See D. N. Logofet, Strana Bezpraviya (St Pb., 1909); Bukharskoe Khanstvo pod Russkim Protektoratom (St Pb., 1911). I am grateful to Philipp Reichmuth for pointing out to me that the former book, slightly bizarrely, was translated into Persian for Emir ‘Abd al-Ahad of Bukhara as Mamlakat bihuquq. BI Vol. I (Tashkent, 1952), No. 238, 94.
policy on the North-West Frontier, saying that he could not understand why, if the Malik (bosses) who acted as British agents in the region were found to have been conniving at tribal raids, they were not immediately executed, rather than wasting time on judicial proceedings. Had he been in General Lockhart’s shoes, he said, he would have crushed the Afridis with an ‘iron fist’, expelled them from their lands, and settled them with 20,000 Cossacks.¹⁴³ Russian rule should be cemented through Russian settlement and, eventually, the undermining of Islam among the native population. Both these elements were lacking until the early 1900s and, as result, Russian methods sometimes resembled those of the British, but tactics such as devolving power to native officials and rulers or preserving Sharia law were always seen as ‘temporary’, Vremennoe. Every set of statutes produced for Turkestan in the nineteenth century included this expression in the title.

However, although the Russians had little time for rural aristocracy, it would be wrong to think that they had no collaborators at all among the native population and simply ruled by the sword. Rather, they sought their agents elsewhere and attempted to ensure their loyalty by choosing people who would owe everything to the Russians. This was increasingly true of the village elites who became Volost Upraviteli, Aksakals, and Qazis, and it was also true, to some degree, of urban, mercantile elites: together they came to form what was sometimes called a Zhivaya Stena, a ‘Living Wall’, between the local population and the Russian military bureaucracy.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, 71.
4

The Military Bureaucracy

All these lovely little experiments recoil on the District-Officer in the end

Russian Turkestan was administered under what was known as *Voennno-Narodnoe Upravlenie* or ‘Military-Popular Government’, a system which can be traced back to the pre-Petrine *Voevody* of outlying districts of the Russian Empire, but dating in its essentials from Catherine the Great’s administrative reforms of 1775, as extended by Speransky in Siberia and Bariatinsky in the Caucasus: the variant introduced in Turkestan closely resembled that introduced in the mountainous regions of the north Caucasus after 1864. The Governors of Provinces under this system normally had the rank at least of Major-General, and the senior bureaucrats were all army officers seconded from their units to perform administrative, judicial, medical, and even educational duties. Whilst civilians could be clerks, surveyors, and accountants, almost all jobs which involved executive or judicial power were filled by military officers, and this remained the case until the Revolution. Apart from the Military Governors and those who served in the Governor-General’s Chancellery and *Sovet*, the most important official posts were those of

---

³ Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire*, 34–5; I cannot agree with Matsuzato’s rather arbitrary grouping of the Caucasian Viceroyalty with the Western *Guberniyas* of the Empire rather than with Siberia, the Steppe, and Turkestan: the Azeri regions and the North Caucasus were clearly seen as an ‘Asiatic’ area with specifically colonial problems and a model for later policies in Turkestan. Kimitaka Matsuzato, ‘General-Gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi Imperii’, *Novaya Imperskaya Istoriya*, 456–7.
Uyezdni Nachalnik (District Commandant) and their assistants, and the local police chiefs or Uchastkovye Pristavy. Below these executive positions power was almost entirely devolved to a separate ‘native administration’. The Zemstva, or provincial elected assemblies, together with the independent civilian courts which had been created by Alexander II’s reforms after 1864, did not exist in military governorships, which placed a very heavy burden on these officers. In civilian areas the Zemstva were responsible for education, public health and sanitation, and numerous other duties, whilst there was an independent judiciary separate from the executive: here all this fell to the lot of a small group of military men, usually with no specialist training. As Pahlen wrote in 1910:

Now the Uyezdni Nachalnik . . . fulfils the functions of the following people and positions in the main Oblasts of the region: Superintendent, Policemaster, Head of the land administration (in his administrative capacity), Head of the urban administration, Urban Justice, Chairman of the land revenue board, hospital committee Chairman, Presiding Director of the prison division . . . Chairman of the Uyezd and urban committees on public health, Chairman of the Uyezd and urban sanitary works committee in charge of monthly inspections. Besides all this, he is entrusted with the supervision of the popular [Sharia] courts and of Waqfs, the control of irrigation and assists in the laying-out of areas for settlers.⁴

Until 1884 the District Commandants had also acted as the local Military Commanders, presenting them with an intolerably burdensome workload. Nothing could demonstrate more clearly the difference between Russian military administration in Turkestan and civilian rule in European areas, where each of these jobs would have been the responsibility of a different official. So who were these administrative Pooh-Bahs, the backbone of Russia’s administration in Turkestan? What was their social background, what sort of education did they receive, and how did they cope with the raft of official duties presented to them if they succeeded in transferring from a line regiment to the administration? On the whole, contemporary sources are not complimentary, laying stress on a lack of education and training, chronic under-staffing, and, in the case of Saltykov-Shchedrin’s scurrilous Gospoda Tashkentsy, greed and immorality, an image that would continue to be reinforced into the twentieth century by other lurid works of fiction.⁵

⁴ Palen, Otchet, Vol. 12, Uezdnoe Upravlenie, 156.
⁵ M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, Gospoda Tashkentsy, Kartiny Nrawov (St Pb., 1873); Saltykov-Shchedrin had never actually visited Tashkent. He merely chose the city as a proverbial archetype of all that was crass, corrupt, and vice-ridden in Russian provincial
Vostochnoe Obozrenie questioned the efficacy of Voennno-Narodnoe Upravlenie, alleging that very few army officers had a university education and that most were intellectually and culturally unsuited to the posts they occupied:

The educational qualifications of the army officer corps are extremely low even in the area of their specialism, in addition to which the administration of the region demands... much specialist knowledge, which can be given only by Universities and other institutions of higher education... Everyone knows that the army officer corps in general, and ours in Turkestan in particular, finish their education with the Junker exams, and do not go beyond the course of the fifth class of the Gymnasium. We have very few officers in the region, who have finished the Gymnasium course, and there are no more than ten Academicians.⁶

The Junker course was a two-year preparation for military service, undertaken by boys (77 per cent from the nobility) between the ages of 16 and 18, ideally after they had reached the fifth class at a gymnasium, or secondary school, although in practice most until then would have been educated at home and some were barely literate.⁷ They would then join the army as a praporshchik, or Ensign, and serve out two more years of probationary service before being given full commissioned rank. Before 1863–5 and the beginning of Miliutin’s army reforms about a third of officer recruits would complete this course at one of the Cadet Corps established in the mid-eighteenth century which educated boys between the ages of 11 and 21 in an environment that attempted to reproduce exactly the discipline of the army proper.⁸ The remainder would undertake the Junker course at private ‘unrecognized’ educational institutions. After 1863 the Cadet Corps were abolished and replaced by twenty military gymnasia which educated potential officers until the age of 16, after which they would attend one of the new specialist Junker Schools established by Miliutin within each of the military districts of the Empire and complete a

society, although his novel was also an attack on irresponsible military adventurism. See J. F. Sahadeo, ‘Creating a Russian Colonial Community: City, Nation and Empire in Tashkent, 1865–1923’ (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ph.D. thesis, 2000), 143–5 for a discussion of his writings and settler reactions to them. I. Il’in, v Novom Krayu (Tashkent, 1913), 2 vols., contains even more scandalous depictions of officers and was written from first-hand knowledge.

⁶ VO 1884g No. 8, in TS, 377 (1883), 1–2.
⁸ V. Krasnov and V. Daines (eds.), Russkii Voennoo-Istoricheskii Slovar’ (Moscow, 2002), 231.
two-year course with a heavy emphasis on drill and reproducing the atmosphere of the barracks. This was supplemented by the creation of 11 (later 16) military academies, which catered to different arms of the service. Between them the academies’ more rigorous four-year course produced 400–500 graduates a year, as opposed to 700–800 completing the two-year Junker course. Military higher education was represented by the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy and the Nikolaevsky Engineering Academy, both established in 1855, which trained small groups of officers in the technical branches of the service. The Russian equivalent of Camberley or St Cyr was the Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff, founded in 1832 and turned into an independent institution of military higher education in 1862. The two- or three-year course here was much more prestigious than that at the Junker Schools, although it similarly focused on military history, military administration, tactics, and the basics of artillery ballistics and fortifications. However, only 35 officers a year were admitted until 1877, after which this rose to 150, all of whom had to hold at least the rank of Major in order to sit the exams. Those who succeeded, particularly those who were asked to stay on for an additional third year and complete a dissertation, were destined for the elite of the Russian Army, the General Staff. Those of this elite cadre who served in Turkestan (notable examples are Veniukov, Snesarev, Terentiev, and Kostenko) were only ever seconded to administrative posts very briefly. Accordingly, even towards the end of the century the formal education of most officers ended when they were 18, whilst earlier on large numbers had not even completed a Junker course, which was itself a modernizing response to the problems exposed by the Crimean War. Even the Miliutin reforms would be somewhat diluted after 1881 under Alexander III, who was suspicious of the liberalizing and professionalizing tendencies of the bureaucracy in his father’s era. This

---

10 Krasnov and Daines, Russkii Voeno-Istoricheskii Slovar’, 52.
11 Bruce Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets. The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914 (Bloomington, 1992), 34.
12 Ibid., 35.
13 See Marshall, ‘Dar al-Harb’, 10, 37–50; The Russian General Staff, 47–9 on the Academy of the General Staff and its role in expanding Russian knowledge of the Empire’s Asiatic provinces, training officers in frontier warfare and intelligence-gathering, as well as (in some cases) Oriental languages.
14 Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education 1832–1914 (New York, 1990), 64.
meant that access to elite military educational institutions became more
difficult for those not of noble birth. Non-nobles, once they had passed
through a lowly Junker School, would still have to serve as Praporshchiki
(Ensigns, but in effect no more than NCOs) for several years before
they could reach commissioned rank.¹⁵ Most officers of the Turkestan
Line Regiments fell into this latter category.

Together with complaints about lack of education, criticisms of the
culture, habits, and morals of Turkestan officers are also common,
with the emphasis on alcoholism and card games for high stakes. These
sorts of criticisms were, of course, not limited to Central Asia—John
Bushnell has drawn attention to what he considers to be a near-universal
phenomenon of officer drunkenness and incompetence, although he
exaggerates the degree to which these were peculiarly Russian charac-
teristics.¹⁶ As far as drinking and gambling were concerned, Turkestan
seems to have been no exception to the Empire-wide rule, and Schuyler’s
caucus observations on Russian official society in Tashkent in 1871 are
quite well known:

Each coterie keeps apart from the others, and there is nothing like real general
social life. These absurd divisions in such a small society, and the fact that
Tashkent is looked upon as a temporary place of exile, are very bad for the
younger officers and officials. There being few amusements, society being dull
and broken up, and their scientific and literary pursuits discouraged or at least
not encouraged, the officers have little resource but gambling and drinking,
and in many instances young men have utterly ruined themselves, some even
having to be sent out of the country—and a man must be bad to be exiled from
Tashkent.¹⁷

He also remarked on the lack of knowledge of local languages displayed
by almost all officers, and their total lack of interest in the country
they had been stationed in. Although Curzon observed in 1888 that
‘Tashkent is, perhaps, less than it used to be, the refuge of damaged

¹⁵ William Fuller, Civil–Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881–1914 (Princeton,
1985), 11–12.

¹⁶ John Bushnell, ‘The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881–1914: Customs, Duties, Inef-
drinking habits of bored line officers in provincial garrisons and the excesses of the more
aristocratic Guards officers Bushnell ignores the degree to which this was common to the
officer corps of all European armies of the day. The world of boredom, hard drinking,
and elaborate mess ritual which is described in The Duel and From Double Eagle to
Red Flag, two novels he cites, is little different from that of Joseph Roth’s The Radetsky
March.

reputations and shattered fortunes’,¹⁸ his opinion of the Russian officer corps in Turkestan was not high. Nalivkin remarked on officers’ love of expensive pomp, as they toured their districts accompanied by enormous suites. In this they were only following von Kaufman’s lead, as he firmly believed that such displays were essential in order to cow and impress Asiatics.¹⁹ This lack of individual qualities was compounded by a sheer lack of manpower when compared to other areas of the Russian Empire. Writing his annual report to the Tsar in 1898, Acting Governor-General Philippov pointed out that, whilst even in Transcaucasia Tiflis and Yerevan Provinces had an average District complement of 52 and 44 chinovniki respectively, in Ferghana Province, with a much larger population, each District had an average of just 17. Whilst Syr-Darya Province had a population roughly the same as that of Daghestan and Terek Provinces put together, it had an area five times larger, but only 18 police officers to the former’s 92. Finally, Samarkand Province, with a similar population to the Elizavetpol Province, had just 11 administrative officers, as opposed to the latter’s 43.²⁰ Comparisons with European Russia were still more stark. The Pahlen Report concluded that the military system was inadequate and recommended a professional civil service on the Indian model. Together with other parts of the Russian Empire, the British Empire was a frequent point of reference in criticisms of the administrative cadre in Turkestan. N. S. Lykoshin,²¹ a member of the small cadre of Central Asian scholar-administrators, together with Ostroumov and Nalivkin, made this comparison explicit when complaining about the poor quality of Russian officers in a collection of articles and official minutes produced to address the problem of their inadequate knowledge of local languages:

Administrative posts in the English colonies in material respects are better organised than in ours . . . This is undoubtedly the case because the English Government only sends ‘choice’ public servants to its colonies, and such can only be found at a good salary. They give civil servants in their colonies the kind of privileges that we cannot even dream about.²²

¹⁸ Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 240–1.
¹⁹ Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, 66–7.
²¹ Nil Sergeevich Lykoshin (1860–1922), a hereditary nobleman from Pskov who studied at the Pavlovsky military academy, was a Pristav in Ura-Tepe in 1889, Commandant of the Khujand District 1905–12, and ended his career as a Major-General and Governor of Samarkand Province 1914–17. Baskhanov, Voennye Vostokovedy, 145–7.
²² I. D. Yagello (ed.), Sbornik Materialov po voprosu ob izuchenii tuzemnych yazykov sluzhashchimi po voenno-narodnomu upravleniyu Turkestanskogo Kraya (Tashkent,
Compared with service in one of the Turkestan Line Regiments or the Ural and Orenburg Cossack Brigades (from which almost all administrators were drawn) secondment to Voennno-Narodnoe Upravlenie had its attractions. Administrators received higher pay than did line officers, normally an additional 500 roubles a year: a total of 2,200 roubles a year including allowances for a District Commandant in 1870, rising to 3,000 roubles in 1886, whilst in 1871 General Abramov received 5,000 roubles a year as Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, plus 6,000 roubles in expenses. They were also entitled to earlier and more generous pension provision than their counterparts in Siberia or European Russia. Nevertheless, these were not particularly high salaries, and life for these men could be very hard. Ostroumov painted a bleak picture of the life of the Pristav, which has echoes of the Spartan existence that was supposedly the lot of District Officers in Punjab, if they adhered strictly to the principles of the Lawrence brothers:

The Pristav serves around the clock, sometimes lives alone in a kishlak, occupies a Sart hut, where he freezes in winter and contracts rheumatism. The Administrator, even the District Commandant, is deprived of the possibility of bringing up his children at home. A social life, entertainments easily accessible to others, reading, all of these practically do not exist for the administrator.

Finally, the Girs Commission also criticized Turkestan’s administrators for extravagance, pointing out that the expenses of the Chancellery alone in the Zarafshan Okrug in 1882 amounted to 20,650 roubles, or almost twice the average cost of a Governor’s Chancellery in European Russia, even though the Okrug was closer to the size of a European

1905). 95. Ivan Dionisevich Jagello (1865–1942) was himself a military linguist. He hailed from the nobility of the Estland Guberniya, the son of a Staff Captain. He was educated at the Pskov Cadet Corps, the 2nd Konstantinovsky Military Academy and the Imperial Archaeological Institute, where he won a silver medal. He subsequently completed the course in Eastern languages in the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and studied Hindustani in France. He served in Turkestan 1895–1915, largely in a military capacity, although he became the Secretary to the Governor-General’s Sovet in 1911. After the October Revolution he served in the Red Army. Baskhanov, Voennye Vostokovedy, 277–8. Some of his contemporaries at least thought that Jagello himself was a part of the problem, ridiculing his Persian–Arabic–Russian dictionary: Marshall, The Russian General Staff, 169–70.

25 A village (originally a winter settlement for nomads).
26 Yagello, Sbornik, 96.
Russian Uyezd.²⁷ In short, Russian administrators in Turkestan, particularly at the district level, were a much-despised caste, seen as uneducated, uncouth, and far too thinly spread—a far cry from their ‘heaven-born’ counterparts in the ICS, or so it seems. However, some more objective assessment of these officers, both collectively and as individuals, is needed to test this stereotype.

RUSSIAN OFFICIALDOM

Very little work has been done on the education or social background of the military bureaucrats who ran Russia’s Asiatic provinces, in Turkestan or anywhere else outside European Russia. Even in the heartland of the Empire a pitiful amount is known about those who manned the provincial administration, and most of the points of comparison with Turkestan’s officers that can be made on the basis of existing research are not particularly helpful. Pintner’s study of the civil servants who worked in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years 1840–55 reveals that in the provincial agencies of the Ministry of the Interior (the group whose role was closest to that of Turkestan’s officers), 77 per cent of the higher positions were occupied by nobles, of whom 46 per cent had received higher education at one of the Universities, and a further 7 per cent at the Lycée or School of Jurisprudence in St Petersburg.²⁸ Peter Zaionchkovsky’s work on the government apparatus of the autocracy deals only with civilian areas, but it is probably the most complete survey of the European provincial administration to have appeared, albeit dealing with an earlier period (1841–59) and based on a mixture of the Annual Adres Kalendary (which typically only listed about a third of serving personnel) and representative samples of formulyarnye spiki (records of service). He writes that civilian service was on the whole considered less prestigious than military, and that whilst nobles were given quicker promotion as civil servants, nobles serving in the army were assured of commissioned rank, whilst the battlefield gave them far more of an opportunity to distinguish themselves and thus leapfrog several places up the all-important table of ranks. Zaionchkovsky’s figures show that in the

²⁷ Girs, Otchet, 93.
highest four classes of civilians the proportion of hereditary nobles was 71.5 per cent. In ranks V to VIII it was 37.9 per cent and in ranks IX to XIV 22.3 per cent. Between 1842 and 1859 3.2 per cent in all ranks had a university degree, 11.3 per cent had a secondary education, and 85.5 per cent had attended primary school, although some of the latter probably had no formal education. By 1894–5 the proportion with a university education had grown considerably to 32.5 per cent, whilst 15 per cent had attended secondary school, and 52 per cent primary, leaving 8 per cent who had been ‘educated at home’.²⁹

N. P. Matkhanova’s work on higher officials in eastern Siberia provides perhaps the best comparison with the bureaucracy in Turkestan. The group whose role most closely resembles that of the District Commandants in Turkestan are members of what, for some reason, she calls the ‘informal’ elite: the heads of the Okhotsk, Amur, and Kamchatka divisions, together with their heads of chancery and subordinates. Out of the 70 who served in these positions in c.1840–70 for whom records of service survive, 49 (70 per cent) were nobles, of whom 15 (22 per cent overall) were landowners; 15 were born in Siberia, 24 had a higher education, and 20 a secondary education, or 64.7 per cent overall; 17 were serving officers of the army or navy (predominantly the latter), but 54 (74.2 per cent) had formerly served in the armed forces. The heads of these administrative divisions were exclusively nobles and naval captains of the first or second rank.³⁰

For the military there are the annual compendia or *Voenno-Statisticheskie Ezhegodniki*, which list the officers and men serving in the different Okrugs of the Empire, though not those seconded for administrative duties, together with a body of Soviet research on this and related material which enable the compilation of some reasonably reliable statistics about the officer corps as a whole. In 1867 76 per cent of officers in the Russian army were Orthodox, 14.68 per cent Catholic (i.e. Polish), but only 1.08 per cent Muslim, at a time when the latter made up roughly 10 per cent of the Empire’s population; 37.19 per cent had been educated at a Cadet Corps or Military Academy, but 37.54 per cent had no formal education.³¹ As far as social background

³¹ See Appendix 5; N. N. Obruchev (ed.), *Voenno-Statisticheskie Sbornik Rossi v Vyp.IV* (St Pb., 1871), 846.
is concerned, in 1912 87.5 per cent of generals were drawn from the hereditary nobility, as were 71.5 per cent of staff officers and 50.4 per cent of line officers. Among the latter many were ‘personal’ (i.e. non-hereditary) nobles, although promotion to Colonel automatically brought with it hereditary nobility. The proportion of nobles was much higher in the elite Guards Regiments and correspondingly lower in Line Regiments, especially those of Turkestan. Apart from the Guards, most of these nobles were bezpomestni, i.e. they did not have estates of their own or private incomes, and were normally entirely dependent on their pay and pensions as officers. They were normally defined as ‘bourgeois’ members of the exploiting classes by Soviet historians, or even raznochintsy, men of indeterminate rank and correspondingly unpredictable opinions.

THE OFFICER CORPS IN TURKESTAN

It is very hard to put together any kind of statistical data on Turkestan’s military administrators to compare with these examples. Although detailed biographies of those Turkestani officers who were more intellectually distinguished can now be found in Baskhanov’s recent work, on the whole for information on their education, social background, campaign history, and medals the historian is reliant on their formul’arnye spiski (records of service) in the Military Historical Archive in Moscow. Unfortunately, these are not arranged geographically according to area of service (some officers moved around so much this would have been impossible) but depend on date of enlistment, and consequently they are very time-consuming to use. There is thus no neat equivalent of the Indian Army and Civil Service Lists, partly because there was no such clear administrative division within the empire. Zaionchkovsky estimates that only 75 per cent of civilian records are extant, and the figure is unlikely to be any higher for the military. Educational statistics for

---

33 Kavtaradze, Voennye Spetsialisty, 23–5.
34 M. K. Baskhanov, Russkie Voennye Vostokovedy (Moscow, 2005); I have made very extensive use of this excellent book. Those officers included in it are not necessarily typical though.
35 Zaionchkovskii, Pravitel’stvennyi Apparat, 10.
the Turkestan officer corps as a whole are somewhat easier to come by, although at best they provide only a snapshot of a particular time and place, and they nearly always refer to line officers rather than administrators. Of 304 officers with the forces in Syr-Darya Province in 1868, 149 (49 per cent) had attended a Cadet Corps or Military Academy, four (1.3 per cent) had a university education, 28 (9.2 per cent) had received secondary education at a gymnasium, 31 (10.2 per cent) had a primary education at a district school, 14 (4.6 per cent) had completed a Junker course, though not at a recognized institution, and 78 (25.6 per cent) had no formal education of any kind. This figure included 14 officers seconded for administrative duties. No doubt because of their greater need for technical training, the Turkestan Artillery Brigade’s officers were noticeably better educated than average, with 85.7 per cent of them having attended a Cadet Corps or Military Academy.³⁶ In 1875 von Kaufman’s assistant, Major-General Tardokensky, provided Alexander II with the figures given in Table 4 for the education of military officers serving in Turkestan.³⁷

This included all officers serving in the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and the sappers, but not those seconded for administrative work. Tardokensky viewed these statistics as encouraging:

Of late years circumstances have begun to change for the better: thus, the old element of poorly-educated officers . . . Is beginning little by little to melt away, partly through death, partly through willing retirement, or at the insistence of

---

the authorities, and furthermore they are being exchanged for fresh forces of officers from the military and Junker academies, with rare exceptions tending towards better intellectual development and knowledge of military affairs. This removal of the old, poorly-educated officers from the ranks of the Turkestan regional forces is most encouraging—it serves as a real earnest of the moral and intellectual improvement in the composition of the officer corps in the army here.\(^{38}\)

However, he still complained that the military club libraries in Turkestan contained too many French novels and too few works of strategy. Tardokensky’s 1875 figures suggest a better educated officer corps than those for 1867 in Obruchev’s *Sbornik*, though whether this is because a higher calibre of officers than the average were serving in Turkestan or simply represents the older generation of officers retiring in the interim is unclear.\(^{39}\) There are indications that the level of education of those who had obtained appointments under Voennno-Narodnoe Upravlenie was higher than the average. Positions in the administration were better paid than service in the line, and consequently sought after as means of securing influence and advancement. Schuyler quoted an officer who wrote in 1871 that

> The best officers, on account of their good instruction, easily obtain places in this administration, which presents to them without contradiction more advantages than would be offered to them by simple service in the army. There are few officers who do not pull every string of intrigue in order to secure some place in the local administration, which will guarantee to them notorious advantages over the ordinary service.\(^{40}\)

This was a position closely paralleled in India, where, especially before the Mutiny, many regiments were chronically short of officers because so many had managed to secure better paid civilian appointments.

### SAMARKAND’S MILITARY BUREAUCRATS

A detailed examination of the records of service of officers who were serving in the Zarafshang Okrug and Samarkand Province between 1868 and c. 1890, combined with information from Baskhanov’s superb biographical dictionary of Russian military Orientalists (several

---


\(^{39}\) See Appendix 6; Obruchev, *Voennno-Statisticheskii Sbornik* Vyp.IV, 846.

of whom began their careers as administrators in Samarkand), shows that of 27 officers, 22 (80 per cent) had received their training in a Cadet Corps, Military Academy, or artillery training school, two (8 per cent) in cantonal battalions (lower provincial), one at a religious seminary, one in the old Regiment of the Nobility, and one at a ‘private educational establishment’ (4 per cent each). This was much better than the average, although it did not include anyone with university training. However, four officers had been educated at the Pavlovsky Military Academy, one at the Konstantinovsky Military Academy, and one at the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, and two would later go on to complete the course at the elite Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff (although these last were rather atypical of the run of administrators) meaning that they were from the intellectual elite of the officer corps—these were Miliutin’s and Tardokensky’s ‘new breed’ of officers with a full military education, although whether this was likely to be of much use in preparing them for administrative work is another matter.⁴¹ No fewer than seven had been educated at the Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps in Orenburg, underlining the importance of this garrison town as a launching-pad for the conquest of Turkestan. All but three of these men were Orthodox, the exceptions being: a minor clerk and translator, Sub-Lt Bogdanov, who was a non-noble Muslim Tatar from Orenburg, where he had attended the Cadet Corps without completing the course; Staff-Captain Shakhaidar Shakhgardovich Syrtlanov from the nobility of Ufa Province, of whom more anon, and Ahmed Akimbetiev, a Bashkir, who was a Captain in the 2nd Orenburg Line Regiment and the chief assistant to the Commandant of the Okrug: He later rose to be a Lt-Colonel, quite a startling trajectory for the son of a private in the Bashkir auxiliary brigade in Ufa. One other officer, Captain Anichkov, was also from Ufa, though from the nobility. Two were from Orenburg Province, one from the Urals, four came from Siberia, four from Ukraine, one from White Russia, two from the Baltic region, and the remaining ten from European Russia. None was from Moscow, and only one from St Petersburg. All but four (15 per cent) were of noble extraction, the exceptions being Bogdanov, Akimbetiev, Staff Captain Tomich, who was the son of a priest from Tobolsk, and Staff-Captain Mikhail Yakovlevich Iskokov, a soldier’s son from Orenburg. These indications are suggestive and although the small size of the sample is a considerable drawback, those listed were

⁴¹ Figures taken from table in Appendix 6.
executive officers and many served in Turkestan in various capacities for over twenty years, notably General N. A. Ivanov, who became Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug in succession to Abramov (who was put in charge of the newly constituted Ferghana Province in 1877), and later Turkestan Governor-General.

Among these officers is Georgii Arendarenko (1846–99), quite a well-known member of the Asiatic ‘frontier cadre’ of Turkestani Officers identified by Alexander Marshall,⁴² who had distinguished himself in the Kokand campaign of 1875, in which he was wounded. In 1880 when he was still head of the Samarkand District he was despatched to Bukhara by von Kaufman to investigate the Emir’s intrigues with ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, the exiled Emir of Afghanistan. Kaufman chose him as a man ‘well known to me for his giftedness and intelligence when dealing with Asiatics, and together with this well acquainted with native languages and customs’.⁴³ The journal of his mission was later published in the Soviet period. Arendarenko was one of only two of the nobles who served in Samarkand for any significant length of time who was listed as having an estate (the other was Syrtlanov)—his mother owned 700 desyatina in the Nezhinsk District of Chernigov Province.⁴⁴ In 1889 he was still head of the Samarkand District, and he ended his career as a Major-General and Military Governor of Ferghana Province—clearly an extremely able and talented officer, whose observations on Bukharan politics are noticeably shrewd, and who also published a fine collection of essays on the geography and ethnography of Turkestan.⁴⁵ Another notable name is that of Leonid Nikolaevich Sobolev (1844–1913), one of those who attended the General Staff Academy, who wrote scholarly articles on Khiva and the Upper Zarafshan Valley, although he only served in Turkestan from 1868 to 1875 before continuing his military career elsewhere with much distinction, becoming head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff (he gained notoriety when he was dismissed from the army in 1907 after being challenged to a

---

⁴³ Quoted in the introduction to G. A. Arendarenko, Bukhara i Afganistan v nachale 80-kh godov XIX veka (Zhurnaly Komandirovok) (Moscow, 1974), 8.
⁴⁴ RGVIA F.400, Op.17, D.4,535; this is more or less what one would expect—Zaionchkovskii pointed out that civilian bureaucrats were far more likely to own estates than were military men: in 1912 only 4.9 per cent of military officers even in the 3rd class of the table of ranks had estates, as opposed to 30.8 per cent of civilians in this rank. Zaionchkovskii, ‘Oftiserskii Korpus’, 47.
Still better known to historians of Central Asia is another young Rotmistr who served briefly in the chancellery of the Zarafshan Okrug in 1869–70 before moving to Khujand: Mikhail Afrikanovich Terentiev, later to write the standard history of the Russian conquest of the region. He, too, would go on to be educated at the General Staff Academy, but, like Sobolev, his administrative career was a short one and he soon returned to military duties.

From a younger generation (he was born in 1860) N. S. Lykoshin has already been mentioned as a member of Turkestan’s small elite of scholar-administrators, and his example helps to show why a university education (he attended the Pavlovsky Military Academy) was not necessarily a prerequisite for producing knowledgeable officers who were skilled in the local languages: among other things, Lykoshin translated the early Bukharan historian Narshahi into Russian, together with Muhammad Sadiq Kashghari’s Code of Eastern Proprieties on which he based a book of instruction in Muslim social mores for his less refined compatriots.

The roll-call of familiar names is completed with the inclusion of Baron A. N. Meller-Zakomelsky, an unpleasant character who would later apply the brutal methods of Asiatic warfare to the suppression of revolution in Russia in 1905–6, and of whom Count Sergei Witte said that this ‘rather dark man . . . Would be a very good gaoler, especially in those gaols where corporal punishment is practised.’ Meller-Zakomelsky was also atypical of the general run of military administrators in that he was a Baron and a Guards Officer, and had completed the course at the Nikolaevsky Academy of Guard Junkers. In 1864 when still a line officer he had been arrested and docked half his pay for acting as a second in a duel. He was transferred to Voenno-Narodnoe Upravlenie in 1870, and was placed ‘at the disposal’ of the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug for the duration of the Shahrisabz campaign, after which he was briefly given charge of the fortress at Ura-Tepe; he served in Samarkand for just over a year.

---

46 Baskhanov, Voennye Vostokovedy, 220–2; he is the subject of a chapter of Marvin’s, The Russian Advance, 60–89.
48 N. S. Lykoshin (trans.) and V. V. Bartol’d (ed.), Istoriya Bukhary Mukhammeda Narshakhi (Tashkent, 1897); Mukhammad Sadyk-i-Kashkari, Adab-ul’-Salikhyn. Kodeks Prilichii Na Vostoke, trans. N. S. Lykoshin (Tashkent, 1992) (1900); N. S. Lykoshin, ‘Khoroshii Ton’ na Vostoke. (St Pb., 1915).
49 Lieven, Russia’s Rulers, 176.
Schuyler’s impressions of the Russian administration in Samarkand in 1871 were surprisingly positive, given his harsh criticisms of officials in Tashkent:

It is impossible not to be struck with the difference between the administration in Samarkand and that in Tashkent. Nearly all the officials seem to have at heart the welfare of the country, and to be earnest in their work. They are, for the most part, the remainder of what are called the ‘Tchernaief men’, many of them having been with that General in his first Central Asiatic Campaign. General Abramof, the commander of the province . . . is a most active man, and knows well the whole of the country. I do not believe that there is a village under his rule which he has not visited. He endeavours to keep himself thoroughly informed of all that goes on, and, although his will in Samarkand is law, as the administrative regulations for the rest of Turkistan have never been applied to that province, he is most anxious to act always with justice, and in the spirit of the Russian law. He is ably seconded in his administration by men who know well the people with whom they have to deal.\(^{52}\)

Abramov was from the nobility of Lifland Province (present-day Latvia), and had joined the Orenburg Artillery brigade as an Ensign in 1854. He had been promoted from Captain to Colonel after the fall of Tashkent, and continued his meteoric rise thereafter, becoming a Major-General in 1868. Ostroumov described him in the following terms: ‘the General was a man of sound, healthy common-sense, but without a broad education.’\(^{53}\) His record of service confirms that he had been educated within the Regiment of the Nobility, since abolished, where he would have received none of the more technical instruction so beloved of the new General Staff.\(^{54}\) Von Kaufman himself also commented on the particularly energetic nature of the Russian officers in Samarkand in the earliest years of its administration.\(^{55}\) Although the previous chapter has demonstrated the limitations of Abramov’s knowledge of his province, Schuyler suggests that we almost seem to have a putative ‘Punjab Tradition’ developing here, in this non-regulation province with its rough-and-ready justice and direct contact between officers and the native population. As in Punjab, however, this honeymoon period of enlightened paternalism did not last long.\(^{56}\) Schuyler reported that


\(^{54}\) RGVIA F.400, Op.12, D.672 1868.


\(^{56}\) The notion of a ‘Punjab Tradition’ of paternal, all-powerful District Officers is increasingly being questioned. I am grateful to Dara Price of Balliol College for
Figure 4. General A. K. Abramov, Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1868–77. *Turkestanii Al’bom* (1871) Part 4, pl. 5, No. 4.
Library of Congress Ref: LC-DIG-ppmsca-09957-00004
one of the principal reasons the administration was functioning so well when he visited Samarkand in 1871 was that

The Prefect of the city was, at that time, Captain Syrtlanof, a Mussulman gentleman of Bashkir origin, speaking Kirghiz, Turki and Persian with great fluency. The inhabitants were well pleased with him, not only because he was a Mussulman, but because he was able to listen himself to their complaints and to decide their disputes, and was, what is rare enough to deserve mention, thoroughly honest.\(^{57}\)

Shakhaidar Shakhgardovich Syrtlanov was a Bashkir nobleman from Ufa Province, educated at the Orenburg Cadet Corps and the largest landowner of all the officers listed with 2,200 desyatina—he appears to have been quite thoroughly russified, apart from his religion.\(^{58}\) Although only just over 1 per cent of the Russian officer corps was Muslim in 1867,\(^ {59}\) such loyal, Muslim members of the Imperial administrative elite still represented a resource which the British in India could not call upon to anything like the same extent by the 1860s, and men like Syrtlanov were potentially the Russian military administration’s best intermediaries with the local population. Another interesting, if atypical, early example, was that of Said Khan Karimkhanov, one of a group of 200 Afghans who had joined the Russians after the fall of Djizak and taken part in the Zerabulak campaign. Once the treaty with Bukhara had been signed, Karim Khan became the junior assistant to the Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District and acquired fame through single-handedly chasing down and arresting three notorious bandits, as well as carrying a letter to Kabul on one occasion and being arrested for his pains. Like Syrtlanov, Karim Khan was an outsider who was nevertheless linked to the local population through language and religion, but he never held commissioned rank.\(^{60}\) One well-known Muslim who did was Colonel Alikhanoff (1846–1907), a Lesghian from Daghestan


\(^{59}\) See Appendix 5; Obruchev, *Voenno-Statisticheskii Sbornik* Vyp.IV, 846.

who was instrumental in bringing about the annexation of Merv, and acquired a tremendous reputation among Anglo-Indians.\textsuperscript{61} George Dobson, a journalist who accompanied Alikhanoff on a railway journey to Samarkand in 1888, described Alikhanoff’s Islam as ‘somewhat lax in practice’, but also noted his ability to recite whole verses of the Koran from memory, along with his fluency in Turki: he was an object of amazement to the crowds in the Bibi-Khanym Mosque, who had assumed he was Russian.\textsuperscript{62} From the 1880s there was considerable debate in India on the advisability of opening the commissioned ranks of the army more generally to ‘native gentlemen’ and Eurasians, partly provoked by the example of Alikhanoff, who at that time was a member of the Afghan Boundary Commission.\textsuperscript{63} The British also made limited used of such intermediaries among their officers: the best-known example is probably that of Colonel Sir Robert Warburton, the product of a marriage between a British officer and an Afghan noblewoman during the First Afghan War. Fluent in Pushtu, he was placed in charge of the Khyber garrisons from 1879 to 1898.\textsuperscript{64} Had the Russians exploited this possibility to the full, it could potentially have transformed the nature of the military bureaucracy in Turkestan, but Alikhanoff remained a relatively isolated example. In Samarkand at least, Muslim officers rapidly fell foul of Russian suspicion of Islam. By 1876, when his book was published, Schuyler had to write that ‘Unfortunately both for the population and for the best interests of the Russian Government, Captain Syrtlanof is no longer there. The Governor-General got an idea

\textsuperscript{61} Marshall, ‘Dar al-Harb’, 93–4; Curzon, \textit{Russia in Central Asia}, 122–5: the latter pointed out that whilst most British commentators envisaged Alikhanoff as a turbaned Oriental, he actually looked rather Scottish, and had a healthy contempt for the barbarous Turcoman. Col. Mahsud Alikhanov-Avarskey was a native of the Avar District of Daghestan, educated at the Tiflis Nobles’ Gymnasium and the Konstantinovsky Military Academy; he served in Western Daghestan before participating in the Khiva expedition in 1871–2. He was decorated for bravery during the Russo-Turkish War, and then served in Transcaspia 1880–5. Baskhanov, \textit{Voennye Vostokovedy}, 12.

\textsuperscript{62} George Dobson, \textit{Russia's Railway Advance into Central Asia} (London, 1890), 224.

\textsuperscript{63} Chandar Sundaram, ‘Reviving a “Dead Letter”: Military Indianisation and the Ideology of Anglo-India 1885–91’, in Gupta and Deshpande (eds.), \textit{The British Raj and its Indian Armed Forces 1857–1939} (Delhi, 2002), 60. He refers to a memorandum from Kimberley to Lord Dufferin discussing Alikhanoff’s propaganda value to the Russians and the impact of his prominence on attitudes in India: OIOC MSS Eur. F.130/3.

\textsuperscript{64} OIOC P/1299 July 1879, No. 6a \textit{Khyber Pass arrangements}, 725–6; Col. Sir Robert Warburton, \textit{Eighteen Years in the Khyber} (London, 1900), esp. 1–14 on his family background. After the second Afghan war the British envoy to Kabul was normally the son of one of India’s Muslim rulers, commissioned into the Indian Army for the purpose.
into his head that he was a fanatic, and removed him.\textsuperscript{65} The incident which led to Syrtlanov’s dismissal appears to have taken place during public prayers in a Samarkand mosque in 1873, which was reported in issue No. 126 of the \textit{St Petersburg Gazette} of that year. The article was forwarded in full to all members of the Samarkand administration, and demonstrates sufficiently clearly the predominant Russian attitude towards Muslim officers in the bureaucracy.

On the 9th of November on the occasion of Bairam, prayers were held at the Sart Mosque, attended by a large number of natives. Just before the prayers began, a large number of Muslims in Russian Service arrived at the Mosque: the acting Nachalnik of the Samarkand Otdel and other officers. Apart from them there were present in the mosque, so rumour has it, up to 300 soldiers. All of these, both the Nachalnik of the Otdel, and the Officers and Soldiers, were wearing Sart khalats, and on their heads wore turbans. At the end of prayers the Qazi presented the soldiers with a gift of khalats.

This demonstration produced amongst Russians strong indignation. Russian Officers viewed this as a prank on the part of the Muslim Officers, took it as an insult to the Russian uniform, and as far as the lower ranks were concerned it had damaged discipline. Some Russians have regretted the lack of the gendarmerie here, which would not have permitted such a demonstration.

On the third day after this, that is the 11th November, the Acting Nachalnik of the Otdel arranged a tamasha\textsuperscript{66} for 300 natives at his house. Local acquaintances were also invited to the tamasha. All those invited, of course, didn’t scorn the turban-wearers and were attracted to the tamasha like flies to honey.

This incident raises the following questions:

(1) Do serving officers and soldiers of the Muslim faith have the right, when taking part in public prayers, to change their uniform for a khalat and turban?

(2) Is it an insult to the Russian uniform to exchange it for a khalat and turban, publicly before the natives?

(3) Does it breach the discipline of soldiers to wear a khalat and turban in public?

(4) Do soldiers have the right to accept khalats as gifts from the Muslim Qazi?

(5) Will similar demonstrations have a baneful influence on the understanding of the natives, in relation to their disgust towards Russians/Kafirs? And

(6) Should we, therefore, have Muslim officers occupying administrative posts, who through their fetishism could reinforce the antipathy of the natives towards Russians?\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} A show, or entertainment.
\textsuperscript{67} TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.228, 1-ob.
The Governor-General wrote to Abramov to ask for an explanation. Syrtlanov was reprimanded, and it seems reasonable to assume that it was this incident which provoked von Kaufman’s suspicion of ‘fanaticism’ and led to his dismissal.\textsuperscript{68} Syrtlanov subsequently returned to his estates in the Bebelev District of Ufa Province, where he became a bitter opponent of General Kryzhanovsky’s attempts to erode Bashkir land rights. He was elected to the first and second Dumas, whilst his son, a prominent lawyer, was elected to the third.\textsuperscript{69} Von Kaufman’s paranoid suspicion of Tatars and Bashkirs meant that it was rare for Muslims to be given positions of real responsibility in the early administration of Turkestan. So far as the ethnic and religious composition of the officials serving in the early period is concerned, a list disappointingly lacking in detail shows that in Syr-Darya Province in 1876 there were 133 \textit{chinovniki} working within the administration at all levels. Of these, only nine were Muslims, three of them probably Kirghiz and the remaining six Tatars or Bashkirs, only one of whom was commissioned (he held the rank of Staff Captain); 14 had German names, although they were not necessarily Lutherans, and the remaining 110 were all Slavs.\textsuperscript{70} By 1896 not one of the officers serving in the crucial executive positions of District Commandant and \textit{Pristav} in Samarkand was a Muslim: the only Muslim commissioned officer listed, Niyaz Muhammad Kulchanov, was the assistant to the Samarkand District Commandant, with the rank of Lt-Colonel.\textsuperscript{71} It is true that in 1910 the officer commanding the Samarkand Garrison was Colonel Mir Hidayatullah Kasimovich, the son of a Bukharan \textit{Haji},\textsuperscript{72} but he was not an administrator, and by that date Samarkand was no longer a very important military outpost.

This suspicion of Muslim officers, as Schuyler observed, meant that direct contact between officials and the local population was rendered extremely difficult, and dependent on a much-despised group of Tatar and Bashkir translators. Officers who had completed the \textit{Junker} course (as most of those in the administration had) would have been instructed in theology, Russian, mathematics, geography, history, tactics, service regulations, military administration, weapons and artillery training,

\textsuperscript{68} TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.228, 5-ob.
\textsuperscript{69} Yamaeva, \textit{Musul'manskie Deputaty}, 19–23, 301–2.
\textsuperscript{70} TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,820b, 1–26.
\textsuperscript{71} M. M. Virskii (ed.), \textit{Adres-Kalendar’ Samarkandskoi Oblasti} Vyp.IV (Samarkand, 1896), 1–10.
\textsuperscript{72} RGVIA F.1,396, Op.3, D.268.
fortifications, military topography, and military law. Whilst much of this would arguably have been of more use to them than the liberal education received by their Anglo-Indian counterparts at Haileybury and later Oxford, there was one area where it was, by comparison, singularly deficient, and that was training in Oriental languages.

**LANGUAGE TRAINING**

From its foundation in 1825 the Orenburg Neplyuevsky Cadet Corps had provided limited instruction in Tatar, Persian, and Arabic: the number of graduates was extremely small, but it is conceivable that Arendarenko and one or two other early Samarkand administrators may have benefited from this. Although the first grammars of the languages of Turkestan were compiled as early as 1868–9, the first formal courses to teach native languages began only in 1886 and were overseen by V. P. Nalivkin. Early results were not encouraging: of 50 students who enrolled in the first year, only two artillery lieutenants remained at the end of the course. Mourning this sorry state of affairs N. S. Lykoshin, wrote that what was needed was a system of prizes as in British India, where, he remarked, a prize of Rs 500 had recently been instituted for knowledge of Tibetan. In Turkestan, by contrast, cadets were expected to pay a rouble a lesson even after 1905. N. P. Ostroumov also remarked that he would be happy if Russian officers in Turkestan simply managed to reach the standard of their French, Dutch, and British counterparts in their Muslim colonies: one of his proposals for attaining this was the abandonment of the Arabic script in favour of Cyrillic in the lessons taken by officers, to be followed by the introduction of Cyrillic for all official correspondence and petitions. V. V. Barthold pooh-poohed this idea, saying that it would be impossible to persuade the natives to conform and that therefore dropping the Arabic script as a short-cut would leave officers just as ill-equipped as before. Training in Oriental languages received little official support largely owing to the Turkestan Governor-Generalship’s acute financial problems, but this was also a by-product of von Kaufman’s policy of Ignorirovanie of Islam and Islamic

---

77 Yagello, *Sbornik*, 16.
culture. Muslims were supposed to be learning Russian enthusiastically, drawn towards the higher European culture the language represented and away from their own vernaculars. In this, as in the rest of his policy towards Islam, von Kaufman made a grave error. Local resources proved wholly inadequate to rectify it, and little help was forthcoming from the Oriental Faculty of St Petersburg University or the courses in Oriental languages run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although by 1888 these institutions were teaching Persian and Turki, most of those who graduated entered the diplomatic service. In 1853 a course in Turkic languages had been initiated in the Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff, but this rapidly fell into abeyance and was closed down.\textsuperscript{78} When it was revived in 1883, with an intake of five officers, it did not offer a solution as those who had completed it were normally unwilling to serve in Central Asia. As the editorial of the newspaper \textit{Zerauvshan—Samarkand} put it:

According to the conditions attached to these courses the officers who have completed them are assigned to the staff of the Caucasus or some other Asiatic area, with the obligation to serve four and a half years there, but...the majority of them left these regions at the first opportunity...The reasons for this systematic striving on the part of orientalists to return to Russia are clear: their employment as officers is unremunerative, and to sit without any right to preferment in a distant land has no purpose and no reason; in general one can call the opening of these courses a half-measure.\textsuperscript{79}

Between 1883 and 1903, 68 officers qualified in Turki and Persian, but of these only 15 became administrators, most of whom did not end up working in the East: only three of the District Commandants working in Turkestan at this time had completed the course.\textsuperscript{80} From 1895 there were also courses in Hindustani run in Tashkent for intelligence purposes, although these were not free and it was fairly rare for officers to be despatched to India in order to exercise their newly acquired skills.\textsuperscript{81} In 1905 the Military Administration was still complaining about the dearth of officers with language skills in Turkestan and for the second time attempted to set up a comprehensive programme for teaching its officers Persian and Turki in Tashkent itself: even then it simply meant that a

\textsuperscript{78} Yagello, \textit{Sbornik}, 55. \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 59. \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 60–1. \textsuperscript{81} ‘Raport poruchika A. I. Vygorntskogo Upravlyayushchemu o ego komandirovke v Indiyu dlya izucheniya yazyka Khindustani’, Nos 137–141, 1895–1897g, in P. M. Shastitko (ed.), \textit{Russko-Indiiske Otnosheniya v XIXv} (Moscow, 1997), 302–11.
Commission was appointed to examine the question. In the preamble to its report to the War Ministry (which took well over a year to appear) the then Governor-General, D. I. Subotich, painted a bleak picture:

We have ruled in Turkestan for 40 years and in Transcaspia for 25, and up until now members of the administration who know the native languages even slightly can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In the Judicial Department they are still fewer. The state of things is disastrous. How can the people be ruled, how can lawsuits be investigated, without understanding the speech of the ruled and the judged? It does not behove us to expatiate on this—measures need to be taken.\(^\text{82}\)

Lykoshin had expatiated at length on the benefits that would accrue were District Commandants and Pristavy to learn the local languages, both in terms of cutting down the number of petitions flooding in and preventing corruption and oppression among the translators, although he did not advocate attempting to abolish the latter altogether: ‘No, the translator is necessary, but necessary as a manual labourer or machine for conversation.’ However, like many other reformists he wanted to see their role as all-important intermediaries between the Russians and the natives undermined, which could only be done through greatly improved language skills for officers:

The natives loathe the translators who work with administrators from the depths of their souls, but are also terribly afraid of them. It is quite different with a Pristav who knows the language, and who without giving his translator an opening is accessible to all at all times. The natives willingly come to such a superior with their affairs and value very highly the possibility of explaining themselves without a translator.\(^\text{83}\)

He further argued for increasing the pay and allowances of translators to discourage corruption, and to attempt to recruit more Russians as translators as they would not have relatives among the populace. The consequences of this reliance on translators were perhaps not as grave as many Russians liked to believe: the Tatars in particular were seen as forming a crucial element in Nalivkin’s ‘Living Wall’\(^\text{84}\) separating the Russians from the populace and they provided a convenient scapegoat for various administrative failings. The widespread resentment towards them is a common trope of Imperial polemic against ‘intermediaries’,

\(^{82}\) Yagello, \textit{Sbornik}, 1. \(^{83}\) Ibid., 93
\(^{84}\) ‘\textit{Zhivaya Stena}’, Nalivkin, \textit{Tuzemtsy}, 67–8, 71.
whether Mestizos, Indians, or Levantines in other Empires.\textsuperscript{85} None the less, there is little doubt that many translators were corrupt, and that furthermore the inability of most officers to speak local languages greatly hampered the process of investigating the petitions that flowed into Russian chancelleries from the population. Sometimes these cases, normally relating to petty corruption among village headmen and Qazis, could remain open for five years or more whilst witness statements were laboriously taken down, often requiring several visits by the officer and his interpreter to remote villages. Subotich summed up the conclusions of the 1905 Commission investigating the language question by stating that

I believe it necessary to propose to all ranks of the administration, up to and including the District Commandants, over the course of a year to study the language of the population to a point where they would be in a position to control the translators, those vipers of our Asiatic dominions.\textsuperscript{86}

All new officers were to have to meet this requirement, and those already serving were given two years, at the end of which time if they had failed to acquire the necessary proficiency they were (at least in theory) to be transferred away from Turkestan or dismissed. There were dissenters from this conclusion: Colonel Lomakin asserted that the trained Orientalists in the officer corps already received an additional 180 roubles a year as an incentive, and argued that all this system would produce would be a group of weedy scholars with a purely theoretical knowledge of the native tongues. As he pointed out, the language in which petitions were submitted was often very different from that taught in textbooks, so that even he, as teacher of Oriental languages, found them hard to decipher. Nalivkin and Ostromov, he added, had learned Persian and Turki ‘from Sart Mullahs’, not at university.\textsuperscript{87} This initiative did not get much further than the more half-hearted ones which had preceded it: it was not until 1911 that five officers a year began to be enrolled into a new language programme in Tashkent, and even this was suspended on the outbreak of the First World War.\textsuperscript{88} However, it would be wrong to imagine that all officers were entirely ignorant of the local languages in earlier years. As we have seen, some outstanding


\textsuperscript{86} Yagello, \textit{Sbornik}, 93.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 129–36.

\textsuperscript{88} Marshall, \textit{The Russian General Staff}, 170–2.
members of the first generation of Turkestan administrators such as Arendarenko had learnt native languages, presumably doing as Nalivkin and Ostroumov had done and employing a tutor. Governors-General Rosenbach, Vrevsky, and Dukhovskoi had all made efforts to encourage officers to apply themselves, and in consequence by the 1890s there were increasing numbers of Russians in the administration who did not have to govern through translators. One unforeseen consequence of this, however, was that certain officers seemed rather to relish the idea of ruling ‘Orientals as Orientals’ through their own languages and customs, rather than following the official line, which was to endeavour to wean the people away from Sharia and persuade them to learn Russian. Pahlen summed up this danger with characteristic forthrightness:

Notwithstanding that over forty years have passed since the time of the invasion of Turkestan. . . . An organic amalgamation of the region with the Empire really does not exist. The rulers and the ruled live side by side lives of complete isolation, mingling in only those few spheres, where it is absolutely impossible to do without each other. What is more, a highly characteristic phenomenon compels attention, that it is not the Russian way of life which by means of the organs of power influences the masses, but on the contrary, the native, Asiatic way of living, outlook, understanding and methods little by little subdue to themselves the local agents amongst the Russian chinovniki, inducing them to act not as they would behave in the Russian heartland, and to sometimes employ principles contrary to those of the Russian Government.89

‘ORIENTALIST’ ADMINISTRATORS

A. I. Termen, one of the new generation of officers who spoke the native languages, served in Samarkand in the 1890s. His brief memoirs, offering the ‘results of researches into the principles of administering inorodtsy’, and published in 1914, offer a vivid insight into the mentality of ‘Orientalist’ administrative officers in Turkestan. Termen had little time for ideas of civilized the natives or introducing the forms of civilian government that were used in European Russia. Instead he argued that Asiatists should be ruled as Asiatists, through the firm, paternalist administration of officers who were wholly familiar with their customs and laws, an attitude highly reminiscent of the ma-baps of the ‘Punjab Tradition’. He attributed the Andijan uprising to Muslim

89 RGIA F.1,396 Op.1 D.437, 29ob.
fear of over-rapid modernization using arguments strikingly similar to those of British officials examining the origins of the Indian Mutiny. The Dukchi Ishan, who led the uprising, had, Termen claimed, said in his court statement that

He raised the rebellion because the Russians are corrupting the people, because under the rule of the Russians the people forget God, become thieves, libertines, drunkards, families break apart and the future introduction of Russian law threatens all Muslim Society with complete collapse... The Ming-Tepe Ishan spoke the essential truth, through his lips better people were speaking, and although the route by which he acquired his influence over the people often came close to charlatanism, none the less the soul of the people was conscious of the righteousness of his words, and those members of that very Russian administration who attended his trial were forced, lowering their eyes behind the mask of outraged authority—inwardly to whisper: yes, he’s right.⁹⁰

_Ignorirovanie_ had failed, and the more aggressive attack on Islam proposed by some modernizers would only make things worse: instead, Termen argued, Russian bureaucrats should learn the local languages, make a profound study of Islam, and attempt to rule according to the prejudices of the local population, not against them. The Russian administration, he complained, had learned nothing from Andijan and was still intent on its ultimate goal of _sblizhenie_, proposing, among other things, to dismantle the system of Sharia courts. Termen believed his experience showed that it was only possible to rule non-Russian peoples according to their own customs, and attributed disturbances and violence in regions as diverse as the Caucasus, Siberia, and Kamchatka to the regime’s failure to realize this. In an earlier book on Buryatia, he advanced very similar arguments, writing that the Buryats associated russification with alcoholism and moral decay, although here he did believe that full assimilation was possible because, crucially, the Buryats were not Muslims.⁹¹ Termen was more than a polemicist, however: he attempted to put his ideas into practice, starting from the principle of, as he put it, ‘Where is the evil in the Koran?’ When he was put in charge of his first

⁹⁰ A. I. Termen, _Vospominaniya Administratorka. Opyt’ Izsledovaniya printsirov upravleniya Inorodtsav._ (Petrograd, 1914), 3–4. I have been unable to find Termen’s biographical details, but those of his brother, Richard Iosifovich, an Oriental scholar who served in the Caucasus and Turkey, reveal that he came from a commercial family of the St Petersburg Guberniya. Baskhanov, _Voennye Vostokovedy_, 235.

⁹¹ A. I. Termen, _Sredi Buryat Irkutskoi Gubernii_ (St Pb., 1912), 1–14, 144.
sub-district in Samarkand Province, he resolved to assure the 50,000 inhabitants of its nine *Volosts* that the Russian administration was not opposed to their ideals and beliefs, but rooted in fair and equal justice based on *Sharia*. He intended to show them how much Christianity and Islam had in common, and to memorize enough of the Koran and the *Sharia* ‘In order to make the people feel that, whilst they may not have native rulers, nonetheless their rulers know their law and value the fact that the inhabitants are good people according to their laws.’

At the first meeting with his *Volost Upraviteli* and *Aksakals* he urged them to ensure strict observance of *Sharia*, regular prayers, for the young to respect their elders, and the elders to instruct the young in the ways of righteousness. This initial harangue was met, he recalled, with some scepticism, as the officials knew full well that the demands of the Russian administration were seldom respected. However, he soon let them know that he took his duties as a moral guardian very seriously. His first triumph was to reconcile a recalcitrant son to his father by beating the former with a whip until the father cried out to be beaten in his stead:

This morning you were a wicked son, and said that you had no father, and that he is an enemy. I became your father and reformed you. Now that you have reformed and promise to be a good son, I wish you all the best, and like a gladdened father, I embrace you.

And I embraced him.

At this the people who had crowded densely around, clasping at their beards, almost with one voice cried out *Allahu Akbar*, you return our children to us!

Termen followed this touching scene with a lengthy homily to the surrounding crowd on the importance of filial obedience, and his determination to uphold it. He further illustrated his point by recounting how he had managed to overawe and control the natives of Samarkand through his own knowledge of *Sharia*, on which he prided himself. One instance of this occurred in a village in his district, when a wealthy native landowner, a *Bai*, refused to pay the canal cess to the *Aryk-Aksakal*, and consigned both the *Aksakal* and the law to the devil. The inhabitants apparently turned to the Russian Officer for justice, as their own *Qazi* was ‘powerless’. Termen evidently felt that the manner in which he dealt

---

93 Ibid., 5–6.
with this case was a model of effective personal government and swift, summary justice according to the tenets of the *Sharia*, for he reproduced the conversation he had with the landowner in full:

— These people complain that you have insulted the law. Is this true?
— I haven’t insulted the law.

I turn to the witnesses

— Make the namaz, before you bear witness.

The witnesses go to the *aryk*, make the namaz (ablution) and then return.

— Did you hear how this man insulted the law?
— He insulted the law and we all heard it, but we can’t repeat how he insulted it
— I don’t need to hear how he insulted it. It’s enough that he dared to insult it

I walk up to the guilty man

— What is your faith?
— I’m a Muslim
— If you’re a Muslim then repeat the *Fatiha* (The first chapter of the Koran, which every Muslim is obliged to know)

He repeats the first chapter of the Koran, and I, finding fault with a slight stumbling, stop him.

— You’re reciting badly, this is how it’s done, repeat after me.

And I, altering every verse, repeat the whole chapter from memory, and he repeats every verse after me.

— Now, repeat the *Farauz Iman* (The creed)
He doesn’t know it, and I repeat the manoeuvre

— Say the *Doai Iftar* (The prayer for mercy)

He remaining silent I repeat the manoeuvre, deliberately exchanging glances with the witnesses. One after the other I ask him to repeat 12 separate prayers, of which he knows only three. Having finished the demands for prayers, I approach closer to him and, gradually raise my voice, as if consumed with anger

— And you say that you’re a Muslim, and permit yourself to insult the law. You’re no Muslim, you’re a dog!

And finally settling myself, I give him a blow with my own hand, and tear off his turban (*savan*)
— You’re a dog, unworthy to bear arms! Bind him—I cry to the Djigit—he’s going to Siberia!

The moral effect of this harangue must have been considerable, for the next day a deputation came to Termen and begged him not to send the man to Siberia. Instead, he magnanimously agreed that he should be soundly whipped with a darra, a form of knout which had been prescribed by the Ra’is under the old Islamic regime for use in cases of offences against religion. Termen admitted that, given this interview took place only a short while after the Andijan uprising, his manner might have been considered unduly abrasive, and that ‘dog’ was not an insult to be taken lightly. Far from provoking further unrest, however, he claimed that special blessings had been called down upon him at evening prayers in the village mosque, and that the villagers had given thanks that a Nachalnik had been sent to them who understood their laws. The wealthy Bai, according to Termen, was a typical, corrupt product of Russian rule in Turkestan, a native who had forgotten the dignity of his own religion and its code of ethics. There are more than slight echoes here of the British officials’ dislike for the déraciné Indian babu. Termen’s claim to understand Islam (or at least the Koran and Sharia) better than Muslims themselves is a familiar tactic for validating European rule in the East, but the manner in which he extrapolates a religious crime from a simple case of tax-evasion is rather more startling, reflecting an evident belief that there is no conception of civil law among Muslims. Whilst we can only speculate as to the real reactions of those natives subjected or witness to Termen’s methods of testing religious conformity, he did record what his superior at the time, the Samarkand District Commandant said: ‘I didn’t think that Termen was such a reactionary. We should ignore the Sharia, and not raise its prestige. What’s needed is for them to forget it and allow themselves to be ruled solely by our laws.’

Termen’s contempt for his superiors and their ideas of Europeanization is palpable, and clearly a by-product of a training in Oriental languages and Islam that was much more thorough than that of an

94 The word Termen uses here is ‘Salya’, either a garbled version of Salh (dung) or Salah (weapon). Either would make sense here.
95 Djigit—a Tatar word meaning simply ‘a horseman’ applied to the men who acted as a mixture of butler, bodyguard, messenger, and general dogsbody to Russian administrators.
96 Termen, Vospominaniya Administratora, 7–8.
97 Ibid., 9. 98 Ibid., 20.
earlier generation. The rest of his short memoir describes how he became a father to the people of his District when he was promoted: women peeped at him through the shutters; little children gave him apples. His vision of himself and his role is closely akin to those British District Officers in India (especially in Punjab) who strove to be benevolent Oriental despots, protecting their charges from the changes taking place in urban India, and shunning natives who had learned English or converted to Christianity. Pahlen was well aware of the dangers of this approach when he wrote in 1909 of certain officers

Without making any progress in the matter of affirming their cultural antecedents, they are backsliding, gradually assimilating and ruling in their official responsibilities the gratification of petty love of power, the traits of eastern despotism. What is more, this frame of mind is visible and is also being transmitted to the newly settled Russian population in the region.  

In Turkestan, Termen’s was a minority view, and one far removed from the official line, partly because the sort of specialist training that would have been needed to produce a cadre of officers who could ‘rule Orientals as Orientals’ was still so limited. Lykoshin, who was one of the few officers so qualified, wrote a retrospective of the Andijan uprising in 1908 in which, whilst he acknowledged that the Dukchi Ishan had won support through playing on Muslim fears of moral decay since the Russian conquest, he rejected the argument that these fears were justified, or that the correct response was simply to pander to Muslim prejudices. He pointed instead to the many civilizing benefits of Russian rule, and looked forward to the further erosion of Islamic fanaticism under its influence. None the less, Termen’s appointment, together with that of three other officers skilled in languages (Captains Reichel and Prisranov, and Staff Captain Myshakov), to the Samarkand Provincial Administration in 1898 (when Termen held the rank of Staff-Captain) did make a considerable difference to the speed and ease with which petitions and complaints could be followed up. In June 1898 Termen was despatched to the village of Kyrk to investigate an alleged tax-fraud on the part of one of its officials, Mullah Tursun Mamatbaev, who had supposedly failed to write the names of 18 villagers

100 N. S. Lykoshin, ‘K desyatitiyu andizhanskoj reznii’, TV, 30th May 1908 No. 115 and 31st May 1908 No. 116.
in his book of receipts when he collected their land-tax, showing them as non-payers, and had pocketed the surplus. Termen took the usual sworn depositions, or doznanie, from the inhabitants of the village, which were normally the cue for a long string of fluent accusations, replete with corroborative detail, which often took the provincial authorities years to sift through and resolve. On this occasion Termen quickly found that of the signatories, seven were indeed not entered in the books, but eight of them were, and three possessed no land anyway. All of them were evidently so taken aback by the fact that they were expected to answer his questions directly, rather than through a perevodchik, that to a man they denied the story and indeed all knowledge of the petition which had been sent to Samarkand in March. The case was closed immediately, when normally such files remained open for at least a year with no definite result. Exactly the same thing happened in November of the same year, when Termen investigated an allegation of bribery against the Starshina of the village of Khoja Bagh, Rahmankul Pirambaev. Muhammadyar Tuyarkulbaev, an illiterate farmer, claimed that the Starshina had taken 60 roubles from him in Bukharan tengas in the presence of two witnesses. This was in return for concealing the true extent of the land he farmed for the purpose of evading tax, but Rahmankul Pirambaev failed to keep his side of the bargain. Once again, when Termen turned up in the village to investigate, the man denied all knowledge and the file was quickly closed.¹⁰² It may be that Termen simply browbeat these people in the manner described above, or had also subjected them to an impromptu oral examination on verses of the Koran, but it seems probable that it was his ability to speak their language (he was fluent in both Persian and Turki) and interrogate them directly which really disconcerted them, so used were most natives to dealing with the Russians at one remove.

CLERKS AND TRANSLATORS

If it is difficult to get a clear picture of the military men who headed the colonial administration in Samarkand, it is still more difficult to get an idea of the background and attainments of their subordinates. Pristavy were more likely to be military men, of a similar background to the

District Commandants to which this post was a stepping-stone. One typical example was Staff Captain Mikhail Dmitrievich Levshin, who in 1893 was serving as the Pristav of the town of Bogdan. He was then 34 years old, having entered the army as an Ensign in 1878, and transferred to Voeno-Narodnoe Upravlenie in 1887, although he had not seen active service in the interim: as an administrator his pay was increased by 187 roubles 50 kopeks a year to 1,687 roubles 50 kopeks. He was probably Ukrainian, from the nobility of Kharkov Province, Orthodox, and educated at a Junker infantry school until the age of 19.¹⁰³ The Civilian Police Pristav of Katta-Kurgan, Titular Counsellor Vladimir Mikhailovich Sobolev, came from the St Petersburg nobility, which was unusual. However, he had been brought up in Orenburg, where he attended the Military progymasium, before moving to the Junker school in Kazan.¹⁰⁴ The clerks and pen-pushers who manned the Chancelleries at the various levels of the administration represent more of a problem. They occupied posts which in India would certainly have been the preserve of natives, a fact attributable to there being a less acute shortage of European manpower in Turkestan, and a lack of locals with the requisite knowledge of Russian. The Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have not yielded a comprehensive set of formulyarnye spiski for those names which crop up in the records, mostly of lowly College Assessors or Government Secretaries, mere pygmies in the Table of Ranks. Occasionally, when they had committed some misdemeanour a full record would be requested, and these yield some pointers. In 1896 College Assessor Nebvetsky, a clerk in the Public Works Department of the Samarkand Town Administration, was accused of selling illegally a piece of government land in the Russian quarter of Samarkand to a retired Colonel, and pocketing the proceeds of 503 roubles. Nebvetsky was 50 years old at the time, a Roman Catholic, and a nobleman, educated at a district (primary) school. He began his career in the provincial court at Kazan, before being transferred to Turkestan in 1873, so he had already served in Central Asia for over twenty years.¹⁰⁵ This does seem to have been reasonably common: pay, allowances, and pensions for those chinovniki who agreed to transfer to Central Asia were higher than in European Russia, and most, having moved there, seem to have remained until retirement or death. The case of College Assessor Graubing, discharged in 1899, was a sad one, but it gives some

further idea of the social background of the civilians who manned the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, and the lives they led in Turkestan. Graubing was a non-noble German from Kurland, a Lutheran, educated at a district school, although he did not finish the course. He had entered State service in the Baltic and was sent to Samarkand in 1888. The head of the surveying Commission remarked on how efficient he had been as land surveyor for the first two years after he arrived there in 1890. For the past seven years, however, he had taken to drink, often disappearing on binges for days at a time, and he was now quite unable to fulfil his duties. Graubing wrote bitterly in a petition that he had heard himself described as ‘not only useless, but as he is constantly before the gaze of the native population, even dangerous’.¹⁰⁶ He added that the twelve years he had served in Turkestan had ruined his health and, although he did not contest his dismissal, demanded that he be given a full pension, despite not having qualified. This was denied, and it was on a half pension of just 142 roubles 95 kopeks a year that he retired to his brother’s house in Riga, where he died in 1904 at the age of 55.¹⁰⁷ What is perhaps particularly interesting here is Graubing’s bitter perception that his superiors thought he was tarnishing the image of the ruling race, an attitude towards ‘poor whites’ familiar from British India. Two other civilians whose details were recorded in 1892 came from similar backgrounds: one was a ‘bourgeois’, whose father had been a member of the St Petersburg Imperial Medical and Surgical Academy and a State Counsellor, and consequently he had inherited noble status. He had been educated at the Siberian Cadet Corps and also in the 2nd Konstantinovsky Military Academy, although he had not completed the course. He had then served briefly as an Ensign before transferring to the civilian bureaucracy as a clerk in Katta-Kurgan in 1892.¹⁰⁸ College Registrar Pospelov, who later wrote several papers on the early years of Samarkand under Russian rule, was the son of a priest from Simbirsk, where he had attended the theological seminary, and had begun his service in Katta-Kurgan in 1888.¹⁰⁹ Despite receiving higher pay than their counterparts in Europe, most civilian chinovniki did not consider themselves well off, and many borrowed heavily in order to meet their vodka and gambling bills. When Stepanov, who worked in the Samarkand Chancellery, was killed in an accident in 1880 he left just 39 roubles and 10 kopeks.¹¹⁰ Fedorov, another clerk attached to the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 5, 33ob, 47.
¹⁰⁸ Ibid. D.178, 48-ob.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 50.
¹¹⁰ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.792.
artillery depot, had debts totalling over 2,000 roubles in 1884, much of it owed to local Hindu moneylenders.¹¹¹

Complaints and petitions against Russian members of the bureaucracy were, as one might expect, much less common than those against the native administration, but far from unknown. Serious corruption seemed to occur most frequently in the ranks of forestry officers, who were often unable to resist bribes to permit illegal felling: a typical case was that of Alexander Efimov, who took 136 roubles from the Sanzar Volost Upravitel,¹¹² but it was not unknown for more senior officers to be corrupt. One of the earliest cases concerned Baron Nolde, the District Commandant in Khujand before 1876, who was accused of exacting a bribe every time he received a petition, levying heavy fines on the population and pocketing the proceeds, and taking kickbacks when the Chancellery buildings were being repaired. N. L. Mordvinov, who was deputed to investigate, complained bitterly that the entire District administration was so heavily embroiled in these scams that it was impossible to find anyone who would testify to the Baron’s wrongdoings, although he was eventually tried, found guilty, and sentenced to eight years’ hard labour in Siberia.¹¹³ Russian officers were also frequently just as financially feckless as their counterparts in British India. In 1884 Major-General Yafimovich, the then Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, was being pursued for debts totalling 7,544 roubles 30 kopeks (far more than an entire year’s pay, even in this senior position), mostly amassed while he was Chief Assistant to the Commander of the Russian forces in Ferghana. Part of the debt consisted of 4,000 roubles which he had borrowed to build a house, but he had also failed to pay any of his mess bills between 1879 and 1882: these had now reached a total of 2,304 roubles. Yafimovich’s response to these demands was to appeal to the Governor-General, whose Sovet generously exempted him from paying most of his mess debts, writing off 1,536 roubles’ worth.¹¹⁴

Although obviously pursuing a political agenda, the radical newspaper Samarkand throughout its brief existence took great pleasure in reporting in detail on instances of official corruption within the Russian administration. In 1906 one Sokolov, a former clerk in the Samarkand Provincial administration, began to make accusations of corruption

¹¹¹ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,517, 7.
¹¹⁴ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,468, 2-ob, 53, 72.
against College Counsellor M. M. Virsky in the pages of the newspaper, saying, among other things, that he had helped to cover up the misdeemours of his brother, Ilya.\footnote{‘Mestnaya Khronika’, Samarkand, 21 May 1906, No. 42.} The Virsky clan had dominated the Samarkand Chancellery throughout the 1890s: Mikhail Virsky was head of the Chancellery and the Provincial Statistical Committee and compiler of the Provincial Gazetteer, whilst his brothers Ilya and Nikolai also worked for the Statistical Committee. They were the sons of an NCO from Tobolsk, who, judging by their patronymic—‘Moiseevich’—was Jewish, but if so they had converted to Orthodoxy. Sokolov’s accusations had more than a whiff of anti-Semitism about them, but two years later in 1908 the Pahlen Commission caught up with Virsky’s brother, Ilya, together with his chief \textit{perevodchik}, Imam Utkulbaev. It transpired that the two of them, Virsky using the translator as a go-between, had been receiving sums ranging from 200 to 500 roubles from Aksakals and Volost Upraviteli in the area around Samarkand, in return for settling land disputes in their favour, turning aside official investigations into the rigging of elections and other special treatment.\footnote{TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.2,583, 3–5ob.} Ilya Virsky had served in Samarkand since 1871, when he joined the postal department, but he had begun his service in Tomsk in 1866, at the age of 16. In 1878 he was sent to Bulgaria for two months in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War, but apart from this he had been in Samarkand for thirty-seven years, ample time to build up the contacts he seems to have used in rural areas, and also, it appears, to secure jobs for his two brothers, who also came under suspicion although they were not charged.\footnote{Ibid., 42ob.} No scandals as serious as those in Transcaspia were uncovered by Pahlen in Samarkand, but it was nevertheless a severe embarrassment to the administration.

\section*{The Military Bureaucracy on the Eve of the First World War}

Pahlen’s report offers a good opportunity to see what progress had been made in the administration of Turkestan since the conquest fifty years before. As he pointed out, the average provincial expenditure in Turkestan was 9,000 roubles higher than for the average province in European Russia. This was largely owing to higher levels of pay for
Russian officers serving in Central Asia, but this did not necessarily translate into a higher calibre of recruit:

The low educational standard in the ranks, even of those occupying positions of the highest responsibility, amongst whom one occasionally meets individuals, who have only received primary education (one Vice-Governor\textsuperscript{118} and two senior advisers). The majority of the lower ranks belong to the group of individuals who have received primary or even so-called ‘domestic’ education. Those with a higher education constitute just 20 per cent of the total number of officials in the Oblast Administration, and are found principally amongst the technicians of the Works Departments. Apart from this, as far as the main Oblasts of Turkestan are concerned, it should be noted that the submission of the latter to the authority of the Ministry of War has as its result this situation, where the personnel serving on both the Oblast and Uyezd establishments consist, for the most part, of line officers with an average military education, lacking both the essential experience and the specialist preparation needed for administrative duties.\textsuperscript{119}

The problem was particularly acute because in Turkestan there was a lack of ‘social elements’, and ‘intellectual resources’ (by which Pahlen probably meant the Zemstva and the cadres which were associated with them) upon which the officers could rely. The crucial executive positions of Pristav and District Commandant were still monopolized by military officers.\textsuperscript{120} By the time of Pahlen’s report, there were 42 chinovniki, military and civilian, serving in the Samarkand Provincial administration who were on the regular establishment. Of these, seven had received higher education, 11 had been educated up to the secondary level, 19 at the primary level, and five had received no formal education.\textsuperscript{121} The officials with a higher education were the engineers in the Public Works Department and the doctors, not the executive officers. Not one official had a higher legal training, and the Military Governor’s chief adviser, who was in charge of the Chancellery, had been educated only at a Junker School. One of his assistants only had a primary education, and of the clerks in the medical division two had a secondary education, three had been at primary school and two had no formal education at all. Pahlen remarked that the situation was even worse than in Ferghana, where nine officials had a higher education, 12 secondary, 19 primary, and three had only been educated at home.\textsuperscript{122} He did acknowledge

\textsuperscript{118} Of Semirechie; Palen \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 13, \textit{Oblastnoe Upravlenie}, 110.  
\textsuperscript{120} Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 13, 219.  
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 72.  
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 47.
that so far as their individual qualities were concerned, many of these officers were probably superior to those serving in equivalent positions in European provinces.¹²³

On the whole, both in the central provinces of Turkestan and in Semirechie, the quality of serving officials is often higher than that of the *chinovniki* serving in many internal provinces. This phenomenon can only be explained by the military character of the administration in Turkestan, which makes it possible to attract the best line officers into the ranks of the administration.¹²⁴

Thus not all was doom and gloom. The Miliutin reforms may have been partly rolled back in Alexander III’s reign, but they still set a benchmark which had contributed to the gradual, but growing, military professionalisation of a minority of officers by the early twentieth century: all the indications are that this professionalized minority was heavily represented in the ranks of those chosen for *Voenno–Narodnoe Upravlenie*, although this is one aspect of the civil–military experience which Fuller does not really touch on in his otherwise excellent work.¹²⁵ In most cases District Commandants had served in Central Asia for 15 to 20 years, and some indeed had taken part in the original conquest as line officers. Some of the younger ones had been born in Turkestan, the sons of the earliest officials to work there. Although, in theory, it was now possible for civilians to become District Commandants, all but two of them had received a military education and been seconded from military service. Most had completed a ‘military course’ at one of the military institutes by this stage, and only a few had merely attended a *Junker* academy. They had all served as *Pristavy* or as assistants to District Commandants before being appointed to the post themselves. Lack of knowledge of native languages was now the exception rather than the rule, with several of them (including the heads of the Kokand, Samarkand, and Khujand Districts) having become noted scholars of Persian and Turki. Pahlen wrote that: ‘On the whole one must acknowledge that the District Commandants have up until now been able to preserve for themselves the respect of the population and to support the prestige of Russian power amongst the natives.’¹²⁶

However, he concluded that, despite their personal qualities, a closer inspection of their concrete achievements revealed severe deficiencies, attributable to the immense variety of burdens they were expected to sustain, combined with a stifling of individual initiative from above. In

¹²⁴ Ibid., 43ob.
practice, they were unable to supervise the police effectively, with only
the most serious crimes ever coming to their attention, and then only in
very exceptional circumstances. Similarly, they exercised only the most
formal control over the native judicial system: they were unfamiliar with
Muslim law, and normally relied on often semi-literate interpreters to
explain the cases to them. Even if they had the necessary linguistic and
legal skills, the report concluded, there were too many Qazis and too
many cases for it to be possible for a single man to supervise them.
As the pressure of office work prevented them from travelling much
outside the District town, the report also criticized them for spending
too much time on urban affairs, and too little on rural administration.
They were unable, through lack of time, to carry out the necessary
crop surveys and tax assessments: instead, the same rates were levied
year after year with no alteration to take into account the expansion
of the cultivated area or changes of use, providing ample opportunity
for corruption and the withholding of revenue among the Aksakals
who levied the land tax. Medicine and public health received too little
attention and had made little progress. In 1897 the Military Governor’s
official report noted that there were only seven doctors for a population
of 600,000 souls in Samarkand Province, two urban hospitals with 75
beds in all in Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan, and two ambulances.¹²⁷
Finally, Pahlen concluded that the whole system had become far too
hidebound and centralized, with almost no opportunity for officers to
exercise individual initiative.

Almost all the power, which in the inner Provinces belongs to the Governors,
is in fact appropriated by the Governor-General’s Chancellery. All the District
Commandants and Pristry know that the most petty questions cannot be
settled on their direct authority, but by the Governor-General’s Chancellery, to
which they also turn for all instruction and advice.

In this way the entire extensive region, divided into five Oblasts, each of
which could constitute a large Province, in practice turns out to be just one
vast administrative unity . . . and this situation presents itself particularly starkly
when the powers of the head of the Turkestan Krai are compared with those of
the Governor-General of India . . . the Turkestan Governor-General in practice
has no assistants who know their business and are sufficiently independent
in their official position to be responsible for the fiduciary branch, hence
the Head of Chancellery should be a specialist in all the questions which
arise.¹²⁸

Pahlen saw in the devolved powers of the Viceroy and the existence of a dedicated, educated Civil Service in India a model for Russian attempts to reform the corrupt and over-centralized system in Turkestan. In India, he wrote, the Viceroy and his Council were given extremely extensive powers: only matters of high policy were decided by the Secretary of State in London, and this decentralization and reliance on local initiative continued right the way down to the lowest levels of the Indian Civil Service. Pahlen was not the only one to make this comparison. Commenting on the scale of corruption uncovered by the senator’s mission, one article in Golos Pravdy read

Clearly Turkestan has been through the same stage of criminality as that in India during the first years of its conquest by the English with only this difference, that the latter pilfered and plundered many hundred times more than our Turkestan administrators...

It remains to us to follow the example of the English, and make use of their experience. As is known, two principles were laid down by them in the matter of renewing the Indian administration—firstly, the most thorough selection of individuals, and secondly the highest possible rates of salary. If the second of these may prove beyond our strength, given the current state of the finances of the country, the first should be more or less within our power.¹²⁹

Unfortunately neither measure was to prove forthcoming before the outbreak of war rendered extensive reforms a mere pipe-dream.

NOT QUITE SO ‘HEAVEN-BORN’

By contrast with Russian Turkestan, a good deal is known about the men who administered British India, at least after 1857: 10 per cent of recruits to the ICS between 1860 and 1874 were drawn from the aristocracy; and 76 per cent from the professional middle classes. The proportion of recruits who had attended university fluctuated a good deal—in 1860 it was over 70 per cent, but for complicated reasons by 1874 it had slumped to just 45 per cent. However, by the early 1900s they overwhelmingly had a university education, 83 per cent of them having attended Oxford or Cambridge.¹³⁰ The figures in Pahlen’s report finally enable a tentative comparison of the education of officers elsewhere in the Russian Empire, Turkestan as a whole, the Zarafshan Okrug, and India.

¹²⁹ ‘Reviziya Turkestana’, Golos Pravdy 1908g No. 967, in TS, 494 (1908), 79.
¹³⁰ Bradford Spangenburg, British Bureaucracy in India (Delhi, 1976), 19, 22–3, 31.
Table 5. Comparative educational statistics for administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Higher civilian officials, European Russia 1894–5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Heads of divisions, Eastern Siberia 1840–70&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Officers, Turkestan Military Okrug 1875&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Military administrators, Zarafshan Okrug 1868–c.1890&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Bureaucrats in Samarkand and Province 1910&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Indian Civil Service recruits&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(both = 37.3)</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Zaionchkovskii, Pravitel’svennyi Apparat, 33–4.
<sup>b</sup> Matkhanova, Vysshaya Administratsiya, 113–9.
<sup>d</sup> Figures taken from table in Appendix 6.
<sup>e</sup> Palen, Otchet, Vol. 13, 72.
<sup>f</sup> Spangenburg, British Bureaucracy, 22–3, 31.

The comparisons in Table 5 are far from perfect, particularly given the different sizes of the samples involved and the different dates from which they are taken. As might be expected, European Russia and Siberia show marked superiority in terms of the number of university graduates, and the contrast with India is even starker. However, although there were no university graduates serving in the Zarafshan Okrug, eight officers had attended Military Academies after completing the Junker course, two of those the General Staff Academy. If this is considered higher education, then the overall figure of 88 per cent of officers receiving secondary education can be broken down into 30 per cent with a higher education and 58 per cent with secondary education. Either way, those officers seconded on Voennno-Narodnoe Upravlenie do seem to have been significantly better educated than the generality of the officer corps in the region. The discrepancy between these figures and those for 1910 is explained by the fact that the latter (from the Pahlen report) do not distinguish between military officers in executive positions and civilian clerks. Nevertheless, there was almost certainly an increase in the number of university and other graduates serving in Turkestan by 1910, thanks to the greater number of positions requiring technical and medical qualifications. The apparent superiority of the education...
afforded Indian Civil Servants is somewhat offset when one remembers that in Punjab particularly, and the non-regulation Provinces more generally, many administrative positions were filled by military officers until the twentieth century.¹³¹ In the Bannu, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, and Kohat Districts, for instance, in the course of twenty years from c.1860 to the early 1880s only one civilian, D. C. Macnabb, was appointed to an administrative post in any of them.¹³² Responsibility for administering the Frontier rested with an assortment of junior officers, Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors. In the early years these were all men from the Company’s Native and European regiments, characterized as ‘not so agreeable or polished’ by Peter Stanley in his study of the military culture of the Bengal Europeans.¹³³ ‘Cockneys’ were not unknown in their messes, although on the whole they came from professional or at least shabby-genteel backgrounds, the sons of clergy, doctors, and lawyers, and, occasionally, tradesmen. Most were privately educated, some (such as William Arnold, son of the Doctor)¹³⁴ public-school men, and about a quarter had passed through the Company’s College at Addiscombe, where between the ages of 14 and 16 they pursued a curriculum ‘heavy with arcane mathematics and light on idiomatic Hindustani’ and indulging in particularly elaborate practical jokes.¹³⁵ Bengal Civilian John Beames did not think much of these military amateurs when he served in the Punjab in the early 1860s, considering them ill-educated and, what was worse, not gentlemen.¹³⁶ Beames himself took a great pride in his liberal education; he had been educated at Merchant Taylor’s and was in the last year at the East India Company’s College at Haileybury, where, although he described the discipline as ‘shamefully lax’, he nevertheless became very fluent in Persian and Hindustani. His attack on Government policy has more than a hint of sour grapes, however, as he had been subjected to various social slights, imagined or otherwise, by his military superior

¹³⁴ He was educated at Rugby (where else), and joined the Company’s army after an unsuccessful year at Oxford. Subsequently he wrote a slightly tedious novel which casts light on the boorish world of the pre-Mutiny Indian Army officer corps: W. D. Arnold, Oakfield; or, Fellowship in the East (Leicester, 1973) (1853).
¹³⁵ Stanley, White Mutiny, 30.
at Ludhiana, Colonel McNeill. The Government of India’s policy of appointing military officers to administrative posts in Punjab may have been born of necessity in the immediate aftermath of the Sikh Wars, but it was continued as a matter of deliberate policy because of the fragile military situation on the Frontier, and the need to have men on the spot who were used to handling troops, and could be relied upon to impose military discipline on quarrelsome and ‘fanatical’ tribesmen: very similar thinking, in fact, to that which lay behind the Russian Empire’s use of Voenno-Narodnoe Upravlenie in Asiatic areas. In this light, the social and intellectual gulf that appears to lie between British and Russian administrators grows considerably smaller, at least in the nineteenth century.

British officials were highly paid, often receiving more than those in equivalent positions at home, and certainly more than their Russian counterparts.¹³⁷ To give one example, in 1871 General Abramov received 5,000 roubles a year as Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, plus 6,000 roubles in expenses.¹³⁸ At the same time the Commissioner of Patna, who occupied a comparable position in the Anglo-Indian administrative hierarchy, received £300 a month and £25 expenses.¹³⁹ Even without the expenses, this was the equivalent of 2,850 roubles a month, or 34,200 roubles a year, more than three times what Abramov received. A junior district official in India could expect to receive £40 a month in the 1860s and 70s, which, despite a higher cost of living in India, similarly compares very well with the 3,500 roubles a year which a District Commandant in Samarkand received in 1871. The probity of British officials after 1857 was not a myth, and in this they compared favourably with their Russian counterparts, although given their lavish salaries this is perhaps no more than should be expected.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, a cadre of well-paid, upper-middle-class, university-educated officials was no guarantee of an effective administration. Not all Russian observers shared Pahlen’s high opinion of the ICS. Snesarev, who had travelled extensively in India, felt that whilst initially British officers were at a ‘higher cultural level’ than their Russian counterparts, they were rapidly corrupted by their surroundings: ‘Englishmen who have lived

¹³⁷ Spangenburg, British Bureaucracy, 45–6.
in India significantly deteriorate, in an intellectual and moral sense, as in, for instance, highly gifted people turn into narrow-minded and blinkered bureaucrats, enlightened British officers descend to levels of wilful savagery and pass their time in barbarous pursuits.¹⁴¹

This latter remark might have been a reference to pig-sticking, or perhaps to the savage reprisals which took place after the Mutiny which the Russians regarded with a mingled horror and fascination visible in Vereshchagin’s famous painting of Mutineers being blown from guns.¹⁴² Clearly Snesarev was biased, although he spoke as a firm believer in the necessity of European Empire in Asia. Lord Curzon also had a very low opinion of the calibre of the ICS when he became Viceroy in 1901, and he wrote of the ‘torpor’, ‘crassness’, and ‘absence of initiative’ of Indian civilians, who were ‘indifferent’, ‘incompetent’, who ‘dislike the country and the people’, and who had ‘no taste for their work’.¹⁴³ The pronouncements of a notoriously arrogant and volatile Viceroy are no certain guide, but they do help to put some of the comments made about Russian officers into perspective. There were, without doubt, many brilliant and dedicated men in the ICS who would have been welcome in any administration, colonial or otherwise, and this continued to be the case even as Indian Independence approached.¹⁴⁴ Russian Turkestan, too, had its brilliant public servants and scholars, such as Nalivkin, Lykoshin, or Ostroumov, some of whom were engaged in day-to-day administration. The training in Oriental languages received by British administrators, at Haileybury, Oxford, and in India itself, was undoubtedly superior to that on offer to their Russian counterparts, and many, such as Beames, took full advantage of it.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the language programme had many flaws, not least because for many years the principal Hindustani texts set for the examination were the Bagh-o-Babar, which was very high Urdu and full of elaborate Persian expressions, and the Baital-Pachisi, which

¹⁴¹ Snesarev, Indiya kak Glavnyi Faktor, 44.
¹⁴² Vzryvanye iz pushek v Britanskoj Indii in fact depicts executions after a Sikh rebellion in the early 1880s.
¹⁴³ Quoted in Spangenburg, British Bureaucracy, 3.
¹⁴⁴ One thinks, for instance, of Sir Alfred Lyall, Sir Penderel Moon, or Frank Brayne and Malcolm Darling, whose careers are so well analysed by Clive Dewey, Anglo-Indian Attitudes (London, 1993).
¹⁴⁵ See Bayly, Empire and Information, 73–8, 144, for reflections on how the British attempted to master Persian and Hindustani before 1850, and the power it sometimes gave them.
was very Sanskritized. Consequently, there were many ICS men who struggled with the spoken vernacular, which left them dependent upon interpreters and Indian officials. Whatever their superior personal qualities, the comparison between the British and Russian Empires must rest on the effectiveness of their respective bureaucracies in connecting with and controlling society through their native subordinates. The reliance of British officers on the North-West Frontier on powerful local agents is well known, and is discussed in the preceding chapter. Nevertheless, even in ryotwari areas, where there were fewer landlord intermediaries and the Collector was supposedly all-powerful and all-knowing, most historians have concluded that they were frequently at the mercy of their subordinates. Washbrook writes of Madras in the 1880s that the Collector was normally wholly ignorant of the affairs in his charge, and that he was rarely allowed to remain in post for longer than a year, rendering him little more than an ‘administrative cipher’. When a Collector did remain in one place for any length of time and built up a network of local contacts, ‘The problem then faced by the Board of Revenue was how to make him do its will rather than his own’. The ‘initiative’ and ‘independence’ so admired by Pahlen when he compared the ICS to Russian officials, who were kept on a tight leash by the centre, did not always lead to good administration. Collectors used their powers of patronage to appoint protégés to official positions and to interfere in local politics: sometimes, though very rarely, they even stooped to corruption, as in the case of the Madras Civilian Arthur Atkinson in the 1870s. On the whole, criminal activity and wilful behaviour were less of a problem for the ICS than an overwhelming reliance on Indian subordinates and local power-brokers, and frequent inability to control them. In 1871 Iltudus Prichard published a satirical novel (more or less a collection of anecdotes) which was a thinly disguised description of the Station in Lower Bengal where he had served. Mocking the stupidity and self-importance of most of the civilians who worked there, the main point of the book was to show how, in reality, the British were mere

---

146 Duncan Forbes (ed.), Bagh-o-Bahar (London, 1846–89) and Baital-Pachisi (numerous editions); neither is written in anything approaching colloquial Hindustani. ‘An Ex-Civilian’ is fairly scathing about the examinations in Oriental languages offered to his generation (c. 1860). See Life in the Mofussil, 23–8.


148 Gilmour, Ruling Caste, 151; Washbrook, Provincial Politics, 31–4, also gives several instances.
The chief villain of the piece is ‘Shekh Futtoo’, the Serishtadar (Head Clerk) in the Commissioner’s Chancery:

For the first time for twenty years he had failed to twist round his fingers the master whom he had throughout that time nominally served, and in reality ruled. Was he about to shake himself free from the trammels? Was he about to break the web that had been wound so skilfully round and round him that he could move neither hand nor foot? . . . Twenty years he had grown fat and wealthy upon corruption and bribery. For twenty years he had kept the avenues to his employer’s eyes and ears. . . . \(^{149}\)

Some of Prichard’s tales are lurid, but more often they are merely sordid, which is what gives them the ring of truth. However much they were embellished, the corruption which surrounded Anglo-Indian officials on all sides (and in which they very occasionally participated) is no myth, and well attested to in the historical record. In many ways they were just as ill-prepared to deal with the native administration as were their Russian counterparts.

He did no more than turn the place into a pleasant little family preserve, allowed his subordinates to do what they liked, and let everybody have a chance at the shekels.¹

Arguably all colonial regimes in non-settler societies require a degree of what may loosely be called ‘indirect rule’. This need not mean the formal devolution of sovereignty to native rulers, as in Bukhara or Hyderabad, or indeed a more informal system of rule through large landowners and religious leaders: the Russians were not interested in using these methods in the area of Turkestan under formal Russian sovereignty. Although this implies a considerable degree of direct Russian control over all aspects of Government, the truth was somewhat different. With fewer manpower problems than the British in India, the Russians none the less lacked the personnel and, more importantly, the local knowledge, to administer Turkestan using exclusively Russian officials. Under Voenno-Narodnoe Upravlenie the bureaucracy was formally constituted in two parts: designated ‘Russian’ or ‘Higher’ administration; and Tuzemnoe, or ‘Native’. The lowest Russian official was the Pristav, or regional chief of police, often with a responsibility for a population of 100,000 or more. In practice, much power was devolved to native officials in the crucial areas of land revenue, irrigation, and justice. The potential this sort of dependence on local co-operation has to undermine the pretensions of the imperial power, while it has seldom, if ever, been examined in the context of Russian Turkestan, is well known from several classic case-studies in British India.² Although nothing

² e.g. Robert Eric Frykenberg, Guntur District 1788–1848. The History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India (Oxford, 1965); Anand Yang, The Limited Raj. Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793–1920 (Delhi, 1989).
quite so dramatic emerged in Samarkand, Russian officials complained constantly that they were never able to deal with the local population without intermediaries.

In the course of the first ten years after the conquest of Tashkent, we succeeded with our own hands in creating a numerous clique of the so-called ‘influential’ or ‘honoured’ natives, a bureaucratic clique (amongst the native administration) and a financial one (for the most part amongst contractors), a newly created aristocracy of riff-raff, including petty shopkeepers, arbakshis (cabmen) and grooms, wearing robes of honour and dangling medals.³

Nalivkin’s judgement, coming from an extremely experienced (if unusually liberal) official in 1913, can be regarded as a final verdict by the Russians themselves on the system they had deliberately created forty years previously. Writing in the late 1870s, ten years after the abolition of Amlakdari and the dismantling of the Bukharan system of revenue collection in the Zarafshan Okrug, General von Kaufman blandly reflected that

The reform began with the abolition of the Serkers and Amlakdars at that time, when the weaknesses of native economic organisation in the Syr-Darya Oblast became clear. Deciding against introducing in the [Zarafshan] region the same unfortunate form of revenue establishment, I found it possible to hand over the matter of tax collections and the economic part of the administration to the direct management of Volost Upraviteli and village headmen.⁴

He went on to express his satisfaction with this move, pointing to the marked increase in the amount of revenue collected by his chosen intermediaries. Thus, although Tsarist officials had decisively rejected the aristocratic model of colonial rule in Turkestan, this did not mean that no power was devolved to local functionaries or that no attempt was made to secure the co-operation of other local elites. In the cities the commercial classes often sought to ingratiate themselves with their new Russian rulers. A famous example of this was the immensely wealthy merchant Said Azim-Bai of Tashkent, who made haste to put himself on good terms with the Russian authorities in the immediate aftermath of the city’s fall to General Cherniaev:⁵ it was men of his stamp who would come to fill the all-important positions of urban Aksakal, Qazi, or, in Tashkent, Municipal Councillor. Some also

³ Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, 72–3.
⁴ fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vseoddanneishego Otcheta, 69–70.
⁵ ‘Said Azim-Bai’, VO 1882g, No. 7, in TS, 327 (1883), 21–9.
enthusiastically adopted Russian modes of living in the new European quarters constructed in Turkestan’s towns, and although this initially occasioned some misgivings, it was not long before the Russians began to see such settlement as more positive evidence of the attraction of European civilization for wealthy natives: Said Azim-Bai’s own house in the European quarter of Tashkent would later become an established part of the itinerary for visiting dignitaries.

Closer to the region under consideration here, the Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan Otdel wrote to Abramov on 16 October 1869, to tell him about the ‘influential natives’ whom he thought could be useful to the Russian cause in his district:

I present a list of worthy natives, who have earned merit through their behaviour and useful influence over the people, and humbly request your Excellency’s intercession to reward these natives. Together with this I have the honour to submit, that of all of them the worthiest of an honourable distinction is the senior Aksakal of Katta-Kurgan... This Aksakal, through his influence over the people has had a field hospital and barracks built of brick through free labour amongst the inhabitants... In general this Aksakal in his conduct has served in such a way, that as an example to others he should be rewarded with a higher honour.⁷

He was rewarded with a khalat, and the status of an ‘honoured citizen’. Ostensibly, at least, the native administration which oversaw revenue collection, and exercised some judicial functions, was to be made up of such people, co-operative and influential but not so influential that they could afford to defy the Russian authorities, as it was feared the large landowners and Khojas of Turkestan could have done. In practice, because of lack of resources and manpower coupled with linguistic difficulties, it frequently proved easy for the urban and village elites who inherited much of the power of the Amlakdars and religious leaders to run things very much their own way.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

The Vremennoe Pravilo, or Temporary Statute, for the administration of Turkestan was the creation of the Steppe Commission, set up in 1865 to devise a statute for ruling the nomadic areas newly annexed

---

to the Russian Empire with the extension of the Siberian line, and subsequently given the job of doing the same for the settled areas of Turkestan after the fall of Tashkent. The Commission’s judgement was that ‘The internal administration of the native population of the Turkestan for all matters that are not of a political character will be left to those elected from amongst the people themselves, adapted to their customs and disposition.’

Writing in 1884, Count N. P. Ignatiev believed that this was a very considerable innovation, but one which had created a favourable impression of the Russians among the natives. As von Kaufman recorded, the Russians had introduced this new system in the Zarafshan Okrug from 1871 onwards, ostensibly basing it on that used in European Russian villages, where the peasantry was largely allowed to manage its own affairs within the commune. The chief feature of this was the indirect election of officials at the village and Volost level. The Russian administrators who formulated this policy were concerned more with budgetary constraints and fear of Muslim fanaticism if any attempt were made directly to administer rural society than with any desire to ensure that the Empire was administered on uniform principles. The idea of selecting officials locally may have owed something to Bukharan and Kokandian precedents, as only a particularly powerful Bek could have had the time or the energy to foist unpopular candidates or outsiders on villages. Furthermore, the very different nature of agrarian relations in Turkestan (where, for example, periodic redistribution of the village fields in accordance with the needs of each household, the defining characteristic of Russian communal agriculture, was unknown), coupled with Russian reliance on interpreters and influential urban families, meant that the outcome of this policy was very different. As the conquest unfolded, numerous voices were heard warning against any attempt to modernize Turkestan too quickly and possibly provoking a response akin to the Indian Mutiny:

Such a break, or, to put it another way, all forcible meddling with native customs—those most sensitive chords of Asiatic peoples—could produce undesirable consequences, and in all probability invite the hostility of the population, even if it were done in the most tentative way. The English have presented us with the best example of this in India; and we ourselves, having introduced a new form of urban government in Turkestan...have

9 Ignat’ev, *Ob’yasnit’el’naya Zapiska*, 39.  
already succeeded in arousing against ourselves the discontent of the local inhabitants.¹²

The latter sentence referred to von Kaufman’s attempt to introduce municipal government in Turkestan, an experiment that remained abortive everywhere apart from Tashkent. A good glimpse of the system of devolved rural administration when it was in its early stages is provided by documents from Khujand and Djizak, at that time part of Syr-Darya Province but later administered from Samarkand. These towns were taken in 1866, Djizak from Bukhara and Khujand from Kokand, but this was an area that had long been contested between the two Khanates and there seem to have been few substantial differences in the way they were administered. The new system was up and running earlier than in the Zarafshon Valley: according to the first District Commandant in Khujand, Colonel Kushakevich, the survey of crops and population had been completed by March 1868, when the first elections were held. The electors for the positions of Aksakal, Arty-Aksakal, and Qazi were known as pyatidesyatniki, or ‘fiftiers’, so called because they in turn represented up to fifty electors (chosen according to a crude property franchise—i.e. they had to be householders) in each Aksakalstvo.¹³ This title may have stemmed from a Bukharan precedent, as the questionable appendix to the Majma’ al-argam refers to the position of Panjah-bashi in the Bukharan administration, a Turco-Persian term meaning ‘head of fifty’. It is unlikely that this indicates a similar electoral role, although they do seem to have been the heads of ‘important households’.¹⁴ In Khujand itself there were 38 pyatidesyatniki, and rural Aksakalstvos could have between nine and 60 according to population. In all throughout the District there were 259 pyatidesyatniki for the 16 Aksakalstvos that the Russians defined as ‘settled’ and rather fewer per head for nomadic auls. This was for a population of 75,725, of whom 65,600 were settled.¹⁵ In Djizak the Russians made some attempt to assess the degree of influence the candidates for Aksakal were likely to have over the population and also how loyal they could be expected to be to the new regime, remarking for instance of Karaul Beg ‘Abd ul-Ghafar that he ‘did not merit full

¹² ‘Novoe Ustroistvo nashikh pogranichnykh sredneaziatskikh vladenii’, Golos, No. 193, 14th July 1867, in Turkestanskii Sbornik, 1 (1868), 161.
¹³ Palen, Otchet, Vol. 9, 93.
¹⁴ Vil’danova, ‘Podlinnik Bukharskogo Traktata’, 43; Khanikoff says it denotes a commander of fifty in the Amir’s bodyguard, Bokhara, 237.
¹⁵ TsGARUz F.1 Op.16 D.84, 62, 85ob–86.
Here most of the successful candidates seem to have been those who had served before the Russian conquest. In all cases the election results were subject to confirmation by the Russian District Commandant.

This model of native administration essentially remained in force until 1917, but some modifications were made. In 1871 the Russians introduced a new set of officials, Volost Upraviteli, who were initially appointed by the Russian District Commandant, replacing (although modelled on) the Bukharan Amins, as it was thought the gap between the Aksakals and the Russian administration was too great: there had been plans to do this as early as 1869. They administered a larger Volost (a Russian term) which normally contained six to ten Aksakalstvos. They were supposed to supervise the activities of the Aksakals (who lost their policing powers), receiving the revenue they collected, and were allowed to impose fines of up to five roubles and gaol sentences of up to three days as punishment for tax evasion; from 1873 they, too, were elected on the same franchise as the Aksakals.

The Aksakals and Volost Upraviteli alike served for three-year terms, the former initially on a salary of 100 roubles a year paid by the District Commandant, the latter on 750–1,000 roubles a year, depending on the size of the area they administered, which they were entitled to deduct from the revenue they had collected before sending it to the Chancellery. Initially there were 38 Volosts in the Zarafshan Okrug, with 241 Aksakalstvos (see Table 6); by the 1880s there were 45 Volost Upraviteli, with responsibility for 302 Aksakals in the villages.

VILLAGE ELITES

The position of Volost Upraviteli (together with those of Qazi and Aryk-Aksakal) came to be monopolized by the wealthier and better educated inhabitants of District towns; one indication of this is that a disproportionate number of officials in the native administration of

---

16 Ibid., p17.
18 fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otceta, 69.
19 PSZ Sob. 3, Vol.VI (1886), No. 3814, 324.
20 Ignat’ev, Ob’yasnitel’naya Zapiska, 43.
21 TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,531, 6–7 ob; see Appendix 7.
22 fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otceta, 69–70.
23 See the next two chapters
Table 6. Administrative divisions of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1871

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions of the Zarafshan Okrug 1871</th>
<th>No. of Volosts</th>
<th>No. of Aksakalstvos</th>
<th>Settled population (households)</th>
<th>Average population (households)</th>
<th>Cost of the native administration (roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>28,825</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katta-Kurgan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22,305</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penjikent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9,746</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>60,876</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,531, 6–7ob.

Samarkand were Tajiks (largely urban-dwellers then as now), who, despite making up just 18 per cent of the provincial population in 1897, constituted over half the number of natives in Government employ listed in the census (119 Tajiks, 79 Uzbeks, and nine Sarts).²⁴ The elections to these positions and those of Aksakal (or Selskii Starshina, i.e. village headman) were the battleground on which rivalries between the wealthiest urban and village families were played out. In theory, candidates simply had to meet the same basic property qualification that was required of electors, i.e. they had to be householders. Determining their precise social background is problematic, but petitions indicate that they were drawn from the wealthier strata of village society, and their russified surnames almost invariably carry the suffix *baev*, indicating that they or their ancestors were *Bais*, that is wealthy men. In 1894 there was an election to Upravitel of the Uralyk Volost, Djizak District, contested by Hasan Kuilbaev and Alla Murad Kokanbaev, and unusually their respective property and other qualifications were listed (see Table 7).²⁵ In this instance education and experience triumphed over wealth, and Alla Murad was the winner, although he was by no means a pauper either. What is also interesting here is that he had been a candidate for Qazi at one time, indicating that judicial and executive posts in the native administration were viewed as interchangeable.

Lower down the administrative hierarchy, Aksakals were normally somewhat less plutocratic. The Aksakal of the village of Sary-Assiisk

²⁴ Troinitskii, *Samarkandskaya Oblast’*, 98.
Table 7. Candidates for election as Volost Upravitel in Uralyk Volost, 1894

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Hasan Kuilbaev</th>
<th>Alla Murad Kokanbaev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Educated in the Madrasah at Khujand. A Mudaris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>200 tanaps, irrigated</td>
<td>20 tanaps, irrigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camels</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Record</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Service</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Three years a Volost Upravitel, once candidate for Qazi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


in the Jumabazar Volost was accused in 1896 of embezzling roughly a third of the revenue he was supposed to have collected that year, something he eventually admitted to. He was 47 years old and described as an ‘Uzbek’, was literate, and was engaged in arable farming on his own land.²⁶ Another Aksakal in Katta-Kurgan, caught trying to evade the taxes he was supposed to be levying himself, owned property worth 501 roubles, including 36 tanaps of land, a horse, and two cows.²⁷ In 1900 there was a rare instance of 186 villagers writing to the District administration in order to put on record their gratitude to their Aksakal, who had borrowed money on their behalf in order to tide them over a late rice harvest, and refused their offer to repay the interest on the loan as well as the capital. The petition may not have been spontaneous, but if it was organized by the Aksakal himself it backfired, as the Russian authorities took a dim view of this means of paying the revenue. What it probably does indicate, however, is that he was the wealthiest man in the village and able to obtain better terms for the loan than they would have done.²⁸ Whatever their background, some members of the native administration seem to have felt that the newly acquired dignity of their office entitled them to take liberties with members of the old elite, as Abramov complained in July 1873 of the ‘coarseness and rudeness’ of Avurat Kasim, the Volost Upravitel of
Dalii-Aryk, in his dealings with the Bek of Ziauddin, who was visiting from Bukhara.²⁹

*Aksakals, Volost Upraviteli, and Qazis* alike had to be over 25 to be eligible for office.³⁰ Reports on the elections held in the Samarkand District in 1906 show that some *Aksakals* were as young as 27; their assistants still younger. Most had been elected by a majority of roughly 2:1, out of a group of electors varying from 50 to 319.³¹ A year later the Commandant of the Samarkand District complained that the system

---

²⁹ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.193, 16-об.
was being abused by the Kabut Volost Upravitel, Nazarkul Salimbaev, who had taken to appointing his youthful relatives as assistants to the Aksakals, often endowing them with considerable powers when, so it was claimed, they were no more than 10 years old.³² Once an individual attained office, service was often for extended periods and could become a full-time career. In September 1892 ‘Abd us-Samad Baba Khojunov appealed directly to the Military Governor to be reinstated as senior Aksakal of the city of Samarkand, a position he had held for three years after twenty-two years as a Volost Upravitel. In this time he had received several khalats and three medals, before in 1890 he was stripped of his post and put on trial for an offence he denied but was too coy to specify.³³

Notwithstanding the occasional limitations and inherent bias of the sources, corruption seems to have been absolutely endemic in the native administration of Turkestan almost from the beginning. The principal theme of V. P. Nalivkin’s Natives, Then and Now was the Zhivaya Stena, or ‘Living Wall’, of corrupt petty native officials that grew up after the Russian conquest, cutting the local population off from the Europeans and, hence, so he argued, from most of the benefits of European enlightenment.³⁴ He was echoed by Barthold some years later:

Neither Kaufman, nor his successors ever succeeded in creating a native administration that the natives themselves would respect. Nor did they succeed in creating a Russian administration that was satisfied with the state salary, resorting neither to extortions nor to loans. Between Russian power and the mass of the native population there remained a dividing wall in the form of ‘honoured natives’.³⁵

To some extent, as far as the native population were concerned, these were the real faces of Russian Imperial rule, rather than the scattered Russian administrative officials, and it offers very strong parallels with the hundreds of thousands of minor Indian civil servants and officials upon whom British rule really relied. Most Russian writers implied that it was the local population who suffered most from corruption, suggesting that it was State support for these local oligarchs that was to blame, whilst they largely ignored the extent to which these same men might be pulling the wool over their eyes. Undoubtedly, peasants

did suffer from the illegal actions and extortions of native officials, but there were instances where they colluded with them in order to fool the Russian authorities. Sometimes corruption and inefficiency can be a form of resistance to Imperial rule, and at the very least ties of language and sympathy between lower officials and the general population can help to undermine it. Stephen Velychenko has recently posited just such a thesis for local officials in nineteenth-century Ukraine.\textsuperscript{36} In Turkestan, native officials frequently seem to have had links with powerful factions in rural society, or indeed been their leaders. This was encouraged by the electoral system and, whilst the main aim of these groups was to promote the interests of their richest members, their activities caused the Russians a good many headaches.

\textbf{PETITIONS AND FACTIONALISM: THE EARLY YEARS}

From the beginning, Russian officials were mostly unenthusiastic about the system of indirect elections introduced by degrees in the various Oblas\-\textsuperscript{t}lasts of Turkestan after 1867. Although some saw limited representation as a way of slowly modernizing Turkestan without exciting the religious prejudices of Islamic society, they were in a minority. Most regarded it as inherently corrupt and potentially destabilizing. District Commandants frequently exercised their right of veto over elected candidates whilst elections to more senior positions, such as \textit{Volost Upravitel}, were often suspended for years at a time by order of the Governor-General. The conduct of elections was singled out for particular opprobrium by Pahlen, who wrote that

\begin{quote}
Amongst the \textit{settled} native population, having in its midst some influential and more developed individuals, wanting out of selfishness or ambition to occupy what are, in the eyes of the people, prestigious administrative positions... parties are assembled through bribery... the principal role is played by corruption, the presentation of false assertions and accusations, fights and battles, accompanied by murder.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{37} Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 9, 100.
Pahlen rather exaggerated the natural criminality of the settled population of Turkestan, but he was quite right in stating that these elections turned into power contests among the village elites. Given that the pay was quite low, the chief attraction of these positions seems to have been the opportunity to fiddle the revenue returns, exempting one’s supporters from tax and making sure it lay particularly heavily on rivals. Corruption of this kind was common, as were attempts to bribe the electors, have political rivals thrown into gaol or, indeed, have them murdered, and the evidence is not limited to the memoirs of disgruntled Russian officials. Numerous instances were brought to the attention of the Russian authorities by means of petitions addressed to the District Commandants and Military Governors, which are in many ways the dominant material to be found in the Chancellery archives. Donish refers to the practice of presenting petitions to the Emir in order to express dissatisfaction with a Qazi’s ruling or the actions of an official, and the fact that petitions began to pour into the Samarkand Chancellery almost from its establishment indicates that this was probably a form of protest and communication with the authorities with which the population were familiar from the previous regime. The precise circumstances under which petitions were submitted are not always clear, but normally they seem to have been drawn up by scribes in Samarkand itself, at the behest of individuals or deputations of villagers with grievances. When, in 1880 one Bika-Ai Abdurahmanova from the village of Kalmak-Tepe in Peishambe Volost wanted to submit a petition to the Governor-General appealing for the release of her son, this was apparently what happened:

On her arrival with her younger son Abdurasul in Samarkand in order to get news of her sons Batyrbai and Ilyubai, the latter gave her a petition written in Russian by someone unknown, and asked her to send copies to the Military Governor and the Acting Governor-General. She carried this out, but what it consisted of and by whom it was written she does not know at all, but was simply given by Ilyubai. She said that in truth many people had signed it, but who they were she didn’t know; this was confirmed by the younger son of the petitioner, Abdurasul. Those named in Bika-Ai’s petition were inhabitants of the village of Kalmak-Tepe, in all 21 people,—with the exception of the late Allahyar Abdullin— the remaining 20 explained, that together with the aforementioned Bika-Ai they came to Samarkand for the petition, without any call or permission from the authorities, where they met

---

38 Donish, Istoriya Mangitskoi Dinastii, 75.
some Russian fellow in the street—whether he was a chinovnik or a clerk they don’t know,—and asked him to write a petition from the afore-mentioned Bika-Ai.³⁹

It is unlikely that this was entirely typical however, particularly as the petition did not concern the election or dismissal of an official or an accusation of bribery. In 1898 Khalbut Nazarkulov was questioned by Colonel Chertov, Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District, about a petition he had submitted claiming that his village Aksakal was taking bribes: ‘I came to petition the District Commandant at the Uyezd Office, but some perevodchik or mirza or djigit wouldn’t let me in to see the District Commandant. I can’t point him out, or recognise him in person, and can’t point out which door in the building I went in and came out.’⁴⁰ As in India, the subordinate on the verandah was the man who controlled the all-important access to the European officer, although in Turkestan the Djigit took the place of the everlasting Chuprassie.⁴¹ His fellow-petitioner, Baizak Khaitov, having denied all knowledge of the written petition which bore his signature, explained further that

He came to Samarkand together with Khalbut Nazarkulov and wanted to petition the Military Governor verbally and in person about the Zerbent Starshina Rahmat Abdurazakov, because he demanded tax from me for 8 tanaps of land which I had not sown, but in the end we didn’t go and petition because the Samarkand Sarts advised me against it, saying that it was unnecessary to petition over such a trifle.⁴²

What we seem to have here are two instances of relatively naïve petitioners who didn’t know how to play the system. Most petitions were drawn up in Turkic by scribes in Samarkand and then translated, often in a rather slovenly manner, by the perevodchiki employed in the District Chancellery. The use of Turkic rather than Persian, in an almost entirely Persian-speaking city, is itself of some significance, reflecting the fact that the Russians relied upon Tatars, Bashkirs, and Kirghiz as translators. The cost of submitting a petition was 60 kopeks, later raised to 80, and it was probably because of its relative cheapness that this form of appeal was often preferred to recourse to the Russian courts, even where the matter at stake involved the judgment of a

³⁹ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,054, 4–ob.
Native Administration in Samarkand

Qazi. It was quite rare for investigations of the allegations made to produce concrete evidence that could result in the prosecution of the official in question, or his summary dismissal. This in large part is because these have to be seen not only as the complaints of a poor and exploited peasantry, but also as attempts by local power-brokers to use Russian authority to gain an advantage in this form of village politics, or to get their tax burden reduced. As early as 1869 in Samarkand Abramov complained that ‘The richer classes of the population, called to participate in the payment of revenue... use all means to arouse the poor people to submit petitions on the unduly burdensome nature of the taxes demanded of them.’\(^43\) Petitions almost always concerned irregularities either in elections or in the collection of revenue. A typical example comes from the Shahab Volost in the Samarkand District, where the Commandant summarized:

The report requested by me from the Upravitel of the Shahab Volost Baba Katta, about the irregularities in the collection of revenue by the Aksakal Karmisak Alibekov; an oral enquiry, made on the spot in the Aksakalsvo of Chauka by my junior assistant, Lieutenant Krechanov, has made it clear, that the said Aksakal had gathered from the inhabitants of the villages he assessed 120 roubles more than the amount of tax apportioned for 1877. I have removed Karmisak Alibekov from the post of Aksakal and authorised demanding 120 roubles from him in order to reimburse the taxpayers.\(^44\)

Two more Aksakals came under arrest for embezzlement in Katta-Kurgan in 1878.\(^45\) In their search for collaborators in the countryside, the Russians were often forced to compromise even when they did undercover evidence of wrong-doing. On one occasion in 1879 the Peishambe Volost Upravitel was found guilty of extorting additional tax revenue and retaining it for himself: not only did he escape punishment, he was left in post thanks to a puzzling intervention from von Kaufman himself, about which the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug, General Ivanov, was far from happy:

I find him entirely guilty of the crimes traced to him, and it is only in deference to the unusual intercession by Your Excellency that I have agreed to leave him in his position as Volost elder, but with a stern assurance, that if he is found once again to have committed acts of tyranny over the people, then he will not only be relieved from his post, but also put on trial.\(^46\)

\(^{43}\) TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.70, 93.  \(^{44}\) TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.433, 1-ob.
\(^{45}\) TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.433, 6-ob, 9–12.
\(^{46}\) TsGARUz F.22 Op.1 D.224, 1–2ob.
Dismissing him would have alienated a powerful local faction and von Kaufman argued that winking at his exactions was a necessary price to pay for a steady remission of revenue.

**THE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION AFTER GIRS**

The reformed Statute of 1886, drawn up on the recommendation of the Girs Commission of 1882, was supposed to rectify the extensive abuses which had come to light during the von Kaufman era: the Commission’s report identified several specific cases of corruption which had not been properly investigated by the Russian authorities, as well as alleging that *Aksakals*, *Volost Upraviteli*, and *Qazis* connived together to defraud the administration and the populace.⁴⁷ General Cherniaev, during his brief reign as Governor-General in 1882–3, had suspended elections to the position of *Volost Upravitel*, and elections were suspended once again in the immediate aftermath of the Andijan uprising in 1898. Russian officials were instructed to observe elections closely and to veto unsuitable candidates, as well as to tour their districts more frequently to prevent corruption in the collection of revenue. After 1886 Land Tax Commissions were established in the Provinces of Turkestan to carry out new land surveys and reduce the discretionary powers of the *Aksakals*. A new official, the *Podatnyi Inspektor* or Tax-Inspector, was given the task of touring the districts annually to check the accuracy of the *Aksakals’* records and relieve the burden on the hard-pressed District Commandants, but only one was appointed to each District, and in the short term, at least, the impact was limited.⁴⁸ In Samarkand the work of the new Commission was not completed until the late 1890s and early 1900s. The basic rate of land tax remained the same, at 10 per cent of the average value of the crop from irrigated land, with a flat levy of 50 kopeks on each *desyatina* of *Bahari* (unirrigated) land. Nevertheless on average land-tax receipts rose by over 100 per cent, giving some idea of the ineffectiveness of Russian revenue collection before this date.⁴⁹

---

Native Administration in Samarkand

Table 8. Files relating to petitions of complaint received by the Samarkand Chancellery, 1888–1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1888</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1908</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town Aksakal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selskii Starshina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volost Upravitel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryk-Aksakal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyatidesyatniki</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵⁰ As can be seen from Table 8, with the creation of Samarkand Province after 1886 the number of complaints continued to grow, reaching a peak in the period immediately preceding Pahlen’s report. The amount of time expended in dealing with complaints about the native administration by the Samarkand Chancellery was quite staggering. Out of a total of 2,584 files in the records of the 1st (general) division of the first table in the Samarkand Chancellery (by far the largest) between 1884 and 1908, no fewer than 1,342 (52 per cent) concern complaints and petitions relating to corruption, extortion, incorrect decisions, and violence on the part of Government servants, overwhelmingly those from the much more numerous native administration.⁵² On average, this meant they were dealing with 56 sets of petitions a year, or roughly five a month, although as several petitions were normally received on the same subject the paperwork

Even then the new rates were based on the average prices of grain in 1889–93, over five years before the Commission’s work was completed. From an administrative point of view this more interventionist attitude led to an increase in the number of petitions and in the time spent investigating them.⁵⁰

As can be seen from Table 8, with the creation of Samarkand Province after 1886 the number of complaints continued to grow, reaching a peak in the period immediately preceding Pahlen’s report. The amount of time expended in dealing with complaints about the native administration by the Samarkand Chancellery was quite staggering. Out of a total of 2,584 files in the records of the 1st (general) division of the first table in the Samarkand Chancellery (by far the largest) between 1884 and 1908, no fewer than 1,342 (52 per cent) concern complaints and petitions relating to corruption, extortion, incorrect decisions, and violence on the part of Government servants, overwhelmingly those from the much more numerous native administration.⁵² On average, this meant they were dealing with 56 sets of petitions a year, or roughly five a month, although as several petitions were normally received on the same subject the paperwork

was considerably more than this. Sometimes these files remained open for several years, as investigations were handicapped by the need to use interpreters to gather evidence. One case which began in 1897, when an Aksakal accused his Volost Upravitel of embezzling taxes and part of his pay, was closed only in 1908 when it was discovered that both parties had died two years previously.\(^{53}\)

Shortly after the new provincial administration was established, in April 1887, a petition was submitted by seven villagers from the Tyuya-Tatar Volost complaining that their Volost Upravitel had somehow imposed a man called Muratov on them as their Aksakal; he had previously held the post in the late 1870s and been found guilty of embezzling 2,600 roubles. They asked for him to be replaced with a worthier candidate, although there was no indication that this had been granted by the Russian authorities.\(^{54}\) In the same month a petition came asking for the result of another election to Aksakal to be overturned:

From Kuya-Bash 31 people, from the village of Chorkui-by 25 people, from the village of Aksar 20 people and from the village of Lyuchi 21 people. All the people are dissatisfied with the appointment of Aksakal Tash-Muhamed Chovak. He is a very evil man, guilty of many crimes during the tenure of Volost Upravitel Azii-Kul Bek, and also of misuse of water.\(^{55}\)

The Samarkand District Commandant dismissed this appeal out of hand, as he stated that he could find no evidence of electoral malpractice. A month later the same complaint was being made by the inhabitants of Kash-Kurgan, Kizil Chahit, and Mir-Kishlak, in the Ak-Tepe Volost, claiming that their Upravitel had foisted an unwanted Aksakal, Yuldash, on them, in defiance of the electors’ wishes. To this the Katta-Kurgan District Commandant characteristically replied that

This petition had already been presented to me earlier when I was on a tour of the Ak-Tepe Volost for the elections to Volost Upravitel. I was sent for by the inhabitants of the Aksakalstvo of Turk, which is composed of the three villages mentioned above, when the majority of votes in the village council were given to Yuldash Mullah Farshanov, whom I confirmed in this position. This petition comes from the minority group who voted for the other candidate at the election to Aksakal, and as it is illegal I leave it without issue.\(^{56}\)

Between April and June 1887 alone, 12 petitions were submitted complaining of the misconduct of elections, many accusing the Volost

Native Administration in Samarkand

Upravitel of bribing the electors or simply changing the date of the poll without telling anybody but their political allies (the Djizak District Commandant replied to this assertion that 25 of the 26 electors had been present, the 26th being the petitioner).\(^5\) Such complaints were tediously commonplace: another typical example (which in this instance was taken seriously by the Russians) was that of Hassanbek Damiyarbek, Volost Upravitel of Shahab, who was supposed to have arranged the election to Aksakal of a man to whom he was in debt.\(^6\) In autumn 1894 Mullah Baqi Muhammad Yuldashbaev, the Upravitel of the Usman-Karatalskaya Volost, accepted a 150 tenga bribe from Ishbai Beknazarov, in return for recording his 150 tanaps of land sown with wheat as only 20 tanaps, for tax purposes. The assessment for the remaining 130 tanaps was then spread among the remaining inhabitants of the village.\(^7\)

Finally, further problems were caused by the fact that, although at 10 per cent of the value of the crop the levels of tax demanded were low (at least compared with India), the Russians were very inflexible about the date on which revenue was to be collected. This meant that when a harvest failed or was late, recourse had to be made to the moneylender, who in many cases became a de facto tax collector, outside official control. In 1899 N. L. Mordvinov estimated that the peasants of Turkestan were paying up to 70 per cent of their income to moneylenders, who had advanced money on interest to pay the revenue when it fell due.\(^8\)

By 1908 the annual salary of a Volost Upravitel stood at just 500 roubles (less than it had been thirty years earlier), together with an additional 300–400 roubles for expenses and to pay for a clerk, whilst an Aksakal received 200 roubles a year. In practice, most clerks in the settled Volosts received no more than 50–100 roubles, barely enough to live on, which made it impossible to find men literate in Russian for this post. The Volost Upravitel was also supposed to employ Djigits, horsemen who acted as both muscle and messengers when the Upravitel made his tax-collecting rounds. They were supposed to receive 100–50 roubles, but in practice seldom got more than 40–60, sometimes still less. The inevitable result was that Djigits and clerks alike were tempted

---

to eke out their meagre salaries through corruption. Volost Upraviteli were also entrusted with distributing the State salaries of Aksakals, which was another invitation to malpractice. Writing in 1897, the Djizak District Commandant complained of one of his subordinates:

On inspection of the paperwork currently in the hands of the Karatash Volost Upravitel I found a great many of my demands which had not been carried out, as well as instructions addressed to other Volost Upraviteli which for some reason he had delayed. I have received a few petitions against him from the local people about his failure to carry out the judgments of the popular courts. Apart from all this it turned out that the Karatash Volost Upravitel instead of distributing the salaries of the village elders gave written undertakings to pay the money at a date, forcing the creditors to place their seals on the records, attesting to the receipt of the money.

This corruption and criminality came in varying degrees of seriousness. Between 1892 and 1903 a total of 167 fines of 5–10 roubles were imposed on members of the native administration in Katta-Kurgan District for various minor offences, increasing from just two in 1895 to 37 in 1902. Trivial accusations included those levelled in 1895 against the Aksakal of the Sufi district of Katta-Kurgan, Mullah Irgash Sagbulgaev, who it was claimed spent all his time sitting in the chaikhana playing chess and strumming his balalaika. Other vices included consorting with prostitutes, drunkenness, wrongful arrests, failing to collect the taxes, and generally neglecting his official duties. The petitioner was the senior Aksakal of Katta-Kurgan, but none the less the Russians left the matter without issue, assuming (probably rightly) that it was part of some local feud.

Sometimes more serious charges were preferred. In June 1888 the senior Aksakal of Khujand, Baba Rahim Atabaev, was accused of masterminding the murder of Mullah Urunbai Faizilbaev by a gang of ruffians who had attacked his house. The petitioners alleged that Faizilbaev had earlier refused to give his beautiful daughter in marriage to the Aksakal, who had then kidnapped her four days before the murder took place. Another accusation involving violence dates from 1897, although this appears to have been a scuffle between the Aksakal and an unwilling taxpayer. Rahmanberdy Maulanbaev claimed that Mullah Kanbar, the elder of the village of Ilanchinsk in the Naukinskaya Volost,

\[63\] TsGARUz F.22 Op.1 D.533.  
\[64\] TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.501, 1d–1e.  
had beaten his son, Artykbai, and his wife, and taken clothing to the value of 50 roubles plus 450 tengas in cash from his house while he was out. The Aksakal’s own version of events read somewhat differently, as he claimed that he had been attacked by Artykbai with a whip and himself robbed of 272 roubles. Finally, in 1903 the Djulskii Volost Upravitel was found guilty of selling a 15-year-old Bukharan boy called Usatbaev for the purpose of buggery.

**LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES**

The principal complication in the management of native officials was that all correspondence had to be conducted in the native languages, necessitating the use of translators. As early as 1869 the Commandant of Katta-Kurgan was remarking on the need for more translators in his first report to Tashkent, as he frequently had to take one with him as an interpreter when he toured his district, leaving his Chancellery with nobody to decipher Turkic documents. This was still the case thirty years later, when in 1898 the Military Governor of Samarkand Province issued a circular advocating the appointment of men fluent in Russian as assistants to the Volost Upravitel, but the reply he received from the Djizak District Commandant stated categorically that no suitable candidates were available.

The compulsory knowledge of the Russian language, both written and spoken, by members of the Native administration is undoubtedly essential, as it could have a great impact on the adoption by the natives of the principles of Russian administration, and would promote the spread of civilisation, because it would require the natives to study in the Russian-native schools, something they do not fully realise at present. Unfortunately though this cannot happen so quickly, because Russophone natives, even those suitable only for the post of Volost Upravitel are extremely few. Those who currently work for Russians as servants are entirely unsuitable, as the moral qualities of those in that sort of work are not high.

Pahlen’s conclusions on the subject were almost identical:

As no educational qualifications whatsoever are required from native officials, the majority of public offices are occupied by individuals who are not only

---

illiterate in Russian, but also in their native language, because of which these lesser agents of government power are left in a wholly undesirable dependence on the Volost clerks, whose quality also leaves a lot to be desired.\textsuperscript{70}

Rectifying this position was considered a matter of urgency, not just to improve efficiency but because of the evil reputation enjoyed by professional translators in Turkestan, who were deeply distrusted by the Russians. The most notorious case to emerge in Samarkand, referred to in the previous chapter, was that of Imam Galiya Utkulbaev, the chief interpreter in the Samarkand Chancellery who was one of those exposed by the Pahlen report. He and College Counsellor Virsky were found to have been accepting bribes in profusion from the native officials of the Khoja-Ahrar and Kabut Volosts. Utkulbaev’s record of service revealed that he was a Kirghiz (i.e. a Kazakh) from Perovsk District in Syr-Darya Province, and a hereditary ‘honoured citizen’ by virtue of his father’s service to the State. Born in 1862, he had joined the administration in 1896 as a translator in the Djizak Chancellery, although he had no formal education.\textsuperscript{71} Unfortunately for Utkulbaev and Virsky, one of the Volost Upraviteli under their protection chose to boast publicly of the influence over the provincial administration which his bribes had bought him:

At the beginning of August the Kabut Volost Upravitel Mirza Nazarkul Salimbaev, resident in the village of Djambai, in the Kabut Volost, about whom the higher administration has received a whole raft of complaints about various crimes committed by him, called together all the village headmen and many ‘honoured citizens’ of his Volost, and persuaded them to make peace with him and withdraw their petitions. Desiring to convince them of the uselessness of the petitions they had submitted, and about which enquiries were progressing, he amongst other things declared publicly that he, Mirza Nazarkul Salimbaev, had given me 15,000 tengas to be handed over as a bribe to officials of the Oblast Administration, which would ensure that all the petitions against him would be left without issue.\textsuperscript{72}

Although Mirza Nazarkul denied this, nine witnesses (all village elders from the Kabut Volost) came forward to confirm the story. The chinovnik in question turned out to be Virsky, and he, the chief interpreter, and the Volost Upravitel were all tried and found guilty. Although this was only the most prominent case to come to light, corruption clearly did not limit itself to the native administration, which was quite capable of suborning Russian officials as well.

\textsuperscript{70} Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 9, 104. \textsuperscript{71} TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.2,583, 3–5ob, 11ob. \textsuperscript{72} TsGARUz F.20 Op.1 D.1,009, 34; see previous chapter.
CALLS FOR REFORM

In March 1898 the District Commandants of Samarkand Province held a conference at which they exchanged ideas on how to improve administration and reduce corruption. The Djizak District Commandant had particularly harsh words to say about the Volost Upraviteli, and made several suggestions to render them more efficient and honest. Above all, he recommended that they be stripped of their minor judicial powers, as they lacked an understanding even of the basic laws of the Empire, let alone the various circulars sent out by the Governor-General’s Chancellery, and had been guilty of many gross errors of justice. He thought that instead Russian officials, judicial counterparts to the Pristavy, should take over these responsibilities.\(^{73}\) As usual, this suggestion came to nothing through lack of funds and trained personnel. A survey of the native administration carried out in one of the Volosts of Ferghana Province had similarly examined “The degree of knowledge of the Volost Upraviteli and Selskie Starshiny of the rights and responsibilities attached to their positions; not only did the complete ignorance of these officials of their rights and duties become clear, but also the lack of the prescribed books demanded by the law.”\(^{74}\)

The Katta-Kurgan District Commandant wanted to know if there was any possibility that literacy be made compulsory for Volost Upraviteli, as currently they were far too dependent on their Mirzas. He also criticized the electoral system in scathing terms:

In view of the numerous instances, constituted from inquests into bribery in the elections to Volost Upravitel in all Uyezds and Oblasts of the region, and the absolute and evident conviction of the District Commandants, that these elections never proceed without bribery, it would follow that the Government should select for appointment to Volost Upravitel men known to the District Commandant and capable of being conduits for Russian civic values in the... mass of the Native population... Not only is the electoral principle far from ideal, but bitter experience has convinced everyone that the electoral principle, at least for Volost Upravitel, was extremely premature and up until now has brought a mass of every kind of insufficiency and no kind of usefulness. The lack of success in collecting revenue, the scandalous distribution of the tax burden (more from the poor, and less from the rich); complete indifference, and sometimes delinquency in matters relating to the apprehension of brigands and

\(^{73}\) TsGARUz F.21 Op.1 D.430, 15ob.  \(^{74}\) TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.1,121, 2.
in general in criminal matters to the exposure of all criminals. In general these people carry out no consciously useful activity, thanks solely to the suborning of those who become Volost Upraviteli. Through whom then are we to influence the people, in order to awake them from their Asiatic slumber?75

The Andijan uprising, which took place less than two months after this harsh assessment was written, provoked still further scrutiny of a native administration which had failed to provide any warning of trouble. One of the first considered reactions in the pages of Turkestanskiya Vedomosti came from Sattar Khan ‘Abd ul-Ghafarov, a former Qazi of Chimkent who was one of the first Turkestanis to learn Russian, and was a close associate of N. P. Ostroumov.76 After a rather toadyng introduction on the miseries of life before the conquest and the glorious benefits of Russian rule, he sketched a familiar picture of electoral corruption and systematic bribery among a body of officials who, however well intentioned (and frequently they were not), found themselves trapped between the incompatible demands of the Russian administration and their wealthy ‘constituents’: this assessment was all the more striking in that it came from a man who had once served as part of the ‘Living Wall’ himself.77 An article by N. L. Mordvinov in Russkii Vestnik in 1899 systematically slammed the entire native administration and called for an end to tinkering: nothing would solve the problems of corruption other than the complete abolition of the electoral system, which had given the natives of Turkestan political rights for which they were entirely unprepared:

It is evident that in place of stern and thorough governmental tutelage we have organised a wide democratic foundation: local self-government, mob law and voluntary taxation. The population has been called upon to play a substantial role in the arrangement of their lives on an entirely new footing; from a regime of strong, theocratic, paternal government people from all walks of life have suddenly been invited to control for themselves all aspects of their internal affairs.78

He was not the only one to yearn for a more paternalistic model, closer to some imagined idea of the administration of the Khanates. N. S. Lykoshin, in a piece ostensibly concerned with the new land

77 Abdu Sattar-Khan Kazii, ‘Zamertki o Narodnom Samoupravlenii i Ishanakh v Turkestane’, TV, No. 54, 19th July 1898.
settlement in the Chapkulukskaya Volost published in the Samarkand Province statistical yearbook, also took the opportunity to condemn the Volost Upravitel as inherently ignorant and corrupt, presenting a fawning, loyal face to his Russian superiors whilst at the same time resenting any official duties which might interfere with his agricultural and stock-raising interests. To those below him, though, he would claim to have the ear of his local Pristav, and to be able to make or break them by recourse to Russian power.⁷⁹ In his much-quoted article written for the tenth anniversary of the Andijan uprising he also alleged that most Volost Upraviteli were ‘fanatics’ at heart and profoundly disloyal, with some being known to have placed their seals on the Dukchi Ishan’s proclamation calling for a ghazavat.⁸⁰ It is quite clear that, as far he and most officials were concerned, the experiment in local self-government had been an abject failure. Corruption ate into the revenue receipts and alienated the population, whilst the language barrier and lack of local knowledge by and large prevented Russian officials from doing anything very effective about it. Petitions, whether as genuine grievance or as an attempt to drag the Russians into local power struggles, constituted an immense burden on the Chancellery and clogged its workings, whilst investigations seldom produced concrete results. Finally, the use of elected native officials had helped both to preserve and enrich village and urban elites and cut off the population at large from the benefits of Russian civilization. What had begun as a means both of undermining the old landed and clerical elites and of saving money had developed into a system which, as it stood, was not only grossly inefficient but would prevent Turkestan from ever becoming an integral part of the Empire, as it had helped to preserve cultural distance and put paid to all ideas of sblizhenie. Nalivkin spoke for most of Russian officialdom when he wrote:

In this way, following our arrival in the region, between us, or, more accurately between our local ruling class and the people there grew up a wall, tightly enclosing us and cutting us off from the people, and made up of the native administration, petty bourgeois and translators. The people communicated with us through this wall, impenetrable to them, and we saw it with our eyes, heard it with our ears and, to our shame, merely pondered over the crafty and rapacious mind of this living wall, allowing it gradually to grow thicker by insensible degrees.⁸¹

⁷⁹ N. S. Lykoshin, ‘Chapkullukskaya Volost ’, SKSO Vyp.VIII (Samarkand, 1905), 8–10.
⁸⁰ Lykoshin, ‘K desyatiletiyu andizhanskoj rezni’.
⁸¹ Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, 71.
LOCAL INFLUENCE IN INDIA

To most officials, the native mind is a sealed book. They are allowed to see exactly as much as the people by whom they are surrounded, and by whom their every action is closely watched, think fit to let them see, and no more. A glass is held before their eyes coloured with the hues which it suits the showman to represent; nor is it ever for one moment withdrawn, from the day they enter the country till the day they leave it.⁸²

This is, on the face of it, a gloomy chronicle of incompetence and corruption, even making allowance for the hyperbole of officials seeking to blame the failure of Russian administration in Turkestan on their native subordinates. However, was this incompetence and corruption peculiarly Russian? Or was it perhaps inherent in any under-staffed colonial administration whose members, by and large, were unfamiliar with the society they were supposed to be ruling over and spoke its languages badly, if at all? Comparison with British India suggests that the latter may be closer to the truth. There were certain elements of the native administration in Turkestan which seem quite distinctive, most notably the electoral system. Whilst village headmen in India were sometimes elected in a crude form of democracy, heavily influenced by property and caste considerations, the Tahsildars—district chiefs who were the equivalent of Volost Upraviteli—were not. In Turkestan most of the clerical staff were Russians or Tatars, not Sarts, in marked distinction to India, where shortage of European manpower meant that these posts were always occupied by natives. There are enough similarities, however, to render some interesting comparisons possible. The best-known case-study of local administration in India is Robert Frykenberg’s Guntur District, where a series of feeble and poorly prepared Collectors were manipulated by a group of powerful Desastha Brahmins who worked in the chancellery. They succeeded in pocketing most of the revenue themselves over an eight-year period from 1837 to 1845, having convinced their nominal superiors that there was a severe famine in the region.⁸³ The activities of these Huzur Serishtadars, or head clerks, are reminiscent of College Counsellor Virsky, who occupied the equivalent post in the Samarkand Chancellery. So far as comparisons

---

with the abuses of power by Volost Upraviteli are concerned, in the Kohat district of Punjab Muzaffar Khan, the Tahsildar of Hangu, used his official position to such good effect that he entirely eclipsed his nephew, the nominal Khan of the lower Miranzai, and became so powerful in his district (where he also acted as magistrate) that the British authorities dared not remove him for fear of alienating his entire clan. Instead, they decided to recognize the status quo by granting him an additional jaghir and the title of Khan Bahadur.\(^4\)

Certainly Russian officials seem to have exaggerated the disloyalty of the native administration, most of whose members relied heavily on Russian prestige and authority to uphold their own status. The most severe test of this came during the Central Asian uprising of 1916, when native officials were often the first victims of violence as the most immediate representatives of the State; the first serious outbreak came in Djizak in July of that year. Led, so the Russians believed, by a local Ishan, a crowd descended on the office of the Aksakal of the native town of Djizak, demanding that he destroy the list of names of those conscripted into labour battalions. He refused to do this, and was immediately killed. When the news of the riot reached them, the District Commandant and Pristav drove to the native town in a phaeton, escorted only by a translator and two Djigits. After a brief altercation with the crowd, they were killed as well. The revolt then spread to the neighbouring Bogdan Volost, where the Pristav only narrowly escaped with his life; several Russian officials and settlers were killed and a number of women abducted. Here the revolt was led by ‘Abd ur-Rahman Djevachi, the wealthiest man in the district, who had previously twice served as Volost Upravitel, although he was not in office at the time.\(^5\)

Thus here we have two members of Nalivkin’s ‘Living Wall’, who on being confronted with a violent uprising against Russian rule responded entirely differently. The Djizak town Aksakal paid for his loyalty with his life, whilst the former Volost Upravitel in Bogdan placed himself at the head of the revolt. When the uprising later spread to nomadic areas similar divisions would be seen, with Aksakals and Volost Upraviteli in some areas becoming the first victims of the revolt as the people took revenge on particularly corrupt officials, whilst in other cases they were suspected of helping to organize the violence against settlers. In part this


\(^5\) ‘Dzhizakskoe Vosstanie v 1916g.’, KA 5: 60 (1933), 60–2.
was no doubt a matter of self-preservation, but the Djizak case does give us some clues as to other factors which might have helped to determine this. Whilst no details about the antecedents of the unfortunate town Aksakal are available, ‘Abd ur-Rahman Djevachi was the son of the last Bukharan Bek or Governor of the Chahar-Darya Vilayat before the conquest. He was a Manghit, from the same Uzbek tribe as the ruling dynasty in Bukhara, and through his wealth, land, connections, and ancestry clearly could draw on a great fund of local influence and legitimacy which were not dependent on his position as a Volost Upravitel. Owing less to the colonial regime, he felt more confident about attacking it.86

The manner in which appointments in the native administration became prizes in local politics between factions is intriguing. Whilst the Russians referred extensively to ‘parties’ and ‘factions’ in the villages, which put up candidates and distributed bribes to ensure their election, the precise nature of these groups remains unclear.87 Colonial officials referred to it despairingly as a form of bullying and corruption, but it seems possible that for some people at least, belonging to the solidarity groups generated by the electoral system may have carried certain advantages: it may be that we see here an extension of the much earlier himayat system examined by Jürgen Paul. This was both a social and religious network and system of economic and political patronage which protected its members from the exactions of the State. The example studied by Paul is that of Khoja Ahrar, the powerful Shaikh of the Naqshbandi brotherhood who combined religious influence with landownership and trade. He used his position to protect his tenants and the merchants of Tashkent from excessive taxation in the turbulent period of the sixteenth century following the Timurid collapse, and also founded a madrasah in Samarkand, where he was buried to the south of the city (a Volost in the province was named after him).88 The networks controlled by Volost Upraviteli may have borne some resemblance to this, as they too could act as intermediaries between the population and the State, helping their followers to escape taxation in return for payments

86 ‘Dzhizakskoe Vosstanie v 1916g.’, KA 5: 60 (1933), 74–5.
87 For an interesting point of comparison, see David Hardiman, ‘The Indian “Faction”: A Political Theory Examined’, Subaltern Studies I, where he argues (221) that ‘much of the political conflict described as “factional” at both district and village level is in fact conflict within an oligarchy’.
made to them. It is unlikely that these himayats based on office-holding were as extensive as that of Khoja Ahrar and, for all Russian fears about ‘Muridism’, the religious element is lacking. Perhaps more relevant, and certainly closer in terms of time, is Olivier Roy’s analysis of modern solidarity groups or ‘açabiyya’ in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. He argues strongly that these must be seen not as ‘traditional’ tribal or religious identities, but as ‘a recomposition of allegiances in a political and territorial space definitively re-modelled by the action of the state’.\(^8^9\) The factions and solidarity groups which grew up around local government elections in Tsarist Turkestan would certainly seem to fall into this pattern. It seems probable that the factionalism and rural feuding, which the Russians believed was provoked by the electoral system, actually had earlier roots. There had always been prizes to struggle for in Turkestan society, positions of power which would enable the ambitious or well-connected to bestow patronage on followers and settle scores with their enemies. The British, who in India made scant use of elections in rural administration, nevertheless found that they had less control over local appointments than they would have liked, as ultimately they always had to rely on somebody’s recommendation—and that sucked them into the politics of local patronage. When elections were introduced in India on a wider scale, firstly in municipalities and latterly at a provincial level after the 1909 Morley–Minto reforms, similar patterns would emerge. Bayly describes how for twenty years after the introduction of elected municipal government in Allahabad in 1883, the city continued to be run by the same group of local notables, or ‘urban raises’, who had controlled it before. Not until the early years of the twentieth century did a new class of educated professional men begin to oust this traditional elite of merchants and bankers, and even then the bloc votes the latter controlled by virtue of their positions as landlords and creditors continued to be of considerable importance.\(^9^0\)

The lawyers and other educated natives who came to dominate Indian politics and in the long run broke the power of the traditional elites were almost unknown in Turkestan. The Russians dispossessed the big landowners, and undermined the old clerical elites, but they were


unable to prevent their native administration being taken over by those who held power at the village level. Further research in the vernacular languages of Turkestan is needed to show precisely what role was played by native officials in local politics. What should be clear from the evidence presented in this chapter is that Russian power and authority was being manipulated and used for alternative purposes, whether simple embezzlement or the creation of local patronage networks, by those the Tsarist State employed at the local level. The failure was not so much a lack of coercive force, personnel, or money, as simply one of knowledge. This was an equally serious handicap to the Russians in their attempts control the system of irrigation in Turkestan.
Irrigation

... canals and the policing of canals; the sins of villagers who stole more water than they had paid for, and the grosser sin of native constables who connived at the thefts... ¹

It is a commonplace of Central Asian history that, fundamentally, everything depends upon water, more specifically artificial irrigation and who controls it. The earliest canals in western Turkestan were constructed as long ago as the fifth millennium BC on the northern side of the Köpet Dagh, and there was a well-developed network of canals leading from the Zarafshan around Samarkand by c.500 BC.² The rise and fall of cities in Khorezm and the Zarafshan Valley can be traced in the outlines of networks of canals and the date of their destruction or abandonment. Samarkand shifted its site after its destruction by the Mongols in order to have access to the surviving canals from the Zarafshan, and today lies to the south of the old mound of Afrosiab.³ The so-called ‘Hydraulic Hypothesis’ suggested by some anthropologists and historians is that in an arid region, where water is needed in bulk, it can only be channelled and kept under control using a mass labour force, rendering central organization and a strong State, or ‘Oriental Despotism’, that much more likely.⁴ There is little evidence that the State was consistently or especially strong in pre-conquest Central Asia except in short-lived bursts when a new dynasty took over. However, in an area where, unlike most of India, rainfall was scarce and irregular, in

¹ Rudyard Kipling, ‘William the Conqueror’, The Day’s Work (London, 1899), 188.
³ V. V. Bartol’d, ‘K Istorii Orosheniya Turkestana’, Raboty po Istoriicheskoi Geografii (Moscow, 2002), 188–91.
those States which were successful controlling access to water was the key to political power, and sometimes the construction of irrigation systems was the very foundation of the State. This had been the case in Kokand where, during the second half of the eighteenth century, the Khans had greatly extended the network of canals in the Ferghana Valley to provide a prosperous agricultural base from which to challenge Bukhara. The last of these great canals, the Ulugh-nahar, was constructed after the Khanate had already become a Russian protectorate in 1868–71, and was remembered in a popular lament for the last Kokand Khan, Khudoyar, as one of his greatest achievements. Elsewhere, whilst the dense network of small canals (aryks) that fed individual villages and towns was constructed and managed locally, the large feeder canals (nahar) that supplied these required far greater State control for their construction and upkeep, as levies of manpower had to be raised over a wide area. Turkestan’s towns, with the exception of Khujand, were rarely constructed directly on the banks of the rivers that sustained them because of the risk of flooding, further increasing the importance of these feeder canals. Thus in Turkestan the State had always played a prominent role in water distribution, and the ability of a regime to exercise control over water was a crucial measure of its power and effectiveness.

When, during the Russian siege of the town in 1868, General von Kaufman cut the flow of water along the canals that fed Samarkand from the Zarafshan, he was supposedly emulating the tactics of the Arab commander Asad ibn ‘Abdullah, who had compelled Marakanda to submit in the same way. As its name implies, the slice of territory that made up the Zarafshan Okrug was annexed principally because it gave Russia complete control of the headwaters of the River Zarafshan, and thus a stranglehold on Bukhara’s irrigation supply. Although unreliable

---


6 A Turkic word, meaning a small irrigation canal. Larger canals were normally known as nahar from the Arabic for river, but the Russians applied aryk indiscriminately to all artificial channels.


8 Edgar Knobloch, Beyond the Oxus (London, 1972), 108; according to Schuyler, General Cherniaev did the same three years earlier, when he seized the headworks of the canal that supplied Tashkent from the River Chirchik, placing the town at his mercy: Schuyler, Turkistan, Vol. I, 113.
in so many respects, the fact that the dubious appendix to the *Majma’ al-argam* devotes so much attention to the question of the division of the waters of the Zarafshan between Samarkand, Miankal (the region around Kermineh), and Bukhara is suggestive of the importance this had for the Bukharan regime.⁹ In the early 1820s the semi-nomadic Kitai-Kipchaks, a mixed Uzbek and Uighur tribe inhabiting the region around Katta-Kurgan upstream from Bukhara on the Kara-Darya branch of the Zarafshan, were visited with four punitive expeditions in successive years

⁹ A. A. Semenov (trans.), ‘Bukharskii traktat o chinakh i zvaniyakh i ob obyazannostyakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoi Bukhare’, *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, Vol. 5 (Moscow–Leningrad, 1948), 146–8; Bregel in *The Administration of Bukhara*, 12–18, points out that the official charged with overseeing irrigation cannot possibly have been the *Ataliq*, described in numerous other sources as having an entirely different, military role.
by the then Bukharan ruler, Amir Haidar, in the course which their crops were destroyed each time. This, according to William Moorcroft,¹⁰ was because ‘they had been rebellious and previously had so far drained both Rivers of their contents to employ the water on their own cultivated lands that the inhabitants of Bukhara had been straitened of the supply necessary for domestic purposes and had suffered severely through this want’.¹¹

Administering irrigation in Central Asia was thus as much, or even more, about political coercion and social control as it was about boosting harvest yields, producing more cash crops, and increasing revenue. Despite the huge dependence on artificial irrigation in Turkestan, the Tsarist regime’s involvement in extending it was fairly minimal. The only major projects undertaken were the rebuilding of Bairam Ali’s dam on the Murghab near Merv, and the irrigation of the ‘Hungry Steppe’ between Tashkent and Samarkand, what in India would have been called the doab between the Zarafshan and Syr Darya rivers. The latter was a pet project of Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich (1850–1918),¹²

¹⁰ Moorcroft (1767–1825) was a highly eccentric veterinary surgeon on the East India Company’s Bengal Establishment; his real passion was horses, and it was in order to bring back Turcoman breeding stock for the Company’s stud at Pusa, of which he was the head, that he set off for Central Asia for the second time in 1819, never to return. His papers and those of his companion George Trebeck were poorly edited and published by Horace Hayman Wilson as Travels in the Himalayan Provinces; of Hindustan and the Punjab, in Ladakh and Kashmir, in Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz and Bukhara, from 1819 to 1825 (London, 1841), 2 vols. The originals in the India Office Library run to 58 vols., only one of which (MSS Eur D.254) deals with Moorcroft’s time in Bukhara; for complicated reasons it was not available to Wilson for his edition, which ends with Moorcroft’s arrival in Bukhara. This may be the reason for Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi’s unwarranted assertion that Moorcroft never made the journey, something he could easily have verified by checking the original journals rather than relying on Wilson’s incomplete and posthumous edition. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, ‘Orientalism’s Genesis Amnesia’, Refashioning Iran (London, 2001), 31–2. See ‘Papers of the Late William Moorcroft’, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1 (1831), 233–47; Elizabeth Baigent, ‘Moorcroft, William (bap. 1767, d. 1825)’, DNB; G. Alder, Beyond Bokhara (London, 1984). The latter remarks that it always seems to have been poor Moorcroft’s fate to be overlooked and slighted.

¹¹ OIOC MSS Eur D.254 (Moorcroft Papers), Bukhara and return from Bukhara, 240; Ivanov suggests that the initial reason for Emir Haidar’s punitive expeditions (which triggered a 4-year revolt) was the refusal of the Kitai-Kipchaks to fulfil their obligation to supply 500 men for the garrison of Merv. He also acknowledges that water shortages occasioned by a shift from pastoralism to crops also played an important part in triggering the revolt: Ivanov, Vostanie Kitai-Kipchakov, 15—17, 56—7. See Holzwarth, ‘The Uzbek State’, 335—41, for an account of earlier bad blood between this tribe and the Manghits.

¹² The Grand Duke was exiled to Central Asia in the early 1880s after a series of misdemeanours, sexual and otherwise, which were the despair of his parents and his
but took many years to reach completion. Given that this is the case, it is curious that historians of modern Turkestan have generally concentrated on the canals built by the Russians in Central Asia, which, before 1917, were insignificant in extent, and assumed that the primary motivation for such construction was the desire to expand the acreage under cotton.¹³ Although cotton cultivation increased dramatically in the years before 1917, most of it was grown on small native plots of two to four desyatinas fed by existing canals, whilst the small acreage fed by new Tsarist projects was given over almost exclusively to Russian colonization.¹⁴ Here, as elsewhere, we see a tendency to ape the Soviet historical agenda in creating a teleological progression of ‘development’ projects that carries on smoothly past 1917, and a reluctance to study irrigation in Tsarist Turkestan as anything more than a prelude to the massive canal construction of the Soviet period. This tendency is also partly attributable to the fact that for many years the most reliable source for the history of irrigation in Turkestan was Aziatskaya Rossiya, a monumental, three-volume work of administrative propaganda produced by the Resettlement Department in 1914, which concentrates disproportionately on Russian engineering projects. Control of the water supply is something of even greater importance in a colonial context, yet virtually nothing has been written about how the Russians managed the pre-existing network of canals upon which agriculture depended in Turkestan.¹⁵ How were their engineers trained? What proportion of the irrigation officials was Russian? How were the crucial decisions taken as to which village or town would receive water, when, and how much?

Both Imperial powers faced a dilemma when it came to administering these pre-existing systems of canals. Whilst a high degree of control over

uncle, Alexander II. In 1874 he was found to have stolen jewellery and other items from his mother’s dressing-table and that of the Empress, in order to give them to his American mistress. He compounded his crime by falsely accusing his aide-de-camp of the thefts. In 1878 he was in hot water again, having married the daughter of the Orenburg Police Chief, Dreier, under a false name. The marriage was annulled and he was packed off to Turkestan. Dnevnik D. A. Milyutina, Vol. I (1873–5), 152–3; Vol. III (1878–80), 67; See M. Yunuskhodzhaeva, Iz Istorii Zemlevladeniya v Dorevolyutsionnom Turkestane (Na Materialakh Khozyaistva Knyazy N.K. Romanova) (Tashkent, 1970).

¹⁵ The major exception to this is Jonathan Thurman’s Ph.D. thesis ‘Modes of Organisation in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to Present’ (University of Indiana, Bloomington Ph.D. thesis), 1999.
water use was desirable for both fiscal and political reasons, in practice European officials found it extremely difficult to acquire the detailed knowledge needed to adjudicate disputes between villages or ensure that water was fairly distributed between the many claimants. Both Russia and Britain as a result devolved a great deal of authority to local officials in water management, continuing arrangements and understandings on water use between neighbouring villages and towns that had often been in operation for centuries.

DIVIDING THE ZARAFSHAN

The use of water as a political instrument is most clearly seen in Russian negotiations with Bukhara over the division of the waters of the Zarafshan. Bukhara’s position downstream from Samarkand, where the river’s flow was sluggish, rendered her peculiarly vulnerable to water-based blackmail. Burnes remarked in 1833 that Bukhara is very indifferently supplied with water for the river is about six miles distant and the canal is only once opened in fifteen days; the inhabitants are sometimes deprived of it in summer for months—when we were in Bukhara the canals had been dry for sixty days as the snow had not melted in the highlands of Samarcand, the scanty supply of the river had been wasted before reaching Bukhara.¹⁶

As the quotation from Moorcroft above indicates, the rulers of the Emirate had always reacted ferociously when there was a risk that the supply upstream had been diverted. A violent response was no longer feasible, and was replaced by negotiation. In 1870 an embassy from Bukhara arrived in Samarkand to settle the water question, and was greeted by General Abramov, who forwarded a translation of the Emir’s letter to von Kaufman. Its tone illustrates clearly enough the hopelessly weak position in which the Bukharan Emirate now found itself:

The people of Bukhara stand greatly in need of water. We have concluded an agreement with you, whereby you promised to let the water flow as it did in the past. At the moment they need the spring/month of Saura¹⁷/water; in conformity with the agreement you should let water flow for the whole month, so that the crops of Muslims do not fall victim and they will then offer prayers

¹⁷ The Persian solar month more or less corresponding to April.
for the welfare of the White Tsar. What should I answer, if those who have not received water on time grow agitated and come to me?

Emir Seid Muzaffar¹⁸

The river was low that year and many crops had already failed, but Abramov was obdurate. The embassy then made its way to St Petersburg, where von Kaufman was at the time owing to poor health. The Emir’s emissary, Ahmad Donish, asserts that he was personally responsible for convincing von Kaufman of the sufferings of the Bukharan people, and persuading him that Samarkand required less water than the Emirate.¹⁹ Whatever the precise reason, von Kaufman ordered Abramov to agree to close the canals leading from the Zarafshan in their territory by a half for one month, in accordance with previous custom, which, reluctantly, he did. The Bukharans had requested a further fifteen days, but this Abramov vetoed, saying that they were already receiving, by his calculation, more water than had been the case before the conquest.²⁰ Relations continued to be strained, as the Bukharans sent repeated petitions, each more fulsome than the last, requesting more water, which the Russians felt obliged to accept. As Abramov put it: ‘for at least three years now I have been unable to turn down a single one of these petitions, as I cannot verify whether their demands are justified or not’.²¹ Von Kaufman invited the Bukharans to send over two or three of their most experienced Aryk-Aksakals²² to form a joint commission to settle the issue.²³ After a lengthy delay, which occasioned still more indignant correspondence, the Emir sent fifteen men, who carried out a thorough inspection of the principal canals leading from the Ak-Darya and Kara-Darya branches of the river. Abramov seems to have hoped that they would also provide insights into the distribution of water within the Zarafshan Okrug, but in this he was disappointed. The expressions used by the men were too vague, as they told him that whenever the water was ‘middling’ or ‘low’ native Mirabs²⁴ should be

²² The elder in charge of water distribution.
²³ TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.63, 9-obr; The documentary record of the negotiations between Russia and Bukhara over the waters of the Zarafshan accords closely with the account of Ahmad Donish, Istoriya Mangiskoi Dinastii, 96–7.
²⁴ From the Persian ‘mir-e ab’ or ‘water-controller’. In Russian Turkestan the title given to the Aryk-Aksakal’s subordinate.
consulted as to the best course of action. In annoyance, Abramov wrote: ‘what is meant by “lots of” water or “a little” water or “an average amount” of water? We do not know the real demands made on the water of the Zarafshan by us and by Bukhara.’\(^{25}\) This frustration of Russian officials confronted with a system they did not understand is a hallmark of documents relating to irrigation in Samarkand throughout this period; they were no nearer to discovering what conventions had formerly governed the distribution of water between Samarkand and Bukhara, and along the course of the Upper Zarafshan. Ignorant of what would be a truly equitable division, Abramov found that the periodic closure of canals, especially in the Katta-Kurgan District, was having serious consequences for agriculture. In 1874 he instituted historical enquiries into the earlier arrangements of Bukhara’s water supply, and was informed by Captain Grebenkin, then Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District, that formerly Bukhara had obtained most of its water supply via a large canal from the Syr-Darya, which had been destroyed during one of the Emirate’s periodic tussles with the nomads. Where Grebenkin had obtained his information from is unclear, but Abramov took up this idea with enthusiasm. In a letter to von Kaufman he claimed that it was only eighty years before that substantial numbers of peasants had settled along the Zarafshan (probably a garbled reference to the sedentarization of nomads around Miankan), and that the Bukharans could easily revert to using water from the Syr-Darya or even dig a canal to the Amu. Somebody (possibly von Kaufman himself) gave this last idea short shrift, annotating the letter ‘This is entirely incredible, in that in order for the said canal to have been possible, it would have been necessary to suppose that the lower reaches of the Syr-Darya were a few thousand feet higher than the middle course of the Amu!’\(^{26}\)

Which, needless to say, is not the case. Ultimately Russian control of the sluices meant that they were still able to use water to bully Bukhara, but it was some time before the conventions for distribution were firmly established. Until 1885 when Bukhara became a formal protectorate, the Emir or his Kush-begi wrote directly to the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug if the Bukharan Government felt that the supply was inadequate. After that date, this went through the Russian political agent at Kagan, who in turn passed on the request to the Governor: normally these seem to have been accepted, albeit with some grumbling.\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\) TsGARUz F.1 Op.1 D.63, 34\(ob\).

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 87\(ob\).

\(^{27}\) TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.9,054, 1.
in 1902 that a fixed formula for sharing the waters of the Zarafshan was established. In that year a Commission met in Samarkand with representatives of the Bukharan Government and decided that 225,000 desyatinas of land in Russian Turkestan and 152,000 desyatinas in Bukhara depended on irrigation from the Zarafshan. The Bukharans protested that the true figure for the Emirate was 925,000 tanaps (231,000 desyatinas) but this went unheeded, and the ratio was set at a distinctly ungenerous 2 : 1 in favour of the Russians.²⁸ By this stage there were modern sluices on the river, but given that there does not appear to have been any very accurate means of measuring water-flow, it is debatable how much difference it actually made. What is most striking is not the degree of influence the Russians were able to exercise over Bukhara, but that, given that they held all the cards, it took them so long to press home their advantage. This can only be attributed to the fact that the Russians had no clear idea of what the conventions for water distribution were, and knew that mismanagement of the canal system could potentially have devastating consequences for local agriculture. This ignorance was a diplomatic inconvenience when dealing with the Bukharans, but it also had serious implications for their efforts to impose direct control on the vast canal systems of Russian Turkestan.

**ADMINISTERING WATER**

In 1914, when the Russians were looking back over half a century of their rule in Turkestan, this was the version of their irrigation policy which they chose to put forward:

By law, the water supplied to the population of Turkestan must be used according to local custom. Russian power, confronted in the region with an extensive water-works, the distribution of which had been consecrated for centuries, found it impossible to interfere in this new, largely unknown region, and left all matters of water-use to the local population.²⁹

In fact, the history of irrigation administration in Turkestan in general, and in Samarkand Province in particular, was slightly more chequered

than this depiction of benevolent *laissez-faire* would suggest. Von Kaufman’s initial policy was to apply to irrigation the same principle he had adopted in local Government in Turkestan—to dispose of all the most powerful officials and aristocratic intermediaries and replace them with Russians. An ‘Irrigator’ was appointed to each province from a central department in Tashkent, together with an assistant and a group of ‘conductors’. They were expected to gather detailed information on the number and size of canals, the villages, towns, and fields irrigated, and the customary cycles whereby water was released to each. Below them the pre-existing Bukharan officials, *Aryk-Aksakals* and *Mirabs*, would be retained, and subjected to careful Russian supervision.³⁰ In theory, such control over the details of water distribution by Russian officials would give the Empire real power in rural Turkestan like nothing else, but the system quickly foundered on Russian ignorance of local conditions.

The network they were called upon to manage was very extensive even before Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich began his work in the ‘Hungry Steppe’. In 1874 the Russians calculated that there were $128,818\frac{3}{4}$ *desyatinas* of irrigated land in the Zarafshan *Okrug*, almost all of it dependent on the Zarafshan.³¹ By 1914 there were no fewer than 94 major and 988 minor canals, totalling 1,136 *versts* in length branching off from the River Zarafshan. They irrigated an estimated 1,001,850 *tanaps* (400,700 *desyatinas*) of land:³² part of the increase is attributable to the addition of the Djizak District, which contained approximately 100,000 *desyatinas* of irrigated land, No doubt the Russians had obtained more accurate measurements by 1914 but, nevertheless, this does indicate that the area under irrigation had increased over the previous forty years, partly because of new Russian construction. In all the Irrigation volume of the Pahlen report suggests that Samarkand Province contained 480,000 *desyatinas* of irrigated land, the addition mostly being land in Khujand District which was irrigated from the Syr-Darya.³³ A later volume of the Pahlen report contradicts this figure, claiming that of 1,280,337 *desyatinas* of cultivated land in Samarkand Province, 606,677 *desyatinas* (47 per cent)

were Abi (irrigated), and 673,660 (53 per cent) Bahari (rain-fed). I am not sure which of these figures is accurate, but the proportion of irrigated land was substantial, and the crops produced upon it much higher in yield and value, reflected in the average cost of a desyatina of irrigated land near Samarkand in 1889, which was 608 roubles 55 kopeks as opposed to just 54 roubles 89 kopeks for one without irrigation.³⁴

In 1871 von Kaufman had claimed blithely that in the course of a single summer an engineer would be able to master the intricate system of canals branching off from the Zarafshan, but he was soon disabused.³⁵ The lengthy report, the ‘Irrigation System of the River Zarafshan’, which Abramov produced in 1874, listed all the major tributaries and the points of latitude and longitude where the major canals branched off, with extensive reflections on the ‘watery richness’ of the Zarafshan. What it lacked was any account of how the water was used, divided, and distributed.³⁶ Leonid Nikolaevich Sobolev’s published report of the same year was more detailed, and attempted to measure both the volume of discharge from each of the Zarafshan’s canals and the overall area of land dependent upon them for irrigation, but once again the crucial information governing distribution between neighbouring towns and villages was lacking.³⁷ In June 1873 a Russian engineering ‘Conductor’, 1st class, one Palmovsky, complained that he had been cursed and abused before a group of native workmen by Z. Zhizhemsky (the junior assistant to the Samarkand District Commandant) whilst he was working in the Samarkand engineering division. Zhizhemsky explained that he had been forced to intervene as Palmovsky had caused the canal which supplied the town to be dammed, diverting all the water to two neighbouring Volosts, and was refusing to let any water through. When his workers, ‘knowing the established customs for water use’,³⁸ broke the dam and restored the supply to Samarkand, he had threatened to lock them all up in the Guard House. Zhizhemsky was furious, and ‘told him, as one of low rank, loudly so that he could hear and understand me ‘You know that the right to water is the same for everyone, that you never divert all the water, nor in the future will you

³⁴ Palen, Prilozheniya k Otchetu, Vol. 19 Chast’ I Otdel I (St Pb., 1911), 102, 141.
³⁶ Ibid., 45–88.
intimidate the native workers by threatening them with the guardroom, you might end up in there yourself.”

There were probably many more such incidents involving poorly educated and plebeian Russian irrigation officials; this one only made it to the official record because Palmovsky, the ‘Conductor’ involved, registered an official complaint at having been treated like a private soldier, and at the language and threats used by Zhizhemsky. The officiating engineer of the Djizak division seemed more concerned with upholding the Conductor’s right to be treated like a gentleman rather than a peasant (and therefore the dignity of his own department), writing that he had been properly dressed according to regulations and should not have been addressed so contumeliously. He made very little attempt to deny the man’s obvious incompetence. Thurman’s work on Ferghana reveals similar problems in irrigation management in the aftermath of the annexation of the Kokand Khanate in 1875–6, as the Russians struggled with their ignorance of local agreements on water, and illegal diversion of supplies was rife.

In practice, a great deal of irrigation administration had to be devolved to native subordinates who understood the system, even though the Russian engineer and his assistants were nominally in charge. In 1883, shortly after the appointment of General Cherniaev as Governor-General in succession to von Kaufman, a correspondent for the Siberian-based journal Vostochnoe Obozrenie remarked approvingly that the General, in accordance with his belief that as much as possible of the old administrative structures of the Khanates should be re-used by the Russians, was planning to reform the system of water management in Russian Turkestan.

He has re-established the positions of Aryk-Aksakal and Kurbash which existed under the native power, for which a real need was felt. The Aryk-Aksakal is an official selected from the knowledgeable natives for the supervision of the watering of the region. All of settled Turkestan is covered by a whole family of canals and aryks, built with wonderful skill. The work associated with them

\[39\] TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.193, 26. \[40\] Ibid., 20. \[41\] Thurman, Modes of Organisation, 81–5. Curiously he writes (82) that ‘The only previous attempt to supervise irrigation within the Empire, in the Caucasus, had been largely unsuccessful’. Of course, Russian officials had already been attempting to manage the Zarafshan’s irrigation systems for seven years when Ferghana was annexed, and indeed in 1877 Abramov left the Zarafshan Okrug to become Military Governor of the new Ferghana Oblast, where he was immediately confronted with exactly the same problems which had dogged his time in Samarkand.
Irrigation

is very great; you will come across canals more than 30 sazbens across, and five to six feet in depth. This entire system of irrigation was built not by us, but by the natives, many hundreds of years ago, and in this respect they are very fortunate.⁴²

In fact, Cherniaev was not so much restoring the previous system as simply recognizing the status quo. The Girs Commission noted Cherniaev’s ‘reforms’, and broadly approved them, remarking that as there were not even any maps of the canals in the Ferghana and Syr-Darya Provinces it was scarcely surprising that Russian control of irrigation was purely nominal.⁴³ The system established by von Kaufman was unworkable and had almost no points of contact with the native population, which for the first fifteen years of Russian rule had managed its affairs much as before.

Observation has shown, that the system of aryks, when it was in the hands of the natives, and of the native Aksakals, was always in excellent order, and the distribution of water was accomplished absolutely correctly . . . Before General Cherniaev in place of Aryk-Aksakals there were a few Russian chinovniki in the region, controlling the irrigation in the Oblasts. As directing the affairs of an entire Oblast single-handedly was impossible, this position became a sinecure, of no use to the population. Finally, apart from personal knowledge and zeal, what is most important is to know the inhabitants and the needs of each for water in order that the water is distributed rationally. It is so important that we must surmise that the native Aksakals somehow continued to exist secretly here and there together with our Oblast Aksakals.⁴⁴

There were in 1888 11 Aryk-Aksakals for the Zarafshan and its canals in Samarkand Province: seven from the Samarkand District: two each from Dzizak and Khujand, and none in Katta-Kurgan, which obtained almost all its water via Samarkand, and where at this stage local distribution was managed by the Volost Upraviteli. In addition to the Aryk-Aksakals themselves 80 Mirabs were elected in the villages to keep an eye on the embankments and channels, and to help organize labour. The Aksakals were quite generously remunerated at between 300 and 600 roubles a year, depending on where they served. By 1910 the number of Aryk-Aksakals in Samarkand Province had risen to 23: 11 in the Samarkand District, six in Katta-Kurgan, two in Dzizak, and four in Khujand, and between them they had 376 Mirabs to assist them.⁴⁵

⁴² VO 1883g. No. 6 in TS, 327 (1883), 1.
⁴⁴ VO 1883g. No. 6, in TS, 327 (1883), 1.
This body of officials had immense power, as the success or failure of crops was largely under their control. Aziatskaya Rossiya concentrates mainly on the few Russian-built canals in Turkestan in the chapter on irrigation. However, among the glossy photographs of headworks, weirs, dams, and the paragraphs of self-congratulation, some space is devoted to the administration and maintenance of the pre-existing irrigation network on which the population depended. In theory, the system was partly democratic, and required minimal Russian intervention:

The supervision of the customs of water-use in Turkestan has long since been undertaken by particular individuals, elected by the population. For the distribution of water along secondary canals amongst the cultivators of a single settlement, the inhabitants of that settlement choose from amongst themselves an aryk or water elder (a Mirab). Some settlements, served by one large canal, choose an aryk elder or Aryk-Aksakal, who directs the duties of the aryk elders (Mirabs). On really large systems where there are a few Aryk-Aksakals, one amongst them is chosen as the senior and directs the general distribution of water.⁴⁶

These elections to the post of Mirab, like those for Selskii Starshina and Aksakal, were modelled on those of the partially self-governing peasant communes of European Russia, and the franchise was limited to the heads of the wealthier households. In practice, this hands-off approach worked far from smoothly. Aziatskaya Rossiya claimed that this was owing partly to the generally low level of cultural development of the population and their unfamiliarity with elective procedures, but principally because controlling access to life-giving water was a source of immense power and a permanent temptation to venal officials:

As water in Turkestan enables the possibility both of agriculture and of life in general in this drought-ridden region, it is obvious that those who are presented with the right to distribute it in the summer months are given enormous vested powers. Apart from this, amongst the uncultured native population of Turkestan, only recently liberated from the despotic rule of the Khans, graft is extremely well developed, inclining the elected officials of the native water administration to irregularities and abuses. Currently Aryk-Aksakals chosen by the Uyezdnye Nachalniki are being given charge of the main water systems of the region, because of the too frequent irregularities of the elected Aryk-Aksakals. All the same there is much in Turkestan’s water administration that remains rickety and obscure. Because of the vagueness of the water rights of the population, founded on ancient deeds and oral commitments, all those who can try to

acquire just a little more and normally only the influential and well-to-do get enough. Even the basic laws of the Sharia on the inadmissibility of trading in water are far from everywhere observed; especially in regions poor in water, the precedence of different areas is determined by buying and selling.⁴⁷

The Aryk-Aksakals were thus the arbiters of what was and was not ‘customary’. In fact, it does not appear that they were ever elected (unlike the Mirabs): certainly the rules on their powers and duties drawn up in 1888 state clearly that they were to be chosen by the Military Governors,⁴⁸ and all that seems to have been done subsequently is to transfer this power of appointment one step lower in the administrative hierarchy to the District Commandants.

WATER CHARGES

The amount the State is able to charge for water gives some clue as to the effectiveness of its control over this resource, and perhaps more generally to its ability to extract revenue. Working out how much peasants in Turkestan actually paid for their water is not easy, and the available figures are from well after the conquest in the 1890s. The official line taken in Aziatskaya Rossiya was that, ‘In accordance with the fundamental laws of the Sharia and the Adat, water, as a gift from God, giving life to the desert, cannot be property; it belongs to each and all who want to use it to irrigate the land.’⁴⁹ This was in accordance with the Russian policy of upholding ‘custom’ in water distribution but, corruption aside, it was hardly true to claim that nobody ‘paid’ the State for water in Turkestan, and in some ways this was simply a means of disguising Russian official impotence.⁵₀ In 1910 Pahlen wrote that

Notwithstanding our lengthy administration of the region, according to the statement of the Head of Irrigation in the Samarkand Oblast, not one of the administrators, not even those close to the population (Uchastkovyje Pristavy, Uyezdnye Nachalniki) know how much the population really pays in irrigation duties.⁵¹

---

⁴⁷ Ibid., 242.
⁵₀ TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1544a, 43. ⁵¹ Palen, Otchet, Vol. 16, 132.
Although the figures for irrigation, cultivation, and crop produced by the Samarkand Land Tax Commission cannot always be relied upon, their thickly forested tables of statistics form the best existing guide to the state of agriculture in the Zarafshan Valley in the 1890s and early 1900s. They show that there was no specific charge for so many hours of water-flow (given that the Russian Empire had not built the system and that there does not seem to have been an Islamic precedent for charging, this was only to be expected). The basic distinction between abi (irrigated) and bahari (rain-fed) cultivation was maintained, with the former paying a (sometimes notional) ten per cent of the value of the crop, and the latter a fixed charge of 50 kopeks per desyatina.\(^{52}\) In the Yany-Kurgan Volost of the Samarkand District in the early 1900s the average crop value of a desyatina of bahari land was eight roubles and 64 kopeks, so there this amounted to a tax of only six per cent. However, although the tax on irrigated land was slightly higher, it was much more productive, with an average crop value of 17 roubles 25 kopeks, and reflecting this abi land normally sold at four times the price of bahari.\(^{53}\) Despite cotton’s thirstiness, in order to encourage cultivation the rate of tax levied upon it was no higher than that on food crops, so the structure of land-tax did not really reflect the added value which irrigation brought to land.\(^{54}\) Instead, the cultivators of Turkestan paid for their water indirectly, through compulsory labour service and numerous charges which were levied on the village community to pay the salaries of Mirabs and Aryk-Aksakals, together with the materials needed for canal maintenance. The taxation figures for four Volosts in Samarkand in 1896, given in Table 9,\(^{55}\) offer some idea of the proportion of the revenue demand that might be said to relate directly to water:

It is notoriously difficult to disentangle canal charges from other forms of taxation, but if the zemskii sbor (which was only levied on irrigated land) is included then on average just over 15 per cent of the tax demand can be directly connected with irrigation. A rough estimate would be 80 kopeks per desyatina of irrigated land (approximately 30 kopeks per acre), in addition to the value of the State’s share of the crop. Pahlen wrote that as no accounts were kept of the amount

---

\(^{52}\) Pahlen, Otchet, Vol. 9, 50, 54.


Table 9. Taxation in four *Volosts* of the Samarkand District, 1896\(^a\) (r = roubles; k = kopeks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volost name</th>
<th>Yany-Kurgan</th>
<th>Kabut</th>
<th>Khalvain</th>
<th>Sergalinsk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land tax</td>
<td>23,361 r 87 k</td>
<td>63,538 r 95 k</td>
<td>48,956 r 60 k</td>
<td>19,746 r 61 k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zemskii Sbor</em>(^b)</td>
<td>3,140 r 51 k</td>
<td>4,510 r 80 k</td>
<td>5,714 r 61 k</td>
<td>2,437 r 79 k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public tax(^c)</td>
<td>2,892 r</td>
<td>3,000 r</td>
<td>2,560 r</td>
<td>2,100 r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To pay for <em>Mirabs</em> and work gangs</td>
<td>200 r</td>
<td>800 r</td>
<td>860 r</td>
<td>400 r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To pay for the <em>Aryk-Aksakals</em></td>
<td>757 r 5 k</td>
<td>801 r 60 k</td>
<td>735 r</td>
<td>532 r 35 k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community tax</td>
<td>295 r 12 k</td>
<td>1,451 r 52 k</td>
<td>400 r 46 k</td>
<td>1,603 r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To pay for works on the major canals (labourers, wood, straw)</td>
<td>1,698 r 60 k</td>
<td>1,347 r 20 k</td>
<td>2,393 r</td>
<td>1,325 r 50 k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,345 r 15 k</td>
<td>75,449 r 97 k</td>
<td>61,619 r 67 k</td>
<td>28,145 r 10 k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) M. Virskii (ed.), *SKSO Vyp.IV* (Samarkand, 1896), 168–9.

\(^b\) This was a tax paid directly to Tashkent, amounting to 17% of the local Government land tax.

\(^c\) This tax was supposed to pay the salaries of the native administration.

...expended in maintenance it was difficult to get an accurate figure, but he estimated that canal maintenance cost the state on average 1 rouble 20 kopeks a year per *desyatina*, which would mean a shortfall of 40 kopeks per *desyatina* to be made up by the Imperial Treasury or from other revenues.\(^56\) It is difficult to judge if this was really the case as the charge which fluctuated most was that for major maintenance work, whilst at least some of the money levied for work gangs would return to the community as wages.

Canal maintenance or *khoshar* was carried out using labour commandeered from the villages concerned, at a rate of one man for every 50 *tanaps*. Labourers were paid 40 kopeks a day in the 1880s,\(^57\) and villages could be fined the same amount for every man who failed to turn up.\(^58\) The village *Aksakal* was supposed to produce the men required on the request of the *Aryk-Aksakal*, and on the whole the system seems to have worked smoothly with few complaints, as most peasants realized just how vital this work was for their own well-being, if not survival.

**References**

57 TsGARUz F.18 Op.1 D.9,057, 120.  
something noted by the Girs Commission.\(^5^9\) In the course of 1889 in Samarkand alone 8,261 men were employed for an average of eight days each in maintaining the network of major canals that radiated from the Zarafshan.\(^6^0\) In 1908 a total of 136,298 working days were spent maintaining the irrigation network in Samarkand Province, at a cost of 37,433 roubles, although in Khujand District, at least, the administration seems to have resorted to the corvée, as there no payments were made for labour at all.\(^6^1\)

*Azıatskaya Rossiya* considered the system to be backward and unscientific,\(^6^2\) but did at least grudgingly concede that it meant very little central expenditure was needed to maintain it: ‘Almost the whole irrigation system of Turkestan was constructed by the natives, who were ill-acquainted with technical rules and could not dispose either of capital, or of modern building materials—cement, iron, etc. Because of this the headworks of the Turkestan canals are exceptionally fragile, although simple and cheap with it.’\(^6^3\)

The design of native canals seldom varied: a large feeder or ‘magistral’ canal would branch off from the river at a gentle angle to ensure a steady flow. From this at right angles distributary canals branched off, each with some sort of regulatory headwork or sluice. From these in turn branched off the actual irrigation canals, also at right-angles and following, roughly, the contours of the land. The main headworks on the magistral canals were gradually replaced with stone and concrete sluices as the nineteenth century progressed. The headworks on the distributory canals normally consisted of no more than a fairly crude dam, of earth, wood, and rubble, which could be breached to allow water-flow: even after forty years of Russian rule permanent sluices were apparently not common.\(^6^4\)

### CORRUPTION

Although elections played a less prominent role in the appointment of irrigation officials than in the rest of the native administration, this did little to prevent abuses. Petitions from villagers complaining of

---

\(^{5^9}\) Girs, *Otchet*, 355, 357.


\(^{6^3}\) Ibid., 229.

\(^{6^4}\) Ibid., 228.
corruption and extortion on the part of Aryk-Aksakals were common. In 1897 one was received from the inhabitants of the kishlak of Kostakozi, which demonstrates the power which their control of the water gave to Aryk-Aksakals, and the potential for abuse within the system:

Two years ago a command was issued that water should be allotted amongst the inhabitants according to the amount of cultivated land they owned, and that the water left over from irrigation should by no means be sold. This prohibition on the buying and selling of water was of great use to the people and they were entirely satisfied.

Now, however, the villagers claimed that the Aryk-Aksakal Kiyazbaev and the Volost Upravitel were colluding to extort titles to land and subsequently to cut off access to water:

He has acquired in each kishlak large parcels of land on which no tax is levied; in order to increase these parcels he pays the landless and homeless 10–20 roubles, and, bringing them to the Kostakozi Narodnyi Sud [Qazi] has documents made out in their name, as if the said pieces had been sold to them for 100–200 roubles. Acquiring by this means large parcels of land, the said men then divert all the water, belonging to all the inhabitants, exclusively to their fields . . . thus the sowings of poor people are left without water, and they suffer heavy loss as a result . . . all the water goes to their land and it turns out they sell water for money; but they do not pay one kopek of land tax.⁶⁵

In all they had acquired 13 pieces of land (11 belonging to the Aryk-Aksakal) totalling 490 tanaps in four different villages, and were charging the villagers four to 20 roubles in return for irrigating their fields.⁶⁶ The authorities took this case sufficiently seriously to prosecute the two men. In 1892 the Djizak Aryk-Aksakal, Mirza ‘Abd us-Satar complained that he had been sent only five workmen to repair the embankments on the Sanzar Sai river, and that he had consequently had to hire eight more at a cost of 64 roubles for a week’s work. The Djizak District Commandant accused him of corruption (he had claimed total expenses of 144 roubles) and of neglecting his duties.⁶⁷ Eventually ‘Abd us-Satar was found to have subcontracted his duties to an assistant in return for 80 roubles a year, he himself pocketing the balance of his official salary of 300 roubles. ‘Abd us-Satar replied that he paid his assistant 150 roubles of his salary and was fully engaged in the job himself, but the

⁶⁶ Ibid., 36.
Russians seemed disinclined to believe him and he was removed from his post.

In 1895 nine inhabitants of the kishlak of Naimang in the Daul Volost petitioned the Governor of Samarkand Province about their Aryk-Aksakal, Muhiddin Muhammad Samkhov, claiming that he

Without cause fined us in roubles to 20 roubles. Not knowing what we were guilty of, we paid the fine according to the decree of the District Commandant to the Volost administration. This year, when we wished to take water from the Anhar aryk for sowing, the Aryk-Aksakal was unwilling to give us water. As water was essential for us, we gave 40 tengas to our Aksakal, in the presence of the people of the village of Naimang. Having received the money, the Aksakal gave us water, but together with this complained about us and fined us. Each year the Aryk-Aksakal gave us water, receiving money and a sheep. This year he fined us because, apart from 40 tengas, we didn’t buy him a sheep.⁶⁸

Violence was frequent in the dealings between villagers and the Aksakals who controlled their water supply. In this instance Samkhov was also accused of landing ‘twenty or so’ blows on a deputation of villagers, and extorting a further 60 tengas from them. When an officer was sent to investigate he found over twenty witnesses willing to testify that they had had to bribe the Aryk-Aksakal to secure water. However, the Volost Upravitel and Aryk-Aksakal had very different stories to tell, and it was they whom the Russians preferred to believe. Hikmet Khoja Junedui Khojinov, the Volost Upravitel, stated that he had received authorization from the District Commandant to fine twenty individuals in the village of Naimang a rouble each for illegal water use:

The Jumabazar Aryk-Aksakal submits that the inhabitants of the village together with Timur-Khoja deliberately construct holding ponds along the aryk and use more water than they are entitled to, which causes loss to others . . . the villagers who were fined by the District Commandant submitted a petition to the Aryk-Aksakal, who, as it seems to me, is not to blame, in view of the fact that I have heard that owing to the dam they constructed without permission, a large embankment around Dargom has burst.⁶⁹

Judging from the Aksakal’s own testimony, Timur-Khoja, an influential villager, had built dams in at least nine places along the canal, impeding the flow in order to irrigate his fields and those of a few others, whom he had then enlisted in an attempt to smear the Aksakal’s name in order to avoid the fine imposed.

More serious perhaps was an incident in 1893, when Alibekov, the *Aksakal* of the Ak-aryk in the Khalvain *Volost*, attempted to close off a distributory channel that had been re-opened illegally. A large crowd of villagers gathered at the spot:

Alibekov [the *Aryk-Aksakal*] showed them the instructions of the officer in charge of Irrigation for the *Oblast* to the effect that water could not be released from the Ak-aryk and began to upbraid them for not listening to the administration’s instructions. On this last Kulmatbai Hasanov said in front of everyone that without water they would all die, that they had sown rice and what was better, for all of them to die at once or the *Aryk-Aksakal* alone? Crying ‘Beat him up’ he threw himself on Alibekov with a *kitmen*; after him came Umar Umarov, also with a *kitmen*.

According to the petition submitted by the *Aksakal*, as many as 40 men then attacked him, and he only escaped by leaping onto his horse and galloping from the spot as fast as possible. Other than a fine for using the water out of turn, which they would have had to pay anyway, the villagers do not seem to have been punished for this attack, indicating that the Russians thought Alibekov’s account of it was exaggerated or perhaps their consciousness of the limits to their authority in rural areas.

As the above incidents illustrate, the petitions which dominate the files of the Samarkand Chancellery were not solely or perhaps even primarily a means for the powerless to make their grievances known to the administration. They could be used by officials themselves, as here, and even where they did come from large groups of villagers they were normally orchestrated by one or two wealthy *pyatidesyatniki* in collusion with a scribe or translator, sometimes indeed without the knowledge of many of the ‘signatories’. Often, as in the case of Timur-Khoja, they were simply used by wealthy villagers in an attempt to escape punishment imposed by officials. In 1883 Jurabai Ishmatbaev petitioned the Samarkand Chancellery for wrongful arrest and imprisonment for three months. This had occurred (so he claimed) because the *Volost Upravitel*, Mirza Haidar, had taken a strong dislike to him after he had refused to pay a bribe of 100 *tenga*. It transpired that Jurabai had constructed a crushing-mill (presumably for producing cotton-seed oil) powered by the water-flow of the canal in his village without waiting for official permission or consulting the peasants who relied upon it for water (mills could only be constructed in certain well-defined spots on

---

70 A type of hoe or mattock used for irrigation work.
a canal). The Volost Upravitel reported that then ‘The inhabitants of several villages applied to me with a petition about the harm done to their fields by the three crushers situated on the aryk whose water they used.’ It was only after a period of extended intransigence that Jurabai was fined, imprisoned, and had his mill closed down. In 1903 another mill-owner from Kara-Tepe Volost was complaining that the Aryk-Aksakal’s decision to increase the flow of water along the canal on which his mill was situated had caused it to flood and a large quantity of flour to be ruined. The Aksakal responded that the water was needed by villages further along the canal, and once again the Russian administration was less than sympathetic to the plight of this village capitalist.

Unlike the Aryk-Aksakals, who tended to come from prominent urban families, the Mirabs who managed the canals from day to day were usually local men, elected from among the more influential families in every four to five villages, and paid partly with a levy on each household and partly from the centre. They were expected to keep the canal headworks and embankments in good order and to settle minor disputes in consultation with village Aksakals: anything more serious had to be referred to the Aryk-Aksakal. In the 1890s Mirabs received on average about 40 roubles a year from the State for their part-time services, but it varied according to the number of canals they had under their jurisdiction—by 1908 it had risen to roughly 60 roubles a year. Naturally enough, their local loyalties meant that they could not always be relied upon to distribute water fairly between neighbouring villages, tending to favour their own and thus leaving those further along the canal without water. The Russian administration, in fact, had no powers to appoint or dismiss Mirabs: when complaints reached the Aryk-Aksakal the village might be called upon to elect a new Mirab, but he was subject to the same loyalties and pressures and the situation soon repeated itself. The practice of selecting Mirabs from among the senior and influential members of the community could also have some unfortunate consequences. In 1897 the inhabitants of Karakhan, Shahpulat, Shuii-Tepe, Nauzanbak, and Adas were complaining that their 80-year-old Mirab, Alim Palvan, was too feeble to fulfil his duties.

73 TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,544a, 43. 74 TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,278, 6.
76 Palen, Otchet, Vol. 16, 176. 77 See Appendix 8.
and that consequently the canal that supplied the villages had become choked. The old man was certainly too frail to travel to Samarkand to defend himself against the petitioners for he sent his son instead.⁷⁹ Despite their greater integration into rural society (or perhaps because of it), Mirabs were not free from corruption either. According to Donish this was already the case before the conquest, but the Russians were less well equipped to deal with it than the Bukharan authorities had been.⁸⁰ In 1896 Mahomet Ali-Khan-Kildiev was accused of selling water from the Yangi-Aryk to cultivators using the Kara-Tepe-Aryk, which was running low that season. As with so many of the petitions submitted to the Samarkand Chancellery it proved difficult to find and take depositions from the signatories, and the Mirab claimed that it was simply an attempt to blacken his name among the rival pyatidesyatniki in his village.⁸¹ In 1897 the Katta-Kurgan District Commandant argued that there were far too many Mirabs, costing the provincial exchequer 14,000 roubles a year, but they remained the backbone of water distribution in Turkestan, largely out of sight and reach of Russian officials.⁸²

**ELUSIVE KNOWLEDGE**

Despite his own valiant efforts to establish clear histories of the various canals of the Zarafshan Okrug and the agreements governing distribution from them, Georgii Arendarenko was forced to conclude that the ‘irrigation question’ was by far the most difficult of those facing the administration in Turkestan after the conquest, and that in the 1880s it was still far from being resolved.⁸³ The Government instructions with relation to water stated that if a quarrel could not be settled by the Mirabs or Aryk-Aksakals on the spot, then it had to be referred to the District Commandants, who were supposed to resolve as many of these disputes as possible on their own authority. There was no mention anywhere of the involvement of the judiciary, either native or Russian, although occasionally Qazis did become involved if the case rested on

---

⁸⁰ Donish, Istorinya Mangistskoi Dinastii, 71.
⁸³ G. A. Arandarenko, ‘Zametki ob Irrigatsii v Zaravshanskom Doline’, Dosugi v Turkestane (St Pb., 1889), 284.
documents in Turkic or Persian. At all times ‘local custom’ was to be observed in water distribution. Many canals and channels crossed Volost boundaries and were shared by the inhabitants of many different towns, villages, and districts. In most cases there were agreements of long standing regarding water use, maintenance, and the payment of revenue, dividing them equitably between villages:

The Pai-Aryk, one of the main systems of Bulungur, at first irrigates the Chalek Volost over a course of around 18 verst; then lower down, beginning at the village of Chapartashli, in the Durtkul Volost over 14 verst. The following system has been established for the distribution of water from the Pai between these Volosts: $\frac{2}{3}$ of the water is used by the Chalektsy, and $\frac{1}{3}$ flows through to irrigate the fields in the Durtkul Volost. In accordance with this the population of the two Volosts also divides the annual expenditure in cash and in kind, demanded for cleaning the channel and the proper functioning of the headworks on the Pai.

This maintenance work was undertaken jointly by peasants from each Volost at the beginning of April every year. That, at least, was how it was supposed to work. In 1893, when the District Commandant made these observations, it was because a dispute had arisen between the Volost Upraviteli, as it was claimed that the Durtkul Volost, downstream, was receiving insufficient water. The Aryk-Aksakal had failed to intervene, the maintenance work was delayed, and, owing to the build-up of silt, the canal burst its banks and flooded a portion of the Chalek Volost. Quarrels over water and canal maintenance between neighbouring Volosts and villages were an everyday occurrence and provided a ready field for bribery of the Aryk-Aksakal by rival Volost Upraviteli. It was common for villages to construct new outlets from canals illegally, prompting both official action when it was discovered and petitions from other villages adversely affected. A typical dispute was that over a new headwork in the village of Beshkal outside Samarkand. The Aryk-Aksakal reported its existence and was told to have it blocked, but the villagers then petitioned the District Commandant, saying that they had sown rice and that it would all die without the extra water. The Commandant, anxious either to secure revenue or prevent undue hardship, then gave them permission to keep the outlet. This promptly provoked a petition from the neighbouring kishlak of Daugor claiming

---

84 Palen, Otchet, Vol. 16, 101, 104.  
86 Ibid., 70b.
Irrigation

that their crops were failing as a result.⁸⁷ In 1892 a quarrel within the village of Kipchak in the Djizak District led to the death of one of the protagonists, Baba Juma Nazarov, after he was badly beaten by two of his neighbours. This particular case came to the notice of the District Commandant because there were two witnesses willing to testify who petitioned the authorities, but there may have been others.⁸⁸ In 1898 the Selskii Starshina of the village of Jar-Aryk in the Khoja-Ahrar Volost, Jurabek Mahmudbekov, was prosecuted for beating a policeman with a whip in a dispute in which he had refused to release water to the man’s village.⁸⁹ In some areas the Volost Upraviteli had control of distribution; such was the case around the town of Katta-Kurgan, where the villagers of Arlak complained bitterly to the District Commandant that their Volost Upravitel, Ibrahim Karaulbegi, had ignored a petition they had submitted about the water supply. The villages upstream, so they claimed, had sown carrots and rice, both thirsty crops, and left them with almost no supply throughout the three hottest months of the year. They asked that the District Commandant, ‘To begin with value the losses suffered by the villages of Arlam and Kizyl; secondly that he assess the tax on the land for the lost crops at the sum of 540 roubles. And together with this that the total be charged to the Volost Upravitel, Ibrahim Karaulbegi, who is guilty of our poverty.’⁹⁰ This he was willing enough to do, agreeing that Ibrahim Karaulbegi had neglected his duties and failed to distribute the water fairly, and stating that he had already reprimanded him severely. The case was handed over to the Peishambe congress of Qazis, which settled matters to the villagers’ satisfaction.

The arrangements dividing water between towns and the surrounding villages were also customary, frequently extremely complicated, and almost always pre-dated the Russian conquest. Z. Zhizhemsky, formerly the Junior Assistant to the Samarkand District Commandant, whom we last met insulting an incompetent irrigation conductor in the early 1870s, had by the late 1880s been made the Chief Irrigation Administrator for Samarkand Province. He wrote a series of articles for Turkestanskiya Vedomosti on the irrigation system of the Zarafshan in which he made grand claims for the efficiency and meticulousness of water management under his authority, which were rather undermined

by a notable lack of detail on water flow and distribution. Even he was forced to admit that ‘the division of water along irrigation systems within oases, i.e. in detail, is managed by Mirabs from the population’. In practice, of course, this worked far from smoothly. When a dispute arose over the allocation of water from the Sanzar-Aryk, which supplied both the town of Djizak and the neighbouring Uzbek and Yany-Kurgan Volosts, the District Commandant wrote rather despairingly to the Governor that

To establish a detailed distribution of water, whether by quarters, settlements or even groups of settlements is impossible as the hours of water-flow change in accordance with various conditions such as the time of waterflow from the Sanzar, the quantity of it and the agreements made amongst themselves by those who are next in turn. The correct order of distribution of water was established by custom long ago during the period of Muslim rule in accordance with the needs of the population, and the most important [customs] are so entirely assimilated that they do not require any written documents.

The water was released on a 12-day cycle alternately to these three areas, and the Commandant found it very hard to get to grips with the logic of this local arrangement. The vague official policy that ‘custom’ in water distribution should always be upheld left the Russians in a quandary. Given their ignorance of local conditions and reliance on native officials, they could not realistically provide an alternative system of distribution, but they were also in no position to judge whether what the Aryk-Aksakals told them was established ‘custom’ was genuine or not. This left the door wide open to extensive corruption at a time when population growth, increased cotton production, and a switch to arable farming by some of the nomadic population meant ever more disputes. The Samarkand Chancellery was subjected to a constant barrage of petitions, complaints, and conflicting claims, whose validity or otherwise was very difficult to establish. There were too few officers to travel to the site of every quarrel over water and attempt to assess whether the aggrieved party’s claim was justified and, even when this was possible, any change in distribution arrangements would be attacked as a breach of ‘custom’, which the Russians were wary of interfering with for fear the entire system might

unravel. In 1908 the Governor of Samarkand wrote to the Pahlen Commission, asking

What we should do in a situation where the inhabitants, having seized water to the injury of others, will not consent to the desire for a new (fair) distribution of water? Does the administration have the right to enforce a distribution of water according to the information it has about the area of irrigated land, or must the matter be left as it stands, regardless of the petitions of the destitute?²⁹⁴

There was no clear answer to this question other than the complete abandonment of customary distribution, and a wholesale re-surveying of the canal network, which would have required hundreds of officers and would still, in the last resort, have been reliant on local knowledge. It was for this reason that the Governor had turned down a request from the Head of Irrigation in Samarkand to be allowed to supervise directly the construction and removal of koburas, or headworks on minor canals, in order to settle those intractable disputes, ‘when one section of the population, normally sitting at the end of the canal, demands an equitable distribution of water, whilst another section, sitting at the head, will not agree . . . If the interested communities refuse to accept a change in the order in which they take turns . . . then the Russian authorities are rendered powerless.’²⁹⁵

Even in the 1890s officials were complaining that they simply did not understand what the native measurements for quantities of water actually meant, echoing Abramov’s pleas of thirty years earlier. N. P. Petrovsky, the Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District at this time, recounted how he had attempted to pin down the precise quantities of water signified by the commonly used native terms ‘Tegerman’ or ‘Tash’ and ‘Kulak’. In the course of three years’ constant tours through the districts he had seen over 200 canals, and questioned Aksakals, Qazis, Aryk-Aksakals, and Bukharan Amins, but had failed to come up with an answer. The Katta-Kurgan Aryk-Aksakal said that he didn’t know, but that he would consult his books and provide him with definitions next time he came round on tour. On his return, however, the Aksakal told him that he could find nothing and that it was a mystery. Other natives said that Tash could be defined as when a canal contained an amount of water that was knee-deep, and two soles-breadths across. This was insufficiently accurate for him, and in any case was contradicted elsewhere. Exhaustive enquiries revealed that in

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 30. ²⁹⁵ Ibid., 31.
the Katta-Kurgan District a *Tash* could be 1.7–9 cubic feet, and in the Khujand District 2–11 cubic feet. In his frustration, he concluded that the only measurement of water volume the *Aryk-Aksakals* in Russian Turkestan and the *Amins* in Bukhara paid any attention to was whether it was possible to ford the canal or river in question on foot. One *Qazi* told him that

Not one amongst us Sarts can determine the quantity of water flowing in a river or *aryk*; if someone from amongst the Sarts tells you, that in some *aryk* or other such-and-such an amount of water is flowing, then he’s lying, as it is not written in any book of ours. We can only divide the water into two, three, four etc. different parts.  

It may be that he was telling the truth and that the sort of scientific measurements demanded by Petrovsky did not exist in Turkestan. The Pahlen report stated confidently that a *Kulak* was the amount of water needed to irrigate 50 *desyatina* of land, but it is unlikely that this can be taken as definitive.  

Thurman, basing his work on Soviet authors, writes that a *Tegerman* was the amount of water displaced by one turn of a mill-wheel, whilst the *Kulak* varied widely according to which crop was sown. It is likely that the meaning of *Tash* or *Kulak* also varied from place to place, even within the districts of Samarkand Province. Nevertheless, it clearly suited the *Aryk-Aksakals* that the Russians did not know how water was customarily measured and, given the enormous importance attached to an equitable distribution, it seems likely that there was at least some way of roughly calculating how much water a canal held and thus how long it should be allowed water in the cycle: the terms *Tash* and *Kulak* certainly signified something, but the native officials consulted by Petrovsky were not letting on. He himself concluded that, ‘All my unsuccessful efforts to establish the size of the *Tash* and learn the means used by the natives to measure water have led me to the conclusion, that not one of the natives has the slightest notion of either the *Tash*, or the *Kulak* (as a volume of water), and they absolutely cannot measure the volume of water.’

---

96 N. P. Petrovskii, ‘*Irigatsiya. Tuzemmaya Edinitsa Vody i Sposoby.*’, *Obzor Samarkandskogo Uezda v Ekonomicheskoi i Bytovoi Otnoshenii* (Samarkand, 1897), 13.
98 Thus a ‘Wheat *Kulak*’ was only 60–70% of a ‘Cotton *Kulak*’, which in turn was only 25% of a ‘Melon *Kulak*’, Thurman, *Modes of Organisation*, 66–7. Nobody seems to have suggested this explanation to poor Petrovsky.
99 Petrovskii, ‘*Irigatsiya*’, 13.
ATTEMPTS AT CLOSER MANAGEMENT

Despite their problems in understanding local custom, the 1890s and early 1900s saw less abdication of responsibility by the Russians in the management of canals, and they made some attempt to establish firmer control over existing distribution arrangements. This was partly as a consequence of the growth of towns, many of which acquired a new European half and consequently an increase in the amount of water they required.¹⁰⁰ In some instances, this did lead to changes, often in ways that were far from the liking of the peasants in the surrounding villages. In 1891 the inhabitants of the village of Ozhevach were forbidden from using water from the Zak-Aryk, which was henceforth to be used exclusively to supply Katta-Kurgan, seven versts away. Instead they had to dig new channels to the Mehtar-Aryk, ten versts distant, which already irrigated 6,000 tanaps of land upstream. Even in cases such as this the Russians were prepared to be flexible: in 1898 the villagers petitioned Petrovsky, the District Commandant, to be allowed to use the Zak-Aryk once more, as the area of cultivable land in the village was rapidly shrinking, which permission he grudgingly gave.¹⁰¹

Count Rostovtsov, then the Military Governor, had in the early 1890s urged the necessity of increasing the number of Russians supervising irrigation in Samarkand province.¹⁰² Each province had an Engineer, with two assistants, and two senior and two junior technicians: in Samarkand their principal job was to look after the two main channels of the Zarafshan, the Kara-Darya, and the Ak-Darya, and the all-important sluices governing the flow of water to Bukhara.¹⁰³ These officers had always been Russian as a matter of course. However, even in 1914 Aziatskaya Rossiya concluded that the involvement of these Engineers in the overseeing and maintenance of the canal network was negligible. The post of Irrigation Administrator had been created in each province... occupied for the most part by engineers, but owing to the vast areas covered by Turkestan’s Oblasts (The smallest, Ferghana, contains 85,000 square versts, excluding the Pamirs), and owing to the legal prevalence of custom in the water

administration in the region, these irrigation officers are completely incapable of really administering it.¹⁰⁴

Pahlen’s report agreed with this judgement, stating that these men were little more than additional secretaries to the Military Governors and only given petty responsibility: they had almost no role in the day-to-day distribution of water, which continued to be managed by the Askakals and Mirabs.¹⁰⁵ However, by 1894, one of the Samarkand Province’s 23 Aryk-Aksakals was a Russian, Nikolai Fedorov, and this proportion was set to rise.¹⁰⁶ In 1897 a retired private soldier, Nikolai Osaurov, can be found applying for a position as an Aryk-Aksakal and, despite a complete lack of prior experience (he could not even spell the word ‘Aksakal’), he was accepted without hesitation, ousting a Sart from the position.¹⁰⁷ By the early 1900s more Slavs were being employed as Aryk-Aksakals, at least in the area immediately around Samarkand. This had obvious advantages from the Russian point of view, as the loyalty of these men could be more easily assured. However, they lacked expertise and were prone to violence. In February 1900 the Aryk-Aksakal for Samarkand, Mironenko, and the Ak-Darya Aryk-Aksakal, Leontiev, were surveying work on the Mazar-Aryk on the outskirts of Samarkand when they were approached by a party of twenty or so villagers who wanted some of the water to be diverted for crops. The two men insisted that the canal’s water was exclusively for the use of the town and the argument quickly degenerated into a brawl in which the leader of the villagers was struck: ‘Mullah Usta Atabaev explained, that at the time of the argument at the Mazar-Aryk Mironenko swore at him, and then hit him once with his fist on the chest; because of which Mullah Usta Atabaev fell to the ground.’¹⁰⁸

Mironenko’s was not an isolated outburst: tempers frequently ran high over water and Russian Aksakals had a short fuse. A few months after this incident, in September 1900, the Tyuya Tatar Aryk-Aksakal Andrei Bychkov and a technician called Perebatov were observed by several witnesses to attack Tash Mohamed Sultanbaev, a villager in Mullah Tepe, with a whip when they discovered that he had cut

¹⁰⁴ Skornyakov, ‘Iskusstvennoe Oroshenie’, 243—in fact Samarkand Province was the smallest overall, but irrigation was negligible in the mountainous areas around the Ferghana Valley and in the Pamirs.
an illegal canal to irrigate his land.¹⁰⁹ By 1907 Bychkov had been replaced by another Russian, Vasilii Filatov, whether as a result of this violent tendency or not is unclear. The position of Aryk-Aksakal, intended exclusively for natives when it was revived by Cherniaev in 1882, was by the early 1900s quite commonly being occupied by Russians. The Pahlen report’s survey revealed that seven out of the 23 Aryk-Aksakals in Samarkand Province were Russian, or at least had Russian names: he claimed that they provided useful assistance to the technical branches of the irrigation administration in a way natives could not, but it is unclear just how effective they could have been given their dependence on Mirabs whose language they did not speak, and on unwritten customs they must have had difficulty in understanding. Russian Aryk-Aksakals were not only rough (several were ex-soldiers); they were also not free from Turkestan’s well-nigh universal administrative corruption. In 1908 Lobushkin, who was in charge of the Dargom-Aryk, was found to have claimed for money to pay 100 workers when he had only employed 20.¹¹⁰

NEW CANALS

This period also saw the first serious attempts to extend the area under irrigation. From the early eighteenth century onwards the Russians had what amounted to an obsession with the idea that the Amu-Darya had been artificially diverted by the Khans of Khiva from its ‘original course’, thought to have run into the Caspian. Peter the Great seems to have believed that this had been done solely to spite the Russians by closing off what he thought could be an all-water route to India,¹¹¹ and the question of ‘restoring’ the Amu-Darya to its original course, the ‘Uzboi’, cropped up repeatedly in proposals to extend irrigation in Turkestan. As early as 1871 one author wrote with ominous callousness in Turkestanskiya Vedomosti that, ‘Even if the whole of the Khanate of Khiva turned into desert, the revenue which our merchants and treasury would receive from diverting the Amu Darya would far exceed

the revenues from the existing khanate, and, therefore, humanity as a whole would benefit'.\textsuperscript{112} One of the most elaborate schemes was that proposed by the French engineer Barrande in 1875, which would have created a navigational canal along the Uzboi to link up with new railway construction; as he wanted a French commercial concession with extensive powers the project was turned down.\textsuperscript{113} None of these more or less fantastic projects was ever realized, although in a sense the Oxus was ‘turned back’ towards the Caspian after the Revolution with the construction of the Kara-Kum Canal through southern Turkmenistan; it is perhaps of significance that Tsarist engineers so frequently referred to the Aral Sea as ‘useless’ and ‘a waste’.\textsuperscript{114}

On a more practical level, preliminary surveys of the ‘Hungry Steppe’ south of Tashkent had been undertaken as early as 1869 on the initiative of General von Kaufman, and work was begun in 1874 with the aim of irrigating up to 150,000 desyatina of land. However, ‘imitating the example of ancient times’, von Kaufman attempted to build the canal using forced, unpaid native labourers (who christened it the tonguz-aryk, or ‘pig-canal’) and the project had foundered altogether by 1879.\textsuperscript{115} Having learned nothing from his arch-rival’s mistakes, von Kaufman’s successor, General Cherniaev, attempted to build a canal along the dry bed of the Yany-Darya, also using unpaid labour, but succeeded only in flooding 30,000 desyatina of land.\textsuperscript{116} It was the exiled Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich who built the first successful Russian canal in Central Asia. He began with the Bukhar-Aryk (designed to take water from the Syr-Darya to Bukhara) in 1886. Unfortunately, three days after water had been released into the new canal it had all either evaporated or been absorbed. Nor was the work completed entirely peacefully—in September 1888 there was a fight on the Bukhar-Aryk between 92 locally levied workers on the Grand Duke’s canal and a group of Djigits and peasants from the neighbouring village of Begobagh, which left eight dead and 21 wounded. No reliable witnesses to the brawl could be found to testify, although

\textsuperscript{112} ‘K-ii’ ‘O povorote reki Amu-Dar’i po staromu ruslu’, TV, 30 August 1871, No. 31.
\textsuperscript{114} See, for instance, Kh. Gel’man, Obvodeniya Starago Rusla R. Amu-Dar’i (Tashkent, 1900), 46–7.
\textsuperscript{115} Skornyakov, ‘Iskusstvennoe Oroshenie’, 247; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 76.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 248.
Irrigation

it appeared that an attempt to steal some of the workmen’s tools lay at the bottom of it.¹¹⁷ The more successful Khiva-Aryk was constructed by widening an existing native canal, probably explaining why its alignment was not faulty, and was later extended by 83 versts to form the Emperor Nicholas I canal, but even so it only irrigated 12,000 desyatinas of land (33,000 acres, or approximately 50 square miles). A further extension of the canal system by 300 versts through the southern part of the ‘Hungry Steppe’ was taken in conjunction with the extension of the Transcaspian Railway to the Ferghana Valley, so that the line would pass through cultivated country. The topographical survey took four years to complete and construction did not begin until 1898.¹¹⁸ Initially, 2,700,000 roubles were assigned to irrigate the first 50,000 desyatinas in Samarkand Province.¹¹⁹ This was to become the ‘Romanov Canal’, an extensive system irrigating some 45,000 desyatinas and costing 5,000,000 roubles (almost twice the original estimate) which was officially inaugurated in 1913 during the dynastic tercentenary celebrations, although the second part of the project, the irrigation of a further 40,000 desyatinas in Syr-Darya Province had not been completed.¹²⁰ Apart from the rebuilding of Bairam Ali’s dam on the Murghab near Merv in Transcaspia, this was all that was achieved across Turkestan before the Revolution; not a great deal to show for fifty years of Russian rule with all the ‘technological’ and ‘scientific’ improvements that was supposed to bring, least of all when compared with the enormous irrigation schemes undertaken under similar circumstances by the British in Punjab where, in 1906, the Chenab Canal alone irrigated over 2,000,000 acres (800,000 desyatinas).¹²¹ Muriel Joffe has written in some detail about the limitations placed on Tsarist attempts to irrigate the steppe by the refusal of the official element to provide the necessary guarantees to encourage the investment of private capital.¹²² The Moscow textile barons were interested primarily in opening up land for cotton cultivation through canal construction, and wanted direct control of large estates on the new canals to supply their

¹¹⁹ TsGARUz F.1 Op.27 D.1,144, 1–2.
factories. They wanted security for their investments, land grants from the Government, and some level of guaranteed return, similar to the methods used by the British to encourage the construction of railways in India using private capital. Instead, they met with heavy regulation and interference both from local officials and from the Resettlement Department in St Petersburg. The Moscow Irrigation Company, for instance, asked to be allowed to take 50 per cent of the harvest from peasants already living on the land they proposed to irrigate, five times the usual rate in Turkestan. This idea was swiftly scotched by administrators, fearful that this might undermine military security.¹²³

Further, as far as central Government was concerned, the new canals were not intended to be part of the Tsarist policy of encouraging a cotton monoculture in Turkestan: indeed, although cotton exports soared from 873,000 poods in 1888 to 13,697,000 poods in 1913,¹²⁴ 90 per cent of it was grown on small native plots of five desyatinas or fewer, dependent on pre-existing canals—indeed, the smaller the plot, the higher the proportion of it that would be sown with cotton.¹²⁵ Instead, as much as possible of the newly irrigated land was populated with Russian settlements by the Resettlement Department. The protocols relating to the newly irrigated areas of the ‘Hungry Steppe’, much of which was in Samarkand Province, specified clearly that only ‘Orthodox Great Russian subjects’ were to be considered for land grants, which amounted to a maximum of 15 desyatinas per person.¹²⁶ As the small size of the plots indicates, the driving force behind canal construction was not to increase the revenue raised from native agriculture or to ensure that peasants remained on the land, as in Punjab, but to create tracts of arable land free of Muslim peasants where this new and ultimately extremely disruptive Slav element could be introduced into rural Turkestan.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Knize and Yuferev, ‘Khlopkovodstvo’, 278.
¹²⁵ Ibid., 285–6; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 167; this meant (according to Pahlen) that 45% of households in the valley regions of Turkestan sowed at least some cotton to supplement their income, whilst those with 0.5 desyatinas of land or fewer sowed cotton on 34.36% of their land, those with more than 10 on just 13.63%. Palen, Prilozheniya k Otchetu, Vol. 19 Chast’ I Otdel I, 338, 328–9. This may be because there was a concentration of smaller plots in areas closest to the rivers and heads of canals, which had been settled for longer and had a better water supply suitable for growing such a thirsty crop.
It was not until 1905, in conjunction with half-hearted attempts to interest private investors in building irrigation canals, that any attempt was made to revise the customary law of water distribution in Central Asia. In that year the Minister of Agriculture in St Petersburg, Krivoshein, set his Ministry to work on a draft for a new water law for Turkestan which would make it legally possible to buy and sell water, and supersede the mixture of Sharia and custom which had hitherto prevailed. However, it was not until 1909 that a fact-finding mission was despatched to Semirechie, and it was another three years before the new law was submitted to the Duma. Even then it was only so it could be redrafted and resubmitted in 1913. Its practical effects were therefore negligible, although it was a clear statement of intent and an acknowledgement that the current system was not only incomprehensible to Russian officials but so easily manipulated by corrupt members of the native administration that the local population was no longer satisfied with it. This conclusion is suggested clearly enough by the petitions received by the Samarkand Chancellery outlined above, and it is corroborated by Pahlen:

From the very beginning of the inspection... I began to receive petitions on the breach of the laws of water use from all sides, both from individuals and from whole groups of people... Enquiries revealed especially clearly that various aspects of the current regulations on water use are exacerbating disputes over water between one Volost and another.

Pahlen wrote that many old Turkestan hands had told him that the irrigation network was better managed under the Khanates, when the authorities were sufficiently knowledgeable and ruthless to prevent gross inequalities in distribution. Whether this was true or not, there was no doubt that by 1908 the wealthy were getting more water, despite prohibitions on buying and selling it, and that they were aided and abetted in this by members of the native administration, many of whom joined in: ‘Enquiries into the petitions of the people on the

---

128 G. K. Gins, Deistvuyushchee vodnoe pravo Turkestana i budushchii vodnyi zakon (St Pb., 1910), 52–61.
130 Palen, Otchet, Vol. 16, 7.
misuse of water normally revealed that those who were seizing water, most often in order to sow rice, were rich and influential people, amongst them Volost Upraviteli.’ Pahlen remarked that exactly the same patterns could be seen in the new Russian settlement of Sretensk in Khujand District, where similarly the richest and most influential had acquired lands at the heads of the canals and were growing rice, using far more water than they were entitled to. He considered local custom in water distribution to be a dead letter, and thought that the Russians should impose their own norms on a system that was far too open to manipulation by the powerful. He wrote of ‘the total vagueness of custom, which each bends according to his need. The clear inconsistency between changing conditions of life and the necessity to protect both individuals and entire Volosts from the tyranny of the wealthy stealers of water—leads to the conclusion that nowadays custom has in part been entirely abolished, and in part lost any significance.’

Attempts to establish the principle that water be assigned to people according to the amount of land they farmed had failed entirely. In Khujand District, for instance, in defiance both of Russian law and of the Sharia, water was being openly bought and sold separately from land. This raised the question of how such crimes and disputes should be investigated and, if necessary, brought to trial: here too there was no consistency. No distinction was made between civil and criminal cases, nor were there any clear principles as to which should be settled by the administration and which sent to the courts. The water sales in Khujand were a good illustration of this. One Pristav decided to settle a case on his own authority; another sent it to the Qazi; and a third to the Russian courts. Pahlen acknowledged that when a dispute depended on native documents it was essential to call in a Qazi, but on the whole he thought their involvement did more harm than good, as they were likely to have connections with other members of the native administration or even with the parties involved in the dispute. Perhaps the most striking example in the Pahlen report of Russian failure to control water distribution was on the Nicholas Canal through the ‘Hungry Steppe’, which actually belonged to the State. Almost all those receiving water from it were Russian peasant settlers in new villages, who waged a constant war against irrigation officials. They petitioned for more water all year round, even when the level in the canal was low, and in the

¹³² Ibid., 54.
¹³³ Ibid., 93, 99.
The failure of the Tsarist regime successfully to irrigate the barren steppes and deserts of Turkestan was part of its wider failure to modernize government and administration. The technology available was relatively primitive until the 1890s, and resources remained limited well after that. Far more ambitious schemes were envisaged and might have been brought to fruition earlier had not the First World War intervened—eventually, as was so often the case, the more grandiose plans of the Tsars (the Turkestan–Siberia Railway, the Kara-Kum Canal) were only realized under Soviet rule after delays of 20 or more years. What is more telling is that, given that control of the water supply was widely acknowledged to be the key to political power in Central Asia, the Russians did not make greater efforts to wrest it from native hands and into their own. In the course of 50 years they were unable to acquire sufficient local knowledge to do this, and a powerful tool of coercion was thus lost to the Tsarist State. This *laissez-faire* attitude to water management, coupled with relatively low taxation and very few newly constructed canals, meant that at least in the sphere of water, the Imperial State’s impact on its subjects’ lives was minimal—corruption, extortion, and coercion were all devolved.

**IRRIGATION IN NORTHERN INDIA**

Controlling access to water was obviously of less importance in securing political power in Upper India, where rainfall was reasonably abundant. Towards Afghanistan, in Western Punjab, as the monsoon begins to peter out, agriculture is far more dependent on artificial irrigation, but in other areas it is merely a supplement to rainfall, not the cultivator’s sole means of existence.¹³⁵ Historically, throughout most of Punjab and the Gangetic Plain various forms of well-irrigation had been more common than inundation canals, and these were wholly outside state control. Nevertheless, there was a Mughal tradition of great public works, among which had been irrigation canals in Punjab and the Ganges-Jumna *doab*. The largest of these was the canal of Firuz Shah, which dated back to

---

¹³⁴ Ibíd., 114.
¹³⁵ Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, second edition (Delhi, 2002), n. to p. 29.
at least the thirteenth century, but was repaired and extended by 78 miles to supply Shah Jahan’s new city at Delhi in the mid-seventeenth century, and designated the Nahr-e Behesht or ‘River of Paradise’.\textsuperscript{136} The Eastern Jumna canal was also of Mughal construction, dating from the early eighteenth century. In addition to these large State projects there were some canals in the upper Bari doab and a dense network of channels leading from most of the major rivers of upper India: whilst these seldom reached very far they were largely under local control.\textsuperscript{137} By the 1890s 42.5 per cent of occupied land in the Ganges–Jumna doab was under some kind of artificial irrigation (much of which would have been well-based).\textsuperscript{138} In the central districts of Samarkand nearest the Zarafshan the equivalent figure was double this,\textsuperscript{139} but the overall figure for the whole province more or less the same (47 per cent);\textsuperscript{140} much lower levels of rainfall in Central Asia, together with the vast tracts of arid and uncultivable land, must also be taken into account. Overall, the network of canals in India which pre-dated British rule was extensive, but much less comprehensive than the irrigation systems which the Russians encountered in Central Asia.

Travelling through Bukhara in 1824–5, William Moorcroft had been struck by the fertility of the irrigated fields, writing that

\begin{quote}
I touch occasionally upon the subject of irrigation because daily observation forces upon me the conviction that it is the life and soul of fertility in a hot country, because I say most decidedly that there never could be famine in British India if its facilities for irrigation were rendered widely available, because its employment would render the country the Garden of the World.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

Although Moorcroft died at Andkhoi in Afghan Turkestan, his journals were eventually returned to Calcutta through the good offices of a Punjabi banker in Kabul called Guru Das Singh, and his other books and papers by the Mir of Kunduz.\textsuperscript{142} It would be nice to think that his eccentric observations on the irrigation networks of Central Asia inspired the Government of India to emulate them, although this can

\begin{scriptsize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{136} Elliot and Dowson, \textit{The History of India}, Vol. VII, No. LXIII, Inayat Khan, \textit{Shah Jahan-name}, 86.
\item\textsuperscript{137} Habib, \textit{The Agrarian System}, 34.
\item\textsuperscript{138} Ian Stone, \textit{Canal Irrigation in British India} (Cambridge, 1984), 204.
\item\textsuperscript{139} Virskii (ed.),’pozemel’no-podatnyya raboty’, \textit{SKSO Vyp.IV} (1896), 168.
\item\textsuperscript{140} Palen, \textit{Prilozheniya k Otchetu}, Vol. 19 Chast’ I Otdel I, 102.
\item\textsuperscript{141} OIOC MSS Eur D.254, 261.
\item\textsuperscript{142} Alder, \textit{Beyond Bokhara}, 362; NAI/Foreign/P.C./14 March 1838/No. 19, Moorcroft’s (Mr.) Books Surrendered by the Meer of Khundooz, 4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{scriptsize}
Irrigation

never be more than an attractive speculation. What is certain, however, is that for both the commercial and humanitarian reasons outlined by Moorcroft, the British massively extended irrigation in Upper India with the Ganges and Jumna Canals and above all in Punjab where they built the most extensive and elaborate system of artificial irrigation to be found anywhere in the world at the time. Works such as Chenab Canal, or the gigantic Sukkur barrage, completed in the 1930s, dwarf anything attempted by the Tsarist regime in Central Asia, and can only really be compared to more grandiose and interventionist Soviet projects. The canal colonies, eventually nine in number, were a conscious attempt to recreate in the barren *doabs* of west Punjab the village communities and the ‘yeoman’ class of independent cultivators found in east Punjab, upon which by 1900 the British relied for over half of the Indian army’s recruits.¹⁴³ Canal construction in Punjab was thus part of a much larger project of social engineering, the largest ever indulged in by the British in India. A ‘hydraulic’ society, to use Imran Ali’s phrase,¹⁴⁴ was created which was heavily militarized and made use of the latest irrigation technology, but was politically and socially rather backward. This was the only part of India where legislation was passed to prevent the alienation of land from ‘sturdy’ cultivators to ‘parasitic’ moneylenders, and in general British intervention in agriculture was far heavier than elsewhere in India.¹⁴⁵ The benefits of canal construction were not only military: the newly irrigated land was burdened with high rates of land revenue and water charges. Even on uncultivated irrigated land the assessment was Rs 5 per acre, whilst land bearing crops was assessed at from Rs 10–12.5 per acre in the early 1890s.¹⁴⁶ On most canals expenses were under 30 per cent, and sometimes under 20 per cent, of gross annual receipts, making them among the most profitable in British India.¹⁴⁷

The closest parallels to be found in Turkestan are the Cossack settlements established in southern Semirechie, which mostly made use of irrigation networks constructed by settled Kazakhs; and the Russian settlements built along the new canals in the 1890s, which were

insignificant in number. However, the canal colonies which are held to characterize British policy in Punjab were a fairly late development. The first canal project in Punjab was the Sidhnai colony in Multan district, established in 1886–8. In 1869 only $\frac{1}{20}$ of cultivated land in Punjab was irrigated by Government, and about 25 per cent (approximately 20 million acres) received water through private and pre-existing canals.¹⁴⁸

In districts of Punjab where pre-British systems of irrigation existed, a non-interventionist approach was taken. Lepel Griffin remarked in 1871 of the Muzaffargarh District that

In this district there is an extensive system of inundation canals from the Indus and the Chenab. These, however, are not, and have never been, under government management. The distribution of water and the silt clearances are managed entirely by the people themselves, who pay all charges for clearance and management. No water rate is levied in this district, as the canals were made, and are kept up, by the people themselves.¹⁴⁹

Griffin complained that in Dera Ghazi Khan District, although such inundation canals as there were had been constructed by Government, no increase in the revenue demand could be made for fear of exciting popular discontent in this sensitive Frontier region. Nor was the Punjab Government, ever-protective of the state coffers, consistently enthusiastic and active in the promotion of irrigation. Rawalpindi District was among the most barren in Punjab, and of 6,000 square miles only 1,800 were cultivable, 30 per cent of which was forced to lie fallow to prevent the soil from becoming exhausted. A mere 2 per cent was irrigated, and Major Cracroft, the Settlement Officer, urged the Government to spend the revenue receipts on extending irrigation. Griffin replied: ‘I am to remark that works of this kind must mainly depend upon the efforts of the people themselves. The State has not the means of devoting the large sums contemplated to local works of this description.’¹⁵⁰

Within Punjab an official called the Zillahdar resembles most closely the Turkestani Aryk-Aksakal, as he similarly bore the most responsibility for setting rates and distributing water. Chowkidars (watchmen) would lead patrols along canal banks,

¹⁴⁸ OIOC Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for the Year 1868–9, 28.
¹⁴⁹ OIOC PRP July 1871, No. 10, 228–30; Griffin was a brilliant if pompous administrator, but his career was hampered by a complicated love-life. See Gilmour, The Ruling Caste, 206–36; Katherine Prior, ‘Griffin, Sir Lepel Henry (1838–1908)’, DNB.
¹⁵⁰ OIOC PRP August 1871, No. 3, 250–3.
whilst the canal department employed *Ameens*, itinerant surveyors who, together with the canal *Patwaris* (accountants) and village *Lambardars* (headmen), would measure the fields and note the crops, a process which took about three months each year, depending on the weather. The Superintending Engineer of the Western Jumna Canal Circle, Captain Brandreth, argued that corruption was endemic and inevitable under the existing system, as the canal *Patwaris* were ignorant of local conditions and at the mercy of the resident village *Chowkidar*, the man who ‘watches the irrigation all the year round, and on whose showing or pointing out to the measurer it is measured. This man can say “I will let you off if you give me something, or have you measured in excess if you don’t” at any time of the year without witnesses.’

As they came from the same village, the *Chowkidar* and the cultivator essentially had the same interests: the peasant would pay the official a bribe that was considerably less than the amount his field was meant to be assessed at, and the *Chowkidar’s* returns would be consistently falsified to show less water being used and fewer crops being sown than was, in fact, the case. The measurers and canal *Patwaris* could either be kept in ignorance or be bought off easily enough when they came round to make the annual assessment. The only loser was the Government, which explained why complaints about this sort of extortion were relatively rare.

Across the Indus, in what became North-West Frontier Province, very little was done by the British to alter the native system of inundation canals radiating from the Kabul, Swat, and Bara rivers. In the Peshawar District the largest of these were the Mohmand, Khalil, and Kasbah Canals, which between them irrigated an area of 36,979 acres. There was also a large canal called the Sheikh ka Kotha, supposedly built by Shaikh Usman, the ruler of Peshawar in Aurangzeb’s time, and still in use, irrigating a further 16,913 acres. The British had inherited overall control of this, but the Settlement Officers described a system of customary arrangements between villages along the *walas* and made very little attempt to interfere with them. This local regulation, overseen by *Mirabs* as in Turkestan, was apparently very strict, as both the precise amount of water and the land on which it could be used were

151 OIOC *PPWDP*, October 1873, Nos. 37–9, 223.
153 *Gazetteer of the Peshawar District* 1897–8 (Lahore, 1898), 174.
154 Ibid., 178.  
155 The Pathan equivalent of an *aryk*, or small channel.
carefully specified.\textsuperscript{156} This was still the case in the late 1890s, when the \textit{Gazetteer} remarked that water distribution took place according to a system known as ‘Sheikh Malli’s’: ‘The allotment of turns is managed by the people among themselves; we have never interfered; and no disputes about it are ever brought into court.’\textsuperscript{157}

As in Turkestan, villagers were obliged to provide labour for canal repairs in accordance with the supply they received. This was part of a customary code of Irrigation Rights and Customs called the \textit{Abpashi}, which the British had enshrined in statute in 1870. In 1898 such supervision as there was over this rambling network was undertaken by Sheikh Sher Muhammad Khan Bahadur, the Engineer in charge.\textsuperscript{158}

**MAKING MONEY FROM WATER**

According to Elizabeth Whitcombe, although Upper India is the most famous field for irrigation in British India, the canals constructed in Madras and the Northern Circars by the East India Company turned a much handsomer profit than did those in the north, until the colonization of the western Punjab began in earnest after 1890.\textsuperscript{159} Even looking solely at northern examples, however, the British achievement in extending irrigation and turning a profit offers a striking contrast to Russian Turkestan. It is difficult to calculate accurately which Imperial power, proportionately, levied higher rates of land revenue and water charges on its subject population. Matters are complicated by different methods of assessment, differentiation between crops, and the basics of different land measurements and currency values. However, there is no doubt that the Imperial State in Northern India was much better at revenue extraction than that in Russian Turkestan. This disparity is more than confirmed by a comparison of canal charges—in India a simple water rate which in the 1890s averaged roughly 4.2 rupees per acre;\textsuperscript{160} in Russian Turkestan a combination of higher basic land tax and a series of cesse to pay for maintenance and for canal officials’ salaries which in Samarkand came to an average of 80 kopeks per desyatina, or 30 kopeks

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Gazetteer of the Peshawar District 1897–8}, 175.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 182–4.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 677.
Irrigation

243

per acre. Taking the value of the rupee c. 1910 to be 1s 4d,\textsuperscript{161} and the rouble (100 kopeks) to be 2s 1\(\frac{1}{4}\)d,\textsuperscript{162} we find that the average return to the State per acre directly from irrigation in India stood at 5s 8d, in Russian Turkestan at just under 8d. Even allowing for errors of calculation, once the lower levels of land revenue are considered as well, it is clear that cultivators in Turkestan were much less heavily imposed upon.

British irrigation administration was much more elaborate, and there is little doubt that the Imperial State in India had greater control over its subjects’ water use than in Turkestan. That said, both powers had difficulty in extending effective control over pre-existing irrigation networks, particularly away from the main canals. Alongside the British-built canal colonies and the Ganges and Jumna Canals, there were pockets of irrigation, in Oudh, the Bari doab, and particularly across the Indus, over which the British exercised little or no control. Such areas were proportionally much greater in Russian Turkestan, where the pre-existing network was so much more elaborate and comprehensive, and therefore this failure of knowledge had much more serious consequences. Russia had far fewer material resources than did Britain to bring to the task of irrigation, but far greater human ones in terms of the number of Slavs who had settled in Central Asia by the early 1900s. She largely failed to capitalize on the latter through a lack of specialized knowledge, although attempts were made to recruit more Russians as Aryk-Aksakals.

The closest parallels, therefore, are seen in the difficulties each colonial power faced when trying to take over earlier canal networks and understand the principles on which they were regulated, a task in which they both failed, by and large. Particularly given the use to which the new Russian canals were put, it seems that the peasantry of Turkestan escaped fairly lightly: thanks to the substantial control they continued to enjoy over their water supplies through Mirabs and Aryk-Aksakals they retained a good deal of local autonomy. It is always possible that the ryots of Punjab would have been happy to swap the Sukkur barrage for some of these advantages.


\textsuperscript{162} Karl Baedeker, \textit{Russia} (Leipzig, 1914), table facing title-page.
In the immediate aftermath of the conquest there was never any question of introducing the great legal reforms carried out just a year earlier in the European areas of the Russian Empire, which for the first time introduced some of the norms of western jurisprudence. The paraphernalia of an independent judiciary and the new civil law code were not considered appropriate for a still dangerously volatile and undeveloped area, so in this as in so many other ways Turkestan was excluded from the fledgling culture of Russian *grazhdanstvennost*, or citizenship. As in Siberia and Transcaucasia, military law was imposed and initially the judges in the Russian courts were military officers. Courts only existed at the *Uyezd* or District level, but even these played a fairly minor role in the meting out of justice. Far more important were the so-called ‘Military-Judicial Commission’ in Tashkent, under the control of the Governor-General and his executive, the provincial administrations with wide but ill-defined powers, and, finally, the District Commandants, who were empowered to pass judgment and hand out punishments on the spot, according to the ‘General Laws of the Empire’ (in which few, if any, had been trained). Distressing as this was to trained jurists, such flouting of the principle of the separation of powers (familiar to historians of British India in the figure of the magistrate-collector in Madras and Bombay) was of very little significance to the natives of Turkestan. This rough-and-ready system largely dealt with cases involving Russians, which in the early years of

---

1 Rudyard Kipling, ‘Gemini’, *Soldiers Three and Other Stories* (London, 1900), 269.
Russian rule meant the military themselves, and its jurisdiction over natives was limited to crimes considered politically threatening.³ The natives retained what the leading Russian expert on matters of Central Asian law described with some distaste as the ‘archaic popular judge’, the Qazi, administering Sharia,⁴ and in so far as they came into contact with the law at all, it was through him.

British and Russian administrators, faced with the task of devising a legal system for newly conquered Islamic peoples, generally failed to realize that the Sharia is ‘No codification of the law in any sense, nor can there ever be one’.⁵ It is an all-encompassing system of ethics derived from God, which determines the duties of Muslims as individuals and of the Islamic State, not the result of legislation or previous judgments; it cannot be altered by man. Islamic jurisprudence, Fiqh, does have a body of texts and interpretations to support it, but is still more flexible than colonial legislators realized. Its sources are: (1) the Koran; (2) the Sunna, or traditions; (3) Ijma, or consensus; and (4) Qiyas, or analogy. The Prophet’s own interpretations of the Koran, the hadith, formed part of the legal canon. Traditions, some of them spurious, based on the actions of the Prophet and his companions, and compiled in the texts of the great Muslim jurists of the ninth to tenth centuries AD, were another source of Fiqh.⁶ For most jurists Ijma, consensus, referred to the legal opinions of the Prophet’s companions and their immediate successors, and these could intervene in all branches of Islamic law. It was Qiyas, however, and the concept of Ijtihad, or the ‘open door’ of interpretation, which gave religious law a certain flexibility.⁷ In order to cover areas of law left cloudy or entirely untouched by the acknowledged authorities, human reasoning could be used to draw analogies with judgments in other areas of the law. To this could be added the idea of Istihbab, judgments which stretched Qiyas to its limits ‘in the general interests’. Only the most respected judges, or Mujtahids, were supposed to use Ijtihad and, in principle, it had given way to Taqlid, acceptance of the existing canon, in the tenth century AD.⁸ Nevertheless, the resulting body of Fiqh was
far from being a code: it varied according to the different legal schools (Hanafi, Hanbali, etc.), was sometimes contradictory, or capable of several interpretations, and could also be affected by prevailing custom in the region where it was practised: the Pathans, for instance, firmly believe that their own tribal custom, or Pukhtunwali, which almost certainly pre-dates their conversion to Islam, is identical with Sharia. The sheer diversity and pluralism of Islamic legal practice around the world, even when based on common texts and within the same legal schools, has only recently come to be fully appreciated. The Qazi accordingly could, and did, play an interpretative role as a judge.

A Qazi is supposed to be a Muslim scholar of blameless life, the principal upholder of the law in any Muslim polity. In fact by the nineteenth century almost all Islamic States had a twofold legal system, religious and temporal, and the jurisdiction of Qazis had become severely limited: they normally sat in judgment only on cases which in one way or another concerned religion, such as family law and inheritance, and the administration of waqf. Many civil and penal cases were left to the secular authorities and decided either on the basis of Qanun or of ‘Adat, even though this was a breach of Islamic legal theory. This tendency was particularly marked in the Ottoman Empire, which had a highly developed system of secular law, but further east in areas such as Sindh before the British conquest, the secular authority,

---

10 Michael Kemper (ed.), Rechtspluralismus in der Islamischen Welt. Gewohnheitsrecht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft (Berlin, 2005), 1–17. I must confess that as my German is poor I have only slogged through the introduction to this work (which pays particular attention to Islamic law in the Russian Empire, although curiously there is no essay on India).
12 Qanun—the general term for law in Persian, Arabic, and Urdu, often implying state legislation of some kind. ‘Adat—local customary law, which varied widely throughout the Islamic world.
13 ‘Kadi’, in EI 1 No. 27 Java–Kaikobad, 606–7 and EI 2 Vol. IV Iran–Kha 1978, 373–4; Rosen’s work on Morocco has led him to suggest that the Qazi’s function was simply to record evidence and encourage people to negotiate in matters relating to personal law, and that he had no particular connection to the state: Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice (Cambridge, 1999), 22–38. Gerber disagrees, arguing that Ottoman Qanun incorporated most precepts of the Sharia, and that Qazi (in seventeenth-century Bursa at least) were state officials with responsibility for most aspects of civil and criminal law; Haim Gerber, State, Society and Law in Islam (New York, 1994) 59, 61–3, 66–8, 76. If nothing else this dispute suggests that while the title remained the same, the role of the Qazi could vary widely throughout the Muslim world. I am not certain which of these models the pre-conquest Qazis in Turkestan most resembled.
in the form of the Amirs, was also supreme in civil and criminal cases, and Qazis dealt only with Muslim personal law. Ashraf Ghani writes that even after the process of ‘bureaucratization’ of the Qazis’ role in Afghanistan under Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan in the 1880s, they still only had responsibility for personal and some property law, together with the registering of deeds and transactions, whilst serious matters of criminal and civil law were the preserve of Provincial Governors and their officials. The available sources make it hard to pronounce authoritatively on the precise extent of the jurisdiction of Qazis in Bukhara before the conquest. The Diary of Muhammad Sharif-e Sadr-e Ziya, a Qazi in the Bukharan protectorate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rarely reveals the precise nature of the cases he was called upon to judge, referring instead simply to being occupied in ‘Sharia Matters’ without specifying what these are most of the time, no doubt on the presumption that it would be obvious to any reader. Donish states that when a serious case of armed robbery and murder occurred in Ghijduvan, the local judges and police authorities were not permitted to handle the case. It had to be referred to the personal attention of the Emir, and as he observes, with typical venom, by the time he got around to dealing with it the thieves were probably ‘in Khorezm’.

Thus in Bukhara and Kokand prior to the conquest the jurisdiction of the Qazis does seem to have been limited to certain civil cases, whilst the power of life and death was reserved to the Emir himself and to the Beks. The absolute primacy of religious law in Muslim states was, however, a common assumption amongst European Orientalists in the nineteenth century and, where secular law was identified, it was regarded either as a temporary corruption or as mere local custom. An interesting comparison is offered by Vladimir Bobrovnikov and Michael Kemper’s work on Sharia and ‘Adat in Daghestan, where the Russians after 1860 were presented with an extremely diverse

16 Edward Allworth (ed.), The Personal History of a Bukharan Intellectual (Leiden, 2004). At 258–9 he does imprison a Shia gunsmith who accidentally shot a potter, but only after consulting with an assembly of the ‘ulama and Amirs as to the best means of settling the matter, suggesting that it did not fall within his sole jurisdiction.
17 Donish, Istoriya Mangitskoi Dinastii, 81–2.
18 Khanikoff, Bokhara, 231–2, 247–8. Whilst observing this, he nevertheless upholds the absolute primacy of Muslim religious law in Bukhara, see 263–5.
and fragmented system of customary and Islamic law. Here, although initially a role for Qazis was envisaged in matters of family and inheritance law, Bariatinsky, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, attempted to create a system based purely upon ‘Adat. It was envisaged as a bulwark against the Sharia law introduced by Sheikh Mansur, Ghazi Muhammad, and Shamil, which Lt-Gen. A. V. Komarov, the Military Commandant of Southern Daghestan in 1868, thought had been abandoned by the local population after Shamil’s capture (Bobrovnikov argues that Sharia already had a profound influence on Daghestani ‘Adat in the first half of the eighteenth century, and that it was much more persistent than the Russians realized). Successive attempts were made to codify ‘Adat based largely on oral interviews, without making use of the compilations of ‘Adat in Arabic which, Kemper argues, could be found in many Daghestani villages. When a leading comparative jurist, M. M. Kovalevsky (who, interestingly, was much influenced by Sir Henry Maine, the pioneer of comparative legal anthropology, who drew many of his examples from India), did make use of these for his work in the 1880s, he found that Daghestani ‘Adat showed substantial Islamic influence, and indeed suggested that Sharia might form a better means of civilizing the population and bringing them closer to Russian norms, although this was never adopted. This suggests still more strongly that Sharia and ‘Adat cannot always be easily disentangled, but such considerations did not weigh heavily with those devising the legal system for Turkestan. Bobrovnikov may be correct in asserting that in nomadic Transcaspia (which was part of the Caucasian Viceroyalty until 1898) a similar ‘Adat-centred system was applied, and the role of the Qazis reduced to a consultative one, but this was not true in the settled regions of Turkestan. Governor Kryzhanovskiy of Orenburg stated in his 1866 report to the Tsar that all judicial power among the Sarts rested with the Qazis, who were obliged to follow ‘the only existing law in Asia, the Sharia’. The Steppe Commission followed his lead and made the assumption that, whilst

19 Bobrovnikov, Musul’mane Severnogo Kavkaza, 136–41.
22 Bobrovnikov, Musul’mane Severnogo Kavkaza, 169–70.
nomads, only partially Islamized, followed ‘Adat, Sharia was supreme in the settled areas of Turkestan and that the Qazis represented the only legal authority there. The evidence available suggests that this assumption was unwarranted.

The Pahlen Report, in its survey of the role of the Qazis before the conquest, described their power and consequence as ‘enormous’, adding that appeals against their decisions could only be made to the Khan or Emir or occasionally to the Bek.²⁴ L. F. Kostenko’s brief description of the judicial system which the Russians found in place at the time of the conquest is considerably earlier and perhaps more reliable. Qazis were appointed by the Beks on the basis of their standing as scholars of the Koran and of the Sharia, after a lengthy madrasah education. They were assisted by Muftis, who took down witness statements, carried out enquiries into cases, and wrote down the judgments. The number of Qazis in a particular town or region was not defined, nor was the sphere of their responsibilities: people brought cases to whichever judge they wanted to hear them, although both parties had to consent to the choice. Judgment was given in the open, before all who wished to attend, and the Qazi acted as a mediator between parties in dispute rather than the upholder of a code enforced by the State. If a particularly thorny case came up, a congress of Qazis and Muftis could be convened to decide it. Kostenko claimed that the Sharia was, in fact, frequently breached and the law would be bent in favour of whoever provided the largest bribe.²⁵ The problem of ‘the bad Qazi’ seems to have been a perennial one and many sources claim that throughout the Islamic world it had been many years since they met the theoretical requirements for education and probity.²⁶ In the late seventeenth century Khoja Samandar Termezi mocked the fondness of a Qazi in Kerminhe for fine silk turbans and luxurious dress.²⁷ Ahmad Donish wrote that Nizamuddin, the Qazi-e Kalan under Emir Daniyal (reigned AD 1758–85), despite being a Sayyid, openly smoked tobacco, drank wine, and took bribes.²⁸ Nevertheless, it is unclear how much credence should be lent to this last statement, as the Russians themselves frequently claimed in later years that before the conquest Qazis had been much less corruptible than they were thereafter. Both Muhammad Sharif-e Sadr-e Ziya and his

²⁵ Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya, 63–4.
²⁶ ‘Kadi’, EI¹ 607.
²⁸ Donish, Istoriya Mangitskoi Dinastii, 27.
father, Damullah ‘Abd al-Shukur, Qazis under the Bukharan regime, seem to have been well educated, humane, and high-minded men: the latter was described by some jealous contemporaries as ‘unlearned’, but this seems merely to have been a snobbish reference to his family background in wool-bleaching, as he had distinguished himself at the madrasah.²⁹ Given that Qazis’ positions, and the number of cases they received (for which they were paid by the parties involved), depended on their reputations as ‘ulama, corruption may have been less widespread than Kostenko claimed. In any case, this problem did not exercise the official mind as much as the intimate link perceived between justice and religion in Turkestan, a link the Russians desired to break, but didn’t quite dare to.

General Cherniaev had given some encouragement to the Muslim judiciary in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Tashkent, confirming the Qazi-e Kalan ³⁰ in his position and putting his signature to a proclamation drawn up by the ‘ulama of the city, indicating, among other things, that Muslim law would be upheld.³¹ Robert Crews takes this, and the conciliatory policies adopted by his successor, D. I. Romanovsky, to be evidence that the same ‘Confessional State’ that existed in the Volga region and Orenburg was being created in Turkestan,³² but Cherniaev’s policy of alliance with the religious elite was to prove short-lived and was clearly viewed with disapproval even before von Kaufman’s appointment in 1867. In his annual report to the Tsar for 1866 the Governor of Orenburg, Kryzhanovksy, was at some pains to explain the confusion, as he saw it, of judicial and spiritual power in the region. He pointed out that all Qazis required a madrasah education, where they were taught by the ‘ulama and studied alongside future Muslim clerics; consequently no real distinction could be made between the clergy and the judiciary in

²⁹ Allworth, Bukharan Intellectual, 1, 6, 119; one must tread carefully here owing to the hagiographical nature of the introduction to this interesting text, which was written by Ziya’s son.
³⁰ ‘Great Judge’, the principal Qazi of Tashkent, to whom appeals could be made.
³¹ Schuyler provides a translation: ‘Let the Mullahs constantly go to their Schools and teach the laws of the Muhammadan faith . . . let children not for one hour miss their lessons . . . and if the parents show carelessness in this, let them in accordance with the Mohammedan Sharia be brought to the Reis, the head of the city, or Kazi Kilian, and be well punished.’ Schuyler, Turkistan, Vol. I, fn. to 116.
³² Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, 241–3; for Romanovsky’s (1825–1905) biographical details, see Baskhanov, Voennyje Vostokovedy, 206. He had a somewhat chequered past, having been reduced to the ranks in 1852 for ‘illegal conduct’.
Turkestan. He went on to discuss the behaviour of the Qazi-e Kalan in Tashkent:

Taking advantage of our mistaken belief in the importance of the clergy, which had taken root in the immediate aftermath of the conquest, the Qazi-e Kalan naturally found it very convenient not to sow seeds of doubt in the minds of the conquerors, and passing himself off as the head of the clergy, took for himself from those very conquerors powers to which he was in no way entitled. In order to strengthen his position still further in 1865, when the chief officer of the region [Cherniaev] was in Tashkent, the Qazi-e Kalan composed an address requesting Russian citizenship, but accompanied by conditions which would have placed the entire region in dependence on him personally, and on the entire clergy; this address could not in any way be accepted by our government.³³

In fact, all he succeeded in securing was the abolition of his office entirely, and his actions reinforced Russian suspicions of ‘fanatical’ Islamic conspiracy in the region. The undesirability of allowing the traditionally educated ‘ulama to monopolize the judiciary could scarcely have presented itself more forcefully, but all the same there were no immediate plans to abolish the position of Qazi, or replace Sharia with Russian military law. Schuyler’s assessment of the motives behind the Russian decision to retain this bulwark of Islamic civilization in Turkestan is an interesting one, not least for his reference to events in India, although it seems likely the example of the Caucasus was more important.

When the Russians occupied Tashkent and prepared regulations for the government of the country it was considered best not to touch the principle of the native courts . . . The Russians had the examples of the Caucasus and the Crimea, where the Kazis had been retained, and where by giving a right of appeal or choice, on consent of both the parties, to the Russian Court, the importance of the Kazis had gradually diminished, and the jurisdiction of the Russian courts had greatly extended among the Mussulman natives, except for family matters. The Russians, too, might have learned something from the English in India. In 1864 the Kazis in India were abolished, a step which caused great discontent among the Mussulmans.³⁴

Not only were the resources, in terms both of men and money unavailable, the Russians were always cautious about provoking the ‘fanatical’ instincts of their new subjects, and this was a measure which, in their eyes, would be almost certain to bring about widespread revolt. The experiences of the Russian authorities with nomadic ‘Adat also had

a considerable influence on the policy adopted in the settled regions of Turkestan. The earliest thinking on civilizing the inorodtsy through legal reform came from Mikhail Speransky, then Governor of Western Siberia, who drew up the ‘regulations for the Siberian Kirghiz’ in 1822, an attempt to modernize the Adat, whilst at the same time giving nomads a law code suited to their ‘primitive’ state of development, which would be administered by traditional judges, or Biis. Over succeeding decades the Steppe Commission made repeated, but fruitless, attempts to impose a fixed form of the Adat (aimed at preventing, for instance, the practice of baramta, or livestock raiding), finally abandoning the struggle in 1861.³⁵ The pessimism this engendered regarding the willingness and capacity of inorodtsy to submit to legal change is reflected in the cautious way in which the Russians approached reforming the Sharia courts among the settled population. Together with the Qazi-e Kalan the office of Ra‘is, who inflicted corporal punishment for breaches of religion,³⁶ was abolished, but otherwise the resultant compromise was an odd one. Parallel to the Russian military courts Qazis were given jurisdiction over all civil and commercial cases solely involving natives up to a value of 100 roubles, whilst cases involving amounts up to 2,000 roubles would be handled by a ‘congress’ of Qazis working together. They could also judge criminal cases that did not involve Russians, although, in theory at least, they could no longer impose sentences of death, amputation, or flogging, or indeed anything more severe than a 300-rouble fine or 18 months’ imprisonment; a congress of Qazis could, however, send a guilty criminal into exile in Siberia or pass a sentence of katorga—forced labour.³⁷ They would still administer judgment according to what the Russians referred to simply as Sharia, a mixture of local custom and religious law that was left largely unchanged. Their decisions could be taken to Russian courts on appeal, but only if both parties agreed, greatly limiting this possibility.³⁸ Although Qazis were now State servants, no fixed rate of remuneration was established for them: instead they were to continue to levy their fees from the parties who brought cases to them. In an effort to reduce religious influence a madrasah education was no longer required, although most would continue to have a traditional Islamic training, and no qualification was required of candidates other

³⁵ Martin, Law and Custom, 35–6, 44–8.
³⁶ Brower, Turkestan, 34; Khanikoff, Bokhara, 248.
³⁷ PSZ Sob.3, Vol. VI 1886, No. 3814, 217–33; Kraft, Sudebnaya Chast’; 57; Palen, Otchet, Tom 14, 7.
than that they be over 25 and not subject to any criminal accusations. Above all, they would now be elected, like other members of the native administration, for three-year terms, and their appointments subject to confirmation by the Russian authorities (the position of Bii also became elective in nomadic areas after 1868).\footnote{Martin, \textit{Law and Custom}, 53.}

Schuyler was somewhat puzzled by this decision and attributed it to a deeply held belief in the virtue of the principle of election in local self-government, which seems questionable. He was, however, alive to the problems which already, at the time of his visit in 1872, bedevilled elections to positions in Turkestan’s native judiciary:

Though the Russians had every right and reason to follow the example of the previous Central Asiatic rulers and appoint the Kazis, yet, from a curious devotion to the principle of popular election, which in a country like this, accustomed only to arbitrary rule, was of very doubtful application, established that they should be elected for a limited term by the very best men of the community, in the same manner as the \textit{Aksakals} and police officials. This elective system has turned out very badly, bribery and corruption having become prevalent in the elections, and direct pressure being at times exerted by the authorities for their favourites, certain persons being excluded from the lists as being fanatical, and the choice of certain candidates almost commanded.\footnote{Schuyler, \textit{Turkistan}, Vol. I, 168–9.}

There were certainly limits to the Russian ‘devotion to the principle of popular election’ and the authorities’ veto was frequently exercised. More serious in the long term was the fact that \textit{Qazis} could now be chosen not on the basis of their knowledge of the \textit{Sharia} or standing as \textit{‘ulama}, but because they could Rally a party of supporters amongst the wealthy householders who made up the electors or were simply the tool of a particular faction. Indeed, at least one scholar has claimed that the election of \textit{Qazis} was designed deliberately to undermine their moral authority\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 69.} and over the years it gradually altered the nature of the office and the profile of those holding it.

\section*{QAZIS AS SERVANTS OF THE TSAR}

In the Zarafshan \textit{Okrug}, many of the \textit{‘ulama}, including \textit{Qazis}, had fled to Bukhara at the time of the conquest, and the remainder were dismissed. Until the electoral system was put in place in 1871, their replacements

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Martin} Martin, \textit{Law and Custom}, 53.
\bibitem{Khalid} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 69.
\end{thebibliography}
were appointed directly by the Russian authorities, who made sure they were reasonably compliant. The first Qazi in Katta-Kurgan after the conquest, Mullah Fazil, was appointed personally by von Kaufman shortly after the relief of the Samarkand Citadel in 1868. Reminiscing many years later he said: ‘When I was appointed Qazi in Katta-Kurgan by his Excellency, Governor-General von Kaufman, he said to me: apart from the death penalty and the amputation of hands, feet etc., you can do everything according to the Sharia, you may inquire after the legality of all taxes, and where you notice some crime or other, you can bring it to the notice of the authorities.’ By 1872 General Abramov had appointed several more Qazis, but von Kaufman’s injunction to refrain from amputations and corporal punishment was being consistently ignored, largely because the Russians had forbidden the use of the Bukharan-era Zindan (gaol) and Katta-Kurgan still had no modern replacement in which miscreants could be incarcerated instead. This state of affairs continued until 1878–9; one of those so punished, Umarbek Abdurasulev, who had received 400 lashes, was still alive in 1912.

If many Bukharan-era punishments continued long after their formal abolition by the Russian authorities, there were signs early on that those the Russians were appointing as Qazis were sometimes rather different from their Bukharan predecessors. L. F. Kostenko, visiting Samarkand in 1870, only two years after the Russian conquest, found the new Russian-appointed Qazi to be a young man of 36, his European tastes clearly shown by the Russian furniture and bottles of wine, sherry, and champagne in his house:

In place of several judges (Qazis) only one was chosen, whose significance, for this reason, was considerably greater. Indebted to the Russians for his power and significance, the new Samarkand Qazi sincerely defends Russian interests. He is still young for his calling: he is not more than 36 years old, when previously, only those of age and experience were chosen for this position.

Although he does not give his name, it seems certain that this Qazi is Mufti Mullah Kamaladdin Kuz-Falak, who, according to Sami, pleased von Kaufman with a sycophantic speech after the initial capture

---

42 Fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vespoddanneisbegho Ocheta, 68.
43 F. Pospelov, Materialy k Istorii Samarkandskoi Oblasti (Samarkand, 1912), 16–17.
44 Ibid., 18.
45 His youth may not have been a Russian innovation. In 1893 Muhammad Sharif-e Sadr-e Ziya was made Qazi of the Tuman of Khayrabad in the Bukharan protectorate at the tender age of 26; Allworth, Bukharan Intellectual, 142.
46 L. F. Kostenko, Puteshestvie v Bukharu Russkoi Missii v 1870 godu (St Pb., 1871), 29.
of Samarkand and was promptly made the chief Qazi of the city.\textsuperscript{47} Kostenko did not think much of this Russian stooge and his opinion seems to have been widely shared; the Qazi himself had a very high regard for his own abilities as an interpreter of the Sharia and was keen to impress on his guests his utter devotion to Russian interests, but in conversation after their rather bibulous dastarkhan\textsuperscript{48} he revealed that he was not unchallenged:

I have placed my son in school, where he has been learning the Russian language.\textsuperscript{49} I have introduced Russian norms into my house, so that I can meet with our dear guests according to their own customs. My enemies—he continued—cannot forgive me either my youth or my importance—that is why they slander me, attempting to discredit me in the opinion of the Russians, spreading various fables and, in the eyes of the people, making me out to be a champion of the kafirs.\textsuperscript{50}

In 1871 Kamaladdin’s fears were realized and he was dismissed, sending an abject petition requesting reinstatement to the Tsar in 1872, in which he spoke of his unwavering devotion to Russian interests (the petition got no further than von Kaufman, who ignored it, and Kamaladdin died of cholera later that year).\textsuperscript{51} He was not alone in being the subject of such accusations, slanderous or otherwise: the Chancellery records of the first ten years of Russian rule in the Zarafshan Valley reveal immense difficulties with the Qazis, whose corruption, partiality, and ignorance of the Sharia were repeatedly the subject of petitions to the District Commandants. One such petition from the inhabitants of Katta-Kurgan complaining about their Qazi Ahmed, having been ignored by the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug was then submitted to the Governor-General. They claimed that Ahmed was in the pocket of the rich inhabitants of the town, having married the daughter of a particularly wealthy and influential merchant, and that he now took bribes freely and refused to listen to cases brought before him by the poor, while the rich were allowed to get away scot-free:\textsuperscript{52} he was

\textsuperscript{47} Sami, \textit{Ta’rikh-i Salatin-i Mangitiia}, trans., 78–9.
\textsuperscript{48} Literally a tablecloth, but in Central Asia it means a ‘spread’ of food and alcohol to welcome a guest.
\textsuperscript{49} This was the little school set up by Sultanov in 1870: ‘Iz Samarkanda’, \textit{TV}, 10 May 1871, No. 15.
\textsuperscript{50} Kostenko, \textit{Puteshestvie v Bukhharu}, 31.
\textsuperscript{51} ZSp TsGARUz F.1 Op.20 D.6,493, ‘Pis’mo Kamalerdina syna mulla-Mukhamed Gal’yam muftiya russkomu Tsaryu (usl.)’.
\textsuperscript{52} TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.300, 3–4.
Figure 7. Kamaladdin Kuz-Falak, the Qazi of Samarkand. Turkestanii Al’bom (1871) Part 2, Vol. 1, pl. 66, No.188. Library of Congress Ref: LC-DIG-ppmsca-09951-00188
making decisions ‘contrary to the Sharia’, a refrain that was to become wearisomely familiar to Russian administrators dealing with challenges to the justice of the Qazis’ rulings. In this instance, however, the petition did not originate with the unsuccessful party in a case. It had 46 signatories from 15 different villages, almost all of whom styled themselves ‘mullah’; in other words, it appeared to be a protest against the Qazi by a portion of the ‘ulama. Despite a final paragraph in which they addressed von Kaufman as the ‘father, brother and tsar of all the poor’ and appealed to the justice of Russian law, the Governor-General was unmoved, and returned the petition to the Zarafshan Okrug’s Chancellery.⁵³ The fact that most of the signatories were mullahs put the Russians on their guard against ‘Islamic fanaticism’. When the head of the Katta-Kurgan District wrote about Ahmed’s case to General Ivanov, head of the Zarafshan Okrug on 27 October 1877, he put the matter thus:

The ringleader in all this is Mullah Jalil, who was summoned by Staff-Captain Khoshaev for questioning on this matter. This same man, in the headquarters of the Otdel and in the presence of a translator anddjigitbegan to incite and instruct other inhabitants summoned for interrogation on this matter. In this way it quickly became clear that the matter was one of the personal dissatisfaction of various individuals with the Katta-Kurgan Qazi, who want to occupy some position or other themselves. Although, on the other hand, one cannot entirely ignore the general petitions of the inhabitants against the Katta-Kurgan Qazi and his not always unbiased activities, in view of the fact that there is no factual proof to support the accusations against Qazi Mullah Ahmed, I would submit that the matter be left without issue, in order not to give the population cause in future to make general petitions, which have as their object the indictment of individuals placed in various positions in the Russian administration, and which would put in their hands the right to make noisy accusations based on their own petty motives.⁵⁴

He concluded that ‘If the Katta-Kurgan Qazi is unworthy of his position then the remaining Qazis of the Katta-Kurgan Otdel are still less worthy of theirs.’⁵⁵ Another petition was quickly forthcoming, giving further details of the Qazi’s misdemeanours and pointing to collusion with other members of the native administration in preventing word of his crimes from reaching the Russian authorities:

In the Kurgan and around the Kurgan, in the environs, he has suborned several of the elder individuals within families, and with their aid arranges matters

⁵³ Ibid., 5ob. ⁵⁴ Ibid., 9ob. ⁵⁵ Ibid., 10.
so that those amongst the poor people... cannot present their claims. Thus, in circumstances where the latter decide to appeal with their petition, those individuals corrupted by the Qazi, in their mutual strength, refute the claims of the unhappy plaintiffs and they are deprived of any possibility of having success in their affair before the District Commandant.⁵⁶

Once again almost all of its 61 signatories were mullahs, and the Russians treated it in a similarly peremptory manner—perhaps rightly, as no hard evidence was offered. Yet another petition swiftly followed, making similar accusations of corruption and signed by 30 mullahs;⁵⁷ 43 further complaints were received over the course of the year, including one from the former Aksakal of the village of Kurp claiming the Qazi had allowed a thief who had stolen his horse to escape and demanded a 50-rouble bribe for the return of the horse.⁵⁸ Assessing the validity of these accusations is difficult, although if nothing else they betray considerable discontent among the body of ‘ulama in Katta-Kurgan over the appointment of Ahmed as Qazi. The Russians believed firmly that, while Ahmed might be no paragon of virtue, the opposition to him was motivated purely by motives of jealousy and ‘religious fanaticism’ on the part of mullahs who had been overlooked for the post, or disapproved of any collaboration with the Kafirs. One indication that they might not have been entirely wrong is provided by a petition submitted in support of Ahmed’s tenure, signed, significantly perhaps, by 112 ‘inhabitants’ of 14 different villages rather than by those who styled themselves ‘mullah’:

We have not seen any wrongs or crimes... it was noted that if there were wrongs or crimes in such a case we would turn to you to ask for the appointment of such a Qazi as Mullah Ahmed and we would always be grateful. Rumours have come to us that some Mullahs have petitioned against the Qazi. These petitions are false and untrue as is clear from the petitions of the people.⁵⁹

Equally, however, Mullah Ahmed could simply have arranged for this public gesture of support to be made. This dispute is similar to those in the Kazan and Orenburg regions described by Robert Crews, where during the 1840s and 50s in particular villagers and rival members of the ‘ulama frequently submitted petitions denouncing local imams and mullahs, claiming that they breached religious orthodoxy and were

acting contrary to the Sharia. Crews interprets this as the Tsarist State playing an important confessional role in the settlement of religious disputes, and in the establishment of Islamic Orthodoxy, whilst at the same time acknowledging that many petitions were probably simply motivated by malice.⁶⁰ In Turkestan, outside the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mufti, and where the State deliberately tried to disengage itself from Islam, it is highly unlikely that Muslims really considered the District Commandants and Military Governors to whom their petitions were addressed to be arbiters of religious Orthodoxy: they were simply seeking to involve them in their local disputes.⁶¹ As we can see from this example, denouncing a political opponent as a ‘fanatic’, or an ‘Ishan’, was a far more effective means of attracting official suspicion towards him than accusations of heterodoxy: instead it was Mullah Ahmed’s accusers who came under suspicion from the Russians. Petitions are a rich source for the native administration in Turkestan and, indeed, one which is almost impossible to avoid, given their sheer number, but they are far from being a reliable gauge of public opinion. Normally, they are simply pointers thrown up by the struggle between different factions in native society, reflecting little but the wealth or coercive power of the party in question: it is naïve to think otherwise.

**TINKERING WITH THE ISLAMIC COURTS**

Initially, the number of judicial appointments made by the Russians was reduced from Bukharan times. In Samarkand, as previously mentioned, in place of eight Qazis initially just one was chosen for the entire city. In 1869 the Commandant of the Samarkand District wrote to General Abramov, asking if eight of the city’s ten Muftis could be dismissed, as he felt that two would be quite adequate. He then warned that all of those sacked had now joined the ‘clerical party’ in the city, led by one Mullah Urumbai. The ‘ulama were now pressing for this man’s appointment as Qazi, which, he added, should under no circumstances be countenanced, despite popular pressure.⁶²

---

⁶⁰ Crews, ‘Empire and the Confessional State’, 66–75.

⁶¹ None of the Turkestani examples cited by Crews suggests anything to the contrary: *For Prophet and Tsar*, 260–72.

This reduction in numbers was due partly to the fact that, for the first time, Qazis would have specific judicial divisions for which they were responsible. Equally, the population no longer had any choice as to which Qazi they brought their grievances to: it had to be the one within whose district they lived. By 1877 the judicial divisions presided over by the Qazis had been firmly established. There was a total of 18 Qazis for the entire Zarafshan Okrug, 57,073 households, a population estimated by the Russians at approximately 285,000. However, seven of these were based in the mountainous region of the Upper Zarafshan with responsibility for just 9,318 households, or a population of 46,000. This was largely because difficulties of communication in the region rendered it imperative that each of the seven mountain ‘Tumans’ (settlement divisions) have its own judge. However, this left the remaining population of the lower Zarafshan, roughly 240,000 people, with just 11 Qazis, although each had several Muftis. The Commandant of the Samarkand District reported that the regions judges were expected to cover were far too large, and that rather than judging cases themselves the majority were delegated to hastily appointed Muftis, who were given the right to use the Qazi’s seal. He wrote to General Ivanov in November 1877:

The organisation of congresses of Qazis has not been established, and the individual judge is investigating civil cases... over such enormous regions, that each of the seven Qazis in the Samarkand Otdel has become a simple affixer of seals—all court cases and other areas under their jurisdiction are de facto undertaken by their delegated subordinates, that is the Qazis’ assistants and their Muftis. It is the responsibilities of the judge under this organisation which is responsible for all the insufficiencies and slowness of the judicial process, and its injustice, examples of which are already sufficiently well known to me after just a short time.

He wanted to increase the number of Qazis in his District alone to 12 and, whilst there was considerable reluctance to reinforce the role of the native judiciary, an expansion in their numbers did take place. By the early 1880s there were 250 Qazis in Turkestan, of whom 46 were in the area that subsequently became Samarkand Province.

Despite early attempts to transform and ‘secularize’ the profile of the Qazis in the Zarafshan Valley, there are numerous indications that

---

63 See Appendix 9 and TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.299, 2, 11–ob, 16.
64 Ibid., 7ob–8.
progress, if any, was slow. In 1882 Mullah Sharif Khoja testified to his embarrassment and shame at being removed from the post of *Mufti* and asked to be reinstated in a petition to the Governor of the Zarafshan *Okrug*. He claimed that his family had provided *Qazis* and *Muftis* in Samarkand for several generations, remarking that he had served the Russians in this capacity as loyally as his father had served the Bukharan authorities:66

For almost 30 years, since my father’s time, when the latter was *Qazi* and *Mufti* in Samarkand and a *Mudaris*, I occupied myself with matters relating to these positions; after this I spent a little time in Bukhara where I heard lessons in the madrasah; after this, having finished the course, in the time of King Timur [?], I spent all my time occupied with the duties of a *Mufti*; when the Russians arrived, a rumour of my *bona fides* reached the Russian *Nachalnik*, and I was a *Mufti* for a few years more. Up until now I had fulfilled these duties for two years when the Mahallinsk *Volost Upravitel*, Mirza-Hakim, a thief, blackened my name in the eyes of the District Commandant, telling him that I do not fulfil the demands of the administration, abuse the people and take bribes from them . . . and the District Commandant, basing his judgment purely on the unsubstantiated testimony of Mirza-Hakim, did not mount the necessary investigation, and at once sent me away from Samarkand . . . I have nine children, and no means of support: apart from the duties of *Mudaris* and *Mufti* I have no abilities. The District Commandant still believes the suspect deposition of Mirza-Hakim and will not give me a job as *Mudaris*. How am I to live with my children?67

Whether or not the accusations against him were justified, this petition not only gives another glimpse into the murky politics of the native administration but also shows that Russian attempts to transform the profile of those becoming *Qazis* were meeting with little success at this stage. The Girs Commission, in fact, revealed that in 1883, out of the 253 *Qazis* serving in the Samarkand, Ferghana, and Syr-Darya Provinces, 225 had the usual madrasah education.68 However, if their religious credentials were unaffected, their morals frequently left a good deal to be desired. In 1883 Nizamuddin Khoja, the Samarkand *Qazi*, was found to have been smuggling opium into Russian Turkestan from Bukhara in collusion with a customs official, as well as accepting bribes and loaning money to Samarkand’s leading pimp, seizing thirteen prostitutes when he failed to pay up on time. Bizarrely it was not so

---

66 TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,056, 1–2.  
67 Ibid., 1-ob.  
much this as his growing reputation for religious ‘fanaticism’ which persuaded the Russian authorities that the time had come to dismiss him. The Samarkand District Commandant, perhaps conscious that he had been somewhat at fault, began his report with a fulsome digression on the general reliability of the native administration in Samarkand since his appointment in 1877 (something not borne out by the documentary record) before launching into his explanation:

Instances of misdemeanours by officials in the Samarkand Otdel have been very rare, and the archives of the administration are entirely free of files relating to crimes committed by Volost officials and on the part of Qazis [!] ⁶⁹

Unfortunately, I am obliged to present an abnormal exception in the official dealings of the Samarkand Qazi, Nizamuddin Khoja. This Qazi was chosen by the townsfolk for two three-year terms, not so much for his non-existent virtues as an even-handed judge, as because of the fanatical influence of the ‘ulama and Khojas over the people. He cannot be considered useful to Russian affairs in the region, especially in Samarkand, and he never has been considered by me to be sufficiently devoted to Government interests—or adequate in fulfilling his duties—or appropriately truthful and honourable as a judge. On the contrary, hypocrisy, cunning resourcefulness, dishonesty and excessive greed were and remain the defining particularities of the character of Nizamuddin Khoja, which also distinguish his conduct as Town Qazi.⁷⁰

This begs the question of why his election was permitted in the first place, given that the Russian authorities had a power of veto over all judicial appointments. It is hard to believe that if he had already been known to be a corrupt tool of ‘fanatical’ clerical interests within the city he would have been appointed at all. This is almost certainly hindsight, or merely a clumsy attempt at self-exculpation by the commandant. Whatever the truth about his alleged connections with the ‘ulama, his other crimes do not seem to have been in doubt, a worrying indication of the sort of Qazis who were sometimes thrown up by the electoral system.

Together with corruption among those in post, the elections themselves continued to be a source of constant appeals to the Russian administration. In 1884, for instance, a petition was received from the former Qazi of Penjikent, Mullah ‘Abd ul-Samad, protesting against the failure to re-elect him to the position after fifteen years of service. He claimed that the Volost Upravitel, Muhammad-Amin Karimov, had bribed the electors in order to oust him and that his replacement was

⁶⁹ See, Ch. 5 passim. ⁷⁰ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,305, 2–3ob.
ignorant of the basic principles of the *Sharia*. The investigation of his claim revealed him to be extremely unpopular in the Aftobruinskii *Volost* and found no evidence of bribery. Furthermore, the new *Qazi* turned out to have a perfectly adequate madrasah education. ⁷¹

FROM *QAZI* TO ‘POPULAR JUDGE’

The *Qazis* and their role came in for considerable scrutiny by the Girs Commission, as calls for the abolition of *Sharia* were heard in the press and from officials; they went unheeded. Ignatiev explained why such a measure would be premature, and possibly dangerous:

The popular court is needed by the people, as it agrees with their customs, understanding and traditions, a premature breaking of which could bring more harm than good . . . The understanding of justice amongst the natives is to a considerable degree different from ours. Muslim law, whether customary, or codified by the *Sharia*, has so little in common with Russian; the popular understanding and world view of the natives is in many cases so contrary to ours, that not even every Russian judge is in a position to comprehend, in sufficient detail, the various norms of this law and the opinions of the natives, rooted in this world-view, with regard to the judicial system. To acquire a mastery of these matters is rendered still more difficult, in the commission’s opinion, because Russian officials, even those in positions which bring them constantly into contact with the people, are only very superficially acquainted with Muslim jurisprudence, and are almost entirely ignorant of native languages. ⁷²

In an effort to combat corruption and the buying of elections, the commission suggested that the system of indirect election be altered, with three candidates placed on a shortlist and then chosen by the Military Governor. ⁷³ This proposal was not adopted, but Ignatiev wrote with approval of the reform commission’s decision not to introduce any educational requirements ‘because education in a madrasah, limited to the study of the Koran and its many interpretations, on the whole does not conduce to general progress, and rather leads to a contrary result, encouraging fanaticism in all its forms’. ⁷⁴ In any case, he added, under the current rules, out of 253 *Qazis* in Turkestan only three were illiterate, so there were no real problems—what more could one ask?

---

⁷¹ TsGARUz F.5 Op.1 D.1,491 1–50b.
⁷⁴ Ignat’ev, *Ob’yasnitel’naya Zapiska*, 78.
The 1885–6 reforms in the aftermath of the Girs Commission’s report did recommend some changes to the Turkestan judicial system, partly because the number of cases heard annually by the Russian courts had reached 10,731 in 1882, and the existing structures were inadequate.⁷⁵ Overall control was transferred to the Justice Ministry in St Petersburg, and the judiciary was separated from the executive at the provincial level, where courts were set up. Although the Mirovoi (Magistrates’) courts in Turkestan were still controlled by the military, they did now implement the legal code of 1864. However, as an article in Vostochnoe Obozrenie pointed out, in practice the provincial administration still acted as a first court of appeal in all civil cases where more than 2,000 roubles were at stake, and, more importantly, in all cases involving crimes committed by officials, making a nonsense of any idea of separation of powers and maintaining much of the pre-reform system.⁷⁶

At the bottom end of the hierarchy, the Qazis were renamed Narodnye Sudy, or ‘Popular Judges’, and their term of office was extended to five years, on account of the disruption caused by elections (in 1898 this was again reduced to three). Their numbers were increased, rising to a total of 275 for the whole of Turkestan (excluding Transcaspia) by 1905.⁷⁷ No attempt was made to make them salaried officials, although the rate at which they levied their fees was fixed (in theory) at 0.5 per cent of the sum in dispute, whilst their Muftis were allowed to levy between 20 kopeks and 10 roubles.⁷⁸ Although in essence their role remained unchanged, as did the Sharia law which they implemented, certain crimes against the State were removed from their jurisdiction.⁷⁹ The only significant change was that which made the withholding of revenue a crime to be tried in the Russian courts, as this was a very common offence and one extensively used as an excuse for prosecution by Qazis engaged in local feuds. On the other hand, the process of appeal to the new provincial courts was, if anything, complicated further: cases could still only be brought to them on appeal if both parties consented, and in theory Qazis’ judgments in criminal cases could no longer be appealed against.

⁷⁵ Girs, Otchet, 204.
⁷⁶ ‘Khod Sudebnoi Reformy v Turkestanskom Krae’, VO No. 45 1885, in TS, 395 (1908), 134.
⁷⁸ Ibid., 34.
⁷⁹ PSZ Sob.3 Vol. VI 1886 No. 3,814, 141; Kraft, Sudebnaya Chast’, 67. These were the following crimes: against the Christian religion; Governmental; against administrative order; in Government service; failure to fulfil obligations to Government; against Government property or revenues; against social order.
at all, although this became a dead letter.⁸⁰ Many people stuck to the old system of asking the District Commandant to settle disputed cases, and made small use of the Russian courts: only very serious crimes, or commercial dealings with Russians, would bring them into contact with even the watered-down version of Russian law which existed in Turkestan.

Given the low levels at which Qazis’ remuneration had been set after 1886, it might perhaps be hard to understand why anyone would bother with electoral fraud, but unsurprisingly the potential rewards of the position amounted to far more than a 0.5 per cent cut. Pahlen wrote that (in addition to straightforward bribery) in practice no limits existed to the amount that Qazis might demand in fees: in one case, judged by a congress of Qazis, which involved the sum of 5,100 roubles, the judges involved openly demanded 200 roubles from either side before they would agree to look at the case. When a protest was brought before the Russian Okrug court, it was dismissed on the grounds that fees could still be legitimately determined ‘by custom’.⁸¹ A secret petition from an inhabitant of Ura-Tepe in 1887 laid bare the methods of electoral fraud which, despite the Girs Commission’s recommendations, were still common, and the motivations of the parties involved.

One Fathullah Khan was elected to the position of Qazi by pyatidesyatniki who were under obligations to him. These obligations which informed the decision of the pyatidesyatniki to elect him—they constantly, day and night, have enjoyed the hospitality of Fathullah Khan, have put on his khalat, borrowed money from him... in order to become Qazi, Fathullah Khan has spent around 1,500 roubles. Amongst the pyatidesyatniki those who were not under obligations to him chose as Qazi Kaza-Mahmud Khan, those amongst them who were under obligation, having taken money, chose Fathullah Khan. Now we place all our hopes on you. If you... confirm as Qazi... Fathullah Khan, then he, so long as he has not made good his expenses, will prey upon the people like a crocodile.⁸²

The anonymous petitioner concluded by remarking that Fathullah Khan had succeeded in bribing 47 electors in all, leaving just 23 to vote against him, and that he had also chosen as his assistant one of his relatives, an illiterate boy of 20. Perhaps as a passing comment on his local influence, or else to ensure the Qazi was utterly damned in the eyes of the Russian authorities, he added that his brother was a ‘great Ishan’. If so, he was to

⁸¹ Ibid., 35.
be disappointed, as the Samarkand District Commandant, Chernevsky, found no grounds for taking the matter seriously. He stated that the election had been carried out with perfect propriety and that Fathullah Khan had long been one of the Qazis of Ura-Tepe and was honoured and respected. His opponent, Mahmud Khan (from whom he hinted the petition had probably come), was a young man of dissolute habits, who had recently married a 16-year-old girl and run up huge debts paying for an elaborate wedding. He consequently had sought election as Qazi as a way of making good his losses.\textsuperscript{83} Whichever of these stories was true, it says little about the respect in which the office was held or the calibre of the men who came forward to fill it: becoming a Qazi was clearly a sure path to enrichment, but one only open to the influential and well-connected. A similar petition was received on the same day from the mountain tuman of Angar in the Samarkand District, protesting against the appointment of ‘Abd ur-Rahman Khoja as Qazi, as he was unworthy of the post and had allegedly distributed a bribe of 650 roubles. There were 25 signatories, all mullahs, and Chernevsky’s response was particularly instructive:

As no claims as to the irregularity of the elections have appeared from any other quarter, this protest comes solely from the mullahs; they are all village Ishans who are against the appointment as popular judge of Abdurahman Khoja, who leads what might be called a ‘non-Sharia’ way of life—their protest is unworthy, in my view, of any serious consideration whatsoever, as they are not people with an unbiased view of elections, and they make up that element (the clergy) whose view of social matters cannot be useful to us.\textsuperscript{84}

Once again, the Russian fear of encouraging ‘fanaticism’ overrode what might have been genuine concerns about corruption. If Chernevsky was correct, which is equally likely, then it certainly suggests that the rural ‘ulama were worried about the election of judges without the usual Islamic qualifications, although this still seems to have been rare.

A more typical petition came from the electors of Djizak in 1894, when they claimed that the elections to Qazi had been rigged by one of the more powerful parties in the town and that the man appointed was uneducated and incompetent. Demonstrating a shrewd understanding of Russian paranoia on this issue, they then mounted a concerted (though ultimately unsuccessful) campaign to convince the District Commandant that the Qazi was a Muslim fanatic, secretly discouraging

the local youth from attending the town’s Russian-native school. The Samarkand District Commandant wrote:

Since the election of the Angar Qazi Tursun-Khoja-Mir-Izamuddinov to this position, for almost two years it has fallen to me and my senior assistant to deal with frequent complaints from the inhabitants about the slowness of his legal proceedings and the incorrectness of his decisions, which have an obvious bias towards one side.

Although he succeeded in having him dismissed, he did not call for any further punishment. These sorts of problems were not confined to settled areas. Martin’s conclusions on the way in which ‘Adat amongst the Kazakhs worked under the Russians and the changing nature of the role of the Bii are strikingly similar to the picture outlined above.

REFORMING THE ISLAMIC JUDICIARY

By the close of the nineteenth century the calls for drastic reform were growing louder. In a series of articles on the administration of the settled population of Turkestan which appeared in Russkii Vestnik from June to November 1899, N. L. Mordvinov concluded that justice had been better served under the Khans:

The contemporary popular courts in Turkestan have almost nothing in common with those which existed under the Muslim rulers, and at the same time by no means have the qualities of an unbiased court…having made the selection of Qazis dependent on the people and made their elections valid for only three years, we have made the courts into a weapon of electoral parties. The defining characteristic of the modern popular judge, the motive which animates him—is party prejudice, if not simple corruption…Modern Qazis, chosen by the people, are often wholly unacquainted with the curriculum of the higher spiritual colleges (madrasahs) and although they exercise justice in the name of Allah as if it were in agreement with the Koran and the Sharia, they have not read these books, something which the people know only too well.

Russian officers also indulged in an argument familiar to historians of British India—that the introduction of western law in an Asiatic

---

society benefits only those elements cunning and unscrupulous enough to exploit it, enabling them to escape traditional sanctions. One correspondent alleged in an article in *Vostochnoe Obozrenie* in 1882 that the influential Tashkent merchant Said Azim-bai had succeeded in sending a *Khoja* to gaol for a year after bringing him before the Russian courts with a false writ for breach of promise (to allow him to marry the *Khoja’s* 9-year-old daughter). He had bribed and bullied the *Qazi* and *Mufti* of Tashkent to draw up the incriminating document.⁸⁹ The eccentric A. I. Termen thought that the solution to such problems was to return to the status quo before the conquest, appointing the *Qazis* according to their standing as ‘ulama, and allowing them to impose sentences of death, amputation, and flogging at will. As he recalled, ‘The Dahbid *Qazi* once asked me a question: why do the Russians respect thieves so much?’ Termen felt that the Russian penal code was far too lenient and not taken seriously by the natives: he wanted to see more chopping off of limbs and much nastier prisons along the lines of the old Bukharan *zindans*. He told a story of two old men asking to be confined to gaol for the winter, which is a mirror-image of similar British Indian anecdotes. Concluding the tale of the wealthy landowner (*Bai*) who had flouted religious laws and been summarily punished by him in breach of the established rules, he mused:

The *Bai* had insulted the *Sharia*. From the standpoint of Russian law this is not a crime, and if the Sarts began to make complaints to the Magistrate’s Court, then they would be replied to thus: this is not my affair, go to the *Qazi*. To this the *Bai* can say: I am a Russian subject and wish to be judged under Russian law. And so here you have a Muslim, who amongst Muslims is free to insult his own law without punishment, when during the time of the Muslim rulers he would have been executed for it. And such cases are frequent and occur at every step. Well, how can one not say that the Russians are corrupting the people?⁹⁰

As this anecdote indicates, by the end of the nineteenth century there is evidence of increasing tension between the parallel systems of Russian and Islamic law used in Turkestan. It was possible to appeal against the judgments of *Qazis* in the higher courts, but the process was considerably more complicated than Termen was prepared to admit. In a typical year between 1886 and 1898, approximately 7,800 cases were settled by *Qazis* in Samarkand Province, and at least as many

---

⁸⁹ ‘Said-Azim-Bai’, *VO* 1882g No. 7, in *TS*, 327 (1883), 28.
remained unresolved at the end of the year. Roughly 66 per cent of these involved crimes against property. ⁹¹ Until the early 1900s few of these judgments were appealed against in the Russian courts but this did not necessarily indicate either satisfaction with the Qazis or a reluctance to call in the Russian authorities to settle disputes. Rather than get involved with a legal system they did not understand, and which could potentially be very expensive, some of those aggrieved by the judgments of the ‘Popular Judges’ preferred simply to petition the provincial or district administration, as this could be done for the cost of a 90 kopek stamp and the scribe’s fee. The number of petitions in the records of the Samarkand administration asking for Qazis’ judgments to be overturned rose from four in 1888 to 41 in 1908. ⁹² Petty matters involving fines of less than 30 roubles or a prison sentence of less than seven days were not subject to appeal at all. For more serious matters the first court of appeal was a ‘congress’ of Qazis, but their effectiveness certainly seems to have been limited: out of 15,410 judgments passed by the Qazis’ courts in 1905, only 370, or 2.4 per cent, were overturned by Congresses, and the proportion continued to hover just under 3 per cent in 1906 and 1907. ⁹³ As the number of judgments appealed against was 9 per cent in 1905, rising to 11.5 per cent in 1907, this meant that the Congresses of Qazis, reflecting a predictable desire to support each other’s decisions, were rejecting over two-thirds of the appeals they heard. Table 10 shows that the contrast with those few appeals which made it to the Russian Okrug courts was striking. By the early 1900s, when the Russian courts got the opportunity to scrutinize the decisions of the popular courts, they overturned the judgments in, on average, 95 per cent of cases (though 82 per cent in Samarkand). Most appeals came from nomadic areas of the Syr-Darya and Semirechie Provinces and were against the judgments of Biis, whilst Samarkand, with its primarily settled population, had the fewest. The Pahlen report gave a breakdown of reasons given for overturning a judgment in the years 1905–7, which revealed that in Turkestan as a whole, in 76 per cent of cases it was for a breach of ‘customary law’, as interpreted by the Russian courts, and in the remaining 24 per cent because the judgments were in conflict with the general laws of the Empire. In Samarkand, however, the respective proportions were 42 per cent and 58 per cent.

⁹¹ Kraft, Sudebnaya Chast’, 84–5.
Thus there the most common reason given for such a decision was that the original judgment had punished a crime which, under Russian law, did not exist, i.e. which was based on traditional custom or the Sharia, however these are defined. Clearly relations between these two legal systems were far from harmonious.⁹⁴ Alongside this, the number of cases brought directly before the Russian courts by natives was slowly rising. The Samarkand District court dealt with 1,716 cases in 1892, and whilst 894 of these came from the Russian town of Samarkand (although a few of these could easily have been from natives), 501 were from the native town, and the remainder from the rural parts of the District. People were travelling up to 300 verst⁵ to Samarkand to have their cases heard, and as few of them spoke any Russian the need for interpreters placed a heavy burden on the court, leading to calls for a second.⁹⁵

Few officials took Termen’s line that the solution to this problem was to get rid of the Russian courts altogether and administer Turkestan according to Islamic custom: most wanted to see the Sharia courts abolished instead or, at the very least, reforms that would reduce their power. I. I. Kraft was a leading advocate of judicial reform in Central Asia, as well as a historian of the law as it had developed since the conquest. Writing in 1899, he observed that

In recent times in the press, in society and especially in government circles, many strong and energetic protests have circulated against the existence of the popular court with its enormous jurisdiction, exceeding the powers of the district courts. The Oblast Governors, closely acquainted with the needs of the people they rule, have positively testified to the utter uselessness of the

---

⁹⁵ RGIA F.573 Op.3 D.5,027, 2–11.
popular court in its current form, and have persistently called for its rapid reorganisation.\footnote{Kraft, \textit{Sudebnaya Chast'}, p. i.}

Hopes had been raised by rumours of a reform planned by the Ministry of Justice, which would have ‘secularized’ the \textit{Qazis’} courts and turned them into something resembling ordinary peasant or \textit{stanitsa} courts, of the kind existing in European Russia. Baron Vrevsky, the Governor-General, had addressed the issue in his report to the Council of Ministers of 1898. He dismissed the idea that Turkestan was ready for the introduction of the ordinary judicial system of the Empire, writing that the separation of powers was a new-fangled western European concept for which Russian peasants, a generation removed from serfdom, were barely ready, whilst the people of Turkestan would be incapable of understanding it. Instead, he argued that the abolition of the \textit{Sharia} courts might be possible if a position akin to that of the ‘Land Captains’ of European Russia were created in Turkestan, combining administrative and judicial functions at a local level. Even this limited proposal foundered for the usual reasons: the position of Land Captain was a lowly one, and the chances of finding Russians from outside the officer class who were fluent in the native languages were virtually nil—in any case there was no money to pay them.\footnote{GARF F.1,099 Op.1 D.619, 20–3.} Thus officials had been disappointed—all that happened was that most really serious crimes were removed from the \textit{Qazis’} jurisdiction,\footnote{Murder, serious assault leading to death, breaking quarantine regulations, spreading seditious rumours, concealing escapees, damaging the telegraphs and railways, banditry, and arson; Palen, \textit{Otchet}, Vol. 14, 13.} but they were still left with a very wide sphere of responsibility in civil cases. Deploring the ‘fanaticism’ and ‘blindness’ of the \textit{Sharia} code, Kraft asserted that the existence of \textit{Qazis} and the popular courts merely served to reinforce a ‘backward’ form of Islam among the population. Echoing Nalivkin’s lament about the ‘Living Wall’, he also deplored the creation of a corrupt nexus between the ‘Popular Judges’ and the native administration, which helped to sustain a wealthy \textit{Volost} elite. The poor might appeal to the Russians against them, but the nominal rulers of Turkestan could do nothing: ‘Russian power thus appears strong, but it is an unwitting weapon in the hands of the \textit{Volost Upraviteli} and popular judges. This power makes inevitable the acceleration of the natural process of the enrichment of some individuals at the expense of the mass of the people.’\footnote{Kraft, \textit{Sudebnaya Chast’}, 90.}
Pahlen’s judgement was much the same when, ten years later, he
turned his attention to the problems with Turkestan’s judiciary:

The Natives, seeing that the Popular judges and the native administration walk
hand in hand, and that it is beyond the power of Russian authority to help
them, suffer these extortions without a murmur, as they know, that in the case
of a refusal, they will be forced, with the aid of false enquiries and accusations,
not only to pay twice over, but also to serve a prison term for disobedience.¹⁰⁰

By and large, the Pahlen report’s criticisms of the Narodnye Sudy, as
they were called in the volume dealing with the Qazis’ courts, echoed
those made by administrators, the press, and legal reformers over the
previous twenty years. The report strongly criticized the electoral system
in this, as in other branches of the native administration, stating that it
had simply turned the appointment of judges into a battleground for
party intrigues, the prize being the bribes that could be extorted during
a three-year term of office.¹⁰¹

One of the Narodnye Sudy of the town of Samarkand, in a note about the
popular courts which he gave to me, openly attests, that the electors, pursuing
profit, bring in as Narodnye Sudy individuals in no way worthy of this position.
The electoral expenses grow year by year; those who have acquired the position
of Narodnyi Sud, in order to get back the money they have spent, resort to evil
practices and decide matters incorrectly; those candidates who have failed to
become judges, and having no means of returning the money they borrowed
before the election, submit petitions about the bad faith of the electors and
foment accusations of corruption against their successful rivals.¹⁰²

This picture is amply confirmed by the documentary record. Investigations
of the petitions discussed above rarely yielded enough evidence
for the authorities to pursue, making the whole process a waste of time.
Those ultimately elected as Qazis were described as dishonest, cunning,
and corrupt, and sometimes even illiterate. The District Commandants
were unable to exercise even nominal supervision over their doings
owing to lack of time and the incompleteness of their records.¹⁰³

Although in 1901 the first attempt had been made to pay the Qazis from
state coffers, they still did not receive monthly salaries. Instead, their pay

¹⁰⁰ Palen, Otchet, Vol. 9, 108.
¹⁰² Ibid., 12.
¹⁰³ These records, the Qazis’ own ledgers of judgments, are to be found in the
Uzbekistan State Archives, Fonds 369–413 covering Samarkand Province. I have not
been able to use them as they are written in Persian and Turki, and most Russian
administrators suffered from the same handicap.
continued to be linked to the value of the cases they were judging, at
levels fixed far too low to remove the incentive to corruption,¹⁰⁴ and
often varying widely from District to District. They openly levied fees
three or four times as high as those they received from the State, and
frequently took bribes in addition. The Commandant of the Andijan
District in Ferghana Province estimated that the four Qazis in Andijan
town alone earned 40,000 roubles a year between them, when the
total amount all judges in the District were paid per annum ostensibly
amounted to just 22,120 roubles.¹⁰⁵

The sheer number of complaints received by the Russian authorities,
Pahlen argued, betrayed a deep discontent amongst the population with
the Qazis and their courts, and for him this was confirmed by the
petitions the Commission itself received directly from large groups of
natives during its tour of Turkestan.

In the name of all the inhabitants of the Chimbai district, we inform your
radiance that in earlier times there existed ‘Ra’īses’ and Muftis, to whose
responsibility fell the supervision over the correct interpretation of the Sharia
by Muftis, the decisions of the popular judges, marriages, and the verification
of shopkeepers’ and bakers’ weights. Now these positions have been abolished,
because of which each of the officials and tradesmen mentioned above does as
he pleases. And because of this for the good of the people we request you to
revive the abolished position of Ra’īs, if there is that possibility.¹⁰⁶

This and other calls for a return to the judicial system before the
conquest may have struck a chord with Pahlen, although there was
never any question of reviving the Ra’īs. Kraft had argued strongly in
1898 that Turkestan’s judiciary should no longer be regarded as a special
case, but be brought into line with the rest of the Empire: Qazis and the
Sharia should be abolished altogether. The Pahlen Commission’s report
devoted an entire volume to the manifold failings of the Narodnye Sudy,
and it made a number of recommendations, but fell short of
dismantling the system altogether. Pahlen had little sympathy with
advocates of purely military rule in Turkestan, still less with Islam,
and it seems likely that, had he felt that sufficient progress had been
made towards grazhdanstvennost’ in Turkestan over the previous forty
years, he might have recommended the abolition of the Qazis’ courts.
Fundamentally, however, Pahlen believed that Turkestan was still a

¹⁰⁴ 5 roubles for 1,000 roubles, then 1 more rouble for each subsequent 1,000 roubles,
and 50 kopeks for each 1,000 roubles over 5,000.
region with very particular, colonial problems which required colonial solutions, and like the Girs Commissioners twenty years earlier he decided that this reform would be premature. To begin with, the Turkestan administration simply lacked sufficient personnel with even rudimentary legal training, to be able to take over and ‘russify’ the Qazis’ role: ‘the lack of trained judicial advisers is particularly keenly felt throughout the region, and in this respect the Turkestan Governor-General is in a worse position than any Governor of any internal province.’

Instead, the report suggested increasing the staff of the Russian district courts and allowing a representative from them, trained in Muslim law, to preside over the congresses of Qazis. Whilst deploring the corruption of the electoral system, the Commission reluctantly concluded that the District Commandants simply lacked the time and specialist knowledge to be able to appoint judges themselves, and instead advocated a more direct electoral system, with one candidate being chosen in each village by the heads of households. It also recommended that Qazis be paid regular salaries, on a par with those of Volost Upraviteli—that is, 500 roubles a year, plus a total of 1,400 roubles for expenses related to their duties. Some suggestions were also made to render it easier for those classified as tuzemtsy, ‘aliens’, under Russian law to acquire full citizenship and thus escape the jurisdiction of the popular courts altogether. This amounted to mere tinkering, and in any case none of these proposals was implemented before 1914.

**REWITING THE SHARIA**

The most ambitious aim of the Pahlen Commission was to create a single, written Sharia code for the use of all Qazis in Turkestan, in place of the ad hoc system of precedent and local custom which had hitherto obtained. There was already a fairly lengthy Russian tradition of Sharia scholarship at Kazan University, represented by the figure of Mirza Alexander Kazem-Bek, a Persian from Resht who had converted to Christianity and had produced translations of a

---

107 ‘Eya gosudarstvennnya nuzhdy daleko ne pokhozhi na te, koi prikhoditsya udovletvoryat v korennoi Imperii’. Palen, Vsepoddanneishaya Zapiska, 12.
number of standard juridical works. The use of these by the muftiate in Orenburg had apparently led to a hardening of the norms of *Sharia* in the Volga region and the fringes of the Steppe.\(^{110}\) Despite this, British India—or specifically Anglo-Muhammadan Law—was to be the model for Pahlen’s Turkestan reforms.\(^{111}\) In 1885 General Annenkov had criticized the Anglo-Indian legal system, contrasting it unfavourably with the devolved and ‘democratic’ system of justice the Russians had created in Turkestan.\(^{112}\) In 1905, however, the commission overseeing the expansion of Oriental language instruction among Russian officers had suggested teaching them the rudiments of Muslim law using a Russian translation of the *Hedaya*, which had already been placed in all provincial libraries. The *Hedaya*, which, in its English translation by Charles Hamilton (on which the Russian text was based), had become the founding text of Anglo-Muhammadan jurisprudence, was in origin a twelfth-century legal digest by the famous Central Asian jurist Burhan ud-din al-Marghinani.\(^{113}\) V. V. Barthold attacked this proposal:

Unfortunately, it is entirely possible that a future administrator, having completed a course in mussulman law according to the programme recommended by the Commission, will come to judge the legal views of the natives according to the code of Timur, as laid down centuries ago in India, or even, armed with the four volumes of the *Hedaya*, lodge protests against every decision of the popular judges, if they are not in agreement with the conditions of that book.\(^{114}\)

If he ever read this impeccably scholarly warning, Pahlen chose to disregard it, possibly owing to advice from Nikolai Ostroumov, who strongly advocated the use of the *Hedaya* and regretted that Grodekov’s translation (which had a very short print-run) was more or less unavailable by 1911–12.\(^{115}\) His understanding of the classical role of the *Qazi* seems to have been largely drawn from the *Hedaya*, and many of his criticisms of the popular courts (which were echoed in the Pahlen report) stemmed from his belief that they did not conform to the

---


\(^{111}\) See Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 70–1, for another discussion of this episode.

\(^{112}\) Annenkov, *Akhal-Tekhinskii Oazis*, 32.


norms expressed in this text. Ostroumov considered that most efforts at modernization within the Islamic world were doomed to failure so long as the *Sharia* remained the basis of the polity. However, he also argued that altering this would produce a profound upheaval of the kind the Russians were anxious to avoid. He pointed to the recent constitutional movements in Persia and the Ottoman Empire as examples of this, and concluded that a measured rationalization of the law, as proposed by Pahlen, was probably the best solution. In a series of articles which originally appeared in *Turkestanskiya Vedomosti* in 1909, he outlined his understanding of what was meant by ‘*Sharia*’, which helps to explain why it was assumed that what was used in India would also be appropriate for Turkestan:

... the *Sharia*, which is applied identically to popular life in Russia, Bukhara, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, India, Java, Arabia, Algeria, China—its teachings are acknowledged in every land of Islam... in other words: Turkestani, Bukharan, Turkish and other Muslims conduct themselves in their creed and in everyday life by a single law, not by different codes as do the Russians, French, English etc.¹¹⁶

Since the 1886 reforms, the *Qazi* of Turkestan had not been obliged to follow *Sharia*, as the relevant articles in the new administrative law simply referred to an ill-defined ‘local custom’. Whilst it is doubtful whether this made a great deal of difference in practice (it was really no more than a change in nomenclature, mirroring that from *Qazi* to ‘Popular Judge’) Pahlen considered it to be of great importance, and the source of much arbitrariness and corruption.¹¹⁷ Significantly, the Commission’s report demonstrated an absolute conviction that, before the conquest, among the settled population the *Sharia* had constituted a strict and uniform code, whilst customary law was ‘rudimentary’.¹¹⁸ This backward but consistent system, the report went on to argue, had been progressively eroded under Russian rule by ‘a whole range of innovations, so that on the pretext of preserving the settled population’s popular judges they were given new courts which were entirely different in their organisation, together with which no real measures to reduce their fanaticism were introduced, nor any to remove the barriers to a rapprochement with the Russians’.¹¹⁹ What was needed was a ‘return’ to the consistency of the pre-conquest period, and the *Hedaya* was taken as

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 4–6.
¹¹⁹ Ibid., 6.
a model to restore Islamic justice in Turkestan to its former purity. There was nothing specifically ‘colonial’ about this aim, which was shared by Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan’s modernizing State in Afghanistan. Here, too, there was an attempt to replace local custom with Hanafi norms drawn from the *Hedaya* and other authoritative texts, and a substantial transformation in the *Qazis*’ roles as a result.¹²⁰

Pahlen himself later recalled in his memoirs that the three-week long conference held in Tashkent to debate the proposed codification of *Sharia* law in Turkestan was a great success. Together with 15 representatives from the local administration, eight Russian judges and four education officials were invited, and 29 *Qazis* and Muslim jurists from the Samarkand, Syr-Darya, and Fergana Provinces were selected by the Military Governors and Prosecutors of the regional courts to attend.¹²¹ All 500 paragraphs of the text Pahlen had prepared were exhaustively examined over eight days: ‘I must here place on record how immensely impressed I was by the earnest work of the mullahs... Never had it been my privilege to preside over a gathering so keen to accomplish the task set before it.’ Afterwards a Russian text was circulated to the courts in Turkestan, and, as Pahlen put it, the population at large were ‘given access’ to the mysteries of the *Sharia* through a translation into ‘Sart’. However, it is clear from his own account that the mullahs assembled in Tashkent were presented with a code that was already substantially complete, and simply asked to comment upon and adapt it to local conditions. Where had this text sprung from?

I had invited a group of learned mullahs with the object of studying and editing a Russian translation of rules based on the *Sharia* which I had prepared... I had found supporting material for the Russian text in French codified collections from Tunis and Algiers, and in compendiums and digests by English magistrates on cases where the litigants were Mohammedan.¹²²

What Pahlen fails to mention here was that among his ‘compendiums and digests’ was Professor Roland Wilson’s 1903 digest of Anglo-Muhammadan law, whilst the text he presented to the *Qazis* seems to have been largely based on B. D. Grodekov’s 1893 translation of Charles Hamilton’s earlier translation of the *Hedaya*, itself the principal source

¹²⁰ Ghani, ‘Disputes in a Court of *Sharia*’, 353–7, 364.
¹²² Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan*, 81–3. These memoirs were written in German in 1922, when Pahlen was in exile, and without the benefit of his notes.
for most of Wilson’s work.¹²³ What the commission was debating could by no means be described simply as ‘the Sharia’. Pahlen cheerfully remarked that ‘The fact that the Hanafite sect . . . ruled the medresehs in both India and Turkestan, so that the same interpretation of the Muhammadan faith was practised in both places, was of very great assistance in this task.’¹²⁴ Leaving aside the degree to which Indian Islam and Sharia had been affected by local conditions, Wilson’s code had been produced to meet specific Anglo-Indian administrative needs, and to view it as a convenient summary of the Sharia that would apply to all Sunni Hanafis, as Pahlen did, was inviting confusion. A newspaper article describing Pahlen’s conference in Tashkent is very much at odds with his own account:

This congress is going on for far too short a time—seven days in all, and in those seven days the whole body of Muslim law has to be reviewed, together with local customary law. The task is in truth gigantic . . . The principal aim of the congress is to establish whether or not the translation of the Hedaya is accurate, and to what degree the Hedaya is in agreement with local customs . . . This Hedaya is a book of the Hanafi doctrine, written in the Arabic language in India in the nineteenth century, when the British were already ruling there. There is no doubt that the book shows clear signs of Anglicisation. The Hedaya was translated into English from Persian, and from English into Russian, thus the Russian translation, through the particularities of language . . . inevitably suffers from gross insufficiencies and distortions.

In Turkestan the Hedaya is largely unknown, and when at the first session they began to read out articles from this book, the ‘scholars’ looked blank, their faces became gloomy and they curtly uttered just the one word: ‘No’.¹²⁵

The official report on the results of the conference was also less fulsome than Pahlen himself seems to have remembered, stating that roughly half of the articles in the translated code had proved acceptable to those assembled, whilst the remainder, relating to property and family law, were rejected. The conclusion was that this was still a ‘work in

¹²⁴ Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, 82.
If Antonovich’s account is to be believed, the gloomy reaction of the assembled Qazis on being presented with the Hedaya is puzzling. As Ostroumov pointed out, the Hedaya is a Central Asian work, originally composed by Burhan ud-din Ali ben Abu Bakr al-Marghinani, a native of Marghelan in the Ferghana Valley who died in AD 1197 and was buried in Samarkand. His Hedaya is a hugely significant juridical text which is widely respected throughout South Asia in particular to this day. One possible explanation is that the Hedaya had gradually fallen out of favour in Mawarannahr in the centuries since the Uzbek invasion: under the Timurids the position of Sheikh ul-Islam and chief Qazi of Samarkand had been reserved for the descendants of Burhan ud-din al-Marghinani, but Shaybani Khan removed the incumbent, Khoja Ab’ul-Makarim, who had tried to organize resistance against him, and replaced him with representatives of a more pliant lineage, that of Faqih Ab’ul-Lays. Ab’ul-Makarim briefly escaped Shaybani Khan’s soldiers and rejoined Babur, but was then recaptured and executed. This may explain why the Hedaya became more widely known and respected in India, where the Timurids found a new home, than in the land of its composition, but this is no more than speculation and seems unlikely. In his account of Samarkand’s major landmarks, composed in the 1840s, Abu Tahir Khoja provided a detailed biography of al-Marghinani and clearly considered his tomb to be of great importance, whilst he paid little attention to those of Ab’ul-Lays and his descendants. The published catalogue of the Biruni Institute’s collection of Oriental manuscripts in Tashkent lists 15 copies of the Hedaya, four from the nineteenth century, and the card catalogue has many more. A more concrete explanation is that, even assuming that the text presented to the Qazis was simply a translation of the Hedaya, not Wilson’s more

¹³⁰ The existence of Hamilton’s translation, which has been in print more or less continuously since the 1870s, may also have contributed to the Hedaya’s popularity in the Subcontinent.
¹³¹ Veselovskii Samariya Text, 32.
fully fledged code of Anglo-Muhammadan law, Ostroumov and Pahlen overlooked numerous problems in using it in the form in which it had come down to the Russian authorities. First it was, of course, extremely old, although most Russians shared the British assumption that eastern law was stagnant and unchanging, and that therefore using law ‘codes’ which were several hundred years old to construct a modern penal system would not cause significant problems (the laws of Manu, which formed the basis of Hindu personal law in the Indian penal code, dated from the third century AD).133 Secondly, the Hedaya was not a comprehensive code (there was no section on inheritance law, for instance), but simply a compilation of judgments by one of Abu Hanifa’s followers. The concept of Ijtihad, or the ‘open door’ of interpretation, meant that the various compilations of principles such as the Hedaya were not intended to be binding codes, merely guides which could be used or not as the judge pleased in his search for Fiqh or religiously appropriate behaviour.134 Ijtihad was held by many jurists to have come to an end in the tenth century AD, but in practice, in India at least, the freedom of Qazis to put their own interpretation on readings from the Koran and hadith was largely unquestioned until the early nineteenth century, when the new code of ‘Anglo-Muhammadan’ law began to be enforced in the territories controlled by the East India Company. The Hedaya used by the Russians in translation was no longer the general handbook composed by Burhan ud-din. The Persian text on which it was ultimately based had been drawn up in 1791 at the behest of Warren Hastings by Ghulam Yahya, Mullah Shariaullah, Mullah Taj ud-din, and Mir Muhammad Hussein, four Calcutta scribes, using an unknown Arabic original. It had various sections added to it from another text called the Sirajiyah135 to fill gaps covering property and inheritance law, and was thus turned into a strict code heavily influenced by British jurisprudential ideas. Charles Hamilton had been puzzled by the way in which some of the advice in the Hedaya seemed to contradict Abu Hanifa’s teachings, and accordingly removed these inconsistencies.136

134 Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 21–4, 36.
135 Composed by Siraj ud-din Muhammad Ben, ‘Abd ur-Rashid as-Sujawandi (d. AD 1411).
Quite apart from the inherent improbability of persuading the jurists of Turkestan to accept a bastardized form of Islamic law codified by Englishmen in India, the Pahlen Commission had not yet prepared a version of the code in Turki (although Pahlen later claimed that the ‘Sart’ version of the code had been available to all present). The simultaneous translation by Tatar interpreters from Russian to ‘Sart’ proved far from accurate and occasioned still more confusion, and in general most of the participants were puzzled as to the aims of the congress.

— Do the Muslims understand the significance of this congress and its aims?
  I asked one of the translators.
— They know that they must give answers, but they don’t know what will come out of it at all. Maybe they will work out some instructions, maybe something else—God knows.¹³⁷

Antonovich mused at some length on the various interpellations made in the *Hedaya* by its English editors, and the fact that British policy towards Islam in India had not been successful in defusing tensions and bringing about peace. He also argued that the proposed reform was viewed with some misgivings by the wider population as well, and could perhaps provoke the sort of ‘fanatical’ reaction which had worried the Russians since the Andijan uprising: ‘The first day of the Congress passed very guardedly. Neither the Muslims, nor the Russians understood what its purpose was. A suspicion grew amongst the Muslims, that a Russian official had decided to re-create Muslim laws, and at every crossroads in the town, in the bazaars and chaikhana the Sarts talked exclusively about the Congress.’¹³⁸ Although the rumours in the bazaars had no immediate serious consequences, the congress ended on a distinctly sour note:

The end of the final session was typical. In it all those relations and feelings which had hitherto been concealed came to the fore. Count Pahlen in his closing speech indicated that the participants in this arduous task had not only become acquainted with one another, but had also become friends: he felt that in this debate there had been a surge of friendly feelings and expressed his confidence that a similar sentiment was felt by the others. But there was much surprise, when the Qazis announced that they had been insulted by Count Pahlen’s opening speech, in which he had suggested that they, the Qazis, were susceptible to the temptation of bribes, and asked him politely to take back his assertions.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Antonovich, ‘Po povodu s’ezda’, 98. ¹³⁸ Ibid. ¹³⁹ Ibid.
Pahlen had clearly aired some of the suspicions that would later appear in the trenchant paragraphs of his report. A translation into ‘Sart’ of the Wilson code was eventually prepared in 1909 by the former Qazi of the Shaikhantaur district of Tashkent, Mullah Ishankhoja, with commentary by a Samarkand Qazi. Pahlen admitted that this was an unofficial collection of laws, although he added that it went into several editions as a guide to administrators and judges. However, as it was never given any kind of official force, despite the time and effort put into this initiative, as with so many of Pahlen’s proposed reforms, it had little long-term significance.¹⁴⁰

**QAZIS AND ISLAMIC LAW IN INDIA**

Whilst it was not until 1864 that the position of Qazi ceased to be a State appointment in areas of India under British control, even before this they had apparently been discouraged from referring back to the Koran or hadith for guidance, and instead told to stick to the developing code of Anglo-Muhammadan law.¹⁴¹ This did mean, however, that for a period of eighty years or so, most regions of British India had Government-appointed, or at least officially licensed Qazis. In Bengal until 1851 they were presented with a sanad of appointment in the name of the High Court in Calcutta, requiring ‘that the Cazee in all honesty be diligent in giving publicity to the injunctions of the faith, in establishing the assemblies of the faithful, in stimulating the moral and religious observances of the people, in reading the matrimonial service, and in making peace between contending parties’ and stating that their seals and signatures on documents carried legal weight.¹⁴² The four principal Qazis of Bengal (based at Patna, Dacca, Calcutta, and Murshidabad) received salaries of Rs 150 a month. In the North-Western provinces Qazis were presented with khalats of Rs 200 at important religious


¹⁴¹ Kugle, ‘Framed, Blamed, and Renamed’, 271–2. This is Kugle’s contention—I must say I have found little evidence of it in the documentary record as, far from trying to prescribe their judgments, the Government of India seems to have all but forgotten about the existence of Qazis by the 1850s.

¹⁴² NAI/Home/Judicial/19 January 1865/Nos. 48–108 Abolition of the Office of Kazi—and payment of compensation to those whose posts have been abolished, 4.
festivals, whilst in Punjab and the city of Delhi, they continued to enjoy rent-free grants of land dating from the late Mughal period. In Madras and Bombay the official connection was rather more tenuous, and seems to have been confined to the issuing of seals of office.¹⁴³ No effort had been made to standardize their duties or conditions of service, let alone the principles on which they made their judgments, and the overall impression of the Qazis under the East India Company’s rule is of an entirely ad hoc system with wide regional variations, which had been inherited from earlier regimes and then forgotten about.

It was only with Queen Victoria’s proclamation of religious neutrality and tolerance on the assumption of sovereignty in India by the Crown in 1858, that attention was drawn to the Qazis once again. They had become an embarrassing anomaly, although many officials seem to have been surprised to find that they existed at all when the matter was debated between 1859 and 1864. George Uday Yule wrote from Bhagalpur that it certainly astonished him ‘to find a mussulman officer appointed by the orders of the Sudder Dewanny Adaulut¹⁴⁴ required by a document under its seal to be diligent in giving publicity to the injunctions of the faith in establishing assemblies of the faithful and stimulating their religious observances’.¹⁴⁵ As reports came in from Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and the North-Western Provinces, it became increasingly clear that most Qazis were little more than glorified marriage registrars, who were also occasionally consulted on matters relating to the law of inheritance, and as witnesses to deeds. Notwithstanding their seeming innocuousness, the official summing-up, which drew together the reports on the matter from the various provinces, concluded that: ‘Whatever may be the opinion of their particular functions as to marriages, there can be [no] doubt that they were originally expected to perform many duties of a more or less religious character which—or the tradition of which—have invested their office with a religious character. And it seems to be agreed that the Government should therefore sever its connection with Kazees as Kazees.’¹⁴⁶

Despite petitions from some Qazis in Bengal, the measure was carried through in 1864–5, although the more important Qazis in the Bengal Presidency were compensated with pensions.¹⁴⁷ Thereafter the Russian

¹⁴⁴ Sadr Diwani ‘Adalat—the High Court in Calcutta.
¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 29.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 19, 417–75.
and British responses to Islamic law diverged. Whilst both colonial powers were anxious to avoid offending religious sensibilities, the Russians, ironically enough, were much more determined to ‘modernize’ the populations under their control, weaning them away from the superstition of the *Sharia*. The preservation of the system of popular courts was purely pragmatic, based on Russia’s perceived military weakness in the face of a potentially ‘fanatical’ population, and, as was so often the case, a simple lack of resources. The ultimate aim of *sblizhenie, rapprochement*, when the Muslims of Turkestan would be subject to the same laws as Russians, was never abandoned, merely repeatedly postponed. The British were much more wedded to the idea of preserving traditional society, and had no real belief that India’s population could be Anglicized and assimilated. Presented with a penal code that was a model of utilitarian rationality by Lord Macaulay in 1835, they proceeded to dilute it with doses of Hindu and Muslim law before it was finally imposed in 1859–64.¹⁴⁸ Even so, they went further than the Russians. *Qazis* did not disappear entirely in areas under direct British control, but as part of the more general dissociation of the Government of India from religious patronage they ceased to be officers of the State (although some former Muslim judges became advisers in the Anglo-Indian courts). Instead, they were selected and paid for by the communities within which they worked, a system reminiscent in some ways of Turkestan, but without any State involvement. This apparently led to considerable abuses, although the subject has received little scholarly attention.¹⁴⁹ *Qazis* remained important in Punjab and the United Provinces, but it was in the North-West Frontier Province that the situation was most closely analogous to Russian Turkestan, as officials there reported that the civil courts were but little used, and ‘among the Pathan Tribes the religious courts under the *Sharia* have a very considerable influence, and are able to settle many cases which would otherwise come into the Civil Courts’.¹⁵⁰

From the Russian perspective, their own attempts at legal reform failed dismal, but the undoubted corruption of the *Sharia* courts

¹⁴⁹ The only description I have found is in Lyall, ‘Islam in India’, *Asiatic Studies*, 254–5.
under their rule was arguably no worse than what went on in Indian courts. The British encountered precisely the problems which had caused the Russians to hold back from a wholesale abolition of the traditional system of justice. In Punjab until 1884 justice was administered purely by the executive, as District Officers almost without legal training were empowered to give judgment in virtually all civil and criminal cases, with few rights of appeal. Elsewhere (and ultimately in Punjab as well) the British created a semi-independent judiciary which was easily manipulated by a minority with the necessary knowledge, and largely impenetrable to the majority: it was also expensive. The courts were too few and understaffed; the judges often entirely lacking in legal training, and usually unable to speak the language of those being tried. The subsequent reliance on interpreters and native advisers led to corruption every bit as prevalent as that in Turkestan, whilst the habitual bribing of witnesses was an open secret.¹⁵² The use of the Laws of Manu and the Hedaya within a modern penal code led to distortions whose impact is still being felt in India today. Perhaps the main thing which can be said in favour of the British approach was that eventually Indians came to participate fully in the system, and it acted as a check on the tyranny of the executive.¹⁵³ It is scarcely surprising that nothing of this kind happened in Turkestan, as the judiciary was unable to play such a role even in European Russia. Although the role of the Qazi in Turkestan changed considerably under Russian rule, and clearly the judicial system worked badly, the corruption was at least in a form most of the inhabitants would have understood.

¹⁵¹ Collectors in Bengal and the ryotwari Presidencies were also empowered to act as Assistant Magistrates, meaning that executive and judiciary still overlapped.
¹⁵² See An ‘Ex-Civilian’, *Life in the Mofussil*, 91–3, for a description of a typical magistrate’s court in the district of Tirhut, in Bihar, in the 1860s. Here one full-time magistrate and one deputy, together with occasional assistance from the Collector were the sole judicial authority for a district of 6,000 square miles with a population of over 4 million, and the court was a three-roomed bungalow.
Conclusion

Such, so far as I have been able to ascertain them, are Russia’s position and prospects, her virtues and failings, in her recently acquired Central Asian dominions. Englishmen may regard her presence there with equanimity and watch her progress with friendly interest. They may compare her doings north of the Hindu Kush and Himalayas with their own to the South, and may perhaps derive some lessons, or imbibe some warnings, from the contrast.¹

Despite a military and technological superiority which, whilst less overwhelming than that of the British, was still substantial, the Russians had no monopoly of either power or knowledge in Samarkand or, by implication, in much of the rest of Turkestan. Whilst they succeeded in ousting the Beks and Amlakdars from authority, they handled religious elites with excessive caution and did little actively to undermine Islam, which was one of their stated aims. Their administrative officers were mostly poorly educated in the local languages, underpaid, and overworked. The native administration they created was deeply corrupt and its members exploited Russian power to build up their own authority in local society, creating patronage networks outside Russian control. The same was true to a considerable degree of the Qazis and the Imperial administration never succeeded in replacing or even codifying the system of customary law. Perhaps most significantly, in an area where almost everything depended on water, they never established effective control over the irrigation networks of the Zarafshan Valley, except in the case of the sluices controlling water flow to Bukhara. Military force was simply not enough: the Russians lacked the financial resources to carry through many of the modernizing measures they envisaged, but

¹ Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, 412.
perhaps more crucially, their administration simply did not penetrate Turkestan society below a certain level. The Aksakals' vernacular ledgers recording land ownership and taxation, the Qazis' vernacular books of judgments, the Aryk-Aksakals' mental record of irrigation custom and lore—all these remained largely beyond their ken. If there is such a thing as 'colonial knowledge', they lacked it.²

To the historian looking back over fifty years of Russian rule in Turkestan, the administration appears a complete shambles. The comparison with India would seem merely to reinforce this impression. Whilst British India suffered similar problems with corruption, inefficiency, lack of funds, and ill-trained administrative personnel, in terms of realpolitik it was a resounding success. Leaving aside the question of trade, the raw material supplies, and the huge market India offered to British goods, the Indian administration not only paid for itself, whilst providing high salaries for officials, it also paid for an enormous army which was crucial to Britain's status as a world power. Despite having only a very muddled and contradictory belief in a civilizing mission, the British transformed India's intellectual landscape through the use of the English language, the foundation of universities, the reform of the judiciary, and, in general, the introduction of enlightenment ideas. Much of this was unwitting: Macaulay may have anticipated that Indians would one day read Locke and Rousseau when he famously wrote that 'A single shelf of a European Library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia',³ but it is unlikely that many others did, except in some far-distant, almost mythical, future. Official reaction when Indians began to demand rights based upon these and other texts, together with their own observations of the British Parliamentary system, was overwhelmingly hostile.⁴ This is, perhaps, the single most delightful paradox of British rule in India, that the most enduring legacies—the English language, parliamentary democracy, and cricket—were all things that the British promoted either with reluctance or not at all.⁵ However splendid the Imperial pomp, the projects of Great Powers frequently

² Bayly, Empire and Information, 6–9.
⁴ See, for instance, Sir John Strachey, India (London, 1888).
⁵ The British dislike of anglicized (or, worse still, Christian) Indians is well known (see Nirad Chaudhuri, Thy Hand Great Anarch! (London, 1987), pp. xx–xxi), as is the fact that they responded to insistent demand and strong political pressure in allowing a measure of democratic government in India after 1909. Ramachandra Guha has to my mind demonstrated convincingly in the early chapters of his history of Indian cricket
have consequences they are unable to control. Russian commentators, reluctant as they were to concede that there was anything positive about British rule in India, were fully aware that it had led to far higher levels of westernization than in Turkestan, if only by example. Snesarev wrote:

The reason for our failure in similar circumstances lies in Britain’s great culture, in her wealth, incomparably greater than ours, and, finally, in the greater flexibility and variety of her methods. Maybe the Slav is not inferior to the Anglo-Saxon in his natural political gifts, but in respect of development, Britain, whether as nation or as individual Englishman, stands significantly higher than Russia and the Russians.⁶

It is bitterly ironic that whilst many British officials wanted nothing better than to rule as petty despots over a population of loyal, monoglot peasants, in a sort of middle-class feudal fantasy, many Russians were genuinely anxious to integrate Turkestan with the rest of Russia, a sentiment expressed by von Kaufman when he told N. P. Ostroumov: ‘If I should die as Governor-General here, then I will ask that I be interred on Konstantinovsky Square [in the centre of Russian Tashkent], protected by a Church, so that everyone will know that this is real Russian soil, in which it is not sinful to lay a Russian man.’⁷ Although strategic considerations came first, and there were numerous dissenting voices, sblizhenie was the ultimate goal, the enlightenment of the population and the spread of the Russian language the means. Judged by the standards they set themselves, they had failed. Already in the 1880s there was enormous pessimism about Russia’s civilizing mission in Turkestan, which only grew more pronounced as the reformed statutes and gradual introduction of some civilian institutions failed to solve the problems of the military administration.

We think, that for the realisation of culture, for the propagation of even the most basic principles of civilisation in so dark a corner as Asia, still more amongst a population wedded to a fanatical form of Islam, you need cultural forces, or to put it more plainly, heads with a fund of knowledge, with thinking and moral qualities. And so, we ask the question: of whom do they consist, these harbingers of Russian culture in the far reaches of Asia? The answer, that the development of the game in India owed little to British encouragement. See A Corner of a Foreign Field (London, 2002), pp. i–x, 4–77.

⁶ Snesarev, Indiya kak Glavný Faktor, 7.
unfortunately, is all too clear, although we must write it not at the beginning of the century, but in the year of 1882: of former line officers, who studied in Cadet Corps, or in Junker academies, of chinovniki, who weren’t educated anywhere, and former military clerks, who have served up to the unforgettable rank of ‘College Registrar’, and are making their way higher and higher on the ladder of ranks!... Turning to the question of how Russian culture in the region manifests itself, we must stop and think for a long, long time... There are, it is true, the post-roads, though hazardous for the ribs... there is the club in the Oblast town, and other amusements, little suited to the people. There are translators, whom one can buy and sell for a glass of vodka and, it seems, that is all there is.⁸

Twenty years later, the Pahlen report entirely confirmed this gloomy prognosis, and a despairing note enters the descriptions of Turkestan written by those who sought its enlightenment. It had always been assumed that military rule would be a temporary expedient, a process of tutelage until Turkestan was ready for the introduction of grazhdanstvennost’. An element of self-flagellation enters into Nalivkin’s assessment of Russian connections with the native world, as he indulges in the favourite Russian pastime of bemoaning his own country’s backwardness. Nevertheless, in 1913 he felt that sblizhenie was as far away as ever:

The knowledge the natives have of us for a long time has extended no further than a belief that all Russians smell of fish. For our part we have grasped no more than the absurd and contradictory pronouncements of self-styled ‘experts’, to the effect that ‘All Sarts are fanatics!’ ‘Sarts are extremely good-natured and hospitable!’ ‘Sarts are unbelievably avaricious and greedy!’ ‘Sarts make excellent gardeners and grooms!’ ‘Sarts understand nothing about agronomy and animal husbandry!’ ‘The Sarts are an extraordinarily corrupted people!’ ‘Before we came here, the Sarts knew neither drunkenness, nor prostitution!’... everything has become more and more confused in the chaos, springing from our own ignorance, lack of culture and self-importance. These have been, in their broad outlines, our relations with the native world.⁹

A more positive assessment of the first forty years of Russian rule had come from the pen of N. S. Lykoshin, but his list of successes was almost entirely material: samovars, tables, chairs, trams, kerosene lamps—and he betrayed much greater unease at the continued adherence of the natives to Islam, and their separation (as he saw it) of the world into the entirely unconnected spheres of believers and

---

⁸ VO 1882g No. 22, in TS, 326 (1883), 1. ⁹ Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, 69.
Kafirs.¹⁰ The tensions that existed between Russians and *tuzemtsy* would be fully revealed with the outbreak of the Central Asian Revolt in 1916, but already in 1910, when the Pahlen report appeared, the prospect of modernization, assimilation, and ultimately civilian rule and full incorporation with the rest of the Empire seemed as far away as ever.

‘Modernization’ can be a dangerous term to use when talking of Empire, and it is all too easy to fall into the trap of believing that all societies must follow the path of development marked out by the West. Nevertheless, it is a useful shorthand to describe the currents of change which have transformed the world since the beginning of the nineteenth century, in which a major role has been played by the European Empires. The transition from an overwhelmingly agrarian, illiterate society, based largely on inherited status and knowledge, to a mobile, literate, predominantly urban (if not industrialized) one based on notions of individual merit and rational enquiry is likely to be a universal human experience, and not by any means a wholly negative one. The evils of European Imperialism are a given, but so is the role it often played as a catalyst for these transformations and a conduit, often unwitting, for these ideas which ultimately would bring about its downfall.

As Daniel Brower has concluded, Russia’s failure to construct a successful administration in Turkestan was part of the Empire’s wider failure to modernize, which led it to collapse under the stresses of war.¹¹ It would remain for the Soviets to bring a different form of modernity to Turkestan, one also ultimately based on the Western Enlightenment but with certain rather crucial components left out.¹² Whether compared with British India or with what came after it, Tsarist rule in Turkestan was wholly ineffective in pursuing policies of modernization. Worse still, it actively, if ineptly, sought to undermine the movements for reform within Turkestan society in the form of the *Jadids*. Its administration was corrupt, and seems to have created a powerful class of middlemen who, if the petitions are to be believed, made the life of

¹⁰ Nil Sergeevich Lykoshin, *Rezul’taty sblizheniya russkikh s tuzemtsami* (Tashkent, 1903), 7–8; he later reprinted this piece in his 1916 memoirs, suggesting his opinions had not changed: *Pol Zhizni v Turkestane*, 5–16.


the peasantry a hard one. The worst abuses of power discovered by the Pahlen report were in Transcaspia, but similar stories emerged all over Turkestan. Muslims in Turkestan had few inalienable legal or political rights, fewer certainly than British Indian subjects under the Indian Penal Codes.

In some ways, though, Russian rule in Turkestan can still be considered a regime of inadvertently benevolent neglect. Lack of resources and fear of Muslim revolt and fanaticism meant that the Turkestan authorities did little to encourage productive change, but paradoxically their deeply engrained prejudices and paranoia regarding Islam meant that the Russians trod lightly on religious sensibilities and, perhaps more importantly, taxed very lightly. The inability of the Tsarist regime to balance its budget in Turkestan was in large part owing to the fact that it took only 10 per cent of the value of the crop, and paid for the garrison from central coffers, all in order to maintain military security. It is going too far to say that it is a sign of virtue when a colonial power makes a substantial loss from its colony. Nevertheless, the single most damning accusation which can be levelled at the British in India is that they taxed the peasantry very heavily—from \( \frac{1}{5} \) to \( \frac{4}{3} \) of the value of the crop—and used most of the revenue to pay the salaries of British officials and for an army that was used partly to keep order internally, partly for foreign adventures in British Imperial interests, and only incidentally to protect India herself.¹³ Little was left to pay for roads, sanitation, education, or health and the legacy of rural impoverishment, though greatly exacerbated by overpopulation, is still evident in India today. Anand Yang’s study of Saran District in Bihar offers some interesting parallels with landholding and taxation in Samarkand Province. There, by the late 1890s, 20 per cent of peasants were virtually or completely landless.¹⁴ The equivalent in Samarkand in the 1890s was only seven per cent,¹⁵ rising to 9.25 per cent by 1908,¹⁶

¹³ In Bengal throughout most of the nineteenth century the proportion received by the State was much lower owing to the Permanent Settlement, but the effective burden on the peasantry was much the same as in Madras and Bombay, where it could be up to half the value of the crop: see Dharma Kumar, ‘The Fiscal System’, in *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, Vol. II, 917. From 1884 to 1913 military expenditure never accounted for less than 43% of total expenditure in India, and was normally closer to 50%. See Rajit Mazumder, *The Indian Army and the Making of Punjab* (Delhi, 2003), 17–18.


something perhaps partly attributable to lower revenue demands under Russian rule. Turkestan remained backward and under-developed, but not particularly impoverished. Without effective control over water, the regime had no means of exerting tight control over agriculture. The very inefficiencies of revenue collection, whilst they meant that bribes had to be paid to patrons and middlemen, protected the peasantry from many of the State’s demands. Lack of money; lack of knowledge; lack of power: all these characterized Russian rule in Samarkand in the Tsarist period, making it far less effective, but also far more humane, than what was to follow after 1917.
Appendix 1
Taxation and Expenditure

1. Income and expenditure in Turkestan, 1868–81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income (roubles)</th>
<th>Expenditure (roubles)</th>
<th>Deficit (roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1,824,719</td>
<td>5,022,508</td>
<td>3,197,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>2,504,671</td>
<td>6,254,342</td>
<td>3,749,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2,635,069</td>
<td>7,061,121</td>
<td>4,426,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2,631,761</td>
<td>8,780,939</td>
<td>6,149,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>2,907,523</td>
<td>9,799,074</td>
<td>6,891,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2,616,409</td>
<td>8,338,097</td>
<td>5,721,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2,727,429</td>
<td>8,002,712</td>
<td>5,275,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>2,736,354</td>
<td>7,964,407</td>
<td>5,228,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>4,327,919</td>
<td>9,502,278</td>
<td>5,174,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>5,410,915</td>
<td>11,502,388</td>
<td>6,091,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>5,661,437</td>
<td>13,468,926</td>
<td>7,807,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>6,256,895</td>
<td>13,608,254</td>
<td>7,351,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>6,493,747</td>
<td>16,160,359</td>
<td>9,666,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>5,979,918</td>
<td>15,130,565</td>
<td>9,160,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54,714,766</td>
<td>140,595,970</td>
<td>85,881,204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Girs, Otchet, 366.

2. Amount and proportion of total receipts of each tax in the revenue raised within the three main Provinces of Turkestan (Samarkand, Syr-Darya, Ferghana) for 1893, 1902, and 1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of tax</th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1909</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount (roubles)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount (roubles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pozemel’nyi nalog (land tax)</td>
<td>2,852,262</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>3,734,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibitochnaya podat’ (house levy)</td>
<td>736,583</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>779,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piteinyi dokhod (liquor monopoly)</td>
<td>335,376</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>872,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of tax</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabachnyi (tobacco ditto)</td>
<td>62,330</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>145,886</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamozhennyi (customs)</td>
<td>662,840</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>2,018,088</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>5,173,789</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerbovyi sbor (stamp duty)</td>
<td>117,850</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>323,983</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promyslovyi dokhod (taxes on trade)</td>
<td>420,760</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>634,826</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pochtovyi (post)</td>
<td>212,623</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>260,366</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegrafnyi (telegraph)</td>
<td>185,757</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>309,384</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (in roubles)</td>
<td>5,586,381</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,079,347</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,588,723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Amounts of expenditure on Turkestan from Ministries or Departments in St Petersburg for 1893, 1902, and 1909, and proportion of the total subsidy paid by each

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount (roubles)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Ministry</td>
<td>6,569,771</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>8,901,111</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>11,103,772</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Ministry</td>
<td>712,339</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1,676,197</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2,074,031</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of Government</td>
<td>82,207</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>629,300</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>6,273</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>50,898</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1,165,924</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post and Telegraph Authority</td>
<td>861,214</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>743,647</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>198,156</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>595,555</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Communications</td>
<td>4,159</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>30,962</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Ministry</td>
<td>110,875</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>229,767</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (in roubles)</td>
<td>8,544,994</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12,857,437</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16,652,372</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures for 1893 and 1902 calculated from those given by V. V. Stratonov, in V. N. Skopin *Srednyaya Aziya i Indiya* (Moscow, 1904), 55; V. V. Stratonov, ‘Dokhodi i Raskhody Kazny’, *Turkestanskii Kalendar’ na 1904g.* (Tashkent, 1904), 2–8, and incomplete figures for 1909 from Palen, *Prilozheniya k Otchetu*, Vol. 19 Chast’ I Otdel II, 596–7.
### 1. Governors-General of Russian Turkestan, 1867–1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Von Kaufman, Gen.-Ad’t. K. P.</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>14 July 1867–3 May 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolpakovskii, Gen. ot Inf. G. A. (Acting)</td>
<td>1819</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1882 (during von Kaufman’s last illness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukhovskoi, Gen.-Leit. S. M.</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>28 March 1898–1 Jan. 1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanov, Gen.-Leit. N. A.</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>23 Jan. 1901–18 May 1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teyyashev, Gen. ot Kav. N. N.</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>22 June 1904–24 Nov. 1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodekov, Gen. ot Inf. N. I.</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>15 Dec. 1906–8 March 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishchenko, Gen.-Ad’t. P. I.</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2 May 1908–17 March 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsonov, Gen. ot Inf. A. V.</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>17 March 1909–Aug. 1914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Commandants of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1868–86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abramov, Gen.-Maior Aleksandr Konstantinovich</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1868–March 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanov, Gen.-Leit. Nikolai Aleksandrovich</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Mar. 1877–23 Nov. 1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yafimovich, Gen.-Maior Aleksandr Mikhailovich</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1883–6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Military Governors of the Samarkand Oblast, 1886–1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yafimovich, Gen.-Maior Aleksandr Mikhailovich</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1887–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostovtsov, Gen.-Leit. Graf Nikolai Yakovlevich</td>
<td>1831</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1891–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedorov, Gen.-Maior Yakov Dmitrievich</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1897–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odishalidze, Gen.-Maior Il’ya Zurabovich</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>9 Nov. 1911–9 Jan. 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lykoshin, Gen.-Maior Nil Sergeevich</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>9 Jan. 1914–1917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables assembled by the author.
Appendix 3
The Population of the ‘Russian Quarters’ of the Zarafshan Okrug, 1875–6

1. Samarkand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>3,841</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>4,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,297</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>4,467</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>5,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Katta-Kurgan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Penjikent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. *Kamennyi Most* (Stone Bridge), a small fortress on the Zarafshan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Other Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Totals for the Zarafshan Okrug

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Other Men</th>
<th>Total Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>5,230</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>5,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,604</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>5,835</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 4
List of Landowning Agents, Peshawar and Derajat Divisions, Punjab (1871)

Services required from Beneficiaries in the Kohat District

1. *Khan Bahadoor Khwaja Mahommed Khan, Chief of the Teeree Khur-rucks.* This is a most valuable servant of the Government. He collects revenue in his own country, is an Honorary Magistrate, and in that capacity ably disposes of a considerable amount of Judicial work, looks after the Police administration of his country, in which there is one Thanah, the establishment of which is paid by Government. He keeps up a number of sowars who are bound to serve when called for on emergency by the District Officer, on receipt of a fixed subsistence allowance for the time they are employed. He also is constantly employed in all matters relating to the independent tribes on his border. The services to Government of this Jaghirdar are cheaply purchased at the rate of emolument he receives.

2. *Khan Bahadoor Shere Khan, Chief of the Kohat Bungushes.* This Chief’s duties are important, in that it is through him that the whole of the Afreedees connected with the Kohat Pass are managed. It is absolutely necessary to deal with these people through a man of high family and local connexions among our own subjects, and the Khan’s office is no sinecure. This Jaghirdar is also liable to be called on by the District Officer to supply sowars when required.

3. *Gholam Mahomed Khan, Sagrie Khuttuk, Rais of Shukkurdarra.* This Jaghirdar would, of course, be bound to send men to serve under the District Officer on necessity occurring, but I have never heard of his doing any particular service, though he holds both Jaghir and Moajib on service conditions.

4. *Mozuffer Khan, Bungush, of Hungoo.* The whole management of Meeranzie has been carried on through this family, the head of it being selected by Government and occupying the important position of Tahseeldar of Hungoo, and Khan of the Upper Bungushes.

5. *Mahomed Ameen Khan*—belongs to the same family, and is Thannadar of Upper Meerauzie.
6. **Allayar Khan**—is son of the late chief of this family. His services are at the disposal of the District Officer, and I have no doubt he will be very useful, as he has now grown up to man’s estate.

7. **Sons of the late Dhurrum Singh, who was Tahseeldar of Kohat.** The Jaghir was given to their father for service performed in 1857–8, and these men are bound to perform service if called on. One of them is now under trial for murder.

8. **Mullik Mazoolah Khan, Mahomedzai**—is the leading man of a considerable village near Kohat, and has to serve with his men when any disturbance occurs in the direction of the Kothul or the Ollun.

9. **Naib Moortaza Khan, Khuttuck**—is an old man. His nephew would have to serve if required.

10. **Syud Ahmed Khan, Buncrie.** This Syud has many ‘moreeds’ and can be useful in obtaining information, etc. His father promptly collected a band of followers on the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857, and hurried down to Delhi, where he was killed.

11. **Jaffir Khan, of Nilab, Eastern Khuttuck**—is the chief of the Khuttucks between the Khwarra and the River, and would always supply men when required as he did in 1857. The present incumbent seems to have retired from public life, but his son carries on his duties for him.

12.–14. **Sons of Syud Kasim Shah.** This family of Syuds have many moreeds among the hill tribes and are useful in negotiation with them. When on one occasion a British Officer was killed in a fight with the Barjotees and others, it was these men who recovered his head from the enemy. They can always be employed as envoys & c., their religious character being recognized and respected by the independent tribes.

15. **Shahzada Tyfoor, Suddozaie, son of Shahzada Zumboor**—always ready to do anything in his power in the service of Government, but has no particular duties at present.

16. **Syud Ufzool, of Hungoo.** This man is a Sheah and has many moreeds among the Sheahs in Tehra, where I believe his influence is great. He is bound to render service as a condition of his pension, and his influence might be made great use of in certain circumstances.

17. **Naib Mahomdee Khan, of Goombut.** I am not aware of the special duties pertaining to this Jaghirdar.

18. **Syud Twahir Shah, of Shahoo Kheyl**—was very useful to the late Deputy Commissioner in dealing with the Mishtees, Rabia Kheyl, and other foreigners, and was murdered in consequence. His heir, if a capable man, will be able to be useful from his position and the influence his father had acquired.
19. *Mulliks of Hungoo and Meeranzaie, thirty-four in number.* Their allowances are in reward for services in 1857–8, but they enjoy them on the general condition of service.

Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, D. C. Kohat, October 1871

OIOC P/141 October 1871 No.1 *Beneficiaries, Peshawar and Derajat Divisions*, 763–5.
## Appendix 5
Religious and Educational Profile of the Officer Corps of the Russian Army, 1867

### 1. Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>12,582</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>16,685</td>
<td>76.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3,217</td>
<td>14.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1,531</td>
<td>6.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16,377</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>21,907</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. N. Obruchev (ed.), *Voeno-Statisticheskii SbornikRossii* Vyp.IV (St Pb., 1871), 846.

### 2. Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadet Corps or Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>8,149</td>
<td>37.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium or seminary</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>1,757</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Junker</em> School course</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>7,031</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8,223</td>
<td>37.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16,378</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>21,910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 6
Military Records of Officers Serving in Samarkand 1868–c.1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Rank and Regiment</th>
<th>Rank and Position at Time of <em>Spisok</em></th>
<th>Position and Dates of Service in Samarkand</th>
<th>Social Rank and Place of Origin</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Date and Archive Ref. of <em>Spisok</em> (RGVIA) or Other Ref.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abramov, Alexander Konstantinovich</td>
<td>c.1837–8</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen., 1st Orenburg Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen., Assistant to the Commander, Syr-Darya Oblast</td>
<td>1868–77 Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug</td>
<td>From the nobility of Lifland Guberniya</td>
<td>In the former Regiment of the Nobility</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1868 F. 400, Op. 12, D. 672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akimbetiev, Ahmad</td>
<td>2 October 1841</td>
<td>Capt., 2nd Orenburg Line Battalion</td>
<td>Lt-Col., Assistant to the <em>Nachalnik</em> of the Samarkand Uyezd</td>
<td>Senior Assistant to the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug Sept. 1873–Sept. 1888</td>
<td>Son of a Private of the Bashkir Military, Ufa Guberniya</td>
<td>Orenburg Nepluyevsky Cadet Corps</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1889 F. 400, Op. 12, D. 171,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Rank and regiment</td>
<td>Rank and position at time of Spisok</td>
<td>Position and dates of service in Samarkand</td>
<td>Social rank and place of origin</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Date and archive ref. of Spisok (RGVIA) or other ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anichkov, Vladimir Ardanovich</td>
<td>22 February 1847</td>
<td>Staff Capt., 9th Turkestan Line Battalion</td>
<td>Col., Head of the Land Revenue Committee, Samarkand Oblast</td>
<td>Senior Assistant to the Commandant of the Mountain Areas, Oct. 1873–June 1896</td>
<td>From the nobility of Ufa Guberniya</td>
<td>Orenburg Nepluyevsky Cadet Corps</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1900, F. 400, Op. 12, D. 21,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arendarenko, Georgii Alexeyevich</td>
<td>4 February 1846</td>
<td>Capt., Orenburg Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Lt-Col., Commandant of the Samarkand District</td>
<td>Commandant of the Samarkand District, July 1877–89</td>
<td>From the nobility of Chernigov Guberniya</td>
<td>1st Pavlovsky Military Academy</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1889, F. 400, Op. 17, D. 4535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Birth Year</td>
<td>Rank and Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bogdanov, Muhamed Garifovich</strong></td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Sub-Lt, 6th Turkestan Line Battalion, Govt. Secretary, Writing Perevodchik of the Kokand Uyezd, March 1869–Jan 1884 Perevodchik of the Katta-Kurgan Otdel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chernevskii, Alexander Nikolaevich</strong></td>
<td>9 February 1845</td>
<td>Maj., 1st Novorossiisk regiment of Dragoons, Maj.-Gen., chief assistant of the Military Governor of the Samarkand Oblast, 30 July 1870–27 Sept 1906 Head of irrigation 1872–7, Head of construction 1877–85, 1896 Commandant of the Samarkand District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>Rank and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-noble, Orenburg Guberniya, Orenburg Nepluyevsky Cadet Corps, but did not complete the course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From the nobility of Mogilev Guberniya, Alexandrinisky Orphan Cadet Corps, Moscow, Engineering course at the Konstantinovsky Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Rank and regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eryklintstev, Georgii Kirillovich</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>Rotmeistr, 1st Hundred of the Ural Cossacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Rank and Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanov, Nikolai</td>
<td>26 Jan 1842</td>
<td>Maj-Gen., Turkestan fortress artillery Hundred of the Orenburg Cossacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandrovich</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt-Gen., Military Commander of the Turkestan Military Okrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 July 1868–23 March 1871, Chancellery Chief, 2 March 1877–23 Nov. 1883 Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From the nobility of Kiev Guberniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orenburg Gymnasium and Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1899 F. 409, Op. 1, D. 133,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskakov, Mikhail</td>
<td>8 July 1841</td>
<td>Staff Capt., 6th Turkestan Line Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakovlevich</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt., Chief of Police of the town of Samarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 April 1874–1892 Urban civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Soldier’s child, Orenburg Guberniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orenburg Battalion of Military Cantonists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1892 F. 400, Op. 17, D. 6,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Rank and regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korolkov, Valerian Ivanovich</td>
<td>5th September 1843</td>
<td>Capt., 3rd Battery, 27th Artillery Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>Rank and Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korotkov, Fyodor</td>
<td>21 Apr 1847</td>
<td>Lt, 3rd Turkestan Infantry Battalion, Lt-Col., Councillor of the Samarkand Oblast Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledyenev, Nikolai</td>
<td>10 Nov 1847</td>
<td>Staff-Capt., 1st Siberian Artillery Battery, Col., Commandant of the Katta-Kurgan District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Rank and regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyamin, Dmitri Alexandrovich</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Sub-Lt, Selencheskii Regiment of Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobolev, Leonid Nikolaevich</td>
<td>28 May 1844</td>
<td>Infantry Gen. 2nd Horse Artillery Brigade of the Orenburg Cossacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrtlanov, Shakhaidar Shakhgardovich</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Rank and regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tveritinov, Pavel</td>
<td>14 March 1842</td>
<td>Staff Capt., 9th Turkestan Line Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikanovich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Tomich, Vsevolod      | 1849   | Staff Capt., Turkestan Artillery Battalion | Lt-Col., Commandant of the Marghelan District Quartermaster | 9 Jan. 1874–3 Jan. 1884
|                        |        |                               |                                                                          | Son of a priest from Tobolsk Guberniya                              |          |               |
| Tomich, Nikolai       | 4 Nov. 1846 | Staff Capt., 6th Turkestan Line Battalion | Lt; Chancellery Assistant to the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug | 3 July 1875–8 March 1880
| Andreyevich           |        |                               |                                                                          | From the nobility of the Chernogorsk Guberniya                         |          |               |
| Viridarskii, Grigori   | 1836   | Lt, 2nd Turkestan Line Battalion | Lt; Chancellery Assistant to the Governor of the Zarafshan Okrug | Assistant to the Land Revenue Collector, Samarkand Otdel              |          |               |
| Grigorievich          |        |                               |                                                                          | From the nobility of Chernigov Province                               |          |               |

Orthodox 1898, F. 400, Op. 17, D. 1,092
Orthodox 1882 F. 400, Op. 12, D. 11,319
Orthodox 1879 F. 400, Op. 9, D. 17,025
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Rank and regiment</th>
<th>Rank and position at time of Spisok</th>
<th>Position and dates of service in Samarkand</th>
<th>Social rank and place of origin</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Date and archive ref. of Spisok (RGVIA) or other ref.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Appendix 7
Volosts of the Samarkand Oblast in 1880

SAMARKAND UYEZD (21)

Usman-Karatalskaya
Tyuya-Tartarskaya
Kabutskaya
Karakalpakskaya
Khalvainskaya
Palwan-Aryskaya
Ishim-Aksakska
Chalekskaya
Khachcha Mukurskaya
Yany Kurganskaya
Dyurtkulskaya
Jui Divanskaya
Sergalinskaya
Dagbitskaya
Shahabskaya
Daulskaya
Angarskaya
Chashmabskaya
Mahalinskaya
Siabskaya
Jumabazarskaya
KATTA-KURGAN UYEZD (10)

Katta-Kurganskaya
Peishambinskaya
Naukinskaya
Khoja-Arykskaya
Kam-Kurganskaya
Mitanskaya
Yarbashinskaya
Aktyubinskaya
Jamskaya
Chimbaiskaya

MOUNTAIN TUMANS (9)

Penjikentskaya
Urgutskaya
Karatyubinskaya
Aftobruninskaya
Yal Kazan Arykskaya
Kshtutskaya
Filgarskaya
Iskanderovskaya
Matchinskaya

Appendix 8
Canals in the Samarkand Oblast 1908

1. Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan Uyezds
(Zarafshan system)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uchastok (sub-district)</th>
<th>No. of major canals</th>
<th>Length (versts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyuya Tartar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besh-Aryk</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirza-Aryk</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pai-Aryk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangikent Ak-Tepe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charjui</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djoj-Divan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoja-Aryk</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasir-Abad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penjikent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangi-Kazan Aryk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dargom</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khishrau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand Town (Russian)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand Town (Native)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nargai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>88</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,880</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Khujand Uyezd (Syr-Darya)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uchastok (sub-district)</th>
<th>No. of major canals</th>
<th>Length (versts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ura-Tepe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ak-Su</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoja Bakirchan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalverzin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,550</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Djizak Uyezd (Zarafshan and Syr-Darya)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uchastok (sub-district)</th>
<th>No. of major canals</th>
<th>Length (versts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Za’amin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanzar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Areas Irrigated, Administrative and Maintenance Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uyezd</th>
<th>Area of irrigated land (Desyatina)</th>
<th>No. of Aryk-Aksakals</th>
<th>Annual expenditure on salaries (roubles)</th>
<th>No. of Mirabs</th>
<th>No. of working days needed for maintenance in 1908</th>
<th>Annual cost of labourers’ wages (roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td>227,785</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>37,665</td>
<td>28,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katta-Kurgan</td>
<td>65,359</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,733</td>
<td>14,580</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djizak</td>
<td>102,721</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khujand</td>
<td>17,572</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ak su uchastok</td>
<td>8,126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalverzin uchastok</td>
<td>4,068</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushkent uchastok</td>
<td>30,307</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ura-Tepe uchastok</td>
<td>24,078</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Paid in kind</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desyatinas</th>
<th>Versts</th>
<th>Aryk-Aksakal salaries</th>
<th>Aryk-Aksakal pay</th>
<th>Mirab</th>
<th>Mirab pay</th>
<th>Cost of works</th>
<th>Working days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>480,016</td>
<td>4,051</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12,452 r</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>23,894 r</td>
<td>37,433 r</td>
<td>136,298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Aryk-Aksakal annual pay: 541 roubles
Average Mirab annual pay: 63 roubles

6. Alternative Figures for Irrigated Land in Samarkand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Irrigated</th>
<th>Rain-fed</th>
<th>Unoccupied</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td>232,964</td>
<td>108,632</td>
<td>219,686</td>
<td>561,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katta-Kurgan</td>
<td>80,216</td>
<td>159,770</td>
<td>99,594</td>
<td>334,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khujand</td>
<td>164,590</td>
<td>132,876</td>
<td>181,431</td>
<td>478,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djizak</td>
<td>128,907</td>
<td>272,382</td>
<td>436,145</td>
<td>837,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>606,677</strong></td>
<td><strong>673,660</strong></td>
<td><strong>931,856</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,212,193</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage (%)</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td>42.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 9
Qazis and their Divisions in 1877

QAZIS OF THE SAMARKAND DISTRICT

I. Samarkand Qazi
Samarkand City—4,668 households
Jumabazarskaya Volost—890
Siabskaya Volost—908
Mahalinskaya Volost—2,060

II. Aforinkent Qazi
Dagbitskaya Volost—1,366 households
Shahabskaya Volost—1,029
Djui Divanskaya Volost—2,228

III. Angar Qazi
Daulskaya Volost—1,464 households
Angarskaya Volost—1,107
Chashmabskaya Volost—848

IV. Sugut Qazi
Ishin Aksakska Volost—1,505 households
Khalvainskaya Volost—2,085

V. Shiraz Qazi
Kabutskaya Volost—1,854 households
Tyuya-Tartarskaya Volost—1,663
Danat Karatalskaya Volost—1,041
Appendix 9 Qazis and their Divisions in 1877

VI. Chalek Qazi
Chalekskaya Volost — 1,220 households
Khatcha Mukurskaya Volost — 580

VII. Yany Kurgan Qazi
Dyurtkulskaya Volost — 947 households
Yany Kurganskaya Volost — 1,293
Total Households 28,756

QAZIS OF THE KATTA-KURGAN DISTRICT

I. Katta-Kurgan Qazi
Katta-Kurganskaya Volost — 3,092 households
Jamskaya Volost — 1,327
Chimbaiskaya Volost — 708

II. Peishambe Qazi
Peishambinskaya Volost — 3,341 households
Yarbashinskaya Volost — 1,310
Aktyubinskaya Volost — 1,573

III. Naukin Qazi
Naukinskaya Volost — 2,385 households
Kam Kurganskaya Volost — 1,881
Khoja Arykskaya Volost — 708

IV. Mitan Qazi
Mitanskaya Volost — 2,674
Total Households 18,999
QAZIS OF THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES

I. Penjikent Qazi
II. Urgut Qazi
III. Falgar Qazi
IV. Matchin Qazi
V. Iskanderov Qazi
VI. Kshtut Qazi
VII. Magiano-Farab Qazi

Total Households 9,318

## Appendix 10

### Land Ownership

1. Land distribution in Turkestan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Total area (Desyatinas)</th>
<th>Town lands</th>
<th>Settled native lands</th>
<th>Private owners</th>
<th>Russian settlers</th>
<th>State land</th>
<th>State forest</th>
<th>Total settled</th>
<th>Nomadic or unoccupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syr-Darya</td>
<td>47,167,184</td>
<td>90,749</td>
<td>936,147</td>
<td>8,898</td>
<td>159,561</td>
<td>22,926</td>
<td>2,505,945</td>
<td>3,724,226</td>
<td>43,443,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>92.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>8,451,645</td>
<td>15,149</td>
<td>2,137,677</td>
<td>9,408</td>
<td>9,925</td>
<td>19,726</td>
<td>942,772</td>
<td>3,134,657</td>
<td>5,316,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>25.30</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>37.09</td>
<td>62.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td>8,289,128</td>
<td>15,997</td>
<td>2,221,113</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>22,907</td>
<td>59,936</td>
<td>3,914,086</td>
<td>6,235,4554</td>
<td>2,053,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>47.22</td>
<td>75.23</td>
<td>24.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63,908,587</td>
<td>121,895</td>
<td>5,294,937</td>
<td>19,721</td>
<td>192,393</td>
<td>102,588</td>
<td>7,362,803</td>
<td>13,094,337</td>
<td>50,814,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>26.49</td>
<td>79.51</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>73.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Land per person in Samarkand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Average land per person (Desyatina)</th>
<th>Of which irrigated or rain-fed (Desyatina)</th>
<th>Proportion %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katta-Kurgan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khujand</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djizak</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note*: these figures are simply produced by dividing the total amount of land by the population and almost certainly do not reflect actual use. Per household, the average figure in the Samarkand District was 13.9 *desyatinas*, of which 5.7 *desyatinas* were irrigated and 2.7 *bahari*, or rain-fed. The figures are of doubtful accuracy, as the Samarkand Statistical Committee only looked at a small sample of the 80,677 different plots in the District.

3. Land ownership in the Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan, and Khujand Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household ownership (Desyatina)</th>
<th>Percentage of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{3}{4} - 1$</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1\frac{1}{4} - 1\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1\frac{3}{4} - 2\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2\frac{3}{4} - 3\frac{3}{4}$</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5\frac{1}{4} - 7\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7\frac{3}{4} - 10$</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10\frac{1}{4} - 12\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12$\frac{1}{2}$ or more</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Original Sources

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

1. TsGARUz—Tsentrал’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistanan

Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent)
Fond No. 1 Кантсельярия Туркестанскаго Генерал-Губернатора
Fond No. 5 Nachал’ник Зерашнашскаго Округа
Fond No. 18 Самаркандское Областное Правление
Fond No. 20 Управление Nachал’ника Самаркандскаго Уезда
Fond No. 21 Управление Nachал’ника Дзизакскаго Уезда
Fond No. 22 Управление Nachал’ника Катта-Курганскаго Уезда

2. GARF—Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii

Central State Archive of the Russian Federation (Moscow)
Fond No. 652 Romanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Vel. Kn.
Fondy Nos. 677, 678 Aleksandr III
Fond No. 728 M. D. Skobelev
Fond No. 730 Ignat’ev, Nikolai Pavlovich
Fond No. 1,155 Graf Ya. I. Rostovtsev

3. RGIA—Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv

Russian State Historical Archive (St Petersburg)
Fond No. 954 Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman
Fond No. 1,396 Graf Konstantin Konstantinovich Palen

4. RGVIA—Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv

Russian State Military-Historical Archive (Moscow)
Fond 1,396 Opisi 1–5 ‘Shtaba Turkestanского Voennogo Okruga 1866–1919’
Op. 8 ‘Voenno-Sudnye Dela Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga g. Tashkent 1867–1889’

5. AV—Sankt-Peterburgskii Filial Instituta Vostokovedenii, Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk: Arkhiv Vostokovedov

St Petersburg Filial of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences: Archive of Orientalists
Fond No. 33 Kun, Aleksandr Lyudvigovich

6. OIOC—Oriental and India Office Collections (British Library)

P/141 Proceedings of the Government of the Punjab in the Political Department
P/3852 Punjab Government Foreign Department Proceedings
Punjab Revenue Proceedings (PRP)
Punjab Public Works Department Proceedings (PPWDP)
L/MIL/17/13 North-West Frontier, Baluchistan
L/MIL/17/14 Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Tibet
MSS Eur D. 254 Moorcroft Papers

7. NAI—National Archives of India (New Delhi)

Foreign Department Records 1830–1859 (Secret and Political Consultations)
Home Department Records 1859–1914 (Judicial Consultations)

8. Gosudarstvennaya Biblioteka im. Alisher Navoi

Alisher Navoi State Library, Tashkent

Newspapers

Okraina—Gazeta politicheskaya, obshchestvennaya, literaturnaya (Samarkand, 1891–8)
Turkestanskiya Vedomosti (Tashkent, 1870–1917)
Samarkand (Samarkand, 1906)
Unpublished Works

Ostroumov, N. P., 2-i Turkestanskii general-gubernator general-leitenant M. G. Chernyaev (1882–1884 gg) Typescript, dated February 1930

Turkestanskii Sbornik (TS)—Sobranie Sochinenii o Turkestanskom Krae voobshe i o sopredel’nykh stran Srednei Azii. Stat’i i zametki iz russkikh i inostrannykh gazet. Sbornik sostavlyaetsya po porucheniyu Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatora (594 vols.)

1868–1883 Compiled by V. N. Mezhov in St Petersburg
1907–1910 Compiled by order of Governor-General Grodekov in Tashkent
Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED THESIS


PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS (RUSSIAN)


Shteinberg, E. (ed.), ‘Andizhanskoe Vosstanie 1898g.’, KA, 91 (1938), 123.
Bibliography

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS (RUSSIAN)

Fon-Kaufman, Gen-Ad’yuntant Konstantin Petrovich, *Proekt Vsepoddanneishego Otcheta ... Po Grazhdanskomu Upravleniyu i Ustroistvu v Oblastyah Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatorstva. 7 Noyabrya 1867–25 Marta 1881g* (St Pb.: Voennaya Tip., 1885).

Gins, G. K., *Deistuyushchee vodnoe pravo Turkestana i budushchii vodnyi zakon* (St Pb.: Izd. Pereselencheskogo Upravleniya, 1910).


Stratonov, V. V., *Turkestanskii Kalendar’ na 1904g* (Tashkent: Tip. Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga, 1904).  

**PRINTED PERSIAN SOURCES**  
Muhammad Saleh Khwaja Tashkandi, *Ta’rikh-e Jadideh-ye Tashkand* (c.1908), Institut Vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk Respublika Uzbekistana imeni Biruni, Tashkent, Uzbekistan: IVAN RUz-1, 11073/II Available at http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t386.html

*Note*: This transcription only includes extracts from ff. b1a1–294 (pp. 1271–1936) of the 1,000 folio manuscript.


**PERSIAN AND CHAGHATAI SOURCES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH TRANSLATION**


Elliot, Sir Henry Miers, and Dowson, John (eds.), *The History of India as Told by its Own Historians: The Muhammadan Period* (London: Trübner & Co., 1867–77), 8 vols.


**PERSIAN AND CHAGHATAI SOURCES IN RUSSIAN TRANSLATION**


Muhammad Narshahi, *Istoriya Bukhary Mukhameda Narshakhi*, trans. by N. S. Lykoshin and ed. by V. V. Bartol’d (Tashkent: Tip. Fig. br. Kamenskie, 1897).


Veselovskii, N. I. (ed. and trans.), *Kirgizskii Razskaz o Ruskikh Zavoevaniyakh v Turkestanском Krae* (St Pb.: P. O. Yablonskii, 1894).

PUBLISHED SOURCES (ENGLISH AND FRENCH)


____ *Russia in Central Asia* (London: Longmans, 1889).


Lal, Mohan, *Travels in the Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkistan to Balk, Bokhara and Herat* (New Delhi: Nirmal, 1986 (1846)).


**PRINTED SOURCES (RUSSIAN)**


Fitrat, Abd-ur Rauf, *Razskazy Indiiskago Puteshestvennika (Bukhara, kak ona est’)* (Samarkand: B. Gazarov and K. Sliyanov, 1913) (Perevod s Persidskago A. N. Kondrat’ega).
336 Bibliography


——— ‘Uzbeni’, *TV*, 16 Aug.–15 Nov. 1871, Nos. 29, 30, 39, 40, 41, 42.

Grigor’ev, V. V., *Russkaya Politika v Otnoshenii k Srednei Azii. Istoricheskii Ocherk* (St Pb.: Tip V. Bezobrazov, 1874).


——— *Srednyaya Aziya i Vodvorenie v nei Russkoi Grazhdanstvennosti* (St Pb.: Tip B. Bezobrazov, 1871).


Krestovskii, V. V., *V gostyakh u Emira Bukharskogo* (St Pb.: A. S. Suvorina, 1887).


——— *Bukharskoe Khanstvo pod Russkim Protektoratom* (St Pb.: V. Berezovskii, 1911), 2 vols.

Lykoshin, Nil Sergeevich, ‘Pis’ma iz Tuzemnogo Tashkenta. Pis’mo 3-e’, *TV*, 13 February 1894, No. 11.


——— *Rezultaty sblizheniya russkih s tuzemtami* (Tashkent?, 1903).


——— ‘K desyatletiyu Andizhanskoi reznii (1898–1908g)’, *TV*, 30–31 May 1908, Nos. 115–16.

——— *Khoroshii Ton’ na Vostoke. K polyvekomu jubileyu zavoevaniya russkimi Turkestanskogo Kraya* (St Pb.: Sklad u V. A. Berezovskogo, 1915).


‘A. L. Kun’, TV, 22 Nov. 1888, No. 46.

Markov, E., Rossiya v Srednee Azii. Ocherki puteshestviya (St Pb.: M. M. Stasylevich, 1901).


‘Mirshab’, ‘Voina s neveryymi v voistvuyushchii Tatarskii listok’, Okraina (1890), No. 232 (1891), Nos. 9, 41, 42.

Nalivkin, V. P., Kratkaya Istoriya Kokandskago Khanstva (Kazan: Tip. Imp. Universiteta, 1885).

‘Shkola u tuzemtsev Srednee Azii’, TV, 8 Aug. 1889, No. 32.


Tuzemtsy: Ran’she i Teper’ (Tashkent: A Kirsner, 1913).


Sarty—Etnograficheskie Materialy (Tashkent: S. I. Lakhtin, 1890), and (3rd Ed, 1908).


Pospelov, F. F., Materialy k Istoriia Samarkandskoi Oblasti (Samarkand: B. Gazarov, 1912).
Bibliography

Romanovskii, D. I.: Zametki po Sredne-Aziyatskomu Voprosu (St Pb., 1868).
‘S’, ‘Samarkand pri Tamerlane’, TV, 10 January 1889, No. 2.
Sal’kov, V. P., ‘Andizhanskie Vosstanie’ v 1898g (Sbornik Statei) Izdanie P. N. Sal’kovoii (Kazan: Tip.-Lit. Imperatorskogo Universiteta, 1901).
Semenov, A. A., ‘Begstvo’ Abdur-Rakhman-Khana iz Tashkenta v Afganistan (Tashkent, 189–?)


Sh[kapskii?], O., ‘Shto schitat’ Amlyakovymi zemlyami?’, Okraina, 4 Feb. 1891, No. 16.
Sinitsyn, L., ‘Zametki po povodu nashikh pereselentsev’, TV, 15 March 1888, No. 11.
Skopin, V. N., Srednyaya Aziya i Indiya (Moscow: Izd. Efimova, 1904).
Sluchanovskii, S., Samarkand i ego proshloe (Samarkand: Tip. A. I. Sirota, 1911).
Snesarev, A. E., Indiya kak Glavnyi Faktor v Sredne-Aziatskom Voprose (St Pb.: A Suvarin, 1906).
Solovev, L. N., Vozmozhen-li Pokhod Russkich v Indiyu? (Moscow, 1901).
Terent’ev, Gen.-Lt. M. A., Rossiya i Angliya v Srednii Azii (St Pb.: P. P. Merkulev, 1875).

—— Istoriya Zavoevaniya Srednei Azii (St Pb.: V. V. Komarov, 1906), 3 vols.

Bibliography

Vereshchagin, V. V., *Na voine v Azii i Evrope. Vospominaniya khudozhnika V. V. Vereshchagina* (Moscow: I. N. Kushnerev, 1894).


Vereshchagin, V. V., *Na voine v Azii i Evrope. Vospominaniya khudozhnika V. V. Vereshchagina* (Moscow: I. N. Kushnerev, 1894).


‘Oroshenie v Doline Zeravshana’, *TV*, 13 Sept. 1888, No. 36.

SECONDARY WORKS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH)


—— *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, trans. by T. Minorsky and C. E. Bosworth (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1992 (1968)).


Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770–1870 (Cambridge, 1982).


Empire and Information. Intelligence-Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


The Administration of Bukhara under the Manghits and Some Tashkent Manuscripts. Papers on Inner Asia No. 34 (Bloomington, Ind.: RIFIAS, 2000).


Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).


——*La Rivoluzione Capovolta* (Naples: l’ancora del mediterraneo, 2003).


——‘Islamic Law, Imperial Order: Muslims, Jews, and the Russian State’, *AI*, 3 (November 2004), *Historical Memory and National Paradigm*.


Bibliography


Frank, Allen, Islam and Ethnic Relations in the Kazakh Inner Horde: Muslim Cossacks, Tatar Merchants and Kazakh Nomads in a Turkic Manuscript 1870–1910’ in Anke Von Kügelgen et al. (eds.), Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries, Vol. II Inter-regional & Inter-ethnic Relations (Berlin, 1998), 211–42.


Holzwarth, Wolfgang, ‘Relations Between Uzbek Central Asia, the Great Steppe and Iran, 1700–1750’, in Stefan Leder and Bernard Streck (eds.), *Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations* (Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2005), 179–216.


Kemper, Michael, ‘‘Adat against Shari’a: Russian Approaches towards Daghistani “Customary Law” in the 19th century’, AI (November 2005), Vol. 3 Empire and the Challenge of Nationalism: Searching for Modes of Self-Description.


Khan, Abdul Rashid, The All-India Muslim Educational Conference (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001).


Bibliography


——and Dudoignon, Stéphane (eds.), Islam and Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries) (London: Kegan Paul, 2001).


—— The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade, 1550–1900 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).


Bibliography


Pernau, Margrit (ed.), *The Delhi College. Traditional Elites, the Colonial State, and Education before 1857* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).


Bibliography


Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, David, Towards the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001).

and Menning, Bruce (eds.), Reforming the Tsar’s Army. Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


Sela, Ron, Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan’s Inauguration Ceremony, Papers on Inner Asia No. 37 (Bloomington, Ind.: RIFIAS, 2003).


Spangenburg, B., British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy and the ICS in the Late Nineteenth Century (Delhi: Manohar, 1976).


Bibliography


——‘Empire without Imperialism? Ambiguities of Colonization in Tsarist Russia’, AI, 2 (June 2003), Beyond the Borders: Political and Economic Migrations, Internal and External Exile.

——Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).


——‘The Legal and Ethnoconfessional Spheres of Empire: Russian Muslims in the Mirror of Legislation (Early Twentieth Century)’, AI, 2 (September 2000), Nationalism and Religion.


SECONDARY WORKS (RUSSIAN)

Abashin, S. N., ‘Obshchina v Turkestane v otsenakh i sporakh russkikh admin-


___ and Bushkov, V. I. (eds.), Ferganskaya dolina: etnichnost’, etnicheskie

Abduraimov, M. A., Ocherki Agrarnykh Otnoshenii v Bukharskom Khanstve v

Abdurakhmanova, N., and Rustamova, G., Kolonial’naya Sistema Vlasti v

Agadzhyanov, S. G., ‘Osnovnye Cherty Sistemy Upravleniya Natsional’nykh
Okrain Rossi’, in S. G. Agadzhanyan (ed.), Natsional’nye Okrany Rossiiskoi
Imperii. Stanovlenie Razvitie Sistemy Upravleniya (Moscow: ‘Slavyanskii
Dialog’, 1997), 351–413.

Agafonova, Z. I., and Khalfin, N. A. (eds.), Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi
Istoricheskiy Arkhiv UzSSR: Putevoditel’ (Tashkent: Arkhivnyi Otd. MVD
UzSSR, 1948).

Akhmedzhanov, G. A., Rossiiskaya Imperiya v Tsentral’noi Azii (Istoriya i
Istoriozapiya Kolonial’noi politiki Tsarizma v Turkestane) (Tashkent: ‘FAN’,
1995).

Alekseev, I. L., ‘N. P. Ostrooumov o problemakh upravleniya musul’manskim
naselenii Turkestanskogo Kraya’, SRIO, No. 5 (153), ‘Rossiya i Srednyaya

Azadaev, F., Tashkent vo Vtoroi Polovine XIX-go Veka (Tashkent: Izd. Akademii
Nauka Uzbekskoi SSR, 1959).

Bababekov, Khaidarbek Nazirbekovich: Istoriya Kokanda (Tashkent: FAN,
2006).

Bartol’d, V. V., Istoriya Kul’turnoi Zhizni Turkestana (Moscow: Izd. Akademii
Nauk SSSR, 1927).

___ ‘K Istoriyi Orosheniya v Turkestane’, Raboty po Istoriicheskoi Geografii

Baskhanov, M. K., Russkie Voennye Vostokovedy do 1917 goda. Biobibli-
ograficheskii slovar’ (Moscow: Izd. Firma ‘Vostochnaya Literatura’ RAN,
2005).


Beisembiev, Timur, Tarikh-i Shakhrukh-i kak Istoriicheskii Istochnik (Alma-Ata:


V. V. Bartol’d i puti dalneishego issledovaniya problemy mil’ka., in B. G. Gafurov, Formy feodal’noi zemel’noi sobstvennosti i vladeniya na Blizhnom i Srednem Vostoke. Bartol’dovskie chteniya 1975g. (Moscow, 1979), 146–58.


Miller, Aleksei, ‘Russifikatsii: klassifitsirovat’ i ponyat’’, AI, 2 (July 2002), Organization of Political Space of Empires and Nations.


Sokolov, V. V., Turkestanskii Krai v Sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii: problemy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo i obshchestvenno-politicheskoe razvitiya (Vtoraya polovina XIX v—Fevral’ 1917g.) Avtoreferat (Moscow, 2002).


Index

‘Abd al-Ahad (Emir of Bukhara) 124 n. 142
‘Abd al-Malik Tura 21–2, 24, 54
‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (Emir of Afghanistan) 34, 139, 247, 277
Abramov, Alexander Konstantinovich: abolishes Amlakdar 109–10
as Military Governor in Samarkand 23–5, 103, 132, 139, 168, 185, 254, 259
at the siege of Samarkand 23–4
at the siege of Tashkent 19
correspondence with von Kaufman, 60, 106–8, 113, 122, 206–11
leads expedition to Shahrisabz 24
portrait 142
social & educational background of 141, 296, 303
Abu Tahir Khoja Samarqandi xxvi, 25, 99, 279
‘Adat (Customary law) 215, 246–52, 267
Afghanistan 4, 6, 14, 22, 34, 63–4, 86, 139, 247, 277
Ahmad Donish (historian) xxvi, 18–19, 54 n. 16, 183, 207, 223, 247, 249
Aksakals (Elders): 180
appointment of, 104, 113
before the conquest, 12–13, 21, 93–5, 98
corruption of, 114–7, 161, 164, 181–91
election of, 118, 176, 253
responsibilities of, 65, 112, 197
Russian views of, 57, 153, 174, 287
social background of, 125, 173, 176, 178–9
Alcohol, alcoholism 28, 130, 152, 255
see also Drunkenness, Vodka
Alexander II 127, 136
Alexander III xxiv, 129, 163, 204–5 n. 12
Algeria 2, 46–7, 67, 76, 276
Alimqul xxvii, 16, 18, 55 n. 22
Amlakdars (landowners) 95–101, 104–112, 119, 121–2, 286
Amu-Darya (Oxus) 19, 35, 41, 208, 231–2
Andijan:
 uprising, 20, 49, 57, 63–5, 73–5, 151–2, 155–6, 194–5
inhabitants of, 13, 44, 273
Anglo-Muhammadan Law 275, 277, 278 n. 123, 280, 282
Annenkov, Mikhail Nikolaevich 6, 80, 275
Arabic (language) xi, xx, 98–9, 147, 245 n. 4, 248, 280
Aral Sea 15, 232
Archives ix–x, xxiv–v, xxvii–viii, 8, 118 n. 120, 135, 158, 183, 262, 272 n. 103, 325–6
Arendarenko, Georgii Alexeevich 139, 147, 151, 223, 304
Aristocracy:
in the Caucasus, 52–3, 123–4
in India, 89–90, 119–22, 165
in Turkestan 95–100, 119, 122–3
and the Russian ruling elite, 91, 121–5
Aryks (Irrigation canals) 28, 154, 317–9
construction of, 202, 212–3
from the Zarafshan, 210–11
maintenance of, 217–8, 224
management of, 213–30
Aryk-Aksakals:
appointment of, 176–7
Bukharan, 207–10
corruption of, 218–221
responsibilities of, 153, 212–5, 223–4
Russian, 230–1

Babur 4, 10 n. xxvii, 44, 279
Bahadur Shah Zafar (last Mughal Emperor) 83, 124
Bai (wealthy man) 153–5, 178, 268
Balalaika 190
Barthold, Vasilii Vladimirovich 12, 45–6, 98, 100, 119, 147, 181, 275
Bashkirs 47, 51, 53–4, 56, 124, 138, 143, 146, 184
Beks (governors)
   After the conquest, 103–4, 105, 119, 124, 286
   Bukharan, 115–6, 180, 198
   before the conquest, 21, 24–5, 52, 91–5, 110–2, 175
   in the Caucasus 124
judicial powers, 247, 249
Bombay 12, 64–5, 89, 244, 283, 291
Bregel, Yuri 9
Buggerby 191
Bukhara:
city of, 41–3
defeat by Russians, 18–19, 21
Emirate of, 13–16, 91–3, 99–100, 238
Emir of, xxvi, 10 n. xxvii, 19, 24, 54, 114, 207
Qazis in, 247–8, 261
Bureaucracy:
   in Bukhara, 93
   in India, 165–71
   in the Russian Empire, 37, 121, 133–5
   in Samarkand, 137–147, 303–14
   Education of, 128–30, 162–3, 302
Burma 86, 89–90, 119
Burnes, Alexander 14–15, 97, 206
Calcutta ix, 3, 81–3, 238, 280, 282
‘Cambridge’ School 5
Caspian Sea 33–4, 41, 231–2
Catherine the Great 18 n. 37, 51, 126
Caucasus:
   ‘Adat in, 248
treatment of elites in, 52–3, 123–4
war in, 52
lessons learned from, 2 n. iv, 31, 53, 56, 123, 126, 251
Central Asian Uprising of 1916 20, 40, 197, 290
Chechnya 52
Cherniaev, Mikhail Grigorievich:
capture of Tashkent by, 18–19 31, 55, 202 n. 8, 250–1
as Governor-General of
   Turkestan, 37–8, 186, 212–3, 231–2
Chimkent 15, 18, 107 n. 77, 194
China 12, 41
Chinovniki (state servants) 48, 95, 131, 146, 151, 158–9, 162–3, 213, 289
Churches 25, 26, 57, 288
Clerks 158–61
Constantinople 64, 76, 78, 83, 85
Cossacks 36, 107, 109, 125, 132, 239
Cotton 20, 28, 30, 36, 93, 205, 216, 221, 226, 228 n. 98, 232–4
Cricket x, 287
Curzon, George Nathaniel 1, 5, 7, 34, 48, 130, 169, 286
Daghestan, Daghestanis 52–3, 131, 144, 247–8
Dahbid 22 n. 50, 61–2, 101, 107, 268
Delhi ix–x, xxv, 4, 81–3, 238, 283
Delhi College 82
District Commandants (Uyezdnye Nachal’niki):
   and irrigation, 214–5, 223–4
   and the judiciary, 245, 265, 272, 274
   and the ‘native administration’, 193–5
   and revenue collection, 69, 115
attitudes to Russian settlement of, 49
   corruption of, 160
duties of, 127, 158, 176–7, 183–6
   failings of, 74, 148–50, 163
   background of, 137–40, 146, 162–3
   pay of, 132, 168
Djigit (bodyguards) 155, 184, 189, 197, 232, 257
Djizak xxiv, 1, 18, 38, 41, 48–9, 70, 176, 178, 197–8, 210, 225–6, 266, 318
Drunkenness 22, 49, 130, 152, 190, 289
Dukhi Ishan, the 20, 65, 73–5, 152, 156, 195
Duleep Singh, Maharajah xxiv, 6
Index

Duma, Russian State 39, 68 n. 76, 146, 235
Dung 189 n. 94

East India Company xxv, 12, 14–15, 80, 94, 167, 204 n. 10, 242, 280, 283

Education 66–73
Madrasahs (Islamic Colleges), 27, 56, 58, 60–2, 69, 72, 79, 82, 85, 179, 198, 249–52, 261, 263, 267
Maktabs (schools), 68, 72–3, 76, 77, 78
Military, 128–30, 135–8, 162–3, 302
Russian-Native Schools, 67–72, 191

Elections (local government):
corruption and rivalries in, 161, 178, 182–3, 188–9, 193, 198–9, 218–9, 263–7, 272
creation of system, 118, 175–7, 214–5, 253, 262–3
suspension of, 71, 74, 186

Factionalism 182, 186, 198–9, 253, 259, 267

Ferghana:
Province, 19, 41, 45, 49, 61, 131, 139, 193, 273
Valley, x, 1, 12–13, 16, 19–20, 41–5, 48–9, 73–4, 101, 202, 212, 233, 279

Forsyth, Douglas 33

Gaspirali, Ismail Bey 76, 78, 86

General Staff, the 124, 129 139, 141
Academy, 6, 129, 138–41, 148, 166

Geok-Tepe 7, 20, 53

Girs, Fedor Karlovich:
reforming commision, 38–9, 59, 74, 98, 111–2, 132 186, 213, 218, 261, 263–5

Gorchakov, Prince Alexander
Mikhailovich 30, 38 n. 109

Governors-General of Turkestan 19, 38–9, 49, 60–1, 67, 69, 78, 131, 139, 149, 151, 271, 295–6

Great Reforms, the 35 n. 99, 127–9, 163, 244

Grebenkin, Afanasii Davidovich 44–5, 115, 208, 308

Grazhdanstvennost’ (citizenship) 35, 244, 273, 289

Hastings, Warren 280

Haj 63–6

Hedaya, the 275–6, 278–81

Hedjaz, the 5, 63, 81, 85

Hissar 60, 92

Ignatiev, Count N. P. xxiv, 38, 59, 111, 175, 263

Ignorirovanie 55–8, 66–7, 74, 84, 123, 147, 152

Indian Civil Service (ICS) 7, 133, 165–6, 168–70

Indian Mutiny 32, 56, 89, 124, 152, 175

Inorodtsy (aliens) 42, 67, 124, 151, 252

Irrigation 201–43, 317–9
before the conquest, 12–13, 43, 201–3, 238
extension of by the Russians, 36, 205, 231–4
in India, 237–43
use as an instrument of power, 202–5

Ishans (Sufi Leaders) 20, 22, 61, 65, 70, 73–75, 107, 123, 152, 156, 195, 259, 265–6

Iskander-Mirza 67

Islam 51–87
‘fanaticism’ of, 51, 54, 56, 59, 63, 70, 72–3, 80, 83–4, 123, 145–6, 175, 257–8, 262–3, 266, 271, 276, 291
Russian policy towards based on fear, 55–8, 73–6, 175, 291

Ivanov, Nikolai Alexandrovich 139, 185, 257, 260, 295

Jadidism (Islamic modernism) 10 n. xxvii, 46, 85, 289
in Bukhara, xxvi, 79
and educational reform, 66–7, 76–8, 87

Judiciary 244–85:
Anglo-Indian, 282–5
Islamic, 250–1, 267–71
Russian. 38, 127, 244, 264, 270

Jumabazar 179, 220
Kamaladdin Kuz-Falak (Qazi of Samarkand) 254–5, 256
Kashgar xxvii, 12–13, 15, 17, 44, 64
Katta-Kurgan xxiv, 1, 21–2, 43–4, 78, 114–5, 174, 190, 203, 208, 225, 228–9, 254–8, 297, 315–6
Kazan 16–17, 45 n. 138, 51, 53, 56, 72, 76, 158, 258, 274
Kazakhs (Kirghiz) 15, 30–1, 36 n. 102, 43, 45–6, 51, 54, 72, 124, 192, 239, 267
Khala (robe of honour) 75, 90, 104, 115, 119, 145, 174, 181, 265, 282
Kheraj (Harvest tax) 92–3, 98–100, 104, 106, 113, 116–7
Khiva 11–12, 17, 19, 41, 46, 54, 91, 124, 231
Khojas:
meaning of term, 101–2
lineages of, 22 n. 50, 55 n. 22, 74, 101, 106–8
role in resisting Russians, 107–8
Khoja Ahrar 58, 101–2, 198–9
Khorezm xxvi, 45, 201, 247
Khudoyar Khan (Khan of Kokand) 15–18, 103 n. 69, 202
Khujaand xxiv, 1, 16, 18, 43, 62, 68–71, 93, 160, 176–7, 190, 202, 210, 218, 236, 317
Kipchak 15–16, 18, 45, 73
Kishlak (settlement) 132, 219–20, 224
Kitai-Kipchak tribe 22, 43, 204 n. 11
Kokand:
city, 41, 62
Khanate, xxv, xxvii, 4, 11–19, 24, 31, 69, 73, 93–5, 97, 101, 115 n. 112, 202, 212
Kostenko, Lev Feofanovich 54, 80, 93, 97, 129, 249–50, 254–5
Kryzhanovsky, Nikolai Andreevich xxiv, 54–6, 146, 248, 250
Kun, Alexander Ludwigovich xxv, 59–60, 62, 98
Kush-begi 62, 93–4, 208

Language training (for Russian officers) 147–51
Language training (for native officials) 191–2
Legal reform:
of the Qazi’s courts, 263–5, 267–71
of the Russian courts, 263–5
‘Living Wall’, the 125, 149, 172–3, 181, 194–5, 271
Local elites:
in India, 89–90, 196–7, 199–200
in Turkestan, 173–4
Lykoshin, Nil Sergeevich 131, 140, 147, 149, 156, 169, 194–5, 289, 310
Macnabb, Donald 120, 167
Madras 89, 170, 242, 244, 283, 291
Maev, Nikolai Alexandrovich 24–5, 57
Manghit dynasty/tribe xxvi, 11, 14, 43, 198, 204 n. 11
Miliutin, Dmitri Alexeevich 23 n. 53, 30 n. 77, 31, 124, 128–9, 138, 163
Mirabs 93, 207, 210, 213–17, 222–3, 226, 230–1, 241, 318
Miropiev, M. A. 2 n. iv, 63, 67, 75–6, 79
Mirza ‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami xxvi, 21–2, 74, 94 n. 30, 107, 254
Mirza Alexander Kazem-bek 274–5
Missionaries 56, 79–83
Modernization 58, 83, 152, 175, 237, 284, 290
Mongols 2, 43, 99, 201
Moorcroft, William xxv, 204, 238–9
Moscow 3, 6 n. xiv, 21, 30, 52, 68 n. 76, 138, 233–4
Mosques 25, 27, 51, 54, 58, 60–1, 81, 144–5, 155
Muhammad Kasani Makhduum-e Azam 22, 101, 107
Muhammad Salih Khwaja Tashkandi xxvi, 21 n. 46
Muhammad Sharif-e Sadr-e Ziya 247, 249, 254
Mulk Amlak 59, 97–101, 104–110, 112, 122
Mysore 12–13, 88
Index

Nadir Shah 11, 14
Nalivkin, Vladimir Petrovich 61, 68, 75, 94, 97, 131, 147, 149–51, 169, 173, 181, 195, 197, 271, 289
Naqshbandiyya 4, 53, 81, 101, 108 n. 84, 198
Nasrullah Khan (Emir of Bukhara) 13–15, 54, 93 n. 18
Nobility 91, 97, 123–4, 128, 135, 141
Nelyuevsky Cadet Corps 109, n. 86, 138, 147
Newspapers 28, 78–9

Obrusenie 35–6
Officer Corps 128, 134–7, 143, 166, 302
Orenburg xxvii, 17–18, 23, 31, 36, 54, 56, 138, 147, 205 n. 12, 250, 275
Orenburg-Tashkent Railway 35, 40, 47
Orientalists xxv, xxvii, 59, 78, 98, 137, 148, 150–1, 247
Orthodoxy 19 n. 38, 35, 45 n. 138, 56–7, 67, 161
Ostroumov, Nikolai Petrovich 45, 56, 68, 70, 76, 78, 131–2, 141, 147, 150–1, 169, 194, 275–6, 279–80
Ottoman Empire/Sultan 54, 63, 75–6, 78–9, 246, 276
Oxford University 147, 165, 167 n. 134, 169

Pahlen, Count Konstantin Konstantinovich:
  attempt to codify Sharia law by, 271–81
  Memoirs, 7, 49, 75, 78, 277
  on assimilation, 151, 273–4
  on British India, 38–40, 131, 164–5, 168
  on irrigation, 210, 230–1, 234–7
  on Islam, 75, 78
  on the ‘native administration’, 182–3, 191–2
  on Qazis, 249, 265, 272–5
  on revenue collection, 102–3
  on Russian officials, 127, 151, 156, 161–5
  on Sharia law, 274–82

Pamirs, the 1, 3, 6, 42, 229–30
Pan-Islamism 73–8
Paranoia 33 n. 91, 65, 73, 78, 87, 146, 266, 291
Peishambe 69, 183, 185, 225, 321
Penjikent 1, 104, 262, 297
Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie (Resettlement Administration) 49, 205, 234
Perovsk 31, 192
Perovsky, Count Vasily Alexeevich 17, 37
Persia/Persians 2, 14, 22, 64, 274, 276
Persian (language) x–xi, xx, xxvi, 24, 42–6, 78–9, 87, 98 n. 44, 124 n. 142, 143, 147–8, 169, 184, 278, 330–2
Peshawar 15, 17, 22, 63, 85, 119–20, 167, 241–2, 284, 299–301
Petitions:
  about revenue collection, 109, 183–5, 192
  about elections, 178–9, 187–90, 265–6, 272
  about irrigation, 207, 218–27, 229, 235–6
  about Qazis, 255, 257–9, 261–2, 269, 273
  as an administrative burden, 183–5, 195, 290
  before the conquest, 95, 183
  from Russians, xxiv, 58, 159–60
  language difficulties with, 149–50, 156–7

Peshpek 15, 31
Plov ix
Population 41–50, 297–8
Pristav (Local Police-Chief) 116, 127, 132, 146, 149, 157–8, 162–4, 172, 193, 195, 236
Prostitution 28, 190, 261
Punjab:
  conquest of, 5, 85
  British rule in, 17, 89, 132, 141, 151, 156, 167–8
  irrigation in, 233–4, 237–43
  landowning agents in, 89–90, 119–21, 197, 299–301
  legal system in, 283–5
Index

Punjab: (cont.)
recruitment to Indian Army from, 76, 86
under Ranjit Singh, 14–15, 85
Pyatidesyatnik 176, 221, 223

Qazis 244–85, 320–2
as 'Popular Judges', 263–5
before the Conquest 246–50
corruption of 263–7
in India, 282–4
Russian changes to the role of, 251–3
Qazi-e Kalan 55–6, 249–52

Railways 3–4, 20, 27–8, 34–6, 64, 66, 232–4
Ranjit Singh (Maharajah of Punjab) 14–15, 85
Rice 179, 203, 221, 224–5, 236
Romanov, Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich 204–5, 210, 232
Romanovsky, Dmitrii Ilyich 18, 56 n. 25, 250
Rosenbach, N. O. 67, 151
Rostovtsov, Count Nikolai Yakovlevich 27, 229
Russian Settlement 46–50, 234

Said Azim Bai 68, 87, 173–4, 268
Samarkand (City) 29
capture by Russians vii, xxiv, 19, 21–2
construction of new town, 25–8
irrigation supply to, 202, 211
old city & monuments xxvi, 25–7
Samarkand Province (Oblast):
administrators in, 131, 137–47, 193–4
creation of, 2, 24, 38, 41, 48, 187
extent of irrigation in, 209–10, 233, 317–9
Military Governor of, 71, 191, 229
Number of Qazis in, 260, 320–2
population of 42–9, 124
religious endowments in, 61
Sart:
language, 44–5, 69, 277, 281–2
meaning of the word, 43–6
Russian views of, 55, 68, 289
Sattar Khan 'Abd ul-Ghafarov 194
Sayyid Alim Khan (Emir of Bukhara) xxvi
Sayyid Muzaffar (Emir of Bukhara) 10 n. xxvii, 18, 21, 24, 54, 207
Sblizhenie (rapprochement) 35–6, 51, 75, 152, 195, 284, 288–9
Schuyler, Eugene 8, 25, 130, 137, 141, 143–5, 250 n. 31, 251, 253
Semirech'ye 4, 18, 36, 46–9, 162 n. 118, 235, 239, 269
Shah Waliullah of Delhi 81
Shahrisabz 21–2, 24, 92, 103, 121, 140
Shamil 2 n. iv, 52, 124, 248
Sharia:
colonial misunderstandings of, 245–6, 248, 276–7
Shia 14, 21–2, 42, 64, 247 n. 16
Sindh 4–5, 89–90, 107, 246
Skobelev, Mikhail Dmitrievich 7, 20, 48, 53
Snesarev, Andrei Evgenievich 6, 80, 129, 168–9, 288
Sobolev, Leonid Nikolaevich 34, 139–40, 211, 311
Steppe Commission, the 112, 174, 252
Sufism 4–5, 20, 53, 61, 85, 101, 123
Syed Ahmad Khan 79, 82–6
Syr-Darya:
Province, 18, 38, 41, 64, 118, 131, 136, 146, 173, 176, 192, 233
river 1, 12–13, 15, 17, 41, 93 208, 232
Syrtlanov, Shahaidar Shaikhgardovich 143–6, 311

Tajiks 22, 42–6, 69, 124, 178
Taluqdar 88, 119
Tashkent:
as capital of Turkestan, 18, 37–8, 68, 127–8, 130, 176, 244, 277–8
capture of 3, 15, 18, 31, 54–6, 202 n. 8, 250–1
cholera riots in, 20
new town, 25–6, 48, 174
commercial importance of, 13
population of, 41, 48
Index

Tatars 43, 45–8, 51–3, 56, 66, 71–2, 75–7, 124, 138, 146, 149, 184, 196, 281

Taxation:
in British India, 118, 291
under the Bukharan Emirate 61, 91–3, 198
under the Kokand Khanate, 93–5
after the Russian conquest, 32, 109, 112–18, 186, 189, 216–7, 237, 291–4

Tea xxiv, 25, 115, 190, 281

Tenga 92, 115 n. 112, 157, 189, 191–2, 220–1

Terentiev, Mikhail Afrikanovich 6, 16, 33, 50, 54, 57, 80, 129, 140, 312

Termen, Alexander Iosifovich 151–7, 268, 270

Tiflis 20, 131, 144 n. 61

Timurid 21, 90 n. 7, 75 n. 103, 101, 108, 198, 279

Translators (Perevodchiki) 66, 71, 74, 138, 146, 149–51, 161, 184, 191–2, 195, 221, 281, 289

Transcaspia 19–20, 40–1, 43, 161, 233, 248, 291

Transcaspian railway 1, 3, 6 n. xiii, 20, 27, 34–5, 48, 64–6, 233

Turcoman xxvi, 7, 31, 35, 43, 204 n. 10

Turkestanski Sbornik xxv, 34 n. 97, 38, 327

Turkestanskiya Vedomosti 25 n. 60, 28, 194, 225, 231, 276

Turki (language) 43–6, 118 n. 120, 143–4, 148, 150, 184, 194, 272 n. 103, 281

Tuzemtsy (natives) 42, 181, 274, 290

’Ulama (Islamic clergy) 43, 54 n. 16, 55 n. 22, 74, 79, 81–2, 85, 87 n. 147, 123, 247 n. 16, 250–1, 253, 257–9, 262, 266, 268


Uzbek x, xxiv, 11, 13–14, 18, 43–6, 73 n. 94, 92, 102, 124, 179, 198, 203, 279

Uzbekistan xxiv–xxvii, 10 n. xxvii, 199

Valikhanov, Chokan Chingisovich 13, 51 n. 3

Vereshchagin, Vasilii Vasilievich 23, 169

Viceroy of India 1, 38–9, 86, 165, 169

Violence:
in opposition to Russian rule, 20, 73–5, 197
irrigation, 220, 225, 230–1
of native officials, 190–1
of the Russians, 7, 20, 51, 53

Virsky Brothers 72, 161, 192, 196

Vodka x, 159, 289

Voennoy-Narodnoe Upravlenie 35, 126, 128, 132, 137, 140, 158, 163, 166, 168, 172

Volost Upraviteli
corruption of, 160–1, 181–2, 185–95, 219, 221–2, 261–2
creation of post of, 113, 125, 173, 177
elections to, 74, 179, 182
power & patronage of, 189–90, 198, 213, 224–5

Von Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich:
appointment as Governor-General of Turkestan, 8, 19, 250
autonomy as Governor-General, 37
capture of Samarkand by, 21–4, 202, 254–5
attitude towards Islam, 55–8, 107–8, 122–3, 146, 148
policy towards landowners, 104–112, 121, 173–5
death, 37–8, 78, 288

Wahhabism 81, 85–6

Waqf (religious endowments) 58–62, 84, 97, 110–11, 122, 127, 246

War Ministry 30 n. 77, 32, 294

Water charges:
in India, 239, 242–3
in Turkestan, 215–8

Water measurements 227–8

Whisky x

Wolff, Revd. Joseph 82

Yafimovich, Alexander Mikhailovich 160, 296

Yakub Beg (Amir of Kashgar) 15–17, 33 n. 90
Zamindars 89, 91, 104, 119, 122
Zarafshan

Valley 1–2, 4, 16, 41, 96, 102, 104, 113, 139, 201, 216, 286
River 1, 19, 202–3, 207, 210–11
Waters divided between Samarkand and Bukhara, 202, 206–9, 229, 286

Zemstvo 35, 72 n. 92, 127, 162
Zerabulak 21–2, 54, 143