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“Foreign Affairs . . . will tolerate wide differences of opinion. Its articles will not represent any consensus of beliefs. What is demanded of them is that they shall be competent and well informed, representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed. . . . It does not accept responsibility for the views in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.”

Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor
Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922
CONTRIBUTORS

SUSAN GLASSER wanted to be a journalist from the age of ten, when she helped her parents distribute copies of a newspaper they founded in Washington, D.C. She began working at The Washington Post in 1998 and eventually spent four years as joint Moscow bureau chief for the newspaper. A former editor in chief of Foreign Policy and a current staff writer at The New Yorker, Glasser is a co-author (with Peter Baker) of Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution. In “Putin the Great” (page 10), Glasser recounts the Russian president’s unlikely rise and inimitable rule.

As a young reporter in the Philippines in the 1980s, SHEILA CORONEL worked for opposition newspapers exposing abuses perpetrated by the regime of Ferdinand Marcos. She went on to become one of Asia’s most celebrated journalists, co-founding the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in 1989. Now, Coronel is a professor of journalism at Columbia University. In “The Vigilante President” (page 36), she examines how as president, Rodrigo Duterte has replicated the brutal, lawless tactics he honed as mayor of Davao.

ODD ARNE WESTAD’s interest in China began during a year he spent as an undergraduate at Peking University, where every morning he had to shout Maoist slogans with the other students. Since then, Westad has become one of the most distinguished historians of modern China and the Cold War. He is the author of numerous books, including The Global Cold War, which received the 2006 Bancroft Prize. Now a professor at Yale University, in “The Sources of Chinese Conduct” (page 86), Westad asks whether the United States and China have entered a new Cold War.

LISA ANDERSON is one of the United States’ foremost experts on Egypt. From 2011 to 2015, she served as president of the American University in Cairo; before that, she was dean of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, as well as chair of the Political Science Department. Anderson, who has also taught at Harvard and Princeton, is now professor emerita of international relations at Columbia. In “An American in Cairo” (page 210), she reflects on the journalist Peter Hessler’s account of postrevolutionary Egypt.
Historical eras tend to have characteristic leadership types: the fledgling democrats of the 1920s, the dictators of the 1930s and 1940s, the nationalist anticolonialists of the 1950s and 1960s, the gerontocrats of the 1970s, the fledgling democrats (again) of the 1980s and 1990s. Now we’re back to dictators.

The leading figures on the world stage today practice a brutal, smash-mouth politics, a personalized authoritarianism. Old-school strongmen, they do whatever is needed to grasp and hold on to power. Here we profile five to see what makes them tick. All fought their way from obscurity to the throne and then took a hard authoritarian turn. But how, and why?

Susan Glasser says that Russia’s Vladimir Putin sees himself as a latter-day Peter the Great. He fetishizes strength, dreams of restoring imperial grandeur, and rules by the old tsarist doctrine of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.”

According to Richard McGregor, China’s Xi Jinping is driven by paternal hero worship and devotion to the Chinese Communist Party. Having concluded that the party’s rule was under growing threat, he has devoted his time in office to restoring its dominance.

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan is harder to pin down, writes Kaya Genc. A fiery Islamist turned reformer turned populist authoritarian, he has become the country’s longest-serving and most significant leader since Ataturk.

Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines is comfortable shooting people and wants you to know it, notes Sheila Coronel. He made his name as a tough mayor bringing order to a crime-ridden city, and as president, he offers that experience as a national model—“Singapore with thugs instead of technocrats.”

And Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Paul Lendvai explains, started off as a liberal activist before cynically switching to populist nationalism when the political winds shifted—and as prime minister, he has proceeded to dismantle democratic institutions and undermine the rule of law.

There is no scholarly consensus on what role individuals play in history, relative to broader structural forces in their environment. You can tell any political story you want through the lens of the people involved, making it appear that their choices mattered greatly. And you can tell the same story with abstract trends doing the work and human particularity washed out of the picture. So how much do details about these men’s lives and characters matter? How would history be unfolding without them, and how much of what happens next will be determined by their personal whims? Good questions.

—Gideon Rose, Editor
The leading figures on the world stage today practice a brutal, smashmouth politics, a personalized authoritarianism.
Putin the Great
Russia’s Imperial Impostor

Susan B. Glasser

On January 27, 2018, Vladimir Putin became the longest-serving leader of Russia since Joseph Stalin. There were no parades or fireworks, no embarrassingly gilded statues unveiled or unseemly displays of nuclear missiles in Red Square. After all, Putin did not want to be compared with Leonid Brezhnev, the bushy-browed septuagenarian whose record in power he had just surpassed. Brezhnev, who ruled the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, was the leader of Putin’s gritty youth, of the long stagnation that preceded the empire’s collapse. By the end, he was the butt of a million jokes, the doddering grandfather of a doddering state, the conductor of a Russian train to nowhere. “Stalin proved that just one person could manage the country,” went one of those many jokes. “Brezhnev proved that a country doesn’t need to be managed at all.”

Putin, a ruler at a time when management, or at least the appearance thereof, is required, prefers other models. The one he has liked the longest is, immodestly, Peter the Great. In the obscenity and criminality of post-Soviet St. Petersburg in the 1990s, when Putin was deputy mayor, he chose to hang on his office wall a portrait of the modernizing tsar who built that city on the bones of a thousand serfs to be his country’s “window to the West.” By that point in his career, Putin was no Romanov, only an unknown former lieutenant colonel in the KGB who had masqueraded as a translator, a diplomat, and a university administrator, before ending up as the unlikely right-hand man of St. Petersburg’s first-ever democratically elected mayor. Putin had grown up so poor in the city’s mean postwar courtyards that his autobiography speaks of fighting off “hordes of rats” in the hallway of the communal apartment where he and his parents lived in a single room with no hot water or stove.

Peter the Great had no business being his model, but there he was, and there he has remained. Earlier this summer, in a long and boastful interview with the Financial Times in which he celebrated the decline of Western-style liberalism and the West’s “no longer tenable” embrace of multiculturalism, Putin answered unhesitatingly when asked which world leader he admired most. “Peter the Great,” he replied. “But he is dead,” the Financial Times’ editor, Lionel Barber, said. “He will live as long as his cause is alive,” Putin responded.

No matter how contrived his admiration for Peter the Great, Putin has in fact styled himself a tsar as much as a Soviet general secretary over the course of his two decades in public life. The religion he grew up worshiping was not the Marxist-Leninist ideology he was force-fed in school but the heroic displays of superpower might he saw on television and the imperial grandeur of his faded but still ambitious hometown, Peter’s town. Strength was and is his dogma, whether for countries or men, and the Russian emperors’ motto
“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” is a closer philosophical fit with today’s Putinism than the Soviet paean to international workers’ solidarity and the heroism of the laborer that Putin had to memorize as a child. Brezhnev was not the model for Putin but the cautionary tale, and if that was true when Putin was a young KGB operative in the days of détente and decline in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is even more the case now, when Putin faces the paradox of his own extended rule, defined by great length but also by perpetual insecurity.

**SURVIVOR: RUSSIA**

Insecurity might seem the wrong word for it: Putin is well into his 20th year as Russia’s leader and in some ways appears to be at his most powerful, the global template for a new era of modern authoritarians. In the early years of this century, when the post-Soviet wave of democratization still seemed inexorable, Putin reversed Russia’s course, restoring centralized authority in the Kremlin and reviving the country’s standing in the world. Today, in Washington and certain capitals of Europe, he is an all-purpose villain, sanctioned and castigated for having invaded two neighbors—Georgia and Ukraine—and for having provoked Western countries, including by interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election in favor of Donald Trump and using deadly nerve agents to poison targets on British soil. His military intervention in Syria’s civil war helped save the regime of Bashar al-Assad, making Putin the most significant Russian player in the Middle East since Brezhnev. His increasingly close alliance with China has helped usher in a new era of great-power competition with the United States.

Finally, it appears, Putin has brought about the multipolar world that he has dreamed of since he took office determined to revisit the Americans’ Cold War victory. All that, and he is only 66 years old, seemingly vigorous and healthy and capable of governing for many more years to come. His state is no Brezhnevian gerontocracy, at least not yet.

But if Putin has aspired to be a ruthless modern tsar, he is not the all-seeing, all-powerful one he is often portrayed to be. He is an elected leader, even if those elections are shams, and his latest term in office will run out in 2024, when he is constitutionally required to step aside, unless he has the constitution changed again to extend his tenure (a possibility the Kremlin has already raised). Putin has struggled at home far more than his swaggering on the world stage suggests. He controls the broadcast media, the parliament, the courts, and the security services, the last of which have seen their influence metastasize to practically Soviet-era levels under his rule. Yet since winning his latest fake election, in 2018, with 77 percent of the vote, his approval ratings have declined precipitously. In a poll this past spring, just 32 percent of Russians surveyed said they trusted him, according to the state pollster, the lowest level of his long tenure, until the Kremlin demanded a methodological change, and his approval rating now stands in the mid-60s, off from a high of close to 90 percent after his 2014 annexation of Crimea. The subsequent war he unleashed through proxies in eastern Ukraine has stalled. Protests are a regular feature of Russian cities today—a decision to raise the retirement age last year was particularly unpopular—and a genuine opposition still exists, led by such figures as the
anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny, despite years of state efforts to shut it down. Putin has no obvious successor, and today’s Kremlinologists report an increase in infighting among the security services and the business class, suggesting that an enormous struggle for post-Putin Russia has already begun.

At every stage of Putin’s long, eventful, and unlikely rule, there have been similar moments of uncertainty, and often there has been an enormous gap between the analysis of those in distant capitals, who tend to see Putin as a classic dictator, and those at home, who look at the president and his government as a far more slapdash affair, where incompetence as well as luck, inertia as well as tyranny, has played a role. “Stagnation,” in fact, is no longer an automatic reference to Brezhnev in Russia anymore; increasingly, it is an epithet used to attack Putin and the state of the nation, beset as it is by corruption, sanctions, economic backwardness, and an indeterminate program for doing anything about it all. At the end of 2018, Putin’s former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, said that Russia’s economy was mired in a “serious stagnation pit.” As the economist Anders Aslund concludes in his new book, *Russia’s Crony Capitalism*, the country has devolved into “an extreme form of plutocracy that requires authoritarianism to persist,” with Putin joining in the looting to become a billionaire many times over himself, even as his country has grown more isolated because of his aggressive foreign policy.

Sheer survival—of his regime and of himself—is often the aim that best explains many of Putin’s political decisions, at home and abroad. In 2012, when Putin returned to the presidency after a hiatus as prime minister so as to observe constitutional niceties, he was greeted with massive demonstrations. These shook Putin to the core, and his belief that street protests can all too easily turn into regime-threatening revolutions is the key to understanding his present and future behavior. On the international stage, no cause has animated Putin more than the prospect of another country’s leader being forced from office, no matter how evil the leader or how deserved the toppling. Early on in his presidency, he opposed the “color revolutions” sweeping some post-Soviet states: the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. He condemned the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. He went to war after his ally Viktor Yanukovych, the president of Ukraine, fled the country amid a peaceful street uprising. He is an antirevolutionary through and through, which makes sense when you remember how it all began.

**FROM DRESDEN TO THE KREMLIN**

The first revolution Putin experienced was a trauma that he has never forgotten, the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the resulting collapse of the communist regime in East Germany. It happened when he was a 36-year-old undercover KGB operative stationed in Dresden, and Putin and his men were left on their own to figure out what to do as angry East Germans threatened to storm their offices, burning papers “night and day,” as he would later recall, while they waited for help. Putin had already become disillusioned by the huge disparity between the higher standard of living in
East Germany and the poverty he was used to back home. Now, he saw his country’s leadership, weak and uncertain, abandon him, too. “We cannot do anything without orders from Moscow,” he was told. “And Moscow is silent.”

This is perhaps the most memorable passage from Putin’s 2000 as-told-to memoir, First Person, which remains both the key source for understanding the Russian president’s history and a prescient document in which he laid out much of the political program he would soon start implementing. The revolution in East Germany, as scarring as it was for Putin, turned out to be only the prelude to what he considered and still considers the greater catastrophe, the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, in 1991. This was the signal moment of Putin’s adult life, the tragedy whose consequences he is determined to undo.

Putin would go from his KGB posting in the backwater of Dresden to president of Russia in less than a decade, ascending to the Kremlin on New Year’s Eve in 1999 as Boris Yeltsin’s handpicked successor. Yeltsin, aging and alcoholic, had brought democracy to Russia after the Soviet collapse but had soured his country on the word itself, which had come to be associated with economic crisis, gangster rampages, and the crooked giveaway of state assets to communist insiders turned capitalists. By the end of his two terms in office, Yeltsin was barely able to speak in public and was surrounded by a corrupt “Family” of relatives and associates who feared they would face prosecution once they lost the protection of his high office.

Putin had arrived in Moscow at an opportune moment, rising in just a few years from an obscure job in Yeltsin’s presidential administration to head of the post-Soviet successor to the KGB, known as the Federal Security Service, or FSB. From there, he was appointed prime minister, one in a series of what had been up until then replaceable young Yeltsin acolytes. Putin, however, was different, launching a brutal war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya in response to a series of domestic terrorist attacks whose murky origins continue to inspire conspiracy theories about the FSB’s possible role. His displays of macho activism transformed Russian politics, and Yeltsin’s advisers decided that this KGB veteran—still only in his 40s—would be just the sort of loyalist who could protect them. In March 2000, Putin won the first of what would be four presidential elections. As in those that followed, there was no serious competition, and Putin never felt compelled to offer an electoral program or a policy platform.

But his agenda from the start was both clear and acted on with breathtaking speed. In just over a year, Putin not only continued to wage the war in Chechnya with unforgiving force but also reinstated the Soviet national anthem, ordered the government takeover of the only independent television network in Russia’s history, passed a new flat tax on income and required Russians to actually pay it, and exiled powerful oligarchs—including Boris Berezovsky, who had helped him come to power and would later suspiciously turn up dead in his British home. Over the next few years, Putin would further consolidate his authority, canceling elections for regional governors, eliminating political competition in the State Duma, and surrounding himself with loyal advisers from the security services and
St. Petersburg. He also, in 2004, arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia’s richest man, and seized his oil company in a politically charged prosecution that had the intended effect of scaring Russia’s wealthy robber barons into subservience.

These actions, even at the time, were not difficult to read. Putin was a KGB man in full, an authoritarian modernizer, a believer in order and stability. And yet he was called a mystery, a cipher, an ideological blank slate—“Mr. Nobody,” the Kremlinologist Lilia Shevtsova dubbed him. Perhaps only U.S. President George W. Bush found Putin to be “very straightforward and trustworthy” after getting “a sense of his soul,” as he announced after their initial 2001 summit meeting in Slovenia, but Bush was not alone in considering Putin a Western-oriented reformer who, although certainly no democrat, might prove to be a reliable partner after Yeltsin’s embarrassing stumbles. At the World Economic Forum in Davos a year earlier, an American journalist had asked the new Russian president point-blank, “Who is Mr. Putin?” But of course, it was the wrong question. Everyone already knew, or should have.

In many ways, Putin has been strikingly consistent. The president who made headlines in 2004 by calling the breakup of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” is the same president of today, the one who told the Financial Times earlier this year that “as for the tragedy related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that is something obvious.” For Putin, the goal of the state remains what it was when he came to office two decades ago. It is not a policy program, not democracy or anything approaching it, but the absence of something—namely, the upheaval that preceded him. “Ultimately,” he said in the same interview, “the well-being of the people depends, possibly primarily, on stability.” It might as well have been his slogan for the last 20 years. Where once there was chaos and collapse, he claims to offer Russia confidence, self-sufficiency, and a “stable, normal, safe and predictable life.” Not a good life, or even a better one, not world domination or anything too grand, but a Russia that is reliable, stolid, intact. This may or may not continue to resonate with Russians as the collapse of the Soviet Union recedes further and further from living memory. It is the promise of a Brezhnev, or at least his modern heir.

**MISUNDERESTIMATING PUTIN**

Today, Putin is no more a man of mystery than he was when he took power two decades ago. What’s most remarkable, knowing what we know now, is that so many thought he was.

There are many reasons for the mistake. Outsiders have always judged Russia on their own terms, and Americans are particularly myopic when it comes to understanding other countries. Putin’s rise from nowhere received more attention than where he intended to take the country. Many failed to take Putin either seriously or literally until it was too late, or decided that what he was doing did not matter all that much in a country that U.S. President Barack Obama characterized as a “regional power.” Often, Western policymakers simply believed his lies. I will never forget one encounter with a senior Bush administration official in the months just before Putin decided to stay in
power past his constitutionally limited two terms and engineered his temporary shift to the Russian premiership. That would not happen, I was told. Why? Because Putin had looked the official in the eye and said he wouldn’t do it.

In general, U.S. interpretations of Putin’s Russia have been determined far more by the politics of Washington than by what has actually been happening in Moscow. Cold Warriors have looked backward and seen the Soviet Union 2.0. Others, including Bush and Obama at the outset of their presidencies and now Trump, have dreamed of a Russia that could be a pragmatic partner for the West, persisting in this despite the rapidly accumulating evidence of Putin’s aggressively revisionist, inevitably zero-sum vision of a world in which Russia’s national revival will succeed only at the expense of other states.

There are many reasons why the West misunderestimated Putin, as Bush might have put it, but one stands out with the clarity of hindsight: Westerners simply had no framework for a world in which autocracy, not democracy, would be on the rise, for a post–Cold War geopolitics in which revisionist powers such as Russia and China would compete on more equal terms again with the United States. After the Soviet collapse, the United States had gotten used to the idea of itself as the world’s sole superpower, and a virtuous one at that. Understanding Putin and what he represents seems a lot easier today than it did then, now that the number of democracies in the world, by Freedom House’s count, has fallen each year for the past 13 years.

When Putin came to power, it seemed as though the world was going in the opposite direction. Putin had to be an outlier. Russia was a declining power, “Upper Volta with nukes,” as critics used to call the Soviet Union. Putin’s project of restoring order was necessary, and at least not a significant threat. How could it be otherwise? On September 9, 2001, I and a few dozen other Moscow-based correspondents traveled to neighboring Belarus to observe the rigged elections in which Alexander Lukashenko was ensuring his continuation as president. We treated the story as a Cold War relic; Lukashenko was “the last dictator in Europe,” as the headlines called him, a living Soviet anachronism. It was simply inconceivable to us that two decades later, both Lukashenko and Putin would still be ruling, and we would be wondering how many more dictators in Europe might join their club.

History has shown that just because something is inconceivable does not mean it won’t happen. But that is an important reason we got Putin wrong, and why, all too often, we still do. Putin is only nine years away from hitting Stalin’s modern record for Kremlin longevity, which appears to be more than achievable. But the West’s long history of misreading Russia suggests that this outcome is no more preordained than Putin’s improbable path to the Russian presidency was in the first place. We may have misunderestimated him before, but that doesn’t mean we might not misestimate him now. The warning signs are all there: the shrinking economy, the shrill nationalism as a distraction from internal decay, an inward-looking elite feuding over the division of spoils while taking its monopoly on power for granted. Will this be Putin’s undoing? Who knows? But the ghost of Brezhnev is alive and well in Putin’s Kremlin.
Party Man

Xi Jinping’s Quest to Dominate China

Richard McGregor

When Joe Biden met Xi Jinping in 2011, China’s leader in waiting hit the U.S. vice president with a volley of questions about U.S. politics. How did the system work? What was the relationship between the White House and Congress? How should Beijing interpret the political signals coming out of Washington? For Biden and his advisers, these were welcome questions after nearly a decade of frustration in dealing with Xi’s predecessor, the colorless, impenetrable Hu Jintao.

But over meetings and meals in Beijing and Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, the American visitors were struck by Xi’s animation on another topic. Chinese leaders are generally cautious about straying too deeply into their own biographies. Recounting their personal stories in front of Chinese officials, let alone foreigners, involves traversing recent Chinese political history, a minefield of purges, betrayals, and ideological about-faces.

Xi, however, talked unprompted about his father, Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary from the early days of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and about Mao Zedong, the founder of modern China, who had turned the country upside down to keep his rivals at bay. Xi’s father, once seen as a loyal party member, had risen to be vice premier in the late 1950s but was purged from the leadership by Mao in 1962, after he backed leadership rivals. Soon thereafter, he was jailed and left to suffer public humiliation at the hands of the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution. Radicals harassed his son and banished him to the countryside. The father was not rehabilitated until the late 1970s, after Mao had died. But as Xi made clear to his visitors, he would not repudiate Mao. He revered him.

Biden and his advisers left China with the impression that Xi would be tougher to deal with than Hu, more ambitious on behalf of his country and more assertive about prosecuting its interests. They were right, but even so, they probably underestimated him. In the years since he took power, Xi has harshly suppressed internal dissent, executed a sweeping anticorruption campaign, and adopted a bold, expansive foreign policy that has directly challenged the United States. Few foresaw the extent of Xi’s ambition before he took over as leader.

There has been much handwringing in the West in recent years about how so many got China, and Xi, so wrong. Foreign analysts have habitually confused Western beliefs about how China should reform with the party’s convictions about how to govern the country. But as misguided as many foreigners might have been, even Xi’s colleagues don’t appear to have known what they were getting when, in 2007, they tapped him to take over from Hu in five years’ time.

RICHARD McGR EGER is a Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute and the author of Xi Jinping: The Backlash (Penguin Books Australia, 2019), from which this essay is adapted.
Xi has always been a true believer in the party’s right to rule China. For him, the centrality of the party, of Mao, and of the communist canon are all of a piece. To deny one part of the CCP’s history is to deny all of it. In Xi’s eyes, a Chinese leader must be above all Red, meaning loyal to the Communist Party, its leader, and its ideological roots, in good times and bad.

By the time he took office, Xi seemed possessed by a deep fear that the pillars of party rule—the military, the state-owned enterprises, the security apparatus, and the propaganda machine—were corrupt and crumbling. So he set out on a rescue mission. He would be the Reddest leader of his generation. And he expected all party members to follow in his footsteps, or else.

**BORN RED**

Xi’s early years tracked both the privilege afforded to the families of top leaders and the perils they faced once the political winds changed direction. As a boy, Xi attended an elite school in Beijing and would visit his father in Zhongnanhai, the sprawling compound next to the Forbidden City where top leaders lived and worked. Once Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution, in the mid-1960s, Xi’s world turned upside down. He was detained by Red Guards and forced to go through a ritual denunciation of his father. When he was dispatched to the countryside along with other elite city dwellers, the 17-year-old Xi struggled with the harsh conditions.

The time he spent in Liangjiahe, an impoverished village in northwestern China, scarred him but also readied him for the battles ahead. “People who have limited experience with power, those who have been far away from it, tend to regard these things as mysterious and novel,” he said in an interview published in 2000. “But I look past the superficial things: the power, the flowers, the glory and the applause. I see the detention houses and the fickleness of human nature. That gave me an understanding of politics on a deeper level.” Xi was only accepted as a full member of the CCP in 1974. But once he was in, he began a steady climb to the top.

These days, only China’s best and brightest qualify to enter the prestigious Tsinghua University, in Beijing, but Xi was admitted in 1975, before the university revived formal entrance exams, as part of the “worker, soldier, peasant” intake. (Much of the Chinese intelligentsia still looks down on Xi as poorly educated.) After graduating, Xi donned a soldier’s uniform to work as an assistant to one of his father’s closest comrades, Geng Biao, at the Central Military Commission, an experience that gave him an important bond with the armed forces. Xi was setting out on the classic career path of an up-and-coming apparatchik. After leaving the military commission, he served as deputy party secretary in Hebei, near Beijing, and in Fujian, on the coast across from Taiwan, eventually rising to become governor of the province in 2000. In 2002, he became governor and then party secretary of Zhejiang, a province near Shanghai.

Fujian and Zhejiang stand out in China as bastions of thriving private enterprise. Fujian was an important gateway for investors from nearby Taiwan. Zhejiang is home to a number of China’s most successful private
companies, including the e-commerce giant Alibaba and the automaker Geely. When Xi became China's paramount leader, in 2012, the Western media latched on to his provincial pedigree to talk up his appreciation for markets. Zhejiang’s capitalist spirit had rubbed off on Xi, Bloomberg News reported, quoting Lu Guanqiu, a businessman who owned and ran Wanxiang Group, a car parts manufacturer. “When Xi becomes general secretary, he’ll be even more open and will pay even more attention to private enterprise and the people's livelihood,” Lu said. But digging deeper into Xi’s statements and writings on the economy during his time in Fujian and Zhejiang reveals a dogged supporter of party orthodoxy. Xi has always talked about balancing development between the state and the entrepreneurial economy. In practice, however, that has meant propping up the state sector to ensure it didn’t get eaten up by entrepreneurs.

It wasn’t until early 2007, when the party leadership abruptly moved him to Shanghai to be party secretary of China’s second city, that Xi came firmly into the frame as a possible successor to Hu. According to convention, the party congress in late 2007 would pick someone to take over five years later, when Hu was due to step down after two terms as president. Xi emerged as a compromise candidate. His chief rivals, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, were both from the Communist Youth League, as was Hu. For party elders, the idea that a candidate from the youth league would take the reins for another decade was unacceptable, as that would have entrenched the power of a single faction at the expense of the others.
Xi had a lot going for him. He was a seasoned official who was acceptable to the dominant cliques and to most of the powerful political families and party elders. He had an impeccable CCP pedigree that extended beyond his father. He had emerged politically unscathed from the Cultural Revolution, with his father rehabilitated and no black marks on his record. He was unsullied by the brutal 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen Square. He was largely untainted by corruption (even though he had been governor of Fujian in the late 1990s, when many provincial officials were caught up in a billion-dollar fraud scheme). Xi had been divorced, but his second wife, Peng Liyuan, was a star in her own right, a nationally known singer attached to the military arts troupe. Xi carried himself confidently and spoke clearly in informal settings, without the stifling jargon that smothers most official communication. Most important, perhaps, the party bigwigs thought they could control him. According to a report from Reuters, they settled on Xi because he was pliable and “lacked a power base.”

As leader in waiting, Xi seems to have been given the nod to recentralize authority in Beijing after a period in which the leadership had dispersed power among far-flung fiefdoms, allowing corruption and cronyism to flourish. But if that was Xi’s initial mandate, he would end up going far beyond it. There was no sense in 2007 that party leaders had deliberately chosen a new strongman to whip the country into shape. The compromise candidate would turn out to be a most uncompromising leader.

PERPETUAL PARANOIA

Xi’s metamorphosis stemmed from several factors. The maneuvering of two of Xi’s rivals, Bo Xilai, the Chongqing party secretary, and Zhou Yongkang, the head of internal security, alarmed top leaders. Under Hu, they had been cautious on many fronts. Now, with Xi’s support, the leadership set out to bring Bo and Zhou down. The pair was toppled after lengthy investigations, largely on charges of corruption and abuse of power. Their fall amounted to an earthquake in Chinese politics. Bo was the charismatic son of a revolutionary hero making a noisy public run for a spot in the leadership’s inner circle. Zhou, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee until the end of 2012, wielded enormous power through his sway over the secret police and the energy sector. The arrests of the two men, in 2012 and 2013, respectively, put on display their alleged crimes and amoral womanizing. Later, state media, quoting senior officials, said that the pair had been conspiring to mount an internal coup to prevent Xi from ascending to the top party post. Within the party, such political misdeeds were worse than mere corruption.

Xi was also alarmed at the ideological decay of the party itself, symbolized by rampant graft and the emergence of leaders’ personal fiefdoms in both public and private companies. Abroad, he had watched as “color revolutions” in Europe and street protests in the Middle East had toppled seemingly invincible governments. But Xi took his greatest warning from the fall of the Soviet Union and was horrified at how the Soviet Communist Party had evaporated almost overnight. “A big party was gone,
just like that,” he said in a 2012 speech. “Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.” China had studied the collapse of the Soviet Union intensely in its immediate aftermath. Nearly a quarter of a century later, Xi was worried enough about the state of the party to make everyone from senior leaders to rank-and-file officials go back to class and learn the lessons of the Soviet collapse again. “To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism,” he said in another 2012 speech. “It confuses our thoughts and undermines the party’s organizations on all levels.”

Leadership rivals and ideological rot spurred Xi into a frenzy of action. During his first 200 days in office, he covered an extraordinary breadth of policy areas and implemented changes at an astonishing pace. Within weeks, he had attached a brand—“the Chinese dream”—to his administration, established strict new rules governing the behavior of officials, and laid down markers on what ideas could and couldn’t be discussed, cracking down on a liberal newspaper in southern China over its promotion of “constitutionalism,” a dirty word in a single-party state. He also started locking up the party’s critics. Activist lawyers who had carved out a small space to protect citizens’ rights were rounded up, one by one, by state security. Officials questioned or detained about 250 of them in a methodical campaign. The accused languished in jail without trials, sometimes for years. The last of the prominent human rights lawyers, Wang
Richard McGregor

Quanzhang, was not formally sentenced until January of this year, after four years in detention.

Xi kept up the breakneck pace through 2013. In September of that year, he unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative, which made concrete Beijing’s plan to develop and dominate the land and sea routes connecting Eurasia and the Indian Ocean and thus make China the hub of business and technology all the way to Europe. Xi established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, over U.S. objections. He set targets to eradicate poverty in China by end of 2020, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. He raised the temperature on Taiwan, calling it a “political issue that can’t be passed on for generations.” Soon after, China set about executing a long-held plan to build large military bases in the South China Sea.

Most important of all, Xi launched his anticorruption campaign, appointing as its head Wang Qishan, one of the toughest and most capable officials of his generation. The scale of the resulting purge is almost incomprehensible: since late 2012, when the campaign began, authorities have investigated more than 2.7 million officials and punished more than 1.5 million of them. They include seven members of the Politburo and the cabinet and about two dozen high-ranking generals. Two senior officials have been sentenced to death. The party has more than 90 million members, but after excluding the farmers, the elderly, and the retired, all of whom were largely spared, the purge amounts to a generational clear-out. The sheer numbers give the lie to the charge that the anticorruption campaign is merely a political purge in disguise. Certainly, the campaign has targeted some of Xi’s rivals, but it has gone far beyond his enemies list.

To illustrate the pitiless nature of the anticorruption drive, consider the case of Zhang Yang, who was one of China’s most senior generals and the head of the military’s Political Work Department, which polices ideological loyalty in the military. To the public, Zhang had been a colorless apparatchik, distinguished in official pictures only by his military uniform, moonish features, and jet-black comb-over. Within the system, however, he was a powerful player. In 2017, Zhang was found hanging from the ceiling at his mansion in Guangzhou, across the border from Hong Kong. The first sign that his suicide was related to corruption came in the press coverage of his death. Despite his decades of service and his seniority, Zhang received anything but a respectful sendoff. The military’s official newspaper called him a man “with no moral bottom” and said that his death was “a shameful way to end his life” and “a bad move to escape punishment.” The party’s pursuit of Zhang did not end with his burial. Nearly a year later, in late 2018, he was expelled from the CCP—the party’s way of rendering an official guilty verdict.

Xi’s effort to concentrate power in his own hands peaked at the end of his first term, in 2017. According to the evolving conventions of top-level Chinese politics, this should have been the moment when Xi nominated a successor to take over in 2022. Instead, he abolished the rule limiting presidencies to two five-year terms, effectively making himself leader in perpetuity.

NOTHING LASTS FOREVER

Xi has chosen to govern China as a crisis manager. That might help him in
China’s immediate rivalry with the United States. But along the way, his enemies at home and his critics abroad have piled up. Thousands of wealthy Chinese families and their associates who have seen their lives of luxury and privilege destroyed in the anticorruption campaign will carry their anger at Xi for generations. The technocratic elite feels betrayed by Xi’s across-the-board power grab, his trashing of emerging legal reforms, and his coddling of the state economy. Until recently, Xi rarely commented on the private sector, which is responsible for about 70 percent of the country’s economic output and an even greater proportion of its job creation. His rhetorical about-face on this issue late last year, when Xi invited a group of entrepreneurs to a morale-boosting meeting at the Great Hall of the People, was a rare sign of a course correction. In the short term, Xi has been lifted by a rally-round-the-flag mood prompted by the trade war with the United States and President Donald Trump’s erratic antagonism. But none of the problems that have festered on Xi’s watch are going away.

Overseas, the backlash to Xi’s China is gathering momentum. The United States is confronting China on everything from its trade practices to its military buildup. Germany, by contrast, is focused not on relative military might but on industrial competitiveness. Australia, like many countries in Asia, fears being left to fend for itself in a region no longer anchored by U.S. power. Japan worries that China wants to not only dominate the seas surrounding it but also settle historical scores. Taiwan, a self-governing island for decades, fears it will be gobbled up by the mainland. Southeast Asian nations already feel overshadowed.

For Canada, the wake-up call came last December, when Vancouver police detained a senior executive from the telecommunications giant Huawei for extradition to the United States, only to see Chinese authorities arrest two Canadian citizens in China and hold them as virtual hostages. In Hong Kong, millions marched in June against a proposed law that would have permitted extradition to the mainland, testing Xi’s resolve and his willingness and ability to compromise.

Even Mao had leadership rivals. Xi has ensured for the moment that he has none. There is good reason to think, as many Chinese officials and scholars do, that Xi’s overreach will come back to haunt him before the next party congress, in late 2022, especially if the Chinese economy struggles. By then, potential rivals might be willing to risk making their ambitions public. Xi might follow the path that has served him well so far and try to take them out. He might be able to leverage the regime’s weakness at home and China’s battles abroad to justify his continued rule. Or perhaps he will finally admit that he, too, is mortal and lay out a timetable to step down.

Xi has displayed remarkable boldness and agility in bending the vast, sprawling party system to his will. Sooner or later, however, as recent Chinese history has shown, the system will catch up with him. It is only a question of when.
Erdogan’s Way

The Rise and Rule of Turkey’s Islamist Shapeshifter

Kay Genc

Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the most baffling politician to emerge in the 96-year history of Turkey. He is polarizing and popular, autocratic and fatherly, calculating and listless. Erdogan’s ideology shifts every few years, and he appears to make up his road map as he goes along. He is short-tempered: he grabs cigarette packs from citizens to try to force them into quitting, scolds reporters who ask tough questions, and once walked off the stage after an angry exchange with the Israeli president at the World Economic Forum in Davos. But he can also be extremely patient. It has taken him 16 years to forge what he calls “the new Turkey,” an economically self-reliant country with a marginalized opposition and a subservient press.

This mix of anger and calm has made Erdogan increasingly successful at the ballot box. He became prime minister in 2003 after his party won 34 percent of the vote, and by 2011, its share had risen to just shy of 50 percent. In 2014, when he ran for president in order to centralize his authority, more than half of Turks who cast a ballot voted for him. They did so again in 2018, by which time they had also voted to do away with the post of prime minister altogether.

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Erdogan has converted his popular mandate into power and used that power to remake Turkey’s relations with the rest of the world. He has expanded Turkish influence in Syria and northern Iraq and tilted Turkey—a NATO member—toward China, Iran, and Russia. His use of power has also generated dissent among feminists, leftists, and the secular middle class. Under Erdogan’s watch, Turkey has become the world’s largest prison for journalists, filmmakers, novelists, photographers, and scholars are also among the imprisoned. Turkey has banned gay and transgender pride marches since 2015; Wikipedia has been blocked since 2017.

In the wake of a financial crisis earlier this year, candidates who were aligned with Erdogan lost support in local elections. But even as his party’s allure diminishes, Erdogan may win a third presidential term in 2023. If that happens, and Erdogan leaves office in 2028, he will go down in history as Turkey’s second-longest-serving president, a year shy of Kemal Ataturk’s rule.

Ataturk, “father of the Turks,” was an Ottoman general who abolished the caliphate in 1924 and modernized Turkey by force over the 1930s. Under his single-party regime, Ataturk forged a modern nation-state from the ashes of a collapsed empire, built a modern bureaucracy, supported the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie, and convinced a Muslim nation to allow Western modernity into their lives. Erdogan initially criticized Ataturk’s centralized remaking of Turkey, blaming him for his highhanded style of rule. But since 2008, when Erdogan started having to balance various factions of the bureaucracy, and even more so after 2013, when Turks took to the public squares to protest his policies, Erdogan
Kaya Genc

has adopted strikingly similar methods. Ironically, the politician he first sought to distance himself from is the one he has come to resemble the most.

YOUNG TURK

Erdogan was born in 1954, 16 years after Ataturk’s death, in Kasimpasa, a rough Istanbul neighborhood of open sewers and muddy streets, famed for its firefighters, pickpockets, and Romani musicians. The son of a ferry captain, Erdogan made pocket money by selling Turkish bagels when he wasn’t studying at a religious school. On his way home, as dusk fell in Istanbul, he would use the deck of a cargo ship anchored in the Golden Horn to practice reciting the Koran, earning plaudits for his oratory. But Erdogan also played soccer, dreamed of a career in sports, and rebelled against patriarchy: his fellow Islamists did not approve of his athletic shorts, and his father asked him to land a proper job.

Erdogan was 15 years old when, in 1969, the leading Islamist politician in Turkish history, Necmettin Erbakan, published the manifesto Millî Görüş (National Vision). Erbakan called on Turkey to sever ties with the European Economic Community (the precursor of the EU) and align with pan-Islamist leaders in Bangladesh and Pakistan and across the rest of the Muslim world. From the moment a teenage Erdogan joined the youth branch of Erbakan’s National Salvation Party, his political instincts were shaped by this mindset. Erbakan’s movement supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their fight against the Soviets and Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran. At political rallies, party leaders condemned what they termed “the West’s crusader mentality” and described the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as its modern incarnations. Erdogan and his ilk opposed the absence of Islamic references in the public domain: in their view, the secular government did not deserve respect as long as it did not respect Islam.

In 1985, Erdogan had a chance to prove his organizational skills to Islamist elders when he arranged a boxing match occasioned by the visit of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of a CIA-backed mujahideen group, who was in Turkey to celebrate Erbakan’s return to politics five years after being banished from political life. Erdogan also aligned himself with the Naqshbandi Sufi order in Istanbul, an influential movement that provided the religious connections that would aid his rise to power. In those years, Istanbul’s city government had hired Erdogan as a player on its soccer team, but the team’s ban on Islamic beards forced him to resign. After completing his mandatory year of military service, Erdogan worked as an administrator at a sausage factory; soon, Islamists invited him to work full time for Erbakan’s party—now rebranded as the Welfare Party after previous incarnations were banned—and there he raised funds from members to pay his wages. As the party’s provincial head in Istanbul, Erdogan delivered speeches against “the evil new world order,” protested the Gulf War, and defended the cause of Islamic rebel groups in the Algerian civil war.

Erdogan distinguished himself from other Islamists through his calculated pragmatism, ushering in a tectonic shift in Turkish politics over the 1990s. “We
don’t need bearded men who are good Koran reciters; we need people who do their job properly,” Erdogan would later say. As part of this drive, Erdogan established a network of volunteers who could put tens of thousands of party posters on walls in a few hours and distribute handouts to voters during morning commutes. These were his “nerve ends,” he said, capable of sending signals from the Welfare Party’s administration to voters. Erdogan also used another analogy to describe his organization: a “brick wall,” carefully laid and difficult to break.

These grass-roots efforts paid off in 1994, when Erdogan was elected Istanbul’s mayor. He made public transportation free of charge during Islamic holidays, banned alcohol in municipal facilities, and lifted employment restrictions on women who wore headscarves. When a reporter asked him to explain his success, he replied, “I am Istanbul’s imam.” Erdogan’s bravado alarmed secularists and generals, and his rising career was soon endangered: in 1998, Turkey’s highest court shut down the Welfare Party, and after a fiery speech at a rally, Erdogan was charged with inciting hatred and sentenced to ten months in prison. The legal stain, which the judiciary planned as a way to terminate his career, maximized Erdogan’s popularity, since pious Turks now viewed him as their voice, which the state wanted to silence. By the time he left prison, Erdogan was ready to take the path to power.

It was then that Erdogan moved from local to national politics, defying the ban on his political activities and leading a breakaway group from Erdogan’s party. (He explained the rift with his mentor by repeating a maxim attributed to Aristotle, “Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend.”)

The vehicle for Erdogan’s ambitions was the Justice and Development Party—known by its Turkish abbreviation, AKP—which he formed in 2001. At a press conference announcing the new party, Erdogan listed democratization and pluralism as its ideological cornerstones. His movement, he claimed, was based on power sharing: “A cadre will run the party, and decisions won’t be taken under the shadow of one leader.” He described his own role as an “orchestra chief,” proclaiming that the “age of me-centered politics is over.” Erdogan founded the AKP with two other veterans of the Welfare Party, Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc, and the troika had charisma, support from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland, and a novel idea: that European integration and the protections of religious freedom offered by the EU were good for the pious and that democratization was in the interest of conservative Turks. “We used to see the Turkish state as a leviathan that oppressed the religious and the poor,” Arinc recalled. “Now, the EU negotiation process convinced us the Turkish state can be democratized.” Erdogan also noted that because of the undemocratic nature of the Turkish establishment, his “conservative democratic” party could be considered “antiestablishment” without calling itself an Islamist party, reaping the benefits of outsider status while maintaining wide appeal. It would become a winning formula for years to come.

The AKP won Turkey’s 2002 elections with 34 percent of the vote; the runner-up received 19 percent. Earlier conservative parties had also won landslides—the
Democrat Party in 1950, Justice in 1965, and Motherland in 1983—but the leaders of those movements fared poorly once in power. Turkish generals hanged one on the gallows, ousted another in a coup, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to keep the third away from power. Erdogan was determined to avoid a similar fate. In 2004, he pledged to curtail the military’s long-standing dominance of politics and demote the chief of the Turkish general staff, once a demigod, to a public servant. These promises won him support from liberals. But Turkey’s military tutelage wasn’t replaced by democracy; rather, as the scholars Simon Waldman and Emre Caliskan have written, it gave way over the 2010s to “AKP patrimony.” “Instead of consensus politics and pluralism,” they point out, “the Erdogan years . . . have often been highly divisive and autocratic in style.” Around this time, Erdogan parted ways with liberals and started making moves toward establishing a presidential system, which would present fewer obstacles to his exercise of power.

OUTSOURCING THE STATE
Erdogan, who is six feet tall, walks with a confident stride: his right shoulder faces forward, while the left shoulder waits in the back. The walk, known as “the Kasimpasali march,” after his boyhood neighborhood, sums up the man. Following his imprisonment, Erdogan resisted pleas to become a Turkish Nelson Mandela and instead cultivated the image of a küllhanbeyi, a roughneck who prowled the streets of Istanbul during the Ottoman period. By evoking that figure, he was able to emphasize his humble beginnings and consolidate his pious base, the disenfranchised Islamists who supported him not for his perceived reformism but for the conservative values he had defended early in his career.

“In the heart of every Turkish citizen lies the desire to become president,” Suleyman Demirel, a poor shepherd boy who fulfilled that desire in 1993, once said. Erdogan’s rise, like Demirel’s, is an inspiring example of upward mobility. Yet as with most good coming-of-age stories, the hero in Erdogan’s bildungsroman has another character trait: vulnerability. In the tradition of wronged conservative politicians before him, Erdogan has presented himself as a precarious leader who needs to be defended. In 2006, when he fainted inside his car after his blood pressure fell, panicked advisers rushed out for help before the armored Mercedes automatically locked its doors. Guards had to break the windshield with hammers to rescue him. The episode only added to the myth of a wronged man, betrayed by those closest to him.

Yet Erdogan has also changed his self-presentation over time, from anti-Western Islamist to conservative democrat. As the Turkish journalist Rusen Cakir has written, Erdogan, when he moved from local to national politics in the late 1990s, “wasn’t comfortable with the ‘liberal’ moniker, which he considered a swearword,” but because he had been marginalized by the old guard, liberals thought of him as a bridge between the establishment and “the organizational power and dynamic voting-base of Islamists.” To realize its vision of an Islamist movement compatible with the global order, the AKP joined the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe, a Europe-wide political party aimed at reforming, rather
than rejecting, the EU. Back home, the AKP developed a strategy of forming alliances to control the Turkish state. In exercising his power, Erdogan worked with both competent bureaucrats and Islamists with political aspirations but little technical know-how. “Other parties have voters,” his teacher Erbakan famously said. “We have believers.” The challenge for Erdogan was to retain the believers even as he pushed for market reforms and accession to the EU.

But therein lay a problem. Erdogan had no cadres to fill the state bureaucracy. Competent functionaries mostly belonged to other political camps. Although the Islamist bureaucrats tended to be skilled at providing public health and transportation services, they showed little interest in education, policing, or intelligence work. And so Erdogan resurrected the Ottoman tradition of indirect rule. He outsourced different components of the state—the judiciary, the police force, and the military—to different power players. Between 2003 and 2013, the old-school bureaucrats who opposed the AKP’s globalist agenda were replaced in the Foreign Ministry and the judiciary by ambitious new cadres. Most had backgrounds in the network of religious schools run by Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic preacher who has lived in exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, after being accused of seeking to undermine Turkey’s secular order. Gulenists also infiltrated the police and the military.

But outsourcing power came with the price of losing control. Like Ottoman sultans, omnipotent in their palaces but ruling at the mercy of local feudal lords, Erdogan saw his decentralized authority become open to usurpation. In the military, secular, nationalist
generals resigned in protest of the Gulenist takeover of the civil administration. Those who didn’t quit were purged in massive court cases in 2008 and 2010; some received life sentences. In the judiciary, newly appointed prosecutors and judges who supported the purge were promoted around 2010 and 2012. The press approved: one liberal paper, since bankrupted, compared the prosecutions to the Nuremberg trials. But nationalist Turks were angry, and the AKP lost their votes in Anatolia. To regain control, Erdogan broke with the Gulenists, cutting his support for their educational institutions and purging its members from the bureaucracy.

In foreign policy, another field in which his cadres lacked expertise, Erdogan handed the reins to Ahmet Davutoglu, a scholar of international relations often described as “the Turkish Henry Kissinger,” and named him foreign minister in 2009. The AKP foreign ministers who preceded Davutoglu had preserved Turkey’s Western-focused foreign policy doctrine. As a member of NATO, a U.S. ally, and a candidate for EU membership since 1999, Turkey had kept its distance from China, Iran, and Russia. Now, the bespectacled, soft-spoken professor proposed a different route. Turkey was the inheritor of the Ottoman caliphate, Davutoglu wrote, and it needed to move from a “wing state” of the West to a “pivot state.” Taking advantage of its location at the intersection of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe, it was poised to lead Islamic nations.

Erdogan relished these grandiose ambitions, and as the Arab Spring unfolded, Turkey set its sights on Syria, where it hoped for a regime change instigated by the Free Syrian Army, and on Egypt, where it placed all its chips on the Muslim Brotherhood. The Davutoglu doctrine allowed Erdogan to reinvent himself as a global Islamic leader, someone who could improve the lot of Muslims not only in Turkey but elsewhere, too. “Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul,” he said after winning a third term as prime minister in 2011. “Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”

Two events shattered those dreams. The first was the unraveling of Erdogan’s foreign policy in the Middle East. In Egypt, President Mohamed Morsi and other leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood refused Erdogan’s call to look to secular Turkey as a “model democracy,” and after Morsi was toppled in a coup, Erdogan’s hopes for a secular version of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region began to look fantastic. In Syria, the Kurds formed a breakaway region in the country’s north, leading Kurds in Turkey, who had long been seeking a separate state, to pull out of the ongoing peace process with the central government. The second event was a domestic uprising. In 2013, millions of leftists and environmentalists marched in Istanbul’s Gezi Park and in city squares across Turkey. It was then that Erdogan, having lost support from the Gulenists, the Kurds, and the liberals, turned to Turkish nationalists to remain in power. He now spoke admiringly of Ataturk and his politics, described his own critics as “rabble-rousers,” and claimed that Turkey was under siege by the West.
The Gezi protests and Ankara’s isolation in the Middle East unsettled the leader who, as the scholar Soner Cagaptay writes in Erdogan’s Empire, “had been a master of reading the global zeitgeist and responding to it with a public relations executive’s craftiness.” In 2014, Davutoglu became prime minister, but soon, his warm relations with the leaders of other European states angered Erdogan, who now considered him a challenger to his authority. In May 2016, Erdogan forced him to resign and replaced him with a low-profile placeholder. Even as the presidential palace moved to the center of Turkish politics, however, Erdogan struggled for control. Less than two months after Davutoglu’s ouster, disgruntled Gulenist cadres in the military staged a failed coup, in which 250 people were killed. As fighter jets bombed the parliament, Erdogan appeared on CNN Turk via FaceTime and asked Turks to defend democracy by fighting off soldiers in public squares.

The failed putsch gave Erdogan a further excuse to centralize power. Announcing a state of emergency, Erdogan suspended the European Convention on Human Rights, detained tens of thousands of civil servants, closed more than 100 media outlets, and canceled the passports of 50,000 Turks suspected of having links to Gulenists to prevent them from leaving the country. It was in this atmosphere of chaos and fear that Turks voted in a 2017 referendum to adopt a presidential system of government. Only Erdogan could will Turkey back into order during this “new war of independence,” he argued; some opposition parties, he claimed, were allied with the enemy. Such polarizing rhetoric seemed anachronistic a century after World War I, but as a political strategy, it worked, allowing Erdogan’s vote to reach 53 percent in the 2018 presidential election. Again, however, Erdogan was at the mercy of another political movement, this time not the Gulenists but the far-right Nationalist Movement Party, with which he formed a coalition government. In doing so, Erdogan worried fellow Islamists by handing key positions in the bureaucracy to their main right-wing rival.

RESENTMENT ON THE RISE

Akif Beki, a tall, sleekly dressed political operative with movie-star looks, was Erdogan’s chief adviser and spokesperson from 2005 to 2009. Today, he speaks critically about his former boss and his team. “The feedback mechanisms of AKP’s first years no longer work,” Beki told me earlier this year. “The party’s old sensitivities disappeared. Instead of conducting dialogue with voters, the AKP insists on a one-way propaganda monologue. Instead of facing problems, it conceals them.” Disgruntled former allies such as Beki are pebbles in Erdogan’s shoe. Erdogan can afford to ignore communists and environmentalists, who garner little support at the ballot box, but disillusioned Islamists, who have talked about forming a new party, pose a challenge to the AKP’s reign. Recently, two of the three founding members of the AKP raised their voices against Erdogan’s strongman politics: Arinc strongly denounced the polarizing tone of the party, and Gul came close to running as the opposition candidate in the 2018 election. Davutoglu, for his part, published a manifesto opposing the presidential system on Facebook.
Kaya Genc

The alarming state of Turkey’s economy is a more threatening problem. Last year, the Turkish lira lost 28 percent of its value, and this year, food prices have increased by 30 percent. From July 2018 to July 2019, the unemployment rate rose by four percent, swelling the ranks of unemployed Turks from 3.2 million to 4.5 million. Further aggravating Turks has been the rise in the number of Syrian refugees making their home in Turkey (more than 3.6 million of them, as of June 2019). It was thus little surprise that in local elections held in March and June, the AKP saw its share of the vote fall dramatically in numerous cities, including the capital, Ankara.

In spite of these cracks, the “brick wall” Erdogan has patiently built remains intact. The AKP has around 11 million party members, ten times as many as the Republican People’s Party, the party Ataturk founded in 1923. Aligning with the AKP today opens up career opportunities for Turks from different social classes, much as aligning with Ataturk’s party did in the 1930s.

Recently, as if to assist future biographers, Erdogan periodized his reign. In a television interview, he named his Islamist years, in the Welfare Party and as mayor of Istanbul, as an “apprenticeship.” His time as a reformist prime minister was his “journeymanship.” But it is his years in the presidency that, in Erdogan’s view, deserve the privileged title of “mastership.” Now 65, Erdogan rules with little separation of powers; that was inevitable, he believes, after the very public betrayal of former allies. In the presidential palace, plasma screens track which news stories are most widely read in the country, requiring specialists to rapidly address the snowballing problems that people care about, but a few dozen officers are hardly sufficient for a nation of 82 million. For almost a century, elected ministers tackled the concerns of their constituents; today, appointed members of boards specializing in education, culture, and technology have been made responsible for developing policy. A corporatist economy and a culture of favoritism in politics, the media, and the public sector are on the rise. Majoritarianism increasingly defines domestic politics. In the AKP’s view, these tactics of control are necessary to keep a multiethnic and polarized country in order. But they in fact deepen the systemic failings of Turkish democracy: the weakness of institutions, the lack of press scrutiny, and the ruthless pace of cultural shifts over the past century. Instead of solving these problems, the AKP has chosen to be victimized by them.

Despite such challenges, Turkey’s civil society remains strong. Turkey has 52 million active social media users. In recent years, initiatives focusing on the security of ballot counting, fact checking in the media, LGBTQ rights, and violence against women have gained traction. As the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk has noted, “Once a country gets too rich and complex, the leader may think himself to be too powerful, but individuals also feel powerful.” Erdogan’s great challenge over the next decade, as individualism grows in Turkey and Islamophobic populism rises in Europe, will be to convince voters that his mixture of anger and patience is still a model to follow, that his formation story can continue to inspire, and that only his unassailable ability can steer Turkey to safety. Erdogan will no doubt do everything in his power to succeed at this daunting task. 

The alarming state of Turkey’s economy is a more threatening problem. Last year, the Turkish lira lost 28 percent of its value, and this year, food prices have increased by 30 percent. From July 2018 to July 2019, the unemployment rate rose by four percent, swelling the ranks of unemployed Turks from 3.2 million to 4.5 million. Further aggravating Turks has been the rise in the number of Syrian refugees making their home in Turkey (more than 3.6 million of them, as of June 2019). It was thus little surprise that in local elections held in March and June, the AKP saw its share of the vote fall dramatically in numerous cities, including the capital, Ankara.

In spite of these cracks, the “brick wall” Erdogan has patiently built remains intact. The AKP has around 11 million party members, ten times as many as the Republican People’s Party, the party Ataturk founded in 1923. Aligning with the AKP today opens up career opportunities for Turks from different social classes, much as aligning with Ataturk’s party did in the 1930s.

Recently, as if to assist future biographers, Erdogan periodized his reign. In a television interview, he named his Islamist years, in the Welfare Party and as mayor of Istanbul, as an “apprenticeship.” His time as a reformist prime minister was his “journeymanship.” But it is his years in the presidency that, in Erdogan’s view, deserve the privileged title of “mastership.” Now 65, Erdogan rules with little separation of powers; that was inevitable, he believes, after the very public betrayal of former allies. In the presidential palace, plasma screens track which news stories are most widely read in the country, requiring specialists to rapidly address the snowballing problems that people care about, but a few dozen officers are hardly sufficient for a nation of 82 million. For almost a century, elected ministers tackled the concerns of their constituents; today, appointed members of boards specializing in education, culture, and technology have been made responsible for developing policy. A corporatist economy and a culture of favoritism in politics, the media, and the public sector are on the rise. Majoritarianism increasingly defines domestic politics. In the AKP’s view, these tactics of control are necessary to keep a multiethnic and polarized country in order. But they in fact deepen the systemic failings of Turkish democracy: the weakness of institutions, the lack of press scrutiny, and the ruthless pace of cultural shifts over the past century. Instead of solving these problems, the AKP has chosen to be victimized by them.

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The Vigilante President

How Duterte’s Brutal Populism Conquered the Philippines

Sheila S. Coronel

In his final year in law school at a Catholic men’s college in Manila, Rodrigo Duterte shot a classmate who made fun of his thick accent. The young “Rody,” as Duterte was then known, was the son of a provincial governor on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Like many of the progeny of the Philippine political elite, he had enjoyed a privileged upbringing. He grew up surrounded by guns and bodyguards, flew his father’s plane when he was in his hometown, and hung out with the sons of local notables in his Jesuit-run boys’ school. In Manila, however, Duterte’s accent, typical of those from the country’s southern periphery, marked him as an unsophisticated provinciano. Hence the classmate’s teasing.

“I waited for him,” Duterte would recall nearly 45 years later, when he was running for president and speaking before an enthusiastic crowd. “I told myself, ‘I’ll teach him a lesson.’” The classmate survived the shooting, he recounted, and presumably learned the lesson. And although he was banned from attending graduation, Duterte got his law degree. “The truth is, I am used to shooting people,” he said. The audience lapped it up.

It was a typical Duterte story, with Duterte cast not as the aggressor but as the aggrieved, resorting to a gun to defend his honor. Sure, he took the law in his own hands, but by doing so, he earned the grudging respect of his tormentor. The telling, too, was classic Duterte: boastful while also self-deprecating. It was crass, hyperbolic, transgressive. And its conclusion—“I am used to shooting people”—could be construed as a joke, a fact, or a threat. Its power, and its beauty, lay in its ambiguity.

Throughout his campaign and his early presidency—and, indeed, his entire public life—the stories Duterte has told and the way he has told them have resonated among a broad public. So have the denim jeans, checked shirts, and aviator sunglasses. His projection of both authenticity and muscular authority has enduring appeal.

Halfway through his presidential term, Duterte enjoys a satisfaction rating that is nearing 80 percent. His popularity helped propel candidates from his coalition to victory in midterm elections in May. For the first time in 80 years, no opposition candidate won a seat in the country’s Senate, a tribute to Duterte’s continuing hold on the Filipino imagination and the clout of his allies among the country’s political clans. Duterte has control of Congress, where his allies constitute an overwhelming majority, and of a Supreme Court packed with his appointees. The liberal opposition has been decimated, the defeat of its strongest candidates at the polls both stunning and humiliating. Large sections of the press have been
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intimidated into docility. And many among the public cheer the president’s war on drugs, leaving the Catholic clergy and human rights advocates tottering on the high ground, alone.

In his three years as president, Duterte has proved to be a consummate power broker and a masterful political tactician. His rambling rants against elites, drug users, and criminals feed on popular frustrations with the country’s broken justice system and feckless ruling class. He has lashed out against “imperial Manila” and the “imperial” United States, articulating festering resentments against national and global elites. Duterte is riding the crest of a political wave, not just in the Philippines but around the world, where his brand of illiberalism is gaining ground. How could a 74-year-old, gun-toting former mayor from the Philippines’ southern frontier have turned out to be so in tune with the global political moment?

THE DAVAO PLAYBOOK
Before Duterte made it the laboratory for his brand of muscular politics, Davao, a sprawling port city on the southern coast of Mindanao, was a petri dish for a Communist-led insurgency. In the early 1980s, the Philippines’ ailing dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, was losing his grip on power. At the same time, Communist guerrillas were gaining ground, especially on Mindanao. In Davao, they recruited followers in the slums, in the universities, and among middle-class professionals railing against the abuses of dictatorial rule.

The Filipino Communists operated mostly in rural areas, and at their peak in the mid-1980s, they had a nearly 25,000-strong peasant army. But they also had an urban presence. As part of an experiment in urban warfare, they formed “sparrow” units, two- or three-person squads that moved quickly and often unnoticed as they gunned down police officers and soldiers on the streets. In Davao, their stronghold was a slum called Agdao, which became a battlefield between urban guerrillas and the military, earning it the moniker “Nicaragdao,” a reference to the violence in Nicaragua.

Davao soon became known as the country’s murder capital. Corpses were turning up on the streets or being fished out of the sea, victims of political killings and personal vendettas, as well as hits by extortionists and common criminals. Law and order had broken down. In 1986, Marcos was overthrown by a popular uprising on the streets of Manila. Under pressure from both the military and the United States, the government of the new president, Corazon Aquino, unleashed the army and vigilantes in an iron-fisted crackdown against the Communists.

Davao then became a testing ground for U.S.-backed counterinsurgency. In 1987, the former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark led a mission to the Philippines that found that the CIA was involved in the rise of vigilante groups. The U.S. government also provided technical assistance to the Philippine army’s counterinsurgency operations on Mindanao. During that time, civilians armed with rifles and long knives patrolled the streets on the hunt for suspected Communists. These anticommunist vigilantes were egged on by incendiary radio broadcasts hyping the Red peril. While reporting on Davao in the late 1980s, I encountered those marauding armed bands on the streets.
DAVAO’S DIRTY SECRET

Duterte borrowed freely from both the Communist and the counterinsurgency playbooks. He bombarded the media with the specter of not communism but criminality. Like Pala, he took to the airwaves, hosting a weekly television show in which he ranted against thieves and drug dealers. During a 2001 episode of his Sunday TV program, he read aloud 500 names of drug and crime suspects from the city’s poorest neighborhoods.

Carolyn Arguillas, a journalist in Davao, interviewed the mayor about a month after the broadcast, and she reported that at least four of those on Duterte’s list had been found dead by the time of the interview. Another 17 suspected drug dealers and cell phone snatchers, including teenagers, were killed soon after.

The killers were mostly masked or hooded gunmen riding pillion on motorcycles, sometimes in broad daylight. Sometimes the assassins left cardboard signs that identified the victims as drug dealers or thieves. These were demonstration killings, intended as much to eliminate the targets as to warn others. They were the work of the Davao Death Squad, made up of thugs, ex-guerrillas, and out-of-work anticommunist vigilantes who gunned down pickpockets, drug peddlers, and other petty criminals.

Amado Picardal, a priest who lived in Davao during this period, recalled officiating at a wedding at his church one afternoon in late 2008. “I heard shots outside, so after mass I went out, and there I saw this probably 15- or 16-year-old sprawled dead on our car park,” he told me in late 2016, just months after Duterte became president. “There were policemen nearby, and they just fired [their guns] in the air as if to allow the
killers to escape on their motorbikes.” Picardal helped document more than 1,400 death-squad murders between 1998 and 2015. He has been speaking out against the killings for years, and he went into hiding in August 2018, after armed men were seen staking out a monastery he frequented. The Davao Death Squad, he said, borrowed their tactics from Communist guerrillas who executed cattle rustlers and other hooligans in the territories they controlled. The motorcycle-riding assassins were reminiscent of the sparrow units, some of whose members had joined the Davao Death Squad.

This was Davao’s dirty secret. Except for a few among the press, the Catholic clergy, and civic groups, residents largely accepted the logic of Duterte’s frontier justice. As the mayor told Arguillas in 2001, “To be really truthful and honest about it, I would rather see criminals dead than innocent victims die, being killed senselessly.” In fact, the death squad’s victims were mostly small-time crooks, not murderers. Moreover, the statement implied that citizens had just two choices: kill or be killed. Due process was not an option. Residents of Davao knew the answer when Duterte asked, during a speech in 2015, “We’re the ninth-safest city. How do you think I did it? How did I reach that title among the world’s safest cities?” They remained complicit in their silence.

**FROM DAVAO TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE**

Davao was Duterte’s school of government. He remade the city, and it remade him. It was also his ticket to the presidency: he promised he would bring peace and prosperity to the country as he had to his hometown. He is the author and champion of the Davao model—imagine Singapore with thugs instead of technocrats. The social contract he offered his constituents in Davao—I will take care of you but don’t ask questions—is what he is offering Filipinos now.

Duterte has no executive experience apart from being the city’s mayor. Running Davao is all he knows. This is why he prefers to be called “mayor of the Philippines” instead of “president.” A mayor’s concerns are micro: crime, potholes, business permits. Duterte is not an ideologue. His rants against imperialist elites in Manila and the United States and his overtures to China and Russia are driven not by ideology but by emotion. They are salve for wounded pride. They are also political gamesmanship: whether in foreign policy or domestic affairs, Duterte likes to play off rivals against one another.

Duterte’s politics are defined by his gut, his experience, and his friends. He didn’t promise Filipinos a statesman. He offered them Duterte, Punisher of Criminals, Avenger of Filipinos’ Wounded Pride, a man who would also build roads, fix traffic, and get things moving in their gridlocked democracy.

Duterte’s trusted circle is made up of people he knew and worked with in Davao. The closest political adviser of his early presidency was Leoncio Evasco, Jr., a Catholic priest who had defected to the Communist underground before becoming chief of staff to Duterte when he was mayor. Evasco has since fallen out of favor, eased out in the infighting among those in the president’s inner circle. Christopher “Bong” Go, who served as a longtime aide in Davao, also followed Duterte to the presidential palace. Now a senator, Go is
said to have Duterte's ear. Some of the president's more influential cabinet members—notably Carlos Dominguez III, the secretary of finance, and Jesus Dureza, who was the presidential adviser on the peace process until last year—were classmates from Duterte's Davao boyhood.

Duterte's policing strategy, too, was inspired by Davao. The architect of his antidrug campaign and his first police chief as president was Dela Rosa, formerly Davao's chief cop and now a senator. Dela Rosa introduced the policing technique known as *tokhang*, a shortened, combined form of the Visayan words for “knock” and “plead,” in which police and village officials would knock on the doors of drug suspects and “plead” with them to stop their drug activities. On his first day as top cop, Dela Rosa ordered all police stations in the country to conduct *tokhang* operations. Many of those at the receiving end of the door knocks eventually ended up dead; they were either shot during police drug stings or killed by masked assassins. Duterte's war on drugs is trademark Davao: the drawing up of lists of suspects and then publicly naming and threatening them, the brazen executions by motorcycle-riding gunmen, the handwritten signs left alongside corpses, and the incessant hyping of drugs as an existential threat. The truth is that the level of illegal drug use in the Philippines is lower than that in the United States or Thailand, but Duterte's warnings about the drug scourge have fueled the public's anxieties about safety.

Even now, Duterte spends part of the week in Davao, professing to be uncomfortable mingling with Manila society. His discomfort resonates among the new middle class, who are his hardcore supporters. These include Filipinos employed around the world as nannies, nurses, seamen, and construction workers, as well as those who work in the country’s booming call centers in Manila and other cities—the digital underclass of the global technology industry.

Duterte's base is made up of scrappy, hard-working, and aspirational men and women. The global economy has given them tickets out of poverty but not to affluence. They are better off than the poor, but their life choices are still limited. They cannot afford the fancy condominiums that dominate the skylines of the new luxury enclaves, nor do they shop in the malls that peddle Gucci and Prada. They worry about petty crime, long commutes, and the prospects of their children. They resent the rich for sucking up the profits from an economy that has been growing, on average, at five to six percent annually for the past dozen or so years. They also resent the poor, who have benefited from antipoverty programs. They are mad because they obey the law, pay their taxes, work long hours, and yet feel squeezed. As the Filipino political scientist Julio Teehankee has explained,
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public services, endured the horrendous land and air traffic, feared the breakdown of peace and order, and silently witnessed their tax money being siphoned by corruption despite promises of improved governance.

THE DUTERTE DISRUPTION

No doubt, Duterte is a disruptor. In his bid for the presidency in 2016, he defeated the money and machines of more established political players. His campaign relied on unpaid volunteers and Facebook; he became the country’s first president to be propelled into office by the power of social media. Unlike his predecessors, he cast aside any pretensions of respect for democratic norms. He mocked human rights advocates, endorsed police killings, and encouraged violence against drug users and criminals. He set the tone for uncivil discourse in public spaces, especially social media, where his army of trolls, influencers, and dedicated followers continue to spew venom against his critics.

More important, in office, he has vitiates the institutional checks on presidential power. He has cracked down on the independent press, jailed a senator who investigated his death-squad past, and engineered the ouster of an independent-minded chief justice of the Supreme Court. He is a vociferous critic of the Catholic Church, which has a history of standing up to presidential overreach. By cozying up to China and thumping his nose at the United States (he famously called U.S. President Barack Obama “the son of a whore”), he is also upending Philippine foreign policy.

Duterte was not the first Filipino leader to ride the populist wave. He came to power almost exactly 30 years after the fall of Marcos’ dictatorship. By then, the elite democracy that had risen from the ashes of authoritarian rule had lost its sheen. The political class elected to public office post-Marcos was widely seen as corrupt, inept, or indifferent to the plight of ordinary people. In 1998, Joseph Estrada, a former movie star, was elected president by capitalizing on his celluloid persona as defender of the poor. In 2004, his best friend, the charismatic action star Fernando Poe, Jr., nearly became president by riding the same wave. These movie-star politicians found a solid electoral base among the poorest Filipinos.

Where Duterte strayed from the movie stars’ script was in his decision to appeal not to the poor but to the aspiring middle class. Indeed, they have fared well under his presidency. He has given them free tuition in state colleges, longer maternity leaves, salary raises for those who work for the government, and free WiFi in public places. He has also promised to ease traffic and shorten commutes: his centerpiece $170 billion “Build, Build, Build” public works program, funded mainly by China and Japan, will supposedly decongest the land, air, and sea routes in the country’s fastest-growing areas.

This is Duterte defining the presidency as if it were the mayoralty writ large. After Marcos fell, democratic reformers devolved authority to local governments, thereby empowering local bosses and political clans, the Dutertes among them. Across the country, these families dominate public office in their fiefdoms and govern to advance their own interests and extend their hegemony.

Duterte belongs to a class of local officials who have remained in power
The Vigilante President

through pump-priming designed to spur entrepreneurial activity and property development. They provide companies with generous financial incentives, infrastructure, an efficient bureaucracy, and a safe place for doing business. The resulting real estate and public works projects often displace poor communities even as they raise property values for the rich and the middle class, but by co-opting or clamping down on dissenters, the local politicians also guarantee a compliant citizenry. Long vilified as breeding grounds for drugs, disease, and crime, the shantytowns are easy targets for forcible, and often violent, evictions and brutal policing. Duterte’s war on drugs is notable for the volume, velocity, and visibility of the killings, but there has long been a war on the disposable poor.

Duterte’s conduct earned him the special moniker of “death-squad mayor” from Human Rights Watch in 2015. But he was not the only one: extrajudicial killings of criminals and dissenters have been documented in places such as Cebu, in the country’s central region, and, closer to the capital, in the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, and Laguna, where business is booming and property developers are thriving. On a trip to Manila earlier this year, I spoke to mothers who had lost their sons to the war on drugs and were now in danger of losing the tiny cinderblock and tin-roofed structures they call home. Concrete pillars of a massive overhead transit system were rising nearby, and these families had nowhere else to go.

In many ways, Duterte’s presidency represents continuity, not change. He has dispensed government largess and positions to his cronies, some of whom have racked up serious corruption charges. He has so far governed as a garden-variety patron, not a graft buster.

Like past presidents, he rules over a fractious alliance of political families. Duterte’s predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, had the support of the liberal-minded elites who came to power when Marcos fell. Duterte’s coalition was cobbled together from the Marcoses and other families displaced by those same liberals. It may hold as long as Duterte is in power, but the president has thus far shown scant interest in building a party that will outlast him. The more progressive thinkers among his cabinet attempted to organize a grass-roots political movement, Kilusang Pagbabago, or “Movement for Change,” but this has fizzled.

India’s Narendra Modi has built both a grass-roots political party and a political movement on the bedrock of Hindu nationalism. Hungary’s Viktor Orban has articulated an intellectual justification for his rejection of liberal democracy and the liberal international order. Duterte suffers in comparison. His illiberalism may be less enduring, as he is bereft of a movement, party, or ideology that will carry on his legacy. He has coyly hinted at his daughter Sara, who is already following in his footsteps by serving as the mayor of Davao, as a possible successor. In true Filipino fashion, he is reverting back to family. For the time being, it’s only Duterte’s dark charisma that holds the country in thrall.
The Transformer
Orban’s Evolution and Hungary’s Demise
Paul Lendvai

In the summer 1989, the Soviet Union was beginning to falter, and its grasp on Eastern Europe was slipping. But in Hungary, the Soviets were hardly gone yet: Moscow still maintained around 70,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks, and 1,500 armored vehicles there. Janos Kadar, who had built and led the repressive, Soviet-aligned regime that had run the country for the past three decades, had resigned the previous year, as the economy sputtered and Kadar himself struggled with cancer. But the regime centered on Kadar’s Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party remained intact and still presided over an immense security apparatus and a network of armed militias.

The momentum, however, was with the opposition groups that sought to take advantage of the Soviet decline. On June 16, they organized a massive demonstration in Heroes’ Square, which includes a monument to the founders of the Hungarian state, in central Budapest. Part memorial service and part protest, the gathering was attended by some 250,000 people. On the steps of the monument lay six coffins. Five contained the unearthed remains of men who had been key leaders of Hungary’s 1956 anti-Soviet uprising and who had been sentenced to death in a secret trial and buried in an unmarked grave. The sixth coffin was empty and symbolized the 300 other people who had been executed for their roles in the uprising. The demonstration was followed by the burial of the coffins, giving the remains the dignified resting place the Soviets had denied them.

The demonstration, broadcast live on Hungarian television, finished with six speeches. The final one was delivered by Viktor Orban, a little-known, 26-year-old activist with a scruffy beard. It was just seven minutes long, but it electrified the crowd and the people watching at home. “If we trust our own strength, then we will be able to put an end to the communist dictatorship,” declared Orban, who the previous year had helped found the Alliance of Young Democrats, or Fidesz, a liberal youth movement.

If we are determined enough, then we can compel the ruling party to face free elections. If we have not lost sight of the ideas of 1956, we will vote for a government that will at once enter into negotiations on the immediate beginning of the withdrawal of Russian troops. If we are courageous enough, then, but only then, we can fulfill the will of our revolution.

In Hungary at the time, it was still unusual for anyone to publicly issue such a blunt rebuke of the Soviets. The speech instantly propelled Orban to fame in his country, and was noticed abroad, as well. Here, it seemed, was a herald of Hungary’s bright, democratic future.

But in the 30 years that have passed since that day, a staggering reversal has taken place, as Orban has transformed...
from one of the most promising defenders of Hungarian democracy into the chief author of its demise. As Hungary’s prime minister during the past decade, Orban has systematically dismantled the country’s democratic institutions, undermined the rule of law, eliminated constitutional checks and balances, hobbled independent media, and built a kleptocratic system that rewards cronies while sidelining critics. His government does not depend on naked oppression. Rather, through the distribution of sinecures, he has assembled around himself an army of devotees, one that extends far beyond the administration, the police, the secret services, and the military. Today, Hungary is at best an “illiberal democracy”—a term Orban has used to describe his vision for the country. Others argue that the country has left democratic governance behind altogether and is now a crude autocracy.

Looking back, it appears that the young man whose rhetoric stirred Hungarians in 1989 was no idealist; he was, rather, a budding opportunist getting an early taste of power. No great trauma or upheaval can easily account for his wholesale ideological turnaround in the years that followed: it seems to have simply been the result of an extended series of shrewd political calculations. Far from fulfilling the will of Hungary’s revolution, as he exhorted his fellow Hungarians to do in 1989, Orban has instead fulfilled only his own will to power.

A PORTRAIT OF THE AUTOCRAT AS A YOUNG LIBERAL

Orban was born in 1963 in the tiny village of Alcsút (today Alcsútberény) near Budapest. Initially, he, his parents, and his younger brother lived in the cramped house of his paternal grandparents. When Viktor was ten, as a consequence of arguments between his mother and grandmother, the family moved to a dilapidated house at the end of the main street in the somewhat larger village of Felcsut. The circumstances in which he grew up were orderly but without doubt very poor. Orban has recalled how hard he and his siblings had to work in the fields as young children: pulling beets, sorting potatoes, feeding the pigs and chickens. The house had no running water. Years later, Orban described the “unforgettable experience” of using a bathroom for the first time, at age 15, and getting hot water by simply turning on a faucet.

His family’s fortunes improved in the 1970s and 1980s, as his father completed a university degree and climbed the ranks of the ruling Socialist Workers’ Party. Orban was a bright student, and his parents sent him to a selective grammar school. But years later, he described himself in an interview as an “unbelievably bad child. Badly misbehaved, cheeky, violent. Not at all likable.” He added: “At home, I had constant problems with discipline; my father beat me once or twice a year.” Throughout his youth, his brief compulsory stint in the military, and his university years, his maxim remained unaltered: “If I’m hit once, then I hit back twice.”

One of Orban’s favorite films is *Once Upon a Time in the West*, a 1968 spaghetti Western directed by Sergio Leone, which arrived in Hungary only in the 1970s, when Orban was a teenager. The plot involves the slaughter of a family; in the end, an avenging angel character, played by Charles Bronson, shoots the leader of the gang behind the killing. Justice
prevails. “To persist and to emerge victorious, it is not enough that the hero can shoot and knows how to use his fists,” Orban once told a biographer, explaining the lesson he took from the film. “He must also use his brain and show magnanimity. That is very important. You must know and understand your enemy, you must find out what in reality makes him tick and then, when things come to a head, you mustn’t shrink from the fight but attack and win!”

Gabor Fodor, a rival of Orban’s who used to be a close friend, once observed that even as a young man, Orban “was already possessed of those domineering, intolerant ways of thinking and behaving that are all too evident in him today.” But, Fodor noted, “he was, in addition to all of this, sincere and likable.” It is a combination of traits that suggests a certain ambivalence in Orban’s character, which perhaps helps explain the ease with which he transformed his political persona later in life.

At Budapest’s Bibo Istvan Special College, for law students, Orban became part of a tightly knit group of liberals. One of the college’s chief patrons was the Hungarian-born American investor and philanthropist George Soros, who generously subsidized a student-run journal and language courses and trips overseas. In 1988, Orban took a part-time job with Soros’ organization, which later became the Open Society Foundations. The organization also gave Orban a grant to attend Oxford University and conduct research on the idea of civil society in European political philosophy.

In 1990, Hungary held its first free elections, which resulted in a center-right coalition government led by Jozsef
Paul Lendvai

Antall. Fidesz, which had transformed into a political party, won 22 of the 386 seats in parliament. In opposition, the party remained true to its youthful image; Orban and other Fidesz politicians kept their beards, long hair, jeans, and open-neck shirts. They advocated liberal reforms and were quick to condemn nationalist and anti-Semitic undercurrents in the governing coalition. Orban himself scoffed at the populist rhetoric of the ruling parties, whose leaders “reject criticism of government policy by suggesting the opposition or media are undermining the standing of Hungary, are attacking the Hungarian nation itself,” he said.

Such statements do not augur well for the future of democracy. Such an attitude indicates that the leaders of the ruling parties tend to conflate their parties and their voters with the nation, with the country. Sometimes, in moments of enthusiasm, they have the feeling that their power is not the consequence of a one-off decision of a certain number of Hungarian citizens but that they express, in some mystical manner, the eternal interests of the entire Hungarian people.

This was a fair description of some elements in the Antall government—and a prescient foreshadowing of the populist style that Orban himself would later adopt.

Despite their avowed liberalism, Orban and his Fidesz circle had an uneasy relationship with an older generation of liberals, especially those of the Alliance of Free Democrats, many of whom were academics from bourgeois (and often Jewish) families. They were well read, open to the world, and fluent in foreign languages—a stark contrast to the Fidesz leaders, who were mostly lawyers from rural areas or small towns. Orban and his friends initially admired the older liberals but soon came to see them as overweening. In one famous episode, at a reception for newly elected parliamentarians, a well-known Free Democrat approached Orban and, with a condescending air, adjusted the younger man’s tie. Orban blushed, visibly incensed.

“LYING OUR HEADS OFF”

In 1991, a poll showed that Orban, who was not yet 30, was the third most popular politician in Hungary. Two years later, he became the president of Fidesz. The future looked bright. But in the national elections of 1994, the party suffered a crushing defeat. The former communists of the Hungarian Socialist Party quintupled the number of votes they had received in the prior election and formed a coalition with the Free Democrats; together, the two parties held over 72 percent of the seats. In contrast, Fidesz had become the smallest party in parliament. To Orban and his friends, this vindicated their distrust of the older liberals, who had once radically opposed the communist regime but were now prepared to join a government led by former communists.

Seeing no other path to political survival, Orban committed himself and the party to a rightward political shift. The erstwhile rebels of Fidesz began dressing conservatively and styling their hair neatly. Their speeches were now peppered with professions of faith in the nation, in Magyar tradition, in the homeland, in national interests, in respectability, in middle-class values, in
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the family, in love of the mother country. This was the first major step in Orban's decades-long transformation into an autocratic right-wing populist. There seemed to be no deep ideological soul-searching involved—just clear-eyed calculations about what it would require to win power.

The Socialist–Free Democrat government struggled under the weight of an unpopular package of economic reforms and a corruption scandal, and in the elections of 1998, Orban's party triumphed, and he became prime minister. For the next four years, the Hungarian economy performed reasonably well, and Orban remained extremely popular. Yet Fidesz, to the surprise of many, lost the 2002 elections. Partly, the upset followed from Orban's failure to clearly distance the party from extreme right-wing groups, which openly trafficked in anti-Semitic rhetoric and even celebrated the Nazi-allied regime that had ruled Hungary in the 1940s.

Orban's party spent the next four years in opposition and failed to win back power in elections in 2006. But a few months later, a political bombshell exploded in Hungary. An audio recording emerged, on which the Socialist prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, could be heard delivering an obscenity-laced tirade to fellow party members to convince them that some painful economic reforms had been unavoidable:

We had almost no other choice [than the package of cuts] because we fucked up. Not just a little bit but totally. No other country in Europe has committed such stupidities as we have. . . . Obviously we have been lying our heads off for the last one and a half, two years. . . . And in the meantime, we have, by the way, been doing nothing for the past four years.

Wall-to-wall media coverage of what became known as Gyurcsány's “lie speech” fueled a massive and passionate attack by the opposition, with Orban leading the charge against what he called an “illegitimate” government. In the years that followed, Orban proved to be a devastatingly effective opposition leader. In the 2010 elections, Fidesz won 57 percent of the popular vote and 263 parliamentary seats. For the first time in the history of democratic Hungary, a political party had achieved a two-thirds majority in parliament. In the nearly a decade since, Orban has used that majority to transform Hungary’s constitution, institutions, and society.

THE MAFIA STATE
After what he deemed a “revolution at the ballot box,” Orban did not form a new government so much as pursue regime change. During the electoral campaign, he had said not a single word about constitutional reform, but in 2011, he proudly announced the drafting of an entirely new constitution, called the Fundamental Law of Hungary. The new constitution was rushed through parliament in nine days without any input from the public, much less a referendum. The main victim of the new constitution was the judiciary, especially the Constitutional Court, whose justices would be selected not as they had been before, through an all-party parliamentary committee, but directly by parliament. With Fidesz holding a supermajority in parliament, Orban
could pack the court with sympathetic judges. He also chipped away at its authority: among other assaults, in 2013, the Fidesz-dominated parliament voted to strip the Constitutional Court of the ability to review laws concerning state finances and wrote directly into the constitution a number of Fidesz-backed laws that the court had previously overturned.

The media were also in Orban’s sights. Orban blamed his party’s defeat in 2002 on the publicly funded media networks and had long dreamed of hobbling them. With parliament’s support, he brought together all the government-funded television and radio networks under a new conglomerate run by Fidesz supporters. He then established a centralized media authority to oversee the organization and named trusted Fidesz officials to run it, giving them nine-year terms. As a result, the public networks are more tightly supervised today than they were in the final period of the communist regime. Hungary’s position on the World Press Freedom Index, compiled by Reporters Without Borders, has plummeted from 23rd in 2010, when Fidesz took power, to 87th this year—one notch below Sierra Leone.

A further erosion of press freedom occurred last year, when all pro-Fidesz media owners “donated” their holdings to a new structure run by three of Orban’s most trusted lieutenants. Dubbed the Central European Press and Media Foundation, the organization now consists of 476 media outlets. The government has exempted it from legal scrutiny and from regulations governing the concentration of media holdings. Except for one television station owned by a German company, a small radio

The MORAL and POLITICAL COURAGE of ISRAEL’S FOUNDING FATHERS

Ross and Makovsky have done a real service.... They tell the story of Ben-Gurion, Begin, Rabin and Sharon... [and] provide guidance for today’s leaders in Israel and for all of us on the meaning of leadership.”

—HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
67th US secretary of state

“A powerful statement on the style and principles of leadership that are critical for shaping the Middle East peace process.”

—HENRY KISSINGER,
56th US secretary of state
Paul Lendvai

station heard only in Budapest, and a few culture-focused weeklies, every single media outlet in the country is now controlled by people close to the regime.

Another part of Orban’s strategy has been to create a socioeconomic elite that prosers from ties to Fidesz. Under his watch, the process of awarding government contracts has been corrupted to an astonishing degree, to the benefit of Fidesz-connected businesses. Transparency International has reported that in 2018, about 40 percent of public procurements in Hungary featured only one bidder. Balint Magyar, a sociologist and founding member of the Free Democrats, has called Orban’s Hungary “a post-communist mafia state, led not by a party, but by Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s political-economic clan.” A sense of impunity has fueled this crony capitalism, as Fidesz has hollowed out the law enforcement and judicial bodies that would normally investigate and prosecute such misconduct. For example, at Orban’s direction, parliament allowed Hungary’s chief prosecutor, a Fidesz loyalist, to serve beyond his term limit and then extended his term by nine years. Moreover, the prosecutor can no longer be questioned by parliament, and his successor can be nominated only by a two-thirds majority.

Orban claims that he has been a good steward of the Hungarian economy. And it is true that under his government, some Hungarians have done very well: the economist Janos Kornai estimates that tens of thousands of Hungarians have enriched themselves by directly or indirectly exploiting ties to the Orban regime. Falling unemployment numbers, hailed by the government, are partly the result of a sleight of hand: in the first quarter of 2019, 100,000 people who did not have jobs were paid by local or state authorities about half the minimum wage for performing community service; the unemployment figures do not account for them. Another factor in reducing unemployment is the fact that since 2015, more than 500,000 Hungarians are estimated to have found employment abroad, mostly in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. And despite Orban’s claims to have revived Hungary’s economy, the economist Istvan Csillag has shown that without the funds Hungary receives from the EU, which amount to between 2.5 billion and five billion euros a year (the equivalent of 2.5 to five percent of GDP), the Hungarian economy would collapse. The irony is that even though his country and his political survival depend on EU funds, Orban delights in thumbing his nose at Brussels, where handwringing over his autocratic abuses of power have not been accompanied by meaningful efforts to rein him in.

“NATION, FAMILY, AND CHRISTIANITY”

The damage Orban has inflicted on Hungary is not limited to its government institutions and economy. He has also degraded the country’s political culture by infusing it with forms of xenophobia, racism, and nationalism that could once be found only on the margins of society. Orban has long toyed with such themes, and since the 2015 refugee crisis, they have become central parts of his political identity. That year, as waves of refugees began to arrive from Afghanistan, Syria, and other conflict zones, Orban directed his government to put up more than 100
food and denied legal representation. What is more, as *The New York Times* wrote of the findings, “Civic organizations that have tried to help [refugees] have been harassed and censored. And courts meant to protect the rights of these people are under immense pressure to do the bidding of the country’s increasingly authoritarian government.”

Meanwhile, Orban has taken aim at the cosmopolitan elites who, in the demagogic fantasy he peddles, are conspiring with migrants to despoil Hungary of its Christian purity. In a stomach-turning twist, the main target of these attacks has been his former patron, Soros. In recent years, Fidesz has blitzed the Hungarian public with anti-Semitic attacks on Soros, painting him as a behind-the-scenes manipulator bent on seeing his homeland overrun by migrants and refugees. In 2017, parliament passed a law intended to force the closure of the Central European University, which was founded in 1991 with an endowment from Soros. CEU is technically an American institution. But it was by far Hungary’s most prestigious institute of higher education, led by the respected Canadian human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff and boasting a distinguished faculty and 1,440 students from over 100 countries (including 400 students from Hungary). Despite the condemnation of academics around the world and a series of protests, the largest of which drew 80,000 to the streets of Budapest, the government went ahead with the plan, and in 2018, CEU announced that it was moving to Vienna. “It’s a warning,” Ignatieff told *The Washington Post*. “Once the rule of law is tampered with, no institution is safe. . . . You can’t have miles of razor wire to keep them out, labeling them a threat to Hungary and Europe’s Christian values. “We shouldn’t forget that the people who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture,” he wrote in an op-ed published by a German newspaper that year. “Most are not Christian, but Muslim.” Around the same time, he warned in a radio interview that “now we talk about hundreds of thousands [of refugees], but next year we will talk about millions, and there is no end to this. All of a sudden, we will see that we are in a minority on our own continent.”

Again and again, Orban has presented himself and his government as “the last defenders of a Europe based on the nation, family, and Christianity.” In the time-honored tradition of populist demagogues, he cast the migrant influx as the product of a conspiracy among hostile foreigners and corrupt elites: “The most bizarre coalition in world history has arisen,” he declared, “one concluded among people smugglers, human rights activists, and Europe’s top politicians, in order to deliver here many millions of migrants. Brussels must be stopped!”

In the years since, Orban’s government has made life for migrants in Hungary extremely difficult. In 2017, parliament passed a law forcing all asylum seekers into detention camps, with some of them housed in converted shipping containers. Amnesty International condemned the measures as “illegal and deeply inhuman” and “a flagrant violation of international law.” A report issued earlier this year by the Council of Europe charged that refugees in Hungary were being deprived of...
Paul Lendvai

academic freedom without the rule of law, and we’re in a lawless environment.”

Finally, Orban has begun to steadily reorient Hungary’s foreign policy, pulling the country away from the liberal democracies of western Europe and making common cause with other strongmen and populist parties. Indeed, there is barely a dictator in the world for whom Orban does not have praise. He has drawn particularly close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, criticizing, time and again, the EU’s sanctions on Russia. In 2014, just as the EU and the United States were preparing to sanction Russia for its annexation of Crimea, and at a time when Brussels was urging EU member states to reduce their dependence on Russian energy, Orban announced a deal under which the Russian nuclear agency would build two nuclear energy reactors 80 miles south of Budapest, with Russia providing a loan of $10 billion for the $12.5 billion project.

“To be considered a good European, you have to disparage Putin like he is the devil,” Orban scoffed in an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica in 2018. The Russian president, he countered, “rules a great and ancient empire,” adding that “it needs to be recognized that Putin has made his country great again and that Russia is once again a player on the world stage.” It is difficult to reconcile such sentiments with the memory of a young Orban railing against Moscow’s domination of his country.

HERE TO STAY

Orban has played his hand with great skill, outmaneuvering his opponents and tightening his clutch on power. He has managed to split and corrupt the discredited Socialists. The liberal opposition, fragmented and racked by infighting, has lost almost all credibility. The inescapable consequence of public apathy is a remarkable indifference to the endemic corruption of the Orban regime. Orban makes no secret of his plans to rule the country for the foreseeable future. “I will remain in politics for the coming 15 to 20 years,” he told a German magazine in 2016. “Maybe in the front row, maybe in the third. Exactly where will be decided by the voters.”

Since the end of Soviet dominance in 1989, never has the future for the liberal values of the Enlightenment seemed so bleek: for tolerance, respect for the importance of fair debate, checked and balanced government, and objectivity and impartiality in media. Orban and his acolytes disparage those who disagree with them as unpatriotic fearmongers and traitors to their country, government-controlled media outlets play on historical prejudices and ignorance, and the regime continues to blame the EU for its own failings and mistakes. Even if the opposition develops more credible leadership, it faces a long, hard road ahead. Given the lengths to which Orban has already gone to maintain his position, one must ask: Is there anything he will not do to maintain his grip on Hungary?
Long-standing assumptions about how the world works are under pressure.

One-off transactions undercut established institutions. Centers of power are shifting. Cross-border crises have intensified and are remaking the nature of international cooperation.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is sparking innovation and disrupting the ways societies interact. Technology is altering the way truths and falsehoods are disseminated.

Training in international affairs and policy builds a critical expertise to recognize the cultural, economic, social, and political forces at work in a new world order. It challenges students to develop communications, leadership, and teamwork skills. An interdisciplinary curriculum and a rich community of people integrate differing ideas. Graduates distinguish themselves by their flexibility and adaptability. They can separate facts from opinions.

As you begin your search for a master’s program, consider how schools examine the traditional and fluctuating rules of the game. Look at how the school provides a solid foundation and offers insight into emerging issues. Consider how you can gain the skills to lead on the global, national, and local levels. Ask how the school anticipates and works to understand changes to the way people work and live.

International affairs graduates master underlying principles of an ever-changing world to prepare for the future—whatever it holds.

By Carmen Iezzi Mezzera
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Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (@apsiainfo)

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Notre Dame’s New Keough School of Global Affairs Focuses on Integration and Partnership

How does the Keough School meet the new challenges in international affairs?

Today, in the era of artificial intelligence and the internet of things, power—the ability to envision constructive change and leverage resources to foster it—must come from below and from across. On a given day, a young thirty-something innovator—or hacker—may wield more power than a head of state, and the architects of new technology think and act beyond territorial and political boundaries. How can this emerging dynamism be directed to serve the common good?

At the Keough School, our focus is forging effective partnerships with various state and non-state actors—including NGOs, private organizations, and local communities—to respond to cross-border crises and threats to human flourishing.

While mastery of new technologies is critical, it must be matched by appreciation of the diverse global communities bearing the brunt of rapid and often chaotic change; these peoples, the vulnerable of the world, are our stakeholders.

That is why we study cultures, history, and religions as well as treaties; social values as well as demographics; effective development practices and policies as well as geopolitics. Our mission is to advance integral human development: the flourishing of whole communities and the whole person.

How does the structure of the new school reflect the new international order?

Contemporary challenges to human development are interrelated: climate change may lead to food shortages, trigger mass migration, and incite resource wars. Health crises follow all of these traumas. Governments fail to deliver essential services.

In this environment, no single discipline acts in isolation. Accordingly, the Keough School is structured to encourage integration of multiple disciplines and practices, with nine multi- and interdisciplinary institutes, each focusing on several dimensions of a problem and in conversation with the other units.

Tell us about the Keough School community.

Our second graduating Master of Global Affairs (MGA) cohort includes thirty-four students from eighteen different countries. Similarly, our faculty come from a diverse range of backgrounds and disciplines. This rich array of voices animates everything we do at the Keough School.

How does the MGA program prepare graduates to lead?

We combine rigorous coursework with hands-on projects and immersive field experiences that provide on-the-job training. All students in the MGA program participate in global fieldwork, research, and development practice as part of our curriculum.

Students interact with prominent campus visitors, such as CEOs of nonprofits, diplomats, and world leaders. They also take full advantage of the Keough School’s center in Washington, DC, where they work with policymakers, government officials, and international organizations.

What does the future look like for graduates?

Graduates are prepared to compete for positions of influence, having held prestigious placements with the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, Brookings Institution, and Oxfam. Notre Dame’s impressive alumni network, which extends across eleven international centers and over two hundred and seventy alumni clubs worldwide, helps graduates succeed.

The Keough School is committed to ensuring that our students are not burdened by student debt following graduation. Generous funding packages and fellowships are available to all accepted into the MGA program.
The Relevance of Gender Studies in International Affairs

How does the study of gender come into the study of international affairs?

Gender is increasingly recognized as a critical concept in fully understanding processes of globalization, international development, humanitarian crises, violent extremism, war, and peace-building. Gender is central to how societies are structured and the roles and responsibilities of women and men, as well as the valuing of girls and boys and how they are positioned within the family, community, and broader society. These demarcations of power lead to the creation of social and gender norms, such as the expectations that women will become mothers, caretakers, and peacemakers and that boys will become fathers, leaders, and soldiers. Worldwide, efforts by armed groups to undermine women’s rights, including the sexual enslavement of women and girls, is a common thread running throughout global conflicts and terrorism. Other global issues include the persistent gender gap in girls’ completion of education; the acute impact of climate change on female smallholder farmers; and the need for women’s equal participation in peace processes. To understand issues of conflict and peace, we need to analyze them from a gender perspective as well as through an intersectionality lens. We need all genders in this conversation to shift our understandings to create just and peaceful societies.

Do you see some big inflection points in the study of gender and security policy issues in the near future?

Since the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 and its eight sister resolutions making up the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, there has been a rapidly growing interest in the transformative potential of viewing security policy issues through a gender lens. While initially the focus of the agenda was on women and girls, there is now a growing interest in men and boys. The #MeToo movement has opened up space for new discourses on eliminating gender-based violence and has encouraged more men to become vocal and visible in their support for gender equality issues. In response to this growing area of interest, we will be launching a new course on masculinities and international affairs soon.

What are some of the most topical gender related issues you or your students are doing research on?

The subject of gender in international affairs and its intersections with race, religion, age, ethnicity, disability, sexuality, and class is a highly complex and sensitive topic. Elliott School graduate students specializing in gender are typically majoring in one of three programs: International Development Studies, Masters in International Affairs, or Masters in Policy and Practice. Students researching a global gender policy capstone cover a wide variety of topics revealing discriminatory gender norms and hierarchical orders of masculinities, femininities, and sexualities. Students are given free rein to follow their specific areas of interest, which are wide ranging. Their research is key to supporting the development of new policies aimed at transforming the gender inequalities that are an integral driver of violence and conflict. Countries that have higher levels of gender equality are more stable, secure, and prosperous. The greater the equality between women and men in a country or region, the less war prone it is.
Seeing the World Through a Multipolar Lens at Seton Hall’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations

You were recently named a Fulbright Scholar and will be looking into the impact of domestic politics and Sino-U.S. rivalry on the strategic behavior of Southeast Asian states. What are ways that today’s students prepare to contribute in a volatile global arena?

Having a voice on pivotal issues, such as how Asian states are navigating the changing balance of power and the trade war between the United States and China, requires a keen understanding of the sociopolitical systems of other countries. Analysts need a firm grasp of the underlying theories and concepts that enable them to address important questions that move beyond the simplistic labels we may see in the press and on social media. There is also a tendency for students to view global issues solely through the prism of U.S. interests. At the School of Diplomacy, we explore the world through a multipolar lens and help our students develop the skills and background knowledge needed to move global politics forward.

As a foreign policy analyst, how has your focus in the classroom shifted to reflect emerging issues?

The only thing certain in international relations (IR) is change. We adapt by expanding our knowledge of emerging issues and their potential impact on traditional national interests, such as security and economic prosperity. Today, foreign policy also encompasses transnational challenges, such as climate change, migration, global health, and food and water security. Our graduate programs provide opportunities in and outside of the classroom for students to wrestle with these issues, and engage in the conversations that are shaping the field.

How are student assignments addressing critical skills needed for tomorrow’s international affairs professional?

Our classrooms emphasize strong critical thinking skills that enable students to analyze foreign policy issues, compare cases, and draw lessons from them are crucial. After studying the Iranian nuclear deal or the sanctions against Russia, my students were asked what recommendations they would make as an advisor to the president. They needed to marshal evidence to support one position—such as whether U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was in the country’s interest—and lay out the alternative argument and rebut it. This is precisely the type of analysis and writing required for students wishing to enter policy debates—as a State Department, Department of Defense, or congressional analyst.

Cities and other subnational areas are having a greater influence on international issues. What opportunities do graduates in IR have to lead on the local, national, and global levels?

As globalization connects us all, hard distinctions between the international, domestic, and local areas are eroding. Leaders interested in promoting economic prosperity in states and cities will increasingly solicit investment from foreign companies and promote local products abroad, creating opportunities for IR graduates to work in trade and investment offices. At the same time, combatting global problems, such as climate change and transnational terrorism, requires local solutions, opening doors for School of Diplomacy alumni to apply their knowledge and address critical issues in local communities.
Prioritizing Global Studies

The Hamilton Lugar School ranks first in the nation in the number of languages taught—more than eighty. You are doing this when some universities are moving in the other direction, shrinking or eliminating global and language programs, and at time of growing appeals to turn inward. What do you make of this moment from your viewpoint as a university that looks outwards?

The Hamilton Lugar School is built on a longstanding commitment to global studies, whatever the political mood. During the McCarthy period, for example, the university resisted political pressure on its Russian and East European Institute and, in later years, we prioritized Russian studies, even when attention turned to other subjects. Today, we have a new Russian Studies Workshop, supported by the Carnegie Corporation, a language flagship in Russian, and new faculty in the social sciences and humanities. This same commitment applies to the study of all critical areas and subjects, from East Asia to the Middle East, Eurasia, and the Americas. Our commitment was recognized last year, when eleven of our area studies and language centers were awarded funding under the prestigious Title VI program—the best in Indiana University history and the most in the nation.

When considering graduate programs, many prospective students know what they want to study but aren’t sure how to pay for it. What funding opportunities are available for Hamilton Lugar School students?

We never want cost to be the reason students don’t pursue their dreams. Most Hamilton Lugar School graduate students receive support from the school. For example, our school is the largest recipient of Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships, prestigious Department of Education awards that cover tuition and provide a stipend to our graduate students and some undergrads. We award more than one hundred FLAS fellowships annually to our students. These awards and the many other fellowships available help to ensure our students can focus on scholarship and classroom experience instead of the anxiety of accumulating debt.

You’ve been both a teacher and a practitioner of foreign policy, including as a diplomat. What trends do you see defining the tenure of tomorrow’s diplomats and students of foreign affairs?

The ethos of the Hamilton Lugar School is to “change the world, first seek to understand it.” At the nuts-and-bolts level, what that means is we seek to leverage our area studies strength and combine it with multidisciplinary offerings in international studies. Supporting that goal, we have added more than twenty tenure-track faculty in the past four years. In bringing area and international studies into conversation, we believe we are helping to plug an important gap in academia and, we hope, helping to bridge the worlds of scholarship and policy. Organizations are becoming flatter and challenged to think more broadly—even the famously compartmentalized State Department.

We have designed our programs to help ensure our students graduate with global perspectives and regional specializations.
StanfordTeaches
StudentsHow to Be
Changemakers, Not
Just Policy Analysts

As the new director for the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy (MIP), what is your vision for public policy education? How does the program embody this vision?

Many American public policy schools have focused on teaching students a set of quantitative skills that allow them to become policy analysts, which means you are the person writing the policy memo telling your boss what should be done. These skills are important, particularly in an age when evidence-based policy has come under attack from certain quarters.

But actually accomplishing policy change in the real world requires a broader set of skills having to do with the ability to implement policies in the face of political constraints. This requires the ability to manage stakeholder coalitions, neutralize opponents, communicate policies, and generate resources. Moreover, it often turns out that your boss wants you to analyze a precooked solution that solves the wrong problem, without ever being able to ask if you were asking the right question in the first place.

In the redesigned MIP program, we aim to teach both skill sets: to be a good policy analyst and to be a changemaker—a leader able to take policies and make them happen. We have developed a policy problem-solving framework that we think applies in many circumstances to help solve policy problems, whether in or outside government.

If you are interested in the background to this approach to public policy education, you can read more about it in my article “What’s Wrong with Public Policy Education.”

Disruptive technologies shift the way societies interact on a global level and have the potential to change the dimension in which conflicts occur. How does the MIP program equip students with the flexibility and adaptability to confront unfamiliar situations?

Our MIP program has a new track in cyber policy, build around the Freeman Spogli Institute’s (FSI) new Cyber Policy Center. Located in Silicon Valley, our program and Stanford have access to a wide range of expertise not just in technology but also in design thinking, cybersecurity, and issues concerning democracy and social media, as well as international relations specialists who have thought about issues such as hybrid warfare and other new forms of political competition.

The policy problem-solving framework I mentioned earlier can be applied to problems created by technology and as a general approach to dealing with new or unfamiliar situations. The interdisciplinary nature of FSI and the MIP program ensures that students will face problems with multiple sets of tools and can look at them from a variety of perspectives.

In an age defined by digital revolution, how does the program teach students to bridge the gap between policy leaders in areas that have access to technology and leaders in areas that may lack access?

The digital divide is not just a problem in the technological sphere. Technology and the globalization it has produced has created winners and losers along many different dimensions—technological, political, social, and cultural. I think our program is grounded in a set of political values that make students aware of the salience of these broad inequalities and hopefully will provide some methods that can help to overcome them. Further, the faculty include former and current practitioners who have direct experience dealing with these divides and the political wisdom to understand how they may be approached.

Stanford in International Policy
Freeman Spogli Institute
Data Analysis and Literacy for the Study of Global Issues

You teach graduate courses on data analysis and statistics and have done your own significant research on political psychology and behavior and on experimental research methodologies. How did you become engaged with these areas, and what is their importance to global affairs and security?

I myself completed the MS in Global Affairs at the NYU School of Professional Studies Center for Global Affairs (CGA) in 2009. The experience was transformative, and as a doctoral student in political science, I became fascinated with political behavior and political psychology. I realized that most theories of politics, and of global affairs more broadly, ultimately hinge upon how individuals think and behave. Understanding a country’s policies necessitates an understanding of its citizens—their beliefs, the types of information they are, and are not, receptive to, and how they make political decisions.

Similarly, when we discuss security threats, such as terrorism, sectarian violence, cybercrime, and environmental destruction, we need to understand why individuals are deciding to engage in constructive or destructive activities. Once we possess this knowledge, we can determine how societies can change for the better.

I became convinced that gaining a basic literacy in statistics and data analysis was, above all, a means of self-empowerment in a world that increasingly relies upon data for communicating and making decisions. Graphs employed as “proof” that global temperatures are not rising, for example, can have the appearance of being scientific but often rely upon cherry-picked reference points, which are painfully obvious to those with some training in statistics.

Further, I became interested in the utilization of experiments because these often represent the most powerful means of identifying causal relationships between phenomena. A recent study in the Journal of Politics, for example, employed an experiment in Bosnia to understand how past violence there differentially affects men’s and women’s political engagement. Such studies reveal to students that, once equipped with some knowledge of research design and data analysis, so much more can be learned about global affairs.

How do you approach these topics in the classroom? How do your students use these analytic skills and methodologies in their own work as researchers and practitioners?

Returning to CGA in 2017 as a clinical assistant professor, it was an honor to develop CGA’s specialization in data analytics and to oversee courses that use specialized software to analyze real-world data. Having originally come from a qualitative background myself, I tell students that the content of my courses may be unfamiliar and, at times, intimidating—and that this is perfectly normal. With time and practice, however, students begin to see the logic, applicability, and incalculable value of these scarce skills.

My ultimate goal for students is that they apply these technical skills to the global issues they care about. I have had the distinct pleasure of seeing students produce amazing course papers and thesis projects, enter doctoral programs, and find jobs that prominently feature a data-analytic component. In this way, I believe my courses have helped to further CGA’s mission of growing more knowledgeable, and more capable, global citizens.
At the Intersection of Global Business, Public Policy, and Law: ASU in DC

Midcareer professionals seeking a global focus for their résumés now have three Arizona State University (ASU) master’s degree programs to choose from that are entirely based in Washington, DC. By combining the elite faculty and expertise of ASU’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Watts College of Public Service and Community Solutions, and the McCain Institute for International Leadership, ASU is able to offer students a curriculum uniquely suited for a new generation of leaders—those who can and must face today’s most pressing global challenges.

What graduate degree programs does ASU have in Washington, DC?

The university is now accepting students into its first graduate degree programs based entirely at ASU’s Ambassador Barbara Barrett and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor Washington Center, located just two blocks from the White House.

Starting in January 2020, the Thunderbird School of Global Management will offer an Executive Master of Arts degree in Global Affairs and Management. Washington-area professionals will be able to boost their marketability by choosing from three pathways: global business, taught by Thunderbird faculty; international law, taught by faculty from the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, and global policy, taught in collaboration with Watts College faculty.

For more than seventy years, Thunderbird has been the vanguard of global management and leadership education. Home to the world’s No. 1-ranked master’s degree in global management, according to the Wall Street Journal in 2019, Thunderbird produces unique leaders capable of tackling the world’s greatest challenges.

Ranked nationally in the top 5 percent by U.S. News & World Report, the ASU School of Public Affairs, which is part of Watts College, now offers an Executive Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree created for public sector and public policy managers. The nineteen-month program, offered in collaboration with the McCain Institute, combines an online curriculum with three-day executive sessions in Washington, DC, designed to expand the breadth and depth of students’ professional networks. Executive MPA students are selected based on their ability to demonstrate the value they would add to the learning experience of the entire class.

Finally, the Master of Arts in International Affairs and Leadership degree, offered by the ASU School of Politics and Global Studies and the McCain Institute, prepares students for international leadership roles in a dynamic active learning environment led by senior international affairs professionals from the public and private sectors. Drawing on the legacy of the values-driven leadership embodied by Senator John McCain, the McCain Institute’s access and connectivity in the international community, and ASU’s extensive academic capacity, students will acquire a distinctive edge to succeed in the full spectrum of international affairs professions.

What’s the ASU-in-DC difference?

Many universities have a presence in Washington, DC, either through a lobbyist, an internship coordinator, or a few folks who hand out swag and try to wrangle money out of federal agencies.

But Arizona State University is a presence in Washington, DC, a place where top researchers share their insights with leaders who create policy and serve as catalysts for tangible change in an environment that is often synonymous with partisan dysfunction.
Preparing Leaders for a Transforming World

The next generation of public policy leaders and social entrepreneurs needs to understand current problems while equipping themselves with new and evolving skills to manage tumultuous environments. There is no better place to acquire and hone these skills than at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College, giving graduates a competitive edge in the job market.

The University at the Forefront of Innovation

Carnegie Mellon University is a recognized world leader in technology and innovation in areas such as artificial intelligence, data analytics, autonomous vehicles, human-computer interaction, and cybersecurity. Innovation happens on our campus every day, and we are thrilled as new ideas meant to solve society’s problems become reality.

Heinz College at the Intersection of People, Policy, and Technology

We are intentional about understanding how these innovations affect people and policy. Students have myriad opportunities to engage these issues through coursework, capstone projects, and research opportunities. At Heinz College, we study, educate, and inform through leading research and action hubs, such as the Block Center and the Metro 21-Smart Cities Institute. We bring together innovators, academics, policymakers, and practitioners to study the impact of technology on society: how tech can disrupt in negative ways as well as how it can be used to improve equity and make our communities more prosperous and peaceful.

From Global to Local with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Carnegie Mellon University and Heinz College tackle issues that are both global and local. We are especially excited about opportunities to advance the SDGs that includes work with cities and next generation leaders in collaboration with a number of partners, including the International Youth Foundation and the City of Pittsburgh. Heinz students are on the leading edge of this work, with opportunities to create new initiatives on campus, including helping organizations that want to take action on the SDGs.

The Option to Launch Public Policy Careers in Washington, DC

Washington, DC offers students unique opportunities for professional work, engagement with leaders, building networks, and applying skills to current, critical policy problems. Our master’s Washington DC track provides a pathway to all that Washington has to offer. Students spend the first year of their program in Pittsburgh, completing our highly sought-after core curriculum and engaging experts there. In the second year, students move to Washington, DC, where they work in the federal government, for nonprofits, or for international organizations on Mondays through Thursdays as Heinz Policy Fellows, taking classes in the evenings and on Fridays.

This combination of classroom and experiential learning, with direct application centered on innovation and transformation, is what sets us apart. We encourage you to explore our program and hope you will join us.
Creating New Value in a Rapidly Changing World

The Asia-Pacific has grown into a driver of the world economy, and its economic influence, in turn, has profoundly reshaped the world’s geopolitical landscape. The region plays a critical part in the major trends challenging the traditional international order. Studying global affairs from an Asian-Pacific vantage point will allow young leaders to fully grasp the nature of the new global landscape, which is no longer shaped solely by major Western nation-states, and effectively address the challenges facing the world today. Located in the heart of Tokyo, a global city, Waseda University prides itself on being one of the region’s leading private universities with its global network of alumni. The Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) offers MA and PhD programs, training students to address a wide range of regional and global issues within a highly international and diverse learning environment.

How does GSAPS prepare students to navigate today’s shifting global landscape?

The complexities of today’s global affairs seem to reaffirm our program’s philosophy, which emphasizes a comprehensive and interdisciplinary analytic approach as well as the willingness and ability to embrace diversity. From its founding, GSAPS has endeavored to build a curriculum to help students address a host of complex and often interconnected issues in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere, including income and gender disparities, environmental issues, poverty, territorial disputes, national security, human rights and security, aging populations and falling birth rates, and impacts of technology, in an interdisciplinary framework. The centerpiece of the MA program is a faculty-led project research seminar, where students develop analytical and research skills necessary for thesis research with peers from all over the world. Our faculty—all leaders in their respective academic fields—work with students to develop a process for identifying their academic interests and crystallizing these into research results. In doing so, we aim to help students make an intellectual contribution to the creation of new value useful for shaping a better world, rather than merely adapt to emerging global realities.

The makeup of our student body, roughly 80 percent of which hail from outside Japan, ensures students learn in a highly international environment while embracing both the challenges and opportunities of diversity. The geographical scope of our curriculum and research extends beyond the Asia-Pacific. Students can take advantage of our international exchange programs to expand their horizon beyond Japan. In addition to providing opportunities to study in our partner graduate schools around the world, we have been focusing on developing programs with one of our partner schools in Europe, which allow students to study international relations and regionalism more intensively from comparative and inter-regional perspectives.

How do GSAPS students perform professionally after graduation?

Our broad multidisciplinary training helps our students find job opportunities and build successful careers in international organizations, governments, NGOs, research institutes, universities and private companies. We expect our graduates to go on to serve and lead society in various capacities in the Asia-Pacific and around the world. Furthermore, we expect them to lead collective global efforts to build a better future, as seen in the sustainable development goals of the United Nations, by bringing various local, national, and international stakeholders together.
Preparing Tomorrow's Leaders to Solve the World's Toughest Challenges

As a senior advisor at the White House, you were a major player in negotiating the U.S.-China climate accord, paving the way for the Paris Agreement in 2016. What skills did you draw on that are taught at The Fletcher School?

Over the years, I often found myself referring to concepts that we teach at The Fletcher School, such as pursuit of mutual gain and identifying the zone of possible agreement. Originally, as a graduate student, and now, as a professor, over the years I have built up expertise about China’s economic development and global climate change policy. My interdisciplinary background was immensely useful in both the White House and the State Department.

At Fletcher, we endeavor to prepare the next generation of leaders to address the world’s most complex challenges. As a professor, I focus on incorporating experiential learning into our students’ curricula by focusing on real-world problems in our everyday studies. Additionally, each year I lead a delegation of students to the international climate negotiations, where they observe and participate in the global negotiations firsthand.

What keeps you coming back to the table?

One of the most rewarding aspects of teaching Fletcher students is seeing them apply what they learn in the classroom to the challenging situations they face in the world. Each year, I am a little prouder because I can see how our growing network of alumni is doing so much good in the world.

I’m also excited that The Fletcher School will be welcoming our new dean on October 1st. Rachel Kyte will be Fletcher’s first female dean, and she comes to us with a wealth of experience, most recently as the CEO and special representative of the UN Secretary General for Sustainable Energy for All. There, she led UN efforts toward greater access to clean, affordable energy as part of its action on climate change and sustainable development. We’re also very proud that our new dean is a graduate of The Fletcher School’s Global Master of Arts Program.
Promoting Research and Learning on Global Issues in a Changing World

As one of the country’s top ten professional public policy and planning schools, the Humphrey School of Public Affairs prepares students to lead in communities worldwide. Our school community is shaped by the legacy of Minnesotans who have exercised leadership on global issues ranging from Arvonne and Don Fraser’s pioneering efforts to advance women’s rights and human rights to Harold Stassen’s role in creating the United Nations and leading the first nuclear arms control talks. And with increasing consensus in foreign policy circles that addressing gender inequalities is key to long-term peace and security, the Humphrey School is one of the only public policy schools to offer a concentration in gender and public policy.

How is the Humphrey School making a global impact?

How is the Humphrey School preparing students to navigate changes in the geopolitical landscape?

As global institutions and democracies are challenged by climate change, conflict, and rising nationalism, the Humphrey School leads in cutting-edge interdisciplinary research and teaching that seeks solutions to global problems. After a twenty-five year career with the Department of State as a foreign service officer, I know the importance of ensuring students graduate with a deep knowledge about global institutions and issues, the analytical skills to think creatively about new challenges to international systems, and a network of relationships with organizations and individuals working to address those problems.

Professor Greta Friedemann-Sánchez researches the linkage between domestic violence and conflict in Colombia, this year presenting her research at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to persuade its members to put pressure on Colombia to address intimate partner violence. Professor Ragui Assaad is an expert in the impact of conflict-related refugee flows on affected groups and host communities, particularly in the Middle East. Professor Deborah Levison studies the work—both labor force and “chores”—and schooling of children in low-income countries.

How is the Humphrey School preparing students to navigate changes in the geopolitical landscape?

Students start with a rigorous foundation in policy analysis, research methods, and professional skills, adding courses addressing a range of global issues, such as international trade, human rights, development practice, and diplomacy. Students have access to leading experts across the University of Minnesota and can earn minors in international law, public health, and human rights.

Our partnership with the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, provides research and internship opportunities on emerging issues in international security, including through dedicated capstone projects. Our faculty, experienced in diplomacy and politics, teach students negotiation skills through courses in diplomacy and a crisis exercise presented by the U.S. Army War College.

After leaving the Humphrey School, alumni are making an impact serving in senior positions in agencies, such as the Department of State, the Government Accountability Office, and at NGOs. Drawing upon the knowledge they gained and networks they built at the Humphrey School, recent graduates have embarked upon careers in the U.S. Foreign Service and with Minnesota-based foreign consulates, at think tanks, such as the Atlantic Council, and in leading international democracy-building and human rights organizations.
ENRICO LETTA
Dean
Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po
Former Prime Minister of Italy

Shaping Global Actors for a More Secure World

What encouraged you to take up the position as dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) at Sciences Po in September 2015?

By 2015, PSIA was already recognized as one of the world’s leading professional schools in international affairs. With my experience in European politics and public affairs, I was eager to contribute to PSIA’s outstanding, multilingual community, which is designed to train and shape global actors to understand and respond to the complexities of our world. Our approach of combining theory and practice is, from my perspective, essential when training tomorrow’s leaders and changemakers. By bringing together the best and brightest students from across the globe with world-renowned faculty and practitioners, PSIA has created a space that fosters dialogue, understanding, and, most of all, action for the twenty-first century.

What new projects and innovations have you instigated during your time as dean?

A first priority was to further develop the school as a platform for public debate. We launched our Youth and Leaders Summit in January 2016, which has become an annual conference for leading international affairs personalities to engage PSIA students in an open dialogue about a major global policy. In November 2018, PSIA students and faculty were important contributors to the Paris Peace Forum, a new initiative spearheaded by French President Emmanuel Macron. Through such events, PSIA students have the chance to challenge world leaders and engage with global policy directly.

We have also launched new, collaborative initiatives relating to economic diplomacy and science diplomacy with our university and institutional partners. Our aim is to contribute and raise awareness of the study of these important fields and to develop world-leading training for students and professionals.

As you prepare to celebrate PSIA’s tenth anniversary, what is your vision for the next decade?

Our aim in the coming years is to ensure that PSIA goes from strength-to-strength. We are all proud of what PSIA has accomplished so far—notably, our top-three global ranking for international studies, from the 2019 QS World University Rankings. This is the result of continuous improvement to our curriculum, our collaboration with leading university partners, and, of course, our ability to attract incredible students from across the globe.

Degrees and courses at PSIA will continue to evolve, including in response to student feedback, to ensure we provide the most relevant and effective training so that our graduates learn to understand, navigate, and engage with a complex world, with a view to making it a better, more secure place.
Understanding the Global Economy Through Interdisciplinary Lenses

What sets Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy and Development (Fordham IPED) apart from other international affairs programs?

Fordham IPED offers a unique, rigorous, and innovative approach to analyzing contemporary global economic relations. Issues in international economic relations and development are understood from both the political and economic perspectives. Furthermore, we provide a strong quantitative methods foundation, which allows our students to develop robust analytical skills in data analysis, project assessment, and computer programming. We also stress professional experience outside the classroom.

How does Fordham IPED prepare its students for a changing international affairs landscape?

Our core curriculum, consisting of economics and political science foundational courses, provides our students with an advanced interdisciplinary knowledge of economic relations. Our electives allow students to specialize in the fields of international banking and finance, international development studies, international and development economics, or global environmental and resource economics.

Through our summer intern fellowship program, we fund a number of internships for our students to gain practical field experience with international businesses, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations, not only here in New York but also in Washington, DC, as well as in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

What unique advantages are available for students in the Fordham IPED program?

Our curriculum and our location in New York City are ideal for anyone who wishes to be at the center of the world economy. Our location affords our students a wealth of internship opportunities, ranging from the United Nations to international nonprofit organizations, international policy institutes, and Wall Street.

We also complement our classes with a weekly lecture series and career trips in New York and Washington, DC, that feature a broad range of professionals highlighting the practitioner perspective on contemporary issues in international affairs.

We have a small class size of roughly twenty-five students, providing the opportunity for close interactions with our supportive and distinguished faculty of experts. Our students come from diverse cultural and professional backgrounds. We draw our students from among the top 40 percent of all applicants to U.S. graduate programs. We offer generous scholarships to exceptional students and provide funding for students’ participation in internship placements, language immersion programs, and international fieldwork overseas.

Lastly, we have a strong alumni network and close association with various international organizations. Our placement record is strong, with about 40 percent of alumni in the private sector, 25 percent in nonprofit, 22 percent in government, and the remaining 13 percent in academia.
Welcoming Challenges to Settled Conceptions

Graduate programs at the Vienna School of International Studies (DA) prepare students to excel in a range of international careers. The eclectic, interdisciplinary teaching approach encourages both theoretical and methodological innovation while maintaining a strong practical thrust. Located in the heart of Vienna, the DA is just down the road from numerous international organizations, NGOs, diplomatic missions, and cultural institutions. With alumni from more than one hundred and twenty countries, the DA is just one node in a vast alumni network.

If definitions of power as we knew them are changing, how are DA students and faculty examining emerging sources of power and influence?

Eclectic coursework and a diversity of student backgrounds ensure that DA students welcome challenges to settled conceptions of power and influence. Each of our three graduate programs—the Master of Advanced International Studies, the Master of Science in Environmental Technology and International Affairs, and the Diploma—prepares students to analyze power and influence from numerous angles. Furthermore, local faculty and a robust rotation of visiting professors and experts make the DA an unwelcome setting for dogma.

Cities and other subnational areas are becoming more influential on international issues. How do students prepare to lead on the local, national, and global levels?

Vienna itself is a city with growing influence on international issues, and DA students benefit from their proximity to the bustling international scene.

Since the campus doubles as a curated forum for international affairs, student life is an immersion experience. Intensive trips to areas such as Kurdish Iraq, Kiev, and the Balkan Peninsula also add experiential depth to student life. The DA makes international affairs tangible, which benefits graduates across the board.

How do DA programs help equip students with flexibility and adaptability in problem-solving?

The DA prepares students to view complex problems through multiple perspectives. Our programs encourage students first to traverse the disciplines of economics, law, history, and political science. Doing so pushes students to think beyond their background knowledge. After completing the initial core coursework, students then acquire in-depth knowledge on the issues and regions that interest them most. Complemented with a battery of language training and practical skills seminars, DA graduates enter the job market comfortable crossing multiple paradigms.

The fourth industrial revolution will change the way people work and live. What innovations has your school promoted to prepare for these changes?

Cutting edge courses, such as Digital Diplomacy and Strategies in Cyberspace, ensure that students always incorporate technological considerations into their analyses. Recent years have also seen a growing interest among student and faculty in computational methodologies, especially regarding econometrics and text mining. Whether by cooperation with the Austrian Artificial Intelligence Agency or representation at start-up incubators, DA faculty go to great lengths to encourage technological experiments with international resonance.
Mastering Analysis and Public Engagement

You’re an international development and foreign aid scholar who also writes for leading general-audience publications and is frequently quoted in the media. How does your public engagement influence students who take your classes?

Graduate students at the Sanford School of Public Policy prepare for careers through coursework that teaches both rigorous analysis and the ability to communicate conclusions to diverse audiences. In today’s workplace, knowing how to write an effective blog post or communicate with a radio host can be as important as demonstrating mastery of the well-known policy memo. My scholarly work has examined the impact of trade agreements and foreign aid in Central America. When extreme violence, food insecurity related to climate change, and high levels of poverty led to increases in migrants leaving that region, there was demand for engaging on these issues with a broader audience. My own efforts to engage different audiences help me teach these techniques more effectively.

How does the Sanford school help students transition to meaningful careers?

The small size of Sanford programs allows students to receive individualized career counseling. Our career services professionals help students pinpoint meaningful internships and jobs. Students receive assistance in networking and guidance on how to prepare professional materials. A highlight is the annual trip to Washington, DC, where students meet a variety of alumni and potential employers with interests similar to their own, through panels and site visits.

Sanford alumni work in nearly one hundred countries. Graduates include the founder of the Global Fund for Children, a peacebuilder working in Syria, U.S. Foreign Service officers fighting human trafficking, and the founder of a global nonprofit helping improve health-care access. Our loyal alumni often return to campus or connect in other ways with current students to offer guidance and advice.
In the Nation's Service and the Service of Humanity

What's unique about the Woodrow Wilson School's approach to policy?

Our distinctive course of study strikes a balance between theory and practice. Ninety-two full-time faculty members teach at the school, most with dual appointments, representing eleven different departments. International relations scholars combine expert analysis of a shifting world order with insight into how history influences today’s geopolitical landscape. Our faculty conduct innovative research; provide policymakers, nonprofits, and research centers with expert, nonpartisan policy analysis; and provide students with the tools and knowledge needed to tackle important policy issues. Students select one of four fields of concentration and can deepen their knowledge in specific areas of study through certificates in health and health policy, urban policy, or science, technology, and environmental policy. All students receive an education focused on rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis—an adaptable “policy toolkit” that allows them to excel in any field, domestically or internationally.

How do Woodrow Wilson School students apply classroom lessons to real-world policy challenges?

We believe that learning extends beyond the classroom. Formal coursework is enriched with public lectures and informal talks with policymakers and advocates working on the important issues of the day. We send students all over the world to learn in the field—required summer internships for Master in Public Affairs students, policy workshops to analyze a complex issue and present recommendations to a real client, or fieldwork to supplement formal studies. The result: students are able to learn about any policy topic from various vantage points.

How does the school support students’ career goals and objectives?

We take the view that the school should invest in the students so they can focus on their studies and pursue careers in public service without worrying about financing their graduate education. Generous financial aid is offered to all graduate students covering full tuition and required fees for everyone, as well as financial support for travel to complement policy workshops, for language training, and for summer internships. Our career services team is dedicated to helping launch students’ careers, providing coaching, guidance, and resources for the lifecycle of their careers.

How does the Woodrow Wilson School engage in foreign affairs and foreign policy, especially as the rules of international affairs seem to be changing?

For a school our size, we offer remarkable range in this regard. Our faculty and practitioners study international relations, politics, and economics, and our twenty centers and programs focus on policy issues ranging from climate change and forced migration to security studies, health, and finance. We are a home for the study and debate of national and international policy and support a variety of educational, research, enrichment, and outreach activities. Opportunities abound for students to gain the skills necessary to become the next generation of strategic thinkers and decision-makers. Recognizing the ways in which advancements in information technology are affecting global relationships, we invest heavily in IT policy studies. In addition to our eighty-plus tenured faculty, we regularly host visiting leaders and diplomats. Ambassadors Daniel C. Kurtzer and Ryan Crocker, both of whom have led crisis decision- and policymaking processes, teach at the school and engage with our community.
Develop Real-World Adaptable Skills for Improving Communities Around the World

The way Roza Vasileva sees it, the future is data: in particular, data gathered by governments—local, regional, national, international—and shared with citizens to make their communities, and their countries, better.

Roza’s desire to make the world a better place drove her to study in the United States as a Fulbright Scholar and to launch a career spearheading open data in more than a dozen countries. What made that happen, more than anything, were her experiences at the No. 1 ranked Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

As she puts it, “Maxwell was life changing for me, in terms of discovering what I should be doing with my life.”

Roza is an information and communication technology (ICT) and open data consultant at the World Bank—a Maxwell internship that turned into a career—with an eye toward her PhD. We caught up with her before her latest trip to Tanzania.

What is open data’s role in international development?

Open data for government is an initiative to release raw data for use in everyday applications. In Tanzania, we are working with geospatial data in a range of projects: participatory mapping, using drones for collecting high-resolution geodata, and developing flood preparedness plans with communities.

Technology is developing so fast—it’s fascinating seeing how it can help communities.

You graduated before Maxwell launched a certificate in Data Analytics for Public Policy and the Autonomous Systems Policy Institute. How did the school prepare you for these rapidly evolving fields?

I remember when I started at the World Bank, my boss said to me, “You don’t have any background in ICT. What are you doing here?” Six years down the road, I’m still here; he doesn’t want to let me go.

My interest in ICT began during a class in which we discussed how to apply a range of technologies in government work. Then, Maxwell gave me a push—especially through the internship at the World Bank—to explore ICT for development. Part of my assignment was to pilot, in Russia, a new methodology they were developing: the Open Data Readiness Assessment, which we’ve since implemented in dozens of countries.

Every day, I use my leadership and program management training from Maxwell, including budgeting, proposal writing, identifying and framing problems, program evaluation, and managing people and teams. I often have flashbacks of Maxwell professors and their modules!

One of the benefits of Maxwell is its campus in Washington, DC, where students take classes and engage in high-profile internships. What was your experience like?

It was a big draw for me. I took classes in international programs and foreign affairs, all in the evening, while earning credit for the World Bank internship during the day.

Maxwell is also famous for networking. It’s one of the key skills they instill. We established an alumni network at the World Bank that meets regularly. While I was in DC, our numbers jumped from twenty to fifty to over eighty alumni, who stay in touch and help each other.
Meeting the Challenges of Emerging Sources of Power and Influence

For over twenty years the Bush School of Government and Public Service has prepared the next generation of public servants to deal with the complex challenges of a changing world. In a strictly nonpartisan environment, Bush School students discuss and debate the key international and domestic issues affecting our country and the world as a whole. A typical class could be led by a distinguished academic expert on the Middle East, a former administrator of the Agency for International Development, or an experienced practitioner in the field of international NGOs. The focus is clearly on the future: how can Bush School students make a difference in a world where power centers are changing, technology is rapidly altering how ideas are transmitted, and the once bipolar international arena has been replaced by a multiplicity of threats?

How is the Bush School different from other schools of international affairs and public service?

Probably the most distinctive feature of the Bush School is its professional focus. There is an expectation that the majority of Bush School graduates will go into careers in government, nonprofit management, or some other form of public service. As a result, the faculty is a blend of academic professionals and nationally recognized practitioners from the worlds of diplomacy, intelligence, the military, law enforcement, homeland security, nonprofit, development, and state and local government. In our experience, this has been a winning formula in preparing students for professional careers. Bush School graduates are comfortable in their academic fields but also have the hands-on skills and knowledge that employers value. Our intelligence and counterterrorism classes, for example, include practical training in professional tradecraft.

What are some of the other advantages of the Bush School experience?

All students accepted into the Bush School’s two-year programs receive a financial award and in-state tuition, reducing their debt load. Additionally, College Station offers an affordable cost of living, much lower than many competitor programs offer. These cost savings enable our students to choose jobs of interest to them, not what best repays their loans. Bush School students participate in culminating capstone projects where they deliver high-quality, faculty-guided research to real-world clients, such as the State Department, the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. military commands, and state and local governments. To develop their language skills, international affairs students are given no-cost access to foreign language software and discussion groups led by native speakers. In the summer between their first and second years, students either complete internships with government agencies or other sponsors or, alternatively, do intensive foreign language study. Finally, the Bush School is part of a large research university of over 60,000 students that features world-class departments and institutes in a variety of fields, including public health, cyber, nuclear engineering, transportation, agriculture, and many others. The Bush School’s close collaboration with these other units enables students to design tailored academic programs to address specialized career goals. With dedicated career staff and faculty helping along the way, Bush School students find careers that matter to them, with between 81 and 95 percent employed within six months of graduation.
Preparing for an Ever-Changing World

What is the most important change in international affairs over the past five years?

Global leadership by the United States is no longer a given. By turning away from multilateral agreements, the Donald J. Trump administration accelerated a shift already underway with the rise of China as a global power. In response, other nations are creating new alliances or strengthening existing ones. A good example of this is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. When the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in January 2017, eleven nations adjusted goals and proceeded with an agreement that more closely aligns them with each other.

How does the School of International Service (SIS) prepare students for a world in which the United States’ dominance in global affairs is no longer guaranteed?

We teach our students about the realities and the potential of an ever-changing world and prepare them with skills in international and intercultural relations, including diplomacy and communication. Our International and Intercultural Communication program is the first program of its type in the United States, and more than fifty years on, it’s still an innovator in the field. We also offer a graduate program in International Economic Relations, which focuses on international trade, finance, investment, development, and governance.

How does SIS remain at the forefront of international affairs teaching and learning?

The future of graduate education offers students a choice of where and when they can study. We now offer an on-campus, skills-based degree in International Affairs Policy and Analysis; starting this fall, we’ll offer a new online degree in International Relations and Business, jointly with the Kogod School of Business.

Our faculty continue to take prominent roles in advancing the scholarship and policy applications of our field. Our new Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology is a forward-thinking collective that leverages research, engagement, and a community of scholars to find optimal, humane solutions to technology-based issues. Our Accountability Research Center, on the other hand, works toward global transparency and responsive governance with an impressive roster of partners promoting citizen action. Viewing these two together provides a snapshot of the SIS personality: engaged in important global questions from a human-centered perspective.

What responsibility do international affairs schools have to adapt to the changing face of work in how we prepare our students?

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is breaking down barriers between nations even more than previous moves toward globalization. This brings both challenges and opportunities. We prepare our students for cultural fluency and careers in global service.

As a higher education institution, we must advocate for coherent U.S. policy on international education, underpinned by an understanding that “international education” isn’t simply sending our students abroad or bringing international students to our campuses. We must holistically develop curricula that include scholars and thought leaders from the global south. We must engage with cultural nuance and prepare our students to flourish in a world where very little is clear cut.
International Diplomacy: Advancing Worldwide Peace and Prosperity at UC San Diego

You launched the school’s newest research center. What is it, and how can future Global Policy and Strategy students benefit from the work the center is doing?

We launched the Center for Commerce and Diplomacy in early 2019 to understand the causes and consequences of the institutions of trade diplomacy. Diplomats operate within a set of domestic and international institutions that govern their behavior in international trade negotiations. But we have little systematic knowledge about the specifics of these procedures, how they came into being, how they vary over time and across countries, and how they affect economic outcomes. As the world looks to shape the rules and institutions governing the next era of globalization, we hope to provide the analytical tools and knowledge to policymakers who seek to make these as robust as possible.

Why is commercial diplomacy important in today’s political and economic climate?

After World War II, countries negotiated a series of multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements that dramatically reduced policy barriers to global trade and investment. Most notable among these was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was the predecessor of the current World Trade Organization. These agreements led to massive increases in trade, foreign investment, and productivity, over the past seventy-five years.

Today, the open world economy, which has bolstered global economic growth, is under threat. Populist pressures, nationalism, and financial crises have weakened the base of support for global integration even at its core. We seek to design institutions that allow commerce and diplomacy to interact for the advancement of worldwide peace and prosperity.

You grew up in Jamaica and went to school on the East Coast. How has living in California shaped your outlook on policy and economics?

The culture of freedom that permeates the state infects all who live here, in the best way possible. My experience in California has served to reinforce many of the basic principles governing markets that economics teaches. At the same time, it has heightened my awareness of income disparities within the United States. Coming from a poorer country, inequality in a large developed country was not salient. However, my California experience has taught me that inequality is as much of an issue within countries as it is across countries. This is a feature of development that has yet to be addressed adequately in the economics or politics literature.

What skills do students in your classes gain to help them in the future job market?

As a game theorist, I teach my students about the politics of international trade policy, focusing on the games being played between countries. Game theory helps students understand the purpose of trade agreements: when they can be successful and when they are likely to fail. The game structure and payoffs are determined by market structure, and so students are taught what strategies are feasible in industries that are perfectly competitive versus industries marked by market power, externalities, or other market imperfections. Through the lens of game theory, students are taught to critically assess actions and pronouncements of policymakers, and consequently, to be able to guide future trade policy strategy.
Preparing Leaders for an Era of Change

Why is the study of international relations important today?

International relations is an inescapable part of everyone’s life, from the foods we eat to the goods we purchase to whether countries go to war. Everyone is affected by it.

Today, the international order that has made possible the remarkable growth and improvements in quality of life over the past 75 years is at a watershed. Geopolitics are changing; global forces such as climate change exercise power that no state can control; and liberal democracy faces competition and challenges that we have not seen in generations. The world needs leaders who understand these developments, and who have the practical skills to respond to them.

Why study at Johns Hopkins SAIS?

Johns Hopkins SAIS is a unique professional school that was founded in 1943 at a time when the world was in extraordinary flux. Today, our students may focus on different issues, but our tradition of structured learning—rooted in international economics, American foreign policy, strategic studies, international development, and regional studies—combined with practical skills and policy engagement remains as relevant as ever.

We are integrating new fields of inquiry into the study of international relations, such as global health, food insecurity, cybersecurity, and sustainable energy. And while our two-year Master of Arts degree remains our flagship program, we are rapidly broadening our offerings in specialized one-year degree programs in fields like global risk, international economics and finance, European public policy, and energy and sustainability. We have recently introduced a new practitioner’s doctorate and are increasingly offering part-time, online, and hybrid forms of education.

Our graduates are known around the world for their cultural fluency, mastery of complexity, and approach to decision-making informed by the realities of the world as it is. And hands-on learning is a hallmark of the Johns Hopkins SAIS experience. Through summer internships and practicum projects with professional clients, students apply what they have learned in the classroom to complex, real-world problems. They go on dozens of staff rides and study trips each year. In this year alone, they met with officials in Colombia coordinating that country’s response to migration out of Venezuela, analyzed the energy sector in Pakistan, met with authorities planning and overseeing free trade zones and ports in China, and studied democratization and stabilization efforts in Tunisia.

Our faculty of practically-minded scholars and scholarly practitioners, are all committed to teaching and learning. Students gain exposure in the classroom to scholars in the forefront of their field, and to experts who have negotiated treaties and trade pacts, run multimillion dollar aid programs, and commanded military forces in the field. Our global alumni network includes 20,000 graduates working in leading roles in 140 countries. They mentor current students, host group visits, and help students make direct connections to employers in their field.

Studying at Johns Hopkins SAIS means learning from the best, becoming part of a large and growing community, and preparing to adapt to whatever challenges a turbulent world will throw your way.
Rockefeller College at UAlbany: Preparing Students for a Rapidly-Changing World

In what ways does Rockefeller College’s Master of International Affairs (MIA) program differ from other international affairs programs?

We offer our students a highly flexible program that can be tailored to suit their particular goals. Our classes tend to be small, usually with fewer than fifteen students in a classroom. In order to accommodate the needs of working professionals, we offer all of our core courses in the evenings. These courses are designed in a way that allows students who may be out of town to join the class by videoconference. The program’s location in Albany, the state capital of New York, offers many advantages: we’re within easy reach of global hubs, such as New York City and Washington, DC, but by being in a smaller city, we’re able to offer our students a program that is much more affordable than others in terms of both tuition and living costs.

How do the courses taught in the program reflect the changing nature of global politics?

Many of the features of the international system that had been taken for granted in the post-Cold War era have been thrown into doubt as a result of recent political developments. Our faculty are able to bring their extensive expertise in the worlds of academia and policymaking to help students make sense of these changes. For instance, in my seminar on global environmental politics, we spend a lot of time discussing attempts to address climate change through mechanisms that lie outside of conventional state-to-state diplomacy—for example, through transnational networks of cities, such as the C40, or through market-based mechanisms. Many members of our faculty have had years of experience working with organizations, such as the U.S. Department of Defense, the United Nations, or the World Bank, among many others. They teach courses that address contemporary issues, such as the global refugee crisis, cybersecurity, economic underdevelopment, and the rise of transnational terrorist movements.

How does your program help to develop the skills that students will need to succeed in a rapidly changing international environment?

Our MIA is, first and foremost, a professional degree. It’s designed to prepare students for careers in international affairs, and the design of our program reflects this. The courses are taught in a way that emphasizes practical skills, such as writing policy memos and effectively presenting complex material to diverse groups of decision-makers. We also train all of our students in the statistical and computational skills that are required to succeed in an increasingly data-driven field.

What support is offered to students trying to find careers in international affairs?

Rockefeller College alumni have an excellent placement record, thanks in large part to the emphasis we place on helping to develop our students’ skills in preparing for a competitive job market. All of our students are required to take a professional development course in their first year. We also offer one-on-one coaching to help students develop their résumés, prepare for interviews, and make connections through Rockefeller’s extensive alumni network.
Advancing International Studies in the Capital of Europe with World-Leading Academics and Experienced Practitioners

What makes the Brussels School of International Studies special?

Our school is right at the heart of Europe and sits close to the institutions making decisions influencing all of us, wherever we are in the world. Our students are part of this, combining a world-class master’s level education while being immersed in conferences, internships, seminars, and lectures across the city. It is a truly unique experience that will prepare students for an exciting range of careers in the international sector. Students that hit the ground running and grab all the opportunities that Brussels has to offer will find a rewarding experience that is hard to beat.

Can you discuss in more detail about how students are equipped with flexibility in problem-solving?

Our programs are interdisciplinary, and this encourages students to build a degree that brings together a variety of disciplines. For example, following a master’s degree in Conflict Studies allows students to study conflict in a theoretical and historical context and also looks at the legal and practical aspects via modules such as Law of Armed Conflict and Negotiation and Mediation. The variety of classes ensures students learn a range of problem-solving skills, and the combination of academic and practitioner teaching brings a contemporary flavor to the classroom, sometimes involving real-life, ongoing case studies. In several modules, students play simulation games—for example, acting as mediators in an international conflict or negotiating among EU member states.

Could you expand on your curriculum and program structure, and how it has developed?

We are a truly international school and endeavor to teach on contemporary issues that reflect the changing world order. Our master’s degrees in Migration and International Relations particularly investigate the challenges faced by organizations, charities, and NGOs to keep abreast of shifts in political structures and a more globalized world. Students relish the opportunity to combine two specializations into one degree, and this interdisciplinary approach ensures students are equipped with a wide range of skills. New modules in Development, Disability, and Disadvantage, along with Politics of Health in Humanitarian Disasters, will enhance our offer and bring in subjects from a global health pathway. Global health issues continue to dominate headlines and are likely to become more prevalent, directly impacting international relations.

How do you prepare graduates to lead on the local, national, and global levels?

At the Brussels School, we aim to equip our students with a quality education while exposing them to internship, job, and networking opportunities across a wide spectrum of industries in the city of Brussels. This approach enables students to implement their knowledge in a variety of sectors and gain valuable experience for future careers. Internships with lobbying groups, for example, enable students to develop skills that will teach them to be influential within various sectors, be it politics, the oil industry, or within human rights. International organizations invariably have an office in Brussels, and this gives our students fantastic access to develop networks on an international level and bring these skills back to their own local or regional area.
Looking to the Future

The Fourth Industrial Revolution will change the way people work and live. What innovations has your school promoted to prepare for these changes?

We recognize that technological innovation is the underlying foundation of the international system. Everything is rooted in how changes in technology impact the way people engage with each other, either the way they do harm to each other or the way they cooperate and create opportunities. If the forms of engagement change, as they have with changing technology, that will have ripple effects on all the other elements based on that foundation. Changing technology has also impacted the ways that great powers, nonstate actors, and small powers engage with each other and the international community.

We are making a major investment to try to understand the implications of new technology. In January 2019, we launched the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. As one of the biggest centers on how emerging technologies reshape the security landscape, CSET will initially focus on the effects of progress in artificial intelligence and advanced computing.

We have hired new faculty who are working on cybersecurity, and students in our Security Studies graduate program can choose to concentrate on technology and security. Georgetown has always been an innovator in science, technology, and international affairs at the undergraduate level, and we’re working on expanding it to the graduate level. We recently launched a partnership between the World Bank and our Master’s in Foreign Service program, Global Human Development program, and Science, Technology and International Affairs program, focused on how digital technology is transforming agriculture around the world. Students will be asked to delve into multiple facets of technology and agriculture, including digital financial services and precision crop monitoring with the aim of examining how these will transform markets and individual livelihoods worldwide.

Cities and other subnational areas are becoming more influential on international issues. How do you prepare graduates to lead on the local, national, and global levels?

Increasingly, there are more entities outside of the U.S. federal government who are playing roles in international affairs. Our students need to be prepared for that. They need to understand how Washington, DC, works, but they also need to be able to make innovations outside of the Beltway. With the federal government pulling back on issues such as climate change and the recent changing trade policies, states are building up their own apparatuses to handle international affairs. Our alumni are taking the lead on that; for example, Bud Colligan, class of 1976, recently became senior advisor for international affairs and trade to California Governor Gavin Newsom. Although we’ve always been a Washington school, that doesn’t mean we only train students for the Washington power structure.
LBJ School
Forges Leaders in the Global Arena

Dr. Kate Weaver conducts research on and teaches international development, evaluation methods, and writing for global policy.

How does the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) School equip students to engage with the global policy world?

Students at the LBJ School get hands-on training through projects with leading institutions, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the United Nations and the State Department. Our students learn a lot of practical skills—ArcGIS, evaluation methods, and grant writing—and have opportunities to intern all over the world. One of our global policy students recently wrote our resident intelligence officer from the U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt, where she is interning, to share how prepared she felt for her work thanks to her LBJ courses. An alumnus who specializes in Asia and foreign policy works for the Congressional Research Service and says he owes it all to his experiences at the LBJ School.

How do you work with students in your research?

I love working with students in our yearlong policy research projects—the LBJ School’s capstone course. On one trip to Malawi, my students and I worked with international aid donors and the government to gather subnational data on all the aid projects in the country. We geo-mapped the data to create interactive maps that policymakers could use to assess the allocation of aid. In one meeting, a minister of finance looked closely at one of the maps and, with great excitement in his voice, declared, “We’re putting all of resources in the wrong spot! I have to talk to the donors about this!” It was a great moment when we realized our research was going to make a real difference. Our work quickly led to other multimillion-dollar research grants that have directly contributed to international aid transparency and accountability, while providing LBJ students with tremendous opportunities to delve into the complex world of global development finance.

Most recently, I worked with students to develop an online, open-source advocacy toolkit for groups working toward the UN sustainable development goal to end global hunger, improve nutrition, and enhance food security. While learning how to use Python and R Shiny App required a steep learning curve, the students developed deep familiarity with policy advocacy and how to influence Congress on these critical global issues.

What makes the LBJ School stand out?

The LBJ School provides an extraordinary number of fellowships, in addition to the lowest tuition rates—by far—of any top ten policy school. This includes numerous fellowships to support professional development and internships around the world, as well as research and teaching assistantships. On all counts, the LBJ School provides the best value. We offer a top-tier education and outstanding career placement records in foreign service, federal and state agencies, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the private and philanthropic sectors. Students are taught by world-class faculty and mentored by an alumni network over 4,300 strong.

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The Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) brings together the leading graduate programs dedicated to professional education in international affairs. Members have demonstrated excellence in multidisciplinary, policy-oriented international studies.

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ESSAYS

China is more of a match for the United States today than the Soviet Union ever was during the Cold War. – Odd Arne Westad

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The Sources of Chinese Conduct

Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?

Odd Arne Westad

In February 1946, as the Cold War was coming into being, George Kennan, the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, sent the State Department a 5,000-word cable in which he tried to explain Soviet behavior and outline a response to it. A year later, the text of his famous “Long Telegram” was expanded into a Foreign Affairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Writing under the byline “X,” Kennan argued that the Soviets’ Marxist-Leninist ideology was for real and that this worldview, plus a deep sense of insecurity, was what drove Soviet expansionism. But this didn’t mean that outright confrontation was inevitable, he pointed out, since “the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force.” What the United States had to do to ensure its own long-term security, then, was contain the Soviet threat. If it did, then Soviet power would ultimately crumble. Containment, in other words, was both necessary and sufficient.

Kennan’s message became the canonical text for those who tried to understand the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Always controversial and often revised (not least by the author himself), the containment strategy that Kennan laid out would define U.S. policy until the end of the Cold War. And as Kennan predicted, when the end did come, it came not just because of the strength and steadfastness of the United States and its allies but even more because of weaknesses and contradictions in the Soviet system itself.

ODD ARNE WESTAD is Elihu Professor of History and Global Affairs at Yale University and the author of The Cold War: A World History.
Now, more than 70 years later, the United States and its allies again face a communist rival that views the United States as an adversary and is seeking regional dominance and global influence. For many, including in Washington and Beijing, the analogy has become irresistible: there is a U.S.-Chinese cold war, and American policymakers need an updated version of Kennan’s containment. This past April, Kiron Skinner, the director of policy planning at the State Department (the job Kennan held when “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” was published), explicitly called for a new “X” article, this time for China.

But if such an inquiry starts where Kennan’s did—with an attempt to understand the other side’s basic drivers—the differences become as pronounced as the parallels. It is these differences, the contrast between the sources of Soviet conduct then and the sources of Chinese conduct now, that stand to save the world from another Cold War.

FROM WEALTH TO POWER
There are two central facts about China today. The first is that the country has just experienced a period of economic growth the likes of which the world had never before seen. The second is that it is ruled, increasingly dictatorially, by an unelected communist party that puts people in prison for their convictions and limits all forms of free expression and association. Under Xi Jinping, there are abundant signs that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to roll back even the limited freedoms that people took for themselves during the reform era of Deng Xiaoping. There are also indications that the party wants to bring private enterprise to heel, by intervening more directly in how businesses are run.

Behind these policies lies a growing insistence that China’s model of development is superior to the West’s. In a 2017 speech, Xi claimed that Beijing is “blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization” and “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” According to the CCP, Western talk about democracy is simply a pretext for robbing poorer countries of their sovereignty and economic potential. Just as China has needed dictatorship to achieve extreme economic growth, the thinking goes, other countries may need it, too. Although such convictions have been slow to find acolytes abroad, many Chinese have bought into the party’s version of truth, believing with Xi that thanks to the party’s leadership, “the Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East.”
Such views are the product of both the unprecedented improvement in living standards in China and an increase in Chinese nationalism. The CCP issues relentless propaganda about the greatness and righteousness of China, and the Chinese people, understandably proud of what they have achieved, embrace it enthusiastically. The party also claims that the outside world, especially the United States, is out to undo China’s progress, or at least prevent its further rise—just as Soviet propaganda used to do.

Making this nationalism even more sinister is the particular view of history endorsed by the Chinese leadership, which sees the history of China from the mid-nineteenth century to the Communists’ coming to power in 1949 as an endless series of humiliations at the hands of foreign powers. While there is some truth to this version of events, the CCP also makes the frightening claim that the party itself is the only thing standing between the Chinese and further exploitation. Since it would be untenable for the party to argue that the country needs dictatorship because the Chinese are singularly unsuited to governing themselves, it must claim that the centralization of power in the party’s hands is necessary for protecting against abuse by foreigners. But such extreme centralization of power could have extreme consequences. As Kennan correctly observed about the Soviet Union, “if . . . anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.”

Another troubling aspect of nationalism in China today is that the country is a de facto empire that tries to behave as if it were a nation-state. More than 40 percent of China’s territory—Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang—was originally populated by people who do not see themselves as Chinese. Although the Chinese government grants special rights to these “minority nationalities,” their homelands have been subsumed into a new concept of a Chinese nation and have gradually been taken over by the 98 percent of the population who are ethnically Chinese (or Han, as the government prefers to call them). Those who resist end up in prison camps, just as did those who argued for real self-government within the Soviet empire.

Externally, the Chinese government sustains the world’s worst dystopia, next door in North Korea, and routinely menaces its neighbors, including the democratic government in Taiwan, which Beijing views as a breakaway province. Much of this is not to China’s advantage politically or diplomatically. Its militarization of faraway islets in the South China
Sea, its contest with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and its attempts at punishing South Korea over the acquisition of advanced missile defenses from the United States have all backfired: East Asia is much warier of Chinese aims today than it was a decade ago. (The percentage of South Koreans, for example, who viewed China’s rise favorably fell from 66 percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2017, according to the Pew Research Center.) Despite this dip in China’s popularity, people across the region overwhelmingly believe that China will be the predominant regional power in the future and that they had better get ready.

This assumption is based primarily on China’s spectacular economic growth. Today, China’s economic power relative to the United States’ exceeds what the Soviet Union’s relative power was by a factor of two or three. Although that growth has now slowed, those who believe that China will soon go the way of Japan and fall into economic stagnation are almost certainly wrong. Even if foreign tariffs on Chinese goods stayed high, China has enough of an untapped domestic market to fuel the country’s economic rise for years to come. And the rest of Asia, which is a much larger and more economically dynamic region than Western Europe was at the beginning of the Cold War, fears China enough to refrain from walling it off with tariffs.

It is in military and strategic terms that the competition between the United States and China is hardest to gauge. The United States today has tremendous military advantages over China: more than 20 times as many nuclear warheads, a far superior air force, and defense budgets that run at least three times as high as China’s. It also has allies (Japan and South Korea) and prospective allies (India and Vietnam) in China’s neighborhood that boast substantial military capabilities of their own. China has no equivalent in the Western Hemisphere.

And yet within the last decade, the balance of power in East Asia has shifted perceptibly in China’s favor. Today, the country has enough ground-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, and ships to plausibly contend that it has achieved military superiority in its immediate backyard. The Chinese missile force presents such a challenge to U.S. air bases and aircraft carriers in the Pacific that Washington can no longer claim supremacy in the region. The problem will only get worse, as China’s naval capabilities are set to grow massively within the next few years, and its military technologies—especially its lasers, drones, cyber-operations,
Odd Arne Westad

and capabilities in outer space—are fast catching up to those of the United States. Even though the United States currently enjoys far greater military superiority over China than it did over the Soviet Union, Beijing has the potential to catch up much more quickly and comprehensively than Moscow ever could. Overall, China is more of a match for the United States than the Soviet Union was when Kennan wrote down his thoughts.

PLUS ÇA CHANGE

The similarities between China today and the Soviet Union of old may seem striking—starting, of course, with communist rule. For almost 40 years, blinded by China’s market-led economic progress, the West had gotten used to downplaying the fact that the country was run by a communist dictatorship. In spite of occasional reminders of Chinese leaders’ ruthlessness, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Western consensus held that China was liberalizing and becoming more pluralistic. Today, such predictions look foolish: the CCP is strengthening its rule and intends to remain in power forever. “The great new project of Party building . . . is just getting into full swing,” Xi announced in 2017. He added, “We must work harder to uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee. . . . The Party remains always the backbone of the nation.”

Another similarity is that just as the Soviet Union sought predominance in Europe, China is seeking it in East Asia, a region that is as important to the United States today as Europe was at the beginning of the Cold War. The methods China is using are similar—political and military extortion, divide-and-rule tactics—and its capabilities are in fact greater. Unless the United States acts to countervail it, China is likely to become the undisputed master of East Asia, from Japan to Indonesia, by the late 2020s.

Like Soviet leaders, Chinese ones view the United States as the enemy. They are careful and courteous in public, and often declare their adherence to international norms, but in the party’s internal communications, the line is always that the United States is planning to undermine China’s rise through external aggression and internal subversion. “So long as we persist in CCP leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics,” went one 2013 communiqué, “the position of Western anti-China forces to pressure for urgent reform won’t change, and they’ll continue to point the spearhead of Westernizing, splitting, and ‘Color Revolutions’ at China.” Such anti-Americanism bears a
striking resemblance to the type Stalin promoted in the late 1940s, including open appeals to nationalism. In 1949, the Soviet-led Cominform proclaimed that the West had “as its main aim the forcible establishment of Anglo-American world domination, the enslavement of foreign countries and peoples, the destruction of democracy and the unleashing of a new war.” The Americans, the CCP leadership tells its followers, hate us because we are Chinese. They are out to rule the world, and only the Communist Party stands in their way.

NOW AND THEN
But China is not the Soviet Union. For one thing, Soviet ideology was inherently opposed to any long-term coexistence with the United States. From Lenin onward, Soviet leaders saw the world in zero-sum terms: bourgeois democracy and capitalism had to lose for communism to win. There could be alliances of convenience and even periods of détente, but in the end, their form of communism would have to be victorious everywhere for the Soviet Union to be safe. The CCP does not share such beliefs. It is nationalist rather than internationalist in outlook. The party sees Washington as an obstacle to its goals of preserving its own rule and gaining regional dominance, but it does not believe that the United States or its system of government has to be defeated in order to achieve these aims.

Moreover, Chinese society is more similar to American society than Soviet society ever was. In the Soviet Union, citizens generally accepted and conformed to socialist economic policies. Chinese, by contrast, appear to be interested above all in getting ahead in their competitive, market-oriented society. For the vast majority of them, communism is simply a name for the ruling party rather than an ideal to seek. True, some sympathize with Xi’s efforts to centralize power, believing that China needs strong leadership after the individualism of the 1990s and early years of this century went too far. But nobody, including Xi himself, wants to bring back the bad old days before the reform and opening began. For all his Maoist rhetoric, Xi, both in thought and practice, is much further removed from Mao Zedong than even the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev was from Lenin.

What’s more, the Chinese have enjoyed a remarkably peaceful few decades. In 1947, the Russians had just emerged from 30-plus years of continuous war and revolution. In Kennan’s words, they were “physically and spiritually tired.” The Chinese have had the opposite experience:
some two-thirds of the population have known nothing but peace and progress. The country’s last foreign military intervention, in Vietnam, ended 30 years ago, and its last major conflict, the Korean War, ended almost 70 years ago. On the one hand, the past few decades of success have demonstrated the value of peace, making people wary of risking it all in war. On the other hand, the lack of near-term memories of war has led to a lot of loose talk about war among people who have never experienced it. These days, it is increasingly common to hear Chinese, especially the young, espousing the idea that their country may have to fight a war in order to avoid getting hemmed in by the United States. Xi and his group are not natural risk-takers. But in a crisis, the Chinese are more likely to resemble the Germans in 1914 than the Russians after World War II—excitable, rather than exhausted.

The global balance of power has also changed since Kennan’s time. Today, the world is becoming not more bipolar but more multipolar. This process is gradual, but there is little doubt that the trend is real. Unlike in the Cold War, greater conflict between the two biggest powers today will not lead to bipolarity; rather, it will make it easier for others to catch up, since there are no ideological compulsions, and economic advantage counts for so much more. The more the United States and China beat each other up, the more room for maneuver other powers will have. The result may be a world of regional hegemons, and sooner rather than later.

The U.S. domestic situation also looks very different from the way it did at the beginning of the Cold War. There were divisions among voters and conflicts between parts of the government back then, but there was nothing compared to the polarization and gridlock that characterize American politics today. Now, the United States seems to have lost its way at home and abroad. Under the Trump administration, the country’s overall standing in the world has never been lower, and even close allies no longer view Washington as a reliable partner. Since well before the presidency of Donald Trump, U.S. foreign policy elites have been lamenting the decline of any consensus on foreign affairs, but they have proved incapable of restoring it. Now, the rest of the world questions the United States’ potential for leadership on issues great and small, issues on which American guidance would have been considered indispensable in the past.
The U.S. economy is also intertwined with the Chinese economy in ways that would have been unimaginable with the Soviet economy. As Kennan knew well, economically speaking, the Soviets did not need to be contained; they contained themselves by refusing to join the world economy. China is very different, since about one-third of its GDP growth can be traced to exports, and the United States is its largest trading partner. Attempting to disentangle the United States’ economy from China’s through political means, such as travel restrictions, technology bans, and trade barriers, will not work, unless a de facto state of war makes economic interaction impossible. In the short run, tariffs could create a more level playing field, but in the long run, they may end up advantaging China by making it more self-reliant, to say nothing of the damage they would inflict on American prestige. And so the rivalry with China will have to be managed within the context of continued economic interdependence.

Finally, China’s leaders have some international cards to play that the Soviets never held. Compared with the class-based politics Moscow was peddling during the Cold War, China’s appeals for global unity on such issues as climate change, trade, and inequality could find far greater traction abroad. That would be ironic, given China's pollution, protectionism, and economic disparities. But because the United States has failed to take the lead on any of these issues, China's communist government may be able to convince foreigners that authoritarian governments handle such problems better than democracies do.

FOCUSING THE AMERICAN MIND
The sources of Chinese conduct, along with the current global role of the United States, point to a rivalry of a different kind than the one Kennan saw coming in 1946 and 1947. The risk of immediate war is lower, and the odds of limited cooperation are higher. But the danger that nationalism will fuel ever-widening circles of conflict is probably greater, and China’s determination to hack away at the United States’ position in Asia is more tenacious than anything Stalin ever attempted in Europe. If the United States wants to compete, it must prepare for a long campaign for influence that will test its own ability for strategic prioritizing and long-term planning. That is especially true given that fast-moving economic and technological changes will make a traditional containment policy impossible—information travels so much more easily than before, especially to a country like China, which does not intend to cut itself off from the world.
Odd Arne Westad

Even though the pattern of conflict between the United States and China will look very different from the Cold War, that doesn’t mean that Kennan’s advice is irrelevant. For one thing, just as he envisioned continued U.S. involvement in Europe, the United States today needs to preserve and build deep relationships with Asian countries that are fearful of China’s rising aggression. To counter the Soviet threat, Washington rolled out the Marshall Plan (which was partly Kennan’s brainchild) in 1948 and created NATO (of which Kennan was at least partly skeptical) the following year. Today, likewise, U.S. alliances in Asia must have not only a security dimension but also an economic dimension. Indeed, the economic aspects are probably even more important today than they were 70 years ago, given that China is primarily an economic power. The removal of U.S. support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership was therefore much as if the Americans, having just invented NATO, suddenly decided to withdraw from it. The Trump administration’s decision may have made domestic political sense, but in terms of foreign policy, it was a disaster, since it allowed China to claim that the United States was an unreliable partner in Asia.

Kennan also recognized that the United States would be competing with the Soviet Union for decades to come, and so U.S. statecraft would have to rely on negotiations and compromises as much as on military preparedness and intelligence operations. Kennan’s fellow policymakers learned this lesson only gradually, but there is little doubt that the process of developing a mutual understanding contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War. U.S. and Soviet officials had enough contact to make the best of a bad situation and stave off war long enough for the Soviets to change their approach to the United States and to international affairs in general.

China is even more likely to change its attitude than the Soviet Union was. The current struggle is not a clash of civilizations—or, even worse, of races, as Skinner suggested in April, when she pointed out that China is a “competitor that is not Caucasian.” Rather, it is a political conflict between great powers. A substantial minority of Chinese resent their current leaders’ power play. They want a freer and more equitable China, at peace with its neighbors and with the United States. The more isolated China becomes, the less of a voice such people will have, as their views drown in an ocean of nationalist fury. As Kennan stressed in the Soviet case, “demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.”
The United States also needs to help create a more benign environment beyond Asia. At a time when China is continuing its rise, it makes no sense to leave Russia as a dissatisfied scavenger on the periphery of the international system. Washington should try to bring Moscow into a more cooperative relationship with the West by opening up more opportunities for partnership and helping settle the conflict in eastern Ukraine. If Washington refuses to do that, then the strategic nightmare that haunted U.S. officials during the Cold War yet never fully materialized may actually come true: a real Sino-Russian alliance. Today, the combination of Russia’s resources and China’s population could power a far greater challenge to the West than what was attempted 70 years ago. As Kennan noted in 1954, the only real danger to Americans would come through “the association of the dominant portion of the physical resources of Europe and Asia with a political power hostile to [the United States].”

One of Kennan’s greatest insights, however, had nothing to do with foreign affairs; it had to do with American politics. He warned in his “X” article that “exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration” within the United States were the biggest danger the country faced. Kennan also warned against complacency about funding for common purposes. Like 70 years ago, to compete today, the United States needs to spend more money, which necessarily means higher contributions from wealthy Americans and corporations, in order to provide top-quality skills training, world-class infrastructure, and cutting-edge research and development. Competing with China cannot be done on the cheap. Ultimately, Kennan argued, American power depended on the United States’ ability to “create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.”

Although one might phrase it differently, the challenge is exactly the same today. Will the competition with China focus, to use one of Kennan’s favored phrases, “the American mind” to the point that the United States abandons domestic discord in favor of consensus? If some unifying factor does not intervene, the decline in the United States’ ability to act purposefully will, sooner than most people imagine, mean not just a multipolar world but an unruly world—one in which fear, hatred, and ambition hold everyone hostage to the basest instincts of the human imagination.

The Sources of Chinese Conduct
Competition Without Catastrophe
How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan

The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is over what comes next.

Like many debates throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy, this one has elements of both productive innovation and destructive demagoguery. Most observers can agree that, as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy put it in 2018, “strategic competition” should animate the United States’ approach to Beijing going forward. But foreign policy frameworks beginning with the word “strategic” often raise more questions than they answer. “Strategic patience” reflects uncertainty about what to do and when. “Strategic ambiguity” reflects uncertainty about what to signal. And in this case, “strategic competition” reflects uncertainty about what that competition is over and what it means to win.

The rapid coalescence of a new consensus has left these essential questions about U.S.-Chinese competition unanswered. What, exactly, is the United States competing for? And what might a plausible desired outcome of this competition look like? A failure to connect competitive...
Competition Without Catastrophe

means to clear ends will allow U.S. policy to drift toward competition for
competition’s sake and then fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation.

U.S. policymakers and analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded
some of the more optimistic assumptions that underpinned the four-
decade-long strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement with
China (which one of us, Kurt Campbell, detailed in these pages last
year, writing with Ely Ratner). But in the rush to embrace competition,
policymakers may be substituting a new variety of wishful thinking for
the old. The basic mistake of engagement was to assume that it could
bring about fundamental changes to China’s political system, economy,
and foreign policy. Washington risks making a similar mistake today, by
assuming that competition can succeed in transforming China where
engagement failed—this time forcing capitulation or even collapse.

Despite the many divides between the two countries, each will need
to be prepared to live with the other as a major power. The starting point
for the right U.S. approach must be humility about the capacity of deci-
sions made in Washington to determine the direction of long-term de-
velopments in Beijing. Rather than relying on assumptions about China’s
trajectory, American strategy should be durable whatever the future
brings for the Chinese system. It should seek to achieve not a definitive
end state akin to the Cold War’s ultimate conclusion but a steady state of
clear-eyed coexistence on terms favorable to U.S. interests and values.

Such coexistence would involve elements of competition and coop-
eration, with the United States’ competitive efforts geared toward se-
curing those favorable terms. This might mean considerable friction
in the near term as U.S. policy moves beyond engagement—whereas
in the past, the avoidance of friction, in the service of positive ties,
was an objective unto itself. Going forward, China policy must be
about more than the kind of relationship the United States wants to
have; it must also be about the kinds of interests the United States
wants to secure. The steady state Washington should pursue is rightly
about both: a set of conditions necessary for preventing a dangerous
escalatory spiral, even as competition continues.

U.S. policymakers should not dismiss this objective as out of reach.
It is true, of course, that China will have a say in whether this outcome
is possible. Vigilance will thus need to remain a watchword in U.S.-
Chinese relations in the period ahead. Although coexistence offers
the best chance to protect U.S. interests and prevent inevitable ten-
sion from turning into outright confrontation, it does not mean the end
Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan

of competition or surrender on issues of fundamental importance. Instead, coexistence means accepting competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.

COLD WAR LESSONS, NOT COLD WAR LOGIC
Given the current hazy discourse on competition, there is an understandable temptation to reach back to the only great-power competition Americans remember to make sense of the present one: the Cold War. The analogy has intuitive appeal. Like the Soviet Union, China is a continent-sized competitor with a repressive political system and big ambitions. The challenge it poses is global and lasting, and meeting that challenge will require the kind of domestic mobilization that the United States pursued in the 1950s and 1960s.

But the analogy is ill fitting. China today is a peer competitor that is more formidable economically, more sophisticated diplomatically, and more flexible ideologically than the Soviet Union ever was. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the world and intertwined with the U.S. economy. The Cold War truly was an existential struggle. The U.S. strategy of containment was built on the prediction that the Soviet Union would one day crumble under its own weight—that it contained “the seeds of its own decay,” as George Kennan, the diplomat who first laid out the strategy, declared with conviction.

No such prediction holds today; it would be misguided to build a neo-containment policy on the premise that the current Chinese state will eventually collapse, or with that as the objective. Despite China’s many demographic, economic, and environmental challenges, the Chinese Communist Party has displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to circumstances, often brutally so. Its fusion of mass surveillance and artificial intelligence, meanwhile, is enabling a more effective digital authoritarianism—one that makes the collective action necessary for reform or revolution hard to contemplate, let alone organize. China may well encounter serious internal problems, but an expectation of collapse cannot form the basis of a prudent strategy. Even if the state does collapse, it is likely to be the result of internal dynamics rather than U.S. pressure.

The Cold War analogy at once exaggerates the existential threat posed by China and discounts the strengths Beijing brings to long-term competition with the United States. Although the risk of conflict in Asia’s hot spots is serious, it is by no means as high, nor is the threat
of nuclear escalation as great, as it was in Cold War Europe. The kind of nuclear brinkmanship that took place over Berlin and Cuba has no corollary in U.S.-Chinese ties. Nor has U.S.-Chinese competition plunged the world into proxy wars or created rival blocs of ideologically aligned states preparing for armed struggle.

Despite the diminished danger, however, China represents a far more challenging competitor. In the last century, no other U.S. adversary, including the Soviet Union, ever reached 60 percent of U.S. GDP. China passed that threshold in 2014; in purchasing-power terms, its GDP is already 25 percent greater than that of the United States. China is the emerging global leader in several economic sectors, and its economy is more diversified, flexible, and sophisticated than the Soviet Union’s ever was.

Beijing is also better at converting its country’s economic heft into strategic influence. Whereas the Soviet Union was hamstrung by a closed economy, China has embraced globalization to become the top trading partner for more than two-thirds of the world’s nations. The kinds of economic, people-to-people, and technological linkages that were lacking in the militarized U.S.-Soviet conflict define China’s relationship with the United States and the wider world. As a global economic actor, China is central to the prosperity of American allies and partners; its students and tourists flow through global universities and
cities; its factories are the forge for much of the world’s advanced technology. This thick web of ties makes it difficult to even start to determine which countries are aligned with the United States and which are aligned with China. Ecuador and Ethiopia might look to Beijing for investment or for surveillance technologies, but they hardly see these purchases as part of a conscious turn away from the United States.

Even as China emerges as a more formidable competitor than the Soviet Union, it has also become an essential U.S. partner. Global problems that are difficult enough to solve even when the United States and China work together will be impossible to solve if they fail to do so—climate change foremost among them, given that the United States and China are the two biggest polluters. A host of other transnational challenges—economic crises, nuclear proliferation, global pandemics—also demand some degree of joint effort. This imperative for cooperation has little parallel in the Cold War.

While the notion of a new Cold War has brought calls for an updated version of containment, resistance to such thinking has come from advocates of an accommodative “grand bargain” with China. Such a bargain would go well beyond the terms of U.S.-Soviet détente: in this scenario, the United States would effectively concede to China a sphere of influence in Asia. Proponents defend this concession as necessary given the United States’ domestic headwinds and relative decline. This position is sold as realistic, but it is no more tenable than containment. Ceding the world’s most dynamic region to China would do long-term harm to American workers and businesses. It would damage American allies and values by turning sovereign partners into bargaining chips. A grand bargain would also require stark and permanent U.S. concessions, such as the abrogation of U.S. alliances or even of the right to operate in the western Pacific, for speculative promises. Not only are these costs unacceptable; a grand bargain would also be unenforceable. A rising China would likely violate the agreement when its preferences and power changed.

Advocates of neo-containment tend to see any call for managed coexistence as an argument for a version of the grand bargain; advocates of a grand bargain tend to see any suggestion of sustained com-
petition as a case for a version of containment. That divide obscures a course between these extremes—one that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U.S.-Chinese condominium.

Instead, the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with Beijing in four key competitive domains—military, economic, political, and global governance—thereby securing U.S. interests without triggering the kind of threat perceptions that characterized the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Washington should heed the lessons of the Cold War while rejecting the idea that its logic still applies.

TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DETERRENCE

In contrast to the military competition of the Cold War, which was a truly global struggle, the dangers for Washington and Beijing are likely to be confined to the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the region features at least four potential hot spots: the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula. Neither side wishes for conflict, but tensions are rising as both invest in offensive capabilities, boost their military presence in the region, and operate in ever-closer proximity. Washington fears that China is trying to push U.S. forces out of the western Pacific, and Beijing fears that the United States is trying to hem it in. Given China’s harassment of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels, minor incidents risk escalating into major military confrontations; Admiral Wu Shengli, the former naval commander of the People’s Liberation Army, has warned that any such incident “could spark war.”

But coexistence in the Indo-Pacific by both militaries should not be dismissed as impossible. The United States must accept that military primacy will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners. Beijing will have to accept that the United States will remain a resident power in the region, with a major military presence, naval operations in its major waterways, and a network of alliances and partnerships.

Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to present the most significant challenges to this overall approach. A military provocation or misunderstanding in either case could easily trigger a larger conflagration, with devastating consequences, and this risk must increasingly animate the thinking of senior leaders in both Washington and Beijing.

On Taiwan, a tacit commitment not to unilaterally alter the status quo is perhaps the best that can be hoped for given the historical com-
plexities involved. Yet Taiwan is not only a potential flash point; it is also the greatest unclaimed success in the history of U.S.-Chinese relations. The island has grown, prospered, and democratized in the ambiguous space between the United States and China as a result of the flexible and nuanced approach generally adopted by both sides. In this way, the diplomacy surrounding Taiwan could serve as a model for the increasingly challenging diplomacy between Washington and Beijing on a variety of other issues, which are similarly likely to include intense engagement, mutual vigilance and a degree of distrust, and a measure of patience and necessary restraint. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, Beijing’s understanding that threats to freedom of navigation could have devastating consequences for China’s own economy might help—when combined with U.S. deterrence—modulate its more nationalist sentiments.

To achieve such coexistence, Washington will need to enhance both U.S.-Chinese crisis management and its own capacity for deterrence. Even as Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union worked concertedly to reduce the risk that an accidental collision would escalate to nuclear war; they set up military hot lines, established codes of conduct, and signed arms control agreements. The United States and China lack similar instruments to manage crises at a time when new domains of potential conflict, such as space and cyberspace, have increased the risk of escalation.

In every military domain, the two countries need agreements that are at least as formal and detailed as the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, a 1972 deal that established a set of specific rules aimed at avoiding maritime misunderstandings. The United States and China also need more communication channels and mechanisms to avoid conflict—especially in the South China Sea—to allow each side to quickly clarify the other’s intentions during an incident. The bilateral military relationship should no longer be held hostage to political disagreements, and senior military officials on both sides should engage in more frequent and substantive discussions to build personalities as well as understandings of each side’s operations. Historically, progress on some of these efforts, especially crisis communication, has proved difficult: Chinese leaders fear that crisis communication could embolden the United States to act with impunity and would require devolving too much authority to senior military officers in the field. But these worries may be easing, given China’s growing power and military reforms.
Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan

Effective U.S. strategy in this domain requires not just reducing the risk of unintentional conflict but also deterring intentional conflict. Beijing cannot be allowed to use the threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in territorial disputes. Yet managing this risk does not require U.S. military primacy within the region. As the former Trump administration defense official Elbridge Colby has argued, “deterrence without dominance—even against a very great and fearsome opponent—is possible.”

To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reorient its investments away from expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and toward cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums. This calls for taking a page from Beijing’s own playbook. Just as China has relied on relatively cheap antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, the United States should embrace long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons. All these weapons could protect U.S. and allied interests, even as they dent China’s confidence that its offensive operations will succeed and reduce the risk of collision and miscalculation. The United States should also diversify some of its military presence toward Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making use of access agreements rather than permanent basing when necessary. This would place some U.S. forces beyond China’s precision-strike complex, preserving their ability to promptly address crises. It would also preposition them to address a wide range of contingencies beyond conflicts involving China, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy missions.

ESTABLISHING RECIPROCITY

Unlike the Soviet Union, which focused its resources on military power, China views geoeconomics as the primary arena of competition. With an eye toward the future, it has invested heavily in emerging industries and technologies, including artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced manufacturing, and biotechnology. China seeks dominance in these fields in part by denying Western companies reciprocal treatment. The United States granted China permanent normal trade relations, supported its entry into the World Trade Organization, and has generally maintained one of the world’s most open markets. But through a combination of industrial policy, protectionism, and outright theft, China
has put in place a range of formal and informal barriers to its markets and has exploited American openness.

This structural imbalance has eroded support for stable U.S.-Chinese economic ties, and the relationship faces a heightened risk of rupture even if Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump are able to reach a near-term trade truce. Many in the American business community are no longer willing to tolerate China’s unfair practices, which include employing state hackers to steal intellectual property, forcing foreign companies to localize their operations and engage in joint ventures, subsidizing state champions, and otherwise discriminating against foreign companies.

Alleviating these growing frictions while protecting American workers and innovation will require making China’s full access to major markets around the world contingent on its willingness to adopt economic reforms at home. Washington, for its part, will have to invest in the core sources of American economic strength, build a united front of like-minded partners to help establish reciprocity, and safeguard its technological leadership while avoiding self-inflicted wounds.

The most decisive factor in the economic competition with China is U.S. domestic policy. The notion of a new “Sputnik moment”—one that galvanizes public research as powerfully as seeing the Soviet Union launch the world’s first satellite did—may be overstating the point, but government does have a role to play in advancing American economic and technological leadership. Yet the United States has turned away from precisely the kinds of ambitious public investments it made during that period—such as the Interstate Highway System championed by President Dwight Eisenhower and the basic research initiatives pushed by the scientist Vannevar Bush—even as it faces a more challenging economic competitor. Washington must dramatically increase funds for basic science research and invest in clean energy, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and computing power. At the same time, the federal government should scale up its investments in education at all levels and in infrastructure, and it should adopt immigration policies that continue to enhance the United States’ demographic and skills advantage. Calling for a tougher line on China while starving public investments is self-defeating; describing these investments as “socialist,” given the competition, is especially ironic. Indeed, such strange ideological bedfellows as Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, are making a convincing case for a new U.S. industrial policy.
On top of this domestic foundation, Washington should work with like-minded nations to define a new set of standards on issues that the World Trade Organization does not currently address, from state-owned enterprises to indigenous innovation policies to digital trade. Ideally, these standards would connect Asia and Europe. To this end, the United States should consider starting a rules-setting initiative of market democracies layered over the WTO system, which would fill these gaps. The logic is straightforward. If China hopes to enjoy equal access to this new economic community, its own economic and regulatory frameworks must meet the same standards. The combined gravitational pull of this community would present China with a choice: either curb its free-riding and start complying with trade rules, or accept less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy. If Beijing chooses to hold to the line that the necessary reforms amount to economic regime change, it can certainly do so, but the world would be well within its rights to offer China reciprocal treatment. In some cases, Washington may still need to impose reciprocal measures on China unilaterally, by treating its exports and investments the same way Beijing handles U.S. exports and investments. These efforts will be challenging and costly, which is precisely why the Trump administration’s decision to pick trade fights with U.S. allies rather than rally them to a common position vis-à-vis China is such a waste of American leverage.

The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S. competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading partner for most.
In this respect, the Trump administration's loud and largely unilateral campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk undermining U.S. innovation.

PRO-DEMOCRACY, NOT ANTI-CHINA

U.S.-Chinese economic and technological competition suggests an emerging contest of models. But unlike the Cold War, with its sharp ideological divide between two rival blocs, the lines of demarcation are fuzzier here. Although neither Washington nor Beijing is engaging in the kind of proselytizing characteristic of the Cold War, China may ultimately present a stronger ideological challenge than the Soviet Union did, even if it does not explicitly seek to export its system. If the international order is a reflection of its most powerful states, then China’s rise to superpower status will exert a pull toward autocracy. China’s fusion of authoritarian capitalism and digital surveillance may prove more durable and attractive than Marxism, and its support for autocrats and democratic backsliders will challenge American values and provide China cover for its own egregious practices, including the detention of more than one million ethnic Uighurs in northwestern China. Some may question whether the erosion of democratic governance across the world matters for U.S. interests; it does. Democratic governments are more likely to align with American values, pursue good governance, treat their people well, and respect other open societies, and all of this tends to make them more trustworthy and transparent and, in turn, better economic and security partners.

Washington can best establish favorable terms of coexistence with China in the political realm by focusing on advancing the appeal of
these values for their own sake, not to score points in the context of U.S.-Chinese competition. As China’s presence around the world grows, the United States should avoid a tendency that was all too common during the Cold War: to see third countries only in terms of their relationship to a rival government. Some of the Trump administration’s policies—such as invoking the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and delivering an address on Africa that is largely about countering China—echo this old approach. A tack that intentionally engages states on their own terms would do more to advance American interests and values than knee-jerk responses to Chinese initiatives that leave states feeling that Washington cares about them only as battlegrounds in its competition with Beijing.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers the most obvious opportunity to apply this principle in practice. Rather than fight China at every turn—on every port, bridge, and rail line—the United States and its partners should make their own affirmative pitch to countries about the kinds of high-quality, high-standard investments that will best serve progress. Supporting investments not because they are anti-Chinese but because they are pro-growth, pro-sustainability, and pro-freedom will be much more effective over the long term—especially because China’s state-led investments have provoked a degree of backlash in countries over cost overruns, no-bid contracts, corruption, environmental degradation, and poor working conditions.

In this light, the best defense of democracy is to stress the values that are essential to good governance, especially transparency and accountability, and to support civil society, independent media, and the free flow of information. Together, these steps could lower the risk of democratic backsliding, improve lives in the developing world, and reduce Chinese influence. This course of action will require an injection of multilateral funding from the United States and its allies and partners that can give countries genuine alternatives. But it will require something more fundamental, too: the United States needs to have greater confidence in the belief that investing in human capital and good governance will work out better over the long run than China’s extractive approach.

Focusing on principles rather than scorekeeping will also be essential for setting norms for new technologies that raise hard questions about human ethics. From artificial intelligence to biotechnology, autonomous weapons to gene-edited humans, there will be a crucial struggle in the years ahead to define appropriate conduct and then pressure laggards to
get in line. Washington should start shaping the parameters of these debates without further delay. Finally, coexistence with China does not, and cannot, preclude the United States from speaking out against China’s egregious and inhumane treatment of its own citizens and the arbitrary detention of foreign nongovernmental organization workers. The West’s relative silence on Beijing’s internment of Uighurs has left a moral stain, and so the United States and its partners should mobilize international pressure to demand neutral third-party access to those who are detained and the sanctioning of the individuals and companies that are complicit in the detention. China may well threaten that such pressure will destabilize ties. Yet Washington should make speaking out on human rights abuses a predictable and routine part of the relationship.

SEQUENCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
It is often taken as an article of faith that as the U.S.-Chinese relationship becomes more competitive, the space for cooperation will shrink, if not disappear. But even as adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union found ways to cooperate on a number of issues, including space exploration, contagious diseases, the environment, and the global commons. The need for cooperation between Washington and Beijing is far more acute, given the nature of contemporary challenges. Leaders in both countries should consider cooperation on such transnational challenges not as a concession by one party but as an essential need for both.

To get the balance between cooperation and competition right, Washington has to consider the sequencing of each. The United States has historically sought to cooperate first and compete second with China. Beijing, meanwhile, has become quite comfortable competing first and cooperating second, linking—either explicitly or implicitly—offers of cooperation to U.S. concessions in areas of strategic interest.

Going forward, Washington should avoid becoming an eager suitor on transnational challenges. Eagerness can actually limit the scope for cooperation by making it a bargaining chip. Although it may seem counterintuitive, competition is likely essential to effective cooperation with Beijing. In the zero-sum strategic mindset of many Chinese officials, perceptions of U.S. power and resolve matter enormously, and the Chinese bureaucracy has long focused on shifts in both. Given this sensitivity, it can be as important for Washington to demonstrate an ability to stand firm, and even to impose costs, as it is for it to speak
earnestly about finding common cause. The best approach, then, will be to lead with competition, follow with offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate any linkages between Chinese assistance on global challenges and concessions on U.S. interests.

**BEYOND THE BILATERAL**

There is one other lesson of the Cold War that U.S. policymakers should keep top of mind: that one of the United States’ greatest strengths in its competition with China has less to do with the two countries than with everyone else. The combined weight of U.S. allies and partners can shape China’s choices across all domains—but only if Washington deepens all those relationships and works to tie them together. Although much of the discussion on U.S.-Chinese competition focuses on its bilateral dimension, the United States will ultimately need to embed its China strategy in a dense network of relationships and institutions in Asia and the rest of the world.

This is a lesson that the Trump administration would do well to remember. Instead of harnessing these enduring advantages, it has alienated many of the United States’ traditional friends—with tariffs, demands of payment for military bases, and much more—and abandoned or undermined key institutions and agreements. Many international organizations, from the UN and the World Bank to the World Trade Organization, are institutions that the United States helped design and lead and that have established widely accepted rules of the road on such issues as freedom of navigation, transparency, dispute resolution, and trade. Retreating from these institutions provides short-term leeway and flexibility at the cost of long-term U.S. influence and allows Beijing to reshape norms and expand its own influence within those organizations.

The United States needs to get back to seeing alliances as assets to be invested in rather than costs to be cut. In the absence of any meaningful capacity to build its own network of capable allies, Beijing would like nothing more than for the United States to squander this long-term advantage. Establishing clear-eyed coexistence with China will be challenging under any conditions, but it will be virtually impossible without help. If the United States is to strengthen deterrence, establish a fairer and more reciprocal trading system, defend universal values, and solve global challenges, it simply cannot go it alone. It is remarkable that it must be said, but so it must: to be effective, any strategy of the United States must start with its allies.
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The Old World and the Middle Kingdom

Europe Wakes Up to China’s Rise

Julianne Smith and Torrey Taussig

Europe is beginning to face up to the challenges posed by a rising China. From the political debates roiling European capitals over the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s involvement in building 5G mobile networks to the tense EU-China summit earlier this year, recent events have shown that European leaders are growing uneasy in a relationship that until recently both sides saw as immensely beneficial. They worry about the political influence China has gained, especially over the EU’s smaller members, and its growing economic clout and technological prowess. They are starting, tentatively, to push back.

To better promote its interests, Europe should use its economic, political, and diplomatic power to level the economic playing field with China, guard against Chinese political influence, and defend democratic values at home. Yet two things stand in the way of such a strategy. First, Europe remains divided over how seriously to take the Chinese challenge. In contrast to the strategic shifts happening in Berlin, Paris, and the EU capital, in Brussels, the leaders of many smaller states still see only the economic benefits of deeper engagement with China. Second, Europe finds itself caught in the middle of a growing U.S.-Chinese rivalry. It cannot abandon its long-standing ties to the United States (even as it squabbles with the Trump administration over everything from tariffs to defense spending), but it also cannot afford to weaken a

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trade relationship with China worth well over $1 billion a day. Europe is walking a fine line by nominally resisting China’s predatory trade and investment practices but not issuing any meaningful threats. So far, playing it safe has failed to persuade China to change course.

Europe needs a new approach, one that acknowledges the gravity of the problems posed by China’s rise and outlines a distinctly European, rather than American, response. Europe and the United States should better coordinate their policies on China, but they will never agree on everything. Even without copying Washington’s every move, Europe can defend its economic and technological sovereignty and serve as a bulwark against China’s efforts to promote its values and system of government abroad. To do that, however, Europe will need to achieve two goals that has so often eluded it: unity and autonomy.

FROM OPPORTUNITY TO THREAT

Germany is well positioned to lead this effort. Few other European countries can match its economic ties with China. This grants Berlin a unique ability within the EU to push back against Beijing—a process that it has already begun. A decade ago, Germany was busy cozying up to China. In 2010, after unsuccessfully advocating an EU-wide China strategy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel returned to the bilateral relationship between Germany and China, aggressively seeking closer economic ties. In 2013, she fought EU plans to slap tariffs on China for selling solar panels below cost, fearing the effect on German businesses operating in China. In 2014, she elevated Germany’s relationship with China to “a comprehensive strategic partnership.” Although she did regularly raise human rights concerns with Chinese leaders, the trade relationship took precedence over most other issues.

Merkel’s efforts paid off. Germany became China’s leading trading partner in Europe and is now one of only three EU countries (along with Finland and Ireland) that run a trade surplus with China. Some 5,200 German companies operate in China, employing more than one million people. By 2017, four out of every ten cars sold by Volkswagen were going to China. That same year, China surpassed the United States as Germany’s biggest trading partner.

Germany still treasures its special relationship with China, but it has grown unhappy with Chinese behavior. In 2015, the Chinese government announced its state-led Made in China 2025 strategy, modeled on Germany’s Industrie 4.0 initiative, with the goal of making China the
global leader in high-tech manufacturing. The strategy prioritizes progress in areas such as 5G networks, robotics, aerospace, advanced railway equipment, and clean energy vehicles. It aims to replace foreign technology with Chinese-made alternatives, first in China’s domestic market and eventually abroad. In response, Germany and other European countries have started to limit Chinese investment in crucial industries.

China’s repressive political turn has also alarmed Germany. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power has shaken Germany’s confidence in China’s future political stability. The Chinese government is using technologies employing artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor its citizens’ every move and power a social credit system that will judge their trustworthiness. In the name of national security, the government has detained more than one million Muslim Uighurs in the western province of Xinjiang in “reeducation camps.” To many in Germany and across Europe, these developments raise troubling questions over what a Chinese-led world would look like.

German industry is growing concerned about Chinese technological progress. German business leaders who have long supported deeper economic ties with China are now apprehensive about China’s state-led quest for technological supremacy at the expense of German companies. In January, the Federation of German Industries released a widely cited report cautioning companies to reduce their dependence on the Chinese market. Then there is the long-standing issue of Chinese hackers stealing foreign industrial and technological secrets. In December, the heightened frequency of Chinese hacking led the German government’s cybersecurity agency to warn German companies about the growing risk of Chinese cyberespionage. That came on top of a 2017 case in which German intelligence agencies accused China of creating fake LinkedIn accounts to connect with more than 10,000 German citizens, including lawmakers and government officials, in order to gain information, recruit sources, and infiltrate the Bundestag and government ministries.

These grievances are having a mounting effect on German policy toward China. Merkel, who now refers to China as a “systemic competitor,” is pushing for a strong and united EU stance and has publicly...
criticized decisions that undercut EU unity on China, such as Italy’s official endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s massive global infrastructure-building scheme. She has also made clear that she values talks between the EU and China as much as direct German-Chinese ones. Earlier this year, she successfully proposed that the 2020 EU-China summit, to be hosted by Germany, include not only EU officials, as is the norm, but also national leaders from all the EU countries. That will make it harder for China to undermine EU unity by negotiating with individual countries.

Germany is not alone in its awakening. Europe’s two other biggest powers—France and the United Kingdom—along with Poland, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries, all maintain that cooperation with China on global challenges, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, serves Europe’s interests. But they also believe that China is undermining Western values, rules, and standards. During Xi’s recent visit to Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron declared an end to “European naïveté” on China. Macron also invited both Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, to join his meetings with Xi in order to present a united front. The message was clear: Europe will resist China’s attempts to divide it.
Many European countries are experiencing what one senior EU official described to one of us as “China fatigue,” after years of investments that were big on promises and short on follow-through. In 2009, a Chinese construction firm promised to build a new highway from Warsaw to Germany for a fraction of the cost of other bids in a project that was meant to showcase Chinese prowess and open up new deals in the EU. Two years later, the Polish government had to terminate the contract after the Chinese firm hit cash-flow problems and stopped work.

The Czech Republic has also grown disillusioned. In 2014, the Czech government proclaimed that it would serve as “China’s gateway to Europe.” At the time, the Chinese megacomp

any CEFC China Energy was promising to invest billions of dollars in the country. Czech President Milos Zeman named the company’s chair, Ye Jianming, as an honorary adviser, a move that vindicated critics who had argued that China’s investments were never solely economic—they were also about building political influence. CEFC then went on a shopping spree, snapping up stakes in everything from Czech football clubs and media groups to transportation companies and breweries. In 2018, after years of negligible progress on the investments, Ye was suddenly arrested in China on corruption charges. CEFC, along with its Czech acquisitions, was taken over by the Chinese state.

In response to such incidents, several European countries have tightened up their screening of Chinese investments. In 2018, the German government, citing national security, blocked a Chinese investor from buying Leifeld Metal, a leading German producer of metals for the automobile, space, and nuclear industries. It was the first time that the German government had vetoed a Chinese takeover. The move was followed by a new law giving the government the power to block a non-European investor from buying a ten percent or higher stake (down from 25 percent) in a German business. The law includes media companies, a sign that Germany is worried about Chinese information influence. A number of other European countries have adopted similar measures. In part as a result of more rigorous screening, as well as shifts in Chinese decision-making, Chinese foreign direct investment in the EU has fallen by 50 percent from its peak in 2016, according to a report by the Rhodium Group and the Mercator Institute for China Studies.

China’s BRI has drawn particular skepticism from EU policymakers, who see golden handcuffs behind Beijing’s promises of lavish spending. In some places, the handcuffs are already snapping shut. In 2016,
Greece and Hungary—both recipients of massive Chinese economic investment tied to the initiative—watered down language issued by the EU on Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. In 2017, Greece torpedoed an EU statement on Chinese human rights violations. Earlier this year, Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa, whose country has received significant Chinese investment, took a strong stand against tighter European screenings of Chinese investments. “We’ve now reached a situation where China essentially has veto power inside EU decision-making bodies,” one senior EU policymaker observed recently to one of us.

As some European countries have grown disenchanted with China’s behavior, they have started to push for a more coherent EU-wide strategy. A recent EU white paper on China labeled Beijing a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” and called on the EU to pursue a more reciprocal relationship with China and to strengthen its own industrial base. At this year’s annual EU-China summit, which took place after the white paper was published, the mood was more tense than in previous years. The Europeans came ready to extract significant commitments from their Chinese counterparts on trade and economic policies, and the Chinese delegation arrived weakened by the trade war with the United States. Both sides wanted to signal to Washington that they could make progress without resorting to President Donald Trump’s strong-arm tactics. The EU managed to win a number of concessions, including pledges to finalize a long-standing investment deal by 2020, improve market access for European companies, and limit forced technology transfers. The two sides also agreed to intensify their discussions on strengthening international rules on industrial subsidies in the World Trade Organization (WTO) that China is known to bend. Yet given China’s past unwillingness to carry out structural changes and the EU’s lack of enforcement measures, China is unlikely to keep its promises.

A HOUSE DIVIDED
The EU has come a long way on China, but internal differences remain. Some countries, including Greece, Hungary, and Portugal, continue to press for more economic investment from China and downplay the concerns of EU officials in Brussels. In a 2017 survey of public opinion in Greece, a majority of respondents listed the EU as the most
important foreign power to Greece, but when asked which ranked second, more respondents (53 percent) listed China than the United States (36 percent). At least in some corners of Europe, China’s strategy of making friends through economic engagement, cultural exchanges, and academic collaboration is working.

That success is reducing the EU’s leverage over China. For example, Brussels has been unable to craft a united response to U.S. demands that European countries ban Huawei from their 5G networks. The EU Commission has issued recommendations on the cybersecurity risks, but it remains up to each member state to determine its own security standards. Most are still struggling to formulate national policies on 5G. Germany and the United Kingdom are tightening the security requirements for their 5G providers, and France already has security standards that deter telecommunications operators from using Huawei equipment in their 5G plans. None, however, is likely to pursue Washington’s preferred approach of banning Huawei entirely, and an EU-wide policy is a long way off.

A similar problem is playing out when it comes to evaluating Chinese investments. Several EU members that depend heavily on Chinese investment oppose strict screening, and only 14 of the EU’s 28 members have national investment-screening measures in place. In April, the EU enacted a new framework for determining when investments threaten European interests. But member states still have the last word on specific investments, and the regulation is much less ambitious than those that the G-7 countries have already adopted.

In addition to tackling its internal divisions over China, the EU is struggling to determine whether and how to cooperate with the United States on China. In theory, it should be easy for the two powers to develop a common approach. Both worry about China’s lack of market access for Western companies, its encroaching political influence, and the debt burdens of BRI projects. Both doubt that China will become the “responsible stakeholder” that many China watchers envisioned a decade and a half ago.

Yet several obstacles stand in the way of transatlantic unity. Decoupling from the Chinese economy, Washington’s current strategy, is not an option for even the largest European countries. The same German
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industry report that called on companies to reduce their dependence on China also said that German industry “rejects targeted and politically forced economic de-coupling.” European governments and businesses may be troubled by China’s unfair trade practices and hacking, but they are unwilling to pursue a trade war to force China to change.

Another problem is that Europe does not trust the United States. By withdrawing from the Paris agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal, threatening to withdraw from the WTO, and slapping steel and aluminum tariffs on the EU, the Trump administration has damaged the United States’ credibility among its closest allies and made China a more important partner for Europe on environmental and security issues. As the United States’ relationship with Europe deteriorates, at least some European leaders see no choice but to jump on the Chinese bandwagon.

**EVER-CLOSER UNION**

Barring domestic setbacks, China’s economic, technological, and political power will continue to grow. But China is not preordained to write the rules of the new international order. Leading democracies across Asia, Europe, and North America still have overwhelming advantages when it comes to trade, intellectual property, economic heft, and political alliances. They can use those strengths to oppose the more divisive and negative aspects of China’s global influence.

For Europe, that will mean developing a more coherent and distinctly European strategy that capitalizes on the EU’s unique strengths. So far, Europe has gone to great pains to avoid confrontation with either the United States or China. That is understandable, but it has left the EU on the sidelines. Brussels does not need to adopt Washington’s hard-line approach to China, but neither should it accept all of China’s attempts to expand its economic and political influence in Europe.

Disunity on foreign policy is nothing new for Europe. On crises from the Balkan wars to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the EU has had to reconcile the different cultural, historical, and strategic perspectives of its member states. Consensus often seems elusive. But it’s not impossible. During the negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal, for example, a group of large member states managed to unite the EU around a single position. Similarly, with more impetus from the countries that have experienced firsthand the downsides of Chinese investment or Beijing’s forced technology transfers, the EU could
narrow the gaps between its members over China. Brussels should invite German industry representatives to brief EU officials on their knowledge of working inside China or ask Czech and Polish officials to share their experiences with Chinese investment.

More European autonomy, far from deepening transatlantic divisions, would bring much-needed balance to a spiraling confrontation between the United States and China. EU members have been calling for autonomy on defense for years, and nascent initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (which enables members to develop joint defense capabilities and invest in shared projects) and the European Defence Fund (which will provide support for joint research projects and shared military hardware), suggest that the EU may finally be moving in the right direction. France and Germany now need to work together to ensure that those initiatives meaningfully strengthen Europe’s defense capacity.

Even more important for its competition with China, Europe must boost its economic and technological sovereignty. That could mean more state investment in key industries, such as transportation and technology, as Germany’s economy minister, Peter Altmaier, has proposed. The EU could also amend its competition laws to allow governments to foster national and European champions that could compete with their counterparts in the United States and China. Some French and German policymakers have called for such an approach, especially after the European Commission rejected a proposed merger between a German rail subsidiary of Siemens and the French transport manufacturer Alstom in early 2019 despite increasing competition from Chinese rail providers. Although building European monopolies would be a bad idea, the EU should consider allowing mergers in industries at risk of being swamped by U.S. or Chinese rivals. Some analysts have suggested creating a cross-border European AI company modeled after Airbus, which was originally formed as a joint government initiative among France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany in the 1960s. To complement such policies, EU countries should do more to encourage entrepreneurs and develop training and academic pipelines to feed growing technology sectors.

Europe can also help set regulatory and ethical standards for the rest of the world. Many foreign companies are already moving to comply with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, even in their operations outside the EU, highlighting Europe’s ability to project its digital
values. The GDPR is only the first step in Europe’s technology leadership. In April, the European Commission released its first guidelines on the ethical development of AI. EU policymakers hope that they will give European technology companies a competitive edge and provide a distinctly European model for international companies to emulate.

A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY
An autonomous EU strategy need not preclude Europe from working closely with the United States on China. But first, the two sides will have to repair their deteriorating trade relationship and return to their 2018 joint pledge to work toward “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods.” Although Brussels and Washington are unlikely to strike a comprehensive free-trade agreement, they could pursue a more piecemeal process that could give them some smaller but much-needed victories, prevent a trade war, and demonstrate transatlantic unity. Resolving at least some of their trade disputes would allow Europe and the United States to turn to a more ambitious global agenda.

That agenda should involve joining with like-minded states to address China’s trade violations within the WTO. The United States already coordinates closely with the EU and Japan to counter China’s market distortions. All three should do more, particularly on protecting intellectual property, lowering nontariff barriers, and stopping cybertheft—all issues that Trump raised with Xi at the G-20 summit in December 2018.

Europe and the United States should also be developing alternatives to the BRI. For many countries, Chinese investment—even with its associated debt burdens—feels like the only option to address ailing or nonexistent infrastructure and build domestic industries. In many places across the European continent, such as Serbia, the EU has tried to offer alternatives. But the bureaucracy-laden and painfully slow aid on offer from Brussels is no match for cheap, unconditional Chinese loans.

The West needs better options. The EU’s Europe-Asia Connectivity Strategy, which was unveiled in late 2018 and aims to strengthen digital, transport, and energy links between Europe and Asia and promote development, could provide alternatives to the BRI. So could the United States’ BUILD Act, which Congress passed last year, creating a new development finance institution with a $60 billion budget to invest in developing countries. Yet such efforts will inevitably pale in comparison to the BRI, whose funding already amounts to more than
$200 billion and could run as high as $1.3 trillion by 2027. If either project is to succeed, therefore, it will need clearer priorities, more money, and greater political backing.

Another, less ambitious approach would be for Brussels and Washington to send policymakers and economists to independently evaluate projects that countries are considering with China. Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department sent a small team to Myanmar to help the government there renegotiate a Chinese port deal. The Wall Street Journal reported that Myanmar officials got a better deal and steered clear of debt traps thanks to U.S. assistance. Brussels and Washington should offer the same expertise in places such as Portugal and Serbia.

EU member states and the United States should also work together to counter Chinese influence in their political systems. Washington and several EU members have already signaled concern over the issue and are looking to the anti-foreign-interference legislation that Australia passed last year as a model for dealing with Chinese political meddling. But such resistance should go beyond national governments. Europe and the United States must better understand the channels of Chinese influence at the local and societal levels to see the full effects on open debate, academic integrity, and public discourse. European and American universities that host Confucius Institutes could share best practices for securing academic freedom in the face of Chinese state funding. Local and regional government officials on both sides of the Atlantic should assess Chinese investment plans, such as that in Duisburg, Germany, where the mayor has decided to partner with Huawei to developed a “smart city” based on advanced infrastructure, cloud computing, and better city logistics.

A transatlantic strategy on China should not focus only on countering Chinese policies. All three actors—the EU, the United States, and China—have come together in the past to address common challenges, such as climate change. They can do so again. China’s environmental policies will be critical to making global progress on climate change; Europe and China should pursue every avenue of cooperation until the United States comes back to the table. Promoting development need not be solely competitive, either. Western governments and companies should try to encourage China to raise the labor and envi-
Environmental standards, use transparent contracts, and focus on financial sustainability in its investment and infrastructure projects by combining their resources and expertise to offer their own high-quality investments to emerging-market countries, creating a race to the top among development projects. Japan’s connectivity strategy, launched by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe soon after China introduced the BRI, offers a good model. The associated $110 billion fund has boosted Japan’s ability to finance high-quality and financially sustainable development projects, at times in cooperation with China, if it abides by Japan’s principles. What the Japanese seem to have learned faster than their transatlantic counterparts is that states will follow China’s lead if it is the only player in the game, but when other countries compete, the developing world gets better options.

**ALL TOGETHER NOW**

These are tough times for the EU. Brexit, illiberal triumphs across Europe, a resurgent Russia, and deteriorating transatlantic ties have sent European leaders scrambling to preserve both the European project and the international system. That has left them with less time and energy to focus on China. Although some countries are developing responses to China’s growing economic engagement with and political influence in Europe, too many are ignoring the challenge from China.

During the Cold War, Europe was a battlefield for ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It had little say in the outcome. Today, Europe has the ability to prevent a new Cold War and promote a more stable and prosperous future. If that is to happen, Germany will have to take the lead. It should urge the continent to develop a coherent strategy that draws on Europe’s unique strengths and liberal democratic values. Only then can the EU work with the United States to revamp a tired international system—from updating the global trading architecture to managing new and disruptive technologies—and protect the liberal order’s open, democratic nature from Chinese influence. If the democratic world cannot rise to the task, China will remake the system as it sees fit. Europe will not like the result.
Donald Trump has been true to his word. After excoriating free trade while campaigning for the U.S. presidency, he has made economic nationalism a centerpiece of his agenda in office. His administration has pulled out of some trade deals, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and renegotiated others, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Many of Trump’s actions, such as the tariffs he has imposed on steel and aluminum, amount to overt protectionism and have hurt the U.S. economy. Others have had less obvious, but no less damaging, effects. By flouting international trade rules, the administration has diminished the country’s standing in the world and led other governments to consider using the same tools to limit trade arbitrarily. It has taken deliberate steps to weaken the World Trade Organization (WTO)—some of which will permanently damage the multilateral trading system. And in its boldest move, it is trying to use trade policy to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies.

A future U.S. administration that wants to chart a more traditional course on trade will be able to undo some of the damage and start repairing the United States’ tattered reputation as a reliable trading partner. In some respects, however, there will be no going back. The Trump administration’s attacks on the WTO and the expansive
legal rationalizations it has given for many of its protectionist actions threaten to pull apart the unified global trading system. And on China, it has become clear that the administration is bent on severing, not fixing, the relationship. The separation of the world’s two largest economies would trigger a global realignment. Other countries would be forced to choose between rival trade blocs. Even if Trump loses reelection in 2020, global trade will never be the same.

**BATTLE LINES**

The first two years of the Trump administration featured pitched battles between the so-called globalists (represented by Gary Cohn, then the director of the National Economic Council) and the nationalists (represented by the Trump advisers Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro). The president was instinctively a nationalist, but the globalists hoped to contain his impulses and encourage his attention-seeking need to strike flashy deals. They managed to slow the rollout of some new tariffs and prevent Trump from precipitously withdrawing from trade agreements.

But by mid-2018, the leading globalists had left the administration, and the nationalists—the president among them—were in command. Trump has a highly distorted view of international trade and international negotiations. Viewing trade as a zero-sum, win-lose game, he stresses one-time deals over ongoing relationships, enjoys the leverage created by tariffs, and relies on brinkmanship, escalation, and public threats over diplomacy. The president has made clear that he likes tariffs (“trade wars are good, and easy to win”) and that he wants more of them (“I am a Tariff Man”).

Although the thrust of U.S. policy over the past 70 years has been to pursue agreements to open up trade and reduce barriers, every president has for political purposes used protectionist measures to help certain industries. President Ronald Reagan, for example, capped imports to protect the automotive and steel industries during what was then the worst U.S. recession since the Great Depression. Trump, however, has enjoyed a period of strong economic growth, low unemployment, and a virtual absence of protectionist pressure from industry or labor. And yet his administration has imposed more tariffs than most of its predecessors.

Take steel. Although there is nothing unusual about steel (along with aluminum) receiving government protection—the industry maintains
a permanent presence in Washington and has been an on-again, off-again beneficiary of trade restrictions since the Johnson administration—the scope of the protection provided and the manner in which the Trump administration gave it last year were unusual. In order to avoid administrative review by independent agencies such as the non-partisan, quasi-judicial U.S. International Trade Commission, the White House dusted off Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This Cold War statute gives the president the authority to impose restrictions on imports if the Commerce Department finds that they threaten to harm a domestic industry the government deems vital to national security.

The Trump administration’s national security case was weak. More than 70 percent of the steel consumed in the United States was produced domestically, the imported share was stable, and there was no threat of a surge. Most imports came from Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and other allies, with only a small fraction coming from China and Russia, thanks to antidumping duties already in place on those countries. The number of jobs in the U.S. steel industry had been shrinking, but this was due more to advances in technology than falling production or imports. In the 1980s, for example, it took ten man-hours to produce a ton of steel; today, it takes just over one man-hour. Even the Defense Department was skeptical about the national security motivation.

Prior administrations refrained from invoking the national security rationale for fear that it could become an unchecked protectionist loophole and that other countries would abuse it. In a sign that those fears may come true, the Trump administration recently stood alongside Russia to argue that merely invoking national security is enough to defeat any WTO challenge to a trade barrier. This runs counter to 75 years of practice, as well as to what U.S. negotiators argued when they created the global trading system in the 1940s.

The Trump administration dismissed all those concerns. The president and leading officials desperately wanted to help the steel and aluminum industries. (It did not hurt that Wilbur Ross, the commerce secretary, and Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. trade representative, both used to work for the steel industry.) The administration

Even if Trump loses reelection in 2020, global trade will never be the same.
also believed that its willingness to impose economic self-harm in the form of higher steel and aluminum prices for domestic manufacturers would send a strong signal to other countries about its commitment to economic nationalism.

Trump also went so far as to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada, something that even the domestic industry and labor unions opposed. Over the last 30 years, the U.S. steel and aluminum industries had transformed to become North American industries, with raw steel and aluminum flowing freely back and forth between Canadian and U.S. plants. The same union represents workers on both sides of the border. In addition to lacking an economic rationale, targeting Canada alienated a key ally and seemed to make no political sense, either.

The administration also miscalculated the foreign blowback against the tariffs. “I don’t believe there’s any country in the world that will retaliate for the simple reason that we are the biggest and most lucrative market in the world,” Navarro, the president’s hawkish trade adviser, told Fox News in 2018, apparently unaware that other countries have trade hawks, too. Canada, China, Mexico, the European Union, and others all hit back hard, largely by slapping tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports. In effect, the administration jeopardized the welfare of 3.2 million American farmers to help 140,000 U.S. steel workers, a remarkable move given Trump’s electoral reliance on Midwestern farm states.

If the aim was to fire a shot across the bow of U.S. trading partners, the tariffs worked. Foreign governments were suddenly on alert that the United States was willing to abandon the established norms of trade policy. The White House has insisted that “economic security is national security.” Yet defining security so broadly opens the door to unrestricted protectionism. And so when, in mid-2018, the Trump administration made yet another national security case for tariffs, this time on automobiles—imports of which dwarf those of steel and aluminum combined by a factor of seven—the fear abroad reached a new level. Although the administration recently announced that it was delaying any new auto tariffs, the threat remains. The consequences of imposing such a large tax on a major household
item, in the sure knowledge that there would be swift and heavy foreign retaliation, may be staying the administration’s hand.

The president’s enthusiasm for tariff threats has even spilled over to issues beyond trade. In May, Trump suddenly demanded that Mexico stop the flow of immigrants into the United States or risk facing new, across-the-board tariffs of 25 percent. As long as Trump is in office, no country—even one that has just negotiated a trade agreement with the United States—can be confident that it won’t be a target.

**POINTLESS RENEGOTIATIONS**

On the 2016 campaign trail, Trump complained that NAFTA was “the worst trade deal ever,” a theme he has continued in office. His advisers talked him out of simply withdrawing from the agreement, but Trump insisted on renegotiating it and proceeded to make the renegotiation process needlessly contentious. The administration made odd demands of Canada and Mexico, including that the deal should result in balanced trade and include a sunset clause that could terminate the agreement after five years, thus eliminating the benefits of reduced uncertainty.

The three countries finally reached a new agreement last September. Unimaginatively called the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), it is hardly a major rewrite of NAFTA. It preserves
NAFTA’s requirement of duty-free access, would slightly open up Canadian dairy markets to U.S. farmers, and incorporates a host of new provisions from the TPP.

The renegotiation was in some ways an unnecessary exercise. NAFTA was a sound agreement—no one in the administration could identify what made it such a terrible deal—and many of its shortcomings had been fixed in the TPP, from which Trump withdrew the United States in 2017. But the contrast between the hostile rhetoric Trump heaped on NAFTA and the soft reality of the USMCA illuminates the president’s approach to trade. Trump just doesn’t like certain outcomes, including trade deficits and the loss of certain industries. But instead of addressing their underlying causes, which have little to do with specific trade agreements, he opts for managed trade, substituting government intervention for market forces, or new rules—a requirement that a greater proportion of a vehicle be made in the United States for it to enter Mexico duty free, for example—that try to force his preferred outcome. The goal is not to free up trade further but to constrain trade according to Trump’s whims.

The USMCA is currently stalled in Congress, partly because the administration did not cultivate congressional support for the renegotiation in the first place. But if the USMCA ultimately dies, neither Canada nor Mexico will miss it. Both felt the need to sign the deal simply to get past the uncertainty created by Trump’s threats to withdraw from NAFTA, as well as to forestall the chance that he would impose auto tariffs.

Both Japan and the EU also begrudgingly signed up for trade talks with the administration, in large part to delay Trump’s auto tariffs for as long as possible. Of the two, Japan is more likely to agree to a deal—after all, it negotiated a trade agreement with the Obama administration as part of the TPP. The Europeans are less likely to do so, not only due to conflicts over agriculture but also because of Trump’s unpopularity across Europe. But the Europeans hope that by agreeing to talk, they can put off Trump’s auto tariffs and perhaps run out the clock on the administration.

YOU’RE GONNA MISS ME WHEN I’M GONE
Acts of protectionism are acts of self-harm. But the Trump administration is also doing broader, and more permanent damage to the rules-based trading system. That system emerged from the ashes of
the trade wars of the 1930s, when protectionism and economic depression fueled the rise of fascism and foreign governments made deals that cut U.S. commercial interests out of the world’s leading markets. In 1947, the United States responded by leading the negotiations to create the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which limited arbitrary government interference in trade and provided rules to manage trade conflicts. Under this system, trade barriers have gradually fallen, and growing trade has contributed to global economic prosperity.

The United States once led by example. No longer. Trump has threatened to leave the WTO, something his previous actions suggest is more than idle talk. He says the agreement is rigged against the United States. The administration denounces the WTO when the organization finds U.S. practices in violation of trade rules but largely ignores the equally many cases that it wins. Although the WTO’s dispute-settlement system needs reform, it has worked well to defuse trade conflict since it was established over two decades ago.

Trump’s attacks on the WTO go beyond rhetoric. The administration has blocked appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body, which issues judgments on trade disputes; by December, if nothing changes, there will be too few judges to adjudicate any new cases. When that happens, a dispute-settlement system that countries big and small, rich and poor have relied on to prevent trade skirmishes from turning into trade wars will disappear. This is more than a withdrawal of U.S. leadership. It is the destruction of a system that has worked to keep the trade peace.

That is particularly unwelcome because so much of global trade has nothing to do with the United States. The system resolves conflicts between Colombia and Panama, Taiwan and Indonesia, Australia and the EU. Most disputes are settled without retaliation or escalation. The WTO has created a body of law that ensures more predictability in international commerce. The system it manages works to the benefit of the United States while freeing the country from having to police global commerce single-handedly.

The dispute-settlement system is not perfect. But rather than make constructive proposals for how to improve it, something Canada and others are now doing, the United States has disengaged. The Trump administration may end up destroying the old system without having drafted a blueprint for its successor.
What will come next? In the worst-case scenario, the new world trading system will be dominated by discriminatory trade blocs that raise the costs of commerce, make trade negotiations harder, and encourage retaliation. Size and economic power, not principles or rules, will determine the outcome of trade disputes. Such a system will hurt smaller, weaker countries and could push them to align with more powerful ones for self-preservation. It was precisely that trend in the 1930s that forced the United States to create the postwar trading system. And the lack of adherence to trade rules beginning in the 1970s made the United States press for the creation of a stronger, more effective dispute-settlement system in the 1990s, resulting in the WTO. For Washington to tear down the trading system it created would be a tragedy.

CONSCIOUS DECOUPLING
Nowhere has the Trump administration left a greater mark on U.S. trade policy than with China. In early 2018, it released a lengthy report documenting a litany of concerns with Chinese trade practices. China had been forcing U.S. companies to form joint ventures with local firms to access its 1.4 billion consumers. These arranged marriages then allowed China to acquire U.S. technology. Sometimes companies would hand it over to grease the palms of regulators, sometimes they would license it at below commercially viable rates, and sometimes Chinese firms or spies would steal it. Combined with some of the economic concerns underlying the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs—China’s industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, overcapacity, and failure to more fully transform into a market economy—the list of U.S. grievances created a recipe for confrontation. The result was tariffs, and countertasirs, on $360 billion worth of trade between the two countries, an unprecedented figure.

Many observers assumed that the Trump administration simply wanted to get a better deal from China. But what constituted a better deal was always vague. If the primary concern was the bilateral trade deficit, China could be pressured to go on a massive spending spree, buying up U.S. soybeans and energy products. If it was intellectual property theft, China might be persuaded to change a few laws and commit to international norms.

It has become clear, however, that the administration does not want a permanent deal, or at least any deal with an explicit path forward.
that the Chinese government might accept. Even if Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping come to some superficial agreement, it is unlikely to be more than a temporary truce in what is now a permanent trade war. The administration’s goal seems to be nothing less than the immediate and complete transformation of the Chinese economy or bust—with bust the most likely outcome. To satisfy the United States, China would have to end forced technology transfers, stop stealing intellectual property, curtail subsidies to state-owned enterprises, abandon industrial policies designed to gain technological dominance, stop harassing foreign firms operating in China, and begin to open markets that the government deliberately closed to give control to domestic firms. In other words, the United States wants China to turn its state-dominated economic system into a market-based one overnight.

Such a change would perhaps be in China’s best interest, but economic regime change is quite an ask for one country to make of another. The Communist Party leadership keeps its lock on power by maintaining control over all facets of the Chinese economy. Losing that control would jeopardize its grip on political power. No one seriously expects China’s leaders to cede control of the economy simply because of U.S. threats.

The Trump administration may not even expect them to; it may have been asking all along for something that it knew China could not deliver. If so, the objective was never a comprehensive deal; it was the tariffs themselves. For one thing, if the administration had been serious about getting a deal from China, it would have maximized its leverage by bringing along Japan and the EU, both of which have similar economic concerns. Indeed, Japan and the EU have made considerable efforts to work with the administration when it comes to China. They have mostly been rebuffed.

There were hints from the beginning that the administration was never searching for a deal that would truly end the trade war. In 2017, Navarro outlined the administration’s view that trade with China threatened U.S. national security. He also let slip that he wanted to rip up the supply chains that bound the United States and China together. At the time, some dismissed him as a rogue eccentric. Now,
the United States is on the cusp of slapping tariffs on all imports from China—the first step toward Navarro’s goal. Geopolitics has trumped economics.

This is not protectionism in the sense of trying to help a domestic industry in its struggle against imports. The goal is much broader and more significant: the economic decoupling of the United States and China. That would mark a historic fragmentation of the world economy. It would represent, in the words of former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, the falling of an “economic iron curtain” between the world’s two largest economies. Such a separation would have foreign policy and national security implications well beyond the economic consequences.

In some respects, the rupture is already happening. Students and scientists from China are no longer as welcome in the United States as they once were. China’s already meager investments in the U.S. economy are now under heightened scrutiny from national security agencies. The administration is tightening up export controls, curtailing how and with whom Americans can share their inventions, especially in cutting-edge areas such as artificial intelligence, advanced computing, and additive manufacturing. That will not stop China from gaining better technology, however; German, Japanese, and South Korean firms will simply fill the void. Going it alone will put the U.S. economy at even more of a disadvantage.

Most traditional supporters of free trade are not so naive as to believe that the United States should tolerate China’s bad behavior as long as cheap goods continue to flow into the United States. China, they agree, breaks the rules. But the Trump administration’s clumsy unilateral approach is not the right answer. A better response would be to identify specific instances in which China has violated international agreements and then join with trading partners and allies to file cases with the WTO. (This is not as hopeless a tactic as it might sound: China has complied with findings from the WTO surprisingly often.) Where China has not explicitly violated agreements, Washington could still sanction unfair practices, preferably together with other countries so as to exert the maximum pressure possible, but unilaterally if that is the only feasible option.

The final plank of a sensible trade policy would be to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the revised trade deal struck by the remaining members of
the TPP after the U.S. withdrawal. Joining the CPTPP would establish a large zone of trade rules favorable to the United States and unfavorable to China. That would help push China to resume its progress toward economic reform. Historians will look back on Trump’s precipitous decision to quit the TPP as a major blunder.

If the Trump administration really does want to separate the U.S. and Chinese economies, the United States will have to pay an economic price. Trump denies that his strategy has costs. China, he says, is paying the tariffs. “I am very happy with over $100 Billion a year in Tariffs filling U.S. coffers,” he tweeted in May. This is nonsense: research shows that firms pass on the cost of the tariffs to American consumers. And U.S. exporters—mainly farmers facing the loss of markets due to China’s retaliation—are paying the price, as well. So, too, are American taxpayers, now on the hook for tens of billions of dollars needed to bail out the reeling agricultural sector.

Whether Trump appreciates these costs isn’t clear, but it’s evident that economic considerations aren’t driving policy. The president’s willingness to look past stock market slumps and continue to push China shows that he is willing to pay an economic price—whatever he says in public. For someone whose reelection depends on maintaining a strong economy, that is a bold gamble.

THE DAMAGE DONE

If Trump becomes a one-term president, the next administration will have an opportunity to reverse many of its predecessor’s trade policies—eliminating the steel and aluminum tariffs, repairing relationships with the United States’ NAFTA partners, joining the CPTPP, and improving the WTO. That would not only help restore U.S. credibility on the world stage but also enable other countries to lift their retaliatory duties on U.S. exports, helping suffering farmers. If Trump wins reelection and continues down the path of economic nationalism, however, the prospect of continued, and perhaps intensified, trade conflict is likely to destroy the world trading system. That would do incalculable damage to the world economy.

Although many of Trump’s policies can be reversed, the tariffs on China are a game changer. Any future administration would have a difficult time removing them without sizable concessions from the Chinese leadership and some way of alleviating the heightened national security fears that now dominate the bilateral relationship. A
future Democratic administration may be even more disinclined to change course. Many Democrats opposed the TPP and broadly support the president’s anti-China stance. In May, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York, tweeted his support for Trump on China, urging him to “Hang tough” and not to cave in to a bad deal. More than a decade ago, Schumer and his Senate colleagues supported slapping even higher tariffs on Chinese goods than the ones Trump has imposed, on the grounds that China was keeping its currency artificially low to boost exports. Concerns over human rights will also push Democrats to confront China. Although China’s herding of over a million Muslim Uighurs in western China into concentration camps did not factor into the Trump administration’s trade negotiations, it could loom large in those of a future administration.

The system of world trade that the United States helped establish after World War II is often described as multilateral. But it was not a global system; it originally consisted of a small number of Western, market-oriented economies and Japan and excluded the Soviet Union, its eastern European satellites, and other communist countries. That division was about more than politics. Market and non-market economies are in many ways incompatible. In a market economy, a firm losing money has to adjust or go bankrupt. Under state capitalism, state-owned firms get subsides to maintain production and save jobs, forcing non-state-owned firms—at home or abroad—to make the painful adjustment instead. The Trump administration, together with China, as it retreats from pro-market reforms, may be moving the world back to the historic norm of political and economic blocs.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism opened up eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to global markets. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping did the same for China. But only in the unipolar moment, which began in 2001, when China joined the WTO, were open markets truly global. Now, the period of global capitalism may be coming to an end. What many thought was the new normal may turn out to have been a brief aberration. Wohnung
In its dealings with the broader world, has the United States been a force for human liberty? Should it be? And if so, how?

To answer these questions, Peace, War, and Liberty: Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy traces the history of United States foreign policy and the ideas that have animated it and considers not only whether America’s policy choices have made the world safer and freer, but also how those choices have influenced human freedom at home.

This evenhanded but uncompromising book considers the past, present, and future of United States foreign policy: why policymakers in the past made certain choices, the consequences of those choices, and how the world might look if America had chosen a different path for its future. Would America—and the world—be freer if America’s foreign policy were more restrained?
The Dictators’ Last Stand

Why the New Autocrats Are Weaker Than They Look

Yascha Mounk

It has been a good decade for dictatorship. The global influence of the world’s most powerful authoritarian countries, China and Russia, has grown rapidly. For the first time since the late nineteenth century, the cumulative GDP of autocracies now equals or exceeds that of Western liberal democracies. Even ideologically, autocrats appear to be on the offensive: at the G-20 summit in June, for instance, President Vladimir Putin dropped his normal pretense that Russia is living up to liberal democratic standards, declaring instead that “modern liberalism” has become “obsolete.”

Conversely, it has been a terrible decade for democracy. According to Freedom House, the world is now in the 13th consecutive year of a global democratic recession. Democracies have collapsed or eroded in every region, from Burundi to Hungary, Thailand to Venezuela. Most troubling of all, democratic institutions have proved to be surprisingly brittle in countries where they once seemed stable and secure.

In 2014, I suggested in these pages that a rising tide of populist parties and candidates could inflict serious damage on democratic institutions. At the time, my argument was widely contested. The scholarly consensus held that demagogues would never win power in the long-established democracies of North America and western Europe. And even if they did, they would be constrained by those countries’ strong institutions and vibrant civil societies. Today, that old consensus is dead. The ascent of Donald Trump in the United States, Matteo Salvini in Italy, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil has demonstrated that populists can indeed win power in some of the most affluent and long-established

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democracies in the world. And the rapid erosion of democracy in countries such as Hungary and Venezuela has shown that populists really can turn their countries into competitive authoritarian regimes or outright dictatorships. The controversial argument I made five years ago has become the conventional wisdom.

But this new consensus is now in danger of hardening into an equally misguided orthodoxy. Whereas scholars used to hope that it was only a matter of time until some of the world’s most powerful autocracies would be forced to democratize, they now concede too readily that these regimes have permanently solved the challenge of sustaining their legitimacy. Having once believed that liberal democracy was the obvious endpoint of mankind’s political evolution, many experts now assume that billions of people around the world will happily forgo individual freedom and collective self-determination. Naive optimism has given way to premature pessimism.

The new orthodoxy is especially misleading about the long-term future of governments that promise to return power to the people but instead erode democratic institutions. These populist dictatorships, in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, share two important features: first, their rulers came to power by winning free and fair elections with an anti-elitist and anti-pluralist message. Second, these leaders subsequently used those victories to concentrate power in their own hands by weakening the independence of key institutions, such as the judiciary; curtailing the ability of opposition parties to organize; or undermining critical media outlets. (By “populist dictatorships,” I mean both outright dictatorships, in which the opposition no longer has a realistic chance of displacing the government through elections, and competitive authoritarian regimes, in which elections retain real significance even though the opposition is forced to fight on a highly uneven playing field.)

According to the new orthodoxy, the populist threat to liberal democracy is a one-way street. Once strongman leaders have managed to concentrate power in their own hands, the game for the opposition is up. If a significant number of countries succumb to populist dictatorship over the next years, the long-term outlook for liberal democracy will, in this view, be very bleak.

But this narrative overlooks a crucial factor: the legitimacy of populist dictators depends on their ability to maintain the illusion that they speak for “the people.” And the more power these leaders con-
centrate in their own hands, the less plausible that pretense appears. This raises the possibility of a vicious cycle of populist legitimacy: when an internal crisis or an external shock dampens a populist regime’s popularity, that regime must resort to ever more overt oppression to perpetuate its power. But the more overt its oppression grows, the more it will reveal the hollowness of its claim to govern in the name of the people. As ever-larger segments of the population recognize that they are in danger of losing their liberties, opposition to the regime may grow stronger and stronger.

The ultimate outcome of this struggle is by no means foreordained. But if the past decade has been depressingly bad for democracy, the next one may well turn out to be surprisingly tough on autocrats.

ERDOGAN’S DILEMMA
In North America and western Europe, populist leaders have gained control of the highest levers of power over the course of only the past few years. In Turkey, by contrast, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power for nearly two decades. The country thus offers an ideal case study of both how populist dictators can seize power and the challenge they face when increasingly overt oppression erodes their legitimacy.

Erdogan became prime minister in 2003 by running on a textbook populist platform. Turkey’s political system, he claimed, was not truly democratic. A small elite controlled the country, dispensing with the will of the people whenever they dared to rebel against the elite’s preferences. Only a courageous leader who truly represented ordinary Turks would be able to stand up against that elite and return power to the people.

He had a point. Turkey’s secular elites had controlled the country for the better part of a century, suspending democracy whenever they failed to get their way; between 1960 and 1997, the country underwent four coups. But even though Erdogan’s diagnosis of the problem was largely correct, his promised cure turned out to be worse than the disease. Instead of transferring power to the people, he redistributed it to a new elite of his own making. Over the course of his 16 years in power—first as prime minister and then, after 2014, as president—Erdogan has purged opponents from the military; appointed partisan hacks to courts and electoral commissions; fired tens of thousands of teachers, academics, and civil servants; and jailed a breathtaking number of writers and journalists.
Even as Erdogan consolidated power in his own hands, he seized on his ability to win elections to sustain the narrative that had fueled his rise. He was the freely elected leader of the Turkish republic; his critics were traitors or terrorists who were ignoring the will of the people. Although international observers considered Turkey’s elections deeply flawed, and political scientists began to classify the country as a competitive authoritarian regime, this narrative helped Erdogan consolidate support among a large portion of the population. So long as he won, he could have his cake and eat it, too: his ever-tightening grip on the system tilted the electoral playing field, making it easier for him to win a popular mandate. This mandate, in turn, helped legitimize his rule, allowing him to gain an even tighter grip on the system.

More recently, however, Erdogan’s story of legitimation—the set of claims by which he justifies his rule—has begun to fall apart. In 2018, Turkey’s economy finally fell into recession as a result of Erdogan’s mismanagement. In municipal elections this past March, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost Ankara, Turkey’s capital, and Istanbul, its largest city. For the first time since taking office, Erdogan was faced with a difficult choice: either give up some of his power by accepting defeat or undermine his story of legitimation by rejecting the results of the election.

Erdogan chose the latter option. Within weeks of Istanbul’s mayoral election, the Turkish election board overturned its results and ordered a rerun for the middle of June. This turned out to be a massive miscalculation. A large number of Istanbulites who had previously supported Erdogan and his party were so outraged by his open defiance of the popular will that they turned against him. The AKP candidate suffered a much bigger defeat in the second election.

Having tried and failed to annul the will of the people, Erdogan now faces the prospect of a downward spiral. Because he has lost a great deal of his legitimacy, he is more reliant on oppressive measures to hold on to power. But the more blatantly he oppresses his own people, the more his legitimacy will suffer.

The implications of this transformation extend far beyond Turkey. Authoritarian populists have proved frighteningly capable of vanquishing...
democratic opponents. But as the case of Erdogan demonstrates, they will eventually face serious challenges of their own.

AN AUTOCRATIC FUTURE?

It is tempting to cast the stakes in the struggle between authoritarian populists and democratic institutions in existential terms. If populists manage to gain effective control over key institutions, such as the judiciary and the electoral commission, then the bell has tolled for democracy. But this conclusion is premature. After all, a rich literature suggests that all kinds of dictatorships have, historically, been remarkably vulnerable to democratic challenges.

Between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, dictatorships had a two percent chance of collapsing in any given year. During the 1990s, the odds increased to five percent, according to research by the political scientists Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. Clearly, the concentration of power that characterizes all dictatorships does not necessarily translate into that power’s durability.

Instead of assuming that the rise of populist dictatorships spells an end for democratic aspirations in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, therefore, it is necessary to understand the circumstances under which these regimes are likely to succeed or fail. Recent research on autocratic regimes suggests that there are good reasons to believe that populist dictatorships will prove to be comparatively stable. Since most of them are situated in affluent countries, they can afford to channel generous rewards to supporters of the regime. Since they rule over strong states with capable bureaucracies, their leaders can ensure that their orders are carried out in a timely and faithful manner. Since they control well-developed security services, they can monitor and deter opposition activity. And since they are embedded in efficient ruling parties, they can recruit reliable cadres and deal with crises of succession.

On the other hand, many of the countries these regimes control also have features that favored democratization in the past. They usually have high levels of education and economic development. They contain opposition movements with strong traditions and relatively established institutions of their own. They often neighbor democratic nations and rely on democracies for their economic prosperity and military security. Perhaps most important, many of these countries have a recent
history of democracy, which may both strengthen popular demands for personal liberties and provide their people with a template for a democratic transition when an autocratic regime does eventually collapse.

All in all, the structural features on which political scientists usually focus to gauge the likely fate of authoritarian regimes appear finely balanced in the case of populist dictatorships. This makes it all the more important to pay attention to a factor that has often been ignored in the literature: the sources and the sustainability of their legitimacy.

BROKEN PROMISES

In the twentieth century, democratic collapse usually took the form of a coup. When feuds between political factions produced exasperating gridlock, a charismatic military officer managed to convince his peers to make a bid for power. Tanks would roll up in front of parliament, and the aspiring dictator would take the reins of power.

The blatantly antidemocratic nature of these coups created serious problems of legitimacy for the regimes to which they gave rise. Any citizen who valued individual freedom or collective self-determination could easily recognize the danger that these authoritarian governments posed. Insofar as these dictatorships enjoyed real popular support, it was based on their ability to deliver different political goods.
Yascha Mounk

They offered protection from other extremists. They vowed to build a stable political system that would dispense with the chaos and discord of democratic competition. Above all, they promised less corruption and faster economic growth.

In most cases, those promises were hard to keep. Dictatorships frequently produced political chaos of their own: palace intrigues, coup attempts, mass protests. In many cases, their economic policies proved to be highly erratic, leading to bouts of hyperinflation or periods of severe economic depression. With few exceptions, they suffered from staggering levels of corruption. But for all these difficulties, their basic stories of legitimation were usually coherent. Although they often failed to do so, these dictatorships could, in principle, deliver on the goods they promised their people.

This is not true of populist dictatorships. As the case of Erdogan illustrates, populists come to power by promising to deepen democracy. This makes it much easier for them to build dictatorships in countries in which a majority of the population remains committed to democratic values. Instead of accepting an explicit tradeoff between self-determination and other goods, such as stability or economic growth, supporters of populist parties usually believe that they can have it all. As a result, populists often enjoy enormous popularity during their first years in power, as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and India’s Narendra Modi have demonstrated.

Once they consolidate their authority, however, populist dictators fail to live up to their most important promise. Elected on the hope that they will return power to the people, they instead make it impossible for the people to replace them. The crucial question is what happens when this fact becomes too obvious for large segments of the population to ignore.

**THE VICIOUS CYCLE**

At some point during their tenure, populist dictators are likely to face an acute crisis. Even honest and competent leaders are likely to see their popularity decline because of events over which they have little control, such as a global recession, if they stay in office long enough. There are
also good reasons to believe that populist dictatorships are more likely than democracies to face crises of their own making. Drawing on a comprehensive global database of populist governments since 1990, for example, the political scientist Jordan Kyle and I have demonstrated that democratic countries ruled by populists tend to be more corrupt than their nonpopulist peers. Over time, the spread of corruption is likely to inspire frustration at populists’ unfulfilled promises to “drain the swamp.”

Similarly, research by the political scientist Roberto Foa suggests that the election of populists tends to lead to serious economic crises. When left-wing populists come to power, their policies often lead to a cratering stock market and rapid capital flight. Right-wing populists, by contrast, usually enjoy rising stock prices and investor confidence during their first few years in office. But as they engage in erratic policymaking, undermine the rule of law, and marginalize independent experts, their countries’ economic fortunes tend to sour. By the time that right-wing populists have been in office for five or ten years, their countries are more likely than their peers to have suffered from stock market crashes, acute financial crises, or bouts of hyperinflation.

Once a populist regime faces a political crisis, the massive contradictions at the heart of its story of legitimation make the crisis especially difficult to deal with. Initially, the political repression in which populist regimes engage remains somewhat hidden from public view. Power grabs usually take the form of complicated rule changes—such as a lower retirement age for judges or a modification of the selection mechanisms for members of the country’s electoral commission—whose true import is difficult to grasp for ordinary citizens. Although political opponents, prominent journalists, and independent judges may start to experience genuine oppression early in a populist’s tenure, the great majority of citizens, including most public-sector workers, remain unaffected. And since the populist continues to win real majorities at the ballot box, he or she can point to genuine popularity to dispel any doubts about the democratic nature of his or her rule.

This equilibrium is likely to be disrupted when a shock or a crisis lowers the leader’s popularity. In order to retain power, the leader must step up the oppression: cracking down on independent media, firing judges and civil servants, changing the electoral system, disqualifying or jailing opposition candidates, rigging votes, annulling the outcome of elections, and so on. But all these options share the same downside: by forcing the antidemocratic character of the regime
out into the open, they are likely to increase the share of the population that recognizes the government for what it truly is.

This is where the vicious cycle of populist legitimacy rears its unforgiving head. As support for the regime wanes, the populist autocrat needs to employ more repression to retain power. But the more repression the regime employs, the more its story of legitimation suffers, further eroding its support.

Populist dictatorships are therefore liable to suffer from an especially sudden loss of legitimacy. Enjoying a broad popular mandate, their stories of legitimation initially allow them to co-opt or weaken independent institutions without oppressing ordinary citizens or forfeiting the legitimacy they gain from regular elections. But as the popularity of the populist leader declines due to internal blunders or external shocks, the vicious cycle of populist legitimacy sets in. Custom-made to help populist leaders gain and consolidate power, their stories of legitimation are uniquely ill adapted to helping them sustain an increasingly autocratic regime.

**A CRISIS OF POPULIST AUTHORITY?**

Many populist dictatorships will, sooner or later, experience an especially serious crisis of legitimacy. What will happen when they do?

In *The Prince*, Niccolò Machiavelli warned that the ruler “who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom” can never sleep easy. “When it rebels, the people will always be able to appeal to the spirit of freedom, which is never forgotten, despite the passage of time and any benefits bestowed by the new ruler…. If he does not foment internal divisions or scatter the inhabitants, they will never forget their lost liberties and their ancient institutions, and will immediately attempt to recover them whenever they have an opportunity.”

Populist dictators would do well to heed Machiavelli’s warning. After all, most of their citizens can still recall living in freedom. Venezuela, for example, had been democratic for about four decades by the time Hugo Chávez first ascended to power at the end of the 1990s. It would hardly come as a surprise if the citizens of countries that have, until so recently, enjoyed individual freedom and collective self-determination eventually began to long for the recovery of those core principles.

But if populist dictators must fear the people, there is also ample historical evidence to suggest that autocratic regimes can survive for a long time after their original stories of legitimation have lost their
power. Take the twentieth-century communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe. From their inception, the communist regimes of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, for example, depended on a horrific amount of oppression—far beyond what today’s populists in Hungary or Poland have attempted so far. But like today’s populists, those regimes claimed that they were centralizing power only in order to erect “true” democracies. In their first decades, this helped them mobilize a large number of supporters.

Eventually, the illusion that the regimes’ injustices were growing pains on the arduous path toward a worker’s paradise proved impossible to sustain. In Czechoslovakia, for example, cautious attempts at liberalization sparked a Soviet invasion in 1968, followed by a brutal crackdown on dissent. Virtually overnight, the regime’s story of legitimation went from being an important foundation of its stability to a hollow piece of ritualized lip service. As the Czech dissident Vaclav Havel wrote in his influential essay “The Power of the Powerless,” it was “true of course” that after 1968, “ideology no longer [had] any great influence on people.” But although the legitimacy of many communist regimes had cratered by the late 1960s, they were able to hold on to power for another two decades thanks to brutal repression.

Populist dictatorships in countries such as Turkey or Venezuela may soon enter a similar phase. Now that their stories of legitimation have, in the minds of large portions of their populations, come to be seen as obvious bunk, their stability will turn on the age-old clash between central authority and popular discontent.

Recently, a series of writers have suggested that the rise of digital technology will skew this competition in favor of popular discontent. As the former CIA analyst Martin Gurri argued in *The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium*, the Internet favors networks over hierarchies, the border over the center, and small groups of angry activists over bureaucratic incumbents. These dynamics help explain how populists were able to displace more moderate, established political forces in the first place. They also suggest that it will be difficult for populists to stay in power once they have to face the wrath of the digitally empowered public.

This argument, however, fails to take into account the differences in how dictatorships and democracies wield power. Whereas dictatorships are capable of using all the resources of a modern state to quash a popular insurgency, democracies are committed to fighting their opponents with
one hand tied behind their back. Dictators can jail opposition leaders or order soldiers to fire into a crowd of peaceful protesters; democratic leaders can, at best, appeal to reason and shared values.

This imbalance raises the prospect of a dark future in which digital technology allows extremist networks to vanquish moderate hierarchies. Once in power, these extremist movements may succeed in transforming themselves into highly hierarchical governments—and in using brute force to keep their opponents at bay. Technology, in this account, fuels the dissemination of the populists’ stories of legitimation when they first storm the political stage, but it fails to rival the power of their guns once their stories of legitimation have lost their hold.

It is too early to conclude that the populist dictatorships that have arisen in many parts of the world in recent years will be able to sustain themselves in power forever. In the end, those who are subject to these oppressive regimes will likely grow determined to win back their freedom. But the long and brutal history of autocracy leaves little doubt about how difficult and dangerous it will be for them to succeed. And so the best way to fight demagogues with authoritarian ambitions remains what it has always been: to defeat them at the ballot box before they ever step foot in the halls of power.
The Return of Doomsday
The New Nuclear Arms Race—and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It

Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

The year is 2020. The Russian military is conducting a large exercise in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea that borders the NATO member states Lithuania and Poland. An observer aircraft from the Western alliance accidentally crosses into Russian airspace and is shot down by a surface-to-air missile. NATO rushes air squadrons and combat vessels into the region. Both sides warn that they will consider using nuclear weapons if their vital interests are threatened.

Already on edge after the invasion of Crimea, rising tensions in the Middle East, the collapse of arms control agreements, and the deployment of new nuclear weapons, NATO and Russia are suddenly gearing up for conflict. In Washington, with the presidential campaign well under way, candidates are competing to take the hardest line on Russia. In Moscow, having learned that anti-Americanism pays off, the Russian leadership is escalating its harsh rhetoric against Washington.

With both sides on high alert, a cyberattack of unknown origin is launched against Russian early warning systems, simulating an incoming air attack by NATO against air and naval bases in Kaliningrad. With only minutes to confirm the authenticity of the attack and no ongoing NATO-Russian crisis-management dialogue, Moscow decides it must respond immediately and launches conventional cruise missiles from Kaliningrad bases at NATO’s Baltic airfields; NATO also responds immediately, with air strikes on Kaliningrad. Seeing NATO reinforcements...
arrive and fearing that a NATO ground invasion will follow, Moscow concludes that it must escalate to de-escalate—hoping to pause the conflict and open a pathway for a negotiated settlement on Moscow’s terms—and conducts a low-yield nuclear strike on nuclear storage bunkers at a NATO airfield. But the de-escalate calculus proves illusory, and a nuclear exchange begins.

This hypothetical may sound like the kind of catastrophic scenario that should have ended with the Cold War. But it has become disturbingly plausible once again. Its essential elements are already present today; all that is needed is a spark to light the tinder.

Even after decades of reducing their arsenals, the United States and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons—over 8,000 warheads, enough for each to destroy the other, and the world, several times over. For a long time, both sides worked hard to manage the threat these arsenals presented. In recent years, however, geopolitical tension has undermined “strategic stability”—the processes, mechanisms, and agreements that facilitate the peace-time management of strategic relationships and the avoidance of nuclear conflict, combined with the deployment of military forces in ways that minimize any incentive for nuclear first use. Arms control has withered, and communication channels have closed, while outdated Cold War nuclear postures have persisted alongside new threats in cyberspace and dangerous advances in military technology (soon to include hypersonic weaponry, which will travel at more than five times the speed of sound).

The United States and Russia are now in a state of strategic instability; an accident or mishap could set off a cataclysm. Not since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has the risk of a U.S.-Russian confrontation involving the use of nuclear weapons been as high as it is today. Yet unlike during the Cold War, both sides seem willfully blind to the peril.

Washington and Moscow share a responsibility to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, even at a time of mutual distrust and U.S. domestic divisions. The U.S. and Russian presidents must begin by creating a climate for dialogue between their governments, managing their differences and cooperating when they can—most of all when it comes to addressing the common existential threat of nuclear war. Reviving and reinventing strategic stability will be a long-term process, but in the United States, leaders from across the political
spectrum should put this at the top of the priority list and get to work on mitigating the short-term dangers of confrontation. The risk of nuclear escalation is too high to wait.

MISSILES AND MISTRUST

Over much of the past two decades, clashing national interests and zero-sum security policies in and around Europe have fueled tension and mistrust between Russia and the West. Friction over the Balkans and the war in Kosovo in the 1990s was an early indicator that the relationship would be contentious in the post-Soviet era. The ongoing process of NATO enlargement that was begun in 1997 substantially added to the tensions. After Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush came to power, in 2000 and 2001, respectively, disputes over missile defense and the Iraq war helped spur Putin’s seminal speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he criticized the United States’ “almost uncontained hyper use of force” and warned of a new arms race. The Russian invasion of Georgia followed in 2008, deepening mistrust between Moscow and the West, which carried into the Obama era despite efforts to “reset” relations. The 2011 NATO intervention and regime change in Libya fueled suspicions in the Kremlin that bordered on paranoia.

The situation gradually worsened until 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military intervention in eastern Ukraine, and the downing of a Malaysia Airlines flight reportedly by a Russian-made missile fired from territory controlled by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine ruptured relations between Russia and the West. The United States and Europe responded with economic sanctions designed to isolate Russia and force a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine crisis. Despite two negotiated agreements—the Minsk I and II deals of 2014 and 2015—the conflict has ground on. NATO and Russia have reinforced their military postures throughout the region. In the Baltics and around the Black Sea, NATO and Russian forces are operating in close proximity, increasing the risk that an accident or a miscalculation will lead to a catastrophic result.

Exacerbating this danger is the deliberate and accelerating breakdown of the arms control architecture that for decades provided re-
straint, transparency, and predictability for each side’s conventional and nuclear forces. In their absence, Russia and the West are assuming and planning for worst-case scenarios. The first crack appeared in 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed three decades earlier to prevent Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. Five years later, Russia effectively suspended another landmark agreement, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and NATO followed suit.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—which banned an entire class of destabilizing nuclear-capable missiles on European territory—has been dealt a likely fatal blow with this year’s decisions by Washington to withdraw from the treaty and by Moscow to suspend implementation of it. This followed U.S. concerns about Russian deployment of prohibited missiles and Russian allegations raised in response. The fate of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is also in doubt, with four Republican U.S. senators writing to President Donald Trump this past spring asking if he would consider “unsigning” the treaty. The future of the 2010 New START treaty is also unclear. Unless both sides agree to extend it—a proposition Trump and his administration have consistently refused to embrace—the treaty will expire in 2021. In short, in less than two years, the last remaining agreement to
limit and monitor the deployment of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces could unravel completely. If it does, any remaining transparency of both sides’ nuclear arsenals, including on-site inspections by each country, will vanish with it.

At the same time as checks on existing weapons are falling away, new technologies threaten to further destabilize the military balance. Sophisticated cyberattacks could compromise early warning systems or nuclear command-and-control structures, increasing the risk of false alarms. Prompt-strike forces, including delivery systems that pair conventional or nuclear warheads with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle or cruise missile, can travel at very high speeds, fly at low altitudes, and maneuver to elude defenses. If deployed, they would decrease a defender’s warning and decision time when under attack, increasing the fear of military planners on both sides that a potential first strike could deliver a decisive advantage to the attacker. Then there is the militarization of outer space, a domain that remains virtually unregulated by agreements or understandings: China, Russia, and, most recently, India have built up their antisatellite capabilities, and Washington is mulling a dedicated space force.

This toxic mix of decaying arms control and new advanced weaponry is made even more dangerous by the absence of dialogue between Russia and the West—in particular, between civilian and military professionals in the defense and foreign ministries. The current disconnect is unprecedented even when compared with the height of the Cold War. As tense as that conflict was, Democrats and Republicans in the White House and Congress understood that engagement with the Soviet Union was essential to keeping Americans safe. U.S. and Soviet negotiators met regularly in Geneva, New York, and Vienna. U.S. military commanders spoke regularly in various forums, including arms control negotiations, with their Soviet counterparts, united by a sense of mutual obligation to prevent nuclear disasters.

This precautionary mindset has faded in the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine and interference in U.S. and European elections. The United States and its NATO allies are now stuck in a retaliatory spiral of confrontation with Russia. The West in recent years has treated dialogue as a reward to be earned by good behavior rather than a diplomatic tool to be employed out of necessity. Insufficient communication only exacerbates acrimony and tension—further raising the barrier to dialogue. The NATO-Russia Council, for example—a
forum set up in 2002 to ensure regular mutual consultation—has become dysfunctional; rather than turning to it in moments of crisis, such as during the Russian attack on Ukraine, NATO suspended all practical cooperation within the council for two years beginning in April 2014. Since then, it has met only 11 times in carefully orchestrated sessions, with officials below the level of NATO ambassadors. Routine exchanges between military professionals are still blocked.

Political fissures in the United States bear some of the responsibility for this communication breakdown. In Congress, distrust of Trump’s handling of relations with Moscow and justifiable outrage over Russia’s election interference and its actions in Ukraine are widespread. As a result, members of both political parties increasingly characterize all dialogue with Russia as suspect. Congress has passed, with overwhelming majorities, laws codifying existing sanctions against Russia and enacting new ones, making it extremely difficult for the president to alter or remove them on his own. More problematic, it has passed legislation prohibiting the U.S. military from cooperating with the Russian military. (Dialogue for limited purposes is still permitted but discouraged.) This restrictive legislation has had a chilling effect on much-needed military-to-military interactions.

Fractures within NATO have also hampered clear communication with Russia. The Trump administration has undercut the United States’ European allies by publicly castigating them for failing to spend more on defense while also putting into question whether the United States will honor its defense commitments. Over the objections of NATO member states and the EU, the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris agreement on climate change. All this transatlantic discord has damaged the perception of NATO as a strong alliance. Moreover, NATO members are divided over how to balance engagement and confrontation with Russia. Because of its uncertain and unpredictable leadership, Washington is in a weak position to guide this debate and ensure that Western states stick to a common and coherent line when dealing with Russia. In a crisis, NATO disunity could undermine U.S. credibility and exacerbate the risk of military confrontation with Russia.

RUSSIA AS IT IS
For all of Russia’s internal problems—an economic and political structure whose overreliance on one commodity (energy) and one person (Putin) is by definition fragile—the country will remain a force to be
reckoned with for a long time to come. By virtue of its vast geography, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, rebuilt military, and immense nuclear forces, Russia can disrupt geopolitical currents in areas vital to the interests of the United States, including Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Arctic. Further clashes and crises are not just possible but probable. Both sides need to start planning now to make sure that any such confrontations do not spiral out of control—or, better yet, to prevent them from occurring in the first place.

Strategic engagement with Moscow does not mean ignoring Russian aggression, be it intervention in Ukraine, interference in Western elections, a chemical attack on a former KGB agent in the United Kingdom, or violations of the INF Treaty. Even as it seeks to work with Russia on nuclear threat reduction, the West should continue seeking to deter unacceptable behavior. The United States and the EU should not, for example, lift their Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia without substantial movement on Ukraine. Nor should Washington remove the sanctions it imposed in response to Russian electoral interference until such interference has been reliably curtailed. At the same time, Congress must give Trump and his successors the flexibility to selectively lift sanctions if they have achieved their purpose; if the Russians conclude they will never get out of the penalty box, they will have very little incentive to change their aggressive behavior.

NATO should also maintain its enhanced military posture in Europe, including its temporary force rotations in the Baltic countries. Yet at the same time, it should honor its commitment—made in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, a road map for the normalization of relations after the Cold War—not to store or deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members in eastern Europe.

Put simply, leaders in Washington and other NATO capitals should engage Russia with a clear-eyed understanding of their differences. But dialogue must rest on a recognition of the shared vital interest in preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

GETTING BACK TO JAW-JAW
In Washington, the first step toward rebuilding a productive dialogue with Moscow is rebuilding a working relationship between the Trump administration and Congress on Russia policy. Even with the lack of trust between the president and congressional Democrats, especially in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, bipartisan leadership
from Congress is essential, and essential now: given the gravity of the risks, legislators simply cannot afford to wait for new leadership in the White House or in the Kremlin.

A new bipartisan liaison group—of House and Senate leaders and committee chairs, on one side, and relevant senior administration officials, on the other—focused on Russia policy, nuclear dangers, and NATO could kick-start and help sustain this process. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Democrat of California, and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, need not wait for a call from the White House to get such a group up and running. They should make this proposal to increase executive-legislative coordination directly to the president and the secretary of state. The forum would strengthen the United States’ hand in dealing with Russia by showing a bipartisan executive-legislative front. If the Trump administration objects or demurs, Congress should use its legislative and appropriations powers to establish the liaison group regardless and use committee hearings to call administration witnesses. (With the help of Pelosi and McConnell, the liaison group could also provide a foundation for dialogue with parliamentary counterparts and Russian leaders.)

The fact that Trump and Putin reportedly agreed to a new dialogue on strategic stability and nuclear dangers at a meeting in Helsinki in July 2018 was a step in the right direction. But their inability to follow through—including at the level of civilian and military professionals, who need the green light from their leaders—underlines how dysfunctional relations have become. The talks on “strategic security” between U.S. and Russian diplomats that began following the June Trump-Putin meeting in Osaka, Japan, at the G-20 summit this year, should be expanded to include senior military and other officials from both governments—with a broader agenda and more frequent meetings. Congressional leaders should also give bipartisan—or, rather, nonpartisan—backing to this initiative.

To increase transparency and trust between their militaries and among militaries Europe-wide, the United States, NATO, and Russia should restart a crisis-management dialogue, one that includes their nuclear commanders. Previously, the NATO-Russia Council (buttressed by arms control compliance commissions) provided a forum for discussions along these lines, and ideally this dialogue could be resumed in the council, or as a separate working group. The United States, NATO, and Russia should also reopen channels of engagement.
between their respective nuclear scientific and expert communities on a variety of shared interests: preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism, enhancing the safety of nuclear reactors, investigating solutions to the problem of nuclear waste, supporting beneficial innovations in civilian nuclear science, and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency.

With a modicum of cooperation restored, the United States and Russia could take more specific steps to reduce the likelihood of a new nuclear arms race—of vital importance for international security, particularly in light of the probable demise of the INF treaty. All nations have an interest in seeing the New START treaty fully implemented and extended through 2026, the maximum five-year extension permitted by the treaty. Here, too, Congress can provide support and make clear—as it did during the United States’ nuclear buildup in the 1980s—that funding for nuclear modernization comes with the expectation that Washington will work with Moscow to reduce nuclear risks and continue to impose verifiable limits on both sides’ arsenals.

BREAKING THE ESCALATION CYCLE
Another top priority is finding ways to give leaders of nuclear weapons states more time to reach a decision on whether to use their nuclear weapons in a moment of crisis—especially when they fear they may be under attack by nuclear weapons. Today, decision-makers in Washington and Moscow have only a precious few minutes to decide whether a warning of a possible nuclear attack is real and thus whether to retaliate with a nuclear attack of their own. New technologies, especially hypersonic weapons and cyberattacks, threaten to make that decision time even shorter. The fact that Russian troops are deployed, and routinely conduct military exercises, in Russia’s western regions close to NATO’s boundaries, and NATO troops are deployed, and have recently conducted military exercises, close to Russia’s borders further raises fears of a short-warning attack. Such shrinking decision time and heightened anxieties make the risk of a mistake all too real. Leaders in both Washington and Moscow should clearly direct their military leaders to work together on ways to minimize such fears and increase their decision time.

Although it may seem counterintuitive given the current political landscape and emphasis on deterrence, the United States, NATO, and Russia should consider that U.S. and Russian forward-deployed
nuclear weapons in Europe may be more of a security risk than an asset. These weapons are potential targets in the early phases of a conflict and thus could trigger early nuclear use, an outcome that all sides must avoid. Despite speculation about Russian interest in escalating to de-escalate (that is, that Moscow would under certain circumstances deliberately escalate a conflict through limited nuclear use to create the conditions for a settlement on terms favorable to Russia—a complex proposition often denied by Russian officials and academics), any nuclear use would almost certainly trigger further escalation. Moreover, U.S. forward-deployed weapons are an attractive target for terrorists, as they are more vulnerable if located in areas where there is a heightened risk of terrorism or political instability (this is also true for Russian weapons). By the same token, Washington and Moscow must find a way to prevent the deployment of U.S. or Russian intermediate-range missiles systems in the Euro-Atlantic region, given that the constraints of the INF Treaty—designed to prevent such deployments—are likely to no longer be binding. Otherwise, leaders in Moscow, London, and Paris could once again become consumed with fears of a short-warning nuclear attack that could decapitate a nation's leaders and its command and control, which would greatly increase the risk of false warnings.

Since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, in 2002, long-range missile defense has been left out of any arms control framework, and Russian leaders worry that the U.S. missile defense program could at some point undermine the Russian nuclear deterrent. A new, legally binding agreement like the ABM Treaty is unlikely given the intense opposition to any constraints on missile defense in the U.S. Senate, which would have to approve any new treaty by a two-thirds vote. Nonetheless, it should be possible to negotiate soft guidelines on missile defense, including reciprocal transparency measures, such as on-site visits to monitor missile defense capabilities and written understandings not to deploy missile defenses in ways or at levels that would threaten the other’s nuclear deterrent and fan first-strike concerns. Exchanging more information about each side’s operations and capabilities could help ensure that prompt-strike systems, such as modern hypersonic missiles, do not further erode strategic stability.
This is primarily a U.S.-Russian issue, but with China’s reported development of hypersonic missile capabilities, addressing it will ultimately require broader engagement. It would also help to offer more transparency on nonnuclear prompt-strike systems and commit to segregating these conventional capabilities from nuclear-weapons-related activities or deployments. Doing so could help ensure that early warning systems would not mistake a conventional attack for a nuclear one. New START or a successor agreement could also put restrictions on some long-range prompt-strike systems capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons—since their unconstrained deployment would increase fears of a first strike.

Washington and Moscow should also work together to develop clear redlines in cyberspace and outer space. In both domains, which are largely unregulated, other nations, or third parties, could threaten U.S. and Russian interests—or even attempt to spark a war between the United States and Russia. Cyberattacks on nuclear facilities, nuclear command-and-control structures, or early warning systems could cause miscalculations or blunders, such as a false warning of a missile attack or a failure to prevent the theft of nuclear materials. As states continue to develop and refine their ability to attack satellites, the United States and Russia could be blinded in the early stages of a conflict. To ameliorate this problem, the United States and Russia could set up a pilot project focused on exchanging information on activities in outer space, which could help avoid collisions and conflicts in space. The pilot project would identify the information to be exchanged and a mechanism for exchanging it—both of which could lead the United States and Russia to adopt guidelines governing civil and defense space activities. Redlines and pilot projects could help build trust and set the stage for future confidence-building measures, or even legally binding agreements, on activities in cyberspace and outer space.

Finally, and perhaps most important, both sides should develop a set of core nuclear weapons principles, starting with the understanding, first articulated in 1985 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Affirming this principle was an important building block to ending the Cold War. Today, it could pave the way for important practical steps, such as a renewed effort by the P5—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which are all
also nuclear weapons states—to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and increase cooperation to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials.

BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE
For decades, strategic stability between the United States and Russia included a mutual recognition of vital interests, redlines, and the means to reduce the risks of accidents or miscalculations leading to conflict, and especially the use of nuclear weapons. Today, however, clashing national interests, insufficient dialogue, eroding arms control structures, advanced missile systems, and new cyberweapons have destabilized the old equilibrium. Political polarization in Washington has only made matters worse, undoing any remnants of a domestic consensus about U.S. foreign policy toward Russia. Unless Washington and Moscow confront these problems now, a major international conflict or nuclear escalation is disturbingly plausible—perhaps even likely. Instead, Trump and Putin have bantered about Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the idea of “getting rid of the press,” and the problem of “fake news,” all at a time when press freedoms are threatened globally and authoritarianism is on the rise. Under these grim circumstances, some have suggested abandoning U.S.-Russian talks and waiting for new leadership in both countries. That would be a mistake. Dialogue between the two presidents remains essential: only that can create the political space for civilian and military officials in both nations to engage with one another in discussions that could prevent catastrophe. Congress must set a tone of bipartisan support for communicating and cooperating with Russia to reduce military risks, especially those involving nuclear weapons. To do otherwise puts Americans at grave risk.

To paraphrase John F. Kennedy—who, during the Cuban missile crisis, had a closer call with Armageddon than any other U.S. leader—humankind has not survived the tests and trials of thousands of years only to surrender everything now, including its existence. Today, watching as the edifice of strategic stability slowly but surely collapses, Washington and Moscow are acting as if time is on their side. It is not.
Winning the Peace in Iraq

Don’t Give Up on Baghdad’s Fragile Democracy

Linda Robinson

For Americans who came of age near the turn of the current century, the war in Iraq was a generation-defining experience. When the United States invaded the country in 2003, toppling the government of Saddam Hussein in a matter of weeks, many saw the war as a necessary or even noble endeavor to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, which Saddam was allegedly developing—and bring democracy to parts of the world that had long suffered under the weight of tyranny.

By the time U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, such illusions had been shattered. The conflict had cost the United States $731 billion, claimed the lives of at least 110,000 Iraqis and nearly 5,000 U.S. troops, and done lasting damage to Washington’s international reputation. The invasion had sparked a virulent insurgency that was only barely quelled by 2011, and which resurfaced following the U.S. withdrawal, when a vicious jihadist group calling itself the Islamic State (or ISIS) seized an area the size of Iceland in western Iraq and eastern Syria. Most Americans who have been to Iraq remember car bombs and streets lined with ten-foot-tall concrete blast walls. For those who have never been, Iraq is less a place than a symbol of imperial hubris—a tragic mistake that they would prefer to forget.

Yet Iraq today is a different country. Few Americans understand the remarkable success of Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S. campaign to defeat ISIS. Some 7,000 U.S. troops (and 5,000 more from 25 countries in the anti-ISIS coalition) provided support to Iraq’s army and local partners in Syria, who fought to free their towns, cities, and provinces from ISIS’ brutal grip. By the time these U.S.-backed forces
Winning the Peace in Iraq

had ejected ISIS from its final territorial stronghold, in Syria, in March of this year, the campaign had liberated 7.7 million people at the relatively modest cost of $31.2 billion. Today, Iraqi schools are open, Baghdad’s nightlife is vibrant, and security checkpoints have been removed. Last May, the country held largely free and fair nationwide parliamentary elections. Its population is young and forward-looking, and its government is back on its feet.

The United States has an opportunity to convert this momentum into a long-term geopolitical gain. Unfortunately, many Americans are so weary of their country’s involvement in Iraq that they fail to recognize the opportunity to salvage a positive outcome there that is far better than what anyone hoped to achieve even a few years ago. Many U.S. officials, meanwhile, are more focused on treating Iraq as an arena for combating Iran. They argue that, in the aftermath of ISIS’ defeat, Iraq has become an unreliable ally and even a proxy of Tehran. Worse, they appear willing to sacrifice the U.S. relationship with Baghdad—and put at risk the relative success that Iraq has become—in service of their campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran.

This approach would be a mistake. Cutting off U.S. support right when Baghdad has managed to achieve a modicum of stability would risk the hard-won gains of recent years, especially during Operation Inherent Resolve. And a confrontational U.S. policy toward Iraq would fan the dying embers of sectarianism at precisely the moment when the country is emerging as a stable, nonsectarian democracy. Worse, it would strengthen Iran’s hand in Iraq and provide ISIS with the chance it needs to rebuild. The only way the United States can achieve its goals—preventing ISIS’ return and ending Iran’s destabilizing activities in Iraq—is by working through and with Baghdad.

A NEW HOPE

Iraq’s future looks brighter today than it has at any point in the past decade. Its progress can be largely attributed to two factors: the country’s recent evolution away from Shiite-Sunni sectarianism and the coalition’s victory over ISIS.

Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections marked a maturation of Iraq’s democracy. These were the first elections in which sectarianism took a back seat to issues of good governance and the daily concerns of Iraqis. A range of parties formed cross-sectarian or nonsectarian coalitions to compete for votes; none of them emerged dominant. Instead,
the election produced a number of parliamentary blocs that must bargain with one another to get anything done. The current government relies on consensus and is led by two politicians with a history of working with the United States: Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi and President Barham Salih. When the government took office in October 2018, it marked Iraq’s fourth successive peaceful transfer of power.

The 2018 elections were a demonstration of Iraqis’ priorities. The alliance that won the most votes, the Sairoon (Marching Toward Reform) coalition, was led by followers of the populist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the erstwhile leader of a militia that fought U.S. troops from 2004 to 2008. Although Sadr studied and once sought refuge in Iran, he is also a vocal nationalist who wants to ensure Iraq’s independence from both Washington and Tehran. Many Iraqis consider today’s creeping Iranian influence to be an affront to their country’s sovereignty, and during the campaign, Sadr persuasively positioned his bloc as the independent alternative to the one led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (which was seen as too pro-American) and the one led by Hadi al-Ameri (which was seen as too close to Iran).

Even more important than Sadr’s emphasis on independence was his decision to champion bread-and-butter economic and governance issues. Sadr has long enjoyed support among poor Shiites thanks to his years spent demanding improved public services and a crackdown on Iraq’s egregious corruption. Although many Iraqis benefit from entrenched party patronage—some 60 percent of employed Iraqis are on the public payroll—they are fed up with politicians siphoning millions of dollars from the public coffers. Recognizing this frustration, Sadr called for the removal of corrupt officials and an upgrading of public services, especially electricity. After the election, he insisted on the appointment of technically competent cabinet ministers instead of politicians as a condition of his support for the government, which has largely occurred.

The demand for improved governance has moved to the fore now that Iraq has finally emerged from its vicious, five-year battle against ISIS. In 2014, the terrorist group swept across northern and western Iraq, capturing roughly one-third of the country’s territory, including Mosul, its second-largest city. Iraq’s military and police forces, corroded by years of political interference and corruption, all but disin-
tegrated in the face of ISIS’s offensive. Some Sunnis, alienated by years of sectarian governance under the Shiite prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, welcomed ISIS forces as liberators. By the summer of 2014, many feared that the group would take Baghdad.

Alarmed by ISIS’s advance, Iran was the first country to come to Baghdad’s aid—by June, it had begun sending aid, equipment, and advisers from the Quds Force, a unit of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Then, in September 2014, Maliki stepped down in favor of Abadi, a pro-U.S. moderate who worked to soothe Sunni fears of persecution. That same month, the United States formed a global coalition to defeat ISIS. Washington and its coalition partners provided Iraq with military assistance in the form of training, equipment, battlefield advisers, and air power. But it was the Iraqis who did the fighting.

The fact that the Iraqis provided most of the troops to defeat ISIS in Iraq was essential to restoring the country’s morale. The government did receive outside help—Iran backed Iraqi Shiite militias, and Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force, became a ubiquitous presence in Iraq during the war. Yet the major military gains in the anti-ISIS campaign were made, with coalition assistance, by the Iraqi army and especially the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, an elite, nonsectarian force funded, trained, and supported by the United States since 2003.

UNSTEADY PROGRESS

Iraq has defeated ISIS on the battlefield, but it has not yet won the peace. The country now faces the massive task of reconstruction. The Iraqi government, assisted by the UN Development Program and the U.S.-led coalition, has returned basic services to places such as eastern Mosul, which was devastated by heavy fighting in 2016 and 2017. But western Mosul and other areas still resemble the bombed-out cities of Europe at the end of World War II.

At an international donor conference last year, Iraq secured some $30 billion in aid, loan, and credit pledges. Yet the government has estimated that recovery and reconstruction could cost as much as $88 billion. The task will take a decade or more, provided the Iraqi government and international donors remain committed to rebuilding Sunni areas. Without consistent progress in this effort, hope will wane and discontent will grow. Already, there are worrying signs that the momentum for ensuring Iraq’s stabilization and security has begun to stall. If it does, it could augur a return to a full-blown insurgency.
In the year and a half since December 2017, when Abadi declared Iraq’s liberation from ISIS, three million internally displaced people have returned to their homes in Iraq. But 1.6 million Iraqis, most of them Sunnis, are still displaced. The International Organization for Migration estimates that most of the remaining displaced people have now been so for over three years—a tipping point that the organization and other refugee experts say threatens permanent displacement. Many of these people are shunned by their fellow Iraqis, who suspect them of having supported ISIS.

The risk is that the resulting tensions could reignite sectarian conflict, drawing disaffected Sunnis—especially permanently displaced ones—back into the arms of ISIS. The group has already begun to reawaken, as former fighters drift back to their homes, forming sleeper cells in cities or creating rural safe havens in the Iraqi and Syrian deserts. Although ISIS attacks have declined since the destruction of the territorial caliphate, the group claims to be carrying out several dozen attacks and inflicting some 300 casualties every week, most of them in Iraq and Syria, a tally that roughly parallels those of outside observers.

**PRESSURE DROP**

Despite the progress it has made in recent years, Iraq is in a delicate position. The United States should be doing what it can to not only ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS but also assist Baghdad with the difficult work of reconstruction. Since the election of Donald Trump in 2016, however, U.S. policy toward Iraq has become increasingly confrontational, as the administration has made Iraq a central battleground in its fights with Iran.

Trump has presented Iraq with two demands that will be difficult for the country to meet. In November 2018, as part of its sanctions policy, Washington ordered Iraq to cease importing electricity and natural gas (which is used to make electricity) from Iran. In principle, Baghdad agrees with the goal of achieving energy independence. But in practice, Iraq currently receives about 40 percent of its electricity supply from Iran. As Luay al-Khatteeb, Iraq’s electricity minister, explained to U.S. officials in December, finding alternate energy sources will require rebuilding Iraq’s decrepit power grid and addressing the damage done by decades of war, mismanagement, and corruption—a project that he estimates will take at least two years. The United States has issued a series of 90-day waivers, most recently in June, to give
Iraq time to comply. But if the administration stops granting waivers and Iranian imports are halted, the resulting electricity blackouts will certainly cause Basra and other Iraqi cities to erupt in violent protests, as they did last summer in response to power shortages.

The United States has also demanded that Iraq disband several Shiite militias with close ties to Iran. These militias are not a new problem: in 2009, Washington designated the most powerful Iranian-created militia, Kataib Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization for its attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq; the group and its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, were also subject to U.S. sanctions targeting insurgents and militias. But over the past five years, the issue has become far more complex. In June 2014, a wave of mostly Shiite volunteers responded to a call from Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to help defend the country against ISIS. Hundreds of small militia groups formed, and in 2016, these groups were formally recognized under Iraqi law as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF. The Iraqi government office set up to oversee the PMF, the Popular Mobilization Committee, became a conduit for Iranian influence, with Muhandis serving as the committee’s deputy chair.

Washington has called on Baghdad to disband both the PMF and militia groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, which it often treats as essentially
indistinguishable. The Iraqi government agrees that the militias should be broken up but understands that, given Iran’s clout, doing so will take some time and deft maneuvering. One aspect of that maneuvering will be to distinguish Iranian-backed militias from groups of Shiite volunteers who were largely motivated by patriotism. Many PMF fighters have already gone home, but over 100,000 remain on the government’s payroll. Some groups have become entrenched and are allegedly involved in extortion and other illegal activities.

The Iraqi constitution bans political militias—a provision that has wide popular support. In addition, Abdul-Mahdi issued a decree in July 2019 that called on all entities bearing arms to be incorporated into the armed forces. As the PMF is already legally part of Iraq’s armed forces, this decree could serve as a vehicle for dissolving the Iranian-backed militias—something Abadi had sought to do with a previous order. Carrying out this decree, however, will require building a powerful coalition in parliament, likely with the Sadrists in the lead.

The PMF is a separate issue. It is unlikely to be disbanded outright. Thanks to the PMF’s achievements in the anti-ISIS campaign, it is politically popular, especially among Shiites. The problem is that the PMF’s official role is redundant, overlapping with that of the Ministry of the Interior’s police force, which already struggles to attract enough qualified recruits. Since PMF fighters receive the same pay and benefits as police officers, they have little incentive to join the federal police. This issue can be best addressed over time, as part of an effort to professionalize the entire armed forces of Iraq.

Instead of engaging with their Iraqi colleagues to find workable solutions, however, officials in the Trump administration seem intent on alienating them. Senior U.S. policymakers apparently believe that Iraqis are hostile to the United States, ungrateful for its help, and beholden to Iran. When I spoke to one U.S. diplomat recently, he noted that almost one-third of Iraq’s current parliamentarians had been detained by U.S. forces at some point before 2011. The implication was that they could not be trusted. But since 2003, the United States has often worked with former combatants in Iraq and encouraged their reintegration into mainstream politics. Abadi’s interior minister, Qasim al-Araji, was a former U.S. detainee, yet he worked closely with

Despite the progress it has made in recent years, Iraq is in a delicate position.
the U.S. coalition to coordinate the counter-ISIS campaign. Washington has cooperated with Ameri, who is the leader of the pro-Iranian Badr Organization, for years.

The administration’s statements and actions have affronted Iraqis by appearing to ignore their sovereignty, which is still a sore subject for a country the United States invaded. In February, Trump asserted in a Face the Nation interview that he planned on keeping U.S. troops in Iraq to “watch” Iran. This touched a nerve—the Iraqi government welcomes the presence of U.S. troops for the express purposes of defeating ISIS and helping improve its armed forces, but its policy is to maintain good relations with both Washington and Tehran. Trump’s statement drew rebukes from Iraq’s prime minister, its president, and Sistani. Then, on May 7, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a surprise visit to Baghdad, where he met with Iraqi leaders and publicly demanded assurances that they would protect Americans against any hostile activity, implicitly from Iran. A few days later, the State Department ordered all nonessential personnel to leave the U.S. embassy in Baghdad after a mortar fell nearby. Since then, two locations where U.S. personnel are stationed have been targeted by rockets, likely fired by Iranian-backed militias.

The mortar and rocket attacks were reminders of the bad old days of the U.S. occupation, when rockets landed near the embassy with some regularity, as well as troubling signs that U.S. troops could be targeted as Washington increases its pressure on Tehran. Yet the United States should be working with the Iraqi government, which desperately wants to avoid a confrontation with Iran, rather than treating it with disdain. The Trump administration’s moves were widely seen as overreactions by U.S. and coalition officials in Iraq, who for the past four years have been quietly working to mitigate the threat posed by Iranian-backed militias and who are confident in their ability to protect U.S. troops. For most Iraqis—and for many coalition officials, too—Pompeo’s demand came across less as a genuine response to a security threat and more as an unnecessary attempt to humiliate Baghdad.

Washington is putting the Iraqi government in a difficult position. It will appear weak to Iraqis if it does not resist American browbeating. And the more confrontational Washington’s stance becomes, the more that pro-U.S. Iraqi politicians will be discredited in the eyes of their fellow citizens. The Trump administration’s approach thus risks driving Iraq into the arms of Iran—the opposite of its stated goal.
Worse, an Iraqi government forced to lean on Tehran would once again alienate Sunnis, paving the way for a return of sectarianism and even a resurgence of ISIS.

COUNTERING IRAN, WINNING IRAQ

With Iraq at a critical point in its transition to a stable and secure democracy, U.S. actions can either help ensure this transition’s success or fundamentally jeopardize its prospects. As this opportunity may be short lived, Washington should act quickly to seize it. It should focus its security assistance and diplomatic efforts on coordinating with the Iraqi government to make certain that there is a successful conclusion to the counter-ISIS campaign—one that will not only eliminate the last remnants of the group but also address the grievances that drove its success in the first place. At the same time, the United States should work behind the scenes with Baghdad to address Iran’s destabilizing activities in Iraq. Finally, the United States should help integrate Iraq into a set of long-term bilateral, multilateral, and regional partnerships.

Continued security assistance to Iraq will be necessary to ensure that ISIS’ nascent efforts to make a comeback do not succeed. The Iraqi security forces are on the mend, but further professionalization of the army and the police force is needed to prevent these forces from unraveling again. A combination of U.S. aid and diplomacy can guarantee that Iraq’s war-damaged areas are rebuilt and that its 1.7 million displaced citizens find homes while resisting ISIS’ blandishments. Washington should also consider pressing Baghdad to revise or eliminate its de-Baathification law, which still subjects Sunnis to unfair treatment.

To ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS, the United States will also need to more actively grapple with the difficult problem of ISIS foreign fighters detained in Syria. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are currently holding over 2,000 foreign fighters, but as the SDF is a non-governmental entity, this is not a permanent solution. The U.S. government should push for one of two solutions: an international tribunal to try these detainees or a coordinated international effort to have them transferred to and tried, or at least held, in their countries of origin.

The United States must also adopt an approach to reducing Iran’s negative influence in Iraq that will help stabilize the region, rather than corner the Iraqi government and force it to choose between Washington and Tehran. Iraqi nationalism is the ultimate hedge against Iran’s overweening ambitions; no Iraqi wishes for his or her
country to become a pawn of Iran. Yet the United States must make sure that the sovereignty card is played against Tehran and not against Washington. Issuing public demands to Baghdad is counterproductive—pressure must be exerted behind closed doors, and savvy coalitions must be built to empower Iraqis to limit Iranian encroachment. That said, Iran is and will remain one of Iraq’s major trading partners, its primary source of tourism revenue, and a much larger and more powerful country forever on its borders. Only a web of countervailing influence from the United States, Europe, and the Arab world will secure Iraqi sovereignty.

The United States has all the tools to help Iraq succeed, and it is manifestly in Washington’s interest to do so. A strong, independent, and democratic Iraq will be a boon to U.S. interests in the Middle East. As the largest Shiite-majority Arab country, Iraq can serve as a bridge between the region’s Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Persians. As a neighbor and former rival of Iran, Iraq can also act as a brake on Tehran’s regional ambitions—provided that it is in a position to look after its own security needs.

A more consolidated Iraqi democracy will also make fewer demands on the United States. Iraq has the fifth-largest oil reserves in the world, which should provide it with the resources to care for its own people. The country is also, finally, beginning to restore diplomatic and commercial ties with the Gulf states, which had withered after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Baghdad, resumed commercial airline service to Iraq, provided the country with reconstruction aid, and welcomed Abdul-Mahdi and Sadr to Riyadh. In April, Saudi Arabia pledged $1 billion in investment to Iraq, and it has offered to sell Baghdad electricity at a discount to help wean the country off Iranian energy.

The basic architecture for a mutually beneficial U.S.-Iraqi relationship already exists. After the 2007 U.S. troop surge, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker worked with Salih, who was then deputy prime minister, and Salih’s fellow Kurd, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, to develop the Strategic Framework Agreement, which called on Washington and Baghdad to deepen their relationship from a security partnership to one spanning cultural, economic, educational, and scientific ties. Thus far, the United States has focused on winning contracts for U.S. businesses and gaining more visas as implicit preconditions for other forms of engagement. This is a mistake. Instead, the United States
should see the broad implementation of the agreement as a chance to use U.S. soft power—in the form of investment, trade, tourism, and educational and scientific exchanges—to draw Washington and Baghdad closer together.

**TELL ME HOW THIS REALLY ENDS**

The U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq have shown the dangers of starting a major war in the absence of some overwhelming strategic objective, such as the liberation of Europe in World War II. Yet the most recent chapter of the United States’ engagement in Iraq holds a much different lesson. The success of Operation Inherent Resolve, with its focus on assisting Iraqis as they took the lead in the fight for their own land, points the way toward a new paradigm for military operations: a middle ground between costly wars and nonintervention, one that relies more on cooperation, diplomacy, and security assistance than on unilateral military action.

After more than a decade of civil war, Iraq has a chance to become a success story all the same: a stable emerging democracy in a region where both stability and democracy are hard to find. Some Americans view Iraq as an unmitigated failure and would prefer to cut U.S. losses there. But the real failure would be to abandon Iraq just at the moment when a genuine victory is at hand.
The India Dividend

New Delhi Remains Washington’s Best Hope in Asia

Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis

For two decades, Washington has had high hopes for India on the global stage. Gigantic, populous, and resource rich, India is, by all appearances, a superpower in waiting. And as the world’s largest democracy, it promises—according to those hopes—to be a crucial U.S. partner at a time of rising competition from authoritarian challengers.

Almost 20 years ago, acting on such expectations, Washington began resolving the disagreements that had held U.S.-Indian relations back through the Cold War and into the 1990s. During George W. Bush’s presidency, U.S. officials gave up their long-standing insistence that India relinquish its nuclear weapons, allowing Washington and New Delhi to sign a landmark nuclear accord and opening the way to heavy U.S. investments—diplomatic, economic, and military—to facilitate India’s rise. Successive U.S. administrations provided liberal access to military technologies and promoted India’s role in international institutions, culminating in President Barack Obama’s endorsement of Indian aspirations to permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Albeit imperiled by the Trump administration’s disregard for allies and partners, this basic U.S. approach continues to this day.

Yet the logic of the U.S.-Indian partnership remains misunderstood by many, especially in the United States. The transformation of U.S.-Indian ties since the early years of this century has given rise to expectations that, sooner or later, the two countries would become allies in all but name, closely aligned on virtually every major foreign policy...
issue. That such an accord has not materialized has brought creeping disappointment and doubt about the relationship's long-term viability.

Critics carp that the United States has overinvested in India—that the favors accorded to New Delhi have not been worth the return. They point, for instance, to India's failure to select a U.S. fighter for its air force or to its inability to conclude the nuclear reactor purchases promised under the breakthrough nuclear agreement. Even supporters of the partnership occasionally chafe at how long bilateral engagement has taken to produce the expected fruits. The Trump administration has taken such frustration further, focusing less on India's potential as a partner than on its unbalanced trade with the United States. It recently withdrew India's privileged trade access to the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences program, churlishly announcing the decision just hours after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was sworn into office for a second time following his spectacular victory in elections this past spring.

Both critics and supporters of the U.S.-Indian relationship seem to agree that the new engagement between the two democracies has not yielded the alliance-like bond once hoped for. These complaints are off the mark. Since the turn of the century, India has become a strong supporter of the U.S.-led international order, despite showing no interest in an alliance with Washington. If the United States’ aim is to turn India into a close ally, formal or otherwise, it will come to grief. Instead, Washington and New Delhi should strive to forge a partnership oriented toward furthering common interests without expecting an alliance of any kind. Simply put, the success of U.S. efforts in India should be measured not by what India does for the United States but by what India does for itself: if New Delhi puts in the economic and political work to make itself a major power—especially at a time of growing Chinese influence—Washington’s ambition to sustain what then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice once called “a balance of power that favors freedom” will have been satisfied in Asia.

To achieve that goal, U.S. and Indian officials alike must think about the relationship differently. Ultimately, the greatest obstacle to a deeper partnership is wishful thinking about what it can achieve.

**STRATEGIC ALTRUISM**

U.S.-Indian relations underwent a dramatic change soon after Bush assumed the presidency, in 2001. After decades of alienation, Bush's
predecessor, Bill Clinton, had already made some headway with a successful visit to New Delhi in March 2000. But a major point of friction remained: the insistence that relations could not improve unless India gave up its nuclear weapons, first developed in the 1970s, in the face of opposition from Washington.

Bush sought to accelerate cooperation with India in ways that would overcome existing disagreements and help both sides navigate the new century. Although the war on terrorism provided a first opportunity for cooperation (since both countries faced a threat from jihadist organizations), a larger mutual challenge lay over the horizon: China's rise. Considering its long-standing border disputes with China, Chinese support for its archrival Pakistan, and China's growing weight in South Asia and beyond, India had major concerns about China. In particular, leaders in New Delhi feared that a too-powerful China could abridge the freedom and security of weaker neighbors. The United States, for its part, was beginning to view China's rise as a threat to allies such as Taiwan and Japan. Washington also worried about Beijing's ambitions to have China gradually replace the United States as the key security provider in Asia and its increasingly vocal opposition to a global system underpinned by U.S. primacy. Where China was concerned, U.S. and Indian national interests intersected. Washington sought to maintain stability in Asia through an order based not on Chinese supremacy but on security and autonomy for all states in the region. India, driven by its own fears of Chinese domination, supported Washington's vision over Beijing's.

For India, neutralizing the hazards posed by a growing China required revitalizing its own power—in other words, becoming a great power itself. But Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his successors recognized that, in the short term, they could not reach this goal on their own. India's fractious democracy, institutional weaknesses, and passive strategic culture would impede the rapid accumulation of national power. Concerted support from external powers could mitigate these weaknesses—and no foreign partner mattered as much as the United States. American assistance could make the difference between effective balancing and a losing bet.

The Bush administration appreciated India's predicament. After many hard-fought bureaucratic battles, it came to accept the central argument we had been articulating from the U.S. embassy in New Delhi: that the United States should set aside its standing nonproliferation policy in regard to India as a means of building the latter's power to bal-
ance China. Washington thus began to convey its support for New Delhi in ways that would have seemed unimaginable a few years earlier. The United States started to work with India in four arenas in which India's possession of nuclear weapons had previously made meaningful cooperation all but impossible: civilian nuclear safety, civilian space programs, high-tech trade, and missile defense. That step laid the foundation for the achievement of Bush's second term, the civilian nuclear agreement, which inaugurated resumed cooperation with New Delhi on civilian nuclear energy without requiring it to give up its nuclear weapons.

Skeptics in and out of government argued that the United States ought to offer its support only to the degree that India would reciprocate by consistently aligning its policies with Washington's aims. But such a demand would have been a recipe for failure. India was too big to forgo its vital national interests when they collided with U.S. preferences, and it was too proud a nation to be seen as Washington's minion. It was also much weaker than the United States and could not often make substantial direct contributions toward realizing U.S. objectives.

Generous U.S. policies were not merely a favor to New Delhi; they were a conscious exercise of strategic altruism. When contemplating various forms of political support for India, U.S. leaders did not ask, “What can India do for us?” They hoped that India's upward trajectory would shift the Asian balance of power in ways favorable to the United States and thus prevent Beijing from abusing its growing clout in the region. A strong India was fundamentally in Washington's interest, even if New Delhi would often go its own way on specific policy issues. Both Bush and his successor, Barack Obama, turned a blind eye to India's positions in international trade negotiations, its relatively closed economy, and its voting record at the United Nations, all of which ran counter to U.S. preferences.

The U.S.-Indian partnership was built on a careful calculation by each side: Washington, unsettled by the prospect of an ascendant China, sought to build up new power centers in Asia. New Delhi, meanwhile, hoped to balance China by shoring up its own national power, with the United States acting both as a source of support and, more broadly, as a guardian of the liberal international order. Under these terms, the partnership flourished. The two countries concluded a defense cooperation agreement in 2005—a first for New Delhi, with any country—and went on to sign the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015; Indian policymakers, breaking with their
past reluctance, supported the U.S. goal of “ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea,” and agreed to a road map toward, among other things, bilateral military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Indian defense acquisitions of U.S. military equipment substantially increased, as well—from none in 2000 to over $18 billion worth in 2018—as New Delhi began shifting away from Russia, traditionally its principal arms supplier. U.S.-Indian cooperation intensified in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, military-to-military relations, and cybersecurity, as well as such sensitive ones as climate change and nuclear security. For two countries that had been at loggerheads for much of the previous three decades, this was a remarkable achievement.

A STRING OF PEARLS

U.S. President Donald Trump has complicated this relationship. His administration has shifted from strategic altruism to a narrower and more self-centered conception of U.S. national interests. Its “America first” vision has upturned the post–World War II compact that the United States would accept asymmetric burdens for its friends with the knowledge that the collective success of democratic states would serve Washington’s interests in its struggle against greater authoritarian threats. India, of course, had been a beneficiary of this bargain since at least 2001.

In some ways, U.S.-Indian relations have changed less in the Trump era than one might expect. There are several reasons for this continuity. For one, New Delhi saw foreign policy opportunities in Trump’s vic-
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tory—such as the possibility of improved U.S. relations with Russia, a longtime Indian ally, and more restraint in the use of force abroad, giving India more sway to advance its vision of a multipolar global order. It was also believed that Trump might put less pressure on India regarding its climate policies and its relations with Pakistan.

Above all, India’s fundamental security calculus hasn’t changed. Leaders in New Delhi are still convinced that China is bent on replacing the United States as the primary power in Asia, that this outcome would be exceedingly bad for India, and that only a strong partnership with the United States can prevent it. As one senior Indian policymaker told us, China’s rise “is so momentous that it should make every other government reexamine the basic principles of its foreign policy.”

New Delhi particularly worries that China is encircling India with a “string of pearls”—a collection of naval bases and dual-use facilities in the Indian Ocean that will threaten its security. A Chinese-funded shipping hub in Sri Lanka and a Chinese-controlled deep-water port in Pakistan have attracted particular concern. China has also invested $46 billion in a segment of its Belt and Road Initiative that crosses through Kashmir, which is claimed by both India and Pakistan. China’s economic, political, and military support for Pakistan, India’s enemy of seven decades and adversary in three major wars, suggest that China is working to establish a local counterweight to India.

India has also watched with growing alarm as China has illegally militarized its artificial islands in the South China Sea, opposed Indian membership in the UN Security Council, and blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international organization of nuclear supplier countries committed to nonproliferation. China claims a huge swath of Indian territory in the Himalayas, questions Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, and last year triggered a military standoff with Indian troops in Bhutanese territory. In Tibet, China has been constructing dams that could potentially limit the flow of water into India, which would exacerbate water scarcity and complicate flood control in India’s plains.

India’s response to the growing Chinese threat has been to develop its own capabilities, including military ones. But the Indian government recognizes that only the United States has the power necessary to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon in the decades ahead. As a result, fostering ties with the United States remains India’s topmost foreign policy priority. This openness to U.S. influence stands in sharp contrast to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calls for “the people of Asia to run the
affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia”—a security vision for the region that excludes the United States.

Buoyed by its hope that Washington will continue to serve as a steadfast security guarantor in Asia, India has begun to take a much tougher stance against China. It has condemned China’s claims to and militarization of islands in the South China Sea and its efforts to undermine the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, emphasizing the importance of “ASEAN centrality” in its own Indo-Pacific policy. New Delhi has also begun to engage more in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal group in which Australia, India, Japan, and the United States discuss how to protect the Indo-Pacific region in the face of Chinese ascendancy. And New Delhi has doubled down on its opposition to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative by collaborating with Japan on infrastructure investments in South and Southeast Asia and Africa.

Most important, India began, in the last years of the Obama administration, quietly cooperating with the U.S. military through intelligence sharing, while continuing to expand its military exercises with the United States. The Trump administration, for its part, has started to resolutely confront China, much to New Delhi’s satisfaction. It has also articulated both a South Asia strategy and an Indo-Pacific strategy that stress India’s pivotal role in the region, has allowed India to buy drones and other advanced weapons systems, and has put India on a par with NATO allies in terms of trade in sensitive technologies. Other defense projects, such as India’s acquisition of advanced military technologies to counteract the expanding Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, are still in the planning stage, but they nonetheless are noteworthy for a country that long preached the value of nonalignment.

A RELATIONSHIP ADRIFT?
Still, U.S.-Indian relations have hardly been spared from the fallout from the Trump administration’s disruptive and often counterproductive foreign policy. Indian leaders want Washington to sustain the traditional strategic altruism displayed toward New Delhi while doing whatever is necessary to protect a liberal international order that will be open to a rising India. On both counts, Trump’s actions have left them jittery.

Trump has questioned the value of U.S. alliances and raised doubts about whether the United States would defend its NATO allies against a Russian attack, leaving even staunch pro-U.S. stalwarts such as Modi wondering whether India could ever count on the United States
to come to its aid in the event of a major crisis with China. These worries are compounded by the suspicion that the United States under Trump is too internally divided to muster the strength, unity, and resolve necessary to compete with China in the long term. Trump has also initiated trade wars with allies such as Japan and the EU, and Indian policymakers are now grappling with Trump’s punitive trade measures against India; in late 2018, Trump labeled India “the tariff king.” Likewise, given that the Trump administration has taken crucial policy decisions regarding North Korea’s nuclear program without consulting South Korea or Japan, who is to say that Washington will be forthcoming on issues of vital interest to India? The administration’s approach to peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, which has failed to consider Indian interests, has already driven this point home in New Delhi. Trump has largely ignored the imperative of protecting U.S. alliances in Asia in the face of China’s rise—despite the continent’s centrality in the policy documents issued by his own administration. Trump, it appears, cares for little beyond major Asian nations’ trade balances with the United States. He has opted instead to invest heavily in personal relationships with autocrats such as Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump’s mercurial personality, which leaves the credibility of his commitments in doubt, and the departure of India’s supporters, such as former Defense Secretary James Mattis, from the administration have only made matters worse, despite recent efforts by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to correct the drift in U.S.-Indian relations.

The uncomfortable question facing Indian policymakers is whether they can continue banking on the cooperation of a Washington that appears to have abandoned the liberal international order and evinces little enthusiasm for continued strategic altruism toward New Delhi. Although they want a stronger relationship with Washington—in part because Modi has already expended much capital on this cause—they have already started diversifying India’s international portfolio and repairing New Delhi’s relations with Beijing and Moscow. In June 2018, Modi himself used a major international address to revive the concept of “strategic autonomy,” a hoary Indian locution that has traditionally stood for seeking good relations with the United States without alienating China or Russia. The fact that Modi has opted for such geopolitical hedging, knowing full well that the strategy would not protect India in the face of increased Chinese hostility, speaks volumes about
India’s crisis of faith in Trump’s America as a security partner.

Strong and enduring policy differences on trade, Iran, and Russia have complicated the relationship even further. Last September, in response to a decline in the rupee’s value against the dollar, the Modi government announced tariffs on various imports, such as jet fuel, plastics, gemstones, and shoes. After many delays in reaching a settlement in its trade dispute with the United States, it also imposed retaliatory duties on U.S. agricultural products and metals in response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. New Delhi is also concerned about the increased difficulties that Indian nationals face when applying for H1-B visas, which allow workers to take specialized jobs in the United States. Washington, for its part, would like to reduce barriers to U.S. access to the Indian market, which has been hampered by tariffs on agricultural and manufactured goods, the latter stemming from the “Make in India” initiative, designed to spur domestic manufacturing. U.S. companies in India also face restrictions on data collection and price constraints on medical products.

The United States and India are currently discussing how to resolve these issues, but the structure of a potential deal remains unclear. Washington could grant New Delhi a lasting exemption to its steel and aluminum tariffs, perhaps in exchange for specific concessions on the pricing of medical devices and information technology imports. But the Trump administration is unlikely to end its trade confrontations anytime soon. And India is unlikely to open its markets significantly in the near future: trade liberalization remains at the bottom of the India’s list of future economic reforms, largely because of the country’s desire to protect its economy from foreign competition for as long as possible. Modi, for all his other economic reforms, has actually taken India a step backward on trade by raising tariffs to generate revenue. Despite the danger that increased protectionism could undo the country’s progress since it liberalized its trading regime in the early 1990s, imperil Modi’s dream of India’s becoming a “leading power,” and exacerbate the trade frictions with Washington, there appears to be neither the vision nor the appetite in New Delhi to liberalize trade.

Iran is another major point of contention. India, whose ties to Iran go back centuries, strongly supported the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement; it had previously worried that a Shiite nuclear power would inevitably set off a cascade of proliferation in the Sunni Arab world, leaving India with many more Muslim nuclear powers to its west. After the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran deal, in May 2018, India joined
Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis

many other states in trying to keep elements of the agreement alive and find ways to avoid U.S. sanctions against Iran, especially on oil. When the United States reimposed oil sanctions in November 2018, India was one of eight countries to secure a six-month waiver from Washington. Subsequently, in an effort to appease Washington, India reduced its oil imports from Iran drastically, despite the importance New Delhi places on its partnership with Tehran (in part because Iran gives India land access to Afghanistan that circumvents Pakistani territory). The Trump administration wants Indian cooperation in its confrontation with Iran, but New Delhi is reluctant to clash with Tehran at a time when it has already gone beyond the original U.S. demands to minimize its Iranian energy imports. Iran is thus likely to remain a source of irritation in U.S.-Indian relations for the foreseeable future.

Relations with Russia form another stumbling block. India worries that despite Trump’s apparent desire to improve relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the U.S. administration is pushing Russia into an ever-closer relationship with China, including intensified military-to-military cooperation. New Delhi is at the same time determined to protect its ties with Moscow, including its decades-long defense collaboration. In October 2018, India announced a deal to purchase a $6 billion S-400 air defense system from Russia, and the two countries reaffirmed their military partnership. Unless the Trump administration issues a waiver for the sale, the deal will trigger secondary sanctions against India under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA. Yet Nirmala Sitharaman, at the time India’s defense minister, stated in July 2018 that India would not change its long-held position on the S-400 based on U.S. domestic laws alone. (Senior administration officials apparently promised India a waiver for the S-400 purchase if New Delhi cooperated by reducing its Iranian oil purchases—which it did—but the administration now seems to have changed its mind.) So far, neither side seems to be budging, and if the issue remains unresolved, there will be significant collateral damage.

PARTNERS, NOT ALLIES

On all these issues, Washington has taken a hard line, at least in public. This is because under Trump, strategic altruism toward India has taken a back seat to demands for specific acts of reciprocity. Yet this American expectation, which even U.S. treaty allies have trouble satisfying, is several bridges too far for what is nevertheless a U.S.-
friendly Indian government. New Delhi is content to cooperate when there are common national interests at stake, as in the case of balancing China, but seeks the right to go its own way without penalty when U.S. and Indian interests diverge.

Ultimately, neither the American nor the Indian approach provides a stable basis for long-term cooperation; both will instead produce only acrimony and frustration. The United States must recognize that India is not an ally and will not behave like one, even though there are issues on which the two countries’ vital national interests align. Strengthening those convergences should be a priority in Washington. Toward that end, the United States should desist under certain circumstances from levying demands on India that could threaten New Delhi’s relations with its other partners: when vital U.S. interests are not at stake, when the demands would undermine progress toward collectively balancing China, and when they relate to peripheral differences in the bilateral relationship with India. And India should stop taking the United States’ strategic altruism for granted and assuming that it can rely on continued U.S. generosity even in the absence of any attempts by New Delhi to make it worth the cost. For India, this means contributing to the liberal international order at a time when Washington’s commitment to bearing those costs is wobbly, accelerating defense cooperation with the United States, and pursuing economic reforms that would allow U.S. businesses more access to the growing Indian economy.

Both sides should prioritize practical cooperation to balance China’s rise. They should start by routinely sharing intelligence on China’s military modernization and real-time information about Chinese military movements in the Indian Ocean. Each could allow the other’s military to use its facilities for rotational access. And by working together on antisubmarine and antisurface warfare, air and missile defense, and cyber- and space technology, they could erect a joint anti-access/area-denial system that constrains Chinese military operations in the Indo-Pacific.

“Forgetting our intentions,” Friedrich Nietzsche observed, “is the most frequent of all acts of stupidity.” Washington and New Delhi should remember that their most pressing objective by far is not to agree on trade or Iran or Russia; it is to cope with the power of a rising China in the coming decades. If balancing China in the context of protecting the liberal international order remains the lodestar, the actions that both sides take toward that goal, both unilaterally and bilaterally, will be more than worth all the inevitable disagreements on other issues.
The Internet Freedom League

How to Push Back Against the Authoritarian Assault on the Web

Richard A. Clarke and Rob Knake

The early days of the Internet inspired a lofty dream: authoritarian states, faced with the prospect of either connecting to a new system of global communication or being left out of it, would choose to connect. According to this line of utopian thinking, once those countries connected, the flow of new information and ideas from the outside world would inexorably pull them toward economic openness and political liberalization. In reality, something quite different has happened. Instead of spreading democratic values and liberal ideals, the Internet has become the backbone of authoritarian surveillance states all over the world. Regimes in China, Russia, and elsewhere have used the Internet’s infrastructure to build their own national networks. At the same time, they have installed technical and legal barriers to prevent their citizens from reaching the wider Internet and to limit Western companies from entering their digital markets.

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They are the authors of The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats (Penguin Press, 2019), from which this essay is adapted. Reprinted by arrangement with Penguin Press, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. Copyright (c) 2019 by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake.
But despite handwringing in Washington and Brussels about authoritarian schemes to split the Internet, the last thing Beijing and Moscow want is to find themselves relegated to their own networks and cut off from the global Internet. After all, they need access to the Internet to steal intellectual property, spread propaganda, interfere with elections in other countries, and threaten critical infrastructure in rival countries. China and Russia would ideally like to re-create the Internet in their own images and force the world to play by their repressive rules. But they haven’t been able to do that—so instead they have ramped up their efforts to tightly control outside access to their markets, limit their citizens’ ability to reach the wider Internet, and exploit the vulnerability that comes with the digital freedom and openness enjoyed in the West.

The United States and its allies and partners should stop worrying about the risk of authoritarians splitting the Internet. Instead, they should split it themselves, by creating a digital bloc within which data, services, and products can flow freely, excluding countries that do not respect freedom of expression or privacy rights, engage in disruptive activity, or provide safe havens to cybercriminals. Under such a system, countries that buy into the vision of a truly free and reliable Internet would maintain and extend the benefits of being connected, and countries opposed to that vision would be prevented from spoiling or corrupting it. The goal should be a digital version of the Schengen Agreement, which has protected the free movement of people, goods, and services in Europe. The 26 countries in the Schengen area adhere to a set of rules and enforcement mechanisms; countries that do not are shut out.

That kind of arrangement is what’s needed to save the free and open Internet. Washington ought to form a coalition that would unite Internet users, companies, and countries around democratic values, respect for the rule of law, and fair digital trade: the Internet Freedom League. Instead of allowing states that do not share those values unfettered access to the Internet and to Western digital markets and technologies, a U.S.-led coalition should set the terms and conditions under which nonmembers can remain connected and erect barriers that limit the value they gain and the harm they can do. The league would not raise a digital Iron Curtain; at least initially, most Internet traffic would still flow between members and nonmembers, and the league would primarily block companies and organizations that aid
and abet cybercrime, rather than entire countries. Governments that fundamentally accept the idea of an open, tolerant, and democratic Internet but that struggle to live up to such a vision would have an incentive to improve their enforcement efforts in order join the league and secure connectivity for their companies and citizens. Of course, authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and elsewhere will probably continue to reject that vision. Instead of begging and pleading with such governments to play nice, from now on, the United States and its allies should lay down the law: follow the rules, or get cut off.

ENDING THE DREAM OF A BORDERLESS INTERNET

When the Obama administration released its International Strategy for Cyberspace, in 2011, it envisioned a global Internet that would be “open, interoperable, secure, and reliable.” At the time, China and Russia were pressing to enforce their own rules on the Internet. Beijing, for example, wanted any criticism of the Chinese government that would be illegal inside China to also be prohibited on U.S. websites. Moscow, for its part, disingenuously sought the equivalent of arms control treaties in cyberspace while simultaneously ramping up its own offensive cyberattacks. In the long term, China and Russia would still like to exert influence on the global Internet. But they see more value in building their closed networks and exploiting the West’s openness for their own gain.

The Obama strategy warned that “the alternative to global openness and interoperability is a fragmented Internet, where large swaths of the world’s population would be denied access to sophisticated applications and rich content because of a few nations’ political interests.” Despite Washington’s efforts to prevent that outcome, that is precisely where things stand today. And the Trump administration has done very little to alter U.S. strategy. President Donald Trump’s National Cyber Strategy, released in September 2018, called for an “open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet”—repeating the mantra of President Barack Obama’s strategy and merely swapping the order of the words “secure” and “reliable.”

The Trump strategy expounds on the need to extend Internet freedom, which it defines as “the online exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms—such as the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, religion or belief, and privacy rights online.”
Although that is a worthy goal, it ignores the reality that in many countries where citizens do not enjoy those rights offline, much less online, the Internet is less a safe haven than a tool of repression. Regimes in China and elsewhere employ artificial intelligence to help them better surveil their people and have learned to connect security cameras, financial records, and transport systems to build massive databases of information about the activities of individual citizens. China’s two-million-strong army of Internet censors is being trained to collect data to feed into a planned “social credit” scoring system that will rank every resident of China and dole out rewards and punishments for actions committed both online and offline. The so-called Great Firewall of China, which prohibits people in the country from accessing material online that the Chinese Communist Party deems unacceptable, has become a model for other authoritarian regimes. According to Freedom House, Chinese officials have held
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training sessions on how to develop Chinese-style Internet surveillance systems with counterparts in 36 countries. In 18 countries, China has helped build such networks.

USING DIGITAL TRADE AS A LEVER

How can the United States and its allies limit the damage that authoritarian regimes can cause to the Internet and also prevent those regimes from using the Internet’s power to crush dissent? Some have suggested tasking the World Trade Organization or the UN with the establishment of clear rules to allow for the free flow of information and data. But any such plan would be dead on arrival, since in order to gain approval, it would have to win support from some of the very countries whose malicious activity it would target. Only by creating a bloc of countries within which data can flow—and denying access to noncompliant states—can Western countries gain any leverage to change the behavior of the Internet’s bad actors.

Europe’s Schengen area offers a real-life model, in which people and goods travel freely without going through customs and immigration controls. Once a person enters the zone through one country’s border-security apparatus, he or she can access any other country without going through another customs or immigration check. (Some exceptions exist, and a number of countries introduced limited border checks in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis.) The agreement that created the zone became part of EU law in 1999; the non-EU states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland eventually joined, as well. The agreement left out Ireland and the United Kingdom at their request.

Joining the Schengen area comes with three requirements that can serve as a model for a digital accord. First, member states must issue uniform visas and demonstrate strong security on their external borders. Second, they must show that they have the capacity to coordinate with law enforcement in other member countries. And third, they must use a common system for tracking entries and exits into the area. The agreement sets rules governing cross-border surveillance and the conditions under which authorities may chase suspects in “hot pursuit” across borders. It also allows for the speedy extradition of criminal suspects between member states.

The agreement creates clear incentives for cooperation and openness. Any European country that wants its citizens to have the right to travel, work, or live anywhere in the EU must bring its border
controls up to the Schengen standards. Four EU members—Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania—have not been allowed to join the Schengen area partly because they have failed to meet those standards. Bulgaria and Romania, however, are in the process of improving their border controls so that they can join. In other words, the incentives are working.

But these kinds of incentives have been lacking in every attempt to bring the international community together to address cybercrime, economic espionage, and other ills of the digital age. The most successful of these efforts, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention), sets out all the reasonable actions that states should undertake to combat cybercrime. It provides model laws, improved coordination mechanisms, and streamlined extradition procedures. Sixty-one countries have ratified the treaty. Yet it is hard to find defenders of the Budapest Convention, because it hasn’t worked: it doesn’t offer any real benefits to joining or any real consequences for failing to live up to the obligations it creates.

For the Internet Freedom League to work, it would have to avoid that pitfall. The most effective way to pull countries into line would be to threaten to deny them the products and services of companies such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft and to cut off their businesses’ access to the wallets of hundreds of millions of consumers in the United States and Europe. The league would not block all traffic from nonmembers—just as the Schengen area does not shut out all goods and services from nonmembers. For one thing, the ability to meaningfully filter out all malicious traffic on a national level is beyond the capability of technology today. Moreover, doing so would require that governments have the ability to decrypt traffic, which would do more to harm security than to help it and would infringe on privacy and civil liberties. But the league would prohibit products and services from companies and organizations known to facilitate cybercrime in nonmember countries, as well as block traffic from rule-breaking Internet service providers in nonmember states.

For example, imagine if Ukraine, a well-known safe haven for cybercriminals, were threatened with being shut out from access to the kinds of services on which its citizens, companies, and government
have come to rely—and on which its future growth as a center for legitimate technological development depends. The Ukrainian government would face a strong incentive to finally get tough on the cyber-underworld that has developed inside the country’s borders. Such threats would not lend the U.S.-led coalition leverage over China and Russia: after all, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kremlin have already gone to some lengths to cut their citizens off from the global Internet. The point of the Internet Freedom League, however, would be not to change the behavior of such committed bad actors but to reduce the harm they do and to encourage countries such as Ukraine—along with Brazil, India, and other places with less-than-stellar records when it comes to fighting cybercrime—to do better or risk being left out.

**ENSHRINING INTERNET FREEDOM**

A foundational principle of the league would be upholding freedom of expression on the Internet. Members, however, would be allowed to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis. For instance, although the United States would not be forced to accept European restrictions on free speech, U.S. companies would need to make reasonable efforts not to sell or display banned content to Internet users in Europe. This approach would, in many ways, enshrine the status quo. But it would also commit Western countries more formally to the task of preventing states such as China from pursuing an Orwellian vision of “information security” by insisting that certain forms of expression pose a national security threat to them. Beijing, for example, routinely submits requests to other governments to take down content hosted on servers on their territory that is critical of the Chinese regime or that discusses groups that the regime has banned in China, such as Falun Gong. The United States denies such requests, but others might be tempted to give in—especially since China has retaliated against U.S. denials by launching brazen cyberattacks on the sources of the offending material. An Internet Freedom League would give other countries an incentive to deny such Chinese demands: doing so would be against the rules, and the other member states would help protect them from any retaliation.
The league would need a mechanism for monitoring its members’ adherence to its rules. Maintaining and publicizing metrics on each member’s performance would serve a powerful naming-and-shaming function. But a model for a more rigorous form of evaluation can be found in the Financial Action Task Force, an anti-money-laundering organization created by the G-7 and the European Commission in 1989 and funded by its members. The FATF’s 37 member countries account for most of the world’s financial transactions. Members agree to adopt dozens of policies, including ones that criminalize money laundering and terrorist financing and require banks to conduct due diligence on their customers. Instead of heavy-handed centralized monitoring, the FATF employs a system by which each member reviews the efforts of another on a rotating basis and makes recommendations. Countries that fail to meet required policies are placed on the FATF’s so-called gray list, triggering closer scrutiny. Repeat offenders can be put on its “blacklist,” obliging banks to start detailed examinations that can slow down or even stop many transactions.

How would the Internet Freedom League prevent malicious activity within its member states? Once again, an existing arrangement provides a model: the international public health system. The league would establish and fund an institution akin to the World Health Organization that would identify vulnerable online systems, notify the owners of those systems, and work to strengthen them (the equivalent of the WHO’s worldwide vaccination campaigns); detect and respond to emerging malware and botnets before they could cause widespread harm (the equivalent of monitoring disease outbreaks); and take charge of the response when prevention failed (the equivalent of the WHO’s response to pandemics). The league’s members would also agree to refrain from launching offensive cyberattacks against one another during peacetime; such a pledge would not, of course, prevent the United States or its allies from launching cyberattacks against rivals that would almost certainly remain outside the league, such as Iran.

BUILDING BARRIERS
Establishing an Internet Freedom League would require a dramatic shift in thinking. It remains part of the gospel of Internet freedom that connectivity will eventually transform authoritarian regimes. But it hasn’t—and it won’t. An unwillingness to accept that reality is the single biggest barrier to an alternative approach. Over time, however,
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it will become clear that the technological utopianism of an earlier era is misplaced in today’s world.

Western technology companies would likely resist the creation of an Internet Freedom League, since they have worked to appease China and gain access to the Chinese market, and because their supply chains depend on Chinese manufacturers. However, the costs to such firms would be partly offset by the fact that by cutting off China, the league would effectively protect them from Chinese competition.

An Internet Freedom League modeled on the Schengen area is the only way to secure Internet freedom from the threats posed by authoritarian states and other bad actors. Such a system would admittedly be less global than today’s more freewheeling Internet. But only by raising the costs of malicious behavior can the United States and its friends hope to reduce the scourge of cybercrime and limit the damage that regimes such as those in Beijing and Moscow can do to the Internet.
Can America Still Protect Its Allies?

How to Make Deterrence Work

Michael O’Hanlon

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ince the end of World War II, U.S. strategic thinking has been dominated by the doctrine of deterrence. At its most simple, deterrence refers to one state’s ability to use threats to convince another that the costs of some action—say, invading one of its neighbors—will outweigh the benefits. Such was the logic behind the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction: if either the United States or the Soviet Union used nuclear weapons, the other would respond with nuclear strikes of its own, resulting in the total devastation of both. By making the costs of war intolerably high, both sides hoped to keep the peace.

Yet for Washington, deterrence was never merely about protecting the U.S. homeland. As it built the postwar system of alliances that today forms an essential part of the global order, the United States developed a strategy of “extended deterrence.” According to this strategy, the United States would use its military power, including its nuclear arsenal, to defend its treaty allies—among them Japan, South Korea, and the states of NATO. The point was not only to discourage Soviet adventurism in Asia and Europe but also to reassure U.S. allies. If Germany and Japan (to take just two examples) knew that Washington would guarantee their security, they would not need to take actions—such as building a nuclear bomb—that might destabilize the international system.

Today, the Soviet threat is gone, but the strategy of extended deterrence remains central to the United States’ global power. Washington is still, on paper at least, committed to using military (and, if necessary, even nuclear) force to protect its allies from aggression by rivals.

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The stationing of U.S. military forces abroad gives additional credence to this commitment, as any attack on a major ally would likely cause U.S. casualties, all but guaranteeing a U.S. military response. Today, Washington’s two principal geopolitical rivals are China and Russia. China is a rising power that is beginning to challenge the United States’ economic and technological supremacy, and Russia under President Vladimir Putin has grown more and more dedicated to undermining the U.S.-led order. Recognizing the threat posed by Beijing and Moscow, top defense officials in both the Obama and the Trump administrations have emphasized the need for Washington to maintain and even strengthen its traditional deterrence strategies.

The question, however, is whether these strategies can credibly deter the sorts of aggression that the United States is likely to face in the twenty-first century. China and Russia are not Soviet-style superpowers with dreams of world domination; they are revisionist powers that want to challenge and change aspects of the U.S.-led global order. There is little chance that China, for instance, would help North Korea try to invade and conquer South Korea, as it did in the Korean War. It is more likely to engage in smaller tests of U.S. resolve, such as seizing from Japan one of the disputed (and unoccupied) islands in the East China Sea that are known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan. Although the United States has formally pledged to defend these islands, China might suspect that it is unwilling to risk a great-power war over what are effectively worthless rocks. Yet if Washington cannot credibly promise to retaliate, extended deterrence has already failed—and much greater consequences than the loss of one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands could follow.

Doubts about U.S. credibility have been heightened since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016. Trump has openly questioned the value of U.S. alliances and disparaged key U.S. allies. At times, he has challenged the logic of extended deterrence directly: in July 2018, he expressed bewilderment that the United States’ obligation to defend Montenegro, a NATO member, could lead to World War III. In addition to emboldening U.S. adversaries, such rhetoric runs the risk of undermining Washington’s ability to reassure its allies. And the more that those allies come to doubt the United States’ willingness to protect them, the more pressured they will be to provide for their own security, potentially leading to nuclear proliferation and an increased risk of preemptive or preventive war, among other consequences.
Trump or no Trump, the United States’ contemporary security problems cannot be solved by traditional military deterrence alone. Washington must commit itself to reassuring its allies that it is both willing and able to fulfill its treaty obligations. But even more important, it must begin to broaden its approach to deterrence in light of the changing nature of the threat posed by rivals such as China and Russia. Above all, U.S. policymakers must develop strategies that combine military elements with economic sanctions and other forms of nonmilitary punishment. Such a strategy would reduce the risk of a disastrous war by convincing adversaries that the United States is willing to follow through on its threats, even in an era in which China and Russia are not only wielding more powerful weapons but also showing an increased willingness to use them.

FRIENDS IN NEED
In some respects, the fact that the United States now faces problems reassuring its allies should come as no great surprise. Reassurance is hard to achieve. Indeed, in a world of Westphalian nation-states, it is
downright unnatural. Persuading one country to depend on another for its security, and perhaps even its survival, runs counter to intuition, common sense, and most of human history. Although Trump’s rhetoric is often imprudent, it may simply make explicit what many already suspected about the United States’ dependability.

Reassurance is also difficult because promises to protect allies should not be unconditional. U.S. allies should not feel that they can be reckless, safe in the knowledge that Washington will bail them out if they get into trouble. In the 1960s, South Korea developed plans for so-called decapitation strikes to kill the North Korean leadership; the United States sought to ratchet down its ally’s offensive inclinations. And in 1965, Pakistan attacked India in the belief that it was protected by U.S. security guarantees. Some fear that Saudi Arabia could attempt something similar today with Iran. As Trump has pointed out in his criticisms of NATO members’ military spending, unconditional reassurance can encourage free-riding by allies, who may assume that the United States will always pick up the bill for collective defense.

Both deterrence and reassurance require clarity of messaging about when and how the United States will back up its allies. Given Trump’s inconsistency and penchant for rhetorical brinkmanship, some of the greatest sources of worry today come from Washington. Trump waited until June 2017—nearly sixth months into his presidency—to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to NATO’s mutual-defense pledge. He has questioned whether the United States would come to the aid of an ally that has failed to meet its pledge to spend at least two percent of GDP on defense. According to anonymous aides quoted in The New York Times, Trump has even said privately that he does not see the point of NATO and would like to withdraw from it. (In June, he also criticized the United States’ mutual security treaty with Japan as “unfair.”) Earlier, on the presidential campaign trail, he mused that perhaps Japan and South Korea should have their own nuclear weapons rather than depend on those of the United States.

Somehow, to date, Trump’s words seem to have done little permanent damage. A 2018 Pew poll found growing doubts about U.S. reliability among U.S. allies (only ten percent of Germans and nine percent of French people asked expressed confidence that Trump would “do
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the right thing regarding world affairs.”) Yet the same poll showed that an overwhelming majority of those surveyed still preferred the United States to China as the world’s leading power. The U.S.-led world order does not appear to be crumbling. No ally has opted out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or threatened to do so. Indeed, no ally has even embarked on a major military buildup. NATO has modestly improved its military burden sharing since 2014, but most of the United States’ security partners still spend a historically modest one to two percent of GDP on their militaries, much less than during the Cold War. Poland and the Baltic states have increased their defense spending to two percent of GDP, but they have not taken the steps, such as fortifying their borders, that one would expect if they truly feared a Russian invasion. U.S. allies may be nervous, but they do not appear to be panicking or radically changing their own national security strategies.

Despite his rhetoric, moreover, Trump has staffed his administration with figures who are committed to the United States’ presence abroad. Neither Secretary of State Mike Pompeo nor National Security Adviser John Bolton is known for his dovishness or isolationism. The U.S. defense budget has continued to grow during Trump’s tenure, and the president has requested additional money from Congress to develop advanced weapons. U.S. troop deployments have generally remained static, and in some places, such as on the eastern flank of NATO, they have actually increased. Trump has hosted high-level meetings with the leaders of most of the countries—Japan and South Korea, Poland and the Baltic states—on the frontlines of struggles with China and Russia, assuaging their fears of being abandoned in a crisis. In these respects, counterintuitively, the transition from George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Trump shows more continuity than change.

These have been good steps. But there is a fine art to both deterrence and reassurance: they require constant attention, as both are ultimately in the eye of the beholder. In addition to avoiding capricious threats to pull out of alliances, the United States should make its military commitments more credible in ways that do not require a major increase in combat forces stationed abroad. Washington, for example, could improve its capabilities in Poland by strengthening its logistical and headquarters assets there (as the Atlantic Council has recently recommended) and agreeing to deploy U.S. troops on a permanent, rather than rotational, basis. The most overdue policy changes, however, lie not in the realm of Department of Defense force
planning but in that of statecraft—in integrating economic and military tools to develop a new and more realistic concept of deterrence.

A NEW FORM OF DETERRENCE
The Trump administration’s two principal strategic documents, the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, both stress the United States’ blossoming rivalry with its great-power competitors, China and Russia. The NDS identifies both as “revisionist powers” that “want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.” Most notably, Trump has increased the annual U.S. defense budget by around $100 billion since taking office, including in it generous funding for high-tech weapons modernization, among other priorities.

But in the effort to strengthen deterrence, it is important to ask how a U.S. war with China or Russia would likely start. Put differently, where and how might deterrence, and specifically extended deterrence, actually fail?

China and Russia know they are weaker than the United States according to raw military metrics. Both are thus highly unlikely to launch the kind of all-out surprise attack against a U.S. treaty ally that would require American retaliation. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that China would invade the main islands of Japan, where some 50,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed, or that Russia would attempt to annex an entire NATO country, even a small Baltic state. Both Beijing and Moscow know that such open aggression would be met with overwhelming U.S. force.

Yet it is much easier to imagine Beijing or Moscow carrying out smaller tests of U.S. resolve. Perhaps Russia would, as it did in Ukraine, send so-called little green men—soldiers in green army uniforms without insignia—into a small town in eastern Estonia under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians there. Putin has declared a right to protect Russian speakers anywhere they live, especially on former Soviet territory, providing him with a tailor-made pretext for such aggression. But what he might truly relish is the chance to nibble at a piece of NATO territory and put the alliance on the horns of a major dilemma. Would Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which guarantees that alliance members will defend one another in the event of an attack, require a military counterattack from NATO in such a situation? Putin might hope that NATO’s 29 members would tie themselves in knots over how to respond. In the event that NATO members, hoping to avoid a great-power war over a
relatively minor incursion, failed to honor their Article 5 promises, it could lead to existential doubts about the core purpose of the alliance.

Or, as suggested above, China might occupy one or more of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. These worthless islets are claimed by both China and Japan. The United States takes no official position on who should control the islands but acknowledges that Japan now administers them and that its security treaty with Japan should therefore apply to their defense. Such a complex, muddled situation is ripe for deterrence failure. Beijing might try to seize one of the islands in order to signal, without crossing the threshold of serious aggression, to Japan and the United States that it is unhappy with some aspect of the postwar order in the Pacific. Beijing might hope that it could force Japan into negotiations and some type of humiliating compromise or drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington that would make Japan feel more exposed, and less self-confident, on other issues in the years to come, thereby opening up East Asia and the western Pacific to Chinese domination.

This type of limited enemy assault would raise difficult questions for U.S. policymakers—what I call “the Senkaku paradox.” Should Washington risk a great-power—and potentially nuclear—conflict in order to preserve its credibility, even over something relatively unimportant? Or should it conclude that the stakes are too small to justify such a risk? In the event of limited enemy aggression against an inherently worthless target, a large-scale U.S. response—as the traditional approach to extended deterrence would dictate—would seem massively disproportionate. On the other hand, a nonresponse would be unacceptable, and inconsistent with American treaty obligations, too.

The way out of this paradox is through a strategy of asymmetric defense. The United States should not formally renounce the possibility of a full military response to very limited (and quite possibly non-lethal) aggression against its allies. Indeed, Lieutenant General John Wissler, then commander of the U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan, was right to insist in 2014 that the United States and Japan could expel the Chinese from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands if required. As a practical matter, however, the United States needs other options—for both before and after a crisis begins.

Most of all, Washington’s deterrence strategy should seek to avoid drawing first blood against another great power if at all possible. The United States should prepare responses to small-scale aggression that emphasize economic warfare, and sanctions in particular. At first, the
main role of U.S. military force should be to create a defensive perimeter so that China’s or Russia’s appetite for expansion is not further whetted. In the event that a crisis worsens, Washington and its allies could attempt indirect military measures—for instance, targeting ships in the Persian Gulf carrying oil to China. This sort of response would, at least initially, keep the conflict far from the shores of any great power, providing more time for the belligerents to avoid further escalation. But economic warfare should be the core of the strategy, with military force in support.

Such an approach would help convince a would-be adversary that it would have more to lose than to gain from the use of force—especially if the United States and its allies had taken proper preparatory measures to ensure that they could tolerate any reprisals. The trick would be to make sure the punishments for noncompliance were commensurate with the initial aggression, while maintaining the potential to escalate if necessary.

For sanctions to be economically sustainable, the United States and its allies need to understand vulnerabilities in their supply chains, financial dealings, and other economic relationships. They should develop strategies to mitigate these vulnerabilities—for example, by bolstering their national defense stockpiles of key minerals and metals, many of which today come primarily from China. They should take steps to avoid becoming overly dependent on China for key manufactured components and goods—Washington could prevent Chinese imports from exceeding a specified percentage of certain critical sectors. European states should also continue improving the infrastructure needed to import liquefied natural gas from the United States and other countries as a backup in case energy imports from Russia are interrupted in a future crisis.

A sanctions-based strategy would be judicious and proportionate, but it would not be weak. Indeed, if Beijing or Moscow refused to either back down or otherwise resolve the dispute once the United States and its allies had deployed sanctions, Washington could raise the stakes. Recognizing that the aggressor state’s strategic aims had become fundamentally untrustworthy or hostile, Washington could seek to not only punish the perpetrator for its specific action but also limit its future economic growth. Over time, export controls and permanent sanctions could replace temporary punitive measures. This strategy would require support from key U.S. allies to be effective—one more
Michael O’Hanlon

reason why Washington needs to respond to these kinds of crises in a way that seems judicious, patient, and nonescalatory, so as to strengthen its coalition and not scare away key partners.

KEEPING THE PEACE
In his 2017 book, *All Measures Short of War*, the political scientist Thomas Wright persuasively argues that global orders do not break down all at once. They are challenged, weakened, and eroded in key regions where the interests of rival powers come into direct competition. The western Pacific and eastern European are precisely the regions where such developments are most likely today.

But China and Russia will not be so mindless as to attack the heartland of a major U.S. ally; American deterrence has not deteriorated that much, even in the age of Trump. The tough scenarios will be in the so-called gray zones of conflict, where classic war-fighting concepts do only so much good. U.S. war plans, as best as can be deduced from the outside, are still too focused on those classic concepts, and probably too escalatory for a world in which large-scale war between nuclear-armed powers must be an extreme last resort. Only a deter- rence strategy that recognizes as much—and develops plans involving all the tools of statecraft instead of just military force—can respond to the modern challenges of great-power competition and keep the U.S.-led system of alliances resolute and reassured.
After the Watergate era, journalistic distrust of authority boomeranged: the press soon found itself on the receiving end.

– Jacob Weisberg

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Bad News

Can Democracy Survive If the Media Fail?

Jacob Weisberg

On Press: The Liberal Values That Shaped the News

Breaking News: The Remaking of Journalism and Why It Matters Now

Merchants of Truth: The Business of News and the Fight for Facts

In 2004—an ordinary, healthy year for the newspaper business—The Washington Post earned $143 million in profit. Five years later, in 2009, the paper lost $164 million amid a shift from paid print to free digital consumption, the erosion of its classified and local advertising businesses, and the global financial crisis. The collapse of its business model forced round after round of cutbacks, staff buyouts, and layoffs. That year, the Post shut all its domestic reporting bureaus outside the Washington area, including those in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.

The Post’s position was typical of the country’s healthiest papers. That same year, The New York Times, facing possible bankruptcy, sold most of the new headquarters building into which it had just moved and arranged a $250 million high-interest loan from the Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim. Around the country, more vulnerable papers closed down or put themselves up for sale. With few exceptions, the great family-owned franchises were being gobbled up by private equity firms with little sense of civic obligation and even less understanding of journalism.

In the years since, the profession of journalism has contracted and grown ever more precarious. Between 2008 and 2017, employment among newspaper journalists fell by nearly half. In 2018, the Pew Research Center reported that the median annual income of newsroom employees with a college degree was around $51,000—about 14 percent less than the median for all other college-educated workers. Twenty years ago, public relations specialists outnumbered journalists by a ratio of less than two to one. Today, the ratio is more than six to one. According to Fortune, the only professions losing jobs more rapidly than newspaper reporter are letter carrier, farmer, and meter reader.

Those who remain at media organizations feel themselves losing status and credibility. Last year, a Gallup–Knight Foundation survey found that 69 percent of Americans had lost trust in the news media over the previous decade. For Republicans, the figure was 94 percent. Journalists covering the big story in Washington recognize the importance of what they are doing.

JACOB WEISBERG is CEO of Pushkin Industries, which produces podcasts. He teaches a course on the ethics of journalism at Yale University and is former Editor of Slate.
They are also under more or less constant assault from social media trolls, people who believe what they hear on Fox News, and the president of the United States. But I repeat myself.

Following Donald Trump’s election in 2016, a few news organizations with international reach—especially the Post and the Times—began exhibiting signs of a return to health. Outrageous abuse has provoked support. But local news seems unlikely to recover, and globally, there are few positive trends. In countries where a free press was just beginning to emerge, a cocktail of rising authoritarianism, audience cannibalization by social media, and financial weakness has thrown it into reverse. Independent journalism is viable in some places, but not overall. Everywhere, the same question about the future of news crops up: How can democratic societies get the journalism they need in order to function?

THE GOOD OLD DAYS
A good way to start answering that question is to look at the period when the U.S. media business was at its healthiest. In On Press, the journalism historian Matthew Pressman examines The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times between 1960 and 1980. During this seeming golden age, the leading news organizations adjusted their fundamental relationship to government, shifting from a kind of elevated stenography to the critical journalism that has become the norm. This was the era of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers, and All the President’s Men, when the image of the reporter as a truth-seeking hero took hold and investigative reporting units proliferated at local newspapers and TV stations all over the country.

Pressman argues that American journalism reached this zenith in reaction to its fundamental failure during the Red Scare of the 1950s. During that time, conventions of objectivity led newspapers to amplify Senator Joseph McCarthy’s accusations and smears, lest they be seen as editorializing. The self-examination that followed McCarthy’s downfall—combined with the new competitive threat from television, the medium that had done the most to expose McCarthy—pushed newspapers away from just-the-facts recitations and toward providing more context, explanation, and interpretation. Still, well into the 1960s, Pressman shows, news coverage tended to be bland and deferential to government. It was the U.S. government’s lies about Vietnam, as well as personal opposition to the war on the part of many journalists, that bred the adversarial style of contemporary political journalism. As Pressman writes, Vietnam “established a baseline level of antagonism between the press and the government.”

But journalistic distrust of authority boomeranged: the press soon found itself on the receiving end, losing the almost automatic trust it had enjoyed when its stance had been less challenging. The right criticized the mainstream press for adopting an oppositional relationship to established institutions. The left criticized the press because it had become an establishment institution. Vice President Spiro Agnew’s attack on the media’s left-wing bias presaged Trump’s. In terms that now seem rather mild, Agnew accused the press of departing from its obligation to simply report the facts and said that by doing so it was taking sides in political conflicts
and exercising undue influence. Those who produced the nightly news that Americans relied on, Agnew charged in a speech in 1969, were “a tiny, enclosed fraternity of privileged men elected by no one” who “bask in their own provincialism, their own parochialism.”

EDITS AND ETHICS
In retrospect, the 1980s and 1990s were a kind of fool’s paradise for American journalism. As the elite press corps became more professionalized, some critics wondered whether reporters were growing too prosperous and comfortable. By the early years of this century, however, the job of leading a major newsroom was becoming obviously more difficult. It no longer just meant standing up to angry officials from time to time—now, all politicians were perpetually unhappy with their coverage. Running a media organization had devolved into a constant struggle on all fronts: to reinvent a failing business model and husband shrinking resources while mollifying an insecure staff in an atmosphere of intense public scrutiny. The old deference and respect gave way to second-guessing of every decision. At the same time, the rise of digital and social media meant that leading news organization no longer had the same gatekeeping power. There were no longer any gates.

Two former newspaper editors, Alan Rusbridger and Jill Abramson, have written accounts of what it was like to run an important newspaper in this period of rising pressure and diminishing control. Their approaches accord with the predominant journalistic styles of their two countries. Rusbridger served as editor of the British newspaper The Guardian from just before the dawn of digital media until just before the era of Brexit and Trump, and he has produced a memoir that recounts the changes he experienced in personal, anecdotal terms. Abramson, by contrast, has written a heavily reported, journalistic narrative about a transformational period in media that happened to include her tenure as executive editor of The New York Times, which lasted from 2011 until her unceremonious firing in 2014.

Rusbridger took the helm at The Guardian in 1995 and committed himself to embracing the Internet, even when it was less than clear what that would mean. Rather than focusing on the potential disruption to his business, he saw a journalistic opportunity. The Guardian, originally based in Manchester and barely in the top ten of British newspapers in terms of circulation, could now reach a global audience. Because it was effectively a nonprofit organization endowed by the deep-pocketed Scott Trust, it could invest heavily in audience growth and public-service journalism. This gave Rusbridger license to launch reportorial crusades on issues as varied as climate change and corporate tax dodgers.

Not everyone in the British press had such a high-minded conception of their mission, and for decades, British news organizations had maintained something akin to a code of omerta around unethical reporting techniques. In 2009, The Guardian exposed the practice, common at newspapers published by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, of hacking the voicemails of unsuspecting people and harvesting their contents for publication. By revealing it, Rusbridger effectively tendered his resignation from the Fleet
was to assume that since there wasn’t any clear way to make a newspaper at once journalistically robust and financially profitable, the paper would just have to live with large losses. But in retrospect, his view has arguably been vindicated.

Today, The Guardian is one of the most important news organizations in the world, in a way it never could have been had Rusbridger not embraced the Internet as he did. It has a larger global audience than any British news source besides MailOnline, the website of the Daily Mail, a celebrity-focused tabloid that helped drive the campaign for Brexit. And under Rusbridger’s successor, Katharine Viner, the newspaper has pared costs and encouraged digital readers to make donations; in 2018, The Guardian had a marginally profitable year. It is one of the few high-quality news organizations that now appears to be sustainable.

Compared with Rusbridger, Abramson gave herself a more difficult assignment in going beyond her own former organization to write more broadly about the changing news business. Her journalistic model is The Powers That Be, David Halberstam’s long-winded 1979 book about the rise of modern media, which revolved around the stories of CBS, Time Inc., The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. Abramson picks four other organizations to tell the tale of the business’ decline: the Post again, plus The New York Times and two digital insurgents, BuzzFeed and Vice. She acknowledges her partiality when it comes to her own experience at the Times, an institution she revered so much that she had a T tattooed on her back in the paper’s iconic gothic-style font. She
Jacob Weisberg

remains aggrieved, however, at what she sees as the unfairness of her firing over management missteps that she partly acknowledges and partly disputes.

Abramson’s attempt to filter her own, still raw experience through the conventions of objective journalism gives her account a passive-aggressive quality, especially when it comes to her depictions of the former publisher of the Times, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., and her successor as executive editor, Dean Baquet, whom she blames for engineering her downfall. But that part of the book is at least entertaining as media gossip. In contrast, Abramson herself seems bored by her own detailed chronicles of the other outlets, which might partly explain how she wound up plagiarizing a number of sources—an act she asserts was inadvertent and for which she has apologized—and making some sloppy factual errors that were discovered by readers and, in some cases, by the book’s subjects.

A greater fault with the book, however, is that Abramson never comes out and says one thing that she seems to think: that Vice is a poor excuse for a news organization, founded by greedy, dishonest people without the slightest comprehension of journalism. During the digital media bubble, Vice became the darling of middle-aged media executives, who invested in it based on the dubious thesis that foreign affairs could be made relevant to young people through video content that often focused on sex, drugs, and violence around the world. Vice has produced some worthwhile journalism, most of which resulted from a partnership with HBO that the cable network recently terminated. But in essence, Vice has been a swindle, and investors are starting to see the light: Disney, which sank $400 million into Vice in 2015, has in the past year written down nearly all of its investment.

Abramson implicitly lumps together Vice and BuzzFeed. Alongside its frivolous lists and personality quizzes, however, BuzzFeed has done a great deal of high-quality journalism. And it showed genuine courage in early 2017, when it published the so-called Steele dossier, a document full of troubling but unverified allegations about Trump’s connections to Russia, compiled by a former British intelligence official.

In supporting BuzzFeed’s still controversial decision to publish the dossier, Abramson parts company with many of her peers. But in other respects, she remains a media conservative. She believes there is a correct way to practice journalism: the way that The New York Times did it before the Internet came along and ruined everything. Arguably, this reverence for tradition is what made her tenure at the paper so difficult. Rusbridger was inspired by the new opportunities that the Internet brought to journalism, even when he didn’t fully understand them. Abramson focused on the risks and losses. She thought that software developers and data scientists were commercial infiltrators in the newsroom and grew increasingly frustrated over their incursions across the church-state boundary. When the company produced a self-critical “innovation report,” in 2014, Abramson took it as a personal rebuke. It sealed her fate in an unexpected way. In answer to the report’s implicit criticism of her, she tried to recruit Janine Gibson, an editor from the more tech-forward Guardian, as a deputy, without mentioning her plan to her existing deputy,
exists no replicable business model that works for local news, which has diminished the accountability of state and metropolitan government. What do seem to be working are a variety of nonprofit and hybrid models that fill specific gaps in coverage, including ProPublica (investigative reporting), the Marshall Project (criminal justice), and The Texas Tribune (state government and politics). What the most innovative journalistic organizations seem to have in common is some form of subsidy combined with an ability to think like for-profit businesses even if they really are not. Every news organization must find its survivable niche, which is why the next generation of editors will have to be not only moral philosophers but also entrepreneurs.

Bad News

Baquet. This provoked the showdown that led to her firing.

A TOUGH BUSINESS

Given the continuing flux in media, editors are best advised not to get any employer’s logo tattooed on their bodies. BuzzFeed and Vice, which were both booming amid a digital news bubble when Abramson began writing her book several years ago, are now flagging. As Vice’s investors have sobered up, BuzzFeed has sought philanthropic investment and announced plans to cut 15 percent of its work force; meanwhile, one of the company’s founders and its CEO, Jonah Peretti, has proposed merging with a number of competing digital media outlets.

The Post and the Times, both in decline a few years ago, have returned to health, if not the stable profitability of previous decades. In 2013, Amazon’s founder, Jeff Bezos, purchased the Post, and in the years since, he has reversed the shrinkage of its journalistic footprint and now says that the paper is profitable again. The Times repaid Slim and has regained stability on the backs of more than four million subscribers. Several other leading legacy publications, including The Atlantic, The New Yorker, and Mother Jones, appear to have moved from jeopardy to viability. Trump’s noxious verbal assaults on news organizations have had the perverse effect of making audiences more willing to pay for journalism, even as those comments have contributed to greater peril for journalists facing less constrained autocrats elsewhere.

It’s far too soon to say that the economic crisis of journalism has passed, let alone the crisis of truth. There still
An American in Cairo

Egypt Through Western Eyes

Lisa Anderson

The Buried: An Archaeology of the Egyptian Revolution

Peter Hessler, the author of several award-winning books on China, spent late 2011 to 2016 in Egypt, reporting for *The New Yorker*. His new book, which collects and expands on his magazine essays, is destined to become the title that all first-time visitors to Egypt are urged to pack, slipped neatly between their guide to the Egyptian Museum and the itinerary of their Nile cruise.

Hessler is an extraordinary writer, and his Egypt is full of scoundrels turned heroes and heroes turned scoundrels. The book’s reach is wide, from the puzzles of ancient tombs to the preoccupations of contemporary marriage, and it offers beguiling stories about ordinary and extraordinary Egyptians alike: a garbage collector, a police officer, a devout woman who wears a niqab, a man who frequents illegal gay nightclubs, a small-town politician. Hessler weaves together rounded portraits of these and other characters, leavening their stories with endearing anecdotes, a little (but not too much) modern history, a lot (but not too much) of Pharaonic history, and droll observations about what you really learn when you try to acquire a new language and what the study of life 4,000 years ago may reveal about life today. As someone who was living as a foreigner in Egypt while Hessler was there, I can attest that much of his portrait rings true, reflecting many recognizable elements of the country—not least the wry, self-deprecating, prideful humor for which Egyptians are justly reputed and the astonishingly powerful family solidarity that is both a source of stability in turmoil and, in Hessler’s view, a drag on social and political change.

Hessler lived with his family in the upscale neighborhood of Zamalek, within walking distance of the best Cairo hotels (not that anyone walks in Cairo). He made a habit of visiting archaeological sites along the route of the classic touristic Nile cruise. Everywhere he went, he found offbeat and sometimes revealing people, sights, and sounds. With typical Egyptian hospitality, his garbage collector Sayyid let this nosy foreigner tag along on his rounds. Hessler reports that if he was “curious about anyone in the neighborhood, I always asked Sayyid”—one can glean a great deal about people’s drug use, health troubles, and tastes in food and sex from their unsorted garbage. Another important source for Hessler was his remarkably open interpreter, Manu, who revealed to Hessler the largely hidden world of gay men in a society in which identities and desires are rarely as straightforward as Hessler expected. As he observes, for all young Egyptians, “sexual repression was a constant weight on their psyches.” He adds that “young

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entrepreneurs selling imported Chinese lingerie—a serendipitous discovery facilitated by Hessler’s earlier residence in China and his proficiency in Chinese. These and many other encounters occasion funny, illuminating, and often provocative observations about Egypt and its people. When he visits Sayyid at home, for example, he is surprised to find that the garbage collector’s apartment is immaculate, equipped with brand-new appliances, two television sets, and a computer for the children. This material well-being illustrates why Cairo, for all
its chaos, is still a magnet for migrants from the countryside and now home to some 20
million people. Hessler’s talks with the
Chinese entrepreneurs he meets yields a
similarly provocative insight. Although
they profess little interest in Egyptian poli
tics, they are keen analysts of what
they saw as Egypt’s halfhearted revolution:
China, after all, “had experienced truly
revolutionary change throughout the span
of the twentieth century, for better and
for worse, and they believed that the
Egyptians had never committed them-
selves to such a wrenching transformation.”

But there are puzzling omissions in
Hessler’s book. Perhaps most surprising,
given that the book purports to be “an
archaeology of the Egyptian revolution,”
there is relatively little about the 2011
uprising that brought down President
Hosni Mubarak. Hessler starts with a
sweetly funny and captivating story about
the repercussions of the revolt at the
Upper Egyptian archaeological site that
provides the book with its name, “an
ancient necropolis that villagers refer to
as al-Madjina: the Buried.” The site
manager grew concerned that the sudden
lack of police was emboldening grave
robbers and looters. So he constructed a
large wooden box, painted it black,
added flashing lights and a siren, and
mounted it on his truck every night: “In
the dark the vehicle was a strikingly good
imitation of the armored personnel
carriers that are ubiquitous at any Egyp-
tian tourist site.” Soon, there were
“rumors in the village that the police
were active again.”

This story permits Hessler to muse
about disorientations of time and space:
Upper Egypt is the south of the country,
as visitors are always surprised to learn,
for example, and ancient Egyptians had
conceptions of time that may be “im-
possible . . . to be grasped by the modern
mind.” But it also obscures the fact that
Hessler himself did not arrive in Egypt
until October 2011—eight months after
Mubarak’s overthrow and after the
intense protests against army rule that
followed during the spring and summer
of 2011. As a consequence, the book
focuses not on the revolt and its after-
math but on the subsequent election
campaign, which resulted in the presi-
dency of Mohamed Morsi (a leader of
the Muslim Brotherhood); Morsi’s one
year in office; the coup that deposed
him; and the early days of the tenure of
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the general who
led the coup and has ruled the country
ever since—a tenure that seems likely to
continue for a long time to come.

This was a fascinating and tumultu-
ous time. But for many Egyptians, it was
aftermath, a struggle to right a ship that
had almost capsized. Hessler joins the
story midway through and doesn’t always
manage to distinguish enduring features
of the country from the aftershocks of a
revolution. He admits, as he contemplates
leaving Egypt, that he has found his
life there “difficult,” but it is never clear
whether this was born of life in Egypt
in general or reflected a postrevolutionary
hangover. (Imagine someone who relo-
cated to New York City in the months after
the 9/11 attacks. To what degree would
his or her impressions have captured
the city’s essence, or would they instead
have reflected the effects of a recent
collective trauma?)

Hessler remarks that compared with
China, Egypt seemed disorganized:
“This was one grim lesson I had learned
in Egypt: Unstructured authoritarian-
ism is worse than structured authoritari-
anism. . . . Few Egyptians seemed concerned that after three years of revolution the authorities still lacked a basic protocol for dealing with unrest.” Comparative authoritarianism is always a dicey enterprise, but I don’t quite agree with Hessler’s conclusion. The Egyptian reluctance to insist on more efficient autocracy may have reflected the residual, if fading, hopes for the revolutionary uprising more than it demonstrated a lack of concern for competent government.

THE WORLD OF WOMEN
There are other missing pieces in Hessler’s picture. His focus on Cairo and Upper Egypt, for example, leaves out quite a bit of the country, including the Nile Delta and the north coast, which is home to the famed, faded city of Alexandria and around 40 million of Egypt’s 95 million or so inhabitants. Instead of unearthing the contemporary reality of those areas, Hessler delves into the Pharaonic past. As Hessler himself observes, his enthusiasm for ancient Egypt is not typical of Egyptians themselves. “Average Egyptians take pride in their pharaonic history, but there’s also a disconnect, because the tradition of the Islamic past is stronger and more immediate,” he writes. “The ancients belong to foreigners and Islam belongs to us” is how Hessler sums up the typical Egyptian view. And yet Islam plays a surprisingly modest role in this book and is usually portrayed as a source of constraint: the demands of the Ramadan fast and the inconvenience of the niqab feature more prominently than, say, the joy Egyptians take in celebrating religious holidays or the satisfaction they find in communal rituals.

This sense of constraint also seeps into Hessler’s assessment of the position of
Lisa Anderson

women in Egypt. “It wasn’t until I started visiting Chinese shopkeepers in Upper Egypt that I realized how much I had missed seeing men and women together,” he writes. “It was relaxing to spend time with the Chinese—I could sit and talk with Kiki without worrying about her husband’s reaction or whether my male presence might damage her reputation.” Hessler does not seem to have spent much time with women during the course of his reporting, but he developed a clear impression of what everyday life is like for most Egyptian women. “I imagined that being a woman in Egypt . . . required constant energy, thought and adjustment,” he writes, adding that a typical Egyptian woman would have to “accept the judgements of the men around her, shifting her dress and behavior according to whoever they might be: husband, close relative, distant relative, friend of husband, neighbor, man on the street.” He then adds: “Of course, the culture in America and Europe also placed unfair demands on women but there was no comparison to Egypt.” As a woman whose life has demanded constant energy, thought, and adjustment everywhere I have lived and worked, I missed a more nuanced account of the specific ways in which Egyptian women navigate their world.

A DIFFICULT COUNTRY

Hessler points appreciatively to the resilience of Egyptians and Egyptian society, something that surely struck every foreigner who lived in the country during the tumultuous years after Mubarak’s overthrow. In April 2013, when blackouts were common across the country, Hessler visited the Upper Egyptian town of Abydos, where “at night, with no electric lights, no police presence, and guns everywhere, I could walk safely in the village.” He marvels that “in a country where systems and laws had always been weak, there were other forces that kept the place from collapsing.” In searching for an explanation for this mysterious stability, he concludes that “the only real structure was the same one that had shaped local life since long before the first royal tombs were dug into the Buried. It has nothing to do with the Brotherhood, . . . or Sisi, or any other political figure or group. For Egyptians, the family was the deep state.” That the family provides safety and solace to Egyptians confronted with a vast but sclerotic and disorganized state is a typically astute observation on Hessler’s part. But even though the family looms large in Egyptian society, so, too, do religious impulses, neighborliness, patriotism, and a certain ineffable warmth and lightheartedness.

Hessler ends his book on a wistful note. “Nobody had asked us to go to Egypt, and nobody was asking us to leave,” he writes of his family’s departure, which was prompted by the realization that there were “limits to how long [they] could stay in a place where life was so difficult.” He was admirably reluctant to admit this to the Egyptians he was leaving behind, and for whom there is little escape from the difficulties. Like most visitors to Egypt, many of whom will value his book as a congenial guide, Hessler found his travels interesting and brought home a lot of good stories, which he tells exceptionally well—but he was glad to be going home.

That leaves readers to wonder about the lives of those for whom Egypt is home. Disappointment with the outcome of the Arab uprisings has soured many
Western commentators on the Arab world. The toxic mix of tyranny and anarchy that dashed hopes for freedom, dignity, social justice, and prosperity surprised and disappointed Western scholars and political analysts; for many observers, curiosity and excitement have been replaced by resignation and even resentment. As activists and Western officials castigate Arab governments for human rights abuses, and Western scholars warn their students away from research that might be dangerous, much of the Arab world now appears to be off-limits even to U.S. students wishing to learn Arabic. Meanwhile, apart from arms dealers and oil companies, foreign investors have turned away from the region, worried about both bureaucratic paralysis and political instability. It is, to use Hessler’s term, just too difficult.

As a result, Westerners know less and less about the quotidian lives of people in Egypt—and more and more of what they know is harvested online, from tweets and blogs and Facebook posts. Few Western reporters are based in the country anymore, and Egypt’s media are hardly free, much less representative. Human rights groups estimate that Egypt currently jails around 40,000 political prisoners—an appalling figure, but one whose accuracy is difficult to assess. And although I would like to know about the status of these prisoners, I would also like to know about the prospects of the thousands of entrepreneurs in the country. What are they working on, and who is funding their projects? And speaking of business, how are the captains of industry who thrived during the Mubarak era faring today? And is it true, as the local press suggests, that fewer people are fasting during Ramadan these days? What might that reveal about religious observance, politics, and family? And lastly (although hardly finally), what is the legacy of the hopes raised and dashed, and the trust extended and betrayed, by the 2011 uprising? Egyptians were surprised by the depth of the differences among them exposed by the revolt and its aftermath: the cleavages between Muslims and Christians, revolutionaries and reactionaries, liberals and populists, patriots and nationalists, the generous and the stingy, and the fearless and the timid all mattered more than they had thought. The future of the country will depend to a great degree on how these identities will be expressed and reshaped, now that they have been revealed.

Today, most of what Westerners write and read about Egypt is still, really, about Westerners. Whether filtered through the fascination of tourists justifiably smitten with the pyramids or the indignation of Western analysts understandably disappointed by the autocrats, what we are writing involves what matters to us. Perhaps that is the best we can do. But it means that what actually matters to Egyptians is likely to remain buried, as it were, under our own hopes and fears.
The Population Bust

Demographic Decline and the End of Capitalism as We Know It

Zachary Karabell

Just as much of the world has come to see rapid population growth as normal and expected, the trends are shifting again, this time into reverse. Most parts of the world are witnessing sharp and sudden contractions in either birthrates or absolute population. The only thing preventing the population in many countries from shrinking more quickly is that death rates are also falling, because people everywhere are living longer.

These oscillations are not easy for any society to manage. “Rapid population acceleration and deceleration send shockwaves around the world wherever they occur and have shaped history in ways that are rarely appreciated,” the demographer Paul Morland writes in The Human Tide, his new history of demographics. Morland does not quite believe that “demography is destiny,” as the old adage mistakenly attributed to the French philosopher Auguste Comte would have it. Nor do Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, the authors of Empty Planet, a new book on the rapidly shifting demographics of the twenty-first century. But demographics are clearly part of destiny. If their role first in the rise of the West and now in the rise of the rest has been underappreciated, the potential consequences of plateauing and then shrinking populations in the decades ahead are almost wholly ignored.

The mismatch between expectations of a rapidly growing global population (and all the attendant effects on climate, capitalism, and geopolitics) and the reality of both slowing growth rates and absolute contraction is so great that it will pose a considerable threat in the decades ahead. Governments worldwide have evolved to meet the challenge of managing more people, not fewer and not older.

For most of human history, the world’s population grew so slowly that for most people alive, it would have felt static. Between the year 1 and 1700, the human population went from about 200 million to about 600 million; by 1800, it had barely hit one billion. Then, the population exploded, first in the United Kingdom and the United States, next in much of the rest of Europe, and eventually in Asia. By the late 1920s, it had hit two billion. It reached three billion around 1960 and then four billion around 1975. It has nearly doubled since then. There are now some 7.6 billion people living on the planet.

ZACHARY KARABELL is the author of The Leading Indicators: A Short History of the Numbers That Rule Our World.
The Population Bust

Capitalism as a system is particularly vulnerable to a world of less population expansion; a significant portion of the economic growth that has driven capitalism over the past several centuries may have been simply a derivative of more people and younger people consuming more stuff. If the world ahead has fewer people, will there be any real economic growth? We are not only unprepared to answer that question; we are not even starting to ask it.

BOMB OR BUST?
At the heart of *The Human Tide* and *Empty Planet*, as well as demography in general, is the odd yet compelling work of the eighteenth-century British scholar Thomas Malthus. Malthus’ 1798 *Essay on the Principle of Population* argued that growing numbers of people were a looming threat to social and political stability. He was convinced that humans were destined to produce more people than the world could feed, dooming most of society to suffer from food scarcity while the very rich made sure their needs were met. In Malthus’ dire view, that would lead to starvation, privation, and war, which would eventually lead to population contraction, and then the depressing cycle would begin again.

Yet just as Malthus reached his conclusions, the world changed. Increased crop yields, improvements in sanitation, and accelerated urbanization led not to an endless cycle of impoverishment and contraction but to an explosion of global population in the nineteenth century. Morland provides a rigorous and detailed account of how, in the nineteenth century, global population reached its breakout from millennia of prior human history, during which the population had been stagnant, contracting, or inching forward. He starts with the observation that the population begins to grow rapidly when infant mortality declines. Eventually,
Zachary Karabell

fertility falls in response to lower infant mortality—but there is a considerable lag, which explains why societies in the modern world can experience such sharp and extreme surges in population. In other words, while infant mortality is high, women tend to give birth to many children, expecting at least some of them to die before reaching maturity. When infant mortality begins to drop, it takes several generations before fertility does, too. So a woman who gives birth to six children suddenly has six children who survive to adulthood instead of, say, three. Her daughters might also have six children each before the next generation of women adjusts, deciding to have smaller families.

The burgeoning of global population in the past two centuries followed almost precisely the patterns of industrialization, modernization, and, crucially, urbanization. It started in the United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century (hence the concerns of Malthus), before spreading to the United States and then France and Germany. The trend next hit Japan, India, and China and made its way to Latin America. It finally arrived in sub-Saharan Africa, which has seen its population surge thanks to improvements in medicine and sanitation but has not yet enjoyed the full fruits of industrialization and a rapidly growing middle class.

With the population explosion came a new wave of Malthusian fears, epitomized by the 1968 book *The Population Bomb*, by Paul Ehrlich, a biologist at Stanford University. Ehrlich argued that plummeting death rates had created an untenable situation of too many people who could not be fed or housed. “The battle to feed all of humanity is over,” he wrote. “In the 1970’s the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked on now.”

Ehrlich’s prophecy, of course, proved wrong, for reasons that Bricker and Ibbitson elegantly chart in *Empty Planet*. The green revolution, a series of innovations in agriculture that began in the early twentieth century, accelerated such that crop yields expanded to meet humankind’s needs. Moreover, governments around the world managed to remediate the worst effects of pollution and environmental degradation, at least in terms of daily living standards in multiple megacities, such as Beijing, Cairo, Mexico City, and New Delhi. These cities face acute challenges related to depleted water tables and industrial pollution, but there has been no crisis akin to what was anticipated.

Yet visions of dystopic population bombs remain deeply entrenched, including at the center of global population calculations: in the forecasts routinely issued by the United Nations. Today, the UN predicts that global population will reach nearly ten billion by 2050. Judging from the evidence presented in Morland’s and Bricker and Ibbitson’s books, it seems likely that this estimate is too high, perhaps substantially. It’s not that anyone is purposely inflating the numbers. Governmental and international statistical agencies do not turn on a dime; they use formulas and assumptions that took years to formalize and will take years to alter. Until very recently, the population assumptions built into most models accurately reflected what was happening. But the sudden ebb of both birthrates and absolute population growth has happened too quickly for the models to adjust in real time. As Bricker and
Ibbitson explain, “The UN is employing a faulty model based on assumptions that worked in the past but that may not apply in the future.”

Population expectations aren’t merely of academic interest; they are a key element in how most societies and analysts think about the future of war and conflict. More acutely, they drive fears about climate change and environmental stability—especially as an emerging middle class numbering in the billions demands electricity, food, and all the other accoutrements of modern life and therefore produces more emissions and places greater strain on farms with nutrient-depleted soil and evaporating aquifers. Combined with warming-induced droughts, storms, and shifting weather patterns, these trends would appear to line up for some truly bad times ahead.

Except, argue Bricker and Ibbitson, those numbers and all the doomsday scenarios associated with them are likely wrong. As they write, “We do not face the challenge of a population bomb but a population bust—a relentless, generation-after-generation culling of the human herd.” Already, the signs of the coming bust are clear, at least according to the data that Bricker and Ibbitson marshal. Almost every country in Europe now has a fertility rate below the 2.1 births per woman that is needed to maintain a static population. The UN notes that in some European countries, the birthrate has increased in the past decade. But that has merely pushed the overall European birthrate up from 1.5 to 1.6, which means that the population of Europe will still grow older in the coming decades and contract as new births fail to compensate for deaths. That trend is well under way in Japan, whose population has already crested, and in Russia, where the same trends, plus high mortality rates for men, have led to a decline in the population.

What is striking is that the population bust is going global almost as quickly as the population boom did in the twentieth century. Fertility rates in China and India, which together account for nearly 40 percent of the world’s people, are now at or below replacement levels. So, too, are fertility rates in other populous countries, such as Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand. Sub-Saharan Africa remains an outlier in terms of demographics, as do some countries in the Middle East and South Asia, such as Pakistan, but in those places, as well, it is only a matter of time before they catch up, given that more women are becoming educated, more children are surviving their early years, and more people are moving to cities.

Morland, who, unlike Bricker and Ibbitson, is a demographer by training, is skeptical that humanity is on the cusp of a tectonic reversal in population trends. He agrees that the trends have changed, but he is less prone to the blanket certainty of Bricker and Ibbitson. This is not because he uses different data; he simply recognizes that population expectations have frequently been confounded in the past and that certainty about future trends is unreasonable. Morland rightly points out that even if fertility rates fall dramatically in Africa, there will be decades left of today’s youth bulge there. Because he is more measured in his assessment of the ambiguities and uncertainties in the data, Morland tends to be more circumspect in drawing dramatic conclusions. He suggests, for instance, that China’s population will peak short of 1.5 billion in 2030 and then
stagnate, with an aging population and gradual absolute decline thereafter. Bricker and Ibbitson, on the other hand, warn that China’s fertility rate, already in free fall, could actually get much worse based on the example of Japan, which would lead China to shrink to less than 700 million people in the second half of the century. Morland does agree with Bricker and Ibbitson on one important point: when it comes to global population, the only paradigm that anyone has known for two centuries is about to change.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

The implications of the coming population bust occupy a large portion of Bricker and Ibbitson’s book, and they should occupy a much larger portion of the collective debate about the future and how to prepare for it. The underlying drivers of capitalism, the sense that resource competition and scarcity determine the nature of international relations and domestic tensions, and the fear that climate change and environmental degradation are almost at a doomsday point—all have been shaped by the persistently ballooning population of the past two centuries. If the human population is about to decline as quickly as it increased, then all those systems and assumptions are in jeopardy.

Both books note that the demographic collapse could be a bright spot for climate change. Given that carbon emissions are a direct result of more people needing and demanding more stuff—from food and water to cars and entertainment—then it would follow that fewer people would need and demand less. What’s more, larger proportions of the planet will be aging, and the experiences of Japan and the United States are showing that people consume less as they age. A smaller, older population spells some relief from the immense environmental strain of so many people living on one finite globe.

That is the plus side of the demographic deflation. Whether the concomitant greening of the world will happen quickly enough to offset the worst-case climate scenarios is an open question—although current trends suggest that if humanity can get through the next 20 to 30 years without irreversibly damaging the ecosystem, the second half of the twenty-first century might be considerably brighter than most now assume. The downside is that a sudden population contraction will place substantial strain on the global economic system. Capitalism is, essentially, a system that maximizes more—more output, more goods, and more services. That makes sense, given that it evolved coincidentally with a population surge. The success of capitalism in providing more to more people is undeniable, as are its evident defects in providing every individual with enough. If global population stops expanding and then contracts, capitalism—a system implicitly predicated on ever-burgeoning numbers of people—will likely not be able to thrive in its current form.

An aging population will consume more of certain goods, such as health care, but on the whole aging and then decreasing populations will consume less. So much of consumption occurs early in life, as people have children and buy homes, cars, and white goods. That is true not just in the more affluent parts of the world but also in any country that is seeing a middle-class surge.

But what happens when these trends halt or reverse? Think about the future cost of capital and assumptions of
inflation. No capitalist economic system operates on the presumption that there will be zero or negative growth. No one deploys investment capital or loans expecting less tomorrow than today. But in a world of graying and shrinking populations, that is the most likely scenario, as Japan’s aging, graying, and shrinking absolute population now demonstrates. A world of zero to negative population growth is likely to be a world of zero to negative economic growth, because fewer and older people consume less. There is nothing inherently problematic about that, except for the fact that it will completely upend existing financial and economic systems. The future world may be one of enough food and abundant material goods relative to the population; it may also be one in which capitalism at best frays and at worst breaks down completely.

The global financial system is already exceedingly fragile, as evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis. A world with negative economic growth, industrial capacity in excess of what is needed, and trillions of dollars expecting returns when none is forthcoming could spell a series of financial crises. It could even spell the death of capitalism as we know it. As growth grinds to a halt, people may well start demanding a new and different economic system. Add in the effects of automation and artificial intelligence, which are already making millions of jobs redundant, and the result is likely a future in which capitalism is increasingly passé.

If population contraction were acknowledged as the most likely future, one could imagine policies that might preserve and even invigorate the basic contours of capitalism by setting much lower expectations of future returns and focusing society on reducing costs (which technology is already doing) rather than maximizing output. But those policies would likely be met in the short term by furious opposition from business interests, policymakers, and governments, all of whom would claim that such attitudes are defeatist and could spell an end not just to growth but to prosperity and high standards of living, too. In the absence of such policies, the danger of the coming shift will be compounded by a complete failure to plan for it.

Different countries will reach the breaking point at different times. Right now, the demographic deflation is happening in rich societies that are able to bear the costs of slower or negative growth using the accumulated store of wealth that has been built up over generations. Some societies, such as the United States and Canada, are able to temporarily offset declining population with immigration, although soon, there won’t be enough immigrants left. As for the billions of people in the developing world, the hope is that they become rich before they become old. The alternative is not likely to be pretty: without sufficient per capita affluence, it will be extremely difficult for developing countries to support aging populations.

So the demographic future could end up being a glass half full, by ameliorating the worst effects of climate change and resource depletion, or a glass half empty, by ending capitalism as we know it. Either way, the reversal of population trends is a paradigm shift of the first order and one that is almost completely unrecognized. We are vaguely prepared for a world of more people; we are utterly unprepared for a world of fewer. That is our future, and we are heading there fast.
formal doctrine, a set of abstract principles, or a group of fixed political institutions, but as a way of life. Across the centuries, liberal thought has been united by “the liberal temperament,” an embrace of pluralism and reform and a skepticism of utopias. Liberalism’s great project, as Gopnik eloquently argues, is the unending struggle to build a society with both liberty and equality at its core.

Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads: Technological Change and the Future of Politics

Beginning in the 1980s, Boix argues, revolutions in communications and the globalization of trade and production undermined the old class compromises at the heart of Western liberal democracy. Highly educated professionals have seen their incomes soar, and previously well-paid manufacturing workers, the old backbone of the middle class, are now struggling to survive. Boix places this crisis in perspective, illuminating the fraught relationship among technology, capitalism, and democracy over the last two centuries. The book focuses on watershed moments, starting with the birth of the Industrial Revolution in cities such as Manchester, where low factory wages, poor living conditions for
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workers, and rising wealth for owners brought political struggles over state protection and the extent of democracy. The golden age of capitalism and democracy emerged in the early twentieth century in places such as Detroit, where new technologies of mass production raised labor productivity, boosted wages, brought down inequality, and enabled vibrant liberal democracies. Today, another technological revolution is generating radical income inequality and destabilizing political life. Yet Boix rejects technological and economic determinism. Industrial societies, he believes, can still regain control of the future.

The World’s Most Prestigious Prize: The Inside Story of the Nobel Peace Prize

Since it was first awarded, in 1901, the Nobel Peace Prize has been given annually to a kaleidoscopic assortment of activists, politicians, diplomats, moral leaders, and organizations—from Theodore Roosevelt and Jane Addams to Amnesty International and the European Union. Lundestad, a longtime director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, argues that despite the diversity of figures and causes, the honorees tend to reflect a “Norwegian approach” to international politics, a mix of realism, idealism, and liberal internationalism that emphasizes practical efforts to promote democracy, human rights, humanitarianism, disarmament, and international cooperation. In its early years, the prize went primarily to European and American men, but the committee has since broadened its reach, honoring women, non-Western groups, and activists engaged in local and nontraditional peacemaking, such as environmentalism and campaigns against sexual violence. Many view the Nobel Peace Prize as an expression of Western liberal values. The Chinese government protested bitterly in 2010 when the award was given to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights activist. But Lundestad makes an eloquent case that the prize has a universal appeal, grounded in humanitarian and nonviolent ideals on which no country or civilization holds a monopoly.

Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers

Yan takes on a classic question: Why do great powers rise and fall? With an eye to explaining recent Chinese success in challenging U.S. dominance, he advances a theory he calls “moral realism.” Borrowing from ancient Chinese philosophers, Yan argues that when governments define a moral worldview, they are more likely to successfully take over from their declining peers. Much of the book details how states can project moral strength in world affairs, which, for Yan, means offering sober and consistent definitions of the national interest, protecting international norms, and establishing credibility in alliances. Yan argues that since the end of the Cold War, China has been more successful—or “efficient”—in this project than the United States and thus has steadily gained ground on its rival, although he admits that China has yet to develop a set of postliberal values that can compete for global influence. It’s not entirely clear whether Yan’s theory is distinctively Chinese, but he is surely correct that U.S.-Chinese competition

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Nationalism: A Short History

Greenfeld, the author of massive historical-sociological studies of the rise of nationalism, capitalism, and modernity, here distills the story of nationalism into a short and captivating historical drama. She traces the origins of “national consciousness” to sixteenth-century England, when the new Tudor monarchy was attempting to rebuild—and legitimate—the political order following the destruction of the aristocracy in the dynastic wars of the previous century. The old self-understanding of England as a social hierarchy was replaced with an image of “the nation,” made up of a single English people. Greenfeld argues that the notions of social equality—secular, democratic, and egalitarian—that dominated this English-led “revolution in consciousness” played out across the rest of the world in the following centuries. The Protestant Reformation, the American and French Revolutions, the rise of commercial capitalism, the coming of modern science, the emergence of modern Chinese and Japanese nationalism—all have their place in Greenfeld’s grand narrative. Greenfeld argues that nationalism’s appeal flows from the dignity that a vibrant national consciousness bestows on a nation’s members. The task for those seeking to preserve the liberal democratic way of life is to reclaim nationalism’s progressive orientation.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and Its Lessons

This collaboration by the three U.S. government officials who led the fight in the United States against the financial crisis of 2008 presents a mature and revealing assessment of the genesis and dynamics of the meltdown—and of the government’s ultimate success in halting it, although not before a painful recession had set in. One of the most interesting points is that they did not want Lehman Brothers to collapse in September 2008, despite some claims to the contrary, but lacked the legal authority to prevent it. The authors also argue that the many bailouts of other financial institutions worked, as they stopped a panic that could have been much worse. In the end, taxpayers recovered much more than they paid out, and executives and shareholders lost heavily, as they should have in a capitalist system—a point that undercuts fears that the bailouts would generate moral hazard and thus lead management and shareholders to take more risks in the future. Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson believe that the U.S. economy is much better positioned to avoid a financial crisis today than it was in 2007 but that
the global economy since 2007 should change economists’ understanding of macroeconomic policy. One obvious point is that economists should pay much more attention to the financial system and its influence on production and employment, as well as to the policies that might strengthen the system against external shocks and destabilizing internal dynamics. Many of the contributors also argue that over the past decade, economies in Europe and North America have relied too much on monetary policy to shore up weak growth and not enough on government taxing and spending to boost demand. They note that allowing capital to flow freely across borders, as it now does in many parts of the world, creates severe problems for emerging-market countries trying to manage their monetary policies and currency exchange rates. One disappointing omission is the lack of a discussion of the influence of accounting rules on corporate behavior and economic stability.

Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital

Amid a growing backlash against international economic interdependence, Clausing makes a strong case in favor of foreign trade in goods and services, the cross-border movement of capital, and immigration. This valuable book amounts to a primer on globalization, explaining without jargon both its benefits and its costs. The former, in her view, greatly outweigh the latter, but she also offers constructive proposals to reduce globalization’s downsides. Clausing’s field of expertise is tax avoidance and evasion by multinational corporations, which employ hordes of well-paid lawyers to take advantage of loopholes in national tax laws and swarms of lobbyists to help create and maintain those loopholes. Clausing argues that the tax reform passed by the U.S. Congress in 2017 contains many moves in the wrong direction.

Evolution or Revolution: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy After the Great Recession

This thought-provoking and accessible collection of reflections by economists, central bankers, and government officials explores how the unusual circumstances that have characterized the federal government is now less well equipped to deal with one when it eventually occurs.

Titans of the Climate: Explaining Policy Process in the United States and China

This collaboration between an American scholar-official and a Chinese counterpart seeks to demystify how their respective governments make and execute policy and explores the two countries’ differing motivations, procedures, and constraints. The authors focus on environmental policy, especially the 2014 agreement between China and the United States, the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases,
that set out a joint plan to mitigate climate change by 2030. The deal, which included China’s first-ever commitment to halt the growth of its emissions, made possible the Paris agreement on climate change the following year. U.S. President Donald Trump has pledged to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement (a decision that will take effect in late 2020), but in the decentralized United States, the effect of the withdrawal will be muted, as over two-thirds of the states and many cities, probably with the support of a majority of U.S. citizens, will carry on with their climate change policies.

Free Trade and Prosperity: How Openness Helps the Developing Countries Grow Richer and Combat Poverty
BY ARVIND PANAGARIYA. Oxford University Press, 2019, 384 pp.

Panagariya puts forth a trenchant case against import tariffs and other forms of trade protectionism in developing countries. He carefully reviews both the economic theory of import substitution (government-led efforts to replace imported goods with domestically produced ones) and the empirical evidence from the past six decades showing which trade policies have fostered economic growth in developing countries. A vigorous supporter of free trade, he criticizes those who advocate import substitution as a path to development. He concedes that rapid economic growth often raises income inequality even as it almost always slashes poverty, but he cautions that some policies aimed at reducing inequality, including import substitution, may thwart growth and thus leave most people worse off.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

Lawrence D. Freedman

Normandy ’44: D-Day and the Epic 77-Day Battle for France

The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff
BY PHILLIPS PAYSON O’BRIEN. Dutton, 2019, 544 pp.

1941: The Year Germany Lost the War

Although a vast literature has covered every aspect of World War II, the war’s length, scope, and intensity mean that authors still manage to find new angles on the same material. Holland adopts a bottom-up approach to the familiar story of the June 1944 Normandy landings and the subsequent fighting on the continent. He shows how the commanders laid their plans and responded to new developments, and he conveys well the sheer scale of the logistical effort and the cleverness of the Allied deception plan. At the heart of the book are the stories of individual people caught up in great events: a teenage German soldier crouching in a bunker watching the Americans land while his confused superiors try to make sense of the invasion, Allied paratroopers dropping...
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Roosevelt’s last ailing months, when Leahy was virtually the acting president. Although Leahy got on well with Truman, the field of policymaking became more crowded after Roosevelt’s death, and Leahy’s influence declined.

Nagorski focuses on the war’s big decisions, especially those taken during 1941. The book begins with Hitler in control of much of Europe but frustrated by the British refusal to agree to a negotiated peace. He decides to get on with his main project—defeating the Bolsheviks to the east, assuming that once the Soviet Union collapses, the British will come to their senses. Thanks to Stalin’s refusal to heed repeated warnings about Germany’s plans, Hitler almost got away with his boldest gamble, but his troops failed to make enough progress before winter set in.

When the German invasion of the Soviet Union began, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at once put aside his deep hostility to the Soviet regime and accepted Stalin as an ally. When another surprise attack, this time from Japan, brought the United States into the war, Churchill knew that Germany had simply too many enemies to win. This is an old tale, but Nagorski tells it well.

The War for Gaul: A New Translation

Julius Caesar’s war stories are so associated with Latin textbooks that they tend to get forgotten as contributions to military history. Originally dispatches sent back to the Senate in Rome, they explained how well Caesar was doing in

into hostile territory, resistance fighters sabotaging German communications, exhausted pilots flying sortie after sortie with little expectation that they would survive much longer, infantrymen scouring the roads and fields for ambushes, a nurse coping with the wounded. The sheer weight of the Allies’ firepower and their command of the air (the Allies flew 14,674 sorties on D-Day; the Luftwaffe flew 80) might make the result seem inevitable in retrospect, but amphibious landings had failed before, and Holland brings to life what a grueling, vicious, and terrifying battle this was.

In contrast to Holland, O’Brien tells his story very much from the top down. Admiral William Leahy was U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s closest adviser on military affairs from early 1942 until Roosevelt’s death, in 1945. (Leahy stayed on to advise President Harry Truman until the end of 1948.) During and after the war, Leahy deliberately kept out of the limelight, content to be known for ensuring smooth processes rather than deep thinking on policy. A dull autobiography, published in 1950, revealed little about his life and work. O’Brien makes a compelling case that this reticence has led historians to miss Leahy’s vital role in shaping U.S. grand strategy during the war and to exaggerate General George Marshall’s part in consequence. The son of a Civil War veteran, Leahy attended the U.S. Naval Academy and rose to the rank of admiral through his professionalism and good judgment, seizing the chance to forge a warm relationship with Roosevelt when the latter was assistant secretary of the navy, from 1913 to 1920. Leahy’s peak influence came during
his battles with a variety of rugged foes. They aimed to boost Caesar’s reputation as a great general and support his bid for power, but they also serve as useful records of events, if not quite the unvarnished truth. O’Donnell has produced a vigorous, modern, and uncluttered translation, removing sections added to the commentaries by later authors and adding few footnotes. He encourages readers to focus on the candor and cruelty with which Caesar describes his victories and his negotiations with foreign leaders. In a jaunty introduction, O’Donnell demonstrates how to appreciate the book as a major contribution to martial literature while deploring its morals. This is, he declares, “the best bad man’s book ever written.”

**Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy From the Korean War to the Present**  

Since 1945, the United States’ experience of war has been a frustrating one, full of stalemates, setbacks, and only occasional victories. In this lively and opinionated book, Stoker pins a major part of the blame on muddled thinking about “limited war.” He is a scholar of Carl von Clausewitz and frequently turns to the Prussian general as his authority. Stoker believes that in wartime, leaders should first and foremost set proper political objectives (and reappraise them when necessary) and not let the means they are prepared to use dictate the ends. Time and again, from Korea to Vietnam to the war against the Islamic State (or ISIS), U.S. leaders have been either too vague about what they are seeking to do or unwilling to devote the requisite resources to achieve it. Theorists, such as Thomas Schelling, have contributed to the muddle by their readiness to talk about war as a form of bargaining. Stoker’s analysis of the United States’ failures is convincing, but his argument that better thinking would enable political leaders to set clear objectives and pursue them to victory is less so.

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**Western Europe**

**Andrew Moravcsik**

**How to Democratize Europe**  
BY STÉPHANIE HENNETTE, THOMAS PIKETTY, GUILLAUME SACRISTE, AND ANTOINE VAUCHEZ. TRANSLATED BY PAUL DERMINE, MARC LÉPAIN, AND PATRICK CAMILLER. Harvard University Press, 2019, 224 pp.

This book, which sparked considerable debate when it appeared in French, criticizes Europe’s single currency not because it does too much (the usual complaint) but because it does too little. The authors, three legal academics and a celebrated economist, charge that the eurozone’s technocratic obscurantism and self-defeating tendency toward austerity exacerbate inequality, right-wing populism, and Euroskepticism. They propose to counteract these forces by greatly increasing fiscal transfers between EU countries. To do so, they recommend that the EU create a powerful new transnational parliament composed of national parlia-
mentarians. This body would, they hope, supplant existing institutions and allow for transfers of wealth from richer EU countries to poorer ones. Yet none of this has the slightest chance of being realized, and even if it were, it would hardly be sufficient to offset the harm done by the euro. Recent experience and social science findings, moreover, belie the idealistic notion that referendums and parliamentary elections automatically legitimate policies. The proposal is important chiefly because it illustrates the utter failure of Europe’s center-left social democrats—caught between their pro-federalist beliefs and the realities of international economic cooperation—to craft coherent and viable proposals for renewing the EU.

**Alarums and Excursions: Improvising Politics on the European Stage**
BY LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR.
TRANSLATED BY LIZ WATERS.
Agenda, 2019, 320 pp.

Part insider memoir and part commentary, this is probably the best analysis yet to appear of how the EU managed its recent crises over refugees, Ukraine, and the euro. Van Middelaar, now a political theorist, worked as a speechwriter for Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, from 2010 to 2014. He repackages the EU establishment consensus in prose largely free of jargon and footnotes. He convincingly shows that the EU has been surprisingly successful at managing crises—although, in keeping with the conventional wisdom in Brussels, he suggests some moderate reforms designed to bolster its power and legitimacy. The book is less persuasive in its overarching explanation for the EU’s success: that, when push comes to shove in Brussels, “politics trumps economics,” thereby purportedly overcoming opposition to integration by special interests. This is the story leaders in Brussels tell. Yet what van Middelaar’s narrative actually reveals is how European leaders, buffeted by market forces and regulatory failures, craft pragmatic responses to real-world problems in pursuit of their enduring national interests. Although this is not the technocratic world dreamed of by economists, it is also far from one in which politics reigns supreme over economics.

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**Dreams of Leaving and Remaining**
BY JAMES MEEK. Verso, 2019, 272 pp.

This book’s title belies its content: it covers dreams only of leaving the EU, not of remaining in it. Indeed, the book belongs to a distinct genre of journalism that has recently emerged, in which a distinguished member of the chattering classes sallies out from London, New York, or a university town to record (for metropolitan consumption) the thoughts and feelings of populist sympathizers in the hinterland. Meek, an editor at the *London Review of Books*, visits a fishing village, a farming town, a former Cadbury chocolate factory, and an urban medical complex. He relates colorful and engaging tales of such places that his readers rarely visit and of the common folk who live there. He concludes that British supporters of leaving the EU view themselves as heirs to the legacy of Saint George: they must slay a foreign dragon, regardless of the practical consequences. It is tempting to think that such stories accurately capture the decisive sources of support for Brexit and other populist
Recent Books

movements, but it is impossible to know for sure. More interesting is Meek's own left-wing analysis of the EU, which ignores local prejudices and instead highlights foreign investment, battles over government subsidies, industrial decline, labor shortages, and other reasons for mass discontent among the older and more rural citizens of the United Kingdom.

1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler
BY TOBIAS STRAUMANN. Oxford University Press, 2019, 272 pp.

In this engaging book, Straumann, a leading Swiss economic historian, examines a critical factor in Adolf Hitler's rise to power. In the last days of the Weimar Republic, Germany faced a punishing international economic environment: a financial crisis was radiating outward from the United States, and Germany's opponents in World War I continued to demand reparations. Market pressure forced the German government to impose austerity by lowering wages, raising taxes, and slashing government spending. This triggered a wave of dissatisfaction with establishment political parties and made the half-truths in Hitler's radical critique of democratic government and the Treaty of Versailles seem plausible. That, in turn, allowed the Nazi Party, up to that point a fringe group, to win enough votes to enter government. The lesson for today's policymakers is all too clear. When establishing the euro, technocrats and politicians ignored the possible domestic political consequences of supranational economic choices, with disastrous results.

The Alps: An Environmental History
BY JON MATHIEU. TRANSLATED BY ROSE HADSHAR. Polity, 2019, 184 pp.

Among the globe's great mountain ranges, the Alps are exceptional, not least because humans have inhabited them for longer, more densely, and in more economically productive ways than any other. Mathieu obsessively packs this introduction to their history with facts about human interaction with the mountains. He describes how people began visiting them to hunt and gather 50,000 years ago and built the first continuous settlements among them 15,000 years ago—culminating in the surprising range of churches and monasteries that dot the mountain range's peaks and valleys today. Ever since 218 BC, when Hannibal drove his army over the Alps, most Europeans have viewed them as an inert barrier to travel and commerce. A few hundred years ago, elite climbers began tackling the Alpine slopes, joined by tourists and writers in search of the sublime. More recently, governments have cooperated to preserve the distinctive Alpine culture and natural environment, which remains a monument to mutually beneficial interaction between man and mountain.
Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

When Democracy Trumps Populism: European and Latin American Lessons for the United States

In this welcome antidote to the many dire warnings that U.S. President Donald Trump could end liberal democracy in the United States, a group of seasoned political scientists express confidence that U.S. institutions will endure. In contrast to more vulnerable nations where authoritarian populists have triumphed—although not as frequently as alarmists often suggest—the United States has strong institutions, and the U.S. Constitution is notoriously difficult to amend. The United States’ well-established two-party system and its deep civil society and independent media have resisted Trump’s power grabs. And the very political polarization that helped Trump win office impedes him from gathering the overwhelming majority he would need to engineer a radical transformation. Moreover, Trump has not so far faced a crisis that he could use to mobilize majoritarian support, and even a national security blowup is likely to boost his popularity only briefly. At the same time, Weyland and Madrid recognize that serious shortcomings, including political gridlock, the undue influence of money in politics, and rising social inequality could eventually destabilize U.S. democracy. They suggest, however, that Trump’s norm-breaking behavior could generate “a democratic backlash” that rejuvenates liberal institutions.

Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and Responses to Integrated, Adaptive Solutions

Ellis is a prolific defense intellectual who recently joined the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. In this comprehensive and thoughtful book, he underscores the serious threat to U.S. national interests posed by organized criminal groups in Latin America. Ellis usefully catalogs the major groups and evaluates the uneven efforts by national governments to combat them. He finds, controversially, that the formerly distinct roles assigned to militaries and police forces are outdated in an era in which borders are ever less relevant to security. He also judiciously warns against desperate, short-term measures, arguing instead for “persistent, adaptive and effectively sequenced” approaches coordinated across government agencies. Ellis pleads for close collaboration among partner governments based on “mutual respect and trust” and for governments to learn from one another’s experiences. The Trump administration’s new Latin America hand issues a pointed warning against “attempting to isolate the United States behind a wall that is high enough to permit its residents to be indifferent concerning the conditions beyond it.”
Recent Books

Sand and Blood: America’s Stealth War on the Mexico Border  
BY JOHN CARLOS FREY. Bold Type Books, 2019, 256 pp.

In this searing eyewitness report on the situation at the U.S.-Mexican border, Frey argues that long-standing U.S. policies to deter illegal immigration by building fences, detaining and mistreating and then deporting immigrants, and now splitting up families cannot stem the flow of desperate people. Harsh U.S. policies have, however, killed an unknown number of immigrants, as people resort to more dangerous routes and some die in overcrowded detention facilities. The only winners are the federal bureaucracies whose budgets and personnel swell, opportunistic politicians who traffic in fear-mongering, and the defense contractors that supply the facilities and weaponry. Although the Trump administration may have adopted “zero tolerance” policies, since the 1980s, the U.S. Congress and various administrations, including those of Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, have laid the groundwork for the mistreatment of immigrants through legislation, executive orders, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Housed within the military-minded Department of Homeland Security, the 20,000-strong Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, in Frey’s view, has morphed into an unaccountable, ill-trained “clandestine police force” running the world’s largest immigrant detention system. Frey argues that instead of locking immigrants up, the United States should promote economic development in the countries from which they come, create legal work programs in the United States, and properly staff U.S. immigration courts.

Thomas C. Mann: President Johnson, the Cold War, and the Restructuring of Latin American Foreign Policy  

Allcock works hard to rehabilitate the reputation of Thomas Mann, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson’s senior adviser on Latin America. Loyalists of Johnson’s predecessor, John F. Kennedy, along with other liberal critics, blamed Mann for abandoning the idealism of the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy’s ambitious economic and security assistance programs for Latin America, in favor of supporting military dictatorships and conservative business interests. Allcock persuasively argues that, in fact, Kennedy’s contradictory Cold War security strategies always preferred pro-U.S. authoritarians over potentially pro-Soviet leftists. Moreover, the administration was already shifting away from its lofty early rhetoric and unrealistic goals by the time of Kennedy’s assassination. Nor was Mann an economic reactionary, as his detractors have claimed; rather, he adhered to New Deal beliefs in government spending on infrastructure projects and public intervention to mitigate market failures. Mann supported international agreements to stabilize the price of coffee, for example, and was unafraid to criticize corporate executives he considered socially irresponsible. A fluent Spanish speaker with years of diplomatic experience, Mann also deserves credit for reducing tensions with Mexico and Panama by negotiating bilateral treaties.
Sugar, Cigars, and Revolution: The Making of Cuban New York

Given the long-running antagonism between the two countries, it is a little surprising that the flags of Cuba and the United States are so similar. But Pérez observes that there is a good reason for the shared red, white, and blue: the Cuban flag was designed in Manhattan. In the nineteenth century, New York hosted a thriving transnational community of Cubans, the flag-designing revolutionary general Narciso López among them. In those years, prosperous Cuban investors manufactured, financed, and traded sugar and cigars in Cuban and U.S., as well as global, markets. Cuban émigrés also organized to liberate their homeland from despotic Spain, some lobbying for U.S. annexation and others battling for full independence. The Cuban founding father José Martí lived in New York for much of his adult life. Writing for several Latin American newspapers, Martí mixed admiration for American industriousness and liberty with criticism of the United States’ social shortcomings and forebodings about U.S. imperial pretensions. Pérez vividly describes how the tightly knit Cuban émigré community reproduced the political cleavages and social mores of its homeland. Although some émigrés absorbed New York’s urbane democratic modernity, the intransigence and intolerance inspired by Spanish rule endured in Cuban political culture, abroad and at home.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Maria Lipman

Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest
BY ANGELA STENT. Twelve, 2019, 448 pp.

Stent is a veteran Russia watcher who has served in senior positions in the U.S. government. She hardly qualifies as an apologist for Russian President Vladimir Putin, but she gives him ample credit for achieving his main foreign policy goals: reasserting Russia’s position as a global player, protecting the country’s sovereignty, gaining respect from non-Western actors, and overcoming the West’s attempts to isolate Russia. To Stent, a historical outlook is indispensable for understanding Putin’s foreign policy. For centuries, she explains, the country’s vast territory and lack of natural borders have bred a deep-seated sense of vulnerability. Putin saw the West as taking advantage of the weakness caused by the Soviet collapse, and he responded by craftily exploiting his Western rivals’ missteps and lack of unity. Eventually, these tactics aided Russia’s resurgence on the global stage. He has been particularly successful, Stent notes, in handling relations with China and the countries of the Middle East. Stent devotes far less space to Putin’s policy failures: the high cost of his clashes with the West, Russia’s lack of any real allies, and the country’s persistent economic weakness. In some respects, Putin’s Russia looks a bit like
Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin has just consolidated and prolonged Yeltsin’s regime. Hence Wood’s central message: don’t focus too much on Putin—the system over which he presides is more important, and it can outlast him.

**Russia Without Putin: Money, Power, and the Myths of the New Cold War**
BY TONY WOOD. Verso, 2018, 224 pp.

Wood seeks to debunk several common misconceptions about Russia and its relations with the rest of the world. One of them, he contends, is the belief that today’s tensions between Russia and the United States stem from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-standing antagonism toward the West. Wood argues that, in fact, the dramatic deterioration of relations witnessed in recent years was all but inevitable and is rooted in the massive power and resource imbalance between the two sides that was produced by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Wood also refutes the idea that today’s standoff is a new Cold War: it lacks any clear ideological dimension, he points out, and, unlike the Cold War, leaves many countries and regions untouched by the tensions between Russia and the West. Wood criticizes some Russian liberals who oppose Putin for their misplaced faith in an “idealized” capitalism based on “undistorted” free-market principles. There is no capitalism outside of history, Wood reminds readers, and the kind of capitalism found in Russia today is directly descended from the postcommunist order installed by

Pollack has produced a rarity: a work of solid scholarship that is also an elegant page-turner. It traces the history of the Russian steam bath all the way back to the Middle Ages, exploring how its image and function have shifted over time. Peter the Great, the westernizing reformer who led Russia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, saw the banya as an outmoded habit of the common people. Westernized Russian elites of that era readily agreed with Europeans who ridiculed the bathhouse as barbarous. But after Russia defeated Napoleon in the early nineteenth century, the banya became a patriotic symbol: a cartoon published at the time showed the terrified French emperor in a banya being thrashed by Russian soldiers. In the early twentieth century, amid the louche atmosphere of late imperial Russia, urban bathhouses came to be associated with sex and sin. When the Bolsheviks took over after the Russian Revolution, they sought to recast the banya as a source of modernizing cleanliness: Stalin declared that Soviet communism would not countenance dirty people. As the Soviet era drew to a close, the recreational function of the bathhouse superseded its utilitarian one. In the words of an American
reporter writing in the 1970s, the banya was “the closest thing Russian males [had] to a men’s club.” More recently, a highly popular film depicted the banya as a place for tough men who can stand up for Russia against the corrupt and decadent West.

_School of Europeanness: Tolerance and Other Lessons in Political Liberalism in Latvia._

BY DACE DZENOVSKA. Cornell University Press, 2018, 276 pp.

What does it take to become European? For the countries of eastern Europe, joining the EU was just the beginning. What followed was a process of remaking people and institutions in the name of political liberalism. Dzenovska studied this painstaking effort in Latvia, which joined the EU in 2004. Her book is an anthropological analysis of government programs designed to promote tolerance and to help the “not-yet-European” Latvians break free of the toxic effects of two dogmatic systems of thought: Soviet communism and nationalism. She tells fascinating stories of her encounters with “tolerance workers” and their “students,” as well as government officials, border guards and asylum seekers, and reveals how the reeducation effort overlooked the essential contradiction of promoting inclusion in a country that had recently liberated itself from the Soviet Union and embarked on an ethnonationalist nation-building project. Limits to inclusion are central to Dzenovska’s analysis of contemporary Europeans polities that are built on values of openness yet are forced to keep their borders securely guarded. Dzenovska’s critique is worth bearing in mind as increased migration has led to a rise in right-wing nativism in Europe and the United States, further undermining Western liberalism’s claim to moral and political superiority.

__Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy__


The role of the Russian Orthodox Church in post-Soviet Russian society has been much discussed in recent years, but Adamsky is the first to examine the church’s place in the nuclear military-industrial complex. He details how a formerly persecuted church made itself indispensable to Russia’s nuclear forces by providing them with ideological legitimation as they faced a catastrophic loss of funding and social prestige in the early 1990s. Three decades later, the church has become a prominent presence throughout the entire military, but the nuclear branch stands out as the most imbued with clericalism. Priests regularly minister to its service members, joining their flock on operational missions. The church has built houses of worship on all of Russia’s nuclear bases, Orthodox icons grace nuclear weapons platforms, and commanders have increasingly incorporated religious ideas into their strategic thinking. Adamsky convincingly shows that this began as a grass-roots process, whereby those of lower military rank recognized priests as a source of the kind of pastoral and psychological support they sorely needed in a high-stress work environment. Only later did the regime take notice and seek to systematize the phenomenon from above. The result is an unprecedented nuclear-religious culture,
whose emergence has significant strategic implications, including the introduction of theological concepts into Russian military planning.

IRINA DU QUENOY

Putin’s Counterrevolution

Democratic institutions, even weak ones, do not wither and die overnight. Leaders bent on undermining free elections or co-opting the judiciary often require years of methodical plotting and legislative chicanery to achieve their goals. And such changes often unfold far from the eye of the general public. In this comprehensive historical study, Aleksashenko does a great service by documenting the decades-long institutional erosion and consolidation of authoritarian rule in Putin-era Russia. The author hits his stride in his discussion of the state’s intervention in the economy. Many previous works have described the consequences of the Kremlin’s takeover of the lucrative oil industry. But the state’s hand has extended into many other sectors, as well. Through detailed interviews and careful work with primary sources, Aleksashenko shows how the Putin regime has taken on oligarchs, pressured international investors, built gigantic state-owned enterprises, and bailed out failing firms. The book offers a definitive account of how, since the late 1990s, the balance of power in Russia has shifted decisively in favor of government officials over private firms. The regime’s economic dominance helps explain its lack of interest in reforms that would protect the property rights or political freedoms of potential challengers.

DAVID SZAKONYI

Middle East

John Waterbury

The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924
BY BENNY MORRIS AND DROR ZE’EV. Harvard University Press, 2019, 672 pp.

First Raise a Flag: How South Sudan Won the Longest War but Lost the Peace
BY PETER MARTELL. Hurst, 2018, 320 pp.

These two books are gut-wrenching chronicles of human depravity that show how ordinary people can become barbarians. Both describe, in numbing detail, decades of pillage, rape, starvation, and torture. Morris and Ze’ev tie together the three waves of killing that swept across the Christian population of Anatolia (in modern-day Turkey) from 1894 to 1924. First, the Ottoman Empire, under Sultan Abdülhamid II, massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians. Then, in 1914, the Young Turks, who had marginalized the sultan after the revolution of 1908, launched their own, far larger Armenian genocide. Finally, after 1919, the Republicans under Kemal Ataturk began killing and deporting the remaining Christians, many of whom were Greek. Over the three decades,
between 1.5 million and 2.5 million Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks were murdered. Morris and Ze’evi convey well the horror of the killings. In a cave where the bodies of at least 100 Greeks were found, they write that “all apparently had first had their hands and feet cut off, after that they were either burnt alive in the cave or had their throats cut.”

If anything, the killing in southern Sudan over the last 60 years has been even more extensive than that in Anatolia. For centuries, the Muslim north of Sudan systematically raided the animistic south for slaves. When Sudan gained independence, in 1956, the southern third of the country was already in revolt. Apart from a brief interlude in the 1970s, the region has known only suffering and death ever since. In recent decades, slave raiding has been replaced by the competition for oil rents, southern Sudan’s only source of revenue other than international aid. Today, the butchers are no longer northerners; they are southern leaders and their militias. According to some reports, since 2013, two years after South Sudan gained independence, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, a member of the Dinka tribe, may have orchestrated the slaughter of about 300,000 members of the Nuer tribe, to which his principal rival, former Vice President Riek Machar, belongs. Like Anatolia at the time of the Armenian genocide, southern Sudan has large inaccessible areas that have become killing fields, rarely observed by outsiders, except a few courageous missionaries. As a result, estimates of the number of victims are uncertain, but they run into the millions. Martell, an intrepid journalist who covered the region for the BBC, has interviewed many of the victims, heroes, and butchers. As he shows, this was not the efficient killing of Nazi extermination camps but individual, face-to-face barbarity. In both Anatolia and Sudan, the heroes of one era became the killers of the next. In neither case have the leaders responsible ever been held to account in a court of law.

*Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neoliberalism, and the Disintegration of a State*


This useful survey reflects Lackner’s 40 years of experience studying Yemen. She examines the country’s descent into chaos, from the golden period of the 1980s, when oil rents and out-migration were high, through the growing kleptocracy under President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the 1990s and early years of this century, to the civil war that began in 2015 and the resulting humanitarian catastrophe. Along the way, she analyzes Yemen’s tribes, its varieties of Islam, its economy, and the mismanagement of its water resources. She dismisses the claim that Iran is supporting the Houthis in the civil war, but she fails to provide sufficient evidence to support her skepticism. She also blames neoliberal policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund for Yemen’s growing inequality. Her account ends before the assassination of Saleh at the hands of the Houthis in 2017. Since then, no one of his Machiavellian caliber has emerged to replace him. Four years of a Saudi-led, U.S.-backed assault by pro-government forces have devastated Yemen’s infrastructure and people, but Lackner is clear that the Houthis do not
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offer an attractive alternative government and doubts that the current UN-led negotiations can bring a sustainable peace.

In this book, Clarke aims to cover what he calls “global jihadism,” although he primarily focuses on al Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS). His account ends several months before ISIS lost the last of its territory with the fall of Baghouz, in Syria, in March of this year, but Clarke’s main message is that the jihadists will regroup in Iraq and Syria and that al Qaeda and ISIS will lead the way. What is more controversial, he argues that the launching of a caliphate by ISIS, in 2014, will in the end prove far more significant than its destruction. He does not add much to the existing literature on jihadism, and although he offers some intriguing figures, he does not explain them. There are some 230,000 jihadists worldwide, he says, but only 19,000 people on government terrorist watch lists. ISIS recruited around 43,000 fighters from 120 countries; between 6,000 and 11,000 of them may be left. In all, Clarke estimates that some 70,000 jihadists have been killed in recent years.

Sky spent three years in Iraq as a British civil servant seconded to senior U.S. military figures, including Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno. In 2015, she produced an insightful book, The Unraveling, chronicling her service. In this new book, she shifts from participant to spectator. The results are disappointing. Starting in 2011 with the early Arab Spring, Sky recounts her travels across several regions, from Galicia in Spain to the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, often guided by diplomats and other acquaintances from her time in Iraq. Sky admits that finding direction and purpose after she left Iraq was not easy and says that her excursions across the Middle East gave her new shots of adrenaline. Yet what the reader is meant to take away from the stories remains a mystery.

Asia and Pacific

Andrew J. Nathan

Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration

This book is the definitive statement of Calder’s long-standing thesis that technological and economic changes are integrating the Eurasian “super continent,” as foreseen over a century ago by the British strategist Halford Mackinder. Beneath the churn of political events, this integration is driven not only by the familiar dynamics of globalization but also by such less noted factors as the growing efficiency of transport logistics and the digitization of customs procedures. U.S. pressure on China and Russia is pushing the two countries together,
and complementary economic strengths are drawing Germany closer to China. China is promoting integration through its Belt and Road Initiative, seeking to aid its giant state-owned enterprises, which are desperate to reach beyond their saturated home market. Integration could be slowed by an economic crisis or an ethnoreligious conflict in China or by ambivalence in other countries about Chinese influence, but it would take a cataclysm to stop it. Calder thinks that China will seek not U.S.-style hegemony but a new kind of influence in which the benefits of integration are more widely distributed among countries, which he labels “distributive globalism.” If so, he recommends that the United States cooperate with countries such as India and Japan, and even to some extent with China, to promote pluralism within the zone of Chinese influence.

The crisis in Xinjiang, where Chinese authorities have locked up an estimated one million or more Uighurs in “reeducation camps” in an attempt, they claim, to eliminate terrorism, is an object lesson in William Faulkner’s aphorism “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” Neither the Uighur population nor the Chinese authorities have forgotten the short-lived Islamic Republic of East Turkestan of 1933 to 1934 or the longer and more institutionalized East Turkestan Republic of 1944 to 1946. Both grew out of the Uighur enlightenment movement, whose leading thinkers believed that Han rulers had treated the Uighurs unfairly ever since their region was incorporated into China in the late nineteenth century. Wang uses original documents in many languages to bring the current crisis into historical focus. The two Uighur independence
movements were led by pro-Soviet Uighur intellectuals who had received modern educations. Although they were ethnic nationalists, they used elements of Islam to forge a fragile common identity with other classes and ethnic groups, including the more numerous, nomadic Kazaks. The two short-lived episodes of self-rule showed what the government of an independent East Turkestan might look like and that such a country would not survive without Russian support, which in both historical cases proved neither strong nor lasting.

The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean
BY BERTIL LINTNER. Hurst, 2019, 288 pp.

The Indian Ocean is scattered with islands, some small, some large, some inhabited, some not, but all strategically significant and all more or less militarized. They range from the Comoros and Madagascar, near the African coast, to the Maldives and Diego Garcia, south of India, to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Cocos Islands, off the coasts of Myanmar and Indonesia, respectively. Lintner recounts centuries of competition among pirates, fishermen, slave traders, mercenaries, money launderers, colonists, and the occasional North Korean adviser to an island dictator. In recent times, the Indian and U.S. navies have dominated the ocean. But under its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has been building ports at a rate that suggests China may have ambitions to join them as a major Indian Ocean power. Lintner’s decades of reporting from all over Asia lend him shrewd insight into the region’s geography and politics. The book does not substantiate his claim that the risk of war is greater in the Indian Ocean than in the South China Sea, but it shatters any complacency the Indian navy and its partners might have about their ability to dominate these waters without challenge.

The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un
BY ANNA FIFIELD. PublicAffairs, 2019, 336 pp.

As the younger son of his father’s third wife, Kim Jong Un was an unlikely heir to the North Korean throne, but from the regime’s perspective, he turned out to be a brilliant choice. He has taken over his grandfather and father’s dynastic cult of personality; reportedly killed, imprisoned, or brought to heel the senior advisers he inherited; maintained the system of hereditary political castes and the gulag; tightened the country’s borders; heightened surveillance of ordinary citizens; restored some economic dynamism; fostered a small moneyed class of supporters; pushed forward missile and nuclear weapons testing; evaded global sanctions; resisted Chinese pressure; and run rings around two U.S. presidents. To figure out how Kim has done it all, Fifield tracked down his aunt and uncle, who run a dry cleaning shop in the United States; interviewed his schoolmates from Switzerland; spoke with the business partner of Kim’s assassinated half brother, Kim Jong Nam; and visited North Korea 11 times. The North Korean system, Fifield concludes, is strong enough to last for a long time. The biggest questions concern the state of the economy and Kim’s health. If he survives to hand power to a fourth generation, the man Fifield labels “the most
ousted him in what Rudd calls a “cynical coup.” Their struggle propelled Australia toward the kind of poisonous politics that is afflicting so many democracies today. Besides Gillard and “the faceless men of the [Labor Party] factions,” Rudd blames his ouster on the Rupert Murdoch–owned media, which opposed his progressive policies, and on mining interests who he believes colluded with Gillard and her allies to prevent the imposition of a new tax. The book also details Rudd’s many accomplishments on issues such as Australia’s response to the 2008 financial crisis, climate change, indigenous affairs, infrastructure, same-sex relationships, and health care. Unusually for a political memoir, the book is unguardedly emotional. This, together with Rudd’s elephantine memory, brings the reader as close to the daily texture of life in politics as it is possible for an outsider to get.

In Plain Sight: Impunity and Human Rights in Thailand
BY TYRELL HABERKORN. University of Wisconsin Press, 2018, 376 pp.

This deeply researched history focuses not so much on the human rights violations that have occurred in Thailand during its frequent episodes of military rule but on the mechanisms by which the perpetrators have avoided accountability. These have included legalizing the arbitrary detention of purported “enemies of the nation,” “hooligans,” and persons considered a “danger to society”; authorizing summary executions when necessary to “defend the nation”; giving the police the discretion to do anything they want in the name of eliminating communism; holding blameless any person acting in the line of duty; dismissing cases as falling outside the jurisdiction of the courts or for insufficient evidence; and declaring amnesties. The legal techniques have varied, but their purpose has stayed the same: to protect the monarchistic elite and its agents. Haberkorn argues that repression is all the more effective when the authorities openly twist the law to protect the perpetrators. The more blatant the impunity, the stronger the message that victims have no hope of redress.

Africa

Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics: How the Internet Era Is Transforming Politics in Kenya

This survey of the growing role of social media in Kenyan society and politics does not offer a straightforward answer to the implicit question in its subtitle. Nonetheless, it develops some keen insights into the effects of the Internet in Kenya. With more than seven million of its citizens Machiavellian figure of our time” will have achieved a remarkable feat.

The PM Years
BY KEVIN RUDD. Pan Macmillan Australia, 2018, 672 pp.

In this hefty second volume of his autobiography, the two-time Australian prime minister settles scores with Julia Gillard, a fellow Labor Party politician who in 2010
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on Facebook and over a million on Twitter, Kenya may well be sub-Saharan Africa’s most online country. Nyabola describes a sophisticated community of users who have found agency through the Internet, whether in criticizing CNN for what they see as its Eurocentric coverage or in publicizing corruption and incompetence by Kenyan officials. The Kenyan government, Nyabola reveals, is deeply ambivalent about the Internet, attracted to it as a symbol of modernity but wary of the hard-to-control political spaces it creates. Nyabola’s conclusions are far from optimistic. She documents how the Internet allowed foreign actors, such as the British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica, to manipulate voters during the 2017 Kenyan elections and explores how social media may come to undermine Kenyan democracy.

How Autocrats Compete: Parties, Patrons, and Unfair Elections in Africa

In recent years, several regimes have emerged that combine authoritarianism with genuinely competitive multiparty elections. In this tightly argued book, which focuses on Cameroon, Kenya, and Tanzania but has implications for all authoritarian countries that nevertheless regularly hold elections, Morse argues that such regimes generally rely on organizational strength and legitimacy to win at the ballot box—but when they lack those attributes, they turn to violence, repression, and vote rigging to stay in power. Morse’s work helps explain the resilience of regimes such as those in Mozambique and Tanzania, where well-organized and relatively legitimate dominant political parties have maintained control over systems that are far from fully democratic, while only rarely relying on repression or fraudulent elections. Interestingly, Morse also shows that international pressure matters. When foreign governments and international organizations are willing to condone nondemocratic practices and continue their economic support, authoritarian regimes prove more stable.

African Catholic: Decolonization and the Transformation of the Church

The Catholic Church is often described as one of the key instruments of French colonialism, working in cahoots with the administrators of France’s colonies in central and western Africa to legitimate French rule to its parishioners. That may have been true in the early years of the French empire, but Foster tells the much more complex and interesting story of the decolonization era, when the church slowly but surely came to grips with the inevitability of independence and the need to Africanize itself. Foster emphasizes the influence of African Catholic intellectuals, such as the Senegalese Alioune Diop, who argued that the church needed to become more universalistic and less European. The Vatican’s changing attitudes were partly the result of sheer pragmatism; after African states’ independence, retaining an all-French roster of bishops and cardinals on the continent would have been a nonstarter. But Foster argues that the church of the post–World
War II era was independently undergoing major doctrinal changes, affected at least in part by the end of colonialism. Her research uncovers conclusive evidence, for example, of Diop’s influence on Pope John XXIII in the lead-up to the Second Vatican Council.

**Combatants: A Memoir of the Bush War and the Press in Uganda**

*By William Pike. Self-Published, 2019, 304 pp.*

In 1984, Pike, then a London-based journalist fresh out of college, used expatriate Ugandan connections to arrange access to the camps of the National Resistance Army in the central Ugandan bush, where the group was fighting a guerrilla war against the regime of Milton Obote, under the leadership of a 40-year-old Yoweri Museveni. Pike’s reports in the British press, which documented atrocities perpetrated by the Ugandan government and cast the NRA in a favorable light, helped the group gain credibility in the West. In 1986, when Museveni came to power, he invited Pike to edit the government newspaper, the *New Vision*, promising him editorial independence. For two decades, Pike ran the paper, turning it into Uganda’s newspaper of record, before the regime’s growing authoritarianism forced him out. Pike tells the story well, mixing his personal experiences with an analysis of the last 30 years of Ugandan history. He follows his detailed account of the nasty civil war of the 1980s with a perceptive look at the Museveni regime, from its early informal idealism to the ossified personal dictatorship of today.

**The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy**

*Edited by Fantu Cheru, Christopher Cramer, and Arkebe Oqubay. Oxford University Press, 2019, 1,008 pp.*

Over the last two decades, Ethiopia has emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. This has proved a boon for analysts, many of whom have seized on Ethiopia’s success as vindication of their particular philosophy of economic development. The editors of this massive volume on the Ethiopian economy have commendably sought to include as many viewpoints as possible while emphasizing empirical approaches. The book covers the major issues, including macroeconomic policy, the development of the social welfare system, agriculture, and industrial policy. Although the different theoretical explanations for Ethiopia’s successes and failures rarely confront one another in the book, the volume as a whole reveals a pragmatic and flexible government trying to solve developmental problems with the resources it has available. Ethiopia has made mistakes, but unlike many other African countries, it has generally avoided repeating them and has tended to eschew ideology in favor of what works on the ground. The state has taken an interventionist stance, but it usually pays attention to market signals and the welfare of its population.
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HOW DEMOCRATIC IS HUNGARY?

To the Editor:

In his essay “Democracy Demotion” (July/August 2019), Larry Diamond laments the decline in prominence of U.S. democracy promotion. It is refreshing to have an American expert lift a mirror to the United States, writing that the country “has to repair its own broken democracy” before it can take up again the mantle of democracy promotion internationally. But Diamond betrays his biases when, expressing concern about “the wave of illiberal populism that has been sweeping developed and developing countries alike,” he claims that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban “has presided over the first death of a democracy in an EU member state.”

The death of democracy in Hungary? That’s a dramatic claim, as ill informed as it is offensive. Diamond and other critics of Orban who assert that Hungary is no longer a democracy rely on a set of flawed arguments that are incapable of explaining a host of other facts about today’s Hungary.

For example, voter participation in Hungary has been going up, not down. Last year’s parliamentary elections saw the highest turnout since 2002. In elections for the European Parliament this past May, Hungarians again showed up in record numbers to vote, and a party barely two years old won ten percent of the vote. The surge in emigration that followed the 2008 financial crisis has subsided, and far more Hungarians are now returning than are leaving. A host of economic indicators—record-low unemployment, record-high female employment, rising real wages, robust GDP growth—show a much more positive picture than the one Diamond offers. So do important social indicators, such as an increasing number of marriages, a declining number of divorces, a dramatically declining number of abortions, and a rising fertility rate. Hungarians are a freedom-loving people, and these trends depict a country of optimism and confidence, not one where our liberty has been taken from us.

Diamond’s bias against Hungary illustrates a larger problem that explains why democracy promotion has taken on such a negative connotation in so many parts of the world: it has become blatantly political. In his 1982 speech to the British Parliament, U.S. President Ronald Reagan made a forceful case for promoting democracy as part of the United States’ foreign and security policy. Recognizing one of the core weaknesses of the Soviet Union, Reagan sought to promote liberty and democracy to win the Cold War. That goal was explicitly tied to a clear national interest. In recent years, however, as U.S. engagement in central and eastern Europe has waned, political interests have hijacked the democracy-promotion agenda. In the name of democracy promotion, groups directly funded by the Hungarian American billionaire George Soros or closely affiliated with his Open Society Foundations promote an ideologically driven agenda. These groups carry out work that has no democratic mandate and no
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balances so tilted the playing field that he was able to renew his two-thirds majority in parliament with less than a majority of the popular vote (and did so again in 2018). The repeated resort to xenophobic and anti-Semitic prejudice (directed not only at George Soros) cannot alter the facts. Orban has transformed Hungary into not an illiberal democracy but a pseudo-democracy.

To the Editor:

Robert Kagan’s thought-provoking essay (“The New German Question,” May/June 2019) addresses the important issue of how a collapse of the European Union and the liberal international order might affect Germany and its role within Europe. He concludes that such a breakdown would bring back the pre–World War II “German question,” which European integration and the Atlantic alliance were in part meant to resolve.

But Kagan underestimates the deep cultural change that has occurred in Germany since World War II. It is hard to imagine any circumstances in which Germany would revert to militarism; the commitment of ordinary Germans to peace is simply too strong. If the United States were to withdraw its security guarantee to Europe, or even if the liberal international order were to collapse, Germany would likely defy the expectations of realist international relations theorists and simply choose to be insecure rather than abandon its identity as a Friedensmacht, or “force for peace.”

At the same time, Kagan underestimates how problematic today’s “democratic and peace-loving” Germany is in the European context. Germany’s semi-hegemonic position within the EU is one of the main relevance to a clear U.S. national interest.

ZOLTAN KOVACS
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Diamond replies:
The test of a democracy is not whether the economy is growing, employment is rising, or more couples are marrying, but whether people can choose and replace their leaders in free and fair elections. This is the test that Hungary’s political system now fails.

When Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party returned to power in 2010 with a parliamentary supermajority, they set about destroying the constitutional pillars of liberal democracy. First, Orban packed Hungary’s Constitutional Court with political loyalists. He did the same with the National Election Commission and the Media Council, a newly created watchdog group. Fidesz then rammed an entirely new constitution through parliament, clipping the authority of the Constitutional Court and politicizing the judiciary more broadly and extending party control over such crucial accountability agencies as the State Audit Office and the central bank. Orban also purged state-owned radio and television stations and made them mouthpieces to justify his creeping authoritarianism. He pressured critical media outlets, which saw their advertising revenues plunge, and harassed civil society organizations that received international assistance.

By the 2014 elections, Orban had rigged the system. Yes, multiparty elections continued, but his systematic degradation of constitutional checks and balances so tilted the playing field that he was able to renew his two-thirds majority in parliament with less than a majority of the popular vote (and did so again in 2018). The repeated resort to xenophobic and anti-Semitic prejudice (directed not only at George Soros) cannot alter the facts. Orban has transformed Hungary into not an illiberal democracy but a pseudo-democracy.
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reasons Europe has struggled to solve the series of problems that began with the euro crisis in 2010. On the one hand, Germany lacks the resources to solve problems in the way a hegemon would. On the other, it is powerful enough that it does not feel the need to make concessions to other EU member states, and in particular to France, as it used to. As a result, the EU has become dysfunctional.

Moreover, postwar Germany has not acted quite as selflessly as Kagan suggests. Although (or perhaps because) Germans abandoned militarism, they found new sources of national pride—in particular, a kind of economic nationalism based on the country’s success as an exporter. German economic policy is often described, with some justification, as mercantilist, and even before U.S. President Donald Trump singled out Germany for its large current account surplus, the U.S. Treasury had put Germany on a list of countries it was monitoring for currency manipulation.

Kagan is right to ask where “the dark path that Europe and the transatlantic relationship are currently on” might lead, but that path might not be as straight as he suggests. In particular, the consequences of a withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee to Europe are far from easy to predict. It is true that, historically, that guarantee pacified Europe, and so there are good reasons to worry that withdrawing it could lead to the disintegration of the region and even the reactivation of security dilemmas. But it is also possible that such a withdrawal could help resolve the German question in its current form. Thanks to the U.S. security guarantee, Germany had no need for France’s military capabilities and thus had little incentive to make concessions to France on other issues, such as the euro. Whatever Trump’s intentions, his threat to withdraw the U.S. security guarantee has given France greater leverage over Germany and thus has gone some way toward restoring the balance of power in Europe. Making good on that threat could mean the end of German semi-hegemony.

Kagan worries that Europeans could return “to the power politics that dominated their continent for millennia.” But power politics never really went away in Europe; it was just no longer pursued using military tools. Within the peaceful, institutionalized context of the EU, member states continued to advance their own national interests. In short, Europe might not have been such a Kantian paradise after all. In resolving one version of the German question, the United States and the EU created another.

HANS KUNDNANI
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FOR THE RECORD
“Democracy Demotion” (July/August 2019) misstated the title of a 2018 report by a group of experts convened by the Hoover Institution and the Asia Society. The correct title is “China’s Influence and American Interests.”

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